### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs on A pr il 8, 200 8
STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CHARLES RI CKY PIPKI N, JR.
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forHardeman County Nos. 06-01-0291, 07- 01-0346 J. Weber McGr aw, Judge

No. W2007-01110-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed September 4, 2008

The de fenda nt, Charles Ricky Pipkin, Jr., pled guilty to char ges of a ggravated burglary and thef t over $500. He a l s o p l ed g u ilty in a separately char ged ca se to initiation of a proce ss to manufac ture methamphetamine a nd possession of methampheta mine with the intent to deliver more tha n .5 grams. As a

condition of his guilty pl eas, the defe ndant proper ly reserved seve ral c ertified que stions of law, c hallenging the legality and validity of the sear ch wa rra nt. Specifica lly, the defe ndant ar gued that the af fidavit for the sear ch wa

rra nt did not satisfy both prongs of the Ag uil ar -S pin e lli test and therefo re failed f

or lac k of proba

ble cause. He further

argue d that information containe d in the war rant wa s stale and in s u ff i ci en t

. Finally, the defenda nt argue d that if the sea rch w arr ant was inv a lidin the fi rs t c a se , th e n a ny e vid e nc e a nd state me nts us e d ag a ins t him in the se c on d c a se mus t also be suppre ssed as fr

uits of an ille g al s ear ch. Following our review of the pa rties’ brie fs, the
rec ord, and the applicable law, we reve rse the judg m en t s of the trial c ourt and dismiss the de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio ns
. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Circ uit Court Reve rsed and Con victions Vacate d
J

. C. M C L IN , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O GLE , J., joined and J OHN E VERET T W I L L I AMS , J., concur red.
Daniel J. Taylor, Jackson, Te nnessee , for the a ppellant, Charles Ricky Pipkin, Jr.
Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr ., At torne y G e ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Sop hia S. L e e , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; D. Michae l Dunavant, District Attorne y Gene ra l ; an d Joe Va n Dyke, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION
I. BACKGROUND
The de fenda nt w a s in d ic te d o nSep te mbe r 5, 2006, in ca se number 06- 01-0291 for aggra vated burglary a nd theft over $500. The defe ndant filed a motion to suppress and a hearing was held on Dec ember

13, 2006. The trial court denied the def endant’ s motion t o suppress. Subsequently, the2

defe ndant was indicte d i n ca s e number 07-01-0346 f

or initiation of a proc ess to manufa cture me tha mph e ta min e a ndpo sse ssi on of mor e than . 5 g rams o f m e th amp hetam ine wi th the int e nt t o de live r. Th e se c ha

rg e s w e re br ou gh t a s a

re su lt o f m a te ri a ls f

ou ndon the de fe nd a nt’ s p ro pe rt y during the two sear ches for stolen items. The defe ndant filed a motion to s uppress in that ca se and
a he ari ng wa s h e ld o n M a y 4, 20 07

. Du ri ng the he ari ng , th e state a ndthe de fe nd a nt a gr e e d to su bmi t certified questions of l aw for appellate review. Upon re aching this agre ement, and w ith the consent of the c ourt, the def

endant pled guilty to the char ges in both case s. He wa s sentence d as a standa rd offe nder to four

year s for a ggravated burg l ar y, two year s for thef t over $500 a nd eight year s eac h fo r i nit ia tio n of a pr oc e ss to ma nu fa c tur e me thamph e ta min e a ndpo sse ssi on of mor e than . 5 g ra ms of methamphe tamine with intent to deliver.
In ve sti ga tor

Bill y D a vis of

the Ha rd e ma n Co un ty S he ri ff ’s De pa rt me nt t e sti fi e d th a t on Ju ly 6, 2006, he was investigating a bur glary whic h occur red at the residenc e of Candy H ammons, the victim. Investigator Da vis arre sted an individual, Donald Stagner, and conducte d an intervie w on Ju ly 1 4 , 2 0 0 6 , in w h ic h M r
. St a g n e r a c k n o w le d g e d h is in v o lv e me n t in th e b u r g la r y
. Mr. Stagner inf or me d I nv e sti ga tor

Da vis that he pa

rt ic ipate d in the bu rg lary a lon g w ith tw o o the r s us pe c ts, Charles W ilson and the defe ndant. Investigator D avis testified that Mr. Stagner informed him that the defe ndant had sever al of the ite ms t ake n in the bu rg lary a t hi s r e sid e nc e . Sp e c if ic a lly , M r. Sta gn e r t ol d Inv e sti gator Da vis that the def

endant ha d taken two CD playe rs, a c amcor der, and seve ral DV Ds. Mr. Stagner pr ovided the names of

some of those DV Ds, including “Chris Rock, B i g ger a nd Blacker ,” “A nger Manage ment,” and “ Blue Streak.” Investigator Davis stated t hat t he li st of i tems provided by Mr. Stagner corr esponded with a description of the items pr ovided by the victim o f t h e burglary. Investigator Da v i s al s o s t ated that he had neve r met Mr. Stagner or used him as a

confide ntial informant in any c apac ity prior to Mr

. Stagner’s arr est and interview. I nvestigator Da vis asserted that Mr . Stag ne r wa s cr e dib le be c a us e his state me nts imp lic a te d h im i n th e bu rg la ry a ndwe re a ga ins t his own penal intere sts. Investigator D avis testified that he sou g h t a sea rch w arr ant for the defe ndant’s re sidence ba se d o n th e inf

or ma tio n p ro vid e d to him by Mr . St a gn e r. Ac c or di ng to I nv e sti gator Da vis , corr oboration for

the wa rrant was provided thr ough the re covery of seve ral items taken by Mr

. Sta gn e r i n th e bu rg lary . T he a ff ida vit su bmi tte d in su pp ort of

the se arc h w arr a nt s ta te s:
The a ffiant make [s] oa th t h at t h ere is probable c ause to be lieve that Charle s Ricky Pipkin, J r. and othe r yet unknown oc cupants of 2130 Buster Rd., Middl et o n, Har deman County, TN. have in his/her/their possession stolen items from a burglary that occur red in this county. Items that ar e believe d to be in the re sidence are two CD players, 25 CD’ s, 5 DVD’s, Cell phone, and neckla ce. Some of the names on the DVD’ s are “Chris Rock - Bigger a nd Blacker ”, “A nger Ma nageme nt”. The CD’ s are misc. burned CD’s w ith female ha nd wr i t i n g on them. The a ffiant’ s rea sons for believing t his are as follows: I spoke with Donald Stagner . Donald gave a stateme nt agiane st [sic] his penal interests that he was involved in a burglary wher e the a bove items were taken. Dona ld stated that Charles Ricky P ipken, J r. and Charles W ilson wer e also involved in the burglary. T his statement was c orrobor ated by some of the3

items that were taken in the bur glary be ing r ecove red f rom Donald. This statement is believed to be r eliable since it was made against his penal interests. Donald gave a desc ription of the items that are suppos ed t o b e at C harle s Ricky Pipken, Jr.’s residenc e and the y matched the description of some of the items taken from the burglary. T he burgla

ry had be en re port ed to HCSD and is curr ently under investiagation [sic].
Based on Inve stigator Davis’s a ffidavit, the se arc h war rant wa s issued. Investigator Davis testified that afte r the sear ch war rant was issued, it wa s ex ec u t ed t he following day with the assistance of the Dr ug Task F orce , the Har deman County Sheriff’ s Offic e, and the W hiteville Police Depa rtment. Investigator Davis stated t hat he and other law enfor ceme nt office rs sea

rche d the re sidence , the grounds, and the stora ge building. Upon entry into the re sidence , office rs sec ured the defe ndant and Char les Wilson inside the house. Investigator

D avis testified that the following items wer e re cover ed as a result of their se arc h:
a sy ri ng e , g re e n p la nt m a te ri a l, s e e ds , a RCA po rt able CD playe r, m ul ti ple DV Ds , a No kia c e ll phone, an unknown liquid substance , a white substance, liquid fr om a Mellow Yellow bottle, rolling paper s, clea

r tubing, the DVDs “ Blue Streak,” “ Passi o n of the Christ,” and a RCA DVD player

. Acc ording to Investigator Da vis, two or three of the rec overe d DVDs ha d titles which corr esponded to the DVDs take n from the victim’s home. A portable CD player and cell phone a lso corre sponded to items taken from the vic tim’s home.
On cr oss-exa mination, Investigator Da vis testified that he interview ed the victim over the telephone. Prior to his interview , In v es tigator Davis stated tha t the victim had prepa red ahandwritten list of items taken from he r home a nd provided that list to another police office r. He a gree d that the list identified t wo portable CD player s, twenty-five CDs, five DVD s, a ca mcorde r and c ase, two cell phones, a

neckla ce, c ash, and food. Investigator Davis said he did not rec all looking at the victim’s list prior to dra fting the affidavit. He also acknow ledged that he did not make a ny notes of his phone interview w ith the victim.
On cr oss-exa mination, Investigator Davis testified t hat he listed the defe ndant’s addr ess as the location whe re the stolen items wer e located. He admitted that he did not specific ally identify the date the burglary oc curr ed but merel y s tated in his aff idavit that the defe ndant “[ has] in his or her posse ssion stol en items from a burglary that occur red in this county.” He further admitted that he listed the items as “CD playe rs, twenty-f ive CDs, five DVDs, c ell phone and ne cklac e” w ithout identifying those items more spec ifically. He also ac knowledged that he seize d CDs and DVDs at the defendant’s r esidenc e without knowing whether they wer e the spe cific items stolen fr om the victim or whether

they legally belonge d to the defe ndant. I n v es t i gator Da vis asserted that Mr. Stagner wa s not a citizen informant, but that he was a criminal informa nt suspected of committing the c ri me in qu e sti on
. Ac c or din g to In ve sti gator Da vis , Mr

. Sta gn e r vo lun tari ly wa ive d his ri gh ts and spoke f

ree ly to him about the burglary. Investigator D avis testified that some of the recovere d CDs and DVDs w ere found in the woods behind the de fenda nt’s residenc e. Other items, i n cl u d i n g DVDs a nd a DVD player wer e4

found i nside an entertainment center in the def endant’ s residenc e. Inve stigator Davis admitted that not all of the items rec overe d wer e stolen prope rty b el o n g i n g to the victim, and he conc eded that some of the items could have legally belonged to the defe ndant prior to the burgla ry. Inve stigator Davis testified that a

suspicious white liquid was found in a kit chen cabinet. Rol ling papers we re found in a w o o d b o x on a cof fee table. A qua ntity of pseudoephedrine, a c ommercia l methamphetamine pr ecur sor, was found in the woods behind the residenc e along with some of the
rec overe d CDs and DVDs. I nvestigator Da vis reiter ated that Char les Wilson, the third participa nt in the burglary, w as pre sent at the de fenda nt’s home at the time of the sear ch.
Inves tigator Davis testified that a fter the initial search on A ugust 15th, he returne d to the defe ndant’s prope rty on August 21st. He stated that he obtained information from another sourc e that the def

endant still had contraband on or near his property. Investigator Davis admitted that the defe ndant was in jail at the time he obtained this a dditional information. I nvestigator Da vis stated that he did not enter the residence but mere ly crosse d the def endant’ s property to an adjac ent ar ea wher e he r ecove red a dditional contraba nd.
At the close of Investigator Davis’s testimony, the def endant moved to suppre ss the evidenc e on three different grounds. F irst, the defe ndant ar gued that the se arc h war rant wa s defe ctive and
un c on sti tut ion a l be c a us e it f a ile d to su pp ly the re qu ir e d in fo rm a tion f or a va lidse arc h w arr a nt. Second, the de fenda nt argue d that the af fidavit supporting the war rant failed to meet the two prongs of the Ag uil ar -S

pin e lli test. Finally, the defendant contended that the information upon which the aff idavit was base d was stale be cause it did not establish a tim e fr ame f or the burgla

ry.
In its written order , the t ri al court de nied the def endant’ s motion t o suppress. The court determined t h at t h e affidavit filed by Investigator D avis was not stale a nd conclude d that the burglary in que stion was adequ at ely identified in the wa rra nt with sufficient spec ificity. Furthermore , the court determined tha t Mr. Stagner’s state ment against pena l interest, when coupled with the corr oboration of items stolen by Mr. Stagner, pr ovided a suff icient basis for the issuance of a se arc h w arr a nt.
II. AN AL YSI S
We begin our revie w by noting that the defe ndant pled guilty to the char ges in bo t h ca ses with certified questions of law. An order certifying those questions of law wa s signed and made a part of the appellate rec ord. Pursuant to Rule 37(b) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proce dure, we must first determi n e w h e ther the que stions presented a re dispositive. Tenne ssee Rule of Criminal Pr oc e du re 37 (b ) p ro vid e s, in p e rt ine nt p art , th a t: An appeal l ies from any order or j udgment in a criminal proce eding where the law provides for s u ch appea l, and from a ny judgment of conviction . . . upon a ple a of guilty [if] . . . [the] Def

endant e ntere d into a plea a gree ment u n d er R u l e 11(e) but explicitly reser ved with the conse nt of the state a nd of the c ourt the right to appea l
a ce rtified question of law that is disposi tive of the c ase a nd the following
re qu ir e me nts are me t:5

(A) T he judgment of c onviction, or other document to w hich such judgment re fer s that is filed befor e the notic e o f ap p eal, must contain a statement of the c ertified question of law r eser ved by the de fenda nt for appe llate re view; (B) The question of l aw must be stated in the judgment or doc ument so as to identify clea rly the scope and limits of the legal issue re serve d; (C ) T he jud gme nt o r d oc ume nt mus t re fl e c t that the c e rt if ie d que sti onwa s e xp re ssl y rese rved w ith the consent of the sta te and the trial judge; and (D) T he judgment or doc ument must reflec t that the defe ndant, t he st ate, and the trial judge ar e of the opinion that the certified question is disposi tive of the c ase.
Ten n. R. Cr im. P. 3 7( b) (2 )( i) (A )- (D ); see State v . Preston , 7 5 9 S. W

. 2 d 6 4 7 , 6 5 0 ( T e n n
. 1 9 8 8 ). Having re viewed the rec ord, we are convince d that the ce rtified questions meet the c riteria a bove,
a ndare pr op e rl y b e fo re thi s c ou rt

. The de fenda nt was cha

rged in two c ases: ca se number 06- 01-0291 and case number 07-01- 03 4 6

. I n c a s e n u mb e r 0 6

- 0 1

- 2 0 9 1 , th e s e ar c h w arr a n t w a s o b tain e d a n d e x e c u te d b a s e d o n the suspicion that the defe ndant had stolen property f rom the burglary at his residenc e. As a result of the sea rch on A ugust 15, 2006, and as a r es u l t o f a subseque nt searc h a fe w days late r, off icer s discovere d drugs and dr

ug para p h ernalia which supplied the ba sis for the cha rges a gainst the defe ndant in case number 07-01- 0346. On appe al, the defenda nt argue d the foll owing issues which wer e pre sented to the c ourt at t he plea hearing and made a part of t he Order Certifying Questions of Law.
In challenging the validity of the sear ch war rant, the defe ndant first argue s that the war rant was ba sed upon unreliable and conc lusory allegations that did not justify the probable c ause ne eded to support its i ssuance . The de fenda nt next argue s that the i n fo rm at ion and fa cts described in the
sear ch wa rra nt were stale and did not establish a time fr ame f or the bur g l ar y and issuance of the war rant. The defe ndant next argue s that the i tems listed in the warrant lacked the requisite degr ee of spec ificity to establish probable c ause f or its issuance. The d ef

en d an t finally argue s that if the
se arc h w arr a nt i s f

ou ndto b e ill e ga l in c a se nu mbe r 0 6- 01 -2 09 1, a ndthe e vid e nc e a ndstate me nts obtained as a

result of that sea

rch a re suppr es s ed , t h en the state ments, evidenc e, and c ontraba nd which supplied the ba sis for the cha rges in ca se number 07- 01-0346 should also be suppre ssed as the fruit of a n illegal sear ch.

A. The Se ar c h Wa r r ant
Th e de fe nd a nt’ s ce rt if

ie d que sti on s ess e nti a lly c ha lle ng e the tr ia l cou rt ’s fi nd ing of pr ob able
c a us e ba se d o n th e su pp ortin g a ff ida vit . O ur

su pr e me c ou rt

ha s st a te d th a t:
The Fourth Amendm ent to the United States Constitut ion require s that sear ch
wa rr a nts iss ue on ly “ up on p r o b a b le c a us e , s up po rt e d b y O a th o r a ff ir ma tio n. ” Artic le6

I, Section 7 of t he Tennessee Constit ution prec ludes the i ssuance of wa rra nts exce pt up on “ e vid e nc e of the fa c t com mit te d. ” Th e re fo re , u nd e r b oththe fe de ra l a ndstate constitutions, no wa rr an t is to be issued exce pt upon probable c ause. Illinois v. Gates , 46 2 U .S. 21 3 ( 19 83 ); Sta te v . J ac um in , [778 S.W.2d 430 (Te nn.1989)]; [Te nn. Code Ann.] § 40- 6-103. Probable cause has been define d as a r easona ble ground for suspicion, supported by circ umstances indicative of an illega l act. Le a v . S tat e , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352 (1944). State v. Casey W

atson , No. E2005-02054- CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL2032528, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 20, 2006) , pe rm
. app
. denied (Tenn. N ov. 27, 2006) (quoting State v. He nning , 975 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Tenn. 1998) ).
It is wel l- e sta

bli sh e d th a t a n a ff

ida vit is n e c e ssa

ry to the iss ua nc e of

a se arc h w arr a nt i n Te nn e sse e
. Te nn
. Cod e An n. § 4 0- 6- 10 3; State ex re l. Blackburn v. F ox , 292 S.W.2d 21, 23 (1956); Ha rv ey v . S tat e , 60 S.W. 2 d 4 2 0 (1933). The aff idavit must set forth on its face thefac ts which
e sta bli sh prob able c a us e be fo re a wa rr a nt m a y b e iss ue d. Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 6- 10 4; T e nn . R. C r i m
. P

. 4 1 ( c )

. T h e i s s u i n g m a g i s tr a t e m u s tm ak e a n e u tr a l a n d d e t a c h e d j u d g m e n tt h a tp r o b ab le
cause is shown. See State v. Nolan , 617 S.W.2d 174, 175 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) . The following require ments must be met to show adequate proba ble cause:
Probable c ause r equire s rea sonable grounds fo r suspicion, supported by circ umstances indicative of an illega l act. State v. Stev ens , 989 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tenn. 1999) . To ensure that the magistrate exer cises indepe ndent judgment, the aff idav i t must i nclude more than conc lusory allegations fr om the aff iant. [ State v. Carter , 160 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tenn. 2005) ]. The affida vit must prese nt fac ts upon wh ic h a ne utr a l a nd de ta c he d ma gis tr a te , e xa min ing the a ff ida vit in a c omm on se ns e and pra ctical manne r, ca n determine whether probable cause exists for the issuanc e of a se arc h war

rant. Id . In exa mining the affidavit, our standard of revie w is limi ted to a determination of whether the i ssuing magistrate had “ a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidenc e of wrongdoing.” Sta te v . B all ar d , 836 S.W.2d 560, 562 (Tenn. 1992)

. State v. Smotherm an , 201 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tenn. 2006)

. As noted abov e, the c onclusory allegations of an af fiant ar e not suffic ient to sustain a war rant. Carter , 160 S.W.3d at 533. ‘“ Recital of some o f t h e u n d erlying circumstance s in the
a ff ida vit is e sse nti a l if

the ma gis tr a te is to pe rf

orm his de ta c he d f

un c tio n a ndno t se rv e me re ly a s a rubber stamp for the police .”’ State v. Moon , 841 S.W.2d 336, 3 3 7 -3 8 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting United States v. Ve ntresca , 380 U. S. 102 , 1 08 -0 9 ( 19 65 )) . “ Th us , in Te nn e sse e , p ro ba ble
cause to support the issuance of the war rant must appea

r i n the affidavit and judi cial review of the existence of proba

ble cause will not inc lude looking to other evidenc e provided to or known by the issuing magistrate or possessed by the aff iant.” Moon , 841 S.W.2d at 338. “Te nnessee law is clea r that in determining whethe r or not pr obable cause supported issuance of a se arc h war rant only the information contained within the four corne rs of the a ffidavit may be considere d.” Sta te v . Ke ith , 978 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tenn. 1998) (citing J ac um in , 7 78 S.W .2 d at 43 2) . “ If pr ob able c a us e is7

absent, the magistrate is not empower ed to issue a wa rra nt.” State v. Kamara L. Whitt ington , No. W2007-00148- CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1891450, at *2 (T enn. Crim. App. at J ac kson, Apr. 20, 2008). “The revie wing court’s standard should be whether , in light of all the evidenc e available, the magistrate had a subst antial basis for finding probable ca use.” State v. Me eks , 876 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. 1. Co mp lia nc e wi th Aguilar -S pin e lli
Th e de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t th e se arc h wa

rr a nt la c ks pr ob able c a us e be c aus e it fails to e sta bli sh the informant’ s basis of knowledge or the c redibility or the re liability of the informant’s information under the two prongs of the Ag uil ar -S pin e lli te st.
When a n aff

idavit is used to establish p ro b ab le cause for a sea rch w arr ant, and the a ffiant relies upon information from an inform an t in the aff idavit, the courts must distingui sh betwee n information provided by “citize n” or “bystande r” informants and information provided by “criminal informants” or

informants fr om a “c riminal mili eu.” State v. Stev ens , 989 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tenn. 19 99 ); see also State v. M elson , 638 S.W.2d 342, 354 (Tenn. 1982) . The information provided by a citizen informant is “pre sumed to be re liable.” See Ste vens , 98 9 S.W .2 d a t 29 3; se e als o Melson , 63 8 S. W .2 d a t 35 6. If

the inf or ma tio n u po n w hic h p ro ba ble c a us e is based is no t of the of fi c e rs ’ pe rs on a l kn ow le dg e , b ut i s r e c e ive d f ro m a cri mi nal i nf

orma nt, pr ob able c a us e un de r o ur state constitution is determined by the application of the Ag uil ar -S pin e lli two-pronge d test. See State v

. Cedric Ruron Saine , No. M2007-01277-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 918511, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Apr. 4, 2008). This two-prong test was develope d to insure that the judgment of the issuing magistrate was independe nt and justified a finding of proba ble cause. See Aguilar v. Texas , 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States , 393 U.S. 410 (19 6 9 ). The two-pr ong Ag uil ar
Sp ine lli te st i s su mma

ri z e d a s f oll ow s:
Un de r the fi rs t or

“ ba sis of kn ow le dg e ” pr on g, fa c ts m us t be re ve a le d w hic h p e rm it the magistrate to de termine whe ther the informant had a basis for his informa tion that
a ce rtain per son had bee n, was or w o u l d b e involved in criminal conduct or that evidenc e of c rime would be f ound at a certain place . Under the sec ond or “ve rac ity” prong, fa cts must be reve aled whic h permit the magistrate t o d et er m i n e either the inhere nt cre dibilit y of the in fo rm ant or the reliability of his information on the particula r occ asion.
Moon , 841 S.W.2d at 338. Both prongs of thi s analysis must be independe ntly considered a nd satisfied to establish probable cause
. State v. Williams , 193 S.W.3d 502, 507 (Tenn. 2006) (citing Steve ns , 98 9 S.W .2 d a t 29 4)

. In de pe nd e nt po lic e c or ro bo ratio n may c omp e ns a te fo r d e fi c ie nc ie s in either pr ong. See State v. Powell, 53 S.W .3 d 2 58 , 2 63 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 20 00 ); se e als o J ac um in , 778 S.W.2d at 436. Upon re view of the rec ord in t h e i n stant case , it is clear that the inf ormant’s ba sis of knowledge w as established by his participation in the burglary with the defe ndant. This court has pr e vio us ly h e ld tha t a n in fo rm a nt’ s p e rs on a l kn ow le dg e of c ri min a l ac ti vity b y th e de fe nd a nt i s adequate to meet the “ basis of knowledge” require ment. See Sm otherman , 201 S.W.3d at 664. We8

do not dispute that the informant participated in the burgla ry al o n g wi th the defe ndant, made a statement aga inst his own penal intere s t, and by doing so, subjected himself to possible criminal prosec ution.
As to the second prong of t he Ag uil ar -S pin e lli te st, we c on c lud e that th e wa rr a nt f a ile d to allege spe cific facts which would allow t he magistrate to determine the informant’s c redibility or the reliability of the information provided by the informa nt. See M oon , 841 S.W.2d at 338. We agre e with the defe ndant t hat t he st atements in the warrant were mere ly conclusory. I n the instant case , the informant state d that he wa s involved in a burglary wher e items wer e st o l en
. The wa rra nt conclude s that the statement made by the informant wa s reliable “since it wa s made a gainst his penal interest.” Corroboration of the informant’s statement came from the fac t that unspe cified, st o len items were rec overe d from the infor mant himself. The warra nt does not describe t hose i tems in any detail, or e stablish how it is known that those items corr espond to the items taken f rom the victim’s residenc e. “I n short, the af fidavit provided c onclusory stateme nts without st ating fac ts as to why the conclusions wer e valid.” Sta te v . No rri s , 47 S.W.3d 457, 470 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) . In our view , mere ly stating that the criminal informant, who was involved in the bur glary, is re liable bec ause he
was able to pr ovide police with items he stole does not c onstitut e sufficie n t , i n depende nt corr oboration to establish the cr edibility of the i n fo rm an t or the re liability of the information he pr ov ide d. “ Cor

rob oratio n o f m or e than a fe w m ino r e le me nts of

the inf orma nt’ s in fo rm a tio n is
nece ssary, however, espec ially if the elements rela te t o non-suspec t behavior.” Smotherman , 201 S.W.3d at 664. Furthermore , there is no i n d i ca t i on that the informant ha d any history of police cooper ation, or of providing information t o police which led t o prior arrests or convictions. Se e id

. Some other i n d i cia of

the informant’ s cre dibilit y and re liability, s uch as inde pendent police
corr oboration, wa s require d to support the cre dibilit y of the informant and by e xtension, support an independe nt finding of probable cause
. Se e Po we ll , 53 S.W.3d at 263.
We f urther note that the informant did not provide speci fi c d et ai led information about the burglary or

about the exa ct location or de scription of stolen i tems at t he defenda nt’s residenc e. Such detailed information may have be en used to e stabl i s h t h e i n formant’s cre dibilit y or to show the reliability of the informant’s information under the second prong of the Ag uil ar -S pin e lli test. See Sp ine lli , 393 U.S. at 416-417. Howeve r, the wa rra nt provides no indication that the informa nt had actua l knowledge of

the wher eabouts of items stolen by the de fenda nt, and he does not describe the bu rg lary in a ny de ta il. Th e inf or ma nt m e re ly g a ve a

de sc ri pti on of

“ ite ms b e lieved

t o b e i n the
re s idence ” and later stated that “items that are supposed to b e a t [ th e d e f e n d a n t] ’ s r e s idence

. . . matc h ed the de scription of some of the items taken fr om the burglary.” (empha sis added). The ref ore, the war rant failed to e stablish the informant’s cre dibilit y or the reliability of t h e i n formant’s information by other me ans. Se e Sta te v . B ob by Gl e nn Sc ott , No. W2007-00373-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 238128, a t *5 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p
. at J ackson, Ja n. 28, 2008). We conclude that beca use the war rant fa ils to establish t he informa nt’s cre dibilit y or t he re liabilty of the informant’s information under the second pr ong of the Ag uil ar -S pin e lli test, the sear ch wa rra nt is invalid.
2. Timeliness and Location9

Th e de fe nd a nt n e xt a

rg ue s th a t th e wa

rr a nt la c ke d pro ba

ble c a us e be c a us e it f

a ile d to state the date or

time on which the burgla

ry occ urre d, the addr ess of the bur glary or whether the informant saw the stolen pr operty in the de fenda nt’s house.
“In or der to e stablish probable c ause, a n aff idavit mu s t s et forth fa cts from whic h a
rea sonable c onclusion may be dra wn that the contr aband w ill be found in the place to be sea rche d pursuant to the wa

rra nt.” Sta te v . No rri s , 47 S.W.3d 457, 470 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Sta te v
. Lo n g s treet , 6 1 9 S

. W.2d 97, 99 (Tenn. 1981)). “ The a ffidavit must allege that the contra band
so ug ht t o b e se iz e d o r the ill e ga l a c tiv ity in q ue sti on e xis ts at th e mom e nt the se arc h wa rr a nt is t o be issued.” Id

. (interna l citations omitted). To this end, the af fidavit must contain information that allows a magistra te to determine whether the fa cts are too stale to es t ab l i s h p ro b able c ause at the time the aff

iant seeks issuanc e of the sear ch wa rra nt. See Longstreet , 619 S.W.2d at 99.
Staleness or a

lack of timeliness must be dete rmined on a cas e- b y -case basis. See State v

. Mee ks , 876 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . While the a bsence of a spe cific date is not controlling, “[i]t is nec essary for a finding of proba

ble cause that the time i n t er v al b etwee n the alleged c riminal activity and the issuance of a war rant not be too grea t.” State v. Baron , 659 S.W.2d 811, 814 (Tenn. Crim

. App. 1983). “ When the illegal activity described is ongoing, courts have gener ally held that the aff idavit doe s not be come stale with the passage of time.” State v. Thomas , 818 S.W.2d 350, 357 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) . The issuing magistrate must consider “ whether the criminal ac tivity under investigation was an isolated e vent or of a protrac ted and continuous nature, the nature of the prope rty sought, and the opportunit y those involved would have ha d to dispose of incriminating evidenc e.” Mee ks , 876 S.W.2d at 124. Upon re view of the rec ord, we note that the af fidavit supporting the war rant doe s not provide the ph ys ic a l a dd re ss o f the bu rg lary or the tim e or

date the bu rg lary o ccur

re d. Al so , th e a ff

ida vit does not specif

y the time span betwe en the bur glary a nd the issuance o f t h e wa rrant. In addition, there is a lack of information establishing “fac ts from which a rea sonable c onclusion may be dra wn that the contraband will be found in the pl ace to be sea rche d pursuant to the wa

rra nt.” Nor ris , 47 S.W.3d at 470. Nothing in th e af fi d av i t shows that the stolen items were in the defe ndant’s p o s s e s s io n o r a t h is r e s id e n c e a f te r th e c o mm is s io n o f th e b u r g la r y
. I n o th e r w o r d s , “ n o nexus betwee n the crime and the plac e to be se arc hed” w as established in the affidavit. See Longstreet , 619 S.W.2d a t 9 9

. Be c a u s e w e d e e m th e b u r g la r y to b e a s in g u la

r e v e n t a n d n o t a n “ o n g o in g illegal activity,” information regar ding when and w here the burglary occur red, a nd how much time passed betwee n the original off

ense and the time the war rant wa s sought are of

particula r importance

. Id

. Again, because no dates, ti mes or l ocations ar e spec ified in the af fidavit, it is im possible to discern from the f our corners of

the af fidavit whethe r one day, one month, or one yea r passe d betwee n the date of the burglary and the d ate the w arr ant was issued. See Longstreet , 619 S.W.2d at 99. There fore , we c onclude that the a ffidavit is untimely or stale.
3. Partic ularity
The de fenda nt next argue s that the warrant lac ked proba ble cause bec ause it did not describe the items sought in the searc h war rant with suffic ient particula rity.10

The F o u rt h Am en dment to the United States Constit ution and Article I , section 7 of the Te nn e sse e Con sti tut ion re qu ir e that a se arc h w arr a nt “ c on ta in a pa rt ic ula r d e sc ri pti on of

the ite ms to b e s ei ze d .” State v. He nning , 975 S.W.2d 290, 296 (Tenn. 1998) . “This re quirement ha s been interpre ted to mean that “ the war rant must be sufficie ntly de finite so that the office r exe cuting it can identify the prope rty sought with reasona ble ce rtainty.” Mee ks , 876 S.W.2d at 12 6 (citi ng W. L aFave a nd J. Israe l, Criminal Procedure § 3

. 4 ( f ) ( 2 d e d

. 1 9 9 2 ) ) ( h o ld in g th a t th e gener alized de sc ri pti on of “ c a sh mon e y, po c ke t bo ok s, fi re arm s, je we lr y, c he c k bo ok s [and ] c lothi ng it ems” we re no t suf

fi c ie nt to de sc ri be tho se ite ms be c a us e the y co uld ha ve be e n fou nd a mon g o the r l e ga lly possessed items). “I f an item can gene rally be f ound among other la wfully possessed objec ts of the same ge nera l classifica tion, then grea ter c are in th e d es cripti on is require d.” Id . ‘“[ W]he re the purpose of

the sea rch is to find spec ific property, it should be so particularly desc ribed a s to preclude the possibilit y of seizing a ny other.” ’ Sta te v . R e id , 164 S.W.3d 286, 326 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Lea
v . S tat e , 181 S.W.2d 351, 352-353 (Te nn. 1944)).
After revie wing the af

fidavit for the warr ant, we c onclude that the stolen items desc ribed a s being in the possession of the defe ndant wer e described with suf ficient particula

rity. The items were initially described in the wa rra nt as “two CD playe rs, 25 CD’s, 5 DVD’ s, Cell phone, and ne cklac e.” The war rant provided further de scription of the stolen items. Two of the DVDs we re ide ntified by sp e cif ic tit le a ndthe CD s w e re “ bu rn e d” c op ie s w hic h c ou ld b e fu rthe r i de nti fi e d b y th e “ fe ma le handwriting” on them. Furthermore, w e believe that police off icer s could verif

y the identity of

the vic tim ’s c e ll p ho ne a ndne c kla c e
. Th e re fo re , we c on c lud e that th is d e sc ri pti on is a de qu a te be c a us e “the wa rra nt[] desc ribed the c hara cter of the property with sufficie nt particularity ‘to enable the
sear cher to rea sonably asce rtain and ide ntify’ the items subject to seizur e.” Re id , 164 S.W.3d at 327 (interna l citations omit ted).
Ha vin g c omp le te d o ur

re vie w o f the wa

rr a nt, we c on c lud e that bec a us e the a ff ia nt f a ile d to establish the cr edibility or reliability of the informant’s information under the se cond prong of the Ag uil ar -S pin e lli test, failed to adequately identify the time, date or location of the bur glary a nd failed to established a ne xus betwee n the crime and the e xistence of stolen items at the defe ndant’s
re sid e nc e , th e se arc h w arr a nt w a s inv a lid

. Th e a ff ida vit fo r the wa

rr a nt d id n ot p os se ss the pr ob able
cause ne e d e d to ju s ti f

y it s is s u a n c e b y th e ma g is tr a te

. Po li c e o f f ic e r s w e r e w ith o u t th e lega l authority to exec ute a se arc h of the de fenda nt’s residenc e. Theref ore, the trial court e rre d by denying the def endant’ s motion t o suppress, an d the def endant’ s convictions for a ggravated burglary and theft over $500 in case number 06-01- 2091 must be reve rsed a nd dismiss ed.

B. Su ppression of the Evid ence
As his f inal argume nt, the defe ndant argue s that if the sear ch war rant in c ase number 06-01- 20 91 is f ou ndto b e ill e ga l, the n e vid e nc e or state me nts ma de in ca se nu mbe r 7 -0 1- 03 46 mus t a lso be suppre ssed as “ fruit of a n illegal sear ch.”
Evidence or statements obtained as fruits of an illegal sear ch war rant mu s t b e s u ppresse d. See W ong Sun v. United States , 3 71 U. S. 4 71 (1 96 3) . A s earch canno t be jus tif ie d b y w ha t it produce s, nor can an arrest be justified by the fruit of a n illegal sear ch. Sta te v . Cr os s , 700 S.W.2d 57 6, 57 7 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 85 ). Ha vin g a lr e a dy c on c lud e d th a t th e se arc h warran t in c a se11

number 06-01- 2091 was invalid and illega lly execute d, we now there fore conclude that the original and subsequent sear ches of the def endant’ s residenc e and pr operty, whic h yielded evide nce of drugs and drug pa

raphe rnalia, w as illegal. E v i d en ce o btained as a result of these sear ches must be
su pp re sse d a s f

ru its of the pr ior ill e ga l se arc h. Ac c or din gly , the e vid e nc e a ga ins t the de fe nd a nt i n case number 7-01- 0346 must be suppressed, a nd the def endant’ s convictions for ini t i ation of a pr oc e ss t o manu fa c tur e me tha mph e ta min e a ndpo sse ss ion of me thamph e ta min e wi th the int e nt t o deliver more than .5 gra ms in case number 06-01-2091 must also be r ever sed and dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the afor ementioned r easons, the judgments of the trial court ar e re v erse d and the convictions are vacated.

___________________________________ J.C. McLIN, JUDG E