4360 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Notices

Brief description of amendment: The

amendment revises Kewaunee Nuclear

Power Plant Technical Specification 6.9,

‘‘Reporting Requirements,’’ by deleting

the annual requirement to submit a

description of changes made pursuant to

10 CFR 50.59. Administrative changes

are also made to correct inconsistencies

in the TS Table of Contents and in a

footnote for Table TS 3.5-1.

Date of issuance: January 6, 1997

Effective date: January 6, 1997

Amendment No.: 131

Facility Operating License No. DPR43: Amendment revised the Technical

Specifications.

Date of initial notice in Federal

Register: December 4, 1996 (61 FR

64397) The Commission’s related

evaluation of the amendment is

contained in a Safety Evaluation dated

January 6, 1997.No significant hazards

consideration comments received: No.

Local Public Document Room

location: University of Wisconsin,

Cofrin Library, 2420 Nicolet Drive,

Green Bay, Wisconsin 54311-7001

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 22nd

day of January 1997.

For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Elinor G. Adensam,

Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects

- III/IV, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

[Doc. 97–1994 Filed 1-28-97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-F

[Docket Nos. 50–255 and 72–7]

Consumers Power Co., Palisades

Nuclear Plant, License Nos. DPR–20;

Issuance of Director’s Decision Under

10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the Acting

Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation, has issued a Director’s

Decision concerning a Petition dated

September 19, 1995, as amended on

September 30, 1996, filed by Don’t

Waste Michigan and Lake Michigan

Federation (Petitioners) under Section

2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR 2.206). The Petition

requested that the NRC (1) find that

Consumers Power Company (licensee)

violated NRC requirements related to

unloading procedures for dry storage

casks for spent nuclear fuel, (2) suspend

the licensee’s use of the general license

provisions related to dry cask storage of

spent nuclear fuel, (3) require a

substantial penalty be paid by the

licensee, and (4) conduct hearings

related to unloading procedures for dry

storage casks at Palisades.

The Acting Director of the Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation has

determined that Petition should be

granted in part and denied in part for

the reasons stated in the ‘‘Director’s

Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206’’ (DD–97–

01), the complete text of which follows

this notice. The decision and documents

cited in the decision are available for

public inspection and copying in the

Commission’s Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street,

NW, Washington, DC, and at the local

public document room located in the

Van Wylen Library at Hope College in

Holland, Michigan.

A copy of this decision has been filed

with the Secretary of the Commission

for the Commission’s review in

accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c). As

provided therein, this decision will

become the final action of the

Commission 25 days after issuance

unless the Commission, on its own

motion, institutes review of the decision

within that time.

Dated at Rockville, MD., this 23d day of

January 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

Director’s Decision Under 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

On September 19, 1995, the

organizations Don’t Waste Michigan and

Lake Michigan Federation (Petitioners)

filed a Petition pursuant to Section

2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR 2.206) requesting

that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) (1) find that

Consumers Power Company (licensee)

violated NRC requirements related to

unloading procedures for dry storage

casks for spent nuclear fuel, (2) suspend

the licensee’s use of the general license

provisions related to dry cask storage of

spent nuclear fuel, (3) require a

substantial penalty be paid by the

licensee, and (4) conduct hearings

related to unloading procedures for dry

storage casks at Palisades.

On September 30, 1996, the

Petitioners amended the Petition by

including additional information in

support of their position that the

licensee did not have a workable

unloading procedure before loading the

13 dry storage casks currently in the

Palisades independent spent fuel

storage installation (ISFSI).

The Petition has been referred to me

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206. The NRC

letter dated October 24, 1995, to Dr.

Sinclair and Mr. Skavroneck, on behalf

of the Petitioners, acknowledged receipt

of the Petition. Notice of receipt was

published in the Federal Register on

October 31, 1995 (60 FR 55388).

On the basis of the NRC staff’s

evaluation of the issues and for the

reasons given below, the Petitioners’

requests are granted in part and denied

in part.

II. Background

NRC regulations contain a general

license that authorizes nuclear power

plants licensed by the NRC, such as

Palisades, to store spent nuclear fuel at

the reactor site in storage casks

approved by the NRC. (See 10 CFR part

72, subpart K.) In regard to dry cask

storage of spent nuclear fuel at

Palisades, the licensee opted to use the

VSC–24 Cask Storage System designed

by Sierra Nuclear Corporation. The

VSC–24 Cask Storage System was added

to the list of NRC certified casks in May

1993 (58 FR 17948). The associated

certificate of compliance, Certificate

Number 1007, specifies the conditions

for use of VSC–24 casks under the

general license provisions of 10 CFR

part 72. Section 1.1.2, ‘‘Operating

Procedures,’’ in the certificate of

compliance for the VSC–24 casks,

requires that licensees prepare an

operating procedure related to cask

unloading. Specifically, the condition

states

Written operating procedures shall be

prepared for cask handling, loading,

movement, surveillance, and maintenance.

The operating procedures suggested

generically in the SAR (safety analysis report)

are considered appropriate, as discussed in

Section 11.0 of the SER (safety evaluation

report), and should provide the basis for the

user’s written operating procedures. The

following additional written procedures shall

also be developed as part of the user

operating procedures:

1. A procedure shall be developed for cask

unloading, assuming damaged fuel. If fuel

needs to be removed from the multi-assembly

sealed basket (MSB), either at the end of

service life or for inspection after an

accident, precautions must be taken against

the potential for the presence of oxidized fuel

and to prevent radiological exposure to

personnel during this operation. This activity

can be achieved by the use of the Swagelok

valves, which permit a determination of the

atmosphere within the MSB before the

removal of the structural and shield lids. If

the atmosphere within the MSB is helium,

then operations should proceed normally,

with fuel removal, either via the transfer cask

or in the pool. However, if air is present

within the MSB, then appropriate filters

should be in place to permit the flushing of

any potential airborne radioactive particulate

from the MSB, via the Swagelok valves. This

action will protect both personnel and the

operations area from potential

contamination. For the accident case,

personnel protection in the form of

respirators or supplied air should be
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Notices 4361

1The schedule for unloading MSB No. 4 remains

indefinite. The staff has recently learned that the

licensee may postpone the unloading until a multipurpose cask is available. This would allow the

spent fuel currently stored in MSB No. 4 to be

transferred to a cask that would support both

storage and transportation of the spent fuel. The

NRC staff is reviewing this plan and will initiate

discussions pertaining to this matter with the

licensee and other affected parties.

2On May 28, 1996, a hydrogen gas ignition

occurred during the welding of the shield lid on a

VSC–24 cask at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. The

hydrogen was formed by a chemical reaction

between a zinc-based coating (Carbo Zinc 11) and

the borated water in the spent fuel pool.

3On December 3, 1996, the NRC staff informed

the licensee for the Arkansas Nuclear One facility

in Russellville, Arkansas, that it had completed its

reviews and inspections associated with that

facility and found that the licensee had

satisfactorily completed the commitments

documented in the CAL. Shortly thereafter, the

licensee initiated cask-loading activities.

considered in accordance with the

licensee’s Radiation Protection Program.

The licensee for Palisades began

loading casks in May 1993 after

implementing pertinent certificate

conditions, including those in Section

1.1.2.

In July 1994, the licensee discovered

radiographic indications of possible

defects in a weld in multi-assembly

sealed basket (MSB) No. 4. MSB No. 4

had been loaded with spent fuel earlier

that month and placed, inside a

ventilated concrete cask, on the ISFSI

storage pad. The licensee evaluated the

flaw indications and determined that

the MSB continued to meet its design

basis and was capable of safely storing

spent fuel for the duration of the

certificate (20 years). Nevertheless, the

licensee stated that MSB No. 4 would be

unloaded to support additional

inspections and evaluations related to

its future use.1 In preparation for the

unloading of MSB No. 4, the licensee

reviewed the unloading procedure

issued in May 1993 (Revision 0) and

identified several technical questions. A

revision of the unloading procedure

(Revision 1) was subsequently

developed to resolve the identified

technical questions.

The technical questions and the

associated procedural changes were

discussed during meetings with the

NRC staff, and additional information

was provided in submittals from the

licensee to the NRC. Evaluation of the

revised unloading procedure by the

NRC staff was initially made through

the review of submittals from the

licensee and has continued through an

inspection of the licensee’s revised

unloading procedure.

As a result of its inspections and

reviews, the NRC staff recognized that

some licensees, including Consumers

Power Company, had developed

unloading procedures that tended to be

simplistic and lacked sufficient details

and contingencies. In order to address

these issues, an item related to cask

loading and unloading procedures was

added to the NRC dry cask storage

action plan that was implemented in

July 1995. Some issues, such as the

thermal-hydraulic behavior of casks

during the unloading process, were

included largely as a result of questions

related to the original unloading

procedure at Palisades. Experience at

other facilities using storage and

transportation casks resulted in the

identification of other issues. For

example, as a result of the turbidity of

the spent fuel pool during the unloading

of a transportation cask at the Shearon

Harris Nuclear Power Plant, the NRC

staff assessed the potential for and

significance of deposits on fuel

assembly surfaces becoming loose

during the unloading of dry storage

casks. Evaluations and inspections were

used to resolve these issues for specific

facilities and revisions to NRC guidance

documents have been prepared to

resolve generic concerns.

Completion of the NRC inspection of

the revised unloading procedure for

Palisades was postponed following an

event at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.2

Following the hydrogen ignition event

at Point Beach, the NRC issued

confirmatory action letters (CALs) to

those licensees using or planning to use

VSC–24 casks for the storage of spent

nuclear fuel (i.e., licensees for Point

Beach, Palisades, and Arkansas Nuclear

One). The CALs document the licensees’

commitments not to load or unload a

VSC–24 cask without resolution of

material compatibility issues identified

in NRC Bulletin 96–04, ‘‘Chemical,

Galvanic, or Other Reactions in Spent

Fuel Storage and Transportation Casks,’’

and confirmation of corrective actions

by the NRC.3

The NRC staff is continuing to review

the bulletin responses and corrective

actions for the Palisades facility, and,

therefore, the licensee is restrained from

loading or unloading additional VSC–24

casks. Completion of the ongoing NRC

inspection of the revised unloading

procedure at Palisades will be

coordinated with the staff’s review of

the licensee’s response to the bulletin.

Further, the NRC has committed to State

officials and members of the public that

the exit meeting for the inspection at

Palisades will be open to the public, the

meeting will be noticed sufficiently in

advance to allow interested parties to

attend, and the NRC staff will allocate

time to discuss issues with the public

following the meeting with the licensee.

III. Discussion

The Petition requests four actions by

the NRC on the basis of the contention

that the original unloading procedure

(Revision 0) implemented by the

licensee was inadequate, and therefore,

the licensee violated NRC regulations

requiring the licensee, prior to using an

approved cask, to establish that all

conditions in a dry storage cask

certificate of compliance have been met

(see 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2)).

(1) Determine That the Licensee

Violated NRC Requirements

In support of the Petition’s contention

that the licensee violated NRC

requirements related to the original

unloading procedure, the Petitioners

claim that issues identified in licensee

documents dated November 11, 1994,

and June 2, 1995, regarding revisions to

the unloading procedure to support the

planned unloading of Cask No. 4,

demonstrate that the original procedure

was inadequate. The amendment to the

Petition filed on September 30, 1996,

included issues related to material

compatibility identified in NRC Bulletin

96–04 as additional evidence that the

licensee’s original unloading procedure

was inadequate.

The primary information offered by

the Petitioners in support of their claim

that the original procedure violated NRC

requirements is identified in the

licensee’s document dated November

11, 1994. Although the issues identified

by the Petitioners have been represented

by the licensee as improvements or

enhancements to the original unloading

procedure to support the planned

unloading of Cask No. 4 at Palisades, a

potential inference that might be drawn

from the November 11 document is that

the original unloading procedure could

not adequately support the unloading of

Cask No. 4. However, the licensee’s

letter dated December 29, 1994, affirmed

the licensee’s position that the original

unloading procedure was adequate, and

therefore complied with the certificate

of compliance. Additional information,

including the revised unloading

procedure and the supporting

engineering analyses, was provided in

the licensee’s submittal to the NRC

dated June 2, 1995. The NRC staff

requested additional information from

the licensee, and that information was

provided by the licensee in submittals

dated October 16, 1995, December 20,

1995, and July 19, 1996.

On the basis of its review, the NRC

staff concluded that, had the licensee

attempted to unload a cask using the
4362 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Notices

4Section 1.1.3 of the certificate of compliance for

the VSC–24 cask states that activities at the ISFSI

shall be conducted in accordance with the

requirements of 10 CFR part 50, appendix B.

Requirements related to quality assurance for ISFSIs

are also contained in subpart G to 10 CFR part 72.

The requirements of Criteria V and VI in appendix

B to 10 CFR part 50 are the same as the

requirements stated in 10 CFR 72.150 and 10 CFR

72.152. In the case of the original cask unloading

procedure at Palisades, the number of problems in

the original procedure and the failure of the

licensee to identify these problems during reviews

performed prior to approval of the procedure

resulted in the finding that a violation of NRC

regulations had occurred. This finding is

documented in NRC Inspection Report 50–255/

96014.

5Although the NRC staff has identified

weaknesses and deficiencies in the unloading

procedure developed by the licensee, these

problems resulted from the licensee giving

insufficient consideration to the complexity of the

activity. As part of its evaluation pertaining to the

mitigation of enforcement sanctions, the NRC staff

concluded that the licensee had not knowingly and

willfully violated NRC requirements related to

having an unloading procedure for dry storage casks

as was claimed by the Petitioners.

original unloading procedure, certain

deficiencies associated with the original

procedure would have prevented

completion of the unloading process.

The original unloading procedure’s

administrative limit for maximum cask

pressure would have prevented the

licensee from establishing a continuous

cooling cycle because the internal cask

pressure would not have been sufficient

to force steam to the outlet of the

discharge piping at the bottom of the

spent fuel pool. Other weaknesses in the

original unloading procedure that

would have hampered cask unloading

included a restrictive venting capacity

due to reliance upon a small vent line

with an installed Swagelok fitting, scant

guidance for personnel performing tasks

such as drawing a gas sample from the

MSB to check for damaged fuel, and

several examples of references to the

wrong step within the procedure. Such

deficiencies and weaknesses would

have required the licensee to suspend

activities at one or more times during

the unloading process in order to

evaluate the problems encountered and

implement necessary revisions to the

procedure. Therefore, because the

original unloading procedure would

have required revision in order to

complete the unloading process, this

was a violation of requirements that all

activities affecting quality be prescribed

by procedures appropriate for the

circumstances and that procedures are

reviewed for adequacy. (See Criteria V

and VI in Appendix B to 10 CFR Part

50.) 4 However, the staff also determined

that the deficiencies in the original

unloading procedure would not have

challenged the integrity of the cask or

fuel contained in the cask and that the

licensee would have ultimately been

able to safely unload a cask. Thus, given

the limited safety significance of the

procedural deficiencies and the fact that

the licensee identified and corrected the

deficiencies, the NRC exercised its

discretion to refrain from issuing a

Notice of Violation or a civil penalty for

the violation.

The purpose and objective of the

NRC’s enforcement program are focused

on using enforcement actions (1) as a

deterrent to emphasize the importance

of compliance with requirements, and

(2) to encourage prompt identification

and prompt, comprehensive correction

of violations. Mitigation of enforcement

sanctions, such as refraining from

issuing a civil penalty and/or a Notice

of Violation, is described in Section

VII.B of the ‘‘General Statement of

Policy and Procedures for NRC

Enforcement Actions (Enforcement

Policy),’’ for those cases in which a

licensee identifies a problem and

corrects it within a reasonable time.

These mitigating factors were applicable

to the subject Severity Level IV violation

pertaining to the original unloading

procedure at Palisades and the violation

was, therefore, dispositioned as a NonCited Violation.5

As noted, the licensee, in various

correspondence, took the position that

the original unloading procedure was

adequate and that subsequent changes

incorporated into the revised procedure

were enhancements based on lessons

learned from operating experience and

additional evaluations. Several

statements in the licensee’s

correspondence appear to assert that

unloading procedures for dry storage

casks do not need to maintain fuel

integrity during the unloading process

in order to satisfy requirements of the

certificate of compliance or NRC

regulations. The NRC staff disagrees

with this interpretation. NRC

requirements mandate that the

unloading process should be developed

with due consideration to maintaining

fuel integrity (see 10 CFR 72.122(h),

72.122(l), and 72.236(h)). Unloading

activities are required to prevent gross

ruptures of the fuel cladding in order to

prevent operational safety problems.

Unloading procedures are also required

to include contingencies in case fuel

cladding has degraded during storage

such that additional measures are

necessary to address increased

radiological hazards during the

unloading process. The NRC staff has

concluded that the original unloading

procedure would have supported

unloading of undamaged fuel

assemblies without causing a significant

loss of fuel cladding integrity.

The issues identified by the licensee

in the document of November 11, 1994,

and for which the Petitioners claim that

the original unloading procedure was

inadequate, are addressed below.

MSB Cooling Skid

The licensee modified the

configuration of the fill and vent piping

and components from that used in the

original unloading procedure. An

increase in the venting capacity and the

use of the previous vent path for

instrumentation necessitated these

modifications. The original unloading

procedure included steps to remove a

gas sample for analysis, connect the

venting arrangement to the spent fuel

pool, and connect the cooling water

supply from the spent fuel pool to the

vacuum drying system water pump and

the MSB drain line. Neither the

Petitioners nor the NRC staff have

identified fundamental safety concerns

with the arrangement used in the

original unloading procedure.

Thermal Hydraulic Modeling

In order to verify that undamaged fuel

could be safely removed from MSB No.

4 and to support preparing the revised

unloading procedure, the licensee

performed multiple analyses by

modeling the thermal hydraulic

behavior of the cask during the cooling

process. These analyses were used to

estimate the pressure response of the

cask, to estimate the time requirements

for cooling the cask, and to select the

appropriate venting capacity in the

revised unloading procedure. The

analyses performed by the licensee

showed that the venting capacity

available for the original unloading

procedure would have supported the

cooling and refill of the MSB. These

analyses also showed that cask

unloading using the original procedure

would have taken significantly longer

than the time estimated for the revised

procedure. However, no violations of

regulatory requirements would have

resulted from taking longer to complete

the unloading process. The licensee’s

performance of the analyses during

preparation of the revised unloading

procedure highlighted the lack of

supporting analyses or evaluations for

the original version of the unloading

procedure and contributed to the staff’s

finding that the licensee had violated

the requirements of Criterion VI of

appendix B to 10 CFR part 50 by issuing

the original procedure without

sufficient reviews to determine its

adequacy.
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Notices 4363

Maximum Allowable Pressurization

During its review of the unloading

procedure, the licensee determined that

the cask should be limited to 38.3 psig

in order to satisfy criteria established by

the American Society of Mechanical

Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel

Code. This value is conservative with

respect to the pressure that would

challenge the structural integrity of the

MSB. The original unloading procedure

included precautions to maintain the

internal pressure less than 10 psig and

thus was bounded by the subsequent

evaluations and the acceptable

conditions specified in the revised

procedure.

However, the staff has concluded that

the procedural limitation of 10 psig in

the original unloading procedure would

have introduced problems in

establishing the cooling cycle because

the pressure would have been too low

to force steam or water from the MSB to

the coolant discharge at the bottom of

the spent fuel pool. These problems, in

turn, likely would have prevented

completion of cask unloading without

revising the procedure. However, the

problems would not have challenged

the integrity of the cask or otherwise

introduced a safety concern. Rather,

upon identifying the problems caused

by the administrative limit of 10 psig,

the licensee could have revised the

procedure, proceeded to establish the

desired cooling cycle, and completed

unloading of a cask.

Fuel Integrity During Cooling

In support of preparing the revised

unloading procedure, the licensee, with

support from the nuclear fuel supplier,

analyzed the allowable temperature

differences between fuel assembly

components and cooling water.

Additional analyses determined

maximum expected fuel temperatures

before establishing the cooling flow to

the MSB. These evaluations and the

expected thermal response of the MSB

and fuel assemblies following the

introduction of coolant during the

unloading procedure confirmed that

thermal shocking would not challenge

the integrity of the fuel assemblies in

the MSB.

Fuel Heatup While the MSB is in the

Transport Cask

As previously mentioned, the licensee

and the contractors analyzed the

maximum fuel temperatures that could

be experienced during the time that the

MSB is in the transfer cask before

establishing the cooling flow from the

spent fuel pool to the MSB interior.

These analyses were performed for

various heat loads and time periods and

included conservative analysis

assumptions. The analyses showed that

fuel temperature limits would not be

exceeded before establishing the cooling

flow from the spent fuel pool using the

original (or the revised) unloading

procedure.

MSB Lid Removal

The revised unloading procedure uses

more advanced cutting technologies in

order to incorporate operating

experience, ease lid removal, and

minimize personnel exposure. The

capability of the original unloading

procedure to control removal of the

MSB lid was verified by the licensee

during mockups before loading casks at

Palisades. Some of the improvements in

the revised procedure are related to

problems experienced during that

exercise. However, the licensee has

demonstrated that techniques for lid

removal in the original unloading

procedure were adequate to remove the

lids and provide access to the fuel

assemblies in compliance with NRC

requirements.

Criticality Prevention

The original unloading procedure

included steps for sampling the spent

fuel pool boron concentration and

establishing time limits for lid removal

following termination of recirculation

flow. The NRC staff considers the

original procedure’s lack of a detailed

contingency for preventing bulk boiling,

as was incorporated into the revised

procedure, a procedural weakness.

However, the weakness does not

translate into a concern related to public

health and safety or personnel exposure

because of the inherent conservatisms

related to reactivity control for storage

casks, such as assuming nonirradiated

fuel assemblies in supporting

calculations, and the time that would be

available for the licensee to implement

compensatory actions.

10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Related to the

MSB Cooling Skid

Modifications to the MSB cooling skid

led the licensee to question whether an

unreviewed safety question was

introduced by a possible break of the

return line to the spent fuel pool. Upon

further review, the licensee determined

that the cooling system configuration

did not create the possibility for an

accident or a malfunction of a different

type than any evaluated previously in

the facility’s final safety analysis report

or otherwise exceed the criteria that

define an unreviewed safety question

under 10 CFR 50.59. The licensee has

stated that this conclusion is also

applicable for the original unloading

procedure. Neither the Petitioners nor

the NRC staff have identified a safety or

compliance issue regarding the

licensee’s conclusion.

Rigging Procedures

The licensee investigated several

minor changes to the rigging process

during the development of the revised

unloading procedure. These changes are

intended to ease the operations and

reduce personnel radiation exposures.

However, the staff determined that the

guidance provided by the original

procedure, combined with expected

skill of licensee personnel, would have

been adequate to control the lifting of

the various loads associated with

unloading a cask.

Helium Sampling

During the development of the revised

unloading procedure, the licensee

recognized possible difficulties in

drawing a gas sample from the MSB

before initiating the cooling operation.

The original unloading procedure

included a step to ‘‘remove a gas sample

from the cask,’’ but did not include the

more detailed guidance that is

incorporated into the revised procedure.

This lack of guidance in the original

procedure may have resulted in licensee

personnel underestimating the helium

concentration in the MSB. The original

unloading procedure included

provisions to suspend the unloading

process if the sampling indicated air

within the MSB. Therefore, this

potential weakness in the original

unloading procedure would not have

introduced adverse safety consequences

but instead may have erroneously

caused the licensee to suspend cask

unloading activities in order to conduct

management briefings and determine

compensatory measures due to the

potential oxidation of the fuel cladding.

Summary for (1) ‘‘Determine That the

Licensee Violated NRC Requirements’’

On the basis of its evaluation of the

licensee’s original unloading procedure,

the NRC staff affirmed the licensee’s

determination that the procedure had

numerous weaknesses. The staff

believes that the administrative limit of

10 psig for maximum cask pressure and

other identified weaknesses in the

original unloading procedure would

have required the licensee to suspend

activities at one or more times during

the unloading process in order to

evaluate the problems encountered and

implement necessary revisions to the

procedure. Given the number of

weaknesses in the original unloading

procedure and the licensee’s failure to
4364 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Notices

6These documents, like all others identified in

this decision, are available to the public at the NRC

Public Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120

L Street, NW, Washington, DC, and from the local

public document room located in the Van Wylen

Library at Hope College in Holland, Michigan.

perform the necessary levels of review

and analysis to have determined its

adequacy prior to its issuance, the NRC

staff found that the licensee violated

NRC requirements contained in Criteria

V and VI of appendix B to 10 CFR part

50. The first request in the Petition, to

find that the licensee violated NRC

requirements related to unloading

procedures for dry storage casks for

spent nuclear fuel, is therefore granted.

The violation was dispositioned as a

Non-Cited Violation consistent with the

NRC Enforcement Policy.

The Petitioners’ amendment to the

Petition dated September 30, 1996,

claims that the original unloading

procedure was inadequate because of its

lack of controls related to the generation

of hydrogen gas from a chemical

reaction between coatings used on the

VSC–24 casks and the borated water in

the spent fuel pool. The chemical

reactions and hydrogen issue were

identified following an event that

occurred during welding of the shield

lid on a spent fuel storage cask at the

Point Beach plant on May 28, 1996. The

need to include special precautions in

the unloading procedures for VSC–24

casks in order to prevent ignition of

hydrogen gas had not been recognized

by the cask vendor, licensees, or the

NRC staff prior to the event at Point

Beach. The licensee’s original unloading

procedure was developed before the

event at Point Beach caused the

recognition of the potential for ignition

of hydrogen gas during the unloading of

a VSC–24 cask. Accordingly, the NRC

cannot reasonably fault the licensee, by

taking enforcement action, for not

having accounted for an issue that was

not known to the NRC staff, the vendor,

or the licensee.

(2) Suspend the Licensee’s Use of the

General License

On the basis of the contention that the

licensee’s unloading procedure was

inadequate, the Petitioners requested

that the licensee’s use of the general

license provisions of 10 CFR part 72 be

suspended until such time as the

significant issues described in the

licensee’s document of June 2, 1995,

have been resolved, the NRC has

documented its review, approved the

licensee’s revised procedure, and Cask

No. 4 has been safely unloaded.

The licensee’s submittal of June 2,

1995, provided Revision 1 of the

unloading procedure and supporting

engineering analyses. The Petition

includes specific questions and

comments regarding the licensee’s

submittal of June 2, 1995, in support of

the Petitioners’ position that actions

taken by the licensee had not resolved

significant safety issues. In response to

questions from the NRC staff, the

licensee provided additional

information related to the submittal

dated June 2, 1995. The subsequent

submittals were dated October 16, and

December 20, 1995.6 In addition, the

NRC staff was reviewing and will

continue to review the issues included

in the submittal dated June 2, 1995, as

part of the ongoing NRC inspection of

the revised unloading procedure.

Further, as described above, the NRC

staff has already concluded that the

deficiencies in the original unloading

procedure violated NRC requirements,

and that the violation should be treated

as a Non-Cited Violation because of the

limited safety significance of the

procedural deficiencies and

consideration of mitigating factors

defined in the NRC Enforcement Policy.

On June 3, 1996, the NRC issued

CALs to the licensee and other users of

the VSC–24 cask system. The CALs

confirmed a commitment made by each

licensee to the NRC staff to refrain from

loading or unloading a VSC–24 cask

pending completion of investigations

and implementation of corrective

actions. On June 27, 1996, a supplement

to the CAL was issued to confirm a

further commitment by the licensee to

refrain from placing a VSC–24 cask into

the spent fuel pool until after the NRC

has reviewed and accepted applicable

responses to NRC Bulletin 96–04 and

verified corrective actions taken in

response to the bulletin. CALs are

among the administrative mechanisms

that the NRC uses to supplement

Notices of Violation, civil penalties, and

orders in its enforcement program. CALs

may be issued to confirm an agreement

by a licensee or vendor to take certain

actions to remove significant concerns

about health, safety, safeguards, or the

environment. The NRC expects

licensees and vendors to adhere to

stated obligations or commitments

included in a CAL and will not hesitate

to issue appropriate orders to ensure

that such obligations or commitments

are met.

The NRC issued the CALs and

Bulletin 96–04 in recognition of the fact

that the generation of hydrogen gas

during the loading of VSC–24 casks at

Point Beach was evidence that possible

material compatibility issues were not

fully addressed during the design or

certification reviews associated with

some spent fuel storage and

transportation casks. It is not unusual

for the NRC to use such administrative

mechanisms to address generic issues.

Given that the generation of flammable

gases was a particular concern for the

users of the VSC–24 cask system, those

licensees, including Consumers Power

Company, were issued CALs to confirm

that VSC–24 casks would not be loaded,

unloaded, or otherwise placed in a

spent fuel pool before the resolution of

issues identified in NRC Bulletin 96–04.

In regard to those issues contained in

the amendment to the Petition, the

existing CAL documents the licensee’s

commitment to refrain from loading,

unloading, or otherwise placing a VSC–

24 cask into the spent fuel pool pending

verification of corrective actions related

to NRC Bulletin 96–04. Given the

licensee’s commitment not to load or

unload a cask, the NRC does not, in this

instance, envision the need to issue an

order as requested by the Petitioners.

Those portions of the Petition that

address NRC’s approval of the revised

unloading procedure and include the

unloading of Cask No. 4 as a condition

for resuming normal activities under the

general license are denied. The NRC

staff does not generally review and

approve specific procedures developed

by licensees. NRC regulations, facility

licenses, and NRC-approved quality

assurance programs require licensees to

establish and maintain a formal process

for the preparation and issuance of

procedures and changes thereto. NRC

assessments of licensee procedures are

generally conducted as part of the NRC’s

inspection program. In this instance,

given the licensee’s commitment to

refrain from action until completion of

NRC’s inspections, the inspections will

confirm that applicable regulatory

requirements are satisfied before use of

the licensee’s revised unloading

procedure. As previously mentioned,

the NRC staff will resume its inspection

activities related to the revised

unloading procedure when the licensee

has resolved the issues identified in

NRC Bulletin 96–04. If, and provided

that, there is satisfactory resolution of

the issues identified in NRC Bulletin

96–04 and any other questions that may

arise during the inspection of the

licensee’s revised unloading procedure,

then the NRC will have reasonable

assurance of the licensee’s compliance

with regulatory requirements.

Accordingly, the staff would not have

any basis or reason to require the

licensee to unload Cask No. 4 before

resuming normal activities under the

general license at Palisades. Thus,

following resolution of all issues to the

satisfaction of the NRC staff, the

determination of the sequence of events
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Notices 4365

related to the planned unloading of Cask

No. 4 and the loading of additional

casks at Palisades will be at the

discretion of the licensee. As noted

above, the NRC staff has committed to

open the exit meeting with the licensee

to the public at the conclusion of the

ongoing inspection and will document

its review in an inspection report that

will be available for public review.

(3) Require the Licensee to Pay a

Substantial Penalty

On the basis of the contention that the

licensee’s original unloading procedure

was inadequate, the Petitioners

requested that the NRC levy a monetary

penalty of $1.3 million against the

licensee. As previously mentioned, the

NRC staff determined that, although

finding that the deficiencies in the

original unloading procedure violated

NRC requirements, the violation

satisfied the criteria to be treated as a

Non-Cited Violation because of the

limited safety significance of the

procedural deficiencies and

consideration of mitigating factors

defined in the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Enforcement sanctions, including

issuance of civil penalties and orders,

are normally used as a deterrent to

emphasize the importance of

compliance with requirements, and to

encourage prompt identification and

prompt, comprehensive correction of

violations. In this case, the licensee

identified the deficiencies that

constituted the violation of NRC

requirements and subsequently revised

the unloading procedure to resolve the

identified technical issues. It was the

judgement of the NRC staff that the

violation should be dispositioned as a

Non-Cited Violation in order to convey

the appropriate regulatory message in

this case. Further, even if the violation

had been cited, it is the NRC staff’s

judgment that it would have been

categorized at a Severity Level IV, for

which a civil penalty would not

ordinarily be issued.

In regard to the hydrogen issues

identified in the amendment to the

Petition, the NRC staff has utilized an

administrative mechanism in its

enforcement policy (CALs) to ensure

that the licensee takes certain actions to

resolve this safety concern. As

previously mentioned, the specific

contentions raised by the Petitioners

pertaining to hydrogen issues and the

original unloading procedure do not

warrant additional enforcement actions

by the NRC.

(4) Allow Petitioners to Review

Procedure, Require NRC to Hold

Hearings, and Allow Petitioners to

Participate in Proceedings

The original unloading procedure and

the first revision of the unloading

procedure have been provided to the

Petitioners. In addition, correspondence

between the NRC and the licensee

regarding the procedures have been

furnished to the Petitioners. Further,

due to the course of events following the

licensee’s decision to unload Cask No.

4—including the licensee’s evaluation

of the original unloading procedure,

identification of improvements to the

unloading process, and the submittal of

this Petition—the original and first

revision of the unloading procedure and

related documentation have been

available for public review.

Accordingly, Petitioners have had the

opportunity to review the unloading

procedure. Further, as noted elsewhere,

it is the NRC staff’s intention to hold a

public meeting in the vicinity of the

Palisades Nuclear Plant at the

conclusion of its ongoing inspection of

the licensee’s revised unloading

procedure.

The Petitioners’ request for hearings

and participation in proceedings has

been addressed in previous

correspondence with the Petitioners and

the Attorney General for the State of

Michigan. In that correspondence, the

NRC staff explained that neither the

general licensing provisions of 10 CFR

part 72 nor the petition process

described in 10 CFR 2.206 require the

NRC to institute a proceeding. Under

§ 2.206, the NRC office director

responsible for the subject matter of the

request ‘‘shall either institute the

requested proceeding in accordance

with this subpart or shall advise the

person who made the request in writing

that no proceeding will be instituted in

whole or in part, with respect to the

request, and the reasons for the

decision.’’

As set forth in this Director’s

Decision, the NRC has determined not

to institute the proceeding as requested

by the Petition.

IV. Conclusion

Petitioners requested that the NRC

determine that Consumers Power

Company violated NRC requirements,

suspend the licensee’s use of the general

license, impose a substantial penalty,

and hold hearings related to the

licensee’s unloading procedure for dry

storage casks. In response, the NRC

determined the licensee violated NRC

requirements insofar as the original

unloading procedure (Revision 0) would

have required revision in order to have

completed the unloading process.

Further, NRC staff determined that the

violation, which was identified and

corrected by the licensee, should be

treated as a Non-Cited Violation

consistent with the NRC’s Enforcement

Policy. Therefore, to this extent,

Petitioners’ request for a determination

that the licensee violated NRC

requirements is granted. The available

information is sufficient to conclude,

however, that no substantial safety issue

has been raised regarding the operation

of Palisades or its associated ISFSI given

the licensee’s commitment not to load

or unload a cask until the NRC staff is

satisfied that the licensee’s procedures

are adequate. Therefore, the NRC has

determined that no adequate basis exists

for granting Petitioners’ requests for

suspension of Consumers Power

Company’s use of the general license for

dry cask storage of spent nuclear fuel at

Palisades or imposition of a civil

penalty.

A copy of this decision will be filed

with the Secretary of the Commission

for the Commission to review in

accordance with 10 CFR 2.206(c).

As provided by this regulation, this

decision will constitute the final action

of the Commission 25 days after

issuance, unless the Commission, on its

own motion, institutes a review of the

decision within that time.

Dated at Rockville, Md., this 23d day of

January 1997.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank J. Miraglia,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation.

[FR Doc. 97–2162 Filed 1–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7690–01–P

Individual Plant Examination Program;

Perspectives on Reactor Safety and

Plant Performance Volume 1, Part 1

and Volume 2, Parts 2–5, Draft

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory

Commission.

ACTION: Notice of revised deadlines for

public comments on draft NUREG–

1560.

SUMMARY: The Nuclear Regulatory

Commission has published a draft of

‘‘Individual Plant Examination Program:

Perspectives on Reactor Safety and Plant

Performance,’’ NUREG–1560, Volumes 1

and 2. Volume 1, Part 1 is a summary

report from a review of the Individual

Plant Examinations (IPE) submitted to

the agency in response to Generic Letter