IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

STEPHEN MAINGUTH, : No. 4:05-CV-00256

:

Plaintiff, :

: (Judge McClure)

v. :

:

SHAWN PACKARD and :

BOROUGH OF RENOVO, :

:

Defendants. :

O R D E R

April 27, 2006

BACKGROUND:

Plaintiff Stephen Mainguth initiated this civil rights action with the filing of a

complaint on February 4, 2005. Named as defendants are Shawn Packard, a police

officer for the Borough of Renovo, Pennsylvania, and the Borough of Renovo

itself. The parties have since stipulated to the dismissal, with prejudice, of any and

all claims against the Borough of Renovo. (See Rec. Doc. No. 15.) 

The complaint alleges a disturbing set of facts that took place on September

16, 2003. Mainguth alleges that while he was traveling on his motorcycle, Packard

struck him from behind with his police cruiser. According to the complaint, the

contact caused Mainguth’s motorcycle to spin out of control and flip over. 

Mainguth further alleges that while he was trapped underneath his motorcycle,

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 1 of 9
1

 As plaintiff points out, defendant did not brief his argument regarding the

state law malicious prosecution claim. We will accordingly deny the motion for

partial summary judgment on that claim.

2

Packard pummeled him with his fists and eventually pepper sprayed him when he

attempted to escape the beating.

Mainguth has asserted a number of claims against Packard, including a

section 1983 claim for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution, and claims for assault and malicious prosecution under

Pennsylvania law. 

Packard has now moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that he is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Fourteenth Amendment substantive

due process claim for property damage to the motorcycle. In his motion, Packard

also moves for summary judgment on the state law malicious prosecution claim and

Mainguth’s claim for damages arising out of his incarceration following the

revocation of his parole.1 

The motion has been fully briefed by the parties in compliance with the Local

Rules, and is now ripe for our decision. For the following reasons, we will deny

defendant Packard’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 2 of 9
3

DISCUSSION:

I. Legal Standard

A district court may properly grant a motion for summary judgment “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). 

The plain language of the rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

At the summary judgment stage, “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh

the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is

a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249

(1986). A genuine issue of material fact is one that may reasonably be resolved in

favor of either party. Id. 

In determining whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court will

draw all reasonable inferences and any ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 3 of 9
2

 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no

State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. 

4

Am. Flint Glass Workers Union v. Beaumont Glass Co., 62 F.3d 574, 578 (3d Cir.

1995) (citation omitted).

II. Mainguth’s Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Claim

Mainguth argues that Packard violated the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment2 by causing property damage to Mainguth’s motorcycle. 

Section 1983 enables Mainguth to institute an action to vindicate his civil rights. 

Section 1983 does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy

for the violation of rights created by federal law. Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,

47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995). The statute provides for a cause of action against

persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive another individual of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In

order for a plaintiff to prevail under Section 1983, he must establish two elements:

(1) that the defendants were “state actors,” and (2) that they deprived the plaintiff

of a federal right. See Groman, 47 F.3d at 633. 

A substantive due process analysis under § 1983 involves a three-step

process: (1) state action; (2) the existence of a protected property interest; and (3)

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 4 of 9
5

executive action that can be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a

constitutional sense. See, e.g., Holt Cargo Sys., Inc. v. Delaware River Port Auth.,

20 F. Supp. 2d 803, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (setting out three-part test); see also

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (discussing arbitrary or

conscience shocking action); Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 616 (3d Cir. 1994)

(“When complaining of a violation of substantive due process rights, a plaintiff

must prove that the governmental authority acted to ‘infringe a property interest

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment.’”)

As regards the state action requirement, there is no dispute regarding

Packard’s status as a state actor. During the events in question, Packard was an

on-duty policeman acting on behalf of the Borough of Renovo. 

There is also no dispute as to the second factor, the existence of a protected

property interest. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has

held that “ownership is a property interest worthy of substantive due process

protection.” Indep. Enterprises Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., 103 F.3d

1165, 1180 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). Mainguth owned the motorcycle

that was allegedly damaged by Packard.

What the parties do dispute, however, is whether Packard’s action can be

properly characterized as conscience shocking. The Supreme Court of the United

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 5 of 9
6

States has observed that “the core of the concept” of due process is “protection

against arbitrary action” and that “only the most egregious official conduct can be

said to be ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’” United Artists Theatre Circuit,

Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392, 399 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Lewis, 523

U.S. at 845-46). “[T]he substantive component of the Due Process Clause is

violated by executive action only when it ‘can be properly characterized as

arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at

847 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992)).

In this case, Mainguth alleges that he was struck from behind by Packard’s

police cruiser while riding his motorcycle. Packard responds that his actions

constituted “carelessness” or “mere negligent conduct.” (See Rec. Doc. No. 22, at

6.) Packard states that “Plaintiff cannot point to any facts of record establishing

the requisite ‘conscience shocking conduct’ with respect to the motorcycle

accident to state as [sic] cognizable Fourteenth Amendment due process claim.” 

(Id. at 8.) However, at her deposition, witness Jessica Stroup-Kelley testified that

she “observed the Renovo police car with its headlights on but no emergency lights

on run into the back of a motorcycle.” (Dep. of Jessica Stroup-Kelley, Rec. Doc.

No. 29, Ex. 2, at 4, Deposition Page 25.)

If defendant Packard intentionally struck Mainguth’s motorcycle, his actions

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 6 of 9
7

could very well shock the conscience. Drawing all reasonable inferences and any

ambiguities in favor of the nonmoving party, as we must, we find that genuine

issues of material fact preclude the grant of summary judgment on this claim. A

jury may well credit the combined testimony of Mainguth and Stroup-Kelley and

find that Packard intentionally struck the motorcycle, an act that could be found to

shock the conscience. We will therefore deny defendant’s motion for summary

judgment on the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim.

II. Mainguth’s Claim For Damages Arising Out Of His Incarceration

Mainguth has also lodged a claim for lost wages incurred during the period 

of his incarceration. This claim is brought in tandem with the state law claim for

malicious prosecution, alleging that Packard filed baseless charges against

Mainguth. 

On the date of the incident, September 16, 2003, plaintiff was on parole for

prior alcohol-related offenses. The conditions of his parole included mandates that

he was to comply with all municipal, county, state and federal criminal laws, and to

abstain from any consumption of alcohol. As a result of the charges filed against

plaintiff by Packard (driving under the influence, careless driving, reckless driving,

resisting arrest, and escape), plaintiff’s parole was revoked and plaintiff was

ordered incarcerated until April 28, 2004. 

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 7 of 9
8

Defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on the damages

claim because it was plaintiff’s parole officer, and not Officer Packard, who issued

the parole detainer against plaintiff. However, it is plaintiff’s contention that

Packard falsified the charges upon which the detainer was based. The Third

Circuit has recognized “the well-settled principle that, in situations in which a

judicial officer or other independent intermediary applies the correct governing law

and procedures but reaches an erroneous conclusion because he or she is misled in

some manner as to the relevant facts, the causal chain is not broken and liability

may be imposed upon those involved in making the misrepresentations or

omissions.” Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted).

Mainguth admits that he consumed two beers before his altercation with

Packard, but denies that alcohol contributed to the incident. It is not clear from the

record whether Mainguth’s parole was revoked because he admitted to consuming

alcohol, or because of the charges filed by Packard. 

The parties contest the exact events of September 16, 2003. If the jury

credits plaintiff’s version of events, Packard’s affidavit of probable cause may be

considered to be a “misrepresentation.” If it were found that Packard’s false

affidavit of probable cause provided the foundation for the revocation of

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 8 of 9
9

Mainguth’s parole, it is possible that Packard could be found liable to Mainguth for

lost wages.

Genuine issues of material fact preclude the grant of defendant’s motion for

summary judgment.

CONCLUSION:

Genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process claim for damage to Mainguth’s motorcycle, as well as

Mainguth’s claim for damages stemming from his incarceration after the revocation

of his parole. We will therefore deny defendant’s motion for partial summary

judgment.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

Defendant Shawn Packard’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment is 

denied. (Rec. Doc. No. 16.)

 s/ James F. McClure, Jr. 

James F. McClure, Jr.

United States District Judge

 

Case 4:05-cv-00256-JFM Document 33 Filed 04/27/06 Page 9 of 9