1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

TANISHA WILLIS, : Case No.4:04-CV-2606

:

Plaintiff :

: Judge Jones

v. :

:

AMERICAN CUSTOMER CARE, :

:

Defendant :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

October 25, 2006

Pending before the Court is Defendant American Customer Care’s

(“Defendant” or “ACC”) Motion for Summary Judgment (“the Motion”)(doc. 39)

filed on September 1, 2006.

For the reasons that follow, the Motion will be granted in part and denied in

part.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On December 3, 2004, Plaintiff Tanisha Willis (“Plaintiff” or “Willis”)

commenced this action by filing a complaint in the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the above-referenced Defendant. (Rec.

Doc. 1). The complaint raises claims for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 1 of 20
2

1981 (Count I), breach of contract (Count II), and promissory estoppel/detrimental

reliance (Count III). On February 7, 2005, the Defendant answered the complaint. 

(Rec. Doc. 6).

On September 1, 2006, the Defendant filed the instant Motion along with

statement of facts. (Rec. Docs. 39 and 40). On September 11, 2006, Defendant

filed a supporting brief. (Rec. Doc. 44). On September 29, 2006, Plaintiff filed a

brief in opposition to the Motion with counterstatement of material facts. (Rec.

Docs. 45 and 46). A reply brief was filed by the Defendant on October 19, 2006. 

(Rec. Doc. 50). Accordingly, the Motion has been fully briefed and is therefore

ripe for our review.

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 

FED .R. CIV. .P. 56(c); see also Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335,

340 (3d Cir. 1990). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of

showing "there is no genuine issue for trial." Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 357

(3d Cir. 1992). Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a

disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences which a fact finder could

draw from them. See Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 2 of 20
3

Cir. 1982). 

Initially, the moving party has a burden of demonstrating the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). This may be met by the moving party pointing out to the court that there is

an absence of evidence to support an essential element as to which the non-moving

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that, where such a motion is

made and properly supported, the non-moving party must then show by affidavits,

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that

there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The United States Supreme

Court has commented that this requirement is tantamount to the non-moving party

making a sufficient showing as to the essential elements of their case that a

reasonable jury could find in its favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

It is important to note that “the non-moving party cannot rely upon

conclusory allegations in its pleadings or in memoranda and briefs to establish a

genuine issue of material fact." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511

(3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, all inferences "should be drawn in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's

evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." 

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 3 of 20
1

 In the interest of brevity, where factual allegations are not disputed, we shall refer only

to the Defendant’s statement of facts, Record Document 40.

4

Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.

1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (citations omitted).

Still, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties

will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)(emphasis in original). "As to

materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. at 248. 

A dispute is considered to be genuine only if "the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS:

Plaintiff is an African American. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶1).1 Defendant is a

Pennsylvania corporation that operates inbound and outbound contact centers and

has a facility in Montoursville, Pennsylvania. ACC’s customers contract with

ACC to have telephone calls made or received on their behalf. (Rec. Doc. 40 at

¶2). On or about August 2004, ACC hired Plaintiff as a Corporate Trainer to be

based in its Montoursville facility. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶3). The Corporate Trainer

position was a new position that had been created by ACC immediately prior to

Plaintiff being hired. ACC had never previously employed a Corporate Trainer. 

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 4 of 20
5

(Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶6). Upon the beginning of her employment, Plaintiff was given

an Orientation packet that contained an “Employment At Will Disclaimer.” (Rec.

Doc. 40 at ¶5). Plaintiff, however, denies that she was hired as an at-will

employee. (Rec. Doc. 45 at ¶4).

The Corporate Trainer was to be the “face” of ACC to its large corporate

clients and would be the primary representative of ACC. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶7).

ACC advertised the position of Corporate Trainer by various means, including the

use of two recruiting firms, and ultimately narrowed down the field of candidates

to five qualified candidates. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶8). ACC was aware that Plaintiff

was African American at the time she was interviewed and hired by ACC to be the

“face” of the ACC company. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶9). The other four candidates for

the job included a Caucasian male, Caucasian female, an African American male,

and an African American female. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶10).

 Plaintiff an her family (husband, son and daughter) planned to move to

Montoursville from Ohio, where they resided prior to Plaintiff’s acceptance of the

job. The plan was for Plaintiff to move first and then for the family to follow. 

(Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶15). Defendant alleges that ACC management personnel

observed, that from the time Plaintiff accepted the position, she was consumed,

almost to the point of obsession, about whether she and her family could ever

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 5 of 20
6

adjust to what she perceived as a lack of openness to diversity in the

Montoursville, Pennsylvania area. Defendant also alleges that Plaintiff repeatedly

posed questions to those with whom she worked about the diversity of the

Montoursville area and the school system. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶13-14). Defendant

alleges that ACC’s management personnel observed that Plaintiff’s obsession with

these issues was having a serious impact on her job performance in terms of her

attitude, her apparent level of commitment to the position, her ability to

satisfactorily perform the duties and responsibilities of her job, and her general

emotional stability. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶16-17). Plaintiff denies these allegations.

Defendant alleges that the first indication of instability occurred after

Plaintiff had accepted the Corporate Trainer position, but prior to her official

starting date. ACC requested Plaintiff to attend a meeting with an important

prospective corporate client. Plaintiff agreed to attend but arrived late to the

meeting. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶18). Plaintiff alleges that this allegation of “instability”

is utterly false, and the reason for her lateness was difficulty with accommodations

and that recruiter Clark Smith was aware of this fact. (Rec. Doc. 45 at ¶18). 

Defendant alleges that another example of Plaintiff’s emotional instability was an

occasion when Plaintiff burst into tears in front of 180-200 employees after being

informed that her cable installation would be later than anticipated. (Rec. Doc. 40

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 6 of 20
7

at ¶20). Defendant alleges that ACC’s management personnel were concerned that

Plaintiff would not be a long-term employee, based upon their observations of her

behavior. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶22). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s agents have

fabricated the purported “instability” and “lack of commitment” bases for

Plaintiff’s termination. (Rec. Doc. 45 at ¶20-24).

Defendant alleges that based upon their observation of Plaintiff’s continued

behavior, the concern of ACC management personnel became so great that on

September 13, 2004, Michael Shea (“Shea”) and Rodd Furlough (“Furlough”),

Plaintiff’s immediate supervisors, had a telephone conference with Jeff Neistat

(“Neistat”), one of the owners of the company, to apprise him of the situation. 

Defendant alleges that Niestat shared Shea and Furlough’s concerns that, based

upon her behavior, it did not appear that Plaintiff would be a long term employee

and that her instability and temperament indicated that she was not a good fit for

the Corporate Trainer position. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶24). Defendants further allege

that based upon their determination that Plaintiff was not a good fit for the

position, it was best to terminate her before her family was uprooted from their

home in Ohio and moved to Montoursville. On September 13, 2004, Plaintiff met

with Shea, Furlough, and Lisa Furlough. Furlough and Shea told her she was

being terminated from employment with ACC. (Rec. Doc. 40 at ¶11, ¶26). 

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 7 of 20
2

 According to Furlough’s testimony, a portion of the conversation between Plaintiff and

Leidecker involved race. (Rec. Doc. 45 at ¶45).

8

Plaintiff alleges that the decision to terminate her was made based upon

input from two employees of Defendant, Rod Furlough and Mike Shea. Plaintiff

alleges that Furlough, the director of inbound operations, testified that the reasons

for Plaintiff’s termination were two-fold: emotional instability and lack of

commitment to the job. (Rec. Doc. 45 at ¶13). Furlough testified as to one

incident of alleged emotional instability that he personally observed, namely an

occasion on which Plaintiff was upset and in tears because of difficulties in finding

what she considered to be a suitable living arrangement. Furlough also testified

that he had informed about a lunch that Plaintiff had with Barbara Leidecker

during which Plaintiff allegedly discussed her concerns about the area.2

 With

respect to Plaintiff’s alleged lack of commitment to the job, Furlough testified at

his deposition that Plaintiff’s statements (i.e. she was not comfortable with the

move, her family was going to struggle, she was uncomfortable with the schooling)

were indicative that she was not committed to the move or the job. (Rec. Doc. 45

at ¶13). Plaintiff denies making statements of this kind. At his deposition, Shea

testified that he attributed Plaintiff’s termination to . . . concern over her instability

over this first couple of weeks [of employment].” He alleges that this

determination was based on the same incidents testified to by Furlough. (Rec. Doc.

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 8 of 20
3

 The plaintiff bears the burden of production to establish the prima facie case. See

Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).

9

45 at ¶13).

Subsequent to Plaintiff’s termination, ACC has not filled the position of

Corporate Trainer and has not been interviewing candidates for the position. (Rec.

Doc. 40 at ¶30).

DISCUSSION:

In the Motion, Defendant moves for summary judgment with respect to

Plaintiff’s three claims: racial discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, breach

of contract and promissory estoppel. We shall analyze the merits of each claim in

turn.

A. Count I - § 1981 Claim

Claims of racial discrimination without direct evidence of discrimination

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are analyzed under the familiar burdenshifting standard first announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973). 

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted:

Briefly summarized, the McDonnell Douglas analysis proceeds in

three stages. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of

discrimination.3

 If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie

case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate,

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 9 of 20
4

 The defendant bears the burden of production to establish a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763.

10

nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s [termination].4 Finally,

should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an

opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons,

but were a pretext for discrimination.

Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999)(citing

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).

 Under the McDonnell Douglas standard, a prima facie case of

discrimination has four general elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a

protected class; (2) the plaintiff was qualified for the job; (3) the plaintiff was

terminated despite those qualifications and (4) after the termination, the job

remained open and the employer sought applicants with the plaintiff’s

qualifications.

In this action, it not disputed that Plaintiff, an African-American, was

terminated from her position Corporate Trainer for ACC. Moreover, inasmuch as

Defendant hired Plaintiff, it is not disputed that Plaintiff was qualified for the

Corporate Trainer position. Following Plaintiff’s termination, the job has

remained open. It is apparent that Plaintiff has succeeded to establish a prima facie

case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

As noted, once Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the “burden of

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 10 of 20
11

production shifts to the defendant to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the employee’s [termination].” Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (quoting

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). “The employer satisfies its burden of

production by introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit the

conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable

employment decision.” Id. (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

508 (1993)). “The employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually

motivated is behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate

burden of proving intentional discrimination always rests with the Plaintiff.” Id.

(citing Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).

In this action, Defendant’s articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for terminating Plaintiff’s employment are two-fold: (1) perceived emotional

instability and (2) perceived lack of commitment to the job. Inasmuch as the

burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is a light one, we find

that the Defendant has satisfied its burden by providing the above-mentioned two

reasons. Moreover, both Shea and Furlough testified that they were involved in

the decision to terminate Plaintiff and that her perceived instability and lack of

commitment were the only reasons for her termination.

“Once the employer answers its relatively light burden by articulating a

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 11 of 20
12

legitimate reason for the unfavorable employment decision, the burden of

production now rebounds to the plaintiff, who must now show by a preponderance

of the evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual (thus meeting the

plaintiff’s burden of persuasion).” Id. “[T]he plaintiff must convince the

factfinder ‘both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real

reason.’” Id. (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-516). “[T]o avoid summary

judgment, the plaintiff’s evidence rebutting the employer’s proffered legitimate

reasons must allow a factfinder to reasonably infer that each of the employer’s

proffered non-discriminatory reasons was either a post-hoc fabrication or otherwise

did not actually motivate the employment action.” Id. at 764 (internal citations

omitted).

“To discredit the employer’s proffered reason, however, the plaintiff cannot

simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual

dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer . . . [T]he

non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find

them ‘unworthy of credence.’” Id. at 765 (internal citations omitted).

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s cited reasons for Plaintiff’s termination,

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 12 of 20
13

emotional instability and lack of commitment to the job, are utterly false. In

support of her argument, Plaintiff states that these purported reasons were not the

reasons cited to her at the termination meeting on September 13, 2004. Plaintiff

testified that, at the termination meeting, she was told that:

they had a concern about whether or not I was going to stay in the

area. They had a concern about the position. And that the three of

them had talked and they decided that they didn’t think that this was

going to be something good for me. That they really felt that they had

made a mistake in asking me to come here, and that they had talked to

Jeff, and that he had given them permission to reverse the hiring

decision. He said – he said, he has given us permission to fix the

mistake. So, we are going to reverse our hiring decision . . . Then Rod

started to talk and he says, you know, Lisa and I have talked about it

and we know what a hard time our kids had acclimating to the area, or

“fitting in” was his words . . . We know how hard our, how hard a

time our kids had fitting in here, you know, we know that it will be

twice as has hard for your kids.

(Rec. Doc. 46, Ex. B, Deposition of Plaintiff, p. 124, ll. 7-25). Plaintiff further

testified that Furlough told her she was still the best person for the job, but “we just

think that in six months you will hate it here and you will quit.” (Rec. Doc. 46, Ex.

B, p. 125, ll. 8-11). 

Plaintiff’s essential argument is that both Shea and Furlough’s testimony

indicate that the reasons articulated for Plaintiff’s termination were post-hoc

fabrications. Plaintiff argues that both Furlough and Shea could largely only point

to piecemeal second-hand information regarding Plaintiff’s alleged “emotional

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 13 of 20
14

instability.” Plaintiff further argues that neither Shea nor Furlough could identify

anything Plaintiff actually said to indicate a lack of commitment to the job. 

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Clark Smith’s (“Smith”) testimony is direct

evidence of discriminatory motive and tends to show that the Defendant’s

articulated reasons are pretextual. Plaintiff argues that Smith, the recruiter, testified

that both Shea and Furlough contacted him following Plaintiff’s hire and expressed

concerns about how Plaintiff would “fit in.” Particularly, Smith testified that

Furlough and Shea expressed concerns that 

“ . . . there was – were not a lot of people of color in the area and that

well, see, I’m not even sure whether [Plaintiff] had expressed that

concern to them or whether they were concerned for her . . . [T]hey

were concerned that Tanisha’s daughter would not be accepted in the

community. Tanisha’s desire for her daughter, things like ballet

school or jazz dancing or something, I don’t recall, and that they

weren’t sure that, you know, a person of color would be accepted in

those.” 

(Rec. Doc. 46, Ex. G., Deposition of Clark Smith, p. 22, ll. 23-25; p. 27, ll. 17-24). 

Plaintiff argues that Smith’s testimony not only reveals that the decision to fire

Plaintiff was based on her race, but also casts significant doubt on the reasons

proffered by Defendant for her termination.

A review of the evidence before us, mainly the testimony of the Plaintiff,

Shea, Furlough and Smith, lead us to the conclusion that a genuine issue of fact

remains as to whether Defendant’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 14 of 20
15

for Plaintiff’s termination are pretextual. For example, the exchange between

Smith and Shea and Furlough clearly reveals that Plaintiff’s race was a stated topic

of the conversation. In light of all the evidence before us, it would be imprudent to

grant summary judgment at this juncture, because Plaintiff has presented evidence

that arguably raises at least an inference of discrimination. Accordingly, we will

deny the Defendant’s Motion with respect to Count I of the complaint.

B. Counts II and III- Breach of Contract and Promissory Estoppel

Under Pennsylvania law, there exists a rebuttable presumption that

employment is on an at-will basis. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa.

171 (1974); DiBonaventura v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 539 A.2d 865, 867 (Pa.

Super. 1988). Generally, at-will employees may be terminated at any time, for any

reason or for no reason. See Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Municipal Auth., 540 Pa. 391

(1995). The burden of overcoming the at-will presumption rests with the

employee. See Luteran v. Loral Fairchild Corp., 688 A.2d 211, 214 (Pa. Super.

1997). 

“In order to rebut the presumption of at-will employment, a party must

establish one of the following: (1) an agreement for a definite duration; (2) an

agreement specifying that the employee will be discharged for just cause only; (3)

sufficient additional consideration; or (4) an applicable recognized public policy

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 15 of 20
16

exception.” Pinderski v. Commonwealth Telephone Enterprises, Inc., 2006 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 50783, *4-5 (M.D. Pa. 2006)(Munley, J.)(quoting Luteran, 688 A.2d

at 214). “Sufficient additional consideration” is present where “an employee

affords his employer a substantial benefit other than the services which the

employee is hired to perform, or when the employee undergoes a substantial

hardship other than the services which he is hired to perform.” Pinderski, 2006

U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *5 (quoting Darlington v. General Electric, 504 A.2d 306, 315

(Pa. Super. 1986).

As noted by the Defendant, the issue of whether an employee has given

sufficient additional consideration to rebut the presumption is “ordinarily” a jury

question. Peremeter v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 38 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379 (E.D. Pa.

1999). However, a court may decide the issue when the “evidence is so clear that

no reasonable [person] would determine the issue before the court in any way but

one.” Id. (citations omitted).

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Motion with respect to Count II should be

denied because Plaintiff provided sufficient additional consideration, and thus the

presumption of at-will employment has been rebutted. Plaintiff cites the case of

Cashdollar v. Mercy Hosp., 595 A.2d 70 (Pa. Super. 1991) to support her

argument. In Cashdollar, the court found sufficient additional consideration where

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 16 of 20
17

an employee left an existing job, sold his home in Virginia and moved his pregnant

wife and young child to Pittsburgh from Virginia. Likewise, additional

consideration was also found where an employee quit his existing job, rejected a

different job offer, sold his home in Massachusetts and purchased a home in

Pennsylvania, see News Printing Co. Inc., v. Roundy, 597 A.2d 662, 665 (Pa.

Super. 1991), and where the employee left his current employment and an offered

increase in salary, sold his home in California, and made a move to Pennsylvania,

where he purchased property and planned to buy a house. See Scullion v. EMECO

Industries, Inc., 580 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Pa. Super. 1990).

Defendant argues that despite Plaintiff’s argument that she provided

sufficient additional consideration, her claim must fail because she was given an

orientation packet that included a document entitled “Employment At Will

Disclaimer.” See e.g., Peremeter, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 380 (plaintiff signed two

documents that prominently stated he was an at-will employee, therefore the court

was constrained to interpret the relationship as an at-will contract); Sharp v. BI/IP

Int’l Inc., 991 F. Supp. 451, 458 (E. D. Pa. 1998)(“If the parties specifically agreed

that the employment would be at-will, even though additional consideration were

present, we would expect a court to construe the contract according to the parties’

stated intention and hold it to be at- will”). Plaintiff does not dispute that she

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 17 of 20
18

received the “Employment At Will Disclaimer.” (Rec. Doc. 45 at ¶5; Rec. Doc.

41, Ex. C).

Despite the fact that Plaintiff herself moved to Pennsylvania, left her former

job, signed a one-year lease on a house, and prepared for her family to relocate

from Ohio to Pennsylvania, Plaintiff’s admitted receipt of the “Employment At

Will Disclaimer” constrains this court to construe her employment as of an at-will

nature. To do otherwise would render the disclaimer meaningless. It indicates that

Plaintiff’s at-will status was made fully known to her at the inception of her

employment, and thus deprives her of the argument that this status was somehow

eviscerated by the additional consideration she claims to have provided. It

logically follows that Plaintiff cannot maintain a action sounding in contract due to

the at-will nature of the employment relationship between herself and Defendant. 

Accordingly, we shall grant the Defendant’s Motion with respect to Count II.

C. Count III - Promissory Estoppel

 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that promissory estoppel is not

an exception to the general rule of at-will employment. Paul v. Lankanau Hosp.,

569 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1990). Specifically, the court has ruled that “[a]n

employee may be discharged with [or] without cause, and our law does not prohibit

firing an employee for relying on an employer’s promise.” Id.

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 18 of 20
19

As previously noted, we are constrained to view the Plaintiff’s employment

with Defendant as an at-will employment, and accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim of

promissory estoppel must necessarily fail and we shall grant the Defendant’s

Motion with respect to Count III.

CONCLUSION:

For the reasons stated herein, we shall grant the Defendant’s Motion with

respect to Counts II (Breach of Contract) and III (Promissory Estoppel) of the

complaint. We shall deny the Defendant’s Motion with respect to Count I (42

U.S.C. § 1981 claim) inasmuch as we find a genuine issue of material fact remains

as to whether the Defendant’s articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons are

pretext for discrimination.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 39) is GRANTED

in part and DENIED in part to the following extent:

a. Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Counts II

and III.

b. Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to Count I.

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 19 of 20
20

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Defendant and against

the Plaintiff on Counts II and III of the complaint.

s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02606-JEJ Document 51 Filed 10/25/06 Page 20 of 20