E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATIO

N

B OAR D

SAFE T Y

N

National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Aircraft Accident Brief

Accident Number: LAX04FA075 

Aircraft and Registration: Learjet 24B, N600XJ 

Location: Helendale, California 

Date: December 23, 2003 

Adopted On: May 23, 2006 

HISTORY OF FLIGHT 

On December 23, 2003, about 0913 Pacific standard time,1 a Learjet 24B, N600XJ, 

registered to and operated by Pavair, Inc., of Santa Monica, California, departed controlled flight 

and crashed near Helendale, California. The captain and the first officer were killed, and the 

airplane was destroyed. The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal 

Regulations (CFR) Part 912

 from San Bernardino County Airport (CNO), Chino, California, to 

Friedman Memorial Airport, Hailey, Idaho. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the 

flight, which operated on an instrument flight rules flight plan. 

A review of radar data3 and air traffic control (ATC) transcripts revealed that the flight 

departed CNO about 0858 and was cleared to climb to an altitude of 29,000 feet mean sea level 

(msl).4

 About 0909:55, as the airplane was climbing through an altitude of 26,000 feet, the first 

officer requested a return to CNO. About 0910:01, the controller asked the first officer if he 

needed to declare an emergency, and the first officer replied that he did not.5 The controller then 

directed the flight crew to maintain an altitude of 24,000 feet. 

Mode C information6

 for the flight showed that, from about 0910:12 to about 0910:59, 

the airplane descended from 26,500 to 24,000 feet at a rate of about 2,000 feet per minute (fpm). 

About 0911:08, the controller cleared the flight directly to HECTOR (a navigation fix) and asked 

the first officer to confirm that the airplane was in level flight at an altitude of 24,000 feet. The 

first officer did not respond. Radar data showed the airplane descending through 23,000 feet at a 

rate of about 6,500 fpm about that time. About 0911:24, while the airplane was descending at a 

 1

 Unless otherwise noted, all times in this brief are Pacific standard time. 

2

 Pavair did not hold a 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate; therefore, the company’s flights were restricted to 

Part 91 operations. 3

 These data were from the Southern California Air Route Surveillance Radar and the U.S. Air Force 84th Radar 

Evaluation Squadron. 4

 Unless otherwise noted, all altitudes in this brief are reported as msl. 

5

 National Transportation Safety Board investigators compared the first officer’s voice in this transmission with 

his voice in transmissions that he made earlier in the flight. The investigators noted that his voice sounded similar in 

this and previous transmissions. 6

 Mode C is a function of the transponder that provides altitude information to air traffic controllers. 
2

rate of about 10,000 fpm, the first officer stated, “we’re declaring an emergency now.”7 No 

further transmissions were received from the airplane. No radar data were available after about 

0911:35. Starting about 0911:47, mode C information was invalid. The airplane impacted high 

desert terrain (an elevation of 3,350 feet) about 3 miles southeast of Helendale. The accident site 

was located about 46 nautical miles (nm) north of CNO. 

A witness to the accident, who was located about 4.5 miles northwest of the accident site, 

stated that, after hearing the sound of a jet flying high overhead, he looked up and observed the 

accident airplane flying straight and level below a high, overcast cloud layer. He stated that the 

airplane then pitched “nose down a little” and “straightened again.” He also stated that, shortly 

thereafter, he observed the airplane’s nose pitch “straight down” until it impacted terrain. The 

witness reported that he did not notice whether the airplane was rotating about its longitudinal 

axis during the descent, but he did indicate that the airplane appeared to be intact without any 

components separating from the airplane during the descent. The witness added that he did not 

observe any smoke or fire before the airplane impacted terrain and that the airplane exploded 

into a “mushroom cloud” when it impacted terrain. 

San Bernardino County firefighters, who were performing controlled burns near the 

accident site, reported hearing an explosion about the time of the accident. The firefighters 

reported that they looked toward the direction of the explosion and saw a rising smoke cloud. 

None of the firefighters observed the airplane before the sound of the explosion. The firefighters 

drove to the accident site and were the first to arrive there. The firefighters extinguished small 

fires that had erupted as a result of the crash. 

PERSONNEL INFORMATION 

The Captain 

The captain, age 51, held an airline transport pilot (ATP) certificate (issued on 

October 13, 1987)8

 with a multiengine land rating and type ratings in the Cessna 500 (Citation) 

and the Learjet.9

 The captain also held a commercial certificate with a single-engine land rating 

and a flight instructor certificate with single- and multiengine land and instrument ratings. The 

captain’s most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first-class airman medical 

certificate was issued on October 1, 2003, with the limitation that he must wear corrective lenses 

to correct his near vision. 

The captain’s résumé indicated that he had been a Learjet and Cessna 500 captain, a 

flight instructor, and director of operations for an aircraft charter company from October 1985 to 

 7

 Safety Board investigators noted that the first officer’s voice during this transmission sounded agitated and 

highly distressed compared with his voice during earlier transmissions. 8

 On April 13 and 25, 2002, the captain received “altitude awareness” faults during Cessna 500 checkrides. On 

September 9, 2002, the captain satisfactorily completed an ATP recheck in a Cessna 500 and was able to maintain 

his ATP certificate. 9

 The Learjet model was not specified on the type rating, which was issued in May 1988, or identified on the 

captain’s Federal Aviation Administration Form 8410-2, Airman Certificate and/or Rating Application, for the 

Learjet. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
3

2000. The captain occasionally worked for the owner of XtraJet, Inc.,10 as a pilot but did not 

appear to be an employee (no hiring record could be found). During the course of the 

investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board was unable to locate any logbooks for 

the captain. 

The Safety Board obtained information about the captain’s flight hours from American 

Air Network (AAN), where he received training.11 A pilot summary, which was signed by the 

captain and dated October 6, 2003, indicated that, at that time, he had accumulated 11,783 total 

flight hours, about 7,900 hours of which were as pilot-in-command of Learjet airplanes. 

According to XtraJet’s former director of operations, the captain completed initial Learjet 24 

training at AAN because Pavair did not have an approved Learjet 24 training program. Further, 

the captain began recurrent Learjet 24 training at AAN but did not complete the training because 

the Learjet 24 was removed from AAN’s operating certificate in November 2003. 

The First Officer 

The first officer, age 23, held a commercial pilot certificate (issued on November 8, 

2002) with single-engine and multiengine land and instrument ratings. He also held a flight 

instructor certificate for single-engine land and instrument airplanes. His most recent FAA firstclass airman medical certificate was issued on September 5, 2003, with no limitations. 

According to the first officer’s September 4, 2003, pilot summary for AAN, he had 

accumulated 250 total flight hours. On October 25, 2003, the first officer completed AAN’s 

basic indoctrination and emergency situation and procedures training for the Learjet 25 and 35. 

From November 3 to 17, 2003, he completed Learjet 35/36 training at FlightSafety International. 

This training consisted of 50 hours of ground training, 15 hours of briefing/debriefing training, 

and 24 hours of simulator training. On November 17, 2003, the first officer completed 4 hours of 

ground training and 2 hours of simulator differences training in Learjet 20 series airplanes. 

According to AAN personnel, the first officer received Learjet 20 series differences training so 

that he could fly those airplanes as second-in-command to build his flight time experience. 

The first officer was listed as an approved pilot on AAN’s Part 135 operating certificate 

on November 7, 2003, and, on the same day, he was given an airmen proficiency check in a 

Learjet 35A simulator in accordance with 14 CFR 135.293, “Initial and Recurrent Pilot Testing 

Requirements.” A review of AAN’s duty and flight time records revealed that the first officer 

flew 4.3 and 19.9 hours in a Learjet 35A in November and December 2003, respectively. 

 10 XtraJet is an FAA-approved charter company with a 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate. Pavair and 

XtraJet are owned by the same individual and use the same staff. 11 AAN is a Part 135 certificate holder and an aircraft management company that arranges lease agreements for 

airplanes and flight crews and charges managerial service fees to operate the airplanes under the company’s Part 135 

certificate. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
4

AIRPLANE INFORMATION 

General Information 

The accident airplane, serial number 190, was manufactured in April 1969, in Wichita, 

Kansas. The airplane was equipped with two General Electric CJ-610-6 turbine engines and was 

operated and maintained in the United States until 1977. From 1977 to 1981, the airplane was in 

Europe. In 1981, the airplane returned to the United States, where it was operated and 

maintained until the time of the accident. 

At the time of the accident, the airplane was registered to and operated by Pavair. The 

airplane was listed on AAN’s 14 CFR Part 135 operating certificate from March 9, 2001, to 

November 17, 2003; at which time, the airplane was removed from the company’s operating 

certificate. According to AAN, the airplane was removed from its operating certificate because 

Pavair had provided inadequate maintenance records. 

The Safety Board requested a copy of all maintenance records for the accident airplane 

from Pavair and XtraJet. The airframe logbook from 1969 to October 1973 and the left engine 

logbook from 1981 to December 1998 were not provided to the Board. Further, no maintenance 

logbooks from April 1999 to the time of the accident were provided to the Board. 

Maintenance Actions 

The accident airplane was maintained by Jet Executive Transport Technologies (JETT) in 

Chino.12 JETT provided the Safety Board with copies of its invoices and endorsements for the 

accident airplane from October 15, 2000, to December 19, 2003. According to JETT’s 

maintenance records, on November 23, 2002, the accident airplane underwent 300- and 600-hour 

inspections in accordance with AAN’s approved airworthiness inspection program. At the time 

of these inspections, the airplane had accumulated 9,439 total flight hours. The records also 

indicated that, on October 17, 2003, the left engine underwent a hot-section inspection. At the 

time of the inspection, the engine had accumulated 7,675 total flight hours (6,702 cycles),13 and 

the airplane had accumulated 9,507 total flight hours. 

XtraJet provided copies of the aircraft flight logs, flight manifests, and discrepancy logs 

to the Safety Board. The records were dated from February 27 to April 17, 2003. No 

discrepancies were noted. According to JETT maintenance personnel, the accident airplane was 

out of service from July to mid-October 2003 because the airplane’s avionics were being 

replaced. 

JETT also provided a major repair and alteration form (FAA Form 337), dated 

October 29, 2003, which revealed that all installed communication, navigation, and transponder 

equipment was removed and replaced with new components. The newly installed equipment 

 12 JETT was formerly known as Executive Aviation Logistics. 

13 A cycle is one complete landing and takeoff sequence. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
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included a global navigation system, communication radios, transponders, radio magnetic 

indicators, distance measuring equipment, a horizontal situational indicator, a computer, and a 

control panel. According to JETT maintenance personnel, the new navigation system was 

coupled to the autopilot. The form was not signed, but a review of the form revealed that the 

airplane was inspected in a manner prescribed by the FAA and was approved by Xtrajet’s 

FAA-approved inspector. The form had not been submitted to the FAA, as required by 14 CFR 

Part 43, Appendix B. 

According to JETT, on the morning of the accident, the airplane’s left battery was 

inoperative. JETT maintenance personnel took the left battery from a Learjet 25B and used it to 

replace the accident airplane’s inoperative battery. No maintenance endorsement was provided 

for this work. 

Right Engine Discrepancy History 

According to XtraJet, JETT, and FAA personnel, on November 26, 2003, during a flight 

from Las Vegas, Nevada, to Mesa, Arizona, the accident airplane’s right engine flamed out. The 

pilot was able to relight the engine during the descent to Mesa, and the airplane landed without 

incident. A JETT mechanic was flown to Mesa to examine the airplane. The cause of the 

flameout could not be determined, and the airplane was flown to CNO on November 29, 2003. 

During the flight, the right engine flamed out again. The pilot of the flight diverted the airplane 

to Palm Springs, California, and made an uneventful landing. The engine was examined by 

another maintenance facility, and the cause of the flameout once again could not be determined. 

According to the Riverside Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), an airworthiness 

inspector followed up on the airplane’s engine issue and asked Pavair to provide him with the 

airplane’s maintenance records. Because Pavair did not provide the inspector with the accident 

airplane’s maintenance records, he placed an aircraft condition notice on the airplane on 

December 12, 2003, that indicated the following: 

Operation of this aircraft may be in violation of FAR [Federal Aviation 

Regulations] 91.409, FAR 91.417, and FAR 91.419. The airplane owner is asked 

to provide for review to the Riverside FSDO: 1. Aircraft maintenance records for 

the past 2 years, 2. List of complied ADs [airworthiness directives]. Owner shall 

provide the data for review no later than 12/29/2003. 

On December 22, 2003 (the day before the accident), JETT maintenance personnel tried 

to contact the airworthiness inspector who had placed the condition notice on the airplane. He 

was not in the office, so they spoke with another Riverside FSDO airworthiness inspector. 

According to this inspector, JETT reported (on behalf of Pavair) that it had complied with the 

limitations of the condition notice; therefore, he verbally released the airplane for operations.14

However, the investigation revealed that Pavair’s maintenance records for the accident airplane 

were never received by the Riverside FSDO. 

 14 FAA Order 8300.10, Volume 3, Chapter 124, refers to the issuance of aircraft condition notices. The chapter 

provides no guidance on release of airplanes for operation. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
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METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION 

Meteorological data were obtained from the Daggett and Palmdale, California, 

Automated Surface Observing Systems (ASOS). About 0853, the Daggett ASOS reported that 

winds were calm, visibility was 10 statute miles, clouds were few at 10,000 feet above the 

ground, the temperature was 7o Celsius (C), the dew point was -3o C, and the altimeter setting 

was 30.10 inches of mercury (Hg). About 0854, the Palmdale ASOS reported that winds were 

from 100o at 4 knots, visibility was 10 statute miles, skies were clear, the temperature was 7o C, 

the dew point was -2o C, and the altimeter setting was 30.11 inches of Hg. 

The closest upper air sounding (that is, a vertical profile of atmospheric conditions) was 

from San Diego, California (110 nm south of the accident site). According to the 0400 sounding, 

at an altitude of 24,000 feet, winds were from 235o at 35 knots. 

Weather Surveillance Radar depicted no precipitation radar returns near the accident site. 

No in-flight weather advisories were in effect surrounding the time of the accident. 

At the time of the accident, two AIRMETs (Airman’s Meteorological Information) were 

in effect for the accident area. One AIRMET indicated moderate turbulence between 18,000 and 

38,000 feet. The other AIRMET indicated occasional moderate rime or mixed ice in clouds and 

precipitation between the freezing level, which sloped between 10,000 feet in the north and 

12,000 feet in the south. 

FLIGHT RECORDERS 

The airplane was not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder or a flight data recorder and 

was not required by Federal regulations to be so equipped. 

WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION 

The accident site was located in high desert terrain (an elevation of 3,350 feet) about 

3 miles southeast of Helendale. 

The accident airplane was severely fragmented. The accident site consisted of an impact 

crater located on the top of a ridgeline with a circular debris field measuring about 0.3 mile in 

diameter. The impact crater measured 43 feet long by 17 feet wide and was between 24 and 

30 inches deep. The Safety Board accounted for all flight controls at the accident site. Because 

the flight controls were severely fragmented and deformed, flight control continuity could not be 

established. The engines were found fractured into numerous sections, which were scattered 

throughout the debris field. 

The only cockpit and cabin components that could be positively identified were an 

oxygen mask, seat components, window frames, Plexiglas pieces, main entry door components, 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
7

excerpts from flight logs, weight and balance calculation sheets, and a binder containing 

Jeppesen charts. No remnants of flight instruments could be located. 

Wreckage Examinations 

The wreckage was collected and transported to Aircraft Recovery Services, Littlerock, 

California, where it was laid out and examined by a Safety Board investigator and Bombardier 

Learjet representatives. No evidence of in-flight fire damage or soot patterns was found. 

Components that would normally be positioned adjacent to each other in the airplane displayed 

contradictory soot and heat signatures. 

The flight control actuating components were destroyed. All systems (including 

atmospheric, oxygen, electrical, flight control, navigation, communications, hydraulic, fire 

suppression, fuel, and engine) were destroyed, and no system continuity or functionality could be 

confirmed. 

The left and right engines sustained severe accordion crushing along the longitudinal 

axis. Numerous rotor and stator blades were separated from their roots. The blades were flattened 

against each other and were mated to other stator and rotor blades along the engine’s airflow 

path. 

An examination of the electrical wire components revealed that some of the wire bundles 

sustained fire damage but that none displayed molten metal or fused components, which would 

have indicated a shorted condition. The fracture ends of various wire bundles were examined. 

The separated wire areas displayed necking deformation in a rounded manner that was indicative 

of a tensile failure. The external surfaces of the wire strands contained soot, but, after removing 

the soot, the wire strands were shiny. 

MEDICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL INFORMATION 

The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Office, Coroner Division, could not perform a 

complete autopsy examination for either pilot because of the condition of their remains. The 

coroner determined that the cause of death for the pilots was massive blunt force trauma. 

The Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, conducted a 

toxicological examination on a tissue specimen from the captain. The tissue tested negative for 

alcohol and other performance-impairing drugs. A tissue specimen from the first officer could 

not be obtained. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
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TESTS AND RESEARCH 

Actuator Examinations 

Two flap actuators, one spoiler actuator, one rudder trim actuator, one landing gear door 

actuator, and the horizontal stabilizer actuator were recovered from the wreckage and shipped to 

Learjet’s facility in Wichita, Kansas, for further examination under the FAA’s supervision. 

According to Learjet, at the time of impact, the flap actuators were in the retracted 

position. The damage to the spoiler actuator prevented the determination of a definitive impact 

position, but Learjet stated that the actuator was either deployed to 1.5o or stowed. The rudder 

trim was found in the near-neutral position. Impact damage prevented the determination of the 

position of the landing gear door actuator. 

The horizontal stabilizer actuator’s upper attachment rod end, which attaches to the 

horizontal stabilizer, was detached from the actuator. The U-bolt, which is installed over the rod 

end, was still attached to the actuator at one end. The lower attachment lug, which attaches to the 

vertical stabilizer, was also detached from the actuator. Examination of the fracture surfaces 

revealed 45o shear lips and irregular fracture features. No evidence of fatigue or cracking was 

noted during a microscopic examination. 

The horizontal stabilizer’s actuator jackscrew dustcover was pressed into the jackscrew 

threads. A 3.2-inch portion of the jackscrew extended from the nut. The extended portion of the 

screw was bent and fractured at the screw and nut interface. A measurement of the nut showed 

that the overall length of the actuator was stretched by 0.30 inch (the original overall length of 

the actuator was 9.89 inches). The screw and nut were examined for evidence of galling or 

abnormal wear, but none was found. The screw and stop were installed in accordance with 

Learjet’s recommended positions. 

A slot and small window were milled into the body of the cylindrical nut to view the 

location of the screw stop in relation to the nut threads. The distance from the mechanical stop to 

the fully extended position was 0.812 inch, which corresponded to a horizontal stabilizer position 

of -1.8o nose down. According to Learjet, with this trim setting and the airplane’s estimated 

weight and balance at the time of departure, the airplane would have been trimmed for a 

calibrated airspeed of 285 knots (± 25 knots calibrated airspeed). 

Air Traffic Control Sound Spectrum Study 

The Safety Board conducted an ATC sound spectrum study on all of the radio 

transmissions from the accident airplane. The frequency response of the first officer’s headset, 

the accident airplane’s radios, and the Los Angeles Air Route Traffic Control Center’s recording 

system prevented background sound signatures associated with the airplane’s systems and 

engines from being recorded during any of the transmissions associated with the accident flight. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
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Aircraft Performance Study 

The Safety Board examined the FAA’s radar data and computed the accident airplane’s 

calibrated airspeed and Mach number throughout the flight. Review of the radar data revealed 

that the airplane’s airspeed continued to increase after the pilots initiated the descent and 

declared an emergency. 

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 

At the time of the accident, XtraJet employed eight pilots and four dispatchers and 

operated two Gulfstream 1159 airplanes and one Learjet 36 airplane. The captain and first officer 

were employees of AAN and were not listed on XtraJet’s Part 135 operating certificate.15 The 

accident airplane was not listed on XtraJet’s or any other Part 135 certificate. XtraJet 

representatives stated that the company had intended to add the captain, first officer, and airplane 

to its Part 135 certificate before the accident but had not done so. According to XtraJet’s former 

director of operations, the accident airplane had maintenance-related issues that needed to be 

resolved before it could be inspected for Part 135 conformity and then added to the certificate. 

Xtrajet’s former director of operations believed placement on the company’s certificate would 

not have happened until spring 2004. 

During initial postaccident interviews, XtraJet personnel told a Safety Board investigator 

that the flight was operated as a personal flight to pick up a family member of the companies’ 

owner. During subsequent interviews, XtraJet’s former director of operations stated that he had 

reason to believe that the intended passenger was not a family member but was instead “a loyal 

paying customer.” 

 15 XtraJet listed a JETT employee on its Part 135 certificate as the company’s director of maintenance. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
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ANALYSIS 

About 0913, a Learjet 24B, N600XJ, registered to and operated by Pavair, Inc., departed 

controlled flight, entered a near-vertical descent, and crashed into high desert terrain near 

Helendale, California. Review of ATC communications and airplane radar data revealed that the 

flight crew requested a return to the departure airport about 12 minutes after takeoff as the flight 

was climbing through 26,000 feet. The controller asked the pilots if they were declaring an 

emergency, and the first officer replied that they were not. During this transmission, the first 

officer’s voice sounded similar to the voice he used during his transmissions earlier in the flight, 

indicating that he was not under any increased stress at that time. The flight crew was instructed 

to descend to and maintain 24,000 feet. As the controller was issuing additional route clearance 

information, he asked the flight crew to confirm that the airplane was level at 24,000 feet. At that 

time, the radar data showed that the airplane had descended through 23,000 feet. About 

15 seconds later, the first officer declared an emergency. The first officer’s voice sounded 

agitated and highly distressed during this transmission compared with his earlier transmissions. 

Transcripts of recorded air-to-ground communications showed that about 2.5 minutes had 

elapsed from the flight crew’s request to return to the departure airport and the declaration of the 

emergency. 

A review of the radar data showed that the flight had a normal descent rate from 26,000 

to 24,000 feet (less than 2,000 fpm [feet per minute]). The descent rate then rapidly increased to 

6,500 fpm and then to 10,000 fpm. Integration of the communications times and the radar data 

revealed that the first officer’s declaration of an emergency occurred about the time of the 

increase in the descent rate to 10,000 fpm. A witness on the ground saw the airplane in level 

flight before it pitched nose down slightly, returned to level flight, and then pitched nose down in 

a near-vertical descent. He stated that the airplane remained in a nose-down attitude until it 

impacted terrain and exploded. The witness added that he did not observe any components 

separate from the airplane or any smoke or fire before the airplane impacted terrain. 

All airplane system components were destroyed and thus could not be examined. All 

primary and secondary flight control surfaces were identified; however, impact damage 

precluded any determination of preimpact control system continuity. The horizontal stabilizer 

was trimmed for 285 knots calibrated airspeed. No useful remnants remained from the cockpit 

instrument panel. No evidence of an in-flight fire was found. Impact damage precluded a 

determination of whether the engines were operating at impact. An aircraft performance study 

for this accident revealed that the accident airplane did not approach its maximum operating 

airspeeds until after the pilots initiated the descent and declared an emergency. No unusual or 

hazardous meteorological phenomena were near the airplane at the time of the loss of control. 

PROBABLE CAUSE 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this 

accident was a loss of airplane control for undetermined reasons. 

NTSB/AAB-06/04 
Member Kathryn O’Leary Higgins, concurring: 

I have concurred in the probable cause in this aircraft accident brief addressing the 

circumstances surrounding controlled flight into terrain by a Learjet 24B on December 

23, 2003, near Helendale, California. The investigation disclosed a loss of airplane 

control for undetermined reasons. I appreciate the detailed and difficult work done by 

NTSB staff in this investigation as they attempted to determine the probable cause of this 

accident, given that there was no information from a flight data recorder or a cockpit 

voice recorder. 

While I concurred with the report and the probable cause determination, I have several 

concerns with the information disclosed by our investigation. I continue to be concerned 

about the criteria used to grant, oversee, and revoke a part 135 operating certificate and 

the criteria used to determine which entity then operates under a new certificate. In this 

case, there were several entities involved in ownership, operation, maintenance, and 

control of the accident aircraft: Pavair Inc.; XtraJet, Inc.; American Air Network (AAN); 

and Jet Executive Transport Technologies (JETT). According to information in the 

docket, these various entities in some manner had responsibility for the aircraft; the 

pilots; pilot training; maintenance and maintenance records; and scheduling of aircraft, 

aircraft maintenance, and crew. 

An informal search of internet news sources disclosed several articles stating that the 

registered owner and operator of the Learjet 24B aircraft and the principle of two of the 

companies involved in this accident was implicated in criminal activity and served time 

in prison. This history seems to have predated the formation of the companies he owned 

that were involved with the accident aircraft. 

I am concerned that there is no requirement for a criminal background check of 

individuals who would provide the management and first line safety oversight of 

commercial aviation operations. Docket information suggests that a limited criminal 

history records check was done on the pilots of the accident aircraft in preparation for 

adding these pilots to the part 135 certificate of another company owned and operated by 

the Learjet 24B owner and operator. Yet, there is no similar requirement that the owner 

and operator of a commercial aviation company providing air transportation undergo 

either a basic pre-employment background investigation or a criminal history or other 

background check as part of the part 135 certification process. It is not clear that such a 

requirement would have prevented this accident, but it might have raised questions about 

the qualifications of such an individual to operate under a part 135 certificate and helped 

to focus oversight resources. Apparently this same individual was granted permission by 

the FAA to operate under the name AFTA, Inc. after the accident, at the same time he 

was being investigated for other illegal activities to which he subsequently pleaded 

guilty. In essence, I make an argument for a “totality of the circumstances” approach by 

the FAA in granting such a certificate, which by necessity requires a more extensive 

examination of a prospective operator’s background. 
Ultimately, the FAA revoked the part 135 operating certificate of AAN, a self-described 

“part 135 management company” for failure to retain operational control of the aircraft 

listed on its operations specifications. The accident plane was owned by Pavair but 

operated by AAN until a few weeks before the accident. Despite what seem to be serious 

regulatory violations of the operational control requirements, a settlement agreement 

executed after appeal of the revocation action would allow the same management 

personnel to hold similar management positions under a new air carrier operating 

certificate. If the inability to exercise sufficient operational control is significant enough 

to warrant emergency revocation of an operating certificate, I question why and how the 

same people, without additional training or demonstration of competence, would be able 

to exercise appropriate operational control of a company under a new part 135 certificate. 

According to the information in the NTSB docket, there were at least four seemingly 

independent entities, but more accurately intertwined operations, touching the airplane 

and its day-to-day operations. And, unfortunately, it is still not clear to me how the FAA 

screens and subsequently oversees these types of enterprises. 

Another issue of concern is the release of the accident airplane on the morning of the 

accident. A conscientious FAA airworthiness inspector from the Riverside Flight 

Standards District Office (FSDO) grounded the accident aircraft when he became 

concerned about two separate in-flight right engine flameout reports for the accident 

airplane. In both reports, the cause of the flameout could not be determined after 

examination. The inspector followed up and asked Pavair to provide the accident 

airplane maintenance records for review. When Pavair did not provide the records, the 

airworthiness inspector placed an aircraft condition notice on the aircraft, effectively 

grounding the aircraft. The condition notice required the owner to provide the records for 

review within 17 days. (Emphasis added.) There were only two simple requirements: 

the owner must provide the records, and the FAA must review them. Based only on the 

verbal assertions of the third party that maintained the airplane claiming that the 

conditions had been satisfied, a different inspector from the Riverside FSDO released the 

airplane for operations on the morning of the accident. Not only were the records never 

reviewed by the FAA, they were never provided for review. 

While there are written procedures for issuing a condition notice, there is little guidance 

for inspectors to follow in releasing the condition notice and returning a grounded aircraft 

to service. The condition notice is intended to ensure that the aircraft is in a safe 

condition for safe operation – or it does not fly. Without review of the records, the 

second inspector could not make that determination and the good work of the first 

inspector was negated. Additional guidance within the FAA governing the release of 

planes grounded with a condition notice is clearly needed. 

Member Hersman joined Member Higgins in this concurring statement. 

 Kathryn O’Leary Higgins 

 May 31, 2006