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42–748 PDF 2009

S. Hrg. 110–694 

FOCUS ON FUSION CENTERS: A PROGRESS 

REPORT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, 

AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS 

AND INTEGRATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

APRIL 17, 2008 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR 

PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

KRISTIN SHARP, Staff Director 

MICHAEL MCBRIDE, Minority Staff Director 

AMANDA FOX, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statement: Page 

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 2008 

Captain Charles W. Rapp, Director, Maryland Coordination and Analysis 

Center .................................................................................................................... 2 

Matthew Bettenhausen, Director, California Office of Homeland Security ........ 4 

Russell M. Porter, Director, State of Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center ............... 7 

Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 14 

Jack Tomarchio, Deputy Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security ..................................................................... 16 

Vance E. Hitch, Chief Information Officer, U.S. Department of Justice ............ 19 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Bettenhausen, Mathew: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35 

Hitch, Vance E.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 83 

Larence, Eileen R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 14 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 57 

Porter, Russell M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 46 

Rapp, Captain Charles W.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 29 

Tomarchio, Jack: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75 

APPENDIX 

Questions and responses submitted for the Record from: 

Mr. Rapp ........................................................................................................... 96 

Mr. Bettenhausen ............................................................................................. 98 

Mr. Porter .......................................................................................................... 101 

Mr. Tomarchio .................................................................................................. 103 

(1) 

FOCUS ON FUSION CENTERS: A PROGRESS 

REPORT 

THURSDAY, APRIL 17, 2008 

U.S. SENATE,

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND

PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark Pryor, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. I will go ahead and call the meeting to order. I 

want to thank everyone for being here today. 

You may not remember, but years ago there was a game show 

called ‘‘Beat the Clock.’’ That is what we are doing today, because 

the Senate is trying to schedule a series of votes that will start at 

3 or maybe 3:15 p.m.. So I am going to keep my comments short, 

but if you all want to go ahead and take your full 5 minutes on 

your opening, you can. I do not think we have to keep it that short, 

but if you want to abbreviate that, that is fine, too. 

Let me welcome everyone here to the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on 

State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration. 

This hearing is entitled ‘‘Focus on Fusion Centers: A Progress Report.’’ We have a great witness list today that I am going to introduce in just a moment. In this hearing we are trying to assess the 

role of the Federal Government in coordinating with and providing 

guidance to fusion centers. And for the general public who may not 

know what a fusion center is, we are going to be talking about that 

today because there are some different definitions. Different States 

and communities have some nuances within their fusion centers so 

they are not uniform or easy to define. But basically fusion centers 

are a cooperation between two or more agencies that provide resources, expertise, and information with the goal of maximizing the 

ability to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and respond to 

criminal and terrorist activity. I know that is a mouthful, but that 

is generally what they do. 

I would like to go ahead and introduce the first panel. After introductions you may give your 5-minute opening statements. Then 

I will have some questions. We may be joined by other Senators. 

2 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Rapp appears in the Appendix on page 00. 

First, let me welcome Captain Charles Rapp. He is the Director 

of the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center. Captain Rapp 

is a 25-year veteran of the Baltimore County Police Department. In 

addition to his current position, he has held command positions as 

a precinct commander, criminal investigations commander, and 

academy director. He will talk about the day-to-day functions of a 

fusion center and baseline capabilities. 

Next, we will have Matt Bettenhausen, Homeland Security Adviser, State of California. For the past 3 years, he has served the 

State of California while concurrently acting as Chairman of the 

National Governors’ Association’s Homeland Security Advisory 

Council. Prior to that, he was DHS’ first Director of State and Territorial Coordination. He will be looking at coordination and cooperation between State and regional fusion centers, as well as how 

States can use fusion centers to protect critical infrastructure. 

And last, we will have Russell Porter. He is the Director of the 

Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center. Mr. Porter has been assigned to 

work criminal intelligence since 1984. In addition to serving Iowa 

as Fusion Center Director and Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, he 

also holds the chairmanship of the Law Enforcement Intelligence 

Unit, the oldest law enforcement intelligence organization in the 

country. Today he will talk about the importance of prioritizing 

civil liberties and privacy when conducting this type of analysis. 

Captain Rapp, we will start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN CHARLES W. RAPP,1 DIRECTOR, 

MARYLAND COORDINATION AND ANALYSIS CENTER 

Mr. RAPP. Thank you, Chairman Pryor, and I would like to thank 

you for inviting me to provide comments to you today. The fusion 

center program I think is crucial to detecting terrorist activity designed to jeopardize the safety of our citizens. 

Obviously, my comments today are based on my experience managing the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) 

over the past 2 years. I have learned a great deal about the intelligence community and the role fusion centers should play in that 

process. The level of information available to State, local, and tribal 

partners is unprecedented in volume. The flow of this information 

is greatly improved. One of our greatest challenges is to expeditiously process the profusion of information to determine what is 

useful to our consumers. State and local public safety officials require a great deal of information on threats and the mechanics of 

the threats. Managing the information flow is only one challenge 

for fusion centers. 

It is a highly dynamic process. We constantly adjust and refine 

our procedures to ensure maximum information relevance to our 

consumers. Local training for our analysts is key to achieving this 

end. We must teach each analyst to more efficiently glean any and 

all relevant data for their consumers. Federal training programs 

can be beneficial, but usually take an analyst away from the job 

for an extensive period and are not necessarily geared to the local 

level. We need to develop specialized training for State and local 

analysts that can be completed in segments and/or using a multiVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jan 29, 2009 Jkt 042748 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42748.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
3 

faceted method of instruction. It is also imperative that we make 

our Federal partners understand that giving us access to information does not necessarily equate to sharing information. 

Another facet of this process is to educate State and local managers about what information they need and what they can expect 

from the fusion centers. Many State and local managers narrowly 

seek only tactical information, while ignoring a broader strategic 

analysis that could benefit their agencies. The intelligence cycle 

and the information they could receive is still unclear to many of 

these decisionmakers. 

Collection of information is another challenge for the local jurisdictions. In Maryland we have gone to a regional concept. We now 

have three regional centers that are operating in more rural parts 

of the State. We hope to take those regional centers and collect information locally which can benefit the local partners of those regional centers and then direct their information into the MCAC as 

a main hub of information. 

In the MCAC, we will be able to take that information and use 

it with the participating agencies not only to see a better threat 

picture for the entire State of Maryland, but also hopefully to put 

information back to the local agencies, both from the Federal Government and from our main center, that will be beneficial to their 

jurisdictions. 

The additional critical role that fusion centers are fulfilling is a 

conduit to pass information quickly between States so the information is available to first responders when they need it. Fusion centers are poised to detect precursors to terrorist activity. They allow 

for a vigorous exchange of information on breaking events among 

first responders nationwide. Shootings at Virginia Tech and Northern Illinois University are recent examples. One of the first issues 

addressed is establishing if there is a link to terrorism. Obtaining 

and providing accurate information is essential to the role of fusion 

centers, and fusion centers need to act as a hub of information as 

well—places where information can be reported and take the responsibility of passing it to the first responders and others that 

need the information. Fusion centers are sharing more time-sensitive information about organized activities and gang-related activities more quickly than they have in the past. 

Our next largest challenge will be deciding what information and 

capabilities a fusion center should provide. Last year, I sat on a 

committee that developed a draft of baseline capabilities for fusion 

centers. This draft was meant to develop some core capacities and 

to provide some guidance as to the capacities that the group 

thought would be important for fusion centers to meet. The baseline capabilities were meant to be obtainable by each center and 

provide some direction on where they should develop. The criteria 

for the baseline document was developed based on what would satisfy current gaps and would benefit first responders with a statewide information-sharing strategy. Some of the baseline capabilities represent a challenge for many of the centers, including my 

own, which has not met all of the baseline capabilities needs. 

Once baseline capabilities are accepted and adopted, fusion centers will know where to focus efforts to develop core capacities. The 

next step will be funding the core capacities. Once a measure has 

4 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Bettenhausen appears in the Appendix on page 29. 

been developed, then the value of each center can be assessed. 

However, without a consistent funding stream some centers may 

never attain the core capabilities. My own center depends on 

Homeland Security Grant Program Funds and Urban Area Security Initiative Funds to operate the center. 

The next step is using the core capacities to develop the operational components within the States. Baseline capabilities require 

a statewide threat assessment listing vulnerabilities and gaps from 

which prioritized collection requirements can be derived. Once the 

centers develop the prioritized information needs, they can clearly 

communicate that to collectors. Collectors will then report back to 

the fusion centers enhancing the capacity of the State to detect potential precursors to terrorist activity. This should then be the focal 

point for Federal agencies to synthesize their intelligence with any 

intelligence gathered on a local level. This is not happening. The 

FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Forces have been reluctant to integrate 

fusion centers into their intelligence-gathering operations. Instead, 

they continue to rely on State and local task force members to 

relay information to their agencies. This compartmentalization of 

information gathering and sharing is counterproductive and 

counterintuitive to the fusion center concept. Without the full cooperation of our intelligence-gathering agencies, the effectiveness of 

our fusion centers and thereby the safety of our citizens will always 

be compromised. 

We have made many strides in developing linkages to Federal information streams. The Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence and Analysis Division, headed by Under Secretary Charles 

Allen, is proactively moving forward. Over the past 2 years, we 

have developed the Homeland Security Information Network State 

and Local Intelligence Portal Community of Interest, known as HS 

SLIC, which has become a vital link and extremely beneficial tool 

for fusion centers. The advisory board, with one representative 

from each State, approves membership to the portal which ensures 

data is being shared with appropriate audiences. The connectivity 

of the States within this portal is very effective and allows members to exchange information within a secure environment. 

In addition, that advisory board has been called by Mr. Allen to 

offer perspectives to him on the information flow from the State 

and local governments to the Federal Government, and that has 

been an open dialogue which has been very beneficial for the 

States. 

With time running down, I am going to cut off there, but I would 

be happy to answer any of your questions. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Bettenhausen. 

TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW BETTENHAUSEN,1 DIRECTOR, 

CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Thank you, Senator Pryor, and we appreciate your interest in this as well as your leadership in making 

America a safer, better prepared Nation, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here on behalf of Governor Schwarzenegger and the 

National Governors’ Association. 

5 

Because this is also informational, I would like to share a couple 

stories with you to demonstrate why terrorism prevention is 

everybody’s business. 

Prior to September 11, 2001, the view was that terrorism prevention and prosecution was exclusively a Federal function. And it 

was. The FBI had the exclusive jurisdiction over domestically—CIA 

and some of the other intelligence community—and foreign. And 

we had set up a number of walls and barriers to that. And I have 

spent most of my career as a Federal prosecutor, but I have also 

spent probably more than anybody else as a State Homeland Security Adviser, both in California and previously in Illinois. 

But the example that I like to use is Timothy McVeigh in 1995. 

When that Oklahoma City bombing happened, the initial part of 

that investigation moved to Chicago because the Federal building 

had been bombed there but, more importantly, at the time the two 

reservation systems for the United States, Sabre and Apollo, were 

located in Chicago. And we, as a Federal Government, were then 

looking to the international connections to terrorism with that tragic bombing incident. And while we, as a Federal Government, were 

busying ourselves looking for that international connection to terrorism, there was a trooper who was out doing his day-in and dayout job who pulled over an individual for a loose license plate. And 

because he knew something was not right, he held that individual. 

We subsequently realized that Timothy McVeigh, that individual 

he held, was the perpetrator of that and changed the entire course 

of that investigation. 

Moving further along, in 1996, Eric Rudolph, the bomber of abortion clinics and the 1996 Olympics, again was the subject of a wideranging Federal manhunt for nearly 6 years—over 5 years. Eric 

Rudolph was brought to justice by a rookie cop on routine patrol 

while he was dumpster diving behind a grocery store. 

What those two examples illustrate is the importance of local law 

enforcement. They are our eyes and ears that are out there. The 

combating terrorism and terrorism prevention is not just about the 

intel community and the Federal Government. In fact, until we 

fully entrust, empower, and enlist our local first preventers and 

first responders, we are not going to have a truly effective terrorism prevention program. They are the ones who can collect the 

dots so that they can be connected. This is not just about international terrorism, but situations like we have also had in California. Day-in and day-out crimes can lead to these kinds of cells, 

and we saw that in California—in the Los Angeles area—a series 

of convenience store and gas station robberies that just were connected, but little did we know had a huge connection to a cell that 

was intending on bombing LAX, synagogues, military recruiting 

stations, and National Guard depots, which was well along in their 

operational planning. But it was because we had taken the time to 

train individual officers on terrorism awareness that when we executed the search warrant on those apartments, rather than pass 

over jihadi material while they were looking for proceeds, the guns, 

and other evidence of the robbery, they knew that they had something more. And what ensued then was a model of Federal, State, 

county, and local law enforcement cooperation to dismantle and 

prosecute that cell, which will be going to trial this year. 

6 

And when I say terrorism prevention is no longer just a Federal 

responsibility, it is everybody’s business. We frequently talk about 

the public’s responsibility to be prepared. But also, if they see 

something unusual, say something. And the Fort Dix Six case was 

a perfect example of that where an individual citizen working at 

a Circuit City where the terrorists presented their training video 

on how they might attack Fort Dix recognized that something was 

not right. And the actions of that individual citizen resulted in, 

again, another cooperative joint investigation that brought down a 

cell and protected the military folks at Fort Dix. 

So this is what is important about making sure that we enlist, 

entrust, and empower our local law enforcement and other first responders. This includes fire as well. And that is the importance of 

these fusion centers. It is bringing people together. 

The captain just talked about the fact about access. One of the 

things that we just have not gotten around to since September 11, 

2001, is stovepiping of information. The beauty of fusion centers is 

that you can bring people in who have access to their databases 

and can then cooperate and work together and break down these 

barriers that exist and also ensure cooperation and coordination of 

effort. Terrorism prevention is not just about prosecution. It is 

about protecting. It is also about interdicting and stopping something from happening. So it is not just simply a law enforcement 

prosecutorial function. 

So our fusion centers need to be focused on all crime because we 

know terrorists use all crimes, from credit card fraud to the robberies we saw in Los Angeles, to finance their operations. They also 

need to be all-hazards, and when I say ‘‘all-hazards,’’ we need to 

be looking at the consequences that can happen because we are not 

going to be 100 percent successful. We cannot bat a thousand. But 

we also know that we are—in California and throughout the Nation, there is earthquake risk, there are tornadoes, there are 

tsunamis, there are hurricanes that we also have to be prepared 

for. And so in that all-hazard perspective and what you also asked 

me to address is the idea that we also need to enlist the private 

sector and that these fusion centers must also have an infrastructure protection role. And that is critical because we need to be able, 

as we better share information on the international risk and our 

threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, we need to be able to 

match that up in terms of what we need to then look at better protect in terms of the critical infrastructure because we know al 

Qaeda’s interest is in killing a lot of American citizens as well as 

disrupting our way of life. And that includes attacking our infrastructure, whether it is oil pipelines, what makes our country great 

and our economy moving. 

So the idea of integrating infrastructure protection into that is 

an essential need, and that is what we have done in California by 

creating a State Terrorism Threat Assessment System that has a 

State fusion center at the top to coordinate across the State and 

then four regional fusion centers, again, driving this bottom up so 

that we have better information sharing. 

I see that my time is up, and we look forward to your questions. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Porter. 

7 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Porter appears in the Appendix on page 46. 

TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL M. PORTER,1 DIRECTOR, STATE OF 

IOWA INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER 

Mr. PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am especially 

pleased to be here with two of my contemporaries, Mr. Bettenhausen and Mr. Rapp, and I appreciate the Subcommittee’s interest in this topic. 

I want to offer just two points: First, a brief overview about fusion centers and their progress; and, second, some remarks about 

a key priority that has been established by local, tribal, State, and 

Federal Governments as we have moved forward together. 

I appreciate your acknowledgment in my introduction about my 

30 years of experience in law enforcement, 24 of which have been 

in the criminal intelligence business, much of which has been spent 

on advocating for the protection of privacy and civil liberties, and 

I am involved in a host of groups nationally that are advocating for 

this on behalf of fusion centers and to help ensure that we are successful in that area. 

In my 25 years of law enforcement intelligence experience, I 

would say that fusion centers have emerged as what may be the 

most significant change in the structural landscape of criminal intelligence in at least the past 25 years. Overall, we have seen significant, but incremental, progress in many areas of information 

sharing, such as the issuance of national security clearances at unprecedented levels and access to information previously unavailable 

to local and State officials: Collocation of personnel from all levels 

of government at the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and other locations, establishment of the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG), and recurring policy-level meetings 

with local, tribal, State, and Federal officials through the Criminal 

Intelligence Coordinating Council, the ITACG Advisory Council, 

and other groups. Each of those has served to improve our information sharing, and while acknowledging the progress, we recognize 

that there is considerable work yet to be accomplished, and a continued sense of urgency, I think, will help us all maintain the momentum. 

But as we establish this national, integrated network of fusion 

centers and as we work to strengthen our information-sharing capabilities, I think it is important to put first things first. And a key 

priority that has emerged as fusion centers have been developed is 

emphasizing the importance of systemic and institutional protections for privacy and civil liberties protections. 

In looking at the history of this type of work in the United 

States, it is one of the key areas that could pose a downfall if we 

do not give it the priority that it deserves, and let me give a brief 

history, if I may. 

The 1960s, as we all know, were a period of turbulence and unrest. We saw reported crime rise dramatically, and we saw outbreaks of civil disorder. Federal commissions and agencies advocated that local and State law enforcement agencies develop intelligence capabilities. In 1967, the President’s Crime Commission 

urged every major city police department to have an intelligence 

unit. In 1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil DisVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jan 29, 2009 Jkt 042748 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42748.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
8 

orders, the Kerner Commission, recommended that police agencies 

establish an intelligence system. In 1968, the creation of LEAA, the 

Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, provided funding and 

technical support from LEIA to establish some of these intelligence 

systems. And finally, in 1973, the National Advisory Committee on 

Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommended that every police agency and every State establish and maintain the capability 

to gather and disseminate information. In fact, they recommended 

that every State establish a central gathering, analysis, and storage capability. 

We are starting to see much of that history again. We are reliving it at this time. However, unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when we 

experienced a pattern of violations of privacy and civil liberties in 

our history and in our practices, we are taking steps to try and prevent that from occurring by establishing and institutionalizing the 

strongest possible protections for privacy and civil liberties. And, in 

fact, I would market as a bright spot, as a star, the coordination 

among levels of government with respect to this particular issue. 

Rather than separately delivering training and technical assistance 

to fusion centers, the Federal partners that we have—in particular, 

the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, 

with support from the Program Manager’s Office at the Information Sharing Environment, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the FBI, through support from Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative—have combined their training 

and technical assistance in this area to deliver it to every fusion 

center in the country at the beginning of this process of establishing this national integrated network of fusion centers. 

And so as with other important issues surrounding the establishment of fusion centers, there is much more work to do in this area, 

but it is one of the bright spots in our progress with fusion centers. 

And on behalf of my colleagues with whom I work at all levels of 

government, I appreciate the opportunity to have appeared here 

today. Thank you for your time, and I look forward to any questions you may have. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for your 

service and for your testimony this morning. What do each of you 

see as the most important contribution that fusion centers are 

making or can make to safety and security? What is the most important thing? Do you want to go ahead and start, Mr. Rapp? 

Mr. RAPP. Sure. Thank you, Senator. I think probably the most 

important thing that we find is they are sharing information between States more quickly. We are taking a lot of information that 

previously would not have been necessarily available to other law 

enforcement agencies and sending that information out, crossing 

jurisdictions so you no longer have those boundaries. 

The other thing I think is important is we are taking Federal law 

enforcement information, and we are blending that with local information to make sure the beat cop has information from all the Federal agencies, such as ICE or FBI, information passed down to the 

street level. I think that is one of the key things I have never seen 

in my career, and that is working now. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. Following on, I agree wholeheartedly with 

that, and it is about leveraging the resources. Look, there are only 

9 

tens of thousands of Federal law enforcement—sworn law enforcement agencies. There are over 800,000 law enforcement agencies 

sworn at the State and local level. And, again, if we fully enlist 

with them by providing them the education and information that 

they need so that they can have terrorism awareness training, this 

is a key to prevention in this country. 

I think the other key idea about this is, look, we are never—it 

is difficult. It was a sea change for Federal agencies in terms of cooperating and providing information, breaking down the walls, 

even within the Department of Justice, that the counterterrorism 

folks could not talk with the criminal investigation people. So 

breaking down these walls by actually having Federal partners, 

State partners, county and local working together at that level, it 

breaks those walls down. There is a lot of bureaucracy that tends 

to get built up, and it is very hard to change the business process 

out here in DC. But in the field, where the rubber meets the road, 

that is the advantage that these fusion centers bring. And just 

tying it in a little bit more, though, with everyday hazards, having 

people thinking in advance and what we are doing in terms of infrastructure protection, in terms of what is critical infrastructure, 

what are the cascading effects, how are we going to protect this, 

and how would we respond, whether it is an earthquake that 

knocks down a building or whether it is another criminal act of 

man, such as Timothy McVeigh, how are we going to respond to 

save lives and property first, as our first priority, but how do we 

help them by understanding what is there and what is critical to 

prevent it from becoming a bigger incident, and how do we quickly 

recover. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Porter. 

Mr. PORTER. From my perspective, fusion centers are about 

knowing your environment. For people who manage resources and 

have stewardship over resources or who must be involved in helping allocate those resources or change security posture, we have to 

understand the threat environment that exists out there, which 

comes from sharing information, but that then better allows one to 

leverage resources. So it is about reducing uncertainty, reducing or 

preventing strategic surprise and hopefully tactical surprise; and 

when you are homeland security adviser or public safety commissioner with resources to allocate, you want to make sure that you 

direct them in the right place based on knowing your environment. 

Senator PRYOR. All three of you have touched on information. 

You have said it in different ways and talked about different aspects of it. But, Mr. Bettenhausen, in your opening statement, you 

mentioned the traditional problem of stovepiping. I am curious 

about your thoughts, and the panel’s thoughts, on the progress we 

are making with regard to breaking down the stovepipes. You have 

all talked about how important it is to share information. As I understand it, you all have access to lots and lots and lots of different 

databases, some Federal, some otherwise. And are you able to, 

first, access all the information you need? And, second, are you able 

to analyze it and understand it and actually use it to help? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. It is a work in progress. We have made 

progress. I think all of us at the Federal, State, and local level are 

a little frustrated, 7 years after September 11, 2001, that there still 

10 

are things that need to be improved. But we are making good 

progress. Having embedded DHS analysts in our fusion centers, 

having the FBI there, having State and local representatives at the 

National Counterterrorism Center is key because part of the problem is that there is a disconnect. They do not understand at the 

Federal level and at the traditional international community. They 

hear us yapping all the time that we have information needs and 

information requirements. But what they are missing is that we 

are also intel and information producers that you need this information to analyze as well. 

I do continue to get frustrated. I mean, we start off on a lot of 

different pilots that the Federal Government throws out there that 

are creating new and additional stovepipes, and we are not breaking them down and consolidating them. But the fusion center 

helps, though, and also can, in essence, do some privacy and civil 

liberty protection because you bring people who have access to 

those databases. You ensure the measures that they have in place 

about who has appropriate access to it. But everybody has access 

to it by being together, working together in a fusion center. But it 

still troubles me. 

One of the ways that we came around to get around this is because—and this is the same problem for the private sector, and it 

is the same for law enforcement. Do you want me to get my terrorism information from law enforcement online, HISN online, 

ATAC’s, all of the groups of different places that you could be 

going? I cannot have terrorism liaison officers and people who have 

this responsible in the field have to remember their passwords and 

go onto 17 different sites to search for information. Again, access 

to the information is not the same as sharing information. 

One of the ways that we overcame that in California is we created CalJRIES, and what we do as a State with our partners at 

DOJ and the Highway Patrol is we visit all of those sites and pull 

out the relevant counterterrorism information that we want shared 

with our law enforcement officers and our terrorism liaison officers 

so that they have a one-stop shop. But the stovepiping continues, 

and I am afraid the factory is still open here in DC. 

Senator PRYOR. Do you have a comment, Mr. Porter? 

Mr. PORTER. Yes, if I may just very briefly. The Global Justice 

Information Sharing Initiative, which is a Federal advisory committee for the Department of Justice, has done some great work in 

terms of trying to address some of these stovepipes. One of the 

projects they have underway is called the Global Federated Identity and Privilege Management Initiative, and that is one which 

will help address some of these stovepipes when that gets rolled 

out with more people engaged in that. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. 

Mr. RAPP. A quick comment, Senator. Just looking at the Federal 

picture, there has been a great deal of information flow. We have 

some products in the center, like the Homeland Security Data Network, which is the secret-level environment, but we have a lot of 

access to that. We still have some battles we need to fight because 

there is a lot of information on there, and we cannot search that 

portal yet because DOD does not allow us access to search that porVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jan 29, 2009 Jkt 042748 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42748.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11 

tal. DHS has taken that fight with DOD, but we are still talking 

about it, a year after it was introduced to the center. 

The second thing I think we are really missing with the FBI, the 

FBI in Baltimore covers Baltimore and Delaware. They have about 

200 agents in their office. We have just in the Baltimore metro 

area over 5,000 cops. They are starting an initiative where they are 

going to go out and look to try and develop sources on the street. 

We already have developed sources on the street that could benefit 

them. The problem is they still see the JTTF as information that 

should not be shared with the locals. And they can share it specifically through the fusion centers so it does not get broadcast out to 

a number of people. 

But those are the issues I think we need to work on because I 

think we are missing some of the local components or the streetlevel components that need to go back into the Federal intelligence 

communities. 

Senator PRYOR. Some of that sounds a little cultural. 

Let me ask, Captain Rapp, a few practical questions about fusion 

centers. In a fusion center, who is the decisionmaker? If decisions 

have to be made and it is this shared environment, who actually 

has the final call? 

Mr. RAPP. In our fusion center, which is maybe a little bit different than the others, but, I mean, typical chain of command, the 

director would make the call if there is information that needs to 

get out. If there is a dispute between us and the Federal agencies, 

we also have the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) for the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office. And we have a U.S. Attorney that sits as 

Chairman of that Council. So if it comes to butting heads between 

whether we disseminate information or not, or get it, we can always use the U.S. Attorney as a neutral party to decide because 

they are the ones that prosecute the cases as well. 

Senator PRYOR. Is that how you all do it? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. That is true, but the ideal should be that 

nobody has ownership of the fusion center. I mean, you have a director and you have leadership. But it should be how we respond 

to disasters, the incident command and unified command that everybody should feel a part of ownership. And so in the ideal world, 

the director does not have to make that decision. You come to consensus. The director does have the final call, but the difficulty is 

that oftentimes, in each of our fusion centers, they are different. 

One is FBI; mostly it is local law enforcement. We have great leaders running our fusion centers. But they do not make the call. If 

it is originator controlled coming from Washington, DC—and that 

can be very frustrating if we think that this is a timely piece of 

information that gets to come out. We don’t get to make that needto-know call, and we have to go back up and fight the chain further 

above us. Then it is beyond just the director at the fusion center. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. One of my colleagues in the House, Jane 

Harman, said not long ago that she feels like there should be an 

association of State fusion centers to help advocate and help educate. Do you all agree with Representative Harman on that? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. We do, and, in fact, we just had a huge conference, a nationwide conference in San Francisco, where we 

brought all of the fusion centers together. We have talked about it 

12 

here, too, that this bottom-up approach, we are producing and having better information on local incidents that could have national 

implication or much better sharing State to State. At some point 

I think the Feds are going to see much more of the value in the 

fusion centers in terms of how much information we are generating 

and sharing. 

The Nation has broken off into regions. We are also cooperating 

in regions and, for example, for California, we also have States of 

interest where we share, for example, with Texas, Arizona, and 

New Mexico, the Southern border, that we are also meeting and 

interconnecting our fusion centers. 

So in terms of the—the national conference brings us all together, and then we have these regional working groups from the 

Western to the Northeast, the Southeast, and the Midwest in terms 

of having these fusion centers working together. But on a day-in/ 

day-out basis, these fusion centers are connecting up on their own. 

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, since that conference there has been 

considerable interest expressed from fusion center directors 

through the contacts that I have in these various organizations 

about trying to move forward with such a consortium or such a 

gathering as a way of trying to have a consolidated voice and being 

able to communicate on issues quickly and in an agile kind of way 

when there are questions that rise up about, what is happening out 

in the fusion center domain. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. All three of you have positive experiences 

with fusion centers, and you feel like they are good. I assume you 

all believe in the concept, and we all recognize there are issues and 

challenges but, still, great concept, doing great things. If you are 

sitting in my chair here, how do you measure success? How do we 

know that these really are doing great things? I know there is a 

lot of anecdotal evidence of it, but how do we measure success? 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. That is one of the difficult things because if 

nothing happens, you are proving the negative. And so there are 

a lot of things in terms of the—it is not just anecdotal. When you 

look at the prosecutions, such as the JIS case in California that involved prison radicalization and an operational cell in Los Angeles, 

or the Fort Dix, those things have been interdicted, and the work 

of the fusion centers has helped in that. 

In terms of the analysis that is being done, it is hard and it is 

a mistake that we only go down the route of prosecutions being the 

numbers that we count. And that is what FBI Director Mueller has 

talked about. The sea change that we have to have is that prevention is the key, not prosecution. And you are always going to 

have—I have thought about this a lot in terms of the metrics that 

you try to put on top of this. It is difficult because you cannot tell 

sometimes if you are a success. 

But as we get more reporting, for example, on suspicious incident 

reporting, if terrorists are targeting a site, there is going to be 

planning, there is going to be targeting, there is going to be operational surveillance. And they also look at this, if the security posture changes, they look elsewhere. But you are never going to know 

that until you ultimately unravel one of these things. But the more 

information that we get in collecting suspicious activity reporting— 

which is a metric. How much more are we hearing from our chemVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jan 29, 2009 Jkt 042748 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42748.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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ical plants about surveillance? How much more are we hearing 

from other pieces of key infrastructure about surveillance so that 

we can look? And do we have a rise off the baseline? And that type 

of reporting is one way that you could have a metric, but the true 

success is nothing happening, and then that is a very difficult thing 

to measure. 

Senator PRYOR. Right. Let me ask, Mr. Porter, if I may, about 

privacy. When I think about the information a fusion center has, 

it is a very impressive amount of information. You can pull together, things like cell phone numbers, insurance claims, driver’s 

license information, photos, and, you can really collect a lot of information on people. And that ability invites abuse, and I know 

that is one of the things you have focused on over the last several 

years. Furthermore, if we are not very careful with that information, it could get into the wrong hands. 

So let me ask about privacy. As I understand it, maybe a little 

less than half, maybe around a third of the fusion centers around 

the country have submitted privacy plans? Do you know? 

Mr. PORTER. I think that is—all of them are in the process of 

doing that, but I think there are about—more than 20, but I cannot 

cite the specific number as of today. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. So tell me what these privacy plans will be 

and why we have them and what safeguards we are putting in 

place to make sure the information is not wrongly used or falls into 

the wrong hands. 

Mr. PORTER. Sure. Great question, and, again, a critically important issue. I appreciate your interest in it. 

First of all, in terms of the types of information that you mentioned, there are certainly times when I use my cell phone and list 

it on, say, a voter registration record or some other type of record 

where it gets into the public domain and it is available to others. 

And so much of that information that a fusion center may have access to is something that law enforcement agencies have access for 

years in investigating crime. But that becomes a key point, is the 

criminal predication, that is what launches an inquiry or a gathering of information. 

When agencies are adhering to 28 C.F.R. Part 23 in the Code of 

Federal Regulations, the regulations that govern criminal intelligence systems and the operating policies for those systems, there 

is a requirement that at least for the storage of information that 

it meet the level of reasonable suspicion. And civil liberties advocates have been very satisfied and supportive of that standard. And 

that is a threshold that is key in these privacy policies and civil 

liberties protections policies that they adhere to that. 

There are certainly times, however, when fusion centers are receiving information that does not rise to the level of reasonable 

suspicion, and so through the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating 

Council, we have drafted a tips and leads policy paper that identifies this issue as one that we need to get our hands around as we 

receive this information, what is the right way to deal with it and 

what is the best way to deal with it? 

So there are still some challenges there. Those privacy and civil 

liberties policy templates were developed from a broad array of people across not only the justice system but people that are civil libVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jan 29, 2009 Jkt 042748 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42748.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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1The prepared statement of Ms. Larence appears in the Appendix on page 57. 

erties advocates and provided input into those to make sure we 

have in that framework issues that relate to data aggregation and 

ensuring that when you bring data from multiple sources together, 

you are not mixing data about Person A and Person B and causing 

some erroneous information to take place. That policy addresses 

things like that. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. Well, listen, I want to thank the first 

panel. You all have been spectacular. Unfortunately, we are going 

to have to close this panel because we are going to be voting in 30 

minutes or so. If I could ask you all to relinquish your seats and 

let the second panel come forward. 

What we will do here as a matter of logistics, we will allow any 

Senators on the Subcommittee to submit questions in writing. We 

will leave the record open for 2 weeks, so it is possible you all will 

get some written questions from various Subcommittee Members. 

Mr. BETTENHAUSEN. I also did want to thank you and the Chairs 

of the overall Homeland Security Committees, both in the Senate 

and in the House, for their support for fusion centers and the legislation that you put to allow our Federal grant funds to be used for 

personnel. We are still struggling with U.S. DHS to allow that 

sustainment funding for these critical positions that are also leveraged by our State and local people serving there. So we appreciate 

your support on that. Thank you. 

Senator PRYOR. You are more than welcome. Thank you. 

While the second panel is coming up, I will go ahead and introduce them like I did the first panel. First will be Eileen Larence. 

She is Director of Homeland Security and Justice for GAO. She 

joined GAO in 1979 and has managed reviews on Federal programs 

ranging from defense and intelligence systems to hazardous waste 

cleanup. 

Next we will have Jack Tomarchio, and he is Deputy Under Secretary of Operations at the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at 

the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to joining DHS in 

2005, he was a national security lawyer in private practice. 

And third will be Van Hitch. He is the Chief Information Officer 

at DOJ and DOJ’s representative to the National Information 

Sharing Council. He has an M.A. in systems management, a B.A. 

in physics, and has served also in the Navy. 

I want to welcome all of you, and, Ms. Larence, go ahead. 

TESTIMONY OF EILEEN R. LARENCE,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. LARENCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to discuss 

GAO’s work on State and local fusion centers, what they are, challenges they face, and Federal support to date. 

After September 11, 2001, States and major urban and regional 

areas realized they needed their own capability to collect, analyze, 

and share terrorism information and created fusion centers. They 

typically include personnel from State, local, and Federal law enforcement and homeland security entities; in some cases, emergency responders, the National Guard, and the private sector. The 

15 

Federal Government provides centers information and access to numerous systems and sources of data and is creating a national network of centers to enhance sharing. 

Most recently, the Congress in the 9/11 Commission Act and the 

Administration in the National Strategy for Information Sharing 

called for Federal support to centers through grants, technology, 

training, and other means. 

Last fall, we reported that, based on our interviews with center 

directors in 58 State and select urban areas and our visits to numerous centers, we learned three things: One, centers vary widely; 

two, Federal help is addressing but has not fully resolved their 

challenges; and, three, centers are concerned about Federal commitment to sustaining them over the long term. 

To elaborate, we learned that most centers were considered operational, but this ranged from having 5 to 80 personnel and from 

a few to 20 member agencies. Most centers are relatively new, open 

since January 2004. Forty-one said they focused not only on terrorism but also on all crimes or all hazards because they recognized crime can be a precursor to terrorism and this broader focus 

brings more partners and more resources to the table. 

Law enforcement entities led most centers, and 12 were collocated with FBI field units, such as Joint Terrorism Task Forces. 

Centers provide intelligence products ranging from alerts and bulletins to in-depth reports. They take tips from the public and share 

them with Federal agencies as appropriate. 

Centers identified five major challenges that Federal support to 

date is to address, but they are not yet fully resolved. First, some 

centers said they have to access too many systems and get too 

much information that can be redundant and not useful, bogging 

down our analysts. Justice and Homeland Security provide centers 

access to classified and unclassified systems and networks. The 

agencies report they are trying to better define centers’ information 

requirements, issue joint products, and solicit feedback on the usefulness of information provided. GAO has not yet assessed these efforts. 

A Federal working group was also supposed to review ways to 

streamline access to some systems, and the new Interagency 

Threat Assessment and Coordination Group, made permanent in 

the 9/11 Act, is to ensure threat information is coordinated across 

Federal agencies before it is disseminated. But the group has had 

start-up problems. Continued oversight of these issues would be 

helpful. 

Second, some centers say they need more security clearances. It 

takes too long to get them, and agencies do not always honor each 

other’s clearances, despite mandates to do so. Justice and Homeland Security continue to provide clearances and to reduce processing time, but were not aware of addressing the issue of honoring 

each other’s clearances at the time of our review. Again, oversight 

could help here as well. 

Third, a number of centers want more specific operational howto guidance and had challenges finding training for their analysts. 

Justice and Homeland Security issued fusion center guidelines and, 

more recently, draft baseline capabilities that outline operational 

standards centers should achieve. This helps but may not provide 

16 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Tomarchio appears in the Appendix on page 75. 

the detailed how-to operational steps some centers still need. Agencies are also providing courses, grant funds, and training technical 

assistance, but centers would like more help with standardized curricula for their analysts and perhaps a certification process. 

Fourth, some centers say that it is tough for partner agencies to 

afford to detail staff, an important source of personnel for centers, 

and to find, attract, and competitively pay analysts to keep them. 

The FBI has provided at least 200 personnel across most centers 

to date, and Homeland Security has personnel in 23 centers. But 

they still worry about meeting long-term staffing needs. 

Finally, a number of centers are concerned about sustaining operations long term. Some say it is tough to compete for State funds 

and that the Federal grant process is complex, restricted, uncertain, and decreasing. Homeland Security has provided grants for 

fusion-related activities, expanded allowable costs, and gave centers more time to spend funds. But some centers worry about restrictions, such as 2-year limits on funds for analysts, and whether 

funds will be available long term. 

We recommended that the Federal Government articulate the 

role it expects to play in centers, especially in sustaining them. The 

recent National Strategy in the 9/11 Act addressed the Federal role 

and also stated that the government will help to sustain centers, 

but how or to what extent must still be answered. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I would be happy 

to answer any questions. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Tomarchio. 

TESTIMONY OF JACK TOMARCHIO,1 DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. TOMARCHIO. Thank you, Senator Pryor, for the opportunity 

to come before you today to talk about the progress fusion centers 

have made in the last 3 years. I hope my testimony helps this Subcommittee in its continuing efforts to assist the States and the 

major urban areas in the development and continuing improvement 

of these centers. In addition to my oral statement, I ask that my 

written statement, previously provided your staff, be incorporated 

into the record today. 

The first and most important piece of progress I have for you 

today is that DHS’ Office of Intelligence and Analysis now has 23 

of its officers deployed and serving in fusion centers around the 

country. These officers have become the pathfinders for the way the 

Federal Government shares information and intelligence with its 

State, local, and tribal partners. These talented men and women 

are using their varied experiences and skills as intelligence professionals to provide their other Federal, State, local, and tribal partners with the information they need to keep America safe—and 

connected. Those very same skills allow them to cull the best of 

what the fusion centers are collecting and analyzing information 

and seeing that this information gets to where it needs to go. This 

has never been done before, and this is why Secretary Chertoff, 

Under Secretary Charlie Allen, and I are proud of these officers 

17 

and what they have accomplished in such a relatively short period 

of time. 

Please don’t take just my word for this record of achievement. 

When I was at the Fusion Center Conference in San Francisco in 

February, I was gratified by the number of State and local officials 

who came up to me and to Under Secretary Allen to voice their unsolicited praise for the work our officers are doing. I have no doubt 

that you will find the same reactions when you talk to your State’s 

homeland security advisers and local law enforcement and public 

safety officials. 

Secretary Chertoff, Under Secretary Allen, and I have committed 

the Department to increase the number of these officers by the end 

of this fiscal year and provide them with all the tools that they 

need to succeed in their collective mission to prevent, protect, and 

respond to any threat or hazard that America faces. 

I am happy to report that one of those tools, the Homeland Security Data Network (HSDN), is now deployed in 19 fusion centers. 

HSDN, as you know, allows access to the National Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC, online, a classified portal that maintains the most current terrorism-related information at the secret 

level. HSDN also provides the fusion centers—and through them 

the States—with a window into the national intelligence community that they can use for their own information needs. 

Another progress report I am happy to deliver is one on security 

clearances. When I arrived at DHS from the private sector 21⁄2

years ago, the wait time to receive a security clearance at the secret level was almost 2 years, and the backlog was enormous. 

Thanks to the efforts of DHS’ Office of Intelligence Analysis and its 

Office of Security, we have dramatically reduced the amount of 

time it takes to grant those clearances and nearly eliminated the 

backlog. The FBI has also played an integral role in reducing this 

backlog over the past 2 years, especially by working to establish a 

reciprocal clearance process whereby security clearances for fusion 

center personnel are recognized by both agencies, regardless of 

which agency issued the clearance. 

The fusion center program is yielding substantial returns on investment. In the past 6 weeks, information from two of the centers 

has been passed to a key international partner in the war on terrorism, who then opened cases after receiving this information. 

DHS received a letter expressing that country’s gratitude for the 

information. In another case, information fused at a center in the 

Midwest was briefed to the President in the President’s Daily 

Brief—a first for a fusion center. This information would not have 

been gleaned without State and local participation in the process, 

and it illustrates the importance of the centers to the Federal Government. 

However, while successful thus far, there is still much work to 

do in the creation of policies and procedures that ensure a predictable and uniform approach on how we interact within these centers. The State and Local Program Office within DHS will work 

hard over the next year to solidify our program and bring certainty 

to that relationship. 

I have given you these progress highlights. Now let me provide 

some additional context as to how far we have come in the last couVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:33 Jan 29, 2009 Jkt 042748 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\42748.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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ple of years and some of the significant changes and challenges 

that await us as we move forward to better prepare the American 

people for the threats that they face. 

Working with our colleagues in the Department of Justice, we 

undertook the challenge of creating the Fusion Center Guidelines. 

These guidelines, which complement the President’s National 

Strategy for Information Sharing, were an important first step in 

formalizing the Federal Government’s relationship with State and 

local fusion centers. To assist the States and urban areas in meeting their intelligence and information needs, DHS created a Program Office within I&A to work specifically with the fusion centers 

as they begin to develop and grow. 

Within I&A itself, we have developed an excellent analytical support to our customers. The Analytical and Production Division, 

A&P, provides support specifically dedicated to Critical Infrastructure Protection Assessment, CBRNE, Borders, Radicalization, and 

Demographics. Each of these divisions has developed an analytical 

relationship with their State and local peers. As a result of these 

relationships, we have seen a tremendous growth in the number of 

analytical products, sometimes carrying the seals of four and five 

partners. 

To foster collaboration and share best practices and lessons 

learned within the fusion center network, DHS sponsors the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence Community of Interest, 

HS SLIC, a virtual community of intelligence analysts from across 

the country—currently, 1,000 members from 42 States and the District of Columbia, as well as six Federal departments. Through the 

HS SLIC, intelligence analysts across the country collaborate via 

weekly threat conference calls, analytic conferences, and a secure 

Web portal for intelligence information sharing at the sensitivebut-unclassified level. 

I see I am now out of time, but let me just say this in conclusion. 

The fusion centers are a new and important tool to keeping our Nation safe. They have made exponential progress in the past few 

years to accomplish that mission. There are still many challenges 

left to ensure that these centers live up to their full potential. The 

DHS, together with our colleagues at the Department of Justice, 

are committed to working with the Congress and with the thousands of State and local law enforcement officers, firefighters, public health officials, and other first responders to ensure that the security of our Nation and its citizens is safeguarded. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. 

We will leave the record open—excuse me. We will allow your 

written statements to be part of the record. That is something that 

we will clean up here at the end, but certainly your written statements are part of the record. 

Mr. Hitch. 

19 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Hitch appears in the Appendix on page 83. 

TESTIMONY OF VANCE E. HITCH,1 CHIEF INFORMATION 

OFFICER, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. HITCH. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very 

much for the invitation to speak to you today. 

On October 31, 2007, the President issued and released the National Strategy for Information Sharing which basically describes 

the vision and road map for how the various components of the 

Federal Government will work with State, local, and tribal, as well 

as private sector officials across the Nation. As both the Chief Information Officer and the Information Sharing Council representative for the Department of Justice, I am very proud to discuss the 

accomplishments of the Department in the area of fusion center 

support. This is truly a departmental effort. I am really here representing many offices, not only the Office of the CIO, the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance, the Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, the 

Executive Office of the U.S. Attorneys, and, of course, the FBI. 

The FBI is really our front line for direct operational support to 

the fusion centers, as you have heard in some of the other testimonies. But the other DOJ law enforcement offices also make contributions on a daily basis to the fusion centers. 

Today, I will highlight some of the Department’s efforts to implement the National Strategy for Information Sharing as well as the 

intent of Congress per the 9/11 Act. 

As an instrumental partner in all of this is the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee, which you have heard a little bit about 

today, called Global. BJA started the Global Justice Information 

Sharing Initiative and its subgroup, the Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council, over 8 years ago. And that was before September 11, 2001. And the CICC has not only nurtured the idea, the 

framework, and developed guidelines for fusion centers, but also it 

has worked to ensure that these fusion centers are successful in 

their stated missions. 

We are preparing to release, as you have heard, new fusion center baseline standards in May 2008, which will serve as the 

foundational elements for integrating fusion centers into the Information Sharing Environment, measuring success and facilitating 

ongoing operations. Much of the progress we have made can be 

credited to Ambassador Ted McNamara in his role as Program 

Manager for the Information Sharing Environment. He has 

brought the agencies together to make this network of fusion centers a reality. We coordinate all of our fusion center efforts, along 

with DHS and DNI, via the National Fusion Center Coordinating 

Group, which has representation within DOJ among four of our offices. The NFCCG has helped move the ball forward by getting 

Federal officials to agree to plans while also pulling the local representatives together to prioritize their needs. 

While many of these fusion centers play a key role in preventing 

terrorist activities, I cannot overemphasize the valuable role they 

can and do play in reducing all types of crime. These fusion centers 

play an important role in protecting their communities by fostering 

something we call information-led policing efforts and focusing resources on the biggest local problems. 

20 

Fusion centers, as you know, first sprang up after September 11, 

2001, as a mechanism to coordinate and share information among 

jurisdictions. Their main value-add is putting people and information together to connect the dots. Fusion centers are critical to 

helping solve interstate and national crime, such as drug or gun 

trafficking. My office, on behalf of the Deputy Attorney General, 

plans and coordinates the Law Enforcement Information Sharing 

Plan, which I developed in the year 2004. We are now beginning 

to see the benefits of this plan as we roll out sharing solutions 

across the country. 

I could talk for a long time about that, but we will refer this Subcommittee to my OCIO website and also a website called NIEM for 

further technology information. 

My colleague from DHS has discussed the sharing of classified 

information and the necessary safeguards and protections that 

must be employed. With regard to sensitive-but-unclassified information, where really the bulk of information sharing can and 

should occur, we have worked very closely with the DHS element 

of ICE to make our approach both joint and seamless to the State 

and locals. 

Also, fusion centers operate under a multitude of regulatory 

frameworks intended to ensure that information is handled in a 

way that protects both the privacy and the legal rights of Americans. Fusion centers are owned and operated by State and local 

governments, and they are required to comply not only with State 

and local laws but also Federal laws. 

Also, grants awarded by both DOJ and DHS in 2007 included 

conditional language that mandated the use of the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), for all technology projects to assure that they will be interoperable and be able to share information. This is significant for two reasons in that it validated the use 

of NIEM and it also illustrates that DHS and DOJ are basically on 

the same page on technical issues. 

In conclusion, I would like to leave this Subcommittee with one 

final thought. Validating a negative is just as important as proving 

a positive. Said differently, building an integrated network of fusion centers will enable local decisionmakers to quickly know if an 

event is either local or national in scope. 

Just recently, here in the Nation’s capital, we had two current 

examples, with the Pope’s visit and the recent food poisoning scare 

at Reagan National Airport. State and Federal officials worked together to create an excellent threat assessment for the Holy Father 

as he traveled from Maryland to DC to New York, and on April 3, 

the fusion centers were able to quickly respond to an event that 

initially caused alarm and identify it as non-terrorist so that 

counterterrorism and law enforcement forces were not mobilized for 

an isolated bad-fish issue at a local hotel. 

We, in the Federal Government, must empower the fusion centers, leverage them, and help them build their capabilities. There 

is much work to be done, but we have made a lot of progress so 

far and look forward to providing Congress with updates on our 

progress. 

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions. 

21 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, and I thank all of you for your testimony and your statements. 

Let me start with you, Ms. Larence. Your GAO report, which I 

believe was dated October of last year, roughly 6 months ago. Are 

you aware of anything that has changed in the last 6 months that 

you might want to update your report? 

Ms. LARENCE. No, sir. We did do some basic updating with both 

the Departments and the recent legislation that came out, the National Strategy that came out since our report was updated. And 

we also had staff in the National Fusion Center Conference recently in March that helped us to make sure that the issues that 

we were talking about were still relevant. 

Senator PRYOR. Ms. Larence, you have been able to look at these 

fusion centers objectively. As I understand it, you have identified 

a number of things that are very promising and very positive, and 

then you have identified some areas where they have their challenges and they need to resolve those and improve, etc. 

You are probably the most objective person in the room about 

this. What do you think the next step for these fusion centers is? 

What are the areas where they really need to focus to take the concept of fusion center where it is really achieving the objective? 

Ms. LARENCE. I think they have a couple of issues to deal with. 

One, as we mentioned, the centers vary tremendously. If you have 

been to New York City’s center, it is the gold standard for fusion 

centers. I am not suggesting that all centers have those capabilities, but there are other centers that are just in the planning 

phases. And so some centers still need basic help to maintain this 

baseline level of capability, and they need help developing their fusion process and developing analysts that have the capabilities to 

do the work that they need to do on the information. 

I think, second, the biggest concern, since a lot of the centers— 

not all of them, because some of them are well funded through 

their State partners, but some of the centers are very concerned 

about their ability to sustain operations long term. Some are very 

dependent on Federal grants, but there are time limits to those 

grants, and they are concerned about being able to compete for 

State funds if Federal grants do dry up. 

So I think funding and building analytical capabilities are probably two of the most important pieces that they are facing. 

Senator PRYOR. All right. Let me ask about that grant piece because I have heard from some local officials that it is hard for them 

to really plan for the future if they are not certain about their 

funding sources. 

Do you have a recommendation on what the Congress or the Federal agencies should do to make sure that these local fusion centers 

can plan? 

Ms. LARENCE. Well, I think our recommendation put on the table 

the policy call that the Federal Government needs to decide whether it wants to be sort of more of a weed-and-seed program, so they 

provide initial funding to get these centers started, but then the 

centers really need to develop some other mechanisms to sustain 

operations over the long term; or if the Federal Government is 

building a national network of centers, relying on these centers, 

asking them to meet baseline capabilities, then does the Federal 

22 

Government feel an obligation to be able to continue to fund these 

centers over the long term? So I think that is probably the policy 

trade-off call there, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. I see. Let me ask our two Federal agency witnesses about the issue of funding these centers long term. I know 

to some extent that is a Congressional question, but it also is an 

agency departmental question as well. 

Do you think that we should make a long-term commitment to 

funding these fusion centers. Let me start with you, Mr. Tomarchio. 

Mr. TOMARCHIO. Senator Pryor, I think that would be a well-reasoned consideration by the Federal Government. We see about 58 

fusion centers that are up and running right now. As Ms. Larence 

said, they are in various stages of maturity. Some are very robust. 

Others are really just getting their sea legs. But the problems that 

we see across the full spectrum of the fusion centers are, I think, 

fairly consistent. There are training issues, and there are issues of 

connectivity and certainly issues of sustainability. And I know 

when we were at the National Fusion Center Conference in San 

Francisco, I spoke to a number of folks from around the country, 

and several of the fusion centers felt that they were living on borrowed time. And if you can imagine a dark black map of the United 

States with a light in the different States that have the fusion centers. I think it is not beyond the pale that within a certain period 

of time, you will see lights blinking out. And I think we need to 

recognize that because the advancements that we have made and 

that have been made by the State and locals within the fusion centers and their interrelationship with the Federal Government and 

the intelligence community and the Federal law enforcement community have been, I think, very admirable. And for us to go back 

to square one and say, well, that was a great idea but we have a 

funding issue and, I am sorry, it is not going to work, I think that 

would be a disservice not only to the country, but it would certainly 

be a disservice to the dedicated folks that work in the State and 

local fusion centers around the country. 

So I think it is a very prudent approach for, I think, the Congress to take a real hard look at that as a possible solution. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Did you have anything you wanted to add 

to that, Mr. Hitch? 

Mr. HITCH. Yes. I agree with that very much. I think fusion centers have been and will continue to be a prudent investment in 

public safety. I think that it should be a joint investment, however, 

not fully funded by the Federal Government but certainly a significant share in funding by the Federal Government, but also State 

and local, because of the point that I made earlier how important 

fusion centers are to the solving of local crime and cross-border 

crime and so forth. And, also, the fact that while we are developing 

standards across the board and there are certain things that we 

want of every fusion center, each fusion center has to be customized, to some extent, to its local environment. A fusion center 

for Delaware is going to be very different from a fusion center for 

California. 

But I do think we owe them a horizon of funding so that they 

know what to expect and, therefore, they can plan because I think 

23 

they think it is a good idea, too. So I think we all think it is a good 

idea, but without a funding horizon and an expectation of what 

they will get, they cannot really plan. 

Senator PRYOR. I am glad you mentioned this idea that each fusion center should be customized to the locality where they are because that does make sense. But it also does raise an administrative question from the Federal end because they may be so different that, if you are not careful, they may not be meeting the objectives that the Federal Government has for them. The Federal 

Government has an interest in the State and local law enforcement 

being very effective, and I think everybody agrees with that. But, 

still, there are other Federal objectives that some of these may not 

meet. 

So do you think we should have a set of standard criteria for all 

of them? Or do you think it really should be a fusion-center-by-fusion-center analysis for the Federal Government? 

Mr. HITCH. Well, I believe that there are standards that all of 

them should meet, and, in fact, as Mr. Porter mentioned in the last 

panel, there is a set of what we call baseline standards that are 

being developed right now by Global, which is the group that I 

mentioned earlier that is supported by the Department of Justice. 

They are working with the fusion center heads to develop performance criteria and baseline capabilities that any fusion center should 

do. That does not mean that they are all going to look alike. It is 

not a cookie cutter. But it does give some baseline capabilities and 

some measures of success so that we know when they are doing 

their job. 

Senator PRYOR. Have you all had the experience yet where one 

of these fusion center’s objectives really are at odds with your objectives? Have you run across that situation yet? 

Mr. HITCH. I have not run into that situation. They all seem to 

be welcoming of the support that we, as a Department, have given 

them. They all appreciate the work that Global has done and the 

ongoing work that they have done, and certainly the FBI and its 

tremendous ongoing presence in their facilities. 

That does not mean there will not be operational issues that 

have to be worked out. But I think in general the congruence of 

objectives is pretty good. 

Senator PRYOR. Did you want to comment on that, Mr. 

Tomarchio? 

Mr. TOMARCHIO. I would concur with that, Senator. I have had 

no experience where we have been at odds with any of the fusion 

centers, and I have been to about 32 of these centers around the 

country. And these people really want to do the right thing for 

their communities, and they are working very hard to provide the 

level of protection that they think that they are mandated to do. 

So we have had no issues. 

Senator PRYOR. Yes, that has been my experience as well. I have 

not heard about problems in that regard, but I wanted to see if you 

all were hearing any. 

Let me also ask, Mr. Tomarchio, it is really the same question 

I asked the previous panel, and all of you have sort of touched on 

this already. But, Mr. Tomarchio, how do you measure success with 

these fusion centers? You talked about objective criteria. I think, 

24 

Ms. Larence, you talked about having standards and criteria, etc. 

So how do we measure success? How do we know that they are 

really effective and that they are worthwhile and that they are 

really doing the job out there? 

Mr. TOMARCHIO. Certainly. There are a couple of metrics that I 

like to look at. 

First of all, I think that the amount of information that is being 

passed between fusion centers and the Federal Government and 

the Federal intelligence community, it is good and valuable information. And one of the things that we were concerned about was 

that we did not want to just have information passing for the sake 

of passing information. We wanted to make sure that the information was relevant, was important, and resulted in actionable intelligence. And we are seeing that. We are seeing good products. 

We are also seeing a great understanding of what the requirements are at the State and local level from the intelligence community, and they are learning what our requirements are of them. 

And what we are seeing is we are learning about things that happened at the local level that within the Beltway we do not see. You 

can put a bunch of analysts at the FBI or the DHS to look at the 

issue of prison radicalization in Illinois. But the persons that are 

going to know what the situation is with prison radicalization in 

Illinois are the folks in Illinois. And we are seeing that information 

filter up to the Beltway and to the community, and that is important. 

I think also, as I think Mr. Bettenhausen said, the idea of proving a negative is important, too. I can give you a case in point. A 

year ago yesterday, we had the tragedy at Virginia Tech, and when 

that happened, the Virginia Fusion Center within minutes of getting the information, they made a determination, they put out horizontally to other fusion centers around the country that this is an 

isolated activity of a deranged individual; there is no nexus to terrorism, and there is no need for all the colleges and universities 

around the country to go to Def-Con 1 because there was a possible 

raft of these shootings. And that was done very quickly. They were 

able to spin down concern, and that in itself is important. 

So I think that you see situations like that—that is a metric of 

success for me. 

Senator PRYOR. Did you want to add something to that? 

Mr. HITCH. I was just nodding my head because I agree with 

what he was saying. One of the things—this is a challenge, obviously. Ultimately, we want to find success stories, and we want to 

find things that were prevented. And that is the gold standard. 

There is nothing that will really live up to that. 

But, as an IT guy, one of the things that we try to build into our 

systems is logs and things that will measure the amount of activity 

and the amount of what in law enforcement is called deconflictions. 

When you are interested in something and you then get in contact 

with another law enforcement officer from a completely different 

jurisdiction, perhaps across the country because of the information 

that you found—and we log that stuff in. We ask for feedback as 

part of the information systems process so that we can begin getting real measures of success as an intermediate level, below the 

gold standard, but certainly something that would let us know that 

25 

there is a lot of activity and there is a lot of good dialogue that is 

happening. 

Senator PRYOR. OK, great. Mr. Tomarchio, let me ask you about 

a very specific fiscal year 2008 DHS grant issue. Fiscal year 2008 

DHS grant guidance apparently restricts how DHS grants to State 

and local fusion centers can be spent in ways that contradict congressional intent. Specifically, the guidance limits spending on fusion center maintenance and sustainment. 

Does DHS have any plan to fix the problem by changing the 

guidance? Do you know anything about that? 

Mr. TOMARCHIO. I do know a little bit, probably enough to get me 

in trouble. I know that one of the things that we do at the Department, especially with regard to our folks that deal with the grants, 

is we really try to listen to the needs of the folks in the fusion centers. And, nothing is etched in stone, and we are trying to take 

their input with regard to what their needs are. 

Now, for example, bricks and mortar, which I think that refers 

to, is right now—grant money for bricks and mortar is prohibited. 

We have talked to some fusion centers that have some real bricksand-mortar problems that right now fall outside of our guidelines. 

We will look at that, and we will see if that, for whatever reason, 

needs to be adapted or changed. So, we realize this is a very dynamic and changing process and that this whole fusion center stuff 

is like building an airplane while in flight. So we are not trying to 

close our minds to saying, sorry, that is just verboten, we are not 

going to do that. At the same time, we have to—obviously, we cannot say yes to everyone. 

So everything is always being looked at, Senator, and I think we 

are trying the best that we can to try and meet their requirements, 

with also keeping in mind our fiscal and our monetary restraints. 

Senator PRYOR. Good. Well, let’s continue to talk about that because it appears that Congress had one intent, maybe the grant 

guidelines say something a little differently. But let’s keep watching that and see if we can make sure that we are all on the same 

page there. 

Let me also ask our two agency witnesses here, you both have 

talked about how fusion centers are a relatively new concept, and 

how they are growing, and how they differ from center to center. 

You mentioned it is like trying to build an airplane while you are 

in flight. I know that you all have spent a lot of time on these fusion centers. What do you hope to achieve with them over the next 

year? Obviously, we are talking about crime prevention and terrorism prevention, but in terms of the fusion centers themselves, 

what would you like to see accomplished over the next 12 months? 

In other words, tell us what your goals might be and what we 

might be looking for over the next 12 months to make sure these 

are up and running and effective. 

Mr. TOMARCHIO. I think one of the biggest and most important 

challenges that we face and one thing I would like to see us do 

more of and maybe do it better is to tackle the issue of training. 

I know that Captain Rapp spoke a little bit about that. 

I think as a result of the fact that we are melding two cultures, 

we are melding a law enforcement and criminal intelligence culture 

with an intelligence culture. And as I think Captain Rapp said, 

26 

there are instances where folks in the fusion centers do not understand the Federal intelligence community, they do not understand 

the intelligence cycle. And I think what we need to do collectively, 

both the Federal Government, the State and locals, is to ensure 

that we can raise the amount of training and awareness in the fusion centers of what needs to be done. 

The folks that I have met in the fusion centers are incredibly motivated to do the right thing. They need the tools and they need 

the training to do that. And I think that that is one of the biggest 

priorities that I think we have to have. We have to be able to get 

mobile training teams out to the centers. We have to be able to 

bring in folks from the centers to come to DHS or come to the FBI 

to receive training. There are numerous courses out there that 

exist that would be beneficial to these folks. 

Now, the problem that we understand is that it is difficult if you 

are a police officer or if you are a watch commander in a fusion 

center to send one of your best analysts to Washington for 8 weeks 

to go to CIA University and receive an analyst course. We realize 

that is a difficulty. We have to find a way to bring that knowledge 

to them, whether it is through online training, whether it is 

through train the trainer. I think we have to start looking at that, 

and we are doing that. But I think that is a very important challenge for us and I think one that will be met, but, again, it is an 

ongoing job. 

Senator PRYOR. All right. Do you want to comment, Mr. Hitch? 

Mr. HITCH. I certainly agree on the training and also technical 

assistance. One of the things that was mentioned earlier about 

these annual fusion center meetings that are held, the recent one 

in San Francisco, it shows the tremendous demand for the information that is being provided by both DHS and DOJ. There were people who could not sign up; there just was not enough room for 

them. We had a huge audience, and I expect that to continue. 

Another thing is, anecdotally you still hear about some organizational issues because this is new and cultures need changing. And 

I think the agreements are there, the President’s information-sharing plan is clear, but yet that does not mean that it works out very 

smoothly every single day. And that is what I would like to see 

happen; as issues happen, I think we need to resolve them because 

our guidance is clear. So I would like to see that. That is really 

more of a smooth working machine as opposed to organizations 

that are in a start-up mode. 

Senator PRYOR. Great. And I assume there will be some new fusion centers coming online. I know my home State of Arkansas is 

in the process of setting one of those up. I do not know if they have 

made final decisions or not. And I am sure other States and regions 

are doing that. 

Well, listen, I want to thank you all for being here and being 

part of this panel. And, Ms. Larence, I understand that this is your 

second time before the Subcommittee. Is that right? 

Ms. LARENCE. It is, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. And you win the prize because we haven’t ever 

had the same witness twice. [Laughter.] 

Ms. LARENCE. Thank you. 

27 

Senator PRYOR. And we are going to hold a hearing next year for 

you to come to. 

Ms. LARENCE. It is a deal. 

Senator PRYOR. Based on one of your GAO reports, just give us 

any ideas and we will have a hearing—no, I am teasing about that. 

But thank you. It is great to have you back and great to have our 

witnesses here. And like I said a few moments ago, we are going 

to leave the record open for 2 weeks. We are going to include all 

of your prepared written statements. If you have charts or anything else we can include those in the record. 

I want to thank you for your time and your preparation, and 

once more thank you all for being here today. But even more importantly, thank you for doing what you do because you all are 

making a difference, and we appreciate it very much. The good 

news is I am going to be able to get over and get those votes cast 

in a few minutes. 

So, with that, I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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