UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

KIMBERLY LAUTERBORN, :

:

 Plaintiff : No. 4:CV-05-0541

:

vs. : (Complaint filed 03/17/05)

:

R & T MECHANICAL, INC., : (Judge Muir)

:

Defendant : 

ORDER

February 1, 2006

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

The vast majority of this order’s background is set forth in

our order of January 3, 2006, in which we granted in part and

denied in part Defendant R & T Mechanical, Inc.’s motion for

summary judgment. For the purposes of this order, the most

significant determination made in that order was that the period

for which Plaintiff Kimberly Lauterborn may recover lost wages is

limited to the two years prior to the last alleged violation of

the Federal Equal Pay Act.

On January 20, 2006, Lauterborn filed a motion for

reconsideration of our January 3, 2006, order. Lauterborn

contends we erroneously stated in the order that “there is no

authority to support Lauterborn’s position that the continuing

nature of [R & T Mechanical, Inc.’s] alleged violation [of the

Equal Pay Act] alters the standard two year period set forth in

the statute.” (Order of January 3, 2006, p. 8) Lauterborn argues

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that our statement constitutes a manifest error of law because

one of the cases we cite in that order, Ryan v. General Machine

Products, 277 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (E.D. Pa. 2003)(Finch, C.J.),

provides such authority. She specifically contends that the

discussion in Ryan of the concept of a “continuing violation,”

which equitably tolls the running of time with respect to a

statute of limitations, applies in this case and allows her to

recover more than two years’ of lost wages.

Lauterborn filed a supporting brief with her motion. R & T

Mechanical, Inc., filed its opposition brief on January 12, 2006. 

The time allowed for Lauterborn to file a reply brief expired on

January 30, 2006, and to this date no such brief has been filed. 

Lauterborn’s motion for summary judgment is ripe for disposition.

A motion for reconsideration is a device of limited utility. 

It may be used only to correct manifest errors of law or fact or

to present newly discovered evidence which, if discovered

previously, might have affected the court's decision. Harsco

Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985);

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Maitland, Civil No.

87-0827 (M.D. Pa. March 1, 1989) (Rambo, J.). We will apply that

standard to Lauterborn’s motion for reconsideration.

Before addressing the merits of her pending motion, we will

set forth the historical facts underlying Lauterborn’s claims as

they relate to the motion for reconsideration. Lauterborn was

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employed by R & T Mechanical from June 8, 1998, to some point in

July of 2004. During that employment she alleges that her

employer violated the Federal Equal Pay Act by paying her male

co-workers a higher wage than she was paid. She filed the

complaint in this case on March 17, 2005.

The dispute at issue in Lauterborn’s motion for

reconsideration concerns the period for which she may recover the

difference between the wages paid to her and to her male coemployees. She implicitly alleges in her complaint that any

recovery in this case would encompass the entire duration of her

employment at R & T Mechanical, Inc. In granting R & T

Mechanical, Inc.’s summary judgment motion, we held that her

potential recovery is limited by a regulation to the two-year

period preceding R & T Mechanical, Inc.’s final alleged violation

of the Federal Equal Pay Act.

There are two time periods to consider in addressing claims

brought under the Federal Equal Pay Act. The first is the one

addressed in our order of January 3, 2006, which relates to the

duration of the alleged violations of the Act for which a

plaintiff may recover. In the absence of any allegedly willful

violation of the Act, this period is expressly limited by

regulation to two years. 29 C.F.R. §1620.33(b). That two-year

time frame applies in this case because no willful violation is

at issue here. In other words, that regulation limits the period

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for which Lauterborn may recover any lost wages from July of 2002

through July of 2004.

The second relevant interval is that addressed by

traditional statutes of limitation; it relates to the time

allowed for a plaintiff to file his or her lawsuit after the

alleged violation had occurred. The discussion in Ryan

pertaining to a “continuing violation” relates only to this

second interval. The court in Ryan did not reference in any

manner the two-year limitation set forth in 29 C.F.R.

§1620.33(b), which relates to the period for which a plaintiff

may recover for violations of the Equal Pay Act. The court in

Ryan had no need to consider that regulation because the issue in

that case was whether the complaint had been timely filed. The

analysis in Ryan related only to the interval between the final

alleged violation of the act and the filing of the complaint. 

We read Ryan to hold that the concept of a “continuing

violation” applies only when considering the second period of

time discussed above (i.e., whether a complaint has been timely

filed). Nothing in that case supports Lauterborn’s position

regarding the period for which she may recover any lost wages.

We will deny her motion for reconsideration.

In closing, we note that the “continuing violation” concept

has been applied in this case just as it was in Ryan. In the

absence of that principle, Lauterborn’s complaint would be timeCase 4:05-cv-00541-MM Document 38 Filed 02/01/06 Page 4 of 5
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barred because the alleged violations began before July of 2002. 

If the two-year statute of limitations were applied to the date

of the alleged initial violation, the complaint would be timebarred. The continuing violation concept tolled the statute of

limitations from running until the alleged final violation, which

was in or around July of 2004. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

Lauterborn’s motion (Document 32) for reconsideration is

denied.

s/Malcolm Muir 

MUIR, U.S. District Judge

MM:ga

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