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# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

No. 11-2734

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee ,

v.

C H A R L E S T O D D S T O K E S , Defen dant-Appellant.

A p p e a l f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r t h e N o r t h e r n D i s t r i c t o f I l l i n o i s , E a s t e r n D i v i s i o n
. N o
. 0 7 C R 5 9 0

- 1

— R e b e c c a R

. P a l l m e y e r , J u d g e
.
A R G U E D M A R C H 28, 2012—D E C I D E D A U G U S T 1, 2013

Before M A N I O N , S Y K E S , and H A M I L T O N , Circ uit Judges. S Y K E S , Cir cui t Judge. Charles T odd St oke s w as convic ted in Flor i da state court of mi sdemeanor batter y for indecently touching tw o boys at the elementary sch ool where he w a s a teacher

. A month later

, for reasons unknown, Flor i da authorities permi tte d hi m to mov e to Thai land where he i mmedi ately began entic i ng adolescent and prepubesc ent boys for sex. Thi s
w ent on for sev eral y ears unti l someo ne tipp ed off the2 No. 11-2734
U.S. Immi gr ation and Customs E nf or cement S erv i ce (“ICE”). In a jo int o p erat i on wi th the Roy al Thai Polic e, ICE agents searched Sto kes’s home and recov ered a camera, a computer , and sev eral compact dis cs contain ing thousand s o f images of St oke s’s s exual acti vity wi th Thaiboys. St oke s w as ext radited to the Uni ted St ates and convic ted of tr av eli ng i n foreign comm erce for the purpose of engag ing i n
a sex act wi th a minor
. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b)

. St oke s appeals, rais i ng no few er than ten clai ms of err or
. None are meritorious

. W e concentrate our efforts on tw o: a procedural mi stake in the ext raditi on process and a challen ge to the legality of the search. The ext raditi on err or inv olv es the Rule of Speci alty , whi ch holds that a nati on secu ring the ret urn of a person pursuant to
an ext raditi on tr eaty may prosecute the ext radited person only for the cri me or cri mes name d in the surrendering country’ s ext raditi on gr ant. Thai land surrendered St okes to face a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 242 3 (c ), wh i ch makes i t a cri me for U.S. ci tizens and lawfu l permanent resi dents to engage in i lli ci t sexual co nduc t i n a foreign place. Prosecutors later shi fted gear s and prosecuted hi m for violating 18 U.S.C. § 24 2 3 (b ), a si mi lar cri me but not the one on whi ch Thaila nd gr anted ext raditi on. On a request from the Ame ric an Embas sy , howev er , the Thai foreign mini st r y w ai v ed the Rule of Speci alty

. Thi s di plomaticacti on cleared the w ay for the go v ernment to proceed o n the sub sti tute charg e. The challen ge to the search rais es tw o questi ons: (1) whether an ext rat err i tor i al search of an Americ an ci tizen by U.S. agents i s subject to the Four th A me nd ment ’s i mpli ci t
w ar r a nt requirement and the explic i t requirements of theNo. 11-2734 3
W arr ant Clause; and (2) whether the search by ICE agents w as
r e a so na ble. Follo wing the Second Ci rcui t, we hold that the Four th Amendment’s w arr ant requirement and the W arr ant Clause hav e no ext rat err i tor i al appli cati on
. Se e In re T errorist Bombin g s of U .S. Embassies in E. Afr ., 552 F .3d 157, 171 (2d Cir

. 2008). But St oke s remain s prot e ct ed by the Amendment’s touchstone requirement of reasonableness

. See i d

. at 170 n.7. Becaus e the search w as reasonable, the photo gr aphi c evidenc e
w as proper ly admi tte d at tr i al.

I. Background St oke s w as a teacher in the Miam i -Dade publi c sch ools for

more than a decad e
. On Februar y 25, 2000, he pleaded no contest to a charge of mi sdemeanor batter y for indecently touching tw o boys who w ere hi s studen t s. A Flor i da court
sus pended sentence and placed St o k e s o n probat i on. As a condi tion of hi s probat i on, St oke s had to surrender hi s Flor i da teaching li cen se and w as barred from uns upervised contact wi th minors a bs e nt wri tte n court permi ssi on. Less than a month after hi s plea and sentencing, Stok es asked for permi ssi on to complete hi s probat i on in Thai land. For reasons not speci fi ed i n the recor d, thi s request w as gr anted. On Mar ch 21, 2000, St oke s mov ed to Thai land, ev entually settlin g in P attay a, about 200 kilometers south of Bangko k. Wi thi n t w o w eeks of hi s ar riv al in Thail and, S tok es beg an seeki ng boys for sex. He fre q uently hi red y oung male prostitutes. He entic ed runaw ays and other boys off the street s to hi s home to play video games, and once there , he engaged in
se x ual acts wi th them. He often photo gr aphed these sexua l4 No. 11-2734
encounters, tr ansfe r ring the i mages from hi s camera to a computer and compact di scs
. Thi s conduc t conti nued undetected for sev eral y ears. Wi th the exception of a three -w eek tr i p to the U nit e d St ates from December 25, 2001 to January 14, 2002, St oke s resi ded continuously in Thai land from Mar ch 21, 2000, unti l hi s arr est on July 28, 2006. He supp or t e d hims elf by teaching Engli sh. In December 2002 ICE agents based in Thai land received a tip that Sto kes had been fi red fro m a teaching jo b in Bangkok for i ndecently touching male students. The agents opened an i nv esti gation and learned that St oke s had been fi red from another teaching jo b at a di fferent sch ool bas e d o n si mi lar allegations. Thi s prompte d ICE to request assi stance from the Roy al ThaiP olic e i n P attay a. Thai P olic e assi gned narcotics offi cer s to the inv esti gation becau se surv ei llance w as anti ci pated and the narcotics offi cers
w or ked i n plain clothes. The Thai offi cers ev entually obtained

a w arr ant authorizing a search of St oke s’s home “to locate and sei ze any il legal i tems and narcotic s ... of wh i ch poss essi on i s consi dered i llegal, or whi ch w as i llegally obtained, or whi ch has be e n us e d or i s i ntended to be used to commi t a cri me.” Becaus e thi s w as a sex-cri mes inv esti gation, the inclu si on of narcotics among the objects of the search w a s an obvious anomaly probably attr ibutable to t he p r esence of the local narcotics offi cers on the j oint law-enforcement team. Early i n the mornin g of October 9, 2003, ICE agents and the Roy al Thai P o l ice executed the w arr ant at St oke s’s home. St oke s w as not there when they arr i v ed, so they w ai ted for hi m befo r e enter i ng. Once the search w as underw ay , the offi cersNo. 11-2734 5

recov ered a di gital camera, mu l tipl e compact di scs, and a computer

. T

oge ther , these i tems co ntai ned more than 6,000 i mages of St oke s’s sexual acti vity wit h adolescent and prepubesc ent Thaiboys. Despi te the v oluminous evidenc e of seri ous cri mes, St oke s
w as not arr ested unti l July 28, 2006, almost three y ears after the search. It too k another y ear to ret urn hi m to the Uni ted St ates. On July 26, 2007, Thai land gr anted an ext raditi on request from the Uni ted St ates and ret urned St oke s to Miam i to face a charge of violati ng 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) , whi ch makes i t a cri me for U.S. ci tizen s a nd lawfu l permanent resi dents to tr av el in foreign commerce and engage in i lli ci t sexual conduc t. But that p a r t icular sub secti on of § 2423 w as enacted after St oke s tr av eled to Thai land and there fore di d not ap ply to hi s conduc t. Feder al pr osecutors in Miam i soon realized their mi stake and dropped the charge. St oke s w as tr ansferr ed to the Nort hern Di stric t of Illi nois a nd indi cted on three counts of violati ng 18 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 1 A(b ) ( 2 ) ( A) , a chi l d

- tr a ffi cking statute. 1 Prosecutors di smi ssed these charges as w ell and ev entually i ndi cted St oke s on a single count of viola t ing 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) , whi ch a t t he relev ant tim e prohibi ted tr av eling in i nterstat e or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in
a sexual act wit h a person under 18. See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (effec tiv e Oct. 30, 1998 t o Nov . 2, 2002).

M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 2 5 1 A ( b ) ( 2 ) ( A ) p r o v i d e s : “ W h o e v e r 1
p u r c h a s e s o r o t h e r w i s e o b t a i n s c u s t o d y o r c o n t r o l o f a m i n o r , ... w i t h i n t e n t t o p r o m o t e
... t h e e n g a g i n g i n o f s e x u a l l y e x p l i c i t c o n d u c t b y s u c h m i n o r f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f p r o d u c i n g a n y v i s u a l d e p i c t i o n o f s u c h c o n d u c t

... s h a l l b e p u n i s h e d b y i m p r i s o n m e n t f o r n o t l e s s t h a n 3 0 y e a r s o r f o r l i f e
... . ”6 No. 11-2734
St oke s mov ed to supp ress the evidenc e recov ered in t he search of his ho me i n Thai land. In a comprehensi v e opin i on, the di st r ict court deni ed the motion

. United States v
. Stokes , 710 F

. Supp. 2d 689 (N.D. Ill. 2009). The judge fi rst held that the Four th Amendment’s w arr ant requirement a nd W arr ant Clause do not apply ov erseas. Id. at 697–70. Next, after consi dering all the ci rcums tances, the judge found that the search w as reasonable. Id. at 701–02. Fin ally , the judge held that ev en i f the search violated t he F o urth Amendment, ICE agents relied in goo d fai th on Thailegal author i ties

. Id. at 702–03. After a flurry of addi tional defense motions, all uns ucc essful, the case w as tr i ed to a jury

. The gover nment intro duced testim ony from the ICE agents inv olv ed in the inv esti gation and tw o Thai boys who w ere sexually assau lted by St oke s. One of the vic tim s w as a street kid ni cknamed “Ice,” who w as 11 y ears old when Sto kes fi rst enticed h i m to his home wi th a promis e of video games and a place to sleep. “Ice” testifi ed that St oke s subjected hi m to v arious sex acts and gav e hi m money
. He recalled approx i mately 2 0 such sexual encounters wi th St oke s. The other vic tim w as a runaw ay ni cknamed “Note,” who also w as 11 when he fir st accepted S tok es’s invi tation to accompany hi m home. “Note” t esti fi ed to a si mi lar pattern of sexual abu se by Sto kes.
Fin ally , the gove rnm e n t in tr od u c e d a re p re s entativ e sampl e of the more than 6,000 photo gr aphi c i mages recov ered duri ng the search of St oke s’s home. The photo gr aphs depi cted St oke s engaged in v arious sex acts wi th Thai boys, inclu ding “Ice” and “Note.” An ICE agent testifi ed that approx i mately 70 di fferent boys appear in the i mages, 60 of whom appeared to be under 16. Of those, 30 appeared to be under the age o f 1 2 , a nd theNo. 11-2734 7

y oungest lo o k e d to be about 7. Sev eral hundred of these photo s w ere tr ansferr ed from St oke s’s ca m e ra to compact di scs i n the m onths i mmedi ately before and after St oke s’s bri ef tr i p to t he Uni ted States and ret urn to Thai land in Decem ber 2001 to January 2002. The j ury found S tok es g ui lty

. The dis tr i ct judge sentenced hi m to 15 y ears in pris on, the maxi mum penalty

. St oke s tim ely appealed.

II. Disc uss ion St oke s has take n a scatt ershot approach to hi s appeal, rais i ng t e n separate i ssu es, some of whi ch hav e sub parts. W e take thi s oppor tuni ty to reiterat e some advic e w e’v e g iv en before : “Losers i n a tr i al can go hunting for relief on appeal wi t h a rifle or a shotgun. The rifle i s better

. ... [T] he shotgun approach may hi t the tar get wi th something but i t runs the ris k of obscu rin g sig ni fi cant i ssu es by di luti on.” Gaga n v
. Am. Cablevision, Inc., 77 F .3d 951, 95 5 (7 t h C i r
. 1996) (Ev ans, J.); see also Fifth Third Mort

g. Co. v
. Chi. T

itle Ins. Co. , 692 F .3d 507, 509 (6th Ci r . 2012) (“When a party comes to us wi th n ine gr ounds for rev ersi ng the dist r i ct court, that usu ally means there are none.”). M ost of St oke s’s arg uments are fri v olous or so obviousl y meritless that w e nee d only address them sum mari ly . T w o r equi re mor e complete di scu ssi on.

A. Rule of Speci alty St oke s arg ues that the Rule of Speci alty barred the government from prosecu tin g hi m for violati ng § 2423(b) becau se he8 No. 11-2734

w as e x t r a di ted for a violati on of § 2423(c) , a di fferent cri me. The Rule of Speci alty

, a tr eaty -law doctrine, holds that a nati on seeki ng ret urn of a person under the te r ms of an ext raditi on tr eaty may prosecute the extr adi ted per son only to the ext ent expr essly authorized by the surrendering nati on in the gr ant of ext raditi on. See United States v
. W arda, 285 F .3d 573, 575–76 (7th Ci r
. 2002) (“[T ]he Rule of Speci alty

... does not allow the country to whi ch an i ndi vidu al i s ext radited to prosecute that person for a cri me unles s the extraditing nation has expr essly authorized su ch a prosecuti on.”). Art i cle 14 of the extraditi on tr eaty betw een the Uni ted St a te s an d Thai land incorpor ates the rule: (1) A person ext radited under this T reat y shall not be detain ed, tr i ed, or puni shed in the ter ritory of the Requesti ng St a t e for an offense

o t he r than that for whi ch ext raditi on has bee n gr anted ... , unl ess :

... . (c) the Requested St ate has consented to detention, tr i al, or puni shm ent of that person for an offense other than that for whi ch ext radi tion w as gr anted, o r to ext raditi on to a thi rd S tate

. ... Extr adi tion T

reat y wi th Thai land, U.S.-Thai land, art

. 14, Dec. 14, 1983, S. T R E AT Y D O C

. No. 98–16 (1984), availab le at 1983 U.S.T

. LEXIS 418 (entered into force May 17, 1991) (emphas i s added). As we wi ll see, the “unles s” cl ause i s i mport ant here.No. 11-2734 9
S t o k e s w as ext radited on a charge of engaging in i lli ci t sexual conduc t in a foreign place in violati on of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). A d o pted as part of the 2003 PROTECT Act, thi s statute prov i des that “[a]ny Un it e d St ates ci tizen

... who tr av els in for ei gn commerce, a nd e ngages in any i lli ci t sexual conduc t wi th another person shall be

... i mpri soned not more than 30 y ears.“ See Prosecutorial Remedi es and T ools Ag ainst the Explo it a tion of Chi ldren T oday Act of 2003 (“PROTECT Act”), Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 St at. 650 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2423 and adding subs ecti on ( c)) . How ev er , becau se Sto kes’s last tr av el to Thai land occurred in January 2002, § 2423(c) could not be appli ed to hi s conduc t

. See United States v
. Jackso n , 480 F .3d 1014, 1018, 1024 (9th Ci r
. 2007) (holding that § 2423(c) does not apply to tr av el occurrin g prior to the enactment of the statute and thus finding no need to consi der ex post facto arg ument). Prosecutors i n Miami q uickly realized the mi stake and

mov ed to di smi ss t he § 2423(c) charge. St oke s w as then tr ansferr ed to the Nort hern Di stric t of Illi no is, and the g ov ernment i ndi cted hi m on three counts of violati ng § 2251A(b), whi ch prohibi ts chi l d t r affi cking. Thi s, too , w as a chargin g mi sfi re, and the charges w ere di smi ssed. The government ev entually obtained an indi ctment chargin g St oke s wi th

a singl e violati on of § 2423(b) , whi ch at the relev ant tim e prohibi ted tr av eling i n interstat e or foreign commerce for the purpose of engaging in a sexual act wi t h a person under the age o f 18. St oke s i nsi sts that the Rule of Speci alty barred the government from prosecuting hi m on the sub sti tute charge. The government responds that St oke s l a ck s standing to assert a10 No. 11-2734
violati on of the Rule of Spe ci alty , rely ing on authority from thi s court holdi ng that ext raditi on tr eaties govern di plo ma tic relat i ons only and do not create enforceable persona l r ights. See U n i te d States v
. Burke, 425 F .3d 400, 408 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (“[E] xtr adi tion tr eaties do not create p e r sonal rights enforceable by cri minal defendants.

... Instead they create rules for the relat i ons betw een nati ons.” (ci tin g Mat ta- Ballesteros v
. Henm an , 896 F .2d 255, 259 (7th Ci r . 1990)))

. On the face of i t, Burke appears to foreclose further inqui ry i nto the R ul e o f S peci alty

. But there i s reason to questi on thi s ci rcui t precedent. In U nited States v
. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), the Supreme Court recog ni zed and enforced the Rule of Speci alty i n a prosecuti on of an Americ an seaman captured by Great Britain on the hi gh seas and surrendered to the Uni ted St ates to face a charge of murder under the ter ms o f t he ext raditi on tr eaty betw een the tw o countries

. After ext raditi on the government tr i ed and convic ted the seaman on a di fferent charge: i nfli cti on of cruel and unus ua l puni shm ent. The Sup reme Court enforced the doctrine of speci alty deriv ed fro m tr eaty law

, explain i ng that [a ] t reat y
... i s a law of the land, as an act o f congress i s, when e ver i ts prov i si ons pr escribe a rule by whi ch the rights of the pri v ate ci tizen or subject may be deter mined. And, wh e n such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justic e, that co ur t resor ts to the tr eaty for a rule of deci si on for t he cas e before it as i t w ould to a statute.No. 11-2734 11
Id. at 419. Under the ext raditi on tr eaty then in effect betw een the Uni ted St ates and Great Britain, murder w as an ext raditable of fense but the sub sti tute cri me, infli cti on of cruel and

unus ual puni shm ent, w as not. Applyin g the Rule of Speci alty , the Court held that a person brought wi thi n the jurisdi cti on of the courtunder an extr adi tion treat y

can only be t r ie d for one of the offenses describe d in that tr eaty

, and for the offense wi th whi ch he i s charged in the p r oceedi ngs for hi s ext raditi on, unti l a reasonable tim e and oppor tuni ty hav e been giv en hi m, after hi s release or tr i al upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly take n under those pro ceedings. Id. at 430. Our deci si on i n Burke i s hard to square wi th Ra us cher , whi ch tho ug h o ld remain s goo d law today

. See United States v
. Alvarez-Machain , 504 U.S. 655, 659 (1992) (r e co g ni zing the conti nued appli cabi li ty of Rauscher, but d i s tin gu i s hing i t where the presence o f t he defendant w as secured by forcible abduction r a t he r than ext raditi on). Indeed, w e hav e speci fi cally acknowledged Rauscher ’s holding in another case, though not
one r a i sing an ext raditi on questi on
. See Jogi v
. V oges , 480 F .3d 822, 831 (7th Ci r
. 2007) (ci tin g Rauscher as holding that the Rule of S p e cia l ty in an ext raditi on tr eaty may be asserted as a defense to a prosecuti on for a cri me other than the one on
whi ch ext raditi on w as based)

. Sev eral of our si ster ci rcui ts ha v e speci fic ally held that cri minal defendants hav e standing to rais e a violati on of the Rul e of Speci alty

. See, e.g. , United Stat es12 No. 11-2734

v
. Puentes , 50 F .3d 1567, 1574 (11th Ci r
. 1995) (“W e beli ev e that Rauscher clearly confers such a right on the ext radited defendant.”); United States v
. Levy, 905 F .2d 326, 3 2 8 n. 1 (10th Ci r
. 1990) (“Levy has standing to rais e the i ssu e.”); United States v
. Cuevas , 847 F .2d 1417, 14 2 6 (9t h Ci r
. 1988) (“A person ext radi ted may rais e whatev er objections the ext raditing country
w o uld hav e been entitled to rais e.”); United States v
. Thirion , 81 3 F

. 2 d 146, 151 (8th Ci r
. 1987) (“[The defendant] may rais e whatev er objections to hi s prosecuti on t hat Monaco mi ght hav e.” (ci tin g Rauscher, 119 U.S. at419)). Although w e questi on whether Burke can be recon ciled wi th Rauscher, Jogi, and the authority from other ci rcui ts, we do not need to resolv e the matter here. It i s w ell-establi shed that the Ru l e o f Speci alty may be w ai v ed by the surrendering country

. See United States v
. T

se, 135 F .3d 200, 205 (1st Ci r
. 1998) (“If Ho ng Kong consented t o the prosecuti on[,] ... T se ’s po si

tion mus t fai l.”); Puentes , 50 F .3d at 1575 (“As a sov ereign, the requested nat io n may w ai v e i ts right to object to a tr eaty violati on and there by deny the defendant standing to object to
su ch a n acti on.”); Thirion , 813 F .2d at 151 (“Whi le the asylum country may consent to ext radite the defendant for offenses other than those expr essly enumerated in the tr eaty , ... i t di d not d o so here.”); United States v
. Najohn , 785 F .2d 1420, 1422 (9th Ci r
. 1986) (“[T ]he prot ecti on [of speci alty] exis ts only to the ext ent that the surrendering country wi shes .”). As w e hav e
no ted, the ext raditi on tr eaty betw een the Uni ted St ates and Th a i land expr essly prov i des for w ai v ers of the Rule of Speci alty , and dipl o ma tic authoriti es in the tw o nati ons i nv oke d that w ai v er pr ocedure here.No. 11-2734 13
On D ecember 8, 2008, the Thai Min i stry of For ei gn Affai rs i ssu ed a commu ni qué to the Uni ted St ates Embas sy expr essly statin g thatThai land
consents to the w aiver of the rule of speci ali ty , viz., to the detention, tr i al, and puni shm ent of Mr

. Charles T

odd St o kes for an offence under T i t l e 1 8 o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o d e , Section 2423(b) whi ch i s techni cally di fferent from Ti tle 18 of the Uni ted St ate s Code, Section 2423(c) for whic h the ext raditi on w as gr anted. S t oke s arg ues that w e cannot rely on Thai land’s w ai v er absent further inq uir y into how i t w as obtained. T o the contrar y , Thai land’s w ai v er of the Rule of Speci alty is c onclusi v e on the questi on. T se, 135 F

. 3 d a t 2 05; Puentes , 50 F .3d at 1575 (“The ext radited indi vidu al

... enjo ys [t he R ule of Speci alty] right at t he sufferance of the requested nati on. As a
sov ereign, the requested nati on may w ai v e i ts right to object to a tr eaty violati on ... .“). Further in qui ry i s unnecess ary
.

B. The Search of Stokes’s H ome in Thailand St oke s also challen ges the di stric t court’s deci si on denyi ng hi s motion to supp ress the photo gr aphi c evidenc e recov ered in the search of hi s home in P attay a. The photog raphs led to t he i denti fi cati on of the tw o Thai vic tim s who testifi ed again st hi m, and the government i ntro duced a repr esentativ e sampl e of the photo gr aphs at tr i al. In denyi ng supp ressi on the di stric t judge conclu ded that the Four th Am endment gener ally ap pli ed but14 No. 11-2734
the A mendment’s w arr ant requirement and W arr ant Clause di d not. The judge also found the s earch reasonable under all the ci rcums tances. Alter nati v ely , the judge held that ev en i f the search violated the Four th Amendment, the exclusi onary rule

w ould not apply becau se the ICE agents relied in goo d fai th on Thai law-en forcem e nt authoriti es. W e rev i ew the di stric t court’s deci si on under a spli t st a nd a r d of rev i ew; factual findings are rev i ew ed for clear err or , and legal conclu si ons and the ulti mate deter minati on of reasonableness are subject to de

nov o rev i ew

. United S ta tes v
. Uribe, 709 F .3d 646, 649 (7th Ci r
. 2013).

1 . Extraterritorial App lic ation of the Fo urth Ame ndment Eviden ce obtained in a search of an Americ an ci tizen by foreig n authoriti es oper atin g wi thin their own country i s gener ally admi ssi

ble in the courts of the Uni ted S tate s ev en i f the search does not other wi se comply wi th our law , inclu ding the law of the Four th Amendment. See United States v
. Emmanu el , 565 F .3d 1324, 1330 (11th Ci r
. 2009) (“The gener a l r ul e is that evidenc e obtained from searches carried o ut by foreign offi ci a l s in t hei r own countries i s admi ssi ble in Uni ted St ates courts, ev en i f the search w ould not other wi se comply wit h Uni ted St ates law or the law of the foreign country .”); United States v
. Bar

ona , 56 F .3d 1087, 1096 (9th Ci r
. 1995); United States

v
. Peterson , 8 1 2 F .2d 486, 490 (9th Ci r
. 1987); United States v
. Morr ow , 5 37 F .2d 120, 140 (5th Ci r
. 1976). But i f U.S. agents sub stanti ally partici pate in an ext rat err i tor i al search of a U.S. ci tizen and the foreign offi ci als were essential ly ac tin g as agents for their Americ an counterpar ts or the s e a rch amountedNo. 11-2734 15

to a jo i nt oper ation betw een Americ an and foreign authoriti es, the Four th Amendment gener ally a ppli es. See Emmanuel , 565 F .3d at 1330; Barona , 56 F .3d at 1096; Peterson , 812 F .2d at 490; c f

. United States v
. Marz ano , 537 F .2d 257, 269–71 (7th Ci r
. 1976) (holding that F BI agent s wh o merely supp li ed informat io n to Grand Cayman poli ce and observ ed but di d no t partici pate i n the search by authoriti es in that country di d not tr i gge r F ourt h Amendmen t pro tection). The di stric t court held that becau se the ICE agents ini tiated the i nv esti gation of St oke s and fully partici pated in the search of hi s home, t he search w as a j oin t oper ation betw een American and Thai authoriti es and “some measu re” of F o ur t h Amendment prot ecti on appli ed. Stokes , 710 F

. Supp. 2d at 697. The government does not contest thi s ruli ng, for goo d reason. On thes e facts we agr ee w i th the di stric t c ourt that the Four th Amendment generally applies

. That co nclu si on, how ev er , does not answer the more preci se questi on about the ext rat err i tor i al reach of the Amendment’s w arr ant requirements

. The Four th Amendment prov i des: The right of t he people to be secu re in their persons, houses, papers, and e ffec ts, again st unreasonable searches and sei zures, shall not be violated, and no W

arr ants shall i ss ue, but upon probable caus e, supp or ted by Oath or affi rmation, and particu larly describing the pla ce to be searched, and the persons or thi ngs to be sei zed. U.S. C O N S T

. amend. IV

. St oke s arg ues th a t t he Thai w arr ant viol a ted the W

arr ant Clause becau se i t di d not describe the16 No. 11-2734
i tems t o be seized wi th part icu l a rity and t he search ex ceeded the scope of the w arr ant. There i s no questi on that the w arr ant used v ery gener al language. S tok es’s ar gument thus r equi res us to deci de whe ther an e xtr ater ritorial search by U.S. agents i s subject to the W

arr ant Clause. The W arr ant Clause i s phrased as a li mi tation on the pow er to i ssu e w arr ants and i s di stinct from the Four th Amendment’s “w arr ant requirement,” whi ch though not e xp re s s e d in the tex t of the Amendment i s implied as a matter of long-standing Supreme Court doctrine. See Kentu cky v
. Kin g, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 2 1856 (2011) (“Although the te xt of the Four th Amendment does not speci fy when a search w arr ant mus t be obtained, thi s Court has i nferred that a w arr ant mus t gen e r ally be secu red.”); Brigham City v
. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“searches and seizures i nsi de a home wi thout a w arr ant are presumpti v el y unreasonable”); Payto n v
. New Y ork , 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980). The Supreme Court has nev er addressed whether the W arr ant C l a us e or the doctrinal requirement of a w arr ant appli es ext rat err i tor i ally

. Nor hav e w e.

B e c a u s e w a r r a n t s i m m u n i z e d g o v e r n m e n t a g e n t s a g a i n s t l i a b i l i t y f o r t r e s 2
p a s s , t h e F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t ’ s W a r r a n t C l a u s e a i m e d t o l i m i t t h e i r
a v a i l a b i l i t y b y i m p o s i n g e x p l i c i t r e q u i r e m e n t s o n t h e i r i s s u a n c e
. S e e A K H I L R E E D A M A R , T H E B I L L O F R I G H T S : C R E A T I O N A N D R E C O N S T R U C T I O N 6 8

– 7 6 ( 1 9 9 8 ) ; A k h i l R e e d A m a r , F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t F i r s t P r i n c i p l e s , 1 0 7 H A R V

. L

. R E V

. 7 5 7 , 7 6 1

– 8 1 ( 1 9 9 4 ) ; W i l l i a m J

. S t u n t z , T h e S u b s t a n t i v e O r i g i n s o f C r i m i n a l P r o c e d u r e , 1 0 5 Y A L E L

. J

. 3 9 3 , 4 0 9

– 1 0 ( 1 9 9 5 )

. T h e “ w a r r a n t r e q u i r e m e n t ” i n
m o d e r n F o u r t h A m e n d m e n t d o c t r i n e a r i s e s b y i m p l i c a t i o n a n d o p e r a t e s a s
a g e n e r a l p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t w a r r a n t l e s s s e a r c h e s a r e u n r e a s o n a b l e , s u b j e c t t o c e r t a i n w e l l

- e s t a b l i s h e d e x c e p t i o n s
. S e e K e n t u c k y v
. K i n g , 1 3 1 S

. C t

. 1 8 4 9 , 1 8 5 6 ( 2 0 1 1 ) ; B r i g h a m C i t y v
. S t u a r t , 5 4 7 U

. S

. 3 9 8 , 4 0 3 ( 2 0 0 6 ) ; G r o h v
. R a m i r e z , 5 4 0 U

. S

. 5 5 1 , 5 5 9 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; P a y t o n v
. N e w Y o r k , 4 4 5 U

. S

. 5 7 3 , 5 8 6

– 8 7 ( 1 9 8 0 )

.No. 11-2734 17
The Supreme Court ’s reasonin g in United States v
. VerdugoUrquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), sheds some li ght on the questi on. In V erdugo-Urquide z t he Court held that the Four th Amendment has no appli cati on to a w arr antless search by U.S. agents of a nonresi d ent ali en’s proper ty located in a foreign countr y—ther e, Mex i co. Id. at 261. The C o urt based its holding on “the tex t of the Four th Amendment, i ts hi stor y , and [the Court ’s] cases di scu ssing the appli cati on of the Constituti on to ali ens and ext rat err i tor i ally .” Id. at 274. Becaus e the Amendment di d not apply at all, the Court had no need to separately address whether the w arr ant requirement a nd t he W arr ant Clause appli ed to foreign searches by Americ an agents. But the Court not e d in p a ssing that any w arr ant i ssu ed by a judi ci al offi cer i n thi s country “w ould be a dead lette r outsi de the Uni ted St ates.” Id

. Jus tic e Kennedy’s co nc ur ring opin i on w as more direct: The absenc e of local judges or magi strat es av ai lable to i ssu e w arr ants, the di ffering and perhaps

unas certainab le concepti ons of reasonableness and priv acy that prev ai l abroad, and the need to cooper ate wi th foreign offi ci als all indi cat e t hat the Four th Amendment’s w arr ant r e qui rement should not apply in M e xic o as i t does in thi s country

. Id. at 278 (Kennedy

, J., concu rr ing). Jus tic e St ev ens echoed the poin t i n hi s concu rr ence, as di d Jus tic e Blackmun in di ssent. See id. at 279 (Steve ns , J. , concu rr ing in the judgment) (“I do not beli ev e the W

arr ant Clause has any appli cati on to searches of nonci tizens ’ homes in foreign juris di cti ons because Ameri can18 No. 11-2734 magi strat es hav e no pow er to authorize such searches.”) ; id. at 297 (Blac kmun, J., di ssen tin g) (“[A]n Americ an magi strat e’s lack of pow er to authorize a search abroad render s the W arr ant Clause i nappli cable to the search of a nonci tizen’s resi dence outsi de thi s coun tr y

.”). A mong the ci rcui t courts of appeals, only the Secon d ha s addressed whether the Four th Amendment’s w arr ant requirement appli es to searches conduc ted by U.S. agents ov erseas, conclu d ing t hat i t does not. See In re T errorist Bombings , 552 F .3d at 167 (“[W] e hold that the Four th Amendment’s

w arr ant requirement does not govern searches condu cted abroad by U.S. agents; such searches of U.S. ci tizens need only sati sfy the Four th Amendment’s requirem e nt of reasonableness .”). The Second Ci rcui t too k i ts cues from V e r d ugoUrquidez, i n whi ch no fe w e r than “sev en justic es of the Supreme Court e nd or sed the view that U.S. courts are not empow ered to i ssu e w arr ants for foreign searches.” Id. at 169. Bey ond reading t he clear si gnals fr om the Supreme Court i n V erdugo-Urqu i d e z , the Second Ci rcui t noted the absenc e of

a ny hi s to ri c a l s u p p ort for the arg ument th a t the Fo u rth Am e n d

ment’s w arr ant requirement appli es to searches carried out by U.S. ag ents ov erseas. Id. (“[T ]here i s nothing i n our hi stor y or
our precedents suggesti ng that U.S. offi ci a ls must fi rst obtain

a w arr ant before conduc tin g a n ov erseas search.”). The court also consi dered the foreign-poli cy i mpli cati ons of ext ending the w arr ant requirement to ext rat err i tor i al searches, no t ing that “not hin g in the hi stor y of the foreign relat i ons of the Uni ted St ates w ould require that U.S. offi ci als obtain w arr ants from foreign magi stra t e s
... or , indeed, to supp ose that allNo. 11-2734 19
other state s ha ve search and inv esti gation rules akin to our own.” Id. at 170. F inally , the court ret urned to the basi c di ffi culty that “i f U.S. judi ci al offi cers w ere to i ssu e search w arr ants intended to hav e ext rat err i tor i al effect, such w arr ants w ould hav e dubi ous legal si gni fi canc e, i f any , in a foreign nati on.” Id. at 171. And “i t i s by no m eans clear that U.S. judi ci al offi cers could b e authorized to i ssu e w arr ants for ov erseas searches.” Id

. For these reasons, the cour t co nclu ded that “the Four th Amendment’s W arr ant Clause has no ext rat err i tor i al appli cati o n, ” and “foreign searches of U.S. ci tizens conduc ted by U.S. agents are subject only to the Four th Amendment’s requireme nt of reasonableness.” Id. St oke s has no response to In re T errorist Bombings

. Nor does he gr apple wi th t he clear i mpli cati on of the Supreme Court ’s statements in V

erdugo-Urquidez

. W

e agr ee wi th the Second Ci rcui t’s re a so ning and now hold that the Four th Amendment’s w arr ant requirement, and by ext ensi on the stric tures of the W arr ant Clause, do not apply to ext rat err i tor i al searches by U.S. agents. The search of St oke s’s home in Thai land i s governed by the Amendment’s basi c requirement of reasonableness, see In re T

errorist Bombin gs , 552 F .3d at 170 n.7, to whi ch we now turn.

2. Reasonab lenes s of the Search Whether a search is reasonable under the Fou r t h A mendment depends on the tot ali ty of the ci rcums tances and requires the court to wei gh the intrusi on on indi vidu al priv acy again st20 No. 11-2734
the government’s need for information and evi dence. Samson

v
. California , 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). On the indi vidu al si de of the ledger

, the priv acy of the home i s cent r a l to the Four th Amendment right. See Kyllo v
. United States , 533 U.S. 27, 3 1 (2001). Ag ainst t hat core indi v idual r i ght i s t he government’s stro ng i ntere st i n prev entin g the sexual e x p l o itation of chi ldren.
In finding the search reasonable, the di str ict court w as he a vily i nflu enced by the fact that the jo int inv esti gation by ICE and the Roy al Thai P olic e had produced information that “almost certainly” w ould hav e been suffi ci ent to establi sh probable caus e that S t o k e s had commi tte d a cri me and evidence of i t w ould be found in hi s home. Stokes , 710 F

. Supp. 2d at 701. W

e agr ee but omi t the quali fi er “al mo st .” Probable

caus e requires a commonsen se “asses sment of probabi li ties in particu lar factual context s,” Illin oi s v
. Gat es , 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983), and here the di stric t court marshaled the compel ling evidenc e supporting probable cau se: St oke s had been fi red from tw o Thai sch ools in
one y ear for t o uch ing chi ldren inappropr i ately

. Hi s colleagues at a thi rd school told inv esti gato rs that he c ontinu ed to engage in si mi lar behavior

. St oke s had a hi stor y of sexually assau ltin g chi ldren[] and a cri minal convic tion for inappropriately touching a chi ld in the Uni ted St ates. He

w as seen reg ularly huggin g and kis sing one particu lar male s tu d e n t. T w o c redi ble informants separ ately i ndi cated that St oke s, an unmarri ed,

m i d d l e - a ge d m a n

, in tim ated that he w as sexual l y
a t t r acted to chi ldren and boasted about li vingNo. 11-2734 21
wi t h young Thai boys. ICE Inv esti gato rs also

v erifi ed thro ugh cooper ation wi th Thai authorities that a wi tness had, on at least one occasi on,
seen y oung boys repo rt ing to St oke s’s priv ate quarter s. Stokes , 710 F . Supp. 2d at 701. Mor eov er

, the search w as executed in a reasonable manner
. The la w-enforcement team acted pursuant to a v ali d Thai search w arr ant. Th e sear ch too k place during the daytime hours. Although St oke s w as not at home wh e n the offi cers
arr i ved e arly i n the mornin g, they w ai ted for hi m before enter i ng the home. St oke s w as not restr ained dur ing t he search, contai ners were not brok en open, an d St oke s receiv ed

an i nv entor y of the i tems sei zed. The entire search lasted only about tw o hours. In the di stric t cour t ’ s view , “Thai and U.S. offi ci als acted reasonably to mini mi ze the intrusi v eness of the search.” Id. at 702. Again, w e agr ee. Becaus e the search o f St oke s’s home w as r e asonable, the di stric t court proper ly deni ed supp ressi on of the ev i dence recov ered t here.

C. Remain ing Claims St oke s rais es a bevy of addi tional arg uments, some downright fri v olous and the rest si mply meritless

. W e mov e thro ugh the re maining i ssu es wi th more di spatch.22 No. 11-2734
1 . Co mme rce Clause Challenge to 18 U.S .C. § 2423(b) Relying on United States v
. Lopez , 514 U

. S

. 5 4 9 (1995), and United States v
. Morrison , 529 U.S. 598 (2000), St oke s arg ues that § 2423(b) exceeds Congr ess’s pow er under the Commerce Clause. Nei ther Lopez nor Morrison i s helpfu l here. In Lopez the

3 Supreme Court e xplai ned that Congr ess i s authorized under the Commerce Clause to reg ulate thr e e ca teg or i es o f activi ty: (1) the use of the chann els o f interstate commerce; (2) t he us e
o f t he i nstrumentali ties of interstat e commerce, o r persons o r thi ngs i n interstat e commerce; and (3) acti viti es that hav e a sub stanti al relat i on to interstat e commerce (tha t is, that sub stanti ally affec t i nterstat e commerce). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. Lopez and Morrison rais ed questi ons about the li mi ts of the thi rd catego ry —the “sub stanti al effects” pow er—but § 2423(b) fi ts comfortably wit hin the fi rst catego ry , the “ch annels pow er .” The statute makes i t a cri me to tr av el in i nterstat e or foreign commerce “for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act

... wi th a p e rson under 18 y ears of age.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (effecti v e Oct. 30, 1998 t o Nov . 1, 2002). In kee p ing wi th these gener al prin ci ples, sev eral ci rcui ts hav e held tha t § 2 4 2 3 (b) i s a proper exer ci se of the chann els pow er
. See, e.g. , United States v . T ykarsk y, 446 F .3d 458, 470 (3d Ci r
. 2006); United States v
. Han , 230 F .3d 5 6 0 , 5 6 2

– 63 (2d Ci r
. 2000). It’ s w or th em phasi zing h ere that Stok es’s case does not i mpli cate the usu al federali sm concerns that ani mate mo st Commerce Clause chall e ng e s. “ F o r e ign commerce i s

T h e C o m m e r c e C l a u s e p r o v i d e s : “ T h e C o n g r e s s s h a l l h a v e P o w e r
... T o 3

r e g u l a t e C o m m e r c e w i t h f o r e i g n N a t i o n s , a n d a m o n g t h e s e v e r a l S t a t e s , a n d

w i t h I n d i a n T r i b e s
... . ” U

. S

. C O N S T

. a r t

. 1 , § 8 , c l

. 3

.No. 11-2734 23 pre-eminently a matter of nati onal concern.” Japa n Lin e, Ltd. v
. County of Los Angeles , 441 U.S. 434, 4 4 8 (1 979). In thi s reg ard, the Fifth Ci rcui t has affi rmed a convic tion under § 2423(b) on almost i denti cal facts. See United S tates v
. Bredimu s , 352 F .3d 200, 208 (5th C ir

. 2003). In Bredimu s the defendant w as convic ted of tr av eli ng to Thai land for the purpo se of engaging in sexual acts wi th minors. Id. at 201. The co ur t rej ected the defend a nt ’ s Commerce Clause challen ge to § 2423(b)

. Id. at 204–08. Relatedly

, St oke s contends that § 2423(b) i s un c on s ti tu ti onal becau se i t cri minali zes “mere thought ” in interstat e or foreign commerce. No t so. The statute tar get s the use of the chann els of i nterstat e a nd foreign commerce for a particu lar i lli ci t purpose—the purpose of enga g ing in a sexual act wi th a minor—a nd not just “mere thought ” in interstat e or foreign

comm e r ce. As the First Ci rcui t noted in rej ecti ng a si mi lar arg ument, “[p]roof of intent natur ally means proving state of mind, bu t t ha t does not mean that one i s puni shing ‘mere thought ’ any m or e than that the requirement of prov ing mens
rea in most cr ime s means that one i s solely puni shing ‘mere thought .’ ” United States v
. Gamache, 156 F .3d 1, 8 (1st Ci r
. 1998). Section 2423(b) li es w ell wi thi n Congr ess’s po w er under the Commerce Clause.

2. V agueness Cha lle nge to 18 U.S .C. § 2423(b) St oke s also contends that § 2423(b) i s unc o ns t itutionally

v ague. Thi s argument requires an examinati on of the full tex t of § 2423(b) as i t stoo d at the t i me of Sto kes’s travel:24 No. 11-2734
A person who tr av els in interstat e commerce, or conspi res to do so, or a Uni ted St ates ci tizen o r
an ali en admi tte d for permanent resi dence in the Uni ted St ates who t rav els in for ei gn comme rce,
or conspi res to do so, for the p ur p o se of engagi ng in any sexual act (as defined in secti on 2246) wi th a person under 18 y ears o f a g e that w ould be in violati on of chapter 109A i f the sexual act occurred i n the speci al mari tim e and ter ritorial jurisdi cti on of the Uni ted St a tes shall be fined under t his title, i mpri soned not more than 15 y ears, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (effec tiv e O ct

. 30, 1998 to Nov

. 1, 2002). St oke s focus es on t he p hr ase “sexual act

... wi th a person under 18 y ears of age that w ould be in v io l a tion of chapter 109A.” He clai ms that thi s cross-reference render s the statute unconstituti onally v ague becau se some of the cri mes li sted i n chapter 109A (18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2244) inv olv e vic tim s under the age of 16, maki ng the age req uirements contradic

tor y and confus i ng. St oke s’s v agueness challeng e sounds in the Fifth Amendment’s guarante e of due process. “A convic tion or puni shm ent fai ls to comply wi th due p r o ce ss i f the statute or reg ulati on under wh ich i t i s obtained ‘fai ls to prov i de a person of or di

nary i ntelli gence fai r notic e of what i s prohibi ted

... . ’ ” FCC v
. Fox T elevisi on Stations, Inc. , 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012) (quoti ng United States v
. W

illiams , 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)) ; see also United States v
. Jones , 689 F .3d 696, 701 (7th Ci r
. 2012) (“Vagueness doctrine rests on concerns about fai r notic e and arbi tr ary enforcement.”); United States v
. Plumm er, 581 F .3d 484, 488 (7thNo. 11-2734 25
Ci r
. 2009) (A statute i s unc onsti tutionally v ague i f i t “ ‘does not prov i de a person of or dinary intelli gence a reasonable oppor tuni ty to know what i s prohibi ted.’ ” (quoting United S tat es v
. Lim , 444 F .3d 910, 915 (7th Ci r . 2006)))

. Wi th respect to the intended vic tim ’s age, the v ersi on of § 2423(b) under wh ich St oke s w as convic ted has tw o basi c requirements: (1) the sought- a ft e r vic tim mus t be a person unde r 1 8 y ears of age; and (2) the intended conduc t mus t q ua l ify a s an offense under chapter 109A i f the conduc t had take n place wi thi n the speci al mari tim e and ter ritorial jurisdi ction o f t he U nited St ates. Chapter 109A creates a seri es o f sex cri mes, some of whi ch do not contai n vic tim -age requirements at all and some o f whi ch per tain only to minor vic tims under the age o f 1 6

. For example, under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a), whi ch defines aggr av ated sexual assau lt, i t i s a federal cri me to caus e another to engage i n a sexual act by the use of force o r t hr eat i f the conduc t occurs in the sp e cial mari tim e and ter ritorial jurisdi cti on of the Uni ted St ates. Section 2241(c) , a di fferent sub secti on of the same statute, cri minali zes sexual acts wi th a person under the age of 12 wi thi n the same jurisdi cti onal li mi ts. Under § 2243(a) i t i s a federal cri me t o e ngage in a sexual act wi th a person older than 12 but y ounger than 16 wi thi n the same jurisdi cti onal li mi ts if the perpet rat or i s at least four y ears older than the victi m. 4 The cross- refer ence, though perhaps awkw ardly phrased, does not intro duce confus i on. T oge ther , § 2423(b) and the

T h e r e a r e o t h e r c r i m e s l i s t e d i n c h a p t e r 1 0 9 A , b u t t h e y a r e n o t r e l e v a n t t o 4 S t o k e s ’ s a r g u m e n t

.26 No. 11-2734
cri mes li sted in chapter 109A cri minali ze interstat e and foreign tr av el undertake n for any of the following purposes: (1) engagi ng i n a sexual a ct wi th a minor under the age of 12, see § 2241(c) ; (2) engaging in a sexual act wi th a minor betw een the ages of 12 and 16 if the perpet rat or i s at least four y ears older than the vic tim, see § 2243(a); and (3) engag ing in a sexual act wi th a minor betw een the ages of 16 and 18 by the use of force

or thr e a t, see § 2241(a). The statute i s not unc onsti tutionally

v ague. 5

3. Evidentiary Claims i . Other-acts evidence und er Rules 404(b), 413, and414 S t o k es objects to the admi ssi on at tr i al of hi s 2000 Flor i d a convic tion for molesti ng tw o boys and the t esti moni al and

S t o k e s a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e i n d i c t m e n t w a s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a g u e
. T h e 5
i n d i c t m e n t c l o s e l y t r a c k e d t h e l a n g u a g e o f 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 2 4 2 3 ( b ) , s o t h i s
a r g u m e n t o v e r l a p s w i t h t h e c h a l l e n g e t o t h e s t a t u t e
. B e c a u s e t h e s t a t u t e i s
n o t u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y v a g u e , t h e i n d i c t m e n t i s n ’ t e i t h e r
. A n d t h e i n d i c t

m e n t w a s o t h e r w i s e l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t

. A n i n d i c t m e n t

m u s t a c c o m p l i s h t h r e e f u n c t i o n s : [ I ] t m u s t s t a t e e a c h o f t h e
e l e m e n t s o f t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d ; i t m u s t p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e
n o t i c e o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e c h a r g e s s o t h a t t h e a c c u s e d m a y p r e p a r e a d e f e n s e ; a n d i t m u s t a l l o w t h e d e f e n d a n t t o r a i s e t h e j u d g m e n t a s a b a r t o f u t u r e p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r t h e s a m e
o f f e n s e
. U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. F a s s n a c h t , 3 3 2 F

. 3 d 4 4 0 , 4 4 4

– 4 5 ( 7 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 3 )

. T h e i n d i c t

m e n t m e t t h e s e r e q u i r e m e n t s
. F i n a l l y , t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t g a v e t h e j u r y c l e a r i n s t r u c t i o n s o n t h e a g e - o f

- v i c t i m i s s u e a s i t p e r t a i n e d t o t h e f a c t s o f t h i s
c a s e
.No. 11-2734 27 photo gr aphi c evidenc e of hi s sexual abus e of Thai boys. Th e di stric t court allow ed thi s evidenc e as proo f of St oke s’s intent i n tr a vel ing to Thai land, as i s permi tte d under Rule 404(b) of the Feder al Rules of Eviden ce. The di stric t court also admi tte d the evidenc e under Rules 413 and 414, whi ch expr essly permi t the i ntro ducti on of the defendant’s prior acts of sexual assau lt

or chi ld molestation i n a prosecuti on for sexual assau lt or chi ld molestation. St oke s fi rst clai ms that Rules 413 and 4 1 4 are unc onsti tutional under the Due Process Clause and the equ al-prote cti on component of the Fifth Amendment. W e hav e already rej ected thi s arg ument, see United States v
. Julian , 427 F .3d 471, 487 (7th Ci r
. 2005), as has the T

enth Ci rcui t, see Un ited States v. Castillo , 140 F .3d 874, 883 (10th Ci r
. 1998). W e see no reason to rev i si t the is sue here. St oke s also i nsi sts that the other- a c ts e vi d e n c e wa s a d m i tte d i n violati on of Rule 404(b)

. Thi s arg ument i s fri v olous. St oke s’s sexual abus e of y oung b oys b oth before and after hi s tr av el to Thai land w as di rectly and centrally relev ant to hi s intent at the tim e of hi s tr av el, an element of the cri me and a p e r mit ted purpose for the admi ssi on of other-acts evidenc e under Rule 404(b)

. See F E D

. R. E V I D

. 404(b) (2) (other -acts evidenc e “may be a dmi ssi

ble for [a nonpropensi ty] purpose, such as prov i ng motiv e, oppor tuni ty , intent, prepar ation, plan, knowledge, i denti ty

, absenc e of mi stake, or lack of acci dent”). Indeed, St oke s’s i ntent w as the key di sputed i ssu e at tr i al

. If that w ere not enough, as w e have noted, Rules 413 and 414 expr essly permi t the i ntro ducti on of prior acts of sexual assau lt

or sexual molestation in a pr o secution for sexual assau lt or28 No. 11-2734

s e xu al m o le s t ation

, o ve r ri d i ng t he p r o p ensit

y b a r i n R ule 4 04 ( a ) ( 1 )

. Mor eov er

, i n a case quit e sim i lar to thi s one inv olving a § 2423(b) p ro secu tion, w e hav e upheld the admi ssi on of the defendant’s past acts of chi ld molestation under Rules 404(b) , 413, and 414

. See United States v
. McGuire, 627 F .3d 622, 626–27 (7th Ci r
. 201 0 ) (holding that “[t]he testim ony [of the chi ld vic tim s] w as admi ssi

ble as evi dence o f t he defendant’s modus operandi (and thus not excludable under Rule 404(b ) of the F e deral Rules of Eviden ce), and i t w as also admi ssi ble under Rules 413 and 414 as evidenc e of the d e fendant’ s prev i ous cri mes” (ci tation omi tte d)). W e hav e also upheld the admi ssi on of the defendant’s p a st acts of chi ld molestation to show motiv e i n chi ld-pornog raphy cases
. See, e
. g
. , United States v
. Russ ell , 662 F .3d 831, 846–47 (7th Ci r
. 2011) (holding that prior molestation w as allow ed under Rule 404(b) to show d e fendant’s motiv e in taking obscene photo gr aphs of ch i ldren); United States v
. Sebolt, 460 F .3d 910, 917 (7th Ci r
. 2006) (holding that prior acts of sexual mi scondu ct wi th a chi ld are admi ssi ble to establi sh defendant’s sexual intere st in chi ldren and motiv e under Rule 404(b) ). Fin ally , thi s evidenc e w as not unfai rly prej udi ci al to St oke s under Rule 403. The go ver nment li mi ted i ts photo gr aphi c evidenc e to 20 repr esentativ e i mages and p r e sented the testim ony o f only tw o of S tok es’s many v i cti ms.

ii . Evidence of Stok es’s changed lifes tyle St oke s sought to intro duce evidenc e that he dramatica l l y changed hi s li festyle following the search of hi s home in 2003.No. 11-2734 29
Recall that three y ears pass ed betw een the October 2003 search and St oke s’s arr est i n 2006. St oke s w anted to testif y that duri ng thi s tim e, he got married, mov ed to a di fferent area of Thai

land , he ld a respectable posi tion in a uni v ersi ty , and establi shed stro ng relat i ons wi th hi s wi fe’s fami ly

. The di stric t court excluded thi s evidence as i rr elev ant. Thi s ruli ng w as sound. Any change i n St oke s’s w ays after O ct o ber 2003 w as utter ly i rr elev ant to hi s purpose in tr av eling to Thai land in Mar ch 2000 and Janu ary 2002.

4. Sufficie ncy of th e Evidence St oke s next clai ms that the g o v ernment’s evidenc e w as i nsuffi ci ent to convic t hi m. Thi s arg ument i s fri v olous. A defendant challen gin g the suffi ci ency of the evidenc e faces an i nti mi datin g stand a r d o f rev i ew
. W e ask only “whether after

rev i ewing the evidenc e in the li ght most fav or able to the prosecuti on, any rat i onal tr ie r of fact could hav e found the essenti a l elements of the cri me bey ond a reasonable doubt.” Jackso n v
. V

ir ginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). St oke s plows ahead undeterr ed, arg uing that the evidenc e w as insu ffi ci ent becau se i t “only establi shed a gener al p r o pensi ty to engage in i lli ci t sexual activi ty” and did not “in any w ay sp eak to hi s speci fi c i ntent o n the relev ant date” o f hi s trav el. The i lli ci t purpose of St oke s’s tr av el w as unmi stakably establi shed by the abund ant evidenc e of wh a t he di d before

a nd after the tr av el. Immedi ately after being convic ted of mi sdemeanor batter y for molesti ng tw o y oung boys in Flor i da, he sought and recei v ed permi ssi on to mov e to Thai land. Less t ha n a month later he made t he mov e, and within t w o w e e k s30 No. 11-2734

o f arr i ving i n Thai land, began entic ing y oung Thai boys fo r
sex. Thi s acti vity conti nued unabated fo r three y ears, wi th a bri ef hi atus for a t hr e e-w eek tr i p to the Uni ted St ates in December 2001. Hi s ret urn tr i p to Thail and in January 2002

w as marked by an i mmedi ate resumpti on of hi s sexual acti vity wi th y oung Thai boys. Th e e videnc e w as ov erwhelming and easi ly suffi ci ent to convic t S tok es und er § 2423(b).

5. Ineffe ctive As sis tan ce of Coun sel St oke s also arg ues that hi s couns el had insu ffi ci ent tim e to prepar e for tr i al and w as consti tutionally ineffec tiv e. C ha ll e ng es to tr i al couns el’s perfor manc e are best brought on collateral rev i ew rat her than di rect appeal. S ee Massa ro v
. Un ited States , 538 U.S. 500, 504–05 (2003) (“When an ineffec tive assi stance clai m i s brought on di rect appeal, appellate couns el and t he co urt mus t proceed on a tr i al recor d not dev eloped preci sely for the object of li tigati ng or preserv ing the clai m and thus often i ncomplete or inadequate for thi s purpose.”). St oke s rais ed the i ssu e of couns el’s ineffec tiv eness in an un derdev eloped arg ument on mo t i ons after v erdic t. The di stric t court deni ed relief, and St oke s asks us to address the i ssu e now
. W e can’t thi nk o f a g ood reason for that strat egy
. “Ci rcui t law i s clear

... that a ‘defendant who complains on d irect appeal about the quali ty of hi s lawy er can’t tr y again on collateral attack unles s there has been an intervening ch ange of law .’ ” Peoples v
. United State s , 403 F .3d 844, 846 (7th Ci r
. 2005) (quoti ng R

yan v
. United States , 214 F .3d 877, 879 (7th Ci r
. 2000)). W e think it bes t to leav e the is sue f or collateral r eview

.No. 11-2734 31
6. Sentencing Arguments In the fi rst of sev eral sentencing arg uments, Stok es clai ms that the di stric t court err ed by increasing his offense lev el under U.S.S .G. § 2G2.1(b )(1) (A) becau se some of hi s vic tim s
w ere und er 12 y ears old. Thi s argument, based on Apprendi v

. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), is fr iv olous and has been for some tim e. The arg ument “i gn or es the effect that [ United States v
. Boo ker

, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)] had on federal sentencing.” United States v
. White, 472 F .3d 458, 464 (7th Ci r
. 2006). Becaus e Boo ker render ed the sentencing gui delines advis or y , “sentenci ng enhanc ements need not be found by a jury bey ond a
r e a so nable doubt becau se they no longer alter the statuto r y maxi mum .” Id

. St oke s also relies on United States v
. O ’ B r ien , 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010), but w e cannot tell why

. O’Brien inv olv ed

a stat utorypenalty pr ov i si on. St oke s also objects to the i mposi tion of a gui delines adjustment for obstruction of justic e under U.S.S

. G

. § 3 C 1

. 1

. He has mi sun dersto od the di st r ict court’s gui delines calc ulati on. The court di d not i n fa ct apply the obstruction adjustment becau se wi th or wi thout i t, St oke s’s advis or y gui delines range
w as li fe, exceeding the stat utor y maxim um of 15 y ears. Fin ally , St oke s’s sentence i s unaffected by the Supreme Court ’s recent deci si on in Peugh v
. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2072 (2013). T o calculate St o k e s’ s advis or y sentencing range, the di stric t court used the 2010 gui delines manual in effe ct a t t he tim e of sentencing. Thi s approach w a s consi stent wi th thenexis tin g ci rcui t precedent

. See United States v
. Demaree, 459 F .3d 791 (7 t h C i r
. 2006)

. In Peugh , how ev er , the Supreme Court abrog ated Demaree
.32 No. 11-2734 Peugh addressed “whether there i s an ex post facto violati on when a defendant i s sentenced under Gui delines promulgat ed after he co mmitted hi s cri minal acts and the new v ersi on prov i des a hi gher appli cable Gui delines sentencing range than the v ersi on i n place at the tim e of the o ff e ns e
. ” 133 S. Ct. at 2078. The Court held th a t “ [a] ret ro spectiv e increase in the Gui delines range appli cable to a defendant creates a suffi ci ent ris k of a hi gher sentence to consti tute an ex postfacto violati on.” Id. at 2084. But the Court also noted that an ex post facto err or may be harmless in “cases in whi ch the recor d makes clear that the Di stric t Court w ould hav e i mposed the same sentence under the old er

, more leni ent Gui delines tha[n] i t i mposed under the new er

, more puni tive ones.” Id. at 2088 n.8. The par ties sub mi tte d supp lemental bri efs on the effec t of Peugh on St oke s’s sentence. They agr ee that the adj us t e d

o ff e nse lev el w ould hav e been low er under the gui delines in effect i n 2002, the tim e of St oke s’s last tr a v el to Thai land. But
ev en wi th t he reduced offense lev el, the advis or y gui delines range w ould hav e been 210 to 262 months, sti ll w ell abov e the statuto ry maxi mumof 15 y ears. Mor eov er

, the di stric t judge made i t abundantly clear that she w ould i mpose the 1 5 -ye ar maxi mum no matter what the gui delines advi sed her to do :

I am of the view that nothin g short of the maxi mum penalt y i s appropr i ate here. I am i mposing a sentencing of 180 months, whi ch i s what the statute calls for

.

... .No. 11-2734 33
I am sati sfi ed that Mr

. St oke s ne e ds to be separated fro m soci ety for as l ong as I h av e i t in my pow er t o do t hat. 180 months. The judge could not hav e been clearer

. Accordi ngly , Peugh does not affec t t his case for tw o reasons. St oke s’s sentencing range exceeded the statuto ry maxi mum no matte r whi ch gui delines manual appli ed, so St oke s nev er actually faced a “ret ro specti v e i ncrease in the Gui delines r a ng e appli cable to [hi m].” Id. at 2084. And becau se the judge w ould hav e i mposed the statuto ry maxi mum reg ardless, any arg uable ex post facto

err or w as harmless

. A F F I R M E D

.