An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-299

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 19 August 2014

IN THE MATTER OF:

S.B.O.

K.G.O.

K.J.O.

Brunswick County

Nos. 12 JT 9-11

Appeal by respondents from orders entered 30 December 2013 

by Judge Sherry Dew Prince in Brunswick County District Court. 

Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 July 2014.

Jess, Isenberg & Thompson, by Elva L. Jess for appellee 

Brunswick County Department of Social Services. 

Peter Wood for appellant mother.

Batch, Poore & Williams, PC, by Sydney Batch for appellant 

father. 

Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, LLP, by Beth Tyner Jones 

and Carolyn C. Pratt, for guardian ad litem. 

STEELMAN, Judge.

The trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to 

terminate mother’s parental rights and its order contained 
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sufficient jurisdictional facts. The court did not abuse its 

discretion by terminating father’s parental rights.

I. Factual and Procedural History

D.E.O. (father) and S.T.C.O. (mother) appeal from orders 

terminating their parental rights in the minor children S.B.O., 

K.G.O., and K.J.O. The Brunswick County Department of Social 

Services (“DSS”) became involved with mother and father in 

August 2011 due to the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of their

home. On 25 January 2012, DSS filed petitions alleging that the 

juveniles were neglected and dependent, and obtained nonsecure 

custody orders placing the children in DSS’s custody. 

At the adjudication hearing held on 13 March 2012, mother 

and father admitted that the juveniles were neglected in that 

“the home in which the children resided was dirty . . . and 

infested with roaches[.]” Information before the trial court 

also indicated that mother and father’s home was unsanitary and

filled with dog feces; that dirty laundry, trash, and food

covered the floors and countertops; and that both mother and 

father used drugs. On 19 March 2012 the court entered an order 

adjudicating the juveniles neglected, and a disposition order 

directing mother and father to comply with the provisions of the

case plan developed by DSS. The case plan required mother and 

father to abstain from using drugs and submit to random drug 
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tests, to engage in therapy as recommended, complete parenting 

classes, and maintain clean and appropriate housing. Review

orders were entered in May 2012, August 2012, and November 2012, 

in which the trial court found that mother and father had made 

little progress towards compliance with their case plan. 

Specifically, mother and father failed to establish a safe and 

sanitary home, did not complete parenting classes, had positive 

drug tests, and did not consistently attend therapy sessions. 

Mother and father also moved several times, but failed to 

demonstrate the ability to maintain an appropriate and sanitary

home and denied DSS access to their homes for inspection. In 

addition, father was twice arrested for assault during this 

period. 

On 27 March 2013, the trial court entered a permanency 

planning order finding that although the children had been in 

DSS custody for over a year, mother and father had failed to 

comply with their case plan. The court changed the permanent 

plan for the children from reunification with mother and father

to adoption and termination of parental rights. On 30 December 

2013, the trial court entered an order finding that grounds for 

termination existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) (1)

(neglect), (2) (12 months in care without progress), and (3)

(failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of foster 
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care). On the same day, the trial court entered an order 

terminating mother and father’s parental rights after concluding 

that it was in the best interests of the children for their

parental rights to be terminated.

Mother and father appeal. 

II. Appeal by Mother

Mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court 

“committed prejudicial error” by failing “to make sufficient 

findings about whether or not the court had subject matter 

jurisdiction.” Mother does not argue that the trial court 

actually lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the termination 

proceeding, but only that the court erred by basing its exercise 

of jurisdiction on the parties’ stipulation, and by failing to 

make required findings regarding subject matter jurisdiction. We 

disagree. 

A. Standard of Review

“‘Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a 

court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the 

action before it[,’] . . .‘[and] is conferred upon the courts by 

either the North Carolina Constitution or by statute.’” In re 

McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793, 795 (2003) 

(quoting Haker-Volkening v. Haker, 143 N.C. App. 688, 693, 547 

S.E.2d 127, 130 (2001), and Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 
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667, 353 S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987)). “‘Jurisdiction is the power of 

a court to decide a case on its merits; it is the power of a 

court to inquire into the facts, to apply the law, and to enter 

and enforce judgment.’” In re A.T., 191 N.C. App. 372, 375, 662 

S.E.2d 917, 919 (2008) (quoting Jones v. Brinson, 238 N.C. 506, 

509, 78 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1953) (internal citations omitted).

“The law is settled that jurisdiction cannot be created by the 

parties’ stipulation, consent, or waiver[.]” McKinney, 158 N.C. 

App. at 447, 581 S.E.2d at 797 (citation omitted). 

Subject matter jurisdiction over proceedings to terminate 

parental rights is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101, which

provides in relevant part that:

The court shall have exclusive original 

jurisdiction to hear and determine any 

petition or motion relating to termination 

of parental rights to any juvenile who 

resides in, is found in, or is in the legal 

or actual custody of a county department of 

social services . . . at the time of filing 

of the petition or motion. . . . Provided, 

that before exercising jurisdiction under 

this Article, the court shall find that it 

has jurisdiction to make a child-custody 

determination under the provisions of G.S. 

50A-201, 50A-203, or 50A-204. . . . 

Although characterized in the statute as a finding, the 

determination that jurisdiction exists is a conclusion of law:

“Matters of judgment are not factual; they 

are conclusory and based ultimately on 

various factual considerations. Facts are 

things in space and time that can be 
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objectively ascertained by one or more of 

the five senses or by mathematical 

calculation. Facts, in turn, provide the 

bases for conclusions.”

In re M.N.C., 176 N.C. App. 114, 121-22, 625 S.E.2d 627, 632 

(2006) (quoting State ex rel. Utilities Comm. v. Public Staff, 

322 N.C. 689, 693, 370 S.E.2d 567, 570 (1988) (internal citation 

omitted). “Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction 

is a question of law, reviewed de novo on appeal.” McKoy v. 

McKoy, 202 N.C. App. 509, 511, 689 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2010). 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A-201(a)(1) authorizes a court to 

exercise jurisdiction over a child custody determination if 

North Carolina “is the home state of the child on the date of 

the commencement of the proceeding[.]” Although this Court has 

recognized that findings of fact related to a trial court’s 

jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A–201(a)(1) “would be the 

better practice,” the statute “states only that certain 

circumstances must exist, not that the court specifically make 

findings to that effect[.]” In re T.J.D.W., J.J.W., 182 N.C. 

App. 394, 397, 642 S.E.2d 471, 473-74 (2007). Therefore, where a 

trial court’s order terminating parental rights asserts its 

jurisdiction and the evidence supports its determination as to 

the statutory requirements for jurisdiction, “the trial court 

properly exercise[s] subject matter jurisdiction over th[e] 

case.” Id. at 397, 642 S.E.2d at 473–74. 
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B. Analysis

In this case, the uncontradicted evidence establishes that 

the children lived in North Carolina for their entire lives, 

that DSS was the petitioner in the termination of parental 

rights case, and that when the petitions were filed the children

had been in the legal custody of DSS since January 2012. Mother 

does not challenge these facts, or dispute that they establish

the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the 

termination proceeding, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50A201(a)(1) and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101. Rather than challenging 

the existence of jurisdiction, mother challenges only the 

sufficiency of the trial court’s findings on this issue. Mother 

asserts that the trial court relied exclusively on the parties’ 

stipulation that subject matter jurisdiction existed and made no 

findings supporting its exercise of jurisdiction. We disagree. 

In its termination order the trial court, found in relevant 

part, that:

. . . 

9(b). That the Petitioner is [DSS.] . . . 

That the minor children who are the subject 

of the petitions are in the legal and 

physical custody of the petitioner. 

. . . 

10. That the minor children were taken into 

custody by [DSS] on January 25, 2012 

pursuant to a non-secure custody order on 
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allegations of neglect and dependency. The 

children were adjudicated neglected 

juveniles on March 13, 2012. . . . 

Based on these and other findings, the trial court concluded “as 

a matter of law” that “the Court has jurisdiction over the

parties and the subject matter[.]” The trial court properly 

exercised jurisdiction over the termination proceeding, and its 

exercise of jurisdiction was supported by its findings of fact. 

In urging us to reach a contrary conclusion, mother asserts 

that the trial court was required to make “specific findings” 

which she contends are missing from the order. However, mother 

does not identify the missing findings or direct our attention 

to any requirement for exercise of jurisdiction that is not 

addressed in the court’s order. Mother also directs our 

attention to several cases that presented a substantive issue

regarding the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, 

requiring the court to make findings of fact resolving disputed 

questions of fact. None of the cases cited by mother hold that, 

where the trial court asserts jurisdiction, its order finds that 

the DSS is the petitioner and has custody of the minor children, 

and the facts establishing jurisdiction are not in dispute, a 

termination of parental rights order is nonetheless “null and 

void” without other unspecified findings. In this case, there 
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was ample evidence to support the court’s assertion of

jurisdiction. 

This argument is without merit. 

III. Father’s Appeal

Father’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court 

abused its discretion when it determined that it was in the best 

interest of the children to terminate his parental rights. We 

are not persuaded. 

A. Standard of Review

Once statutory grounds for termination have been 

established, the trial court is required to “determine whether 

terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best 

interest.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a). When determining 

whether it is in the juvenile’s best interest to terminate the 

parent’s rights, the statute requires the court to make written 

findings regarding: 

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the 

juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental 

rights will aid in the accomplishment of the 

permanent plan for the juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the 

parent.
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(5) The quality of the relationship between 

the juvenile and the proposed adoptive 

parent[.]

(6) Any relevant consideration.

“We review the trial court’s decision to terminate parental 

rights for abuse of discretion.” In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 

94, 98, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602 (2002) (citation omitted). The trial 

court is “subject to reversal for abuse of discretion only upon 

a showing . . . that the challenged actions are manifestly 

unsupported by reason.” Clark v. Clark, 301 N.C. 123, 129, 271 

S.E.2d 58, 63 (1980).

B. Analysis

Father acknowledges that the trial court made appropriate 

findings regarding the ages of the children, the likelihood of 

adoption, whether termination of parental rights would 

facilitate achievement of the permanent plan, and the bond 

between the children and the proposed adoptive parents. He 

contends, however, that the trial court failed to give adequate 

consideration to his bond with the children and his efforts to 

comply with his case plan. 

In support of its conclusion that it was in the children’s

best interest to terminate father’s parental rights, the trial 

court incorporated its findings in the adjudication order 
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finding grounds for termination. These findings, unchallenged 

and thus binding on appeal, include the following:

. . . 

10. That the minor children were taken into 

custody by [DSS] on January 25, 2012 

pursuant to a non-secure custody order on 

allegations of neglect and dependency. The 

children were adjudicated neglected 

juveniles on March 13, 2012. . . . 

11. The parents entered into an out of home 

family services agreement on February 20, 

2012[.] . . . The case plan required [father 

and mother to] . . . submit to random drug 

screens . . . allow inspection of the home 

by DSS . . . [and] maintain their home in a 

clean and sanitary manner[.] . . . 

. . . 

14. On March 26, 2012 . . . the parents’ 

home [was] found to be in disarray and 

unclean. The conditions were unsanitary[.] . 

. . 

. . . 

16. . . . [T]hroughout the course of [DSS’s] 

involvement there remained many issues with 

regard to cleanliness including roaches, 

flies and dirty dishes on every flat 

surface, [and] debris on floors[.] . . . 

17. On several occasions, [DSS] was denied 

access to inspect the home to ascertain if 

it was being kept clean and safe for the 

children. The parents did not contact [DSS] 

to have them inspect the home during the 

pendency of this action between April 9, 

2012 and April 15, 2013. 

. . . 
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19. On September 24, 2012, [a DSS employee 

inspected mother and father’s home and] 

noted the presence of pests, a lack of 

cleanliness of walls and carpets, debris in 

the yard, dirty dishes, and dirty laundry. . 

. . 

. . . 

21. . . . [H]omes in which the parents lived 

prior to the filing of the petition each 

presented with an infestation of bugs. . . . 

. . . 

25. The parents did not demonstrate an 

ability to maintain their homes in a 

sanitary fashion, even after intensive inhome services were provided. 

. . . 

34. [Father] stated that he did not have 

time to help clean the house as he was 

always working, “daylight to dark.” . . . 

. . . 

36. [Father] understood the terms and 

conditions of the case plan. . . . 

37. [Father] had anger issues due to the 

fact that he was working all day and had to 

clean the house as well. 

. . . 

39. [Father and mother] separated from each 

other on February 16, 2013. . . . [Father] 

began to live in a camper for several months 

that he acknowledged was not appropriate for 

the minor children. . . .

40. Neither [father nor mother] paid any 

monies to [DSS] for the benefit of the minor 

children prior to the filing of the 
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petitions to terminate parental rights. . . 

. 

. . . 

44. A review hearing was held on July 17, 

2012 . . . [at which the] court found that 

[mother and father] had not enrolled in 

parenting classes . . . had denied [DSS] 

entry into their home for inspection and 

had not been compliant with drug screen 

requests. . . . 

In its disposition order, the trial court made additional 

findings, including the following: 

. . . 

3. . . . The permanent plan to secure a 

safe, stable home for the children within a 

reasonable period of time is adoption and 

that has been the plan since the Court held 

a permanency planning review hearing on 

March 14, 2013. In order to achieve the 

permanent plan, termination of parental 

rights must be accomplished. 

4. . . . The children have been in foster 

care since [March 2012.] . . . 

5. The parents have not been actively 

involved in their daily care since March 

2012 due to their failure to comply with 

case plan goals and objectives. 

. . . .

11. . . . [Father] has not called to arrange 

for a home inspection. 

12. . . . [Father] has not demonstrated an 

ability to maintain a safe, clean home . . .

during the Department’s involvement between 

March 2012 and April 2013. 
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13. The children have been in an “at-risk” 

adoptive placement since May 10, 2013. . . .

14. The children, ages four, six and seven, 

are bonded to each other and get along well 

together, are in the same home, a two parent 

household, where the foster parents have 

been able to insure that the children attend 

all of their medical appointments, obtained 

a mental health assessment, secured speech 

services for [S.B.O.], and participate in a 

number of activities including trips to the 

zoo, fine art events and sporting events. 

They are doing well in school[.] 

15. The children and the foster parents 

display reciprocal affection for each other.

. . .

. . . .

19. The children are being properly cared 

for and all of their needs are being 

addressed and met in the foster home. 

20. The foster parents are financially in a 

position to provide for the children. 

. . . .

23. It is necessary in order to promote the 

healthy and orderly physical and emotional 

well being of the minor children that a 

permanent plan for their care be made at 

this time. 

Father does not challenge the above findings of fact, and they 

are binding on appeal. Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 

S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). Father argues that the trial court 

failed to give adequate consideration to evidence of the bond 

between him and the children and his efforts to comply with the 
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case plan. The court did not ignore evidence favorable to 

father, as demonstrated by its findings that:

. . . 

4. . . . The children know their parents and 

the visits went well.

. . . .

9. . . . [Father] began to participate in 

therapy . . . on February 19, 2013. It was 

recommended that he participate in treatment 

two times a month. . . . Since August he has 

attended one session per month. His 

therapist believes that he is actively 

engaged in treatment sessions[.] 

10. [Father] secured a vehicle on February 

12, 2013 and showed evidence of valid 

insurance[.]

11. [Father] executed a lease agreement 

dated October 1, 2013 for a mobile home with 

three bedrooms and two baths. 

12. [Father] is working forty-seven hours a 

week, but represents that he has flexibility 

with his employment to provide for the needs 

of his children on a daily basis. . . . 

. . . .

16. [K.J.O.] has inquired with regard to how 

her father is doing. 

The trial court weighed the evidence and used its 

discretion to conclude that, despite some findings that 

reflected positively on father, he still had not demonstrated he 

could “maintain a safe, clean home” for the children. The court 

therefore determined it was in the children’s best interest that 
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father’s parental rights be terminated so they could be adopted 

by a family who would best be able to provide them with a “safe, 

stable home[.]” Given the substantial findings of fact 

supporting the trial court’s conclusion, we cannot agree that 

the trial court’s best interest determination was “manifestly 

unsupported by reason.” In re A.R.H.B., 186 N.C. App. 211, 218, 

651 S.E.2d 247, 253 (2007).

The court did not err in its findings of fact and 

conclusions of law pertaining to subject matter jurisdiction and 

did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it was in the 

children’s best interest to terminate father’s parental rights.

We affirm the trial court’s orders terminating mother and 

father’s parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.

Judges McGEE and ERVIN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).