[Cite as State v. Felson, 2023-Ohio-3071.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

EDWARD FELSON,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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APPEAL NO. C-220559

TRIAL NO. 22CRB-17254

 O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 1, 2023

Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, 

and Danielle Ferris, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Edward Felson, pro se.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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BERGERON, Presiding Judge.

{¶1} During a hearing regarding his client’s failure to comply with discovery

requests, the trial court held defendant-appellant Edward Felson in direct criminal 

contempt after an outburst in which he voiced displeasure with the court’s ruling that 

held him accountable, jointly and severally, with his client for attorney’s fees. Mr. 

Felson was ultimately ordered to pay a $250 fine at the show cause hearing that 

followed. He now appeals, insisting that the trial court erred by finding him in 

contempt and endeavoring to minimize the significance of his actions. After reviewing 

the record, however, we find his argument unpersuasive and affirm the trial court’s 

judgment.

I.

{¶2} In September 2022, Mr. Felson appeared before the trial court to defend 

his client in a sanctions hearing concerning his client’s failure to comply with discovery

requests. Having just returned from a three-week international vacation the night 

before, Mr. Felson professed that he had not yet read the opposing party’s motion filed 

during his vacation thanks to poor internet connections abroad. He accordingly

requested more time to review the motion, offering up a week as a suitable time-period

to analyze the 55-page motion. The court, however, granted him only a five-minute 

recess before proceeding with the hearing.

{¶3} Prior to this September hearing, the trial court had admonished Mr. 

Felson twice before at two separate hearings, once for interrupting and being 

dismissive of the court, and a second time for making unwarranted attacks against 

opposing counsel. These admonishments did not have their intended effect, as Mr. 
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Felson interrupted or spoke out of turn during the September hearing at least eight 

different times, interrupting both opposing counsel and the trial court judge.

{¶4} As the hearing wound down, the trial court ultimately found Mr. Felson 

and his client jointly and severally liable for sanctions related to discovery 

improprieties. The following exchange then prompted the contempt finding:

The Court: Defense Counsel, Edward J. Felson, is jointly and severally 

liable for the $15,351 –

Mr. Felson: Aw, Judge, you can’t do that.

The Court: -- and the total fee.

Mr. Felson: That’s ridiculous. Come on, Judge. Really? 

The Court: Mr. Felson, you’re now in contempt. You’re now in 

contempt, sir. That’s totally disrespectful. You’ll be down here for a 

hearing of show cause.

{¶5} At the subsequent show cause hearing, Mr. Felson insisted that he did 

not harbor any contemptuous feelings towards the court, suggesting that the contempt 

charge stemmed from the court’s personal dislike of him. The court responded that 

Mr. Felson was cited for contempt “based on [his] lack of respect for the court and 

discourteous treatment.” The court also discussed previous (unheeded) warnings that 

Mr. Felson had received concerning his conduct. The court ordered him to pay a $250 

fine, leading to this appeal. 

II.

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Felson argues that the trial court 

erred in finding him in direct criminal contempt. He insists that his allegedly 

contumacious comments—saying, “That’s ridiculous. Come on, Judge,”—were made 
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at the end of the hearing and did not obstruct the administration of justice to a level

that would warrant finding him in contempt. The state responds that the frequency of 

Mr. Felson’s interruptions during the hearing and the content of his final 

interruption—which challenged the court’s authority to impose sanctions—elevated 

the conduct to a contemptuous level. 

{¶7} Appellate courts in Ohio “review a trial court’s contempt sanction under 

an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Heekin v. Silver Rule Masonry, Inc., 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-100585, 2011-Ohio-2775, ¶ 10. “An abuse of discretion connotes more 

than a mere error of judgment; rather, ‘it implies that the court’s attitude is arbitrary, 

unreasonable, or unconscionable.’ ” Hayes v. Durrani, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C190617, 2021-Ohio- 725, ¶ 8, quoting Boolchand v. Boolchand, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. 

C-200111 and C-200120, 2020-Ohio-6951, ¶ 9. An abuse of discretion occurs when “a 

court exercis[es] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over 

which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-

Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35.

{¶8} The trial court held Mr. Felson in direct criminal contempt. “Direct 

contempt is misbehavior that is committed in the presence of the court in its judicial 

function, and that obstructs the due and orderly administration of justice.” State v. 

Webster, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-070027 and C-070028, 2008-Ohio-1636, ¶ 56, 

citing R.C. 2705.01, and In re Lands, 146 Ohio St. 589, 595, 67 N.E.2d 433 (1946). 

“ ‘Criminal contempt * * * is usually characterized by an unconditional prison sentence 

or fine. Its sanctions are punitive in nature, designed to vindicate the authority of the 

court.’ ” State v. Hudson, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 157, 2011-Ohio-6424, ¶ 33, 
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quoting Denovchek v. Bd. of Trumbull Cty. Commrs., 36 Ohio St.3d 14, 16, 520 N.E.2d 

1362 (1988). 

{¶9} A court may punish a person for direct contempt when two conditions 

are met. “First, the judge must have personal knowledge of the disruptive conduct 

‘acquired by his own observation of the contemptuous conduct.’ ” State v. Stegall, 1st 

Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110767, C-120112 and C-120113, 2012-Ohio-3792, ¶ 40, quoting

In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948). No one disputes 

that Mr. Felson’s comments occurred before the judge, satisfying this requirement. 

“Second, the conduct must pose ‘an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court 

and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public’ 

that, if ‘not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority 

will follow.’ ” Id. 

{¶10} Contempt cannot be found when conduct simply offends the court’s 

sensibilities, but it must “pose an actual or imminent threat to the administration of 

justice.” Webster at ¶ 57, citing State v. Conliff, 61 Ohio App.2d 185, 189, 401 N.E.2d 

469 (10th Dist.1978). Judges should be careful not to become “personally embroiled” 

in a contempt hearing to the extent that there is “bias, or such a likelihood of bias or 

an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the balance between 

vindicating the interests of the court and the interests of the accused.” Ungar v. 

Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). 

{¶11} Mr. Felson compares his comments at the end of the sanction hearing 

to those at issue in Conliff and State v. Drake, 73 Ohio App.3d 640, 643-644, 598 

N.E.2d 115 (8th Dist.1991). In Conliff, a direct criminal contempt charge was reversed 

on appeal when the defendant asked the sentencing judge between hearings if the 
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judge was going to take his “pound of flesh” and sentence him. Conliff at 188. The 

appellate court in Conliff found that this statement, while offensive to the court’s 

sensibilities, did not rise to the level of contempt because the comment was singular, 

occurred off the record at the end of the proceeding, and did not “ ‘impede, embarrass 

or obstruct the court in the performance of its functions.’ ” Id. at 190, quoting In re 

Green, 172 Ohio St. 269, 175 N.E.2d 59 (1961), paragraph one of the syllabus. In 

Drake, a contempt conviction was similarly overturned when the defendant used 

profane language towards the judge as he was being led out of the courtroom after 

proceedings had concluded. Drake at 644. The Drake court found that the outburst, 

while rude and improper, did not pose an imminent threat to the administration of 

justice or disrupt the court proceedings. Id. 

{¶12} By contrast, the state likens Mr. Felson’s situation to that in Hudson, 

7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 157, 2011-Ohio-6424, at ¶ 40, where a contempt 

conviction was upheld when the court had issued a prior warning to the defendant. 

The trial court found the defendant in Hudson in contempt after he continued to talk 

during court proceedings after the court had instructed him to stop. Id. Though the 

defendant’s comments were not boisterous or derogatory in nature, the Hudson court

held his behavior was improper because his soliloquy interrupted proceedings and he 

continued talking even after the court ordered him to stop. Id. 

{¶13} Here, we find that Mr. Felson’s actions during the sanctions hearing are 

distinguishable from those in Conliff and Drake. First, the comments made by Mr. 

Felson were made on the record as the judge attempted to hand down his decision

(rather than after the fact). Furthermore, like Hudson, Mr. Felson had already been 

warned about interrupting both the court and opposing counsel numerous times both 
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during the hearing in question and in two prior hearings. And while the attorney in 

Hudson was held in contempt after a mere two interruptions, Mr. Felson interrupted 

eight times before the trial court intervened. See Hudson at ¶ 40. 

{¶14} Furthermore, we cannot focus myopically on Mr. Felson’s final 

comment: “That’s ridiculous. Come on Judge,”—which, admittedly, seemed to be the 

final straw for the trial court. We must take into consideration the full picture of the 

context of counsel’s behavior at the hearing as we have described above. We find that 

the nature of his interruptions, particularly his final comments, of telling the trial 

judge that “you can’t do that” and describing the court’s ultimate decision as 

“ridiculous,” called into question and undermined the nature of the trial court’s 

authority. In other words, his comments demonstrated an “ ‘open threat to the orderly 

procedure of the court.’ ” Stegall, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-110767, C-120112 and C120113, 2012-Ohio-3792, at ¶ 40, quoting Oliver, 333 U.S. at 275, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 

L.Ed. 682.

{¶15} Given the nature of Mr. Felson’s conduct, and the measured $250 fine 

that the court assessed, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding him in direct criminal contempt. We overrule Mr. Felson’s assignment of 

error.

* * *

{¶16} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Mr. Felson’s assignment 

of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Judgment affirmed.

BOCK and KINSLEY, JJ., concur.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

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Please note:

The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.