This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS A15-1774 Michael Delaney Harris, petitioner, Appellant,

vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent. Filed July 11, 2016 Affirmed Reyes, Judge Ramsey County District Court File No. 62CR123704 Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Carol Comp , Special Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Lori Swanson, Attorney Gene ral, St. Paul, Minnesota; and John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Kaarin Long, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Schellhas, Presiding Judge; Peterson, Judge; and Reyes, Judge. U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N REYES , Judge On appeal from the denial of postconvic tion relief, appellant argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to fifth-degree possession of a controlled2 substance because of testing deficiencies di scovered at the St. Paul Police Department Crime Lab (SPPDCL). We affirm. FACTS On May 5, 2012, appellant Michael Dela ine Harris was arrested for violating an order for protection (OFP). Wh en appellant was arrested, an officer found a brown vial in his pocket containing what the officer su spected was cocaine. The SPPDCL tested the substance, and it tested positive for cocaine. On June 8, 2 012, appellant pleaded guilty to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substan ce, and in exchange, the state dismissed the charge related to the OFP violation. The di strict court accepted appellant’s plea and adjudicated him guilty. Appellant wa s sentenced on July 26, 2012. On July 25, 2014, appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. In his petition, appellant outlined seve ral problems at the SPPDCL th at were revealed in a 2012 case and subsequent lab audits. The postco nviction court denied appellant’s petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. The postconviction court determined that appellant’s petition was tim ely but meritless. This appeal follows. D E C I S I O N “[Appellate courts] review a denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for an evidentiary hear ing, for an abuse of discretion.” Riley v. State , 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012 ). “A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State v. Nicks , 831 N.W.2d 493, 50 3 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). “[Appellate courts] review legal issues de n ovo,” but our review of factual issues “is3 limited to whether there is suffi cient evidence in th e record to sustai n the postconviction court’s findings.” Matakis v. State , 862 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. 2015) (quotation omitted). An individual who is convicted of a crime and claims the co nviction was obtained in violation of the individual’s constitutiona l rights may file a petition for postconviction relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2012). A petition for postconviction relief must be filed within two years of the later of “(1) th e entry of judgment or conviction or sentence if no direct appeal is filed; or (2) an ap pellate court’s dispositi on of petitioner’s direct appeal.” Id. , subd. 4(a) (2012). Here, appellant’s petition is timely because it was filed on July 25, 2014, which is with in two years of July 26, 2012, the date on which appellant was sentenced. Id. We next turn to appella nt’s substantive arguments. Appellant argues that, in light of the defi ciencies at the SPPD CL, he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea base d on (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) a Brady violation; (3) a procedural due-process vi olation; (4) manifest injustice; and (5) ineffective assistance of coun sel. In addition, appellant argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Appellant’s first th ree arguments fail becau se a counseled guilty plea “has traditionally operated, in Minnesota a nd in other jurisdictions, as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects arising prior to the entry of the plea.” State v. Ford , 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986 ). We address appellant’s remaining arguments in turn. I. Manifest injustice Appellant argues that his guilty plea wa s not accurate, voluntary, or intelligent, resulting in a manifest injustic e. We are not persuaded.4 A court must allow a defendant to withdr aw a guilty plea if it is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. “Manifest injustice occurs if a guilty plea is not accurate , voluntary, and intelligent.” Perkins v. State , 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). “A defendant bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid. Assessing the validity of a plea presents a ques tion of law that [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010) (citations omitted). A. Accurate For a guilty plea to be accurate, “[a] prope r factual basis must be established.” State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Appellant pleaded guilty to fifthdegree possession of a controlled s ubstance, and he admitted to all of the elements of the offense. He admitted that the substance he possessed was cocaine and acknowledged in his plea petition that he was not claiming inno cence. These facts, admitted by appellant at his plea hearing, satisfy the accuracy requirement. B. Voluntary Courts determine whether a plea is vol untary “by considering all relevant circumstances” and ensuring that the defend ant did not plead guilty “due to improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh , 778 N.W.2d at 96. Appellan t argues that the test results from the SPPDCL created improper pressure that induced him to plead guilty. The record does not support appellant’s contentio n. Appellant did not ask to review the SPPDCL records, did not challe nge the test results, and did no t dispute that the substance was cocaine. Appellant’s plea petition, whic h he signed and acknowledged at the plea hearing, stated that no one had threatened him or made him any pr omises in order to5 obtain a guilty plea. Accordingly, appellant was not improperly pressured or coerced to plead guilty. C. Intelligent For a guilty plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand the charges against him, the rights he is waiving, and the consequences of the plea. Id . Appellant argues that he did not know about the defici encies at the SPPDCL, did not understand the scope of his right to challenge the evidence against him, and did not know that he was waiving this right by pleading guilty. At the plea hearing, appellant confirmed that he understood that he had been charged with and was pleading guilty to fifth-degree possession of a controlled substan ce. He also stated that he had no reason to dispute the law-enforcement tests, which indicated that the controlled substance appellant possessed was cocaine. Additionally, the signed plea pe tition confirms that a ppellant’s attorney informed him of the rights he was waivin g and that he would not have another opportunity to object to the st ate’s evidence against him. These facts indicate that appellant understood the charges against him, the rights he was waiving, and the consequences of his guilty plea. Therefore, we conclude that appella nt’s plea was accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. As such, the district court di d not abuse its discreti on by determining that appellant is not entitled to postconviction relief based upon a manifest injustice. II. Ineffective assistance of counsel Appellant argues that he received objec tively unreasonable representation because his attorney did not demand and review the SPPDCL file. We disagree.6 Appellate courts review ineffective-a ssistance-of-counsel claims de novo. State v. Rhodes , 657 N.W.2d 823, 84 2 (Minn. 2003). To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim, appellant must show that (1 ) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding wo uld have been different. Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984). “We need not address both the performance and prejudi ce prongs if one is determinative.” Rhodes , 657 N.W.2d at 842. An attorney provides objectively reasonable assistance when he exercises the customary skill a nd diligence that a reasonabl y competent attorney would exercise under similar circumstances. State v. Vang , 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn. 2014). “Trial counsel’s performance is presumed to be reasonable.” Id . at 266. This court recently addressed an argumen t similar to that of appellant’s in Roberts
v. State , 856 N.W.2d 287, 293 (Minn. App. 2014), review denied (Minn. Jan. 28, 2015). Roberts also claimed that he received ine ffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to investigate and disc over the deficiencies at the SPPDCL. Id. at 293. But like Roberts, appellant does not allege thathis attorney failed to discuss this option with him, refused to request the file, “or advised him not to challenge the results.” Id. Appellant also fails to prov ide evidence that it was the customary practice of defense attorneys at the time to request SPPDCL file s for cases involving controlled substances. Because appellant does not show how his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, his inef fective-assistance-of-counsel argument fails, and we need not consider the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, we7 conclude that the district court did not abus e its discretion by denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief based on his in effective-assistance-of-counsel claim. III. Evidentiary hearing Finally, appellant argues that the postconv iction court erred by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. A postconviction court’s decision regard ing whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Riley , 819 N.W.2d at 167. A postconviction petitioner is not entitled to an ev identiary hearing if “the petition and the files and records of the proceed ing conclusively show that th e petitioner is entitled to no relief.” Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2012). “An evidentiary hearing is not required unless there are material facts in dispute that must be resolv ed to determine the postconviction claim on its merits.” Powers v. State, 695 N.W.2d 371, 374 (Minn. 2005). For the reasons previously di scussed, the record conclu sively demonstrates that appellant is not entitled to relief, and there are no disputed issues of material fact. Therefore, appellant has not shown that the postconviction court abused its discretion by denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Id. Affirmed.