96-406

 No. 96-406

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

LINDA LEE MOORE and H. GARY MOORE,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

 v.

IMPERIAL HOTELS CORPORATION,

 Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Yellowstone,

 The Honorable Diane G. Barz, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellants:

 Jack E. Sands, Attorney at Law; Billings, Montana

 For Respondent:

 John O. Mudd and Lucy T. France; Garlington,

 Lohn & Robinson; Missoula, Montana

 Submitted on Briefs: July 2, 1997

 Decided: October 23, 1997 

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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 This is an appeal by Linda Lee Moore and H. Gary Moore from the Yellowstone

County District Court's November 13, 1996, order requiring the Moores to post a 

$5,000

bond to secure payment of Imperial Hotels Corporation's costs on appeal. We reverse

and remand. 

 The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its discretion in 

requiring

the Moores to post a $5,000 bond to cover anticipated attorney fees for an appeal as 

an

element of costs on appeal pursuant to õ 39-2-915, MCA.

 FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Linda Lee and H. Gary Moore filed a wrongful discharge claim, as well as claims

involving violations of wage and hour statutes pursuant to õ 39-3-204, MCA, and õõ 

39-

3-404 and -405, MCA, against Imperial Hotels Corporation in the Thirteenth Judicial

District Court, Yellowstone County, on November 2, 1994. On February 23, 1995,

Imperial made an offer to arbitrate the case pursuant to õ 39-2-914, MCA, and the

Moores refused. A jury returned a verdict in Imperial's favor on January 25, 1996. 

On

February 7, 1996, judgment was entered and the District Court awarded Imperial 

attorney

fees and costs totaling $41,881.33.

 The Moores filed a notice of appeal on March 12, 1996. On November 12, 1996,

counsel for Imperial filed a motion in the District Court requesting that the Moores 

be

ordered to post a bond in the amount of $5,000 in order to secure costs of appeal,

including anticipated attorney fees incurred in defending the appeal. Imperial 

served the

Moores by first class mail with notice of this motion. The next day, November 13, 

1996,

the motion was granted by the District Court without a hearing and before the Moores

filed a responsive brief. That order was appealed on December 6, 1996. 

 On December 17, 1996, this Court ordered that the briefing schedule and

underlying appeal be stayed until the appeal concerning the District Court's bond 

order

was resolved.

 The Moores appeal from the District Court order dated November 13, 1996,

requiring them to post a $5,000 bond to secure payment of Imperial's costs on appeal.

 DISCUSSION

 Did the District Court abuse its discretion in requiring the Moores to post a 

$5,000

bond to cover anticipated attorney fees for an appeal as an element of costs on 

appeal

pursuant to õ 39-2-915, MCA?

 The issue presented here is one involving a district court's order on a posttrial

motion for costs on appeal. Discretionary rulings of a district court include trial

administration issues, post-trial motions, and similar issues. Eagle Ridge Ranch v. 

Park

County (Mont. 1997), 938 P.2d 1342, 1344, 54 St. Rep. 495, 496. The standard of

review of discretionary court rulings is abuse of discretion. May v. First Nat'l 

Pawn

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Brokers, Ltd. (1995), 270 Mont. 132, 134, 890 P.2d 386, 388.

 The Moores sued Imperial under the Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act. 

As part of the act, õ 39-2-915, MCA, provides:

 Effect of rejection of offer to arbitrate. A party who makes a valid offer

 to arbitrate that is not accepted by the other party and who prevails in an

 action under this part is entitled as an element of costs to reasonable

 attorney fees incurred subsequent to the date of the offer. 

Thus, under õ 39-2-915, MCA, if a party declines an offer to arbitrate a dispute and

subsequently loses in court, the prevailing party that made the offer to arbitrate 

is entitled

to reasonable attorney fees incurred after the offer was made.

 Both the Moores and Imperial agree that Imperial made a valid offer to 

arbitrate,

that the Moores, within their rights, declined Imperial's offer to arbitrate, and 

that

Imperial prevailed on the action in the District Court. However, the parties dispute

whether the District Court can require the Moores to post a bond securing Imperial's

anticipated attorney fees for defending the appeal as costs on appeal.

 The Moores argue that the District Court's November 13, 1996, order requiring

them to post a $5,000 bond to cover Imperial's anticipated attorney fees for the 

appeal

is contrary to Rule 6, M.R.App.P., and is not authorized by õ 39-2-915, MCA. The

Moores contend that under Rule 6, the only costs allowed as "costs on appeal" are 

those

costs specifically mentioned in Rule 33, M.R.App.P.

 Imperial counters that the District Court properly required the Moores to post a

$5,000 bond to insure payment of Imperial's costs on appeal. Imperial contends that 

õ

39-2-915, MCA, expressly provides that attorney fees be included as an element of 

costs

on appeal under Rule 6.

 For the reasons stated below, this Court concludes that, for the purposes of

determining the amount of a bond or security under Rule 6, a district court may not

include anticipated attorney fees for the defense of an appeal as part of costs on 

appeal. 

This is not to say, however, that attorney fees incurred on appeal may not 

ultimately be

recovered by a prevailing party when allowable by law.

 Rule 6, M.R.App.P., is entitled "Undertaking for costs on appeal in civil cases"

and provides in relevant part:

 (a) The district court may require an appellant to file a bond or

 provide other security in such form and amount as it finds necessary to

 insure payment of costs on appeal in a civil case. The provisions of Rule

 8(a) apply to a surety upon a bond given pursuant to this rule.

The term "costs on appeal" is not defined under Rule 6. However, Rule 33 defines 

costs

on appeal in civil cases.

 Rule 33, M.R.App.P., provides in relevant part:

 Rule 33. Costs in civil cases. 

 (a) Costs on appeal. Costs on appeal in civil cases will be taxed as

 provided by section 25-10-104, Montana Code Annotated, and if not

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 otherwise provided by the court in its decision, will automatically be

 awarded to the successful party against the other party. All costs on appeal

 shall be claimed as provided by section 25-10-503, Montana Code

 Annotated.

 (b) Costs of briefs and appendices. The cost of printing or otherwise

 producing briefs and appendices shall be taxable at rates not higher than

 specified in Rule 23(g).

 (c) Other costs taxable. Costs incurred in the preparation and

 transmission of the record, the cost of the reporter's transcript, if necessary

 for the determination of the appeal, the premiums paid for cost of

 supersedeas bonds or other bonds to preserve rights pending appeal, and the

 fee for filing notice of appeal shall be taxed in the district court as costs of

 the appeal in favor of the party entitled to costs under this rule.

 Under Rule 33, M.R.App.P, we conclude that there are two types of costs that are

components of costs on appeal when a district court sets a bond under Rule 6. First,

Rule 33(b) provides for the costs of printing and producing briefs and appendices. 

These

costs are to be taxed as provided for under Rule 23(g), M.R.App.P. At the time of 

the

Moores' appeal, Rule 23(g) stated that "reasonable costs for briefs shall be limited 

to

$250 for appellant's brief and $200 for respondent's brief." Second, Rule 33(c) 

provides

for the costs associated with preparing and transmitting the record, the cost of the

reporter's transcript, premiums paid for supersedeas bonds or other bonds, and the 

fee

for filing a notice of appeal. Under Rule 33, there is no provision specifically

incorporating attorney fees into costs on appeal.

 Imperial argues that the anticipated attorney fees for defending an appeal may 

be

included in setting the amount of a bond under Rule 6. Imperial points out that Rule

33(a) makes specific mention that "[c]osts on appeal in civil cases will be taxed as

provided by section 25-10-104." Imperial suggests that one must then refer to õ 25-

10-

201, MCA, for the definition of "costs." Imperial then points out that õ 25-10-201

(9),

MCA, provides for allowable costs that include "such other reasonable and necessary

expenses as are taxable according to the course and practice of the court or by 

express

provision of law." The express provision of law on which Imperial bases its request 

for

anticipated attorney fees is õ 39-2-915, MCA.

 As stated above, under õ 39-2-915, MCA, a prevailing party that made an offer

to arbitrate that was refused is entitled "as an element of costs to reasonable 

attorney fees

incurred subsequent to the date of the offer." The District Court awarded Imperial

attorney fees in the amount of $41,881.31. That amount represents total fees, costs 

and

disbursements incurred from February 22, 1995, the date the offer to arbitrate was 

made,

through January 26, 1996, the day after the verdict was rendered. These costs 

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awarded

by the District Court are directly related to the District Court proceeding and are 

not

disputed nor at issue in this appeal.

 Imperial's motion to the District Court requested that the Moores post a $5,000

bond to insure the payment of Imperial's costs on appeal. Imperial asserts that as

attorney fees are an element of costs pursuant to õ 39-2-915, MCA, the amount of the

bond should include attorney fees incurred in connection with the appeal.

 Imperial's motion states, "Imperial's counsel estimates the costs and fees 

associated

with defending the appeal will be $5,000.00." Attached in support of Imperial's 

motion

is the affidavit of John O. Mudd, Imperial's counsel. In the affidavit dated 

November

8, 1996, Mudd swears:

 2. Although the plaintiffs have not filed their brief in this matter,

 I estimate that the time involved in analyzing the plaintiff's brief, reviewing

 the trial transcript, performing the necessary legal research, and writing the

 defendant's response brief will take approximately 40 hours. My hourly rate

 for this work will be $120.00, which I understand to be comparable to the

 hourly rate charged by counsel handling this type of litigation.

 3. The experience of our law firm and [sic] handling appeals of

 this type indicates that there will be approximately $200.00 in additional

 costs associated with printing, preparation and filing of the defendant's brief

 . . . .

 4. I therefore estimate that the total cost, exclusive of oral

 argument, will be $5,000.00.

 In the affidavit, counsel has not stated any costs that Imperial has actually 

incurred

in defending the appeal against the Moores. Indeed, the affidavit sets forth an 

estimate

of the costs of appeal, including attorney fees, that Imperial might incur. Since 

the

underlying appeal has yet to be briefed, it is impossible for the anticipatory 

attorney fees

to be fixed with any precision. This estimate of costs cannot yet be included as 

costs on

appeal as "reasonable attorney fees incurred subsequent to the date of the offer" 

pursuant

to õ 39-2-915, MCA (emphasis added), because they are not costs that have been 

actually

incurred by Imperial.

 Imperial relies on two cases in its brief for the proposition that anticipated 

attorney

fees can be included as costs on appeal by a district court when setting bond under 

Rule

6. In Chamberlin v. Puckett Construction (1996), 277 Mont. 198, 921 P.2d 1237,

attorney fees were included in costs on appeal awarded to the prevailing party based 

on

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contract. Also, in Missoula High School Legal Defense Ass'n v. Superintendent of 

Public

Instruction (1981), 196 Mont. 106, 637 P.2d 1188, attorney fees for costs of appeal 

were

awarded to the prevailing party under the common fund doctrine. In neither of these

cases did the district court order, as was done here, anticipatory attorney fees to 

be

included in the Rule 6 bond as a cost of appeal. In fact, we remanded both cases 

back

to the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine reasonable 

attorney

fees on appeal. 

 For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the District Court abused its

discretion in ordering the Moores to post a $5,000 bond based upon Imperial's 

motion. 

Although õ 39-2-915, MCA, allows for attorney fees for the prevailing party 

subsequent

to the date of offer to arbitrate as an element of costs, these costs must have 

actually been

incurred. 

 At this time, we do not preclude Imperial the opportunity to eventually recover

costs on appeal, including reasonable attorney fees for defending the appeal, if 

they are

ultimately successful in this litigation. In the event Imperial is successful on the

underlying appeal, it will be entitled to reasonable attorney fees incurred in 

defending the

appeal. At that time, this matter will be remanded to the District Court to 

determine the

amount of those fees as an element of costs on appeal .

 In conclusion, we determine that the District Court abused its discretion in

requiring the Moores to post a $5,000 bond to cover anticipated attorney fees as 

costs on

appeal under Rule 6, M.R.App.P. We remand to the District Court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 /S/ JIM REGNIER 

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

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