IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 6, 2012 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. RONALD EARL COOK

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Giles County

Nos. 15423 & 15699 Stella Hargrove, Judge

No. M2012-00921-CCA-R3-CD - Filed February 27, 2013

Defendant pled guilty to eleven counts of observation without consent, Class A

misdemeanors, two counts of stalking, Class A misdemeanors, one count of phone

harassment, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of theft of property worth less than $500, a

Class A misdemeanor, and ten counts of criminal trespass, Class C misdemeanors. The

defendant was sentenced to the maximum sentence on all counts—eleven months and

twenty-nine days on each of the Class A misdemeanors and thirty days on each of the Class

C misdemeanors. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve all sentences consecutively,

for a total effective sentence of almost sixteen years. In addition, the trial court placed a

special condition on each judgment that “further ordered that the defendant shall not receive

good time credit or work release” on any of his sentences. On appeal, the defendant claims

the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences and ordering that he not receive “good

time” credit. After careful review of the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by ordering the defendant to serve all of his sentences consecutively. However,

the trial court was without authority to order the denial of the defendant’s statutory “good

time” credit. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgments with respect to the special

condition directing that the defendant be denied “good time” credit and remand the case for

entry of judgments deleting this special condition. We otherwise affirm the judgments.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed

in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which JERRY L. SMITH

AND ALAN E. GLENN, JJ., joined.

Claudia Jack, District Public Defender, and Richard H. Dunavant, Assistant Public Defender,

for the appellant, Ronald Earl Cook.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney
General; Mike Bottoms, District Attorney General; and Larry Nichols, Assistant District

Attorney General; for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 11, 2011, the defendant was indicted on ten counts of criminal trespass in

violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-405, eleven counts of observation

without consent in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-607, two counts of

stalking in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-315, one count of phone

harassment in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-308, and one count of

theft of property with a value of $500 or less in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated

section 39-14-103. The eleven counts of observation without consent were dismissed by the

State on January 12, 2012, later brought again in a superseding indictment, and proceeded

under a separate case number.

On February 21, 2012, the defendant pled guilty to all charges. A sentencing hearing

was held on April 4, 2012. On April 16, 2012, the defendant was sentenced to the maximum

term with respect to each conviction—eleven months and twenty-nine days on each of the

fifteen Class A misdemeanors and to thiry days on each of the ten Class C misdemeanors.

The trial court ordered all the defendant’s sentences to be served consecutively, for a total

effective sentence of fifteen years and nine and one-half months. In addition, the trial court

further ordered that the defendant was not to receive “good time” credit or work release.

The defendant filed a notice of appeal on May 1, 2012. On June 13, 2012, the

defendant filed a Statement of Evidence or Proceedings. The State filed “Objections” to the

Defendant’s Statement of the Evidence on June 27, 2012.

We are satisfied that the defendant’s appeal is now properly before this court. We

proceed to address his claims.

ANALYSIS

The defendant claims that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve all of his

sentences consecutively and by ordering that he not receive his statutory “good time” credit.

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by ordering the defendant to serve all of his sentences consecutively but did err by

ordering the defendant to be denied “good time” credit. We reverse the portion of the

-2-
sentences directing that the defendant be denied “good time” credit and remand the case to

the trial court for entry of orders deleting that requirement. The remainder of the judgments

of the trial court are affirmed.

I. CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING

The defendant claims that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve all twenty-five

of his sentences consecutively. A trial court’s in-range sentencing decisions are entitled to

a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 707 (Tenn. 2012). It is

undisputed that the defendant’s sentences are within the permissible range. We review such

sentences under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. We discern no abuse of discretion here.

No transcript of the defendant’s sentencing hearing has been included in the record

on appeal. The defendant filed a Statement of Evidence in the trial court, and the State filed

“Objections” to that statement which in fact consist entirely of additional facts. There is no

indication in the record concerning whether the trial court approved the Statement of

Evidence as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(e). If the absence of

such indication is the simple result of the trial court’s failure to act upon the Statement of

Evidence and related objections, the rules provide that the “transcript or statement of the

evidence and the exhibits shall be deemed to have been approved and shall be so considered

by the appellate court.” Tenn. R. App. P. 24(f). However, on appeal, the defendant

conceded to use the State’s version of the evidence presented at sentencing, as contained in

the State’s list of “Objections.” In light of our ignorance concerning what action, if any, the

trial court may have taken with respect to the matter, and considering the fact that it is the

defendant’s responsibility to prepare an adequate record on appeal, see Tenn. R. App. P.

24(b), accepting this concession strikes us as an appropriate solution. Consequently, where

any conflict exists, we accept the State’s version of the evidence presented at the defendant’s

sentencing hearing as true for purposes of resolving the defendant’s claims.

A “court may order sentences to run consecutively if the court finds by a

preponderance of the evidence” that one or more statutory factors apply. T.C.A. §

40-35-115(b). These factors include a determination that “[t]he defendant is a professional

criminal who has knowingly devoted the defendant’s life to criminal acts as a major source

of livelihood,” a determination that [t]he defendant is an offender whose record of criminal

activity is extensive,” and a determination that “[t]he defendant is [being] sentenced for an

offense committed while on probation.” T.C.A. §40-35-115(b)(1), (2) & (6). After receiving

evidence including the defendant’s presentence report and testimony from several of the

defendant’s victims, the trial court determined that the latter two factors were present by a

preponderance of the evidence.

-3-
Our review of the defendant’s presentence report leads us to conclude that the trial

court correctly concluded that these two factors were present. The presentence report reflects

that the defendant has over twenty prior convictions, many of which are felonies. The

defendant’srecord includes multiple convictionsfor aggravated burglary, burglary, and theft.

In addition, the presentence report reflects that the defendant was sentenced to an effective

sentence of eighteen months of probation on December 3, 2009, as a result of consecutive

sentences stemming from his convictions for theft and observation without consent on

November 17, 2009. In sum, the record fully supports—and the defendant does not appear

1

to dispute—that the trial court properly found that the defendant’s criminal history was

extensive and that he committed the current offenses while on probation. Two factors

supportive of consecutive sentencing were present.

However, the defendant claims that “[t]he effective county jail sentence of almost

sixteen years is unconscionable and clearly reflects an abuse of discretion.” The defendant

points out that the total number of his convictions greatly exceeds the number of his criminal

acts, and “[t]hese were all misdemeanors.” The defendant claims that his effective sentence

does not “reasonably relate to the severity of [his] offenses,” as the defendant urges is

required by State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. 1995).

The twenty-five consecutive sentences imposed in this case might be viewed by some

as extreme. The defendant, who committed only misdemeanors, received an effective

sentence of almost sixteen years—a sentence that would normally be reserved for someone

committing an upper-level felony. However, the damage caused and danger posed by this

defendant might be viewed as equally extreme. The victim impact statements contained in

the defendant’s presentence report make clear that the defendant’s most recent crime

spree—which involved trespassing onto numerous peoples’ property, climbing up a ladder,

and viewing women of all ages in a vulnerable state—caused a reign of terror in the affected

community. Numerous woman discussed at length the depth of the psychological harm they

suffered as a result of the defendant’s actions. Many victims reported difficulty sleeping and

fear of being alone. Some had to move in an effort to escape the haunting memories.

In addition, the criminal justice system has afforded this particular defendant

numerous opportunities to rehabilitate himself, without any appreciable success. His

criminal record may be charitably labeled as “extensive.” During his twenty-year criminal

history, the defendant has committed more than twenty crimes—ten of which were felonies.

The defendant committed the various “peeping Tom” violations at issue here while he was

on probation for committing precisely the same type of crime.

The defendant was also charged with criminal trespass on that same date, although this charge was 1

later dismissed by the State. 

-4-
The defendant’s criminal conduct appears to be escalating over time. The writing

on the wall appears plain and unambiguous. The trial court expressed concern that the

defendant’s escalating course of conduct would ultimately result in even greater harm to the

public, and we agree. In light of the serious harm that the defendant had already inflicted on

the community by placing it into a constant state of fear, the trial court was not required to

wait for someone to be hospitalized or killed before taking aggressive action. We discern no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision that the defendant’s offenses were serious

enough to merit the maximum punishment permissible under law.

II. DENIAL OF GOOD CONDUCT CREDITS

The defendant claims that the trial court erred by ordering as a special condition of

each of his sentences imposed on April 16, 2012, that he receive no “good time” credit. It

is well-settled law that a defendant who is sentenced to county jail for less than one year has

a statutory right to earn good conduct credits. See T.C.A. § 41-2-111(b). This statutory right

may not be abridged by the trial court. State v. Clark, 67 S.W.3d 73, 78 (Tenn. Crim. App.

2001). The judgments imposed are reversed in part accordingly, and the case is remanded

for entry of appropriate orders.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the trial court in regard to ordering the

denial of the defendant’s “good time” credits are reversed, and the case is remanded for entry

of orders deleting these requirements. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court

are affirmed.

_________________________________

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, JUDGE

-5-