United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

May 1997 SURFACE

COMBATANTS

Navy Faces Challenges

Sustaining Its Current

Program

GAO/NSIAD-97-57

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-272547 

May 21, 1997

The Honorable John W. Warner

Chairman

The Honorable Edward M. Kennedy

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on Seapower

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable C. W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable John P. Murtha

Ranking Minority Member

Subcommittee on National Security

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives

Surface combatants—cruisers, destroyers, and frigates—represent over one-third of the Navy’s

war-fighting fleet and a significant portion of the Navy’s annual funding for new ships. This

report discusses the Navy’s basis for its current and planned surface combatant force, its plans

to sustain the current force size into the next century, and the key factors that could affect

future force requirements. We conducted this review under our basic legislative responsibilities

and are addressing this report to you because we believe it will be useful to your committees in

their deliberations on future naval force size and composition, particularly on decisions for the

Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, 21st Century Surface Combatant, and the Arsenal Ship. This

report contains a recommendation that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress with specific

information on the basis for the surface combatant force and on the Navy’s plan for sustaining

the force.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the Navy and the

Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also be made available to others on

request.

Please contact me on (202) 512-3504 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Richard Davis

Director, National Security

 Analysis
Executive Summary

Purpose The Navy currently spends about $3 billion each year to modernize its

surface combatant force. The high cost of these ships, especially the

Arleigh Burke-class destroyer at about $870 million per ship,1

 raises

questions about whether the Navy will be able to sustain the fleet size it

says is needed to achieve U.S. national security objectives. As a result of

these concerns, GAO initiated a review to determine (1) the basis for the

Navy’s current and future force size, (2) the Navy’s plans to sustain the

current force size into the next century, and (3) key factors that could

affect future force requirements.

Background Surface combatants—cruisers, destroyers, and frigates—provide the Navy

with a wide range of capabilities and choices to satisfy U.S. national

security objectives. In peacetime, these large, heavily armed multimission

ships carry out a wide range of day-to-day overseas presence missions and

enhance U.S. crisis response capabilities. During a conflict, surface

combatants would conduct combat operations against enemy submarines,

surface ships, aircraft, missiles, and targets ashore either independently or

with other military forces. Over the last decade, technological advances,

such as the Aegis combat system, the vertical launching system (VLS), and

the capability to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles,2

 have significantly

expanded the range of tasks that the newer, more capable ships entering

the force can undertake.

With the end of the Cold War, the Navy significantly reduced its number of

surface combatants from about 220 in the late 1980s to 125—115 active

cruisers, destroyers, and frigates and 10 reserve frigates—at the end of

fiscal year 1996. Although the size of the force has declined, surface

combatants represent more than one-third of the Navy’s battle force ships,3

and the proportion and number of ships in the force with the Aegis combat

system have been increasing, as shown in table 1. According to the Navy,

Aegis-capable ships are considered to be effective in numerous

1

This figure is based on the procurement of four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in fiscal year 1997. The

cost for each destroyer depends on the number of ships built each year and the changes made to the

ship’s design in that year’s procurement.

2

Aegis is an integrated network of computers and displays linked to sensors and weapon systems

capable of simultaneously detecting, tracking, and engaging numerous air and surface targets. VLS is a

computer-controlled launching system that can store, select, initialize, and rapidly launch different

type missiles. Tomahawk is an all-weather, subsonic missile capable of striking sea and land targets

located more than 500 miles away. It is launched from surface combatants or attack submarines.

3

Other battle force ships include active and reserve aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, strategic and

attack submarines, patrol and mine warfare ships, and logistics ships. At the end of fiscal year 1996,

the Navy had 359 battle force ships.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Executive Summary

war-fighting areas and tasks and are best able to defend themselves and

protect other forces while providing critical support to ground forces.

Table 1: Number of Aegis-Capable Surface Combatants by Fiscal Year

Actual Funded Planned

1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 2005 2007 2010

Ticonderoga-class cruisersa 16 26 27 27 27 27 27 27

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers 0 2 16 28 37 46 51 57

Total for Aegis-capable surface combatants 16 28 43 55 64 73 78 84

Percentage of surface combatants that are Aegis

capable 8 19 34 43 49 54 57 59

Total for all surface combatants 199 148 125 127 130 136 137 142

aThe first five Ticonderoga-class cruisers have an early, less capable version of the Aegis combat

system and do not have VLS or the capability to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles.

The Navy is currently building only one class of surface combatant—the

Arleigh Burke destroyer. The Navy has 38 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers

in its force, under construction, or under contract as of April 21, 1997, and

plans to procure an additional 19 destroyers through the next decade.

Completion of the Arleigh Burke destroyer program, along with the earlier

procurement of Ticonderoga-class cruisers, will allow the Navy to achieve

a force of 84 Aegis-capable surface combatants by fiscal year 2010. The

Navy is completing a cost and operational effectiveness analysis for a new

surface combatant—known as the 21st Century Surface

Combatant—sometime in 1997. This analysis will help determine the

surface combatant force levels and mix and the design or designs for this

new ship, which will begin construction around fiscal year 2003 and enter

the fleet starting around fiscal year 2009.

As mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year

1997, the Secretary of Defense is conducting a comprehensive quadrennial

review of the defense program. This review, expected to be completed by

May 15, 1997, is intended to assess defense needs through the year 2005

and examine strategy, force structure, and modernization plans. The act

also requires an independent panel of defense experts to submit a

comprehensive assessment of DOD’s report and conduct an assessment of

alternative force structures through the year 2010 and beyond by

December 1, 1997.

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Executive Summary

Results in Brief The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy are pursuing a surface

combatant force size and construction program based largely on budget

priorities, industrial base concerns, and operational requirements. DOD has

not clearly explained the link and any underlying assumptions between the

force and the national military strategy. DOD and Navy studies illustrate

that the size of the force can vary widely depending on the specific

assumptions considered. An explanation of the linkage between force size

and key assumptions would assist Congress in evaluating the

appropriateness of the Navy’s surface combatant program.

The Navy can sustain at least 125 surface combatants through 2013 if it

(1) completes its Arleigh Burke-class destroyer construction program as

planned, (2) maintains its current build rate of three ships a year, and

(3) retains existing ships in its inventory for their expected service lives.

However, these conditions hinge on the Navy’s ability to sustain budget

levels to support its ship construction plans, successfully compete with

other Navy and defense programs, and retain its surface combatants

longer than achieved for previous ships.

Several factors could affect the size, composition, and overall capability of

the surface combatant force through the middle of the next century. These

factors include (1) decisions related to the appropriate size and mix of

surface combatants within the Navy and other DOD priorities; (2) the

design and construction program for the 21st Century Surface Combatant;

(3) the results of DOD’s ongoing quadrennial defense review, which could

change the planning parameters for meeting the mandates of the U.S.

military strategy; (4) introduction of new or improved capabilities that

could affect doctrine, operational concepts, and responsibilities for the

force; (5) introduction of the Arsenal Ship, which could lead DOD and the

Navy to reexamine force requirements and employment; and (6) force

efficiency strategies, such as expanded overseas home porting and

alternative deployment schemes, which could help to increase force

availability and use.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Executive Summary

Principal Findings

Basis for the Surface

Combatant Force Has Not

Been Clearly Explained

The post-Cold War Bottom-Up Review concluded that a Navy comprised

of 346 battle force ships4

 would be sufficient to carry out the U.S. military

strategy by fiscal year 1999. It did not, however, specify a force goal for

surface combatants. In congressional presentations subsequent to the

review, DOD and the Navy indicated that 120 to 126 surface combatants

would be needed to meet national security objectives. However, this force

was determined largely from budget-driven priorities. DOD’s current Future

Years Defense Program, for fiscal years 1998 through 2003, supports a

force of at least 125 surface combatants that, according to DOD officials, is

largely based on budget, industrial base, and operational considerations.

DOD has not yet established a long-term surface combatant goal based on

the number of ships it needs to implement the national security strategy.

DOD has not clearly explained the process used to determine the number of

surface combatants needed to fulfill the two nearly simultaneous major

regional conflict (MRC) scenario specified in DOD guidance or the number

needed to meet desired levels of peacetime presence, as it has done with

aircraft carriers. It is unclear what key assumptions support the force size,

such as expected allied contributions to war-fighting objectives.

Information is also unclear concerning the Navy’s assumptions on the

expected service lives of the ships; the pace of the shipbuilding program;

the funding level required to sustain the force within and beyond the

current Future Years Defense Program; or the effect of emerging

technologies and concepts, such as the Arsenal Ship, on force

requirements and levels. DOD officials told us that DOD and the Navy are

currently examining these issues as part of ongoing studies, such as the

quadrennial defense review.

Navy Faces Challenges in

Sustaining Its Force

The Navy will retire a large number of its older surface combatants as they

reach the end of their estimated service lives over the next 2 decades. GAO

estimates, using the Navy’s notional service life estimates, that the Navy

will retire about 75 of its surface combatants between fiscal year 2000 and

2020. Although a relatively small number of ships are expected to retire

early next decade, the majority of retirements—55 ships—will occur

between fiscal year 2011 and 2018. The ships retiring in these years are the

4

Assessments and programming decisions subsequent to the Bottom-Up Review have modified the

projected fleet size to about 330 to 346 ships.

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Executive Summary

Navy’s remaining non-Aegis ships—the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates

and the Spruance- and Kidd-class destroyers.

By completing the 57-ship Arleigh Burke program, maintaining its current

building rate for the new 21st Century Surface Combatant, and retaining

ships to their expected service lives, the Navy can sustain at least 125

ships through 2013. The Navy is currently procuring about three Arleigh

Burke destroyers annually, with construction taking about 5 years before

the ship is delivered to the force. The Navy believes that this rate is the

minimum needed to ensure that the shipbuilding industry makes the

necessary investment and manages its overhead to reduce Navy program

costs. The last Arleigh Burke destroyer is due to be delivered to the fleet

around fiscal year 2010. The Navy plans to start building the 21st Century

Surface Combatant around fiscal year 2003 and ships will begin to enter

the fleet around fiscal year 2009.

The Navy’s ability to achieve and sustain a desired force size is affected by

the service lives of existing ships, cost of new ships, and funds Congress

makes available to build ships. DOD officials note that the cost of operating

and supporting the current fleet and other Navy and defense mission

priorities also affect surface combatant force size. Navy cruisers and

destroyers have historically been retired by 30 years of service and frigates

by 22 years of service. In recent force planning for ships, the Navy uses

notional estimated service lives of 35 years for Aegis-capable cruisers and

all current classes of destroyers and 24- to 32-year service lives for most

Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates retiring after fiscal year 1999. The extent

to which these longer service lives can be achieved will have an important

bearing on whether the Navy is able to sustain a force of at least 125 ships

through 2013.

The high cost of surface combatants is also an important factor in

sustaining the force. Acquisition of new surface combatants represents a

large portion of the Navy’s annual ship and overall procurement funding.

Between fiscal year 1990 and 1996, the Navy allocated about 44 percent of

its annual funding for ship construction and conversion to surface

combatants and about 14 percent of its overall annual procurement

funding. Congress appropriated $3.6 billion for construction of 4 new

destroyers in fiscal year 1997 and gave the Navy authority to procure a

total of 12 destroyers in fiscal years 1998 through 2001 using a multiyear

acquisition strategy. In its biennial budget submission for fiscal years 1998

and 1999, the Navy is requesting about $2.8 billion and $2.7 billion,

respectively, for the procurement of six destroyers. Continuing this level

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Executive Summary

of post-Cold War annual investment could prove increasingly difficult over

the long term with the many competing defense modernization programs

and other force and readiness priorities in the overall defense program.

Several Factors Could

Affect Future Force Levels

Several upcoming DOD and Navy decisions are likely to affect the

capabilities, size, and composition of the overall force for many decades.

For example, an ongoing cost and operational effectiveness analysis for

the 21st Century Surface Combatant is due to be completed in 1997 and

will be followed later that year by a decision for approval to begin a new

acquisition program. In addition, the Navy will be selecting contractor

teams to do detailed design work on the Arsenal Ship in early 1998, and

Congress will face annual budget decisions on procuring the remaining

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers through fiscal year 2005.

Several longer term factors could affect the Navy’s future surface

combatant force. For example, the ongoing quadrennial defense review

could alter the parameters used to plan the future defense program as a

whole. Depending on the nature and extent of these changes, the size,

composition, required capability, and employment of the surface

combatant force, as well as other major military components, could be

significantly altered. For example, a recent Navy study illustrated the

effect on force size of changing the two nearly simultaneous MRC

requirement. With the assumption that a 145-ship force of current ship

types, with some allied support, is needed for the current MRC requirement,

the assessment calculated that changing the requirement to two

simultaneous MRCs could increase the required force size by about 

20 ships. Changing the requirement to two sequential MRCs or one MRC

could reduce the war-fighting force requirement by as much as 45 ships

(assuming some allied support).

Technological innovations could also affect the requirement for surface

combatants. These improvements could provide greater efficiencies in the

use of the force and allow changes in doctrine and operational concepts

that could reduce force requirements. These include improvements to the

Tomahawk cruise missile, which could allow the missile to be used for

tactical applications in support of ground operations; modifications to the

Aegis combat system and Standard missile, which could provide a defense

against theater ballistic missile attacks while operating in littoral areas;

and introduction of the Cooperative Engagement Capability on existing

and new combatants, other ships, and airborne elements, which will

enhance ship self-defense capabilities by increasing response time and the

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Executive Summary

amount of information available to defend against antiship cruise missile

threats. It is also possible that the introduction of the Arsenal Ship, which

would carry a large inventory of missiles and potentially serve several

military purposes, could permit the Navy and the other services to retire or

forego purchases of some assets, such as aircraft carriers, surface

combatants, ground-based launchers, or combat aircraft.

Potential changes in operational practices could increase the availability

of ships for deployment in peacetime. These changes include

consideration of additional overseas home ports and changes to

deployment schemes and personnel policies, such as shortening the time

between deployments. Lengthening the deployment period, rotating crews,

increasing transit speeds, and using different maintenance schemes are

other potential options to increase the availability of ships for deployment

in peacetime. These options may offer opportunities for the Navy to

achieve national security objectives more efficiently as it operates with a

smaller force structure and possibly smaller budgets.

Recommendations GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress with

specific information regarding the surface combatant force. Such

information should include the

• number and types of surface combatants that are needed to fight and win

two nearly simultaneous MRCs;

• number of ships that are needed to meet peacetime forward presence

objectives;

• key assumptions that support the force level and mix, such as expected

allied contributions;

• expected impact of new technologies and capabilities on the size and

composition of the future force; and

• impact of the Arsenal Ship on the surface combatant force structure.

GAO also recommends that the Secretary provide information on the Navy’s

plan to sustain the surface combatant force level, including key

assumptions regarding expected service lives, pace of the shipbuilding

program, types of ships, required funding, and any other factor that might

alter the requirement.

Agency Comments DOD concurred with the information in this report and the

recommendation. DOD stated that the information regarding surface

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Executive Summary

combatants listed in the recommendation would be provided to Congress

as a result of the ongoing quadrennial defense review. DOD indicated that

the results of the review should provide a basis for understanding future

surface combatant needs. Although the review could establish a strategic

context for surface combatants, as did DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review, GAO

believes that the broad scope of the review may not adequately provide

the specific discussion of surface combatant requirements that the

recommendation is intended to provide. Thus, considering the significant

investment and annual budget requirements needed for surface

combatants, GAO has retained the recommendation. DOD’s comments

appear in appendix III.

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

14

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 27

Chapter 2 

Surface Combatant

Program Is Not

Clearly Linked to the

National Military

Strategy

31

Revised Defense Strategies Have Reduced the Size of the Surface

Combatant Force

31

Current Strategy Calls for Fighting Two Conflicts 33

Forward Deployed Ships Help Satisfy Crisis Response and

Presence Mandates

35

Forward Presence Is a Key Component of Defense Strategy 37

Force Size Varies Widely Based on Assumptions 40

Chapter 3 

Navy Can Sustain Its

Current Force Size

Through 2013

43

Ship Retirements Could Affect Future Surface Combatant

Requirements

43

Retaining Ships Longer Helps to Mitigate New Construction

Requirements

47

Navy May Have Difficulty Financing Its Shipbuilding Program 52

Chapter 4 

Several Factors Could

Affect the Future

Surface Combatant

Force

60

Near-term Decisions Could Affect the Force for Many Decades 60

Review May Change DOD Planning Parameters for Meeting

National Security Objectives

62

New Capabilities Could Affect Surface Combatant Roles and

Missions

63

Arsenal Ship Could Significantly Augment Surface Force

Capabilities

67

Opportunities May Exist to Improve Force Efficiencies 69

Chapter 5 

Conclusions and

Recommendations

71

Conclusions 71

Recommendations 73

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 74

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Contents

Appendixes Appendix I: Selected Carrier Battle Group Deployments 76

Appendix II: Operational Factors That Affect How Surface

Combatants Are Employed

79

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 85

Appendix IV: Major Contributors to This Report 87

Tables Table 1: Number of Aegis-Capable Surface Combatants by Fiscal

Year

3

Table 1.1: Selected Capabilities of Surface Combatant Classes 20

Table 2.1: DOD Force Structure Goals for Surface Combatants

and Battle Force Ships

32

Table 2.2: Surface Combatants in the Navy’s Notional

Configuration and Recent Atlantic and Pacific Fleet

Carrier Battle Groups

40

Table 3.1: Navy’s Shipbuilding Plan for Surface Combatants 44

Table 3.2: Historical Service Lives for Navy Surface Combatants

Built After World War II

48

Table 3.3: Recent Annual Funding for Surface Combatants, Other

Ships, and Overall Navy Procurement

53

Table 3.4: Examples of Competing Navy Procurement Programs

and Their Estimated Costs

57

Table I.1: Atlantic Fleet Carrier Battle Group Deployments 76

Table I.2: Pacific Fleet Carrier Battle Group Deployments 77

Figures Figure 1.1: Changes in Surface Combatant Force Levels From

Fiscal Year 1988 to 2010

15

Figure 1.2: Number of Aegis-Capable Surface Combatants in the

Navy’s Fleet Through Fiscal Year 2010

17

Figure 1.3: Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers, U.S.S. Ramage and

U.S.S. Gonzalez

25

Figure 2.1: U.S.S. Valley Forge Aegis Cruiser Stops and

Interrogates a Merchant Ship Crew Suspected of Violating

Sanctions Against Iraq

36

Figure 2.2: Peacetime Presence Operations of Surface

Combatants

38

Figure 3.1: Projected Surface Combatant Retirements From

Fiscal Year 2000 to 2020

45

Figure 3.2: Major Factors That Sustain the Surface Combatant

Force

46

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Contents

Figure 3.3: Projected Surface Combatant Force Levels Achieved

at Various Service Life Estimates

51

Figure 3.4: Annual Funding Requirements for Surface Combatant

Concepts at Various Procurement Rates

55

Figure 4.1: Projected Force Lives of Selected Surface Combatant

Classes

61

Figure 4.2: An Aegis Cruiser Launching a Tomahawk Cruise

Missile Against An Iraqi Target

65

Figure 4.3: Design Proposals for the Navy’s Arsenal Ship Concept 68

Figure II.1: U.S.S. John Hancock and U.S.S. Thorn Undergoing

Routine Overhauls

80

Figure II.2: Underway Replenishment Operations in the Arabian

Gulf

84

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

MRC major regional conflict

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OPTEMPO operating tempo

PERSTEMPO personnel tempo

VLS vertical launching system

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Surface combatants—cruisers, destroyers, and frigates—are an essential

component in most naval and joint force operations. These large, heavily

armed multimission ships provide U.S. decisionmakers with a wide range

of capabilities and choices to satisfy some overseas presence, crisis

response, and war-fighting missions. The overall number of surface

combatants has steadily declined over the last decade as the Department

of Defense (DOD) has reduced the size of its military forces in response to

the end of the Cold War and shifting defense priorities. To reduce its Cold

War force, the Navy retired many of its older, less capable surface

combatants before the end of their planned service lives. Frigates were

reduced more than other surface combatants because of the diminished

threat to naval carrier battle groups and merchant shipping in the open

ocean. The Navy had 199 surface combatants at the end of fiscal year 1990

and 125 ships at the end of fiscal year 1996. The number of ships will

remain at or about the 1996 level through fiscal year 2001 but will

gradually increase through the next decade to 142 ships in fiscal year 2010.

Figure 1.1 shows the force level changes for cruisers, destroyers, and

frigates during fiscal years 1988 through 2010.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: Changes in Surface Combatant Force Levels From Fiscal Year 1988 to 2010

88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

0

50

100

150

200

Fiscal year

Number of ships

Cruisers Destroyers Frigates 21st Century

Surface Combatant

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

Although the number of surface combatants has declined, the proportion

and number of ships in the force with the Aegis combat system continues

to increase.1

 For example, the Navy had only 16 Aegis-capable combatants

1

The Aegis combat system is an integrated network of computers and displays linked to sensors and

weapon systems. It is capable of simultaneously detecting, tracking, and engaging numerous air and

surface targets. The system is designed to defeat a wide range of targets from the water’s surface to

directly overhead. The Navy considers the Aegis system to be effective against antiship cruise missiles

and manned aircraft in all environmental conditions. It has an all-weather capability and outstanding

abilities against electronic countermeasures. The Navy plans to upgrade the Aegis system to

incorporate a capability to defend against theater ballistic missile attacks.

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

in fiscal year 1990, but at the end of fiscal year 1996 had 43. Completion of

the 57 ships in the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer program, along with the

earlier procurement of 27 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, will bring the total

number of Aegis-capable ships to 84 by fiscal year 2010 and these ships

will comprise about 60 percent of the planned surface combatant force.

With the exception of the first five Ticonderoga-class cruisers, all

Aegis-capable ships will have the vertical launching system (VLS) to fire

Tomahawk cruise and Standard surface-to-air missiles.2

 The planned Aegis

ship force in 2010 will have about 8,000 VLS cells compared with about

4,600 cells today.3

 Figure 1.2 shows the changes in the number of

Aegis-capable ships from fiscal year 1990 to 2010.

2

VLS is a computer-controlled launching system that can store, select, initialize, and rapidly launch

different type missiles. Tomahawk is an all-weather, subsonic missile that is capable of striking sea

and land targets more than 500 miles away. It is launched from surface combatants or attack

submarines. Standard is an all-weather, medium- to long-range, fleet air defense missile that is

launched from surface combatants against missiles, aircraft, and ships. The Navy is developing a new

version in the family of missiles to provide a future capability to defend against ballistic missiles.

3

In 2010, Spruance-class destroyers would provide an additional 1,400 VLS cells. The proposed Arsenal

Ship force, if built as planned, will have between 2,000 and 3,000 VLS cells. Nuclear attack submarines

also provide VLS capability.

Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.2: Number of Aegis-Capable Surface Combatants in the Navy’s Fleet Through Fiscal Year 2010

90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

0

50

100

150

200

Fiscal year

Number of ships

Aegis Non-Aegis

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

The Navy categorizes its multimission surface combatants as either

Aegis-capable or non-Aegis ships. Aegis-capable ships are considered to be

effective in numerous war-fighting areas and tasks and are best able to

defend themselves and protect other forces while providing critical

support to ground forces. Non-Aegis ships are fully capable in several

mission areas but have more limited capability in air defense missions.

Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Non-Aegis ships include the nuclear-powered Virginia- and California-class

cruisers, the Kidd- and Spruance-class destroyers, and the Oliver Hazard

Perry-class frigates.

The distinction among surface combatants is primarily the extent of the

ship’s capabilities, although Aegis-capable ships are normally considered

more survivable in more stressing threat environments. For example,

Spruance-class destroyers have excellent strike and antisubmarine

mission capabilities, but they are limited to self-defense against a narrow

range of air threats. The Navy believes that the capabilities of

Aegis-capable surface combatants and their ability to perform many tasks

simultaneously provide greater flexibility in its operations than non-Aegis

ships. Table 1.1 provides some of the major capabilities and differences of

cruisers, destroyers, and frigates in the force at the end of fiscal year 1996.

Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Selected Capabilities of

Surface Combatant Classes

Classa

Number of ships as

of Sept. 30, 1996

Initial operational

capability date

Cruiser

Ticonderoga (CG-47)c 22 1986

Ticonderoga (CG-47)— without VLSd 5 1983

Virginia (CGN-38) 2 1976

California (CGN-36) 2 1974

Destroyer

Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) 16 1991

Kidd (DDG-993) 4 1981

Spruance (DD-963) 31 1975

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Approximate date of

last ship in class

retiredb

Full-load

displacement

tons

Major combat

system Major weapon systems

Embarked

helicopter

aircraft

Number of

VLS cells

2029 9,600 Aegis Tomahawk missile

Standard missile

Antisubmarine rocket

MK-46 torpedo

MK-45 5”/54 caliber lightweight gun

Phalanx close-in weapon system

2 SH-60Bs 122

2022 9,600 Aegis Standard missile

Harpoon missile

Antisubmarine rocket

MK-46 torpedo

MK-45 5”/54 caliber lightweight gun

Phalanx close-in weapon system

2 SH-60Bs or

2 SH-2Fsd

0

1998 11,000 New Threat

Upgrade

Tomahawk missile

Standard missile

Harpoon missile

Antisubmarine Rocket

MK-46 torpedo

MK-45 5”/54 caliber lightweight gun

Phalanx close-in weapon system

None 0

2004 10,450 New Threat

Upgrade

Standard missile

Harpoon missile

Antisubmarine rocket

MK-46 torpedo

MK-45 5”/54 caliber lightweight gun

Phalanx close-in weapon system

None 0

2045 8,300 Aegis Tomahawk missile

Standard missile

Harpoon missilee

MK-46 torpedo

MK-45 5”/54 caliber lightweight gun

Phalanx close-in weapon systeme

Plannede 90e

2017 9,900 New Threat

Upgrade

Standard missile

Harpoon missile

Antisubmarine rocket

MK-46 torpedo

MK-45 5”/54 caliber lightweight gun

Phalanx close-in weapon system

1 SH-2F 0

2018 9,100 NATO Sea

Sparrow Surface

Missile System

Tomahawk missile

Harpoon missile

NATO Sea Sparrow missile

Antisubmarine rocket

MK-46 torpedo

MK-45 5”/54 caliber lightweight gun

Phalanx close-in-weapon system

2 SH-60Bs 61

(continued)

Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
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Introduction

Classa

Number of ships as

of Sept. 30, 1996

Initial operational

capability date

Frigate

Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) 43f 1977

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Approximate date of

last ship in class

retiredb

Full-load

displacement

tons

Major combat

system Major weapon systems

Embarked

helicopter

aircraft

Number of

VLS cells

2018 4,100 Other Standard missile

Harpoon missile

MK-46 torpedo

MK-75 3”/62 caliber rapid fire gun

Phalanx close-in weapon system

2 SH-60Bs or

1 SH-2Fg

0

aSpecific capabilities of individual ships or groups of ships in a class may vary because of

modifications and upgrades.

bRetirement date assumes a 35-year service life for Ticonderoga-class cruisers and all classes of

destroyers, and current service life plans for Virginia- and California-class cruisers and the Oliver

Hazard Perry-class frigates.

cTiconderoga-class cruisers are from Bunker Hill (CG-52) through Port Royal (CG-73).

dThe first five Ticonderoga-class cruisers—Ticonderoga (CG-47) through Thomas S. Gates

(CG-51)—have an early, less capable version of the Aegis combat system and do not have VLS

or the capability to launch Tomahawk cruise missiles. Also, the first two ships of the class have

two SH-2F helicopters instead of the SH-60B helicopter employed on later cruisers.

eThe first 28 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers have a helicopter deck but no hanger or embarked

helicopters. Beginning with DDG-79, a helicopter capability—with two embarked SH-60B/F

helicopters equipped with the Light Airborne Multipurpose System —will be added for the

remaining 29 ships of the class. The modifications require removal of Harpoon missile capability.

Also beginning with this ship, the number of VLS cells will be increased from 90 to 96, and the

Phalanx close-in weapon system will be replaced by vertical-launched the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles when they become available.

f

The Navy currently maintains about 10 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates in the Naval Reserve

Force to help fill short-term overseas and presence requirements near the United States. All other

cruisers, destroyers, and frigates are in the active fleets.

gThe use of either two SH-60B helicopters or one SH-2F helicopter varies throughout the class.

However, two SH-60B helicopters are generally used on the most recently built frigates.

Source: Our analysis of multiple source data.

The Navy considers the newest Arleigh Burke-class destroyer to be its

most capable and survivable surface combatant. Originally designed to

defend against Soviet aircraft, cruise missiles, and nuclear attack

submarines, this higher capability ship is to be used in high-threat areas to

conduct antiair, antisubmarine, antisurface, and strike operations. It is

equipped with an enhanced air and surface multifunctional phased array

radar,4

 an Aegis combat system, and VLS. The Navy is also adding several

4

The radar system—the AN/SPY-1—is the primary air and surface radar for the Aegis combat system. It

is a multifunctional phased array radar capable of search, automatic detection, air and surface target

tracking, and missile engagement support.

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

new capabilities to better adapt the ship for war-fighting in littoral areas.5

For example, the future version of the ship—Flight IIA—will have an

embarked helicopter capability, improved surface-to-air missiles, and

increased VLS capacity for missiles. Over the next several years, the Navy

plans to upgrade the ship’s multifunctional phased array radar to improve

its capabilities while operating in littoral environments and add new

capabilities to permit sharing targeting data with other Navy and joint

sensors and defend against theater ballistic missiles. Figure 1.3 shows two

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, the U.S.S. Ramage (DDG-61) and U.S.S.

Gonzalez (DDG-66).

5

Littoral areas extend from the shore to open ocean, generally out to 300 nautical miles, and inland

from the shore over that extensive area that can be supported and controlled directly from the sea.

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.3: Arleigh Burke-class Destroyers, U.S.S. Ramage and U.S.S. Gonzalez

Note: The Navy believes the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer is critical to its fleet modernization plan

by supporting future surface combatant force levels and providing the capabilities it considers

essential in littoral warfare. The U.S.S. Ramage is on the left, and the U.S.S. Gonzalez is on the

right.

Source: Navy.

As a follow-on to the Arleigh Burke-class program, the Navy is evaluating

concepts for a new generation of surface combatants—known as the 21st

Century Surface Combatant—that is expected to provide the future fleet

with the necessary capabilities and be built in sufficient quantities to

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
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Introduction

provide the required number of ships for overseas presence and

war-fighting missions. The Navy is conducting a two-phase cost and

operational effectiveness analysis, which is to be completed in 1997, to

recommend design alternatives for the new ship, or family of ships, and

will be followed later that year by a decision for approval to begin a new

acquisition program. A land-attack destroyer is planned as the first variant

in the new family of ships, whose primary missions will be to (1) support

the establishment of comprehensive battlespace dominance to protect

friendly forces from enemy attack and (2) influence events ashore through

the application of precision firepower. The Navy intends to begin building

the first ship around fiscal year 2003. The new ships will begin to enter the

fleet around fiscal year 2009, soon after which a significant number of

non-Aegis ships—the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and the Spruance

and Kidd-class destroyers—will be retired from the force each year. A

full-capability cruiser variant is planned as a replacement for the earliest

Aegis-capable cruisers sometime after 2010.

Additionally, a new ship concept—the Arsenal Ship—is being developed

initially as a demonstration program to provide a large increase in the

amount of ordnance available to ground- and sea-based forces in a

conflict, particularly during the early days. The Navy envisions that the

ship would have a large capacity of different missiles, including

Tomahawk and Standard, and space for future extended range gun

systems. The ship could also have a sea-based version of the Army Tactical

Missile System. This ship could greatly increase capabilities in littoral

operations to conduct long-range strike missions, provide fire support for

ground forces, defend against theater ballistic missiles, and maintain air

superiority. The Navy envisions the ship to have a small crew (possibly

less than 50 members) and be highly survivable. The Navy and the Defense

Advanced Research Project Agency are jointly developing and funding the

program to allow the Navy to accelerate the ship’s development and

construction and be able to accept delivery of the first limited capability

ship for concept evaluation in October 2000.6

 If the evaluation is

successful, the Navy plans to expand the mission capabilities of the

demonstration ship and construct three to five additional ships early in the

next decade.

6

The Arsenal Ship Joint Program is managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and

includes representatives from the Naval Sea Systems Command and the Office of Naval Research.

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

We initiated a review of the Navy’s plans and assessments for the size,

mix, and capability of its future surface combatant force as part of our

ongoing examination of DOD’s planned force structure to support

peacetime, crisis, and war-fighting requirements. Specifically, we

determined (1) the basis for the Navy’s current and future force; (2) the

Navy’s plans to sustain the current force size into the next century; and

(3) the key factors that could affect future force requirements.

To examine the basis for the Navy’s current and planned surface

combatant force, we reviewed pertinent documentation, including policy

directives, planning guidance, strategies, threat assessments, operational

histories, statistics, and schedules, and studies and assessments on the

surface combatant force structure. We reviewed and conducted analyses

using the Navy’s force presence model to understand the various factors

that affect the required numbers of ships to achieve various overseas

presence levels, and we obtained and examined the Navy’s assessments of

surface combatant requirements for overseas presence. We also reviewed

several DOD and Navy studies, including the Naval Forward Presence

Report, Surface Combatant Force Level Study, and 21st Century Surface

Combatant Force Architecture Assessment, and the preliminary results of

the Navy’s Cost and Effectiveness Analysis for the 21st Century Surface

Combatant program to understand how assumptions on key operational

factors affect force size. In addition, we obtained and reviewed

information on new technologies and system improvements and

alternative operational concepts to identify possible effects on future

surface combatant requirements, capabilities, and operations.

To understand how the Navy is using its surface combatant force during

peacetime and crises, we discussed past and current naval operations with

U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet officials. We also spoke with

officials of the U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S.

Central Command to obtain the joint perspective on Navy operations. Our

intent was to determine how naval operations may have changed as a

result of declining numbers, increasing unit capabilities, and littoral

warfare planning emphasis and whether any trends help to validate the

Navy’s assumptions for its future force. We obtained and examined

briefings on recent deployments of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets’ carrier

battle groups to understand the role, use, and missions of their associated

surface combatants and determine how surface combatants are being used

in peacetime. We also obtained and reviewed briefings for deployments of

the Middle East Force surface action group, military exercises, and

counternarcotics operations. In addition, we visited three of the Navy’s

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 1 

Introduction

newest surface combatants—an Aegis-capable Ticonderoga-class cruiser

and Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and an Oliver Hazard Perry-class guided

missile frigate—to discuss ship operations and capabilities with officers

and crew.

To determine the Navy’s ability to sustain its future surface combatant

force, we examined DOD’s Future Years Defense Program, budget

documents, congressional testimony statements, and current surface

combatant construction and force plans. To understand the long-term

sensitivity of ship construction rates and retirements on force size, we

spoke with Navy officials and obtained documentation on the issues and

key assumptions used in developing future force structure projections for

surface combatants. We developed a force projection model that we used

to conduct several analyses on the effects of different estimated service

lives and procurement profiles on sustaining force levels. To determine the

effect of different individual ship costs on future annual procurement

requirements and sustaining force levels, we conducted analyses using a

ship cost model and rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimates for future

ship concepts, which we obtained from the Navy. Additionally, we

reviewed surface combatant procurement and construction assumptions.

To assess the magnitude of competing funding requirements for several

major Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force procurement programs

over the next decade, we obtained and reviewed program and budget

documents and congressional testimony and discussed these requirements

with program officials. We also analyzed data from historical and current

defense programs and longer term procurement plans to determine future

funding patterns and requirements.

To establish a point-of-reference for our analysis and discussion of future

force levels in this report, we used the Navy’s surface combatant force

level at the end of fiscal year 1996 of 125 ships. This level is close to levels

used in recent defense planning guidance following DOD’s Bottom-Up

Review and is the lowest surface combatant level at any time during the

Cold War, in recent years, or for some time into the future. We use this

force level only as point of reference rather than as a verified or suggested

force size. In our projections of future force levels, we use the Navy’s

notional service life estimates, which the Navy uses in its current force

planning, to determine individual ship retirements. Additionally, in our

force level calculations, we include the future procurement of the new

21st Century Surface Combatant or subsequent ship at an annual

procurement rate of three ships, which is consistent with current rates for

the ongoing Arleigh Burke destroyer program. However, we did not

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
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Introduction

include the possible procurement of up to six Arsenal Ships because of the

yet-unproven demonstration of the new ship concept. If procured, these

ships, with significant ordnance capability, would add to surface

combatant levels and the overall force capability beginning next decade.

We contacted experts and academicians from both public and private

organizations to obtain additional perspectives covered in our visits with

U.S. military and defense officials. We performed work at the following

locations:

In the Washington, D.C., area

• Office of the Secretary of Defense

• Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

• Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

• Surface Warfare Division, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources,

Warfare Requirements, and Assessments)

• Institute for Defense Analyses

• Defense Intelligence Agency

• Office of Naval Intelligence

• Naval Sea Systems Command

• Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren and Carderock Divisions

• Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces

• Applied Physics Laboratory, The Johns Hopkins University

• Global Associates, Ltd.

In the Norfolk, Virginia, area

• U.S. Atlantic Command

• U.S. Atlantic Fleet

• Naval Surface Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet

• U.S.S. Vella Gulf (CG-72)

• U.S.S. Stout (DDG-55)

• U.S.S. Simpson (FFG-56)

• Navy Doctrine Command

Page 29 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
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Introduction

At MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

• U.S. Central Command

In the Honolulu, Hawaii, area

• U.S. Pacific Command

• U.S. Pacific Fleet

In the San Diego, California, area

• U.S. Third Fleet, U.S. Pacific Fleet

• Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet

We conducted our review from July 1994 to February 1997 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 30 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 2 

Surface Combatant Program Is Not Clearly

Linked to the National Military Strategy

The basis for the Navy’s surface combatant program,1 as well as the

underlying assumptions, have not been clearly linked to the key elements

of the National Military Strategy. Although DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review

concluded that a Navy comprised of 346 battle force ships would be

sufficient to carry out the strategy by fiscal year 1999,2

 it did not specify a

force size for surface combatants. In subsequent congressional

presentations, DOD and the Navy indicated that between 120 and 126

surface combatants would be needed to meet national security objectives.

However, this figure was derived largely from budget-driven objectives

rather than an analysis of war-fighting, crisis response, and overseas

presence objectives. DOD’s current defense program supports a force of

131 surface combatants in fiscal year 2003 that is largely based on budget,

industrial base, and operational considerations. DOD has not yet

established a long-term surface combatant goal.

Revised Defense

Strategies Have

Reduced the Size of

the Surface

Combatant Force

During the 1980s, the Navy pursued a 600-ship force goal as part of its

maritime strategy to prepare for a global war against the former Soviet

Union. This goal included 238 surface combatants. In August 1990, the

President announced a shift in U.S. defense strategy from a Soviet threat

to major regional conflicts (MRC) against uncertain adversaries. The

following year, DOD proposed a “base force” plan to reflect the new

strategy that reduced the force structure to about 450 ships (including 150

surface combatants), which would be a sufficient level to counter a

possible reemergence of the Soviet threat.

In early 1993, DOD initiated a “bottom-up” review to examine the U.S.

defense strategy, force structure, modernization, foundations,

infrastructure, and resources needed in the post-Cold War era. Through

this review, DOD concluded that the United States should maintain

sufficient military power to be able to fight and win two MRCs that occur

nearly simultaneously.3

 It also required U.S. forces to engage in

expeditionary operations, such as peace enforcement or crisis

intervention, and fulfill overseas presence missions. The review

1

According to DOD officials, the program plan for surface combatants reflects the current Future

Years Defense Program (for fiscal years 1998 through 2003) and internal planning for fiscal years

beyond the program showing anticipated procurements and retirements.

2

In addition to surface combatants, battle force ships include active and reserve aircraft carriers,

amphibious ships, strategic and attack submarines, patrol and mine warfare ships, and logistics ships.

At the end of fiscal year 1996, the Navy had 359 battle force ships.

3

For planning purposes, DOD defined nearly simultaneous to be a certain number of days between the

time that enemy forces mobilize in each conflict. The number of days is classified.

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Chapter 2 

Surface Combatant Program Is Not Clearly

Linked to the National Military Strategy

deemphasized the possibility of a reemerging Soviet threat and reduced

U.S. forces to levels smaller than the earlier base force plan.

The review concluded that a Navy comprised of 346 battle force ships, to

be realized by fiscal year 1999, was sufficient to carry out U.S. strategy and

meet national security requirements. The review stated a force size for

aircraft carriers (12) and attack submarines (between 45 and 55) but did

not state a specific number for surface combatants. In congressional

presentations subsequent to the review, DOD and the Navy indicated that a

force of between 110 and 116 active and about 10 reserve surface

combatants would be needed. Navy officials told us that the force level of

120 to 126 ships was derived from a budget reduction effort to reduce the

base force goal for surface combatants by about 25 percent rather than an

analysis of force structure requirements.

DOD assessments and programming decisions after the review have

modified the projected fleet size to between 330 and 346 battle force ships

to provide flexibility for future programming decisions. DOD’s current

Future Years Defense Program retains this goal for battle force ships and

establishes a near-term program plan in fiscal year 2003 of 131 surface

combatants (123 active and 8 reserve ships). Table 2.1 summarizes the

surface combatant and battle force ship goals under various DOD force

structure plans.

Table 2.1: DOD Force Structure Goals for Surface Combatants and Battle Force Ships

Cold War Post-Cold War

DOD plan The Maritime Strategy Base Force Bottom-Up Review Current program plan

Date of plan FY 1988 FY 1991 FY 1993 FY 1998

Number of surface

combatants

238 150 a 131b

Total number of

battle force ships

600 About 450 346 330-346

Goal achievement date Mid-1990s FY 1995 FY 1999 FY 2003

Note: Numbers include both active and reserve ships.

aAlthough a goal was not specified by the Bottom-Up Review, DOD planning guidance in 1994

showed a force of between 120 and 126 surface combatants.

bThis number of surface combatants reflects the programmed force level in fiscal year 2003. DOD

has not established a surface combatant force goal.

Source: Our analysis of DOD and Navy data.

Page 32 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 2 

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Linked to the National Military Strategy

In commenting on our report, DOD officials told us that a long-term surface

combatant goal has not yet been established and that the current program

plan is largely based on budget, industrial base, and operational

considerations. The officials noted that a goal and its basis was under

review as part of DOD’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Navy’s

assessment for the follow-on surface combatant class to the Arleigh Burke

destroyer, the 21st Century Surface Combatant.

Current Strategy Calls

for Fighting Two

Conflicts

Current U.S. military strategy requires that the military be prepared to

fight and decisively win two nearly simultaneous MRCs.4

 However, the

strategy specifies a number for aircraft carriers and attack submarines but

not a particular surface combatant force size for carrying out this strategy.

DOD believes that two nearly simultaneous MRCs will be the most stressing

situation the U.S. military will face in the future. The strategy currently

envisions that the MRCs would be a conflict similar to the 1991 Persian Gulf

War and a conflict potentially in Korea. DOD considers the timing and

location of these conflicts to be uncertain and believes that most required

U.S. forces would not be in those areas before the outbreak of the conflict.

Therefore, forces already in the area, such as naval forces conducting

overseas presence, would provide critical capabilities in the early days of

the conflict. Current strategy also states that, although planning for the

regional conflicts should include the contributions of U.S. allies, the U.S.

military should be sized and structured to act unilaterally if necessary.

The only recent example of surface combatants being used for

war-fighting roles in an MRC is the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Surface

combatants were used to conduct several sea control and power

projection missions, which included protecting maritime traffic,

performing maritime intercept operations of contraband shipping to sever

Iraqi trade, conducting deep-strike Tomahawk missile attacks against Iraq,

and providing combat search and rescue operations in the region. On

January 17, 1991, the first day of the war, the Navy had 30 surface

combatants—14 cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 6 frigates—deployed in the

region. Among the 30 ships, 14 had a capability to launch Tomahawk

missiles, and 9 ships were equipped with Aegis, including 7 of the

Tomahawk-capable ships.

4

Current U.S. military strategy also requires the military to be able to (1) deploy or station forces

abroad in peacetime to shape the international security environment in favorable ways; (2) conduct a

wide range of contingency, or crisis, operations to intervene when U.S. interests are threatened; and

(3) prevent and defend against the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

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Linked to the National Military Strategy

The specific circumstances of the two envisioned MRCs would significantly

affect the number of ships the Navy might use. According to current

strategy documents, the Navy envisions a greater emphasis on fighting in

littoral areas in the future. The Navy also envisions that surface

combatants will (1) conduct battlespace dominance missions against air,

surface, and undersea threats to make the area safe for joint force

operations; (2) perform power projection missions to provide strategic

strike and naval surface fire support capabilities in support of the joint

land and air campaigns; and (3) provide joint forces with command,

control, information, and surveillance support. Specifically, surface

combatants would

• support and defend carrier battle groups, amphibious task forces, and

mine countermeasure ship operations;

• provide defense against enemy theater ballistic missile attacks;

• fire missiles and guns against enemy units ashore;

• protect maritime and air traffic;

• collect intelligence information; and

• interdict enemy maritime shipping.

The Navy has not said how this shift in strategy to fighting in littoral areas

would affect the size of its surface combatant fleet. However, it believes

that the postulated threats and probable roles and missions assigned to its

surface combatants require that the force consist of a large number of

Aegis-capable ships. These ships can perform several simultaneous tasks

more effectively than the non-Aegis-capable ships and operate

independently in high-threat areas. The Navy envisions using its

non-Aegis-capable ships for maritime intercept operations; protection of

sea and air routes; and battlespace dominance missions, including

protection of carrier and amphibious forces. It also expects allies to

provide a limited number of less capable ships that would help to offset

requirements for similar U.S. ships.5

5

According to the Navy’s August 1995 Surface Combatant Force Level Study, draft Navy MRC scenario

plans anticipate that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force would provide surface combatants for

protection of sea lanes and defense of their homeland in an MRC in the northwest Pacific Ocean.

Additionally, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada may support the

United States in future MRCs with less capable destroyers and frigates than the U.S. Navy’s

Aegis-capable ships.

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Linked to the National Military Strategy

Forward Deployed

Ships Help Satisfy

Crisis Response and

Presence Mandates

Forward deployed ships help the Navy meet the U.S. military requirement

to be able to respond rapidly to crises. The extent and location of surface

combatant and battle force ship deployments are based on the need to

provide deterrence, respond to crises, and maintain a presence overseas.6

Crisis and contingency missions for surface combatants include maritime

intercept operations to enforce sanctions, humanitarian relief, air

surveillance and air control, protection of U.S. forces, and strike

operations. For example, in support of ongoing NATO peacekeeping

operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, a Ticonderoga-class

Aegis cruiser, the U.S.S. Normandy, made a high-speed transit in

September 1995 from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Adriatic Sea and then

fired several Tomahawk missiles against Bosnian Serb military targets.

Another Ticonderoga-class cruiser, the U.S.S. Monterey, left the Central

Command’s area of responsibility in December 1995 and accompanied the

aircraft carrier U.S.S. America to the Adriatic Sea to support NATO force

deployments into Bosnia.7

Figure 2.1 shows an Aegis-capable cruiser conducting maritime

interception operations to enforce U.N. sanctions against Iraq in the

Arabian Gulf during December 1996.

6

During peacetime, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, service chiefs, and chiefs of the five

unified commands establish long-range planning guidance for the location and number of U.S. naval

forces assigned to all regions on a fair-share basis. This scheduling guidance—Global Naval Force

Presence Policy—can be adjusted, as necessary, to meet unexpected contingencies. This policy results

in planned gaps in various theaters, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.

7

The Central Command is one of five unified U.S. commands. The other four are the Atlantic,

European, Southern, and Pacific Commands. The commands are composed of forces from two or

more of the military services. The commanders in chief of these commands are responsible for all

operations within their designated geographic areas.

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Linked to the National Military Strategy

Figure 2.1: U.S.S. Valley Forge Aegis Cruiser Stops and Interrogates a Merchant Ship Crew Suspected of Violating

Sanctions Against Iraq

Note: Maritime interception operations to enforce sanctions or monitor drug traffic into the United

States is an increasingly important mission for surface combatants in recent years.

Source: Navy.

The Navy believes that surface combatants and other forward deployed

forces will be important early in a conflict. Surface combatants can

provide protection of sea and air routes, ports, coastal airfields, and

facilities and substantial command, control, and communications

capabilities. The Navy also believes that surface combatant forces will

provide initial capabilities until additional forces arrive in the area.

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Forward-deployed surface combatants could be available to immediately

strike targets on land with Tomahawk cruise missiles and provide naval

fire support for ground forces. In the future, they are also expected to

provide defense against ballistic missiles. A 1995 Navy surface combatant

study concluded that defense against theater ballistic missile and

Tomahawk strikes will be a high-priority task of Aegis-capable ships early

in an MRC.

Forward Presence Is a

Key Component of

Defense Strategy

In addition to providing a means to respond rapidly to a crisis, the Navy

forward deploys ships to carry out other U.S. strategic objectives, such as

providing stability and deterrence. Surface combatants and other naval

forces, including aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and attack

submarines, routinely deploy to maintain U.S. presence throughout the

world. At any given time, the Navy has about one-fifth of its surface

combatant force deployed overseas to conduct a variety of overseas

presence missions.

Surface combatants conduct a wide range of presence missions and tasks,

such as making protocol visits in foreign ports and conducting regional,

bilateral, and multilateral training exercises to enhance diplomacy and

improve interoperability among allies. In recent years, these ships have

provided substantial contributions to U.S. counternarcotics operations

around Central and South America by conducting surveillance and

interception missions.

Surface combatants can deploy with an aircraft carrier as part of a carrier

battle group, with several other combatants as a surface action group, or

independently. The number of surface combatants needed to carry out

such operations depends on the types of deployments that DOD elects to

use. Figure 2.2 shows the operating areas, deployment types, and activities

for surface combatants during peacetime.

Page 37 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 2 

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Linked to the National Military Strategy

Figure 2.2: Peacetime Presence Operations of Surface Combatants

Map location Unified

command

Area Types of operations Number of surface 

combatants deployed 

or underway on

Feb. 3,1997

A Central

Command

Red Sea and Arabian 

Gulf

Carrier battle group and 

surface action group 

deployments

9 deployed

B European

Command

Mediterranean and 

Adriatic Seas

Carrier battle group and 

independent deployments

6 deployed

C Pacfic

Command

Pacific and

Indian Oceans

Carrier battle group and 

independent deployments 

and training

10 deployed

D Southern

Command

Caribbean Sea and 

Pacific and Atlantic 

Oceans near South 

America

Counternarcotics and 

independent deployments 

6 deployed

E Pacific and 

Atlantic 

Commands

Pacific and 

Atlantic Oceans near 

the United States

Battle group and 

independent training

20 underway

A

B

D

D C

D

E E

C

C

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Source: Navy.

Currently, the majority of surface combatants deploy as part of carrier

battle groups for routine 6-month deployments to the Mediterranean Sea,

western Pacific Ocean, and North Arabian Sea. As a major element of a

carrier battle group, surface combatants provide the primary defensive

capabilities for the group and contribute significant strike and fire support

for joint operations ashore. Navy officials stated that one or more surface

combatants are necessary at all times to escort and protect the aircraft

carrier. Without them, an aircraft carrier could not safely deploy. Although

the Navy has emphasized using its surface combatants more

independently, they are still inherently linked to carrier force structure

and deployments.

The Navy’s notional carrier battle group has six surface combatants, an

aircraft carrier and its airwing,8

 two nuclear attack submarines, and a fast

combat support (logistics) ship. This notional configuration is considered

to have the necessary capabilities to provide an initial crisis response from

a forward posture. However, the actual number and type of ships

assembled for each deployment will depend on the available assets,

surface combatants already in area, and the needs of the joint unified

commands. As shown in table 2.2, recent Atlantic Fleet carrier battle

groups generally deployed with the Navy’s notional configuration and

corresponding capabilities, whereas recent Pacific fleet deployments were

configured with fewer ships and embarked helicopters than the notional

configuration. Appendix I summarizes the roles, missions, and specific

tasks of surface combatants as part of the deployments of seven carrier

battle groups from the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets between May 1994 and

February 1996.

8

A carrier air wing includes fighter, attack, electronic countermeasures, antisubmarine, refueling,

search and rescue, special warfare support, and surveillance aircraft.

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Table 2.2: Surface Combatants in the Navy’s Notional Configuration and Recent Atlantic and Pacific Fleet

Carrier Battle Groups

Number of surface combatants with

capability

Carrier battle group configuration

Total number

of surface

combatants in

group

Aegis

combat

system VLS

Tomahawk

cruise missilea

Number of

embarked

helicopters

among ships

Navy notional 6 3 4 4 10

Atlantic Fleetb 6 2-3 2-5 2-5 7-9

Pacific Fleetc 3-4 1-2 1-3 1-3 4-8

aSome groups included Virginia-class cruisers, which do not have VLS but can launch

Tomahawks with their armored box launcher systems.

bThese figures are based on five sequential Atlantic Fleet carrier battle group deployments

between May 1994 and July 1996.

cThese figures are based on five sequential Pacific Fleet carrier battle group deployments

between June 1994 and May 1996.

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

Surface combatants can also be deployed without a carrier either

independently or as part of a surface action group. A surface action group

generally consists of two or more surface combatants and deploys for

unique operations, such as augmenting military coverage in world regions,

providing humanitarian assistance, and conducting exercises with allied

forces.

Several operational factors also affect how the surface combatant forces

are employed. For example, routine maintenance and long-term overhaul

requirements render about 10 percent of the force unavailable for

deployment at any given time. Appendix II discusses various operational

factors and their affect on the Navy’s management of its surface

combatant fleet.

Force Size Varies

Widely Based on

Assumptions

DOD and Navy studies illustrate that the size force needed to meet Navy

presence and war-fighting requirements is highly dependent on the

assumptions made. For example, in its August 1994 assessment, Naval

Forward Presence Report, DOD analyzed peacetime presence options for

naval forces to meet the five unified commands’ unconstrained

requirements for naval presence. It concluded that the unified commands’

naval force requirements generally exceeded the levels of available assets.

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The report stated that “. . . the totality of this set of all-encompassing

requirements is beyond what could be reasonably covered by naval forces

alone, it is a representation of the broad scope of presence missions

confronting the theater commander” and that “. . . any exercise in

determining alternative force structures must necessarily account for

other service contributions . . . .”

The assessment also stated that the most important overseas presence

requirements can be met through a range of measures, including “tethers”,9

 other service forces, and greater acceptance of periodic presence in some

cases. Further, the assessment indicated that alternative naval force

groups, consisting of various combinations of surface combatants,

submarines, and land-based aircraft, can perform certain naval presence

tasks when an aircraft carrier and its airwing are unavailable.10

Changing assumptions, such as operating tempo, availabilities, and

originating ports and destinations, can also alter conclusions about force

requirements. The Navy has periodically assessed naval force

requirements using a model to calculate the total force necessary to meet

the unified commands’ presence requirements for given assumptions and

inputs. Altering key assumptions has yielded total force estimates that

ranged from 126 to 144 surface combatants. For example, the Navy’s most

recent analysis concludes that 126 surface combatants can meet current

unified commands’ presence requirements. The lower estimate results

from several changes to inputs in the model, such as (1) basing distances

used in the model on the location of recent naval engagements,

(2) redefining the number of months between deployments, and

(3) changing the origin of ships to deployed areas.11 These changes

improve the overall efficiency and availability of ships to deploy and

9

Tether refers to the practice of maintaining ships at acceptable distances away from a specific area of

presence operations while allowing them to return within a specified number of days. The tethered

presence policy is a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and DOD policy that is supported by funding in the

fiscal year 1998 budget and the Future Years Defense Program for fiscal years 1998 through 2003. This

policy results in lower force level requirements than those needed to support continuous presence in

all three major regions.

10In our reports, Navy Carrier Battle Groups: The Structure and Affordability of the Future Force

(GAO/NSIAD-93-74, Feb. 25, 1993) and Cruise Missiles: Proven Capability Should Affect Aircraft and

Force Structure Requirements (GAO/NSIAD-95-116, Apr. 20, 1995), we suggested that DOD consider

relying more on groups comprised of surface combatants, particularly those equipped with cruise

missiles, for some presence and crisis missions to reduce aircraft carrier requirements.

11The Navy revised the origin of surface combatants assigned to the Middle East Force in the Central

Command’s area of responsibility to achieve a more efficient forward presence rotation of ships.

Instead of assigning all five ships from San Diego, California, the Navy began sending three from

Norfolk, Virginia; one from Pearl Harbor, Hawaii; and one from San Diego. By reducing the distance

for some ships, the overall number of ships needed to support the forward presence is reduced.

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results in an overall reduction in the number of ships required to maintain

a given level of presence. More recently, DOD analyses for the ongoing

quadrennial defense review show that tethered presence requires about

110 surface combatants, including 16 ships assigned to the Western

Hemisphere group and 10 with similar missions on the West Coast of the

United States, to support operations, such as counternarcotics, in other

areas. DOD considers this force to be adequate to meet the apportionment

of forces required by the commanders in chief for the current two nearly

simultaneous MRC strategy.

Similarly, the Navy’s Surface Warfare Division’s August 1995 Surface

Combatant Force Level Study concluded that 165 cruisers, destroyers, and

frigates would be needed through 2010 to meet war-fighting requirements

of two nearly simultaneous MRCs. According to the study, however, this

number could be reduced to 145 ships, including 10 reserve frigates, with

use of allied surface combatants. Subsequently, a related study, 21st

Century Surface Combatant Force Architecture Assessment, completed in

February 1996 by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, suggested that the

surface combatant force level from 2010 to 2030 could be even smaller

than the 145-ship force recommended by the earlier study because

(1) better weapon systems could permit some operations to be more

effective or allow a ship to operate in safer waters farther from shore;

(2) new classes of surface combatants might provide a more tailored mix

of capability to fight littoral warfare; and (3) deployment strategies, when

used with the new classes, would reduce current peacetime deployment

ratios, thereby increasing ship availabilities. The study concluded that

peacetime and wartime requirements can be satisfied after 2010 with new

ship classes and the use of innovative forward presence concepts.

Neither DOD nor the Navy has endorsed the findings and conclusions of

either of the Navy’s studies. However, these studies, as well as others, are

being used by the Navy’s cost and effectiveness analysis group in its

evaluations of concepts and force requirements for the 21st Century

Surface Combatant.

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The Navy can sustain its current surface combatant force size of at least

125 ships through 2013 by completing its 57-ship Arleigh Burke-class

destroyer program, building the new 21st Century Surface Combatant, and

retaining ships for their expected service lives. If the Navy builds 3 ships

each year for the 21st Century Surface Combatant program—the same as

its recent average rate for the Arleigh Burke program—the force will fall

below 125 ships after 2013 and remain at lower levels for the remainder of

the decade. The lower force levels result from the large number of

retirements occurring during this time. By 2020, the Navy will have about

115 surface combatants. The Navy would have to build 4 to 5 ships each

year after completion of the Arleigh Burke program to sustain a force of at

least 125 surface combatants through 2020.

Sustaining a force of at least 125 ships to 2013 depends on the Navy’s

ability to keep surface combatants longer than it has in the past. Cruisers

and destroyers have historically been retired from the force by 30 years

and frigates by 22 years. However, the Navy plans to retain most of its

current cruisers and all of its destroyers for 35 years and most of its

frigates retiring after fiscal year 1999 for 24 to 32 years. The Navy believes

this plan is feasible because of the use of less maintenance-intensive gas

turbine propulsion systems, rather than steam, and modular, highly

computerized weapon systems on some ships, permitting relatively easy

and cost-effective upgrades.

Unless the next new combatant class is less costly than the Arleigh

Burke-class destroyer, which currently costs about $870 million per ship,1

increasing the number of ships built annually may be difficult over the

long term because of competition for funding from several other Navy

ship, aircraft, and weapon modernization programs as well as other

services’ programs.

Ship Retirements

Could Affect Future

Surface Combatant

Requirements

The Navy’s current shipbuilding plan through fiscal year 2003 supports

continued procurement of the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer and the

introduction of the 21st Century Surface Combatant. The Navy is

procuring about three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers annually, with

construction taking about 5 years before the ship is delivered to the force.

The Navy believes that this rate is the minimum needed to ensure that the

shipbuilding industry makes the necessary investment and manages its

1

The $870 million figure is based on procurement of four Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in fiscal 

year 1997. The cost varies with the number of ships built each year and the changes made to the ship’s

design in that year’s procurement.

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overhead to reduce Navy program costs.2 The Navy plans to begin building

the first 21st Century Surface Combatant in fiscal year 2003. Table 3.1

shows the Navy’s current shipbuilding plan for surface combatants

through fiscal year 2003, including expected delivery dates and resulting

force levels. The Navy plans to procure the remaining four Arleigh

Burke-class destroyers in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, with the last ship

being delivered to the fleet around fiscal year 2010. However, DOD

indicates that the results of the soon-to-be-completed 21st Century Surface

Combatant cost and operational effectiveness analysis could change the

total number of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers to be procured.

Table 3.1: Navy’s Shipbuilding Plan for Surface Combatants

Fiscal year

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Number of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers 2 4 3 3 3 3 1 2

Number of 21st Century Surface Combatants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1a

Number of other new shipsb 3 2 1 2 2 3 4 3

Total new construction ships 5 6 4 5 5 6 5 6

Approximate fiscal year of delivery for new destroyers 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Surface combatant force level after deliveryc 126 130 131 133 136 140 137 135

aThe first 21st Century Surface Combatant is planned to be delivered during fiscal year 2008 but

will not achieve initial operating capability in the fleet until fiscal year 2009.

bOther new ships in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 included an SSN-21 class attack submarine, an

LHD-1 class amphibious assault ship, an LPD-17 class amphibious transport dock ship, and two

oceanographic ships. In fiscal years 1998 through 2003, the plan includes another Nimitz-class

nuclear aircraft carrier, four New Attack Submarines, nine LPD-17 class amphibious transport

dock ships, and one fast combat support ship. This plan does not reflect possible procurements

of Arsenal Ships, which may occur during this period.

cForce levels reflect retirements based on current Navy notional service lives.

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

Sustaining a surface combatant force of at least 125 ships beyond the end

of the next decade will become increasingly difficult for the Navy because

a large number of surface combatant retirements will begin around that

time. According to our estimates, the Navy will retire about 75 of its

surface combatants between fiscal year 2000 and 2020. However, the

majority of these retirements—55 ships—will occur between fiscal year

2011 and 2018. The ships retiring during this 8-year period represent the

2

Two private shipbuilding contractors currently build Arleigh Burke-class destroyers: Bath Iron Works

Corporation in Bath, Maine, and Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., in Pascagoula, Mississippi. Both contractors

have significant design, construction, and combat systems integration capabilities.

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last of the Navy’s current non-Aegis ships—the Oliver Hazard Perry-class

frigates and the Spruance- and Kidd-class destroyers. Figure 3.1 shows the

approximate number of surface combatants that are to be retired each

year between fiscal year 2000 and 2020.

Figure 3.1: Projected Surface Combatant Retirements From Fiscal Year 2000 to 2020

00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Fiscal year

Number of ships

Cruiser Destroyer Frigate

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

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The Navy’s ability to achieve and sustain a desired force size is affected by

the following three major factors:

• the service lives of existing ships (the length of time between a ship’s

commissioning and retirement), which determine when ships need to be

replaced if the force level is to be sustained;

• the cost of new ships, which is determined largely by the capabilities of

those ships; and

• the funds Congress makes available to construct new ships, which

ultimately determines whether the required ships can be built.

Ultimately, the Navy must achieve a balance among ship retirements, new

ship cost, and the likely available funding to enable it to build ships with

the necessary capabilities and in sufficient numbers to sustain the desired

force. Figure 3.2 shows how these factors affect the Navy’s ability to

sustain a particular surface combatant force level.

Figure 3.2: Major Factors That Sustain

the Surface Combatant Force

<--Average annual construction rate-->

Force level to

be sustained =

Average annual procurement

funding available for combatants

___________________________

Average cost of a new combatant

X

Average

service life of

current force

Source: Navy.

If the average service life of the current force is 35 years and the cost of

new ships being built is $900 million, for example, the Navy would need

average annual procurement funding for surface combatants of about

$3.2 billion each year to sustain a 125-ship force level. By contrast, if the

Navy plans to sustain a larger force, such as a 138-ship force, it would need

about $3.6 billion each year to support ship construction.3

3

The “average annual procurement funding available for combatants” divided by the “average cost of a

new combatant” results in the average annual construction rate necessary to support the force level. In

the given examples, the formula would yield a hypothetical average of 3.6 and 3.9 ships each year,

respectively.

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DOD believes this calculation assumes a steady-state construction rate, that

is, ships leave the force at the same rate they arrive. As a result, DOD

believes the calculation provides only a rough estimate for force size

planning and is applicable only if the force objective remains constant

throughout the service life assumed, which has never occurred

historically. However, our intent in using this calculation is to show the

dynamics, and the resulting difficulties, of sustaining ship force levels.

Retaining Ships

Longer Helps to

Mitigate New

Construction

Requirements

Determining the useful service lives of ships is a major factor in planning

and budgeting for future force levels. The estimates of expected service

lives are used to help determine the rate at which new ships must be

acquired to sustain a given force size. The longer the Navy retains ships in

its force means the longer it can delay replacing those ships. However, if

ships are retired earlier than anticipated, the Navy must adjust its

shipbuilding plan and budget to sustain desired force levels. Due to the

length of time required to construct modern combatants—about 

5 years—early retirements must be identified as soon as possible to make

the needed adjustments.

Navy cruisers, destroyers, and frigates have historically been retired by 

30 years, although recent deactivations have occurred earlier than planned

as the force was downsized since the end of the Cold War. For its

August 1995 Surface Combatant Force Level Study, the Navy analyzed the

actual service lives of surface combatants constructed since World War II

and found that most ships were retired before 30 years (frigates were

retired at around 22 years). In particular, the study noted that lives were

significantly shorter for ships that were not upgraded with new combat

systems or had significant maintenance problems associated with their

steam engineering systems. For example, combat systems for cruisers,

which usually have the most demanding missions, became obsolete in

about 12 to 16 years unless they were extensively modernized to meet

projected threats. When the combat systems were upgraded and the ships

were modernized, the ships served up to 30 years. Table 3.2 shows the

historical service lives of ships built after World War II. In informal written

comments to the report, DOD noted that the historical data was somewhat

distorted because of earlier-than-planned retirements of some ships,

particularly frigates, since 1990.

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Table 3.2: Historical Service Lives for

Navy Surface Combatants Built After

World War II

Figures in years

Ship type Ship as built Ship with upgrades

Cruiser 14-22 27-30

Destroyer 15-20 29-30

Frigate 21-22 a

Note: Historical service lives are based on actual retirements for ships that were built after the end

of World War II.

aFrigates that were built as single-purpose antisubmarine warfare escorts have become obsolete

in 21 to 22 years. Weight and size limitations have precluded easy modernization, and

nonredundant engineering plants have limited survivability in combat.

Source: Navy.

The Navy noted that, on the basis of historical service lives, notional

estimates for surface combatants cannot be realized without

modernization and upgrades to the ships and their combat systems. When

modernized, some ships may exceed the current estimates. The Navy

specifically identified most of the Ticonderoga-class cruisers as possible

candidates for life-extending upgrades. It also noted that, even though

combat systems are becoming obsolete faster as the threat becomes more

rapidly adaptive, the use of modular, software-based combat systems will

permit more frequent cost-effective upgrades to maximize service lives in

the future. Additionally, the use of gas turbine propulsion systems may

allow opportunities for longer service lives because of their lower and less

costly maintenance requirements than previous steam systems.

Due in large part to the design and construction of modern surface

combatants, the Navy plans to keep most current ships longer than

previous ships. In recent force planning for ships, the Navy uses notional

estimated service lives of 35 years for Aegis-capable cruisers and all

current classes of destroyers and 24- to 32-year service lives for 28 of the

35 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates retiring after fiscal year 1999.

According to Navy officials, these service life estimates are primarily

based on the number of years the ship’s structure, which includes its hull,

mechanical, and electrical systems, is reasonably expected to last without

incurring significant repair and modification costs. In the case of frigates,

however, the Navy has recently added combat system capability as a

factor in its estimates. Unlike prior classes of frigates, the Navy has been

able to make some modernization upgrades to the Oliver Hazard

Perry-class frigates to extend their lives. Twelve frigates that have had the

most extensive modifications to their combat systems are currently

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expected to remain in the force for 29 to 32 years. Another 18 that have

had significant modernization are planned to average about 25 years of

service life. In contrast, seven frigates in the force after fiscal year 1999

that are largely unmodernized are being retired early as new Arleigh

Burke-class destroyers enter the force. As a result, current plans show

these frigates having an average service life of about 17 years.

The notional estimated service lives used in recent Navy planning also

differ from the current officially approved ship service life estimates. The

official estimates for current surface combatants are 40 years for

Aegis-capable cruisers and all classes of destroyers and 35 years for

frigates. These estimates are substantially longer than historical lives and

reflect the original engineering design lives. Navy officials have stated that

the official estimates are misleading for planning purposes because of the

difficulty and expense of maintaining ships beyond 35 years. At that point

in the ship’s life, it is often more economical and militarily sound to

replace the ship. The Navy is currently reviewing its official service life

estimates and anticipates that new service estimates, similar to the

notional estimates, will be approved soon.

For our analyses, we use the notional estimated service lives that the Navy

has used in its recent force planning for surface combatants.4

 These lives

are as follows:

• Aegis-capable cruisers, 35 years;

• nuclear-powered cruisers, 17 to 29 years;

• destroyers, 35 years;

• frigates with significant modernization, generally 24 to 32 years; and

• frigates without significant modernization, an average of about 17 years.

Service Life Assumptions

Affect Future Force Plans

The length of estimated service life used for ships in the force has a

significant effect on the number of ships to be built each year to sustain a

given force level. To illustrate this effect, we examined three different

service life assumptions for ships to be retired after fiscal year 1999:

• historical service lives based on actual retirements of surface combatants

built since World War II (cruisers and destroyers, 30 years; frigates, 

22 years),

4

Notional estimated service lives are used for all force level projections in this report unless otherwise

noted. The actual service life of a surface combatant, however, may vary somewhat from the estimated

life depending on the ship’s unique configuration, modernization, operational history, and cost

considerations.

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• notional estimates used in recent Navy force structure planning, and

• officially approved service life estimates based on projected lives of recent

ship classes as designed (cruisers and destroyers, 40 years; frigates, 

35 years).

Our analysis assumed implementation of the current Arleigh Burke-class

construction plan and that the lead ship for the 21st Century Surface

Combatant will be procured in fiscal year 2003. Follow-on construction of

that ship and other future surface combatants was assumed to proceed at

a rate of three ships annually beginning in fiscal year 2005. This projected

construction rate for future surface combatants is consistent with the

current construction profile for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. Figure 3.3

shows the force levels achieved for each of the three service life

assumptions.

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Figure 3.3: Projected Surface Combatant Force Levels Achieved at Various Service Life Estimates

125

00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18 20

0

50

100

150

200

Fiscal year

Number of ships

Currently

approved Notional Historical

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

If ships are retired close to historical averages, the force will fall

significantly below 125 ships beginning about 2007. Keeping ships for the

currently approved estimates actually increases the size of the force

through 2014 before leveling off and then declining sharply to 128 ships in

2020. The principal reason for the higher force levels achieved with the

currently approved estimates is the significantly longer lives assumed for

the frigates than the other two service life assumptions.

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If ships are retired at the Navy’s current notional estimates, the force will

decline below 125 ships in 2014. After that, the Navy could sustain a force

of between 111 to 117 surface combatants through 2020 and as long as

2029, assuming continued procurement of 3 ships each year.5

 However, to

sustain a force of at least 125 ships through 2020, the Navy would need to

increase the average rate to slightly more than 4.5 ships each year for

9 years beginning in 2005 before returning to a 3-ship annual rate in 2014.

Therefore, the construction program for the next surface combatant

class—the 21st Century Surface Combatant—depends on the Navy’s

ability to retain its current surface combatants longer than historical

experience. Otherwise, the Navy will need to replace ships earlier than

anticipated to sustain its desired force size or accept a smaller force level.

Navy May Have

Difficulty Financing

Its Shipbuilding

Program

The cost of new surface combatants is a large share of the Navy’s annual

ship and overall procurement funding. Between fiscal year 1990 and 1996,

the Navy allocated about 44 percent of its annual funding for ship

construction and conversion to surface combatants and about 14 percent

of its overall annual procurement funding.

Funding for surface combatants remains a high priority in recent Navy

budgets and through the end of the current defense program. Congress

appropriated $3.6 billion for construction of 4 new destroyers in fiscal 

year 1997 and gave the Navy authority to procure a total of 12 destroyers

in fiscal years 1998 through 2001 using a multiyear acquisition strategy. In

its biennial budget submission for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, the Navy is

requesting about $2.8 billion and $2.7 billion, respectively, for a total

procurement of six destroyers. Table 3.3 compares recent annual funding

for Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, other Navy ships, and overall Navy

procurement for fiscal years 1995 through 1999.

5

If future surface combatants are procured at 3 ships each year and retained for 35 years, the force

eventually reaches a steady-state level of 105 ships around 2032. Therefore, surface combatants would

be replaced on a one-for-one basis with new ships.

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Table 3.3: Recent Annual Funding for Surface Combatants, Other Ships, and Overall Navy Procurement

Fiscal year

Then-year dollars in billions

Procurement

1995

(Actual)

1996

(Actual)

1997

(Current

estimated)

1998

(Requested)

1999

(Requested)

Arleigh Burke-class destroyer (construction and advance

procurement)a $2.6 $2.2 $3.5 $2.8 $2.7

Other ship construction and conversion 3.8 4.3 2.0 4.6 3.3

Total Navy shipbuilding and conversionb $6.5 $6.6 $5.5 $7.4 $6.0

Total Navy procurementc $17.3 $15.8 $17.5 $18.2 $20.5

Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding.

aThe Navy was appropriated funding for three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers in fiscal year 1995,

two in fiscal year 1996, and four in fiscal year 1997 and has requested funding for three in fiscal

year 1998 and three in fiscal year 1999.

bShipbuilding and conversion includes construction of new ships and certain modifications and

overhauls to existing ships, such as the refueling of nuclear-powered ships and submarines and

extending the service lives of ships.

cNavy procurement includes ships, aircraft, weapons, ammunition, and equipment for the Navy

and the Marine Corps.

Source: DOD.

Capability Is the Key

Driver of Surface

Combatant Cost

The average ship cost is determined by a number of factors, including

business strategy, contractor competition and productivity, procurement

rates and stability, and technical requirements and specifications.

However, the key cost driver is the types of capabilities necessary for a

ship to effectively perform its intended missions against anticipated

threats. Procurement of combat and weapon systems with the necessary

capabilities has comprised a large percentage of a surface combatant’s

basic construction cost. For example, combat and weapon systems

account for about 55 percent of the cost of the latest version of the Arleigh

Burke-class destroyer. Navy officials indicate that the Aegis combat

system is a large cost—at about $235 million, or about 25 percent of the

ship’s cost. As a result, the Navy is examining ways to reduce the cost of

combat and weapon systems while maintaining or improving the ship’s

overall capability. Such cost savings approaches are being studied for the

21st Century Surface Combatant and Arsenal Ship programs.

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To illustrate the effect of procurement cost of new surface combatants on

sustaining the force, we examined three preliminary ship concepts used in

the first phase of the Navy’s cost and operational effectiveness analysis for

the 21st Century Surface Combatant program. Each concept has a

different set of capabilities and therefore a different estimated cost. The

concepts are as follows:

• The tailored capability ship concept is a lesser capable ship with high

capability in one or two missions areas but limited or virtually no

capability in others. It would provide capability in mission areas requiring

large numbers of ships, such as antisubmarine warfare, rather than those

capabilities already sufficiently available in the fleet. One version, an

antisubmarine ship, would be a smaller, frigate-type ship equipped with

state-of-the-art antisubmarine systems, sufficient antisurface warfare

capabilities, and basic self-defense capabilities in other warfare areas.

• The upgraded Arleigh Burke-class destroyer concept would incorporate

important radar improvements and limited survivability and reduced

manning enhancements. The ship would retain its significant capabilities

in all other mission areas.

• The advanced capability cruiser is a ship concept that would be about the

size of a Ticonderoga-class cruiser and have advanced systems in all

warfare areas, including theater ballistic missile defense; a significant

command, control, and communications suite; enhanced survivability; and

reduced personnel requirements. However, the ship is unlikely to be

procured before 2010 because of the time needed to develop the advanced

systems.

The Navy developed rough-order-of-magnitude cost estimates for these

notional ship concepts. We used these estimates in a procurement cost

estimation model, provided by the Navy, to calculate

rough-order-of-magnitude estimates of the average annual funding

requirements to procure each of these concepts at different procurement

rates. Figure 3.4 illustrates the consequences of funding each of these ship

concepts.

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Figure 3.4: Annual Funding Requirements for Surface Combatant Concepts at Various Procurement Rates

3 billion

2345

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Number of ships procured

Dollars in billions

Tailored 

capability

Advanced

Arleigh Burke

Advanced

capability

Note: These cost estimates take into account the effects of higher construction rates and

production learning curves. We assumed that the lead ship would be bought in the first year and

that the full-scale construction rate would begin in the third year and be maintained through the

seventh. We then averaged procurement funding for that 5-year period of construction.

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

With annual surface combatant construction funding at around $3 billion,

the Navy could procure nearly 5 tailored capability frigates each year, for a

total of 24 ships over a 5-year period. However, procurement rates for the

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higher capability ship concepts would be considerably lower due to their

higher costs, enabling procurement of only about 13 of the advanced

Arleigh Burke destroyers or about 8 of the advanced capability cruisers

over the 5-year period. Construction rates for these more capable ship

concepts would not be sufficient to sustain a force of at least 125 surface

combatants beyond 2013.

Surface Combatant

Funding Will Need to

Compete With Other

Defense Priorities

Attempts to achieve a balanced budget and manage competing priorities

both within the Navy and among the other services will make funding

surface combatant construction to sustain planned force levels difficult.

After fiscal year 2000, the Navy plans to increase its spending on numerous

programs to modernize and sustain its forces. These programs include the

F/A-18E/F strike fighter aircraft, V-22 advanced vertical lift aircraft, LPD-17

class amphibious transport dock ship, and New Attack Submarine, as well

as the 21st Century Surface Combatant and Arsenal Ship programs.

Additionally, the Navy plans to procure new aircraft carriers and continue

nuclear refueling overhauls of its Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. All of these

programs will place considerable fiscal pressures on the Navy’s

procurement budgets in general and its shipbuilding funding in particular.

Table 3.4 shows projected costs and number of years of funding for

several ongoing and planned Navy procurement programs.

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Table 3.4: Examples of Competing Navy Procurement Programs and Their Estimated Costs

Fiscal years of

procurement

Then-year dollars in billions

Navy program

Funding for

fiscal year 1998 and

balance to complete Next Last

F/A-18E/F strike fighter aircraft $72.1 1998 2016

New Attack Submarine 63.7 1998 2015

V-22 advanced vertical lift aircraft 38.7a 1998 2018

LPD-17 class amphibious transport dock ship 9.6 1999 2004

CVN-77 nuclear aircraft carrier 5.4 2002 b

First three Nimitz-class aircraft carrier nuclear refueling overhaulsc 6.8 1998 2005

aThis amount includes Air Force funding for 50 of the 523 aircraft planned for procurement.

bThe Navy is evaluating a follow-on program to the Nimitz-class nuclear aircraft carrier and

expects to procure the first new design ship in fiscal year 2006.

cThe Navy plans nuclear refueling overhauls for its Nimitz-class carriers beginning with the U.S.S.

Nimitz in fiscal year 1998. The second overhaul is scheduled for fiscal year 2001, and the third is

projected to begin about fiscal year 2005. Other Nimitz-class carriers will follow so that a carrier

will be in a shipyard undergoing a nuclear refueling overhaul for about the next 30 years, with the

exception of about 4 years during this period.

Source: Data from DOD’s Selected Acquisition Reports, December 31, 1996, and fiscal year 1998

budget submission documents.

Total new ship construction will be a substantial portion of the Navy’s

annual procurement funding in the 21st century. In July 1996, the Chief of

Naval Operations stated before Congress that the Navy would need to

increase its annual ship procurement rates after fiscal year 2000 to support

the Bottom-Up Review ship force levels of between 330 and 346 ships. The

official stated that, to sustain these levels, the Navy would need to

construct an average of 9 to 10 new ships each year, which is about 3 more

ships than its current annual construction rate.

A senior Navy official stated that the Navy’s planned investment

spending—procurement plus research and development—will have annual

shortfalls of about $5.2 billion between fiscal years 2002 and 2010. This

estimate assumes a 1-percent real growth in spending from the end of the

fiscal year 1997 defense program (fiscal years 1997 through 2001). On the

basis of estimated spending in the last year of the program, the overall

shortfall represents between 6 and 7 percent of the Navy’s total

obligational authority in those years.6

6

Total obligational authority is a financial measure unique to DOD that refers to the total value of

direct defense programs for a fiscal year. The term is essentially the same as budget authority.

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Our analysis of the Navy’s June 1996 notional long-range shipbuilding plan

suggests that shortfalls in future ship construction funding could be quite

large. The plan provided preliminary procurement projections and cost

estimates for ship construction programs through fiscal year 2020. It

generally assumed that new, more capable ships would replace retiring

ships at a slightly less than a one-for-one basis and that future ship costs

would approximate those of current ships. On the basis of the plan, we

observe that the magnitude of the estimated funding required for ship

construction in the next decade, particularly after fiscal year 2002, is

significantly higher than for recent budgets. We estimate that average

annual Navy shipbuilding funding between fiscal year 2002 and 2010 may

require over $11.6 billion each year, which is about double the average

annual funding for ship construction during the latter half of the 1990s.

Assuming, as the Navy official did, future funding levels equivalent to the

last year of the fiscal year 1997 defense program—about $7.4 billion for

shipbuilding in fiscal year 2001—and a budget growth of 1 percent, we

estimate that annual funding for ships will be short, on average, about

$3.8 billion each year between fiscal year 2002 and 2010.7

 If no budget

growth is assumed, the average annual shortage for that period increases

to about $4.2 billion.

Further, the other military services are also planning several expensive

procurement programs over the same period. The Air Force plans to begin

procuring the F-22 fighter aircraft in fiscal year 1999, and that program is

expected to cost $54.9 billion in then-year dollars between fiscal year 1998

and 2015. The Army plans to procure the Longbow Apache attack

helicopter at an estimated cost of $6.1 billion over the next 11 years and

the Comanche helicopter at an estimated cost of $41.7 billion in then-year

dollars over the life of the program. The Air Force, the Navy, and the

Marine Corps plan to begin procuring the Joint Strike Fighter later in the

next decade, which could be DOD’s most expensive future weapon

program. On the basis of DOD’s goals for the Joint Strike Fighter, the

Congressional Budget Office estimates the program could cost

$165 billion, excluding inflation, or up to $219 billion if the program’s

estimated cost is based on the historical relationship between cost and

aircraft performance. Tentative plans are for the Navy and the Marine

Corps to procure about one-third, or 940, of the estimated 3,000 aircraft to

be bought through fiscal year 2030.

7

Planned funding for ship construction in fiscal year 2001 would be the second highest amount in any

year since fiscal year 1993.

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The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised Congress in March 1996

that annual procurement funding would need to increase to $60 billion

over the next several years to adequately support the cost of DOD’s planned

modernization programs. Such an increase in annual procurement funding

will require that the current allocation of funds among appropriation

accounts change significantly. This change would be made more difficult

because of congressional commitment to a balanced budget plan by fiscal

year 2002. Reaching and retaining a balanced budget may put pressure on

Congress and future administrations to reduce, rather than increase,

defense budgets.

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DOD and the Navy are expected to make several decisions regarding

surface combatants and other major assets, including those designed to

achieve ground attack and provide defense against ballistic missiles. These

decisions could affect the size, composition, and overall capability of the

surface combatant force through the middle of the next century. The

decisions, to be made over the next several years, involve approving a

program to design and construct the 21st Century Surface Combatant,

evaluating the Arsenal Ship concept and designing and approving the

ship’s construction, and continuing to procure the remaining new Arleigh

Burke-class destroyers.

Several factors could affect future surface combatant force goals. These

factors include the results of DOD’s planned review of defense strategy and

requirements, which could change the planning parameters for meeting

the mandates of the U.S. military strategy; new or improved capabilities,

which could affect doctrine, operational concepts, and responsibilities for

the force; introduction of the 21st Century Surface Combatant and Arsenal

Ship, which could lead DOD and the Navy to reexamine force requirements

and employment; and force efficiency strategies, such as expanded

overseas home porting and alternative deployment schemes, which could

help to increase force availability and use.

Near-term Decisions

Could Affect the

Force for Many

Decades

Force structure decisions for ships have long-term consequences on the

size and overall capability of future forces. The number of years between

the introduction of a class of ships into the force and their progressive

retirements can span nearly half a century. This time span does not

include the many years needed for the initial planning, design, and

construction before the first ship’s delivery. Figure 4.1 shows the

approximate force lives of the Ticonderoga-class cruiser, the Arleigh

Burke-class destroyer, and the planned 21st Century Surface Combatant

class. As shown, the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Arleigh

Burke-class destroyers are expected to remain a part of fleet force

structure for about 46 and 54 years, respectively. The 21st Century Surface

Combatant force life of about 49 years assumes a 20-year building program

beginning in fiscal year 2003, a 5-year construction period for each ship,

fleet delivery of the first ship in fiscal year 2009, and a 35-year expected

service life.

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Figure 4.1: Projected Force Lives of Selected Surface Combatant Classes

B

1983

E

2058

 A = Program approval/

 initial ship construction

 B = First ship delivered

 C = Last ship delivered

 D = First ship retired

 E = Last ship retired

Ticonderoga-class cruiser: 46 years

Arleigh Burke-class destroyer: 54 years

21st Century Surface Combatant-class: 49 years

B

1991

E

2029

B

2009

E

2045

C

1994

C

2010

D

2018

D

2026

C

2023

D

2044

Program approval

and initial

construction

A

1997

Program approval

and initial

construction

A

1981

Program approval

and initial

construction

A

1978

Source: Our analysis of Navy data.

Over the next several years, DOD and the Navy are expected to make many

important decisions on the surface combatant force structure, as well as

for other joint military assets with capabilities in similar mission areas.

These decisions, which are likely to affect the capabilities, size, and

composition of the overall force for many decades, include the following:

• A series of “acquisition milestones” decisions for the 21st Century Surface

Combatant program to proceed through the design, development, and

construction of the new ship, as well as annual funding decisions on the

ship’s procurement for many years. The next major decisions are to

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complete the ongoing cost and operational effectiveness analysis in 1997

and approve the program to begin design and development work

(acquisition milestone I)1

 around July 1997.

• Decisions on operational concepts and design of an Arsenal Ship,

construction of a demonstration ship for evaluation, and potential

follow-on construction program for 3 to 5 additional ships. Near-term

events include industry teams to do detailed design work through 1997,

authorize a contract to one of three industry teams for construction of a

demonstration ship in January 1998, and begin concept evaluation at sea in

late 2000.2

• Annual budget decisions on the continued procurement of the remaining

Arleigh Burke-class destroyers through fiscal year 2005.

Review May Change

DOD Planning

Parameters for

Meeting National

Security Objectives

In its May 1995 report,3 the Commission on Roles and Missions of the

Armed Forces recommended that the Secretary of Defense conduct a

quadrennial review of the defense program at the beginning of each newly

elected presidential administration. The Commission believed the review

“. . . would provide the foundation for a consistent military strategy,

defense force posture, and budget estimate for use in the Secretary’s [of

Defense] programming direction to Defense components” and “. . . could

in addition serve as a basis for developing a consensus between the

executive and legislative branches on a four-year DOD funding level.”

The Secretary of Defense endorsed the concept, and Congress later

included a provision mandating such a review in the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. The review is to involve a

comprehensive examination of defense active and reserve force structure,

modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense

program and policies to determine defense strategy and establish a revised

defense program through 2005. Results of the review are due by May 15,

1997. Additionally, the act required an independent panel of defense

1

Milestone I, Approval to Begin a New Acquisition Program, in the DOD acquisition process establishes

a new program and approves an acquisition strategy and concept baseline containing initial program

cost, schedule, and performance objectives.

2

The three industry teams performing design work during 1997 are (1) General Dynamics,

Marine/Electric Boat, Raytheon Electronic Systems, and Science Applications International

Corporation; (2) Lockheed Martin, Litton Industries/Ingalls Shipbuilding, and Newport News

Shipbuilding; and (3) Northrop Grumman Corporation, National Steel and Shipbuilding Company,

Vitro Corporation, and Band Lavis and Associates, Inc. The Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency plans to select one of the three industry teams in January 1998 to complete final design work

and construct a demonstration ship.

3

Directions for Defense (Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces,

May 24, 1995).

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experts to submit a comprehensive assessment of DOD’s report and

conduct an assessment of alternative force structures through the year

2010 and beyond by December 1, 1997.

This quadrennial defense review could result in significant changes in the

parameters used to plan the forces needed to meet national security

objectives. These changes could include adopting different planning

scenarios and parameters for future MRCs, readjusting force structure

priorities to meet national security objectives, and proposing new

initiatives to meet requirements and create efficiencies in defense

spending. Depending on the nature and extent of these changes, the size,

composition, required capability, and employment of the surface

combatant force, as well as other major military components, could be

significantly altered. For example, a recent Navy report, 21st Century

Surface Combatant Force Architecture Assessment, illustrated the effect

on force size of changing the two nearly simultaneous MRC requirement.

With the assumption that a 145-ship force of current ship types, with some

allied support, is needed for the current MRC requirement, the assessment

calculated that changing the requirement to two simultaneous MRCs could

increase the required force size by about 20 ships. Changing the

requirement to two sequential MRCs or one MRC could reduce the

war-fighting force requirement by as much as 45 ships (assuming some

allied support).

New Capabilities

Could Affect Surface

Combatant Roles and

Missions

Several significant improved or new capabilities could affect the

requirement for surface combatants. Even though these improvements and

capabilities could add new responsibilities for the force, they could

provide greater efficiencies in the use of the force and allow changes in

doctrine and operational concepts that could reduce force requirements.

Various improvements to the Tomahawk cruise missile to enhance its

effectiveness and capabilities could allow the missile to be used for

tactical applications in support of ground operations during crisis and war.

Also, the Navy is modifying the Aegis combat system and improving the

Standard missile to provide a defense against theater ballistic missile

attacks while operating in littoral areas. Additionally, the introduction of

the Cooperative Engagement Capability on existing and new combatants

and other ships will enhance the ships’ self-defense capabilities by

increasing the response time and amount of information available to

defend against antiship cruise missile threats. This capability is also

critical for theater ballistic missile defense operations.

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Planned Improvements for

Tomahawk Will Likely

Affect Its Use in Warfare

The Navy is making various improvements to the Tomahawk cruise missile

to increase its effectiveness, flexibility, and responsiveness and strengthen

mission planning capabilities aboard ships. In addition to upgrades to the

missile’s guidance, navigation, and control systems, the Navy plans to

incorporate a penetrating warhead, which will expand potential targets to

include weapon bunkers and reinforced structures.4

 Several

enhancements, such as the Afloat Planning System and the Advanced

Tomahawk Weapon Control System, will allow forces at sea to plan and

modify land attack missions more rapidly than currently possible.

A significant change planned for Tomahawk is to employ it for tactical

applications against an adversary’s military forces and to support the

ground war. Currently, it can be deployed against strategically important

targets, such as command and control facilities and radar sites, under the

control of the unified commanders. According to Navy officials, using the

missile for tactical applications could have a significant affect on ship

operations and the number of Tomahawk missiles because of the potential

increase in missions and targets. Additionally, the U.S. military is making

changes to the command and control structure, which may allow theater

commanders to use Tomahawk missiles for tactical applications. 

Figure 4.2 shows the Aegis cruiser U.S.S. Shiloh launching a Tomahawk

missile against a target in southern Iraq in September 1996.

4

Tomahawk land attack missiles can currently carry a 1,000-pound-class high-explosive or a

submunition warhead against land targets that are fixed or not easily relocatable.

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Figure 4.2: An Aegis Cruiser Launching a Tomahawk Cruise Missile Against an Iraqi Target

Note: Several planned Tomahawk improvements will greatly enhance Navy surface combatants’

unique capability to conduct long range precision strikes from the sea.

Source: Navy.

Theater Ballistic Missile

Defense Capability Is a

Major New Mission

Theater ballistic missiles have been used in six regional conflicts since

1973—the most recent of which was the 1994 conflict between North and

South Yemen in which Scud missiles were armed with conventional

warheads.5

 The Navy is developing a capability for Aegis-equipped cruisers

and destroyers to defend against this threat by using improved Standard

5

A ballistic missile does not rely on aerodynamic surfaces to produce lift and consequently follows a

ballistic trajectory when thrust is terminated. Generally, a theater ballistic missile travels less than

3,500 kilometers, or 1,889 nautical miles. These missiles can carry conventional, nuclear, or chemical

warheads.

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surface-to-air missiles. The Navy believes that this defensive capability will

become an important new mission for its surface combatants in MRCs and

that a sea-based capability is essential for protecting U.S. and allied forces,

population centers, logistics facilities, and key coastal areas from missile

attacks. The Navy also believes its surface combatants will (1) provide the

only initial capability to defend arriving ground forces against ballistic

missile attacks, particularly in the early days of a crisis, and (2) have the

advantages of independent operations, rapid relocation, high survivability,

and self-sustainability.

The Navy plans to modify the Aegis combat system and make

improvements to its Standard surface-to-air missile. The system’s primary

air search radar will be modified to allow it to search at higher elevations

and for longer ranges and maintain its tracking on ballistic missile targets.

The system is being designed to predict intercept points and engagement

limits, initialize missile firings, and provide communication with the

missile as it travels to intercept the target. Aegis equipment is to be

modified to display missile tracks and engagements and communicate

with other elements of the combat system and remote sensors.

The Navy intends to (1) initially deploy the area defense portion of this

capability to protect joint forces in littoral areas and coastal airfields and

(2) later add the theaterwide portion to protect vital assets over entire

regions. The Navy plans to equip two Aegis cruisers with an operational

evaluation version of the area defense portion in fiscal year 1998 and

deploy the tactical version on Aegis cruisers and destroyers beginning in

fiscal year 2001.

Increased use of a theater ballistic missile capability for littoral operations

could allow the Navy to protect larger areas with fewer surface

combatants. Also, the capability allows the use of a more efficient firing

doctrine for many engagement situations than the doctrine used for area

defense missiles. This doctrine reduces magazine space requirements and,

in turn, reduces the number of ships.

Cooperative Engagement

Capability Could Increase

Connectivity Among

Forces

The Navy plans to begin deploying the Cooperative Engagement Capability

on many of its ships later in the decade. This computer-based information

exchange system permits the simultaneous sharing of detailed targeting

information between ships or forces at extensive ranges within the littoral

area, thereby increasing reaction time and firing opportunities against

enemy missile attacks. By creating a single composite threat picture from

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all the sea-, air-, and land-based sensors in the area, ships with less

sophisticated combat systems will have the same quality sensor, decision,

and engagement information as Aegis-equipped ships. This system is

designed to enhance capabilities to rapidly respond to enemy attacks by

providing an over-the-horizon capability that will give the local

commander the ability to defend against threats not yet detected by

sensors. The Navy believes this capability will be a major defense against

antiship sea-skimming cruise missiles.

This capability may allow the Navy to acquire some ships with lesser

capability than Aegis. For example, the proposed Arsenal Ship will depend

heavily on this capability for its operations, and thereby reduce its need

for a sophisticated combat system and sensors. The capability is currently

installed on the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Eisenhower, the Aegis cruisers

U.S.S. Anzio and U.S.S. Cape St. George, and the amphibious assault ship

U.S.S. Wasp. The Navy plans to install this equipment on additional aircraft

carriers, surface combatants, amphibious ships, and carrier-based E-2C

tactical warning and control system aircraft between fiscal year 2000 and

2010. By fiscal year 2003, the Navy plans to have the capability on about 60

ships and aircraft.

Arsenal Ship Could

Significantly Augment

Surface Force

Capabilities

The Navy and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency are

developing a new type of ship—the Arsenal Ship—that has the potential to

provide substantial fire support to a variety of missions in regional

conflicts without the logistics burden of transporting both delivery

systems and ammunition to the shore and forward areas. The Arsenal Ship

is expected to carry a large number of VLS cells but without the

sophisticated command and control and radar equipment found on

Aegis-equipped ships. This ship, which will rely on other military assets,

including surface combatants, to provide the targeting information and

connectivity necessary to launch its weapons, will have the equivalent

ordnance—about 500 vertically launched weapons from a wide variety of

the military’s inventory—of about four or five Aegis cruisers and

destroyers. Figure 4.3 shows design proposals for the Arsenal Ship from

three competing industry teams.

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Figure 4.3: Design Proposals for the

Navy’s Arsenal Ship Concept

Source: General Dynamics, Marine team.

Source: Lockheed Martin team.

Source: Northrop Grumman team.

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The Navy plans to maintain the Arsenal Ship forward deployed in major

overseas regions for extended periods by rotating the ship’s crew and

returning the ship only for major maintenance and overhauls. This plan

will allow the Navy to use fewer Arsenal Ships to maintain overseas

presence than if the ships were deployed routinely from the United States

and permit their early availability in a conflict. Additionally, if the Arsenal

Ship concept proves successful and within its current cost projections

(around $500 million for construction of each ship), DOD and the Navy may

be able to retire or forego purchases of some assets, such as aircraft

carriers, surface combatants, ground-based launchers, or combat aircraft.6

Opportunities May

Exist to Improve

Force Efficiencies

Several operational factors, such as distance and transit speeds to reach

areas of deployment, deployment schemes and group configurations, and

personnel and maintenance policies affect how the force is employed.

Over the years, Navy and independent studies have suggested ways to

improve the use and availability of the surface combatant force by

adjusting these factors. For example, a Navy report, Surface Combatant

Force Level Study, provided some options to increase not only availability

of ships for crisis and war but also their availability during peacetime. The

study suggested that the Navy home port more ships in more locations

overseas, if possible, and increase the home porting of Aegis-capable ships

overseas to reduce transit distances and maintain capabilities closer to

potential crisis areas. Although increasing overseas home porting of

surface combatants may be difficult, Pacific Fleet officials indicated that

the Navy began home porting more Aegis-capable ships in Japan and

Hawaii as older, less capable ships returned for overhaul or retirement.

The study also suggested having surface combatants deploy to potential

trouble areas early and independently of other forces, such as carrier

battle groups, to increase the capabilities available early in a conflict.

Other studies have suggested changes to deployment schemes and

personnel policies, such as shortening the time between deployments,

lengthening the deployment period, rotating crews, increasing transit

speeds, and using different maintenance schemes, to increase the

availability of ships for deployment in peacetime. As these studies show,

those and other changes have the potential for significant cost and force

structure savings and improved force efficiencies. On the other hand, such

changes could also affect personnel retention and morale, training,

6

In informal written comments to the report, DOD indicated that a potential issue with the Arsenal

Ship would be the cost of the weapons for additional VLS cells. DOD stated that the number of

programmed VLS cells without the Arsenal Ship is about 30 percent larger than the funded inventory of

VLS-cell weapons.

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readiness, and fleet structuring. Many of these changes are not new, but

they may help the Navy to achieve sufficient risk aversion as it operates

with a smaller force structure and budget.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Surface combatants will continue to play an important role in the

deployment of naval and joint forces overseas during peacetime and in

conflict by providing a wide range of defensive and offensive capabilities.

Since the capabilities of individual ships have increased and a greater

emphasis has been placed on fighting in littoral areas, the surface

combatant force has assumed new or increased roles and missions, such

as conducting deep strikes against land targets with their Tomahawk

missiles and providing a future capability to defend against theater

ballistic missiles. The Navy believes this force, to be composed of

increasingly capable multimission ships with the Aegis combat system,

may assume greater importance in supporting joint forces in future

conflicts. However, the Navy has not yet provided an adequate explanation

to Congress of the relationship between surface combatant force structure

requirements and national security objectives.

DOD faces a major challenge in recapitalizing its forces across the military

services during a period when the administration and Congress attempt to

balance the federal budget. Given this challenge, the Secretary of Defense

must make difficult tradeoff decisions among competing weapon

modernization programs. The Navy is nearing completion of a cost and

operational effectiveness analysis for a new surface combatant class and

plans to initiate the program this year. It also has begun an accelerated

effort to develop a new ship concept, the Arsenal Ship. Both these

programs will help to modernize and sustain the surface combatant force

but will also require significant funding in future Navy budgets. However,

DOD’s annual budget presentations to Congress have not clearly indicated

how surface combatant ships contribute to achieving U.S. national

security objectives and why large future budgetary outlays are needed to

sustain the surface combatant force into the next century.

Conclusions Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy’s surface combatant force has

been resized to a smaller yet increasingly more capable force as older, less

capable ships have been replaced with Aegis-capable Ticonderoga-class

cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. These new ships bring to the

force significant new capabilities, such as the Aegis combat system, VLS,

and Tomahawk cruise missile, and will bring in the future the Cooperative

Engagement Capability and theater ballistic missile defense. By the end of

fiscal year 2003, the Navy will have about the same number of cruisers and

destroyers as it had during the Cold War in the late 1980s—about 105.

However, the cruisers and destroyers in the surface combatant force in

Page 71 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Recommendations

2003 will far exceed the capabilities possessed by similar-type ships in the

late 1980s.

The Navy’s Arleigh Burke-class destroyer program remains essentially as

envisioned when it was initiated during the Cold War as a counter force to

the former Soviet Union. It remains driven by the desire to increase the

capabilities of the force and sustain the surface combatant shipbuilding

industrial base. The ongoing Arleigh Burke-class destroyer construction

program allows the Navy to sustain surface combatant force through the

next decade at a level higher than the current size of about 125 ships.

The Bottom-Up Review generally established the size of the current

surface combatant force to implement the national military strategy.

Subsequent budget, industrial base, and operational considerations have

supported a near-term force size of at least 125 ships. The Navy will have

131 surface combatants (123 active and 8 reserve ships) by the end of the

current defense program in fiscal year 2003. However, DOD’s long-term

surface combatant force goal beyond the current defense program and the

range of capabilities that Navy surface combatants need to implement the

national military strategy objectives are still undecided.

The Navy has conducted several internal studies to define surface

combatant war-fighting roles and missions and the size of force and

capabilities that are anticipated to deploy in the future. These studies

show that size of the needed force can vary significantly depending on the

assumptions underlying the analyses. Some key assumptions include the

planning parameters made for the type and occurrence of future MRCs; the

roles and missions of naval, other U.S. military, and allied forces in a joint

or combined warfighting environment; and operational constraints. The

studies concluded that the various assumptions made in the analyses

indicate that the Navy could support a larger surface combatant force than

now exists. However, the variability in these assumptions can also result

in numbers below the currently programmed force levels.

DOD and the Navy are moving forward with several programs that could

significantly change surface combatant requirements. For example, the

significant offensive and defensive capabilities of the proposed Arsenal

Ship could lessen the need for costly, higher capability surface

combatants, as well as permit the Navy and the other services to retire or

forego purchases of some assets, such as aircraft carriers, ground-based

launchers, or combat aircraft. Likewise, the development and

implementation of a Cooperative Engagement Capability, which allows

Page 72 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Recommendations

radar and other data to be shared among remote users, may allow the

Navy to design, build, and deploy fewer, less costly surface combatants.

The Navy plans to retire a large number of surface combatants after the

end of the next decade. To sustain force levels of at least 125 ships

through 2020, the Navy will need to begin building more new ships than

are currently built each year sometime before these retirements begin.

However, we believe that, with such a large percentage and number of

Aegis-capable cruisers and destroyers in the force at the time of these

retirements (about 84 ships) and with the significant firepower potential of

the proposed Arsenal Ship, the significant number of retirements will not

have a great effect on the overall capability of the force as it declines

below 125 ships after 2013. As a result, the Navy may be able to accept a

smaller, but still highly capable, surface combatant force or begin

procuring a less costly and capable ship than the Arleigh Burke-class

destroyer. The Navy can further defer difficulties with force size by

retaining its ships as long as planned or longer if maintenance

considerations allow this to be practical. For example, the Navy plans to

keep its current destroyers for 35 years—longer than the historical average

of 30 years. If the Navy is unable to achieve these longer service lives, it

will be forced to decide on whether to procure replacement ships sooner

than planned.

The effects of expected service life, individual ship cost, and annual

funding have significant consequences on Navy force structure decisions.

The Navy will be challenged to achieve a reasonable balance between

these factors. Its ability to maximize ship service lives and manage costs

for new ships to a large extent determine the size and type of surface

combatant force the Navy will be able to sustain over the long term.

Additionally, the competition for procurement funding from other Navy

and service programs, as well as from other appropriation accounts, may

significantly restrain the annual share allocated for surface combatants.

These factors will particularly influence planning and budgeting decisions

the Navy makes for sustaining the surface combatant force, particularly

the design, cost, and construction of the 21st Century Surface

Combatant-class over the next several years.

Recommendations We recommend that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress with

specific information regarding the surface combatant force. Such

information should include the

Page 73 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Chapter 5 

Conclusions and Recommendations

• number and types of surface combatants that are needed to fight and win

two nearly simultaneous MRCs;

• number of ships that are needed to meet peacetime forward presence

objectives;

• key assumptions that support the force level and mix, such as expected

allied contributions;

• expected impact of new technologies and capabilities on the size and

composition of the future force; and

• impact of the Arsenal Ship on the surface combatant force structure.

We also recommend that the Secretary provide information on the Navy’s

plan to sustain the surface combatant force level, including key

assumptions regarding expected service lives, pace of the shipbuilding

program, types of ships, required funding, and any other factor that might

alter the requirement.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

DOD concurred with the information in this report and the

recommendation. DOD stated that the programmed surface combatant

force structure contained in the fiscal year 1998 budget and associated

Future Years Defense Program are adequate to support DOD’s current

presence and contingency response requirements. However, DOD officials

stated that the current force structure is based largely on budget,

industrial base, and operational considerations rather than specific

linkages to national military strategy objectives.

DOD stated that the information regarding surface combatants listed in the

recommendation would be provided to Congress as a result of the ongoing

Quadrennial Defense Review. DOD indicated that the results of the review

should provide a basis for understanding future surface combatant needs.

Although the review could establish a strategic context for surface

combatants, as did DOD’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review, we believe that the

broad scope of the review may not adequately provide the specific

discussion of surface combatant requirements that our recommendation is

intended to provide. Thus, considering the significant investment and

annual budget requirements needed for surface combatants, we have

retained the recommendation.

DOD’s comments appear in appendix III. Additionally, DOD updated the

report to reflect information its fiscal year 1998 budget request, and we

have incorporated this information into the report.

Page 74 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Page 75 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix I 

Selected Carrier Battle Group Deployments

Surface combatants are a major element of the Navy’s carrier battle

groups.1

 These groups, which also include an aircraft carrier, air wing,

nuclear attack submarines, and a fast combat support ship, routinely

deploy during peacetime to maintain the primary overseas naval presence

on a nearly continuous basis in the Mediterranean Sea, western Pacific

Ocean, and North Arabian Sea. They also help provide an initial military

capability to respond to crisis and enable the introduction and build up of

additional forces as needed. Tables I.1 and I.2 show the number and types

of surface combatants that deployed with the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet

carrier battle groups, respectively, between May 1994 and February 1996.

The tables also show some of the geographic areas and the responsible

unified commands where the surface combatants operated during the

deployments.

Table I.1: Atlantic Fleet Carrier Battle Group Deployments

Carrier battle group and dates of

deployment Number and type of surface combatants

Unified commands and operational

areasa

U.S.S. George Washington (CVN-73), 

May to November 1994

2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, 1 Arleigh

Burke-class destroyer, 2 Spruance-class

destroyers, and 1 Oliver Hazard

Perry-class frigate

European Command—Mediterranean Sea,

Adriatic Sea, and Black Sea

Central Command—Arabian Gulf

U.S.S. Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69),

October 1994 to April 1995

2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers, 1 Kidd-class

destroyer, 1 Spruance-class destroyer, and

2 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates

European Command—Mediterranean Sea,

Adriatic Sea, and Aegean Sea

Central Command—Arabian Gulf and Red

Sea

U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), 

March to September 1995

2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers,

1 Virginia-class nuclear cruiser, 1 Arleigh

Burke-class destroyer, and 2 Oliver 

Hazard Perry-class frigates

European Command—Mediterranean Sea,

Adriatic Sea, and Black Sea

Central Command— Arabian Gulf and Red

Sea

U.S.S. America (CV-66), 

August 1995 to February 1996

2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers,

1 California-class nuclear cruiser,

1 Kidd-class destroyer, and 2 Oliver

Hazard Perry-class frigates

European Command—Mediterranean Sea

and Adriatic Sea

Central Command—Arabian Gulf and Red

Sea

aThis listing shows only some of the geographic areas visited by surface combatants from the

respective carrier battle group.

1

In addition to deploying with an aircraft carrier as part of a carrier battle group, surface combatants

deploy with other combatants as a surface action group or by themselves.

Page 76 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix I 

Selected Carrier Battle Group Deployments

Table I.2: Pacific Fleet Carrier Battle Group Deployments

Carrier battle group and dates of

deployment Number and type of surface combatants

Unified commands and operational

areasa

U.S.S. Kitty Hawk (CV-63),

June to December 1994

2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers,

1 California-class nuclear cruiser, and

1 Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate

Pacific Command—Korean coastal waters

and Japanese coastal waters

U.S.S. Constellation (CV-64), 

November 1994 to May 1995

2 Ticonderoga-class cruisers and

1 Spruance-class destroyer

Pacific Command—Korean coastal waters

Central Command—Arabian Gulf and Red

Sea

U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72),

April to October 1995

1 Ticonderoga-class cruiser,

1 Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, and

1 Spruance-class destroyer

Pacific Command—Japanese coastal

waters and Hawaiian coastal waters

Central Command—Arabian Gulf

aThis listing shows only some of the geographic areas visited by surface combatants from the

respective carrier battle group.

Surface combatants from battle groups in the Atlantic Fleet provide

presence in the Mediterranean Sea, exercising with allies in the region and

conducting port visits. These ships also provide a portion of the carrier

battle group presence in the Arabian Gulf. Each of the four Atlantic fleet

deployments that we reviewed involved port visits and exercises in the

Mediterranean Sea, U.N. peacekeeping operations in the Adriatic Sea, and

Iraqi sanctions-related operations in the Arabian Gulf.

Pacific Fleet battle groups provide presence in the western Pacific Ocean,

Indian Ocean, and Arabian Gulf. Two of the three Pacific Fleet

deployments we reviewed included Arabian Gulf operations to intercept

illegal shipping and enforce sanctions against Iraq and bilateral exercises

with allies in the region. For example, one battle group that deployed to

the Central Command area, which consisted of an Aegis cruiser, an Aegis

destroyer, and a Spruance-class destroyer, participated in northern

Arabian Gulf operations and maritime intercept operations. The battle

group also participated in four different exercises with allies in the

Arabian Gulf and made various port visits. Additionally, all three Pacific

Fleet deployments conducted training operations and exercises in seas

adjacent to Korea and Japan.

During peacetime operations, most surface combatants split from the

battle group into smaller formations when reaching an area of deployment

to conduct specific missions, such as training, exercises with allies, and

port visits in the region. (Usually one or more surface combatants, either a

frigate or Aegis-capable cruiser or destroyer, in the group stays with the

carrier to provide defense against air threats.) For example, the Atlantic

Page 77 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix I 

Selected Carrier Battle Group Deployments

Fleet continuously assigned one combatant from a battle group to meet

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standing Naval Force

Mediterranean requirement for exercises with various allies in the area.2

 A

frigate is usually provided rather than an Aegis-capable destroyer or

cruiser. In each of the recent Atlantic Fleet battle group deployments we

reviewed, one ship was continuously assigned to the NATO force, although

that ship was not the same throughout the deployment. An Atlantic fleet

official stated that, for the last 3 years, ships assigned to the NATO force

have been in the Adriatic Sea as part of the task force supporting the U.N.

peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia.

2

The NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean requirement consists of destroyers and frigates

assigned by member nations that are available on short notice for an early military response to a crisis.

Page 78 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix II 

Operational Factors That Affect How

Surface Combatants Are Employed

The Navy’s operational, maintenance, and personnel policies affect how

surface combatant force are employed. Such factors as maintenance

requirements, personnel quality-of-life guidelines, the frequency and

duration of operations, training needs, distance, and the time spent

traveling to and from deployment areas all enter into determining ship

availability and employment.

Major Overhauls Surface combatants and other Navy ships periodically require major

overhauls that leave them unavailable for immediate deployment. For

most surface combatants, these overhauls generally occur

every 80 months for periods of over 6 months. The average surface

combatant spends about 7.7 percent of its life in major overhauls.1

 For

example, in a force of 100 surface combatants, the Navy would have about

92 ships available for deployment at any given time and about 8 ships in

some phase of a major overhaul. Figure II.1 shows two of the Navy’s

Spruance-class destroyers, the U.S.S. John Hancock (DD-981) and

U.S.S. Thorn (DD-988), undergoing routine overhauls at the Newport News

Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation at Newport News, Virginia.

1

According to a Navy official, this figure was derived by computing an average for all surface

combatants from the Navy’s guidance on depot-level maintenance availabilities of ships.

Page 79 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix II 

Operational Factors That Affect How

Surface Combatants Are Employed

Figure II.1: U.S.S. John Hancock and U.S.S. Thorn Undergoing Routine Overhauls

Note: The U.S.S. John Hancock is on the left, and the U.S.S. Thorn is on the right.

Source: Navy.

Personnel Tempo During peacetime, the availability of surface combatants for deployments

is affected by the Navy’s policy on personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO). This

policy limits the amount and duration of time personnel are away from

their home port compared with the time they spend at sea and in other

ports. Time spent in major overhauls is not included in PERSTEMPO

calculations.

Page 80 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix II 

Operational Factors That Affect How

Surface Combatants Are Employed

In response to concerns about excessive periods at sea, the Chief of Naval

Operations established a PERSTEMPO policy in October 1985 to achieve a

balance between quality-of-life considerations for Navy personnel and the

need to sustain fleet operational readiness. The policy guidelines have

three specific goals, which are to

• limit the length of any deployment, including transit time, to 6 months;

• ensure that, before beginning a new deployment, ship personnel spend a

minimum of 2 months in their home port operating area for every month

the ship was deployed; and

• ensure that the ship and its personnel spend a minimum of 50 percent of

the time during a recurring 5-year period in their home port.

By limiting the length of deployments and requiring a minimum time in

home port and home operating area for its personnel, PERSTEMPO policy

affects the number of ships that can be deployed at a given time.

According to Atlantic Fleet officials, PERSTEMPO helps keep up the morale

of Navy personnel and maintain acceptable retention levels in an

all-volunteer Navy. During crisis and war, these goals can be temporarily

suspended to increase the number of deployed ships.

Operational Tempo Operational tempo (OPTEMPO) defines the fuel budgeted to fund operations

and training for ships, commonly referred to as the steaming days

program. The budget for the steaming days program is based on a formula

that considers the number and types of ships; the number of operating and

maintenance months; and utility, fuel, repair, and other estimated costs. In

recent years, the OPTEMPO goals for ships have been 50.5 days at sea per

quarter for deployed forces, 29 days at sea per quarter for nondeployed

Atlantic fleet forces, and 27 days at sea per quarter for nondeployed

Pacific fleet forces. The remaining time each quarter in intended to be

used for overhaul, upkeep, training, and crew rest. If operational

requirements are higher than planned, ships may exceed the OPTEMPO goals

to meet the additional days required at sea.

Interdeployment

Cycle

Ships returning from deployment generally require nearly 1-1/2 years to

prepare for a subsequent deployment. During this interdeployment cycle,

short-term ship maintenance, repairs, and upgrades to the ship’s systems

are completed, and personnel participate in training activities.

Additionally, this period allows the ship’s personnel to take leave and

spend time in their home port.

Page 81 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix II 

Operational Factors That Affect How

Surface Combatants Are Employed

The Navy uses a turnaround ratio to measure the rate at which ships will

be available for their next deployment. This ratio is determined by dividing

the interdeployment cycle time by the length of a deployment. For

example, if ships require 18 months between 6-month deployments, they

have a turnaround ratio of 3:1. PERSTEMPO policy requires a minimum of a

2:1 ratio to ensure that ship personnel spend at least 2 months in their

home port operating area for every month their ship was deployed.

As the ratio increases, fewer ships are available in the force to meet

forward deployments. Some efficiencies, such as reduced training or

maintenance, can be realized in the interdeployment cycle, which can

reduce the ratio and increase ship availability for deployments. For

example, if a turnaround ratio of 3:1 is maintained, about five ships are

needed to keep one ship from Norfolk, Virginia, forward deployed in the

Mediterranean Sea. If the ratio is reduced to 2:1, the same presence can be

met with four ships. Lower turnaround ratios allow the Navy to deploy

more ships within the current force structure for presence but places

pressure on the fleet’s ability to train crews and maintain ships.

Distance, Speed, and

Port Visits

The round-trip distance a ship must travel between its home port and a

deployment region and the time required for the trip affects ship

employment and the number of ships available for peacetime operations.

Longer distances require longer transit times, which reduce the amount of

time during a 6-month deployment that a ship will spend in an overseas

region. For example, Atlantic Fleet ships generally cross the Atlantic

Ocean and arrive in the Mediterranean Sea in about 11 days without stops,

or around 22 days round trip. This transit time allows the ship to spend

more than 5 months in the region during its deployment. On the other

hand, the transit times for the Pacific fleet ships deployed from the West

Coast of the United States are much greater to deployment regions. For

example, a ship deployed from San Diego, California, to the Arabian Gulf

can spend around 34 days in transit without stops, and as much as 45 days

if port visits and training exercises en route are included. With a similar

time required to return to its home port, the ship would spend about half

of its 6-month deployment in the overseas region. These greater distances

for Pacific Fleet ships are mitigated somewhat by having 9 surface

combatants home ported in Japan and 12 in Hawaii.

Similarly, the average speed at which a ship advances toward its

destination also affects transit time. The Navy’s standard average speed

during peacetime deployments is about 14 knots. Increasing the average

Page 82 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix II 

Operational Factors That Affect How

Surface Combatants Are Employed

speed would reduce transit time and increase the amount of time spent in

an overseas region. According to the Navy, faster speeds can increase

maintenance requirements and reduce training time while a ship is

underway. Additionally, port visits during transit or return also increase

transit time and reduce time in the deployment area.

Logistics in Theater While deployed in a forward area, ships require periodic repairs and

replenishment of fuel, ammunition, and supplies at sea to sustain

war-fighting effectiveness. To minimize the risk while operating in

high-threat areas during combat, these ships will travel to protected or

rear areas for replenishment by combat logistics ships. On the basis of its

operational experience, the Navy estimates that about 15 percent of ships

deployed in a forward area will be temporarily unavailable while they are

being replenished. This in-theater logistics factor is considered in planning

the total number of ships required to sustain war-fighting capabilities.

Figure II.1 shows the Aegis-capable cruiser U.S.S. San Jacinto (CG-56) and

the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Nimitz (CVN-68) conducting underway

replenishment operations with the fleet oiler U.S.S. Merrimack (AO-179) in

the Arabian Gulf during April 1996.

Page 83 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix II 

Operational Factors That Affect How

Surface Combatants Are Employed

Figure II.2: Underway Replenishment Operations in the Arabian Gulf

Note: The U.S.S. San Jacinto is on the left, the U.S.S. Merrimack is in the center, and the U.S.S.

Nimitz is on the right.

Source: Navy.

Page 84 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 85 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix III 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 8, 73-74.

Now on pp. 8, 74.

Page 86 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
Appendix IV 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Carol R. Schuster, Associate Director

Richard J. Herley, Assistant Director

Mark J. Wielgoszynski, Evaluator-in-Charge

Bob N. Kenyon, Evaluator

Karen S. Blum, Communications Analyst

Norfolk Field Office C. Douglas Mills, Jr., Regional Assignment Manager

John R. Beauchamp, Evaluator

(701044) Page 87 GAO/NSIAD-97-57 Navy Surface Combatants
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