1

Filed 11/19/20 P. v. Stevens CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JERRY WILLIAM STEVENS,

Defendant and Appellant.

E072003

(Super.Ct.No. SWF1501294)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Stephen J. Gallon, Judge. 

Affirmed.

Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, 

Daniel Rogers , Christopher Beesley and Vincent P. LaPietra, Deputy Attorneys General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant and appellant, Jerry Williams Stevens, repeatedly sexually assaulted his 

13-year-old daughter, J.T., over the course of three weeks. A jury found him guilty of 

one count of aggravated sexual assault by means of forcible rape (Pen. Code, §§ 269, 

subd. (a)(1); 261, subd. (a)(2) & (a)(6); count 1),1six counts of aggravated sexual assault 

by means of forcible oral copulation of a child under 14 years old (§§ 269, subd. (a)(4); 

288a, subd. (c)(2) & (3), (d); counts 7-12), and six counts of aggravated sexual assault by 

means of forcible sexual penetration of a child under 14 years old (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5); 

289, subd. (a); counts 13-18). The trial court sentenced defendant to 15-year terms for 

each count, for a total of 195 years to life.

On appeal, defendant argues (1) there is insufficient evidence that he committed 

the offenses through force or duress, (2) the trial court failed to instruct the jury on lesser 

included offenses, (3) the trial court improperly admitted testimony of defendant’s 

uncharged sex offenses under Evidence Code section 1108, (4) Evidence Code section 

1108 is unconstitutional, and (5) his trial counsel was ineffective. We reject defendant’s 

contentions and affirm the judgment.

1

Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Defendant rented a detached room with one bed behind a house that Joshua 

Plotner shared with his girlfriend, Samantha DeMarco-Joy. Shortly after moving in, 

defendant’s 13-year-old daughter, J.T., who lived in Tennessee, came to spend the 

summer with defendant. J.T. did not want to come to California to visit defendant 

because he had previously molested her when they lived together in Tennessee.

J.T. stayed with defendant in his room behind Plotner’s house. Over the next few 

weeks, defendant digitally penetrated J.T., orally copulated her, and she orally copulated 

him. Defendant also inserted his penis into J.T.’s vagina at least once. Defendant told 

J.T. to keep these incidents secret. He also showed her pornography allegedly depicting 

fathers having sex with their daughters in an effort to convince her that what he was 

doing was “okay.”

Defendant’s half-sister, A.M., called Plotner about three weeks after defendant 

moved in, and told Plotner that defendant had sexually abused her when they were 

children. Plotner, who was at a worksite with defendant, left work with defendant and 

went home. When they arrived at Plotner’s house, defendant spoke with J.T. on the 

porch while Plotner went inside and spoke with DeMarco-Joy. Plotner then returned to 

the porch and told J.T. to go inside and speak with DeMarco-Joy.

DeMarco-Joy asked J.T. if “anything” ever happened between her and defendant, 

and asked whether he had ever touched her. J.T. began crying and said “‘[i]t’s farther 
4

than that.’” Plotner came back inside and saw DeMarco-Joy was visibly angry and J.T. 

was crying. He asked, “what’s going on?” and DeMarco-Joy replied, “‘[h]e’s been 

molesting his daughter since she’s been here.’” Plotner and DeMarco-Joy went outside 

to confront defendant. Before they said anything, defendant immediately jumped up, ran 

to his truck, and drove away without saying anything while Plotner unsuccessfully chased 

after him.

The police arrived and took statements. Defendant was apprehended later that 

day. J.T. went to the police station and gave a statement that described defendant’s abuse 

in detail. A medical examination of J.T. revealed defendant’s semen was found in J.T.’s 

vulva.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supports Defendant’s Convictions

The parties agree, as do we, that each of defendant’s convictions required a 

finding that defendant committed the offense “by means of force, violence, duress, 

menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.” 

(§§ 261, subd. (a)(2); 287, subd. (c)(2)(B), 289, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Defendant argues his 

convictions must be reversed because there was “no evidence” that he committed the 

offenses by fear or duress. We disagree.
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1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

When reviewing on appeal the sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, 

this court must consider the evidence presented and all logical inferences from that 

evidence in light of the legal definition of the charged crime. “Settled principles of 

appellate review require us to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the 

judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence 

which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact 

could find that the defendant” committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People

v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1124.) “The standard of review is the same in cases such 

as this where the People rely primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

“Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that 

circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt 

and the other innocence, [citations] it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be 

convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ‘“If the circumstances 

reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the 

circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not 

warrant a reversal of the judgment.”’” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 932-933; 

People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1124.) Accordingly, defendant “bears an 

enormous burden” of showing there is insufficient evidence to uphold his convictions. 

(People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 46 (Veale).)
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2. Analysis

Duress is “‘a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or 

retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to 1) 

perform an act which otherwise would not have been performed or, 2) acquiesce in an act 

to which one otherwise would not have submitted.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Leal (2004) 

33 Cal.4th 999, 1004-1005, 1010.)

2

 This definition is “objective in nature and not 

dependent on the response exhibited by a particular victim.” (People v. Soto (2011) 51 

Cal.4th 229, 246 (Soto).) To evaluate duress, we look at “[t]he totality of the 

circumstances includ[ing] the victim’s age, her relationship to the perpetrator, threats to 

harm the victim, physically controlling the victim when the victim attempts to resist, 

warnings to the victim that revealing the molestation would result in jeopardizing the 

family, and the relative physical vulnerability of the child.” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 

Cal.App.5th 1063, 1072-1073 (Thomas).)

Duress can take the “‘form of psychological coercion to get someone else to do 

something.’” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 243; see People v. Cochran (2002) 103 

Cal.App.4th 8, 15 (Cochran), overruled on different grounds by Soto, supra, at p. 248, fn. 

12.) “Duress can arise from various circumstances, including the relationship between 

the defendant and the victim and their relative ages and sizes.” (People v. Schulz (1992) 

2 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005.) Duress also can be established by “a defendant’s attempt to 

2

Threat of hardship does not apply to count 1. (People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th 

at pp. 1004-1005, 1010.)
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isolate the victim and increase or maintain her vulnerability to his assaults.” (Cochran,

supra, at p. 15.) “When the victim is young and is molested by her father in the family 

home, duress will be present in all but the rarest cases.” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th 

at pp. 1072-1073, italics added.)3

This is not one of those rare cases. Defendant began molesting J.T. when she was 

11, when they lived together in Tennessee. She was afraid to report what had happened, 

but eventually told K., the daughter of the family J.T. and defendant were living with at 

the time. K. later reported the abuse. When J.T.’s mother learned that the police were 

responding to the reported abuse, she helped defendant evade arrest by taking him, J.T., 

and her siblings to a hotel. While driving to the hotel, J.T.’s mother asked J.T. if 

defendant had abused her, but J.T. was too scared to say anything because defendant was 

in the car. J.T.’s mother never asked her again about the abuse.

Defendant committed his current offenses against J.T. almost every night while 

she was staying with him in a detached room with one bed in California, far away from 

anyone she knew well. J.T. did not want to come to California in the first place because 

of defendant’s prior abuse, but felt like she could not say so, in part because she was not 

3 We acknowledge this principle was drawn from cases involving a seven-yearold and nine-year-old victim, whereas J.T. was almost 14 at the time of defendant’s 

offenses. We do not believe this difference is material here. When assessing duress, we 

ask whether the victim was at “an age at which adults are commonly viewed as authority 

figures,” and thus whether the victim was “susceptib[le] . . . to intimidation by an adult.” 

(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 50.) At 13, children normally view their parents as 

authority figures. Regardless, as explained in more detail below, there was substantial 

evidence that defendant committed the offenses against J.T. by duress.
8

sure how her mother would react given that she previously told her mother that defendant 

had not abused her.

On occasion, defendant made J.T. sleep in the detached room instead of in the 

house, and abused her on those occasions. This shows that defendant “attempt[ed] to 

isolate [J.T.] and increase or maintain her vulnerability to his assaults.” (Cochran, supra,

103 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.)

Defendant would always initiate the abuse by taking off J.T.’s pajamas. J.T. 

usually would be using her tablet, and defendant would take it away from her.

Defendant penetrated J.T. with his penis more than once, including on the night 

before his arrest. When doing so on one occasion, she was lying on her back and he got 

on top of her. J.T. felt like she could not get up. J.T. tried to push him off because it 

hurt.

At times, defendant dragged J.T.’s hand across his penis. He also pushed her head 

down while she copulated him at least once. When he did that, J.T. tried to say no, but 

defendant “made” her do it. Defendant told J.T. to swallow his semen at least once. The 

jury could reasonably infer that this was “an ‘order,’ not a request.” (People v. Reyes 

(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 811.) As J.T. testified, she felt like she had to touch 

defendant’s penis and keep it in her mouth.

In fact, J.T. felt like she “had to do” all of the sexual acts defendant initiated and 

requested. J.T. tried to “say no” to the abuse, but defendant persisted. Although 

defendant once stopped the abuse at J.T.’s request, he did it again the next day. J.T. 
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knew defendant was “much stronger” and she was afraid of what would happen if she 

told him to stop the abuse. J.T. also felt like she had to tell defendant “it felt good” 

because she “didn’t know what he would do if” she said no, or if “it would irritate him or 

anything.” J.T. was scared to report the abuse because of defendant’s past violent 

behavior. He had angry outbursts in the past, which scared her, and were the reason why 

she did not report the abuse in Tennessee. In particular, J.T. was afraid of defendant 

because she witnessed him fighting with her mother, during which defendant was 

“pushing her [mother] around.”

Defendant frequently showed J.T. pornography depicting a father having sex with 

his daughter, and told her what he was doing to her was “okay” because the people in the 

pornography were doing it too. Defendant also told J.T. to keep the abuse secret. By 

doing so, defendant exerted a form of “psychological pressure” that implied she “should 

not otherwise protest or resist the sexual imposition.” (People v. Senior (1992) 3 

Cal.App.4th 765, 775.)

The fact that defendant did not always “use force or threats does not require a 

finding of no duress” given J.T.’s “age and her relationship to the defendant.” (Cochran, 

supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p.14.) “‘The very nature of duress is psychological coercion.’” 

(Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 48; accord, Cochran, supra, at p.15.) “A perpetrator 

may use duress . . . against a victim even if this conduct does not ultimately influence the 

victim’s state of mind.” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 243.)
10

For instance, in People v. Pitman (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50, the court held 

there was substantial evidence of duress even though the defendant did not use force, 

violence, or the threat of violence. Similarly, in Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th 40, the 

defendant abused his seven-year-old stepdaughter several times, generally when they 

were alone in the house, without making any verbal or physical threats. (Id. at p. 43.)

The victim testified that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid, did not think 

her mother would believe her, and was afraid the defendant would hurt her or her mother 

if she reported the abuse, although he never said he would. (Ibid.) The Veale court held 

that, even in the absence of threats or physical force, the jury could reasonably find 

duress based on an implied threat from the victim’s fear, age, and size compared to the 

defendant. (Id. at p. 47.)

Here, there was substantial evidence that defendant committed his offenses against 

J.T. through duress given that (1) defendant is J.T.’s father, a position of dominance in a 

single-parent household, (2) he isolated her in the detached room away from other adults 

in the main house, (3) he told her to keep the abuse secret, (4) he tried to convince her it 

was acceptable by showing her pornography depicting fathers and daughters having sex,

(5) he was “much stronger” than J.T., (6) he sometimes directed J.T.’s participation in the 

abuse, and (7) J.T. was afraid to report the abuse due to defendant’s previous violent 

behavior. Viewed objectively, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to 

reasonably conclude that defendant committed the offenses by placing J.T. under duress, 

particularly given that J.T. was afraid to report the abuse and felt obliged to participate in 
11

it. The record thus establishes that J.T. was a young, “vulnerable and isolated child who 

engaged in sex acts only in response to her father’s parental and physical authority.” 

(Cochran, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 15.)

Defendant’s reliance on People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287 

(Espinoza) and People v. Hecker (1990) 219 Cal.App.2d 1238 (Hecker) does not alter our 

conclusion. In Espinoza, the defendant repeatedly molested his 12-year-old daughter on 

several occasions. (Espinoza, supra, at p. 1293.) She testified she was “‘too scared to do 

anything’” while her father abused her, and was afraid to report the molestation because 

she thought he “‘would come and do something.’” (Id. at pp. 1293-1294.) The Espinoza

court held there was insufficient evidence of duress because the victim never testified the 

defendant used “any ‘direct or implied threat’ of any kind.” (Id. at p. 1321.) In reaching 

this conclusion, the Espinoza court relied on Hecker, which broadly held that 

“‘“[p]sychological coercion” without more does not establish duress. At a minimum 

there must be an implied threat of “force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution.”’”

(Id. at p. 1321.)

Subsequent decisions have cast doubt on Espinoza and Hecker. The same court 

that decided Hecker later explained in Cochran that some of “th[e] language in Hecker is 

overly broad” because “[t]he very nature of duress is psychological coercion.” (Cochran, 

supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 15; accord, Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 48-50.) 

Most importantly, our Supreme Court in Soto approved a definition of duress in child 

molestation cases more in line with Cochran, describing duress as “‘us[ing] some form of 
12

psychological coercion to get someone else to do something.’” (Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th 

at p. 243.) Espinoza and Hecker therefore do not persuade us that defendant committed 

his offenses against J.T. without duress.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err By Failing to Instruct on Lesser Included 

Offenses

Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury 

on “nonforcible” lesser included offenses.4 We disagree.

An uncharged offense is included in a greater charged offense if the greater 

offense, as defined by statute, cannot be committed without also committing the lesser 

(the elements test), or the language of the accusatory pleading encompasses all the 

elements of the lesser offense (the accusatory pleading test). (People v. Parson (2008) 44 

Cal.4th 332, 349.) “[E]ven absent a request, a trial court must instruct on the general 

principles of law relevant to the issues the evidence raises. [Citation.] ‘“That obligation 

has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the 

evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were 

present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that 

charged. [Citations.]”’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he existence of “any evidence, no matter how 

weak” will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such instructions are 

required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is 

4

Like the parties, we refer to “forcible” offenses as those that required the 

requisite element of force, violence, duress, retribution, menace, or fear, and refer to 

“nonforcible” offenses as those that do not require any such element.
13

“substantial enough to merit consideration” by the jury. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 623.) “‘“Substantial evidence” in this context is 

“‘evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[ ]’” 

that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed.’” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 

Cal.4th 537, 553.) We review the failure to give a lesser included offense instruction 

under the de novo standard of review. (People v. Cooksey (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 

1411.)

As to count 1, aggravated sexual assault by means of forcible rape (§§ 269, subd. 

(a)(1); 261, subd. (a)(2) & (a)(6)), defendant argues the trial court should have instructed 

the jury on unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor more than three years younger than 

the perpetrator (§ 261.5, subd. (c)) as a lesser included offense. As to counts 7 through 

12, aggravated sexual assault of a minor by means of forcible oral copulation (§§ 269, 

subd. (a)(4); 287, subd. (c)(2) or (c)(3) or (d)), defendant argues the trial court should 

have instructed the jury on oral copulation of a minor (§ 287, subd. (b)(1)) as a lesser 

included offense. As to counts 13 through 18, aggravated sexual assault of a child by 

means of forcible sexual penetration (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5); 289, subd. (a)), defendant 

argues the trial court should have instructed the jury on sexual penetration of a minor 

(§ 289, subd. (h)) as a lesser included offense.

The People agree as to count 1, and we accept their concession. We also accept 

defendant’s concession that sexual penetration of a minor (§ 289, subd. (h)) is not a lesser 

included offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child by means of forcible sexual 
14

penetration (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5); 289, subd. (a); counts 13-18). We assume without 

deciding that defendant is correct that oral copulation of a minor (§ 287, subd. (b)(1)) is a 

lesser included offense of sexual assault of a minor by means of forcible oral copulation 

(§§ 269, subd. (a)(4); 287, subd. (c)(2) or (c)(3) or (d); counts 7-12).

However, as the parties agree, the trial court was obliged to give instructions as to 

the allegedly nonforcible lesser included offenses only if there was substantial evidence 

that defendant committed the offenses nonforcibly. Defendant argues there was such 

substantial evidence because there was sufficient evidence that would allow the jury to 

conclude that he committed the offenses nonforcibly, that is, without duress. We 

disagree.

Defendant did not submit any evidence that he committed the offenses without 

duress. Indeed, he denied that he committed any offense at all. J.T., on the other hand, 

unequivocally and repeatedly testified that defendant committed the offenses against her 

will, she felt forced to participate, she was scared to say no, and defendant at times 

physically directed her participation. As explained in more detail above, the 

circumstances under which defendant committed the offenses established that he

accomplished them by duress. (See Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1072-1073 

[“When the victim is young and is molested by her father in the family home, duress will 

be present in all but the rarest cases.”].) Defendant does not identify, and we cannot 

locate, any evidence in the record from which the jury could reasonably infer that 

defendant committed his offenses against J.T. without duress. On this record, the jury 
15

could not reasonably conclude “‘that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was 

committed’” because no substantial evidence showed that defendant committed counts 1 

and 7 through 12 without force or duress. (People v. Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 553.)

Finally, even if the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on lesser included 

offenses, any resulting error was harmless. When a trial court fails to instruct on lesser 

included offenses, reversal is not required “unless an examination of the entire record 

establishes a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (People v. 

Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 165; People v. Racy (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1327, 

1335 [“In a noncapital case, the error in failing to instruct on a lesser included offense is 

reviewed for prejudice under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.”].) A 

“‘probability’ in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable 

chance, more than an abstract possibility.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 715.)

We conclude it is not reasonably probable that defendant would have received a 

more favorable outcome had the trial court instructed the jury on the alleged lesser 

included offense. In our view, there was overwhelming evidence that defendant 

committed the offenses against J.T. through duress, including her young age, the fact that 

defendant is her father, and the psychological and sometimes physical pressure he exerted 

on her. (See Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1072-1073 [“When the victim is 

young and is molested by her father in the family home, duress will be present in all but 

the rarest cases.”].) Given J.T.’s age, defendant’s authoritative status as her father, the 
16

circumstances under which defendant abused J.T., and because the jury apparently 

believed defendant abused J.T. in the manner described, it is not reasonably probable the 

jury would have found that defendant committed the alleged lesser included offenses had 

that been an option. The jury was instructed on assault, battery and simple sexual assault. 

If it had concluded defendant committed his offenses against J.T. without duress or some 

form of force, it likely would have found defendant guilty of one of these lesser offenses.

Instead, it found defendant guilty of all 13 counts and, in so doing, found that he 

committed the offenses forcibly.

In addition, the jury was instructed that to find defendant guilty on all counts, it 

must find that J.T. did not consent and that defendant accomplished the offenses by force, 

violence, duress, menace, fear of injury to J.T. or someone else, or the threat of 

retaliation. By finding defendant guilty of all 13 counts, the jury necessarily found that 

J.T. did not consent. Given the strong evidence that defendant committed the offenses 

through duress and the jury’s findings that J.T. did not consent, there is no reasonable 

probability that the lack of the lesser included offense instructions affected the verdict.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion By Admitting Testimony About

Defendant’s Uncharged Sex Offenses

Defendant asserts the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting testimony from 

A.M. and K.W. that defendant committed sex offenses against them under Evidence 

Code section 1108. We disagree.
17

1. Additional Background

A.M., defendant’s younger half-sister, testified that defendant repeatedly sexually 

abused her when she was between the ages of two and 10. He performed oral sex on her, 

made her perform oral sex on him, and digitally penetrated her. He eventually began 

penetrating her with his penis. Defendant’s abuse stopped when A.M. and defendant 

lived in separate states when A.M. was between the ages of 11 and 16, but moved back in 

together when she was 16. Defendant began abusing her again. When A.M. was 16, she 

disclosed the abuse to a friend, and later to the police.

Defendant sexually abused K.W. when she was between the ages of 13 and 16. At 

the time, defendant was living with K.W., her older sister (defendant’s ex-girlfriend), and 

their father in Tennessee. Defendant “sometimes” abused K.W. “a couple days in a row 

or sometimes it would be a month later,” but always did it at night when everyone was 

sleeping. He abused K.W. by orally copulating her, and digitally penetrating her, and 

forcing her to orally copulate him.

2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

“The general public policy on character or propensity evidence is that it is not

admissible to prove conduct on a given occasion.” (People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 

269, 285.) The Legislature, however created an exception for sex offense cases through 

Evidence Code section 1108, which provides in relevant part: “In a criminal action in 

which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s 

commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by [Evidence 
18

Code] [s]ection 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code] 

[s]ection 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).)

Thus, under Evidence Code section 1108, there is a “presumption favoring the 

admissibility of sexual offense evidence . . . to show propensity to commit the charged 

offense.” (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 42, italics added.) Evidence Code 

section 1108 nonetheless “preserves the trial court’s discretion to exclude evidence under 

[Evidence Code] section 352 if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative 

value. [Citations.] In deciding whether to exclude evidence of another sexual offense 

under [Evidence Code] section 1108, ‘trial judges must consider such factors as its 

nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and 

the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, 

its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden 

on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less 

prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the 

defendant’s other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details 

surrounding the offense.’ [Citation.] Like any ruling under [Evidence Code] section 352, 

the trial court’s ruling admitting evidence under [Evidence Code] section 1108 is subject 

to review for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1294-1295.)

3. Analysis

At the outset, we reject defendant’s suggestion that the admission of evidence of 

uncharged sex crimes under Evidence Code section 1108 is unconstitutional. Our 
19

Supreme Court has directly held otherwise, and we are bound by that decision. (People 

v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 60-61; Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 

Cal.2d 450, 455.) We also need not decide whether defendant forfeited his objection to 

the admission of A.M.’s testimony, as the People maintain, because we conclude the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting her testimony.

A.M. called Plotner when she learned that J.T. was living with him to tell him that 

defendant had sexually abused her (A.M.) when she was younger. As defendant 

recognized, his abuse of A.M. was therefore relevant to explaining why A.M. called 

Plotner “‘out of the blue.’” A.M.’s testimony about defendant’s abuse also was relevant 

because it showed that defendant abused her in a manner similar to how he abused J.T.—

first by orally and digitally molesting her, then progressing to penetrating her with his 

penis. (See People v. Avila (2014) 59 Cal.4th 496, 516 [evidence of prior uncharged 

conduct was relevant because it involved abuse of young girls, “suggesting defendant 

was a pedophile who committed the crimes against the young female victim in this 

case”].) The straightforward nature of A.M.’s testimony and defendant’s charges was not 

likely to distract the jurors. Finally, her testimony was not unduly prejudicial or 

inflammatory because defendant’s uncharged sex offenses against her were not more 

egregious than his charged offenses against J.T. (People v. Yovanov (1999) 69 

Cal.App.4th 392, 406 [evidence of “uncharged sexual misconduct” was not unduly 

inflammatory because it was as “equally graphic” as charged offense]; People v. Harris

(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, 738 [evidence of violent attack of a stranger extremely 
20

inflammatory because it was more egregious than charged offense of licking and fondling 

incapacitated victim].)

The facts that weigh against the admission of A.M.’s testimony are that there was 

no corroborating evidence and the uncharged offenses occurred 15 to 31 years earlier. 

But defendant’s offenses against A.M. were not an isolated event that she remembered 

vaguely or inconsistently. A.M. testified unequivocally that defendant sexually abused 

her on a near-daily basis for years. Nothing in her testimony suggests she was uncertain 

about what defendant did to her or could not remember the details. Thus, the trial court 

could rationally conclude A.M.’s certainty of defendant’s offenses against her were 

sufficient to allow her to testify about them, particularly given the highly probative value 

of her testimony. (See People v. Story, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1294 [trial court must 

evaluate “certainty” that prior uncharged sex offenses were committed].) Although the 

offenses were 15 to 31 years in the past, “[n]umerous cases have upheld admission 

pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108 of prior sexual crimes that occurred decades

before the current offenses.” (People v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 992 

[collecting cases upholding the admission of sex offenses from 18 to 30 years in the 

past].) The similarities between the charged and uncharged offenses in this case, as well 

as the probative value of A.M.’s testimony, balance out the remoteness.

In sum, the trial court reasonably found that the factors the trial court was to 

consider under Evidence Code section 1108 weighed in favor of admission of A.M.’s 
21

testimony. We therefore conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting 

her testimony.

We reach the same conclusion as to K.W.’s testimony for the same reasons. Like 

A.M., K.W. testified that defendant repeatedly sexually abused her over the course of 

several years in a manner similar to how he abused J.T. He waited until everyone was 

asleep and would orally copulate K.W., digitally penetrate her, and make her orally 

copulate him.

To the extent defendant argues K.W.’s testimony should not have been admitted 

because of the “passage of time, absence of records, and distant locality,” defendant 

forfeited the argument by failing to object on those grounds in the trial court. (See 

People v. Miramontes (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1099.) Regardless, those 

considerations do not change our conclusion that K.W.’s testimony was properly 

admitted. Defendant’s offenses against K.W. occurred 15 years before his current 

offenses, so they were not impermissibly remote in time. (People v. Robertson, supra, 

208 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 [collecting cases upholding the admission of sex offenses from 

18 to 30 years in the past].) The fact that there was no corroborating evidence did not 

preclude the admission of K.W.’s testimony. Whether she was credible was for the jury 

to decide. As to defendant’s abuse of K.W. occurring in a “distant locality,” defendant 

provides no authority or explanation for why the fact that his offenses against K.W. 

occurred in Tennessee weighed in favor of excluding her testimony. Finally, although 

K.W.’s testimony was arguably more inflammatory in that she claimed she did not report 
22

defendant’s abuse because he once used physical violence against her and also threatened 

her and her father with a gun, that testimony was elicited by defense counsel. In any 

event, given that several other relevant factors weighed in favor of admitting K.W.’s 

highly relevant testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing K.W.’s 

testimony under Evidence Code section 1108.

D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to explore a DNA 

defense and for failing to object to alleged prosecutor misconduct. We disagree.

1. Applicable Law 

“When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court defers to 

counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption counsel acted within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 

986, 1009.) Accordingly, “[w]hen the record on direct appeal sheds no light on why 

counsel failed to act in the manner challenged [the defendant asserts counsel should have 

acted], defendant must show that there was ‘“‘no conceivable tactical purpose’” for 

counsel’s act or omission. [Citations.]’” (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 675.) 

“[R]arely will an appellate record establish ineffective assistance of counsel.” (People v. 

Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 122.) If the record sheds no light on counsel’s actions, 

the claim must be rejected unless no satisfactory explanation exists or counsel was asked 

for an explanation and failed to provide one. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 

264, 266.)
23

2. DNA defense

Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to provide expert 

testimony to corroborate his belief that his semen was found on J.T. because she used a 

towel that a woman defendant slept with the day before used the towel after they had 

intercourse. Defense counsel may have had a tactical reason not to pursue this theory 

because, as the People point out, defendant “has never identified the woman.” There is 

no evidence in the record as to her identity, whether she would have corroborated 

defendant’s theory, or even whether she could be located to testify. There is also nothing 

in the record about whether Plotner, DeMarco-Joy, or J.T. knew anything about the 

woman, or whether they would have testified that they never saw her, which could have

undermined defendant’s theory. Finally, defense counsel represented to the trial court in 

a post-trial Marsden hearing5that defendant told him that “[defendant] wasn’t worried 

about the DNA” evidence, which further suggests that defense counsel may have made a 

tactical decision not to pursue a DNA-based defense—after conferring with defendant 

about it. Because there are conceivable reasons for why defense counsel did not pursue a 

DNA defense, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

3. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking defendant a 

series of questions during cross-examination and that his defense counsel was ineffective 

for failing to object. We disagree.

5

People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
24

“‘“‘“A prosecutor’s . . . intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution 

when it comprises a pattern of conduct ‘so egregious that it infects the trial with such 

unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’”’ [Citations.] Conduct by 

a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial 

misconduct under state law only if it involves ‘“‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible 

methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’”’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’” 

(People v. Zambrano (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 228, 241.)

“‘“A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the 

conviction a denial of due process.’”’” (People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1009.) A 

prosecutor’s misconduct violates California law if it involves the use of deceptive or 

reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury. (Id. at 

pp. 1009-1010.) An objection must be raised, and an admonition sought for the issue to 

be preserved on appeal. (Id. at p. 1010.)

Prosecutorial misconduct that violates state law warrants reversal only when it is 

reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have occurred 

had the district attorney refrained from the untoward conduct. (People v. Milner (1988) 

45 Cal.3d 227, 245; see People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839.)

We review de novo a defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (People v. 

Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 860.) “‘In conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly 

infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from 
25

the prosecutor’s statements.’” (People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 553-554.) We 

consider the prosecutor’s remarks in context of the entire record. (People v. San Nicolas

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 665-666.) We presume, in the absence of evidence to the 

contrary, that the jury understands and follows instructions from the trial court. (People 

v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 823.) We presume that jurors treat the court’s 

instructions as statements of law, and the arguments of the prosecutor as words spoken by 

an advocate in an attempt to persuade. (People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 441.)

The first exchange, according to defendant, involved “argumentative questions 

about [his] relationships with various women which served no purpose except to paint

him as a person of bad character.” The exchange went as follows:

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: So [J.T.’s mother] was pregnant with (J.T.) at the time 

that you were kicked out of Rhonda’s, right?

“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: And you didn’t take her with you, did you?

“[DEFENDANT]: I had no place to take her.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: You just kind of left your pregnant girlfriend?”

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: So how long were you dating Amber?

“[DEFENDANT]: Roughly – maybe three, four weeks before she got pregnant 

until right before she had Jonathan.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: And so you leave Rhonda’s and - - but do you see Jenny 

again, or do you just let her fend for herself?”
26

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: You were still living with Amber when she was 

pregnant, right?

“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: And you started dating Katie?

“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: And you moved in with her pretty fast, didn’t you?”

In the second series of questions, the prosecutor asked defendant four separate 

times why a witness would lie or falsely accuse him. Although defense counsel objected 

each time and the trial court sustained the objections, defendant contends trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to ask the trial court for an admonition.

In the third exchange, the prosecutor continued to ask defendant about whether 

witnesses were lying:

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: So everyone’s lying?

“[DEFENDANT]: I didn’t sexually abuse anybody.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: So they’re all lying about that?

“[DEFENDANT]: I didn’t sexually abuse anybody.

“[THE PROSECUTOR]: They’re all lying about that, right?”

Defense counsel objected, and the trial court sustained the objection.

We assume without deciding that the prosecutor’s questioning was improper and 

that defense counsel should have objected to all of the questions and asked for an 

admonition from the trial court. Even so, defendant cannot establish he was prejudiced 
27

by counsel’s failure to object or failure to request an admonition. It is not reasonably 

probable that defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had defense counsel 

objected to the prosecutor’s questions. The evidence of defendant’s guilt was significant 

and turned primarily on the credibility of defendant, J.T., and the several other witnesses 

who testified that defendant had repeatedly sexually abused them. The prosecutor’s 

questioning likely had little, if any, effect on the jury’s evaluation of the evidence. On 

this record, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON

Acting P. J.

We concur:

RAPHAEL

J.

MENETREZ

J.