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THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 23, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

SEPTEMBER 23, 2008

Page

Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense ........................................................ 8

Cartwright, Gen. James E., USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ......... 15

(III) 

(1)

THE SITUATION IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2008 

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Bill 

Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Pryor, Webb, McCaskill, Warner, 

Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, and Thune. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Cindy Pearson, assistant chief clerk and security manager. 

Majority staff members present: Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William 

K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; 

and Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, 

and Ali Z. Pasha. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant 

to Senator Kennedy; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher 

Caple and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew 

R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, 

assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator 

Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to 

Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, 

assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator 

Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; David 

Hanks, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Jason Van Beek, assistant to 

Senator Thune; and David Brown, Brian W. Walsh, and Erskine W. 

Wells III, assistants to Senator Martinez. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Today the committee receives testimony from 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General James Cartwright, 

the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the situation in 

2

Iraq and Afghanistan. A warm welcome to both of you. This may 

be the final appearance of Secretary Gates before the committee 

and on behalf of all the members of the committee, Mr. Secretary, 

I want to extend our sincere gratitude to you for your cooperation, 

for your open-minded attitude, and your thoughtful approach to the 

duties that you have as Secretary of Defense. 

Secretary Gates, the committee will be interested in your observations from your visit to Afghanistan and Iraq earlier this month. 

That visit included attending the change of command of Multi-National Forces-Iraq from General David Petraeus to General Raymond Odierno. We owe these two distinguished generals our appreciation for their dedication and their willingness to continue to 

serve our Nation. General Petraeus will take over as Commander 

of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), where his responsibilities 

will entail a broad perspective to balance the need of the conflicts 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the threats elsewhere in the 

region. 

Since we last met, the President has announced a small troop reduction through next February or March and an open-ended presence beyond that. For some of us, that small reduction and openendedness fails to put adequate pressure on the Iraqis to work out 

their political differences, which—and there is pretty much a consensus on this point—is the only hope of ending the underlying 

conflict. 

The surge helped achieve a lower level of violence. It has not yet 

achieved its stated purpose, political accommodation among Iraq’s 

leaders. The Iraqi Government has yet to adopt urgently needed 

legislation, including laws for the long-promised and repeatedly delayed provincial elections, hydrocarbon revenue-sharing, and constitutional amendments, including regarding the status of the increasingly volatile Kirkuk region. 

In addition, the Iraqi Government continues to fail to pay for 

items that it should pay for. The Iraqis’ failure to pay for such 

items continues despite Iraq’s budget surplus, which is projected to 

approach $80 billion as a result of the soaring oil revenues, including money that comes from Americans paying high prices at the 

pump. 

Our open-ended commitment in Iraq, which is an invitation to 

continued Iraqi dawdling and dependency, carries many costs: more 

American lives and wounded, and $10 billion, $11 billion a month 

beyond the $600 billion already spent. 

One additional cost is the continuing shortage of troops needed 

to address the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, the 

central front in the war on terrorist extremism. The security of our 

troops and the Afghan people has worsened over the past 2 years. 

In June more American soldiers were killed in Afghanistan than 

Iraq. Improvised explosive device (IED) attacks have risen sharply 

in Afghanistan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, 

said on September 10, 2008, that he is ‘‘not convinced that we’re 

winning . . . in Afghanistan. I’m convinced we can.’’ He added, 

‘‘Frankly, we’re running out of time.’’ 

According to Admiral Mullen, the 4,500 troops for Afghanistan 

announced by President Bush on September 9 don’t ‘‘adequately 

meet’’ the demands and needs of our commander in Afghanistan. 

3

General David McKiernan, Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF) has said that, even with those additional troops, he remains 

short by at least 3 more combat brigades, or potentially more than 

20,000 troops once support units are included. ISAF is also short 

on helicopters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

assets, and training teams for the Afghan National Army (ANA) 

and the Afghan National Police (ANP). 

Major General Jeffrey Schloesser, the U.S. Commander of Regional Command East, the Afghanistan region that borders Pakistan’s tribal areas, has said ‘‘there is no doubt that we definitely 

need more troops and some more resources.’’ It is critical for the 

security situation that the training of these Afghan security forces 

be speeded up. Many more are needed to secure the border with 

Pakistan as well as for internal security. 

The shortfall in troops in Afghanistan is also exacting a price on 

the Afghan people. General McKiernan said that because of shortages of troops on the ground the coalition forces are more dependent on air power, which has produced in turn an increase in civilian casualties. Afghan anger and frustration over civilian deaths 

threatens to undo the goodwill that our forces are building in Afghan communities. 

We need to also do something that Secretary Gates has spoken 

of so eloquently: apply effectively America’s instruments of ‘‘soft 

power’’ to the mission in Afghanistan—our economic, political, and 

development capabilities. In May, I visited a village near Bagram, 

Afghanistan, where three local community development councils, 

from three villages had pooled funds provided through the Afghanistan National Solidarity Program to build a school for their children. The polished new primary school was a magnificent sight, a 

very, very modest structure though it was. The elders that I met 

were proud to have given their sons and daughters a place to learn 

and an opportunity for a better life, and they told me that the extremists wouldn’t dare attack the school because the people and 

communities would fight to the death to defend it. 

On the Pakistan side of the border, it is unacceptable that extremist elements are finding safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal regions 

and staging cross-border attacks from there on U.S. and coalition 

forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Government keeps promising 

to act to do more to eliminate these safe havens. In the meantime, 

it plays into the hands of the extremists and promotes their recruitment when Pakistan’s media focuses on our incursions as the 

cause of the deaths of innocent civilians and the destruction of 

their homes. 

Newly-elected Pakistan President Asif Zardari warned recently 

that Pakistan ‘‘will not tolerate the violation of our sovereignty and 

territorial integrity by any power in the name of combating terrorism.’’ We must be careful not to undermine Pakistan’s cooperation with our counterinsurgency efforts and unwittingly cause a 

spurt in the recruitment of extremists through actions of ours that 

are viewed widely throughout Pakistan as being disdainful of Pakistan’s sovereignty, particularly when the Pakistan Government 

publicly condemns our efforts. 

Senator Warner. 

4

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to start my remarks this morning with a quote by Thomas Jefferson which reflects on my high esteem for the Secretary, 

the work he has done and will continue to do, but as you look at 

the terminal phase of this current step in your career. Jefferson 

said: ‘‘Our duty to ourselves, to posterity, to mankind call on us by 

every motive which is sacred or honorable to watch over the safety 

of our beloved country during the troubles which agitate and convulse the world and to sacrifice to that all personal and local considerations.’’ 

Mr. Secretary, you have made a considerable sacrifice by returning to public office. I think I’ve had the privilege of introducing you 

before the Senate for four public offices, including this one. You’ve 

done that, you’ve made that sacrifice, together with your family. 

I’ve had the opportunity to work with every Secretary of Defense 

since Melvin Laird in 1969 and your performance of service 

matches the finest of all of them. Your decisive actions were cogently formulated. You never shot from the hip. Your voice was always firm, modest, and reassuring. You understood that in these 

difficult times we must forge broader bipartisan support. You have 

that bipartisan support on this committee, unlike I’ve ever seen for 

a previous secretary. 

Your character and integrity earned utmost admiration and respect, not only here in Congress, but around the Nation. 

So we thank you, sir. But there’s much to be done, as the distinguished chairman stated. 

I’d like to start off and again welcome you and General Cartwright. It’s reassuring for Secretary Gates and I as we step down 

in the coming months that you and individuals like you will continue to carry on. It’s very important to have that continuity. 

I want to start, of course, by recognizing the courage and commitment and valor of the fighting men and women in uniform who 

served and are currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan and other 

parts of the world. They along with their families have borne the 

risks, the hardships, and the sacrifices that make possible the freedom that we enjoy today. The United States is so fortunate to have 

great men and women who continue to volunteer—and I repeat, 

volunteer—to serve in uniform. 

I also wish to acknowledge the courage and valor of the Iraqi and 

Afghan security forces and the important contributions of our coalition partners in NATO. 

Further, I’d be remiss if I did not acknowledge the vital role 

played by the civilian employees of the Federal departments and 

agencies of the U.S. Government who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

One of the hard-earned and well-known lessons of these wars 

was the weakness of the interagency process. You’ve strengthened 

that, Mr. Secretary, through your tireless efforts. The weakness of 

that process, however, has to be further strengthened to make it 

work. We’ve come a long way and created new tools for interagency 

coordination that were all born out of necessity. They must be expanded and institutionalized. 

5

With regards to Iraq, I commend the concept of the surge. I commend most heartily the courage of the forces, U.S. and Iraqi, that 

carried out this operation that today by any fair, pragmatic judgment has been a success. But against that success, unfortunately, 

is not matched a significant advancement in political reconciliation 

among the Iraqi Government. There we had planned the surge—

I went back last night and reread what the President said in January and the concept was to provide a security arrangement within 

which political reconciliation could advance, and by advance I mean 

take major strides. In my judgment that simply has not happened. 

But it must happen. Let’s hope the forthcoming elections are not 

further delayed. 

Early this month the President said he’d bring home 3,400 combat forces and another Army brigade next year. I share with my 

colleague the chairman that we had hoped here in Congress, indeed 

by comments given by yourself and others earlier this year, that 

those force reductions would have been larger. I do hope that we 

can look to the future for further and larger reductions. 

These reductions were made possible, less so by the meager political reconciliation, but among the Iraqi people down at the grassroots level and their efforts, and most importantly the accomplishments made by the courage of our forces in bringing about a reduction in the casualties and the incidents and a whole lot of other 

statistics that are very positive as it relates to the war. 

I join the chairman—he mentioned it about the Iraqi funds and 

their use. Unfortunately, during the floor consideration of the Senate Armed Services authorization bill certain procedural steps were 

taken to preclude a full exploration of the issue of Iraqi funds and 

the extent to which they are now being put forward to pay the 

costs of the war and particularly the reconstruction costs. 

I had an amendment. I think the chairman had an amendment. 

As a matter of fact, I will ask to have my amendment, which did 

not make it into the bill because of procedural reasons, put into the 

record at the appopriate location. 

But I drew attention in my amendment to the very significant 

amount of military construction being asked for in the President’s 

budget for installations, and it seems to me, with the hopes and expectation we’re drawing down, with the extensive framework of installations we have in place, that we need the clearest of justification from the administration for future expenditures of literally billions of dollars on further construction in that country. 

I also close by saying in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee earlier this month Admiral Mullen said: ‘‘Absent a 

broader international and interagency approach to the problems in 

Afghanistan, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops 

and no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek 

in Afghanistan. Frankly, we’re running out of time.’’ 

You stated last week: ‘‘We are taking a close look at our strategy 

in Afghanistan and I don’t know whether the results of that will 

be a significant change in strategy or just some adjustments.’’ 

This is a very important opportunity this morning, and I commend the chairman for calling this hearing, to bring to Congress 

the framework of the current status in Afghanistan as well as Iraq 

such that we can go back home to our constituents in the coming 

6

months and try and do the best we can to keep the public informed 

and, if I may say, to the extent possible supportive. Support for the 

men and women of the Armed Forces carrying out the orders of the 

Commander in Chief is fundamental. It is essential. It’s the duty 

of Congress to do what we can to maintain that support for those 

troops and these families in the face of realistic appraisals by yourself, Mr. Secretary, the chairman and others about the challenges 

that face us both in Iraq and in Afghanistan. 

Likewise, you have it in your statement but we ask you today to 

give us a current assessment of the NATO commitment to the missions, including the future of NATO enlargement as it relates to 

several states, particularly the ones that have recently been in a 

combative relationship with Russia. Certainly the Georgia-Russia 

situation was a tragic chapter in current history and must be 

avoided for the future. 

Lastly, I close with a subject that I’ve raised repeatedly throughout hearings here and that is the continued, almost unabated trade 

of narcotics in Afghanistan, which trade yields funds which go directly into the hands of the insurgents to buy weapons to fight our 

own forces and those of NATO and our allies. 

So, Mr. Secretary, I close once again by saying this country is 

fortunate to have you in your position, as well as General Cartwright, and we thank you for your public service. 

I’d like to give a minute to my colleague, Senator Inhofe, who has 

to depart. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Mr. Chairman, thank you, and I thank you for holding this important hearing on 

the way forward in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

I join you in welcoming Secretary Gates and General Cartwright here today. 

It is only appropriate to start by recognizing the commitment, courage, and valor 

of our fighting men and women in uniform who have served, or are currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. They, along with their families, have borne the risks, 

hardships, and sacrifices, so valiantly and selflessly. 

The United States is so fortunate to have great men and women who continue 

to volunteer to serve in uniform. 

I would also like to acknowledge the courage and valor of Iraqi and Afghan security forces and the important contributions of our coalition partners and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. 

Further, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the vital role played by the 

civilian employees of the Federal departments and agencies of the U.S. Government 

who have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. 

One of the hard-learned and well-known lessons of these wars was weakness of 

the interagency process. The weaknesses of that process, however, do not reflect on 

the strength and exceptional service of those civilian Federal employees who deployed in harm’s way. 

We have come a long way and have created new tools for interagency coordination 

that were all born out of necessity. They must be expanded and institutionalized. 

The next administration must make the retooling of the interagency process a high 

priority. 

With regards to Iraq, I commend the concept of the success of the surge and the 

courage of all the military forces that executed successfully the military operations. 

Violence is now down to its lowest point since the spring of 2004. Civilian deaths 

are down, sectarian killings are down, suicide bombings are down, the number of 

improvised explosive device attacks is down, and normal life is returning to many 

communities across the country. 

These reduced levels of violence in Iraq have been sustained for several months 

and as General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker have reported that there now appears to be a ‘‘degree of durability’’ to the gains. 

7

Earlier this month, President Bush announced that we will bring home about 

3,400 combat support forces in the next few months, plus a Marine battalion that 

is now serving in Anbar Province, and, in February 2009, another Army combat brigade will come home. 

The courageous accomplishments of the troops made possible these reductions in 

forces. 

I remain concerned about the disappointing pace of political reconciliation in Iraq 

that was a fundamental part of the surge concept. The Iraqi Government must come 

to agreement on holding provincial elections this year. 

The committee will likely ask, as we have in the past, about the expenditure of 

Iraqi funds on reconstruction projects; the state of the Iraqi security forces; and 

progress on the Strategic Framework Agreement and the Status of Forces Agreement with the Government of Iraq. 

I request consent to place a copy of an amendment I filed on the Defense Authorization Bill regarding the funding of infrastructure progress in Iraq into the record. 

Now turning to Afghanistan where the security trends are not nearly as positive. 

The enemy we are facing in Afghanistan is growing more militarily capable and possibly more collaborative. This complex amalgam of insurgent groups is using safe 

havens in Pakistan to their advantage and the political situation in Pakistan further complicates this situation. The situation along the Afghan-Pakistan border and 

efforts to work with the Government of Pakistan to do more against extremists will 

be of high interest to the committee, especially after the hotel bombing in Islamabad 

that was reportedly planned in the tribal regions of western Pakistan. 

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee earlier this month, Admiral Mullen said: ‘‘absent a broader international and interagency approach to the 

problems in Afghanistan, it is my professional opinion that no amount of troops in 

no amount of time can ever achieve all the objectives we seek in Afghanistan. 

Frankly, we’re running out of time.’’ Mr. Secretary, you should be prepared to comment on that very frank and candid observation. 

Secretary Gates, last week you said: ‘‘We are taking a close look at our strategy 

in Afghanistan and I don’t know whether the results of that will be a significant 

change in strategy or just some adjustments.’’ The committee will want to hear a 

report about progress on that review. 

I remain concerned about some NATO allies’ commitment to the fight in Afghanistan. 

I clearly remember your testimony before the committee last February when you 

said: ‘‘I worry a great deal about the alliance evolving into a two-tiered alliance in 

which you have some allies willing to fight and die to protect people’s security and 

others who are not.’’

You will be asked to give us a current assessment of NATO’s commitment to the 

mission and, in light of the Georgia-Russia situation, and, whether or not, you think 

that this will make it more difficult to keep the NATO members committed in Afghanistan, let alone ask them to do more? 

I have often pressed about the need to address drug trafficking in Afghanistan. 

The profits from that illicit trade are being used to purchase arms for the insurgents 

which are used against United States, NATO, Afghan, and other partnered forces. 

I continue to call this unconscionable. You should be prepared to address the current impact of narco-economy on the insurgency and state of coalition and Afghan 

counternarcotics efforts? 

Secretary Gates, this is very likely your last appearance before this committee as 

the 22nd Secretary of Defense. You have had a remarkable career in public service 

and in this office. 

In 1809, Thomas Jefferson wrote: ‘‘Our duty to ourselves, to posterity, and to 

mankind, call on us by every motive which is sacred or honorable, to watch over 

the safety of our beloved country during the troubles which agitate and convulse the 

world, and to sacrifice to that all personal and local considerations.’’ Secretary 

Gates, you have done that. 

I have had the opportunity to work closely with every Secretary of Defense since 

Melvin Laird, all were outstanding patriots. 

Your recall to service, during these very trying times, was a selfless act of duty 

and patriotism. Your service in this office was exceptional. 

Your decisive actions were cogently formulated. Your voice was always firm, modest, and reassuring. 

You understood that at these difficult times you must forge broader bipartisan 

support. 

Your character and integrity earned utmost admiration and respect in this body, 

around the Nation, and the world—but most importantly with the men and women 

in uniform. 

8

I am confident that my colleagues join me in thanking you for your service and 

for your commitment to the men and women of our Armed Forces.

Senator WARNER. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Not even a minute, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. I just wanted to explain; Chairman Boxer has 

called a hearing where I’m the ranking member, that requires my 

attendance in and out of this. I hope, Mr. Chairman, though, that 

we’ll be able to get around to the confirmations of General Fraser 

and Mr. Donley if at all possible. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Secretary Gates, again a very warm, appreciative welcome to 

you, and General Cartwright, of course, but especially to you for 

your service, your demeanor, your willingness to consider ideas 

coming from various sources. It’s really been a very important 

chapter that you’ve written in the very short time that you’ve had. 

So we welcome you. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner. 

Thank you both for your very kind comments. I would note that it 

was 42 years and 1 month ago that I first took the oath entering 

government service. 

I want to thank you and the committee for inviting us to give you 

an update on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I’d like to express 

at the outset gratitude to this committee and to Congress for passing legislation to enhance the benefits of the GI Bill. The Department is very pleased with the outcome and I can tell you that our 

men and women in uniform are deeply appreciative. Of course, this 

is just one example of the many ways in which you have supported 

our troops over past years, and on behalf of all of them I thank 

you. 

But I’d also like to take this occasion, just echoing Senator 

Inhofe, to encourage the committee to act this week on the nominations of Mike Donley to be Secretary of the Air Force and General 

William Fraser III to be the Service’s Vice Chief of Staff. The Air 

Force is undergoing a critical period of transition and renewal and 

it’s vitally important that the full leadership team is in place and 

confirmed. 

Chairman LEVIN. If I could just interrupt you right there, we will 

make every effort to get those confirmations completed this week. 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, sir. 

I visited last week with our troops, commanders, and local partners in both countries. In Iraq I was honored to pay tribute to our 

outgoing commander, General David Petraeus, as well as Ambassador Ryan Crocker, to whom, I might add, I gave the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) highest civilian award. Beyond their own brilliant individual performances, the Petraeus-Crocker team was a superb model of military-civilian partnership, one that should be 

studied and emulated for years to come. 

Earlier this month, General Petraeus made his recommendations 

on the way forward in Iraq. Separate recommendations were subVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47117.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
9

mitted by the Commander of the ISAF in Afghanistan, the Commander of CENTCOM, the Service Chiefs, and the chairman. Although each viewed the challenges from a different perspective, 

weighing different factors, all once again arrived at similar recommendations. 

They’ve already withdrawn the five Army Brigade Combat 

Teams (BCTs), two Marine Battalions, and a Marine Expeditionary 

Unit that were sent to Iraq as part of the surge. The President announced earlier this month that approximately 8,000 troops will be 

withdrawn from Iraq in February without being replaced. The 

withdrawal of approximately 3,400 noncombat forces, including 

aviation personnel, explosive ordnance teams, combat and construction engineers, military police, and logistics support teams, began 

this month, will continue through this fall and winter, and be completed in January. In addition, a Marine battalion stationed in 

Anbar will return in November and another Army BCT will return 

by early February. 

The bottom line point is that the drawdowns associated with the 

President’s announcements of 8,000 drawing down do not wait 

until January or February, but in fact have begun. The continuing 

drawdown is possible because of the success in reducing violence 

and building Iraqi security capacity. 

Even with fewer U.S. troops in Iraq, the positive trends of the 

last year have held and in some cases steadily continued in the 

right direction. Our casualties have been greatly reduced, even 

though one is still too many, and overall violence is down more 

than 80 percent. Recent turnover of Anbar Province to Iraqi provincial control, the 11th of 18 provinces to be turned over, highlights 

how much the situation has improved. 

My submitted testimony has more details on some of the other 

positive indicators, as well as the serious challenges that remain. 

In short, Iraqi security forces have made great strides, political 

progress has been incremental but significant, and other nations of 

the region are increasingly engaged with Iraq. 

That said, there are still problems, such as the prospect of violence in the lead-up to elections, worrisome reports about sectarian 

efforts to slow the assimilation of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi 

security forces, Iranian influence, the very real threat that al 

Qaeda continues to pose, and the possibility that Jaish al-Mahdi 

could return. 

Before moving on to Afghanistan, I would like to make a few 

general comments and put the successes of the past year and a half 

in some context. The President has called our reduction in troop 

numbers a return on success. I, of course agree, but would expand 

on that. The changes on the ground and in our posture are reflective of a fundamental change in the nature of the conflict. In past 

testimony I have cautioned that no matter what you think about 

the origins of the war on Iraq, we must get the end-game there 

right. 

I believe we have now entered that end-game, and our decisions 

today and in the months ahead will be critical to regional stability 

and our national security interests for years to come. 

When I entered this office, the main concern was to halt and reverse the spiraling violence in order to prevent a strategic calamity 

10

for the United States and allow the Iraqis to make progress on the 

political, economic, and security fronts. Although we all have criticisms of the Iraqi Government, there can be no doubt that the situation is much different and better than it was in early 2007. 

The situation, however, remains fragile. Disagreements in our 

country still exist over the speed of the drawdowns and whether we 

should adhere to hard and fast time lines or more flexible time horizons. I worry that the great progress our troops and the Iraqis 

have made has the potential to override the measure of caution 

born of uncertainty. Our military commanders do not yet believe 

our gains are necessarily enduring and they believe that there are 

still many challenges and potentials for reversals in the future. 

The continuing but carefully modulated reductions the President 

has ordered represent, I believe, not only the right direction, but 

also the right course of action, especially considering planned and 

unplanned redeployments by some of our coalition partners. Our 

planned reductions are an acceptable risk today, but also provide 

for unforeseen circumstances in the future. They also preserve a 

broad range of options for the next Commander in Chief, who will 

make his own assessment after taking office in January. 

As we proceed deeper into the end game, I would urge our Nation’s leaders to implement strategies that, while reducing our 

presence in Iraq steadily, are cautious and flexible and take into 

account the advice of our senior commanders and military leaders. 

I would also urge our leaders to keep in mind that we should expect to be involved in Iraq for years to come, though in changing 

and increasingly limited ways. 

Let me shift briefly to Afghanistan. There we are working with 

the Afghans and coalition partners to counter a classic extremist 

insurgency, fueled by ideology, poppy, poverty, crime, and corruption. During my recent visit to Afghanistan I reemphasized our 

commitment to success there, a commitment that includes increasing the size of our forces in country as well as the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. 

I also expressed my regret and the regret of the American people 

for the civilians killed and injured in coalition and NATO air 

strikes. While no other nation in history has done more to protect 

the innocent, I pledge that we must and will do better. 

My submitted statement details some positive developments, 

such as the increased commitment by our international partners on 

both the military and nonmilitary fronts and the announcement 

earlier this month to double the size of the Afghan army, which 

has demonstrated its effectiveness on the battlefield. The statement also outlines in more detail some of the logistical challenges 

we still face and are working to improve, such as ISAF shortfalls 

and coordination problems between military forces and civilian elements, particularly the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). 

Persistent and increasing violence, resulting from an organized 

insurgency, is of course our greatest concern. The President has decided to send more troops to Afghanistan in response to resurgent 

extremism and violence reflecting greater ambition, sophistication, 

and coordination. 

We did not get to this point overnight, so a little historical context is useful. The mission in Afghanistan has evolved over the 

11

years since 2002 in both positive and negative ways. Reported insurgent activities and attacks began increasing steadily, particularly in the spring of 2006. This has been the result of increased 

insurgent activity, insurgent safe havens in Pakistan, and reduced 

military pressure on that side of the border, as well as more international and Afghan troops on the battlefield, troops that are increasingly in contact with the enemy. 

In response to increased violence and the insurgent activity in 

2006, in January 2007 I extended the deployment of an Army brigade and added another brigade. This last spring, the United 

States deployed 3,500 marines and all the number of American 

troops in the country increased from less than 21,000 2 years ago 

to more than 31,000 today. 

At the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, ISAF allies and 

partners restated their own commitment to Afghanistan. France 

has added 700 troops in eastern Afghanistan. This fall, Germany 

will seek to increase its troop ceiling from 3,500 to 4,500. Poland 

is also increasing its troops by 400. The number of coalition forces, 

including NATO troops, has increased from about 20,000 to nearly 

31,000, and it appears that this trend will continue as other allies 

such as the United Kingdom add more troops. 

In Bucharest in April the President pledged the United States 

would send more troops to Afghanistan in 2009. Accordingly, we 

will increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan by deploying a Marine battalion this November and in January an Army BCT, both 

units that had been slated for Iraq. 

As in Iraq, however, additional forces alone will not solve the 

problem. Security is just one aspect of the campaign alongside development and governance. We must maintain momentum, keep 

the international community engaged, and develop the capacity of 

the Afghan Government. The entirety of the NATO alliance, the 

European Union, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 

other groups, our full military and civilian capabilities must be on 

the same page and working toward the same goal with the Afghan 

Government. 

I am still not satisfied with the level of coordination and collaboration among the numerous partners and many moving parts associated with civilian reconstruction and development and building 

the capacity of the Afghan Government. 

We do face committed enemies, which brings me finally to the 

challenge of the tribal areas of Pakistan. As in Iraq, until the insurgency is deprived of safe havens insecurity and violence will 

persist. We are working with Pakistan in a number of areas and 

I do believe that Islamabad appreciates the magnitude of the 

threat from the tribal areas, particularly considering the uptick in 

suicide bombings directed at Pakistani targets, most recently the 

Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. 

During this time of political turmoil in Pakistan, it is especially 

crucial that we maintain a strong and positive relationship with 

the government since any deterioration could be a setback for both 

Pakistan and Afghanistan. The war on terror started in this region. 

It must end there. 

Let me close by again thanking all of the members of the committee and Congress as a whole for their support for our men and 

12

women in uniform. I have noted on a number of occasions how 

positive the public response has been to those who have volunteered to serve. Our Nation’s leaders across the entire political 

spectrum have led the way in honoring our service men and 

women, not just by providing the funds they need for their mission, 

but also by publicly declaring their support and their admiration 

for our troops. 

I thank you for these sentiments and I thank you for your leadership during these challenging times. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. ROBERT M. GATES

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee: Thank you for inviting me to give you an update on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I would also 

express gratitude to Congress for passing legislation to enhance the benefits of the 

GI Bill. The Department is very pleased with the outcome, and I can tell you that 

our men and women in uniform are deeply appreciative. Of course, this is just one 

example of the many ways in which you have supported our troops these past years. 

On behalf of all of them, I thank you. 

I would also like to take this occasion to encourage this committee to act as soon 

as possible on the nominations of Mike Donley to be the Secretary of the Air Force, 

and General William Fraser III to be the Service’s Vice Chief of Staff. The Air Force 

is undergoing a critical period of transition and renewal, and it is vitally important 

that the full leadership team is in place and confirmed. 

Last week I visited with our troops, commanders, and local partners in both countries. In Iraq, I was honored to pay tribute to our outgoing commander, General 

David Petraeus, as well as Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Beyond their own brilliant 

individual performances, the Petraeus-Crocker team was a superb model of militarycivilian partnership, one that should be studied and emulated for years to come. 

Earlier this month, General Petraeus made his recommendations on the way forward in Iraq. Separate recommendations were submitted by the Commander of the 

International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, the Commander of Central 

Command, the Service Chiefs, and the Chairman. Although each viewed the challenges from a different perspective, weighing different factors, all once again arrived 

at similar recommendations. 

We have already withdrawn the five Army brigade combat teams, two Marine battalions, and the Marine expeditionary unit that were sent to Iraq as part of the 

surge. The President announced earlier this month that approximately 8,000 U.S. 

troops will be withdrawn from Iraq by February without being replaced. 

The withdrawal of approximately 3,400 noncombat forces—including aviation personnel, explosive ordnance teams, combat and construction engineers, military police, and logistics support teams—began this month, continues through the fall and 

winter, and finishes in January. In addition, a Marine battalion stationed in Anbar 

will return in November, and another Army BCT will return by early February. 

This continuing drawdown is possible because of the success achieved in reducing 

violence and building Iraqi security capacity. Even with fewer U.S. troops in Iraq, 

the positive trends of the last year have thus far held—and in some cases steadily 

continued in the right direction. U.S. troop casualties have been greatly reduced—

though even one is still too many, and overall violence is down more than 80 percent. The recent turnover of Anbar province to Iraqi provincial control—the 11th of 

18 provinces to be turned over—highlights how much the situation has improved. 

There are other positive indicators:

• The Iraqi Army has planned and executed operations in Amarah, Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, and Mosul—with encouraging results. Seventy percent 

of more than 160 Iraqi battalions are now in the lead. Their confidence 

level has grown with each passing month, as has ours in their ability to 

get the job done. 

• Overall, political progress has been incremental but significant. The Iraqi 

parliament has passed key legislation this year. The recent return of the 

Sunni Iraqi Accord Front party to ministerial positions was a welcome sign 

of reengagement by Sunnis at the national level.

With the exception of Iran, we have seen an increasing willingness by neighboring 

countries to help engage with and stabilize Iraq. Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, the 

United Arab Emirates and even Syria have announced that they will send ambasVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47117.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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sadors to Baghdad. Jordan’s king and Lebanon’s prime minister both visited Iraq 

last month. 

The International Monetary Fund estimates that the Iraqi economy will have 8–

81⁄2 percent real growth this year.

Despite all this, very serious challenges remain:

• Political progress remains too slow—as seen recently by the inability of 

the parliament to pass an election law. This means that provincial elections, which we believe will continue and enhance the process of reconciliation, will in all likelihood be pushed back until at least December. Elections also mean the possibility of increased violence. 

• There have been some worrisome reports about sectarian efforts to either 

disrupt or slow the process of assimilation of the Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi 

security forces. It is a reminder that sectarian tensions still exist and have 

the potential to undo recent progress at the local and national level. 

• Despite Iran’s pledges last year to stop providing weapons, training, and 

funding to armed militias, evidence suggests that this support continues. 

• Iraqi security forces still lack many key capabilities. Many of their operations would simply not have been possible without coalition enablers. That 

will remain the case for some time to come. 

• The threat from al Qaeda and other militant groups has receded, but is 

still very real. In the last few months, we have seen a number of suicide 

attacks—as well as tactical shifts, such as the increased use of women. This 

is a reminder that al Qaeda still retains the ability to inflict mass casualties, the operational capacity to assess and change strategies, and is still 

trying to sow chaos and reassert itself. 

• Similarly, there is the possibility that Jaish al-Mahdi could return.

On that note, I would like to make a few broader comments and put the successes 

of the last year and a half into some context. 

The President has called our reduction in troop numbers a ‘‘return on success.’’ 

I of course agree, but I might expand further. The changes on the ground and in 

our posture are reflective of a fundamental change in the nature of the conflict. In 

past testimony, I have cautioned that, no matter what you think about the origins 

of the war in Iraq, we must get the endgame there right. I believe we have now 

entered that endgame—and our decisions today and in the months ahead will be 

critical to regional stability and our national security interests in the next few 

years. 

When I entered office, the main concern was to halt and reverse the spiraling violence in order to prevent a strategic calamity for the United States and allow the 

Iraqis to make progress on the political, economic, and security fronts. Although we 

all have criticisms of the Iraqi Government, there can be no doubt that the situation 

is much different—and far better—than it was in early 2007. The situation, however, remains fragile. 

Disagreements in our country still exist over the speed of the drawdowns and 

whether we should adhere to hard-and-fast timelines or more flexible time horizons. 

I worry that the great progress our troops and the Iraqis have made has the potential to over-ride a measure of caution born of uncertainty. Our military commanders do not yet believe our gains are necessarily enduring—and they believe 

that there are still many challenges and the potential for reversals in the future. 

The continuing but carefully modulated reductions the President has ordered represent, I believe, not only the right direction but also the right course of action—

especially considering planned and unplanned redeployments by some of our coalition partners. The planned reductions are an acceptable risk today, but also provide 

for unforeseen circumstances in the future. The reductions also preserve a broad 

range of options for the next Commander in Chief, who will make his own assessment after taking office in January. 

As we proceed deeper into the endgame, I would urge our Nation’s leaders to implement strategies that, while steadily reducing our presence in Iraq, are cautious 

and flexible and take into account the advice of our senior commanders and military 

leaders. I would also urge our leaders to keep in mind that we should expect to be 

involved in Iraq for many years to come, although in changing and increasingly limited ways. 

Let me shift to Afghanistan. There we are working with the Afghans and coalition 

partners to counter a classic extremist insurgency fueled by ideology, poppy, poverty, crime, and corruption. 

During my recent visit to Afghanistan, I reaffirmed our commitment to success 

in that country—a commitment that includes increasing the size of our forces in 

country as well as the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. I also exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47117.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
14

pressed my regret, and the regret of the American people, for the civilians killed 

and injured in coalition and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes. 

While no other nation in history has done more to protect the innocent, I pledged 

that we must, and will do better. 

First, some positive developments:

• The international coalition, led by NATO, is more committed than it has 

ever been. We see this in increased troop contributions from our partners, 

as well as efforts to reduce some of the caveats they place on their troops. 

There are also increased resources being devoted to nonmilitary efforts. Our 

allies deserve credit, and I thank them for their sacrifices. 

• At the Paris Donors Conference in June, the international community 

pledged more than $20 billion in assistance to Afghanistan. 

• The United Nations appointed Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway as the 

Special Representative of the Secretary General to the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. Ambassador Eide has been empowered to play a greater role in coordinating international assistance to ensure aid is distributed 

effectively and where it is most needed. 

• The Afghan National Army is more than 65,000 strong and growing. Earlier this month, the President announced an initiative to double the size of 

the Afghan National Army over the next 5 years. 

• The Afghan National Police lag behind the army, but here, too, progress 

is being made. There are nearly 80,000 police assigned today. Our main 

challenge is increasing the competence and reliability of the force, and that 

requires large numbers of mentors and trainers. So far we have been unable to fill most of what is required. Nonetheless, an innovative program 

called Focused District Development is helping build police forces capable 

of serving local Afghan communities.

Before addressing the increase in violence, let me mention other problem areas:

• Despite increased NATO contributions, we are still short in several areas. 

More maneuver forces are required, as well as aviation assets, Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), and mentors for the Afghan army. Where Allies cannot provide more troops and equipment, they need to provide other 

types of support to build Afghan capacity. 

• There remain questions about the efficacy of having 2 lines of command—

1 for a contingent of U.S. troops training and equipping Afghan forces as 

part of Operation Enduring Freedom, and 1 for the Internation Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, which also includes nearly 14,000 American 

troops. 

• Coordination between PRTs and ISAF needs to be improved. Civilians in 

PRTs report to their respective capitals—which makes it difficult to synchronize PRT activities with military actions. We are working with allies 

and partners to stand up a civil-military planning cell in the south to help 

coordinate PRTs in a more holistic fashion—both locally and regionally. 

• Afghanistan’s Government must improve its delivery of essential services 

and extend its reach by reducing corruption and promoting faster development and a stronger economy. Here we do run up against some hard realities: Afghanistan has always been a diffuse, tribal nation with few natural 

resources and little infrastructure. To give you some idea, total annual revenue for the government is approximately $700 million versus tens of billions in Iraq.

The persistent and increasing violence resulting from an organized insurgency is, 

of course, our greatest concern. With the flexibility provided by success in Iraq, the 

President has decided to send more troops to Afghanistan in response to resurgent 

extremism and violence reflecting greater ambition, sophistication, and coordination. 

We did not get to this point overnight, so some historical context is useful. The 

mission in Afghanistan has evolved over the years—in both positive and negative 

ways. Reported insurgent activities and attacks have grown over the past 21⁄2 years. 

In some cases, this is a result of safe havens in Pakistan and reduced military pressure on that side of the border. In others, it is the result of more international and 

Afghan troops on the battlefield—troops that are increasingly in contact with the 

enemy. 

In response to increased violence and insurgent activity in 2006, in January of 

last year we extended the deployment of an Army brigade and added another brigade. This last spring, the United States deployed 3,500 marines. In all, the number 

of American troops in the country increased from less than 21,000 2 years ago to 

more than 31,000 today. 

15

At the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April, ISAF Allies and Partners restated 

their commitment to Afghanistan. France added 700 troops in Eastern Afghanistan. 

This fall, Germany will seek to increase its troop ceiling from 3,500 to 4,500. Poland 

is also increasing its forces by 400 troops. 

The number of coalition troops—including NATO troops—increased from about 

20,000 to nearly 31,000. It appears that this trend will continue—as other allies, 

such as the United Kingdom, add more troops. 

Thanks to success in Iraq, we will increase U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan by 

deploying a Marine battalion this November and in January 2009 an Army brigade 

combat team—units that had been slated for Iraq. 

As in Iraq, however, additional forces alone will not solve the problem. Security 

is just one aspect of the campaign, alongside development and governance. We must 

maintain momentum, keep the international community engaged, and develop the 

capacity of the Afghan Government. The entirety of the NATO alliance, the EU, 

NGOs, and other groups—our full military and civilian capabilities—must be on the 

same page and working toward the same goal with the Afghan Government. I am 

still not satisfied with the level of coordination and collaboration among the numerous partners and many moving parts associated with civil reconstruction and development and building the capacity of the Afghan Government. 

We do face committed enemies, which brings me to the challenge of the tribal 

areas of Pakistan. As in Iraq, until the insurgency is deprived of safe-havens, insecurity and violence will persist. We must continue to work with the Pakistani Government to extend its authority in the tribal region and provide badly needed economic, medical, and educational assistance to Pakistani citizens there. At the same 

time, we continue to train and equip the paramilitary Frontier Corps and Pakistani 

military units so they can better secure the border area and carry out operations 

against militants. 

We also continue to encourage the Afghans and Pakistanis to work together to 

secure their common border. This effort includes the establishment of more Border 

Coordination Centers jointly manned by ISAF, Afghan, and Pakistani troops; following up on the 2007 Joint Peace Jirga; and holding routine meetings of the Tripartite Commission. 

I do believe Islamabad appreciates the magnitude of the threat from the tribal 

areas—particularly considering the uptick in suicide bombings directed at Pakistani 

targets, most recently the Marriott hotel in Islamabad. During this time of political 

turmoil in Pakistan, it is especially crucial that we maintain a strong and positive 

relationship with the government—since any deterioration would be a setback for 

both Pakistan and Afghanistan. The war on terror started in this region. It must 

end there. 

One final point. Last year, Admiral Mullen noted that in Afghanistan we do what 

we can—while in Iraq, we do what we must. With the positive developments in Iraq, 

the strategic flexibility provided by ongoing troop reductions there, and the prospect 

of further reductions next year—I think it is possible in the months to come to do 

militarily what we must in both countries. 

Let me close by again thanking all members of the committee—and Congress as 

a whole—for their support of our men and women in uniform. I have noted on a 

number of occasions how positive the public response has been to those who have 

volunteered to serve. Our Nation’s leaders across the political spectrum have led the 

way in honoring our service men and women—not just by providing the funds they 

need for their mission, but also by publicly declaring their support and admiration 

of our troops. I share your sentiment. I thank you all for your leadership during 

these challenging times.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Gates. 

General Cartwright? 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, VICE 

CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

General CARTWRIGHT. Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, I will 

not do a prepared statement, but I will respond just briefly to a 

couple of your comments, and those are to remind all that over the 

past few weeks we’ve celebrated and remembered September 11 

and the prisoner-of-war/missing-in-action remembrance, along with, 

on the Capitol lawn out here this weekend, a session with many 

of the children of the fallen. In each of those, many of you particiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47117.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
16

pated. That means a lot to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines that go out day-in and day-out, volunteer and sacrifice, and 

to the families that sacrifice. 

So my thanks from them to you for that support. It is important, 

and I am ready for your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General. 

Why don’t we try an 8-minute first round. 

Mr. Secretary, you commented on the relative commitment of our 

forces, our energies to Iraq compared to Afghanistan. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, in a statement which has 

been clearly and broadly quoted—you quoted it in your own testimony—said that ‘‘In Afghanistan we do what we can and in Iraq 

we do what we must.’’ 

Now, your testimony says that it’s possible in the months to 

come to do militarily what we must do in both countries. It seems 

to me that is just simply not good enough. To say it’s possible that 

we’ll do what we must do in Afghanistan does not represent the 

kind of commitment of forces or resources that our commanders on 

the ground are asking us for. We have General McKiernan, he’s requested three more Army BCTs in addition to the one that’s now 

set to deploy in January. He said recently that ‘‘The danger is that 

we’ll be here longer and we’ll expend more resources and experience more human suffering than if we had more resources placed 

against this campaign sooner.’’ 

That’s our commander on the ground. Why are we not responding promptly to that request from our commander on the ground 

in Afghanistan, given the fact that I think most people would agree 

that the terror threat to us from that area along that border, is 

probably the most existential threat that we face. It’s the greatest 

source of the terror threat. What are we just sort of saying, well, 

we’ll send one team in February, silent on what happens after that, 

when our own commander says we need at least three teams above 

that commitment? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, the requirement for forces in Afghanistan has been evolving. To tell you the truth, when I left for 

Afghanistan last week, my impression was that the requirement 

was for a total of three BCTs, not four. These things change even 

while you’re in the air, and that request is in the Pentagon, but 

has not yet come to me for the fourth BCT. 

The reality is, as I indicated in my remarks, over the past 18 

months between ourselves and our allies we have added over 

20,000 troops to Afghanistan. I realize what the requirements of 

the commanders are and I have given great deference to those requirements, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan, beginning with the 

measures I took in Afghanistan a year ago January. 

I would say there are two considerations. One, I think we need 

to think about how heavy a military footprint ought to have in Afghanistan and are we better off channeling resources into building 

and expanding the size of the ANA as quickly as possible, as opposed to a much larger western footprint in a country that has 

never been notoriously hospitable to foreigners, regardless of why 

they’re there. So I think that’s one question that we have to weigh 

and the next President will have to weigh in terms of the troop requirements, is the balance between increased Afghan capacity and 

17

the increased footprint, particularly of Americans, in terms of the 

forces that we have on the ground. 

The second consideration is one that is, I think, evident to all, 

and that is that without changing deployment patterns, without 

changing length of tours, we do not have the forces to send three 

additional BCTs to Afghanistan at this point. My view is that those 

forces will become available, probably during the spring and summer of 2009. The President made a commitment in Bucharest to 

send more troops. That’s obviously a decision that will be up to his 

successor. 

I believe we will be able to meet that commander’s requirement, 

but I believe we will meet it in the spring and summer of 2009 

rather than immediately. 

Chairman LEVIN. If we reduced our troops and our presence in 

Iraq more quickly, would we be able to meet the U.S. commander 

in Afghanistan’s request more quickly? 

Secretary GATES. Let me ask General Cartwright. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s a very short question: If we reduced our 

troop presence—and that’s fine, General, for you to answer it. But 

if we reduced our troop presence in Iraq more quickly, would we 

be able to meet our U.S. commander in Afghanistan’s request more 

quickly? 

General CARTWRIGHT. We would not be able to meet the entirety 

of that request. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, could we meet part of it at least? 

General CARTWRIGHT. We could meet part of it. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

General CARTWRIGHT. The challenge is the infrastructure and the 

enablers and moving them. 

Chairman LEVIN. At least we could meet part of his request more 

quickly; is that correct? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Gates, Pakistan’s President Zardari 

recently warned that Pakistan ‘‘will not tolerate the violation of our 

sovereignty and territorial integrity by any power in the name of 

combating terrorism.’’ Now, are we going to have the public support 

of the Pakistani Government in implementing any new comprehensive strategy going after those safe havens and preventing crossborder incursions, or are we going to face the public opposition of 

the Pakistani Government in carrying out whatever cross-border 

military actions we determine are necessary? 

Secretary GATES. I think it’s essential for Pakistan to be a willing partner in any strategy we have to deal with the threat coming 

out of the western part of Pakistan and in Afghanistan. This is the 

first time that Pakistan has had a fully civilian government I think 

in about a dozen years. It has taken some time for them to get 

their feet on the ground and get organized. The fact is that in recent weeks the Pakistani army has been active in the Northwest 

Frontier area, in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). 

Regardless of the effectiveness of their operations, their mere presence and willingness to fight has reduced some of the pressure on 

the Afghan side of the border as the Taliban and others keep more 

troops at home to watch their backs, as it were. 

18

But Pakistan has to be a part of this strategy going forward. 

They have to be our partner and we have to engage them in a way 

that makes it very helpful. I would tell you in a gratuitous bit of 

endorsement here that some of the bipartisan proposals here on the 

Hill for a multi-year economic assistance package to Pakistan I 

think would make a significant contribution in signaling our longterm commitment to that country, to its civilian government, and 

to the well-being of the Pakistani people. That in turn would significantly advance our strategic interests. 

Chairman LEVIN. My question, though, is really a different one. 

Are we going to have the public support of President Zardari in 

Pakistan for any cross-border operations that we carry out? That’s 

my question. 

Secretary GATES. I don’t think that they can do that. I will say 

to you though, that we will do what is necessary to protect our 

troops. But it is very important to engage the Pakistani Government, and I think that the threat that they are seeing creates, to 

themselves, the opportunity where we can work together and 

there’s no necessity for us to take any actions to protect our troops 

along those lines. 

Chairman LEVIN. I agree with you, with that. But for the President to condemn cross-border operations on our part it seems to me 

just undermines the efficacy of those actions, creates popular opposition, and gives the people who are training folks to attack our 

people, who are training terrorists, the kind of propaganda fodder 

that they’re looking for. 

It seems to me that there has to be some kind of a better relationship and an understanding than we currently have. I think 

that public condemnation of our cross-border activities, just works 

against their usefulness. For us to say, well, he can’t do that, to 

me is totally unacceptable and undermines the usefulness to a 

large extent of those operations and is counterproductive. Would 

you agree with that? 

Secretary GATES. We need his help. We need him to be a partner. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Just to follow on that very important line of 

questioning. Basically I share the chairman’s concerns. I copied 

down what you said: ‘‘Pakistan must be a willing partner.’’ What’s 

your own personal assessment of this new government today and 

do you think over a period of time that partnership can be forged? 

Namely, has there been sufficient time for you to gain confidence 

that’s likely to come about? 

Secretary GATES. I actually think it will. I think we’re already 

seeing some positive signs. Pakistan is already cooperating with us 

in some very important ways in terms of helping us with logistics. 

They have suffered several thousand casualties in this war on terror. They have captured a number of high-ranking al Qaeda and 

other terrorist leaders over the course of this war. 

Pakistan has been a good partner in this war, and what’s important is to forge an even stronger partnership with the new civilian 

government as we had with its predecessor. I think that the nature 

of the threat that we face, beginning with the assassination of the 

current president’s wife, and now most recently the attack on the 

19

Marriott Hotel, makes very clear to the Pakistani Government that 

they face an existential threat in the western part of their country. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would just add, the relationship is improving between the Pakistanis and the Afghanis and we’re starting to see some signs of that, in addition to at the tactical level an 

uptick in their willingness to work with us in the border control 

centers, to stand up a common operations center, so that we can 

monitor both sides of the border and both militaries can see what’s 

going on. So we are starting to see a level of cooperation that we 

did not have in the past. 

Senator WARNER. Well, have you had an opportunity to read the 

article this morning saying that the Afghans, the Pakhs, and the 

U.S. may be discussing the creation of a joint military task force? 

Were you able to read that or do you know something about it? Because that to me is one of the most encouraging signs that I have 

seen. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I do not know about that specific instance, 

but the things that I just cited to you and the work that is going 

on across the border indicate the same type of relationship. There 

is an acknowledgment by both sides that they have a common 

threat that they’re going to have to address together and addressing that singularly will not solve the problem. 

Senator WARNER. Well, let me press on. The Afghan defense minister—and the Secretary apparently met with him a few times—

said he proposed the idea and it was discussed last month at the 

meeting of military officers from the three countries. I certainly 

would support that effort and I think all of us would. 

Is there any more gravitas to this story this morning, or is it just 

a little blip? 

Secretary GATES. I met with Minister Wardak, as well as with 

President Karzai last week. This kind of a tripartite effort did not 

come up and was not raised by them. I did agree to a proposal by 

Minister Wardak for a combined or joint Afghan-U.S. investigative 

committee to look into and investigate civilian casualties. But that 

was the only similar thing that was raised. 

Senator WARNER. I thank you for that. General, back to a tough 

question, which is distinctly the responsibility of the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs, and the Vice Chairman, yourself, and that’s to 

constantly monitor U.S. readiness. You said forthrightly we’re not 

ready, even if we were to reduce significantly in Iraq, to suddenly 

shift those forces into Pakistan. Are we to interpret that our readiness is pretty well stretched at this moment? The Secretary added 

that probably we could not meet the current request of the commanders in Afghanistan until spring or summer. Possibly that’s 

when, dictated by weather considerations, the more severe fighting 

is likely to take place. 

Let’s talk about readiness. What is the state of readiness of our 

forces today? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator Warner, the comments that I 

made were less about the physical readiness of equipment and personnel and more about changing the posture between one front and 

another. As we look to move forces, as Chairman Levin postulated, 

towards Afghanistan, if we’re going to do that there are several 

20

challenges. We need bed-down spots for those forces, infrastructure 

that would support them. 

Senator WARNER. You mean in country Afghanistan? 

General CARTWRIGHT. In country Afghanistan, in order to put 

them down. In the winters the climate is harsh there, so we have 

to have that type of capability. 

Two, that has to match up with the strategy that we would lay 

down for those forces. So are we to keep them in centralized enclaves or are we going to start to get them out into the country? 

That means that you have to have a basing construct that allows 

that, and the mobility and the communications that allow that. 

Those are two pieces. 

Right now we’re structured for a sequence of forces that measures infantry, Stryker BCTs, and heavy BCTs in a certain sequence. Whether that sequence fits the deployment cycle and the 

needs of Afghanistan, which is mountainous, hard terrain for heavy 

vehicles to traverse, altitude, et cetera. We have to restructure our 

deployment cycles, restructure our training, and put the infrastructure in place: those are the challenges that I was referring to, sir. 

Senator WARNER. Can you describe to the American public today, 

what is your professional judgment as to the state of overall readiness of our Armed Forces, to continue to meet these contingencies 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as to pivot if a third problem 

arises, unforeseen at the moment? 

General CARTWRIGHT. They are well-trained, well-equipped for 

this fight. 

Senator WARNER. What’s ‘‘this fight’’? 

General CARTWRIGHT. This fight is a counterinsurgency, counterterrorism fight. For the broader things, a third conflict, undefined, 

we need more time to train them for other types of conflict. There 

is unique training associated with Afghanistan that we need to put 

in place. That takes weeks, not months. But we have to do that 

when we switch a force or a group from one country to the next. 

Those are the readiness issues that I was trying to address. 

From the standpoint of the force, moving us quickly to at least 12-

month tours, which is what we’re on the path to do for the Army, 

will be a big assistance in helping us reconstitute this force, ensure 

that the equipment gets through the depot and gets up to the top 

notch that it can get up to in readiness. Those things are well in 

hand. Thanks to this committee and others, we’re getting the resources to do this. 

But if you add additional stress and take us back towards extended tours, that’s going to wear on the force very quickly. 

Senator WARNER. Mr. Secretary, let’s turn to the posture of the 

strategic framework and the status of forces agreement. Every expectation was raised here in Congress that these agreements would 

be ready for review by the administration and perhaps some forthcoming representation to Congress from the administration as to 

these two agreements. Here we are, about to recess Congress in a 

matter of days perhaps, although we may have another session. 

Who knows? I’m not in the position to raise that now. 

But it seems to me that the congressional input on these two 

agreements is absolutely essential if the American public is going 

to accept them. It’s a joint responsibility. I realize the Executive 

21

Branch is tasked —the President is our chief diplomat—to negotiate these things. But then again, they impact the future use of 

our forces and that bears on the constitutional responsibilities of 

Congress. 

Where are we on this? 

Secretary GATES. The agreements are still under negotiation. We 

have had some disagreements. It’s been a tough negotiation. We 

are now dealing with a sovereign government that feels very 

strongly about its sovereignty. Our negotiating team either has, or 

imminently will, return to Baghdad. 

My understanding is that all the relevant committees of Congress, and particularly here in the Senate, have been briefed on the 

course of the negotiations, and it is my understanding that even 

when we reach an agreed text that there will be no signature of 

these agreements before consultation with Members of Congress. 

Senator WARNER. The chairman, I believe, could speak to this 

better, but we have certainly followed the process. We were told 

that in all likelihood they would be present in July before the August recess for us to take a look at. Now, facts are facts. I’m not 

here blaming you or anybody else. I’m just saying point blank that 

if Congress is in recess or goes out sine die and suddenly these two 

agreements come in without any clear ability of a coordinated consultation with Congress. Now when I say coordinated, I don’t mean 

just one or two chairmen here or a ranking there, I believe that 

there will be an inherent weakness in the support across this country for these agreements, and that concerns me greatly, because 

we’re pivoting again from concentration on Iraq with our military 

forces into Afghanistan. We have to have as much certainty as we 

can as to the projected requirements for Iraq in the future in order 

to address the worsening situation in Afghanistan. 

These agreements are central to that. So are you saying in effect 

that in all likelihood the culmination and the finalization of these 

will take place in November or December? You have to do it before 

the first of the year because of the expiration of the U.N. mandate. 

Secretary GATES. I would hope that the agreements would be finalized within the next few weeks, quite frankly. But I had hoped 

that some weeks ago. It’s just been a tough negotiation and, believe 

me, no one would have preferred anything other than to have these 

things done weeks ago, so there would have been ample time to do 

it, to have a consultation, while Congress was still in session. 

But my understanding is there will be a significant effort to 

reach out to Members if these agreements are reached after you recess. 

Senator WARNER. Well, you run the risk of having the American 

public of a view that somehow this was not handled properly or 

timely. 

My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me just reiterate what Senator Warner 

said. There’s a commitment from this administration that before 

the agreements are finalized that there be consultation with the 

leadership of Congress. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Whether we’re in session or out of session. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

22

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. That’s critically important. We’re counting on it. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, you described the number of troops that the 

NATO allies are adding to the effort in Afghanistan. It didn’t seem 

to me that that’s a very robust addition by the other members of 

NATO compared to our presence there and our future presence 

there. But hopefully we’ll see that improve as we go along. 

My first question, is as you look at the largely nonregulated, lawless FATA area, is it possible for success to occur without a joint 

effort including Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as the United 

States, and I guess NATO in some capacity? Is it even possible to 

be successful there unless we have all three parties to that agreement? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I think the answer to your question is 

no. I think that on the Pakistani side of the border we face the 

same situation that we have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 

that is that military action, even if it’s carried out aggressively and 

effectively by the Pakistani army, still needs to be accompanied by 

economic development, civic development, and so on. That’s where 

perhaps NATO and the United States and others can work with 

the Pakistanis in terms of helping them in that regard. 

Pakistan’s in desperate economic straits right now and any help 

we could give them in terms of development there I think is critically important. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I appreciate that. I think it was earlier 

this year that Admiral Mullen indicated he was developing a comprehensive strategy for the region. It would seem to me that comprehensive strategy should include this three-party joint effort. So 

I’m surprised that we’re surprised to learn about the conversation 

apparently between the Pakistanis and the Afghanis without including us in those discussions. 

Do you think it would be a good idea on our part to pick up the 

ball here and go back to those two countries and begin the discussion about a three-party effort? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. I think there is absolutely no down side 

that I can see. I must say, the one area where I think this conversation, assuming it took place, may have happened, is when 

President Karzai was in Pakistan for the inauguration of President 

Zardari. That’s where they may have discussed this, and we just 

haven’t gotten a readout on it yet. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But the Washington Post said Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the United States are discussing. So they have 

included us, perhaps without our knowledge. But they’ve already 

suggested that that’s ongoing. Undoubtedly, the discussion took 

place when the two leaders, Pakistan and Afghanistan, were together. 

Secretary GATES. I should just note, Senator, that it’s not the 

first time that the Post would have known something I didn’t 

know. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I was trying not to say it exactly that way, 

but I guess that is the bottom line. Well, thank you for your response. 

23

In the announcement by the President to withdraw 8,000 troops 

from Iraq, we’re going back to the pre-surge levels at some point 

along the way. There’s been some discussion about benchmarks 

being achieved, but has the oil agreement benchmark been 

achieved? What about provincial elections? I think there’s a lot of 

talk about potential success in Iraq and the fact that things have 

improved there, and no one is going to disagree with the numbers. 

But until you get provincial elections, until you get buy-in at the 

local level, is there really a chance for major success in Iraq? 

Secretary GATES. I think every element in Iraq understands the 

importance of provincial elections. We certainly do. I think that the 

Council of Representatives, which has just convened, is working on 

getting the provincial elections law completed as quickly as possible. But every faction that I’m aware of in Iraq understands the 

importance of that and wants those elections, as a matter of fact. 

With respect to the hydrocarbon law: there is no hydrocarbon law 

yet, but, as has been the case for some time now, the sharing of 

the revenue from the hydrocarbons still is going on throughout the 

country. 

Senator BEN NELSON. But as long as that’s ad hoc there’s still 

uncertainty as to the stability of that sharing; isn’t that true? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. But the interesting thing is that the debate really is less about who’s going to get what than a debate between two economic philosophies in Iraq. Is oil development, servicing and everything going to be controlled by the central government or are pieces of that going to be decentralized? It’s more over 

this debate over how to do this going forward than it is the allocation of resources that has held up that law. 

Senator BEN NELSON. How is the centralized government under 

al-Maliki functioning as it relates to the Sunnis in the north, where 

the Sons of Iraq have been established in effect by joint agreement 

between the Sunnis and our government, where al-Maliki is now 

sending Shias into the north to disarm some of the Sons of Iraq? 

Secretary GATES. Prime Minister Maliki told me last week, when 

I was there, that he had the day before our meeting signed a paper 

in which he gave the directive to absorb Sons of Iraq into the Iraqi 

security forces. For those not going into the security forces to pick 

up their salaries and to continue to pay them even if they lacked 

professional skills until they could find work. So I think that really 

this last week, after some concern, I think that there was some 

substantial progress. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Is this part of an amnesty program? Because they seem to be totally opposed to amnesty for any of the 

Sunnis in the north, whereas we’ve been willing to forgive former 

insurgents who joined together with the Sons of Iraq approach. 

Secretary GATES. I think I have never heard the Sons of Iraq 

program described as an amnesty program, but I think it is a reconciliation program. 

Senator BEN NELSON. At least a reconciliation. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I was just going to add that we’ve actually 

started to see the movement, the absorption of the Sons of Iraq into 

the military and into other jobs in the public sector and private 

sector. So the activities of a week ago have already started to show 

material activity. 

24

Senator BEN NELSON. Which would give us some hope that reconciliation is at least a possibility, that this might be able to spread 

even beyond the north there. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. What about as it might relate to the Kurds 

in the north? 

Secretary GATES. I think one of the concerns is on the part of the 

Maliki Government, is that Kurdish forces are deployed outside of 

the traditional zone that constituted Kurdistan. While the Kurdish 

military units have been very helpful in places like Basra and elsewhere, I think that there is a desire to assert the authority of the 

central government, particularly in those areas beyond the traditional Kurdish zone. I think that a lot of the confrontation or the 

set-to that we’re seeing between the Kurds and the central government really has to do with that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So trying to establish some sort of agreement between those two entities could in fact resolve that for the 

future, or is this going to be an ongoing disagreement for which 

there is probably no resolution? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think there is a resolution and it comes 

back in no small part to provincial elections. I think if we can get 

these provincial elections that it’ll be a big step forward. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has 

expired. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first take just a minute to, since this may be the last 

hearing for Secretary Gates, I want to say what respect I have for 

you and the job you’ve done in terms of accountability. Not once 

but twice, when I doubted whether or not you would be willing to 

fire a top commander based on issues within their command, you 

exceeded my expectations both times and provided I think desperately needed accountability by placing blame at the top of the 

command, as opposed to what had traditionally gone on, which is 

trying to only provide accountability at the bottom of the ladder. 

So from this United States Senator, I just want to compliment 

you. You have my deepest respect for your public service and for 

your willingness to make the very tough decisions at the very top. 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I also want to ask you, would you disagree 

that the terrorist threat that we face right now is strongest in both 

Afghanistan and Pakistan? That is in fact where the most threat 

lies in terms of terrorist activity? 

Secretary GATES. I think that there has been an interesting evolution of the terrorist threat being strongest in Afghanistan in 

2001. By the mid-2000s al Qaeda itself was saying that Iraq had 

become the central front. If you ask me today, after the successes 

we have had against al Qaeda in Iraq, where the greatest threat 

to the homeland lies, I would tell you it’s in western Pakistan. 

Senator MCCASKILL. As we talk about Pakistan, I know there 

has been some previous questions about Pakistan. I am really concerned. I hang out with these Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) reports. I’m concerned about the money we’re giving PakiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\47117.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
25

stan and the lack of accountability for that, especially in light of 

reports that they’re now shooting at us. It is hard for me to reconcile us paying Pakistan for their willingness to weed our terrorism along their border and then the ultimate irony, that we 

might be paying them to be shooting at our helicopters. 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, we don’t have any evidence 

that they have shot at us or our helicopters at this point. But, that 

said, we are very aware of those concerns in terms of accountability. We share them. We have taken very seriously the GAO report on the coalition support funds that came out in June and are 

in the process if implementing the recommendations in that GAO 

report to try and improve accountability in this area. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just think if we’re giving them $2 billion, 

and we’ve given them, obviously, billions and billions of dollars; I 

think we’re up to $6 billion that we’ve given them to assist us, and 

obviously we’re very frustrated. It feels like to me anyway, and correct me if I’m wrong, that we’re frustrated over the level of assistance that they’ve given us in terms of these safe havens along their 

borders. 

Secretary GATES. I think part of the problem is that part of the 

border has really never been well controlled by the Pakistani central government, regardless of who was in authority. I remember 

going up there in the 1980s when we were helping the mujahedin 

and that was pretty wild territory even then. 

I think our concern has really been, our most immediate concern, 

was the peace agreements that were signed during the first months 

of this year, where the Pakistani military basically backed out of 

that area, and that alleviation of the pressure created the opportunity then for the Taliban to cross the border, and for others as 

well for that matter. 

So we have already seen the benefits of the Pakistani army becoming active again in that area, and we are prepared to do whatever we can to help them be more effective. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me also talk a little bit about the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. I know the 

chairman and the ranking member have had some concerns about 

this, and it’s been an ongoing concern of mine, the growth of this 

program. I understand winning the hearts and minds and I understand being able to cut red tape, but now the initial idea was that 

these would be small, short-term expenditures, as opposed to large 

ongoing programs. 

In reading some of the materials on the CERP program, where 

we’re actually building hotels and are, putting in water systems 

without any follow-up; and I know that the field manual talks 

about money as a weapon system. My concern is, Mr. Secretary, 

what are we doing in terms of follow-up on these expenditures of 

money? Who is going to take over making sure that what needs to 

be done; especially for these projects that are much more than 

$500,000 and have long-term consequences? 

Is there any plan to transition this back over to the Department 

of State or to U.S. Agency for International Development, since 

really what we’re talking about is coming in and trying to better 

do reconstruction? Obviously, our reconstruction efforts were, I 

think, to be kind, less than successful. Now you have undertaken 

26

this without any, it doesn’t appear to me, real plan how we transition that over to folks who have long-term training on the followup on these reconstruction projects. 

Secretary GATES. Well, let me offer some comments and then invite General Cartwright to comment. First of all, I know the committee is sensitive about the hotel that was started at the Baghdad 

International Airport. Basically, it was to try and wrest control of 

the airport away from Jaish al-Mahdi through giving people jobs 

and creating opportunities for them to do something other than 

shoot at us. We are not investing any more money in that. The 

Iraqi Government has obligated about $45 million in that hotel and 

so on. 

But we’ve also tightened up the procedures. The reality is, most 

of the CERP money has gone to pay groups like the Sons of Iraq. 

I think at this point in 2008 about $280, $290 million of the CERP 

funds have been used to do exactly what we said, and that is get 

these guys to put down their weapons and pick up shovels. We now have new controls in place. Any project that is $2 million 

or over I personally have to approve. There have been new procedures put in place for projects that are over $500,000. So we are 

trying to provide better controls and, frankly, more transparency 

here to Congress on how that money is being spent, specific 

projects, and so on. 

General, do you want to comment? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would just reinforce that. As we start to 

rebalance towards Afghanistan, it’s going to become important 

again, for the reasons that you cited, the original reasons that we 

started into the CERP program, to be able to use CERP, as you 

would phrase it, as a weapon to bring people from fighting against 

us to working and employ them, and find ways to raise the public 

services that are available in these small areas where the security 

is very low and our ability to get in there in a protected way is 

probably the only ability to get in there until we can get the PRTs 

and other types of services in there. 

This is a very important program to us. I couldn’t agree with you 

more that we have to make sure that we have the oversight in 

place, that it is transparent, that you can see what is being done, 

and that authorities are at the appropriate level. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But as we pull out is there a plan? Is anybody talking about how this transitions over to either USAID or to 

State or preferably the Iraqi Government? Is there any kind of 

work being done on transitioning these projects out of our control? 

General CARTWRIGHT. There is work right now with the Iraqis on 

them picking up their share, on trying to build inside of Iraq a coherent management system. Treasury is working very hard on this 

so that they can manage their resources, a tax capability, and ability to distribute resources, which is one of their biggest challenges, 

and we’re working very hard with Treasury to support that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. They haven’t reimbursed us for all the investment that we put into those hotels, have they? 

Secretary GATES. No, but the Iraqis have been willing to make about $280 million, I think, available, almost $300 million in CERP 

funds that we can obligate or we can tell them how to spend. 

27

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you so much for service to our 

country during very extraordinary times. I want to, General Cartwright, start by asking you a question with regard to Iran and 

whether or not you think Iran is still exercising a malign influence 

in Iraq? Are they still equipping and training some of the Special 

Groups, so-called Special Groups, and other extremist groups for 

operations inside Iraq that are killing Americans? 

Secretary GATES. I think that they continue to train. I cannot tell 

you that I have the smoking gun right now, and my sense right 

now is that the border between the two countries and the dialogue 

that has begun between the two countries, which we have encouraged, is giving us the best opportunity to get that under control 

and to get those two neighbors to start to treat each other as neighbors. 

We still have very significant concerns about Iran’s motives. But 

I would tell you that less so than in the past the flow of weapons 

and fighters has come down. 

Senator THUNE. The overall trend is positive, but there’s still 

some residual influence there that we need to be concerned with? 

Perhaps as we begin to draw down, do you see that influence there 

increasing over time? Once the U.S. presence is less there, will the 

Iranians try and step in and fill that vacuum? 

Secretary GATES. We certainly worry about Special Groups and 

support to those Special Groups re-emerging as we change our posture in Iraq. I think that’s a fair statement, and support by Iran 

to those special groups would be a concern. 

Senator THUNE. How would you describe the latest in terms of 

the Iraqi army and security forces. 

Secretary GATES. By us? 

Senator THUNE. Well, just overall. What’s their capability of the 

Iraqi army and police forces? That’s been such a key in terms of 

our being able to hand off the baton, so to speak. 

Secretary GATES. One, I think that they have progressed significantly. In recent conversation with their minister of defense, kind 

of a question of what are you most worried about, and it was the 

logistics infrastructure, schools for NCOs and officers, to ensure 

that we keep building the leadership within the organization, logistics, medical, and ISR capabilities for the military, and then transportation. Those were his top concerns. I share those concerns. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Secretary, shifting to Afghanistan for just a 

moment, you mentioned some of the highlights in terms of the contributions that NATO is making with regard to Afghanistan. Do 

you think that they’re doing enough in that fight and are they addressing and removing any of the caveats that they’ve placed on 

their troops? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I spent most of last year engaged in what 

one of my NATO colleagues referred to as megaphone diplomacy, 

trying to get NATO to do more. Now I look back and realize that 

over that period of 18 months or so they actually have increased 

their forces by about 10,000. So the truth is at least right now the 

28

forces are almost in balance, in terms of about 30,000-plus from our 

partners and NATO and from the U.S. 

Now, the direction we’re headed, that number is going to tilt I 

think more toward the U.S. side. I do not expect significant additional troop commitments from the Europeans. There have been 

some moves since the Bucharest Summit to ease or lift some of the 

caveats, but there are still some significant ones in place. 

Senator THUNE. General, I asked the question about the Iraqi security forces. I’m also interested in knowing about the Afghan army 

and the national police and how well equipped they are for combat 

operations. That has been so essential, I think, to the success that 

we’re starting to experience in Iraq with regard to getting the Iraqi 

security forces trained and ready to take the lead in more of the 

space there. 

In terms of the Afghan army, how far away are we from having 

their capability at a point that they can assume more and more of 

the lead? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think the good news side of this story is 

that the ANA is an army that is willing to fight, will not back away 

even under strain. They want to fight for their country. They want 

to be in a position where they can do that. They need additional 

support in mobility and ISR and the enablers that are so important. 

We’re growing that army and it is resilient. A statistic that I received this past week would say that better than 50 percent of the 

combat operations are led by the ANA, and we partner with them. 

So we’re starting from a different dynamic. They still need the 

enablers. 

We need to grow them. Afghanistan is a significantly larger 

country. We have in the neighborhood of 60 to 80,000 that are welltrained and ready to go, in comparison to about 500,000 in Iraq. 

So we have some work to do. We’ve committed to doubling the size. 

We also have to bring up the size of the police, though, and that’s 

going to be a harder problem. We need trainers to do that. The police also manage the border, in particular that eastern border with 

Pakistan, and we have to bring up the level and the quantity of 

police forces, ANP forces, to help us manage the border in a way 

that’s appropriate. 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Secretary, how would you characterize the 

level of cooperation between the two governments, between Pakistan and Afghanistan, right now? I know there’s been a lot of tension in the past and it seems to me to get control of those border 

areas and establish a level of security it’s going to require a heightened level of cooperation. 

Secretary GATES. I think your characterization of the relationship in the past as being a tense one is entirely accurate. I have 

the impression overall, and I would say particularly from my conversation with President Karzai last week, that they are off to a 

very different kind of relationship. I don’t believe I’ve ever heard 

President Karzai speak as positively and as warmly about the Pakistani Government as I did last week. So I hope it forms the basis 

for the kind of bilateral or trilateral cooperation that Senator Warner was talking about. 

29

Senator THUNE. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Gentlemen, thank you for your service to 

our country. 

Mr. Secretary, for 25 years I have been trying to protect the national security interests of the country in protecting the ranges offshore. In the early 1980s, as a young Congressman, I had to take 

on the then-Secretary of the Interior James Watt, who wanted to 

drill off the east coast of Florida in the footprint of where we’re 

dropping the first stages of the rockets that we’re launching out of 

the Cape Canaveral Air Force Station, as well as the solid rocket 

boosters that are dropped from the Space Shuttle coming out of the 

Kennedy Space Center. Ultimately, after two different times, was 

able to prevail in protecting that defense interest. 

It looks like that is not going to occur this week because of all 

the other press of business. But here is the attempt, for those that 

would want to drill in the Gulf of Mexico for oil and gas in the area 

that we have protected by law, which is the testing and training 

and evaluation range, not only for the DOD, but for other agencies 

that have classified programs that are tested in that range. 

This matter has come to you for evaluation since the standing 

policy is the policy issued 2 years ago by the Secretary of Defense, 

that a line running north and south which leaves the coast at approximately Fort Walton Beach, Eglin Air Force Base, that anything east of that line should be protected for the national security 

interest. 

Do you want to comment on your evaluation that is underway 

now in the DOD? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. Senator, after you called me and several 

other Senators called me a few weeks ago on this matter, I read 

Secretary Rumsfeld’s decision memorandum from 2005, I believe, 

that prohibited drilling in these areas. In light of the interests and 

passage of time, I have tasked the Secretary of the Navy to evaluate the test ranges on behalf of the DOD and to make a recommendation on whether there is any reason to change the decision that Secretary Rumsfeld made in 2005. To the best of my 

knowledge, that Navy evaluation is just now getting underway. But 

until it’s done and some new decision is made, the decision of 2005 

stands. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I’m glad that you clarified that. We’re basically looking at some time down the road, a few months or so, before that would work itself through the system, since you said the 

evaluation has just started? 

Secretary GATES. Knowing the lightning-like pace at which studies take place in the DOD, that sounds like a good estimate. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The reason I bring it up, we were going 

to have an all-out battle here this week by the so-called Gang of 

Ten that were going to completely eliminate that testing and evaluation area. Of course, I was insisting at a minimum that there be 

a certification by the President, after consulting with the Secretary 

of Defense, the Secretary of Interior, and other agencies that use 

30

the range, such as classified agencies, that there would not be national security interests of the country harmed. 

It looks like that battle is not going to occur this week, but at 

some point that discussion will occur, and we will look forward to 

your testimony at that point. 

Now, let me shift to Iraq. In his book, Bob Woodward says that 

it wasn’t only the surge that has made the conditions favorable for 

how you have reported, but that it was also an intelligence operation that was quite sophisticated, the Sunni Awakening, as well 

as the Shiite standdown. Would you comment on Mr. Woodward’s 

assertion? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t think I agree with his characterization. 

I think that, first of all, the Sunni Awakening was enabled by the 

surge. The first tentative signs of it began before the surge started, 

but without the additional presence of the Marines in Anbar to provide security for those sheiks to go after al Qaeda in their own 

neighborhoods, I don’t think the Sunni Awakening would have 

been successful. 

The significant expansion of intelligence capabilities, really 

began about a year ago. We had 12 orbits, I think, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, actually about a year ago. We have more than doubled that as of now and we’ll double it again by next year. So I 

think that we have had some very sophisticated operations underway, clearly enabled by intelligence. But I think that they have 

really developed their full force, if you will, since the surge began, 

perhaps not related to the surge of troops, but related to the surge 

in ISR. 

The Shia backing off, who knows what motivated Mr. Sadr to call 

his people off, whether it was the prospect of significant fighting 

with a larger American force or internal Iraqi politics or whatever? 

But clearly a major change in his attitude followed the Iraqi Government’s successful initiatives in Basra. 

So that’s the way I would interpret the situation. General? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would just add from the intelligence 

standpoint that at the same time the security of the sheiks and the 

security of the leadership in the communities and localities 

changed their risk calculus. They started to be willing to put even 

their family members at risk to support us, to give us critical intelligence on the ground, that really started to change the dynamic: 

Where are the IEDs? Who doesn’t belong in this town and on this 

street? Who’s in our market that doesn’t belong there? 

That all built. So it’s a little bit of art here, but the sequence was 

really later than was put in the book. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That would apply outside of Anbar Province as well? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The Awakening in Anbar really set the 

pattern for us as a military to start to understand how to engage 

at the bottom and help grow this from the bottom and empower the 

locals. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

31

Mr. Secretary, just a quick thanks to you for the steady hand you 

have brought to the five-sided building over there. I appreciate 

your commitment on this issue of independent contractors, to try 

to run down exactly what is going on over there. I had a meeting 

with Admiral Mullen about it and we intend to pursue this from 

the perspective of our staff with some vigor. 

Let me just start by asking you if the Pakistani Government accepts the justification under international law that we would apply 

for the unilateral military actions that have taken place in Pakistan? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know for sure, Senator, but I would suspect from the public reaction of the government that it probably 

does not. 

Senator WEBB. But you would agree that under international law 

there is a justification for the United States to conduct unilateral 

actions inside Pakistan of the sort that have taken place? 

Secretary GATES. I am far from expert on international law. I 

just consider it part of my responsibilities to protect our troops. 

Senator WEBB. But we’re a Nation of laws and a leader in the 

international community in terms of the morality of what we do. 

Have we examined that in terms of our right under international 

law? 

Secretary GATES. I assume that the State Department has, yes. 

Senator WEBB. That was not in the calculus when the authorization was made in your presence? 

Secretary GATES. The authorities that we have been granted 

were carefully coordinated over a protracted period of time in the 

interagency. So I would simply assume that in that coordination 

process appropriate international law was consulted by the State 

Department. 

Senator WEBB. I’m a little surprised here because I believe there 

is justification under international law. I’m surprised that question 

hasn’t been asked of you in some media forum or something like 

that. I believe the United Nations Charter allows us the right of 

self-defense in a situation where a foreign government is either unable or unwilling to take care of international terrorist activity inside its borders. 

Secretary GATES. That certainly is my view and the fact that we 

are also operating under U.N. Charter in Afghanistan would 

strengthen that view in my opinion. 

Senator WEBB. I would say anywhere the United Nations Charter and the right of self-defense would arguably apply. I’m trying 

to help you out here. 

Secretary GATES. I understand. 

Senator WEBB. I think that we ought to strongly clarify that in 

terms of the public understanding of appropriate response. 

Secretary GATES. General, did you have something? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think it was unclear if you were looking 

for specific statute in international law. 

Senator WEBB. I’d say Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 

right of self-defense. 

General CARTWRIGHT. Article 51 is the basis by which we are 

there and acting. But the right of self-defense is something that we 

never cede. 

32

Senator WEBB. In terms of international terrorism, this is really 

in my view the appropriate response when a government is either 

unable, as is probably the case in some of those border areas in 

Pakistan, or unwilling to take care of international terrorism inside 

its own borders. 

Let me shift to something else. What percentage of our logistical 

functions in Afghanistan begin in Pakistan, roughly? 

Secretary GATES. I would say that about 80 percent of dry cargo 

and about 40 percent of fuel come through Pakistan. 

Senator WEBB. Arnaud de Bourchgrave wrote a piece about a 

week or 10 days ago saying that the Pakistani Government had 

threatened to shut down our access to those facilities in protest of 

the actions that were taking place along the border area. 

General Cartwright, is that something that’s plausible, and if 

that were to occur what would happen in terms of sustaining our 

presence inside Afghanistan? 

General CARTWRIGHT. It would be challenging to sustain our 

presence. We have done a substantial amount of planning against 

a contingency like that, whether it was a complete shutdown or 

whether it was partial, one of the gates being closed out of protest 

or something like that. It is very difficult then to get to this landlocked nation in a way that would provide the quantity of resources 

that we need, particularly as we see ourselves growing. 

We have three or four what we’re calling test cases that we’re 

running of alternative routes to get both dry bulk and fuel into the 

country. They started about 3 weeks ago and we’re working our 

way through to understand rail, pipelines, customs, what would it 

take, are they there in a sufficient scale to allow us to do this. So 

we’re working this one pretty hard. 

We listened to that comment. We heard it more in the press than 

we did from the government, and there was some discussion about 

maybe one of the gates had closed down for a few hours. But that’s 

the most that we’ve seen. But we still take this issue seriously because it could be a vulnerability. 

Senator WEBB. If that were to occur, I would assume again just 

from reading press reports that alternate routes, a good many of 

them would go through areas that would require the cooperation of 

the Russians? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Potentially, particularly the pipelines and 

some of the rail lines. But we’re looking at that challenge. 

Senator WEBB. Basically what we’re seeing in reality is the larger we grow the force in Afghanistan, the more vulnerable we are 

strategically to the situation diplomatically that we’re facing in 

Pakistan and in Russia? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, the larger the force the greater the 

need. 

Senator WEBB. One other question. From materials that I’ve 

been reading—and as a matter of fact, there’s an article in this 

week’s Economist to this point—about Pakistani activities, there 

are people who are saying that Pakistan has been going after al 

Qaeda with some regularity, but has been very reticent about, or 

less enthusiastic, about going after Taliban. Do you see that distinction? 

33

Secretary GATES. Let me comment and then invite the General. 

One of the things that I think makes the Regional Command East 

more complex than the rest of the country and more difficult in 

many respects is that the problem is not just the al Qaeda, but the 

Haqqani network, Gulbadin Hekmatyar, and some others. Pakistan 

has had some long-term relationships, particularly with 

Hekmatyar, probably also with the Haqqani network, and they 

don’t see these people necessarily as their enemy and they don’t I 

think in many respects see the Taliban as their enemy. 

They see some of the insurgents, they see the foreign fighters, 

they see al Qaeda as their enemy, and particularly if it is shown 

that al Qaeda was behind the Marriott bombing and so on. They 

also see Besmullah Khan as their enemy. 

Frankly, I think one of the keys in terms of expanding our cooperation with the Pakistanis is identifying common threats if they 

see us taking an action, it has been against somebody they consider 

an enemy to them as well. So that’s one avenue of approach. But 

they do not see some of these groups in the same way we do. 

General CARTWRIGHT. I would just add that by putting this joint 

command in place that would allow us to share the intelligence and 

share particularly the ISR, so that there is visual proof or convincing evidence that someone is an adversary, will help us in that 

area. 

Senator WEBB. Just to make your point, the Economist article indicates that only 48 percent of Pakistanis back military action 

against the Taliban and that the army is just as divided as the 

population. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary Gates, General Cartwright. My guess is 

you will be back before us, Secretary Gates, before the end of this 

administration. But on the rare possibility that you’re not, I want 

to join Senator McCaskill’s thanks and praise to you. It struck me 

as she was talking about you that if there’s ever been anybody in 

American public service who exemplifies the Teddy Roosevelt invocation to speak softly and carry a big stick, and in your case to 

wield it wisely, it is you. I thank you for all of that combination. 

I want to talk first briefly about the connection between Iraq and 

Afghanistan and the conflict in both places. Obviously, we are 

drawing down our forces in Iraq because we are succeeding there. 

We are contemplating moving more forces, in fact we are, to Afghanistan because we found, well, that numbers matter. 

I certainly take it to be the belief of our military commanders in 

Iraq that, though the gains we’ve made there are substantial, they 

are not, in General Petraeus’s terms, irreversible, and that if we 

draw down too rapidly from Iraq we may lose some of the gains 

we’ve achieved there, even if we do so to send more troops to Afghanistan more quickly. Do you agree with that view? 

Secretary GATES. I’ll quickly answer and then ask General Cartwright. I think that they are uneasy about putting at risk the gains 

that have been bought at a very high price, and therefore, they 

know we are coming down in Iraq. 

34

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Secretary GATES. This will be part of whatever agreement we 

have with the Iraqis, because the truth of the matter is they want 

us out, too, but not too quickly, because they don’t want to see the 

gains jeopardized, and they still need to gain more confidence in 

each other and in their own army and so on. There is kind of a mutual sense that we want to see a smaller and smaller coalition-U.S. 

footprint, but at a pace that safeguards the gains to the extent possible that have already been achieved. 

I think that this is why you got a fairly cautious recommendation 

from General Petraeus, that ultimately CENTCOM and the Joint 

Chiefs endorsed, despite their understanding and their focus on 

other fights, including Afghanistan. I think that there is a broad 

view among the most senior military that we do need to continue 

drawing down, we do need to continue narrowing our footprint in 

Iraq. We do need to be transitioning our mission to something that 

is very different than where we have been during the past 18 

months, but we need to do it carefully. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General, before you begin let me ask you 

specifically, and I’m going back to something I believe Senator Ben 

Nelson asked about, which is you responded to the importance of 

the provincial elections in Iraq. Isn’t it true that one of the reasons 

that our military commanders on the ground in Iraq don’t want to 

see our troop presence there drawn down too quickly is that they 

are mindful of the importance of a secure environment when those 

provincial elections occur? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think that’s a very accurate portrayal, 

and I would only add: One, we do not want to jeopardize the gains 

that we’ve made. We’ve paid a very high price for those gains in 

security and capability of the Iraqis. By the same token, we are 

looking at the risks that are growing to the homeland in Afghanistan. It is easy to talk about a BCT here and a BCT there. It is 

not that simple. Reposturing in Iraq has to be done carefully and 

it has to be done in mind with the idea that the Iraqis are taking 

certain measures under their own wings in police and military, and 

so moving out of the cities is important. That means we have to 

go to someplace new, but we have to be responsive. 

Enablers are critical. Those same enablers are what is critical in 

Afghanistan. So while we focus on the BCTs, I would tell you the 

numbers and the capabilities and the limiting factors are in those 

enablers, and how we manage those enablers so, in Marine terminology, we don’t end up with one foot on the ship and one foot on 

the shore is critical. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Agreed. 

Let me turn to Afghanistan now. It’s clear from your testimony 

this morning or we know that the enemy, the Taliban particularly, 

has both increased its numbers, is employing more lethal equipment, including IEDs that are killing our troops and the Afghans. 

I wanted to ask you the extent to which we see increased Iranian 

support for the enemy in Afghanistan playing a part in this increased tempo by the Taliban? I know we’ve just talked in response 

to Senator Webb about the role of Pakistani support for the 

Taliban. How about the Iranians? 

35

Secretary GATES. There’s some evidence of Iranian support in the 

west in particular. It does not seem to be significant at this point. 

There are some indications that they would like to expand that 

presence and create more problems for us. They do want to maintain a good relationship with the Afghan Government, so it’s a little bit like the situation with Iraq as they weigh how much trouble 

can they get away with causing us and at the same time not spoil 

their relationship with the government. 

Senator WEBB. That’s well stated. So let me ask the question 

more generally. How do you explain the source of the increased activity and lethality of the enemy in Afghanistan? Where is it coming from? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I think when we look in general terms at 

the character of the attacks that the forces weather out there and 

encounter, there is a percentage in the 30 or 40 percent that seem 

to be trained and equipped and come from outside the country, 

mostly from the Pakistan areas. There is about another 30 or 40 

percent—and don’t take this Marine math too technically—that are 

locals, so in other words they come together in a common attack. 

We are seeing onesies and twosies of that group of advisers from 

neither place, that come from outside, may have been brought in 

by al Qaeda or someone else, that are there and are managing the 

relationship between the two groups, setting them up for complex 

attacks. 

I would add just one more thing. They are smart enough to know 

that they can engage us for about 20 or 30 minutes and then they 

must break contact because our air will get there. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks. My time is ending. 

Secretary Gates, let me just thank you for the initiative to increase the size of the ANA. I think that in my own trips there and 

talks to our military there is great respect for that army. If in fact 

we need more boots on the ground in Afghanistan, they obviously 

don’t all have to be and shouldn’t be American or even NATO. I 

think this emphasis on increasing the Afghan army is critically important, and I thank you for it. 

Secretary GATES. At the end of the day, from a military standpoint the Afghan army is our exit strategy. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. They’re really ready. That is, 

they’re willing. They may not all be ready, but they’re willing. 

Secretary GATES. They are very tough. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. They’re tough. 

Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having been down at the EPW meeting. I’m trying to reprogram myself 

here so I can remember what’s going on. 

General Cartwright, you’re the best one to get into this. Right 

now we are at some difficulty in our authorization bill. There’s a 

lot of provisions in there that I was particularly interested in. One 

is all three of the provisions on train and equip. It was 1206, 1207, 

and 1208. I’ve had very strong feelings about that. However, we’re 

not sure whether that’s going to make it now. It is in our bill. 

36

Would you like to comment on the value of that expansion that 

we put in there? 

General CARTWRIGHT. I will let the Secretary jump in on this. 

But this area is one that we feel very strongly is a partnership 

with State, that allows us to avoid conflict if we do it right, if we 

get at it early, to build partnership capacity, allowing nations to 

basically be able to defend their sovereignty and manage their borders in a way that doesn’t get us to conflict. 

Having those funds and having that authority with the people 

who are on the ground and are meeting day-in and day-out and 

working day-in and day-out is critical to us. This is more about the 

authority to do it than it is about the amount of money, as you well 

know. But we have found that the ability for all of the combatant 

commanders, not just CENTCOM, to start to be able to get out into 

their region and help nations help themselves is essential. 

Senator INHOFE. Well, very closely related—I’m sorry. 

Secretary GATES. I just wanted to say, Senator, I wanted to 

thank you and this committee in particular for your support of the 

1206 authority. For all the nice things that have been said about 

the speeches I have given on the full range of national power and 

how do we use all the tools of national power so that kinetic action 

is the last choice and we have other choices before, this ability to 

equip our partners with the ability to protect themselves is absolutely central to a future in which we don’t so often have to deploy 

American men and women in uniform to do this job. 

This is absolutely central as part of that quiver or that arsenal 

of nonkinetic capabilities that make it less likely we will have to 

deploy American kids abroad. 

Senator INHOFE. Since I’m getting the answers I want here, let 

me continue to roll. The CERP program, now they’ve changed the 

name here, but part of the effort of globalizing CERP so it’s not 

just in two areas. But the concept of being able to do it and getting 

it done immediately, without having to go back all through the 

time that it takes to get things done in Washington, DC, I think 

is very, very valuable. 

I just feel strongly about the expansion of that program in the 

areas where it’s already allowed, as well as areas where it’s not 

right now. Do you agree with my thoughts on that, giving the commanders in the field that authority? 

Secretary GATES. Absolutely. It is so important to us. There is 

just a human dimension to being able to present to someone the 

resources to do what they need to do to improve their quality of life 

and actually have that tied to a uniformed person, a face that’s 

going to be there through the whole execution of the project. It 

builds a level of trust. We talked a little bit earlier about intelligence, but having that relationship established allows us to understand the street-level activities that are going on around us, for 

which we will never be sensitive to. It’s like you in your neighborhood, you know when a car is there that doesn’t belong there. That 

kind of input, that kind of intelligence, allows us to be effective and 

allows them to help themselves. 

Senator INHOFE. I happened to be in Baghdad when they were 

trying to get the electricity to homes, and people were actually 

going out there with wire and tying it on and all that. That was 

37

a good application of CERP being able to save lives. We were able 

to save X number of lives every day to be able to do that. 

Frankly, I feel the same way about the International Military 

Education and Training Program. For a number of years, we treated that as if we’re doing them a favor in having them come over 

and train with us. Our experience has been, Mr. Secretary, as you 

well know, once these officers come over and get trained here, they 

develop an allegiance that stays with us. We used to say that they 

couldn’t do it unless they had, what was it, Article 29? Anyway, 

we’ve been able to eliminate that, to encourage them to come over. 

We know if we’re not doing it China’s going to do it. 

Secretary GATES. One other point. We’ve talked a lot about Pakistan here. The United States is paying a heavy price for the fact 

that for 12 years Pakistani officers were not coming to the United 

States to be trained. So we have senior officers in the Pakistani 

army who have very close relationships here in the United States 

and have a very favorable view of the United States, but midlevel 

and junior officers, we’re dealing with a whole generation of Pakistani officers who have not studied in the United States, have not 

developed relationships with our military, and we may pay a heavy 

price for that. 

Senator INHOFE. That’s a good testimony to use in favor of this 

program, because we’re seeing it now down in some of the African 

nations, sub-Saharan Africa, where we are hopefully going to be 

able to help them in building five African brigades. 

The last thing, and I won’t belabor any of this because I know 

you probably covered it while I was down at the other hearing. But 

the surge, the success of the surge. I don’t think there’s anyone left 

out there in his or her own mind that doesn’t agree that this has 

just been very successful. 

I had occasion to be in Fallujah and some of the other areas during this time and I just look at the performance of our people, of 

what David Petraeus has done, and I am so thrilled with that. 

I know it’s more difficult in Afghanistan. When I was there I 

took the last trip with General Jones before he retired. Right now 

one of the major problems is there really isn’t that central authority you can deal with like you can in other places. You have a 

bunch of mayors and local officials. 

I don’t want you to repeat anything you’ve already stated, but if 

there’s anything that you have not stated yet about how to overcome that and the path forward with our NATO allies in Afghanistan, this would be an opportunity to do it. 

General CARTWRIGHT. You put your finger on one of our greatest 

challenges, which is the separation in principle between the central 

Government in Afghanistan and the tribal or feudal system that is 

there, and trying to bring those closer together, trying to attack the 

enemy in a way that allows us to bring the tribal side of the equation closer to the central government and create an understanding. 

This is not a concept which they readily embrace. The power centers are not set up that way culturally. It is probably in my mind 

one of the biggest challenges for the central government to start to 

be able to present services and security to its population. 

Secretary GATES. I think two of the long-range challenges we 

face in Afghanistan are, first, the fact that it’s a desperately poor 

38

country, the fifth poorest in the world, in contrast to Iraq; and second, this is a country that in its whole history has never had a tradition of a strong central government. So trying to create an effective central government at the same time is going to require working with them and helping them strengthen the provincial and 

local governments in a way that they don’t just become another 

warlord or another militia. 

Senator INHOFE. My time has expired, but I want to thank both 

of you for your great service. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, I would just, before we get into this subject, 

have to make a comment about your deputy’s comments a few days 

ago about the tanker competition, in which he revealed, I think for 

the first time, that the Boeing aircraft was 25 percent more expensive in the bid process that went on to select the best aircraft. Of 

course, the Northrop team’s aircraft was 16 years younger and had 

more capability, and it appeared that the prices, from what we 

heard, may have been fairly close. 

But this is a dramatic difference in price and I’m somewhat disappointed, I have to say, that competition has not gone on to conclusion. I just want to say that. 

Secretary GATES. Can I just say, Senator Sessions, I am very disappointed also. I had believed when I moved this competition under 

the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics that 

we knew, as much of the newspaper commentary at the time said, 

that the timeline was going to be short, but that we ought to be 

able to get it done. 

After we issued the request for proposal, it became clear that if 

we got it done at all it would be in the last few days of the administration. Part of my concern was, frankly, I didn’t like the smell 

of approving a potentially $100 billion contract or opportunity in 

the last day or 2 of being on the job. 

We considered an alternative. Because both planes met the technical qualifications, we considered changing the competition to one 

based simply on the best deal for the taxpayer, who could come up 

with the cheapest number for us to go forward. But after talking 

with a lot of folks, we realized what that meant was that after 7 

years of a competition based on value, we would be changing the 

rules at the end of the game to one based purely on cost. So we’d 

be changing the rules at the end of the game. 

My hope is that the next administration will move forward with 

this very quickly, and my advice to them would be to establish 

minimum military requirements—what do we need—and then 

what’s the best deal for the taxpayer. My hope would be that this 

is what I would have done if we had more time. We’ve gotten in 

previous competitions with things like 800 requirements and things 

like that. I think it’s a classic case of overcomplicating the problem, 

and I think that a straightforward, ‘‘does the plane meet these 

technical military requirements and who will provide the taxpayer 

with the best deal’’ would be the best course of action. 

My hope is the next administration will move forward promptly 

with this. 

39

Senator SESSIONS. I was pleased when you said you intended to 

assume responsibility for it and move it forward and was disappointed when you were not. I don’t know how much this may 

mean in terms of delay and extra cost and whether politics will infect the process. I certainly hope and believe that the Department 

of Justice will resist allowing that to happen. 

We can talk about that some more perhaps, and I would like to 

do that. 

What happened in Iraq was an acceptance of the tribal nature 

of the society, at least in a number of areas of the country where 

the tribes were very strong, a partnering with them because, as I 

think you indicated, General Cartwright, people know who the foreign al Qaeda fighters are, they got tired of them, and a partnership was reached between the United States military and the local 

historic leadership in these communities, and that’s what made the 

difference in many ways, certainly in the al-Anbar Province. Would 

you fundamentally agree with that premise? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator SESSIONS. How are we in Afghanistan now? I think we 

have to be a lot more humble than we have been. This idea that 

we can go in and remake a country like Afghanistan, that’s poor, 

very big area, with scattered tribal groups, that we’re just going to 

somehow remake them and have some bureaucrat in Kabul start 

dictating how things are going to run in far-distant provinces—I 

hope we’re not so committed to that that we don’t see the opportunity that we found in Iraq. 

Secretary Gates? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, as we look at our way forward in Afghanistan, one of the things that I think we need to do is listen 

better to what the Afghans are saying and the Afghan leadership. 

We all know that the leadership has its deficiencies, but they know 

their people. The history of Afghanistan has been that if the Afghan people see a foreigner that they believe is trying to help 

them, it works out okay. If they see a foreigner that they regard 

as an occupier, it hasn’t ever worked. 

We need to make sure that our military planning and our operations are aligned with the interests of the Afghan people and that 

they see that they are aligned in that way. We need to work harder 

at doing more to avoid civilian casualties. We need to weigh the 

consequences of that against any potential military advantage. 

As we think about how we do this going forward, I think you’ve 

put your finger on it, and frankly one of the worries that I had 

when I took this job was that in both Iraq and Afghanistan we 

were so focused on the central governments that we were moving 

orthogonally to their culture and to their history, and that we 

needed to better align ourselves with the way the country really 

works, and that meant paying more attention to the tribes, to the 

sheiks, and so on in Iraq, and then in Afghanistan. 

What we have to figure out with the Afghan Government is how 

do you empower provincial and tribal leaders, as I suggested earlier, without creating warlords and extragovernmental militias? 

But clearly we have to focus more on the tribes and the provincial 

areas in Afghanistan, at the same time we try to build capacity for 

the central government. 

40

Senator SESSIONS. I think if those local leaders, tribal many of 

them, who have respect in their communities, who have been affirmed by the community as their leaders, I think we do well to see 

if we can partner with them and try to help them achieve their 

goals, which is for a better community that they live in for the 

most part, and help them achieve that, perhaps we can achieve the 

same sort of partnership we achieved in Iraq. 

Is that our direction? I guess since General Petraeus was involved in this and he now has that command, do you see us moving, utilizing some of the same techniques of Iraq in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. I suspect so, along the lines we’ve just been discussing. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Let’s try a 5-minute second round. 

First let me say how much I agree with what you have just said 

and what Senator Sessions just said in terms of working with the 

people of Afghanistan, and realizing that whenever you have a 

military action you have to look at not just what you might 

achieve, but also the unintended consequences of that action. 

I think we need to do that across the board, not just in Afghanistan, but also in our operations in Pakistan. I think we have to understand that if we’re going to be attacked by the Pakistani Government for what we’re doing to protect our troops that there are 

some significant down sides and we have to try to limit that to essential operations, going after high-value targets, sticking close to 

the border, taking the consequences where the value to be gained 

or the benefit to be gained is getting a really high-value target, and 

avoiding some of those negative consequences in the process. 

But I think Senator Sessions has put his finger on something 

very important in terms of Afghanistan as well as other places, and 

working with the Afghans. 

One of the things, however, that sort of goes in the other direction in a sense in Afghanistan is that I understand, as Senator 

Lieberman pointed out, their national army is well respected inside 

of Afghanistan. It’s highly motivated. They do not like the Taliban 

and they don’t like al Qaeda. They are fighters. This is a very different situation from Iraq. 

But the one question, though, is are they accepted and respected 

inside of Afghanistan generally, that ANA, would you say? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. They are respected. The challenge 

that they have, and I won’t call it a shortfall on their part, but 

there aren’t enough of them to be where they need to be. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let’s go into that. That’s what I really wanted 

to get to. Why is it going to take them 5 years to add 30,000 Afghan troops? 

Secretary GATES. The goal for the force right now is 80,000. They 

are at about 65,000 or 66,000. The goal is to increase the size of 

the regular army to 122,000, with an additional 12,000 that’s kind 

of a float that would be in training or in school at any given time. 

Part of the challenge is, again in contrast to Iraq, a very substantial number of the Afghans are illiterate, for openers. So when we 

talk about basic training, we’re talking about really basic training. 

It’s a matter of equipping them, it’s a matter of training them. I 

41

think that Minister Wardak would tell you that if he can accelerate 

that process he would. 

Part of the challenge that we’re going to face and where we’re 

going to try and take the lead is the cost, the steady state cost of 

an army of about 122 or 134,000 is about between $2 and $2.5 billion a year. Overall Afghan Government revenues this year will be 

$700 million. So our view is we have a lot of partners and friends 

and allies around the world who do not have fighting forces in Afghanistan. We see this as an opportunity for them to get some buyin to this U.N.-commissioned endeavor in Afghanistan by contributing to the money that would expand the ANA. If we’re successful 

in that and if the money’s available, then we may be able to accelerate the growth of that army. My impression is they do not have 

a problem with recruitment. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s my understanding, that money’s the 

problem. When you compare what we’re spending in Iraq to what 

we’re spending in Afghanistan, what that cost is, it is a tiny fraction. To pay our share—and I agree with you our allies have to do 

much more, but our share of the Afghan army—is a tiny fraction 

of the monthly cost of our presence in Iraq. 

Secretary GATES. We’ve taken care to be sure to include some 

money in our budget for that, too. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think it’s critically important. They have the 

motivation, they have the capability. You say they’re not literate, 

but do they not follow orders from their commanders, whether 

they’re literate or not? I mean, is that a problem? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. I mean, nobody ever questioned these 

guys’ ability to fight. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think that’s the real issue. 

Secretary GATES. Including the Soviets. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think that is exactly the issue. 

On the reconstruction issue in Iraq—and we’re glad that we’re 

not going to pay any more for those hotels at the Baghdad Airport. 

We are, I notice in the spending plan for the Iraqi security forces 

funds which we just got 2 weeks ago—this is the plan for next 

year. This plan includes hundreds of millions of dollars for things 

such as 12 new police stations, 4 national police bases, headquarters facilities for the Iraqi military. Why are we paying for 

those? That’s the September 12 plan we just received. 

Secretary GATES. I’ll have to go back and look at that, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Fair enough. 

Thank you. My time is up. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks, Senator 

Sessions. 

I want to continue the chairman’s line of questioning about the 

ANA, and I totally agree with what he said. Incidentally, I had the 

honor of having Minister Wardak, the Minister of Defense, in my 

office earlier this morning with General Cohn. This is a very patriotic, impressive man, both of them really, but I’m speaking about 

Minister Wardak here. 

Also, you feel within him, the great sense of pride in the Afghan 

army and their commitment to restore national pride, which is 

42

really quite impressive; also their profound gratitude to the U.S. 

military and their sense of camaraderie with the U.S. military. 

Secretary GATES. I want to just say one thing in that regard, 

Senator Lieberman, that really moves me about Minister Wardak. 

He is genuinely embarrassed and moved that Americans are laying 

down their lives for his people. I have not heard another leader in 

the world be as eloquent on that subject as he is, and it’s in virtually every meeting I have with him. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree. He spoke of that today with obvious 

sincerity to me, and he said that they’ll never be able to repay the 

U.S. for the commitment to their freedom and independence, but 

that he believes that there will be a day in the not too distant future when they will, one, repay us by being responsible for their 

own defense to a great degree; and second, that they will join us 

elsewhere in the world in peacekeeping or other missions. So we 

can hope for that. 

Without wanting to dwell too much on the point, the sense of camaraderie is unique among all the militaries that are there. I think 

it’s something that, without trying to speak comparatively, should 

just make us proud of our own military. 

He said to me, not today but when I was in Afghanistan earlier 

in the year—it’s a small, simple, human statement, but he said his 

soldiers tell him that it is only the American military that are prepared to share their canteens with the Afghan military. That 

speaks a lot about our military. It means a lot to them. 

Let me just talk about this increase in the ANA. Minister 

Wardak said today—and General Cohn kind of backed him—that 

they think that because, one, there are recruits ready to come in; 

two, they’ve raised the eligibility age, I think from 28 to 35, among 

the Afghans; that they can meet this 134,000 goal in fact in 2 

years, as opposed to 4. 

If that’s plausible, can we, through our resources or international 

resources, come up with the money in that timeframe to support 

that 134,000 goal? I presume that the sooner we can get them on 

the ground the better the security situation will be. 

Secretary GATES. To the chairman’s point, we do have some 

money in the budget for 2009 and in the supplemental for 2009 for 

training the ANA, and I think that there is a sufficient shared interest in accelerating that process that, as the chairman was saying, the costs are at a level that our interests would certainly be 

well served by finding some additional money if they can accelerate 

their growth. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. I can also appreciate very much the 

thought of going to countries around the world who are not prepared to send troops or more troops and asking them for financial 

support of the ANA. Am I correct in assuming that you are thinking there not just of our NATO allies, but perhaps going to allies 

in Asia and the Middle East for financial support for the ANA? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The final question I have, as you know better than I, we’ve had some operational difficulties when different 

member countries of NATO, for instance, have made contributions 

to the training of the Afghan police force, that they have tended to 

want to do the training they want to do as opposed to being part 

43

of a comprehensive training strategy. I’m expressing my hope, and 

asking you if you share it, that as we get other countries to buy 

into a financial commitment to the ANA that we essentially retain 

control, so that there is at least a unity of approach to training and 

we don’t have a balkanized situation where every country giving 

money does what it thinks is best to train the Afghan army. 

Secretary GATES. This has been a concern that we have had for 

some time, and it is that these Operational Mentoring and Liaison 

Teams that do a lot of this training arrive in country not fully prepared and without any consistency in terms of the kind of training 

they’re doing. We encourage the foreign sourced omelets, we call 

them, to go to a training facility that we have in Hohenfels, Germany, and go through that process, to try and bring greater consistency. 

I would say we’ve had mixed success in getting them to do that. 

I would say one of the biggest and most urgent of our commanders’ 

requirements for additional troops in Afghanistan is in fact for 

trainers, not for fighters. I think that that’ll be one of the things 

we work hardest on. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You will not be surprised to hear that General Cohn mentioned that. 

Thank you both very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman; and Senator Sessions, thanks for your 

courtesy. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. Senator Lieberman, thank you for 

your commitment of time and effort in going to Afghanistan and 

Iraq. I know you’ve been there, you and Senator Inhofe both, many 

times, and the chairman also. 

There’s a little bit of a difference, I think, between what we were 

doing in al-Anbar and maybe what we’re talking about in Iraq, it 

seems to me, in terms of the size of the army. The forces that volunteered and came forward and we have helped financially and 

militarily to be successful aren’t really part of the Iraqi official 

army. Are there potentially such pacts or agreements or bonds and 

cooperative activities that could occur in Afghanistan to utilize 

local young people who don’t like the Taliban and are willing to 

help fight them off if they know they have some support, but if left 

alone out in the country without being able to contact the Afghan 

army or the American army they feel pretty vulnerable? 

Secretary GATES. Let me answer and then turn to General Cartwright. The President’s attitude is it was the tribes that helped us 

win in 2002. I think there’s a real interest and opportunity there 

that over the last several years perhaps we haven’t taken full advantage of. So I know that there’s an interest in figuring out, as 

I say, if we can do this without creating anti-government militias 

or creating new warlords, then absolutely that’s the direction I 

think we need to go, in addition to strengthening the national 

army. 

General CARTWRIGHT. That’s the vector that we want to be on. 

I think the two cautions are: one, to focus on the local security initially with these tribes; and then second is that we have to be there 

and we have to stay there, ‘‘we’’ being the ISAF or the United 

44

States. But we can’t come, empower them, and then leave and 

leave them vulnerable to attacks that may overpower them. We 

have to stay with them and get the security stable and allow them 

to become functional for their local security. If we leave too quickly, 

we leave them vulnerable and then it is harder to go back because 

we don’t have their confidence any more. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, we partnered at the beginning in 2002 

with the Northern Alliance, and we didn’t train them. 

General CARTWRIGHT. No. 

Senator SESSIONS. Pretty good fighters. 

General CARTWRIGHT. But we stayed with them. 

Senator SESSIONS. We stayed with them. Just for perspective, if 

you recall, how many American troops were on the ground 

partnering with, approximately, the Northern Alliance when the 

Taliban collapsed and were defeated? 

I think it’s less than 10,000 or something in that range. This was 

a partnership that worked. It’s a different problem and I can understand the problem of trying to have a central government. But 

I just think we need to be a little bit more modest about how quickly we can establish a central government. I have people in Alabama 

that are not real interested in what happens in Washington. There 

are probably some in Alaska and Idaho, too, and other places, probably even Virginia, that are not that interested in what happens 

here. It’s not affecting their lives. I feel pretty strongly about that. 

Now, with regard to how this country is supposed to be managed 

and the money and aid that we provide to it, Mr. Secretary, let’s 

say there’s a decision to be made about an irrigation system, a 

water system, a highway system, an electric generation system, a 

garbage disposal system, who is making this decision about how 

the money is allocated? On paper at least, who is responsible for 

making those allocations from our side? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, you’ve put your finger on what I think 

is one of the real weaknesses of the effort in Afghanistan. We have 

42 countries, hundreds of NGOs, universities, and various others, 

all in effect doing their own thing in Afghanistan. From the day I 

took this job and the first NATO meeting I went to, I said we have 

to do a better job of sharing information, of collaborating and working together and partnering with the Afghans in terms of these economic development and reconstruction projects, and sharing best 

practices—what’s working, what’s not working. 

My hope had been when the senior U.N. representative Kai Eide 

was appointed, when Secretary Rice and I sat down with him here 

in Washington and talked about what the need was, he clearly understood that need. I’m sorry to say that, for a variety of reasons, 

there has not been a significant improvement in that kind of coordination and cooperation. If I had to identify one area working 

with the Afghans and where we need somebody in the Afghan Government who’s competent and capable, who could oversee these 

things from the Afghan side and be a partner, and then we could 

get better coordination on the side of the owner countries, then I 

think the whole process would be significantly enhanced. 

But right now, as far as I can tell it’s essentially everybody doing 

their own thing. 

45

Senator SESSIONS. Well, that’s the impression I’ve gotten. Also, 

I have to tell you I think there’s some confusion within our government. I suppose, like Iraq, on paper at least the State Department 

has the primary responsibility for the reconstruction and economic 

development and the PRTs; is that right? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. But in truth, the American military has far 

more persons there and are far more able to take action because 

of their military training and equipment and arms, than the State 

Department is. Are you satisfied that that relationship is strong 

enough? 

Secretary GATES. I think the relationship is fine. I think there 

is the difference in Iraq in that we’re really not operating in cities 

and big towns and using CERP in the same way in terms of 

projects, as best I understand it, just because of the size of the 

country. I think we are less engaged in those kinds of projects in 

Afghanistan than we have been in Iraq. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, just maintaining coordination and a cohesive plan is very difficult and the military is so important and 

integral to this effort. Yet on paper at least, the State Department 

has the responsibility. They’ve made some mistakes. I don’t like 

this idea of saying you want a secular government. I mean, that’s 

an affront to a religious people, to say that. We’ve been saying we 

want to create secular government. What does that mean? To the 

average person, they hear that as eliminate God from their community and that’s not what they want. So we need to be more sophisticated, I think, and sensitive to other societies that have different 

traditions maybe than we do. I hope that our State Department 

people are as engaged and committed as the men and women in 

the Defense Department. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Just a couple more questions, first, on the Afghan police. General, I think you indicated that it’s important that we bring up the 

police or that the police be brought up to manage the border better. 

I’m just wondering, why is that not also the responsibility of the 

Afghan army? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The Afghan army has a role there, but it 

is predominantly the police that patrol that area. We have an objective right now to increase over the next year by 52 companies 

the police force that manages the border and to partner with them 

and give them the intelligence to allow them to do that. But just 

in their form of government, they are the predominant force along 

the border. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are they as motivated as the army? 

General CARTWRIGHT. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. I raised this issue when I was in Afghanistan 

and urged them—the Afghan army and the Afghan Government—

to consider using the army as border control. I mean, if the police 

aren’t as motivated, the biggest problem we have in Afghanistan, 

and you said it and we noticed it, is that border. So you have to 

use your stronger forces, it seems to me, at that border to go after 

the people who are penetrating that border, in some places with 

great ease, by the way. 

46

Have we suggested to the Afghan Government that they consider 

using the army there? 

Secretary GATES. I think the tack is, one, the army is engaged 

with us along the border, but we don’t want to tie them down on 

the border. Given their size, we want them to have the ability to 

maneuver. Two, try to bring to the Afghan border police the motivation and the skills necessary to do that job, because it is fundamentally a different kind of force. It is not a maneuver force. 

Chairman LEVIN. But you say they’re not as motivated. That’s 

troubling. There’s not the same fighting spirit among the police as 

there are among the army? 

General CARTWRIGHT. The incentives, because of traffic across 

the border, historically have probably not been as pure as the 

army’s. We have to work our way through that. I think that’s a 

challenge that’s in front of us. It’s a cultural issue as well as a 

technical issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just going back for 1 last minute to the assessment of the reduction of violence in Iraq, obviously the surge has 

led to a significant reduction, for which we’re all grateful. The 

question of course is whether the purpose of the surge, which was 

stated to be a political reconciliation, has been achieved. We have 

a long way to go in terms of achieving the surge’s purpose. 

However, my question is something for you, Mr. Secretary. 

You’ve indicated that political reconciliation is absolutely critical to 

Iraq’s success. I think those were your recent words. Can you tell 

us why you believe that? If you do believe that, as you’ve indicated, 

why is it that when the October 1 election date was not met by the 

Iraqis—they haven’t passed the legislation—is there no apparent 

comment from this administration to put some pressure on the 

Iraqis to keep those commitments which are so critically important? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know about public comments, but there 

certainly has been ongoing pressure to get the elections law passed 

and to try to make sure that the elections took place before the end 

of this year. 

I think that the reconciliation is essential, in part because these 

are elements of a country that were always held together by force 

and that were used against each other, where the Sunnis dominated both the Kurds and the Shia, and there’s a long history there 

and it’s an ugly one. The Shia have always had a strong relationship with their brethren across the border in Iran, from a religious 

standpoint, even though they fought each other for 8 years. The 

Kurds, to the extent they could get away with it, essentially wanted to be independent of everybody in the country and kind of run 

their own affairs. 

So getting these three principal groups to work together and to 

share power and to have some measure of trust in each other is 

essential for Iraq’s future, and I would tell you that I think that 

making progress on that has taken longer and has been more difficult than we anticipated. I would add gratuitously, like a lot of 

other things. 

Chairman LEVIN. You say we put pressure on them when they 

don’t meet their own deadlines for the political reconciliation, 

which is essential to ending this conflict. They said October 1. They 

47

didn’t pass the law to make those provincial elections happen. They 

keep dawdling and dawdling and dawdling on the elections law, 

which you’ve testified again here today are critically important to 

these kind of political reconciliations. 

How do we put pressure on them? Where is the pressure? 

Secretary GATES. The challenge that we face in Iraq is that we 

have politics in the country and one of the issues that has held this 

up is the status of Kirkuk. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, of course, but where’s the pressure? 

You’ve said we put pressure on them privately. Where? How? 

Secretary GATES. We tell them that this is something they need 

to get done. 

Chairman LEVIN. Or? 

Secretary GATES. We’ve had this discussion before. 

Chairman LEVIN. I know, but it’s important that this discussion 

continue. The Iraqis get the impression, that we’re still open-ended, 

and that we’re just going to be down to a level of troops in February which is probably a little bit larger than the level of troops 

we had before the surge. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the Iraqis think 

this is an open-ended commitment. 

Chairman LEVIN. What have we told them? 

Secretary GATES. As much as anything, it’s what they have told 

us. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m not talking about what they want. I’m talking about what we’re going to do. 

Secretary GATES. I think that it’s inevitable that our force sizes 

are coming down. They know that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, would you say this, that one of the reasons for the reduction in violence in Iraq is that we changed our 

tactics, not just the increased number of troops, but that we 

changed our tactics, which put more of our troops out in the communities in joint combat outposts—living where they work is the 

way some of our commanders have put it. We’ve stationed our 

troops there. Would you agree that was one of the factors in the 

improved security in Iraq? General, do you? 

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, I agree. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with that? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. I am concluded. My dear friend, do you have 

additional questions? 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would simply conclude by, one, putting into this record today the letter that you and 

I jointly sent to Secretary Gates on August 1st, and that regards 

to Iraqi dollars that are alleged to be here in the United States and 

how they can be put into the programs that I think you’ve enunciated. I believe today you’ve covered this subject very carefully, 

and I’m sorry I had to be absent for a few minutes. But I think 

our letter together with your response should be put in this record, 

because this is a question that’s repeatedly asked of the chairman 

and me from our colleagues as we move around, and indeed when 

we visit our constituents. They find it almost incomprehensible. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

48


923ful1.eps
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Senator WARNER. Separately, I’m putting in the record an 

amendment which today I discussed with you. We were not able to 

get it in the bill, but it directs your attention to the substantial 

military construction part of our bill and the amount of funds that 

the administration is requesting and I think if our bill gets through 

will be authorized in new construction funds in Iraq. Specifically, 

we had in mind to put in a framework whereby each of those items 

could be reexamined by you to determine if in fact U.S. dollars are 

needed and whether or not Iraqi dollars can be expended, because 

after these many years that we’ve been in this country—and all of 

us have visited on a number of occasions on our oversight trips—

the amount of construction that we have put in refurbishment, is 

enormous. As we drawdown, it’s difficult to say to our colleagues 

we need to continue to build more over and above what we have 

in place now. 

So we thank you, Mr. Secretary, for appearing here today; and 

I think we’ve had a full hearing, Mr. Chairman. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


923ful4.eps
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Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner, in terms of that amendment’s 

language, I wonder if we could just ask the Secretary, not to respond now, but whether he would take a look at that proposed 

structure and, even though it’s not going to be part of our bill for 

the reasons that Secretary Warner discussed, whether you would 

consider following that kind of structure. I’m not asking you to 

commit to that, but——

Senator WARNER. No, but I think I’d appreciate that. 

I had tried to get it here and I couldn’t get it here this morning, 

because it follows the Secretary’s response about the CERP program. You’ve drawn it down to 200,000 you’re going to look at each 

one; is that correct? 


923ful7.eps
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Secretary GATES. $2 million for me, $500,000 at lower levels. 

Senator WARNER. Correct. Well, it’s the same type of concept applying to CERP that we apply to the military construction budget. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you could just take a look at that, Mr. Secretary, we’d appreciate it. 

Senator WARNER. We’d appreciate that. 

[The information referred to follows:]

I understand and agree with the intent of Senator Warner’s proposed amendment: 

however, we are already implementing the intent of the draft language. The U.S. 

military is not seeking permanent bases in Iraq. Restrictions on the use of military 

construction funds for permanent facilities in Iraq already exist. A determination 

that no reasonable alternative facility or installation will satisfy requirements and 

confirmation that the project is for use by U.S. forces in Iraq are required prior to 

initialing all military construction projects in Iraq. Certification of urgent need is 

already required for operation and maintenance-funded construction projects. 

As always, we will continue to look for opportunities to increase Government of 

Iraq (GOI) spending on projects in Iraq. Recent examples include handing over the 

costs of police infrastructure, Iraqi force generation, and the Sons of Iraq program. 

In addition, revised guidance for the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 

will require the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq to certify that projects 

greater than $750,000 are linked to a cost-sharing arrangement with the GOI where 

feasible. However, it is important that U.S. commanders retain the ability to satisfy 

operations support requirements and to fully fund projects that are in the U.S. interest but may not match GOI priorities.

Chairman LEVIN. Because many members, as Senator Warner 

has pointed out, of this committee have done more than just express interest. They’ve offered amendments. We’ve adopted amendments along this line. 

I think the only disappointing note that I felt or saw in your face 

was when Senator Lieberman said that this might not be your last 

visit to this committee. I’m not sure if he knows something that we 

don’t know. We do expect that this will be the last one unless 

something unusual happens, and I think we all feel very strongly 

that you have really made a major contribution to the relationship 

between Congress and this administration in terms of openness 

and in terms of confidence. You’ve represented and done a wonderful job in terms of your relationship with our troops. General, I 

know you have for a long time as well. We just want to congratulate you, Secretary Gates, for that service. Thank you. For how 

many years now? You say you were sworn in 40——

Secretary GATES. 42 years ago. 

Chairman LEVIN. 42 years ago. You don’t have a clock running 

backwards as well as forward that you carry around with you? 

Secretary GATES. Let the record show 118 days. 

Senator WARNER. Was that when you went into the Air Force? 

Secretary GATES. When I was first recruited by CIA. 

Senator WARNER. Prior to then you were in public service? 

Secretary GATES. The Air Force came later. 

Senator WARNER. Oh, it came later. 

Chairman LEVIN. We congratulate you on your long service. 

There will be other ways in which you’re going to be asked to serve, 

I’m sure. You don’t have to react to that. 

Senator WARNER. One further question. In my opening comments 

I addressed my continuous concern, as you have the same level of 

concern, about the narcotics in Afghanistan. That is simply undermining much of the progress that the Afghan Government is trying 

56

to make and it does provide a source for dollars to be utilized by 

the enemy, diverse as they are, against our forces. 

Just a brief response of what you’re working on there. I know 

you’ve tried hard to cut that back. 

Secretary GATES. We are trying to get the alliance, to get ISAF, 

to get the North Atlantic Council to agree, to get our allies to 

agree, to make counternarcotics, particularly in terms of going 

after the drug labs and kingpins, a part of the mission of ISAF. 

Right now it’s not, and we’re running into some flack and I’m not 

sure whether we’ll be successful. 

Governance makes a huge difference in Afghanistan, the local 

governance. The reality is that in all but seven provinces, there is 

essentially no poppy growing or it’s at very, very low levels. That’s 

the good news, and the other piece of good news is the U.N. says 

that the number of hectares that are under poppy cultivation are 

down about 19 percent year on year. That’s another piece of good 

news. 

The bad news is that the poppy growing in the seven provinces 

where it’s still going on more than meets world demand. 

Senator WARNER. Absolutely, that’s the problem. Well, gentlemen, because I know, General, this has to bother you and those 

particularly in the chain of command directing our forces, because 

you’re asking us to go into harm’s way knowing that some of the 

weapons used against them are derivative of this poppy trade. 

That’s just something that the American people cannot comprehend 

and will not accept. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, you put your finger right on it. 

It’s not part of our mission, getting rid of particularly these labs. 

They know where they’re at. There’s no reason it shouldn’t be part 

of our mission except for local opposition in Afghanistan. When I 

asked President Karzai about this issue, he said just tell us where 

they are; we’ll get rid of them. Well, I’m afraid I’m skeptical about 

that statement. I have a lot of respect in many ways for President 

Karzai, but I’m very skeptical that he says just tell us where they 

are and we’ll go and get them, when we know where they are, but 

it’s not part of our mission to destroy them. I’m talking about the 

labs. I’m not talking about spraying crops. We’re just talking about 

labs where this process is centralized. I agree with you, it’s long 

overdue that that is part of our mission. 

We thank you both for this presentation this morning and for 

your responses. Secretary Gates, we wish you again all the best. 

Secretary GATES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’ll stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS

1. Senator PRYOR. Secretary Gates, on June 3, we had a full committee hearing 

on Department of Defense (DOD) acquisitions of major weapons systems. It was reported by the Government Accountability Office that the current portfolio of 95 

Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) has experienced a cost growth of 

$295 billion. What plans or strategy have you implemented within the DOD that 

responds to the challenges of noted cost and schedule growth in budgetary acquisition levels caused by unrealistic cost and schedule estimates; unreasonable performVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:19 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\47117.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
57

ance expectations; use of immature technologies; changes to program requirements; 

and reductions in production quantities and funding levels? 

Secretary GATES. The Department has implemented numerous initiatives focused 

on controlling cost and schedule growth. They are captured in the Under Secretary 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) Strategic Goals 

Implementation Plan. Strategic Thrust 2 of that plan describes how the Department 

will responsibly spend every single tax dollar. The USD(AT&L) tracks and monitors 

those initiatives, including the following:

Competitive Prototyping: Successful implementation of competitive prototyping will inform us on the realism of requirements, mature technology before final development phases, and significantly improve our cost estimates. 

Technology Readiness Assessments (TRA): TRAs are intended to ensure 

technology is appropriately mature at each sequential phase of development 

and that the Department budgets adequate funds for necessary technology 

maturation. 

Incentive Policies: Careful, aggressive use of profit and contract incentives 

is critical to the program manager’s efforts to control costs, incentivize performance, and ensure disciplined behavior by industry. 

Enhanced Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM): ADMs now specify 

the requirements document and its date and prohibit changes to program 

requirements. The ADMs also require full program funding. 

Configuration Steering Boards (CSB): CSBs will review requirements and 

technical configuration changes, which have the potential to result in significant increases to program cost and schedule. 

Independent Cost Estimates: We intend to ensure all programs are properly priced and budgeted by requiring programs to develop independent cost 

estimates prior to program initiation. Independent cost estimates are to be 

fully considered during any MDAP’s milestone review and realistic cost estimates and schedule projections are to be adopted. 

Materiel Development Decision (MDD): The Department intends to establish the MDD as the formal entry point into the acquisition process. The 

MDD will assess potential materiel solutions and is mandatory for all programs. 

Life Cycle Management (LCM): By integrating LCM principles into the acquisition and sustainment processes, we will increase system readiness 

while lowering total life cycle costs.

For program managers, there is a renewed emphasis on accountability and tenure 

agreements so that program managers will remain with their programs longer. 

Signed Program Management Agreements (PMAs) establish a ‘‘contract’’ between a 

program manager and acquisition and requirements/resource officials setting expectations for cost, schedule, and performance. The PMA must be reaccomplished if 

conditions change. 

The Department is engaging with industry continuously. That dialogue occurs not 

only on a program-by-program basis where industry holds a contract, but we also 

communicate with industrial associations that involve many contractors. For example, we send liaison representatives to the National Defense Industrial Association’s 

Industrial Committee on Program Management (ICPM). The ICPM is working on 

topics of interest to both industry and government, for example the use of new Program Startup Workshops and improved application of Earned Value Management 

Systems. 

In addition, the USD(AT&L) writes weekly AT&L notes to the broadest possible 

DOD acquisition team audience. These notes convey principles and lessons seeking 

to change the acquisition community culture and develop better practices. These efforts to influence the broadest possible audience in the DOD acquisition community 

represent critical efforts to produce lasting, enduring improvements. 

These polices will be institutionalized in the forthcoming update to DOD Instruction 5000.02. It will take time to show the impact of these policies, but lasting 

change starts with good common-sense policies that are measurable, enforceable, 

and widely accepted. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ

CONTRACTOR LIABILITIES

2. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, Lt. Col. Dominic ‘‘Rocky’’ Baragona died 

on May 19, 2003, in a tractor trailer accident in Iraq near the Kuwaiti border. This 

accident was all the more tragic because Lieutenant Colonel Baragona had fought 

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in the invasion of Iraq, survived while serving honorably, and was returning home 

to his family. Lieutenant Colonel Baragona was an outstanding officer, a West Point 

graduate, and his loss will be keenly felt both by the Army and his family. His parents are my constituents and Rocky’s residence was my State, Florida. 

The tractor trailer truck, owned by Kuwait & Gulf Link Transport Company 

(KGL), a Kuwaiti multinational firm, careened across a highway and struck Rocky’s 

Humvee, killing him. 

KGL is a large Kuwaiti company, organized under Kuwaiti law and doing business across the Middle East. Its business includes the execution of substantial contracts with the Army. After Lieutenant Colonel Baragona’s death, the Army conducted an AR15–6 and determined in the accident investigation report that KGL’s 

negligence caused the traffic accident that killed Lieutenant Colonel Baragona. The 

Army required that KGL certify that it had purchased third-party liability insurance for just this sort of accident. 

Please explain how the Army assists families of U.S. service personnel access to 

the insurance purchased for their benefit and please fully explain how the Army 

otherwise assists family members of service personnel killed by contractors. 

Secretary GATES. The Army assigns a trained Casualty Assistance Officer (CAO) 

to the surviving family of every soldier who dies while on active duty. The CAOs 

helps the family with all aspects of casualty assistance, to include applications for 

all Government benefits, settling claims for funeral expenses and the Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance, obtaining copies of all DOD-conducted death investigations, and coordinating for any specialized assistance requirements such as bereavement support, legal assistance, or financial counseling. 

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2006 requires that the Services provide military legal assistance to surviving families who need help with issues related to settling the decedent’s estate, such as probating an estate, drafting new 

wills, transference of property, et cetera. However, this assistance is limited to basic 

matters of the nature described above. Military attorneys cannot represent surviving families with matters that must be adjudicated by the civil court system, 

such as wrongful death suits or tort actions. When surviving families have need for 

the services of a civilian attorney, the military legal assistance office can assist the 

family in locating a qualified civilian attorney, who often may agree to work pro 

bono or at a reduced rate for military families.

3. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, in Baragona v. KGL the court found that 

the Kuwaiti company should pay Rocky’s family nearly $5 million, but now KGL has 

appeared in court to argue that the court does not have jurisdiction over KGL because it is a Kuwaiti company. 

Contractors, including foreign contractors, play an important part in the success 

of the U.S. military but it’s important that the contractors act responsibly and conform to the contracting requirements of the DOD, which has extensive regulations, 

the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), designed to promote contractor accountability and DOD policy interests. For example, the DFARS 

requires that both foreign and domestic contractors carry insurance for accidental 

death or injury to third parties in order to protect American service personnel, third 

parties, and the United States Government. 

If the Army requires the purchase of this insurance by all of its trucking contractors, foreign and domestic, but the foreign contractors are able to assert that they 

shouldn’t have to compensate accidental death or injury claims because of their lack 

of presence in the United States, what is the point of requiring the purchase of the 

insurance? 

Secretary GATES. Contractors that use automobiles (or trucks) in the performance 

of their contracts are required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), Subsection 28.307–2, Liability, to have automobile liability insurance. The point of requiring the contractor to purchase this type of insurance is to protect the interests 

of the United States Government. The requirement for liability insurance applies to 

contractor performance in the United States and overseas. KGL’s question about the 

jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia 

Atlanta Division does not question the use of liability insurance; it only questions 

the jurisdiction of the court. KGL’s assertion about jurisdiction does not affect the 

use of liability insurance in Federal Government contracts.

4. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, does this not defeat the important DOD 

policy considerations at interest in the DFARS provisions that require insurance? 

Secretary GATES. Contractors under contract with the DOD are required to carry 

the appropriate insurance, as specified in the contract. The requirement for liability 

insurance applies to contractor performance in the United States and overseas. In 

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the case Baragona v. KGL, KGL does not question the inclusion of insurance but 

the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. KGL’s assertions about jurisdiction do not affect the use of 

liability insurance provisions in Federal Government contracts.

5. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, shouldn’t the assertion of this defense affect the ability of the contractor to receive future contracts from the United States 

Government as it involves the responsibility of the contractor? 

Secretary GATES. Contracts shall be awarded to responsible prospective contractors only, pursuant to FAR 9.103. To be determined responsible, a contractor must 

meet various criteria including a satisfactory performance record and a satisfactory 

record of integrity. In addition, if a contracting officer becomes aware of a situation 

that requires investigation in accordance with FAR 9.4, the contracting officer must 

refer the matter to a suspending and debarring official for that official’s consideration. Possible causes for debarment and suspension are listed in FAR 9.4 and include the contractor’s commission of an offense indicating a lack of business integrity or honesty that would seriously and directly affect the present responsibility of 

the contractor.

6. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, in the case of an accidental death how 

does a family find out if a contractor has insurance, as is required? 

Secretary GATES. Any interested party may obtain a copy of the contract through 

the Freedom of Information Act to determine what type of insurance is required 

under the contract. In addition, when a proper request is filed in a private litigation 

such as Baragona v. KGL, the government will make available nonprivileged documents and testimony to the parties.

7. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, is the Army able to facilitate a resolution 

in this kind of case? 

Secretary GATES. This case (Baragona v. KGL) is a tort action brought by the parents of Lieutenant Colonel Dominic F. Baragona seeking damages arising from the 

death of their son, who was killed in an automobile accident in Iraq while serving 

as an officer in the United States Army. The defendants are KGL and Mahmoud 

Muhammed Hessain Serour. The accident occurred when the Army Humvee in 

which Lieutenant General Baragona was a passenger collided with a truck owned 

by KGL and driven by Mr. Serour, a KGL employee. The United States Army 

(Army) is not a party to this court action; therefore, we must remain neutral. The 

Army’s role in private litigation is to make available nonprivileged documents and 

testimony to the parties when they file a proper request. Both parties to this litigation have made such requests and the Army has provided documents in accordance 

with law and regulation.

8. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) 

should protect the families of service personnel killed or injured by negligence just 

as the SOFA between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany protected service families posted in Germany during the Cold War. There have been 

cases of accidental death or injury to U.S. personnel that have left the families with 

nowhere to turn because the accident happened in Iraq and was caused by foreign 

DOD contractors that claim that a U.S. court has no jurisdiction over them. 

In Baragona v. KGL the court found that KGL should pay Lieutenant Colonel 

Baragona’s family nearly $5 million but now KGL has appeared in court to argue 

that the court does not have jurisdiction over KGL because it is a Kuwaiti company. 

In Lessin v. First Kuwait Trading and Contracting Company a U.S. serviceman 

who was severely injured by a Kuwaiti subcontractor sued the Kuwaiti company 

and the prime contractor, which was KBR. KBR said contractually the liability was 

on the Kuwaiti company, which then argued it couldn’t be sued because it was located in Kuwait and the case was dismissed. The serviceman was left out in the 

cold. 

Is it contemplated that the U.S.-Iraq SOFA now being negotiated will protect U.S. 

servicemembers’ families in cases of accidental death or injury caused by traffic accidents involving foreign contractors once the SOFA is implemented? If so, please explain how the SOFA will protect them. 

Secretary GATES. No. The current draft of the SOFA does not address matters relating to accidental death or injury caused by traffic accidents involving non-U.S. 

DOD contractors.

9. Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Gates, how does the Army plan to address those 

servicemembers killed or injured before the implementation of the SOFA? 

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Secretary GATES. Such matters are beyond the scope of the SOFA. Where 

servicemembers are killed or injured in Iraq by non-U.S. DOD contractors, the 

servicemember or his/her family is free to pursue available remedies in the civil 

courts.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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