IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA

September 2019 Term

_____________

No. 18-0356

_____________

STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA ex rel. DANITA LADANYE,

ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF 

JONATHAN S. LADANYE,

Petitioner

V.

WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATIVE CLAIMS COMMISSION AND

WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 

DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS,

Respondents

________________________________________________

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WRIT DENIED

________________________________________________

Submitted: October 16, 2019

Filed: November 22, 2019

Mark R. Staun

David B. Lunsford

Hartley Law Group, PLLC

Wheeling, West Virginia

and

Sean J. Sawyer

Higinbotham & Higinbotham, PLLC

Fairmont, West Virginia

Attorneys for the Petitioner

Stacy A. Jacques

Francis M. Curnutte

Charleston, West Virginia

Attorneys for the Respondent

West Virginia Department of 

Transportation, Division of Highways

Doren Burrell

Staff Attorney 

West Virginia Legislature Joint 

Committee on Government and 

Finance

FILED

November 22, 2019

released at 3:00 p.m.

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
JUSTICE JENKINS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE ARMSTEAD, deeming himself disqualified, did not participate.

JUDGE WHARTON, sitting by temporary assignment. 

Charleston, West Virginia

and

Daniel W. Greear

Chief Counsel 

West Virginia House of Delegates

Charleston, West Virginia

and

James M. Bailey

Chief Counsel

West Virginia Senate

Charleston, West Virginia

Attorneys for the Respondent

West Virginia Legislative 

Claims Commission
i

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1. “Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy resorted to for the purpose of 

supply[ing] a defect of justice in cases obviously entitled to redress and yet unprovided for 

by the ordinary forms of proceeding.” Syllabus point 1, Poe v. Machine Works, 24 W. Va. 

517 (1884). 

2. “Where it is proper to review the proceedings of inferior jurisdictions, 

where neither appeal, writ of error[,] or supersedeas are allowed to lie, resort may be had 

to certiorari.” Syllabus point 1, Meeks v. Windon, 10 W. Va. 180 (1877). 

3. Review by writ of certiorari to this Court does not lie as to a nonbinding recommendation of the West Virginia Legislative Claims Commission made 

pursuant to West Virginia Code § 14-2-12 (2019) that does not involve an existing or 

special appropriation and as to which the West Virginia Legislature has not taken final 

action. 
1

Jenkins, Justice:

Petitioner, Danita Ladanye, Administratrix of the Estate of Jonathan S. 

Ladanye (“Mrs. Ladanye”), requests this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to vacate an

opinion issued on February 27, 2018, by Respondent, the West Virginia Legislative Claims 

Commission (the “Claims Commission”).

1

 On December 9, 2015,

2 Mrs. Ladanye 

submitted a notice of claim with the Claims Commission against Respondent, the West 

Virginia Department of Transportation, Division of Highways (“the WVDOT”), following 

the death of her son. Subsequent to discovery and a hearing, the Claims Commission issued 

an opinion that stated it “[was] of the opinion to deny this claim.” Before us now, Mrs. 

Ladanye contends that this Court has the authority, on a limited basis, to review an opinion 

issued by the Claims Commission on a writ of certiorari. Mrs. Ladanye further contends 

that several errors were committed during the hearing before the Claims Commission and 

in the resulting opinion. Upon review of the parties’ briefs, oral arguments, the submitted 

record, and the pertinent authorities, we deny the requested writ of certiorari because we 

find that the opinion of the Claims Commission is not reviewable by this Court on a writ 

of certiorari at this procedural posture. 

 

1 The Claims Commission was formerly known as the West Virginia Court 

of Claims. See W. Va. Code § 14-2-4 (LexisNexis 2019). Since its creation in 1941, the 

Claims Commission has been known by several names, including the State Court of 

Claims, the Court of Claims, and the West Virginia Legislative Claims Commission. We 

will use these names interchangeably throughout this Opinion. 

2 We note that Mrs. Ladanye’s notice of claim is dated December 9, 2015; 

however, it appears to have been deemed filed by the Claims Commission on December 

14, 2015. The actual date of filing has no bearing on the outcome of this matter.
2

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 17, 2014, there was a single vehicle crash in Monongalia 

County, West Virginia. Mrs. Ladanye’s son, Jonathan S. Ladanye (“Mr. Ladanye”), was 

one of two passengers in a vehicle operated by James A. Coffman (“Mr. Coffman”) that 

ramped over a snow pile along a bridge parapet wall on Interstate 79. The vehicle then fell 

approximately thirty feet to the roadway below the bridge. The WVDOT contends that 

Mr. Coffman accelerated on the entrance ramp of Interstate 79 until the vehicle completed 

three 360 degree spins on the icy roadway. Mr. Coffman continued to drive the vehicle, 

fishtailing around the road until he hit and drove over the side of the bridge. Mr. Ladanye 

was seriously injured from the accident and was subsequently pronounced dead at Ruby 

Memorial Hospital in Morgantown, West Virginia.3 According to the WVDOT, Mr. 

Coffman had a blood alcohol content of .218 and illegal drugs in his system. 

On December 9, 2015, Mrs. Ladanye, as administratrix of her son’s estate, 

submitted a notice of claim with the Claims Commission against the WVDOT. In her notice 

of claim, Mrs. Ladanye alleged that “the fatal crash was caused by, inter alia, [the 

WVDOT’s] failure to maintain Interstate 79 pursuant to the standards outlined in [the 

WVDOT’s] Maintenance Division Performance Standards.” In particular, Mrs. Ladanye 

asserted that the vehicle “encountered a large snow pile on the shoulder of the bridge which 

 

3 Mr. Coffman and the second passenger survived the vehicle accident. 
3

paralleled and covered the parapet wall of the bridge” and “[w]hen the vehicle encountered 

the large snow pile that covered the top of the parapet wall, the snow pile acted as a ramp, 

and the vehicle launched over the parapet wall of the bridge, falling to Fairmont Road 

below the bridge.” Mrs. Ladanye contended that the WVDOT was negligent in failing to 

timely remove the snow pile and that it was reasonably foreseeable “that a vehicle may be 

launched over a parapet wall to the ground below if the vehicle encounter[ed] an uncleaned 

snow pile on the shoulder of the bridge[.]” In response, the WVDOT contended that it was 

not negligent and that the snow removal activities of the Division of Highways were

appropriate and consistent with its policies and procedures. The WVDOT further argued 

that the sole and proximate cause of the vehicle accident in question was the negligence of 

Mr. Coffman. 

Following discovery, on August 16, 2017, Mrs. Ladanye and the WVDOT

engaged in a one-day hearing before the Claims Commission. During the hearing, Mrs. 

Ladanye produced three witnesses: William Yaskoweak, First Sergeant with the 

Monongalia County Sheriff’s Office; Larry Weaver, designated representative for the

WVDOT; and Kevin Beachy, an expert. The WVDOT produced two witnesses: Jerry 

Pigman, an expert; and Larry Weaver. After the conclusion of the hearing, the Claims

Commission, on February 27, 2018, issued its opinion that Mrs. Ladanye’s claim for 

compensation for the death of her son should be denied. The opinion stated that 

[t]he law in the State of West Virginia has been adhered 

to by this Commission consistently in that [the WVDOT] may 

be held liable for defective conditions on its roads only where 
4

it has been established that the [WVDOT] knew or should have 

known of the defective condition and had a reasonable time in 

which to take corrective action. 

Furthermore, the opinion provided that 

[a]fter having carefully reviewed the testimony, the 

exhibits admitted into evidence, the argument of counsel and 

the findings of facts and conclusions of law submitted at the 

conclusion of the hearing, the Commission is of the opinion 

that [the WVDOT] was not negligent in its maintenance of the 

Westover Bridge parapet when this accident occurred.

It further stated that the Claims Commission was “also of the opinion that there were 

circumstances surrounding this accident [that] would have made a recovery by [Mrs. 

Ladanye] difficult.” Finally, the opinion concluded that 

[a]lthough the Commission is not unmindful of the tragedy 

[that] has occurred for [Mrs. Ladanye] as the mother of the 

deceased, the Commission must base its decisions upon the 

facts and the law as it relates to each claim. 

Accordingly, the Commission is of the opinion to deny this 

claim. 

On March 6, 2018, Mrs. Ladanye filed with the Claims Commission a motion 

to alter or amend the opinion. In her motion, Mrs. Ladanye asserted that several factual 

findings made by the Claims Commission were clearly wrong based upon the evidence 

presented at the hearing; that there were “glaring omissions contained within the 

conclusions of law”; and that the Claims Commission “blindly ignore[d] the evidence 

presented[,] . . . the weight of such evidence, and the laws of West Virginia.” On March

13, 2018, the Claims Commission entered an Order noting that it “considered [Mrs. 

Ladanye’s] Motion . . . requesting a rehearing and reconsideration of the Commission’s 
5

Opinion[.]” The Claims Commission’s March 13, 2018 Order found “that there [were] no 

new issues or newly-discovered evidence presented in [Mrs. Ladanye’s] Motion that 

mandate either an appeal or a new hearing[.]” The Order stated that the claim “remain[ed] 

disallowed[4]and dismissed” the matter from the docket of the Claims Commission. From 

these adverse findings and recommendations, Mrs. Ladanye seeks a writ of certiorari from 

this Court. 

II.

STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT

Mrs. Ladanye brought this action seeking a writ of certiorari from the opinion 

of the Claims Commission. A petition for a writ of certiorari invokes this Court’s original 

jurisdiction. See W. Va. Const. art. VIII, §3 (“The [S]upreme [C]ourt of [A]ppeals shall 

have original jurisdiction of proceedings in habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition[,] and

certiorari.”). We have stated that a writ of certiorari “is an extraordinary remedy used in 

cases where there has been an error in justice which cannot be reviewed and corrected by 

the ordinary forms of procedure.” Ashworth v. Hatcher, 98 W. Va. 323, 325, 128 S.E. 93, 

94 (1924) (citations omitted). Furthermore, we have previously held that “[a] writ of 

 

4 While the statutory provisions that govern the Claims Commission do not 

precisely define a “disallowed claim,” they do define the opposite, an “approved claim.” 

Pursuant to West Virginia Code § 14-2-3 (LexisNexis 2019), an “approved claim” is 

defined as “a claim found by the [Claims C]ommission to be one that should be paid under 

the provisions of this article.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, it is logical to find that a 

“disallowed claim” is a claim found by the Claims Commission to be one that should not

be paid. 
6

certiorari will lie from an inferior tribunal, acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, 

where substantial rights are alleged to have been violated and where there is no other 

statutory right of review given.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, North v. Bd. of Regents, 160 W. Va. 

248, 233 S.E.2d 411 (1977). 

Elaborating on the discretionary nature of the writ of certiorari, this Court 

has explained that 

[t]he extraordinary remedy of certiorari is not granted as 

a matter of right, but rather is relief that rests within the sound 

discretion of the Court: “The remedy by writ of certiorari . . . 

to review the judgment of a[n inferior tribunal], is not given as 

a matter of right, but is awarded by the court . . . for cause on 

proper case shown.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, Harrow v. Ohio River 

R.R. Co., 38 W. Va. 711, 18 S.E. 926 (1894). Accord W. Va. 

Rev. R. App. Proc. 16(a) (“Issuance by the Court of an 

extraordinary writ is not a matter of right, but of discretion 

sparingly exercised.”); Syl. pt. 2, in part, Welch v. County 

Court of Wetzel Cnty., 29 W. Va. 63, 1 S.E. 337 (1886) (“A 

writ of certiorari is not a writ of right, but the issuing of it is 

dependent on a sound judicial discretion[.]”). 

Foster Found. v. Gainer, 228 W. Va. 99, 104, 717 S.E.2d 883, 888 (2011) (alteration in 

original). Moreover, a writ of “[c]ertiorari is an extraordinary remedy resorted to for the 

purpose of supply[ing] a defect of justice in cases obviously entitled to redress and yet 

unprovided for by the ordinary forms of proceeding.” Syl. pt. 1, Poe v. Mach. Works, 24 

W. Va. 517 (1884). Therefore, the writ of certiorari is proper only when there exist no other 

means of reviewing the lower tribunal’s decision. Accordingly, “[w]here it is proper to 

review the proceedings of inferior jurisdictions, where neither appeal, writ of error[,] or 
7

supersedeas are allowed to lie, resort may be had to certiorari.” Syl. pt. 1, Meeks v. 

Windon, 10 W. Va. 180 (1877). 

Additionally, “[w]hen determining whether to award a writ of certiorari in a 

particular case, the standard for the issuance of the writ is quite limited.” Foster Found., 

228 W. Va. at 104, 717 S.E.2d at 888. We have held that “[t]he scope of review under the 

common law writ of certiorari is very narrow. It does not involve an inquiry into the 

intrinsic correctness of the decision of the tribunal below, but only into the manner in which 

the decision was reached.” Syl. pt. 3, id., 228 W. Va. 99, 717 S.E.2d 883. With the 

foregoing in mind, we turn to the parties’ arguments. 

III.

DISCUSSION

Although Mrs. Ladanye presents six questions in her petition for writ of 

certiorari, we resolve this case based upon the threshold question of whether this Court has 

the authority to review an opinion issued by the Claims Commission. Accordingly, we do 

not reach the remaining five questions presented by Mrs. Ladanye.

In the matter sub judice, Mrs. Ladanye asserts that this Court has original 

jurisdiction through a writ of certiorari to review the underlying opinion of the Claims 

Commission because in Foster Foundation v. Gainer, 228 W. Va. 99, 717 S.E.2d 883

(2011), this Court found it proper to review, by writ of certiorari, a matter from the court 
8

of claims. Mrs. Ladanye does acknowledge that after the decision in Foster Foundation,

there was a recently enacted statute, West Virginia Code § 14-2-28 (LexisNexis 2019), that 

limits judicial review of the opinions of the Claims Commission. However, Mrs. Ladanye

argues that 

the Legislature’s attempt to preclude judicial review of 

findings and recommendations made by the [] Claims 

Commission is unconstitutional as it seeks to preclude this 

Court from exercising original jurisdiction review of decisions 

made by the [] Claims Commission and further interferes with 

the separation of powers established by the West Virginia 

Constitution.

In response, the WVDOT contends that this Court does not have the power 

to review an opinion rendered by the Claims Commission because the Commission is 

merely “the fact-finding arm” of the West Virginia Legislature (“Legislature”) and is not a 

“court.” It further asserts that this very issue was addressed in the new statutory language

contained in West Virginia Code § 14-2-28(b). Additionally, the WVDOT argues that,

“[u]nlike the Workers[’] Compensation Board of Review or other similar quasi-judicial 

bodies, the Claims Commission has no actual authority to award anything. It simply makes 

recommendations.” 

In its original response to this Court, the Claims Commission conceded that 

this Court may review the determination of a claim before the Claims Commission through 

a writ of certiorari, but that the scope of the Court’s review is limited. However, subsequent 

to its original briefing, the Claims Commission moved this Court to file supplemental 
9

briefing.

5

 In its supplemental brief, the Claims Commission takes an opposite position

from its original brief and asserts that the opinions of the Claims Commission are merely 

recommendations prior to the final determination of the Legislature to approve, modify, or 

reject the recommendations, and incorporating its decision into an act of the Legislature. 

Specifically, the Claims Commission argues that an opinion of the Claims Commission is 

an intermediate event in a legislative procedure and not a final determination of rights. The 

Claims Commission asserts that until the Legislature as a whole has enacted a claims bill,6

no moral obligation exists in law, and the recommendations of the Claims Commission are 

not enforceable. The Claims Commission further contends that West Virginia Code § 14-

2-28(b) is simply a codification of judicial precedents; it merely provides that the statute is 

both a definition of the limited role of the Claims Commission and the application of 

principles from prior decisions of this Court. Additionally, the Claims Commission argues 

that the Legislature’s review of the recommendations of the Claims Commission is not 

merely a formality of process, but represents an independent review that may result in a 

decision by the Legislature contrary to the Claims Commission’s recommended decision. 

 

5 By order entered on April 29, 2019, this Court granted the Claims 

Commission’s motion for leave and ordered the supplemental brief to be filed. 

6

 A “claims bill” is a special bill that generally compensates a particular 

individual or entity for injuries or losses against the State which would otherwise be 

immune from suit. According to the Claims Commission, a claims bill is “introduced in 

each house of the Legislature, reviewed in committee, debated on the floor of each house, 

and ultimately enacted into law by votes of the House of Delegates and the Senate.” Once 

voted on by the Legislature, it is submitted to the Governor. 
10

Mrs. Ladanye did not directly respond to the Claims Commission’s argument 

that its decision is not final, but rather re-asserted her arguments that article eight, section 

3 of the West Virginia Constitution provides this Court with original jurisdiction in 

certiorari and this Court has interpreted that article of the West Virginia Constitution as 

allowing it to review decisions reached by the Claims Commission. 

Mrs. Ladanye’s arguments would lead us to believe that judicial review has 

always been available pursuant to the Claims Commission’s statutory framework until the 

Legislature added subsection (b) to West Virginia Code § 14-2-28 in 2014, and essentially 

precluded judicial review of the Claims Commission’s findings and award 

recommendations. Given these arguments, the State’s significant history regarding

sovereign immunity and claims against the State, and the various frameworks of the Claims 

Commission, we think it necessary to provide a brief historical overview. 

Our State constitution provides sovereign immunity protections and does not 

allow for suits to be brought against the State. Pursuant to article six, section thirty-five of 

this State’s Constitution, 

[t]he State of West Virginia shall never be made defendant in 

any court of law or equity, except the State of West Virginia, 

including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein, 

or any officer, agent, or employee thereof, may be made 

defendant in any garnishment or attachment proceeding, as 

garnishee or suggestee.
11

However, to “ameliorate the harshness of the constitutional bar to suits against the State” 

the Legislature created the Court of Claims “which [was] authorized to consider and 

approve claims against the State not otherwise cognizable in the regular courts of the State, 

and to recommend an award to the Legislature.” Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. W. Va. Bd. of 

Regents, 172 W. Va. 743, 754 n.7, 310 S.E.2d 675, 686 n.7 (1983). 

Specifically, in 1941, the Legislature created the State Court of Claims. The 

Court of Claims’ purpose was

to provide a simple and expeditious method for the 

consideration of claims against the state that because of the 

provisions of section thirty-five, article six of the constitution 

of the state, and of statutory restrictions, inhibitions or 

limitations, cannot be determined in a court of law or equity; 

and to provide for proceedings in which the state has a special 

interest.

W. Va. Code § 14-2-1 (Michie 1941). See also Walter M. Elswick, State Court of Claims, 

49 W. Va. L. Q. 45, 45 (1942). Moreover, § 14-2-4 created the “State Court of Claims” 

“which shall be a special instrumentality of the legislature for the purpose of considering 

claims against the state, . . . and recommending the disposition thereof to the legislature.” 

W. Va. Code § 14-2-4 (Michie 1941). Section four further provided that “[a] determination 

made by the court shall not be subjected to appeal to or review by a court of law or equity

created by or pursuant to article eight of the constitution.” Id. (emphasis added).

Regarding the 1941 statutory framework, the Court in State ex rel. Adkins v. 

Sims, 127 W. Va. 786, 789-90, 34 S.E.2d 585, 586 (1945), stated that “the Court of Claims 
12

is not a judicial body, but its function is entirely legislative and recommendatory. Code, 

14-2-4. It, alone, does not determine whether a moral obligation rests upon the State of 

West Virginia.” Thus, the Court observed that 

[n]o review lies to its findings except to the extent that the 

Legislature may adopt or reject. The Courts consider them only 

to the extent that they may become a part of the legislative 

procedure in the particular matters under consideration. Their 

findings determine no legal nor moral right that would 

overcome legislative decision to disregard them. 

Id., 127 W. Va. at 790, 34 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added).7 

 

7 One commentator stated as follows:

As to the position that the Court of Claims assumes in aiding 

the legislative determination, it should be remembered that the 

Court of Claims has only the capacity of a legislative 

committee. In 1941, to assist the legislature to arrive correctly 

at the proper decision, and to provide an expeditious 

consideration of claims against the state, the State Court of 

Claims was created. W. Va. Code c. 14, art. 2, § 1 (Michie, 

1943). . . . A determination of the Court of Claims is not 

subject to appeal or review by a court of law: the findings of 

the Court of Claims may be adopted or rejected by the 

legislature as its own determination of such facts . . . . State 

ex. rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 436, 43 S. E.2d 805, 

811 (1947). This court has no power to issue an award itself; 

it may only recommend action to the legislature; the 

legislature, in approving this recommendation is granting its 

own award. Having no power in itself, the Court of Claims is 

only a step in the procedure of making a claim against the 

state. It serves to “weed out” unworthy claims, and thereby 

saves the legislature valuable time, while assuring the 

claimants that their claims have received thorough 

examination. 

Paul James Fourney, Note, Moral Obligation-Who Shall be the Keeper of the State’s 

Conscience, 52 W. Va. L. Rev. 57, 64 n.33 (1949) (emphasis added).
13

In 1953, the statutory framework for allowing claims to be brought against 

the State was slightly altered. Rather than having the State Court of Claims provide the 

Legislature with the investigations of claims against the State and the resulting 

recommendations, the attorney general was enabled with that authority. The new statutory 

framework provided that “[t]he attorney general is hereby authorized to act as a special 

instrumentality of the legislature for the purpose of considering claims against the State, 

. . . and recommending the disposition thereof to the legislature.” W. Va. Code § 14-2-3 

(LexisNexis 1966) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the statute expressly provided that “[a] 

determination made by the attorney general shall not be subject to review by a court of law 

or equity created by or pursuant to article VIII of the Constitution.” W. Va. Code § 14-2-

3. (emphasis added). 

Thereafter, in 1967, the Legislature once again altered the statutory 

framework for these matters against the State. In the 1967 revised statutory framework, 

the investigatory authority of the attorney general was removed. Instead, West Virginia 

Code § 14-2-4 (LexisNexis 1991) created the “court of claims.” Furthermore, West 

Virginia Code § 14-2-12 (LexisNexis 1991) set forth the general powers of the court of 

claims. These powers include the authority of the court of claims to consider each claim

in accordance with the provisions set forth in Article 2. Notably absent from the 1967 

statutory framework is any language prohibiting review by a court of law or equity.

However, during this time, the Court nevertheless continued to note that 
14

[t]he Court of Claims is advisory and recommendatory in 

character to both the legislature and state agencies where . . . 

an appropriation has not been made in advance of the Court’s 

action. Its function in that manner is not judicial. It is created 

by the legislature with one of its purposes [being] that of 

conducting investigations in aid of legislative actions for 

obtaining information necessary to enable the legislature to 

discharge its functions and to exercise its power of legislation. 

The legislature may accept or reject its findings, or approve or 

disapprove its recommendations.

State ex rel. Stollings v. Gainer, 153 W. Va. 484, 491, 170 S.E.2d 817, 822 (1969) (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). 

In 2014, the Legislature again modified this statutory framework with the 

most relevant change being the adoption of subsection (b) to West Virginia Code § 14-2-

28 (LexisNexis 2014), which provides that 

[b]ecause a decision of the court is a recommendation 

to the Legislature based upon a finding of moral obligation, and 

the enactment process of passage of legislation authorizing 

payments of claims recommended by the court is at legislative 

discretion, no right of appeal exists to findings and award 

recommendations of the court of claims and they are not 

subject to judicial review.

(Emphasis added). Finally, in 2017 the Legislature made one additional alteration by 

changing the name from the “court of claims” to the “West Virginia Legislative Claims 

Commission.” W. Va. Code § 14-2-4 (LexisNexis 2019).

As stated above, in its supplemental briefing, the Claims Commission argues 

that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review its opinions because it is only an 
15

intermediate part of a legislative procedure, and does not render a final determination of 

rights. In support of its argument, the Claims Commission argues that “[u]ntil the 

Legislature has enacted a claims bill, no moral obligation exists in law and 

recommendations of the Commission are not enforceable.” 

This Court has, with limited exceptions, consistently acknowledged the 

importance and necessity of reviewing matters only after a final determination has been 

made. See State ex rel. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 222 W. Va. 37, 45, 658 

S.E.2d 728, 736 (2008) (“It would be premature on our part to prohibit the circuit court 

from doing that which it has yet to rule upon.”). See also State ex rel. W. Va. Dep’t of 

Transportation, Div. of Highways v. Kaufman, No. 18-0864, 2019 WL 1468584, at *5 

(W. Va. Apr. 2, 2019) (memorandum decision) (“Critically, parties must exhaust the 

remedies available to them . . . before initiating original jurisdiction proceedings before 

this Court.”).8 Furthermore, in Strahin v. Lantz, 193 W. Va. 285, 286 n.1, 456 S.E.2d 12, 

 

8 But see Syl. pt. 3, Lower Donnally Ass’n v. Charleston Mun. Planning 

Comm’n, 212 W. Va. 623, 575 S.E.2d 233 (2002) (“The final actions of a planning 

commission adopting a comprehensive plan or amendments to it, approving or rejecting 

plats or plans of subdivisions, and adopting a final report with respect to a zoning 

ordinance, regardless of whether that report is an initial report or a revised and resubmitted 

report, are subject to review by writ of certiorari regardless of whether the final action of 

the planning commission is dispositive of the matter or is followed by legislative action of 

the governing body. Insofar as Garrison v. City of Fairmont, 150 W. Va. 498, 147 S.E.2d 

397 (1966), conflicts, that holding is hereby modified.”). However, we decline to extend 

the reasoning found in Lower Donnally Association to the present matter because we find 

it to be distinguishable because one of the reasons the Court allowed review was that the 

Legislature had granted judicial review of planning commission actions pursuant to a 
16

13 n.1 (1995), we addressed the finality requirement by “adopt[ing] a practical 

interpretation that looks to the intention of the circuit court. See Vaughn v. Mobil Oil 

Exploration and Producing Southeast, Inc., 891 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.1990) (holding the 

intention of the circuit court is controlling in final judgment determinations).” While we 

acknowledge this procedure was in relation to direct appeals, we find it persuasive in the 

instant matter. 

The Legislature has made its intention clear that the opinions of the Claims 

Commission are merely non-binding recommendations. In the 1941 version of the statute, 

the Legislature explicitly stated that the State Court of Claims only “recommend[ed] the 

disposition thereof to the legislature.” W. Va. Code § 14-2-4. Again in 1953, the 

Legislature stated that the attorney general only “recommend[ed] the disposition thereof to 

the legislature.” W. Va. Code § 14-2-3. In 2014, the Legislature once again stated that the 

Court of Claims’ opinion was only “a recommendation[.]” W. Va. Code § 14-2-28(b) 

(LexisNexis 2014).9 Additionally, this Court has repeatedly commented since the Claims 

 

statute, West Virginia Code § 8-24-38 (repealed 2004). Id., 212 W. Va. at 630, 575 S.E.2d 

at 240. 

9 The Legislature has also stated that 

[n]o liability shall be imposed upon the [S]tate or any state 

agency by a determination of the commission approving a 

claim and recommending an award, unless the claim is: (1) 

Made under an existing appropriation, in accordance with 

section nineteen [§14-2-19] of this article; or (2) a claim under 
17

Commission’s initial inception in 1941 that the opinions of the Claims Commission are 

merely recommendations and advisory in nature. See State ex rel. McLaughlin v. W. Va.

Court of Claims, 209 W. Va. 412, 415, 549 S.E.2d 286, 289 (2001) (per curiam) (“The 

Court of Claims is an administrative arm of the West Virginia Legislature, not a court 

created within the judicial branch of government.”); G.M. McCrossin, Inc. v. W. Va. Bd. of 

Regents, 177 W. Va. 539, 543, 355 S.E.2d 32, 36 (1987) (“[A]n award of the court of 

claims is not binding on the Legislature.”); Pittsburgh Elevator Co., 172 W. Va. at 754 n.7, 

310 S.E.2d at 686 n.7 (“[T]he recommendation of the Court of Claims is not binding on 

the Legislature, which may accept or reject the court’s findings and approve or disapprove 

its recommendations.”); Russell Transfer, Inc. v. Moore, 158 W. Va. 534, 540, 212 S.E.2d 

433, 436 (1975) (“It would appear, however, that the Legislature in approving claims 

against the State would create debts of the State. After satisfaction of all statutory 

requirements, including those contained in Code, 14-2-23, the debts become final unless 

subjected to a successful judicial attack.”); State ex rel. Stollings, 153 W. Va. at 491, 170 

S.E.2d at 822 (“The Court of Claims is advisory and recommendatory in character to both 

the legislature and state agencies where, as here, an appropriation has not been made in 

advance of the Court’s action. Its function in that manner is not judicial. . . . The legislature 

may accept or reject its findings, or approve or disapprove its recommendations.”); State 

 

a special appropriation, as provided in section twenty [§ 14-2-

20] of this article.

W. Va. Code § 14-2-12 (LexisNexis 2019).
18

ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 436, 43 S.E.2d 805, 811 (1947) (“The Legislature 

may accept or reject [the Court of Claims’] findings or approve or disapprove its 

recommendations. [State ex rel.] Adkins v. Sims, 127 W. Va. 786, 34 S.E.2d 585

[(1945)].”). 

Furthermore, as this Court has stated, the 

[Claims Commission], alone, does not determine whether a 

moral obligation rests upon the State of West Virginia. No 

review lies to its findings except to the extent that the 

Legislature may adopt or reject. The Courts consider them 

only to the extent that they may become a part of the legislative 

procedure in the particular matters under consideration. Their 

findings determine no legal nor moral right that would 

overcome legislative decision to disregard them.

State ex rel. Adkins, 127 W. Va. at 790, 34 S.E.2d at 586 (emphasis added). Moreover, 

“[a] legislative body cannot delegate its final power to a committee, and, except as 

especially authorized, the committee’s acts have no force but remain subject to approval, 

modification, or rejection of the parent body.” State ex rel. Todd v. Essling, 128 N.W.2d 

307, 314 (1964). The Legislature’s intention that the opinions of the Claims Commission 

are not final because further Legislative action is required is clear. 

The 2014 statutory amendment contained in West Virginia Code § 14-2-

28(b) does nothing more than return to language that the Legislature had originally adopted 
19

in 1941 where the code provisions explicitly stated that no judicial review is allowed.10 

This 2014 amendment only provides further clarification and explicitly codifies what this 

Court has repeatedly stated since at least 1945: the Claims Commission’s decision “is a 

recommendation to the Legislature based upon a finding of moral obligation, and the 

enactment process of passage of legislation authorizing payments of claims recommended 

by the commission is at legislative discretion[.]” W. Va. Code § 14-2-28(b).11 Thus, in 

 

10

 To the extent Mrs. Ladanye argues that the 2014 statutory amendment to 

West Virginia Code § 14-2-28 is unconstitutional, we are not persuaded. First, we have 

held that “‘[e]very presumption is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, 

and it can never be declared unconstitutional except when it is clearly and plainly so. A 

reasonable doubt as to its unconstitutionality must be resolved in favor of the validity of 

the law.’” State ex rel. Greenbrier Cty. Airport Auth. v. Hanna, 151 W. Va. 479, 491, 153 

S.E.2d 284, 290-91 (1967) (citations omitted). Second, Mrs. Ladanye has offered nothing 

more than a skeletal argument. “We have made clear that ‘[a] skeletal “argument,” really 

nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim[.]’ State, Dep’t of Health v. 

Robert Morris N., 195 W. Va. 759, 765, 466 S.E.2d 827, 833 (1995) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted).” State v. Sites, 241 W. Va. 430, 449, 825 S.E.2d 758, 777 

(2019) (alterations in original). 

11 We note that in her supplemental briefing in response to the Claims 

Commission’s assertion that judicial review is not appropriate due to the lack of finality, 

Mrs. Ladanye does not make any argument that the opinions of the Claims Commission 

are in fact final, or, even if they were not final, that they are of such a nature that we should 

exercise our discretion to hear them. The only argument that Mrs. Ladanye puts forth in 

response is that this Court should follow its past precedent and continue to review Claims 

Commission opinions upon a writ of certiorari. 

With regard to Mrs. Ladanye’s argument that we should follow our past 

precedent in reviewing the Claims Commission’s opinions, we find the limited number of 

cases cited to be readily distinguishable. Specifically, Mrs. Ladanye relies on a footnote 

in G.M. McCrossin, Inc. v. W. Va. Board of Regents, 177 W. Va. 539, 541 n.3, 355 S.E.2d 

32, 33 n.3 (1987), in which we said that “this Court obviously may review decisions of the 

court of claims under the original jurisdiction granted by article VIII, section [3] of our 

Constitution, through proceedings in mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari.” She further 

relies on two additional cases: Foster Foundation v. Gainer, 228 W. Va. 99, 717 S.E.2d 

883 (2011), and State ex rel. Smith v. West Virginia Crime Victims Compensation Fund, 
20

this context the Claims Commission’s opinion is merely a recommendation that is subject 

to further review of the Legislature and is not binding on the Legislature. Therefore, we 

hold that review by writ of certiorari to this Court does not lie as to a non-binding 

recommendation of the West Virginia Legislative Claims Commission made pursuant to 

West Virginia Code § 14-2-12 (2019) that does not involve an existing or special 

appropriation and as to which the West Virginia Legislature has not taken final action. 

 

In this matter, there is no allegation or even suggestion that Mrs. Ladanye’s 

claim was made under an existing appropriation or a special appropriation. Moreover, her 

claim was clearly brought pursuant to the Claims Commission’s authority to consider a 

claim against the State pursuant to West Virginia Code § 14-2-12. Further, there is no 

dispute that at the time this matter was initially brought before us, there had not been any 

final Legislative action taken on the claim. Accordingly, the Claims Commission’s opinion 

regarding its mere recommendation to the Legislature is not appropriate for review by this 

Court at this procedural posture.12 Because we have disposed of this matter on the 

 

232 W. Va. 728, 753 S.E.2d 886 (2013). First, the issue of the finality and actual effect of 

a Claims Commission opinion was not directly brought before and examined by this Court 

in those matters. Second, Mrs. Ladanye has failed to consider that in State ex rel. Smith, 

the decision at issue was brought pursuant to an entirely different code section and 

procedural rules. In the present matter, a claim was brought pursuant to Chapter 14, Article 

2. Claims Against the State, while in State ex rel. Smith, the claim was brought pursuant 

to Chapter 14, Article 2a. Compensation Awards to Victims of Crimes. See State ex rel. 

Smith, 232 W. Va. at 730, 753 S.E.2d at 888. 

12 During oral arguments, it was stated that since the filing of this matter with 

this Court, the Legislature had declined to reject the Claims Commission’s opinion 

regarding this matter. However, because neither party has briefed this precise issue as to 
21

threshold question that we do not have the authority to review this non-binding 

recommendation at this juncture, we do not reach the remaining five questions presented 

by Mrs. Ladanye.13 

Based upon the foregoing, we deny the requested writ of certiorari.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, there is no basis to reverse the opinion of the 

Claims Commission at this stage in the procedural posture. Accordingly, the writ of 

certiorari is denied. 

Writ denied.

 

whether review would be appropriate now that the Legislature has acted, or if so, what 

review would be available, this issue is not properly before us now and we decline to 

address it. We leave this question for another day. 

13 The Claims Commission also asserted that this Court should deny the 

requested writ of the certiorari because the elements of the writ had not been satisfied 

because the Claims Commission is not an “inferior tribunal,” that there is no demonstration 

of a violation of substantial rights, and there is a right of non-judicial review available. 

Because our holding that we cannot review the non-binding opinion for lack of finality is 

dispositive, we do not reach these issues.