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i 

65–591 2011

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–24] 

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 16, 2011 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

BENJAMIN RUNKLE, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2011 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 16, 2011, Developments in Afghanistan ............................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 16, 2011 ................................................................................... 61 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16, 2011 

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 4 

Petraeus, Gen. David H., USA, Commander, International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan ........................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Flournoy, Hon. Miche`le .................................................................................... 69 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 65 

Petraeus, Gen. David H. .................................................................................. 83 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 67 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 99 

Ms. Pingree ....................................................................................................... 99 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 99 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 103 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 106 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 106 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 111 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 105 

Ms. Sutton ......................................................................................................... 110 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 103 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 107 
(1) 

DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 16, 2011. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ 

McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive an update on security and stability 

in Afghanistan. 

During a visit last week with U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates observed, ‘‘The closer you get to this 

fight, the better it looks.’’ 

Having just returned from a fact-finding trip to Afghanistan a 

few week ago, I couldn’t agree more. That is not too close. 

Our delegation met with senior military commanders and diplomats, talked to airmen at Bagram Air Base, Marines in Helmand 

province, and soldiers in Kandar, the birthplace of the Taliban 

movement that harbored Al Qaeda in the years prior to 9/11. 

We spent time with Afghan leaders who are trying to build a better tomorrow for their people, and excited children who were able 

to attend school for the first time in their young lives. 

It was clear to our delegation that our forces have made significant gains in the past year and have reversed the Taliban’s tactical 

momentum. Our forces, working alongside their Afghan partners, 

have cleared former enemy strongholds, swept up significant weapons caches that are vital for the insurgency, and given more Afghans the confidence to defy the Taliban. 

We have made considerable progress in growing and professionalizing Afghanistan’s army and police, so these forces are more 

capable and reliable partners to our own troops. 

As significant as our troops’ achievements in the fields are, they 

can easily be undone by poor decisions made here in Washington. 

Although the influx of additional troops and a better-resourced 

counterinsurgency strategy have led to operational gains, our witnesses today have the opportunity to lay out how this progress can 

be consolidated into a lasting strategic victory for the United States 

and its Afghan allies. 

In particular, the committee must understand what resources are 

required to reinforce the positive trends of 2010, so we can allow 
2 

the Afghan government to assume the lead in governance and security. 

As Secretary Gates also said during his trip, ‘‘There is too much 

talk about leaving and not enough talk about getting the job done 

right.’’ 

Among the key questions to be addressed are, what conditions 

would be sufficient to permit the redeployment of some U.S. forces 

beginning in July 2011? Thus far, the exact term of these conditions remain ambiguous. Unfortunately, what we hear informally 

from commanders on the ground is that the calendar is the only 

condition they have been given. 

Can any tactical and operational gains be permanently consolidated so long as the Taliban’s leadership enjoys safe havens in 

Pakistan? 

Fortunately, our two witnesses, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy Miche`le Flournoy and Commander of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan General David 

Petraeus are eminently qualified to address these issues. 

Our nation has asked military families to shoulder a tremendous 

burden. Just as we owe it to our nation’s warriors and their loved 

ones to remain committed to the fight by properly resourcing the 

fight, we also owe it to them to get the war strategy right, for nothing would do more to honor their sacrifices than to achieve a strategic victory that makes all Americans more secure. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Petraeus, Under Secretary Flournoy. We appreciate you being here, and certainly we appreciate all of your 

leadership and work in Afghanistan. 

And I want to start by concurring with the Chairman’s remarks 

about the progress that may have been made in Afghanistan in the 

last year to 18 months. It has been very real. 

I think I and virtually every member of this committee who has 

been to Afghanistan and seen that progress understands the territory that the Taliban controlled not long ago, they no longer control. They have been driven out because of the hard work of the 

men and women of our armed forces. 

And also at great personal sacrifice. We have lost a lot of lives 

and many, many wounded fighting that battle, and we need to 

honor that, respect that, and also understand the very real 

progress that they have made. 

And this makes a huge difference. Denying the Taliban safe 

haven undermines their ability to undermine the Afghan government and makes progress. And we should not fail to recognize the 

very, very real progress that is made. 

And I think we also need to be very clear that we have unquestionable national security interests in Afghanistan. I have heard 
3 

some question those. You know, ‘‘Why are we there?’’ And I understand the frustration when you look at the cost and the loss of life. 

And I think we need to be 100 percent clear on why we are there. 

We are there because the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies clearly 

threaten U.S. national security interests. This is where 9/11 was 

plotted. And if we don’t have a secure Afghan government, there 

is no reason to believe that Al Qaeda and the Taliban will not return and once again have safe haven to plot attacks against us. 

We need a stable government in Afghanistan. We need a stable 

government in Pakistan. And right now, unquestionably, in both, 

in different ways, they need our help to get there. 

So those interests are clear, and I hope every member of this 

committee understands that. 

At the same time, the cost of this is very high, certainly in terms 

of lives and wounded; also in terms of dollars. But also it is not 

a sustainable long-term strategy for us to be in Afghanistan forever. 

That undermines our security interests by giving our enemies 

the ability to claim that we are occupiers that don’t intend to leave. 

They have a long and painful history of being occupied in that part 

of the world, and they are very distrustful of outside forces. 

Which is why it is so important that we make it clear that we 

are there to help them stabilize their government and as soon as 

they do we will leave. And that needs to be our plan: to withdraw 

and draw down from Afghanistan as soon as we responsibly can. 

And the ‘‘responsibly can’’ part is the key part of that and what 

I look forward to hearing from your testimony, because what really 

concerns me at this point is the transition. 

As I said, the gains we have made are real. I have, you know, 

seen them myself. But how sustainable are they? We can’t continue 

to spend the amount of money that we are now spending in Afghanistan and have the presence that we have there forever. So at 

what point can we begin to transition to Afghan control? 

And certainly security is a big part of that. I know we are doing 

a great deal of training of Afghan National Army, as well as police, 

and we are making progress on that front. 

My biggest concern, and what I hope you will address in your 

testimony, is the governance issue. That is where I have, you know, 

the greatest concern in terms of our ability to transition. 

The gains that we have made and the price that we have paid 

for those gains, will we be able to hold on to them as we begin the 

transition to a completely Afghan-run governance structure—rule 

of law, all of the basic elements of civil society? Can they do that 

in the district level, on the provincial level, in Kabul? Do they have 

the, you know, the ability to do that? 

And there are challenges, you know, given corruption and basic 

lack of confidence in—competence, sorry—in the governance in Afghanistan. I think that gives us pause. 

So we need the assurances that as we begin to transition out, 

you know, the gains that we have made and the price that we have 

paid for them will be sustained by an Afghan government structure 

that can stand without us. 
4 

That is what I am really interested as we hear your testimony. 

And, again, we thank you for being here. And thank you for your 

leadership on this critical, critical issue. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 67.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

As I mentioned, we have our two witnesses today, the Honorable 

Miche`le Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, General 

David Petraeus, the Commander, International Security Assistance 

Force and U.S. Forces–Afghanistan. 

General, you have been called many times to very important assignments. We really appreciate what you are doing and the sacrifice you have made and your family has made and all of those sitting behind you in uniform and all of those men and women that 

you lead in the command area where you are serving. Thank you. 

Secretary Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHE` LE A. FLOURNOY, UNDER 

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative 

Smith, distinguished members of the committee. I want to thank 

you for inviting us here to address such an important topic today. 

But before I offer my remarks on the current situation in Afghanistan, I would actually like to take a moment to echo and underscore the gracious remarks that General Petraeus made at the 

outset of his testimony yesterday regarding the devastating situation in Japan. 

As General Petraeus mentioned yesterday, Japan is a very close 

friend and steadfast ally of the United States. We are deeply concerned with what is going on there and are very much committed 

to providing whatever assistance we can to this great and resilient 

nation to deal with and recover from this terrible sequence of disasters. 

So our thoughts and prayers are very much with the people of 

Japan at this difficult time. 

Let me just take this opportunity to update you on how we see 

our efforts in Afghanistan. 

Nearly 10 years ago, Al Qaeda operatives carried out terrorist attacks that killed thousands of Americans and citizens from other 

countries. As we all know, these attacks emanated from a safe 

haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. 

In response to the September 11 attacks, the United States, supported by a coalition of international partners, entered Afghanistan 

by force in order to remove the Taliban regime and prevent further 

attacks by Al Qaeda and its associates. 

Our mission was just. It was fully supported by the international 

community and initially it was quite successful. 

In the years that followed, however, we lost focus on Afghanistan. While our attention was elsewhere, Al Qaeda, the Taliban 

and associated extremist groups reconstituted their safe havens 

along the border lands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

As a result of this inattention, we risked the return of a Talibanled Afghanistan that would likely once again provide a safe haven 
5 

for terrorists who could plan and execute attacks against the 

United States. 

When President Obama took office, he immediately undertook a 

thorough review of our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and 

reaffirmed our core goal, and that is to disrupt, dismantle and 

eventually defeat Al Qaeda, and to prevent its return to Afghanistan. 

In the course of this review, we found that the situation in Afghanistan was actually much worse than we had thought, and that 

the Taliban had seized the momentum on the ground. In response, 

over the course of 2009, 2010, the President committed tens of 

thousands of additional U.S. forces to reverse that momentum. 

Last December, we conducted another review, a follow-on review 

of our strategy’s implementation. In that review, we reaffirmed our 

core goal and the strategy’s key elements: a military campaign designed to degrade the Taliban-led insurgency, a civilian campaign 

to build Afghanistan’s capacity to secure and govern their country; 

and an increased diplomatic effort designed to bring a favorable 

and durable outcome to the conflict. 

Over the last year, we have made significant progress. With the 

troop surge, the U.S. and our ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] partners now have over 150,000 forces in Afghanistan, 

putting relentless pressure on the insurgents and securing more 

and more of the Afghan population. 

That surge has been matched by a surge in the numbers, quality 

and capability of the Afghan national security forces. During the 

past year, the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] have increased by more than 70,000 personnel and we have been able to 

improve their quality substantially by developing Afghan noncommissioned officers and trainers, expanding the training curriculum, adding literacy programs, increasing retention rates and 

partnering Afghan units side by side with ISAF forces. 

As General Petraeus will describe in some detail, U.S. and ISAF 

forces fighting side-by-side with an increasingly capable ANSF 

throughout Afghanistan have wrested the initiative from the insurgents, even in the strongholds of Kandahar and Helmand provinces. 

And we have turned up the pressure on Al Qaeda and affiliated 

groups in the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan, significantly degrading, though not yet defeating, their ability to plan and 

conduct operations against us. 

One key contributor to this positive momentum is the Afghan 

Local Police Initiative, a village-focused security program that has 

already significantly disrupted insurgent activity, denied insurgent 

influence in key areas and generated serious concern among the 

Taliban leadership. 

At the same time, we have ramped up our civilian efforts to improve Afghan governance and development. Today, thanks to the 

civilian surge, there are more than 1,100 civilians from 9 different 

U.S. agencies helping to build Afghan governance and economic capacity, work that is absolutely vital to the ultimate success of our 

overall mission in Afghanistan. 
6 

Nevertheless, the significant gains we have made in the last year 

are still reversible. There is tough fighting ahead and major challenges remain. 

Most notably, we must continue our efforts with Pakistan to 

eliminate terrorist and insurgent safe havens. We seek to build an 

effective partnership with Pakistan that advances both of our interests, including the denial of safe haven to all violent extremist organizations. 

To do so, we must demonstrate to our Pakistani partners that we 

will remain a strong supporter of their security and prosperity, 

both now and in the years to come, even as we ask them to do even 

more to defeat terrorism. 

In addition, we must work with the Afghan government to tackle 

corruption, especially the predatory corruption that erodes public 

trust and fuels the insurgency. 

And we must help create the conditions necessary to enable a political settlement among the Afghan people. This includes reconciling those insurgents who are willing to renounce Al Qaeda, forsake violence and adhere to the Afghan constitution. 

This July, we will begin a responsible, conditions-based drawdown of our surge forces in Afghanistan. We will also begin the 

process of transitioning provinces to Afghan lead for security. By 

the end of 2014, we expect that Afghans will be in the lead for security nationwide. 

This transition is a process, not an event. The process will unfold 

village by village, district by district, province by province. The determination of when transition will occur and where it will occur 

is going to be based on bottom-up assessments of local conditions. 

This process is beginning now, and in fact, we expect President 

Karzai to announce the first round of districts and provinces for 

transition on March 21st. As this transition process gets underway 

and as ANSF capabilities continue to develop, we and our ISAF 

partners will send out our forces, as conditions allow, and gradually shift to more and more of a mentoring relationship with the 

ANSF. 

Some of the ISAF forces that are moved out of a given area will 

be reinvested either in other geographic areas or in the training effort in order to further advance the transition process. 

The objective here is to ensure that any transition is irreversible. 

We have no intention of declaring premature transitions only to 

have to come back and finish the job later. We would much rather 

stick to a gradual approach, making sure that an area is truly 

ready for transition before thinning out ISAF forces there. This is 

the surest path to long-term and lasting success. 

But let me be absolutely clear, the transition that will take place 

between now and December 2014 in no way signals our abandonment of Afghanistan. President Karzai and President Obama have 

both agreed that the United States and Afghanistan will have an 

enduring strategic partnership that goes far beyond 2014. And we 

are currently working with the Afghans on the details of that partnership. 

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the very real costs of this 

war. Many of you have expressed concerns about these costs, espe-
7 

cially in light of our battlefield casualties and our fiscal pressures 

here at home. 

But failing in this mission or walking away would have even 

greater costs. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border lands have served 

as a crucible for the most catastrophic terrorist actions of the past 

decade. The outcome we seek is the defeat of Al Qaeda and the denial of the region as a terrorist sanctuary. 

This objective is the reason why our brave servicemen and servicewomen have sacrificed so much and continue to do so. We are 

determined to bring this war to a successful conclusion for the sake 

of our own security, but also for the sake of the security of the Afghan people and the Pakistani people who have suffered so much, 

and have so much to gain from a secure and lasting peace. 

Members of this committee, I want to conclude by thanking you 

for providing the opportunity for us to appear before you today, but 

also for your continued and invaluable support to the men and 

women who serve and your support for the policies and programs 

that are absolutely critical to our success in Afghanistan and in 

Pakistan. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Flournoy can be found in 

the Appendix on page 69.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Petraeus. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AND U.S. 

FORCES–AFGHANISTAN 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, it is 

a privilege to be here today with Under Secretary Flournoy to report on the situation in Afghanistan. 

Before I proceed, however, I too would like again to offer my sincere condolences to the people of Japan as they work to recover 

from one of the worst natural disasters in their history. 

As the Under Secretary noted, for many years now Japan has 

been a stalwart partner in Afghanistan and an important contributor to the mission there. Now our thoughts and our prayers are 

indeed with our long-time allies and with all those in Japan affected by the earthquake and the tsunami. 

As a bottom line up front, it is ISAF’s assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has 

been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of 

important areas. 

However, while the security progress achieved over the past year 

is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. Moreover, it is clear 

that much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the expected Taliban 

spring offensive. 

Nonetheless, the hard-fought achievements in 2010 and early 

2011 have enabled the joint Afghan-NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization] transition board to recommend initiation this spring 

of transition to Afghan lead in several provinces. 

The achievements of the past year are also very important as I 

prepare to provide options and a recommendation to President 
8 

Obama for commencement of the drawdown of the U.S. surge forces 

in July. 

Of note as well, the progress achieved has put us on the right 

azimuth to accomplish the objectives agreed upon at last November’s Lisbon summit, specifically that of Afghan forces in the lead 

throughout the country by the end of 2014. 

The achievements of 2010 and early 2011 have been enabled by 

a determined effort to get the inputs right in Afghanistan. With the 

strong support of the United States and the 47 other troop-contributing countries, ISAF has focused enormous attention and resources over the past 2 years on building the organizations needed 

to conduct a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency campaign, on staffing those organizations properly, on developing in 

close coordination with our Afghan partners the requisite concepts 

and plans, and above all on deploying the additional forces, civilians and funding needed. 

Indeed, more than 87,000 additional NATO–ISAF troopers and 

1,000 additional civilians have been added to the effort in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2009. And Afghanistan security forces 

have grown by over 122,000 in that time as well. 

Getting the inputs right has enabled our forces, together with Afghan forces, to conduct the comprehensive campaign necessary to 

achieve our goals in Afghanistan. 

Our core objective is, of course, ensuring that Afghanistan does 

not once again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Achieving that objective requires that we help Afghanistan develop sufficient capabilities to secure and to govern itself. And that effort requires the 

execution of the comprehensive civil-military effort on which we are 

now embarked. 

Over the past year in particular, ISAF elements, together with 

our Afghan and international partners, have increased all the activities of our comprehensive campaign substantially. 

We have, for example, stepped up the tempo of precise, intelligence-driven operations to capture or kill insurgent leaders. In a 

typical 90-day period, in fact, precision operations by U.S. special 

mission units and their Afghan partners alone kill or capture some 

360 targeted insurgent leaders. 

Moreover, intelligence-driven operations are now coordinated 

with senior officers of the relevant Afghan ministries, and virtually 

all include highly trained Afghan soldiers or police, with some Afghan elements now in the lead on these operations, particularly in 

the Kabul area. 

We have also expanded considerably joint ISAF–Afghan operations to clear the Taliban from important, long-held safe havens, 

and then to hold and build in them. 

ISAF and Afghan troopers have, for example, cleared such critical areas as the districts west of Kandahar that were the birthplace of the Taliban movement, as well as important districts of 

Helmand province, areas that expand the Kabul security bubble, 

and select locations in the north where the Taliban expanded its 

presence in recent years. 

One result of such operations has been a four-fold increase in recent months in the numbers of weapons and explosives caches 

turned in and found. Another has been the gradual development of 
9 

local governance and economic revival in the growing security bubbles. 

In fact, Marjah, the one-time hub of the Taliban and the illegal 

narcotics industry in central Helmand province, held an election for 

a community council on March 1st during which 75 percent of registered voters cast a ballot. 

And as a result of improvements in the security situation there, 

the markets, which once sold weapons, explosives and illegal narcotics, now feature over 1,500 shops selling food, clothes and household goods. 

We have positioned more forces as well to interdict the flow of 

fighters and explosives from insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. 

And we will do further work with our Afghan partners to establish 

as much of a defense in-depth as is possible to disrupt infiltration 

of Taliban and Haqqani network members from those sanctuaries. 

Meanwhile, we are coordinating more closely than ever with the 

Pakistani army to conduct ISAF operations that will provide the 

anvil on the Afghan side of the Durand Line against which Pakistani Taliban elements can be driven by Pakistani operations in 

the border areas. 

With your support, we have also devoted substantial additional 

resources to the development of Afghanistan’s security forces. This 

effort is, of course, another important component of our comprehensive approach. Indeed, it is arguably the most critical element in 

our effort to help Afghanistan develop the capability to secure 

itself. 

We have seen significant progress in this arena over the past 

year, but we have had to contend with innumerable challenges, and 

our Afghan partners are the first to note that the quality of some 

elements is still uneven. 

The train-and-equip mission is, in fact, a huge undertaking, and 

there is nothing easy about it. However, the past year alone has 

seen Afghan forces grow by over one-third, adding some 70,000 soldiers and police. And, notably, those forces have grown in quality, 

not just in quantity. 

Investments in leader development, literacy and institutions 

have yielded significant dividends. In fact, in the hard fighting 

west of Kandahar in late 2010, Afghan forces comprised some 60 

percent of the overall force, and they fought with skill and courage. 

As the Under Secretary noted, President Karzai’s Afghan Local 

Police Initiative has also been an important addition to the overall 

campaign. It is, in essence, a community watch with AK–47s under 

the local district chief of police, with members nominated by a representative shura council, vetted by the Afghan intel service, and 

trained by and partnered with Afghan police and U.S. special 

forces elements. 

The initiative does more than just allow the arming of local 

forces and the conduct of limited defensive missions. Through the 

way each unit is established, this program actually mobilizes communities in self-defense against those who would undermine security in their areas. For that reason, the growth of these elements 

is of particular concern to the Taliban, whose ability to intimidate 

the population is limited increasingly by it. 
10 

There are currently 70 districts identified for Afghan Local Police 

elements, with each district’s authorization averaging 300 ALP 

members. Twenty-seven of the district ALP elements have been 

validated already for full operations, while the other 43 are in various stages of being established. 

This program has emerged as so important to our overall effort 

that I have put a conventional U.S. infantry battalion under the 

operational control of our Special Operations Command in Afghanistan to augment our special forces and increase our ability to support the program’s expansion. 

We have increased as well our efforts to enable the Afghan government’s work and that of international community civilians to 

improve governance, economic development and the provision of 

basic services. 

These are essential elements of the effort to shift delivery of 

basic services from provincial reconstruction teams and international organizations to Afghan government elements, thereby addressing President Karzai’s understandable concerns about parallel 

institutions. 

And we have provided assistance for new Afghan government-led 

initiatives in reintegration, supporting the recently established Afghan High Peace Council and provincial peace and reintegration 

councils. 

Indeed, we recognize that we and our Afghan partners cannot 

just kill or capture our way out of the insurgency in Afghanistan. 

Afghan-led reintegration of reconcilable insurgents must be an important element of the strategy—and it now is. 

In fact, some 700 former Taliban have now officially reintegrated 

with Afghan authorities, and some 2,000 more are in various 

stages of the reintegration process. 

All of these efforts are part of our comprehensive civil-military 

approach, and we have worked hard to coordinate ISAF activities 

with the international organizations and diplomatic missions in Afghanistan, as well as with our Afghan partners. 

We have also sought to ensure that we minimize loss of innocent 

civilian life in the course of our operations, even as we also ensure 

protection of our forces and our Afghan partners. 

Of note, a recently released U.N. [United Nations] study observed that civilian casualties due to ISAF and Afghan force operations decreased by just over 20 percent in 2010, even as our total 

forces increased by over 100,000 and significant offensive operations were launched. 

Our progress in this area notwithstanding, in view of several 

tragic incidents in recent weeks, I ordered a review of our tactical 

directive on the use of force by all levels of our chain of command 

and with the air crews of our attack helicopters. 

I also reemphasized instructions on reducing damage to infrastructure and property to an absolute minimum. Counterinsurgents 

cannot succeed if they harm the people they are striving to protect. 

As I noted at the outset, the Joint NATO–Afghan Inteqal, or 

Transition Board, has recommended to President Karzai and 

NATO leaders commencement of transition in select provinces in 

the next few months. President Karzai will announce these locations in a speech next week. 
11 

In keeping with the principles adopted by the North Atlantic 

Council to guide transition, the shifting of responsibility from ISAF 

to Afghan forces will be conducted at a pace determined by conditions on the ground, with assessments provided from the bottom up 

so that those at operational command level in Afghanistan can plan 

the resulting battlefield geometry adjustments with our Afghan 

partners. 

According to the NATO principles, transition will see our forces 

thinning out, not just handing off, with reinvestment of some of the 

forces freed up by transition in contiguous areas or in training missions where more work is needed. 

Similar processes are also taking place as we commence transition of certain training and institutional functions from ISAF trainers to their Afghan counterparts. 

As we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in 

mind, as the Under Secretary stressed, the imperative of ensuring 

that the transition actions we take will be irreversible. As the ambassadors of several ISAF countries emphasized at one recent 

NATO meeting, we will get one shot at transition, and we need to 

get it right. 

As a number of ISAF national leaders have noted in recent 

months, we need to focus not just on the year ahead, but increasingly on the goal agreed at Lisbon of having Afghan forces in the 

lead throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014. 

Indeed, we need to ensure that we take a sufficiently long view 

to ensure that our actions in the months ahead enable long-term 

achievement in the years ahead. 

We have refined our campaign plan to do just that, and we are 

also now beginning to look beyond 2014, as well, as the United 

States and Afghanistan, and NATO and Afghanistan discuss possible strategic partnerships. All of this is enormously reassuring to 

our Afghan partners and of considerable concern to the Taliban. 

With respect to the Taliban, appreciation that there will be an 

enduring commitment of some form by the international community to Afghanistan is important to the insurgents’ recognition that 

reconciliation, rather than continued fighting, should be their goal. 

Before concluding, there are four additional issues I would like 

to highlight to the committee. 

First, I am concerned that levels of funding for our State Department and USAID [United States Agency for International Development] partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the 

hard-fought security achievements of our men and women in uniform. Inadequate resourcing of our civilian partners could, in fact, 

jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission. 

I offer that assessment, noting that we have just completed a 

joint civil-military campaign plan between U.S. Forces–Afghanistan 

and the U.S. Embassy, which emphasizes the critical integration of 

civilian and military efforts in an endeavor such as that in Afghanistan. 

Second, I want to echo the Under Secretary’s expression of deep 

appreciation for your support of vital additional capabilities for our 

troopers. The funding you have provided has, for example, enabled 

the rapid deployment of a substantial increase in the intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance assets supporting our forces. 
12 

To take one example, we have increased the number of various 

types of persistent surveillance systems—essentially blimps and 

towers with optics—from 114 this past August to 184 at the 

present, with plans for continued increases throughout this year. 

Your support has also enabled the rapid procurement and deployment of the all-terrain vehicle version of the Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected family of vehicles, with 6,700 fielded just since I 

took command 812 months ago. 

And your support has continued to provide our commanders with 

another critical element of our strategy, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program funding that has once again proven absolutely invaluable as a way of capitalizing rapidly on hard-won 

gains on the ground. 

Indeed, CERP funding, the establishment of the Afghan Infrastructure Fund, and the specific authorization for the reintegration 

program funding have been instrumental in enabling key components of our overall effort. 

Third, I should at this point also highlight the critical work of 

the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. These institutions are the largest donors to Afghanistan after the United States, 

and they have been critical to the success of such projects such as 

the Ring Road and the Uzbek-Afghan railroad. 

We need these critical enabling institutions, and further U.S. 

support for them will ensure that they are able to continue to contribute as significantly as they have in the past. 

Fourth, I also want to thank you for the substantial funding for 

the development of the Afghan National Security Forces. The continued growth of Afghan forces in quantity, quality and capability 

is, needless to say, essential to the process of transition of security 

tasks from ISAF to Afghan forces, and the resources you have provided for this component of our effort have been the critical enabler 

of it. 

In closing, the past 8 months have seen important, but hardfought progress in Afghanistan. Key insurgent safe havens have 

been taken away from the Taliban. Numerous insurgent leaders 

have been killed or captured. And hundreds of reconcilable midlevel leaders and fighters have been reintegrated into Afghan society. 

Meanwhile, Afghan forces have grown in number and in capability. Local security solutions have been instituted, and security 

improvements in key areas like Kabul, Kandahar and Helmand 

provinces have in turn enabled progress in the areas of governance 

and development as well. 

None of this has been easy. The progress achieved has entailed 

hard fighting and considerable sacrifice. There have been tough 

losses along the way, and there have been setbacks as well as successes. 

Indeed, the experience has been akin to that of a roller-coaster 

ride. The trajectory has generally been upward since last summer, 

but there certainly have been significant bumps and difficult reverses at various points. 

Nonetheless, although the insurgents are already striving to regain lost momentum and lost safe havens as we enter the spring 

fighting season, we believe that we will be able to build on the mo-
13 

mentum achieved in 2010, though that clearly will entail additional 

tough fighting. 

As many of you have noted in the past, and as you noted this 

morning here, Chairman and Ranking Member, our objectives in 

Afghanistan and in the region are of vital importance, and we must 

do all that we can to achieve those objectives. 

Those of us on the ground believe that the strategy on which we 

are embarked provides the best approach for doing just that, noting, as dialogue with President Karzai has reminded us at various 

points, that we must constantly refine our activities in response to 

changes in the circumstances on the ground. 

Needless to say, we will continue to make such adjustments in 

close consultation with our Afghan and international counterparts 

as the situation evolves. 

Finally, I want to thank each of you for your continued support 

of our country’s men and women in Afghanistan and their families. 

As I have noted to you before, nothing means more to them than 

knowing that what they are doing is important and knowing that 

their sacrifices are appreciated by their leaders and their fellow 

citizens back home. 

Each of you has sought to convey that sense to them and we are 

very grateful to you for doing so. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus can be found in the 

Appendix on page 83.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

In every speech that the President has given on Afghanistan 

since December of 2009 he has emphasized the withdrawal of U.S. 

forces that will begin in July of 2011. 

At the same time, Administration officials have assured us that 

any such withdrawal will be conditions-based. 

General Petraeus, in your best professional military judgment, 

would you recommend that the July 2011 redeployment include the 

withdrawal of combat forces? 

General PETRAEUS. Mr. Chairman, I am still formulating the options that I will provide to the President and the recommendation 

that I will make. But I do believe that there will be some combat 

forces included in those options and in that recommendation. 

Indeed, if I could, I think—and I mentioned this to the SASC 

[Senate Armed Services Committee] yesterday, because people 

were talking about Secretary Gates’ message to the ministers of defense at NATO, getting the job done right, and then also about 

transition initiation and initiation of the responsible drawdown, to 

use the President’s term, of surge forces in July. 

I think it is logical to talk both about getting the job done right, 

as he did to his NATO counterparts, and about beginning transition and commencing the responsible drawdown of surge forces— 

again, at a pace determined by conditions on the ground. 

Those conditions that I will assess will clearly include an assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces and their ability to 

do more as we do less, as we thin out but don’t hand off, in accordance with transition principles, needless to say, the security situation and whether they can indeed handle it, if it has been reduced 

to that point, and how they have grown in their capability. 
14 

But we also must include, as both of you noted, governance and 

development, because those elements have a direct effect on the security situation. If governance is seen as legitimate in the eyes of 

the people, if it gains their support and their willing participation, 

then indeed, obviously, you are able to build on the hard-fought security gains, on the foundation of security that is essential but is 

not enough. 

And then beyond that, of course, the gradual development in the 

economic realm, in the provision of basic services, with increasingly 

those services being provided by Afghan rather than international 

organizations is also essential to that. So these are the components, 

again, the very broad components, and we have got quite a rigorous 

assessment criteria that we employ. But those are the big ideas, if 

you will, that form the core of our assessments. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just two questions, focusing on that transition, on getting to the 

point where the Afghans take over responsibility, frankly, for all 

elements of the security, governance. 

I think the struggle is, we can lay out the arguments, and I 

think you laid out them fairly well, about why it is important, what 

we are doing to try to get us to that point. But what you will need, 

I think, to make the argument better is sort of measurable signs 

of progress. What can we look to, you know, before that point when 

we are all gone? I mean, we could just leave and see if they can 

figure it out, but I think you would—we would all agree that that 

is, you know, not a good plan at this point. 

But what we need to see is measurable progress. You know, what 

can we point to in the next year—well, next few months as well 

as the next year or 2—that shows, here is evidence that they will 

be able to handle it, they will be able to take responsibility for security, and again on governance? I think that is the biggest challenge in terms of the way the Afghan governance structure is put 

up. 

What can you give us in terms of measurable, instead of just saying, you know, July, you know, 2014 or 2011, here is where we 

need to be to know that we have gotten where we can safely make 

that hand-off? 

General PETRAEUS. Congressman, that is a great question. In 

fact, we often are asked out there, ‘‘When will the Afghans step up 

to the plate?’’ and that kind of question, which I think is an understandable and reasonable question. And these questions often take 

place while we are in Kabul with visitors. 

And I will note quite often that, in fact, in the area that they are 

located, it is Afghans who have assumed the lead in security tasks, 

in Kabul, the greater Kabul area, which includes some one-fifth to 

one-quarter of the entire country’s population, somewhere around 

5 million or so people. 

And the face of security on the streets of Kabul, without question, is the Afghan police. And a little further out it becomes the 

Afghan National Army. 

And every single night in Kabul there are precision, intelligencedriven operations to capture or kill, arrest, because we have actu-
15 

ally gone to a—‘‘we,’’ the Afghans, have gone to a rule-of-law-based 

detention system in the greater Kabul area for the most part— 

going after those organizations, Taliban, Haqqani Network, IMU 

[the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan] and others that are trying 

to disrupt security there and have indeed periodically conducted 

sensational attacks. 

Although the past 9, 10 months or so, those periodic attacks notwithstanding, have seen really quite good security by really any 

standard. In fact, President Karzai a few months back was asking 

what was it that was leading to this? In my view, what was it? 

And it was, of course, the comprehensive approach, but it was indeed Afghan forces in the lead disrupting these different cells that 

are trying to carry out attacks on the Afghan people and Afghan 

institutions. 

So I think right there, you have a very good example, essentially, 

of what—generally looks like and we will see if, you know, that is 

among the areas in which transition may proceed when President 

Karzai makes his announcement. But we have literally only got basically two battalions, a little bit more than that, of ISAF forces 

there, and they have very largely stepped back already and are 

what we would call a tactical or even operational over-watch stage 

even at this point. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Another question is about why it is important to make it clear 

that we are at some point leaving. And I know it is a delicate, difficult balance because you can make the one argument that says, 

well, the second we say that we are leaving, they just know they 

have to wait us out. 

But on the other hand, if we don’t make it clear that we are leaving, then we appear to be an occupying force. We strengthen the 

insurgency. We also, you know, create dependence in some different elements of Afghan society. 

And the goal here isn’t that the second we leave, the other side 

wins. The goal here is, as we said, that we build up the strength 

of the Afghan forces and the Afghan government so when we leave, 

the Afghan people win. 

But talk a little bit about why it is important to deliver that—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well, it is a very important message. First of 

all, it undercuts the Taliban narrative, of course, that we intend to 

stay forever, that we want permanent bases, that we want to dominate the region or take Afghanistan’s mineral wealth. You name it. 

There is a number of different conspiracy theories out there, and 

this pokes a hole in all of those. 

Second, it does indeed impart a message of urgency. And I think 

we have to remember that President Obama’s speech, the whole 

July 2011 issue, if you will, was intended to complement the message of enormous additional commitment on the 1st of December 

at West Point, you know, 30,000 extra forces, tripling the number 

of civilians, substantial additional funding request for Afghan national security forces and so on. 

That was complemented, but we are not going to do this forever. 

Eighteen months from now, Afghan forces are going to need to 

begin to step up to the plate as well. 
16 

And I think that message of urgency has resonated, frankly. I 

think it has made a difference. And Secretary Gates in discussing 

this whole issue with the SASC a couple of weeks ago I think quite 

effectively laid out, you know, on the one hand his normal resistance to timelines and so forth during Iraq, but also his recognition 

of the value of, again, a message that can convey a sense of urgency to all of our partners, but specifically to our Afghan partner 

so that there is not a sense of dependency that is infinite. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Yes? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I may just add, you know, as we begin 

this transition process, we are also placing great emphasis on discussing with the Afghans what the nature of a long-term partnership might look like. Because even as we begin the drawdown of 

our surge forces and eventually can envision a broader reduction 

in our military presence, we don’t intend to leave Afghanistan in 

the sense of pull up tracks, abandon, leave them to their own devices. 

We are, as the President said from the beginning, we are making 

an enduring commitment to our core goals and to the partnership 

with Afghanistan to achieve them. And that is going to involve 

long-term security assistance. It is going to involve help in building 

their capacity, their economic development, and so forth. 

So we are very actively discussing the terms of that partnership 

even as we begin this transition process, to reassure them of our 

commitment. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. General Petraeus, a bit more than a week ago, 

you graciously hosted our CODEL [Congressional Delegation] in 

Kabul. You were very generous with your time and energy, sir. Because time and resources permitted, you gave us a longer and more 

thorough brief than could be afforded by your testimony here today. 

So I have had more than ample opportunity to have my questions 

answered. 

I therefore will yield my time to our most junior member who 

was present here at gavel-fall, Congresswoman Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much, 

Representative Bartlett. 

And I just want to tell you guys how much I appreciate your testimony here today and being with us. 

General Petraeus, as the commander of our forces in Afghanistan, what is your view on the advisability of the House of Representatives passing a resolution offered by Representative 

Kucinich that would call for the removal of all U.S. forces from Afghanistan no later than December 31st, 2011? And specifically, how 

do you believe our troops would view such a measure? And how do 

you believe the Taliban and Al Qaeda would view such a measure? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, to start with the latter elements, the 

Taliban and Al Qaeda obviously would trumpet this as a victory, 

as a success. Needless to say, it would completely undermine everything that our troops have fought so much for and sacrificed so 

much for. 
17 

Ultimately, though, this is about our vital national security interests. And as President Obama has identified them, foremost among 

these is ensuring that Al Qaeda and other transnational extremists 

cannot reestablish sanctuaries such as they had in Afghanistan 

under Taliban rule when the 9/11 attacks were planned in Afghanistan. The initial training of the attackers was carried out in Afghanistan before the attackers moved on to Germany and then U.S. 

flight schools, and then carried out their acts of terror. 

So needless to say, this would close the door on the very, very 

hard-fought effort and a mission that I think is seeking to achieve 

a very, very important security objective of our country, as well as 

of our allies. Again, there are 48 troop-contributing nations, including the U.S.—I think among the biggest alliances, certainly way beyond just NATO. It is NATO plus ISAF troop-contributing nations. 

And what it would do in the region, of course, would be of really 

incalculable consequence as well. 

Mrs. ROBY. And for our troops? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, you know, when we have taken in particular I think tough losses, and I remember the first time when 

I was a division commander in Iraq in 2003 and we had a horrible 

night. We had two Black Hawk helicopters that collided. One was 

circling an operation, the other for some reason transited, and 17 

great troops were killed in a single crash in a single night. 

And as you might imagine, this is all that a commander, it is all 

that an organization can think about even after we had done the 

recovery in the middle of the night and everything else. And on the 

way out of the command post the next morning, we were trying to 

go through the motions of getting back to the normal battle 

rhythm, because you have to drive on. You have to continue the 

mission. 

And it was a young private first class actually saw me walking 

out of the hallway of the command post, and he literally put his 

arm around me, and he said, ‘‘You know, sir, that is 17 reasons to 

get this thing right.’’ We have had well over 1,000 reasons to get 

this thing right and many thousands more whose lives have been 

changed forever because of grievous wounds. And again, obviously, 

this would not allow us to get this right. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you so much. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Andrews. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, thank you for your service. 

General Petraeus, thank you for your heroic embrace of a couple 

of major problems for this country, and all that you have done to 

help solve them. 

I want to go back to Mr. Smith’s question about the metrics that 

you will be looking at and we should be looking at to determine onthe-ground conditions that would determine the pace at which we 

would withdraw. 

I notice on the chart that you gave us, page 16 of the document 

that is ANSF capability in the field. These quality measures of police and Afghan military readiness, are these going to play a central role in your determination of the on-the-ground circumstances? 
18 

General PETRAEUS. They do already and they certainly will. We 

look very closely at the capability of the forces. We try to make this 

as rigorous and absolutely forthright as we can. These are not 

measures of just quantitative items. In other words, it is not just 

do they have 80 percent or better of their equipment; does it work; 

this and that. 

It also includes subjective evaluations of leadership in the organizations and, frankly, their fighting capability. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I notice that on both the police and army readiness measures, none of the units are at the ‘‘green’’ or ‘‘independent’’ level yet that you are looking at. But it does look like the 

trending is good. On the police units, in May of 2010, 35 out of 293 

units were at the ‘‘effective with advisers’’ level. By February, that 

was 96 out of 313. 

In the army, the similar comparison would have been a jump 

from 27 units out of 115, up to 52 out of 157. 

What do you think is going to happen to that pace in both the 

police and the army, let’s say, in the next 6-month window? What 

can we expect? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, we certainly have every objective of increasing, again, the quality of the performance of these organizations. Keep in mind that one reason that they are generally not 

seen as capable of independent activities is because the forces don’t 

have the enablers that are necessary to do this. And that is, in fact, 

our effort with the Afghan national security forces is shifting increasingly from building more infantry battalions or Afghan national civil order police battalions—in other words, combat forces— 

to building more combat support forces—artillery and light armor, 

logistics and military intelligence. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I would assume that if that works, we might see 

sort of an exponential jump in readiness because as more leaders 

become more battle-tested, they can elevate the level of performance in more units. Is that right? 

General PETRAEUS. I am not sure that I would share ‘‘exponential.’’ I think we will see a steady increase in the development 

of these forces. 

But again, the real challenge you just put your finger on, Congressman, and that is leadership. It is leader development. And 

you can develop private soldiers, you can develop young policemen, 

but development of leaders who can command companies, battalions, brigades and corps, in their structures, just as in ours, takes 

years. And it takes not just, again, training and experience in the 

battlefield, it literally takes education and professional military development. 

Mr. ANDREWS. I wanted to come back to the comment you made 

at the bottom of page 3, your testimony, where you are concerned 

about—or, excuse me, I am on the wrong page—but you expressed 

your concern about ‘‘underfunding our AID and State Department 

efforts.’’ 

I think I know the answer to this question, but describe to us 

what you think would happen if we made the error of underfunding 

those efforts as a follow-on to the sacrifices of the servicemembers 

in uniform. 
19 

General PETRAEUS. Well, again, it would deprive us of the ability 

to build on the hard-fought security gains. Again, security if the 

foundation on which all else is built. And once you have it, though, 

you do have to build on it, because it actually strengthens the foundation. 

This is not a linear development, this is not security then governance then confidence, or what have you, although there is a little 

bit of that, there is really a spiral effect, where a bit of progress 

in the security arena allows a bit of progress, say, in local governance, which now lets the market reopen, which means that now the 

people give you a little more intelligence, tell you where the weapons—right. Just as the upward spiral can succeed and an underfunding would create a downward spiral that could get us right 

back in the same hornet’s nest. 

General PETRAEUS. It can. And it can—you know, it can enter a 

death spiral. And that is what you always are seeking to avoid, 

needless to say. 

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much for your time this morning. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate you all’s efforts to put a silver lining on the dark 

cloud of the July withdrawal date, but, as I summarize your testimony, it is, we are just getting the inputs right. We are making 

significant progress. That progress is fragile and reversible. And we 

are going to leave in July, no matter what. 

Now, we are going to be careful about it, where we leave and 

how we leave, and we are going to try not to pull the rug out from 

under anyone. 

But if I am an Afghan, trying to figure out which side I am going 

to come down on, or if I am a Taliban, trying to pace my activities, 

or even if—or my own troops, I am not sure I follow that logic. 

But I understand that the President said it, and that is what is 

happening. But I worry about whether it undercuts our efforts 

there. 

General, I would like to ask about corruption, because we hear 

a lot about that. But I was intrigued by an article in The American 

Interest by Lawrence Rosen, who basically argues that the idea of 

corruption in a tribal society is fundamentally different from the 

way we view corruption. 

And, as a matter of fact, he says that for Afghans to understand 

corruptions as American do more or less entails they are having to 

experience the whole web of religious, social and economic concepts 

that we have experienced. That really is asking too much. 

Are we asking them too much on the anti-corruption piece of 

this? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks, Congressman. 

And, first, if I could just very quickly comment on the July 2011, 

I think you would be correct if it were not for the Lisbon and 2014 

date that was agreed at Lisbon. That I think was very reassuring 

to the Afghan people. 

There is no question that as we explained July 2011, the concept 

of a message of urgency to complement the additional huge com-
20 

mitment of the United States and so forth, that there was a residual doubt. 

But I remember going out into a small village in western Afghanistan a week or so after returning from the Lisbon summit where, 

of course, all the NATO ISAF leaders agreed that the goal would 

be Afghan forces in the lead by the end of 2014, and, indeed, they 

were already talking about the concept of beyond 2014 with a 

NATO and Afghan and then U.S. and Afghan strategic partnership 

agreement, discussions on which have now begun. 

And I was out there in this little village. There is no electricity. 

There is no satellite dishes. There is very little of anything. Crowd 

gathered around in the marketplace. And I thought I would try to 

explain what a summit was and what took place at Lisbon, a place 

far, far away and so forth. 

And I started into this. And I said, ‘‘You know, there was a big 

meeting held a week ago.’’ 

And he said, ‘‘You mean the Lisbon summit, General?’’ 

And I said, ‘‘Yes, did you hear about that?’’ 

And he said, ‘‘Of course, all Afghans are politicians. And we all 

listen to BBC–Pashtu [British Broadcasting Cooperation—Pashtu] 

every night.’’ And he said, ‘‘We were very reassured to hear the 

leaders talk about the end of 2014.’’ 

So I think that, again, that, as Secretary Gates explained, there 

is something to a message of urgency, there is something to undercutting the Taliban narrative of staying forever, but there is also 

something, clearly, to a responsible, conditions-based pace for 

drawdown. 

With respect to corruption, we are not, of course, trying to turn 

Afghanistan into Switzerland in a decade or less. There is a very 

realistic understanding of the conditions in tribal societies and in 

village-by-village, valley-by-valley in Afghanistan. 

Having said that, there is also a very clear understanding that 

what President Karzai and we have agreed to call criminal patronage networks, these are individuals breaking the law in substantial 

ways, they enjoy a degree of political protection and patronage, and 

they are not acting as individuals, they are networks, that these 

kinds of activities are a cancer that will undermine the very institutions to which we have to transition tasks and responsibilities for 

transition to succeed. 

He is quite seized with this. Brigadier General H.R. McMaster, 

one of our brightest Army brigadier generals, is heading the task 

force that is taking this on with our Afghan partners. 

In the second or third briefing to President Karzai on this, when 

we laid out to him the criminal patronage network that was essentially headed by the surgeon general of the Afghan military, he 

fired the individual on the spot, despite the individual having political protection, and then fired the entire chain of command of the 

Afghan army national hospital as well. 

Now, these are very tough issues. Again, we are after what is, 

in a sense, good enough for Afghanistan, again, not trying to apply 

a standard of a western industrialized democracy. 

But there are certain corrupt activities that do have to be dealt 

with, and, in particular, these that come under the rubric of criminal patronage networks are of huge importance. 
21 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Flournoy, and, of course, General Petraeus, we 

appreciate your appearance here, once again. And I don’t know how 

many more appearances there are going to be, but you have been 

just a tremendous leader for us and we all appreciate that. 

I want to turn very quickly to the question that Mr. Andrews 

asked about the capability—Afghan capability in the field by the 

chart that you provided. And I, too, was looking for the independent and where that was. 

So, you said that that does not include enablers. Where does 

the—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well, to be precise—— 

Mrs. DAVIS [continuing]. Enabling—— 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. It is that the independent activity requires a sufficient level of Afghan enablers so that they can 

be independent. And the challenge right now is that in many cases, 

although the capabilities are building, but in many cases Afghan 

units still depend fairly heavily on ISAF elements or contracts or 

other vehicles to ensure their logistics, maintenance and other various—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. And in order for that to move, in order for that to 

change, on what are they dependent, in terms of funding? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, the U.S.-provided Afghan Security 

Forces Fund is far and away the bulk of the funding. Now, certainly, there are other major contributors. Japan, for example, provides the salaries for Afghan police. There is another fund to which 

NATO ISAF countries contribute. But, again, it is the Afghan Security Forces Fund that is, without question—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Does that 20 to 24 percent cut, which I believe is in 

the C.R. [continuing resolution], in H.R. 1, how does that affect it? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, when that hits—and, again, we project 

that that would hit perhaps sometime in June, that would have an 

enormous effect, a negative effect, on our effort, needless to say. 

And it would undermine—it would undercut—our efforts to develop 

the enablers. 

Because, again, we have always had a progression, that first you 

develop guys who can help you in the fight, actually out there 

against the insurgents, and gradually you build the institutions, 

the ministries, the branch school staff colleges, leader development 

courses. 

By the way, literacy programs have featured very prominently 

now. We finally bit the bullet and said that, you know, having a 

soldier who can shoot but can’t read a serial number off a weapon 

is not the way to go. So with basic training we also do basic literacy now, and we are way over 100,000 that have either been 

trained or in the process of—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. Could you provide a timeline then? Because, I mean, 

getting the independence and moving that to that place, even with 

the funding, sounds like a very ambitious undertaking. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, it is essential. We have to, again, ensure that Afghan forces, over time, can support themselves, both 

with combat service support and then the actual combat support, 
22 

so artillery, mortars. They are developing a helicopter fleet, fixedwing fleet. 

You know, I cut it out of the narrative to just cut time, but we 

occasionally say that this effort is so big and so complex and so 

challenging that it is like developing the—building the world’s aircraft while in flight, while it is being designed and while it is being 

shot at. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Do you think, General, that that is one of the reasons that the U.S. has grown so impatient with this effort, that trying to get one’s head around it is a very difficult thing to do? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think there are a number of reasons. 

And, again, but I think the biggest is just that we have been at 

this for 10 years. And, unfortunately, as both the Under Secretary 

and I explained, we have only been at it in the right way, with the 

inputs having been gotten right, with that for less than 6 months 

or so. 

It is just last fall. Though, clearly, as we were developing the inputs, we were also seeking to produce outputs. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just add, you mentioned the potential cut to funding for the ANSF that the C.R. would involve. 

And I think it would be devastating at this point, not only in terms 

of building their further capability for independent operations, but 

also these are the same—this is the same funding that supports 

units that will be critical to continued partnering, to eventual transition, where they start holding real ground or expanding the 

amount of ground that they hold in the lead. And so it could really 

complicate broader timelines beyond just the development of the 

NSF. 

So it is really, really crucial to keep that funding at the appropriate levels. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Madam Secretary and General Petraeus, it is an honor to have 

you before us today. 

And I want to read a couple comments, and then I will just have 

one simple question for you. 

I pulled the quotes from Secretary Gates a couple weeks ago 

about the 2014 withdrawal, excuse me. I want to read this to you. 

Says, ‘‘That is why we believe that beginning in fiscal year 2015 

the U.S. can, with minimal risks, begin reducing Army active duty 

end strength by 27,000 and the Marine Corps by somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000.’’ 

These projections assume that the number of troops in Afghanistan would be significantly reduced by the end of 2014, in accordance with the President’s strategy. So I assume from that that we 

are talking about 2014, 2015, with a large number of our military 

in Afghanistan. 

Just a couple things. I have got Camp Lejeune in my district. I 

think I am pretty close to the Marine Corps. I don’t have a military 

background, but I listen to them very carefully. And I have a couple of friends who are generals that are active duty, a couple that 
23 

are retired. I am not going to mention their names, it wouldn’t be 

fair, so I am not going to do that. 

But recently I was down in Jacksonville and spoke to a group, 

and I said, ‘‘I know you all probably would disagree with me, but 

I am for getting our troops out in a reasonable time in a safe way.’’ 

So this Marine, 31 years in the Marine Corps, retired as a lieutenant colonel, said, ‘‘No, let me tell you. I talk to active duty Marines, and many of them are just tired and want out. They don’t 

see the end point.’’ 

I am getting to something else and then the question. 

So he said—I said, ‘‘Well, could I use your name during a debate?’’ 

He said, ‘‘I will give you a letter.’’ And I will just read a couple 

sentences and I will get toward the end, because time is moving 

forward. 

‘‘It makes no difference if we are there 4 or 40 years, the result 

will be the same. The war is costing the United States billions of 

dollars a month to wage and will still continue to get more young 

Americans killed. Afghans have no end state for us, it has no end 

state for us. 

‘‘I urge you to make a contact with all the current and newly 

elected members of Congress and ask them to end this war and 

bring our young men and women home. If any of my comments will 

assist you in this effort, you are welcome to use them and my 

name, Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Adams.’’ 

The retired general that I made mention to that I cannot tell you 

his name, but I think you would know it if I could, I asked him 

after the comments came out by Senator McCain and Lieberman, 

‘‘General, what do you think about 4 more years?’’ 

These are his thoughts. ‘‘I do not believe that 40 more years will 

guarantee victory, whatever that is, so 4 will do nothing.’’ Then he 

made comments about Lieutenant General John Kelly’s son being 

killed. 

The other point—I won’t have time to go through that, because 

I want to give you a chance to answer the questions. But in the 

latest poll that was released yesterday, I believe, by the ABC 

News-Washington Post poll, 73 percent of Americans say the 

United States should withdraw a substantial number of its combat 

forces from Afghanistan this summer, but just 39 percent think it 

will. 

Well, after listening to Secretary Gates, who I respect, as I respect both of you, they are right, it ain’t going to happen. 

My point is, I probably will not be sitting here in 2015. You 

might not be sitting at the panel in 2015. But if there would be 

a general or a madam secretary that would say to the Congress in 

2015, ‘‘We just need 2 or 3 more years to train the Afghans and 

to make sure that their governance can withstand,’’ give me your 

thoughts on being—on 3 or 4 years from now having to say that. 

Would you think we are making progress if we have to be there 

longer than 2014, 2015? Or would you be honest with—not you personally, but the people sitting there, would they be honest with the 

Congress and say, ‘‘You know, 15, 16, 17 years, for God sakes, how 

much more can we take, how much more can we give treasure and 

blood?’’ 
24 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, Congressman, let me reassure you of something that I have told you and this body before, 

and also the SASC, and that is if I ever felt that we couldn’t 

achieve our objectives, that I would be very forthright with my 

chain of command, with the President of the United States, and 

with all of you. 

I believe the objectives are of enormous importance, as I stated 

earlier. You know, when I have—when the President asked me to 

deploy there on very short notice there was only one possible answer to that. 

You know, I may not be at this table, probably won’t be at 2015, 

but I will tell you that my son is in uniform, and Lieutenant 

Petraeus just completed a tour in Afghanistan, which thankfully 

we were able to keep very quiet, and redeployed in November, after 

serving as an infantry platoon leader. We are very proud of what 

he did. He thinks he was doing something very important. 

I, candidly, I mean, this sort of—I understand the impatience of 

the U.S. people. I am impatient. I remember one of your colleagues 

actually who came to Iraq at the—we were about 6 months into the 

surge, it was the height of the violence, it was extraordinarily difficult, and she told me, up front, she said, ‘‘General, you need to 

know that I am a member of the out-of-Iraq caucus.’’ And I said, 

‘‘Congresswoman, so am I. But I just want us to get out under the 

right conditions.’’ 

And I think that is what we are trying to do here, of course, is 

to achieve our objectives, gradually to transition tasks to our Afghan counterparts so that we can indeed hand off something to 

them that is sustainable and that avoids that country becoming the 

kind of sanctuary that it was in the past. 

The truth is we have tried the hands-off approach in this region 

before, in the wake of Charlie Wilson’s war. We got tired of it, we 

cut off all funding, and the results were what they were. I am not 

sure that that is the right course of action in the future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Cooper. 

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary, General, appreciate your being here today. I 

appreciate your excellent work. 

Can you tell me about Taliban recruiting, and the Haqqani Network and folks like that? To what extent are they augmenting their 

numbers, are they augmenting their capabilities? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, Congressman, the bulk of the Taliban 

are from within a relatively small radius of the fighters, they are 

within a relatively small radius of their village, their valley. 

The leaders may come from other areas. And, indeed, there is a 

recruiting of suicide bombers that does take place in some of the 

sanctuaries in Pakistan with the senior leaders, of course, never 

setting foot in Afghanistan but rather exhorting their troops to 

fight on by cell phone or H.F. [high frequency] radio. 

With the Haqqani Network there is indeed more recruiting that 

does take place in North Waziristan, although that area is under 

considerable pressure from the counterterrorist campaign that is 

being conducted there. 
25 

Mr. COOPER. When I see a chart like the one on page 15 about 

Afghan National Security Forces growth, how would you plot a 

chart showing Taliban forces or Haqqani Networks or other insurgents that our troops have to worry about? 

General PETRAEUS. That is a hotly debated topic, and we have 

a methodology for trying to determine the numbers of Taliban, 

keeping in mind that of course it goes up and goes down based 

on—and based on how things are going and so forth, recognizing 

that there is a fair amount of the population in Afghanistan, after 

30 years of war, that can adopt chameleon-like attributes as required to survive from day to day. 

The general assessment is that there has been somewhere 

around 25,000 Taliban at their peak that may be active at a given 

time. There is no question but that there have been significant 

losses sustained by mid-level leaders and fighters in certain areas 

in particular. 

There is also no question that these are resilient organizations 

and that they can find others to put into these positions, although 

there has been quite a replacement of Taliban leaders in recent 

months in particular because of upset by senior leaders with the 

performance of those on the battlefield in Afghanistan and also by 

some, in some cases, literally just having enough of it and voluntarily taking themselves out of the fight. 

Mr. COOPER. So your estimate would be that the Taliban was 

about 25,000, their top ranks have been hurt. What would be their 

current troop levels or force levels, about 25,000? 

General PETRAEUS. No, I would—again, it is still early in the 

fighting season. And, again, we will see—the way the methodology 

works is you literally build the organization as best you can in an 

analytical way by identifying. 

We have pretty accurate tree diagrams, if you will, wire diagrams and link diagrams that show who the leaders are at various 

levels, who they work for, and roughly how many fighters we assess that they have working for them. 

And as you aggregate this for a particular district and province 

and then country, that is how you get the estimate. And I am not 

sure that we would say that we are at that point in this particular 

fighting season by any means. We still assess that there is a fair 

number of leaders who are either just coming back or preparing to 

come back. 

Mr. COOPER. About how many people would be in the Haqqani 

Network? 

General PETRAEUS. Let me actually take that one for the record, 

if I could, and I will provide you the classified numbers of that and 

show you the structure of that organization. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

Mr. COOPER. How about their fighting capabilities? 

General PETRAEUS. The Haqqani Network is generally assessed 

to be, again, the most challenging, frankly. Again, it is an organization that most also assess as certainly the senior leadership is very 

unlikely to reconcile. Where there is, on the other hand, a reasonable prospect for reconciliation of mid-level and below Taliban lead-
26 

ers who are in Afghanistan, and even the possibility of some of the 

more senior leaders breaking off and considering reconciliation. 

The fact is that there are some former senior Taliban government members who reconciled, if you will, living in Kabul, and are 

occasionally seen as conduits by the national High Peace Council 

and others with those who are still active. 

Mr. COOPER. I see that my time is expired. 

Thank you for your service, General. 

General PETRAEUS. And thanks for your support of our troopers 

in that great state, especially the Screaming Eagles. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to sort of move forward a little bit and ask an optimistic question. Let’s say that we move forward a number of years 

and you put together the structure. And really, Afghanistan is looking pretty good. You have got your local police going, the military 

and all, even their support networks are somewhat developed. 

My first question is, then how capable are they to sustain something like that with the Pak border the way it is and with the infusion of people coming across the border? How much of a threat? 

And do you think they could be strong enough to basically hold the 

border and maintain some level of civilization? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, obviously a lot will depend on what 

Pakistan does over the years to help its neighbor to the west. It 

is generally assessed that the most effective way of influencing 

Pakistan, in fact, is by having it see that Afghanistan is going to 

turn out reasonably well; that indeed the Taliban-Haqqani Network and some of these other organizations will not prevail, and 

indeed therefore to reassess what relationships might exist with 

some of these organizations and whether it is time to deal with 

them a bit more on Pakistani soil where they have sanctuaries. 

Noting that the Pakistanis have sustained enormous losses in 

the conduct of quite an impressive counterinsurgency campaign in 

what used to be the North-West Frontier Province, in Khyber 

Pakhtunkhwa and then in various of the agencies of the Federally 

Administered Tribal Areas, while noting again that they also recognize that there is clearly more that needs to be done and that there 

are areas that need more attention. 

Mr. AKIN. So I think the answer that I heard was it really depends a whole lot on Pakistan. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, clearly what happens in Afghanistan is 

related to what happens in Pakistan, but also vice-versa, and really 

even more broadly regionally. I think you have to take into account 

the actions of Iran, the actions of the central Asian states, and certainly India, and then even beyond that, Russia and others are all 

very important actors in the regional context of this effort. 

Mr. AKIN. But your point is, a good example in Afghanistan kind 

of sets a higher bar for some of the other countries as well. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, and it gives them reassurance as well. 

Clearly, the central Asian states and all the way on up to Russia 

are very concerned about the prospect of transnational extremism 

flowing out of Afghanistan together with the flow of the illegal narcotics industry. 
27 

Mr. AKIN. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. That has enslaved the populations, enormous 

segments of the population in Iran, as well as in, again, Russia, 

Europe, and some of that even makes its way to the United States. 

Mr. AKIN. That was going to be my second question, General. 

The economy, I don’t think of Afghanistan as a very well-to-do 

economy and its main product, apparently, is heroin and poppies. 

How do you, in a sense, do you believe in phasing out that trade? 

Or do you just try and eradicate it whenever you see drugs? And 

how does that build into an economic model to rebuild on the foundation of stability that you are trying to create? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, we should keep in mind that 

there are literally trillions, with an ‘‘S’’ on the end, of dollars of 

minerals in the ground in Afghanistan. Now, you have got to get 

them out of the ground with human capital and capacity and— 

chain and transportation, everything else, to be able to exploit that 

for the good of the people of Afghanistan. 

But there are small steps going forward in that regard. There are 

more tenders out there now for some of these different opportunities. And it is our hope that this will reach critical mass, really, 

and they will see an economic chain reaction take off at some point 

as companies realize the extraordinary potential that is there, in 

some cases with minerals that are in very short supply elsewhere 

in the world. So that is a very important component to this. 

The illegal narcotics industry is of concern for a number of reasons. I mean, one, of course, is that it is again enslaving parts of 

the population of not just Afghanistan, but more so many of its 

neighbors and way beyond that. 

The other is that it is illegal, and how can you have rule of law 

in a country if the major export crop is illegal? 

Mr. AKIN. I just, because our time is getting a little close, my 

question is just from a practical point of view, when you have got 

the people on the ground—— 

General PETRAEUS. Oh, right. 

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Do you say, ‘‘If you see it, burn it; destroy 

it,’’ or whatever. How do you approach it? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, if you deprive the little guy of his 

livelihood, you have just created more insurgents. So number one, 

if there is eradication—Afghan-led government eradication, because 

that is how it is done. And we might support it with an outer ring 

of security, but we also ensure that there is compensation so that 

these individuals are not out completely. 

Our target really is the big buys. It is the industry bosses and 

the labs and the large infrastructure that supports this industry 

that we go after, and that is our focus. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, General. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Madam Secretary and General once again for 

being before us. 

I have a couple of questions for you, General. We have been in 

Afghanistan about 10 years and we have lost over 1,400 U.S. lives, 

and we have spent more than $300 billion on this military oper-
28 

ation alone. We have invested over $26 billion in training and 

equipping the Afghan national army. And although we are training 

more of those soldiers, I don’t see that much progress with respect 

to stability or safety in the country. 

Because why is it from—it almost seems like this war is ultimately about who can outlast whom. And I think that we are sacrificing a lot of lives and wasting a lot of our resources over there. 

So I would really like to ask the question that former Chairman 

Shelton asked last year, and that is: What does success look like 

in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks very much, Congresswoman. 

Success in Afghanistan is a country that can secure and govern 

itself and in so doing, prevent the reestablishment of sanctuaries 

by Al Qaeda and like-minded groups. 

Clearly, success will include an enduring level of some international support—very different in character, very different in 

level, one would think, from that at the present, but again I think 

most countries—you recently had the Australian prime minister 

here. I think she addressed Congress and talked about the importance of a commitment beyond 2014, given the recognition that Afghanistan, while it is ultimately potentially very wealthy, certainly 

is not in that situation right now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. General, with respect to that, there are currently 

47 countries who are in this coalition with respect to Afghanistan. 

I know that we have gone from April and 2009 where we had 

39,000 American troops there, and we now have over 100,000 in Afghanistan. 

But it seems to me like some of the others, like Poland’s 2,600 

troops and Canada’s 2,800 troops are scheduled to pull those out 

before the end of this year, and Italy and Germany just recently 

announced that they intend to begin withdrawals, and we—of their 

troops. 

And we, or President Obama has committed when he did the 

surge that even though he grew the number of troops in Afghanistan from 39,000 to over 100,000, that is almost doubling or tripling it, that he would start to withdraw in this year also. And 

somehow, mission-creep has gotten into this thing and now we are 

at 2014. 

The other day, I can’t remember who—Gates or somebody said, 

or maybe it was the Vice President—we would be in there with 

combat troops past 2014. 

So, you know, we keep coming back to this fragile and reversible. 

We are making gains, but it is fragile and reversible. How long do 

you think our allies stick with us with that? How long do you think 

the American people stick with this? How much past 2014 will this 

take, in your opinion, conditions on the ground? 

Because it seems to me like we could be here in 2019, and we 

would still be in the same place and you would be coming before 

us—maybe not you; maybe somebody else, if you have had enough 

of it. 

Fragile and reversible—I mean, what does that really mean, 

General? 

General PETRAEUS. I could never have enough of this. 

[Laughter.] 
29 

First of all, again, Canada actually is indeed going to move its 

combat forces out of the Kandahar area, but it has plans, as it has 

announced, to reinvest a substantial number of those in the trainand-equip mission, which is actually quite important because of 

course—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, train and equip, train and equip. Everybody 

wants to train and equip. We have spent a lot of money on train 

and equip, but nobody wants to do the hard fighting. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, we are also short 750 troops in the 

train-and-equip mission. And so these are critical trainers. And 

again, if trainers are the key—the ticket to transition, as the 

NATO Secretary General has stated, then it means a great deal if 

Canada fills a substantial number of the 750 trainer shortfall that 

we currently do face. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me ask you, because I have run out of time 

here—corruption. I mean, I have been at this corruption thing for 

a while now, and understand that in fact there was just a longtime observer who noted that it is no longer enough to say that corruption permeates the Afghan state. Corruption by and large is the 

Afghan state. The Afghan government does not so much serve the 

people as it preys on them. 

What are we doing about that? I just—I have somebody who is 

close to you out there who is telling me everybody is on the take 

out there. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, actually, we would welcome the opportunity to have Brigadier General McMaster brief you on what we 

are doing with the Task Force Shafafiyat, which is one of the initiatives that I launched a couple of months after taking command. 

He is working with the Afghan staff of the National Security Council. He and I have briefed President Karzai now 3 or 4 times. It 

was after one of those, as I mentioned, that President Karzai, on 

the spot, fired the Afghan surgeon general and hung with that despite some political support for that individual, despite his absolute 

failure and criminal activity in not meeting his sacred obligation to 

wounded warriors. 

So we would welcome, again, that opportunity. Or, if he is back 

on mid-tour leave or so, or I would do a VTC [video teleconference] 

with you to lay out—because there is a great deal of effort in that 

regard. 

There is also a considerable effort to determine that our money 

is not part of the problem. And, as part of that, we have debarred 

nine contractors, for example. There are dozens more that are 

under suspension to make sure that, indeed, if money is ammunition, as the counterinsurgency guidance states, that—as the counterinsurgency contracting guidance states, it needs to get into the 

right hands. 

But we would welcome the opportunity to lay that out for you in 

detail. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Madam Secretary, for your service. 

And thank you, General, for your service to our country. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
30 

General, thank you for being here. We know that you are not just 

a good soldier, you are a great soldier. And that is not to fluff, that 

is just factual. 

And, Madam Secretary, we know how hard you work, and that 

your heart is for the best interest of this country. 

General, you did mention that the gains we have had over the 

last decade are now fragile and reversible, but we have got the 

right inputs; we are headed in the right direction. 

But, you know, for the last decade, everybody that sat where you 

have sat has told us basically the same thing: We think we have 

got it right. 

So we have to hope you are right, but realize the possibility 

maybe we are wrong. 

Madam Secretary, you also mentioned something that was accurate. You said we lost our focus on Afghanistan. But that can be 

a little misleading to some people who just hear it because is seems 

to suggest that maybe we went to sleep or we weren’t paying attention. 

The reality, as you know—and I know you have said this before—is we can’t focus everywhere. We have to pick our priorities, 

and we have to focus. And we moved our focus to Iraq. We had a 

pretty successful situation there. We came back to Afghanistan. 

But there are those who would say that, based on our focus in 

Afghanistan, we are now taking our focus off of other areas. Some 

would say South America, and we see the rise of drug cartels there. 

Some would say the Pacific, and we are watching the anti-access, 

denial strategies of the Chinese, where we still have no concept to 

deal with that. 

We are seeing an increased modernization in the military of the 

Chinese, with cyber attacks and space attacks for which we don’t 

seem to be focusing. We have cut out our F–22s, while we watch 

the Russians increase their production of their PAK FAs [Prospective Airborne Complex of Frontline Aviation] and their J–20s, and 

so, some would argue we are not focusing on air superiority. 

We stopped focusing on jointness as much as we had, doing away 

with the Joint Forces Command. 

We have ship repair shortfalls of $567 million, and some would 

say we are risking a reduction in service life of our fleet. And many 

of us feel that our lack of focus on shipbuilding could cause the 

Chinese navy to outnumber our Navy. 

Because both of you have lived with this so long, help me to articulate the priorities of why it is important that we continue that 

focus in Afghanistan, knowing all the things that we are accomplishing in Afghanistan. 

But why is it important we continue that focus, even if it means 

taking our focus off of some of these other areas? And, if so, how 

long can we afford to do that? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Let me just start out, and I know General 

Petraeus wants to add. 

First of all, I would say that we are certainly focused on Afghanistan because we do have vital interests at stake. The core goal of 

disrupting, dismantling, defeating Al Qaeda, denying them safe 

haven is absolutely essential. We have to achieve that, not only in 
31 

terms of where the bulk of Al Qaeda senior leadership reside, but 

also looking to their affiliates around the world. 

And I would say we have not taken our focus off the broader war 

against Al Qaeda, which is global in its dimensions, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

But I would also tell you that, you know, Secretary Gates has 

very clearly enunciated a strategy that says, first and foremost, we 

do have to prevail in the wars we are in, given what is at stake, 

but we also have to invest in preventing and deterring conflicts 

elsewhere, and we have to prepare for the future. 

So I would assure you, with the work that the Air Force and the 

Navy are doing on air-sea battle, that our technologists are doing 

in terms of science, technology, research, development, we are focused on the anti-access, area denial problem like a laser. 

And you can look at our investment streams to track that. You 

can look at the efficiencies effort that has pulled money out of unnecessary overhead and plowed it back into the shipbuilding program and elsewhere. 

So I would argue we haven’t lost our focus on those other priorities. But obviously we have got, given the stakes involved, the 

lives on the line, we have to maintain a focus on Afghanistan, as 

well. 

General PETRAEUS. And, if I could, Congressman, first of all, I 

would really go back to September 2005, when I was asked to do 

an assessment in Afghanistan on the way home from a second tour 

in Iraq, when I stood up the train-and-equip mission there. 

And after doing that assessment at the request of the Secretary 

of Defense, I went back and briefed him in the Pentagon. And this 

is when Afghanistan was seen as the ‘‘war we were winning.’’ 

And I said, ‘‘Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, this is going to 

be the longest campaign in the long war, for all the following reasons.’’ And it had to do with the damage of 30 years of war, the 

lack of human capital, the lack of infrastructure, the illiteracy 

rates, all of the issues that we have been grappling with, and I 

think have come into much higher relief since that time, as we 

have focused more on that. 

Over 2 years ago—21⁄2 years ago, when I took command of Central Command and focused and did an assessment of Afghanistan, 

I concluded that we did not have the inputs right. And I stated 

that at that time, and I am on the record at various times as having said that. 

Therefore, the gains really are the gains of the past year. There 

may have been points along the way, up until 2005, maybe even 

a bit beyond that, where we thought as if things were headed in 

the right direction, but not recognizing that the Taliban were coming back. 

But our assessment certainly, retrospectively, would be that the 

Taliban have had the momentum in the country since at least 

2005. There are areas in that country that we didn’t realize, until 

we went in and took them away from the Taliban, how long they 

had been there and how much infrastructure they had established 

there. 

Now, with respect to, again, taking the focus off other areas, as 

a former geographic combatant commander, I would affirm that I 
32 

think we can juggle more than one ball at a time. I think we can 

keep a lot of plates spinning at one time. 

We might feel like the guy at the circus who is racing around 

doing that, but we certainly have that capability, even as we, rightly, as the Secretary and the Under Secretary have noted, do everything that we can to win the wars we have got, which is of enormous importance. 

Again, why Afghanistan? Because it is the home to Al Qaeda’s 

senior leadership. It has been for decades. It has to be disrupted, 

dismantled, defeated. And it has some affiliates there with whom 

it has symbiotic relationships, other organizations that are 

wannabe transnational extremists as well and cannot be allowed to 

become that. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, a few numbers—about—there are about 

305,000—our goal is about 305,000 ANSF in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. For October this year, it is 305.4 thousand I 

think is roughly what it is. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. All right. And we are short 750 trainers to 

get to that number? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, no, I wouldn’t—it is not quite a cause 

and effect. The 750 in many cases are for expanding the training 

capacity that actually develops enablers. Some of those are in that 

305,000; some of them are in the projections beyond that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. So I am getting to the comments from Minister of Defense Wardak, who, and other reports, saying that some 

folks want to push that to 378,000. So, if we are not there generally 

with—to get to 305,000 with what we have, what is your assessment of getting to 378,000 any time soon with what we don’t have? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think that we will figure out how to 

do it at the end of the day, even if there is a necessity of diverting 

perhaps some additional U.S. forces, and they would be a mix of 

combat, combat service—or combat support and combat service 

support. Because, again, now we are increasingly doing enablers, 

not just—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Combat forces. But perhaps hiring more contract trainers, which is something we don’t want to do, 

we want to draw those numbers down, and then accelerate the socalled train-the-trainer, the Afghan trainer program, which is also 

now starting to bear dividends. 

Mr. LARSEN. Is this an ISAF decision or U.S. Forces–Afghanistan 

decision regarding the training? Is that a United States—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well, the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan is an ISAF organization, but it is a dual-hatted command, just 

as is ISAF, with the Afghan Security Forces Fund flowing to the 

Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. A commander who is also the 

NTM–A [NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan] commander. 
33 

Mr. LARSEN. So, then, has that decision been made, to move to 

378,000? 

General PETRAEUS. It has not. There is a recommendation that 

has gone forward. It was developed in very close consultation with 

the minister of interior, minister of defense of Afghanistan, was ultimately approved by President Karzai. 

It is actually a recommendation of 352,000 as a floor, and if there 

are certain reforms that continue—because the Afghans are very 

much working on reforms in the area of recruiting, retention and 

reduction of attrition, as well as leader development and some 

other institutional development areas—if those continue, then 

there are—essentially are incentives. So if you are doing this well, 

then we are going to keep and go to 378,000. And that is what has 

gone forward. 

That has the endorsement of General Mattis and the Secretary, 

but it also has a recognition from all of us that there is a sustainability issue. 

Mr. LARSEN. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. And that is what policymakers have to grapple with. 

Again, it is my job to state requirements and to do so forthrightly, and that is what I have tried to do. It is the job of others, 

then, to determine whether those requirements can be adequately 

resourced and what the long-term sustainment implications are, as 

well. 

Mr. LARSEN. And that is where we ended up—right back to us. 

Right. Yes. Here in Congress. 

So, Secretary Flournoy, I don’t think that you are—I don’t think 

the Administration’s talking enough about the long-term relationship that we will have with Afghanistan. 

It is only—you know, in recent memory, there is only one country 

that we have been involved with and that we then left alone, and 

that was Afghanistan. And so I think it is important to put this 

strategic relationship in context. 

And I want you to talk, a little bit, about specifically what this 

Administration and what the Karzai Administration believes would 

be the elements of a relationship that sees a decreasing military 

footprint and an increasing diplomatic and economic relationship 

with Afghanistan. 

Because, talking with folks back home, you know, they are saying get out of Afghanistan. And the response is, well, do you mean 

literally America, the United States of America has no relationship 

with Afghanistan at all? 

Because that is what people hear. And I think we need to be telling folks, we are not saying that; no one is saying that, that there 

is a relationship that we are going to have with Afghanistan that 

is strategic. 

But can you give us, in 26 seconds, what those details might look 

like? 

And perhaps the Chairman will be kind enough to give you some 

forbearance. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think, as we begin the transition 

process and the cutting the front edge of the responsible drawdown, 

it is very important to clarify publicly and with the Afghans what 
34 

a strategic partnership entails, what this enduring commitment involves. 

I think, first of all, you could expect to have a security cooperation or assistance component, a long-term commitment to helping 

the ANSF continue to grow and develop and build in capability. 

There will be an economic dimension, what kind of trade relations; what kind of economic assistance; what kind of collaboration 

on that front? 

There will be a political and diplomatic component, a people-topeople component. If you look at the strategic framework agreement that we came up with in Iraq as a model, it is that kind of 

thing, laying out the elements of a commitment on both sides to a 

multifaceted interaction between the two countries over time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The chair exercises great forbearance, but if 

members want to use the 5 minutes to prepare their question—— 

[Laughter.] 

I will ask the witnesses to respond on the record, in deference 

to all the other members that are sitting here that have questions 

to ask. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will try to conform 

to the standard. And it will be difficult. 

But, first of all, Secretary Flournoy, I want to thank you for your 

message on behalf of the Administration—and you restated it—and 

that is we are not abandoning Afghanistan, that there is an enduring partnership, strategic partnership, that I interpret that we will 

stop terrorism there to protect American families at home. 

I find this reassuring to the people of Afghanistan. I know that 

it is appreciated by our allies and our troops serving there. And I 

hope it is a warning to our enemies around the world that we will 

not abandon the people of Afghanistan. 

And, General Petraeus, it is an honor to be back with you. I always like to point out that I am very grateful personally. I have 

had two sons serve under your command in Afghanistan. I am very 

grateful my former National Guard unit, the 218th Brigade—the 

people of South Carolina are very proud that they were there, 

1,600 troops, the largest deployment of troops since World War II 

in Afghanistan to help build the Afghan army and police. 

And you trained our new adjutant general, Bill Livingston, very 

well. And so we are very grateful. 

I know your success in Iraq as the co-chair of the Victory in Iraq 

Caucus. I appreciate the success of the surge. And then I appreciate the President accepting your recommendations for a surge in 

Afghanistan. 

And in my most recent visit there, I was so grateful to come back 

to the House floor and point out that the success of the surge is 

truly to encourage the people of Afghanistan, their police and their 

army units. You have gained 70,000 more police and army personnel, with great leaders like General Wardak. 

And the American people need to know that this is also assisting 

with literacy, marksmanship. This is real-world progress. 

With that, my question really is related to our longtime ally 

Pakistan. Sadly, the country has been under assault by natural dis-
35 

asters, political instability. What is the status of our military relationship with our longtime ally? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, Congressman, the people of 

South Carolina should indeed be very proud of their brigade, of the 

218th. And it was great to have Bob at CENTCOM [United States 

Central Command] and wonderful to see him now become the A.G. 

[Adjutant General] of the state. 

With respect to Pakistan, clearly it has endured innumerable 

challenges in recent years, terrible natural disasters, a spread of 

the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani that forced the initiation, some 2 

years ago, of very tough fighting, very impressive counterinsurgency operations in which the Pakistanis have lost thousands of 

soldiers and also thousands of civilians. 

The fact is that the cooperation between Pakistan, the Afghan 

forces and ISAF forces has never been better. We have had a number of meetings, literally just in the last couple of months, to coordinate operations where Pakistan is continuing its offensive 

against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani. And we will conduct complementary operations on our side, on the Afghan side of the border. 

Again, there is also no question about the gains that Pakistan 

has made against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani and the TNSM 

[Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi] and some affiliates. But 

there is also no question about the very worrying developments, in 

terms of extremist activity in Pakistan with the assassination of 

the governor of the Punjab and the reaction to that, which was 

troubling to many Pakistanis, and then more recently the assassination of the minister of minorities. 

Beyond that, the Pakistanis clearly recognize—and I have had 

many conversations with their army leadership—that more needs 

to be done against groups that reside in various areas of Pakistan, 

in north Waziristan, in Baluchistan, that are causing significant security challenges for their neighbor and their partner Afghanistan, 

while also being fair to recognize that the Pakistanis would rightly 

state that they have put a lot of short sticks into a lot of hornets’ 

nests in recent years, and they absolutely have to consolidate some 

of their gains and solidify their gains and build on them before 

they can take on major new fights. 

Nonetheless, there is a clear recognition among all of the importance of their doing that at an appropriate moment. 

And indeed the U.S. relationship with them, which has, I think 

it is fair to say, sustained a degree of tension in recent weeks in 

particular, as a result of the case involving the State Department 

employee, but hopefully we can move forward, take the rearview 

mirror off the bus and resume the very cooperative activities that 

have characterized the relationship in the past. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

We will have one more, Ms. Bordallo. And then we will call a 5- 

minute recess, and then we will begin with Mr. Turner. 

Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Madam Secretary and General Petraeus, it is—thank you for appearing today, and it is nice to see you again. 
36 

To begin, representing Guam, the closest neighbor of Japan, I 

wish to extend our prayers and condolences to the people of Japan 

and that they may recover from this horrendous disaster. 

I have, as you both know, traveled extensively on CODELs 

through Afghanistan and Central Asia, since 2003, I might add, 

where I met you, General. 

And I have seen success. I want to make—place that in the 

record. Just 3 weeks ago, I traveled with the Wilson CODEL. It 

was a very factual CODEL. And I thank you, General, for the very 

informative brief that you gave all of us. 

Now, my first question is to the Secretary. I believe one of the 

keys to advancing democracy in Afghanistan is to educate the 

women. 

Madam Secretary, you touch on this in your testimony briefly in 

the formation of the Afghan consultative peace jirga. My question 

for you is what other measures are coalition forces involved in to 

encourage the advancement of women’s rights? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think there—writ large, there are 

a number of U.S. policies and programs designed to, sort of, secure 

and enhance the role of women in Afghan society. There are a 

number of State Department programs, USAID programs. Every 

time Secretary Clinton goes, she gives great prominence to these. 

But in terms of the ISAF forces—and I know General Petraeus 

may want to speak to this—one of the things that—one of the innovations that has occurred is using our own female soldiers, Marines—there are troopers—in female engagement teams, the Lioness Program, where they are able to actually go into Afghan villages and access and engage half the population that otherwise 

would be off-limits to us. 

And so they are working, face to face, with Afghan women, at the 

local level, trying to ensure their voice is heard, that they are part 

of the process of transforming an area from insecurity to security 

and then, you know, in terms of being participants in the broader 

governance and so forth. 

So that is happening at that local level all the time. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, I also—— 

General PETRAEUS. Maybe I could add, on that, actually—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. I am going to get to you, General—— 

General PETRAEUS. Okay. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I have another question for you, but I will get to 

you. I tended to—I was with Speaker Pelosi on a CODEL, and 

we—it was strictly women meeting women, both in military and 

the Afghan government. And they are very vocal, and they spoke 

about security. That was the main thing. They wanted the U.S. to 

provide security for them so they can go out and teach and meet 

with the Afghan people. 

General, to what extent, if any, must corruptive behavior by 

those in government in Afghanistan be countered in order to support stability? 

What exactly is needed from President Karzai, in order for corruption in the Afghan system to be countered successfully? 

During a dinner with Ambassador Eikenberry on this recent 

CODEL, we understood, from the parliament members who at-
37 

tended the dinner, that this corruption in the government still exists. And I know this is a little out of your realm, but I think that 

politics and the military are commingled in Afghanistan. 

So if you could help us in that? I understand there isn’t even a 

speaker yet, appointed in the parliament. Is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. No, actually, there was a speaker elected a 

couple of weeks ago and the committee members have been being 

selected as well more recently. 

In fact, as I noted to the SASC yesterday, I think there are 10 

percent more women in the Afghan parliament than there are in 

the U.S. Congress. 

Now, in part because there is a constitutional requirement for 

certain levels. But it does reflect, I think, a degree of seriousness 

about opportunities for women, which certainly in a very, very conservative society there has to be constant attention to that. 

I would point out, I think the most important advance for 

women, though, is actually in the area of access to education. It is 

well known that under the Taliban, during which there were less 

than 1 million in school at all, in any case, in elementary school 

and so forth, now there are over—this year, we believe, there will 

be 8.2 million, according to the minister of education, and somewhere over 30, 35 percent, we believe, will actually be female students. 

So this is quite an enormous step forward for them and a great 

opportunity. 

There are actually Afghan female generals. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. There are growing numbers of Afghan female 

police and soldiers. 

Don’t get me wrong, there are all kinds of barriers, institutional 

norms and others that have to be confronted in some of these 

areas, but they are proving themselves and showing to be of enormous value in these operations. Indeed, I think it is Afghan commanders that increasingly recognize the need for that. 

And then finally the corruption that has be dealt with is clearly 

that which threatens the institutions to which we will transition, 

have to transition, and that corruption which completely undermines the legitimacy of the governmental organizations which have 

to earn the support of the people. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess. We will reconvene at 6 minutes after 12. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. 

Mr. Turner is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank both of you for being here today and for your 

leadership on such an important issue as Afghanistan. We all know 

that as we look at the threats to the United States, that Afghanistan of course was the source of the attack from 9/11, and we appreciate that it is a security environment that must be secured for 

the United States and for—as we go forward. 
38 

General, you and I actually have had several opportunities to 

talk about Afghanistan. I was last in Afghanistan as you had taken 

the leadership position there. And my issue that I raise just about 

every time is the drug trade. We see—excuse me, I have got a problem with this chair. Switch chairs here. 

Everyone identifies the drug trade as a source for corruption, 

funding the Taliban, funding the insurgency, causing instability in 

government; also suppressing the issue of the transition of their 

economy to legal production and to a stable economy from which 

then Afghanistan could grow. 

General, I have held up several times this chart, which I am 

going to show you again. This shows the historical production of 

poppy in Afghanistan going back to 1991. And what I like about 

this chart—CRS [the Congressional Research Service] did this—is 

that it shows that we actually have, as we were looking at responding with a troop surge, we had an opium production surge. 

If you fold this chart in half you can see that from this side you 

have the historical levels of production, and then you have these 

4 years, which are really the last 4 years, that are spikes in opium 

production. 

You indicated that really Afghanistan had turned since 2005, 

and you can see from the chart that 2006 is actually the first year 

that opium production spiked. It is almost double the historical levels of production. And I know now that in 2010 there was a reduction as a result of disease among the crops. But I don’t think people 

are projecting that it is going to go back to half again. 

We all know that the list, the to-do list of what to do with this 

includes eradication, attacking the labs, attacking the cash, attacking the leaders and the leadership, looking for alternate crops and 

supply routes. 

But, General, nonetheless, even though that remains the to-do 

list, I am not confident that we are being as effective as we need 

to be, knowing that this goes directly to the heart of really what 

we are facing. 

I looked at your written testimony. And, General, you do mention, in Marjah, the turnaround there, and that it was prior affected by the narcotics trade. But I don’t see in your testimony 

really the drug trade being identified as a major initiative that we 

need to attack and address. 

We looked at prior testimony that has come—that this committee 

has heard. We heard in 2006, General James Jones stated that, 

‘‘The Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. I think 

the uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that 

it brings in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the 

insurgency, the criminal elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder.’’ 

General, are we doing better? And what do we need to do? This 

is obviously a time when we try to look to how we bring resources 

to bear to what you are undertaking. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks. In fact, we are doing quite a bit 

better. Over the last 6 months, for example, we assessed that we 

have found and destroyed some three times or so the weight of the 

illegal narcotics products of various types, and also a tax on labs 

and so on. 
39 

The fact is that I think your slide, and we probably should help 

you update it because, again, it did come down this past year now 

and it appears as it is going to come down further this year. But 

what it shows is that insecurity and Taliban control lead to production of poppy and therefore the flourishing of the illegal narcotics 

industry, which provides somewhere around at least a third of the 

funding for the Taliban movement. The other elements coming 

from illegal activities like kidnapping, extortion and so forth, and 

then outside remittances, donations. 

If you look at slide 12, in fact, in our packet there, you will see 

what happens after ISAF and Afghan forces control an area for a 

period. And we can work through the process of crop substitution, 

of providing wheat seed and other alternative crops, rather than 

having to resort to the poppy, which in many cases the Taliban 

forces the people to plant and to harvest because, again, that provides substantial revenue for them. 

So there has been considerably more emphasis on this over the 

course of the last 6 months. Again, as the slide shows, Nawa was 

an area of very heavy concentration of poppy production and it has 

become an area now of virtually no poppy production. And it is not 

just the blight that has led to a reduction in poppy cultivation, but 

also literally just to less cultivation as well. 

So again, I think there is much more attention on this than there 

has been in the past. It was fortuitous that you visited when you 

did and showed me the slide that you did when you did, because 

it indeed helped. It was a catalyst for a pretty substantial examination that we did of this problem. Thank you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to thank both witnesses for their outstanding testimony and service. 

General, in the slide presentation, the last slide which talks 

about strategic risks, one of the clouds—storm clouds—here was 

the inadequate State-USAID resourcing. You know, you gave a 

very, I think, blunt and honest answer earlier today about the resolution that we are going to be voting on tomorrow. 

And I want to first of all thank you for your answer to Senator 

Graham about your concerns about the budget that came out of the 

House in terms of the cuts to USAID and to the State Department 

in general. 

One of the frustrations for a lot of us during that debate was 

that the—it was framed as cutting discretionary domestic spending, but in fact obviously the State Department and USAID were 

brought into those cuts. And just to be very clear on the record 

here, I mean in 2010 USAID was funded at a level of $1.42 billion. 

H.R. [House Resolution] 1 cut that to $1.3 billion, which was about 

a 14 percent reduction from what the President requested for 2011. 

You know, for a lot of people, though, USAID is just an acronym. 

It just doesn’t mean anything to the average citizen out there. And 

I am just wondering if you could maybe, you know, fill in that— 

what that means in terms of the work that USAID is doing in Af-
40 

ghanistan and how integral it is to a successful diplomatic and 

military strategy, and the quicker we can pivot away from a military footprint in that country. 

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks very much, Congressman. In 

fact, I sent a letter to Senator Graham in response to a question 

that he asked of me, and it was put on the record yesterday in the 

SASC. And it might be worth sharing, in fact, with members of this 

committee. 

The bottom line, though, in that letter was that I stated that this 

category of funding, which is so essential to building on the hardfought security gains that our troops sacrificed so much to achieve, 

this category is really a national security funding issue, not just an 

issue of foreign assistance or some other element. 

Again, without that construction of governance and development 

on the foundation of security that is achieved by our men and 

women in uniform, you cannot consolidate your gains. You can’t solidify and, indeed, build on them, as we say. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Another slide which was submitted, I think it 

was slide 13, which were some photographs of school openings, and 

there was a rather, well, a ‘‘shooting a bullet into our enemy’s 

heart,’’ which is a pretty vivid metaphor in the context of showing 

kids lining up for school. 

But again, it shows the really strong connection between—and 

that may have been a CERP [Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program] project, but nonetheless, USAID is all about school construction. And the fact is that that is how we win with that type 

of investment. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. This particular district where the 

school is being opened, and it is the district governor, now, mind 

you, not us. He is the one saying that this is akin to shooting a 

bullet into our enemy’s heart. This district is Mullah Omar’s hometown. And needless to say, that school was not open under the 

Taliban. 

In Marjah, there were zero schools open under the Taliban. That 

was a nexus of the illegal narcotics industry and the Taliban command and control. There are now five schools open, including a 

high school for the first time in we think almost a decade, and also 

five others that are under construction. 

Now, it may well be that these are CERP funded, but the idea 

is that this is—we all work together. And as you know, when it 

comes to the Afghan infrastructure fund, that is jointly administered between the military and State/USAID, and I don’t know if 

the Secretary wants to mention something on that. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. I would just say that at this particular 

point in the campaign, when we are actually getting traction on the 

security dimension, we are creating space for those things to happen, as General Petraeus said. You know, it is even more important now that we maintain, if not increase, the funding for some 

of these critical—the early stabilization programs. 

As soon as you clear an area, OTI, the Office of Transition Initiatives, as part of USAID, goes in and immediately starts programs 

to engage the community. Agricultural development, which is the 

heart of the Afghan economy; capacity building so that, you know, 

Afghans will be more able to do for themselves over time; dispute 
41 

resolution, which goes at the heart of what the Taliban, you know, 

sort of really competes directly with the Taliban and the role it has 

tried to carve out for itself. 

These are critical programs. And if we focus—we only fund the 

military piece, you can’t actually get across the goal line without 

State and USAID assistance as well. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Madam Secretary, General, for being here, for your 

testimony, for answering the questions. 

Thank you, General, for hosting us just a few weeks ago. The 

Chairman, Mr. Reyes and I were out and had terrific briefings, a 

great chance to visit. We were concerned by some of the briefings 

we got on corruption, but uplifted by many others. 

Thank you also for your son, and please convey to Lieutenant 

Petraeus well done and thank you, certainly from me, and I suspect from the whole—from the whole committee. 

It was surprising, almost shocking, that we could go to Marjah; 

no body armor, walk through the market, talk to proprietors, go to 

a school opening, cut a ribbon for opening a school for 500 kids, 10 

teachers, but tremendous, tremendous progress. 

So Mr. Forbes said that we have to hope that you are right in 

your estimation of progress and anticipation of the Afghans taking 

over responsibility. And based on a lot of what we saw, it appears 

that you are right. There is certainly progress being made. 

And one of the places where we are definitely getting it right is 

the effort that General Caldwell and his folks have undertaken and 

are doing in training the new Afghan national security forces. The 

police particularly seem to be—were making progress where we 

didn’t think it might even be possible to make progress a couple 

of years ago. 

And the brilliant idea of including literacy training in a country 

where you have got—I think they said these recruits that are coming in, 85 percent can’t read or write at all. They can’t even read 

their own name. And so now this effort to get them up to what we 

are calling the first grade level, ‘‘see Spot run,’’ I think is going to 

pay tremendous, tremendous dividends in their capability, the 

chance for professionalism. I was just hugely heartened by that. 

And so when you look at the improved quality of the new members of the Afghan national security force, with this change in how 

we train them, I want to go back to Mr. Larsen’s question about 

the 378,000 total end-strength, if you will, of ANSF in October, 

2012, I think is the date that is being talked about. 

And so I have just a really simple question. Do you support that 

number? And I know you put 350 and some enablers, but overall, 

are you supporting that goal? And do you think we can do it? 

General PETRAEUS. I support it if and only if, again, our Afghan 

security force partners meet the reform goals on which they are already making progress. So they would need to continue progress in 

the areas of recruiting, retention and then reduction of attrition, as 

well as a variety of different leader-development initiatives that 

are critical. Indeed, without those, then it is not worth continuing 
42 

it. If they do that, that is a very tangible recognition of and, in a 

sense, a reward for—an incentive for meeting the very important 

benchmarks for the continued development of quality, as well as 

quantity. 

Whether they can do it will depend, in fact, on reduction of attrition, in particular. They have been ahead of glide-path so far in 

their growth—in meeting their growth goals. But as this increases, 

of course, it becomes increasingly challenging. So we will have to 

see how they do, again, in meeting the attrition reduction goals. 

Mr. KLINE. Let me ask it this way. 

General PETRAEUS. The answer is yes. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. You think they will do it. All right. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

We like nuanced answers in today’s modern military. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Loebsack. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Madam Secretary, General Petraeus, thank you for your service. 

Thank you for being here today. It is always good to see you at 

these hearings, and in the past in Afghanistan. And hopefully in 

the future as well, General, I will be able to see you in Afghanistan 

at some point. 

At the outset, I do want to note that the Iowa National Guard 

currently has roughly 3,000 soldiers deployed in Afghanistan. That 

is the largest for our state since World War II. And you were kind 

enough to assent to a video interview with my colleague Bruce 

Braley when he was there most recently with the—with a CODEL. 

The 2nd Brigade Combat Team did deploy last summer and is 

operating in, I believe, five provinces throughout R.C.-East [Regional Command East]. The 734th Agribusiness Development Team 

deployed a few months before that. 

And thank you, Madam Secretary, for your comments about agriculture. I am really proud of the Iowa team that is there working 

in the agriculture sector. I think they are really doing a great job, 

the ADT [Agribusiness Development Team]. 

It is not Iowa, that is for sure. Having been there, I have a sense 

of what agriculture is like in Afghanistan. But I think it is an essential component to the strategy. 

And I think it is safe to say that all Iowans are very proud of 

our National Guard and their activities there. 

What I want to talk a little bit about is what we mean by legitimate governance, what we mean by successful governance and 

what we mean by successful development. 

And I will just preface that a little bit by saying that before I 

became a congressman, I traveled overseas principally to the socalled Third World a number of times. I taught comparative politics. I know that the word ‘‘nation-building’’ has not been part of 

the vocabulary of this Administration for some time. 

But I am one of those who has a lot of concerns about nation 

building, and I understand why folks aren’t calling what we are 

doing necessarily nation building. 

But when we talk about defining success as Afghanistan being 

secure and able to govern itself, and part of that being able to cre-
43 

ate a legitimate governance system and also being able to engage 

in successful development in a country which I think, and correct 

me if I am wrong, is still about the fourth poorest country in the 

world—extremely poor. Having been there, I am very aware of the 

lack of infrastructure, all the problems that they face. 

I guess my question is: How do we define things like provision 

of basic services, for example, when we talk about governance? 

Madam Secretary, if you would? Thank you. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Well, I think that, you know, when you 

look at governance, we start bottom up, at the local level, to say 

what are the essential components? Things like a shura—a functional shura, that is representative of the population. A decent district governor. A decent, noncorrupt, nonpredatory police chief. 

Some funds available for basic development programs, whether it 

is coming from Kabul or coming from the international community. 

There are some basic building blocks that, as you put them in 

place, really start to make a difference at the local level. 

Afghanistan is going to be a poor country for decades. The economic development timeline is very, very long. And that is part of 

the long-term relationship that we will—we and others in the international community will have with Afghanistan. This will be something we work on with them for many, many years. 

But the key—what we are focused on right now are the key governance and development pieces that are absolutely essential to the 

core goal of getting to the point where Afghanistan can take the 

lead in securing and governing itself, with continued help from the 

international community, but of a nature that looks like—more like 

a traditional long-term assistance program. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. General, do you want to weigh in on that? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, you know, I think you are 

right, that nation-building has a bit of a pejorative connotation in 

this town. And—but the fact is that we have also gotten away from 

that a tiny bit because we want to convey a sense that we are quite 

measured in our objectives in Afghanistan. We are not trying to 

build, again, Switzerland in that country; we are trying to help Afghanistan achieve what is sufficient for Afghanistan. 

So we have measured objectives that are based on a very realistic 

assessment of the challenges that confront us there. 

Among the provision of basic services that I would add to what 

the Secretary described, and partly embodied in the shura council, 

is the issue of dispute resolution. This is an area where the Taliban 

can compete with local—Afghan local governance, if it is not done 

well. 

Indeed, this is the area in which in Swat Valley, the Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistani was able to play on grievances, because of the 

lack of speedy justice because of the way the system was set up 

there and in the Northwest Frontier province. 

So that is another important component of this. And, again, this 

is all part of achieving that legitimacy in the eyes of the people, 

governance that serves the people, that doesn’t prey on them, that 

is transparent and sufficiently, again, representative of integrity as 

well. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. Well, thanks to both of you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chair. 
44 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

And, General, in particular, I want to—again say I don’t think 

any of us on this committee can often enough tell you about how 

much we appreciate your service and the consequent sacrifice you 

and your family are making. The nation owes you a great deal of 

gratitude. 

You touched on this subject in your opening statement, but I 

wanted to be a little bit more specific. One of the commands that 

you have is the Joint Urgent Operational Needs, which is for persistent surveillance systems which provide actionable intel to decisionmakers to counter IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and indirect fire and protection of convoys. 

Do you have enough of these systems? And, if not, how many do 

you need? 

General PETRAEUS. We do not have enough. There is an urgent 

operational needs statement in, in fact a joint urgent operational 

needs statement, and I will get that to you for the record, what the 

specifics of—by each different category of intelligence, surveillance 

and reconnaissance system. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

I will tell you that the Secretary of Defense has done an incredible job, first, when I was in Iraq as the commander there, then 

in Central Command, and now that I am in Afghanistan, in doing 

everything humanly possible to produce this as rapidly as it can 

come off the assembly line and out of industry, as he has done with 

the MRAP [mine resistant ambush protected] altering vehicle and 

a variety of other items that we desperately have needed. 

Mr. ROGERS. You mentioned the use of blimps over there, along 

with cameras on poles. The blimps, are they manned or unmanned? 

General PETRAEUS. There is nobody in the blimp, but there is a 

team down at the base that is obviously steering the camera and 

is typically—I forget how many people are actually part of that 

team typically, but—and then that ties into the operation center of 

the unit in whose area it is being employed. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. 

And the last question I have got, to make things simple for a 

simple fellow from Alabama, is, when you look at the Afghan security forces and the way you found them and then the point that 

they are developed now, from a professional skill set level, if you 

consider the way you found them a zero and the way you want 

them when you are gone a 10, where would you say they are on 

that scale in their development? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first, with respect, I wouldn’t want to 

label where they were a zero. Again, there has been enormously 

hard work there. And the fact that we had not gotten the inputs 

right doesn’t mean that there wasn’t a tremendous amount of productive activity in building institutions, in building infrastructure, 

in building human capital and everything else. 

It was just that we hadn’t applied enough and in some cases 

didn’t have the right constructs, organizations, and resourcing. 
45 

But, I mean, there is no question that there has been significant 

improvement in them, again, not just in terms of quantity, but also 

in terms of quality—leader development, infrastructure development, and now increasingly the development of these critical 

enablers that are necessary so that we don’t have to continue to enable them in every single category. 

And, again, I would—General Caldwell and his team have done 

magnificent work, first in building the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan, which has been a big part of this, so that we have all 

the NATO countries and NATO ISAF countries engaged, not just 

those that are following the U.S. lead in what used to be the 

CSTC–A [Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan] 

organization, but now to expand it, as it has. 

And that is particularly useful, because in many cases there are 

skill sets required for trainers that we don’t have in our inventory. 

You know, we don’t fly MI–17s, we don’t fly some of the smaller 

fixed-wing aircraft, we don’t use D–30 howitzers, and yet some of 

the former Soviet Warsaw Pact countries that are now either part 

of NATO or troop-contributing nations of ISAF have those skill sets 

and have been very helpful in that regard. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, for 

your testimony here this morning. 

I opposed President Obama’s initial request for supplemental 

funding for the surge of an additional 30,000 troops because I had 

questions about our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan that I 

felt were unanswered, and did not feel comfortable increasing the 

number of servicemembers serving there without answers to those 

questions. 

I have been there three times now, and I still have strong reservations and many unanswered questions. So I am glad you are 

both here and I am glad that the President has carried out several 

very deliberate assessments of the challenges we face. 

I want to congratulate you for establishing a timeline and benchmarks to success, which you describe as an Afghanistan ‘‘that can 

secure and govern itself.’’ 

However, I believe this timeline and these benchmarks are almost entirely dependent upon the actions of a corrupt central government and on the growth in the size and capabilities of the Afghan national security forces, both very difficult challenges—and 

you have had many questions about that today. 

General, The Washington Post reported a few weeks ago that we 

have recently made significant gains in Marjah, and you have alluded to that today and talked about it, as have others who have 

recently visited. Violence has declined, more civilians are cooperating with our forces, and last September’s elections had a high 

voter turnout. 

However, this progress required the deployment of 15,000 soldiers and a full year of fighting to secure a town of less than 80,000 

people. And we were supposed to be well on our way by now to se-
46 

curing Kandahar, a hub of Taliban activity with a population of 

half a million. 

With progress this slow, why should we have any confidence you 

will hue to the timeline with substantial redeployments beginning 

this summer? Why should we believe that the current strategy will 

succeed across the rest of Afghanistan by 2014? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, with respect, Congresswoman, I think the—number of U.S. Marines that we ever had in 

Marjah was a bit less than 4,500. And we will get you the exact 

number. I think it was a few hundred less than that. 

And the last I saw, I think we are down to around 1,600 now. 

So even though we haven’t formally commenced transition in 

Marjah, because there are a number of other issues and challenges 

that have to be dealt with before we can get to that point, there 

is no question that we have already been able to thin out our forces 

and have our Afghan partners expand their presence and capability. 

That notwithstanding, this is a tough fight. And I don’t want to 

diminish the challenges that continue to confront us there. But the 

fact is that we have indeed been able to reduce our forces substantially and that we have been able to reinvest them, if you will, in 

other areas further out from the population centers and then in 

other districts where they were needed. 

Ms. TSONGAS. But, General, nevertheless, it took quite a bit 

longer than you initially anticipated—— 

General PETRAEUS. Not longer than I anticipated, with respect, 

Congresswoman. I think I am on the record talking about how long 

these take. I think it is fair to say that we used some rhetoric at 

that time, like governance in a box, that turned out not to be in 

the box, and that kind of thing was unhelpful. And indeed there 

have been times when we have made pronouncements in the past. 

But we have frankly tried very hard on my watch to underpromise and overdeliver. In fact, if you look at the record in my 

statements on Zhari and Panjway Districts west of Kandahar, and 

Arghandab and so forth, you will see that we were very cautious 

in our projections of the rate of progress there. 

And, frankly, ultimately, we did actually state that we had actually done it a little bit faster than we had anticipated. 

This is hard government work. It is tough fighting in very, very 

difficult conditions, almost like the hedgerows of Normandy, in certain respects, in some of these districts. And again, I would submit 

that, on my watch as the commander, that I have been very, very 

circumspect in projections about what it is that we will do and in 

explaining what we have done, and that there are a lot of caveats 

and that what we have tried to do is to be as forthright as we possibly could. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And nevertheless, these gains are fragile. And I 

think what, as you testified—— 

General PETRAEUS. And that is my statement as well. 

Ms. TSONGAS [continuing]. I think what you see here today is we 

have, sort of, a fork in the road, where those who see this, the fragility supporting continued investment and those who, seeing that 

fragility, wonder simply how much longer can we hew to this 

strategy? 
47 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. David, Miche`le, thank you all for coming this 

morning. 

David, since you gave a shout-out to the 101st a while ago, the 

Screaming Eagles, my dad served and fought with the 101st in 

Korea, and he was very proud of that affiliation with that fine organization. 

We talked a lot about corruption. There is some corruption that 

we can do something about in our supply chains and in our care 

and feeding of our team. As you push into that, give me a couple 

of—let me give you a couple questions on that, about connections 

between U.S. contracting and corruption in Afghanistan, as well as 

what are the barriers that you need to identify the malign actors 

and the systems? 

And what can Congress do to give you either new tools or new 

authorities to deal with things that we can do something about 

when it comes to corruption? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, Congressman, it is a great 

question. And Senator Brown, and I think it was Senator Ayotte 

in the SASC have introduced legislation that would be quite helpful to us. 

It basically gives us greater authority for more rapid termination 

of contracts when we identify that the contractors have been carrying out essentially corrupt practices or practices that undermine 

what it is we are trying to do as counterinsurgents. So that would 

be quite helpful. 

We have also requested some 60 or so individuals with special 

skill sets to help us with oversight of these various contracting activities. Now, these are quite highly trained and experienced individuals. It is another area in which Secretary Gates has worked exceedingly hard to encourage the services to find these individuals 

and to provide them to us. 

I think we are about halfway there in that, and there is a good 

prospect for additional ones coming. 

We have formed two task forces, Task Force 2010 and Task 

Force Spotlight. The latter focuses on the issue of private security 

contractors as we move forward, an area of legitimate and understandable concern to President Karzai, as they can take on the role 

of extralegal armed groups, if not careful, without sufficient oversight. 

And then the other is looking at all contracts. And we reviewed 

several hundred contracts to this point. There is a small percentage 

of those that we have identified in which there have been activities 

ongoing that either, again, undermine our counterinsurgency effort 

or corrupt or a combination of the two. 

And in those cases, we have indeed debarred nine contractors, 

and then there are a couple dozen more—a few dozen more that 

are under suspension with the possibility of debarment. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Will this legislation give you access to the books 

and records of the contractors that you may not have access to 

now? 

General PETRAEUS. There could be a provision. Again, I am not 

the expert on the legislation, other than to have been assured by 
48 

those who are experts that it would be very helpful to us in what 

it is we are trying to do. 

Because we occasionally are unable to take action as swiftly as 

we would like to. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Miche`le, most of us think that Afghanistan 

will be a country in which the world will have to pour resources 

for a long time. Can you give us some sort of a scope as to what 

we currently spend there as ISAF, writ large, versus the Afghan 

economy? 

And what are the—or what are you all’s plans, you know, postour leaving, whatever that might be, with troops and the Afghanis 

have got the national police in place and the Afghan national army 

is in place, and—police and all that is working—can you give us 

some sort of a scope as to how they—how that continues to fund 

that infrastructure of security? 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Congressman, I would like to get back to 

you on the figures, particularly the comparison between what we 

are spending versus the Afghan GDP [gross domestic product]. So 

I will—if that is okay, I will take that and get back to you with 

the figures on the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

Secretary FLOURNOY. But I think, you know, we are seeing the 

beginnings of growth in the Afghan economy as they bring their agricultural sector back. But I think, long-term, the key elements are 

going to be creating the capacity to really build a strategic minerals 

extraction industry that actually benefits the Afghan people and 

the Afghan government, not just the foreign companies who come 

in, although there will be benefits for them as well. 

Building a whole—they really don’t have a customs, taxation— 

they have no real revenue-generating system that is above board 

and that is, sort of, formalized and so forth. 

And so part of what we are doing is providing advisers to the 

various ministries, particularly the finance ministry, to help them 

put some of these structures and systems in place. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. Please don’t break our internal revenue 

code over there, as a go-by. That doesn’t work. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Okay. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you for your service. Appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Pingree. 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Thank you, Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, for joining 

us today. I know it has been a long day already, and I can see you 

are down at the bottom row, so congratulations on making it this 

far. 

And I want to reiterate what many of my colleagues have said. 

That is that we all truly appreciate the hard work and sacrifice of 

both of you and the troops that you lead. And coming from the 

state of Maine, where we do have National Guard deployed and 

have sent so many of our citizens to this and other wars, we know 

what this sacrifice is. 

Also in Maine, when we look at the costs of this war, we feel that 

there has been an extraordinarily high burden to our state when 
49 

you divide that up. It is about $3.4 billion, the cost to our state 

residents in paying for the war in Afghanistan. 

And I continue to hear from my constituents about the astronomical costs that we have here, both in our lives lost and the resources we sacrifice at home to support the ongoing mission. I want 

to talk a little bit about that. 

As we have seen earlier, 75 percent of Americans have said that 

a substantial number of combat troops should be removed from Afghanistan this summer, according to a Washington Post poll released this week. 

Many like myself are deeply concerned that this will not be a reality come July, and I think we know that is true. 

Every day more and more Americans are looking for an end to 

this war, but as we sit here and talk about it, there really doesn’t 

seem to be an end in sight. 

DOD budget documents have forecast a drop of U.S. troops in Afghanistan from 102,000 to 98,250. That is only a 3.5 percent reduction, which can hardly be described as an accelerated transition. 

In the President’s final orders for escalation, he defined the mission of escalation as setting conditions for accelerated transition to 

Afghan authorities beginning in this July. 

However, I believe there is a lack of transparency and accountability, and this has raised some serious concerns. And it has also 

made it more challenging to fully understand some of the conditions on the ground. 

In recent months, I believe there has been a significant reduction 

in information about the war in Afghanistan coming from the Pentagon. For example, you have made it clear that a key ingredient 

to a successful counterinsurgency strategy is for the population in 

Afghanistan to support and have confidence in their government. 

As you once put it, and I know you have again, you cannot kill 

or capture your way to victory in Afghanistan. 

This makes it hard to understand why data collected quarterly 

about the support of Afghans, the support that they have for the 

government, was dropped from your most recent report to Congress 

in November of 2010. 

I am interested in knowing whether this decision has been made 

to no longer collect this data, and if the decision has not been 

made, why it was omitted from the report? 

One of my major concerns, as well as the loss of life, and one that 

I share with my constituents, is if taxpayer dollars are being used 

appropriately. 

Reports by the GAO special inspector general for Afghan reconstruction and others have raised serious concerns about the potential waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars associated with security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. 

Last April the Department of Defense reported that Afghan civil 

service support program, ACSS, will disburse $85 million in support of civil service reform efforts from January 2010 to the end of 

the project in 2011. 

The department also reported that the U.S. government was 

transferring $30 million directly to the Afghan ministry of finance 

to support the civilian technical assistance plan. 
50 

And in fiscal year 2010, $1 billion was appropriated for the commanders’ emergency program with the goal of continuing reconstruction and development work. 

I know you have spoken in support of that program, but I have 

serious concerns about how it is spent, and have not seen any accounting to Congress about those—how those U.S. taxpayer dollars 

have been spent. 

I know this is a lot of information to provide in my last minute 

and would be happy to see it in writing. 

But I would like to know more, and I would like the committee 

to have more information about how U.S. taxpayer funds in the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program have been used and 

what objectives that funding has achieved. 

The CHAIRMAN. I would ask that you do wrap this up at the 5 

minutes. I know you have a hard leave time and we still have several members. So—— 

Ms. PINGREE. And I completely concur with that. It is a lot of information and I would be happy to see it in writing. So I appreciate 

that. 

General PETRAEUS. Let me just state, I would welcome the opportunity to provide it. We will be completely transparent with you. 

We have voluminous records on how CERP is spent. And the $400 

million that is spent directly by our commanders to support the security gains averages about $17,000 a project, and we can show you 

every single project and lay that out for you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

General PETRAEUS. The CERP AIF [Afghanistan Infrastructure 

Fund] is working its way through, because that is spent in coordination with AID, as I am sure you know. And then the CERP for 

reintegration $50 million has been invaluable in helping our Afghan partners initiate the conduct of reintegration of reconcilable 

members. We have spent about $5 million to $6 million of that so 

far. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just say, I think that if you look 

at the reporting to Congress, that we have sought to make it more 

factual, more detailed, and, frankly, have been complimented on 

that. 

On the specific issue of the polls, I will look into that and try to 

get to you whatever the latest polling information we have on that. 

Because we are striving to be more transparent, to be more factual 

and provide more data to Congress. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 99.] 

Secretary FLOURNOY. On the July 2011 date, a couple of folks 

have said, you know, we are not going to realize what the President promised. We are. We will begin the responsible drawdown in 

July. 

What 2014 is, is not moving the goal posts, it is just setting the 

goal of what we—when we expect to complete the transition to Afghanistan lead for security countrywide. 

So these two dates are bookends. It is not a moving of the goal 

posts. 
51 

Ms. PINGREE. My time has run out, but I will look forward to following up with you in the future. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Secretary Flournoy, let me just say thanks for being so accessible to us and being here so much for us so that we are able 

to ask. You have made yourself very available all the time. I am 

sure you enjoy it. 

And, General Petraeus, I don’t think people understand first the 

sacrifices and the time. I mean, you have been going nonstop 

since—well, since you first deployed to Iraq. So it is hard for anybody, even me with three tours, it is still nothing compared to what 

you have gone through, and your family, and your wife, and how 

tired you must be just in general of this. And I am sure nobody 

wants victory in Afghanistan so you can get out more than you do, 

and we understand that. 

My little brother got back from Iraq, from his 1-year tour, without a combat action ribbon. So with that, I want to thank you, too. 

He was in the 4th Stryker Brigade up there, and he is not happy 

with you for that, but we are, my father and I. 

And lastly, pertaining to Iraq as well, thank you again for giving 

us victory over there. You and General Keane and General Odierno 

and what you orchestrated. My father just wrote a book called ‘‘Victory in Iraq,’’ and it is because of you. So I don’t think we talk 

about that enough, that we did achieve victory there, and thank 

you for that. 

First question is, in the first part of your testimony, General, you 

said, ‘‘But I do believe there will be some combat forces included 

in those options and in that recommendation.’’ I think it was in regard to Chairman McKeon’s question. 

So the question is, is every option you are going to submit going 

to have combat forces included for withdrawal, or will that be one 

of the options? 

General PETRAEUS. I am still working on the options, as I said. 

And there is still obviously some months to run. It is something 

that will be, again, based on conditions on the ground. And so we 

want to—frankly, any commander always wants as much flexibility 

as he can have prior to doing—providing options and recommendations. And so we are going to exercise that to the best of our ability. 

Mr. HUNTER. But will every option have—if you give five options, 

will all five include a combat troop withdrawal or combat troop 

withdrawal could be included in your options? 

General PETRAEUS. Could be included in those. Again, I don’t 

want to get pinned down into what each option will consist of at 

this point in time, because we are still formulating them. 

Mr. HUNTER. And when it comes to risk, obviously, is Congress 

going to be able to be presented with a risk analysis of your drawdown—— 

General PETRAEUS. Well, I—— 

Mr. HUNTER [continuing]. I mean, if you drop by 5,000, the risk 

goes up by this much, et cetera? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, there is a variety of criteria, actually—one of which, by the way, is that it is a meaningful imple-
52 

mentation of the policy, because, again, there is something about 

the message of urgency here that does actually have significance, 

as Secretary Gates has explained I think quite effectively to the 

SASC. But then in other cases there will certainly be risks in certain aspects. 

I will lay that out for the chain of command. It is going to be extraordinarily closely held and will then be presented to the President. And, you know, beyond that point in time I will defer to the 

Pentagon on how they might share that with the Congress. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. 

Madam Flournoy, along with Ms. Pingree’s question—she asked 

about CERP—I know that CERP works, because I saw it work. I 

mean, there is nothing better you can spend—there is no way to 

better spend the money than put it into the commander’s hands, 

sometimes when that ground commander is like the mayor of that 

town basically for a while as it stands up. 

My question is, I was working a little bit with General Duncan, 

Arnie Duncan—not Arnie Duncan, trying to think of his first name. 

He was the I.G. [Inspector General] for USAID. 

General PETRAEUS. Arnie Fields? 

Mr. HUNTER. Arnie Fields. Sorry, Arnie Fields. Too many Duncans and Arnies. 

And he is no longer there, but we were looking at how aid is 

being spent on the State Department side. I think that is a big 

question a lot of folks have, because the military keeps extraordinary records. The State Department side doesn’t always. 

Who is in charge now for, you know, further on contact from me, 

who should we be contacting to make sure that aid money is being 

spent appropriately? Because we have all heard these $100 million 

bungles that USAID has done. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. Sure. I think the two people who are really 

providing the critical oversight are the new Deputy Secretary of 

State, Tom Nides, and the head of USAID, Raj Shah. They have 

provided pretty clear guidance, policy guidance, on what the priority should be. 

Down at the embassy level, that has been integrated as the civilian dimensions of an integrated campaign plan with ISAF. And 

there are oversight levels down at the embassy level as well. 

So—but I think they would be happy to come in and explain to 

you how that works and how it is integrated with the military campaign. 

Mr. HUNTER. And I am going to finish early. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Thank you both so much for your service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Under Secretary Flournoy and General Petraeus, 

for your service to the nation. Thank you for being here today. 

General Petraeus, you have done something that perhaps many 

people didn’t think could be done, and that was to establish an orderly withdrawal from Iraq. I know of nobody who says anything 

like we failed over there, even though it was a mission that should 

not have been undertaken, in my opinion. 
53 

But nevertheless, we are in a bad situation. We are starting to 

draw down. We have drawn down considerably, quite a few troops 

there. And I look forward to the same eventuality in Afghanistan, 

and the sooner the better. 

I have heard the President and I have heard you this morning 

say that the principal objective of the United States in Afghanistan 

is to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda. 

And I have also heard you say today that we are there to subdue 

the Taliban, promote economic development, and engage in diplomacy. And I assume that the diplomacy has to do with political reconciliation. Am I correct? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, if I could, our core objective 

in Afghanistan, of course, again, relates to Al Qaeda. And that is 

to make sure that Al Qaeda does not return to Afghanistan and establish the kind of sanctuary they had prior to 9/11. 

So, again, that is the focus. Now, the only way to do that—— 

Mr. JOHNSON. And we only have 100 or so Al Qaeda. 

General PETRAEUS. The only way to make sure they don’t return 

in greater numbers is to help Afghanistan over time develop the capability to secure and to govern itself. And that leads to the need 

for the comprehensive civil-military campaign that I have described 

to you this morning. 

Mr. JOHNSON. I see. I see. So we have moved past the subdue, 

disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al Qaeda per se and now we are on 

that second strategy of subduing the Taliban. 

How many of those—how many people would you say we are engaged with militarily in Afghanistan, in terms of the opposition? 

General PETRAEUS. Well, as I mentioned earlier, Congressman, 

there is—you know, the upper bound would be in the 25,000 range 

when you are in the full-blown fighting season, if indeed they do 

return to that number. And given the losses sustained by mid-level 

leaders and a number of the fighters, we will have to see indeed 

how that transpires this spring and this summer. 

It is not at that level certainly right now. You know, I can literally walk you around the map at this point and show you where 

the active cells and active insurgent groups are. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So what I hear you saying—and I hate to interrupt, but I don’t have a lot of time—is that we are substantially 

forward in terms of controlling the Taliban. How are we doing as 

far as reconciliation, political reconciliation? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, there are two components really, if you 

will, to reconciliation. There is the component that is reintegration 

of reconcilable mid-level leaders and below. And as I mentioned in 

my opening statement, there are about 700 of those who have officially reintegrated, gone through all the steps of the official reintegration. There are another 2,000 or so who are in various 

stages of that process. 

And then we are trying to get a grip on how many have literally 

sort of unofficially reintegrated by just going back to their villages, 

laying down their weapons and reintegrating themselves into society without making a big deal about it so that they don’t make 

themselves vulnerable to the Taliban or visible to the Taliban as 

having done that. 
54 

The other component is the reconciliation with senior Talibanlevel leaders. That is something that is and has to be Afghan-led. 

That is what Secretary Clinton talked about in terms of the diplomatic surge, if you will, and so forth. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, General Petraeus and Madam Secretary, for your 

service to our country. 

The Secretary of Defense recently said at West Point that if a 

general came up to him and recommended that we do the similar 

action, that we invade, pacify, and worse, we in effect engage in nation-building again, that he would say absolutely not. 

And I just want to second that. I think we have significant, I 

think, security interests in Afghanistan. And I think we don’t want 

the Taliban to take over the country, to make that a permissive environment whereby they could leverage that as a nation-state to 

further destabilize Pakistan; to assist the Taliban on the other side 

of the Durand Line; that we need some basis from which we can 

launch attacks against Al Qaeda in the FATA areas of Pakistan. 

And so I think that those are certainly significant, but we seem 

to have taken the most costly approach to achieve our security interest in Afghanistan, spending over $100 billion a year, and that 

the American taxpayers will be on the hook indefinitely. Even 

when we are out of Afghanistan, there is a projected $8 billion-ayear cost in terms of maintaining Afghan security forces because 

they don’t have an economy to do that. That we are, in fact—I 

think our first actions in there were brilliant. We gave air, 

logistical and advisory support to the anti-Taliban forces in the 

country which were the Northern Alliance, and they drove them 

out. 

And instead of using our leverage to say, ‘‘You know, you need 

to reach out,’’ to, say, the anti-Taliban Pashtun elements in the 

country, and that we will assist you so long as you keep the 

Taliban and Al Qaeda out, we led an effort to superimpose a political system on them that doesn’t fit the political culture of the 

country; that doesn’t have the capacity to govern outside of Kabul; 

that is mired in corruption. 

We are trying to restructure that society and build them the 

economy at U.S. taxpayers’ expense that they have never had before. I mean, you say we are not nation-building to build them a 

Switzerland, but at over $100 billion a year, we ought to expect a 

Switzerland. 

So I, you know, I am—but I have got to tell you this. I am in 

a hard position here. I came into Congress after this whole thing 

was going on. And I volunteered to go to Iraq even though I disagreed with invading the country because I believe that once in, we 

have an obligation to finish the job. We just can’t simply run away. 

We can’t simply expeditiously extricate ourselves from that situation. 

But, so I just want to tell you that my—I have served this country now for a third time—Army, Marine Corps and as a member 

of Congress on this committee—and if I can accomplish anything 
55 

on this tour of duty, it is keeping this country from ever going 

down this path again. 

But with that said, could you please, no matter—I was with the 

Marines in Helmand province in November where they are making 

tactical successes. But tactical successes on the ground are meaningless unless we have the Afghans coming in with the governance 

piece after we have stabilized an area. 

So could you tell me, General Petraeus or Madam Secretary, are 

the Afghans able to in fact accomplish that? Are there any—can 

you give me any specifics where they have stepped in? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Please go ahead. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, Congressman. If you look at the 

five central districts of Helmand province, you will find actually 

quite good district governors now in charge of each of them. In 

some cases, it has taken more than one to get to that point, such 

as in the case of Marjah. But in each case now, we assess the district governors and the provincial governor as really quite positive 

individuals and doing good work. 

With respect, I think you are arguably correct that the first actions were brilliant. Certainly, it was a lightning campaign and it 

took out the Taliban, but they were not sufficiently capitalized on. 

And had we left it like that, it would have been in the hands of 

the warlords that we used to get rid of the Taliban, and there is 

no indication that they could have controlled the country, and you 

would have plunged back into a civil war. 

So I think, again, that we certainly have to think through, you 

know, the what-thens and the second- and third- and fourth-order 

effects of these kind of endeavors, without question and I agree 

with you very strongly on that. 

And also with respect, this is the only approach to achieving our 

core objectives in Afghanistan. Now, if you don’t want to achieve 

those objectives, then that is a different matter. But the fact is that 

we have tried every other approach. I put a slide in there that 

showed the different approaches that we tried all along the way, 

essentially counterterrorism, counterinsurgency-light, and these 

other approaches, and I can assure you that none of them are adequate. And that is why we are doing what we are doing. 

Finally, I think it is only fair to recognize that Afghanistan actually first of all was a nation-state before our own state; and second, 

had some 40 to 50 years of quite reasonable national peace and 

tranquility under a central government from Kabul prior to the 

onset of the tragic 30 years of war that they have sustained. 

Thanks again, Congressman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Madam Secretary, General, I know your time to leave was at one 

o’clock. Could I ask you to stay another 15 minutes? 

General PETRAEUS. I think we can do another 10 minutes, but 

we are actually meeting with—the former speaker is our next appointment, at least on my side. 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, well then let’s stay another 20. 

[Laughter.] 
56 

Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Flournoy and also General Petraeus. 

All the way, sir. 

I spent 21⁄2 years in Afghanistan, June 2005 to November 2007, 

and I am looking forward to getting back over there to visit with 

you in a couple months. 

But based upon my recent trip to Guantanamo Bay and also 

some of the issues that we know we are having at Pul-e-Charkhi 

prison, how is the Administration planning to handle the transfer 

or release of high-value and third-country nationals when withdrawal occurs? And specifically, I am looking at how we are planning to release or transfer these populations of detainees who are 

members of Al Qaeda and affiliated splinter groups without placing 

our national security at risk. 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, thanks for what you did do there, 

and we do look forward to getting another master paratrooper back 

out there with us. 

With respect to Pul-e-Charkhi, there has actually been substantial improvement there. In fact, there was an article in The Washington Post about Pul-e-Charkhi that our individuals who are in 

charge of helping the Afghan and also the State Department INL 

[Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs] 

individuals with—actually provided some updated information for 

them. 

There are still significant areas in which there need to be improvements there, but we have actually focused a fair amount with 

the Joint Task Force 435, not just on ensuring that the detention 

facility in Parwan, which is the new facility at Bagram Airbase, not 

the old one, is truly an international organization that monitors 

this, that we are not allowed to use the name of, but call it ‘‘the 

gold standard’’ in detention operations. 

And we are seeking to help our Afghan partners as well because 

indeed, you do have to take bad guys off the battlefield in a counterinsurgency operation. And they can’t be broken out, as they 

were broken out of the prison down in Kandahar on an annual 

basis. And there hasn’t been a jailbreak down there annually 

since—in the last year-and-a-half either. 

With respect to the third country, this is a substantial policy 

issue, and I am happy to hand off to the USDP [Under Secretary 

of Defense for Policy] on that one. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. So we do have a number of third-country 

nationals in the facility at Parwan, at Bagram. All of these are, as 

in every detainee case, they are reviewed by a detention review 

board within 60 days, and then every 6 months after, to determine 

their status, whether they meet the criteria for continued internment; whether they should be recommended for transfer to a third 

country for criminal prosecution and so forth. 

Those recommendations come all the way up to the Deputy Secretary of Defense level for review and decision. 

If we were to have additional third-country nationals captured in 

Afghanistan, they would be brought to that facility. That facility is 

not part of what is going to be transferred to Afghan control as we 

transition responsibility for detention operations. 
57 

General PETRAEUS. And if I could just add by the way, we have 

actually begun the process of transition in the detention arena as 

well. We started last year with the training and the development 

of Afghan security forces who can over time take over the various 

detainee housing units in the detention facility in Parwan. They already control the first one. There are a couple-hundred Afghan detainees who have been transitioned to them. 

And the process is that we provide the basis for which they were 

detained, which is in our system, if you will, a national security 

threat under the U.N. Security Council resolution that gives us this 

authority. But then we help them establish the case for charging 

them under Afghan law, and interestingly, biometrics and other 

forensics have proven to be very helpful and very persuasive, that 

we get off, for example, improvised explosive devices and so forth. 

And as I said, that process has begun already and a couple-hundred have already been transitioned, and it is accelerating as we 

go along. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you very much, sir, and I will see you over in 

the box. 

And I yield back to the Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Ryan. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to speak. Thank you for sticking around. 

I guess it is appropriate that this may be the final question or 

a final bit of conversation that we have. It is the issue of suicides 

among our soldiers. From 2005 to 2009, we have had 1,100 soldiers 

commit suicide, one every 36 hours. A report in Navy Times said 

that 7.3 percent of Army, Navy and Marines have thought about 

attempting suicide. 

Have we changed any of our pre-deployment training or training 

in general to try to help diminish these numbers a bit? 

General PETRAEUS. We have. We have also taken a number of 

steps in the theater in a whole host of different ways, everything 

from increasing the staffing of medical professionals who deal with 

this, to the training of leaders to identify individuals who might be 

at risk, and literally training all to be willing to raise one’s hand 

and not feel as if, you know, it is just unacceptable to say, ‘‘Hey, 

I am feeling under some considerable stress, and so forth, and 

would like to talk to someone about it.’’ 

Touch wood, but the rate in Afghanistan has been significantly 

less since these have been instituted. There are also significant 

policies, of course, that have been enacted for post-deployment, because that is really where the challenges are. 

That is not something I have obviously had oversight of as the 

Commander in Afghanistan, but I have obviously monitored as an 

Army four-star with the Vice Chief of Staff of Army and the Chief 

of Staff, directing a number of actions for the post-deployment period as well. 

And the Under Secretary might want to supplement that. 

Secretary FLOURNOY. If I could just add, there is intense interest 

and concern on the part of the Secretary, the Chiefs, the service 

Secretaries about this issue. 
58 

Interestingly, from what we can tell, the data suggests there is 

not a strong correlation with deployment, in terms of the rates 

don’t increase based on time deployed or number of deployments. 

But in any case there is an intensive effort to—for a broad educational effort on how to identify the signs, giving people the sense 

that they can come forward with concerns without risk—taking 

risk in their careers, much more resourcing of prevention programs, greater availability of prevention programs, and just a 

much broader set of efforts to get at overall stress on the force, 

whether it manifests itself in this way or in other things like divorce rates or PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] and so forth. 

So this has really risen to the level of getting strategic-level attention in the department. 

Mr. RYAN. Well, I appreciate that, and I think a lot of these numbers don’t include those people who, you know, also get in car accidents because they are drinking and driving, and substance abuse. 

And you guys know the whole routine. 

And I wanted to bring this up to you primarily because, General 

Petraeus, you are the preeminent military man in our country 

today. And I wanted to just bring to your attention—and you guys 

probably know some of this already—but the recent brain science, 

the field of neuroplasticity gives great hope to some of these soldiers. 

And I want to point you to a study and a program called Mind 

Fitness by Elizabeth Stanley, who is over in Georgetown with a 

neuroscientist, Amishi Jha. And they did this study, and it is basically dealing with working memory capacity and how through the 

training, through this mind fitness training—and they studied 

about 30 Marines—through the mind fitness training you can actually build up resiliency within the working memory capacity. 

And studies have shown outside of the military increased working memory capacity has all kinds of benefits that I think would 

benefit the soldier, situational awareness, attention skills, awareness, all of these great things. 

But in addition to that, she cites in her report here, which I will 

hand each of you before you leave here, working—people with low 

working memory capacity have poorer academic achievement, lower 

standardized tests, more episodes of mind wandering, which gets to 

the operational side. 

But they are more likely to suffer from PTSD, anxiety disorders, 

substance abuse, and are more likely to exhibit prejudicial behavior 

towards personally disliked groups. 

So the point is, I think a part of our training pre-deployment can 

be working on increasing this working memory capacity as a buffer 

throughout the deployment and possibly an opportunity. 

So a lot more studies have to be done. I wanted to take this opportunity to bring it to your attention because I think it really can 

be transformational for how we train our troops. 

General PETRAEUS. In fact, the Army has launched an initiative, 

it is about a year old now, I think, on resiliency training, that you 

can actually, again, harden an individual psychologically in advance and actually recover more rapidly if that—if that training is 

carried out. 

Thank you. 
59 

The CHAIRMAN. Madam Secretary, General, I know that you have 

given us an additional 15 minutes. I thank you for your patience. 

And let the former speaker know we are sorry that you are late. 

And we appreciate her patience. 

What I would ask, we have four other members here that have 

been patient but not able to get their questions in. If they put them 

to you in writing, would you please respond to them? 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will stand in and be adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 16, 2011 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 16, 2011 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2011 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] [See page 44.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] [See page 25.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] [See page 48.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. PINGREE 

Secretary FLOURNOY. [The information referred to was not available at the time 

of printing.] [See page 50.] 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] [See page 50.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2011 

(103) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. The January 2011 SIGAR report identified the absence of a ‘‘coordinated, results-oriented approach to determine whether CERP projects have achieved 

their goals, are being used as intended, and are being sustained.’’ Such an approach 

does exist in the Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework (TCAPF)-credited by commanders as contributing to successes in areas of Helmand and Kunar 

Provinces. Do you believe there is merit in institutionalizing TCAPF as a means of 

focusing the targeting of CERP funds and evaluating their effectiveness in terms of 

reducing instability? 

General PETRAEUS. The Tactical Conflict Assessment Planning Framework 

(TCAPF) is designed to identify the causes of instability, to develop initiatives to diminish or mitigate those causes, and to evaluate the effectiveness of those initiatives 

in fostering stability at the tactical level. By focusing on village dynamics and priorities, and, in particular, follow-up interviews, TCAPF has been useful in determining whether stability has improved as a result of implemented projects. 

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) encompasses programs 

and projects intended to have immediate tactical effects for the warfighter, including 

development initiatives, construction projects, and humanitarian efforts. To implement CERP effectively, we established the Money As A Weapon System—Afghanistan (MAAWS–A) CERP Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) to provide guidelines that are, in fact, similar to those that guide TCAPF and that incorporate lessons learned from SOPs in Iraq. For example, CERP projects are currently initiated 

after speaking with the local Afghan population—including village elders and other 

local leaders—to determine their most critical needs so that we can support the 

highest priority requirements. 

CERP could potentially benefit from TCAPF lessons learned and processes during 

after-action reviews. We will explore this concept further, with a particular focus on 

whether CERP SOPs need additional emphasis on follow-on interviews to determine 

whether CERP objectives were met. We will also examine whether TCAPF’s instability assessment processes could benefit from data we are gathering as part of the 

CERP program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. What is the strength of the Haqqani network in numbers? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. COOPER. What is the fighting capability of the Haqqani network? What do 

they bring to the fight compared to Taliban fighters? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Since you assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan, what steps have you taken to reduce the 

opium production? 

a) Has it been successful? Please describe. 

b) What are you doing to limit future production? 

c) What can Congress do to help? 

General PETRAEUS. Since the illegal narcotics industry is the largest source of Afghanistan-derived income for the Taliban—with other revenue streams from outside 

the country—we are working to deprive the enemy of this important source of funding, especially in the major poppy-growing areas in the south. As we have made 

progress on the security front in Helmand, we have further pressured illegal narcotics networks by significantly increasing the amount of drugs interdicted and by 

reducing enemy freedom of movement. As security improves, we and our Afghan 
104 

partners are also pursuing development initiatives to provide licit opportunities for 

Afghans as an alternative to the drug trade. 

Beyond security and development, we are also supporting Afghan-led eradication 

efforts, which are most mature in the south. Helmand Province, for example, accounts for around 70 percent of Afghanistan’s eradication efforts, with approximately 1,600 hectares eradicated there in 2010. And, as of early April, more than 

1,200 hectares had already been eradicated this year. Although crop-eradication initiatives are Afghan-led, we are working with our Afghan partners to offer incentives 

for provincial governors to pursue eradication, and these have shown signs of success this year. 

Additionally, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency is mentoring Afghan counternarcotics police, who are showing an increase in capabilities as a result. 

a) Nationwide drug interdictions have increased significantly from last year, with 

interdictions in the south representing a significant portion of the finds. In the first 

quarter of 2011, we interdicted nearly 350 percent more illegal drugs than in the 

same time period in 2010 (with a 700 percent increase between March 2010 and 

March 2011). Simultaneously, there was a nearly 50 percent decrease in nationwide 

opium production between 2009 and 2010, although a poppy blight last year is responsible for much of that. 

As part of our effort to sever the nexus between the insurgency, corrupt government officials, and narcotics traffickers, we are also working to establish a more effective counter-narcotics criminal justice center. Last year, the Afghans achieved a 

98 percent conviction rate for drug-related offenses, with most sentences in the 

range of 15–20 years. 

Clearly, much work remains to be done with all of our counter-narcotics efforts— 

especially capacity-building—but we have made clear progress over the last year 

and anticipate that we will make further progress in the coming year. 

b) The most important element of our strategy to limit future production is to continue expanding the security bubbles in the most important poppy-growing areas in 

the south. Improved security increases the risk to narco-traffickers and also prevents the insurgency from reaping the full financial benefits of the drug trade. Additionally, security allows governance and development projects to take hold, which 

in turn helps to establish a licit economy that encourages Afghan farmers to grow 

licit crops rather than poppy. 

The other important element of our long-term strategy is to build Afghan capacity 

to maintain and to increase pressure on narcotics networks. Among other initiatives, 

this includes the continued development of the Afghan National Security Forces (especially the counter-narcotics police), support for eradication efforts, and expanded 

rule-of-law efforts to increase the Afghan government’s ability to detain and prosecute drug kingpins and corrupt officials involved in the drug trade. 

c) Congress has been very supportive of our counter-narcotics efforts. Perhaps the 

most important area in which Congress can help is to ensure that the civilian agencies involved in counter-narcotics efforts have sufficient funding. In particular, our 

long-term success in this mission will depend on the important work of the Drug 

Enforcement Agency and the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement Affairs. 

Mr. TURNER. What conditions will you consider, in July 2011, to determine the 

extent of a U.S. troop drawdown? 

General PETRAEUS. I will consider all elements of our comprehensive civil-military 

campaign as I prepare my recommendation for a troop drawdown commencing in 

July 2011. As part of that process, I will provide my chain of command with various 

options as well as my best military advice for each, which will incorporate, among 

other factors, assessments of: security gains in key geographic areas; Afghan National Security Forces growth and development; Afghan readiness to assume additional security responsibilities; Afghan Local Police growth and effectiveness; reintegration momentum, and Afghan governance and development, especially at the 

district and provincial level. 

Mr. TURNER. When do you expect to reach the next ‘‘decision point,’’ after July 

2011, about possible further reductions in U.S. troop commitments? 

General PETRAEUS. Current and future decisions regarding a conditions-based 

drawdown of U.S. troops are ultimately the purview of the President. As we begin 

an initial U.S. drawdown in July 2011, I will continuously assess the situation on 

the ground in order to provide my best military advice to my chain of command during my remaining months on the ground. 
105 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Over the course of our involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

we have learned many valuable lessons about reconstruction and stabilization. In 

your opinion, what would be the most valuable lesson learned in terms of something 

that was done successfully. What would be the most valuable lesson learned based 

on a policy that did not work? 

General PETRAEUS. The most valuable lesson learned about reconstruction and 

stabilization in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that reconstruction and stabilization 

is not an end in itself, but rather a means to lay the foundation for long-term security and development. In Afghanistan, we are dealing with a severely fractured and 

war-torn social and economic environment, where government capacity to deliver 

critical socio-economic services to the grassroots is weak. In these conditions, we 

have learned that we need to pursue both top-down and bottom-up approaches. For 

instance, we have to build capacity in key ministries to ensure that the Afghans can 

build sufficient security forces and also improve the ability to deliver certain services, such as those associated with the rule of law. At the same time, we also have 

to build up local communities with governance and development programs to empower the Afghan people and to increase economic opportunities. The World Bankled National Solidarity Program is one example that incorporates local decisionmaking, prioritizes projects, and requires a minimum 10 percent community input— 

all of which supports our goal of mobilizing communities and connecting the people 

to their government. 

One of the most valuable lessons we have learned during these conflicts is the 

need to continually improve coordination and communication—with the host nation 

as well as other stakeholders, such as U.S. government agencies, international partners, and non-governmental organizations. When it comes to coordinating with the 

host nation, it is particularly important to work with local partners and leaders to 

ensure a sense of responsibility and ownership by the community. In Iraq, we frequently tended to take a top-down approach to reconstruction, which did not always 

promote responsibility at the local level, and that in turn often undermined the 

long-term sustainability of individual projects. Although we have been more effective in Afghanistan, there are still instances where a lack of buy-in undermined the 

goal of a given initiative. 

More generally, we have learned the importance of coordinating with all the various stakeholders, on matters large and small, to ensure that we do not duplicate 

efforts and that we are all focused on the same goals. Obviously, this is a particular 

challenge considering how many actors are often involved. Still, improving our ability to get everyone on the same page is the only way that we can establish the necessary unity of effort to be successful in this endeavor. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Currently, the Department of Defense, Department of State 

and the U.S. Agency for International Development have all been working together 

to implement reconstruction policy. 

a) Is this relationship working? 

b) How could it work better? 

c) Would you recommend the development of a separate agency to take over reconstruction policy? 

General PETRAEUS. a) Yes, a combined U.S. Embassy, USAID, ISAF, and 

USFOR–A civil-military team is working together closely to plan and to implement 

reconstruction policy, particularly with the development of large-scale strategic infrastructure projects. 

There are many examples of our combined efforts, especially in recent years. For 

instance, USAID and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) have leveraged 

resources to address multiple Afghanistan water-resource issues. Over the last year, 

USAID has used Economic Support Funds to finance USACE provincial watershed 

assessments, 15 of which were completed in February 2011 (the remainder should 

be completed by June 2011). These assessments are critical to identify small-scale 

dam sites with the potential to increase agricultural production. 

A more significant example of our ability to work together on reconstruction is the 

newly created Afghan Infrastructure Fund (AIF), a joint venture between the State 

Department/USAID and the Defense Department. Projects require joint approval by 

the Secretaries of State and Defense, which requires close coordination. The initial 

proposal for this year’s $400 million allotment included improvements to the Northeast Power System and the Southeast Power System, other projects to improve the 

national electricity grid, and funds for rule-of-law initiatives. We are currently working on a second list of projects to be nominated for funding in 2012. 

b) The relationship between the Defense Department, the State Department, and 

USAID has improved over the last several years as all three agencies have increas-
106 

ingly focused on the civil-military counterinsurgency campaign plan. Despite the increased coordination and common goal, there is still room to improve our collective 

understanding of individual roles and responsibilities and how they fit into the overall campaign plan. This is particularly true when it comes to development efforts, 

but, as noted, we have made substantial progress in this arena. 

c) I would not recommend creating a separate agency to lead reconstruction policy, 

especially considering the improvements we have made and are making along this 

important line of effort. Creating another agency would not necessarily translate 

into either better policy or better policy implementation. It could, in fact, have the 

opposite effect since it would inevitably increase bureaucratic friction and confuse 

the current roles and responsibilities that have evolved over many years and in response to many lessons learned. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. General, President Obama has noted that ‘‘Pakistan is central to our 

efforts to defeat Al Qaeda’’ and has insisted that Pakistan deal with terrorist safe 

havens within their borders. As a result, we have poured money into the country 

in hopes of having some effect on Pakistani leadership. I am concerned how Pakistan is using these funds, especially given the recent killings of non-Muslims and 

the arrest of Raymond Davis, not to mention their nuclear stockpile. 

a) What is Pakistan doing with all of the funds we have given them? 

b) Are we handing money to trusted hands that share similar goals or are we 

funding a government that is increasingly opposed to our vision? 

General PETRAEUS. a) As commander of the International Security Assistance 

Force and U.S. Forces—Afghanistan, I do not have oversight of U.S. funds provided 

to Pakistan. Obviously, we coordinate closely with other U.S. entities working with 

Pakistan—and I have a working relationship with Pakistani military leaders—but 

specific funding questions would be better answered by the Office of the Defense 

Representative—Pakistan, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department. 

b) Again, questions along these lines are better answered by the U.S. agencies 

that directly control the funding and by senior U.S. policymakers responsible for foreign policy. 

Mr. FRANKS. General, I am a big supporter of the Guard and Reserve Components 

of our military forces and I deeply appreciate their service to America. Given the 

2014 timeframe, what is the role of the Guard and Reserve today in Afghanistan 

and how do you see their role evolving with the projected change of our Nation’s 

force structure? 

General PETRAEUS. Current and future operations depend on a fully integrated 

Active, Guard, and Reserve force with the flexibility to respond quickly to changing 

operational requirements. As it is currently sized, the U.S. Army is dependent on 

the Reserve and National Guard to maintain the current deployment tempo in Iraq 

and Afghanistan and to provide critical enabling capabilities on the battlefield. In 

Afghanistan, Reservists and Guardsmen play particularly important roles in the 

fields of Engineering, Signal, Medical, Civil Affairs, Transportation, Logistics, and 

Military Police. 

As we move toward 2014 and beyond, a smaller active force may be even more 

dependent on these key enablers, although the number of troops deployed will also 

affect the roles of the Reservists and Guardsmen. Regardless, there is little doubt 

that our Guard and Reserve Components will be critical elements of our overall 

force in the years to come. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Mr. JOHNSON. Al Qaeda has a relatively small presence in Afghanistan—likely 

less than 100 fighters, is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it correct that the overwhelming majority of combat engagements 

for coalition and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan do not involve Al Qaeda; instead, they involve a variety of armed groups with various ideological, political, or 

tribal identities and objectives? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 
107 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it fair to say, General, that many of the warring factions in Afghanistan—and many of them are Pashtun—are principally concerned with domestic Afghan and local political issues? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. Rather than attacking and further alienating these factions, General, and attempting to force their total submission to the Afghan central government, is it worth considering whether we should instead play the role of the honest 

broker and mediate disputes between these Afghan factions, facilitating the redress 

of grievances, so a political settlement can be achieved? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. You have said, ‘‘You don’t end an industrial strength insurgency 

by killing or capturing all the bad guys. You have to kill, capture, or turn the bad 

guys, and that means reintegration and reconciliation.’’ As we approach the 10th anniversary of the Bonn Conference, where are we on the reconciliation piece of that 

strategy? What will a likely political settlement look like? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. In an op-ed in The New York Times on Wednesday, March 23, 

Lakhdar Brahimi and Amb. Thomas Pickering write that, ‘‘we believe the best moment to start the process toward reconciliation is now, while force levels are near 

their peak.’’ In other words, we’re at our position of greatest negotiating strength 

now. Do you agree with that and believe it’s time to start negotiating? If not now, 

when will be the right time? 

General PETRAEUS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. The spending resolution that the House passed last month cut the 

International Affairs budget by 16 percent. How would cutting State and USAID 

funding affect operations in the AfPak area? 

General PETRAEUS. Reducing State and USAID funding could significantly affect 

operations in Afghanistan, and, depending on the scale of the cuts, potentially undermine the hard-fought gains that we have made over the last year. Our State and 

USAID partners are involved in every element of our comprehensive civil-military 

counterinsurgency campaign. For example, State and USAID provide substantial 

funding and, just as importantly, institutional knowledge necessary to construct 

strategic infrastructure and to establish effective governance and rule of law—all of 

which is critical to the long-term stability of Afghanistan. 

Additionally, as the transition process begins, there will be a greater emphasis on 

the civilian elements of our civil-military campaign. In particular, we will need to 

support the Afghan government as it strengthens human and institutional capacity 

and as it works to improve basic-service delivery to the Afghan people. This includes 

initiatives to improve health care, education, sanitation, food security, vocational 

training, and access to potable water—all of which are important to successfully carrying out irreversible transition. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. General you stated that the core objective is ensuring that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for Al Qaeda. Achievement of this objective, I feel, is shared by everyone in this room and it requires that we help Afghanistan develop sufficient capabilities to secure and govern itself. You stated that 

in a typical 90-day period, precision operations by SOCOM units and their Afghan 

counterparts alone kill or capture some 360 targeted insurgent leaders. I am assuming that these leaders have ties to the Taliban, Al Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, 

and various other groups sympatric to the Taliban and radical Islamic terrorism. 

a) It has been promulgated by multiple sources, including our current administration, that Afghan forces will take over throughout Afghanistan by the end of 2014; 

at that time who will assume the duties of kill/capture missions and the prolonged 

detention of captured insurgents? 

b) Do you see a shared strategic partnership in this endeavor after 2014? The 

main point here being that if we are sending SOCOM units to kill or capture these 

targeted insurgents, who live most likely become high-value detainees, I assume 

they are threats to our national security. These aren’t people we just want to ‘‘let 

go’’ of or lose situational awareness and control of after 2014. 
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c) Between now and 2014, how do you and the ISAF plan to release or transfer 

these populations of detainees, who are members of Al Qaeda and affiliated splinter 

groups, without placing our national security at risk? 

d) Is there an adequate plan in place for transfer or release? 

General PETRAEUS. We intend for Afghan security forces to be in the lead for security across the country by the end of 2014. Obviously, capture/kill missions and detainee operations will remain important components of the fight over the next few 

years. To increase Afghan capacity to carry out targeted raids, we have been and 

are continuing to build Afghan commando and special operation units for high-precision missions. The Afghan Army has already fielded a formidable special operations 

component with nine commando kandaks and 14 Special Forces A–Teams, all of 

which are increasingly capable of performing independent operations. We intend to 

further increase the numbers and capabilities of these units in the years ahead so 

that Afghans can assume more responsibility for high-end missions. That said, even 

after 2014, some targets may require high-end technology and capabilities that our 

armed forces alone possess. 

We have already started transitioning the Detention Facility in Parwan, and we 

are working with our Afghan partners to build Afghan capacity for detention operations. We believe that Afghans will possess the personnel and capacity to lead this 

effort by the end of 2014. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General, you have stated that it is imperative to ensure the transition actions we take are irreversible. We have one shot to get this right. You recognize that we and our Afghan partners cannot kill and capture our way out of this 

insurgency. 

a) With that said; can you please elaborate on the Afghan-led reintegration of reconcilable insurgents? 

b) What is a reconcilable insurgent? 

c) What is the reintegration process? 

d) How do we know that these 700 former Taliban who have been reintegrated, 

and 2000 who are in the process are not just biding their time? 

e) Are any of these men being reintegrated and then allowed to join the ANA or 

the ALP? As you know these guys have been fighting for 30 plus years, and even 

though we have the watch, they have the time. 

General PETRAEUS. a) Reintegration is a process whereby insurgents lay down 

their arms and rejoin Afghan society. Reintegration is focused on lower-level fighters and commanders, and the official program—the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP)—was implemented by the Afghan National Security 

Council in September 2010. Since APRP began, more than 1,700 fighters have officially enrolled, and an additional 2,000 are in some form of negotiation. ISAF’s role 

in these efforts is to support them however we can, with the understanding that 

these must be Afghan-led processes in order for them to be successful. 

b) A reconcilable insurgent is an individual who is willing to stop fighting and to 

engage in dialogue and grievance resolution with community leaders or with the Afghan government; the central goal is for him to peacefully rejoin his community 

with dignity and honor. Due to the local nature of the insurgency—a majority of insurgents fight near their homes—the grievances driving fighters are often local in 

nature. The APRP seeks to enable local agreements so that villages and communities can reach out to insurgents, address grievances, and offer enticements to stop 

fighting. There are various reasons that an insurgent might choose to lay down his 

weapon, including fear over being targeted, a belief that fighting is no longer the 

way to achieve his goals, or simply that he is tired of fighting. Reintegration depends on trust and confidence among Afghans as well as the active participation of 

the Afghan government, which we are encouraging. 

c) APRP has three phases: 1) Social Outreach, Confidence Building, and Negotiation, 2) Demobilization, and 3) Consolidation of Peace. In the first phase, community, district, and provincial leaders reach out to insurgents—via both modern and 

traditional means—to learn of their grievances and to encourage them to peacefully 

rejoin their communities. 

If there is a willingness to reintegrate, and an insurgent meets APRP eligibility 

criteria, the ex-combatant enters the demobilization phase and is formally enrolled 

in APRP. Formal enrollment includes an intent-to-reintegrate form, individual survey, biometrics collection, small-arms registration, and heavy weapons turn-in. The 

reintegration candidates are then provided assistance to aid in meeting their basic 

needs and to replace financial support that may have been provided by the insurgency. This assistance lasts for approximately 90 days, during which time the goal 

is to enroll the reintegration candidates in disengagement training. This training is 

designed to counter common misperceptions among ex-combatants and to increase 

their chances of becoming healthy, productive members of their communities. The 
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training includes modules on civics, dispute resolution, social responsibility, religion, 

and health. Upon successful completion of disengagement training, the candidate 

signs a Declaration of Reintegration. 

The third phase of APRP, Consolidation of Peace, aims to ensure that peace and 

reintegration are permanent. It involves community recovery initiatives that benefit 

the entire community, not just the insurgent. Elements of this phase include vocational and literacy training, long-term employment opportunities, and community 

development projects. 

d) It may be that a few of the more than 1,700 former fighters who have joined 

APRP are biding their time, but intelligence reports, interviews, and surveys of reintegration candidates all indicate that the vast majority of reintegration activities 

are genuine. The extensive steps involved in APRP also help to ensure that the willingness to leave the fight is sincere. The key is to continually engage ex-combatants 

as they proceed through the process and to facilitate local efforts since this is a very 

personal, community-based process that seeks to bind ex-combatants to their community, to the local government, and to the national government. 

e) When reintegration candidates complete the demobilization process, they are 

once again full citizens of Afghanistan, with all of the rights and responsibilities 

that entails. This means that a reintegrated individual is eligible to join the Afghan 

National Security Forces or the Afghan Local Police, assuming he meets the rigorous criteria and clears the multi-layered vetting process that each of these organizations have implemented. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General, can you discuss with us the importance of Village Stability Operations (VSO) and how this is going to affect the counterinsurgency? Can 

you talk to us about the objectives of VSO and how you see this integrated civilmilitary approach succeeding in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Since 2009, Village Stability Operations (VSO) and, since fall 

2010, the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program—a vital extension of our greater VSO 

efforts—have factored significantly into our civil-military counterinsurgency (COIN) 

campaign design and will continue to do so. VSO and ALP represent an integrated 

approach that is both bottom-up and top-down, providing security, development, and 

governance effects that are focused at the local (or village) level in rural Afghanistan. These local effects are also tangibly linked to the district, provincial, and national Afghan government in a manner that extends the government’s presence to 

rural areas—a key goal of our COIN campaign. 

VSO and ALP districts also support the larger campaign plan by disrupting insurgent infiltration routes and by denying insurgents staging areas from which they 

can attack populations in key districts. By working through local shuras and community leaders, VSO and ALP help to mobilize communities to defend themselves. 

After all, no one is more vested in the security of a village than those who live there 

and those who have offered their own sons to defend the village. This ‘‘defense in 

depth’’ adds security in areas where Coalition forces are minimal or absent. In this 

respect, VSO and ALP act as important ‘‘thickening’’ agents to increase securityforce presence, especially in rural areas. As of early May, there were 39 validated 

ALP sites with more than 5,800 ALP patrolmen, with plans to expand to a total 

of 77 sites. 

In the vast majority of VSO and ALP sites, we have seen violence levels decrease 

since these sites were established. Initially, there is often a spike in violence as insurgents challenge new forces in areas that had been previously been uncontested, 

but, over time, violence subsides. Surveys suggest that strong majorities believe that 

ALP is capable of defending their community, and we are also starting to see an 

increase in the number of people returning to VSO communities. Finally, bazaars 

and commerce have become more robust in VSO/ALP areas. All of these are important signs of localized progress, and, taken together, are increasingly contributing 

to our overall COIN campaign. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Petraeus, you mention in your testimony the importance 

of improving governance at the local level in Afghanistan. 

a) Am I to assume the same holds true at the national level as well? 

b) What are your thoughts with respect to governance capacity in central government ministries? 

c) Are these efforts also being hindered by State and USAID funding decisions? 

General PETRAEUS. a) Yes, our civil-military efforts to help our Afghan partners 

improve governance must be both bottom-up at the local level and top-down at the 

national level. 

b) Despite many challenges, the Afghan government continues to make measured 

progress in building the human and institutional capital of its central line ministries. For example, we have seen notable advance at the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior; continued institutional growth and development in those ministries will be 
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particularly important as Afghans assume more responsibility for security efforts as 

part of the transition process. The Ministry of Justice likewise will need to increase 

capacity and effectiveness as well as its ability to extend its reach into the provinces 

with rule-of-law initiatives. And other ministries—such as the Ministries of Commerce, Mines, Agriculture, and Rural Development—have important roles to play in 

economic development. 

All the ministries face institutional and personnel shortcomings, but there are important efforts underway to improve the situation. For example, there are numerous 

capacity-building initiatives supported by donors, to include merit-based hiring, pay 

increases for government employees, improvements to the systems and processes 

linking central line ministries to provincial offices, and training programs for civil 

servants. 

Increasing the capacity of the central line ministries is a long-term project that 

will require substantial investment in human-resource development over many 

years, but further progress is necessary to lay the foundation for long-term Afghan 

self-sustainment. 

c) These efforts are not yet being hindered by State and USAID funding decisions, 

but they likely would be if funding support is significantly reduced or is reduced 

in critical areas. Without strong support for the civilian elements of our civil-military campaign, stabilization and transition efforts will face real limitations—and we 

will potentially put our hard-fought gains at risk. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SUTTON 

Ms. SUTTON. Understandably, there are many more preparations that need to be 

made for the drawdown of U.S. forces beginning in July. 

a) What is being done to coordinate the withdrawals of other NATO member countries whose forces are currently deployed in Afghanistan? Will their departure be 

phased out over the 2011-to-2014 timeframe? 

b) With three of the Regional Commands led by other nations, does the U.S. expect to take over in the interim in each of these areas, or will the withdrawals of 

these other nations involve a turnover directly to Afghan forces? 

General PETRAEUS. a) During the Lisbon Summit and subsequent international 

conferences, partner nations agreed on key principles as we move forward with 

plans to transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. These principles included affirmation that any drawdowns during that time would be conditions-based 

and would also entail ‘‘reinvesting’’ troops elsewhere in the country or in the training mission, as Canada is in the process of doing. Further, members of the Alliance 

have reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan through the end of 2014 and even 

beyond. Given all this, I believe that the actions of partner nations will be coordinated and based on conditions on the ground in Afghanistan. We will continue to 

work closely with our partners to ensure that decisions on troop drawdowns do not 

adversely affect the hard-fought gains that we have made. 

b) Troop decisions are still being formulated by partner nations—as well as by the 

U.S.—so any discussions of specific areas or partner-nation plans would be premature. All troop-contributing nations agree that transition should be based on conditions on the ground, and, further, as Secretary Gates said during the March Defense Ministerial in Brussels, our goal is for members of the Alliance to abide by 

the principle of ‘‘in together, out together.’’ Obviously, the continued growth and development of Afghan security forces will inform decisions about troop drawdowns as 

well as the nature of the transition in any given geographic area, which will likely 

vary by region. 

Ms. SUTTON. Our brave men and women have been serving in Afghanistan since 

2001, along with civilian personnel, contractors, diplomats, and many others. Many 

have bravely served and much has changed in Afghanistan’s landscape after a U.S. 

presence. 

a) What do you believe it will look like in 2014? 

b) Are there only U.S. civilian personnel? 

c) Are any of our soldiers still deployed, and how many? 

d) Would those soldiers be restricted to certain areas, or bases? 

e) Will we be the only country with a presence, or will other NATO members also 

have personnel stationed there after 2014? 

General PETRAEUS. a) I am still developing recommendations for my chain of command for the initial conditions-based drawdown of U.S. troops to commence in July 

2011. Given that, it would be premature to speculate on our force posture in 2014. 

b) It would be premature to predict the exact composition of our military and civilian presence in 2014 since those are ultimately decisions for the President. 
111 

c) Again, it would be premature to predict exact numbers or even the nature of 

our mission in 2014, since our long-term relationship with and support for Afghanistan is the subject of current negotiations. 

d) It is too early to predict what our force presence or mission will look like in 

2014, but it is likely that our posture—to include troop numbers, bases, roles, and 

areas of operation—will look very different than it does today. 

e) During the Lisbon Summit and subsequent international conferences, partner 

nations reaffirmed their commitment to Afghanistan through the end of 2014 and 

even beyond. Obviously, force levels will be determined by individual nations, but 

we are confident that decisions with our partners will be well-coordinated. Additionally, NATO and Afghanistan signed a Declaration on an Enduring Partnership during the November 2010 Lisbon Summit, and NATO is currently working with the 

Afghan government to determine the scope and nature of NATO’s long-term relationship with Afghanistan. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. I represent South Mississippi, a military-heavy district where all 

branches of service are represented, including Camp Shelby, one of our Nation’s premier mobilization bases, and one of the largest Guard and Reserve training sites 

in the Nation. This weekend I had an opportunity to participate in a hero’s homecoming with a great group of soldiers, the Mississippi National Guard’s 287th Engineer Company (Sappers). These soldiers were conducting route clearance and IED/ 

roadside bomb removal, allowing for their fellow soldiers’ safe travel on the roads 

of Southeastern Afghanistan. With this in mind, we must be mindful that there is 

a dark cloud over America, our national debt. Still, I remain committed to making 

sure funding is provided in a manner that continues to train for, equip, and execute 

our mission successfully, so that our men and women in uniform can do their job 

and return home safe and sound. 

a) Many of these soldiers told me that the MRAPs and mine rollers that they are 

currently using are saving their lives every day. How do you perceive the performance of the MRAPs and mine rollers currently in service? 

b) Do you believe we need more MRAPs and mine rollers in Afghanistan? 

c) What do you feel is the current trend regarding IEDs and Roadside Bombs in 

Afghanistan? Are we seeing more or less as we continue to improve technology to 

identify and disarm threats? 

d) Is the equipment we are using currently, the best possible for the job? 

General PETRAEUS. a) The Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicles (MRAPs) 

and mine rollers currently deployed in Afghanistan are performing extremely well 

and are saving lives and limbs on a daily basis. MRAPs offer far superior protection 

for our troops than the up-armored High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicles 

(HMMWVs) that they replaced. And the ‘‘V’’-shaped hull and armor plating on these 

vehicles are specifically designed to provide enhanced protection against mines and 

IEDs. Based on current data gathered by Combined Joint Task Force Paladin, the 

executive agent for Counter-IED efforts in Afghanistan, U.S. Service personnel have 

a 96 percent survival rate when attacked by IEDs or small-arms fire while traveling 

in an MRAP. Mine rollers, specifically designed to detonate IEDs preemptively, provide additional protection to our servicemembers. Overall, these assets have proved 

invaluable in saving lives and minimizing damage to other critical lifesaving, protective equipment. 

b) Based on the current deployment projections for MRAPs, the rate of loss due 

to battle damage, and the current and projected production rate, we are confident 

that all current and future requirements will be met. We will, however, continually 

assess these requirements as conditions on the ground warrant. On this point, it 

should be noted that the incredible work to surge this equipment to theater would 

not have been possible without strong congressional support. 

c) Over the last year, the number of IED incidents theater-wide has increased, 

although not nearly to the same degree as other forms of attacks, most notably direct-fire incidents. There are obviously deviations based on seasonal factors, such as 

declines during winter or the annual poppy harvest, and, of course, we have significantly increased our total force numbers. 

While the total number of IED attacks is higher, the effectiveness of these attacks 

has declined since October 2010 (an effective IED is one that causes a casualty). In 

the event of an effective IED attack, the rate of those killed or seriously injured has 

also declined steadily since August 2009. Further, the rates of IEDs found and 

cleared—versus those that detonate—have remained at or above expected seasonal 

levels. This is possibly due to increased mounted and dismounted operations, tar-
112 

geted raids to disrupt IED networks, improved detection capabilities, neutralizing 

technologies such as mine rollers, more tips from local Afghans, and the possibility 

that the enemy is emplacing IEDs more hastily as a result of more patrols and more 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms. 

On the second question, just as we are constantly adjusting our tactics, so too is 

the enemy. We anticipate that the enemy will continue to use IEDs and one of its 

main weapons of choice since IED emplacement minimizes direct confrontation with 

our forces. We will continue to adjust our tactics and pursue new technologies to 

minimize the risk IEDs pose to our troopers. 

d) Yes, the equipment we are using represents the best technology that we have 

developed. Over the past 16 months, we have deployed billions of dollars in new 

equipment to counter IEDs, including MRAPs and variants like the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (more than 14,000 vehicles total), sophisticated metal detectors, electronic counter-measures (jamming devices), mine rollers, robots, myriad surveillance 

platforms, and other gear. Most of this equipment was specifically designed for the 

Afghanistan area of operations, based on lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. We have also redoubled our efforts to take lessons learned from the field on 

tactics, techniques, and procedures and institutionalize them in short order. We will 

continue to assess the needs of our warfighters and to ensure that we meet constantly-changing battlefield requirements. 

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