U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

45–665 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–634

CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS

TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED

STATES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE

UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 27, 2008

Page

McConnell, Hon. John M., Director of National Intelligence (DNI); Accompanied by Timothy E. Langford, Cuba-Venezuela Mission Manager, DNI; 

Benjamin A. Powell, General Counsel, DNI; Alan R. Pino, National Intelligence Officer for Middle East, DNI; and Thomas Fingar, Deputy Director 

for Analysis, DNI ................................................................................................. 7

Maples, LTG Michael D., U.S. Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency .... 33

(III) 

(1)

CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE 

THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF 

THE UNITED STATES 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD–

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, E. Benjamin 

Nelson, Inhofe, Sessions, Graham, Thune, and Martinez. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional 

staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, 

professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff 

member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, 

professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; 

David G. Collins, research assistant; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jessica L. Kingston, 

and Benjamin L. Rubin. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator 

Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Nathan Reese, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason Van 

Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian W. Walsh, assistant to 

Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator 

Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Before we begin, let 

me just give you a quick report. I talked to Senator Warner a few 

minutes ago. He sounds great. He’s going to be released from the 

hospital today. Our thoughts, of course, are also with Senator Byrd, 

and hope for a very quick recovery for our other colleague on this 

committee. 

2

On behalf of the whole committee, let me welcome our witnesses 

to today’s hearing on current and longer-term threats and the intelligence challenges around the world. We’re glad to have Director of 

National Intelligence (DNI) Mike McConnell and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director General Maples appearing here 

today. This committee has a special responsibility to the men and 

women of our Armed Forces to be vigilant on intelligence programs 

because decisions on whether or not to use military force and the 

planning for military operations depend so heavily on intelligence. 

For instance, we face a growing threat in Afghanistan, with the 

President painting a rosy picture of the situation there for the 

American people. Recently he said that in Afghanistan the Taliban, 

al Qaeda, and their allies are on the run. But on the other hand, 

recent independent reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and 

the Atlantic Council provide a very different assessment. Among 

the findings of these Afghanistan reports are the following. Efforts 

to stabilize Afghanistan are faltering. The Afghanistan Study 

Group reports that since 2002 ‘‘violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen dramatically, as Afghan confidence in their government and its international partners falls.’’ 

The Atlantic Council report states: ‘‘Make no mistake, the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in Afghanistan. Instead, the security situation is a strategic stalemate,’’ in 

their words, ‘‘with NATO and Afghan forces able to win any headto-head confrontation with the Taliban, but not being able to eliminate the insurgency so long as the Taliban enjoys a safe haven 

across the border with Pakistan.’’ 

The anti-government insurgency threatening Afghanistan has 

grown considerably over the last 2 years, according to the Afghanistan Study Group. Last year was the deadliest since 2001 for U.S. 

and international forces there. The Taliban are relying entirely increasingly on terrorism and ambushes, including over 140 suicide 

bombings in 2007. 

The Afghanistan Study Group report also finds that the Taliban 

have been able to infiltrate many areas throughout the country, intimidating and coercing the local Afghan people. The Atlantic 

Council report concludes: ‘‘In summary, despite efforts of the Afghan Government and the international community, Afghanistan 

remains a failing state. It could become a failed state.’’ 

What a contrast to the President’s statement to the American 

public that the Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies are on the run 

in Afghanistan. 

The situation in Afghanistan is intimately connected to events in 

Pakistan. The elections held in the wake of the Bhutto assassination appear to have been relatively free of manipulation and the 

army may be pulling back from its domination of Pakistani politics. 

Some assessments of the election indicate that popular support for 

extremist elements is marginal. Director McConnell and Secretary 

Gates testified recently that they believe that Pakistan’s political 

leaders now perceive that the lawlessness prevailing in the Northwest Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Area 

(FATA), and parts of Baluchistan represents a potentially mortal 

threat to Pakistan. 

3

We need to understand from our witnesses how these developments might be translated into concrete gains against extremist 

elements in Pakistan and eliminating the sanctuary for the Taliban 

and al Qaeda along the Afghan border. 

Secretary Gates recently testified that Pakistan’s preoccupation 

with preparing for traditional warfare against India leaves Pakistan’s army ill-equipped and ill-trained for irregular warfare in 

those tribal regions along the Afghan border. What are the prospects for Pakistan adjusting its security priorities and capabilities 

to confront tribal and religious militants? Can Pakistan’s newly victorious parties overcome their historic fragility and animosity to 

forge a lasting turn to stable parliamentary democracy that can 

adopt and enforce difficult policies? 

In his prepared statement for today’s hearing, Director McConnell states that al Qaeda’s central leadership, based in the AfghanPakistan border region, is ‘‘its most dangerous component.’’ He also 

states that the Intelligence Community (IC) sees indications that 

al Qaeda’s global image is beginning to lose some of its luster. It’s 

important to be clear about whether the Director believes that this 

trend is likely to be lasting and how it relates to the Taliban’s 

strength in Afghanistan and al Qaeda’s growing strength in northern and eastern Africa. 

Regarding Iraq, we need to understand the prospects for political 

reconciliation. The concern remains that, while the intensity of the 

violence has subsided, reconciliation, which was the purpose of the 

surge, is still halting and unsteady. That means that we may be 

merely postponing a resurgence of violence while training combatants for that resurgence. 

As Director McConnell’s prepared statement indicates, the political gaps between Iraqi communities remain deep. Sunnis now cooperating with U.S. forces remain hostile towards the Shiites and 

the Shiites still look on the Sunni groups working with the U.S. 

forces against al Qaeda as ‘‘thinly disguised insurgents,’’ in Director McConnell’s words, who remain committed to overthrowing the 

Shiite majority. 

On the Shiite side, we need to know what the IC’s understanding 

is of the Shiite militias’ intentions and plans and the degree of penetration by and dependence on Iran and its agents in Iraq, how 

many Quds Force personnel or other Iranian personnel are operating in Iraq and what they are doing. 

Director McConnell’s prepared statement indicates that, despite 

pledges by senior Iranian officials, Iran continues to provide weapons, funding, and training to Iraqi Shiite militias. 

The Iraqi parliament approved a de-Baathification law, but its 

likely effects remain unclear. There have been reports, for example, 

that the law may actually lead to fresh rounds of purges of Sunnis 

from government posts. Fundamental hydrocarbon legislation remains stalled. A provincial elections law that must be passed before the critically needed elections in the provinces can be held has 

not been adopted. Amendments to the Constitution have not even 

been proposed. 

Turning to Iran’s nuclear activities, the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran several years ago 

ceased work on warhead design and weaponization. More recently, 

4

in Senate testimony Director McConnell said the wording of the 

NIE led to the misperception that Iran has abandoned its efforts 

to acquire nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the other two critical elements of a weapons program, uranium enrichment and a 

ballistic missile delivery capability, continue and continue openly. 

Director McConnell further testified that the prospects for Security Council support for additional sanctions on Iran are good. We 

need to explore this issue carefully today, along with the Director’s 

assessment of the meaning and significance of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) new report on Iran’s nuclear activities. 

I’m going to put the balance of my statement, particularly as it 

relates to North Korea and the Balkan region, in the record at this 

point. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

I would like to welcome our witnesses for today’s hearing on current and longerterm threats and intelligence challenges around the world. We are glad to have Director of National Intelligence (DNI) McConnell and Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA) Director General Maples appearing here today. 

This committee has a special responsibility to the men and women of our Armed 

Forces to be vigilant on intelligence programs because decisions on whether or not 

to use military force and the planning for military operations depend so heavily on 

intelligence. 

For instance, we face a growing threat in Afghanistan, with the President painting a rosy picture of the situation there for the American public. Recently, he said 

that in Afghanistan ‘‘The Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies are on the run,’’ while 

on the other hand, recent independent reports by the Afghanistan Study Group and 

the Atlantic Council provide a very different assessment. 

Among the findings of these Afghanistan reports are the following:

• Efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are ‘‘faltering.’’ The Afghanistan Study 

Group report finds that since 2002 ‘‘violence, insecurity, and opium production have risen dramatically as Afghan confidence in their government and 

its international partners falls.’’

• The Atlantic Council report states, ‘‘Make no mistake, North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) is not winning in Afghanistan.’’ Instead, the 

security situation is ‘‘a strategic stalemate,’’ with NATO and Afghan forces 

able to win any head-to-head confrontation with the Taliban, but not being 

able to eliminate the insurgency so long as the Taliban enjoys safe haven 

across the border with Pakistan. 

• The anti-government insurgency threatening Afghanistan ‘‘has grown 

considerably over the last 2 years,’’ according to the Afghanistan Study 

Group. Last year was the deadliest since 2001 for U.S. and international 

forces. The Taliban are relying increasingly on terrorism and ambushes, including over 140 suicide bombings in 2007. The Afghanistan Study Group 

report also finds that ‘‘the Taliban have been able to infiltrate many areas 

throughout the country,’’ intimidating and coercing the local Afghan people. 

• The Atlantic Council report concludes, ‘‘In summary, despite efforts of the 

Afghan Government and the international community, Afghanistan remains 

a failing state. It could become a failed state.’’

What a contrast to the President’s statement to the American public. ‘‘The 

Taliban, al Qaeda, and their allies are on the run in Afghanistan.’’ 

The situation in Afghanistan is intimately connected to events in Pakistan. The 

elections, held in the wake of the Bhutto assassination, appear to have been relatively free of manipulation, and the Army may be pulling back from its domination 

of Pakistani politics. Some assessments of the election indicate that popular support 

for extremist elements is marginal. 

Director McConnell and Secretary Gates have testified recently that they believe 

that Pakistan’s political leaders now perceive that the lawlessness prevailing in the 

Northwest Frontier Province, the Federally Administered Tribal Area, and parts of 

Baluchistan represents a potentially mortal threat to Pakistan. We need to understand how these developments might be translated into concrete gains against exVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
5

tremist elements in Pakistan and eliminating the sanctuary for the Taliban and al 

Qaeda along the Afghanistan border. 

Secretary Gates recently testified that Pakistan’s preoccupation with preparing 

for traditional warfare against India leaves Pakistan’s Army ill-equipped and illtrained for irregular warfare in those tribal regions along the Afghan border. What 

are the prospects for Pakistan adjusting its security priorities and capabilities to 

confront tribal and religious militants? Can Pakistan’s newly victorious parties overcome their historic fragility and animosity to forge a lasting turn to stable parliamentary democracy that can adopt and enforce difficult policies? 

In his prepared statement for today’s hearing, Director McConnell states that al 

Qaeda’s central leadership, based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, is ‘‘its 

most dangerous component.’’ He also states that the Intelligence Community (IC) 

‘‘sees indications that al Qaeda’s global image is beginning to lose some of its luster.’’ It is important to be clear about whether the Director believes that this trend 

is likely to be lasting, and how it relates to the Taliban’s strength in Afghanistan, 

and al Qaeda’s growing strength in northern and eastern Africa. 

Regarding Iraq, we need to understand the prospects for political reconciliation. 

The concern remains that, while the intensity of the violence has subsided, reconciliation which was the purpose of the surge is still halting and unsteady. That means 

that we may be merely postponing a resurgence of violence while training combatants for that resurgence. 

As Director McConnell’s prepared statement indicates, the political gaps between 

Iraqi communities remain deep. Sunnis now cooperating with U.S. forces remain 

hostile toward the Shiite, and the Shiites still look on the Sunni groups working 

with U.S. forces against al Qaeda as ‘‘thinly disguised insurgents’’ (in Director McConnell’s words) who remain committed to overthrowing the Shiite majority. 

On the Shiite side, we need to know what the IC’s understanding is of the Shiite 

militias’ intentions and plans, and the degree of penetration by, and dependence on, 

Iran and its agents in Iraq. How many Quds Force personnel, or other Iranian government agents, are operating in Iraq and what are they doing? Director Mcconnell’s prepared statement indicates that, despite pledges by senior Iranian officials, 

Iran continues to provide weapons, funding, and training to Iraqi Shiite militants. 

The Iraqi Parliament approved a de-Baathification law but its likely effects remain unclear. There have been reports, for example, that the law may actually lead 

to fresh rounds of purges of Sunnis from government posts. Fundamental hydrocarbon legislation remains stalled. A provincial elections law that must be passed 

before critically needed elections can be held has not been adopted. Amendments to 

the Constitution have not yet even been proposed. 

Turning to Iran’s nuclear activities, the recent National Intelligence Estimate 

(NIE) concluded that Iran several years ago ceased work on warhead design and 

weaponization. More recently, in Senate testimony, Director McConnell said the 

wording of the NIE led to the misperception that Iran had abandoned its efforts to 

acquire nuclear weapons. He emphasized that the other two critical elements of a 

weapons program—uranium enrichment and a ballistic missile delivery capability—

continue openly. 

Director McConnell further testified that the prospects for Security Council support for additional sanctions on Iran are good. We need to explore this issue carefully today along with the Director’s assessment of the meaning and significance of 

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) new report on Iran’s nuclear activities. 

With respect to North Korea, many questions remain open, including whether 

North Korea had a highly-enriched uranium (HEU) program and, if so, whether 

North Korea has one today. Did the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research and other intelligence agencies review the notes of the October 4, 2002, 

meeting between U.S. and North Korean officials, where the North Koreans were 

confronted about an HEU program? If so, did the North Koreans admit that they 

had an HEU program, or was that ambiguous? 

Also, a recent unclassified report on North Korea assessed that North Korea could 

have produced up to 50 kilograms of plutonium, enough for at least half a dozen 

nuclear weapons. Since the 2002 unclassified estimate was one to two weapons, that 

means North Korea could have produced up to five more weapons after the Agreed 

Framework fell apart. We hope to hear from our witnesses today what the current 

unclassified estimate is of the number of weapons North Korea has produced from 

2002 to last year. 

The key issues are whether the North Korean government will provide the required transparency into all of its nuclear programs, capabilities, and proliferation 

activities, and ultimately, if North Korea is prepared to completely dismantle its nuclear weapons programs. The IC assessment of this is also critical. 

6

The Balkan region is again prominently in the news, with renewed signs of instability in Bosnia and with Kosovo’s independence. Beyond the immediate regional 

danger of conflict and violence, there is the question of whether Russia will really 

follow through on threats to retaliate by fostering the independence of break-away 

regions of Georgia. 

Before turning to Senator Inhofe for his opening remarks, and our witnesses for 

their testimony, I would remind everyone that we have arranged for a closed session 

in S–407 following this open session if that is necessary, 

Senator Inhofe.

Chairman LEVIN. Before turning to Senator Inhofe for his opening remarks and to our witnesses for their testimony, I would remind our colleagues that we have arranged for a closed session in 

S–407 of the Capitol following this open session if that is necessary. 

Senator Inhofe. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me join you in 

welcoming our witnesses this morning. I’m an admirer of each one 

of them. Your efforts and all of those of the intelligence services are 

essential to our Homeland defense, to the security of our national 

interests, and to the men and women of the Armed Forces who are 

deploying around the globe. 

Our Nation is currently making great demands on the intelligence system. I’m reminded, and you might remember this, Mr. 

Chairman, that when I came from the House to the Senate in 1994 

my predecessor was David Boren. He was the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). I always remember, 

he called me up after I was elected to replace him and said that 

he had one big failure in his life and that was that they’ve really—

this proliferated type of intelligence system that we have, where 

one group doesn’t want the other group to compete with them and 

all of this. 

We’ve come a long way since then, but I keep talking to him with 

some regularity and he says that things are improving, but it was 

a problem. I can actually remember once when I was becoming familiar with the National Security Agency and what they’re doing. 

They had some kind of a device that would go through maybe three 

feet of concrete. I said, that’s exactly what the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation needs, and they implied: No, this is ours. 

So we’ve come a long ways since then, and I’m sure that David 

is impressed with some of the changes. 

I think the lessons we learned from the intelligence failures before September 11 lead to improvements in intelligence collections, 

the analysis, the coordination, and the information sharing. These 

improvements were required to provide our policymakers, our 

Armed Forces, and law enforcement officials with better tools with 

which to respond to a complex array of challenges. 

The reforms enacted since September 11 to strengthen our IC 

have made significant improvements. However, constantly evolving 

threats and technologies require continuous vigilance. I have seen 

the unclassified reports of some of the successes we’ve had of some 

of the terrorist threats that have been out there that our improved 

intelligence has been able to avoid. In fact, I read a list of those 

on the floor of the Senate yesterday. I think maybe it would be betVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
7

ter for the classified version. I think the American people need to 

know that we’ve had a lot of successes, and nobody seems to talk 

about them. It’s always a little awkward when someone, whether 

it’s the President or anyone else, says we haven’t had an attack 

since September 11. Well, that’s true. Would there have been attacks? I think we all understand that there would have been, and 

I think we need to be talking about it. 

We have a little bit of a problem this morning, Mr. Chairman. 

I am the ranking member on the Environment and Public Works 

Committee, which starts at 10 o’clock. I have a required attendance, so I’ll be in and out of this hearing. But there are certain 

areas that I want to stay for the first round, some interests that 

I have, and I’d like to have them addressed. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Inhofe. 

Director McConnell?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCCONNELL, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DNI); ACCOMPANIED BY TIMOTHY E. 

LANGFORD, CUBA-VENEZUELA MISSION MANAGER, DNI; 

BENJAMIN A. POWELL, GENERAL COUNSEL, DNI; ALAN R. 

PINO, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR MIDDLE 

EAST, DNI; AND THOMAS FINGAR, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR 

ANALYSIS, DNI

Mr. MCCONNELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and 

members of the committee. I’m delighted to be here. I’m pleased to 

be accompanied, of course, by Lieutenant General Mike Maples, the 

Director of the DIA. I submitted a longer classified, as you’ve mentioned, and unclassified statement, and that will of course cover 

more topics than I can in these brief remarks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Your statement will be made part of the record. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Thank you, sir. 

In discussing the threats facing our country, let me say that the 

judgments I will offer are based on the efforts of thousands of patriotic, highly skilled professionals, many of whom serve in harm’s 

way. My sincere hope is that Congress and the American people 

see these men and women as the skilled professionals that they 

are, with the highest respect for our laws and values and dedicated 

to serving the Nation, with courage to seek and to speak the truth 

to the best of our abilities. 

Let me start with terrorism. I would like to highlight a few of 

the top counterterrorism successes of the last year, first to point 

out that there was no major attack, as has been noted, against the 

United States; also, there was no major attack against most of our 

European, Latin American, and East Asian allies throughout 2007. 

That was not an accident, as has been noted. 

In concert with Federal, State, and local law enforcement, our 

community helped disrupt cells plotting violent attacks. For example, last summer we and our allies unraveled terrorist plots linked 

to al Qaeda and its associates in both Denmark and in Germany. 

We were successful because we were able to identify key personalities in the planning. We worked with our European partners to 

monitor the plotters and disrupt their activities. I would note that 

one of the intended targets was a U.S. facility in Europe. 

8

In addition, our partners throughout the Middle East and elsewhere continue to aggressively attack terrorist networks involved 

in recruiting, training, and planning to strike American interests. 

Al Qaeda in Iraq suffered major setbacks last year. Hundreds of 

al Qaeda’s leadership, operational, media, financial, logistics, weapons, and foreign fighter facilitator cadre have been neutralized. In 

addition, the brutal attacks unleashed by al Qaeda in Iraq and 

other al Qaeda affiliates against Muslim civilians have tarnished 

al Qaeda’s self-styled image of the extremist vanguard. 

Are we at a tipping point? Have we witnessed the decline in this 

radical behavior? We don’t know the answer to that question, but 

because of some of the recent setbacks suffered by al Qaeda we’re 

watching this very closely. 

Nonetheless, al Qaeda remains the preeminent terrorist threat to 

the United States at home and abroad. Despite our successes, the 

group has retained or regenerated key elements of its capability, 

including top leadership, operational, middle level lieutenants, and 

de facto safe haven in Pakistan’s border area with Afghanistan, 

known as the FATA. 

Al Qaeda’s current efforts are to recruit and train operatives for 

terrorist operations spread from the Middle East to Europe and to 

the United States. 

Pakistani authorities who are our partners in this fight have 

helped us more than any other nation in counterterrorism operations, increasingly are determined in their counterterrorism performance, even during a period of heightened domestic transition 

exacerbated by the December assassination of Benazir Bhutto and 

the formation of a new government that will result from the elections on the 18th of February. 

In 2007, at least 865 Pakistani security forces and civilians were 

killed by suicide bombers. In addition, almost 500 security forces 

and civilians were killed in armed clashes, for a total of over 1,300 

people killed in Pakistan in 2007. The losses in Pakistan in 2007 

exceeded the cumulative total for all years between 2001 and 2006. 

Al Qaeda’s affiliates also pose a significant threat. Al Qaeda in 

Iraq remains al Qaeda’s central most capable affiliate. We are increasingly concerned that, even as coalition forces inflict significant 

damage on al Qaeda inside Iraq, they could deploy resources outside Iraq, and of course they remain capable of attacks inside the 

country such as suicide bombings that kill scores of people. 

Al Qaeda’s North African affiliate, al Qaeda in the Land of Islamic Magreb, based in Algeria, is active in North Africa and is expanding its target set to include U.S. and western interests. Other 

al Qaeda regional affiliates in the Levant, in the Gulf, Africa, and 

Southeast Asia maintained a lower profile in 2007, but they also 

remain capable of conducting strikes against U.S. interests. 

Let me turn to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. 

The ongoing efforts of nation-states and terrorist groups to develop 

and acquire dangerous weapons and delivery systems constitute 

the second major physical threat to our country. After conducting 

missile tests and its first nuclear detonation in 2006, North Korea 

returned to the negotiating table last year. Pyongyang has reaffirmed its September 2005 commitment to full denuclearization. 

9

They shut down the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and they’re in 

the process of disabling those facilities. 

But the North missed its December 31, deadline for a full declaration of its nuclear programs. Although Pyongyang continues to 

deny uranium enrichment programs and proliferation activities, we 

believe North Korea engages in both. We remain uncertain about 

Kim Jong Il’s commitment to full denuclearizations, as promised in 

the Six-Party Framework. 

I want to be very clear in addressing Iran’s nuclear capability, 

as you alluded to, Mr. Chairman. First, there are three parts, as 

you noted, to an effective nuclear capability: fissile material, a 

method for delivery—ballistic missiles—and then the technical design and weaponization of the warhead itself. As you noted, we assess in our recent NIE that Iran’s technical design and weapons 

warhead weaponization work was halted in 2003 along with a covert military effort for the production of fissile material. However, 

the declared uranium enrichment effort that will enable the production of fissile material continues. 

Production of fissile material is the most difficult challenge in a 

nuclear weapons program. Also, as in the past, Iran continues its 

effort to perfect ballistic missiles that can reach as far as North Africa and into Europe. The earliest possible date that Iran could 

technically be capable of producing enough fissile material for a 

weapon is late 2009, although we consider that unlikely. As the estimate makes clear, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design-related activities in response to international pressure, but is keeping 

open the option to develop nuclear weapons. 

If Iran’s nuclear weapons design program, one of the three parts 

of the overall program, has already been reactivated or will be reactivated, it will be a closely guarded state secret in an attempt to 

keep us from being aware of its true status. The Iranians have 

never admitted the secret nuclear weapons design work which they 

halted in 2003. 

Iran also remains a threat to regional stability and to U.S. interests in the Middle East. This is because of the continued support 

for violent terrorist groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and its 

efforts to undercut western actors, such as in Lebanon. Iran is pursuing policy intended to raise the political, economic, and human 

costs for any arrangement that would allow the United States to 

maintain presence and influence in the Middle East region. 

Let me turn now to a threat that hasn’t been discussed much before this committee, the cyber threat. The United States’ information infrastructure, including telecommunications and computer 

networks and systems and, most importantly, the data that reside 

on these systems, is critical to virtually every aspect of our modern 

life. Threats to our intelligence infrastructure are an important 

focus of this community. We assess that nation-states, which include of course Russia and China, long have had the technical capability to target U.S. information systems for intelligence collection. Think of it as data exploitation. Today those countries and 

others could target our information infrastructure for data degradation or data destruction. Data destruction, as opposed to data exploitation, is of increasing concern because of the potential impact 

10

on U.S. and the global economy should such perpetrators be successful. 

At the President’s direction, last spring an interagency group 

was established to review the cyber threat to the United States. It 

was also tasked to identify options for countering the threats. The 

tasking was fulfilled with the issuance of the President’s planning 

directive earlier this year. A program and budget has been submitted to Congress and this subject will be addressed in this budget cycle as we go throughout this year. 

Let me turn now to Iraq. The security situation in Iraq continues 

to show signs of improvement. Security incidents countrywide have 

declined significantly, to their lowest level since February 2006, 2 

years ago. Monthly civilian fatalities nationwide have fallen by half 

in the past year. 

However, despite these gains, a number of internal factors continue to undermine Iraqi security. Sectarian distrust is strong 

throughout the Iraqi society. Al Qaeda in Iraq remains capable of 

conducting destabilizing operations and spectacular attacks, such 

as we have seen recently, despite disruptions to their network. 

Intercommunal violence, especially in southern Iraq, has spread beyond clashes between rival militia factions. While improving significantly over the past year, the ability of the Iraqi security force 

to conduct effective independent combat operations, independent of 

coalition operations, remains limited in the present timeframe. 

Bridging differences between the competing communities and 

providing effective governance are critical to achieving a successful 

state. While slow, progress is being made. We have seen some economic gains and quality-of-life improvements for the Iraqis, but improvements in security, in governance, and the economy are not 

ends in themselves. Rather, they’re a means for building Iraqi confidence in the central government and easing the sectarian distrust. 

Let me just touch on Afghanistan. In 2007 the number of attacks 

in Afghanistan’s Taliban-dominated insurgency exceeded that of 

the previous year, in part because NATO and Afghan forces undertook many more combat operations. Efforts to improve governance 

and extend economic development, similar to Iraq, were hampered 

by a lack of security in some areas in Afghanistan and limitations 

on government capacity. 

Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily upon 

the government’s ability to improve security, deliver with effective 

government, and expand development for economic opportunity. 

The drug trade, as was mentioned, is one of Afghanistan’s greatest 

long-term challenges. The insidious effects of drug-related criminality continue to undercut the abilities of the government to assert its authority, develop strong rule of law-based systems for governance, and build the economy. The Taliban, operating in poppygrowing regions of the country, gain at least some financial support 

through their ties to the local opium traffickers. 

Let me touch briefly on China and Russia. Increases in defense 

spending have enabled the Russians to begin to reverse the deep 

deterioration in their capabilities that began before the collapse of 

the Soviet Union. However, the Russian military still faces significant challenges, for example in demographic trends and in health 

11

problems. In addition, conscription deferments erode available 

manpower and Russia’s defense industry suffers from a lack of 

skilled personnel. 

China’s military modernization program is shaped in part by the 

perception that a competent, modern military force is an essential 

element of great power status. Improvements in Chinese theaterrange missile capabilities will put U.S. forces at greater risk from 

conventional weapons. In addition, Beijing seeks to modernize China’s strategic nuclear forces to address concerns about the survivability of those systems. 

If present trends in the global development of counter-space capabilities continue, both Russia and China will have increasing 

ability to target U.S. and intelligence satellites, as well as our command and control systems. 

Let me touch on Venezuela and Cuba. The referendum on constitutional reform in Venezuela last December was a stunning setback for President Chavez. The loss may slow Chavez’s movement 

toward authoritarian rule. The referendum’s outcome has given a 

psychological boost to his opponents. However, high oil prices probably will enable Chavez to retain the support of his constituents, 

continue coopting the economic elite, and stave off the consequences of his financial mismanagement. Without question, however, Chavez’s policies and politics, those that he’s pursuing, have 

Venezuela on a path for economic ruin. 

The determination of the Cuban leadership to ignore outside pressure for reform is reinforced by the more than $1 billion net 

annual subsidy that Cuba receives from Venezuela. We assess the 

political situation probably will remain stable in Cuba during at 

least the initial months following—now that Fidel Castro has handed off power to his brother Raul. However, policy missteps or the 

mishandling of a crisis by the Cuban leadership could spark instability in Cuba, raising the risk of mass migration. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, issues I touched on and covered 

much more extensively in my statement for the record will confront 

us for the foreseeable future. The IC is fully committed to arming 

the policymakers, the warfighters, law enforcement officials, and 

Congress with the best intelligence that we can possibly provide. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak this morning. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McConnell follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY J. MICHAEL MCCONNELL

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the invitation to offer my assessment of threats to U.S. national security. 

I am pleased to be accompanied today by Lieutenant General Michael Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. 

The judgments that I will offer the committee in these documents and in my responses to your questions are based on the efforts of thousands of patriotic, highlyskilled professionals, many of whom serve in harm’s way. I am pleased to report 

that the Intelligence Community (IC) is even better than it was last year as a result 

of the continuing implementation of reforms required by the Intelligence Reform 

and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. This statement is, in part, a product of our 

moving forward with the transformation of U.S. intelligence, including more innovative and rigorous analysis and wider and more far-reaching collaboration. 

You will see from the testimony that many of the key topics I touch on are not 

traditional ‘‘national security’’ topics. Globalization has broadened the number of 

threats and challenges facing the United States. For example, as government, priVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
12

vate sector, and personal activities continue to move to networked operations and 

our digital systems add evermore capabilities, our vulnerability to penetration and 

other hostile cyber actions grows. The Nation, as we indicated last year, requires 

more from our IC than ever before and consequently we need to do our business 

better, both internally, through greater collaboration across disciplines and externally, by engaging more of the expertise available outside the IC. 

Many of the analytic judgments I present here have benefited from the increasing 

integration of collection and analysis. Our systematic effort to synchronize requirements across the national intelligence, defense, homeland security, and Federal law 

enforcement communities ensures collection assets will be better utilized and the 

collection community will be able to mount efforts to fill the gaps and needs of analysts. This more integrated community approach to analysis and collection requirements is part of the DNI’s plan to transition the IC from a federation of independent 

intelligence organization to a reintegrated enterprise; the beginning results of this 

new approach are reflected in the more nuanced and deeper analysis of the challenges and threats facing the U.S. 

Against this backdrop, I will focus my statement on the following issues:

• The continuing global terrorist threat, but also the setbacks the violent extremist networks are experiencing; 

• The significant gains in Iraqi security since this time last year have been accompanied by some recent political momentum, but significant political and economic challenges remain. 

• The continuing challenges facing us in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, where 

many of our most important interests intersect; 

• The persistent threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related proliferation:

• Despite halting progress towards denuclearization, North Korea continues to maintain nuclear weapons; 

• Despite the halt through at least mid-2007 to Iran’s nuclear weapons design and covert uranium conversion and enrichment-related work, Iran continues to pursue fissile material and nuclear-capable missile delivery systems.

• The vulnerabilities of the U.S. information infrastructure to increasing cyber 

attacks by foreign governments, nonstate actors, and criminal elements; 

• The growing foreign interest in counterspace programs that could threaten 

critical U.S. military and intelligence capabilities; 

• Issues of political stability and of national and regional conflict in Europe, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia; 

• Growing humanitarian concerns stemming from the rise in food and energy prices for poorer states; 

• Concerns about the financial capabilities of Russia, China,and OPEC 

countries and the potential use of their market access to exert financial leverage to achieve political ends. 

TERRORISM

Let me start by highlighting a few of our top successes in the past year. Most 

importantly, there was no major attack against the United States or most of our 

European, Latin American, East Asia allies and partners. This was no accident. 

Last summer, for example, with our allies, we unraveled terrorist plots linked to 

al Qaeda and its associates in Denmark and Germany. We were successful because 

we were able to identify key plotters. We worked with our European partners to 

monitor the plotters and disrupt their activities. In addition, our partners throughout the Middle East and elsewhere continued to attack aggressively terrorist networks recruiting, training, and planning to strike American interests. The death in 

January of Abu Layth al-Libi, al Qaeda’s charismatic senior military commander 

and a key link between al Qaeda and its affiliates in North Africa, is the most serious blow to the group’s top leadership since the December 2005 death of then external operations chief Hamza Rabi’a. 

AL QAEDA

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) suffered major setbacks last year, although it still is capable of mounting lethal attacks. Hundreds of AQI leadership, operational, media, financial, logistical, weapons, and foreign fighter facilitator cadre have been killed or 

captured. With much of the Sunni population turning against AQI, its maneuver 

room and ability to operate have been severely constrained. AQI’s attack tempo, as 

measured by numbers of suicide attacks, had dropped by more than half by year’s 

13

end after approaching all time highs in early 2007. We see indications that al 

Qaeda’s global image is beginning to lose some of its luster; nonetheless, we still 

face multifaceted terrorist threats. 

Al Qaeda and its terrorist affiliates continue to pose significant threats to the 

United States at home and abroad, and al Qaeda’s central leadership based in the 

border area of Pakistan is its most dangerous component. Last July, we published 

a National Intelligence Estimate titled, ‘‘The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,’’ which assessed that al Qaeda’s central leadership in the past 2 years has 

been able to regenerate the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks 

in the Homeland:

• Al Qaeda has been able to retain a safehaven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that provides the organization many of the 

advantages it once derived from its base across the border in Afghanistan, 

albeit on a smaller and less secure scale. The FATA serves as a staging 

area for al Qaeda’s attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan as well 

as a location for training new terrorist operatives, for attacks in Pakistan, 

the Middle East, Africa,Europe, and the United States. 

• Using the sanctuary in the border area of Pakistan, al Qaeda has been 

able to maintain a cadre of skilled lieutenants capable of directing the organization’s operations around the world. It has lost many of its senior operational planners over the years, but the group’s adaptable decisionmaking 

process and bench of skilled operatives have enabled it to identify effective 

replacements. 

• Al Qaeda’s top leaders Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri continue to be able to maintain al Qaeda’s unity and its focus on their strategic 

vision of confronting our allies and us with mass casualty attacks around 

the globe. Although security concerns preclude them from the day-to-day 

running of the organization, Bin Laden and Zawahiri regularly pass inspirational messages and specific operational guidance to their followers 

through public statements. 

• Al Qaeda is improving the last key aspect of its ability to attack the U.S.: 

the identification, training, and positioning of operatives for an attack in 

the Homeland. While increased security measures at home and abroad have 

caused al Qaeda to view the west, especially the U.S., as a harder target, 

we have seen an influx of new western recruits into the tribal areas since 

mid-2006.

We assess that al Qaeda’s homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on 

prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass 

casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or 

fear among the population. 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR THREAT FROM AL QAEDA

We judge use of a conventional explosive to be the most probable al Qaeda attack 

scenario because the group is proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and is innovative in creating capabilities and overcoming security obstacles. That said, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups are attempting to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials. We assess al Qaeda will continue to try to acquire and employ these weapons and materials; some chemical and radiological materials and crude weapons designs are easily accessible, in our judgment. 

AL QAEDA AFFILIATES

Al Qaeda’s affiliates from Africa to Southeast Asia also pose a significant terrorist 

threat. I will discuss the success we are having against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as 

part of the larger discussion of the IC’s analysis of the Iraq situation, but here I 

would like to highlight that AQI remains al Qaeda’s most visible and capable affiliate. I am increasingly concerned that as we inflict significant damage on al Qaeda 

in Iraq, it may shift resources to mounting more attacks outside of Iraq. 

Although the ongoing conflict in Iraq will likely absorb most of AQI’s resources 

over the next year, AQI has leveraged its broad external networks including some 

reaching into Europe—in support of external operations. It probably will continue 

to devote some effort towards honoring Bin Ladin’s request in 2005 that AQI attempt to strike the United States, affirmed publicly by current AQI leader Abu 

Ayyub al-Masri in a November 2006 threat against the White House.

14

• AQI tactics, tradecraft, and techniques are transmitted on the Internet, 

but AQI documents captured in Iraq suggest that fewer than 100 AQI terrorists have moved from Iraq to establish cells in other countries.

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

Al Qaeda’s other robust affiliate, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM), is the most active terrorist group in northwestern Africa. We assess it represents a significant threat to U.S. and European interests in the region. AQIM has 

continued to focus primarily on Algerian Government targets, but since its merger 

with al Qaeda in September 2006, the group has expanded its target set to include 

U.S., U.N., and other interests. AQIM likely got a further boost when the al Qaeda 

central leadership announced last November that the Libyan Islamic Fighting 

Group united with al Qaeda under AQIM’s leadership. Two simultaneous suicide car 

bomb attacks in Algiers in December killed nearly 70 people and marked AQIM’s 

highest profile act of violence to date. Improvements in AQIM’s use of IEDs suggest 

the group is acquiring knowledge transmitted from extremists in Iraq. 

AQIM traditionally has operated in Algeria and northern Mali and has recruited 

and trained an unknown, but probably small, number of extremists from Tunisia, 

Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Libya, and other countries. Although the degree of 

control that AQIM maintains over former trainees is unclear, the IC assesses some 

of these trainees may have returned to their home countries to plot attacks against 

local and western interests. 

Other Affiliates Worldwide 

Other al Qaeda regional affiliates kept a lower profile in 2007, but we judge that 

they remain capable of conducting attacks against U.S. interests. al Qaeda is active 

on the Arabian Peninsula and presents a long-term threat to both western and host 

nation interests there, particularly in Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Yemen. In 2007, 

Saudi authorities detained over 400 extremists, highlighting both the threat and the 

Kingdom’s commitment to combating it. We judge al Qaeda will continue to attempt 

attacks in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab 

Emirates, and Bahrain. 

The IC assesses al Qaeda-associated groups and networks in Lebanon pose a 

growing threat to western interests in the Levant. In East Africa, the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia disrupted al Qaeda in East Africa (AQEA) operations and activities, but senior AQEA operatives responsible for the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings 

and the 2002 attacks in Mombassa, Kenya, remain at large. The IC assesses 

Jemaah Islamiya in Indonesia and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines—which 

have historic links to al Qaeda and have killed over 400 people are the two terrorist 

groups posing the greatest threat to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. The IC assesses that Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and other Kashmir-focused groups 

will continue attack planning and execution in India. Shia and Hindu religious observances are possible targets, as are transportation networks and government 

buildings. We judge Kashmir-focused groups will continue to support the attacks in 

Afghanistan, and operatives trained by the groups will continue to feature in al 

Qaeda transnational attack planning. 

BUT AL QAEDA’S REPUTATION IS DIMMING

The brutal attacks against Muslim civilians unleashed by AQI and AQIM and the 

conflicting demands of the various extremist agendas are tarnishing al Qaeda’s selfstyled image as the extremist vanguard. Over the past year, a number of religious 

leaders and fellow extremists who once had significant influence with al Qaeda have 

publicly criticized it and its affiliates for the use of violent tactics.

• Osama Bin Laden’s public statement about Iraq in October—in which he 

admitted that AQI made mistakes and urged it to reconcile with other Iraqi 

insurgent groups provoked controversy on extremist Internet discussion forums. Likewise, deputy al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri has been criticized by supporters for perceived contradictions in his public statements 

about HAMAS and softness toward Iran and the Shia. 

HIZBALLAH

The IC assesses that the 12 February death of Hizballah Jihad Council Chief 

Imad Mughniyah—who oversaw all Hizballah military, security, and terrorist operations will prompt retaliation against Israeli and potentially Jewish and U.S. interests. Hizballah has publicly blamed Israel for the operation but said that other ‘‘arrogant powers,’’ probably a reference to the United States, had sought to kill 

15

Mughniyah. Hizballah has the ability to attack almost worldwide with little warning. 

THE ‘‘HOMEGROWN’’ THREAT

Over the next year, attacks by ‘‘homegrown’’ extremists inspired by militant Islamic ideology but without operational direction from al Qaeda will remain a threat 

to the United States or against U.S. interests overseas. The spread of radical Salafi 

Internet sites that provide religious justification for attacks, increasingly aggressive 

and violent anti-Western rhetoric and actions by local groups, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in western countries that identify with violent 

Salafi objectives, all suggest growth of a radical and violent segment among the 

West’s Muslim populations.Our European allies regularly tell us that they are uncovering new extremist networks in their countries. 

While the threat from such homegrown extremists is greater in Europe, the U.S. 

is not immune. The threat here is likely to be fueled in part by propaganda and 

mischaracterizations of U.S. foreign policy as harmful to Muslims, rather than by 

any formal assistance from al Qaeda or other recognized groups. The al Qaeda-propagated narrative of an ‘‘us versus them’’ struggle serves both as a platform and a 

potential catalyst for radicalization of Muslims alienated from the mainstream U.S. 

population. 

A small, but growing portion of al Qaeda propaganda, is in English and is distributed to an American audience—either in translated form or directly by Englishspeaking al Qaeda members like Adam Gadahn, the American member of al Qaeida 

who, in early-January, publicly urged Muslims to use violence to protest the President’s Middle East trip. Bin Laden’s September 2007 ‘‘message to the American people’’ and Zawahiri’s May 2007 interview include specific U.S. cultural and historical 

references almost certainly meant to strike a chord with disaffected U.S. listeners. 

Disrupted plotting over the past 14 months in New Jersey and Illinois highlights 

the diverse threat posed by Homeland-based radical Muslims inspired by extremist 

ideology. A group of European and Arab Muslim immigrants arrested last May for 

planning to attack Fort Dix, NJ, used a groupmember’s familiarity with the U.S. 

Army base to determine their target. In Illinois, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) arrested U.S. Muslim convert Derrick Shareef in December 2006 as he attempted to obtain weapons for a self-planned, self-executed terrorist attack against 

a shopping mall in Rockford. 

To date, cells detected in the United States have lacked the level of sophistication, 

experience, and access to resources of terrorist cells overseas. Their efforts, when 

disrupted, largely have been in the nascent phase, and authorities often were able 

to take advantage of poor operational tradecraft. However, the growing use of the 

internet to identify and connect with networks throughout the world offers opportunities to build relationships and gain expertise that previously were available only 

in overseas training camps. It is likely that such independent groups will use information on destructive tactics available on the Internet to boost their own capabilities. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION PROLIFERATION: KEY STATES OF CONCERN

In addition to terrorism, the ongoing efforts of nation-states and terrorists to develop and/or acquire dangerous weapons and delivery systems constitute major 

threats to the safety of our Nation, our deployed troops, and our friends. We are 

most concerned about the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. We 

also are concerned about the threat from biological and chemical agents. 

WMD use by most nation states is traditionally constrained by the logic of deterrence and by diplomacy, but these constraints may be of less utility in preventing 

the use of mass-effect weapons by terrorist groups. The time when only a few states 

had access to the most dangerous technologies has been over for many years. Technologies, often dual-use, circulate easily in our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design and use them. The IC works with other elements of 

the U.S. Government on the safeguarding and security of nuclear weapons and 

fissile material, pathogens, and chemical weapons in select countries. 

We assess that some of the countries that are still pursuing WMD programs will 

continue to try to improve their capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the 

next decade. We also are focused on the potential acquisition of nuclear, chemical, 

and/or biological weapons—or the production technologies and materials necessary 

to produce them—by states that do not now have such programs, by terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda, insurgents in Iraq, and by criminal organizations, acting 

alone or via middlemen. We also are concerned about rogue or criminal elements 

16

willing to supply materials and technology—alone or with a network—without their 

government’s knowledge. 

We are especially concerned about the potential for terrorists to gain access to 

WMD-related materials or technology. Many countries in the international community share these concerns. Therefore we are working closely with other elements of 

the U.S. Government to enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapons and 

fissile material and the detection of WMD materials. 

IRAN’S AND NORTH KOREA’S WMD AND MISSILE PROGRAMS

The Iranian and North Korean regimes flout U.N. Security Council restrictions 

on their nuclear programs. 

Over the past year we have gained important new insights into Tehran’s activities 

related to nuclear weapons and the community recently published a National Intelligence Estimate on Iranian intent and capabilities in this area. I want to be very 

clear in addressing the Iranian nuclear capability. First, there are three parts to an 

effective nuclear weapons capability:

1. Production of fissile material 

2. Effective means for weapons delivery 

3. Design and weaponization of the warhead itself

We assess in our recent National Intelligence Estimates on this subject that warhead design and weaponization were halted, along with covert military uranium 

conversion- and enrichment-related activities. Declared uranium enrichment efforts, 

which will enable the production of fissile material, continue. This is the most difficult challenge in nuclear production. Iran’s efforts to perfect ballistic missiles that 

can reach North Africa and Europe also continue. 

We remain concerned about Iran’s intentions and assess with moderate-to-high 

confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear 

weapons. We have high confidence that Iranian military entities were working 

under government direction to develop nuclear weapons until fall 2003. Also, Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could 

be applied to producing nuclear weapons. Iran continues its efforts to develop uranium enrichment technology, which can be used both for power reactor fuel and to 

produce nuclear weapons. As noted, Iran continues to deploy ballistic missiles inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and to develop longer-range missiles. 

We also assess with high confidence that even after fall 2003 Iran has conducted 

research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons. 

We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities, as well as its covert military uranium conversion and enrichment-related activities, for at least several years. Because of intelligence gaps, Department of Energy and the NIC assess with only moderate confidence that all such activities were halted. We assess with moderate confidence 

that Tehran had not restarted these activities as of mid-2007, but since they comprised an unannounced secret effort that Iran attempted to hide, we do not know 

if these activities have been restarted. 

We judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response 

to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s 

previously undeclared nuclear work. This indicates that Iran may be more susceptible to influence on the issue than we judged previously. 

We do not have sufficient intelligence information to judge confidently whether 

Tehran is willing to maintain the halt of its nuclear weapons design and 

weaponization activities indefinitely while it weighs its options, or whether it will 

or already has set specific deadlines or criteria that will prompt it to restart those 

activities. We assess with high confidence that Iran has the scientific, technical, and 

industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons. In our judgment, only an 

Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly 

keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons and such a decision is inherently reversible. I note again that two activities relevant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: uranium enrichment that will enable the production of fissile material and development of long-range ballistic missile systems. 

We assess with moderate confidence that convincing the Iranian leadership to 

forgo the eventual development of nuclear weapons will be difficult given the linkage many within the leadership see between nuclear weapons development and 

Iran’s key national security and foreign policy objectives, and given Iran’s considerable effort from at least the late 1980s to 2003 to develop such weapons. 

We continue to assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon. We continue to assess with low confidence that Iran 

17

probably has imported at least some weapons-usable fissile material, but still judge 

with moderate-to-high confidence it has not obtained enough for a nuclear weapon. 

We cannot rule out that Iran has acquired from abroad—or will acquire in the future—a nuclear weapon or enough fissile material for a weapon. Barring such acquisitions, if Iran wants to have nuclear weapons it would need to produce sufficient 

amounts of fissile material indigenously—which we judge with high confidence it 

has not yet done. 

Iran resumed its declared centrifuge enrichment activities in January 2006, despite the 2003 halt in its nuclear weapons design and weaponization activities. Iran 

made significant progress in 2007 installing centrifuges at Natanz, but we judge 

with moderate confidence it still faces significant technical problems operating 

them.

• We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran 

would be technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) for weapon is late 2009, but that is very unlikely. 

• We judge with moderate confidence Iran probably would be technically 

capable of producing enough HEU for a weapon sometime during the 2010–

2015 timeframe. INR judges Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013 because of foreseeable technical and programmatic problems. All 

agencies recognize the possibility that this capability may not be attained 

until after 2015.

We know that Tehran had a chemical warfare program prior to 1997, when it declared elements of its program. We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities 

intended to produce CW agent in times of need and conducts research that may 

have offensive applications. We assess Iran maintains a capability to weaponize CW 

agents in a variety of delivery systems. 

We assess that Iran has previously conducted offensive BW agent research and 

development. Iran continues to seek dual-use technologies that could be used for biological warfare. 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile programs threaten to destabilize a region that has known many great power conflicts and comprises some of the world’s 

largest economies. North Korea has already sold ballistic missiles to several Middle 

Eastern countries and to Iran. We remain concerned North Korea could proliferate 

nuclear weapons abroad. 

While North Korea’s military almost certainly could not defeat South Korea, it 

could inflict hundreds of thousands of casualties and severe damage on the South. 

Missile delivery systems, including several hundred deployed Scud and NoDong missiles, which were flight-tested in July 2006, add to the threat to South Korea and 

extend it to Japan, including to U.S. bases in both those countries. The north’s October 2006 nuclear test supports our previous assessment that it had produced nuclear weapons. The test produced a nuclear yield of less than one kiloton, well below 

the yield of most states’ first nuclear tests. Prior to the test, North Korea produced 

enough plutonium for at least a half dozen nuclear weapons. 

The IC continues to assess that North Korea has pursued a uranium enrichment 

capability at least in the past, and judges with at least moderate confidence that 

the effort continues today. 

Pyongyang probably views its capabilities as being more for deterrence and coercive diplomacy than for warfighting and would consider using nuclear weapons only 

under certain narrow circumstances. We also assess that Pyongyang probably would 

not attempt to use nuclear weapons against U.S. forces or territory unless it perceived the regime to be on the verge of military defeat and risked an irretrievable 

loss of control.

• We assess that North Korea’s Taepo Dong-2, which failed in its flight-test 

in July 2006, probably has the potential capability to deliver a nuclearweapon-sized payload to the continental United States. But we assess the 

likelihood of successful delivery would be low absent successful testing. 

NORTH KOREA AND SIX-PARTY TALKS

North Korea conducted missile tests and its first nuclear detonation in October 

2006. Since returning to the negotiating table last year, Pyongyang has reaffirmed 

its September 2005 commitment in principle to full denuclearization, shut down its 

nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and begun the process of disabling those facilities. 

But the North missed a 31 December deadline for a full declaration of its nuclear 

programs, as had been agreed to last October. The regime appears stable, but persistent economic privation and natural disasters such as the severe floods last August—and uncertainty about succession arrangements create the potential for domestic unrest with unpredictable consequences. 

18

NUCLEAR AND COMPETITORA INDIA AND PAKISTAN

In assessing the nuclear competition between India and Pakistan, we note that 

missile tests and new force deployments over the past 3 years have not affected the 

ongoing political dialogue. Although both New Delhi and Islamabad are fielding a 

more mature strategic nuclear capability, they do not appear to be engaged in a 

Cold War-style arms race for numerical superiority. 

PAKISTAN NUCLEAR SECURITY

We judge the ongoing political transition in Pakistan has not seriously threatened 

the military’s control of the nuclear arsenal, but vulnerabilities exist. The Pakistan 

Army oversees nuclear programs, including security responsibilities, and we judge 

that the Army’s management of nuclear policy issues—to include physical security—

has not been degraded by Pakistan’s political crisis. 

THE CYBER THREAT

The U.S. information infrastructure—including telecommunications and computer 

networks and systems, and the data that reside on them is critical to virtually every 

aspect of modern life. Therefore, threats to our IT infrastructure are an important 

focus of the IC. As government, private sector, and personal activities continue to 

move to networked operations, as our digital systems add .evermore capabilities, as 

wireless systems become even more ubiquitous, and as the design, manufacture, and 

service of information technology has moved overseas, our vulnerabilities will continue to grow. 

STATE AND NON-STATE CYBER CAPABILITIES

Our information infrastructure—including the internet,telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries increasingly is being targeted for exploitation and potentially for disruption or 

destruction, by a growing array of state and non-state adversaries. Over the past 

year, cyber exploitation activity has grown more sophisticated, more targeted, and 

more serious. The IC expects these trends to continue in the coming year. 

We assess that nations, including Russia and China, have the technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the U.S. information infrastructure and for 

intelligence collection.Nation states and criminals target our government and private sector information networks to gain competitive advantage in the commercial 

sector. Terrorist groups—including al Qaeda, HAMAS, and Hizballah have expressed the desire to use cyber means to target the United States. Criminal elements continue to show growing sophistication in technical capability and targeting, 

and today operate a pervasive, mature on-line service economy in illicit cyber capabilities and services available to anyone willing to pay. 

Each of these actors has different levels of skill and different intentions; therefore, 

we must develop flexible capabilities to counter each. It is no longer sufficient for 

the U.S. Government to discover cyber intrusions in its networks, cleanup the damage, and take legal or political steps to deter further intrusions. We must take 

proactive measures to detect and prevent intrusions from whatever source, as they 

happen, and before they can do significant damage. 

At the President’s direction, an interagency group reviewed the cyberthreat to the 

U.S. and identified options regarding how best to integrate U.S. Government defensive cyber capabilities; how best to optimize, coordinate and de-conflict cyber activities; and how to better employ cyber resources to maximize performance. This 

tasking was fulfilled with the January 2008 issuance of NSPD–54/HSPD–23, which 

directs a comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative. These actions will help to 

deter hostile action in cyber space by making it harder to penetrate our networks. 

AFGHANISTAN

In 2007 the number of attacks in Afghanistan’s Taliban-dominated insurgency exceeded that of the previous year, in part because NATO and Afghan forces undertook many more offensive operations. Efforts to improve governance and extend development were hampered by a lack of security in some areas and a general lack 

of government capacity and competency. The ability of the Karzai government, 

NATO, and the United States to defeat the Taliban will determine the continued 

support of the Afghan people for the government and the international community. 

Afghan leaders also must deal with endemic corruption and pervasive poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily 

on the government’s ability to improve security, deliver services, and expand development for economic opportunity. 

19

SECURITY DETERIORATION IN THE SOUTH

Although international forces and the Afghan National Army continue to score 

tactical victories over the Taliban, the security situation has deteriorated in some 

areas in the south,and Taliban forces have expanded their operations into previously peaceful areas of the west and around Kabul. The Taliban-dominated insurgency has expanded in scope despite operational disruption caused by International 

Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom operations. The death 

or capture of three top Taliban leaders last year—their first high level losses—does 

not yet appear to have significantly disrupted insurgent operations. 

Continued progress has been made in expanding and fielding the Afghan National 

Army, which as of the end of 2007 reported attaining 70 percent of its authorized 

70,000 end strength. While this is an improvement, the shortage of international 

trainers in the field, high operational tempo, attrition, and absenteeism hamper efforts to make units capable of significant independent action. The Afghan National 

Police has approximately 90 percent of its authorized 82,000 end strength. While the 

National Police may have more forces throughout Afghanistan, corruption, insufficient training and equipment, and absenteeism hamper their effectiveness. 

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY AND CAPACITY

Kabul in 2008 must work closely with the national legislature, as well as provincial and tribal leaders, to establish and extend the capacity of the central government. The country faces a chronic shortage of resources and of qualified and motivated government officials at the national and local level. 

The drug trade is one of the greatest long-term challenges facing Afghanistan. 

The insidious effects of drug-related criminality continue to undercut the government’s ability to assert its authority, to develop a strong, rule-of-law based system, 

and to rebuild the economy. Despite improved eradication and investigative efforts, 

poppy cultivation increased again last year. Opium poppy cultivation remains at or 

near 2004 record levels with over 200,000 hectares of land under cultivation in 

2007. 

Both law enforcement and judicial capacity—although somewhat improved—remain limited, and Kabul remains constrained in its ability to deploy programs at 

the provincial and local levels. For farmers, opium poppy cultivation remains significantly more lucrative than wheat and other crops. The United Nations estimated 

the total farm-gate value of opium production in 2007 at $1 billion, with Helm and 

Province producing just over half of this total. The Taliban and other insurgent 

groups operating in poppy-growing regions gain at least some of financial support 

as a result of their ties to local opium traffickers. Drug money is an important 

source of income, especially at the local level where some Taliban commanders accrue their own operational funding. 

IRAQ: TANGIBLE GAINS IN SECURITY

The security situation in Iraq continues to show signs of improvement. According 

to Multinational Force-Iraq, as of the end of 2007, security incidents countrywide 

and in the 10 Baghdad Security Districts have declined to their lowest levels since 

the February 2006 Samarra Golden Mosque bombing; civilian violence has declined 

to pre-Samarra levels; and monthly civilian fatalities nationwide have fallen by over 

half in the past year. We judge these security gains are the result of a combination 

of factors, including the success of tribal efforts in combating AQI, expanded Coalition operations, and the growing capabilities of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).

• We judge that organized tribal resistance to AQI—aided by expanded Coalition operations—has reduced AQI’s operational capabilities. Concurrently, decisions by major elements of the Sunni insurgency to work with 

the Coalition this year have weakened the insurgency by reducing the number of Sunnis involved in violent resistance. 

• Many tribal members and former insurgents have joined ‘‘Concerned 

Local Citizen’’ groups or ‘‘tribal awakening’’ movements that are cooperating with the coalition and Iraqi Government. Some groups have indicated 

a desire to move beyond providing security. They now want to promote economic development and become political movements. They also are endorsing the legitimacy of elections and political bargaining to effect change at 

the provincial and national levels of government. 

• A steady decline in suicide attacks—the majority of which we judge are 

conducted by foreign terrorists indicates that coalition disruptions of AQI’s 

foreign terrorists have eroded AQI’s capability to mount suicide operations. 

20

• The ISF effectively deployed forces to Baghdad in support of Operation 

Fardh al-Qanun this spring and, most recently, to Al Basrah and Ad 

Diwaniyah. While showing dramatic improvements, the ISF currently needs 

the Coalition for planning, supporting, and executing sustained operations. 

BUT SECURITY CHALLENGES REMAIN

Despite these gains, a number of internal factors continue to undermine Iraq’s security. Sectarian distrust is still strong throughout Iraqi society, and AQI remains 

capable of conducting destabilizing operations and spectacular attacks despite disruptions of its networks. AQI remains a potent force and the most active and capable of the Sunni extremist groups fighting coalition and Iraqi Government forces in 

Iraq. Also, since last August, intra-communal violence in southern Iraq has spread 

beyond rival militia factions as Shia groups compete for advantage. 

Many Sunnis who participate in local security initiatives retain a hostile attitude 

toward Shia parties that dominate the government, and some Shia leaders still view 

many anti-AQI Sunni groups as thinly disguised insurgents who are plotting to reverse the political process that brought the Shia to power. 

Security in southern Iraq probably will remain fragile in the coming months as 

rival Shia groups continue to compete violently for political power and economic resources. In Al Basrah, security remains tenuous. Security also is a problem in northern Iraq. Violence has increased in Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city, as both Sunni 

resistance elements and AQI increasingly focus their activities in the area. The Iraqi 

Government will have to address Sunni Arab concerns over representation on the 

provincial councils, defeat AQI and the insurgents, and address Kurdish expansionism to improve security in northern Iraq. 

A number of factors continue to challenge the ISF’s ability to conduct effective operations independent of Coalition forces.While improving significantly over the past 

year, ISF units remain hindered by shortages of personnel—especially trained leaders—and many units still rely on the Coalition for logistics support. Lastly, the return of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons to their former homes and 

neighborhoods as security improves could increase ethnosectarian tensions in mixed 

communities and create an additional strain on the Iraqi Government’s ability to 

provide security and basic services to the general population. 

NEIGHBORS, FOREIGN FIGHTERS FURTHER CHALLENGE SECURITY

Efforts by some of Iraq’s neighbors to exert influence in Iraq also endanger Iraq’s 

security. Iran primarily through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods 

Force—continues to provide weapons, funding, and training support to certain Iraqi 

Shia militants despite reported commitments by senior Iranian officials to stop such 

support. Iran’s provision of lethal aid to Iraqi Shia militants is designed to increase 

Tehran’s influence over Iraq as well as ensure the United States suffers setbacks. 

Approximately 90 percent of all suicide attacks in Iraq are conducted by foreign 

terrorists with 50 to 80 foreign terrorists entering Iraq each month, although that 

number appeared to decline in the last part of 2007. Seventy to 80 percent of the 

foreign terrorists gain final entry into Iraq through Syria, many through the Damascus international airport. 

Syrian internal security operations have contributed to the reduction in the effectiveness of AQI’s Syria-based foreign terrorist facilitation networks and in the number of foreign terrorists entering Iraq; nevertheless, Syria remains the primary transit hub for Iraq-bound terrorists. 

POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE: CRITICAL COMPONENTS TO IRAQ’S SECURITY

Improved security is a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilize Iraq. 

Bridging differences among competing factions and communities and providing effective governance are critical for achieving a successful state, but moving ahead on 

that road has been tough for Iraq. 

Prime Minister Maliki’s government had only limited success in delivering government services and improving the quality of life for Iraqis. Despite the beginning of 

a return of Iraqis who had fled because of violence, the political gaps between Iraqi 

communities, particularly the Arab Sunni and Shia, remain deep. 

Against this backdrop, Baghdad has managed to demonstrate forward momentum 

on key legislation. Since August, Iraqi political leaders have overcome months of 

contentious debate to pass key legislation because of strong U.S. pressure and a desire on the part of Iraqi political parties to show momentum. The Council of Representatives in the past 2 months has passed a pensions law, de-Baathification reform, a provincial powers law, and an amnesty law. 

21

Baghdad continues to struggle to enact key legislation in two areas critical for political progress: hydrocarbons and provincial elections. Provincial elections must 

take place before October, according to the provincial powers law, but could face 

delays if legislative and bureaucratic issues are not resolved by the end of March. 

Negotiations on hydrocarbon laws continue to be stalled by disagreements between 

the central government and the Kurds over control of resources and revenue sharing. Progress also has been mixed on resolving outstanding constitutional reform 

issues and preparing to hold provincial elections. 

Gains on the economic front have improved the quality of life for Iraqis. Improved 

security has contributed to an increase in oil output from northern Iraq. The government also improved its performance last year in executing its budget, and the rate 

of inflation declined to 4.7 percent in December 2007 after hovering around 50 percent for most of 2006. 

Legislation and improvements in governance and the economy are not in themselves ends; rather they are critical means for restoring Iraqi confidence in the central government and for easing sectarian distrust, which are the greatest requirements for enabling reconciliation. 

TURKEY

The Marxist inspired KGK maintains approximately 3,000–3,500 guerrilla fighters in its northern Iraqi camps, about 1,000–2,000 fighters inside Turkey, and several hundred in Iran and Syria and wants to establish a greater Kurdistan. The 

group has maintained a high-level of violence in Turkey a few months each year 

since it ended its 5-year old unilateral cease fire in 2004. 

Although the KGK has not previously targeted U.S. interests, the risk of retaliatory attacks against U.S. interests in Turkey and Iraq could grow. 

IRAN

During the next year Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iran’s various conservative factions, despite some differences and in fighting, are expected to maintain 

control over apolitically stable if economically troubled Iranian state. However, recent public feuding between government factions over President Ahmadi-Nejad’s 

handling of foreign and domestic policy issues specifically the nuclear issue and the 

economy—probably is making it more difficult for Khameneito avoid taking sides. 

The political discord probably has intensified as a result of international pressure, 

and as each side tries to position itself in advance of the Majles elections in March.

• Expediency Council Chairman Rafsanjani in November called on the government to take the latest sanctions seriously, according to press. 

• Ahmadi-Nejad publicly has responded by calling his critics’’traitors’’ and 

threatened to publicly reveal their identities. 

• In December, Rafsanjani publicly attacked Ahmadi-Nejad,likening the 

President’s economic policies to those of the Shah an extremely unusual 

and pointed critique. 

• Iran is on its soundest financial footing since the revolution with record 

high oil export revenue boosting foreign exchange Reserves to more than 

$70 billion. Despite the positive financial outlook, Iran’s economy is plagued 

by the twin problems of high inflation and unemployment, which are Iranians’ top complaints. Ahmadi-Nejad’s populist policies have reduced unemployment marginally, but at the expense of rising inflation, which his political rivals might try to exploit in the upcoming Majles elections.

Iran remains a threat to regional stability and U.S. interests in the Middle East 

because of its continued support for violent groups, such as HAMAS and Hizballah, 

and efforts to undercut pro-Western actors, for example in Lebanon. Tehran’s leadership seeks to preserve Iran’s Islamic revolutionary government, sovereignty, stability, and territorial integrity while expanding Iran’s influence and leadership in 

the region and the Islamic world. 

Iran also is enhancing its ability to project its military power primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power—with the ultimate goal of dominating the Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries. It seeks a capacity to disrupt Gulf shipping, especially in the Strait of Hormuz, and thus the operations and reinforcement 

of U.S. forces in the region potentially intimidating regional allies into withholding 

support for U.S. policy. Iran’s growing inventory of ballistic and anti-ship cruise 

missiles is a key element in its efforts to assert its influence. 

Iranian leadership perceptions of a favorable environment are driving its foreign 

policy to expand Tehran’s influence and leadership in the region and the Islamic 

world and to undermine U.S. influence, which it perceives as inimical to Iran’s clerical regime. To achieve its regional aims and mitigate threats, Iran seeks to develop 

22

a sphere of influence based on diplomatic and economic relations, religious affinities, 

and shared anti-U.S. sentiments. While Tehran seeks better relationships with Shia 

populations worldwide, it continues to be especially strident in denying Israel’s right 

to exist. 

Whether courting other governments or Muslim citizens, Iranian leaders seek political allies and economic partners as well as religious converts. Moreover, Tehran 

probably judges that local surrogates—usually Shia allies or proxies cultivated over 

many years—can promote Iran’s interests. 

In Afghanistan, Iran likely will continue to focus on political activities, reaching 

out to alternative power centers, and challenging the U.S.-led Coalition. Iranian officials probably will increase contact with various militias, political oppositionists, 

and religious leaders in Afghanistan and continue to provide lethal aid to groups 

and individuals who might be able to influence events in Iran’s favor should the 

Karzai government falter or turn against Iran. We assess Iran has provided weapons to some Taliban commanders. NATO forces last September interdicted a vehicle 

convoy from Iran that contained weapons, including advanced IEDs, destined for the 

Taliban.

• In the Levant, Iranian security concerns, particularly vis-a-vis Israel and 

the United States, and ambitions to become adominant regional player, loyalty to allies, and concern for Lebanese Shia probably are driving Tehran’s 

relations with Syria, Hizballah, and other regional groups. Over the longer 

term, differences in Iranian and Syrian goals could limit their cooperation, 

but barring significant changes in threat perceptions by either Syria or 

Iran—Tehran probably will continue providing military support to Syria. 

• In Lebanon, Tehran seeks to build Iran’s and Hizballah’s influence to the 

detriment of other Lebanese communities and U.S. and Israeli interests. To 

enhance its role as the leader of resistance to Israel, Iran will increase its 

support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including HAMAS. 

PAKISTAN

Pakistan is a critical partner in U.S. counterterrorism efforts,but continues to face 

an array of challenges complicating its effectiveness against al Qaeda and other radical Islamic elements operating in the country. These challenges include coping with 

an unparalleled level of suicide attacks ordered by Pakistan-based militants, many 

of whom are allied with al-Qaeda. At least 865 security forces and civilians were 

killed by suicide bombings and IEDs in 2007. Four hundred ninety-six security 

forces and civilians also were killed in armed clashes in 2007 to make a total of 

1,360 killed in 2007. Total casualties in 2007 including the number of injured security forces and civilians exceeded the cumulative total for all years between 2001 

and 2006. 

Pakistan is establishing a new modus vivendi among the Army, President 

Musharraf, and elected civilian leaders now that Musharraf has stepped down as 

Army chief. These civilians, including the leaders of the Pakistan People’s Party 

Parliamentarians (PPPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML–N) who 

captured the largest vote shares on the parliamentary and provincial elections on 

18 February, will seek some influence over the country’s counterterrorism policies 

and cooperation with the United States. Pakistani authorities are increasingly determined to strengthen their counterterrorism performance, even during a period of 

heightened political tension that we expect to continue over the next year. 

Radical elements in Pakistan have the potential to undermine the country’s cohesiveness. The terrorist assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto could 

embolden Pashtun militants, increasing their confidence that they can strike the 

Pakistani establishment anywhere in the country. 

Over the long-term, the killing of Bhutto weakens the political party in Pakistan 

with the broadest national reach and most secular orientation, the PPPP. However, 

sympathetic voters gave the party the largest number of Assembly seats in the recently held elections. The PPPP now must craft a coalition government with other 

parties, some of which, like the PML–N, have signaled more confrontational stances 

toward president Musharraf than has the PPPP. 

The Pakistani government’s current plans will require intensified and sustained 

efforts to orchestrate the administrative, economic, educational, legal, and social reforms required to defeat Islamic extremism and militancy. Pakistan’s law and order 

problems arising from tribal and religious militancy can be effectively addressed in 

the long-term only if police and paramilitary forces can more reliably provide justice 

and border security. All of these administrative reforms require effective political 

leadership focused on improving the capabilities of Pakistani institutions for effective governance and development of economic opportunity. 

23

SYRIA

The regime in Damascus continues to undermine Lebanon’s sovereignty and security through its proxies; to harbor and support terrorists and terrorist organizations 

opposed to progress on peace talks; and to allow terrorists and criminals to cross 

its borders into Iraq and Lebanon. As I noted previously, Syria’s efforts to stop the 

flow of foreign fighters through Syria into Iraq has improved in recent months but 

is uneven over the past year. 

Since the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005, eight additional political leaders 

or officials have been killed in Lebanon in an effort to intimidate 14 March Coalition 

figures and alter the political balance in the Lebanese legislature. The Syrian regime, Hizballah, and pro-Syrian opposition elements in Lebanon have attempted to 

stymie international efforts to bring to justice those responsible for the Hariri assassination and disarm militia groups which constitute a challenge to Lebanese security and sovereignty. We anticipate that Syria and its supporters will continue to 

manipulate political developments in Lebanon through violence, intimidation, and 

refusal to work within constitutional parameters. 

Syria continues its support of Hizballah as that group seeks to rearm against 

Israel and advance its political agenda in Lebanon at the expense of the legitimate 

government. Damascus continues to support Palestinian rejectionist groups, including HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the Popular front for the Liberation 

of Palestine-General Command. These organizations continue to base their external 

leadership in Syria, and despite repeated demands from the international community, Syria refuses to expel them or their leaders from their safe-haven in Damascus. 

LEBANON

In Lebanon, international efforts, to ensure free, fair, and constitutional presidential elections, have been impeded by destabilizing actions of Syria, Iran, and 

their Lebanese proxies. 

Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) Commander Michel Sulayman has emerged as the 

prospective consensus candidate to become the country’s next president; but 

Hizballah and the other pro-Syrian opposition parties insist on further concessions 

from the ruling Coalition before agreeing on the compromise. Even if the presidency 

is decided peacefully, issues such as the formation of the new government, naming 

of a prime minister, and the prospects for a U.N. tribunal investigating the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri will be contentious.

• Since November 2006, a Minister, a deputy chief of the LAF, and several 

pro-government legislators have been killed in a campaign of intimidation 

deepening fear among the Lebanese people that Syria, Iran, and their Lebanese cohorts will prevent Lebanon from asserting their political and economic independence. 

• The pro-Syrian opposition has interfered with the government’s implementation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. In violation of UNSC Resolution 1701, weapons and fighters continue to flow across Lebanon’s borders 

to Hizballah and other terrorist organizations. 

In southern Lebanon more than 13,000 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 

(UNIFIL) peacekeepers and the LAFs patrol Hizballah’s stronghold. As recently as 

January, militants launched rockets into northern Israel from inside the UNIFIL 

zone and a roadside bomb killed six peacekeepers last June. Many former militias 

in Lebanon are reconstituting, rearming, and retraining their fighters. The increased political and sectarian tension also raises the potential for civil war within 

the country. Lastly, militant groups, some associated with al Qaeda, continue to 

threaten Lebanese internal security. 

PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Despite progress toward initiating formal peace talks made in Annapolis last November, concern persists over the Palestinian Authority’s ability to deliver the security demanded by Israel and to win popular support for its positions. President 

Abbas and other moderates remain vulnerable to actions by HAMAS and other 

groups aimed at subverting an agreement. The intra-Palestinian schism between 

Abbas and HAMAS has escalated since HAMAS’ takeover of Gaza last summer. 

HAMAS feels increased pressure over a weakening economic situation and an accelerating humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip; however, the group remains fairly 

unified, especially its military wing, and in charge in the Gaza Strip where it controls all PA facilities. HAMAS continues to curtail freedoms and to harass Fatah 

members. 

24

In the West Bank, we see signs of progress by Fatah,including steps to reorganize 

the security sector, the return of PA customs revenues collected by Israel, renewed 

security and law enforcement cooperation with Israeli forces in taking more effective 

action against HAMAS, and progress by PA security forces in establishing security 

in Nablus and other areas. 

SAUDI ARABIA

In Saudi Arabia, the long-term challenge from Islamic extremism has been 

checked for now, and the government benefits from steady, oil price-driven economic 

growth. Saudi security forces have achieved notable successes against al Qaeda networks inside the Kingdom since 2003, killing or capturing al Qaeda’s original Saudibased leadership and degrading its manpower, access to weapons, and operational 

capability. 

Although Riyadh also has made strides against key supporters and facilitators of 

extremist attacks in Iraq, Saudi Arabia remains a source of recruits and finances 

for Iraq and Levant-based militants and Saudi extremists constitute the largest 

share of foreign fighters and suicide bombers in Iraq. 

RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Let me turn now to Russia and Eurasia. In March, Russia is set to reach what 

many anticipated would be an important milestone the first on-schedule change in 

leadership since communism and the first voluntary transfer of power from one 

healthy Kremlin leader to another. That milestone has been clouded, however, by 

President Putin’s declared readiness to serve as prime minister under his handpicked successor, Dmitry Medvedev, a move that raises questions about who will be 

in charge of Russia after Putin’s presidential term expires in May. Coming at a time 

of uncertainty about Russia’s direction, the Medvedev-Putin ‘‘cohabitation’’ raises 

questions about the country’s future and the implications for Western interests. 

While many of the essential features of the current system are likely to endure, 

including weak institutions, corruption, and growing authoritarianism, we will be 

alert for signs of systemic changes such as an indication that presidential powers 

are being weakened in favor of a stronger prime minister. 

ELEMENTS OF RUSSIA’S REVIVAL

We judge the Russian economy will continue to expand under a new leadership, 

although at a slower rate than over the last 8 years, given capacity constraints, the 

slow pace of institutional change, the impact of real ruble appreciation, and developments in the international economy. Negative longer-term demographic challenges 

loom and investment will remain a significant constraint, particularly in the energy 

sector. 

Other elements of Russian national power—from trade and energy, to diplomatic 

instruments and military and intelligence capabilities are on a path to grow over 

the next 4 years. For example, Russia is positioning to control an energy supply and 

transportation network spanning from Europe to East Asia. Aggressive Russian efforts to control, restrict or block the transit of hydrocarbons from the Caspian to 

the west—and to ensure that east-west energy corridors remain subject to Russian 

control—underscore the potential power and influence of Russia’s energy policy. 

The Russian military has begun to reverse a long, deep deterioration in its capabilities that started before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although determined 

that defense spending not harm Russia’s economic performance, Putin has been 

committed to increases for defense commensurate with GDP growth that has averaged just under 7 percent this decade. By 2006 the military had significantly increased the number of high-readiness units from 1999 levels, ramped up ground 

forces training—including mobilization exercise activity—and begun to man its 

high-readiness units with longer-term ‘‘contract’’ personnel rather than conscripts. 

Moscow also is making more use of its strengthened armed forces. A growing 

number of exercises with foreign militaries and an increased operational tempo in 

the North Caucasus Military District, often focusing on potential Georgian contingencies, are designed primarily to demonstrate regional dominance and discourage 

outside interference. Russia has used widely publicized missile launches and increased long-range aviation training flights to the Pacific, Atlantic, and Arctic 

Oceans to showcase Russia’s continued global reach and military relevance. 

The military still faces significant challenges, and recent activity does not approach Soviet era operations. Demographic, health problems, and conscription 

deferments erode available manpower. Strategic nuclear forces remain viable, but 

Russia’s defense industry suffers from overcapacity, loss of skilled and experienced 

25

personnel, lack of modern machine tools, rising material and labor costs, and dwindling component suppliers. 

EURASIA AND BALKANS IN FLUX

The other states of Eurasia remain in a state of flux. Unresolved conflicts in the 

separatist Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will remain potential 

flashpoint seven if Russia in response to Western recognition of Kosovo does not follow through with its implicit threat to recognize the two regions as independent. 

President Saakashvili’s reelection in January will help renew his democratic credentials and leadership mandate. 

Elsewhere in the Caucasus, the stalemated Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between 

Azerbaijan and Armenia continues to produce dozens of casualties annually along 

the Line-of-Contact. Moreover, Russia’s recent suspension of its conventional Forces 

in Europe obligations could lead to similar suspensions by Azerbaijan and Armenia 

and a subsequent arms race. 

Ukraine will continue to experience an unsettled domestic political situation for 

months to come. The struggle for power between various factions, however, has remained within the political system since the Orange Revolution, decreasing the possibility of violence. 

Prospects for major political change in Belarus are dim over the next year. 

Lukashenko’s populist rhetoric, image as the defender of Belarus, and ability to 

keep the economy stable have maintained his high popularity. Opposition efforts to 

promote a pro-Western democratic agenda and build support for his ouster have 

gained little traction. 

Central Asian Trends 

Central Asia remains fertile ground for radical Islamic sentiment and movements, 

due to socioeconomic and other factors. In Uzbekistan, President Karimov is intent 

on retaining firm control, but faces increased public dissatisfaction over a weakened 

economy and higher commodity prices. He has already demonstrated the willingness 

to use force against his people and could move quickly to suppress protests. 

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack the energy resources of other Central Asian states 

and have weak economies, but appear relatively stable for now. In the last year, 

Turkmenistan has shown progress on human rights and has begun to expand contacts with the outside world, but is still recovering from years of isolation. 

We judge that the Balkans will remain unsettled in 2008 as Kosovo’s drive for 

independence from Serbia comes to a head and inter-ethnic relations in Bosnia 

worsen. Kosovo leaders have now declared independence, a move that could trigger 

confrontation with rejectionist Serbs living in northern Kosovo and some retaliatory 

measures by Belgrade. 

Inter-ethnic violence that brings about intervention by NATO-led forces is possible, especially if Serbs take provocative steps to block Pristina’s authority, and any 

violence could spill over to neighboring states. However Kosovo’s status is resolved, 

ethnic Albanian minorities in Macedonia and southern Serbia are likely to continue 

pressing for greater autonomy, and ethnic Albanian extremists could attempt to exploit public discontent and use small-scale violence to rally support for unification 

with Kosovo. Serbian officials say they will not intervene with the Serbian Army 

in Kosovo, but they have warned of political and economic responses that would 

probably harden Kosovo Serb’s rejectionism of independence and hinder Kosovo’s 

economic development. 

Kosovo’s independence could exacerbate problems in Bosnia, where ethnic Serb 

leaders have warned of public protests and civil unrest in response. Fundamental 

differences between Bosniak and Bosnian Serb leaders over the ultimate structure 

of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state, fueled by increasingly strident ethnic rhetoric over 

the past year, have stymied most reforms required to keep Bosnia on a stabilizing 

path toward closer ties with the EU and NATO. However, the EU recently initialed 

a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Sarajevo. The international community presence in Bosnia is set to decline further in 2008. We judge the probability 

of interethnic violence is low absent a move by Bosnia’s Serbentity, the Republika 

Srpska, toward secession. Any violence would put pressure on U.S. and NATO forces 

in the region to assist. 

CHINA

China sees itself as a regional power with global interests.Its strategic priorities 

focus on sustaining economic growth and political stability, partly as means to reinforce China’s status as a great power and to uphold its territorial integrity. Beijing 

sees a peaceful external environment as vital to achieving these goals. As a result, 

26

China’s global engagement is not driven by Communist ideology or military expansionism, but instead by a need for access to markets, resources, technology and expertise, and a desire to assert its role in the international community.

• All these goals have been reflected over the past few years in Beijing’s 

expanded engagement with Africa and Latin America. China’s efforts there 

have largely focused on gaining greater access to natural resources—especially oil—but China’s involvement in these regions also helps promote its 

regional and global influence by burnishing China’s image as a leader of the 

developing world. For example, Beijing has boosted its participation in African peacekeeping operations, most notably in Sudan. 

• China’s engagement in these regions, however, often overlooks the tendency of some developing world leaders to engage in human rights abuses 

or proliferation behavior—thus providing disincentives for those leaders to 

alter such behaviors. In addition, Beijing still engages in some activities—

including arms sales—that could contribute to instability in Africa or Latin 

America. China’s arms sales in the Middle East are also destabilizing and 

a threat to U.S. forces, while missile sales to Iran pose a threat to U.S. 

forces in the Persian Gulf.

Public statements by Chinese leaders indicate that Beijing perceives itself as 

being in the midst of a 20-year ‘‘window of opportunity’’ favorable to China’s growth, 

development, and rise in influence. As a result, Beijing is seeking a constructive relationship with the U.S. and the rest of the world, which will allow China to fully 

capitalize on a favorable strategic environment. Indeed, Chinese officials consistently emphasize the need to seek cooperative relations with Washington, because 

conflict with the United States would risk derailing China’s economic development. 

They also seek to alleviate international concerns about China’s strategic intentions. 

As China’s influence grows, however, Beijing probably will increasingly expect its 

interests to be respected by other countries. This will be especially true within East 

Asia, as Beijing tries to leverage its growing influence into a greater leadership role 

in the region. 

The Taiwan presidential election scheduled for 22 March, coincides with an internal referendum on membership in the U.N. Outgoing President Chen Shui-bian is 

seeking to affinn Taiwan’s sovereignty and separate identity from the mainland. 

Beijing is attempting to use political and economic levers to deter what it sees as 

Taiwan’s moves toward independence, but Chinese leaders say they are prepared for 

military contingencies, and have occasionally cited Beijing’s 2005’’Anti-Secession 

Law,’’ which authorizes the use of force if Beijing’s leaders deem it necessary. 

DOMESTIC STABILITY, ECONOMIC CONCERNS

Notwithstanding China’s external goals, the leadership is focused on threats to 

domestic stability. President Hu Jintao’s domestic policy agenda is an attempt to address some of the underlying causes of social discontent, which has erupted in local 

demonstrations, by focusing on more balanced economic opportunity, environmental 

protection, expanded social services, and rule of law while strengthening the Communist Party’s hold on power. Chinese leaders rely on security forces to clamp down 

on non-governmental organizations, dissidents, and religious groups viewed as 

threats to the Party’s power. Implementation of Hu’s program will require a major 

shift of resources to the countryside, greater accountability of provincial leaders to 

Beijing, and stronger efforts to root out corruption—all of which require overcoming 

substantial obstacles or taking significant political risks. 

China’s impressive economic growth—it is the world’s second largest economy—

masks significant distortions and risks, including a rigidly controlled currency that 

contributes to excess liquidity, wasteful investment; government policies that favor 

exports over domestic consumption; and a state-run banking system slowly recovering from a series of credit problems. China’s demographic problem of an aging 

population, high incidence of chronic and infectious disease, environmental degradation, and an increasing energy crunch are likely to slow economic growth over the 

long-term. A sudden and sharp slowdown in China could exacerbate vulnerabilities 

in the global economy; hardest hit would be its neighbors who sell about 50 percent 

of their goods to China and commodity producers who have enjoyed high prices and 

expanding export volumes because of China’s rising demand for raw material, metals, and food. 

PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY MODERNIZATION

The People’s Liberation Army continues to develop a wide range of systems that 

increasingly could put U.S. and allied forces and bases in the region at risk. China’s 

military modernization program is driven by the perception that a competent, modVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
27

ern military force is an essential element of the’’great power’’ status to which Chinese leaders aspire. We judge that any Chinese regime, even a democratic one, 

would have similar goals. 

China continues to develop and field conventional theater-range ballistic and 

cruise missile capabilities that will put U.S. forces and regional bases throughout 

the Western Pacific and Asia at greater risk. China also is developing more capable 

long-range conventional strike systems and short- and medium-range ballistic missiles with terminally guided maneuverable warheads that could be used to attack 

U.S. naval forces and airbases. China’s arms sales in the Middle East are destabilizing and a threat to U.S. forces, while missile sales to Iran also pose a threat 

to U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. 

In addition, counter-command, control, and sensor systems to include communications satellite jammers and anti-satellite weapons, are among Beijing’s highest military priorities. 

Beijing seeks to modernize China’s strategic forces in order to address concerns 

about the survivability of those systems in the face of foreign advances in strategic 

reconnaissance, precision strike and missile defenses. China’s nuclear capabilities in 

terms of range, lethality, and survivability will increase rapidly over the next 10 

years. 

THREATS TO SPACE SYSTEMS

Potential foreign adversaries arc aware of the increasing U.S. reliance on space 

systems and the advantages these systems provide to U.S. military and intelligence 

operations. Over the last decade, the rest of the world has made significant progress 

in developing counterspace capabilities. I expand on this threat in my classified 

statement for the record. 

LATIN AMERICA

The gradual consolidation of democracy remained the dominant trend over the 

last year in Latin America, but a small group of radical populist governments continues to project a competing vision that appeals to many of the region’s poor. Indeed, the persistence of high levels of poverty and striking income inequalities will 

continue to create a potentially receptive audience for radical populism’s message, 

especially in the less developed areas of Latin America. 

Inspired and supported by Venezuela and Cuba, leaders in Bolivia, Nicaragua, 

and—more tentatively—in Ecuador are pursuing agendas that undercut checks and 

balances on presidential power, seek lengthy presidential terms, weaken media and 

civil liberties, and emphasize economic nationalism at the expense of market-based 

approaches. Moreover, each of these governments, to varying degrees, has engaged 

in sharply anti-US rhetoric, aligned with Venezuela and Cuba—and increasingly 

Iran—on international issues, and advocated measures that directly clash with U.S. 

initiatives. 

VENEZUELA

The referendum on constitutional reform last December was a stunning setback 

for Venezuelan President Chavez and may slow his movement toward authoritarian 

rule and implementation of his vision of 21st century socialism. However, Chavez 

will not abandon his goals for sweeping change toward socialism in Venezuela but 

may be compelled to spend more time bolstering his domestic support. 

We judge Chavez miscalculated public opposition to such moves as seeking indefinite re-election and greater discretionary authority over expropriating private property. The proposed constitutional changes also generated schisms within the heretofore united pro-Chavez movement as Chavista governors and officials came to recognize their loss of power under the new system. The outcome of the referendum 

has given a major psychological boost to Chavez’s opponents among the middle 

class, the private sector, the Catholic Church, and especially university students 

who have become an increasingly important political force. The challenge for the diverse opposition will be to remain united absent a coalescing event like the referendum. 

While Chavez’s policies are damaging the Venezuelan oil industry and its economy, over the next year or so, high oil prices are likely to enable Chavez to retain 

the support of his constituents through well-funded social programs; continue co-opting some members of the economic elite who are profiting from the consumer-led 

boom; and stave off the eventual consequences of his financial mismanagement. Adverse economic trends are increasingly evident, including food shortages, rising inflation, and an overvalued currency. Without question, policies being pursued by 

President Chavez have Venezuela on a path to ruin its economy. 

28

Continued Regional Activism 

Even with his likely increased attention to domestic affairs, Chavez will continue 

to seek to unite Latin America, under his leadership, behind an anti-U.S., radical 

leftist agenda and to look to Cuba as a key ideological ally. Chavez’s leadership ambitions are likely to encounter growing opposition as time passes, however, because 

he has antagonized several of his regional counterparts and is increasingly portrayed by influential media as a divisive figure. 

The sidelining of Fidel Castro in favor of his brother Raul may lead to a period 

of adjustment in Venezuela’s relations with Cuba. Nevertheless, both governments 

depend heavily on this special bilateral relationship, and we assess they will find 

ways to smooth over any differences that may arise during the ongoing succession 

period in Cuba. 

A high priority for Chavez will be to support the Morales government in Bolivia. 

The inauguration of Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega in January 2007 has given Chavez 

another staunch ally and a location from which to expand Venezuela’s activities in 

Central America. We expect Chavez to provide generous campaign funding to the 

Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador in its bid to secure the 

presidency in the 2009 election. 

Venezuela and Iran 

Chavez and Iran’s President Ahmadi-Nejad have established a rapport, having 

visited each other seven times since 2005. Venezuela and Iran have made the most 

progress on the economic and energy fronts, negotiating agreements in such areas 

as agriculture, automobile, and tractor manufacture, petrochemicals, and oil exploration in Venezuela’s Orinoco region. Venezuela and Iran also have discussed cooperation on nuclear energy, but we are not aware of any significant developments 

as a result of these discussions.Military cooperation between Tehran and Caracas 

is growing. Nevertheless, the well over $3 billion in arms Venezuela has purchased 

from Russia over the past 2 years far exceeds the military sales and maintenance 

contracts to which Venezuela and Iran have agreed. There are growing signs of anxiety among Venezuela’s neighbors about this military build-up. 

Venezuela as Drug Transit Point 

Since 2005 Venezuela has been a major departure point for South American—predominantly Colombian—cocaine destined for the U.S. market, and its importance as 

a transshipment center continues to grow. Chavez’s lack of counterdrug cooperation 

undermines efforts by other countries, particularly Colombia, by giving traffickers 

access to alternative routes and transit points. Chavez is likely to remain 

unengaged on the counternarcotics front unless the drug trade is perceived to damage his international image or threaten his political longevity. 

CUBA

Raul Castro, whose brother Fidel recently announced he will not ‘‘run’’ again for 

President, has served as Cuba’s Provisional President for over 18 months; but Raul 

Castro’s political skills will be further tested over the next year as he deals with 

heightened public expectations for economic improvement in food availability, housing, transportation, salaries, and meaningful employment. His actions to date indicate that he is looking for ways to bring about economic changes through a modest, 

though not a sweeping transformation of Cuba’s Communist economic model. Raul 

Castro has publicly called for contact with the United States on Havana’s terms 

aimed ultimately at bringing about an end to the U.S. embargo. 

We judge Raul’s most likely approach will be cautious, incremental steps to make 

the agricultural sector more productive, to allow some private sector expansion 

through the creation of more small-scale enterprises, and to attract new foreign investment. If Raul moves forward, he probably will take pains to ensure elite consensus. Senior Cuban officials have made clear that there are no plans to permit 

competitive elections or otherwise alter the Communist Party’s monopoly of power. 

Indeed, the determination of the Cuban leadership to ignore outside pressure to 

carry out significant economic and political reform continues to be reinforced by the 

more than $1 billion net annual subsidy that Venezuela provides to sustain Cuba. 

Policy missteps or the mishandling of a crisis by the leadership could lead to political instability in Cuba, raising the risk of mass migration. We assess the political 

situation is likely to remain stable at least in the initial months following Fidel Castro’s death and do not expect to see overt signs of major cleavage in the ruling elite 

because many of the top party and aimed forces leaders were hand-picked by Raul 

Castro. Moreover, senior party and government officials probably would not want 

to jeopardize their futures by forcefully challenging regime decisions. Pro-democracy 

29

dissidents continue to be harassed and to risk lengthy prison sentences for minor 

public criticism of the regime. 

COLOMBIA

Under President Uribe, Colombia—the United States’s taunchest ally in the region—has continued to make major progress in strengthening democracy by improving security while energetically implementing a comprehensive counternarcotics 

strategy. 

Colombia’s better-trained security forces and improving counterinsurgency capabilities have significantly weakened the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

(FARC), confining the group’s operations largely to ambushes and harassment attacks. This is a major difference from the late 1990s when the FARC regularly assaulted rural police garrisons and even battalion-sized Army units. Bogota now 

holds the strategic advantage because of the military’s sustained combat operations 

in the FARC’s rural heartland and the permanent stationing of security forces in 

regions previously dominated by the insurgents. Key successes last year included 

the killing of two prominent FARC Front commanders and the continuing high 

number of FARC deserters. 

FARC leaders increasingly rely on political tactics to try to distract or restrain 

the government. The group’s recent release of two Colombian hostages was a bid 

by the FARC to gain international recognition and pressure the government into offering it a demilitarized zone. The FARC has since announced it may release three 

more. The Uribe government continues to work with the United States to secure the 

freedom of three U.S. hostages, who have been held captive for nearly 5 years. The 

FARC currently holds about 750 hostages. 

The second major prong of Uribe’s security strategy—demobilizing and reintegrating paramilitaries into civilian society—also has yielded important benefits. 

Government successes against all the illegal armed groups have caused murder and 

kidnapping rates to drop significantly, and the improved security environment has 

helped fuel an economic boom. Stepped-up efforts to prosecute human rights violators, including in the security services, have contributed to a gradually improving 

human rights picture. Bogota is taking steps to follow through with proposals to 

strengthen the judiciary and prosecute the murders of union members and human 

rights workers. 

Bogota’s counterdrug program continues to show impressive results, particularly 

in interdiction, arrests of major drug traffickers, and extradition. The police and 

military seized 65 metric tons of cocaine and cocaine base in 2006; it also destroyed 

200 cocaine labs. The government has approved more than 550 extraditions to the 

United States since 2002, including more than 100 cases in 2007. Colombian authorities captured kingpin Diego Montoya in September, the country’s most important drug trafficker on the FBI’s Top Ten list. Although aggressive U.S.-supported 

aerial eradication has diminished coca cultivation in some areas, coca farmers have 

adapted by moving beyond the reach of the spray program or taking actions to save 

or replace sprayed fields. In response, the Uribe administration is combining spray 

efforts with increased emphasis on manual eradication. 

MEXICO

The overall picture in Mexico is positive. President Felipe Calderon’s strong start 

in his first year in office featured an aggressive counter narcotics offensive, forging 

a working relationship with elements of the opposition, securing a limited revamping of the government pension system, and pushing through Congress a high-priority fiscal reform package. The public has supported most of Calderon’s policies, 

and sustaining this momentum will be an important task as the midterm election 

season approaches in 2009. 

Illegal migration, drug smuggling and associated violence, and human trafficking 

continue to threaten to Mexico’s internal security and the security of the U.S. southern border. Calderon’s aggressive offensive against drug-trafficker-inspired violence 

has led him to deploy 20,000 to 30,000 Federal police and soldiers to 10 Mexican 

states. A mid-year truce between major Mexican drug cartels aimed at diminishing 

inter-cartel violence appeared to reduce drug-related murders in certain areas last 

summer; but drug violence remains high and indeed, criminal violence has increased 

in frequency, brutality, and geographic scope. The government also faces a rejuvenated threat from a small group of domestic insurgents: bombings of Mexican oil 

and natural gas pipelines marked a return to violence by the radical leftist Popular 

Revolutionary Army (EPR). In response, Calderon has stepped up security of oil and 

gas pipelines. 

30

To deter criminal activity, Calderon has deployed military troops to bolster security in states plagued with drug violence and extradited high-level traffickers to the 

United States. He is seeking to reform Mexico’s police and judicial system, and has 

subjected top Federal police commanders to drug tests, polygraphs, and a review of 

personal assets. While making progress, sustained success will require long-term 

commitment. 

AFRICA

Persistent insecurity in Nigeria’s oil producing region, the Niger Delta, poses a 

direct threat to U.S. strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Ongoing instability 

and conflict in other parts of Africa pose less direct though still significant threats 

to U.S. interests because of their high humanitarian and peacekeeping costs, drag 

on democratic and economic development, and potential to get worse. 

THREATS TO U.S. INTERESTS IN NIGERIA

President Yar’Adua has pledged to resolve the crisis in the Niger Delta but faces 

many obstacles created by decades of neglect, endemic corruption, mismanagement, 

environmental degradation, and deep public mistrust of government. The armed elements behind the violence, sabotage, kidnappings, and oil theft appear to be splintered into numerous groups with different agendas that are mostly criminal in 

focus. Government officials, politicians, and military personnel have a history of 

colluding with these groups. Nigeria’s corruption-prone military has reined in some 

gang violence under the new administration but lacks the capacity and resources 

to police sprawling infrastructure in its swampy terrain. The military could provoke 

even more unrest if it went on the offensive against the armed groups. 

Nigeria’s overall political stability remains fragile even though tensions surrounding elections in 2007 have diminished. 

The crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region shows few signs of resolution, even if the 

planned U.N. peacekeeping force of 26,000 is fully deployed. The rebels are fractured; some of them are prolonging the conflict for material gain and others regard 

the Darfur Peace Agreement as serving Khartoum’s interests. Khartoum also has 

failed to honor cease fire agreements. Some 2.2 million Darfurians remain displaced. 

Sudan’s North-South peace agreement also is in danger of collapse because of 

mounting southern frustration with the North’s failure to honor core provisions on 

power and revenue sharing; military redeployments, and border demarcation. The 

agreement is further undermined by allegations of southern corruption, lack of expertise, and failure to participate in key implementation bodies. 

Violence in Kenya after a close election marred by irregularities represents a 

major setback in a country that had long been among Africa’s most prosperous, 

peaceful and stable countries, and one which gradually had progressed from dictatorship to democracy. The situation remains in flux, but President Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga as yet show few signs of meaningful compromise in negotiations brokered by foliner U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. The political dispute has played itself out in ethnic violence that has so far killed about 1,000 and 

caused over 300,000 people to flee to displaced-persons camps and a like number 

to the homes of friends and family. It has damaged, perhaps for the long-term, public trust in political institutions and the democratization process. Kibaki probably 

will do everything he can to hold onto power. Even if Annan’s talks result in a negotiated settlement between the Odinga and Kibaki factions, Kenya has already entered a period of increased social tension and instability that will affect its willingness and ability to cooperate with the U.S. on regional diplomatic and counter terrorist matters. 

Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia in December 2006 quickly toppled the Council 

of Islamic Courts, a coalition of business, clan and religious interests increasingly 

under the influence of extremists with close ties to the al Qaeda East Africa terrorist network. Ethiopia’s intervention provoked an insurgency and sharpened divisions among Somalis, making governance close to impossible. The Ethiopian-backed 

transitional Federal Government is incapable of administering Somalia and probably would flee Mogadishu or collapse if the Ethiopians withdrew. Ethiopia’s 

counterinsurgency operations in its own ethnic Somali region, the Ogaden, are 

blocking access for relief workers and creating a humanitarian crisis that risks hundreds of thousands. 

Though the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has vastly improved 

since the early 2000s, fighting in the east in 2007 displaced more than 400,000 civilians and could draw in neighboring countries if it resumes. A peace agreement in 

January 2008 helped defuse a showdown, but warlords continue to operate autonoVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
31

mously, underscoring the fragility of Congo’s post-war transition and the difficulty 

president Kabila will continue to have in consolidating control over the country. 

Fledgling insurgencies among nomads in Mali and Niger are likely to remain confined to the remote and sparsely populated Sahara desert but nonetheless are a 

strain on the security forces of these two impoverished democracies. The insurgency 

in Niger also threatens uranium mining, which is controlled by a French company. 

Tensions between longtime enemies Ethiopia and Eritrea have increased over the 

past year, with both sides seemingly preparing for a new war. The last war killed 

about 80,000 soldiers on both sides. If conflict reignites, Ethiopian President Meles’s 

own hold on power could be put in jeopardy if the war went badly for him. 

Serious threats to Zimbabwean President Mugabe have yet to materialize despite 

hyper inflation, economic decline, and political uncertainty. Ruling party insiders 

are divided and appear unlikely to mount a credible challenge to Mugabe in the 

near-term. Opposition party leaders, who have been deeply divided in the past, announced in late January that they would unify behind a single candidate, but the 

opposition still appears unlikely to mount a serious challenge to Mugabe’s authority. 

Zimbabwe is likely to face a political standoff if Mugabe suddenly departs the scene 

without ruling party consensus on his successor. 

GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY

Access to stable and affordably priced energy supplies has long been a critical element of national security. Sustained increases in global demand and the interactive 

effects of energy with other issues have both magnified and broadened the significance of developments in the global energy system. Oil prices in late 2007 were near 

record levels and global spare production capacity is below the market’s preferred 

cushion of 3 to 4 million barrels per day (b/d). 

FACTORS FUELING HIGH PRICES

Geopolitical uncertainties and tensions heighten the risk of a major oil supply disruption and the attendant negative repercussions for the global economy. Threats 

to Iraqi and Nigerian oil output remain a concern despite some positive developments last year. Terrorist attacks against Persian Gulf oil facilities and the potential fallout from mounting tension with Iran over its nuclear program are significant 

additional risks. 

In Iraq, completion of a new pipeline and security improvements have helped 

Baghdad boost production and exports in recent months by several hundred thousand barrels per day, but output remains vulnerable to episodic violence. 

Ethnic and political violence and criminal activity threaten a large portion of Nigeria’s 2.2 million b/d of oil output. Approximately 550,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 

potential oil production, about a fifth of Nigeria’s production capacity, have been off 

line since February 2006 because of militant attacks, and probably another 100,000 

b/d are stolen. Over the past 2 years, the amount shut in has been as much as 

900,000 b/d. Even greater and more prolonged disruptions could occur again with 

no advance warning, and this fear is contributing to upward pressure on oil prices 

in international markets. U.S. companies have billions of dollars in investments in 

Nigeria. Abuja has begun to take these problems more seriously and directed national security assets to the area. However, local militias, who target oil facilities 

and kidnap foreign oil company personnel, will remain a persistent threat until political and other grievances are addressed. 

Public statements by al Qaeda leaders indicate that terrorists are interested in 

striking Persian Gulf oil facilities. 

Iran could withhold some or all of its 2.4-million barrels per day oil exports or 

even try to impede the flow of 18 million barrels per day of oil through the Strait 

of Hormuz if its pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle sparks a major crisis; however, we 

assess Tehran is likely to take these provocative steps only if it perceived it had 

little to lose. Venezuela’s President Chavez has pledged solidarity with Iran and 

might also curtail some or all of his country’s exports of about 2 million b/d in such 

a scenario. 

WINDFALL FOR PRODUCERS

High energy prices and escalating demand for oil and natural gas, also has resulted in windfall profits for producers. OPEC countries earned an estimated $690 

billion from oil exports last year, nearly three times the revenues earned in 2003. 

The increased revenues also have enabled producers like Iran, Venezuela, Sudan, 

and Russia to garner enhanced political, economic and even military advantages and 

complicated multilateral efforts to address problems such as the tragedy in Darfur 

and Iran’s nuclear program. 

32

With about 70 percent of global oil reserves inaccessible or of limited accessibility 

to outside oil companies, competition between international oil companies to secure 

stakes in the few countries open to foreign investment is likely to intensify. Determined to secure the energy inputs necessary to fuel continued robust economic 

growth, Chinese and Indian state-owned and private energy companies are pursuing 

strategic investments in energy assets worldwide. We also see a sharp rise in Russia’s investment abroad, much of it driven by Russian energy companies. Moscow 

is using the power of its energy monopoly to ensure that east-west energy corridors 

remain subject to Russian influence. 

RISING GLOBAL FOOD PRICES

Global food prices also have been rising steadily over the past 2 years driven by 

higher energy prices which push up input costs weak harvests, historically low 

stocks, and robust demand. Wheat prices were up over 60 percent in 2007, and are 

at a 20-year high. Other foodstuffs such as vegetable oils also are near records. 

There is little near term relief in sight because production increases in several countries, including Australia, are hampered by water shortages and land constraints. 

High food prices in several countries, including Russia, China, India, and Vietnam, 

are forcing governments to engage in market distorting practices such as banning 

food exports, increasing subsidies, or fixing prices. Food prices are likely to be an 

issue in several upcoming elections, and probably were important in the February 

elections in Pakistan. 

The double impact of high energy and food prices is increasing the risk of social 

and political instability in vulnerable countries. Corn protests in Mexico, bread riots 

in Morocco, and recent unrest in Burma are directly linked to higher food and energy prices. Higher food prices, as well as rising transportation and logistical costs, 

also have outstripped global aid budgets and adversely impacted the ability of donor 

countries and organizations to provide food aid. For example, the World Food Program’s food costs have increased by more than 50 percent over the past 5 years and 

are projected to grow another 35 percent by the end of the decade. 

INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND U.S. SECURITY

The international spread of infectious diseases and the increasing emergence of 

new ones remain challenges to U.S. security. Even with the U.N.’s recent downgrading of the size of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, that disease, malaria, and tuberculosis together kill 6 million persons annually. The spread of infectious disease is 

exacerbated by poverty, an insufficient global health infrastructure, increasing 

globalization, urbanization (especially in the developing world), migration, complex 

humanitarian emergencies with resultant refugee flows, and environmental degradation. Additionally, misuse of antibiotics has led to an increase in resistant bacteria strains. 

The most direct threat to the U.S. is the spread of infectious pathogens to our 

shores, or within areas where U.S. personnel are deployed. Disease also indirectly 

threatens us with its potential impacts upon the international economy, civil society 

and critical infrastructures. Even a relatively limited outbreak, as happened with 

SARS in 2003, can have widespread ripple effects. Even if an outbreak does not 

threaten the U.S. directly, the resulting instability or humanitarian emergency can 

place additional demands on U.S. military and financial resources. 

The most pressing infectious disease challenge for the United States is still the 

potential emergence of a severe influenza pandemic. Although the avian H5N1 virus 

has remained primarily a threat to poultry, it continues to expand its geographic 

coverage, and to evolve—indeed it retains the potential to evolve into a human pandemic strain. 

A virulent virus from such an emerging pandemic also has the potential to be 

used as a weapon by a terrorist group or a technically experienced lone actor; such 

an attack would likely be devastating, both economically and socially. While we do 

not currently see this level of technical sophistication in terrorist groups—isolating 

a virulent strain is difficult the possibility cannot be ruled out; therefore, we will 

continue to use our intelligence resources to try to help detect any such preparations 

to use a virus as a terrorist weapon. 

CONCLUSION

The issues that we consider here today confront responsible citizens and their governments everywhere. I, my colleagues, and the IC we represent are fully committed 

to arming our policymakers, warfighters, and law enforcement officers with the best 

intelligence and analytic insight we can. This is necessary to enable them to take 

33

the actions and make the decisions that will protect American lives and American 

interests, here and around the world.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Director. 

General Maples? 

STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, U.S. ARMY, 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 

General MAPLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, 

members of the committee. I too appreciate the opportunity to be 

here today and to present the information that has been developed 

by our defense intelligence professionals. I too have submitted an 

unclassified statement for the record, as requested by the committee, and I will focus my oral remarks on key military operations 

and capabilities, beginning with global military trends. 

Among them: the availability of the knowledge and technology 

needed to produce and employ WMD. Longer range ballistic missiles that are growing more mobile, accurate, and harder to find. 

Ballistic missiles are increasingly being designed or employed to 

penetrate advanced air defense systems. Improvised devices and 

suicide weapons as weapons of choice. The growing ability to target 

and attack space-based communications, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance assets. The proliferation of precision conventional anti-tank, anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles, including to 

non-state criminal or terrorist networks. The sophisticated ability 

of select nations and non-state groups to exploit and perhaps target 

for attack our computer networks. Lastly, efforts by potential adversaries to conceal and protect their military leadership and special weapons programs deep underground, which makes them increasingly difficult to locate and, if directed, to attack. 

Turning now to ongoing operations in countries and regions of 

special interest. In Iraq, an improved security situation has resulted from coalition and Iraqi operations, tribal security initiatives, Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) groups, and the Jaish alMahdi freeze order. The trends are encouraging, but they are not 

yet irreversible. 

Al Qaeda in Iraq has been damaged, but is still attempting to reignite sectarian violence and remains able to conduct high profile 

attacks. It has moved into the north, into what it hopes to be more 

permissive areas. It also remains committed to planning and supporting attacks against the West beyond Iraq’s borders. 

We have seen a decline of the movement of foreign terrorists into 

Iraq. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Quds Force continues to provide training, weapons, and support to groups that attack Iraqi security forces and coalition forces in Iraq. DIA has not 

yet seen evidence that Iran has ended this assistance. 

Iraqi security forces, while reliant on coalition combat service 

support, have improved their overall capabilities and are increasingly leading counterinsurgency operations. 

Turkey has launched a limited ground incursion with supporting 

artillery and air strikes against the Kurdish People’s Congress 

(KGK) in northern Iraq. Sustained operations could jeopardize stability in northern Iraq. 

In Afghanistan, the United States and International Security Assistance Forces successes have inflicted losses on Taliban leaderVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
34

ship and prevented the Taliban from conducting sustained conventional operations. Despite their losses, the Taliban maintain access 

to local Pashtun and some foreign fighters and is employing suicide 

bombings, improvised explosive devices, and small arms to increase 

attack levels. While the insurgency remains concentrated in the 

Pashtun-dominated south and east, it has expanded to some western areas. 

The Afghan army has fielded 11 of 14 infantry brigades. More 

than one-third of Afghanistan’s combat arms battalions are assessed as capable of leading operations with coalition support. 

In addition to the Taliban, the central government is challenged 

by corruption and strong narcotics trade. NATO member nations 

continue to debate how best to achieve counterinsurgency goals in 

Afghanistan. There are differences on many levels on approaches 

to reconciliation, reconstruction, and the use of direct combat 

power. 

Iran continues efforts to strengthen its influence in Afghanistan 

using humanitarian aid, commercial trade, and some arms shipments. We believe that al Qaeda has expanded its support to the 

Afghan insurgency. At the same time, al Qaeda presents an increased threat to Pakistan while it continues to plan, support, and 

direct transnational attacks from its de facto safe haven in Pakistan’s largely ungoverned Frontier Provinces. Al Qaeda has extended its operational reach through partnerships and mergers 

with compatible regional terrorist groups, including a continued effort to expand into Africa. Al Qaeda maintains its desire to possess 

WMD and, despite the death or capture of senior operatives, al 

Qaeda remains a threat to the domestic United States and our allies and interests overseas. 

We know that al Qaeda is interested in recruiting operatives who 

can travel easily and without drawing scrutiny from security services. As such, Europe could be used as a platform from which to 

launch attacks against the United States. 

Pakistani military operations in the FATA have had limited effect on al Qaeda. Pakistan recognizes the threat and realizes the 

need to develop more effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities to complement their conventional forces. 

Pakistan has adopted a military, political, administrative, and economic strategy focused on the FATA. At present we have confidence in Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons. 

Iran’s military is designed principally to defend against external 

threats and threats posed by internal opponents. However, Iran 

could conduct limited offensive operations with its ballistic missiles 

and naval forces. Iran is investing heavily in asymmetric naval capabilities, modern air defense missile systems, and ballistic missiles. New capabilities include missile patrol boats, anti-ship cruise 

missiles, surface-to-air missile systems, and an extended range variant of the Shahab–3 ballistic missile. Iran is close to acquiring 

long-range SA–20 SAMs and is developing a new Ashur mediumrange ballistic missile. Tehran still supports terrorist proxies, including Lebanese Hezbollah, with weapons, training, and money. 

North Korea maintains large forward-positioned land forces that 

are, however, lacking in training and equipment. Robust artillery 

and mobile ballistic missiles are being sustained. The development 

35

of the Taepo Dong-2 continues, as does work on an intermediate 

range ballistic missile, a variant of which has reportedly been sold 

to Iran. 

North Korea may have several nuclear weapons stockpiled from 

plutonium produced at Yongbyon. We do not know the conditions 

under which North Korea would fully relinquish its nuclear weapons program. 

China is fielding sophisticated foreign-built and indigenously produced weapons systems and is testing new doctrines that it believes will strengthen its ability to prevail in regional conflicts and 

counter traditional U.S. military advantages. Military modernization includes anti-ship, cruise and ballistic missiles, submarines, a 

cruise missile-capable bomber, and modern surface-to-air missile 

systems. China’s missile development includes the road-mobile DF–

31 Alpha intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). Future ICBMs 

could include the JL–2 submarine-launched ballistic missile and 

some ICBMs with multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles. 

China successfully tested an anti-satellite missile in January 

2007 and is developing counter-space jammers and directed energy 

weapons. China seeks to replace its historical reliance on mass conscription in favor of a more professional force, one capable of successfully engaging in modern warfare. 

Russia is trying to reestablish a degree of military power that it 

believes is commensurate with its renewed economic strength and 

political confidence. Russia’s widely publicized strategic missile 

launches, long-range aviation flights, and carrier strike group deployment are designed to demonstrate its global reach and relevance. Development, production, and deployment of advanced 

strategic weapons continue, including the road-mobile SS–27 ICBM 

and the Bulova–30 submarine-launched ballistic missile. 

While Russia is making some improvements in its high readiness 

permanently ready conventional forces, elsewhere it is finding it 

difficult to improve the quality of conventional training, modernize 

its equipment, and recruit and retain high quality volunteers and 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs). 

In 2007 Russia signed more than $10 billion in arms sales, the 

second consecutive year of such high sales activities. Moscow is 

selling advanced fighters, surface-to-air missiles, submarines, frigates, main battle tanks, and armored personnel carriers. 

The Levant remains tense with the potential for renewed conflict. 

Syria is investing heavily in advanced Russian anti-tank guided 

missiles, based in large part on Hezbollah’s success with this weapon in the summer 2006. Continued attacks on Israel from Gaza increase the chances of Israeli military action there. 

To our south, Colombia’s counterinsurgency operations are 

achieving success against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Venezuela’s neighbors express concern about its desire to buy submarines, transport aircraft, and an air defense system, in addition to the advanced fighters, attack helicopters, and 

assault rifles it has already purchased. 

In summary, the United States is operating within an unusually 

complex environment, marked by an accelerating operational pace 

and a broad spectrum of potential threats. That threat spectrum is 

36

bounded on the one side by traditional nation-states with significant military inventories and on the other by non-state terrorist or 

criminal networks that exploit the gaps and seams between nations, cultures, laws, and belief systems. 

With the support of Congress, we continue to strengthen our 

ability to collect and analyze the military intelligence that policymakers and our commanders need in order to be successful. 

In conclusion, thank you for this opportunity to share with you 

the collective work of our defense intelligence professionals, who 

work shoulder to shoulder with our national intelligence, homeland 

security, and law enforcement counterparts. They are honored to 

serve our Nation. On their behalf, thank you for this committee’s 

support and your continued confidence. 

[The prepared statement of General Maples follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG MICHAEL D. MAPLES, USA 

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of this committee. Thank you for this opportunity to testify on current and projected threats to the United States. 

My testimony today reflects the work of thousands of collectors, analysts and support personnel, many of whom are deployed worldwide and often to dangerous and 

remote locations. They take great pride in providing the very best military intelligence to a broad range of customers, including the President of the United States, 

Congress, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. 

Combatant Commands, allies and our service men and women in combat. 

Whether defense intelligence is informing national policy or enabling command 

decisions, we remain acutely aware at all times that lives depend upon on the accuracy, speed and thoroughness of our work. On behalf of the civilian and military 

men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and across the defense 

intelligence enterprise, thank you for your support. 

My testimony begins with an assessment of today’s global strategic environment, 

followed by trends and developments in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will also discuss 

today’s global terrorist threat before addressing countries, regions and transnational 

issues of special interest. 

GLOBAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The United States is presently operating within an unusually complex environment marked by an accelerating operational pace and a broad spectrum of potential 

threats. That spectrum is bounded on one side by traditional nation-state regional 

powers within recognized borders and armed with large military inventories and on 

the other by non-state terrorist or criminal networks operating in the gaps and 

seams between nations, cultures, laws, and belief systems. 

The environment includes ongoing combat operations, ascending and aspiring regional powers, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), evolving alliances, competition for resources and ideological conflicts that are fueling novel 

challenges to the established order in regions of vital interest to the United States. 

While the United States still projects a dominant influence across the world’s 

military and security landscape, other nation-states and non-state actors are aggressively seeking advantage. Today’s unprecedented access to information gives individuals and events the potential for a real-time, unfiltered worldwide audience which 

can influence global leadership and popular perceptions. This can compress time 

available for decisionmaking and the considerations that historically have been addressed separately at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of conflict. 

This uncertain and dynamic environment also fosters the conditions that can simultaneously enable and mask strategic surprise, whether initiated by design or 

miscalculation. 

In this setting, DIA collects and analyzes intelligence against a broad range of 

highly dissimilar potential threats and adversaries. While our priority today is to 

provide the best intelligence in support of current military operations, we continue 

to meet our additional, broader responsibilities. 

37

CURRENT OPERATIONS

Iraq 

A number of trends across Iraq turned more positive for the coalition and Iraqi 

Government in 2007, though none are yet irreversible. 

Overall violence across the country has declined to the lowest level since April 

2005 and violence against coalition forces is at the lowest level since March 2004. 

This is largely the combined result of coalition and Iraqi operations, tribal security 

initiatives, concerned local citizen groups and accommodations with former insurgents. 

Muqtada Al-Sadr’s ‘‘freeze’’ order helped lower violence levels in Baghdad and 

southern Iraq, although some Iranian-supported Jaysh al-Mahdi elements still target coalition and Iraqi forces, Sunni civilians and competing Shiite groups. 

Al Qaeda-in-Iraq (AQI) and other active Sunni Arab insurgents moved most of 

their operations to more permissive northern provinces where they are trying to exploit Arab fears of Kurdish expansionism and related territorial disputes. 

AQI remains the most active terrorist group in Iraq. It continues to target the 

Iraqi Government and coalition forces while also trying to reignite sectarian violence. Successful coalition and Iraqi security forces (ISF) targeting of AQI leaders, 

the widespread emergence of local security groups through the Sahawa or Awakening movement, coalition support for local security initiatives and accommodation 

with former insurgents have significantly reduced the ability of AQI and other irreconcilable insurgent groups to operate in central and western Iraq. In response, 

AQI is targeting anti-AQI Concerned Local Citizen (CLC), or ‘‘Sons of Iraq’’ local security groups in Anbar, Diyala, and other provinces. AQI remains able to launch 

high-profile attacks. With its continued commitment to external attack planning, 

AQI also remains a threat beyond Iraq. 

Sunni insurgent groups remain active at lower levels throughout central and 

northern Iraq. Some align with larger groups such as the 1920 Revolution Brigades, 

but most operate at a more local level. 

Tribal opposition grew out of frustration with AQI’s terrorist tactics against Sunni 

civilians and AQI encroachment upon traditional tribal authorities and economic activities. In response, some former insurgents joined the ranks of the tribal ‘‘awakening’’ movements in many areas. This cooperation is generally localized and rooted 

in the many intertwining family, tribal, and neighborhood ties between insurgents 

and tribes. Once they feel the threat from AQI has ended, the tribes and other reconciled Sunni groups may reconsider these alliances of convenience if they continue 

to feel politically disenfranchised and do not receive the economic, infrastructure 

and other benefits from cooperation with the coalition and the Government of Iraq 

(GOI) and/or believe their security is threatened. Recent passage of the Provincial 

Powers law, which requires provincial elections to be held by October 2008, is likely 

to help defuse growing inter-tribal disputes in western Iraq. 

Sunni Arab relations with coalition forces have greatly improved, as have those 

between local Sunni security groups and the GOI despite lingering mutual mistrust. 

Greater stability has enabled reconstruction and the central government has recently shown more willingness to fund projects in Sunni-majority areas. Tribal 

awakening movements and other CLC local security groups want many of their 

members to be accepted into the formal ISF or receive other government and civilian jobs. In the near term, Sunni Arabs are likely to continue cooperating with coalition forces, at least partly to pressure Iraq’s government to increase Sunni representation across the government and security forces and gain a greater share of resources. Some Sunni Arab groups now favor a continued U.S. troop presence primarily as a way to counter Iranian influence, although others remain opposed to 

a continued coalition presence. 

During 2007, Shiite parties and militants increasingly fought at the local and national levels for political and security dominance, particularly over southern Iraq’s 

religious and economic spoils. Despite the Sadrist freeze, the intra-Shiite conflict 

will likely continue and could intensify in the run-up to provincial elections, the coalition drawdown, the transfer of additional provinces to Iraqi control and the federalism debate. 

Shiite parties in the government generally support the coalition, but want more 

autonomy and a bilateral security agreement with the United States. The Sadrists 

still strongly oppose the coalition’s presence. The Iraqi Shiite religious authority 

(Marja’iyah) supports Sunni-Shiite reconciliation and the Iraqi Government. 

Expanding Kurdish influence across northern Iraq’s disputed territories is fueling 

ethnic tensions and violence between Kurds and Arabs. The Kurds will leverage 

their political and military strength to ensure that disputed areas come under Kurdish control. They seek to accomplish this through the Article 140 referendum procVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
38

ess and by placing Kurdish forces in key locations. Increased Kurdish economic development, resulting from regional laws passed without Baghdad’s approval or 

blessing may exacerbate the ethnic divide. 

Turkey has attempted to disrupt and degrade cross-border Kurdish terrorist activity with some limited artillery, air-strikes, and ground operations into northern 

Iraq. Ankara has indicated an intent to conduct additional operations against the 

Kurdish People’s Congress, or KGK (previously called the PKK) in response to the 

perceived threat. A sustained, large-scale Turkish operation could jeopardize stability in northern Iraq. 

Iran continues to provide money, weapons, and training, often through the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC–QF), to some Iraqi Shiite militants despite pledges by senior Iranian officials to stop such support. The weapons 

include very deadly Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) with radio-controlled, 

remote arming, and sophisticated passive infrared detonators, mortars, rockets, 

rocket-propelled grenades and launchers, small arms ammunition and explosives. 

The IRGC–QF is part of the Iranian government. It covertly trains, funds and 

arms Iraqi insurgents and militias. It also offers strategic and operational guidance 

aimed at undermining Iraqi stability. Approximately 12,000 Iraqi Shiite operatives 

that had been exiled to Iran entered Iraq at the start of the war in 2003. The 

IRGC–QF’s partner, Lebanese Hizballah, has trained Iraqi insurgents in Iraq, Iran 

and Lebanon. Lebanese Hizballah provides insurgents with the tactics and technology to conduct kidnappings, small unit tactical operations and employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), among the lessons learned from that 

group’s operations in southern Lebanon. 

One of the signature weapons of this war is the IED, which can be employed in 

a variety of ways. Efforts to defeat these weapons and the networks that design, 

build, emplace and fund them draw persistent counter-responses. The steady flow 

of new IED technologies and highly-creative emplacement and employment methods 

underscore the enemy’s ability to adapt and react quickly and efficiently. 

The ISF improved their overall capabilities in 2007. While the ISF is increasingly 

leading counterinsurgency operations. the force still depends upon coalition combat 

service support. Iraq’s army has grown substantially with the addition of two more 

divisions, the decision to fill out other divisions and a new policy permitting combat 

units to man 120-percent over authorized levels. ISF numbers have grown partly 

due to more successful recruitment among recently engaged Sunni tribal leaders 

and former regime commissioned and noncommissioned officers. This also is increasing Sunni Arab representation in the ISF. Today, there are approximately 450,000 

trained members of the ISF including army, local and national police, border enforcement, and air force, navy and special operations forces. The ISF inventory includes more than 350 armored personnel carriers, 3,000 cargo trucks, 150 tanks, 25 

helicopters, 15 fixed-wing aircraft, 3 transport aircraft, and 30 patrol boats. 

However, the ISF still suffers from a lack of trained, qualified, and experienced 

leaders at the tactical level. This fosters a climate in which individuals remain vulnerable to improper political and criminal influence. Iraq’s army is trying to increase the number and quality of its leaders. A new military justice system will help 

enforce the rule of law. That will help security forces win popular recognition as the 

legitimate guarantor of Iraq’s security. 

The flow of foreign terrorists into Iraq and the number of associated suicide attacks have declined. The Saudi grand mufti’s 1 October condemnation of foreign terrorists and Osama bin Laden’s December 2007 message in which he spoke of mistakes in Iraq could weaken AQI’s appeal to foreign recruits. At the same time, the 

nations where foreign fighters originate or transit have increased their counterterrorism efforts, especially targeting foreign fighter transport networks. 

Afghanistan 

Although the Taliban cannot conduct sustained conventional operations, it has increased attacks every year since 2002. Violence in 2007 grew by 33 percent over levels in 2006. Statistics also show 21 percent increases in suicide bombings and the 

use of IEDs and a 47 percent increase in small arms attacks. Some of these trends 

reflect the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) increased engagements 

in expanded operational areas. 

Through violence and intimidation, the Taliban-led insurgency continues to undermine the development of a stable Afghanistan. While the insurgency remains concentrated in the Pashtun dominated south and east, it expanded in 2007 to some 

western areas that lack an effective security and government presence. 

The Taliban play to an international audience through press releases, videos, and 

the Internet, sometimes with al Qaeda’s support. The Taliban lost several key commanders in 2007. However, they can sustain operations with steady access to local 

39

Pashtun and some foreign fighters. Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan is increasing 

to levels unseen since 2001–2002. Al Qaeda supports the Afghan insurgency with 

personnel, training and resources, particularly in Afghanistan’s south and east. 

Insurgents in Afghanistan have expanded their use of some tactics and techniques 

that have proven effective in Iraq, such as kidnappings, suicide attacks and the occasional use of EFPs, demonstrating the adaptive nature of the threat. They also 

still cross the porous Afghan-Pakistani border despite pledges by local tribal groups 

to the Pakistani government that they would remove foreign fighters from their 

midst while also preventing insurgent border transits. 

Iran seeks to expand its influence in Afghanistan, mainly along its eastern border, 

while challenging the coalition’s presence and influence in Afghanistan. Tehran advances its goals through legitimate business and humanitarian efforts along with 

weapon shipments that include EFPs, rocket propelled grenades, mortars, rockets, 

small arms ammunition and explosives. 

Afghanistan’s army and police forces are growing slowly and unevenly both in 

numbers and effectiveness. The Afghan army has made progress by fielding 11 of 

14 projected infantry brigades. A third of Afghanistan’s combat arms battalions can 

lead combat operations, albeit with coalition support. In contrast, Afghan National 

Police (ANP) forces still require considerable training and coalition support to fulfill 

their mission. The Afghan National Army has grown from 31,000 to approximately 

49,000 over the last year. The ANP has grown from 56,000 to 75,000 over the same 

period and is expected to grow to 82,000 by the end of this year. Recent polls show 

that the Afghan people generally view the army as one of the most trusted Afghan 

institutions. However, the Afghan Government continues to struggle against violence, corruption, narcotics and foreigners opposed to a unified and strong Afghanistan. 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member nations continue to negotiate 

how to achieve counterinsurgency goals in Afghanistan. Differences exist over manning levels and the relative utility of hard and soft methods, such as use of force, 

reconstruction and reconciliation programs. Budget constraints and competing global deployments will limit some allies from contributing more personnel and equipment to the ISAF which now includes approximately 42,000 troops from all 26 

NATO and some non-NATO nations. NATO allies engaged in combat operations in 

Afghanistan have performed well, but low domestic support for ISAF among some 

allied nations will limit their willingness to engage in more direct combat due to 

concerns over potential casualties. 

The Afghan Government is likely to progress slowly even with NATO’s and ISAF’s 

continued help. Afghanistan will remain vulnerable to insurgent violence, the narcotics trade, foreign influences and disruptive political maneuvering ahead of the 

2009 Afghan presidential election. 

Afghan popular discontent will endure in areas where corruption persists, select 

Pashtun tribes remain disenfranchised, the promise of reconstruction is not kept 

and in areas with poor security. The Taliban insurgency and foreign terrorists will 

continue to attack the Afghan Government’s resolve and the international community’s commitment to build a stable Afghanistan. 

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST THREAT

Still the most significant terrorist threat to U.S. interests worldwide, al Qaeda remains committed to using violence to displace western influences across the Islamic 

world with its own interpretation of Islamic rule. 

During 2007, al Qaeda expanded its support to the Afghan insurgency, continued 

to plan, support, and direct transnational attacks against the west from its safehaven inside Pakistan’s ungoverned regions while also expanding the threat it poses 

to Pakistan itself. 

We know from the past that al Qaeda is interested in recruiting operatives who 

can travel easily and without drawing scrutiny from security services. As such, Europe could be used as a platform from which to launch attacks against the United 

States. 

Al Qaeda continues efforts to obtain chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

capabilities. In September 2006, al Qaeda-in-Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri publicly called upon scientists to help the terrorist group develop such weapons. These 

efforts will likely persist. 

Al Qaeda’s threat to Pakistan itself grew in 2007, marked explicitly by Osama bin 

Laden’s September appeal that Pakistanis rise up against President Musharraf. 

This is broadly consistent with previous assassination attempts against Musharraf 

and previous calls from other senior al Qaeda members such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. 

40

Al Qaeda may step up attacks across Pakistan to accelerate and exploit internal instability with likely targets also including U.S. and western interests. 

Osama bin Laden issued six statements between September and December 2007, 

his first public statements since July 2006 and first live video since October 2004. 

The spate of statements by the group’s leaders, including Ayman al Zawahiri, signals their continued health and control over the movement despite their isolation. 

The messages are designed to encourage donors, enlist recruits, maintain control 

over the movement and discourage the west. 

Al Qaeda has consistently recovered from senior leadership losses. Despite the 

deaths and capture of key figures, mid-level operatives rise to advance plans and 

operations. Al-Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al-Libi have issued statements throughout 

the year, but from late April to early June, several others issued statements in 

rapid succession, each emphasizing various themes to different audiences. They included al-Zawahiri, Abu al-Yazid, Adam Gadahn, and Abu Yahya al-Libi. This array 

of speakers is likely meant to signal to internal and external audiences that al 

Qaeda’s viability transcends bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri. 

Al Qaeda pursued partnerships in 2007 with compatible regional terrorist groups 

to extend the organization’s financial and operational reach while also seeking to 

portray a sense of momentum under the al Qaeda brand. In November 2007, alZawahiri announced a merger between the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) 

and al Qaeda, following the 2006 merger with the Algerian Salafist Group for 

Preaching and Combat (GSPC). 

Al Qaeda selects regional terrorist groups for ‘‘franchises’’ based upon their religious and ideological beliefs, capabilities and adherence to al Qaeda’s global agenda. 

Al Qaeda uses such mergers to foster public perceptions of its worldwide influence, 

pursue its transnational agenda and to strike U.S. and western interests in new 

areas. 

Regional groups believe such mergers enhance their status and strengthen their 

ability to recruit and raise funds. However, such mergers require most regional 

groups to subordinate their local agendas to al Qaeda’s global aspirations, which can 

spark internal friction. A regional group’s mistakes can also tarnish the al Qaeda 

brand, as AQI demonstrated in 2006–2007 when it failed to rally the Sunni Arab 

population to its banner and instead sparked violent tribal opposition in al-Anbar 

and beyond. 

As these mergers multiply, the threat to U.S. and western interests may increase 

as new franchises adopt al Qaeda’s targeting priorities, namely western interests. 

For example, following its 2006 merger, the GSPC—renamed al Qaeda in the Lands 

of the Islamic Maghreb—increased its focus on targeting western interests. 

Al Qaeda’s mergers with the GSPC and LIFG demonstrate its effort to expand 

into Africa. Lebanon may be another region ripe for al Qaeda expansion. 

East Africa al Qaeda and an increasing number of associated Somali extremists 

operating across the largely lawless territory of Somalia continue to pose the greatest threat to U.S. and western interests across the region. 

Since Ethiopia’s late 2006 intervention in Somalia, anti-government militants, 

remnants of the Council of Islamic Courts and Somali extremists associated with 

the East Africa al Qaeda have regrouped mainly in Mogadishu. They conduct assassinations, bombings and suicide attacks against the Somali government, Ethiopian 

troops and the African Union Mission in Somalia. While regional counterterrorism 

operations have killed or captured some key operatives, local al Qaeda and their associates still operate with relative freedom. 

Following the February 12 killing of Hizballah terrorist leader Imad Mughniyah, 

Hizballah publicly threatened Israel and reprisal attacks against Israeli and/or Jewish interests are likely. Hizballah has a near global reach and previously has demonstrated a retaliatory capability with attacks in Buenos Aires during the 1990s. If 

Hizballah perceives significant U.S. involvement, attacks against U.S. interests are 

also likely. 

NATIONS AND REGIONS OF INTEREST

Iran 

Iran’s military is designed principally to defend against external threats from 

larger, more modem adversaries such as the United States and threats posed by internal opponents. However, Iran could conduct limited offensive operations with its 

ballistic missile and naval forces. 

Diplomacy, economic leverage, and active sponsorship of terrorist and paramilitary groups are the tools Tehran uses to drive its aggressive foreign policy. In 

particular, Tehran uses terrorism to pressure or intimidate other countries. More 

broadly, it serves as a strategic deterrent. Tehran assesses that its use of terrorism 

41

provides benefits with few costs and risks largely because it believes it successfully 

conceals its involvement in such tactics. Iran continues to provide lethal aid to Iraqi 

Shiite militants and Afghan insurgents while simultaneously providing weapons, 

training and money to Lebanese Hizballah, its strategic partner. 

In recent years, weapons that are unique to the IRGC–QF and Lebanese 

Hizballah have been used by Iraqi Shiite militants in anti-coalition attacks, especially EFPs. Coalition forces have also recovered Iranian-made munitions, including 

EFPs, in Afghanistan. Within the country’s borders, modernization of Iran’s conventional military inventory has traditionally favored naval and air defense forces over 

ground and air units. 

Ongoing naval modernization is focused on asymmetric equipment such as fast 

missile patrol boats as well as anti-ship cruise missiles and naval mines. Iran recently launched an additional mini-sub and started an additional product line for 

the MOWJ corvette. Iranian broadcasts claim that Iranian unmanned aerial vehicles have monitored U.S. aircraft carrier operations in the Persian Gulf. 

Since early 2007, Iran has begun to invest heavily in advanced air defenses, reversing decades of neglect in this arena. Iran began taking delivery of the advanced 

SA–15 tactical surface-to-air missile systems and in December 2007 announced it 

will acquire the strategic, long-range SA–20. Iran’s procurement of modern surfaceto-air missiles (SAMs) with automated command, control, and communications systems will improve its ability to protect senior leadership and key nuclear and industrial facilities. 

While not investing in major new ground systems since at least early 2005, Iran 

is building an asymmetric capability to counter more advanced, adversary ground 

forces, including through enhancements to its Basij volunteer forces, which would 

play a large role in an asymmetric fight. 

Regular Iranian ballistic missile training continues throughout the country. Iran 

continues to develop and acquire ballistic missiles that can hit Israel and central 

Europe, including Iranian claims of an extended-range variant of the Shahab–3 and 

a new 2,000-km medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) called the Ashura. Beyond 

the steady growth in its missile and rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the 

lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with accuracy improvements and new 

sub-munition payloads. 

We judge that Iran halted its nuclear weaponization and covert uranium conversion and enrichment-related work in 2003, but we assess that Tehran at a minimum 

is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran continues to develop 

its enrichment program in defiance of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Iran is producing uranium enrichment feed material at Esfahan, claims to be enriching uranium in 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz and is working on more advanced centrifuges. 

It also continues to build a heavy water reactor at Arak which will be capable of 

producing plutonium that could be processed for use in a weapon. 

Tehran continues to seek dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise which have legitimate uses, but also could enable ongoing biological warfare efforts. We assess that Tehran maintains dual-use facilities intended to produce chemical warfare agents in times of need and conducts research that may have offensive 

applications. 

North Korea 

North Korea’s main goals are to preserve its current system of government while 

improving its economic situation, albeit at a pace it believes will not threaten internal stability. Pyongyang does not view its nuclear weapons, improved relations with 

the United States and a large Active-Duty Force of about 1.2 million as mutually 

exclusive. Rather they are the means Pyongyang uses to realize its goals. 

North Korea’s large, forward-positioned, but poorly-equipped and poorly-trained 

military is not well-suited to initiate major military operations against the Republic 

of Korea (ROK). The long-range artillery the north has positioned very near the demilitarized zone is complimented by a substantial mobile ballistic missile force with 

an array of warhead options to include WMD that can strike U.S. forces and our 

allies in the ROK and Japan. The north relies upon these capabilities to ensure its 

sovereignty and independence. 

Development of the Taepo Dong-2, which has the potential to reach the continental United States with a nuclear payload, continues despite a failed July 2006 

test launch. North Korea also continues work on an intermediate range ballistic 

missile. 

Although North Korea has halted and disabled portions of its nuclear program, 

we do not know the conditions under which Pyongyang would entirely abandon its 

nuclear weapons capability. It could have stockpiled several nuclear weapons from 

plutonium produced at Yongbyon and it likely sought a uranium enrichment capaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
42

bility for nuclear weapons. It may also have proliferated nuclear weapons-related 

technology abroad. North Korea may be able to successfully mate a nuclear warhead 

to a mobile ballistic missile. 

North Korea has had a longstanding chemical warfare program and we believe 

North Korea’s chemical warfare capabilities probably included the ability to produce 

bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood agents. We believe that 

Pyongyang possesses a sizable stockpile of agents. North Korea has yet to accede 

to the Chemical Weapons Convention and is not a member of the Australia Group. 

North Korea possesses a biotechnical infrastructure that could support the production of biological warfare agents. North Korea continues to research bacterial 

and viral biological agents that could support an offensive biological warfare program. This biological infrastructure combined with its weapons industry give North 

Korea a potentially robust biological warfare capability. North Korea is stable and 

leadership succession, should it occur due to Kim’s sudden death, is more likely to 

be smooth than not. Should the Six-Party Talks break down, the North is likely to 

respond with resumed production of fissile material at Yongbyon while also increasing rhetoric intended to encourage a return to dialogue on the North’s terms. In 

such a scenario, additional missile or nuclear tests could occur. 

China 

China is strengthening its ability to conduct military operations along its periphery on its own terms. It is building and fielding sophisticated weapon systems and 

testing new doctrines that it believes will allow it to prevail in regional conflicts and 

also counter traditional U.S. military advantages. 

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is building its own sophisticated aircraft, surface combatants, submarines and weapon systems while still buying others overseas. For example, China is integrating Russian-produced Kilo-class submarines and 

Sovremenny-class destroyers into the Navy as well as 5–300 PMU2 surface-to-air 

missiles and Su–27 aircraft into the Air Force. China has developed and begun to 

deploy indigenous SAM systems which, together with SAMs imported from Russia, 

provide Beijing with a modem, layered, groundbased air defense capability to defend 

important assets. China bought four S–300 PMU–2 (SA–20) air defense battalions 

and intends to buy four more. This increases its engagement range out to 200 km. 

China is developing a layered maritime capability with medium-range anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarines, maritime strike aircraft and surface combatants armed 

with increasingly sophisticated anti-ship cruise missiles. 

The PLA has achieved moderate success in introducing these new weapons. Additional integration probably will accelerate as the PLA explores the full potential of 

new weapons. 

China is looking beyond a potential Taiwan contingency and is pursuing capabilities needed to become a major regional power. The navy already operates a large 

surface and an increasingly modem submarine fleet and may be seeking to operate 

an aircraft carrier. The air force is developing an extended-range, land-attack 

cruise-missile-capable bomber. However, China must still integrate new doctrinal 

concepts and it also lacks the overseas bases needed for extended operations. Although China may not achieve a true regional power-projection capability in the 

next decade, it most likely will increase maritime patrols of disputed oil fields and 

its Exclusive Economic Zone. 

China’s space and counterspace capabilities have significant implications for U.S. 

space-based communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations in a Taiwan Strait contingency and beyond. Beijing operates communications, 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, navigation and Earth resource systems with military applications and will continue to field more advanced satellites 

through the next decade. In addition to the direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) program successfully tested in January 2007, China also is developing jammers and kinetic and directed-energy weapons for ASAT missions. Citing its manned and lunar 

space programs, China is improving its ability to track and identify satellites—a 

prerequisite for ASAT attacks. 

Moving away from its historical reliance upon mass conscription, China is trying 

to build a more professional military workforce—one able to engage successfully in 

modem warfare. The PLA seeks to rejuvenate its officer corps, strengthen military 

education, reform its noncommissioned officer corps, improve military quality of life 

and combat corruption. However, the PLA still appears to be encumbered by centralized control and a lingering mistrust of individual initiative. 

China is developing missiles of all ranges. The CSS–10 Mod–X–2 (DF–31A) intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) can strike the continental United States and is 

joining China’s operational inventory along with the less-capable DF–31. Other future ICBMs could include some with multiple, independently-targeted reentry vehiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
43

cles (MIRVs). Development continues on the conventional DF–21 (CSS–5) MRBM 

variants which can hold U.S. regional assets at risk. 

China’s deployed missile inventory includes nuclear-armed intercontinental, intermediate and medium-range ballistic missiles, conventional medium- and short-range 

ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. China’s nuclear force is becoming more survivable with the deployment of DF–31 and DF–31A roadmobile ICBMs and the eventual deployment of the JL–2 submarine launched ballistic missile. China currently 

has less than 50 ICBMs capable of targeting the United States; however the number 

of ICBM warheads capable of reaching the United States could more than double 

in the next 15 years, especially if MIRVs are employed. China has also fielded over 

1,000 CSS–6 and CSS–7 conventional short-range ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. 

It also is developing more capable conventional missiles able to range U.S. and allied military installations in the region. Chinese conventional missile upgrades may 

include maneuvering reentry vehicles with multiple constellation, satellite-aided 

navigation and terminal guidance. 

China’s nuclear weapon stockpile likely will grow over the next 10 years as new 

ballistic missiles are activated and older ones are upgraded. China likely has produced enough weapon-grade fissile material to meet its needs for the immediate future. In addition, China likely retains the capability to produce biological and chemical weapons. 

Growing capabilities in counterspace, cyber warfare, electronic warfare and longrange precision strike could help China achieve strategic surprise. Nevertheless, 

China’s security strategy emphasizes strategic defense, which integrates diplomacy, 

economics and information with conventional military operations. If Beijing adheres 

to this strategy, we will have indications of Beijing’s concerns along with warning 

of imminent crises. 

While Chinese security strategy favors the defense, its operational doctrine does 

emphasize seizing the initiative through offensive action, including possible preemptive action. China does not view an offensive operational doctrine within the context 

of a strategic defense as contradictory. 

China’s total military-related spending for 2007 could be as much as $85 to $125 

billion. China has made marginal improvements in military budget transparency, 

but the PLA’s disclosed budget still does not include large costs for strategic forces, 

foreign acquisitions, military-related research and development and paramilitary 

forces. China’s accounting opacity reflects a lack of institutional capacity as well as 

an unwillingness to comply with international standards for reporting military 

spending. China also remains reluctant to share details about its growing ASAT capabilities. 

China maintains an active presence in the South and East China Seas. Chinese 

operations in the South China Sea (covering areas such as the Spratly and Paracel 

islands) include reconnaissance patrols, training and island defense, air defense and 

service support exercises. China also has conducted operations in the East China 

Sea area, including patrols to protect its maritime interests and claimed oil and gas 

resources. 

Russia 

Russia is trying to re-establish a degree of military power that it believes is commensurate with its renewed economic strength and general political confidence. Perceived western encroachment into its claimed areas of interest and Islamic or insurgent threats along its periphery are driving Russia’s current military activities and 

modernization efforts. 

Russia’s widely publicized strategic missile launches, increased long-range aviation flights and Kuznetsov carrier strike group deployment are meant to signal Moscow’s continued global reach and relevance to domestic and international audiences. 

Russia has made a major commitment of almost 5 trillion rubles to its 2007–2015 

budget to develop and build new conventional and nuclear weapon systems, with 

Moscow’s priority on maintenance and modernization of the latter. 

Development and production of advanced strategic weapons such as the SS–27/

TOPOL–M ICBM and the Bulava–30 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) 

continues. In April, Russia rolled out the first Dolgorukiy-class ballistic missile submarine designed to carry the Bulava–30 SLBM which continues testing despite several publicized failures. 

Russia is developing a new Iskander weapon system that will incorporate the SS–

26/STONE short-range ballistic missile and a cruise missile. Both missile systems 

share common launch equipment, command and control infrastructure and can engage multiple targets in near real-time. In the future, other weapons may be incorporated into the Iskander weapons complex such as artillery and multiple rocket 

launchers. 

44

Russia announced it had deployed three more Topol-M (SS–27) roadmobile ICBMs 

in December 2007 at Teykovo, in addition to the three Topol-Ms already on alert 

there since December 2006. Russian officials said they also deployed four more SS–

27s in silos at Tatishchevo, increasing the total to 48. Russian media reports say 

Russia flight-tested its developmental RS–24, a MIRVed version of the Topol-M, 

twice in 2007 and it expects to deploy it in 2009 after several more tests. Russia 

claims the MIRVed Topol-M can penetrate any missile defense. 

Russia retains a relatively large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear warheads. Nuclear weapons or material diversion remains a concern despite increased security 

measures. Some nuclear facilities and research reactors remain vulnerable to internal theft, sabotage or a well-executed terrorist attack. Since the early 1990s, Russian scientists familiar with Moscow’s chemical weapons development program have 

been publicizing information on chemical agents designed to circumvent international arms control agreements and to defeat western detection and protection 

measures. Such work may be continuing today. 

Russia may consider using chemical or even biological agents in counterterrorism 

situations as demonstrated by its use of chemical incapacitants to resolve the 

Dubrovka Theater hostage situation in 2002. 

Russian conventional force capabilities continue to also grow, albeit at a measured 

pace. Readiness improvements are seen primarily among the conventional ‘‘permanently ready forces’’ (PRF). Russia has increased training and readiness levels in 

these units above the lowest points of the mid-1990s. However, Russia is finding it 

hard to improve training quality and modernize equipment while also increasing recruitment and retention rates for the volunteers needed in the PRF and the noncommissioned officer cadre. 

Russia unilaterally suspended participation with the Conventional Armed Forces 

in Europe (CFE) Treaty in late 2007 after claiming that the agreement was outdated and biased. Moscow seeks to pressure NATO members to ratify the adapted 

CFE Treaty. Russia’s refusal to abide by treaty equipment limits, provide required 

treaty data or accept or conduct inspections undermines trust and will make it 

harder to monitor key European security issues. 

Russia opposes closer integration of former Soviet countries with the west and 

wants to continue its presence in the so-called ‘‘frozen conflict’’ areas. Peacekeeping 

forces in the Georgian separatist areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and other 

military forces in Moldova continue to be a major source of friction between Russia 

and respective national governments. 

Russia signed more than $10 billion in arms sales agreements in 2007, marking 

a second consecutive year of high sales. Russia recently signed large contracts with 

several countries, including Algeria, India, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Vietnam 

while new agreements with China have declined. Pending sales include advanced 

weapons such as MiG–29M and Su–30MK multi-role fighter aircraft, Gepard and 

Krivak-class frigates, Kilo-class submarines, BMP–3 armored infantry fighting vehicles, T–90 main battle tanks and advanced surface-to-air missile systems. 

Russia will continue to produce advanced fighter aircraft for export to countries 

such as Venezuela, Algeria, India, and Malaysia while also seeking additional warplane sales to South America and Middle East. Moscow also continues to aggressively market its air defense systems, ballistic missile systems and related automated command and control systems to Iran, China, Syria, and other countries. 

Syria 

Syria is trying to balance a complex mix of objectives throughout the region, particularly in Lebanon and Iraq. 

Damascus seeks improved relations with the Iraqi Government while at the same 

time it still harbors Iraqis with ties to insurgents and other oppositionists in Iraq. 

Syria also seeks to strengthen its influence in Lebanon through its continuing 

support to Hizballah and other pro-Syrian allies. Its primary goal there is to ensure 

the selection of a president and cabinet that will accommodate Syrian interests in 

Lebanon. With significant influence over the Lebanese government, Syria may be 

able to stymie the United Nations’ investigation into former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination. More broadly, Syria wants to protect its interests in any 

Israeli-Lebanese peace deal and in wider Middle East diplomatic efforts. 

Internally, Syria is trying to counter domestic Islamic extremists. In response to 

western pressure, Damascus does block some foreign terrorist movements from 

Syria into Iraq. 

With regard to its external defense, Syria was impressed by Hizballah’s combat 

performance against Israel in 2006 and likely will try to incorporate the terrorist 

group’s small-unit tactics into its own military doctrine. In particular, it is trying 

to emulate Hizballah’s successful and aggressive use of anti-tank guided missiles 

45

(ATOMs). While its military remains in a defensive posture and inferior to Israel’s 

forces, Syria is upgrading its missile, rocket, antitank, aircraft, and air defense inventories. It reportedly has contracted for thousands of additional Russian ATOMs. 

Syria is investing in ATOMs as a weapon of choice against Israeli armor and seeks 

the most capable missiles available. Press reports indicate that Syria may give advanced anti-tank missiles to Hizballah. 

Syrian military training in 2007 focused on blocking an Israeli invasion and reportedly included increased urban and guerilla warfare training. Syrian contracts 

with Russia may also include new MiO–31 and MiG–29M/M2 fighter aircraft and 

96K6 Pantsyr-S1E self-propelled short-range gun and missile air-defense systems. 

Media reports indicate that Syria successfully launched an improved version of its 

SCUD–D ballistic missile in 2007; one with greater accuracy and which is more difficult to intercept. 

Syria’s chemical warfare program is well established with a stockpile of nerve 

agent, which it can deliver by aircraft or ballistic missiles. During the past several 

years, Damascus has continued to seek chemical warfare-related precursors and expertise from foreign sources. Syria has the facilities and the expertise to domestically produce, store and deliver chemical warfare. Syria will continue to improve its 

chemical warfare for the foreseeable future to counter regional adversaries. 

Syria also has a program to develop select biological agents as weapons. The program is judged to be in the research and development stage, with Syria’s biotechnical infrastructure capable of supporting limited biological agent development. 

However, Syria is not known to have successfully weaponized biological agents in 

an effective delivery system. 

Syria’s ballistic missile inventory is designed to offset shortfalls in the country’s 

conventional forces. It includes older Russian built SS–21 missiles as well as 

SCUD–E, SCUD–C, and SCUD–D missiles. Syria continues to flight test ballistic 

missiles which it views as a strategic deterrent against Israel. 

Levant 

The Levant remains tense with the potential for renewed conflict. Israel, 

Hizballah and Syria are internalizing lessons learned from the summer 2006 conflict 

in preparation for a subsequent round. While none appear to want fighting to resume now, they all view its likelihood over the medium term. The period of high 

tension between Israel and Syria during the summer of 2007 has subsided. Nevertheless, Israel remains concerned over Syria’s military posture. Similarly, Syria 

fears an Israeli attack. Senior Israel Defense Forces leaders are driving an intense 

effort to fix shortcomings in readiness, training, logistics, and combined arms operations identified following the summer 2006 war. 

Iran and Syria jointly continue to support anti-Israel terrorist and militant groups 

in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. However, the alliance between secular 

Arab Syria and theocratic Persian Iran is not a natural one. It may erode if Syria 

is accommodated significantly in any diplomatic agreement with Israel. 

HAMAS’ rise to power in the Gaza Strip, the split in the Palestinian Authority 

and the ongoing rivalry between HAMAS and Fatah complicate Israeli Palestinian 

peacemaking efforts. Continued attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip increase the 

chances of major Israeli military action there. 

Since taking control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, HAMAS has been readying 

itself for an expected Israeli attack by adopting tactics similar to those Hizballah 

used successfully against Israel in Lebanon during 2006. Israel believes HAMAS has 

smuggled into the Gaza Strip, mainly through tunnels to Egypt, large quantities of 

arms and munitions which likely include dozens to hundreds of Soviet-era anti-tank 

missiles and possibly man-portable air defense systems. The military wing of 

HAMAS appears intent on transforming itself from a guerrilla or terrorist force into 

a military-style organization like Hizballah. 

The Lebanese military’s defeat of Fatah al-Islam militants in 2007 strengthened 

that national institution amidst growing instability. However, the persistent political impasse over the presidency and cabinet, the rearming of militias and Syria’s 

effort to maintain its influence in Lebanon are significant destabilizing influences. 

Al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups have tried to develop support and 

operate in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. 

Pakistan 

While Pakistan continues to strengthen its conventional and strategic forces, 

there is growing recognition of the need for more effective counter-insurgency and 

counterterrorism capabilities against the extremist threat across the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) and Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). 

46

This new focus, however, is unlikely to displace India as Pakistan’s perceived traditional, preeminent threat over the near term. Islamabad has adopted a military, 

political, administrative and economic strategy focused on the FATA. Pakistan has 

added more border posts, begun counterinsurgency training, fenced portions of the 

border and seeks to obtain counterinsurgency equipment while also expanding paramilitary forces. 

Pakistan lacks the transport and attack helicopters and upgraded communication 

gear needed to prosecute more effective and sophisticated counterinsurgency operations. Much of the Pakistani army also lacks the knowledge and language skills 

required to successfully operate across the tribal frontier’s complicated cultural terrain. While Frontier Corps troops understand the culture and region better and 

speak the local language, they have even less equipment and less training than the 

military. 

Although efforts to improve these deficiencies are underway, it will take 3 to 5 

years before results can be expected on the battlefield. 

Recent skirmishes in Swat, NWFP, indicate that when police stand and fight, 

they can counter militant attacks. Because the militants are unable to sustain attacks in the face of a military response, they often muster enough forces to overwhelm paramilitary and police units and then generally break contact before the 

military is able to engage them. 

So far, Pakistani military operations in the FATA have not fundamentally damaged al Qaeda’s position in the region. The tribal areas remain largely ungovernable 

and, as such, they will continue to provide vital sanctuary to al Qaeda, the Taliban, 

and regional extremism more broadly. 

Al Qaeda exploits this permissive operating environment to support the Afghan 

insurgency while also planning attacks against the U.S. and western interests 

worldwide. Together with militant groups, al Qaeda uses this sanctuary to train and 

recruit operatives, disseminate propaganda and obtain equipment and supplies. 

They consider Pakistan’s army and other Pakistani government interests as legitimate targets. Former Prime Minister Bhutto’s assassination underscores the 

threat’s severity and reach. 

On matters of external defense, Pakistan seeks to maintain stability and a balance.of power across the region through continued improvements to its nuclear and 

conventional forces. 

Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon 

stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems. We presently 

have confidence in Pakistan’s ability to safeguard its nuclear weapons, though 

vulnerabilities exist. 

Strategic rivalry with India continues to drive Pakistan’s development of an expanding array of delivery systems, with recent and growing emphasis on cruise missiles. Likely as a way of countering India’s emerging anti-ballistic missile capabilities, Islamabad is building cruise missiles such as the Hatf-VII/Babur for groundlaunch and the Hatf-VIII/Ra’ad for air-launch. Pakistan may pursue other launch 

platforms and missions for these missiles. 

Meanwhile, Pakistan continues to develop the Hatf-II/Abdali short-range and the 

Hatf-VI/Shaheen II medium-range ballistic missiles. These will join a missile inventory that already includes nuclear- and conventionally-armed short- and mediumrange ballistic missiles. While Islamabad has shown no interest in developing 

ICBMs, Sino-Pakistani space cooperation will likely give Islamabad access to the 

requisite technologies. 

Pakistan is modernizing conventional forces with aircraft from the United States, 

Chinese frigates and fighters and possibly German submarines 

Responding to media reports speculating on U.S. unilateral military action inside 

Pakistan’s borders, Pakistani representatives have stated that any unauthorized 

military strike by coalition forces on Pakistani soil would be considered an ‘‘enemy 

act.’’ Nevertheless, Islamabad welcomes intelligence sharing, technical cooperation 

and equipment and armaments in support of its counterterrorism and counterinsurgency missions. 

Arabian Gulf 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states remained stable despite increased reports 

of terrorist activity in the region during 2007. Saudi Arabia continues aggressive 

counterterrorism efforts while other Gulf Arab states are pursuing modest improvements of their own. 

GCC states remain wary of Tehran’s intentions towards Iraq, the Levant and 

among Gulf Shiite, but most are unwilling publicly to confront Iran’s regional interference or nuclear potential. Gulf leaders prefer diplomatic solutions to these issues, 

47

fearing that Iran could launch retaliatory strikes, cause economic disruption or 

interfere in their internal affairs if it is confronted with military force. 

While GCC countries have individually sought to improve their defensive capabilities, they have had less success in integrating their military capabilities. An example is the unsuccessful effort to establish an integrated air defense system. 

Gulf leaders believe that catastrophic sectarian civil war in Iraq would likely follow an abrupt withdrawal of U.S. forces. Most harbor reservations about Iraqi 

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s ability to represent all Iraqi factions and make 

progress toward national unity. Also, they are highly suspicious of Iran’s influence 

over the current Iraqi Government. 

Southeast Asia 

The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are the terrorist groups 

that pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia. The JI, which is 

based mainly in Indonesia, works regionally with other Islamic extremist and separatist groups, including with the ASG, to achieve its goal of establishing a global 

caliphate. 

In Indonesia, elite counterterrorist police units arrested the JI leader and a senior 

operative in June 2007; although other senior operatives remain at large. While JI 

has not carried out a large-scale attack in Indonesia since the 2005 attack in Bali, 

raids by Indonesian authorities revealed caches of weapons and explosives—clear 

signs that the group maintains the interest and capability to conduct attacks. 

Elsewhere in Indonesia, the government continues to successfully advance the August 2005 peace accord that ended the 29-year separatist conflict in the Aceh province, with a former rebel leader elected governor during Aceh’s provincial elections 

in December 2006. Still, sustained attention and cooperation remain necessary to 

prevent backsliding, particularly given reintegration and economic challenges. Sporadic separatist violence in Indonesia’s Papua province and low-level insurgency in 

Sulawesi pose no serious security threats. 

The Philippine government has successfully sustained a ceasefire in its Muslim 

south with the Mora Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), reaching an agreement with 

the MILF in November 2007 on territorial land boundaries for an expanded Muslim 

autonomous region. However, a comprehensive peace accord has remained elusive. 

Absent the resolution of the final obstacles, there is the risk of resumed fighting. 

While Philippine counterterrorism efforts have disrupted some attacks, ASG and 

other terrorists retain the capability to conduct operations. 

Thailand also continues to struggle with entrenched Muslim separatist unrest in 

its southern-most provinces, presenting a major challenge for the recently installed 

democratic government in Bangkok. An estimated 2,700 people have been killed in 

near-daily assassinations and bomb attacks since the previous spike in violence, 

which occurred in 2004. Increased military operations in the South since last summer have failed to significantly impact the rate of insurgent attacks. 

While the insurgency is indigenous, some local Muslim extremists proclaim their 

solidarity with ‘‘oppressed’’ Muslims worldwide. Successive Thai governments have 

failed to reduce insurgent violence in the South and address insurgent grievances. 

Despite Bangkok’s increased efforts to crack down on insurgent activity, continued 

high-profile attacks underscore rebel resiliency. The military, which remains the 

dominant actor on Bangkok’s policy vis-a-vis the south, will have to improve its efforts to win ‘‘hearts and minds’’ if underlying Muslim dissatisfaction is to be resolved entirely. 

Africa 

The United States faces no major military threat in Africa, although there are serious challenges to our interests. 

In Nigeria, militants threaten western oil interests by attacking oil facilities, kidnapping workers, and disrupting production. The government seeks a peaceful solution, but no agreement has been reached yet and the militants themselves are divided. 

Continuing post-election violence in Kenya underscores the fragility of the region’s 

democratic institutions. The stakes are high in Kenya as it is a key U.S. ally against 

transnational terrorism and East Africa’s major economic power. 

In Sudan, humanitarian concerns in Darfur continue to escalate. The government 

and rebels remain at odds, despite efforts to negotiate a peaceful solution. International efforts to deploy an enlarged peacekeeping force have yet to be realized. 

Elsewhere in Sudan, tensions are rising over delays in implementing the northsouth peace agreement. 

48

Propped up with Ethiopian troops, Somalia’s transitional government remains 

shaky and threatened by Islamist and clan insurgents. If the government collapses, 

warlords and others with terrorist affiliations are likely to refill the vacuum. 

Tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea persist, threatening a renewal of war between the two countries over a disputed border region. 

Latin America 

While the United States presently faces no major military threats or challenges 

across Latin America, a number of concerns endur. 

Despite his defeat in the recent referendum, Venezuelan President Chavez continues efforts to expand his power and confront U.S. regional influence. His government has expressed a desire to buy submarines, transport aircraft and an air defense system. Venezuela has already purchased advanced fighters, attack helicopters and assault rifles. 

Colombian counterinsurgency operations have degraded FARC field units and operations and led to increased desertions. Drug trafficking organizations cooperatively ship cocaine worldwide in an effort to maintain their dominant position as 

global suppliers. 

While Bolivia’s Morales continues to consolidate power with Venezuelan and 

Cuban help, continued opposition efforts to derail his draft constitution and calls for 

regional autonomy likely will challenge and perhaps destabilize his government. 

The broad support that acting Cuban President Raul Castro receives from the 

military, security services and the Communist Party will likely enable him to maintain stability, security, and his own position following Fidel Castro’s announced exit. 

Raul has displayed a preference for making decisions over the years in a collegial 

fashion. This suggests that the leadership group’s consensus will inform policymaking. The Cuban military’s support for Raul Castro shows no signs of reversing. 

Ungoverned Regions 

Ungoverned—or undergoverned—areas are territories beyond any sovereign nation’s control and, as such, lie outside the reach of traditional tools of statecraft. 

They often serve as training and recruitment safe havens for terrorist groups, insurgents, maritime pirates, criminal networks, gray/black market arms merchants or 

drug traffickers. Populations within ungoverned areas serve as fertile recruiting 

grounds for such non-state terrorist or criminal networks. 

TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES OF CONCERN

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Delivery Systems 

The proliferation and potential use of WMD against U.S. forces, the American 

people, our allies and interests remains a grave, enduring and evolving threat. 

Non-state terrorist networks continue to seek this capability while nationstates 

expand their WMD capabilities and the survivability, accuracy, and range of the associated delivery systems. 

Since mid-2006, several U.N. Security Council Resolutions have authorized sanctions against Iranian and North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 

While these actions have impeded some acquisition and support efforts, they have 

not stopped the programs themselves. Further frustrating sanction efforts is the inconsistent interpretation and enforcement of the resolutions by several key nations. 

Motivated by economic and strategic interests, entities in China and North Korea 

continue to supply technologies, components and raw materials in support of WMD 

and missile programs, especially across the Middle East and South Asia. 

Such technology transfers have lasting consequences. China’s provision of solidpropellant missile technology more than 15 years ago helped Pakistan develop the 

Hatf-VI/Shaheen II medium-range and Hatf-II/Abdali short-range ballistic missiles. 

Other examples include an agreement between China and Turkey regarding a shortrange ballistic missile (SRBM), Beijing’s active marketing of their latest developmental SRBM, the P12; and Egyptian SCUD production from North Korea. 

While some of these transferred items are proscribed under various WMD-related 

control regimes, many others are dual-use with legitimate industrial applications. 

Examples include: multi-axis computer numerically controlled machine tools that 

have applications in nuclear and missile programs, but are also commonly used 

throughout legitimate industry. Specialty metals such as 7000-series aluminum 

used in nuclear and missile programs is also commonly used in aircraft and other 

industries. 

Since 1999, Russia has adopted stronger export control laws and amended its 

criminal code to permit stricter punishment for illegal WMD-related exports. Similarly, China has also moved to enact export control laws to restrict proliferation of 

WMD-related materials. However, both have been inconsistent in applying these 

49

regulations, particularly regarding the sale of dual-use technology. When prompted, 

both Russia and China have been responsive to the United States and other countries and halted some questionable transactions. 

Non-governmental entities and individual entrepreneurs also remain a great concern. These organizations and the proliferation networks (front companies, shippers, 

facilitators) they tie into are often able to sidestep or outpace international detection 

and export control regimes. By regularly changing the names of the front companies 

they use, exploiting locations in countries with more permissive environments or lax 

enforcement and avoiding international financial institutions, these organizations 

are able to continue supplying WMD and ballistic missile programs to countries of 

concern. 

Most state programs now emphasize self-sufficiency to reduce reliance upon external suppliers which also limits their vulnerability to detection and interdiction. 

For example, Iranian weapon makers advertise their ability to manufacture guidance and control components, such as dynamically tuned gyros. Instead of importing 

ballistic missile systems, Tehran now produces the SCUD–B and –C, Shahab–3 and 

Fateh–110 even though it still depends on outside sources for many of the related 

dual-use raw materials and components. 

While these indigenous capabilities are not always a good substitute for foreign 

imports, particularly for more advanced technologies, they prove adequate in many 

cases. 

Consequently, as some countries forego imports in favor of indigenous WMD-related production, they position themselves anew as potential ‘‘secondary 

proliferators.’’ One example is North Korea’s proliferation of ballistic missile systems based on Soviet designed SCUD missiles they acquired in the 1980s. 

Even though most advanced nations cooperate against WMD proliferation, a number of trends beyond direct government control still fuel the threat. They include 

commercial scientific advances, the availability of relevant dual-use studies and information, scientists’ enthusiasm for sharing their research and the availability of 

dual-use training and education. 

Overall, the threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to continue 

increasing while growing more complex over the next decade. Current trends indicate that adversary ballistic missile systems, with advanced liquid- or solid-propellant propulsion systems, are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, 

and accurate while also presenting longer ranges. Pre-launch survivability is also 

likely to increase as potential adversaries strengthen their denial and deception 

measures and increasingly base their missiles on mobile sea- and land-based platforms. Adversary nations are increasingly adopting technical and operational countermeasures to defeat missile defenses. For example, China, Iran and North Korea 

exercise near simultaneous salvo firings from multiple locations to defeat these defenses. 

Space and Counterspace 

The growing distribution of space-related knowledge and technology largely 

through commercial uses is helping other nations acquire space and space-related 

capabilities. including some with direct military applications. 

Because most space technologies have both civilian and military uses, this trend 

is providing some countries and non-state groups with new or more capable communications, reconnaissance, navigation and targeting capabilities. Insurgents in Iraq, 

for example, have been captured in possession of commercial satellite imagery available on the Internet. 

Russia and China remain the top military space and counterspace states of concern. China successfully tested an ASAT missile in January 2007. Some countries 

have already deployed systems with inherent ASAT capabilities, such as satellitetracking and laser range-finding devices. 

China, Russia, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden seek improved space object tracking and kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities. 

However, these technologies are costly and most countries that want them are not 

expected to buy them soon. China is developing technology that could eventually be 

used to counter vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication and intelligence 

collection capabilities. 

Other states and non-state groups pursue more limited and asymmetric responses 

that do not require large financial investments or a sophisticated industrial base. 

These methods include: denial and deception, electronic warfare or signal jamming 

and physical attacks on ground-based space assets. 

50

Computer Network Threats 

The U.S. information infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer networks and systems, and the data that resides on them, is critical to most 

aspects of modern life in the United States. Russia and China pose the most experienced, well-resourced and capable computer network operations (CNO) threats to 

the United States, but they are not the only foreign entities that do. Other nations 

and non-state terrorist and criminal groups are also developing and refining their 

abilities to exploit and attack computer networks in support of their peacetime and 

wartime military, intelligence, or criminal goals. 

The scope and sophistication of malicious CNO targeting against U.S. networks 

has steadily increased over the last 5 years. This is of particular concern because 

of the pronounced military advantages that the United States has traditionally derived from information networks. Potential adversaries that cannot compete headon against the United States may view CNO as a preferred asymmetric strategy to 

exploit our weakness while minimizing or degrading our traditional strengths. 

China became the largest exporter of information technology in 2004, surpassing 

the United States and the European Union. Current trends suggest that China will 

soon become a major supplier to the United States. Overseas production provides 

opportunities for hostile actors to access targeted systems by exploiting the supply 

chain at its origin. 

Russia and China have the technical, educational, and operational ability to conduct CNO against targeted networks. Russia remains the most capable cyberthreat 

to the United States. Several high-ranking Russian military officials have promoted 

CNO’s potential against future adversaries. Since 2005, China has been incorporating offensive CNO into their military exercises, primarily in first strikes 

against enemy networks. Recent hacking activities emanating from China underscore concerns about Beijing’s potential hostile CNO intelligence collection activities. 

Underground Facilities 

Potential adversaries are going underground to deny the United States an important military advantage it has held for decades: precision-strike from the air. 

Hardened and deeply buried targets (HDBTs) protect the leadership and military 

assets that current and potential adversaries value most. They include: command 

and control functions, WMD and associated delivery systems and WMD research 

and development. HDBTs often feature strong physical security, modern air defenses, and networked communications. 

The rising importance of HDBTs to potential adversaries grows each year. Whether those nations are rogue, major, or emerging powers, they increasingly protect 

their important military and security assets underground. This is most true for nations that support terrorism and whose potential possession of WMD makes these 

facilities a special concern. Recent and rapid advances in commercially available 

Western tunneling technology helps these nations and non-state actors build underground sanctuaries that are effectively immune to the kinds of precision-strike 

weapons used by the U.S. in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 

In the 2006 conflict in Lebanon, Hizballah complicated Israeli targeting by using 

HDBTs to store weapons, conduct operations and launch rockets. 

Major elements of Tehran’s nuclear program are protected and concealed within 

hardened and tunneled underground facilities. 

As potential adversaries improve their ability to build underground facilities, the 

United States will find it harder to destroy these targets successfully with conventional penetrating munitions. 

Advanced and Improvised Weapons 

Improvised munitions and highly-accurate long-range guided weapons help nonstate actors inflict losses against technologically superior opponents at a relatively 

low cost and with little training. 

These weapons can produce operational and even strategic-level effects beyond the 

battlefield when used to their maximum effect at the tactical level and publicized 

through the media or Internet. This provides terrorist and insurgent groups with 

a magnified politico-military potential that exceeds their historical norm. 

For example, Hizballah inflicted significant Israeli casualties and challenged 

Israeli ground operations and plans while using scores of advanced ATOM against 

Israeli ground troops and armored vehicles during the summer 2006 South Lebanon 

conflict. Hizballah also heavily damaged an Israeli warship with an anti-ship cruise 

missile, a military capability once limited to nation-states and that Hizballah was 

not known to possess prior to the conflict. 

Very advanced and portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles are increasingly 

available to non-state groups through uncontrolled exports, falsified end-user stateVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
51

ments, gray market transfers, ransacked armories and/or direct supply from sympathetic regimes. MANPADS were recovered in the Horn of Africa during 2007. These 

weapons can be used in ambush and sniper attacks against high-value and lightlydefended targets such as political facilities, vehicles, and aircraft. 

The threat posed by improvised and suicide weapons, such as those used in Iraq 

and Afghanistan lies in the relatively low technological barrier to their construction, 

the relative ease in acquiring or manufacturing their ingredients and the growing 

availability of information about how to build and deploy them. The variety and sophistication of IEDs is largely limited only by the ingenuity of those who design, 

build and emplace them. 

Non-State Actors 

When available in combination, advanced weapons, sophisticated information 

technologies, ungoverned spaces and external sponsorship give non-nation-state 

criminal or terrorist groups the chance to develop credible military, intelligence and 

counterintelligence capabilities once limited to nation-states. 

Largely unencumbered by traditional internal and external governance responsibilities aside from attending to their own supporters, these groups can operate beyond the reach of traditional state-craft tools such as economic and diplomatic sanctions. 

The premier example is Lebanese Hizballah, a terrorist group functioning as a 

state within a state in South Lebanon. While the group runs substantial and diverse 

social, cultural, economic and political programs, it also fields significant and growing military, intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, as it demonstrated in 

2006 against Israel. 

While ideology and political goals drive non-state actors such as Lebanese 

Hizballah, crime is a motivating factor for others. The FARC presents formidable 

intelligence capabilities and the group has access to hundreds of millions of dollars 

from drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping. 

Such non-state actors pose a significant threat to the United States mainly because they are less responsive to traditional state-craft tools. Additionally, when 

they serve as proxies, these groups allow sponsor nations to conduct deniable terrorist, covert action or intelligence activities. 

As the proliferation of weapon and information technology accelerates, non-state 

actors will have more opportunities to develop very capable conventional and asymmetric military, intelligence and counterintelligence abilities, perhaps matching or 

even exceeding those of some advanced nations, including U.S. allies. This could further destabilize regions critical to U.S. interests. 

Health Security 

Infectious diseases can undermine U.S. national security and international economic stability. Pandemic influenza remains a major threat, with H5N1 avian influenza lurking in animal populations as a potential human pandemic strain. Reluctance by China and Indonesia to share avian influenza samples with international 

health authorities limits our ability to track changes in this dangerous virus. Drugresistant pathogens, such as tuberculosis, also pose significant threats and are amplified in some regions by HIV co-infection. New international health regulations 

may increase visibility of these threats; however, lack of laboratory capacity and intentional under-reporting will continue to hamper efforts to control disease outbreaks. 

Crime 

Terrorist and insurgent groups that engage in commercial or criminal activity can 

achieve more autonomy and resilience than groups that rely mainly upon external 

donations. By sustaining themselves with locally-derived criminal and commercial 

proceeds, terrorist and insurgent groups can limit some of the constraints and 

vulnerabilities associated with external donor relationships. Conversely, criminality 

can have corrosive and divisive effects on terrorist cadres’ internal cohesion, ideological commitment and discipline. 

The FARC generates substantial income from the illegal drug trade, weapons 

smuggling, extortion, and kidnapping. Lebanese Hizballah receives some funds from 

associates who profit from the drug trade. Some terrorist and insurgent groups in 

Iraq sustain themselves with funds generated from kidnapping, smuggling, oil theft, 

fraud, and extortion. The Taliban also derive substantial operating resources from 

kidnappings and their involvement in Afghanistan’s opium production. 

52

FINAL THOUGHTS

The very complex environment in which the U.S operates today is full of risk and 

threats, but also opportunities to influence and shape positive outcomes. 

Our allies and potential adversaries are not set to static courses, but instead 

adapt and react quite quickly to changes in our common environment. 

While combat operations against transnational terrorists continue, other potential 

threats endure and evolve. Today’s current focus against the terrorist threat does 

not foreclose the possibility that conflict among major, nation-states could intersect 

vital U.S. interests. Additionally, aspiring or ascending nation-state adversaries 

could present direct military challenges to vital U.S. interests with little or no warning. 

As such, defense intelligence must remain able to provide timely and actionable 

intelligence across the entire threat spectrum to policymakers and decisionmakers 

at all levels so they can maximize our Nation’s opportunities while minimizing its 

risks. 

In conjunction with the broader Intelligence Community, we have important 

structural and procedural reforms underway within DIA and across the defense intelligence enterprise. We are strengthening collection while also expanding information sharing across intelligence disciplines, agencies and with our closest allies. 

In particular, we are improving the number and quality of our defense Human 

Intelligence (HUMINT) collectors, which prove most valuable against the hardest 

targets. We are standardizing the rigorous training for HUMINT collectors within 

DIA and across the defense intelligence enterprise while also improving their collaboration with the National Clandestine Service. 

At the same time, DIA is attracting additional employees with critical language 

skills in areas of special interest with expanded financial incentives. 

We are also reaching new levels of cooperation with our allies in analysis. There 

is stronger recognition today that no single agency or country possesses all the analytic depth needed to solve our toughest intelligence and military challenges. 

To strengthen defense intelligence support to customers at all levels, we established the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center (DIOCC) in October 

2007. The DIOCC provides us the ability to focus our intelligence collection resources on the intelligence priorities of the Department of Defense and the Nation. 

Operating with the National Intelligence Coordination Center, we have the potential 

to integrate and synchronize national, defense and homeland intelligence operations 

and requirements. 

Tying much of this together is the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System which provides a secure information backbone for the flow of classified 

knowledge to the U.S. and allied defense intelligence communities. 

As a combat support agency, DIA is focusing even more intently on providing our 

regional combatant commanders with the intelligence they need to be successful in 

both combat and global shaping operations. 

We continue to invest in our intelligence professionals through the establishment 

of performance standards and training programs that enhance their professional capabilities. 

During this period of change and in the years ahead, your continuing support is 

vital. On behalf of the men and women of DIA and across the defense intelligence 

enterprise, thank you for your continuing confidence. 

Our personnel are very proud of what they do. They are honored to have the opportunity to work on behalf of the American people. It is a privilege for me to serve 

with them and to have this opportunity to share their work with you today. 

Thank you—and I would be pleased to answer your questions at this time.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Maples. 

We’re going to have a first round of 8 minutes. Because of Senator Inhofe’s responsibilities as ranking member on another committee, I’m going to yield first to him. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I won’t use the full 

8 minutes. 

First of all, nothing was said in the opening statements by either 

of you talking about the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 

(FISA) reform that we’re in the process of right now. I assume 

that’s because in my opinion we did our job in the Senate, but it’s 

now over there on the House side. 

53

I’d like to have either one or both of you give us a sense of urgency as to why this is needed, if it is needed, to go ahead and get 

it done on the House side. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Senator, there is a sense of urgency. When the 

law expired, several things put us in a situation of uncertainty for 

the future. One, part of the law that was passed last August gave 

us the ability to compel the private sector to assist us. The main 

thing to understand about that is we can no longer do this mission 

and be effective without the assistance of the private sector. 

So now the question is, can we compel? Now, there is a portion 

of that legislation that has expired that said as we put things in 

the system with appropriate authorization they would run for a 

year in the future. That’s true. But what it doesn’t account for are 

changes, new knowledge, new personalities, a new service, that 

sort of thing. 

The other question that we’re wrestling with is the issue of retroactive liability for the private sector because they cooperated with 

us in the past. The question was how do we deal with liability protection. In the bill that passed last August, it provided prospective, 

future protection, but it did not address retroactive, and that’s the 

question. 

Senator INHOFE. The immunity issue. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, and that’s the question, because what 

they’re faced with is they have a fiduciary responsibility, as you’re 

aware, with the bill that passed this house with regard to their responsibility of protecting shareholder value, and some of these suits 

are in the billion dollar range. So that’s the dilemma they face. 

Senator INHOFE. Do you pretty much agree with that, General 

Maples? 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator INHOFE. In your opening remarks, Director McConnell, 

you talked about the al Qaeda presence in North and Central Africa. We didn’t say much about in East Africa. I’ve had occasion to 

spend quite a bit of time there, Uganda, Somalia, and Ethiopia. 

How do you see that? I was pleased with the cooperation we got 

from Ethiopia in going into Somalia. Where is that now, in an unclassified form, in terms of the al Qaeda threat in that part of 

northeastern Africa? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Let me start and I’ll hand off to General 

Maples for a follow-up. They were establishing—a year, 18 months 

ago, al Qaeda was establishing a footprint in Somalia that had the 

prospects of being formidable. When the Ethiopians came in, of 

course, that was disrupted. For the most part, we’ve been able to 

keep it tamped down or on the run. We’ve traced personalities. One 

recently escaped into Sudan and, with cooperation there, we were 

able to detain him. 

So the effort in East Africa was on a growth vector. It is now at 

best sustaining or going down, but it’s not growing like it was. So 

it has been a success. 

Senator INHOFE. Good, good. 

General MAPLES. Sir, the presence is still there. We have had 

tremendous cooperation in that region, particularly with Ethiopia. 

There still of course is a concern and we have security interests 

54

there that we need to continue to follow. The military continues to 

engage with our partners in that region. 

Senator INHOFE. I think Prime Minister Meles has done a good 

job and he certainly has that commitment and talks about it. 

Lastly, and this is something you might want to do for the 

record, I was disturbed back in the 1990s when we were downgrading our military. During that decade the procurement in 

China—and I believe this is accurate—increased by 1,000 percent, 

just totally changed where we were in 1990 as to where we are 

today. 

I think you covered it pretty well, but when you talk about there 

is a nuclear problem, but I’m more concerned, quite frankly, which 

is the conventional buildup that they have right now. I can remember when they bought a fleet, and this was unclassified, a few 

years ago of the Su–27s. At that time that was better in some ways 

than our best strike vehicles were. 

So what I’d like to have you do for the record, not to do it now, 

is give us an assessment as to our relative strength in both the nuclear and in conventional warfare between the two countries between about 1990 and today. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to go first. 

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Director McConnell, the Afghanistan Study Group found that 

2007 was the deadliest for American and international troops in Afghanistan since 2001, and that the anti-government insurgency has 

grown considerably over the past 2 years. The Atlantic Council report issued last month stated bluntly: ‘‘Make no mistake, NATO is 

not winning in Afghanistan,’’ and called the situation on the 

ground a ‘‘strategic stalemate.’’ 

Do you agree with the Afghan Study Group’s assessment that 

overall the insurgency in Afghanistan has grown considerably over 

the last 2 years? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, we’ve seen the numbers increase over the 

last 2 years. We’ve attempted to do a baseline assessment so we 

could capture that, whatever that number is, and then compare it. 

We did a review recently to try to get a better understanding of 

territory that’s controlled. Just to give you a number so you have 

a frame of reference, the Taliban was able to control the population 

and the area, about 10 to 11 percent of the country. The Government, on the other hand, the Federal Government, had about 31 

percent, and then the rest of it was local control. 

I would say one of the reasons the violence has gone up so significantly is because of the more aggressive action on the part of 

the United States and NATO, not all of NATO but much of it. So, 

therefore, the incidence of contact has gone up. What we’ve observed the Taliban to do, because many of their leaders have been 

killed or captured, is they’ve resorted then to the kinds of tactics 

used by al Qaeda in Iraq, which is a suicide bomb or roadside device. That’s one of the reasons we’ve seen the incidents and the casualties go up. 

55

Chairman LEVIN. So would you say overall that the Taliban and 

their allies are on the run in Afghanistan overall? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I would say that they’ve suffered significant 

degradation in their leadership. The way they choose to engage, 

Senator, is if it’s a face-off with U.S. or NATO forces, they lose. So 

how they choose to engage is they’ll fill in an area when we withdraw or they will influence a village or a region if our presence is 

not there. 

So the question becomes—the part I try to make clear in my remarks, in my opening statement: The issue becomes, security has 

to be provided, but then it’s also governance and opportunity that 

must develop. 

Chairman LEVIN. Has the anti-government insurgency been contained overall, would you say? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. No, sir, I wouldn’t say it’s contained. It’s been 

sustained in the south. It’s grown a bit in the east and we’ve seen 

elements of it spread to the west and the north. Now, that’s not 

to say control by the Taliban. It’s just presence of the Taliban. 

The key, you said it in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. 

The key here, in this observer’s view, is the opportunity for safe 

haven in Pakistan. If they can operate beyond reach in a de facto 

safe haven in Pakistan, it gives them the ability to train, recruit, 

rest, and recuperate, and then come back into Afghanistan to engage. 

Chairman LEVIN. Directors, were the recent elections in Pakistan 

fair and transparent in your judgment? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. All the reporting I saw is they were, 

by Pakistani standards, reasonable and fair, and the numbers of 

people voting were a little higher than we anticipated, a little higher than average for Pakistan. It was over 40 percent. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you assess that the elections represent 

a repudiation of Islamic extremism? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. What I would highlight is those Islamic extremists that had been serving in the assembly were defeated in 

this election. So at that level, the parties that won are more secular. So there is some level of repudiating extremism. 

Chairman LEVIN. But is there some element of repudiation of 

army rule in the outcome? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I would agree with that. We’re watching very 

closely now to see how the coalition is formed, who the members 

will be, who the prime minister might be. Of the two parties, the 

two largest winners, they will probably form a coalition. They’ve already announced that they would, the Pakistan People’s Party and 

former Prime Minister Sharif’s party. Sharif has an agenda to impeach President Musharraf. Both those parties do not have the 

votes to do that, but if they had independents join them they could 

possibly have the votes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Inhofe raised the FISA issue and I 

want to just get some facts straight on this. As I understand it, last 

Friday night the last of the private sector partners, the telecom 

partners, agreed to cooperate with us. Was that true? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. We’ve negotiated for 6 days and came to closure on Friday night, yes, sir. 

56

Chairman LEVIN. So is it true then that as of last Friday night 

they agreed to cooperate with us? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. They did, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. On a voluntary basis? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. For the subject matter as a part of the debate. 

The question is the uncertainty going forward, will they do it 

again. 

Chairman LEVIN. But as to what we were asking them to do, 

they agreed to do it? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Did you notify the White House of that agreement? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. As soon as we had the information, we did two 

things: We notified Congress and the White House, and issued a 

press statement. 

Chairman LEVIN. So that would have been what, Friday night? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I think it was late Friday night, yes, sir. I don’t 

think we had the press statement out until early Saturday morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you remember when you notified the White 

House? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I’d have to get that time for you, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Would you do that? 

[The information referred to follows:]

The White House staff was notified at about 8 p.m., Friday, February 22.

Chairman LEVIN. If we extended the law, would that be valuable 

to you, the Protect America Act? If we extended that law, would it 

be valuable? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It would do several things for us. It wouldn’t 

answer a critical question. What it would do for us is it would put 

the opportunity, the possibility of compelling the private sector to 

help, back in; and it would answer the question of prospective liability protection. Of course, what it leaves unanswered is the 

question of retroactive liability protection. 

Chairman LEVIN. But for that issue, would it be valuable? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, it would be valuable. What we were 

concerned about, of course, is as we engage the carriers and they’re 

subjected to this potential huge financial loss, would their cooperation be assured in the future? So that’s the issue that we’ve been—

Chairman LEVIN. But actually, that extension would compel their 

cooperation, wouldn’t it? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It could compel their cooperation. But, sir, let 

me make this very clear. 

Chairman LEVIN. You say could. It does compel. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, but let me make clear. Compelling cooperation for a specific activity is one thing. Having a partner to 

engage with you in an activity that’s dynamic and fast-moving and 

global is another set of conditions. We need their participation and 

partnership in the broader context, not just compelling a specific 

act. 

Chairman LEVIN. But as a matter of fact, when you say the issue 

is whether we can compel—that’s what you just said here a few 

minutes ago—we can compel their cooperation, can’t we? 

57

Mr. MCCONNELL. Not today, no, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If we extended the bill? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. If we extend the bill, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. We can compel? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. We can compel. That’s what’s in the bill. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you favor compelling? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I know you favor a broader approach. But do 

you favor a bill extending this law so we can compel their cooperation? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I’m sorry. You’re working me into a corner. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m doing my best. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, I know you are. 

Let me be very clear. 

Chairman LEVIN. But I think you have to also give us straight 

answers here. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I’m giving you as straight as I can, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is it valuable that we compel their cooperation? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Congress has a disagreement with the administration and I’m trying to give a straight answer. So just let me do 

that, if I may. 

A law that compels is in the interests of this community. A law 

that provides prospective liability protection is in the interests of 

this community to do our job. I would add: It’s also absolutely essential in this observer’s point of view that we have the retroactive 

liability protection, for the same reason: We have to have partners 

that willingly cooperate with us. 

Chairman LEVIN. So it’s valuable to have it, that retroactive? In 

your judgment it’s valuable. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If in order to achieve that we indemnified the 

companies against liability, would that be valuable? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I’d have to understand what ‘‘indemnity’’ 

means here. If you mean substitution or—there are some issues 

with that, as we’ve discussed. 

Chairman LEVIN. But would that be valuable? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Liability protection would be valuable. Now, 

sir, you’re a lawyer and I’m not. If you use a term I don’t understand I may give you the wrong answer. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you don’t understand it then I won’t pursue 

it. If you don’t understand ‘‘indemnification’’——

Mr. MCCONNELL. I know what ‘‘indemnification’’ is, but you’re accomplished at this as a lawyer; I am not. So what I’m saying is I 

need liability protection. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s fine. Thank you. 

I think we’re back to the regular order, but on this side there is 

no one present. So who is next on the Republican side? I think Senator Martinez was next. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I’m not accustomed to being this far up the lineup. 

Chairman LEVIN. I caught you by surprise. I apologize. 

Senator MARTINEZ. You did indeed, but I’ll recover. 

I presume that if it was anything else beyond what you said in 

your opening statement regarding FISA, that you said in the quesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 09:35 Dec 09, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\45665.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
58

tioning, I should invite you to clarify further now if you didn’t fully. 

You continue to believe that it is vital for you to have the types 

of protections that were in the Senate-passed bill? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Which includes retroactive immunity? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, that’s correct. If I could take just a 

second to answer your question, this may be helpful. For me this 

is a fairly simple proposition. What’s the purpose of this law? Why 

do we even have this law? When Congress wrestled with it in the 

late 1970s, the purpose was to allow our community to do foreign 

intelligence collection and to protect Americans. 

The bill this body passed not only allows us to do foreign intelligence, regardless of where we do the intercept of the activity—

and that was the key because the old law said if you obtained it 

in this country you had to have a warrant, and we couldn’t keep 

up with that. So it gives us the ability to do foreign intelligence 

and it provides warranted protection for a U.S. person anywhere on 

the globe. 

So if you strip everything else out of it, why do we have this law? 

Let us do foreign intelligence, let us protect U.S. persons. That’s 

where we are and that’s what we need to do. 

Now, the mechanics of that is we can’t do it without the private 

sector and they’re in a difficult situation right now because they’re 

being sued for assisting us. That’s why I’m very strongly in favor 

of liability protection retroactively. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Which is assistance that they provided in 

good faith, at the request of the government, when they were told 

that in fact the government desperately needed their cooperation 

and that it was legal for them to do so. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. The words you use are ‘‘good faith’’ 

and those are exactly the right words in my view. The SSCI 

worked with us for months to go through every detail, to look at 

all the records and so on. Their conclusion in the report they issued 

was that, one, we can’t do it without the private sector help; and 

two, they cooperated in good faith. ‘‘Good faith’’ are the words in 

the Senate report. 

So I think they captured the right description. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Let me take you to the Middle East and the 

situation in Israel. You discussed it during your testimony, and it 

is clear that the continuing violence against Israel—did I understand you correctly to say that in your opinion and in your view 

the cooperation of Iran with terrorist organizations like Hezbollah 

has continued and continues and is a——

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. The support from Iran to Hezbollah, 

is one of the principal threats to Israel; financial, weapons, and 

training support are significant from Iran to Hezbollah. In addition, what I would highlight is Hezbollah has gone to Iran for 

training, set up training camps, and they’ve taken some of the Shiite militia in Iraq out of Iraq, over to Iran, trained them, and then 

with Hezbollah supervision come back into Iraq to attack coalition 

forces. 

So Iran’s behavior here is not only directed against Israel, it’s 

also directed against U.S. and coalition forces. 

Senator MARTINEZ. In your estimation that is undiminished? 

59

Mr. MCCONNELL. There has been some rhetoric that they would 

reduce it. We are currently making a very concerted effort to determine if we can prove that there’s any reduction, and this is the dilemma we have. Their calendar year starts next month. When they 

make weapons, rockets, and so on, they put a date on it. Right now 

we have 2006, 2007, mint condition, but we don’t yet have one with 

a 2008 date. Does that mean they haven’t done it in the last few 

months or they’re waiting to start dating it 2008 in March? So 

that’s a question we’re trying to sort out right now. 

Senator MARTINEZ. If we can go to Latin America, and I know 

you discussed the situation in Colombia and the FARC. Some time 

in the recent days President Chavez of Venezuela indicated that 

the FARC was not a terrorist organization. Would you agree with 

me that that is a huge misstatement? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. A huge mistake, yes, sir. He’s doing that for political advantage and rhetoric. Nothing could be further from the 

truth. 

Senator MARTINEZ. General? 

General MAPLES. Absolutely agree. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I wanted to continue on that vein. You did 

suggest that in his setback with the referendum, which would have 

made him essentially president for life, I guess——

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator MARTINEZ.—that his move towards authoritarian rule 

may have slowed. I’ve not seen any evidence of that. Obviously, to 

the extent that he did take a huge defeat politically and the people 

spoke clearly, that was a setback. But he continues to be an authoritarian ruler and increasingly more so every day; is that correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. What we’re hopeful of is that the opposition that was generated by that vote would generate itself in a 

more forceful way. So his rhetoric is not appealing as broadly as 

it did. So has the tide turned? We don’t know. We’ll stay engaged. 

Senator MARTINEZ. His buildup of military forces, equipment, 

particularly assault rifles, in my estimation goes beyond the needs 

of what Venezuela would need for its internal defense. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, probably three or four times more 

than what he would need. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Does that suggest to you that perhaps his intentions are to destabilize neighboring governments, particularly 

Colombia, and to assist the FARC? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It could very well be. 

General MAPLES. Sir, I would say on that, though, that for the 

rifles he has been in receipt of, we haven’t seen a distribution in 

that direction. We have seen them go into armories, and we do 

hear discussion within Venezuela about using asymmetric kinds of 

capabilities and tactics and empowering the population in some 

way, in a home guard sense. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. So it’s really forming—one of the thoughts is 

forming an internal militia to enforce his authoritarian rule. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Within the country? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Within the country, yes, sir. 

Senator MARTINEZ. The recent succession in Cuba of Raul Castro 

to power, I was disappointed in the fact that it seemed to be the 

60

same old faces in rearranged position, particularly folks who 

present no new ideas or any real indication of change. My understanding is that there’s been great disappointment in the Cuban 

people, who had hoped for maybe a little breathing room. 

My concern now arises, for the first time in some time, that we 

may be viewing an increase in migration in the Florida Straits. 

Have you seen anything regarding that or is there any information 

you can share with us on that? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. We’re alert to it. We’re concerned about it. But 

nothing we’ve seen yet. Sir, the way I would characterize it is in 

essence what we’re seeing in Cuba is not unlike what we witnessed 

in Russia to some extent, with the older generation hanging on. 

The key in my view is going to be fourth generation, and we’ve 

seen in some of our collection efforts and understanding the fourth 

generation, they’re thinking new thoughts and they’re asking hard 

questions. So how do you get from the first generation of the revolution to the fourth generation, that’s going to be the question. 

What my concern is, is there going to be some instability in that 

process? 

Senator MARTINEZ. But with the current leadership there is really no change? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. No change, none. 

Senator MARTINEZ. In policy and attitudes or anything else. My 

information is that there’s been also an uptick in repression internally. I don’t know whether you’ve seen that as well. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Similar, and the person that Raul brought in 

as his number two is someone older than he is, who was an original participant in the revolution. So no change is the objective. 

Senator MARTINEZ. A real hard-liner. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

General MAPLES. Sir, I think that that is something we need to 

watch over the next 6 or 7 months, because I think there may be 

an expectation on the part of the population to see where a new 

presidency will go, and a failure to deliver could increase concerns. 

Something we have to be attuned to, as Director McConnell mentioned, is looking for any indicators that the dissatisfaction is going 

to reach a level where a migration from the island might take 

place. We’re going to be very attuned to looking for those indicators. 

Senator MARTINEZ. There’s no question that that is a real possibility. My continued interest is in the fact that what the goal of our 

policy towards Cuba would be to see a democratic change, and the 

only concern we have vis-a ́-vis that you should not just fear a mass 

migration, although that is a direct threat to our security and we 

should view it as such. The fact is I think also that there is a tremendous potential for there to be political, dramatic political 

change in the future. 

But thank you very much, both of you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Senator Martinez. I think we need not to forget the 

Western Hemisphere. You’ve been very articulate and valuable and 

constructive in your comments about that, and I think we should 

61

all of us not allow Europe or the Middle East to just dominate everything we do, because our neighbors and friends are in this hemisphere and we need to have strong ties. 

General Maples, you mentioned perhaps arming in Venezuela 

militias as a strategy of Chavez. It’s something like perhaps the 

groups that took over Germany? Are you talking about creating a 

grassroots force that’s armed, to be an extension of the Chavez regime and are able therefore to intimidate, oppress, and suppress 

any opposition that might occur? Is that a concern you have? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I haven’t seen it go that far at this point, 

but certainly with the availability and the number of small arms 

weapons in Venezuela, and we are seeing indications of a desire to 

create some kind of a home guard that could be taken in one sense 

as an asymmetric defensive capability for a nation, but on the 

other hand could be going down the road, as you mention, of arming supporters to a leader within a nation. The opportunity is 

there. We haven’t seen it move in that direction yet. We’ve seen 

arms actually go into armories. So the arming has not occurred yet, 

but the potential is there. 

Senator SESSIONS. He is not a leader that seeks to promote democracy. He is an authoritarian leader and apparently he’s prepared to do anything, including making himself a lifetime leader, 

to maintain his power. I do think it’s a very serious question. 

You noted Colombia was making some progress against the 

FARC. Two years ago, Senator Specter and I were there. Colombia 

is the longest, I believe, serving democracy in South America. It 

has strong economic growth, very strong ties to the United States 

and trade relations with the United States. Could you give a little 

more detail about how President Uribe is progressing in his efforts 

against the terrorist group FARC? 

General MAPLES. Sir, Colombia has been very aggressive in engaging the FARC. They have not allowed the FARC to have secure 

areas, secure territory. They’ve taken the fight into the FARC’s territory. As a result of their aggressive actions by their military, very 

professional military engagement, we’re seeing increased desertions 

within the FARC, in addition to the losses that they are taking as 

a result of the military engagements that are going on. 

So I think there’s a very aggressive attitude that is backed up 

by the employment of a professional military. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. I know that Colombia for years 

tried to work in a negotiating fashion with the FARC, probably 

wrongly, but at least it demonstrated their commitment to try to 

reach a peaceful solution. Finally, when it became quite clear that 

couldn’t happen, I’m glad the leaders of Colombia took the strong 

action that they took, and hopefully that progress will continue. 

Do either one of you desire to comment on the impact that could 

occur if the United States does not enact the trade agreement with 

Colombia, our ally, and a very, very strong trading partner? There 

appears to be some unease among members of Congress, which I 

find baffling, utterly baffling, that we presumably don’t think that 

Colombia is perfect in everything that they’ve done, but they really 

seem to be making progress and are a legitimate democracy. Any 

thoughts about that, Admiral McConnell? 

62

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, let me introduce Tim Langford. The reason 

I ask him to step up is he is our mission manager for Cuba and 

Venezuela and he just finished a tour in Colombia. So he’ll have 

firsthand insight to answer your questions. Let me ask him to comment. 

Mr. LANGFORD. Yes, good morning, Senator. In fact, I was in Colombia when you and Senator Specter visited. I was running the 

Intelligence Fusion Center assisting the Colombian Government. 

To your point, absolutely General Maples is right on target. The 

success that they have had under President Uribe has been tremendous. When I first arrived in Colombia in 2002 and to see 

where they are now, controlling areas where the FARC was, previously had control; taking down high value targets; putting the 

FARC on the run; having tremendous success in fighting both terrorists and narcotics trafficking; it really is a testament to the joint 

work that Colombia and the U.S. Government have done, with 

great assistance from both the IC and Armed Forces. It really 

couldn’t have been done without them. All the testament to President Uribe as an outstanding leader. 

The point of the free trade agreement—I departed Colombia in 

August and at that time President Uribe, when he would have 

been visiting security officials, one of the key points that he would 

always make to them is that one of the most important things that 

could be done to codify security in Colombia was to approve the 

free trade agreement because of the jobs that it would produce 

there. So he was very much linking the economic security with the 

domestic security and fighting terrorism. 

Just to speak very briefly on Venezuela, on your point about 

Chavez and arming the populace. He has organized these militias. 

Again, it’s very much unclear how structured and how organized 

they are, bringing folks in for Saturday training. As the General 

noted, we haven’t yet seen these weapons going out to these really 

ill-structured units yet. We’re looking for that. 

But again, any time you create a parallel military structure it 

has some implications for your existing military structure, which 

heretofore, up until the late 1990s was one of the most adept in 

Latin America and worked very closely with our U.S. military. 

I would liken actually the structure of what he’s trying to create 

more to probably what Senator Martinez knows, and that’s the 

Committees for the Defense of the Revolution in Cuba. I think 

that’s the paradigm that we have there. 

Senator SESSIONS. Do you consider that a possibly dangerous 

move and direction? 

Mr. LANGFORD. I think it’s something that we need to monitor 

very closely, if we actually see these weapons going out to them. 

Again, one of the things that we’re looking at very closely in Venezuela is the economic policies that are being pursued are causing 

some significant social problems. There are food shortages in Venezuela. It’s a very wealthy country that actually has food shortages. 

Why? It’s because of the economic policies and getting the pricing 

wrong. So that’s something that we’re very much watching to see 

how President Chavez is able to resolve that, as well as get the 

food to the people, because again food shortages are a potential for 

unrest. 

63

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral McConnell, just to mention the concerns, I think legitimate concerns, of our telecommunications industries. According to a column in the Washington Post a few days 

ago, 66 trial lawyers representing plaintiffs in these telecommunication suits have contributed $1.5 million to Democratic Senators 

and House Members. So this is just some little lawsuit, but apparently they’re facing a host of lawsuits with a host of aggressive attorneys, and I don’t think we should treat lightly their concerns. 

I’m glad you were able to negotiate something so you can continue that. But I think they legitimately deserve to be given assurance they won’t be sued when they are simply following the written 

request of the Attorney General of the United States of America, 

authorized by the President, to assist the United States Government in a time of need, and having been certified that it was done 

legally. 

So my time is up, but I thank you for working on this and taking 

the time to explain the importance of it. I’m glad the Senate did 

pass that reform that we needed and will fix this problem, and I’m 

amazed that the House continues to be recalcitrant and failing to 

act. 

I thank you, and would offer for the record the letter you and Attorney General Mukasey wrote to Chairman Reyes in the House 

explaining why it’s ‘‘critical to our national security that Congress 

act as soon as possible to pass the Senate bill.’’ You go six pages, 

I believe, of detailing with great specificity the problems you face. 

Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

64


227ful1.eps
65


227ful2.eps
66


227ful3.eps
67


227ful4.eps
68


227ful5.eps
69

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Graham? 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

A practical application of FISA in Iraq I think has been discussed in the past. I think some time last year there was a kidnapping of three American soldiers. Are you familiar with this case? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, last June. 

Senator GRAHAM. Can you walk me through very briefly what 

happened in that case and what can we learn from the problems 

that we found? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. The kidnapping took place and everything, tactical, local—separate, if you would, two kinds of communications, wireless, and wire. If wireless, walkie-talkie, or whatever, we’re doing everything possible, so we’re collecting. Some of 

those that we believe to be responsible engage in communications 

activity that use wire. Think laptop, connection to the Internet, and 

so on. It’s not uncommon, because of the configuration of the globe 

now, it moves the path of least resistance, the least cost, the fastest 

speed—so it wouldn’t be uncommon for someone in Baghdad talking to somebody else in Baghdad for it to go through the United 

States, because it’s fiber optics, moves fast. 

Senator GRAHAM. Now, what kind of equipment are they using 

to talk with each other? 


227ful6.eps
70

Mr. MCCONNELL. Just standard laptop, anything. Even could be 

a cell phone. 

So now as we worked this problem and we got into it, we had 

an opportunity to get more and better, to have better collection and 

understanding of who the perpetrators are, who are they working 

for, how does the larger group operate. So the issue is some of the 

communications passed through a wire in the United States, and 

at that point in time the law said you must have a warrant. So we 

have to stop and now produce about a 2-inch document. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s slow down a bit. We have a conversation 

going on using wire, a wire technology, right? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Between two people in Iraq? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Multiple people. 

Senator GRAHAM. Multiple people in Iraq. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. We believe to be non-U.S. citizens. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. They are non-U.S. citizens, yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. That we believe to be involved in kidnapping 

three American soldiers. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Because of the modern world some of these 

connections pass through the United States. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. So at that point in time we had to stop the battlefield intervention to go get a warrant? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. Now, there’s a situation here called 

emergency procedures. But the key for us, the thing that’s hard for 

people to understand, is if you’re going to do a wiretap in that circumstance the law says, wire in the United States, you have to 

have a warrant. Therefore the requirement is probable cause, and 

in your background you know exactly what that is. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. A tough standard. Now, some say, well, just go 

faster; it’s an emergency, you can go anyway. You still have to provide probable cause standards. So first of all somebody has to write 

it down and justify it and do the research and so on. Then it goes 

to their leadership for signature. It comes to me for signature. I 

send it to the Attorney General for signature. 

Senator GRAHAM. How long did this take? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It probably took us the better part of a half day 

on emergency procedures. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Now, so for that half-day period we were 

unable to listen and track; is that correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. You can actually extend it a little beyond that. 

Once we realized it, the issue then becomes what is it we need to 

do. So if you factor all the time in it’s a little longer than a half 

day. But yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator GRAHAM. Have we fixed that in the Senate bill? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. That’s a good thing. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The Protect America Act that passed last August corrected it. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

71

Mr. MCCONNELL. Then expired. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. But the Senate bill fixed that. 

Let me add one other thing, sir. It’s very important, and this is 

very important to the American people to understand. The Senate 

bill extended warranted, court-provided protection to any U.S. person anywhere on the globe, period. So we protect a U.S. person, we 

do foreign intelligence. The foreign intelligence is the issue. That’s 

what we’re trying to do, unimpeded by the fact we have to stop and 

work through a court. 

Senator GRAHAM. From this kidnapping episode, we learned a 

very hard lesson, because no telling what we missed, but we 

learned that lesson. Congress came together and passed legislation 

to fix that problem. It’s expired. Now we’re hung up again. 

This is no man’s land that we’re in, how has it affected our ability as a nation to defend ourselves? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. For the past week after it expired we were in 

negotiations with the private sector to add additional information. 

I don’t want to be too specific here because now the bad guys are 

listening. But if you’re going to pull information out of the global 

infrastructure you have to do it surgically. It’s lots of stuff, so you 

want to know how to pull it out. 

So once you have a method for doing that, you have to have the 

cooperation of the private sector to enable it. The answer initially 

was, wait a minute, this law has expired, you can’t compel, we’re 

not sure we’re going to do any more than we’re doing exactly right 

now. 

So our question was, we have more to add, we have the authority, but we have more to add. They said: Not so fast. So we negotiated, and we thought we were going to lose it, and as of Friday 

we issued a statement to try to tell everybody what was going on. 

Then Friday night, last Friday night, they said: All right, we’re 

going to add in what you’ve asked us. 

Now, so at the moment we’re okay. But the question is what happens the next time, or what happens if it’s a new communications 

method? Remember, this stuff morphs all the time. So the authorities that we have now are for a set of capabilities. If there’s a new 

capability there’s no authority. 

Senator GRAHAM. So the agreement doesn’t get you where you 

need to go in an ever-changing battlefield? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. No, sir. The issue, sir, is we can’t keep up. This 

is dynamic. It moves in seconds and minutes, and there’s no way 

we can keep up if we have to keep going back to the court for authorization. 

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s talk about the enemy called al Qaeda in 

Iraq. Why do you think al Qaeda operatives were sent to senior 

Iraqi al Qaeda leaders outside of Iraq? We know they’re doing that. 

There are foreign al Qaeda operatives going into Iraq. Bin Laden 

says ‘‘Go to the land of the two rivers’’—Iraq—‘‘this is the great 

battle.’’ 

Why are they going to Iraq? What compels al Qaeda to feel the 

need to go to Iraq and fight us? 

72

Mr. MCCONNELL. Primarily it was to stimulate sectarian violence 

between the Sunnis and the Shiites, and that’s what they did for 

most of the——

Senator GRAHAM. But why are they doing that? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Ultimately what they would like to see in my 

view is the Sunnis prevail in Iraq, and then that potentially provides a base of operations if al Qaeda prevails, a place for al Qaeda 

to operate from. 

Senator GRAHAM. Were they threatened by this concept called 

moderation that was being tried in Iraq? Do you believe that would 

undermine the al Qaeda agenda, if Iraq became a stable, functioning government where Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds could live together under the rule of law, a woman could have a say about her 

children? Do they lose if that happens? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. They lose, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think they know they lose if that happens? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Oh, yes, sir, they know that. This is totally contrary to their point of view, so they would lose. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe Iraq is a battle in an overall 

global struggle or is it an isolated event, uninvolved with the war 

on terror generally? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It is not isolated. There are lots of debates 

about cause and effect and so on, but stability in the Middle East 

is absolutely essential in the interests of this country for the next 

30 to 50 years. 

Senator GRAHAM. What would be the payoffs in the region if Iraq 

became a stable, functioning government based upon the rule of 

law, that rejected extremism, denied al Qaeda a safe haven, lived 

at peace with its neighbors, and aligned themselves with us in the 

greater fight? What would be the payoff to America in terms of our 

national security? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Stability in the region, a check on Iran’s expansionism, a reliable supply of oil to flow to customers around the 

world, potential spread of democratic values in the region to its 

neighbors. So I see nothing—if Iraq evolved the way you just explained it, to me that would be the ideal for moderation in the Middle East. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Director McConnell, Senator Graham went through a particular 

problem that you said was fixed by the Senate bill, is that correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. That problem that he described would also 

have been fixed by the House bill, would it not? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. No, sir, it would not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why wouldn’t the House bill, if the only thing 

it was short of was retroactive immunity? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The House bill has many shortcomings, sir. I’ll 

give you an example——

Chairman LEVIN. I’m not talking about shortcomings. I’m talking 

about that specific problem of the new technology that was described. I think everybody wants to give you the power to use that 

new technology. Was that not also provided for in the House bill? 

73

Mr. MCCONNELL. I don’t think so, and I’ll give you an exact answer because I asked my General Counsel to be here to answer 

your question, anticipating it. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m talking about that specific problem. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I’ll get you an answer on that specific one. Ben 

Powell. 

Can I take—can I wait for a second, because he just got called 

out, and I’ll answer that specific question. I know——

Chairman LEVIN. That’s the question I want to ask you, is 

whether or not that specific issue that Senator Graham talked 

about, which was fixed in the Senate bill and I think we all want 

to fix, I believe was also fixed in the House bill, and I want you 

to tell me whether or not I’m right on that. Okay? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I will tell you that as soon as I know for sure. 

Chairman LEVIN. Right, I understand. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. But I don’t know absolutely for certain. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, you’ve also indicated that there was some 

intelligence that was missed or may have been missed during a 5- 

or 6-day period after the expiration of the Protect America Act——

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN.—until there was an agreement with the 

telecoms last Friday night; is that correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The private sector partners, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If the Protect America Act had been extended 

and there was no gap, would that 5 or 6 days of lost or possibly 

lost information have occurred? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Probably not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. I just want to be real clear on this because there have been some suggestions that there were 5 or 6 

days of lost information, that was lost because there was some failure on the part of either the House or the Senate to act in time, 

where as a matter of fact there was a willingness—and I think 

you’re aware of this—to extend the Protect America Act so that 

there wouldn’t have been that gap. You are aware of that willingness, are you not? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, I am. 

Chairman LEVIN. When the President’s statement last Saturday 

was made that we were unable to get cooperation from private 

companies—and he put that in the present tense, that the House’s 

refusal to act ‘‘is undermining our ability to get cooperation from 

the private companies’’—as a matter of fact that cooperation had 

been obtained the night before, had it not? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I don’t know what the President—you’re talking about what he said on Saturday morning? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I don’t know his verb tense on Saturday. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’ll read it to you: ‘‘The House’s refusal to act 

is undermining our ability to get cooperation from private companies.’’ 

My question to you: As a matter of fact, that cooperation had 

been obtained the previous night, had it not? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The cooperation—I can get you the exact time, 

but it was, my understanding, it was late Friday night. 

74

Can I ask a question of you? The statement you’re reading from, 

is that the President’s radio address? 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The radio address is normally taped on Friday 

morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s correct. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. So I suspect that if there’s a disconnect that’s 

probably the source of it. But I don’t know. 

Chairman LEVIN. You said before that the White House was notified Friday night, and yet they still played that address on Saturday morning. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I’m just highlighting it’s taped on Friday morning. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I don’t know what it said, but——

Chairman LEVIN. I’m reading to you what it said. 

Mr. MCCONNELL.—that may be the disconnect. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m reading to you what it said. I read it to 

you. In other words, ‘‘The House’s refusal to act is undermining our 

ability.’’ 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Then, sir, I would agree with the words you 

just said. It is. For that period of time——

Chairman LEVIN. To get cooperation from private companies? It 

had already been obtained on Friday night. You just told us. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s a point of view, and I’ll give you my 

point of view. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, no, no. That’s not a point of view. You just 

said a minute ago—

Mr. MCCONNELL. It is, sir. It is. It is today, it is for the future, 

and it’ll get worse over time. That’s the point I’m trying to highlight. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, but I’m trying to ask you, did we get cooperation from private companies on Friday night? That’s my question. That’s my question. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. We did. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. But I can also, in answering the question, say 

the way you phrased—you’re taking issue with the verb tense and 

the point I’m attempting to observe for you is the failure to get this 

new bill passed is having an impact on our operations. It is causing 

detriment and it will get worse in time. 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m talking about cooperation from the private 

companies. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s what I’m talking about, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. So you’re saying that——

Mr. MCCONNELL. It will get worse in time. 

Chairman LEVIN.—that we’re not going to get the cooperation? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. If we don’t have a bill that does three things: 

compel, prospective, and retroactive liability. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, and we have the compel in both bills; we 

have the prospective in both bills; is that correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. The issue is whether or not there’s retroactive 

liability. 

75

Mr. MCCONNELL. Retroactive liability. 

Chairman LEVIN. As to whether or not, you point out, whether 

or not there’s liability protection. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Liability protection. 

Chairman LEVIN. Which is what you want. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Forward and backward. 

Chairman LEVIN. Forward and backward. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. That there was an effort to provide that liability protection in the Senate bill. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The Senate bill, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. There was an effort made. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The Senate bill. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. There was an effort made to do it other than 

wiping out claims of plaintiffs, was there not? Are you aware of 

that fact? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I am aware of that, sir, and you and I took a 

sidebar to discuss why that wouldn’t work from our point of view. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Because what it does—

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. But on the indemnification issue, 

you’ve not yet taken a position on that because that was never offered; is that correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I don’t yet understand——

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. MCCONNELL.—what you mean by ‘‘indemnification,’’ sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. We won’t go into that. Since you don’t know 

what ‘‘indemnification’’ means, let me ask you a different question. 

I’ll ask General Maples about this. It has to do with the 

waterboarding issue, General. Director McConnell has already commented on that in a different forum. General, do you believe that 

waterboarding is consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva 

Conventions? 

General MAPLES. No, sir, I don’t. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you believe it’s humane? 

General MAPLES. No, sir. I think it would go beyond that bound. 

Chairman LEVIN. You testified recently that the approaches that 

are in the Army Field Manual give us the tools that are necessary 

for the purpose under which we’re conducting interrogations. 

General MAPLES. Sir, that’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do the approaches in the Army Field Manual 

give you the tools you need for conducting intelligence operations? 

General MAPLES. Sir, they do, and we have recently confirmed 

that with those who are using those tools on operations, just to reaffirm that fact. 

Chairman LEVIN. Director, relative to the question of Iran, do 

you believe that the Russians would be concerned about nuclear 

weapons in the possession of Iran? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, very much so. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why are they providing uranium to the Iranians? 

76

Mr. MCCONNELL. The issue is for activating a reactor for generation of electric power, and the negotiation was absolute certainty 

and agreement between the Russians and the Iranians that what 

is delivered is accounted for and used for its intended purpose and 

what is generated in terms of plutonium and so on is accounted for 

and then exported out of Iran, back to Russia. So that it was a very 

concerted effort on the part of the Russians to have certainty that 

what they provided to the Iranians could not be turned into fissile 

material for weapons. 

Chairman LEVIN. But that is not satisfactory to us in terms of 

certainty, I gather; is that correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It causes me to worry, out of observation or 

control. But that was the Russian rationale for how they did what 

they did and the assurances they received. Recall they stopped it 

at one point and negotiated back and forth over getting the certainty that would satisfy the Russians for providing the nuclear 

material. 

Chairman LEVIN. But we’re still concerned, despite that agreement; is that fair to say? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Certainly I would be concerned. If it’s something you don’t control you would be concerned about it, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, General, thank you for appearing before us today. It 

sounds like you have exhausted the FISA issue and some of the 

other issues that I had perhaps wanted to ask some questions on. 

But I do have a question I’d like to ask regarding the Iraqi security 

forces, because, General Maples in your prepared testimony you 

discuss the Iraqi security forces and their overall improved capabilities in 2007, but you also stated in your prepared testimony 

that the Iraqi security forces still suffer from a lack of trained, 

qualified leaders at the tactical level, and you go on to say that this 

fosters a climate in which individuals remain vulnerable to improper political and criminal influence. 

Do you have any kind of an estimate at all on when it’s likely 

that the Iraqi security forces will be able to stand on their own 

and, as you have said, win popular recognition as a legitimate 

guarantor of the Iraqis’ security? 

General MAPLES. Sir, first of all, I think the Iraqi security forces 

have made great strides, and particularly over the course of the 

last year. The army has grown by 55,000 in that time. 

We have also seen that, with an effort to provide additional soldiers into the force, that many of the units now are well over 100 

percent strength in their organizations. That, however, does not 

give the true picture because they are still lacking, particularly in 

the middle grades. They are lacking in their NCO corps, the kind 

of professional leadership that really does enable a force. 

I know that that’s a great effort right now on the part of our 

forces who are providing training and equipping to the Iraqi armed 

forces. The greatest concern with the Iraqi armed forces, of course, 

are the logistics support, the combat service support, and the combat support capabilities that they would require to stand on their 

own. There are a number of initiatives that are underway right 

77

now to try to improve the logistics support to the Iraqi armed 

forces that are short-term processes. I believe that over the course 

of the next year and a half the Iraqis have projected that they will 

be functionally sufficient to be able to support themselves. 

The longer-term issue I think for the Iraqi armed forces is when 

they will reach the capability at a higher end, when they’ll have 

a full complement of capability in order to defend their borders. For 

that purpose, they’ve laid out a 10-year plan in order to purchase 

the arms and equipment that will enable them to operate at that 

level. 

Nevertheless, with the divisions that they currently have, 11 on 

the books going to 12, and the strength that they have in those 

units, plus how they have been able, if they are able to take advantage of the Sons of Iraq, the CLC groups, and incorporate them in 

some way into the Iraqi security forces, I would say that over the 

course of the next 2 to 3 years they’re going to have a greater capability to sustain themselves on operations. 

They’re increasingly able to now certainly take the lead, particularly on counterinsurgency operations. The issue is how they sustain the force for the longer term. 

Senator THUNE. Just in terms of the culture that the military—

and you mention in your testimony this susceptibility or vulnerability to improper political and criminal influence. Assuming, say 

for example, as you have suggested, that their capability continues 

to grow, the numbers continue to grow. If they are left on their 

own, is this going to be an issue that is going to really weaken 

their ability, absent U.S. support, to protect the Iraqi people to provide security for the country? 

General MAPLES. I still think it has to be an Iraqi solution to 

this, and therefore we have to grow the quality NCOs and officers 

that they need in the force. 

There is some belief that the passage of the de-Baathification law 

may help us in this regard if in fact it will enable us to enable 

members, former members of the Iraqi military who have experience in leadership roles, particularly from among the Sunni population, and to bring them back into the military as NCOs and 

midgrade officers into the force structure. I think that that will 

help alleviate the problem that I allude to or that I state in my 

statement for the record. 

Senator THUNE. Admiral McConnell, much has been written 

about the growing capability of cyber space threats. What type of 

cyber space threats do you view as the most dangerous and do you 

think that we’re currently prepared to deal with these threats on 

both civil and military sides? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, we’re not prepared to deal with it. That’s 

the reason for the initiative. Let me separate the threat in terms 

of exploitation of data, which countries like Russia and China and 

so on will try to capture information and take it out of this country. 

One estimate I’ve seen is that that volume was something in the 

terabytes, 20 terabytes is what I recall, of data that was taken out 

of Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State, universities, companies, Congress, and so on. So that’s one level of threat. 

The threat that also concerns us a great deal and maybe even 

more so is if someone has the ability to enter information systems 

78

where they can destroy data, and the destroyed data could be 

something like money supply, electric power distribution, transportation sequencing, and that sort of thing. So our worry right now 

is the military is probably the best protected, the Federal Government is not well-protected, and the private sector is not well-protected. 

So the question is how do we take some of the things that we’ve 

developed for the military side, scale them across the Federal Government, and then the key question will be how do we interact 

with the private sector. That’s the process we’re trying to work 

through right now. 

Senator THUNE. Do you see non-state actors becoming credible 

threats? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. The issue here is—think of it as one 

global net and the cost of entry is low. You need a few people that 

are gifted in computer sciences, electrical engineering, and that 

sort of skill set, and some computers. So you can remotely at some 

location, if you are good enough, enter into a data stream and get 

access. In terms of exploitation, usually if you’re in that business 

you want to be able to take something, information, and leave no 

fingerprints. That’s pretty challenging. If your objective is strictly 

to break in and destroy, that’s less of a challenge. 

So while we haven’t seen terrorist groups exhibit this kind of behavior as of yet, it’s a tool set that’s available to them. They’re 

talking about it and I suspect at some point they will try to have 

that capability. 

Senator THUNE. I want to ask you one other question. I guess I 

want to direct this to General Maples. But it has to do with the 

Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test last year which I think surprised 

quite a few people. Do you see ASAT weapons as a mature threat, 

and if not when do you expect them to be a serious threat? Then 

as a follow-on, are these types of systems being proliferated? 

General MAPLES. Sir, of course the launch in January of last year 

was a direct ascent SE–19 by the Chinese. Clearly it was effective 

in the launch that was taken, and we can see continued development on the direct ascent kind of capability. I don’t necessarily see 

a proliferation of that particular direct ascent kind of capability, 

but there are other kinds of capabilities that are ASAT capabilities 

that we do see a proliferation of, some of which are kinetic and belong to nations today, some of which are nonkinetic kinds of capabilities that would provide either jamming or blinding kinds of capabilities, that would threaten our communications and our satellite systems. 

Senator THUNE. It’s also been recently reported that China is 

selling up to 24 J–10 advanced fighter aircraft to Iran. Do you see 

this as an isolated incident or a more troubling trend of the proliferation of advanced fighter aircraft? 

General MAPLES. I think it is a greater trend, and there are more 

nations that are seeking advanced fighter aircraft. Chinese export 

of weapons is also a concern to us. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Martinez. 

79

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Admiral, I see that your General Counsel has returned 

and I would be pleased to give you a moment to answer the chairman’s question if you’re prepared now. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, if I could ask Ben Powell, our General Counsel, 

to answer your specific question. 

Mr. POWELL. As I understand it, the question was what would 

be the effect of the Restore Act—

Chairman LEVIN. No, that wasn’t the question. 

Mr. POWELL. Okay. 

Chairman LEVIN. The question is whether or not that specific 

fact situation which Senator Graham laid out and which the Director said was fixed, was fixed by the Senate bill, would that have 

been fixed by the House bill? That’s the question. 

Mr. POWELL. I think the answer to that is no, and the specifics 

of that: First, what the House bill does is have us go to the FISA 

Court for a court order to authorize our initiation of surveillance. 

So first we would be in a situation where we’re going to the court. 

There are emergency provisions, to be fair, in the House bill that 

would provide that the Attorney General and the DNI could do 

things on an emergency basis. That’s similar to the emergency provisions of FISA, which we did, in fact, use in the case that Senator 

Graham laid out. But we would have to have a baseline requirement to go with the court order or to go with some type of emergency authorization. 

A second issue would be that the House bill contains a significant purpose test, which says that if a significant purpose of our 

reason for doing the surveillance is to acquire the communications 

of a U.S. person, we would have to go and get a FISA Court order 

for that. 

That presents us with the issue of—we would certainly be very 

interested to know if somebody who had kidnappped a U.S. soldier 

was communicating with somebody here in the United States. So 

could I certify under oath to a court that a significant purpose of 

acquiring that communication is not to determine whether they’re 

communicating with a U.S. person? In fact we would be very interested in that. 

The Senate bill says that if ‘‘the purpose’’ is to get a U.S. person’s 

communications, then in fact you have to get a FISA order, but if 

it’s just one of the significant purposes that would present some 

difficulty to us, particularly the upfront going to the court. 

As an example of that, under the Protect America Act we were 

required to submit our foreign targeting procedures to the FISA 

Court. We did that with our initial authorization in August. Those 

were approved in January. So the court is very diligent. They have 

numerous questions. They want to make sure that they are doing 

a full and fair review and job. 

So if we have that upfront review before we can initiate surveillance or the DNI and the Attorney General need to make certain 

findings before they can authorize it on an emergency basis, it 

makes it very difficult for us to act with the kind of speed that we 

have acted under the Protect America Act while the court was reviewing our procedures, which they ultimately approved. 

80

Chairman LEVIN. So the procedures are not the ones that need 

to be approved; it’s the specific intercept, you’re saying, under the 

House bill? 

Mr. POWELL. Under the House bill, they have a broader approval, 

not necessarily on specific surveillances. It’s on groups and targets. 

So it would depend on what this group was, did we have an existing authorization that already covered this group already approved 

by the court in place. If we did, perhaps we could go up on them, 

or we’d have to look at an emergency type of procedure. 

Chairman LEVIN. So is the answer it depends on the group, then? 

Mr. POWELL. In that case, it would depend whether we had already gone to the court under those procedures upfront to get 

them, yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. So is the answer maybe to the question that I 

asked is ‘‘it depends’’? 

Mr. POWELL. It is a complex area and, unfortunately, that’s what 

we’re trying to clear up——

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. I’m just asking you whether the 

answer to the question is then ‘‘it depends’’? 

Mr. POWELL. It depends. I would have great concern about the 

significant purpose test, though, because——

Chairman LEVIN. Except for the significant purpose test. 

Mr. POWELL. The significant purpose test would present——

Chairman LEVIN. Other than that, it depends on whether the 

group was already covered? 

Mr. POWELL. Yes. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, I didn’t mean to donate my 

time. 

Chairman LEVIN. I know you didn’t. 

Senator MARTINEZ. But I know this is important. 

Chairman LEVIN. I appreciate your leniency on that. 

Senator MARTINEZ. May I have your leniency on my time? 

Chairman LEVIN. Please. Oh, absolutely. You have more than my 

leniency; you have my time. I will yield you my next round if you 

need it. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I know it was an important series of questions and I know the General Counsel wanted to provide the answer. 

This is for Admiral McConnell and General Maples both, on the 

issue of Kosovo, which has been so much in the news of late, their 

assertion of independence, declaration of independence, which the 

United States has supported, and the violence that has occurred 

thereafter. I wonder if you can give us your assessment of the situation in Kosovo, as well as NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR), their 

ability to respond to the violence, and are they sufficient to meet 

the need that is there? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, the leadership in Serbia, the Prime Minister, is determined to roll this back if at all possible. So the question is, is he going to be able to prevail, and is some level of violence probably going to ensue? We have good information that 

when the U.S. Embassy, the British Embassy, and others were attacked, a decision was taken by the Government of Serbia actually 

to pull the police back and allow them to be attacked and burn the 

Embassy and conduct the violence that they conducted. 

81

The forces that are there now can contain a low level of violence. 

If it was extended, it would probably be beyond their control. So 

the question is how determined is the leadership in Serbia and will 

they incite violence at a much higher level than we’ve observed to 

date. 

Let me invite General Maples for additional comment. 

General MAPLES. Sir, within Kosovo today we’re seeing low levels 

of violence within the Serb enclaves, particularly in the southern 

part of Kosovo, clearly within the ability of the KFOR to provide 

a secure environment. The greater concern is in the area of 

Mitrovica to the north and the area of the Ibar River, where you 

have the largest Serb enclave in the northern part of Kosovo. To 

the north of the Ibar, where you have a large Serb population, you 

have a very different approach to and reaction to the situation then 

we have right now. 

Across the bridge itself that separates the community in 

Mitrovica and to the south, KFOR is very involved. In fact, just recently some of the population to the north tried to block access into 

the northern part of the city, across the bridge, used barriers and 

dumpsters to try to do that. KFOR removed those to enable access. 

So clearly, at the level that we are at in Kosovo today, KFOR is 

able to still provide a safe and secure environment. 

Senator MARTINEZ. What about Russia’s role in this? Are they 

being a helpful agent in the violence, or are they being a contributor to the violence? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. They could be much more helpful than they 

are. They’re attempting to maintain a strong relationship with Serbia and they’re attempting to pull Serbia into their orbit, into their 

sphere of influence. 

The leadership in Serbia, the Prime Minister, wants to contribute to that progress to be more closely aligned with Russia. The 

President, however, has a different point of view. President Tadic 

is convinced that integration with the European Union, Europe, 

and what’s referred to as a European Atlantic Alliance, is a better 

course of action. 

So there’s disagreement within the Government of Serbia as to 

what the future course of action is for Serbia and of course for 

Kosovo. 

Kosovo will, given that they establish their independence and 

sustain it, they will align in my view with Europe, not with Russia. 

Senator MARTINEZ. In Russia, the upcoming leader, Dmitry 

Medvedev, do you view him in any way independent of President 

Putin, or do you presume what has been reported is pretty much 

as it will be, that he will be someone pretty well guided by President Putin? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, I think conventional wisdom is that Mr. 

Putin will have significant influence. But, interestingly, what we 

took an excursion on is just to look at Medvedev’s background and 

what he’s saying. If you took at face value what he’s saying, it’s 

certainly encouraging: rule of law, independence of citizens, a right 

to free speech, business entrepreneurship, and private sector 

growth. 

82

So all the words sound right. Now we’re going to find out here 

when the election happens how much independence there is between Medvedev and Putin. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Returning to Latin America, recently Venezuela is in a dispute with Exxon over the expropriation and lack 

of adequate compensation filed a lawsuit, and as a result of that 

action President Chavez threatened to cut off oil supplies to the 

United States. My understanding is they provide somewhere in the 

neighborhood of 12 percent of our consumption. 

A twofold question. One, the impact of that to us; and the impact 

to Venezuela if we were to choose not to purchase oil from Venezuela? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Quite frankly, Senator, my view would be a 

greater impact on Venezuela. We have an expert here who can add 

a little bit to this. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Bring him up. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. But the oil that comes out of there is 

very, very—— 

Senator MARTINEZ. High in sulfur? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, high in sulfur, dense, thick. As I understand it, the refineries that can handle that are in the United 

States. There may be one in the Caribbean. So at one level, doing 

this is cutting off your nose to spite your face on the part of Venezuela. 

Senator MARTINEZ. He backed off a couple of days later. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator MARTINEZ. But I just wondered if that’s a real threat to 

us in fact. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It has some impact, but oil is fungible and 

right now in Nigeria the production level is down about 500,000 

barrels a day just because of the internal strife. So there is a potential area you could start to make it up. 

We’ve done an analysis recently to find out how much oil is in surplus and what’s the impact of $100 oil per barrel. Quite frankly, 

it hasn’t stimulated investment and created a surplus that you 

would think it would create. Therefore, we’re a little bit concerned 

that this 10 to 12 percent could have some level of impact. So we’re 

watching it closely. 

Tim? 

Mr. LANGFORD. Just to elaborate on what the Director said, Senator, absolutely right. The initial statement again, this is not the 

first time he has made that statement. In fact, President Chavez 

subsequently qualified that to say that he would cut it off if we invaded Venezuela. 

So what we see is all the oil that goes to Exxon Mobil, some of 

that is still flowing. That hasn’t been fully cut off either. There’s 

a variety of reasons why it makes economic sense for them to continue to sell to us. As the Director said, the refineries are in the 

United States. If you were going to sell in other parts of the world, 

they would have to sell at a greater discount because of the transportation costs and the like. 

So the assessment is that cutting off oil would definitely have a 

greater impact on the Venezuelan economy than ours, I think that 

would be our assessment. 

83

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today and for your 

service to the Nation over the many years. 

There are many fault lines in Iraq. One of them is the legislation 

that is passed, but is somewhat nebulous, that depends upon implementation. So I wonder, do you have a sense of whether the legislation that was passed with respect to reconciliation and oil distribution, et cetera, will have any real effect going down the road? 

Admiral McConnell first and then General Maples. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. The belief of the analytical community, if the laws are passed and are effective it’s going to have a 

very positive impact. I did a little quick checking this morning just 

to see where those laws are. De-Baathification has passed. Amnesty has passed. The budget has passed. Then the one that we 

were most worried about was the Provincial Powers Act, which now 

allows elections and local government and that sort of thing. We 

have a report that at the last minute, the assembly passes a bill, 

they have 10 days and you have three choices: agree to it, veto it, 

or abstain and then it’s law. On the last—at the last hour, it’s our 

understanding that Abdul Mahte, one of the members of the presidency council, vetoed it. 

Now, if that’s in fact the case, that’s going to be somewhat of a 

setback. There’s also another complication. When they passed the 

amnesty, budget, and the provincial powers, they lumped them together. Now, his intent was to veto provincial powers, but does that 

action actually impact the others? 

So de-Baathification’s passed. That’s positive. Hydrocarbon revenue sharing has not passed. That’s critical to be passed. That said, 

production of oil is up about 500,000 barrels a day. They are selling 

it and there is some level of sharing going on. But they need that 

legislation to codify it. 

So to answer your question, I would say it’s essential to have 

those bills passed for reconciliation, and one has passed, one hasn’t, 

and there are three that we’re trying to understand this morning. 

Senator REED. I think it goes to the point you made, though, 

about effective implementation. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. When I was in Iraq a few weeks ago, Ambassador 

Crocker and General Petraeus pointed out that there is some ambiguity with respect to the reconciliation legislation. Does it mean 

simply fire people and give them a pension and that’s the reconciliation? Does it mean actually bringing them back into the Ministries of Finance and Interior? 

Have your analysts formed an opinion about the probability of effective implementation? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, there’s someone behind me that probably 

has a better answer to your question. What we’re wrestling with 

is the 7,000 Baathists that were not included—— 

Senator REED. Yes. 

84

Mr. MCCONNELL. I think that’s probably what Ambassador 

Crocker was making reference to. Alan Pino, who’s our expert for 

that area, probably has a better answer for you than I do. 

Mr. PINO. Senator, on the de-Baathification law, right now they 

are looking at amendments to ensure that Baathists who have already been functioning effectively in the government are not fired 

because of the law. So those should be ready soon, but they are not 

implementing the law until they have those amendments completed. 

Senator REED. So, there is a sense that there’s some legislative 

progress, but still we have not turned the corner in terms of fully 

integrating and fully welcoming in this case Baathists, and I presume Sunni Baathists, into the government. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sunnis, that’s the key. I would agree that full 

implementation is when it’s effective, and that’s in process. 

Senator REED. General Maples, do you have a comment? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I made a comment earlier about what we’re 

looking at in terms of the Iraqi security forces and in particular the 

army today and the issue that we have in the NCO corps and middle grade officers, and the potential to enable a return of Sunni officers and NCOs to the armed forces, which would make a tremendous difference for us. 

So we’re not there yet, but hopefully that would enable us. 

Senator REED. Let me raise another, related issue. You don’t 

have to arm folks in Iraq, but we have organized these local security forces, the Sunnis principally. My latest information, there’s 

approximately 60,000 of these individuals who are being paid by 

the United States and not yet accepted by the Shiite government 

as integrated either into their security forces or elsewhere. 

Both you gentlemen, if they can’t effectively integrate 60,000 

armed and organized militia forces, that could be a very difficult 

challenge to the government and it could present a force in waiting 

for civil conflict. So again first with General Maples, your comments about, can that be done, will that be done? What’s the indication? Are they doing it? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I think it’s a real key point. The CLC 

groups, the Sons of Iraq, really have made a difference locally, and 

there is a great effort right now to try to integrate them into the 

Iraq security forces. Of course, a big part of that is where the payment is coming from. Right now from the United States, but ultimately from the Government of Iraq. 

We have seen inconclusive trends, I would say. That is, there are 

some acceptance and movement in a positive direction, but we 

aren’t at the point where that has been done. I think it’s one of 

those matters that is critical for us to be inclusive, particularly 

with the Sunni population, and to bring them on board, because 

not doing so has an extremely negative effect. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, I’d just add a couple things. The Prime 

Minister was pretty negative on this in the beginning. What’s happened is the CLC groups have been effective in tamping down on 

the insurgency and al Qaeda in Iraq and so on. So I think the number you quoted is 60,000. It’s probably closer to 70,000. 

The current thinking is 20 percent will be integrated in the government. I think that’s been agreed, and then the government will 

85

attempt to find jobs for the remaining forces, so they’re not armed 

groups any more. 

Senator REED. My understanding from my recent visit was it was 

a roughly 80,000 total, 20,000 effectively, but in Anbar province, 

which is much easier because it’s a Sunni province—in fact, I visited several of our military policemen who are training the Iraqi 

highway patrol. They seem to be part of this group that was integrated. 

But south of Baghdad, in these critical mixed areas where these 

groups are located, the integration is not going well. 

Let me quickly change because my time will come to an end. Admiral McConnell—and correct me if I’m misstating this—but the 

last NIE that spoke about the status of al Qaeda in Pakistan suggested strongly that they have reconstituted themselves in many 

respects, that they have been able to recruit individuals who are 

culturally assimilated to the United States and Europe, which 

makes their ability to conduct operations here more credible, their 

capacity has increased. 

Do you find it troubling, more than 6 years after September 11, 

that in fact their capacity seems to be growing and their capability 

to attack us seems to be enhanced over these last several months 

and years? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, I only would modify a bit of how you described it. The three things that they have—de facto safe haven, 

leadership, and the middle management—I agree with. They’re attempting to recruit those that could assimilate and so on. They’ve 

been successful at some level, but has yet to be determined if 

they’re going to ultimately be successful. 

So you’re asking in my view exactly the right question: What is 

it we do about this? The big question for us right now is what does 

the new government in Pakistan do about it? At one level, they are 

talking about at least that at the military level, being much more 

aggressive with regard to going into the FATA to address this 

issue. 

At another level, at the political level, they’re having dialogue 

about it’s time to open dialogue and negotiate. So that becomes the 

question: What’s the right course of action to actually be effective 

in reducing a threat. 

Senator REED. My time has expired, unless, General Maples, you 

have any additional comment? 

General MAPLES. No, sir. 

Senator REED. Can I for the record at least ask the question, 

which is, do you feel you have sufficient human intelligence and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities included in 

this budget that’s been proposed and what you’ve asked for that is 

adequate to the threats that you see across the globe? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, the budget—— 

Chairman LEVIN. If it’s a short answer why don’t you give it now. 

If not, for the record. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It’s a short answer. The budget’s adequate, but 

doing the things you just highlighted are difficult, because now you 

have to recruit, penetrate, all those kind of things. So it’s a series 

of actions in progress. We have been successful. I’d have to take 

you to a closed session to give you a better understanding. 

86

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me take a few questions in random order 

briefly. Admiral McConnell, the Senate bill, the Protect America 

Act, passed with more than a two-thirds vote in the Senate. It 

came out of the SSCI 13 to 2, a bipartisan, strong bipartisan piece 

of legislation. You have made it clear today and in your letter to 

the House chairman that this impacts and places at risk our intelligence gathering capability. 

I don’t think there’s any dispute about that. I am very disappointed that the House spent a great deal of time in trying to 

issue a contempt of order against the White House and didn’t have 

time to pass this legislation. So I think the American people need 

to be concerned about it, and there’s just no—we’ve been in this. 

We know the details, some of which is secure, some of which is 

public. Enough is certainly public to make a good decision. I believe 

we need to keep moving and get this thing done soon. 

I’m sure you generally agree that sooner is better than later. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. The more time that we wait, the more 

uncertainty that’s created. The phrase I’m using, that I think is accurate, is our capabilities will atrophy as we go forward. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think it’s very critical. 

General Maples, with regard to Senator Reed’s questions about 

these militias that have been such a positive force, the Awakening 

groups, the Sons of Iraq, the CLC groups, that have really taken 

it upon themselves to say, we’re tired of this violence, we’re tired 

of al Qaeda, let’s get this country moving in the right direction, 

seems to me their fundamental view. We have supported them. 

I guess my question to you is, there has been some concern that 

that could create sectarian violence. Have you seen any of that to 

date? I’m sure there’s always some possibility some of these groups 

might be hostile to one another. But to date, how is that going? 

General MAPLES. Sir, we have not seen them turning to sectarian 

violence. In fact, quite the opposite. There is, I believe, a change 

in psychology among those Sunni groups and they really are trying 

to integrate into the processes and the future of their country. 

Now, that said, we are starting to see some of those groups 

which you’ve talked to, particularly the Awakening movement, 

start to move from simply a gathering and a concern over security, 

to move into the political process and having their political interests run into the political interests of other Sunni groups. So you 

start to see some friction within the groups. 

We also see a difference as we start——

Senator SESSIONS. It’s a problem with democracy, isn’t it? 

General MAPLES. Yes, sir. 

But we also see this in the areas where that has been successful. 

That may not be the same model that may be applicable in other 

parts of the country. So as we move further to the north, through 

Diyala and Ninawa Minowa, you start to see a different type of 

structure, less of the family, tribal basis to operate from. So you’ll 

have to have different structures, different models, in order to 

bring about the same kind of security. 

87

Senator SESSIONS. I couldn’t agree more. Every area of Iraq, just 

like every area of the United States, is somewhat different, and the 

thought that we can run everything from Baghdad through this 

parliament is wrong. I think the grassroots positive progress is a 

model for success. 

I see General Petraeus has noted that Mosul represents the last 

strongest area of al Qaeda. There’s an article in the Washington 

Times today that’s with the military in Sharqat, and shows that 

the population there is reevaluating. Captain Sam Cook, the commander there, noted: ‘‘They don’t want occupation, but they don’t 

like the insurgency’s foreign links. They don’t like al Qaeda’s thuggery and foreign support, and they’re totally against Iraqis killing 

innocent Iraqis.’’ He goes on to talk about in that northern area in 

the Sunni city of Sharqat that had been a very big problem, they 

were seeing about a 60 percent drop in high profile attacks. 

So I guess our hope is that the plan, continuing to focus on the 

northern area, can lead to good results. 

General MAPLES. Sir, can I just comment too and add to that? 

Because we’ve talked about the Sunni groups, but there’s a whole 

other part of the country that we need to be concerned about and 

that is in the south. In fact, as we move towards the prospect of 

provincial elections in the October timeframe, particularly if the 

bills can be passed and we can start to move towards elections, 

there will be increased competition between the Shiite groups in 

the south as they move for position. 

As that is going on, there have been a number of Shiite groups 

that have started down the Awakening line also and trying to do 

the same sorts of things in terms of assimilation into the country. 

There has been resistance to that. In fact, many of those groups 

have been taken on by special groups supported by Iran to keep 

them from moving forward in a positive way. So we still need to 

be concerned on the Shiite side as well. 

Senator SESSIONS. I have no doubt of that. This is a delicate 

thing. 

With regard to waterboarding, I think we’ve now had an official 

statement that it was used three times, never, General Maples, by 

DOD; is that correct? 

General MAPLES. Sir, that’s correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. Only three times, against high-value targets, 

after legal review had been conducted, and, I would note, before the 

case Hamdan involving Common Article 3, that said that Common 

Article 3 applied in these circumstances, and since that date there 

has been none. It’s been suspended. The Attorney General said 

none will be approved. 

I think it’s important for us to realize that where we did use 

some of these tactics, they were only used in a limited number of 

circumstances, against the highest targets, before the Common Article 3 case came out. 

Admiral McConnell, let me ask you this. Put on your hat. We pay 

you to think at that high position you have. Kosovo, Somalia, Haiti, 

Afghanistan, and Iraq, all those I think tell us that culture is important in creating effective governments, and it’s a bit arrogant to 

think that we have the ability to virtually overnight in historical 

terms create perfectly stable entities. 

88

Is that a valid concept? Give us your thoughts on how we should 

think in the future about our capacity to bring dramatic change to 

cultures and civilizations that are not used to it? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sir, there will be no dramatic change or rapid 

change. As you highlight, it’s generational. So addressing the cultural issues, understanding the cultural issues, addressing it 

through a cultural point of view, is essential for us to be successful. 

So I think we have to understand and respect those local cultures, 

if we’re going to hope to achieve change, particularly with regard 

to democratic institutions. Democracy’s hard. It’s really, really 

hard. 

So if you think about it at one level, you’re attempting to take 

cultures who normally resort to violence when they have a disagreement, to have them resort to dialogue to resolve their disagreements. That sometimes is generational for change. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s correct, and we have to understand that before we undertake military operations, and we understand that if we do undertake them what the difficulties we’re facing, and the fact that we’re going to have to be patient and seek 

progress one step at a time. It’s just not possible. 

I would just conclude, Admiral McConnell, I remember Mr. 

McLaughlin, who was Acting Director of the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), before our committee told us when we created the 

DNI the real question is who will brief the President and who will 

be responsible if it’s wrong. At that point I think it was the CIA 

Director. Now you’re the DNI, and CIA is under you, and we have 

an Iran NIE by some committee that somebody appoints, that ends 

up with a couple of State Department people who have a political 

agenda involved in writing this report, you attest to it, and it becomes a matter of great national and international significance. 

I basically want your opinion, General Hayden’s opinion. I’m not 

so interested in some group here making a report within the entities. You’ve indicated some concern about the Iran NIE after it’s 

over, and certainly, the IAEA Commission has also. Would you give 

any thoughts about how we as Congress and the President can be 

assured we’re getting the absolute decision of the top person in an 

agency on these kinds of issues? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. First of all, Senator, I do brief the President 6 

days a week and I’m responsible for the output, and I can assure 

you he holds me personally responsible for the output. 

With regard to how we close out a NIE, I chair that board. There 

are 16 agencies that participate. General Hayden is sitting right to 

my right or left because of his seniority. We went through that 

process. What I would highlight for you is we got ourselves trapped 

a bit. We created an expectation here in Congress that if we did 

a NIE it would have unclassified key judgments. 

Now, if you look back at our history, whatever the number is, 

200, 300, 400 NIEs, we had never done unclassified key judgments, 

except in the debate surrounding Iraq and the terrorist threat to 

the Homeland. So it was about three NIEs that all of a sudden created a normative expectation: If we’re going to produce a NIE, 

we’re going to have unclassified key judgments. 

So what I negotiated with my committees and the executive 

branch is, let’s get back to let this community do what we’re paid 

89

to do, which is to collect and analyze foreign intelligence, we do it 

in a classified manner, and we provide the results that are classified to our leadership in the executive branch and to our overseers 

in Congress. 

We got that agreed to. It took me several months to negotiate 

that. We agreed in October. 

Let me fast forward to the end of November. We now had a NIE 

that had a significant change. Now, I think the press 

mischaracterized that change. I tried to put some of that in my 

comments today. There are three parts to a nuclear weapons program. You have to have fissile material; that’s the biggest challenge. You have to have some way to deliver it; and you have to 

have a technical design or weapon. 

What that NIE says, if you read it closely, is what they interrupted, what they halted, was the design specifics of the weapon. 

They’re still doing ballistic missiles and they’re still doing fissile 

material. 

So the situation we found ourselves in is we brought that group 

in that you want to hold accountable together, we argued and debated for most of the afternoon, and agreed, here are the facts that 

we’re going to report to the President. We did that on a Tuesday, 

which was November 27, and the next morning we reported to the 

President. 

The President had an issue: There’s a change here that is contrary to what you, Mike McConnell, testified to in public to Congress. I said: Yes, sir, I understand that and I’m worried about it, 

because if we don’t make this public we withheld or we lied. So we 

had a dilemma. What is it? We went into this all the time planning 

to not have unclassified key judgments, so when we presented it 

to the leadership, because of the dilemma, it was concluded—it became my decision, but because of the dilemma the only thing we 

could do was to have unclassified key judgments and they had to 

be exactly consistent with the classified data. 

Now, at that moment in time we had a real rush on our hands, 

because it’s written, there’s always a worry about a leak. We had 

not yet notified Congress, we had not yet notified our key allies. 

So we were in a race against time. 

If I had had the foresight to know I was going to be forced to 

do unclassified key judgments because of the circumstances, I 

would have caused the key judgments to be very clear about what 

was stopped and what continued. 

So I’ll take responsibility. That’s an error in judgment on my 

part. I wasn’t clairvoyant or smart or it just happened in a way so 

that I couldn’t get ahead of it. So that’s my responsibility. 

Lesson learned for us in my view is the appropriate policy for 

this community is we do not do unclassified key judgments of our 

classified work. I think that in a couple of mentions: one, if it’s unclassified it enters a political dialogue. I’d rather give you the classified information and you have it, Congress has it, the President 

has it, the executive branch has it, and you can argue in the appropriate channels. 

The other thing I worry about is the young analyst who’s there 

writing it. We all have a political orientation and if you know now 

that this is going to be written for release to the public, does that 

90

impact the way you would frame it? I don’t know the answer to 

that question. I just, I worry about it. 

So I think the appropriate place for us is let’s not as a normal 

practice produce unclassified key judgments, and if I had to do it 

over again I would be very specific in how I described what was 

cancelled and what was continued. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Let me clarify one point with Mr. Powell about the FISA. You 

made reference to the difference between ‘‘a significant purpose’’ 

and ‘‘the significant purpose’’ in the Senate or House bill; is that 

correct? 

Mr. POWELL. In the Senate bill I believe it says ‘‘the purpose’’ is 

to target, is to acquire the communications of a U.S. person, not 

‘‘a significant purpose’’ or ‘‘the significant purpose.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. In the House bill? 

Mr. POWELL. In the House bill I believe it says—well, I’ll pull it 

right here: ‘‘A significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the 

communications of a specific U.S. person.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. In any event, it relates to the purpose being to 

acquire conversations of U.S. persons; is that correct? 

Mr. POWELL. Correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, in Senator Graham’s statement this had 

to do with adversaries in Iraq talking to adversaries in Iraq; is that 

correct? 

Mr. POWELL. In the Iraq soldier situation, yes, I believe that’s 

how he referred to it, yes, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. In that circumstance it’s our Iraqi adversaries 

talking to Iraqi adversaries; is that not correct? 

Mr. POWELL. Correct, but if they’re talking to a—certainly it 

would be one of our significant purposes would be to find out if 

they’re contacting a U.S. person, which would not just be a specific 

U.S. person in terms of a human being, but also of course that includes companies and others also. 

Chairman LEVIN. In other words, you think that he was referring 

to communications that were targeting U.S. persons? That’s what 

you understood from his description? 

Mr. POWELL. No, Senator, not at all. The question would be is 

when we go up on somebody overseas and surveil them in this case 

of Iraqi insurgents——

Chairman LEVIN. Iraqi insurgent to Iraqi insurgent. 

Mr. POWELL. We don’t know who they’re going to talk to when 

we go up on them. That’s the problem. 

Chairman LEVIN. That was his hypothetical. 

Mr. POWELL. I could just say when we cover our adversaries we 

don’t know who they’re going to call, and that’s of course one of the 

key problems and why the Director has talked about why we can 

only target one end. ‘‘Foreign to foreign,’’ sometimes people use 

that phrase, but we don’t know. It’s foreign to someplace. A high 

percentage of the time it’s foreign to foreign, but at times it may 

touch a U.S. person or contact a U.S. person. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The reason that we, in working with the committee, agreed to ‘‘the significant purpose,’’ that makes it very 

clear. Our purpose is foreigners, but if it’s ‘‘a significant purpose’’ 

you could interpret that to say if the foreigner possibly called in to 

91

the United States, and I would submit that may be the most important call we got that day, but it’s not the purpose, but it could be 

a purpose. 

Chairman LEVIN. You understood from Senator Graham’s fact 

situation that that was a significant purpose? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Senator Graham’s situation was pre-Protect 

America Act. We were operating under FISA. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand, but you understand that his description, the factual description? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I don’t think Senator Graham made any reference to ‘‘significant purpose’’ at all. In this case the way we discussed it, it was all about Iraqis, foreigners in Iraq, and the issue 

was——

Chairman LEVIN. Talking to foreigners in Iraq. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. You understood that? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, but—— 

Chairman LEVIN. You understand that’s—— 

Mr. MCCONNELL. But their communications passed through the 

United States. That’s the issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. Of course, of course, and everyone wants to 

cover them, by the way. There’s no dispute on that. 

But you understood that, Mr. Powell, also? When you got into the 

‘‘significant purpose’’ test, you understood that in his hypothetical 

that it was Iraqi persons talking to Iraqi persons? You understood 

that when you gave me that answer about ‘‘significant purpose’’? 

Did you understand that? 

Mr. POWELL. I didn’t see it as limited to that situation. I was 

thinking of it as what would we do presented with that situation 

under the House bill and could I certify, because I wouldn’t know 

who they’re talking to. There’s a lot of baggage with the ‘‘significant purpose’’ test that goes back to the pre–2001 amendments to 

FISA. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Mr. Chairman, in fairness now—you know 

you’re very good at this. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, I don’t know. I must—I’m not at all satisfied with the way you handled that question. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Let me try to——

Chairman LEVIN. That’s fair enough, but it was very clear about 

that was the factual situation which was laid out for you, whether 

or not——

Mr. MCCONNELL. But what’s important for me to make the point 

is, we talked about June, which is FISA. You’re asking questions 

about Protect America Act, which came later, and you’re putting it 

in the context of the Senate bill, which hasn’t been made law yet. 

So when you ask your questions I think those of us listening have 

to know which point in time are you talking about, which law are 

you talking about, and then we can answer. 

Chairman LEVIN. My question was absolutely specific, Director. 

It was whether or not the Senate version fixed that problem. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It does. 

Chairman LEVIN. It does, and then I asked you, does the House 

version do it? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It does not. 

92

Chairman LEVIN. No, it depends. Your counsel says it depends. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I believe it sets up a situation where it would 

not in all cases. 

Chairman LEVIN. It might or might not. That’s what your counsel says. You call in your counsel, he finally acknowledges it depends on something. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. My worry is it sets up a situation where we’re 

debating it. So if we’re debating it we’re not collecting it, that’s the 

point. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand, I understand. We all want to collect it. That’s not the difference between anybody. There’s only one 

difference that remains that’s significant, and that has to do with 

whether or not there’s going to be retroactive immunity given to 

telephone companies who allegedly have violated the privacy rights 

of Americans. That’s the only issue that really remains. 

But you have here, it seemed to me, attempted to make another——

Mr. MCCONNELL. I was making no other point. I would agree 

with what you just said. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

On North Korea’s nuclear program—let me switch subjects, and 

I know it’s kind of a lot to ask to move from issue to issue the way 

we do. The IC has made a conclusion here that North Korea could 

have produced up to 50 kilograms of plutonium, enough for at least 

half a dozen nuclear weapons. Nuclear experts outside of the government have concluded that North Korea could have up to 12 

weapons. 

I’m wondering whether your assessment, which says at least six 

weapons, is possibly consistent with the outside assessors that they 

have 12 weapons. Is there any inconsistency? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. There’s no inconsistency, sir. If you’re good at 

it and you have 50 kilograms, that’s enough for 12 if you know how 

to do it. The estimate is they’re not very good at it, therefore they 

would take more of it, so the better guess is 6, but it could be 12. 

Chairman LEVIN. But your reference is it’s at least six? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Could be 12. 

Have you taken a look at the conversation that took place between a senior North Korean official who’s their vice minister of 

foreign affairs, between—when he said allegedly something on October 4, 2002, about the existence of a North Korean highly enriched uranium (HEU) program? You may remember that there 

was some—— 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. There’s some question as to whether or 

not he unambiguously acknowledged that program or whether 

there was some ambiguity in there. Have you concluded as to 

whether it was unambiguous? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The lack of ambiguity is more an assessment 

on our part of the evidence surrounding what was going on at that 

time. 

Chairman LEVIN. The lack of ambiguity? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. There is—we have high confidence that they 

had a HEU program, and there’s no ambiguity about that in our 

93

estimation based on the evidence that we had at hand. The person 

you’re making reference to was searching for negotiating ground 

and presented a hypothetical. Some interpreted that to be an admission and some said, not necessarily an admission. So that’s the 

reason there was confusion around what he said. 

One thing I’ve discovered about North Koreans is they have no 

idea, the idea of truth. It’s not in their makeup. So when you’re 

having a discussion it’s always how am I getting advantage and so 

on. 

Now, our estimate on their HEU program has changed from high 

confidence in 2002 at the time you’re making reference, to today, 

when we only make medium confidence, with the exception of DIA. 

The reason for that is the evidence that we saw—and when you 

have a situation like this you have shreds and pieces and some 

level of data—is not as consistent today as it was when we made 

the original estimate. So we have dropped our confidence level from 

high confidence previously to only medium confidence today. 

Chairman LEVIN. Have you looked at the notes of that conversation where you say some have interpreted it as being an acknowledgment and some have said it’s ambiguous? Have you reached a 

conclusion as to whether it was an acknowledgment or it was not? 

No, not you. I’m talking about has the IC, you as head of it, have 

you reached that conclusion one way or another? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I will get you that answer. I just don’t recall. 

I’m familiar with it and I read some of the transcript data, but I 

don’t know exactly. I just don’t remember. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you could do that for the record it would be 

great. 

[The information referred to follows:]

[Deleted.]

Chairman LEVIN. I want to now switch to the ICBM, the North 

Korean ICBM program. They attempted to launch a Taepo Dong2 in July 2006, which failed apparently. Do you know whether that 

Taepo Dong-2 was a space launch vehicle like the Taepo Dong-1 

satellite launch attempt in 1998, or was it an ICBM? Have you 

reached a conclusion on that? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I think the IC has a position. I don’t remember 

what it is. I just don’t recall. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s fine. We’re shifting around here pretty 

quickly, so it’s impossible to remember all these things. We understand that. 

Mr. FINGAR. There’s the inherent capability. If you can launch a 

satellite, it can be a ballistic missile. There are all kinds of reentry 

problems to it. On the first one launched, they claimed it was a 

space launch vehicle. On the one that failed, I don’t believe there 

was a claim and there wasn’t a separate assessment other than the 

inherent capability to be a ballistic missile. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. I may be the only person in the room that’s 

ever gotten a wiretap based on probable cause. I was a United 

States Attorney for 12 years and I think we had two, only two, and 

they’re very difficult to obtain. 

94

Mr. MCCONNELL. I was going to ask you, sir, to explain the process to get a probable cause warrant. That is a significant undertaking. 

Senator SESSIONS. The both that we used I think had at least 

100 pages. You have to take it to some judicial authority. They 

have to examine it and review it, and they have their staff review 

it to make sure there’s probable cause before the judge will sign off 

on it. 

Then you have to have a team of agents 24 hours a day involved 

in monitoring the calls, and if you clearly have a wife calling about 

a personal matter you have to turn off the machine and not listen 

to that. But even then, Admiral McConnell—and Senator Levin, I 

think this is important—if a call is made to someone you never expected to call, that call is recorded, because that’s the purpose of 

the wiretap. 

The purpose of the wiretap is to find out who this person is calling, to gather evidence that they may be involved in a crime, and 

you have to have substantial—so to put that kind of burden—now, 

your counsel here, but it’s a simple thing historically and remains 

so today: You do not have to have probable cause to get a wiretap 

on a foreign, non-American citizen outside the United States. Isn’t 

that correct, for intelligence purposes? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. We’re back now to the situation, if it’s not already in the books for Protect America Act, we’re back to a situation where we would have to produce a probable cause standard to 

get a warrant if it’s a foreigner in a foreign country talking to a 

foreigner, if the place of the intercept is in the United States on 

a wire. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s what the Patriot Act had to fix. I admit 

that’s because of the possibility it went through the United States. 

But the simple question is, you are not required by law to have 

to have probable cause to participate in intelligence gathering of 

foreign people outside the United States? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. If I intercept it in a foreign country. 

Senator SESSIONS. Right. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. If I intercept it here——

Senator SESSIONS. That’s the historic principle and it’s not been 

changed. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. 

Senator SESSIONS. That’s the way, and so we have the technical 

problem of a call might be routing through the United States and 

that causes a technical problem. But I’m trying to focus just on the 

simple principle, because I think we need to understand we’re not 

overreaching here. 

So if you have a wiretap on a drug dealer in the United States 

or a Mafia person and they call someone to discuss something that 

you never heard of, some other American citizen in the United 

States, of course you listen to it. That’s what the wiretap is for, to 

find out who he is talking to. 

Now, if you have a legal right to tap a terrorist in Iraq and they 

call to the United States, I think it’s plain to me that you have a 

right to tap that phone. You’ve established a legal authority to tap 

that phone. So then it comes up, what if you know that person in 

Waziristan or Baghdad periodically calls different people in the 

95

United States? One of your purposes is to listen to that call because it might be the message to blow up some building and kill 

Americans. You want to know that call. Then I think, isn’t that the 

reason you couldn’t accept the ‘‘a purpose’’ of the call, ‘‘a purpose’’—— 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. —because one of your purposes would be 

hopefully to pick up a call that might help identify a terrorist cell 

in the United States? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, that’s correct. I would add that the bill 

that was passed on the Senate side, and it’s actually included in 

the Protect America Act, is if we were targeting someone inside the 

United States for foreign intelligence purposes, we get a warrant. 

So if it’s strictly foreign and he happens to call in, I have a situation where I must—I can use the information if it’s of intelligence 

value. I can report it. I camouflage the identity of the U.S. person, 

but I can report it, and if it is of no intelligence value, then I have 

to minimize it. 

So the situation was accommodated in either case to ensure the 

protection of the civil liberties of Americans. 

Senator SESSIONS. So I think a significant purpose of the intercepting of a terrorist phone call in Iraq, listening in on those numbers, may get you by, although that might sometimes cause you a 

problem. But any purpose of it, I think every time you’re listening 

in on a terrorist who may be leading an organization, one of your 

purposes would be to hear if they make calls into the United 

States. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The purpose would be to collect information on 

the foreign target. A purpose could be if he is activating a cell. 

That’s why we were very specific——

Senator SESSIONS. I think you were correct to make that clear 

and be firm on that. I’m glad we agreed in the Senate by more than 

a two-thirds vote and we passed it. It’s time for the House to get 

busy and work this thing out and move us forward and make these 

rules permanent so you can have confidence. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Just to clarify that, if there’s a call being made by a terrorist 

that you believe is a terrorist, not through this new technology, just 

a direct call to somebody in the United States on a regular pay 

phone, you need to get a warrant for that? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. It depends on where I intercept it, sir. It depends on where I intercept it. 

Chairman LEVIN. In the United States. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. If I got it in the United States and it’s not already pre-loaded, I would have to have a warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. You do? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Under today’s rules. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, no, even under the Senate bill? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Under the Senate bill, if it originated in a foreign country and it’s a foreigner I do not have to have a warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. If it comes into the United States on a regular 

pay phone? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. What do you mean, ‘‘regular pay phone’’? 

96

Chairman LEVIN. A regular phone, not—it’s not routed to——

Mr. MCCONNELL. A regular phone wouldn’t be any different from 

any other phone. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, it’s not routed to somebody outside of 

the United States. It’s a call made to somebody——

Mr. MCCONNELL. To a pay phone here in the United States? 

Chairman LEVIN. To a phone here in the United States. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. I would not have to have a warrant under the 

Senate bill. 

Chairman LEVIN. How about under the House bill? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Under the House bill, it depends. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Can I give you an example? 

Chairman LEVIN. So the new routing issue, this new technology 

where it’s being routed through the United States to a foreign person or to a foreign point, that’s not just the issue here, then? In 

other words, the argument has been that there’s new technology, 

and it’s been described publicly, where a foreign call is routed 

through the United States. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Foreign to foreign, yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Foreign to foreign. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. That if it were foreign to foreign without being 

routed, you wouldn’t need a warrant under the old law. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Under Protect America Act. 

Chairman LEVIN. Under the old law, if it was not routed through 

the United States. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. No warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. You don’t need a warrant. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Even under old FISA. 

Chairman LEVIN. Under old FISA. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Agreed. 

Chairman LEVIN. Because there’s a new technology where it’s 

routed through the United States——

Mr. MCCONNELL. Under old FISA, warrant; under Protect America, no warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. Exactly right. I think everybody wants to correct that problem. That is not the issue and it shouldn’t be made 

the issue. 

So now you do not have this new technology under my next question. You have old technology being used. Is there any change you 

need relative to old technology being used? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The change—the way it’s described in the Senate bill——

Chairman LEVIN. You need a change in law on that. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. In the Senate bill—it depends. Let’s go back to 

old FISA. If I’m intercepting it overseas, no warrant. If I’m intercepting it in the United States, warrant. 

Under Protect America Act, because I’m targeting overseas, no 

warrant. Under the Senate bill, no warrant, because my purpose is 

foreign. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, even though it comes into the United 

States. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. 

97

Chairman LEVIN. All right. If a purpose is to overhear a conversation to an American, it’s foreign to American and that’s your 

purpose, do you need a warrant? The answer would be yes under 

the House bill. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. House bill. No under the Senate bill. 

Chairman LEVIN. If that is a purpose. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. A purpose. The purpose, okay. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s correct. If a purpose, however, is to 

intercept a phone call coming from overseas to an American citizen, 

if a purpose, under the House bill, you then have to go and get a 

warrant? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. The way you’re describing it 

here, the ‘‘a’’ in this case could be a hypothetical. So what that introduces is uncertainty, and now you’re in a debate about it. So 

that’s why we tried to hold the line on ‘‘the purpose.’’ 

Chairman LEVIN. Right. 

General, just one last question for you. I wrote you on December 

21, 2007, requesting that you declassify two DIA documents. You’re 

still waiting on the CIA to complete its part of the review before 

you can get me the material. A great deal of similar material has 

already been reviewed and declassified, so this is not new ground. 

Do you know why the CIA has not completed this straightforward review for more than 2 months? 

General MAPLES. Sir, I’m not aware specifically of their reason. 

We are in direct contact with them and with your staff right now 

to try to facilitate a response to you. I did get a response back from 

them that they anticipate having something to me in the near 

term, and I mean within about a week, and which we’ll immediately respond and turn your response back to you. 

Chairman LEVIN. I want to go back to this probable cause issue 

as well, just to clarify that. Under the Senate bill, if the purpose 

is to intercept a conversation to an American here and the intercept takes place here——

Mr. MCCONNELL. If the purpose, I have to have a warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. You have to establish probable cause. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir, probable cause and a warrant if the 

purpose. 

Chairman LEVIN. A warrant. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. A warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. The same difficulties of establishing probable 

cause exist. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Sure, and appropriately so. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think we all agree that it’s appropriate. So I 

just want to make clear that under either bill, under different 

tests, that if it’s the purpose one time then you have to get probable cause; if it’s a purpose, under the House bill you have to establish probable cause. But in either event, there are circumstances in 

both bills where, even though it’s a call coming in from a terrorist 

to the United States, intercepted in the United States, you must 

establish probable cause. 

There are circumstances in either bill—I’m not saying it’s the 

same circumstances. 

98

Mr. MCCONNELL. There’s a nuance here you need to appreciate, 

sir. You can only target one or the other. If I’m targeting foreign, 

no warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. Got you. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Now, if I target in this country I have to have 

a warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s true, that’s true under both bills. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That would be any time I target a U.S. person 

I have to have a warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. Even though the call comes from a foreign terrorist? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. But sir, you can’t target—that’s the part of the 

technology you’re not—— 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m not talking about the new technology. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Any technology. Remember, I can only—think 

of it takes two telephones to talk. I can only target one or the 

other. So I’m targeting foreign; I don’t know who he’s going to call. 

He could call a foreigner, he could call an American, he could call 

wherever. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand, I understand that. But I’m saying if the call is coming in——

Mr. MCCONNELL. Coming in. 

Chairman LEVIN. —from a foreign source that is a terrorist 

source——

Mr. MCCONNELL. No warrant because I’m targeting a foreign 

source, because I can only do one. I can only target one end. I can’t 

control who he calls. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Now, if I am targeting inside, that’s my target, 

that’s the phone number I’m going to go after, I have to have a 

warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. If the significant purpose of targeting that foreign source is an American, is an American—— 

Mr. MCCONNELL. If it’s the purpose—— 

Chairman LEVIN. If it’s the purpose. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. —got to have a warrant. 

Chairman LEVIN. Then you have to go and get a warrant. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. If that’s the purpose. 

So all I’m saying is under either bill there are circumstances 

where you must establish probable cause and go to a FISA court. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. There are—in either bill, I must do probable 

cause if I’m targeting a U.S. person. 

Chairman LEVIN. Under either bill. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The probable cause difficulty is the same always? Probable cause is probable cause. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. We should be required to do probable cause 

any time we target—— 

Chairman LEVIN. I hope everybody would agree on that. 

Mr. MCCONNELL. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think everybody would agree. 

99

Mr. MCCONNELL. But we’re arguing as hard as we can that we 

shouldn’t be going to a probable cause standard to target a foreigner in a foreign country. 

Chairman LEVIN. We got it. 

I won’t ask if there’s any other questions because I’d be asking 

myself. We thank you both. It’s been a long hearing and I hope a 

useful hearing. We appreciate your attendance and your patience. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

INTERROGATION PRACTICES—ARMY FIELD MANUAL

1. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, the Intelligence Authorization Act approved by Congress includes a requirement that all elements of the Intelligence 

Community (IC) follow the Army Field Manual (AFM) on Interrogations. The AFM 

on human intelligence (HUMINT) collection operations prohibits a number of specific actions from being used for interrogations, including waterboarding, forced nudity, beatings, use of military working dogs, and mock executions. The AFM requires treatment consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 

which prohibits ‘‘cruel treatment and torture’’ and ‘‘humiliating and degrading treatment.’’ 

You testified to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence earlier this month 

that you didn’t believe the AFM would be appropriate for use by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) because the AFM is ‘‘designed for a specific purpose, for men 

in uniform, generally younger, less experienced, and less trained’’ than CIA interrogators. What did you mean when you said that the AFM on Intelligence was designed for ‘‘a special purpose’’? Isn’t it designed to collect intelligence? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The United States AFM on Interrogations was designed to meet 

the needs of America’s military. The AFM was not designed with the sole focus on 

interrogation of senior al Qaeda terrorists who may have information necessary to 

disrupt an attack on the Homeland. The AFM was intended to cover detainees who 

Department of Defense (DOD) personnel may encounter worldwide—many of whom 

enjoy the full protection of the Geneva Convention as uniformed military personnel 

complying with the laws of war.

2. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Maples, what is your understanding on why 

the AFM prohibits waterboarding? 

General MAPLES. Paragraph 5–75 of Field Manual 2–22.3, Human Intelligence 

Collector Operations, prohibits the use of waterboarding in conjunction with intelligence interrogations. This manual was issued on 6 September 2006 and reflects 

the statutory mandate of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 that no individual in 

the custody or under the control of the U.S. Government shall be subject to cruel, 

inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Waterboarding is not consistent 

with this standard.

3. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Maples, do you believe that waterboarding 

is consistent with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions? Is it humane? 

General MAPLES. As I stated during the hearing, I do not believe that 

waterboarding is consistent with common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, nor 

do I believe it is humane.

4. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Maples, you testified recently that ‘‘the approaches that are in the AFM give us the tools that are necessary for the purpose 

under which we are conducting interrogations’’ in your testimony before the House 

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on February 7, 2008. Do the approaches in the AFM give you the tools you need for conducting intelligence operations? 

General MAPLES. The 18 approaches listed in FM 2–22.3 provides DOD interrogators the tools necessary for interrogations, which are an integral part of intelligence 

operations.

100

AL QAEDA ALLURE DIMINISHING?

5. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, several times in your prepared statement 

you suggest that al Qaeda’s reputation and allure may be fading. Do you believe 

the erosion is significant and lasting? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

IRAQ—DEPTH OF STRIFE

6. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, in recent testimony, you stressed that 

‘‘[M]any Sunnis who participate in local security initiatives retain a hostile attitude 

toward the Shiite parties that dominate the government, and some Shiite leaders 

still view many anti-al Qaeda in Iraq Sunni groups as thinly disguised insurgents 

who are plotting to reverse the political process that brought the Shiite to power.’’

You also noted that ‘‘Improved security is a necessary but not sufficient condition 

to stabilize Iraq. Bridging differences among competing factions and communities 

and providing effective governance are critical for achieving a successful state, but 

moving ahead on that road has been tough for Iraq . . . the political gaps between 

Iraqi communities . . . remain deep.’’ Is one implication of your remarks that the 

Iraqi people and the elites are themselves as yet unpersuaded that Iraq is destined 

to be stable and secure? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

NEED FOR PRESSURE

7. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, do you believe that the Iraqi Government, 

security forces, and broader political and religious leaders will take responsibility 

for their country’s destiny without pressure from the United States, including the 

message that our commitment is not open-ended? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

AMBITIONS AND FEARS OF SUNNIS, SHIITES, AND KURDS

8. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, have the Sunni elites accepted minority 

status in a decentralized Federal Government, or do they still generally harbor ambitions to regain their former dominant position in Iraq? Do the Shiite elites remain 

convinced that the Sunnis intend to reassert their authority, and do they lack confidence that they can resist the Sunnis without substantial external assistance—either from the United States or from Iran? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

SECTARIAN POTENTIAL OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

9. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, if the political process breaks down altogether in Iraq, do you expect that the Iraqi security 

services will split apart along sectarian and ethnic lines and become combatants in 

a civil war? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

10. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, would the 

tribal groupings we have been working with also become organized assets in a civil 

war? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

STRENGTH OF AL QAEDA IN IRAQ

11. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, how 

would you characterize the level of success we have achieved against al Qaeda in 

Iraq? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

12. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, what portion of this success is due to military actions, actions by Iraqis themselves turning 

101

against al Qaeda in Iraq, and actions by Iraq’s neighbors in stemming the flow of 

foreign fighters and material support into Iraq? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AGAINST IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE NETWORKS

13. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, the national intelligence agencies are focused on countering al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and particularly on supporting the military’s campaigns against al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some 

in the military have expressed concern that the intelligence agencies are not adequately supporting the armed forces’ struggle against improvised explosive device 

(IED) networks—specifically the flow of funds and materials into Iraq that support 

these networks. Have you closely examined the type and level of national intelligence support committed to the IED problem? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

IRANIAN AGENTS IN IRAQ

14. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, how many Quds Force operatives do you 

estimate are operating in Iraq? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

15. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, are there significant numbers of Iranian 

agents from other Iranian government organizations? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

16. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, what is the range of activities that these 

personnel are engaged in? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

STRENGTH OF IRANIAN INFLUENCE

17. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, how would you characterize the degree of 

influence Iran exercises over the Shiite organizations and population as a whole in 

Iraq? Is this influence growing or shrinking? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

THREAT ESTIMATES SUPPORTING F–22 ACQUISITION

18. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Maples, my understanding is that you and 

the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are responsible for producing a consensus estimate of the threat that is the basis upon which we develop and purchase weapons 

systems for the future. Is that correct? 

General MAPLES. Essentially, that is correct. DIA is tasked in DOD Instruction 

5105.21 to ‘‘[s]upport the DOD weapons system acquisition process by producing 

threat assessments within DIA or validating assessments produced by other Defense 

Intelligence Components for all major DOD acquisition programs . . .’’ For each 

Major Defense Acquisition Program, DIA works with the intelligence analysis center 

supporting the lead Service responsible for developing the program to convene a 

Threat Steering Group (TSG). The TSG consists of all DOD IC agencies with analytic responsibilities for areas potentially affecting the system under development. 

The System Threat Assessment Report (STAR) for the program is produced by the 

Service intelligence center and reviewed by the agencies represented on the TSG, 

including DIA. When each agency’s concerns have been resolved, DIA validates the 

STAR for use in the defense acquisition process. Should an analytical disagreement 

arise that cannot be resolved, the STAR process allows for the representation of alternative views. 

DIA also validates the Capstone Threat Assessment (CTA) series of documents, 

the DOD IC’s official assessment of the principal threat systems and capabilities 

within a category of warfare that a potential adversary might reasonably bring to 

bear in an attempt to defeat or degrade U.S. weapon systems undergoing development. CTAs look out 20 years and are not associated with any specific U.S. weapon 

system.

102

19. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Maples, my understanding is that one 

principal reason that there is a difference of opinion between the DOD leadership 

and the Department of the Air Force over continued production of the F–22 aircraft 

is a disagreement between their respective estimates of the severity of future 

threats in the fiscal year 2025 timeframe. Are you aware of this disagreement? 

General MAPLES. DIA is not aware of disagreements between DOD leadership and 

the Department of the Air Force over the severity of future threats in the fiscal year 

2025 timeframe. 

DIA has validated two principal threat documents for use in support of the

F–22 acquisition program: the System Threat Assessment Report for the F–22A, 

published by the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) in November 

2006, and the Air CTA, published by NASIC in August 2006. Both documents arc 

in the process of being updated. DIA also validates the Joint Country Forces Assessment (JCOFA), which provides estimates of future threat order of battle, to include 

air assets. The JCOFA process is similar to that of the STAR in that it includes 

the pertinent Service intelligence centers in both action and review.

20. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Maples, what is the process that the DOD 

uses to resolve disagreements that arise? 

General MAPLES. In the event of substantive disagreement between production 

centers, should the TSG be unable to resolve the disagreement into a single DOD 

IC position, the position held by the production center with primary analytical responsibility for the issue will become the position slated in the STAR. Centers with 

analytical responsibility for aspects of the issue under consideration that still disagree with the stated position may submit alternative text stating their disagreement. In the rare case of a significant issue where: (1) different assessments based 

on the same intelligence exist, (2) both assessments meet the validation criteria 

noted below, and (3) agreement cannot be reached on appropriate language, the senior acquisition intelligence official in the production center or office may request alternative text. The validation criteria include appropriateness and completeness of 

the intelligence, consistency with existing intelligence positions, and use of accepted 

analytic tradecraft in developing assessments.

21. Senator LEVIN. Lieutenant General Maples, do you know whether the DOD 

and the Air Force are both using the DIA-approved threat estimates? If they are 

not, on what basis would they use a different estimate? 

General MAPLES. So far as DIA is aware, both DOD and the Air Force are using 

the same DIA-approved threat estimates.

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

22. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, your January quarterly report to this 

committee, as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2007, continues to assess—in its unclassified version—that the IC has ‘‘high confidence that North Korea has pursued efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment capability, which we assess is intended for nuclear weapons. All the IC agencies judge 

with at least moderate confidence that this past effort continues today. The degree 

of progress towards producing enriched uranium remains unknown, however.’’

Assuming North Korea had a program, is it possible that North Korea, like Iran, 

has suspended it? If so, how possible would you say that it is? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

23. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, what possible considerations might have 

led, or might lead, North Korea to abandon an existing highly enriched uranium 

(HEU) program? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

24. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, under what conditions might we expect 

North Korea to continue any existing HEU program activity? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

IMPLEMENTATION OF SIX-PARTY TALKS AGREEMENT ON DENUCLEARIZATION

25. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, as a result of the agreement reached in the Six-Party Talks, North Korea is required to 

take steps to disable and then dismantle its nuclear weapons program. The disablement process, which was supposed to have been concluded by December 31, remains 

103

incomplete. The press has indicated that North Korea claims to have slowed the removal of fuel from its 5-megawatt reactor in response to late fuel deliveries and because the United States has not accepted the regime’s declaration of its nuclear activities. Some of the slow-down occurred at the suggestion of the United States to 

address some health and safety issues. What is the IC’s assessment of why North 

Korea slowed the removal of fuel from the reactor? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

26. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, given the 

slower pace, when can we expect the disablement to be completed? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

27. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, your written statement notes you remain 

concerned North Korea could proliferate nuclear weapons abroad. Has North Korea 

proliferated nuclear materials or technology to other countries? If so, when, and to 

whom? Is such proliferation ongoing? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

28. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, how would you assess our ability to detect 

North Korea’s nuclear proliferation activities? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

29. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, do you have any reason to believe that 

North Korea is providing assistance to, or cooperating with, other states seeking nuclear weapons, such as Iran or Burma? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

30. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, what factors or motivations would prevent 

North Korea from proliferating nuclear material, or technology, to terrorists? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

31. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, are there any circumstances under which 

North Korea might knowingly proliferate nuclear weapons to terrorists or other nations? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS

32. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, the United States, Russia, China, and 

other nuclear weapons states have ongoing strategic modernization programs. At 

what point do modernization programs present a concern or a threat? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS

33. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, China demonstrated an anti-satellite 

(ASAT) capability last year, creating debris that will last for decades. The United 

States recently used a SM–3 missile from the Navy’s ballistic missile defense program to shoot down a dead United States satellite. While clearly this effort was 

driven by a need to protect populated areas from exposure to the toxic satellite fuel, 

it did demonstrate an ASAT capability. What are the long-term implications of both 

actions for development—not just research or testing—of ASAT systems globally? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. China and Russia are using the United States, intercept of a 

National Reconnaissance Office satellite for their campaign to portray the United 

States’ intention to weaponize space. In addition, Russia has claimed the use of the 

SM–3 missile—developed for missile defense purposes is proof this was an ABM/

ASAT test and has tried to link the intercept to the missile defense sites issue in 

Europe. 

[Deleted.]

34. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell, conversely, do these two actions improve 

the chance of an international discussion on ASAT weapons or debris mitigation or 

prevention? 

104

Mr. MCCONNELL. International discussions on ASAT weapons and debris mitigation/prevention have been ongoing even prior to either of these two actions being 

performed. In specific, there exists the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 

Outer Space (COPUOS), the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD) Prevention of 

an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and the international Interagency Space 

Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). 

Since 2002, Russia and China have been collaborating in the CD/PAROS forum 

on a joint proposal that would prohibit signatories from testing or deploying weapons on orbit (Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer 

Space). Russia recently updated the draft proposal in June 2007 and this proposal 

is still under debate. Of note, the draft treaty would not have banned the Chinese 

ASAT test or the U.S. satellite engagement. For COPUOS, space debris has become 

the top priority and the committee is working on developing ‘‘Rules of Good Behavior’’ in outer space to address the issue. To this end, COPUOS, in June 2007, endorsed the IADC’s ‘‘Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines’’ document.

BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS

35. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, in July 

2006, North Korea attempted to launch a Taepo Dong-2, but it failed within the first 

minute after launch. Given the failure of the July 2006 Taepo Dong-2, does the IC 

judge that North Korea has any operational intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBM) deployed? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

36. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, given the 

failure in July 2006, does the IC judge that North Korea would need to conduct additional development and testing to have a reliable long-range ballistic missile capable of striking the United States? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

37. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, does the 

IC assess that North Korea has developed reliable and effective re-entry vehicle 

technology that would successfully survive re-entry of an ICBM flight? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

38. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, does the 

IC assess that North Korea has developed a reliable nuclear warhead for a ballistic 

missile that would work effectively from launch through re-entry and successful detonation at intercontinental ranges? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

IRAN’S MISSILE PROGRAMS

39. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, previous 

unclassified testimony and reports indicate that Iran currently has the largest inventory of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in the Middle East, numbering 

hundreds of missiles. Is that still correct? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

40. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, last 

year’s testimony indicated that Iran’s ballistic missile program was focused on regional missile capabilities. Is that still the case? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

41. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, does the 

IC assess that Iran is likely to have an ICBM capability deployed by 2015, without 

foreign assistance? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

105

TERRORIST ATTACK MORE LIKELY THAN INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK

42. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, for a 

number of years, the IC has judged that it is more likely that the United States 

would be attacked by terrorists than by long-range ballistic missiles, and that an 

attack against the United States with a weapon of mass destruction is more likely 

to be delivered by means other than a ballistic missile. Is that still the judgment 

of the IC? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

43. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, how long 

does the IC judge that will be the case, for example, for the next decade? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.]

RUSSIAN REACTION TO EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE

44. Senator LEVIN. Director McConnell and Lieutenant General Maples, Russia 

has made numerous harsh statements and threats concerning the proposed deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, including 

the possibility of targeting nuclear missiles at those nations. What do your organizations judge is the most likely Russian reaction if the deployment goes forward, and 

what do you believe is a plausible worst-case Russian reaction? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.] 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

FUTURE CHALLENGES

45. Senator AKAKA. Director McConnell, recent history has once again demonstrated that some of the most potentially devastating threats come from areas 

and directions that are generally unpredicted. Or, even if highlighted by intelligence 

personnel, these threats do not receive the adequate attention and resources necessary to respond to them before it’s too late. Your testimony before this committee 

highlights many areas for concern, especially in the space and cyberspace domains, 

that are relatively young in their development. What geographic region of the world 

or subset of space/cyberspace threats not identified today has the biggest potential 

to be a future challenge to U.S. national security and is currently not a priority in 

the Western IC? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

46. Senator AKAKA. Director McConnell, when do you speculate attention and resources need to be turned toward this area? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. [Deleted.]

CONTINUING EDUCATION

47. Senator AKAKA. Director McConnell, education is important to me. I am especially concerned at the widening gap between the number of U.S. students graduating with post-secondary degrees in science, engineering, and computer technology disciplines when compared with China and India. With the growing cyberspace threats to America’s information infrastructure and corresponding economic 

security that you mentioned, how concerned are you with the availability of people 

from the future technological talent pool that will be able to help us mitigate these 

threats? 

Mr. MCCONNELL. The DNI is concerned with the widening gap between the number of U.S. students graduating with post-secondary degrees in science, engineering, 

and computer technology disciplines compared to other countries. To that end, 

through our National Intelligence University (NIU) System, we are actively encouraging institutions to develop and emphasize, and individuals to pursue, degrees in 

these fields. Our programs with universities not only encourage student to study intelligence analysis, but also to obtain degrees in mathematics, computer science, and 

other technological specialties. In addition, we are working jointly with the DOD on 

the ‘‘Flagship Program’’ which focuses on teaching students critical languages, such 

as Farsi, Urdu, and Chinese. With the development of the NIU System, we now 

106

have a means by which to gather IC education requirements and anticipated shortfalls. We will continue to close that gap through our partnership with academia. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

48. Senator PRYOR. Lieutenant General Maples, in your testimony you state, 

‘‘Russia retains a relatively large stockpile of non-strategic nuclear warheads. Nuclear weapons or material diversion remains a concern despite increased security 

measures. Some nuclear facilities and research reactors remain vulnerable to internal theft, sabotage, or a well-executed terrorist attack.’’ How effective have our Departments of Energy, State, and Defense nuclear non-proliferation programs been 

in trying to reduce this nuclear proliferation threat that has been of concern for 

years? 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

Weapons-usable nuclear material will likely remain more vulnerable to theft than 

warheads because it is stored in diverse facilities that have different security practices and levels of accessibility than do weapons sites. Undetected diversion of weapons-usable nuclear material has likely occurred, and we are concerned about the 

total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 15 

years. However, there has been a marked decline in the number of observed nuclear 

material interdiction cases since the time immediately following the collapse of the 

Soviet Union and the subsequent implementation of several ongoing threat reduction programs. 

[Deleted.]

49. Senator PRYOR. Lieutenant General Maples, from your perspective, have U.S. 

nuclear non-proliferation efforts reduced the vulnerability of attacks or internal 

theft of Russian nuclear stockpiles? 

General MAPLES. [Deleted.] 

Russia’s nuclear material protection, control, and accounting practices have been 

slowly improving over the last several years. Progress on security enhancements is 

most advanced at civilian institutes and Russian navy sites. Progress is impeded at 

facilities within the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy State Corporation (Rosatom) 

nuclear weapons complex, which contains large amounts of material of proliferation 

interest, because Russian security concerns prevent direct U.S. access to sensitive 

materials. We remain concerned about the insider threat and potential terrorist attacks at facilities housing weapons-usable nuclear material.

[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

Æ