UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RAYMOND M. KRUSHIN, :

Plaintiff :

:

v. : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-04-2151

:

: (Judge McClure) 

GENE FISCHI, ET AL., :

Defendants :

ORDER

July 12, 2005

Background

Raymond M. Krushin, an inmate presently confined at the Luzerne County

Correctional Facility, Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, initiated this pro se civil rights

action. Presently pending are is Plaintiff’s motion requesting that the Defendants

be compelled to provide him with a copy of a “Consent Decree” from

approximately 1985 or 1986 which dealt with conditions of confinement at the

Luzerne County Correctional Facility. Record document no. 96, p. 1.

Discussion

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides in relevant part as follows:

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not

privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter

involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the

claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the

claim or defense of any other party, including the

existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and

location of any books, documents, or other tangible

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things and the identity and location of persons having

knowledge of any discoverable matter. The information

sought need not be admissible at the trial if the

information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead

to the discovery of admissible evidence.

. . .

The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods

. . . shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i)

the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or

duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that

is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;

(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample

opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the

information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the

proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking

into account the needs of the case, the amount in

controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the

issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the

proposed discovery in resolving the issues.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), (2).

It is well-settled that Rule 26 establishes a liberal discovery policy. 

Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); Hickman v.

Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 (1947); Great West Life Assurance Co. v. Levithan,

152 F.R.D. 494, 497 (E.D. Pa. 1994). As a general rule, therefore, discovery is

permitted of any items that are relevant or may lead to the discovery of relevant

information. Hicks v. Big Bros./Big Sisters of Am., 168 F.R.D. 528, 529 (E.D.

Pa. 1996); Transcontinental Fertilizer Co. v. Samsung Co., 108 F.R.D. 650, 652

(E.D. Pa. 1985).

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Relevancy is not limited to the precise issues set out in the pleadings. 

Caruso v. Coleman Co., 157 F.R.D. 344, 347 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Instead, discovery

requests "may be deemed relevant if there is any possibility that the information

[requested] may be relevant to the general subject matter of the action." Id.

Moreover, discovery need not be confined to items of admissible evidence but

may encompass that which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery

of admissible evidence. Callahan v. A.E.V., Inc., 947 F. Supp. 175, 177 (W.D.

Pa. 1996); Momah v. Albert Einstein Medical Ctr., 164 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D. Pa.

1996); Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117 (E.D. Pa. 1994). 

Although "the scope of relevance in discovery is far broader than that

allowed for evidentiary purposes, it is not without its limits." Stabilus v.

Haynsworth, Baldwin, Johnson & Greaves, P.A., 144 F.R.D. 258, 265 (E.D. Pa.

1992) (citations omitted). The Court will not permit discovery where a request is

made in bad faith, unduly burdensome, irrelevant to the general subject matter of

the action, or relates to confidential or privileged information. S.S. Fretz, Jr., Inc.

v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., No. 90-1731, 1991 WL 21655, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb.

15, 1991); M. Berenson Co. v. Faneuil Hall Marketplace, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 635,

637 (D. Mass. 1984); see generally 8 Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice

and Procedure §§ 2007-2013 (2d ed. 1990).

Krushin’s motion and supporting brief offer no clear explanation as to how

a Consent Decree from 1985-86 is relevant to the subject matter of his present

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action. Plaintiff has failed to present any argument which would establish that a

Consent decree issued almost twenty years ago is relevant or could lead to the

discovery of relevant information. Since Krushin’s motion fails to satisfy the

relevancy requirements and additional standards of Rule 26, it will be denied. 

Consequently,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

Plaintiff's motion to compel production of a copy of a 1985-86

Consent Decree (Record document no. 96) is denied.

 s/ James F. McClure, Jr. 

JAMES F. McCLURE, JR.

 United States District Judge

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