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46–091 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–665

THE NORTH KOREAN SIX-PARTY TALKS AND

IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 31, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

(

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia, 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

MICHAEL V. KOSTIW, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE NORTH KOREAN SIX-PARTY TALKS AND IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

JULY 31, 2008

Page

Hill, Hon. Christopher R., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and 

Pacific Affairs, Department of State ................................................................... 5

Tobey, Hon. William H., Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy ........................................................................................................................ 14

Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas .......................... 19

(III) 

(1)

THE NORTH KOREAN SIX-PARTY TALKS AND 

IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES 

THURSDAY, JULY 31, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:42 a.m. in room SR–

325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Warner, Sessions, Collins, Thune, and Martinez. 

Other Senator present: Senator Brownback. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff 

member. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican 

staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Lynn 

F. Rusten, professional staff member, and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Benjamin L. Rubin, 

and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: David E. Bonine, assistant to Senator Byrd; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; 

Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Jon Davey, assistant 

to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; 

Jennifer Cave, assistant to Senator Warner; Lenwood Landrum 

and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor 

IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to 

Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez; and Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. First, we welcome 

our witnesses this morning. On the panel that we’ll have in this 

room, we have Ambassador Chris Hill, Assistant Secretary of State 

for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), of the Department of Energy. 

Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey, we look forward to hearing from 

you today on the current status of the Six-Party Talks and efforts 

to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. We look forward to understanding how the U.S. and other members of the Six-Party Talks 

2

will be able to obtain a full and complete declaration of all North 

Korean nuclear programs, how that declaration will be verified, 

and then how the facilities and materials will be disabled and destroyed. 

Resumption of the efforts to denuclearize North Korea is most 

welcome, but long overdue. The administration is almost back to 

where our country was when we pulled out of the Agreed Framework, except that we are worse off. North Korea has produced more 

plutonium and more nuclear warheads. It has conducted a nuclear 

test and has withdrawn from the Nonproliferation Treaty. That 

means that Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey are left with the difficult task of trying to turn back the clock and once again not only 

halt plutonium production, but also to get an accurate accounting 

of all of the plutonium that’s been produced by North Korea, determine the status of the uranium enrichment program, and get the 

plutonium that is there under safeguards and their bombs destroyed. 

What cannot be undone, however, is the knowledge that North 

Korea has gained in their nuclear development program since 2002. 

Through its nuclear weapons test, North Korea clearly proved that 

it has the ability to produce nuclear weapons. That knowledge will 

always exist and with it the concern that a weapons program could 

be resumed or the knowledge proliferated. 

When we complete the first panel, we are going to move to a 

closed session in room S–407 of the Capitol. Ambassador Hill and 

Mr. Tobey will be joined by Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, who’s the 

North Korean Mission Manager; and Vann Van Diepen, National 

Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction, both of whom 

are from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Good morning. Welcome to our witnesses this morning. On the first panel we have 

Ambassador Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of Slate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Department of Energy. Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey we look forward to hearing from you on the current status 

of the Six-Party Talks with North Korea and efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. 

Most importantly we look forward to understanding how the US and the other 

members of the Six-Party Talks will be able to obtain a full and complete declaration of all North Korean nuclear programs, how that declaration will be verified, 

and then how the facilities and materials will be disabled and destroyed. 

Resumption of the efforts to denuclearize North Korea is most welcome but long 

overdue. The administration is almost back to where our country was when we 

pulled out of the Agreed Framework except that we are worse off—North Korea has 

produced more plutonium and more nuclear warheads, it conducted a nuclear test 

and withdrew from the Nonproliferation Treaty. 

Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey you are left with the difficult task of trying to 

turn back the clock and once again not only halt plutonium production but also get 

an accurate accounting of all the plutonium produced, determine the status of the 

uranium enrichment program, get the plutonium under safeguards and the bombs 

destroyed. What cannot be undone, however, is the knowledge that North Korea 

gained in their nuclear development program since 2002. Through its nuclear weapons test North Korea clearly proved that it has the ability to produce nuclear weapons. That knowledge will always exist and with it the concern that a weapons program could be resumed or the knowledge proliferated. 

When we complete the first panel we will move to a closed session in room S–

407 of the Capitol. Ambassador Hill and Mr. Tobey will be joined by Ambassador 

Joseph Detrani, North Korean Mission Manager, and Vann Van Diepen, National 

3

Intelligence Officer for Weapons of Mass Destruction, both of whom are from the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Ambassador Hill we will begin with you. Please proceed with your opening statement.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, gentlemen. I welcome all my colleagues and others who 

are here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I’m going to ask that I put my whole statement 

in the record, but I want to talk about a couple of aspects of this 

very important hearing this morning. I had the opportunity to consult with Ambassador Hill and I asked that he address this morning the subject of human rights as a part of his presentation in the 

opening statement and then respond to such questions as may be 

propounded on this issue. 

Mr. Ambassador, I have read through the testimony that you are 

submitting before the committee and I commend you for that action. I also commend you for what I think is one of the great chapters in the contemporary history of the Department of State and 

indeed, under the direction of the President and others, in achieving the current status with regard to North Korea, and indeed it’s 

the whole Korean Peninsula that we’re addressing. We’re anxious 

to hear about the further progress we hope that you can make on 

the ground over there. 

I want to say a word about the President’s nominee to be Ambassador to South Korea. As I understand, she was a principal deputy. 

Her name is Kathy Stephens. I have met with her, talked with her 

at length. She has an extraordinary background. In my judgment, 

she is very, very capable of taking on this heavy responsibility. 

I hope that the Senate—and I will so address the Senate on the 

floor—can proceed to a confirmation before the August recess to enable her to be there for the important visit, as I understand, scheduled by the President. 

I say that, Mr. Chairman, with a deep sense of humility because 

in 1951–1952 I was a young officer in the Marine Corps stationed 

for a brief period in Korea during that conflict. That conflict is one 

that’s very important to me. My participation was of no great consequence, but I certainly served alongside others who gave their 

full measure, their life and their limb, to see that South Korea 

would be preserved as a free and sovereign nation. 

Of course, we had the United Nations (U.N.) forces in there. 

37,000 Americans lost their life in enabling South Korea to survive 

as a sovereign nation. I think it’s just important, the progress 

that’s been made to maintain peace on that peninsula and to limit 

the capabilities of North Korea to project in one way or another either its influence or through the sales of weaponry or other issues, 

project beyond the shores of that peninsula and place in harm’s 

way innocent people, wherever they may be, on the planet today. 

I think the steps that you’ve achieved thus far are to be commended. Once again, I’ll have further to say on the floor of the Senate, but I ask the chairman if part of my allocation of time on questions could be yielded to Senator Brownback, whom you know very 

4

well, of the Foreign Relations Committee. He, as well as some 

other Senators, have understandable concerns on the issue of 

human rights and I do hope that a colloquy between the two of you 

can occur as a part of this hearing, which would underlie the hopeful confirmation by the Senate before the August recess of Ambassador Stephens. 

I thank the chair. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

I join Chairman Levin in welcoming our witnesses today. Given recent developments in the Six-Party Talks with North Korea, it is important that the committee 

receive this update on the negotiations and the prospects for continued progress in 

persuading North Korea to disable, dismantle, and ultimately abandon its nuclear 

weapons program. 

Ambassador Hill, you have faced many challenges in negotiating with a most difficult adversary—North Korea, in coordinating with our foreign partners in this effort, and in navigating a delicate political landscape right here in the U.S. Government and Congress. I thank you for your dedicated service, and commend you for 

the success you have achieved to date. The committee is keenly interested in your 

report this morning. 

We are also eager to hear about the progress being made on the ground in North 

Korea, to include the role the National Nuclear Security Administration is playing 

in implementation and verification of North Korea’s denuclearization commitments. 

In addition, we welcome our witnesses from the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence who we hope will shed light on North Korea’s intentions, its nuclear 

declaration, and its nuclear and missile programs. 

Mr. Chairman, a word about a chapter in the history of the Korean Peninsula. 

I note the 55th anniversary of the Korean War Armistice. I acknowledge, with a 

deep sense of humility, that I was privileged to serve in Korea with the U.S. Marine 

Corps for a brief time during the 1951–1952 period of the Korean War. I bring a 

unique and heartfelt perspective to the past and present American involvement, 

with other nations, on the Korean Peninsula. Last week, I attended a solemn ceremony on the occasion of the 55th Anniversary of the Korean War Armistice. This 

event, sponsored by Senator Cardin and House Majority Leader Hoyer, honored the 

sacrifice and service of our Armed Forces in that war, where over 36,000 Americans 

gave their lives. Over 100,000 were wounded and today, a number of prisoners of 

war are still missing. American forces were a part of a United Nations force structure. Fifty-five years later, the Republic of Korea remains a free democracy and 

faithful ally to our Nation. 

Because of my deep and abiding interest in Korea, and the relationship between 

our two nations, I requested a meeting with Ms. Kathleen Stevens, the President’s 

nominee to be the next U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. I was impressed 

to hear that she started her distinguished career as a Peace Corps volunteer serving 

in rural South Korea. Her impressive experience rising through the ranks of the 

Foreign Service, up to and including her service as Principal Deputy and Political 

Advisor in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State, 

combined with her fluency in the Korean language, make her uniquely and immensely qualified to be our next Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. If confirmed, 

she would succeed another outstanding Foreign Service Officer—Ambassador Sandy 

Vershbow—who has served with distinction, but is slated to leave Seoul in September. 

Our President will travel to Asia next week for the Olympics, stopping first in 

Seoul. I think it is critically important that he be able on that visit to announce 

the confirmation of the next U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. 

Therefore, I am urging my colleagues in the Senate to allow Ms. Stephens’ nomination to be called up and voted upon before the Senate leaves for the summer recess. 

With that I will conclude my remarks and look forward to our witnesses’ testimony.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. 

Ambassador Hill? 

5

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Ambassador HILL. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin. 

Thank you very much, Senator Warner and distinguished members 

of this committee, for inviting me to come here and give you an update on the status of our efforts to achieve verifiable 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through this Six-Party 

process. 

I have a lengthy statement which, with your permission, I’d like 

to submit for the record, but make some comments drawing on 

that. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you for that. The entire statement 

will be made a part of the record. 

Ambassador HILL. Mr. Chairman, in addition to discussing what 

we are doing to try to achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, I would also like to talk today about our broader vision, 

as outlined in the 2005 joint statement, for the overall region and 

to ensure that region enjoys the benefits of human rights protection 

and also economic development that would accompany this 

denuclearization. 

Senator Warner has spoken of his sacrifice, of his time in the Korean War. Some 55 years ago this month was the armistice. Senator Warner, I want to say to you, as someone who has spent a 

good bit of time on the Korean Peninsula, how important your efforts have been to that part of the world. South Korea today is one 

of the world’s most vibrant economies, but, more importantly than 

that, it’s one of the world’s most vibrant democracies. It provides 

freedoms for its people. It provides human rights for its people. I 

think if you trace that human rights record, which wasn’t easy to 

achieve and wasn’t achieved overnight, but when you go back 

through the decades, when you look back at what happened in the 

1990s, especially what happened in the 1980s with the student 

movement there, with the movement to release political prisoners—

and I might mention in that regard, Senator Warner, that the candidate to become our next ambassador was very much involved as 

the Human Rights Officer of those times. 

They were very difficult times. But none of this would have been 

possible without the sacrifice of your fellow soldiers and sailors, the 

efforts during that terrible war to maintain freedom there. So I 

think for all people who participated in that war, they can be very, 

very proud of what was achieved. 

Our duty now is to see if we can achieve that, not only for the 

Republic of Korea, South Korea, but now to bring some of those 

freedoms to the people in North Korea. To get to that point, we 

need to focus very heavily on this, on denuclearization. But I want 

to stress, that is not the only area of our focus. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

I wish to note, Mr. Chairman and others, that it is the 55th anniversary of that conflict, and we had two very solemn ceremonies 

here on Capitol Hill to allow veterans and others who participated 

in that conflict—I’ve always said mine was very modest compared 

to the others. But it is well remembered across America the sacrifices that this country and those other nations of the U.N. at that 

6

time—it was a U.N. force structure—that participated in providing 

the security for South Korea. 

Chairman LEVIN. One of the most extraordinary memorials in 

Washington is the Korean War Memorial, which too many people 

don’t even know about, but when they go there they are absolutely 

stunned by its impact. 

Thank you, Ambassador. 

Ambassador HILL. If I could also mention that I’m very pleased 

to be joined here today by my colleague Will Tobey from the Department of Energy. The Department of Energy has a very key role 

in this process of denuclearization. Will and I have done some traveling together out there to the region. We’ve done some negotiating 

together, and I’m very pleased to have Will here today. 

Mr. Chairman, we have made some important progress on the 

Six-Party Talks, but I must tell you as a person involved in it that 

we have a lot more to be done in order to implement the September 

2005 joint statement, that is to achieve verifiable denuclearization 

and to achieve a better life on the Korean Peninsula. 

Before turning, however, to the specific status of implementation 

of the Six-Party Agreements, I do want to reflect a little on the SixParty process. In October 2002, President Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin discussed creating a Six-Party framework to deal 

with this, with the problem of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions. 

Our President made it very clear that the United States alone cannot solve this problem. We need partners. We need to work with 

others. Indeed, we need to make sure that others understand that 

this is a problem that doesn’t just threaten the U.S.; it threatens 

them as well. 

Over the past 6 years we have seen the strategic importance of 

this framework, not only for dealing with the nuclear issue, but 

also for Northeast Asia more generally. Multilateral diplomacy 

takes time and effort, as President Bush has said from time to 

time. Merging the interests of six parties is not easy. I must say, 

as I’ve said before, it offers no refuge for those in need of instant 

gratification. It requires concerted efforts. I think in working with 

our partners we have achieved some accomplishments. 

I would say our close cooperation with China in the Six-Party 

Talks has had implications beyond the Korean Peninsula and 

Northeast Asia. I believe it’s had an important impact on China’s 

emergence as a responsible stakeholder in the region. It is very important that we find ways to work with China. We hold China to 

certain international standards, whether it be in the proliferation 

area or the human rights area, and I think one of the best ways 

we’ve been able to do that is through the Six-Party process. 

The Six-Party framework works because each nation represented 

at the table has a shared interest in a peaceful, stable, and 

denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and it makes North Korea accountable not just to us, but to all of its neighbors. The process is 

based on the principle of action for action. This was very much embodied in the September 2005 joint statement. That statement lays 

out the goals for the process, requiring that all the parties undertake to promote economic cooperation in the field of energy, trade, 

and investment. It also looks to bring the international standards 

7

in all areas to this Korean Peninsula, in particular to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 

To be sure, this is a broad vision and full implementation of this 

joint statement would not only offer the North Korean people a better future, but it would provide a foundation for regional peace and 

stability based on recognized norms of international relations, including human rights. 

Of course, this ambitious agenda cannot be realized all at once. 

The parties agreed to take a phased approach to reaching these 

goals. Each of these phases have been challenging, but we are making some progress. The action-for-action process has allowed us to 

build trust as each side knows that the process will only move forward when each side fulfills its commitments. Under the framework, DPRK receives something from the other parties only as it 

moves forward in its own commitments. 

So what is the status of these agreements? The initial phase was 

concluded in 2007 and we’re currently completing the second phase 

actions and we hope moving into the third phase of implementation. In the first two phases, we’ve made some important progress. 

Under the February 2007 agreement on initial actions, the DPRK 

shut down and sealed its core nuclear facility and invited the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) personnel to conduct monitoring and verification. IAEA personnel have remained in place, 

monitoring the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, since July 2007. Indeed, it was only 1 year ago this month 

that North Korea shut down its production of plutonium. 

Under the October 2007 agreement on second phase actions, the 

DPRK took significant steps to disable its three core Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and on June 26, just about a month ago, it provided 

a declaration of all of its nuclear programs to the Chinese chair. 

On June 27, in an important symbol of its commitment to the process, it collapsed the cooling tower at Yongbyon to make clear that 

it has no intention of reviving this facility, this nuclear facility, in 

the future. 

Since November 2007, a rotating team of U.S. experts has been 

on the ground overseeing disablement of the three core nuclear facilities. North Korea is no longer able to produce weapons-grade 

plutonium at Yongbyon. It’s completed some eight out of eleven 

agreed disablement tasks. It’s discharged more than half of the 

8,000 spent fuel rods from the reactor. When it completes all of 

these 11 steps, it would have to expend significant time and effort, 

upwards of 12 months, maybe more, if it ever wanted to reconstitute the facilities. Our experts—and Mr. Tobey can speak in far 

greater detail on this—continue to report good working cooperation 

with the DPRK experts on the site. 

The declaration package that the DPRK provided to the Chinese 

on June 26 addresses its nuclear program and acknowledged our 

concerns about uranium enrichment and its past nuclear proliferation activities, specifically with Syria. 

The DPRK’s declaration is not an end point, however, in our efforts to understand their nuclear program. Frankly, it’s the basis 

now of a rigorous process of verifying all of their nuclear programs. 

We have reviewed copies of 18,000 pages of documents handed over 

to us by the North Koreans, consisting of operating records from 

8

its 5-megawatt reactor in Yongbyon going back to 1987, and the reprocessing facility that they gave us in May, and already it’s producing some results. 

The six parties have agreed on general principles for verification 

that are guiding the ongoing discussions of a verification mechanism. These principles include access to facilities, documents, and 

interviews with personnel, and other measures as agreed by the 

Six Parties. 

In response to the North Korean actions to fulfil its commitments, the U.S. has also moved on fulfilling our second phase commitments. On June 26, President Bush announced that he was terminating the exercise of authorities under the Trading With the 

Enemy Act with respect to North Korea and notified Congress of 

his intent to rescind designation of North Korea as a state sponsor 

of terrorism following a minimum 45-day congressional notification 

period. 

The President made very clear that during this 45-day period we 

would use that period to assess the DPRK cooperation, including 

on reaching an agreement on a verification protocol. Indeed, one 

cannot talk about a declaration without verification. They go handin-hand. 

North Korea is also receiving some energy assistance in return 

for its denuclearization actions. To date they’ve received some 

420,000 tons of heavy fuel oil and equivalent assistance, including 

134,000 tons of heavy fuel oil provided by the U.S. heavy fuel oil, 

equivalent material, and equipment provided has also been consistent with U.S. laws controlling exports to the DPRK. 

On July 12, the six parties announced agreement to work in parallel to complete all of the disablement work at Yongbyon and to 

contract to deliver remaining energy assistance by the end of October. That means that if the DPRK wants more energy assistance 

they will have to do more denuclearization. 

The U.S. remains very much concerned about outstanding questions relating to North Korea’s uranium enrichment efforts and 

proliferation. We’ll continue to engage the DPRK in detailed and 

candid discussions on these issues until these issues are resolved 

in a verifiable way. The six parties have agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism, that all six parties have agreed to, to track all 

parties’ obligations, including, and from our perspective especially, 

nonproliferation. We will use this mechanism to hold the DPRK to 

its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or 

know-how. This is a commitment they have made to the other five. 

That commitment was in the October statement and we will monitor it with great care. 

We will continue to press the DPRK to address questions about 

Japanese abductees. We’ll continue to urge North Korea at every 

opportunity to address Japan’s concerns. Japan is an important 

friend and ally of the United States. We’ll continue to consult closely with the Japanese Government as we move forward. We have 

done this at every step of the way. Any move we have made with 

respect to the DPRK, we have worked very closely with the Japanese as our allies. Keep in mind that Japan has some special concerns here, namely the fact that several of their citizens, an undetermined number of citizens, were actually abducted, in some cases 

9

right off the streets of Japan, in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 

Those citizens, whether the number is 12 or 20 or whether it’s 

more, as some people do believe, there needs to be a proper accounting on that, and we have pressed the DPRK and I can assure 

you we will continue to press them because we consider that something that has to be addressed if we’re going to achieve this sense 

of neighborhood in Northeast Asia that we’re looking for. 

But even as we make progress on these second phase actions and 

begin to move into the third and final denuclearization phase, significant work remains, including the abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, the dismantlement of all of their 

facilities, and the removal of fissile material from the country and 

the verification that indeed there is an absence of fissile material. 

That is, once they have removed it we need to make sure that all 

of it has been removed and taken from the country. 

In exchange, the United States is prepared to transform our relationship with North Korea into a more normal relationship. The 

U.S. and the DPRK are committed to improving bilateral relations 

and working toward full diplomatic relations, and one way we’ll do 

this is by increasing bilateral exchanges aimed at enhancing mutual trust. 

The issue of human rights will be a key element of this normalization process. We will continue to press the DPRK for the kind 

of meaningful progress that will be necessary for the DPRK to join 

the international community. The DPRK’s human rights records is, 

quite frankly, abysmal and every day that the people of North 

Korea continue to suffer represents an unacceptable continuation of 

oppression. 

I have personally seen satellite images of the DPRK’s extensive 

prison camp system. This is truly a scar on the Korean Peninsula, 

in which it is reported that North Koreans suffer torture, forced 

abortion, and in some cases execution. The dangers faced by North 

Korean refugees who flee their country in search of a better life, 

often only to face suffering or eventual repatriation with a very uncertain fate, are similarly unacceptable. 

The United States’ dedication to improving the lives of the North 

Korean people will never wane and we will continue to seek all 

available opportunities to improve this heartbreaking situation. We 

have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that human rights is not 

only a U.S. priority, frankly it’s an international priority. It is part 

of the standard of joining the international community. We’ve emphasized how much we value the advancement of human rights in 

all societies and our need to have this and other outstanding issues 

of concern discussed in the normalization process. 

We note, for example, that the Republic of Korea’s National Assembly is currently considering legislation that also addresses 

North Korean human rights issues. Our Special Envoy on Human 

Rights to North Korea, Jay Lefkowitz, plans to travel to Seoul soon 

and we’ll look for every opportunity to work with our partners in 

the region on our shared goal for a better future for the people of 

North Korea. 

On a separate track, to respond to severe food shortages in the 

DPRK, the United States has joined in an international effort to 

provide food assistance to the DPRK in June, after establishing a 

10

strong framework to ensure that food will reach those most in 

need. The administration also shares the desires of families and 

veterans from the Korean War to resume remains recovery operations in North Korea and we’re prepared to do so at an appropriate time. The Department of Defense temporarily suspended remains recovery operations in May 2005 due to concern about our 

personnel and about heightened tensions between the U.S. and 

North Korea. As soon as we believe it’s appropriate to reengage 

with North Korea on this to make sure that once we reengage our 

engagement can be sustained and not stopped again, we’ll ensure 

that Congress is indeed informed. 

Full implementation of the September 2005 joint statement may 

also provide a way forward for the transformation of the overall security relationships in Northeast Asia. The U.S. believes that a discussion of a Korean Peninsula peace regime could begin early in 

this next phase. We achieve a permanent peace arrangement on 

the Korean Peninsula once North Korea has verifiably 

denuclearized. 

We also hope to move forward in the development of a Northeast 

Asia peace and security mechanism that could help further solidify 

the cooperative relationships built through the Six-Party process. 

While we have made important progress toward full implementation of the September 2005 joint statement, much work remains to 

be done to verifiably denuclearize DPRK. We must continue to 

work forward in the Six-Party process to realize their abandonment 

of all nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs in accordance 

with all their commitments, as well as to have them return to the 

Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and IAEA safeguards. We’ll continue to work very closely with our Six-Party partners as we work forward in the tough tasks that lie ahead. 

I want to thank you once again for allowing me to appear here 

and I stand ready to answer any and all of your questions. Thank 

you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Ambassador, thank you very much. Thank you 

for your long commitment and your professionalism and your 

steadfastness. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Hill follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. CHRISTOPHER R. HILL

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members for inviting me to update you on the status of our efforts to achieve the verifiable 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party process. I also want 

to talk today about our broader vision—as outlined in the September 2005 Joint 

Statement—of a region where the benefits of human rights protections and economic 

development go along with progress on denuclearization. I am pleased to be joined 

today by my colleague Will Tobey from the Department of Energy (DOE), a key 

partner in the implementation of our Six-Party agreements. 

We have made important progress recently in the Six-Party Talks, but much work 

remains for the full implementation of the September 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement and the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Before turning 

to the specific status of implementation of Six-Party agreements, I want to reflect 

on the importance of the Six-Party framework that we have built. 

THE SIX-PARTY FRAMEWORK

In October 2002, President Bush and Chinese President Jiang Zemin discussed 

creating a Six-Party framework to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue. Over 

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the past 6 years, we have seen the strategic importance of this framework not only 

for dealing with the important North Korean nuclear issue, but for Northeast Asia 

more generally. Multilateral diplomacy takes time and effort, and merging the interests of six countries is not an easy feat. Yet, it is because of our common interests 

in the region and our concerted efforts that we have achieved important accomplishments to date. 

Throughout this process, the Chinese Government, which chairs the Six-Party 

Talks, has played a key role. Our close cooperation with China in the Six-Party 

Talks has implications beyond the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, and has 

an important, salutary impact on China’s emergence as a responsible stakeholder 

in the region. 

The Six-Party framework works because each nation represented at the table has 

a shared interest in a peaceful, stable and denuclearized Korean Peninsula, and because North Korea is accountable to all of its neighbors for its actions. Each of these 

nations complements one another in our efforts to hold North Korea to its commitments. 

The Six-Party process is based on the principle of ‘‘action-for-action,’’ which was 

embodied in the September 2005 Six-Party Joint Statement. The Joint Statement 

lays out the goals of the Six-Party Talks, most importantly the Democratic People’s 

Republic of Korea (DPRK) commitment to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing 

nuclear programs, and return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons and to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and 

investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally, and the other Parties described their 

willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK. The joint statement outlines 

a vision for transforming relations in Northeast Asia, including through normalization of bilateral relations with the DPRK, exploration of ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia, and negotiation among directly related parties of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula. 

This is a broad vision. Full implementation of the September 2005 Joint Statement would not only offer the North Korean people a better future, but also provide 

a foundation for regional peace and stability, based on recognized norms of international relations, including human rights. Of course, this ambitious agenda cannot 

be realized all at once. Rather, the Parties agreed to take a phased approach to 

reaching these goals. Each of these phases has been challenging, but we have made 

important progress throughout each phase. With each step forward, we have reduced the number of tasks before us. 

The action-for-action approach has allowed us to build trust, as each side knows 

that the process will only move forward when each party fulfills its commitments. 

Under this framework, the DPRK receives something from the other Parties only 

as it moves forward on its commitments. This process of building trust is of great 

importance, for the tasks will only become more difficult as we progress. 

CURRENT STATUS OF SIX-PARTY ACTIONS

So what is the status of the implementation of these agreements? The Initial 

Phase was concluded in July 2007. We are currently completing Second Phase actions and moving into the Third Phase of implementing the September 2005 Joint 

Statement. In the first two phases, we have made important progress. Under the 

February 13, 2007 agreement on ‘‘Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint 

Statement,’’ the DPRK shut down and sealed core nuclear facilities and invited back 

the IAEA to conduct monitoring and verification activities. IAEA personnel have remained in place, monitoring the shut-down and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facility, since July 2007. Under the October 3, 2007 agreement on ‘‘Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,’’ the DPRK has taken significant steps to disable three core Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and on June 26, it provided a declaration of its nuclear programs to the Chinese chair. On June 27, in 

an important symbol of its commitment to the disablement process, North Korea collapsed the cooling tower at Yongbyon before the international media. 

Since November 2007, a rotating team of U.S. experts has been on the ground 

overseeing disablement of the three core nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, and North 

Korea is no longer able to produce weapons-grade plutonium at Yongbyon. As of 

today, the DPRK has completed 8 out of 11 agreed disablement tasks, and has discharged more than half of the 8,000 spent fuel rods from the 5–MW(e) reactor. Upon 

completion of all 11 steps, the DPRK would have to expend significant effort, and 

time—upwards of 12 months—to reconstitute all of the disabled facilities. Our experts continue to report good cooperation with DPRK experts at the site. 

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The declaration package that the DPRK provided to the Chinese on June 26 addresses its plutonium program, and acknowledged our concerns about the DPRK’s 

uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation activities, specifically with regard to 

Syria. The DPRK’s declaration is not an end point in our efforts to understand 

North Korea’s nuclear programs, but rather is the basis for a rigorous process of 

verifying all of the DPRK’s nuclear programs. Review of the copies of 19,000 pages 

of documents, consisting of copies of operating records from its 5–MW(e) reactor at 

Yongbyon and the reprocessing facility, that the DPRK provided to the United 

States in May, is already producing results. The Six Parties have agreed to general 

principles for verification that are guiding ongoing discussions of a verification 

mechanism. These principles include access to facilities, documents, and interviews 

with personnel, and other measures as agreed by the Six Parties. The verification 

process would include participation by experts from the Six Parties and the IAEA. 

In response to the DPRK’s actions to fulfill its Second Phase commitments, the 

United States has also moved forward on fulfilling our Second Phase commitments. 

On June 26, President Bush announced that he was terminating the exercise of authorities under the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, and notified Congress of his intent to rescind designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor 

of terrorism following the 45-day congressional notification period. The President 

made clear that we would use this 45-day period to assess the DPRK’s cooperation, 

including on reaching agreement on a verification protocol, and respond accordingly. 

North Korea is also receiving energy assistance in return for its denuclearization 

actions in the First and Second Phases—equivalent to 1 million tons of Heavy Fuel 

Oil (HFO). To date, the DPRK has received approximately 420,000 tons of HFO and 

equivalent assistance, including 134,000 tons of HFO provided by the United States. 

HFO-equivalent materials and equipment provided have been consistent with U.S. 

laws controlling exports to the DPRK. On July 12, the Six Parties announced agreement to work in parallel to complete all remaining disablement work at Yongbyon 

and to contract for or deliver remaining energy assistance by the end of October. 

Even as we have seen progress on these fronts, the United States remains concerned about outstanding questions relating to North Korea’s uranium enrichment 

efforts and proliferation. We will continue to engage the DPRK in detailed and candid discussions on these issues until North Korea resolves these concerns in a 

verifiable manner. The Six Parties have agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism to track all Parties obligations—including nonproliferation and provision of energy assistance. We will use this mechanism to hold the DPRK to its commitment 

‘‘not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.’’ The North Koreans 

are also cognizant of the fact that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 

remains in effect. 

At the same time, the United States will continue to press the DPRK to address 

questions about the Japanese abductees. We will continue to urge the DPRK at 

every opportunity to address Japan’s concerns. Japan is an important friend and 

ally of the United States, and we will continue to consult closely with the Japanese 

government as we move forward. 

OFFERING THE DPRK A BETTER FUTURE

Even as we make progress toward finalizing Second Phase actions and begin moving into the Third, and final, denuclearization Phase, significant work remains, including abandonment of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, dismantlement of all North Korea’s nuclear facilities, removal of all fissile 

material, and verification of North Korea’s denuclearization. 

In exchange, the United States is prepared to transform our relations with the 

DPRK into a more normal relationship. The United States and DPRK have committed to improving bilateral relations and working toward full diplomatic relations. 

One way we will seek to do this is by increasing bilateral exchanges between the 

United States and DPRK aimed at enhancing mutual trust. 

The issue of human rights will be a key element of the normalization process. We 

will continue to press the DPRK for the kind of meaningful progress that will be 

necessary for the DPRK to join the international community. The DPRK’s human 

rights record is abysmal, and every day that the people of North Korea continue to 

suffer represents an unacceptable continuation of oppression. I have seen satellite 

images of the DPRK’s extensive prison camp system—a scar on the Korean Peninsula—in which it is reported that North Koreans suffer torture, forced abortions, 

and in some cases execution. The dangers faced by North Korean refugees, who flee 

their country in search of a better life, often only to face suffering or repatriation, 

are similarly unacceptable. The United States’ dedication to improving the lives of 

the North Korean people will never wane, and we continue to seek all available opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46091.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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portunities to improve this heartbreaking situation. We have repeatedly made clear 

to the DPRK that human rights is a U.S. priority. We have emphasized how much 

we value the advancement of human rights in all societies, and our need to have 

this and other outstanding issues of concern discussed in the normalization process. 

We note that the ROK’s National Assembly is considering legislation addressing 

North Korean human rights. Our Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, 

Jay Lefkowitz, plans to travel to Seoul soon. We will look for every opportunity to 

work with our partners in the region on our shared goal of a better future for the 

people of North Korea. Our goal through this process has been and will remain improving the lives of the people of North Korea. 

On a separate track, to respond to severe food shortages in the DPRK, the United 

States began providing food assistance to the DPRK in June after establishing a 

strong framework to ensure that the food will reach those most in need. The United 

States also assisted U.S. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in providing aid 

to fight the outbreak of infectious diseases following floods in North Korea last summer, and is working with U.S. NGOs to carry out a plan to improve the supply of 

electricity at provincial hospitals in North Korea. 

The administration shares the desire of families and veterans to resume remains 

recovery operations in North Korea, and we are prepared to do so at the appropriate 

time. The Department of Defense temporarily suspended remains recovery operations in May 2005 due to concern for our personnel during a period of heightened 

tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. As soon as we believe it is appropriate 

to reengage with North Korea on these recovery efforts, we will ensure that Congress is informed. 

Full implementation of the September 2005 joint statement may also provide a 

way forward for the transformation of overall security relations in Northeast Asia. 

We remain committed to replacing the 1953 Armistice with a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. The United States believes that discussions of 

a Korean Peninsula peace regime could begin early in the Third Phase. We can 

achieve a permanent peace arrangement on the Korean Peninsula once the DPRK 

has verifiably denuclearized. We also hope to move forward on the development of 

a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism, which could help further solidify 

the cooperative relationships built through the Six-Party process and provide a 

means for the parties to work together to address issues including greater economic 

opportunity and greater human rights protections for their citizens. 

Our denuclearization efforts in the Third Phase will require substantial funding, 

and we welcome Congress’ provision of the additional authorities necessary to undertake these important tasks. While the State Department’s Nonproliferation and 

Disarmament Fund may continue to shoulder some costs in the Third Phase, we are 

hopeful that DOE will be able to provide funding, if the President exercises the recently enacted authority to waive needed elements of the Glenn Amendment sanctions imposed on the DPRK. My DOE colleague will speak to those estimates. We 

look forward to working with Congress to ensure that the administration has the 

necessary funding to undertake these important tasks. 

THE ROAD AHEAD

While we have made important progress toward the full implementation of the 

September 2005 joint statement, much work remains on the road to verifiable 

denuclearization of the DPRK and all the goals laid out in that document. We must 

continue to move forward in the Six-Party process to realize the DPRK’s abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in accordance with the 

September 2005 joint statement, as well as its return to the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards. We will continue to work closely 

with our Six-Party partners as we move forward on the tough tasks that lie ahead. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I am happy to answer 

your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Tobey? 

Senator WARNER. I wish to join you, Mr. Chairman, in that observation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

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STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. TOBEY, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. TOBEY. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, members of the 

committee: Thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss 

achieving verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. You 

and Ambassador Hill have eloquently defined the important context for our work, one that includes both conflict and the political 

and economic success of the Republic of Korea, and I’m certainly 

mindful of that context. 

Since early November 2007, teams of NNSA nuclear monitors 

have maintained a continuous on-the-ground presence at the 

Yongbyon site, overseeing the implementation of agreed disablement tasks. Ambassador Hill has detailed the progress that has 

been made on those tasks and I agree with his characterization 

and I won’t repeat that assessment. 

Of course, North Korea’s pledge to abandon all existing nuclear 

programs extends beyond the plutonium production plants at 

Yongbyon. It also includes other nuclear facilities or activities to be 

subject to verification, as agreed by the Six Parties. 

Working level cooperation between U.S. teams and their North 

Korean counterparts has been generally constructive. Our experts 

have been able to perform maintenance on installed monitoring 

equipment, access the spent fuel pond to measure water temperature, clarity, and pH levels, and access the reprocessing plant and 

fuel fabrication plant to verify that completed disablement tasks remain in effect. Our working level relationship with IAEA inspectors 

monitoring the shutdown at Yongbyon has also been very strong. 

As Ambassador Hill noted, the Six-Party Talks are moving toward Phase Three activities, including negotiation of a comprehensive verification protocol and negotiation of dismantlement and 

fissile material removal measures. The NNSA will continue to provide policy and technical support to these negotiations and we 

stand ready to implement agreed verification measures and other 

tasks as requested by the Six Parties. 

Although the exact details of Phase Three are yet to be negotiated, our planning assumption is that the NNSA will be called 

upon to support implementation of comprehensive verification and 

denuclearization measures. We anticipate that the costs of implementing Phase Three activities will be substantially higher than 

the costs of Phase Two. To date the NNSA has spent approximately 

$15 million in support of Phase Two implementation. 

In addition, the State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund has provided assistance of approximately $20 million 

for the costs of completing disablement activities in Phase Two. 

This assistance has been necessary because the Department of Energy has been prohibited by Section 102[b] of the Arms Export Control Act, known also as the Glenn Amendment, from providing financial assistance to the DPRK in support of the denuclearization 

process. 

By legislation recently enacted which provides the President with 

the authority to waive the so-called Glenn Amendment restrictions, 

Congress has addressed this problem and opened the door to more 

15

substantial NNSA participation, and I thank the committee for its 

role in passing this legislation. 

If the President exercises this waiver authority, the NNSA will 

be able to procure, ship to North Korea, and use equipment required to support the full range of disablement, dismantlement, 

verification, and material packaging and removal activities that 

phase three will likely entail. If these activities begin soon and continue at a more rapid pace, we estimate that the total implementation costs could amount to an additional $34 million in 2008 and 

over $360 million in fiscal year 2009. The bulk of these costs relate 

to packaging and disposition of separated plutonium and spent fuel 

at Yongbyon. But they also cover implementation of critical measures necessary to verify North Korea’s nuclear declaration and to 

ensure our teams on the ground have adequate protective equipment and health physics support. 

The cost to the U.S. Government for this effort could well fall on 

the NNSA, as the lion’s share of verification work involves the time 

and expertise of technical specialists from the Department of Energy and the NNSA. 

I would like to conclude by reiterating our strong commitment to 

supporting U.S. efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula. Through the Six-Party process, we have 

achieved tangible progress towards this goal and our dedicated 

staff of technical experts remains ready to provide whatever additional support may be required as the process moves forward. 

I thank you again for this opportunity and look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tobey follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. WILLIAM H. TOBEY

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the invitation to appear today to discuss the process of achieving verifiable 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. My remarks will focus on: (1) the role of 

the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) in implementing agreed denuclearization measures in North Korea; (2) 

progress to date; and (3) planning for anticipated ‘‘Phase Three’’ verification and 

material removal activities, including the budget requirements for those activities. 

DOE/NNSA provides two main forms of support for U.S. efforts to eliminate the 

nuclear threat posed by North Korea. First, we provide technical experts to advise 

Ambassador Hill and the U.S. delegation to the Six-Party Talks, including the 

Denuclearization Working Group and Economy and Energy Cooperation Working 

Group, on issues related to the disablement and dismantlement of North Korea’s existing nuclear programs as well as verification. Second, we lead technical teams responsible for on-the-ground oversight of implementation of denuclearization measures agreed to in the Six-Party Talks context. 

Under the September 2005 joint statement, North Korea committed to abandoning all of its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at 

an early date, to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As a first step towards this objective, North Korea agreed in the February 13, 2007 ‘‘Initial Actions Agreement’’ 

to shut down and seal its nuclear facility at Yongbyon, for the purpose of eventual 

abandonment, and also to invite back IAEA inspectors to conduct monitoring and 

verification as agreed between the IAEA and the DPRK. In July 2007, the IAEA 

confirmed that the Yongbyon facility had been shut down. 

Under the October 3, 2007 Agreement on Second Phase Actions, North Korea 

agreed to disable all existing nuclear facilities subject to abandonment under the 

2005 joint statement. North Korea further agreed to disable the three core facilities 

at the Yongbyon site—the 5MW(e) reactor, the reprocessing plant, and fuel fabrication plant—by the end of 2007. A list of 11 ‘‘Phase II’’ disablement tasks was agreed 

based on the findings of a Six-Party team of experts, including a technical repVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46091.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
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resentative from DOE/NNSA, that visited Yongbyon in September 2007 to assess 

the feasibility of various disablement approaches. 

Since early November 2007, teams of DOE/NNSA-led nuclear monitors have 

maintained a continuous on-the-ground presence at the Yongbyon site overseeing 

the implementation of agreed disablement tasks. As of today, 8 of the 11 agreed 

tasks have been completed, including all agreed tasks at the reprocessing plant and 

the fuel fabrication plant. Discharge of the nearly 8,000 fuel rods from the core of 

the 5–MW(e) reactor continues, with over 4,000 rods discharged, but progress has 

been slower than anticipated. 

Equipment developed by DOE/NNSA has been installed at the 5–MW(e) reactor 

to monitor the fuel rods as they are discharged. As a result of these disablement 

actions, we estimate that it would take North Korea a significant amount of time, 

upwards of 1 year or more, to reconstitute a plutonium production capability at 

Yongbyon. Of course, North Korea’s pledge to abandon all existing nuclear programs 

extends beyond the plutonium production plants at Yongbyon. It also includes other 

nuclear facilities or activities to be subject to verification as agreed by the Six Parties. 

Working-level cooperation between U.S. teams and their North Korean counterparts has been generally constructive. Our experts have been able to: perform maintenance on installed monitoring equipment; access the spent fuel pond to measure 

water temperature, clarity, and pH levels; and access the reprocessing plant and 

fuel fabrication plant to verify that completed disablement tasks remain in effect. 

Our working-level relationship with IAEA inspectors monitoring the shutdown at 

Yongbyon also has been very strong. 

As Ambassador Hill has noted, the Six-Party Talks are moving toward Phase 

Three activities, including negotiation of a comprehensive verification protocol and 

negotiation of dismantlement and fissile material removal measures. DOE/NNSA 

will continue to provide policy and technical support to these negotiations, and we 

stand ready to implement agreed verification measures and other tasks as requested 

by the Six Parties. 

While we have been actively planning to support implementation of Phase Three, 

it is difficult to predict the full scope and schedule of Phase Three activities. The 

Six Parties have agreed that verification will include access to facilities, documents 

and personnel, and we anticipate that DOE/NNSA will be called on to undertake 

technical measures to implement the verification process. The Six Parties continue 

to work on negotiating a comprehensive verification protocol outlining the full scope 

of verification activities. We hope to begin agreed activities quickly once the protocol 

is in place. The North Korean declaration and the more than 18,000 pages of operating records provided by the DPRK provides a basis to initiate further verification 

activities. We anticipate that verification will proceed in parallel with other Phase 

Three activities, which we hope will include dismantlement of facilities and removal 

of the DPRK’s fissile and other nuclear materials. 

Although the exact details of Phase Three are yet to be negotiated, our planning 

assumption is that DOE/NNSA will be called upon to support implementation of 

comprehensive verification and denuclearization measures. To plan for something 

less than this and then be caught unprepared is unacceptable. 

We anticipate that the costs of implementing Phase Three activities will be substantially higher than the costs of Phase Two. To date, DOE/NNSA has spent approximately $15 million in support of Phase Two implementation. In addition, the 

State Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) has provided 

assistance of approximately $20 million for the costs of completing the disablement 

activities in Phase Two. NDF assistance has been necessary because DOE has been 

prohibited by Section 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act—also known as the 

Glenn Amendment—from providing financial assistance to the DPRK in support of 

the denuclearization process. 

By legislation recently enacted which provides the President with the authority 

to waive Glenn Amendment restrictions, Congress has addressed this problem and 

opened the door to a more substantial DOE/NNSA role. If the President exercises 

this waiver authority, DOE/NNSA will be able to procure, ship to North Korea, and 

use equipment required to support the full range of disablement, dismantlement, 

verification, and material packaging and removal activities that Phase Three will 

likely entail. 

If these activities begin soon and continue at a more rapid pace, we estimate that 

the total implementation costs could amount to an additional $34 million in fiscal 

year 2008 and over $360 million in fiscal year 2009. The bulk of these costs relate 

to packaging and disposition of separated plutonium and spent fuel at Yongbyon, 

but they also cover implementation of critical measures necessary to verify North 

Korea’s nuclear declaration and ensure our teams on the ground have adequate proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\46091.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
17

tective equipment and health physics support. The cost to the U.S. Government of 

this effort will largely fall on DOE/NNSA, as the lion’s share of verification work 

involves the time and expertise of technical specialists from DOE/NNSA. 

I would like to conclude by reiterating our strong commitment to supporting U.S. 

efforts to achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Through 

the Six-Party process, we have achieved tangible progress towards this goal, and our 

dedicated staff of technical experts remains ready to provide whatever additional 

support may be required as the process moves forward. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Tobey. We’re going to 

do a 7-minute round and try to complete the questioning during a 

first round so that we can go to S–407. 

Ambassador, in the 2005 agreement in which North Korea 

agreed to denuclearize, did they agree to dismantle and destroy 

their nuclear weapons? Was that part of the agreement? 

Ambassador HILL. Yes, they did. That is right up at the top of 

the agreement, all nuclear programs, specifically nuclear weapons. 

Chairman LEVIN. Not be ended, but they agreed that they would 

dismantle and destroy those weapons? 

Ambassador HILL. It was that they would be abandoned, and 

‘‘abandoned’’ means taken out of the country. We don’t have information to say how much of the kilos of plutonium that they have 

produced are actually embedded in weapons. But the point is all 

separated plutonium must be abandoned. 

Chairman LEVIN. Whether it’s in weapons or otherwise? 

Ambassador HILL. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, back in 2002 Ambassador James Kelly 

confronted the North Koreans with evidence of a uranium enrichment program, and Ambassador Kelly reported that the North Korean foreign ministry representative acknowledged that North 

Korea had such a program. Of course, there’s been a great deal of 

interest since then in trying to get a bead on that program, and 

we have received a letter apparently from North Korea which simply acknowledges U.S. concerns about uranium enrichment, but reportedly it does not acknowledge the existence of a program. 

Has that letter been made public? 

Ambassador HILL. That letter is part of the declaration package 

that they gave us. Essentially what they have said is that they do 

not now and will not in the future have a highly enriched uranium 

program. They acknowledge our concerns about it and also acknowledge the information, our information about it. 

What we have tried to do is to pursue with them our information 

to run down the facts that we have. I think in closed session I can 

go into greater detail, but suffice to say in this context that we 

have in our view pretty compelling evidence that they made certain 

purchases that were very much in line with a uranium enrichment 

program. Our effort is to try to find out the disposition of those 

purchases, and they have tried to address some of our concerns 

with some of those purchases and have not yet addressed some of 

our other concerns. So it’s a work in progress. 

Chairman LEVIN. But in that letter they deny that they ever 

have had one? 

Ambassador HILL. They did not deny they ever had one. They 

simply deny that they have one now. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can that letter be made public? 

18

Ambassador HILL. Let me get back to you on that. It is part of 

the declaration package and it was given as part of the package 

that was given to the six parties, and let me see how that can be 

disseminated. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, we would appreciate your informing us as 

to whether or not that letter can be made public and, if not, why 

not. 

Ambassador HILL. All right. 

Chairman LEVIN. In your judgment, does that letter constitute a 

complete declaration? 

Ambassador HILL. What it constitutes is it provides a basis for 

us to continue to work on that issue such that, since it provides 

that basis, we can eventually make a judgment as to whether we 

have a complete and correct declaration. But we cannot make that 

judgment as of now. The letter obliges North Korea to continue to 

work to address our concerns. 

Chairman LEVIN. So that as of now we don’t have a complete 

declaration on the uranium issue? 

Ambassador HILL. I cannot say that we do. I can only say that 

after we address our concerns with them, and if they are fully addressed then I can say, yes, it was complete. But I cannot make 

that statement today. 

[The information referred to follows:]

As part of North Korea’s declaration package, the DPRK acknowledged U.S. concerns relating to uranium enrichment. The entire declaration package was provided 

to relevant congressional committees, including the Senate Armed Services Committee. The declaration package is classified, and therefore, cannot be publicly released.

Chairman LEVIN. You made reference in your opening statement 

to the question of our recovery operations for the remains of missing Korean War veterans and we appreciate your reference to that. 

It’s been an important subject that we press very hard to get a satisfactory explanation from our Defense Department as to why we 

have not resumed those recovery operations, given the fact that the 

talks have resumed. 

Your statement is that it’s not yet appropriate to reengage North 

Korea on these recovery efforts. Can you be a little more explicit 

as to why it’s not yet appropriate? 

Ambassador HILL. Senator, first of all I want to make very clear 

that my colleagues in the Defense Department need to address specific questions about this. But I can certainly answer the question 

as you’ve posed it to me. 

I think one of the concerns is that we don’t want a situation 

where things are restarted, only to be stopped again. The thinking 

here is foremost the humanitarian concerns about the families. So 

when these efforts are restarted, we want them to be sustained and 

not stopped again. 

I can tell you, speaking from my vantage point, that I would like 

to see if we can do that, but I’m very respectful of my colleagues 

in the Department of Defense. 

Chairman LEVIN. Can they run in parallel? Could these efforts 

be done in parallel, the talks and the recovery efforts going on at 

the same time? 

19

Ambassador HILL. Again, I do not want to speak for my colleagues in the Defense Department, but from my vantage point 

that could be done. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are North Korea’s ballistic missiles included in 

the Six-Party Talks? 

Ambassador HILL. No, sir, they are not. I share the concern of 

many people that we do need to get at their ballistic missile program. They have been exporting missiles and missile know-how to 

other countries and I think this is an issue that does need to be 

addressed. There are many problems in that country, as I alluded 

to in my statement, and what we have tried to focus on is what 

we feel is the most imminently dangerous problem, that is their 

nuclear program. 

But I would certainly believe that missiles need to be addressed 

at an early opportunity. 

Chairman LEVIN. As part of these talks? 

Ambassador HILL. Not directly as part of these talks, but certainly as we go forward I would say that the Six Parties need to 

address missiles. I would emphasize again, for the same reason 

that we mentioned, in the issue of nuclear talks, that missiles are 

not just a problem for the U.S. They are a problem to all the other 

parties, and that’s why it is appropriate to raise those in the SixParty context and why I also, as I suggest in my testimony, address human rights issues as well. This is not just a U.S. concern. 

This is part of the price of admission to the international community and they need to address that. 

Chairman LEVIN. We very much welcome that focus on human 

rights concerns. It’s a very important part of any solution to the 

problems on the peninsula and it also represents something that 

America should always be in the lead in insisting upon. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I 

share your thoughts, as I’m sure other members of this panel do, 

about the issue of human rights. 

Since I will be joining you for the balance of this hearing, I’ll 

withhold my questions at this time and ask the permission of the 

chair, which has been granted to me, to let my time be used by my 

distinguished colleague Senator Brownback, who is an acknowledged person with expertise in the area of human rights. We’re 

proud of him in the Senate for his voice on that, not only with regard to the Korean Peninsula, but elsewhere in the world. 

Chairman LEVIN. We not only welcome Senator Brownback, but 

we have always welcomed his focus on human rights. It’s a very 

important part of the U.S. Senate. 

Senator Brownback. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK, U.S. SENATOR FROM 

THE STATE OF KANSAS 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

I really appreciate this incredible privilege you’re granting me to 

be here today and join this distinguished panel, and my colleague 

from Virginia for allowing me to step forward. 

20

We all share the same concern. Ambassador Hill and I have 

talked several times about human rights issues and I had some 

frustration about that. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Mr. Chairman, ranking member, colleagues who serve on this committee: I want 

to start by thanking you for giving me the opportunity to join you today for this 

extremely important hearing. I know that my colleagues who serve on this committee have focused on the nuclear disarmament issues, and although I have numerous concerns about the way this process has moved forward—whether by ignoring uranium, proliferation to Syria, or even the deficiencies in the plutonium declaration itself—my purpose here today is to determine what specific steps the State 

Department has taken—is taking—and will take in the future—to improve the disastrous human rights situation of the North Korean people. I do not wish to take 

any more time than necessary, so I will move straight to my questions. 

Ambassador Hill, I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today. Thank 

you for you service. 

In the interest of time, almost all of these questions can be answered with a simple yes or no response. My goal here is not to play ‘‘gotcha.’’ Most of the questions 

refer to U.S. law, international conventions, or previous agreements or public statements. 

Refugees: 

1. Congress passed the North Korean Human Rights Act nearly 4 years ago. That 

Act requires U.S. consular facilities to facilitate the submission of applications for 

political asylum in the United States. Nearly 4 years later, the United States has 

admitted just 60 North Korean refugees, and according to credible reports from 

human rights workers, our consular facilities are turning away North Korean refugees as their gates.

a. Ambassador Hill, has the State Department failed to execute this law, 

or is there a problem in understanding Congress’s legislative intent, even 

though the bill passed unanimously? 

b. Would you agree that turning away North Korean refugees is contrary 

to at least the spirit of the law, if not the statutory requirement?

2. Have you heard the estimates that up to 300,000 North Korean refugees are 

living as fugitives in China, under the constant threat of being trafficked or repatriation to face torture or death?

a. Can you understand why some Members of this Congress would be dissatisfied at the admission of just 60 refugees?

3. I understand that it is the State Department’s position that it needs China’s 

concurrence to let a North Korean into one of our consular facilities in China to 

apply for asylum.

a. Does State believe that China is complying with its obligations under 

the Refugee Convention it signed? 

b. When, if ever, will State clarify its instructions on North Korean asylum seekers for our consulates to better comply with the law? 

Famine: 

1. Are you aware of the estimate by Andrew Natsios that 2.5 million North Koreans may have died in the famine of the 1990s? 

2. Have you read the research by Natsios, or by the experts Marcus Noland and 

Stephan Haggard suggesting that those deaths could have been prevented, but for 

the regime’s misallocation of food and other resources? 

3. Are you aware of the call by Elie Wiesel and Vaclav Havel to ask the U.N. for 

Chapter VI sanctions against North Korea for failure to protect its population from 

famine? 

4. Have you seen the reports this year, including reports by the U.N. this very 

week, that North Korea has slipped back into famine? 

5. Are you aware that despite the reports of famine, North Korea has resumed 

construction on a 105-story, 4 million square foot hotel for tourists in the middle 

of Pyongyang—a hotel that sat unfinished for two decades until this year? 

6. In your discussion of the normalization of relations—or in any other context—

have you raised any of these issues about North Korea’s failure to protect its population?

21

a. If so, when was this raised? What specific steps have been taken to 

link this issue to normalization? 

Gulags/Concentration Camps: 

1. Have you ever asked the North Korean regime about the 200,000 men, women, 

and children believed to be in their concentration camps? 

2. Have you ever asked them about estimates that some of those camps have a 

20 percent annual mortality rate, or the reports of widespread torture, starvation, 

and arbitrary executions there? If so. when, and how many times have you brought 

this up? 

3. Have you ever asked them about allegations that they test chemical and biological weapons on political prisoners in those camps? 

4. You were interviewed by the L.A. Times for a report that was published on 

March 4, 2008. The interviewer asked you about the relationship between the establishment of diplomatic relations and human rights. You said, ‘‘Obviously we have 

continued differences with them, but we can do that in the context of two states 

that have diplomatic relations.’’ Do you recall that response? 

5. Will you state on the record here today, and follow up in writing, that any prospect for normalization with North Korea is contingent upon the regime shutting 

down the political gulags and concentration camps? 

Normalization/Diplomatic Relations: 

1. Have you ever told the North Koreans when you expect the U.S. to begin the 

process of establishing diplomatic relations with NK? 

2. Have the North Koreans ever told you when they will let the Red Cross visit 

any of those concentration camps? 

3. Have you ever asked—or have they ever told you—when North Koreans will 

be able to speak, think, or worship freely? 

4. Have the North Koreans told you when they will allow the World Food Program 

and USAID full and free access to their starving people? 

5. Have they given you any promises, benchmarks, or deadlines about casing the 

oppression of their people? 

6. Has the Special Envoy for Human Rights in North Korea ever been invited to 

take a place at the negotiating table in our normalization working group?

a. Will you state for the record that the Special Envoy will be invited to 

all future negotiating sessions with the North Koreans as a way of carrying 

out the NIC Human Rights Act and a way of firmly linking human rights? 

Lifting of Sanctions/Trade: 

1. Do you agree that lifting sanctions will make North Korea eligible to export 

certain goods to the United States? (If no, do you foresee that NK will be able to 

export goods to the U.S. in the next 3–5 years?) 

2. Are you aware of the prohibition in the Tariff Act, at 19 U.S.C. § 1307, against 

landing any goods made with forced labor in U.S. ports? 

3. You’re aware that North Korea is a Tier III country for human trafficking? 

4. Which means that North Korea does not fully comply with minimum standards 

for the elimination of human trafficking—which includes slave labor—and is not 

making significant efforts to do so. 

5. If the North Korean regime were to attempt to land merchandise in our ports, 

what plans are in place to verify that the goods were not made in one of those concentration camps? 

6. Have you made North Korea aware of the Tariff Act’s prohibitions? 

Abduction of U.S. Resident Reverend Kim Dong-shik: 

I’d like to ask you about the case of Rev. Kim Dong-shik. who was abducted in 

2000 from northeastern China and taken to North Korea for interrogation and imprisonment, [hold up picture] As I hope you now recall, he had raised the ire of the 

North Korean government by helping its citizens flee torture and repression and by 

attempting to convert North Korean athletes who attended the 1996 Olympic Games 

in Atlanta. When you came to my office in November of last year, I personally handed you the letter from Mrs. Kim, Rev. Kim’s wife. Back in January 28, 2005, the 

entire Illinois delegation, including Senators Durbin and Obama wrote to the North 

Korean ambassador that ‘‘We view Rev. Kim Dong Shik as also being a hero who 

assisted with the escape of the powerless and forgotten . . . we will NOT [capitalized in the letter] support the removal of your government from the State Department list of State Sponsors of Terrorism until such time, among other reasons, as 

a full accounting is provided to the Kim family regarding the fate of the Rev, Kim 

Dong-Shik following his abduction into North Korea 5 years ago.’’ [hold up letter]

22

1. Have you raised Rev. Kim’s matter with the North Koreans in any of 

the many meetings you have had with the North Koreans? 

2. What do you say to his wife, a US legal permanent resident, and to 

his children who are U.S. citizens, who in testifying before this Congress 

last month begged for an explanation as to how North Korea could be removed as a state sponsor of terror without her either being told exactly 

what had happened to her husband, let alone her receiving his remains for 

her to bury so she could have some closure and so he could rest in peace? 

3. How long does the State Department believe she should have to wait? 

Helsinki Process: 

Please state for the record if and when there will be a Human Rights Framework 

established with respect to North Korea, that is modeled on the Helsinki Process, 

which explicitly links human rights with security concerns.

Senator BROWNBACK. Ambassador Hill, I appreciate your specific 

statement—I’ve read it in the record; I’m sorry I had to step out 

briefly while you were in the middle of that—on human rights. I 

would like for you to drill down on the specifics on this, though, 

for me, and I just want to ask you when and in what setting will 

specific issues of human rights be negotiated between the United 

States and North Korea, either in the Six-Party Talks or in some 

side setting? 

Ambassador HILL. First of all, we have raised the issue many 

times with our interlocutors. The issue that you’re addressing, 

though, is the crucial issue, how do we negotiate things and, frankly, what are we going to be negotiating. So what we want to do as 

we go forward into this next phase is we would like to set up our 

working group where we address the DPRK-U.S. relationship. In 

specific terms address human rights issues. 

Now, this would involve a human rights dialogue of the kind 

we’ve had with other countries. It doesn’t mean that a human 

rights dialogue is going to solve this problem, but it is a start to 

set up a dialogue and to begin to address the issue of prisoners of 

conscience, people who have been summarily put into prison, to try 

to address that, and also begin to address the issues of how their 

judiciary functions. 

We are prepared to do that on a systematic basis as part of our 

overall effort at normalization, with the understanding that we do 

not normalize with North Korea absent a nuclear deal. 

Senator BROWNBACK. In the next set of dialogues this will be a 

formal part of the negotiations? 

Ambassador HILL. The plan is to make this a formal part of our 

series of meetings with the North Koreans, in our so-called bilateral working group, human rights would be riveted into that bilateral working group. 

Senator, I want to again emphasize, human rights is not just for 

the United States. Other countries also have a human rights issue. 

I know that Japan will also raise this in their bilateral working 

group. Ideally, Senator, I would like to see it raised in a plenary. 

I can’t get all of the parties to agree to that. But we will raise this 

systematically in our bilateral working group. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Ambassador Hill, there’s a Special Envoy 

for Human Rights in North Korea, which I don’t believe has been 

invited to any of the negotiations to date between the United 

States and the Six-Party Talks. 

Ambassador HILL. Well, first of all, he would be most welcome 

if he wishes to attend. 

23

Senator BROWNBACK. I want to, because my time will be narrow 

here: will you state that the Special Envoy will be invited to all future negotiating sessions with North Korea? 

Ambassador HILL. I would be happy to invite him to all future 

negotiating sessions with North Korea. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. 

Mr. Ambassador, you noted this earlier, that there are political 

gulags and concentration camps in North Korea. Will you state 

that any prospect of normalization with North Korea is contingent 

upon the regime shutting down the political gulags and concentration camps? 

Ambassador HILL. I can say to you, Senator, that we will definitely raise these issues as an element of the normalization process. I’m not in a position at my level to state to you today what 

the specific conditions of normalization were, but they will be 

raised as part of that and clearly, we will be looking for more satisfactory answers on this. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Ambassador, the Illinois delegation in 

total in a letter dated in 2005—noted the abduction of Reverend 

Kim Dong Shik, who’s a U.S. citizen, and his wife is an Illinois 

resident, children U.S. citizens. I’m going to enter this letter in the 

record. It’s from the Illinois delegation. They have said they would 

not support any normalization with North Korea until his abduction is dealt with. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

24


731ful1.eps
25


731ful2.eps
26

Senator BROWNBACK. Are you familiar with this particular case? 

Ambassador HILL. Yes, I am. I received a letter from his wife and 

I’ve answered it and offered to meet with them directly. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Will you raise that with the North Koreans? 

Ambassador HILL. Yes, I’m happy to do so, as I have done for the 

Japanese. 

Senator BROWNBACK. It seems like this case is very similar to 

the Japanese that were abducted. Now, he has been a human 

rights advocate and really an underground railroad hero helping 

people out of North Korea. I think in the history of the Korean Peninsula his name will go down famously. It’s just my hope and 

prayer that he’s still alive and that he’s somebody that we can get 

out. 

Ambassador HILL. Senator Brownback, these are truly horrific 

stories and they are ones that I think require us to pursue them. 

I’m just pulling out of my wallet the list of the Japanese abductees 

that I carry. These are their pictures. I’ve raised these on individual terms with the North Koreans, and I’m most happy to raise 

his case specifically to see if we can find out what has happened 

to him. 


731ful3.eps
27

The number taken from Japan is something between 12 and 20. 

The government is looking at those cases. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) feel it’s more. If you look at some of the numbers 

in South Korea, it’s a lot more. There are a lot of South Korean 

fishermen, for example, who were caught and never returned, and 

it was never explained what happened to them. These all need to 

be pursued. 

I think the best way to do this is to set up a process where we 

are talking about normalization. We will address these issues in 

the context of normalization, because I think the North Koreans 

need to understand. We need to establish a level of effort. We need 

to show the North Koreans this stuff is important to us. When they 

understand it’s important to us and they understand that it’s 

things they have to do in order to get what they want, I think it’s 

a better way to proceed. 

Senator BROWNBACK. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and my 

colleagues for this deferential treatment in allowing me to be here, 

and I want to thank you, Mr. Hill, for your direct answers to me. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback. 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator Brownback. I associate 

myself with the concern you have on these issues. Thank you very 

much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Brownback, for 

your focus on these issues. It’s really critically important and I 

know you speak for so many of us when you speak about them. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Hill, Mr. Tobey, thanks so much for your service. An 

expression of parochial pride in Mr. Tobey since he’s a resident of 

Connecticut, where I know he looks forward to returning, and we 

will welcome him. 

We talked earlier about the fact that in some ways we will know 

some years from now about how significant the breakthrough is 

that you’ve achieved with the North Koreans through the Six-Party 

Talks. But essentially, they have an opportunity that they’ve been 

given to become part of the community of civilized nations. 

I want to ask you about one part of the agreement with the 

North Koreans and that is the removal of North Korea from the 

list, our list of state sponsors of terrorism. Frankly, I’m concerned 

that was premature. I understand that this was a first step. There 

had to be a quid pro quo. I think the removal of North Korea from 

the U.S. sanctions as part of the Trading With the Enemy Act was 

appropriate, the giving of more food was appropriate. 

But here’s the basis of my concern. The North Korean Government, as part of this recent agreement on June 10, issued a statement that they do not support international terrorism now and will 

not support international terrorism in the future. But my question 

is whether there’s any real basis for believing that statement is 

true by the North Koreans. 

I want to tell you what I’m concerned about, and I’m going to cite 

a few reports that are public. The Congressional Research Service, 

in a report earlier this year said: ‘‘North Korea’s relationship with 

the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC) appears to 

28

be in two areas, coordination in support for Hezbollah and cooperation in ballistic missile development.’’ 

Still quoting: ‘‘Reports also suggest that North Korea cooperates 

with the IRGC and other Iranian entities in the development of nuclear capabilities or nuclear weapons.’’ 

A detailed report in the Los Angeles Times—it goes back, I will 

say, about 5 years—nonetheless stated that ‘‘Many North Koreans 

are working on nuclear missile projects in Iran. There is some evidence that the North Koreans have been supporting in one way or 

another the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka.’’ 

There was a recent study completed and issued by the U.S. Army 

Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth on the 2006 Lebanon 

War, that found evidence that North Korea had provided various 

forms of support to the Lebanese Hezbollah, including weapons and 

technical support. 

So my question is whether the North Koreans’ statement that 

they’re not involved in terrorism and won’t be is actually true, and 

therefore whether they’ve really earned removal from the U.S. list 

of state sponsors of terrorism. 

Ambassador HILL. Senator, I think the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, Dell Daley, should address some of these issues. 

But I want to say to you that I am aware that all of these allegations have been carefully looked at and it was the judgment of this 

interagency process that North Korea qualifies from the statute to 

be removed from the list. 

All of these issues and these questions were very carefully looked 

at. You are quite correct that there have been these reports, but 

I know that they have taken each and every one of these reports. 

The last known incident of North Korean terrorism was the explosion of a South Korean airliner in 1987. Prior to that it was the 

bombing of the South Korean cabinet in Rangoon back in 1983. My 

understanding from our counterterrorism people is that they do not 

have other examples since that time. Moreover, North Korea has 

since signed on to U.N. declarations, antiterrorism declarations. 

My understanding, again from the experts, is that they qualify 

on this matter. Now, with respect to the negotiation issue of why 

did we agree to do this as part of the negotiation, first of all, they 

wanted us to take away economic sanctions against them and this 

would have resulted in the inflow of things of monetary value to 

North Korea, and we refused that. So what we’ve done is we’re in 

the process of negotiating an agreed on the removal from the list, 

state sponsors of terrorism, provided of course that we get the 

verification package that needs to be accompanied with their declaration. That’s where we are right now. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You cited two instances which were both direct North Korean acts of terrorism, as opposed to sponsorship of 

other terrorist groups. I remain concerned about it. I’m going to 

ask this question again in the closed session we’re going to have 

later this morning and perhaps would ask that Mr. Daley come before the committee or meet with me to pursue this, because it’s 

easy enough to say it, but I want to feel that we really have a 

verifiable understanding and will monitor, because of the North 

Koreans’ bad record here, that they really have stopped supporting 

some of the groups, such as the IRGC, that according to evidence 

29

presented by the U.S. Army are responsible for training and equipping Iraqi extremists, who in turn are responsible for murdering 

hundreds of American soldiers. 

I know that the law that creates the sponsor of terrorism list is 

a vague law. But what North Korea has done in support of terrorism is not vague, and I think we have a right to expect, before 

we essentially say they’re clean, that they really are clean, not just 

that they’re saying they’re clean. I look forward to discussing this 

in the closed session. 

I do want to ask you one other question if the time allows. I appreciate that you took out the pictures of the Japanese abductees, 

and I’m concerned. I know, as you know very well, that Japan is 

very concerned that we gave the North Koreans too much too soon. 

‘‘Abductee’’ is a word. I don’t have to tell you the stories, but these 

stories are unbelievable. 

I mean, a Japanese school girl leaves her family in the morning, 

goes to school, and the North Koreans simply grab her off the 

street and take her to North Korea, and her family doesn’t see her 

again. I mean, imagine if some foreign power did this to American 

kids and others. 

Japan is our most consistent, closest ally in the Asia Pacific region, and they’ve now pulled back, as I understand it, from the SixParty Talks, only in the sense that they’re not, I gather, being part 

of the economic and energy assistance to North Korea as part of 

this. I just want to invite you to talk a little bit about that, because 

I worry that in going forward with the agreement as we have with 

North Korea we’re jeopardizing the real rock of our relations in 

Asia, which is Japan. 

Ambassador HILL. Well, first of all, Senator, I want to assure you 

that we cooperate very closely with the Japanese. We work with 

them extremely closely, and especially on this abduction issue. I 

have raised this issue. Virtually every time I see the North Koreans, I raise the Japanese abduction issue, and I’ve done it in very 

specific terms with them. 

Second, with respect to the issue of the de-listing on the terrorism list, before we did that we worked very closely with the Japanese on what would constitute, from their vantage point, progress 

so that we would make sure that as we move forward in the overall 

denuclearization process they are also moving forward. We reached, 

with the Japanese, an understanding of what progress would be, 

and I raised this with the North Koreans in very specific terms: 

what we would need them to do vis-a-vis Japan. 

This was part of the package. Senator, I completely agree with 

you, these are horrific, horrific human tragedies. It is frankly appalling what went on at this time. This was clearly an organized 

abduction program. It lasted several years from the late 1970s, 

early 1980s. There is no excuse for this sort of thing, I completely 

agree with you. 

What we are trying to do is make progress on that. But at the 

same time, we are really trying to get this plutonium program shut 

down, because we had a problem where they were producing plutonium. We did not want to just have a situation, as we did in the 

past, where we got them to shut it off, and that’s what we did a 

year ago, we got them to shut it off. We wanted to make sure it’s 

30

disabled so that even if they wanted to bring it back up, it would 

be very difficult. 

That’s what we’re trying to do. Of course these things involve 

painful choices, Senator. I have met with many of these abductee 

families. I have met with the same in South Korea. This is an area 

of the world that just has had tragedy of the type that I think for 

many Americans is hard to understand. So it is not an easy process. 

But what I can assure you—and I have said this on many occasions to the North Koreans directly—we are not going to see ourselves in a situation where we are going forward with you while 

causing problems with our very good ally Japan. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that assurance. Thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First let me once again commend Ambassador Hill. Senator 

Lieberman takes parochial pride in Mr. Tobey. Let me assert the 

same prerogative for Ambassador Hill, who is a native of Rhode Island, who was educated in Rhode Island, and who was recently 

honored with an honorary degree from the University of Rhode Island. 

But Ambassador Hill, you’ve done a remarkable job and only history will tell whether the negotiations within the administration 

were as difficult as the negotiations with the North Koreans. But 

we’ll let history, a few years from now, make that judgment. 

I think Senator Lieberman raised some very interesting questions along the lines of the terrorism list. But I would point out 

that while the Agreed Framework was in place the North Koreans 

were on the terrorism list, and unfortunately one of the prices of 

getting back to where we were several years ago is this new decision by the administration to remove them from that list. 

The other issue, which I think we’ll go into in more detail, is that 

the premise for taking apart the Agreed Framework was the issue 

of highly enriched uranium, which still proves elusive in terms of 

determining what they were doing and what they might be doing 

right now. So that is sort of a prologue. 

But let me just ask a question and clarify what you said, I think, 

previously. If this process is successful, there will be a full accountability of their plutonium and removal of the plutonium, including 

those bits of plutonium which have been weaponized, is that correct? 

Ambassador HILL. That’s absolutely correct. 

Senator REED. I know this is very difficult, but do you have a 

sense of how long this might take in terms of the process going forward? 

Ambassador HILL. That is very difficult to assess. One of the reasons we’re working on a step by step basis is the North Koreans, 

first of all, aren’t very good at taking large leaps. They prefer small 

steps. So a lot of people felt they would not have shut down and 

disabled the Yongbyon facility. Yet they did it. But they only did 

it because we moved them along, first through just shutting it 

down. 

31

We are committed, however, to completing this job, and we would 

like to be able to rule out any ongoing uranium enrichment program. They claim they do not have an ongoing uranium enrichment 

program—if we are able to continue on this disabling of Yongbyon, 

and we believe we are continuing on this disabling of Yongbyon, 

they will have a certain amount of plutonium, which we can talk 

about in closed session. They have to assess whether that pile of 

plutonium, whether it’s in weapons or just in someone’s pockets, 

whether that’s worth not having recognition from the United 

States, whether that’s worth not having any access to international 

financial institutions, whether that’s worth not having a peace 

treaty on the Korean Peninsula to try to replace the armistice, 

whether that’s worth not having the eventual Northeast Asia peace 

and security mechanism. 

They have to gauge whether this pile of plutonium they have is, 

frankly, worth holding onto. My hope is that as they get down to 

just this pile of plutonium, with a completely disabled Yongbyon facility, they will understand what this is really costing them. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. Ambassador, the International Atomic Energy Agency is participating with you. Is it the hope that in the long term, North 

Korea will be a non-weapons state party to the nonproliferation regime and that the IAEA will be actively engaged with us? 

Ambassador HILL. It’s not only our hope; it’s expected. In the 

September 2005 statement they have committed to return to the 

Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with IAEA safeguards. So in order 

to do that, they have to cooperate with the IAEA. The North Koreans are very skeptical of the IAEA. We’ve made it very clear that 

they have to have a role in this process and we have an ongoing 

negotiation with them as we speak to try to address that. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. That, by the way, I think 

would be maybe even a new lease on life on the nonproliferation 

regime, if you could bring them back from the dark side. 

Mr. Tobey, the administration has failed to ask for any money 

to implement the Six-Party Talks in either fiscal year 2008 or fiscal 

year 2009. We have included in the National Defense Authorization 

Bill $50 million for NNSA. Does the administration plan to include 

a request in any supplemental? Otherwise, this is all very good 

rhetoric, but without the resources you’re not going to be able to 

do your job. 

Mr. TOBEY. Yes, Senator. As I outlined, the costs going forward 

could be substantially more than what we’ve incurred to date. 

There has been a high degree of uncertainty as to exactly when we 

would incur those costs. As Ambassador Hill has outlined, we’ve 

had a series of joint statements which have been helpful in moving 

progress forward, but it has been somewhat slower than we had at 

one point hoped for. 

For example, there was, I believe, a commitment by the north to 

submit a declaration by the end of 2007, and of course it was much 

later that we actually got the declaration. 

It’s very difficult to ask others within our Department to budget 

within the regular budget process substantial amounts of money 

that we are highly uncertain as to whether or not we could actually 

spend. In my discussions with other members of the administration 

32

and with the Office of Management and Budget, I have made the 

point—and as far as I can tell there has been general agreement—

that extraordinary expenditures which can’t be reliably predicted, 

but are clearly in the national interest, are just the sort of thing 

for which a supplemental request might be useful. 

I would anticipate that if in fact we do go forward and can move 

forward at a very rapid pace, allowing us to spend these large 

amounts of money, something like that would be anticipated. 

Senator REED. Just in terms of timing, the issue of a supplemental here is very much up in the air. This I think is something 

that the administration has to lead on, and the timing is very uncertain. 

Let me ask, Ambassador Hill, just a concern that you might 

have, that there is some movement by the North Koreans, that we 

can’t rapidly support because the funds are unavailable. Not only 

will we look a little silly, but that will give them an excuse to begin 

to walk away from something difficult that they’ve chosen to do. 

Ambassador HILL. I think we have to be prepared for a lot of 

eventualities, even the one where North Korea moves faster than 

we expect. That has not tended to be our problem, but I think 

you’re absolutely right, we have to be prepared for that. 

I think we are tracking this very carefully, and I think we would 

be in a position to respond. So I think we do share your concerns 

about that. 

It was, for us, very important when they began the disabling action. Often this isn’t talked about, but they’re not even doing maintenance in that facility. That facility is falling apart and that’s exactly what we want it to do. So we certainly want to be prepared 

as we move to the dismantlement and get critical components out 

of there. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to add my welcome to you, Mr. Tobey and Ambassador 

Hill, to the Senate committee here. I’d like to talk about something 

a little different and that’s about money and about costs. Mr. 

Tobey, you have projected the costs of Phase Three of the 

denuclearization process, to be an additional $34 million for fiscal 

year 2008, and more than $360 million in fiscal year 2009. This is 

in addition to the $35 million already spent during Phase Two. 

While few doubt the importance of allocating resources to ensure 

a nuclear-free North Korea, it seems we are bearing a large share 

of the costs. So my question to you, Mr. Tobey, is what financial 

commitments have the other countries involved in the Six-Party 

Talks made thus far, and are they willing to contribute comparable 

amounts as compared to their respective gross domestic products 

over the coming 2 years? 

Mr. TOBEY. Senator, I think you raise a very good point. I tried 

to be careful in my statement to talk about the costs that could be 

incurred, but not necessarily to talk about the funding sources for 

those costs. I would defer to Ambassador Hill in a moment to discuss what might have been talked about with other members of the 

33

Six-Party Talks. But I would note that, because of the actions of 

Congress, our nonproliferation programs are generally able to accept contributions from other countries; that we have received substantial contributions, which we have put to use elsewhere in the 

world to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear material. 

I think it would be entirely possible and appropriate for other 

countries to bear some portion of these costs. But the actual negotiation of that process I think would be more in Ambassador Hill’s 

domain than in mine. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Hill, would you comment further on 

that? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, again, as I said to Senator Reed, we 

have really tried to project out what this third phase might look 

like. Now, I must say as someone who’s been negotiating the second phase, which went on far longer than we wanted, if we can get 

to that third phase and we can get agreement on some of the elements that we need. Those are problems I would love to have, because we have really had real troubles getting through this disablement and the third phase would envision dismantlement and abandonment of these weapons. 

But I don’t want to speak for my colleagues, Acting Under Secretary John Rood or Acting Assistant Secretary Patty McNereny, 

but my understanding is that they have had a very careful look at 

how we’re going to be able to manage this. 

Senator AKAKA. Continuing on verification, Ambassador Hill, 

many of the critics of the Six-Party Talks have pointed to a North 

Korean regime that is untrustworthy. In response to these criticisms, you have been reported as saying: ‘‘This has nothing to do 

with trust; this has everything to do with verification.’’ 

Do you still agree with this view and if so has North Korean 

transparency, concerning its nuclear program, developed to the 

point where verification of their declarations would indeed be possible? 

Ambassador HILL. You might make an agreement at the table 

that we’ll do something and they’ll do something, but the real issue 

is can we verify their declaration package on nuclear materials. So 

we cannot place any trust in that. We have to be able to verify. 

It’s our belief that, assuming we get a protocol of international 

standard that involves what we need in terms of site visits, in 

terms of access to documents, in terms of access to their personnel, 

and to make sure that our people are allowed to do what they 

would do in any other protocol in any other part of the world—and 

that’s what we’re negotiating with the North Koreans, and those 

are pretty firm positions on our part—we should be able to take 

samples, for example, and we should be able to determine that the 

number they gave us in plutonium is correct. 

It’s very important that we be able to do that, because we cannot 

come back to this committee, to Congress, and say that they’ve 

given us something that makes sense. We have to be able to verify 

it. Fortunately, thanks to a lot of modern technologies, we should 

be able to verify the statements that they’ve made to us. 

Senator AKAKA. Ambassador Hill, during a recent talk at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies you mentioned an 

idea of establishing a new regional framework for Northeast Asia 

34

that could expand upon the Six-Party process. In particular, you 

mentioned membership considerations for a more permanent mechanism, that the Six-Party Talks could be the precursor of, and that 

both China and Russia had discussed this idea with Secretary Rice 

as well. 

My question to you is, is this something that has been discussed 

with the remaining states involved in the Six-Party Talks and do 

you see this involving all the major states in the region? 

Ambassador HILL. Absolutely. We believe we’ve made some 

progress on the Six-Party process and framework, with the understanding that we need to make more progress. But we would like 

to keep that framework together and maybe have it exist at first 

as a forum to discuss regional security issues, and eventually to 

broaden it and to bring in some other countries that are also interested in being part of sort of a neighborhood in Northeast Asia. 

Now, in fact, in the Six-Party process we set up a working group 

to address this issue—we don’t want a situation where anyone is 

concerned that somehow the creation of this very new concept, and 

at this point not very well defined concept, we don’t want this in 

any way to be seen as replacing the bilateral alliances that we 

have in the region. That is the bedrock, that is the basis for us 

being there, are these bilateral relationships. 

We would see this as complementing them, but by no means replacing them. So we have talked to all of our partners in the SixParty Talks. The enthusiasm for pursuing this Six-Party—this 

peace and security mechanism, varies. Some partners have felt it’s 

a little premature to be discussing the principles of it yet; we still 

have denuclearization to deal with. Others have felt it’s time to get 

on with this. Asians often look at other parts of the world and they 

say: Wait, are we doing enough to foster a sense of community with 

multilateral structures. 

I think opinions are mixed, but I think it was unanimous at the 

last Six-Party meeting that we should begin a discussion of principles, with the understanding that, with respect to North Korea, 

we cannot conclude anything until we denuclearize North Korea. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Ambassador Hill, I know this is a tough, tough job, and we thank 

you for your steadfastness in undertaking it. I think you’re wise to 

talk about verification. Some have tried to point out that, I think, 

and today some are taking inconsistent positions about verification. 

Isn’t it true that during President Clinton’s attempt to work with 

and develop a more peaceful relationship with the North Koreans, 

which I didn’t oppose, we discovered they were conducting activities seriously in conflict with what they were publicly saying? 

Ambassador HILL. That is correct, Senator. They appeared to be 

pursuing a uranium enrichment program, and this was something 

noted by our experts, and at the time when we had a so-called 

Agreed Framework which acted to freeze their plutonium production. So indeed this speaks to the issue of trust and speaks even 

more clearly to the issue of verification. 

35

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it was a big deal. So while we were trying to negotiate a plutonium issue they were setting about secretly 

in direct violation of what they were saying publicly and to us. 

Ambassador HILL. I think that’s a fair statement. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, as a result of that President Bush pulled 

back, and he was roundly criticized by the people who today are 

criticizing you, some of them at least, for not being able to verify 

everything that goes on. But he moved forward in 2002 with Jiang 

Zemin and the Chinese and the Six-Party Talks, and frankly it 

looks like you’re beginning to make some progress. I think we all 

ought to be cautious, but we all ought to be thankful that we have 

a President who’s been firm in trying to make sure we’re verifying 

what we are doing and not allow us to be too much manipulated 

by the North Koreans. 

It’s just a tragic thing that they seem to be so obsessed with negotiation and gameplaying and manipulation when their people are 

in such horrible shape, that starvation is again arising as a specter. It’s just an international tragedy. It’s just unbelievable to me 

that this nation, with such great potential, is in this state. 

I think you were wise to acknowledge Senator Warner. 55 years 

ago he served as a marine as part of the Korean War. I was honored to be invited by former Secretary William Cohen to the Defense Department to have a dinner with Senior Minister Lee from 

Singapore, and he told the story that some of us may have thought 

we did not succeed in Vietnam, but he ticked off Singapore and 

Taiwan and Hong Kong and the Philippines and Malaysia and 

South Korea as free, independent, progressive states, and that that 

was part of the result of what we’ve done. 

Just a few years ago, I just have to note, Senator Warner, the South Koreans invested $1 billion in my home State of Alabama to 

build an automobile plant that has 4,000 direct employees and 

more indirect employees that that, paying our citizens high wages 

to produce a high quality, energy efficient automobile. So this is a 

remarkable thing that history has taught us, that sometimes it 

takes years for our actions to pay off. 

Sometimes do you think we think in too short terms, Ambassador Hill? 

Ambassador HILL. Oh, now and again, but I waited 86 years for 

my baseball team to win. [Laughter.] 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me just briefly ask you to tell us what you 

could tell us in open session about the North Koreans and their actions involving the Syrian nuclear reactor that was attacked by 

Israel recently. What can you say to give any assurances that this 

kind of activity won’t happen again? 

Ambassador HILL. Obviously, this is an issue of very great concern, given the amount of evidence to support our conviction that 

we had a serious problem of proliferation of technology. So in addressing this with the North Koreans, they have acknowledged our 

information and very much our concerns on this. They have declared to us that they do not now have any programs involving nuclear proliferation. They have also said they will not in the future. 

These are declarations. So what we have done is, first of all, 

these declarations are contained in a Six-Party instrument, meaning that they have made them to us, but they’ve also made them 

36

to all of their neighbors, as of October 2007. To the best of our information, this declaration is accurate. As of October 2007, it is accurate. It would not have been accurate to describe the past. 

What we did, and as recently as 2 weeks ago, in China when the 

heads of delegations met in the Six-Party process, we agreed to establish a monitoring mechanism at the level of head of delegation, 

a monitoring mechanism whereby we will continue to monitor and 

we put in specific terms the commitment to nonproliferation. 

What does that mean by monitoring? It will essentially be an information-sharing ability, and any time we see examples of this we 

will bring it to the Six Parties as an example of noncompliance 

with commitments made. 

At this point, I don’t want to get into the hypothetical of ‘‘what 

if we find something,’’ but I can tell you we will definitely raise it, 

and it will obviously be a very serious matter, not just for us but 

for all the other countries that were part of that agreement. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would hope that we would take decisive action if they do anything like that again. 

Could you tell us, based on the time you’ve been there and been 

a part of this effort, is there any realistic prospect that North 

Korea could see what’s happened to their brothers to the south and 

the progress that other nations are making and that this leadership could somehow alter its course that’s been so devastating to 

the people of Korea and so dangerous for the world and actually 

begin to participate with the decent nations of the world? 

Ambassador HILL. Senator, I think this is really the fundamental 

question. I think North Korea needs to understand that their security and their well-being will depend on their willingness to open 

up. By that I mean not just economically, which is important, but 

also they need to open up to allow their people the freedoms that 

other people have. I think human rights really do need to be seen 

as part of this overall issue, where as long as they deny human 

rights and as long as they deny really the rights that I think other 

people all over the world expect, this is going to be a serious drag 

on their ability to create a more successful economy. 

I think from the point of view of their leadership, they’re trying 

to walk a very narrow path. They’re very concerned about opening 

up in the ways that we think they have to do, because they feel 

that somehow to do that would be to destabilize the place. At the 

same time, they can’t stay closed because in this information world 

we live in, they simply cannot survive as a completely closed society. They’re afraid of their survival as an open society and they understand they can’t survive as a closed society. So they’re walking 

a very narrow path. 

I think it’s in our interest to try to point this out to them and 

explain to them that, with the understanding that if they 

denuclearize, we’re prepared to help them on this path, we’re prepared to help widen this path for them, and they shouldn’t fear 

change, they shouldn’t fear that we will somehow look to destabilize them. We will be prepared to work with them, but we cannot 

work with them as long as they continue to have nuclear weapons. 

It is simply unacceptable in so many different ways and we have 

to get at that problem. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

37

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Martinez. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you both for the work you’ve been doing, that’s 

so important to the United States and to the world. 

Ambassador Hill, I want to focus on the relationship between 

North and South Korea and the framework of the Six-Party Talks. 

First of all, I recall at the beginning of the Six-Party Talks that 

many criticized the lack of direct engagement between the United 

States and North Korea. I believe that the wisdom of the Six-Party 

Talks has been proven by the participation of China in such a vital 

way, as well as the engagement of neighbors that needed to be at 

the table, like Japan and South Korea particularly. 

But I wonder if you would comment on the North-South relationship in the framework of the Six-Party Talks? 

Ambassador HILL. If you think of the Six-Party Talks as not only 

a forum, but essentially a platform on which you can have a number of different configurations—you can have bilateral talks within 

the Six-Party process and we’ve been doing a lot of that with North 

Korea, especially as we’re addressing issues like the terrorism list, 

which is very much a bilateral issue—we have found that countries 

that have had great difficulty talking to each other directly are 

able to do so within the Six-Party process. For example, North 

Korea and Japan were not talking for a long time, but did so within the Six-Party process. So it’s clearly been a mechanism that has 

helped soften some of the very difficult bilateral problems. 

Now, with respect to North and South Korea, of course they had 

a parallel structure known as a North-South Process, and this process has not gone well lately. If you ask the North Koreans, they 

criticize the South Korean government for, in the North Korean 

view, taking a harder line with them. But I think if you talk to the 

South Koreans, our allies in this, what they have really tried to do 

is to ensure that as they do things for North Korea in this NorthSouth Process, they expect some things to be done by the North 

Koreans. They want this to be a two-way street. 

They have raised some issues that haven’t been raised before and 

the North Koreans have not taken this well. So the South Koreans 

have had, I think, to some extent a difficulty in this North-South 

Process. 

But I think from the point of view of South Korea, they would 

like to reduce tensions on their peninsula. They would like to see 

a North-South Process continue. If you looked at the speech their 

President Lee Myung-Bak gave a couple of weeks ago, it really was 

a clear statement that they want this process of dialogue to continue. 

I think they have continued to be able to talk to the North Koreans in the Six-Parties even as this North-South Process has become 

more difficult. From our vantage point, it’s very important that 

North and South continue to talk and continue to address the instabilities on the peninsula. In particular, there was a very ugly incident just a couple of weeks ago, where you had a South Korean 

tourist in North Korea who, according to the North Korean authorities, strayed from the tourist enclave that was up in this Kumgang 

Mountain and, as a result of allegedly straying from this tourist 

38

enclave, she was shot several times by automatic rifle fire. Clearly 

this is something that any government has to be extremely concerned about, and the South Korean Government has been extremely concerned about this. 

Senator MARTINEZ. That sounds like a very dramatic sort of incident, the kind of thing that occurs in totalitarian, closed societies 

like North Korea and others around the world. 

One of the things I noted is that we’re now providing food aid 

to North Korea as part of this process. You mentioned in your testimony about a strong framework to ensure the food will reach those 

most in need. What is that framework, what are we doing, and is 

the food reaching those in need? 

Ambassador HILL. Well, first of all, it is not part of the Six-Party 

process. It is based on our response to the World Food Program’s 

assessment that there is a very serious food problem in North 

Korea today. It’s caused by harvest failures, which in turn were 

caused by flooding and other factors. 

The U.S. agreed to provide 500,000 tons of food aid in the framework of the World Food Program and also provided by several 

American NGOs. We, the United States Government, put together 

a protocol that they agreed to with the North Koreans, which goes 

into great detail about certain aspects of how this is going to be administered. 

I think the key factor here, and it was very much of an unprecedented factor, is the degree of monitoring of this assistance. That 

is, we have an unprecedented number of monitors who will ensure 

that the food gets to those in need. Indeed, the first shipment was 

actually held up briefly because of some disagreements on how it 

would be handled. We continue to incur some of those problems. 

But we have made very, very clear to the North Koreans that we 

cannot move without the proper monitoring and, thanks to this 

protocol, which was assiduously negotiated between our food experts and North Korea, we can point to provisions throughout the 

document that I think will allow us to go forward with this. 

We really want to see this food aid delivered. There are people 

starving. There are children who don’t have enough food in that 

country. If you look at the average height and weight of North Korean children, it is a great tragedy. We want to be part of the process of helping that. 

Senator MARTINEZ. What is the population of North Korea? 

Ambassador HILL. The overall population of North Korea is estimated at about 22 million people. One of the issues in the food aid 

was to try to get to certain provinces where it was the judgment 

of our experts that the harvest conditions had been worse. 

Senator MARTINEZ. I know the human rights situation was covered earlier. I was unfortunately not here, so I’m not going to ask 

you to repeat. But perhaps just as a treetop kind of a thing, do you 

believe that there is any progress on the human rights front as it 

relates to North Korea? 

Ambassador HILL. As I said in my statement, I think North Korea’s human rights record is abysmal and it needs to be addressed. 

It needs to be addressed in some fundamental ways. We have 

raised these issues with the North Koreans and we have made 

clear that as we move toward some sort of—assuming they’re movVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:00 Dec 30, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 C:\DOCS\46091.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: JUNEB
39

ing on denuclearization—I must be very clear with you; 

denuclearization is of fundamental importance to us. As we move 

forward, we would look to normalize our relationship with North 

Korea, with the understanding that we do not normalize unless 

they denuclearize. 

As part of that normalization effort, we will have an ongoing 

human rights process to address human rights concerns. I must be 

very frank with you; the North Koreans don’t like to hear the term 

‘‘human rights.’’ But that should not mean that we shouldn’t raise 

it. 

I think from North Korea’s point of view, they need to understand this is not just an American issue; this is an international 

issue. Every country has challenges in human rights and I think 

the North Koreans need to understand that, while their challenges 

are more than other countries, they need to begin to address them. 

They cannot expect to be a member in good standing in the international community sporting the human rights record that they 

have today. 

Senator MARTINEZ. My time has expired, but just very briefly, do 

you get any assistance from the other five members of the SixParty Talks on this issue? 

Ambassador HILL. I do, actually. I think it’s important to have 

the North Koreans hearing this from someone besides me. I have 

certainly talked to other participants. Some help is greater than 

others. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Understood. 

Ambassador HILL. But I think everyone understands it’s important to us and, frankly speaking, it’s important to North Korea to 

just understand that, like it or not, this is part of the price of admission to the international community. 

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Hill. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez. 

Senator Warner. 

Senator WARNER. First I would express my appreciation to the 

remarks of my colleague who just talked about the historical importance of the American participation during the Korean Conflict 

period, when we lost 37,000 killed and tens and tens of thousands 

more than that wounded. 

But it also raised in my memory the acknowledgment that we 

owe to President Harry Truman, who had the foresight as Commander in Chief of those forces that went in and made the tough 

decision to see that freedom could well have been lost, not only in 

the Korean Peninsula, but in many, as Senator Sessions said, other 

smaller nations in that area. He was a Democrat President and I 

was proud to, in a very modest way, be just a youngster under his 

leadership as Commander in Chief. But a Democrat President, and 

now a Republican President is building on that foundation. I just 

think this is one of the better hearings that we’ve had in some 

time, and I commend both of you again for your service. 

Why don’t you take a little rest here for a minute, Ambassador 

Hill. I want to talk a little with Mr. Tobey. 

I’m particularly interested in the participation of the IAEA in the 

Six-Party process. 

40

Mr. TOBEY. Well, Senator, as I outlined, there are IAEA personnel at Yongbyon right now, and our people work closely with 

them. 

Senator WARNER. That we know. But are they likely to stay 

there for a period? 

Mr. TOBEY. That’s my understanding, yes. 

Senator WARNER. What sort of attitude does North Korea have 

towards the IAEA? 

Mr. TOBEY. My impression is that North Korea is not favorably 

disposed toward the IAEA, although, as I’ve just noted, they have 

allowed IAEA personnel present, to be present. I think Ambassador 

Hill may wish to comment on this as well, but at least for a time 

the North Koreans would often attempt to turn this issue into a bilateral issue between the United States and North Korea, and in 

particular that applied to verification issues. 

We in turn have equally tried to make sure that they understood 

that this was really a multilateral issue and that it necessarily 

would involve the IAEA as well, particularly with respect to their 

return to the NPT, which they agreed to in the September 19, 

2005, joint statement. 

Senator WARNER. Did you wish to add anything to his observations? 

Ambassador HILL. No, I think that is correct. I think the North 

Koreans have tried to bilateralize as much as possible. We’re prepared to do some things bilaterally, especially as we have the 

strong Six-Party platform to do it. I think from the point of view 

of the verification, we definitely want the IAEA there and we want 

them to have a role, because ultimately the objective here is to get 

them back in, back into the NPT. So it’s very appropriate that they 

be there. 

But I also want to say that as we’ve gone forward with this disablement of the facilities, I feel very good that every day we have 

Americans working on behalf of our Government and our Six Parties. As we sit here today, we have four Americans who probably 

about now are tucking themselves into their guest house in 

Yongbyon. So the fact that we have had the presence of some four 

Americans, often colleagues of Will’s from the Department of Energy—they’re courageous people, frankly. They’ve been out there 

supervising this disablement and I’m very pleased they’re there. 

As we go forward, I would like to see that the U.S. continues to 

play this very important role, because as we worry about 

verification I worry a lot less when I see Americans out there. 

Senator WARNER. I might note, it’s pretty cold up there this time 

of year. 

Ambassador HILL. It will be. 

Senator WARNER. It can get very cold over there. 

Would you, Mr. Tobey, talk about the significance of Congress 

taking action this spring in the context of the budget, that is appropriations, waiving the Glenn Amendment so that you have broader 

authority now? 

Mr. TOBEY. That was very significant, Senator Warner, and we 

are quite appreciative of that action. 

Senator WARNER. Detail what that will enable you to do over and 

above? 

41

Mr. TOBEY. Up until now, the activities have been funded 

through the State Department and those funds are relatively limited in their amounts. They’ve amounted to $15 or $20 million. The 

costs for packaging and removing the spent fuel and plutonium and 

uranium would be substantially higher and those were the costs 

that I spoke of earlier. 

Because that amount of money would be spent by the NNSA, it 

would make sense that in fact we not rely on those relatively limited State Department funds. So allowing the Glenn Amendment to 

be waived was an important step as we move forward. 

Senator WARNER. Ambassador Hill, going back to the 1953 armistice, people should recognize we never concluded that conflict in 

a formal manner other than the armistice agreement. That arrangement hopefully will be replaced by another framework. Do 

you have any more information you can provide the committee on 

that? 

Ambassador HILL. That’s exactly what we would like to do, replace the armistice with a peace process. At this point I want to 

reserve on the issue of whether we call it a treaty. 

Senator WARNER. Sure, I would, too. 

Ambassador HILL. But we need a more durable peace process. Of 

course, one of the key elements today is that ROK needs to be, the 

Republic of Korea, needs to be in the forefront of that peace process. They were not, of course, during the armistice days in 1953, 

so that will be a change from how the armistice was handled. 

We have worked very closely with the South Koreans on how 

that would work. I would say that if you look at the Six-Party documentation on it, we use the term ‘‘directly related parties.’’ It’s a 

term of art, but it basically refers to four countries: U.S., China, 

and North and South Korea. But we want to make sure that Japan 

and Russia are also well informed. They have interests there. But 

the actual peace process would be conducted by these four countries. 

Senator WARNER. Wouldn’t the U.N. have a role, given the historical context? 

Ambassador HILL. I think we’ve had a number of lawyers look 

at this issue and I think our sense is that they would not play a 

direct role, but at some point there would be a U.N. imprimatur 

on it because of their direct role in 1953. 

Senator WARNER. I think that would be wise. I think it would be 

very wise. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my questions until we go into the 

executive session. I thank you again, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you both. When you talk, Ambassador 

Hill, about how good it is when you see Americans there at 

Yongbyon, you throw me back to my memory, because in 1997 or 

1998 I went to Yongbyon. They let me in and I walked in, and 

there was an American from Texas who was I guess supervising 

the canning of those rods at that time under the Agreed Framework. That was a terrific sight. I actually saw those cans in those 

pools. 

Then when we pulled out of the Agreed Framework because of 

the suspicions about their uranium program, and we pulled out I 

guess in 2002 or 2003, whenever we pulled out, it was a real step 

42

backward, I’m afraid. But that’s part of the history. You’re working 

hard now to get us back on track. You have the Yongbyon facility 

apparently, if not out of commission, just about out of commission, 

and that is a good sight. 

We again thank you both for all the work you’ve put in on this. 

We will now adjourn to S–407, where we will begin in 10 minutes. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

NORTH KOREAN DECLARATION

1. Senator THUNE. Ambassador Hill, Ambassador John Bolton wrote in a June 30, 

2008 op-ed for the Wall Street Journal that the administration has accepted a North 

Korean declaration that is ‘‘narrowly limited, incomplete, and almost certainly dishonest in material respects.’’ How would you describe the North Korean declaration? 

Ambassador HILL. North Korea submitted a declaration to the Chinese, as the 

chair of the Six-Party process, on June 26. In conjunction with the declaration submission, China issued a statement, which read, ‘‘The Parties agreed that the declaration will be subject to verification, and there is agreement within the Parties 

on a set of principles to guide the establishment of a verification regime.’’

This declaration package includes information about North Korea’s plutonium 

program, which has produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons. As part of this 

package, the North Koreans acknowledged U.S. concerns about uranium enrichment 

and proliferation activities. By submitting this declaration, North Korea has begun 

to fulfill its declaration commitment, but much more remains to be done. 

After intensive talks on verification measures October 1–3, United States and 

North Korean negotiators agreed on a series of verification measures to be used for 

evaluating North Korea’s declaration. We understand that these measures will serve 

as the basis for a Verification Protocol to be finalized and adopted by the Six Parties 

in the near future and would allow Six-Party experts to assess the DPRK’s June 

2008 nuclear declaration. The package agreed on by the United States and North 

Korea provide that: experts from all Six Parties, including experts from non-nuclear 

states, may participate in verification activities; the IAEA will have an important 

consultative and support role in verification; experts will have access to all declared 

facilities, and based on mutual consent, to undeclared sites; experts will be allowed 

to review documents, interview personnel involved with the nuclear program, and 

use scientific procedures, including sampling and forensic activities; and all measures contained in the verification protocol will apply to the plutonium-based program and any uranium enrichment and nuclear proliferation activities.

2. Senator THUNE. Ambassador Hill, is Ambassador Bolton’s description of the 

North Korean declaration as ‘‘incomplete’’ and ‘‘almost certainly dishonest in material respects’’ accurate? 

Ambassador HILL. North Korea’s provision of a declaration was an important step 

toward fulfilling its declaration commitment. Verification of the declaration has already begun with review of the copies of over 18,000 pages of operating records from 

Yongbyon that North Korea provided on May 8. Review of these operating records, 

which date back to 1986, has already yielded useful data and will contribute to the 

verification of North Korea’s declaration. As we proceed with verification, discrepancies that may arise in the declaration will have to be satisfactorily explained and 

additional information provided as necessary, in order for the declaration ultimately 

to be deemed complete and correct. 

At October 1–3 verification discussions in Pyongyang, the DPRK agreed to a series of verification measures. The President has determined that this agreement by 

the DPRK represents significant cooperation concerning the verification of North 

Korea’s denuclearization actions.

[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

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