J-S44030-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LAMAR DOUGLAS CLARK 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 400 MDA 2020

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 31, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-36-CR-0005760-2014

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 13, 2021

Appellant Lamar Douglas Clark appeals from the order denying, after 

an evidentiary hearing, his first Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541-9546, petition. On appeal, Appellant raises several claims of trial 

counsel’s ineffectiveness. We affirm.

We state the facts as set forth by this Court on direct appeal:

Some time before 10:00 p.m. on November 7, 2014, [Appellant] 

entered Shenk’s Cafe, a neighborhood tavern in Lancaster, 

Pennsylvania, with Daniel Ishman, known as “Zip.” The bar area 

of Shenk’s Cafe is a narrow space, approximately 14 feet wide. 

At the time [Appellant] entered, the crowd in the barroom was 

estimated at between 20 and 50 people. 

[Appellant] and Ishman left the bar and returned approximately 

twenty minutes later with Joshwin Gonzalez, known as “J” or 

“Joey.” At around 10:00 p.m., [Appellant] called Ishman over 

and said that “he felt like someone was after him.” Then, as 

Gonzalez approached, [Appellant] told him to stop and asked 

why he was coming over. Gonzalez replied that he thought 

[Appellant] had called him. [Appellant] then pointed a pistol at 

him and fired five shots. Three people were struck by gunfire. 
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Joshwin Gonzalez suffered a gunshot wound to the left arm. 

Cynthia Boots, a customer who had been seated near the 

jukebox, suffered a wound to the left breast. Barry Diffenderfer, 

a customer also seated near the jukebox, suffered a fatal wound 

to the chest. He was found unresponsive on the floor by the first 

responding police officer. 

Shortly after the shooting, police observed [Appellant] running 

naked on Chestnut Street, approximately two blocks from 

Shenk’s Cafe. As [Appellant] was being detained, a juvenile 

called to police and gave a pistol to Lancaster City Detective 

Stanley Roache explaining that [Appellant] had given the 

weapon to him. That weapon, a five-shot revolver, contained 

five spent .38 caliber cartridges. Four .38 caliber bullets were 

recovered from Shenk’s Cafe; one had DNA from Joshwin 

Gonzalez and a second had DNA from Cynthia Boots. A fifth 

bullet was recovered from the body of Barry Diffenderfer. The 

pistol that the juvenile gave to police was traced back to the late 

father of [Appellant]’s current girlfriend at the address where 

[Appellant] lived with his girlfriend. 

Police were able to identify and interview approximately twelve 

people who had been in Shenk’s Cafe that night. One witness, 

Veldresha Lucas, [Appellant]’s sister, testified to seeing the 

interaction between [Appellant], Ishman and Gonzalez that 

preceded the shooting as well as the shooting itself. Others 

testified to hearing shots and hiding in fear. 

[Appellant] also presented evidence which was largely 

discredited by the jury. . . . Martha Cuelo testified that she 

overheard Ishman saying that “they had set up [Appellant] and 

he was going to never come out . . . .” 

On cross examination, Detective Roache testified that the 

juvenile who handed him the pistol told him that [Appellant] had 

said “they tried to kill me.” Police Officer Ben Bradley, who was 

present when [Appellant] was detained and transported him to 

the police station, also testified on both direct and cross 

examination that [Appellant] had said “they tried to set me up in 

Shenk’s.” 
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Commonwealth v. Clark, 2017 WL 1520732, at *3-*4 (Pa. Super. filed 

Apr. 25, 2017) (unpublished mem.) (citations omitted), appeal denied, 177 

A.3d 829 (Pa. 2018) (per curiam order). 

On May 3, 2016, after a six[-]day jury trial, [Appellant] was 

found guilty of one count of third degree murder, two counts of 

aggravated assault, eleven counts of recklessly endangering 

another person and one count of firearms not to be carried 

without a license. On July 7, 2016, [Appellant] was sentenced to 

an aggregate term of not less than 38 and one-half nor more 

than 81 years incarceration. . . .

Id. at *3 (footnotes omitted). This Court affirmed on April 25, 2017, and 

our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on 

January 3, 2018. 

On November 26, 2018, the PCRA court docketed Appellant’s timely 

first pro se PCRA petition. Appellant’s PCRA petition raised several claims, 

which we summarize in relevant part below. The PCRA court appointed 

PCRA counsel.

1

 The PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing on July 23, 

2019, at which Appellant’s trial counsel, among others, testified. The docket 

reflects that on January 31, 2020, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA 

petition, and on February 27, 2020, Appellant filed a timely notice of 

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1 PCRA counsel indicated he would not file an amended petition but 

continued to represent Appellant.
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appeal.2 Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, 

which only raised the following four issues:

1. The [PCRA c]ourt [erred] in determining that trial counsel was 

not ineffective for failing to call Anthony Clark as a witness at 

trial.

2. The [PCRA c]ourt [erred] in determining that trial counsel had 

a reasonable strategic basis for his failure to object to the 

Commonwealth’s questioning of Detective Roache, which elicited 

testimony that was in violation of the trial court’s order 

regarding [Appellant’s] Motion in Limine.

3. The [PCRA c]ourt [erred] in determining that trial counsel had 

a reasonable strategic basis for his failure to seek DNA evidence.

4. The [PCRA c]ourt [erred] in determining that trial counsel had 

a reasonable strategic basis for his failure to request a jury 

instruction for involuntary manslaughter.

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 3/23/20 (formatting altered).

Appellant’s counsel’s brief identifies one question, “Whether the trial 

court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for post-conviction collateral 

relief,” but raises the following six issues, which we reordered for ease of

disposition:

1. Trial counsel’s failure to call Anthony Clark as a witness for 

the defense.

2. Trial counsel’s failure to object to the violation of the court’s 

order regarding a Motion in Limine.

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2 Neither filing was transmitted to this Court as part of the certified record. 

We add that the PCRA court’s January 31, 2020 order was attached to 

Appellant’s brief. 
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3. Trial counsel’s failure to pursue DNA evidence.

4. Trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction for 

involuntary manslaughter.

5. Trial counsel’s decisions to ask a key defense witness, Joshua 

Welsh, a question that elicited a response which undermined the 

witness’s credibility.

6. Trial counsel’s lack of communication with [Appellant]

regarding his decision as to whether he should testify in his own 

defense.

Appellant’s Brief at 4, 6 (formatting altered).

3

We need not summarize Appellant’s arguments in support of his first 

four issues for the reasons that follow. Further, Appellant did not cite or 

discuss any legal authorities in support of his arguments.

Our standard of review follows:

[O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is 

limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of 

legal error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we 

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions. . . . 

Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner's burden to 

prove that counsel was ineffective.

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3 Appellant’s brief violates numerous Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, including Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), which states the “argument shall be 

divided into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall 

have at the head of each part--in distinctive type or in type distinctively 

displayed--the particular point treated therein, followed by such discussion 

and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).
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Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered), appeal denied, 216 A.3d 1029 

(Pa. 2019). 

Claims may be waived under Rule 2119(a) for failure to cite to 

relevant case law or to otherwise develop issues in a meaningful fashion 

capable of review. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Commonwealth v. 

Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009).

[I]t is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are 

sufficiently developed for our review. The brief must support the 

claims with pertinent discussion, with references to the record 

and with citations to legal authorities. Citations to authorities 

must articulate the principles for which they are cited. Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(b).

This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments 

on behalf of an appellant. Moreover, when defects in a brief 

impede our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review, we 

may dismiss the appeal entirely or find certain issues to be 

waived.

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some 

citations omitted).

Instantly, as noted above, for his first four issues, Appellant failed to 

cite supporting legal authority or analyze relevant case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a); see also Kane, 10 A.3d at 331. Further, Appellant did not discuss

any of the relevant standards of review or legal principles governing a claim 

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Kane, 10 

A.3d at 331. Appellant’s boilerplate allegations of ineffectiveness do not 

satisfy his burden of proving trial counsel was ineffective. See Sandusky, 
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203 A.3d at 1043-44. Because Appellant failed to meaningfully develop his 

arguments, Appellant is not entitled to relief for his four issues. See Kane, 

10 A.3d at 331.

Finally, with respect to Appellant’s last two issues, it is well-settled 

that “[a]ny issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be 

deemed waived.” Commonwealth v. Lord, 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998). 

Here, Appellant failed to raise his last two issues in his Rule 1925(b) 

statement, and therefore has waived them for appellate review. See id. 

For these reasons, because Appellant failed to establish legal error, we 

affirm.4 See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-44.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/13/2021

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4 “[I]ssues of PCRA counsel effectiveness must be raised in a serial PCRA 

petition.” Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1200 (Pa. Super. 2012).