IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VICTORIA MCCLOUD and BARBARA :

BOYLE, :

 :

 Plaintiffs : No. 4:04-CV-2322

 :

v. : Complaint Filed 10/21/04

 :

CITY OF SUNBURY, : (Judge Muir

 :

 Defendant :

ORDER

February 23, 2006

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

On November 22, 2005, a jury returned a verdict on

liability in favor of the Plaintiffs with respect to the

Plaintiffs’ claims of unlawful retaliation in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pennsylvania Human

Relations Act. On December 7, 2005, the jury awarded Plaintiff

McCloud $250,000 and Plaintiff Boyle $65,000 in damages. 

On December 21, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion for

attorney’s fees and expenses and a brief in support thereof. 

Defendant filed a brief in opposition on December 27, 2005. A

reply brief was filed on January 10, 2006. Normally when a reply

brief is filed a motion becomes ripe for disposition. However, on

December 22, 2005, Defendant filed a motion to stay Plaintiffs’

motion for attorney’s fees and expenses pending appeal. On

February 8, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a brief in opposition to

Defendant’s motion to stay Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees

Case 4:04-cv-02322-MM Document 106 Filed 02/23/06 Page 1 of 5
2

and expenses pending appeal. Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s

fees and Defendant’s motion to stay Plaintiffs’ motion for

attorney’s fees became ripe for disposition on February 22, 2006,

with the filing of Defendant’s reply brief in support of

Defendant’s motion to stay. 

We will first address Defendant’s motion to stay

Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and expenses. We do not

recall any instance where we have stayed a motion for attorney’s

fees and expenses pending the outcome of an appeal. Defendant

has relied primarily on one case in support of its request. 

However, the opinion in that case was issued by the United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey and is not binding

on us. The citation set forth in Defendant’s brief is Public

Interest Research Group of N.J. v. Hercules, Inc. 2004 U.S.Dist.

LEXIS 28584 (D.N.J., Oct. 27, 2003). More importantly, in that

case it was the Plaintiff which requested the stay of its own

motion for attorney’s fees and the matter involved complex issues

under federal environmental laws. We see no merit in

Defendant’s motion to stay and it will be denied.

We will now address Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s

fees and expenses. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

provides that “the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee (including

expert fees) as part of the costs, . . . .” It is undisputed

that Plaintiffs are the prevailing parties under the statute. 

Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to $93,097.50 in attorney’s

Case 4:04-cv-02322-MM Document 106 Filed 02/23/06 Page 2 of 5
3

fees, the “lodestar” amount, and $11,034.27 in expenses. The

“lodestar” amount is the amount determined by multiplying the

number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by the amount of a

reasonable hourly rate. Defendant does not contest the

“lodestar” amount of attorney’s fees in this case. Instead,

Defendant contends that the amount of attorney’s fees should be

reduced because Plaintiffs were only partially successful in the

lawsuit. 

It is clear that the court has the discretion to make

certain adjustments to the “lodestar” amount. See Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435-37 (1983). The Supreme Court in

Hensley stated that to determine the appropriate adjustments we

should “focus on the significance of the overall relief obtained

by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on

the litigation.” 461 U.S. at 435. The reduction of the

“lodestar” is justified “[i]f . . . a plaintiff has achieved only

partial or limited success” and “the product of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly

rate” is an “excessive amount.”

In assessing whether the “lodestar” amount should be

reduced for limited success, courts have focussed on the

interrelationship between the winning and losing claims asserted

by the Plaintiff or Plaintiffs. See Washington v. Philadelphia

County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031 (3d Cir. 1996). In

Washington, as in the present case, there were both

discrimination and retaliation claims. Plaintiff Washington was

Case 4:04-cv-02322-MM Document 106 Filed 02/23/06 Page 3 of 5
4

unsuccessful on his discrimination claims but prevailed on his

retaliation claims. The district court reduced the award by 50%

and the Court of Appeals affirmed noting “the alleged relatedness

between the two general claims is too tenuous to support a

finding of error” and the district “court was well within its

broad discretion when it discounted the fees . . . for partial

success.” Id. at 1044. 

In the present case, we cannot conclude that the

Plaintiffs’ discrimination claims were distinct from the

retaliation claims. Plaintiffs asserted sexual discrimination

based on a hostile work environment and retaliation based on

their complaints regarding that work environment. Plaintiffs

quite appropriately presented at the time of trial evidence

relating to the hostile work environment for the jury to evaluate

the retaliation claims. The jury was instructed, in assessing

the retaliation claims, that the Plaintiffs had to prove that

they were acting on a good faith, reasonable belief that they

were the victims of discrimination when they made the original

discrimination charges. In order for the jury to make such a

determination evidence regarding the work environment had to be

presented.

Furthermore, we cannot conclude that Plaintiffs had

limited success in this case. The jury awarded $65,000 in favor

of Plaintiff Barbara Boyle and $250,000 in favor Plaintiff

Victoria McCloud. We will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for

attorney’s fees and expenses, including the additional request

Case 4:04-cv-02322-MM Document 106 Filed 02/23/06 Page 4 of 5
5

for an award of $1,020.00 relating to the preparation of

Plaintiffs’ reply brief.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendant’s motion to stay Plaintiffs’ motion for

attorney fees and expenses pending appeal (Doc. 87) is denied.

2. Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees and expenses

(Doc. 84) is granted as set forth below.

3. Plaintiffs are awarded attorney’s fees and expenses

in the amount of $105,151.77.

4. Within 60 days of the date hereof, Defendant shall

pay to Plaintiffs’ counsel the amount set forth in paragraph 2 of

this order. 

 

 

 MUIR, U.S. District Judge

MM:gs

 

Case 4:04-cv-02322-MM Document 106 Filed 02/23/06 Page 5 of 5