## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Progressive Prem ier Insu rance Co. of Illinoi s v. Em iljan owicz , 2013 IL App (1st) 113664

Appellate Court Caption PROGRES S I VE PREMI ER I NSURANCE COMPANY of I L L I NOI S, Plaintiff-Appellee
, v. KRZ YSZ TOF EMI L J ANOWI CZ, BA RBARA K A RA WA CK

I

- H O RO WI TZ
, DA V I D H O RO WI T Z
, G E I CO a /k /a G e ic o Gene ral I nsu ra nce Company
, and OCCI DENTAL FI RE AND CASU AL TY COMPANY, Def endants (Oc cidental Fire and Casualty Company
, Appellant and Counterplaintiff; v. Prog ressive Premier I nsuranc e Company of I llinois
, Krzy szt of Emiljanowicz, Ba rbar a Kar awa cki-Hor owitz, David Horowitz and Geico, a/k/ a Geico Gene ral I nsuranc e Company , Counterdef endants)

District & N o. First District, Second D ivision
Docke t No. 1-11-3664

Filed May 28, 2013

Held (Note : Thi s sy ll abus

con st i t ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed b y the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) I n an action arising from an acc ident involving a truck the owner had just l ease d to a freig ht company for the transportation of freig ht pursuant t o the company ’s operating rig hts, the trial court proper ly enter ed summary judgme nt fo r the owner ’s insurance company in its action seeking a decla ratory judgme nt that the fre ight company ’s insurance provi d ed

cover ag e, since the fre ight company h ad p o s session and control of the truck at the time of the acc ident, the truck was being driven to a mecha nic
at the fre ight company ’s direc tions for an inspection prior to transporting fre ight, and the truck was a cover ed “auto” p u rs u ant to the company ’s policy

.

Dec ision Under
Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Cook County
, No. 04-CH-08266; the Hon. Sophia Hall, J udg e, pre siding.J udg ment Affir med.

Counsel on Appea l Fe iere isel & Kasbohm, L L C, of Chicag o (Ga ry M. Fe iere isel, of counsel), for a ppellant.

Mag nani & Buc k, L td., of Ch i ca go (Thomas L

. Buc k, of counsel), for appellee

.

Panel PRES I DING J USTI CE HARRI S delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion.
J ustices Quinn and Connors c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Appellant Occ idental Fire & Casualt y C o mpany (Oc cidental) appea ls the order of the circ uit court g ranting plaintiff-a ppellee Prog ressive Premier I nsuranc e Company ’s (Prog ressive) motion for summary judgme nt on Prog ressive’ s decla ratory judgme nt action. On appea l, Occ idental contends (1) g enuine issues of materia l fac t exis t prec luding summary judgme nt; and (2) if b o t h Occ idental’s and Prog ressive’ s policies apply to the underlying

acc ident, Prog ressive’ s policy is primary pursuant to the “other insurance ” provisions of the rele vant policies. We aff

irm.

¶ 2 J URI SDI CTI ON ¶ 3 The circ uit court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of Prog ressive. On November 14, 2011, the court enter ed a judgme nt in the amount of $480,231.24 in favor of Prog ressive and
ag ainst Occ idental. Occ idental filed a notice of appea l on Dec ember 12, 2011. Acc ording ly
, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to I llinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303 g overning
appea ls from final judgme nts enter ed below. I ll. S. Ct. R. 301 (ef f. Fe b. 1, 1994); R. 303 (ef f. May 30, 2008).

¶ 4 BA CKGROUND ¶ 5 Def

endant Krzy szt of Emiljanowicz (Emilja n owicz) owned a 1995 Fr eig htliner truck. On April 21, 2004, Emi l

j an o wi cz executed an application of employ ment with SSTS
, I nc. (SSTS), a corpor ation in the business of transporting fre ight both i n t erstate and intrastate. SSTS operates under a cer tificate of public convenie nce and nece ssity issued by the I nterstate Commerce Commi ssion, and possesses operating rig hts issued by the state of I llinois

. SSTS lease s equipment for ha

uling f reig ht from contra ctors such a s Emiljanowicz.

-2-¶ 6 On May 12, 2004, at 10 a.m., SSTS and Emiljanowicz e x ecute d a contr actor operating
ag ree ment in which Emi ljanowicz ag ree d to l ease his fre ightliner to SSTS for the purpose of hauling fre ight. I n his deposition, the president of SSTS
, Alex Sand rz y k, stated that pursuant to t h e ag ree ment Emiljanowicz would furnish the fre ightliner “for the exclusive possession, Control and use of” SSTS and “shall transport only fre ight of” SSTS

. As proof SSTS rec eived the fre ightliner from Emiljanowicz, SSTS issued a signe d “Rec eipt for Possession of the Equipment.” The contra ctor, howeve r, assumed “complete responsibility for the operation of equipment for the duration of this agr eement.” Sandrzy k stated that it was S STS policy to require its contra ctors to h av e t h ei r equipment inspected and service d by a mecha

nic befor e transporting fre ight for the company

. Chris Sandrzy k, Al ex ’s son, signe d the ag ree ment on behalf of S STS. At that time, he instructed Emiljanowicz to have his freig htliner inspected by a mec hanic. ¶ 7 After execution of the ag ree ment at 10 a.m., S S T S i s s u ed deca ls to Emiljanowicz for place ment on his fre ightl i n er

. T h e deca ls indicate the authority to operate the fre ightliner pursuant to Department of Transpor tation regulations and contain identification numbers. Sandrzy k stated that it is the responsibility of the drivers to place the deca ls on their vehicles. ¶ 8 L ater that same day
, Emiljanowicz drove the truck to pick up a friend and take the truck to a mecha

nic. In his deposition, Emi ljanowicz stated that the truck did not have problems but he neede d to “[c]heck ever y t h i n g out” beca

use he was “start[ing] a new job.” He purcha sed the fre ightliner so he could g o into business as an indep en d ent operator. Emiljanowicz stated that he had called his friend ear lier and asked him “to come with [hi m]

so [he] can drop it off to [t he] mecha nic.” Around 1:45 p.m. on May 12, 2004, on his way to pick up his friend, Emiljanowicz collided with a vehicle dri v en b y defe ndant Ba rbar a Kar awa cki-Hor owitz. ¶ 9 Offic er Kenne th King responde d to the call of an acc ident. I n his deposition, Offic er King acknow ledg ed that his repor t did not contain information identify in g Emiljanowicz’s vehicle

as a co m m er ci al car

rier. He st ated that he could not rec all whether the t ruck had deca ls or placa rds identify ing it as a commerc ial car rier, but if the truck had such information Offic er King would have indicated so in his repor t. Offic er King further stated th at Emiljanowicz

never told him that he was working for SSTS at the time of the acc ident. Of fi ce r Ki ng obtained insuranc e information from Emiljanowicz. ¶ 10 At the time of the acc ident, Emiljanowicz was cover ed by an insurance policy issued by Prog ressive. The Prog ressi v e policy contains the following “Continge nt L iability Endorseme nt”:
“We ag ree with you that the provisions of the Policy rela ting to insurance for P ersonal Injury P rote ction, Bodi ly Injury Liab ility, and P ropert y Dam age Lia b i l i ty are subject to the following limit ations:
1. These c overa g es apply

only to an insu red named in the Policy decla rations.
2. These cover ag es do not apply at any time when an insu red under this endorse ment is operating, maintaining , or using the insu red auto or any other auto for or on behalf of any one else or any org anization whether or not the insu red is being compensa ted for such use.

-3-3. These cover ag es do not apply when a n insu red under this e ndorsement is a cting

as an a g ent or e mploy ee of any one else or any

org anization.” ¶ 11 Occ idental issued a liability insurance policy to SSTS for cover ag e of all v eh i cl es in service for SSTS
, whether owned or lease d by SSTS

. The policy provides cover ag e for “all

sums an ‘insured’ must leg ally pay as damag es beca us e o f ‘bodi ly injury ’ or ‘prope rty damag e’ to which this insurance appl i es, cause d by an ‘ac cident’ and resulting from the

owner ship, maintenanc e or use of a cover ed ‘auto’.” The policy also contains the following : “1. Who Is An I nsu red The following are ‘insureds’ : a. You f or any cover ed ‘a

uto’.
* * *
d. The owner or any one else from whom y ou hire or borrow a cover ed ‘auto’ that is not a ‘trailer ’ while the c overe d ‘auto’: (1) I s being used exclusively in y our business as a

‘trucke r’; and (2 ) I s being used pursuant to opera ting rig hts g rante d to y ou by a public authority .” The policy define s “truc ker” as “any person o r org anization eng ag ed in the business of transporting proper

ty by ‘auto’ f or hire.” ¶ 12 Wit hin the Occ idental policy is a “SCHEDUL E OF COVERED AUTOS YOU OWN” i n which SSTS listed both its owned and nonowned vehicles. The policy also contain s a provision detailing liability cover ag e for owned vehicles a c q u ired by SSTS afte r the eff ective date of the policy : “B . Owned Autos You Acquire After The Policy

Be g ins
1. I f Sy mbols 41, 42, 43, 44 or 45 are enter ed next to a cover ag e in I tem Two of
t h e Dec larations, then y ou have cover ag e for ‘autos’ that y ou acquir e of t h e t y p e descr ibed for the rema inder of the policy period.
2. But, if Sy

mbol 46 is enter ed next to a cover age i n I t em Two of the Dec larations, an ‘auto’ y ou acquir e will be a cover ed ‘auto’ for that cover ag e only if:
a. We alre ady

cover all ‘autos’ that y ou own for tha t cover ag e or it re place s an ‘a uto’ y ou previously

owned that ha d that cover ag e; and b. You tell us within 30 day s afte r y ou acquir e it that y ou want us to cover it for that c overa g e.” ¶ 13 S y

m b o l 46 ref

ers to the “autos” specific ally descri b ed i n t h e “S C HE DU L E OF COVERED AUTOS YOU OWN.” Sy mbol 47 applies to “those ‘autos’ y ou lease
, hire, rent

or borrow.” Both parties ag ree that Emiljanowicz’s fre ightliner falls within the definition of
sy mbol 47. As is appar ent from th e ab o v e provision, Occ idental’s policy does not specify

cover ag e for leased v eh i cles obtained afte r the policy beg ins. SSTS
, howeve r, did add Emiljanowicz’s fre ightliner to the list of specific ally descr ibed nonowned vehicles on J une 8, 2004. ¶ 14 Ms. Kar awa cki-Hor owitz filed a bodily injury claim ag ainst Emiljanowicz to re co v er

-4-damag es as a result of the acc ident. Her husband, David Horowitz, filed a claim for loss of

consortium. Prog ressive defe nded the claims under a rese rvation of rig hts, and the claims

wer e subseq

u e n tl y d is mi ssed pursuant to a settlement in the amount of $400,000. Prog ressive filed a de clar atory

judgme nt action seeking a decla ration of cover ag e under the Occ idental policy in lieu of the Prog ressive policy

. I t soug ht reimburse ment for the defe nse and settlement of the Horowitz claims. Occ idental filed a counter claim alleg ing no cover ag e was provided unde r its policy , as we ll as other def enses. ¶ 15 Prog ressive filed a mot ion for summ ary judgm en t and Occidental filed a response and

a cross-motion for summary judgme n t

. On April 15, 2011, the trial court g rante d Prog ressive’ s m o tion and denied Occ idental’s motion, ruling that the underly ing action trig g ere d Occ idental’s duty to defe nd. The court ruled that Emiljanowicz and his fre ightliner

wer e cove red by

Occ idental’s policy

and “[i] t is undisputed that at the time of the ac cident Emiljanowicz was in the proce ss of taking his trac tor to a mecha nic to g et his trac tor examined.” The trial court rese rved the question of the application of the “other insurance ” provisions of the policies pending further briefing on the application of Prog ressive’ s policy

. Prog ressive then filed a

supplemental motion for summary judgme nt, and Occ idental filed

a response

. The trial court g rante d Prog ressive’ s motion on Aug ust 11, 2011, and on November 14, 2011, it enter ed judgme nt in favor of Prog ressive and ag ainst Occ idental. Occ idental filed this timely appea l.

¶ 16 ANAL YSI S ¶ 17 On appea l, Occ idental contends the trial court err ed in g ranting Prog ressive’ s motion for
summary judgme nt, finding that Occ idental’s poli cy provided covera g e for the underly ing Horowitz claims, and denying Occidental’s cross-motion for summary judgme nt. “The construction of an i n s u rance policy and a deter mination of the rig hts and obliga tions there under ar e questions of law for the court and appropr iate subjects for dispositi on by
summary judgme nt.” Konami ( America)

, Inc. v. Hartford Insurance Co. of Illinois
, 326 I ll. App. 3d 874, 87 7 (2 0 0 2). I f parties file cross-motions for summary judgme nt, they acknow ledg e that no materia l questions of fac t exis t and the on l y issue is one of law
reg ardingthe construc tion of an insuranc e policy

. American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fisher De ve l opment, Inc.
, 391 I ll. App. 3d 521, 525 (2009). W e review the trial court’s deter minations on motions for summary judgme nt de novo

. Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New Y

ork , 224 I ll. 2d 550, 556 (2007). ¶ 18 I n order for Occ idental’s policy to ap p l y h er e, we m u st find that Emiljanowicz is an insured under the policy and that his fre ightliner is a cover ed “auto.” Acc ording to the terms of Occ idental’s policy
, Emiljanowicz qualifies as an insu re d if his vehicle is being used exclusively in SSTS ’s business of “tra nsporting proper

ty by ‘auto ’ for hire.” Occ idental contends Emiljanowicz is not an insured under the policy beca use he was driving his vehicle
to pick up a friend and was not eng ag ed in the bus iness of t ranspor ting prop er t y o n behalf of S STS at t he ti me of the accident. Oc cidental’ s arg uments on this issue, in both its main brief and its reply brief, make no supporting citations to auth o ri t y

. Oc cidental’ s argument without support violates I llinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)( 7) (ef f. J uly 1, 2008), which

-5-provides that arguments “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the rea sons

there for, with citation of the authorities and the pag es of the rec ord relied on.” There fore
, it has waived this argument on revie w. Howeve r, even on the merits we are not persua ded by Occ idental’s conte ntions. ¶ 19 The u n d i s puted fac ts show that SSTS is a corpor ation in the business of transpor ting fre ight both interstate and intrastate. SSTS operates under a cer tificate of public convenie nce and nece ssity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commi ssion, and possesses op e r a ti n g r ig hts issued by the S t at e o f I llinois

. Pursuant to a contra ctor operating ag ree ment, SSTS lease d Emiljanowicz’s fre ightliner for transporting propert y

. T he ag ree ment g rante d SSTS “exclusive possession, Control and use of” the fre ightliner for its bu s i n es s. Emiljanowicz
agr ee d t o transport only fre ight from SSTS

. The ag ree ment also provided that t h e “[c]ontractor shall follow the direc tions of [S STS] exclusively in t h e p er formance of its duties under this Ag ree ment.” Fur thermore
, i t wa s S STS’s policy to direc t contra ctors to have their equipment inspected and service d by a mecha nic befor e beg inning work with the
company . SSTS g ave E miljanowicz identification deca ls to place on his vehicle

. ¶ 20 After the parties signe d the ag ree ment, Chris Sandrzy k instructed Emiljanowicz to ha ve hi s vehicle inspected by a mecha nic. Emiljanowicz stated that the truck did not have problems but he neede d to “ [c] heck ever y thing out” beca

use he was “start[ing] a new job.” Emiljanowicz wanted to take a friend along so that he could drop off the truck with the mecha nic. On his way to pick up his friend, Emiljanowicz was involved in the collision that resulted in the unde rly ing H orowitz claims. ¶ 21 Where the contra ctor ag re em en t p ro v i d es that the insured corpor ation has exclusive possession, control and use o f a lease d vehicle, and at the time of the acc ident the vehicle
was ope rating on direc tions from the corpor ation, the vehicle is being used i n the bus iness of the corpor ation. Occ idental Fire & Casualty C o

. o f N orth Carolina v. Padgett
, 113 I ll. App. 3d 215, 219-20 (1983). There fore
, Emiljanowicz was eng ag ed in the business of SSTS at the time of the a ccide nt. ¶ 22 Occ idental, howeve r, argues that Emiljanowicz was not eng ag ed in the business of SSTS beca use his vehicle did not have a trailer at t ac h ed and did not display placa rds or deca ls identify ing it as unde r lea se by SSTS . Occ idental also ar g ues that its policy does not cove r Emiljanowicz beca

use he was not employ ed by SSTS at the time of the acc ident to transport proper ty but, rathe r, was on his way to pick up a friend. As discus s ed ab o v e, Occ idental provides no case s in support of its arguments. Neve rtheless, as long as the hiring corpor ation had exclusive posse ssion a nd control of the vehicle, and the vehicle was being operated on direc tions from the corpor ation, it is eng ag ed in the business of the corpor ation even if it was not in the proce ss of transporting proper ty and did not have a trailer attache d. See Occ idental
, 113 I ll. App. 3d at 220 (cove red acc ident occur red afte r corpor ation told driver to leave his trailer and g o home beca

use another load would not be rea dy for transport until the following day ). See also St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Frankart
, 69 I l l

. 2 d 2 0 9 (1977) (ac cident that occur

red when the driver was returning home pulling an empty trailer on direc tions of company

was in the c ourse of

the company ’s business). ¶ 23 The undisputed testimony also reve als that Emiljanowicz was g iven the deca ls a fter he

-6-signe d the ag ree ment with SST S an d h e possessed the deca ls at the time of the acc ident.

Sandrzy k stated that it is the responsibility of the contr ac t o r t o display the deca ls on the vehicle. Occide ntal provides no case s in support of i ts argument that the failure t o d i s p l ay the deca ls prec ludes a finding that Emiljanowicz was opera t i n g h i s fre ightliner in the business of SSTS at the time of the acc ident. I n fac t, the deca ls ar e part of an I nterstate Commerce Commi ssion regulatory scheme that, althoug h informative, is not controlling on this iss ue. Occ idental , 113 I ll. App. 3d at 220. ¶ 24 The deter

minative fac tor rema ins wheth er S S T S h ad ex cl u s ive possession, control, responsibility and use o f t he freig htliner at t he ti me of the accident. The parties signed the
ag ree ment at 10 a.m. on May 12, 2004. At that time, Chris Sandry zk instructed Emiljanowicz
to g et his fre ightliner inspected and service d by a mecha nic pursuant to SSTS p o l icy

. Approxim ately three hours later, Emiljanowicz was on his way to pick up a friend so that he could drop off his vehicle with the mecha nic and complete the inspection demande d by SSTS

. The acc ident o cc u rr ed as Emiljanowicz drove to g et his friend. I n his deposition, Emiljanowicz e x plicitly stated that he had called his friend ear lier and asked him “ to c ome with [hi m] so [he] can drop it off to [t he] mecha nic.” Emiljanowicz provided no other rea son for driving the fre ightliner to his friend’ s house, and no testimony contra dicted him on this issue. We hold that under the terms of Occ idental’s po l icy
, Emiljanowicz is a cover ed insured. 1 ¶ 25 Next we deter

mine whether Emiljanowicz’s fre ightliner was a cover ed “auto” at the time of the acc ident. The trial court found that the fre ight l i n er , as a specific ally descr ibed auto within Occ idental’s policy
, was cover ed by sy mbol 46 in the provision for au t o s acquired afte r the policy beg ins. Since the policy cover s all such “autos” lease d by SSTS
, and SSTS added the fre ightliner on J une 8, 2004, within 30 day s of acquir ing it by signing the
contra ctor ag ree ment with Emiljanowicz, the trial court deter mined that the fre ightliner was

a co v ere d “auto” under Occ idental’s policy

. Occ idental disag ree s, arguing that the fre ightliner falls under sy mbol 47, not 46, and as such must be listed on the policy for

cover ag e to apply . Occ idental, howeve r, provides no c itations to support i ts arg ument. ¶ 26 I t is true that Occ idental’s poli cy contains no specific provision for covera ge o f lea sed
autos acquir ed after the policy beg ins. Howeve r, although Emi ljanowicz’s fre ightliner is a l ease d “auto” within the definition of sy mbol 47, Occ idental’s policy also lists t h e fre ightliner as a specific ally d es cr i b ed auto in the “SCHEDUL E OF COVERED AUTOS YOU OWN” se ction of the de clar ations. I t appea rs that SSTS listed all of its leased truc ks

as specific ally descr ibed autos. Specifica lly descr ibed autos are desig nated by sy mbol 46 in the pol i cy

. Occ idental’s policy is ambig uous insofar as it does not specify whether lease d vehicles listed as a specific ally descr ibed auto can be desig nated by sy mbol 46 in deter

mining

T he par ti es al so dis cus s Fre ed v. The Trav el ers , 300 F.2d 395 (7t h Cir

. 1962 ), in whic h the 1 dri ver of a le ase d vehicl e had a coll is ion af te r drop pin g off a load and whil e taking his vehicl e to a ga r a ge f o r ser vice and m ai nte nan ce. T he Fre ed cou rt fou nd tha t al tho ugh the dri ver had a dut y t o

m ai nta in the tr uck, thi s dut y did not ef fe ct ively re m ove per for m anc e of m ai nte nan ce fr om the sph er e of the cor por at ion ’ s b u s i n e s s a ct ivit ie s. Id

. at 398. Alt hough inf ormati ve, fe der al cas e la w is not

con tr oll ing her e. Pri or P lumb ing & Heat ing

Co. v . Hagi ns , 258 I ll . App. 3d 6 83, 6 88 ( 1994 ).

-7-cover ag e for those acquir ed afte r the policy beg ins. Courts will const rue such ambig uities

ag ainst the insurer who draf ted the policy

. Outboard Ma r i n e Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
, 154 I ll. 2d 90, 108 (1992). Th e r e f o r e , we find that Emiljanowicz’s fre ightliner falls within the definition of sy mbol 46 for deter

mining cover ag e of autos acquir ed afte r the policy beg ins. The parties do not dispute that Occ idental’s policy cover s all of the trucks SSTS lease s to transport proper ty

. SSTS also added the fre ightliner within 30 day s of signing the contra ctor ag ree ment with Emiljanowicz. Acc ording to the terms of Occ idental’s policy
, the fre ightliner

is a cove red “ auto” unde r Oc cidental’ s policy

. ¶ 27 Occ idental also contends that the tr i al court err ed in finding that Prog ressive’ s policy issued to Emiljanowicz did not apply and denying Occ idental’s motion for summary judgme nt. Gene rally
, the denial of a summary judgme nt motion is not a final judgme nt and is there fore not appea lable. Chavda v. W olak
, 188 I ll. 2d 394, 403 (1999). Howeve r, revie w of a denial for summary judgme nt is proper wher e the trial court’s order also g rante d a crossmotion for summary

judgme nt on the same c laim. Id

. ¶ 28 At issue is the following conting ent liab i l i t y en d o rs em en t p ro v i s i o n co n tained in Prog ressive’ s policy : “2. These cover ag es do not apply at any time when an insu red under thi s endorse ment is ope rating
, maintaining, or using the insu red auto or any other auto for

or on behalf of any one else or any org anizat i o n wh et h er or not the insu red is being
compensated for suc h use.” ¶ 29 Occ idental argues that this provision does not apply here beca us e “ [a ]l th o u g h

Pr o g r e s s ive
argued below that Emiljanowicz was in the proce ss of taking his truck to a mecha nic to have it chec ked out to make sure it was in proper operating condition so he could start his job with SSTS
, another equally likely infere nce is that Emiljanowicz was picking up a friend and, in addition, was g oing to a mecha nic to make sure the truck
, which he just purcha sed, was operating proper ly in order that he could use it for any rea son.” Occ idental conclude s that a g enuine issue of materia l f act exis ts pr ecluding the g rant of summar y judgme nt in favor of Prog ressiv e. However, Prog ressive filed a motion for summary judgme nt and Occ idental filed a cross-motion for summary judgme nt. In filing cross-motions for summary judgme nt, the parties acknow ledg e that no materia l que stions of fac t e x ist a nd the only issue is one of law reg arding the construction of a n insurance policy

. American F amily Mutual Insurance Co. , 391 I ll. App. 3d at 525. ¶ 30 Neve rthele s s , t h e ev i d en ce i n the rec ord does not support Occ idental’s claim. As discussed above, it was S STS policy to require its contra ctors to have their equipment inspected and service d by a mecha nic befor e transporting fre ight for the com p an y

. Chris S an d rzy k, afte r signing the ag ree ment on behalf of SSTS
, told Emiljanowicz to have his fre ightliner inspected by a mecha nic. In his deposition, Emiljanowicz s tated that he had called a friend ear lier and asked him “to come with [h i m ] s o [he] can drop it off to [t he] mecha nic.” This undisputed testimony shows that Emiljanowicz we nt to pick up his friend

so that he could drop off his fre ightliner at the mecha nic for the inspection order ed by SSTS

. When the acc ident occur

red, a mere three hours afte r he signe d the contra ctor ag ree ment and

rec eived SSTS’s identify ing de cals, Emil janowicz was in the process of taking his vehicle

-8-to the mecha nic. There fore
, Emiljanowicz wa s operating or maintaining his f reig htliner on behalf of SSTS at the time of the acc ident and Prog ressive’ s conting ent liability endorse ment applies to exclude cover ag e. See Occ idental
, 113 I ll. App. 3d at 219-20. The trial court did

n o t err in g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of Prog ressive and deny ing Occ iden t al ’s cross-motion for summar y judgme nt. ¶ 31 Oc ci d ental also argues that Prog ressive’ s policy should apply beca use “in I llino i s t h e g ener al rule is that the insurance follows the car .” I t cites to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group
, 182 I ll. 2d 240 (199 8 ). State Farm
, howeve r, involves a test driver at a deale rship who g ot into an acc ident while test driving the deale r’s c ar. State Farm is not applicable he re. ¶ 32 Si n c e w e find that Prog ressive’ s policy does not apply
, we need not consider O ccide ntal’s

rema ining contention that Prog ressive’ s policy is primary and Occ idental’s policy is excess pursuant to their “ other policies” provisions. ¶ 33 For

the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the c ircuit court is af firmed.

¶ 34 Affir

med.

-9-