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Williams asserts that the Board violated his due process rights by: (1)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RALPH I. WILLIAMS :

:

Petitioner, : Case No. 4: 05-CV-132

:

v. :

:

PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF : (Judge McClure)

PROBATION & PAROLE, :

RAYMOND COLLERAN, :

Superintendent, SCI-Waymart, and :

PA STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL :

:

Respondents. :

O R D E R

November 17, 2005

BACKGROUND:

On or about January 19, 2005, petitioner Ralph I. Williams, an inmate at

SCI-Waymart, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. Williams’s petition arises from the revocation of his parole for technical

violations, a process which required Williams to be returned from Florida to

Pennsylvania. Williams asserts that the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and

Parole (“Board”) violated his due process rights for several reasons.1

 On March 8,

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failing to visit petitioner within twenty-four hours after incarcerating him on a

detainer with the Florida officials; (2) violating petitioner for different violations

than the three violations indicated in the notice of a preliminary hearing served on

petitioner by the Florida officials; and (3) failing to hold a revocation hearing

within 120 days.

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2005, respondents filed their answer and brief in opposition to the petition

asserting, inter alia, that Williams failed to exhaust his state court remedies. For

the following reasons we will dismiss Williams’s petition for failure to exhaust his

available state court remedies and because his claims are now procedurally

defaulted.

DISCUSSION:

I. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARD

The court may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petition filed under § 2254 must be timely

filed under the stringent standards set forth in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (Apr.

24, 1996). See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Additionally, we may only reach the

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merits of a petitioner’s federal claims if each claim in his petition (1) has been

exhausted in the state courts, and (2) is not procedurally defaulted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(1)(A); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991); Slutzker v.

Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 379-81 (3d Cir. 2004). Exhaustion is required because it

gives the state the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its

prisoners’ federal rights.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (quoting

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam)) (internal quotations and

additional citations omitted). In order to provide the state with the opportunity to

address the prisoner’s federal claims, a state prisoner must “‘fairly present’ his

claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers

of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the

claim. Id. (citing Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66.) 

II. RELEVANT FACTS

On February 4, 2004, shortly after the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and

Parole recommitted Williams to a state correctional institution as a technical parole

violator, Williams filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus directly to the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court seeking to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction. 

(Rec. Doc. No. 12-3, Ex. 2.) On February 11, 2004, the Board of Probation and

Parole responded to the Petition for Writ of Mandamus and noted that there was no

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Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that Williams took an

administrative appeal of the Board’s order. The notice of the Board’s decision,

mailed to Williams January 12, 2004, indicated that if Williams wished to appeal

his decision he “MUST FILE A REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE RELIEF

WITH THE BOARD WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THIS ORDER. THIS

REQUEST SHALL SET FORTH SPECIFICALLY THE FACTUAL AND

LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ALLEGATIONS. SEE 37 PA CODE SEC. 73. YOU

HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY IN THIS APPEAL AND IN ANY

SUBSEQUENT APPEAL TO THE COMMONWEALTH COURT.” (Declaration

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basis for Williams to bypass the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court with his

Petition and to proceed to the Supreme Court. (Rec. Doc. No. 12-4, Ex. 3.) On

July 21, 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of

Mandamus without opinion. Williams v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and

Parole, No. 33 MM 2004, slip op. (Pa. July 21, 2004) (per curiam) (order granting

request for leave to file original process and denying petition for writ of

mandamus); see also (Rec. Doc. No. 12-5, Ex. 4). Williams never filed a Petition

for Writ of Mandamus, or a petition for review of the administrative decision,

contesting the issues raised in this action before the Pennsylvania Commonwealth

Court.2

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of Amy Stanton, Rec. Doc. No. 12-2, Ex.. R, at 40-41.)

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III. FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE REMEDIES

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Administrative Agency Law

provided Williams with an avenue to exhaust his allegations that the Board of

Probation and Parole violated his constitutional rights when they revoked his

parole by filing a petition for review. 2 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 702, 704 (providing that

court conducting review of an agency decision shall not affirm an administrative

decision if it finds that the “adjudication is in violation of the constitutional rights

of the appellant”), 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 763(a) (conveying Commonwealth Court with

exclusive jurisdiction over “appeals from final orders of government agencies”);

see, e.g., Smalls v. Pa. Bd. Of Probation & Parole, 823 A.2d 274 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

2003). Before pursuing judicial review of the Board’s decision, petitioner should

have followed the instructions in the Board’s notice of decision, and filed an

administrative appeal with the Board governed by 37 Pennsylvania Code Section

73. In relevant part, section 73 of the Pennsylvania Code provides:

§ 73.1. Appeals and petitions for administrative review.

(a) Appeals.

(1) An interested party, by counsel unless unrepresented,

may appeal a revocation decision. Appeals shall be

received at the Board's Central Office within 30 days of

the mailing date of the Board's order. When a timely

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appeal of a revocation decision has been filed, the

revocation decision will not be deemed final for purpose

of appeal to a court until the Board has mailed its

decision on the appeal. . . . 

(2) The scope of review of an appeal will be limited to

whether the decision is supported by substantial

evidence, an error of law has been committed or there has

been a violation of constitutional law.

. . . 

(4) Second or subsequent appeals and appeals which are

out of time under these rules will not be received.

(b) Petitions for administrative review.

(1) A parolee, by counsel unless unrepresented, may

petition for administrative review under this subsection

of determinations relating to revocation decisions which

are not otherwise appealable under subsection (a).

Petitions for administrative review shall be received at

the Board's Central Office within 30 days of the mailing

date of the Board's determination. When a timely petition

has been filed, the determination will not be deemed final

for purposes of appeal to a court until the Board has

mailed its response to the petition for administrative

review. ... 

(3) Second or subsequent petitions for administrative

review and petitions for administrative review which are

out of time under this part will not be received.

 37 Pa. Code § 73.1.

Williams has procedurally defaulted his claim as he failed to file an

administrative appeal with the Board, and a subsequent petition for review with the

Commonwealth court. Instead, Williams incorrectly filed a writ of mandamus with

the Supreme Court and bypassed the appropriate state avenues for relief.

Petitioner’s reliance on DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 2005),

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is inapposite. In DeFoy, the Third Circuit held that a Pennsylvania state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole on constitutional grounds other than the Ex Post

Facto Clause need not file a state petition for a writ of mandamus in order to satisfy

the dictates of exhaustion before seeking federal habeas relief. DeFoy, 393 F.3d at

444. This was because under Pennsylvania law mandamus is not available for state

prisoners seeking to challenge the denial of their parole on constitutional grounds

other than the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 445. The facts of the instant case are

different - petitioner is challenging the revocation of his parole, not the denial of

his parole. As indicated above, the Pennsylvania Code and Pennsylvania’s

Administrative Agency Law provide both administrative and judicial avenues for

Williams to present his constitutional grievances, avenues which Williams did not

exhaust. Williams’s brief and petition cite to numerous cases in which there has

been judicial review by the Commonwealth Court of a Board’s decision. These

cases all belie Williams’s assertion that there is no relief available to state prisoners

asserting claims similar to his.

Similarly, Williams’s claims are procedurally defaulted because he failed to

file an administrative appeal within thirty days of the Board’s notice of decision,

and likewise failed to file a petition for review of the administrative decision with

the Commonwealth Court.

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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Williams’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 is dismissed, with prejudice. (Rec. Doc. No. 1.) His petition is dismissed

for failure to exhaust the remedies available in the state courts and because his

claims are now procedurally defaulted.

2. No basis exists for a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253.

3. The clerk is directed to close the case file.

s/James F. McClure, Jr.

James F. McClure, Jr.

United States District Judge

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