RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 20a0132p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

IN RE: AARON K. HILL,

Debtor.

___________________________________________

CMCO MORTGAGE, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AARON K. HILL,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 19-5861

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.

3:16-cv-00246—Claria Horn Boom, District Judge.

Nos. 3:14-bk-33623; 3:15-ap-03001—Alan C. Stout, Judge;

Argued: March 12, 2020

Decided and Filed: May 4, 2020

Before: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Christopher B. Madden, DENTONS BINGHAM GREENEBAUM LLP, Louisville, 

Kentucky, for Appellant. Elisabeth S. Gray, MIDDLETON REUTLINGER, Louisville, 

Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James R. Irving, BINGHAM GREENEBAUM DOLL 

LLP, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Elisabeth S. Gray, Katherine T. Reisz, Matthew P. 

Dearmond, MIDDLETON REUTLINGER, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee.

>
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Aaron Hill, whether on his own accord or 

due to poor legal advice, decided not to attend a state court damages trial after being admonished 

by the state court judge that, if he failed to appear, “adverse things [were] likely [to] happen.” 

The judge was right. The court entered a final judgment against Hill in the amount of 

$3,417,477 and a finding that Hill’s actions “caused a willful and malicious injury.” Hill now 

seeks relief from the bankruptcy court’s holding that the debt is nondischargeable in his Chapter 

7 bankruptcy proceeding because he is collaterally estopped from contending that the debt was 

not the result of “willful and malicious injury.” The bankruptcy court was correct to find that the 

state court damages judgment provides preclusive effect to the determination of the 

nondischargeability of Hill’s debt. We AFFIRM.

I.

Prior to November 2010, Aaron Hill was a principal of First Meridian Mortgage 

Corporation (“First Meridian”). That month, he and the other three First Meridian principals 

agreed to sell the company to CMCO Mortgage, LLC (“CMCO”), an Ohio based mortgage 

company. According to Hill, the parties agreed that after the sale the former First Meridian 

principals would build and manage an internet division of CMCO. The sale was consummated 

as a stock purchase agreement and also involved the execution of two promissory notes 

evidencing loans to First Meridian. 

On January 15, 2012, Hill received an offer of employment from CMCO’s competitor, 

Peoples Bank, which he accepted. On February 17, 2012, CMCO terminated Hill, alleging that 

he breached his contract, provided trade secrets to Peoples Bank, and unlawfully recruited and 

hired nearly all CMCO’s Louisville, Kentucky, and Indianapolis, Indiana, employees over to 

Peoples Bank. Hill contends that he discussed the possibility of joining Peoples Bank with 

CMCO as early as December 2011 and was informed that he should “do what’s best for 

[himself] and [his] family.” On February 27, 2012, CMCO filed a complaint in Jefferson County 
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 3

Circuit Court (the “state court”) against Peoples Bank, Hill, and other former employees of 

CMCO. Eight of the claims named Hill as a defendant: (1) breach of contract; (2) breach of 

fiduciary duty; (3) interference with actual or prospective business advantage; (4) unfair 

competition; (5) usurpation of corporate business opportunities; (6) trade secret 

misappropriation; (7) conversion; and (8) unjust enrichment. 

At the start of the state court action, Peoples Bank paid for Hill and other employees’ 

legal representation, but following a July 2013 mediation, wherein CMCO settled all of its 

claims against Peoples Bank and most of the other defendants, Peoples Bank informed Hill that it 

could no longer fund his representation. After a brief period wherein Hill’s previous attorney 

represented him gratis, the attorney withdrew, and Hill proceeded pro se. Hill, however, 

generally declined to participate in the action. Most importantly, Hill failed to attend the pretrial 

conference on August 19, 2014, resulting in the state court granting CMCO’s motions for 

sanctions and entry of a default judgment on the claims set forth in its complaint. Making 

matters worse, Hill also declined to appear for the damages trial that took place on September 22, 

2014. 

Hill asserts that he never received the state court’s trial order scheduling a pretrial 

conference because many of the state court filings were mailed to the incorrect address.1 He 

admits that he was initially aware of the pretrial conference through correspondence with 

opposing counsel in February 2014, but states that he was unaware that the August 19, 2014 date 

was finalized and that he was expecting a trial order to be sent to him from the state court. Hill 

further acknowledges that he knew of the trial date because he spoke with the state court judge 

on the phone and was warned that if he did not appear “adverse things [were] likely [to] happen.” 

He contends, however, that a bankruptcy attorney he was consulting at the time advised him that 

he need not participate in the action because any judgments obtained against him would “go 

away” if he sought bankruptcy relief. 

The state court entered judgment in favor of CMCO on “all claims asserted by and 

against Hill in [the state court] action based on Hill’s repeated and intentional failures to comply 

1Hill alleges that the filings were mailed to an address in Lawrence, Kansas; Hill lived in Louisville, 

Kentucky.
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 4

with the Court’s Second Civil Jury Trial Order dated February 11, 2014, and his failure to appear 

at the final pretrial conference.” As part of its findings of fact, the court stated that

Hill’s actions . . . were willful, intentional, in bad faith, egregious, and done with 

malice. Hill’s actions caused a willful and malicious injury to [CMCO]. Hill’s 

actions further constitute fraud and defalcation while acting in a fiduciary 

capacity given his intentional misrepresentations made to conceal his wrongful 

actions from [CMCO], and his failure to meet his fiduciary obligations to 

[CMCO]. Hill intended the consequences of his actions, namely the destruction 

of [CMCO’s] internet division. Hill’s actions were done in reckless disregard of 

[CMCO’s] economic interests and expectancies.

State Court Judgment, Bankr. R.1-7, Page 6/8. The court held a damages trial on September 22, 

2014, and on October 3, 2014, entered a final judgment against Hill in the amount of $3,417,477 

in compensatory damages. 

On September 29, 2014, seven days after the trial and four days before the state court 

entered its final judgment in favor of CMCO, Hill filed his Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the 

United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Hill notified CMCO of 

his bankruptcy case the next day. On October 29, 2014, CMCO filed a timely proof of claim for 

the $3,147,477 judgment against Hill in the bankruptcy court. On June 8, 2015, the bankruptcy 

court entered an order annulling the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)—lifting the 

injunction which prevents creditors from collecting debts from a debtor who has declared 

bankruptcy—with respect to CMCO’s damages judgment against Hill. On January 5, 2015, 

CMCO filed an adversary proceeding against Hill (now represented by counsel), seeking a 

determination that the debt owed by Hill to CMCO is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 

§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6) (excepting discharge of debts obtained through fraud, fraud 

committed in a fiduciary capacity, and conduct for willful and malicious injury) and a denial of 

Hill’s Chapter 7 discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(4)(A) (denying discharge to a debtor 

who knowingly and fraudulently made a false oath or account in their bankruptcy case).

Finally, on July 21, 2015, CMCO filed the motion now before this Court, seeking 

summary judgment only on its claim of nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) (excepting 

discharge “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of 

another entity”). On November 2, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered its order granting 
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 5

CMCO’s motion for summary judgment and holding the damages judgment nondischargeable by 

application of collateral estoppel based on the state court judgment finding Hill’s actions caused 

“willful and malicious injury.” In re Hill, 540 B.R. 331, 342 (W.D. Ky. 2015). Hill filed a 

motion to vacate the order, arguing that the state court’s default judgment could not be given 

preclusive effect, but on April 20, 2016, the bankruptcy court denied the motion. 

While the bankruptcy case was pending, Hill filed an unsuccessful motion to vacate the 

damages judgment in the state court. Hill appealed the denial to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, 

but on January 12, 2018, the appellate court affirmed the lower court’s denial, finding his appeal 

to be “nothing more than a frivolous attempt to circumvent Hill’s utter failure to participate in 

the underlying litigation.”2 Hill v. CMCO Mortg., LLC, No. 2016-CA-000400-MR, 2018 Ky. 

App. Unpub. LEXIS 21, at *13-14 (Ky. App. Jan. 12, 2018). The appellate court also granted 

CMCO’s motion for sanctions, finding Hill’s appeal “so totally lacking in merit that it appears to 

have been taken in bad faith.” Ky. App. Order, R. 28-1, PageID 234. Hill sought further review 

before the Kentucky Supreme Court, but the court denied his motion for discretionary review. 

Hill v. CMCO Mortg., LLC, N. 2018-SC-000068-D, 2018 Ky. LEXIS 237, at *1 (Ky. June 6, 

2018). 

On April 28, 2016, Hill timely appealed the grant of summary judgment to CMCO to the 

district court. On July 3, 2019, the district court entered its order denying Hill’s appeal and 

affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to CMCO through the application 

of collateral estoppel. On August 1, 2019, Hill appealed the district court’s denial of his appeal 

and affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment to this Court. 

II.

Under the Bankruptcy Code, the filing of a petition creates an automatic stay as to most 

proceedings against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). This provision was enacted to protect the 

“class of ‘honest but unfortunate debtor[s].’” Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 

374 (2007) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)). However, “[o]n request of 

2Hill did not appeal either the default judgment or the order awarding damages directly to the Kentucky 

Court of Appeals. 
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 6

the party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay[,] . . . 

such as by . . . annulling . . . such stay [] for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of 

an interest in property of such party in interest[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1).

Hill claims that the bankruptcy court lacked the requisite grounds to annul the automatic 

stay with respect to the state court damages judgment. Whether the bankruptcy court erred in 

lifting the automatic stay, however, is not a question before us. Hill failed to challenge the 

bankruptcy court’s order annulling the automatic stay in the district court or list it in his notice of 

appeal to the district court. Furthermore, Hill failed to appeal the bankruptcy court’s order 

annulling the automatic stay to this Court. Hill appealed only the bankruptcy court’s order 

granting summary judgment to CMCO and the order denying his motion to vacate that order. 

Therefore, the extent of his appeal is limited to the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary 

judgment. See Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A] court of appeals has 

jurisdiction only over the areas of a judgment specified in the notice of appeal as being 

appealed.”) (quoting JGR, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc., 550 F.3d 529, 532 (6th Cir. 

2008)); Pletten v. MSPB, Nos. 88-1467, 89-1086, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 11900, at *10 (6th Cir. 

July 13, 1990) (“[W]here a party intentionally appealed only a portion of the judgment in that the 

notice of appeal was expressly limited as to the orders . . . appealed from, the court may not read 

into the notice that which is not there.”) (citing Averitt v. Southland Motor Inn, 720 F.2d 1178, 

1181 (10th Cir. 1983)); see also Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B).

III.

“On appeal from a district court’s judgment affirming an order of the bankruptcy court, 

this Court reviews the bankruptcy court’s order directly, and gives no deference to the district 

court’s decision.” McMillan v. LTV Steel, Inc., 555 F.3d 218, 225 (6th Cir. 2009). We review 

the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. In re Wells, 561 F.3d 633, 634 (6th 

Cir. 2009). “Granting summary judgment is appropriate ‘where the moving party has carried its 

burden of showing that the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and 

affidavits in the record, construed favorably to the nonmoving party, do not raise a genuine issue 

of material fact for trial[.]’” Meade v. Pension Appeals & Review Comm., 966 F.2d 190, 192-93 
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 7

(6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1536 (6th Cir. 1987)); see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a).

Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation of an ultimate fact that was determined by a 

valid and final judgment in a prior action. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 347 (1990). 

Here, the bankruptcy court held that collateral estoppel required it to give preclusive effect to the 

state court’s determination that Hill’s debt to CMCO was the result of “willful and malicious 

injury” such that Hill is precluded from arguing that his debt to CMCO is dischargeable in his 

Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

Hill contends that the bankruptcy court erred by raising the application of collateral 

estoppel sua sponte. But this contention is contrary to our precedent and that of other federal 

courts. See Hutcherson v. Lauderdale Cty., Tenn., 326 F.3d 747, 756-57 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(collecting cases where courts considered collateral estoppel sua sponte) (“[W]e have not failed

to exercise our discretion to reach an issue that the parties have not briefed where it involves a 

pure question of law that cries out for resolution.” (quotations omitted)).

Hill also asserts that the state court judgment included extraneous damages against him 

and was a violation of due process because he was denied the opportunity to be heard, such that 

the judgment was not entitled to the full faith and credit necessary to extend it preclusive effect. 

“[S]tate proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit 

guaranteed by federal law.” Kremer v. Chem Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982). The 

Kentucky courts found that Hill had his opportunity to litigate the claims against him but instead 

chose not to appear. After unsuccessfully attempting to vacate the state court’s damages 

judgment, Hill appealed to the state appellate court which held that “Hill willingly chose to 

abandon his defense, even after he was admonished by the trial court of the dangers associated of 

doing so, and subsequently chose not to pursue [a direct] appeal of the trial court’s orders.” Hill, 

2018 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 21, at *14. The state court’s judgment against Hill clearly 

satisfied the minimum procedural requirements to establish full faith and credit in its judgment.
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 8

“[F]ederal court[s] must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as 

would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” 

Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Ingram v. City of 

Columbus, 185 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 1999). This requirement applies equally in the context of 

extending a state court judgment’s determination of elements to a question of dischargeability 

before a bankruptcy court. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991); In re Berge, 953 F.3d 

907, 916-17 (6th Cir. 2020); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224, 227 (6th Cir. 1981) (“If a state 

court should determine factual issues using standards identical to those in dischargeability 

proceedings, then collateral estoppel—if held to be applicable and in the absence of 

countervailing statutory policy—would bar relitigation of those issues in the bankruptcy court.”).

Therefore, we must look to Kentucky law to determine what preclusive effect Kentucky 

courts would give to the damages judgment. See Migra, 465 U.S. at 81. Under Kentucky law, 

collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, requires four elements: “(1) the issue in the second case 

must be the same as the issue in the first case. In addition, the issue must have been (2) actually 

litigated, (3) actually decided, and (4) necessary to the court’s judgment.” Coomer v. CSX 

Transp., Inc., 319 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Ky. 2010) (quotations omitted). 

A. Identity of Issues

The issues in this action and the state court action are identical. The state court found 

Hill liable as to eight separate claims stemming from his involvement with Peoples Bank while 

working for CMCO. As part of its findings of fact supporting that judgment, the state court 

determined that “Hill’s actions . . . were willful, intentional, in bad faith, egregious, and done 

with malice[, and that he] caused a willful and malicious injury to [CMCO].” State Court 

Judgment, Bankr. R.1-7, Page 6/8. The same finding that Hill’s conduct caused willful and 

malicious injury is the essential element of determining whether his debt to CMCO is 

dischargeable in the instant bankruptcy proceeding. Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code 
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 9

excepts from discharge any debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity 

or to the property of another entity.”3 

B. Actually Litigated

The determination that Hill’s conduct caused willful and malicious injury was actually 

litigated in the state court. Under Kentucky law, default judgments are considered “actually 

litigated” such that they can be given preclusive effect. See Davis v. Tuggle’s Adm’r, 178 

S.W.2d 979, 981 (Ky. 1944) (“The fact that no defense was offered in the suit . . . cannot make 

any difference, for the rule as to the conclusiveness of judgments applies to a judgment by 

default . . . .”); see also Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 309-10 (Ky. 2010) 

(reaffirming the rule previously established in Davis). 

Hill disagrees, citing a Kentucky appellate case, Five Star Lodging, Inc. v. George 

Const., LLC, decided long after Davis and mere months before Petrotech. 344 S.W.3d 119 (Ky. 

Ct. App. 2010). There, the Kentucky appellate court stated that “a default judgment is not a 

judgment on the merits.” Id. at 125 (citing Buis v. Elliott, 142 S.W.3d 137, 139-40 (Ky. 2004)).

There are several reasons to give more credence to Davis and Petrotech than Five Star 

Lodging. First, we find no case law disputing Davis, which was favorably cited by the Kentucky 

Supreme Court just last year. See Lawrence v. Bingham Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P., No. 2018-

SC-000344-TG, 2019 Ky. LEXIS 357, at *16-17 (Ky. Aug. 29, 2019) (holding that a default 

judgment constituted a judgment “on the merits” for purposes of claim preclusion). Second, 

Petrotech was decided after Five Star Lodging and by a higher Kentucky court. Third, the 

portion of Five Star Lodging that Hill cites was merely dictum because res judicata was plainly 

inapplicable to the facts of the case.4 Finally, the Kentucky Supreme Court case cited by Five 

3Hill contends that the damages judgment did not adjudicate the same issues of willful and malicious intent 

as under § 523(a)(6), but his real argument is tied to the final element of collateral estoppel—whether that finding 

was necessary to the state court’s damages judgment. He admits as much in the “identity of issues” portion of his 

brief: “Even if Hill were deemed to have admitted such allegations by the Default Judgment, any such admission or 

finding was not necessary to the Damages Judgement as the State Court did not award punitive damages.” 

Appellant’s Br. at 44 (emphasis added).

4Res judicata could not be applied in Five Star Lodging to give preclusive effect to the order establishing 

damages because the grant of summary judgment preceded the damages judgment. 344 S.W.3d at 125.
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 10

Star Lodging as precedent, supporting its statement that a default judgment is not a judgment on 

the merits, does not support the principle espoused. See Buis, 142 S.W.3d at 139-41 (holding 

that a default judgment does not preclude the bringing of a permissive crossclaim, unraised in the 

prior action). 

Although not entirely uniform, Kentucky’s case law is clear enough that Kentucky courts 

will apply preclusive affect to default judgments such that they are considered “actually 

litigated” for the purposes of collateral estoppel. 

C. Actually Decided

It is clear that the state court actually decided that Hills’ conduct caused willful and 

malicious injury because it is clearly articulated in the damages judgment. Hill does not 

challenge the existence of this element. 

D. Necessary to the Judgment

Finally, the state court’s finding that Hill’s debt resulted from “willful and malicious 

injury” was necessary to the state court’s damages judgment. In order for the state court’s 

finding to be necessary to its judgment and provide preclusive effect to the bankruptcy court’s 

determination of nondischargeability, the same elements required for nondischargeability under 

the Bankruptcy Code must have also been required to enter judgment against Hill. Generally, 

parties to a federal bankruptcy proceeding should not be bound by state proceedings determining 

facts in anticipation of bankruptcy. “However, where the factual issues necessary for [a] 

dischargeability determination were also necessary to the state court determination, the parties 

would not have to anticipate the bankruptcy proceedings and the state courts would not be 

determining issues irrelevant to the state proceedings.” Spilman, 656 F.2d at 228. 

Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a Chapter 7 debtor cannot 

discharge a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the 

property of another entity.” “‘The word “willful” in (a)(6) modifies the word “injury,” indicating 

that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or 

intentional act that leads to injury.’” In re Markowitz, 190 F.3d 455, 464 (6th Cir. 1999) 
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 11

(quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998)); see also Berge, 953 F.3d at 914-15. 

The word “malicious” further requires that the injury be “without just cause or excuse.” Berge, 

953 F.3d at 914 (quoting In re Boland, 946 F.3d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2020)). Therefore, we must 

look to CMCO’s pleadings to determine if the state court’s finding that Hill deliberately or 

intentionally injured CMCO without just cause or excuse was a necessary element of any of 

CMCO’s claims against Hill on which it received a default judgment.5 

CMCO sought an order enjoining Hill from engaging in certain activities and providing it 

compensatory damages, punitive damages,6and costs and reasonable attorney’s fees relating to 

the eight claims it raised against him.7 CMCO’s third claim8against Hill was for “interference 

with actual or prospective business advantage.” States disagree whether “willful and malicious 

injury” as defined under § 523(a)(6) is an element of a claim for tortious interference with actual 

or prospective business advantage. See In re Cardin, No. 11-52077, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 503, at 

*20-23 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan. 31, 2013) (collecting cases). Although Kentucky courts have 

yet to answer this question, we can infer that their answer is that “willful and malicious injury” is 

an element of a tortious interference claim.

Under Kentucky law, the elements of tortious interference with a prospective business 

advantage are: “(1) the existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy, (2) that the 

defendant was aware of this relationship or expectancy, (3) that the defendant intentionally 

interfered, (4) that the motive behind the interference was improper, (5) causation, and 

(6) special damages.” IB Agric., Inc. v. Monty’s Plant Food Co., No. 3:12-CV-00271-CRS, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136833, at *22-23 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2014) (citing Snow Pallet, Inc. v. 

Monticello Banking Co., 367 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Ky. App. 2012)). The tort requires that the defendant 

5The state court’s Findings of Fact relate to all claims. Therefore, a finding that “willful and malicious 

injury” was necessary to one claim accordingly means that the element was necessary to the state court’s judgment. 

6CMCO attempted to obtain punitive damages, inserting language as such in the Findings of Fact and 

Judgment, with a requested recovery of $17,087,385, but the state court scratched out that portion in its entry of 

judgment and only awarded CMCO compensatory damages. 

7There were eleven claims in total (Claim X is listed twice), but several claims were brought solely against 

the other defendants. 

8This claim was listed as Count VI in CMCO’s complaint. 
No. 19-5861 In re Hill Page 12

“show malice or some significantly wrongful conduct.” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n By and 

Through Bellarmine Coll. v. Hornung, 754 S.W.2d 855, 859 (Ky. 1988). Moreover, such cases 

“have turned almost entirely upon the defendant’s motive or purpose, and the means by which he 

has sought to accomplish it . . . .” Id. (quoting W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, 

Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §130 (5th ed. 1984)). 

The key question is whether the defendant has a valid reason for taking the 

challenged action; if the defendant had a legitimate reason for doing what he did, 

the simultaneous existence of an improper motive, such as spite or a desire to 

cause the plaintiff harm, will not generally result in the defendant’s liability.

Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 246 F. App’x 953, 967 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing 

Hornung, 754 S.W.2d at 859).

Thus, to find Hill liable as to CMCO’s tortious interference claim, it was necessary for 

the state court to determine that Hill’s motive or reason for interfering with CMCO’s business 

advantage was not only improper, but that he had no legitimate reason at all. The state court’s 

finding that Hill caused “deliberate or intentional injury” to CMCO “without just cause or 

excuse” satisfied this element of the claim. Absent such a finding, it would not be possible for 

the state court to have entered judgment in CMCO’s favor. Therefore, this finding, which 

matches the elements of § 523(a)(6), was necessary to the state court’s judgment holding Hill 

liable to CMCO and precludes Hill from challenging the nondischargeability of his debt to 

CMCO.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.