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On Winter Warfare S SEP301993

George K. Swinzow June 1993

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Abstract

The report is a review of the history and art of winter warfare. It attempts to

publicize a neglected subject by making historical facts concerning it available

in a single volume. Part t covers winterwarfare through the ages, beginning with

Genghis Khan and ending with World War II, a period of 700-odd years. Part

III covers the art of winter warfare as practiced during recent decades. Part II

consists of illustrations which present additional points and expand upon the

other two parts. It is noted that throughout history the lessons learned on the

subject have continually been ignored and forgotten. All other conditions being

equal, the most important factors determining an army's winte, warfare

capability are the individual soldier's willingness to accept hardship, the quality

of his training, including survival skills, and his morale. Snow, ice and low

temperatures can become a strategic advantage to the well-trained, highly

motivated combatant.

For conversion of SI metric units to U.S./British customary units of measurement

consult Standard Practice for Use of the International System of Units (SI), ASTM

Standard E380-89a, published by the American Society for Testing and Materials, 1916 Race St., Philadelphia, Pa. 19103.

This report is printed on paper that contains a minimum of 50% recycled

material.
Special Report 93-12L

US Army Corps

of Engineers

Cold Regions Research &

Engineering Laboratory

Accesion For

NTIS CRA6t On Winter Warfare DTIC TAB

Unannounced C]

George K. Swinzow. Justification ....... ....................... June 1993

By

Dist ibution I

Availability Codes

Dist Avail andcor

A o l s r iSpecial

Approved for public releaose: distribution Is unlimited.
PREFACE

This discourse was prepared in 1982, just prior to his retirement, by Dr. George K. Swinzow of

the Experimental Engineering Division, as an independent research program sponsored by the

U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory.

Dr. Swinzow was born in Russia early in this century and was interned in Germany during World

War It. He came to the United States after the war and taught geology at Boston University before

joining CRREL in the 1960s. This work has been on file at CRREL as an Internal Report since its

preparation. Its publication at this time comes in response to continuing requests for copies over the last

10 years.

The author benefited from discussions with and suggestions by numerous friends and colleagues. Dr.

William St. Lawrence, Dr. Ronald A. Liston, Albert F. Wuori and Colonel Alfred B. Devereaux gave

generously of their time, and made valuable suggestions, Deborah Diemand conducted a thorough review and made useful suggestions. The author also thanks Donna Harp for her skillful word processing

of the original manuscript.

A serious editorial effort by Stephen L. Bowen added logic, comprehension and consistency to the

manuscript; his accomplishment is gratefully acknowledged by the author.

The excellent photographs illustrating winter warfare skills and the portrait of Marshal Mannerheim

were provided by the Finnish Attache in Washington. The German town of Tuftlingen provided historical material concerning the famous winter battle fought there.

The author also acknowledges the contributions of many others who helped with illustration work,

advice, and suggestions.

The contents of this report reflect the views and opinions of the author, which may or may not coincide with official U.S. Army policy, strategy or tactics.

ii
CONTENTS Page

Preface ........................................................................................................... ........................... ii

Foreword ................................................. .................................................................................. v

Introduction ................................................................. tr od................................... ... _ ....................

Part I: W inter W arfare Through the Ages ........................................................... ............ 4

First appearances of winter warfare ............................................................................. ......... 4

A prom ising start and a decline .................................................................................................. 6

The m any uses of winter ............................................................................................................ I I

A slow shift .................................................................................................................................. 15

One hundred years ................................................................................ ..................... ................. 16

M ass arm ies in the First W orld W ar ........................................................................................... 18

Classical winter war ................................................................................................................ 20

The last world war (?) ..................................................................................................... ... 22

The Subarctic ............................................................................................................................. 27

Part II: Illustrations ................................................................................................................... 29

Genghis Khan ............................................................................................................................. 29

The Spread of the M ongols ....................................................................................................... 30

W arriors on Skis ...................................................................................................... ...... . ..... 31

A Cannon ..................................................................................................................................... 32

Gustav I Vasa, King of Sweden ................................................................................................ 33

Gustavus II Adoiphus of Sweden .............................................................................................. 33

The W inter Battle of Tuttlingen ................................................................................................ 35

Charles X G ustav of Sweden .................................................................................................... 36

Frederick the Great, King of Prussia ........................................................................................ 36

Napoleon Bonaparte ................................................................................................................. 37

The Battlefield of W aterloo ...................................................................................................... 38

Crossing the Balkans in the Russian-Turkish War ................................. 39

Crossing the Shipka Pass .......................................................................................................... 40

Finnish M ilitary Skiers ............................................................................................................. 41

Finnish Jaegers ............................................................................................................................. 41

A Squad of Skiers in the Northern W ilderness of Finland .......................................................... 42

An Am bush Position ................................................................................................................ 42

Carl-Gustav Baron M annerheim , M arshal of Finland ................................................................ 43

George Konstantinovich Zhukov, Marshal of the Soviet Union ................................................ 44

Preliminary German Plan for the Invasion of Russia in World War II ........................................ 44

Plan Barbarossa ............................................................................................................................ 45

W orld W ar II: The Battle of M oscow ........................................................................................ 46

W orld W ar H: Stalingrad .......................................................................................................... 47

A Snow Shelter ............................................................................................................................ 48

Battlefield Locom otion .......................................................................................... ................ 49

Digging-in .................................................................................................................................... 50

Trenches in Snow ......................................................................................................................... 51

Tank Traps in Snow .................................................................................................................. 5I

Preparing a Covered Trench ....................................................................................................... 52

Snow Cover Distribution and Duration ...................................................................................... 53

Snow (3⁄4 ver FUL, mation ...................................................................................... ... ...... 54

Snow Penetration by Fragm ents ................................................................................................ 54

111
Page

Part I1 : The Art of W inter W arfare ......................................... 55

M ilitary art in the cold .................................................................................................................. 55

Some military properties of snow ................................................................................................. 58

Fundamental sources of modem wisdom(?) ............................................................................... 61

Unconventional operations ............................................... 03

C lo sing ............................................................................................................. .................. ........ . 64

Literature cited .................................................................................................................... .... 66

Abstract .................................................................................................................................. 69

iv
FOREWORD biased, it means simply that the opinions of the author

are cleverly hidden or correspond to the opinions of the

Historical literature presents wars either as culminat- reader. The subjectiveness and bias of this interpreter are

ingconflict points in theotherwise smooth, peaceiul flow as follows:

of man's progress, or as dynamic cataclysms that propel I. Great leaders are often incapable of learning from

him into new situations. In the specialized segment of the past and make similar errors in similar ,ituahistory known as the history of war it appears clearly tions.

that wars are inevitable, recurring events. An observa- 2. The greatest wars always take place in areas with

tion that ensues from studying the history of war is the the densest and most advanced populations.

periodic repetition of errors by great leaders. It seems 3. Wars, with time, lose their localized nature and afalmost inevitable that such errors as dispersal of forces, fect greater territories.

stietched comminication lineq. poor timing, and lack of 4. Major wars last longer than one season; that is the

coordination were bound to recur throughout history. reason for the very important role of winter warWhy do great leaders refuse to learn from each other or fare in the past, present and future.

from the past? Often their errors, for which many must Since neither general nor specialized military literapay in blood, difficult struggles, prolonged misery, or ture emphasizes the role of winter warfare sufficiently,

total defeat, could have been prevented fully or in part subjective point 4 is the main point stressed here. Furjust by considering the actions of predecessors in simi- thermore, areas with large, advanced populations also

lar situations. tend to be areas with more or less severe winter climates,

One fatal error which recurs with regularity is unpre- so point 2 also emphasizes the importance of winter warparedness for winter warfare. The changes in warfare fare skills. In addition, it unfortunately appears that a good

technology that have evolved in the course of history have measure of a country's winter warfare capability is the

eliminated many previously essential things, but not the severity of the climate in the area where its supreme milneed for special winter warfare skills. Old-time cavalry itary headquarters are located. Whenever the headquartroops had to rest occasionally; they had to feed and take ters are located in a mild or tropical climate, there will

care of their horses (which did not have ignition keys). be no trace of capability for winter warfare.

Now, mechanized combat vehicles are more efficient and The reader is invited to make his own objective judgdeadly than any number of horsemen. But when cold ment about bias point I. Unlike analytical writing, this

weather strikes and snow accumulates on the ground, inquiry is based on selected past events, outlined approxthe marvelous, sophisticated combat vehicles become im- imately chronologically as much as the subject permits.

mobilized. Personnei casualties due to exposure, frost- It cannot be called complete, but may hopefully be debite, and cold in general increase catastrophically. Some- monstrative enough. The illustrations do not all depict

times more casualties are caused by the weather than by the text; rather they present additional points and expand

the enemy. If there had been only one such event in his- the content. The literature quoted is listed at the end of

tory it could be, with some effort, explained, if not ex- the paper.

cused. But we are ready to demonstrate that unprepar- Due to imposed limitations this work is not a historiedness for winter warfare is a recurring phenomenon that cal treatise in the classical sense. It publicizes a badly

can contribute to spectacular defeat for one side and eas- neglected subject by making historical facts on that subier-than-expected victory for the other. ject available, but does little more. To accomplish this, it

Since there has been very little reflection on the role was imperative that the discourse be divided into three

of winter warfare in military history writing, and since parts. An attempt has been made to present the message

great errors have a tendency to reappear, there is a need in each part, and to have each part maintain a degree of

to select and to present examples of winter campaigns independence from the others. This has resulted in some

and show the deciding role of winter warfare skills. The reiteration and redundancy. A reader not sufficiently conmain purpose of this writing is to demonstrate the dan- vinced by one part may decide to examine another. Or

ger of ignoring the skills and preparation needed for ef- even to explore all three! The writer is prepared to disfective winter warfare operations. cover, that is, to hear from any reader, that he is in error,

History is an expanded chronicle of outstanding events heretical or fallacious. That is, inevitably, a by-product

widened and interpreted by the historian. Any event, or of authorship. More important: the ideas, opinions and

chain of events, is interpreted from the viewpoint of the notions are those of the "discourser" alone.

investigator. So-called "objective interpretations," "unbiased views" and "unbiased presentations" simply do George K. Swinzow

not exist. Whenever someone judges a presentation un- March 1982

v
On Winter Warfare

GEORGE K. SWINZOW

INTRODUCTION governments. His thinking reveals the perpetual great

weakness in the process of government action. ClauseLimitations witz insists that governments must have complete conTo emphasize the purpose of this investigation cer- trol over the development and deployment of the militain concepts will be examined briefly. Others will be tary machineries available to them. Heads of government,

ignored completely, although this presents difficulties, experts in doing government work, in governing the peoWe cannot examine forms of government, for example, pie or the country, feel that they must have the power to

as they unify and direct groups of people called nations, determine the time and place of military action. But both

But we will have to mention how the leaders of some the time of military action and the locality where it takes

countries have been influenced by their forms of gov- place are important elements of strategy, and strategy

emnment, since the leaders are the ones who have made should be in the hands of generals. Clausewitz has a very

major mistakes on the battlefield. clear conception of strategy, which begins with selectIn order to eliminate the need to investigate the rea- ing a proper time and place and ultimately ends with imsons for wars (the output of a major pape, industry would posing one's will upon the adversary. Clausewitz also

not be sufficient for that subject), we need only to state states that as a "continuation of political action by other

that wars are initiated by aggressive leaders in order to means" a war must be started with a clear political purunify their people, to plunder, to conduct slave raids, to pose that extends beyond ultimate victory. The absence

occupy other people's territory (lebensraum), to expand of such a clear purpose may prove more disastrous than

their own power, etc. History records an unbelievable a clear defeat in the field.

number of reasons for hostility, for wars, beginning with According to Clausewitz war begins with aggression.

the Golden Fleece* of Greek mythology and ending with Aggressiveness may be the innate property of a nation.

the Second World War, for which, according to histori- Characteristically (although not necessarily openly) the

ans, there is a long list of bewildering reasons and at- aggressiveness of a given government system is docutempts at justification that can be picked according to mented in official philosophy. But it is often camouflaged

the side one is on. in a demagogic form intended to create the appearance

of the opposite. The terms aggressiveness and peacefulUndefinable concepts ness are political jargon, and therefore lose their meaalThe terms war, peace, strategy and tactics are very ing when used in political pronouncements. Also, both

often used, misused, and used out of context and with- terms are relative. Absolute peacefulness becomes its diout consistency of definition. It is remarkable that, lack- alectic opposite-it precipitates war. War can appear to

ing a consistent set of definitions, people may still un- be a historical necessity characteristic of man (Vaida

derstand each other perfectly. Apparently we are deal- 1976). "Perpetual peace" is a historically recurring pheing with concepts often limited to suit the user's purpose. nomenon; it seems to appear between wars. Along the

Von Clausewitz (1832), definitely an outstanding author- same line of thought one may say that peacetime is the

ity, defines war in a way that excludes revolutions, civil time for war preparations, and intensive accumulation of

wars and military actions by groups of people other than war potential by a peaceful nation has the effect of postponing a war. * The Tadzhiks of central Asia placed fresh sheep hides in small trib- Since most modern political ethics teach that peace is

utaries of the rivers Vakhsh and Zerafshan, kept them there during

high water, then dried and burned them, The residue contained gold good and war is cruel, inhuman and bad, eloquent statesdust. men, politicians and diplomats, subconsciously avoiding
rude language, have introduced such nebulous terms as A traditionally trained military force faces, with the

armed conflict, force interjection, intervention, help in onset of winter, a series of new problems differing so

conflict, etc. Other terms are continually being invented drastically from those of other climates or sea,;ons that it

for this purpose. None of these terms need special defti- finds itself engaged in action that is tar from traditional.

nitions and a!' of them mean the same-war. Therefore, The landscape, snow-covered and drifted ovei, requires

in dealing with war we're dealing with unclear and mud- different clothing for warmth and camouflage. Everydied definitions. The same could be said about peace. thing--sheiters, machines, men-becomes visible in a

different way than before, and new detection methods

The season, the weather and the climate become effective and have to be counteracted. Ground

Another difficulty is the concept "time of war." One movement of men and machines leaves visible tracks. In

might think that between the beginning of a war and its the cold, sophisticated firearms fail to function, and speend is the time for fighting the war-is the actual war. cial cold-start techniques must be used on internal comThat is imprecise and wrong. The Thirty-Years War ac- bustion engines. Deep snow may slow down or completetually comprised many battles and many years. The Hun- ly stop off-road fighting vehicles.

dred-Years War between England and France was not a Besides special clothing, men in battle need more

long-lasting war, it was a 100-year period with many wars ammunition and more and better rations, but delivery has

and battles. So we can simply say that a war may consist a tendency to slow down or even to stop. Behind the lines,

of one or more battles and may be short or long. roads must be kept free of snow, and at the battle-front

To simplify what we have to convey, we may say that swamps and rivers may become crossable. While most

a short war can begin and end within one season of the movement slows down or stops, ski troops, if properly

year-a summer or a winter. A long war, which lasts trained and equipped, acquire a mobility similar to that

longer than one season, requires some small or large ad- of cavalry (we will show how readily that has been forjustments, changes and measures, indicating that time, gotten through the ages). But the fast skier also needs

or rather the season, must be considered. Such a consid- food and ammunition, and he needs a warm shelter at

eration may be termed a "strategic consideration." The least once in a while. Frost injuries, especially among

role of winter in warfe is -,.sentially the subject of the poorly trained troops, are a nightmare for medics, and

present effort. The rest of the seasons are disregarded, many wounded soldiers who would ordinarily have a

perhaps due to lack of interest by the author. We will for chance to survive and return to the battlefield become

simplicity recognize only two seasons-summer and permanent casualties.

winter. This report is concerned with warfare in winter,

a season with drastically different requirements for sur- Morale

vival and functioning. It might be defined, for the pur- Perhaps the most serious incapacitating factor is low

pose of this review, as a season with a clear predomi- morale. In all wars and at all times there are a number of

nance of below-freezing temperatures, freeze-up of open individuals who loiter in the rear without actual need or

water bodies, accumulation of snow cover on the ground, purpose. In the wintertime the number of men in the rear

and shorter periods of daylight. The severity of these fac- echelon increases dramatically, and it requires an enertors changes with latitude and climate. getic commander and established military "tradition and

From the viewpoint of military science, cold regions culture" to control the phenomenon. In very general terms

are those where troop and equipment movement is af- it seems that the higher the ratio of support people (headfected by snow and low temperature for at least one quarters personnel, rear echelon, etc.) to people actually

month per year. Using this definition, at least one-half of in the front lines, the lower the capability for winter warthe world's dry land is in cold regions. Bates and Bilello fare, Also, the higher the number of headquarters, com-

(1966) gave a very good definition of cold regions: those mand posts, battle stations and intermediate supply poaffected by classical wintertime. Wintertime is an advan- sitions, the lower the winter warfare capability of a militage to the army that is better trained and better prepared tary organization. All these "elements" consist of men

for winter warfare. If both adversaries are equally strong, who must be fed, clothed, and sheltered. The irony of

equally equipped, and equally trained, the one with bet- the situation centers on the fact that rear echelon people

ter winter warfare capabilities has the advantage, and has are better supplied with scarce essentials than the troops

a greater chance to win a decisive battle. However, there in the front lines. Often, the farther to the rear, the better

are no absolute equalities in strength, quantity and qual- supplied the personnel are. One example may illustrate

ity of equipment, or, especially, leadership skill. After this grotesque situation. During the Second World War

all, the side which begins a war usually believes itself to the Germans developed a personal heat source, consistbe superior, but very often, especially in the case of win- ing of a package of chemicals that was activated by a

ter warfare, that turns out to be an error. cup of water. The gentle heat emitted lasted for several

2
hours. It was intended to keep wounded soldiers warm We know by now only too well that whoever comes to

during evacuation from the battlefield in winter. Numer- the battlefield with superior weapxons but lacks training.

ous observers stated that most of these packages were motivation and morale will soon find himself an unwillused by clerks at various headquarters to sit on while per- ing materiel supplier to the enemy

forming their "combat duty." Training, morale and stamina are the factors that make

All othei conditions being equal, the most important a good winter warrior. Armies, ,(x)o or bad, trained or

factors determining an army's winter warfare capability untrained, may find themselves in winter trving to carry

are the individual soldier's willingness to accept hard- on a dragged-out campaign, unwillingly practicing winship, the quality of his training, inctuding survival skills, ter warfare. In other cases, the wintertime might be deliband his morale. The Germans' claim, that the level of erately selected for its advantages. Snow and low ternsophistication and the extent of so-called civilization were peratures may be a disadvantage to the less trained, less

the deciding factors in superiority, was clearly proven disciplined or poorly motivated force. They then become

wrong. Superior weapons and mobility and a lavish sup- a strategic advantage to the trained, motivated combatply of technological amenities may offset the advantag- ant. It seems logical to begin with a review of such

es of stamina, training and morale only to a certain point, cases.

3
PART I: WINTER WARFARE THROUGH THE AGES

FIRST APPEARANCES OF dragged on into the wintcr and both sides found themWINTER WARFARE selves handicapped by low temperatures, snow, and ice.

Such cases can be found throughout history and are usuIt appears that the development of winter %warfare is a ally of no special interest.

phenomenon that cannot be treated chronologically. It is An outstanding case where winter was delbtratcly

also difficult to trace the development of winter warfare selected as an advantageous period of the year for a miliskills in parallel with technological advances. It wilt be- tary operation was the early part of the westward thrust

come apparent that while new machines, weapons and by the Mongolians. Genghis Khan* unified and ruled the

tools have enhanced battlefield performance and result- Mongolians by leading them in a series of field campaigns

ed in irreversible tactical changes, some of the innova- which eventually resulted in Mongolian rule and domitions eliminated, quite unexpectedly, the capability of nation of a sizable part of the European continent.

conducting warfare in the winter. The Mongolians were a nomadic people comprising

Efforts to increase the ability to fight often seem to many independent pastoral tribes with a clan- or familyovershadow the need to clothe, feed and shelter an army. structured leadership and an undefineO' 'erritory- Clan riAlso, the need for new weapons and war iateriel leaves valry, competition for leadership, httility and intrigue

unattended the need to move and maneuver. Finally, the were the reasons why the Mongolians were not a serious

urge to create impressive masses of soldiers leaves the threat but only a nuisance to their neighbors. Genghis

need for special training unmet. We will show that train- Khan recognized that because of their cultural stage and

ing, clothing, and equipment specially adapted for the their peculiar way of life, unifying the clans by force and

winter constitute advantage: if Pccompanied by proper intrigue was not the same as keeping them unified.

tactical concepts. But there will be examples of grave To interest them in staying united, Genghis Khan led

errors resulting from simple lack of comprehension of the Mongolian nation in many successful conquests in

the fact that winter changes the terrain drastically and an ever-widening circle. In 1215 a part of China was subgives the battlefield new properties. dued and the city of Peking was occupied. Then came

Most unexpected are the numerous errors connected Central Asia, the Khorezm Khanate as it was called then,

with winter warfare committed by leaders. It seems, 10so, which is now a part of Russia. In 1241 the Mongolians

that commanders are often unwilling to draw conclusions invaded Hungary. In their campaigns the Mongolians infrom errors committed in the past. We will try to point vaded only loosely conglomerated city-states. Their pu, -

that out. pose was not so much rule and organization as booty,

A chronological approach to winter warfare and cam- plunder and taxation. Unification against the Mongolians,

paigns in the winter should probably begin with the ad- as opposed to organization and unification of them, was

ventures of Xenophon (431-350 BC), or of Alexander the reason for their decline following the battle at Kulikthe Great (356-323 BC), or of Hannibal (247-183 BC) ovo Field in 1380.

for his glorious crossing of the Pyrenees and the Alps The Mongolians were a barbaric and illiterate group

with elephants. But there is no evidence whatsoever that of people without any concept of orderly governing. Their

these great men made any special effort to employ win- main skill and capability and strength was martial art.

ter strategically. Had winter any advantage for them? Genghis Khan, as well as his grandson, Kublai Khan

There is no trace of evidence of it. Did they take any (1215-1294; called by his contemporaries "the wise

special measures to make their lives easier in the win- Khan"), were superb, perhaps unsurpassed leaders of

ter? This is also unknown; probably not. Historical works mounted armies. (Kublai Khan, incidentally, is very well

do not mention anything of that nature. Winter just came known to the West through Marco Polo, the famous Italupon these people and they had to fight or march as readi- ian traveler. He concentrated on Eastern and South Asily as they did in the summer. Winter warfare can differ atic conquests and control, while Genghis Khan was the

so substantially from military action in warmer seasons leader who developed innovative and progressive, for his

that, if practiced deliberately by using the conditions to time, cavalry combat tactics.) As we now well know, the

advantage, it must be considered a separate military art

requiring separate tactics. Here we must emphasize again *Genghis (or Tshengis) Khan was born about 1 1622 and died in 1227;

that we are not considering cases where campaigns his true name was Tamugin of the Borgigin clan4
use of massed horsemen presents numerous difficulties the established way. ]The Mongolk, deNeloped xery effiwith forage, supplies, shelter, gear. Of all that, the Mon- cient clothing, and mastered proper winter bivouac techgolians were masters. Also, leading masses of horsemen niques and the right way to care for themsel, es and 1heir

into battle, and conducting battles without the closed horses. Fires were seldom made, and raw hor,,e•eat was

mounted formations that were invented much later, was perfectly acceptable. Planning. timing and training. (the

an achievement revolutionary for the time. Later in his- three prerequisites of successful ,tralcgy. were excellent

tory, Napoleon would have appreciated some of Geng- for the time, and suited not only the mein and horses but

his' skills (Howarth 1876). also the geography.

After unifying the Mongols in 1206 through a series The men traveled fast. switching horses frequ,_nTly

of invasions and ra' s into China, Genghis Khan refined they rested at night and easily covered close to 1(0) kilohis tactics to perfection. He recognized what is now to a meters a day on flat land. Using wintertime to full advandegree an axiomatic reality: the greatest expenditure of tage, they traveled along ridges, where the snow was shalmateriel, effort and time is not woade on the battlefield, low. Their horses could, without difficulty, obtain enough

but in reaching it. He used to say that only life is expend- dry grass from under the snow. The bands, organized into

ed on the battlefield, but great eftort is expended in get- units of tens. hundreds and thousands, were hardly ever

ting there. His masses of horsemen, traveling "on three detected by the sparse agricultural population of the area.

horses" (each man had severad spare horses with him). The population was in villages, and the villages were in

were able to cover up to 100 km (about 62 miles) a day. valleys. In the wintertime the peole were huddled in their

In their long marches ".y usually met only unprepared huts, and did not detect the passing Mongols in time to

and demoralized populations. The shaggy Mongolian warn the remote cities. Robbing and burning of a few vilhorse, put to grass and rest at night, did not require spe- lages took place near their destinations, mainly to augcial forage and was invariably fresh ai the morning. While ment their frugal provisions for the way back. The popunot very spectacular in appearance and only moderate in lation was alarmed but invariably too late. The disunited

speed, they were capable of bringing masses of Mongo- Slavic city-states were unable to provide meaningful rellan horsemen over colossal distances, serving as relays sistance against the marauding Mongols. When they fiand also as a protein source when the need arose. Slaugh- nady managed to muster organized resistance, it turned

tering spare and injured horses for meat was an estab- into a disaster. The Mongols appeared en masse and, oplished procedure. erating in familiar territory, defeated the Slavic rulers evChina, at the time we are talking of, was known to the erywhere they went. This was the way the Mongolian hold

Mongols very well. Information had been accumulated over Russia began.

during prolonged raids and invasions long before Geng- The year 1223 is usually considered the beginning of

his Khan's decision to subdue the country. There the idea Mongolian dominance over Russia (us Vladimirtscv menof reconnoitering in force on horseback ripened. Individ- tioned), The Russians had lost a battle known as the Kalual scouts hardly ever provided reliable information when ka River Defeat. However, the Mongolians did not inthey were seot out into the countryside. They were slow, vade the Russian heartland at this time; they returned to

and most of them never returned. Evaluation by an indi- their pastures and left the Slav',: tribes more or less alon;.

vidual scout was always subjective, sketchy, self-serv- for 12 years (Sergeevsky 1954).

ing, incomplete and often plain wrong. For these reasons, Besides a victory, the Kalka Battle gave the Mongols

Genghis Khan usually employed reonr,,issance by force. some good information about the tactics the Slavic leadAt the peak of hostilities with China, he saw that soon he ers had been practicing. The winte, raids continued to

would conquer the country, and had to make plans for bring information about climate, waterways, obstacles and

the future. He realized then that he actually had no population centers. In 1236 the Mongols decimated the

information whatsoever about the nature of the land and Volga Bulgars, who were a threat to their right flank. In

people in the West, the direction of his next conquests the winter of 1237 the Mongols appeared before the city

and adventures. of Riazan, the center of the loose association of city-states

Raids into what later became Russia began about 1210. which had begun at the time to call itself Roosj (Russia).

The main purpose of these deep raids into the country The statement of a cont, mporary chronicle about the

was to collect information, and their most remarkable as- Mongolian demand upon the Russian population is interpect was that they were always conducted in the winter. esting. The Mongols said, "Give us one-tenth of your rulBands of as many as 1500 horsemen assembled, riding ers, one-tenth of your people. ofyour black horses, of your

well-rested, semi-wild horses from the best pastures. The white horses, give us one tenth of everything." That would

waen collected some very frugal provisions (hard chees- presumably keep them satisfied. The Russians answered:

es, hard meat, some cereals and salt) and took off to the "When nobody of us is alixc. everything will be yours."

west. Each horseman le,' hree or four spare horses, in It happened exactly that way. The Mongolians moved

5
in large masses. Marching on the ice of frozen water- material goods than the Romans ever did. Their winter

ways, they brought heavy siege machines and breached warfare methods were miost innovative. Is it fortunate that

the walls of the city of Riazan within five days. As was they were so thoroughly forgotten? Yes, fbrtunate for

the Mongolian custom with resisting centers and cities, Russia. The Mongols actually forced the unification of

the population was massacred. From Riazan, still using Russia. But none of the subsequent invaders of the counthe river ice to transport their heavy machinery and siege try learned from the Mongols. They came in the sumsupplies, and swiftly annihilating the two small fortified mer. Was the winter a surprise for them? Yes, a deadly

towns of Kolomna and Moscow, the Mongolians moved surprise!

on and breached the fortress of Vladimir by 7 February Much is known about the anthropologic differences

1238. and also annihilated its population. By March, 14 between the races. Much nonsense has been written about

cities had been destroyed, and the uncoordinated resis- the superiority and inferiority of various races, race puritance of the Slavs had become ineffectual. Then the Mon- ty, etc. The fact is that since a pre-historic period of isogolians withdrew to their pastures. By 6 December 1240, lated growth and pure race formation, all historical proafter taking due notice of its beauty and architectural won- cesses have been race-mixing. War, the business of killders, the Mongols burned and destroyed the city of Kiev. ing people, has historically been a tool of race-mixing.

By 1242 Hungary was conquered. An example is the first occupation of Germanic land by

The Mongolian hold over Russia lasted until 1480. the Romans. The Germanic population of southern BaThe decline of their power began after the battle of Ku- varia has a clearly Mediterranean look. Russians in many

likovo Field (1380), but the decline was a gradual one. areas display a striking Finno-Mongolian appearance. Are

Their main achievement was recognition of the winter there pure races?

as an advantageous season for campaigning against What else did the Mongolians leave behind'? First of

sparsely populated lands with clustered, sedate agricul- all, and most important, a unified Russia, a nation speaktural populations. In doing this they developed their mass ing several Slavic dialects, unified and with a powerful

cavalry tactics to a state of perfection for the time. Would appetite for expansion, which they did for several centuthey have succeeded in summer campaigns? Perhaps, but ties. But a discussion of that subject would lead us away

possibly at a higher cost in battle losses. The population, from winter warfare, except perhaps for the Russian's tenforewarned and alarmed, would have organized pockets dency to accept and use the harsh winter as a time to trayof resistance in many places, and at best there would have el, a time to work in the forest, a time for intensive a-ribeen guerrilla resistance, which the Mongolians didn't cultural commerce.

like and tried to avoid. Re-supply of raiding parties would Something else derived from the Mongolians: their

have been more difficult and the Mongolian horse would horses. The large Slavic battle horse was replaced by the

have been in poorer physical shape after the winter, enduring Mongolian pony. The Cossacks would not have

The period of Mongolian domination was an impor- been the same without it. The horse, and better winter

tant formative period in Russia. The growing desire for clothing. But most of all the new attitude toward the winunity as opposed to feudalistic independence and th.. shift ter opened new opportunities. Siberia was ready to be

of the power center deeper into the Eastern European colonized.

plain were important events in shaping Russian history

(Kliuchevsky 1904). In the previous, greater conquest, A PROMISING START AND A DECLINE

that of China, the Mongolians were much interested in

imposing a new government upon the land. Not so in We have mentioned that battles prolonged into the

Russia. Perhaps they found the European population, as winter, where both siles are handicapped by snow and

opposed to the Chinese, and the European ideology too cold weather, do not necessarily exemplify any mastery

different for their rudimentary concept of government, of winter warfare. To be sure, there are many examples

That may have been the reason why Kublai Khan went of winter warfare, involving many great leaders. We have

to great lengths to preserve and to support all the local already mentioned Xenophon, who was born in 431 BC

rulers. All the Mongolians were interested in was tribute in Attica and died in 350 BC in Athens. a very colorful

in goods, cattle and slaves. That was, perhaps, their only personality of many talents. Xenophon had to fight batgreat weakness (Vladimirtsev 1922). But the main thing tles in winter (Jacks 1930).

is that the Mongolians discouraged local feuds and im- Hannibal (born 247 BC, died by his own hand 183

posed peace in the conquered countries. BC) and Alexander the Great (356 BC-323 BC) both

As a historical event, the Mongolian appearance may fought in winter. But we cannot see that they made any

be of major significance, perhaps of even greater signifi- attempt to use winter to advantage, nor can we detect any

cance than the Romans. After all, the Mongols controlled advantage of an unexpected nature that winter brought

much more territory and affected many more people and to them.

6
An important achievement in winter warfare occurred armies be et f.cti se on a snow, -co, ercd balllefield? l)etin western Europe roughly at the time of the Mongolian initely not. Uniforms did not protcct the mnci aiwinst the

exploits: skis began to appear on the battlefield. Around elements. Artillery and supply trains became immobiAD 1200 the Norwegians were marchin2. patrolling and lized in the winter.

conducting combat on skis (Firsoff 1943). Their speed. The warfare that evolved gives the impression of beagility and mobility in places where men on foot became ing artificial, unnatural and strange It) a contemplxrary

completely immobilized impressed every observer. Like observei. Colorfully dressed armies of men marched on

the Mongolian cavalry, ski troops were able to arrive foot and on horseback over lown distances, dragging

where they were not expected or before they were ex- heavy supply trains and artillery %,ith thern. They mapected. That constituted an undisputed, colossal ad- neuvered into positions opposite each other. usuall) on

vantage, a plain called the "battlefield," ovrlrooked by hills to be

But the expected refinement of military ski tactics did occupied by the commanders and statf. Upon command,

not take place. Instead, martial art and military thinking given by signal or message, the ar•iýes started closing

turned away from winter warfare for a long period. Rus- in, stopping ititermittently to disclh,[ vollcys of arrowks

sia was under the Mongols, who knew what to do in sum- and, later on. bullets. They moved, rcioaded. fired again,

mer as well as in winter. The European armies began to and then. still in rigid formation, engaged in hand-to-hand

grow bigger, and in a gradual process developed tactics battle until one side was routed. The battles %%ere incredincompatible with winter. ibly bloody, and by modern standards cnormously conBig crowds on the battlefield cause confusion. It be- centrated. Strategy was simple.c. ach side hoped to subcomes difficult to distinguish friend from foe. Battling due the other by having better trained (more obedient)

the Mongols never presented difficulties-the racial dif- or more numerous soldiers. Tactics were equally simference signaled whom to hit, stab, spear or let fly an pie: there were rules to let the enemy fire the first volley,

arrow at. But in Europe, the racial brothers easily be- rules for engaging the artillery, rules for the cavalry thrust.

came confused in the midst of a melee. Some relief was A number of such battles constituted a war. and a war

provided by the flag: gathering around the flag and de- was often not finished by the end of the warm season.

fending it was most useful behavior on the battlefield. As incredible as it sounds now, the opposing armies disCanvases by many artists were beautifully adorned with engaged when the weather became bad late in the seaflags on the battlefield, often at the expense of the ac- son and began a process called "taking to winter quartion. Heroism connected with the flag was a steady em- ters," which means they occupied villages and towns to

bellishment of the corresponding literature. The flag was wait out the cold season.

a coveted trophy, a symbol; but the flag became insuffi- The rigid fonnations and parade ground precision of

cient for directing men on the battlefield. An improve- movement became an ingrained concept that lasted for

ment was needed. centuries. The winter quarters mentality is still alive in

The great and initially inexpensive answer was the certain military circles. We will have to (leal more with

uniform. These mass-produced garments were identically "parade ground warfare," which is a consequence of intailored and colored. The problem of confusion on the flexibility in military thinking. This inflexibility may be

battlefield was brilliantly solved: just attack and kill ev- the reason why commanders of all times have had so

erybody who does not wear the familiar clothing! The much difficulty with guerrilla warfare. Now, however,

other side did the same. Uniforms became traditional and there is a need to describe an example of good w intcr

symtolic and have been preserved for centuries by the warfare, while emphasizing that it constitutes an exceptoy industry and tin soldier collectors. But the immedi- tional example, rather than a significant change in hisate result was a competition in fanciness and a complete torical practice.

loss of functionality in clothing. The time for fatigues The sedate approach to winter warfiare , as boldly inwas ripe, but they did not arrive until long after. terrupted by the Swedish king. Gustav I Vasa (1496--

Along with the numerical growth of the armies came 1560), who once again employed skis on the battlefield.

the need for more discipline. Tactics required intensive Gustav Vasa understoxo very well the essential prercquidrilling and training, marching in step, closed, deep square sites for a successful winter campaign. At a time when

formations with each move made to the sound of drums, other armies were indulging in hibernal winter torpor,

bugle signals, and, rarely, shouted orders. c appear- he trained, prepared and hardened his troops fOr winter

ance of firearms added another factor: a decrease in vis- maneuvers and combat, He said that his ski troops could

ibility due to black powder smoke. There was more need move 100 miles a day (Heidenstam 1925). In 1521 he

for discipline. The appearance of artillery had a predict- successfully fought Denmark. with his ski army display- able effect. Competition for bigger rounds resulted in ing speed. endurance and quick decision on the battleheavier guns (and thicker gunpowder smoke). Could such field. A classical campaign against Musco y was fought

7
in 1555-1557. The superior army of the Russian general cult to control on the battlefield without modern means

Ivan Bibikov was skillfully out-maneuvered and then of communication. Gustavus Adolphus kept his units

defeated. His early successful field campaigns earned him small and mobile, and in this way controlled them much

the Swe, crown and led to the recognition that mo- better in the field.

bility wa• superior to bulk force. And at that time high His most famous battle was also his last. He fell on 6

mobility could be achieved only with skis. November 1632, at Lutzen, in a battle with Wallensten

Gustavus II Adolphus (1594-1632) ruled Sweden who, ironically, was at the time preparing to disperse to

from 1611 to 1632. He is often called the Thirty-Year- winter quarters.

War king. His ideas of strategy, tactics, and especially A few years before the end of the Thirty-Year War a

winter warfare were revolutionary for his time (Fletcher very interesting march and winter battle took place.

1892). In the Thirty-Year War (1618-1648) he recog- Friedrich Shiller called the battle "the merry battle of

nized that smaller tactical units have more flexibility, and Tuttlingen." Tuttlingen, also called by contemporary docthat a flexible line as opposed to a square, rigid column uments Dutlingen and Duttlingen, is a small town in

is advantageous. This, together with wider strategic ob- southwest Germany on the banks of the river Danube. In

jectives and his whole fighting style, were completely the middle of November 1643, French forces under Gunew in Germany. His radical thinking on winter warfare beriant had the intention of taking to winter quarters. The

was limited to surprisingly obvious (now), simple prin- weather was bad and there had been several snowstorms;

ciples. The armies of that time, in competing for superi- it was time to give the army a rest. True to the spirit of

or artillery firepower, were developing progressively the times a marching army usually "foraged" the area

heavier pieces. The result was serious difficulty in coor- through which it marched, and was accompanied by a

dinating artillery action with infantry in movement and wild, marauding band which devastated a wide zone

logistics. Instead of supporting infantry in action, artil- around the slowly marching forces, stripping it of all provlery pieces were often engaged in bombarding enemy ender. For this reason, it was decided not to winter in

batteries and were in serious trouble when friendly in- Rottweil where the French at that time were located, but

fantry became unavailable to cover them. That was the to march to Tuttlingen which, according to a reconnaisway the rudiments of the "artillery duel," that ultimately sance, was "fresh," meaning that the houses had not been

pointless tactical engagement of all times, were created. burned and the population was well prepared for the winAlso, the heavy pieces of that time could not be trans- ter. So Tuttlingen and the surrounding villages were ocported over snow-covered terrain very easily. That was cupied by the French force. As the southern side of the

another reason for retiring to winter quarters. Gustavus Danube Valley is hilly and wooded, Count von RantzAdolphus developed a light, sled-mounted, mobile artil- aw, the French field commander, put out a screen of palery which operated together with his foot soldiers and trols on all roads leading to the south, where, somewhere

supported them, and was said to fire as fast as a musket behind the hills, lurked the Bavarian forces under von

could be loaded. Hatzfield and Johann de Werth.

Gustavus completely rejected the idea of winter quar- Meanwhile the Bavarians, amply familiar with the

tersand, inorder to operate successfully, employed mean- spirit of winter quarters, concluded that there was a

ingful training and care of his soldiers. Properly trained, chance for a successful attack and started to assemble

fed and clothed soldiers went confidently into the field their forces. In order to enhance their chances, they capin winter and were always successful. While command- tured a few foraging patrols of French and cleverly let

ers of otherarmics required that their men, placed in ranks them know that they were moving to Bavaria for the winaccording to their size, be subject to senselessly harsh ter. Then they allowed the captured men to slip away.

discipline while on duty, they did not enforce any disci- After thus planting a false story for the enemy they startpline during free time. Hordes of camp followers of both ed working out their marching orders. Without campsexes debauched and pillaged occupied villages and con- fires or heavy supply trains they marched on secondary

tributed to the low morale of the soldiers. Gustavus Ad- trails through the hills toward Tuttlingen. The difficult

olphus' training was purposeful. He insisted on discipline task of movement coordination was masterfully perand demanded meaningful behavior, and his army was formed. There was a standing order to capture all enemy

of high caliber. For soldiers off duty he required decent patrols encountered, which was successfully done. An

behavior, "clean living" and sobriety. Sex, drunkenness intense snowstorm permitted the Bavarians to approach

and marauding were completely eliminated. The morale very close to the enemy outposts, and at 3 o'clock in the

in his small units was high. This was especially true in afternoon a concentrated attack was mounted. The enethe case of his elite ski units (Dodge 1895). my artillery, too heavy to place within the city limits,

Another factor was control of the troops. Whenever was captured, and to the great surprise of the French,

an army unit reaches a certain size it becomes very diffi- turned immediately against the city. The panicky enemy

8
were either killed or captured or dispersed into the woods. winter warfare underwent a process of development and

Rich booty was taken. Guberiant, who had been wound- change. First, ,conceptual-no "winter quarters"-- and

ed in a previous action, died. General von Rantzaw and then physical adaptation of weapons. When the going got

an impressive list of officers, together with 6000 "com- hard, lighter weapons, lighter artillery, sledge- transported

mon laborers," were captured (Zeiller 1643). artillery, and other innovations began to appear on the

The old contemporary accounts of that event consti- battlefield. And most important, training and discipline

tute somewhat difficult reading. The language, full of bar- became meaningful, flexibility developed, and proper care

barisms and bizarre spelling, is in some places obscure. of men appeared. Actually, the advantage of crossing froCertain works, however, written in Latin (Puffendorf zen water bodies had been recognized long before Charles.

1685: Historia Germanico-Sveviae), are authoritative and The Mongols crossed ice-covered lakes and rivers and

full of detail. The facts and names mentioned above co- used them for transportation. However, crossing a water

incide in several contemporary works. As near as can be body when the adversary thinks it is uncrossable, by retold, the date of the battle was either the 13th or 24th of inforcing thin ice, indicates a very high degree of refineNovember 1643. ment in winter warfare technique for the time.

The Thirty-Year War ended in 1648 with the Peace But the emotions of men with power over many other

of Westphalia. human beings led in other directions. A leader commandAnother Swedish king famous for ingenuity was ing ten units of 1000 men each may win ten battles, some

Charles X Gustav (1622-1660). He was a statesman at of them in the winter, against 15,000 enemies and feel

the court of Christina of Sweden (1626-1684) and dili- satisfied. But commanding a mass of 15,000 men and

gently studied the military art. When Christina stepped engaging an adversary with, let's say, 14,000 men in one

down he became King of Sweden (1654). A year later battle and winning it is a greater satisfaction! (This should

his skill as a warlord was put to the test in the First North- preferably be done on a clear summer day on a suitable

em, War (1655-1660). In the winter of 1657-1658 he battlefield.) At the time of Charles and others, the satisperformed a remarkable sea crossing at the Little Belt. faction of viewing such a victorious battlefield constituted

The sea ice was thin and the Danish forces felt safe, sep- a much stronger argument for the traditional approach than

arated from Charles. By carefully testing the ice and re- any reasoning could provide. Thus developments moved

inforcing it by flooding a layer of planks and straw, which in the preset direction. Generals needed spectacular viche allowed to refreeze, Charles crossed the Little Belt. It tories and the battlefield needed to be spectacular durinng

appears that his most important measure was carefully the battle. Therefore, men were sent in tight uniforms to

spreading out men, horses and baggage, thus avoiding exchange salvos of bullets and bayonet each other. But

load concentrations. The commander of one of his cav- men are naturally reluctant to be exposed and to die while

airy units, Count Bertelskiold, approached the problem killing others. The answer to that problem was training.

in another manner. He apparently assumed that a short- Parade ground precision training, movement in step, abduration load application would allow the ice to support solute obedience to command, and automatic behavior

a heavier load, and attempted to cross the ice with a closed were the only ways to control the great number of people

column at full speed. The Count perished with his men and to mold them into an organized mass efficient in comand horses. Charles succeeded and won a tactical sur- bat.

prise over the Danes (Topelius 1883). The strict discipline enforced by harsh punishment and

In several subsequent marches Charles did not hesi- endless training resulted in the capability of acting "as

tate to use ice-covered water bodies in his military move- one man." Maneuvers on the battlefield were performed

ments. The inevitable effect was always there. The ad- swiftly and precisely. Commanders had the ability to maversary felt secure behind the thin ice barrier. The unex- nipulate large masses of people molded together by dispected appearance of Charles produced the desired re- cipline into square formations or blocks. The men literalsuits (Heidenstam 1925). What is thin ice for one may ly fought and died shoulder to shoulder, instantly stepbe just thick enough for another. Putting a purpose into ping over the bodies of their fallen and wounded corndiscipline, taking care of the men to increase their stain- rades. The battles became so intense that blood shed by

ina, and preventing "sinful behavior" to keep morale high friend and foe covered the ground. It was the time of the

allowed the leader to think about increased mobility, both bloodiest battles in history (although compared with the

in space (sudden crossing of ice barriers) and in time potential of future war they would appear almost harm-

(winter warfare). The result was small, mobile units that less). Mass courage, stamina, and automatic execution of

solved the problems of maneuver and guidance, demon- commands were the most important factors in tactics and

strating innovation and pointing toward progress. the most important contributing to victory.

Perhaps with the end of the Thirty-Year War we be- All the innovations that had appeared in the art of wingin to see that from the early 17th century on, the idea of ter warfare up to and including Charles X were gradually

9
forgotten and abandoned. The general officers, perched refined and eloquent (in French), he put many of his ideas

high on their hilltop command posts, needed more than down in writing. His unabashed view that the sacrifice of

ever before a clear picture of the position and movement human life was fully justified if victory and ten itorial gain

of friend and foe. Therefore, colorful, handsome uniforrms were actitevable was apparently the key to his military

with decorative plumed helmets were developed. The thinking (Montross 1944). In a fast field campaign with

soldiers, and even more their officers, looked like pheas- 40,000 men during the winter of 1740, he invaded, occuants (or perhaps we should say fighting cocks). Since the pied and annexed Silesia (Schlesien). On the I 0th of April,

idea that power equals size and weight took firm hold 174 1, his Austrian adversary took a day's rest in the town

with the developers, heavier artillery appeared on the of Mollwitz because of a very bad blizzard. Upon being

battlefield once again. The functionally useless uniforms, informed of this, Frederick marched nine miles through

the heavy supply trains, and especially the low mobility the storm and surprised and defeated the numerically suof the artillery made the return of the winter quarters idea perior Austrians.

just about inevitable. Forgotten was the battle of Tuttlin- Another winter campaign and battle took place at Kesgen. The development of the art of winter warfare came seldorf in 1750. The Austrians occupied an elevated, forpractically to a standstill. tified position. The approaches were steep and slippery

The general trend of the times also affected those great with ice. Two Prussian attacks were easily repulsed. The

developers of winter warfare skills-the proponents and third time the Austrians, sure of a victory, not only beat

beneficiaries of them-the Swedes. Charles XII of Swe- back the Prussian attack force but started a counterattack

den (1682-1718), during his campaign against Peter the down from their fortified hill position and came within

Great of Russia (1672-1725), fought and won a battle reach of the Prussian cavalry. Their retreat back up the

with the Russians in Poland during the summer of 1708. same slippery hill failed. Their ranks were broken. The

But instead of consolidating his victory and securing his Prussian victory was sweetened by the capture of 6000

rear, he became drawn into a long field campaign which prisoners and numerous cannon (Carlyle 1899). This was

dragged out to the winter of 1708-1709. Attempting to probably a rare, seldom-encountered situation.

break out to the south, Charles suffered from severe Another well-known winter battle fought by Frederweather and began losing people to fatigue, freezing and ick the Great was the battle of Leutnen in 1757. The Ausvicious cavalry rides. Supply trains and replacements trians were occupying well-fortified positions and enjoywere systematically captured by the Russians. ing the feeling of secure winter quarters when Frederick,

Peter's great achievement at this time consisted in the in a 250-mile forced winter march, arrived with a large

skill with which he extricated himself from the battle- amount of artillery together with heavy siege pieces, and

field in Poland. He lost a battle, but not a decisive one. began an immediate energetic attack. He employed a novel

He skillfully kept using the winter situation, denying diagonal battle formation, reduced the Austrian fortificaCharles a decisive battle until the Swedish army had be- tions, lost 5000 men, but enjoyed a complete victory. This

come sufficiently weakened. Peter selected his own time episode of the Seven Year War was probably one of the

and battlefield. At Poltava, in southern Russia, he forti- most significant winter battles of that time.

fled his field position in a manner which forced the at- During his 46-year rule, Frederick the Great did not

tacking Swedes into dispersal and splitting of their forc- contribute much to the art of winter warfare as such. The

es. The results are very well known. The bulk of the tactics employed in the victorious winter battles were

Swedish army was captured, and Charles XII fled to Tur- equally useful in the summer. There was no difference.

key (Topelius 1884). The diminishing role of the Swedes He looked to training for more effective firepower, disciin politics and as a military force was conspicuous on pline on the battlefield, and endurance. It is said that his

the European scene from that time on into the middle of soldiers were more afraid of their officers than of the enthe 18th century. These past masters of winter warfare emy. The misery of snow, cold and darkness affected both

began to abandon their position in Europe. sides. Whoever was capable of enduring more was at an

Generalship in that time was perhaps best represent- advantage, and Frederick's people simply could take more

ed by Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712-1786). This hardship. Many investigators were much impressed by

king, during the first part of his rule (he was crowned in Frederick's strategic talents (Philipps 1940). However,

1740), engaged in a series of wars, including some win- there is virtually no evidence of special innovations or

ter episodes. In military doctrine he adhered to the prin- special strategic winter-adapted capabilities. Frederick was

ciples set forth by his predecessor and father, and refined not against using winter quarters to rest and restore his

battlefield maneuvering to a parade ground precision forces. But he ignored them whenever he needed a victonever achieved before. Heavy training, exhausting exer- ry or felt that his adversary needed the winter quarters

cise, strict discipline, speed in march, and quick deci- more than he did. His greatest achievements were in iron

sions on the battlefield were his attributes. Intellectually discipline, improvisation, unexpected maneuver and the

10
ability to overpower a numerically superior foe by attack- or especially tactical, principles in general, and winter

ing at a place and time where the foe could not deploy all warfare techniques in particular. To the contrary, "hathis forces, ever was invented was short-lived and soon abandoned.

What we see toward the end of the 18th century in This period is considered to have culminated in the

Europe appears actually to be a gradual abandonment of beginning of a new era in history. One often reads about

the idea that when the land is covered by a blanket of the Napoleonic time, even the Napoleonic Era. Whatever

snow, the temperatures are low, and the days are short, it may have been (time, period, era), our interest centers

another type of warfare must be fought. Populations be- on the legend that the downfall of Napoleon (the end of

came denser and conflicts more intensive. The warmth the period, time or era) was brought about by winter and

and comfort of winter quarters often had to be left be- the winter warfare skills of his enemies, the Russians. How

hind. Battles began to be fought in the winter more fre- that legend came about is perhaps much less important

quently. The added hardship was countered by added than whether or not it was the truth.

training, discipline and drill. The armies grew bigger and Napoleon (1769-1821) was an enigmatic personality.

distinct uniforms were still needed, even more than be- His original name was Napoleon Buonaparte, later

fore. Proper clothing could not be used very well, and changed to Bonaparte. He was a Corsican of Italian dehygiene and sensible nutrition had not yet been discov- scent, was well educated, and had a brilliant military caered. Since men in the army were still a very small por- reer, specializing in artillery. Considered often the Ultition of the population, selection for size and strength was mate Adventurer, he had the talent and reputation of a

widespread. The artillery was heavy, but managed to fol- great military leader. At the age of 30, he became the millow the forces on roads and highways. The endless sup- itary dictator of France. In 1804 he was pronounced "Emply trains, to a great extent officers' belongings, strug- peror" of France. His experience was accumulated durgled along in wintertime and often became separated from ing long campaigns in Italy, Egypt, and other places

the main body of men. The inconvenience slowed down (Dodge 1904). His reputation as a strategic genius comes

the armies significantly. Mass use of sleigh transporta- especially from such battles as the Battle of Austerlitz

tion did not occur to anybody. (December 1805), where he defeated the Austrian and

Russian armies, or, for example, the Battle of Jena in 1806,

THE MANY USES OF WINTER where he defeated the Prussians. These battles have been

studied and are textbook examples of Napoleon's successPeople generally are born to be led; few are born to be ful military strategy, but they show no specifics or speleaders. A lucky gambler leads a flock of followers, ad- cial measures useful in winter warfare.

miters and imitators. When his luck runs out, he is aban- The Napoleonic wars in Central Europe were fought

doned, disregarded and forgotten. to simplify the "political map" and impose Napoleon's

A lucky, courageous historical personality, such as a will upon the continent. They displayed no special event

warrior or king, attracts a flock of analysts, chronologers of winter warfare interest with the exception that on the

and historians. But when his luck runs out and he com- side of the Swedes and Englishmen there were about 2500

mits errors, resulting in lost campaigns and battles, he is excellently trained and highly mobile Norwegian ski

not abandoned. His historians, chronologers and analysts troops who were highly successful at the Battle of Traustay with him, and by all means (concealing facts, invent- gen (1808). Their success was typically due to mobility;

ing events, exaggerating and belittling) try to explain his they always appeared where not anticipated (Firsoff 1943).

bad luck in terms of an Act of God, circumstances be- A large amount of literature exists on the personality,

yond human control, and so forth. After all, the reputa- talent, leadership and capabilities of Napoleon. There are

tions of their leader and their country are at stake. Most plays, motion pictures, fiction (most famous probably is

of all, their own reputation is at risk. War and Peace by Tolstoy), and factual historical litAn example is Napoleon's 1812 campaign against erature. Fiction often contains interesting facts, and facRussia. Napoleon lost that war. But he won the seeming- tual literature sometimes bears fictitious embellishments.

ly decisive battle in the campaign. The Russians lost the There is no way to evaluate his personality without sharbattle but won the war. This was due to the fact that he ing the bias of the Napoleonic Legend, but doubtless he

made some grave errors, although the legend is that the was a talented general and strong leader, attracting men

Russian winter did it. who went enthusiastically to their deaths for him. Was he

Toward the beginning of that period there had been an especially good winter warfare leader? Definitely not.

some changes in military art, some indications of progress. His exploits in Poland prior to his famous Moscow camThe great marshals of that era were able to move large paign demonstrate that amply. Napoleon ignored the adarmies at any time, winter or no winter. We would be vantages of winter and was often handicapped by snow

unsuccessful in searching that period for new strategic, and cold more than his adversaries were.

11
Studying the material on battles fought by Napoleon, they did they came empty-handed. HaraLssment by ban•,s

one develops the impression that he gradually began to of peasants, night attacks by Cossacks, burned bridges

neglect to study his prospective theaters of operation, and log obstacles in forests sapped the strength of the

From what is known ni w, many of his battles were fought army, slowed it down, and undermined morale. Was this

in partially unfamiliar territory. The impression is also strategy adopted by the Russians correct? Did they actuthat he either did not know or did not consider the events ally have a choice? Most probably not. The army was in

which brought about the defeat of Charles XI1 of Swe- disarray and the commanders had been haggling among

den. During the years prior to his Moscow campaign themselves; there had been no decision about a supreme

Napoleon slipped gradually into a remarkable "no choice commander. The forces were not consolidated and were

position" which led ýAim into a major war in the east with- practically unprepared. For this reason Napoleon moved

out being able to resolve his conflict with England, so it almost unopposed. although very slowly, deeper into

was a war on two sides. After the battle of Trafalgar ( Russia. All he could do was to figlht one or two undeci1805) there was ro hope of invading England in the im- sive battles and perhaps win them. Perhaps the most pomediate future. Recognizing this, Alexander I of Russia tentially dangerous situation developed gradually: the

was in no mood to cooperate with Napoleon on his French forces were operating further and further away

scheme for a "new Europe" and became openly hostile. from their bases.

Napoleon assembled his famous Grande Arm6e, consist- On 9 August, Alexander appointed Prince MA. Kutuing of 453,000 men accompanied by a colossal baggage zov supreme commander, and Kutuzov rapidly assemtrain and a huge amount of artillery. It was something bled an army capable of conducting a major battle. An

that had never been seen before, and actually should have elderly, experienced soldier, a pupil of Suvorov. he had

impressed Alexander without even a battle. already been defeated once by the French at Austerlitz.

But Russia had space-space occupied by a sparse Kutuzov had small hope of winning a decisive battle.

but hostile population ready to harm the invader in any Nevertheless, the famous battle of Borodino was fought

possible way. This was something that Napoleon obvi- on 7 September 1812. It was one of the fiercest battles in

ously was unfamiliar with. Whenever he had invaded or history. The Russians lost 60.000 men killed and woundoccupied a European country the population had contin- ed. The battle lasted all day, from sunrise to sunset, and

ued to take care of everyday chores, placidly accepting fatigue on both sides eventually brought hostile action

another change at the remote top, a change they could to a standstill. Kutuzov, realizing that he was losing his

not feel but had experienced frequently before. Life un- men, that continuation of the battle in the morning would

der the new ruler had just continued as before. bring either defeat or annihilation, and that the luck of

In Russia the reaction to the Napoleonic invasion was battle would be on the side of the enemy, skillfully extridifferent. The area had not been recently invaded by for- cated his forces and abandoned the battlefield together

eigners, and was unfamiliar with political changes since with the capital of Russia-Moscow.

times unknown to the population. The natural reaction Legend tells us that Napoleon, assuming himself to

to the armed foreign invader, strange in behavior, dress be victorious, waited outside the abandoned capital for

and religion, was total hostility. Everything turned against the "boyars" to bring him the keys to the city. But nothNapoleon. Every soldier felt the "primordial" hatred of ing of the kind happened. There was no indication of surthe population. Horses disappeared from night pastures, render or peace negotiations. What must Napoleon have

water wells were poisoned by carrion, tree tangles on felt at that time? The capital of a large country at his feet

forest roads appeared faster than they could be removed, and nobody to pay tribute to him, no enemy army to consoldiers could not move out of sight without the risk of test his victory, or to surrender to him, and a mass of

perishing from a pitchfork thrust. Edgy, disturbed, and dead soldiers to bury. Kutuzov's army had retreated to

plainly frightened, the military masses kept moving where parts unknown to lick its wounds. Moscow had been

they were ordered. Morale suffered. abandoned by the authorities and by most of the populaNapoleon crossed the Russian border in June 1812. tion.

Alexander did not react to this as expected. There were The rest is generally known from literature; it has been

no signs observable that the Russians were preparing for described many times. Napoleon's occupation of the buma "decisive battle" on a battlefield. As a young officer of ing city ended on 19 October. His great achievement,

the Grande Arrnme wrote: "they evaded, retreated, and the long march through Russia followed by the Borodifled." The ponderous pursuit movement proceeded over no battle and occupation of the capital, had unexpectedso-called "scorched earth." Bridges were destroyed, vil- ly become a dangerous liability. Fires continuously breaklages were burned, fields were trampled, and resupply ing out in the city, the uncooperativeness of hostile remoff the land was a dangerous, ineffective, almost impos- nants of the population, and drunkenness and looting by

sible task. Foraging details seldom came back, and when the troops had a catastrophic influence upon the Grande

12
Armre's morale. Napoleon himself was badly influenced played by most of the people, beginning w, ith the lowest

by the lack of any sign that the Tzar would be willing to camp follower and ending, as we will see shortly, with

negotiate with him. Nothing was proceeding right in any Napoleon himself. We may say that the winter did not

aspect of warfare. In preparing to leave the city the army make much difference. Had there been no winter at all

loaded itself down with booty. Contact with the enemy that year, a few more wretched people would have esforce was completely lost. No small, light, mobile units caped and a few more Russians would have fallen. That

were drawn up for peripheral security and no orderly would have been the only effect.

movement plans were made. In this context the only two But we must continue with a few more highlights of

correct decisions, to abandon Moscow and not to use the that famous event. The well known disaster developed

devastated so-called Smolensk route on the way back, toward the bloody end: Marshal Ney covered the retreat

could not be implemented advantageously. Moscow of the French army with 12,000 men, but soon it became

should not have been occupied, or rather invaded, to be- known that over half of them had no weapons. Most of

gin with, so it was abandoned too late. the time Ney had no connection or contact with the main

The French forces began the withdrawal from Mos- forces. At one point, he was cut off by Miloradovich,

cow with a decision and an order, without any direct pres- but refused to surrender and with great difficulty broke

sure from the adversary. In addition to all the errors corn- out with only 800 men who marched around the Rusmitted before, such as not considering the extended corn- sians. By November, after the disastrous crossing of the

munications, neglecting to consolidate the area under Berezina River, the French army had lost most of its men.

control, and occupying an otherwise useless city full of In the final accounting, only 10,000 fighting men and

tempting booty, thereby triggering uncontrollable loot- some 50,000 stragglers escaped Russia.

ing by men and officers with all its attendant demoraliz- What were the reasons for the catastrophic winter reing effects, new errors accumulated. The Grande Armae treat? Was it the severity of the winter? Was there some

began its retreat without any contact with the enemy. The disastrous misunderstanding of the time. distances, and

high command did not know where the enemy was or landscape? Who is to blame for the disaster? It appears

what its intentions and movements were. now that only one person, Napoleon, was the root and

But the isolation of the French was not so complete the reason for the carnage that befell almost 40,000 men.

as it appeared to them. They were closely observed by It appears that after assembling his Grande Armee he

the Russian command, and once their intention to break expected Alexander to step with his forces into his way

out in a southerly direction was recognized, the Russians and sacrifice the small Russian army before surrenderdecided to intercede. Marching south, the French forces ing his country and throne to Napoleon. That was naive,

would be in a fresh, undevastated area where foraging to say the least. To pursue the Russians into the heart of

and resupply would present few problems. Skillful and their own country, to expose their flanks to the Cossack

rapid regrouping put the Russians in an advantageous sabers and the peasants' pitchforks, and to extend composition to prevent the southerly movement of the Grande munications with the rear to the utmost were grave erArm~e. rors. It was an error not to evaluate time and distance.

In the battle of Maloiaroslavets the Russians fought Was the onset of the Russian winter unexpected? Hardthe French advance columns energetically and denied ly. Was the winter unexpectedly severe'? No.

them passage. The French also found the stepped-up Napoleon's 1812 campaign was known by the RusCossack cavalry strikes (Platov) increasingly unbearable sian people as the "invasion of the twelve-language

and were forced to take once again the devastated route horde." It may or may not have been exactly twelve naused for their advance a few months before. Customari- tions, but there were soldiers from almost all of Europe.

ly this part of Napoleon's Russian campaign is referred This presented potentially serious problems with morale,

to as the beginning of the great winter disaster. But it discipline and loyalty. What was done to keep morale

was not as simple as it may appear to have been. To be- and discipline high? Practically nothing. Napoleon himgin with, the French army was tired, demoralized, weight- self lost his nerve and fled ahead in a coach, and it is

ed down with useless booty and to a degree disoriented, said that he was among the very first men to leave RusThe French were also underprovisioned. The large pro- sia. All his actions and decisions during that campaign

vision magazines which fell into the hands of the French indicate fairly cloudy thinking. It is also possible that his

army were not requisitioned; they were looted by the sol- generalship was brilliant, dashing and great only in the

diers, which meant lost. The same thing happened on the familiar framework of the western European battlefields:

way back in Smolensk. The supply magazines established first large columns marching into position on the battlewith great difficulty for the retreating army were looted. field; then, usually, an interesting evening session spent

It appears that the French army was beaten by time, over maps; and then, early in the morning, colorfully

distance, and the lack of morale, skill and stamina dis- uniformed formations marching out under orders from a

13
command post overlooking the battlefield. With the ex- that the greatest error of the French leadership consisted

ception of one real battle at Borodino all these satisfac- in letting themselves get into a situation where they had

tions of great generalship were denied Napoleon in Rus- to do something beyond their capabilities They moved

sia. The fruits of a clear victory, as one might see it at too far and too slowly, and lost what little control they

the time, did not materialize. The occupation of the ad- had over the army. Meaningful centralized control beversary's capital was only illusory. In any case, Russia's comes progressively difficult with increased size. A

ancient capital, Moscow, was only a secondary focus of streamlined organization and new means of communipower-there was St. Petersburg. But seeing the focal cations are needed after a certain size is achieved. That

point of Eastern Orthodoxy-Mother Moscow- in the did not become available for a long time to come.

hands of the enemy did have a mobilizing effect on the That the population of the territory the French marched

population, and therefore worked against the French. through would resist and engage in a guerrilla war did

It is possible that Napoleon himself was the first to not occur to them. Closed, wooded areas are suitable for

lose his nerve. Otherwise, how could all these errors have guerrilla warfare both in summer and winter. But we have

piled up on each other? It also would be a grave error to already pointed out that by the time winter warfare was

say that the Russian winter defeated Napoleon's forces. developing the French were already incapable of meanWhen the winter came, Napoleon had already been de- ingful resistance, and the role of winter in the great defeated. The winter only increased the number of men left feat of 1812 is an understandable fiction.

behind. The winter did not make the life of the angry What is not understandable is the reason why nobody

Russian peasant guerrillas easier either. But the French learned the lessons presented by the campaign of 1812.

had no winter training, equipment or experience. The The need for flexibility in maneuvers was as badly felt

Russians did not need training and had everything else. subsequently as before. Artillery, with its propensity to

The Russian peasant could sleep all night long in a snow- bog down, was still the pride of commanders, and the

drift and wake up somewhat rested and capable of con- flexibility, speed and endurance of Cossack horses was

tinuing to fight and bother the retreating enemy. The forgotten. Military thinking during the years after NapoFrench soldier, when forced to do that, did not wake up. leon was dominated by the works of Baron Henri JemiInstead of blaming the Russian winter for the cata- ni (1779-1869), who thouaht it was a fallacy to chase

strophic defeat of the French, we may point out that every- the enemy; his territory must be occupied. His two printhing about Napoleon's Russian campaign was ill-con- ciples, dominating the local focus and striking in the deceived and unexpected by him. His great weakness was cisive direction, were well understood by higher miliprobably generated by a series of successes under pre- tary and political circles. At the implementation levels

dictable conditions. Somehow, under the strange Rus- he was ignored. Typical is a reaction by the 1812 poetsian conditions, he got out of touch with real events and warrior hero Denis Davydov: "Jomini, Jomini... but how

gave commands while disregarding the actual situation. about a vodka ration"--meaning that the daily requireThat may be in some way connected with the peculiar ments of the unit were more important than

properties of a man who has absolute power over too incomprehensible strategy. The result of the period was

many other men. It seems to be that in their minds, such a disappointment: nothing was learned that should and

men assume they have power not only over armies of could have been learned, and the rediscovery of winter

men and life and death, but also over time, distance and warfare principles had still to come. The same type of

nature itself. battlefield confrontations between shoulder-to-shoulder

What about the Russians? Did they employ any spe- columns of men occurred in summer and winter.

cial winter warfare skills that made their victory over the Russia had a special type of soldier, a serf conscriptFrench forces easier? The answer: none at all! But the ed into the army practically for a lifetime. Excellently

campaign was complete with examples demonstrating the trained, enduring, willing to undergo colossal hardships,

importance of timing, management of space, and con- this soldier had excellent morale; religiosity and patriotrol over masses of people. The supreme leadership of tism were one and the same to him, and he conthe French forces had the goal of imposing its will upon scientiously and devotedly obeyed the commands of his

the Russians. How could that be done? The only way officers. An additional special feature was a notable vathey knew: march, prepare for battle, and engage the en- riety of ages: among old, experienced veterans were

emy on the battlefield. And they would win a decisive young peasant boys who learned the fine points of batbattle somewhere in Poland. Why did that not take place? tlefield survival from their older comrades.

The Russians knew that they were neither ready to fight The only real change in respect to winter warfare in

nor capable of winning. Thus the big retreat. In the mean- Russia at that time was march norms and orders espetime the French moved into hostile space and gradually cially adapted for winter conditions, better uniforms and

lost not only their manpower but their morale. It seems bivouac equipment, and, temporarily at least, less reliance

14
upon artillery. All that was progress, but it was very lit- few thousand skilled professionals for the purpose of

tie. imposing his will upon his neighbors. Technology and

When Peter Wysotski started an insurrection in Po- industry provided weapons and ever-increasing portions

land in November 1830, it rapidly gathered momentum of the populations had to learn to use them.

and encompassed the entire country. The Russians felt Nations, large groups of people under common leadcompelled to subdue it. So in January 1831 Russian forces ership with defined political interests, formed coalitions,

moved into Poland. It was a pacification campaign which signed open and secret treaties, violated them. and inshould have lasted three months at the most. But since trigued against each other at an ever-increasing rate and

both sides were equally skilled in winter maneuvers and complexity. At the very bottom of the whole complex

the Poles avoided accumulating large forces in one place, maze of double crosses and diplomatic relations was a

the insurrection lasted well into the fall of the following strong but not very c!early expressed desire: the weaker

year. The Russians demonstrated their ability to move, ones tried to preserve what they had in terms of power

bivouac and rest in the field in any weather, including and influence and the stronger ones tried to expand their

winter. Their resupply trains moved, often with cavalry power by imposing their will upon others. Whenever redetachment protection, with no difficulties at all. fined savagery and camouflaged rudeness failed to

The Polish patriots, recognizing that Russian forces achieve the set goals by diplomatic aggression. armies

controlled limited territory and could not be everywhere, of a new type-national armies-were called upon. War

developed an initially successful tactic of strike and eva- gradually became a very serious business. National

sion, avoiding direct confrontation. Both sides were armies supported by national wealth with improved weapequipped for, and capable of, winter operations. Winter ons and ammunition influenced to a larger degree the

was an advantage for both in that impassable areas were life and economics of the involved countries.

converted into good sleigh transportation routes. Although The increased economic basis improved warfare techthe Russians were operating in hostile territory, they had nology and sharpened and intensified international connumerical superiority. The Poles were bidding for time: flicts (Engels 1957). Conscription. feeding, clothing and

they hoped, based on previous encouragement, for help supply of arms and ammunition proceeded on a large

from the West. The outcome is known. Help never came. scale. The armies were considered to be capable of fightThe Polish insurgents demonstrated much courage, ing longer and larger wars than before. Single battles were

tactical skill and winter warfare capability. They had to only episodes. When winter came. both sides were prelose due to numerical inferiority. Nothing else had to be pared in terms of more sensible clothing and shelter.

blamed for their defeat. Besides, they did not have Na- Winter was a disadvantage equally unpleasant for both

poleon's eloquent historians with their "Russian winter." sides, so there was no reason to cease hostilities. But still

What would have happened if the Russians had con- the longing for winter quarters was perceptible. Studysidered themselves prepared to fight at the beginning of ing campaigns of that period, such as the 1848-1849

the 1812 campaign? They would probably have fought a Austro-Hungarian war or the Franco-Prussian war of

major battle somewhere west of Smolensk. As it was, they 1870-1871, we cannot observe any special measures takhad no choice but to use the proper strategy and the only en, or winter skills or advantages made use of. The winsound tactics. For that we credit not the Russian leaders' tertime was an additional hardship which the soldiers

wisdom, but their failure to be prepared and their disuni- were commanded to bear in the name of their country

ty at the top. and out of devotion to their rulers (von Hersetsky 1909).

The mild winter of 1812-1813 is a lame excuse for It appears then that, perhaps with the exception of the

Napoleon. He was finished before it began. so-called Great Patriotic War of 1812, there was little

winter warfare skill developed during most of the 19th

A SLOW SHIFT century. Industrialization brought about bigger, better

equipped armies, but by no means were they ideally

In the 19th century, the populations of the European clothed for winter operation. Military skiing was, with

countries grew, and they developed industries capable of the exception of the Norwegians, in steady decline and

producing material goods and economic power, thereby disfavor. Only toward the end of the century in 1883-

bringing increased prosperity to the ruling classes. The 1884 did a revival of special ski battalions begin to apcomplexity of economic relations increased and, at the pear. It is remarkable that Russia was behind the others

same time, the sense of security and political stability in military skiing. Only in 1890 were there a few small

deteriorated. Governments, driven by the need to secure ski units that were said to be capable of marching 70 km

their political positions, felt the urge to divert ever larger a day for 10 to 20 days at a time. But they were abanportions of their resources to military power. It became doned for reasons unknown, probably budgetary, and

unacceptable for a ruler to dip into his treasury and hire a nothing more was heard from them.

15
It goes without saying that moving, housing and sup- ONE HUNDRED YEARS

plying troops in the winter puts special demands on the

logistician. As the Prussian campaign in France in 1870- On 31 January 1878, the nine-month war between

1871 showed, no proper wintertime logistics had been Russia and Turkey ended with an armistice at Adnanodeveloped. Despite railroad transportation, the relatively pie and the truce of St. Stephano. It had begun with a

mild climate in the area, and an abundance of settlements Russian declaration of war and crossing of the Romain the theater of operations, the armies on both sides suf- nian border on 24 April 1877. The war was conducted in

fered from exposure and fatigue to a degree where units two theaters simultaneously. Turkey was attacked across

often were completely incapable of combat (von Her- the Danube River and the Balkan Mountains in a main

setsky 1909). The lack of progress in developing winter thrust and, as a secondary objective, from Transcaucasia

warfare skills and capabilities may be explained in part into Asiatic Turkey.

by the increase in war potential experienced by the Eu- Somebody said that a war always has political-straropean powers. During previous centuries, monarchs tegic origins and strategic-tactical implementations. (The

conscripted and supported armies that were numerically use of double words here is apparently due to the undesmall compared with the population. But the second half finable nature of the words taken singly, and their enof the 19th century was characterized by evolving mass hanced sound of importance when used hyphenated,)

armies drafted from the entire population. Training and Whatever the definitions may be, there was a reason for

drill requirements changed drastically. Emphasis shifted the war. But most interesting is the way that i2ason is

more toward new battlefield requirements. Parade ground explained, depending upon the side from which it is illutraining was needed, but only as a character-building minated. It is also an illustration of the way historical

measure, as a means for developing and maintaining dis- events are interpreted, depending upon the time and pocipline and obedience, the ability to understand, to take sition of the historian.

and to execute orders under all conditions. Somehow The situation in the Balkans at the time was as folwinter warfare training of the troops was overlooked, and lows. The Balkan countries-Bulgaria, Romania, Serthe regular peacetime armies always conducted their bia, Bosnia, Herzegovina-were under various degrees

training maneuvers in the middle of the summer, prefer- of Turkish dominance. Only Greece was a formally sovably after harvest time when the fields could be used with- ereign country. Shortly before the outbreak of the war

out doing too much harm. there was a bloodily suppressed national insurrection in

An exception was the establishment of small, spe- Bulgaria. But all the Balkan nationalities were resisting

cialized units capable of operating on skis and fighting theirTurkish rulers to a greater or lesser degree, actively

in the mountains. Those units, trained intensively in supported by Russia. The underground revolutionary

mountaineering techniques, alpine skiing, and survival movement of the Christian population of the Balkan

under winter conditions, were formidable specialists in countries against their Moslem suppressors had many

winter warfare, and their only deficiency was in num- forms but their main stimulus was moral, monetary, and

ber. France and Germany had only a few battalions (the leadership support from Russia. In the Russian society

Chasseurs Alpins and Gebirgsjaeger). A larger but less sympathy for the "suffering Slavic brothers" was great

intensively trained contingent of Tyrolean Mountaineers and permeated all circles of the society. including the

existed in Austria. Russia had no mountain troops what- Imperial Court in St. Petersburg. This Pan-Slavic movesoever. ment was welcomed by the political leaders of Russia,

As a result of the previous developments, we see now who hoped to satisfy certain expansionistic ambitions.

that the large armies were better fed and clothed in the As the matter stood, Russia had been fascinated with the

winter, but, for apparently geographical reasons, were unique value of the Bosporus Straits and Constantinople

poorly trained to survive and to stand the cold. On a large (Istanbul) for many centuries; the power that controlled

scale there was still no trace of regular winter warfare them controlled the passage from the Black Sea to the

tactics. The specialized mountaineer troops were very few Mediterranean Sea. Therefore, while the national emoand were intended for use in special circumstances. Since tional reason for a war with Turkey was the liberation of

most transportation relied on horses, rarely on the sparse the suffering Christian brothers, the political need was

railroads, the difficulties connected with movement on to control the straits.

snow and ice were still uncontrollable. But others were watching the Dardanelles-Bosporus

Although the appearance of rudimentary specializa- Straits also. The major European powers realized the potion in winter warfare, such as mountain ski troop train- tential value of the Black Sea tor Russia if it controlled

ing, indicated some progress, there was no widespread the exits. It would be an inner Russian sea and would

recognition of the advantages of winter operation. Win- shift the maritime role of Russia to the Mediterranean.

ter was still a season to be avoided. Also, this was a time of intensive Russian expansion into

16
Central Asia and the Caucasus. And India was close to strategic avenue toward Constantinople and the Black Sea

Central Asia, as was Africa across the Mediterranean Sea. Straits. The Russian "Shipka Sitti ng"--occupation of the

France and England were sympathetic with Turkey. Tur- passes-was a mixture of proper strategy and inept winkey imported its war materials from these countries, and tertime tactics. The Balkan fortified positions, built with

had their diplomatic support. That is why Russia did not a tremendous effort into rocky soils, were strong enough

dare to occupy Constantinop... Russia had, as the result to be held against suicidal Turkish mass attacks. But

of the peace negotiation, to be content with an "indepen- snowstorms, low temperatures, and colossal snowdrifts

dent" core region of Bulgaria and the Batumi-Kars ter- constituted hardships and caused resupply irregularities.

ritories in Transcaucasia. The army was poorly equipped, supplied and sheltered.

For us there is more interest in the shooting war which Losses to fatal and crippling frost injury, typhus and exbegan in April 1877 than in all the subsequent diplomatic posure exceeded combat casualties.

battles fought. For a start, it appears that it was poorly The crossing of the Balkans took place at the eiid of

coordinated. All the insurrections took place shortly be- December 1877. The movement began at the right flank

fore the war rather than after it began. Nevertheless, the (western passes) and proceeded toward the city of Sofia.

invading Russians found sympathy, support, and a siz- with subsequent crossing threatening the right flank of

able number of volunteers among the Balkan population. the Turkish Army retreating east down the Maritsa ValMost significant was the intelligence support provided ley. It appears that the strategy was sound, economical

by the local population. Every day Russian officers re- and successful. In several cases maneuver substituted for

ceived detailed information about the movements and insufficient advantage, and the campaign presented the

intentions of the Turkish armies at all levels, while the opportunity to test and establish tactical methods never

Russians often managed to keep their adversary com- used before. The traditional tactics of attacking in square

pletely uninformed about their own strategic movements, formations of "blocks" or columns as were used in NaAfter occupying almost unopposed the north bank of the poleonic wars were no longer acceptable. The use of new

Danube River in Romania the Russian army crossed it firearms resulted in unacceptable losses. By 1870 all fireat a place where only local resistance was mustered by arms had become rifled and breech-loaded. The Russian

the Turks. After establishing a bridgehead, the whole Berdana rifle fired eight to nine rounds a minute and cararmy managed to cross the river in less than two days. ried aimed shots up to 1200 meters. Others performed

The main Turkish forces were up and down the river with similarly. The majority of the Turkish weapons were simonly area security forces between. The Turkish Danube ilar, except that the Turks had a small number of Winfleet was cut in two and was kept in check with mine- chester carbines that fired 15 rounds in 45 seconds. Both

fields and steam launches brought in over land. sides had a great variety of rifled artillery pieces with

The march from the Romanian border, including the different performance characteristics.

Danube crossing, lasted until the beginning of July. Then The new fundamental tactical attack element was a

the march south and into the Balkan (Stara Planina) row formation of extended skirmish lines that approached

mountains began. The Turkish forces, unable to orga- the enemy by leaps and bounds, supporting each other

nize energetic resistance, had to retreat everywhere. Their with rapid aimed fire. The use of depressions and obstaplan was to let the enemy penetrate northern Bulgaria cles for cover was (unbelievably to older officers) acand occupy strong fortresses east and west from the main ceptable and encouraged. This was the way increased fireRussian thrust to the south. The Russians attempted to power was reacted to. Hand-to-hand combat and bayooffset the plan and twice assaulted the fortified city of net charges were ordered from a distance of 40 to 50

Pleven (Plevna), with great losses. Due to losses, ex- meters.

tended communications lines, and dispersion of forces The new tactics were so revolutionary that many units

over that everwidening semicircle, the Russian command were drilled and trained in the new art right in the thedecided to halt, consolidate, and bring in reinforcements. ater of operations, often in plain view of the fortified enThe mountain passes in southern Bulgaria were con- emy. The intensive training, and especially the instincts

sidered strategic thresholds for further advance, and were of the men, who were reluctant to expose themselves in

ordered to be held at all costs. The defense of the Shipka tight crowds to enemy fire, led to a degree of mastery.

Pass against repeated bloody Turkish mass attacks which The new assault tactics were used in winter against forlasted into the winter is famous (see Military Historical tiffed positions as well as against the enemy in the field

Commission 1913). The situation at the end of the year (Zaionchkovsky 1893). While attacking in field skirmish

was as follows. The Turks had a series of fortresses to lines was found acceptable in the winter, there was still

the rear of the Russians, threatening their flanks. The no trace of any special wintertime combat methods. True,

Russians had the Balkan passes under control, threaten- the people, on the Russian side at least, were dressed

ing Sofia and the Maritsa Valley, which constituted a somewhat more sensibly than Napoleon's Grande Arm&e

17
had been, but they were still not warm and comtortable eers demonstrated their ability to deliver swift and etenough. There was no sign of the idea of using white fective blows. The Germans feind that in order to concamouflage. The soldiers were poorly fed. War corre- trol the aggressive French Chasseui.s their Bavarian skispondents also made observations that the old-time sol- ers had to be employed. Regular ski battles we-_ ,ought,

diers' concept of tough and harsh treatment was still alive and there were indications that an interesting new tactic,

and resulted in a certain amount of unnecessary hard- based on the high mobility of ski troops, was in the rnakship (Nemirovich-Danchenko 1879). ing. Some talented leaders recognized the advantages of

The political outcome of the war, ended at Sanct unexpected strikes i•nd evasions, and swift retreats to

Stephano (Eshilkee on contemporary Turkish maps) in avoid retaliation, especially by heavy weapons The winthe spring of 187S and agreed upon at the June confer- ter of 1914-1915 was unusually snowy in the Vosges

ence in Berlin the same year. was definitely short of iiie Mountains. The excellently trained Chasseurs actually

initial Russian expectations and intents. As mentioned, excavated fighting trenches in snow, and used white

only half of Bulgaria had a degree of autonomy. But it clothing for camouflage. The French Vosges positions

was a first step toward modernization in the Balkans. The were in some places literally snow fortifications (Ward

colonialistic-feudalistic power of Turkey in Europe dis- 1917). A seemingly promising start.

appeared. The war was most important as an example of These promising tendencies in winter tactics, howevnew technology forcing new tactics and new tactics lead- er, went largely unnoticed. The notion that success is terriing to modification of winter warfare strategy. The rap- tory taken and controlled was still firmly ingrained. Also,

id, precise fire of the Turks required attack in open for- it was difficult to visuali:-e the spc,:ifics of winter warmation and a new battle order. The great winter offen- fare from well-heated supreme headquarters.

sive across the Balkan mountains would not have been With tire few exceptions mentioned, all parties inpossible in columns such as were employed at the battle volved in First World V. ar winter battle displayed very

south of Moscow against the French 65 years before. The few special winter warfare skills. When the Germans atRussians would not have been able to bring in and place tacked Verdun in February 1915, they attacked in broad

enough people. Since creative people and nations never daylight over snow-covered fields, presenting excellent

forget new weapons and never return to older, less effi- dark targets to the defending French. The carnage of

cient ones, the new tactics on the battlefield could not be Verdun, as it was called in the press at that time. is furforsaken, despite the fact that the older, higher ranking ther evidence of the fact that the idea of employing differgenerals never felt comfortable with them. Subsequent ent warfare methods in the winter than the ordinary' atwinter wars were fought in a new way. tacks learned and practiced in summer maneuvers was

The primitive errors of a hundred years before were simply not thought of at this time. A ni: ht attack by troops

not so readily repeated. White camouflage was invented dressed in white camouflage clothing might have been

and in some cases used. But we will see the same inabil- more effective. On the eastern front the Germ:)ns conity to learn from the past. The need for protectivc cloth- ducted several unsuccessful attacks on the Russian posiing, shelter and special food was often neglected. The tions with a major snowstorm blowing into their faces.

need for special training, tactics and strategy would, in In the Carpathian Mountains Russian forces that had no

the hundred years following the Balkan engagement in mountain training and no ski troops at all were under

the snow, often be disregarded. Why is it that past experi- continuous pressure from small Austrian ski patrols. It is

ence in winter warfare is not considered for the future? not entirely comprehensible why the Russian armed forcWe will be unable to answer that. es did not develop strong, sufficiently trained ski units.

They had the terrain, the climate and the type of men

suitable for skiing. A general view of the events (if the

FIRST WORLD WAR First World War shows that besides the innovative utilization of the almost 4-meter-deep snowdrifts by the

The growing populations of the world, with their French in the Vosges there wa.s very little imaginative

growing mobilization potential, did not produce any spe- use of the winter. Essentially, all sides involved had to

cial new thinLg about the need for a winter defense cope with the weather, and trench warfare with quiescapability. More or less proper field clothing was adopt- cent periods during bad weather (which indicates the pered for all seasons, but otherwise cold weather problems sistence of the old "winter quarters- viewpoint) was the

were solved whenever they arrived, on a makeshift ba- rule (Ward 1917).

sis. To be sure, some of the improvisations were bril- After the various armiitlces were signed peace did not

liant and functioned very well, but there were instances come to all nations. ,A LIvil war broke out in Russia which

of utmost helplessness in the winter, lasted until 1922. The intensity of fighting did not apDuring the first winter of World War 1, ski mountain- pear to diminish in winter; large scale troop movements

18
and maneuvering went on, using horse-drawn sleds. V iot mance during a severe winter. Also, the Russian tanks.

is remarkable is that skis suddenly appeared on the bat- with high clearance and low footprint pressure, were sutlefield during the Russian Civil War (Sokolov-Strakhov -+erbly adapted to combat in deep snow. As a parallel de1927). America gained some winter warfare experience velopment, the infantry learned to throw up efflcitive tank

when a small expeditionmiy force was briefly exposed to barriers using plain snow (M.K. 1938). The military pres.

the rigors of winter warfare in far eastern Russia. It was of that time reported achievements in successful winter

a generally limited action, but our troops had a taste of maneuvers.

cold weather warfare. The Russians were excellently We may add, also, that Russia, by its climatic and gceoequipped and fought on skis. The Americans complained graphic setting, was naturally expected to develop an army

about very poor equipment, poor walking boots, etc. of skilled ni,,n capable of conducting successful winter

(Moore 1920). The Russian participants were generally campaigns.

amused by the Americans' helplessness, inability to protect themselves against the elements, and rinsuitable cloth- CLASSICAL WINTER WAR

ing and equipment. In any case we could surmise that

the difficulties that were revealed by the experience which To engage in war. a power evaluate, its chances for

the U.S. troops had during that brief interlude were duly victory by comparing army strength, weapons, materiel,

recorded and conclusions drawn. mobility, resources, skill, and patriotism, in other words

It appears that after the Civil War the Russian mili- willingness to fight.

tary rese. cthers' thinking was completely free of the win- A follower of political and military Russian literature

ter quarters syndrome and they proceeded with ski train- of the late 1930s might rightfully have concluded that

ing and investigation into winter warfare. Gavrichkov progress in the military art was beine made. Never be-

(1929) investigated ski marches and military skiing in fore had Russian military strength been as 'iigh as at that

general. He found that a ski soldier with a full pack could time. It appeared, then, that Russia could with very little

cover an average distance of about 35 km in eight hours risk and cost afford the luxury of pressuring its neighbors

of trailblazing, tbh, maximum being 50 km. for advantages. It appears at the surface that not much

Russian military skiing broke away from western con- effort or large-scale mobilization were needed. Neverthecepts entirely at this time and went its separate and fully less, commanders, to properly engage in a field campaign,

individual way. The western skiers, especially the Ger- must not only evaluate the potential adversary, but must

man Gebirgsjaeger, well developed by the mid-thirties, be able to answer questions about their own state of pretrained on downhill type skis, which are very difficult to paredness. They must compare terrain specifics with

use in deep, fluffy snow and require sophisticated bind- equipment, and know the availability of materiel, the efings with boots good only to approximately -15 to - fects of propaganda upon the adversary., and the spirit.

170C (00F).But the Russians were accumulating ex- skill and knowledge of their soldiers.

perience with skis capable of supporting combat-loaded A military conflict between Finland and Russia was

men. Trials were concentrated on long marches that lasted ripening in 1939. It is hard to say how much true intorfor weeks at a time made by self-sufficient small units. matrion the Russian command had about Finland s generThe rather modest range of fighting men on skis dou- al stateof preparedness fordefense. Clearly, they had figbled, reaching 100 km a day, and much experience was ures to compare. The Russian command could also cornaccumulated on bivouacking, shelter, concealment and pare quantitative and qualitative data on weapons. equipcasualty evacuation. Togeth'er with it there was an inter- ment and resources. What must have been greatly underest in winter terrain fortification (Karatun 1940). estimated was skill, patriotism and morale. One pays for

It must be emphasized that the knowledge obtained errors of underestimation, especially in a winter campaig-n

at that time, although valid, good and useful, was by no The Russo-Fi nish war was for Russia a payment in

means adopted by the country's armed forces as a whole. blood. In any event, it is a clJassic case of a defensive winter

As is so often true, research, development and produc- campaign. The winter war, as it was usually called, betion (in this case incorporation of new items into the mil- gan in 1939 following a breakdown in Russian-Finnish

itary system) always require considerable time. territorial negotiations. Russia, having increased its BalMachines, weapons, transportation-anything me- tic coastal territory considerably by incorporating into the

chanical---either perform less efficiently or, as is too of- U.S.S.R. the republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia,

ten the case, do not perform at all in severe weather. Win- wanted to increase Leningrad's security as it was put at

ter exercises in Russia resulted in established tactical that time by obtaining part of the Finnish shoreline, inprocedures for armor (Amosov 1935, Knizhnikov 1937). cluding the city of Viipuri. also called Vvtxbrg. Finland

Training manuals for all mechanized equipment adopt- disagreed, and on 30 November 1939 Russian forces

ed improvisations, resulting in relatively high perfor- crossed the Finnish ',order.

19
From the very first days of the campaign there seemed survivors it was teamed that the pero)nnel were conscripts

to be an unexplainable twist in the thinking of the Rus- from open southern plains who, unlamiliar %ith the northsian leadership. Armor was sent across the border where em forests, were paralyzed by fear and died from ex'x)-

there was no suitable terrain, and in the not-so-frequent sure, frostbite and sniper fire. The most deadly effect carme

places where there was good tank country infantry from the swift Finnish skiers, equipp, ' with excellent

stomped resolutely forward. Poorly outlined objectives and Suomi submachine guns and hand grenades. They apmassing of columns along the few roads ideally suited the peared in the most unexpected places and w&ere swift and

defensive doctrine of the Finns. The excellently trained deadly. Characteristically a Finnish assault would last less

Finnish ski units operated in small, independent, highly than a minute, after which the white-clad Finrns ',ould

mobile groups off the road, avoiding enemy counterfire. disappear. In the night the Finns attacked heated tents by

while the Russian columns, afraid of the forest, hugged sneaking around sentries, ripping slits in the fabric with

the highways and huddled together seeking the security their knives, and dropping grenades inside. Bonfires, badly

of open space (Suomalainen 1949). Attempts by the Rus- needed in the severe cold, were favorite submachine gun

sian forces to establish flank protection were energetically targets. The harassed, stretched, cut-offdivision, with badcounteracted. The commanders soon realized that to send ly depleted supplies, lost its field kitchens and was cut up

out detachments to the left, to the right, or ahead meant to into small pockets and annihilated. By 7 January 1940 it

lose them as soon as they entered the forest. was all over. Two divisions had been annihilated, and 43

In early December 1939, a Russian division marched tanks, 10 armored personnel carriers, one airplane and

west from the vicinity of Ukhta and crossed the border large amounts of supplies had fallen into the hands of the

with the intention of cutting Finland in half. Their objec- Finns.

tive was to march southwest along the shore of Lake Kuo- The double battle of Suomussalmi represented the fatajarvi, then at the Oulujoki River to proceed along the vorite tactics of both sides. The Russians relied on massrailroad to the Bay of Bothnia. There was no frontal re- ing men, materiel and heavy weapons. They were unsistance whatsoever when the division (the 163rd) crossed trained for forest warfare and were not equipped for the

the border, but soon after there were numerous ambushes winter. The nearest they came to winter warfare was when

from left and right. Flank protection detachments were a Siberian ski brigade was finally deployed. These men

useless and were lost. The division slowed down and the were properly trained for ski mobility and were warmly

columns stretched out to more than 12 km along the main dressed. But due to the absence of white camouflage gear

highway. The harassing ski patrols never attacked armor and failure to protect their flanks, the brigade was trapped

and heavy artillery. Instead, they concentrated on infan- and wiped out on a frozen lake.

try, supply trains and, at a later stage, field kitchens and The Finnish tactics, based on a defensive strategy. conbakeries. sisted essentially of a flexible offense. They never directAt Suomussalmi the entire division lost all commu- ly resisted the advance columns of the invasion force.

nications with the rear, slowed down to a crawl, and fi- Guided by people who knew the local topography, using

nally stopped. Harassment picked up in intensity. The the terrain to their advantage, they attacked swiftly with

Russians attempted to retaliate with intensive artillery and deadly automatic fire, directing it at marching columns

mortar area bombardment. But most of the time the fire and vehicles. Slowing the enemy down, weakening them

was laid down in empty space. The long column was bro- psychologically and physically, and cutting them up and

ken up into five separate encirclements which suffered isolating them in pockets was developed into a most effrom shortages of rations, fuel and ammunition. A des- fective art (Anonymous 1950). These were the famous

perate request for help was sent out. A 24,000-man relief Motti tactics, which proved themselves time and again

division marched west as fast as it could to salvage what- against the 300,000-man invading force. Col. Jarvinen

ever was possible, but by the time it got to the general (1949) gives a lucid description of the defensive doctrine,

area, the 163rd Infantry Division no longer existed save offensive tactics, use of skis and mobility. (For a review

for a few wretched stragglers who lay dying from expo- of Jarvinen's thinking see also Meyerhofer 1949.) Up to

sure and frost injuries in the snowy forests and in Finnish the very end of the Finnish war, Finnish operations north

hands. of the Karelian Isthmus were distinguished by skill, valThe relief division, initially more numerous than the or, sacrifice and courage. There is no doubt that for a long

163rd, went the same way. Slowed down, stretched out time to come that episode will remain a classic of winter

along its route, losing men to ambushes, wasting time warfare and coordinated operation of small units.

working around artificial obstacles, it lost connection with As the Russians discovered during their slow, tortoisethe rear. The division was doomed. The Finns managed like advance across the Karelian Isthmus, there was a

to cut it up into several sections and stopped it. Armor strong line of fortification shielding Viipuri (Vyborgyand artillery with its flat trajectory were ineffectual. From the so-called Mannerheim Line (named for Marshal of

20
Finland C.G. Mannerheim, 1867-1951, head of state and were very few leaders left capable of evaluating the proSupreme Commander of the Armed Forces). This forti- spective adversary, of training and selecting the manfication belt, superbly designed and constructed, consisted power, and of arriving at a .et of tactical options suitable

of a network of interconnected, camouflaged bunkers, for the time of the year and the terrain.

strong points and fortified positions.* With overwhelm- The outcome of the Finnish winter war influenced the

ingly superior forces the Russians, suffering casualties evaluation of Russia as a military power. It was univerfrom enemy action, frostbite and exposure, had to pin- sally believed that Russia had a low potential for engagpoint the camouflaged bunkers and reduce them one by ing in a serious war. Indeed, the results of this small w inter

one, often actually excavating them with artillery fire. war were really tragic for Russia. The U.S.S.R. lost

But the inevitable happened-the Mannerheim Line 48,000 men killed and 158,000 men wounded (mainly

was breached and the Russian forces could not be stopped by frost). That was according to Russian source-,. The

before Helsinki. A peace was signed in early March 1940 Finns evaluated the Russian losses as being significantly

(Mannerheim 1952) but did not last long for the coura- higher. The annihilation of the two divisions at Suomusgeous Finnish nation. In June 1941 they marched at the salmi alone indicates losses significantly higher than the

side of the Germans against Russia. Had it not been for official Russian statements led the people to believe. Ofthe territorial losses so painfully felt by the Finns, they ficial commentaries and the press were. as always, enigprobably would have been neutral along with the Swedes. matic. At that time (January 1940) schools, hospitals and

Their aim in 1941 was the recovery of lost territory. As student dormitories deep in the hinterland were filled with

is known, peace did not come to Finland until Septem- wounded and for the most part severely frostbitten solber 1944, after tragic loss of life and land. diers. In addition to observations, to rumors, which alWhat actually happened during the 1939-1940 win- ways proliferate when official sources fail to provide inter war? Why, with a colossal superiority in men and formation, there were the stories by survivors. Word of

materiel, did the Russians suffer such losses and find mouth goes a long way where public information sourcthemselves so helpless in the field? It appears in retro- es fail to do their job. The public impression was that

spect that the Russian high command did do just about something terribly wrong had happened to Russian naeverything wrong that they possibly could. They under- tional defense, and, unofficially, public pessimism was

estimated the enlightened, meaningful training, health, deep, with a disenchanted mood prevailing.

patriotism and skill of the Finnish army. Most impor- The intensive official political propaganda of this time

tant, they could not comprehend the strong national will became ineffectual. Statements about the defensive might

of the Finns to defend themselves. In their hasty plan- of the Fatherland, spread by Voroshilov, Budenny and

ning they assigned large amounts of useless artillery to Stalin himself, had an annoying and irritating effect. Due

positions in the Finnish forests. Their maps were poor to a gap between the official statements and the observand their troops were poorly equipped for winter war- able facts the credibility of the propaganda reached anfare. The Russians knew about the Mannerheim Line and other low.

about the training of the mobile ski units. But the fact is Below the surface a feverish reorganization of the Rusthat they led untrained troops into a winter theater of op- sian armed forces and the armament industry began.

erations, weighted them down with tanks and artillery, Analysis, comments and evaluations of Russia as a miliand failed to provide them with proper clothing, includ- tary power that appeared in Western Europe were coning whites. All this, together with the inability to predict troversial. Sympathy for Finland was universally high.

the outcome of engagements between ponderous divi- While the public opinion of the free world unanisions and small mobile units, as in the action at Kuota- mously castigated the deplorable aggression against Finjarvi Lake, indicates only one thing-a complete lack of land, there was no clear opinion about the poor military

capability at the very top levels of military leadership. performance of the Russian army. The puzzle remained

And so it was. Russia had suffered the loss of 15,000 unexplained until Nikita Khrushchev partially lifted the

officers in the purges of 1937-1938, among them M.N. curtain of secrecy at the 22nd Party Congress. He made

Tukhachevski, Bliukher, Govorov, Rokossovski, all fa- a statement to the effect that Stalin's purges had encommous names and great thinkers in Russian strategic devel- passed military circles and that innocent higher officers

opment, and many others. After the Finns rejected their had been victims; thus was explained the ineptitude at

territorial demands and Russia decided to march, there the very top of the army. But what had triggered the purges of the army? Alexandrov (1964) presents a fascinat-

* There was also a viewpoint often expressed at that time that the ing story: the Germans, observing the purge atmosphere

Mannerheim Line had not been completed and was more of a sym- in Russia, skillfully forged documents implicating Marbolic deterrent than a serious tactical obstacle. But the fact is that all shal Tukhachevsky and others in high treason. The docdefense installations are either under construction and in the process uments were imaginatively slipped to the Czech govern- of improvement or they are obsolete.

21
ment (a German attache had too much to drink and left a es. Clearly, the German leadership had the wnng concepbriefcase with the documents in a restaurant in Prague) tion of the Russian mobilization process, thus underestiand were presented by the friendly Czechs to Russia. The mating its reserve potential. Most bizarre appears the emprovocation apparently worked very well. phasis on Moscow as a strategic objective. The amazing

Whatever the actual origin of the purges was, their part is that the German leadership knew that Moscow

consequences were felt not only in the course of the win- had been controlled by alien forces in the past--more

ter war but in the initial period of the Russian war with than once. Occupation of Moscow would

the Germans. Describing the state of the Russian armed not be a deciding factor in checking Russian resistance.

forces, observers called it a "Decapitated Army." It is also not clear at all why the Germans did not prepare for winter warfare. Napoleon could not preparehe needed the "colorful uniforms", the Germans did not.

So why'? The Germans planned to finish the eastern camRussia achieved its territorial objectives in its winter paign before the onset of cold weather, which may be

war against Finland. It came out of the war victorious considered to have been prudent, to a degree. But there

and disgraced. The losses in manpower did not appar- was no trace of recourse in case the hostilities continued

ently disturb the high command but the errors made did, into the winter. That was clearly the main weak point of

and there were signs of a "mini-purge" in military cir- Barbarossa. Delays in the onset of the invasion brought

cles. Whatever the foreign evaluators made out of the it to the very middle of the summer(22 June 1941), which

Russian performance in Finland, the main display was contributed greatly to the impending disaster. The straineptitude at the very top. tegic significance of the drive for Moscow was entanHitler, in the meantime, prepared for a"lightningcam- glement in the winter campaign of 1941-1942. Germapaign" against Russia. Staff work, planning and prepara- ny was by no means defeated that winter, but it would

tion proceeded secretly but was by no means smooth. never again make a strategic move significant enough to

Delays and revisions were frequent (Blau 1955), and the neutralize the effect of the winter campaign into which

planning was replete with deadly faults and flaws, some- it was drawn unprepared.

times of incredible simplicity. The effort proceeded un- The Germans drove toward the Caucasus. They made

der the code name "Barbarossa" and began with the fa- a lunge toward Stalingrad but with insufficient force to

mous Directive #21 on 18 December 1940. The plan- secure and hold their gains. In the first 38 days there was

ning was most thorough and painstaking through all the more than 450 miles of advance, but the rest of the offenstages of staff work, intelligence estimates, evaluation sive toward Moscow did not resemble a "blitz" at all.

of terrain and its traffic-bearing capability, and thorough The remaining 90 days they moved only 200 miles

estimates of the adversary's military strength, disposi- against a stiffening, more organized resistance (Blau

tion and strategic reaction to a major assault. It called for 1955).

a surprise attack of the 'Blitzkrieg' (war with lightning The Germans could never realistically evaluate their

speed) type--engagement and annihilation of Russian adversaries. Toward the end of the summer offensive the

forces in the western parts of the Ukraine and Byelorus- Russian army lost a large number of small unit leaders;

sia, culminating in the occupation of Moscow. The main the officers available were, on the whole, mediocre, and

strategic objective was the Russian capital, which was, had relatively little experience. But that improved rapidin certain aspects, it was assumed, the vital hub of all ly. The Russian soldier was characteristically frugal,

activity in the country. The campaign was firmly based tough, unbelievably disciplined and obedient, and had

on the following postulates: had saict and meaningful training. His field equipment

1. After the main Russian forces are annihilated in was usable and useful, protecting him in all seasons. If

the western part of the country the adversary will have ski-trained, the soldier could easily cover long distances

neither the will nor the means to resist. on skis which were functional in deep, light snow. (Nei2. The conquest of Moscow will constitute a great po- ther downhill skis nor cross country skis as we know them

litical victory, with a shock effect; it will also provide would be considered useful under the Russian conditions.)

control of the main transportation hub, thus crippling lo- If a Russian unit used horses, they were the small, shaggistics and supply of the front. gy horses raised by the rural population since the times

3. All the main objectives must be reached before the of the Mongols. They outlived and outperformed the

onset of the winter, since engaging in a lengthy winter heavy western European breeds. When supported by

campaign is undesirable. tanks, the Russian infantryman fought beside the T-34-

It is not entirely clear why it was postulated that the a tank with wide tracks and high clearance capable of

Russian army would have neither the will nor the means operating in deep snow. The individual Russian soldier

to resist after annihilation of a significant part of its forc- fought equally well in winter and summer.

22
Most of the German soldiers in Russia were battle test- to full strength with replacements, were operating with

ed. Their officers had superior tactical knowledge, and great tactical efficiency. Preparation and equipping tur

for many of the higher officers this was their "second winter warfare were completed.

visit" to Russia. Their soldiers were well armed and well The Germans had overextended lines of communicaequipped for good weather and summer soldiering. Es- tion. Their rail transport was impaired by the need to

pecially formidable were the excellently trained subma- change the gauge to the narrower Eastern European stanchine pistol infiltrating units. But they functioned well dard. Their ground and rail transportation were constantonly in good summer weather. Spoiled by victories in ly threatened and often interrupted by Partisan activity in

many battles and under the influence of Nazi propagan- the rear. The beginning of a frost injury' epidemic was an

da, the German soldier was generally cruel and arrogant indication of their complete unpreparedness for winter

to the population. The German mountain infantry, the warfare. (Frostbite can be completely prevented by simGebirgsjaeger, although excellently trained, could not pie measures and skill acquired through training. Russian

often use its skis in Russia; they were small downhill soldiers were punished if they became frostbitten through

skis, impractical in deep snow. carelessness.) All these factors compelled the higher ofThe Germans managed to push to within sight of ficers to request withdrawal to positions nearer GermaMoscow, where the offensive finally ground to a halt. ny. Hitler, exercising his power as Supreme CommandBoth sides suffered losses seemingly greater than they er, considered a withdrawal option unacceptable since:

could tolerate. The Germans lost close to a million killed, a),ýivng up territory would be bad for the morale of both

wounded and missing, while the Russians had more than the troops and the home front; b) remembering Napoleon,

a million killed and wounded, and three million, accord- he considered it dangerous, thus proving that his analying to German sources, taken as prisoners of war. Re- sis of Napoleon's retreat was faulty and that historical

treating, the Russians had given up unproductive, devas- information was wrong; c)most of all, he considered his

tated territory, which was destroyed partially by conscious prestige at stake. His famous orders-"Not a step back"-

effort-burned and blasted-and partially by shelling and were never implemented.

fighting in we streets. Most important, the Russian civil- The central front was crumbling in many places. and

ian population was mobilized to dismantle, pack and ship instead of withdrawing to prepared positions many units

a large part of the productive industry into the hinter- were put to flight and to makeshift positions. That was

land. The Russians managed to dismantle whole facto- more costly in terms of casualties and lost materiel than

ries and transport them by rail east beyond the Urals. This was deemed to be acceptable.

relocated industry began to deliver materiel as early as A curious effect was developing in respect to the relaNovember 1941. Reserves and poorly equipped people's tions between Hitler and his generals. From then on, unguard units were successful in stiffening resistance but til the very end, the gap between reality and his image of

not much more. The Russian defense was still showing it widened. After giving an unfulfillable order, such as

little flexibility. Stalin's orders were bloody and need- demanding that an under-strength, under-equipped unit

lessly wasteful. But the German offensive came to a stop. attack a strong, superior manned position, he was often

The first six months of the German offensive were sincerely surprised when the unit was annihilated. Also,

often considered by outside analysts to have been the Hitler had a mystical conception of the German soldier

most crucial for Russia. Many observers believed that and his fighting ability. The "superior race must be supeRussia was almost defeated (Liddel-Hart 1950). Many rior on the battlefield with superior leadership." And in

German specialists advising Hitler held his ear by report- his opinion, he and only he was providing the needed

ing estimates of total exhaustion of manpower reserves, superior leadership. Hitler systematically dismissed reof huge materiel deficiencies, starvation and chaos be.- ports about the superior winter warfare capability of the

hind the Russian front. The Chief of the German Army Russians, their tenacity, etc. Like Stalin, he accepted only

Economic Office, Lt. Gen. George Thomas, evaluated what fitted his set of beliefs, and had, therefore, an inferithe Russian strength more realistically, but, characteris- or conception of winter battle (Clark 1965). In Decemtically, he did not last very long (Blau 1955). ber 1941 Hitler dismissed several general officers. Staff

What was the situation, then, at the beginning of the work, so important in winter warfare, suffered. The mowinter campaign of 1941-1942? The Germans felt the rale and fighting quality of the German army was in deincreasing pressure of the refurbished, strengthened Rus- cline. The extent of the winter crisis would not have been

sian units on all parts opposite their Army Group Cen- so dramatic if proper measures had been applied. Advancter. Fresh units from the Far East arrived and were sent ing so far into the heartland of Russia and trying to hold

into action. Materiel and ammunition difficulties were onto the territory was a dangerous mistake. An orderly

by that time nonexistent. The Russians operated with retreat would have corrected it in part. The order to stay

short rear communication lines. All small units, brought and fight, if given to an army properly trained, prepared

23
and equipped, would have been tolerable. But given the parative ease. Another example of creative improvisation

situation, the events of the winter of 1941-1942 were the was the use of armored sleds, towed by tanks in deep snow

beginning of the German demise. on the battlefield. This made it very difficult to separate

All the work on Plan Barbarossa appears in retrospect the tanks from their infantry escorts, and the technique

to have been a mixture of wishful thinking, unfounded was especially important in decreasing the fatigue of the

intentions, faulty information and an image of the poten- fighting men (Corotneff 1943).

tial adversary that was based on ideology rather than real- To the unfamiliar, winter warfare is many unexpected

ity. Barbarossa was based on the need to destroy the ene- bad things. There are new physical hazards of exposure,

my's forces in the western part of the country. That was frost injury, dehydration and fatigue. Terrain use is diffigood. But there was no alternative plan to use in case the cult, and entirely new requirements for camouflage and

adversary refused to allow itself to be destroyed west of evasion tactics exist. Precision weapons requiring lubritihe Dnieper River. cation stop functioning, and artillery needs new air temperThe plan called for the occupation of Moscow as an ature correction factors. Most important, motorized transultimate goal, after which event, it was believed for some portation systems perform poorly, to the point of traffic

reason, the Russians would not be able to produce mean- breakdown. Engines fail to start and over-snow traffic in

ingful resistance. Nobody apparently remembered that in many cases fails also.

1812 really meaningful resistance began after the occu- By employing their winter warfare techniques, the expation of Moscow. Many German sources (Von Unruh cellently trained fresh Russian units became formidable

1947, Philippi and Heim 1962) mentioned the long, over- foes. Their tactical advantages, if properly implemented,

stretched communication lines that caused almost would perhaps have led to a total victory over the Gerinsurmountable difficulties. The impression is that trans- mans during the winter of 1941-1942. But in fact, the

portation difficulties were at least in part unexpected. Fi- Russian offense bogged down and came to a stop toward

nally, evaluation of Russian manpower reserves, indus- the end of February 1942. What happened? How could

trial potential and resources was significantly too low, the badly shaken German army take the initiative away

mainly because Hitler was incapable of reconciling his from the advancing Russians? It appears that the reason

image of Russia and the Russians with the actual situa- for this lag was certain organically built-in tactical

tion. He committed the error of action based on insuffi- disadvantages, as well as a nonexisting strategic plan. The

cient knowledge. political commissars attached to each unit (reintroduced

As a result he was engaged in winter warfare with an in July 1941) supervised the commanders continuously

adversary whose capabilities were superior to his. It is in- and participated in making the few decisions the officers

disputable that the Russians learned their lessons from the could still make without checking with their superiors.

Finnish winter war. Military skiing, camouflage discipline, That was a devastating handicap, under which tactical skill

survival and march endurance were at their best (Collian- was essentially neutralized.

der 1954). There were also numerous minor everyday Strategy, as determined by Stalin himself, consisted in

difficulties a soldier never reads about in manuals but is a standing, literally implemented order to attack the encompelled to overcome in winter. They constitute ex- emy--everywhere. The only course for a general was, afperience. An internal combustion engine does not start ter addition of a very few implementing orders, to order

very well at -40°C (and 'F). Its oil pan must be warmed. his regimental commanders to attack; they, after adding

Heating devices are supplied, but as a rule in insufficient some more details, ordered the battalion commanders to

numbers, and they also often fail to function. Many Rus- attack, and so forth. This meant that the only chance for

sian soldiers knew how to mix gasoline with sand to cre- the individual soldier to survive was to fulfill exactly this

ate a controllable fire (on a shovel) to heat up an engine, command. One out of three things could actually happen

(If sand is not available, snow can be used.) The Germans after the order to attack reached the squad level. The soldid not know that. Many of their vehicles and tanks were diers could attack the objective and be successful; in this

lost due to failure to start. case, they would probably lose some of their comrades

Many other little experiences, including treatment of wounded and dead. If the enemy fire was very heavy the

animals, motorized vehicles, weapons and materiel at low advancing small unit might be wiped out; in this case, antemperature, the Germans simply lacked. And that con- other unit, if available, would be sent out to attack. There

stituted the difference. While the German lines of com- could also be the case when, during the attack, the survimunication were stretched, overextended and frequently vors of the small unit would struggle back without hayinterrupted by Partisans, and supply of the front became ing achieved the objective; it was often the practice to sumhaphazard, the shortened rear communication lines of the marily shoot such soldiers before the eyes of their comRussians began to function superbly. The Russian tanks, rades. This was the responsibility of the political commisespecially the T-34, could operate in deep snow with com- sars. The repeated frontal attacks, with their costly casu24
alties, and the commissars' excesses puzzled the Germans occupy winter positions, even 'winter quarters." A pe-

(Department of the Army 1953). They adapted very quick- culiar situation was created: pressured by Hitler to stand

ly to this type of tactics. and fight and not to give up territory, the commanders

The large-scale errors committed by the Russians dur- were not in a position to go to winter quarters as in the

ing the winter war of 1941-1942 were mainly in the lit- remote past. They converted towns and villages into reeral implementation of Stalin's orders. The Russian armies sistance centers with only sparsely manned lines in beput on continuous pressure over the whole sector of the tween. They created what were officially called winter

army group center (Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge). defensive positions. The strategic fallacy of such a conThe evenly applied pressure over the whole front pre- cept needs no comment. In the years following the 194 1-

cluded the use of strategic reserves wherever weak spots 1942 winter this tendency presented excellent opportudeveloped. Numerous breakthroughs of the German de- nities for the Russians. They no longer displayed the poor

fenses could not be widened arid wedged open, either due performance of the irnnish winter. t-itere were often exto lack of sufficient forces or due to absence of initiative. cellent small unit operations and good coordination, mi IWhile the Russians quickly learned from the Finnish win- itary skiing was good, and winter was used to full adter war to broaden their cold weather tactics, and the Ger- vantage at the unit level. The German troops, holding on

mans suffered great losses due to frost injuries, the Rus- desperately to their winter quarters, had to be on guard

sian leadership had the serious weakness of lack of ini- and ready to defend whenever the Russians chose to attiative and use of opportunity. Energetic concentration on tack. The "winter positions" were by no means relaxing

one or two major weak spots would have resulted in a and restful. To counter the Russian winter tactics the Gercatastrophic collapse of the German resistance lines. Hit- mans had their Gebirgsjaeger. But they were not very

ler's stiff attitude and inability to adopt a flexible man- numerous, and with their alpine training and equipment

power-conserving system was inviting a spearhead strat- performed rather poorly under the conditions of the cenegy. Apparently, the Russians had learned very little from tral front.

the previous summer's mass encirclement battles. In the The Russians were able to outski the German mouncourse of their winter defensive battles, the Germans left tain troops with their superb equipment and training. The

behind a deep, relatively narrow salient, which at times large Russian skis, with low ground pressure (or rather

became completely encircled ("Festung Demiansk"). To snow pressure), were more adapted to military skiing.

the Germans' great surprise the Russians neither starved The Russian army had men and units capable of marchit out nor annihilated it. ing up to 120 km a day under favorable conditions while

In the German rear the Russians operated several very remaining combat-ready. Harassment became routine:

large Partisan or guerrilla units. Their size was their great- deep penetrations into the rear and attacks from unexest weakness. The units established elabc-ate headquar- pected directions were frequent.

ters in the forest, had very little agility, were very con- Other events of winter warfare interest center on the

spicuous, and received most of their instructions from famous German drive to Stalinogmd and the encirclement

coordinating centers behind the front instead of from units and annihilation of the German Sixth Army. Stalingrad

operating directly opposite. Smaller mobile, independent was encircled and destroyed in winter. With snow and

units have a proven, much higher effectiveness in winter ice on the ground, the Germans were again at a disadoperations behind enemy lines, especially if coordinated vantage. Most significant, within Stalingrad itself, was

across the front lines. the lack (relative to the Russians) of ability to take winThe errors committed on both sides are only partly re- ter hardships. (Besides the Germans, there were large

flected in the rather abundant literature examining the first units of Italian and Rumanian troops involved in Stalinlarge-scale winter war in 1941-1942. The official Rus- grad.) Also, many Russian units fought in white winter

sian history (see Institute of Marxism-Leninism 1964) gear, superbly equipped for winter warfare. Due to ciromits a good deal of the erroneous strategy and tactics. cumstances well described in the literature the enclosed

The Generals Rendulic (1947a, b) give an insight into armies did not receive the promised supplies and ammumany German shortcomings, while General Munzel nition. Also often described (but not explained) is the

(1949) gives an insight into the disadvantages of the Ger- failure of the German forces to break out of Stalingrad

man armed forces in Russia and the peculiarities of com- when there was still a chance. Indeed, a tank column unmand relations at higher levels. der General von Manstein was ordered to relieve PauEyewitnesses and historians of the whole Russian cam- lus, the German commander of Stalingrad. In a strained,

paign often reveal the existence of an interesting tendency very difficult march toward Stalingrad from the south

which should have disappeared long before the Germans von Manstein took off. The march, well executed otherbecame involved in a war with Russia. Every time a win- wise, fell short of the objective. Only 32 kilometers septer approached there were openly expressed intentions to arated Manstein from the edge of the Stalingrad caul25
dron when he was stopped. Short of supplies and gaso- a correct strategic objective implemented by sound tacline, Manstein came to a halt, presumably to coordinate tics. They noted a large German spearhead weakly sehis actions with the surrounded Stalingrad defenders and cured at the flanks, and established the objective of deawait further orders (Werth 1964). stroying it. They were capable of a large-scale mobile

The terrain in which the relief force marched was flat, winter operation and counted on it. They did not attack

bare, and sparsely populated. The poor condition of the entrenched Germans in the city directly, which was corroad network was partially neutralized by the frozen state rect. By tenaciously clawing at any tank in the field they

of the ground. The significance of a tank force march con- managed to slow down and stop an armor thrust using

sists in the achievement itself (Lechens 1959) but, as is infantry combat methods. Since all this was successful

well known, the objective was not reached. Why the ob- with a relatively low cost in men and material it was a

jective was not reached will probably never be known with correct operation.

certainty. The official Russian Second World War history is not of much help (Institute of Marxism-Leninism THE SUBARCTIC

1964); it simply mentions that Manstein ran out of supplies. This is true to a degree, but he could have been re- We have shown that the German plans for the camsupplied relatively easily. It is important to note that the paign in the East had grave faults and omissions but a

Russians interdicting Manstein were limiting themselves clear, openly revealed objective. The main objective cento infantry action only. The Russians also outran their sup- tered on the central front in Russia and consisted in coinplies. But they were fighting in snow. At that time Hitler plete destruction of the Russian military force for the purwas in a state of indecision. Paulus, the commander of pose of the use of the land and all its resources for Gerthe Germans in Stalingrad, never received an order to many's own benefit. In that process, Russia, as a nation,

abandon the encircled city (Clark 1965). Perhaps there is would be eliminated, and the Russian government sysnot much need to dwell on the Battle of Stalingrad. Much tem would be replaced by German rule. A primary obhas been written about it, but deep, detailed analysis of- jective indeed.

ten slips into lengthy descriptions of tragedy and cruel The campaign in the north (everywhere north of Lensuffering, or heroism and self-sacrifice, as well as stan- ingrad) had a secondary objective, subordinate to the main

dard patriotic propaganda, depending upon the origin, goal. For the present, its main interest consists in examThe facts, however, remain clear and straightforward. pies of perhaps not very intensive but still important casA large German force thrust east into Stalingrad. A large es of winter warfare.

Russian force organized "resistance to the last man." By 22 June 1941, the date of the beginning of the war

Faulty intelligence and eagerness made the Germans in Russia, Germany had a large force occupying Norway.

overconfident-they neglected their flanks and were en- Sweden was neutral, and Finland declared war on Russia

circled. They were still poorly prepared for mobile win- shortly after the beginning of the German invasion. Toter operation and the Russians were the masters of the gether with mountain troops from Norway, the Finns besnow-covered landscape. Both sides outran their supply gan their military action. The German objectives were

bases, but the Russians could function under the cir- mainly to secure the strategic ore depo.-, in the Scandicumstances because they were better at winter warfare. navian Arctic, to gain access to the Rusmzan strategic ore

The German High Command, probably Hitler himself, deposits in the Arctic on the Kola Peninsula, and to cut

overemphasized the strategic and political propaganda the north-south Murmansk railroad, thus denying the

value of Stalingrad. froze in indecision, and the Sixth Russians any access to sea transport of strategic materiArmy was lost. als. The initial objective of the Finns was to regain the

We might point out that a contributing factor in the territory lost to the Russians in the winter war of 1939-

defeat at Stalingrad was that the Germans were fighting a 1940 (Ziemke 1959).

winter battle with false strategic objectives. The city dom- The theater of operations was difficult. In the north it

inated the River Volga-a major waterway important in was stony tundra, highly dissected, swampy and impasssupplying the northern part of the front with automotive able even by track-laying vehicles in off-road operation;

fuel. Cut at Stalingrad, it would still have supplied the farther south, in Karelia, rocky, swampy forest lay everysouthern part. The north could have been supplied from where. The area was sparsely populated, with only a few

the Urals and from Murmansk and Arkhangel. It appears passable roads.

that the main value of Stalingrad was in the name: to take The climate can be described as cold subarctic, with a

and hold a historical city recently renamed for Stalin was long winter, a prolonged dark period, and a stable snow

for Hitler a prestige factor. And that constituted faulty stra- cover. Winter temperatures may not be extremely low;

tegic objectives. the influence of the North Atlantic tempers the weather

Contributing to the Russian victory at Stalingrad was somewhat.

26
Transportation to and from the front could proceed with excellent way of handling small units. Their military ordifficulty, and improvisations, such as use of reindeer, had ganization was such that commanders busied themselves

to be employed. This and the insufficient force assigned with loose staff work, giving, as a principle, orders of a

to the task resulted in a considerable decrease in the in- generalized nature. The main initiative was with the small

tensity of the fighting before the onset of the first winter, unit commanders. Commanders of small units capable of'

The Germans complained about the rough terrain, and operating for a long time without rest and resupply disroads existing only on the maps. After penetrating only played knowledge, resourcefulness and initiative seldom

10 to 15 miles the German offense came to a stop at the found in the history of winter warfare. It was said that Rybachiy Peninsula (Degen 1948). one Finnish forest fighter was as good as ten regular GerThe winter war in the Arctic and in the subarctic taiga man infantrymen. Descriptions of the northern theater of

forest was fought aw position warfare. Most notable was operations, as reflected in contemporary newspapers, difthe intermittent small unit action (Department of the Army fer to such a degree that one is hard pressed just to com1953). TheRussiansclearlyconserved forces, consolidated prehend the fact that the area was a theater of intensive

positions, and carefully observed the enemy. They were winter warfare. While one side reported patrol action and

weary of deep winter penetrations, which were always measures to keep the enemy under observation, the other

energetically eliminated. However, transportation difficul- side might report deep penetrations, encircling maneuvers

ties and lack of sufficient strength prevented decisive ac- and combat against fortified positions.

tion by the Germans also. It appears that the Finns, su- More fundamental literature, with the claim of being

perbly adapted, with perfect knowledge of the terrain, were historical documenttion, presents the same difficulties in

the most effective fighters (Erfurth 1950), but units of the interpretation, but of a more general type. While the GerGerman mountain corps also performed relatively well. mans always stressed the amount of effort and the size of

While winter temperatures did not affect the Germans as the operation, objectives and their achievement were subbadly as in the central front, partially due to more sensi- dued or not discussed at all.

ble equipment, transportation difficulties and the abun- An exact chronological treatment based mostly on a

dance of natural barriers prevented any spectacular gains, skillful interpretation of Axis documents, with an objecas well as losses, of territory. It is very interesting that the tive interpretation of the events, is given by Ziemke (1959).

ease with which the Russians brought up replacements Compared, for example, with Rumiantsev (1963), who

was a complete surprise to the Germans. But the fact is speaks about complete destruction of the enemy, Ziemke's

that the "empty desert" had many forced labor camps interpretation, presenting a strategic retreat at the end of

where inmates were taken out as replacements on the front the war, seems to be historically correct.

(Ziemke 1959). This perhaps not so profound comparison of two hisThe outcome of that clearly secondary campaign was torical interpretations of a winter warfare event needs to

almost a stalemate. The main German objective-to ob- be qualified; otherwise the reader is due an apology. Can

tain access to the Russian strategic ore deposits and to cut the study of serious historical works add to our knowlthe flow of supply from Murmansk-was never reached. edge of the ways and means by which winter warfare is

The Germans were too weak. The other objective-pro- conducted? The answer seems to be negative. What have

tection of their valuable Scandinavian ore deposits-was these two authors given us in terms of a description of

reached before the Germans even started their northern winter warfare skills, capabilities, its role? Very littleoperations. It is doubtful that the Russians would have most historical works are poor sources of winter warfare

started a march into Finland to take the Scandinavian stra- knowledge. Veterans' accounts, military memoires, and

tegic ore deposits away from the Germans. The Russians other personal recollections disclose the real picture of

were too busy elsewhere. The defense on the Karelian what contributes to successful winter warfare. There is a

and Kola front sectors proceeded with a minimum effort, need for enlightened command, which does not abuse the

in part by local forces. The Germans exaggerated the need ubiquitous modem means of communication. Orders of

for the campaign and the Russians exaggerated their vic- only a general nature, advice and information must flow

tory toward the end of it (Rumiantsev 1963). Actually, at from the top down. The opposite, commanding small units

that front there was no victory on either side--either one from supreme headquarters, leads to defeat. Commanders

could record intermittent success in a large number of of adjacent units may coordinate their action directly if

small separate actions. The final German retreat, a strate- they are truly "adjacent." Mobile action does not always

gic necessity, was precipitated and hastened by Finland's require that. The other prerequisites for successful winter

capitulation. Neither the Germans nor the Russians warfare are individual, covering every single soldier. We

showed any clear use of the winter, speak of skill, mobility, and willingness to suffer hardBut the Finns amply demonstrated once again their ships. All this was amply demonstrated by the Finns.

27
PART II: ILLUSTRATIONS

Genghis Khan (c. 1162-1227)

With only rudimentary knowledge of the concepts of Mongols created Russia by forcing an end to the continstatesmanship and the art of government, this famous uous strife between competing Slavic princes. In the lands

leader of the Mongols managed to unify a people who they conquered, the Mongols supported communication

had a common language but little national feeling. There and trade, and enforced peace and stability. Historical

were two factors affecting unification at the time: tribal works describing the "yoke" of the Mongolian rulers and

leaders were working to unify the clans, but clan leaders the unbearable tribute they demanded ("Give us one-tenth

kept switching tribal allegiances. Genghis Khan unified of everything!") overlook the peace and order they

and ruled the nation through warfare. A gifted warlord brought to the land and their benevolence toward the

and leader, he was able to develop a new strategy and church, which resulted in the growth and prosperity of

tactics based on masses of horse-mounted warriors. His orthodox monasteries. But the skill of history writing was

strengths were leadership, the logistics of mass move- in the hands of those who ruled before the Mongols. This,

ment, and battle coordination. And although not the first as well as their strange race, language and religion, was

to wage winter campaigns, he was the first to use win- why the national memory of Russia could never intertertime to advantage. The purposeful movement of large pret the period objectively.

forces over long distances, and the speed, endurance and It is said that their harshness brought about the Monstamina of the Mongols, introduced a new dimension into gols' downfall, but in reality as long as tribute was flowwarfare. ing (compare it with contemporary taxation) their interGenghis Khan founded a dynasty of powerful rulers, ference with government affairs was minimal. Their conand his conquests affected more territory and more peo- cept of government was minimal also, which may have

pIe than any others before or since. Some say that the been the true reason for their downfall.

29
The Spread of the Mongols rian forests to the north and the deserts to the south. UsIn Mongolia, the River Kerulen (Hereleng) and Lake ing the sometimes narrow grassland belt north of Lake

Dalainor are, tradition says, the sources of Genghis Khan's Baikal, the Aral and Caspian Seas, the Sea of Azoff, and

unified Mongolian nation. The Mongols were nomadic the Black Sea, the Mongols reached Hungary. Marching cattle herders and raised an ancient breed of excellent in winter, using frozen rivers to transport massive siege horses. Contrary to some popular conceptions, nomadic trains, they quickly destroyed resisting Russian towns.

life was a series of regular movements made to achieve The Mongols left a lasting imprint everywhere they

proper utilization of the two great resources of open land: went. There are still Mongolian-speaking enclaves in

water and pasture. The skill of the nomad was applied in China. Several national republics of the U.S.S.R. are popthe field campaigns of the Mongols. The preference for ulated by descendants of the Mongols. Many Russian

winter movement, the art of coordinating the action of words and place names are of Mongolian origin. Historlarge masses of horsemen, frugality, and speed were the ically the words "Mongol" and "'Tartar" indicated the

basic factors contributing to the Mongols' conquests. same people. Currently, Mongolia, Buriat Mongolia, and

After establishing control (mainly by devastation) over the autonomous Tartar Republic are populated by peoChina, the Mongols moved west. They ignored the Sibe- ple of common origin.

SLA~oSLA VIC LANC)S•

/HUNGARYole

S~Khoresm

"S4 Khonate

30
Warriors on Skis

Olaus Magnus (mid- 17th century) is the author of sev- can be frustrating difficulties in basing graphic illustra- eral books on various interesting subjects. Among his ti- tions on narrative material. (The original illustration is tles we find: "A compendious History of the Goths, cluttered and difficult to discern; this is an extraction.) Svvedes and vandals and other Northern Nations." While Skiing is also encountered much earlier in history. The writing on wars in the north he published this fantastic chronicles of King Haakon IV (1200-1263) of Norway illustration of men shooting triple arrows, riding deer with mention skis and describe their advantages. Skis period- arboreal growths on their heads, or using large shoe-like ically appeared on the battlefield. Ski troops had the devices on their feet, which may have been the result of a advantages of speed and endurance without the disadpoor description of skis. (The Germans called skis "Schnee vantages of cavalry: only waxing-no hay, no oats. Schuhe" for a long time.) The part of the book that the In modem days skiing has become specialized: sla- original illustration comes from is entitled: "Olaus Mag- lom, downhill,jumping, cross-country. This has had some

nus, the Goth, Arch Bishop of Upsal: of Wars Upon the effect on military operations. Mountain ski troops are Ice." It seems that the book's illustrator, relying on de- unable to operate on moderately flat land. Russian ski

scriptions and narrative, introduced some distortion. There troops are mainly cross-country endurance skiers.

31
A Cannon it is a shell containing high explosive for more terminal

The desire to drop heavy projectiles on an advancing effect, with a complex fuze mechanism incorporating a

enemy has existed since time unknown, and the means variety of functions. Rifling imparts spin stabilization,

to do so were devised long ago. Ballistae were slow, cum- which makes an artillery piece one of the most precise

bersome machines, but were nevertheless respected and machines in the world, if we can measure precision as

popular with many warriors. Defenders of fortresses the ratio of range over terminal error. It is also a maplaced them in towers to reach greater distances, chine with a short functional lifetime. A gun barrel wears

The dscovery of black powder and its use as a pro- out after a few thousand rounds are fired, and each round

pellant did not result in practical artillery right away. The travels through the barrel for only a few thousandths of a

old cannon were erratic and dangerous. But the smoke second.

and noise alone had a strong effect (mainly on horses). Curious is the seemingly cyclic or spiral development

Experience accumulated, resulting eventually in the sci- of technology connected with artillery. Henry Shrapnel's

ence of ballistics, as well as in advances in metallurgy invention added to antipersonnel "efficiency" in 1784.

that made artillery practical. Cannon on the battlefield Motorization increased mobility, mainly in the summer.

could inflict terrible losses upon the closed formations The short time that a target was exposed to an aircraft

of an adversary, literally tearing them apart and convert- gun, or that an aerial target was exposed to an antiairing them into panicky crowds. But cannon had to be craft gun, led to smaller calibers and automatic rapid fire

fought with cannon. Thus the artillery duel was created. at incredible rates of hundreds or thousands of rounds

Heavier guns had the advantage of range and had more per minute. These weapons fire explosive artillery shells

terminal effect, but their increased mass resulted in low- equipped with sophisticated miniature fuzes at approxier mobility. First came restriction to roads. Then the mately 1000-meter/second velocity!

heavy guns could travel only on good roads and in good It is difficult to say whether or not there will be any weather. This became another reason for taking to "win- breakthroughs leading to the discovery of new princiter quarters." ples of propelling and guiding projectiles, and deliverToday artillery functions according to the same prin- ing them to the target. Probably the subjects of research

ciple as at the very beginning: a rapidly burning propel- will only be improvement and refinement of existing arlant accelerates the projectile down the barrel. But the tillery principles. Perhaps artillery will be made to funcprojectile is no longer a ball (cannonball) of inert metal, tion better in the winter.

32
Gustav I Vasi (1496-1560), King of Sweden

Gustav I created a strong monarchy using confiscated church lands as an economic base. He believed in the

advantages of hereditary monarchy rather than elective

rule. Under him the country evolved from a rural society

into a significant military-political power. He had progressive ideas about warfare, which he had the opportunity to test and develop in numerous revolts and wars.

He did not fohow the routine of moving large columns

of men and fortification gear on cumbersome maneuvers.

His imaginative approach ensured advantages in military

winter operations. Fast movement, quick decisions and

flanking attacks were some of his strong points. And of

course winter itself!

Gustavus II Adolphus of Sweden (1594-1632),

the Thi .y-Year-War King

Gustavus 11 had many new and revolutionary ideas

about winter warfare. During his time commanders

assembled big armies to dominate the battlefield and to

impress the adversary. Heavy guns, ponderous baggage

trains, and separate tactics for cavalry, infantry and artillery contributed to inflexibility and inefficiency. Gustavus Adolphus believed in speed, maneuver, and simultaneous attack at several places. In his small, flexible units

light artillery supported the infantry. He even experimented with a light leather gun, but it turned out to be danS~ gerous.

On 10 November 1632, Gustavus engaged Wallenstein, who was in the process of occupying winter quarters. During the heavy day-long fighting (rare at that time)

the king fell, but this battle of Luetzen gave the Swedes

a victory nevertheless.

Under him Sweden was transformed into a great European power.

33
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Abmm ~ ~ ~ .~aeu )e 

A ZZ

~ ~uihL~ Lý L

A bP. d.~..,,.. . ~ ~ .M..i- .. # --- '~~AMY..f

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4.-il

34t
The Winter Battle of Tuttlingen

Two contemporary maps and a 19th century painting tion as much information as possible. It gives us some

illustrate the famous battle in 1643. Primitive engravings conception of the type of warfare practiced. The closed

that presented information on recent battles were dis- formation "blocks" of fighting men with intervals beplayed in city squares and market places, where people tween the columns and an abundance of flag-like devicgathered and listened to a "Presentierer" with a pointer es in the first rows are characteristic of the time. Defeatexplain the event. Comparison of the two maps reveals ed units are shown running separately; single men are

the difficulties one encounters in deciphering what actu- detectable. The character of the topography is reflected.

ally took place. The charming, naive drawings attempt but the concept of scale is not applicable.

to show in one scene a whole sequence of events as com- Whether or not contemporary television, radio, and

prehended by the compiler. newspaper journalism does a better job of informing the

The purpose of all the detail was to give the popula- population on military events of significance is arguable.

35
Charles X Gustav of Sweden (1622-1660)

Charles X was a king with a methodical approach to

warfare. His thoughts on the advantage of surprise offered by weather and environment were innovative. If

an attack in good weather and during summertime is expected, then why not conduct warfare in the winter? Or, -' -

if a water body covered with thin ice is considered impassable, why not reinforce the ice and carefully spread

the load in order to arrive unexpectedly? The ideas may

appear simple after the fact. But they involved thinking,

action and conclusion.

Frederick the Great (1712-1786), King of Prussia

When the situation required, Frederick conducted

warfare in the winter, but he did not display any special

measures or any special means to use winter to his advantage. He was a colorful figure, full of contrasts and

contradictions. Refinements in taste, knowledge of classical music, and a certain liberality went hand-in-hand

with harsh military training in a class army. And a sort

of coquettishness toward universal rights for everyone

before the law went hand-in-hand with the military concept of the worthlessness of soldiers' (in this case peasants') lives on the battlefield if a quick victory could be

obtained.

His harsh drilling, discipline, and hardship training

were accepted and used in full measure by many followers. It is said that his soldiers were more afraid of their

officers than of enemy bullets. Tradition has it that a unit

of his tall grenadiers once became panicky and started to

run in disorder. The furious king began running around

and hitting the soldiers with his walking cane, shouting,

"What's the matter with you guys? Do you want to live

forever?!" It may have been the truth.

36
Napoleon Bonaparte (1760-1821) ]eon decide to withdraw. A short battle south of MosNapoleon was a self-made military leader possessed cow forced him to take once more the already devastatof considerable luck, and a gifted statesman and politi- ed Smolensk route. With great loss of men and materiel

cian. He was born in Ajaccio, Corsica, of Italian parents, Napoleon recrossed Russia, reaching the border in Noand educated in France. His main talents were in poli- vember. He had only 12,000 fighting men with him; he

tics. He had a strong personality, and was a gifted mii- had started out with 453,000!

tary leader as long as his luck lasted. Men enthusiasti- Many serious historical sources hint, indicate or incally gave their lives for him on the battlefield. sist that the main reason for Napoleon's retreat was the

Napoleon became the military dictator of France in "harsh Russian winter." The recorded fact is that the win1799. In 1802 he was designated "Consul of France for ter of 1812-1813 was rather mild and late. We discuss

Life." He became Emperor of France, to discourage fur- Napoleon here because of that legend about "winter hardthier assassination attempts, as Joseph Fouch6 suggest- ship." The fact is that a normal winter would actually

ed. The "Napoleonic Era" comprised a series of wars and have helped him, at least in one instance. In western Rusbattles which reshaped completely the political map of sia is the River Berezina, which had to be crossed over

Europe. Without first bringing hostilities with England rather poor bridges, with great losses of men, horses and

to an end, Napoleon assembled his famous Grande Armde cannon. Had there been an average winter there would

and invaded Russia in 1812. Unprepared, the Russians have been ice on the river, and the losses would have

retreated without fighting the "decisive battle" Napoleon been significantly less.

was craving, leaving behind "scorched earth." Napoleon There is something mysterious about many great leadhad to press on to Moscow over devastated, guerrilla- ers, generals, or emperors. A long streak of luck allows

infested land until finally the Russians under Count Ku- them to be recorded in history as great and famous men

tusoff were ready to give battle at Borodino on 7 Sep- of genius. But once luck fails them, they begin to act

tember 1812. The battle lasted a whole day and was un- irrationally and incomprehensibly, and lose the ability to

decisive. After sunset both sides ceased hostilities, mainly extricate themselves from critical situations by energetic

due to fatigue and exhaustion. Kutusoff disengaged and leadership. Napoleon abandoned his forces and hurried

Moscow was occupied by the invaders. back to France to meet some other crisis. But his historiThe uncertain situation, the inability to provision his arts never abandoned him--they created a face-saving

army, and the many fires in the city soon made Napo- legend about defeat by snow, ice and frost.

37
Vert 00\i"

Saint-Jean "i

Lo Hoye-Sainre

S = \11

HougoumontPo

S' 0

o0 5kmn

The Battlefield of Waterloo exception that he could hold back and then engage reThe map shows the disposition of forces on the morn- serves in places he imagined to be important. New mething of 18 June 1815. The subsequent battle, delayed by ods of battlefield communication were badly needed. An

Napoleon to give the muddy ground a chance to dry, was observer of such an intense battle could not predict its

not an example of tactical innovation. But it was an outcome very well until its very end.

important historical event-the final defeat of Napoleon. There is a curious legend connected with the Battle

Together with illustrations created by "batalists" (artists of Waterloo. It is said that Natan Rothschild (1777-1836)

specializing in battle scenes), maps of this type consti- observed the battle, and when the end came he rushed to

tute important historical material, although they often con- the coast on fast horses, crossed the channel, and raced

tain very little useful information. One observation can to London. He sold his French stock on the London exbe made. The general growth of the armies, the ever- change and invested the proceeds in English shares. Beincreasing use of black powder, and the increasing size cause there was no telegraph, Rothschild became one of

of the battlefields made the control and direction of a the richest men in England overnight. The poet neinrich

battle virtually impossible. (Consider that the distance Heine called him Natan the Wise.

from Piancenoit to Maransart is approximately 3 km.) After Waterloo, winter battles were fought with much

Therefore, once all the "blocks of people" were engaged, smaller armies, and improved communications gave the

the commander became essentially an observer, with the commander the means to command during the battle.

38
Crossing the Balkans in the

Russian-Turkish War triple flank maneuver destabilized the Turkish forces,

This unique winter operation is considered to have been which suddenly found themselves without defensible

the most important for the Russians in the whole furkish wintertime bases. The march east along the Maritsa Rivcampaign of 1877. The Russians occupied the three passes er was energetic enough to prevent the Turks from throwthrough the Balkans (Konak, Trojan and Shipka), and used ing up defensive positions strong enough to shield Conthe time to gather forces, supplies and ammunition. Then, stantinople.

on 13 December 1877, General Gurko broke out during The Russians realized that the strategic objectivea blizzard, pushed into the valley, and threatened Sofia, the Bosphorus Strait and Constantinople-was all but atthe capital of Bulgaria. Threatened from the flank, the tained. There was no way for the disorganized Turkish

main Turkish forces under Suleiman Pasha gave up the army to stem the Russian winter offensive. But then came

capital. On 23 December, Kartsev's force broke out. international politics, diplomacy, threats and treaties. The

Finally, on 28 December, the defensive Turkish positions pens of the diplomats proved more powerful than the

at the Shipka Pass were overpowered, and Radetsky Russian bayonets. Russia failed to obtain control over

marched south, threatening the whole Maritsa Valley. This the Bosphorus.

-Guro KGrtsov Rode tsky

Q =1,1 11

+•'4,,,,, . , -o + %. +,+-

ote 0 fi

"'J ~ ~~~14% kk10"llim,,I tllg ,-.0 14mi••,,,,;;,+,•¢•I::.g•,""

Itil I I I I t

""39 it t 1l1

(1,10 oe110 17 A0 'A ImO

lift W.- I PC h

391a -
Crossing the Shipka Pass Skobelev with 16,000 performed difficult flanking

In the Russian-Turkish war the so-called "Shipka sitting" marches. Sixteen hours later than planned, Skobelev still

during the first part of the winter of 1877-1878 resulted surprised the Turks at Sheinovo. When the forces at the

in considerable non-combat losses for the Russians. left flank occupied the towns of Giussovo, lanina and

Nevertheless, disadvantageous as it was, the position had Kazanlyk, Vessel Pasha was encircled, and soon capituto be held to allow reinforcements and materiel to be lated. The Russians lost 5000 killed and wounded against

brought up. The Turks, under Vessel Pasha, had fortified 1000 Turkish casualties during the five-day battle. The

the pass. Their main forces were in the fortified town of Russian army captured 22,000 men, including 765 ofSheinovo. The Russian assault, coordinated with the other ficers. Thirteen thousand Turks dispersed and slipped

two Balkan crossings, was a flanking maneuver per- away over forest trails.

formed in difficult terrain under harsh winter conditions. With the Shipka assault, the Balkan crossing was comRadetsky attacked head-on to attract and hold the Turk- pleted. The Turks in the Maritsa Valley had been outish forces, while Sviatopolk-Mirsky with 18,000 men and maneuvered.

i, WO .... / | t,',,,.\'

Sodetsky

z V/. AN go _V~

-_r IV *J'r I I

11ttk~ •'/ll~'€llllt/Illlll~l#111/l/#0 [•lll~l:.•|lt•'/llf/pJv~l'r POttt•""'lk-M\ irsky

hS ipko -

r~l { • <Wq, -- Giussovo

SKazon lyk

0 V0e km

40
Finnish Military Skiers

Military skiing differs considerably from the civilian prolonged periods without the impairment or loss of their

winter sport. Its purpose is to enable fighting men to combat capabilities.

move over otherwise impassable terrain. The speed of The men here wear their duty uniforms and fur hats

ski marches may be considered modest compared with and are armed. The first man carries an automatic rifle;

civilian cross-country ski racing, but at the end of a march the second has a light machine gun. In their rucksacks

there is not a finish line but often engagement of the ad- they may have extra underwear, socks, rations and perversary. Furthermore, ski troops carry their weapons, sonal hygiene articles. The Finnish Army is trained for

ammunition and life support equipment. The skiers in marching and bivouacking at any time of the year in any

the Finnish Army are capable of remaining outdoors for weather.

Finnish Jaegers

In the winter these men travel by bicycle over high- march can be brought to the point of exhaustion by nuways, roads and trails. Off the roads, usually before en- merically inferior ski troops. Harassment, and denial of

gaging the adversary, Jaegers move on skis. Russian vet- bivouac safety or rest, reduces fighting power and can

erans of the Winter War of 1939-1940 relate that Finnish lead to the complete destruction of a strong adversary,

skiers skillfully used slopes to inflict lightning fast auto- superior in numbers and equipment.

matic fire and hand grenade attacks and disappeared be- Normally, we are reluctant to use bicycles on snow

fore any resistance could be organized. In small unit tac- and ice. But the skill to use a bike on surfaces other than

tics Jaegers may be compared with mobile units of light asphalt can be learned fast. Everywhere behind the front

cavalry, but with more firepower and without the thun- lines in a battle area the roads are normally open. The

derous noise of cantering horses. Jaegers may end up at a place other than where their bicyIn proper terrain and with suitable tactics the Jaeger cles are-but that is not as important as the accomplishcan be a formidable fighter. An enemy column on the ment of the mission.

41
. ..... i. 

...............

A Squad of Skiers in the

Northern Wilderness of Finland

These men can travel over long distances and can re- ers can reach areas nobody else can, except perhaps paramain independent of supply bases for a relatively long troopers. But once landed, parachute troops need skis too,

time. The greatest value of the type of training such ski or they will just sit in the snow.

squads have is their ability to make large areas insecure Finnish infantrymen familiar with cross-country skifor the adversary, to operate behind the lines, and to en- ing literally since early childhood can move on skis over

gage the enemy where they are not expected. Also, ski- long distances without losing their combat capability.

An Ambush Position

The men form a Finnish recoilless antitank rifle team. They are in white camouflage clothing and are partially buried in

snow. There is some question as to whether

or not small automatic weapons function

properly in snow. Finnish weapons perform well.

42
Carl-Gustav Baron Mannerheim (1868-1951),

Marshal of Finland

This popular Finnish statesman and general made an

important contribution to the art of winter warfare. Baron

Mannerheim participated in five wars-the 1904 RussoJapanese war, the First World War (in the Russian Imperial Service), the White Finnish Liberation War (1918),

the Winter War of 1939-1940, and the Second World

War. His tactical innovations made the Finnish Army the

most effective winter warfare force in the world. Fundamentally the Finns practiced a mobile, active form of elastic defense mostly conducted by independently acting,

self-sufficient units. Flexibility, full utilization of terrain,

aggressiveness, and skill were the basic attributes of the

Finnish winter warriors. Mannerheim's leadership and

command methods were to a great degree opposite to our

current practice. He encouraged, supported and demanded initiative, energy and independent action. Giving explicit orders to a field unit from general headquarters, in

the way now possible using modem communication methods, was simply unthinkable (see, for example, "Raids

and National Command: Mutually Exclusive," by Lt. Col.

Peter A. Kelly, Military Review, April 1980).

'a In international relations Mannerheim had to suffer

many bitter disappointments. In the Winter War it was

the promised western support that never came (except for

a few Scandinavian volunteers). In World War II, England,

upon Stalin's insistence, declared war on Finland. Mannerheim could never comprehend the slavish eagerness

of western democracies to please and placate Stalin.

43
Preliminary German Plan for the

Invasion of Russia in World War II

In the summer of 1940 the German supreme headquarters envisioned the assault on Russia as a lightning F,,iod

("blitz") campaign to be conducted in three phases, delineated more or less by the natural boundaries of the great

rivers. Three million people, 3000 tanks and 7000 artil- ,,od

lery pieces were mobilized in 12 armies divided into three

groups. The plan called for the annihilation of most of

the Russian forces during the first stage. Most of the resistance was to be over before the end of summer and Phase

III. The German Armed Force Economic Division as- Mk

sumed that after Phase III most Russian industrial poten- wo io0,

tial would be in German hands, and the rich agricultural

area of the Ukraine would significantly improve Germa- _ Khorkov

ny's economic base.

The greatest deficiency of the preliminary planning as

well as the subsequent "Plan Barbarossa" was the absence e of

of any contingency planning. Most important, the plan R noo,

assumed only summer operation. As unbelievable as it

may sound, the German army had no warm winter cloth- Block Sea

ing and no winterized equipment or materiel. Their equipment was good only for summer.

George Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974),

Marshal of the Soviet Union

A specialist in command and leadership, Zhukov developed expertise in offensive warfare and was successful in interpreting and implementing Stalin's blanket orders. In military political thinking he advocated independence for the military. In 1941 he was Chief of General

Staff. Under his leadership the Russians conducted the

first winter offensive. He recognized the role of mobile

defense in winter and emphasized the role of artillery in

:I offense and breakthrough. He survived pre- and postWorld War II purges, but had a disturbing up-and-down

career. He was a strong believer in quality training and

quality equipment.

Zhukov served as an enlisted man in World War I,

and was a cavalry officer in the Russian Civil War. In

1941 he was Commander in Chief during the defense of

Moscow. Subsequently he commanded and planned most

of the major battles of World War II. He prepared and

conducted the final assault on Berlin in 1945 and later

commanded the occupation forces in East Germany.

Until 1944 his most successful plans were winter operations. Staff work and planning under Zhukov resulted

in the Stalingrad encirclement.

44
Plan Barbaro"sa

This was the WWII campaign plan for a war of anni- - A 

hilation against Russia. The planning took place over a

long period, and several versions were produced by the Finland

German high command. The Germans considered themselves superior technologically; they had an experienced ,-

army and were more efficiently organized. Two factors Lenf grod

contributed to their confidence: the Russians made a very

poor showing in the Finnish Winter War, and a large

number of highly qualified military specialists perished ) OMOSCOWGorky cla

in the great purges. S ns,

Initial exploratory staff work began shortly after the Miunk. Turn

French campaign in June 1940, resulting in a strategic orsaw

survey in October of the same year. Operational plan- j -a

ning continued until June 1941. The plan called for all K Kov.

objectives to be reached before the onset of winter. Yet Ukraine Stlingrad

the offensive did not begin until 22 June. At least two

months were lost to unexplainable delays. The plan's ob- of

jective was the collapse of the Communist regime, and Rumania Azov

it required the annihilation of most of the Russian forces

in the western part of Russia, essentially west of the River Black Sea . ....o.-.. ..

Dnieper. Also, the Germans counted on the Russian agri- A

cultural and industrial production as well as mineral resources and forced labor.

The very first months of the war appeared to proceed

according to plan Barbarossa. A strategic surprise was thing the Germans could put their hands on was a large

achieved, and the rapidly advancing forces encircled and forced labor manpower pool, which was transported to

annihilated large Russian Army groups west of the Riv- Germany and used in industry and agriculture.

er Dnieper. The badly equipped, disorganized, and poorly The plan was faulty. There were no provisions made

supplied Red Army lost several million men. But the suc- in case the campaign lasted longer than planned. So for

cess was illusory. The German communication lines be- the rest of the war the Germans had to improvise, makcame overextended over poor highways. Agriculture ing short-term operational plans and taking emergency

yielded nothing. And the industrial plant was disman- measures. Their greatest shortcoming was their failure

tled and, in a gigantic, antlike effort, transported across to plan for a winter campaign and their inability to conthe Urals. What was left behind was destroyed. The only duct winter warfare.

45
C,'

4 0 ~. 4,• •.Iokromo Dmitrov,

Reinhardt . (5 tank divs.) .

U1. Zhukov

(18 fresh diva.

with tanks)

0•, Rokossovsky

(4 i f°. 4.) #

(11 mt\ diva) 5 I Aprglevka.) Mohas Zakharov

0 Soldin

0O .. 9km

World War II: The Baffle of Moscow

The rapid advance of the Germans in 1941 slowed south of Moscow, was encircled. Moscow was evacuated.

down in the mud of the fall, and they came to a complete The overall command and planning of the Moscow

stop in full view of Moscow. However, the exhausted, defense was under Zhukov. A line of defense was prepoorly equipped troops of the Russian forward screen pared, with the city as a center point. It appears now that

were barely holding the adversary. The Germans arrived the Germans would not have had sufficient strength to

with 14 tank divisions and I I infantry divisions. But the penetrate the fortified city. In the meantime the Russians

long march, extended communications and poor prepa- assembled 18 fresh divisions with enough materiel and

ration for the winter reduced their capabilities. They be- armor to launch a counterattack. Their counteroffensive

gan to suffer more frost injuries than combat casualties, constituted a blow to German morale and confidence from

Their remaining combat vehicles often failed to start in which they never fully recovered. The Germans began to

the cold, and rearward communications were hampered pay tribute to Russian winter warfare skills.

by small mobile Russian ski units. Nevertheless, the situ- It is said that at one point the availability of three or

ation was dangerous for Moscow. The Germans pene- four fresh divisions would have allowed the Germans to

trated the Russian defenses and cut the Moskva-Volga take Moscow. But, like Napoleon, what would they have

River canal at Iakroma and Dmitrov. The town of Tula, done with it?

46
World War II: Stalingrad

This city, stretching 22 miles along the River Volga, The Germans must have been aware of the six armies

was an important industrial center and had extensive accumulating north and south, yet they forced themselves

shore facilities for freight handling during the naviga- into the Stalingrad cauldron.

tion season. German forces, including some Rumanian The situation of the German, Rumanian and Italian

and Italian units, attacked the city from the west, and in forces deteriorated rapidly after encirclement. They lost

a series of bloody battles pushed through to tht. jiver. the airstrip at Kalach, and combat air support became

But the city was never entirely cleaned up. The Russian ineffective. Still poorly equipped for wintercombat, they

forces defended every building and continued resistance suffered from cold and expobure. There were many frost

even after being cut in half. The fierce house-to-house casualties and many wounded soldiers froze to death.

combat was equally costly to both sides. Shortly after encirclement there were realistic chancIt is not clear why either side was so eager to control es for Paulus to break out with the help of an outside

this ruined city. There may have been no valid strategic relief titrust. But Hitler hesitated to give the order. He

objective, only the city's name. General Erich Paulus, acted as if he was reluctant to give up Stalingrad. When

the Commander of the German 6th Army, was given the the order was given it was too late. Von Manstein was

objective of reaching the Volga and cutting it off. He dispatched with an armored relief column but it perachieved it. But it was useless; the river was frozen. formed poorly in the snow-covered terrain. He was

General Chuikov implemented Stalin's bloody orders- stopped "by infantry combat methods" before reaching "not a step back! "-which resulted in enormous losses, the Stalingrad encirclement. Stalingrad was retaken by

Paulus would have been better off not entering the the Russians. It cost the Germans 250,000 men. Paulus

city. Chuikov would have done better to withdraw from and 23 other captured general officers were used for prothe city andjuli the forces which later encircled Paulus. paganda purposes.

jacmfimoumAv

3O Leninsn

Staligrad ncicement Chir 7•Arm

(15i Nov 1942

47/ nouvko

J 0 50kin

47brm
3m

A Snow Shelter

The iOlustration shows a snow shelter designed accord- become quite comfortable. Inuit women are quite skillful

ing to good European and North American literary tradi- at maintaining a proper combination of heat generation

tions. "Igloo" means "house" in Inuit (Eskimo). Many such and ventilation by means of a hole poked in the ceiling.

igloos have been built upon request, according to western Snow shelters, of any space-conserving shape, can be

specifications, but nobody ever lived in one. When there prepared expeditiously, are warm and healthy, and can

is a need, and material is available in the form of a large be of great benefit, if the two principal features of an acdrift of dense, aged snr w, the Inuit can build a snow shel- cess tunnel and an elevated platform are incorporated. But

ter very fast and efficiently. The only two realistic ele- in actuality the Inuit do not particularly care about giving

mrents in the drawings are the elevated sitting and sleep- the igloo a neat circular shape.

ing platform and the elongated entry tunnel. With the en- The National Ski Patrol System, Inc., in its Ski Mountry plugged, and a cooking fire such as a Primus stove taineering Manual (1980), presents excellent instructions

going, the temperature at and above platform level may for the construction of snow shelters.

48
Battlefield Locomotion

A moderately trained man can cover 10 kin in I hour ing to the bottom of the layer. But men do not stand on

running or jogging. If he is armed and carrying some am- one foot very long, and their movement results in sidemunition, he will be under considerable strain, and rest slip of the pressure bubble. In this way. one sinks almost

may be required, Marching cross-country with intermit- to the bottom of the snow cover. Dissecting footprints in

tent brief rests he can cover 50--60 knVday, even if there deep snow made with boots with dirty soles can show

is 10-15 cm of snow on the ground. Skiers can march the mechanism of foot locomotion in snow.

up to 100 km a day over moderately difficult terrain cov- Most wheeled and track-laying vehicles move through

ered with any amount of aged snow, of approximately the snow, and a few tens of centimeters immobilizes

0.3 g/cm 3 density. Over light snow, the going becomes them. The process is complex. Engineers studying crossslower. Snowshoeing is much harder and slower, but al- country locomotion must consider many factors, such as

lows men to move where nothing else can. On foot, men ground pressure, snow depth, snow cohesiveness and

are immobilized by little more than 35 cm of snow. density, type of undersnow surfa,:e, slope, and many othExperiments indicate that an 85-kg man in winter ers. Sending fighting vehicles onto a snow-covered batboots sinks only 10 cm into 0.2-g/cm3 snow. Placing such tlefield may be a serious problem. Terrain covered by

a load on 0.2-g/cm 3 snow does indeed result in surface 40-50 cm of snow belongs to the skier. Ski troop perforcollapse and formation of a densified "'bubble" under the mance may vary considerably, but so also do conditions

plate (boot) supporting the load that prevents it from sink- of urgency and need.

12

E

" - 2 'V

CL 6 6

0 4-

03

05

6

0240 60 80 100

Snow Depth (cm)

1: Running or jogging (1 hour) 4: Marching on foot in up to 20 cm of snow

2: Sustained skiing in aged snow 5: Marching on snowshoes in light snow

3: Sustained skiing in light snow 6: Marching on foot in more than 20 cm of snow (2 hours)

49
Digging-in

Two not-very-well-perceived facts about a snow coy- ground fire position such as is shown here built with snow

er must be kept in mind. Compared with any type of soil, blocks or large bags is very effective and may be consnow is "labor-effective," that is, it can be excavated very structed seven to ten times faster than a conventional sandfast. The other fact is that snow attenuates fast-moving bag structure would be in the summer.

fragments and small arms projectiles. By piling uo snow, The effect of any ammunition is severely degraded

or by digging into deeper drifts, roadside bern , etc., a by snow. The radius of fragmentation action of a burstsoldier can protect himself from enemy fire very effec- ing mortar round, for example, can easily be 70% less if

tively. it is fired into a surface covered by as little as 35 cm of

At low temperatures a snow cover may have very little snow. Only the first round may find the men above the

cohesion. A vertical snow wall may need conventional snow surface; they will be within the snow cover when

sandbags or snow blocks for support. But we find that large subsequent rounds arrive. Thus the effect of explosive

feed bags filled with snow are more effective. An above- fragmentation ammunition may be severely degraded.

90 Shoveled

*.SAOw 90

Shoveled Snow .

Snow Blocks S NOaurol

'ulurol Snow Cover 5 nwCoe .

Frozen Ground Frozen Ground

Unfrozen Unfrozen

Compacled Shoveled Snow Snoele Snow

/ Sno

Snow Shoolw C ý I150 el ocks Snoweled- chunks

707

507 -- u . .. 1] S... 

'-" : , :5NoturOl Snow Cover ., Nolurol Snow Cover

Frozen Ground _Fozen Groun

Unfrozen Unfrozen

Trenches in Snow

These are conceptual cross sections from some Rus- tells us that the excavation of such trenches is laborsian manuals. The dimensions are in centimeters. It is effective. It is more than an order of magnitude easier to

obvious that such structures have a dual purpose: to excavate in snow than in the lightest unfrozen soil. We

protect against aimed fire and to conceal the movement have found also that there is no need to slant the walls of

of individuals and groups of soldiers. In the case of open the trench. The average snow makes stable vertical

trenches there are no vertical dimensions given. It is clear walls. The two covered trenches were also tried. We

that the structures depend upon the depth of the snow found that, as shown, they could be constructed only on

cover, as well as its physical properties. Our experience paper!

50
200- 200-

500-700 300 500-700 300 500-700 (cm)

Snow Tank Obstace1

77t:.r,., 150cmn

300-500 1 350-500 (cm)

Icing and Steepening of Slope

Tank Traps in Snow

Tank mobility deteriorates rapidly with increasing ties for tanks in snow-covered terrain. Mechanical means

snow depth. In deep snow tanks slow down and may be of snow moving may provide rapidly constructed tank

stopped completely. The loss of uphill mobility of tanks obstacles.

due to a snow cover is serious. We discovered also that any flat trajectory fire aimed

The drawings, inspired by a Russian training manual, at tanks behind such snow berofs is quite ineffctive. The

recommend relatively easy ways to increase the difficur - berms provide good protection for tanks.

51
Preparing a Covered Trench

Once it is covered, a trench blends into the landscape,

protects against shrapnel, and renders traffic undetectable by hostile observers. The drawing, from a Russian

manual, suggests that a movable arch be placed over a

snow trench on blocks. The arch is covered with snow,

and when (or perhaps if) the snow hardens the arch is

moved, blocked up again, etc. We have never tried the 5o-60C"

procedure, but it appears that during a thaw the snow

could be packed and molded around the device very fast.

During below-freezing weather, however, one would 1 A5'ocm30-1 

have to wait several hours before the snow acquired sufficient cohesion to stand up unsupported. There might

be a few instances when that would be practicable. Adher- to another results in a significant increase in density. The

ence of wet or dry snow to the mold might not be a prob- density of snow is expressed in fractions of a gram per

lemr-any oil or grease would help. cubic centimeter or fractions of a metric ton per cubic

Deposited snow differs in density, "hardness," and meter. Water is approximately 1 g/cm3; light snow is 0.1

particle size. Shoveling very light snow from one place to 0.2 glcm3.

52
Snow Cover Distribution and Duration

There is a need for much improvement, compilation In certain mountain regions spectacular avalanches

and reexamination of snow data on a global scale. Much occasionally bury villages, highways, and skiers (who

is known for particular areas. For example, winter sports should know better). In some foothillsfoehns, chinooks

regions have a fairly good conception of depth and dura- and boras precipitate fantastic thaws and wet snow detion of snow cover. On a broader scale, the Northern posits. At the southern edges of the snow regions snow

Hemisphere of our planet develops yearly a snow cover on the ground may not be experienced for several winwhich lasts from less than one month to eight or more ters, yet at other times a snow cover may form several

months at high latitudes. The extremes are warm climates times during one winter, disrupting traffic and the patwithout known snow deposits on the ground and north- tern of daily life. Catastrophic avalanches, snowstorms

em ice caps with a permanent, yearly replenished snow and thaws are simply regular phenomena with a low frecover. Does this mean that the farther north you go the quency of reappearance.

deeper the snow cover is? No. Most of the industry and population of the Northern

Does a deeper snow cover last longer? Also no. A Hemisphere is in areas with snowyn winters. In the Southsnow cover is a function of intricate climatic interrela- ern Hemisphere snow does not play such a significant

tions. For example, in polar deserts and semideserts there role in man's life. The lines on the map indicate the apis very little precipitation. If snow is deposited as a blan- proximate duration (in months) of snow cover during one

ket during calm weather, which is rare, it may disappear winter. Very special regions are the permanent ice caps

very quickly in the spring. Drifts behind obstacles, espe- and the Himalayan-Tibetan area, with a permanent snow

cially if shaded from the sun, may survive a long time, cover in the former and cool, arid winters and varied snow

sometimes into the following winter, cover in the latter.

The map shows snow regions in very broad terms. Snow cover on a world-wide scale and its reappearVery interesting, and therefore intensively recorded and ance each winter are still awaiting comprehensive study.

studied, are local deviations from what is shown on the Until such a study is performed a military planner must

map. prepare for the worst case.

53
80 I I

a. A time-depth historyfor a place with a winter lasting 0.

from November until mid-April with a January thaw.

S40

or

b. A drier, shorter winter without the evidence of a mid- 0" 40 ,

winter thaw. Both diagrams are hypothetical. In practice there [b. is variability from place to place and from one season

to another. There is enough evidencefor many places to construct a most probable, or worst case, diagram of snow cover. 0

c. Entirely hypothetical and sketchy. There are simply not 10

enough data found. But it shows that in the far north a snow C c. cover may not last very long: less snow, faster thaw. Also, 10 =

if itforms in the south at all it does not last: too warm. The Z 5

probability of a snowstorm for a military leader is not very E 7.7-

important; he counts on the worst case. 0905 75- 6o0 450

North Latitude

Snow Cover Formation

How does a snow cover form? It is not always sim- thickness depends upon precipitation intensity. Immedipie. A snow cover may fail to form, or it may be unusu- ately after precipitation snow begins to settle. Subsequent

ally persistent, or deep, or variable. But some things about snowstorms add to the depth of a snow cover and thaw

a snow cover may be said with certainty. Provided the periods may partially or fully destroy it.

temperature is below freezing, it forms a deposit whose

80C I ' I t I

60-

00

0 0

a0.0

20- Alum. *" *

, .. II I I ,

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

Impact Velocity, m/sec

Snow Penetration by Fragments

We took blocks of dense (0.42-g/cm 3) snow and accel- ocity. Only the degree of distortion was different. On anerated 5.5-mm metal cubes into it. The snow was sifted other occasion we observed that M-1 6 rifle ammunition

through a screen to make it homogeneous. The density was also deformed when it penetrated a snow target.

was approximately that found in a roadside berm, in a Automatic point-blank fife aimed at one spot excavated

drift, or in a shoveled snow pile. We found that begin- a snow target, resulting in a tunnel 1.4 m long. A snow

ning approximately at a velocity of 800 m/s, fragments, berm 1.5 m deep protects against fragments and small

simulated by the 5.5-mm cubes, started to deform, and arms fire.

the penetration distance actually declined with further in- High explosive antitank ammunition (HEAT) with

crease in velocity. We found it remarkable that both steel shaped charge action is ineffective if the target is proand aluminum began to deform at the same terminal vel- tected by as little as 0.75 m of shoveled snow.

54
PART III: THE ART OF WINTER WARFARE

MIUTARY ART IN THE COLD

Within his native environment a man functions, per- To the well-worn clichd that a power goes to war in

forms, survives and thrives. Outside it, performance order to impose its will upon a reluctant adversary, we

drops, and survival becomes questionable. A native of may add that this must be done at the time that presents

the South American jungles survives perfectly there; the best chance of success, at the least cost, and in the

brought to the United States he will have to learn to wear shortest period. It is said that a campaign must be conshoes and clothing, and any error he makes due to igno- ducted efficiently. We have already indicated that in temrance may have grave consequences. For example, im- perate and cold climates the more prepared side will deproper use of socks and shoes in January in Vermont liberately select the winter for the decisive battle. This

could result in frostbite, amputation and possible loss of may be done either by selecting the time to begin the

life. However, properly instructed, supplied and trained, armed conflict, or by avoiding the main battle until the

a native of a tropical country will function well in a cold advantageous time arrives. In the primitive battles of anenvironment, in some cases better than some of the local tiquity the weather and the time of year were not such

population. important factors as they are now-the battlefield weather

To live and earn a living is one thing. To fight a war affected both sides in the same way. But the examples

sets additional requirements. Briefly listed they are as fol- we have quoted also indicate the opposite: the power

lows: better prepared or adapted to winter warfare has the ad1. All fighting men must be familiar with and prop- vantage.

erly prepared for low temperature, snow cover and It is important to emphasize that the winter warfare

prolonged darkness. This includes the proper use skills of an army cannot be evaluated separately from its

of clothing. It is surprising how much harm peo- morale qualities. Friedrich Engels emphasized that for a

pie can do to themselves by negligent and improper proper evaluation of the combat qualities of an army one

use of clothing. There is also a need to know how must be informed not only about its materiel and fireto prevent frost injury in cold weather, to have power, but also about the degree of discipline, steadfastproper dietary habits, hygiene, etc. It is known, for ness and stamina. Most of all, information is needed about

example, that dehydration in winter is as diAdge-r- an army's morale status to provide an estimation of the

ous as in a hot desert. Improperly trained people hardships that could be imposed without demoralization.

are tempted to use snow to quench their thirst in The need for winter warfare skills is concentrated

the field, which is absolutely unacceptable. The mainly in the teamwork of small units. The main prereqskills of outdoor living (called survival) need to uisite for a successful winter operation is the developbe learned by instruction and training. Untrained ment of survival skills. All members of a small unit must

men in winter warfare are a liability. A command- be able to live, move and rest in the open in any weather

er may rely on having a number of men to fight, and any temperature. Clothing, food, water and shelter

but they either die, or are injured, or become ill are as important as skill with weapons. The ability to

and must be taken care of. march over snow-covered terrain and to use camouflage

2. A snow-covered theater of operations presents and evasion tactics is vital. Not all is achieved and not

unique tactical opportunities. Skiers provide an all is well with most armies preparing to fight and deadditional mobility factor, while road vehicles must fend themselves in cold weather or cold climates. The

await snow removal before starting to move. Scouts clothing of native people in the north is light and warm;

and infiltrating troops become invisible. To take army clothing is typically heavy and impractical. The

full advantage of these opportunities, winter war- Inuit and others were able to travel light, fast, and over

fare skills must be learned. A good beginning is to long distances. Before their economic life changed they

read the material found in the various manuals that consistently preferred to travel in the winter.

involved armies have to offer. But learning should With the exception of a very few small ski units (such

be accompanied by intensive training, as the Danish Sirius patrol in Greenland) military winter

55
mobility depends upon mechanized means, and motor ve- the snow cover. A large effort must be expended to keep

hicles depend upon highways. To be sure, technology, roads open, and special equipment must be amply availfirepower, and mobile and armored forces play a crucial able. Very low temperatures adversely affect weapons

role in modern war. Properly applied they help to win. and motorized equipment, and one must count on an inBut improperly deployed they weigh a force down. creased incidence of equipment breakdowns and failures.

As we have shown, nothing is more disastrous than No matter how well the commander may be equipped

poorly trained men on a winter battlefield. Briefly, the with heavy vehicles and materiel, his success or failure

training of men for a winter campaign should include the in combat depends upon the tactical preparedness of the

use and care of clothing and equipment, the use of snow small unit. The untrained soldier is a liability; he may

for shelter and protection, and the development of the become a casualty before he hears the first shot. Wellability to live in and move over snow-covered terrain, trained troops properly equipped, capable of operating

Customarily, in instructions, that which should be natu- independently, and pursuing limited objectives have a

ral is lumped together under the term "survival" and pre- superb chance of success. The tactical skills of small units

sented as exotic emergency procedures, which obvious- in snow-covered terrain should encompass movement,

ly is insufficient for the demands of a modern winter cam- offense, delay and defense (Deghtiarev 1961).

paign. Small units need to be able to march for long peri- In a march that precedes an attack, especially a crossods over snow-covered terrain. This requirement stems country ski unit march, objectives as to distance are set

from the elementary need to be able to do the unexpect- rather modestly. It has been recommended that such

ed: people should be able to reach places where (and marches not exceed 35 km in eight hours under average

when) they are not expected. They must also have the conditions, and 50 km in eight hours under exceptionalcapability of fighting at the end of such a march. A fre- ly good conditions (Gavrichkov 1929). Those limitations

quently made observation concerning skis is that special- are set to preserve the combat capability of the individuization leads to uselessness. Skis designed for cross-coun- a) soldier. Besides swift ski marches, concealed bivouacs,

try races are used by the public for cross-country plea- and winter shelters in unexpected places, winter tactics

sure trips, and downhill competition skis, or alpine skis require thorough reconnaissance, transportation of heavy

as they are called, are a prestige symbol for amateurs. infantry weapons such as mortars and machine guns on

Neither type is good for military skiing. We may recall sleds, and coordination of ski attacks with armor (Sabathe helplessness of the German mountain troops in Rus- liauskas 1971). The cross-country winter mobility of

sia. tanks was frequently used by the Russian army in the

The military skis in use now are by no means the ulti- Second World War either by letting the infantry ride the

mate design. Requirements for military skis, if written tanks or by having the tanks tow groups of men onto the

by specialists in supplying an army, could never be met. battlefield on skis. This way considerable speed was

They would have to be inexpensive, durable, light, small, achieved without a gap developing between the tank and

large. They should not sink deeply into the snow, should the accompanying infantry. Another interesting improvibe good for cross-country and downhill, and should serve sation consisted of towing "armored" sleds made of logs

a secondary function as parts of a sled or shelter. Per- to transport infantry. Swift night attacks by properly

haps the skis used by Siberian hunters are what all armies trained men were very successful (Vassilieff 1955).

need. We may say for brevity that a similar situation pre- The attack of a small, mobile, independent unit must

vails in relation to all ,&thcr rmlitaly cold weather equip- 6e swift and precise. To insure success, reconnaissance

ment. must be as complete as possible. Most importantly, the

Camouflage, evasion and deception are different in commander of the small unit should not hesitate to ensnow terrain then elsewhere-any movement leaves gage a superior force, provided that the attack is swift,

clearly discernible tracks which last until the next large unexpected and under the cover of night or a snowstorm.

snowstorm. Those tracks can reveal, but can also be used Ideally, enemy positions should be engaged by several

for deception. All the old deception techniques practiced small groups, in a coordinated but not simultaneous

during the Second World War must be included in train- attack (Ljungner 1955). It is important to conserve forcing programs. Trail and encampment discipline must be es and not to continue the pressure if there is danger of

learned and mastered. The Finns had a saying: "The les- being annihilated. Experience in the Second World War

son of bivouac security is written in the snow-read it." showed that if small units are ordered to reach a defendThe task of the tactician in intermediate and large unit ed terrain objective, rather than to conduct a brief attack

operations in winter becomes less complex, but requires with the objective of inflicting casualties, the engagement

a large overall effort. All movements are slower, and the often becomes too costly. Observations confirming these

off-road mobility of fighting vehicles is reduced or ideas are presented by von Senger (1954).

brought to a complete halt, depending upon the depth of Since resupply of forward positions is difficult in the

56
wintertime, it is especially important to have men trained 1959). It appears that the most important element conin firing discipline. Fire for "morale effect" is highly tributing to success on the battlefield in the winter is moobjectionable. Each man must pull the trigger of his bility (Grouzdev 1944).

weapon only when he has a target. Resupply with ammu- An attack with a small unit supported by tanks requires

nition presents far greater difficulties in winter than at careful coordination of movement and fire. Both infantry

other times. Also, the plans for each attack should in- and armor must engage the adversary simultaneously, yet

clude provisions for swift disengagement. The art of dis- to move with the troops may expose the machines to a

engagement does not involve "a return to the initial posi- higher risk from the adversary's antitank fire. Depending

tion," which is most likely known to the adversary. A upon the circumstances, with travel speed being the domsmall unit with a permanent base is in grave danger of inant factor, the infantry must have a head start. The comannihilation (Matsulenko 1968). mander's skill consists in selecting terrain cover for the

While aggressiveness, skill, leadership, courage and tanks that affords the possibility of support fire (Lechens

the luck of the leader determine the success of an individ- 1959). The Russian army is very attentive to winter trainual small unit, the task of higher command is significantly ing (Limno 1973), and it is considered most important to

complicated in offensive winter combat. Preparation of develop coordination between small infantry units and arplans, coordination, supply and support are more compli- mor. Also, northern armies carefully collect data on the

cated in winter, and all have specifics to be considered. constantly changing properties of minefields and obstaWhile it is true that a well-trained small unit may oper- cles. After a minefield is laid, a snowfall of 20-30 cm

ate for a week without resupply (Fainschmidt 1967), the makes it passable to skiers and very often to tanks also.

rear echelon roads must be kept free of snow and fre- Plunger type mines frequently fail when their mechanisms

quently reopened; many vital supply items must be pro- become immobilized by ice accumulation. An adversary

tected from frost. One must consider that in winter there on the defensive may be expected to construct protective

are more frequent equipment breakdowns. For this rea- structures and position fortifications of a more or less deson, special skill and experience are required from high- liberate nature (the borderline between deliberate and hasty

er command (Zakharov 1967). Winter combat brings out fortifications is elusive). Attacking and attempting to rethe need for warm shelter in man and machine. Certain duce permanent or deliberate fortifications in winter may

small repairs normally done "at the roadside" in warm have tactical disadvantages. The leadership must explore

weather become an almost impossible task in winter, the possibilities of mobility to see whether there is an adThere is also the tragic fate of the wounded soldier vantage in swiftly bypassing the stationary adversary and

on the winter battlefield. The importance of keeping him cutting his lifelines (Erfurth 1951).

warm is obvious, but the opportunity to do so is limited. A new element in winter warfare tactics is the defense

Exposure and frost injury is an ever-present danger. The of reverse slope positions. This presents less opportunity

Russian experience indicates that prevention and train- for controlled fire by the attacking side aAd a chance to

ing minimize it. separate armor from foot soldiers (see Biblioteka OfitOffensive infantry combat, with tank support, is very sera 1966). An advantage for the attacking skiers may be

effective if deliberate field fortifications must be pene- the increased speed of approach. Most important for a

trated. By the nature of things, however, the approach of small unit is the selection of a position which permits fast

the tanks, their very presence, often eliminates the sur- disengagement-to hold a position "at any cost," or to

prise element and new factors must be considered. As become pinned down and annihilated, is under all circummentioned, an operational limit is imposed upon over- stances inefficient and must be avoided. Ideal defensive

land movement of tanks, depending upon the depth and combat is a series of swift attacks and withdrawals. There

density of the snow cover as well as the slope of the ter- is great tactical advantage in a series of lateral withdrawrain. Shamshurov (1969) observed that in flat terrain me- als and renewed attacks, all conducted in rapid succesdium tanks can negotiate slopes of 15' with a maximum sion. In this way small units may slow down or completely

snow cover of 35 cm at a density of 0.25 g/cm 3.Russian stop superior forces, which may then become targets for

heavy tanks are capable of operating in 80 cm of snow aircraft or heavy weapons (Sorokin 1939, Zhukov 197 1).

at 0.20 g/cm 3 and in up to 90 cm of 0.25-g/cm 3 snow in While mobility in flexible defense is an assurance of surflat terrain. On a 150 slope, 45 cm of snow stops a heavy vival for small units, marching, resting and occupying detank. This restricts offensive tank operation and limits it fensive positions require greater camouflage skills and

mainly to ridges and elevated terrain with less snow on discipline in winter than during warm seasons (Anonythe ground. German tacticians consider tank forces suf- mous 1941, Sander 1959). Enemy scouts, and especially

ficiently flexible under winter conditions, provided that airborne reconnaissance, easily detect tracks in the snow.

rear echelon roads are open, support is available, and per- Laying false tracks; setting up false (decoy) positions,

sonnel at all levels are well enough trained (Lechens campfires and sn~oke; and white camouflage have a'l been

57
used successfully to thwart an observing adversary (Zhuk- covered terrain! Mobile ski operations-swift attack and

ov 197 1). Since winter detection became not only an art withdrawal-do not require excavations, and preclude

but a science (Gurevich and Pucheiko 1945), evasion, permanent defensive positions. A zone of entrenchments,

camouflage and decoy techniques have required more emplacements and foxholes deliberately blasted, dug or

training than before. "excavated" in frozen ground and occupied by immobiDefensive tactics at the division level are in no way lized soldiers waiting to answer enemy fire is ineffeclike the mobile warfare of a small unit. The modern con- tive, to say the least.

cept of defense in depth visualizes a line up to 46 km In contrast, the men could be on skis, moving swiftly

long for a division deployed along such a natural barrier to upset and disturb the approaching enemy with more

as a major river (Lysukhin 1968). Prepared positions, effect. Infantry, including motorized infantry equipped

obstacles and minefields extend 16 km in front of the with vehicles capable of over-snow movement, does not

main line. A division in a defensive position prepares a find winter to be an especially formidable obstacle

sufficient number of alternate fortified positions to al- (Frashe 1976). Russian military doctrine points out readilow for flexibility and independent action by small units ly that winter brings more requirements of a logistical

within the overall mission. In most cases the role of a nature, slows down all larger scale movements, and inriver as a natural obstacle does not decrease significant- creases the need for supplies. For this reason training and

ly in the winter. To attack a defending division heavy equipment are designed so that winter will be less of a

weapons and armor are needed, and that requires thick handicap than it will be for a potential adversary.

ice, which usually takes a prolonged cold period to form. The subject of training deserves one more considerAlso, an ice cover can easily be weakened, destroyed and ation: a soldier trained in winter is also a good summer

filled with obstacles. If the river position dominates the fighter; trained only in summer he is helpless in winter.

approaches the adversary has to use, the defense becomes

less flexible than in the case where the defender has to

operate on a flat shore with few natural barriers. In the

latter case an active, flexible defense with maximum op- Except on high mountains, glaciers, and permanent

erational freedom for small units becomes advantageous, ice caps, snow cover on the ground is a seasonal pheThe principle of active, flexible defense does not pre- nomenon. Most snow cover develops in the Northern

clude deliberate or hasty terrain fortification and improve- Hemisphere. In the Southern Hemisphere, except on the

ment. Foreign experts stress the importance of terrain Antarctic continent, winter snow is restricted to high elpreparation-construction of artificial obstacles and pro- evations. About half the world has moderate or so-called

tective positions (Shamshurov 1969). There are many cold climates where there is snow on the ground in winmethods of wintertime obstacle construction that are both ter. Most of the regions of potential large scale military

quick and egfective. An uphill road can be made impass- conflict also have snow on the ground in the winter. Reable for tanks and vehicles simply by piling snow on it; currence of snow cover ranges from episodic to sporadic

a hill cannot be climbed if it has been iced; a frozen log to fully predictable, and depths from a few centimet-"s

barricade must be skillfully blasted away. In principle, to 80 centimeters, depending upon the climate and latipreparation of deliberate fortified positions is not much tude. In the high Arctic, with the dry climate of a desert,

different in winter than at other times of the year, except snow is most persistent, but hardly forms a cover; it is

that in winter the frozen ground must be blasted by explo- normally found in drifts behind obstacles. The global

sives and more heavy equipment must be used per unit distribution and seasonal formation of snow cover have

of volume removed. There is also the problem of visibil- still been insufficiently studied (Richter 1960). A snow

ity: against the white snow background excavation activ- cover may be deep or shallow; it may last for a large part

ity, especially blasting, is visible at great distances, both of the year or it may cover the surface only briefly, in all

from the air and from the ground. "Digging-in" by an cases being an integral part of the climate (Koeppen

individual soldier is almost impossible in frozen ground. 1918).

Many armies have developed "magic" individual fox- Deposited snow may be dense and compact, or light

hole-blasting explosive charges, but no matter how con- and incohesive. Individual grains may be coarse or very

fident their descriptions sound, or how many rewards fine. In military reconnaissance, observations on depth

have been earned by their developers, explosive excava- and the capacity to support over-snow vehicles and miltion of foxholes is impractical. When or if the real need itary skiers must be routinely collected. Researchers disfor them arrives, and they are used, they may kill as many tinguish grain size, density, hardness, stratification, crusts,

soldiers as they protect. Digging into frozen ground is a internal hoarfrost, and temperature of a layer of natural

formidable task. But ifproper training and tactics are pro- snow. After deposition a snow cover changes its denvided there may be no need for it in combat on snow- sity, hardness increases, contacts between grains become

58
stronger. It is said the snow undergoes a metamorphosis. ing snow to achieve higher densities becomes progresThe density of a light snow increases under any mechani- sively unproductive.

cal influence and, since any mechanical process is Laboratory ballistic studies required homogeneous

accompanied by breakup of a large number of grains, specimens with a large variety of densities. This was

reworked snow hardens appreciably. Densification by achieved by screening and mixing fine- and coarse-grained

compaction and reworking has its theoretical limit-that snow in various proportions, and placing it in molds of

of ice (0.9 g/cm 3). Reworked snow is firm, can be han- suitable dimensions. Handling individual target specimens

died, and can be used to make a comfortable shelter. The presented no problems. A series of rifle projectiles and

snow house used by the Inuit, the so-called igloo (the simulated fragments of various types were fired into snow

word means house), is always made from dense, hard targets.

snow, found in drifts. Various types of compacted, pro- Chronographic observation methods permitted a corcessed and reworked snow were studied by Bader and relation of terminal kinetic energy with penetration disKuroiwa (1962). The properties, limitations and uses of tance into snow targets with different densities. It was

snow are given by Mellor (1964). Yosida (1958) and found that projectile instability (tumbling) was important

Kuz'min (1957) discuss snow cover on the ground. in decreasing penetration. Curiously, an elongated ogiveInteresting from a military viewpoint is the ability of shaped small arms projectile seems to tumble only in one

ordinary snow to attenuate the motion of fast-moving pro- of two ways. In both types of tumbling rotation is around

jectiles and fragments. To study this phenomenon a a short axis of the projectile. In one case the rotation axis

series of experiments in terminal ballistics have been per- is parallel to the trajectory of motion; in the other it is

formed. Snow targets of varying density and hardness perpendicular to it. Any intermediate type of tumbling

were placed in a refrigerated target room, and projectiles apparently decays very rapidly.

and simulated fragments were fired into them. The con- All types of bullets and simulated fragments, as N ell

trolled laboratory work revealed a sensitivity to density, as true fragments accelerated by explosive ordnance.

but not to grain size, hardness or age. Hard, aged snow penetrated ordinary snow (of 0.3 to 0.5 g/cm 3 density) to

did indeed resist impact more than freshly reworked in- distances of 30 to 120 cm (Swinzow 1970a, 1972).

cohesive material, but the difference was measurable only Another observation of military significance concerns

at low terminal velocities, such as free fall from 1 or 2 explosive fragmentation ordnance used over snowmeters. Temperatures, as long as they were definitely be- covered terrain. A series of trials revealed that it is very

low the melting temperature of ice, say -3'C and lower, difficult to ensure the functioning of a point detonating

also had no measurable influence. fuze at the surface of a snow cover. Consequently, a round

Age and work-hardening were the two properties of detonates within the snow, thus losing part of its fragsnow determining the degree to which it could be used. mentation effect. The degradation effect of a snow

Freshly fallen snow has very little cohesion and presents cover may be significant (Swinzow 1970b), even if it is

some handling difficulties in laboratory ballistic studies. as shallow as 18-20 cm. It follows that warfare requires

At sufficiently high temperatures (-3' to -10°C) the co- significantly more ammunition when conducted on snowhesion increases in about a week to the point where the covered terrain in winter than it does during summer.

snow can be handled. Then target blocks can be cut out Foreign military literature seems to be positive about

and brought to the laboratory for ballistic tests. winter warfare, snow, ice and frozen ground. All informaAt low air temperatures and in the presence of a steep tion is presented in an authoritative tone, as the "unquesthermal gradient within the deposit, the coherence of tionable truth'" Military troop manuals and officers' handsnow does not increase. Moisture migrates within the lay- books seem to convey the message that snow must be

er and becomes redistributed. Internal hoarfrost forms. trusted, used as shelter, and especially as a material to

Such snow has the consistency of fresh sawdust. It flows construct fortified positions. All discussions about snow

from the shovel, does not support the skier or over-snow fortifications are illustrated with practicable drawings and

vehicle, and cannot be handled. Passed through a vibrat- sketches, but depend upon general tactical instructions (for

ing screen, shoveled once from one place to another, or example Deghtiarev 1961) for implementation. Hard to

disturbed in any other mechanical way, such snow be- find is information about the degree of protection a given

comes manageable within a short time and is said to be layer of snow will provide against projectiles and fragwork-hardened. Another phenomenon of work-harden- ments. Yet paradoxically, Belokon' and Korneichuk

ing is an increase in density. Johnson (1977) observed (1964) state that a layer of 50 cm of snow (how dense?)

that simple shoveling increased the density of snow from cut ionizing radiation in half. There is also a sparsity of

0.18 to 0.34 g/cm 3, and milling snow with a snow-re- information about productivity. It is obvious that diggingmoving machine increased its density to 0.40 g/cm3 . in into unfrozen ground under the most favorable condiJohnson also found that shoveling, milling and compact- tions is slower than doing it in snow. But, again: how good

59
is it? And how much faster will the soldier get out of the artillery shells-if fired into snow-covered terrain never

way of a killing swarm of bullets or fragments? The prob- detonate at the snow surface, as has been mentioned, but

lem is elementary, and simple trials can give clear, defin- either at the surface of the ground underneath the snow

itive answers. Military experts speak of deliberate and or, at best, within the snow cover. The so-called fragmenhasty fortifications. The question of how "elaborate" is tation effect circle is small compared with free surface

"deliberate" and how "spontaneous" is "hasty" cannot be bursts; it may shrink as much as 80% (Swinzow 1970b).

answered. The Maginot Line was a deliberate effort, and The fragments, in most cases small, irregular pieces of

a soldier throwing himself on the ground and scooping metal (or spheres, in controlled fragmentation ordnance),

out a small parapet is protecting himself hastily. Once travel only a few meters in the snow. Fragments travelagain we must do without definitive statements. Never- ing at an angle upwards have a large target intercept antheless the need for straightforward, realistic information gle. So unless the round falls directly on the target, the

about the performance of men in the field and the ability target survives.

of snow to attenuate small arms projectiles is acute. With- The fuze action of explosive rounds aimed at, and hitout a set of meaningful, realistic trials, laboratory work ting, artificial protecting structures such as ordinary snow

discloses only curious phenomena. berms causes the rounds to explode within them. The

David Schaefer (1973) took a group of soldiers into a rounds that fly through them are usually duds. Generally,

snow-covered field near Fairbanks, Alaska, told them to an area bombarded with flat-trajectory fused explosive

shovel up snow berms of various forms, and carefully ammunition becomes "dud infested."

observed their performance and the results. He found that, Modem armor-penetrating ordnance based on shaped

provided there are proper tools available, one man can pile charge effects, such as artillery, recoilless gun rounds and

up 10 to 12 cubic meters of snow in one hour. The light, probably the Warsaw Pact RPG-7 antitank grenade, perfluffy, cold snow, initially of 0.2 g/cm3 density, became forms very poorly if the armored vehicles, tanks or ardenser in the berm, close to 0.4 g/cm 3, and acquired a co- mored personnel cariers are protected by a layer of snow.

herence sufficient to allow blocks similar to those used in It has been observed (Farrell and Swinzow, unpubl.) that

igloo construction to be cut out. Schaefer found, inciden- the fuzes are triggered by the snow. The metal jet forms

tally, that the standard Army entrenching tool, designed before reaching the armor, disperses its energy in the snow,

for light loam and sandy soil, is unproductive, and that and becomes harmless. A tank in ambush or guarding an

the best tool for work in snow is the so-called D-handle object of tactical importance may become immensely

scoop. more secure if quickly covered with shoveled snow. One

Silhouette targets were placed behind the berms and meter of such reworked snow would be enough to proautomatic weapons were fired into them. The testing of tect against shaped charge ammunition.

the snow structures was severe: the weapons were aimed All this shows once again that at the level of small units

at one point, so that the projectile impacts were concen- and the individual soldier the snow-covered battlefieid has

trated in a small area. Schaefer observed depth of pene- great advantages for the trained and skillful and is "the

tration, erosion of the snow target, and travel of the pro- white shroud of defeat" for the poorly equipped and ignojectile within the snow. Aiming at the edge of the snow rant.

structure resulted in some scattering of the snow, and

sometimes in slumping. Otherwise, the reworking caused FUNDAMENTAL SOURCES OF

by the multiple impacts produced densification and a MODERN WISDOM (?)

notable increase in hardness. A snow revetment of approximately 0.4 g/cm3 density was subjected to intensive con- It has been said that reading history is similar to hiscentrated automatic fire by a modern small caliber weap- tening to a deaf man: one may hear many answers but

on. One thousand 5.56-mm rounds were fired into an area not those to the questions asked (War and Peace-Leo

25 x 25 cm. Most of the projectiles penetrated less than I Tolstoy). Searching history for fundamental material on

meter and none penetrated deeper than 1.4 m. Schaefer winter warfare strategy leads one into the situation so aptly

(1974) also reports that individual rounds fired separately referred to in the above metaphor. The learned works give

into a target not disturbed by previous impacts were found a wealth of insight on strategic thought and its developas a rule less than 1 meter deep, and a light snow (0.32 g/ ment through the ages, but none of the great military stratecm3) penetration of this type of ammunition was around gists directly addresses winter warfare. Yet the thought is

1.2 m. there, indirectly traceable through the ages, beginning with

What about heavier projectiles? They are also affected Sun-Tzu (4th century BC). In The Art of War, he advises

by snow. The effect is multifarious and can, as will be that darkness and winter are friends of the tough and skillshown, be very serious. Explosive fragmentation rounds- ful. We might add Mao Tse-Tung, who will doubtless be

hand grenades, rifle grenades, fragmentation mortars and recognized as the greatest of modern strategists.

60
Of all thepractical changes in strategic thinking, most must be accommodated by winter waw are strategy. But

radical appears to be one introduced by Mao. We recol- no specialized work on winter warfare strategy has ever

lect how Henri J mini (1779-1869) postulated the need been written. Battles have been fought following the same

to deprive the adversary of space, to take away territory strategic principles, summer and winter! Having observed

in order to put him at a disadvantage. Or Carl von Clause- what was employed or discarded in wir:er we see that six

witz (1780-1831), who spoke of initiative and the impo- clearly distinct principles remain applicable during the

sition of one's own will upon the adversary. (Incidental- winter.

ly, both these strategists spent a part of their active life in

Russia and had a strong influence upon Russian military I

thinking.) Mao Tse-Tung, a strategist with perhaps the To hold and control a territory is strategic stability. To

longest personal military and political experience, sud- do so in the winter is immobility. Immobility in the windenly brought all thinking onto a new plane. He saw a ter is delayed defeat and the territory loses its strategic

new dimension for guerrilla warfare. Along with Sun- value.

Tzu, he saw guerrilla warfare as a strategic auxiliary to The implementation of th- aims and purposes of warregular forces, whereas guerrilla warfare had always been fare leads, according to the new views, not to domination

regarded as of tactical benefit only. The main difference of territory, as was the view of Jomini, but to the incapacbetween him and his predecessors such as Jomini was itation of the adversary's forces. In effect, a space (snowrecognition of the secondary role of space: "To gain ter- covered space) could, and should, be given up to the eneritory is no cause for joy, to lose territory is no cause for my if it causes him to be put in a situation where he dissorrow." (Interesting are his views on various aspects of perses his forces and suffers increased casualties. A friendthe role of armed men in politics. He believed that vio- ly land supports its army, also, when overrun by the enlence must be creatively used, that the most revolution- emy, presumably through non-cooperation, sabotage and

ary class is the peasant class, that armies can and must guerrilIv• warfare. For this reason the main purpose of an

give political support, etc.) However, Maoism as a politi- offensive becomes not territory but the incapacitation or

cal driving force may be difficult and premature to evalu- weakening of the adversary's armed forces. (One of the

ate now. Of greater interest remain his strategic concep- great defeats suffered by Mao Tse-Tung was due to his

tions that emerged in the 1940's. But that leads us away unwillingness to give up territory in 1934.) Mobility in

from the main subject. winter warfare is a problem that differs significantly from

What about winter strategy? By its very nature win- mobility in other seasons. We think here of snow removter differs so drastically from other seasons of military al, which requires petrol, machines, and most importantactivity that a distinct strategy must exist to accommo- ly manpower, which means that there will be far fewer

date the whole new set of dimensions faced with the on- men available for the most important (and to an increasset of the winter. The new requirements on the large scale, ing degree neglected) occupation of trigger-pulling. No

such as clothing, shelter and ammunition, are recogniz- matter how good a snow removal program is assured, road

able, if not always fulfillable. New efforts must be made traffic in winter is slower. That such a condition affects

to prevent the breakdown of machines and the slowdown both sides of the "front line " is small consolation. Mechand congestion of traffic, and to remove snow from high- anized off-road mobility is always, under all conditions,

ways and airports. New conditions appear: shorter peri- more limited in winter. It can be shown that cases where

ods of daylight, different conditions of visibility, new winter (mainly frost) opens new opportunities to traffic,

ways of camouflage, and others. New advantages appear: such as in crossing swamps and water bodies on ice, are

enemy armor becomes slow or completely stops operat- exceptional in all climates. The only mechanical means

ing off the roads, trained skiers become highly mobile, of cross-country transportation that benefits from snow

and skillful soldiers dig quickly into the snow, building cover is the sportsman's snowmobile. But that machine

excellent protective structures (Karatn 1940, Chekotillo is unacceptable for military use. It is too narrowly spe1943). There are also psychological advantages and dis- cialized. The trained skier seems to gain the most from

advantages: the weak and tired are easier to capture, winter and deep snow.

but the stubborn are less likely to give up deliberately

prepared positions, and are lost. The most dangerous phe- II

nomenon, already mentioned, is the increase in :he num- Only after the problem of mobility is solved can the

berof people who ingenuously findreasons to participate second most important principle of winter warfare

in indoor activity at various headquarters, including "pla- materialize: initi-itive. Without it a force is at the mercy

toon command centers," leaving a decreasing number of of the adversary. Initiative means many things. Forcing a

unlucky ones to bear the oislaught of the adversary. In superior enemy to deploy into battle formation before

short, winter differs drastically from other seasons and withdrawing is initiative. So is engaging where (and when)

61
an attack is not contemplated, or denying the adversary a V

seemingly uncontestable position of advantage. On the It is also important to see flexibility as a factor in deother hand, time-consuming regrouping, resupplying, re- fense as well as offenie. Rolling with the punches, allowinforcing, or redeploying in the face of an imminent threat ing the enemy to bypass (into Stalingrad, for example),

disclose one's intentions to the adversary and are unac- flanking attacks, capture and immediate use of the

ceptable, especially in the winter, enemy's arms, ammunition and materiel, all are axioinatic

conditions for success. Most of all, many military

IlIl authorities stress the idea that offense as well as defense

Offense in the winter is possible only if five- to six- must be conducted so that the enemy pays more in anyfold superiority is assured. Superiority everywhere may thing-men, materiel, ammunition, even hours of marchbe desirable but is not always achievable. The initially ing.

successful Russian winter offensive in 1941-1942 fell

short of its potential because Jomini's second principle VI

was so ineptly disregarded. The Russians failed to single Finally, superiority and surprise: total superiority must

out an objective narrow enough to concentrate reserves be counteracted by multiple local superiorities to make

on and to drive for. Pushing back an enormously wide winter warfare meaningful. Any surprise, especially inifront dissipated their efforts and they were stopped. How tial surprise, is important. The effect of initial surprise

to achieve, then, local superiority when a sensible objec- may last for a long time, but all effort must be made to

tive is recognized? Events during the Second World War eliminate it. The dialectic approach in strategy regards

showed that the Russians finally learned that also. When surprise as superiority in a qualitative sense. If backed by

a major breakthrough objective is recognized, chances quantitative relations it may be equal to permanent sucare that the reserves concentrated opposite it may be de- cess. This type of thinking can be developed at great

tectable and become known to the adversary. Since hold- length, but wo-ild lead us away from the subjec: of wining a "front" to the left and right of the potential thrust ter warfare again. One example is sufficient. The Gerdirection requires less force than rolling it back, concen- mans, attacking the Russians in 1941, achieved strategic

tration for the needed effort may be achieved by skillful surprise and local superiority. But by giving up space,

lateral motion. This way local superiority may material- materiel and manpower, all incidentally involuntarily, the

ize. However, lateral shifts of force require perhaps the Russians led the Germans into winter warfare. This

greatest degree of skill and control capability. Planning evolved into loss of initiative, rigidity, and waste of

and execution must have a very high degree of preci- strength; the rest is known.

sion. Preparation should incorporate the need for more

supplies and materiel. For one thin6 , all ammunition ex- UNCONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

penditures will increase at least five-fold as compared

with summertime. Also, every military need becomes crit- The wars of this century have had examples of posiical in wintertime. For example, if a soldier loses a glove tion warfare and maneuvers, as well as a large number of

in the winter, it must be immediately replaced to prevent unconventional and guerrilla operations. It is evident that

the man from becoming a casualty. in the winter the principle of guerrilla operation is most

productive and economic. The Finns in 1939-1940 had

IV both extensive deliberate fortifications and excellently

As already mentioned, defense, stiffened by prepared trained and motivated mobile forces operating with a high

positions, no matter how elaborate, is strategically a post- degree of efficiency. While the fortified positions were

ponement of defeat. Flexibility, with gradual minimal ter- eventually defeated, and many men were sacrificed to hold

ritory vz6, may be the only creative approach. A posi- them, the units practicing flexible mobile winter warfare

tive illustration here is the Russian-Finnish winter war. inflicted huge losses on the attacking enemy and finally

A negative example is the Russian strategy in the winter ceased fire only on orders from their high command.

of 1941-1942. Orders to "hold at all costs," as well as Conventionally one thinks of guerrilla warfare _-, a

their opposite, or to prepare "..ard" positions, a reluctance military operation behind enemy lines. This may be true

to trade territory for enemy strength ("space for time" is if a well-discernible front line is established and the mila meaningless clichM in the case of winter defense) are in itary situation is, or is approaching, position warfare. Howwinter unacceptable tendencies. The principle of man- ever, under many circumstances discernible front lines

power, materiel and strength conservation is most im- may not even materialize. The previously mentioned moportant in winter and pays off more richly then than at bile battle of Suomussalmi is an example of a successful

any other time. unconventional mobile operation. Had the Finns had a

larger number of men available, and had the Finnish sol62
diers been trained only in conventional warfare, they Se vei la"'ltcal lt.riela of willicl rl wa•,i ic ale

probably would have met the onslaught of the first Ruis- reco,-ihaible Ifroi ll S ai ples " a n uihic- I i I i,,t

sian force by digging trenches and inlplaceciiints of all be kept small and independent hitl should iIc xiid, lc thiCr

sorts and establishing fortitied positions. It is cerlaiily action withi adjaccnt ,,rouls. 2p All at. tion is kept %-. ithill

conceivable that the Russians would have been stopped easy reach anld I1u1s"t he swilt ()Occ+upahtoin 0t a Itl Atlier

after advancing a very short distance, would have had the enllemy has hceui desiroyed o• llec, must be 1iIM1iiiuuia

relatively smaller losses, and would have evaluated the No action must he undertaken k 1ithou1 .t a 'eallstIc 'A 1h

situation, found a solution and eventually reached their drawal plan. 3) Any actolo against the eneui1V must he

objective. Instead, the Finns used unconventional war- unexpected. A forewarned einemy tis not to b, etaied.

fare and were successful. In counting on a conventional 4) Initiative IuM,, alwaIys beI in the hand o• the ,uer, lla.

reaction to their assault, the Russians made an error. It If enemy antiguerrilla attack is ixpssible. withdrw,,, discost them two divisions! lerse, cancel everything and reassenmble in t sa nCtoaryV

We are using tile two terms 'convenitonal" and "'un- 5) .Logistic support effort must he minimal. A on liious

conventional" as direct opposites. That may not be en- effort must be made to rearni and resupply froni the ctetirely justifiable. If attacking in square formation, wear- my. 6) A serious efforl must be made to keep the popi:ig uniforms and oxcupying trenches is conventional and ulation friendly. Population suppolr through intelligence.

any other type of warfare is unconventional the issue is supply, etc. is paramount. 7) Guerrilla operations cannot

clouded. But just observing the past we may see a few he conducted indefinitely without a saIctuary. i ,wo types

characteristics of the type of warfare called "unconven- of sanctuaries are recognized+ -friendly temtory, not contional." enough that we feel justified in removing the trolled by tile adversary, and temox)rary bases of opera-

"conventional" label applied at first glance. tion within tile territory controlled by the enemy.

Normally, when a conflict between two powers or As is frequently recognized, the Russian Partisan

groups of powers must be solved by military means, nei- movement during the Second World War violated riany

ther knows what his chance of success is. Then they en- of the above principles and was not as effective as cxgage in "conventional" warfare. If the weaker or the pected. considering their number. The orders they -

weakened has not the will, means or strength to resist, ceived from Moscow were too explicit and had th,. samne

he is defeated by conventional means. If the one that is character as those the rest of the army received iThe Ru,

weaker in the first place has no intention of being defeat- sian Partisan units were large and controlled large regions,

ed. and therefore has the will to fight, he must engage in with several villages. Consequently, the majority of the

"unconventional" warfare. (This warfare is the best for men never participated in actions. Strategic ,oordination

wintertime!) In strategy, nothing is for free. Therefore, with the main forces was often very poolr. I owever, due

the weaker one, or the one in the weaker position, must to the extent of the movement it played a significant role

be willing to give up territory, and often population. What in obstructing German supply through Nabotage and hais gained in return for that sacrifice'? Reduction in rasstnent. At one time the Partisan movement tied down

enemy strength in terms of manpower and war supplies, more than I(X).OMX) German security troops. Besides thie

and time. size of the units, their main faults were a greater-thanWhether or not this warfare is conducted by regulars justified reliance on central headquarters and an inability

using flexible defensive or offensive tactics or by guen'il- to secure honest and total cooperation from the populalas behind the lines is not very relevant. It is imlportant to tion (Department of the Army 1951). The activity of the

note that a significant amount of skill, knowledge and Partisans behind the German lines was notably more enexperience has been accumulated in the strategy and tac- ergetic during winter than summer. Landings by clandestics of irregular warfare. It is applicable where the sol- tine aircraft were more frequent, and supplies, medicadiers and the population have the will to resist, are unwill- tion, radio equipment inid, most imnportant, military-poing to consider themselves conquered, defeated or occu- litical leaders and organirers arrived more frequently in

pied, and have territory to give up. the winter. Anti-guerrilla action by the Germans could

In China, Viet Nam, Russia and Finland experience not be conducted with sufficient vigor during the winterin irregular warfare has been accumulated. Part of that time.

knowledge is applicable in winter campaigns. Three prin- The idea that irregular warfare is guerrilla warfare and

ciples are universally applicable in winter guerrilla war- must be left to civilians who presumably rise, arm themfare: I) The enemy pays more. 2) Do not hold on to ter- selves and fight the invader "out of patriotic protest" is

ritory. 3) A guerrilla force is the auxiliary to a regular narrow, naive and wrong. Winter fighting troops must

force. Being subordinate to regulars, guerrillas receive be trained to be capable of operating in an irregular manguidance and coordination from the leadership of the reg- ner behind enemy lines (if there are enemy lines). Civilular operations. ians need to be persuaded, recruited. organized, trained

63
and guided, a complicated task that is difficult to perform give up a territory controlled by guerrillas rather than to

if peacetime preparations were not made. In irregular war- try to control it with half measures. Removal of the popufare small trained units of civilians can be used in addi- lation is a costly and desperate measure. It can never be

tion to independently operating military groups. In gener- properly done; there are always people staying behind.

al, the boundary line between regular and irregular winter Relocating villages means leaving the most stubborn peowarfare must not be kept distinct. Most important, small pie behind and being burdened with the considerable task

winter warfare unit training must include the skills so aptly of taking care of refugee camps.

displayed by the Finns, for example, during the Second Most of all, the rather simple "if... then" rule must alWorld War. ways be applicable. If the adversary chooses irregular deWhat about anti-guerrilla operations? Merely revers- fense, irregular offense must be practiced in winter waring the principles of irregular w nter warfare operations fare.

would be a rather simplistic appr iach and would not constitute a doctrine. As is evident from much experience,

anti-guerrilla warfare may be passive, mainly safety and CLOSING

security measures, and active, devising methods of neu- The use of the terms "war," "peace," "strategy" and

tralizing irregular adversary operations. "tactics" by many of the sources examined indicates the

Guarding and protecting key objectives such as bridg- absence of a clear conception suitable for a definition with

es, airstrips and ammo dumps may be the classical pas- fewer words than would fill a page or two. In diplomacy,

sive approach, and so would be selecting open, safe routes which also uses "strategy" in its lexicon, there are strong

and avoiding places suitable for ambush. Patrolling and words such as "agreement," "treaty" and "contract." Their

the use of escort detachments and blocking positions are power is proportional to the tear resistance of the paper

all effective if sufficient manpower is available. All forc- on which such documensL, are written. History studies such

es using passive measures must be stronger and more mo- documents and interprets the events of the past as influbile than the expected hostile forces. One must consider enced by their content. This study has ignored them. Since

the colossal advantage of the partisans, guerrillas or irreg- observations, and anyone is free to call them insufficient,

ulars if passive measures are practiced. Lookout posts and indicate that wars changed the otherwise predictable

sentries freezing in the snow never know when or from events, and since we have followed only winter warfare

where the adversary will strike. The men in the bunkers events, this work is not a historical treatise.

and shelters are idle and subject to what is called "cabin The art of warfare has become complicated with defever," It is not surprising that so many strong points, out- veloping technology. Examples are presented, from primiposts and security detachments are so often lost to an en- tive methods to the more sophisticated uses of technoloemy who picks his own time to strike. gy in winter warfare. Again, since warfare during warm

Active anti-guerrilla measures begin when a territory seasons and places has been ignored, this work is also

is occupied. A thorough mop-up is perhaps the very first not chronological. The growth of a plant from seed to seedmeasure to be undertaken. If, after a time, the area under ling to maturity is a cycle with an end. The growth of

control shows evidence that irregular armed groups are winter warfare skills also seems to be a cycle, with its

beginning to accumulate, sanctuaries and bases of opera- end not yet in sight. Also, it has been shown that this

tion must be recognized and destroyed or kept under con- growth has been far from orderly and healthy. Many growtrol. Raids and penetrations must be conducted ener- ing branches dried out, and growth, or more precisely

getically and fast; at all times the initiative must be kept. winter warfare development, acceptance and recognition,

An important measure, perhaps political in nature, is had to start several times from the beginning. Yet we have

to ensure the cooperation of the population. The Germans, had only seven and one-half centuries under scrutiny.

after occupying a large part of European Russia, initially To fight a war a leader needs men, weapons, iransporhad a large part of the population on their side. But inef- tation, suitable supplies, and clothing. The first one havfective propaganda, which did not correspond to native ing and adapting all this for winter warfare was Gen-his

population policy, as well as harsh treatment spoiled their Khan. He also recognized and used the advantages of winchance of retaining the people's support. In this way they ter warfare. What happened to these experiences? They

lost an effective source of information and the hostile pop- were ignored and forgotten!

ulation systematically cooperated with the other side. At the other end of the continent the Swedes adopted

Imaginative, sincere propaganda, together with a sensi- skis for winter warfare. The effect was similar to that of

ble, informed population policy are perhaps the most ef- the Mongolian cavalry-speed and unpredictability. Subfective anti-guerrilla measures. sequent developments brought about heavy baggage trains

Under some circumstances it may be advantageous to that provided "creature comforts" to everlower-ranking

leaders, until winter movement became difficult. Then,

64
later on, the ever-increasing weight of artillery pieces al- Dynamic middle echelon leadership used means to

most totally immobilized winter armies. Other Swedish "interpret" (adapt or circumvent) such commands from

ideas-to use sled-mounted light artillery and to take the top. The result was succe- and victory (lb)o'v 1965).

proper care of the men-were glowing examples of pro- The seeming paradox-improved communication, loss

gress in winter warfare. It took less than 50 years to of touch with reality-is labeled, without explanation,

ignore and forget them. as leadership crisis, and we encountered it on several

What was going on? To use a modem expression, occasions. We came close to offering the explanation that

dynamic changes in leadership affected operations. Large whenever the leader concentrates more power than his

numbers of people were sent to the battlefield. How were power of reasoning can handle, he takes mental shortthey handled? In large columns. How was their move- cuts and relies on past successes and his orders ignore

ment controlled? Visually, from a "commanding posi- reality. Only in such a way can we explain the absence

tion." And what was needed to enhance this contiol? of any provision for winter warfare in the seemingly thorColorful, distinct uniforms. But from a distance any col- ough, methodical and logical plan "Barbarossa." Hitler

or except white is black against a snow background, and wanted to finish with Russia before the onset of winter,

the uniform did not protect against the weather. The sit- and did not take the time to reason along the lines startuation did not provide satisfactory results. Hence winter ing with "What if.""

quarters. While the crisis of uncontrolled leadership may be exIn essence we see a succession of cases where winter plainable, we cannot explain why planners and leaders

warfare was either deliberately disregarded to make plan- of so many major campaigns so thoroughly disregarded

ning easier, or to have better "control" of the battlefield, the winter warfare experience and innovations of their

but it may also be that winter campaigns were avoided predecessors.

to avoid the unpleasant. There is an interesting custom in the western world.

Somewhat apart is leadership. Indeed, leading, com- Authors, upon completing a poem, fiction, or a philomanding a battle between two large masses of people, sophical or historical work, dedicate it. The dedication is

may have, after a certain critical size was reached, be- a crisp statement expressing in most cases gratitude, apcome a formidable task sometime around the beginning preciation or admiration. When the work, whatever it may

of the 19th century. The will ot the commander (from be, is completed, the dedication goes on the frontispiece.

the command post on the hill) could be conveyed only The reasons for it are multifarious. One frequently sees

initially: "Start the battle!" (by raising a flag or dropping the phrase: "To my beloved wife, without whose inspia handkerchief). But later, commands to modify attacks, ration the work would have been impossible," meaning

to change the course, to engage reserves could be exe- perhaps that she did not very often mobilize the author

cuted only with difficulty and often too late. An exam- away from the desk to do the dishes. (We only mean to

ple is the battle between the Russians and Napoleon in say that the persons mentioned in the dedication never

1812. Had it taken place in winter it would have been receive full and specified credit.)

complete chaos. But Napoleon should not have concen- If it were appropriate to dedicate this work to sometrated so many people on one battlefield anyway. In body, it would be the type of military leader who disre1877-1878 the Russians had smaller concentrations of garded past experiences in winter warfare, had more powpeople and used the telegraph extensively. er than his reasoning could handle, used modern

So instead of having small mobile units operating with communications to abuse his command power, and was

initiative and efficiency we see that the leadership had a incapable of planning and predicting. Together with futendency to use the developing means of communica- ture leaders, we wish those past leaders to rest in a place

tion to impose its will in more minute detail upon pro- which, tradition says, is much warmer than a snow-covgressively smaller units. It is an irony-the more sophis- ered battlefield. They deserve it. Indeed, if all were skillticated the communications, the more explicit the orders ful in winter warfare, who would need this work? The

that go to the smaller units, and the less imaginative the leaders who disregarded winter warfare made this work

independent small unit action in winter battle. possible. Perhaps also useful...

65
LITERATURE CITED logo grunta v fortifikatsii (The use of snow, ice and froThe examined literature contains historical books of zen ground in fortification). Moscow: Voienizdat. Clark, A. (1965) Barbarossa. New York: William Moreither a general or specific nature. Other documents pro- Clarow and C any.

vide instruction in winter warfare techniques. Individual row and Company.

works are indicated by author, date, tie 832) Vom Kreige (On War). [This

Perkseiodicalstare so maurked. aTe, exaitnatind publimportant work has appeared in many publications and

Periodicals are so marked. The examination of many editions. In 1953 there was an edition with unauthorized

events required information from foreign sources. When- changes in it-historically unacceptable, as one authority

ever it was practical the title was transliterated, with the stated. A good English edition is: London: Rutledge &

translation given in parentheses. Whenever an original Keagan Paul, Inc., 1940.]

and its translation were available, the former was pre- Colliander, S.W. (1954) Russian ski patrols in action.

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Alexandrov, V. (1964) The Tukhachevsky Affair. Engle- MacMillan Company.

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68
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4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS

On Winter Warfare

6. AUTHORS

George K. Swinzow

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER

U.S. Army Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory

72 Lyme Road Special Report 93-12

Hanover, New Hampshire 03755-1290

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Available from NTIS, Springfield, Virginia 22161.

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

The report is a review of the history and art of winter warfare. It attempts to publicize a neglected subject by making historical

facts concerning it available in a single volume, Part I covers winter warfare through the ages, beginning with Genghis Khan

and ending with World War II, a period of 700-odd years. Part III covers the art of winter warfare as practiced during recent

decades. Part II consists of illustrations which present additional points and expand upon the other two parts. It is noted that

throughout history the lessons learned on the subject have continually been ignored and forgottei. All other conditions being

equal, the most important factors determining an army's winter warfare capability are the individual soldier's willingness to

accept hardship, the quality of his training, including survival skills, and his morale. Snow, ice and low temperatures can become a strategic advantage to the well-trained, highly motivated combatant.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBERQF PAGES

Cold regions Frost Snow Winter 7

Cold weather Ice Unconventional warfare 16. PRICE CODE

History Skiing Warfare

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