J-S13019-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF G.R.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: T.A.D., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1436 WDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 14, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Orphans' Court 

at No(s): CP-65-OC-0000058-2023

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BECK, J.: FILED: June 7, 2024

T.A.D. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered by the Westmoreland 

County Court of Common Pleas (“orphans’ court”) terminating his parental 

rights to G.R.D., born May 2022 (“Child”), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b).1 Because we conclude that the orphans’ court did 

not abuse its discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights, we affirm.

In May 2022, the Westmoreland County Children’s Bureau (the 

“Bureau”) received a referral that Child was born testing positive for drugs. 

The Bureau was already involved with Father because Child’s sibling was in its 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 The orphans’ court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s birth 

mother, T.R.B. (“Mother”). We collectively refer to Father and Mother as 

“Parents.” Mother did not file a notice of appeal.
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custody. Father had a history of domestic violence, mental health concerns, 

and drug use, and he lacked housing. The Bureau obtained an emergency 

order of protective custody for Child and she was placed in foster care upon 

her discharge from the hospital. On June 21, 2022, Child was adjudicated 

dependent. Child has remained in the same pre-adoptive home throughout 

these proceedings. Permanency review hearings occurred on August 17, 

2022, February 22, 2023, and August 29, 2023. At the February 22, 2023

hearing, the juvenile court found that, with respect to Child, aggravated 

circumstances existed as to Parents because their parental rights to Child’s 

sibling had been involuntarily terminated.2 The juvenile court ordered the 

Bureau to continue making reasonable efforts to reunify the family.3

On May 19, 2023, the Bureau filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Parents’ rights to Child. The orphans’ court held a hearing on the petitions on 

October 12, and October 24, 2023. Father appeared with counsel; Mother did 

not appear but was represented by counsel. Child’s best and legal interests 

were represented by an individual who served both as guardian ad litem and 

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2

 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302(5) (defining aggravated circumstances to include a

circumstance where the “parental rights of the parent have been involuntarily 

terminated with respect to a child of the parent”).

3 See id. § 6351(e)(2) (stating, in pertinent part, “[i]f the court finds from 

clear and convincing evidence that aggravated circumstances exist, the court 

shall determine whether or not reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the 

need for removing the child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or 

to preserve and reunify the family shall be made or continue to be made”).
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legal counsel and stated that separate counsel was unnecessary given Child’s 

young age. N.T., 8/15/2023, at 3; see also N.T., 10/12/2023, at 5 (orphans’

court agreeing with Bureau counsel that because of Child’s age, legal counsel 

was not needed). With respect to Father, the Bureau presented five witnesses 

and Father presented two, as well as his own testimony. 

At the hearing, the Bureau presented evidence that Child had spent her 

entire life in the Bureau’s custody, coming into its care the day she was 

discharged from the hospital following her birth. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 7. 

Bureau caseworker Chelsea Crewe (“Crewe”) testified that she had been 

working with Father prior to Child’s birth, as Child’s sibling was in the Bureau’s

custody.

4

 Id. at 134. When Child was born, Father was permitted only 

supervised visits with Child’s sibling, had not made progress in treatment, and 

had not demonstrated an ability to safely care for a child. N.T., 10/12/2023, 

at 90-91, 104; Bureau Ex. 4. Father also had a then-ten-year-old child with 

whom he was only allowed supervised visits per a custody court order. N.T., 

10/12/2023, at 91, 104; Bureau Ex. 4. Father had a history of domestic 

violence with multiple protection from abuse orders issued against him, a 

history of drug use, mental health concerns, and lacked housing. Id.

After Child came into the Bureau’s care, a case plan was prepared for 

Father that required him to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation and comply 

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4

 In June 2023, Bureau caseworker Angelina Poole (“Poole”) was assigned to 

Father’s case. 
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with any recommended treatment; comply with random drug screens; attend 

Narcotics Anonymous (“NA”)/Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings; 

continue all recommended mental health treatment/individual counseling and 

take prescribed medications; participate in parenting instruction, domestic 

abuse counseling for offenders, and anger management counseling; obtain 

and maintain stable and appropriate housing; and secure and maintain 

verifiable and legal employment. Bureau Ex. 4. Father was never more than 

minimally compliant with the case plan and never made more than minimal 

progress toward achieving reunification with Child. Id.; N.T., 10/12/2023, at 

103.

Father had been offered parenting services since April 2021, when 

Child’s sibling came into the Bureau’s custody. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 135. 

Tiffany Mazary (“Mazary”) from the Children’s Institute testified that she had 

been working with Father for two years, supervised Father’s visits with Child,

and worked with him on parenting. Id. at 47. Father attended less than 

twenty percent of the visits with Child—twelve of the sixty-six visits offered. 

Id. Because of his lack of attendance, Father’s visitation decreased from three 

times per week to twice per month, parenting instruction ceased, and Father 

was subject to a double confirmation policy, which required him to confirm 

both before and the day of a visit. Id. at 47-48, 95. For the first nine months

of Child’s life, Father visited her only once, when she was about two months

old. Id. at 56-57. Thereafter, he failed to visit her again for over seven 
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months. Id. at 97, 107. Put another way, Father did not visit Child at all 

between July 12, 2022, and February 20, 2023. Id. at 56. In February 2023, 

the orphans’ court found that, with respect to Child, aggravated circumstances 

existed as to Parents because their parental rights to Child’s sibling had been 

involuntarily terminated. Bureau Ex. 4.

Thereafter, Father began to visit Child more regularly, attending six 

visits between February 2023 and May 2, 2023, and resuming parenting 

instruction. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 53. In May 2023, the Bureau changed its 

contracted provider to In-clusion for Father’s supervised visits. Id. at 55, 60. 

Shelly Weaver (“Weaver”) supervised Father’s visits and, at the time of the 

termination hearing, had completed one parenting session with him.5 Id. at 

60-61. Weaver had difficulty scheduling and confirming visits with Father. 

Id. 62; Bureau Ex. 3. For Weaver’s first session with Father in May 2023, he

missed visiting Child because he failed to confirm. Id. at 61. Father failed to 

visit Child at all in August 2023. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 61; Bureau Ex. 3. 

Father was still on a twice-per-month- and double-confirmation-visitation 

schedule. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 62. Father attended his visits in June and 

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5

 In May 2023, the Bureau stopped offering Father contracted parenting 

services and instead referred him to a community-based parenting provider. 

N.T., 10/12/2023, at 137-40. The Bureau also referred Father to other 

community resources, including an emergency rental assistance program, 

drug and alcohol evaluation, NA/AA meetings, and mental health, anger 

management, and domestic violence counseling. Id. at 140-44. Contracted 

parenting services resumed in October 2023. Id. at 60-61.
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July 2023, as well as the day before the termination hearing. Id. at 61;

Bureau Ex. 3.

Weaver testified that during visits, she had concerns about Father’s 

inconsistency with checking and changing Child’s diaper, putting too much 

food in Child’s mouth at once, and not getting down on Child’s level to engage 

with her. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 64-65, 71, 98; Bureau Ex. 3. She also reported 

that Father was “very distracted” during visits and she had concerns that if 

another adult was present during the visit, Father would engage with that 

person rather than Child. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 98; Bureau Ex. 3. Weaver 

observed Father was inattentive to Child’s special needs, failing to inquire 

about why Child had medical tape on her neck and failing to retrieve Child’s 

glasses or attempt to get Child to wear them, even after Weaver told Father

the glasses were in the diaper bag. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 66; Bureau Ex. 3. 

At the hearing, Weaver testified that she did not recommend unsupervised 

visits for Father with Child and believed that Father had a continued need for 

parenting instruction. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 75, 86. Neither Mazary nor

Weaver ever recommended Father for less restrictive visits with Child. Id. at 

97. Crewe testified that she was concerned about Father’s lack of progress 

with parenting instruction, particularly as the curriculum is only a couple of 

months, yet he was unable to finish it within the two years he was receiving 

parenting services. Id. at 138-39. 
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Father called the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”), Loretta 

Shearer (“Shearer”), as a witness at the termination hearing. Shearer began 

working with Father in June 2023 and attended all but one visit between Father 

and Child in that time. Id. at 206. Although she observed Father engage

with Child, Shearer testified that he needed additional services and was not 

ready to take custody of Child. Id. at 210. She was of the view that Child 

should remain with her foster parents and she agreed with the Bureau’s 

recommendation to terminate Parents’ rights. Id. at 210; Court Ex. 1.

Father has a lengthy criminal history and was incarcerated on three 

separate occasions during Child’s first eight months of life. N.T., 10/12/2023, 

at 98. The periods of incarceration were very brief—only a matter of days6—

and not long enough for the Bureau to arrange visits with Child. Id. at 98-

99. At the time of the termination hearing, Father had pending criminal 

charges at five dockets, which included, among others, driving under the 

influence of a controlled substance, simple assault, harassment, terroristic 

threats, use/possession of drug paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. 

Bureau Ex. 1.

When Child’s sibling came into the Bureau’s custody in April 2021, it 

contracted services for Father. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 134. In addition to 

parenting instruction, the Bureau offered Father individual, anger 

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6

 The record reflects Father was incarcerated for seventeen, fourteen, and 

three days, respectively. Id. at 98-99.
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management, and domestic violence counseling for over two years. Id. at 

100, 114, 135. Father had not successfully completed any mental health 

treatment at the time of the termination hearing. Id. at 136. Father was 

required to complete a mental health evaluation following Child’s birth, but 

failed to do so until she was days away from her first birthday. Id. at 33. At 

the hearing, Benjamin Yaroch (“Yaroch”) testified as an expert in outpatient 

therapy. Id. Upon the Bureau’s referral, he first met with Father on May 3, 

2023, but Father was discharged soon after his evaluation for too many missed 

or no-show appointments, despite Yaroch’s opinion that he needed more 

therapy. Id. at 33-34, 39; Bureau Ex. 2. After his initial intake session, 

Father only attended two of six sessions between May and September 2023, 

both of which were after the termination petition was filed. N.T., 10/12/2023, 

at 33-34; Bureau Ex. 2.

Similarly, Father did not complete a drug and alcohol evaluation until 

July 2023, after the termination petition was filed. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 91. 

The evaluation recommended ongoing outpatient treatment once per week for 

six weeks, but Father did not participate.7 Id. at 92. The Bureau attempted 

to drug screen Father sixty-eight times, but was unable to screen him twentythree times. Id. at 93. Of his forty-five screens, fifteen were positive for 

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7

 Father was reevaluated by the same agency in September 2023, and no 

further treatment was recommended because Father presented a medical 

marijuana card. See N.T., 10/12/2023, at 91-92; Father’s Ex. B.
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marijuana.8 Id. Father only began attending NA meetings in September 

2023, again, after the termination petition was filed. Id. at 94, 143. 

Father also has a long history of domestic violence. When Child was 

just days old, Father’s ex-wife obtained a three-year protection from abuse 

order against him, which prohibited him from having any contact with his exwife or his then-ten-year-old child. Id. at 177; Bureau Ex. 5. Additionally, in 

August 2022, Father’s then-girlfriend, A.S.,9 obtained a protection from abuse 

order against Father. Bureau Ex. 7. A.S.’s petition alleged violence by Father 

while her children were home, including burning her, grabbing her, wrapping 

his arms around her neck, holding her down, and taking her cell phone. Id. 

Further, A.S. had a custody consent order with the father of her child. In June 

2023, the court granted an emergency custody motion filed by the father of 

A.S.’s child, giving him primary physical custody of their child and prohibiting 

Father from having any unsupervised contact with that child. Bureau Ex. 6. 

Father called Robert Brinker (“Brinker”) as an expert witness in 

therapeutic services related to anger management and domestic violence. 

N.T., 10/24/2023, at 6-30. Brinker testified that Father began a program in 

2018, but he did not complete it until about five years later, in May 2023, 

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8

 Father’s medical marijuana card was dated May 2023; it is unclear how 

many of his positive screens occurred prior to that date. N.T., 10/12/2023,

at 93; Father’s Ex. E. 

9

 Father and A.S. married days before the termination hearing. N.T., 

10/12/2023 at 158. 
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despite its relatively short duration of sixteen, ninety-minute sessions. Id. at 

10, 16, 19; Father’s Ex. C. Although Father provided evidence of completion 

of an anger management and domestic violence program, the Bureau had 

concerns about the short-term nature of the program, Father’s inconsistent 

participation over a lengthy period of time, and the lack of individualized 

sessions based on Father’s specific needs, particularly given Father’s domestic 

violence history. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 136, 147-48. Poole testified that 

because of Father’s domestic violence history, he needed additional ongoing 

treatment beyond the short-term program he completed with Brinker. Id. at 

119. 

Until March 2023, Father did not have a history of stable housing, had 

periods of homelessness, and was living in his car for some time in 2022. Id.

at 54, 99, 105, 125. At the time of the termination hearing, Father had 

obtained appropriate housing. Father’s Ex. D. Father reported working for 

DoorDash, but he was unable to provide documentation to verify his income. 

N.T., 10/12/2023, at 99, 105, 145. Father admitted his child support was in 

arrears. Id. at 191-92.

At the termination hearing, Father claimed to take responsibility for 

himself, but at the same time, did not believe he needed the services offered 

by the Bureau. Id. at 200, 203. He did not think he needed anger 

management or domestic violence counseling—now or ever—despite his 

documented history of domestic violence. Id. at 185-86; Bureau Ex. 2 
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(Yaroch counseling discharge summary stating Father “makes it clear he does 

not agree with [the Bureau’s] involvement, and, at times, thinks he is being 

“‘set up’”). Father believed he was a “victim” of the protection from abuse 

orders and thought that the Bureau was “lying to people.” N.T., 10/12/2023, 

at 187, 200. 

On November 14, 2023, the orphans’ court issued a decree involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(2) and (8), and finding, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), that 

termination best serves the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of Child.10 Termination Decree, 11/14/2023, ¶¶ 2.b, 2.h, 2.l. Father 

timely appealed to this Court and filed a concise statement pursuant to Rule 

1925(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Father presents the following issues for review:

I. Whether the [orphans’ court] erred in finding that the

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

of [Father] has caused [Child] to be without essential 

parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for her

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes 

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot, or will 

not be remedied by [Father]?

II. Whether the [orphans’ court] erred in finding that [Child]

has been removed from the care of [Father] by the court, 

or under a voluntary agreement with the agency, 12 months 

or more have elapsed from the date of removal or

placement, the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of [Child] continued to exist and termination of 

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10

 The orphans’ court entered a decree terminating Mother’s parental rights 

on that same date.
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the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of [Child]?

III. Whether the [orphans’ court] erred in finding by clear and 

convincing evidence that the Westmoreland County 

Children’s Bureau met its burden, under 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 4-5.

In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental 

rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether 

the decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. This standard of review corresponds to the standard 

employed in dependency cases, and requires appellate courts to 

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

[orphans’] court if they are supported by the record, but it does 

not require the appellate court to accept the lower court’s 

inferences or conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings 

are supported, we must determine whether the [orphans’] court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of 

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. Thus, 

absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient 

evidentiary support for the [orphans’] court’s decision, the decree 

must stand. We have previously emphasized our deference to 

[orphans’] courts that often have first-hand observations of the 

parties spanning multiple hearings. However, we must employ a 

broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine 

whether the [orphans’] court’s decision is supported by competent 

evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (Pa. 2021) (quotation marks, 

some brackets, and citations omitted).
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Termination of parental rights is governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which 

requires a bifurcated analysis. See C.M., 255 A.3d at 359. “Initially, the 

focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a).” In re 

C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). If the 

orphans’ court determines the petitioner established grounds for termination 

under section 2511(a) by clear and convincing evidence, the court then must 

assess the petition under subsection 2511(b), which focuses on the child’s 

needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Clear and 

convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re C.S., 761 A.2d 

1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted).

As stated above, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s rights to Child 

pursuant to subsections (a)(2) and (a)(8) of the termination statute. 

Termination Decree, 11/14/2023, ¶¶ 2.b, 2.h. “This [C]ourt may affirm the 

[orphans’] court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights with 

regard to any one subsection of [s]ection 2511(a).” In re J.F.M., 71 A.3d 

989, 992 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). We focus our analysis on 

section 2511(a)(8).
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Father argues that the Bureau “cast aside the core concepts of 

concurrent planning and failed to make good faith efforts to remedy the 

conditions which led to the removal.” Father’s Brief at 16. Father claims that 

the Bureau stopped offering services in February 2023, removed Father from 

parenting instruction in May 2023, and changed his caseworker to someone 

who was unavailable during the summer of 2023. Id. According to Father, 

the Bureau “presumed that termination would be granted and withdrew all 

services aimed toward reunification.” Id. Father also points to his successful 

completion of anger management and domestic violence counseling as 

evidence that he remedied the conditions that brought Child into care. Id. 

To terminate parental rights under section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner 

must prove: (1) the child has been removed from parental care for 12 months 

or more; (2) the conditions that led to the removal or placement of the child 

continue to exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the 

needs and welfare of the child. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 

2008); 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). Notably, this subsection “does not require 

the court to evaluate a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions 

that led to the placement of the children.” Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 

832 (Pa. Super. 2022). Rather, the “relevant inquiry regarding the second 

prong of [section] 2511(a)(8) is whether the conditions that led to removal 

have been remedied and thus whether reunification of parent and child is 

imminent at the time of the hearing.” Id. (quotation marks and citation 
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omitted). Further, “the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to 

remedy the conditions described [in section 2511(a)(8)] which are first 

initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

The orphans’ court provided the following explanation for its decision to 

terminate Father’s parental rights under the first two prongs of section 

2511(a)(8):

In examining the facts established in this matter, it is clear 

to the [orphans’ court] termination under Section 2511(a) is 

warranted. At the time that the Child was removed from Father 

and Mother’s custody, [the Bureau] had concerns related to 

Father’s violent behaviors and his failure to demonstrate an ability

to safely parent a child. The [orphans’ court] took judicial notice 

that, as recently as May 24, 2022, a three-year Protection from 

Abuse (PFA) order was entered against Father in favor of []

Father’s ex-wife. This PFA was the most recent example of 

Father’s history of domestic violence, which had been an issue in 

the removal of both this Child and Father’s previous child, to which 

his rights had been terminated.[]

Father produced evidence from [] Brinker that he completed 

a relatively short course in anger management offered by Catholic 

Charities, which concluded in May 2023. Father contended that 

this course should alleviate the domestic violence concern that led 

the Child into placement. [] Yaroch, an expert in outpatient 

therapy, testified that anger management and domestic violence 

issues should be treated as part of an overall mental health 

treatment plan, which the evidence shows that Father has never 

fully engaged. Additionally, Father has been requested to 

participate in parenting [classes] since his first child was removed 

from his care in 2021, and the parenting deficiencies remain 

unresolved to this point. Father has consistently been 

recommended to engage in supervised visitation without making 

sufficient progress toward being unsupervised. Lastly, the Child 

has been in custody of the [Bureau] for 17 months as of the time 

of the termination hearing, with the same circumstances 

preventing the Child from returning to Father’s care.
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Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/2023, at 4-5.

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s findings of facts 

as well as its legal conclusions. There is no dispute that Child has been in care 

for more than twelve months. Child was removed from Father’s care because 

Child tested positive for drugs when she was born; the Bureau’s ongoing 

involvement with Father and Child’s sibling, who was in the Bureau’s custody; 

Father’s history of domestic violence, mental health concerns, and drug use;

and his lack of housing. Child has been in the care of the same foster parents 

since birth. Following adjudication, Father was to complete a drug and alcohol 

evaluation and comply with recommended treatment; comply with random 

drug screens; attend NA/AA meetings; participate in parenting instruction; 

attend individual therapy, domestic abuse, and anger management 

counseling; and obtain and maintain stable and appropriate housing and 

employment. 

The record reveals, however, that Father completed only some of his

objectives before termination—anger management, domestic violence 

counseling, and housing. Although Father completed a drug and alcohol 

evaluation in July 2023 and began attending NA meetings in September 2023, 

neither were initiated until after the termination petition was filed in May 2023. 

Father’s compliance with drug screens was dismal, and of the completed 

screens, one-third were positive. Although Father participated in parenting 

instruction for two and a half years, his participation was inconsistent and 
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parenting issues remained, requiring him to have supervised visits for the life 

of the case. Father was finally evaluated for individual therapy just before the 

termination petition was filed, but he was discharged from treatment because 

of lack of attendance. While Father completed a short-term anger 

management and domestic violence program, his attendance was sporadic 

and the Bureau was concerned it did not adequately address Father’s

individual needs, especially with his long history of domestic violence. 

Further, as recently as June 2023—a month after the termination petition was 

filed—a custody court ordered Father not to have any unsupervised contact 

with A.S.’s minor child. While Father had housing at the time of the hearing, 

he failed to provide any verification that he was able to maintain steady 

employment. 

The record supports a finding that Father largely has not addressed, let 

alone remedied, the concerns that resulted in Child’s removal from his care—

namely his ability to safely parent and care for Child and to provide her with 

a healthy and stable living environment. This Court has recognized “that the 

application of section 2511(a)(8) may seem harsh when the parent has begun 

to make progress toward resolving the problems that had led to removal” of 

his child. Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

However, by allowing for termination when the conditions that led 

to removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute 

implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to 

assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not 

subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and 
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stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future. 

Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that contemplates 

only a short period of time, to wit eighteen [] months, in which to 

complete the process of either reunification or adoption for a child 

who has been placed in foster care.

Id. (emphasis and citations omitted). Further, there is no record support for 

a finding that reunification of Father and Child was imminent at the time of 

the termination hearing. See M.E., 283 A.3d at 832. Moreover, Father’s 

argument that the Bureau improperly withdrew reunification services after the 

orphans’ court found aggravated circumstances existed is without merit. The 

orphans’ court found the Bureau continued to provide reasonable efforts to 

reunify Father and Child, and the record supports that finding. Orphans’ Court 

Opinion, 12/19/2023, at 6; see N.T., 10/12/2023, at 137-44 (caseworker’s 

testimony that she referred Father to specific community resources, including 

parenting, an emergency rental assistance program, drug and alcohol 

evaluation, NA/AA meetings, and mental health, anger management, and

domestic violence counseling, and that in her experience, these referrals were 

often preferrable because services could continue beyond the Bureau’s 

involvement in the case). Accordingly, our review of the record supports the 

orphans’ court’s findings as to the first two prongs of section 2511(a)(8).

As noted above, a finding that the Bureau satisfied its burden as to the 

first two prongs of subsection (a)(8) does not end our discussion, as there is 

a third prong that must also be satisfied—that termination of Father’s parental 

rights best serves Child’s needs and welfare. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). 
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Although section 2511(a) generally focuses on the behavior of the parent, the 

third prong of section 2511(a)(8) specifically “accounts for the needs of the 

child.” In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). 

The third prong of section 2511(a)(8) “is not a mere formality flowing from 

the existence of the preceding [two] elements enumerated in the statute.” 

See In re P.A.B., 570 A.2d 522, 525 (Pa. Super. 1990) (addressing the 

necessity of a separate consideration of the needs and welfare prong under 

subsection (a)(5), which is identical to the needs and welfare prong under 

subsection (a)(8)). And although subsections (a)(8) and (b) of the 

termination statute are unquestionably “distinct,” this Court has held that the 

same legal standard and same evidence may be used to satisfy both. C.L.G., 

956 A.2d at 1008-09; see also Matter of Adoption of M.A.B., 166 A.3d 

434, 448 (Pa. Super. 2017) (combining discussion of the children’s needs and 

welfare pursuant to subsections (a)(8) and (b) because the “third element of 

[s]ection 2511(a)(8) requires that the [o]rphans’ [c]ourt conduct an analysis 

similar to that required under [s]ection 2511(b)).11

Section 2511(b) provides, in pertinent part:

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

____________________________________________

11

 The propriety of using the same needs and welfare analysis to satisfy the 

two separate provisions of section 2511 is not before this Court in this matter, 

and we are bound by our prior en banc decision in C.L.G. Pa.R.A.P. 3103(b).
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inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical 

care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). This requires that courts consider the matter from the 

child’s perspective, placing the child’s “developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” In re K.T., 296 

A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023) (citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has cautioned that “the law regarding termination 

of parental rights should not be applied mechanically but instead always with 

an eye to the best interests and the needs and welfare of the particular 

children involved.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268-69 (citation omitted). The party 

seeking termination bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that termination of parental rights serves a child’s needs and 

welfare. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114 (citation omitted).

The law is clear that “the determination of the child’s needs and welfare 

requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. 

The utmost attention should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). It is not enough that there exists a bond between 

parent and child to avoid termination; rather, the trial court must determine 

whether the parent and child share an emotional bond and assess whether 

the bond is “necessary and beneficial” to the child, such that “maintaining the 

bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare,” as well as the effect upon the child of severing that bond. K.T., 296 

A.3d at 1109. This assessment requires the orphans’ court to determine 
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whether severing the bond “is the kind of loss that would predictably cause 

extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm” to the child. 

Id. at 1109-1110 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In addition to the child’s bond with her biological parent, the needs and 

welfare analysis must also include the factors delineated by the K.T. Court, 

which include: “the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster 

care ...; whether the child is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster 

parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort, 

security, safety, and stability.” Id. at 1113 (citations omitted). “These factors 

and others properly guide the court’s analysis of the child’s welfare and all 

[their] developmental, physical, and emotional needs.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Importantly, “[t]rial courts have the discretion to place appropriate weight on 

each factor present in the record before making a decision regarding 

termination that best serves the child’s specific needs.” Id. Consideration of 

these factors, however, is mandatory. See id.

With respect to its needs and welfare analysis, the orphans’ court 

explained:

[The Bureau] presented concerns regarding Father’s stability for 

the Child in that, for a period of seven months during the 

dependency case, Father had no visitation with the Child. Also, 

Father is exhibiting drug and alcohol concerns exemplified by 

criminal charges for possession and driving while under the 

influence. The Child is currently placed in a pre-adoptive foster 

home [that] has been a stable placement for the Child. Lastly, 

the Child is a special needs child requiring physical therapy, which 

Father has never participated in to gain any kind of understanding. 
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The best interest of the Child will be served by achieving 

permanency with a family that is able to fully understand the 

special needs of the Child and provide stability for her life. For all 

of these reasons, the Court found that the [Bureau] satisfied its 

evidentiary burden under Section 2511(b).

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 12/19/2023, at 5-6. 

Father asserts that the orphans’ court erred because it failed to 

determine whether a parental bond between Father and Child exists or 

address how severing any such bond would impact Child. Father’s Brief at 12, 

19. Father argues generally that “testimony from service providers and the 

[CASA] show that Father and [Child] have a loving relationship,” and that 

“testimony of a bond existing between Father and [Child was] given by 

numerous service providers,” id. at 19, but fails to identify or cite to any 

specific evidence in the record to support this claim. 

As the recitation of the orphans’ court’s discussion reflects, the court 

considered Child’s needs and welfare as it relates to the excellent care she 

receives in her foster home, her need for permanency, and her bond with her 

foster parents. This is all well supported by the record. Child, who has been 

in a preadoptive foster home since birth, has special needs that have required 

physical and occupational therapy. N.T., 10/12/2023, at 22, 24. The foster 

parents are the sole individuals who have ensured Child receives the

treatment she requires and they participate in her therapy sessions. Id. 

Additionally, at the termination hearing, Poole testified that Child’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare were consistently 
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being met by her foster parents. Id. at 22-23. Child is very well cared for, 

“very clearly has a healthy bond” with her foster parents, and has a “strong 

relationship” with her foster family. Id. at 23, 25. Child attends extended 

foster family events and is treated as part of the family. Id. at 25. She is

attached to her foster parents during visits; she consistently returned to the 

foster mother for security and safety with strangers in the room. Id. at 23. 

In addition, Shearer testified that Child has “excellent interaction” with foster 

parents. Id. at 209.

With respect to the bond between Father and Child, our review of the 

record finds no evidence of a bond between Father and Child. While the record 

reflects that Child may have been familiar with Father, there is no evidence of 

a history of Father in a caregiving role or meeting her developmental needs 

such that she developed an attachment to him. See In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 

840, 852 (Pa. 2015) (finding termination of parental rights supported under 

2511(a)(8) and (b) where child was familiar with parent, but no attachment 

existed and parent did not have a history of engaging in a caregiving 

relationship with child or taking responsibility for child over an extended 

period). As Father observes, there was testimony that Child was happy to see 

Father during visits; however, there was also testimony that the Child had a 

generally affable attitude, which was not directed particularly at Father.

Compare N.T., 10/12/2023, at 54 (Mazary testifying that during Father’s 

supervised visits, Child smiled when she saw him and reacted favorably 
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toward him), with id. at 207 (CASA testifying that Child is very affable, 

pleasant, and lovable, and when she’s alert, “she’s happy to see everybody. 

It’s not like anything in particular, but she’s just very happy and easygoing 

with everyone.”). This does not provide evidence of a parental bond. See, 

e.g., Interest of S.R.S., 2023 WL 2544886, at *8 (Pa. Super. filed March 17, 

2023) (non-precedential decision) (“Although the Children are affable during 

the visits, the same should not be confused with a beneficial or necessary 

parent bond .... That the Children have done well during the visits is a 

testament to the Foster Parents’ attention to the Children’s healthy 

development.”).

12

 

Further, although there is record evidence that Father demonstrated 

love and affection toward Child,13 it is well settled that a parent’s own feelings 

of love are not sufficient to show that termination would not best serve the 

child’s needs and welfare. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 

2010) (stating that a “parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, 

alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights”). Without record 

____________________________________________

12

 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating that non-precedential decisions of the 

Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive 

value).

13

 N.T., 10/12/2023, at 73 (Weaver testifying that Father “showed affection” 

and said “I love you” at most visits before leaving and expressed to Weaver 

that he missed Child and loves her).
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evidence of a bond between Father and Child, we infer that no bond exists.14 

Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 984 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). 

Our review of the record supports the orphans’ court’s conclusion that 

terminating Father’s parental rights best serves Child’s needs and welfare, 

freeing Child for adoption by a family that is able to fully attend to her special 

needs and provide her with safety and stability. K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113. We 

therefore find no abuse of discretion in the orphans’ court’s consideration of 

the third prong of section 2511(a)(8) and subsection (b).

Based on the record before us and the standard of review we must 

employ, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not commit an error of law 

or abuse its discretion by finding that the Bureau proved grounds to terminate

Father’s rights under section 2511(a)(8) and (b). As the orphans’ court’s 

determination is supported by the record, we affirm. See C.M., 255 A.3d at 

358-59.

Decree affirmed.

____________________________________________

14

 Even if the record contained evidence of a parental bond between Father 

and Child, there is no support for a finding that the bond is necessary or 

beneficial such that its severance would result in extreme emotional 

consequences or significant, irreparable harm to Child. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 

1109-10. Rather, the record reflects that Child never resided with Father and 

that she has scarcely seen him throughout her life. Father only visited Child 

once in her first nine months of life and attended less than twenty percent of 

his scheduled visits with her. On the other hand, as stated hereinabove, Child 

is attached to her foster parents, with whom she has spent her entire life, and 

is thriving in their care. See id. at 1113.
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DATE: 06/07/2024