1 

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-22-00392-CV

__________________

IN THE INTEREST OF K.R.K.-L.H.

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CV2016063

__________________________________________________________________

OPINION

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to

Karl (K.R.K.-L.H.), her twenty-three-month-old son.1 In the same 

proceeding, the trial court terminated the parental rights of B.H. Jr., 

Karl’s father, to Karl.2 

Mother raises two issues in the brief she filed to support her appeal. 

In issue one, Mother argues the trial court erred in admitting records into 

1To protect the identity of the minor, we use pseudonyms to refer to 

the child and the members of his family. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2). 

2B.H. Jr. and Mother were married. Unlike Mother, B.H. Jr. didn’t 

appeal from the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights. 
2

evidence during the trial, which the Department of Family and Protective 

Services used to prove Mother tested positive for illicit drugs on several 

drug tests proven up with a business records affidavit signed by a records 

custodian employed by the Texas Alcohol Drug and Testing Service. In 

issue two, Mother argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient 

to support the trial court’s finding that terminating her parent-child 

relationship with her child is in Karl’s best interest. Because we conclude 

Mother’s issues lack merit, we will affirm.

Background

Karl was born in March 2020. Four days later, Tyiesha Justice, an 

investigator employed by the Department of Family and Protective 

Services, Child Protective Services Division, received a report that there 

was “Neglectful Supervision of [Karl] by his mother[.]” Justice found Karl 

in the hospital, but his mother was not there. Justice told the trial court 

that under the circumstances, she “took custody of the child and placed 

the child in foster care.” 

A few days later, Justice located Mother in Santa Maria, a rehab 

facility in Harris County. When Justice met Mother there, she told 

Justice that she had been using meth since she had been eighteen-years 
3

old. Mother, however, denied having using drugs in the past six months. 

But Mother then contradicted herself, as according to Justice, Mother 

told her she had eaten “methamphetamines so that she [could be]

accepted into the program. And then she also admitted that she had 

taken four opiate pills to relieve some pain, some like back pain issues 

that she was having while she was pregnant.” 

Hair samples, which Mother submitted to the Department for 

testing on April 6, 2020, tested positive for meth. When the Department 

got the results ofthe testthe next day, it sued Mother and B.H. Jr. (Karl’s 

father), seeking to protect Karl by establishing a conservatorship and to 

terminate the existing parent-child relationships between Karl and his 

parents. When the Department filed suit, it already had open cases 

against Mother involving two of her other children, Bobby and Lacy. In 

September 2020, just five months after launching the formal proceedings 

that led to the order terminating Mother’s parental rights to Karl, the 

253rd District Court of Liberty County signed a final order terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Bobby and Lacy. 

Turning to the evidence Mother complains about in the trial of the 

case at issue here, Mother’s evidentiary objections focus on the trial 
4

court’s ruling admitting Exhibit H. Exhibit H contains the results of the 

testing done on urine and breath specimens that Mother submitted for 

testing at the Department’s request. The following chart, which we have 

prepared, summarizes the results of the tests in date order:

The testimony the trial court heard about Mother’s drug use, 

however, was not restricted to the information in Exhibit H. Eleven

witnesses testified in a hearing before an associate judge. That hearing 

ended when the associate judge signed an order terminating Mother’s 

Date Specimen Result

April 2020 Urine Neg.

April 2020 Hair Pos./Meth.

June 2020 Urine Neg. 

June 2020 Hair Neg. 

December 2020 Hair Pos./Meth.

December 2020 Urine Neg. 

January 2021 Urine Pos./Barbiturates, 

Benzodiazepines

March 2021 Urine Neg
5

and Father’s parental rights to Karl. The witnesses who testified in the 

hearing before the associate judge were: (1) Mother; (2) the investigator 

employed by the Department in charge of the investigation the 

Department conducted in Karl’s case, Tyiesha Justice; (3) the custodian 

of records for the Harris County Hospital District, Jacqueline Jefferson;

(4) Tina, an adoptive parent of another of Mother’s daughters, Ruth; (5)

Carole Karachiwala, a caseworker formerly employed by Child Protective 

Services (the caseworker assigned by the Department to work on the 

cases that involved Bobby and Lacy); (6) Mary, Tina’s daughter, whom 

the trial court named in the order terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to be one of Karl’s joint managing conservators; (7) John—Mary’s 

husband—whom the trial court named as Karl’s other joint managing 

conservator; (8) Karl’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA); (9)

Traci McMurtry, Mother’s recovery coach; (10)Sarah Cross, who testified 

she lives in a house near the house where Mother was living when the 

hearing before the associate judge occurred, and who testified that 

Mother lives with a man named Wade Morgan; and (11) Brenda, Karl’s 

maternal grandmother, who testified that she is currently responsible for 

taking care of four children in her one-bedroom home and that she knows
6

Wade Morgan, but she doesn’t believe it would be appropriate to have 

children in his presence. 

Importantly, we note that in this appeal Mother hasn’t challenged

the trial court’s findings of condition endangerment, conduct 

endangerment, or its finding that her parent-child relationship had been 

terminated in a prior proceeding on grounds of endangering a child.3

Instead, Mother argues the evidence is insufficient to support the trial 

court’s best-interest finding, pointing to her testimony that she “has been 

clean since May 2019.” 

To support her argumentthat the trial court’s best-interest finding 

is not supported by sufficient evidence, Mother points to the parts of her 

family service plan that she completed, suggesting the trial court should 

have relied on her testimony rather than the evidence presented by the 

Department in determining whether allowing her to retain her rights to 

Karl would be in Karl’s bestinterest. As Mother would have it, the trial 

court should have believed her testimony that she now has the skills she 

needs to “keep going to church and keep going to classes[,] I mean, going 

3See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (condition 

endangerment), (E) (conduct endangerment), (M) (had her parent-child 

relationship terminated on an endangerment finding as to another child).
7

to work and just carrying a good lifestyle for me and my son.” In the 

Department’s view, however, Mother’s longstanding history with the 

Department, a history that involves a prolonged substance abuse history 

involving methamphetamines, makes Mother unsuitable to parent a 

child. 

At trial, the Department established that Mother’s parental rights 

to Ruth, Bobby, and Lacy had been terminated in prior proceedings 

through two court orders. Copies of the orders terminating Mother’s 

rights in those proceedings were admitted as exhibits in the proceeding 

involvingKarl. As to Ruth, the order terminating Mother’s rights shows

the court terminated Mother’s parental rights in that proceeding on 

predicate findings of abandonment, conduct endangerment, and for 

failing to support Ruth.4 And as to Bobby and Lacy, the order reflects 

Mother’s rights were terminated on two predicate grounds, her failure to 

comply with her family service plan and a finding that her rights had 

4The trial court’s order in the suit that involved terminating 

Mother’s rights to Ruth, which was admitted into evidence in the trial of 

the proceeding that involves Mother’s rights over Karl, shows that 

Mother was served with citation in the suit to terminate her parental 

rights to Ruth but that she never appeared. 
8

been terminated on grounds of endangerment in a prior case that 

involved another child.

As mentioned, Tina was one of the witnesses who testified in the 

hearing conducted before the associate judge.Tina explained that she is 

Karl’s father’s aunt (Karl’s great aunt). According to Tina, Ruth was 

placed in her care after the Department (Child Protective Services) 

removed Ruth from Mother’s and Father’s home. Tina added that after 

Mother’s rights to Ruth were terminated, she sought to adopt Ruth. 

According to Tina, when the adoption case was going to court, Mother 

threatened her and made terroristic threats. Tina explained that 

currently, Karl is living in the home of her daughter (Mary) based on his 

placement.Tina explained that one of the advantages of that placement 

is that Karl gets to see Ruth (his sister) at Mary’s home every day. Tina 

added that Karl and Ruth appear bonded, “love each other[,] and [t]hey 

play hard.”

Carole Karachiwala, the Department’s caseworker, developed a 

family service plan for Mother in Karl’s case. The plan required a drug 

and alcohol evaluation. At trial, Mother admitted having used “illegal 

drugs” during her pregnancy with Karl, claiming she did so to be 
9

admitted into the facility at Santa Maria Hostel so she could be “stable 

enough to take care of my son.” Even though Mother testified the Santa 

Maria Hostel required a failed drug test as a condition to admission, its 

former employee Tracy McMurtry (Mother’s recovery coach at Santa 

Maria) testified that “you have to be positive to get into detox services, 

but not . . . just to get into treatment.” 

The trial court heard testimony that Mother went into treatment 

programs many times but never successfully completed a program.

Mother’s own testimony confirmed she didn’t complete a drug-treatment 

program, as she testified in the hearing conducted by the associate judge 

that she was kicked out of the facilities she attended. Even so, Mother 

also testified in that hearing that she had maintained her sobriety and 

been free from drugs from a period of twelve to eighteen months. 

The Department’s caseworker, Karachiwala, testified that in her 

time with the Department, Mother failed to comply with requests for 

drug screens “twice a month every month, from June of 2019 until April 

[2021].” Other witnesses —Tina, Mary, John, and the CASA — told the 

trial court that they believed that Mother was still using drugs. 
10

The evidence in the trial also shows that Mother moved often

during the time Karl’s case was pending on the trial court’s docket. In the 

eighteen months the case was on the docket, Mother lived at the Santa 

Maria Hostel, with her mother Brenda, in several hotels, at the Brazos 

Place (another rehab facility), at a Christian-based facility in Hitchcock,

and at a residence on K Street. As to the K Street residence, Mother 

testified she leased the residence with money she received on loan from 

“an 80-year-old retired CPA,” whom Mother described as a close friend. 

During the hearing before the associate judge, Mother admitted she 

was friends with a registered sex offender named Wade Morgan.Mother, 

however, denied that she and Wade Morgan were romantically involved, 

Mother told the trial court that she could keep Karl away from Morgan. 

But there was other testimony in the trial contradicting Mother’s account 

about her relationship with Morgan. According to Tina, Karl’s father 

(Mother’s husband) told her that Mother and Morgan “were in a romantic 

relationship.” And Sara Cross, Mother’s neighbor, testified that Mother 

introduced Wade to her as her husband. Cross added that she had seen 

children at Mother’s residence when Wade was there.
11

The evidence before the associate judge included testimony relevant 

to Karl’s current placement with his foster parents and his development, 

as the associate judge heard evidence that Karl has bonded with Mary 

and John. The testimony shows that Karl has been in the placement with 

Mary and John for about a year. Mary described Karl as a “very funny, 

happy baby. He’s silly, he’s smart, he’s sweet, he’s just great.” According 

to Mary, Karl is meeting his developmental milestones. John testified

that Karl is “very much” thriving in their home. Both Mary and John 

testified they were bonded with Karl; for instance John described his 

bond with Karl as “[l]ike he’s my own.” Mary and John added that they 

have the resources, support, and ability to provide Karl a safe, stable 

home. 

Mary and John asked the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. The CASA recommended Mother’s rights should be terminated 

too, citing Mother’s instability, lack of support, lack of financial stability,

and association with a registered sex offender. The CASA stated she had 

no concerns about Mary’s and John’s ability to meet Karl’s needs.

Karachiwala (the Department’s caseworker)testified that in her opinion, 
12

it was in Karl’s best interest for the court to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights. 

On the other hand, Mother asked the court to return Karl to her.

She told the court that she has a room for Karl, which is ready for him in 

her home. As to her plans for Karl, she plans to put him in daycare or 

with Brenda (her mother who is caring for four other children in a onebedroom home) when she’s at work. Mother claimed to have family, 

friends, and members of a church who would help support her. 

At the end of the trial before the associate judge, the associate judge 

signed an order terminating the parent-child relationship between 

Mother, Father, and their son Karl. Then, Mother requested a de novo 

hearing in the referring court, complaining about that ruling made by the 

associate judge.5 Mother requested the de novo hearing on two issues: (1) 

“Termination of [Mother’s] parental rights;” and (2) “the Appointment of 

[Mary] and [John] as joint managing conservators.”

5See id. § 201.15(a). The court that referred the case to the associate 

judge was the 253rd District Court of Liberty County, Texas. After 

Mother filed her request for a de novo hearing, the case was transferred

from the 253rd District Court to the Liberty County Court at Law 

Number 2. No one has challenged the validity of the order signed by 

Judge Thomas Chambers on November 16th ordering the case 

transferred to the Liberty County Court at Law Number 2. 
13

The County Court at Law Number 2 conducted the de novo hearing 

in February 2022. The judge advised the parties that it would consider 

the Reporter’s Record from the hearing conducted by the associate judge

in its review. Mother also asked the judge to allow her to call one witness, 

Stephanie Cole, in the de novo hearing. The trial court agreed it would 

allow Mother to call Cole. While Cole didn’t testify in the hearing before 

the associate judge, she is the person who signed the affidavit for the 

Texas Alcohol and Drug Testing Service as the custodian of the business 

records, the records that were marked and admitted as Exhibit H during 

the initial hearing. 

Turning to testimony of the additional witness in the de novo 

hearing, Cole testified she works for the Texas Alcohol and Drug Testing 

Service (TADTS) as its custodian of records.6 She explained she is the 

person who signed her name to the affidavit attached to the records in 

the exhibit marked as Exhibit H. Cole agreed that she could not testify 

to the exact chain of custody for the drug test results in the TADTS’s

6Cole’s affidavit reflects the name of the business is Texas Alcohol 

& Drug Testing Service, Inc. 
14

records, however, because she only keeps track of the records and does 

not collect the biological specimens, which TADTS tests.

According to Cole, the actual testing of the biological samples is 

performed by an outside lab, Quest Diagnostics, which is not part of the 

TADTS’s facility. The outside lab is responsible for calibrating their 

equipment, and Cole agreed that she cannot attest to the machines that 

Quest uses or the accuracy of Quest’s machines. Cole agreed that she 

could not testify about the qualifications of the persons at Quest who had 

performed the tests on Mother’s biological specimens. As the custodian of 

TADTS’s records, Cole explained, she was testifying that the records 

attached to Exhibit H are the records TADTS’s keeps in the normal 

course of its business. 

In closing argument, Mother’s attorney argued that Exhibit H was 

inadmissible “as hearsay and there’s a lack of proper foundation . . . 

[because Cole] was not qualified to testify as to the standard of testing, 

the qualification of these people who administer the test, the type of test.” 

Mother’s attorney agreed that Mother was not claiming Exhibit H is not 

a business record;instead, she explained she was objecting to Exhibit H 
15

because the Department (according to Mother’s lawyer) had not shown 

the drug test results in the records are reliable. 

Nine months later and after the trial court overruled Mother’s 

objection to Exhibit H, the County Court at Law Number 2 signed a final 

order terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Karl. The 

trial court’s final order terminates Mother’s parental rights on the 

predicate grounds of condition endangerment, conduct endangerment, 

and a finding that she had her parent-child relationship terminated in a 

prior case for having endangered another child.7 The trial court also 

found that terminating Mother’s parental rights to Karl is in Karl’s best 

interest.8 In the final order, the trial court appointed Mary and John as

Karl’s joint managing conservators.

Standard of Review

Mother’s first issue challenges the trial court’s ruling admitting 

Exhibit H. On appeal, a trial court’s ruling to admit or exclude evidence 

7See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M). B.H. Jr.’s (Father) rights were 

also terminated by the trial court’s final order. But B.H. Jr. neither 

appealed from the trial court’s final order, nor did he request a de novo 

hearing from the associate judge’s order. Both orders terminate B.H. Jr.’s 

parental rights to Karl.

8Id. § 161.001(b)(2). 
16

is reviewed for abuse of discretion.9 A trial court abuses its discretion 

when it acts without regard to the guiding rules or principles governing 

the admission of evidence, or if its decision to admit or exclude evidence

is shown to have been arbitrary or unreasonable.10

In Mother’s second issue, Mother argues the trial court’s bestinterest finding is not supported by sufficient evidence. In a suit filed by 

the Department to terminate the parent-child relationship, the 

Department must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that 

terminating the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best interest.11

As defined by the Family Code, clear and convincing evidence “means the 

measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of 

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to 

be established.”12 When the parties try a case to the bench, the trial court 

is the factfinder and decides which witnesses were credible, how much 

weight to give to each witness’s testimony, and it resolves any 

9In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005).

10See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 

(Tex. 1998); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-

42 (Tex. 1985).

11Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007. 12Id. 
17

inconsistencies or conflicts in the evidence admitted before it in the 

trial.13

Under a legal-sufficiency review, we determine whether “a 

reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that 

its finding was true.”14 In reviewing the evidence, we “look at all the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding,” “assume that the 

factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable 

factfinder could do so,” and “disregard all evidence that a reasonable 

factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”15 In 

conducting our review, we will not disregard “undisputed facts that do 

not support the finding” a party has challenged in the appeal.16 When 

deciding whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief 

or conviction that the evidence supports a finding, we defer to the 

factfinder’s role as the “sole arbiter of the witnesses’ credibility and 

13In the Int. of D.P., No. 09-22-00480-CV, 2022 WL 2975691, at *7 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont July 28, 2022, pet. denied).

14In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). 15Id. 16Id. 
18

demeanor” when the inferences it drew from the evidence before it were 

reasonable.17 

In a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due deference” to the 

findings that depend on the direct and circumstantial evidence admitted 

before the factfinder in the trial.18 Under a factual sufficiency review, the 

question we must decide is not what we would have found from the 

evidence in the trial had we been the factfinders in the trial.19 Instead,

the question is whether from the evidence as a whole the factfinder could 

“reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the 

[Department’s] allegations.”20

To support her argument that the evidence is factually insufficient 

to support the trial court’s best-interest finding, Mother needed to 

explain why the evidence in the trial did not allow the trial court to infer 

that terminating her parental rights to Karl is in his best interest.21

When we review the evidence the trial court considered, we will not find 

17In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021); see In re J.W., 645 

S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). 18In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006)(cleaned up).

19Id. 20See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). 21See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.
19

the evidence factually insufficient to support the best-interest finding 

Mother has challenged unless “in light of the entire record” and the 

evidence the trial court “could not have credited in favor of the finding is 

so significant” that the trial court “could not reasonably have formed a 

firm belief or conviction” favoring the finding that it made.22

In evaluating the factors that a trial court considers in reaching a 

best-interest finding, the inquiry is necessarily child-centered and 

focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and development.23 Generally, 

when examining the evidence supporting the finding, we compare the 

evidence admitted in a trial against the nonexclusive factors the Texas 

Supreme Court identified in Holley v. Adams.24 Still, the factors 

mentioned in Holley aren’t exclusive, and the evidence tied to a 

factfinder’s normal decision-making process in determining what’s in a 

child’s best interest need not include evidence addressing all eight Holley

factors.25

22Id. at 267. 

23See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). 24See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). 25In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 (noting the lack of evidence on some 

Holley factors “would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming 

a strong belief or conviction that termination is in the child’s best 

interest”).
20

As a result, when probative, evidence on one of the more than 

twenty-one predicate grounds for terminating a parent’s rights may 

reinforce a trial court’s best-interest finding.26 That’s often the case when 

the trial court is acting as the factfinder and has found the parent 

endangered the child.27 As then Chief Justice Jefferson writing for the 

Texas Supreme Court explained in In re C.H.: “The absence of evidence 

about some of these considerations would not preclude a factfinder from 

reasonably forming a strong conviction or belief that termination is in the 

child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the 

parental relationship endangered the safety of the child.”28

Analysis

The Ruling to Admit Exhibit H

On appeal, Mother argues thatthe trial court abused its discretion 

in admitting Exhibit H because the exhibit contains “drug test results 

without anyone to testify” about the “qualification[s] of the tester, the 

equipment used, and the testing procedures amounted to an abuse of 

discretion.”

26Id. at 27-28.

27Id. at 27. 

28Id. 
21

The lab reports that Quest sent to the TADTS are among the 

records in Exhibit H. Some are positive for the presence of meth. Quest’s 

reports are tied to specimens that TADTS collected from Mother and then 

submitted and processed at Quest’s “DHHS CERTIFIED 

LABORATORY,”based on the information found within Quest’s reports

While Quest’s lab reports do not include a definition of the term 

“DHHS Certified Laboratory,” all the Quest reports show that Mother’s 

samples were tested in a DHHS Certified Lab.29 When the trial court 

ruled on Mother’s objection to Exhibit H, we assume the trial court 

noticed that fact, and that the trial court also would have known that 

“DHHS” stood for the Department of Health and Human Services. A

DHHS Certified Lab subject to the Department of Health and Human 

Services’ certification program for drug testing involves entities and 

individuals engaged in interstate commerce subject to federal law.30 We 

presume the trial court knew what the meanings of the terms were in the 

29Cole was also not asked to address whether she knew what a 

DHHS Certified Lab was when she testified in the de novo hearing. 

30See 49 C.F.R. pt. 40 (Procedures for Transportation Workplace 

Drug and Alcohol Testing Programs); see also 49 C.F.R. § 49.81 (What 

laboratories may be used for DOT drug testing).
22

drug testing records and applied them when deciding whether the 

records should be admitted into evidence in the trial.31

The evidence that the lab results came from a DHHS certified lab 

is circumstantial proof that shows the lab that tested Mother’s drug 

samples was certified to test for five classes of drugs, including 

amphetamines like meth.32 DHHS certified labs are also required to run 

tests to determine the validity of the tests they perform in their labs.33

In addition to the Quest Lab reports, Exhibit H includes reports 

signed by Dr. David Nahin interpreting the results of the testing on 

Mother’s specimens. Dr. Nahin’s reports reflect that he is a “Certified 

Medical Review Officer.” Even though the term Certified Medical Review 

Officer (MRO) is not defined in Dr. Nahin’s report, we presume that the 

31Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (“Trial judges are 

presumed to know the law and to apply it making their decisions.”), 

overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 584, 589 (2002); 

Ellis v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, No. 02-19-00224-CV, 2021 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 327, at *14 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied) (“Absent 

conclusions of law to the contrary, we presume the trial court knew and 

correctly applied the law to the facts.”); Buckeye Ret. Co., L.L.C. v. Bank 

of Am., N.A., 239 S.W.3d 394, 402 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) 

(“Further, we presume the trial court knew and correctly applied the law 

regarding spoliation and determined that if the presumption applied, it 

was overcome by the evidence.”). 3249 C.F.R. § 40.85(c).

3349 C.F.R. §§ 40.89, .91.
23

trial court would have known that federal law requires an MRO to be a 

licensed physician and to have training in collection procedures for urine 

specimens, chain of custody, reporting, recordkeeping, interpretation of 

drug and validity of test results, and the role and responsibilities of the 

MRO in the Department of Transportation drug testing program.34

The Department introduced Exhibit H under Texas Rule of 

Evidence 902(10) as business records accompanied by a business records 

affidavit. Under that rule, records are self authenticating if the original 

or copy of the records attached to the affidavit meet the requirements of 

the business exceptions rule, Texas Rule of Evidence 803(6).35 On appeal, 

Mother points to no defects in the business records affidavit signed by 

Stephanie Cole. Boiled down, Mother’s argument is whether the 

Department proved the results of her drug tests, shown in the reports 

attached to Cole’s affidavit, are reliable. Mother has not argued or 

claimed the reports attached to Cole’s affidavit are not authentic. 

That said, once the Department established the records were 

authentic, which Mother doesn’t dispute, the burden of proof shifted to 

3449 C.F.R. § 40.121 (Who is qualified to act as an MRO?).

35Tex. R. Evid. 902(10); id. 803(6). 
24

Mother under the business records exception to prove the source of the 

information,the method the records were prepared, or the circumstances 

behind them “indicate[d] a lack of trustworthiness.”36 Mother didn’t call 

any witnesses to meet her burden. She doesn’t point out any problems 

with the records themselves, for example by explaining how a drug test 

in a given report was internally inconsistent with the other parts of the 

report. Instead, what she claims is that after the Department presented 

the trial court with authentic certified records of Mother’s drug test 

results the Department should have done more to prove the results were 

accurate. But Mother’s problem is that once the records are proven to be 

authentic, the burden shifted to her to establish the records were 

untrustworthy. 

We have no such evidence the records are not trustworthy here. For 

example, there is no testimony in the record showing:(1) the testers who 

performed the tests were not qualified;(2) the equipment used to perform 

the tests provided the individual who performed them with less than 

accurate results; (3) the individuals who performed the tests were not 

properly trained to perform the tests; or (4) the individuals who 

36Id. 803(6)(D).
25

performed the tests reflected in the reports failed to follow the proper 

testing procedures when they performed the tests that are reported.

37

Instead, the only evidence before us about the source of the reports comes 

from Stephanie Cole, whose testimony shows the records were made, 

kept and maintained as business records of the Texas Alcohol and Drug 

Testing Service, and there is nothing in Cole’s testimony that shows

Mother’s biological specimens were gathered, sampled, or tested

improperly. As Cole told the trial court in the de novo hearing, “[t]he only 

thing I do is I pull records and keep track of records. That’s all I do.” 

Of course, had Mother wanted to understand how the samples were 

gathered and the testing performed, she could have taken the deposition 

or subpoenaed Dr. David Nahin for the trial. His name is on the reports, 

so Mother knew he was the MRO and was on notice that he is the person 

who had the training and qualifications required to provide the answers 

to her questions about the chain of custody procedures followed by 

TADTS. But once the Department met its burden by establishing that 

records it wanted to introduce met the business records exception of Rule 

37Id. 803(6) (providing that records of regularly conducted activities 

—often called business records — are “not excluded by the rule against 

hearsay regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness”). 
26

803(6)(A-D), the burden under Rule 803(6)(A-D) shifted to Mother as the 

party opposing the admission of the records to show the information in

TADTS’s records was untrustworthy. 

We conclude the Department’s business records affidavit complied 

with Rule 803(6)(A-D). We further conclude Mother failed to meet her 

burden of introducing evidence rebutting the prima facie evidence 

presented by the Department through its records custodian that the 

Quest records were authentic, and that they were created and 

maintained in the regular course of business.38 Accordingly, Mother 

failed to introduce evidence sufficient to demonstrate the source of the 

information or the method or circumstances of preparing the reports 

indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 

Last, we note we have rejected similar arguments on claims about 

similar drug-testing records three times in the past twenty-seven

months. Mother failed to cite or distinguish these cases in her brief.39

Mother’s first issue is overruled. 

38Id. 803(6)(E).

39In re S.J., No. 09-22-00305-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 513, at *39 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 26, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting DHHS Certified lab 

reports, which were accompanied by business-records affidavits); In re 
27

The Best Interest Finding

In Mother’s second and last issue, Mother seeks to overturn the 

trial court’s best-interest finding. That said, Mother hasn’t challenged 

the trial court’s predicate findings that she engaged in conduct that 

endangered Karl, allowed him to remain in conditions or surroundings 

that endangered him, and that she had her parent-child relationship 

with another child terminated in another case on a finding that she had 

endangered that child.40 Instead, she argues the evidence is insufficient 

O.G.H.D., No. 09-21-00172-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 8002, at *21-23

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding no 

abuse of discretion occurred in admitting DHHS Certified lab report of 

drug testing based on business-records affidavit of the Texas Alcohol and 

Drug Testing Service); In re J.N.P., No. 09-20-00245-CV, 2021 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 1827, at *21-22 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting drug testing records maintained by the Texas Alcohol and 

Drug Testing Service as business records because the trial court “could 

have concluded that the affidavit by the custodian of records for the 

[business] was sufficient for the business-records exception”). 

We note the attorney who represented Mother on appeal was not 

one of the attorneys involved in the above three cases. Still, we would be 

remiss were we not to mention that we expect that appellate lawyers,

when briefing their arguments, to “advise the Court of controlling legal 

authorities, including those adverse to their position[.]”

https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1437423/standards-for-appellateconduct.pdf (Texas Supreme Court, Standards for Appellate Conduct, 

Lawyers’ Duties to the Court).

40See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); id. 161.001(b)1)(D),(E), 

(M).
28

to overcome the presumption under the Family Code that appointing her 

child’s joint-managing conservator is in the child’s best interest.41

To support her argumentthat now, she is free from what has been 

a repeated historical pattern of drug-use involving meth, Mother relies 

on her own testimony that she acquired the skills she needs to overcome 

her methamphetamine abuse problem that has plagued her in the past. 

Mother suggests the associate judge and the trial court should have 

believed her when she testified that “May 20, 2019 was the last time” she 

“did any type of drugs[.]” Mother adds that in evaluating her testimony, 

the factfinder in the hearing should have believed her testimony when 

she said she intends to maintain “a good lifestyle for me and my son[,]”

and when she testified that after Kyle’s birth, she had attended drug and 

alcohol assessments, a psychiatric evaluation, drug evaluations, 

individual counseling, and a parenting course. Yet the only exhibits 

Mother introduced supporting her claim that she completed counseling 

consists of a certificate showing she completed a four hour parenting 

education and stabilization course and an AA/NA attendance log, a 

41Id. § 153.131(b); see also In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 

2006)(nothing that a “strong presumption” exists in keeping a child with 

its parents). 
29

document that Mother claims shows she attended AA/NA meetings in a 

four-month period between June and September 2021.42

As mentioned, the trial court’s findings that Mother endangered 

Karl are undisputed. In her brief, Mother hasn’t explained why the trial 

court’s endangerment findings alone aren’t sufficient to support the trial 

court’s finding that terminating her parental rights to Karl is in Karl’s 

best interest. While we could stop there and affirm the trial court’s order, 

we note that in deciding whether it would serve Karl’s best interest to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights and appoint Mary and John as Karl’s 

joint-managing conservators, the trial court had a right to considerpast 

conduct toward her other children and toward Karl.43

As to Mother’s other children, Mother provided the Court with no 

argument to explain why the associate judge and the judge that 

conducted the trial de novo could not have reasonably inferred that when 

Karl was born, Mother had a ten-year history of using illicit drugs. As to 

Karl and based on the drug test results in Exhibit H, the evidence before 

42Even though Mother testified she attended the AA/NA meetings

between June and September, nothing in the log the AA/NA group kept 

for the meetings contains Mother’s name or verifies Mother’s attendance. 43See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28. 
30

us shows that it was reasonable for a factfinder to infer that after Karl

was born and Mother knew her parental rights to him were at stake, 

Mother still chose to keep using meth. The tests in the record show that 

Mother tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, 

barbiturates, and benzodiazepines after the Department removed Karl 

from Mother’s care. As the factfinder, the trial court also had the right to 

conclude that Mother never successfully completed a drug rehabilitation 

program since Mother never provided the trial court with any objective 

evidence of completing outpatient or inpatient treatment and agreed that 

she enrolled in and failed to complete rehab in three programs. Even if 

the trial court believed Mother’s conduct had improved after Karl’s birth, 

the trial court was not required to weigh the evidence Mother presented 

of her recently improved conduct more heavily than the evidence it heard 

about her parenting abilities from the time she was eighteen, as that 

history shows she had a longstanding and untreated drug problem that 

had already led to the termination of her parental rights to three children

before Karl.44

44See Interest of J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 

89 S.W.3d at 28.
31

Finally, the trial court was also entitled to consider Mother’s plan—

to have Karl live with her and her mother, who was responsible for the 

care of four children in a one bedroom home—as compared to the plans 

of the Department, which was to allow Karl to remain in his current 

placement in a foster home.The trial court heard testimony that Karl is 

living with Mary and John, his foster parents, who are meeting his 

physical and emotional needs. The foster parents testified they wanted

to adopt Karl. Karachiwala (the Department’s caseworker), the CASA, 

and Mary, offered opinions that terminating Mother’s parental rights 

would be in Karl’s best interest. Finally John, describing his bond with 

Karl, testified: “Like he’s my own[,]” and that if Mother’s and Father’s 

rights to Karl were terminated, he intended “[v]ery soon” to proceed with 

the proceedings that were required to adopt Karl as his son. 

To sum it up: Mother’s argument focuses on the presumption 

created by the Family Code that allowing a child to remain with its 

parent is in the child’s best interest. Yet it is equally presumed that “the 

prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment. . . 

is in the child’s best interest.”45 Given Mother’s historical use of an illegal 

45Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a). 
32

substance and the fact the record contains little evidence other than 

Mother’s belief that she has gained an awareness that her problem is 

serious, the trial court could reasonably infer that even if Mother’s drug 

use is now in temporary remission, her addiction creates a condition that 

makes terminating her parental rights to Karl so that he may have a 

prompt and permanent placement in his best interest.

Because the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support 

the trial court’s best-interest finding, we overrule Mother’s second issue.

Conclusion

First, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting records maintained in the regular course of business by the 

Texas Alcohol and Drug Testing Service under the business records 

exception to the hearsay rule. Next, we hold the evidence is legally and 

factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. For 

the reasons explained above, the trial court’s Order in Trial Court Cause 

Number CV2016063 terminating Mother’s parent-child relationship is 

AFFIRMED. _________________________

HOLLIS HORTON

Justice

Submitted on March 2, 2023

Opinion Delivered May 25, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.