EASA AD No.: 2010-0035 

EASA Form 110 Page 1/2 

EASA AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE 

AD No.: 2010-0035 

Date: 04 March 2010 

Note: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued by EASA, acting in accordance with 

Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 on behalf of the European Community, its Member States 

and of the European third countries that participate in the activities of EASA under Article 

66 of that Regulation.

This AD is issued in accordance with EC 1702/2003, Part 21A.3B. In accordance with EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.301, 

the continuing airworthiness of an aircraft shall be ensured by accomplishing any applicable ADs. Consequently, no person 

may operate an aircraft to which an Airworthiness Directive applies, except in accordance with the requirements of that 

Airworthiness Directive unless otherwise specified by the Agency [EC 2042/2003 Annex I, Part M.A.303] or agreed with the 

Authority of the State of Registry [EC 216/2008, Article 14(4) exemption]. 

Type Approval Holder’s Name : 

BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd

Type/Model designation(s) : 

HS.748 and ATP aeroplanes 

TCDS Number : EASA.A.192 and EASA.A.397 

Foreign AD : Not applicable 

Supersedure : None 

ATA 27 Flight Controls – Aileron and Rudder Tab Hinge Pins – 

Inspection 

Manufacturer(s): Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd, British Aerospace plc, British Aerospace 

(Commercial Aircraft) Ltd 

Applicability: HS.748 aeroplanes, all models, all serial numbers. 

ATP aeroplanes, all serial numbers. 

Reason: Early in the life of the ATP (circa 1989), a report was received that a 

control surface hinge pin had migrated out of position, causing a rubbing 

contact. BAE Systems responded by issuing SB ATP-27-11, describing a 

one-time inspection of the hinge pins, which was classified mandatory by 

UK CAA AD 006-06-89. Both SB and AD were subsequently cancelled in 

1990. The HS.748 and the ATP secondary controls are similar in these 

areas, although no action was taken on the HS.748 fleet at that time. 

Recently, during a walk round check, an operator found an aileron trim tab 

hinge pin that had migrated sufficiently to cause a rubbing foul on the flap. 

Other reports indicate that, for the purposes of expediency, it has become 

common practice during maintenance when replacing a control tab, 

instead of unbolting the forward part of the piano hinge from the primary 

control surface, the hinge pins are punched out of the hinges. 

Investigations have concluded that, after reinserting the pins after 

maintenance, the ends of the hinges may not have been pinched, which is 

likely to have been the cause of the detected hinge pin migration. 
EASA AD No.: 2010-0035 

EASA Form 110 Page 2/2 

This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to further 

incidents of migration of a tab hinge pin out of the hinge, likely resulting in 

restricted movement of the tab control and consequent reduced control of 

the aeroplane. 

For the reasons described above, this AD requires the inspection of 

aileron and rudder tab piano hinge pins and, depending on findings, the 

necessary corrective actions.

Effective Date: 18 March 2010 

Required action(s) 

and Compliance 

Time(s): 

Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously: 

(1) Within the next three (3) months after the effective date of this AD, 

inspect the aileron and rudder tab piano hinge pins in accordance with 

the instructions of paragraph 2 of BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd 

Service Bulletin (SB) HS748-27-136 or SB ATP-27-090, as applicable 

to aeroplane type. 

(2) If any incorrectly secured hinge pin is found during the inspection as 

required by paragraph (1) of this AD, before next flight, accomplish the 

necessary corrective actions in accordance with the instructions of 

paragraph 2 of BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd SB HS748-27-136 or 

SB ATP-27-090, as applicable to aeroplane type. 

Ref. Publications: BAE Systems (Operations) Limited SB HS748-27-136 dated 14 April 

2009. 

BAE Systems (Operations) Limited SB ATP-27-090 dated 14 April 2009. 

The use of later approved revisions of these documents is acceptable for 

compliance with the requirements of this AD. 

Remarks : 1. If requested and appropriately substantiated, EASA can approve 

Alternative Methods of Compliance for this AD. 

2. This AD was posted on 26 January 2010 as PAD 10-015 for 

consultation until 23 February 2010. No comments were received 

during the consultation period. 

3. Enquiries regarding this AD should be referred to the Airworthiness 

Directives, Safety Management & Research Section, Certification 

Directorate, EASA. E-mail ADs@easa.europa.eu 

4. For any question concerning the technical content of the requirements 

in this AD, please contact: 

BAE Systems (Operations) Ltd, Customer Information Department, 

Prestwick International Airport, Ayrshire, KA9 2RW, Scotland, United 

Kingdom; Telephone +44 1292 675207, Facsimile +44 1292 675704; 

E-mail: RApublications@baesystems.com.