II 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. 192 

To provide for the improvement of foreign stabilization and reconstruction 

capabilities of the United States Government. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JANUARY 26, 2005 

Mr. LUGAR introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred 

to the Committee on Armed Services 

A BILL 

To provide for the improvement of foreign stabilization and 

reconstruction capabilities of the United States Government. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find5 ings: 

6 (1) The Armed Forces of the United States are 

7 extremely capable of effectively projecting military 

8 force and achieving conventional military victory. 

9 However, achieving United States objectives not only 

10 requires military success but also successful sta-
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1 bilization and reconstruction operations in countries 

2 affected by conflict. 

3 (2) Without success in the aftermath of large4 scale hostilities, the United States will not achieve 

5 its objectives. Success in the aftermath follows from 

6 success in preparation before hostilities. 

7 (3) Providing safety, security, and stability is 

8 critical to successful reconstruction efforts and for 

9 achieving United States objectives. Making progress 

10 toward achieving those conditions in a country is dif11 ficult when daily life in that country is largely 

12 shaped by violence of a magnitude that cannot be 

13 managed by indigenous police and security forces. 

14 (4) Reconstruction activities cannot and should 

15 not wait until safety and security has been achieved. 

16 Many elements of reconstruction, including restora17 tion of essential public services and creation of suffi18 cient jobs to instill a sense of well-being and self19 worth in a population of a country, are necessary 

20 precursors to achieving stabilization in a country af21 fected by conflict. Stabilization operations and re22 construction operations are intrinsically intertwined. 

23 (5) Since the end of the Cold War, the United 

24 States has begun new stabilization and reconstruc25 tion operations every 18 to 24 months. Because each 
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1 such operation typically lasts for five to eight years, 

2 cumulative requirements for human resources can 

3 total three to five times the level needed for a single 

4 operation. 

5 (6) History indicates that— 

6 (A) stabilization of societies that are rel7 atively ordered, without ambitious goals, may 

8 require five troops per 1,000 indigenous people; 

9 and 

10 (B) stabilization of disordered societies, 

11 with ambitious goals involving lasting cultural 

12 change, may require 20 troops per 1,000 indig13 enous people. 

14 (7) That need, with the cumulative requirement 

15 to maintain human resources for three to five over16 lapping stabilization operations, presents a formi17 dable challenge. It has become increasingly clear 

18 that more people are needed in-theater for stabiliza19 tion and reconstruction operations than for combat 

20 operations. 

21 (8) Since the end of the Cold War, the United 

22 States has spent at least four times more on sta23 bilization and reconstruction activities than on large24 scale combat operations. 
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1 (9) One overarching lesson from history is that 

2 the quality, quantity, and kind of preparation in 

3 peacetime determines success in a stabilization and 

4 reconstruction operation before it even begins. If an 

5 operation starts badly, it is difficult to recover. 

6 (10) It is clear from experience in Afghanistan 

7 and Iraq that the United States must expect to en8 counter significant challenges in its future stabiliza9 tion and reconstruction efforts, including efforts that 

10 seek to ensure stability, democracy, human rights, 

11 and a productive economy in a nation affected by 

12 conflict. Achieving these ends requires effective plan13 ning and preparation in the years before the out14 break of hostilities in order for the Armed Forces 

15 and civilian agencies of the United States Govern16 ment to have the capabilities that are necessary to 

17 support stabilization and reconstruction. Such capa18 bilities are not traditionally found within those enti19 ties. 

20 (11) The United States can be more effective in 

21 meeting the challenges of the transition to and from 

22 hostilities, challenges that require better planning, 

23 new capabilities, and more personnel with a wider 

24 range of skills. 
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1 (12) Orchestration of all instruments of United 

2 States power in peacetime would obviate the need 

3 for many military expeditions to achieve United 

4 States objectives, and better prepare the United 

5 States to achieve its objectives during stabilization 

6 and reconstruction operations. 

7 (13) Choosing the priority and sequence of 

8 United States objectives, acknowledging that not ev9 erything is equally important or urgent, and noting 

10 that in other cultures certain social and attitudinal 

11 change may take decades, all require explicit man12 agement-decisionmaking and planning in the years 

13 before stabilization and reconstruction operations 

14 might be undertaken in a region. 

15 (14) To be fully effective, the United States 

16 needs to have Federal Government personnel de17 ployed continuously abroad for years-long tours of 

18 duty, far longer than the length of traditional as19 signments, so that they become familiar with the 

20 local scene and the indigenous people come to trust 

21 them as individuals. 

22 (15) There is a significant need for skilled per23 sonnel to be stationed abroad in support of stabiliza24 tion and reconstruction activities. The active compo25 nents of the Armed Forces cannot meet all of these 
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1 requirements. Personnel from other Federal agencies, 

2 reserve component forces, contractors, United States 

3 allies and coalition partners, and indigenous per4 sonnel must help. 

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con6 gress that— 

7 (1) enhancing United States effectiveness in the 

8 transition to and from hostilities will require— 

9 (A) management discipline, that is— 

10 (i) the extension of the management 

11 focus of the Armed Forces (covering the 

12 full gamut of personnel selection, training, 

13 and promotion; 

14 (ii) planning, budgeting, and resource 

15 allocation; 

16 (iii) education, exercises, games, mod17 eling, and rehearsal, performance and 

18 readiness measurement; and 

19 (iv) development of doctrine (now fo20 cused on combat operations) to include 

21 peacetime activities, stabilization and re22 construction operations and intelligence ac23 tivities that involve multi-agency participa24 tion and coordination; and 
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1 (B) building and maintaining certain fun2 damental capabilities that are critical to success 

3 in stabilization and reconstruction, including 

4 training and equipping sufficient numbers of 

5 personnel for stabilization and reconstruction 

6 activities, strategic communication, knowledge, 

7 understanding, and intelligence, and identifica8 tion, location, and tracking for asymmetric war9 fare; 

10 (2) these capabilities, without management dis11 cipline, would lack orchestration and be employed in12 effectively, and management discipline without these 

13 capabilities would be impotent; and 

14 (3) the study of transition to and from hos15 tilities, which the Defense Science Board carried out 

16 in the summer of 2004 at the request of the Sec17 retary of Defense, provides an appropriate frame18 work within which the Department of Defense and 

19 personnel of other departments and agencies of the 

20 Federal Government should work to plan and pre21 pare for pre-conflict and post-conflict stability oper22 ations. 

23 SEC. 2. DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT. 

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that a new coordina25 tion and integration mechanism is needed to bring man-
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1 agement discipline to the continuum of peacetime, combat, 

2 and stabilization and reconstruction operations. 

3 (b) PRESIDENTIAL ACTION.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that the President should issue a directive to develop 

5 an intensive planning process for stabilization and recon6 struction activities, and that the directive should provide 

7 for— 

8 (1) contingency planning and integration task 

9 forces, that is, full-time activities that could continue 

10 for months or years, to be staffed by individuals 

11 from all involved agencies who have expertise in the 

12 countries of interest and in needed functional areas 

13 to work under the general guidance of the Assistant 

14 to the President for National Security Affairs; 

15 (2) joint interagency task forces composed of 

16 senior Government executives and military officers 

17 who operate in a particular country or area of inter18 est and are created to ensure coordination and inte19 gration of the activities of all United States per20 sonnel in that country or area; and 

21 (3) a national center for contingency support, 

22 that is, a federally funded research and development 

23 center with country and functional expertise that 

24 would support the contingency planning and integra25 tion task forces and joint interagency task forces 
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1 and would augment skills and expertise of the Gov2 ernment task forces, provide a broad range of in3 depth capability, support the planning process, and 

4 provide the necessary continuity. 

5 (c) ACTIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—While a 

6 directive described in subsection (b) is being implemented, 

7 the Secretary of Defense shall— 

8 (1) take immediate action to strengthen the role 

9 and capabilities of the Department of Defense for 

10 carrying out stabilization and reconstruction activi11 ties; 

12 (2) actively support the development of core 

13 competencies in planning in other departments and 

14 agencies, principally the Department of State; 

15 (3) instruct regional combatant commanders to 

16 maintain a portfolio of operational contingency plans 

17 for stabilization and reconstruction activities similar 

18 in scope to that currently maintained for combat op19 erations; and 

20 (4) instruct each regional combatant com21 mander to create a focal point within their command 

22 for stabilization and reconstruction planning and 

23 execution. 
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1 SEC. 3. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILI2 TIES. 

3 (a) CORE COMPETENCY.—The Secretary of Defense 

4 and the Secretary of State shall each— 

5 (1) make stabilization and reconstruction one of 

6 the core competencies of the Department of Defense 

7 and the Department of State, respectively; 

8 (2) achieve a stronger partnership and closer 

9 working relationship between the two departments; 

10 and 

11 (3) augment their existing capabilities for sta12 bilization and reconstruction. 

13 (b) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.— 

14 (1) MISSION.—The Secretary of Defense shall 

15 designate the planning for stabilization and recon16 struction as a mission of the Department of Defense 

17 that has the same priority as the mission of the De18 partment of Defense to carry out combat operations. 

19 (2) SUPPORTING ACTIONS.—In administering 

20 the planning, training, execution, and evaluation 

21 necessary to carry out the stabilization and recon22 struction mission, the Secretary of Defense shall— 

23 (A) designate the Army as executive agent 

24 for stabilization and reconstruction; 

25 (B) ensure that stabilization and recon26 struction operational plans are fully integrated 
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1 with combat operational plans of the combatant 

2 commands; 

3 (C) require the Army and the Marine 

4 Corps to develop, below the brigade level, mod5 ules of stabilization and reconstruction capabili6 ties to facilitate task organization and exercise 

7 and experiment with them to determine where 

8 combinations of these capabilities can enhance 

9 United States effectiveness in stability oper10 ations; 

11 (D) require the Secretary of the Army to 

12 accelerate restructuring of Army Reserve and 

13 Army National Guard forces with an emphasis 

14 on providing the capability for carrying out the 

15 stabilization mission; and 

16 (E) ensure that stabilization and recon17 struction becomes a core competency of general 

18 purpose forces through training, leader develop19 ment, doctrine development, and use of other 

20 force readiness tools and, to do so, shall require 

21 that— 

22 (i) the Secretaries of the military de23 partments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in24 tegrate stabilization and reconstruction op25 erations into the professional military edu-
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1 cation programs of each of the Armed 

2 Forces and the joint professional military 

3 education programs, by including in the 

4 curricula courses to increase understanding 

5 of cultural, regional, ideological, and eco6 nomic concerns, and to increase the level of 

7 participation by students from other agen8 cies and departments in those programs; 

9 (ii) stabilization and reconstruction be 

10 integrated into training events and exer11 cises of the Armed Forces at every level; 

12 (iii) the commander of the United 

13 States Joint Forces Command further de14 velop, publish, and refine joint doctrine for 

15 stability and reconstruction operations; 

16 (iv) the Director of Defense Research 

17 and Engineering and the senior acquisition 

18 executive of each of the military depart19 ments develop and implement a process for 

20 achieving more rapid and coherent exploi21 tation of service and departmental science 

22 and technology programs and increase the 

23 investment in force-multiplying tech24 nologies, such as language translation de25 vices and rapid training; 
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1 (v) the resources for support of sta2 bility operations be increased; and 

3 (vi) a force with a modest stabilization 

4 capability of sufficient size to achieve am5 bitious objectives in small countries, re6 gions, or areas, and of sufficient capability 

7 to achieve modest objectives elsewhere be 

8 developed, and consideration be given to 

9 the actual capability of that force in mak10 ing a decision to commit the force to a 

11 particular stabilization and reconstruction 

12 operation or to expand the force for that 

13 operation. 

14 (c) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.— 

15 (1) POLICY ON RECONSTRUCTION INTEGRA16 TION.—It is the policy of the United States that the 

17 capabilities to promote political and economic reform 

18 that exist in many civilian agencies of the United 

19 States Government, in international organizations, 

20 in nongovernmental and private voluntary organiza21 tions, and in other governments be integrated based 

22 upon a common vision and coordinated strategy. 

23 (2) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF

24 STATE.—The Secretary of State shall— 
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1 (A) be the focus for carrying out the policy 

2 on reconstruction integration set forth in para3 graph (1); and 

4 (B) develop in the Department of State ca5 pabilities— 

6 (i) to develop, maintain, and execute a 

7 portfolio of detailed and adaptable plans 

8 and capabilities for the civilian roles in re9 construction operations; 

10 (ii) to prepare, deploy, and lead the 

11 civil components of reconstruction mis12 sions; and 

13 (iii) to incorporate international and 

14 nongovernmental capabilities in planning 

15 and execution. 

16 (d) COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN

17 DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND STATE.—The Secretary 

18 of Defense shall— 

19 (1) assist in bolstering the development of the 

20 Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction of the De21 partment of State and otherwise support that objec22 tive through the sharing of the extensive expertise of 

23 the Department of Defense in crisis management 

24 planning and in the process of deliberate planning; 
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1 (2) work collaboratively with that office and as2 sign to that office at least 10 experts to provide the 

3 intellectual capital and guidance on the relevant best 

4 practices that have been developed within the De5 partment of Defense; and 

6 (3) ensure that extensive joint and collaborative 

7 planning for stabilization and reconstruction oper8 ations occurs before commencement of a conflict 

9 that leads to such an operation. 

10 SEC. 4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION. 

11 (a) PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE.—Recognizing an in12 crease in anti-American attitudes around the world, par13 ticularly in Islamic and Middle-Eastern countries, the use 

14 of terrorism, and the implications of terrorism for national 

15 security issues, it is the sense of Congress that the Presi16 dent should issue a directive to strengthen the United 

17 States Government’s ability— 

18 (1) to better understand global public opinion 

19 about the United States, and to communicate with 

20 global audiences; 

21 (2) to coordinate all components of strategic 

22 communication, including public diplomacy, public 

23 affairs, and international broadcasting; and 
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1 (3) to provide a foundation for new legislation 

2 on the planning, coordination, conduct, and funding 

3 of strategic communication. 

4 (b) NSC ORGANIZATION.—It is, further, the sense of 

5 Congress that the President should establish a permanent 

6 organizational structure within the National Security 

7 Council to oversee the efforts undertaken pursuant to a 

8 directive described in subsection (a) and that such struc9 ture should include— 

10 (1) a deputy national security advisor for stra11 tegic communication to serve as the President’s 

12 principal advisor on all matters relating to strategic 

13 communication; 

14 (2) a strategic communication committee, 

15 chaired by the deputy national security advisor for 

16 strategic communication and with a membership 

17 drawn from officers serving at the under secretary 

18 level of departments and agencies, to develop an 

19 overarching framework for strategic communication 

20 (including brand identity, themes, messages, and 

21 budget priorities) and to direct and coordinate inter22 agency programs to maintain focus, consistency, and 

23 continuity; and 

24 (3) an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan cen25 ter for strategic communication to serve as a source 
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1 of independent, objective expertise to support the 

2 National Security Council and the strategic commu3 nication committee, by (among other actions) pro4 viding information and analysis, developing and 

5 monitoring the effectiveness of themes, messages, 

6 products, and programs, determining target audi7 ences, contracting with commercial sector sources 

8 for products and programs, and fostering cross-cul9 tural exchanges of ideas, people, and information. 

10 (c) ACTIONS BY DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DE11 FENSE.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State and 

13 the Secretary of Defense shall each allocate substan14 tial funding to strategic communication. 

15 (2) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—Within the De16 partment of State, the Under Secretary of State for 

17 Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs shall be the 

18 principal policy advisor and manager for strategic 

19 communication. 

20 (3) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—Within the 

21 Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of De22 fense for Policy shall serve as that department’s 

23 focal point for strategic communication. 
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1 SEC. 5. KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND INTEL2 LIGENCE. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find4 ings: 

5 (1) The knowledge necessary to be effective in 

6 conducting stabilization and reconstruction oper7 ations is different from the military knowledge re8 quired to prevail during hostilities, but is no less im9 portant. 

10 (2) To successfully achieve United States polit11 ical and military objectives, knowledge of culture and 

12 development of language skills must be taken as se13 riously as development of combat skills. 

14 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con15 gress that— 

16 (1) the collection, analysis, and integration of 

17 cultural knowledge and intelligence should be ongo18 ing to ensure its availability far in advance of sta19 bilization and reconstruction operations for which 

20 such knowledge and intelligence are needed; and 

21 (2) a new approach is needed to establish sys22 tematic ways to access and coordinate the vast 

23 amount of knowledge available within the United 

24 States Government. 

25 (c) COMMANDERS OF COMBATANT COMMANDS.— 
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1 (1) INTELLIGENCE PLANS.—The Secretary of 

2 Defense shall require the commanders of the com3 batant commands to develop intelligence plans as a 

4 required element of their planning process. Each 

5 such plan shall satisfy information needs for peace6 time, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction 

7 (including support to other departments and agen8 cies) and be developed by use of the same kinds of 

9 tools that are useful in traditional pre-conflict and 

10 conflict planning. 

11 (2) RESOURCES.—The Secretary of Defense 

12 shall provide resources to the regional combatant 

13 commands for the establishment of offices for re14 gional expertise outreach to support country and re15 gional planning and operations, and to provide con16 tinuity, identify experts, and build relationships with 

17 outside experts and organizations. 

18 (3) AREA EXPERTS.—In order to increase the 

19 number of competent area experts, the Under Sec20 retary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness shall 

21 lead a process to set requirements and develop ca22 reer paths for foreign area officers and a new cadre 

23 of enlisted area specialists, a process based on a 

24 more formal, structured definition of requirements 

25 by the commanders of the combatant commands. 
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1 (4) MILITARY EDUCATION.—The Secretaries of 

2 the military departments shall improve the regional 

3 and cultural studies curricula in the joint profes4 sional military education system, as well as in online 

5 regional and cultural self-study instruction, in order 

6 to broaden cultural knowledge and awareness. 

7 (d) INTELLIGENCE REFORM.— 

8 (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of 

9 Congress that the United States should shift the 

10 focus of intelligence reform from reorganization to 

11 the solving of substantive problems in intelligence. 

12 (2) ACTIONS.—The Director of National Intel13 ligence, in consultation with the Secretary of De14 fense, shall— 

15 (A) establish a human resource coordina16 tion office charged with the responsibility to de17 velop a comprehensive human resource strategy 

18 for planning, management, and deployment of 

19 personnel that would serve as the basis for opti20 mizing the allocation of resources against crit21 ical problems; 

22 (B) adopt a new counterintelligence and 

23 security approach that puts the analyst in the 

24 role of determining the balance between need25 to-share and need-to-know that will enable the 
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1 intelligence community to enlarge its circle of 

2 trust from which to draw information and skills; 

3 (C) improve integration between networks 

4 and data architectures across the intelligence 

5 community to facilitate enterprise-wide collabo6 ration; 

7 (D) harmonize special operations forces, 

8 covert action, and intelligence, and ensure that 

9 sufficient capabilities in these specialized areas 

10 are developed; 

11 (E) accelerate the reinvention of defense 

12 human intelligence and ensure that there are 

13 enough such personnel assigned and sustained 

14 for a sufficient number of years in advance of 

15 the nation’s need for their services; and 

16 (F) enhance the analysis of intelligence col17 lected from all sources, including by improving 

18 the selection, recruitment, training, and con19 tinuing education of analysts, producing regular 

20 and continuous assessment and post-operation 

21 appraisal of intelligence products, and creating 

22 incentives to promote the creativity and inde23 pendence of analysts. 

24 (e) FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY.— 
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1 (1) FINDING.—Congress finds that the utiliza2 tion of individuals with foreign language skills is 

3 critical to understanding a country or a region, yet 

4 the Department of Defense lacks sufficient personnel 

5 with critical foreign language skills. 

6 (2) ACTIONS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.— 

7 The Secretary of Defense shall— 

8 (A) prescribe the specific foreign language 

9 and regional specialist requirements that must 

10 be met in order to meet the needs of the De11 partment of Defense, including the needs of the 

12 commander of the United States Joint Forces 

13 Command and the commanders of the other 

14 combatant commands and the needs of the 

15 Armed Forces generally, and shall provide the 

16 resources for meeting these requirements in the 

17 annual budget submissions; and 

18 (B) develop a more comprehensive system 

19 for identifying, testing, tracking, and accessing 

20 personnel with critical foreign language skills. 

21 (f) EXPLOITATION OF OPEN SOURCES OF INFORMA22 TION.— 

23 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that open 

24 sources of information— 
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1 (A) can provide much of the information 

2 needed to support peacetime needs and sta3 bilization and reconstruction needs; and 

4 (B) can be used to develop a broad range 

5 of products needed for stabilization and recon6 struction operations, including such products as 

7 genealogical trees, electricity generation and 

8 transmission grids, cultural materials in sup9 port of strategic communication plans, and 

10 background information for noncombatant evac11 uation operations. 

12 (2) EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR DEPARTMENT OF

13 DEFENSE.—The Secretary of Defense shall des14 ignate the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agen15 cy to serve as executive agent of the Department of 

16 Defense for the development and administration of 

17 a robust and coherent program for the exploitation 

18 of open sources of information. 

19 SEC. 6. IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING IN 

20 ASYMMETRIC WARFARE. 

21 The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

22 Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately de23 velop a program administered by a new organization es24 tablished by those officers to provide— 

25 (1) an overall technical approach to— 
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1 (A) the identification, location, and track2 ing of asymmetric warfare operations carried 

3 out against the Armed Forces of the United 

4 States or allied or coalition armed forces; and 

5 (B) tracking targets in asymmetric warfare 

6 in which the Armed Forces of the United 

7 States, or allied or coalition armed forces may 

8 be engaged; 

9 (2) the systems and technology to implement 

10 the approach; 

11 (3) the analysis techniques for translating sen12 sor data into useful identification, location, and 

13 tracking information; 

14 (4) the field operations to employ, utilize, and 

15 support the hardware and software produced; and 

16 (5) feedback to the Secretary of Defense and 

17 the Director of National Intelligence on the impact 

18 of related policy decisions and directives on the cre19 ation of a robust identification, location, and track20 ing capability. 

21 SEC. 7. MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION PLANS. 

22 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR PLANS.—Not later than 90 

23 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec24 retary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall each 

25 submit to Congress a management plan for carrying out 
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1 the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense (and the 

2 duties of other officials of the Department of Defense) and 

3 the responsibilities of the Secretary of State (and the du4 ties of other officials of the Department of State), respec5 tively, under this Act. 

6 (b) CONTENT.—Each plan submitted under this sec7 tion shall include objectives, schedules, and estimates of 

8 costs, together with a discussion of the means for defray9 ing the costs. 

10 SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

11 (a) DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.—There is author12 ized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for 

13 the Office for Stability Operations such sums as may be 

14 necessary to enable that office to carry out the planning, 

15 oversight, and related stabilization and reconstruction ac16 tivities required of the Department of Defense under this 

17 Act. 

18 (b) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—There is authorized to 

19 be appropriated to the Department of State such sums 

20 as may be necessary for carrying out the planning, over21 sight, and related stabilization and reconstruction activi22 ties required of the Department of State under this Act. 

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