U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

29–830 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

S. HRG. 115–264 

OPEN HEARING ON THE INTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNITY’S ASSESSMENT ON RUSSIAN 

ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE 2016 

U.S. ELECTIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov 

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(II) 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.] 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina, Chairman 

MARK R. WARNER, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

SUSAN COLLINS, Maine 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri 

JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma 

TOM COTTON, Arkansas 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RON WYDEN, Oregon 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

ANGUS KING, Maine 

JOE MANCHIN, West Virginia 

KAMALA HARRIS, California 

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Ex Officio 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio 

JACK REED, Rhode Island, Ex Officio 

CHRIS JOYNER, Staff Director 

MICHAEL CASEY, Minority Staff Director 

DESIREE THOMPSON-SAYLE, Chief Clerk 

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CONTENTS 

JANUARY 10, 2017 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Burr, Hon. Richard, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from North Carolina ................ 1 

Mark R. Warner, Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from Virginia ......................... 3 

WITNESS 

James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Accompanied by: John 

Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; James Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and ADM. Michael Rogers, 

Director of the National Security Agency .......................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8 

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OPEN HEARING ON THE INTELLIGENCE 

COMMUNITY’S ASSESSMENT ON RUSSIAN 

ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN THE 2016 

U.S. ELECTIONS 

TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, 

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:03 p.m. in Room 

SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Burr (Chairman of the Committee) presiding. 

Present: Burr, Warner, Risch, Rubio, Collins, Blunt, Lankford, 

Cotton, Cornyn, Wyden, Heinrich, King, Manchin, Harris, and 

Reed. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BURR, CHAIRMAN, A 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA 

Chairman BURR. I’d like to call this hearing to order. I’d like to 

welcome our witnesses: Jim Clapper, Director of National Intelligence; John Brennan, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; 

Jim Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and 

Admiral Mike Rogers, Director of the National Security Agency. 

Directors Clapper and Brennan, while I’ve said this to you before 

in closed session, this is likely your last appearance before the 

Committee, at least in your current roles. I want to thank each of 

you, before you get out of here, for your many years of dedicated 

service both in uniform and out of uniform. Jim, John, in many different capacities, you have served your country in an unbelievable 

way, both of you. We want you to know how grateful we are to you 

and how grateful the Nation is to you for the service that you’ve 

provided. 

We convene today to discuss the President’s directed review of 

Russian activities and intentions in recent U.S. elections. While 

Russia and the Soviet Union have used active measures as tools of 

statecraft since the 1920s, recent actions by the Russian government represent, as you reported, a notable escalation. 

I know that the public disclosure of these activities surprised 

many and the notion that another state would attempt to interfere 

in our elections is quite troubling. However, Russian active measures as a general topic is not new to the Members of this Committee. We’ve held more than 10 hearings and briefings over the 

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derstand the scale and scope of these efforts and the intentions behind them. 

Each of our witnesses has appeared before us in closed session 

to discuss this topic, and in response, on a bipartisan and bicameral basis, this Committee and its sister committee in the other 

body have put forward unclassified and classified proposals to address these activities. Some work has been done, but to effectively 

address this challenge to the integrity of our system of government 

will require a ‘‘whole of government’’ approach. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the details of the 

intelligence community assessment. Intelligence reporting over the 

last few years, to include the classified and compartmented portions of this assessment, gives me no reason to doubt the findings 

contained within the product. That said, we owe it to our colleagues and the American people to do an independent and bipartisan review of the report and its conclusions. 

I’ve therefore instructed Committee staff to carry out an assessment of the sourcing behind this report, and we will be asking each 

of our witnesses to provide the Committee access to the intelligence 

that contributed to this assessment. I want to assure my colleagues 

on this Committee and in this body that we will follow the intelligence wherever it leads and we will conduct this review in a nonpartisan manner. I also want to assure the witnesses before us 

today, as has long been our practice, the Committee will treat the 

protection of these sources with the level of security and professionalism required. 

I’d also like to quickly thank the men and women of the intelligence community for their work in completing this review. To 

each of our witnesses: Please thank your respective staffs. I have 

no doubt that the President’s directive, Jim, to you and to others 

ruined many’s holiday plans. 

While this moment in our history is critical and the testimony 

before this Committee in an open setting will, I hope, help the 

American people understand what Russia attempted to accomplish 

as part of its focus on our 2016 elections, I want to make this clear: 

Our democracy is not at risk. We can rest assured in the strength 

of the United States of America and have continued faith in the 

electoral process. 

We must be alert, though, to the challenges that face us and the 

threats posed by those who seek to undermine Western democratic 

values, whether they are through interference in our elections or 

relentless propaganda and active measures targeting our friends 

and our allies abroad. 

Our values are indeed under assault. The key differences between the efforts of the past and the attacks of today, however, is 

the tools being used to carry these out. 

Gentlemen, thank you again for being here today. I look forward 

to your testimony, General Clapper, and to the opportunity to 

query questions to the rest. 

I will now turn to the distinguished Vice Chairman, the Senator 

from Virginia. 

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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARK R. WARNER, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I 

want to echo, first of all, your comments in terms of commending 

all the witnesses, but particularly Director Clapper and Director 

Brennan, for your great service to our country. 

I also want to acknowledge the new Members of our Committee, 

both new Members here, Senator Manchin and Senator Harris. I 

know Senator Cornyn will be joining us briefly and, while she’s not 

here yet, I want to acknowledge the great role that Senator Feinstein has played, both as Chair and Vice Chair on this Committee. 

We’re here today to discuss the intelligence community’s comprehensive review into Russian interference in our 2016 presidential election, for me one of the most serious events of my public 

life. Interference in American democracy and our electoral process 

by any outside power is unacceptable. 

Now, much of the press reporting and conversation about Russian activities have focused on the hacks of the DNC and John Podesta. But, as the report pointed out, the Russians also hacked systems associated with the Republicans. They just chose not to release that material yet. There’s nothing that prevents them from 

doing so at a time of their choosing in the future. 

While the target of this campaign was Secretary Clinton, any of 

us, Democrats or Republicans, including members of this body, 

could easily be the next target. 

What the Russians did was nothing less than an attack on our 

political system and democracy itself. We can simply not allow it 

to stand. 

The IC assessment is more detailed, but is in line with the previous assessments from the intelligence community that Russian 

officials at the highest level, including President Putin, engaged 

in—in your words, not mine—‘‘in an unprecedented level of interference in our election.’’ It concludes that ‘‘these actions had the 

goal of harming the candidacy of Hillary Clinton and boosting the 

candidacy of President-elect Donald Trump.’’ 

We are not here to re-litigate the results of the election. At the 

same time, I am committed to ensuring that there is a thorough, 

bipartisan, and expeditious Congressional investigation of Russia’s 

role. In my view, our Committee should focus on three broad areas: 

the Russian hacking and release of stolen information; Russia’s use 

of state-owned media and other means to amplify real and fake 

news to further their goal; and contact between Russian government and its agents and associates of any campaign and candidate. 

I, like you, Mr. Chairman, have written to all the witnesses here 

today asking them to cooperate with us in this investigation and 

turn over as many documents and as much evidence as quickly as 

possible. I, like you, am reiterating that call today. It is equally important that the incoming Administration and those folks who will 

take Director Clapper and Director Brennan’s roles going forward 

will continue to cooperate in this effort. 

Additionally, it’s my hope, while we’ve made a first step, that 

we’ll continue to try to declassify as much material as possible 

while again protecting sources and methods. 

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The American people deserve to know, as soon as possible, that 

their elected representatives have taken a close look at the intelligence report that we’re considering today. They deserve to know 

whether we concur or not with its conclusions and that we’re prepared to respond to the threats outlined in the assessment. 

The actions that the President took recently in response to Russian activities were an appropriate first step. At the same time, I 

still have questions why the Obama Administration didn’t act further and didn’t act sooner. 

But as we look forward, preventing future attempts to undermine 

our democracy and our position in the world will require a sustained response from the incoming Administration and from this 

Congress. I truly believe the strength of America’s democracy will 

be measured in part on what actions we take to develop a robust 

and proactive cyber strategy. 

Part of that strategy must include tools and capabilities to deter 

and effectively respond to future attempts by foreign actors to influence America’s democratic process. 

One of the things I’ve always valued about service on this Intelligence Committee is the tradition of leaving partisanship at the 

door oftentimes when we go into that SCIF. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and all our Members to complete this 

investigation as quickly and expeditiously as possible. 

Gentlemen, your agencies—the work that your agencies completed underscores the importance of the role the Nation’s intelligence community plays and the men and women who quietly 

work every day to keep our country safe. This report represents the 

best analysis of the men and women of the intelligence community. 

These are professionals who have taken an oath of office to present 

the whole truth as they see it, faithfully to Republicans and Democratic administrations alike. 

As a member of this Committee, I think all of us who’ve served 

for some time have seen first-hand the dedication of the men and 

women who work for you. I know that one of the most primary missions of the intelligence professionals is to render the best professional judgment, regardless of political considerations, and always 

be willing to speak truth to power. I support them for their work. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Vice Chairman. 

For Members: Once Director Clapper has been recognized and 

completes his testimony, it is the intention of the Chair to recognize members based upon seniority for five-minute questions. 

There is a vote that’s scheduled right now for 2:30. It’s the intent 

of the Chair to complete our questions in open session by the conclusion of that vote, and it is the intent of the Chairman to then 

move to a closed session, which would start after the 2:30 vote. If 

there’s need to adjust that, we’ll make an adjustment on the way. 

Having said that, a reminder to all members that we’re in open 

session and that you should take that into account from the standpoint of the questions that you ask and realize that there are unclassified and classified reports. 

With that, Director Clapper, the floor is yours. 

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STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. CLAPPER, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY: JOHN BRENNAN, 

DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; 

JAMES COMEY, DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND ADM. MICHAEL ROGERS, DIRECTOR OF 

THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY 

Director CLAPPER. Chairman Burr, Vice Chairman Warner, 

Members of the Committee: First, thank you for your gracious comments, particularly for John and me, as this should be our last 

hearing, although one never knows. There’s still 10 days left. But 

more importantly, the comments about the work, the dedication 

and the patriotism of the women and men of the intelligence community. So we appreciate that. 

We’re here today to present the intelligence community’s assessment of Russian activities and intentions during the recent U.S. 

presidential election. As you indicated, some aspects of our report 

involve very sensitive sources and methods that we can’t discuss in 

this open televised hearing. So obviously we’re asking for your support and understanding as we need to defer to a closed setting. 

Our remarks today are based on a highly classified assessment 

that was produced by the three agencies represented here, the CIA, 

FBI, and NSA, at the request of President Obama, which we, as 

you also indicated, released publicly in a declassified version last 

Friday afternoon. 

The report covers the motivation and scope of Moscow’s intentions regarding the U.S. election and Russia’s use of cyber tools 

and media to influence U.S. public opinion. I want to make clear 

that this report does not—repeat, does not—assess the impact of 

Russian activities on the actual outcome of the 2016 election or 

draw any conclusions in that regard one way or the other. The IC’s 

role is to assess the intentions, capabilities, and actions of foreign 

actors, not to analyze U.S. political processes or U.S. public opinion. We can say that we did not see evidence of the Russians altering vote tallies. 

We can’t discuss the full range of classified information that supports our conclusions because of the extreme sensitivity of these 

sources. But the key judgments in the public and classified 

versions are the same. I can say that the report draws on intelligence collected by all three of these agencies represented here, 

some of which only came to light after Election Day. 

When the IC says high confidence, we mean we have multiple 

high-quality sources of information that contribute to that assessment. The intelligence comes from a wide range of sources, including human sources, technical collection, and open source information. The key judgments are based on corroborating sources that 

are consistent with our understanding of historical and current 

Russian behavior. 

While we cannot publicly disclose most of the information that 

backs up these judgments, we have briefed the report in detail to 

President Obama and his team, President-elect Trump and his 

team, and Congressional leadership, and this morning the House 

Permanent Select Committee for Intelligence. They have had the 

opportunity to explore the report and pose any questions they have 

had about the basis for our conclusions. 

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Both the classified and public versions of this report were written 

by seasoned, nonpartisan intelligence professionals, consistent with 

the highest standards of analytic objectivity and tradecraft that the 

IC has refined over the last 15 years or so to ensure we provide 

policymakers the most accurate insights that we can. I also need 

to add that this reflects the intelligence community’s view, not that 

of the Administration. 

Attributing cyber operations is difficult, but not impossible. 

Every cyber operation, malicious or not, leaves a trail. IC analysts 

use this trail and their constantly growing knowledge base of malicious actors and their tools and methods to trace operations back 

to their source and determine their connections to foreign governments. This is exactly what we did here. 

Let me start with respect to the findings, to first address Russia’s goals and intentions. We have high confidence that President 

Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. 

presidential election. The goals of this campaign were to undermine 

public faith in the U.S. democratic process, denigrate Secretary 

Clinton and harm her electability and potential presidency. 

Putin and the Russian government also developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. Russia aspired to help Presidentelect Trump’s election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to him. 

Moscow’s approach evolved over the course of the campaign 

based on Russia’s understanding of the electoral prospects of each 

of the candidates. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton was likely to win, the Russian influence campaign began to 

focus more on undermining her future presidency. 

Moscow’s influence campaign blended covert intelligence operations with overt efforts by Russian government agencies, statefunded media, third party intermediaries, and paid social media 

users. 

We’re highly confident that the Russian intelligence services conducted cyber operations against people and organizations associated with the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including both major 

U.S. political parties. Russian military intelligence, or the GRU, 

compromised the email accounts of Democratic Party officials and 

publicly released victim data using the Guccifer 2.0 persona and 

DCLeaks.com and in exclusives to media outlets. They also relayed 

material to WikiLeaks. 

Russia collected on some Republican-affiliated targets, but did 

not conduct a comparable disclosure campaign. 

Russia’s intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements 

of multiple U.S. State or local electoral boards. However, the Department of Homeland Security assesses these types of systems 

were not involved, not involved, in vote tallying. 

Russia’s state-run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a platform for Kremlin messaging 

using Russian government-funded outlets, such as RT. 

Moscow has long sought to undermine U.S.-led liberal democratic 

order. Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on U.S. presidential 

elections. They’ve used intelligence officers, influence agents, and 

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press placements to disparage candidates perceived as hostile to 

the Kremlin. 

Moscow’s behavior reflects Russia’s more aggressive cyber posture in recent years, which poses a major threat to U.S. military, 

diplomatic, commercial, and critical infrastructure networks, as 

well as, as we’ve seen now, our elections. However, Russia’s activities in 2016 demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, 

level of activity, and scope of effort compared to previous operations. We assess Moscow will apply the lessons learned from the 

2016 campaign aimed in the future to influence efforts worldwide, 

including against U.S. allies. 

I’d like to wrap up by saying I’ve now got just 10 days left in my 

53 years or so in the intel business, and I’ve seen the IC get things 

right and get things wrong. But I believe the level of professional 

tradecraft and cross-agency intelligence integration required to put 

this report together gives me great confidence that we’ve gotten it 

right here. 

With that, we’re open for your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Director Clapper follows:] 

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Chairman BURR. Director, thank you for that thorough and concise testimony. 

Director Clapper, as I stated in my opening statement, I’ve instructed a select group of Committee staff to complete an independent and bipartisan review of the reporting that underpins the 

intelligence community assessment before us today. Do I have your 

assurance that you will provide the access that they need to the reporting necessary to make their conclusions? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. 

Chairman BURR. Director Comey, let me talk about forensics for 

just a minute, because the FBI has the expertise there. I know 

there’s tremendous investigative value when the FBI is actually 

able to conduct their own forensics review on devices that have suffered cyber intrusions and attacks. 

I believe there’s some confusion, though, or at least some conflicting reporting as to whether the FBI requested access to the 

DNC’s services, the Democratic Congressional Committee servers, 

and John Podesta’s personal devices. Did the FBI request access to 

those devices to perform forensics on them? 

Director COMEY. Yes, we did. 

Chairman BURR. Would that access have provided intelligence or 

information helpful to your investigation and possibly to the findings included in the intelligence community assessments? 

Director COMEY. Our forensics folks would always prefer to get 

access to the original device or server that’s involved. So it’s the 

best evidence. 

Chairman BURR. Were you given access to do the forensics on 

those servers? 

Director COMEY. We were not. A highly respected private company eventually got access and shared with us what they saw 

there. 

Chairman BURR. But is that typically the way the FBI would 

prefer to do the forensics, or would your forensics unit rather see 

the servers and do the forensics themselves? 

Director COMEY. We’d always prefer to have access hands-on ourselves if that’s possible. 

Chairman BURR. Do you know why you were denied access to 

those servers? 

Director COMEY. I don’t know for sure. I don’t know for sure. 

Chairman BURR. Was there one request or multiple requests? 

Director COMEY. Multiple requests at different levels, and ultimately what was agreed to is the private company would share 

with us what they saw. 

Chairman BURR. There has been much debate over the content 

released by WikiLeaks, Director Clapper—I should say DCLeaks— 

and what the intentions were behind those disclosures. Director 

Clapper, you made it perfectly clear in your testimony that the 

community feels that vote tallies were not altered. 

Director CLAPPER. That’s correct. 

Chairman BURR. Do you believe there’s any evidence that the 

DNC or the DCCC or the Podesta emails released publicly were altered in any way? 

Director CLAPPER. We have no evidence of that. 

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Chairman BURR. Director Comey, do you have any intelligence 

that any Republican system that was targeted by these same 

groups was either successfully penetrated or, if penetrated and 

there was data exfiltrated, was there any exfiltration? 

Director COMEY. There were successful penetrations of some 

groups and campaigns, particularly at the State level, on the Republican side of the aisle, and some limited penetration of old Republican National Committee domains. 

Chairman BURR. Penetrations of those National Committee domains? 

Director COMEY. Right, that were no longer in use. 

Chairman BURR. From the standpoint of Republican candidates 

that were running for President, were those campaigns, any of 

those campaigns, targeted under this same effort by the Russians? 

Director COMEY. The campaigns themselves, not to my knowledge. 

Chairman BURR. Okay. 

Vice Chairman. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, let me thank you, Director Clapper, for your report and 

the point that you continue to make, that it was not your job to 

analyze the effects in terms of the political campaign. I would add 

that any of us who are up here who’ve ever been through a close 

election, it means that any small item can be cause for harm. 

I want to follow up on where the Chairman was headed. Director 

Comey, there was some information, though, that was taken from 

Republican-affiliated entities. There was a great deal of information taken from Democrats. There was selective leaking with, as 

the Director has indicated, with clear political intent in the process. 

One of the things that I’m a little flabbergasted at is that somehow this is viewed by some as in their rear-view mirror. Don’t the 

Russians have the capability of taking, even if it’s old information 

about Republicans or other information about Democrats, and selectively leak that prospectively? 

Director COMEY. Sure. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. And could you describe—to my mind, 

this is not only one of the most significant items I’ve seen in my 

political life, but this is an ongoing threat to all of us and our electoral process. We have to be on guard, and could you speak for, or 

any other member of the panel speak to, the fact that—do you expect to see similar tactics used by Russians in terms of the upcoming elections in Germany, France, and The Netherlands? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, we do. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. And are our allies taking what’s happened in America with significant enough importance and are they 

putting up new defenses trying to guard against these activities? 

Director CLAPPER. I can’t say—at least I can’t; maybe others can 

here—the extent to which they have reacted to this. But they are 

certainly aware. Europe has long been a target of Russian attempts 

to manipulate electoral processes. So they will continue with that. 

And certainly because of the controversy that’s generated in our 

country, I think that will reinforce their desire to do that. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. One of the things that actually another 

Member of the Committee raised is, certain Russian activities, 

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against just to note the seriousness, not only retrospectively but 

prospectively, that I believe there was a Russian dissident in London where Russian agents in effect planted false information in 

this individual’s personal file and then called law enforcement and 

said: Look in this person’s file, and there was child pornography 

placed there. 

Could you anticipate at some time Russia trying, if we don’t take 

more aggressive actions, trying those actions against American 

public officials? 

Director CLAPPER. The Russians I think, while they have no compunction about using the full array of tools and techniques available in their kitbag. So I wouldn’t put it past them to do that or 

any other tools they’ve used, such as paying people to participate 

in social media, for example. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. This has been described as in effect the 

new normal for Russian doctrine; is that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. I believe, yes. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. And again, we’ve seen our system, your 

words, ‘‘a significant escalation.’’ Before us we have people with 

service in the IC and the defense of our Nation for hundreds of 

years. I’d like to just go down the line. In any of your careers, have 

you ever seen this level of Russian interference in our political 

process? We’ll start with Director Comey and just go down the line. 

Director COMEY. No. 

Director CLAPPER. I have not. 

Director BRENNAN. No. 

Admiral ROGERS. No. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. I know we’ve got a lot of Members. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

Let me begin by saying I don’t believe this thing has anything 

to do with—well, let me just begin by saying, and I think the 

Chairman’s already asked, it’s clear that there was no hacking of 

voting machines and the changes of tallies. I would argue this has 

nothing even to—because this term ‘‘hacking’’ is thrown around 

and it makes it sound like some sort of cyber-specific situation. 

That cyber tools were used as a means to an end. It isn’t necessarily what we should be focused on here. What we’re talking 

about here is active measures, the active measures taken by the 

government of Vladimir Putin to influence and to potentially manipulate American public opinion for the purpose of discrediting individual political figures, sowing chaos and division in our politics, 

sowing doubts about the legitimacy of our elections. 

So if you look at the situation we now face, here’s the aftermath: 

We had an election where, after some intrusions into some State 

databases, there was a leading—one nominee for President warning about fraud in the election. Then after the election we have 

some on the other side questioning the legitimacy of the Presidentelect because of Russian interference. And we have the Presidentelect questioning the credibility of the intelligence community because of its findings. 

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ment institutions. In essence, it sounds like they achieved what 

they wanted, to get us to fight against each other over whether our 

elections were legitimate and divide us in the way that it sows the 

sort of chaos that they sought to achieve. 

My question is along the lines of what Senator Warner asked 

about a moment ago, because we’ve seen these active measures employed in the Baltic States, with Russian-speaking media outlets 

controlled by the Kremlin, in the Dutch referendum, in the Brexit 

vote, in the Italian referendum. 

So let me lay out a hypothetical and you tell me if this is the 

kind of scenario we could face, because they don’t limit this to elections. They target individual policymakers throughout many countries in Europe, particularly those in the former Soviet sphere. Hypothetically, imagine that there’s a U.S. Senator or Congressman 

who adopts a policy position that the Kremlin does not agree with. 

So somehow through a phishing expedition they gain access to your 

personal computer network, and once they gain access to your personal computer network they use it to fabricate and/or actually conduct—you used the child pornography example; I’d say let’s say 

money-laundering activity. Then they call law enforcement and tip 

them off: Congressman John So-and-So has been money laundering. And they go into your home, they seize your computer, and 

sure enough, it’s sitting there on your network because someone 

got into it and did it. Now you’re arrested and you’re charged and 

you’re removed from the public discourse. 

Is this not what we have seen, the tactics that have been employed by Russian intelligence on behalf of the government of 

Vladimir Putin in other countries around the world? Is that not a 

tactic they have used to discredit individual political figures? And 

isn’t it true that that could very well happen here in the United 

States? 

Director CLAPPER. It is certainly well within both their technical 

competence and their potential intent to do things like that. The 

last two years running in my threat presentations, I’ve cited I 

think the next worrisome trend in the cyber business will be the 

compromise of the fidelity of information, and whether it’s for a 

criminal purpose or a political purpose. So this is well within the 

realm, I think, of possibility. 

Senator RUBIO. In the context of what their goals were, ultimately their ultimate goal—they may have or not—I don’t get into 

the whole thing of who they wanted to see win. But in the end 

what they really wanted to see was Americans fighting against 

each other, bickering over these things, having questions about the 

legitimacy of the process, our leaders, etcetera. 

Was that not their goal? And if it was, have they not largely 

achieved that, based on how this issue has been discussed since the 

aftermath of the election? 

Director CLAPPER. I think in the first instance that was their 

goal. First, as I said in my prepared remarks, was to sow doubt 

about the efficacy of our system and to cast aspersions on our political system. 

Senator RUBIO. To create doubt about the credibility of our elections, the legitimacy of our leaders, etcetera? 

Director CLAPPER. All that, yes. 

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Senator RUBIO. So my last point is, the last time I checked Vladimir Putin is neither a registered Democrat nor a registered Republican. So what he is interested in is achieving these measures in 

the United States for his own strategic purposes. Therefore, there 

is literally—neither political party should take this lightly. This 

should not be a partisan issue. This involves whether or not we are 

going to allow someone to actively interfere in our political discourse and divide us as a Nation against each other. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Wyden. 

Senator WYDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, the same to you. Let me, if I might, begin with you, 

Mr. Comey. After the election, as you know, the foreign minister, 

the Russian foreign minister, was quoted in various news reports 

saying that the Russians had had contacts with people associated 

with the Trump campaign. Now, that may or may not be true. 

There is, however, extensive press reporting on the relationships 

between the Russians and the individuals associated with both the 

Trump campaign and the incoming Administration. 

My question for you, Director Comey, is: Has the FBI investigated these reported relationships and, if so, what are the agency’s findings? 

Director COMEY. Thank you, Senator. I would never comment on 

investigations, whether we have one or not, in an open forum like 

this. So I really can’t answer it one way or another. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, can you provide an unclassified response 

to these questions and release it to the American people prior to 

January 20th? 

Director COMEY. I’m sorry? You said will I? 

Senator WYDEN. Yes. Will you provide an unclassified response 

to the question I’ve asked? And as I’ve said, it’s been reported widely. It’s on the Reuters News Service, widely reported. Will you provide an unclassified response to the question I asked and release 

it to the American people prior to January 20? 

Director COMEY. Sir, I’ll answer any question you ask, but the 

answer will likely be the same as I just gave you: I can’t talk about 

it. 

Senator WYDEN. Well, I will tell you, I think the American people 

have a right to know this. And if there is delay in declassifying this 

information and relating it to the American people, releasing it to 

the American people, and it doesn’t happen before January 20th, 

I’m not sure it’s going to happen. That’s why I’m troubled, and I 

hope that you will make a declassified statement with respect to 

the questions I’ve asked. 

Now, let me ask one other question if I might. The report has 

a brief description of Russian cyber intrusions into State and local 

electoral boards. It reads, and I quote: ‘‘DHS assesses that the 

types of systems we observed Russian actors targeting or compromising are not involved in vote tallying.’’ 

My question to you—and I think I’d like to have you involved in 

this, too, Director Clapper. Director Comey, Director Clapper, what 

systems in your view were compromised by the Russians and what 

was the nature and extent of those compromises? 

Director COMEY. There were intrusions and attempted intrusions 

at State-level voter registration databases. That is, not containing 

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the voting mechanism, but who’s registered to vote and the address 

and the particulars of that sort. What the purpose was of those intrusions is not clear to us at this point. And we saw no activity on 

Election Day that reflected that anyone had messed with those 

voter registration databases. But there’s no doubt that the Russians attacked, intruded, and took data from some of those systems. 

Senator WYDEN. Director Clapper. 

Director CLAPPER. I think that’s the response. I don’t have anything to add to that. 

Senator WYDEN. I hope you will also tell us in the days ahead, 

Director Comey, more about the nature of those systems, because 

it is very clear, given what you found and reported in the declassified version, that we’re going to be dealing with these issues coming up. And I think we need to know more specifics, maybe do it 

in a classified session, about the nature of those systems. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First let me start by thanking Director Clapper and Director 

Brennan for your many years of service to your country. I also 

want to say that I appreciate the work that has been done by the 

intelligence community to produce this report, and I accept its findings. 

I do think that it’s important that we understand more fully the 

extent of Russian intrusions into the electoral process to try to 

shape public opinion. And it is important to underscore two points 

that have been brought out already, and that is that there is no 

evidence that voting totals were manipulated or changed or that 

emails that were released were manipulated or changed. Is that 

correct, Director Clapper? 

Director CLAPPER. That’s correct. 

Senator COLLINS. The unclassified assessment states that Republican-affiliated web sites were hacked by the Russians, but the report does not go into detail about whether or not data were taken, 

stolen, from those systems and whether information came from networks used by Republican candidates, whether that included the 

Trump campaign. 

Could you give us a fuller understanding of the hacking on the 

Republican side? Was the Trump campaign, for example, hacked by 

the Russians? Or if Mr. Comey is the better person for this. 

Director COMEY. Thank you, Senator. I want to be thoughtful 

about what I say in an open setting. There was evidence that there 

was hacking directed at State-level organizations, State-level campaigns, and the RNC, but old domains of the RNC, that is email 

domains that they were no longer using, and that information was 

harvested from there, but it was old stuff. None of that was released. 

We did not develop any evidence that the Trump campaign or 

the current RNC was successfully hacked. 

Senator COLLINS. Does the IC’s conclusion that the Russians 

sought to assist President-elect Trump’s campaign depend upon an 

assessment, then, that the Russians covertly collected information 

from primarily Democratic sources, but some Republican sources as 

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well, but only chose to release the derogatory information from 

Democratic sources? 

Director CLAPPER. That’s correct. 

Senator COLLINS. And I noticed, having looked at many IC assessments, that this one was produced by three agencies. Usually 

I’m used to seeing assessments where the entire intelligence community is involved. For example, the State Department’s Bureau, 

which was the Bureau that was correct about the weapons of mass 

destruction, was not mentioned in the report. 

Is there a reason why it was—did you only need the CIA, the 

FBI, and the NSA? 

Director CLAPPER. It had a lot to do with the sensitivity of the 

sources and who could actually contribute to putting the assessment together. We can discuss all that in closed session. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Finally, I just want to underscore your point that we have talked 

a lot about the Russians’ attempt to mold public opinion for our 

campaign and, as Senator Rubio so eloquently said, sow the divisions and seeds of doubt that has everyone questioning and charges 

and countercharges, which are really not healthy in our democracy 

when a new administration is taking over. 

But there’s also an active Russian campaign to infiltrate, as you 

have said, military systems, defense contractor systems, critical infrastructure, commercial interests. Don’t we need to take a broad 

look at all of the efforts by our adversaries to either control critical 

infrastructure, for example, or influence decision making in those 

arenas as well? 

Director CLAPPER. Oh, I think if I understand your comment, 

Senator Collins, the point is valid that this is a multi-faceted activity. It began with a rather broad-gauged assault, if you will, attempt to infiltrate many entities across the board—military, commercial, governmental, party-related. 

So yes, they think of this holistically and use many tools, as they 

did in this case. Hacking was just one of them. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Heinrich. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank Senator Collins for her continued focus on critical infrastructure, because that’s something that, in light of what 

we’ve learned, I think we need to think through and realize what 

our exposures are. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses. Attribution, obviously, of responsibility in cyber attacks is the first key step towards imposing 

a cost on those involved. Since a number of us wrote to the President in November asking that information on Russian interference 

in the presidential election be declassified, the four of you and your 

respective agencies have done some very important work in making 

as much of your findings public as possible. I want to say I’m very 

grateful for that. The public needs to understand what is at risk 

here. 

To those who criticize these investigations as partisan, I would 

remind them that Russia didn’t do this to help the Republican candidate. Russia did this to help Russia and to weaken America, and 

therein lies the heart of why this is so important, because in the 

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next election the shoe could easily be on the other foot and a foreign power could decide it wants the Democrat to win this time. 

I think that both scenarios are deeply offensive, and foreign influence on our elections is intolerable no matter which party benefits in any given election. The ongoing efforts of Russia to impact 

U.S. elections threatens to undermine faith in our democratic systems, which is precisely their goal, and I think it’s critical that they 

pay a price for their actions. 

I want to return to the issue of the Russians being able to obtain 

access to parts of our electoral infrastructure, not the actual machines that count the votes, but the databases. We’ve had a couple 

of questions on this, but I want to ask, first of all, do we know if 

they would be able to manipulate the kinds of data that they had 

access to? So, for example, if you have a voter databases in a local 

county that was penetrated, would they be able to change the information within that database? 

Director COMEY. Potentially, and that was our concern at the 

time we discovered this. We saw no indication of that, but that’s 

a definite possibility. 

Senator HEINRICH. If that had happened and, for example, the 

FBI or other elements of the intelligence community were not looking for that, would the electoral boards have had indications that 

that data had changed? 

Director COMEY. Potentially not. They would have the indication. 

When chaos erupted on Election Day, when someone shows up to 

vote and your address is different or your middle initial is different 

or some particulars different, that creates delay, controversy, confusion. 

Senator HEINRICH. So, unfortunately, I think this tells us that 

we are vulnerable to future attacks and manipulation in this case. 

I think that, obviously, you’ve laid out a scenario that would be 

very evident, but also we could have very subtle impacts to the 

elections. You could potentially have a scenario where someone’s 

voter history, for example, was changed and if they haven’t voted 

for a certain number of years maybe they get purged from the rolls. 

Or many of us have had—we’ve seen flyers of our colleagues 

who’ve been criticized for missing a particular election. Maybe they 

didn’t actually miss that election. So I think it begs the question 

what can we do in concert with those local, county, and State entities to make sure that we are protecting this data the way that we 

should. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, part of our charge in this report was carried out jointly by—and I’ll ask Director Comey to speak to this— 

the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, to come up 

with a set of sort of best practices for inculcating greater degrees 

of cyber security. 

DHS reached out in the run-up to the election to the states and 

I think ultimately about every State took advantage of the recommendations proffered by DHS. 

Jim, do you want to add to that? 

Director COMEY. No, I think that’s the answer, is just understanding that they’re a target and availing themselves of the expertise and technology to try to protect themselves, then we on the inLAP51NQ082 with DISTILLER

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telligence community side pushing to them indicators of the bad 

guys. 

Senator HEINRICH. Director Clapper, I want to with my last 

question sort of change gears here for a moment. I asked you in 

the Armed Services Committee hearing last week about the role of 

Russian propaganda media outlets like RT. I saw a comment from 

General Flynn last August that sort of compared RT to CNN or 

MSNBC. Is that a fair analogy? Is there a structural difference between the way that RT exists within the media infrastructure and, 

say, a Fox News or MSNBC or CNN or CBS? 

Director CLAPPER. To me, the major difference here is the bulk 

of funding for RT comes from the Russian government, and the 

Russian government gives editorial direction on what RT is supposed to broadcast. So I think that’s a little bit different than CNN. 

Senator HEINRICH. And they seem to exercise that discretion. 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, they do. 

Senator HEINRICH. Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Blunt. 

Senator BLUNT. Director Clapper, does RT get any of its broadcasts into the United States? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, it does, some. 

Senator BLUNT. It does? 

Director CLAPPER. It’s very prevalent in Europe and lesser so— 

I think there’s an RT channel here. 

Senator BLUNT. And that would be a channel that would be accessible here to some number of people here? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. 

Senator BLUNT. Let me—— 

Director CLAPPER. I don’t know the audience size of RT. 

Senator BLUNT. I doubt if it’s very large, would be my guess. But 

I don’t want to defend RT. I think it’s a propaganda arm of a government that is definitely not on our side, and we need to be aware 

of that. We also need to be aware that—I think you said at one 

point that they—I think at that point you meant the Russians— 

think about this holistically and use many tools. We have lots of 

other countries, the Chinese particularly, that we also believe look 

holistically and use many tools. It’s one of the topics, as you know, 

from our other meetings over the years, I’m very concerned about 

cyber generally. 

I’m also concerned about our failure to secure Federal records. I 

think we could certainly give advice to states as to how to secure 

their records since we’ve had intrusions into our personnel system, 

since we’ve had hacking into the clearance process that a significant number of Americans, including all of you and most of us, 

have gone through, that are very detailed. 

I was the State election official, chief election official in Missouri 

at one time, and those records, while could be confusing on Election 

Day, I don’t believe there’s any evidence of polling places where 

people had lines that were backed up because there were record 

changes that were out of the ordinary. I mean, often people show 

up and say, oh, I know I sent my voter transfer in, when they may 

or may not have. 

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But, Director Comey, we don’t have any evidence of any disruption of the participation process because somebody got into local 

registration records; is that correct? 

Director COMEY. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator BLUNT. It’s also my opinion that in any State I’m aware 

of there’s nothing in those records that’s not publicly available. You 

can go to the local registration office. You can often go directly into 

those records to access those records. Frankly, we have lost a lot 

more secure records at the Federal level than the relatively open 

voter registration records. 

That doesn’t mean that we don’t want to help State and local officials secure their records in every way. But those are neither the 

most confidential records nor the hardest records to get into. And 

I guess for purposes of this discussion most importantly, there’s no 

indication that any effort to get into those records impacted Election Day. I think you’ve all repeatedly said absolutely no indication 

that anything—that there was any intrusion into the vote-counting 

process. 

I was a local election official when we first started counting ballots with computers and one of my concerns always was that the 

security for how you verify that system was only really protected 

by how many of those systems were going on all over the country. 

The diversity of the system itself makes it fairly hard to manipulate. I don’t know that we benefit by trying to standardize it, either. But we would benefit by providing guidance on how to secure 

those important records. 

No evidence, I think you said, Director Comey, that the Russians 

were able to get into Trump campaign email or other records or the 

current RNC records; is that right? 

Director COMEY. That’s correct. 

Senator BLUNT. So since we don’t believe they got in, the fact 

that they had nothing to release should not be a shock, on the 

records? 

Director COMEY. Yes. 

Senator BLUNT. And we do believe they tried to get in? 

Director COMEY. We can’t say with respect to the Trump campaign. With respect to the RNC, there’s no doubt they hit an RNC 

domain. So it could be they were aiming at the current one and 

just missed it and hit an old one. But I can’t say for sure sitting 

here. 

Senator BLUNT. Well, I do know that the Chairman of the RNC, 

I heard him say over the weekend he thought they had done a better job securing their records. Whether that’s true or not, I 

wouldn’t know. 

I think I did read in one, more than one published account, that 

the password to Mr. Podesta’s email was ‘‘Password1,’’ with a couple variations of spelling, of using capitals or something, and ‘‘password.’’ So hopefully lots to be learned here, and thanks to all of you 

for your efforts to help us learn it. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could I? For the Senator, and it was in the public report, in terms of YouTube views 

and YouTube subscribers, RT actually has a bigger presence in the 

United States than the BBC. 

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Senator BLUNT. And the BBC is also funded by the government, 

right? 

Chairman BURR. Senator King. 

Senator KING. Well, I’ll just follow up on that point, because this 

is in the annex to the published report. RT America, millions of 

views on YouTube, 850 million; BBC, about two-thirds of that; 

CNN, significantly lower. The same thing in YouTube subscribers: 

RT America, 450 million. 

So RT is a significant media presence. I think the important 

point with regard to RT is that we are talking about hacking. 

That’s how this discussion is characterized. But this was a comprehensive strategy involving RT, trolls, paid bloggers, hacking, the 

whole package. 

In fact, General Clapper, this is exactly what the Russians have 

done throughout Eastern Europe for some years; isn’t that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. That’s correct. It’s just as technology has progressed the Russians have taken advantage of it for this purpose. 

Senator KING. I just want to be sure I heard correctly. Mr. 

Comey, did you answer Senator Wyden’s question that there is an 

investigation under way as to connections between either of the political campaigns and the Russians? 

Director COMEY. I didn’t say one way or another. 

Senator KING. You didn’t say that—— 

Director COMEY. That was my intention at least. 

Senator KING. You didn’t way one way or another whether even 

there’s an investigation under way? 

Director COMEY. Correct. Especially in a public forum, we never 

confirm or deny a pending investigation. 

Senator KING. The irony of your making that statement here I 

cannot avoid. But I’ll move on. 

Director COMEY. Well, we sometimes think differently about 

closed investigations. But you asked me if I had any pending investigations and we’re not going to talk about that. 

Senator KING. All right. 

Is it my understanding that there are actually three reports—a 

highly classified that only went to certain individuals; classified, 

which this Committee has seen; and the public report—but that 

the conclusions of those three reports are identical? Is that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. That’s correct. 

Senator KING. And the only issue, the difference between them, 

is sources and methods; is that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. Largely. 

Senator KING. And the reason you can’t reveal sources and methods is that you would compromise future opportunities to gain information and also compromise fragile sources? 

Director CLAPPER. Exactly. 

Senator KING. It seems to me that trust is one of the issues. I 

mentioned in the Armed Services Committee, my folks in Maine 

tend to be skeptical: Prove it. Speak to me for a moment about the 

difficulty of proving what you’ve concluded pretty unequivocally, 

without revealing sources and methods? How do I convince my barber in Brunswick that this is for real? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, that’s why we have intelligence oversight committees, to represent the American people, with whom we 

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cannot share as fully and completely as we might like the evidentiary proof that we have and in which we’re very confident. 

So we’re very dependent, given the nature of intelligence work to 

start with, very dependent on you as our overseers to look at that 

yourselves on behalf of the electorate. 

Senator KING. But I think it is important to make the point to 

the public why sources and methods need to be protected. 

Director CLAPPER. Well, we spend money that you the Congress 

appropriates. We literally spend billions of dollars gaining these accesses, which we would jeopardize. And of course, this then impairs 

the support that we can render to the oncoming administration and 

successive administrations. When we lose these accesses, it takes 

money and time to recover them, not to mention putting potentially 

assets who work for us lives at risk. 

Senator KING. Was there any political influence brought to bear 

on any of the three of you in the preparation of this report? Did 

the President tell you what he wanted to find? Or was this somehow a politicized investigation? 

Director CLAPPER. Absolutely not. The President asked us to 

compile all available information that we had, and when he was 

briefed on it he made the point once again that he was not—had 

not and was not going to give us any direction. That’s why this is 

an IC product; it is not that of the current Administration. 

Senator KING. Mr. Comey, would you affirm that as well? 

Director COMEY. Yes. I hope I’ve demonstrated by now I’m tone 

deaf when it comes to politics, and that’s the way it should be. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Director Brennan, the same conclusion? 

Director BRENNAN. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator KING. A final sort of technical question. I notice that the 

October 10th—sorry—the October 7th statement was the IC, the 

community itself, implying the entire community. This one was 

FBI, CIA, and DNI. Is there any difference? Why wasn’t the report 

that was just released represent the entire 17-agency community? 

Director CLAPPER. Again, because the three exclusive contributors to this are represented here and because of the sensitivity of 

many of the sources, we made a judgment to restrict it to these 

three agencies. 

Senator KING. So there was no elimination of other views? 

Director CLAPPER. No, there was none. But we felt, again because 

of the sensitivities, the sensitivity of the source, which we tried to 

protect even within the intelligence community, to cast the report 

as emanating from these three agencies. 

Senator KING. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Lankford. 

Senator LANKFORD. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you for your 

work and your service to the country and the leadership you’ve 

brought. I need to ask a couple of questions, some that you’ve 

heard before, just for quick review, and then I want to build on several things from the report. 

Just to clarify again, does anyone know of any votes that were 

changed or an attempt to change votes in voting machines? 

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Director CLAPPER. As we stated in the report, we have no evidence of any manipulation of vote tallies whatsoever. 

Senator LANKFORD. Voter rolls? 

Director CLAPPER. No. There was reconnoitering, intrusion on 

certain voter rolls, but to the best of our knowledge no manipulation of them. 

Senator LANKFORD. Give me a best guess: How many other countries is Russia currently or have, let’s say in the last four years, 

tried to influence in their elections? 

Director CLAPPER. I think one of the annexes portrays that, the 

number of countries that to one degree or another Russia has expended effort to try to influence political views or opinions. 

Senator LANKFORD. 15 countries, 20? Give me a ballpark? 

Director CLAPPER. A couple dozen maybe. 

Senator LANKFORD. So maybe 20 or so. 

You also make a comment in the report itself about previous U.S. 

elections and Russian engagement in previous U.S. elections, going 

all the way back to KGB putting a person—recruiting a Democratic 

Party volunteer or activist—you don’t give the details on it—even 

on Jimmy Carter’s campaign in the 1970s—moving forward. 

Tell me about the differences in aggressiveness and style. If the 

Russians and then back to even the Soviets before have been involved in our elections since the 1970s and before, tell me the degree of difference in this one versus how they’ve been engaged in 

others? 

Director CLAPPER. The history of this goes back to the sixties, 

when the Russians attempted to fund certain candidates, parlay 

certain lines of opinion or lines of view. And of course, you had the 

radio broadcasts and that sort of thing they would do. As the technology has increased and they’ve gotten more tools available to 

them, they’ve broadened the spectrum of things that they have 

done. 

What is unique and what is disturbing, though, about this election, 2016, is the aggressiveness and the variety of tools they use 

and their activism in trying to convey information that they stole, 

in an effort to influence the outcome of the election. That’s different 

than any previous case. 

Senator LANKFORD. So additional tools, additional aggressiveness. They’ve been engaged in our elections before; this one’s just 

at a much higher level? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. 

Senator LANKFORD. You mentioned as well about the Russians 

trying to hack into both Democrats’ computers and political operations and Republican, Democratic computer and political operations. Between the—let’s just say DNC and RNC. We’ll just use 

loose terms here. I understand there’s multiple other entities that 

are connected there. 

Between DNC and RNC, were they able to penetrate to the same 

level, to get the same quantity, quality, and type of materials? Or 

was there a difference between what they were able to glean from 

the Democratic DNC or the RNC? 

Director COMEY. They got far deeper and wider into the DNC 

than the RNC. 

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Senator LANKFORD. Did they use similar methods with both? 

They were able to actually penetrate deeper or wider? 

Director COMEY. Hard to say. Hard to say in this forum. Hard 

to say even in a closed forum. Because they didn’t get into the 

RNC, it’s harder to see. It makes it harder to answer. Similar techniques, the spear phishing techniques, were used in both cases. But 

there’s no doubt they were more successful at DNC, deeper and 

wider, than at the RNC. They did hit some Republican-affiliated organizations, but not the current RNC itself; they didn’t get in. 

Senator LANKFORD. So they weren’t getting to current information, basically? 

Director COMEY. Not on the RNC. They got at the State-level current information, but not RNC current. 

Senator LANKFORD. Okay. You also highlight several other ways 

that the Russians have been engaged in our Nation just as a whole. 

You mention not only the election and previous elections, but you 

also move and give two practical examples of how the Russians 

have been engaged in our political system. One was an antifracking campaign that the Russians seemed to be engaged in. Another one was the Occupy Wall Street movement that the Russians 

were engaged in as well. 

Any additional highlights or any additional details that you can 

give on that? It was interesting that you highlighted those. Can we 

tell the nature of, for instance, with the Occupy Wall Street, the 

social media pages that were created to give communications capabilities to the Occupy protesters, how those were used and if they 

were used? 

Director CLAPPER. We probably ought to take that one for the 

record, Senator, just to be for the sake of accuracy and just exactly 

what they did in those two campaigns. I don’t have that on the top 

of my head. 

Senator LANKFORD. It was just in the report. I thought it was interesting just as a way of illustration in the report that there was 

an illustration to say that they’ve also been engaged in some of the 

anti-fracking and some of the Occupy Wall Street movement as 

well. 

I appreciate your work. Thank you. 

Yield back. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Manchin. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you 

for your service. 

If I might ask, were there any disagreements on the involvement 

that Russia has had or attempts to have in this process of our elections by any of the intelligence community? Did any of you have 

different takes on this or have to collaborate in order to come to 

one conclusion? 

Director CLAPPER. There was one aspect that there was a difference in confidence levels held by NSA versus the rest of us on 

one single aspect. I’d be more comfortable discussing that in a 

closed session. 

Senator MANCHIN. Any other countries that have been hacking 

us from the standpoint that it brings the concern that you have 

with this? You’re saying no one’s ever done this to this level in our 

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political process, but when you look at espionage, sabotage, basically through military or industrial—— 

Director CLAPPER. Well, there’s a lot of espionage, certainly, collecting and exfiltrating information. Obviously, the Chinese come 

to mind. But very much a contrast between the passive collection, 

passive exfiltration, as opposed to actively purloining information 

and then using it for a political end. That’s the difference here. The 

Russians are unique. 

Senator MANCHIN. Yes. I think all of us have been very much 

concerned that the outcome of the election was altered, and you 

have been very clear saying it has not been altered, nor would the 

outcome of this election have been any different. 

Director CLAPPER. I have to clarify one aspect of what you just 

said, Senator. We did not assess the impact on the electorate. We 

did not do public opinion polls, because that’s not our charter of the 

intelligence community to do that. So we just can’t say about 

whether the release of the hacked information—how that changed 

any voters’ opinion. We don’t know. 

Senator MANCHIN. Knowing that, then, what recommendations of 

sanctions would you have? What sanctions recommendation do you 

think would deter Russia or any other country from continuing 

hacking us? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, that’s clearly a policy call. We got into 

that last Thursday at the Senate Armed Services Committee, and 

there are a range of tools that we can use. I think Admiral Rogers 

and my view is that we should consider the whole range of tools, 

not necessarily do a cyber for cyber reaction, and look at all of 

them. 

Senator MANCHIN. I’m thinking—what I’m trying to get to is, if 

hacking is so serious and the technology we have today can alter 

our lives relatively very quickly, if that’s all capability and possibilities of happening, shouldn’t we have a broad basically policy in 

the United States of America that any hacking internationally 

that’s been confirmed and concurred by the intelligence community, 

once you all basically authorize that this happened, as you agreed 

right now this happened in our electoral process, that we should 

enforce sanctions on any country that does this, to deter them from 

doing it? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think again the discussion we had in 

the Armed Services Committee Thursday was if you are conducting 

espionage then if we’re going to punish, nation-states are going to 

punish each other for conducting espionage, which is a passive collection of information, that’s a pretty heavy policy call which I don’t 

think any of us want to make. 

When it’s an activist campaign as it was here, that’s a different 

proposition. Again, I think it’s not our call to decide what to do in 

response. Our only comment—and I will repeat it—was to consider 

the whole range of potential tools, instruments of power, national 

power, to respond. 

The challenge you get into with cyber for cyber, of course, is you 

have to also consider the counter-retaliation to that. While we 

spend a lot of time agonizing over precision and being very surgical, the adversaries may not be quite as precise as we might be. 

So again, the bottom line: Consider all tools. 

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Senator MANCHIN. I’m just saying that when we now it’s statesponsored—Article 5 of the NATO Treaty specifies that all NATO 

members will defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 

other allies if they are attacked. Has NATO intervened at all? 

Have any of the other countries intervened in this, NATO allies? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I can’t speak for each individual NATO 

member, what they may or may not have done to defend themselves or to retaliate against a perceived cyber attack. 

Senator MANCHIN. Do we as the United States defend any of 

them when they’ve been attacked? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, if the NATO alliance and member nation 

invokes Article 5—I believe that’s the provision; I’m getting out of 

my lane here—that’s where an attack against one is considered an 

attack against all. I don’t know that that’s ever been exercised, I 

don’t think it has, in the cyber context. 

Senator MANCHIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Cotton. 

Senator COTTON. I want to add my voice of gratitude to the many 

Members of this Committee who have expressed our gratitude for 

the men and women of our intelligence community. As Presidentelect Trump said on Friday, he has tremendous respect for those 

men and women, and I share that as well. 

Second, those men and women have concluded that Russia 

hacked into the DNC and John Podesta’s email. And while this 

Committee, as the Chairman said, will conduct a thorough inquiry 

into this matter, I have no reason to doubt those conclusions. 

Third, I don’t doubt it in part because Vladimir Putin is KGB, 

always has been, always will be. Back in the Cold War, Russian 

intelligence used to refer to the United States as ‘‘the main enemy,’’ 

and they still do today. Vladimir Putin undermines the United 

States and our interests for the same reason the scorpion stings 

the frog as it crosses the river: It’s in his nature. And he’s done 

much worse for the last 18 years across numerous domains. 

Seventh, Donald Trump won this election fair and square. Vladimir Putin didn’t hack into Hillary Clinton’s calendar and delete 

rallies in Michigan and Wisconsin, and didn’t hack into a speech 

writer’s computer and delete speeches that laid out a compelling vision for the working class. It’s time to look into the mirror and say 

that Hillary Clinton lost this election, not because of Vladimir 

Putin or Jim Comey or fake news or the Electoral College, but because she ran a bad campaign. 

That brings me to a conclusion in the report about the clear escalation, Director Clapper, of the scope of the activities: that Russia 

has conducted these kind of activities in recent years, but this was 

a clear escalation in the scope and the scale; is that correct? 

Director CLAPPER. That’s correct. 

Senator COTTON. Why did they think they could get away with 

that kind of clear escalation against U.S. interests? 

Director CLAPPER. I think the challenge, particularly in the cyber 

realm, I’ll say, is that there’s kind of an insidious progression of aggressiveness. I’ve certainly seen this over the last six years or so, 

where other countries get progressively more—as they develop 

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more capability, they also have an attendant willingness to try to 

use it. 

We’re seeing this particularly with kind of the second tier, meaning North Korea and Iran, who don’t have the cyber capability, we 

don’t believe, of the level of sophistication of certainly the Russians 

or the Chinese, but they are progressing. That’s to me what’s bothersome about this whole business of cyber and when do you draw 

the line to say enough’s enough. 

Senator COTTON. Let’s move to the question of motive. The report 

states that at first Russia, in the assessment of the IC, had a desire to undermine U.S. democracy, to sow discord and confusion. 

Over time, though—as it viewed Hillary Clinton as the likely winner, to undermine her presidency. But over time it developed a 

‘‘clear preference’’—that’s the language—for Donald Trump. 

Can you tell us when Russia viewed Hillary Clinton as the likely 

winner? 

Director CLAPPER. I think that was in the summer time frame, 

perhaps July–August or so. 

Senator COTTON. Can you tell us when you believe that Vladimir 

Putin developed a clear preference for Donald Trump? 

Director CLAPPER. Some time after that. I don’t know that, certainly not in this setting, we can pick a date when he shifted gears, 

but he clearly did. 

Senator COTTON. Did he or the intelligence services ever believe 

that Donald Trump was a likely winner? 

Director CLAPPER. Initially, no. They thought that he was a 

fringe candidate and didn’t think that at all. 

Senator COTTON. A newspaper headline about the report over the 

weekend said something—I paraphrase—Russian cyber attack 

aims to install Putin in White House. Would a more accurate headline perhaps be ‘‘Russian cyber attack aims to undermine expected 

Clinton presidency’’? 

Director CLAPPER. I don’t think you’ll find a line like that in our 

report. 

Senator COTTON. Your assessment of motive is based in part on 

the selective leaking and the relative levels of targeting Democratic 

material and Republican material on the one hand versus the 

other; is that correct? More democratic material was leaked, even 

though—— 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, clearly. 

Senator COTTON. Is it possible that they just leaked the Democratic material because they thought Hillary Clinton was going to 

win and they wanted to undermine her and they didn’t view it as 

profitable to leak Republican material? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, that’s—yes. I mean, that would seem to 

be the logical observation, that they favored the President-elect and 

they wished to denigrate as much as possible Hillary Clinton. And 

had she won, their plan was to try to undermine her presidency. 

Senator COTTON. One final question about the leaks that have 

happened in this case, first in December before President Obama 

directed this review to occur, and then there were none until last 

Wednesday night when the Washington Post reported on what may 

be sensitive signals intelligence. Director Comey, have you received 

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a crimes report from anyone in the intelligence community about 

these leaks? 

Director COMEY. I don’t think yet as to the December leak or, obviously, anything this month, not yet. 

Senator COTTON. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we should include 

those leaks as part of our inquiry. 

Chairman BURR. The Chair and the Vice Chair are working on 

that right now. 

Senator Harris. 

Senator HARRIS. Director Clapper, your report states that, quote, 

‘‘We assess Russian intelligence services will continue to develop 

capabilities to provide Putin with options to use against the United 

States, judging from past practice and current efforts.’’ You go on 

to write: ‘‘Immediately after Election Day, we assess Russian intelligence began a spear phishing campaign targeting U.S. Government employees and individuals associated with United States 

think tanks and NGOs in national security, defense, and foreign 

policy fields. This campaign could provide the material for future 

influence efforts.’’ Then you indicate that the, quote, ‘‘election operation signals a new normal in Russian influence operations.’’ 

So indeed this is troubling. My question is, is the intelligence 

community supporting efforts to ensure that the computer networks and personal devices of the President-elect and his transition 

team are protected from continued influence? 

Director CLAPPER. It’s my understanding that they are very, very 

sensitive to this threat, and we’ve done what we can to educate the 

transition team about the pitfalls of mobile devices in secure areas 

and the like. 

Senator HARRIS. Do you believe your education efforts have been 

successful? 

Director CLAPPER. You’d have to ask them, I think. 

Senator HARRIS. What about the President-elect’s Twitter account, and in particular what is being done to safeguard his phone 

and account, given the potentially dire national security consequences of an infiltration? 

Director CLAPPER. Probably best left to a closed environment to 

talk about that. 

Senator HARRIS. Okay. 

Director Comey, this is more of a comment than a question, but 

I wanted to echo the points made by Senators Wyden and King. I 

understand why the FBI could not disclose and comment on ongoing investigations. However, it seems that, despite past precedent, 

the new standard that was created over the summer and fall regarding the investigation into Secretary Clinton’s email server was 

that there was a unique public interest in the transparency of that 

issue. 

Particularly given the findings of your report, I am not sure I can 

think of an issue of more serious public interest than this one. This 

Committee needs to understand what the FBI does and does not 

know about campaign communications with Russia, and I hope 

that we can follow up on this in closed session to have more of an 

idea of what the FBI knows and what we might do to prevent any 

further harm. 

Thank you. 

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Chairman BURR. Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to each 

of you for your service to the country and for the people you represent, who faithfully discharge their duties daily, many times 

unheralded. 

I wanted to ask first of all, there seems to be a disparity between 

the RNC servers and the DNC servers in terms of their vulnerability. Admiral Rogers, this perhaps is a good question for you. Is 

good practice in terms of defenses important in terms of securing 

information like that that was stolen in these hacks? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes. 

Senator CORNYN. Would this also be—would your concerns about 

the vulnerability of a private server also extend to government officials using private email servers and engaging in an exchange of 

classified information on those private email servers? 

Admiral ROGERS. I would argue everyone needs to have an 

awareness of how they communicate, whether we’re talking personal or at work. That’s the nature of the world we find ourselves 

in. 

Senator CORNYN. And to do so in compliance with the law, the 

protocol, etcetera, of the Federal Government. 

When did the Russians first begin to hack U.S. networks, Admiral Rogers? 

Admiral ROGERS. With respect to this particular issue? 

Senator CORNYN. No. I’m just wondering, how long has this been 

going on? 

Admiral ROGERS. Since the 1990s, off the top of my head. 

Senator CORNYN. So while this has certainly become much more 

visible and focused, given the focus of the effort, this really is a 

longstanding effort by nation-states, including Russia, to hack into 

our networks, correct? 

Admiral ROGERS. Yes, we have seen longstanding efforts to hack 

into our networks. 

Senator CORNYN. This was perhaps unusual—maybe I should 

ask you—in that there was a coordination between the hacking and 

the propaganda efforts of Russia in order to try to undermine the 

legitimacy of the election process. Director Clapper, would you 

agree with that statement? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes, orchestrated by the intelligence services. 

Senator CORNYN. Is this the first time in your experience where 

you’ve seen that sort of multi-layered, multi-faceted coordination 

between propaganda efforts and hacking into our networks, or is 

this a new normal? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, it’s a progression of capabilities as 

they’ve acquired them and used them. They certainly have longstanding practices like that against European countries. 

Senator CORNYN. What has the United States done since—the 

United States Government or—let’s start with the U.S. Government. What have we done to respond to the hackings that have 

been occurring in U.S. networks since the 1990s in order to discourage or deter that sort of activity? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, we’ve tried to up our game defensively. 

We have selectively responded. The Sony Picture attack comes to 

mind, and certainly there was a response to this, this case. But the 

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issue, as I said earlier, is if nation-states are conducting espionage 

against one another, which we do as well, as many other nationstates, that’s—and if the standard is to punish because of the conduct of detected espionage, well, that’s another policy call. 

Senator CORNYN. As I recall, during the publicity about the Sony 

hack there was a lot of discussion as to how do you characterize 

this? Was this an act of war, was this a commercial—criminal activity involving a commercial enterprise? How do you think about 

that? Have we gotten better about characterizing the nature of the 

attack? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, we in the intelligence community, particularly the Bureau, I think do an excellent job of attribution. 

Then of course the hard part is what, if anything, to do about it. 

Again, I would repeat what was said earlier about, against a cyber 

activity is the best response a counter-cyber activity or not? In the 

end, that wasn’t the case with the Sony attack. 

Senator CORNYN. Well, there could be multiple options, as I 

think you alluded to. It doesn’t need to just be cyber for cyber. 

There are a multitude of retaliatory options, correct? 

Director CLAPPER. Exactly, yes, sir. That was the point I think 

that Admiral Rogers and I made to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee when we had this discussion there Thursday. 

Senator CORNYN. Perhaps this is heresy since I’m a new Member 

of the Intelligence Committee, but let me just give you my impression: that we have so fractured the jurisdiction of oversight of cyber 

issues that we need to figure out some better whole-of-government 

approach. I see Senator Reed smiling because, of course, the Armed 

Services Committee has some involvement in this; Homeland Security and Government Affairs. 

But we need to figure out some way, I think, to deal with a 

whole-of-government approach so we are working as efficiently and 

effectively as possible. I know from what I read in the newspaper 

President-elect Trump has said he wants to commission a study to 

come back to him within 90 days, if I’m not mistaken, with some 

recommendations in that regard. We would certainly welcome your 

insight and advice. 

Thank you. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for your dedicated service to the Nation for many, many, years. 

The non-classified intelligence assessment which is available to 

the public concludes that, quote: ‘‘Putin, his advisers, and the Russian government developed a clear preference for President-elect 

Trump over Secretary Clinton,’’ close quote, in part because, quote, 

‘‘Putin has had many positive experiences working with Western 

political leaders whose business interests made them more disposed to deal with Russia, such as former Italian Prime Minister 

Silvio Berlusconi and former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.’’ 

Either General Clapper or Director Comey, does the community 

have any intelligence that suggests that President-elect Trump or 

those close to him may have business interests that made them 

more disposed to deal with Russia? 

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Director CLAPPER. The Russians just believed or came to the conclusion that, because the President-elect is a businessman, that he 

would be easier to make deals with than the Democrats. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Director Clapper, at the Armed Services Committee hearing I 

asked you whether, given the scope and the difficulty of hiding all 

the different aspects of this comprehensive campaign, was this— 

first, was Putin advised that there was a significant chance of 

being discovered? And second, did he disregard that because he 

wanted to send a message as well as being disruptive of our process? And you deferred that response until after you had briefed the 

President and the President-elect. Can you add anything to that? 

Director CLAPPER. I’m sorry, sir. Would you repeat the question? 

Senator REED. Given the multiple aspects of this campaign—the 

hacking, the trolling, the social media—the idea that this could be 

done unnoticed—and given the scale and the intent—would be unnoticed, raises one question at least: Was he in any way advised 

that, you’re taking a risk here? And second, did he disregard that 

risk, not only to be disruptive, but also to signal to the world that 

he is prepared to engage in this cyber operation and send us a signal? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think, as we’ve seen, he I think always 

feels that, or felt, that he had deniability. And of course, that’s 

what—both the Russian government and the Russian media are 

denying any culpability. And we’re somewhat restricted because of 

our sources and methods concerns about showing our hand, showing our deck here, so to speak, and what led us to those conclusions 

that we feel so strongly about. 

So he knows that. He’s a professional intelligence officer and he 

probably understands our approach to the protection of sources and 

methods, and so he can just deny it and get away with it. 

Senator REED. Let me just a final point here—— 

Director BRENNAN. If I could add, Senator. 

Senator REED. Yes. 

Director BRENNAN. When this started to break in the press in 

early August, I had a conversation with the director of the FSB, 

Alexander Bortnikov, and told him clearly that if Russia was doing 

this they were playing with fire and it would backfire and they 

would be roundly condemned by not only the U.S. Government, but 

also the American people. 

And he said he would relay that to Mr. Putin at the time. He 

denied any activity along these lines, but I made it very clear to 

him that basically we were onto him. 

Senator REED. A final point. Everyone has indicated and the report indicates that there was an effort made against the Democratic political campaigns and Republican political campaigns, but 

one was much more aggressive, frankly, than the other in terms of 

finding ways into the servers of not only the DNC, but the individual Democratic operatives. 

Given what you posit as the goal of Putin, which was to discredit 

Secretary Clinton as much as possible, assuming she might be 

President, or in some way disrupting her campaign, it seems to me, 

at least to me, logical that they would devote those kind of resources to, one, to going after Democratic computers rather than 

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resources to Republicans. Is that borne out by your analysis, Director Clapper? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say that, after sitting 

through this, to put this in perspective for the American people, 

those of us who are involved in intelligence matters at the dais 

here, for that matter at the table, I doubt there was anyone who 

was shocked or even mildly surprised when these facts came out. 

This hacking business is ubiquitous and it has been since the 

internet was set up. The question was asked, when did Russia 

start this? I would expect it was the day that they hooked up to 

the internet. This goes on constantly, and as we’ve been sitting 

here there have been thousands of efforts against U.S. entities, 

U.S. computers, government, non-government, and that’s just in 

the U.S. This has been going on all over the world. 

Those of us who engage in this and have watched these things, 

most of which have never become public, on a scale of one to 10, 

we’ve seen a number of 10s. This one doesn’t come close to a 10. 

But the interesting thing is, because it’s been in the political—it’s 

in the political spectrum, it has caught the fancy of the media, it’s 

caught the fancy of the American people. 

Russia is not in my judgment the most aggressive actor in this 

business. I think there are other actors that are much more aggressive, and indeed I think much more dangerous. It isn’t limited to 

state actors. There’s state actors, there’s non-state actors, and 

there’s combinations. They go after everything. 

The criminal element is particularly troubling to a lot of people. 

I just heard Director Clapper. I think it’s the first time I’ve ever 

heard an admission by an intelligence person that the U.S. does espionage. By that I think he’s inferring, in the context we’re in, that 

the U.S. does this. Now, I am not confirming that. I’ll leave that 

to Mr. Clapper to do. 

But nonetheless, the other interesting thing I’ve found is that I 

think I agree with Director Clapper entirely that you want to be 

careful here when you’re talking about how you’re going to respond 

to this. If it’s responded to with a similar type of hacking, that escalates very, very quickly. We’ve sat through, actually gamed out 

what would happen in the situation where we had an actual hacking and then decided how we were going to respond to it, and if 

we did how the other side would respond to it. 

The good that has come out of all of this is that finally I think 

the American people are getting a picture of how big this, how 

ubiquitous it is, how dangerous it is, and that something has to be 

done about it. Director Clapper I think is correct that our response 

has been to up our game as far as our defensive posture is concerned. Really, that is where the focus needs to be. 

Again, one would hope we could find the silver bullet where you 

could stand up a defense and say: Look, it’s there; this can never 

be penetrated; anything that happens behind this wall is just fine. 

I don’t know if I’ll live to see that day. I don’t know if anybody will. 

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But in any event, it is good that we have this on the table. It’s 

good that we’re having the discussion about it. And I’m hoping that 

everyone will be patient with us and will be supportive as we do 

our best to up our game, to defend on these things, particularly in 

the realm of most of the challenges that the government generally 

and the public generally doesn’t hear about, but the intelligence 

community does. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BURR. Thank you, Senator Risch. 

The vote has started. Senator Warner would like a question and 

a clarification. I have a clarification. Do any other members seek 

anything in this open session? 

[No response.] 

If not, I’ll recognize Senator Warner. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. My question is this. One, I’m intrigued 

by my colleague’s comments. Many of us felt the conclusions were 

accurate. In many ways, it was the President-elect until Friday 

who was questioning these results. 

I believe—and I would go back to my comments in my first line 

of questions, when all four of you, with literally hundreds of years 

of experience, said you have never seen anything in your career 

that approaches this level of Russian activities. We can debate who 

is the most serious threat, but anyone that underestimates the seriousness of this Russian threat I think does so at their own peril. 

I want to ask you, Director Comey, and then I want to get a clarification. If a thief came up to the DNC and broke in and stole all 

of the most valuable information, and that same thief then drove 

up to the RNC and, because they had a better lock on the door, was 

only able to break in and get some old information, would both of 

those be crimes and would both of those be prosecuted? 

Director COMEY. Sure, yes. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Director Clapper, one thing that I want 

to clarify, because I think, particularly with Senator Collins, there 

might have been some ambiguity. The conclusion you reached that 

the Russian government at its highest levels was targeting Clinton 

and favoring Putin was not the result simply of more—I’m sorry, 

favoring Trump and disfavoring Clinton—was not the result simply 

of more leakage on the Democratic side, but I believe, based upon 

page 1 of your unclassified report, is that Putin most likely wanted 

to discredit Clinton since he’d publicly blamed her since 2011 and 

then a series of other activities. That conclusion of favoring Trump 

and not favoring Clinton was not simply the result of disproportionate leaking on the Democratic side; is that correct? I just want 

to clarify that for the record. 

Director CLAPPER. You mean just by virtue of the hacking? 

Vice Chairman WARNER. My understanding, I was left with the 

impression that the reason you reached the conclusion that there 

was favoring of Trump over Clinton was because of the disproportionate releasing of information. I’ve seen in the non-classified report lots of evidence that it was ongoing concerns between Putin 

and Clinton. 

Director CLAPPER. Clearly, one aspect of this. But we reviewed 

the totality of what they were doing. Whether by this means or by 

the multi-faceted propaganda campaign, the use of social media 

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tools, planting fake news, there was a campaign, all of which clearly seemed to favor, clearly favored—— 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Including after the election—— 

Director CLAPPER [continuing]. A preference for the Presidentelect over Secretary Clinton. 

Vice Chairman WARNER. Including after the election, the fact 

that Russian efforts to discredit the electoral process in America 

stopped? 

Director CLAPPER. Well, I think that was an overall objective 

throughout, to accomplish that objective, then as things moved on 

and progressed clearly a proclivity for the President-elect and an 

attempt to denigrate Secretary Clinton. 

Director COMEY. If I might add, Senator, that’s the challenge of 

the unclassified forum. There’s more behind that conclusion. We 

just can’t talk about it here. 

Chairman BURR. Director Clapper, I think this is in the scope of 

an open session. You’ll tell me if it’s not. Is there any intelligence 

that Russian leadership, specifically Putin, directed the GRU or the 

SVR to penetrate these political organizations? Or was the leadership involvement in this process triggered by what they were able 

to exfiltrate and when the leadership saw the breadth of information they directed a disinformation campaign to happen? 

Director CLAPPER. I think, as we said in our October statement, 

this came from the highest levels of the government, and I would 

assess that there was overall broad direction given, with execution 

carried out by the services. 

Chairman BURR. So one can take the fact that this has been a 

continual fishing process on the part of the Russians that started 

in 2014, and from 2014 forward, that was all directed by the highest echelons of the Russian government? 

Director CLAPPER. Yes. Again, I think it would be best to get into 

the details of that in a classified setting. 

Chairman BURR. And we will do that. 

There are a couple minutes left in a two-vote session. We will reconvene in the Committee room in closed session at the completion 

of that vote. This open hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

Æ 

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