IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-30814

Summary Calendar

KATHERINE S. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS,

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:15-CV-308

Before JOLLY, DAVIS, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Katherine S. Johnson moves for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) 

on appeal from the district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(1) of her civil action against Loyola University New Orleans 

(Loyola) on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and res judicata. 

By so moving, Johnson is challenging the district court’s certification that she 

is not entitled to IFP status because her appeal lacks arguable merit and is 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 20, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-30814

2

thus not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor, 117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 

1997); Howard v. King, 707 F.3d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). 

“As always, we must first consider whether we have jurisdiction.” 

Budget Prepay, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 605 F.3d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 2010). We 

review a ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction de novo, and the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of 

proof. Id. The relevant inquiry here is whether this case presents a federal 

question triggering jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes 

federal jurisdiction over civil actions “‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or 

treaties of the United States.’” Id. at 278 & n.1 (quoting § 1331). “Generally, 

under section 1331, a suit arises under federal law if there appears on the face 

of the complaint some substantial, disputed question of federal law.” Carpenter 

v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 366 (5th Cir. 1995).

In her pleadings before this court, Johnson cites several potential sources 

of federal question jurisdiction. For the first time in this appeal, Johnson relies 

upon: 15 U.S.C. § 57a, which sets forth the Federal Trade Commission’s 

rulemaking process relative to unfair or deceptive trade practices; 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1001, which criminalizes false statements to federal investigators; 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1514, which creates a civil action to restrain harassment in the context of a 

federal criminal case; the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33; Title VI of 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; the Age Discrimination Act, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 6101 et seq.; and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), which 

authorizes a post-judgment motion alleging fraud. Since Johnson failed to 

raise any arguments regarding these federal law provisions in the district 

court, we will not review these issues. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 225 

(5th Cir. 1993). 

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Johnson’s remaining arguments before this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, 20 U.S.C. § 1011l, the First Amendment, and the Constitution are 

insufficient to establish a federal question. Even construing her pro se 

pleadings liberally, see Yohey, 985 F.2d at 225, Johnson has failed to articulate 

how her claims create a substantial, disputed federal question under the cited 

statutory and constitutional provisions. See Carpenter, 44 F.3d at 366. 

Johnson’s mere labeling of her case as a § 1983 action is insufficient to explain 

how the private institution of Loyola acted under color of state law to deprive 

her of federal or constitutional rights. See Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 

(5th Cir. 2013) (holding that a § 1983 claim may be asserted only against a 

person acting under color of state law). 

Johnson has likewise failed to explain how her claim that her degree was 

“conferred on Civil District Court New Orleans, not the Appellant in violation 

of 20 U.S.C. § 1011l” in fact arose from that statute. Section 1011l mandates

the Secretary of Education’s continued collaboration with other government 

agencies to expose and crack down on diploma mills. See § 1011l. Finally, 

Johnson’s constitutional claims against Loyola are insufficient to create a 

federal question, as non-state actors like Loyola are generally not subject to 

constitutional restrictions. See Price v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 261 F. App’x

761, 764 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676, 680 (5th 

Cir. 1996)). Accordingly, Johnson has failed to establish that the district court 

erred in dismissing her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 

Budget Prepay, Inc., 605 F.3d at 278. 

As Johnson has failed to demonstrate that her appeal involves legal 

points that are arguable on their merits and thus not frivolous, her IFP motion 

is DENIED. See Howard, 707 F.2d at 219-20. Because the appeal is frivolous, 

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it is DISMISSED. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. Johnson’s

motions for appointment of counsel and to supplement the record are DENIED. 

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