Filed 5/27/15 Stinson v. LA County Civil Service Com. CA2/5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

DEXTER STINSON, 

 Plaintiff and Appellant, 

 v. 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY CIVIL 

SERVICE COMMISSION, 

 Defendant. 

LOS ANGELES COUNTY PROBATION 

DEPARTMENT, 

Real Party in Interest and 

Respondent. 

 B253372 

 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. 

 No. BS134549) 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Joanne 

O’Donnell, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Romero Law, Alan J. Romero, Elliot A. Rosenberger, for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 No appearance for Defendant. 

 Law Offices of William Balderrama, William Balderrama and Daniel C. 

Carmichael, III, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 

_____________________ 
2

 Plaintiff and appellant Dexter Stinson was discharged as a deputy probation 

officer with the Los Angeles County Probation Department for excessive use of force on 

a minor. Stinson filed an administrative appeal with the Los Angeles County Civil 

Service Commission (Commission), which upheld his discharge. Stinson then filed a 

petition for writ of mandate, seeking to overturn the Commission’s ruling. (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 1094.5.) In this appeal from the judgment of denial of the mandate petition, 

Stinson contends the Probation Department’s withholding of crucial materials constituted 

a violation of his Skelly1 due process rights. Specifically, Stinson argues the Probation 

Department failed to provide him with a copy of a surveillance video of the incident that 

led to his discharge, the Residential Treatment Services Bureau (RTSB) Safe Crisis 

Management policy, and his training logs. Stinson further contends his discharge was not 

an appropriate penalty. We reject Stinson’s contentions and affirm. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Background 

Stinson started his employment with the Probation Department in 1994. He was 

promoted to Deputy Probation Officer I in 1996, and to Deputy Probation Officer II in 

1999. At the time of the incident which led to his discharge, Stinson was assigned to 

Camp Scobee, one of six camps at Challenger Memorial Youth Center. Camp Scobee is 

part of the Probation Department’s RTSB. 

 In November 2004, the Probation Department discharged Stinson for excessive 

use of force on a minor. After Stinson appealed to the Commission, a hearing officer 

determined that Stinson had not committed all of the misconduct alleged, but had used an 

inappropriate restraint and some excessive force on the minor. The hearing officer did 

 

1 Skelly v. State Personnel Bd. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 194 (Skelly). 
3

not believe that the discharge was an appropriate penalty and recommended a 30-day 

suspension. That recommendation was adopted by the Commission.2 

 Stinson received performance evaluations that rated him “very good” in the two 

rating periods prior to the incident leading to his termination. The most recent 

performance evaluation given to Stinson after the incident praised him for being “able to 

de-escalate volatile situations that may arise in the dorm.” 

The Incident

 Stinson was conducting showers for a group of minors at Camp Scobee during the 

evening of July 3, 2009. After the minors exited the showers, they were given a “shower 

roll,” containing a T-shirt, underwear, and socks. When the minors finished showering, 

they were required to go to their beds, put on their shower roll, and get between the 

sheets. Deputy Probation Officer Roger Robinson was in the control center while Stinson 

was conducting the showers. Robinson’s job was to observe the minors in, and exiting 

from, the showers. Any problems with clothing were handled after all minors have 

showered. 

 After minor Naim A. returned from the shower with his shower roll and went to 

his bed, Stinson observed Naim rip up his underwear and throw it on the ground. Naim 

then sat on his bed with a towel around his waist. Stinson told Naim to get between the 

sheets. Naim responded, “I don’t have any fucking underwear.” Naim did not comply 

after Stinson repeated his instruction. The other minors continued the shower movement 

without incident. 

 After Naim continually refused to obey his instructions, Stinson walked over from 

the other side of the dorm to where Naim’s bed was located. When Stinson reached 

 

2 The Probation Department did not incorporate the Commission’s action into 

Stinson’s personnel file until February 10, 2010. 
4

Naim’s bed, he told Naim to leave the bed area and go to a nearby table to cool off. 

Naim responded, “Fuck that. I’m not doing anything until I get some underwear.” Naim 

stood up, pulled a pair of shorts on over the towel he was wearing, and then sat back 

down on his bed. As Naim started to get up from the bed, Stinson pulled pepper spray 

out of his pocket. Naim sat back down. Stinson then told Naim to stand up and put his 

hands behind his back so he could put handcuffs on him. Naim responded, “Fuck that. 

I’m not doing anything.” Stinson then gave Naim a pepper spray warning. When Naim 

did not comply, Stinson gave him a second warning and pointed to the ground. After 

Naim failed to respond, Stinson sprayed Naim with a two-second burst of pepper spray 

and took Naim down to the ground. 

 Robinson noticed the disturbance and quickly approached to assist Stinson. 

Robinson restrained another minor, Max G., who had attempted to interfere. Another 

officer removed Max from the dorm. Stinson placed his foot on Naim’s back to keep him 

immobile, eventually placing Naim in handcuffs. Stinson continued the shower 

movement with the other minors. Ten minutes after deploying the pepper spray, Stinson 

escorted Naim out of the dorm to be decontaminated by the nurse. 

 The Probation Department’s Child Abuse Special Investigations Unit (CASIU) 

conducted an investigation regarding allegations that Stinson had engaged in excessive 

force against Naim. As part of its investigation, CASIU interviewed Naim and Stinson, 

as well as numerous other minors and staff. CASIU determined that the standard 

procedures for pepper spray were not adhered to and Stinson “acted inappropriately and 

used excessive and unnecessary use of force on . . . Naim.” 

Notice of Intent to Discharge and Applicable Probation Department Policies 

 By letter dated March 29, 2010, the Probation Department notified Stinson of its 

intent to discharge him from his position as a Deputy Probation Officer II. The notice 

explained the proposed action was based on (1) misuse of force, (2) falsifying a report, 

(3) untruthful statements during an official investigation, (4) inappropriate and 
5

unprofessional conduct, and (5) failure to exercise sound judgment. The notice stated 

that the discharge was based on Stinson’s violation of Probation Department Policy 

Manual Nos. 15.1 (Employee Conduct) and 15.7 (Corporal Punishment), as well as 

Probation Department Directive Nos. 1094 (Safe Crisis Management) and 1211 

(Employee Cooperation Related to Administrative Hearings and Departmental 

Investigations). The letter outlined Stinson’s Skelly “right to respond either orally or in 

writing to the charges contained in [the] letter,” and review “[w]ritten materials, reports, 

and documents, upon which [the] action is based.” 

 In an April 29, 2010 letter, Stinson’s counsel requested materials from the 

Probation Department that were not provided with the Skelly packet, which included a 

surveillance video of the July 3, 2009 incident. On May 12, 2010, the Probation 

Department provided Stinson with the opportunity to view the video before the Skelly 

meeting with his counsel and a Probation Department representative present. On May 

28, 2010, the Skelly manager met with Stinson and his counsel. 

 By letter dated June 29, 2010, the Probation Department informed Stinson he was 

discharged from his position of Deputy Probation Officer II and from Los Angeles 

County service effective July 6, 2010. In making its decision, the Probation Department 

relied heavily on the surveillance video. It also considered its Guidelines for Discipline, 

Stinson’s July 3, 2009 Physical Intervention Report (PIR),3 CASIU’s report, and witness 

interviews. The Probation Department reviewed Stinson’s performance evaluations, past 

discipline, and his training logs. The notice of discharge advised Stinson of his right to 

appeal his termination and to request a hearing from the Commission. On July 22, 2010, 

Stinson appealed and requested a hearing. 

 

3 The Probation Department requires a deputy probation officer to prepare a PIR 

whenever that officer has a physical altercation with a minor. 
6

The Administrative Proceedings 

 On September 29, 2010, the Commission defined the issues for the parties: “1. 

Are the allegations contained in the [Probation] [D]epartment’s letter of June 29, 2010, 

true? [¶] 2. If any or all are true, is the discipline appropriate? [¶] 3. Was there 

compliance with the requirements of Skelly rights due process? [¶] 4. If not, what is the 

remedy.” After five days of evidentiary hearings in February and April 2011, the hearing 

officer issued his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended decision. The 

hearing officer’s findings of fact were based on a review of the surveillance video4

supplemented by testimony from Stinson and Robinson. 

 The hearing officer made the following findings of fact, which are relevant to 

Stinson’s appeal: “17. The [Probation] Department has a ‘Safe Crisis Management 

Policy’ that requires [deputy probation officers] to attempt to de-escalate a situation 

involving a non-compliant minor prior [sic]. [¶] 18. Under the [Probation] 

Department’s policy, [pepper] spray is not to be deployed if the situation is ‘controlled’ 

and not to be deployed prior to attempting to use de-escalation techniques. [¶] 19. 

Shortly prior to the incident, Stinson had attended training where these principles were 

taught. [¶] 20. Stinson did not try to de-escalate the situation using techniques both 

familiar and available to him, including seeking the assistance of other [deputy probation 

officers] and calling for his supervisor. [¶] 21. Stinson took out his pepper spray and 

warned Naim that he was going to use it while the dorm was still in a controlled situation. 

He also deployed the pepper spray while the dorm was in a controlled situation. [¶] 22. 

Under the [Probation] Department’s policy, known to Stinson, a minor who is sprayed 

should be removed for de-contamination as soon as possible. Stinson waited 10 minutes 

before removing Naim for decontamination.” 

 The hearing officer made the following conclusions of law: “1. The [Probation] 

Department has sustained its burden of proving that Stinson misused force, acted in an 

 

4 There was no audio available for the surveillance video. 
7

inappropriate manner, and failed to exercise sound judgment, when he used [pepper] 

spray on a minor in violation of [Probation] Department policy. [¶] 2. The [Probation] 

Department failed to sustain its burden of proof that Stinson falsified a report and made 

untruthful statements during an investigation. [¶] 3. The discipline imposed was 

appropriate. [¶] 4. There was no violation of Stinson’s Skelly rights.” The hearing 

officer recommended that the Probation Department’s decision to discharge Stinson be 

upheld. 

 On September 18, 2011, the Commission adopted the findings of fact, conclusions 

of law, and recommendation of the hearing officer as its final decision. The formal order 

of the Commission sustaining Stinson’s discharge was filed October 5, 2011. 

Stinson’s Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus 

 Stinson filed his original petition for writ of administrative mandamus on 

November 14, 2011, and his operative third amended verified petition on September 13, 

2012. Stinson contended the Commission’s decision must be set aside for three reasons: 

(1) the Commission failed to provide Stinson with a fair hearing because the Probation 

Department did not provide him materials that were used in its decision of discharge; (2) 

the Commission’s decision is not supported by the findings of fact Nos. 17, 18, 20, 21, 

and 22; and (3) the Commission’s conclusions of law Nos. 1, 3, and 4 are not supported 

by the findings. 

 In a ruling filed September 12, 2013, the trial court denied the petition. As 

relevant to the issues on appeal, the trial court found no Skelly violation because “[t]he 

failure to provide an RTSB [Safe Crisis Management policy] concerns the sufficiency of 

the Hearing Officer’s finding of fact that [Stinson] violated an actual policy.” Stinson did 

not contest that he was given notice of the charges against him or a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard. He failed to articulate what prejudice which arose from this 

failure, other than the fact of his discharge. With respect to the Probation Department’s 

failure to provide Stinson a copy of the surveillance video, the court held Stinson’s 
8

contention that he would have been able to better prepare for the hearing did not amount 

to a due process violation. Additionally, Stinson’s “protestations that he could have 

better prepared his case if he had access to the video ignores the fact that the subject of 

the video is [Stinson’s] conduct, creating a reasonable presumption that he knew what it 

depicted.” Stinson also provided no evidence that he requested and was denied a 

subsequent viewing of the surveillance video. Stinson did not establish that the Probation 

Department’s failure to provide a copy of the video materially prejudiced him in any 

way. The court reached the same conclusion as to his training logs, finding Stinson 

presented no argument demonstrating how the failure to provide the logs prejudiced him. 

The court concluded that Stinson’s discharge was an appropriate penalty because his 

misconduct involved the unauthorized use of last-resort force against a minor, which is a 

serious offense. Moreover, the incident was the second serious disciplinary action for 

Stinson involving the inappropriate and excessive use of force against a minor. 

 The judgment was entered October 23, 2012. Stinson filed a timely notice of 

appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

Standard of Review 

 “Termination of a nonprobationary public employee substantially affects that 

employee’s fundamental vested right in employment. (Jackson v. City of Los Angeles

(2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 899, 902; McMillen v. Civil Service Com. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 

125, 129.) Accordingly, when ruling on a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus 

seeking review of procedures that resulted in the employee’s termination, the trial court 

examines the administrative record and exercises its independent judgment to determine 

if the weight of the evidence supports the findings upon which the agency’s discipline is 

based or if errors of law were committed by the administrative tribunal. (Fukuda v. City 

of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 811 [‘when a court reviews an administrative 
9

determination [affecting a vested fundamental right] the court must “exercise its 

independent judgment on the facts, as well as on the law . . .”’]; Wences v. City of Los 

Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 314; McMillen [v. Civil Service Com., supra,] at p. 

129.)” (Bautista v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 869, 874-875 

(Bautista).) 

 “On appeal we review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence 

(Jackson v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 902; Evans v. Department 

of Motor Vehicles (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 958, 967, fn. 1) and its legal determinations . . . 

de novo (see People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432; 

Gai v. City of Selma (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 213, 219; Oldham v. Kizer (1991) 235 

Cal.App.3d 1046, 1057.)” (Bautista, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 875). 

Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Contrary to fundamental tenets of appellate practice, Stinson fails to cite much of 

the unfavorable evidence set forth above or has done so in a one-sided manner. Stinson 

further fails to affirmatively argue that the judgment is not supported by substantial 

evidence. The focus of Stinson’s opening brief is his contention that his Skelly due 

process rights were violated and his discharge was not an appropriate penalty. The 

Probation Department contends in its responding brief that there was substantial evidence 

for the trial court to uphold Stinson’s discharge. In his reply, Stinson “acknowledges that 

[the Probation Department’s] substantial evidence argument has some merit and that [the 

Probation Department]’s Brief accurately portrays their version of the events.” However, 

Stinson “respectfully asks this Court to duly weight the record on appeal and the 

competing narratives in its decision making.” Although he makes no argument regarding 

the sufficiency of the evidence, Stinson is essentially urging this court to make an 

argument on his behalf. (See Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly

(2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [“[a] party who challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support a finding must set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that 
10

point, both favorable and unfavorable”].) We decline to do so and deem any challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence waived. (Gombiner v. Swartz (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 

1365, 1374; Oliver v. Board of Trustees (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 824, 832.) Because we 

draw all legitimate inferences and resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the 

judgment, we hold the facts support the trial court’s finding that there was substantial 

evidence to uphold the discharge. Moreover, Stinson’s own admission that the Probation 

Department’s substantial evidence argument “has some merit” bolsters the trial court’s 

finding. 

Skelly Was Not Violated 

 Stinson contends the Probation Department withheld critical materials, including 

the surveillance video of the July 3, 2009 incident, RTSB Safe Crisis Management 

policy, and his training logs. Because this is an appeal from a writ proceeding, Stinson 

has the burden of pleading and proving the materials received prior to his Skelly hearing 

were not sufficient to provide him an opportunity to meaningfully respond at the 

pretermination stage. (Gilbert v. City of Sunnyvale (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1281 

(Gilbert).) We conclude Stinson failed to make an adequate showing. 

 In Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at page 215, the California Supreme Court determined 

that “due process does not require the state to provide the employee with a full trial-type 

evidentiary hearing prior to the initial taking of punitive action.” The court held that the 

minimum procedural due process protections required before disciplinary action became 

effective included “notice of the proposed action, the reasons therefor, a copy of the 

charges and materials upon which the action is based, and the right to respond, either 

orally or in writing, to the authority initially imposing discipline.” (Ibid., italics added.) 

“Subsequent to Skelly, the California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme 

Court have repeatedly recognized that due process [in this context] is a flexible concept” 

and does not require the production of every document later offered at the posttermination hearing. (Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1276, 1280.) Skelly merely 
11

requires an “unambiguous warning that matters have come to a head, coupled with an 

explicit notice to the employee that he or she now has the opportunity to engage the issue 

and present the reasons opposing such a disposition.” (Coleman v. Regents of University 

of California (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 521, 525-526.) “[T]he pretermination hearing 

‘should be an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a determination of 

whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are 

true and support the proposed action.” (Gilbert, supra, at p. 1277.) “‘To require more 

than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government’s 

interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) 

 Stinson contends the Probation Department did not provide him a copy of the 

surveillance video in violation of his Skelly due process rights. In an April 29, 2010 

letter, Stinson’s counsel requested that the Probation Department provide Stinson with 

the surveillance video, among other materials. In response, the Probation Department’s 

Head Civil Service Representative Rahman Williams contacted Stinson’s counsel and 

told her that there were privacy concerns regarding the identity of the minors. Williams 

explained it was the Probation Department’s practice to not “provide actual copies, but 

we will allow the employee who is the subject of discipline to come review at our facility 

as many times as they need to.” Williams then scheduled both Stinson and his counsel to 

view the surveillance video at the Probation Department’s facility on May 12, 2010. 

Stinson viewed the video that day with his counsel and Williams present. Stinson was 

given the opportunity to review the videotape as many times as he wanted. 

 We conclude Stinson’s unrestricted access to the surveillance video provided him 

adequate notice of the charges against him and a meaningful opportunity to rebut them at 

the pretermination hearing. Stinson must show prejudice before administrative 

adjudicatory decisions will be reversed. (E.g., English v. City of Long Beach (1950) 35 

Cal.2d 155, 159-160; Swars v. Counsel of City of Vallejo (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 872; see, 

e.g., Southern Cal. Jockey Club v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1950) 36 Cal.2d 167, 

176 [requiring a miscarriage of justice for reversal of administrative decisions].) Nothing 

in the record suggests that Stinson lacked sufficient time to view the video or that he was 
12

denied the opportunity to further view the video. Stinson does not challenge the trial 

court’s interpretation of the video or its authenticity, only the Probation Department’s 

failure to provide him a copy. Stinson speculates that he would have been better prepared 

for his Skelly meeting if he had received a copy of the video, but does not explain how he 

would have prepared differently, let alone how it would have changed the Probation 

Department’s decision to discharge him. Stinson does not establish that the Probation 

Department’s failure to provide a copy of the video materially prejudiced him in any 

concrete way. 

 Stinson contends he was not provided with a Safe Crisis Management policy as 

applied to RTSB staff. Instead, the Probation Department produced only a Safe Crisis 

Management policy, as applied to Detention Services Bureau (DSB) staff.5 We agree 

with the trial court that Stinson’s contention does not implicate his Skelly due process 

rights. The failure to provide a RTSB policy to Stinson concerns the sufficiency of the 

hearing officer’s finding of fact that Stinson violated an actual policy applicable to him.6 

Stinson’s argument does not suggest he was not given notice of the charges against him 

or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Nor does Stinson articulate what prejudice 

arose from this failure, other than his discharge. This is not a basis for a Skelly due 

process rights violation. 

 Stinson lastly argues his training logs were not provided by the Probation 

Department in violation of his Skelly due process rights. Stinson presents no further 

argument demonstrating how the failure to provide him with the training logs deprived 

him of notice of the charges against him or a meaningful opportunity to respond at the 

pretermination hearing. The training logs were used by the Probation Department only to 

support the contention that Stinson was trained in the Safe Crisis Management policy and 

 

5 RTSB staff work in juvenile camps, and DSB staff work in juvenile halls. 

6 The hearing officer found a violation of RTSB policy based on Stinson’s own 

training and testimony. Stinson’s training included an eight hour course on the Safe 

Crisis Management policy in March 2009, just a few months prior to the incident, and 

Stinson’s testimony indicated his actions were contrary to his training. 
13

had knowledge of that policy. (Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1275-1281 

[employer need not supply all documents in the file to the employee prior to a Skelly 

hearing, only sufficient material to enable the employee to respond to the specific 

charges].) The training logs were not critical documents required under Skelly, and 

therefore not a violation of Stinson’s due process rights. 

 The video surveillance and other materials relied on by the Probation Department, 

which were made available to Stinson prior to his pretermination hearing, adequately 

provided an explanation of the evidence supporting its decision and notice of the 

substance of the relevant supporting evidence, sufficient to enable Stinson to adequately 

respond at the pretermination stage. (Gilbert, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 1280.) We 

hold Stinson did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the Probation Department 

failed to substantially comply with the pretermination requirements of Skelly. 

The Penalty Imposed was Not Excessive 

 Stinson challenges the appropriateness of the discipline imposed on him given his 

lack of training and knowledge of the Safe Crisis Management policy, his supervisor’s 

review of the incident, and his past performance evaluations. We hold that the gravity of 

Stinson’s misconduct, coupled with the previous 2006 suspension, provided an ample 

justification for Stinson’s disciplinary discharge. 

 “‘[I]n a mandamus proceeding to review an administrative order, the 

determination of the penalty by the administrative body will not be disturbed unless there 

has been an abuse of its discretion.’” (Skelly, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 217; accord, 

Bautista, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 879; West Valley–Mission Community College 

Dist. v. Concepcion (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1766, 1778-1779.) “Neither an appellate 

court nor a trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative 

agency concerning the degree of punishment imposed. [Citation.]” (Barber v. State 

Personnel Bd. (1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404.) “It is only in the exceptional case, when it is 

shown that reasonable minds cannot differ on the propriety of the penalty, that an abuse 
14

of discretion is shown.” (Bautista, supra, at p. 879, citing West Valley–Mission 

Community College Dist v. Concepcion, supra, at pp. 1778-1779; see Talmo v. Civil 

Service Com. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210, 230 [upholding discharge of deputy sheriff]; 

cf. Pegues v. Civil Service Com. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 95, 107 [no abuse of discretion 

when reasonable minds could differ as to the propriety of the penalty]; Szmaciarz v. State 

Personnel Bd. (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 904, 921 [even in instances when the trial or 

reviewing court believes the penalty was too harsh, it cannot interfere with an agency’s 

imposition of a penalty].)

 Stinson contends he had no knowledge or training in the Safe Crisis Management 

policy. As stated in the previous section, his contention goes to the hearing officer’s 

factual findings, which he failed to challenge on appeal. He further failed to contest the 

hearing officer’s finding of fact No. 19 in his writ petition, which states, “Shortly prior to 

the incident, Stinson had attended training where these principles were taught,” referring 

the Safe Crisis Management policy. Therefore any challenge to that fact is forfeited as it 

was undisputed that Stinson had training and knowledge of the policy prior to the July 3, 

2009 incident. Stinson gives significant weight to the review of the incident by his 

immediate supervisor, Robert Moore, in support of his contention that the penalty was 

excessive. Moore concluded that Stinson acted within departmental policies and 

procedures. We find no fault with the hearing officer’s decision affording no weight to 

Moore’s opinion because he was not present at the incident, did not review the 

surveillance video, and based his conclusion solely on Stinson and Robinson’s reports. 

Stinson does not address the deficiencies in Moore’s review on appeal, and we decline to 

disagree with the hearing officer’s assessment without any argument by Stinson. Stinson 

lastly contends the Probation Department failed to take into account his “historically 

‘very good’” performance evaluations. The Probation Department did, in fact, consider 

Stinson’s performance evaluations, along with other materials in making the decision to 

discharge him. As this was a serious offense, discharge was within the range of 
15

discipline contained in the Probation Department’s Guidelines for Discipline.7 

Additionally, the incident was the second serious disciplinary action for Stinson 

involving the inappropriate and excessive use of force. The first incident involved 

inappropriate restraint and excessive force against a minor, resulting in a 30-day 

suspension in 2006. We conclude discharge was an appropriate penalty for Stinson’s 

misconduct, in light of the nature of the offense and his similar previous infraction. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal. 

 KRIEGLER, J. 

We concur: 

 TURNER, P. J. 

 GOODMAN, J.*

 

7 The Guidelines for Discipline regarding discharge state in pertinent part: 

“Discharges occur when prior discipline has not corrected the employee’s unacceptable 

behavior or performance or in circumstances where a single act of misconduct has 

rendered the individual unsuitable for further employment. [¶] It is not necessary to 

impose each step of discipline . . . [s]ome factors [include] the seriousness of the offense, 

training, the frequency . . . .” 

 * Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice 

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.