U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–259 PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES– 

RECENT EFFORTS TO WIN THE WAR AGAINST ISIS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 17, 2018 

Serial No. 115–60 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://oversight.house.gov 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Trey Gowdy, South Carolina, Chairman 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Darrell E. Issa, California 

Jim Jordan, Ohio 

Mark Sanford, South Carolina 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Scott DesJarlais, Tennessee 

Blake Farenthold, Texas 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Thomas Massie, Kentucky 

Mark Meadows, North Carolina 

Ron DeSantis, Florida 

Dennis A. Ross, Florida 

Mark Walker, North Carolina 

Rod Blum, Iowa 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma 

Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin 

Will Hurd, Texas 

Gary J. Palmer, Alabama 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Paul Mitchell, Michigan 

Greg Gianforte, Montana 

Elijah E. Cummings, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Carolyn B. Maloney, New York 

Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Columbia 

Wm. Lacy Clay, Missouri 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts 

Jim Cooper, Tennessee 

Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia 

Robin L. Kelly, Illinois 

Brenda L. Lawrence, Michigan 

Bonnie Watson Coleman, New Jersey 

Stacey E. Plaskett, Virgin Islands 

Val Butler Demings, Florida 

Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois 

Jamie Raskin, Maryland 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Matt Cartwright, Pennsylvania 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

SHERIA CLARKE, Staff Director 

ROBERT BORDEN, Deputy Staff Director 

WILLIAM MCKENNA, General Counsel 

BRICK CHRISTENSEN, Senior Military Advisor 

KILEY BIDELMAN, Clerk 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Ron DeSantis, Florida, Chairman 

Steve Russell, Oklahoma, Vice Chair 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Justin Amash, Michigan 

Paul A. Gosar, Arizona 

Virginia Foxx, North Carolina 

Jody B. Hice, Georgia 

James Comer, Kentucky 

Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Minority Member 

Val Butler Demings, Florida 

Peter Welch, Vermont 

Mark DeSaulnier, California 

Jimmy Gomez, California 

Vacancy 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on January 17, 2018 ......................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Sebastian Gorka, Ph.D., Former Deputy Assistant to the President 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 7 

Mr. Michael Pregent, Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 23 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 25 

Mr. Phillip Lohaus, Research Fellow, Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies, American Enterprise Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 33 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 35 

Mr. Robert Anthony Pape, Jr. Professor, Political Science Department, University of Chicago 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 46 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 48 

APPENDIX 

Statement for the Record of Michael J. Morell, submitted by Ranking Member 

Lynch ..................................................................................................................... 72 


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BATTLEFIELD SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES– 

RECENT EFFORTS TO WIN THE WAR 

AGAINST ISIS 

Wednesday, January 17, 2018 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ron DeSantis [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives DeSantis, Russell, Duncan, Amash, 

Hice, Comer, Lynch, Welch, and DeSaulnier. 

Also Present: Representatives Jordan, Meadows, and 

Krishnamoorthi. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The Subcommittee on National Security will come 

to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

We are here today to learn more about the Trump Administration’s battlefield successes against the Islamic State. Since coming 

into office almost a year ago, President Trump has made great 

strides in the war against ISIS. At the time of his inauguration, 

the Islamic State controlled major cities in Iraq and Syria. The Islamic State’s black flag flew over Raqqa in Syria and over Mosul 

in Iraq. Today, both cities are liberated. ISIS lost thousands of 

square miles in territory at an astonishing rate. 

Unfortunately, the American people are not seeing this good 

news story. Instead, they see nightly stories in the mainstream 

press about Russian interference and other issues. The American 

people deserve to know the facts about what changed between administrations and how President Trump is keeping us safe. We are 

here, then, to talk about real, concrete successes and what the 

United States Government can do to build on these wins to ensure 

the safety of the American people. 

We have before us a distinguished panel of experts with deep national security experience. 

Dr. Sebastian Gorka served as Special Assistant to President 

Trump and advised the President on the existential threat posed 

by radical Islamic terrorism. He has a distinguished career of service in counterterrorism, is on the advisory board of the Council for 

Emerging National Security Affairs. We look forward to his testimony and thank you for coming. 


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We will also hear from Mr. Michael Pregent, an Adjunct Fellow 

from the Hudson Institute. He is a former intelligence officer with 

nearly 30 years of experience and is an expert on the Middle East 

and North Africa. We hope he can shed light on the future challenges we face against ISIS and what we can expect moving forward. 

We are also joined by Philip Lohaus, a research fellow in the 

Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He is an expert on unconventional and emerging 

national security challenges. He served as an embedded analyst 

with the Department of Defense and the Multinational Force-Iraq, 

and also embedded with the U.S. Army in eastern Afghanistan. We 

thank him for coming and for his testimony. 

We also have Dr. Robert Pape, a professor of political science at 

the University of Chicago. He has studied this subject in detail and 

written numerous books on the topic. We look forward to his perspective on this matter and thank him for coming. 

I am confident we can do more in this battle against radical Islamic terrorism. I am heartened by the President’s dedication to 

our military and his emphasis on defeating, not simply deterring, 

ISIS. The days of feckless leadership, of underestimating our foe, 

those days need to be over. The naive declarations that ISIS is simply a JV squad, those days are over. We have an administration 

that appreciates the danger posed by the Islamic State and I think 

critically is actually playing to win against the Islamic State. 

I hope the witnesses can shed light on what the administration 

has gotten right, but also what we can improve on, and where we 

go from here, because the successes, while real, are not the end of 

the ballgame. 

So, thank you, and I will yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. 

Lynch, for his opening statement. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to join you in 

this hearing to examine the progress of efforts to combat the terrorist group known as the Islamic State, or ISIS. I would also like 

to thank today’s witnesses for their willingness to help this subcommittee with its work. 

As reported last month by the Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve, ISIS has no capital, no physical caliphate, 

and across Iraq and Syria has lost nearly all of its territory that 

they once held. Since the establishment of the U.S.-led coalition to 

combat ISIS by President Obama back in 2014, the terrorist group 

has lost nearly 40,000 square miles of its claimed territory and currently holds approximately 2,000 square miles. 

ISIS has also been reduced in deployed force strength from peak 

estimates of tens of thousands of insurgent fighters to less than a 

thousand. The liberated territory includes the former ISIS stronghold of Mosul, Iraq, recaptured by U.S.-backed Iraqi security and 

Kurdish Peshmerga forces last July following a nine-month effort 

that began in October of 2016. The self-declared ISIS capital of 

Raqqa, Syria also fell in October of 2017 to the U.S.-supported Syrian Democratic Forces. 

However, the decimation of ISIS territorial control does not signify the outright defeat of a terrorist organization whose motto is 

remaining and expanding. In a statement submitted for the record, 


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former Acting Director of the CIA, Michael Morell, who served 

under both George W. Bush and the Obama Administration, notes 

that the elimination of the so-called caliphate cannot be confused 

with the elimination of ISIS itself. In the wake of surmounting battlefield losses, insurgent fighters have moved underground to perpetrate traditional and destabilizing terrorist attacks in the region 

while continuing to rely on affiliate organizations and social media 

to direct or inspire terrorist attacks globally. 

I ask for unanimous consent to enter into the record Director 

Morell’s statement into the official hearing record. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Without objection. 

Mr. LYNCH. The Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point 

similarly reports that following the fall of Mosul, ISIS leadership 

made a calculated decision to withdraw its fighters from further 

sustained clashes with regional security and coalition forces in the 

city of Tal Afar in the town of Hawija in Iraq, in contested areas 

along the Euphrates River Valley, and even in the battle for Raqqa. 

Their sole purpose was to preserve manpower for a pivot to an allout insurgency and the use of guerilla tactics, including hit-and-run 

attacks on secure areas by small units, the assassination of security personnel, and the recruitment of new members among displaced civilians for suicide bombings. 

We have continued to witness this marked shift to guerilla warfare in the form of a coordinated terrorist attack committed by ISIS 

operatives in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and other regional countries. Just this week, two suicide bombers reportedly associated 

with ISIS sleeper cells killed nearly 40 people at an open-air market located in Baghdad’s Tayran Square, marking the first major 

attack in the Iraqi capital since Iraqi Prime Minister HaideralAbadi declared the victory over ISIS. This attack came on the 

heels of an ISIS suicide bombing detonated at a market in Kabul, 

Afghanistan on January 4th that killed at least 20 people, and another at a Shia cultural center in Kabul on December 28th that 

killed more than 40 people. 

The persistent threat of ISIS-directed or inspired attacks in the 

West also remains. Last week the Department of Justice announced the indictment of Akayed Ullah on terrorism and explosives charges for his detonation of a bomb in a subway station near 

the Port Authority bus terminal in New York City in December of 

2017. Ullah stated in his initial law enforcement interview that, 

quote, ‘‘I did it for the Islamic State.’’ This attack followed an ISISinspired truck attack in November of 2017 along the Hudson River 

bike path in New York that killed eight people. 

Clearly, our national security strategy must adapt to combatting 

a terrorism group that the commander of the U.S. Central Command, Joseph Votel, recently deemed a different kind of organization that has been very adaptive. We should all be concerned that 

at this point we lack a fully articulated and detailed plan to address the remaining pockets of the ISIS insurgency in Iraq and 

Syria, or implement a full-spectrum response to combat the rise of 

affiliate organizations in Libya, the Philippines, the Sinai, and 

other areas, which will require close collaboration with our international partners. 


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President Trump has proposed a 32 percent cut, or a nearly $19 

billion cut, from the State Department budget and has left vacant 

the U.S. ambassadorships in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and 

other key nations in the fight against ISIS. We simply cannot combat ISIS by neglecting the long-term security and political stability 

of the region. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to discussing these and 

other issues with today’s witnesses, and I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

The Chair notes the presence of our colleague, the gentleman 

from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, and I ask unanimous consent that he be 

allowed to fully participate in today’s hearing. 

Without objection, it is so ordered. 

With that, I am pleased to introduce our witnesses. We have already mentioned in my opening statement Dr. Gorka, Mr. Pregent, 

Mr. Lohaus, and Dr. Pape. Welcome to you all. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses will be sworn in before they testify. So if you can all please rise, raise your right hand. 

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give 

is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 

you God? 

All witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

You can be seated. 

In order to allow time for discussion, please limit your testimony 

to 5 minutes. You will note the clock in front of you shows your 

remaining time. The light will turn yellow when you have 30 seconds left, and red when your time is up. Your entire written statement will be made part of the record, and in the question and answer period you will obviously be able to hit on points that you 

may not be able to reach in your opening statement. So please 

abide by that time limit, and remember to turn the microphone on 

before speaking. 

With that, I will recognize Dr. Gorka for 5 minutes. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF SEBASTIAN GORKA 

Mr. GORKA. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis. Thank you, Vice 

Chair Russell and Ranking Member Lynch, for this opportunity to 

address the subcommittee today. 

To begin, I would like to reiterate what the Chairman has already stated. This is perhaps one of the greatest untold stories of 

the last 11 months, meaning this administration’s success against 

ISIS, along with the untold story or the story which isn’t getting 

enough attention with regards to the rebounding U.S. economy. 

My message is a very simple one. The victory or victories against 

ISIS are a function of the first rule of war. One must not only have 

the capabilities to win, but one must have the will to win. What 

happened at 12:01 on January the 20th last year is that we have 

a new commander in chief who had the will to win and to devolve 

the decision-making, the military decision-making to the right commands and the right commanders in the field so that will could be 

translated into successes on the battlefield. 


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We had been told by the last president that ISIS represents a 

generational threat to the United States. It seems as if President 

Trump has crunched a generation down to just a few months. How 

do we know this? ISIS, less than three years ago, held territory in 

more than three countries of the Middle East and had 18—according to the NTCT, the National Counterterrorism Center, had 18 

fully functional affiliates in 18 different countries around the 

world. It was making, according to the Financial Times, $2 million 

every 24 hours in illicit oil sales, racketeering hostage-taking, and 

even through its local taxation system. And most important of all, 

ISIS was the first jihadi organization in almost 100 years to successfully reestablish a theocratic caliphate. 

The Trump Administration, which I had the honor of serving, we 

made the destruction of the physical caliphate our number-one priority, and as the Vice Chairman has already noted, we have already succeeded thanks to our military forces in the field. None of 

the above attributes of ISIS is true today. It is not a caliphate, it 

does not hold significant amounts of territory, and it no longer has 

more than 6 million people living on the territory of that so-called 

caliphate. 

Why is this? Because of the D–ISIS strategy, the defeat ISIS 

strategy that was implemented by the President and by Secretary 

Mattis. What is the most simple summary of the D–ISIS strategy? 

Very simply, we went from a war of a thousand cuts, the so-called 

attrition strategy that was nibbling at the edge of a global problem, 

to a strategy of annihilation under Secretary Mattis, and it has 

worked. A very clear metric of this, on one day recently more than 

1,000 ISIS jihadists surrendered. We have never, ever seen this before in modern jihadist history. Why? Because the jihadist believes 

if he dies in a war to defeat the infidel, then he will go straight 

to heaven. They don’t usually surrender. Now they do. 

In addition to the strategy changing from attrition to annihilation, we have also seen a far more intangible change, which is the 

morale of our armed forces. The decision-making authorities have 

been divested to the commanders in the field. Under the last administration, even tactical targeting decisions were taken inside 

the NSC. The NSC should be the place for policy and strategy, not 

tactical or even operational decisions. That was changed under the 

new administration. 

As one tier, one operator told me when I was very fresh to the 

White House, we understand now the commander trusts us and 

has our back, and that has an unprecedented effect on the morale 

of our forces and their capacity to execute their mission. 

Lastly, there is the aspect of the morale amongst our partners 

and allies. With the President’s Riyadh speech, he took them to 

task as a friend to say they must clear their houses, they must target and isolate the extremists in their places of worship and in 

their communities, and they have done so, especially with the 

GCCC taking on Qatar as its prime role as a funder of extremism 

throughout the world. 

In sum, we have gone from a generational threat being crushed 

in just a matter of months. But the war is not won. As we look forward, the Trump Administration must focus on its counter-ideological policies. We must make the black flag of jihad as reviled as the 


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Nazi swastika. That will take a full-throated counter-ideological 

push. I have recommended in my summary the Active Measures 

Working Group from the Cold War and the closer cooperation with 

our partners in the field, our Muslim allies, to delegitimize the ideology of all groups that share the jihadi creed. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Gorka follows:] 


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House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Testimony: Dr. S. Gorka 

17 jan 2018 

Battlefield Successes and Challenges: 

Recent Efforts to Win the War Against ISIS 

Less than 3 years ago ISIS was the most powerful jihadist organization in the 

world, having eclipsed AI Qaeda. 

ISIS controlled vast areas in more than 3 nations, with operational affiliates in 1S 

more. It was making $2 million a day, had 6 million humans on its territory, and 

had re-established the physical theocratic Caliphate, the first ever group to do so 

since the last Caliphate was dissolved in 1924. 

- Today, none of the above it true, with the physical caliphate functionally 

destroyed. This is a direct result of the new Defeat ISIS (D-ISIS) strategy put in 

place by the Trump Administration. 

- Crucially, under President Trump and Defense Secretary Mattis, America has 

moved from a strategy of "attrition" to a strategy of "annihilation." This has led 

to unprecedented events such as the surrender of more than 1,000 ISIS jihad is in 

one day. 

In addition to a new strategy, the new Administration has most importantly 

devolved military decision making to the appropriate levels. Grand Strategy and 

policy has remained at the NSC and DoD, with theater and operational decisions 

left to the relevant commanders in the field and at the respective commands. 

This has redressed an imbalance which previously saw Washington taking even 

tactical decisions and removing decision making authorities from those best able 

to take sub-strategic military decisions. 

- Additionally, the Trump White House has retaken the regional initiative with our 

allies and partners, the most important event being the President's Riyadh 

speech which openly called for our Muslim/Arab partners to directly tackle the 

extremists in their countries. 

In sum: the Trump Administration has taken what the Obama White House called 

a "generational threat" and made it strategically irrelevant in the space of just a 

few months. But the war is not over. 

1/2 
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House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Testimony: Dr. S. Gorka 

17 jan 2018 

Finishing the War 

The Physical Caliphate is no more, but Rump-ISIS still functions in numerous nations and 

still inspires attacks in Europe and the US. In order to suppress the Global Jihadist Threat, 

the Trump Administration needs to incorporate the following measures into a broader DISIS strategy: 

1. The political integrity of Iraq is vital in preventing a re-emergence of ISIS or similar 

actors in the future. At the same time, our battlefield victories against Sunni extremists 

such as ISIS or AI Qaeda, must not occur in ways that strengthen Iran and the Iranian 

regime's Shia version of jihadi extremism. Subsequently all our regional diplomatic 

efforts must be aimed at having our Sunni Muslim partners become the stabilizing 

force in Iraq (and the Sinai). 

2. America is peerless is the application of military force. No one comes close. 

Nevertheless, the ultimate victory in this type of irregular war does not come in the 

counting of enemy body bags. Killing terrorists is not a good metric given the size of 

the jihadist recruiting pool and the Enemy's belief that death in jihad leads to instant 

salvation. Thus, we will only have won when young men and women no longer wish 

to become jihadists and when the black flag of jihad is as globally reviled as the Nazi 

swastika is today. This will take a much larger counter-propaganda effort than we 

currently conduct. The effort should be executed in the overt and covert domain and 

focus on how best we can help credible voices in countries such as Jordan and Egypt 

delegitimize the message of the extremists. Most importantly this initiative will have 

to be driven out of the White House. (An excellent model for such a measure is the 

Cold War's interagency Active Measure Working Group). 

Sebastian L. Gorka Ph.D. served most recently as Strategist and Deputy Assistant to President 

Donald J. Trump and is now Chairman and CEO of the 

Threat Knowledge Group. Previously he was the Major 

General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military 

Theory at Marine Corps University and Associate Dean of 

Congressional Affairs and Relations to the Special 

Operations Community at National Defense University. A 

graduate of the University of London and former Kokkalis 

Fellow at Harvard's J. F. Kennedy School of Government, he 

was an Adjunct Professor with Georgetown University. Dr. Gorka is a regular instructor with the 

Special Warfare Center and School in Fort Bragg and recipient of the DoD's Joint Service Civilian 

Commendation awarded to him by USSOCOM. Dr. Gorka has testified before Congress and 

briefed the CIA. ODNI, FBI, NCTC, the NIC, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the 

SEALS, and also served the Department of Justice as an expert during the Boston Bombing Trial. 

seb.gorka@gmail.com T.: 703 300 5014 2/2 

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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Witness Disclosure Requirement- "Truth in Testimony" 

Pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5) and Committee Rule 16(a), non-govemmental witnesses are required to provide the Committee w

information requested below in advance of testifying before the Committee. You may attach additional sheets if you need more space. 

I certify that th6irifonnaUJn.:~!J.cYve.~n. Ct\att.ac~Cd is true and correct to the best of my knowledge. 

. '<:fl,\) 'c(o.c_;,t:)JCR 

Signature <:. .. ) '. / ' '\ Date: --'-+.J.C'-+~ Page _'_1 o
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Sebastian L. Gorka, Ph.D. is the Chairman and CEO of the 

Threat Knowledge Group and Non-Resident Scholar with the 

Institute of World Politics in Washington D.C. 

Until August on 2017 he served as Strategist and Deputy 

Assistant to President Donald J. Trump. 

Before serving in the White House, Dr. Gorka held the Major 

General Matthew C. Horner Distinguished Chair of Military 

Theory at Marine Corps University where he taught courses on 

Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism. Previously he was 

Associate Dean of Congressional Affairs and Relations to the 

Special Operations Community at National Defense University. 

He is an internationally recognized authority on issues of national security, irregular warfare, 

terrorism and democratization and has testified before Congress and briefed the CIA, ODNI, NCTC, 

the NIC, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the SEALS. He also served as a subject 

matter expert for the Office of the US Attorney for the Boston Bombing trial. 

During his time with the Defense Department, Dr. Gorka was an Adjunct Professor with 

USSOCOM's Joint Special Operations University where he served as lead Instructor for the Special 

Operations Combating Terrorism course, as well as the interagency and Senior/Executive 

Counterterrorism courses. He has also been an Adjunct Professor in National Security and US 

Foreign Policy at Georgetown University's McCourt School of Public Policy and remains to this day 

a regular instructor with the US Army's JFK Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg. 

Dr. Gorka has advised the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the draft guidance for US 

Strategic Communications and was consulted by USSOCOM during the drafting of the new Joint 

Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare. Dr. Gorka is a recipient of the Department of Defense 

Joint Civilian Service Commendation, awarded by US Special Operation Command. 

Dr. Gorka has published in excess of 140 monographs, book chapters and articles, many for the 

JANES Group of the UK, and along with Dr. Chris Harmon and the late COL Nick Pratt (USMC), he 

was contributor and co-editor of Toward o Grand Strategy Against Terrorism (McGraw Hill). His 

latest book, Defeating Jihad- the Winnable War, was a New York Times best-seller. He is the coauthor of two reports, ISIS: The Threat to the United States, and The Islamic State and Information 

Warfare: Defeating ISIS and the Broader Global Jihadist Movement which are widely used by the 

FBI, the Intelligence and Special Operations communities 

Tel.: 703 300 5014 

seb.gorka@gmail.com 
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How America Will 

Be Attacked 

Irregular Warfare, the Islamic State, 

Russia, and China 

Dr. Sebastian Gorka 

[The Future Operating Environment] "wiU feature tile erosion of sovereignty, weakened developing state.<, the empowerment c.:.f smaU groups or individuals, and an increasingly 

contested nar-r-ative environment favoring agile nonstate 

actors and state actors demonstrating persistent proficiency 

in the irregular domain:' 

-ARSOF Operating Concept: Future Operating 

Environment, US. Army Special Operations Command 

You may not be intereSted in War but War is intereSted in you. 

-Apocryphally attributed to Leon Trotsky 

A this paper is being written, the US. national 

security establishment is under significant 

nternal and external pressures: internally 

from the consequences of prosecuting the longest war 

in the Republic's history which has seen unprecedented 

post-Cold War operational tempos, matched by constant downsizing of our forces and sustainment budgets; 

externally from the events occurring in the lvfiddle East, 

North A6·ica, Asia, and Africa, which has included the 

rise the Islamic State (IS), the most powerful jihadist 

organization of the modern age, and the concurrent 

displacement of more than sixty-five million refugees, a 

historic world record surpassing even Vvorld War II. 

1bese pressures are not going to abate, which will 

most probably lead to the reality of our armed forces 

having to accomplish more missions with less resources. 

At the same time, both nonstate and nation-state adversaries of the United States who have become supremely 

30 

adept at exploiting irregular warfare (IW) and unconventional modes of attack will exploit these forces. 1his 

article is an introduction to three of the most important 

enemies we face today and who we will also face in the 

future, and how these actors use IW and unconventional 

warfare (UW) against our interests: the Islamic State, 

China, and Russia. 

The Operating Context 

There are many kinds ojntanouevre [sic] inWa1J some only of 

which take place upon the battlefield. 1 

-Winston Churchill 

1he United States is still engaged in the longest 

formal military campaign since the founding of the 

Republic. Launched in October 2001, the war against 

the global jihadi movement-including al-Qaida and 

IS-persists and will continue into the next administration. We may have weakened the original al-Qaida's 

operational capacity, but the threat has transformed 

and moved elsewhere in the last fifteen years to areas as 

diverse as Yemen, Mali, and Nigeria, and more recently 

to Libya and Syria, with IS becoming a fully-fledged 

insurgency mobilizing eighty thousand-plus fighters. 

Additionally, the jihadist threat to the continental 

United States has not subsided but increased as the 

bloodshed and mass violence of San Bernardino and 

Orlando attest. In fact, according the terrorist monitoring organization SITE, between 2 June 2016 and 1 

August 2016, outside oflraq and Syria, a jihadist attack 

is perpetrated every eighty-four hours. 

September-October 2016 MILITARY REVIEW 
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At the same time we have seen America's erstwhile 

enemy, Moscow, act in newly belligerent and destabilizing ways. Its invasion of Ukraine breaking the sixty~plus year European taboo on territorial aggrandizement through force together with military jet fly-bys 

of U.S. naval vessels and along the American seaboard 

harken back to the Cold War days of military intimidation and brinlananship. 

And there is the Communist People's Republic of 

China. Although it has yet to use direct force against 

its neighbors or the United States, it has used a broad 

array of unconventional means to increase its military presence and strategic footprint-from very 

aggressive cyberattacks against U.S. interests, both 

governmental and coinmercial, to the manufacture of 

artificial islands in disputed waters as platforms for 

military installations. 

'Though none of these adversaries or enemies unilaterally could feasibly win a conventional war with 

the United States that still maintains a "hyperpower" 

position amongst the nations of the world, they have 

deployed old IW techniques as well as developed new 

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016 

IMMIIIEIIT ATTACK 

ones with which to progressively both undermine our 

interests now, and weaken our allies and partners. 

1he sooner we as a nation, and our armed forces 

understand that the age of conventional warfare is a 

bygone and grasp how nations like Russia and China, 

and ''super-insurgencies" like IS, are waging IW against 

us today, the sooner we will be able to defeat them or 

lessen their impact upon our 0)Vl1 national security. 

Irregular Warfare Is Dead; 

Long Live Irregular Warfare 

Although history may not in fact repeat, as Twain is reputed to have said, it surely does rhyme. 

1he United States remains a true superpowet~ but 

mostly in one dimension: conventional warfare and kinetic direct action (DA). As our nation's response to the 

war in Vietnam, and the last fifteen years in Afghanistan 

and Iraq would seem to attest, we as a nation do not 

much care for fighting "irregular enemies~ Nor does it 

seem that we are that often successful in such endeavors. 

This is a very serious problem given that IW is historically the most prevalent mode of warfare. 

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The Correlates of War Project at the University of 

Pennsylvania has collected all the most relevant data on 

every conflict since the age of Napoleon in one place. 

According to this data set in the last two hundred years, 

there have been four hundred-sixty wars of various types. 

These can be broken dovvn into conventional wars-state 

forces versus state forces, and unconventional or irregular 

conflicts-states fighting nonstate actors, or nonstate 

actors fighting other nonstate actors. The breakdown is 

expressed visually in the figure (see page 31).2 

Therefore, among all the other information the database contains1 one can draw a very significant conclusion: of all the wars since Napoleon ( 460), more than 

80 percent (380) were irregular in nature, conflicts in 

which at least one of the fighting forces was not a representative of a recognized government. In other words, 

in modern history we see four times as many conflicts 

resembling our war in Vietnam, or the war with IS and 

the Tali ban, than wars that look like World War I or 

World vVar II, or even the first Gulf War. 

Subsequently, if the frequency of IW has been so 

high in the last two hundred years, we can, with a high 

degree of certainty, predict that in the coming decades American forces will frequently be called upon 

to fight and assist others in future conflicts that fall 

under this category-' 

Eleven years after the 2001 attacks, the .Joint and 

Coalition Operational Analysis (]CAO) division 

of the .Joint Staff J7 published a set of reports titled 

Decade of War; Enduring Lessons from the Pa51: Decade of 

Operations:1 Several of the J7's observations and conclusions concerning Operations Enduring Freedom 

and Iraqi Freedom (OEF and OIF) bear directly upon 

current and future missions. They include-

• a f3.ilure to recognize, acknowledge, and accurately 

define the operational environment, leading to a 

mismatch behveen forces, capabilities, missions, 

and goals, 

• a slowness to recognize the importance of information and the "battle for narrative" in achieving 

objectives at all levels, 

• difficulties in integration of general purpose and 

special operations forces (SOF), 

• individuals and small groups exploiting globalized technology and information systems to 

shape the battlespace and near state-like disruptive capacity, and 

32 

the increased state use of surrogates and proxies to 

generate asymmetric threats,5 

There is widespread agreement among those who 

have been responsible for planning and running our 

more kinetic operations after 9/11 that on the whole 

the armed forces have performed without peer in the 

application of direct force. America's ability to execute 

strike~ and maneuver-type missions has developed to 

such a degree that no other nation can come close to 

matching our capabilities in the conventional and surgical strike (SOF) domains. 

But when we step beyond the application of"steel on 

target;' and move into the indirect and unconventional 

domains, our peer position is rapidly lost to others who 

have devoted more time to these less obvious modes of 

attack. IS has a force that represents less than 10 percent 

of the forces the United States has at its disposal yet 

persists and is now bringing the jihadi way of war to our 

shores more frequently than ever before. China escalates 

its military adventurism daily without our doctrine 

providing an obvious response mechanism or our policy 

providing a lucid strategic end-state. And the Russian 

Federation has not only used established modes ofUW 

in Europe in ways that would impress surviving members of the Office of Special Services ( OSS) of World 

War II, but it also has deployed a full suite of psychological operations (PSYOP) and information operations 

in the Middle East, Europe, and even tl1e United States 

that matches anything from the heyday of the Union of 

Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). 

V\That follows is a brief primer on how these actors 

use their IW and UW techniques against our interests. 

It should be taken as the most basic of introductions 

on how America is being challenged today and will be 

undermined by these adversarial actors in the future. 

The Islamic State and 

the Modern Way of Jihad The modern movement for global jihad was born with 

the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after World War I, 

refined by the fatwas ofjihadi strategist Abdullah Azzam, 

and made a ~ectacular international phenomenon by 

Osama bin Laden and the attacks of 11 September 2001.' 

But in recent years, the global jil1adi movement has transformed. With the death ofbin Laden and the separation 

of al-Qaida in Iraq from the original parent organization, 

IS has become the new standard-bearer for Holy War 

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against the infidel and has done so in a way that makes it 

far more dangerous that al-Qaida ever was. 

Today, after the collapse of Syria, the fall ofMosul 

in Iraq, and the multiple IS-connected attacks around 

the world, including the San Bernardino and Orlando 

massacres, very few 

people talk any more 

IMMIHEHT ATTACK 

terrorize. Instead, they hide in safe houses when inactive 

or plotting, then rapidly execute an attack only to return 

immediately back to their covert locations. 

Thus, by comparison, an insurgency functions as a 

quasi-military force that is able to muster recruits and 

deploy in formation 

not just to attack but 

about al-Qaida or 

about its current 

leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.7 And for 

••• an insurgency functions as a 

quasi-military force that is able 

to exercise lasting 

control over the territory it captures. For 

the insurgent, terrorist violence is but one 

tool with which to 

challenge government 

writ and not his or 

her reason for being. 

For the terrorist 

good reason, for on 

at least four counts, 

IS is now far more 

powerful than al-Qaida ever was: 

to muster recruits and deploy in 

formation not just to attack but 

to exercise lasting control over the 1. Unlike al-Qaida, IS is a true 

trans regional and 

territory it captures. organization-which 

global insurgency. 

2. IS is the richest nonstate threat group of its 

kind ever. 

3. IS has demonstrated stupendous recruitment capabilities~ pioneering such recruitment through the 

global Internet. 

4. Most important, IS has achieved that which all 

other modern jihadi groups have failed to achieve: 

the re-establishment of a theocratic caliphate1 or 

actual Islamic state. 

The Islamic State Is a True 

Trans regional and Global Insurgency 

Elaborating further while comparing the two, al-Qaida, wherever it functioned after 9/11, never did so as 

a true insurgency. Instead} it maintained its identity as 

a globally ambitious and globally operational terrorist 

organization. Even when it was associated with a local 

insurgency, such as in Somalia and in Afghanistan, it was 

always in a parasitic fashion. Specifically, true insurgencies like Al Shabaab (al-Qaida's affiliate in Somalia) and 

the Taliban are defined by having a mass base of support 

and so many actual fighters that they can operate in daylight and capture territory with the intention of holding 

and governing it. In contrast) exclusively terrorist groups 

are by nature much smaller, without a mass base of 

support such that they must therefore operate covertly, and they do not attempt to govern the people they 

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016 

has no true military 

capacity-coercion and intimidation through violence 

is the reason the organization exists, 1hus, al-Qaida was 

never a true insurgency, but an organization that was 

founded only to terrorize in campaigns the purpose 

of which was to seek revenge and inflict punishment. 

Even in those theaters such as Afghanistan and Somalia 

where it is linked to an insurgency, it never recruited its 

own mass base of support1 instead leveraging pre-existing insurgencies such as the Taliban and Al Shabaab and 

piggybacking on top of them. 

On the other hand, IS is all the more impressive 

because it took no short-cuts to quasi-statehood. It is 

not a terrorist group perched upon another pre-existing insurgency and does not have to borrow its fighters 

from another older threat group. IS has recruited its 

own mass base of fighters, at least eighty-thousand, in 

just a couple of years. And not only is IS more powerful 

than al-Qaida because it is an insurgency) it is additionally unique amongst all modern insurgencies. 

Byway of context to see just how unique, if one looks 

at the whole range of modern twentieth-century insurgent groups, there is one characteristic common to them 

all. Whether it be Mao Tse-tung in China after World 

War II, or FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 

Colombia) in Colombia, irrespective of ideology they 

shared the same proximate goal: the defeat and dL<placement of the government they were fighting. Mao wanted 

to defeat and replace the nationalists and create a Marxist 

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China. 1he FARC wanted to defeat and replace the 

Hispanic elite of Bogota and create a Bolivarian people's 

republic. Similarly, whether in Asia, Latin America, 

Africa, or Europe, insurgents are set on replacingjust one 

regime, the regime they were at war with. 

In contrast, though IS shares the immediate goal of 

usurping Syrian and Iraqi governance in a wide geographic area overlapping both nations, it is far more 

ambitious and has global objectives. To that end, not 

only has ISIS built its own insurgent base with tens of 

thousands of fighters, it has managed to capture city after city in multiple countries. IS now holds territory in 

both Iraq and Syria as well as Libya, making it the first 

historic insurgency to control land in multiple coun~ 

tries in one region. On top of that success, it has spread 

into West Africa as well. Two years ago, Boko Haram, 

the black African jihadi group of Nigeria swore bayatmade the Arabic pledge of allegiance-to al-Baghdadi, 

the self-appointed caliph of IS. It had done so several 

times before, but this time its pledge was accepted by 

IS, and Boko Haram was accepted into the new "caliphate" under al-Baghdadi's leadership. 

Not long afier, the leaders ofBoko Haram officially changed its name to the West Africa Province of the 

Islamic State1 meaning that any of the territory w1der its 

control was de facto part of the new sovereign Islamic 

State. Never before has an insurgency successfully captured 

and held land in mnltiple nations of mnltiple regions. 

The Islamic State Is the Richest 

Honstate Threat Croup in History 

Secondly, IS is the richest threat group of its type ever. 

Unclassified U.S. govenunent estimates put its income 

at U.S.$2-4 million per day, which comports with the 

Financial Times' own estimate of IS having a gross domestic 

product of $500 million. Considering that, according to 

the official9/11 Commission Report, the 2001 attacks on 

New York and Washington only cost al-Qaida $500,000, 

this means that IS is in a completely different league than 

its progenitor and is in no way a 'JV (junior varsity) team:' 

The Islamic State Has 

Demonstrated Stupendous 

Recruitment Capabilities 

Thirdly, IS has been incredibly impressive when it 

comes to mobilizingjihadist fighters. According to the 

United Nations, in the first nine months of renewed 

34 

IS operations in Iraq, it managed to recruit nine thousand fighters, and in the last few years, of the eighty-five 

thousand recruited, at least thirty-five thousand have 

been foreign fighters from outside oflraq and Syria. The 

IS recruitment effort is all the more impressive given that 

when al-Qaida operated as the MAK (Arab Services 

Bureau) for mujahideen during the Afghan war of 1979-

1989, its recruited only fifty-five thousand over a decade. 

This has been done through the use of truly pioneering 

Internet-based propaganda, which has enabled recruitment globally in ways that were previously unheard of 

when recruitment had to be done mainly face to face. 

Establishment of a Theocratic Caliphate 

When a country is being subverted it is not being outfought; 

it is being outadministered.8 

-Bernard B. Fall 

But the last facet oflS that makes it truly stand out 

from other groups with similar motivation and objectives is what its leader a!-Baghdadi managed to achieve 

on 29 June 2014 from the Grand Mosque in Mosni. 

When he declared reestablishment of the caliphate-the 

theocratic Islamic empire-and proceeded to exercise 

true control over a population of more than six million people in a territory larger than Great Britain, he 

achieved that which no other jihadist group has in the 

last ninety years. Here it is crucial to reme1nber that 

the caliphate is historically not just the fabulist whim of 

extremists but was a true political and religious entity 

for over a thousand years, established in Mecca and 

then headquartered respectively over the centuries in 

Damascus, Baghdad, and lastl)~ Istanbul. Moreover, the 

caliphate in fact existed just one hundred years ago in the 

form of the Ottoman Empire. Yet it dissolved because 

of the Ottomans being on the losing side in World War 

I and the decision of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the head 

of state of the new Republic of Turkey, to do away with 

it in order to clear the way for modernizing his nation. 

In doing so, he officially dissolved the caliphate by decree 

in 1924. Ever since then, jihadist organizations have 

been trying to bring the caliphate back, starting with the 

Muslim Brotherhood, which was created just four years 

after Ataturk disbanded the empire. 

Subsequently, literally hundreds of extremist organizations were created over the next nine decades with the 

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express purpose of reversing what Ataturk had decreed. 

Yet every single one of them failed, including al-Qaida. 

Even after winning the elections in Egypt, the descendant group rooted in the original Brotherhood failed 

when it tried to Islamize too rapidly and was dethroned 

by Egyptian Gen. Fattah el-Sisi and the military. 

1his invokes the question, "How, exactly1 has the 

Islamic State 

succeeded 

where all 

other jihadist 

groups failed?" 

The answer 

is a twofold 

one. 111e first 

answer has to 

do with how 

IMMINENT ATTACK 

importance of The Management of Savage.y as it relates to 

fomenting global Islamic insurgency is illustrated by the 

fact that it informs most of how IS operates today. 

All national security professionals should read the 

full translation of the book, but the summary is as follows. Like all jihadis, Naji believed that a Muslim must 

live under a caliphate, and that war must be waged unThe Management of Savagery: 

Titt: Most Critical Stage 

Through Which the 

UmmaWillPass 

til the Empire 

of Islam covers 

the world. 

However, he 

effectively IS 

has leveraged a 

religious narrative, ')Jecifically an eschato· 

logical one that 

portrays their 

"holy war" as 

the final jihad 

prior to end 

times. (For de· 

The Management of Savagery by Egyptian jihadist Abu Bakr Naj! closely parallels Chinese communist leader Mao Tse-tung's theory of revolutionary war as it outlines the process of waging 

insurgent jihad in stages. A link to the complete English~language translation, by scholar William 

McCants1 can be found within endnote 10. 

is explicit that 

violence alone 

will not magically result in 

the appearance 

of a functioning caliphate. 

Instead the jihadi movement 

must follow a 

comprehensive 

phased plan of 

operations that 

systematically 

builds layer 

upon layer 

until the final 

tailed background and discussion beyond the scope of 

this article, see my article in the May-June 2016 edition 

of lvfilitary ReviewY) And the second ans·wer has to do 

with an Egyptian jihadi theorist of IW. 

Prior to the success of IS, the key strategists of the 

global jihadist movement were less than pragmatic. 

The majority saw violence as a sacred act with the 

fate of their movement wholly contingent on the will 

of Allah. If the holy warriors of Allah were faithful 

in the execution of violence against the infidel in an 

escalation of operations, the caliphate would be miraculously established. 

That idealist attitude was challenged when the 

Egyptian writer Abu Bakr Naji published his e-book, 

The Management of Savagery. 10 Although Naji was killed 

not long after the book was made public, the work 

remains extremely influential, and thus very dangerous, 

as it has injected a level ofiW understanding into the 

jihadist movement that we had not seen previously. lhe 

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016 

theocratic reality is achieved. 1he phases Naji describes 

in his book are: 

Phase One: 'Ihe Vexation Phase (IS four years 

ago). In the initial stage the jihadist organization will 

apply IW to execute. dramatic terror attacks against 

the infidel and his regional partners. The goal here is to 

attrit and weaken the infidel and apostate governments 

and prepare the battlespace for Phase Two. 

Phase Two: Spread Savagery (IS two years 

ago). Under this stage, the !W attacks are drasti· 

cally increased in size and frequency. According to 

open source reports, when Ramadi fell, two hundred 

vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices were 

employed in a twenty-four hour period; this is exactly 

what Naji prescribed. 111e objective of Phase Two is to 

dislocate the local government from its own territory, 

making it functionally impossible for it to govern. This 

illuminates IS strategy for focusing on operations to 

sever the Syrian government or the administration 

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in Baghdad from the people to prevent the respective 

governments from exercising sovereignty. The jihadist organization thus ain1s to engender such a level of 

chaos that the resultant doubt of the population in 

the viability of legacy state structures positions the 

threat group as the only viable governance alternative. 

Phase Three: Administer Savagery-Consolidate 

Expand (IS now). In an echo of our own manual, 

FM 3-24, CounteYinsurgency, 

this is the stage when the 

enemy consolidates its hold 

on captured territory1 members of the local population 

are integrated into new 

fighting units, and a new 

governance structure is put 

in place that weds provision 

of services to the population 

with imposition of a draconian judicial system based 

upon sharia law. 

stage the movement must pass through if it is to finally succeed in its global mission. And, unfortunately, 

his pragmatic approach has been effectively implemented by Abu Bakr and his IS. 11 

Only when we understand that IS understands IW 

as an instrument to obtain specific pragmatic objectives 

far better than al-Qaida ever did will we be intellectually focused on understanding the true scope of their 

aspirations and then better 

positioned to formulate effective 

ways and means to defeat them 

both on the battlefield and, more 

importantly, in the war of ideas. 

The Russia 

Federation: 

War by Other Means 

Turning to consideration of 

Russia as a growing IW foe, it 

is well to observe that today's 

Russia is not the Soviet Union: it 

is not an existential threat to the 

United States. 

The territory thus captured is gradually converted 

into a new "base state; or giant forward operating base} 

to be used as a launching 

platform for new Phase One 

and Phase Two type operations in new territories such 

as Libya, Yemen, Jordan, or 

Saudi Arabia. 

The significance ofNaji's 

Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: fmplications 

for Latvian Defense Policy is a detailed analysis of Russia's 

current approach to conducting warfare in the twen· 

ty-first century by Latvian military scholar Janis Berzins. 

However, it is an anti-status 

quo actor that intends to antagonize, undennine, and frustrate 

accomplishment of U.S. goals, a 

spoiler controlled by a thuggish 

former KGB officer who called 

the dissolution of the USSR the 

'greatest geostrategic calamity of the twentieth century:' 

work is that it injects a 

dose of pragmatism and an understanding of IW into 

the global jihadi movement that had been lacking for 

ideological and theological reasons. Additionally, Phase 

Three is really a transitional stage after which the final 

global caliphate will be achieved. As such it represents 

a period under which the jihadist enterprise is functioning as a quasi-nation-state with a fixed territory, 

borders, administration, and a monopoly of force. 

In contrast, prior jihadi strategists had rejected 

the Westphalian nation-state as a heretical construct 

of the infidel West. Naji's great contribution-and 

a very dangerous one at that-was to argue in 1he 

Management of Savagery that even if one does not like 

the nation-state conceptually. it is an evolutionary 

36 

Consequently, it needs to be 

acknowledged that Moscow is committed to re-establishing a sphere of unchallenged dominance in Central 

and Eastern Europe, and beyond that, to achieving an 

approximate level of influence globally that the Soviet 

Union had during the Cold War, 

Unfortunately, its invasion of the sovereign nation 

of Ukraine resulting in the annexation of Crimea is a 

masterful example of how to do U\V in a post-Cold 

War and post-9/11 world. Similarly, its exploitation 

of the vacuum caused by the withdrawal of U.S. 

combat forces from Iraq in 2011 that enabled it to 

become a key player in Syria proves just how ambitious the Kremlin is to reshape the geopolitics of the 

Middle East also. 

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How has Russia done this? Some have argued that it 

has developed a new mode of"hybrid war:' This is not in 

fact true, Moscow has simply further developed andrecalibrated old Cold War tools in a new combination that 

emphasizes a less direct and more subversive approach 

to war that Sun Tsu would have instantly recognized. 

As those nations under greatest threat after the invasion 

of Ukraine, the Baltic nations ofEstonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania are doing some of the most important v.rork in 

showing the world just how it is that Russia is winning 

its wars without recourse to conventional means. 

The best English-language summary of the revamped Russian approach to war is in the 2014 report 

of the National Defence Academy of Latvia's Center 

for Security and Strategic Research. Titled Russia's New 

Generation Wa1jare in Ukraine: Implication~ for Latvian 

D~fense Policy, Janis Berzins summarizes Russia's approach as emphasizing the following guidelines for war 

in the twenty-first century: 

1. from direct destruction to direct influence, and 

from direct conflict to "contactless war"j 

2. from direct annihilation of the enemy to subverting them internally; 

3. from war with kinetic weapons and an emphasis on 

technology and platforms, to a culture war attacking the will of the enemy; 

4. from war built around conventional general-purpose forces to subconventional war using specially prepared UW forces and irregular groupings 

and militiasj 

5. from the traditional three-dimensional perspective 

of the battlespace to an emphasis on information 

operations1 PSYOP, and the "war of perceptions"; 

6. from compartmentalized war to a total war, including the targeting of the enemy's "psychological 

rear" and population base; 

7. from war focused on the physical environment to 

war targeting human consciousness, cyberspace, 

and the will of the enemy to fight; and 

8. from \varina defined period of time to a state of 

permanent war-war as the natural state for the 

nation to be in.U 

These guidelines, each of which can be illustrated 

in the campaign to subvert Ukraine, were used to 

politically, psychologically, and economically undermine it as a nation prior to any hostilities breaking 

out. They were further employed in concert with 

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016 

IMMINENT ATTACK 

unmarked SOF units covertly deployed as UW force 

multipliers to conduct operations to assist fifth-column local militia assets. 

lhe guidelines are, according to Berzins1 implemented in a set of clear phases. 

First Phase: Nonmilitary Asymmetric Warfare. 

Synchronized informational, moral, psychological, 

ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures sup¥ 

porting the overall Russian plan to establish a political, 

economic, and military environment favorable to the 

interests of Moscow. 

Second Phase: Special UW Operations. Actions 

designed to mislead the adversary's political and military leaders through coordinated measures on diplomatic channels, through the media, and via key government and military agencies, utilizing the "leaking" 

of false data, and counterfeit orders and directives. 

'Third Phase: Subversion. Intimidating, deceiving, and bribing adversarial government and military 

officers with the objective of making them abandon 

their service duties. 

Fourth Phase: Propaganda. Information operations 

targeting the civilian population to increase discontent amplified by the arrival of Russian-sponsored and 

trained bands of militant..:;, escalating subversion. 

Fifth Phase: Military Measures below Open \Var. 

Establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be 

attacked, imposition of blockades, extensive use ofUW 

units and direct ad ion in close cooperation with armed 

"opposition" units. 

Sixth Phase: Open Use of Force. Commencement 

of military action, immediately preceded by 

large-scale reconnaissance and sabotage missions. 

Employment of all means of attack and types of 

assets, kinetic and nonkinetic, including SOF, space 

capabilities, electronic warfare (EW), aggressive and 

subversive diplomacy, and intelligence assets, industrial espionage, allied force-multipliers, and embedded 

fifth-column actors. 

Seventh Phase: Force Escalation. Intensification 

of targeted information operations, increased EW, air 

operations, and harassment, combined with the use 

of high-precision weapons launched from multiple 

platforms, including long-range artillery. and the use of 

weapons platforms based on new physical principles, 

including microwaves, radiation, and nonlethal biological weapons targeting the will to resist. 

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Eighth Phase: Assert Control. Roll over and neutralization of all the remaining points of resistance, use of 

SOF and stand-off platforms to destroy remaining combat-effective enemy unitsJ deployment of airborne assets 

tO surround last points of resistance, execution of"mop 

up" and territorial control operations with ground forces. 

As can be seen, none of the above together constitute a new type of war. However, the focus and combination of modes of attack have changed. Instead of 

the Cold War scenario of all-out war under which all 

means of attack are to be used initiaily, including chemical, biological, and nuclear, and during which maskirovka (deception) was an integral part of the plan to defeat 

the enemy, the Kremlin's new priorities put indirect 

and nonkinetic measures first. 

Sun Tsu wrote that the ultimate skill in war was to 

achieve victory without fighting, and the Kremlin has 

taken Sun Tsu to heart and modified its approach. As 

has been demonstrated in its actions relative to Ukraine 

and elsewhere, for Russia, the approach is now to win 

without fighting too much. The Russian Federation has 

even established a pseudoscientific theory upon which 

its new approach is based. This repurposed Soviet-era 

theory is called Reflexive Control and is the science 

of how to shape the information environment in such 

a way as to n1ake your enetny take decisions that are 

preferable to your victory and detrimental to his success. 

This more aggressive version of"perception management" is well worth studying by the U.S. military and 

intelligence community. An excellent primer is Timothy 

Thomas's "Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and the 

Military" from the Journal of Slavic Military StudiesB 

The Hew Sun Tsus: "Making Trouble 

for the Troublemakers" 

In 1999 two senior colonels of the Communist 

Chinese People's Liberation Army, with experience 

in political warfare, published the work Unrestricted 

Warfare." Qjao Liang and \Vang Xiangsui proposed 

with their work that the context of conflict had drastically changed and that this change required a "new" 

type of war without limits. 

In their work, the colonels focused first on the 

geostrategic and geopolitical changes that necessitate "unrestricted warfare:' 1his discussion included 

excursions on the topic of globalization, the wan~ 

ing power of the classic nation~ state, the rise of 

38 

"super-empowered" actors such as hackers and cyber 

warriors, and a lengthy discourse of the significance 

of the First Gulf War in demonstrating the new "omnidirectionality" of combat, wherein integration is at 

a premimn and the instruments of war are deployed 

in all dimensions and directions at the same time. 

This then led to the authors enumerating the eight 

principles ofUVv: 15 

Omnidirectionality. A 360-degree perspective 

guaranteeing all-around consideration of all the 

factors related to war and when observing the 

battlefield, designing plans, employing measures, 

and combining the use of all war resources to. 

have a field of vision with no blind spots. Warfare 

can be militarYJ quasi-military, or nonmilitary 

with the "battlefield" existing everywhere with 

no distinction made between combatants and 

noncombatants. 

• Synchrony. Conducting ad:ions in different locations within the same period. Synchrony accomplishes objectives rapidly and simultaneously. 

• Limited Objectives. Limit objectives in relation to 

measures employed. Objectives must always be 

smaller than measures used to obtain them. 

• Unlin1ited Measures. Once objectives are limited 

there should no restrictions placed on the measures 

used to achieve them. Hence UW 

• Asymmetry. Understanding and employing the 

principle of asymmetry correctly so as to find and 

exploit an enemy's weaknesses. 

Minimal Consumption. Use the least amount of cotnbat resources sufficient to accon1plish the objective. 

(Analogous to the U.S. principle of economy afforce.) 

• Multidimensional Coordination. Coordinating 

and allocating all forces, which can be mobilized in 

the military and nonmilitary spheres covering an 

objective (this includes nonmilitary assets, such as 

cultural warfare). 

• Holistic Adjustment and Control of the Entire 

War Process. Continual acquisition of information 

through the campaign to allow for iterative adjustn1ent and comprehensive control. 

As even a cursory glance will demonstrate, none of 

these principles is at all new. In fact, several are as old 

as Sun Tsu's The Art of War itsel£ And others are simply 

good common sense. Likewise, the contextua] factors 

that lead to these principles being evinced are not new 

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either, with scores of Western authors) such as Phillip 

Bobbitt and Ed Luttwak, having discussed them after 

the end of the Cold War. 

Nevertheless, we should not disregard this work, or 

rather, we should not conclude that there is nothing 

new about how China has been thinking about and 

exercising its power in the post-9/11 world. Every nation-and even individual nonstate actors-has its own 

unique strategic 

culture. China 

is shaped by 

two ,;pecifIMMIHEHT ATTACK 

Simply looking at China's actions in Latin 

America and South Asia, with billions "invested" in 

countries like Venezuela and Afghanistan for access 

to natural resources such as oil and copper, we see 

how China uses the nonkinetic to realize its national 

goals. Add to that the privatization and co-option of 

the state China has perpetrated in Africa in places 

such as Angola and Nigeria, and we can agree with 

Unrestricted Warfare 

Qia<>LwngandWan!!Xrnngsui 

the label Rafael 

Marques has 

used to describe China's 

foreign policy: new 

imperialis1n. 

While 

ic historical 

experiences the 

most. The one 

is the original 

period of the 

warring states 

which brought 

us the wisdom 

of Sun Tsu, and 

the other is the 

nineteenth and 

early tv..rentieth-century 

experiences of 

modern China. 

1he former 

imbued the 

Original cover of Unrestricted Warfare by Chinese People's Liberation Army Co!s. Qiao Uang and 

Wang Xiangsui, published in 1999. Several commercial translations are available. See endnote 13 

for a partial translation originally made by the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. 

Russia subverts 

and buys individual actors, 

China buys the 

good will of 

whole governments in ways 

that are very 

reminiscent of 

the mercantilist ways of 

the West just a 

couple of censtrategic personality of China's generals and leaders with an obsession for maintaining internal cohesion to a degree that 

far exceeds any reasonable attitude other nations have 

toward maintaining internal peace and harmony. And, 

the second created a suppurating psychological wound 

in the mind of the political elite that China must never 

again be exploited and humiliated by foreign powers as 

it was for so long in the modern age. 

What has this resulted in today when it comes to 

China's strategic goals and actions? Liang and Xiangsui 

may not have expounded a revolutionary new way of 

war for their nation, but Beijing is most definitely practicing a very shrewd forn1 of IW that seems to reflect 

its prescription for war. Less aggressive than Russia's in 

that its primary purpose is not subversion, this approach is focused less on remote political control than 

on intimidation and economic control. 

MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2016 

turies ago. In 

short, Beijing's approach is to exploit weak nations 

and corrupt regimes, while exploiting the weaknesses 

of strong nations. And when it comes to the strongest of its competitors, such as the United States, to 

quote Liang, from a CCTV interview in 2012 when 

he was already a general, the goal is "to make trouble 

for the troublemaker:' 

Irregular Warfare: 

Back to the Future 

As the empirical data shows, war is most often 

"irregular" and "unconventional': Wl.th America's 

capacity to maintain an overwhelming competitive 

advantage in the conventional military arena, our 

adversaries and enemies will continue to develop 

and employ established unconventional and irregular modes of attack. Although not all of these are 

39 
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revolutionary, or even novel) there are proving very 

effective already. The sooner our strategists and policymakers recognize and acknowledge this) the better 

able they will be to develop relevant counters and 

hone our own indirect and nonkinetic modes of attack to better secure our republic and all Americans 

in what has become a decidedly unstable and ever 

more dangerous world. • 

Notes 

Epigraph. U.S. Special Operations Command, ARSOF Operating Concept: Future Operating Environmen!ARSOF Operating 

Concept Phase 1 (28 june 2013), 17. 

Epigraph. This quote has been apocryphally attributed to 

Leon Trotsky though no original source has been found. 

1. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, vot 2 (New York: 

Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923), 5. 

2. Sebastian Gorka and David Kilcullen, "An Actor-Centric 

Theory of War;' joint Force Qjiarterly 60(20 11 ): 14-18, http://www. 

dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc' ADoADA5 35254. 

3. Based upon the empirical data described and the frequency of unconventional wars in contrast to state-on-state conflicts, 

it would seem obvious that we should, in fact, doctrinally label 

irregular warfare as conventional, and see conventional warfare as 

the anomaiy1 not the standard. Even though these are the facts of 

the matter, I do not expect to see the Pentagon make such a switch 

in the near future. 

4. The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis findings were 

drawn from forty~six separate studies that looked at operations 

raging from Strategic Communications Best Practices to Counter-lED 

Efforts and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. 

5.joint Staffj7, "Decade ofWar1 Volume 1: Enduring Lessons 

from the Past Decade of Operations;' Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (2012), 20 March 2012, accessed 4 August 2016, 

http:/ /www.dtic.milfdoctrineltrainmg/conferences/wjtsc 12 1! 

Wltscl2 11LLdecadeOfWar.pdf. 

6. For a summary exposition of the key strategists of modern 

Jihad, including Azzam, see Sebastian Gorka, "Understanding 

Today's Enemy: The Grand Strategists of Modern Jihad;' Military 

Review 96, no. 3 (May-june 2016); 32-39, accessed 10 August 

2016, http://usacac.army.miiJCAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English!MilitaryReview _.20 160630 art009 .pdf. 

7. This is dangerous. Although the Islamic State (!S) is currently 

more impressive and capable than al-Qaida, that does not mean 

that ai-Qaida is finished or dormant. On the contrary, AI-Qaida 

has, in fact, expanded its reach in many parts of the world outside 

40 

of IS influence, including Africa. The war for the "crown of the 

Caliphate" is far from over. 

8. Bernard B. Fall, "The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and 

Counterinsurgency;' Naval War College Review, 8 no. 34 (April 

1965): 34. 

9. Gorka, "Understanding Today's Eneml 

10. Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most 

Critical State Through Which the Umma Will Pass, trans. William 

McCants (Cambridge, MA:John M. Olin Institute for Strategic 

Studies, 23 May 2006), PDF e-book, accessed 8 August 2016, 

https:/ /azelin.files.wordpress.com/20 1 0/08/abu-bakr~naji-the-man~ 

agement-of-savagery-the-most-crltica!-stage-through-whlch-theumma-wi!l-pass.pdf. 

1 1. Note also that it is dear the IS has studied their Mao. The 

original al-Qaida had a more Guevarist approach to insurgency, 

believing that spectacular attacks would trigger a mass movement and mass mobilization of fighters. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has 

demonstrated an understanding of what Mao taught: the insurgent 

will be successful if he can establish the "counter state" and provide services to the local population in competition to a failing 

legacy government Appreciation of what the hackneyed phrase 

"hearts and minds" truly means illuminates what makes IS much 

more dangerous than al-Qaida ever was. 

12.janis Berzins, RussiaS New Generation Warfare in Ukraine; 

Implications for Latvian Defense Policy, Policy Paper No. 2, (Riga, 

latvia; National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security 

and Strategic Research, April 2014), accessed 5 August 2016, 

http:f/www.naa.mil.!v/~/media!NANAZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-

2014.ashx. 

~mothy Thomas, "Russia's Reflexive Control Theory and 

the Military;'}ournol of Slavic Military Studies 17 (2004): 237-56, 

https:/Jwww.rit.edu/-w-cmmc/literature/1homas 2004.pdf. 

14. Qjao bang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), 

accessed 4 August 2016, httpJ/www.c4Lorg/unrestricted.pdf. 

Some Sinologists prefer the translation "Warfare Beyond Limits:' 

15. Adapted from Maj. john A. Van Messel, "Unrestricted 

Warfare: A Chinese doctrine for future warfare?" (master's thesis, 

Marine Corps University, 2005), accessed 4 August 2016, h!!PiL 

www.dtic.mil/dticltr/ful!textfu2/a509132.pd( 

September-October 2016 MILITARY REVIEW 
23 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Pregent, you are up for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL PREGENT 

Mr. PREGENT. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and 

distinguished members of the Subcommittee on National Security, 

on behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am honored to testify before 

you today about the successes against ISIS and the challenges that 

remain. 

Both the Obama and Trump Administrations achieved success 

against ISIS. Under President Obama, ISIS lost the Mosul Dam, 

ISIS was defeated trying to take the Syrian town of Kobane in 

Syria and lost control of Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah in Iraq. 

Under President Trump, ISIS lost its caliphate capitals of Mosul in 

Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, and its stronghold of Deir ez-Zor. 

We learned early on that ISIS lost territory every time it faced 

a capable force backed by U.S. airpower. The first example of this 

was the battle over the Mosul Dam in 2014 where the Kurdish 

Peshmerga, backed by U.S. Special Operation Forces and U.S. air 

power, retook control of the Mosul Dam and handed ISIS its first 

defeat. 

The second example was Kobane. In October 2014, Secretary of 

State John Kerry indicated that preventing the fall of the Syrian 

town of Kobane to ISIS was not a strategic U.S. objective. As ISIS 

moved on Kobane, international media broadcasted ISIS maneuvers and artillery barrages on the city in broad daylight. ISIS was 

winning, and it was being televised. The administration, embarrassed by this, finally authorized U.S. Special Forces to partner 

with Peshmerga forces and call in airstrikes on ISIS, and ISIS was 

handed its second loss. 

The key lesson here that emerged from both Kobane and the 

Mosul Dam was that the clear and hold force was from the area 

and had a vested interest in fighting to keep ISIS out. The most 

important aspect of a clear and hold strategy that was tested and 

proved successful during the surge of 2007 in Iraq basically is that 

the force from the area has a vested interest in keeping it out. So 

the most important aspect of that strategy is to use local force, and 

it has to be empowered to keep ISIS out. It has to be empowered 

to do so. 

After Kobane and the Mosul Dam, operations to take back Tikrit, 

Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul in Iraq were done with predominantly Shia forces, with the support of IRGC militias. In other 

words, the ‘‘clear’’ phase has been touted as a success, but the 

‘‘hold’’ phase will not hold without Sunni forces empowered by their 

central government to protect Sunni areas. It is critically important 

that the ‘‘hold’’ force reflect local political dynamics for there to be 

success. This is not happening in Iraq or Syria. 

Obama and Trump have key differences in strategy, but also unfortunate similarities. The Obama Administration’s anti-ISIS strategy took away from the combatant commander the decision-making 

process, resulting in lost opportunities to kill and capture targets 

of opportunity. It publicly touted victories hours after successful 

raids against ISIS, killing the intelligence community’s ability to 

exploit ISIS networks and conduct follow-on raids, and it allowed 


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the IRGC Quds Force to increase its influence and presence in Iraq 

and Syria. 

The Trump Administration’s strategy has pushed resources and 

decision-making back to the combatant commander, restoring authorities to break the will of the enemy. It has expanded our Special Operations missions to kill and capture key ISIS and al-Qaeda 

leadership throughout the globe, and allowed the time for our intelligence agencies to exploit intelligence before touting success to the 

media and to the terrorist organizations themselves. When you tell 

a terrorist organization that you have effectively conducted a raid 

hours after that raid, they throw away their SIM cards and they 

go to the mattresses, and it sets back the intelligence community 

big time. 

One of the things, unfortunately, that the Trump Administration 

is continuing to do is it is continuing to stand by while the IRGC 

Kuds Force increases its influence and presence in Iraq and Syria. 

So now that ISIS has lost territory, challenges remain in holding 

liberated terrain with non-Sunni Arab forces. ISIS sought out 

ungoverned spaces in Iraq and Syria where disenfranchised Sunnis 

were oppressed by a sectarian government. That dynamic exists 

today in both Iraq and Syria. ISIS continues to seek out and operate in areas where Sunnis are distrustful of their government, be 

it sectarian, secular, or even Sunni. ISIS operates in the Sunni 

Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in Egypt’s Sinai, 

Yemen and Libya, and the list goes on. 

ISIS has lost territory but has not been defeated in Iraq and 

Syria. ISIS still operates in liberated areas, following the insurgent 

al-Qaeda model, as demonstrated by the two suicide attacks in 

Baghdad resulting in the loss of 38 personnel. The Institute for the 

Study of War has an ISIS control map. That map still shows ISIS 

operating in most areas declared liberated by the U.S. and Baghdad. 

Losing territory is phase one of many. The next phase is building 

and partnering with Sunni forces capable of effectively holding territory. These phases are the most important and are not likely to 

happen due to continued U.S. deference to Russia and Iran and 

Syria, and to Baghdad and Iran and Iraq. If this is not changed, 

we simply reset the conditions that led to ISIS to begin with. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Pregent follows:] 


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Testimony of 

Michael Pregent 

Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute 

on 

11Battlefield Successes and Challenges: Recent Efforts to 

Win the War Against ISIS11 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform's 

Subcommittee on National Security 

Wednesday, January 17, 2018 

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Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member lynch, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee 

on National Security, on behalf of the Hudson Institute, I am honored to testify before you 

today about the successes against ISIS, and the challenges that remain. 

Successes 

Both the Obama and Trump administrations achieved success against ISIS. Under President 

Obama, ISIS lost the Mosul Dam, was defeated trying to take the Kurdish town of Kobane in 

Syria; and lost control of Tikrit, Ramadi, and Fallujah in Iraq. Under President Trump, ISIS lost its 

caliphate capitals of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, and its stronghold of Deir ez-Zor. 

We learned early on that ISIS lost territory every time they've faced a capable ground force 

backed by US airpower. Two key examples of this happened early on in the campaign. 

The first example of this was the battle over the Mosul Dam in 2014. There, Kurdish Peshmerga 

forces backed by US Special Forces and US air power retook control of the Mosul Dam and 

handed ISIS its first defeat.1 

The second example was Kobane. 

In October 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry indicated that "preventing the fall of the Syrian 

town of Kobane to Islamic State fighters was not a strategic U.S. objective."2 Of course, Kobane 

was nothing if not strategic. A border town between Syria and Turkey, ISIS could have used it to 

profit from the black market oil trade and to facilitate foreign fighter flows in and out of Syria, 

not to mention that ISIS taking a Kurdish town while the world watched would help the terrorist 

army recruit. 

Such situations underscored the incoherent approach the Obama administration brought to 

their understanding of how to contain and roll back ISIS. Without a broader strategy, the U.S. 

struggled to articulate its role in fighting ISIS. 

As ISIS moved on Kobane, international media broadcasted ISIS maneuvers and artillery 

barrages on the city in broad daylight. Initially, Secretary Kerry did not see Kobane's strategic 

value in defeating ISIS. Then, the administration authorized US Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

to call in airstrikes in support of Kurdish fighters- but from this, ISIS quickly adapted to our 

targeting windows when it became clear the U.S. would not strike during the day. 

ISIS was allowed freedom of movement during the day- the group knew when we would hit, 

and when we wouldn't. 

1 Jethro Mullen and Susana Capelouto, "U.S. airstrikes critical in Mosul Dam capture," CNN, August 19, 2014. 

(http:(/www.cnn.com/2014/08/18/world/meast/iraq-mosul-dam/index.html) 

'Arshad Mohammed and lesley Wroughton, "The US Isn't Too Eager to Help Save Kobane From ISIS's Onslaught," 

Reuters, October 8, 2014. (http://www.businessinsider.com/us-is-not-eager-to-help-kurds-in-kobane-2014-10) 

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Eventually, ISIS's ability to reorganize its formations in Kobane during daytime hours 

embarrassed the administration and led to a partial reversal of the policy, allowing daytime 

strikes. But the incapacity for local commanders to make targeting decisions in the early stages 

of the fight against ISIS certainly enabled ISIS to take more territory. 

One crucial lesson that emerged from both Kobane and the Mosul Dam was that the key to 

success in both cases was that the "Clear and Hold" force was from the area and had a vested 

interest in fighting to keep ISIS out. The most important aspect of a "Clear and Hold" strategy is 

the Hold phase that keeps ISIS and future iterations from coming back, but only when its 

government empowers it to do so. 

After Kobane and Mosul Dam, the operations to take back Tikrit, Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul in 

Iraq were done with predominantly Shia forces in Sunni areas, which were the same forces that 

had lost that territory to begin with under Prime Minister Nouri ai-Maliki. In other words, the 

"Clear" phase has been touted as a success, but the "Hold" phase will not hold without Sunni 

forces empowered by their central government to protect Sunni areas. 

Obama and Trump Have Key Differences in Strategy, but Also Unfortunate Similarities 

The Obama administration's anti-ISIS strategy centralized decision making, resulting in lost 

opportunities to kill and capture targets of opportunity. It publicly touted victories hours after 

raids, killing the Intelligence Community's ability to exploit the ISIS network after a successful 

"JackPot"- meaning a key leader was captured or killed. And it allowed the IRGC Quds force to 

increase its influence and presence in Iraq and Syria. 

The Trump administration's strategy has pushed resources and decision making down to the 

combatant commander, expanded our special operations missions to kill and capture key ISIS 

and AI-Qaeda leadership, and allowed the time for our intelligence agencies to exploit 

intelligence before touting success to the media and to the terrorist organizations themselves. 

Unfortunately, the Trump administration has also continued to stand by while the IRGC Quds 

force increases its influence and presence in Iraq and Syria. 

PR Victory vs. Intelligence Win 

The key change between the Trump and Obama administrations' ISIS strategy is Strategic 

Patience when it comes to battlefield successes. 

The Obama administration showed more interest in gaining PR victories than in gaining tactical 

or strategic intelligence victories. One of the biggest shifts in President Obama's approach 

versus President Trump's approach is that, under President Trump, after high-value targets are 

killed, the military often waits up to two weeks to publicly announce the successful operation. 

This allows intelligence analysts to comb through the target's personal computer and effects, 

and to watch jihadi networks "light up" as the communication travels. This allows for follow-on 

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raids based on the communication patterns they saw. Typically, the actionable intelligence and 

patterns dies down after a couple of weeks. 

Under President Obama, however, immediate publicity of the killing was prioritized. After the 

Abu Sayyaf raid, for example, President Obama's Administration waited only a handful of hours 

to announce the killing and the specific details of the raid.3 Announcing the death of one of 

ISIS's top men immediately meant that ISIS leaders immediately burned their SIM cards and 

went to the mattresses- different mattresses, setting back intelligence efforts considerably. 

There's no better place to be than at the NSA after a raid to see a network light up- each 

selector with a geolocation our Special Operations Forces can strike. Under President Obama, 

this opportunity was repeatedly lost. 

ROE Differences 

The Trump Strategy has relaxed the rules of engagement, and this has accelerated ISIS's loss 

of territory. Targeting authority has been moved down to the combatant commander- the 

operational commander, who has the best sense of the tactical situation on the ground. This 

makes sense. Both Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and National Security Advisor H.R. 

McMaster were operational commanders who were trusted to make decisions without asking 

D.C. for permission. There would be no tactical hotline to the NSC under their watch. Targets of 

opportunity are being hit and again, without getting permission from thousands of miles away 

in the U.S. to conduct an attack. 

Indeed, their predecessors Leon Panetta and Robert Gates also voiced frustrations with 

Obama's National Security Council aides interfering in and micromanaging military decisions. 

Secretary Gates famously ripped out a phone line at the Joint Special Operations Command in 

Kabul that went straight to the NSC. "You get a call from the White House, you tell 'em to go to 

hell and call me."4 

It wasn't just interference. Obama-era rules of engagement (ROE) were very stringent, designed 

in part to avoid the potential loss of a pilot. The established framework was to strike targets at 

night, and only if there was a high certainty of hitting the right target while minimizing 

collateral damage. Furthermore, the Obama administration made the decision to avoid striking 

convoys carrying oil out of environmental concerns. Thus, ISIS was enabled to continue 

profiting enormously from the oil trade. The U.S. Treasury estimated ISIS made up to $500 

million a year from oil in 2015.5 

3 Juliette Kayyem, "Abu Sayyaf raid: Messing with the heads of ISIS," CNN, May 18, 2015. 

(http://www .cnn.com/20 15/05 I 18/ opi nions/kayyem-ab u-savvaf -isis-operation/index. htm I) 4 "Hagel's Predecessors Decried White House 'Micromanaging,"' NBC News, November 24, 2014. 

(https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/first-read/hagels·predecessors-decried-white-house-micromanagingn255231) 

5 Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing Daniel Glaser, "The Evolution ofTerrorism Financing: Disrupting the 

Islamic State," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 21, 2016. 

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This risk aversion meant that targets had to be cleared by the National Security Council (NSC). 

However, targets of opportunity often disappear within seconds, and many of these targeting 

opportunities were lost. Furthermore, ISIS was able to continue making enough money to 

sustain itself. Thus, ISIS maintained the ability to move assets and oil around without being hit. 

The Obama-era NSC employed a system of Centralized Targeting, which was fundamentally at 

odds with the windows of opportunity presented in which the U.S. could have incapacitated ISIS 

assets and leaders. This made prosecuting the fight against ISIS more difficult, as, to strike ISIS 

targets within the targeting window, approval authority must be at the ground level. 

Destroying Sunni Cities to "Liberate" them from ISIS 

The Rules of Engagement were relaxed when it came to taking back Ramadi. In 2015, Ramadi 

fell to 800 ISIS fighters as the numerically superior Iraqi Security Forces (IS F) withdrew. Ramadi 

had a population of 500,000 when the ISF withdrew and left it to 800 ISIS fighters, a number 

that later grew to 1,600. Eighty percent of Ramadi was destroyed in the ensuing campaign to 

retake the city, and the population became internally displaced refugees-all to defeat fewer 

than 1600 fighters.6 

This is not what liberation looks like- this is what the destruction of a Sunni city looks like. 

Unfortunately, it continued with the Mosul operation under President Trump. 

Mosul was left to ISIS for two and half years. ISIS was able to emplace sophisticated obstacle 

belts backed up by car bombs and snipers. They were able to wire buildings to explode, and 

took human shields. 

Mosul, a Sunni city with a population of 1.6 million at the beginning of the operation, was 

heavily destroyed, and its residents pushed into the internally displaced refugee camps-all for 

an estimated four-thousand ISIS fighters who were allowed years to prepare their destructive 

defenses.7 

The US and the ISF played a role in the destruction of Mosul as well. The coalition allowed IRGCIed militias to use crude artillery and rockets to indiscriminately target the city, and the 

(http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/theevolution-of-terrorism-financing-disrupting-theislamic-state) 

6 Tim Arango, "Key Iraqi City Falls to ISIS as Last of Security Forces Flree," The New York Times, May 17, 2015. 

(https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/18/world/middleeast/isis-ramadi-iraq.html) 

7 Peter Cook, various reporters (17 October 2016). Defense Department Briefing. Arlington, Virginia, United 

States: C-SPAN. Event occurs at 23:02. Archived from the original on 18 October 2016. Retrieved 17 

October 2016. The estimate [of ISL fighters in Mosul] I've seen was ... 3,000 to 5,000 . We've seen other numbers 

that are higher. 

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disproportionate use of force in President Trump's air campaign against ISIS saw our air force 

use 500 pound bombs in densely populated civilian areas against ISIS sniper positions. 

In the Old City of Mosul, ISIS's last stronghold in the city, there were an estimated sixtythousand civilians and 400 ISIS fighters in a 2km square area. The ratio for civilian to ISIS fighter 

was 150:1. The Old City of Mosul was completely destroyed. This is not counterinsurgency, 

nor is it victory over ISIS. At no time were the 300,000 Sunni military aged males in Mosul 

empowered by the Government of Iraq and the U.S. to resist and ultimately defeat an ISIS force 

of less than 5000. 

Where we are now 

Now that ISIS has been defeated militarily and has lost territory, challenges remain in holding 

that terrain-with a tenuous and opportunist force in Syria, and a sectarian one in Iraq-while 

striking ISIS wherever they pop-up. 

ISIS sought out ungoverned spaces in Iraq and Syria where disenfranchised Sunnis were 

oppressed by a sectarian government. That dynamic exists today in both Iraq and Syria. ISIS 

continues to seek out and operate in areas where Sunnis are distrustful of their governmentbe it sectarian, secular, or even Sunni. ISIS operates in the Sunni Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, 

in Egypt's Sinai, Yemen, and Libya-and they will continue to operate in Iraq and Syria and 

attempt to take back territory. 

1.) loss ofTerritory and Status 

Early successes by ISIS resulted in an increased flow of foreign fighters into Iraq and Syria. The 

loss of terrain had the opposite effect. The golden nugget here is that jihadists weren't rushing 

in to help the so-called caliphate after a loss- and those that were already there were trying to 

exit. These Bandwagon Jihadists were caught and executed by ISIS, along with ISIS fighters who 

lost territory. 

Now, ISIS has to rely on local recruits in Iraq and Syria -the only foreign fighters coming into 

Iraq and Syria are those sent by the IRGC's Quds Force. 

Early on, ISIS compensated for the loss of terrain by releasing Quentin Tarantino-like execution 

videos, adding affiliates that AI-Qaeda rejected like Boko Haram, conducting attacks in the 

West, and claiming credit for lone-wolf attacks across the globe. 

Now they are grasping at straws, attempting to take credit for anything that hints at a 

connection to the terrorist group, and even attacks with no connection to the group, like the 

Las Vegas shooting. ISIS, aware that they were grasping at straws and looking desperate, tried 

to distance itself after claiming credit for the failed subway suicide bomber in New York. 

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2.) Down but Not Out 

ISIS has lost territory, but has not been defeated in Iraq and Syria. ISIS still operates in liberated 

areas, following the "ai-Qaeda model." The ai-Qaeda model employs decentralized cells that 

recruit, intimidate, ransom hostages, assassinate, foment sectarian divisions, plan and execute 

targeted operations, and conduct high-profile attacks. 

The Institute for The Study of War ISIS control Map shows that ISIS is operating in the ai-Qaeda 

model in most areas declared "liberated" by the U.S. and Baghdad.8 

Obstacles to Success 

Losing territory is phase one of many: the next phase is building and partnering with local Sunni 

forces capable of effectively holding territory while U.S. Special Operations Forces {SOF) 

simultaneously conduct kill and capture missions based on actionable intelligence. The phases 

of government concessions, reconciliation, and the dismantling of sectarian militias in Iraq and 

Syria remain. 

These phases are the most important, and are not likely to happen due to continued U.S. 

deference to Russia and Iran in Syria, and to Baghdad and Iran in Iraq. If this does not change, 

we have simply reset the conditions that led to ISIS to begin with. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. 

Michael Pregent 

Adjunct Fellow, Hudson Institute 

8 "ISIS Sancutary: December 18, 2017," Institute for the Study of War, December 18, 2017. 

(https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/948237408897765376/photo/1) 

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Michael Pregent 

Mike Pregent is an adjunct fellow at Hudson Institute. He is a senior Middle East analyst, a 

former adjunct lecturer for the College of International Security Affairs, and a visiting fellow at 

the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. 

Pregent is a former intelligence officer with over 28 years experience working security, 

terrorism, counter-insurgency, and policy issues in the Middle East, North Africa, and 

Southwest Asia. He is an expert in Middle East and North Africa political and security issues, 

counter-terrorism analysis, stakeholder communications, and strategic planning. 

He spent considerable time working malign Iranian influence in Iraq as an advisor to Iraq's 

Security and Intelligence apparatus, including an embedded advisory role with Prime Minister 

Nouri ai-Maliki's extra-constitutional Office of the Commander-in-Chief. An office set up to 

ensure Iranian-backed Shia militia party control of Iraq's security and political process. 

Pregent served in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, served as a liaison officer in Egypt during the 

2000 Intifada, as a counter-insurgency intelligence officer at CENTCOM in 2001, and as a 

company commander in Afghanistan in 2002. 

Pregent served as an embedded advisor with the Peshmerga in Mosul 200S-06. Also, as a 

civilian SME working for DIA, he served as a political and military advisor to USF-1 focusing on 

reconciliation, the insurgency, and Iranian influence in Iraq from 2007-2011. He was a violent 

extremism and foreign fighter analyst at CENTCOM from 2011-2013. 

He holds a Masters in Strategic Public Relations from The George Washington University and is 

a graduate of the U.S. Army's Defense Language Institute in Modern Standard Arabic and 

Egyptian Dialect. 

Mike is a free-lance writer for the The Wall Street Journal and a contributing writer to the Daily 

Beast. 

Mike Pregent has numerous publications on ISIS, Iran's Qods Force, and on Syria and Iraq. His 

writings have been published in Foreign Affairs, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, 

Foreign Policy Magazine, The Tower Magazine, Long War Journal, New America Foundation, 

CNN, AI-Jazeera, Business Insider, and the Daily Beast. 

Mike frequently appears as an expert analyst on Shia militias, Iran, Iraq, and ISIS with 

appearances on BBC World News, MSNBC, AI-Jazeera International, CNN, CNN International, 

VOA Persia, and Fox News. 

8 
33 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Lohaus for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP LOHAUS 

Mr. LOHAUS. Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and 

honorable members of the Subcommittee on National Security, I 

am honored by the opportunity to testify before you today as you 

examine our nation’s recent efforts to defeat the Islamic State. 

My testimony will show that while the Obama Administration’s 

approach incrementally degraded the Islamic State’s grip on 

swaths of Iraq and Syria, the Trump Administration’s timely reforms have accelerated America’s gains against the Islamic State. 

I caution that these gains should not obscure the amount of work 

left to do to defeat ISIS and jihadist terrorist groups more generally. Doing so will require adjustments to our strategy, a few of 

which I will discuss today. 

In response to the rise of the Islamic State, President Obama 

took a measured and cautious approach to reestablishing Iraq’s internal security. He relied primarily on conducting limited air 

strikes and to putting a small cadre of Special Operators to build 

the capacity of the fledgling Iraqi armed forces. A similar though 

more restrictive approach characterized our efforts against ISIS in 

Syria. In both cases, partner forces did eventually grow more adept 

at fighting ISIS, but only after the latter had weakened significantly. 

The White House’s decision-making style impeded rapid progress 

against the Islamic State. This is without doubt. Their risk aversion, inefficient target nominations process and, above all, involvement in day-to-day operational and tactical decision-making added 

unnecessary friction to the decision-making process. These policies 

made for a time-consuming approach to a problem that required 

rapid responses. 

Despite this, one cannot deny that progress has been made in the 

fight against the Islamic State, particularly in Iraq and Syria. I 

would echo the comments made earlier by the Chairman and Ranking Member in that regard. The siege of Mosul resulted in the ouster of Islamic State from that city, as did the siege of Raqqa. As of 

October 2017, territory controlled by ISIS had shrunk to isolated 

pockets mostly along the Iraq-Syria border. 

None of this would have been possible without the valiant efforts 

of American troops and partner forces. Their efforts should be applauded. However, progress in the fight against ISIS may have occurred sooner, or its rise may have been prevented entirely if friction points between the military and its civilian leadership had not 

impeded America’s responsiveness. 

The Trump Administration has streamlined the executive decision-making process and authorized a more aggressive posture towards the Islamic State. For one, they appear much more willing 

to rely on the expertise of military advisers. This has made a difference. From personal experience, I have seen how empowering 

decision-makers and operators on the ground enhances operational 

responsiveness and increases joint and combined synergies and operations. 


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Trump has also signaled a willingness to dedicate more resources 

to the fight. He deployed, for example, 400 Marines and Army 

Rangers to Syria in advance of the siege of Raqqa, increased the 

pace of air strikes within U.S. Central Command, and approved the 

training of YPG fighters in Syria. These developments have been 

timely and appropriate. 

These successes aside, much more work remains to be done to 

defeat the Islamic State and other extremist groups around the 

globe. An effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond air 

strikes and Special Operations direct-action missions. The Administration is also yet to articulate U.S. policy toward a post-Islamic 

State Iraq and Syria. The danger remains that recent gains will be 

viewed as signs of total victory and therefore used as a reason to 

reduce America’s involvement in the region. Doing so would be pennywise but pound foolish. 

Defeating a group like ISIS and other jihadist groups will require 

more than just military victories on the battlefield. It will require 

a sustained commitment to our partners and allies and the creation 

of new ones. It will require an understanding of the ideological appeal of extremism and efforts to reduce that appeal. It will require 

a clever and coordinated application of all sources of national 

power. Above all, it will require an understanding of the long-term 

and ideological nature of this fight. 

There are several things that our political leadership and decision-makers could do to improve our global position vis-a-vis Islamic extremists. First, the White House should map out the role 

that individual agencies will play in implementing the counterjihadist terrorism provisions of the recent National Security Strategy. To name just two examples, the Department of State should 

redouble public diplomacy efforts that incorporate local partners 

whenever possible in vulnerable countries around the world. I 

would second Dr. Gorka’s attestation to taking a look at the Active 

Measures Working Group from the Soviet Union era, which gives 

a great example of how interagency groups can combat these types 

of threats. And the Department of Defense and intelligence agencies for their parts should emphasize the importance of military information support operations, human intelligence and Special 

Forces. Bombing campaigns and direct-action missions cannot succeed without or be replaced by the knowledge gained by these 

ground assets. 

For its part, Congress could consider revising U.S. code to better 

reflect the overlapping nature of government-wide counterterrorism 

efforts. 

It is accepted in the defense community that strategy equals 

ends plus ways plus means. Compared to jihadist groups, the 

United States does not want for means. If America’s goal is to 

move the needle from degrading ISIS to finally defeating it, the 

ways and ends, however, will require ongoing examination. 

I thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss these issues, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Lohaus follows:] 


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A .. l AMERICAN 

~ 

.. ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE 

Statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Govcmment Refonn 

Subcommittee on National Security -

On '·Battlefield Successes and Challenges: Recent Efforts to Win the War Against ISIS'' 

Moving the Needle from 

Degradation to Defeat 

Aligning Ends, Ways, and Means in the Fight Against the 

Islamic State 

PHILLIP LOHAUS 

Research Fellow 

17 January 2017 

The American Enterprise Institute {/\El) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 50 l (c ){3) educational organization <md docs 

n1)t tab: institutional positions on any issues. The views exprc~sed in this testimony are thosc~of1hc autlwr. 
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''Battlefield Successes and Challenges: Recent Efforts to Win the War Against ISIS'' 

Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch, and honorable members of the Subcommittee on 

National Security, I am honored by the opportunity to testifY before you today as you examine 

recent successes and challenges in our nation's effort to defeat the Islamic State. For the past five 

years, I have conducted research and published numerous articles on the evolving use of our 

nation's special operations forces, the intelligence community, and our national security strategy. 

I continue to work closely with military and civilian leaders to devise innovative and adaptive 

operational approaches for some of the most pressing threats facing the United States. My 

understanding of the international threat environment draws from prior service in the intelligence 

community, during which time I served as an embedded analyst with the US military in both Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

My testimony today will discuss the current state of the fight against the Islamic State and 

contrast the approaches of Presidents Obama and Trump. It will show that while both Presidents 

played a role in decimating the Islamic State's presence in Iraq and Syria, the processes and 

policies in place during Obama's tenure may have inhibited the pace of battlefield success. The 

refonns made by the Trump administration have been timely and correspond appropriately with 

t11e later stage of the fight they inherited from their predecessors. Whether this administration 

will resist the temptation to declare victory over the Islamic State and reduce America's presence 

in the Middle East remains an open question, as does the future of America's approach to 

countering Islamic extremism. Taking a realistic stock of the ends, ways, and means associated 

with the fight against the Islamic State is the first step to devising a long-term strategy to move 

from "degrading" it to finally "defeating" it. I conclude by providing a few thoughts on how the 

current administration may accomplish this. 

Carl von Clausewitz defined strategy as the "use of engagements for the object ofwar."1 Though 

now ubiquitous, the "ends+ ways+ means= strategy" formula was not put forth until1989. The 

elegance of the formula led to its widespread adoption, but its simplicity suggests an equal 

weight to each variable on the left side of the equation.2 As the ongoing struggle against 

comparatively resource-poor groups such as the Islamic State shows, the ways that resources are 

employed often explains more about strategic success than does a comparative enumeration of 

military equipment and tools. 

Ends, ways, and means of warfare are all impacted by policy decisions. The United States, 

compared to other countries and organizations, does not want for means. However, America has 

not always succeeded in aligning its stated goals with its willingness to employ the ways 

required to achieve victory. Sometimes, such as in Operation Iraqi Freedom, these imbalances 

have been corrected mid-campaign, but sometimes, as in Vietnam, they have not. Political will, 

friction within the national security establishment, and a short-term, crisis-oriented outlook have 

all affected America's ability to deliver strategic success, particularly in protracted low-intensity 

campaigns.3 Examining how national security resources are applied is thus critical to 

understanding how strategic misalignment impedes success. 

Since the conclusion of the prior administration, ends concerning ISIS have been refined, and 

additional means of military power have been made available for employment in the battlefield. 

Though significant gains in the battle against the Islamic State have been made, moving the 

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needle from degradation to defeat will require additional adjustments to the way America 

approaches the enemy, and above all, a greater understanding of the long-tem1 nature of the fight 

against Islamic extremism. To quote strategist B.H. Liddell Hart, "in strategy, the longest way 

round is often the shortest way home."4 

America's current position concerning the Islamic State is rooted in the context of the procedures 

employed during the prior administration, both in the field and in Washington. 

Not long after the drawdown of American troops in 2011, the Islamic State threatened to 

overwhelm Iraq's ability to defend itself, a development that was both politically inconvenient 

and, potentially, strategically disastrous to the United States. To square the circle, President 

Obama took a measured and cautious approach to re-establishing Iraq's internal security. The 

administration's methodology lay primarily in conducting airstrikes and deploying a small cadre 

of special operators to build the capacity of the fledgling Iraqi military. The administration 

would later take a similar approach to fighting ISIS in Syria. 

In the field, airstrikes were authorized against ISIS targets beginning in August of 2014. Though 

the air campaign initially focused on providing supplies to isolated groups such as theY azidis on 

Mount Sinjar, the number of munitions released by the US military and its coalition partners 

increased dramatically in the years to come5 Airstrikes thus quickly took a central role in the 

campaigu against ISIS, though American forces were not responsible for all of these airstrikes.6 

The administration exempted airstrikes against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria from collateral 

damage regulations/ but in practice, the theaters received differing treatment. In Iraq, the 

administration largely delegated targeting authority for airs trikes to the military. Strikes 

conducted in Syria, however, underwent additional scrutiny from the White House. 8 

Despite promises to not deploy additional ground troops to the Middle East, the Obama 

administration devised an approach that would eventually have American special operators on 

the ground in both Iraq and Syria. Guided by the principle that U.S. forces would act primarily to 

enable local forces rather than act in combat roles, the administration deployed 300 military 

advisers to Iraq in June 2014, a number that would grow to 5,200 by the end ofObama's second 

term.9 

In Iraq, special operations advisers faced strict limitations on engagement with the enemy, such 

that, initially, few left their headquarters base at all. Eventually, trainers were allowed to 

accompany smaller units into the field. However, American forces were still subject to highly 

restrictive rules of engagement, which curtailed their ability to join their trainees on many 

missions. Despite eventual successes in training Iraqi Special Forces, political infighting in the 

Iraqi government, the rise ofShi'a militias, and the size of the American trainer cadre hindered 

the wide-scale improvement to the Iraqi military that the administration had envisioned 

attaining. 10 The Iraqi military grew more adept at fighting ISIS, but only after the latter had 

weakened significantly. 

With respect to Syria, American forces were initially limited to training local fighters outside of 

the country. When this effort proved unsuccessful, if not counterproductive, a small number of 

American special operators were deployed to train Kurdish fighters inside of Syria. This 

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initiative, which originated and was advocated for years prior, proved highly successfuL Whether 

pursuing it earlier would have made a difference in the fight against ISIS, however, remains an 

open question, as deeper cooperation with the Kurds came with the risk of upsetting Turkey. 

In Washington, the White House's style of oversight complicated efforts to "degrade and defeat" 

ISIS. Some of the friction points between the west wing and subordinate agencies were hardly 

unique to the Obama administration. It is not uncommon, for example, for civilian leadership to 

place certain constraints on processes related to targeting. The magnitude of friction, however, 

was amplified by an emphasis on caution and an aversion to risk, an inefficient target 

nominations process, and, above all, the involvement of the National Security Council-and 

often the President himself-in day-to-day operational and tactical decision-making. The 

targeting process resulted in missed drone strike opportunities, which, outside of "areas of active 

hostilities," required explicit White House approval, and also reportedly increased the weight of 

political considerations in decisions affecting national security. 11 Most importantly, these 

processes would have impacted the ability of SOF to innovate and adapt to changing operational 

circumstances on the fly, undcm1ining the effectiveness of the instrument most central to the 

White House's approach to counterterrorism. 12 In short, the White House's decision-making 

style made for an incremental and laborious approach to a problem that required decisive and 

rapid responses to an enemy that was quickly metastasizing around the world. 

Despite these shortcomings, one cannot deny the progress made in the fight against the Islamic 

State, particularly in Iraq and Syria. The siege ofMosul, however delayed, resulted in the ouster 

of the Islamic State from that city, as did the siege ofRaqqa. As of October 2017, the overall 

territory controlled by ISIS had shrunk from a wide swath extending from central Syria to the 

outskirts of Baghdad to an isolated rump along the Iraq/Syria border. 

These successes would not have been achievable without the efforts of American forces on the 

ground and in the air. Their accomplishments on the battlefield deserve applause. It is worth 

asking, however, whether the degradation of ISIS would have occurred sooner-or its rise 

prevented entirely-if friction points between the military and its civilian leadership had not 

impeded America's responsiveness, and if the ends, ways, and means of strategy had been 

aligned more effectively. 

Although the pace of operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria accelerated under 

President Trump, 13 it would be disingenuous to attribute all of the recent successes in the fight 

against the Islamic State to the current administration-the siege of Mosul, after all, began prior 

to the 2016 election. Nonetheless, specific reforms that have taken place since that time have 

enhanced the ability of America and its coalition partners to eradicate the Islamic State from its 

former sanctuary. 

For one, the Trump administration's willingness to rely upon the expertise of military advisers 

contrasts with the more civilian-centric approach of the prior administration. Increased reliance 

on military expertise should not be viewed as a categorical positive, as an overreliance on advice 

of the military can erode the ability of civilians to oversee the military and lead to a discounting 

of other tools of national power. 14 Rules and constraints have a proper role in regulating military 

actions-including tactical ones. Once these rules are in place, however, devolving judgment to 

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lower levels of the hierarchy enhances operational responsiveness and allows for unforeseen 

synergies within the services, and also with interagency and international partners. 15 This is 

particularly important in the latter phases of conflict when the destruction of the enemy is in 

sight. In this sense, the Trump administration's change in approach was timely. 

The increased influence and autonomy of military advisers accompanied a more aggressive 

stance toward jihadist groups, both in Iraq and Syria, as well as further afield. For example, the 

President rescinded Obama-era regulations on drone strikes and loosened restrictions on how the 

military operated in Yemen. Trump also authorized the deployment of 400 Marines and Army 

Rangers to Syria, and approved arming the YPG, in advance of the siege ofRaqqa, and the 

number of airstrikes authorized by the administration in US Central Command's area of 

responsibility has increased dramatically. 16 When taken into accow1t with the streamlining of 

National Security Council involvement, these developments will aid in the military's ability to 

execute upon their commander's intent. 

In many respects, however, the current administration has simply amplified Obama's approach. 

They have streamlined processes, brought additional means to bear on the battlefield, and created 

space for operational and tactical innovation. Yet the fundamentals of their counterterrorism 

strategy remain similar to those of their predecessor, including an emphasis on the direct-action 

missions of special operations forces, drones, and airstrikes. Perhaps most importantly, like prior 

administrations, they have yet to devise a plan for what US policy toward a post-Islamic State 

Iraq and Syria should look like, or how US counterterrorism strategy writ large might be 

improved to move the needle from "degrade" to "defeat." 

Another danger, one that is hardly unique to this administration, is that recent gains will be 

viewed as signs of total victory, and therefore used as a reason to reduce America's involvement 

in the region. The decimation of the Islamic State's presence in Iraq and Syria represents just one 

battle in a much larger war against Islamic extremism. The Trump administration has accelerated 

the degradation ofiSIS that commenced during the Obama administration, but the Islamic State 

has not yet been "defeated." 

Defeating a group like ISIS and other instantiations oflslamic extremism will require more than 

just military victories on the battlefield. It will require a sustained commitment to our partners 

and allies, and the creation of new ones. It will require an understanding of the ideological appeal 

of extremism, and efforts to reduce that appeal. It will require the use of all tools of national 

power, orchestrated in a manner that facilitates adaptation and innovation, and alignment towards 

clearly articulated ends. Above all, it will require that, if our goal is to extinguish the power and 

lure of extremist groups, political leaders are honest with themselves and their constituents about 

the need for an extended commitment to these endeavors. 

The United States is at a strategic crossroads concerning its fight against Islamic extremism. The 

path of least resistance would be to declare victory over ISIS and reduce our presence in the 

Middle East. This course of action would likely open new opportunities for ISIS and similar 

groups to reconstitute, and could potentially create the need for the United States to intervene, 

with significant cost of lives and treasure, at some point in the future. Alternatively, the United 

States could maintain or expand its efforts to support regional security in the Middle East and 

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beyond. Cost-wise, this choice would forego small savings today for larger savings tomorrow. 

The prudent choice is clear. 

In a concrete sense, there are a few measures that the United States could take to help move the 

needle from "degrade" to "defeat." First, we should develop a blueprint that articulates explicitly 

how individual agencies and partners should pursue the countcr-jihadist terrorism provisions in 

the recent National Security Strategy. For its part, Congress could significantly enhance the 

effectiveness of such a blueprint by revising US Code that governs agency authorities (e.g., 

Titles I 0, 50, and 22) to better reflect the overlapping nature of government-wide 

counterterrorism efforts. 17 Jihadist groups benefit from their size and structure, which permits 

flexible and nimble responses that challenge the ability of America to respond quickly and 

effectively, Revising US Code would be a first step toward mitigating this advantage. 

Second, the US should reassert its commitment to diplomatic initiatives in the Muslim world. 

Specifically, it should redouble efforts to counter violent extremism, particularly concerning the 

development of compelling counter-narratives. Sophisticated public diplomacy efforts, especially 

online, and through third parties when possible, will be critical to winning the ideological war 

against Islamic extremists. American diplomats should continue to work with partners in other 

countries to devise bespoke strategies for particular contexts, settings, and mediums. 

Third, the US should take a hard look at the disposition of its intelligence and special operations 

personnel around the globe, and consider whether current allocations and positioning align with 

the ideological nature of the fight. Emphasis should be placed on military information support 

operations, human intelligence, and Special Forces, as bombing campaigns and direct-action 

missions cannot succeed witl1out, or be replaced by, the knowledge gained by ground assets. 

These elements should expand efforts to foster long-tern1 relationships with key partners, and 

continue to build the capacity of our allies to eradicate extremism within their borders. The 

resources brought to bear by these frequently overlooked professionals are particularly well 

suited to creating strategic advantages before extremist organizations grow to the point where 

direct action is required. The Islamic State made many counterproductive choices on its road to 

failure; the United States should develop ways to compel them and other extremist groups to 

continue to make decisions that lead to their own demise. It is time for America to think two 

steps ahead. 

To summarize, the United States has made significant battlefield gains against the Islamic State 

in Iraq and Syria. Still, a danger remains that these successes will distract from the amount of 

work left to effectively counter Islamic extremism around the globe. Though the framework 

created by President Obama to counter ISIS manifested in gradual achievements, friction 

emanating from the White House delayed and presented significant complications to battlefield 

success. The Trump administration has taken action to address the missteps of their predecessors, 

and loosened the reigns of the military in conjunction with the heightened pace of operations that 

the recent battles against ISIS have required. 

Moving forward, the Trump administration should carefully consider the ends, ways, and means 

pertaining to its efforts to counter Islamic extremism. With respect to ends, it should consider 

whether the true goal of US policy is to eradicate ("defeat") Islamic extremism or to simply 

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mitigate or minimize ("degrade") it.lfthe current administration's goal is to defeat it, I hope that 

I have provided several recommendations today that demonstrate how we might go about 

optimizing the employment of the American people's resources. I thank the committee for the 

opportunity to discuss these issues and look forward to your questions. 

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1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Indexed Edition, trans. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, 2 See Jeffrey W. Meiser, "Ends+ Ways+ Means= (Bad) Strategy," Parameters 46, no. 4 (Winter 

2017 20 16), https://ssi.arrnywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues!Winter _ 2016-17/10 _Meiser. pdf. 3 See Phillip Lohaus, "A Missing Shade of Gray: Political Will and Waging Something Short of 

War," War on The Rocks, January 11,2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/0l/a-missing-shade-ofgray-politica1-will-and-waging-something-short-of-war/ The piece discusses how these dynamics 

impact political will to fight in the gray zone, but much of the analysis is extendable to other kinds of 

conflict. 

4 B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, Reprint Edition (Pentagon Press, 2012), 25. 5 In 2014, according to the Combined Forces Air Component Command, from the initiation of 

airstrikes in August 2014 to December 2014,6,292 coalition weapons were released as part of 

Operation Inherent Resolve. Those numbers increased to 28,696 and 30,743 in 2015 and 2016, 

respectively. Taking into account the shorter reporting period in 2014, the rate of munitions releases 

more than doubled from 2014 to 2015, and increased slightly in 2016. 6 In December 2016, the White House reported that the US had conducted 16,000 airs trikes against 

the Islamic State. See Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Administration's Approach 

to Counterterrorism" (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, December 6, 2016), 

https :// obamaw hitehouse. archives. gov /the-press-office/2 0 16/12/06/remarks-presidentadministrations-approach-counterterrorism. 

7 Jim Acosta and Kevin Liptak, "White House Exempts ISIS Strikes from Civilian Casualty 

Guidelines," CNN, October 2, 2014, http://edition.cnn.com/2014/1 0/01/politics/wh-isis-civilians/. 8 Julian Barnes and Carol Lee, "Obama Plans to Tightly Control Strikes on Syria," Wall Street 

Journal, September 17,2014, sec. Middle East, https://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-u-s-militarycommanders-discuss-fight-against -islamic-state-141 0969352?mg=prodlaccounts-wsj. 9 Mark Gordon and Michael Landler, "U.S. to Send Up to 300 Military Advisers to Iraq," New York 

Times, June 19, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/20 14/06/20/us/obama-to-address-nation-on-iraqcrisis.html; Molly Hennessy-Piske, "Americans Adjust to a Changed Role in Iraq," Los Angeles 

Times, December 16,2016, http://www.latimes.com/worldlmiddleeast/la-fg-americans-iraq20 161217 -story.html. 10 See Ned Parker and Jonathan Landay, "U.S. Falters in Campaign to Revive Iraqi Army, Officials 

Say," Reuters, June 3, 2016, sec. World News, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisisiraq-cxclusive/exclusive-u-s-falters-in-campaign-to-revive-iraqi-army-officials-sayidUSKCNOYP2DO. 

11 In his memoir, Leon Panetta, White House staff would "regularly put politics over the advice of 

intelligence and military advisers. See Leon Panetta and Jim Newton, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of 

Leadership in War and Peace, Reprint edition (New York: Penguin Books, 2015); David Ignatius, 

"A CIA Director and Defense Secretary Uncensored," Washington Post, October 6, 2014, sec. 

Opinions, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinionslbook-review-leon-panettas-worthyfights/2014/l 0/06/ed517c6e-4d70-ll e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d _story.html. 12 As the military's primary sources of innovative and adaptive operational thinking, special 

operations forces are most effective when allowed to execute on a commander's intent with minimal 

outside involvement. See Phillip Lohaus, A Precarious Balance: Preserving the Right Mix of 

Conventional and Special Operations Forces (American Enterprise Institute, 2014). 13 Karen DeYoung, "Under Trump, Gains against ISIS Have 'Dramatically Accelerated,"' 

Washington Post, August 4, 2017, sec. National Security, 

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/under-trump-gains-against-isis-havedramatically-accelerated/20 17 /08/04/8ad29d40-7958-11 e7 -8f39-eeb7d3a2d304 story.html. 14 The proper relationship between civilians and the military, as well as how to cl1aracterize its 

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current state, is the subject of much academic debate. For a summary of some foundational 

arguments in the context of the current presidency, see Sara Plana, "Civil-Military Relations Under 

President Trump," Newsletter, precis Student Piece (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Fall 

20 17), http://cis.mit.edu/publications/newsletter/civil-military-relations-under-president-trump; for 

more recent treatments of the subject, see also Janine Davidson, Emerson Brooking, and Benjamin 

Fernandez, "Mending the Broken Dialogue" (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, December 

2016), https://www.cfr.org/report/mending-broken-dialogue; and Jim Mattis and Kori N. Schake, 

eds., Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military (Stanford, California: Hoover 

Institution Press, 2016). 15 This was the central argument of Stanley McChrystal, whose approach to the special operations 

forces and intelligence officers under his command (of which this author was one) that resulted in the 

now ubiquitous "fusion" of many sources into a common operating picture. See General Stanley 

McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, Reprint edition (Portfolio Trade, 2014). 16 Note that recent airstrike increases have occurred concurrently with a higher operations tempo. See 

United States Department of Defense, "AFCENT Airpower Summary'' (United States Air Forces 

Central Command- Combined Air Operations Center, November 30, 2017), 

http://www.afcent.af.mil/Portals/82/Documents/Airpower%20summary/Airpower%20Summary%20-

%20November%202017.pdf?ver=2017-12-14-053557-530. 

17 Andru E. Wall, "Demystizying the Title I 0-Title 50 Debate," Harvard Law School National 

Security .Journa/3 (December 2011), http://www.soc.mil/528thiPDFs/TitlelOTitle50.pdf. 

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Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Witness Disclosure Req nirement- "Truth in Testimony" 

Pursuant to House Rule XI, clause 2(g)(5) and Committee Rule 16(a), non-governmental witnesses are required to provide the Committee w

information requested below in advance of testifYing before the Committee. You may attach additional sheets if you need more space. 

Name: 

to the best of my knowledge. 

Date: 1/ 'if / 'JA]'{ 

r I Page j_ o
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Phillip Lohaus is a research fellow in the Marilyn Ware Center for Security Studies at the 

American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he blends practical experience gained from 

serving in the intelligence community with a broad interest in emerging foreign military 

capabilities. His current research focuses on the unconventional and emerging national 

security challenges posed by Russia, Iran, China, and the Islamic State. In addition to 

numerous reports and articles, he is the author of a forthcoming book in which he 

explores how America's adversaries gain strategic advantage in the space between war 

and peace. 

Before joining AEI, Mr. Lohaus served as an analyst with the Department of Defense and 

the Multi-National Force- Iraq. He was also embedded with the US Army in eastern 

Afghanistan, where he supported the counterterrorism efforts of US Special Operations 

Command. While in government, he focused on counterproliferation, counterterrorism, 

and economic security issues related to the Middle East. 

Mr. Lohaus' writings have appeared in a variety of publications, including The Hill, PBS 

News Hour, The National Interest, and US News & World Report. At AEI, he has 

conducted studies on foreign denial and deception capabilities and on the balance 

between special operations and conventional forces. He has also served as the executive 

director of AEI's American Internationalism Project. His awards include a Joint Civilian 

Service Commendation Medal from USSOCOM. 

A graduate of the University of Florida, Mr. Lohaus holds an M.A. in Strategic Studies 

from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins 

University. 
46 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. 

Dr. Pape, 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT ANTHONY PAPE, JR. 

Mr. PAPE. Thank you very much for having me. There is a 

slideshow that will be starting in just a moment. 

ISIS has been effectively defeated as a territorial entity in Iraq 

and Syria, a military victory that makes America safer. This military victory is due not to any one person or any one president. This 

is America’s victory due to the steadfastness of the American people; our superb military, diplomacy, and intelligence agencies; our 

regional allies like Qatar that provided an air base for our bombers; large ground forces in Iraq and Syria; and an international coalition that has grown every year since 2014. 

Next slide, please. 

The key to our success was the application of a consistent hammer and anvil strategy. In effect, Western air power and local 

ground power worked together like a hammer and anvil to smash 

ISIS to bits, while Special Forces and intelligence coordinated the 

effort. 

Next slide. 

Our hammer and anvil strategy progressively succeeded over 

three years and over three phases under the leadership of two 

presidential administrations. 

Next slide. 

Phase 1, the containment of ISIS expansion, occurred in the fall 

of 2014. Once ISIS surprised the world by taking Mosul, the most 

urgent problem was to prevent ISIS from going further to seize oil 

fields and other resources in Iraq that could have vastly increased 

the group’s power and threat. The Obama Administration reacted 

quickly and decisively, leading a coalition to use air power like a 

hammer to smash numerous ISIS military offensives and contain 

it. 

Next slide. 

Phase 2, rollback, began in early 2015. The coordination of air 

power and ground power produced results almost immediately, 

with large portions of ISIS territory falling by the summer. 

Next slide. 

Rollback was nearly complete in Iraq by the time administrations 

changed. As you can see, by February 2017 our coalition had seized 

about two-thirds of Mosul, the heart of ISIS in Iraq, controlling the 

large grey areas to the west. 

Next slide. 

By the end of the Obama Administration, over half of ISIS-controlled territory had been liberated, the large green areas. Equally 

important, these two years established the essential mobilization 

and coordination of Kurdish and Iraqi government forces that 

would enable the final push in Phase 3. So when the Trump Administration took office, ISIS was losing fast, and America’s coalition was a well-oiled machine, in a position to finish off the group. 

Next slide. 

Phase 3 was the final push in Syria that completed ISIS’ defeat 

as a territorial entity. What exactly changed under the Trump Administration? Two things, one good and one problematic. The good 


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change was cooperating tacitly with the Russians and the Syrian 

government so that the Kurdish-led forces could take Raqqa and 

other areas north of the Euphrates while Syrian government forces 

could take Palmyra and the area to the south of the river. This 

change made America’s strategy of hammer and anvil more effective in Syria and accelerated ISIS loss of territory there. 

Next slide. 

The problematic change was over-escalation of air power. As this 

slide shows, both the escalation of air strikes and spikes in civilian 

casualties related to the coalition’s air strikes occurred within 

weeks of the new administration. The sharp increase in civilian 

casualties is not just a moral issue. These casualties pose a strategic threat to the United States because they significantly amplify 

the propaganda that ISIS and other terrorist groups rely on to inspire people to attack America. Let’s see how they do it. 

Next slide. 

Just last November, ISIS released Flames of War 2, a video targeting Westerners with powerful segments focused on how the escalation of bombing has killed children, and the group calls for revenge. 

Please show the video. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. PAPE. Under the Obama Administration, we saw similar 

ISIS video propaganda related to drone strikes which was leveraged to justify attacks against the West, but nothing this extreme. 

Sir, if I may just have 20 more seconds? 

Mr. DESANTIS. Twenty, all right. 

Mr. PAPE. The next slide. 

The main danger for the future is that we declare victory and 

walk away. ISIS remains a threat. The root cause is not just ISIS’ 

ideology but its power to take advantage of political grievances and 

the disenfranchisement of millions of Sunnis. Without a political 

strategy to address this problem, a new ISIS 2.0, worse than the 

past, could emerge. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Pape follows:] 


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1 

Robert A. Pape, PhD 

Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago 

Director of the University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats 

Testimony to the National Security Subcommittee for the US House Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform 

Capitol Hill, January 17, 2018 

Thank you for having me. 

Let me begin with a summary of my key points. 

As of today, ISIS has been defeated as a territorial entity in Iraq and Syria, 

since the group controls less than 3 percent of its former territory. This military 

victory makes America safer. 

This military victory is due not to any one person or any one President. 

This is America's victory- due to the steadfastness of the American people and 

the superb execution of policy by our military and many parts of the US 

government. This is a victory for the Iraqi and Syrian people- whose forces and 

people endured many thousands killed and many more injured, mostly at the 

hands of ISIS, without buckling. This is an Allied victory- where regional partners 

like Qatar provided an airbase for US B-52 bombers and international partners in 

Europe and elsewhere committed critical over-the-horizon resources and power. 

This international coalition has grown every year since 2014. 

The primary key to success was the application of a consistent hammer and 

anvil strategy, which was executed over three years and over three phases under 

the leadership of the United States spanning two Presidential administrations. 

The Trump administration was key for the final push in Syria, but certain 

aspects of the campaign have fueled ISIS propaganda to inspire attacks against 

America. 

Our military strategy was a classic case of "hammer-and-anvil," where US 

and Western airpower, special forces and intel worked by, with, and through local 

ground partners. In essence, Western-led airpower, the hammer, and local 

ground power, the anvil, worked together to smash ISIS between them. 

Our hammer and anvil strategy was executed over three phases. Phase 1 

involved the successful containment of ISIS expansion in the fall 2014. Phase 2 
49 


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2 

was successful rollback of ISIS from Iraq and large parts of Syria, which occurred in 

2015-Spring 2017. Phase 3 was the final push, completing the military defeat of 

ISIS as a territorial entity in Syria. The next set of maps will show the progressive 

success of our hammer and anvil strategy. 

The containment of ISIS expansion in fall 2014. Once ISIS surprised the 

world by quickly taking Mosul, the most urgent problem was to prevent ISIS from 

going further to seize oil fields and other strategic resources like dams in Iraq, 

because even partial control of these resources could have vastly increased the 

group's power and threat. The Obama administration reacted quickly and 

decisively, leading a coalition to use air power, like a hammer, to smash 

numerous ISIS military offensives and contain it. The Obama administration also 

put US boots on the ground in Syria. This was required to properly work by, with, 

and through our partners on the ground to set conditions for rollback in phase 2 

and the final push in phase 3. 

Phase 2, rollback, occurred in Iraq and Syria from 2015 to May 2017. This 

phase occurred mostly under the Obama administration and continued under the 

Trump administration. It involved detailed coordination of air strikes and local 

ground forces, mainly with the Kurds in Syria and Iraq as well as Iraqi government 

forces. Together with our allies, America sequentially liberated Kobane in Syria in 

2015, Ramadi in Iraq in spring 2016, and then Mosul. 

Rollback was nearly complete in Iraq by the time the administrations 

changed. Mosul was the heart of ISIS in Iraq. As you can see, by February 2017, 

our Coalition had seized about 2/3rds of the city- the large areas to the we~t of 

the Tigris River- and we were already advancing from the airport to take the 

remaining third of the city. 

ISIS suffered major losses by the end of the Obama administration. By the 

end of 2016, overall, over half of ISIS-controlled territory had been liberated. 

Equally important, these two years represent not only the degradation of ISIS 

territory in Syria and Iraq, but also the essential mobilization and coordination of 

local allies, particularly the Kurdish forces in Syria and Iraq as well as Iraqi 

government ground forces that would enable the final push in phase 3. The 

critical coordination between US and local partners in Iraq and northern Syria was 

established in 2015. So, when the Trump administration took office, ISIS was 
50 


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3 

losing fast and America's coalition was a well-oiled machine, in a position to finish 

off the group. 

Phase 3, the final push in Syria, occurred from spring to fall2017. By 

December 2017, there was virtually no ISIS control in significant areas in Syria as 

both US-allied ground forces and Syrian government forces independently 

controlling nearly all previous ISIS territory, essentially on different sides of the 

Euphrates River Valley. 

Phase 3 completed ISIS's defeat as a territorial entity. The Trump 

administration took steps that accelerated this phase. 

So, what exactly changed? Two things, one good, one problematic. The 

good change was cooperating tacitly with the Russians and Syrian government, so 

that the Kurd ish-led forces could take Raqqa and other area north of the 

Euphrates River, while Syrian government forces could take Palmyra and the area 

south of the river. This change made America's strategy of hammer and anvil 

more effective in Syria and accelerated ISIS loss of territory there. De-conflicting 

air power efforts with Russia was also important. As our respective ground allies 

neared each other, this brought Russian and Coalition air power closer together. 

This detailed coordination avoided problems and facilitated success. 

The problematic change was over-escalation of air power. Both the 

escalation of airstrikes and spike in civilian casualties related to airstrikes occurred 

within weeks of the new administration. 

The sharp increase in civilian casualties is not just a moral issue. These 

casualties pose a strategic threat to the United States, because they significantly 

amplify the propaganda that ISIS and other terrorist groups rely on to inspire 

people to attack America. This propaganda can be powerful. 

Just last Nov 29, ISIS released "Flames of War II," a video targeting 

Westerners with powerful segments focused on how the escalation of bombing 

has killed children in ugly ways and the group calls for revenge. Under the 

Obama administration, we saw similar ISIS video propaganda related to drone 

strikes, which was leveraged to justify attacks against the West. But, nothing this 

extreme. 

The main danger for the future is that we declare victory and walk away. ISIS 

remains as a threat because its remnants in Iraq, Syria, and many other countries 
51 


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4 

can use propaganda to inspire attacks against America. Further, the root cause 

of ISIS's power is not just ideology, but the exploitation of political grievances and 

disenfranchisement of millions of Sunnis. ISIS took advantage of these before, just 

as its predecessor, AI Qaeda in Iraq took advantage of the turmoil after we 

toppled Saddam. And without a political strategy to address Sunni 

disenfranchisement, a new ISIS 2.0 could emerge. 

I am delighted to answer your questions. 
52 


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53 


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ROBERTPAPE 

Professor 

Robert A. Pape is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago specializing in 

international security affairs. His publications include Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion o.lGlobal 

Suicide Terrorism and Hov·: to Stop It (Chicago 20 l 0) (with James Feldman); Dying to Win: The 

Strategic Logic ofSuicide Terrorism(Random House 2005); Bombing to Win: Air Power and 

Coercion in War (Comell1996), "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International 

Security (1997), "The Detern1inants of International Moral Action," International 

Organization (1999); "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," American Political Science 

Review(2003); and "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security (2005). His 

commentary on international security policy has appeared in The New York Times, Washington 

Post, New Republic, Boston Globe, Los Angeles Times, and Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, as well 

as on Nightline, ABC News, CBS News, CNN, Fox News, and National Public Radio. Before 

coming to Chicago in 1999, he taught international relations at Dartmouth College for five years 

and air power strategy for the USAF's School of Advanced Airpower Studies for three years. He 

received his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1988 and graduated summa cum laude and 

Phi Beta Kappa fi"om the University of Pittsburgh in 1982. His current work focuses on the 

causes of suicide tenorism and the politics of unipolarity. He is the director of the 
54 

Mr. DESANTIS. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for 5 minutes. 

Looking forward, one of the reasons why ISIS was able to inspire 

folks in this country via social media was because of the existence 

of this caliphate. People actually thought that was a romantic concept. So, Mr. Pregent, do you think, having broken the caliphate— 

obviously, people can still be inspired, but do you think that that 

is helpful in combatting the inspiration for terrorism here at home 

and in places like Western Europe? 

Mr. PREGENT. Thank you for the question. What we saw early 

on, when ISIS had success, the foreign fighters were coming into 

Iraq and Syria. But after a defeat or a loss of territory, that foreign 

fighter flow stopped. It ebbed. Foreign fighters tried to leave the 

caliphate. They were captured. They were executed by ISIS, and 

ISIS fighters who had actually lost territory were being executed 

by ISIS as well. 

So what we saw early on was that the brand attracted people to 

the caliphate when it was successful, and when it lost territory 

that flow started to ebb. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Dr. Gorka, when I was in Iraq back in ’07, ’08, 

we had pretty restrictive rules of engagement. I think that was 

under Bush. Under Obama, I think it was similar or even more restrictive. Was there an effort to obviously delegate to the commanders but say, look, fighting with one hand tied behind your 

back is just not going to do the job, we need adequate rules of engagement so we can actually win? 

Mr. GORKA. Absolutely, absolutely. There are, on the unclassified 

side, one can find stories of ISIS targets not being engaged because 

the individual who has eyes on the pilot or what-have-you was not 

allowed to engage unless somebody in Washington had given him 

the all-clear from the Obama Administration. 

During Vietnam we had something called the 8,000-mile screwdriver. It got even worse under the Obama Administration because 

that decision, once you have been trained at the cost of millions of 

dollars, taxpayer dollars, whether you are an A–10 pilot, whether 

you are a Special Forces detachment leader, the decision to engage 

the enemy once you have the requisite intelligence should be taken 

by that military professional, not by a civilian staff who is sitting 

in the NSC or somebody watching a video screen in the DOD. 

So, yes, the operators who I had the honor of working with have 

said they were given the due recognition to execute the mission as 

they had been trained to do, which not only makes America more 

successful operationally but also has a requisite effect on the morale of all our fighting forces, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Mr. Pregent, don’t we need to, at this point, 

though, support people like the Kurds more robustly than we have 

under either Obama or so far under the Trump Administration? 

Mr. PREGENT. We do. The Kurdish Peshmerga of Iraq have been 

an ally since the beginning, since we entered Iraq. We actually entered Iraq in Kurdish areas, and they have been instrumental to 

not only defeating ISIS but also defeating al Qaeda during the 

surge effort and the initial phase of the Iraq war. 

What has happened, unfortunately, under this administration is 

our Kurdish allies have been abandoned. After President Trump’s 


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October 13th speech declaring that the IRGC in its entirety would 

be declared a terrorist organization based on its support for Qasem 

Soleimani’s Kuds Force, within hours Qasem Soleimani used his 

Shia militias—and they had access to U.S. tanks and equipment— 

to move on Kurdish spaces. We should have done something about 

that. It sent a loud message to our Kurdish allies, but it also sent 

a loud message to Qasem Soleimani. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I think it also hurts our national prestige when 

you have people like Soleimani that have a lot of American blood 

on their hands attacking an ally like the Kurds with American 

equipment left over from the Iraq campaign. We have to do a lot 

better than that. 

The President, I think, has rightfully spoken out in favor of the 

protesters in Iran. What more do we need to do? Because when you 

are talking about fighting Sunni Islamic jihadism, one of the problems I had with the Obama Administration is as they were doing 

that, they did do some good things, they were passively empowering the Iranians on the ground in places like Iraq. We cannot do 

that. 

So we need to support the protesters. What else should the Administration be doing? 

Mr. PREGENT. Well, the good thing about this protest, initially it 

started off as an economic protest, but then it started complaining 

about the adventurism from the IRGC Kuds Force, the fact that 

the regime was using that windfall of money it received from the 

JCPOA, the Iran deal, to actually export terrorism, to destabilize 

Iraq, to further destabilize Syria, to destabilize Lebanon and 

Yemen. So what we should do is we should go after the IRGC Kuds 

Force in Syria, in Iraq. We can sanction the Supreme Leader’s vast 

fortune, his network that he set up of shadow companies to skirt 

sanctions. Upwards of $86 billion goes unsanctioned that the Supreme Leader has access to, to conduct these operations with the 

IRGC and the Kuds Force. 

We should also listen to what they are complaining about. They 

are complaining about the Basij. The Basij is the most unpopular 

directorate in the IRGC. It is the organization that makes you disappear at night if you protest the government. There are a lot of 

things we should do. We should encourage our Iraqi allies to increase their Internet bandwidth to allow messages to get out of 

Iran. We should also do that with other neighbors that border Iran, 

basically hold the regime accountable for pressure on the Iranian 

people, but also pressure our European allies to voice their concerns. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Our time is up, but I think 100 percent we need 

to be doing that, and I would just say before I yield to the gentleman that ISIS is not the sum total of militant Islamic terrorism. 

It is a part of it. There are other Sunni jihadist groups, and then 

the Iranian-inspired Shia jihadist groups. This is a good step. We 

have to do more. 

God bless those people fighting off that Iranian regime. If they 

could do something there, that would be such a positive environment. But we are going to continue to have to deal with this problem in the United States and in places like Western Europe. I am 

concerned about Las Vegas, the lack of information. ISIS claimed 


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credit for that. We have no evidence either way, but no evidence 

on anything bothers me, and ISIS typically when they claim these 

things, they typically are borne out. So that is a very, very important thing to know exactly which attacks are being inspired by 

ISIS. 

With that, I will yield to Mr. Lynch. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree on the point of 

supporting our allies in northern Iraq, in Kurdistan. I think more 

can be done. I agree with Mr. Pregent’s testimony. 

As a member of this committee, a lot of us have been to Iraq 

multiple times. I have been there 20 times with my Republican colleagues going back to 2002, 2001, to the present. One of the most 

remarkable changes that I can see from my early trips is that back 

in the day we had 165,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq. That 

was about our peak, 165,000. The one huge change that I think the 

Obama Administration brought about was that he compelled the 

Kurds and the Iraqi government in Baghdad to take responsibility 

and to carry the fight. 

You can see it in the casualty numbers in the fight against ISIS, 

several thousand Kurdish Peshmerga casualties, 10,000 Iraqi National Army casualties, and thankfully far, far fewer U.S. casualties. 

The change there, though, will not remain if we don’t support the 

incumbent government and empower the local government to prevent the next iteration, as I think Mr. Pregent and all of the witnesses have said. We have to prevent the next iteration of ISIS 

from taking hold. 

It appears to me, Dr. Pape—and thank you for your great presentation—supporting the State Department is a key part of making 

sure that the Iraqi government that is in power now that has driven out ISIS, including the Kurdish authority in northern Iraq, that 

they are empowered really to provide services to those areas that 

they have liberated. That, I think, will be very important. Can you 

talk about that, please, Dr. Pape? 

Mr. PAPE. Yes, sir. We need a political strategy to win the peace. 

We have won a military victory. That is only half the battle. The 

task in front of us is the key fight, the real fight, which is winning 

the peace. In order to do that, we need a political strategy, and I 

would just expand on your points for just a little bit. 

Number one, we need a political strategy that prevents score settling from undermining the military victories we have just 

achieved. You are hearing from Mr. Pregent that we have other instances of score settling that could easily take hold. So if we just 

walk away and say, ‘‘Oh, yes, let’s let them deal with this themselves,’’ this is ripe for score settling across the board. 

Number two, we need, as you said, direct support so that the 

military victory can be backed up with economic strategies, economic policies to empower especially Sunnis, who actually are the 

heart of the problem that we have. When we toppled Saddam back 

in 2003, we didn’t just knock off an evil dictator. We basically created a situation of massive ungoverned space, and the Sunni part 

of Iraq was the worst. And then with the Arab Spring, this spread. 

Now we had more ungoverned space in Syria, and the problem is 

the Sunnis need a voice in their own future. It is not enough to put 


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them back under a repressive regime, and we need a political strategy to do that. 

The third thing is we need to mediate more the Sunni/Shia divide. This is in Iraq, this is in Syria. The Alawites are Shia, of 

course, as you all know. But in Yemen we have a proxy war effectively going on between the Saudis and the Iranians inside of 

Yemen, and if we just let that go, if we don’t mediate that, what 

is going to happen is we are going to have enormous pools of 

ungoverned space for those millions of Sunnis, which is just going 

to be ripe for ISIS 2.0 to take hold. 

So we really need a political strategy, sir, to win the peace. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

Mr. Pregent, I want to go back to one point that you made which 

I thought was very, very good, the presence of foreign fighters 

being drawn into Iraq. When the U.S. had 165,000 troops on the 

ground, foreign fighters were pouring in. But when the Obama Administration required Iraqis and Kurds to carry the fight, we saw 

the number of foreign fighters drop precipitously. Are those factors 

correlated? 

Mr. PREGENT. Thank you for the question. The key difference is 

when foreign fighter flow was coming into Iraq, it was being facilitated by Assad, being facilitated by the IRGC Kuds Force. These 

foreign fighters were coming into staging areas in Syria and then 

being allowed to come into Iraq to carry out attacks against Americans. 

The foreign fighter flow in this case was foreign fighters and 

their families to come into the caliphate. ISIS sold them a false 

narrative that it was safe to come, and ISIS quickly learned that 

unless you could shoot down an American aircraft, it wasn’t safe 

to plant a black flag. So the foreign fighter flow was just a little 

different, sir. 

Mr. LYNCH. Very good. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the Vice Chairman of the committee, 

Mr. Russell, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for all the 

guests being here today. We appreciate the perspective. 

I guess, Dr. Pape, there is one major area we are in agreement 

on—actually, a couple—the danger of declaring victory and walking 

away. But no factor was more instrumental in creating ISIS than 

doing just that in 2011 in Iraq. We created the ISIS caliphate simply by our abandonment of what was a good strategy to win the 

peace in Iraq. 

Having commanded a task force in 2003 and 2004, and having 

been heavily involved in the hunt and capture of Saddam Hussein, 

I am very familiar with what our objectives were at the beginning 

of that venture. We did not leave ungoverned space, sir. In fact, 

after the surge in 2008, we stabilized it. We had every member of 

the military here begging to continue to have a presence, at least 

a brigade combat team, to draw down but leave a presence so that 

we could use U.S. advisers and air power. 

Instead, we abandoned it. And what did that do? It created 

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dad, they would no longer be accommodated and they created this 

narrative that they could go out and now have a better way, that 

there was no accommodation, there was no future for Iraq, and we 

began to see it unravel at the seams. 

How do I know? Because I am heavily invested there. I still have 

friends there. 

Whatever saving we thought we had in terms of treasure and 

troops we lost when it unraveled. When we lost friends in Tikrit, 

Samara, Hawija, all the way up to Mosul and Tal Afar, all of it unraveled at the seams. Whatever lives were spared in the U.S. military were more than compensated by human suffering on a grand 

scale with a million people in Mosul who lived torturous lives 

under ISIS. We saw barbarians gain power, and guess who was 

helping administrate that? We sat and wondered that they had 

currency or that they had administrative skills in the occupied territories. Guess who was doing that? The very people we arrested, 

the very people we incarcerated, the very terrorists that we tracked 

down and captured. The Sunni Baathists were those that were creating that. 

So I agree, we shouldn’t declare victory and abandon anything. 

I am very concerned about a narrative that the United States is 

involved with indiscriminate bombing. I find it as a warrior offensive, and here is why. It assumes a lack of training. There is no 

military more trained on targeting than the United States military, 

period. There is none. No one spends more treasure and more 

training effort and more legal classes, morality classes, than the 

United States military in terms of targeting. 

It also assumes a lack of technology. We would rather spend 100 

times the cost of a bomb so that we can put it in the correct place 

than we would to make 100 bombs and hope that we just hit it. 

It also assumes a lack of morality on the warrior. The warrior, 

perhaps more than any politician or college professor or anyone 

else, when they look down the rifle sights or the crosshairs of any 

weapon, they take dead serious that they hold in their hands the 

taking of human life. How do I know this? Because for me, sir, it 

is not academic, it is experiential. I have been there. I have done 

that. I have had to take human life. It is not pleasant, but it is not 

done indiscriminately. 

When we see these videos and we see things like that—okay, do 

you want to see dumb bombs? Do you want to see the hitting of 

water works? Do you want to see the hitting of hospitals? Do you 

want to see all of that? Just go to the Russian targeting and 

Assad’s air force targeting and you will find examples of all of that, 

to include the examples of the footage that we see in these ISIS 

videos. 

One, we should not, nor should our national media, propagate 

such propaganda by using it as B-roll and showing these people 

running around, sneaking around in their tennis shoes and standing on burning equipment as if they are heroes or something. That 

is offensive. And as Americans, we should not allow that to happen. 

Instead, what we ought to do is back up the Iraqi people, back 

up the free Syrian people, back up those that have been trapped 

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barians sawing off the heads of people, killing children, killing 

women. 

And you know what? Thank God for our military. We can debate 

the politics all day long, but we should never, ever assume that it 

is our warriors indiscriminately taking human life on battlefields. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I don’t apologize for not having 

any questions, but I yield back my time. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Vice Chairman. I 

know your experience —— 

Mr. PAPE. Mr. Chairman, may I respond? 

Mr. DESANTIS. I will recognize Mr. Welch for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much. 

First of all, thank you for your service and for your statement of 

support for our military. I agree with what you said about the military. Where I think we have a problem is with the politicians who 

sometimes give the military a mission that we don’t support or we 

don’t sustain. 

But one of the big questions I have, because I do disagree with 

some of your analysis, the one was the question on Iraq and the 

wisdom of going in. We are not going to cover that today. Two was 

the wisdom of totally unraveling the Sunni governing structure 

once we did take Baghdad, again a political decision made by the 

leader of that. So it totally created a vacuum. 

But three, the long-term question, and this is I think a real dilemma. The military will do the job we give them to do. They will 

do it with honor, professionalism, and integrity. But then we added 

a new mission for the military in Iraq, and that was nation-building, and frankly I have a question as to whether that is an appropriate job for the military. Is it a reasonable expectation for warriors to be required to essentially build a nation? 

On the other hand, if there are gains that our military makes, 

they have to be consolidated, so just leaving the field accentuates 

that vacuum. But, as I recall, one of the reasons that we didn’t stay 

was not so much an unwillingness even on the part of the Obama 

Administration but an unwillingness on the part of the Baghdad 

government to acknowledge that the rule that would apply to our 

troops would be American law and American military law, as opposed to Iraqi law, and we were not going to allow our soldiers to 

be put in that kind of jeopardy in that political environment. That 

is my take on it. 

But I will ask this question, and I will start with you, Dr. Pape. 

How do we get this balance between avoiding the problem that Mr. 

Knight said, you get these battlefield gains and then you leave, and 

then you lose them all, but do that short of taking on the responsibility of full-scale nation-building that costs hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars, something that we are continuing to do 

in Afghanistan? 

Mr. PAPE. The first step is to avoid this false dichotomy that it 

is either nation building or no political strategy whatsoever. 

Mr. WELCH. Can I interrupt? Congressman Russell, sorry. I was 

saying your name wrong. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Oh, thank you. Look, when we went into Iraq, for 

example, we had five very clear objectives. It was defeat Saddam’s 

army, and then it was to kill or capture Saddam himself, it was 


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to stabilize the area and key infrastructure, and then it was to set 

the conditions for free elections and nascent institutions, and then 

they could rebuild governance for themselves. 

How do I remember all five of those things? Because it was very, 

very clear to us when we went in. And you know what? That was 

the spring of 2003. Every one of those objectives we met. 

I think part of it—and I totally agree with you and even find myself in agreement with many of Dr. Pape’s statements. But as we 

debate the politics of it here, let’s have a crystal-clear view of what 

created and got us there. It was intransigence. It was abandonment. Our State Department has to be involved with that, as well. 

Mr. WELCH. I agree with that. Thank you, Congressman Russell. 

Go ahead. 

Mr. PAPE. The first step, I think, is to see that it is a false dichotomy that it is either nation building or no political strategy. A 

good example of the middle ground that we need to navigate is 

Bosnia in the 1990s. I am sure many of you know that for years 

there was an awful civil war occurring, ’92 to ’95, in Bosnia. Well, 

there is no civil war there now. It is actually quite stable. 

How did that happen? That happened not because we went in to 

nation-build Bosnia, but it is also not because we just walked 

away. It is because we navigated a political strategy that really 

worked with the three different warring factions, and that is why 

that is stable. That is a really good example, and it is one that we 

should be using for the future. 

Sir, I would also like to say that I am very pro-military. I worked 

with the U.S. Air Force for three years in the 1990s. I was one of 

the faculty that helped stand up the School of Advanced Air Power 

and Space Studies that now exists to this day. I educate to this 

day; the Air Force and the Army sends me military officers to get 

Ph.D.s. Some of my military officers, one of whom came to the University of Chicago, is running Air Force intelligence in South 

Korea. One is commanding U.S. forces in Syria right this second. 

So I absolutely believe we have the best men and women with the 

best morals that are involved in the military. 

The other thing I would like to say is you and I have an awful 

lot that we should go and talk about because when we toppled Saddam, we had objectives but not a plan for the Sunnis, which opened 

the door to AQI. And then what happened is we had this false idea 

that they were all religious. Well, I was one of the people with my 

work, coming to Washington dozens of times to speak with NSA, 

CIA, our Secretary and Deputy Secretaries of Defense to argue for 

what became the Anbar Awakening. So I wasn’t just loosely doing 

this from Chicago. I came to speak to our 3rd ID in February 2007 

before they went into the surge in Baghdad for two hours in front 

of all their military officers to talk specifically about their strategy 

in the different neighborhoods in Baghdad. 

I fully believe we need to not have this repeat of a problem that 

we let it unravel. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair notes the presence of our colleague from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, and I ask unanimous consent that he be allowed to fully participate in today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 


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The Chair will now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. COMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Gorka, it is a pleasure to have you here today. I have a few 

questions for you. First of all, in your opinion, what should our 

level of support for the Iraqi government be moving forward? 

Mr. GORKA. Thank you. The level of support in Iraq isn’t about 

the Iraqi government. I am going to get technical for a moment 

here, but bear with me. The outline of this argument is in the Military Review article that I have given to the committee. 

In the United States U.S. Army doctrine, there are two types of 

function that fall under irregular warfare. One of them is counterinsurgency. Everybody is familiar with that, the so-called Petraeus 

doctrine, Field Manual FM 324. The other one, which is less well 

known, is called Foreign Internal Defense. It is one of the core missions that the Green Berets were created to execute. 

America is not good at counterinsurgency writ large because we 

are not an empire. Counterinsurgency is what empires do on their 

own soil, whether it is France in the northern Akwa Akpa in North 

Africa, which became Algeria, or whether it is the United Kingdom 

in Northern Ireland or elsewhere. What we are exceptionally good 

at is foreign internal defense such as El Salvador, such as Colombia. 

It is not about how we support or how much we support the Iraqi 

government. It is about how everybody who needs to be part of the 

solution in Iraq is part of the solution. The great test—I think it 

was the Iraqi member who mentioned this—is now the political objective. 

Iraq, whether or not we invaded under correct objectives or not, 

is irrelevant. We did, and we are there, and we are assisting Iraqi 

forces. As a former African American general said, you break the 

china in the china shop, you have to fix it. So how do we do that? 

We have to have our local partners, all of them, not just the 

Baghdad government, be part of the solution. The objective is a 

very simple one, sir. Everybody who lives in Iraq has to agree that 

living together in a functioning Iraq is better than a continued civil 

war or instability. It sounds simple, but as Clausewitz said, war is 

simple but not easy. 

So the challenge is not how much we support Baghdad but the 

following question, as Mr. Pregent has rightly demonstrated, that 

we must not allow Baghdad to become an appendix of Tehran, and 

we have allowed it to do so for far too long. We have to have our 

local Sunni allies, not just from Iraq but from the region, such as 

Egypt, such as Jordan, buy into the future of Iraq and assist them 

to stabilize the region. 

All too often—and I will end on this—our successes against the 

Sunni jihadists in Iraq have led to the Shia jihadists, such as the 

IRGC and the Kuds Force, profiting from those successes. So the 

goal is to support Baghdad as much as possible while supporting 

our other partners even more. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. COMER. That leads me to my next question, Dr. Gorka, and 

I get asked this a lot. Should Americans expect to be in Iraq indefinitely? 


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Mr. GORKA. A great question. In my time in the White House as 

strategist to the President, I always reminded people of the question number one of strategy: Why should we care? It is a very simple question. Some nations—I know it is not politically correct. 

Some nations are more important than others. It is called life. Iraq 

is a geo-strategically important nation. 

How long should we expect to be there? Let’s go back to the mission set. Why are we there? To make sure that that part of the 

world is not used to plan and execute attacks against us here in 

America or against our partners and allies. That is the metric. 

How long does that take? How long is a piece of string? But at 

the end of the day, it is much more effective to help our local Sunni 

partners effect that stability than to have U.S. forces in U.S. uniforms that are targets on the ground be there for a long period of 

time. So the ideal situation is, again, foreign internal defense, a 

very small footprint of trainers and advisors who help our local 

partners execute that stabilization mission. 

And if I may, with regards to the parallel to Bosnia, Bosnia and 

the Balkans is not a good example of strategy. I don’t know when 

Dr. Pape was last there, but Bosnia has become a hive of recruitment for Iran and it is a hotbed of extremism today. It may not 

be a civil war as it was in the 1990s, but Bosnia is not solved in 

any way, shape, or form. 

Mr. COMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. I thank the Chairman. 

Dr. Gorka, in his testimony Dr. Pape basically said that not 

much of the credit should go to the Trump Administration, it 

should also go to the Obama Administration. In fact, he said in his 

testimony, ‘‘The Obama Administration reacted quickly and decisively, leading a coalition to use air power like a hammer to smash 

numerous ISIS military offensives and contain it,’’ talking about 

how the Obama Administration did an amazing job dealing with 

ISIS, and I think his point was terrorism at large. 

Do you agree with that assessment of Dr. Pape? 

Mr. GORKA. Not in the slightest. It makes for a good PowerPoint 

visual, but it wasn’t an anvil and a hammer. It was a scalpel used 

now and again in a fashion in which the Commander in Chief was 

not interested in winning. 

Will is key to success. Remember, the former senator from Illinois campaigned for president under a very simple bumper sticker 

when it came to national security. Let’s remind ourselves, 10 years 

ago he said Afghanistan was the good war, Iraq was the bad war. 

Once he became Commander in Chief, he was locked into that narrative, which meant sooner or later, if he was going to be true to 

his campaign pledge, we had to leave Iraq. 

And I agree with the statements already made, we are not responsible for the creation of ISIS, but the decision of the then-Commander in Chief to leave without a SOFA—we could have gotten 

a SOFA. It is not a question. America has always managed to get 

Status of Forces Agreements. We could have got one. Leaving withVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:39 Jun 26, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\30259.TXT APRIL

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out a SOFA meant that ISIS could become the most powerful jihadi 

organization of the modern age. 

Talking to the military, it is very simple: the Commander in 

Chief and his White House did not have the will to win because 

they had made an ideological decision that Iraq was the wrong 

war. 

Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Pregent, what would be the—I mean, if you had 

to summarize the legacy of the Obama Administration when it 

comes to foreign policy and dealing with terrorism, what would you 

say that it was? 

Mr. PREGENT. Well, unfortunately, the call saying that ISIS was 

a JV team was unsettling for a lot of us that followed the Zarqawi 

movement from the al-Qaeda model to the ISIS model. 

What I would say to the Obama strategy against ISIS, Mosul 

was left to ISIS for two-and-a-half years, to 4,000 ISIS fighters. A 

population of 1.6 million Sunnis was left under brutal control by 

this terrorist army for two-and-a-half years without a single effort 

to call up the 30,000 Sunnis that Maliki had kicked out of the Iraqi 

security forces. Fallujah was left to ISIS for three years. 

So if you look at the strategy, there was no attempt in the beginning to build a Sunni force like we did during the surge, the awakening, the Anbar Awakening, the Sons of Iraq. We couldn’t do it 

because the Administration had embedded 5,000 Americans with a 

predominantly Shia force that was heavily influenced by the IRGC 

Kuds Force. It basically made our advisers hostages to our policies 

in Iraq. If we called for the standing up of a Sunni force, it would 

put our soldiers in harm’s way. 

Mr. JORDAN. Broaden it out a little bit. What are things like 

today in Libya? 

Mr. PREGENT. It is ungoverned space. ISIS can do what it wants 

—— 

Mr. JORDAN. Wasn’t that supposed to be—I had the privilege of 

serving on the Benghazi committee, and my read on all of it was 

that Libya was supposed to be the Obama Administration’s shining 

example of foreign policy success, Secretary Clinton, the State Department’s example of how it was going to work: throw out a dictator, usher in the Arab Spring, put no troops on the ground, and 

this was how it was going to work. And what we wound up with 

was that tragedy on September 11th, 2012, and then this narrative 

where, because it happened 56 days before an election and it went 

against their narrative during the campaign, they had to create 

this story that it was somehow inspired by a video, a video-inspired 

terrorist attack. 

So when I think about the legacy of the Obama Administration 

relative to terrorism and what Dr. Pape said in his opening comment, I just see an entirely different scenario altogether. Am I accurate, Dr. Gorka? 

Dr. Gorka, and then Mr. Pregent. 

Mr. GORKA. I will be very blunt, as blunt as you have been, sir. 

For eight years, narrative was more important than reality. It 

wasn’t the reality on the ground. It was spin. And when you have 

the deputy national security adviser whose qualifications are a 

Master’s degree in fictional writing, it tells you everything you 

need to know. 


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Mr. JORDAN. Mr. Pregent, you get the last word. 

Mr. PREGENT. I would just say that the message that was sent 

to the terrorists was an unserious one, and it actually led to ISIS 

and other groups. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 

Ranking Member, and thank you to the panelists for this informative hearing. 

So, Dr. Pape, I would sort of like to talk about why we can learn 

lessons from what has happened on the military side. It is more 

sort of where we go from here. So recently in the San Francisco 

Bay area, where I am from, the FBI fortunately caught a disaffected gentleman who is a former Marine Corps veteran who was 

working through social media to plan to blow up Pier 39, a very 

touristy area, over the Christmas holiday. 

So in the context of—I am confident that the American military 

is adjusting with our partners to take care of a military threat, but 

it is the radicalization, the use of social media to turn Americans 

into radicals and to appeal to this radicalization. To me, it is the 

combination of disaffected human beings wherever they are in a 

globally connected community. 

So talk to me a little bit about how sophisticated their ongoing 

operations are vis-a-vis social media. 

Mr. PAPE. Absolutely, sir. This is something I study; and our center, CPOST, a half-dozen full-time people, 40 people work on this 

problem, the propaganda problem. And I was just at our U.S. Attorney’s office in Chicago just a couple of days ago giving a twohour briefing to the new attorney general for Chicago who has just 

come in. 

This is a serious problem that the end of the caliphate has not 

yet stopped, if it is going to stop at all. So our national counterterrorism representative for the Midwest started that briefing by giving a two-minute statement saying that we have seen no decline 

in the pace of radicalization inside the United States with the collapse of the caliphate. In fact, Saipov just did the attack in New 

York in November when most of the caliphate was gone. 

So you are exactly right, sir, to be concerned. 

The fundamental problem that we are seeing is that inside—the 

threat we face here at home is now a home-grown threat. I have 

looked at all 158 cases of individuals indicted in U.S. courts for 

ISIS-related offenses or carrying out attacks inside the United 

States. Two-thirds of those individuals were born in the United 

States. The other one-third are immigrants, but they are people 

who have been here for many, many years. Over 83 percent are 

watching these jihadi videos as the gateway in. Lots of other things 

are happening too, but these videos are the gateway that is starting the process. Saipov himself, the guy who did New York, says 

it was the videos that radicalized him. 

So, sir, we have to be very vigilant. We can’t just sort of think, 

oh, yes, we dealt with ISIS and it is dead and we are going to walk 

away. We really have to pay attention here inside because the 


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video propaganda doesn’t die with the caliphate. The video propaganda is really difficult to get off the Web. It can go to the Dark 

Web. There is a whole lot more to say about this, but we are nowhere near in a position to think we have cleansed the threat, and 

it really would be kind of foolish to think that internally, yes, we 

are done, check that box. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So to go to the second part about encryption, 

as we develop new technologies and they learn from those technologies or use them, our struggle here in Congress to preserve 

American traditional civil liberties but also do all our due diligence 

to make sure we are making people safe here in America and in 

the West from terrorist attacks, could you talk a little bit about 

that, particularly encryption applications? 

Mr. PAPE. Yes. A few years ago there was a terrific panel. Michael Morrel was on the panel. It was a commission. Jeff Stone, a 

professor from the University of Chicago was on this, to really look 

closely at our steps of international phone calls to see whether or 

not—because this was Snowden and so forth, became quite a big 

deal. We need a new such major effort to really look closely at exactly where we should move that bubble. 

Jeff Stone, a former dean of the University of Chicago Law 

School, professor of civil liberties, provost—we need to bring together security experts, legal scholars to really look closely at exactly—because the fact of the matter is we are developing more 

encryption technology day by day, and the terrorists are only just 

a few weeks behind. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Let me ask you one last question, Dr. Pape. So 

in the context of sewing more radicals in Syria or Iraq, what are 

our responsibilities to go in and rebuild those countries, particularly Syria? 

Mr. PAPE. It is tremendously in our strategic interest. There are 

moral issues, sir. But the fundamental problem is we have created, 

over a period of many years, since 2003, enormous governance 

problems for Sunnis in Iraq, and now the spillover effects in Syria, 

and unless we take diplomatic efforts with a sustained political 

strategy to, number one, prevent score settling among the folks we 

actually worked with; number two, to have more direct economic 

support; and number three, to mediate the Sunni/Shia divide, we 

are going to be right back here again, or very likely, in just a few 

years. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. DESANTIS. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair notes the presence of our colleague, the gentleman 

from Illinois, Mr. Krishnamoorthi. I ask unanimous consent that he 

be allowed to fully participate in today’s hearing. 

Without objection, it is so ordered. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hice for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Pregent, let me ask you, all the bureaucratic processes that 

were added under the Obama Administration, can you address 

through the international security team, can you address how that 

impacted the military? 


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Mr. PREGENT. Well, commanders were being questioned by aides 

in the National Security Council whether or not they should actually go forward with a target. One of the biggest complaints coming 

from combatant commanders was that they weren’t necessarily 

trusted to make those decisions. Initially, again, we talk about aircraft flying with munitions that weren’t able to drop their bombs 

when they actually had targets of opportunity on the ground. 

The biggest complaint is the targets of opportunity. That is a 

small window in which a commander has an opportunity to hit 

ISIS and hurt it, and when you have to call back to D.C. for permission to do it because there happens to be an oil tanker in the 

convoy, the ISIS convoy, that not only allows that target of opportunity to go away but it sustains a terrorist organization. 

Remember, ISIS early on, in 2015, was estimated to receive $500 

million a year in the illicit oil trade, and that was because they 

were able to simply move during the daytime. Initially, one of the 

biggest problems with the ROE as it relates to getting permission 

from D.C. to do something was that ISIS could move around freely 

during the daytime without being hit. Those convoys who were flying black flags after taking territory should have never been allowed to move without being hit, and the biggest complaint was 

that they had to get permission from D.C. 

Mr. HICE. Okay, so you are saying that our commanders were 

not trusted, and with that the National Security Council, they were 

actually making decisions about strikes rather than our leaders in 

the field? 

Mr. PREGENT. Right. They were delaying the decisions, which 

made the targets of opportunity go away, and then they were questioning whether or not they should be attacking convoys with oil 

in them anyway due to environmental concerns. 

Mr. HICE. This seems like insanity to me. So what other decisions was the National Security Council making that should have 

been made by our commanders on the field? 

Mr. PREGENT. Well, I can only contrast the difference between 

the Obama and Trump Administrations. Combatant commanders 

now can make those decisions on the ground. They are able to use 

lethal force to degrade ISIS, to defeat ISIS, and they are trusted, 

and that should be no surprise. Both H.R. McMaster and Secretary 

Mattis were both combatant commanders in Iraq. They didn’t have 

to ask D.C. for permission to do anything. 

So it is good that they pushed it down to combatant commanders 

in Iraq and Syria to be able to do these things without asking permission, as well as Afghanistan. So that is the key difference. 

Mr. HICE. All right. So with that, obviously, there has been an 

enormous difference in impact and what has been accomplished 

from the previous administration and the rules of engagement 

versus now. 

Mr. PREGENT. Yes. ISIS, the leadership, once we initially had 

success with our information operations campaigns. In 2015, we 

talked about an imminent move on Mosul. That resulted in ISIS 

highlighting targets and convoys of ISIS fighters and equipment to 

leave Mosul and go to Syria during the daytime without being hit. 

That is not happening now. We did not see ISIS try to reinforce 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mosul. We did not see ISIS try to reinforce any of the territories 

that were taken under the Trump Administration. 

One of the key differences also is every piece of territory that 

ISIS lost under the Obama Administration using this proxy force 

of a predominantly Shia Iraqi security force with IRGC militias, 

there was a negotiated evacuation of ISIS fighters. You saw that 

in Fallujah with convoys leaving Fallujah. You saw that in Ramadi. 

Initially in Mosul we saw that, but the combatant commanders on 

the ground wanted to close off Mosul so nobody could get out, and 

that was one of the differences that I think has expedited the loss 

of territory for ISIS. 

Mr. HICE. The way you phrased it a while ago was extremely 

strong, where our commanders were not trusted. That is just stunning to me. Whereas now they are trusted, and the difference of 

outcome between those two points of view is enormous. 

Mr. PREGENT. I will just go back to what Secretary Gates did in 

Afghanistan. He walked into a Joint Special Operations Center and 

saw a phone line connected directly to the NSC. He said what is 

that for? They said it goes back to the NSC. He said rip it out of 

the wall. If they call you, if the White House calls you, you tell 

them to call me. That is a key difference. 

Mr. HICE. That is excellent. Thank you for your testimonies, each 

of you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Thank you, Chairman DeSantis, and 

thank you, Ranking Member Lynch, for allowing me to participate 

in today’s hearing. And thanks to all of you for coming today. 

On January 27th, 2017, the White House issued a Holocaust Remembrance statement that made no mention of the Jewish people, 

Jewish deaths, or the Nazi policy of Jewish extermination. This is 

a notable break from past administrations. President George H.W. 

Bush’s Remembrance statement was explicit. ‘‘On Yom HaShoah, 

Holocaust Memorial Day, Jews recall the Nazi atrocities that 

claimed the lives of six million of their fellow Jews.’’ President 

George W. Bush was just as clear in his statement. The Holocaust 

was ‘‘a policy aimed at the annihilation of the Jewish people.’’ 

It is important to accurately remember the past, even more so in 

these types of situations. According to Holocaust historian Deborah 

Lipstadt, minimizing the Third Reich’s focus on Jews is a common 

tactic of Holocaust deniers and neo-Nazis. 

Dr. Gorka, on Monday, February 6th, 2017, Michael Medved 

asked you on CNN if President Trump’s statement was ‘‘at least 

questionable in being the first such statement in many years that 

didn’t recognize that Jewish extermination was the chief goal of the 

Holocaust.’’ Your response was, ‘‘It’s a Holocaust Remembrance 

statement. No, I’m not going to admit it because it’s asinine.’’ 

Dr. Gorka, it wasn’t asinine for President George H.W. Bush to 

recognize Jewish extermination in his Holocaust Remembrance 

statement, was it? 

Mr. GORKA. I don’t know if the good member, Mr. 

Krishnamoorthi, has arrived at the wrong hearing. I was invited 


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here to discuss the Trump policies towards the defeat of ISIS. If 

you wish to lower this meeting to a —— 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Sir, please answer my question. Did you 

understand my question? 

Mr. GORKA. Well, since it was so inaccurate, it is hard— Michael 

Medved does not work for CNN, number one. Number two, you 

have arrived 75 minutes into this hearing and may have arrived 

at the wrong hearing. 

So, no. I would like to ask you, do you know —— 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. I will assume that you are not prepared 

to answer the question. 

Mr. GORKA. If you keep interrupting me—would you like —— 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Mr. Gorka, I will reclaim my time. Dr. 

Gorka, please answer the question. Was it asinine of President 

George W. Bush to recognize Jewish extermination in his Holocaust Remembrance statement? 

Mr. GORKA. It is asinine —— 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Please answer the question. 

Mr. GORKA. Will you hector me, or allow me to answer? 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. I allowed you. 

Mr. GORKA. Will you continue to hector me while I am to answer? 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Will you answer the question? 

Mr. GORKA. I am trying to, but you are interrupting me. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Please do so. 

Mr. GORKA. The President’s grandchildren are Jewish. How asinine is it to posit that his White House would do anything not to 

recognize the tragedy of the Holocaust? That is my answer. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Dr. Gorka, are you saying that it was not 

questionable that it was asinine to mention that this Holocaust Remembrance statement omitted the mention of Jews? 

Mr. GORKA. It is asinine to posit that a Holocaust Remembrance 

statement is not about the Holocaust. Yes, I hold that line; it is asinine then, it is asinine now. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. So you stand by your statement. 

In recent years there has been a disturbing rise in far-right parties in Europe, from AFD in Germany to Marie Le-Pen’s National 

Front in France, to Jobbik in Hungary. In fact, the President of the 

European Jewish Congress, Moshe Kantor, described Jobbik as 

‘‘unabashedly neo-Nazi’’ in an October 1st, 2014 interview with the 

Times of Israel. 

Dr. Gorka, in an August 6th, 2007 interview with Hungary’s 

Echo TV, when asked if you supported the formation of a militia 

run by Jobbik, you responded ‘‘that is so.’’ You explained this militia as a necessary response to ‘‘a big societal need.’’ You, of course, 

stand by this statement; correct, Dr. Gorka? 

Mr. GORKA. No, because I never made that statement. That was 

a 12-minute interview which had been scurrilously edited down to 

two-and-a-half minutes. That is a lie, sir, on the record. It is a distortion of the facts. I reject it. And my father, who defended Jews 

during World War II as a teenager, has been recognized on the 

record by Rabbi Billet and the Tablet magazine, the most important Jewish magazine, as having done so. Sir, I reject your absolute 

smear campaign —— 


KING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. You can argue all you want with the 

record, sir. 

Mr. GORKA. It is an edited interview. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. You can debate with me on television 

about this record. 

Mr. GORKA. It is 13 minutes long. 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. We will hand this to the reporter so they 

can verify what you said. 

Mr. GORKA. Absolutely, and I will share with them —— 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI. Sir, on August 15th, 2007, the World Jewish Congress —— 

Mr. GORKA. Mr. Chairman, are we here to discuss ISIS? 

Mr. KRISHNAMOORTHI.—called this militia a serious violation of 

human rights. Do you still support this organization? 

Mr. DESANTIS. The gentleman’s time has expired. I appreciate 

that. That was a little bit far afield. But I will say, if we are going 

to be bringing up things related to Israel, this subcommittee has 

taken the lead on not only framing the issue of recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital—I led the trip last March where we looked 

at the different sites that will be ready. We were disappointed 

when the President didn’t announce that in May, so we had another hearing here in November stressing that this is something 

that he should follow through on. And to his great credit, he did 

that, and I am eagerly anticipating news from the State Department about how they are going to implement that directive. We are 

not going to be satisfied if they take years to do it. It needs to happen this year, and we need to have a temporary site up and running. 

So we are going to follow that issue 100 percent. I just give the 

President a lot of credit because we haven’t talked about it since 

we did our hearing in November. That was a big, big deal, long 

overdue. Other presidents have promised it. Jerusalem is and always has been the capital of the Jewish people. 

And with that, I want to thank the witnesses again for appearing 

with us today. 

The hearing record will remain open for two weeks for any member to submit a written opening statement or questions for the 

record. 

If there is no further business, without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 


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APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD


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The Fight Against ISIS: The Road Ahead 

Point Paper- For the january 17tl', 2018 Hearing on 

Battlefield Successes and Challenges: Recent Reform Efforts to Win the War Against ISIS 

National Security Subcommittee of the 

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

Michaelj. Morell 

Former Acting and Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency 

1. The destruction of the ISIS caliphate is nearly complete. The last figure provided to the public by 

the Administration is that ISIS now holds only 5 percent of the territory it controlled at its peak. 

This is a significant success story, and compliments go to both the Obama Administration, which 

put together the overall strategy of fighting the group through proxies supported by the United 

States and to the Trump Administration, which made some meaningful adjustments in military 

tactics, including putting additional U.S. special forces on the ground and deploying them closer to 

the fighting, cutting off escape routes for ISIS fighters trapped in urban areas, and employing a 

greater use of U.S. airpower (with a consequent increase in civilian casualities, which ISIS is using 

in its propaganda). I have no doubt that the Obama Administration's tactical approach would have 

brought us to where we are today, but 1 also have no doubt that the Trump Administration's 

tactics accelerated the success. The destruction of the caliphate is important as it has already 

reduced the ability of ISIS in Iraq/Syria to direct attacks in the West and as it will undermine the 

ISIS brand and therefore eventually lead to a reduction in attacks in the West inspired by ISIS in 

Iraq/Syria. 

2. The elimination ofthe'caliphate is not the same thing as the elimination of ISIS in Iraq/Syria. ISIS 

fighters will now go underground, will now operate out of the shadows, much like its predecessor 

organization, a!-Qaida in Iraq did for years. From these shadows, we will see traditional terrorist 

attacks in both countries- against regime targets and against Shia targets in an effort to kindle 

sectarianism- as well as attacks in neighboring countries. What is the U.S. strategy for dealing 

with the remnants of the group in both countries and the near-term risks they pose? I have not 

yet heard the Administration articulate such a strategy. 

3. Importantly, military /security success against ISIS is only the first step in ensuring that we do not 

see a reemergence of a safe haven for group in Iraq/Syria. We need a similar political success in 

both countries. What is that success? It is the Sunnis in both Syria and Iraq feeling as if they have 

a stake in the future of their countries and that they have a say in how they are governed. Without 

that, ISIS, in that name or some other, will reemerge, and our current military success will be for 

naught. Thus, the focus now needs to shift from DoD to the State Department. What is State's 

political strategy for both countries? I have not heard this clearly articulated. Two final points on 

this: First, some say that this is not the job of the U.S. Some say this should be left to the region to 

resolve. The answer to that point is that if we do not lead, it won't happen, and we will be the ones 

who pay the price down the road. And, second, a political solution in both countries, particularly 

Syria, will be exceptionally hard to achieve. But we should not shy away just because it is hard. 

America can and is able to do hard. 

4. ISIS has spread around the globe. ISIS affiliates now operate in some over 20 countries, including 

in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Egypt, the Philippines, and many other countries. My sense is 

that DoD is on the offensive against these groups, aggressively assisting local forces and 

allies/partners in their fights against them. This is important and needs to continue, as we can't 
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Jet ISIS outside Iraq/Syria become the new center of gravity for the group, become the new 

caliphate, become the place where the group can again direct operations against the West, become 

the place that can inspire young men and women to either join the group where it is or fight where 

they are by conducting lone-wolf attacks. The overriding lesson of my time working CT issues for 

both the Bush and Obama Administrations is that you have to keep the pressure on terrorists and 

that the best way to do that is, as a first choice, supporting allies/partners in their fights but also 

being willing to do it on our own when allies/partners are not available. 

5. The United States and its allies/partners have largely focused on the symptoms of the extremist 

disease- that is, those terrorists who already exist, those terrorists who are trying to kill us. We 

have not focused on the causes of the disease- poor governance in many countries around the 

world, the regional struggle between Iran and the Sunni gulf states, and the struggle within Islam 

between fundamentalists and moderates. We cannot solve these problems, but we can lead those 

who can solve those problems. If we do not- and we have not in the past and we are not doing so 

today- the problem of Islamic extremism will be with us for generations. As fast as we take bad 

guys off the battlefield, the enemy will put more on it.