FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

SEPTEMBER 28, 2011

JOHN LEY

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

 No. 10-12032

 ________________________

 D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-00923-SDM-EAJ

ANTHONY CATRON, 

JO ANNE REYNOLDS,

WILLIAM SHUMATE,

on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,

RAYMOND YOUNG,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

CHARLES R. HARGIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

versus

CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG,

Defendant - Appellee.

________________________

 Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Middle District of Florida

 ________________________

(September 28, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and HODGES, District *

Judge.

EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge:

In this Section 1983 case, four homeless plaintiffs challenge the

constitutionality of two ordinances in the City Code of St. Petersburg, Florida (the

“City”) and of the City’s enforcement of the ordinances. 

One ordinance, Section 20-30 (or, the “trespass ordinance”), authorizes

certain city agents to issue a temporary trespass warning for specific city land -- in

effect, an exclusion from the property -- on which the agent determined that the

warning recipient had “violate[d]” city or state law. The other ordinance, Section

8-321 (or, the “storage ordinance”), prohibits storage of personal property on city

land such as parks and rights-of-way. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiffs’

claims; we affirm the district court’s rulings, except we vacate part of the district

court’s ruling about the trespass ordinance. Plaintiffs have stated claims on the

issues of procedural due process under the United States Constitution and on their

right to intrastate travel under the Florida Constitution.

 Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, *

sitting by designation.

2
I.

This case involves a complaint against the city of St. Petersburg, Florida, by

four homeless residents: Anthony Catron, Raymond Young, Jo Anne Reynolds,

and William Shumate (“Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs contend that two city ordinances,

Sections 20-30 and 8-321, and the City’s manner of enforcement for these

ordinances, violate Plaintiffs’ rights under the United States and Florida

constitutions. 

The City has cited, arrested, or confiscated property from each of Plaintiffs

for violating the trespass ordinance, the storage ordinance, or both. Plaintiffs filed

suit in district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. The district court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiffs’ amended complaint.

On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the trespass ordinance -- both on its face and

in practice -- violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the

First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, and the right to intrastate travel under the

Florida Constitution. Plaintiffs argue that the storage ordinance is void for

vagueness under the Due Process Clause.

3
II.

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Redland Corp., Inc. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 568 F.3d

1232, 1234 (11th Cir. 2009).

A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974

(2007)). Stating a plausible claim for relief requires pleading “factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged”: “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id.

III.

Plaintiffs’ first three arguments on appeal are about Section 20-30, the

trespass ordinance. Briefly stated, the trespass ordinance authorizes certain city

employees, including police officers, to issue a “trespass warning,” which warns

persons on public property to depart from that property and not to return. 

4
The trespass ordinance gives authority to issue a trespass warning for public

property in three instances: (1) “city employees or officials, or their designees,

having control over a facility, building, or outdoor area, including municipal

parks” may issue a trespass warning to “any individual who violates any city

ordinance, rule or regulation, or state law or lawful directive of a city employee or

official” for the public property where the violation occurred, (2) a police officer

may issue a trespass warning, when the city official in control of the pertinent city

property is unavailable, to “any individual who violates any city ordinance or state

law” for the public property where the violation occurred but only if “the police

officer [has] receive[d] the approval of the officer’s immediate supervisor for the

issuance of the trespass warning,” and (3) any city employee or official has

authority “to issue a trespass warning to any person for any lawful reason for any

city property . . . , when necessary or appropriate in the sole discretion of the city

employee or official.” §§ 20-30(a)-(b), (g). On its face, the trespass ordinance

does not cover public rights-of-way. Section 20-30(a)-(b). But Plaintiffs allege

that the City enforces the ordinance “curb to curb” -- on public sidewalks and bus

shelters located on public sidewalks.

After a person has received a trespass warning, if the person is found on the

pertinent public property “in violation of a trespass warning [he] may be arrested

5
for trespassing.” Section 20-30(e). Section 20-30 requires trespass warnings -- as 1

exclusions -- to be for a limited time. For first-time violations, the trespasswarning period may not exceed one year; for all other violations, the trespasswarning period may not exceed two years. Section 20-30(c). 

A person who has been issued a trespass warning (the “warning-recipient”)

may apply to exercise lawfully that person’s First Amendment rights on the city

property that is the subject of the trespass warning, and the city official or

employee in control of the property “shall not [] unreasonably den[y]” the

warning-recipient authorization “to enter the property or premises to exercise his

or her First Amendment rights or to conduct municipal business.” 

Section 20-30(f).

A copy of the trespass warning -- it is a writing -- issued pursuant to the

trespass ordinance must be provided to the warning-recipient, but no formal

 Florida’s trespass statute for property other than a structure or conveyance provides: 1

A person who, without being authorized, licensed, or invited, willfully enters upon or

remains in any property other than a structure or conveyance . . . [a]s to which notice against

entering or remaining is given, either by actual communication to the offender or by posting,

fencing, or cultivation. . . commits the offense of trespass on property . . . .

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.09.

6
procedures have been set out by which the recipient of a trespass warning may

challenge the basis of the warning or the terms of the warning. Section 20-30(d).2

A.

Plaintiffs first argue that the trespass ordinance is unconstitutional facially,

and as applied to Plaintiffs, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.3

 The Due Process Clause requires “that a deprivation of life, liberty or

property ‘be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the

nature of the case.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493

(1985) (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 70 S. Ct. 652, 656

(1950)). The government must provide the required notice and opportunity for a

hearing “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” although the notice

and hearing may be postponed until after the deprivation has occurred. See

Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976). 

 The trespass warning form attached to the City Police Department’s instructional order on 2

trespassing reads, in part, this way: “You are hereby notified that your presence is no longer

welcome . . . on the [municipal] property/premises described below, unless such prohibition is

rescinded in writing by the City official having control over the premises.” 

 Plaintiffs, in what they term a “facial” challenge, do not attack only the trespass ordinance but 3

allege also that the City’s actual manner of enforcement goes beyond the plain words of the

ordinance.

7
A Section 1983 procedural due process claim requires a plaintiff to prove

three elements: “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected liberty or

property interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” 

Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).

Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected liberty interest to be in parks or

on other city lands of their choosing that are open to the public generally. City of

Chicago v. Morales, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 1858 (1999) (plurality opinion) (citations

omitted) (“[A]n individual's decision to remain in a public place of his choice is as

much a part of his liberty as the freedom of movement inside frontiers that is ‘a

part of our heritage,’ or the right to move ‘to whatsoever place one's own

inclination may direct.’”) Whether or not this interest is a fundamental right for

the purpose of substantive due process, Doe v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757,

770-73 (7th Cir. 2004), a person may forfeit this liberty right by trespass or other

violation of law, Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1345 (11th Cir.

1994). But the initial question we decide is not whether Plaintiffs have forfeited a

liberty interest by trespass or other violation of law, but what interest Plaintiffs

allege they possessed (and then have been deprived of) in the first place.4

 The City -- arguing that Plaintiffs do not have a right to trespass on public property --

4

misunderstands the deprivation alleged here. Before receiving a trespass warning, the warningrecipient is, by definition, not trespassing. The deprivation accomplished by the issuance of a

8
Plaintiffs’ factual allegations that the City prohibited them from being in

city parks (in general, and in Williams Park specifically), on public sidewalks, and

at bus shelters located on public sidewalks lead us to conclude that “there is more

than a sheer possibility” that Plaintiffs have been deprived of a constitutionally

protected liberty interest. Cf. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Plaintiffs have sufficiently

alleged that the City has deprived them of liberty interests in two ways, by 1)

enforcing the trespass ordinance to prohibit them from having access to a specific

park (Williams Park) as ordinarily used by the public; and 2) carrying out a policy

of enforcing the ordinance to prohibit their use of all parks in the City open to the

public generally. These allegations satisfy the first element for a procedural due

process claim. 

5

And the parties do not dispute that state action is present. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978). Therefore, due process is

needed, and we must determine whether Section 20-30 provides the

trespass warning therefore takes place before any trespass -- or supposed “right to

trespass” -- exists.

 This right, to use a city park or parks, of course, is not absolute. We decide today only that a 5

resident of St. Petersburg has some federal right to use St. Petersburg parks under the ordinary

conditions in which these parks are made available to the general public. St. Petersburg residents

do not have a constitutional right to use public parks under all conditions and at all times. 

9
constitutionally adequate process that is due. See Morissey v. Brewer, 92 S.Ct.

2593, 2600 (1972).

To determine whether the ordinance satisfies the constitutional requirement

of procedural due process, we apply the Mathews balancing test:

identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires

consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that

will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural

safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

96 S. Ct. at 903.

Because Plaintiffs possess a private liberty interest in lawfully visiting city

property that is open to the public (an interest of which Plaintiffs will be deprived

by the issuance of a trespass warning), the first element of the Mathews test

weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor. 

Turning to the third Mathews element, the City’s interest in discouraging

unlawful activity and in maintaining a safe and orderly environment on its

property is substantial. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando,

638 F.3d 756, 762 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc). In addition, we accept -- even

without the aid of a factual record -- that some expense and burden would

10
probably arise as a result of additional procedures to allow challenges to the

receipt of a trespass warning. This element weighs in the City’s favor.

Last, considering the second Mathews element, we conclude that this

element weighs heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor. The trespass ordinance causes a

substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty because it is seemingly easy for

the City -- through a variety of agents -- to issue a trespass warning and because

no procedure is provided for the recipient of a trespass warning to challenge the

warning or for the warning to be rescinded.

Section 20-30 provides a lot of discretion to many different city agents to

issue trespass warnings for a wide range of acts. Given that these warnings

operate like some kind of injunction, this situation creates a substantial risk of

erroneous deprivation of liberty. Section 20-30 gives many different agents

authority to issue a trespass warning: warnings can be issued by police officers,

“city employees or officials . . . having control over” a particular city property,

plus even the designees of city employees. §§ 20-30 (a)-(b). In addition, a wide

range of acts could constitute a violation of “any city ordinance, rule or regulation,

or state law or lawful directive of a city employee or official” and might result in a

trespass warning: public indecency, littering, and even disobeying the lawful

directions (for example, do not run around the pool) of a lifeguard in a public pool

11
would seemingly all be included in that description. Furthermore, Section 20-30

provides no guidance to city officials (or their designees) or police officers in

exercising their discretion to determine whether a person has actually committed a

violation that permits issuance of a trespass warning: this lack of specificity

suggests that whenever an authorized city employee thinks a violation has

occurred, he may issue a trespass warning.6

The ease with which trespass warnings may be issued is particularly

problematic here because the trespass ordinance provides no procedural means for

a warning-recipient to challenge the warning. An evident process for such

challenges has significant value in avoiding mistakes. Even if it is impractical for

the City to provide a pre-warning hearing to “assure that there are reasonable

grounds to support” the trespass warning, the City must provide some

post-deprivation procedure to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause. 

See Gilbert v. Homar, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 1813-14 (1997). 

The City argues and the district court concluded that the trespass ordinance

affords adequate procedural due process because if a warning-recipient later

violates the warning and is ultimately charged with misdemeanor trespass (a

 And the text of the ordinance seems not to rule out issuance of a trespass warning based on a 6

violation that the pertinent city agent failed to witness personally. 

12
violation of state, not city law) the warning-recipient will be able to challenge the

validity of the trespass charge in state court. 

We are not persuaded that this state forum affords sufficient procedural

protections. These trespass warnings are intended to serve instantly as some kind

of restraining injunction. The process available in state court, as a matter of

criminal procedure, to contest a state trespass charge -- if the trespass warning

later is not heeded -- is beside the point. A challenge to a trespass charge in state

court does not equal a challenge to the validity of a trespass warning, especially of

the warning’s issuance at the outset: these two different legal questions (was a

trespass warning rightly due per the city ordinance; was the state trespass law

violated) require examination of different acts and different circumstances. 

Nothing presented to us shows that a state court must evaluate the

underlying circumstances that supposedly led to a trespass warning to hold a

person criminally responsible for the act of entry on property that gave rise to the

later trespass charge. Besides, even if a Florida court acquitted the warning- 7

 The Florida trespass statute contains no requirement that “notice against entering or remaining” 7

be rightful, authorized, or valid. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.09; see also id. at § 810.011 (no

definition of “notice”). The trespass statute has four separate elements: “1) wilfully entering

upon or remaining in any property; 2) other than a structure or a conveyance; 3) without being

authorized, licensed or invited; 4) where notice against entering or remaining is given either by

actual communication to the offender or by posting, fencing or cultivation.” Smith v. State, 778

So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).

13
recipient of the state trespass charge, that the state court’s decision, as a matter of

law, would vacate a trespass warning issued by the City, a different political

entity, is not obvious. 

8

The way the City has allegedly applied Section 20-30 against Plaintiffs in

this case illustrates some of the problems posed by the absence of municipal

review. In 2006 a police officer issued Catron a trespass warning for “all of

Williams Park” and “all [C]ity parks,” which would remain in effect

“permanently.” This warning is an example of a trespass warning not authorized

by Section 20-30, which authorizes a warning applying only to the “specific

property where the violation occurred” for a limited time. But as the trespass

ordinance is currently written, Catron has been provided by the City with no way

to contest the trespass warning or at least the scope of the warning. Catron’s only

 The trespass warning states that the warning-recipient is "hereby notified that [the 8

warning-recipient's] presence is no longer welcome . . . on the property/premises described . . .

unless such prohibition is rescinded in writing by the City official having control over the

premises." The City and the district court point to the language in the trespass warning form,

which implies that a trespass warning can be "rescinded in writing by the City official having

control over the premises." The suggestion that a trespass warning -- in some unspecified

circumstance -- can be rescinded does not establish (or give notice) that a procedure exists for a

warning-recipient to seek the rescission. For example, nothing in the ordinance or in the

language of the trespass warning obligates anyone on behalf of the City to listen, even for a

moment, to a single word from a warning-recipient who wishes to call into question the

correctness of the warning's issuance -- even after the warning has been issued. And the

"rescinded in writing" phrase is entirely consistent with the simple idea of mercy or clemency by

grace on the part of a city official brought about by the official's own change of mind, with no

prompting from or no meaningful opportunity to contribute information from the

warning-recipient: this kind of rescission is disconnected from the right of due process.

14
options, it seems, are to relinquish his right to visit city parks altogether or to

violate the trespass warning and subject himself to a criminal prosecution for

trespass by a different sovereign (the state) or to bring a court action challenging

the entire scheme.

We conclude that Plaintiffs have stated a claim, facially and as-applied,

under the Due Process Clause: Section 20-30 lacks constitutionally adequate

procedural protections as the ordinance is presently written and allegedly

enforced. 

B.

Plaintiffs next argue that they, in the light of the First Amendment, have

stated a claim for relief that Section 20-30 is facially unconstitutional and

substantially overbroad.

“[A] party [may] challenge an ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine in

cases where every application creates an impermissible risk of suppression of

ideas, such as an ordinance that delegates overly broad discretion to the

decisionmaker . . . .” Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395,

15
2401 (1992). We must keep in mind that invalidating a law for overbreadth is

“strong medicine.” Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S.Ct. 2191, 2199 (2003). 

Plaintiffs contend the trespass ordinance is overbroad in the discretion it

gives city employees to issue trespass warnings, warnings which ban access to

quintessential public fora uniquely dedicated to expressive activities. Plaintiffs 9

allege no facts to support this attack-on-expression argument, but just set out the

words of the trespass ordinance instead. This recitation of Section 20-30 does not

support an inference that the trespass “notice would even be given to anyone

engaged in constitutionally protected speech.” Hicks, 123 S.Ct. at 2198. 

A risk of erroneous enforcement of Section 20-30 does exist and some risk

of suppression of speech in traditional public fora could therefore possibly exist,

given the broad discretion city agents possess in enforcing the ordinance. See

Forsyth Cnty., 112 S. Ct. at 2401. But the facts alleged do not plausibly suggest

an “impermissible risk of suppression of ideas” in “every application” of the

 Plaintiffs also argue the trespass ordinance is overbroad in the discretion it gives city officials to 9

grant or deny permission to warning-recipients who later wish to exercise their First Amendment

rights. We suspect that this First Amendment exception may suffer from the same problems of

too much discretion and insufficient procedural due process that infect the ordinance in general. 

But, given our resolution of Plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim, we need not rule on the exception

specifically. Just as the Supreme Court did in Hicks, “even assuming invalidity of” the First

Amendment exception that requires advance permission from a city official with broad

discretion, we conclude that Plaintiffs have not alleged facts to support a claim that the “trespass

policy as a whole prohibits a ‘substantial’ amount of protected speech in relation to its many

legitimate applications.” Hicks, 123 S.Ct. at 2199. 

16
ordinance. See id. (emphasis added). In this instance, “whatever overbreadth may

exist should be cured through” as-applied litigation in “fact situations to which

[the ordinance’s] sanctions . . . may not [constitutionally] be applied.” Broadrick

v. Oklahoma, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2918 (1973).

Plaintiffs have stated no claim for the extraordinarily rare overbreadth

invalidation they seek. 

C.

Third, Plaintiffs argue that they have stated a claim for relief for violation of

Plaintiffs’ right to intrastate travel and freedom of movement under the Florida

Constitution: Plaintiffs contend that the City’s customs and practices taken

pursuant to the trespass ordinance burden their right to intrastate travel. 

Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly suggest that the City’s practice of enforcing

the trespass ordinance limits their protected freedom to travel intrastate. The 10

Florida Supreme Court recognizes, under its state constitution, a fundamental right

 In their amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that the City’s enforcement of a variety of 10

policies and ordinances burdens Plaintiffs’ right to intrastate travel under the Florida

Constitution. On appeal, Plaintiffs limit their argument about their alleged right to intrastate

travel to a challenge of the City’s manner of enforcement of the trespass ordinance.

17
to intrastate travel. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1113 (Fla. 2004); see FLA.

CONST. art. I, § 2. 

Of decisive importance, Plaintiffs allege that the City “enforc[es] the

trespass laws to prohibit Plaintiffs . . . from being present on public sidewalks

surrounding public parks [and] waiting for buses at bus shelters located on public

sidewalks surrounding public parks . . . .” All Florida citizens have a right under 11

the Florida Constitution to “chat[] on a public street,” “stroll[] aimlessly,” and

“saunter down a sidewalk.” J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1113 (quoting Wyche v. State, 619

So. 2d 231, 235 (Fla. 1993)). If the City has a policy of enforcing the trespass

ordinance on sidewalks surrounding public parks as Plaintiffs allege, the alleged

City policy limits Plaintiffs’ right of intrastate travel as defined by the Florida

Supreme Court. The City constitutionally may burden this right. But the City

must meet a condition first: the City’s policy must be narrowly tailored to advance

a compelling governmental interest. See J.P., 907 So. 2d at 1115-16. 

 The City argues that the Florida Supreme Court has not recognized a right to intrastate travel to 11

a particular place and that the trespass ordinance only denies warning-recipients access to the

particular place where the violation occurred. But Plaintiffs do not allege or argue that citizens

of Florida enjoy a fundamental right to intrastate travel to a particular place on which they have

trespassed. Plaintiffs allege that the City has a policy of enforcing -- by barring access to

adjoining sidewalks and bus shelters -- the trespass ordinance beyond the boundaries of the

public parks where violations have occurred.

18
Even on appeal, the City asserts no interest in this alleged enforcement of

the trespass ordinance on sidewalks nor does the City argue that the alleged

enforcement policies are narrowly tailored to meet the City’s goals. We cannot

conclude, based on the allegations and arguments before us, that the City’s alleged

policy of enforcing the trespass ordinance on public sidewalks passes the strict

scrutiny test required by Florida law. 

IV.

Plaintiffs challenge Section 8-321, the storage ordinance, under the Due

Process Clause as impermissibly vague on its face. 

Section 8-321 prohibits the “unlawful” outdoor storage of, among other

items, “personal property including clothing or bedding,” on private property and

on public property, including public rights-of-way. §§ 8-321(b)(5), (h)(4). 

Plaintiffs challenge the parts of Section 8-321 about storage on public property. 

Under the ordinance, storage is “broadly interpreted to include any action to place,

store, park, display, locate, or set” an item of personal property. 

Section 8-321(h)(1).

19
If, pursuant to the storage ordinance, a city official provides a person with

written notice that the person is unlawfully storing personal items on public

property, the person must remove his personal items from public property within

thirty-six hours. Section 8-321(d)(1). The City may remove unlawfully stored

items that remain (or have been moved to another public location) on public

property after thirty-six hours have passed. §§ 8-321(d)(1), (3). Moreover, if a

sign is posted on public property “stating that unattended items may be removed

immediately, then no additional notice shall be required and the item may be

removed immediately.” Section 8-321(d)(4). 

Plaintiffs argue that the storage ordinance is vague and unconstitutional on

its face because it fails to define sufficiently the term “unlawful storage” or fails to

define sufficiently the term “unattended” or both. Plaintiffs allege that the

ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it does not “‘give the person of

ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited . . .’”

and it provides no “sufficiently explicit standards for those who will apply it,

thereby encouraging ‘arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’” United States v.

Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 630 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Grayned v.

City of Rockford, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (1972)). 

20
In bringing a facial challenge to an ordinance for vagueness, a party “‘who

engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the

vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.’” Holder v.

Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.Ct. 2705, 2719 (2010) (quoting Vill. of Hoffman

Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1191 (1982)). 

Accordingly, even though this challenge is a facial challenge, we must determine

whether the terms “unlawful storage” and “unattended” are vague as applied to

Plaintiffs’ circumstances. If Plaintiffs’ own conduct is clearly proscribed by the

terms of the ordinance, this “necessarily precludes a finding of facial vagueness.” 

High Ol’ Times, Inc. v. Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 1982).

For Plaintiffs’ “unlawful storage” argument, the term “unlawful storage”

clearly proscribes plaintiff Reynolds’ alleged conduct and is not vague. Reynolds

placed several bags, blankets, and other personal belongings -- more than she

could carry -- on a park bench beside her. Reynolds kept these items with her

because “she did not have access to shelter or a place to store her belongings.” A

police officer gave Reynolds written notice that her belongings were “unlawfully

stored on public property.”

Plaintiffs’ allegations indicate that Reynolds accumulated personal items

and kept them with her on public property to preserve them for future use: this

21
conduct accords with the ordinary meaning of the word “store.” Reynolds’

conduct was clearly proscribed by the storage ordinance: thus, the ordinance could

be constitutionally applied to her. In addition, because even “the possibility of

constitutional application to some of the conduct in which the [plaintiffs] are

engaged necessarily precludes a finding of facial vagueness,” and a constitutional

application is possible given the allegations in Reynolds’ case, we need not

examine what is alleged about plaintiff Young’s conduct; we can conclude that

Section 8-321, on its face, is not unconstitutionally vague in its definition of

“unlawful storage.” See Busbee, 673 F.2d 1225, 1228. 

12

For “unattended,” Plaintiff Shumate says this term is too vague and that his

own conduct was not clearly proscribed by the storage ordinance. The City, on

three occasions, removed Shumate’s personal property, which he had left

temporarily in the care of other people, from a city park; according to Shumate the

removals took place because the City considered his property to be “unattended”

 Plaintiffs’ argument that variations in the exact amount of personal possessions officers have 12

said Plaintiffs are allowed to keep on public property raise only marginal problems in the

application of the ordinance that do not suggest the ordinance is vague in its definition of the

normal, “general class of offenses” to which the ordinance is directed. United States Civil Serv.

Comm'n v. Nat’l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897 (1973). “As always, enforcement

requires the exercise of some degree of police judgment,” Grayned, 92 S.Ct. at 2302, and the

degree of judgment involved for a police officer to determine what constitutes storage is

acceptable.

22
for the purpose of enforcing the storage ordinance. The common and ordinary

meaning of “unattended” indicates that an item is not “unattended” if some person

-- the owner or his proxy -- is present with the item and looking after it. 

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2482 (1993) (“lacking a

guard, escort, caretaker, or other watcher”). We agree that Shumate’s alleged

conduct was not clearly proscribed by the storage ordinance.

Because Shumate’s conduct was not clearly proscribed by the challenged

terms of the ordinance, we must decide whether “what the ordinance as a whole

prohibits . . . in the vast majority of its intended applications” is clear enough. Hill

v. Colorado, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 2498 (2000) (quotations and citations omitted). 

Given health, safety, and security concerns, the City’s removal (even immediate

removal when a warning sign is posted) of unattended items on public property

would not surprise a person of ordinary intelligence who left personal belongings

unattended -- that is, not closely and plainly accompanied by someone associated

with the owner -- on public property. And although Shumate’s specific conduct

was not clearly proscribed by the storage ordinance, in the vast majority of the

intended applications of the ordinance, the ordinary meaning of “unattended” is

not so broad as to encourage arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Cf. Busbee,

23
673 F.2d at 1229 (if a law is susceptible of an interpretation which cures the law’s

vagueness, the court must accord the law such meaning). 

We cannot conclude that the ordinance is facially void for vagueness

because we cannot conclude that it is “impermissibly vague in all its applications.” 

Hoffman Estates, 102 S.Ct. at 1191. 

V.

We AFFIRM the district court’s ruling, except we VACATE the district

court’s dismissing the claim that Section 20-30 violates procedural due process

and dismissing the claim that Section 20-30 violates the right to intrastate travel

under the Florida Constitution.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

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HODGES, District Judge, Concurring in part and Dissenting in part:

I concur in those parts of the majority opinion that affirm the rulings of the

district court, but respectfully dissent from the majority holding (Part III.A.) that

the Appellants have adequately pleaded a deprivation of procedural due process as

to Section 20-30, the trespass ordinance, and I would not reach the state

constitutional claim regarding the right to intrastate travel (Part III.C.).

In sum, I would affirm the district court’s dismissal of the action, but with

instruction to dismiss the state constitutional claim without prejudice, thereby

leaving that issue for the state courts to resolve.

I.

As the majority skillfully points out, the liberty interest asserted by the

Appellants is bifurcated and progressive in nature and significance. At the time a

trespass warning is issued, no trespass has yet occurred and the limitation upon the

claimant’s liberty of movement is minimal. If the warning is later unheeded

resulting in an arrest, the deprivation of the claimant’s liberty is obviously much

more severe. This is important because the process that is due depends upon the

extent or significance of the deprivation involved. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S.

924, 931, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 1812, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997); Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Morrissey v. Brewer,

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408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972); Goldberg v.

Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1018, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). 

Here, as noted in the majority opinion, the trespass warning issued to

Appellant Anthony Catron expressly stated that it was effective “unless such

prohibition is rescinded in writing by the City official having control over the

premises.” The majority dismisses this declaration as insufficient to establish a

necessary procedure, and this is the point of my disagreement. The mere mention

of rescission necessarily implies – and gives notice of – the right to apply to the

designated city official for review and possible relief. To be sure, that is not an

elaborate procedural mechanism, but I deem it to be enough under the

circumstances to provide the required procedural safeguard for the minimal

deprivation occasioned by a trespass warning. Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399

(6th Cir. 2001) is a case remarkably on point. Albert Thompson was placed on a

“no trespass” list by a public housing authority prohibiting entry by Thompson

upon the grounds of public housing facilities managed by the authority. Among

other claims, Thompson asserted a violation of his right to procedural due process. 

The Sixth Circuit held (250 F.3d at 407-408) that a meeting between Thompson

and the executive director of the authority concerning Thompson’s placement on

the list was sufficient to satisfy any process he was due.

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II.

If the dismissal of the federal claims is affirmed in all respects, as I believe

to be appropriate, it then becomes unnecessary to decide what to do about the state

constitutional claim. The district court dismissed it with prejudice while the

majority (Part III.C.) holds that the claim should be reinstated. In the absence of

the federal claims, however, the statute – 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) – provides a 

mechanism for declining jurisdiction in order that the state courts may resolve

issues of state law, especially issues of state constitutional law. The circumstances

of this case clearly fall within the ambit of the relevant authorities teaching that

dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate course of action here. See Parker v.

Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 742-747 (11th Cir. 2006). See also

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218

(1966); Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[I]f the

federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even

requires dismissal of state claims.”).

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