44494 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 162 / Thursday, August 21, 1997 / Notices

Vicki A. Novak, Executive Director,

Personnel Division, NASA

Headquarters

Michael I. Mott, Associate Deputy

Administrator (Technical), NASA

Headquarters

Robert E. Whitehead, Associate

Administrator for Aeronautics and

Space Transportation Technology,

NASA Headquarters

Spence M. Armstrong, Associate

Administrator for Human Resources

and Education, NASA Headquarters

Daniel S. Goldin,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 97–22254 Filed 8–20–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7510–01–M

NATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEM

Telecommunications Service Priority

System Oversight Committee

AGENCY: National Communications

System (NCS).

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

A meeting of the Telecommunications

Service Priority (TSP) System Oversight

Committee will convene Thursday

September 25, 1997 from 9 a.m. to 12:00

a.m. The meeting will be held at BoozAllen & Hamilton 8283 Greensboro

Drive, McLean VA.

—Opening/Administrative Remarks

—Status of the TSP Program

—Working Group Reports

—CPAS Program Update

Anyone interested in attending or

presenting additional information to the

Committee, please contact LCDR Angela

Abrahamson, Manager, TSP Program

Office, (703) 607–4930, or Betty Hoskin

(703) 607–4932 by September 15, 1997.

Frank M. McClelland,

Acting Federal Register Liaison Officer,

National Communications System.

[FR Doc. 97–22125 Filed 8–20–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3610–05–M

NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50–335 and 50–389]

Florida Power and Light Company, et

al., St. Lucie Plant, Units 1 and 2;

Exemption

I

The Florida Power and Light

Company, et al. (FPL or the licensee) is

the holder of Facility Operating License

Nos. DPR–67 and NPF–16, which

authorize operation of the St. Lucie

Plant, Units 1 and 2. The licenses

provide, among other things, that the

licensee is subject to all rules,

regulations, and orders of the

Commission now or hereafter in effect.

The facility consists of two

pressurized-water reactors at the

licensee’s site located in St. Lucie

County, Florida.

II

Section 70.24 of Title 10 of the Code

of Federal Regulations, ‘‘Criticality

Accident Requirements,’’ requires that

each licensee authorized to possess

special nuclear material (SNM) shall

maintain a criticality accident

monitoring system in each area where

such material is handled, used, or

stored. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of

10 CFR 70.24 specify detection and

sensitivity requirements that these

monitors must meet. Subsection (a)(1)

also specifies that all areas subject to

criticality accident monitoring must be

covered by two detectors. Subsection

(a)(3) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees

to maintain emergency procedures for

each area in which this licensed SNM

is handled, used, or stored and provides

that (1) the procedures ensure that all

personnel withdraw to an area of safety

upon the sounding of a criticality

accident monitor alarm, (2) the

procedures must include drills to

familiarize personnel with the

evacuation plan, and (3) the procedures

designate responsible individuals for

determining the cause of the alarm and

placement of radiation survey

instruments in accessible locations for

use in such an emergency. Subsection

(b)(1) of 10 CFR 70.24 requires licensees

to have a means to identify quickly

personnel who have received a dose of

10 rads or more. Subsection (b)(2) of 10

CFR 70.24 requires licensees to

maintain personnel decontamination

facilities, to maintain arrangements for a

physician and other medical personnel

qualified to handle radiation

emergencies, and to maintain

arrangements for the transportation of

contaminated individuals to treatment

facilities outside the site boundary.

Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 70.24 exempts

Part 50 licensees from the requirements

of paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 70.24 for

SNM used or to be used in the reactor.

Paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 70.24 states that

any licensee who believes that there is

good cause why he should be granted an

exemption from all or part of 10 CFR

70.24 may apply to the Commission for

such an exemption and shall specify the

reasons for the relief requested.

III

The SNM that could be assembled

into a critical mass at St. Lucie, Units 1

and 2, is in the form of nuclear fuel; the

quantity of SNM other than fuel that is

stored on site is small enough to

preclude achieving a critical mass. The

Commission’s technical staff has

evaluated the possibility of an

inadvertent criticality of the nuclear fuel

at St. Lucie, Units 1 and 2, and has

determined that it is extremely unlikely

for such an accident to occur if the

licensee meets the following seven

criteria:

1. Only one fuel assembly is allowed

out of a shipping cask or storage rack at

one time.

2. The k-effective does not exceed

0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%

confidence level in the event that the

fresh fuel storage racks are filled with

fuel of the maximum permissible U-235

enrichment and flooded with pure

water.

3. If optimum moderation occurs at

low moderator density, then the keffective does not exceed 0.98, at a 95%

probability, 95% confidence level in the

event that the fresh fuel storage racks

are filled with fuel of the maximum

permissible U-235 enrichment and

flooded with a moderator at the density

corresponding to optimum moderation.

4. The k-effective does not exceed

0.95, at a 95% probability, 95%

confidence level in the event that the

spent fuel storage racks are filled with

fuel of the maximum permissible U-235

enrichment and flooded with pure

water.

5. The quantity of forms of special

nuclear material, other than nuclear

fuel, that are stored on site in any given

area is less than the quantity necessary

for a critical mass.

6. Radiation monitors, as required by

General Design Criterion 63, are

provided in fuel storage and handling

areas to detect excessive radiation levels

and to initiate appropriate safety

actions.

7. The maximum nominal U-235

enrichment is limited to 5.0 weight

percent.

By letter dated February 19, 1997, and

supplemented July 10, 1997, the

licensee requested an exemption from

10 CFR 70.24. In this request the

licensee addressed the seven criteria

given above. The Commission’s

technical staff has reviewed the

licensee’s submittals and has

determined that St. Lucie, Units 1 and

2, meets the criteria for prevention of

inadvertent criticality; therefore, the

staff has determined that it is extremely

unlikely for an inadvertent criticality to