OURNAL

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Combating WMD

J

Issue 7 Spring/Summer 2011

Decon Emitting Neutralizer of Improvised 

Explosive Devices (DENIED)

The Spore Casing as Defense for the 

“Anthrax” Biological Agent

Department of Army’s Role in Response to a 

Domestic Bioterror Attack!

U.S. - Russian Partnership and the Plutonium 

Production Reactor Agreement

Exercise “Poets Corner” a Multinational 

Effort to Prevent CBRNE Terrorism Service-Level CWMD 

Framework
Inside the Journal

COMBATING WMD

INTERNATIONAL

MODELING and SIMULATION

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

HISTORY

3 Service-Level CWMD Framework

10 The Department of the Army’s Role in 

Response to a Domestic Bioterror Attack

41 U.S. - Russian Partnership and the Plutonium 

Production Reactor Agreement

37 Enhancing Visualization of HPAC Scenarios using Google Earth©

45 Exercise “Poets Corner” a Multinational Effort 

to Prevent CBRNE Terrorism

20 Decon Emitting Neutralizer of Improvised 

Explosive Devices (DENIED)

24 The Spore Wall as Defense for the Biological 

Agent Bacillus anthracis

32 Pentomic Soldiers

Mr. Steven Rollins

LTC Mitchell L. Wise

 MAJ Kevin J. Owens, U.S. Army

Mr. Mathew Jackson

LTC Vasilli “Bill” Karatzas

 LTC Michael S. Quinn

and

2LT Christopher Rivers 

and

Dr. Jon J. Calomiris

LTG Daniel P. Bolger

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7

COL Sones, MAJ Kling,

 MAJ McManus, MAJ Guard, MSG Sarveri

45

41

37

Front Cover: Royal Logistic Corps (UK) EOD Tech 

positions his x-ray on a RDD in the trunk of a car 

during CAPEX 2011 Morton-on-Marsh, UK. EOD 

would later render safe the RDD with a disruptor 

in order to allow a police forensic team to collect 

evidence. Photo courtesy of LTC Michael Quinn
Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United 

States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are those 

of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating 

WMD Journal’s contents does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army positions 

and does not supersede information in other official Army publications.

Distribution: U.S. Army organizations and activities with CBRN-related missions, 

to include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear 

surety programs, and FA52 officer. The Secretary of the Army has determined that the 

publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as 

required by law. 

Article Submission: We welcome articles from all U.S. Government agencies and 

academia involved with CBRN matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved 

by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Submit articles in 

Microsoft Word without automatic features, include photographs, graphs, tables, etc. 

as separate files, please call or email us for complete details. 

The editor retains the right to edit and select which submissions to print.

Mailing Address: 

Director, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA)

5915 16th Street Bldg 238 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-0529.

Telephone: 703-806-7848, DSN 656-7848, Fax 703-806-7900

Electronic Mail: usarmy.belvoir.hqda-dcs-g-3-5-7.mail.usanca-mailbox@mail.mil

Subject line: ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal (enter subject)

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

16

1 From the Director

By Mr. Peter Bechtel

Combating WMD

Resource Page

16 Japan had an atomic bomb 

(genzai bakuden) program in WWII?

By Mr. Robert Pfeffer

DO YOU KNOW...

48 Combating

WMD Resources

Published by the 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA)

Director

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Editors

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Mr. Glen Scott

Editorial Board

COL Brent Bredehoft, Chairperson 

Dr. Martin Moakler, Analysis Division 

COL Kenneth Deal, Operations Division

COL Joseph Marquart, Capabilities Division

Design/Layout

Gerald Barrington

Combating WMD JOURNAL

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
FROM THE DIRECTOR

Putting R and N Back in CBRN

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Mr. Peter Bechtel 

Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and 

Nuclear (CBRN) are weapons, effects 

and conditions that the Army must be 

prepared to deal with on the battlefield or within our 

own borders. Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) is a mission, broken down into eight 

military mission areas that cross cut the six warfighting functions by which we prevent, protect, respond 

and recover from CBRN weapons and their effects.

Each of the CBRN weapons and their effects have 

unique challenges and operational response requirements. The Army has invested a great deal of effort 

and resources in passive defense, consequence 

management (CM) and foreign consequence management. However, for nuclear effects and particularly the 

prevention of nuclear smuggling, the Army’s doctrine 

and equipment, except for a few specialized and elite 

units, have not progressed much from the Cold War era. 

The US and international partners have taken action to 

address the nuclear threat. Cooperative Threat Reduction 

efforts have done excellent work in securing nuclear weapons and material from the former Soviet Union. Departments of State, Energy and Defense efforts have identified and secured special nuclear material and radiological 

sources world-wide and increased national and international capabilities to detect illicit movement of nuclear 

weapons and the special nuclear material (SNM) that is 

key to their development. Multilateral initiatives, like the 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, have raised 

international awareness of the threat. Safeguards under 

the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty allow peaceful use of 

nuclear technology, while attempting to ensure weapons 

programs are detected and avoided. Arms control treaties 

have limited the number of weapons in Russia and the U.S. 

CWMD Military Mission Areas

 • Security Cooperation and Partner 

Activies

 • Threat Reduction Cooperation

 • WMD Interdiction

 • Offensive Operations

 • WMD Elimation

 • Active Defense

 • WMD Consequence Management

ARMY Warfighting Functions

 • Mission Command

 • Movement and maneuver

 • Intelligence

 • Fires

 • Sustainment

 • Protection

1 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
Despite all these positive steps, the threat from 

nuclear proliferation and potential terrorist acquisition of 

nuclear capabilities is expected to continue. Thousands 

of nuclear weapons still exist, special nuclear materials remain outside of safeguards and vulnerable to theft 

or diversion, and detection and interdiction of SNM 

remains a technical and operational challenge. Recognizing this, our national and military strategic guidance 

documents have articulated the need to increase our 

focus and capabilities in the areas of preventing nuclear 

proliferation and terrorism and responding to their use. 

The Army’s Operating Concept for 2016-2028 went as 

far as specifying that the threat from a terrorist device 

employed in the U.S. is the “most dangerous alternative.” 

In the past the Army recognized the requirements and 

challenges of a nuclear armed adversary. During the Cold 

War we prepared to continue operations and win when 

confronted with thousands of tactical nuclear weapons. 

The basic tenants found in FM 100-30, Nuclear Operations, still apply and are being updated by the Combined 

Arms Center to better reflect and apply to full spectrum 

operations. The Army continues to harden essential 

combat power platforms against nuclear weapons 

effects. The Army’s nuclear survivability program was the 

model upon which DoD patterned a recent directive for 

a department-wide survivability program. Vigilance into 

the future is essential to ensure that when faced with a 

nuclear threat, our Soldiers and their equipment survive 

so they can continue the fight. As equipment becomes 

more and more sophisticated and autonomous, our survivability schema must adapt. We cannot become overly 

vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse that could potentially 

affect electronics over thousands of square kilometers. 

The Army was also prepared for radiation on the battlefield. We manned, trained, and equipped our organizations to predict, detect and avoid fallout, and decontaminate personnel and equipment. The current multi-service 

Tactic techniques and procedures (TTPs) found in the FM 

3-11 series provides our foundation to conduct CBRN 

defense and sense, shape, shield and sustain in a contaminated operating environment. The radiation detection 

equipment fielded to our forces is still adequate for this 

mission, but, as will be discussed later, is not capable 

for a wider set of prevention requirements. The recent 

experience from the unfortunate reactor accidents in 

Japan has reinforced the Army’s need to understand and 

implement RN defense, not only for the forces conducting 

operations, but for our civilian personnel at fixed installations. Lessons are still being captured across the Army, 

DoD, and interagency, but the basic principles laid out 

for conducting operations in a radiological contaminated 

environment, whether from a nuclear detonation or a reactor accident, the “fallout” and procedures are basically 

the same. Unfortunately, on a macro level we neglected 

our doctrine and TTPs. The Army must institutionalize 

the forthcoming lessons and refresh the leader awareness and soldier skills associated with these basic tasks.

The Army is best postured for responding to a CBRN 

employment—actions to the “right-of-boom.” National level 

emphasis is now being placed on prevention measures—

those actions to the “left-of-boom.” Prevention measures 

have been for the most part conducted by a limited number 

of exclusive units and teams. However, the organization of 

our forces to discover and prevent radiological and nuclear 

development and employment cannot rely exclusively on 

a few expert teams. It requires general purpose CBRN 

forces to have a basic understanding of nuclear weapons 

program signatures and a set of tools capable of detecting 

low levels of radiation and identifying the source of that 

radiation and knowing when to call for additional experts 

like that resident on an NDT to confirm and further exploit 

what was found. Further, positive efforts have been taken 

by DoD to enable the maritime and air interdiction of nuclear weapons and material. However, land interdiction is 

only now being addressed. As global response plans for 

dealing with “loose nucs” and preventing WMD terrorism in 

the homeland mature, the Army needs to develop RN land 

interdiction strategies and capabilities to support the land 

component commanders in their emerging counter nuclear 

missions. Land, air and sea components under command 

and control of GCCs will have the mainstay of efforts to 

cover transit routes in an ambiguous environment and 

assist in developing the situation. For Land Components 

this is basically application of cordon and search and wide 

area security doctrine and TTPs with the object of finding 

nuclear material. Unfortunately, the radiation detectors 

we have in the force that are so good for nuclear fallout, 

are not adequate for the interdiction mission. Appropriately, the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence is 

conducting an experiment to determine the capability and 

capacity required of the CBRN forces to fulfill this mission.

The Army’s challenge is to sustain our efforts in passive defense and CM, maintain momentum for those 

initiates to exploit and eliminate nuclear programs, and 

finally define and develop a capacity to support land 

interdiction of nuclear weapons and material. Putting RN 

back into CBRN will require added emphasis on training 

and will require some upgrades to existing equipment. 

While I applaud the past and ongoing efforts in this area, 

I also caution that only through vigilance, renewed training on RN, and an institutional adoption of prevention 

as a priority will the Army meet its responsibilities to the 

nation in combating nuclear and radiological weapons.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 2 
 3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 

he Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (CWMD) 

Joint Integrated Concept 

(CWMD JIC) evolves from the 

National Military Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS 

CWMD) by defining the objective 

not as defeating a single device but 

as defeating a rogue actor or nation 

utilizing a combination of skill sets 

(technology, financing, security, 

etc) to develop, transfer or employ 

a Chemical, Biological, Radiological 

and Nuclear (CBRN) weapon. 

While the Services currently support 

CWMD-related operations and 

requirements development, there 

has been no formal concept or 

direction to them to define, at the 

tactical level, the extent and capacity 

to which these tasks are to be done. 

This paper merges the objectives 

and key elements of current Joint 

CWMD doctrine with the military 

mission areas and proposes a 

tactical-level template for designing 

service-specific plans and concepts 

for supporting CWMD efforts.

While much of the focus of 

CWMD operations is on weapon 

effects (i.e. contamination hazards), 

the requirement for the Services 

to interact with and enable joint, 

coalition and interagency actions to 

prevent WMD development, transfer 

and employment goes far beyond 

the CBRN Defense community. 

It is, in essence, a headquarters 

staff function; similar to addressing 

counternarcotics and the Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT). The 

additional considerations associated 

with preventing or mitigating 

contamination while conducting 

CWMD operations create challenges 

and considerations peculiar to this 

mission set.

Obviously, there is more to the 

Department of Defense’s (DoD) 

ability to execute CWMD operations 

than the contributions of the 

Services. Combatant Commands, 

Support Agencies (like the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency) and other 

organizations and offices within the 

Department of Defense all contribute 

to the overall effort. This proposed 

concept, however, focuses on the 

Service contribution and provides 

a methodology to aid in the overall 

organize, train and equip direction 

that is still in line with DOD Directive 

2060.02 Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. Similarly, while 

each Service has its own unique 

capabilities and structure, this 

concept uses a ‘general force’ as 

an example and does not endeavor 

to direct the specialties of any one 

service in particular.

The Central Idea

The Services support U.S. 

Government (USG) and Joint Task 

CWMD Framework

Mr. Steven Rollins

Kalman and Company

NonProliferation

Threat Reduction

Cooperation

Security Cooperation

Elimination

Interdiction

Offensive

Opetations

Active Defense

Passive Defense

Consequence

Management

Force Projection

Force Application

Force Protection

Counter

Proliferation

Consequence

Management

National Strategy National Military Strategy Service Strategy

Figure 1. Relationship of CWMD concepts from National Strategy to Combat 

WMD to National Military Strategy to Combat WMD to Service Framework to 

Combat WMD.

Force Commander (JTFC) efforts in 

CWMD operations by providing an agile 

and flexible response force capable of 

operating across the range of military 

operations (ROMO) despite the threat 

or presence of CBRN weapons. The 

general purpose force supports the 

overall DoD effort across the spectrum 

through the capabilities of WMD Force 

Projection, WMD Force Application 

and WMD Force Protection. This triad 

of pillars more accurately maps how 

the Services operate and develop 

capabilities at the tactical level. (see 

Figure 1.)

Service Framework supporting 

CWMD JIC 

WMD Force Projection supports 

and demonstrates our nation’s resolve 

to NonProliferation by supporting 

Diplomatic and Political-Military 

COMBATING WMD

T

Service-Level
efforts. This capability supports the 

WMD Threat Reduction Cooperation 

and WMD Security Cooperation 

and Partner Activities mission areas 

as identified in the NMS-CWMD. 

WMD Force Projection shapes the 

environment by creating conditions 

conducive to Service involvement 

in CWMD operations and assures 

our allies of our capability through 

Service involvement in multinational 

exercises, show of force operations 

and supporting other services or 

Other Government Agencies (OGAs) 

in activities that support USG 

objectives. 

WMD Force Application imposes 

costs on the enemy or rogue actor 

through kinetic or nonkinetic denial of 

the ability to obtain or employ WMDs 

against our forces or allies as well as 

supporting efforts to eliminate WMD 

programs. This capability supports 

the WMD Elimination Operations, 

WMD Interdiction Operations and 

WMD Offensive Operations mission 

areas identified in the NMS-CMWD. 

When employed, WMD Force 

Application must be executed with 

precision yielding decisive results. 

Precision reduces collateral damage 

or harm to innocent civilians. Decisive 

results ensure that the enemy is 

unable to employ these weapons 

against our forces and allies. 

WMD Force Protection applies 

materiel and non-materiel solutions 

to ensure mission accomplishment 

by denying the enemy the benefit 

of WMD use. Our Services must be 

capable of mission accomplishment 

in any climate and place. This 

includes hazardous environments 

that could be used in asymmetric 

conflicts. This capability supports 

the WMD Active Defense, CBRN 

Passive Defense and WMD 

Consequence Management mission 

areas identified in the NMS-CMD. 

WMD Force Application is applied 

through materiel means in the 

form of weapon systems, detection 

equipment, protective clothing, 

warning and reporting systems, 

decontamination equipment and 

other means of ensuring individual 

and unit survivability and mission 

accomplishment. Non-materiel 

means include doctrine, education, 

and individual and unit training that 

increase proficiency in operating 

in hazardous environments. 

Additionally, Services must have the 

capability to respond to and recover 

from WMD attack or release other 

than attack (ROTA) of toxic industrial 

materials as quickly as possible 

to restore combat operations and 

continue the fight.

To be effective in supporting 

and executing CWMD operations, 

our forces must be trained and 

equipped to apply the capabilities 

of WMD Force Projection, WMD 

Force Application and WMD Force 

Protection across the ROMO at any 

time. (See Figure 2.) It is important 

to remember that CWMD operations 

are not linear or sequential. Rather, 

they are continuous and often involve 

multiple overlapping efforts. Nor 

will Services always be involved 

in all aspects simultaneously. 

Commanders and staffs must be 

educated and trained in the tactical 

aspects of CWMD requirements 

and capabilities to ensure that their 

forces are technically and tactically 

prepared to provide the right support, 

in the right form, at the right time. 

WMD Force Projection

WMD Force Projection establishes 

political-military and military-military 

NonProliferation

Force Projection

Force Application

Force Protection

Joint and Multinational

Exercises

CBRN Passive

Defense

Restoration and

recovery Ops

Offense Strike

(air, land, sea)

Show of Force

Security Support

Visit Board Search

Missile Defense

Capability Objective Current Application

Shape

and

Assure

Shape

and

Assure

Shape

and

Assure

and Seizure (VBSS)

Figure 2. An example of Service Framework supporting CWMDJIC objectives 

using existing capabilities.

relationships that demonstrate U.S. 

resolve and capability. It deters 

the use or proliferation of WMDs 

and encourages the support of 

nonproliferation of these devices and 

technologies. Services shape the 

environment to one where, if called 

upon to act in the nation’s interests, 

the demonstrated capabilities of 

Services can more easily be brought 

to bear. The day-to-day operations 

of WMD Force Projection gain 

familiarity in forward operating areas 

while also fostering the international 

relationships that may alleviate 

diplomatic impediments to access. 1

WMD Force Projection also 

assures our allies (and our enemies) 

of US resolve and demonstrates 

that Services are willing, capable 

and ready to respond to the 

threat of WMD use. Through the 

combination of diplomacy, militarymilitary contacts, combined military 

activities and demonstrated skills, 

and effectiveness, we build allied and 

partner will and capacity for combined 

action. Assurance comes from 

the combination of demonstrated 

proficiency, reliable response 

capability and the dependability 

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 4 
gained through relationships formed 

over time.

The mission areas of WMD Threat 

Reduction Cooperation and WMD 

Security Cooperation and Partner 

Activities are more diplomatic in 

nature, but US Forces may be called 

upon to support or enforce them. 

Services conduct persistent forward 

engagement and are prepared to 

respond as the Nation’s force in 

readiess. WMD Force Projection 

focuses on the support of Unified 

Action and holds the objective of 

shaping and assuring our allies and 

partners of Services’ commitment 

and capability. These efforts are 

aided at the tactical level through 

military to military contacts, research 

and development agreements and 

similar efforts by subject matter 

experts (SMEs) assisting in arms 

control efforts. 

Future WMD Force Projection 

capabilities will develop and 

enhance Service support to USG 

efforts. When developing plans 

and exercises, commanders will 

seek to incorporate CWMD-specific 

activities that encourage and enable 

allied and coalition participation, 

including participating in joint and 

multinational CWMD exercises if only 

in the capacity of a general purpose 

force. Commanders will also actively 

pursue opportunities to increase 

partner capacity through CWMDrelated training and joint or coalition 

operations. 

WMD Force Application

WMD Force Application 

encompasses the WMD Elimination, 

WMD Interdiction and WMD Offensive 

Operations mission areas. Here the 

focus is on the enemy and on either 

the capture or destruction of his ability 

to employ WMDs. Services may be 

called upon to employ combined 

arms, provide specialized forces or 

conduct forcible entry operations to 

accomplish this goal. 

WMD Force Application may be 

kinetic or nonkinetic operations to 

detect, identify, disrupt and destroy 

an adversary’s WMD assets, delivery 

systems and technologies. It requires 

refined intelligence and the ability to 

conduct complex operations in the 

urban littorals and other challenging 

environments. The objective is to 

impose costs on the enemy through 

the application of destructive or 

disruptive military capabilities under 

conditions that range from hostile 

to uncertain in permissive and 

nonpermissive environments. The 

demonstrated ability to accurately 

and precisely execute these actions 

may have a deterrent effect on WMD 

actors.

Elimination operations focus on 

the destruction of a WMD program 

(or WMD network) and require 

a high degree of operational or 

strategic level communication and 

coordination. The 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review Report identified the 

Army’s 20th Support Command as the 

DoD lead for Elimination Operations.2

At the tactical level, Services may be 

tasked by Combatant Commanders 

to seize, secure and isolate the 

facility or WMD materials and may 

also be called upon to support the 

technical operation through the 

initial identification of CBRN agents 

or precursors, intelligence and other 

actions that enable interagency 

activities. Forces should be fully 

prepared to provide support in 

whatever capacity (traditional or 

technical) the Joint Task Force 

Command (JTFC) may require.

Interdiction operations work to 

stop the “in transit” proliferation of 

WMD delivery systems, materials, 

or expertise through the tracking, 

interception and possibly the 

destruction of the assets to 

prevent their transfer or eventual 

employment. Joint Publication 

3-03 Joint Interdiction Execution

outlines the current joint doctrine 

for these operations and includes 

in the purposes for Interdiction the 

effectiveness of these operations for 

stopping the proliferation of WMD.3 

Services should be prepared to work 

with or alongside joint and coalition 

forces in the execution of these 

missions. 

Offensive operations disrupt, 

neutralize, or destroy a WMD threat 

before it can be used, and deter 

subsequent use of such weapons. 

These operations may be performed 

by Services acting alone or as part 

of joint, coalition or host nation 

forces. They may be performed 

in permissive, semi-permissive or 

nonpermissive environments and, 

when directed, may be executed 

pre-emptively (in the absence of 

other hostilities) to destroy a known 

WMD threat prior to deployment. 

Additionally, planning for WMD 

Offensive Operations must also 

consider the type of agent and the 

possible need to conduct subsequent 

WMD Consequence Management 

actions to reduce the hazard created 

by any residual contamination. 

When the decision has been 

made to impose costs through 

WMD Force Application, the force 

accomplishes the task through 

precision engagement, ideally with 

minimal collateral damage.Further, 

WMD Force Application plans for 

CWMD operations will include 

CBRN passive defense capabilities 

to protect the force and may require 

WMD Consequence Management 

contingency plans to mitigate any 

residual contamination resulting from 

the operation.

Future development of WMD 

Force Application will include 

increased ability to support the 

site characterization aspect of 

Elimination Operations; the ability 

to perform on-the-move stand-off 

CBRN detection, and packaging 

and transporting of captured 

materials in support of Air, Land 

and Sea Interdiction Operations; 

and, increased targeting accuracy 

and munitions selection with special 

consideration for WMD in support of 

Offensive Operations. 

WMD Force Protection

WMD Force Protection is the 

most familiar aspect of CWMD and 

encompasses the mission areas of 

WMD Active Defense, CBRN Passive 

Defense and WMD Consequence 

Management. Here the focus is on 

the protection of the force and the 

ability to sustain and accomplish 

the mission, given that we cannot 

fully expect to defeat the threat 

through WMD Force Projection or 

Force Application. Forces in the 

field must maintain freedom of action 

on the battlefield unconstrained 

by CBRN hazards. Dominance is 

achieved through the ability to initiate 

operations, defend against attack, 

logistically sustain operations, and 

to restore operations where CBRN 

contamination may be involved. 

These three areas must be linked 

 5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
to ensure the force has overlapping 

protection throughout efforts to 

mitigate the CBRN hazard. WMD 

Force Application involves materiel 

and non-materiel capabilities to 

protect forces, equipment and 

installations from WMD use and 

to speed recovery operations. 

Intelligence supports WMD Force 

Application through collection efforts 

regarding enemy weapons capability, 

disposition and intent, and by 

identifying industrial hazards in the 

area of operations. These actions 

work together to deny the enemy 

any benefit of WMD use by reducing 

the forces’s vulnerability attack and 

by minimizing the effects of CBRN 

hazards on the force. 

WMD Active Defense includes 

action taken to destroy, nullify or 

reduce the effectiveness of hostile air 

and missile threats against friendly 

forces and assets. This task includes 

the use of aircraft, air defense 

weapons, electronic warfare, and 

other available weapons which 

are used to prevent enemy use of 

airspace through fire potential or 

other means without direct attack of 

air targets. When elements of the 

JTF employ WMD Active Defense 

assets, additional consideration 

must be taken to anticipate possible 

contamination for those who may be 

affected by successful engagement 

against enemy WMD weapons and 

systems. Warning those in the 

possible area of contamination and 

the availability of WMD Consequence 

Management assets are additional 

planning considerations.

CBRN Passive Defense 

measures reduce the effect of CBRN 

hazards on the force. It protects 

forces and critical infrastructure 

through the application of multiple 

disciplines that detect, identify, and 

characterize CBRN contamination, 

warn and report the presence of 

contamination, and physically protect 

personnel, equipment, military 

working animals and facilities from 

hazards. Throughout the DoD, 

Passive Defense is developed in 

four operational elements: CBRN 

Shape, CBRN Sense, CBRN Shield 

and CBRN Sustain. CBRN Shape 

provides the common operational 

picture that contributes to the overall 

awareness of threats and hazards. 

CBRN Sense provides the means to 

detect, identify and quantify hazards. 

CBRN Shield applies a layered 

approach to physically protect the 

force (i.e., suits, boots, gloves, 

masks). CBRN Sustain mitigates 

the hazard (e.g., decontamination) 

to ensure that the force is able to 

continue operations and accomplish 

the mission unimpeded. Passive 

defense can be challenging to 

implement, given the proliferation 

of different CBRN hazards and the 

need to address both the protection 

of the general force and the more 

sophisticated needs of specialized 

reconnaissance forces. JP 3-11 

Operations in a CBRN Environment

provides additional guidance on 

the application of CBRN Passive 

Defense equipment and techniques. 

WMD Consequence Management 

is the ability to respond to and 

recover from a WMD event. These 

operations facilitate a return to 

stability by minimizing or mitigating 

the effects of hazards in order to 

provide timely assistance to affected 

forces, save lives and reduce 

environmental damages. Services 

possess WMD Consequence 

Management capabilities primarily to 

ensure unit survivability and mission 

accomplishment. As with any other 

military capability, DoD may be called 

upon to provide WMD Consequence 

Management support for domestic or 

foreign events. During a domestic 

event (on the U.S. Homeland 

or territory), the Department of 

Homeland Security is the lead 

and DoD supports as directed. 

During events on foreign soil, DoD 

supports the Department of State. 

DoD leads WMD Consequence 

Management when directed or in the 

absence of other civilian authority. 

WMD Consequence Management 

includes the ability to function in 

exotic environments with reduced 

oxygen or levels beyond Immediately 

Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH). 

DoD is not a ‘first responder’; such 

as firemen, emergency medical 

technicians or police. Rather, DoD 

capabilities can provide much needed 

personnel, equipment and logistics 

to support the ongoing hazard 

mitigation effort. WMD Consequence 

Management operations often 

support the transition to interagency 

or other civilian authority for the 

continued mitigation effort. 

Bases and stations must rely 

heavily on WMD Force Protection 

preparation and efforts. Installations 

employ a full range of CBRN Passive 

Defense and WMD Consequence 

Management capabilities to 

protect the force from the effects 

of WMD. Advanced bases may 

need to consider WMD Active 

Defense measures coordinated with 

tenant activities. Memorandums 

of Understanding (MOUs) and 

Memorandums of Agreement 

(MOAs) along with coordinated 

training with local, joint, coalition and/

or host nation governments in CBRN 

incident response will enhance first 

responder capabilities and increase 

the ability to recover and respond 

from attack. Services should seek 

out these opportunities to train and 

build command relationships. 

Future capabilities in WMD Force 

Protection will enable the Service 

to prevail in any environment. 

Continued analysis and requirements 

development efforts will focus on 

measures to detect, track, target 

and destroy incoming WMDs using 

a networked array of intelligence 

sensors and detectors that tie into 

the common operational picture. 

By ensuring that all operational 

units possess the ability to improve 

situational awareness by identifying 

and characterizing any CBRN threat, 

forces will be able to communicate 

changes in the operational 

environment across the networked 

battlefield in real-time. Forces will 

employ technical reachback to 

aid in detection, identification and 

quantification efforts to characterize 

the threat or hazard. Operational 

tempo will be maintained through 

lighter, more durable individual and 

collective protection and a layered 

contamination mitigation plan that 

fully utilizes a robust, yet flexible, 

logistical support network. Individual 

and unit training integrates CWMD 

tasks and missions into exercises and 

operations at all levels of command. 

To aid in achieving this future-state 

commanders and staffs are educated 

in CWMD as part of their professional 

military education continuum; 

especially in understanding the 

assets and resources of DoD as a 

whole.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 6 
End State

While the CWMD mission areas 

are presented as a continuum from 

NonProliferation through WMD 

Consequence Management, they are 

not performed “sequentially”. Instead, 

numerous events contributing to 

the overall effort may be occurring 

simultaneously or in a mutually 

supportive fashion in any given 

geographic region. (See Figure 3.) 

Services may be tasked to contribute 

to the overall CWMD strategy of the 

Geographic Combatant Commander 

through tactical-level action that may 

not reflect the overall effort to destroy 

a network. 

CBRN defense is a participant to 

the overall effect but is not the sole 

source of information or solution the 

problem. CBRN defense capabilities 

contribute to the overall execution 

of all CWMD tasks but do not solely 

define a CWMD mission. The staff 

remains the focus of effort. The 

commander remains the decisionmaker. The objective remains the 

accomplishment of the mission. 

WMD Force Projection, WMD 

Force Application and WMD Force 

Protection are supported by the 

cumulative efforts of the entire staff. 

Intelligence, Logistics, Fires and 

Operations (including CBRN) must 

be timely, scalable and coordinated 

through a flexible command and 

control network. Staffs at all levels 

must be aware of the CWMD 

mission areas and the Service 

functions that support them. Staffs 

should become well versed in the 

CWMD JIC, its objectives and its 

methodologies to better understand 

the needs of the JTFC and how 

Service capabilities assist in mission 

accomplishment. 

Ultimately, this concept introduces 

no new tasks. Rather, it exemplifies 

how existing Service capabilities 

support the ongoing DoD strategy in a 

way that better enables the Services 

to apply the limited resources of 

personnel, time and equipment. The 

core capabilities of each Service 

fully support this concept can be 

applied to stopping the development, 

transfer and use of weapons of mass 

destruction. 

 7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 

Vignette: MAGTF Operations 

and Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction

The year is 2018. Operations 

in the Middle East have stabilized 

to a steady state wherein the force 

commitments are reduced and 

combat advisors conduct routine 

capacity building missions in support 

of indigenous military forces. 

However, Africa has continued to 

experience steady economic decline 

with crushing poverty, government 

corruption, epidemic level medical 

emergencies, and ethnic conflict 

creating conditions that threaten US 

interests and regional security. The 

U.S. Government has taken the lead 

for the international community in an 

effort to bring the continent out of this 

state of continuous crisis. 

Learning of rogue actor attempts 

to develop new bases of operation 

for advanced weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) development in 

East Africa, the U.S. Government 

invests in WMD Force Projection to 

deter proliferation and assure our 

partners of our commitment. The 

U.S. leads a NATO effort to broker 

the “East African NonProliferation 

Agreement” (EANPA), in which 

signatories from several nations 

agree to identify dual-use technology 

facilities, enter the names of scientists 

and specialized technicians into an 

international database, and to deny 

agencies, foreign governments and 

industries from using their sovereign 

land for the development of WMDs. 

This threat reduction cooperation 

Nonproliferation Counterproliferation Consequence

Management

Threat

Reduction &

Security

Cooperation

Offensive

Operations 

Operations

Elimination Active Defense Passive Defense 

Defense

Consequence

Management 

Management

Interdiction

Force

Projection

Force

Application

Force 

Protection

Protection •Security

Cooperation

•Exercises

•Mil-Mil Training

•

•Seize, Secure, Isolate

•VBSS

•Air Strike

•Raid

•Missile Defense

•Sense, Shield, Shape, Sustain

•Training, Education

•CBIRF, MAGTF ACM

Figure 3. Service Framework to Combat WMD supports all existing 

CWMD mission areas.

effort is augmented by a NATO 

guarantee to aid these nations in 

developing their own ability to deny, 

defeat, deter and defend themselves 

from proliferators and WMD use 

through political-military education, 

training and materiel support (where 

needed). 

As part of a whole of government 

approach to support the EANPA, the 

Marine Corps assigns 1st Battalion 

2nd Services (1/2) as a Security 

Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task 

Force (SC-MAGTF). The battalion 

acts as the core of the SC MAGTF 

and is supported by an attached 

composite squadron, a detachment 

from Service Logistics Group 2, digital 

and satellite communications assets 

provided by 8th Communications 

Battalion, military police, intelligence, 

information operations, and civil 

affairs detachments. Following 

its pre-deployment training which 

included combat training and 

specialized training for security 

cooperation, SC MAGTF 1/2 deploys 

to a forward operating base at Rota, 

Spain where the battalion command 

post is established. The main body of 

the battalion has been preceded by an 

advance party who conducts liaison 

with MARFORAF, AFRICOM, and 

theater Service Advisors provided 

by the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. The SC MAGTF is seen 

as a prime candidate for strategic 

communication that demonstrates 

U.S. resolve and commitment to the 

EANPA.
Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 8 

The battalion commander and 

select members of his staff deploy to 

inspect and supervise the operations 

of the subordinate units. They also 

support the SC MAGTF mission by 

deploying to selected high visibility 

training and exercise events. The 

disaggregated elements of SC 

MAGTF 1/2 conduct a range of 

sustained bi-lateral training, foreign 

internal defense, and partnership 

capacity building activities including: 

training with the Djiboutian military 

aimed at professionalizing the small 

country’s ethnically fractious military, 

bi-lateral training with a composite 

African Union (AU) battalion destined 

for peacekeeping duty in Somalia, 

and combined CBRN Consequence 

Management exercises with Ethiopia, 

United Nations forces, and other 

non-governmental organizations 

aimed at preventing loss of life due 

to industrial accidents as the nation 

continues to develop modernization 

efforts outside of its capital. 

Three months into the battalion’s 

deployment, a crisis erupts in a 

small East African country. Acting 

on Defense Intelligence Agency 

(DIA) and National Security Agency 

(NSA) reports, East Africa receives 

increased and persistent intelligence 

focus which reveals possible 

chemical weapons development in 

a textiles plant owned by the Argus 

Corporation, a company which also 

is suspected to be supporting a 

rogue actors engaged against US 

forces in Afghanistan. AFRICOM 

and CENTCOM work together 

seeking to disrupt and destroy the 

WMD node in its entirety. Each 

COCOM begins independent 

efforts to identify personnel, funding 

resources, technology development 

levels, logistical support, delivery 

means, intelligence/surveillance/

reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, 

command and control mechanisms 

and authorities. The host nation 

(HN) government aids in the effort by 

authorizing unprecedented access 

to records and communications 

involved with the Argus facility in 

accordance with the EANPA. 

Believing that sufficient 

intelligence exists to support that 

this facility is being used for WMD 

development (and concerned that 

internal government corruption may 

lead to having the plans known to 

the proliferators) , HN nationalizes 

the facility and authorizes a US lead 

multinational military action to seize 

all property and personnel. Already 

having a WMD Force Application plan 

in place, SC MAGTF 1/2 leads the 

coalition effort to seize, secure and 

isolate the facility, and to stabilize the 

situation to a sufficient degree until 

a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 

can arrive on station for relief. The 

Marines meet resistance from the 

facility security personnel but are 

able to suppress the small arms fire 

with minimal casualites to either side. 

Joint Task Force Elimination 

(JTF-E) formed in advance and 

deployed to a forward staging area in 

Rota, Spain arrives the next day to 

begin the systematic elimination of the 

WMD program within in this nation. 

Technical reachback is employed 

to support chemical identification 

and translation processes. Within a 

day, JTF-E confirms the intelligence 

reports of chemical agent production; 

identifying precursor agents for 

a binary chemical weapon being 

developed alongside textile 

chemicals in a separate part of the 

facility. Documents and human 

intelligence reveal that a shipment of 

the agents was currently on its way via 

a handysize freighter ship (The Fruit 

of Allah- Afghani flag) to the port of 

Aden in nearby Yemen. CENTCOM 

receives a SecDef directive to seize 

the ship in international waters and to 

interdict the transfer of the chemicals. 

CENTCOM tasks Expeditionary 

Strike Group 2 to conduct visit, 

board, search and seizure (VBSS) 

operations and, if possible, locate the 

agents and confirm their presence. 

JTF-E stands by to assist, if required, 

as technical reachback.

The strike group locates 

and blocks the Fruit of Allah in 

international waters and deploys 

elements of the 26th MEU to execute 

the VBSS operation. The crew 

offered no resistance and the captain 

claimed no knowledge of any illegal 

chemicals aboard. In the non-hostile 

environment, the MEU deploys 

a CBRN reconnaissance team 

equipped with a Level B protective 

ensembles and detection equipment 

capable of identifying industrial 

chemicals. Once the containers 

matching the shipping labels 

identified at the Argus facility were 

located, the toxic industrial chemical 

identification equipment confirmed 

the presence of carefully packaged 

chemical agent precursors but no 

launching devices. 

Continued DIA and NSA 

operations in Afghanistan 

corroborated corporate reports of 

“missing fruit” to the expected date 

and time of the ship’s arrival in 

Yemen. The intelligence trail leads 

to a company operating from a factory 

on the outer edge of a small village 

along the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

border; an area known for terrorist 

activity. Theater Special Operations 

Command (TSOC) Reconnaissance 

assets deploy near the village and 

confirm the presence of chemical 

protective equipment and mobile 

launch vehicles. It is believed that 

the rogue organization is planning to 

use chemical weapons to make up 

for their diminished numbers after 

years of guerilla warfare.

Under direction from CENTCOM 

and Commander, International 

Assistance and Assurance Force 

Afghanistan, the 4th Brigade Combat 

Team begins offensive operations 

against the rogue organization to 

deny the enemy use of the weapons, 

defeat them in place, deter any future 

use and defend US forces and allies 

from WMD use. The 82nd Airborne 

Division conducts a ground assault 

supported by an initial air attack with 

continued security. 

WMD Force Application planning 

encompasses the active defense, 

passive defense and WMD 

Consequence Management aspects 

of the effort. The air attack plan is to 

execute the operation with precision 

via rotary wing aircraft, carefully 

identifying the proper munitions 

to ensure both the destruction 

of the agent and to minimize 

collateral damage and residual 

contamination that could threaten 

civilians. The ground assault force 

will be augmented by air defense 

weapons systems, CBRN protective 

equipment and mobile CBRN 

reconnaissance platforms. A mobileloaded decontamination team is put 

in support.

Discovering the massing U.S. 

forces, the rogue organization 

scrambles into action for an 

attack and manages to launch a 
 9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 

single chemical missile towards 

the American ground forces even 

as the air attack obliterates the 

compound. The assault force 

successfully detects the inbound 

missile and utilizes its active defense 

systems to engage and destroy 

it. Observing the destruction of the 

terrorist camp, the unit then deploys 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to 

reconnoiter the facility for survivors 

without exposing personnel to any 

possible contamination resulting 

from the attack on the chemical 

storage facility. Even though the 

unit was deployed upwind from the 

facility to reduce the possibility of 

contamination, passive defense 

activities, such as chemical detectors 

and alarms, and maintaining Mission 

Oriented Protective Posture Level 

2 (MOPP 2), are engaged for WMD 

Force Application.

The ground force then deploys a 

CBRN Reconnaissance team and the 

mobile decon section to the missile 

crash site to conduct Consequence 

Management Operations to mitigate 

any contamination and thus reduce 

any residual hazard to the force and 

any civilians who may come through 

later. The force secures the site (at 

a safe distance) dressed in MOPP 

4 and ensures safe passage for 

the CBRN and EOD teams. CBRN 

Reconnaissance team members, 

dressed in Level B protective suits 

and equipped with toxic industrial 

chemical detectors locate the missile 

remains and confirm that the canisters 

containing the chemical payload 

remain intact. While accompanying 

EOD team members (also in Level 

B) render safe the rocket system, 

the CBRN Reconnaissance team 

carefully packs the canisters for 

shipment and transfer to inbound 

JTF-Elimination personnel for 

forensic analysis. Care is taken to 

begin a chain of custody for any future 

legal action and to record identifying 

marks from the missile parts to assist 

in assigning attribution for any who 

may have aided in supporting the 

WMD program. Once the canisters 

have been shipped and the CBRN 

Reconnaissance team confirms 

that there was no residual chemical 

contamination in the facility or village, 

the unit turns over control of the area 

to civilian authority provided by the 

Host Nation and redeploys to its next 

engagement.

Within two weeks following this 

operation CENTCOM and DIA 

intelligence resources were able 

to use the forensic evidence to 

identify financial resources and 

technical experts related to the rogue 

organization and their attempted 

use of WMDs. These leads later 

yield arrests that strike a major blow 

to several terrorist splinter groups 

attempting to develop WMD systems 

for a coordinated attack against U.S. 

forces in Afghanistan, Africa and 

Europe. This successful operation 

saved countless military and civilian 

lives.

Conclusions

This vignette has shown how 

Services can successfully support 

U.S. Government objectives and the 

Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) 

to execute combating weapons of 

mass destruction missions. Within 

less than 5 days, three Services, 

functioning at various levels and 

located in two different geographic 

combatant commands, worked in 

unison to support or execute the 8 

mission areas to combat weapons 

of mass destruction and destroy the 

rogue actor’s WMD network through 

the application of WMD Force 

Projection, WMD Force Application 

and WMD Force Application. 

Mr. Steven Rollins supports the 

Marine Corps Combat Development 

Command (MCCDC) CBRN Branch 

in Future Operations dealing 

primarily with CWMD integration, 

Experiments, Analysis and Concepts. 

He has a M.A in Homeland Security 

(specialization in Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction) from 

American Military University (2006). 

He retired from the Marine Corps in 

2006 after serving over 20 years in 

the CBRN field. His email address is 

shrollins@yahoo.com.

ENDNOTES

1. NMS-CWMD page 15

2. 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review Report page 52

3. Joint Publication 3-03 Joint 

Interdiction Execution
LTC Mitchell L. Wise

CBRN Officer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

istory of National 

Terrorism Response 

Policy

For the past three 

to four decades the United States 

(U.S.) has faced an increasing 

threat of terrorist attack. Although 

the horrific scale of the World Trade 

Center and Pentagon attacks of 

September 11, 2001 have not been 

repeated in the U.S. mainland, there 

can be no doubt that terrorists, with 

any number of political and religious 

agendas, are still targeting the U.S. 

homeland. The arrests in October 

2009 of members of an Islamic 

terrorist organization in New York 

City as well as the jihadist rampage 

by MAJ Nadal Hasan at Fort Hood in 

November 2009 and the failed 2010 

Times Square car bombing serve 

as stark reminders that large scale 

attacks continue to be planned and 

executed in the U.S. The growing 

tensions between the U.S. and 

the Islamic Republic of Iran over 

its nuclear weapons development 

program should also cause great 

concern. Any military intervention 

by the U.S. or Israel against Iran 

will almost certainly precipitate a 

response in the form of terrorist 

attacks worldwide, including the 

United States. Although terrorism is 

largely treated as a criminal activity 

by the current administration, the 

U.S. Army is likely to play a key role 

in responding to any large scale 

attack in the homeland, especially 

those involving weapons of mass 

destruction. This article will address 

the role of the Department of the 

Army (DA) in response to such an 

attack, with particular attention to 

biological weapons.

PDD-39 1995 (U.S. Policy on 

Counterterrorism) and NunnLugar-Domenici Act

Shortly after the Oklahoma 

City bombing in March 1995 and 

with the first World Trade Center 

attack as well as the Aum Shinrikyo 

sarin (nerve gas) attack in Tokyo in 

recent memory, President William 

Clinton issued Presidential Decision 

Directive 39. PDD-39 delineated the 

responsibilities of the various Federal 

Agencies in countering terrorism and 

provided guidance for mitigating 

the possibilities of such attacks. It 

also outlined measures to manage 

their consequences. This directive 

led directly to the formulation, in 

1996, of Public Law 104-201: The 

National Defense Authorization 

Act (also termed the Nunn-LugarDomenici act for the three Senators 

that introduced the legislation). The 

Nunn-Lugar-Domenici act called for 

Federal Assistance, primarily from 

the Department of Defense (DOD), 

to local, state and federal first 

responders for training to respond 

to a WMD event. At the time the 

Department of Energy (DOE) had a 

radiological response team, but units 

specifically trained and equipped for 

a large scale chemical or biological 

terror attack were lacking. The act 

called on the DOD to create at least 

one rapid response team:

“...capable of aiding Federal, State, 

and local officials in the detection, 

neutralization, containment, 

dismantlement, and disposal of 

weapons of mass destruction 

containing chemical, biological, or 

related materials.” 1

Pursuant to this act the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense assembled a 

Tiger Team to formulate how best to 

comply with this mission. 

After an in depth analysis of DOD 

capabilities the Tiger Team identified 

the U.S. Army Technical Escort Unit 

(TEU) and the U.S. Marine Corp 

Chem-Bio Incidence Response 

Force (CBIRF) as having some of the 

desired capabilities. Although these 

teams were deemed adequate for 

large public events that might attract 

the interests of terrorists, such as the 

1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta, they 

were inadequately focused for an 

unforeseen local catastrophe. The 

Tiger Team also surmised that the 

DOD had certain unique laboratory 

capabilities such as the AMC Treaty 

Laboratory, The U.S. Army Medical 

Research Institute of Infectious 

Diseases (USAMRIID), and the 

Edgewood Research, Development 

and Engineering Center (ERDEC). 

All of which are capable of 

dispatching mobile laboratories 

world wide. But what was desired 

were multiple, highly mobile units 

dispersed throughout the United 

States capable of fitting into the 

National Response Plan (later to 

evolve into the National Response 

Framework) whose mission would 

focus on Civil Assistance in the 

event of a domestic WMD event. 

The National Guard’s long history 

in support of State Government 

in natural disaster response was 

considered an ideal starting point. 

The National Guard occupies a 

unique position in the DOD as it 

can function either as a State asset 

under the authority of the Governor 

and the Adjutant General or it can 

be mobilized by the President in 

the event of a National Emergency. 

Initially termed Rapid Assessment 

and Initial Detection (RAID), these 

units were task organized for the 

specific mission of deploying to 

a site of a catastrophic natural or 

man-made disaster (e.g. WMD) 

and to provide support in assessing 

The Department of the Army’s Role in 

Response to a Domestic Bioterror Attack

H

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 10 
the nature of the threat and to 

identify potential nuclear, chemical 

or biological agents. Presidential 

Decision Directive (PDD) 62 

(Combating Terrorism) called for 10 

RAID teams to be fielded, one in each 

of the FEMA regions. This program 

was subsequently expanded to 

provide at least one team in each 

of the U.S. states and territories as 

RAID teams transformed into WMDCivil Support Teams (WMD-CST). 

Posse Comitatus Act

To fully understand the role (and 

restrictions) of the DA in Homeland 

Defense one must recognize the 

stipulations of the Posse Comitatus 

Act of 1878. This statutory regulation 

limits the role of Federal Uniformed 

Services in responding to civil 

disturbance. It was enacted in the 

aftermath of the American Civil 

War, interestingly, as a political 

compromise with Southern members 

of congress to settle the hotly 

disputed 1876 presidential election. 

In essence, this Act prohibited 

the use of the Army in an active 

law enforcement role, such as it 

performed during the Reconstruction 

Era following the Civil War. The Act 

was extended to include the U.S. Air 

Force in 1956 and by DOD regulation 

it also encompasses the U.S. Navy. 

The U.S. Coast Guard and National 

Guard (under the direction of the 

Treasury Department or operating 

under state authority pursuant to Title 

32 of the U.S. Code respectively) are 

exempt from Posse Comitatus. Only 

when these agencies have been 

federalized do they fall under this 

regulation. Although intended to 

prevent the use of military forces for 

civil law enforcement, a concept most 

Americans would likely agree with, the 

law has been circumvented through 

various mechanisms in recent years.2 

The transnational nature of many 

terrorist organizations, who aren’t 

constrained by sovereign borders 

or recognizable governments, 

combined with the blurring of acts 

of war with criminal acts within the 

US borders, challenge the utility 

of the Posse Comitatus Act in 21st 

century America.3 Nevertheless, 

many activist groups vigorously 

uphold the provisions of this act 

and work stridently to prevent 

any circumvention of its intended 

purpose. Any federal military 

assistance to civilian authorities 

must take the provisions of 

Posse Comitatus into account. 

Biodefense in the 21st Century

In 2002, after the massive terrorist 

attacks in New York and Washington 

DC, President George W. Bush 

formulated a new strategy to combat 

terrorists from implementing 

weapons of mass destruction. This 

strategy, articulated as the National 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction 2002, outlined three 

principal pillars: counter-proliferation, 

nonproliferation and consequence 

management. These pillars are to 

be integrated with four cross-cutting 

functions: intelligence collection and 

analysis, research and development, 

bilateral and multilateral cooperation, 

and targeted strategies against 

hostile states and terrorists. This 

document also charged the newly 

formed Department of Homeland 

Security to: 

“coordinate all federal efforts 

to prepare for and mitigate the 

consequences of terrorist attacks 

within the United States, including 

those involving WMD”.3

This represents a departure from 

the previous administration’s policy in 

which the FBI, under the Department 

of Justice, would be the lead 

agency in response to a domestic 

terrorist attack. Under the new 

guidance, the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA) is the 

lead federal agency for consequence 

management while the FBI still leads 

the investigation. In 2004 President 

CST Civil Support Team Member in Level A gear.

Bush specifically addressed the 

threat of bioterrorism with his 

Homeland Security Presidential 

Directive 10 titled “Biodefense for 

the 21st Century”. This document 

clearly delineated the lead agencies 

for various aspects of our defense 

to biological terrorism. It also 

provided the impetus to start several 

new homeland defense programs 

related to biological weapons 

including: BioShield (a program 

to stockpile medical resources 

such as vaccines and antibiotics), 

BioSense (a program to monitor 

infectious disease outbreaks) and 

BioWatch (a program to emplace 

bioagent detection systems in 

“critical” locations). In the event of 

a domestic bioterror event the DOD 

largely has a supporting role to 

assist whatever lead federal agency 

is involved. The assets available 

from the Department of the Army will 

be described in some detail below.

The Bioterror Threat 

Of all the potential WMDs, the 

threat posed from bioterrorism is 

un-doubtably the least understood. 

“...we are launching a new 

initiative that will give us the 

capacity to respond faster and 

more effectively to bioterrorism 

or an infectious disease, a plan 

that will counter threats at home 

and strengthen public health 

abroad.”

President Obama, State of the 

Union Address, Jan 27, 2010.

The quote by President Barack 

Obama, above, refers to the United 

State’s new strategy to reduce 

 11 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
biological threats by “improving global 

access to the life sciences to combat 

infectious disease regardless of its 

cause; establishing and reinforcing 

norms against the misuse of the life 

sciences; and instituting a suite of 

coordinated activities that collectively 

will help influence, identify, inhibit, 

and/or interdict those who seek to 

misuse the life sciences”.4 President 

Obama clearly illustrates, there is 

much concern about the feasibility 

of terrorist organizations to mount a 

biological weapons attack. Several 

reports indicate considerable interest 

by an Islamic terrorist organization, Al 

Qaeda, to acquire biological agents.5,6 

However, the evidence for 

these reports and the feasibility 

of these loosely knit transnational 

organizations to actually acquire 

and effectively employ a biological 

weapon has been severely 

questioned.7 The actual use of 

bioterror in modern times has been 

rather limited. Two of the most 

significant events in the U.S. were the 

anthrax attack on the senate offices 

of Senator Tom Daschle (South 

Dakota) and Patrick Leahy (Vermont) 

along with several major news outlets, 

including collateral contamination 

of numerous Postal Service mail 

rooms in September of 2001. Also 

the Rajneesh religious cult attempt 

to sway local elections in The Dalles, 

Oregon by incapacitating potential 

voters through contamination of local 

diners’ salad bars with a virulent 

strain of salmonella. Although in 

terms of numbers of fatalities these 

bioterror events were comparatively 

small both attacks point out two 

salient features of bioterrorism: (1) 

they tend to spread fear far in excess 

of the harm actually done and (2) the 

very slow pace in which the actual 

attack is realized (relative to, for 

example, a high explosive device).

Department of the Army 

Operational Support

At the time of the Tiger Team 

assessment of DOD bioterrorism 

response capabilities there were 

two specifically trained and 

equipped units, the U.S. Army 

Technical Escort Unit (TEU) and 

the U.S. Marine Corps Chem-Bio 

Incidence Response Force (CBIRF). 

The U.S. Army TEU was originally 

developed during World War II to 

provide a specially trained unit to 

transport chemical weapons and 

other hazardous materials. The TEU 

was subsequently employed in postwar Europe to transport captured 

German chemical munitions, later 

they played a key role in the 

disposal of U.S. chemical weapon 

stocks. As the pace of chemical 

weapons demilitarization increased, 

subsequent to enactment of the 

Chemical Weapons Convention, 

the U.S. Army’s TEU took on the 

role of the DOD’s premier experts 

in chemical weapons identification 

and decontamination. This role 

has subsequently expanded 

to include biological weapons.

In 2004 the U.S. Army transformed 

the TEU, an Army Materiel Command 

Table of Distribution and Allowances 

unit, into a Forces Command 

(FORSCOM) Table of Organization 

and Equipment battalion, the 22nd 

Chemical BN (Technical Escort). In 

2005 the Army activated a second 

TE BN, the 110th Chemical BN 

(Technical Escort). Each battalion 

has the typical S-1 through S-4 

and command staff sections, 

along with maintenance, medical, 

communication, and chaplain 

sections. The operational component 

consists of a single Technical Escort 

Company composed of Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, 

high-yield Explosives Response 

Teams (CRT). The CRTs can assist 

the combatant commander in the 

planning for sensitive site exploitation 

for WMD – Elimination operations. 

They have the capabilities to conduct 

Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) 

on identified and suspected WMD 

sites (with limited disablement), 

perform presumptive identification 

of chemical and biological warfare 

agents, sample, package, transport 

and escort WMD materials. 

Additionally the CRT can conduct 

render safe and explosive threat 

mitigation with its organic Explosive 

Ordinance Disposal (EOD) capability.

The CRT, as currently configured, 

is capable of world wide deployment 

in support of military and civilian crisis 

management. With security support 

from a combatant command the CRT 

can operate in the entire spectrum 

of environments from permissive 

to hostile and CBRN hazardous. 

The CRTs have only limited self 

decontamination capabilities and do 

not offer full spectrum EOD support, 

due to team size limitations. The 

CRTs may also require external 

maintenance support for some 

of their commercial off-the-shelf 

(COTS) equipment. Some of the 

high tech CBRNE identification and 

render-safe equipment available to 

the CRTs include the HazMatID, the 

Ahura, the R.A.P.I.D.®, the CBRN 

Unmanned Ground Reconnaissance 

(CUGR) robot, the ANDREX X-ray, 

and the Portable Isotopic Neutron 

Spectroscope (PINS, a device 

using neutron radiation to nonintrusively identify explosive or 

chemical agents inside a closed 

container such as an artillery shell).

Also mentioned in the Tiger Team 

assessment was the Marine Corps 

CBIRF. Although not a component 

of the Department of the Army, 

this force is closely aligned with 

homeland security and is included 

in the task organization of the 

CBRNE Consequence Management 

Response Force (CCMRF, see 

below). The CBIRF was originally 

formed in 1996 and consists of about 

375 marines. Originally stationed 

at Camp Lejune, NC they are now 

headquartered at Indian Head, MD. 

The CBIRF is task organized to 

respond to crisis management as well 

as consequence management in the 

event of a chemical or biological event. 

The CBIRF, which is built 

around 500 Marines, Sailors, 

civilian employees and contractors, 

provides the following consequence 

management capabilities: agent 

detection and identification, 

casualty search and extraction, 

technical rescue, personnel 

decontamination, emergency 

medical care and stabilization 

of contaminated personnel.8

The reconnaissance team is 

equipped with an array of DOD 

and COTS nuclear, chemical, and 

biological agent detection as well 

as individual protective equipment 

ranging from Level A through D 

chemical protective garments.

The decontamination element, 

when fully established, has the 

capacity of up to 225 ambulatory 

personnel per hour and up to 30 

response force personnel hour.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 12 
Civil Support Team (CST) Organization

The medical team, built around an 

emergency or occupational medicine 

doctor, physicians assistants, and 

corpsmen, is capable of operating in 

Level B-D and initiating treatment in 

either the hot or warm zone. All these 

team members have specialized 

training for treatment of chemical 

and biological warfare victims. 

Casualty search & extraction 

and technical rescue teams are 

capable of locating and removing 

victims from a contaminated areas 

as well as operating in confined 

space and collapsed structure 

environments. Both teams 

are Level B trough D capable. 

CBIRF’s C4I capability allows 

them to communicate between 

Title 10 and 32 organizations as 

well as local, state and federal 

agencies. Additionally, they 

have and EOD detachment 

designed to mitigate threats for 

continued down range operations.

Civil Support Team (CST)

The National Guard (NG) WMD 

Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) 

developed as a result of the DOD Tiger 

Team’s assessment, now number 

57. They are now commissioned 

in each of the fifty states (California 

has two) and the District of Columbia, 

Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin 

Islands. These units are federally 

funded but, unless federalized by 

the President, are under operational 

control of their respective State 

Governor and Adjutant General. 

Each team is commanded by a 

Lieutenant Colonel and consists of 

22 full time Active Guard Reserve 

(AGR), Active Army and Air National 

Guard personnel. The units are 

organized into an Operations 

team, Administration and Logistics 

team, a Communications team, a 

Medical team and a Survey team. 

According to Field Manual 3-11.22 

(Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 

Support Team Operations Manual):

The mission of the WMD-CST 

is to support civil authorities at 

domestic CBRNE incident sites 

by identifying CBRNE agents 

and substances, assessing 

current and projected 

consequences, advising on 

response measures, and 

assisting with appropriate 

requests for additional support. 

Using largely non-standard 

equipment, these units are well 

equipped to assess and identify 

chemical, biological and radiological 

contamination. The survey team 

members have Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration (OSHA) 

approved level A and B personal 

protection equipment. Each unit 

has a mobile analytical laboratory 

system that combines standard 

DOD detection equipment with 

the latest COTS chemical and 

bio-agent detection equipment9 

to provide rapid (presumptive) 

field identification. They are also 

equipped with a unified command 

suite (UCS) vehicle housing ultra 

high frequency (UHF), very high 

frequency (VHF), high frequency 

(HF), FM and digital communications 

equipment. The UCS can also 

set up a local area network with 

other first responders and provide 

secure digital communications 

in remote areas. Some of these 

communication capabilities 

are duplicated in the advanced 

operations (ADVON) vehicle and 

are highly prized by first responders 

in many emergency situations. 

CBRNE Enhanced Response 

Force Package (CERFP)

The CERFPs are modeled after 

the U.S. Marine Corps CBIRFs and 

are a component of the National 

Guard. Created to augment the 

capabilities of the CST, they were 

initially fielded in each of the 10 

FEMA regions in the United States. 

At present there are 17 CERFPs 

certified by the National Guard 

Bureau.10 Each CERFP is composed 

of four elements: command and 

control (C2), search and extraction, 

decontamination and medical. These 

elements are drawn from existing NG 

units, the extraction element usually 

coming from an Engineer Battalion, 

the decontamination element from 

a Chemical Company, the Medical 

element typically from an Air National 

Guard Medical unit, the C2 element 

can be drawn from a variety of 

operational NG units. Each CERFP 

consist of 180-200 personnel and 

provide immediate support to the 

CSTs in the event of a mass casualty 

event resulting from a WMD. Like the 

CSTs, the position of these CERFPs 

under the National Guard Bureau 

allow implementation of their assets 

either under Title 32 provisions by 

the State Governor or, if Federalized, 

under Title 10 and the DOD.

CBRNE Consequence 

Management Response Force 

(CCMRF)

At the upper end of the response 

forces programmed to respond 

to a civil support mission is the 

CBRNE Consequence Management 

Response Force (CCMRF). This is 

a brigade size unit (approximately 

2,900 - 4,70011 personnel depending 

on mission) that is organized 

as a joint task force to provide: 

command and control, incidence 

assessment, search and rescue, 

medical, decontamination, aerial 

and ground transportation, general 

logistic support as well as security 

forces (specifically allocated 

for force protection). Under the 

 13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF) Organization

command of Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM), the first CCMRF 

was activated in October 2008 at 

Ft. Stewart GA and was designed to 

deploy as a C2 HQ with three force 

packages: Operations, Medical, and 

Aviation. The CCMRF are the first 

Title 10 asset dedicated to respond 

to a large scale CBRN event. 

They have a goal of being on-site 

within 24-96 hours of notification. 

The operations force package 

will provide nuclear, chemical 

and biological survey capabilities, 

equipment and personnel 

decontamination, rescue and 

extraction expertise to include 

engineer assets, transportation 

capabilities and a security force. 

The technical forces associated 

with the operations force package 

come in the form of a U.S. Marine 

Corps CBIRF, a U.S. Army Chemical 

Decon company, an U.S. Army 

Chemical Reconnaissance platoon 

and a Chemical BIDS (biological 

identification and detection system) 

platoon. A Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) Consequence 

Management Advisory Team (CMAT) 

is also assigned to the CCMRF. 

The operations force package also 

has a mortuary affairs section. 

The medical force package, 

including a medical headquarters 

and an emergency deployable 

medical headquarters (EMEDS), will 

provide triage and treatment, hospital 

augmentation, essentially the full 

array of medical care associated with 

a brigade medical team. The aviation 

force package provides helicopter 

airlift capabilities to facilitate survey 

and reconnaissance missions as 

well as MedEvac. In essence the 

CCMRF is similar to a combat support 

force with logistics capabilities 

specialized for operations in a 

CBRNE environment. Additionally, 

the search and rescue personnel 

are trained to the standards of the 

National Fire Protection Association.

CBRNE Headquarters (20th 

Support Command)

A CBRNE Headquarters, currently 

designated the 20th Support 

Command, activated in October 

of 2004 as a major subordinate 

command to provide a “one-stopshop” for FORSCOM CBRNE 

response capabilities. Composed of 

three Explosive Ordinance Disposal 

groups (52nd, 71st, and the 111th 

(USAR)), a chemical brigade and an 

asymmetric warfare regiment, the 

20th Support Command provides 

major combatant commands their 

required CBRNE support world 

wide.12 In addition they support 

homeland defense in the event of 

a WMD attack. The 20th Support 

Command also functions as the core 

element of the Joint Task Force for 

Eliminating WMD (JTF-E). Within 

the structure of the 20th are three 

conventional EOD groups consisting 

of ten battalions based throughout the 

United States. In addition there is the 

21st Ordinance Company specifically 

designated for WMD disposal. The 

48th Chemical Brigade is composed 

of five Chemical battalions including 

the 22nd and 110th TE BNs. The 20th 

Support Command also possesses 

a unique “CBRNE Analytical and 

Remediation Activity (CARA)”. 

The CARA is an all civilian 

DOD organization consisting of 

four sections, two of which are the 

Remediation Response Sections 

(RRS). In order to provide a more 

immediate transcontinental response 

the RRSs are located at Aberdeen 

Proving Ground Maryland, and at 

Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas. There 

is an aviation section, for Continental 

U.S. (CONUS) operations, with 

the capability to transport chemical 

surety escort teams. There is also 

a Mobile Expeditionary Laboratory 

(MEL) section capable of deploying 

highly mobile field confirmatory 

laboratories for analysis of nuclear, 

chemical and biological warfare 

agents. These MELs offer a light 

and heavy configuration. The light 

configuration can be packaged in 

a shelter equipped HMMWV with 

a trailer mounted power generator. 

The heavy configuration is contained 

in twenty foot International 

Standards Organization (ISO) 

trailers. This unit provides an 

essentially “brick and mortar” facility 

capable of confirmatory identification 

of chemical and biological 

agents; it is designed for more 

long term employment scenarios.

Additional Ad Hoc Capabilities

The Department of the Army has 

additional resources, not specifically 

programmed for a civil support 

mission, but available to respond to 

a domestic terrorist attack. These 

include Chemical companies 

stationed on virtually all CONUS 

U.S. Army posts as well as Reserve 

and National Guard units throughout 

the United States. The DA also 

has a number of assets specifically 

trained and resourced to deal with 

bioterrorism. These include the 

laboratories associated with the U.S. 

Army Medical Research Institute of 

Infectious Disease (USAMRIID), the 

1st and 9th Area Medical Laboratories. 

The U.S. Army Medical Command 

has specially trained Special Medical 

Augmentation Response Teams 

(SMART) that are equipped with 

sophisticated telecommunication 

equipment capable of establishing 

communications in virtually any 

environment. These units can provide 

limited support to local authorities 

in the event of a bioterror attack.

Conclusions

The prospect of bioterrorism 

in the United States is horrifying. 

Contributing to the anxiety of the 

bioterrorism threat is the fact that, 

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 14 
aside from the relatively small 

scale anthrax attack in 2001, there 

is no experience on which to plan 

a coordinated response to this 

specific threat. In the event of a 

successful attack there may be 

thousands, if not tens of thousands 

of victims and, especially in the case 

of an infectious agent, the number 

of walking-well patients seeking 

medical attention will be enormous. 

Medical treatment facilities will 

undoubtedly be overwhelmed and a 

panic stricken populace will attempt 

to vacate the area. The DA assets 

programmed for response to this 

scenario are manifold and, in terms 

of numbers, probably adequate. A 

recent evaluation by the Government 

Accounting Office indicated that, 

overall, the DOD was far ahead of 

other federal agencies in planning 

for a domestic CBRNE event.13 

But certain shortcomings, 

particularly with respect to the 

training, equipping and operational 

control of the CCMRFs, were 

pointed out. For example it was 

noted that identification of training 

and equipment requirements for 

the CCMRFs is handicapped by 

a lack of planning by state, local 

and other federal agencies under 

the Integrated Planning System (a 

program established in 2009 by the 

Department of Homeland Security 

to standardize national homeland 

security planning in response to 

Presidential Homeland Security 

Directive 8). This shortcoming 

has resulted in uncertainty of the 

gaps the DOD may be required to 

fill. For example, a National Guard 

State mission of responding to a 

catastrophic / natural disaster event. 

If the 2nd and 3rd CCMRFs were 

activated and deployed under Title 

10 authority and a major natural 

disaster occurred, a governor maybe 

required to request assistance 

from surrounding states for Title 

32 support. There is potential for 

delays in support or specific type 

of support at state and local levels.

Although there is substantial 

overlap in capabilities between the 

resources found in the CST, CERFP, 

CCMRF progression and the 20th 

Support Command. It should be 

recognized that the Title 32 CST 

and CERFP along with the Title 10 

CCMRFs have a mission specifically 

to respond to a domestic terrorist 

attack; whereas the 20th Support 

Command is, in essence, designed 

to support overseas operations. 

Nevertheless, the CARA’s, RRTs 

and MALs are tasked and trained to 

augment DA involvement in support 

of civil operations. The organization 

of these units, their mission and their 

training requirements are currently 

in a state of flux. The field manual 

for the CBRNE Headquarters 

operations is, in fact, designated 

as FMI 3-90.10, FMI meaning Field 

Manual Interim to reflect the dynamic 

nature of current doctrine for civil 

support operations. How well these 

DA assets will perform, in the event of 

a domestic bioterrorism attack, is yet 

to be challenged by a major incident.

Author’s Note. At time of publishing, 

the DOD was reviewing CBRNE 

Force Package tactics techniques 

and procedures in order to develop 

more responsive capabilities.

LTC Mitchell L. Wise is a Chemical Officer 

(IMA) with the US Army Nuclear and 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Agency, Ft Belvoir, VA. He has a B.S. in 

Zoology from the University of Georgia, 

an M.S. in Fish Pathology from Auburn 

University, and a Ph.D. in Biochemistry 

and Biophysics from Oregon State 

University. He was previously 

assigned as the Chemical Officer for 

Headquarters, Multi-National Forces, Iraq. 

His email address is 

m i t c h e l l . w i s e @ u s . a r m y. m i l . 

ENDNOTES

1. Public Law 104-201: The National 

Defense Authorization Act.

2. Trebilcock, C. The Myth of 

Posse Commitatus. http://www.

homelandsecurity.org/journal/

articles/Trebilcock.htm.

3. The National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

2002.

4. National Security Council. 

National Strategy for Countering 

Biological Threats, Nov 2009, p.3. 

http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/cbw/

strategy2009.pdf

5. Cordesman, A.H. The Challenge 

of Biological Terrorism. Center for 

Strategic and International Studies 

Press. Vol 27. 208 p. 2005.

6. Graham, B., Talent, J., Allison, 

G., Cleveland, R., Rademaker, S., 

Roemer, T., Sheerman, W., Sololski, 

H., Verma, R. World at Risk. The 

Report of the Commission on the 

Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 

Terrorism. Vintage Books, New York. 

160 p. 2008.

7. Leitenberg, M. Assessing 

the Biological Weapons and 

Bioterrrorism Threat. http://

StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. 

2005

8. CBIRF Capabilities, 4th MEB 

Homepage. http://www.wood.army.

mil/4meb/TRIFOLDs/CBIRF%20

Information%20Paper%20June%20

09%20ver%203%20PDF.pdf

9. Government Accounting Office 

Report 10-123, 2009. Planning, 

Resourcing and Training Issues 

Challenge DODs Response to 

Domestic CBERNE Incidents. http://

www.gao.gov/new.items/d10123.pdf

10. Army National Guard CERFP 

Media Fact Sheet, Feb 2009. http://

www.ng.mil/media/factsheets/

CBRNE.pdf. 

11. 2009 U.S. Army Posture 

Statement. http://www.army.mil/

aps/09/information_papers/cbnre_

consequence_mgmt_ccmrf.html

12. 20th SUPCOM History. http://

www.cbrne.army.mil/history.htm

13. Wise, M and Calomiris, J. 

Detection Systems for Biological 

Agents, Present and Future. 

Combating WMD Journal 2009, 3, 

4-13.

 15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
ost of us in the combating weapons of mass 

destruction (CWMD) community know the history of the United States (U.S.) Manhattan Project and why it was funded. However, few of us 

knew that Japan had its own “Manhattan Project”. Even 

General Leslie R. Groves, the chief of the U.S. Manhattan 

Project, had little to say about the Japanese effort in his 

memoirs. Fortunately, information on their program was 

eventually documented in Science magazine in 1978. 1 2

In addition, a documentary that aired on the History Channel on 16 August 2005 described the location of a Japanese heavy water facility and a purported atomic weapons test facility in what is now North Korea.3 While there 

is no conclusive proof Japan ever developed a fission 

device or weapon, there is substantial evidence they had 

conducted their own research program to develop one. 

This article is a summary of findings from these and several other sources.4-13 Most of the findings challenge the 

ideas that Japan and its military was innocent of involvement 

in atomic weapon development and that the U.S. atomic 

bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unwarranted.

Pre-World War II Interest

Japanese physicists, like most physicists throughout the world, followed closely both the theoretical and 

experimental nuclear fission research that began in 

Europe and the experimental work later carried on in the 

U.S. The work on atomic physics and quantum physics at the Niels Bohr Institute in Copenhagen, Denmark, 

the pioneering work by Werner Heisenberg and other 

German physicists on nuclear fission, and the cyclotron 

development by E. O. Lawrence (University of California 

at Berkeley) (Figure 1) were of special interest to Yoshio 

Nishina (co-author of the Klein-Nishina formula) and 

Ryokichi Sagane of the University of Tokyo. These two 

world class Japanese physicists would become the leaders of the Japanese nuclear fission research program. 

Chronology of World War II Activities

1. September 1940 – Japanese scientists (including Nishina and Sagane) proposed atomic bomb 

research to the Japanese government. The Japanese name for atomic bomb is gensai bakuden.

2. 27 September 1940 – Japan, Germany, and 

Italy signed the Tripartite Pact (also known as the 

Three-Power Pact, the Three-way Pact, the Axis 

Pact, and the Tripartite Treaty). It established the 

Axis Powers of World War II and was intended to 

keep the U.S. out of the war. Nine other nations 

also signed. In time, the Pact was apparently 

used to exchange information on military research, 

including the military applications of nuclear fission.

3. December 1940 – Japanese Army-sponsored 

atomic bomb research began at The Institute of 

Physical and Chemical Research (Riken) (Nishina’s institute in Tokyo). Funding was modest.

4. 1940 – 1943 - A period of growing military interest in developing a Japanese atomic weapon 

5. 1941 – Hideki Tojo, who was both Prime Minister and War Minister, ordered an investigation 

into the possibility of making an atomic weapon.

6. Late 1942 – The Japanese Navy (Naval Institute of 

Technology) funded some fission research at Riken.

7. December 1942 – March 1943 - The Army set 

up an experimental project (the Ni-Go Project) at 

Riken with an additional 700,000 yen ($175,000) 

to separate the isotope uranium-235 (U-235) via 

thermal diffusion. In 1943, the Navy Bureau of 

Ships upgraded their nuclear research program 

(the F-Go Project) at Kyoto University with 300,000 

yen ($70,000). The project was led by Bunsabe 

Arakatsu. It led to the design and construction of a 

cyclotron at Kyoto University and the production of 

20 grams of heavy water from electrolytic ammonia plants in North Korea and Kyushu (Japan). 11

 

8. March 1943 – The Japanese “Physics Colloquium”, a series of ten sessions, concluded a fission 

weapon was too difficult to complete within ten years. 

9. April 1945 – As the gaseous thermal diffusion apparatus and the cyclotron began workFigure 1. E. O. Lawrence Original Patent Drawing for 

the Cyclotron [Wikipedia]

DO YOU KNOW

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 16 

Mr. Robert Pfeffer, Physical Scientist

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Japan Had an Atomic Bomb

 (Genzai Bakuden) Program in WWII?

m
ing together in an experimental mode, the 

building housing the diffusion apparatus was 

destroyed in a US B-29 bombing raid over Tokyo.

10. 7 May 1945 – Victory in Europe (V-E) Day. Germany surrendered. Commander-in-Chief of the German 

Navy Admiral Karl Donitz and the last President of the 

Third Reich (with the death of Adolph Hitler on 30 April 

1945) notified all naval ships to surrender to the Allies.

11. 14 May 1945 – The German submarine U-234 

(no apparent reference to uranium-234) surrendered to U.S. submarine Sutton south of the Grand 

Banks. It was subsequently taken to Portsmouth, 

NH. (Figure 2) Two of the twelve passengers were 

Japanese military officers. They committed suicide 

rather than surrender to U.S. forces and were buried 

at sea. The high-tech cargo being taken to Japan 

included technical drawings, examples of the newest electric torpedoes, one crated Messerschmitt 

Me 262 jet aircraft, a Henschel Hs 293 glide bomb, 

and 560 kilograms of uranium oxide destined for 

Japan's own atomic research program. The oxide 

contained about 3.5 kilograms of the isotope U-235,11

12. 26 July 1945 – The U.S. and its Allies issued the 

Potsdam Declaration. It called for the immediate and 

unconditional surrender of Japan. Japan refused.

13. 6 August 1945 – The U.S. dropped an atomic bomb 

on Hiroshima, Japan (B-29 named Enola Gay, Colonel 

Paul Tibbets commanding). It was a gun-assembly 

Figure 2. U-234 Surrenders 14 May 1945 to USS Sutton 

and Sunk 20 Nov 1947

Figure 3. Hiroshima Detonation 6 Aug 1945 (top) and 

Little Boy

 17 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
type weapon using U-235 

(codename Little Boy). (Figure 3). 

14. 8 August 1945 – Russia 

declared war on Japan. They 

quickly occupied Manchuria 

and then North Korea, capturing many Japanese plants, 

factories and test facilities.

15. 9 August 1945 – The U.S. 

dropped an atomic bomb on 

Nagasaki, Japan (B-29 named 

Bockscar, Major Charles 

Sweeney commanding). It 

was an implosion-assembly 

type weapon using plutonium-239 (codename Fat Man) 

A third detonation was proposed by MG Leslie Groves to 

General of the Army George C. 

Marshall but never approved 

by President Harry Truman. It 

would have been available for 

use on 17 or 18 August, but 

the fighting had ended by that 

time. Three additional weapons 

would have been available in 

September and three more in 

October had they been needed.

16. Post-Hiroshima detonation - 

Japan’s atomic weapon research 

program quickly disintegrated. 

Nishina flew over Hiroshima on 

8 August to assess the damage and what caused it. Both 

he and Arakatsu (who flew over 

Hiroshima on 10 August) independently concluded the destruction was caused by an atomic 

bomb. A recorded message by 

Emperor Hirohito on Domei radio 

on 15 August 1945 (14 August 

1945 U.S. time) announced 

the acceptance of the surrender conditions of the Potsdam 

Declaration. The Instrument 

of Surrender papers were then 

signed on the U.S. battleship 

Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945 (known as Victory 

in Japan (V-J) Day). (Figure 5)

17. 30 October 1945 – The U.S. 

Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered that 

all Japanese research facilities 

and equipment “...on atomic 

energy and related subjects 

be seized.” “No research...on 

atomic energy shall be permitted 

in Japan.” [Further Reading 2]

18. 24-26 November 1945 – General Groves ordered that all five of 

Japan’s cyclotrons be destroyed. 

They are subsequently hacked to 

pieces and dumped into the sea.

Conclusions

The relatively small-scale Japanese effort to develop an atomic 

bomb was probably destined to fail. 

They started quite late, had limited 

natural resources (e.g., uranium) to 

support the research, and had no 

national priority comparable to the 

U.S. Manhattan Project. And while 

the rumor of a Japanese weapon 

test conducted on a small island 

20 miles off the coast near Konan, 

North Korea three days before being 

captured by the Russians has never 

been confirmed [Further Reading 3], 

much information on the Japanese 

basic fission research program has. 

We now know that Japan entered 

into the Tripartite Pact with Germany 

and Italy (1940) to learn more about 

German research programs, including nuclear fission, no doubt to supplement their own modest research 

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 18 

Figure 4. Nagasaki Detonation 9 Aug 1945 (top) and Fat Man
Figure 5. Japan Surrenders on US Battleship Missouri 2 September 1945

programs. That Pact, plus the unreported (until 1978) fact that most of 

the fission research was funded by 

the Japanese military to develop 

a genzai bakuden means the general public was initially uninformed of 

Japanese efforts to build one. Perhaps the most incriminating evidence 

of the extent of the Germany-Japan 

cooperative fission research program was the discovery of uranium 

oxide on the German submarine 

U-234 that surrendered to the U.S. 

before delivering its cargo to Japan.

 

Evidence now shows the U.S. 

was not only in competition with Germany to build an atomic bomb; they 

were in competition with Japan as 

well. Though the Japanese program 

probably never went beyond nuclear 

fission research, the portrayal of 

Japan as innocent and blameless 

and the U.S. atomic bombing of 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki as overkill 

remains controversial. Nishina and 

Arakatsu were internationally recognized physicists that had intimate 

knowledge of atomic bomb technology and its potential damage mechanisms (blast, thermal, and radiation). 

Both flew over Hiroshima within days 

after the bombing to survey the damage and report their findings to the 

Japanese government. They independently concluded the destruction 

was caused by a U.S. atomic bomb. 

It is no coincidence Emperor Hirohito formally agreed to the Potsdam 

Declaration just six days after the 

Hiroshima bombing. This unconditional surrender clearly stopped 

the carnage that would have followed an Allied invasion (Operation 

Downfall) of the Japanese homeland. 

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer is a Physical 

Scientist at the United States Army 

Nuclear and CWMD Agency on 

Fort Belvoir, VA, working on nuclear 

weapons effects. He has a B.S. in 

Physics from Trinity University and 

an M.A. in Physics from The Johns 

Hopkins University. 

ENDNOTES

1. Shapley, Deborah, Nuclear Weapons History: Japan’s Wartime Bomb 

Projects Revealed, Science, New 

Series, Vol. 199, No.4325. (January13, 1978), pp. 152-157. This seminal article finally brought to the public the reality of Japanese research in 

fission weapons development during 

World War II. It was based upon two 

Japanese documents: (1) the first 

being a history of science and technology (S&T) in Japan – volume 13 

(published in 1970) deals with S&T 

during World War II, and (2) a social 

history of science by Tetu Hirosoge 

(published in 1973). In addition, there 

were several personal accounts on 

the subject, notably a diary by Masa 

Tekeuchi (who worked for Nishina), 

and a memoir of Bunsabe Arakatsu 

(the Kyoto University physicist). 

2. The Japanese A-Bomb, abridged 

and slightly edited version of the previous article, uploaded by Freeman 

10602PANC (9/13/1988), http://www.

fortfreedom.org/w08.htm

3. www.japanprobe.com/2007/06/24/

japans-atomic-bomb

4. This website emphasizes the military funded weapons research programs. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Japanese_nuclear_weapon_program

5. A brief summary of past and present Japanese technical and political 

facts is given on www.fas.org/nuke/

guide/japan/nuke/index.html

6. The article found on www.ww2incolor.com/.../showthread.php?...

Japanese-Atomic-Bomb supports the 

idea that Japan had developed and 

detonated an atomic bomb (genzai 

bakuden) at their North Korean test 

facility just before the end of the war.

7. A short summary of the 16 August 

2005 History Channel program mentioned in 3 above is given in 8. www.

rense.com/general67/japansatomicbomb.htm

8. www.shop.history.com/detail.

php? p=69230 provides readers 

with a place to purchase a DVD set 

entitled Japan’s Atomic Bomb.

9. www.39th.org/39th/hc/

hc_japan_a_bomb.html is another 

website that discusses the test site 

in North Korea.

10.www.avaxhome.ws/misc/japans_

atomic_bomb.html refers to the History Channel program.

11. Wilcox, R.K., Japan’s Secret War, 

William Morrow and Company, NY, 

1985.

12.http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=5387&start=15 provides 

a personal opinion of the Hungnam, 

Korea work on the genzai bakuden.

13.http://www.jstor.org/

stable/3655253?seq=6 is an article 

entitled Wartime Nuclear Weapons 

Research in Germany and Japan 

that provides additional details not 

covered in the other articles.

14. Images retrieved from Wikipedia 

1,2,3,4 and Wikicommon 5.

 19 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
error attacks using chemical or biological agents 

pose a grave danger to society. Chemical and 

biological agents can effectively harm large 

population centers and cripple the country’s perception of 

its security. National security depends on the government’s 

ability to mitigate emerging threats, so the Department 

of Homeland Security has taken steps to mitigate these 

attacks by conducting training exercises for hospitals 

and first responders.1 The intelligence community is 

continuously gathering information on terrorist activities, 

with chemical and biological plots being among the top 

priorities.2 However, there is a gap in technology for first 

responders. There is no real solution to the “ticking timebomb” scenario. In other words, what happens if our 

first responders find such a device in a heavily populated 

area? How can they render the device ineffective and 

how can the chemical or biological agents be neutralized? 

A recently developed concept, Decon Emitting Neutralizer 

of Improvised Explosive Devices (DENIED), is an attempt 

to solve these problems simultaneously. DENIED uses a 

decontamination solution developed at Sandia National 

Labs (SNL), to neutralize a wide range of chemical and 

biological agents. For chemical agents, the solution bonds 

with the chemical’s central atom and breaks the agent into 

two smaller, harmless molecules; for biological agents, the 

surfactants poke holes in the spore’s membranes, allowing 

the oxidizing agent to destroy the genetic material. The 

SNL solution has already been tested in the lab and the 

field against an array of agents.3 The DENIED system 

delivers this solution to a weaponized agent by using a 

shaped charge loaded with sheet explosive. The shaped 

charge is in the form of an arc that projects the solution as 

a blade, allowing it to penetrate the suspected weapon. 

Theory

The first prototype of the DENIED project is the 

Rivers’ Box (RIVBOX). Using the SNL solution allows 

the decontamination of the agent to start as soon as 

the blade penetrates the target. While the blade of 

decontamination solution disrupts the target, it also 

mixes with the payload. The solution must mix with the 

payload so it can microscopically destroy the agents. 

Hence, the solution that physically destroys the triggering 

mechanism also decontaminates the agent. The first 

prototype concept is the RIVBOX as seen in Figure 1:

The idea of using fluids to disrupt devices is fairly 

common on the modern battlefield. Explosive ordnance 

disposal (EOD) units have an array of directed liquid 

penetrators for precision destruction of improvised 

explosive devices.4 EOD units from all services have 

been using explosively propelled water to defeat 

improvised explosive devices in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The RIVBOX is unique because it aims to combine the 

effectiveness of an explosively driven liquid penetrator 

with the neutralizing capability of a decontamination 

solution. This combination is made possible with the use 

of a heat shield between the explosives and the solution. 

This protects the solution from the high temperatures of 

the detonation. The heat shield is the thin layer of plastic 

or metal that supports the explosives in the shape of 

an arc, and it prevents excessive heat from degrading 

the decontamination solution before leaving the device. 

Since the solution is being driven by an arc, it takes 

the shape of a blade, which offers the best balance 

2LT Christopher Rivers

COL Sones,i MAJ Kling,i MAJ McManus,i

MAJ Guard,ii MSG Sarveriii

Department of Physics and Nuclear Engineering

United States Military Academy

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

Figure 1. Depiction of the RIVBOX Concept.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 20 

Decon Emitting Neutralizer of

 Improvised Explosive Devices 

(DENIED)

T
between penetration power and spread of solution. 

Furthermore, the solution is effective against a wide 

range of agents, especially in a situation where identifying 

the agent may not be possible in a timely manner. 

Experiment

Phase One Concept Test. The purpose of this test 

was to determine the penetration and delivery capabilities 

of the RIVBOX. In the desired end state, the RIVBOX 

would penetrate the intended target and effectively 

spread the decontamination solution throughout the 

target’s interior. Using the trunk of a compact car 

as the target, a high speed camera captured the 

detonation of the device at 7,000 frames per second. 

 This test was very successful. The solution moistened 

the interior of a prepositioned crate within the trunk. Signs of 

moisture could be detected all the way through the trunk to 

the ground. The solution also coated objects within the trunk 

and the trunk itself. The physical destruction and coating 

of the target positively confirm the RIVBOX’s capabilities 

and provide proof of principle for the next phase of testing. 

Phase Two Concept Test. Phase one testing assumed 

that the decontamination solution did not change after 

exposure to the high pressures and temperatures of an 

explosion. Additionally, phase one testing assumed that this 

technology relies on a professionally produced RIVBOX. 

Phase two addresses both of these assumptions: Does 

exposure to high pressure and temperature degrade the 

effectiveness of the decontamination solution? How great 

is the difference in results when comparing a commercial 

off-the-shelf (COTS) product to a field expedient device? 

Previous work at SNL measured effectiveness 

using simulant testing, by annotating the amount of 

simulant destroyed. However, in explosive outdoor 

testing, simulants add various complications due 

to their mild toxicity levels. Simulant testing also 

requires spectroscopy or some means of precise 

measurement. Explosive testing results in a solution 

with explosive residue, target residue, and uncontrolled 

atmospheric variables. Therefore, phase two employed 

a metric for effectiveness that minimized these variables. 

In order to determine if the chemical composition changes 

during the RIVBOX detonation, chemical concentration 

acted as a measure of effectiveness. Hydrogen 

peroxide is the most volatile part of the solution and as 

an oxidizing agent, plays a vital role in effectiveness. 

Therefore, it was assumed that the hydrogen peroxide 

concentration correlates to the solution’s effectiveness. 

The manufacturer of the solution, Modec, Inc., claims 

that the solution is effective for a period of eight hours 

after mixing. The concentration of hydrogen peroxide was 

measured as a function of time, using a hydrogen peroxide 

assay kit from Cayman Chemical Co. (Catalog No. 

Figure 3. Picture of the RIVBOX Exploding and the 

Contents of the Trunk after the Explosion.

Figure 2. The RIVBOX on Top of a Vehicle Trunk and a 

Picture of the Contents of the Trunk before the Test.

 21 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
706011) which was originally made for measuring natural 

concentrations of hydrogen peroxide in human urine. The 

ratio of hydrogen peroxide in human urine to the amount in 

the decontamination solution is about 1:10,000. Therefore, 

the solution was diluted to 1:10,000 for the measurements. 

Samples of the solution were mixed at hourly time 

intervals for nine hours. The kit works by using iron ions that 

react with the hydrogen peroxide and a reagent to produce 

a dye that is 595 nm in color. Then, a plate reader shined 595 

nm light into each sample and measured the amount of light 

absorbed. The results indicated that the solution started 

losing hydrogen peroxide when all three parts were mixed. 

The same process was used for samples with known 

concentrations of hydrogen peroxide. The relationship 

between light absorbance and known concentrations allows 

for the unknown concentrations of the decontamination 

solution to be calculated as a function of time. Each data 

point had four trials that added to the accuracy, though 

only averages were used in the actual calculations. 

Figure 4. shows the results along with the 480 minute 

(8 hour) mark where the solution is no longer effective. 

The manufacturer claims that the solution starts 

with 4.0% hydrogen peroxide, which our data supports. 

The results also show that at the 480 minute (8 hour) 

mark the concentration of hydrogen peroxide is 

3.1%, which accomplishes the goal of this explosive 

testing – to determine if the concentration of hydrogen 

peroxide lost during the explosion is greater than 0.9%.

Phase two also sought to test different designs of 

the RIVBOX concept. In the end, the professionally 

developed RIVBOX effectively disrupted one 

test target, while three different field expedient 

versions also disrupted targets successfully.

Each RIVBOX shared the same overall design, but 

the field expedient RIVBOX was far less expensive. The 

components of the field expedient RIVBOX are M118 sheet 

explosive, a plastic container, and aluminum foil tins. The 

physical results yielded similar disruption of the test targets 

among all the prototypes. These results suggest that the 

exact shape, material, and construction are not critical for 

physical penetration. Additionally, as in the previous test, 

the solution covered the entire interior of the test targets.

To measure the change in hydrogen peroxide 

concentration, samples of solution were taken before 

and after the explosion and were placed into a chilled 

Figure 4. Shows concentrations of Hydrogen Peroxide 

over time. 

Figure 5. Shows the Professional RIVBOX and the 

Field Expedient RIVBOX. 

Figure 6. Shows the Disruption of the Steel Cabinets.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 22 
container in order to minimize the amount of hydrogen 

peroxide lost while cleaning and clearing the testing 

area. Again, each sample was an average of 4 trials, 

and the same dilution, as the first chemical test, was 

used. The chemical testing began 3.5 hours after the 

explosive trials were completed. According to the results, 

the professionally manufactured RIVBOX yielded a 0.1% 

decrease in hydrogen peroxide, while the field expedient 

RIVBOX yielded a 0.2% decrease in hydrogen peroxide. 

These results fall within the 0.9% effective window. 

Conclusions

The RIVBOX testing was divided into two phases. The 

first phase of testing was used to determine if the RIVBOX 

could physically penetrate a potential target while coating 

the target’s interior with a decontamination solution. The 

first explosive test exceeded expectations – it used minimal 

explosives to project a blade of decontamination solution all 

the way through the trunk of a car, and coated the interior of 

the trunk with solution. Follow-on tests with steel cabinets 

produced similar results. The RIVBOX successfully 

disrupted the targets and applied a layer of solution. 

The second phase of testing was used to ensure 

the integrity of the chemical composition under the high 

temperatures and pressures of the detonation. The 

result of the concentration testing shows a 0.9% window 

of effectiveness, and the explosive testing shows a 

hydrogen peroxide concentration loss between 0.1%-

0.2%. Each test was within the 0.9% window. These 

are just initial results. The RIVBOX requires additional 

testing at more advanced facilities that can model the 

mixture of the solution with potential agents and produce 

a more thorough report of chemical effectiveness. The 

decontamination solution to explosives ratio needs to 

be optimized to ensure proper mixing and concentration 

in order to neutralize the payload. Optimization should 

be a part of the next phase of development and testing. 

The combination of both phases shows that 

DENIED is a concept worth pursuing. Further testing 

should include mixing the decontamination solution 

with chemical and biological agents inside the device 

to ensure effective neutralization. However, the 

RIVBOX shows great promise as a low-cost tool 

against improvised chemical or biological devices. 

2LT Christopher Rivers is the Company Intelligence 

Support Team (COIST) at the 95th EN CO, Schofield 

Barracks, HI. He has a B.S./B.A. in Physics from the 

United States Military Academy. He was previously 

assigned as a Cadet at the United States Military Academy. 

His email address is Christopher.m.rivers@us.army.mil. 

ENDNOTES

i United States Military Academy Department of Physics 

and Nuclear Engineering

ii United States Military Academy Department of 

Chemistry

iii US Army Explosives Ordnance Disposal Technology Directorate

1. Author participated in these drills in his work as an 

Emergency Medical Technician in CT 2004.

2. DHS Presidential Directive 10, Biodefense for the 21st 

Century: 

http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1217605824325.

shtml.

3. Sandia National Labs: http://www.sandia.gov/SandiaDecon/.

4. Discovery Channel, Future Weapons: Bootbanger: http://

dsc.discovery.com/videos/future-weapons-bootbanger.html.

 23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
he “Anthrax” Spore Threat

Anthrax is a disease of humans and warm-blooded animals 

caused by a bacterium named Bacillus anthracis, a microbe identified in 

1875 by the pioneer microbiologist 

Robert Koch. The bacterium can 

be isolated from soils of many areas 

throughout the world, including agricultural regions of central North America from Texas to Canada (Pepper et 

al., 2002; Dragon et al., 2005). Consequently, anthrax occurs in many 

countries among wild and domesticated herbivorous mammals as a result of the bacterium being ingested 

or inhaled during grazing. Anthrax 

also occurs among humans in many 

countries (World Health Organization, 2008). Human anthrax typically 

results from unprotected handling of 

infected animal carcasses or products (hides and wool) or consumption 

of improperly prepared food of diseased animals. While about 20,000 

to 100,000 cases of human anthrax 

occur annually worldwide, mostly 

in developing countries, human anthrax in the U. S. is very rare. The 

disease is controlled in the U. S. by 

an effective vaccine, given to veterinarians and personnel of livestock 

industries, and inspection of animals 

before and after slaughter for food.

While human anthrax in the U. S. 

is rare, notable cases of the disease 

have been reported. In 2007 a 

Danbury, Connecticut, drum maker 

and one of his children contracted 

anthrax through exposure attributed 

to contaminated goat hides imported 

from Guinea in West Africa (Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention, 

2008). An environmental investigation conducted by the FBI, EPA, 

and Connecticut Department of 

Environmental Protection revealed 

contamination of the drum maker’s 

work shed and residence which 

required extensive fumigation with 

a disinfectant (chlorine dioxide) to 

render the dwellings safe for occupation. The disease manifested 

as a skin lesion, with the infection 

likely resulting from the organism 

contacting broken skin. Fortunately 

both individuals were successfully 

treated with appropriate antibiotics.

Rather than occurring by natural 

causes as was the case with the 

Danbury incident, human anthrax 

can be the consequence of exposure 

from deliberate acts of war or terrorism. Utility of Bacillus anthracis as 

a biological weapon may have originated as early as the 1930s, when, 

as reported, the Japanese Kwantung 

Army Unit 731 intentionally exposed 

the bacterium to thousands of war 

prisoners in Manchuria (Eitzen et 

al.,1997). During the past decade, 

Bacillus anthracis has emerged as a 

formidable biological threat to the U. 

S. military and homeland. The warfighter is aware of the biological agent’s 

potential impact on the battlefield. As 

defense for such an attack, warfighters have been vaccinated for protection against the agent. Knowledge of 

the organism’s potential also extends 

to U. S. civilians. From news broadcasts that abounded about ten years 

ago, the public learned numerous 

details on the havoc that Bacillus 

anthracis presented as an agent 

packaged as a dry powder in letters 

delivered to unsuspecting individuals.

Among various microorganisms regarded as biological threats to the battlefield or homeland, Bacillus anthracis often predominates as an agent 

of concern due to unique properties 

associated with the microbe existing 

in the form of a spore. As one of a variety of microbial forms, the spore can 

exist in a dormant “sleeping” state and 

remain viable for extended periods 

under harsh conditions. In addition, 

spores typically are tolerant to disinfectants and other antimicrobial compounds that easily kill other microbial 

forms. This tolerance requires elevated disinfectant concentrations or 

longer exposure times to adequately 

kill spores. The key to the spore’s tolerance or hardiness is the organism’s 

multi-layered casing that surrounds 

and protects the organism’s interior. 

Like a fortress that wards off invading 

enemies with a moat and steep walls, 

the spore casing can protect the organism in adverse conditions. Consisting of a series of concentric layers, 

the structure includes a barrier layer 

that can protect the spore by limiting 

entrance of antagonistic materials 

when the spore finds itself in a hostile 

environment. Another layer provides 

structural strength to the spore. In addition, some components of the casing are able to tolerate reactive compounds, such as disinfectants, and 

maintain their protective function. This 

article presents Bacillus anthracis as 

Jon J. Calomiris, Ph. D.

Microbiologist, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

The Spore Casing as Defense for 

the “Anthrax” Biological Agent

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 24 

T
a spore, describing how the spore’s 

casing contributes to the microbe’s nature as a formidable biological threat 

and challenge to biological defense.

The Bacillus anthracis Spore: 

A Unique Microbe

Microorganisms are ubiquitous 

and have been found in essentially 

every type of environment around 

the world, including harsh regions 

that are inhospitable to almost all life 

forms (Finlay et al., 2001). Microbes 

have been isolated from areas of 

extreme temperatures, including 

soils of Antarctica and waters of 

ocean hydrothermal vents where 

temperatures were reported to reach

-128.6oF and 867oF, respectively. Inhospitable regions that are laden with 

metals, salts, or other toxic compounds 

have been found to be colonized by a 

great variety of microbial species able 

to tolerate the noxious materials. To 

comprehend the possibility of microbial life on Mars, NASA scientists have 

studied microbial populations of soils 

collected from Antarctica and the Atacama Desert in South America as the 

coldest and driest regions, respectively, on Earth. Scientists have also postulated that microbes could survive in 

outer space (Horneck et al., 2010).

The many microorganisms that 

have been isolated from diverse environments and identified by scientists 

as microbial entities can been classified into basic taxonomic groups, 

which include bacteria, viruses, fungi, 

algae, and protozoa. Fortunately, 

only a small number of the many 

microbial entities are human pathogens (organisms capable of causing 

human disease). As another positive 

fact, most human pathogens, upon 

shedding from an infected human 

host into the environment, do not 

thrive and eventually die during exposure in air, on surfaces, or in water. 

In addition, human pathogens usually 

are sensitive to and effectively killed 

by disinfectants. However, Bacillus 

anthracis, as the causative agent 

of anthrax, is an exception since it 

can exist in the form of a spore. As 

a spore in a dormant state, Bacillus 

anthracis can endure austere environments for extended periods. Survival 

of the Bacillus anthracis spore is 

exemplified by the reported persistence of the pathogen on Gruinard 

Island, a remote uninhabited region 

off the coast of Scotland (Manchee et 

al., 1994). In 1942 Porton Down scientists detonated bombs of Bacillus 

anthracis on the island and monitored 

the health of sheep as susceptible 

hosts to ascertain the feasibility of an 

“anthrax attack” by the Germans. As 

a testament to spore durability, the 

pathogen survived on the island for 

many years until extensive decontamination treatment was conducted 

in 1986. Treatment involved spraying 280 tons of formaldehyde diluted 

in seawater over about 485 acres 

of land. Warning signs were finally 

removed from the island in 1990, 48 

years after the pathogen’s release.

It is not surprising that Bacillus 

anthracis persisted in Gruinard Island 

soils since spore-forming microbes 

thrive very well as predominant microbial entities of soils. Soils are typically laden with various bacteria and 

fungi that are able to exist as spores. 

The possibility of extreme longevity of spores in ground environments 

is suggested by a scientific report 

on the isolation of a spore-forming 

bacterium from the interior of an 

ancient salt crystal buried about 

2,000 feet below the desert floor of 

Carlsbad, New Mexico (Vreeland 

et al., 2000). Based on the age of 

the crystal, the scientists claimed 

the spore, that was named “Bacillus 

strain 2-9-3,” may have existed 

within the crystal for 250 million years.

Spore-related properties of 

Bacillus anthracis contribute to the 

pathogen’s potential use as a formidable biological agent. Tolerance to 

harsh environments could allow the 

organism to survive and remain infectious during release and dissemination at target attack sites. In addition, 

released spores could persist and 

remain infectious for extended periods at attack sites and consequently 

increase the number of exposed persons and exposure time. The potential power of the Bacillus anthracis

spore as a threat is broadened by the 

ability of the pathogen to cause disease by any of three exposure routes, 

those being inhalation, ingestion, and 

dermal contact. By comparison, most 

human pathogens are capable of 

causing disease by only one or two 

exposure routes. Multiple exposure 

routes combined with spore hardiness broadens the scope of possible 

attack scenarios. Potential means of 

exposure include introducing aerosols 

(air containing spores as particles) to 

enclosed or open air spaces as well 

as deliberate contamination of food 

and water supplies. Fortunately, 

anthrax is not transmitted by humanto-human contact as is possible 

with other pathogens such as those 

that cause influenza or plague. 

While Bacillus anthracis has the 

potential to cause illness (morbidity) that can lead to death (mortality), medical countermeasures are 

available for effective protection or 

treatment. During vaccination with a 

series of shots, an individual develops 

immunity that provides protection 

against exposure to the pathogen. 

For those not protected by vaccination, antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin 

or doxycycline are effective if administered soon after exposure or at 

early stages of the disease. While an 

anthrax incident can be abated or controlled with medical countermeasures, 

an extensive biological attack could 

create a serious situation that requires 

decontamination of large areas or 

complex materials. Decontamination 

of Bacillus anthracis could be a great 

challenge due to the innate tolerance 

of spores to disinfectants such as 

“chlorine bleach” (Calomiris, 2004) 

and chlorine dioxide (Chatuev et al.,

2010). This is exemplified by the 2001 

“anthrax letter” attacks and the extensive effort (hundreds of millions of dol-

 25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
lars cost for over two years) required 

to reduce Bacillus anthracis spore 

numbers of contaminated buildings 

to acceptable levels (Franco et al.,

2010). Understanding the properties 

of Bacillus anthracis as a spore could 

provide the basis for developing more 

effective means to control the biological agent. The significance of the 

spore casing as the organism’s protective armor and a challenge to biological defense is discussed in this article.

A Tale of Two Forms:

Bacillus anthracis as Spore or 

Cell

As presented in the above section, 

B. anthracis as a dormant spore is 

a “sleeping” entity that can survive 

austere environments, tolerate disinfectants, and cause human disease. 

However, as other microbes that 

exist as a spore, the life cycle of B. 

anthracis has a dual nature due to the 

microbe’s ability to exist as either a 

spore or a cell. Should a spore find 

itself in a nutrient-rich environment 

(such as an animal host or laboratory beef broth), the resting entity can 

awaken and transform into an active 

cell form through the process of germination. As a cell in a lush environment, the organism is metabolically 

active, feeding on nutrients, growing, 

and dividing into new cells. However, 

unlike the spore, the cell does not 

survive well in harsh environments, 

is sensitive to disinfectants, and is 

not infectious. To continue the life 

cycle, an active cell that encounters 

harsh or nutrient-poor conditions can 

produce a spore through the process 

of sporulation. This spore-to-cell 

dual nature provides the organism 

flexibility, allowing the dormant spore 

to survive an inhospitable environment or enabling the cell to multiply 

and increase the number of organisms under favorable conditions.

A major difference between the 

spore and cell that greatly impacts the 

bacterium’s nature is the casing of the 

organism. All bacteria, as the spore 

or cell form, are bounded by a shell 

structure that houses the organism’s 

components, including a nucleoid that 

organizes DNA as genetic material, 

ribosomes as structures involved with 

synthesis of proteins, enzymes that 

catalyze numerous reactions, and 

granules that house nutrient reserves, 

lipids, and inorganic compounds. 

In addition, the casing serves as a 

protective barrier for the bacterium. 

Having direct, intimate contact with 

the organism’s environment, the casing provides the first line of defense 

by excluding or limiting the entrance 

of environmental materials that could 

harm the organism. While functioning 

as a protective barrier, the outer structure also allows entrance of essential 

nutrients and other materials needed 

by the bacterium to survive and grow.

Compared with the casing of the 

spore, the casing of the bacterial cell 

is more interactive with the organism’s environment. This interaction is 

directed by two pathways designed, 

under ideal conditions, to allow 

entrance of nutrients into the organism while excluding materials that 

could harm the organism. The lipophilic pathway, as a lipid membrane 

structure that encases the entire cell 

like a balloon, imparts a hydrophobic 

surface and, thus, tends to repel water. 

The lipophilic pathway can allow passage of hydrophobic (water insoluble) 

compounds into the cell while excluding hydrophilic (water soluble) compounds. The hydrophilic pathway, 

which consists of structural proteins 

(porins) embedded throughout the 

cell’s lipid membrane, provides waterlined channels as conduits for passage of small hydrophilic compounds 

into the organism. In a favorable environment, both pathways promote the 

survival of the bacterium by allowing 

nutrients to enter the cell while excluding harmful materials. However, the 

presence of harmful compounds of 

size or solubility that allows passage 

through the cell casing could lead to 

the death of organism. In addition, 

a variety of compounds (detergents, 

disinfectants, and organic solvents) 

can react with cell casing components 

and thereby destroy the protective 

structure. Disruption of the barrier can 

lead to leakage of vital cellular components from the cell and less restricted 

entrance of harmful environmental 

materials into the cell. These events 

usually result in the bacterium’s death.

Unlike the casing of the bacterial 

cell, the casing of the spore is generally less interactive with the organism’s environment. This is attributed 

to the spore surface being much more 

hydrophobic than the outer region of 

the bacterial cell (Doyle et al., 1984). 

As such, spores suspended in aqueous environments could behave like 

oil droplets in water. Consequently, for 

spores suspended in a typical waterbased environment, the hydrophobic 

spore surface would tend to repel 

hydrophilic compounds of the aqueous 

environment and reduce the association of adverse compounds with the 

organism. The hydrophobic nature of 

the spore surface could contribute to 

spore’s basic tolerance to a variety of 

hydrophilic antimicrobial compounds, 

such as hypochlorite (the active component of “chlorine bleach”), chlorine 

dioxide, and hydrogen peroxide.

The Bacillus anthracis Spore Wall: 

A Hard Cookie to Crack!

As discussed in the preceding section, the spore surface with its hydrophobic nature plays a role in limiting 

the entrance of unwanted environmental materials into the organism. 

Compared with the casing of the bacterial cell, the spore shell has more 

layers, with the layers being more 

complex and thicker. Architecturally, 

the spore casing, as a series of 

concentric layers, presents multiple 

obstacles that can limit the entrance 

of materials present in the spore’s 

surrounding environment (Figure 1). 

However, antimicrobial materials, 

such as disinfectants, have some 

capacity to enter the spore and exert 

deleterious effects (Riesenman et al.,

2000; Tennen et al., 2000; Young et al.,

2003). But the spore’s survival during 

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 26 
disinfectant exposure is typically a 

function of disinfectant concentration 

and time which, as factors of diffusion, 

influence the quantity of disinfectant 

molecules that enter the spore. In 

addition, the spore’s fate is influenced 

by the type and extent of reactions of 

the disinfectant with the various layers 

of the casing. Entrance of many disinfectant molecules into the spore and 

gross alteration of the casing layers 

resulting from deleterious reactions 

could lead to the demise of the spore.

The outer most structure, which 

has direct contact with the Bacillus 

anthracis spore’s environment, is the 

exosporium. As a loose fitting layer, 

the exosporium does not appear to 

exert a barrier function since many 

materials are able to freely traverse 

the structure. The exosporium is 

unique since it has only been found to 

be present in two other spore-forming 

bacteria (Bacillus cereus and Bacillus 

thuringiensis) which are genetically 

related to Bacillus anthracis. The 

exosporium structure of Bacillus 

anthracis consists of a base layer with 

distinctive finger-like projections composed of glycoprotein (a sugar-protein 

hybrid biomolecule). While researchers have presumed the exosporium 

may play a role in the ability of the 

Bacillus anthracis spore to infect its 

host, experiments with laboratory animals failed to demonstrate the 

requirement of the structure to cause 

disease (Brahmbhatt et al. 2007). 

However, the exosporium’s hydrophoFigure 1. Cross-section of the Bacillus anthracis spore casing architecture. 

The spore casing consists of a series of concentric layers that surround and 

protect the core of the organism.

bic nature contributes to the spore’s 

hydrophobic surface and, thus, how 

the organism interacts with and, 

perhaps, survives in its environment.

The coat, as the next layer of the 

casing, plays a major role as a barrier that offers the spore protection 

against antagonistic compounds 

(Driks, 1999). As a permeability barrier, the coat prevents passage of 

many environmental materials into 

the spore. Behaving like a molecular 

sieve, the coat only allows passage of smaller compounds, which 

can include nutrients present in the 

spore’s environment. Compounds 

with a mass about 50-fold greater 

than that of a molecule of glucose 

may be too large to effectively pass 

through the coat. Composed primarily of proteins, the coat consists of a 

dense outer region and a less dense 

inner region. The coat’s outer region 

is strengthened by many sulfur-bond 

bridges that crosslink amino acids, 

the building blocks of proteins. Since 

hypochlorite is reactive with certain 

amino acids and can break the sulfur 

bridges, exposure to the disinfectant 

would be expected to weaken the coat 

barrier. However, the spore exhibits 

some tolerance to hypochlorite at 

lower concentrations, such as those of 

chlorinated drinking water (Calomiris, 

2004). Elevated hypochlorite levels 

and extended exposure periods could 

be required for hypochlorite molecules to sufficiently react with amino 

acids of the coat and enter the spore.

As the next layer of the casing, the 

cortex is a complex web-like structure 

composed of crosslinked peptidoglyan (a protein-sugar hybrid biomolecule) (Haridasan et al., 2002). An 

outer membrane layer may be located 

between the coat and cortex. The 

cortex provides structural strength 

and can maintain its integrity under 

extreme pressure. However, unlike 

the protein coat, the cortex is refractory to oxidants such as hypochlorite 

and requires strong reactions with 

acids for degradation. Alternately, the 

cortex can be degraded under mild 

conditions by an enzyme (lysozyme) 

that catalyzes a hydrolytic reaction 

that breaks the peptidoglycan crosslinks. However, spores exposed to 

lysozyme retain their cortex structure 

since the lysozyme molecules are 

too large to pass through the coat 

barrier and reach the cortex. But 

spores lacking coats (by treatment 

with alkali or the enzyme proteinase 

which digests proteins) are sensitive to lysozyme since the enzyme 

can reach and digest the cortex.

As the inner-most layer of the casing, the inner membrane surrounds 

the core, the central region of the 

spore. The lipid-based membrane 

as a protective barrier restricts passage of compounds, including those 

of smaller size, into the spore core. 

However, unlike the coat or cortex, 

inner membrane is not refractory to 

chemical insult. Sensitivity of the inner 

membrane to various oxidizing compounds (such as hypochlorite, chlorine dioxide, and hydrogen peroxide) 

was suggested by research findings 

demonstrating that oxidizing compounds can increase the membrane’s 

permeability (Cortezzo et al., 2004).

Finally, there is the core, the central 

region of the spore. The core contains 

the spore’s guts needed to produce a 

cell when environmental conditions 

trigger germination. Thus, protection 

of core constituents (DNA, enzymes, 

and other biomolecules) is crucial to 

ensure germination is successful for 

 27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
generating a new cell. Protection of 

DNA, as genetic material, is afforded 

by small proteins that bind to the DNA 

structure and absorb environmental 

insults that reach the core so that 

the DNA remains untouched. A very 

important condition for protection of 

core constituents and maintenance 

of the spore’s dormant state is the 

dryness of the core. The significance 

of the lack of water in the spore core 

is presented in the next section. 

Key to Bacillus anthracis Spore Survival: No Water!

As a general premise, water is required to sustain life. Water is essential for survival of the bacterial cell, 

which utilizes the liquid to maintain its 

vital activities for metabolizing nutrients, growing, and dividing into new 

cells. However, for the bacterial spore 

to maintain its dormancy and survive 

under austere conditions, water molecules are not welcome in the spore 

core. In the absence of water, the 

spore core’s various biomolecular machineries used to produce a new cell 

are locked and, thus, the spore is dormant. Within the confines of the dry 

dormant core, DNA is sequestered in 

a crystalline state, enzymes and other 

biomolecules involved in germination 

remain inactive, and the spore sleeps.

The spore is designed to restrict 

water from the organism, particularly 

from the core. Absence of water in 

the dormant Bacillus anthracis spore 

core can be observed by phasecontrast microscopy, with the dry core 

appearing bright due to the difference 

in the refractive index of the core and 

water environment (Figure 2). A key 

component to the spore’s anhydrous 

state is the compound dipicolinic acid 

(DPA). As a small molecule that complexes with calcium, DPA occupies 

much of the core space and thereby 

displaces water or toxic compounds of 

the spore’s environment. The significance of DPA for its potential to keep 

the core devoid of water is reflected by 

the compound comprising 20 percent 

of the core’s mass and 10 percent of 

the mass of the entire spore. While 

DPA resides within the dormant spore 

as a drying agent, during germination 

there is a rapid exodus of DPA from the 

spore and, as a result, a rapid egress 

of water molecules into the spore. 

DPA release is regarded as a characteristic indication of the germination 

process. In addition, because DPA is 

unique to the bacterial spore, some 

technologists believe that DPA can be 

utilized for strategies to detect Bacillus 

anthracis as a biological agent.

The cortex may also play a role in 

maintaining the anhydrous state of the 

spore core. As presented above, the 

cortex is a web-like layer that provides 

the Bacillus anthracis spore structural 

strength. Researchers have suggested that the cortex could play a role 

in maintaining the desiccated state 

of the spore core (Westphal et al.,

2003). Microscopic examination and 

spore size measurements indicated 

that the bacterial spore, prepared as 

a dry powder, can swell in response 

to increases in relative humidity. It 

was suggested that humidity-induced 

spore swelling could be attributed to 

the cortex web structure expanding 

and thereby increasing the overall 

size of the spore. During this expansion process, the cortex could exert 

force against the inner membrane 

that surrounds the core, prevent the 

core from expanding, and thereby 

limit entrance of water into the core. 

In addition, the force of the expanding 

cortex against the coat was postulated to expand the coat by unfolding 

of the coat’s proteins. This proposed 

process would promote core dryness 

and, consequently, spore dormancy. 

Thus, the dormant spore is not completely inert but could respond to 

environmental changes while remaining dormant. Like a person who walks 

in his sleep, the dormant spore could 

contract and expand while asleep.

How does the sleeping Bacillus anthracis spore awaken? Germination

Under hospitable environmental 

conditions, the dormant spore can 

awaken and produce an active cell. 

The cell can grow and then divide into 

two cells, with continued growth and 

divisions yielding logarithmic production of many cells. The germination 

process is initiated or triggered if and 

when the environment provides specific chemical compounds, commonly 

termed germinants, to the spore 

(Setlow, 2003). However, for germination to be fully successful in producing a viable cell, the environment 

must also provide building blocks 

needed for production of molecular 

structures, such as proteins, lipids, 

and genetic material, which constitute the new organism. In addition, 

an energy source, such as glucose, 

is required to fuel the synthetic 

processes that generate a new cell.

Spore germination can occur 

under a variety of conditions and 

scenarios. A dormant spore planted 

in a nutrient-poor soil could germinate in response to a rain event that 

produces a water conduit that transports germinant compounds from 

a nutrient-rich region to the spore. 

While soil-induced germination of 

spores has been demonstrated for 

microbes such as Bacillus cereus

(Vilain et al., 2006), germination of 

the Bacillus anthracis spore in natural 

environments most likely involves 

Figure 2. Bacillus anthracis spores 

suspended in water observed by phasecontrast microscopy. The spore (elliptical 

shape, approximately 1.5-mm long and 

0.8-mm wide) displays a bright center 

due to the refractive index difference 

between of the dry core and the water 

environment. The spore casing appears 

as a dark ring surrounding the core. 

Image produced by the author.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 28 
Figure 3. Process of Bacillus anthracis spore germination. 1: Dormant 

Spore (intact casing and dry core). 2: Stage I Germination (release of DPA 

and calcium from core, core hydration, increased permeability of inner membrane causing spore sensitivity to antimicrobials). 3: Stage II Germination 

(coat disruption, cortex degradation, additional core hydration and swelling, 

greater spore sensitivity to antimicrobials). 4: Cell growth (synthesis of cell 

components and release of cell from degraded spore components).

infecting an animal host (Dragon et 

al., 1995). However, some researchers have reported germination of 

Bacillus anthracis spores associated 

with the roots of plants under laboratory conditions (Saile et al., 2006).

Anthrax, as a human or animal 

disease, requires germination of the 

spore after it enters the host. The 

disease process, as for inhalation 

anthrax, involves spore deposition 

in the alveoli (small air sacks) of 

the lungs and ingestion by alveolar 

macrophages (white blood cells that 

engulf and digest microbes and other 

debris). While macrophages can kill 

many of the spores they ingest, some 

spores can survive and proceed to 

cause disease. The macrophages 

serve as a Trojan horse that transports surviving spores to lymph nodes 

which provide conditions for germination. Upon germination, cells are 

able to rapidly grow and increase in 

number in the bloodstream since the 

cells are encased in a capsule (a thick 

outer coating composed of a protein 

polymer) that protects them from 

macrophages. The cells produce toxins that destroy tissue, cause bleeding, and lead to the death of the host

Germination of the Bacillus 

anthracis spore can also occur in a 

laboratory under controlled conditions. As germinants, an amino acid 

(L-alanine) and another compound 

(inosine) are commonly employed 

to trigger germination of Bacillus 

anthracis in a test tube. If conducted 

with inclusion of growth nutrients, 

such as a beef broth, the germination 

process can proceed to production 

of complete cells that can grow and 

produce many new cells. A variety 

of germinants (include various amino 

acids, sugars, and salts) have been 

identified by laboratory experimentation. In addition, mechanical abrasion 

and barometric pressure have been 

reported to initiate spore germination.

Should a dormant spore have 

the good fortune of its environment 

transforming from bad to good, what 

mechanisms would allow the lucky 

organism to awaken and take advantage of its new hospitable habitat? At 

the molecular level, spore germination 

is a rapid sequential process initiated 

within seconds with new cell growth 

occurring within minutes (Figure 3). 

Spore activation, as the awakening 

event of the germination process, 

typically results from germinants, as 

specific small chemicals, travelling 

from the spore’s environment, traversing the casing layers, and reaching 

receptors located around the area of 

the inner membrane. Receptor binding immediately leads to the opening 

of channels that direct the exit of the 

dipicolinic acid depot from the spore 

core. As water fills the large void in 

the core left by the dipicolinic acid 

release, the spore interior assumes a 

hydrated state which furthers the germination process. With the arrival of 

water, enzymes in the cortex become 

active and degrade the cortex structure. In addition, the flux of water 

activates protein-degrading enzymes 

associated with the coat, resulting in 

the disruption of the coat structure. 

The water also engages enzymes and 

machinery within the core to produce 

a new cell. Because the cortex and 

coat structures have been breached 

by enzymes, the growing cell is able 

to push through the spore casing layers and emerge from the spore debris.

While many new multiplying cells 

can emerge as the result of a dormant 

spore finding its way to a salubrious 

environment, the fate of the new cells 

is not final. Should the environment 

change for the worse, the cells could 

die since their outer layers are fragile 

and not as protective as the spore 

casing. Alternately, certain adverse 

conditions can trigger the production 

of a new spore within a cell through 

the process of sporulation. The new 

spore can survive while its mother cell 

succumbs to the austerity. As such, 

the cycle of a bacterium, such as 

Bacillus anthracis, continues and the 

species is able to persist under both 

favorable and unfavorable conditions.

How does Bacillus anthracis 

transform from an active cell to a 

sleeping spore? Sporulation

Bacterial cells in a salubrious 

environment, such as a moist soil, 

can flourish as happy, actively growing organisms that yield new cells 

and increase their population size. 

However, a cell can quickly find itself 

in a bad situation should its surroundings transform by unfavorable natural 

events, such as drought or influx of 

toxic compounds via rain water. In 

addition, human intervention with 

control measures, such as application of disinfectants, could devastate 

cell populations. While bacterial cells 

would die in harsh surroundings, 

those bacteria that exist as spores 

could prevail. Thus, the ability of the 

cell to transform back to its spore 

form, through the process of sporulation, can allow the organism to survive 

in ever changing environments.

Sporulation, as the process of a 

 29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
cell producing a spore, is typically 

initiated when nutrients of a spore’s 

environment diminish. The cell can 

sense reduced levels of metabolic 

building blocks (such as carbon and 

nitrogen) and, if conditions are suitable, respond by producing a spore. 

By doing so, the organism charts 

its destiny to survive as a dormant 

entity in an austere environment. 

Alternately, if unable to sporulate, the 

cell could die in the harsh environment 

and, as a result, the microbial entity 

would be lost. As with germination, 

sporulation occurs as a sequential 

series of events resulting in formation of a new spore. Upon initiation 

of sporulation, the cell is transformed 

to operate its machinery to produce a 

spore within the cell. This transition 

is largely directed by genetic material 

in the cell, with genetic regions that 

lead to production of a spore being 

expressed. This process involves 

small molecules (“sigma factors”) 

binding to an enzyme (“RNA polymerase”) and, by doing so, enabling 

the enzyme to read specific regions 

of the genetic material that produces 

various components of a new spore. 

At the same time, genetic regions that 

direct a variety of the cell’s activities 

are no longer read or expressed.

As depicted in Figure 4, the sporulation process involves structural 

changes within the cell, starting with 

formation of a membrane septum that 

divides the cell into a smaller section 

(“forespore”), in which the new spore 

forms, and a larger section (“mother 

cell”) that nutures the new spore as 

it develops. After about three hours 

of spore development, the septum 

reforms as a spherical membrane 

structure in the forespore region of 

the cell. Through various synthetic 

steps, the spherical structure evolves 

to become a complete spore, with 

formation of the cortex, coat, and 

exosporium. The entire sporulation 

process can be completed in a few 

hours. In addition to occurring in 

natural environments, sporulation can 

be conducted under defined conditions in the laboratory. For a scientist 

to produce spores, cells are typically 

cultivated at 98.6oF in a flask containing a nutrient broth amended with 

specific metals. Under optimal conditions, almost every cell will produce 

a spore. At the end of sporulation, 

the cells lyse and the new spores are 

released into the broth environment.

The Bacillus anthracis Spore Casing as a Challenge to Biological 

Defense

As demonstrated by the “anthrax 

letter” attacks of 2001, the Bacillus 

anthracis spore as a biological agent 

can impose great challenges to 

biological defense. As mentioned 

above, the effort and cost required to 

decontaminate the stricken buildings 

is staggering. It is interesting to ponder the thought that the ramifications 

of the attacks were attributed, at least 

in part, to physiological properties 

associated with the bacterial spore 

casing. Protective layers allowed the 

organism to survive during release 

and exposure periods as well as persist in the building environments. In 

addition, the spore’s disinfectant tolerance provided by the layers posed 

great challenges to experts tasked to 

select the best disinfectant and decontamination strategy. Thus, defense 

approaches that address spore casing 

properties could provide better protection in the event of another attack.

More effective control of Bacillus 

anthracis as a biological agent calls 

for scientific research focused on 

spore physiology. Understanding 

mechanisms of spore degradation by 

disinfectants or, perhaps, identifying 

the Achilles’ heel of disinfectant attack 

could provide the basis to develop 

novel strategies for more effective 

decontamination. In addition, further 

knowledge of the spore could lead to 

devising treatments that unlock the 

protective casing and release nucleic 

acids for improved DNA-based detection sensitivity. Scientific findings 

could initiate new approaches to biological defense and improve response 

to a Bacillus anthracis attack.

As an alternate strategy for Bacillus 

anthracis control, a mild treatment 

was developed to disrupt the spore 

casing and thereby sensitize the spore 

to chlorine disinfection (Calomiris, 

2006). Compatible with drinking water 

systems, the treatment appeared 

to activate the dormant Bacillus 

anthracis spore, disrupt the protective 

barrier, and allow spore death with 

lower disinfectant doses. The process 

offers potential for decontamination of 

sensitive materials or systems since 

spore disinfection could be achieved 

without harsh conditions. While this 

scientific finding is an example of a 

novel approach developed to improve 

biological defense technology, additional research is needed to more 

fully understand the Bacillus anthracis

spore and advance defense capability.

Figure 4. Process of Bacillus anthracis sporulation. 1: Cell in environment suitable for sporulation. 2: Septum produced to form mother cell (left 

region) and forespore (right region). 3: Septum reforms during assembly 

of membranes. 4: Cortex synthesis. 5: Coat and exosporium assembly. 

6: Cell degradation and release of mature spore into the environment.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 30 
 31 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 

Jon J. Calomiris is a microbiologist at USANCA, Fort Belvoir, 

VA. He has degrees in microbiology from the University of Maryland, (B.S.) M.S. in microbiology 

from Oregon State University, and 

a Ph.D. in microbiology from Johns 

Hopkins University. He previously 

directed microbiology research with 

the Air Force Research Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Edgewood, Maryland. His email address is jon.calomiris@us.army.mil

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LTG Daniel P. Bolger

Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G-3/5/7

Pentomic Soldiers

HISTORY

n today’s long, grueling war 

against Al Qaeda and their ilk, 

American Soldiers enjoy plenty of 

popular support. Although only about 

1% of our citizens serve in uniform, 

it’s a rare public gathering that does 

not feature a salute to “the Troops.” 

Athletes, singers, musicians, comedians, and actors put on shows and 

meet and greet, traveling gamely to 

the fetid Tigris River valley and the forbidding Hindu Kush. They follow trails 

blazed by luminaries like Bob Hope 

and Marilyn Monroe. Indeed, recently 

entertainers Mila Kunis and Justin 

Timberlake made two Marines very 

happy by accepting their invitations to 

the next annual Marine Corps Birthday 

Ball. Betty White, age 90, had to take 

a pass, but appreciated the offer.1 

This is all certainly a welcome 

trend after the heartache of the 

Vietnam War era. But it is not without 

precedent. Not so long ago, American 

entertainers didn’t just salute people 

in uniform, or date people in uniform. They were people in uniform.

In the decades after World War 

II, Uncle Sam gave many a chance 

to contribute, courtesy of a formatted 

telegram that always began with the 

cheery word: “Greetings.” Facing off 

against the Soviet Russians, the U.S. 

Army needed plenty of able-bodied 

young men. The Army had trounced 

the Kaiser’s Germans in the Great 

War, beaten the Nazi Germans and 

Imperial Japanese in the Second 

World War, and stood strong against 

the Red Chinese and North Koreans 

in the Korea War. Those veterans 

expected their sons to serve. They did.

i The volunteers and draftees of 

the high Cold War, between 1953-

1965, joined an Army that called itself 

Pentomic. The storied old regiments 

were gone, replaced by gleaming 

new “battle groups” of five companies 

(the “pent” part) backed by a hightech menagerie of front-line nuclear 

weapons (the “atomic” part). The 

New Look Army deployed long range 

Redstone and Corporal missiles, 

shorter-ranged Honest John and 

Little John rockets, atomic artillery 

shells, and atomic land mines.2 There 

was even a jeep-mounted pocket 

rocket called the Davy Crockett, in 

a simultaneous salute to the storied 

frontier marksman and the ubiquitous 

marketeer/Mouseketeer Walt Disney 

corporation that made the Tennessee 

legend a household name in the 

1950s.3 The idea was that in defense 

of West Germany, a battle group’s five 

Pentomic companies would spread 

out and hurl their various nukes 

at the waves of advancing Soviet 

tank divisions. Energetic American 

commanders judged it a good way 

to fight outnumbered and win. The 

West Germans locals were not 

quite so enthusiastic about the idea.

The young Soldiers embraced it. 

From every state and territory, they 

reported for duty in their thousands. 

Even at the height of the draft, a 

great many volunteered, if only to 

get some say in their future. Among 

their number were three rather 

typical Pentomic Soldiers: Elvis Aaron 

Presley, James Marshall Hendrix, 

and Kristoffer Kristian Kristofferson. 

We know them better today as stars 

of American popular music. But 

back then, they were just doing their 

“hitch,” holding the line when the 

Cold War was the coolest, daddy-o.

Armor: A Little Less 

Conversation, A Little More 

Action

Elvis Presley was a Cavalry scout. 

Born in Tupelo, Mississippi, Presley 

was 23 years old when he reported 

for duty at Fort Chaffee, Arkansas. 

Already a famous singer with thousands of adoring young female fans, 

Presley had the right approach: “The 

Army can do anything it wants with 

me.”4 And being the Army, it did.

After a one-day media madhouse 

disrupted Presley’s basic training at 

Fort Hood, Texas, the Army wisely 

restricted access. The new private 

completed basic training, earned 

the specialty of Cavalry Scout, and 

went home on leave before heading 

to Germany. But unlike most of his 

fellow Soldiers, Presley stopped by a 

Nashville, Tennessee recording studio and knocked out several records. 

While he served in Europe, his shrewd 

agent released ten singles one after 

another, carefully spaced to assure 

maximum sales. Each made the top 

40, including “Hard Headed Woman.”5 

The Elvis Presley brand stayed very 

much in the public eye while the new 

Cavalry Scout served in Germany.

Some wanted the new private 

to join Special Services, a traditional route for celebrity Soldiers like 

athletes, singers, and actors. But 

Presley would have none of that. He 

had trained to be a Cavalry Trooper 

and that’s what he wanted. He was 

assigned in accord with his training, 

like every other Soldier arriving in 

October 1958 aboard the troop ship 

USS General George M. Randall.

6

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 32 
On posting to the 3rd Armored 

Division (“Spearhead”), Presley 

joined the 1st Battalion, 32nd Armor 

in Friedburg. He was assigned 

to the Reconnaissance Platoon, 

and drove the platoon sergeant’s 

jeep.7 The battalion had the mission of defending the Fulda Gap.

From its base at Ray Barracks, 

Presley’s platoon trained to deploy 

forward and screen the East German 

border. Multiple Soviet divisions 

waited just on the other side. It fell 

to Presley and his fellow Scouts to 

move up by Jeep, dismount, and 

provide early warning of any such 

invasion. Presley spent many weeks 

at ranges, on field maneuvers, 

and rehearsing the movements 

necessary to find the enemy—and 

exploit planned U.S. atomic bursts.

The rest of the battalion used big, 

heavily armed and steel-clad M-48 

main battle tanks. But Presley and the 

Scout teams had unarmored 1⁄4 ton 

trucks and a few machine guns. Their 

radios, however, and their observing 

skills would be crucial in the event 

the Russians came over. If an atomic 

shell had to drop on an advancing 

Soviet tank column, Presley and his 

fellow reconnaissance Soldiers would 

likely provide the map coordinates.

The new Scout was reportedly a 

model Soldier. Of course, he was also 

Elvis Presley. He lived in a nearby 

hotel with his father Vernon, and spent 

time now and then signing autographs 

for German fans. Presley donated his 

meager Army salary to charity. He used 

his much more ample record earnings 

to host parties, bought televisions for 

the battalion day rooms, and even 

purchased new uniforms for his fellow Scouts. The famous Soldier also 

met an Air Force dependent named 

Priscilla Beaulieu, age 14. They grew 

close. She became his wife in 1966.8

Presley made Sergeant the 

month before he returned home and 

received his Honorable Discharge. 

"I was in a funny position,” Presley 

explained. “Actually, that's the only 

way it could be. People were expecting me to mess up, to goof up in 

one way or another. They thought 

I couldn't take it and so forth, and I 

was determined to go to any limits 

to prove otherwise, not only to the 

people who were wondering, but to 

myself."9 He had done just that. For all 

the fame and adulation he achieved, 

he was a Soldier when and where 

his country needed him. When we 

salute those who held the line in Cold 

War Germany, we number Sergeant 

Elvis Aaron Presley among them.

Airborne: ‘Scuse Me While I 

Kiss the Sky

Jimi Hendrix was a supply clerk. 

Born James Marshall Hendrix in 

Seattle Washington, Hendrix was 

19 years old when he volunteered 

to join the Army’s first purposebuilt Pentomic formation, the 101st

Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, 

Kentucky. Having seen a friend wearing the impressive Screaming Eagle 

patch, Hendrix wanted to see if he, 

too, could become a paratrooper. A 

nudge from a judge also played a role, 

as young Hendrix had been caught 

twice riding in stolen cars, although 

he himself was not the thief.10

Hendrix was not yet a prominent 

musician. He was a young black 

man in 1961 from the relatively tolerant Pacific Northwest. During basic 

training, he performed well enough 

to keep his requested skill as a supply clerk, a good thing, as he was 

the worst marksman in his platoon. 

Still, a black man in 1961 with a 120 

aptitude score drew favorable notice. 

But that was at Fort Ord, California.11 

Scrutiny got tougher as he went south.

Young Hendrix of Seattle headed 

into segregated Fort Benning, 

Georgia for jump training, to be followed by a posting to Fort Campbell, 

located on the just as segregated 

Kentucky/Tennessee state line. He 

made it right through Airborne School, 

at that time four weeks in length for 

enlisted Soldiers.12 He completed 

his five jumps, thereby accomplishing the one thing that mattered 

most to him about joining the Army.

Hendrix enjoyed parachuting. It 

was—and is—an unnatural act, a 

controlled fall from the sky. In their 

myths, the ancient Greeks lamented 

Icarus for daring such a feat and failing. But modern paratroopers train 

for it. The rush of air into the plane, 

the leap into the roaring wind, the 

disorienting spin of sky and ground, 

the opening shock, the gentle ride 

to the hard, hard ground—they all 

formed impressions that deeply 

influenced the budding guitarist.

When Hendrix reported to Fort 

Campbell in November of 1961, the 

Army placed him as a repair parts 

supply clerk in the 801st Maintenance 

Battalion.13 This organization tended 

and repaired the many weapons 

and vehicles in the division. Much 

 33 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 

Sergeant Elvis Aaron Presley

Private First Class Jimi Hendrix
as he liked to jump, Hendrix did not 

care for the routine life of a supply 

clerk. Minor chores and handing out 

springs and switches did not seem 

like much of an Airborne adventure.

There were plenty of Screaming 

Eagles that were getting the full 

experience. The 101st Airborne’s five 

Infantry battle groups trained to leap 

into the Soviet rear area. Allowing 

for the normal spread of parachute 

forces, the Airborne expected to be 

dispersed. Armed with Davy Crocket 

recoilless “hand gre-nuke” launchers, 

atomic land mines, and radios to call 

in a rain of nuclear Little John rockets, 

the paratroopers prepared to spread 

mayhem.14 The rifle companies carried out a good number of parachute 

drops to keep proficiency. Meanwhile, 

Private First Class Hendrix 

handed out bolts and fan belts.

To add to the frustrations of a 

humdrum schedule, Hendrix and his 

fellow black paratroopers dealt with 

the harsh Jim Crow mentality that 

started just past the gate. He and 

fellow Soldier Billy Cox of Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania took the 45-mile trip 

to Nashville, Tennessee to play guitars and jam in black neighborhood 

clubs.15 They both missed bed check 

now and then. Hendrix grew listless 

in his duties. His active mind drifted.

Although the Army was integrated, 

black Soldiers in 1961-62 sometimes drew more than their share of 

discipline. In the 801st Maintenance 

Battalion, white officers and sergeants had no time for Private First 

Class Hendrix. He was late. He was 

careless. He spent too much time 

in Nashville. First Sergeant Louis 

J. Hoekstra summarized: “His mind 

apparently cannot function while performing duties and thinking about his 

guitar.”16 In March of 1962, he received 

non-judicial punishment under Article 

15 of the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice for missing bed-check, with a 

consequent reduction to Private. Two 

more Article 15s followed, and then 

by June of 1962, a general discharge 

characterizing him as “undesirable.”17

Yet ex-PFC Hendrix had the last 

laugh. In 1967, Hendrix asked in one 

of his first big hit songs: “But first. . . 

are you experienced? Have you ever 

been experienced? I have.” Most of 

his young fans, hippies and “straights” 

alike, thought he was talking about 

drugs. (And to some extent, he was.) 

But when questioned, the self-christened “Jimi” talked of what he felt during Army parachute jumps: “. . .once 

you get out there everything is so quiet, 

all you hear is the breezes.”18 Indeed.

His fellow Soldiers knew the 

deal. In Vietnam, Hendrix was the 

artist of choice out in the bush. 

He had been there. And nobody 

could ever take that away from him.

Airmobile: Sunday Morning 

Comin’ Down

Kris Kristofferson was a helicopter 

pilot. Unlike draftee Presley or curious volunteer Hendrix, Kristofferson 

was born to be a Soldier. His 

grandfather fought in the Philippine 

Insurrection and rose to the rank 

of colonel. His father flew for the 

Army Air Forces in World War II 

and then the U.S. Air Force in the 

Korean War. The elder Kristofferson 

rose to be a major general.19

The younger Kristofferson was 

a prodigy. After graduating with top 

honors from Pomona College in 

California in 1958, he earned selection as a Rhodes Scholar. He majored 

in English literature and took an 

Army commission, which he deferred 

to complete his time at Oxford 

University. Kristofferson dabbled in 

music and singing while in England. 

But flying really got him interested.

When he came back to America 

in 1960, he made up quickly for his 

academic detour. “I volunteered for 

jump school and Ranger School and 

flight school, everything available,” he 

recalled in a 1991 interview.20 At about 

the same time Sergeant Presley was 

wrapping up his small role in screening the Fulda Gap, and Private First 

Class Hendrix was enjoying parachute jumps, Lieutenant Kristofferson 

learned how to fly helicopters.

Rotary-wing Aviation was a key 

innovation for the Pentomic Army. 

When the Kristofferson’s father and 

the new U.S. Air Force split off from 

the Army in 1947, the ground service was left with a few militarized 

Piper Cub light planes for artillery 

spotting. But the grim, ugly war in 

Korea showed the utility of a new 

flying machine: the helicopter, a very 

late entry at the end of World War 

II. Slow, ungainly, and bug-like in 

appearance, the early rotary wing 

craft were good at one very important thing—landing on razor-backed 

ridges and removing the wounded.21

That was their forté in Korea.

The Pentomic Army of the 1950s 

saw real promise in these inelegant 

contraptions that flew close to the 

dirt. They could carry troops and light 

vehicles. They could elevate artillery 

observers and Scouts. They could 

even carry machine guns and rockets, and hover right above friendly 

Soldiers to rip up advancing foes. Best 

of all, the new Air Force, preoccupied 

with great, gleaming swept-wing 

bombers and hot-rod Century Series 

fighter jets, had very little interest in 

helicopters. Every Pentomic Division 

included almost forty helicopters.22

Plans were afoot to build entire units 

around the new flying machines, 

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 34 

Kris Kristofferson piloted the Huey 

helicopter for the Army
especially the very capable jet turbine 

UH-1 Iroquois, destined to become 

the redoubtable Huey of Vietnam lore.

Lieutenant Kristofferson entered 

Army Aviation in these seminal days. 

He ate it up. “I really enjoyed flying and 

firing at targets and things like that,” 

he said later.23 Like Elvis Presley, he 

wanted to get out and do something. 

Unlike Jimi Hendrix, he got his chance 

when he was ordered to Germany, to 

the 8th Infantry Division. Kristofferson 

benefited from all the flight time 

and young Aviator could want.

Of the major American combat 

forces in Germany, the 8th Infantry 

Division occupied the western-most 

positions, far back from the border. As 

such, the “Pathfinder Division” formed 

the primary U.S. Army counterattack 

punch once front-line elements like 

Elvis Presley’s 3rd Armored Division 

chewed up the lead Soviet echelon. 

In the Pentomic fight, that meant the 

employment of dozens of atomic munitions. The 8th Infantry Division fully 

expected to be advancing over a smoking, cratered German countryside, 

edging around blown-down trees and 

avoiding known radioactive hot spots.

That’s where Lieutenant 

Kristofferson and his helicopter could 

make a difference. In many ways, 

regardless of the assigned mission, 

Army Aviation always fulfilled the traditional Cavalry tasks of route and zone 

reconnaissance. They could invent 

their own high ground, cross rivers, 

ridges, and wreckage, and report back. 

Kristofferson flew many hours, always 

calling back with what he saw enroute. 

Despite some crisis periods and false 

alarms, the Russians did not come.

But the 8th Aviation Battalion kept 

looking and stayed ready. The new 

UH-1B Hueys and their older CH-43C 

Choctaw stable mates participated 

in every alert and exercise. The 

notoriously sketchy German weather 

included lingering morning ground 

fog, icing, rain and snow squalls, 

and unpredictable variations in each 

river valley. Instrument ratings were 

rare and night flying unusual. So 

the climate made it very tough. As 

one of the other 8th Infantry Division 

Aviators of that time put it, “It was said 

that one year flying in Germany was 

worth three years flying anywhere 

else.”24 Kristofferson served there 

from 1962-65, during the Cuban 

Missile Crisis and its tense aftermath. He was promoted to captain.

In 1965, Kristofferson volunteered 

for combat duty in Vietnam. The 

American effort there was ramping 

up, and with the advent of the 1st

Cavalry Division (Airmobile), experienced Huey pilots were much in 

demand. But one particular Huey 

flier was also a Rhodes Scholar, and 

the Army decided that Kristofferson’s 

talents were better used teaching cadets at West Point. Despite 

entreaties, orders were orders.

The Captain was not amused. 

In frustration, he resigned from the 

service. His first song was “Vietnam 

Blues,” aimed squarely at college 

student draft resisters and anti-war 

protestors.25 The general’s son 

later evolved considerably, embracing many of the anti-war political 

views he once despised. But by and 

large, he eschewed politics and wrote 

songs about life. He acted in films. 

And he gained quite a bit of notoriety.

It’s said that he got his break as 

a singer by flying a helicopter onto 

to the lawn of the Nashville estate 

of country music giant Johnny 

Cash. Kristofferson was flying for 

a civilian firm after his Army days. 

One weekend, he “borrowed” the 

corporate helicopter to make the 

delivery of his composition “Sunday 

Morning Comin’ Down.” Cash loved 

the song and the bravado.26 The 

company fired Kristofferson. It didn’t 

matter. He was on his way to stardom.

But he never forgot his Army service. In 1991, he addressed a concert 

crowd in the wake of America’s first 

war with Iraq: “I want you to know 

I’m an Army brat; I was a captain 

in the Army and my brother was a 

jet pilot in the Navy. So I support 

our troops; I identify with them.”27

The hall erupted in cheers. The 

old Pentomic Soldier remembered.

Days of Future Passed

On their respective journeys to 

stardom, our country’s three bestknown Pentomic Soldiers each passed 

through Nashville, Tennessee, the 

center of America’s recording industry. Each man adopted some form of 

rock and blues music, variously tinged 

by gospel, folk, country, and psychedelic influences. Despite wealth 

and fame, drugs, drink, and demons 

afflicted them all. In this regard, they 

were not much different from the 

society that bred them, nor the Army 

of the time in which they served.

Elvis Presley became the most 

popular music icon of his era. He 

starred in multiple hit movies, television specials, and concerts. Presley 

defined a look, an attitude, and a 

generation with a cascade of hit 

songs. His early death in 1977 only 

served to increase his popularity. His 

recordings still sell briskly as MP3 

downloads, having outlasted vinyl, 

8-tracks, cassettes, and compact 

disks. To many, Elvis Presley epitomizes American popular music of 

the latter half of the last century.

Jimi Hendrix served the shortest stint in the Army. His musical 

career was equally brief, ending 

in an untimely demise in 1970. Of 

the three, though, his work is most 

recognizably tied to the turbulent 

1960s, particularly the fever dream 

of the Summer of Love of 1967 and 

the coincident Vietnam War raging 

on the far side of the world. Hippies 

and grunts alike listened and nodded. 

Hendrix was “experienced,” all right.

 35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
Kris Kristofferson alone has lived 

to be an old Soldier. He still writes, 

plays, sings, and appears. His 

accomplishments include numerous 

songs, albums, movie appearances, 

and concert stage events. He doesn’t 

pilot his own aircraft anymore. Still, 

he remains ever the restless Aviator, 

looking over the next ridge, hoping 

to tell others what he sees coming.

So five decades later we regard 

them, a Sergeant, a Private, and a 

Captain—one drafted, one volunteered, one commissioned—with 

experiences like those of millions 

of Pentomic Soldiers. But unlike 

the vast majority of their comrades, 

they left behind their thoughts in 

music and lyrics. In their art (and it is 

indeed that) you can hear the fading 

echoes, see the dim outlines, and 

feel the dried sweat of an Army long 

gone by. Thanks to three Pentomic 

Soldiers, it will not be forgotten.

Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger 

is the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff, 

G-3/5/7. He has degrees in History from the Citadel (BA), (MA) in 

History from University of Chicago, 

(PHD) in History from University of 

Chicago. 

email: daniel.bolger@us.army.mil

ENDNOTES

1 “Mila Kunis, Justin Timberlake: Yes, 

We're Going to the Marine Corps 

Ball!” Celebrity News, Us.com, 16 

July2011.

2 Colonel Andrew J. Bacevich, U.S. 

Army, The Pentomic Era: The U.S. 

Army Between Korea and Vietnam 

(Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 1986), 106-08.

3 Ibid., 97-98; U.S. Department 

of the Army, FM 7-15: Tank Units, 

Platoon, Company, and Battalion 

(Washington, DC: Department of the 

Army, December 1961), 207-10.

4 Adam Victor, The Elvis 

Encyclopedia (New York City, NY: 

Overlook Press, 2008), 27.

5 Joel Whitburn, The Billboard Book 

of Top 40 Hits (New York City, NY: 

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 36 

Billboard Books; 2004), 501.

6 Victor, The Elvis Encyclopedia, 

23-27.

7 U.S., Department of the Army, 

Center of Military History, “Elvis 

Presley’s Military Career,” at http://

www.history.army.mil/faq/elvis.htm 

accessed 25 August 2011.

8 Victor, The Elvis Encyclopedia, 

415.

9 Priscilla Presley. Elvis and Me 

(New York City, NY: G.P. Putnam's 

Sons, 1985), 40. Priscilla Presley 

said that her husband’s manager, 

“Colonel” Tom Parker, strongly 

encouraged Elvis Presley to serve in 

an actual unit.

10 Marty Kufus, “When Private 

Hendrix Kissed the Sky,” Command 

(November-December 1989), 55.

11 U.S. Department of the Army, 

Headquarters, 3rd Brigade, “Special 

Orders Number 145” (Fort Ord, CA, 

15 July 1961); U.S. Department 

of the Army, Headquarters, 801st

Maintenance Battalion, 101st Airborne 

Division, “Request of [sic] Physical 

and Psychiatric Examination” (Fort 

Campbell, KY: Headquarters, 

801st Maintenance Battalion, 16 

February 1962), both at http://www.

thesmokinggun.com/documents/

crime/jimis-private-parts, accessed 

25 August 2011.

12 Kufus, “When Private Hendrix 

Kissed the Sky,” 55.

13 U.S., Department of the Army, 

“Request of [sic] Physical and 

Psychiatric Examination.”

14 Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 

106-08.

15 U.S., Department of the Army, 

“Request of [sic] Physical and 

Psychiatric Examination.”

16 U.S., Department of the Army, 

“Statement of First Sergeant Louis 

J. Hoekstra” (Fort Campbell KY: 

Headquarters, 801st Maintenance 

Battalion, 28 May 1962) at http://

www.thesmokinggun.com/

documents/crime/jimis-private-parts, 

accessed 25 August 2011.

17 U.S., Department of the Army, 

“Unit Punishment Record” (Fort 

Campbell KY: Headquarters, 801st

Maintenance Battalion, 24 May 1962) 

at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/

documents/crime/jimis-private-parts, 

accessed 25 Aug 11.

18 Steven Roby, Black Gold: The 

Lost Archives of Jimi Hendrix (New 

York City, NY: Billboard Books, 

2002), 15.

19 Ethan Hawke, “The Last Outlaw 

Poet,” Rolling Stone (April 2009), at 

http://ravinwire.com/2009/04/08/kriskristofferson---the-last-outlaw-poet.

aspx, accessed 25 Aug 11.

20 Rosa Jordan, “Kris Kristofferson,” 

The Progressive, (September 1991) 

at http://rosajordan.com/kris.html, 

accessed 25 Aug 11.

21 U.S., Department of Defense, 

Directive Number 5160-22: 

Clarification of Roles and Missions of 

the Departments of the Army and the 

Air Force Regarding Use of Aircraft 

(Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 18 

Mar 57).

22 Bacevich, The Pentomic Era, 108.

23 Jordan, “Kris Kristofferson.”

24 Brigadier General Joseph W. 

Camp, Jr., U.S, Army, “Flying in 

Germany: A Company, 8th Aviation 

Battalion,” www.usarmygermany.

com, 2010, 8.

25 Hawke, “The Last Outlaw Poet.”

26 Ibid. Johnny Cash used to claim 

that Kristofferson dismounted 

from the helicopter holding a beer. 

Although quite a heavy drinker at the 

time, the former captain demurred: 

"Do you know how hard it is to fly one 

of those things? I don't know how the 

hell I'd land one holding a beer."

27 Jordan, “Kris Kristofferson.”

Pictures: 

Jimi Hendrix - http://www.

guitarmasterclass.net/wiki/index.php/

Jimi_Hendrix

Elvis Presley - http://news.bbc.

co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/

glasgow_and_west/7361164.stm

Kris Kristofferson Huey Picture - 

Defense Image Digest
his article marks the beginning of a series of articles covering advanced techniques and resources 

that can be leveraged to assist the modeler in improving the quality of simulations. Our first topic focuses 

on expanding the capabilities of a widely used software 

package: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)’s 

Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC). 

HPAC is a software package used by numerous government agencies for consequence assessment, and is an 

invaluable tool when modeling Chemical/Biological/Nuclear/Radiation/High Explosive (CBRNE) scenarios. As a 

modeler, it is important to display this data in a way that 

gives the commander a clear view of the extent of the 

hazard and what major land areas or population centers 

might be impacted. While HPAC allows for a user to import and overlay satellite imagery, it can be a cumbersome 

task if multiple locations or large regions encompass a 

given scenario. As an alternative to using plots similar to 

those in Figure 1, this article will demonstrate how HPAC 

users can utilize Google Earth (http://earth.google.com/) 

to visualize their scenarios. The default Google Earth 

server on unclassified systems contains satellite imagery 

of almost every location in the world. Use of the default 

Google Earth server would prevent the inclusion of any 

classified data, but fortunately the National GeospatialIntelligence Agency (NGA) has established their own 

Google Earth servers for use on classified systems. An 

up-to-date list of these servers can be found by searching 

for “google earth servers” while on a classified machine. 

Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) is 

the developer of the most popular geographic information 

system (GIS) tools in the world; their shapefile format is 

widely used throughout the GIS community. In order to 

visualize HPAC contours within Google Earth, the contours must first be exported to ESRI’s shapefile format 

and converted to Google Earth’s kml file type. The conversion of HPAC contours to shapefiles is covered in-depth 

within module thirteen of the Consequence Assessment 

Tool Set (CATS) level 1 training material, but is briefly 

outlined below: after creation of a contour with HPAC 5.0, 

right click the contour and a tooltip menu will appear, from 

that menu select the next to last entry (which corresponds 

to the title of the graph) and choose “Export”. The HPAC 

export dialog box should appear. Click the drop down 

menu next to “Files of Type” and select “ESRI Shapefile(*.shp)” from the list. Choose a file name and save.

After the HPAC contour has been converted to shapefile format, it can be used in GIS software. Those with a 

licensed copy of ArcGIS can utilize the ESRI script located at http://arcscripts.esri.com/details.asp?dbid=14273 

to convert the shapefiles to kml. As an alternative to 

purchasing ArcGIS, an open source GIS tool, MapWindow (http://www.mapwindow.org), can be coupled with a 

$30 plug-in, Shape2Earth (http://www.mapwindow.org/

downloads/index.php?show_details=29), to convert the 

shapefiles exported from HPAC to kml. Advanced users 

familiar with coding in C who wish to develop their own 

conversion script may find the shapefile C library (located 

at http://shapelib.maptools.org/) useful. Briefly described 

below is the process to import shapefiles into MapWindow, and export them as a kml file usable in Google Earth. 

First, select File->Open from the MapWindow 

main window, then select ESRI shapefile from the 

file type menu circled in red (hit enter figure 2). Navigate to the location where the shapefile exported 

in HPAC was saved, select the file, and click Open.

Enhancing Visualization of HPAC Scenarios using 

Google Earth©

Figure 1. Example of HPAC Contour.

Mr. Mathew Jackson

Nuclear Engineer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

MODELING AND SIMULATION

T

 37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
The plot of your shapefile will likely be a single color; this will need to be corrected so it graphs correctly in Google 

Earth. First, one will see a single data layer listed inside the legend section. Highlight the section and click properties. 

Figure 3. MapWindow Main Dialog: Properties Selection

Figure 2. MapWindow Open File Dialog

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 38 
 Unfortunately, MapWindow by default does not know how to color the contours. To set the contour color levels 

select the button labeled “ ” next to the “Edit...” entry in the properties menu (figure 4). This brings up the Coloring Scheme Editor (figure 4), where the contour levels can be set and labeled as needed. The important thing to 

note is that clevel must be selected as the “Field to color by” property. If desired, the contour levels/color selected can be saved for use in later projects by clicking on the disk icon within the Color Scheme Editor. Once 

all color levels have been set, the Shape2Earth plug-in can be used to export the contour to a kml file (figure 5).

Figure 4. Properties Tab and Color Scheme Editor

Figure 5. Shape2Earth Export Window

 39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
 Figure 6. HPAC Contour Imported into Google Earth (©2010 Google, ©2011 DigitalGlobe, USDA Farm Service 

Agency

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 40 

 One entry to note is the opacity setting: this should be set at 40-60% if the terrain contained within contours is to be visible. The Properties tab allows for the creation of labels for the contours as well, the locations of 

these may need to be tweaked within Google Earth since it appears that Shape2Earth places the labels at 

each contour’s center of mass. When all options have been set, select File -> Export -> SaveAs KML/KMZ. Finally, browse to the location of the KML file and double-click. Google Earth should open and zoom to the relevant region. As an example, a source was placed in a city, modeled with HPAC, and exported to Google Earth, 

as outlined in this article. With a little manipulation in PowerPoint and MS Paint one ends up with figure 6. 

This is just one way that a modeler can use Google Earth to expand the capabilities of existing modeling software. The next article in this series will discuss the how a modeler can use Google 

Earth to view prompt effects and apply shadowing techniques to compute line-of-sight calculations from Google Earth polygons for more realistic modeling of thermal effects in urban landscapes.

Matthew Jackson is a nuclear engineer at the U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency, and can be 

reached at matthew.r.jackson3@us.army.mil or 703-806-7867 should any questions arise from this article.
verview

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 

once said, “We may have all 

come on different ships, but we're in 

the same boat now.” This statement 

astutely represents the current conditions between the U.S. and Russia, as 

well as each country’s nuclear weapons program. One significant and 

cooperative measure being executed 

between the United States and Russia is the monitoring of each country’s plutonium production facilities. 

The PPRA is now in its thirteenth 

year and continues to be a vital 

component for monitoring plutonium 

production facilities in the United 

States and Russia. It is a bilateral 

agreement that applies to 14 plutonium reactors in the United States 

and 13 Russian plutonium reactors in 

existence at the time the agreement 

was signed that requires the cessation of plutonium producion for use 

in nuclear weapons. This is achieved 

through monitoring to ensure that 

shutdown plutonium production reactors in both countries do not resume 

operations. A list of the reactors 

and locations are cited in Table 1. 

*These three recently shut down 

Russian reactors will be transitioned to the established PPRA 

monitoring regime to ensure they 

remain permanently shutdown.

The United States and Russia 

are permitted to conduct monitoring visits once a year at the other’s 

shutdown reactors. During these 

visits, personnel visually inspect and 

observe placement of seals on plutonium oxide storage containers to 

ensure material is not used in weapons. The United States also has the 

right to monitor two of Russia’s plutonium storage facilities in Seversk 

and Zheleznogorsk, twice a year. 

U.S-Russia cooperation on nuclear 

nonproliferation and continued monitoring of weapons grade plutonium 

sends a positive signal to each country and to the international community. Since the end of the Cold War, the 

United States and Russia have worked 

toward a stronger partnership in the 

monitoring of each other’s plutonium 

reactors. Developing strong partnerships and gaining an understanding 

of each other’s nuclear material proMAJ Kevin J. Owens

The U.S. and Russian teams take a group photo after monitoring K Reactor 

at the Savannah River Site

INTERNATIONAL

U.S. - Russian Partnership and the Plutonium 

Production Reactor Agreement

O duction complex have been instrumental in the success of the PPRA. 

At the time of the signing of the 

1997 Plutonium Production Reactor 

Agreement (PPRA), twenty-seven 

reactors in various stages of shutdown, dismantlement, or operation 

existed in the United States and Russia. These plutonium reactors and 

their supporting facilities produced 

large amounts of weapons grade 

plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. All those reactors are now shutdown with the announcement made 

at the April 2010 Nuclear Security 

Summit that Russia’s last plutonium 

producing reactor was shut down. 

Agents of the PPRA

Department of Energy’s (DOE) 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) serves as the United 

States’ Executive Agent for the PPRA. 

DOE works in cooperation with 

Department of State and the Department of Defense’s Defense Threat 

Nuclear Counter-Proliferation Officer U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD 

Agency

 41 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
Table 1: List of shutdown and current operational plutonium production reactors

Reduction Agency (DTRA) to share 

responsibility for PPRA monitoring. 

As an executive agent, NNSA ensures 

that weapons-usable plutonium in 

Russia (estimated to be at least nine 

metric tons) is placed in secure storage and remains accounted for until 

transferred to a disposition process. 

Key contributors to the PPRA 

effort are also joint military service 

members. The U.S. Army assigns 

Nuclear Research and Operation Officers (Functional Area 52 Officers (FA52)) to DTRA in support of the PPRA 

mission. These FA-52 officers offer a 

unique background with specialized 

training in developing national and 

military strategy, generating plans 

and policy recommendations, and 

providing interagency leadership in 

nuclear related combating weapons 

of mass destruction mission areas.

Also in support of the PPRA are 

subject matter experts (SMEs) from 

the United States, mainly from DOE’s 

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and the Savannah River Site. 

These SMEs are the backbone to 

the program because they have the 

operational knowledge and experience working with nuclear reactors and plutonium storage. DOE 

also hosts visits to the Hanford and 

Russian Federation (13) Reactor

Status

United States of America (14) Reactor

Status

Ozersk (5) Hanford (9)

A Reactor Shutdown B Reactor Shutdown

IR-AI Reactor Shutdown C Reactor Shutdown

AV-1 Reactor Shutdown D Reactor Shutdown

AV-2 Reactor Shutdown DR Reactor Shutdown

AV-3 Reactor Shutdown F Reactor Shutdown

H Reactor Shutdown

Seversk (5) KE Reactor Shutdown

I-1 Reactor Shutdown KW Reactor Shutdown

I-2 Reactor Shutdown N Reactor Shutdown

ADE-3 Reactor Shutdown

ADE-4 Reactor Shutdown Savannah River (5)

ADE-5 Reactor K Reactor Shutdown

L Reactor Shutdown

Zheleznogorsk (3) P Reactor Shutdown

AD Reactor Shutdown R Reactor Shutdown

ADE-1 Reactor Shutdown C Reactor Shutdown

ADE-2 Reactor

Shutdown

Shutdown

Savannah River Sites, and to ensure 

an efficient visit, DTRA’s personnel 

escort the Russian team members 

while they are in the United States.

Monitoring at the Savannah River 

Site

Since the inception of the PPRA, 

relationships have been a key element in the success of the program. 

For example, during the June 2010 

monitoring visit at the Savannah 

River Site (SRS) in South Carolina, 

the U.S. and Russian teams worked 

very well with each other and demonstrated a common passion for the 

work. Everyone involved in the visit 

diligently conducted the monitoring for 

each facility. This type of continuous 

working relationship among the team 

members, developed through previous PPRA monitoring visits in the 

United States and Russia, is essential 

for sustaining an effective program.

The SRS visit began with a reception for the Russian team, followed by 

a day of rest to recover from the flight. 

“The mission is straightforward and we 

know what we need to do,” explained 

Oleg Komkov, Russian Federation’s 

Team Chief, who has been associated 

with the delegation since 2000. The 

next day, Russian and U.S. teams 

met informally to discuss the agenda 

for the week ahead. While on site, 

the two teams visited four reactors 

and specifically identified locations 

within the facilities that were identified as disabled. After monitoring the 

shutdown reactors, the Russian team 

developed their report and conducted 

an outbrief to discuss the visit and 

plans for the next monitoring visit.

After the monitoring visit at SRS, 

both teams proceeded to monitor 

the shutdown reactors at Hanford. 

Since the majority of the U.S. team 

members were not fluent in Russian, 

interpreters were used to communicate during the monitoring visit and 

away from the site. The facility SMEs 

(mainly from NNSA and SRS’s Management and Operations Contractor, 

Savannah River Nuclear Solutions) 

provided the site-specific knowledge 

needed to facilitate the monitoring 

visit and were prepared to answer 

questions. It was apparent that the 

teams had done this before and were 

knowledgeable about the facilities. 

DTRA’s Deputy Team Chief MAJ 

Rich Nameth said, “I have gotten to 

know these guys and we work well 

together. It took a little while, but 

they are more comfortable with me 

now.” This was MAJ Namath’s last 

monitoring visit because he was 

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 42 
The U.S. and Russian teams monitor facilities at SRS during the PPRA visit.

preparing to transition into a new 

FA-52 assignment in Florida. It was 

also, therefore, important for MAJ 

Nameth during this visit to introduce new members to the Russians 

for continuity of future missions. 

When asked about the relationships he has developed over the 

past ten years with NNSA, DOS, and 

DTRA, Mr. Komkov said, “It helps, 

of course, having personnel that are 

familiar with the program and process. 

This includes having the right technical 

representative, interpreters, and personnel to logically plan for the event.” 

When asked about the significance of 

the event, Mr. Komkov said, “Our mission is important to verifying the stopping of plutonium production facilities 

for nuclear weapons.” MAJ Nameth 

also noted that “this was one of the 

smoothest visits we have had and the 

Russians really enjoyed their visit.” 

Off-duty time was filled with activities that allowed the teams an informal way of getting to know each other 

better. The teams toured the Augusta 

Canal and also attended an Augusta 

Green Jackets baseball game. “Trying to explain baseball is more difficult 

than I thought,” said DTRA Team 

Chief, LTC Jeffery Weston. This was a 

first time for the Russians to see baseball being played in the United States. 

Recent United States - Russian 

Developments

As the program continues, it 

will be important to maintain the 

established relationships and to 

develop the skills and experience of 

new PPRA team members. Since 

the United States and the Russian 

Federation are expected to continue 

the monitoring visits, it will be equally 

important for both to continue a 

positive working relationship. Working together and understanding each 

other’s nuclear program will allow 

them to build even stronger partnerships in the future.

 

The group enjoys a cruise in the evening on the Augusta Canal.

A significant and positive development that recently occurred in 

Russia was the shutdown of the 

ADE-2 reactor. Russia announced 

on April 15, 2010, the formal shutdown of the reactor in the Siberian 

city of Zheleznogorsk, which is 2,500 

miles east of Moscow. The production complex was founded in 1950 

on the orders of then Soviet General 

Secretary Joseph Stalin. During a 

47-nation nuclear summit, hosted 

by President Barack Obama in April 

2010, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev pledged to close the reactor. 

Prior to the summit on April 8, 2010, 

President Obama and President Medvedev signed the New Strategic Arms 

Reduction Treaty (New START). 

New START is another significant 

example of the cooperative effort 

between the United States and Russia. The signed treaty was approved 

on September 16, 2010, by the U.S. 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the full Senate approved it 

on December 22, 2010. Following 

the Foreign Relations Committee’s 

approval, Senate Majority Leader 

Harry Reid said, “The New START 

Treaty that the President signed with 

Russia in April re-establishes U.S. 

leadership on global non proliferation 

of nuclear weapons, reduces Russia’s 

nuclear arsenal, and takes concrete 

steps to secure a nuclear-free world 

without sacrificing America’s security. 

I am pleased that the Senate Foreign 

 43 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
Relations Committee passed this historic agreement with strong bipartisan 

support today . . . [and] I look forward 

to bringing this treaty to the floor.”

Conclusion

The PPRA is a non-proliferation 

agreement between the United 

States and Russia. It fosters a 

cooperative effort for the cessation 

of plutonium production for use in 

nuclear weapons, and is reliant on 

a strong partnership and mutual 

understanding of both countries’ 

nuclear weapons production complex. Although small in size, the U.S. 

and Russian teams of 21 personnel 

at the Savannah River Site during 

the week of June 7 11, 2010, made 

a positive impact in continuing this 

agreement for now and for the future. 

Partnerships and relationship are 

not built overnight and will require an 

effort from both countries. 

 “The past is prophetic in that it 

asserts loudly that nuclear wars 

are poor chisels for carving out 

peaceful tomorrows. One day 

we must come to see that peace 

is not merely a distant goal that 

we seek, but a means by which 

we arrive at that goal. We must 

pursue peaceful ends through 

peaceful means.” (Martin 

Luther King Jr.)

MAJ Kevin J. Owens is a FA-52 Officer in the CWMD Operations Branch 

at USANCA in Fort Belvoir, VA. He 

is an active Army Reservist and lives 

in Atlanta, GA. His e-mail address is 

kevin.owens1@us.army.mil. 

Bibliography

 This article is comprised of several 

refences that are listed.

1. MAJ Kenneth L. Deal. (2002). 

On-Site Monitoring Under the Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement. 

NBC Report Fall/Winter 2002.

2. U.S. Department of State. (2010). 

Annex I and II. Agreement between 

the Government of the United States 

of America and the Government of 

the Russian Federation Concerning 

Cooperation Regarding Plutonium 

Production Reactors. 

3. U.S. Department of Energy, 

National Nuclear Security Administration. (2010). Treaties and 

Agreements,http://nnsa.energy.gov/

aboutus/ourprograms/nonproliferation/treatiesagreements

4. ABC News. (2010). Russia Shuts Down Last Plutonium 

Reactor, http://www.abc.net.au/

news/stories/2010/04/15/2874254.

htm?section=justin

President Barack Obama hosts the 47-nation summit in Washington.

5. Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program. (2010). Fact Sheet on 

U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production 

Reactor Agreement. http://dtirp.dtra.

mil/pdfs/ppra_factsheet.pdf

6. GOP to Obama: START Treaty 

Still Far From Votes Needed For Ratification. (2010). The Hill Website. By 

J. Taylor Rushing.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 44 
ackground

“Poets Corner” was the biennial Technical Response 

Group Capabilities Exercise (TRG-CAPEX) which 

consists of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

bulk high yield explosives (CBRNE) law enforcement 

and military members from Canada, Australia, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States. The TRG shares 

techniques and procedures, equipment updates and 

scientific advances among the other members as they 

relate to preventing or attributing CBRNE terrorism.

On a rotating basis, members of the TRG host a 

CAPEX. This year, the United Kingdom’s Home Office 

sponsored the event. The CAPEX was hosted by the 

United Kingdom Police National CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) Center and conducted 

at the National Fire Service College in Morton on Marsh, 

Gloucestershire, England from 21-26 March 2011. 

The American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New 

Zealand (ABCA) Armies Program was granted permission 

to send an observer team of subject matter expert observers to “Poets Corner”. The team consisted of representatives from the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, 

and New Zealand. The team’s goal was to observe and 

report on improvements in national and coalition force 

Joint, Inter-agency, Inter-governmental, and Multi-National (JIIM) CBRN sensitive site exploitation interoperability. 

The ABCA observer team had the following objectives: 

1) Observe the execution and develop lessons learned on 

the conduct of CBRN operations, 2) Use results to inform 

ABCA Armies future capability development and improvements in CBRN SSE, and 3) Coordinate with other Capability 

Groups within the ABCA Armies Program to share the information derived from the achievements of the observer team.

Exercise Methodology

Exercise “Poets Corner” was the largest CAPEX to 

date with over 100 law enforcement and military CBRNE 

personnel from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, 

and the United States. The exercise focus was technical 

response and forensic collection immediately following a 

chemical, biological, radiological incident during an event 

of interest such as the Olympics, World Cup, or political 

inauguration. The exercise consisted of three scenarios 

with nations rotating through each scenario. Each nation 

therefore conducted the scenarios independently of 

other participating nations. Each nation had the opportunity to observe other nation’s equipment and tactics, 

techniques and procedures (TTPs) during the conduct 

of the exercise. “Poets Corner” enabled participants to:

• Detect the presence of a hazard.

• Defeat a hazard.

• Create a permissive working area.

• Enable fast forensic collection.

• Allow immediate after action reporting.

• Evaluation of team performance.

Exercise “Poets Corner” a

 Multinational Effort to Prevent CBRNE Terrorism

LTC Michael S. Quinn

CBRN Officer, U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency

LTC Vasilli “Bill” Karatzas

U.S. Army Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear School

UK Fire Service College Location.

B

 45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
Scenario Descriptions

 Each team was given 6.5 hours to complete each sceario. 

National umpires and evaluators provided country specific njects and arbitration as required. 

Biological scenario - In the lead up to a major sporting event, two custodial cleaners from a major laboratory were admitted to a hospital and one of the cleaners subsequently died of anthrax. Responders were 

dispatched to the laboratory and were required to gain 

access, locate, render safe the device and collect intelligence and forensic evidence. Intelligence gathered 

from the site indicated an attack at the venue of a major 

press conference. Responders then moved to a second location to gain access, locate and render safe the 

explosive biological device and collect forensic evidence. 

A simulant was used to provide positive lab readings.

Chemical scenario - Two terrorists were transporting 

chemical devices by train on two separate passenger 

cars. One of the devices broke, releasing agent, killing all 

of the people on one of the passenger cars to include one 

of the terrorists. The train stopped in a remote area. The 

second terrorist, on a second car, departed in the subsequent evacuation but left a second chemical device in a 

backpack on the train. Responders were required to gain 

access, identify the suspected agent, locate and render 

safe the devices and collect forensic evidence. Simulants were used to provide positive readings on detectors.

Radiological scenario - While attempting to construct 

a ‘dirty bomb’, terrorists accidently caused a gas explosion which partially destroyed the multi-story building 

where the bomb was being constructed. The building 

partially collapsed and first responders having detected 

a radiological source had alerted police to its presence. 

Responders were required to locate and identify the radiation source, render safe the improvised explosive device 

and collect forensic evidence. The realism of this activity 

was enhanced with the use of a live radiological source.

Observations

Equipment. All four nations, both national police and 

military, used the same or similar pieces of commercial or 

military spec detection and identification equipment. The 

most common pieces of equipment were: The HazMat 

ID®, HAPSITE (GC/MS)®, AP2Ce, ICAM and Multi-Rae®. 

Individual protection equipment (IPE) ranged between 

national military versions of chemical protective overgarments to Tyvek® level B suits with corresponding hand 

and footwear. The S10 protective mask (or variant) was 

the most commonly used air purified respirator by teams 

other than the United States. Essentially all teams used 

equivalent types of IPE during the exercise.

Command and Control. National police were the lead 

agency for all scenarios. All other agencies (military or 

fire) were in a supporting role and at times the control 

UK EOD soldier rendering safe a chemical dispersion device.

U.S. soldiers assisting FBI on decontamination line after 

initial entry.

Canadian Royal Mounted Police conducting initial evidence 

monitoring and photo documentation.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 46 
of the areas was ceded to these agencies for mission 

specific functions (EOD or CBR reconnaissance), however, overall site control was always maintained by the 

police. Canada, Australia, and the United States all used 

a similar incident command structure to conduct site 

operations. The United Kingdom’s incident command 

structure, in principal was similar, however there were 

enough differences in national procedures and terminology that would have made interoperability challenging. 

Tactics Techniques and Procedures. All countries 

approached each tactical scenario in a similar fashion: 

• Establishing control, structures, organization and 

layout.

• Search and incident procedures methodology.

• Evidence/Forensic collection.

• Decontamination procedures.

• Primacy of law enforcement command of the incident.

• Integration of Scientific Advisers and Subject Matter 

Experts.

Conclusions

The TRG-CAPEX demonstrated the success of 

the groups sharing of techniques and procedures, 

equipment updates, and scientific advance. The TRG 

members conduct the exploitation of a CBRNE terrorism event with very little differences1

. Similar equipment and TTPs not only strengthen confidence when 

sharing results between national agencies they set 

the stage for potential international interoperability. 

LTC Michael S. Quinn is CBRN Officer assigned to the 

US Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency. He has 

a BS in Chemistry from Auburn University and a MS in 

Health Sciences from Touro University. He was previously 

assigned as the Corps CBRN Officer, Allied Rapid Reaction 

Corps (NATO) and BN XO & S3, 22nd Chemical BN (TE). 

His email address is michael.s.quinn@us.army.mil

LTC Vasili Karatzas is a CBRN Officer assigned to the 

US Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He has a BS 

in Criminal Justice from St. John’s University and a MS 

in Environmental Management from Webster University. He was previously assigned as the Deputy Corps 

CBRN Officer, I Corps and CBRN Operations Officer, III 

Corps. His email address is vasili.karatzas@us.army.mil

ENDNOTE:

1 Differences were based on national policies and laws 

such as military / police jurisdiction. 

Australian EOD Team preparing to make initial site entry.

UK EOD preparing to x-ray radiological dispersal device.

 47 Combating WMD Journal Issue 7 
Highlighted Courses available at the 

Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS)

 and 

Defense Threat Reduction University (DTRU)

Theater Nuclear Operations Course (TNOC)

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Next class availability:

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Combating WMD Courses

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Email: dnws@abq.dtra.mil

Fax: (505) 846-9168 or DSN 246-9168 

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CWMD Journal

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If you do not desire a hard copy and prefer an email 

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