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D~fi~U11N TATENW

Appoved o Dktua _ for public .. uw m, mi.oa ti
El Salvador

at War

An Oral History of Conflict

from the 1979 Insurrection

to the Present

Edited by Max G. Manwaring

and Court Prisk

With a Preface by

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr

1988

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

WASHINGTON, DC

I
National Defense University Press Publications. To increase general knowledge and

inform discussion. NDU Press publibhes books on subjects relating to U.S. national

security. Each year, in this effort, The National Defense University, through the

Institute for National Strategic Studies, hosts about two dozen Senior Fellows who

engage in original research on national security issues. NDU Press publishes the best of

this research. In addition, the Press publishes especially timely or distinguished writing

on national security from authors outside the University. new editions of out-of-print

defense classics, and books based on conferences concerning national security affairs.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely

those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of The National Defense

University. the U.S. Southern Command, the Department of Defense, the Department

of State, or any other Government agency.

Portions of this publication are protected by copyright: "The People's Struggle." in

Foreign Policy 52 (Fall 1983); Duarte: My Story (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986); "El Salvador: Legitimizing the Government." in Current History. Inc. 84 (March 1985); Conversaciones con el Comandante Miguel Castellanos (Editorial Andante, 1986); The

Commandantes Speak: The Military Strategy of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, translated by Dr, Gabriel and Judith F. Marcella; and Revolution and Intervention in Central America (Synthesis Publications, 1983. now CM Associates).

Permission to reproduce copyrighted material contained in this publication must be

obtained directly from the copyright owner. Material that is not copyrighted may be

quoted or reprinted without permission. Please give full publication credit.

Photographs courtesy of Captain Steven Donehoo, U.S. Army. and Comit6 de Prensa de

las Fuerza Armada (COPREFA).

NDU publications are sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. For ordering information, call (202) 783-3238, or write to the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data.

El Salvador at war: an oral history/edited by Max G. Manwaring, Court Prisk.

p. cm.

$9.00 (est.)

I. El Salvador-Politics and government-1979- 2. Insurgency-El SalvadorHistory-2Oth century. 3. Military assistance. American-El Salvador-History-- 20th

century. 4. United States-Foreign relations-El Salvador. 5. El Salvador- Foreign

relations-United States. 6. Oral history.

i. Manwaring, Max G.

1I. Prisk. Court

F1488.3.E37 1988

972.84'053-dc19

88-18741

CIP

Proofread byEditorial Experts, Inc., Alexandria, Va.. under contract DAHC32-87-A0012.

First printing. December 1988
To those who read Das Kapital and raised the sounds of

warning. To those who read Mein Kampf and called the

democratic world to arms. To those who read Mao's

words, "Fight Fight, Talk Talk, Fight Fight," and told of

their threat.
Foreword

TO UNDERSTAND INSURGENT

conflict in the Third World, Americans must recognize the nature of

the struggle between totalitarianism and democracy. The insurgency in

El Salvador in the 1980s is not a mass movement, but a carefully

scripted strategy executed by an educated and disciplined elite. This

insurgent group is not in revolt against a government or its military,

per se. Rather it is reacting against corruption, racial and religious

discrimination, foreign intervention, and inability or unwillingness of

a government to protect and be responsible to the general population.

The revolutionary elite uses political, economic, and social grievances

as justification for its actions. This struggle between insurgent and

incumbent is over who has the moral right to govern. Such is the

probable nature of future conflict, and it is with that understanding that

any appropriate response must begin.

El Salvador at War is an oral history of the Salvadoran struggle.

In an illuminating departure from conventional histories of war, Max

Manwaring and Court Prisk trace the major contours of the conflict.

Their book tells what key individuals think about the war, what the

really important lessons are, and what the participants should have

learned. It is their perspective, their truth, recorded here-what a

number of the key participants see as historical fact and a basis for

action.

Studying the fundamental nature of insurgent conflict is key to

understanding this most prevalent form of twentieth-century

conventional war. In examining insurgent conflict, El Salvador at War

offers some new insights into our role in contemporary international

security.

BRADLEY C. HOSMER

LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U.S. AIR FORCE

PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DEFENSE

UNIVERSITY

I
Contents

Foreword ix

Preface by Ambassador Edwin G. Corr xxxiii

Acknowledgments xliii

Introduction xlv

Chronology xlix

PART I. EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

CHAPTER 1. PRONE TO VIOLENCE 5

No Strong Basis for Democracy 6

General John R. Galvin

A History of Minority Governments 7

Guillermo M. Ungo

Live With the System or Become Part of the

Fertilizer Program 8

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

The Political Spectrum 8

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

2. REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE ROLE

OF THE UNITED STATES 13

The People Are Sick and Tired of the System 14

General Jos Guillermo Garcia

A Breakdown of Political Consensus 16

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr

xi
xii CONTENTS

Time to Develop an Insurgent Cadre 17

Comandante Joaquin Villalobos

The People Will Decide Which Revolution 18

President Jose Napole6n Duarte

The Role of the United States 19

The United States Preached Democracy and

Human Rights But Did Little 21

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi

We Haven't Decided What or How Important

the Problem is to the United States 23

General Wallace H. Nutting

The Context of the War: Reconnaissance of the

Valley 24

PART II. IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO

OCTOBER 1981

CHAPTER 3. CURRENT CONFLICT AND THE COUP OF 15

OCTOBER 29

By 1979, the Situation Was Beyond Control by

Repression 29

Dr. Alvaro Magafia

Prelude to the Coup 30

General Jose Guillermo Garcia

The 15 October 1979 Coup: Unhinging the

Oligarchy's Power 32

Fermdn Cienfuegos

The Leadership Was in Limbo 33

General Fred F. Woerner

The United States Did Not Respond Effectively 35

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi

No One in Control 36

President Jose Napole6n Duarte

m m mmm 6 m m .'mm. mmmmm •• mm mmmmm •m •mmI
CONTENTS xiii

Agrarian Reform 36

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Human Rights Reform 37

President Josi Napole6n Duarte

The 13-15 August 1980 General Strike 38

Juan Chac6n

Murder, Assassination, and Death Squads 39

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial")

CHAPTER 4. PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND THE ARMY 41

We Had to Administer Reforms, But We Had

No Resources 42

General Jaime Abdul Gutiirrez

There Was No Real Unity in the Junta 46

President Josi Napole6n Duarte

The Major Weakness of the Junta Is the

Economic Situation 49

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial")

The First Junta Becomes Unglued 50

General Josi Guillermo Garcia

There Is No Leadership in the Junta 54

Fermdn Cienfuegos

The Condition of the Army 54

The Army Was Internally Fragmented 55

General Fred F. Woerner

The Army Was Divided 57

Dr. Alvaro Magaia

Colonel James J. Steele

The Contradictions within the Army Are

Intensifying 59

Fermdn Cienfuegos

Three Grave Deficiencies in the Armed Forces 60

General Jaime Abdul Gutiirrez

The Army Was without External Support 61

Colonel Ren# Emilio Ponce

I
xiv CONTENTS

9

CHAPTER 5. THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT

DISUNITY 63

The Insurgents Attempt to Take Advantage:

The "Final" Offensive 64-

Rafael Menjivar

The Army on the Defensive 67

Comnandante Joaquin Villalobos

No Way of Providing the Necessary Support 70

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar

The "Final" Offensive Convinced the United

4

States To Provide Support 71

General Wallace H. Nutting

Guerrillas Overestimate Mass Support and

Underestimate U.S. Support 72

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila

We Finally Began to See Signs of Hope 75

General Juan Rafael Bustillo

Insurgent Disunity 76

Fidel and Unity within the FMLN: San Vicente 77

Miguel Castellanos

We Did Not Have the Degree of Unity

Necessary 78

Comandante Joaquin Villalobos

Guerrilla Organizations 79

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Cspez Nuila

There Is Only One Road to Victory: Armed

Struggle 84

* Juan Chac~n

The Five Armed Elements 88

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

6. EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE

COMBATANTS 89

Significance for the Insurgents 89

Fie4n nt ihnteFL:SnVcne 7

MiulCstlao

WeDdNtHv h ereoInt

Neesay7
CONTENTS xv

The First Diplomatic Offensive Begun by the

FDR Is Paying Off 90

Rafael Menjivar

They Had Introduced 600 Tons of Weapons into

the Country 91

General Jaime Abdul Gutierrez

We Traced Weapons Back to Vietnam 92

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

International Propaganda Support 93

Colonel Orlando Zepeda

... But We Lose Internationally 93

Colonel Oscar Campos Anava 4

The Lowest Point for the Junta Government 96

President Jose Napole6n Duarte

The Role of the United States during this Period 96

Two Key Decisions for the United States 97

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi

Through the Back Door of the White House 98

President Jose Napole6n Duarte

The Lack of Materiel Support 100

Dr. Alvaro Magafa

The State Department Denied a Need for U.S.

Military Aid 100

General Wallace H. Nutting

Friction between CINC South and the Country

Team 104

Ambassador Deane Hinton

Perception That Southern Command Wanted to

Run the War 105

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Different Perceptions 106

The Model of U.S. Intervention in El Salvador 106

Rafael Menjivar

Imperialism Has No Other Option Than

Intervention 110

Ferm4n Cienfuegos
xvi CONTENTS

The "Woerner Report" 110

A Basic Look at What It Would Take to Win I11

Ambassador Deane Hinton

I'd Like Some of the Experts from the U.S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff 112

President Jos Napole6in Duarte

Duarte Asked Us to Help 113

General Wallace H. Nutting

Fundamental Objective: Develop a Military

Strategy 114

General Fred F. Woerner

The Woerner Report Changed the Perception of

the War 116

Colonel Charles B. Stone IV

Comments on the Period of Disarray: A Look

at the Antagonists 117

PART III. INSURGENT ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981

TO LATE 1984

CHAPTER 7. THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT

ACTIONS 123

One Road to Power 123

Juan Ctucian

Consolidation and Changes: Irregular War

Becomes a Fundamental Element 124

Captured FMLN Documuent

Unification of the Guerrilla Organizations 129

Juan) Chatc¢tl

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ( 'Marcial")

Guerrilla Unity 131

Coloel Carlos Revnaldo L6pe: Nuila

"Offensives": December 1981 to October 1983 132

Comandate Joaquin Villdobos

fI
CONTENTS xvii

The October Campaign 141

Comandante Joaquin Villalobos

U.S. View of the 1983-84 Guerrilla Situation 144

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Colonel James J. Steele

The Guerrilla Situation in the Fall of 1983 146

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial")

Comandante Joaquin Villalobos

The Military Situation from the Fall of 1983 to

the Turning Point 148

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham III

CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AND

SANCTUARIES SUPPORT THE INSURGENTS 153

Explanations in Cuba: ,83-.La Habana 153

Miguel Castellanos

FMLN Efforts Enjoy Great Support in All

Parts of the World 155

Guillerm M. Ungo

Unconditional Support without Accounting 156

Colonel Orlando Zepeda

The Fundamental Concept of Sanctuaries 157

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila

Sanctuaries (The "Bolsones") 159

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Our Neighbors Do Not Have Our Problems 159

Colonel Oscar Campos Anaya

Different Types of Sanctuaries 160

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila

Vietnam Lesson: Take the War to the U.S.

Congress 162

Miguel Castellanos

The United States Underestimated External

Insurgent Support 164

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi

i
xviii CONTENTS

CHAPTER 9. MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLTICAL

ACTIONS 167

Reforms: A Dynamic in the Salvadoran

Equation 167

An Underlying Problem 168

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Reforms in General 169

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

The Basic Reforms 170

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila

Land Reform Gave Breathing Space 176

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

General Jose Guillermo Garcla

The Most Significant Political-Civil-Military

Reform of the Decade 177

General Fred F. Woerner

Resolving the Primary Political Problems in El

Salvador 179

The Historical Context of the Political

Environment 180

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea

The Problem 182

Dr. Alvaro Magafia

The Elections Were the Turning Point 183

Ambassador Deane Hinton

The First Free Elections in 50 Years 184

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

The Army Won't Vote 184

General Josi Guillermo Garcta

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila

The Veracity of the Elections 186

Dr. Alvaro MagaAa

U.S. Official Observer Delegation

Guillermo M. Ungo
CONTENTS xix

Election of Dr. Alvaro Magana 189

President Jose Napole6n Duarte

Magana's Objectives 192

Dr. Alvaro Magaiia

The Magafia Presidency 193

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

The Institutionalizing of Elections 196

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Colonel James J. Steele

The Presidential Election of March 1984 199

President Jos Napole6n Duarte

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Impact of the Democratic Process on the FMLN 204

Miguel Castellanos

C-5 Spokesperson

Subsequent Elections 208

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pe: Nuila

CHAPTER 10. ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND NATIONAL

PLAN DEVELOPMENT 209

The State of the Army in 1982 209

Dr. Alvaro Magahia

Professionalizing the Armed Forces 210

General Juan Bustillo

Changes in Leadership 212

Colonel John Cash

Vice-President Bush's Visit Provokes a Change 212

General Adolfo Bland6n

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham I1l

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Recognizing the Need for Change 215

Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce

Major Changes for the Armed Forces 215

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova

Changes for the Security Forces 220

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo LUpe: Nuila

V
xx CONTENTS

Change in Focus: In Spite of Who's Elected 221

Colonel Oscar Campos Anaya

Origins of the National Plan 222

General Wallace H. Nutting

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Government Priorities Tended to Go in Other

Directions 224

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Evolution of the Plan 225

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila

Status of the Plan at the End of 1984 226

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham III

Importance of the Plan 227

General John R. Galvin

CHAPTER 11. OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 231

The Venezuelan Effort 231

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

"Wolf'." 233

General Wallace H. Nutting

Training Was Critical 234

Ambassador Deane Hinton

U.S. Training of Salvadoran Units and Cadets 235

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Two Overviews of U.S. Support 237

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova

Dr. Alvaro Magafia

Problems in Coordinating U.S. Support Efforts 239

General Wallace H. Nutting

Colonel John Cash

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham III

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

The Need for a Rational, Coherent Process by

Which Aid Can Be Provided 241

Major General James R. Taylor
CONTENTS xxi

The United States Needs People Capable of

Analyzing and Understanding a Problem Like

the Salvadoran War 242

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Continuity of Personnel Is Important 243

General Wallace H. Nutting

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Neither the Doctrine, Support, nor

Coordination to Be Effective 244

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

Comments on the Period of Insurgent

Ascendancy: A Look at Dismounted Knights

and a Few Other Things 246

PART IV. THE WAR CHANGES DIRECTION: LATE

1984 TO LATE 1986

CHAPTER 12. MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF

GRAVITY 253

Assailed By Every Conceivable Problem 253

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

The War Had Turned Around 256

General John R. Galtin

The Military Situation 257

Colonel Jamnes J. Steele

The Internal Political Environment 259

Colonel Lmnan C. Durvea

Evolution and Political Awareness 259

General Adolfo Blanli

Guerrilla Politics Is Part of the Equation 262

Colonel Orlando Zepeda

Guerrilla Propaganda as Part of the Equation 264

Captured FMLN Document

I
xxii CONTENTS

Guerrilla Strategy as Part of the Equation 269

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

U.S. Actions at the Time 270

Dr. Jose Z. Garcia

CHAPTER 13. ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 273

Garcia Replaced by Vides 273

Colonel John Cash

Vides-The Right Man at the Right Time 274

Colonel John D. Waghelsteit:

Unity in the Army: An Example 275

President Josi Napole6n Duarte

Army Unity Surprised the FMLN 277

Miguel Castellanos

The Basic Understandings 278

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

We Must Understand That This War Is Fought

on Diverse Fronts 281

Colonel Carlos Revnaldo LJpe: Nuila

Toward a Permanent Offensive 283

General Carlos Euqenio Vides Casanova

General Carlos Revnaldo L6pe: Nuila

The Professionalization of the Salvadoran

Military 291

Colonel James J. Steele

14. CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION, TRAINING,

AND OPERATIONS 293

Evolving Organization, Training, and

Operations in the Army 293

Colonel Reni Emilio Ponce

Another View of Organization and Training 298

Colonel Lyvman C. Durvea

No Place in the Country the Army Can't Go 305

Colonel John Ellerson
CONTENTS xxiii

Development of Intelligence Was Difficult 308

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

The Organization for Intelligence 310

Colonel Orlando Zepeda

Another View of Intelligence 314

Colonel James J. Steele

The Logistics of the Offense 316

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea

CHAPTER 15. RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 321

Psychological Operations and Civic Action 321

Colonel James J. Steele

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

In the Beginning They Took No Prisoners 324

C-5 Spokesperson

Evolution: Integration of Psyops, Civil Affairs,

and Intelligence 328

Major General James R. Taylor

Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Perez

A Most Successful Operation-Civil Affairs 334

Colonel Leopoldo Antonio Herndndez

Joining Civil Defense: A Vote for the

Government 336

Colonel John C. Ellerson

Leadership Is the Key to Success 339

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

16. THE ARMED FORCES AT THE END OF 1986 341

The Different Services 341

Colonel Lyman C. Durvea

The Army in 1986 343

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea

Earthquake: The Army Loses Momentum and

Insurgents Re-Arm 346

Colonel John C. Ellerson
xxiv CONTENTS

CHAPTER 17. CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND

TACTICS 349

Diminished International Support and Guerrilla

Strategy 350

Miguel Castellanos

Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics 351

Colonel Carlos Revnaldo L6pez Nuila

Insurgents Revert Back to "Creole" War 356

General Juan Rafael Bustillo

Operational Modes We Will Use 357

Captured FMLN Document

The Principal Organizations and Their

Activities 360

Colonel James J. Steele

Objectives and Tactics 366

Colonel Liman C. Durvea

The Evolution of Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics

since 1980 368

Colonel Orlando Zepeda

The Primary Objective Remains the Same 372

Joaquin Villalobos

18. OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 373

Negotiations as a Form of Insurgent Conflict 373

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pe: Nuila

The International Environment 375

Dr. Jose Z. Garcia

The Military View of the Problem 376

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

The United States Invests in the Peace Talks 377

Colonel Lyman Durvea

Negotiating with the Insurgents 378

President Josi Napole6n Duarte

Duarte's Political Motives 387

Colonel James J. Steele

ilI
CONTENTS xxv

CHAPTER 19. U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 389

THE INSURGENT VIEW

U.S. Aid Reflects an Insolent Pursuit of

Supremacy 389

Guillermo M. Ungo

Forms of U.S. Intervention in El Salvador 392

Salvador CaYetano Carpio

THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT VIEW

U.S. Support For El Salvador 393

President Jose Napole6n Duarte

U.S. Support Represents a Great Opportunity

for Democracy 394

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova

Were It Not for U.S. Support, El Salvador

Probably Would Not Have Survived 396

General Juan Rafael Bustillo

Modern War Is Not Fought with Rifles Only 397

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pe: Nuila

VIEWS FROM U.S. PRACTITIONERS

An Unpredictable Ally 398

General John R. Galvin

U.S. Legislative Debates Were Not Helpful 399

Ambassador Deane Hinton

U.S. and Southern Command Policy toward El

Salvador 400

Major General James R. Taylor

U.S. Policy and Support Has Been Piecemeal 401

General Wallace H. Nutting

Greater U.S. Military Support Might Bkc

Inappropriate 403

Colonel John D. Waghelstein

Blessed with a Small Staff 405

Ambassador Thomas Pickering

The View From the Mil Group 407

Colonel James J. Steele

gI
xxvi CONTENTS

Comments on the Period as the War Changed

Direction: A Look at the Archers and the

Forest 411

PART V. STALEMATE: 1986 TO THE PRESENT

CHAPTER 20. PROLONGED PEOPLE*S WAR: THE

SALVADORAN CONTEXT 417

Discontinuity of the Offensive 418

Joaquin Villalobos

Prolonged People's War Is Fundamentally

Ideological 419

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pe: Nuila

Insurgent War against the People 422

General Adolfo Bland6n

Their Plan Will Backfire 426

Colonel Oscar Eduardo Casanova Vejar

Guerrilla Strategy Has Changed during My

Presidency 429

President Jos Napole6n Duarte

Nobody Wins without the Support of the People 432

General Adolfo 0. Bland6n

We Won't Be Able to Terminate This War

Completely 433

Colonel Oscar Campos Anava

Insurgent Leadership: The Next Center of

Gravity 435

Colonel John C. Ellerson

To Win We Need a Long-Term American

Commitment 436

General John R. Galvin

This Is a Doubly Dangerous Phenomenon 438

General Fred F. Woerner

I

. 0wmmmm# as ~mawwmamu , h llall-
CONTENTS xxvii

CHAPTER 21. PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 439

Warm-Up for the Future 439

General Carhs Eugenio Vides Casanova

Seizing the Moral High Ground 440

Colonel James J. Steele

Securing the High Ground 441

Colonel Oscar Cantpos Anava

Maintaining the High Ground 442

General Adolfo Bland6n

Democratization, Human Rights, and the Will

to Win 444

Colonel John C. Ellerson

The Salvadoran Report Card 447

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr

No Political Will to Win 453

Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Prez

Total National Commitment by El Salvador Is

Still Lacking 455

General Fred F. Woerner

A Democracy Based On Voting, Not Weapons 456

General Adolfo 0. Blandfn

22. THE U.S. ROLE IN THE FUTURE 457

Assisting Countries to Fight Their Own Wars Is

a Viable Strategy 457

General Fred F. Woerner

Understanding the Nature of Insurgent War

and the Past Failure of Leadership 458

General Wallace H. Nutting

U.S. Needs a Pro-Democratic Unified Strategy 458

General John R. Galvin

Our Support Policy for Democracy Is at Some

Risk 461

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi
xxviii CONTENTS

U.S. Needs a Consistent Method of Forming

Strategic Policy 462

General Wallace H. Nutting

Political Will Is the Crucial Element in

Determining Commitment 463

General Fred F. Woerner

Let Us Develop Our Own Democracy 464

Colonel Sigijredo Ochoa Pere:

CHAPTER 23. STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR

STRATEGY 467

The Economic Element of the Plan Is Lacking 467

General Jolin R. Galvin

The War Has Turned into a Business 468

Colonel (Retired) Sigijre'do Ochoa Pare:

This Country Seems Stalemated 469

C-5 Spokepersnl

Reinforcing the Stalemate 471

Colonel Lyman C. Durwea

They Don't Have a National Plan 472

Colonel John Ellerson

Strategic and Tactical Objectives Must Strike at

Centers of Gravity 473

Colonel Orlando Zepedai

The FMLN Cannot Win the War 474

Miguel Castellamos

The FMLN Is Being Forced to Develop a

Protracted War Strategy 476

Dr. Guillermno M. Ungo

No Clear Vision of Where We Want to Go 478

Colonel Oscar Eduardo Caanova V'eJlar

4#
CON rENTS xxix

Toward the Future 480

PART V1. THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

CHAPTER 24. THE SAME VALLEY OR THE NEXT VALLEY 485

The United States Must Have a High-Level

Coordinating Mechanism 485

Anbassador Th nas Pickering

Democracy Can Be Supported 486

General Fred F. Woerner

A Must: Support For Central American

Democracies 487

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr

The Indispensable Requirement for Intelligence 488

General Wallace H. Nutting

A Broad Program for Training U.S. Personnel

Is Needed 489

Ambassador Deane Hinton

Some Interests Must Be Sacrificed 490

President Jose Napolein Duarte

The People Are the Equation 491

General John R. Galvin

Witnesses to the Conflict in El Salvador 493

The Editors 499
Illustrations

MAPS AND CHARTS

Central America liv

El Salvador Political Boundaries 9

El Salvador Brigade Headquarters 65

Insurgent Organizations 80

El Salvador Bolsones 158

PHOTOGRAPHS

General Jos6 Guillermo Garcia 30

General Juan Rafael Bustillo 75

Colonel Oscar Rodolfo Campos Anaya 94

Colonel Miguel Mendez briefs President Duarte and

General Adolfo Bland6n. 133

During the height of the military effort, military

commanders met in Morazdn. 135

The Morazin Battalion in the field. 137

March 1986, Psyop and Intelligence troops in

Chalatenango treated and evacuated wounded guerrillas

who were found left behind in a cave. 139

National Federation of Trade Unions members protest

after the 1984 elections. 189

Members of the Social Security Workers Union stage

protest. 191

Jorge Shafik Handal, General Secretary of the Communist

Party of El Salvador, one of five FALN

commandantes. 193

FPL guerrilla 195

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova 216

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda 311

San Francisco Chinadega members of a newly formed

civil defense unit. 325

xxxi
xxxii ILLUSTRATIONS

Army troops present weapons to civil defense unit

members. 327

Candelavin, La Paz, civil defense members died. 329

Ana Isabel Henriguez, victim of a land mine. 331

Colonel Leopoldo Antonio Hemndez 335

On 10 October 1986, a severe earthquake

struck. 421

The conflict and the earthquake reduced

parts of the countryside and San

Salvador to rubble. 423

Joint military and community efforts have

been credited with improving public

perceptions. 425

Haircut Day, a local civic action effort. 427

Medical Battalion members provide on-thespot dentistry. 429

Promoting a changed image, the government

says the military are part of the

solution now, not part of the problem. 431

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova-Vjar 479
Preface

THIS IS AN IMPORTANT BOOK.

Max Manwaring and Court Prisk uniquely permit the major

actors involved to tell the story of the struggle between the

United States supported Salvadoran democrats and the CubanNicaraguan supported Marxist-Leninist guerrillas. The type of

conflict confronted in El Salvador is known by many namesrevolutionary war, the struggle for national liberation, guerrilla

war, low-intensity conflict, prolonged people's war, insurgency,

protracted conflict. The phenomenon is not new to history, but

to North Americans such conflicts have become particularly

important because they almost universally are supported and

frequently are fostered from abroad by Communist governments

that regard the United States as their principal adversary.

There is an increase of this kind of hostility and a

corresponding greater likelihood that our country will be

engaged in similar contests for years to come. It thus becomes

imperative that we learn from our experience. This type of

armed political struggle requires national persistence and will

and involves the promotion of constitutional democracy,

political warfare (including the foreign manipulation of the

American body politic), foreign support for subversives,

propaganda, economic development, and diplomacy. In dealing

with these pressing issues, this book is both engaging and

valuable. It presents the candid opinions of many of the most

important participants at different stages of the Salvadoran

struggle. It suggests and allows the reader to draw conclusions,

and it provides a wealth of lessons to be learned.

When I arrived in San Salvador in the summer of 1985 to

assume my responsibilities as the American Ambassador, I was

pleased to see firsthand how sound United States Government

policy was for Central America and how well the programs to

xxxiii
xxxiv PREFACE

achieve our objectives were being implemented in El Salvador.

Today, in 1988, 1 am even more convinced of the correctness of

our Central American policy and of the manner in which we are

strongly supporting and closely collaborating with the

democratic governments of this region. The contrast between

our efforts in Central America and those in Southeast Asia,

where I also served as a diplomat during the tragic years of

1972 to 1975 (when America's defeat there became final), is

striking.

There are numerous reasons why I am convinced of the

correctness of U.S. policy especially in El Salvador. Included in

the book is an interview in which I discuss and assess progress

in the five areas that the American Embassy in San Salvador

observes, analyzes, and provides support for Salvadoran

programs. In their totality they constitute the areas where

success is essential in order to consolidate a lasting

constitutional democracy. Failure in any one of the five areas

would mean eventual failure in them all, and their order of

priority varies with the evolving situation and the total progress

being made toward democracy.

As you read this book you will come to know, as I do, that

El Salvador is and will remain for some years an

underdeveloped Third World country. The resource base is

minimal. The politico-economic structure is regressive. The war

is only the most obvious problem. The challenge is and has

been to create the infrastructure, protect it from destruction, and

lay the groundwork for a rational and equitable economic

system. This goal involves not just the internal restructuring of

the country's economy but also changing the import laws of

industrialized countries, which currently restrict the products of

developing countries, and creating mechanisms to ensure more

constant and fairer prices in the international market for their

exports.

With respect to El Salvador's role in Central America.

events begun in El Salvador have given impetus to a situation in

which four of the five Central American countries are now

democracies, even if fragile ones, and contrast sharply with

Nicaragua where the design of the Sandinistas has been to
PREFACE xxxv

consolidate a Marxist-Leninist state. Recognizing that Costa

Rica has a long tradition of democracy, it is my firm belief that

President Duarte's leadership and persistence have been the

major force behind the creation of democratic institutions in his

country and have served as an example to the other nations.

Certainly his deep belief in democracy has played an important

role in garnering congressional support for President Reagan's

Central American policy.

Seven years of unflagging Salvadoran effort, personal

sacrifice, a limited American presence, and the investment of

considerable United States resources-though still small in

comparison to our current outlays in the Middle East or previous

expenditures in Southeast Asia-have thus far precluded a

Communist military takeover in El Salvador. The effort has

stabilized the economy and provided sufficient social peace to

begin laying the foundations for institutionalization of a

constitutional, multiparty democratic system with equity and

justice.

Another indicator of progress has been that the

Salvadorans, with our material and training support, have

reduced full-time combatant strength of the guerrillas from over

12,000 to less that two-thirds that number. But, the insurgency

nevertheless remains at an institutionally threatening level. Any

slackening militarily on the part of the government, regression

of the democratization process, or failure of the economy to

begin growing could bring a resurgence of guerrilla strength.

The back of the guerrillas has not yet been broken. To do this,

we need to maintain or increase current levels of assistance so

that the Salvadoran government can win its war-not merely

provide enough aid to keep Salvadorans from losing their battle.

This is difficult at a time of Gramm/Rudman/Hollings budget

limitations, fatigue by the Congress after seven years of

support, and the emergence of other problems that reduce

Washington's responsiveness and capacity to provide backing

required.

There are many reasons, beyond the challenges mentioned,

why I consider it a great privilege to be the American Chief of

Mission in El Salvador and am thankful for the opportunity to
Xxxvi PREFACE

direct the work that has been done so effectively and efficiently

by the United States Government to protect and to advance the

interests of democracy here. I am proud to join the ranks of

distinguished Ambassadors who have been my predecessors in

El Salvador, such as Deane Hinton and Tom Pickering, and of

U.S. Southern Command Commanders-in-Chief, such as

Generals Paul Gorman, Jack Galvin, and Fred Woerner. The

United States has been extremely fortunate to have the quality

of men and women that "the system" has chosen to assign El

Salvador at all levels, both military and civilian. The United

States' success in El Salvador has derived in large part from

Embassy support by and close collaboration with the United

States Southern Command, from the highest level of support

within the Executive, and from the necessary minimum level of

bipartisan support of the Congress for President Duarte-though

this support has been, as President Duarte says. enough to

prevent failure but not enough to win the war and resolve the

economic problems.

El Salvador represents a historic test for the American

people who are accustomed to short-term accomplishments and

immediate gratification. The test is about "lessons learned" in

Vietnam and elsewhere, not in the sense of a direct country

analogy, but rather, in the greater maturity and persistence in

our conduct of foreign relations. In El Salvador we are only 8

years into what could prove to be a 12- to 14-year low intensity

conflict unless, as the Salvadoran government seeks and we

support, there are successful negotiations and changes that allow

a peaceful and earlier solution. Even should peace be achieved

earlier, continued United States assistance, at a significant but

diminishing level, will still be required to assure consolidation

of self-sustaining democracy and economic growth. United

States strategic and security interests do not permit us to ignore

the political and military challenge posed by guerrilla wars like

the one being waged in El Salvador.

While the history and comments presented in this book

deal primarily with events in El Salvador, the questions of the

proper organization of the American government and the

importance of American persistence in coping with low-
PREFACE xxxvii

intensity conflicts are mentioned by several of the principals

interviewed. As one who is charged with the conduct of our

relations with El Salvador and the management of all United

States programs and personnel in El Salvador, a few comments

about certain current developments within the American foreign

relations framework may be useful.

Leaders and governments in Central America have been

lobbied and presented foreign policy positions by former

American Presidents, presidential candidates, both political

extremes of Congress, and congressional staffers that are at

variance or contradictory to that enunciated by the President and

the Secretary of State. Central American governments and

leaders have been confused, frustrated and inclined to "play our

system" to their own advantages (and, in the case of Nicaragua,

adversely to United States security interests). Senator

Vandenberg's dictum that foreign policy differences among

Americans should cease at the water's edge has long been

forgotten. Probably little will be done to reverse this trend, but I

believe that one of the lessons to be learned from El Salvador

and Central America is that the American Executive and

congressional leadership must address how to minimize the

problems in conducting foreign policy related to our system of

separation of powers, checks and balances, and the treasured

democratic debate and freedom of speech inherent in our

political process.

The United States Government, largely because of

Executive-congressional relations and a current lack of

bipartisan consensus on Central America, is often inflexible

and, in certain areas, incoherently organized to meet the

demands of crises-ridden El Salvador which require quick

responses to changing circumstances. A prime example of this

has been our inability to win congressional support for

Salvadoran efforts to reform the police and improve law

enforcement to help public security forces increase their

capacity to bring to justice human rights abusers, to combat

urban terrorism, and to impede guerrilla creation and infiltration

of urban support/front groups-this, despite the FMLN's

murder of American citizens and Embassy employees.

1
xxxviii PREFACE

The danger with protracted conflict is that after a while

Washington may come to treat El Salvador as an "in-box"

issue, bureaucratizing responses to the El Salvadoran war

because it is going on so long. It is too easy to forget that

people are fighting and dying every day. Because it is not the

type of global conflict that fully engages the American people's

national consciousness, prolonged low intensity conflict is

difficult for our government. Complacency, reflected in a lack

of urgency or policy relativism or resource allocation, could

become our Achilles heel. Lack of adequate resources becomes

the tangible manifestation of the problem.

There is also a need for the Executive and the American

public to work with congressional leadership to reduce the

growing tendency of Congress to try to micromanage United

States assistance programs. This penchant too often results in

lessened efficiency, effectiveness, and timeliness of our actions.

I believe that the Agency for International Development (AID)

is the best development institution in the world-superior to

international development institutions and other countries'

foreign development aid agencies-but ever expanding

congressional restrictions, earmarking, and guidance have

imposed enormous bureaucratic demands on AID programming,

project paper preparations, project implementation, and

evaluations and have led to interruptions and problems in

smooth project execution.

Congress' control of the purse strings and the Senate's

constitutional role of advice and consent on the President's key

appointments and agreements with foreign governments are

welcome and necessary, but the level of direct oversight by

Congress has, it seems to me, become excessive. Congressional

impositions on such matters as to what kinds of military

equipment should be used and how to employ such equipment,

long delaying "holds" by a few Congressmen on Executivedesired changes in already congressionally approved programs,

and congressional conditions on assistance that overly limit

management and negotiating flexibility are disruptive to

effectively conducting our foreign policy. Much of this derives

from Congressmen's misuse of and overreliance on an ever-
PREFACE XXXix

expanding number of staffers. Congressional oversight is

essential and wanted, but in a crisis situation such as Central

America, the Executive must be able to respond and implement

rapidly and must possess sufficient flexibility for efficient and

effective program implementation.

Also, if the Department of State and embassies are to

perform well their function of management of the United States

programs abroad, explain policies, and persuade host country

leaders and sectors to back United States efforts, understand

what is going on, keep Washington informed, and implement

successfully our programs and policies, the Department of State

must be properly and adequately staffed. All administrations of

the United States since our emergence as a superpower after

World War II have failed to adequately educate the American

people and Congress to the fact that diplomacy and foreign

assistance are just as vital a part of our national security as are

our Defense Department and armed forces. This is particularly

true in coping successfully with subversive and Communistinspired revolutionary movements. Compared to the budget for

our own armed forces, foreign economic and security assistance

and the cost of our diplomatic establishments are small. An

ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. We need to give

greater priority to assuring adequate resources and personnel in

these areas.

The strategic importance of El Salvador and Central

America to our country, the Marxist-Leninist led insurgency in

El Salvador, the economic crisis, the need to consolidate a

fragile democracy and to continue progress in human rights, the

natural disasters of the massive October 1986 earthquake and

two years of drought, the interventionist actions of the

Nicaraguans and Cubans and Soviets, the lack of sufficient

bipartisan consensus in the Congress on our Central American

policy (as opposed to our policy on El Salvador), and the

consequent difficulty of our government to speak with one voice

on our Central American policy-all these factors--combine to

make complex the conduct of our policies and programs in

support of Salvadoran democracy. The final results of the

struggle are not yet determined. Salvadoran President Jose

A
x PREFACE

Napole6n Duarte says that the Cuban-Nicaraguan backed

guerrillas are engaged in prolonged people's war, that his

government is waging a prolonged strategy for peace and

constitutional democracy, and that what is required from the

United States is a prolonged commitment to support democratic

leaders and their armed forces.

If the American people, through our Congress, maintain

such a commitment, I am confident that a tremendous foreign

policy success will be achieved in Central America. We will

have denied to the Marxist-Leninists a foothold on the American

landmass and have helped democratic forces to consolidate

constitutional democracies that can provide a better way of life

for their peoples. This book describes how that success is

coming about.

What Salvadorans have achieved in their nation during the

past eight years is remarkable in institutionalizing democracy, in

better observing human rights, in improving the military and

turning the tide against the Marxist-Leninist Farabundo Marti

Liberation Movement (FMLN), and in halting the economic

decline, while laying the basis for long-term growth. El

Salvador has become an example of a country successfully

struggling through the difficult transition from a legacy of

military dictatorship to democratic government while under

attack by a foreign-backed insurgency. As such it stands in stark

contrast to neighboring Nicaragua where Sandinistas ate

attempting to consolidate a Marxist-Leninist regime.

El Salvador has been and will continue to be a constant

reminder of the Sandinistas' failure to live up to their promise in

1979 to the Organization of American States to carry out

immediately democratic elections. El Salvador's own honest

elections, freedom of assembly and expression, and its active

opposition political parties all show contrast with the lack of

similar democratic rights and practices in Nicaragua. The

complete compliance of El Salvador with the Esquipulas If

treaty, in comparison with the Sandinistas' begrudgingly taken

cosmetic measures, is another way in which President Duarte

has pressured the Sandinistas to move toward democracy and

peace.
PREFACE xli

After you have read the ideas and thoughts of the principals

(of all persuasions) in this dynamic history, I am confident that

you will concur that the United States is doing the job right in

El Salvador. There are not massive numbers of Americans. We

are allied with truly democratic leaders and on the correct side

of struggle. Our goals and objectives are consistent with our

values, traditions, and history. And, success here is essential to

our national security. In this region we are on the right track, and we must learn further from this experience in order to live

securely and successfully in a world that most likely will be

plagued by low-intensity conflicts for some years to come.

The Cuban/Sandinista supported guerrillas' commitment to

a prolonged people's war strategy in El Salvador continues

unabated. I am hopeful that the American people and the

American Congress will continue to provide the backing and

resources to pursue the attainment of an acceptable and lasting

peace in the region and to assure pluralist, democratic political

systems based on the consent of the governed and the rule of

law. The United States' principal objective is to help

Salvadorans in their quest to achieve peace and to consolidate

constitutional democracy. This is a long and difficult process. I

suggest that only after continued progress through at least three

more Salvadoran presidential elections and the diminishing of

the guerrilla war over the next couple of years will we be able to

talk about having achieved an institutionalized, self-sustaining

democratic system.

The United States and its Salvadoran allies are on the verge

of a tremendous success for democracy and for our nation's

foreign policy-if we stay the course.

Here in El Salvador there are lessons to be learned. Max

Manwaring and Court Prisk have done a superb job of recording

the thoughts and opinions of the key actors in the Salvadoran

struggle. They provide to the readers the views of Salvadoran

civilian officials and civilian opposition leaders, of Salvadoran

military officers and guerrilla commanders, and of American

civilian and military officers who have been and continue to be

deeply involved in the ongoing struggle. Their candid,

engaging, and extremely cogent book provides information,

i II I IIIII b il I I iIll
xlii PREFACE

analyzes varied opinions, and records for us the valuable lessons

being learned. Good reading.

EDWIN G. CORR

UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR

TO EL SALVADOR

San Salvador, El Salvador

8 December 1987

4

II
Acknowledgments

THIS WORK WAS FIRST PROPOSED

in the Fall of 1986 by General John R. Galvin who was then

Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern Command.

The idea was to develop the general lessons learned from the

conflict in El Salvador as part of a continuing effort to revitalize

strategic thinking as it pertains to "small wars." Additionally,

the United States Ambassador to El Salvador, Edwin G. Corr,

saw the need for a contemporary history of the conflict. Thus.

this book is a synthesis of these two concepts.

When General Galvin left Panama to become Supreme

Allied Commander in Europe, the project continued with the

active support and encouragement of Ambassador Corr and the

current Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command,

General Fred F. Woerner. Others who were key players in one

capacity or another include Colonel John A. Cope, Jr.. Colonel

Robert M. Herrick, Colonel George Meynes. Colonel Rod

Pascall, Colonel Edgar L- Smith Ill, Dr. Gabriel Marcella,

Lieutenant Colonel John T. Fishel, and Major James K. Waters.

Mrs. Helen Hurley and Lieutenant Colonel Martin

Andresen of the Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks.

Pennsylvania, are responsible for getting us off to a proper start

in the oral history business. Moreover, the BDM Corporation of

McLean, Virginia, under contract with the Southern

Command's Small Wars Operational Research Division

(SWORD), supported the search of available literature and the

interviewing of most of the contributors. This effort resulted in

over 2,000 pages in 40 volumes and provided the necessary data

base for the book. The interviews have been provided to

SWORD and to the Military History Institute to aid both

practitioners and researchers in their labors relating to the war in

El Salvador.

xliii

rI
xliv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A volume such as this is built on the work of many others.

The bulk of the credit goes to the book contributors themselves.

However, a special word of acknowledgment must go to Allison

E. Letzer and Wendy R. Christensen for their special expertise

and talents. Allison went way beyond the call of duty in doing

the translations and transcriptions. Wendy's mastery and

drudgery at the word processor-especially in the final hectic

days before the "drop dead date"-were indispensable and

much appreciated. Finally, Bob Parrish did some very heavy

editing on his own time, and Steve Winter did the format and

made the arrangements which led to a very fruitful interview

with Dr. Guillermo Ungo.

We alone, of course, are responsible for any errors and

omissions.

MAX G. MANWARING

COURT PRISK

Panama Cit', R.P.

15 December 1987
Introduction

IN THE LATE 1970s, CHRONIC

political, economic, and social tensions began to generate

another in a relatively long list of crises in El Salvador. During

that time, General Carlos Humberto Romero was brought to

power by those who thought that he would be able to establish a

regime strong enough to control the various forces agitating for

change. But by 1979 the situation was beyond control by

repression.

The catalyst that ignited the continuing violence in El

Salvador over the past several years was the military coup of 15

October 1979 in which Romero was ousted as the last protector

of the interests of the oligarchy. After that, the history of the

country breaks down into four clearly defined periods. The

period after the coup was one of almost complete disarray.

None of the three major actors in the conflict-the military, the

insurgents, and the United States-was ready for the aftermath

of 50 years of authoritarian government. Then, from the end of

1981 to the end of 1984, the Salvadoran revolutionaries seemed

to unify and appeared to be well on their way to a military

victory and the assumption of political power in their own right.

Clearly, the insurgents were ascendant. By the end of 1984,

however, the armed forces had taken the best the insurgents

could give and were beginning to regain control of the politicalmilitary situation. Perhaps it is still too early to tell, but the

period 1985-1986 appears to us to be the beginning of the end

of the idea that revolution comes only from the 'barrel of a

gun." Finally, the period from the end of 1986 to the present

has been a time in which nothing really decisive seems to have

taken place. The revolutionaries have been deprived of their

military victory, yet the U.S.-backed government forces have

not won either. There is a stalemate.

xlv
xlvi INTRODUCTION

Lessons that might be learned from the Salvadoran conflict

cannot be classified as neatly as events. But, they provide

cogent illustrations of many universal aspects of contemporary

war. As an example, there is usually an asymmetry of power in

contemporary conflicts. An actor wishing to change or

overthrow a prevailing situation or regime cannot directly

challenge the superior force of a government and its

international supporters. This requires the application of what

Sun Tzu calls indirect force. Indirect force is applied or

conducted through the use o moral as well as military power.

The use of this type of power implies the addition of a number

of political-psychological dimensions to the conflict that

heretofore have not been given much weight. If carefully done,

the use of "moral" influences can undermine the legitimacy

and the position of another actor by breaking the bonds which

unite a people, its political leadership, and its protective security

organizations. And, when the usual attrition techniques fail to

produce victory over insurgents who are using these methods,

military and civilian leaders complain bitterly that the war has

been won "militarily" but lost "politically -- as if these two

elements were not totally interdependent.

Moreover, by transforming the emphasis of war from the

level of military violence to the level of a struggle for

legitimacy, an actor can strive for total objectives-e.g., the

overthrow of a government-instead of simply attempting to

obtain leverage and influence for "limited" objectives in the

traditional sense. Thus, the concept of indirect force permits

actors to engage in covert and prolonged wars-striking at an

adversary's right to govern-while appearing to pursue moral

and even peaceful intentions. This can be the case before a

conflict is recognized to have begun, during a conflict, or after

it has been considered terminated. In these terms, war is not an

extension of politics, politics is an extension of war. As long as

opposition exists vis-a-vis some situation in the international

security system, there is conflict-very political, multidimensional, and total.

In this milieu of a total conflict, the continuing struggle in

El Salvador appears to be an excellent example of achieving
INTRODUCTION xlvii

stalemate by virtue of not dealing adequately with problems at

the strategic level, even though actions at the tactical level

might have been generally successful.

As such, the Salvadoran case is interesting and instructive.

Nevertheless, a word or two of caution is in order. First,

"lessons learned" may not be in consonance with the popular

wisdom and therefore not assimilated into policy and budgets. It

is not just a matter of learning from past errors or successes.

The question is, "Are we willing to deal with a given issue?"

Second, "lessons learned" can be erroneous if too literally

applied to a seemingly similar situation.

The only honest way to face the first problem is to examine

personal conscience, ethics, and priorities. A quick look into

history can provide an illustration and solution to the second

problem: in the year 1415, a superior French force was defeated

at Agincourt by the English under King Henry V, as a result of

adapting to erroneous lessons learned.

Sixty years earlier, in 1346, the English under King

Edward II severely defeated the forces of Philip VI of France at

Crecy. Edward chose a defensive position close to the center of

a narrow valley and on the down slope of a small hill. There, he

placed his men-at-arms and knights. He then located his longbow archers as legs of a vee on each flank of the valley. French

men-at-arms, followed by mounted knights and cross-bowmen,

attacked with superior numbers in successive waves through the

valley floor. But, the French knights, following the men-atarms, could never break through the mass in the middle or take

advantage of the mobility of their horses. Instead, they fell to a

rain of arrows from the English long bow. There were many

lessons for the French to learn: Don't attack piecemeal; don't

fight long bows with cross bows; don't attack in a defile which

limits maneuver room. But, one lesson remembered by the

French, who left 1,500 knights among the thousands of dead in

the valley of Crecy, was that the English men-at-arms and the

English knights were dismounted on the front slope of the hill.

At Agincourt a vastly superior French force of

approximately 20,000, with 12,000 men-at-arms, blocked

Henry V's return to England. This time, the French chose the
xlviii INTRODUCTION

site. It was a narrow front along a road with forest on both

sides. The English took up positions on a small hill in the center

of the defile-upon and in front of which Henry placed his

dismounted knights and men-at-arms. And, again, the long-bow

archers were positioned in a vee radiating out from the center

hill along the edge of the forest. Impatiently, the French

attacked the archers along the wooded flanks with light cavalry

charge while the main body charged the middle position. Only

this time, the French demonstrated they had learned their

lesson. The men-at-arms and the knights-wave after waveattacked dismounted. The French lost 10,000 of their 20,000-

man force. Henry sailed home with almost all of his army, and

another victory.

Clearly, the French had studied the battle of Crecy well.

The minutia were completely understood. But, there apparently

had been no analysis. no appreciation of the entire situation.

and-consequently-no valid lessons learned.

There are also definite lessons to be learned from the

individuals who have been involved in the struggle in El

Salvador. What we endeavor to provide here is a more complete

picture which provides perspective and assists understanding. In

drawing conclusions about the experiences noted herein, readers

and planners must strive to note the archers, the general

capabilities of the foe, the valley, and the whole strategic scene

and not focus only on the obvious-the dismounted knights on

the front slope of the hill.

Having made the above cautions, the following oral history

of the conflict in El Salvador can, conveniently, be considered

as an interesting but specific and unique situation. However, it

seems to us that there is much more to it than that. Our

experience and observation indicate strongly that much of what

is said by those who have dealt with that war at the strategic and

operational levels can be applied analytically at a proper level of

abstraction to the problems of contemporary "people's wars"

wherever they might be found. Despite other very real

challenges, insurrection is and will be the most likely threat to

Western security over the next generation.

A
Chronology

The Conflict in El Salvador, 1979-1987

IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

1979

15 October President Carlos Humberto Romero is deposed in a

coup led by Colonel Adolfo Arnoldo Majano and

Colonel Jaime Abdul Guti~rrez.

16 October Civil-military junta announces state of seige:

suspends constitutional guarantees for 30 daysannounces ambitious social and economic reform

program; and calls for free elections.

22 October Junta names 12-member cabinet that represents all

opposition to the Romero government-including

Communists.

1980

5 January Junta dissolves. New Christian Democratic Partymilitary junta formed.

6 March Junta announces plans to expropriate all properties

over 500 hectares and form cooperatives to be

owned by the families working them.

23 March Archbishop Arnulfo Romero assassinated.

!1 October FDR/FMLN organized from the May 1980 union of

five insurgent groups-as a result of pressure by

Fidel Castro.

OctoberNovember 600 tons of weapons provided to guerrillas. Some

traced back to Vietnam.

xlix

II I I I I I I
I CHRONOLOGY

4 December Bodies of four American women-three nuns and

one lay worker-are found in shallow grave along

highway from airport to San Salvador.

5 December U.S. suspends military and economic aid to El

Salvador.

15 December "Radio Liberacion" starts broadcasting to El

Salvador from Nicaragua, inciting people to organize

a general insurgency against the Salvadoran

government.

17 December U.S. restores economic aid to El Salvador.

1981

4 January Two American labor leaders and head of Salvadoran

Institute of Agrarian Reform are assassinated at

Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador.

10 January Insurgent forces begin "final" offensive.

14 January U.S. resumes military aid to El Salvador.

5 March Junta announces establishment of electoral

commission to prepare for legislative elections to be

held in 1982.

4 August Government turns over the first land titles to be

issued under the Agrarian Reform Program.

August France and Mexico give diplomatic recognition to

FDR/FMLN.

INSURGENT ASCENDANCE FROM THE END OF 1981 TO THE END

OF 1984

December Insurgent forces begin the "general" offensive-a

rationalization of the "final" offensive.

1982

28 January Campaign to elect a Constitutional Assembly opens.

28 March Elections held for Constituent Assembly.
CHRONOLOGY

22 April Arena party leader Roberto D'Aubuisson elected

president of the Constituent Assembly.

29 April Constituent Assembly names Dr. Alvaro Magafia as

president of a provisional government to replace

junta.

1982-1983 Insurgent forces continue general offensive and

specific efforts to disrupt electoral and constitutional

processes.

1983

U.S. begins to train Salvadoran battalions and

officer candidates in the U.S. and Honduras.

8 September Constituent Assembly approves law permitting

peasant labor organizations.

II December Vice-President George Bush visits El Salvador,

Makes U.S. position clear regarding the necessity to

secure human rights.

16 December Constituent Assembly unanimously approves final

version of new constitution.

17 December Special unit created to investigate and eliminate

death squads.

21 December Constituent Assembly becomes national legislature.

31 December Insurgent forces stage major attack and take over

Fourth Brigade Headquarters at El Paraiso.

1984

25 March Presidential elections. No candidate wins majority.

Run-off election required.

6 May Run-off election held. PDC Candidate Josd

Napole6n Duarte wins with 53.59 percent of the

vote.

24 May Five former National Guardsmen are convicted of

the December 1980 murder of the four American

church women.

I June Josd Napole6n Duarte inaugurated as first freely

elected president in 52 years.

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lii CHRONOLOGY

Mid-1984 Government forces begin to regain the military

initiative.

8 October President Duarte at U.N. General Assembly calls for

dialogue with armed opposition.

15 October Meetings between government and FMLN take place

at La Palma.

30 November Additional government-FMLN meetings at

Ayagualo.

I December Insurgent forces ambush government troops in El

Salto in north-eastern La Paz Department.

THE WAR CHANGES DIRECTION FROM THE END OF 1984 TO THE

END OF 1986

1985

31 March National Legislative Assembly and municipal

elections held. PDC takes a majority of seats in the

National Assembly and 58 percent of municipal

councils.

Early 1985 Insurgent forces begin to change tactics from

relatively large-scale. conventional-type attacks to

smaller unit actions. At the same time, more

economic and civil population targets come under

attack.

19 June Persons dressed as Salvadoran military personnel

attack several night clubs in San Salvador's Zona

Rosa, killing 13 unarmed people in cold bloodincluding 4 off-duty U.S. Marines.

10 September Inds Guadalupe Duarte Duran, oldest daughter of

President Duarte. and her secretary, kidnapped.

10 October Insurgent forces generate a major attack on the

Army's Basic Training Center at La Uni6n.

24 October In6s Guadalupe Duarte Duran, her secretary. and

mayors and other municipal officials kidnapped

earlier are released in exchange for over 100

insurgent prisoners.
CHRONOLOGY liii

November A National Reconstruction Plan (Unidos Para

Reconstruir) unveiled.

STALEMATE: 1986 TO THE PRESENT

1986

8 January Government forces initiate long-term "Operation

Phoenix" with the intention of driving insurgents

from strongholds on the Guazapa Volcano in

Cuscatlan Department. Lasts until mid-1987.

26 February Gunmen convicted of the 1981 Sheraton murders

given maximum 30-year prison sentences.

1 June Insurgents accept President Duarte's proposal for

resumption of peace talks.

10 October Major earthquake in San Salvador. More damage

done in seven seconds than through insurgent actions

over past seven years.

1987

21 January Insurgent forces attack El Paraiso again. This is the

first major attack since the effort at La Uni6n in

October 1985.

20 May Government forces initiate "Operation Monterosa'"

with intention of disrupting as many insurgent

operations as possible. Lasts through August.

Fall Central American Peace Plan proposed by President

Arias of Costa Rica. Received great acclaim and

Arias is given the Nobel Peace Prize.

6 November President Duarte announces a unilateral ceasefire and

general amnesty in El Salvador. citing his desire for

all critics of the government to return to the country

and participate openly in a free and nonviolent

electoral process.

7 November Insurgent forces initiate the most destructive

economic sabotage operation since the beginning of

the war.
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El Salvador at War
Partl

El Salvador

in Context
Prone to Violence

THE EDITORS-To counter a revolutionary strategy aimed

at a Third World social order, the first priority is to

understand it. An appreciation for the causes of a

specific environment and the primary center of gravity

form the basic foundation for that understanding. In this

context, the struggle in El Salvador needs to be

understood as it appeared to the three primary

players-the insurgents, the Salvadoran government,

and the United States.

The root causes lay deep within the history of Latin

America, and for the insurgents, the "revolution" had

its root causes in social injustice and had been going on

for at least a decade prior to October 1979. They saw it

as a long-term violent struggle which must totally

displace the existing order. Likewise the new political

elites, brought to power by a coup, wanted to use the

existing governmental structure to implement reforms

and saw the need for a "revolution" which createdagain over a long term-a more representative

governance, one capable of correcting the social and

economic injustices. The United States, as the third

major actor, saw the conflict as a follow-on to the

regionally unsettling, anti-U.S. takeover in Nicaragua.

The United States wanted to calm the situation, sought a

return to normalcy, but had no plan or long-term

objectives.

5

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6 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

No Strong Basis for Democracy

General John R. Galvin-The root causes go back 400 years.

First of all, there was never any franchise for the indigenous

people in Central America and indeed in most of Latin America.

While every country is different and Latin America is not a

homogeneous unit or organization, the so-called revolutions of

Latin America were the revolutions of the Spanish elite to free

themselves from Spain, in order that they could do whatever

they wanted to do in running the governments. The neglect for

the indigenous person is obvious in the fact that the indigenous

peoples, even today, are pushed up into the mountains, into the

less productive areas, and have very little to say about what

goes on in the countries. So, the revolution, in effect, never

came. The gnawing background that is there is the elitism.

Really, I believe there is a great deal to what the historians say

about the old civilizations, such as the Toltecs. the Aztecs, the

Incas. They were more collective civilizations. True, the priests

were an elite. But, there was greater involvement of the masses

at that time than there is now. The Spanish Conquistador

outlook is still reflected in the elitism that you see in many of

these countries. There was not the same desire to bring the

country itself ahead. There was more of a "what's in it for me"

attitude in a lot of these people. I realize that's a strong

accusation, but it is one that I think is supported by history.

Now, in addition to that, you had governmental infrastructures

which were extremely weak. They did not extend out into the

provinces. They were basically concerned with agriculture and

industry, such as it was-mining, and so forth-in the

countries. So, a combination of lack of franchise for indigenous

peoples and extremely weak infrastructures gave a

comparatively greater strength to the church and the military

and those allied with the administrations, one after the other, in

those countries. These conditions did not provide a kind of

strong foundation for democracy. These weaknesses remain in

General John R. Galvin. Cornmander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command. 1985 to 1987, interviewcd in Mons. Belgium. 18 August 1987.
PRONE TO VIOLENCE 7

the background. Now, it is the move of the disenfranchised

people and the reaction to that by the elites that has a lot to do

with the problems in Central America.

A History of Minority Governments

Guillermo M. Ungo-The struggle for democracy in El

Salvador has a long history. Its fundamental causes are internal,

but since the conflict's beginnings, its course has also been

affected by a powerful external force, the government of the

United States.

The oligarchic-military governments of El Salvador have

long kept in place unjust institutions and policies that have

excluded the majority of the people from real participation in

the decision-making processes that affect their social, economic,

and political life. Democracy has become a cruel and painful

deceit to Salvadorans; its practice is considered dangerous and

subversive. Any statement favoring social change provokes

violent retribution as a matter of course. The social doctrine of

the Roman Catholic church and the other churches, the exercise

of trade-union rights and of freedom of thought, and criticism of

the government are perceived to serve international

communism.

The consequences of this way of thinking are clear. Church

leaders are persecuted, unions are destroyed, and opposition

newspaper offices and radio stations are dynamited. More than

40,000 Salvadorans have been murdered since 1980, including

reporters, teachers, students, professionals, political leaders, an

archbishop, and priests, in addition to thousands of workers and

peasants. Thus the practice of democracy in El Salvador has a

history written in blood.

Making a mockery of Abraham Lincoln's ideals, El

Salvador's rulers have created governments of the minority and

(Political leader of the FPL) Guillermo M. Ungo. "The People's

Struggle." Foreign Polic'v 52. (Fall 1983), p. 51-52. Copyright 1983 by the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Reprinted by permission of

Foreign Policy.

.a
8 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

for the minority whose survival has depended on

institutionalized violence, on closing the channels of democratic

participation, and on ever-increasing violations of human rights.

Over the years, the dispossessed majority and the political,

social, and religious leaders have faced a dilemma: To fight

back and risk death in resistance or to submit and risk death

from hunger, poverty, or political repression. It is not possible

in El Salvador to aspire peacefully to human rights and political

freedoms; their pursuit is a reckless venture. This is the true

cause of the present war.

Live with the System or Become

Part of the Fertilizer Program

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-The Salvadoran system (prior

to the coup) was not designed to solve the problems of the

campesino dating back 50 years, or even longer if you go back

before the Matanza. It was designed to keep the lid on, and if

the campesino didn't like it, he had a couple of options: You

could emigrate or you could become part of the fertilizer

program. There wasn't any mechanism for grievances that

worked. You were at the mercy of the landowner and the

military in cahoots.

The Political Spectrum

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-I would say you had in the

political structure, first, the organized parties. You had, over on

the extreme left, the Communist party and its more radical

offshoots. A good reason why the guerrilla organizations

developed in the first place was that the Communist party for a

long time hewed to the Moscow line of a broad political front

Colonel John D. Waghelstein. Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 August 1987.
PRONE TO VIOLENCE

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10 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

but no armed action. So some of the original guerrilla groups

split off because they believed in armed action. You had them

joined by some of the church reformers in the late sixties and

seventies, who became more and more politically radicalized

and as a result found it easier and more compatible to join the

political wing of the armed resistance. Moving closer to the

center, you had the Social Democrats and the left of the Social

Democrats. Some of them, along with the left of the Christian

Democrats, joined the guerrilla organizations in 1979 at a time

of major upheaval when it didn't look like the political situation

would improve, and they felt sort of trapped out there. Some of

them, I understand, now want to come back in out of the cold.

Among the political front of the guerrillas, there were some

people who were genuinely Social Democrats and some people

who were pretty much radical Communists in one guise or

another. Further over you have the broad range of Christian

Democrats, some of whom are conservative and some of whom

are fairly liberal but occupying a center and left of center

position. Right center was the PCN, Partido de Conciliaci6n

Nacional (National Conciliation party). The old party of the

aristocracy, which was trying to find a way to reform its own

image, and its right-wing offshoot ARENA (National

Republican Alliance). And to the right of ARENA you had

people who were basically only semipolitical managers of death

squad activities, some of it for political reasons, some it for

economic and commercial reasons, some of it just to try to

control labor, to keep the campesinos under their thumb, and to

maintain some tranquility in their village or whatever it was.

You had a strong attraction in the rural population, interestingly

enough, for authoritarianism of the Right because it was

traditional, because they knew nothing else. You had, of

course, the spectrum to the left of the Christian Democratic

party flirting with the guerrillas from time to time.

The major campesino organizations, which had been

radicalized by the political processes leading up to the '79

overthrow of Romero, the Junta, and all the things that came

out of it, were influenced by the AFL-CIO on the one hand and

the guerrilla organizations on the other, constantly competing
PRONE TO VIOLENCE 11

for their loyalty and support. That's the political spectrum.

Within the social spectrum certainly there were the wealthy

land-owning families, a large share of which had left, but the

remnants of which were generally allied with ARENA, though

not entirely. There were exceptions, people who would support

other parties that in their total political views shared their deep

resentment over the changes that had so affected them in their

lifestyles. They weren't really affected all that much, but with

their insecurity they were very difficult to deal with, and they

ran the gamut in their power and influence. Then you had

people who supported the PCN for traditional reasons, who

were more open to democratic arguments and wanted to give

themselves a new image, and you had people who were

blatantly and openly ARENA, vocally anti-Communist. Fear of communism justified a lot of other things on their part. Not all

of them were necessarily bad actors, but many of them were

extreme nationalist Salvadorans who felt that the old system and

the good old days were not yet over. They were definitely afraid

of the Communists and the radicals or those who had been hurt

one way or another by the violence of the country. You had to

understand that the country itself was an extremely violent

country. We looked back at world statistics in 1967, at one

time, for civilian death rates, and we found that Salvador was

right behind Aden in those days, and, of course, that was a

period of war in Aden when the South Yemenis were trying to

get rid of the British. It was true, it was a society heavily prone

to violence. In large measure, alcohol, the machete, lack of

education, frustration, all tended to produce a certain

atmosphere of Saturday night massacre in the place. It was often

violence simply for reasons of quarreling. Violence and alcohol

were familiar ways for people to find respite from the other

difficulties of life in the country. Violent methods of control

were a part of the the repressive atmosphere, and this was very

much looked on as normal by people on the Right.

Aside from all these, you had within the country a welleducated class of individuals, a growing middle class, whose

political views covered a spectrum. The Christian Democratic

leadership in large measure had been influenced by American
12 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

education and values and by European education and values.

They considered themselves intellectually respectable. You had,

in the universities, strong centers of leftism particularly among

the academics and the tradition of the free university of Latin

America. And in a sense the major leadership of the guerrillas,

in an intellectual sense, was drawn from the universities. They

were a combination of university drop-outs-not that they were

intellectually unable but, rather, people who were products of a

radical university system-plus campesinos and peasants,

pressed into the organization and pushed by them, plus priests

and other individuals who grew out of the Catholic reform

movement. That's basically the kind of spectrum you had to

deal with in the country. Some technocrats, 500,000 internal

refugees, and 500,000 external refugees.
Revolutionary Change

and the Role of the

United States

THE EDITORS-In February 1972, after a decade of political

struggle to work within the electoral process, the

center-left National Opposition Union (UNO) was

declared the winner of the national election by the

Central Election Board of El Salvador. Napole6n Duarte

was to be the first president and Guillermo Ungo the

first vice-president in 40 years who were not the hand

picked candidates of the landed oligarchy and the ruling

military. Immediately following the board's

announcement of UNO's victory a news blackout was

imposed, to be lifted three days later when the Election

Board announced new results. The military-backed

National Coalition party (PCN) was declared the winner

with Colonel Arturo Molina as president. Soon

thereafter Duarte was implicated in an abortive coup

attempt. He was forcibly taken from the Venezuelan

Embassy, beaten, and put on a plane to Guatemala,

from where he went into exile in Venezuela. This overt

subversion of the election process created political

turmoil. The legitimacy of the government was eroding,

and the opposition political parties began to look for

alternatives to the election process to bring about

change.

13

, , ii
14 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

Satisfied with maintaining the status quo, the

oligarchy, fully in charge of the economy, looked to the

military to maintain order and to protect their interests.

With the oligarchy's continued seemingly total

inflexibility to change, coupled with growing social

unrest and political turmoil, the military government

under Colonel Molina and his successor, General Carlos

Humberto Romero, became more and more repressive.

As the military government became more

repressive, the support for radical and insurgent

solutions grew. The repression on one hand helped

develop a cadre of leaders supporting insurgent

solutions and on the other hand convinced moderates

inside and outside of the government that dynamic

change was necessary. Both insurgents and moderates

began to talk of the needed changes as revolutionary.

The People Are Sick and

Tired of the System

General Josi Guillermo Garcia-During the transition

between the presidencies of Colonel Molina and General

Romero, I had been mentioned and involved indirectly with

politics because of the former method of presidential succession:

it was performed the same way as in other countries which I

prefer not to mention. The person who is governing at the time

decides who will succeed him as president. At that time,

Eugenio (Vides Casanova), General Romero, and I were

rumored to be possible presidential successors. I took the

situation as calmly and normally as possible. However, when

the time came to decide-after going through certain

vicissitudes and the crude reality of what politics really are in

this country-the nomination didn't depend exclusively on the

President's decision but, rather, the decision of a sector. It's

very long to explain. Our inexperience caused us to play sincerely

General Josef Guillermo Garcia, Minister of Defense, El Salvador. 1979

to 1984, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 2 July 1987.
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE UNITED STATES 15

but not politically. If we had been politically astute, we would

all probably be ex-presidents today. But we are not politicians. I

don't know if I should confess with happiness or sadness, but

the fact is that we were nominated. The day before the President

made public his decision of who his successor would be he

called Eugenio (Vides Casanova) and me in. He told us he had

arrived at the conclusion that his successor was going to be

General Romero. He told me, "I would like to tell you that up

until 15 days ago you were the finalist. You were going to be

my successor but due to circumstances... - First of all, it is

now when we find out that was true. We never accepted it as

fact, and secondly, why did he tell us that'? Simply because we

were the finalists and he wanted us to know about it before it

became public.... We stated our objections to the President

(Colonel Molina), as friends, concerning the consequences of

Romero's elections on the country. Romero was not very

popular among a very large sector of the population for various

reasons. But the President told us he had possible solutions by

means of a decree, which at that time constituted a new way of

agrarian reform. At that time, the agrarian reform had a lot of

potential. The President, by the way, committed himself to his

decision, and he wasn't going to turn back on it. So when the

time came for General Romero to be nominated, the people

protested and said, "Why him'? He is not the right one." The

President responded, "But I have the solution. The people will

think that the agrarian reform is more important than the

nomination of a candidate." Unfortunately, the decree

disappeared. The situation was better off before the decree had

even been mentioned. That is when you began to feel the social

turmoil stirring. We had to go through a series of circumstances

during that nomination period. As a military man, youth and

inexperience bring honesty and sincerity. But not as a politician.

The politician thinks about one thing and says something else.

right'? We were subject to a lot of pressure from different

sectors, and you can imagine where they were coming from.

They sat the three of us down once-General Romero. Eugenio

Vides Casanova, and myself-the same way they sit the

accused on the benches. They asked us very delicate questions

immiimm [ I a Hi " a li~ n ii 
16 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

of a political nature, such as, "What is your opinion about the

future of El Salvador?" I was the first one to speak. I said,

"This country is going to experience some terrible problems if

you don't do something to avoid it, because the people are sick

and tired of the system. Certain changes must be made." They

probably thought at the time I was a Communist. Eugenio, with

all sincerity, and General Romero answered the question. You

can imagine the results. They are evident. I do not regret having

said what I said at the time, because only time uncovers the real

truth about things. One cannot, at a given moment, decide what

is good or bad. Time takes care of that. When Romero took

over, I found out I was being sent back to the Military

Academy, for the third time, as Deputy Director.

A Breakdown of Political

Consensus

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr-You had a situation in the

country where there was a relative amount of stability. There

was agreement and a consensus on a political formula by which

the country was managed. And you had had considerable

progress and growth with the Central American market, and

then all of a sudden there were other forces at work. There was

a tremendous growth of population. There were changes in

attitudes as people got transistor radios and began to look at the

function of government differently, not just as an institution that

provided a certain amount of internal order, but also one that

had to provide certain goods and services to its citizenry. You

also had the introduction of certain ideas of socialism,

communism, and so forth that begin to work on the people.

They begin to build up demands that the system was no longer

capable of coping with. During the seventies, particularly

following the Honduran/Salvadoran War, the political consensus

that had existed began to break down. You began to see a

greater amount of violence. The highest indices of kidnappings

took place from '75 to '77. And one also notes that there began

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1985 to

date. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. I June 1987 and 24

September 1987.
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE UNITED STATES 17

to be a breakdown in the institutions of government. This is seen

today as one examines such things as the controller general's

office where they are still processing records from the early

seventies-long before the '79 coup. Oh certainly, I could give

you a number of examples that indicated that the institutions of

government and the institutions within the society were no longer

capable of meeting the demands that were being placed upon them

by society and by the people. So you had a breakdown of political

consensus, you had institutions that were beginning to fail, you

had certain foreign ideologies that were also at work. You had 

a

very large, landless rural population that only could work about

four months out of the year, picking other people's crops or

cutting their cane, picking coffee or cotton. The economic picture

was a little bit more complex. Those people in the private sector

here look back to the pre-1979 or pre-1978 period as a period of

great prosperity. But I would only point out that the economy of

El Salvador is so affected by external market prices that this is 

a

little bit misleading. In 1978 the world price for coffee in real

terms was more than three times what it is today. That kind of

feeling that there was great prosperity, I think, was really caused

more by external conditions than internal conditions, and

eventually the economic machinery was breaking down too,

primarily because of the failure of the Central American market.

So all of these things came together, plus the events of Nicaragua,

to bring about this coup that took place in 1979. It was truly 

a

landmark happening.

Time to Develop an

Inuyget Cadre

Joaquin Villalobos-I would say that the war as a military

phenomenon of strategic importance indeed started in January

Joaqufn Villalobos. Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary

Army (ERP), one of the organizations which forms the FMLN. Interview by

Marta Harnecker was originally published in Mexico, November-December

1982, and later published in Revolution and Intervention in Central America,

edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis

Publications/CM Associates. 1983), pp. 79-80. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission.

! 1

f
18 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

1981. But the revolutionary war as such has existed throughout

the last 10 years. This distinction is important because prior to

January, two important phenomena took place. On the one

hand, there was the development of cadre who would be the

future leaders of the revolutionary army, those who could

conduct the insurrection and later guide a revolutionary army.

On the other hand, there was the ability shown by this armed

apparatus to also organize a powerful revolutionary mass

movement which led to the military confrontation with the

enemy.

The People Will Decide

Which Revolution

President JosO Napole6n Duarte-I acknowledged that the

revolutionaries may have had good reason for taking up arms

when there was no hope of economic reform, social justice or

free election under the tyranny of the oligarchy allied with the

armed forces.... The oligarchy controlling the economy, the

armed forces running the government, and the United States

protecting its interest in stability all worked to maintain the

status quo in El Salvador....

When the armed forces threw me out of El Salvador, faith

in the electoral process faded away. Many people concluded

that the powers ruling El Salvador would never permit votes to

defeat them. Change had to come by other means.

Both the guerrillas and the government are trying to win

over the Salvadoran people and show the world who is right.

The people will decide between Marxist revolution and

democratic revolution.

Revolution is a process, not the act of taking power. The

process of the revolution may begin with a change of

government, but the revolution takes place only when there has

Josd Napole6n Duarte, Duarte: My Story (New York: G.P. Putnam's

Sons, 1986), pp. 91, 211, 268-69. 274. 279. 281-82. (President of El

Salvador. 1984 to present). Copyright 1986 by Jos6 Napolc6n Duarte.

Reprinted by permission of G.P. Putnam's Sons.
I

REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE UNITED STATES 19

been a transformation of the economy, the social patterns, the

armed forces, the education, and the culture of a country. To

carry out a revolution, the leadership must have an ideology and

the political, economic and social strategies to apply it. These

strategies affect all sectors of society and the international

factors as well. They must respond to the conditions at any

given moment.

There will be no common ground as long as the guerrillas

believe violence is the only way they can gain power. There are

opportunities for all political beliefs within the democratic

system. The working class can organize to gain power within a

' democracy. But the guerrillas, who claim to represent the

workers, seem more interested in attacking Salvadorans than

trying to change the unjust structure of our society.

To become a democracy, the way we think about our

differences must be democratic. When disagreements arise, the

opponents must resort to public expression of opinion, to

political organization around their cause, and to the courts when

challenging interpretation of the law. A democracy cannot

function without the intermediary structures such as a free press,

political parties and a fair judicial system. Existing institutions

may not be democratic, requiring a process that transforms them

into instruments of democracy. This cannot be done overnight

in El Salvador.

If the Christian Democrats demonstrate in El Salvador that

a democratic system can bring about structural changes

peacefully, then the polarized choice between domination by the

rightist oligarchy and violent revolution by the Left will no

longer be valid.

The Role of the United States

THE EDITORS-The historical violence in Central America,

and in El Salvador particularly, gave the Carter

administration ample reason to adopt a hard line

insistence on human rights and "democratic" reform as

conditions of U.S. assistance to countries in the region.

The long-standing U.S. preoccupation with East-West

I

4

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.
20 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

issues, sprinkled with an occasional attention to the

South in the forms of military intervention or short lived

economic assistance, led to a general lethargy and lack

of understanding of the problems and the people of

Central and South America.

While factions of the U.S. military and the U.S.

State Department seemed to understand the overall

strategic importance of the region, U.S. policy-makers

as a whole tended to treat situations in the individual

countries as isolated problems. The region was

strategically important, but, like Cuba or the Panama

Canal, the importance was in terms of East-West balance

or context. Except in instances where U.S. businesses or

blatant corruption impacted the U.S. image as a

supporter of a particular regime, the policy-makers were

seemingly content with preaching democracy and

human rights, giving minimal amounts of military and

economic aid, and otherwise adopting the policies of

nonintervention in the affairs of their poor neighbors to

the South.

The events in Nicaragua, especially after the U.S.-

supported Sandinistas showed their preferences for the

Marxist-Leninist ideology, forced the United States out

of its lethargy. Previously held conditions for U.S. aid

based on human rights gave way to "showing progress"

in this area and in democratization.

The United States would have to be involved in

order to fight the spread of communism and to bolster

democratic regimes. And yet, the United States had not

developed a better understanding of the problems nor a

long-term plan for involvement. Everyone-insurgents,

embattled regimes, and the now awakened Washington

policy-makers-understood that the U.S. commitment

would be critical to the eventual solution. The United

States, however, was prepared to be anti-Communistto return the situation to normalcy and stability-but

lacked a program or the policies to be pro-democratic.

There was no support net for democracy in the U.S.
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE UNITED STATES 21

arsenal, only the tools and programs to fight against

something.

The United States Preached

Democracy and Human Rights

But Did Little

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi-Stepping back for a minute. I would

say that El Salvador has been an extremely difficult problem for I American policy. American officials have, in fact, been forced

to become fairly deeply involved in supporting democratic

political processes. My own conclusion is that the success of

U.S. policy has been in direct proportion to our ability to

support democratic processes in a constructive fashion. Let me

illustrate this to be very certain that we understand what I mean.

I do not mean support for democratic processes in an abstract,

uninvolved, or purely rhetorical fashion. I don't think that

works. The best example of that in El Salvador is what

happened in the period between 1977, when the first human

rights reports were published in January 1977, and the collapse

of the first civil-military junta of October 1979, a collapse

which took place between December of '79 and January '80. In

that period, basically the Americans, the American government,

the State Department, the administration, preached democracy

and human rights and did little to advance them in practice. The

Salvadorans clearly have to take their share of the blame. They

rejected military assistance out of nationalist pride after the

publications of the first reports, but it is perfectly clear that they

would have gotten precious little from us, in any case, and the

Carter people were delighted to be able to say that by God they

weren't giving any aid to those torturers in Salvador. But,

beneath the rhetoric, the reality is there are a lot of Salvadorans,

including those it, the military and security services who were

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi. Director. Office of Policy. Planning and

Coordination. Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. U.S. Department of State,

1977 to date. interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 10 September 1987.

I rmi llm ll l l•m l l nnn l[
22 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

troubled by having a fouled up relationship with the United

States, who asked formally, on more than one occasion and at

least once in writing, for U.S. assistance in human rights

matters, so as to be able to figure out what to do to improve the

relationship. And as far as I know they never got any very

effective answer from the Department of State. I am not sure,

for example, that the original request was ever even answered.

In 1979 the fall of Somoza set off repercussions that were

very deep for El Salvador. Some of these, of course, on the far

left side led directly to the formation of the FMLN and the

guerrilla tactic because they thought that it would be possible to

reproduce, in El Salvador, the Nicaraguan tactic-from unity of

the different fragmented groups on the far left to the launching

of some sort of final offensive. That, in fact, is the origin of the

guerrilla offensive of January 1981. But there are other impacts,

as well. On the American side, the Carter administration was

shocked out of its noninterventionist lethargy when Nicaragua

went sour. And by going sour, I mean until the Somoza regime

came to an end in a way that clearly put Communist-oriented

elements in the driver's seat. The Carter people had tended to

assume that what happened in Central America really wasn't all

that much business of theirs, that they couldn't influence it all

that much anyway, indeed, maybe that it was immoral for them

to try to influence it too much, and so forth.

When the Nicaraguan denouement took place, the first

reaction was that the situation had changed in a fundamental

fashion, t'at we had to get involved. I was told at the time, I do

not remember on what basis, that President Carter reacted in

part by saying that he wanted the United States to become more

involved, to prevent a repetition of the Nicaraguan experience

anywhere else, but that he didn't want us to be backing the

wrong horse. And, to some extent our mission, the mission of

the Assistant Secretary, Ambassador Vaky, in 1979 when I

accompanied him to El Salvador, was a fact finding mission.

One of whose purposes was to see what kind of horse Romero

might prove to be. Our meetings with him were inconclusive.

We did not find him particularly impressive, as a man and as

the President. I at least remember going back to my quarters and
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE UNITED STATES 23

drawing up a list of the presidents that I have known in my life

and discovered that I ranked President General Romero as

approximately number 40 out of 40, at the bottom of the list. To

the best of my knowledge, though I did miss a brief portion of a

private meeting between Vaky and Romero, Vaky did not at any

point suggest to Romero that he resign. Rather, what he did talk

about was the need for some kind of dramatic political

initiatives in order to keep the situation in El Salvador from

deteriorating. Be that as it may, the Romero group was clearly

not in very good control of the situation, and it was no great

surprise, therefore, when they fell and were replaced by a new

coalition in October 1979.

We Haven't Decided What or How

Important the Problem is to the U.S.

General Wallace H. Nutting-I moved from a command in

NATO to USSOUTHCOM (US Southern Command) without

passing GO, collecting $200.00, or anything else. I will say that

General Meyer, then Chief of Staff of the Army, recognized the

need to have some kind of program. Having worked with him

before we were pretty much on the same frequency. I

understood his concerns, and I very quickly was able to refine

my own. But from no one else in the government did I get any

guidance. I think that's wrong. It was a critical period.

Obviously U.S. interests were being challenged, yet the sensing

in Washington of priorities and importance never changed, and

that's wrong. And that, I think, is a big problem. The fact that 1

received no guidance from anyone except the Chief of Staff of

the Army is indicative of Washington's view. It has taken a

long time to turn it around, and, obviously, it's a matter of

continuing national debate. We haven't yet decided as a nation,

as a government, what the problem is or how important it is to

the United States.

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern

Command, 1979 to 1983. interviewed in Orlando. Florida. 29 January 1987.
24 EL SALVADOR IN CONTEXT

The Context of the War:

Reconnaissance of the Valley

THE EDITORS-For the insurgents violent revolution is a

requirement of the Marxist-Leninist class struggle. They

see it as a long-term, total effort to replace the existing

order with the "vanguard of the proletariat"-which is

the only leadership group capable of properly

correcting long-standing economic, social, and political

injustice. The insurgent's objective was to destroy the

legitimacy and the leadership of the government. The

military-civil elites who generated the 1979 coup saw the

need for radical change and proposed a set of dynamic,

evolutionary processes which would correct the existing

problems and leave the general fabric of society intact.

These changes could be achieved through a

"democratic" process in which the long-repressed "people" could take a major role. The third actor in the

struggle, the United States, tended to view the situation

in El Salvador as an extension of the general East-West

superpower confrontation and as a follow-on to the

Sandanista takeover in Nicaragua. As such, the primary

objective of the United States seemed to be to do what

was necessary to return to "normalcy" so as to

concentrate on the primary threat.

The context of the war in El Salvador, then, was

twofold. In terms of time, it would be a long-term

struggle for survival for both the revolutionaries and the

government. As far as the United States was concerned,

it was something to be resolved as quickly as possible,

but with complaisance. In terms of effort, the conflict

would be political and moral as much as military. Thus,

it would be a total effort for both insurgent and

incumbent. Only an outside superpower would have

the luxury of thinking in "limited" terms.

The thrust of the revolutionary program centered

around the redress of real as well as perceived

grievances and deprivations. The government
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE AND THE UNITED STATES 25

counterinsurgency planners understood this and did not

respond only to the dismounted "enemy" military

forces. They centered their efforts around basic reforms

and the establishment of the foundations of

participatory democracy. Thus, legitimacy-the moral

right to govern-was the center of all power and

movement on which everything depended and the basic

context of the conflict. In Clausewitzian terms, it was

also the primary center of gravity.

4

mmmmmmm m'I] mma l mm
Part H

In Disarray:

15 October 1979

to October 1981

I
3

Current Conflict and the

Coup of 15 October

THE EDITORS-While there are many antecedents to the

war in El Salvador-not a few of which might be traced

as far back as 1492-it was the military coup of 15

October 1979 that will go down in history as the event

that started the current conflict. At that time, none of

the principal actors was ready for the events brought on

by the ouster of General Romero.

By 1979, the Situation Was Beyond

Control by Repression

Dr. Alvaro Magaiia-It has been said that ... in 1972.

electoral fraud was perpetrated against the Christian Democrats

and that it was [President] Duarte who won those elections.

Nevertheless, Colonel Molina took power because it was

thought that he would be able to establish a regime strong

enough to control the various forces agitating for change. But.

by 1979, the situation was beyond control by repression.

Moreover, Salvadoran officers had seen what had happened to

Somoza's National Guard at the hands of the Nicaraguan

people, and they were afraid they might not be able to put out

Dr. Alvaro Magafia. provisional President of the Republic of El Salvador.

1982 to 1984. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 18 December 1986

and 30 June 1987.

" 1 29
30 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

the fire of revolution in El Salvador. To save the armed forces,

they would have to break their alliance with the oligarchy and

realign with political forces that could win popular support.

For me this was an extraordinary experience because an army

that for many years had been directly or indirectly instrumental in

maintaining certain parties in power transformed itself into an

army of a democratic country and began to understand its

responsibilities. Practically speaking, it was the same officers that

five years before had been participating indirectly to maintain the

status quo, who overthrew General Romero and proclaimed the

reforms of 1980. The fundamental reforms were agrarian reform,

banking reform, and the reform of foreign commerce.

Prelude to the Coup

General Josi Guillermo Garcia-When the seeds of the 1979

movement began. I was not included among the group that was

stirring up the movement, but I was called because I was, and

still am, a great friend of Colonel

Jaime Guti~rrez. Through him, they

began to tell me what the movement

was all about. During a meeting,

which was attended by the principal

participants, along with delegates of

different military corps, I stated as my

position that I was in agreement with

what was going on and I was going to

participate. But I laid down certain

conditions because I knew at once

there were several fellow soldiers who

saw this as an opportunity to benefit

COPREFA from the movement. I told them that

General this was not a situation that would be

Jos Guillermo Garcia used for the personal gains of each one

but, rather, the future of our country. That is to say. we

General Josd Guillermo Garcia. Minister of Defense. El Salvador, 1979 to

1984, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 2 July 1987.
THE COUP OF 15 OCTOBER 31

began the movement with sincerity and good faith. We were

leading it with such good faith, we hadn't even noticed who

were the true leaders of the movement. Among them were those

who had their principal offices in the university, UCA

(Universidad Centroamericana), and part of the employment

sector, who were very well informed and, of course, were the

primary inducers of the movement. I don't want to say that

there wasn't good faith on the part of the officers. I believe that

the majority of us did go in good faith, each in his respective

echelon.

When the movement was initiated, I stated firmly that I

didn't want any responsibilities. I had already devoted 26 years

to the service, and I had already planned on retiring after San

Vicente. I didn't want anything. But the October 15 movement

came along and the following day I was being asked to take

over as Minister of Defense. I said no. I told both Majano and

Jaime, jokingly, that instead of giving me the title of Defense

Minister, why not give me the responsibility as Minister of

Foreign Relations. That's nice, with a lot of decorations and

trips. But, to give me the responsibility of Defense Minister

during that time was not very generous on their part. Finally

they said, "Well, you are betraying us; you have fooled us all

along." How could I refuse? I said, "O.K.. I'll go." That is

how I came to the First Brigade and was able to learn what the

movement was all about and who was really behind it. That is

where the big battle started out. From the first moment, from

the first Council of Ministers, I noticed at once what the

situation was. It was the beginning of the subversion, which had

always existed in the country. The principal objective was the

destruction of the armed forces.

I knew the problem was serious, and my mission was to

defend the armed institution in order to avoid its collapse.

Before October 15, none of us wore a uniform on the streets.

not because we were afraid they'd kill us, but because we were

afraid they'd spit on us. Such was the degree of pressure that

had been transferred over from the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

Already they were saying, "We don't even want to see military

men." We started out, on October 15 with zero public opinion.

a
32 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

We began to build up on it. That is where I began to exercise

some of my influence in order to build public opinion in our

favor rather than conducting a war.

You must remember that at that time we were all alone.

Everybody was against us. Everything began because

international opinion was being managed by representation of

international Marxism or by leftists, and here their

representatives had many connections and succeeded at first in

making an erroneous image of the government which had been

installed. They managed to create a superfluous image of the

government that had been installed at the time. The leaders,

Guillermo Ungo and Zamora, were at the peak. I saw the

situation very clearly.

The 15 October 1979 Coup:

Unhinging the Oligarchy's Power

Ferman Cienfuegos-Let's not forget that, after all, the coup

of October 15, 1979, signified a relative unhinging of the

oligarchy's power, in that it was a new situation with less than

ideal conditions. For the oligarchy it was a matter of recovering

government positions, which they hadn't really lost, but hadn't

been able to handle either. The representatives of the

oligarchy's corporate interests, finding themselves in a delicate,

complex and dangerous political situation, had been unable to

reconcile these with their long-range goals.

This situation caused shifts within the core of the

oligarchy. Those with a more long-range political and economic

approach had been pushed to the sidelines, in many far-reaching

decisions, while those with a "do-it-now" approach and the

Fermin Cienfuegos. Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of

National Resistance (FARN) and a member of the general command of the

FMLN. His analysis of the situation in El Salvador was originally published in

the Mexican journal Poceso on 9 March 1981. and later published in

Revolution and Intervention in Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and

Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates. 1983),

p. 57. Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.

_
THE COUP OF 15 OCTOBER 33

most bellicose tendencies had gained much ground. This sector of

the oligarchy views the present situation as a process of recovering

political power it nearly lost to the bourgeois-reformist sector of

the oligarchy which imperialism had wanted to impose.

The Junta is definitely unable to govern. That it has ever

governed is questionable. The Christian Democratic military

regime has no popular support whatsoever, nor any national or

international credibility. The continuous crisis of the regime,

marked by constant desertions of its administrators and by an

incapacity to implement even a small part of its programs, is now

dramatized by total economic chaos, a chaos which, from many

points of view, is irreversible.

Only one thing still holds up this government, and it is the

same thing that props up all puppet regimes: imperialism's dollars

and the political alliance of the most retrogressive sectors. The

military's attempts to make a leader out of Duarte only add a touch

of melodrama to a situation that is clearly untenable.

The Leadership Was in Limbo

General Fred F. Woerner-The political and military

leadership of El Salvador was in limbo after the coup of '79

when General Romero was overthrown and Colonel Garcia

came to power. The military found it advisable to unite with the

leader of the Christian Democratic movement. This coup was

very significant in terms of measuring the seriousness and intent

to effect changes. They went so far as to call upon Napole6n

Duarte, whom they had robbed of his presidential election

(1972), had exiled, and probably even tortured, to head the

Civil-Military Junta. Whether this occurred for military

institutional reasons or because of the personal desires of the

participants to gain power and its spoils, this was one of the

most significant events since the 1930s in Salvadoran history. It

was probably a mix of motives.

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America, 1982 to 1985,

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, 7 November 1986.

.1t
34 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

This coup had been prompted, as many others, by a group

of idealistic and frustrated junior officers, but in this instance

they co-opted powerful elements of the senior officer corps

because the senior officer corps, except for one or two

individuals, probably were not willing participants. They had

been drawn into it for various reasons, some good, and others

not so good. The co-optation increased institutional support to

the young turks, who, in the limbo of '79-'81, were trying to

consolidate and lead toward a Constitutional Assembly and

eventual elections.

The military was buffeted on both sides and internally. The

far right was clearly opposed to their intentions because it was

the Civil-Military Junta that initiated the momentous reforms in

agriculture, land tenure, and banking, which were all to the

elites' perceived detriment. They were opposed by the FDR and

its militant arm, the FMLN, because they were co-opting the

political and social rationale of the guerrilla movement and

placing it within a potentially democratic context.* They were

opposed internally by the leadership of the armed forces, who

saw a threat to their vested interests in continuing an alliance

with the oligarchy that had existed for decades.

In spite of the apparent unity of purpose personified in the

Civil-Military Junta, there was an extraordinary degree of

suspicion between the military and the civilian government. This

was obviously a marriage of convenience. At this point in

Salvadoran history, Napole6n Duarte had no confidence in the

military, for good reasons. The military looked upon him as an

enemy of the military, The standard quote of the day was, "The

only good military man is one hanging from a lamp post,"

attributed to Napole6n Duarte. Whether or not that was

apocryphal, I don't know. But they certainly suspected him. There

was a deliberate design to exclude him from the decisionmaking

process of the military, which was very much still in control.

At that time the military had not joined the civilians who

were opposed to the continuing rule of the famous 14 families

(which many years ago expanded to a greatly increased

number). They had, however, banded together for mutual

*See pages 80-81 for insurgent organizations.

Si
THE COUP OF 15 OCTOBER 35

convenience, particularly in the light of the failure of earlier

juntas and the withdrawal of different civilian segments from

the earlier Civil-Military Junta.

So the military in turning to Napole6n Duarte were taking a

giant step-a step that dramatized the seriousness of their

intentions, since they were aligning themselves with their

traditional internal enemy. In so doing they cut themselves off

from their traditional internal ally, the oligarchy. Thus they

were in a state of limbo-cut off from their traditional ally but

far from being unified with their new ally.

The United States Did Not

Respond Effectively

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi-What is interesting is that although the

coalition contained not only military but also political

representatives (like Ungo, who were later to associate with the

guerrillas), the administration was still unable to get itself on

track and accept the need to get involved and to really support

the regime. We talked, launched a number of nice sounding

phrases, but we really did not get involved. We did not have the

flexibility to provide a significant increase of economic or

security assistance rapidly. In fact, the very idea of providing

security assistance was opposed with all possible force by the

new human rights bureau in the department. Of course, in

responding slowly the United States was no different from the

rest of the Western world. Although appealed to by that CivilMilitary Junta of '79 for help, the West did not react positively.

Therefore, in effect, it fiddled while the most extreme elements

on the far left took the initiative, provoked street

demonstrations, and helped to bring down the '79 Junta. It is at

that point that American policy began to change in a positive

direction for the first time. Realizing that there was too much at

stake here, the administration decided to back the emerging

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director. Office of Policy. Planning and

Coordination. Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

1977 to date, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 10 September 1987.

I
36 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Christian Democratic Military Coalition and even to back its

social reform programs. And to do so even with nonlethal

security assistance meant breaking through the cutoff of El

Salvador from military aid. This, indeed, is one of the key

elements in changing the situation in El Salvador.

THE EDITORS-After the ouster of General Romero, El

Salvador became a polarized, fragmented society on the

verge of anarchy. The total confusion of the situation

was to last for more than a year. Some examples

illustrate the "good" and the "bad" of the time.

No One in Control

President Jose Napole6n Duarte-No one seemed to be in

control, neither the Junta, the security forces nor the Leftists.

The Army officers were fighting among themselves.... They

had staged a coup, but they could not control the Army or the

government. Nor did the government control them. [After]

October, 1979 there was a power vacuum.

One would have thought the Army, internally divided and

infiltrated, would have panicked. We had received none of the

military aid requested, while the guerrillas were well armed

with weapons which the Sandinista rebels no longer needed and

passed on.... The only force holding back the Leftist revolution

was the Army.

Agrarian Reform

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-The biggest single problem

stemming from the '79 coup was that the Junta had initiated

banking, land, and commodity reform. They had viewed these

Jose Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to present),

Duarte: MY Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986), pp. 102, 115,

162. Copyright 1986 by Josd Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G.

P. Putnam's Sons.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.
THE COUP OF 15 OCTOBER 37

problems as being the keys. The problem with the land reform

is that only about 10 percent of the landowners have ever been

compensated. You have this festering sore because the

landowners think they are going to come back one of these days

to turn back history, as the Bourbons did coming back after

Napoleon's reign, having learned nothing and forgotten nothing.

We need to get them out of the equation. They need to sign that

quit claim that says, "Yes, I've been compensated." It doesn't

have to be in cash. The law says 60-40 bonds. The landowner

should say I'm out of it. The land is gone, and I'm going to

have to turn my interest, intelligence, and entrepreneurial fervor

elsewhere. That takes care of the immediate problem of whom

does the land belong to, and then come the various phases of

land reform. Lots of people benefit. The banking reform had to

be-there's not only land reform, but you also have to be able

to make loans available for seed and fertilizer.

The land reform will come along, but if there's no backup--

there are no small business loans, no extension services, they

cannot market their products, and they can't get the agricultural

services if you will-then the reformers haven't dcne all the things

that land reformers are supposed to do that cost money.

Human Rights Reform

President Jose Napoleon Duarte-As a junta, we had no

chance of reforming the military bureaucracy or making the

lower levels responsive to our orders. Our decrees on

controlling the abuses of authority were never even transmitted

to the local commanders. Only Colonel Vides Casanova in the

National Guard and Colonel Reynaldo L6pez Nuila in the

National Police made a personal effort to begin disciplining

their men and weeding out the most abusive ones.

A few other commanders were ready for the changes, but

the structure was not.

Jose Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to present). Duarte:

Mv Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1986), p. 172. Copyright 1986 by

Jose Napolc6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P. Putnam's Sons,

iz
38 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

The 13-15 August 1980 General Strike

Juan Chac6n-In the first place, let me make it clear that this

was not a general strike; we envision the general strike as

accompanying the final battles for power. Rather, these actions

were general work stoppages, like the one on March 17, which

was the first to be carried out by the joint forces. The latest

work stoppage of August 13-15 had as its goal, first, to

demonstrate the regime's inability to solve the problems of our

country; to expose it as a government totally isolated from the

masses; and to reconfirm the people's support for the FDR as

their legitimate representative. It was also aimed at breaking the

blackout that imperialism has tried to impose on our struggle

and transcending national boundaries to tell people about what

was really happening and the power of the revolutionary forces.

But the principal objective of the work stoppage was to

begin moving to a more advanced stage of popular struggle.

How do we achieve these objectives? It's very clear. The enemy

tried to hide the achievements of the work stoppage, boasting

that it had been a failure. Ever since the general strike was first

announced. the government had carried out a publicity

campaign to keep people from joining it. They also positioned

all their armed forces in the capital, which is the nerve center of

the country. The Army and riot squads occupied streets.

factories, public services, neighborhoods. etc., to force people

to work and give an appearance of tranquility.

In spite of all this, the work stoppage was a tremendous

success for the Salvadoran people. Without having to utilize all

their potential, the people put the enemy on the defensive, as

shown by this wasted military action of the Junta.

During the work stoppage, we gained more experience.

there was greater organization of people by neighborhood, and

Juan Chac6n. member of the executive committee of the Democratic

Revolutionary Front (FDR) until his death in 1980. Interview by CIDAMO

originally published in Mexico, 1980, and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas

(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983). pp. 45-46.

Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
THE COUP OF 15 OCTOBER 39

mass participation was not limited to political actions, but also

included actions with the militias and the people's army. Military

encounters at the national level had results favorable to the

revolutionary forces; these battles have been wearing down the

enemy troops. For example, the FPL alone caused 810 enemy

losses during the three days of the general strike while 31

revolutionary compaifieros were killed. This does not include the

actions of the other political-military organizations.

The regime attempted to conceal all these achievements from

the eyes of the world, trying to present a facade of apparent

"tranquility," which they did by going house to house and forcing

many people to go to work. There were workplaces of 200 or

more employees where only 10 to 25 showed up. They forced

transportation workers to work, while members of the Junta

strutted triumphantly through the streets. This didn't break

people's morale but it did confuse some sectors of the population.

who let themselves be influenced by the demagogic nonsense.

Murder, Assassination, and

Death Squads

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial")-One more indicator

of the breakdown of the regime is the incredible degree of

cynicism and sadism in the assassinations that they commit daily.

They take an entire family from their home, and the next day the

bodies are found strung up in the outskirts of town with their faces

tied together, as if kissing each other. It is repulsive to have to talk

about these things, but the world must know about them. In

December, disfigured bodies began to appear with signs that read,

"Merry Christmas, people. We are ridding you of terrorists."

Salvador Cayetano Carpio (**Marcial). primary leader of the Popular

Forces of Liberation (FPL). one of the organizations that make up the FMLN,

until his death in i983. Interview by Adolfo Gilly originally published in Mexico

on 4 and 5 January 1981, and later published in Revolution and Intervention in

Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco:

Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983). pp. 52-53. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.

• ! i I I /iH I H I HP Ril~ •
4E

Problems in the Junta

and the Army

THE EDITORS-After the coup of October 1979 the

military sought to establish the Junta following the

historic model of Latin American politics. This focused

on sharing power with key power centers in the attempt

to establish a unity of effort around the military's

proclamation to institute reform objectives. Very quickly

the military leadership found that the various groups

were not interested in modifying what existed but were

polarized around either maintaining essentially what

had existed before or the implementation of more

radical reforms. This first Junta could not establish a

cohesive coalition nor was it able to control the violence

from either of the opposing ends of the political

spectrum. Without the ability to effectively establish its

authority, the first Junta disintegrated and was replaced

by a second Junta in January 1980. The second Junta,

one of convenience between the military and the

Christian Democratic party (PDC), brought together

traditional political enemies. It was characterized by

mutual distrust and the mutual goal of political and

institutional survival against the common threat of the

leftist insurgency. The willingness of the PDC to align

itself with the armed forces created the milieu which

promised meaningful change. The flexibility and

capability of the military to adopt the coalition

41

A
42 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

requirements, to essentially deny its traditional

oligarchic allies, to neutralize the ultra-rightists, and to

initiate and implement the reforms called for in the

coup proclamation were the ingredients which began to

reestablish the national and international legitimacy of

the government.

We Had to Administer Reforms,

But We Had No Resources

General Jaime Abdul Gutikrrez-There was an urgent need

to take action against the general insurgency. It was at this time

that a group of officers and myself got together and began to

design a strategy to attack the problems from the bottom.

Naturally, there was a need to guarantee a democratic process in

the country. In principle, we needed to make a political opening

and include participation by what we considered the Democratic

Left, in order to reduce the social conflict at the time and to

provide some hope, at least for the masses. We had to allow

them (the Democratic Left) to participate in the decisionmaking

process of the government. This was one of the first measures

we took. Additionally, as a result of the high concentration of

land in the hands of a few, we determined there would have to

be a better distribution of income. Those were the strategic

objectives we set out to accomplish. Unfortunately, it was too

late to start taking these kinds of measures within the

government at that time. If we would have set out to do this in

the seventies, obviously, things would have been different;

however, we had to accelerate our plan. In order to do this, we

needed to overthrow the government, to have a coup and to

establish programs based on those primary premises.

What we did not count on was the degree of infiltration in

the various institutions, such as universities, and mostly within

General Jaime Abdul Gutidrrez, member of the Civil-Military Junta

which took control of the government of El Salvador after deposing General

Romero on 15 October 1979, interviewed in S~in Salvador. El Salvador, 18

December 1986.

)A
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 43

the Salvadoran intellectuals, who were extremely infiltrated.

They definitely wanted radical changes, including the

reorganization of the armed forces, that is, the dissolution of the

security groups. I was particularly opposed to all that because I

believed we needed to start with what we had. One of the

objectives was to avoid a war. And we believed that by

allowing for a political opening and providing measures to

improve economic conditions that we were going to reduce the

insurgent state the country was facing. There was not a single

institution that had not been infiltrated and was not against the

government. The government had lost everything. The labor

unions controlled everything, not only the industry, but also

strategic sectors of the state such as the electrical energy,

potable water, ports and airports, health, hospitals, and so forth.

They had infiltrated everything and could easily paralyze the

entire country. In lieu of that, we analyzed the situation and

decided we needed to attack the problem from three directions.

First, we had to win the trust of the people, the masses, who

were in complete opposition of the government due to the

deaths of several priests who were obviously involved in

terrorist activities. There had been a definite split between the

state and the church. We then focused on looking for someone

who was highly associated and involved with the universities,

specifically the Jesuit University. We wanted someone who had

the intellect and had strong links with the people. This was

Ram6n Mayorga, who later became a member of the Junta. We

then had to allow them to participate in the political parties and

began negotiations with the Popular Forum, with the labor

unions, trade unions, political parties, and even the ultra-Left

organizations.

We also believed it was necessary to have someone of trust

who could represent private enterprise in the new government.

We asked them to provide us with someone, and they chose

Mario Andino. I mentioned previously that we had made

contact with the Popular Forum, which was infiltrated and

managed by the leftists. They provided us with an additional

member, Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo. Those were the three

civilians who formed the new government. A proclamation was

I innm amm a N • in la i i na mnn I I I
44 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

then issued which contained all of the ideological bases and

precisely what we were going to do with the new government.

These were the strategic objectives we had in mind to

accomplish. What we did not count on, and this was a grave

mistake, was that the Left had already infiltrated these

organizations and had made serious commitments with terrorist

organizations. We thought we were dealing with a Democratic

Left. However, they had already made serious commitments

with members of the ultra-Left and had established certain links

with these organizations, not as guerrillas, but as idealists.

Thus, the new government was formed with five members.

three civilians, as mentioned previously, and the military. We

were determined to establish a reform movement. At this point.

relations with the United States changed. However, there was

still no military aid, and it was not very likely that we would

receive any for a while. But the United States was seriously in

favor of radical changes with respect to reforms, and they did

support the new government from the beginning.

Important changes occurred in the eighties. On 15

December 1979, Fidel Castro ordered the Left to abandon the

government and only leave the military in control. We found

out later on in September of 1980 that Fidel Castro had

managed to unite the groups with different ideologies in order to

form a common front. This affected us tremendously. The

government entered into a state of crisis. Prior to the crisis with

the Left, the only serious reform actions introduced into the

government were those introduced to satisfy the strategic

objectives and to satisfy the Left. There had been a need to

repress right-wing demonstrations, right-wing publications, and

everything the right wing was saying. And that was a primary

problem of the new regime, that we had to declare the Right as

our only enemy. We then had the crisis with the Left, and the

government was eventually overthrown. This occurred on 3

January, but the effects stemmed from what was happening in

Cuba since 15 December.

We then reverted to our original state with only two

military officers and no government. We spoke with the

Christian Democrats, the military, and we tried to enter
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 45

discussions with the Social Democrats in order to integrate a

new government. The Social Democrats said they wanted no

part in dealing with us. So, we then proceeded to discuss and to

negotiate for a new government with the Christian Democrats.

We signed a pact between the armed forces and the Christian

Democrats. A second Junta was created on 12 January 1980

with new members. In addition to the two existing military

officers, an independent doctor, Dr. Ram6n Avalos Navarrete,

came on to the scene. Two others, Dr. Morales Erlich, a

Christian Democrat, and the engineer, Hector Dada Hirezi, also

joined the Junta. The Left knew what our strategy was and

blocked the promulgation of our structural economic reforms.

We insisted on the promulgation of the reforms, and on 5 March

1980, we established the agrarian reform. We removed the basic

law of the land ownership, and this resulted in the resignation of

Dada Hirezi who was seriously blocking the promulgation of the

reform. Foreign commerce was nationalized. This was

accomplished under the first Junta, and I was able to get

signatures of those members before they resigned on 3 January.

The bank was also nationalized, obtaining for the state 51

percent of the shares. These new measures brought new hope. It

also provided the campesino with a different situation. If we

gave him access to the land, it denied the Left any opportunity

to manipulate the campesino and his land. Naturally, the Left

had no other alternative but to fight the reform since they had

already spoken about reforms with clubs and cudgels and other

such means. But, this placed the government in a very difficult

situation; we had an enemy who was not only the Left but also

the Right. We then promoted another law, for strategic reasons,

which was the transfer of the land to the tenant farmers who

leased it. This program was created with the purpose of having

the campesino defend his property regardless of how small it

was. And, definitely, to this day it is still not understood that

these measures were anti-insurgency measures. We wanted to

take away the slogans from the Right, besides trying to establish

a more calm and just environment in the country. But.

definitely, the Left had a very large summoning capacity. On

January 23, 1980, they led a very large demonstration of
46 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

approximately 250,000 people in the capital, a capital which at

the time was estimated as having 600,000 people. The people

were very scared. I think that this process of reform and the

restructuring we implemented had positive effects, and we were

able to take away the Left's power to mobilize. Even though we

managed to take away this power, we faced serious problems.

The problem was how to administrate the reforms. We had no

resources. A lot of capital had been taken out of the country.

That year, the coffee prices dropped to $90.00 per quintal. We

had no chance for survival. On the one hand we had the Right

trying to overthrow the government, and we definitely knew of

the Left's attempts to prepare for the offensive.

There Was No Real Unity

in the Junta

President Josi Napole6n Duarte-The October Junta was

probably doomed as a multiheaded monster from its birth. Not

even the colonels on the Junta, Jaime Guti6rrez and Adolfo

Majano, agreed on where the government was going. The

differences between these two military officers would eventually

lead to a confrontation within the Army. Meanwhile, the tension

between the officers and the civilians grew. Two of the civilian

Junta members, Ungo and Mayorga, identified with the Left and

were frequently at odds with the businessman on the Junta,

Mario Andino.

Below the Junta, the crevices widened even deeper among

the ministers from opposing political philosophies, giving El

Salvador a government of national disunity. The Labor Ministry

was under a Communist, Gabriel Gallegos. It was taken over by

the leftist mass organizations, as was the Education Ministry.

The Defense Minister, Colonel Josd Guillermo Garcia,

Josd Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to present).

Duarte: MY Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1986). pp. 104-1I.

Copyright 1986 by Jose Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P.

Putnam's Sons.
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 47

continued the repressive policies of the deposed Romero

government, letting the security forces use brute force and terror

against leftist demonstrations. The Junta ordered the disbanding

of ORDEN, a paramilitary network of informers and vigilantes;

but under the protection of the armed forces, ORDEN continued

to operate. The Junta appointed a committee to investigate the

fate of political prisoners who had disappeared, with obvious

aims to destroy the Army structure, but the armed forces refused

to be held accountable.

By December, as the government tottered, the Junta's own

Minister of the Presidency, Rub6n Zamora, was eager for its

collapse. Zamora and his brother Mario were both leaders of the

Christian Democratic Party, members of its key political

committee. Mario, a true believer in Christian Democratic

concepts, would pay for his commitment with his life. Ruben, a

Marxist-minded political scientist, would later join the

guerrillas. Back then, he believed that the disintegration of the

Junta government would enable him to dictate new terms to the

military. Zamora thought that when the Army faced the

alternative of either the complete collapse of the government or

its own submission to the Junta's control, the armed forces

would accept any order, especially those aimed at stopping the

abuses. If not, then the Army would be left without any political

allies....

The Left took strength from the chaos, from the bloodshed,

the hundreds of victims each month. This made a mass

insurrection more likely. The Left was counting on a broadbased uprising, not a guerrilla victory. At that time, the tiny

guerrilla cells had no hope of defeating the Army. They were

capable only of destabilizing the government.

Their plan was to lead a massive revolt by the population,

the way the Sandinista guerrillas led the people against

Somoza's dictatorship. First the Left needed to totally discredit

the Junta by turning everyone against it. The Left began by

dismantling the government. The first group to resign was the

Communists-the Labor Minister and the Education Minister,

Salvador Samayoa, who announced that he was joining the

guerrillas.

m • m mI• 
48 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Next to resign was the Minister of Agriculture, Enrique

Alvarez, protesting at the lack of support for agrarian reform.

Alvarez, who was a friend of mine, had taken the first step

toward land reform by freezing ownership of all landholdings

over 100 hectares (247.1 acres). He went off to head the

political alliance representing the Left, the Democratic

Revolutionary Front, known as the FDR....

The third wave of resignations from the Junta government, on

January 3, 1980, included all the non-Communist Left and the

Christian Democrats. But this group had a plan to come back as

the next government. Their resignation letter read like a political

platform....

A decisive meeting took place January 5 in the Presidential

Palace's Blue Room. On one side of the long table sat Colonels

Gutirrez and Majano, Defense Minister Colonel Garcia and his

deputies: Colonel Francisco Castillo and the officer who would

rather have eliminated Christian Democrats than negotiate with

them-Colonel Nicolfs Carranza. All the party leadersincluding Zamora and me-faced them across the table.

The night before, I had made a televised speech explaining

our position. The Christian Democrats offered the armed forces a

political program, based on our ideology.... We were offering the

blueprint for a new form of government-democracy. The

transitional form of government should not be based on a

corporative model, one that allotted representation to sectors such

as business or labor. For this reason, Mario Andino, the

spokesman of the business sector ... [stated.! "The Christian

Democrats cannot participate..." [Andino said,! "I do not wish

to be an obstacle, therefore, I resign from the Junta. But I will

warn you that this is a bad mistake. From now on, the business

sector will consider the government their enemy and you will not

be able to govern. This situation won't last very long. God help

you.

He got up and walked out of the room.

After he left, there was no further discussion. We would meet

the next day. This allowed the armed forces time to consider all

that had been said. They decided to accept Andino's resignation.

On January 9, 1980, the armed forces published their

promises to implement reforms, bring forth a democracy and

d )A

A
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 49

respect human rights. The Christian Democrats' convention then

chose Antonio Morales Erlich and H6ctor Dada Hirezi to join the

new Junta with Colonels Guti6rrez and Majano. Neither I nor the

party wished for me to be a member of the Junta. My character

and experience were suited for a democratic environment, not a

military junta. If our pact with the armed forces meant anything,

elections must come someday. I was being held in reserve for that

time. Selecting the fifth member of the Junta was a problem. The

Army kept proposing names from the Right which we rejected,

and they turned down our nominees. The compromise, suggested

by my wife, was Dr. Ram6n Avalos, an apolitical doctor with a

social conscience whom the military respected.

Next, I knew we had to build popular support for the new

Junta if it was to have strength against the Left and the Right. "If

we're going to be part of this government," I argued within the

party, "we should call a meeting of the people and tell them that

we need their help." The rally we tried to organize failed. The

Christian Democrats were too afraid of violent attacks from the

Right and the Left. Even our party veterans, including Rey

Prendes, who was then mayor of San Salvador, and my son

Alejandro, organized the plan timidly, adding so many precautions

that no one knew what to do or where to go. Instead of twenty

thousand people, five hundred turned up. That was how our junta

period began-with the image of a government that no one

seemed to want.

The Major Weakness of the Junta

Is the Economic Situation

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial")-Undoubtedly the crisis

of the military government has grown more severe in recent

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ('Marcial"), primary leader of the Popular

Forces of Liberation (FPL), one of the organizations that make up the FMLN,

until his death in 1983. Interview by Adolfo Gilly originally published in Mexico

on 4 and 5 January 1981. and later published in Revolution and Intervention in

Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco:

Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983), p. 49. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.
50 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

weeks. Their major weakness is now the economic situation. In

November, the Junta issued decrees designed to close off the

flight of capital and slow down the internal deterioration of

business, forcing them to leave part of their capital resources in

the country.

The transnational corporations are leaving. The

industrialists are leaving their factories with lower-level

managers and factories are operating 40 percent of capacity In

August, the indicators of economic activity had fallen to

minimal levels. It seems impossible that the economy won't

collapse.

The First Junta Becomes Unglued

General Josi Guillermo Garcia-When I w.as given the

responsibility as Defense Minister, I faced serious problems in

the institution, specifically within the security corps. The

situation was frightening. We began the struggle, and you can

see the results today. We have security corps, maybe not as

acceptable as they could be, but certainly an improvement to

what we found in the beginning. I have to commend Eugenio

Vides Casanova, in the National Guard, for all his efforts and

Reynaldo L6pez Nuila in the National Police. I remember at 

a

Council of Ministers, I was asked to provide the names of those

who would become the directors.

I gave the name first of Eugenio Vides Casanova for the

National Guard. His task was very difficult to fulfill but very

important for the armed forces. He had to renew the system.

And for the National Police I selected Reynaldo L6pez Nuila,

who had just returned frorm Spain. He had just graduated as 

a

lawyer. He is an honest man who has no aspirations for power,

but instead he desires to renovate and to chang. The same way

we want a social change, we also want an institutional chang,.

We don't want to continue in what has been the armed forces, 

I

am referring here to the abuses of power and the viola!ion of

General Jos6 Guillermo Garcia. Minister of Dcfense, El Salvador, 1979

to 1984. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 2 July 1987.

.4

'a

I
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 51

human rights. I can never speak highly enough of those two

for the tremendous work they've accomplished within their

respective security forces, that is, of course, following the

basic guidelines of working together, jointly. We took great

risks in order to make the necessary changes. A lot of thought

had to be given to this endeavor because of the repercussions

we might have received from the others. And inevitably we

did. We were accused of doing this and that, of trying to

institute new systems and new methods into the Army under

very negative conditions. That is when we began to notice

that the real enemy was inside the institution. The peak of

power was in their hands. I resigned verbally three times. On

the third day I gave my verbal resignation, and I told them 

I

didn't think I belonged in this scheme of things. My way of

thinking was different to what they were doing. My friends

told me, "If you leave now, you are giving up, and that's

what they want." That is when a struggle for power began. I

am referring to the leftists against me. They began to

discredit me, which is the usual method they employ-a

method which has no values, no truth, no base. They began

to slander and take away one's prestige. I was not used to that

kind of situation because I have always tried to get close to

the truth. There are certain principles in life I try to live by,

and justice is one of them. I detest injustice no matter where

it comes from. It is one of the principles which has guided my

life and, therefore, orients me to not make commitments with

anyone.

One of the ironic situations was that at the beginning of

1979, 1 was accused of being a leftist. However, when I

began to fight against the Left, within the government, they 

4

themselves accused me of being a rightist. That is to say, the

classifications and accusations against someone, in my case

being that I held such a position, are the product of the

people's interest who are accusing at the time. Analogously

speaking, it's like the artist when he creates his work. It

depends on the perspective he creates in his painting, and

according to the distance he projects which creates the desired

depth.
52 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

I stand neutral and independent. No commitments with

the people or the armed forces. And if I have to make great

sacrifices I will do it for the good of the nation, not for the

present, but for the future. That is how we began cementing

the basic principles for establishing a solid democratic

system.

You know that in politics there is nothing better than to

know a man's weaknesses, and the Marxists know them well.

If they want to conquer someone, they find out what are his

greatest weaknesses in order to exploit them little by little. I

believe Colonel Majano had a weakness. He suffered from

egocentrism, which is very destructive. They began deciding,

"Well, you are the good one, and why is Garcia doing such

and such? Garcia says he has the power. Why don't you?"

That's when those who held power from the Left began to

clash with me. It got worse by December of that same year,

1979, in which they said, "Listen, we're leaving. Either the

Defense Minister resigns from his post or we resign from

ours." Fortunately, they left. They miscalculated.

The late Monsignor Romero told one of the ministers, in

my presence, "There was a lot of tension at that moment.

You have the power, and you are going to resign from it now

in order to recover it later? You are all masochists." I

thought to myself, "I hope they don't convince them to stay,

because they'll stay for good." But they left, they

miscalculated. I was going to resign also. I had no ambitions,

absolutely none. But I was told, "No, it can't be accepted."

I measured the strengths within the Army and realized I had

support. So, I consented to stay.

There were a series of conflicts at the time they left, and

when January 1 came along, we discovered we were all

alone. Once again we were alone, with no international

support. What's more, international opinion was highly

critical of us, because those who had left the government had

already begun spreading twisted and slanted rumors about us,

and attacking the institution. They began attacking me and

other principal participants. We had no support from the

United States, nor from anyone else. We were alone.
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 53

At that critical time, we were forced to look for internal

support once again. We called on those who wished to render

their contributions. The only ones who appeared were those in

power today-the Christian Democrats. We couldn't deceive

ourselves of the fact that at that moment, the Christian

Democrats saw their move as something secure for the future.

We were conscious of that. So they came on board, and certain

conditions were established, some of which I can comment on.

One of the conditions, which was requested by the current

president, and he told me this personally, was "I want nothing

to do with private enterprise! I don't want to even see them." I

told him I was no politician, but if I were, I would never agree

with that because no country in the western world can survive

without private enterprise. And, I think it is a kindergarten or

first grade level mistake to think of such a thing or even say

things like that. I am no politician, but I am aware of what you

mean. "Yes ... " he said, "... I want nothing to do with

private enterprise." This has obviously corroborated with time.

But those are circumstances of life, each person's way of

thinking. And I think that in politics, one can determine what is

good and what is bad, according to the results, not according to

what people think. Time has proven he was wrong, because that

is what his principal problem has been, fundamentally. I have

nothing against the President. On the contrary, I respect him.

He has made many mistakes, but they are the result of the

situation which developed.

But, overall, the Christian Democrats came along and they

joined us. Almost three months went by, and those who had

spent their time in the Public Forum demanding new reforms

didn't make them. The first Junta, which was composed by Mr.

Ungo and Mr. Zamora, did not make any reforms, none

whatsoever. At that time we were confronting a lot of problems,

and we requested that they make a decision with respect to the

agrarian reform. But they said it was stuck and was subject to

revision, and so forth. The reform was not made until the

Christian Democrats came to power.

I
54 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

There Is No Leadership

in the Junta

Ferman Cienfuegos-The "leadership" of Duarte is nothing

but an expression of the most abject and treasonous sellout, a

systematic genocide designed to assure maintenance of the

circuits of capital accumulation.

Attempts are made to counter Duarte's fascism with the

"clean" image of one Fidel Chavez Mena, a man who strives

for a political solution to the crisis that will salvage not only the

capitalist aims, but above all the image of the PDC, which is

now quite bloodstained and discredited by its perpetration of

genocide in El Salvador.

Individuals and tiny groups within the PDC take various

positions, all of them based on the most rabid anticommunism,

and none of them with any potential for providing leadership;

their expression is limited to infighting.

The Condition of the Army

THE EDITORS-The coup of October 1979 and the

subsequent accommodation between the armed forces

and the Christian Democratic party (PDC) caused deep

divisions within the Army. The need to implement the

reforms proclaimed to be the rationale for the coup,

coupled with the struggle to establish a government

based on a nontraditional, noncorporate framework,

created confusion and fragmentation. There existed a

faction which wanted to retain ties to the oligarchy,

favoring a maintenance of status quo and totally

Fermin Cienfuegos, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of

National Resistance (FARN) and a member of the general command of the

FMLN. His analysis of the situation in El Salvador was originally published in

the Mexican journal Proceso on 9 March 1981, and later published in

Revolution and Intervention in Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and

Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates. 1983).

p. 59. Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 55

incapable of accepting alliance within the PDC. There

was a second faction, lead by Colonel Majano, which

wanted a radical departure from the status quo and

radical reforms. There was a third faction, headed by

Colonel Gutitrrez, which sought to fulfill the promises

of the proclamation reforms in a systematic manner,

one which ensured the continued institutional

survivability of the Army and maintained the basic

societal structure. The internal division, although

intense, was not the only situation which kept the Army

on the verge of crisis. While simultaneously attempting

to change the institutional role of the military in the El

Salvadoran society, the Junta and the military were

facing the increasingly more successful leftist

insurgents-an enemy for which they were neither

trained nor equipped to fight.

The Army Was Internally Fragmented

General Fred F. Woerner-The Salvadoran Army,

particularly and importantly at the upper echelons, was

internally fragmented concerning the wisdom of the coup

overthrowing the Romero regime. This fragmentation was

exacerbated by agitation from the idealists below-the young

turk movement. So the military was divided into two camps.

One group was the followers of Colonel Gutirrez, who favored

reforms in a more moderate or systematic approach. The

followers of Colonel Majano, who was actually the leader of the

young turk movement, wanted a much more radical departure

from the status quo in order to achieve their political, social.

and economic reforms.

One could say that there was a third movement in the

military, but it did not crystallize as cleanly as did the radicals

and conservatives, who were both committed to change. The

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America. 1982 to 1985,

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco. California. 7 November 1986.
56 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

third segment would be the ultra-conservatives, the ultrarightists, who were committed to the continual alliance with the

oligarchy, with D'Aubuisson and the status quo. That segment

of the military, although very significant, for some reason did

not have a single point of leadership. The ultra-Right element,

perhaps deliberately seemed to melt into the conservative or

middle wing, either deliberately or just accidently, hoping to coopt it and swing it back to the right.

I do not know where the dividing line was between the

conservative and the ultra-Right. I could identify it in terms of

personalities, but there did not seem to be the same type of

fissure between these two elements, as clearly appears between

the conservatives and the very definitely left-of-center segment

of the Army. Though the left-of-center segment were in

ascendancy at the beginning of the revolutionary coup, they

progressively fell into the minority category. Colonel Garcia,

the Minister of Defense of that era, while facing the insurgency

movement that had emerged in the '80-'81 timeframe,

nevertheless considered the greatest threat to the nation the

division within the military. He always talked of two elements;

there was always a hesitancy to acknowledge and, as time went

on, a virtually adamant reluctance to admit to the existence of

an ultra-Right element within the military. He would talk of the

left-of-center faction which he and Colonel Guti6rrez

represented. Then they would talk of the radical faction, but

they would not publicly take cognizance of the ultra-Right. In

fact, they were trying to separate themselves from that element.

Their position was that there was no institutional identification

with the ultra-Right terrorism that had taken place.

In addition to all this turmoil (the division within the

military, the emergent insurgency, and the military's divorce, at

least momentarily at that time, from its traditional ally, the

oligarchy), the military had a simultaneous internal purge of its

hierarchy. Whether they knew the exact numbers or not, no one

was ever keen on discussing the scope of it. But, I was led to

believe that certainly one-third, and perhaps up to two-thirds, of

the senior leadership were removed from all positions of

influence at that time. Because of the institution's long history,

KJ
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 57

this clearly strengthened the moderates, and moderate is a better

descriptive than conservative. I wouldn't call the ultra-rightists

conservatives; I'd still refer to them as the ultra-conservatives or

the ultra-rightist because there was nothing in their orientation

that would put them in the camp that we normally attribute to

political conservatives. And they were far more radically to the

right than the radicals were to the left.

The Army Was Divided

Dr. Alvaro Magafia--It appeared that after the coup in 1979,

the Army lost many officers who were once associated with the

government that had recently been overthrown. Thus, it was

easy to conclude that the Army was divided, and at this point

the guerrillas believed it to be the right moment. 1 think that

their biggest mistake was to believe that this was the right time

to move in on what they referred to as the final offensive. They

believed the final offensive was going to last only a few

months. The Army was not really prepared for a guerrilla war.

Let's assume the guerrillas started out with 6,000 men and were

able to increase their numbers up to 10,000. The Army had a

little over 15,000. An army of 15,000 men cannot fight a

guerrilla force of 7,000, it's impossible.

The Army was practically divided becduse when the

Romero administration was overthrown, some of them left the

Army; others did not agree with how the government was

handling the subversive forces. It was believed that the

government was sympathetic towards these forces. Thus, at this

point, the guerrillas thought they could win by launching the

final offensive because some were working within the Army

itself for their cause. Because when the final offensive began, a

captain, who was sympathetic towards the subversive forces.

captured the Cuartel de Santa Ana (Santa Ana Barracks), which

is the Second Brigade. I was not part of the government at the

time, so I didn't have information, but it seemed that at that

Dr. Alvaro Magafia. provisional President of the Republic of El Salvador.

1982 to 1984. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 18 December 1986

and 30 June 1987.

S
58 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

time there were similar operations taking place in other areas

such as Gotera, La Uni6n, or San Miguel-I am not sure

exactly. That is to say, they were counting on the fact that they

were going to have two or three Army barracks under their

control by the time they would launch the final offensive. Now,

the subversive force's greatest mistake was to believe that the

Army could not resist the attack, despite the latter's lack of

preparation to fight a guerrilla war and other limitations they

faced.

Colonel James J. Steele-To look at the Salvadoran military,

you have to look at what the country was like in 1979 and 1980.

I am talking about a military force whose role was one of

praetorian guard, a garrison force. People joined the military

with the idea of upward mobility. Certainly, no one joined the

military with the idea of having to die in the process. The

insurgency really began in San Salvador, here in the capital, and

was characterized by urban unrest, labor strikes, mass

demonstrations, bombings, assassinations, and so on. That

situation was dealt with principally by the public security

forces. They dealt with it in a way that, you could probably

argue, was successful to the extent that it forced the guerrillas

out of the capital. The movement then became a rural

insurgency. However, they did it in a repressive way, a lot of

people were killed. Well, they alienated a lot of the people in

the process. This created a support base for the guerrillas, and

we are only now (1986) getting to the point where the

government's overcoming the fear and mistrust that was created

back in those early years. The guerrillas went from an urbanbased to a rural-based movement. The movement caught fire.

The number of insurgents nearly surpassed the level of the

armed forces. We saw between 1980 and 1984 a guerrilla

attempt to take over almost the same way we saw the Marxists

operate in Nicaragua and Cuba, certainly with political

overtones, but principally a military effort. The idea that you

Colonel James J. Steele. Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1984 to 1986. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 5-10

October 1986; and, in Monterey. California. 5 November 1986.

i
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 59

would just essentially overwhelm the government forces and

move in and take over the country, they almost did that.

The Contradictions within the

Army Are Intensifying

Fermdn Cienfuegos-The bourgeois-imperialist undertaking

of January 1980, bas.ed on an alliance of the Army with the

Christian Democratic Party, the oligarchy and the U.S.

government, did not come close to solving the contradictions

that existed within the core of the armed forces. Instead, it

created new conflicts and intensified the existing ones. The

crisis of authority was rather apparent and was shown by the

constant attempts on the lives of democratic officers. The fact

that members of the military have no recourse except gunfire for

resolving their conflicts shows the crisis of authority was

severe, that there was no way to keep the Army moving

together, down the same road.

Due to the intensification of contradictions within the

Army moving together, down the same road, we see that the

present Minister of Defense, Colonel Garcia, holds the key to

maintaining unity within the Army, while the key to political

unity is divided between Junta member Abdul Guti6rrez and

Colonel Majano. Clearly the conditions are not exactly

favorable to resolving the crisis of authority. Colonel Majano

was persecuted and, after resolving attempts on his life, was

imprisoned. This was intended to solve the crisis. But is there,

in fact, an easy way out of this crisis? Is the problem so simple

that the imprisonment of an officer will suffice to curtail a

widespread democratic-technocratic movement within the

Army?

FermAn Cienfuegos, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of

National Resistance (FARN) and a member of the general command of the

FMLN. His analysis of the situation in El Salvador was originally published in

the Mexican journal Proceso on 9 March 1981, and later published in

Revolution and Intervention in Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and

Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983),

pp. 57-58. Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
60 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Perhaps that would be the case if it were not for another

fundamental issue. The FMLN is not only a political threat; it

is above all a military threat. The U.S. government and

certain big shots in the Christian Democratic regime openly

recognize this, as demonstrated by the desperate and hurried

manner in which the U.S. government has reinforced the

Junta militarily.

Three Grave Deficiencies

in the Armed Forces

General Jaime Abdul Gutidrrez-At the moment of the

coup, the armed forces did not have more than 12,000 men

including their paramilitary security forces. It was a very

limited armed force. There were three fundamental, grave deficiencies in the armed forces-( I) a total lack of

equipment, (2) lack of training, and (3) mostly it was not

being prepared to confront the type of problems we were

facing at the time. We also lacked an adequate intelligence

system, and overall, we were not prepared to deal with a

revolutionary war, which was ideological to begin with.

Which is the war of propaganda'? Which is the military war'?

Military operations had several dimensions. And on the other

hand, we did not have the ability to command a small unit.

We did not have anyone prepared to train small unit

commanders. This was probably the most serious deficiency.

We were prepared for an international war against Honduras

or against another neighboring country, but we did not have

any kind of preparation to deal with a revolutionary war,

which we did not expect.

General Jaime Abdul Gutidrrez. member of the Civil-Military Junta

which took control of the government of El Salvador after deposing General

Romero on 15 October 1979. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 18

December 1986.
PROBLEMS IN THE JUNTA AND ARMY 61

The Army Was Without

External Support

Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce-With regard to operations, I'm

referring strictly to the military operations. When we became

involved in the conflict, our military support was minimal. We

basically had none. Under those conditions and without any

U.S. support, we confronted the "final offensive" in January

1981. However, thanks to the armed forces and the support

received by the civilian population, we were able to stop the

terrorists from executing this offensive. Within 72 hours we

managed to neutralize them. But, it is only fair to mention the

fact that we were so incredibly limited in our resources. We did

not have enough vehicles or means for aerial transportation. In

communications we had limitations and deficiencies-our

equipment was obsolete, and our aerial support and logistics

support were extremely limited.

We could not depend on enough troops to carry out certain

tasks and face the kind of struggle we were dealing with at the

time, and the tremendous lack of officers and chiefs contributed

significantly to this chaotic situation. We needed to organize

units in hybrid formations, and in our attempts to accomplish

this we installed an operation in Guazapa. We organized a

battalion made up of a Second Brigade company, esc'uadr6n de

caballeria (cavalry squadron), and a First Brigade company.

We later appointed a commander and several officers who came

from other units. Nobody knew each other, but that is how we

set up our operations, despite the numerous limitations we had.

As a result of the upgraded training, combat experience.

the expansion of the armed forces, and the aid that was coming

from abroad since 1980, we managed to create organized units

such as the Batallones de Reacci6n Inmediata (Rapid Reaction

Battalions), antiterrorist groups, contra-subversion battalions,

special reconnaissance units, snipers. All this provided us with

Colonel Rend Emilio Ponce, former C-3 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces

and now Commander of the Third Brigade. interviewed in San Salvador. El

Salvador, 22 January 1987.
A

62 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

greater military capabilities to confront the subversives. But, ill

the beginning, we had numerous problems with regard to

command and control because there was a polarization in the

armed forces. Little by little we overcame that weakness. Of

course, I'm referring to the polarization that existed betwee,' a

group of sympathizers of Colonel Majano and those of General

Garcia. That was a big crisis, and all it seemed like, at the time,

was a crisis after crisis situation.

I

p
s1Bl

The "Final" Offensive

and Insurgent Disunity

THE EDITORS-In every conflict or battle, there is a

significant event which stands out as a watershed. The

"final" offensive undertaken by the insurgents in

January of 1981 was just such an event. The insurgents

were buoyed by the "insurrectionist" takeover in

Nicaragua, the apparent internal fragmentation of

the armed forces, the inability of the go- -rnment to

gain external support and the continu; ,g problems

the government experienced in implementing

reforms. Believing that the people would rise up in

mass support, the insurgents launched the "final"

offensive only to find out that they had overestimated

the willingness of the people to support them and

underestimated the armed forces capability to unify

around the Junta and the need for institutional

survival. Perhaps the insurgent leadership's most

significant error was the failure to understand

or interpret the political will of the United States. In

view of the Carter administrations's history of

nonintervention the insurgents felt it was inconceivable that the U.S. administration would

act forcibly with only 10 days remaining in

power.

63
64 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

The Insurgents Attempt to Take

Advantage: The "Final" Offensive

Rafael Menjivar-It is important to begin with an analysis of

the offensive of January 10, 1981, when the general offensive

was launched by the democratic revolutionary forces, and in

that light evaluate developments from then on.

The announcement of the general offensive implied a

qualitative change in the struggle, both militarily and politically.

Here it is important to clarify a point which perhaps was misunderstood and for which we are perhaps partly responsible. There

were moments in which there was talk of a final offensive

instead of a general offensive. The conception was of a general

offensive-a tactical as well as strategic offensive--culminating

in the final offensive. Thus, what began on January 10 was the

general offensive, and within it also began the first movement

or the first political-military wave.

This first wave, or first stage of the general offensive, had

precise tactical and military objectives as well as political ones.

Most of the military objectives were achieved. One of them, for

example, was to consolidate the rear guard, that is, the areas

which the People's Revolutionary Army controls. In effect,

after all the military operations that took place, we find in areas

such as the north zone, the central zone of San Vicente,

Guazapa, Sensuntepeque, that the goal of consolidating and

strengthening the areas where the revolutionary movement is

located was achieved. We cannot say at this time that we have

liberated zones. They are almost liberated. Rather, they are

zones which the enemy can penetrate but in which they cannot

remain. So, we do think that this goal was achieved.

Another important objective was to cause the Army to

spread itself throughout the country, in order to prevent it from

Rafael Mcnjivar. spokesman for the Democratic Revolutionary Front

(FDR). His analysis of the situation in El Salvador was originally published in

El Salvador, April 198 1. and later published in Revolution and Intervention in

Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco:

Synthesis Publications/CM Associates. 1983). pp. 63-65. Copyright 1983 by

CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.

.a'
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 65

' 

C

2

j'\C

JA
66 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

carrying out heavily concentrated attacks as it had been doing in

the past. And in effect, the People's Revolutionary Army, the

guerrillas, the militias, all moved throughout the whole country,

attacking different military zones, thus forcing the enemy to disperse its forces throughout the territory.

The other objective, which was perhaps the one we

achieved the least, was to sharpen the division that was developing within the Army. Perhaps the problem is not that we were

unable to accomplish this to a greater extent, but rather that

there weren't ways, possibly due to our own errors, in which

this division could manifest itself. Nevertheless, we know this

division exists, as in the case of Santa Ana, where a large group

of soldiers led by army officers rebelled and were able to "liberate" a Sherman tank and weapons, and blow up what was

left. However, this phenomenon did not repeat itself in other

places as we had expected. But without a doubt, the effects of

the offensive itself are causing a sharper division among both

the officers and the ranks of the army.

Another important factor was the mobilization of several

large contingents of the Revolutionary Army, which were able

to surround cities. The tactical objective was not to remain in

those cities, but rather to take them and then leave. In fact,

afterwards there was mobilization of the Revolutionary Army

without it's suffering great losses....

Where we think there have been some problems is in the

area of mass organizing. That is to say, we called for a general

strike that was not able to consolidate and take hold completely.

We think there were various problems. The first is that we had

no effective military operations in cities such as San Salvador,

San Miguel and Santa Ana-the more important cities with

more industry and a larger number of workers. This limited the

population's ability to evade the repression. So there was a lack

of definitive military actions.

The other aspect has to do with the restructuring of our

military, taking into account the mass movement. It may be

necessary to restructure the Revolutionary Front of the masses,

in the sense of increasing the cadre, who have been harshly

repressed in those cities we mentioned, so they can lead the

tU
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 67

mass movement. For my part, I would add another phenomenon

which has had great repercussions; in addition to the incredible

repression in the cities where we saw the problems described

above. In other cities of the interior, there were partial insurrections. This spoke, in large part, to the effect of the death of

Monsignor Romero. The fact that Monsignor Romero, the

spokesperson for vast sectors of the population, was killed, and

that the Church hierarchy has since switched to such an ambiguous position, has left the people not totally demobilized, but

certainly confused.

The Army on the Defensive

Joaquin Villalobos-If one thinks about it. at that time there

were even bourgeois sectors open to establishing alliances with

us, and they had political weight. They were still supporting a

reformist position and had some possibility of action. In the

Army, to be specific, were Mena Sandoval and those who honestly believed in the coup of October 15. They were at their best

moment within the Army; there existed better conditions for

conspiracy inside the barracks. Within the Army there were

great hopes regarding the revolutionary mass movement, even

respect for it and a desire to participate in it. They had tried to

set up talks with the CRM, Coordinadora Revolucionaria de

Masas (Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses).

... our inability to meet the challenges of the situation in

March was significantly influenced by the fact that we were lagging behind in the task of unity around a common political strategy; within the revolutionary movement we had not gone

beyond an embryonic level of unity, and had not reached a unity

Joaquin Villalobos, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary

Army (ERP), one of the organizations which forms the FMLN. Interview by

Marta Harnecker was originally published in Mexico, November-December

1982, and later published in Revolution and Intervention in Central America.

edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983). pp. 71-72, 77-78. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.

I
68 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

with a greater political content. This fact accounts for the lack

of an insurrectional strategy and a more correct political-military

strategy.

If in March, April, and May of 1980, the FMLN had had

the military force or the number of combatants that were available on January 10, 1981, and if these had been utilized as in

later stages, I think there would have been an insurrection, independently of tactical problems, and possibly the enemy would

have collapsed. On January 10 this was no longer possible,

given the degree of terror imposed by the repressive apparatus.

The masses by then demanded from their vanguard a higher

level and quality of their military presence, in order for them to

advance to a struggle of more definitive characteristics....

This (January 10th) offensive put the Army on the defensive, forcing it to concentrate on its strategic positions. That

gave us a few months at ease and allowed us to create the seven

strategic fronts, the seven concentrations of forces and the rearguard that permitted us to prepare new combatants. Even the

enemy's offensives became schools for the training of fighters

the best schools of combative training. All those months, the

months in which we resisted inside our positions, made us

learn. We not only had the terrain to prepare our fighters, but

we were also forced to solve the problem of learning military

tactics in the daily clash with the enemy. We did not have a

school where first the students graduated and then were taken to

a theater of operations. We had the rear-guard and the theater of

operations all mixed up in the same place, since sometimes the

enemy forced us out of an area and we then had to come back to

recapture it. Our people had to learn to do engineering work to

protect themselves from artillery fire, from air bombardment,

because there were daily occurrences. What turned Morazn,

Chalatenango, and Guazapa into good schools for military contingents was the fact that during several months we had to fight,

almost daily, against the enemy's efforts to annihilate us.

Another thing which helped in the formation of our army

was that, for the January 10 offensive, the revolutionary

movement decided to arm itself and carry out logistical plans.
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 69

These plans, designed with an insurrectionist mentality,

basically started from two considerations: first, to have the

people willing to take up arms-and the revolutionary

movement had more than enough arms, even after the

previous setbacks in the cities; second, to have financial

resources, which were also available from the actions of the

previous period. But it was not only the availability of a war

chest and people willing to arm themselves that allowed us to

carry out our plans. Above all, we showed the capacity to

execute supply operations in a very difficult terrain; this

capacity implied having plans, cadre, and organizational

structures capable of achieving our goals by taking advantage

of all the possibilities. If by January 10 we had not solved

this question of logistics, it would have been very difficult to

build the rear-guard. During 1980, the Army began to launch

military operations against what today are the zones of

control and the resistance that we put up at that time was

much weaker than the one that began after January 10,

when we were already armed. This, added to the fact of

having established a rear-guard, allowed us to put up an

effective resistance and get down to the task of building our

army.

The other important thing was that we achieved basic

supply levels, through the small acticns of recuperation

undertaken during the period from January to July-August of

1981, and by executing logistics operations to maintain our

ammunition supply. We no longer had a problem of

weaponry, but now we needed to maintain a flow of

ammunition to be able to resist the Army. The Army tried to

surround us. maintained the offensive, sought to clash against

our forces to deplete our logistics potential. They knew that if

we ran out of ammunition they would have better chances to

finish us off. Our ability to maintain our logistics

disconcerted our enemy. When it seemed that a front had

been depleted, after a few weeks it was back in action, and

sometimes at an operational level much greater than the

enemy thought possible.
70 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

No Way of Providing the

Necessary Support

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar-It must be pointed

out that, internationally, El Salvador received almost no support

in the beginning, and when the terrorists began their final offensive, we had only received very few promises and intentions

from the United States of giving us any support. It is true,

however, that one or two days after the offensive, we began

receiving the first signs of military aid from the United States.

But up until then, I think our Army was composed of some

5,000 men, and I think our cuarteles were in the same condition

as the one I described in Zacatecoluca. The largest units constituted maybe some 300 men with responsibilities that included

those of an entire department. That is a rather wide territorial

jurisdiction.

It had been only a few days after I was iransferred from the

Instruction Center for Engineers to the General Staff when I

realized, at that moment, that we had employed all of our

means, including the reserve. And, I think, if the terrorists had

been more courageous and if the population would have given

them the backup support they needed, the general insurrection

they were going to cause with the final offensive would have

probably succeeded. For example, there were departments, such

as Santa Ana, which were infiltrated by terrorists.

You know that there was a serious fight in that cuartel. and

one of the captains was co-opted. The terrorists were giving out

weapons to anyone that would pass by. There were problems

that resulted from that situation because, as a result, a lot of

thugs and criminals kept the weapons. But, the truth is that the

insurrection was not successful because the people didn't support them and didn't participate. That, I think, is another indication of the hatred and rejection they feel towards the terrorists.

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, former Second Brigade Commander and now Director of the Military Academy, interviewed in Santa Ana

and San Salvador, El Salvador, 23 January 1987 and 23 July 1987.

respectively.
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 71

The interesting thing is that, maybe-and that situation is rather

far away-but at that time, if they had made a little bit more

effort, they would have been more successful. However, the situation was under control.

I don't know if it was due to lack of planning on their part

or lack of human resources. There were times when we were so

dispersed, there was no way of providing the necessary support.

So, strategically speaking, the subversion could have had some

success if they would have attacked with more force.

The "Final" Offensive Convinced

the United States to Provide Support

General Wallace H. Nutting-We were preaching the role,

the proper role, for the military in a democratic society. But, we

had a very difficult time convincing Ambassador Bob White

(U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador) that there was an external

problem to which he should pay attention. I argued with him

long and hard that this was a serious problem that affected U.S.

interests and that we ought to be doing something with the Salvadoran military. He disagreed. He kept telling me that this was

an internal problem, that the Right was the most serious part of

the problem, that we didn't have to worry as much about the

Left. He echoed the State Department's position, as evidenced

in our actions with respect to Somoza in Nicaragua, that the socalled revolutionary movement was inevitable. As such they initially advocated we should try to go along with it and retain as

much influence and communication with the new leadership as

we could. I kept saying that was naive. It was naive in Nicaragua, and it was quite obvious to me that the same thing was

going to happen in El Salvador if we adopted that attitude.

The State Department people felt there were individuals

and groups so bad that we should refuse to have anything to do

with them, either on a personal or professional basis. I kept

General Wallace H. Nutting. Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern Command, 1979 to 1983. interviewed in Orlando. Florida. 29 January 1987.

I
72 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

saying that we needed to provide assistance such as communications, intelligence, logistics, planning, and conduct of operations that would be effective against the insurgent forces; that

external support was obviously going to the insurgents.

White's response was that he didn't see any external assistance, that it was all happening internally. If I could show him

the first bit of evidence, the first bullet coming from outside,

then he would seriously consider what I was recommending. I

insisted that the first time I could provide any positive evidence,

it would be too late, and that we should be working now to help

the Salvadoran military, which has demonstrated a social conscience and a recognition of the need to change. We needed to

help them develop their programs and support their efforts.

In my view, the State Department was not truly convinced

that it was a major problem or that it was amenable to military

assistance until the so-called final offensive, 10 January 1981.

And then of course the Carter administration as a whole agreed

that, yes, there was a problem, and we had better help. And we

went on from there. I estimated three to five years would pass

before we would begin to see the kind of turnaround and

impacts that we are looking for.

Guerrillas Overestimate Mass Support

and Underestimate U.S. Support

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila-They exaggerated,

perhaps, or rather overestimated the people's participation in

this war. Somehow, the manifestation of those few who did

indicate their support for the guerrillas suggested a general support. They believed that the situation in El Salvador was the

same situation as Nicaragua, and the people were going to

launch themselves into the streets, take up arms, and unite with

the guerrillas in overthrowing the government the same way it

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila. Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador. 1984 to date. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.

I
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 73

happened in Nicaragua with the Somoza government. On January 10. when the final offensive took place, they drove through

the neighborhoods with vehicles filled with arms. They began

knocking on doors and telling people to come out, that the hour

of revolution had come, and everybody had to take up arms.

They were needed in order to overthrow the government and

establish a new political power, obviously of a Marxist nature.

But the people secured and locked their doors tightly so the

guerrillas could not enter and force them to participate.

What could have been the motivation that prevented these

people from becoming massively incorporated into this final

offensive? Could it have been for lack of conscience or. as they

refer to it, a revolutionary conscience'? That is to say. they had

not worked the clandestine labor sufficiently in order to attract

followers to achieve popular support. It could have been also

the fact that their own actions had generated a distancing. a

repudiation and a censorship of the actions that they had taken

against the Salvadoran people. It could have been that their own

activities lead people to take a stand against the Marxist effort.

And finally, it could have been the same example of Nicaragua.

in which certain things neither depicted nor crystallized clearly

were not carried out in the same manner as they had planned.

The same case with Cuba and other countries, in that there

could have been another element of justice that prevented the

people from giving support.

Similarly. I think that Miguel Castellanos suffered a great

deception at this time. After that, the real military activity

began. The armed forces of El Salvador and the government.

which were integrated by a revolutionary junta, called Junta

Revolucionara de Gobierno, fulfilled structural changes of a

social character.

The agrarian reform (which as I understand is the most profound reform of Latin America), the banking reform, and the

foreign trade reform were established, and with that. the objectives and justifications of the Marxist revolution practically disappeared. They claimed they were fighting against a military

dictatorship. The dictatorship had disappeared and a new democratic process was instituted. They were fighting against an
74 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

oligarchy, but the oligarchy had disappeared. They were fighting against the tenancy of the land and the exploitation of the

campesino, but the agrarian reform was established. The

oligarchy themselves were the owners of foreign trade and that

too disappeared. That is, fundamentally, all those principal factors which motivated the masses to follow the Marxist ideology

had practically disappeared. There were others, for example, such as violation of human rights, which underwent drastic

changes. Even though they didn't disappear completely, a new

process was instituted where labor and education were

improved, and there was a minimization of the abuses of

authority. So, all those justifications which they used, for practical purposes, disappeared from the panorama of the national

reality of El Salvador.

All of a sudden, they found themselves without any banners or slogans. There was no longer an oligarchy or a dictatorship or violations of human rights. The land belonged to the

campesino. The subversives no longer had anything to offer.

So, consequently, it became another blow for the subversion.

Later on came the belief that the United States was going

to back off and not support El Salvador. That was another historical mistake. President Carter, who revoked all military aid to

us, who gave Nicaragua away, who gave Rhodesia away, who

practically gave Angola and Mozambique away, who gave Iran

away, was forced to initiate an emergency aid program for us

because he himself felt the danger of a Marxist revolution in El

Salvador. This was another error on the part of the terrorist

organizations and, quite possibly the defection of Miguel Castellanos, is why the situation no longer favors them. And

finally, another reason could very well be our own attitude.

They thought they were going to be dealing with an uncon- 4 ditioned and somewhat irrational armed forces throughout the

conduct of this war. But we understood, at the outset, what the

plan of this war would be. That is why I spoke to you about the

dimensions of war. There was not only an expression of military

order, but also there was an expression of social, economic,

political, diplomatic, propaganda, and psychological order. So,

all of those are elements that are contrary to the plans and pretensions of the terrorist organizations.
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 75

We Finally Began to See

Signs of Hope

General Juan Rafael Bustillo-It is true that for two years we

had gained little experience, but our army was in sad shape

because we were limited in ammunition, and our equipment had

a lot of problems. Transportation

vehicles for the Army, airplanes, and

helicopters were very difficult to

obtain because, not only were we

expecting aid from other countries,

but we also had embargoes. We were

not able to purchase ammunition or

weapons anywhere. We were slowly

sinking. As a result of this situation

the guerrillas thought we were very

weak because we lacked equipment,

ammunition, and weapons. There /

was great international political pressure against El Salvador. There was COPREFA

an embargo, and therefore, we were General Juan

unable to purchase the necessary Rafael Bustillo

materiel in order to defend ourselves. The guerrillas, on the

other hand, had strengthened their forces due to the tremendous

aid they were receiving from Cuba-weapons, ammunition, and

trained personnel. At that point they believed they were strong

enough to strike a final blow against the armed forces and the

provisional government at the time.

There were two incidents that occurred at the time. First,

heavily armed guerrillas and the subversive forces on the part of

the FDR realized that the people did not respond to their movement as they had expected. They launched attacks throughout

several cities carrying tremendous amounts of weapons and

ammunition, attempting to convince the people that they should

take up arms against the armed forces and the government. But

General Juan Bustillo. Chief of Salvadoran Air Force. 1979 to date. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 21 January 1987.
76 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

the people did not respond. Recognizing the fact that they

received no support from the people in the cities, the guerrillas

fled to the mountains. The second incident was the fact that for

the first time the United States realized there had been a lot of

injustice done; there were serious economic and social problems; there were violations of human rights, etc. I am convinced

that our own people and people at the international level knew

about this. It wasn't until then that the U.S. Government

realized that this was not only a social movement in which the

masses of El Salvador were uprising against the social

injustices, but there was also an ideological motive behind it,

The internal conflict in El Salvador began to take a different

course. They started to realize that this conflict was being supported by an international Marxist-Leninist movement. We

finally began to see some signs of hope when the United States

finally admitted there was a Communist threat to the situation in

El Salvador. They started to help us, and little by little we

began receiving the military and economic aid that was needed.

Since then we have been counting on the support we

receive from the United States. Unfortunately, and this I have

discussed several times, democracies are not always as effective

because you can never count on having mutual support nor a

unanimous front. I consider this a weakness. Sometimes a country has internal problems, and these problems may be the result

of a lot of internal mistakes on the part of the people who

govern, on the part of the military, on the part of the people,

etc. But the problem is that those mistakes should not occur,

and if they are able to foresee them happening they should be

dealt with and avoided, not ignored. Because if you ignore a

country that has a democracy, whether it is mediocre or not, it

is preferable to stand by and help a democracy that is mediocre

to become stronger.

Insurgent Disunity

THE EDITORS-The Junta and the armed forces were not

the only ones in disarray during this period. The separate insurgent groups were equally if not more fragmented. As a condition of his support, Fidel Castro

"I

-. I m ml m amll u I ~ ll~ll m I n l llm ll ll
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 77

demanded that the insurgents form one unified organization capable of speaking and acting in a coordinated

manner. The "Unity," as Fidel is reported to call it, was

one of significant benefit to the political aims of the

insurgent leadership. The actual combined military

actions were given mixed reviews. On the international

scene the development of the unified guerrilla structure, especially with the inclusion of the Communist

party, gained significant rewards and recognition in the

international Communist arena.

Fidel and Unity within

the FMLN: 1979--San Vicente

Miguel Castellanos-Fidel, along with Comandante Pifieiro.

dealt with the situation personally and summoned those in charge

of the organizations such as, "Marcial," "'Ana Maria," and

Shafik. Marcial was the most obstinate, considered to be the

strongest and should have had the most recognition. He ,&wcty,

challenged the official relationship between Cuba and the Soviet

Union.

During mid-1979, at the Central Committee reunion.

"Marcial" referred to his conversations with Fid0. Af't.,i the

first conversations between the FPL (Popular Liberation Forces)

and the PCS (Salvadoran Communist Party), we had a chance to

talk to the RN (National Resistance). After a meeting held with

the three organizations, Fidel-according to "Marcial"-personally called him and told him that as a result of having agreed

to "the unity," he promoted a major change in the line of the

PCS, and that this would be a determinate factor in influencing

the actions of the other Latin American Communist Parties.

"Marcial" was very pleased with himself. He considered this

his first triumph, specifically at the continental level.

Comandante Miguel Castellanos, former insurgent leader, 1973 to 1985.

interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 25 September 1987. As quoted in Conversacones con el Comandante Miguel Castelhno, edited by Javier Rojas P.

(Santiago. Chile: Editorial Andante. 1986), pp. 29-31. Copyright 1986 by

Editorial Andante. Reprinted by permission of Editorial Andante.
78 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

When it came time to establish this "unity," all of the organizations had to make concessions in the political, strategic and

logistic aspects. In the political scene, it was established that this

unity must be based on the actual characterization of the government-reformist, fascist, a puppet of Yankee Imperialism. It

became obvious that the armed struggle was the means for obtaining power; logistics and distribution of arms would subsequently

follow.

Up until then, the PCS (Salvadoran Communist Party) had

refused any form of armed struggle and had opted for the electoral

process as the means for gaining power through the accumulation

of forces. This implied that the PCS had to structure its armed

units organically, which they had never done before.

They had the arms, but they didn't have an operative line.

Only with difficulty will they bring themselves up to a level of

competence; and as always, the Communist Party arrives late at

the front. Throughout the history of Latin America, the PCS has

always been behind in the revolutionary process.

They (the Communists) had to undergo a profound restructuring of their mentality. And if it were not for the initiative of the

Cuban PC and Fidel's direct involvement in the matter, they

would still not be at the front. The most attractive part of this total

unity of forces, from "Marcial's" point of view, was the subordination of the Communist Party to his purposes. At last, after so

many years of being accused of revolutionary infantilism, the PC

took over the armed struggle!

We Did Not Have the Degree of

Unity Necessary

Joaquin Viflalobos-l have stated that in the period of March,

April, and May 1980, with 1,000 armed combatants we could

Joaquin Villalobos. Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary

Army (ERP). one of the organizations which forms the FMLN. Interview by

Maria Harnecker was originally published in Mexico, November-December

1982. and later published in Revolution and Intervention in Central America,

edited b Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates. 1983). p. 73. Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted

by permission of CM Associates.

I
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DIsUNrTY 79

have led the masses into insurrection and broken the backbone

of the Army.

But, in April and May 1980, we did not have the necessary

logistics nor the required armed apparatus. And when I say that

we did not have it, I don't refer to the fact that it did not exist. I

am saying that we did not have the degree of unity in the revolutionary movement necessary to generate the conditions to

rapidly create the armed apparatus. No single organization, by

itself, was capable of going into that battle. Now, if we had unified the armed components of all the organizations, then it is

most likely that we could have responded to the situation. And

we would have needed a minimum level of logistics, much

smaller, in any case, than what was actually utilized.

Guerrilla Organizaions

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila-At one time, there

were five guerrilla organizations. The FPL, which at one time

was dependent on the church for support, was organized and set

up by the Jesuits. They founded organizations of campesinos

called FECCAS and UTC, Federaci6n Cristiana de Campesinos

Salvadorefios (Christian Federation of Salvadoran Campesinos)

and Uni6n de Trabajadores del Campo (Union of Rural

Workers), respectively. These organizations were created specifically by Jesuit priests. They would travel around the country

lecturing about their base committees, which were their meeting

grounds, and in each community they would form small groups

of people to whom they would inculcate their beliefs and their

doctrine. These groups began to increase in size and later on

became more violent. It was just a matter of time before they

were recognized as terrorist groups. Those who were capable of

assimilating this new doctrine were consequently integrated into

these terrorists organizations. The BPR, Bloque Popular Revolucionario (Popular Revolutionary Bloc), which is a component

of the FPL, serves as an umbrella for the unions and labor

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador. 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.

.4.
80 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

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THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 81

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82 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

sectors, including the ANDES, Asociaci6n Nacional de

Educadores Salvadorefios (National Association of Salvadoran

Educators). They usually move around trying to influence

various sectors of the population. This is the FPL.

Another organization is the ERP, Ejdrcito Revolucionario

del Pueblo (People's Revolutionary Army), which branched out

into another organized group known as the Ligas Populares-28

de Febrero (Popular Leagues-28th of February). At one point

these guerrilla organizations began to break away from the

Communist party, took their own initiative, and established

their own political concept, doctrine, and were determined to

accomplish their goals. At this point, the type of activities they

engaged in were of a violent nature, terrorist nature, and they

successfully upheld a front-of-the-masses, which allowed them

to continue to produce chaos on the streets and at the same time

strengthen their military, terrorist organizations.

Next is the National Resistance which branched out into

another front-of-the-masses called FAPU, which at the time

broke away from the ERP. The ERP broke away from the Communist party, and subsequently, the National Resistance broke

away from the ERP when their primary leader, Roque Dalton

Garcfa, was killed. He was a poet, but he was a well-known

Marxist who at one time lived in Cuba and was accused of treason and, therefore, executed.

The last organization is the FAL, Las Fuerzas Armadas de

Liberaci6n (Armed Forces of Liberation). This group is a military front of the Communist party. The Communist party was

the last group to establish a military organization because they.

in the beginning, were convinced that they could attain power

through democratic means, through nonviolent means, through

political participation. Then, these three different groups broke

away from them because they opted to pursue their objectives in

a violent manner. The Communist party was then isolated.

When they realized how successful these guerrilla groups had

been they decided to organize their own terrorist group or military organization known as FAL.

These are then the four military, terrorist organizations that

have their fronts of the masses. Who are their leaders'? Well, for
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 83

the FPL we had both Cayetano Carpio and a professor who was

president of the ANDES, Melida Anaya Montes. They both

died in Managua. Melida was killed by Cayetano Carpio's men,

and Cayetano Carpio committed suicide. The supreme leader

today is a man by the name of Roca, which is a pseudonym,

and I don't remember exactly what is his real name.

The ERP has always had its supreme commander, Joaqufn

Villalobos, which is also a pseudonym. He is one of the original

founders ot these organizations and has been at the front for a

long time. He is also the most prestigious member of these terrorist groups. He is very radical. Since the time of the kidnappings, his organization has been characterized as being brutal,

sanguine, cruel but also extremely capable because one of their

brigades, BRAZ, Brigada Rafael Arce Zablah (Rafael Arce

Zablah Brigade), has launched some of the most spectacular

blows against the government's forces. The leader of the

National Resistance or FARN, Fuerzas Armadas de La

Resistencia Nacional (Armed Forces of National Resistance). is

Fermdn Cienfuegos, and the leader for the FAL is Shafik

Handal, who is also the secretary for the Communist party.

Those are the four principal commanders of the terrorist organizations. They normally have central committees or, as they refer

to them, general staffs. There they have a group of people that

follows a strict political and military part simultaneously. One

thing that you must bear in mind is the fact that these commanders started out with a strict political orientation, but later

on they turned around to take an active military role. Then, they

managed the political and military elements simultaneously,

indistinctly and with a lot of conviction. These groups wound

up with not only a military leader but a political one as well.

Those were their characteristics.

A fifth organization that I have yet to mention is the

PRTC, Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos (Central American Worker's Revolutionary

party). They have strong ties with the ERP. It is a small group:

however, they were the ones who effected the massacre of the

Marines in the Zona Rosa. Their presence in Cerros de San

Pedro in San Vicente is very strong, but it is an organization

i

I°
84 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

that has suffered heavy blows. Nidia Diaz, a former commandant of this organization, was captured by our forces but was

later freed as a result of President Duarte's daughter being

kidnapped.

There Is Only One Road

to Victory: Armed Struggle

Juan Chac6n-Following the treacherous events of October

15. and their tremendous failure, all the democratic and mass

organizations realized there was only one road to victory: that of

armed struggle and the use of the people's methods of combat.

After the complete disintegration of the first Junta, there

began a process of consolidating the revolutionary alliance until

it reached the level of a revolutionary coordinating body. Thus

the Political-Military Coordinating Council was founded in

December 1979, which initially included the Popular Liberation

Forces-Farabundo Martf (FPL), the Communist Party of El

Salvador (PCS), and the National Resistance (RN). This was a

very important development, because it meant coordination

between the organizations which were the vanguard of the people, which had been directing the revolutionary war from its

beginning and which had been organizing among the people.

The coordination of these forces had a far-reaching influence at

the level of the masses and the organized sectors. A process of

coordination and tightening of alliances likewise developed

among the mass organizations, and in January the Revolutionary

Coordinating Committee of the Masses (CRM) was formed. It

meant more than coordination among the revolutionary mass

organizations, which included the Popular Revolutionary Bloc

(BPR), the United People's Action Front (FAPU), UND and the

Juan Chac6n, member of the executive committee of the Democratic

Revolutionary Front (FDR) until his death in 1980. Interview by CIDAMO

originally published in Mexico. 1980. and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas

(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983). pp. 41-44.

Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 85

Popular Leagues (LP-28), It also meant the formation of a

nucleus that could generate the broadest possible unity among

democratic and revolutionary forces in the country.... There

were various reasons for this. First of all, the CRM represented

for us the alliance of the revolutionary sectors. Within it exists

the worker-peasant alliance. We in the revolutionary organizations had long maintained that the basis for any alliance and any

unity would have to be in a worker-peasant alliance, that it

would be the nucleus for generating any sort of viable alliance.

And for that reason we were all struggling to build that workerpeasant alliance. So now it is in the CRM that we have seen our

aspirations take real shape; it is there that the forces of the proletariat and of the peasant class have converged. The other revolutionary sectors of society have, in turn, joined the alliancesuch as the students, teachers, slum dwellers, market vendors,

public employees, etc.

In the second place, the CRM expresses the local power of

the people. It is we in the revolutionary mass organizations who

have initiated the construction of local power in the barrios, in

the towns, in the precincts. In all the organizations, we have

been building People's Committees, Precinct Committees and

even Municipal Committees (the base of local people's power);

they would eventually replace the present regime's structures of

control. It is very important to point out all these factors, for

they show the value of this kind of unity.

In order to win power, it was not only necessary to unite

the revolutionary forces but also to join together with the powerful torrent of progressive and democratic forces in our country,

thus completely isolating the regime and beginning to build a

united political movement. The platform and program of the

democratic revolutionary government played an important role

in this. It was launched by the Revolutionary Coordinating

Committee of the Masses and then won the support of all the

democratic sectors of our country. In April the process of unification took a further step with the creation of the Democratic

Revolutionary Front, which became the broadest expression of

our people's unity and the social and political base of the future

democratic revolutionary government. And so we developed the
86 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

first stage, which then enabled us to move more swiftly toward

preparing the conditions that would eventually see us take

power. And here is an important point: unity grows not only out

of the need to defend ourselves against a common enemy as it

unleashes a campaign of extermination against us, it is also born

from the real possibility before us of taking power.

That is how we began our coordination, which in practical

terms has opened the doors to greater mass involvement in democratic and political organizations. The birth of unity has given

us more than a sum of our forces, it has in fact caused a multiplication of those forces; through that unity, we can deepen the

consciousness among the people and incorporate them at a

higher level in the struggle for winning power. Likewise, international support for us grows wider and stronger. The achievements of this first stage are very great, indeed, but in order to

win we couldn't stay at that level of coordination.

The consolidation of unity was not a preordained fact, not

a mechanical resolution by leadership, but a process which was

unfolded in the practice of our daily lives. It is pressure from

the masses, participation by the people and the advance of the

revolution which make our organization draw nearer, close

ranks and take a united stand along tactical and strategic line. It

is in this sense that we have taken some very important steps in

the process of consolidating our unity: the Political-Military

Coordinating Council announced its reorganization into a Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), preceded by the integration into that body of the People's Revolutionary Army-Party of

the Salvadoran Revolution (ERP-PRS). That event marked a

qualitative leap in the development of our unity, because it conferred upon the people's movement a single leadership--we

would now have a single strategy and set of tactics for our military and political fronts and on the international level. The DRU

has announced that it has ready a plan for winning the war and

that the people are only waiting for the signal to commence the

final battle for victory. The other organizations of unity, CRM

and FDR, have likewise been consolidating themselves, to completely isolate the enemy and increase their influence among the

people.
THE "FINAL" OFFENSIVE AND INSURGENT DISUNITY 87

CRM has made a qualitative leap inasmuch as it no longer

simply coordinates, but now has the capacity to direct activity.

As such we don't think its title as Coordinating Council accurately describes what it now does. The Revolutionary Coordinating Committee of the Masses now gives direction to the

entire mass movement, and so its title is inadequate. However,

the title has wide recognition and on that merit we keep it.

The FDR is likewise solidifying itself. On the one hand,

the strength of the masses given to it by the CRM is increasing

and on the other hand, the FDR is broadening, with the incorporation of new sectors. The participation of the democratic sectors has given FDR its pluralistic aspect and its capacity to draw

together every sector of the people. This makes their role very

important. The democratic forces are not playing a merely decorative role in the FDR. an, t they know that -still, the imperialists have tried to describe it that way. These sectors of the

movement have pdl% ,;d a very active role, they are playing an

active role, ard they will continue doing so throughout the construction of the new society. We can truthfully say that the FDR

has gained broad international support as the main embodiment

of the unity of popular forces- more, it is becoming the social

and political force that will in time create the democratic revolutionary government.

As of now, we can count on a unity that is irreversible. All

our organizations have made a serious commitment-they will

not abandon this movement at any time. This commitment

includes the intention, from here on, to develop common structures, because in spite of common leadership, our internal structures remain distinct from each other. An example is that,

within the CRM, the BPR has kept its own structure, as has the

LP-28 and each of its sections. With the political-military organizations, it is the same situation-the people's armies each

have their own structure. But the strategy we project is the formation of a single organic structure. The same is true on an

international level; everybody has their own structure and while

they are coordinated, the goal is to move more and more

towards forming common structures. In the future, there will be

examples of such unified structures on the military, political and
88 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

international levels. That is the kind of perspective, the process

which in the short range opens the doors to putting the people in

power.

The Five Armed Elements

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-You have five groups that

have armed elements in the field. During my tenure (as Military

Group Commander) they were mixed, and, depending on which

department or which one of their zones of operation you were

in, you could have had all five groups represented. Up in Morazdin it's ERP, in La Uni6n you have ERP and FARN, and in

San Vicente you had three groups. In San Salvador proper you

found underground groups from all five elements. In Santa Ana

there were three of the five groups. It depended-there were

cooperative arrangements which sometimes worked and sometimes didn't. Sometimes they were very effective in military

operations which were orchestrated, and where each element

was given a specific mission in support. One would get the

blocking position, another the ambush positions, the third was

the assault force-pretty good cooperation sometimes. Other

times it broke down, and they would end up squabbling and

pointing fingers at each other-s"He didn't support me,"

"that's typical of this group," "they always let us down," and

this sort of thing. You read the traffic, and you heard the grumblings from debriefs of guerrillas that came in and said, "Yes,

we have trouble with this group and so forth." The facade

appeared to work better on the political front. The front organizations operating out of Mexico appear to have the better politicians-Ungo, for example, can sit down with Cienfuegos. What

comes out of a political discussion may be much smoother,

much more when tailored for public consumption. In the field it

may be a little rougher.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 23 February 1987.
External Support for

the Combatants

Significance for the Insurgents

THE EDITORS-One of the precepts for a successful

insurgency is to establish strong external support. With

the personal backing and prodding of Castro as

mentioned previously, the El Salvadoran guerrilla

organizations were building strong support from the

Socialist International, Marxist-Leninist countries and

from countries not normally aligned with eitherincluding the United States. The support in terms of

diplomatic recognition from France and Mexico and in

terms of developing communications and logistical

support bases was significant to the buildup of the

insurgent organizations. While not a monolithic

structure, the external support given the insurgents

during this period of disarray was sufficiently broad to

influence international opinions with the impression

that the insurgents were in fact more legitimate

representatives of the El Salvadoran people than was the

Junta government.

89
4

90 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

The First Diplomatic Offensive

Begun by the FDR Is Paying Off

Rafael Menjivar-The work that we began more or less in

May 1980, when the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR)

began its first diplomatic offensive, has begun to take shape in

international organizations, as well as in the positions taken by

different countries. We think that an important example of that

progress was the U.N. Resolution at the last General Assembly,

in late November. early December. At that Assembly, the

Democratic Revolutionary Front presented to the Third

Committee a resolution condemning the violation of human

rights and the participation of foreign governments in aiding the

Christian Democratic Junta. This resolution coincided with the

murder of the leadership of the Democratic Revolutionary

Front. There were good results in the General Assembly: 70

votes in favor of the resolution, 13 against-which forced the

U.S. to abstain-and 40 abstentions counting the U.S.

We would also like to mention the Resolution of the NonAligned Nations, a very important force, in which there is

concrete mention of El Salvador. This resolution calls for

nonintervention in El Salvador and supports its right to selfdetermination. They gave their support to the national liberation

forces. Along these same lines, there was the resolution by the

Feople's Permanent Tribunal. Although this is not 

a

governmental entity, it is an established Non-Governmental

Organization of the United Nations. Its resolution condemned

the military Junta and U.S. intervention; it is important because

of its practical links with the Bertrand Russell Tribunal and its

successor, the Lelio Bazzo Tribunal.

There were also resolutions from political movements,

such as the Socialist International, represented in different

Rafael Menjivar. spokesman for the Democratic Revolutionary Front

(FDR). His analysis of the situation in El Salvador was originally published in

El Salvador, April 1981. and later published in Revolution and Intervention in

Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco:

Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983). pp. 68-69. Copyright 1983 by

CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.

.1 I l M N MIM
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 91

governments. During the past year, the Socialist International

issued resolutions that were more and more favorable, more

and more clear in their support for the Democratic

Revolutionary Front and against intervention. We were able

to get resolutions in San Jos6, Costa Rica; then in the

Dominican Republic, from the Latin American Section; then

in Oslo last July and again last November. In spite of

pressure from the U.S., the Socialist International made a

strong statement against U.S. intervention and it also

recognized and gave all its political support to the Democratic

Revolutionary Front as the representative organization of the

Salvadoran struggle. So, in these organizations, most of the

nations and peoples of the world are supporting us except

Venezuela, Honduras, Guatemala and the countries of the

Southern Cone-which, according to statements by members

of the National Action Front (FAN, the paramilitary

organizations of El Salvador). are supporting the Junta.

Support for us comes even from the peoples of those

countries and the rest of the governments of the world, some

with a firm decision of support and others at least critical of

the United States and the military Junta.

They Had Introduced 600 Tons of

Weapons into the Country

General Jaime Abdul Gutiirrez-By the end of 1980, in

October-November, the guerrillas were organizing and

introducing more documentation. The information we had

was that they had introduced 600 tons of weapons in the

country. They had the ability to equip and supply some

15,000 men. Very superior. We were beginning to form the

first rapid reaction battalions.

General Jaime Abdul Guti~rrez. member of the Civil-Military Junta

which took control of the government of El Salvador after deposing General

Romero on 15 October 1979, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 18

December 1986.
92 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

We Traced Weapons Back to Vietnam

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-They were getting

weapons; some weapons we traced back to Vietnam on many

occasions. All of the demolitions that we policed up after the

Ilopango raid in '82 had come out of Czechoslovakia. There

was also Bulgarian, Hungarian, and East German equipment.

They were buying medical supplies and communications

gear. I'm sure you know that the bank-rolling was being done

in Managua. I'd say that it was substantial, and it is hard to

say what would happen if it were cut off. First, you could not

cut it off completely. Even if it's just a trickle, as long as it's

there the guerrilla knows that he has an umbilical cord back

to a sponsor which gives him the psychological lift and the

sustenance that he needs. It may not amount to a hell of a lot,

but at least he knows that it's there. As an example, the effect

of the MEDEVAC program where they would actually come

in airplanes and take out their wounded to aid stations up on

the border. We had somewhere in the ballpark of 100

sightings of airplanes every three months. If you halve those

because of duplication of reporting, that's still a fair number

of small planes coming in. The cayucos (boats) were still

coming across the Gulf of Fonseca. The mother ships were

working off the south coast; the small boats would make the

run into the coast. It didn't have to be a lot; it just had to be

there. If they cut it off, if we're ever able to really strangle

that-or another possibility might be to get the Nicaraguans

to terminate support-you still have the Belize-Guatemalan

Connection. It comes into Belize, which is a sleeve, and goes

across the Guatemalan border into Salvador and part of the

corner up in Honduras.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander. U.S. Military Group in ll

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 23 February

1987.
S• -------

EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 93

International Propaganda Support

Colonel Orlando Zepeda-They also enjoy free propaganda at

a global level and international organizations that echo a

sensationalist viewpoint of this struggle. As a weak

government, we find it very difficult to counteract that

propaganda at the international level. We do not have the

resources, but they do. For example, Radio Venceremos is

broadcast throughout the entire world. There is a broadcasting

center in France called the Sistema Venceremos, and it works

throughout France and Nicaragua. Magazines, pamphlets,

bulletins, and communiques are also circulated throughout these

countries free of cost. Mexico has provided them with a

clandestine publications agency called SAL 3. Costa Rica

collects the information coming from Radio Venceremos and

publishes it-what the war is in El Salvador. That is a great

advantage. Unfortunately, democracy is a weak institution.

Democracy advocates for people's rights and opposes the rules

of dictatorships. The fundamental principles of democracyfreedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of

movement-are weaknesses and are easily taken advantage of

by the subversives.

.. .But We Lose Internationally

Colonel Oscar Campos Anaya-That is why we believe that

this war can continue to be prolonged in view of what the

enemy knows to be his doctrine. The doctrine is the same

employed in all the other parts of the world-countries such as

Ethiopia and the African countries where this same type of war

is being fought. The same steps are occurring over and over.

Communists are universal. That is why they refer to themselves

as the Communists of the world. Unfortunately, the Communist

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda H.. C-2 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces,

1985 to 1987, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 22 January 1987.

Colonel Oscar Rodolfo Campos Anaya, former Fifth Brigade Commander

and now First Brigade Commander. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador.

21 July 1987.
94 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

of El Salvador is the same as the Communist of the United

States, and they think the same way as the Communist in Italy

and the Communist in France and the Communist in Russia.

Unfortunately, democracies are

very particular and each democracy

wants to take its own course of

action and go its own way.

Unfortunately, the democratic

countries have several formulas for 4 meeting their objectives and goals.

The Russians have only one formula.

The Communists have only one

formula, which is to defeat and

destroy capitalism and democracy.

This is our worst enemy, and we can

see that in the international forums.

COPREFA The moment a democracy has to

Colonel Oscar fight against the Communists and

Rodolfo Campos Anaya Marxists, the democracies are

disunited, and their votes are divided. All Communists vote the

same in support of the Communist proposals. Unfortunately,

our biggest problem is that democracies don't. That is why El

Salvador has been condemned in many international forums.

Communist proposals are supported by Communist

countries. And, in addition, not only do we see Communist

countries supporting these proposals but democratic countries as

well, due to the reprisals they could receive from other

Communist countries against their own and the fact that they

don't want to be involved. A lot of times we see them voting in

favor of Communist proposals. An example is what just

happened in Geneva with respect to the condemning of Cuba.

Countries friendly to the U.S. voted against or they abstained.

As a result, the game was lost by one vote.

Democracies are always looking after their own particular

conveniences and not for the good of the whole. The

Communist focuses on the whole, and that is our biggest

problem with respect to democracies. The streets of El Salvador

are still in flames as a result of this war. Yesterday, for
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 95

example, I was listening to an American reporter stating that the

subversives had taken over the cities. They had knocked down

poles. They had knocked down a bunch of other things. And

they had attacked the garrisons. It was all a big lie. And the

worst possible thing for us to have is that kind of propaganda

which is being promoted by the Communists. We know very

well that 75 percent of the Communists' budget is spent on

propaganda. We don't practice that sort of thing, and that is

where we tend to lose out in this war. We win internally but we

lose internationally.

Unfortunately, the aid comes from the exterior, and as a

result we stumble into closed doors because of the

counterpropaganda the enemy has made of us in those countries

we believe to be our allies. Thus, when we seek the necessary

aid we are turned down because we have been condemned by

the international forums because of the bad things it is reported

we are doing here. That is one of the fundamental issues in

which countries we consider our allies all of a sudden turn into

enemies because of the Communist propaganda which has

reached those sectors. And unfortunately for us, these countries

and organizations have been infiltrated by the Communist

regime. They are able to give their own version and account of

the war before we have the opportunity to give the true version

of what is going on. That is one of the greatest harms caused by

the subversion because they have the support of communism,

and the Communists are universal. International communism

supports Communists all over the world. That is why

propaganda works so well. And reporters can print any article

they want, which is far from the truth because it has been

provided by a Communist or a Communist organization.

So, that is why the amount of aid we have been receiving

has decreased. This has deteriorated our image. But people just

like yourself who have come to our country have been able to

observe personally what the real problems are and what we are

really interested in. I am very grateful for that. The problem lies

when news about us is released to the exterior by people who

are trying to cause trouble for us. An example of that is what

occurs in the U.S. Congress, where there are people who inform
96 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 To OCTOBER 1981

the Congress only about the bad things we do. Unfortunately,

that is how the world is. An individual is criticized for the

negative things he does and is never given any credit for the

positive things, even though 95 percent is positive and 5 percent

is negative. Unfortunately, that 5 percent vote wins over the

other 95 percent because of propaganda. That is why many

people who sit in high positions in office recognize only the 5

percent negative aspects and never credit us with the other 95

percent.

The Lowest Point for

the Junta Government

President Jos6 Napoleon Duarte-Overall, we were being

crushed under the avalanche of international press coverage. We

had been totally unprepared for it. If there had been some

structure to handle the press, some capacity to investigate

charges and demonstrate what was true or false, we might have

done better. Mixed together were lies and truths, omissions and

exaggerations. The government became isolated. Other

countries withdrew their ambassadors and closed down their

embassies. The lowest point for the Junta government came in

August, 1981 when France and Mexico gave diplomatic

recognition to the FDR-FMLN as a representative political

force.

The Role of the United States during

This Period

THE EDITORS-The necessity for consistent external

support to a government fighting an insurgency is well

documented but poorly understood. For El Salvador, the

United States was the only source of external

Jos6 Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to present).

Duarte: My Storv (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1986). p. 170. Copyright

1986 by Josd Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P. Putnam's

Sons.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 97

support which could make a difference. And yet, during

this period of disarray the United States was

inconsistent in its support. The U.S. lack of unity,

consistency, or understanding was highlighted by the

inability of major U.S. policy-makers or departments to

develop a coordinated effort to support the El

Salvadoran government. The perceived denial by the

State Department of the need for military assistance

during this period is but one example. With the arrival

of a new administration, and the writing of the Woerner

Report, the development of a more coordinated policy

began.

Two Key Decisions for the

United States

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi-To be precise, the first key decision

was the decision by the U.S. Government, a decision taken in

the spring of 1980, to support both the military institutions and

the civilian politicians associated with democratic parties in

order to try to restore a sense of authority and direction to the

Salvadoran government. This decision caught the Communists

on the far left totally unaware. And when the land reform began

to be implemented in April, and various other social reforms

were implemented during the summer of 1980, the results

pulled the rug out from under the prospects for success of the

Communist strategy, which has been rendered famous through

Handal's travel diary, and ultimately the launching of the final

offensive. The United States finally had become solidly

involved.

The second key factor that made a big difference was the

willingness of the United States to stay involved in spite of

major troubles. I would say that here there were three elements

involved. The first took place at the very end of the Carter

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director. Office of Policy. Planning and

Coordination. Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. US Department of State.

1977 to date, interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 10 September 1987.

---------
98 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

administration after Ronald Reagan had already won the

presidency. That was the crisis occasioned by the murder of the

American church women. We immediately suspended all aid

and immediately attempted to take steps to try to force some

kind of an investigation.

And let me say that it is a good thing that we did. I can still

remember asking where the van was that the church women had

been riding in when they were kidnapped and being told that it

was simply lying there abandoned by the side of the road, where

it had been found. We had the guts to restore military assistance

even though the investigation of this human rights outrage had

not been completed.

The second key decision that was made to overcome all of

these difficulties was that of the Reagan people who were

willing to accept the need for continuity with the Carter

policies. They realized, in other words, in this particular case.

they were working. They believed that agrarian reform, bank

nationalization, and similar collective economic measures were

likely to be counterproductive in the long run from an economic

point of view. Nonetheless, what was needed now was

continuity, not more disruption; order, not anarchy. Most of

all-and this was a fundamentally correct American insightwhat was needed was the restoration of the reputation, standing

perception, of the United States as a reliable ally and supporter.

Through the Back Door of

the White House

President JosO Napole6n Duarte-The first time I entered the

White House was through the back door, for a quick interview

with Carter. Pastor met me in the Old Executive Office

Building. Fidel Chdvez Mena, our foreign minister, came with

me because he happened to be in Washington for the

Jos6 Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to present).

Duarte: Mv Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1986). pp. 142. 158-59.

Copyright 1986 by Jos6 Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P.

Putnam's Sons.

PA

LI
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 99

Organization of American States assembly. Pastor led us down

through an underground passageway that connects to the White

House. We were late, running all the way to make our Oval

Office appointment on time. President Carter was standing in

front of his desk. He was supposed to leave in his helicopter in

ten minutes. Without any formalities, I summed up the situation

in El Salvador, asking if he could speed up the delivery of four

helicopters.

"You're leaving the government," I said, "but the

Communists could attack and take over before your presidency

ends, unless you help us defend ourselves."

He quickly consulted Pastor about the status of aid and

agreed to see what he could do. But a week later the four

American women were killed. All U.S. aid was suspended. No

military supplies would be authorized by Carter until after the

guerrilla offensive took place.

In my opinion. Ambassador White acted as a proconsul,

assuming that no local system of justice existed. Thus he could

order the excavation of the bodies without waiting for any legal

or police authority. In the case of the Canadians. he helped to

protect witnesses who wanted to leave the country before they

could be questioned. He kept the Embassy's driver from being

involved in the inquiry. He learned of information about a radio

communications that suggested someone in the security forces

was looking for the nuns at the airport, but never revealed it to

me. Months later White told reporters about this strange

message, but only after he had left the diplomatic service to

become a leading critic of Reagan's policies in Central

America.

To forestall any offensive from the right flank and see what

the attitude of the incoming Republican Administration would

be, I sought out Reagan's foreign policy advisers: Richard

Allen, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Constantine Menges. Their

attitudes ranged from skeptical to rude as they interrogated me.

They seemed to have been coached by the Salvadoran Right to

think that we Christian Democrats had no respect for private

enterprise. I explained that we did believe in a healthy private

sector and would treat business fairly, but that at the same time
100 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

our government must ensure that Salvadoran society as a whole

benefited and shared in the economy. They questioned me about

agrarian reform, as if only a Communist would ever advocate

such a plan. Allen, in particular, kept insisting on questions

about whether I admired Fidel Castro.

Of all of them, Kirkpatrick, though doubtful at the

beginning of our interview, showed more understanding and a

willingness to listen. It may have been her influence that

convinced Reagan to express support for our Junta government,

even before his inauguration. The coup from the Right did not

materialize in December when I became president of the Junta.

But on January 10, ten days before Reagan took office, the

guerrillas' final offensive exploded around us.

The Lack of Materiel Support

Dr. Alvaro Magafia-With respect to the aid, we did not

know exactly when we were going to receive it. We didn't even

know if we could count on that aid. At the outset of 1982,

during my tenure, there were several attempts made to take the

offensive, but the lack of sufficient materiel support did not

allow us to do so, particularly the lack of ammunition.

The State Department Denied

a Need for U.S. Military Aid

General Wallace H. Nutting-When I arrived in

USSOUTHCOM in 1979, the U.S.-Salvadoran relationship as a

whole was not very positive. I think it was a very strained

relationship when Romero was still in power. On the other

hand, when the military leadership, with some civilian

Dr. Alvaro Magatia, provisional President of the Republic of El Salvador,

1982 to 1984, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 18 December 1986

and 30 June 1987.

General Wallace H. Nutting. Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command, 1979 to 1983, interviewed in Orlando, Florida. 29 January 1987.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 101

involvement in support, overthrew Romero on the 15th of

October and announced their reform programs, we really had a

chance to establish new relationships. I think the U.S.

Government position, as articulated by the State Department at

that time, continued to take a very hard view of the military

involvement even though they were the reformers. It was slow

to move, was slow to give them credit for what they were

doing, and remained, probably rightly so, fairly suspicious of

the military's connections with the Right. All of that continued

to deny the need for or appropriateness of any U.S. military

assistance, the predominant view being that the most serious

problem was from the Right, not on the Left.

Our efforts continued into '81 at a relatively low level until

the so-called final offensive, and then they increased when the

new administration came in. Again, we had some slippage for a

few months, but the program began to increase.

Correspondingly, our contacts with the Salvadorans began to be

much more positive. Bob White never let me go to Salvador.

Deane Hinton, who followed him, similarly had reluctance but

had to acknowledge that there was greater need by that time. He

let me come in controlled situations and, I think, specifically to

serve his purposes. I didn't mind doing that because I tried to

tell all the ambassadors in Latin America that 1 had some

resources and some ability to help them accomplish their

mission and that, after all, was my job. Deane Hinton agreed, to

a certain extent, and I think relationships improved

correspondingly as the war increased in intensity and as our

attempts to help them increased in quality and quantity.

When Duarte was Interim President. I went a couple of

times, and when Magafia was there I went a couple of times. I

went when Garcia was Defense Minister and developed with

him some pretty good relationships. The Military Group had

good working relationships at that point. My efforts to develop

an organization both in San Salvador and elsewhere in the

region involved establishing U.S. intelligence and operational

skills in the capitals and ministries in order to work with

national counterparts to improve their general staff intelligence

and planning capabilities-really as co-workers more than

advisors.
102 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Our purpose was just to try to be there, to help them

recognize the problem, to recognize a useful piece of

intelligence, to establish intelligence requirements, and once

information was available, to help them plan and know how to

execute an operation. Additionally, we were trying to help them

use the communications capabilities we were providing, the

intelligence that was becoming increasingly available, the

logistics capabilities and to keep the pressure on to operate

tactically in a relevant way.

My purpose was to establish a modest network of U.S.

intelligence, operations, and planning capabilities in each

capital and at the theater-operational level, using that regional

network to try to pull together and to coordinate the efforts that

we were undertaking in each country. It was hard to do that. It

was not hard in Honduras. The Ambassador was pretty

agreeable. It was very hard, as I described, in El Salvador. I

also tried to put secure U.S. communications capabilities in

each of those locations to establish a sub-regional network and

eventually to make use of the intelligence that was becoming

available from some of the new systems that we brought in. We

had more success in convincing the indigenous leadership than

we had with the U.S. political leadership in Salvador.

When Vides Casanova replaced Garcia, I was able to

establish an extremely positive relationship with him. As soon

as we made arrangements to train that first rapid reaction

battalion at Fort Benning, I talked to Vides Casanova about his

interests in going up there to observe the training, said that I

wanted to see it and suggested we go together. We went to

Benning and spent two or three days visiting the training of the

first rapid reaction battalion. It was interesting to see Vides

Casanova really bloom.

The Salvadoran military, much like the rest of Latin

America, has a very sharp division between the officer corps

and the enlisted. There's almost no contact, and the senior

officers really don't know how to deal with enlisted people.

which is quite contrary to my experience in the U.S. military.

Vides Casanova was very observant. He watched me run

into sergeants and soldiers that I had served with in various
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 103

places, shake hands and talk with them and slap them on the

back or talk to two or three when you got them together. Within

a day or two he began doing the same thing-shaking hands

with his soldiers and asking them how they were getting along

and speaking to them in squads and platoon formations. I think

after that trip together to Benning, which involved a lot of

contact, day and night, personal and professional,

USSOUTHCOM's relationships became very positive; this

reinforced the capabilities of the Mil Group. But

USSOUTHCOM had a hell of a lot more to contribute, even

with our limited resources, but we were not allowed to do that.

Why? That's another lesson learned that needs to be developed.

Somebody needs to interview those ambassadors and find out

why they were reluctant to allow USSOUTHCOM to develop

more of its potential.

I agree that smaller is better, and if USCINCSO

(Commander-in-Chief, Southern Command) is going to become

involved in : visit, it has to be carefully planned. It needs to be

carefully timed, have specific and agreed purposes and that sort

of thing. But the total exclusion under those circumstances in

1980 and 1981 didn't make sense. We could have had a more

rapid, effective impact in El Salvador if there had been a closer

working relationship between USSOUTHCOM and the

embassies, which would have given us a more positive

relationship sooner with the Salvadorans. And the same is pretty

much true all over Latin America.

Honduras was different. john Negroponte had, I think, a

better appreciation of the problem, what we could do about it

and what USSOUTHCOM was capable of helping him do. We

proceeded on a much more rapid basis. He accepted the

strategic survey right away. and we worked with the

Hondurans, just as Woemer had worked with the Salvadorans,

to come up with a strategic appreciation and came out with a

force development plan, which also included a national

communication system, on which to base a sensible security

assistance program. There was a lot more that USSOUTHCOM

could have done earlier, but it really is internal U.S.

relationships that are more critical than U.S. military/indigenous
104 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

country relationships in my view, Those are a lot easier to

handle.

Friction between Cincsouth

and the Country Team

Ambassador Deane Hinton-I don't think there was a great

deal of friction (between DOD and State Department). I think

always in those things there is room for reasonable men to

disagree. There was probably more friction between

CINCSOUTH and the country team than was desirable. One

had the impression that the CINCSOUTH headquarters wanted

to take the Salvadoran war over. But the Salvadorans thought it

was their war. By and large, I tended to agree that their views

had to be respected. Even though there were times when one

had to twist their arms rather hard. The CINC, ! don't know

how to put it.... I do not consider General Nutting as very

politically astute.

I guess, one of the incidents that I remember, the issue was

where to send Salvadoran cadets to OTC. They then decided

they needed officers for an expanded army and that the way to

get them was to take the cadet corps to a crash OTC course,

forget about the three or four years of Salvadoran West Point

training. The CINC, General Nutting, wanted to train them, in

Panama. The Salvadorans and some people in the Pentagon said

the place to train them was at Benning.

I suggested that General Nutting come up so we could sit

down with the Salvadorans, the Minister of Defense, Chief of

Staff, and the general high command to discuss the pros and

cons of Panama and Benning. We did that. We spent an

afternoon running through it; General Nutting made his

arguments. Unanimously the Salvadorans thought it had to be

Benning and that for all kinds of reasons. Unfortunately, much

of their reasoning was pride. They just thought it would reflect

better if their officers went to Benning rather than the School of

the Americas or whatever it is.

Ambassador Deane Hinton. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1982 to

1983. interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 10 Scptcmber 1987.

.1
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 105

But there were also military angles for the kind of training

available and so forth. It was perfectly clear that we could have

forced Panama training down their reluctant throats, you know,

but it would have been a terrible thing. I thought that having

listened to the same reasons I had been listening to, General

Nutting might change his view, but it had no effect on him at

all. He went out and sent another message to the Joint Chiefs

saying it's got to be in Panama. That led to a difference of

view, and fortunately the Joint Chiefs went with the

Ambassador and the Salvadorans. But that is one example

where I think a lot of trouble could have been avoided by a little

understanding of Latin mentality. It seemed to me to be that

way all too often.

Perception That Southern Command

Wanted to Run the War

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-The bottom line was that

SOUTHCOM was viewed as this monstrous headquarters totally

committed to taking over the running of the war. Anyone that's

ever been to Quarry Heights (location of HQ, SOUTHCOM, in

Panama) knows better than that. But that aside, Ambassador

Hinton, with his marching orders from Enders (Assistant

Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs), was not about to

turn over the running of the war to what he viewed as a bunch

of conventional soldiers whose only solution would be to add

more, make it louder, and make it bigger.

What needed to be done was to keep it small in terms of

focus and not become preoccupied with gimmicks and gadgets

and more firepower and more and more and more but, rather,

let's go with what the Salvadorans are best at, and let's try to

minimize what they're worst at. And within the constraints of

the budget, of the appropriations, get on with the business of

making this thing happen.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington. D.C., 23 February 1987.
106 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Different Perceptions

THE EDITORS-The insurgent view of the U.S. role and

activities in El Salvador is diametrically different. In that

view, there is absolutely no suggestion that Mr. Duarte

might have had to almost beg for even limited U.S.

help, no inkling that Dr. Magaia could not count on any

support for his provisional government, and no

recognition that President Carter had major problems

with the U.S. Congress over the question of even

humanitarian aid to El Salvador. Instead, the insurgents

felt that there was a long-term U.S. policy or plan to be

totally involved in El Salvador. Rafael Menjivar

elaborates the situation in a discussion of his model of

U.S. intervention in that country.

The Model of U.S. Intervention

in El Salvador

Rafael Menjivar-A State Department official stated that they

were willing to support the Salvadoran Junta up to the final

consequences and in effect, they are doing so. I have pointed

out before, the similarities between Reagan and Hitler, who

announced at one point everything he was going to do. There

were a lot of people who did not believe he was going to do it

when, in effect, he was almost at the point of succeeding. In the

case of Reagan and all his advisors, I think he is ready to

attempt everything he says. Whether he'll be able to succeed is

another matter. That will depend not only on our stand in El

Salvador but also on the actions of the other peoples of the

world.

Rafael Menjivar. Spokesman for the Democratic Revolutionary Front

(FDR). His analysis of the situation in El Salvador was originally published in

El Salvador. April 1981. and later published in Revolution and Intervention in

Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco:

Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983), pp. 65-67. Copyright 1983 by

CM Associates. Reprinted by Permission of CM Associates.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 107

What does it mean to say, "Support the Junta to the final

consequences." We understand it to mean that if the Junta falls,

as it is about to do, the United States would be willing to

intervene in El Salvador. They have said it very clearly. They

are looking for, and they have made this public, a way to launch

a diplomatic offensive against the Socialist International, or

involving the Socialist International, in order to derailaccording to them-its support for the struggle in El Salvador.

In my opinion, the United States is searching for several

options. In the first place, they are attempting a maneuver

through the OAS, in order to apply the Inter-American Treaty

for Reciprocal Assistance which eventually would have the

participation of those countries allied with the U.S. against El

Salvador, such as the governments of Guatemala and Honduras

(which has been militarily strengthened by the U.S.) and the

support of the Herrera Campins government in Venezuela

(which has provided the main support for the U.S. and for

Christian Democratic politics in El Salvador). And in the event

that they are not able to carry out this plan, they would be

willing without a doubt, to carry out a full-scale, direct

inter,,ention in El Salvador. This intervention, according to their

own plans, would not be limited to El Salvador, but would

include Nicaragua and also would serve to strengthen

Guatemala.

Given this reality, we have prepared ourselves for a longer

struggle. We don't doubt for a moment that the U.S. will

regionalize the conflict-which we do not wish to happen. This

leads us to make a comparison with other types of interventions

carried out by the United States in Latin America and other

parts of the world.

I think there are two models that the United States always

has in mind, one of which it obviously does not like. The first

model is that of the invasion of the Dominican Republic in

1965, which was for the U.S. the most satisfactory in that they

could localize the problem and leave the country very rapidly,

with little loss of human lives (North American, of course) and

at low political cost as well. The other model is that of
108 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Vietnam, where the conflict became a regional one, where the

loss of American lives was high, the political cost was high and

even the economic cost was high. Analyzing the Central

American, Caribbean and world context of the situation, we

think that in the case of El Salvador, the U.S. is not very likely

to invade as they did with the Dominican Republic. In the case

of El Salvador, as in Vietnam, we think they are going to make

it a regional problem, because El Salvador cannot be seen

outside the context of Central America.

Nicaragua has already warned, and it is quite evident, that

an invasion of El Salvador would be immediately detrimental to

the Nicaraguan Revolution. It would be practically an invasion

of the Nicaraguan Revolution, which is already feeling the U.S.

attacks and economic offensive through the denial of wheat,

loans, etc. Also, we don't think this can occur without a

reaction from the revolutionary movements of Guatemala,

Honduras, and Costa Rica. On the diplomatic level, we think

that if Nicaragua is attacked, other countries in the Caribbean

and the world will have to participate.

And then there is Mexico, a very important factor in our

estimation. Mexico has had an anti-imperialist policy, not

purely as a vocation, but because of very concrete interests of

its own which make it take the side of the national liberation

movements. Mexico has on its southern borders 80 percent of

its oil, and 63 percent of its (natural) gas, and it has an oil

pipeline; but it also sees very clearly that what the U.S. wants to

do is close in, through a hard-line policy in the Caribbean and

Central America. We think that the United States is launching a

very strong offensive, with many economic and political

pressures, on a worldwide scale. We know it has launched a

campaign against Mexico. Mexico has maintained a position of

respect for self-determination, the same as Roldos [President of

Ecuador, killed in a plane crash later in 1981.- Eds.], who

practically elaborated a whole theory on the self-determination

of El Salvador. Maybe there is something to the idea that the

struggle over the Peruvian border is not far away. There is
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 109

definitely the possibility of pressure being applied on Roldos

so that he will change his position within the Andean Pact.

The United States is unleashing all forms of pressure

against us, with the accusation that there is foreign

intervention in El Salvador. That is nothing new. Since last

April, the State Department and the Pentagon tried to prove

in the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Congress that

Russia and Cuba were intervening. The only thing they

achieved was to prove that Cuba was calling for the unity of

all revolutionary forces, which is quite ridiculous if one is

seriously looking for intervention by those countries. Then

there are the provocations against Nicaragua, with the

accusation that Nicaragua is sending arms and guerrillas by

way of the Fonseca Gulf. Anyone with any knowledge of the

situation in El Salvador, especially knowing the route by

which the guerrillas allegedly reached El Salvador, would

immediately see that it is an absurd claim. The guerrillas

would have had to pass right in front of the island of

Meanguera, which has a helicopter base set up by none other

than the United States. There has also never been proof of

any captured or dead guerrillas.

We think they will continue with these ridiculous claims.

Their aim is to fool the American people, more than other

people in the world who already understand the situation. The

U.S. claimed not too long ago that they will present proof of

Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador,

proof which is yet to be seen. This reminds us of their

arguments during the U.S. intervention against the Arbenz

government in Guatemala, when they fabricated a whole

series of articles charging that there were submarines in

Guatemala's Lake Izabal. Anybody who knows Guatemala

and Lake Izabal can see how ridiculous this is. But in any

case, there is a strong offensive. Our position is one of

flexibility regarding negotiations with the United States but

we also stand firm in defending the revolutionary processas someone said, to the last man of the FMLN and FDR.

J

.1
110 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Imperialism Has No Other

Option Than Intervention

Fermdn Cienfuegos-The point is that the "Salvadoran"

Army is no longer capable of directing the war, strategically or

tactically. With the January 10, 1981 general offensive, the

FMLN gained the strategic offensive and all the bourgeois

Army's attempts to regain it have resulted in major military

defeats. This has had very far-reaching consequences-it leaves

imperialism with no option other than intervention in order to

try to defend a situation which is militarily indefensible.

So imperialism converts the "Salvadoran" Army into a

puppet army whose reins are held outside of the country; an

army-of-occupation with its command center in the United

States.

The "Woerner Report"

THE EDITORS-The "Woerner Report" was one of the

most important documents upon which subsequent

U.S. military security assistance to El Salvador was

based. It was also the beginnings of the Salvadoran

planning for conducting a successful war against the

insurgents. The results, over time, would include force

expansion-the equipping, training, and modernization

of relatively professional and well-disciplined security

forces. But, these things take time. Before positive

results could be attained, there would have to be a

building period in which it would appear that the

insurgents fortunes were ascendant.

Fermdn Cienfuegos, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of

National Resistance (FARN) and a member of the general command of the

FMLN. His analysis of the situation in El Salvador was originally published in

the Mexican journal Proceso on 9 March 1981. and later published in

Revolution and Intervention in Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and

Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates. 1983).

p. 58. Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS U1

A Basic Look at What It Would

Take to Win

Ambassador Deane Hinton-When I went down, the mission

given to me by the government, the Secretary, and to some

extent directly from the President, was to make sure that the

guerrillas and Communists didn't take over El Salvador. There

was considerable confusion in the administration about what the

situation was. I hadn't been there very long, before I personally

thought that it was more serious than people realized. Certainly

military pressures were considerable. While the final, the socalled final, offensive had been stopped by the end of the Carter

administration, the guerrillas were a lot stronger than some

people seemed to realize. There was also a political-economic

dimension which was disturbing.

I can't recall how long I'd been there, but within the first

six weeks, two months, or so, I came back up with an analysis

and my recommendations of the situation pretty much across the

board. In the military, the thing that impressed me the most was

that there had been a fairly effective series of ad hoc responses

to immediate problems, but there was no overall concept. One

of my principal recommendations was that there should be a

basic look at the military situation and what it would take to

win ... that produced Woerner's mission.

I consider myself very lucky that Fred Woerner was the

fellow who was chosen to do this. Not everyone agreed on a

DOD/JCS team. I had to specify at least a brigadier, a

"Spanish-speaking brigadier." There weren't very many people

who would have met those qualifications. We got a good one.

What I was trying to do was appraise the situation, make

my own estimate of what was needed. I got a lot of support for

some of the proposals that I made originally, and some others

provoked great laughter. One asked for about a half billion

dollars in guarantee funds, since it is easier to get guarantee

authority than actual appropriations. At the time that provoked

Ambassador Deane Hinton. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1982 to

1983. interviewed in Washington. D.C., 10 September 1987.
112 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

hilarious laughter throughout Washington, that anybody would

think that they would put a half billion dollars into El Salvador.

It has now become far more than that, and it wasn't done the

guarantee way ... I expect maybe if more had been done sooner,

less would have been necessary later. But who knows.

I'd Like Some of the Experts

from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff...

President Josi Napoleon Duarte-The United States,

meanwhile, debated the issue of aid to El Salvador. We had

begun receiving military aid in February, and by March the

number of military personnel attached to the Embassy was

proliferating. The idea of sending advisers came from

Washington, without consulting me. In honor of the American

Undersecretary of Defense's visit to El Salvador in June, U.S.

Ambassador Hinton invited Colonel Gutidrrez, the Secretary

and me to dinner to discuss the need for more U.S. advisers

with a high-ranking Pentagon official. Several American

officers made presentations about what was happening in the

battalion where each one was stationed. Hinton told me the

United States wanted to increase the aid and send more

advisers.

"Look, before you send any more aid, I want to ask a

favor," I replied. -I'd like some of the experts from the U.S.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the rank of general if possible, to

study the military situation here. Tell me exactly what they

think we should do. All that your officers have told me tonight

is anecdotal. Neither you nor I really can come to any

conclusions at this moment about what is happening or where

the military situation of the country as a whole stands." I had

my own ideas and a general plan based on the information given

to me by the Salvadoran Army Chief of Staff, but I wanted to

compare notes.

Josd Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador, 1984 to present).

Duarte: MY Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1986). pp. 170-71.

Copyright 1986 by Jos6 Napolern Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P.

Putnam's Sons.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 113

The U.S. military study done at my request came back

with three alternative plans: one for defeating the guerrillas in a

short time period, the second to win over the longer term, and a

third that would just enable us to survive by preventing a

guerrilla victory. The first plan involved sophisticated American

military.

Duarte Asked Us to Help

General Wallace H. Nutting-As President, the head of the

Junta at that time, Duarte asked us to help him develop a

strategy. We talked about it, and my assessment was that the

Mil Group was already overextended and not capable of doing

it. We needed some outside assistance, and we needed some

fresh views on the problem. We needed people who had had

some experience in the area with language ability. The Army

proposed Fred Woerner. I had not known him before, but he

obviously had good credentials. He was given a charter in

Washington. Then he came to USSOUTHCOM, and I added to

his charter, asking him to take the classical approach in El

Salvador. Look at the problem in terms of the Salvadoran and

U.S. interests and objectives; identify the threat. How are those

interests and objectives being affected? What kind of policies

need to be established? What kind of action programs are

appropriate, and what kind of commitments are reasonable?

We were in agreement that it ought to be a formal,

methodical, classical approach. The product was really a superb

job. Fred Woerner motivated and led the Salvadorans to do their

own thinking about their own strategy and force structure

requirements. It laid the basis for convincing Washington, from

a practical and intellectual base, what the problems were and

what needed to be done about them. At the same time he

established, I think, a much closer relationship between the

U.S. military, the Mil Group, and the Salvadoran military

leadership at the time. He reinforced what the Mil Group was

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command, 1979 to 1983. interviewed in Orlando. Florida. 29 January 1987.
114 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

trying to do and produced a force development program, key to

the problem, which has provided the basis for the whole

security assistance program since then.

We repeated the same effort in Honduras later, and it was

my intention where it was appropriate, country by country, to

try to take the same approach. An intellectually honest,

objective, studied approach to what is the problem and what the

United States should do, if anything, to help solve the problem.

The Woerner mission and the report that came out of it was

what we needed at the time to gain credibility, not only in

Washington, but in San Salvador and put together a program,

which a couple of years later began to bear fruit. It took time.

Fundamental Objective:

Develop a Military Strategy

General Fred F. Woerner-My presence in El Salvador was

prompted by a personal request by the President of the CivilMilitary Junta, Napole6n Duarte, to the government of the

United States. I believe he asked for an American general to

come to El Salvador and assist the Salvadoran high command in

the development of the national strategy. I am not certain

whether his intent was to develop a total national strategymilitary, economic, political-or just a military strategy. But I

believe the request was made in the terminology of a national

strategy.

There was debate in Washington as to the scope of the

mission. It was initially decided that we should assist the

Salvadoran government with a comprehensive national strategy;

however, on consideration of the scope, the effort was reduced

to a national military strategy. The intent was that there would

be a national strategy developed later, but I would agree with

the argument that the process is the reverse of how it should be

done.

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander. U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America, 1982 to 1985.

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco. California, 7 November 1986.
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 115

Very definitely, a political strategy should have been

developed first, along with a supporting economic strategy, and

then a subordinate but supportive military strategy-a

Clausewitzian approach to obtaining the political objectives. But

that didn't happen. El Salvador indicated somewhere in this

process that they had a national strategy. In fact, they did not. I

read it and it was a couple of pages of political platitudes but

nothing substantive that would provide an operative plan in

order to establish a pluralistic democratic society. It was more a

statement of grand idealistic, philosophic, ideological

objectives-ideological objectives, not even political objectives.

My task, then, was to go into El Salvador and-working

with the Salvadoran high command-develop their national

military strategy. Within the context of my letter of instructions

to assist the Salvadoran high command were, based on my

interpretation of that letter of instructions, two additional

requirements. One was to provide to the U.S. Government a

military assessment of conditions of the moment in El Salvador,

and the second was to conceptualize an assistance program for

an unspecified period of time, which could reasonably be

interpreted to be an approximate five-year program.

My analysis of the mission indicated, as I've mentioned,

that I had three fundamental tasks: develop a national military

strategy for El Salvador, a military assessment for the United

States, and a security assistance program in outline form by

which the United States would assist the government of El

Salvador and their counterinsurgency campaign. I was given

command of a team, as I recall, of six military and one civilian.

The one civilian, actually, was part-time from the CIA, and I

rarely saw him or got any contribution out of him. He worked

fundamentally for the Agency in-country, and other than having

him assigned to a team, there was virtually no participation. The

composition of the team is a matter of record, and it covered the

major functional areas. I had no voice in the selection thereof.

In fact, I did not know any member of the team prior to our two

or three days of orientations in Washington and preparations for

the movement.

i
f

116 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

The movement was very abrupt. I believe I got word on a

Friday, as I recall. I had to be in Washington on the following

Monday, and we deployed on Wednesday. There was absolutely

no background work done before we arrived in-country. The

focal point of the mission was the development of the military

strategy, which was to be done in a combined fashion so that

the end product would be accepted by the Salvadorans as a

Salvadoran product, and the more transparent or invisible our

role had been in the process, the more successful we would be.

One of the elements in which I take pride was the degree to

which we achieved that objective. We developed, in my

opinion, a professional document. It was a strategy that had the

active participation of the Salvadoran high command and was

not only accepted by them in its final form but viewed by them

as a product of their labor for which we had been helpful but

perhaps not critical and which, my subsequent analysis would

indicate, has served the armed forces of El Salvador admirably

in providing a guide to the conduct of their internal war.

The Woerner Report Changed the

Perception of the War

Colonel Charles B. Stone IV-It (the Woerner Report) was a

very significant and important thing. It would be safe to say that

the document did result in increased military assistance to El

Salvador in terms of equipping, sustaining, and training, and it

did give the Military Group a document to generally guide them

in developing their programs for El Salvador. It was also a

document that the Salvadorans took quite seriously. It pointed

out the strong points and weaknesses. It changed the way they

looked at and proceeded with the war. It changed the

Salvadorans from a defensive mentality to an offensive

mentality.

Colonel Charles B. Stone IV. member of the tcam which wrote the

"Woerner Report." 1982, interviewed in Panama City. Republic of Panama.

4 December 1986.

d

I
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 117

Comments on the Period of Disarray:

A Look at the Antagonists

THE EDITORS-General Romero had been brought to

power because it was thought !hat he could maintain

the status quo in El Salvador. But, by 1979, the forces of

change were moving out of control. Moreover, some of

the Salvadoran military had seen what happened to

General Somoza's National Guard at the hands of the

Nicaraguan people and were afraid that they might

suffer the same consequences if they did not act quickly

to put out the fire of revolution in their own country. To

save their institution-and themselves-they would

have to break the alliance with the oligarchy and realign

with political forces that could win popular support.

These officers were buffeted by both the Left and

the Right, and also internally. The Right opposed them

because it was tied to the oligarchic interests that were

threatened by the reforms. The military officers were

labeled as traitors by the Left because they were coopting the political-social rationale of the MarxistLeninist movement. That rationale was placed within a

context in which it was not likely that the "correct"

interpretation of the country's problems would be made

by the insurgent leadership. Internally, the need to

implement fundamental reforms coupled with the

struggle to establish a government based on a nontraditional, noncorporate framework created confusion

and fragmentation.

These problems and their components were

magnified by the inability of the Junta to cope with the

war of information. This impacted the general war in

two ways. It gave the insurgents-traditionally better

prepared to fight a propaganda war-a veneer of

cohesion, strength, and even legitimacy. Perhaps more

importantly, it caused U.S. policy-makers-ever

sensitive to the press image of an ally-to waiver on the

type and amount of support to provide. Jos6 Napole6n

7%
118 IN DISARRAY: 15 OCTOBER 1979 TO OCTOBER 1981

Duarte recognized the strategic implications of the

issue: "Overall, we were being crushed under the

avalanche of international press coverage. We had been

totally unprepared for it. If there had been some

structure to handle the press, some capacity to

investigate charges and demonstrate what was true or

false, we might have done better."

In the time-honored tradition of Latin American

politics, the dominant military leadership sought to

establish a civil-military junta. This effort focused on

sharing power with as many of the key power centers in

the country that were willing to cooperate in an attempt

to establish a unified control of the situation. This would

provide the beginnings and the basis for the necessary

subsequent organization that would have to be

established and empowered to effectively pursue the

many dimensions of the struggle. Putting this concept

into effect would help ensure that all efforts would be

concentrated on the ultimate goal-survival.

For the Salvadoran reformers, the United States was

the only source of external support that could make a

difference. Yet, during this period of disarray, the

United States was also apparently confused. This

problem is highlighted by the unwillingness or inability

of senior policy-makers to develop a coordinated effort

to deal with the situation in El Salvador-despite the

willingness of both the Carter and Reagan

administrations to help. The perceived denial of the

need for military assistance during this crucial period is

but one example.

Despite 10 years of preparatory work and the

decision to try to take control of the country, the

Marxist-Leninist movement was not ready to take

advantage of the near anarchy of the time. The various

leftist factions had not unified in any significant way,

and they were not agreed on any common politicalmilitary strategy. At that point in time, the movement

consisted of at least five different organizations-the

I, mm m im i ml m m lmm rrl111
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE COMBATANTS 119

Moscow-oriented FAL and FPL, the Socialist FARN, the

Maoist ERP, and the Trotskyite PRTC. It was Cuba's Fidel

Castro who personally prodded the various leaders into

joining their disparate forces under an umbrella

organization now known as the FDR/FMLN.

Thus, to both insurgents and incumbents, the

strategic solution to the mutual problems of confusion

and disarray was to begin to create a unity of command

and effort. Without a body at the highest level that can

establish, enforce, and continually refine cogent

objectives, authority is fragmented, and there is no way

to resolve the myriad problems endemic to war and

survival. That could mean failure or, at best, no win for

either side. Again, only the United States had the luxury

of ignoring the central reality of the period.
PailII

Insurgent Ascendance

from Late 1981

to Late 1984
7.1%

The Converging Major

Insurgent Actions

THE EDITORS-The setting at the end of 1981 was not

bright for the El Salvadoran government. The guerrillas

had established a coordinated political front, had

solidified external support, had built up logistical stores,

and had reasons to believe they could have a successful

people's war, isolating the government and defeating

the military forces. The government had developed,

with the aid of the Woerner Report, a national plan but

was still divided, both inside and outside the military,

on how to proceed.

One Road to Power

Juan Chac6n-The democratic and mass organizations

realized there was only one road to victory: that of armed

struggle and the use of the people's methods of combat.... In

order to win power, it was not only necessary to unite the

Juan Chac6n, member of the executive committee of the Democratic

Revolutionary Front (FDR) until his death in 1980. Interview by CIDAMO

originally published in Mexico. 1980. and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas

(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983). pp. 41-43.

Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.

123
124 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

revolutionary forces, but also to join together with the powerful

torrent of progressive and democratic forces in the country, thus

completely isolating the regime and beginning to build a united

political movement.... And so we developed that first stage,

which then enabled us to move more swiftly toward preparing

the conditions that would eventually see us take power. And

here is an important point: Unity grows not only out of the need

to defend ourselves against a common enemy as it unleashes a

campaign of extermination against us. It is also born from the

real possibility of us taking power.

Consolidation and Changes:

Irregular War Becomes a

Fundamental Element

Captured FMLN Document-The development of the

military strategy of the FMLN has gone through distinct phases

which responded to each period of the war and to successive

levels of our experience. These processes of growth each

climaxed in new phases.

After the offensive of 10 January 1981 our revolutionary

process embarked on a new course requiring some years in

order to achieve precise strategic characteristics which would

permit us to foresee the direction the war would take and to

develop our plans in the best way. The process of developing

our best military strategy for us to face the changed character of

the war, begins with the end of the insurrectional approach

[March 19821.

This meant that the first national crisis of the revolutionary

situation had ended. It was now necessary, because of the new

From "Concerning Our Military Plans: The Military Strategy of the

FMLN." (document captured and transcribed by the Atlacatl Battalion. near

Perquin, El Salvador. date unknown, probably late 1983). in The

Comandantes Speak: The Military Strategy of the Farabundo Marti National

Liberation Front. translated and edited by Gabriel and Judith F. Marcella.

Department of National Security and Strategy. U.S. Army War College.

March 1987. pp. 2-7. 19-22.
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 125

circumstances, to develop a process of political and military

growth which would maintain the revolutionary direction until a

new revolutionary situation emerged.

From then on we implemented different approaches which

responded to each period of the war, each of which generated

processes of growth whose climax required new plans.

Accordingly, based upon the plan of massing our forces, we

achieved the consolidation of the strategic rear of the FMLN.

This is the period during which, by seeking the decisive

battle (Batalla Sintesis), we provoked a profound attrition of the

enemy, projecting the masses into a new phase of war with a

victorious advance which opened new national and international

expectations about the war in El Salvador and the prospects for

victory by the FMLN. This period left us with a strong strategic

military force, with growth and ability to execute attacks on a

grand scale.

This means that the next phase in the growth of forces

cannot have the same characteristics since it requires not only a

new plan of military attack, but also a new and more integratcd

union with the political struggle. This is due to the results

achieved in previous phases which have created favorable

political strategic conditions which will multiply the impact of

the military advance.

The territorial expansion, which will ensue by opening new

theaters of operations, will make the masses grow. It will be

necessary to incorporate them as well as other social sectors

which are potential allies of the revolutionary forces. This will

be an essential feature of our strategy in the next phase of the

war.

Similarly, the expansion of territory under control will

permit us to organize the masses in the zones liberated. This

will require a new strategic effort.

In the previous period our military approach was based on

the application of regular tactics, where the massing of force

was the determining factor for striking large targets. This meant

the strategic necessity of achieving growth objectives which

solved the problem, not only of combat losses, but also of

expansion of regular units in our army....

La
126 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

According to the basically conventional mode in which we

were fighting the war and making a linear interpretation of its

progress, a simple logic could have led us to conclude that the

continuity of our strategic plan should be achieved through an

accelerated and planned growth of the strategic mobile force and

the gathering of large logistic and financial stores, which would

place us in condition to defeat the strategic objectives of the

enemy.

Coming to this conclusion might make us lose sight of the

dialectic nature of the revolutionary process, of the interplay of

political, military and ideological factors and of the need for a

precise combination of the qualitative and quantitative elements

of our growth process. The temporary dominance of this view is

what forces us to recruit in a way which breaks with the natural

manner of integrating the masses into the war. Thus we are

faced with negative consequences for our relations with them in

the national and international political scene at a time when we

have before us the reactivation of the masses in the cities and

the need to work with the masses in the zones of control in a

manner appropriate to their environmental characteristics.

The growth achieved in the previous phases of the war has

generated conditions for the development of political factors and

the possibility of deploying military tactics which generate new

elements of political and military cooperation. These,

accompanied by the action of the strategic mobile force, would

mark a new course in the advance of the war. From all of this

we conclude that at this stage of the war we need to move to

combine with certainty, regular and irregular tactics,

conventional war and guerrilla war; that is to say, the combining

of guerrilla and regular forces.

We now have the strategic mobile force and we must move

to form guerrilla units which will constitute the instrument with

which we will apply a new tactical mode to strike the enemyin defense when he makes incursions into the zones of control,

as well as in offense in his vital areas and his strategic rear.

The same regular strategic forces must learn to break up

into small units to fight in guerrilla fashion and reconfigure in

order to strike in the regular manner.
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT AcTIONS 127

The development of guerrilla tactics will open a field of

military cooperation that will permit the strategic mobile force

to defeat enemy objectives and assure our operational

continuity. Accordingly, we will also secure our preparation to

face the escalation of the war and even the invasion by Yankee

troops.

The guerrilla units base their action on a political military

concept in which the ties with the masses are the vital element

for survival, for fighting and for expansion.

In the organization and integration of the masses is founded

the support base, the intelligence, the subsistence, and above

all, the growth of new guerrilla units, which in the future will

provide experienced combatants to strengthen the strategic

mobile force.

Within the guerrilla war, the urban commands, the

neighborhood forces and the self defense units are fundamental

to reach the cities and construct clandestine apparatus in them.

These are linked to the masses and have a decisive role in

fighting and in the destabilization and wearing down of the

enemy and the political process.

In the takeoff phase of the application of the new tactical

mode, we must support the development of guerrilla units with

the participation of leaders, units, and battle-seasoned

combatants in the strategic mobile force that accelerates their

becoming qualified and effective.

The development of the guerrilla units and the application

of the new tactical mode multiplies our chances of operating in

various directions, but the most important thing is that it places

within our reach the possibility of introducing ourselves

permanently in the nerve centers of the enemy and of striking

him in his rear guard.

Our military tactics for this period must correspond to the

following , lements:

I. Help strengthen the line of the masses.

2. Defend efficiently the conquered territories.

3. Impede the military strengthening of the enemy.

4. Prepare our forces to face the intervention.

5. Wear down the enemy on a grand scale.
128 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

6. Take maximum advantage of our means of war.

7. Create the conditions whereby our mobile force can strike

strategic objectives.

In summary, irregular warfare is now a fundamental

element and we have not sufficiently developed this tactic. Our

forces have become very regular. Our commanders have not had

to operate in small units and blend in with the masses.

It is necessary and urgent that our guerrilla squadrons and

platoons take the initiative in operating in small units in the

enemy's rear, using camouflage, secret hideouts, popular

support, small arms, explosives, and infiltration into the

enemy's environment. This implies the participation of women,

children, and even old people, using all kinds of trickery and

devices to deceive the enemy and strike him whereever and in

whatever form he least expects. We need to develop deeply the

creativity and audacity of our leaders in the application of

guerrilla tactics. Therefore, the war of guerrillas requires that

each combatant be a political organizer of the masses because

these are vital elements in assuring that we strike the enemy.

The political and ideological education of the guerrilla

units and of the entire mobile strategic force, is fundamental

since without it they will not be able to work the masses and

they will not have the initiative.

Explosives and all forms of arms such as mines, traps, and

firing become essential elements of our plans. Accordingly, our

whole force becomes a guerrilla one; all fighters must

understand the principles of guerrilla warfare and have the

ability to apply them (knowledge of topography, target, tactical

superiority, secrecy, surprise, high mobility, etc.). This will

permit us to use the concentrated force when we decide to take

on a large target and to disperse into guerrilla platoons and

squadrons when we consider it necessary.

Our guerrilla force must know how to hide and to mobilize

in secret. We must keep in mind that in this phase of the war the

human and logistical attrition of the enemy is a fundamental

factor. It is not so important to recover great quantities of arms,

as it is to cause large numbers of casualties, using the minimum

of resources and people. It is also important to make the enemy

I
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 129

lose political authority over the territory and people, verifying

that he is incapable of striking us and that whereever he may be,

we can surprise him.

The frontal attacks of our mobile strategic force should be

resolute and strong. The enemy by operating in our zones will

attempt to push us [to] use up logistical supplies and to cause us

casualties as he uses massive aviation and artillery.

Against this we must apply creatively small unit guerrilla

tactics, with explosives and sharpshooters, to wear down the

enemy. We must not evade any more enemy operations; we

must take advantage of each operation to wear down his troops

with little human and material effort on our part.

All of the enemy rear (cities and highways) is within our

reach if we use the appropriate tactics. The rear is the place

where the enemy is the most vulnerable; he moves in trucks,

trains his troops, and reduces his security. With the appropriate

tactics and with few men and many explosives we can cause

more casualties with the strategic mobile force than can be

caused in many battles, which might require thousands of

rounds and a normal number of casualties for us.

We should realize that defeating the strategic objectives of

the enemy implies:

a. Cooperation in a national campaign in the western part of

the country.

b. Strong pressure by guerrilla units on the enemy rear.

c. Strong attrition of enemy troops.

d. Support of the masses and political work to break up enemy

troop units.

Unification of the Guerrilla

Organizations

THE EDITORS-On 11 October 1980, the Unified

Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) announced the

founding of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation

Front (FMLN), which is charged with and structured for

making strategic decisions regarding the direction of the
130 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

revolutionary war. The FMLN is made up of the Popular

Liberation Forces-Farabundo Martf, the People's

Revolutionary Army, and the Armed Forces for National

Liberation; it was directed, politically and militarily, by

the DRU. On 11 November, the Armed Forces of

National Resistance were also incorporated into the

FMLN.

Juan Chac6n-The development of unity among the

Salvadoran people is the principal factor in their revolutionary

struggle for liberation. It is characterized by solid unity, a rocklike unity which is now irreversible. Our revolutionary,

democratic and mass organizations had to take a series of steps

that have now made it possible to consolidate. Previously the

organizations existed independently of each other. That is, they

developed separate fronts of resistance, each has its own

strategy, tactics and methods of struggle, and this resulted in a

lack of coordination between the struggles we waged. However,

with the development of the revolutionary process itself, the

growth of our forces and the beginning of a new stage in the

people's war, these organizations find that they must unify and

coordinate their efforts against the enemy-North American

imperialism, the Salvadoran oligarchy, and the reactionary

military. In practice, the ranks began closing among the mass

organizations last October. In November and December 1979,

an alliance was being consolidated. Unity was not achieved

overnight, but followed a process of rapprochement until there

was finally a convergence in tactical and even strategic

planning.

The unification of revolutionary forces resulted from

necessity, and practically every mass organization in our

country anticipated it and included it in its strategy. However,

Juan Chac6n, member of the executive committee of the Democratic

Revolutionary Front (FDR) until his death in 1980. Interview by CIDAMO

originally published in Mexico, 1980, and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas

(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983), pp. 40-41.

Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 131

each organization had its own idea of what that unity would

mean and the methods to be used in achieving it. It is very

important, that every organization, without exception, saw the

unification of mass forces and the formation of a single, broad,

united front as necessary for taking power.

Salvador Cayetano Capio ("Marcial")--In recent months

the revolutionary forces have grown much stronger. The

coordination that we have achieved by forming the FMLN

doesn't signify a mere increase in forces, but a qualitative leap.

It enables us to plan operations on a greater scale, to combine

small operations with large ones, to concentrate our fire power

when we decide to, to choose our objectives better and with

greater possibilities of success. The wearing down of the enemy

forces matches our increasing fire power. Their tanks are not

invulnerable. The use of the equipment they can count on is

reaching a saturation point, since it has to be transferred from

one front to another, and then worn-out parts aggravate the

damage done by our fire power. We are now using bazookas,

high power mines, grenade launchers and mortars all the time.

Other arms will soon be brought into combat.

Guerrilla Unity

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila-The document that

was found back in July '84 was an analysis of the subversives'

activities, and it revealed their weaknesses with respect to the

political doctrine of their forces. For this reason their forces had

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial"), primary leader of the Popular

Forces of Liberation (FPL), one of the organizations that make up the FMLN.

until his death in 1983. Interview by Adolfo Gilly originally published in

Mexico on 4 and 5 January 1981, and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas

(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates. 1983). p. 53.

Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.

!i
132 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

lost all presence, courage, and bravery. They did not have the

ideological motivation that is so characteristic of a Marxist. I

remember that at that time they had decided to sacrifice the

military instruction in order to give more importance to the

political instruction. We learned a lot from that move. It just

goes to show you that a Marxist's greatest motivation, what

causes him to make sacrifices and accomplish his objectives, is

an ideological nature and not essentially of a political or strictly

military nature. Nor are they necessarily driven by motivation

geared towards the stomach; more the heart. It is all centered

right here, and that is the principal motor that drives the terrorist

forces to do what they do.

All these [guerrilla] organizations were united thanks to

Fidel Castro. He called them to La Habana and told them that

he was willing to provide assistance if and when they would

form a single organization called the FMLN. This happened

more or less back in December of 1980. I'm not altogether sure

about the month, but I am sure about the year. This is when the

four separate guerrilla organizations united into one single front

without renouncing to their own particular problems. Then they

began to deploy their forces throughout different areas. Unlike

the situation we had previously where the groups were so

intermingled with each other, we now see organized groups

divided throughout the country, and each begins to work out in

his assigned area.

Offensives: December 1981

to the End of October 1983

Joaquin Villalobos-After January [ 198 11, we could not start

an insurrectional counteroffensive on short notice. It was

Joaqufn Villalobos, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary

4 Army (ERP), one of the organizations which forms the FMLN. Interview by

Marta Harnecker was originally published in Mexico, November-December

1982, and later published in Revolution and Intervention in Central America,

edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis

Publications/CM Associates, 1983), pp. 86-98. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.

I1
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 133

COPREFA

Colonel Miguel Mendez briefs President Duarte and General Adolfo

Blandon.

obvious that what we needed to do was to strengthen our

military power. The six months following January were a period

of resistance, of consolidation of the rear guard, of development

of our forces, of achieving greater military ability.

Pressure on the urban centers. The military process from

December to March was characterized by the political content of

the different actions. There was a need to put pressure on the

urban centers, to carry out spectacular actions such as the one

that took place at the airport, with the purpose of demoralizing

the army and heightening the combativeness of the masses.

During this period actions took place against the capital. Santa

Ana, Usulutin, San Vicente, San Miguel-practically all the

major cities in the country. The attack against the air force base

at Ilopango on January 27, 1982, was a commando action which

destroyed 70 percent of the airplanes and helicopters of the

Salvadoran Armed Forces. This action shocked the Army.

The effort against the election. The FMLN's military

offensive of March 119811 took place in the context of
134 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

continuous pressure against urban centers, and the elections of

March 28. To transform this date into the beginning of the

enemy's debacle we needed an action of strategic significance

and audacious employment of the forces of the revolutionary

movement. Not to go out with 10 or 15 percent of our strength,

but to use 100 percent of our forces. Without seeking a final

battle, we still had to fight a strategic battle that could at least

weaken the results of the election. Essentially the plan was to

try for a military victory at some place in the country that would

unleash an insurrectional process there and, if successful, then

allow for two other developments: One, that the revolutionary

movement could redeem for itself the force represented by the

urban masses and in this way proceed along insurrectional lines

that would accelerate the war. Second, that the enemy would

begin to crumble and fall apart, so that the situation would then

lead to a final offensive. If that did not work, then our plan was

to try to maximize the obstacles to the electoral process, and

this we did manage fairly well. The results were felt with time.

We decided on Usulutdn for the following reasons: First,

the weakness of the Army garrison, made up of 300 to 400 men

who could be forced to surrender if we maintained a siege for

several days. Second, the front located there was capable of

exerting pressure on the city, of surrounding the city and

controlling its access routes and means of communication.

Third, of the eastern part, it is the city where tile urban masses

have a higher political level, the best history and tradition of

struggle, and therefore, their participation in insurrectional

actions was more likely. Fourth, the FMLN could concentrate

there a good proportion of its forces, and it was possible for

other fronts to cooperate militarily by controlling tae access

routes. Finally, in that front we had forces with greater

experience in urban combat because of their frequent incursions

into the cities.

So, what happened? The first goal was accomplished, with

the participation of hundreds of people in the Usulut~in actions.

We occupied the city for over one week, and reached positions

within a few meters from the garrison. The whole eastern part

6'

I,
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT AcTIONS 135

(OPREI F

During the height of the military effort, January-February 1984, military

commanders met in Morazan. From the left, Monterosa, Cruz, Blandon,

and Zepeda.

of the country was destabilized, preventing the elections from

taking place in four Departments: U ulutdn, San Miguel,

Morazin, and La Uni6n.

The Army, considering that the guerrilla army had been

weakened by the electoral process, took time out to dedicate

itself to internal conflicts and didn't even imagine the significant

improvement that the FMLN was to show during the June

campaign. For all these reasons we do not feel that the battles of

March ended in a defeat of our forces. We simply did not reach

the strategic goals we had set.

The June campaign against the Armsy. The enemy

considered us to be defeated after they reoccupied Usulut~n. We

responded in June. and in this period a decisive strategic shift
136 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

took place. The defeat of the Salvadoran Army began, and the

revolutionary movement advanced irreversibly toward victory.

We demonstrated before the world that we could win the war.

With the end of the electoral process our actions against the

enemy no longer had to be determined by the political

implications of a specific situation, a previous reality which had

forced us to subordinate our military activity to the political

demands of the moment. Our fundamental problem now became

how to militarily crush the Army.

We encircled Perqufn, one of the most important positions

from the point of view of the terrain, in the Department of

Moraz~n. It was a minor position, with about 50 soldiers, a

small garrison. We were not interested in the position itself,

only in attacking the reinforcements that we assumed the Army

would send in. That position is the most important on the north,

and of great utility for the Army's communication with

Honduras.

As we expected, the Army moved in by air two companies

to San Fernando, which is immediately west of Perquin, about

10 kilometers away. It also ordered the Perquin garrison to

retreat, hoping to recapture the position later. Some did manage

to escape, others were captured and taken prisoner, and our

forces occupied the town.

At that time, our plan was different from previous onesreflecting very clearly the qualitative development in our

tactics-since we no longer cared if we maintained control over

Perqufn. We obviously maintained the control over the town,

but to advance in our major aim, we put the emphasis on

surrounding the enemy's reinforcements, 250 soldiers that were

assigned at that time to San Fernando.

Circumstances forced a new Army movement to take place:

Three companies were brought from Torola, southwest of San

Fernando. That was the opportunity we were looking for. The

enemy fell into our trap. We knew that a classical ambush had

few chances of success, because the Army already knew about

our behavior, knew about our ambushes and harassment tactics,

etc. Obviously their plan was to gain control of the high ground,

that is. the strategic position, to advance along the access routes

without problems.
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 137

COPREFA

The Morazan Battalion in the field.

We had also prepared ourselves for that, to execute

maneuvers to envelop the enemy while moving. In the end, it

was the same ambush principle. The key problem was to

annihilate an important Army unit while it was moving. That

was our line of reasoning. How could it be accomplished? The

answer would be given by the terrain and the behavior of the

enemy.

So, what happened to the three companies from Torola that

were trying to save the 250 soldiers surrounded in San

Fernando? The Army moved in by foot, and not only through

the main road. When they detected us they tried to move

through our flank, through a small canyon, at a lower spot in

the area. We detected their maneuver, enveloped them, and

finally annihilated their units while they were in that position.

When you are in that situation it is extremely dangerous to

occupy a low spot.

The final results of this action were 43 prisoners, 80 dead,

the capture of over 170 automatic rifles, 12 support weapons

including light artillery, and thousands of rounds of

ammunition. And in the final phase we also reaped a military

S
138 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

and political victory, when we shot down the helicopter that was

transporting the Undersecretary of Defense, as he tried to reach

San Fernando to improve the morale of the surrounded forces.

Several days later, units of the FMLN captured the

Undersecretary as he tried to escape towards Honduras.

The offensive against all forms of movement. The June

campaign was continued by the August operations. In other

words, it was practically an uninterrupted plan, that diminished

in intensity, of course, but that lasted three months: June, July,

and August. Then came a lag during September and the first 10

days in October, when we started our next campaign.

The new military concept used towards the end of the

campaign, in about July 1982, which was to sabotage all forms

of transportation, commercial, national, fuel transports, etc., is

a better developed form of the notion of attacking the enemy

while in movement.

The sabotage of transportation would reach strategic

significance. Closing down, blockading the means of

communication; harassment ambushes against enemy units

trying to clear the roads to allow the movement of goods and the

delivery of inputs for the cultivation of cotton, coffee, and other

crops; all will become a fundamental part of our plans. The

Army is starting to be hit while attempting to clear the roads.

The new modality, which forces the Army to move and allow us

to attack right when its defenses are lowered, is becoming a new

law for the revolutionary movement; it is a leap in the quality of

our forces.

We can say that the two main highways in the country, the

Panamerican and the coast highways, going from El Salvador to

the east and north, were about 75 percent shut down, and traffic

towards the west was also diminished by some actions, although

they had lcss effect. This is a zone where the revolutionary

movement does not have sufficient strength to act against

highways; but towards the east and north, towards

Chalatenango, transport was virtually paralyzed.

The actions during the June campaign ended with the

capture of the Undersecretary of Defense; the disarticulation of

two Army companies; the capture of over 200 weapons in a
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 139

COPREFA

March 1986, Psyops and Intelligence troops in Chalatenango treated and

evacuated wounded guerrillas left behind in a cave.

single front, Morazfn; the forced withdrawal into Honduras of

250 surrounded soldiers; and the participation of 6,000

Salvadoran and 3,000 Honduran soldiers in an operation against

a single front that yielded not one positive result to them. They

could not dislodge us from our positions and instead left behind

500 casualties and tens of prisoners. And, most fundamentally,

we were able to show that we can win the war, and win it in a

military sense. That was our aim when we planned the June

campaign.

All of this was possible because of the sharp improvement

in our tactics. The revolutionary movement went beyond the

defense of positions and reached a stage of war of maneuvers;

the control of the means of communication emerged as the

fundamental element of its military tactics. This destroyed all of

'1
140 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

the plans and the Army was beginning to progressively weaken.

At !he same time, this change in tactics allowed the

revolutionary movement to open up a permanent logistical

reservoir, through the capture of the Army's weaponry.

In this campaign, the revolutionary movement finishes the

battle with more logistics than we had to begin with and with far

fewer casualties than those suffered in any previous combat.

These casualties are mostly due to the fact that, since we are

constantly on the move, we have no time to build defense

structures, so enemy artillery is more effective as is the air

force, with its helicopters and airplanes. This is what now

causes our casualty rate.

These are the main results of this campaign. Another

positive result was that we were able to change the terms of the

military debate within the FMLN. We changed the method with

which we prepare our plans; they have become more practical,

with less political debate.

The Ciudad Barrios ambush. The August operations were

of great importance because they blocked the Army's ability to

move about. That was the role played by the ambush on the

road to Ciudad Barrios, the occupation of Yamabal, and the

occupation of the San Carlos Hacienda near the Cacahuatique

Volcano. Together, these actions added up to the loss of more

than an entire Army company-between dead, wounded,

prisoners, and captured weapons.

This time the Army did not take the necessary precautions

to travel; it went aboard trucks and on the main road that leads

to that city, which had been taken over by the FMLN that

morning. To guarantee the ambush, we deployed our forces

eight kilometers from the objective, and we created the

impression that we were carrying out a harassment operation

against the city, to encourage the enemy's movement. In this

way they fell into a classical ambush, where we utilized mines

and automatic rifles against the trucks as they went by, causing

practically the complete annihilation of that whole group of

reinforcements. This provoked a crisis in the movements of the

Army, which had a great impact on later military plans. The

Army lost maneuverability, and this weakened its minor
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 141

outposts and positions. The other important factor is that we

occupied a city of over 20,000 inhabitants, Ciudad Barrios,

something we had never seen before.

The October Campaign

THE EDITORS-As time progressed from the "Final

Offensive" through the end of 1984, it became more

and more evident that the insurgent organizations were

not interested in reforming the Salvadoran society.

Indeed, reform appears to be no more than a pretext to

rally support both internally and externally. After

reforms were, in fact, initiated by the government, the

real objective of the "revolutionaries" became

obvious-take power. In October 1982, the FMLN began

a prolonged, nearly constant offensive.

Joaquin Villaobos-ln the previous campaign we wanted to

prove that we could win the war. Now we wanted to push the

Army to the point where its morale would collapse. To beat an

army it is not necessary to annihilate all its men, nor to capture

all its arms, only to cause the collapse of its morale. How can

we achieve our aim? On the basis of deepening the three lines of

the previous campaign: First, actions of strategic annihilation

wherever possible. Second, destabilizing the country through

sabotage, fundamentally against transportation, power lines,

telephone lines, and fuel. Third, harassment ambushes and

annihilation of minor positions. By deepening these lines of

action, making better use of all our forces and taking advantage

of our high combative morale arid the large efforts of all our

Joaquin Villalobos. Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary

Army (ERP), one of the organizations which forms the FMLN. Interview by

Marta Harnecker was originally published in Mexico. November-December

1982. and later published in Revolution and Intervention in Central America.

edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis

Publications/CM Associates, 1983). pp. 86-98. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.
142 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

fronts to further their development, we are making progress in

our aim to provoke a collapse of the enemy's morale.

The Army has been dealt three severe blows already: the

one in El Jicaro-Las Vueltas, in Chalatenango, and the ones in

Perquin and Corinto and Morazfn, with the loss of three Army

companies. Our plan, in concrete, was to confront the Army

with these alternatives: either they would give up terrain

because they decided not to mobilize and we would continue

occupying positions and extending our zone of control, or they

would mobilize, in which case our plan was to achieve the

annihilation of major units.

What did the Army choose? At first, they opted to give up

terrain, abandoning territory that for us offered greater areas of

maneuverability to solve the supply problem. Now, in the

process of occupying six towns and in the ambush on the

Corinto-Sociedad highway, on November 8 in Morazfn, we

have annihilated and captured the weapons of two companies

and have disarticulated and put out of combat other two. We

practically put an entire battalion out of commission in a month.

Prior to this, they could maintain a broad encirclement around

our zones of control to impede the arrival of supplies in order to

weaken our social support base. Now that option was

eliminated, as our theater of operations and zones of control

have extended.

The October campaign in Morazan began with the

encirclement of more than 100 soldiers in an important location

and the occupation of three towns practically at the same time.

The towns of Turola and San Fernando were taken in the first

hours of combat, and the Army's positions at Perquin were

surrounded, ending with the occupation of the town and

surrender of the majority of the forces there, including the

captain in charge of the company.

This presented the Army with a situation which

theoretically obliged them to make a strategic move. However,

the Army did not, so we searched for other targets: the

occupation of the town of Carolina, in the northern part of San

Miguel. This added to the quantity of terrain at our disposal,

and now practically the northern part of the Department which
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT AcTIONS 143

borders Honduras was in our hands. On November 18, on

Corinto-Sociedad highway, our forces annihilated another

enemy company which was heading towards Corinto as

reinforcements. Nearly 100 arms and some military vehicles

were captured, and 62 prisoners, including two officers, were

taken. Later, our forces occupied Corinto.

The eastern part of the country was practically paralyzed

economically since the start of the campaign, without transport

or electrical power. Fuel was scarce since we had destroyed

over a dozen fuel trucks. Water was rationed. The railroad was

paralyzed due to our sabotage of the bridges and engines. All

these facts will have an effect on the cotton and coffee harvests.

In the central zone there were four Departments affected to

a greater degree by our sabotage of power lines: San Vicente,

Cabahas, Cuscatlin, and Chalatenango. The Troncal del Norte

highway was also closed down because of our constant

sabotage.

In the western part of the country we managed to partially

close down the transportation system, by destroying railroad

cars, buses and trucks loaded with coffee. Electrical power was

also starting to be affected in the west. Commercial

transportation from Guatemala was paralyzed by our sabotage

actions. By prolonging and sustaining this situation, and by

continuing with our military operations, we put the Army in a

difficult position. During the course of the campaign we carried

out actions that reinforce the enemy's awareness that they must

concentrate on defending strategic positions. One such example

was our attack against the oil refinery located in what was

presumed to be their safest territory, the western area, their deep

rearguard, where the revolutionary movement, because of the

terror campaign, had been forced to scale down its activity. We

attacked the refinery with several Chinese RPG-2 rockets,

producing "considerable damage," as was recognized by the

government itself, forcing a reduction in their output and in the

distribution of fuel to the rest of the country.

That attack, our actions along the highways, and our

sabotage in the capital city, forced the Army to dilute its

concentration of forces. The elite units were used to control

1I

A
144 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

roads and highways, while the Army continues to lose its

remaining positions in our rearguard zones. By now we had

taken over six population centers in Morazin and three in

Chalatenango, aside from the 19 towns that the Army

abandoned already, but that we had not occupied. We were now

in control of vast new areas, which is also a great improvement.

Another element, aside from the conquest of new terrain,

was the decline in the Army's morale. It is reflected in two

facts: First, there are more prisoners taken than killed or

wounded soldiers. Their troops now have a marked tendency to

surrender. They prefer not to fight in order to save their lives.

Another proof of their demoralization was that they refused to

move. This was not the result of a military option in favor of

defensive tactics; it reflects lack of morale, fear that the troops

may be disarticulated or annihilated. Another element of the

same phenomenon was that increasingly they were talking about

operations that simply do not exist, or operations that militarily

did not make any sense.

U.S. View of the

1983-84 Guerrilla Situation

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-I arrived on the first of

September, 1983, and three days after that, the last major

guerrilla-sustained offensive was launched with an attack that

did fairly heavy damage in San Miguel, in the east. That was

followed up in a three-month period with roughly 85 separate

guerrilla attacks of varying mzgnitudes but all significant

enough to be worth reporting. A large share of them were

partially or fully successful even from the Embassy's viewpoint.

They may have had a 60, 70, or 80 percent success rate in that

they did significant damage to army units caught off guard,

perhaps managed to kill or wound a large number of

government individuals, and were able to take over towns for a

period of time.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985. interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel. 25 August 1987.
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 145

It was, in a military sense, a low point in military activities

and operations. We had just begun to train people in Honduras.

We had just begun to pull together for the umpteenth time an

effort to coordinate political-military and economic development

activity. It's something that we still probably need to do more

work on to achieve real success. It's something which the

government resisted.

The main lesson coming out of that attack sequence is that

its success was really heavily on the military side and heavily on

the intelligence side. There were days at the end of 1983 when

we wondered whether we would make it through the next two or

three months because of that offensive and where things were

taking us, and we were beginning to stare an election process in

the eye. One can well characterize my two years, more or less,

as the nadir of political-military activities, and all the

consequences-political and economic negative effects-were

being widely felt in the country.

Colonel James J. Steele-The guerrillas launched a "final

offensive" in early 1981, and they almost pulled it off. Really,

the guerrillas maintained the initiative even after that. You can

argue at what point the government forces gained the initiative,

and so on. But certainly, even into 1983 and early 1984 the

guerrillas were operating with a considerable amount of

strength. They were operating in large units almost in a

conventional mode at times. They were operating in 100-man

columns or more and confronting the Army consistently.

By late 1983 we saw some fairly significant

reorganizational changes within the military establishment. We

saw a considerably increased level of U.S. assistance and

reorganization of the general staff. There were, however, some

major guerrilla successes which extended right up into 1984.

They destroyed the bridges across the Lempa, the 15 September

bridge in particular. They captured the 4th Brigade headquarters

in El Parafso on New Years of 1984, and so on. What we saw

Colonel James J. Steele, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1984 to 1986, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986; and, in Monterey, California, 5 November 1986.

I

I
146 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

after that was a situation where the government forces were

obviously getting better; the Air Force was particularly

effective, and the guerrillas saw their prospects for a quick

victory beginning to fade. They saw the political situation in the

country changing.

After the presidential elections in early 1984, principally to

survive, the guerrillas initiated and implemented a major change

in strategy in mid-1984. President Duarte took office in June

1984. Even though there were some major attacks after he took

office-a major dam complex in late June of 1984, and attacks

in areas like Suchitoto-the guerrillas had essentially taken a

step back in terms of classic insurgency stages and had gone to

smaller units, dispersed, with less confrontation with

government forces, and so on. At the same time, the insurgency

began to lose its people. There were a lot of defectors after

Duarte was elected. June of 1984 was a fairly large month for

deserters. The guerrilla movement was obviously having some

problems trying to hold itself together politically, but it would

be wrong to say that it was defeated. It still numbered between

perhaps 9,000 and 11,000 armed insurgents at that time.

The Guerrilla Situation in the

Fall of 1983

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial")-They [ these

defeats] have led to a realization among the high echelons of the

Army and their Yankee advisers that strategically the Army has

been steadily losing its capability of destroying its enemy-the

popular forces. Not because it is weaker than before, but

because the guerrillas are getting stronger.

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial"), primary leader of the Popular

Forces of Liberation (FPL), one of the organizations that make up the FMLN.

until his death in 1983. Interview by Adolfo Gilly originally published in

Mexico on 4 and 5 January 1981, and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas

(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983). p. 51.

Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.

"l

• 'I ll1IIl llllm~ lIPi mmi
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 147

Joaquin Villalobos-We have achieved a strategic

accumulation of victories which will be expressed in a final

culminating moment. But because of the characteristics of our

situation, because of the decrease in the insurrection

potential-especially of the urban mass%=s-the offensive

cannot be maintained in an ever ascending spiral, as occurred

in Nicaragua in the last 6-8 months of the war. In Nicaragua I

would say that at times the masses themselves got ahead of

military actions. In other words, the Sandinista Front made

the determination to take a neighborhood between today and

tomorrow and as the hours passed in that time slot the masses

took that neighborhood, and the military units would arrive to

secure it. But that was a different situation from what our's

has been.

The Army can continue to act, to harass our positions,

but without achieving any military result. And what does this

signify? That we are clearly going to begin to resolve the

supply problems and we are going to resolve them in two

ways: by a generalization of mass support for the

revolutionary army and because the increased terrain gives

greater possibilities. The annihilation of Army units provides

arms, ammunition, and logistics, and the arms allow us to

incorporate new fighters from the masses. In other words,

other factors appear. Apd what does this i.nply? It implies an

ascending spiral in which the continuity of operations will be

constant and no vacuums will be produced.

Joaquin Villalobos. Commander-in-Chief ot the People's

Revolutionary Army (ERP), one of the organizations which forms the

FMLN. Interview by Marta Harnecker was originally published in Mexico,

November-December 1982, and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America. edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne

Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983), pp.

86-98. Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
148 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

The Military Situation from the Fall

of 1983 to the Turning Point

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham Ill-Frankly, you could just

see things start to slow down after Agostinas [vacation period]

was over. Everybody said we operated like hell during

Agostinas and said, "Okay Americans, we did it for you Now

we have to take a break," and in fact they did. Then, in September [1984] they [the insurgents] hit San Miguel. I had a 50-

yard line seat and watched the whole thing. They also hit all the

way around the base of Cocawatiki, and it was rather an interesting day for me. Really, the first time I got a chance to see

what was going on.

Right down at the bottom of the hill about 20 click. [kilometers] you could see this thing going on at San Miguel, and

that was extraordinary. They dropped those three bridges with

charges; that wasn't Josd Sievo with his little handy-dandy

rucksack on those charges-they were big. I could feel the

impact. That was the overmanifestation of what was going to be

a dramatic and total defeat for the Salvadoran military. The

insurgents were going to make it dramatic and did that in San

Miguel. The attack had a devastating psychological impact.

They had to do it and they did it.

The third factor in this thing was us, generic term

"gringos." The Salvadorans were scared silly. They weren't

going to get money to buy more bullets, and they were ratholing everything they possibly could, from radio batteries to

ammunition to everything else, and of course the scale of operations was dropping off. Equipment was starting to wear outthe old equipment they were using. We didn't have a ](c of field

equipment and stuff In stock for them anyway, and we went to

zero in money at the end of the July. Although we were expecting 25 million dollars and I had a plan to spend it, it wasn't

there. Of course when you shut the pipeline off, you know it

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham 11. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1983 to 1984. interviewed in Carisle Barracks, PA. 29 May 1985.

I
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 149

takes some time to get the pipeline going again. In effect, they

had to operate with what they had already received, and nothing

else was going in.

During the month of October, the military situation continued to reverse rapidly. We lost a Cazador battalion trained at

RTC [Regional Training Center], and we lost a Salvadoran battalion at Cocawatiki, which had beer, trained by Salvadorans incountry, although at least one company made a good account of

themselves there. This took place over a period of three weeks,

and I am talking about "wipe out!" Government losses were

extraordinarily high in the October and November time frame.

They had quite a psychological impact on the government and

the military. As an example, on the Monday morning before

Thanksgiving, Manny Granado came to me and said that he

thought the Salvadoran Army was in the process of disintegrating. The day before, Sunday afternoon, just south of a little

place called Corinto, which is on the Torola River, right up on

the Honduran border, there was a company outpost where the

subversives drove up in buses like they were going to play soccer, and the lieutenants surrendered the garrison.... This was

not a local force militia. No, they were a company from a

Cazador battalion.

I went over to the Estado Mayor [General Staff Headquarters]. There was a major sitting there, on a beautiful sunshiny

Sunday afternoon, myself, and three other gringos. I went to

him, and I said, "Hey look, this is not my country, but you

guys better get serious about this thing or you are not going to

have to worry about me complaining to you much anymore." I

said, "I'm going home." I went at that time to see the Ambassador, and early Monday morning I said. "I just want to tell

you, Mr. Ambassador, that there are some people, very knowledgeable guys on my staff, that think they are witnessing a general disintegration in process in the armed forces, and I'm not

ready to buy off on that yet, but things aren't looking very

g od." He's an unflappable guy, and he chuckled, and he said,

"Well, that's not a real nice way to start Monday morning out.

Give me some facts. I've got to know what's going on." I went

on what I call my famous barnstorm tour. I started at
150 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

Ahuachapdn and went all the way to Miagin, an island in the

Gulf of Fonseca. I went to every brigade area. I went to every

department. I covered them all, and I got very close to what was

going on. The day before I ended "Le Grand Tour," significantly, I went again to Watikitu, and this time I was at base. A

Cazador battalion was hung-up up there, but this time the insurgents hit them with about 600 people. This was a significant

change, subversives going to mass operations-600 folks is a

significant number of people. It's always about that number

when you get your ass kicked, and they were supported with

indirect fire systems. They were willing to eat the significant

casualties which they received from the Air Force. In the afternoon it was all over. The Cazador battalion was gone, it disintegrated. One lieutenant hung on up there. This kid hung on up

there. Well into the afternoon he ran out of ammunition, and

Cruz [the battalion commander] called him up and said, "Don't

lose your balls," and the kid came back on the radio-and, I'll

never forget it, he said "My balls are fine and intact. I want to

keep them that way." He said, "They are not throwing candy at

me up here." He got out and I later got a chance to pat him on

the back.

In December the Army go* two more bad, bloody noses.

One was at El Paraiso, which happened right after Christmas. It

was a disaster; it was awful. We found out, with the attack on

Cocawatiki (near San Miguel) and others, that Villalobos and

the other insurgent field commanders were willing to mass large

amounts of troops.

Tactical mobility was grossly lacking on the government's

side to fight this kind of a war, where you must have some kind

of a force multiplier, not just bodies against bodies. The

Cazador battalions didn't have staying power. They didn't have

any punch, and we didn't have the tactical mobility to respond

to the emerging guerrilla tactics. Monterosa, being the field

commander, put together the double Cazador battalion, which

became the light infantry battalion later on down the road. This

new unit, significantly enough, was about the size of one of his

company engroupments in the Atlacatl battalion, which had

punch and could stay and could wait a while for help to come if

they got in deep water.
THE CONVERGING MAJOR INSURGENT ACTIONS 151

They had been used to dealing with disparate guerrilla formations of maybe 15 or 20 people or maybe not even that

many. All of a sudden, they're running up against a main force,

heavily armed with punch. They had to adapt to the tactics of

the 600. As a result, the Salvadorans changed their modus operandi. If they hadn't, they would have continued losing major

forces.

m44
8E:'

International Efforts

and Sanctuaries

Support Insurgents

Explanations in Cuba:

1983-La Habana

Miguel Castellanos-Comandante Humberto Ortega, Minister

of Defense of Nicaragua, presented his condolences for the

deaths of "Marcial" and "Ana Maria." The rest was directed

against the imperialists and the Contras. He told us that if the

imperialists intervened, we would be corpses because they

would have to kill us all. He continued talking about how we

were wearing down as a result of our posit'on, and that we

should use all our economic resources to defend ourselves

against imperialism. A matter I wish to focus on is when he

referred to the methods of Sandinista warfare.

We were fighting against the counter-revolutionaries by

utilizing the Intelligence Services and the masas* in the cities in

Comandante Miguel Castellanos, former insurgent leader, 1973 to 1985,

interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 25 September 1987. As quoted in

Conversaciones con el Comandante Miguel Castellanos, edited by Javier

Rojas P. (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andante, 1986), pp. 86-88. Copyright

1986 by Editorial Andante. Reprinted by permission of Editorial Andante.

*Masas literal translation is masses used with at least two meanings: (1) The

noncombatant supporters of the various insurgent groups; (2) The people in

general terms.

153

i

I~m~ I Inmm-I ill l~ 
154 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

order to impede the opposition's creation of a social base

[referring to the mobilization of the masas that they used to

prevent the organized actions of the opposition).

Another meeting, which was not scheduled, was held at the

residence where Colonel Denis (Chief of Special Operations]

and his subordinates were staying. After listening to whatever I

had to say about the current state of the war, he pointed out the

fact that there were improved conditions for fighting this war,

and the most important aspects within the unit were the strategic

and tactical operations executed by the General Commandance

of the FMLN. I explained to him that when Dr. Ungo-of the

FDR-was in Managua, he expressed his disagreement with

respect to the transferring of the Commandance in El Salvador

because now, a meeting between the seven (five from the

FMLN and two from the FDR). would no longer work. But

Colonel Denis told me emphatically that the FDR's involvement

in the war was not important, and they'd have to search for

another solution.

We met with the Soviet and Vietnamese Ambassadors in

their respective embassies. The former was rather pleased with

the information I provided him with. He told me that he was

following the war in El Salvador very closely and that the

advances made by the united front were very significant. He

promised me that upon my arrival in Moscow, I would be

received by a very prominent leader of the Party so I could

deliver the information to him personally. It was more or less

the same with the Vietnamese; although when he expressed his

sympathies for "Ana Maria" and "Marcial," he was more

effusive when referring to the latter. Later we talked about

Salvador. He commented that during the past years, the FMLN

had demonstrated an historical advance, and as a representative

of Vietnam, he was willing to offer all of his political solidarity.

He also promised to pursue my request for a special meeting so

I could expose in more detail the information regarding

"Marcial" and "Ana Maria."

The meeting held with the political attaches of the

respective accredited embassies in Cuba was very similar. The

representatives from the Democratic Republic 'A Germany,
SANCTUARIES SUPPORT INSURGENTS 155

Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Vietnam and

Hungary were there. Their greatest fear was that, while the war

in El Salvador continued to advance and favor the FMLN, the

more likely it was that the U.S. would intervene with its combat

troops. They asked me how we foresaw the situation and I told

them that, like in Vietnam, we had to first, prevent the

intervention, and later destroy the aggressive attitude of

imperialism.

FMLN Efforts Enjoy Great Support

in All Parts of the World

Guilermo M. Ungo-FDR-FMLN efforts have received the

deepest international support from a broad range of countries in

both the capitalist and the socialist worlds-from Cuba, France,

Mexico, Nicaragua, Sweden, and Third World countries. The

FDR-FMLN is not a social democratic movement seeking

assistance only from the Socialist International, nor a

communist movement seeking support only from Cuba. The

FDR-FMLN has sought broad-based support to guarantee its

nationalist and nonaligned position. The FDR-FMLN

understands very well that to reconstruct El Salvador, aid from

many sources will be required, especially from the Western world. FDR-FMLN nonalignment is, consequently, a position

of principle, of necessity, and of political convenience. The

FDR-FMLN wants to have friends, not enemies or masters.

The struggle for democracy in El Salvador enjoys great

popular support in all parts of the world. Even in the United

States important sectors of the population have a better

understanding of the situation of the Salvadoran people and the

reason for their political and armed struggle than does the U.S.

Government. It is the people of many countries and not their

governments who actively support the guerrillas and provide

material aid such as money, medicine, and clothing.

Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (political leader of the FPL), "The People's

Struggle," Foreign Policy 52 (Fall 1983), pp. 54. 59. Copyright 1983 by the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Reprinted by permission of

Foreign Policy.

I' ! ! a
156 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

Unconditional Support

without Accounting

Colonel Orlando Zepeda--Their [insurgents] blatant disregard

for honor and the law gives them a greater advantage in this

struggle. They are fighting a clandestine war. They don't have

to account for their actions to anyone, especially where

violations of human rights are concerned. The tremendous

support received from Russia and other members of the Soviet

bloc-Vietnam, Lybia, East Germany, Cuba-is unconditional.

They must simply continue to struggle to win the war. Their

ultimate goal in this struggle is to obtain power, no matter what

the costs.

Joaquin Villalobos states that either there is a nation for all

or no nation at all. His goal is to obtain power and destroy what

is left of our economic infrastructure. Then, they don't have to

account for their actions; they are guerrillas. I call them

terrorists. Since most of their ideology focuses on international

proletarianism, the support from the Soviet bloc countries is

tremendous. All of these countries are obligated to help one

another.

The Sandinista revolution is a revolution without a frontier,

and the revolutionaries from Honduras and El Salvador must

support Nicaragua. That is one advantage. However, we've had

to prove to the world that our position is defensive and that our

struggle is legal and in accordance with all of the principles and

regulations for fighting a war. From the standpoint of the

humanitarian aspects, we are being supervised by international

entities such as the International Red Cross, the Commission for

Human Rights, the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, the

Senate, the Democrats, everybody. On the other hand, nobody

supervises them. Their system of war pivots on destruction,

violation of human rights, and subjugation of the people. It is a

clandestine war.

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda H., C-2 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

1985 to 1987, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 22 January 1987.
SANCTUARIES SUPPORT INSURGENTS 157

We have to wear our uniforms and submit the terrorist to a

legal, official investigative process. They, on the other hand, do

not have to do this. They take advantage of the people's

situation and appeal to their need for food, medicines, jobs, and

a roof over their heads. Since the guerrilla does not wear a

uniform and can easily infiltrate into the crowds, we are unable

to identify him. That is another advantage they have.

The Fundamental Concept of

Sanctuaries

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila-The concept of

sanctuary is fundamental. Every insurgent movement needs a

rear guard that provides logistics, human resources, moral

support, and propaganda, and without this rear guard the

insurgents could not survive. For example, when someone asks

me, "When is the problem in El Salvador going to end?" I ask,

"When is the problem in Nicaragua going to end?" While there

exists a Marxist Nicaragua we are going to have problems,

unless we grow in such a way and we turn into such a powerful

country that Nicaragua could not then intervene. I believe that

sanctuary is a resource which has always been provided. What

happened in South Vietnam was due to North Vietnam. Every

successful insurgent group has a committed source of supplies

and/or sanctuary. Even Cuba received aid from the United

States, from Mexico, and other places.

The Sandinistas were successful because they received aid

from Costa Rica and Cuba. Costa Rica played a vital role in the

establishment of the Sandinistas in Central America. They

allowed arms, ammunition, and people to be smuggled through

the borders into Nicaragua. They also allowed Cuban airplanes

carrying weapons and other equipment to land in their airports.

Therefore the organization and presence of a sanctuary is

fundamental for a subversive activity.

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.

A
158 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

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ZD Lz

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SANCTUARIES SUPPORT INSURGENTS 159

It is very difficult for a subversive activity to take place

without the support of a sanctuary. Take Colombia, for

example. What they do in Colombia is only accomplished

because they do it through Panama. The subversives that were

captured trying to enter through Ecuador declared they were

coming from Cuba. That is to say that no spontaneous

generation of a subversive activity really exists. There must

always be a country that is willing to provide support, train, and

unite and willing to develop an extraordinary effort in order to

maintain the subversive activities in other countries.

Sanctuaries ("The Bolsones")

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-There are four places

guerrillas get the wherewithal to fight, and outside sponsorship

is only one way. You get it from contributions from the people,

or you grow it or make it yourself. You capture it, or you get it

from the outside. What they are getting from the people in most

cases is not done freely, with the exception of the areas called

the "Bolsones" up on the border. There they've had time to

develop an infrastructure and some popular support.

Our Neighbors Do Not Have

Our Problems

Colonel Oscar Campos Anaya-Their [guerrilla] commands

are very effective. The subversion has managed to take

geographical positions in our country which they consider to be

propitious for their armed struggle-military struggle. An

example of this can be seen in the northern zone of the

Departments of Morazfn and Chalatenango, which share

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.

Colonel Oscar Rodolfo Campos Anaya, former Fifth Brigade Commander

and now First Brigade Commander, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador,

21 July 1987.
160 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

border lines with a friendly country such as Honduras. They are

also taking over the western side which borders along

Guatemala, with the objective of controlling the contested

border zones that serve as sanctuaries.

When we are operating on one side and our neighbor, who

has no intentions of getting into trouble, allows them to come

and go through the zones as they please, it gives them a greater

advantage just by being there. But when we are in a difficult

situation, for example, and we try to engage the enemy, he is

able to withdraw and go to his sanctuary on the other side where

it will be very difficult for the authorities to trespass.

Our neighbors do not have our problem to contend with

and thus do not give much interest to this type of war, which

must be fought along with all the other countries that, one way

or the other, are involved in the problem. That is what happens

with both Guatemala and Honduras. The subversives chose the

border line with the objective of always having a place where

they can recover and rest and a place where they can heal their

wounded and a place where they can easily obtain aid from

other countries.

Different Types of Sanctuaries

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila-The sanctuaries are

the base of operations. They are the safest place where the

insurgent can retire when tired, when wounded, when in need of

retraining. They are also areas where the insurgents receive

logistics supplies, where the logistics bases are located, where

new equipment and ammunition and weapons can be stored for

further distribution.

There are three kinds of sanctuaries. There is a sanctuary in

Nicaragua where the commanding headquarters of the FMLN

are located-the Radio Venceremos, which is a means for

propagandizing the psychological war against our armed forces,

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila. Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador. 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.
SANCTUARIES SUPPORT INSURGENTS 161

and the general headquarters where Nicaraguan and Cuban

forces are directing the internal operations of terrorist forces in

El Salvador and where all of the logistics support program is

located. There are also other training centers in Nicaragua,

ideological training centers and logistics bases to support other

efforts.

The second sanctuary is Mexico. This is a sanctuary in

which a democratic government (Mexico) offers its territory to a

political group so this group can then attack another democratic

government. This is a political sanctuary. We are not quite sure;

however, we suspect that Mexico provides economic aid to this

political group, and not only does it offer them its territory, but

also it provides all other means which the government has. They

have, for example, the Mexican government's means of

communications, used against El Salvador's government. This

is favorable to the FMLN. They [Mexicans] are in favor of the

FMLN and against our government. The newspapers, the

television, the magazines are all against us. The same thing

occurs with the intellectual structures-the universities. They

allow them to utilize public squares or plazas, which are internal

but nevertheless important enough, to allow them to divulge

their own goals, their own objectives, in order to convince the

world that they are good people. They also utilize this territory

in order to assemble the foreign press and have their personal

articles (communiqus) published throughout the world. This is

another sanctuary.

The third sanctuary is that of the refugee camps. We have

refugee camps in Honduras. We have three refugee camps of

30,000 Salvadorans who, in the beginning, were stationed close

to the border but now are only 30 kilometers from the center of

Honduras. These refugee camps are supported by the United

Nations. It does not cost them anything to remain there. There

are the families of the ones who are impressed into the terrorist

organizations. They have schools, doctors, jobs, free food; they

are safe. Nothing happens to them. The terrorists cross the

border to visit their families. They take the wounded, sick, tired

to rehabilitation centers in order to regain their strength and

afterwards return to this place. A lot of times, the food that is

I ,

a

K ,, A nnmlumnu ia m
162 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

distributed among the refugees in the camps often reaches the

terrorist forces when they are not able to feed themselves by

their own means.

There is another sanctuary, which is a specific case,

between El Salvador and Honduras. That is the problem of

never having been able to define the border lines between these

two countries. We don't know where El Salvador ends and

where Honduras begins. One says it ends here. The other one

says it begins there. This area is defined as a bols6n. In these

areas both governments have agreed to not interfere militarily.

Therefore, since the Honduran forces cannot go into these areas,

this becomes an ideal place for the refugees to remain. Lately,

however, we have been able to make some sort of arrangements

with the Hondurans in order to go into these areas and clean

them up. But we can't remain there for long. I think that if we

are able to solve the border-line problems with Honduras, we

will be able to solve even greater ones. This is fundamental.

The sanctuaries have always been support bases for the

insurgents from where they can maintain their activities in other

countries, in other territories, or with other democratic

governments. Remember that France is a sanctuary for

Khomeini. France was the one which precisely provided all the

facilities for Khomeini to overthrow the Shah of Iran. He was

able to do it from there. It is not necessary to be on the other

side of the border. He can be, for that matter, on the other side

of the planet. But if he does have the means and s .port for

this, he can be successful in destabilizing and attacking another

government or another nation.

Vietnam Lesson: Take the War

to the U.S. Congress

Miguel Castellanos-After the history involving the French,

the subject of U.S. involvement is discussed. You can see how

they also manipulate international politics, because in the

beginning it was the Chinese who helped them. After, came the

Comandante Miguel Castellanos. former insurgent leader. 1973 to 1985.

interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 25 September 1987.
SANCTUARIES SUPPORT INSURGENTS 163

issue of World War 1I against the Japanese, and how they allied

with each other. In addition, the U.S. helped them at one time, but

after that was over they returned to the attack. The agreements of

1954-55 that divided North Vietnam from South Vietnam

stipulated that the government of South Vietnam was to hold

elections, and they never did. Then, they decided to create

guerrilla forces to fight in Vietnam. Then, the French withdrew,

and in came the U.S. to help. There began a struggle against what

they referred to as a puppet regime, and the U.S. You gradually

begin to see how the U.S. becomes involved and increases their

force, and they themselves begin to increase and develop. You can

see very well how they developed their tactic. For example, at the

operative level, which is referred to as the "Leopard Skin,"

consists of not giving a dividing line between the enemy and them.

In all regular wars there is a dividing line. Well, here are the allied

forces. In a guerrilla war there are none. Then. Leopard Skin

consisted of spotting the entire territory. That is why it's called

Leopard Skin; conflicts of the type in which the enemy is not able

to go in one principal direction. Well, the same way it's done

here. The other is being able to utilize the types of forces-the

zonal guerrilla lines that are located in one zone, and the regular

lines, which are the mobile strategic forces, the popular militias.

They also have a large role to get support from the people with

their insurrections. That is, for them victory consists of knowing

how to combine decisive blows with popular insurrections,

consolidating territory. That is what is referred to as a variant,

even though they don't accept it. After, one sees it as a variant of

a prolonged people's war. That is what they are applying now.

They also have another advantage. They created the Ho Chi Minh

trail, which maintained a constant logistical flow during the entire

war, and it never ended. They said that the Ho Chi Minh trail was

an umbilical cord for them. Without it, the war would have been

lost and the support of the people along with it. That's why I've

never done those two things. And the creation of the constant

units. In that way they continued to advance until 1975, the year

in which Saigon, or Ho Chi Minh City was taken. They also have

a mock-up in a large room showing the entire city. They explained

that attack with small tanks. "There goes the first direction, the
164 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

other direction, here is how they attacked, and the U.S.

Ambassador fled in a helicopter."

In addition, at the end of the course, the Vice-Minister of

Defense came to lecture us on the subject of the struggle against

imperialism because they considered it to be very important for us,

because we were going through the same situation back then.

Then, how to attack imperialism, politically. The psychological

war, because they said, "... well, imperialism, those who employ

psychological warfare, superpower, that it is a great power .... "

But they demoralized the Marines completely. Then, they said,

we have to bleed the North American Army as much as

possible and do a lot of propaganda." Another issue was to take

the struggle to the U.S. Not only take it to the country, but at *

political level, take it to the Congress. Then, they explained

all of the mobilization of masses that took place in the U.S., they

were involved in large part. Of course with the support of the

Socialist bloc, because they do have one thing; that when the

Socialist bloc supports a movement on all sides it is constant, but

more at the political level. And that's what happens in the U.S. In

other words, it was a total war. Total in the integral sense, a war

at the political-military and diplomatic levels. Then, there was a

subject that is called the Negotiations Dialogue, which is provided

by the leductor [sic), or the Second One. The Second One gave us

the lecture. They concluded that the dialogue serves to seal a

victory, or try to consolidate the advances achieved; but never to

make basic concessions. Concessions may be made, but they must

not affect what has been won. It should be used to gain time. They

teach that very well, and how dialogue is used in the political

sense.

The United States Underestimated

External Insurgent Support

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi-The third decision was the one taken

in the spring of 1983 after the brief but unexpected and bloody

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy, Planning and

Coordination, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Department of State,

1977 to date, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 10 September 1987.
SANCTUARIES SUPPORT INSURGENTS 165

takeover by the guerrillas of the city of Berlin. That event really

caught many of us in the State Department at least somewhat by

surprise. Speaking for myself, I had assumed that once the

Americans showed that they were semi-reliable and were

prepared to provide security assistance and economic assistance

to the government of El Salvador, even after the failure of the

1981 offensive, that this guerrilla movement that had launched

it would probably wind up going historically the way of most

Latin American guerrilla movements. That is to say, you had

your chance, you made your run at power, you lose it, you blow

it, you disintegrate, you disappear.

What this perception underestimated was the importance of

Nicaragua and of the Cuban-Soviet connection. Namely, the

ability to have a safe haven where the defeated can recover.

Something to provide external confidence, propaganda, sources

of training. I have always thought that we have incorrectly, for

public relations reasons (but even there it has been a mistake),

overemphasized the role of arms transfers as such. That what is

really involved here is the whole political-psychological

infrastructure of support that was provided the guerrillas. In any

case, instead of fading away, the guerrillas escalated. We found

ourselves facing a situation two years later where guerrilla

operations were taking place with large concentrations of

forces-with units that were able to take on the military in

almost conventional set battles, and do them in. So the decision

was made then, instead of caving in, to start on a crash project

of actually remaking the Salvadoran military. Providing the kind

of training to the officer corps that would enable them to really

absorb significant amounts of new aid and to take on the

guerrillas, whose military strength was in their cadres. Perhaps

if we'd been a little less overconfident before, and less trapped

by traditional visions of U.S.-Latin American relations, we

should have done this back in '81.

Now, all of these developments took place within the

framework of the support for democratic processes. At no point

did we stop making clear to the military that we thought that

their institutional structure needed to be depersonalized and

organized in such a way to be able to provide effective loyalty

A

4

I l I i IBEliIB .-.m •.i.. ..
166 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

to the government and to its political leadership. When

Secretary Shultz visited El Salvador, the point he made to the

presidential candidates (including retired Major D'Aubuisson,

who was present at the lunch) was that we could be neutral as to

the individual candidates and the parties involved in a

democratic process but that we could not be neutral about the

process itself. This point has been thoroughly ingrained in the

Salvadoran military.

The last time I was in El Salvador in September of 1986, 1

remember, at a dinner, a collection of military officers asking

whether our ban on military officers as presidents extended even

to a military man who might be smart enough to get himself

elected president. To which I responded (by the way, as a

citizen of the country that elected Dwight Eisenhower) that 1

didn't think that I could answer that in any other way but, yes,

no officer could be elected president without creating grave

problems within the United States. But, I added, the real issue

is the political process in which the elections take place.

a
9

Major Government

and Political Actions

Reforms-A Dynamic in

the Salvadoran Equation

THE EDITORS-By late 1981, after two years of insurgent

ascendancy, the military in El Salvador knew that basic

internal alliances would have to change. The military, as

much for institutional survival as for any other reason,

had successfully staged the '79 coup. The military's coup

proclamation stated that basic reforms were the reasons

for the coup. Once in power, having begun the

implementation of the agrarian, banking, and foreign

trade reforms, it became obvious that another more

fundamental reform was needed. Having irreparably

ruptured its ties with the oligarchy, the military's

political role, as the praetorian guard for that sector of

the society, no longer provided the philosophical base

for the institution's survival.

The military was protecting something from the

insurgents. This something became the new political

system which was adopted by the Constituent

Assembly. The change in the military attitude and the

demonstrated support for the new political system, with

the military subordinate to that system, may have been

the most significant reform. It signalled a very

167
168 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

fundamental change in terms of professional ethics and

purpose for the military as an institution in Latin

American politics.

An Underlying Problem

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-The problem was a great

dislocation of population. A loss in production through

everything from land reform to guerrilla activities. A

tremendous growth in urban sprawl and an inability of the

government to keep up in education and social welfare and

health. You had a very poor political-economic situation to

begin with, one that was made worse by the war. Part of the

guerrilla strategy was, in a sense, to try to take advantage of and

capitalize upon the attacks against the government and

government areas as a way of perhaps reinforcing the notion

that they, not the government, could provide an end to the

economic and social hardships that the people felt. So it was a

very, very difficult situation, and I don't feel we ever really got

a firm hand on it.

We were able to deal with refugees and the immediate

problems but had very few long-term solutions. We were able

gradually to get people to begin to work to try to make the

reform a success, but the big co-ops created as a result of the

reforms suffered from all the problems of people unused to real

management having to deal with enormous responsibilities. The

better part of the reform was the fact that small holders and

small farmers who were tenants on the land began to have

ownership, and as a result their skills were much more attuned

to success. As a result they could apply what they knew on an

individual basis to making this a success.

In a macro sense when I was there, coffee, cotton, and

sugar were the main export crops, and each one of them was

going through very hard times internationally so world prices

weren't too helpful. After I left, while cotton and sugar

Ambassador Thomas Pickering. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1983

to 1985. interviewed in Tel Aviv. Israel, 25 August 1987.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 169

continued to be very depressed, coffee picked up for a while

and gave them some additional breathing space in terms of

income, but it is a country not endowed with too many great

natural assets and a tremendous number of difficulties.

We were all looking at alternative crops when we were

there. Developing them takes a long time, but we had, for

instance, people growing melons for export to the United States

or beginning to look at citrus as an alternative crop or beginning

to look at some more exotic crops, certain nuts and that kind of

thing, that might have higher value and could be grown. They

all required special skills, and they all required a change in

ways of agriculture. They all required market development. You

have to address all the problems at one time. But they were

questions that were certainly being looked at and were

worthwhile to look at. I don't think coffee can ever be replaced.

We had all seen growth in light industry in the seventies

under better times. People were looking at assembly industries

in which the hand labor that was so plentiful and labor

discipline which was generally pretty good and could be

adapted, in order to produce for United States and other markets

under some of the deplorable trade arrangements to countries

like El Salvador, such as GSP and the CBI. But all of that takes time. It takes a lot of security and a certain amount of

confidence, and it was moving slowly.

Reforms in General

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-In 1979 the military finally

realized that things were coming apart. That the country had

gotten so polarized that things had to change. They took the big

step and threw out Romero and initiated the reforms. The land

reform was the military's idea. The military brought Duarte out

of exile. They came to the realization that they had to change

the way they were doing things. Not the same players, but the

same outfit. They had come a long way. Majano and others

became infected by political realism and survival.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.

,I
170 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

There are people in the military who are not necessarily

enamored with reform but who realize they don't have any

choice. There are others who fought it tooth and nail and were

allied with the ultra-Right, but they are a muted minority now.

Whereas a few years ago when they were the majority-it was

different. Majano and followers did what they did out of their

own self-interest, their own view of what Salvador could take

and what it couldn't take and what needed to be done to save

the country and incidentally save the military. If you talked to

General Bland6n, now Chief of Staff, you would realize that

these guys knew that things had to give. Now, they are in the

process of trying to clean up their own outfit-clean up the

Army-they have a long way to go, but they've already come a

long way. In '82 nobody would have given any chance at all for

El Salvador. Guerrillas were at the gate. They were sure

winners. All reporting was "The Guerrillas are on the roll."

Then all of a sudden the first glimmer appeared that democracy

might make it; it might survive.

The Basic Reforms

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila--It was then in 1980

(9 January or 9 February) when we finally established the

fundamental reforms as a result of the new revolutionary

government. The armed forces were determined to accomplish

this because we knew how important these reforms were in

order to win the war. We already had some foresight as to what

was going to happen in El Salvador. If we did not have the

intelligence and the determination to take these measures then

we were not going to be able to control the social revolution that

was yet to come. Conditions were established very objectively.

The Marxist sectors had gained the National University, and

student organizations at the high school level had been created.

The insurgents had gained partial support from the Catholic

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila. Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.

I
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 171

church, with Archbishop Romero as its leader. It criticized

openly and was willing to support all of their (Marxist)

movements.

There was no alternative other than to proceed immediately

in establishing substantial reforms. We established the agrarian

reform, the banking reform, and the foreign trade reform in

March-April 1980. With those reforms we were able to calm the

masses' desire to throw themselves into the streets and support

the subversion. Since then, we have continued working on

implementation. There were new jobs, new attitudes, new

changes. We had to establish programs which pleased the

people without neglecting the military. Since then we have been

trying to walk alongside the people, and fortunately we have

succeeded.

The first reform that was fulfilled in El Salvador was

agrarian. This was a condition imposed practically on the

military sector by the Christian Democratic party when they

constituted the second revolutionary Junta. In '75-'76, under

President Molina's administration, the first agrarian

transformation project was established in El Salvador for the

eastern part of the country. But a stronger, more powerful

economic force interceded, made up the Frente Agricola de la

Regi6n Oriental, FARO [Agricultural Front of the Eastern

Region].

Through the various means of support, generated in all the

economic sectors of the country, the FARO was able to paralyze

the effort, and the government was not able to fulfill the reform.

This new organization (FARO] introduced law reforms, and

with these law reforms they were able to nullify the agrarian

transformation project. They said they were not against the

reform. What they opposed was the way it was to be fulfilled.

They claimed there were other ways to accomplish this, and

they were offering alternatives to do so. But we didn't know

what these alternatives were.

In 1980 the reforms had to be implemented immediately.

In spite of the fact that the Marxist sectors had promised the

people would succeed and that they were only two months away

from gaining the power, they did not have the will to do this.
172 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

The Christian Democratic party put these reforms into effect

immediately. They did it with the support of the armed forces.

We had to go to all of the farms, all of the ranches, all of the

agricultural centers with more than 500 hectares and confiscate

them militarily. There were almost 300 properties in San

Salvador which were confiscated, and between the farms and

the ranches, cooperatives were formed and were turned over to

the employees. The armed forces actively participated in the

project for agrarian transformation. Without the armed forces'

cooperation, this effort would never have been fulfilled.

We had two parts to the reform--one part which included

the great stretches of land, properties ranging from 500

hectares, and the other part, those of five hectares or less. There

was a huge group of owners here in the center that had not been

affected. A deal was made in the Assembly, and it was

determined that only 150 hectares would remain under

ownership of the person. The properties wouldn't be given to

them until 20 December, and therefore they had four days to

sell any land they could in excess of 150 hectares. They had to

sell anything in excess of 150 hectares because they were only

allowed that amount. At this time, all of the agriculturists,

landowners, were in the process of either selling or getting rid

of the excess land which had already been determined by the

constitution. That was the agrarian transformation project.

The third aspect of the agrarian reform concerned

properties ranging over 200 hectares and those small properties

which are leased to the settlers, the contractors, to the

campesinos so they can work the land. I worked with that law

(it was called the 207th Decree), which was enacted in 1982 and

through which all those properties over five hectares were being

leased. They were leased to another person, and later on that

person could claim it as his property because evidently, if he

leased it, it meant that he needed it. We said we were going to

leave it with that person who was going to work the land and

who could work it.

Initially the project was successful in the implementation.

It has been supported economically. There is an organization

called ISTA which manages and controls all of this. But
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 173

unfortunately, and this is something we are correcting, the

farmers, the campesinos, and the settlers were not really

prepared to become proprietors. They had no credit. They had

no access to the credit institutions. They had no sense of

direction, planning, agricultural capabilities, or agricultural

knowledge. All they know is how to handle a tractor or maybe

just sow for that matter. But they don't know which is the best

seed. the best land. All of that has been a negative factor in the

process of the agrarian reform but is slowly being improved.

The most important thing is that we have realized what the

problem is and that we are taking certain measures in order to

accomplish the goals we set out for.

With respect to the banking reform-since 1930 the large

economic sectors in this country began to organize banks.

Banking is one of the best businesses there is. I recommend you

start a bank. The banks then began to make fabulous deals, such

as the following: The Central Bank, which is the bank of the

state, would give the economic sectors large sums of money so

they would be able to borrow. These sectors would then receive

the money at a 2 or 3 percent interest rate and would then place

it at 8 to 10 percent for the people. Just for administering the

money they were making a profit of 7 percent or 8 percent. That

money would then be distributed among friends and family and

then maybe to support a project they were working on.

Consequently, someone off the streets who did not have any

contacts had no access to anything, never had the opportunity to

come to this bank in order to receive a credit. The businessmenagriculturalists would borrow among themselves and would

inevitably benefit enormously from these transactions because

they would receive it at the fixed rate of 2 or 3 percent. There

was a financial structure created by them which made them the

sole beneficiaries of the Central Bank.

The Central Bank was not serving the needs of the people

for which it had been created in the first place. That had to

come to a stop. We then determined we were going to

nationalize the banking system. That is, the state is now the

major owner of the banks, controlling 51 percent. Individuals

can own 25 percent, and the other 24 percent is owned by the

£
174 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

employees of the bank. In relation to the success with the

banking reform, we cannot talk about success or failure

because, in spite of the fact that the banks have apparently

increased in size and assets, that is also a result of the inflation.

In El Salvador inflation was traditionally at a minimum,

but unfortunately since 1979 this has increased tremendously,

which has left us at a 5 to I ratio with the dollar. But also the

cost of living is a lot higher because what used to be worth one

colon is now worth five. What used to be 2, now is 10. The cost

of living is 10 times what it was then. We cannot then say that

because of this abnormal situation in which we have lived-of

uncertainty, of violence, of insecurity-that it has been a

suitable environment for economic growth in the country. For

that matter we cannot judge whether the banks are good, bad, or

average. I think the banking system has continued to function,

and, even if it has not improved considerably, at least it has not

worsened.

With respect to foreign trade we also have to point out that

this reform was necessary. In the past, the major product of El

Salvador, coffee, the foreign trade was in the hands of only five

traders. They were the only ones who could export overseas.

These people monopolized prices and of course the State's

income. They could declare they had sold so much and would

leave the rest in the banks of the United States, Switzerland. or

France. They would store their money and then invest it in other

businesses overseas. That money would never return to

Salvador. Because of this, there was a need to nationalize, to

stabilize foreign trade, and that is why the Salvadoran Institute

for Coffee was created. Those are the three reforms we have

accomplished so far.

Economically, 1979 was the best year we have had. This

also provided the opportunity for the country to have higher

income. Traditionally, in El Salvador, the percentage of taxe:s

was and still is much lower than in other countries. For

example, I think in Spain it had 14 percent, and you (the United

States), 20 percent, while we had close to 7 percent. A lot of

things had not been recorded, especially the patri,:1ony. The

state actually received very little income and therefore was
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 175

unable to perform some of its responsibilities. This worsened with

the increase in violence because there was not only the need to

increase the size of troops of the armed forces, but also to create

new structures for the state that could respond to the threat posed

by the subversive forces. The diplomatic corps had to be

strengthened. The Ministry of Culture and Communications

needed strong economic support in order to maintain a permanent

internal and external campaign. All of these sectors were new and

required constant economic attention.

Unfortunately, since 1979, we have been increasing the

state's expenses, public expenses, without requiring an extra

effort from the people-any additional sacrifice. That is, we

Ihave been maintaining this war with a very small budget.

We never had a budget for a war. This has caused a lot of

problems. For example the size of troops has increased five

times its original size. In '79 we were 10.000, and now we're

50,000. How are we going to pay them? Where is the money

going to come from in order to pay them? In order to deal with

this problem we have been reducing percentages of the other

ministries in order to gear it towards defense. That is how we've

been functioning. But every time income was less because

businesses were closing down, there were less jobs available,

bridges had been destroyed, the electric company had to invest

in order to reconstruct their system, and so forth. Then there

comes a moment of frustration and desperation where we realize

that our budget is only going to cover expenses through

September, but there will be no money to cover expenses in

October, November, and December,

We have had to come up with an additional tax which we

call a sovereign tax or defense tax in order to acquire the

necessary funds and be able to handle the deficit for this year.

We have another problem-foreign debt. It is extremely high,

especially with our own economic crisis. We couldn't really

handle everything. We had to once again resort to taxing, but

unfortunately that is where we don't see eye-to-eye with the

political sectors. Not so much unable to see eye-to-eye, but they

believe that here is where they should take advantage of the

situation and weaken the government economically in order to

win the next elections.

I
176 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

Land Reform Gave Breathing Space

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-The government did less

with the population than we thought the guerrillas tried to do in

the rural areas. But the population was of enormous size to deal

with. So it wasn't easy to see a big campaign turning the

population around. The population had been more influenced by

actions of the past than they were by promises of the present.

As a result, for them, the question of what the government was

doing was much more important than what the government said.

As a result you had to help the government turn itself around in

order to get it to do a retter job with the people.

The land reform program was very important in popular

attitudes. It gave the government the breathing space necessary

to survive the '83 military campaiga and to go into the electoral

process with some sense of confidence that the government

could still offer alternatives.

General Josi Guillermo Garcia-Now everbody complains

about the reform. They say it was bad. It's not the fact that it

was a bad reform, but instead it was not implemented, which is

different. If you give a Mercedes-Benz or a Cadillac to a

campesino, he will only be able to look at it, because he won't

know how to drive it. If we don't teach him how to drive it, if

we don't teach him that you have to put gasoline in, and not just

water, in other words, take care of it, that car will last. But if

we only hand it over to him, the first opportunity that comes he

will take it over a cliff. Analogously, that is what I consider has

happened to the agrarian reform and the other reforms. At that

time, they weren't only necessary, they were indispensable.

The people were tired of so many lies and so much fraud,

and subversives were about to explode in a guerrilla war,

earning support for their efforts and the support of the people.

The country was destroyed. What happens is that many people

forget, but the circumstances back then were extremely tense,

Ambassador Thomas Pickcring. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1983

to 1985. interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel. 25 August 1987.

General Jose Guillermo Garcfa. Minister of Dcfense. El Salvador. 1979

to 1984, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 2 July 1987.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 177

problematical, and decisive. That is how the change came

about, and the guerrillas' principal propaganda vehicle was

taken away from them. They no longer had anything to offer, so

we took away their support, and we began to improve our own

image in the eyes of the people.

The Most Significant Political-CivilMilitary Reform of the Decade

General Fred F. Woerner-The most significant politicalcivil-military development since the turn of the decade is the

demonstrated loyalty of the military to the civilan institution of

the presidency-and therefore, to Napole6n Duarte. I placed it

in that sequence because the loyalty is definitely to the

President, Napole6n Duarte, not to Napole6n Duarte, the

President. This can be clearly established by the analysis of the

military's political conduct in the intermediate years, and this

takes on increased credibility when one acknowledges the

earlier relationship of the military with the individual, Napole6n

Duarte, and with his party, the Christian Democrats.

If there is any party in Salvador, other than the Communist

party, that the military would have difficulty working with, that

is the Christian Democratic party, and yet that's the very party

they've been working with. The military clearly facilitated.

even insisted upon, the Constituent Assembly elections.

protected those elections, and ensured freedom of expression,

And the Army acted similarly with the first presidential

election, the presidential run-off election, and the most recent

gubernatorial and congressional elections that took place. All of

them were witnessed by the observers from the international

community and were universally acknowledged as being

conducted openly and honestly. The military, without

exception, conducted itself properly in guaranteeing not only the

process but the results of the election and respected the results,

which have, frankly, not always pleased them.

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America, 1982 to 1985.

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco, California, 7 November 1986.
178 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

There are other incidents of perhaps lesser note, which give

testimony to the military's commitment to civilian rule and the

role of the military in that context. For example, one can look at

negotiations leading to the release of the kidnapped daughter of

President Duarte. This was a very, very difficult issue for the

military in the obvious terms of public security and the

expansion of kidnapping attempts against the military and their

families. And yet, in spite of these very real dimensions of the

issue, the military was absolutely loyal. In this case, to

Napole6n Duarte, the individual, President of the Republic.

Other factors would be the internal purging of the ultra-rightist,

an analysis of the new leadership of the military, and even the

steps taken to eliminate human rights abuses. I think all of these

incidents give testimony to a fundamental change of attitude

within the military.

I would not go so far as to say that there is universality

within the military of belief and confidence in the new trends,

nor would I argue that all was done in an altruistic spirit. But,

the fact is, there have been very significant steps.... With the

passage of time, some of the true motivation may be lost and

placed in a more euphoric or altruistic context as happens

historically. It will have its own dynamic influence on the

institution and the youth therein and become, I believe, the new

ideal motive, merely because of its existence, for others who

have been born into that environment. It becomes the natural

environment for the institution.

I would caution that all that I have said, about describing

this change and attitudes and all, must be placed within the

normal context of the role of the military in a Latin society. If

one lifts it out and places it in a U.S. or Anglo context, it then

loses some, not all. Even by our standards, it is significant. It is

not nearly as dramatic in our standards and traditions, but within

the Latin context, in which the military has a very legitimate

political role, the movement towards our political philosophical

status has been incredible in Salvador. I believe, personally,

that this trend is substantive. I'll go much further. I think it is

permanent.

I believe the rupture with the oligarchy is irreparable and

that there is an institutionalized respect for the presidency that

!N
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 179

will permit it to endure serious levels of challenge and that it

will progress forward. If not to be modeled on the United

States, to nevertheless achieve such levels of what we would

call maturity as have been achieved, for example, in Colombia

and Venezuela. I think the Salvadoran military is well on its

way to that level of a political status within the body politic.

Moving towards that, they will achieve it.

Resolving the Primary Political

Problems in El Salvador

THE EDITORS-The political problems facing El Salvador

were rooted in the traditional form of political system

prevalent in much of Latin America. There were two

large polarized segments of the society. The landed

oligarchy supported by the military and other

traditionally oriented power centers, such as the church

and banking interests. The other segment was the

peasants, the workers, and a large population which

were by choice or circumstance not participants in the

political process or political power sharing.

There was no middle ground, no large middle class

which represented the middle ground, and thus there

was little ability to gain consensus. The notion that the

political system should foster or openly recognize the

democratic necessity of a viable opposition was

considered disunifying. As the only real power behind

the government, the military found a new institutional

mission in the apolitical support of the elections. In

order to avoid politicizing the military, and in order to

promote the new concept that the military was the

protector of the political system, the military was not

allowed to vote, to campaign, or voice support for one

party or another. The military support of the system

allowed for normal elections and campaigns, 

a

circumstance considered extraordinary by many El

Salvadorans.

While problems did exist, the military was praised

for doing a very creditable job in protecting the

I
180 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

elections, and the insurgents failed to intimidate the

voters. The presence of observers and press is also

credited with helping to keep the elections honest. The

reports and the statements of the press concerning the

fairness of the elections provided a tremendous boost

to the legitimacy of the El Salvadoran government and

served to drown out the insurgent claims that the

elections were fraudulent.

The Historical Context of

the Political Environment

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-When we talk about the political

environment, let me exclude that element of the population

which is supportive of the insurgent movement because it really

constitutes a very, very small percentage of the population.

Perhaps, to wildly guess at it, 4, 5, 6 percent of the population,

at the most, actively supports the insurgency. So, we're talking

about well over 90 percent of the population which participated

in the democratic process and which was hopeful of finding a

political solution in some context other than violence. But

within this large substantial majority of the population, over 90

percent of the people, the society is rather strongly polarized.

You have a very strong conservative element which is well

to the right of center in our definition of the political spectrum;

it includes not only well-to-do business people and landowners

but also very close to 50 percent of the rural population

consisting of poor campesinos in the countryside who are very,

very strongly conservative and who traditionally support a

strong central government. They respect central authority. All

they ask is that they not be abused and that the government

make some effort to provide some basic services for them and

little else.

Then you have an element, mostly an urban element of

workers-people who have a job or are hopeful of having a job

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea. U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador, 1983 to

1985, interviewed in Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania, 4 March 1986.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 181

but aren't really receiving very much money, aren't living well,

that are living on the fringes of society, so to speak. They're

just barely getting by. Many of them are unionized workers, and

they're very liberal. Their intellectual leaders, in fact, are

represented by the Christian Democrats, and they are well to the

left of what we consider the political center. They basically

believe in a distribution of the national wealth by the

government-a centrally controlled redistribution of wealth that

includes a redistribution of land, a redistribution of profits

among the working class, if you will. And these are the people

who now are, in fact, in political power. The problem, of

course, in El Salvador is that no matter how you cut the pie

there's never enough. There's simply not enough wealth in the

country to satisfy the basic needs of the people. But you have

here a political polarization. You have a conservative Right,

which is very firm in its belief in law and order, in a free market

economy, in government noninterference in the private market,

and noninterference in most arenas. In fact they favor a

government which protects their interests, and so they support a

free market economy to the extent that it favors and protects

them. They also support the kind of governmental controls and

tampering which protect them from competition.

On the Left, you have people who believe that the

government should take a much larger role in distributing the

goods and services of society. There's really no happy meeting

ground in the center. There's only a small place in the center

where people of these groups overlap and are philosophically

compatible. But you have on either end of the spectrum such a

divergence of firm belief and commitment that it's difficult to

find a consensus.

Traditionally, in a Latin society, a consensus is what you

seek. Traditionally, strong central rule in Latin America means

that whoever is in power, whether he came to power through

military backing or democratic process or by whatever process,

whoever holds power by virtue of the fact that he is in power,

determines what the political course of that society will be and

obliges the balance of society to support him. He puts all of the

people who support him into positions of authority and

A

'l1

SI~HHHWm • m • n n mmm m m m ~ .,
182 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

influence, denies people who don't agree with him from

positions of influence and power, favors those who support him

with jobs, favors them in any other possible way so that he can

get on about the business of governing according to his concept.

The Latins accept this. They understand that they are going to

probably have to support, actively support, whoever is in

power. With the democracy-with what we have done in

supporting the concept of democracy in a pluralistic societywe have almost imposed upon them a system which traditionally

hasn't been the way society has worked in Latin America.

The Problem

Dr. Alvaro Magaf a-The fundamental political problems are

based on the fact that a constructive opposition was never given

any opportunities and in fact were practically eliminated. This

did not allow for different opinions to be considered throughout

the government and thus created a lot of frustration. The fact

that the official party had all the advantages in order to win

created skepticism in the democratic system. There historically

was great abstention. I don't know the details, but let's just say

that in '82 and '84, 80 percent of the people voted. I'm sure that

in former elections 30 percent-40 percent of the people did not

vote. There was a total abstinence to voting because the people

had lost all faith and confidence in the system. But it seems that

that trust has been slowly regained since '82 and '84.

i think the greatest political mistake was to try to eliminate

and to exclude the opposition. They should have tried to

encourage and help create an opposition in order to establish

some sort of balance in the system and the possibility that the

differences of opinion between the two parties could somehow

be conducive to something constructive. I think that was one of

the causes for all these problems. This does not mean I'm

referring specifically to what had been said about the fraud

Dr. Alvaro Magafia, Provisional President of the Republic of El

Salvador, 1982 to 1984, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 18

December 1986 and 30 June 1987.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 183

in elections of 1972, against President Duarte and his Christian

Democratic party. It is not that case in particular but, rather, the

government's whole attitude towards excluding and ignoring a

viable opposition.

The Elections Were the Turning Point

Ambassador Deane Hinton-We developed a broad political,

economic, and military approach. Of course there was the

training effort followed for the military that was absolutely

crucial. The Woerner Report gave that emphasis. Some adverse

military developments, destruction of most of the Air Force on

the ground at Ilopango, bought a response up here. Helped

clarify some people's thinking. Politically we worked right from

the beginning to overcome the skeptics who didn't believe that

you could hold an election in these circumstances. Duarte was

the head of the Junta, the political head, and most of the

members thought it could be done and should be done. Lots of

people in El Salvador and in the United States didn't think it

could be done.

So the main effort, politically, culminated in the very

extraordinarily successful '82 elections. Those elections were a

turning point in history. In one day the impression of most

Americans switched. What happened was totally unexpected.

Television commentators early in the morning were pooh

poohing, but over the course of the day they changed their tone

and then in the night were highly positive. It was of major

importance for turning the situation around politically. The

principal economic problem was just to keep the economy afloat

with all kinds of emergency economic help.

The guerrilla-delivered attacks on the electric power system

had a particularly serious impact on the economy in many,

many ways. It depressed morale of people in the cities. They

also affected what industry there was. Coffee mills out of

action. We spent a lot of time devising strategy to deal with that

Ambassador Deane Hinton. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1982 to

1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 10 September 1987.
184 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

and eventually got a very effective strategy. Reasonably

effective. You never can totally protect the electrical system.

An important part was intelligence. All these things were going

on. I can't remember the time, but the decision to bring

Salvadorans to the United States for training was an important

decision.

The First Free Elections in 50 Years

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-The election was incredible. I

was there. I did not believe what I was seeing. All these stories

I was told. First the guerrillas said they were going to stop the

elections. They were threatening the people. Then everybody

said, well people won't turn out. There won't be anybody out

there. If they do, the votes won't count. They were all wrong.

The Army Won't Vote

General Jose Guillermo Garcia-One of the purposes of the

October 15th movement was for us to avoid delving in politics.

And the irony is that we stopped voting. I gave them elemental

reasons for justification. I believe a man who has the power of

arms behind him should not be able to have a say in politics

because he can make use of the arms in order to make his

opinion prevail. That is elemental. But the causes that justified

the fact that a man in uniform should not be involved in politics

made me insist that a soldier should not vote. We made it legal,

and he didn't vote. Certain officers-lieutenants, captainsremind me of that today. I remember they insisted upon one

thing. They told me, "Listen, Mr. Minister, the only thing we

don't want is to have another ... ," and they'd mention an expresident's name, who had once been involved in a coup, or a

movement, and had taken advantage of the situation in order to

declare himself president. "We don't want that." I told them

Colonel John D. Waghelstein. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 23 February 1987.

General Josd Guillermo Garcia, Minister of Defense. El Salvador. 1979

to 1984. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 2 July 1987.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 185

they had nothing to fear and that they could be sure that

wouldn't happen if I had anything to do with it. I wasn't going

to take advantage of my responsibility as Minister, create a halo

over my head, and all of a sudden declare myself as a

candidate, as a politician, taking advantage of the institution in

order to achieve personal objectives. I don't do it, and I never

did, and they remember that. "We didn't believe you ......

they'd say, "... but you've convinced us, and you've fulfilled

your promise." I told them they were moral commitments.

They are commitments of faith one has with himself, because

the institution should not serve as a ladder in order to satisfy

negative personal hungers for men in uniform. And whoever

does so is hurting the institution. Those are principles I stand

by. I advise you, I had many opportunities. During the

transition of the Junta government to the new transitory

government-after the assembly election-they came to me

with the offer of becoming the provisional president. I refused.

First, because we were under a de facto government, and we all

know the power resides, not in the person, but due to the fact of

what the armed institution represents. A president can be

removed legally on the third day, with a majority assembly.

But, I refused. That's when Dr. Alvaro Magafna came in, to

whom I have a great deal of respect, a great admiration, and I

believe he fulfilled his term in accordance with the

circumstances at the time-excellently. A capable, honest,

sincere man, he seemed to be the ideal person for the time.

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nui/a-Since 1980-81, the

purpose for our political project was to establish the ideal

conditions to establish or reestablish democracy in El Salvador.

With that purpose we continued to work, and in 1982 we had

the first free elections in 50 years. At that moment we realized,

despite whatever the constitution dictates, that everyone has a

right to vote and the duty to vote.

We could not afford to have any high-ranking military

personnel vote in these elections. There were several reasons for

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security for El Salvador, 1984 to date. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 17

December 1986. 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.
186 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

doing this. First, if we were to vote, we would have politicized

the armed forces. It would have created conditions for the

soldier that some would have voted for one party and some for

another. We could not afford the luxury to vote because at that

time we were in the process of building an institutional unity.

We were looking precisely to consolidate the unity that had

been fractured because one side had shifted towards the Right

and the other side had shifted towards the Left. There was a

large sector in the center. We also could not both provide the

necessary security during the elections and at the same time be

able to vote. We opted for providing the necessary securitysome 25,000 to 30,000 of our troops-and fortunately the

people responded beautifully. At that moment I recall the

subversive forces responded with threats to the people saying,

"Vote in the morning and die in the afternoon." They were

circulating pamphlets with those threats. That is, if those people

participated in the elections, their lives were threatened. But the

people paid no attention. Inclusive, there were people who

walked 20-25 kilometers from wherever they were to the

election centers to cast their ballots. The percentage of voters

was approximately 90 percent. No one interfered. This also

allowed for some of the elected deputies to get out and proceed

to the constitution of a Constituent Assembly and write up a

new constitution.

The Veracity of the Elections

Dr. Alvaro Magania-I think that after the experience in 1982

of having presidential and deputy elections, the people, for that

reason, were so anxious to participate and cast their vote.

Because of that, the elections of '84 were technically better

organized. With the experience in '82, the possibilities that

there could be fraudulent elections or any other irregularity were

avoided. There was a more or less normal political campaign

Dr. Alvaro Magafia. Provisional President of the Republic of El

Salvador, 1982 to 1984, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 18

December 1986 and 30 June 1987.

ii
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 187

with proper elections. That, for us, was extraordinary, but for

others living in any other democratic country it was like any

other election. I'm sure there was no pressure or influence from

any governmental authority or any other kind of help of the

parties. It is possible that in a small town, the local authority

would have acted as such. But altogether I think they were free

elections. This was verified by a great many foreign visitors

whom we invited to the elections. We had to have two elections

because there was not a majority for the presidency during the

first election. We then had two elections and I'm quite satisfied

with the outcome. In some cases there were rumors suggesting

that help had been provided in favor of the Christian Democrats.

From what I know there was no indication of such.

U.S. Official Observer Delegation-The official United

States delegation to the March 28, 1982 El Salvador Constituent

Assembly elections, having personally visited a number of

polling areas around the country, believes these elections were

fair and free.

One of our members, Dr. Howard Penniman, an elections

expert who has participated in some 45 difficult elections,

observes that yesterday's election was one of the most massive

expressions of popular will he has ever seen.

The tremendous turnout, perhaps over one million,

underscores the sense of commitment of the people.

Over and over again we heard the people say, "We are

voting for peace and an end to the violence. We believe this

election can be a new beginning for this country."

In general the election process itself was orderly and

peaceful. The voting procedures adhered to rules established by

the Central Elections Commission. There were poll watchers

from at least two parties at each table we visited, and the

election officials worked seriously at their responsibilities, both

in processing the voters and later in counting the ballots. We did

see some minor technical problems during the day, but we saw

From the statement by the US Official Observer Delegation to the

Elections in El Salvador, 28 March 1982, in Inter-American Economic Affairs

36, no. I (Summer 1982), pp. 61-62.

.1J
188 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

no indication of fraud. We believe they had no influence on the

outcome of the elections.

Because of the threats of violence during the voting, the

Central Elections Commission made the decision to concentrate

the polling places in some 300 sites. This did cause some

confusion. By the early hours of the morning, there were long

lines all over the country. For example in Santa Tecla, a suburb

of San Salvador, we estimated that some 10,000 people were

standing in line to vote at 9:00 A. M. We were concerned that

not all would have a chance to vote. But by the end of the day,

election officials assured us that most of the voters were

attended to. The Salvadoran people have said in overwhelming

numbers that they want peace and an end to the violence.

We hope that the sense of commitment and cooperation

that the voters demonstrated yesterday at the polls will be

reflected in the efforts of the leadership of the Constituent

Assembly that they have elected. The people have asked for a

new beginning and they most definitely deserve it.

Guilermo M. Ungo-The elections of March, 1982 were held

without FDR-FMLN participation because the armed forcessupposedly neutral and charged with guaranteeing impartiality

and electoral integrity-publicly declared that, as subversives

and terrorists, alliance members were legitimate targets of

persecution. A government that violates human rights on a

genocidal scale cannot call itself democratic.

Somoza also held electoral events, and El Salvador's

history is filled with examples of this type of fraudulent

exercise. It must not be forgotten that voting is compulsory in

El Salvador and that the regime used all of its propaganda

resources to accuse those who would not vote of being

subversives.

The truth is that the FDR-FMLN and the Salvadoran

people do want free elections, but guaranteeing the security of

the political leaders, or even of the FDR-FMLN rank and file. is

not enough. The security of all the people must be guaranteed

Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (political leader of the FDR). "'The People's

Struggle." Foreign Policy 52 (Fall 1983), pp. 61-62.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 189

N IADOS

(COPRIF A

"Yesterday we were misled in our voting. Today we are convinced in our

protest. Duarte must go." National Federation of Trade Unions members

protest after the 1984 elections.

so that they can participate without fear in an election

campaign. To ensure such security, it is necessary to dissolve

the death squads, to bring peace, to respect human rights, and to

permit the exercise of political and trade-union rights.

Election of Dr. Alvaro Magafha

President Josi Napole6n Duarte-As soon as the votes for the

Constituent Assembly delegates had been counted,

Jos6 Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to present),

Duarte: Mv Storv (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1986). pp. 183-85.

Copyright 1986 by Jos6 Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P.

Putnam's Sons.
190 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

D'Aubuisson* made the astute move of calling all the parties

together and confronting the Junta with the elected power of the

assembly. The Junta's role was ended, they said. Within the Junta,

we debated whether the assembly was meant to take power from

us or simply write the constitution. I thought that only the elected

assembly had legitimate power-there was no longer justification

for the Junta. The armed forces also opposed any extension of the

Junta government. Garcfa intended to get rid of the Junta so that

he could rule as defense minister in the vacuum. The majority

among the officer corps wanted a civilian president because they

thought the Junta government had been damaging to military

prestige. The struggle then began over who would be the

provisional president.

It was a horse race. Dozens of names were entered.... The

U.S. Embassy, hearing rumors about Carranza and D'Aubuisson,

was very worried. The Reagan Administration wanted a moderate

civilian in the role of provisional president. The names that were

said to have the U.S. Ambassador's blessing included a Christian

Democrat, Abraham Rodriguez, Dr. Bustamante of the Election

Council. Fortin Magafia of the Democratic Action Party and a

banker named Alvaro Magafia Boija, among others.

[There was not a consensus around any military candidate

among the officers.] But D'Aubuisson, seeing the disagreement

among the military, decided he should take the job himself. Since

he had the votes in the Constituent Assembly, it was only a matter

of gaining military acquiescence. D'Aubuisson's mistake was

overconfidence, I learned. The cocky major went to Gutirrez to

offer him the post of Salvadoran ambassador to Washington.

Guti6rez kept his anger under control, quietly saying he would

prefer to stay out. D'Aubuisson, who was drinking at the time,

thought Guti6rrez had accepted the job, so he regaled him with all

his plans for his Cabinet. The more Gutirrez knew, the more

reasons he had to convince the armed forces that they should not

allow D'Aubuisson to take over.

The High Command knew that the United States opposed

D'Aubuisson. The Embassy was so concerned about a D'Aubuisson

*Major (Retired) Roberto D'Aubuisson. ARENA party leader. Former

President of the Constituent Assembly. Founder of ARENA's predecessor.

The National Broad Front (FAN).
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITCAL ACTONS 191

COPREFA

"The cost of living is too high." Open demonstrations have become

commonplace sights in San Salvador. In 1986, members of the Social

Security Workers Union staged this protest parade.

presidency that Washington was asked to send reinforcements to

help block this development. President mReagan dispatched

General Vernon Walters, his troubleshooting ambassador, who

was then involved in trying to end the war between Argentina and

Great Britain, which broke out five days after our elections.

Walters, a direct man who speaks to Latin military leaders in their

own language, works well as Reagan's envoy. But before General

Walters could arrive, the High Command decided that the issue of

the provisional presidency had to be settled.

There was one unexpected visitor who was brought into the

military conclave, the Honduran Army Chief, General Gustavo

Alvarez. The Honduran general was officially there to bring

congratulations on the elections. But Guti~rrez asked him how the

Honduran military had gotten an acceptable president after its

Constituent Assembly was elected the year before. Alvarez said

they had formed a military committee whose decision was

imposed on the parties. Gutidrrez then proposed that the armed

wI
192 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

forces back Alvaro Magafia as president. Magafia was viewed as

a friend by the military, politically neutral, acceptable to the

U.S. Embassy-a good compromise. The entire officer corps

was consulted and approved.

By the time Walters reached the meeting of the High

Command, their decision to impose Magafia's presidency had

already been taken. The officers quickly accepted U.S. advice

to do what they had already planned.

Magafia's Objectives

Dr. Alvaro Magafia-The most difficult ,hing that occurred

during my tenure as interim president was not having the full

cooperation of all the parties. The fact that I had not been

elected officially and the circumstances under which I took

power did not help my situation. I tried to incorporate these

parties into the government. I gave them positions in the

Cabinet, three positions to each one of the most important

parties. They participated and were responsible for the different

areas that they had chosen, but the bottom line was that there

was not any kind of cooperation. They knew it was 

a

provisional government, and they were only interested in taking

advantage of the situation in order to improve their chances for

winning in the next elections.

My job was very difficult. On the other hand, we have

always attempted to solve problems in a nondemocratic way.

When two parties disagree on something and are not able to

meet eye to eye on decisions, we resort to a coup as the most

immediate solution. I didn't confront any problems of that

nature during my tenure, but nevertheless, I did face many

different points of view with the higher echelons of the

government with respect to problems such as the one with

Colonel Ochoa. Other than that specific situation, there was 

a

general acceptance that it was better for everyone that I be

allowed to finish my term as interim president. Everyone

Dr. Alvaro Magafia, Provisional President of the Republic of El

Salvador, 1982 to 1984, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 18

December 1986 and 30 June 1987.

m mmim • mmmm m •• m ni I
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 193

DONEHOO

Jorge Shafik Handal, General Secretary, Communist party of El Salvador

(standing, second right), one of five FALN commandantes.

thought they would be the next winning candidate in the upcoming

elections. It was very convenient that I be allowed to finish my

term so that the new government would have a fresh start with

democracy. It was very difficult to develop a large government

program, and I was determined to accomplish two things. First, as

a fundamental objective, to serve the time it was required for me

to complete my term and, second, attempt to do everything

possible to make the next elections as free and legitimate as

possible and to make the transition to the next government as

democratic as possible, through the people's elections.

The Magana Presidency

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-A key event was the critical

role played by the selection of President Magafia as interim

Colonel John D. Waghelstein. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 23 February 1987.
194 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

president, which would diffuse the political wrangling, the

potential confrontation and total disruption of whatever was

going to pass for a government between the ARENA and their

allied parties on the Right and the Christian Democrats on the

Left. The Army's candidate was Magafia, and I might add, he

was also the Embassy's candidate. It gave us a breathing spell

between the elections of '82 and the final election that resulted

in a Duarte victory. It gave us some time to at least map out a

strategy.

It also gave the Army, interestingly, another two years in

which to meditate, cogitate, and feel out its new position vis a

vis the politicians.

I remember one very heated series of debates in the Assembly in which there were handguns in evidence, a very emotional and very dangerous situation. The situation had arisen

between the ARENA delegates and the Christian Democratic

delegates.

The bottom line was essentially that the ARENA party was

going to bank together with other right-wing parties and oust the

Christian Democrats from the Assembly. The Army leadership

had a series of one on one talks with various politicians and

served notice that the Army was not going to find itself in the

position of having guaranteed the elections-protected the

electorate and guaranteed the results of those elections--only to

have the first tentative steps toward democracy being undone by

the politicians in the Assembly. The bottom line from the Army

was "Knock it off; we're not going to lose everything because

you guys can't make the system work."

So. the whole Magafia interregnum had a function of

allowing some very tentative steps into this democratic mine

field, some paths to be found. The most important path was the

one that the Army, through the political maneuverings of the

Right and Left, found itself in the position where it always

viewed itself but under slightly different raiment. As the

defender of the constitution, It took on the position that rather

than intervening to change the government, the Army was going

to make sure that the system worked no matter who got elected.

I
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 195

('OPREIFA

In 1986 this FPL guerrilla turned himself in. He received a bounty for the

weapons and equipment he brought with him.

During that time, the Army continued a weaning process from the

oligarchs and, if you will, a wedding of the Salvadoran military to

the U.S. military because of their relationship in the security

assistance environment so that it no longer depended upon the

favors of the oligarchy for its existence. It had a reason to exist

beyond maintaining the status quo, and that was to defeat the

guerrillas. And it had tasted a bit of popular support because of its

successful role in the elections.

This heady new feeling of camaraderie it established with

the population made it much easier for the slow, winnowing out

of the undesirable elements of the Mano Blanca, the ultra-Right.

the death squads, if you will. That time period allowed certain

evolutionary processes to take place.
196 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

The Institutionalizing

of Elections

Colonel John Waghelstein--I got there a couple days before

the March elections, and we had geared up---the Salvadoran

military had been prodded out of the barracks, out of the

cuarteles, into the field, and it had been very active. Then just

before the elections they were pulled back to guard the polling

places. I believe at the time that was the correct plan. With one

notable exception, they were able to effectively protect the

populace, and the voters were able to turn out in surprisingly

large numbers and vote despite the threats. The Army

effectively sealed off attempts by guerrillas in a number of

cities, including the capital, to penetrate and to disrupt the

balloting. The problem was then to get them back out into the

field after the elections were over.

Politically the situation was bad, even after the elections,

as there was a right-wing coalition formed around the ARENA

party that was determined to oust the Christian Democrats,

notably Duarte and others, from the political arena. My

discussions with Flores-Lima (then Chief of Staff, now SubMinister) indicated that the Army was not happy with ARENA

and viewed it as an attempt to oust the party that had gotten 40

percent of the vote. This would cause problems for the Army

which was committed to the land reform and to democracy. He

indicated to me that they had served notice on the politicians

that there wasn't going to be a power play. Therefore, it came

as no surprise that Magafia was picked as the Interim President.

He was the Army's man, and he served for the next two years

until the presidential elections of last year (1984).

Militarily, things were pretty bad. Out of the 14

departments there were only two departmental commanders that

Colonel John D. Waghelstein. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 197

were worth a damn, the others being notably ineffective. The

one exception that I mentioned to the success of the defense of

the election was down in Usulutfn where the departmental

commander allowed himself to be suckered out, and the

guerrillas got into the city and disrupted the election. He was

just one of several departmental commanders who should have

been sent off to attachd duty in Chad or Tasmania or

somewhere. There were lots of young lieutenant colonels

around who knew what to do, but they were viewed with some

suspicion by Garcia, who, as Minister of Defense, was more

intent on maintaining his power base within the military.

Politically though, I will give Garcia credit. He did his part in

committing the military to the elections, to guaranteeing the

elections, to guaranteeing the results and to the continuation of

the reform.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-[ would think that by the

time I got there we had made an enormous amount of effort to

begin to get them to deal with the continuing problems that were

of great interest to us in a political sense: the question of judicial

reform, of planning for the election, of opening up the political

process. A lot of that had already begun. The guerrilla offensive

didn't make it any easier to continue with that. Nevertheless,

there was almost an overriding commitment on the part of

everybody on our side to see that through. We did a tremendous

amount of work behind the scenes with individuals in the

bureaucracy and in the government to move ahead.

My sense is that the judicial reform issue is still a very

important, outstanding, unfulfilled promise of our policy in El

Salvador. It's not going to be easy over the long term to change,

and it is perhaps the most difficult challenge. The organization

of the electoral process at times was nip and tuck. It worked out quite well. The commitment of the military to pull up their

Ambassador Thomas Pickering. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1983

to 1985. interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 August 1987.

A
198 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

socks after the offensive, and turn themselves to combining

their military planning with the absolute necessity of protecting

the elections, gave them a new goal and respectability and a

sense of pride in their potential accomplishment that they hadn't

had before. It aligned them, in a sense, with the good guys for a

long period of time. So, it made a big difference.

The depoliticization of the military was a very important

factor throughout the whole effort, and the Defense Minister

was an enormously important individual in making certain that

the military stayed in bounds, widely recognized, respectable

bounds of political behavior. He had to treat the military in El

Salvador as an institution in its own right but one which had to

adopt a course of supporting political change toward electoral

democracy in large measure because their conclusions paralleled

ours.

Colonel James J. Steele-In probably what has to be, as you

write the history, an historical moment in El Salvador, VidesCasanova, Bland6n, L6pez Nuila, all of the brigade

commanders, in effect, the high command plus, were brought

together and went in front of the press and everyone during the

1985 Assembly elections. There were a host of accusations that

the elections were not fair and that the military had interfered,

etc. Vides basically said-to those that had close ties to the old

order-he said, "We lost over 600 people killed and wounded

in the process of protecting this election, the campaign, and the

voting itself. If any of you out there think that this is some kind

of a damn card game that you don't like the results of and you

just throw all the cards in, you're wrong. The military has no

intention of being a party to throwing out these elections. It has

been playing it's proper, constitutionally appropriate role in

protecting the elections, and as far as the military is concerned,

the elections stand." This was significant!

Colonel James J. Steele. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1984 to 1986. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986; and. in Monterey, California, 5 November 1986.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 199

The Presidential Election

of March 1984

President Josi Napoleon Duarte-The Right could not

believe that the Christian Democrats had really won even 42

percent of the vote in 1982 without cheating. So this time they

insisted on a ponderous system of voter registration, using

American-financed computer technology. The result was utter

confusion. Many people did not know where their names

appeared on a list. Many stood in the wrong line for hours.

Sometimes lists of ballots failed to arrive. The Right did not

care whether voters got discouraged or gave up, because a lower

turnout was supposed to favor them, especially in San Salvador.

I spent election day, March 25, 1984, at our party

headquarters. I fielded the complaints about interference,

intimidation and legal violations called in from one polling

place or another. We were in permanent contact with the Army

headquarters, because the military High Command had taken on

the responsibility for enforcing the election rules that local

commanders were flouting. General Vides Casanova stated

publicly, "The Armed Forces reiterate their pledge that nobody,

absolutely nobody, will sway the free choice of the ballot box."

Imperfect, but not impaired, the election results came in

from around the country. My son Napole6n ran the party

computer, analyzing the reports we received from our party

observers at each ballot count. Both my sons and my daughters,

their husbands and wives, worked for my candidacy in the

party. By II P. M. we had our first projection, but only by 1 A.

M. could we be fairly sure of the results. We knew that the

Christian Democrats had won 45 percent, not quite a majority.

D'Aubuisson was second with 29 percent, Chachi third with 16

percent. When the official results were counted, they gave us a

bit less than our count: 43.4 percent of the vote.

Josd Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to present).

Duarte: Mv Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986), pp. 197-201,

204-206. Copyright 1986 by Josd Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission

of G. P. Putnam's Sons.

a
200 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

In the next round, between myself and D'Aubuisson on

May 6, we had to receive more than 50 percent if I were to

become president. The Right could stop me if the votes for

Chachi and the other rightist parties went to D'Aubuisson. The

critical difference would be made by the undecided voters who

had not cast their ballots for me or D'Aubuisson the first time.

Our strategy was to talk with the local leaders of the

smaller parties and seek out those voters who abstained during

the first round. Instead of rallies and mass-media saturation, the

second round of campaigning was quiet, personal, door-to-door

canvassing.

Chachi told us his party would not make a deal with

D'Aubuisson. He told PCN members to vote according to their

individual consciences, but the local leaders went for

D'Aubuisson. D'Aubuisson charged into his campaign, raging

for a total confrontation with me. There is no denying he built

up an anti-Duarte, anti-Christian Democrat hatred. They wanted

an emotional campaign, but we refused to match their hysteria.

Our campaign was reasoned and calm, to avoid inciting violent

clashes between ARENA and the Christian Democrats.

D'Aubuisson played on nationalism, saying the Christian

Democrats were internationally controlled. The press called me

the American candidate. while the Far Right in the United

States, led by Senator Jesse Helms, told D'Aubuisson the

Christian Democrats were getting money from the CIA. We did

not receive CIA funds. I know because we worked very hard

and went into debt for our money. The party had saved some

money that went to the Institutes for Christian Democratic

Studies, supported by foundations and donations. For years we

donated the proceeds from our lectures. For our campaign, we

took out bank loans that are still being paid off with

contributions from individuals. The government also provided

funds to parties based on their percentage of the vote. I do not

think money or external influence made any difference in this

election.

On the second election day, in May, I stayed at home with

my vice-presidential running mate, Rodolfo "Chele"' Castillo.

Chele and I spent the day watching old movies on television.

Ii
7

MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 201

drinking coffee, pacing back and forth, while the party structure

managed the process. Because I was afraid of what such fervid

D'Aubuisson allies as Colonels Cruz and MorAn could do, I

asked the military High Command and the international

observer missions to get to their areas, Moraz~n, Zacatecoluca,

on election day. As one U.S. senator after another came into

Morazdn, with journalists and high-ranking officers too, Cruz

realized what was happening and took off into the mountains

with his men. Mordn was neutralized, too. Except for a few

small towns where it is easy for the Right to intimidate people,

the observers and the press did help to keep the elections

honest.

Election morning, the guerrillas launched a major attack on

San Miguel. They even fired on the observers' helicopter, but

within hours the guerrillas had fled and the people were back in

lines at the polling places. The guerrilla threats never

discouraged most Salvadorans from voting.

Compared to the first presidential round, the number voting

increased because the elections were better organized. People

had learned the first time exactly where they were assigned to

vote. They did not have to search from table to table for their

names. This time the choice was simple-only two

candidates- and those running the polling places had become

more efficient....

By midnight, Alejandro came to me with his first

projection. "You've won the election," he said simply. "Fiftyfour percent of the vote." He had wanted to be absolutely sure

before he told me, because he knew what it would mean to me.

I had been elected president by the people of El Salvador

despite, or because of all that had happened in the past-the

stolen elections, seven years in exile, my role as a junta member

and figurehead president in the bloodiest times....

I had not taken any votes from the Right. Town by town,

ARENA's votes were the sum of those cast for other rightist

presidential candidates the first time. The votes that made the

difference came from those who had not voted in the previous

round. I won because we had a better turnout.

Our largest share of the vote came in the cities, not the

countryside. D'Aubuisson used these statistics to say he won ten

1

I

AL -
202 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

out of fourteen provinces. Just after the election, he launched

another campaign publicizing his complaints, trying to erase the

fact that he had lost. D'Aubuisson is not the type of man to

tolerate being beaten fairly. With false figures and wild

denunciations, he claimed he really won the election. Only

hours before the Central Election Council was to formally

present to me the official certificate saying I had won the

presidency, D'Aubuisson demanded that the election be

annulled. We also uncovered a plot to kill me that day.

Military intelligence sources heard that the assassination

plot was to be carried out on May 16, the day I was to receive

the certificate designating me as president in a small ceremony

at the National Theater. The American Embassy also learned of

the plot, which included the assassination of U.S. Ambassador

Thomas Pickering as well. The information from the embassy

coincided with ours on several points. First, the assassins

planned to use A high-powered rifle with a telescopic sight.

shooting when I entered or left the theater. Therefore, I entered

from a side door, while Army sharpshooters were posted on the

roofs of all surrounding buildings. The assassins expected

another opportunity if I went into the streets to greet my

followers after becoming president. We had to cancel any

victory celebrations where I %ould join with people in the

streets....

The first Cabinet member I selected was the Defense

Minister, General Vides Casanova. Rey Prendes, Alejandro and

I had prepared a twenty-seven-point program on how the armed

forces should function. I had consulted four officers on my

plans. If Vides accepted my offer to be Defense Minister on the

basis of the twenty-seven-point plan, then he was the logical

choice. He had led the armed forces to conduct fair elections, he

had the support of the officers corps. His presence in the

government would inspire confidence within the armed forces.

When I asked him to be my defense minister, Vides

responded, "I want to tell you that I've never felt a duty to you.

only to the armed forces. But you've offered me the Defense

Ministry and I will accept it to carry out faithfully the twentyseven-point plan." He has repeated this to the officers when
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 203

there have been accusations that I try to manipulate the armed

forces. Vides stressed his loyalty to the democratic program, not

to me.

The most important part of this program was controlling

the death squads and stopping the abuses by officers. Some of

them had to be removed, disciplined or investigated internally. I

was determined to pursue by every legal means, those

responsible for crimes such as the Viera-Hammer-Pearlman

murders. We agreed that when there was solid evidence of

involvement, we would take action no matter who was accused.

Finally we talked about the military structure, and although it

was not popular, I decided to separate Army and police

functions into two subsecretaries of the Defense Ministry. My

choice of Colonel L6pez Nuila to head the police forces had to

overcome resistance because it placed him on an equal status

with higher-ranking officers. L6pez Nu-'la became the

Undersecretary for Public Security, managing the National

Police, the National Guard and the Treasury Police.

It is almost unbelievable how much was at stake in the

selection of the Cabinet. We were trying for a social pact to

bring as many different groups into the government as possible.

The private enterprise sector was brought into the economic

ministries. In order not to weaken the Christian Democratic

presence in the National Assembly, I planned not to draw on

any legislator, but a delegation of the party wore me out with

their arguments.

My decision to offer Fidel Chdvez Mena the Planning

Ministry caused an uproar in the party. My supporters did not

think he or his allies should be included in the government. But

I wanted a government of reconciliation, tolerance and peace for

the nation. The best place to start was within my own party. He

was reluctant at first, then accepted....

Once I had chosen the officials of my Administration, there

had to be a clear understanding of what I expected from them. I

spoke to each one individually, and all of them together. I laid

out my plan for our government and the five goals:

humanization, pacification, democratization, participation and

economic reactivation.

0$ mmm mmm mm • -
204 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-The elections were a

success, in that they were closely watched internationally and

generally came up to the standards of the international observers

who came to see them. I think a lot of people came expecting to

see the kind of demise of El Salvador and in a sense went back

home tremendously impressed by the degree to which the

Salvadoran public was prepared to support the elections. The

public supported the elections because they were so exhausted

by the lack of any other alternative that they were willing to try

almost anything to try to end their own agony in the situation.

The success of Duarte and his own personality and his

capacity to deal with the Congress-which was really key to the

financing of all of these new activities-was important. The

government was able to at least maintain some basic economic

equilibrium in the face of all of this difficulty and disaster,

mainly because of fairly large inputs on the order of 200 to 300

million dollars a year in U.S. economic assistance. This gave

them an opportunity also at least to deal in a defensive way and

in a stabilizing way (as opposed to a very forward, go-ahead growth-oriented way) with the economic problems and a

capacity to move ahead slowly and inexorably in dealing with

the question of human rights abuses.

Impact of the Democratic Process

on the FMLN

Miguel Castellanos-We [the guerrillas] saw that the political

project of Apaneca was being formed; that things were

marching right along; that the new Constitution, which would

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv. Israel, 25 August 1987.

Commandante Miguel Castellanos, former insurgent leader, 1973 to

1985, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 25 September 1987. As

quoted in Conversaciones con el Comandante Miguel Castellanos, edited by

Javier Rojas P. (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andante, 1986), pp. 105-106.

Copyright 1986 by Editorial Andante. Reprinted by permission of Editorial

Andante.
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 205

establish the juridical bases of the new order, was marching

right along. At that level it was a go, but the FMLN observed

that that project was marching right along the fringe of the

masas. It is true that there were elections in 1982, and the

people went to vote. Some explain that they went for fear of

being repressed, but they also admitted there was a middle class

sector of the population that went to the ballot boxes because

they thought there was a solution to the problem. The FMLN

also saw the disposition of the political parties-neither to

attack nor strike against the Christian Democrats as Romero and

Molina had once done. The petit- and movenne-bourgeoises saw

a way out of the conflict.

The FMLN pondered the situation of the municipalities in

the zones they controlled-they noticed that the people had not

participated in the elections. I would say that up to date, the

democratic process does not have any major influences in the

FMLN. The government continues to operate at an institutional

level: not at a level of the masas. With respect to the military,

the FMLN sees the Army going down the tubes. What remains

is political, and with the transferring of titles of land brought by

the reforms, it is given greater impulse.

C-5 Spokesperson-The Latin American guerrilla is a lousy

Leninist. Normally they are lousy in terms of understanding

what Lenin really said. Lenin thought of himself as a

subversive, first and foremost. That means you subvert from

within. Sure you always use terrorism, sure you have your

guerrillas-you need guerrillas, you need violence-but they

are a complement to another subversive effort. I don't think the

guerrillas in most Latin American countries understand that. It

goes against machismo or something. Again they violated

Leninist principles of subversion when they boycotted the

elections. The FDR should have come back and taken part. That

would have really produced a crisis. Then you would have the

C-5 is the joint civil-military staff of El Salvador. The C-5 spokesperson.

whose name and position were withheld by request of the individual and with

the concurrence of responsible U.S. and Salvadoran officials, was interviewed

in San Salvador, El Salvador, 28 September 1987.
206 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

right-wing element saying, "Wait a minute. We can't have the

FDR taking part in the elections."

By taking part in the elections, they could have really

destroyed the elections, if they would have had the brains to do

that. Instead they boycotted the elections, and they machinegunned people standing in lines in the elections. They blew up

election booths. They had a violent, overt negative reaction to

the elections, and they set themselves up. What happened? The

Salvadoran people by the millions voted.

The elections, most definitely, were depressing for the

guerrillas. Actually there was something else. While it was

depressing for the guerrillas, it really stoked the Army. I visited

San Francisco Gotera with Ernesto, the former guerrilla

commander who operated in Morazdn at the time of the

elections with orders to stop the elections.

I also went there with a guy who is now a captain but at

that time as a young lieutenant right out of the military academy

had orders to protect the elections. It was a unique experience

that I could be there with these two guys, This was in '87, and

they were looking back on the elections. I don't know if they

were in '82, or '84, but they were both in Morazan, one trying

to stop the elections, one trying to protect the elections. They

were both sitting there talking together about what they both did

during that election period.

The captain, at that time a lieutenant, was in San Francisco

Gotera, and he said the peasants came in from the hills to vote

and the guerrillas attacked the town during the elections, during

the voting period. He was a young guy so he was kind of

excited, coming under fire. He had his men take their fighting

positions, and there was a fire fight. He said the civilians all

threw themselves on the ground, instinctively. There was a little

short fire fight, and then after the shooting stopped the civilians

got up and got back in line. That happened more than once, and

then the shooting started again, and civilians all threw

themselves on the ground or took cover, and then when the

shooting stopped, they got up and they got back in line. Mao

and Marx and all these guys talk about the will of the people,

but this was really it. This was a really palpable demonstration

n mnnm ms • nIwinnniinn umn nmav mvn mmninm -- - - i lnln 
MAJOR GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL ACTIONS 207

of the will of the people. The real popular will. What all the

Leninists are always talking about. This was it, this was the real

thing, not manufactured, not manipulated the way they do it.

This was authentic, genuine, popular desire for democracy, and

unfortunately it has been frustrated, but that is another story.

But at that time they had a great deal of faith, in that they

wanted democracy. They wanted change.

The lieutenant said that, seeing this display of courage by

unarmed civilians and this commitment, and nobody was

forcing them to, despite all the propaganda to the contrary,

nobody could force a peasant to come out of the hills of

Morazin and go to Gotera and do anything if he doesn't want

to. But they did it. They did it voluntarily. He told me, "It

made my hair stand on end. It made shivers go up and down my

spine to see these civilians do this, masses of them." He also

said that, "For the first time I felt a unity of the Army with the

people. I am protecting an activity that the people want. The

people obviously want elections and I am here protecting them

and I am part of this."

This was the first time he said that he, as a young officer,

felt unity with the people. It was a new feeling, it was totally

new. That says something about the Army before. He says there

was a new and exciting feeling and a change. It really brought

home to him the message that gets repeated in all the

propaganda, but to a lot of people it rings hollow. To him it was

really true. He said, "We are here serving the people. We are

the protectors of the people for real and in very palpable

concrete terms." That kind of colored his whole thinking about

his role, the role of the Army.

It made him feel good about the Army. Made him feel

good about himself and it gave him a great admiration for the

civilians. Conversely, the guerrillas are seeing this great popular

display against them. It was demoralizing to them. In terms of

that, we have this situation of demoralization. We have the

democratic improvement. We have the promulgation of the war.

However, you still have this hatred for the soldiers and this fear

of reprisal. My point has been that the Army changed its

behavior. That's fine, but images don't change from one year to

I l IIl in= Iii imi illli ~mBIli l --
208 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

the other. The change I'm talking about actually came about

pretty quickly. I would say from '83 to '85. We are talking

about a major change accomplished in two-three years. In terms

of institutions, that is lightning quick. Look at the civil rights

movement in the United States and the civil rights laws. We

even make a lot of demands on our allies, and I think the

Salvadorans have produced and we don't appreciate it. They

have changed, rapidly, but the American press and American

public opinion just does not want to recognize it.

Subsequent Election

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L~pez Nuila-During his [Magafia]

provisional government they had new elections. The winning

party, the Christian Democratic party, did not win the

presidential elections by a majority; therefore, a second election

was needed. In the second election, President Duarte won by

almost 53.6 percent. With this percentage he was elected

President of the Republic and began to govern the nation on I

June '84. However, the opposition seems to have the leading

part in the Assembly. Then, in 1985 they had new elections for

deputies. With these elections Duarte was able to choose 33

deputies. With this he obtained a majority in the Assembly in

order to be able to govern. Since 1979, we have had four clean,

free elections.

During these four elections there was considerable increase

in participation by the Salvadoran electorate. This has probably

been the greatest proof by which the people have shown support

for the political project, the government, and the armed forces.

We have always understood why the people massively

supported the elections. We took it as a reference indicating that

the people preferred to be governed by the democratic parties

rather than the leftist parties. The option was definitely for a

democracy.

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila. Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.

!U
Armed Forces Change

and National Plan

Development

The State of the Army in 1982

Dr. Alvaro Magafta-In 1982 (and even in 1983), everyone

believed that the Salvadoran Army was an army that fought

from 9 to 5. When I went to Washington to visit President

Reagan, I was asked about that, and I tried to explain to them

that it was not true. Unfortunately, there was a lot of truth to it.

There was a lot of truth to that because we didn't have enough

troops to fight 24 hours a day. That is, if we were going to fight

24 hours a day we needed one soldier fighting 12 hours and

another fighting the other 12 hours. Therefore, the first

limitation we had was not having enough soldiers to fight 24

hours a day. Secondly, during 1982, the guerrilla forces were

very strong. I think they had probably close to 12,000 men at

the time. Their presence ranged not only from Morazdn and

Chalatenango but also in La Paz and Usulutin. Except for the

western part of the country, it seemed they had control of most

of the areas.

Dr. Alvaro Magazia, provisional President of the Republic of El Salvador,

1982 to 1984, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 18 December 1986

and 30 June 1987.

209
210 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

It was very difficult if we needed to have a military operation

in Morazin. We had to move troops from Sonsonate for that

operation. We didn't have any helicopters. We were extremely

limited. In San Miguel, La Uni6n, and in Gotera you could easily

need an operation of 5,000 to 7,000 men. We ourselves had only

5,000 to 7,000 in the entire area; we couldn't do it. The Army was

criticized a lot for that reason. It was said that the Army did not

want to fight. That's not true. I think the Army has always wanted

to fight because that is its function. Our Army had only 400 to 500

officers at the time.

The guerrillas were unable to convince our officers to join

their forces, with the exception of the case in Santa Ana of

Captain Sandoval and two other Army doctors, Cruz and

Navarrete, and one other officer I can't recall. Even if they tried to

convince a soldier and in some cases due to family ties-a brother

who might have been a guerrilla-they were not very successful.

The most a soldier would have done was to pass on information

but never significant enough to have a cuartel turned over to the

guerrillas. Those were the issues I was worried about in 1982.

1 feared a mutiny within the cuarteles, but fortunately that

never happened. That shows two things: first, the Army was not in

such bad shape. That is, there was discipline and determination on

the part of the officers to avoid something like that. It is possible

that there would have been certain minor incidents but never

serious ones. And secondly, the guerrillas were incapable of

convincing them. That is important, too. They were never able to

convince them to join their forces. Therefore, as a result of the

unsuccessful turnout of the final offensive, the guerrillas decided

to prolong the war.

Professionahzing the

Armed Forces

General Juan Bustillo-Unlike our armed forces, the

Salvadoran guerrillas were receiving tremendous support. Our

General Juan Bustillo. Chief of Salvadoran Air Force. 1979 to date.

interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 21 January 1987.

I
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 211

armed forces had very little equipment. We faced two major

problems. First, we had very few personnel, and second, we did

not have the capability or the training to confront a subversive

force. These subversive forces were not created in one day.

Gradually, they had been acquiring certain characteristics we ignored in the past precisely because we were not capable of dealing

with it. We did not have the necessary training for combat and we

lacked a fundamental element: enough trained personnel in order

to obtain information and intelligence from the enemy. Therefore,

those who executed the operation in the armed forces lacked information and adequate intelligence. We just did not have that

capability.

I think that neither our officers nor our troops should be

blamed for this. I think that the former high-ranking officers in the

military did not take on the responsibility to provide us with the

necessary preparation and skill to confront a problem like we have

today. Maybe it was due to the fact that we were not as experienced, that we were not really in command of the units, but

we ignored the situation and believed the occasional reports that

the insurgents were under control.

We were told the intelligence officers had knowledge of

every move the insurgents made. We found out later on this was

not true because when we younger officers took hold of the situation after the 15 October coup, we had to deal with the problems

in the streets and up in the mountains. We acquired a lot of

experience that way. But it wasn't an experience that was left

behind by the former military officers. They left us with a lot of

problems and grievances and without the knowledge that the insurgents had been trained and heavily equipped by other countries.

We had to start improvising and dealing with this internal

problem in El Salvador, which was not just a military problem but

also a political, economic, social, and international problem. We

lacked credibility in our government and armed forces and,

therefore, had to begin to rebuild our armed forces and

institutional prestige and credibility within the international world.

Our struggle was not only in dealing with the insurgents.

We had a lot of internal and external pressures that required us

to build a professional armed forces. That was very difficult. It

I n IN mu n •I nto• • nu--I nnn mnnn 
212 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

has taken us a lot of time to gain our prestige in the eyes of the

world. Our former officers left us with tremendous socioeconomic and political chaos, and when we came in after the 15

October coup we had to start from scratch. It was a social

explosion. And even with our very limited human and materiel

resources we started looking for solutions to these problems.

Changes in Leadership

Colonel John Cash-Around May Vides took over as Minister

of Defense and many things began to change. He started an

effort to have people become more amenable to human rights,

which was very successful. He began to make himself visible by

visiting all the cuarteles, something that Garcia never did unless

there were TV cameras. That did a lot to improve things for the

Salvadorans. And when Ambassador Pickering came, he had a

different orientation than Ambassador Hinton. He was just as

professional in a different kind of way. He began to work

closely with the Salvadorans. The military and political reforms

began to happen which made his job easier. November of '84 is

when the Salvadorans probably did the most important thing to

put them on a winning track. They started to get rid of the dead

wood we'd been telling them about for months. That's when

they put in Monterosa. With a hot shot strategist like

Monterosa, who I'd put up against any American hot shot,

things began to happen, and it began to make a difference in the

theater.

Vice-President Bush's Visit

Provokes a Change

General Adolfo Bland6n--In my opinion, the importance of

Vice-President Bush's visit to El Salvador was his specific

Colonel John Cash, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador. 1981 to 1983.

interviewed in Washington, D.C., 20 March 1987.

General Adolfo Onecffero Bland6n, Chief of Staff of Salvadoran Armed

Forces. 1984 to date. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 21 July 1987

and 26 September 1987.
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 213

worries concerning the human rights situation in El Salvador

and the forceful manner in which he spoke to us at the residence

of the President of the Republic. The Minister of Defense, the

rest of the high military command, other representatives of the

military units were all at the house.

We noticed how concerned Vice-President Bush was with

respect to the human rights situation. We told him that we were

making great efforts to have the military units and the security

forces initiate a campaign in favor of human rights. I believe his

visit provoked a change. Little by little this change has

continued to effectively materialize, to such a degree that last

year we've accomplished a major success in that El Salvador

was recognized for its advances made in the area of human

rights. Vice-President Bush commented that he had some

specific cases, but he did not mention them.

We all understood that U.S. support for this waraccording to his opinion--could only be continued if we had a

comprehensive program and understood what it meant, in the

current situation, to respect the human being's integrity and to

respect people's property.

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham Ill-After November, when

the next general order came out, Vides cleaned house. Rubio

came in from Chalatenango and took over as the D-2 [Army

Intelligence]. He's a super guy. Monterosa went to the 3rd

Brigade. Rodriguez Morcio went into San Vicente. He was kind

of a big mover. Ochoa went to the States. Cruz stayed in

Morazin, and we started to consolidate.

Vice-President Bush's showing up at this time was really

an ultimatum to the military. But it also served to strengthen

Vides' hand at a time when he was pretty weak. He just had

kicked over the tanda system* in effect, not completely, but he

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham Il1, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1983 to 1984. interviewed in Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania. 29

May 1985.

*Tanda system-Groupings formed at the Military Academy and

maintained throughout one's career. They exert great influence over decisions

affecting the military and sometimes have been known to attempt to influence

the political process.
214 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

really did some dramatic things, and it strengthened him. So

much so that when the devastating attack in El Paraiso happened

three weeks later and the Crucal6n bridge went down on New

Year's morning, everybody turned and said, "This was going to

go anyway." Vides said, "Yes, but I have the support I need

from the U.S. mission, and I need your support. If you don't do

it, this is going to happen again." In other words, he said that

this was a good example of what was going to happen if we

didn't get this thing turned around-and get it turned around

real fast. So, he turned it in his favor, building up on the VicePresident's visit. Fortuitously, a week after the Crucal6n bridge,

the guerrillas attacked Chalatenango and were thrown out. From

that point, it was all up hill-that's the turnaround point.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-In part, it was almost a

clear sense of impending doom if they didn't. They were

beginning to stare real defeat in the face, and for many of them

it meant the loss of their country and maybe the loss of their

lives, certainly the loss of their families. Some may have gotten

out, some may have not. Also, an increasing confidence that the

United States was prepared to stay the course with them and to

be with them throughout this process. And an increasing sense,

as they succeeded from time to time, that they could do the job.

And a feeling that training, new ideas, new dedication, and hard

work on their own side could make a difference. Also a feeling

that corruption, political misbehavior, human rights abuses, and

all of those kinds of things threatened the very support that they

required in order to survive. That was certainly brought home

by the Bush visit in a very real way.

I think that at least the vision of the visit that VicePresident Bush made was an important psychological turning

point both in the attitude of the military toward their continued

capacity to operate in the ways in which they had in the past and

those in the military who wanted to end the abuses suddenly had

the strong sense that they had very high-level allies in the U.S.

administration.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 August 1987.
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 215

I think, particularly the fact that the Reagan administration

put down a hard, firm marker, perhaps for the first time, as to

exactly how it felt, it no longer had the attitude that there may

have been some bad guys, but they were strongly antiCommunists, and therefore, they were our bad guys, and they

ought to be tolerated. Perhaps the situation had gotten bad

enough that they could become the seeds of the destruction of

the whole policy if they weren't turned around, and therefore, a

high-level commitment by somebody like Bush made sense at

the time when it came.

Recognizing the Need for Change

Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce-We understand the function of

the armed forces in a democratic society is to provide support in

giving impetus to the democratic process. But one of the most

significant advancements made during these past years has been

to create an image for ourselves in the eyes of the international

world as a respecter of human rights and a terminator of abuses

inflicted on the people by governmental authorities. We must

face the fact that we were, at one time, responsib!'e for the

brutalities and ill-treatment imposed on the citizens of this

country. I repeat, the support and impetus given to the

democratic process and the socio-economic reforms were

essential.

Major Changes for the Armed Forces

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova-In order for our

armed forces to survive this period, our first major goal focused

on dealing with the people. We needed to know what were their

Colonel Ren6 Emilio Ponce. former C-3 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces

and now Commander of the Third Brigade, interviewed in San Salvador. El

Salvador, 22 January 1987.

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova. Salvadoran Minister of

Defense, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 19

December 1987.

d

'I
216 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

anxieties, their complaints, their motivations, their needs. We

also needed to understand and accept that we were part of these

people. They gave us their full support, and we in turn had to

defend them against the attacks by the subversive forces. We

needed to give them the guarantee that they would be able to

freely elect their own leaders, and we needed to treat them as

humanly as possible.

What had to be done, and has

been done to some degree, was to

establish some sort of reference point

from where we could act in the

future. That is to say that the armed

forces established the following

points before the entire nation. It was

'I",, a calling made to the future officers

that were graduating and

subsequently, the entire armed

X. forces.

First, the eminent professionalism in the military field was

COPREFA understanding the roots and the

General Carlos objective reality of this war in order

Eugenio Vides Casanova to establish an efficient organization

to win. We needed to have truly professional military men that

would not only excel but also understand that part of the

problem that we are dealing with today is due to the social.

economic, and political problems. And, understanding that we

had to respond to the insurgents' attacks, not only at the military

level, but also at the national level.

Second, re-establish discipline as a fundamental pillar to

support our entire Army without any leniency or deception,

whatsoever. There had always been discipline within the armed

forces, but following the 15 October coup we had a divided

army, to the extent that each half would confront each other

violently. We needed to reinstitute one of the basic pillars to

maintain stability, and we have successfully managed this. We

have done this without leniency, without any exceptions. In

many cases this has been necessary not only from the military
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 217

point of view but also with respect to the human rights situation.

Third, we had a divided Army. My duty was then to

restrengthen the unity of the armed forces and the nation as one

group, rejecting all internal and external influence. For a long

time now we have been receiving a lot of attacks from overseas,

attacks from within the armed forces, and attacks from political

factions attempting to set a coup d'etat. A divided armed forces

was completely vulnerable to these attacks.

Our responsibility was to reunite the armed forces. First,

because there was a country we had to save; second, because we

needed to save our own institution; and third, because we had

an obligation to serve and defend the people of this country. 

I

want to confess to you that I did not always think that way.

During the first years I was in a more difficult position. I did

not oppose the agrarian reform, but I was not a fanatic of it

either.

My mentality changed, however, and I started to realize

that there sh,,uld not be any hatred among the people of this

country. When I opposed the reforms I was opposing the way

they had been created. I tried to find some justice behind them.

I was thinking more in terms of national unity and the

institutional unity than I was in sharing land. However,

throughout this entire ordeal I have supported these reforms as 

a

necessity but not necessarily as a vocation.

Fourth, the patriotism that will be expressed in the honesty,

abnegation, and sacrifice by the individual when performing his

duties. Honesty and sacrifice are needed in order for us to lead

our soldiers into combat and, overall, to be able to stay alive in

this war. This has not been easy, but we have managed to

survive for the last seven years when no one, at first, believed

we would.

Fifth, a strong vigilance in the fulfillment of our political

program, assumed and demonstrated by the collective

citizenship throughout the civic struggle for peace. Looking for

the path of reason in order to attain justice. There had already

been elections for a national Constituent Assembly. This was

the first step the armed forces took in order to obtain

}g

a

o.
218 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

conciliation from all the Salvadorans and to establish in the

political constitution, the rules of the game for which we were

each held responsible.

There was representation from different political parties in

this Constituent Assembly, and you could say that the Right had

a majority with respect to the votes. This meant that if there had

been any previous injustice they could balance a constitution

that, to my knowledge, fulfills all of the requirements. It also

has the possibility of being reformed during two terms of the

Assembly, in the event that something does not work out in the

future. This has had some considerable effect on the situation of

El Salvador. The people decided to go to the ballot boxes and

cast their votes under pressures and threats posed by the

guerrillas rather than to support them. The people would rather

fight through for a democratic system. Our obligation to the

people was, "We aren't going to let them down. We are going

to prove to everyone that the armed forces supports the

democratic system."

Sixth, complete support to the central government of the

Republic in its effort toward national unity. At that time Dr.

Alvaro Magafia Borja was Interim President. He created a plan,

APANECA, in which he attempted to involve all of the

different political parties. He issued several government

projects, and we supported them because this was a first attempt

to try and unite the people. Our duty was to unite the armed

forces and cooperate in the effort to reunite the country.

Seventh, complete support to the democratization process,

understanding it to be the incorporation of all of the national

forces and sectors in the conflict, including those "civilized"

disputes that originate in the ideological field and doctrinaire

principles. Disputes that can only be disselved if there is peace

and mutual respect between the people. We then assumed that,

with these efforts, we had already taken our first steps toward

an initial democratic process. Our second step was to support

the following: (1) maintain a strong armed forces, (2) maintain a

separate boundary from politics, and (3) the armed forces was to

support the democratic process. The support to the central

government materialized when President Duarte took power.
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 219

Eighth, a watchful and vigilant process through which the

social changes established by the armed forces, since the 15

October coup d'etat, could materialize and provide the truthful

and just benefits of a democracy for our people. This meant that

if the armed forces had provided the 15 October reforms without

thinking twice about it, we were giving our solemn word that

these reforms were going to be maintained according to what

was established in the democratic process. That meant that if the

Assembly accepted it into the constitution we would defend

that, and if the Assembly rejected it we would also defend that.

We were basically telling the Assembly that they held

maximum authority for establishing rules of the game for our

people. We let the Assembly work at this, and the political

constitution was approved. The reforms that had been somewhat

modified, some in favor, others have at least remained in

writing, allowed for these reforms to be shaped and

incorporated into the most important document of the political

constitution. We were always thinking about the needs of the

people and not of the personal needs of a specific group or

individual.

Ninth, a profound and truthful position of respect from the

high command and, accordingly, from all the armed forces

toward human rights and all the Salvadoran people. No longer

because of external demands, but because of personal

conviction.

I believe that when many people heard about these nine

points they thought of demagogy. I knew of the implications of

these nine points-the responsibility and the effort which had to

be made in order to make them work. It was an extremely

difficult task to perform because I, individually, had to make

sure this was going to be successful. Unfortunately, it was not

to be a direct effort by the entire armed forces. While I

remained as Minister of Defense I was going to make sure that

every word behind these nine points was to be accomplished,

not only because I thought it as something basic, but because I

knew it was the only way to save this country and our own

institution--the Army.
220 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

Changes for the Security Forces

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila-1 will begin by

pointing out those situations which the people probably refer to

as products of change and of the effort that it has taken at any

given time. The most important thing is probably the work that

has been accomplished since 15 October of '79 in which we

received totally run-down, extremely unprofessional, and

incompetent police corps. Those were the circumstances we had

to confront from the first day and without the aid of the United

States. We then had to basically start from scratch, without any

resources-human, materiel-but with a strong determination

and precise objective to undertake the necessary changes.

I have talked about the fundamental issues of maintaining

public security forces, to have the police combat common

delinquency. But, in addition we have the additional need to

combat terrorist delinquency. This means we had to exert an

extra effort. But we have successfully made that effort, which is

an effort for change. We have tried to introduce new attitudes in

the minds of each policeman, each guard, as opposed to what

they used to be. That is, a new attitude, completely professional

with a clear concept as to what is really important in his line of

work within the community, what we classified as the social

function of the public security forces. That has been a very

difficult job, which we've managed to accomplish successfully.

There has been a substantial change, and we haven't really

noticed it because we are part of it, but the people outside have

noticed it. It is the people who have noticed this change and

have allowed us to establish a certain dynamic for change that

has favored us and helped us take on the initiative in seeking the

best way to professionalize our forces in order to maintain peace

and offer the best security for our people. This peace and this

security are also based on the respect for human rights for these

people. That is fundamental for us. That is our motivation and

incentive for doing our job.

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 221

Change in Focus: In Spite of

Who's Eketed

Colonel Oscar Campos Anaya-You see our army has

changed for the positive. Many people have changed because

they've understood the need for a democratic country. But,

unfortunately, many people want us to learn these lessons in a

rapid and simple way. You know that all the countries and

peoples of the world have had to endure pain and suffering,

warfare, walking long stretches dragging chains, and dragging

vices inherited through previous generations, in order to achieve

what they have presently. That is the procedure for a democratic

country. Unfortunately, we are at the beginning stage, but the

Army has behaved itself throughout this process of change.

We are more respectful of human rights, and we want to

continue this process, not only with respect to human rights, but

also with respect to the legally elected government and free

elections. And that is what we'll continue to do in spite of who

is elected to our government. We will respect the will of the

people because that is the focal point from which a democracy

should flourish. We believe the Army has matured

tremendously. The current policy gives us the right to always be

able to respond to anyone who attacks us. Unfortunately. many

mistakes are made, but "to err is human." We are not

machines. Many people would like all of us in the military to be

perfect, unfortunately.

Perfect just like them. But unfortunately, this is a very

difficult world we live in, and who has the right to throw stones

at someone else? The crystal ball will be viewed and interpreted

differently, regardless if you are inside of it or not. If I am

inside the crystal ball, I will view it one way, and he who is

outside will see it differently, and vice versa. I believe that

mutual respect and the way in which each of us throughout the

world tries to help the other improve the countries and the

making of nations are key ingredients in this process.

Colonel Oscar Rodolfo Campos Anaya. former Fifth Brigade Commander

and now First Brigade Commander, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador,

21 July 1987.
222 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

Origins of the National Plan

General Wallace H. Nutting-At some point we ought to

acknowledge the importance of the National Plan. I called it a

campaign plan.

We should have been conducting campaign planning. In

my view, that's an appropriate orientation. Deane Hinton didn't

know what I was talking about, and he called it National Plan.

He opposed that kind of an effort for quite a few months but

finally agreed that we could do that sort of thing.

You may recall, the Mil Group was not capable of doing

that and doing everything else they had to do. That was another

reason I was trying to put an intelligence and an operationally

oriented officer in the Mil Group and to reinforce with

appropriate skills at the right times from USSOUTHCOM. To

help the Salvadorans develop a campaign plan, that was the next

step to take after Woerner helped develop the strategic

appreciation and force structure.

We then had to come to grips with the force development

actions that Woemer recommended, along with the doctrine and

all the functional capabilities, and sew the thing together in

terms of political-military objectives in El Salvador. I don't

know whether it was suspicion or reluctance (for whatever

reason) on the part of the U.S. Embassy to allow the military to

undertake that effort.

When we finally did get the Ambassador's concurrence to

proceed, he would not allow USSOUTHCOM to participate,

and it had to be done from the Mil Group. Waghelstein was

there by then, and we were able to provide Stevenson and a

couple other officers from USSOUTHCOM to work with them

from time to time. They worked under the Ambassador's very

close supervision.

I could hardly put any guidance into the pot, except what I

could give directly to the Mil Group commander. Of course the

National Plan (so-called) originally had a narrow focus on

UsulutAn and San Vicente. That was all right with me. It was

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command. 1979 to 1983. interviewed in Orlando. Florida, 29 January 1987.
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 223

sensible on the ground to prioritize and execute the campaign plan

with a narrow focus. Obviously, even that was a hell of a job.

Again, relationships with the Salvadorans by that time were more

positive than intra-U.S. relationships.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-By mid-1983, the

improvements began to have an effect. New commanders, new

training facilities, newly trained units, and better inter-service

cooperation contributed to a growing optimism among the

Salvadorans. The military assets necessary for conducting a

comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign were now available.

Assuming all the organizational force structure and personnel

problems noted could be remedied, the problem of focus

remained. The Salvadoran military was still preoccupied with

killing the guerrillas and little understood that this aspect of the

war was incidental to winning popular support and ultimately the

war.

So we started asking all those painful questions. We also

started asking about the government's campaign plan. Initially

there was no plan, and we kept telling them that the secret is

popular support. The guerrillas are targeting the economy, and

there is only one way you can combat that-and it isn't by

multibattalion sweeps in northern Morazdn. We weren't, however,

getting through. The military was not about to change its direction

on our say-so. What we needed was presidential clout, and that's

why we ended up briefing Minister Garcfa and President Magafia.

The briefing, organized in the form of a discussion of

options, was held at the high command on 2 February 1983. It

was attended by President Magafia, Ambassador Hinton,

General Woerner, General Garcia (the Minister of Defense),

selected members of the U.S. country teams, Military Group

personnel, and key Salvadoran military leaders. The objective

was to explore together how to proceed with the war. What we

did was pick up from where the Woerner Report left off and run

in the direction that it pointed. The outcome of these discussions

was a presidential directive to the military and the civilian

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.

I
224 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

ministries to establish a joint military-civilian entity to plan,

execute, and coordinate a plan in the two key departments of

San Vicente and Usulutin.

The National Campaign Plan placed emphasis on civic

action and developmental projects behind a security screen. This

is a radical departure from the purely military, multibattalion

operations extant prior to the Plan.

Government Priorities Tended to

Go in Other Directions

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-All of us felt that there

ought to have been a kind of integrated economic development

and combined defense and military effort to be worked out over

a long period of time. To try to develop some concept of this,

we needed to involve things like integration of military

operations, civilian defense, and economic development. We

found an enormous incapacity in the government at all levels to

deal with this, both conceptually and practically. The issue

broke down constantly because government priorities tended to

go in other directions. They tended to see a large share of the

activities in a purely military sense on the one hand, or purely

political on the other.

There were times when conflicts among parties and

individuals tended to determine where resources might go.

There were such overwhelming needs for resources that the

resources we were able to bring to bear often didn't make a

major dent in the development area. Often the guerrillas would

find opportunities to disrupt or spoil those kinds of approaches.

But some progress actually was made. Up in Chalatenango

things moved ahead, and we got new roads open and new areas

under relative control, not perfect control. And some of the

other marginal areas in the center of the country, some of the

key departments that had been pretty much besieged, began to

open up their activities a little more when roads became more

Ambassador Thomas Pickering. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985. interviewed in Tel Aviv. Israel. 25 August 1987.

A
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 225

passable. Then as the guerrillas shifted and tried to expand their

activities, they tried to put the western part of the country in

more danger and were relatively successful in doing it. They

tried urban operations in the towns. There the government

forces had more success against guerrilla operations than the

guerrillas had against the government. But that floated up and

down.

In the eastern part of the country there was more success in

dealing with guerrilla activities in the populated areas where

they had become relatively more isolated. Even then the

government was having the first opportunities to move up into

Morazdn against the border even though they were not able to

completely control it or to do much in terms of big strikes of

great success against major guerrilla areas of lodgment or to

cement things against supply bases. There was some success

against the supply activities, some in an intelligence sense, but

they were always very tough to deal with both against what we

believed were seaborne supply activities as well as overland,

across the Honduran border. That was the effort.

Evolution of the Plan

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Ldpez Nuila-We began in 1983,

with a plan for the area of San Vicente. That plan was meant to

bring the areas under control that had been traditionally under

subversive forces and to install a security system in those areas

so the people that once lived there could return and start a new

life. The plan was designed to develop the economy and at the

same time re-establish those public services that had been

destroyed. The plan worked out very well in San Vicente. We

later wanted to extend it into Usulutfn, but unfortunately we did

not have the means to do so.

Beginning with this year 119871 a new plan was to be

implemented, and we were supposedly counting on U.S. aid to

accomplish this. The plan was called Unidos Para Reconstruir

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila. Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador. 1984 to date. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.

i

II

S iimmum n 

m
226 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

[United to Reconstruct]. The objectives for this plan were the

same as the previous one, however, at a national level. It would

create once again the local authority's entire infrastructure. The

local public services' infrastructure; that is, creating once again

the population centers so they could turn into production

centers-agricultural, industrial, agro-industrial, or commercial.

But unfortunately, since the earthquake, this situation has

worsened, and the country's economic condition, being as bad

as it was, did not help.

Status of the Plan at

the End of 1984

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham 111-The National Plan was a

well conceived, carefully thought out program largely

engineered by John Waghelstein and Jim Hallums, massaged,

worked to a great degree with Ambassador Deane Hinton.

Additionally, an important role was played by General Fred

Woerner. Once they had it all put together, they briefed it to

President Magafia himself. He approved the concept. It

contained regional coordination centers, with all the civilian and

military actors, as well as a force development program. It was

initially based on taking advantage of interior lines. Thus, with

the rainy season coming on, initial emphasis was placed on San

Vicente Province, which had less economic value but which

was closer to San Salvador than Usulutdn. (Although Usulutin

had played a strong psychological pivotal role in the history of

El Salvador.)

At the advent the Army and key social segments all went to

the field. They trained and operated together. Initially, it went

pretty well. They had people working on the staff in San

Vicente, the National Planning staff, the students from the Staff

College. They were a real bright bunch of guys and really had a

good hold of what needed to be done. Emphasis was placed on

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham 111, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1983 to 1984, interviewed in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 29

May 1985.
ARMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 227

the developmental aspect as opposed to the military parameter

alone, with the acknowledgment that you couldn't develop

anything if you didn't have security. At that time the U.S.

Mission's attitude toward the National Plan was that it was

primarily an economic developmental initiative, with the El

Salvadoran military insisting they should be in complete control

with their managerial expertise. The problem, of course, was

that the military went ahead, all over the country, seizing the

initiative.

The El Salvadoran Armed Forces got way out in front of

the developmental aspect of the plan, perhaps too far out in

front. They outstripped their own capability as far as support

systems were concerned. However, they couldn't keep going

forward. In the military arena, if you aren't going forward, you

start going backwards quickly. There was no plan for

compensating for the fact that the civilian initiative was

necessarily going to move slower, and at the same time the

military had to keep going ahead or lose the initiative.

Importance of the Plan

General John R. Galvin-First of all, the most important

event was the one that culminated in the National Plan, the UPR

[Unidos Para Reconstruir-United to Reconstruct]. Now, as we

worked toward that plan, a number of things happened, many of

which were setbacks and some of which were successes. In

general, it would be laid out like this. First, there was the

statement by Joaquin Villalobos that indeed the Marxist

guerrillas had been forced to move back to small unit operations

and that the promise of early success on their part was out. And

during most of the two years, the guerrillas indeed found

themselves reeling back from the pressure that had been put on

them by the military. But we recognized that that could be only

a temporary thing.

General John R. Galvin, Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command, 1985 to 1987, interviewed in Mons, Belgium, 18 August 1987.
228 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

The guerrillas, although they were pushed back, broke

down into smaller groups so that they could put more energy

and effort into proselytizing the people-into what they call

"conscientization"-working on the political conscience of the

people. In other words, trying to make Marxists out of the

people, trying to exploit every weakness that the Salvadoran

government had, e.g., its indifference to the people. Now,

basically that is what the guerrillas worked on during the whole

two-year period. They kept trying to recruit and build the

political infrastructure of Marxism in the country.

Now, we started to oppose that and tried to destroy that by

building the democratic infrastructure of the country. The ability

of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Transportation

and all the other ministries to serve the people-especially to

rebuild the economy of the country, which was vitally important

at the time-was not sufficient.

Additionally, we suffered certain setbacks. The first of

those was the Zona Rosa incident where the Marines were

killed. The second was the kidnapping of In6s Guadalupe.

Another was the austerity program that President Duarte had to

adopt in order to work the economic problem. Another was the

earthquake itself. Those were four strong setbacks, significant

difficulties with which the government had to deal. In each case

they caused some problems.

Also, President Duarte all along was not supported by

what we in the United States would call big business in El

Salvador, the businessmen. Because he is from the Christian

Democratic party and because he has a centralized view of how

to run the economy, the big businessmen rejected him and felt

that he did not create an environment in which they could

prosper. Duarte also had strong feelings of rejection for the

businessmen because they had left the country. In his opinion

they were all living in Miami, while the little businessman-the

man with the small shop on the corner of the street, the man

who sold fruit under a tent-was supporting the country. So, all

of those things mitigated against any smooth sailing for the plan

Unidos Para Reconstruir. However, because the military were

strongly successful throughout the period (although once in a
AMED FORCES CHANGE AND THE NATIONAL PLAN 229

while they suffered a setback or two), the military war went

well. However, we all recognized that the military war could not succeed unless the economic war, unless the war for the

education of the populace, and the many other wars also

succeeded.

j 4
li

Outside Efforts Aid

the Government

THE EDITORS--The period from the end of 1981 to the end

of 1984 demonstrates the multidimensional character of

modern conflict. The seemingly successful actions of

the insurgents against the government forces were the

most obvious aspects. Nevertheless, while the

insurgents were stressing the military dimension of the

struggle, the government cuncentrated on the strategic

dimension of gaining legitimacy and, thus, internal and

external support. Despite numerous military setbacks,

the armed forces were never totally defeated, and the

government was able to establish the necessary

credibility to attain the support it needed. The key to

success in this context was the outside effort which

enabled the government to upgrade and professionalize

the armed forces. External aid was admittedly

inconsistent and not as effective as it might have been,

but it made the difference between defeat and survival.

The Venezuelan Effort

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-Venezuelan Special Forces

Mobile Training Teams had trained two light Cazador battalions

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 23 February 1987.

231
232 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

in Salvador. There were a couple of reasons why they were

training these light battalions: First, during that time frame we

didn't have any money to train Salvadorans. All we had gotten

was the CRA [Congressional Continuing Resolution

Appropriation] of 25 million dollars to begin the fiscal year

with. Secondly, the Venezuelans are also Latins. They do a

good job. In some respects they are better at the job than we

are. The El Salvadorans seem to respond to the Venezuelans in

a pretty positive way. Being fellow Latins, there's a certain

commonality in the language that's not filtered out by any

mental translations and that sort of -hing. They knew their

business, and the thing that they brought with them was a

similar experience from the early sixties, in which they were

besieged and beset. We had helped them to train their Cazador

units, trained their light infantry units, and they in turn now are

passing on the expertise.

There are problems with third country training. At the risk

of stating the obvious, first, you've got to find a country in

whose national interest it is to support El Salvador. That doesn't

happen quite as easily as you might think. The Venezuelan

domestic political scene makes the Venezuelans vtry careful

about mobile training teams. They have to be very careful.

That's why to date it's been very hard to mobilize the third

country support. One of the reasons the Venezuelans are so

acceptable is they don't have an antidemocratic stigma as the

Chileans have. They have the democratic experience that's

worked now for 20 years plus. They are good at their job, and

the ideological connection between the Christian Democratic

party in El Salvador and their counterpart in Venezuela is also

very good.

Other than the Venezuelan Mobile Training Teams, whose

presence was revealed by some of our leaders at the most

inopportune time, there hasn't been a hell of a lot of support

from other Latin American countries in terms of materiel

support. Various schools throughout South American countries

have provided quotas for their schools. There's always a

handful of Salvadoran officers that are going to school in Chile

or Paraguay or Argentina or somewhere. The Taiwanese have
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 233

offered security assistance in various forms. The fact is,

Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa went to Taiwan for school

particularly during that period when we weren't doing anything

for El Salvador, when there wasn't a hell of a lot of support.

"Wolf."'

General Wallace H. Nutting-My estimate at the end of '82,

early '83, was that the whole thing was about to go down the

tubes. The leftist guerrillas in El Salvador were very strong. The

armed forces did not yet have their act together. We'd been

beating on them to improve their professional performance in

terms of communications, command and control, intelligence

activities, planning and executing operations, and the kind of

tactics that they had to use, to adopt appropriate small unit

tactics.

We beat on them from late '80 through '82 with limited,

noticeable change in performance and logistics. They bought

hundreds of Ford trucks at one point. They had absolutely no

control over issue, no system for maintenance, no system for

dispatch. When they needed transport to move a reserve force in

reaction to some guerrilla challenge, the trucks were scattered

all over the country, and they didn't know who had them. There

were just tremendous problems in all those areas, and we tried

to work with them to find reasonable solutions.

But then, within the 55-man limit, it was very slow going.

By the end of '82, early '83, 1 was afraid that the whole thing

was about to go down the tubes, and I reported that to

Washington, to the JCS. They sent me to the State

Department-to the so-called core group-at that time, to give

them my estimate; they sent me on to the White House. I'll

nevcr forget it. On the 26th of January of 1983 I told Judge

Clark that if we did not step up our effort and make a

commitment that was visible, the thing was going to go down

the tubes. That got people excited!

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern

Command. 1979 to 1983, interviewed in Orlando, Florida, 29 January 1987.
234 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

We were able to establish the Regional Military Training

Center in Honduras, as a means of enhancing output because we

couldn't do enough in Salvador under the 55-man limit.

Additional resources came with General Gorman* when we

changed command in May of '83 and, finally, everything

together started to make a difference.

Training Was Critical

Ambassador Deane Hinton-lt I reform of the military] was

an attitudinal problem that ran through the human rights death

squad issue. The military and security forces were unfortunately

not as clean as they should have been through the continuing

struggle. There were all kinds of efforts by Mil Group

commanders, both to try to reform the way the war was

conducted and to get people off of their butts and out of the

cuarteles [barracks]. They have succeeded at long last. By the

time I left, it seemed to me it was still in doubt as to whether

the Salvadoran Army would ever be an effective field force.

Certainly training was critical: training in the States, the original

training of their action battalions in El Salvador, the eventual

creation of a regional military training center. Trying to get an

army that had always thought that if it ever fought, it would

fight for 48 hours against the Hondurans, to recognize that it

had a continuing relentless struggle against a very determined

and able group of guerrillas.

My own impression and maybe there are cases you could

cite that would joggle my memory-but two reaction battalions

already had been trained or had just finished training when I got

there, and as far as I could see, they lacked the concept of

immediate reaction. We later pressed of course for nationwide

recruit training or a recruit training center which was different

from the way they traditionally did it. They did it by training

*General Paul Gorman, Commander-In-Chief. United States Southern

Command (USSOUTHCOM), 1983-1985.

Ambassador Deane Hinton, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1982 to

1983, interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 10 September 1987.
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 235

recruits in their units. My own impression was that they agreed

that a national center was desirable and the right way to go, but

there were a lot of practical difficulties, with recruit training,

Since I went through recruit training (in 1943), that seemed the

reasonable thing to do; certainly it was U.S. doctrine, and I

can't recall that there was any real resistance on the grounds that

this isn't the way we Salvadorans do things. The problem was

where the facility was going to be? That's the sort of emotional

issue that arose-I may be wrong. They were ... resistant, of

course, to the idea that Salvadorans should be trained in

Honduras. That was an idea they did not take kindly to. I guess

it was eventually done to some extent.

Part of the problem about a recruit center in El Salvador

arose from the congressional limit on the number of American

trainers you could have in El Salvador. Congress wouldn't

budge. There was a limit as to what we could put in El

Salvador. This was a problem in the conduct of almost all

operations. Sit there and it was like a football team that has 45

or 55 players, and you must shuffle them in and out (of El

Salvador) of the lineup. There were days when we had to stay

within the ceiling, to send trainers out so we could get people

in, because we needed even more. Peculiar way to run a ball

game.

U.S. Training of Salvadoran

Units and Cadets

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-Back in '81 we sent a mobile

training team (MIT) in and trained the Atlacatl Battalion which

is still the best unit in the country. We trained a 600-man

battalion, and then we looked around to try to train another one,

but we didn't have the cushion in the 55-man limit. It didn't

allow us to bring enough trainers in to train another battalion.

By that time the program had expanded. We had Air Force and

Navy MTTs, and we were doing other things. There just

weren't the spaces.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.

i
236 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

You couldn't bring in a 40- or 50-man MTT, or whatever it

would take. Once we sat down and figured that it would take 50

to 60 trainers to train a battalion, if they didn't have any

housekeeping duties and stuck strictly to training. There wasn't

room for them in-country because of the 55-man limit, so they

looked around for other locations. You couldn't take them to

Panama. Obviously that's politically unacceptable to bring in

600-700 Salvadorans to Panama to train them. You can't train

them in-country, so the only option at that time was to take

them to the United States and pay top dollar. It cost $8,000,000

to train the BELLOSO Battalion in the United States. I could

have trained and equipped six to eight battalions for the price of

one if we could have done it in-country.

One of the advantages of training a battalion outside of

Salvador was that we were able to train the battalion

commander and his staff ... not formally as such, but because

of the environment at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the battalion

commander and his staff had to wrestle with training problems,

with coordination for training areas, for ammunition, etc. All

the things that you do in the training environment (obviously

without the stress, the problems and the casualties), your staff

does similar type work in combat. Nevertheless, the S-4

(logistics) has to function like an S-4; the S-I has to take care of

the personnel. All of that was done at Fort Bragg in a training

environment. When you train a battalion in-country, the officers

are usually doing other things. They are not being trained as

such, and that was the one advantage of going to the States.

There we had the whole battalion as a package and trained them

from the top down.

We tried to train another IR (Immediate Reaction) battalion

in El Salvador and had the same kind of problems we had had

with the IR battalion we tried to train in El Salvador in '82.

During the elections it was constantly being pulled out, and they

had a lot of problems getting it trained. It never really did get up

to standards-distractions were constant. In '83 we started to

train another one, and we had the same kind of problems.

Again, we didn't have enough trainers in-country so they took

the Atonal Battalion over to the regional training center and
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 237

finished up the training. We have since trained a couple more

there. I was not overly enamored with the Fort Benning,

Georgia, training program. I thought it was conventional OCS

(Officer Candidate School), war-in-Europe type training. I'm

not the only one who was critical of it. The leadership aspect of

it was superb, but they didn't get enough counterinsurgency,

small unit tactics, or night operations. Having said that-we

were more interested quite frankly in the long-range

ramific.tions of breaking the cycle of the four-year military

academy. When we sent the first group of 470 cadets to Fort

Benning we had essentially cracked the facade of the academy.

There were attempts to re-blue these guys, to take them back to

the academy after we got through with them, but after they had

been in the field for awhile and had proven themselves, none of

the departmental commanders wanted to give up "their cadets."

Initially, however, there was the view that "these cadets are all

gringo-trained, and we are going to have to retrain them in the

Salvadoran mode. We don't trust them. They don't know how

to really be soldiers." They didn't know a lot about the parade

ground, how to do push-ups and squat jumps, and a lot of the

things taught them in the academy. But they knew how to lead

in the field. They took their lumps. They took their casualties,

and they proved themselves,

Two Overviews of U.S. Support

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova-When the

reforms came in '79 we had a professional armed force, but it

was divided. There was constant quarreling at the higher

echelons of the armed forces. There were constant arguments,

internal struggle for power and higher positions within the

forces and also an ideological struggle. We were not aware of

what was really coming and what we were about to face on 10

January 1981, the "final" offensive. We did not know how

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova. Salvadoran Minister of

Defense. 1984 to date. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 19

December 1987.
238 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

much support the people were going to give to the armed forces.

The insurgents claimed it would take them only 15 days to

completely destroy the armed forces and gain absolute control

over the country. Those were the longest 15 days they ever had

to deal with because they underestimated the armed forces'

capability even though we only had 14,000 to 15,000 men. If

the insurgent forces would have had the complete support of the

people at the time they would have inevitably won. However,

the armed forces with their own resources were able to go ahead

and defeat the insurgents. After this incident President Carter

announced his intentions to provide aid to El Salvador. I think

he gave us some 10 million dollars. But I think what was most

important was being able to say, "I don't want another

Nicaragua." There was a significant change after this, and it

was when we started to receive aid from the United States.

Dr. Alvaro Magafia-In 1981 there was still not a serious

commitment to provide military aid. I think what we received

initially, during my tenure, were 37 million dollars.

By the time I left office we were receiving more than 300

million. It was a significant improvement. That is why we were

able to increase our Army personnel from 15,000 to 45,000.

You know what it is to equip that number of soldiers. Now,

what I think was the most important were the relationships

between the two Ambassadors from the United States during my

tenure, Deane Hinton and Tom Pickering. In addition to being

highly professional and very responsible, they worked 24 hours

a day for El Salvador, and we established some very good,

friendly relationships. They would call us up at 11:00 P.M., and

we would call them up at 12:00, that sort of thing. That,

undoubtedly, helped me tremendously. I had no complaints with

respect to that situation. I can say it over and over again-that

the attitude of the U.S. Government, during my tenure as

Interim President, was what definitely saved this country.

Dr. Alvaro Magafia, provisional President of the Republic of El Salvador.

1982 to 1984. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 18 December 1986

and 30 June 1987.
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 239

Problems in Coordinating

U.S. Support Efforts

General Wallace H. Nuting-Policy formulation and policy

execution for me was a total frustration. I said earlier that every

time I went to Washington I tried to gauge those visits to have

some impact. I didn't want to be there all the time. I wanted to

go when it appeared that I could use a lever or a hammer to

achieve something. And each time I went, I made the rounds of

various offices in DOD, CIA, State ARA, and the NSC. I may

have gone to the NSC and to those other places without formal

clearance or blessing from DOD. But I felt it was my mission to

try to articulate my concerns throughout the government,

because it was a lot more that just a military problem. What I

ran into, as I made the rounds in Washington, was a total lack

of coherence. People in Washington, wherever they are, are

focused on the immediate fire. No long-range view; no ability to

take a long-range view. Just put out today's fire and hope for

the best tomorrow. Meetings are always interrupted by phone

calls, and people have to go zo other meetings and those kinds

of things. It was just a general lack of attention to this particular

problem because it was perceived by most people to be a very

low priority or a tar-baby that they wanted to have nothing to do

with.

Colonel John Cash-General Nutting, his staff, all of his

officers, myself, a couple of attach6s, and members of the

various other offices in the Embassy sat around for about two or

three hours discussing what was going on-Mil Group options.

It finally got to the acrimonious level, and General Nutting

turned to the Ambassador. "Damn it, Mr. Ambassador, what

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southtrn

Command, 1979 to 1983. interviewed in Orlando. Florida, 29 January 1987.

Colonel John Cash. U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador, 1981 to 1983.

interviewed in Washington. D.C., 20 March 1987.

I'
240 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

the hell do you think we're here for?" And Ambassador Hinton

said, "I'm here to hold on." General Nutting said, "I've been

told that we're here to win." And then we all kind of looked at

each other and said maybe we've got some basic philosophical

disagreement.

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham Ill-Ambassador Hinton had

never been given instructions to win the war. He had been given

instructions to maintain the status quo and not let the thing

slide. But when Ambassador Pickering came in, the game plan

had very evidently changed. His first words to me (but not his

first words because we had a very exciting first night, but very

shortly thereafter) were, "I want you to get Fred Woerner up

here, and I want a strategy for bringing 90 percent of the terrain

and population under control of the government in two years

and marginalizing his [the subversivesl front."

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-But you didn't have anything

between the NSC and the country team that allowed for any

unity of command. You didn't have a regional political State

Department offensive for Central America. You have a POLAD

(representative of Department of State) at SOUTHCOM. but he

didn't function as the senior guy on the scene, the equivalent of

a CINC. You didn't have anything at State Department in those

days that really fused the military and the political. Sure you

had military guys that were up there, but there wasn't the same

feeling that, "Hey we are managing policy from the connecting

links between NSC and the country team." You had a total

disconnect.

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham Ill. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1983 to 1984. interviewed in Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania. 29

May 1985.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 241

1The Need for a Rational,

Coherent Process by Which

Aid Can Be Provided

Major General James R. Taylor-Well, the first thing

needed would be a change to the Arms Export Control Act and

to change that system so that we approach the provisioning of

MAP and MIF dollars and FMS dollars on a more rational and

coherent basis rather than an irrational emotional basis. And

two, in the process as you change those two laws, build a

system that is more responsive but still provides the same intent

of the Congress-oversight. Right now it's a bureaucratic

jungle, and you can't get from here to there because of all of the

control mechanisms, all of which are well-intentioned and

responding to the intent of the Congress. But we have regulated

ourselves almost out of business and do not, in fact, support the

Commander in Chief of the unified command that's responsible

for the provisioning or the administration of that program. It's

designed both on the congressional side of the house and the

DOD side of the house to support the bureaucracy. It's one of

those self-generating bureaucratic kinds of structures where

there is so much notification required and so much else required

that, by the time you get what it is that you need, it is too late.

And in our efforts to make sure that we never sell anything for

less than it cost us, we don't ever sell things that we need to sell

when we need to sell them.

Major General James R. Taylor, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry

Brigade (Panama), 1986 to 1987, interviewed at Fort Amador. Republic of

Panama, 14 December 1986.

lll Il I l llnll mmaI
242 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

The United States Needs People

Capable of Analyzing and

Understanding a Problem Like

the Salvadoran War

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-You have got to be able to do

the analysis necessary to come up with some proposed courses

of action. You know, there's nothing magic in this. The

problem is that to arrive at the same conclusion, you have to

understand what's pushing it. You can't look at El Salvador if

you don't understand the Matanza.* You can't look at El

Salvador unless you understand the impact of the Soccer War.

You can't look at El Salvador unless you understand the

population pressures, land distribution, pre-revolutionary

situation. You can't look at El Salvador unless you understand

why they are the way they are, why the insurgents are doing

what they're doing. In any situation like this you really have to

do your homework first. Once you do that, from the military

side you've got to understand the organization and why they're

organized that way, what the historical precedences are, why

they have a tanda system, or whatever system they have.

What's the relationship between the officers and the troops?

What do the troops do day to day? How responsive are they?

How brave are the soldiers? With the right kind of training are

they capable of taking on the guerrillas head on? What are the

relationships of the population toward the military? Do they

view the military as the reason for the problems or as a possible

solution for the problem? You have to do your homework, do

an analysis and really understand the nature of the beast you are

going to be dealing with. And not be afraid to say what's right

and what is wrong and if there's an impediment.

Colonel John D. Waghelstcin. Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 23 February 1987.

*The Matanza (massacre) of betv een 10,000 and 30,000 people in El

Salvador in 1932-a demonstration of the misuse of oligarchic power and

military brutality.
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 243

Continuity of Personnel Is Important

General Wallace H. Nutting-You have to begin with

personnel programs that provide for repetitive tours and

experience and contacts with foreigners in their areas of

expertise and interest. But you have to put people in those jobs

and leave them there long enough to know what it is they're

trying to do. To build positive relationships with their

counterparts in El Salvador and Honduras, for example. You

can't do it on TDY in 89 days. You can't do it in 179 days.

Most people in uniform acknowledge that if there's a war going

on, they are obligated to serve. The trouble is that we have not

yet understood or accepted the fact that low-intensity conflict is

the preferred modern form of aggression that we see most

frequently in the latter part of this century. And, therefore, the

Army and the other services, you know, treat a tour, 179-day or

89-day tour in Honduras, as an aberration. Well, bullshit. It's a

wartime assignment. It's got to be long enough to be productive

for the individual and his job and so forth. It makes it hard on

families. So was WWII, but we found ways to do it. And it

doesn't have to be all soldiers to do those kinds of things. There

must be economists and politicians, psychological warriors, all

those kinds of people that work together in all the dimensions to

help solve the problem. It's personnel policies that have to be

changed to help institutionalize that experience.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-The other thing that I

fought like hell for, and had an enormous problem with, was

longer tours for military people. I felt that we were constantly

running people through there who had to relearn. The one-year

tour did not become effective for four to six months, and it was

a tragedy that we did this. We didn't have that many people

who wanted to come, first, and secondly, we didn't have that

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command, 1979 to 1983, interviewed in Orlando, Florida. 29 January 1987.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 August 1987.

LA
244 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

many people who could pick up as rapidly on what their

predecessors had done, so in a sezise we were constantly

relearning old lessons. The notion that we could bring people

out for longer and build into the system some institutional

knowledge was another key to how we pushed the peanut

ahead.

Neither the Doctrine, Support, nor

Coordination to Be Effective

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-I felt that when I arrived we

were dealing with a phenomenon that we had faced before, yet

we had very little recorded information to reflect our past

historical experience. One of the first things I did was to get

together a conference in the State Department, with the help of

the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, of about a dozen and a

half, two dozen individuals from many different facets of

activity, to look first at the military situation and then later at

some of the political and economic activities. Their experiences

were easily applicable to El Salvador.

We discovered a combination of not knowing the lessons

we should have learned from past experience on the one hand

and having to adapt ourselves to somewhat different and new

situations on the other. It was a tragedy that there was no

respectable body of doctrine to be drawn on, that we were

thrown back onto pragmatism. We had no respectable

organizational approach to deal with this. In a sense, the

Embassy played a key coordinating role. We had, because of

the personalities involved and a commitment, an unusually good

4relationship with the Southern Command. We had a certain

amount of independence in AID in terms of being able to direct

our funding. But, nowhere in the U.S. Government do we have

basically, in any way that I know of, this sort of center of focus.

I went through a lot of literature, because, while I had had some

experience in this kind of situation, I wanted to try to get some

grip on the wide range of possible experiences and answers both

Ambassador Thomas Pickering. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985. interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 August 1987.
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 245

doctrinally and pragmatically. I went to things like the

intelligence assessments of past counterinsurgencies and worked

very closely with the people who had the expertise. But I found,

we really had a very sluggish bureaucracy. We had to make a

tremendous effort because there was no central area of authority

in organizing ourselves. We were conducting the activities in El

Salvador on a business-as-usual basis. Though we were a

squeaky hinge, and got a little more oil, nobody saw this as

such a powerful and overwhelming national objective to the

extent that we could count on the full weight of American

backing being put behind it.

One of our public relations and public affairs activities was

to try to do as much as we could from El Salvador in informing

the American public about what was going on, in order to build

up backing in the Congress, which under normal conditions,

you'd assume you have when a national decision to deal with

the problem has already been made. I spent most of my time

with the press, dealing with issues on the record. We wanted,

first, to build confidence that we knew what we were about,

then second, some confidence that we were making slow but

steady progress, that we were aware of a wide-range of issues.

and lastly, that we were trying to deal with the problems that

everybody was constantly complaining about rather than

ignoring them or brushing them aside.

We had a certain amount of success over the two yearspartly through this campaign, partly through the elections,

partly through the Congress, partly through public exposure of

national figures down there, partly through all kinds of

contacts-in beginning to develop a slight turnaround in public

support and confidence, which is really essential. So, we had

neither the doctrine nor the support nor the coordination in the

U.S. Government that would really be required to deal

effectively with that kind of operation. I don't think we ever

developed it. We still are kind of ad hoc in our way of viewing

the problem. That is really quite a critical comment. The fact

that we were reasonably successful has very little to do with the

fact that we had previously developed the answers to those

issues, and in effect we were often condemned to reinventing a

1
246 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

lot of them. In a way, we were unhampered by doctrinal

preconceptions, and that helped in pragmatism and flexibility,

but in another sense this made it very difficult to stay the

course, to know what other things happened, to do all of the

things that had to be done all at once.

Comments on the Period of Insurgent

Ascendancy--A Look at Dismounted

Knights and a Few Other Things

THE EDITORS-The insurgent political leaders we!l

understood the importance of moral power in the

strategy of conflict. They were also responsive to the

need to completely operationalize the classical principle

of unity of command in war. Nevertheless, the more

military-oriented leadership prevailed. They elected to

pursue a military victory over what was perceived to be

a completely incompetent enemy-the regular

Salvadoran armed forces.

Thus, despite the failure of what was to be the

"Final Offensive" of January 1981, the FDR/FMLN had

sufl:cient organizational unity, manpower, arms,

sanctuaries, and outside support to generate a more-orless continuous and growing military effort from the end

of 1981 to the end of 1984. During that period they were

able to organize, train, and logistically support units that

were capable of mounting attacks with as many as 600

men at virtually any time. Givcn the admittedly poor

support provided to the insurgency on the part of the

Salvadoran people, the ability to achieve this level of

warfare is remarkable. I his degree of military capability

can only be explained in terms of the extremely high

level of external support enjoyed by the FDR/FMLN.

Although this guerrilla ascendancy was the most

obvious and best reported aspect of the period, the

other parties to the conflict were not inactive. In a

struggle fcr the "hearts and minds" of a people, the

S.

4t

d

S
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 247

fundamental question is one of the moral right to

govern. This is the hub of all power and movement on

which everything depends. And, it was here that the

government response began. That is to say that while

the "revolutionaries" were concentrating their efforts

on the military aspects of the war, the Salvadoran civilmilitary leadership made the strategic dimension of

gaining legitimacy-and, thus, internal and external

support-their first priority.

As a consequence, one of the first things the Junta

did on taking control of the government after the 1979

coup was to announce land, banking, and commodity

export reforms. Subsequently, other reforms were

promulgated-not the least of which were popular

elections that really mattered. The degree of success the

reforms may or may not enjoy is moot. The point is that

enough people were sufficiently convinced of the

progress of the situation that they did not support the

revolutionary cause to any extent that might have been

expected.

In military terms, the armed forces' leadership

responded to the legitimization process on at least two

levels. First, they joined with the civilians in an alliance

to support the democratic process. As a result, the

military went to extreme lengths to provide security for

free elections and has consistently demonstrated loyalty

to civilian institutions-particularly to the Office of the

Presidency. This in itself was probably the most

significant reform of the decade.

Second, the military leadership understood that this

type of war is fought on diverse fronts and that soldiers

and officers had to do more than shoot people in order

to win the long-term struggle. Thus, they would take the

necessary time and resources to change a "Praetorian

Guard," accustomed to abusing its authority, into 

a

more professional organization that could engage an

enemy force without alienating the general citizenry.

This was another significant reform with long-term, positive implications.

I

!I
248 ASCENDANCE FROM LATE 1981 TO LATE 1984

The primary objective of the armed forces was to

ensure institutional survival by helping to promulgate

and implement and to protect basic civil reforms. At the

same time, equally important, they began to reform and

professionalize themselves. All while increasing in size

from about 14,000 to over 50,000 personnel, developing

the requisite small-unit leadership crucial to

counterinsurgency and fighting a relatively intense war.

At that point in time, the primary center of gravity was

not a piece of territory or the enemy force; it was the

basic underpinnings of the government itself.

During the period of insurgent ascendancy, the

United States did not demonstrate the ability to provide

any kind of consistent assistance to El Salvador. At least

a few senior decisionmakers were not particularly

concerned. They had assumed that once the United

States had showed that they were semi-reliable and

were prepared to provide some help, the guerrilla

movement would see the inevitability of defeat and

simply go away. What this perception did not take into

account was the ideological commitment of the

insurgent leadership, and the strategic importance of

the Vietnamese-Nicaraguan-Cuban-Soviet connections.

In short, there was no thorough analysis or appreciation

of the situation in Washington. Having said all that, it is

necessary to point out that despite the fact that the

Salvadorans "never knew when the next shipment of

ammunition would arrive" or what they could plan on in

terms of other assistance, U.S. aid was as important to

the government as the external support was to the

insurgents.

In summarizing this seemingly dark period in the

history of the conflict in El Salvador, three things stand

out in strategic perspective. First, legitimacy is

reaffirmed as the first center of gravity-the

fundamental factor that would be in the long term more

decisive than traditional military action. The government

and the military got off to an apparently slow start in the
OUTSIDE EFFORTS AID THE GOVERNMENT 249

war against the insurgents but began the process of

seizing the "moral high ground." On the other hand,

the comandantesof the FMLN chose to ignore the

council so generously provided by Lenin, Mao, Giap,

and their own "politicos."

Second, the classical principles of unity of

command and objective were also reaffirmed. Both

sides to the conflict organized to the degree necessary

for survival and perhaps even for moderate success but

not to the extent required for either to win. Neither of

the combatants developed an organization at a

sufficiently high level or gave it the authority necessary

to coordinate and effect a winning set of strategic

military-political objectives.

Third, outside aid made the guerrilla ascendancy

possible. By the same token, U.S. aid probably saved

the incumbent Salvadoran government. The major

lesson learned here is that the center of gravity in this

context of the war is not the assistance itself or the

routes that assistance might take to get to the

battlefield. Rather, the center of gravity is the source of

whatever support that might be provided. As a result,

the insurgents' efforts to stem U.S. aid and government

efforts to obtain that help centered on the proverbial

corridors of power in Washington. On the other side of

the coin, neither the United States nor the Salvadoran

governments seriously addressed the external sources

of insurgent support which gave them the physical

strength and psychological balance to ascend.

Finally, an ancillary lesson learned was that a regime

under violent attack, under the microscope of the world

press, with less than stable or consistent external

support, can develop and implement major social and

institutional democratic reforms.
Part IV

War Changes Direction:

Late 1984

to Late 1986

i
12

Military and Political

Centers of Gravity

THE EDITORS-By the end of 1984, there was a general

consensus that the military aspects of the war had

turned around. There was also consensus that winning

the military war was only part of the struggle. As

President Duarte gained the confidence of and

confidence in the military, his focus shifted somewhat

from the military situation to the political aspects of the

country's struggle. This shift was especially true after the

1985 Assembly elections which gave the Christian

Democrats a majority. Avoiding a split, which the

insurgents hoped to cause by the kidnapping of

Duarte's daughter and subsequent ransom negotiations,

the military and Duarte struggled together to come to

terms with the new concepts of pluralism they had

instituted and had sworn to protect.

Assailed by Every Conceivable

Problem

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-Our principal problems in

the two years that I was there were (I) to deal with the military

situation on the ground and (2) to deal with the economic, social,

Ambassador Thomas Pickering. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv. Israel, 25 August 1987.

253
254 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

and political situation. (In each case we had a series of efforts

partly at least coordinated to try to work on it.) On the military

side, we focused heavily on training, on re-equiping with the

appropriate weapons, on getting the money in order to do that,

on bringing the Congress along, and on building leadership in

the Salvadoran military--one that could handle the problems

and develop a series of tactical and strategic approaches to try to

deal with the guerrilla effort as a military and political-military

activity. Since the guerrillas were nearly in an open-war phase,

it was possible to see guerrilla units at levels of multibattalion

strength. We estimated that perhaps, on some battlefields, they

may have been able to mass as many as a thousand fighters

against government units-and they were particularly successful

in wiping out government units.

Well, we may have overestimated the manpower strength

because the losses were so great. Everybody has a tendency to

do that. Nevertheless, there were large units. The whole

strategy that developed in the early stages and which proved

quite successful was to begin a process of being able to deal

with guerrilla units at that level and then to move further on

down into being able to handle more dispersed, more broken up

guerrilla units. We put a heavy focus on intelligence collection

and building Salvadoran capabilities as well as integrating our

own, particularly technical intelligence collection, which was of

immediate use. But in a sense we were assailed on every side by

every conceivable kind of problem, and we had no choice but to

try to attack most of the major pressing problems at once. There

were four or five, maybe six or seven, major priority tasks on

the military side which had to be dealt with on a kind of

emergency basis. We had to accept rough strategic objectives

and to mold tactical approaches to them as we went along. We

began to make an ad hoc series of tactical efforts, some of

which worked and some of which didn't work. On the economic

side, we had to find ways to try to stabilize the economy, to

handle the massive social problems-the refugees and ot'ier

issues-and to get more money. In a way, the money depended,

both on the military and the economic sides, on the kind of

i
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 255

confidence the Congress had in the political situation in the

country. As a result the military, economic, and political issues

were directly interlinked. Military failure meant congressional

discouragement. Likewise, political problems-human rights

abuses and social dislocation, stagnation, and a strong sense that

the government was either out of control or dominated by

ind;viduals whose capacity to deal with these problems across

the board was distinctly limited both politically and

economically-meant that we could not garner the kind of

congressional support that we needed. In addition, the country

was headed into an election arrangement that posed enormous

dangers in two or three ways. On the military side, the prior

elections that took place in '82 had been partly blocked by

guerrilla military activities on the ground, and so were less

successful than they should have been. On the political side,

there were deep uncertainties whether elections would work,

whether you would get a turnout.

Obviously there were deep concerns about what the results

would be. There were chances that the two right-wing parties

would merge and adopt an extremist platform which would

mean that broad political support from the United States would

die out. It wasn't certain that Duarte and his more middle-ofthe-road people really could appeal to the voting public and

indeed offset the monetary, military, thug-type pressures of both

the Right and the Left to influence the voter outcome. And

finally, there was a really important question as to whether the

Left could capture the labor movement or whether Duarte and

his people could maintain their contacts and hold some

solidarity with the labor movement. That solidarity only

developed slowly. The labor movement, in a sense, refused to

make a deal with Duarte in the first of the elections but did join

him in the second runoff elections. So we had an enormous

series of problems across the board. In addition, we had a real

struggle to try to develop a political-military-economic

development strategy, particularly for the rural areas under

guerrilla control. In that sense there were many villages that

were not defended.

I
256 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

The War Had Turned Around

General John R. Galvin-By the time I took over as CINC

USSOUTHCOM, the war had been turned around with a lot of

help and guidance, in my opinion, from Paul Gorman. But it

wasn't just Paul. Ambassador Pickering was a very astute

individual, and he was followed by Ed Corr, an equally good, if

not better, ambassador. Corr, who came in soon after I did, has

a military background and has a very good understanding of the

overall question of what to do in El Salvador. What to do was.

in my opinion, to ensure that the entire country was dedicated to

fighting the insurgency, getting rid of the insurgency, and

reestablishing, in an even better form, a democratic

government. When I say "an even better form," it wasn't a

democratic government 10 years earlier, and an "even a better

form" of democracy was what President Duarte wanted to

establish. The thing that I think was established during my

period there-not by me but by a team of people that included

myself, Ed Corr, President Duarte, Vides Casanova, and

Bland6n and many others-was the idea of an all-out war of the

people of El Salvador against the Marxist guerrillas. That was

the country plan, which was known as Unidos Para

Reconstruir, which brought in every government ministry doing

its part to try to put down the insurgency and bring peace to the

country. Militarily, when I arrived, El Salvador was doing fairly

well already. But it was obvious that you could not win the war

by a military fight alone; you had to enlist all aspects, all facets

of the country. President Duarte, when he became convinced of

this, went out and made a series of speeches. Every weekend he

was out on the stump in different parts of the country telling

the people that the war could not be won unless the

people dedicated themselves to winning it. He was absolutely

right.

General John R. Galvin, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern

Command, 1985 to 1987, interviewed in Mons, Belgium. 18 August

1987.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 257

The Military Situation

Colonel James J. Steele-What we've seen since 1984, from

a political/military perspective, are the beginnings of

consolidation of democracy. Early on the President focused very

heavily on cementing a workable relationship with the military.

His first priority clearly was the war, and that meant making

sure that he was in the position where he could influence and

work well with the military. His early actions were very

positive. When he assumed the presidency in 1984, the military

was very suspicious of him.

It's always a mistake to talk about the military as a totally

cohesive element, but there was a lot of suspicion of Duarte

within the military. However, within several months he did a

good job of reassuring those who were very suspicious that, in

fact, he was not going to turn the country over to the

Communists.

Even though many had predicted that the military would

never let Duarte take office, obviously they did, and their

attitude became one of acceptance and even of seeing Duarte as

a positive influence. He represented, first of all, tremendous

external support. They knew that and they needed that in the

military; so, there was a marriage. Both needed the other, and

that brought the country along pretty well. That continued even

through the Assembly elections. Then we saw the Duarte focus

shift a little bit, from the military and preoccupation with the

war effort, to probably what was his secondary priority-the

political situation of the country. He focused on that. His party

did very well in the Assembly elections in 1985. Again, I think

it was a product of his own personal priorities and efforts. Early

on, we saw very little focus on the civilian government side

towards economic problems in the country. The priorities were

military and political. The time when Duarte took a bit of a nose

dive with the military was over the kidnapping (of Inds

Colonel James J. Steele, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1984 to 1986, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986; and, in Monterey, California, 5 November 1986.
258 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Guadalupe) issue. It would be wrong to think that the military

was totally against any kind of negotiations. In fact, there

was an acceptance that it was difficult for many of us to

understand.

When Duarte's daughter was kidnapped, it was almost an

easy acceptance that, "Well, this is certainly going to result in

negotiations and some trades," because that's almost a way of

life in El Salvador. Many families have been touched by

kidnappings, and ransoms have been paid, and it's an accepted

thing. When it really hit the military, though, was when she was

released in exchange for an awful lot of guerrilla leadership and

wounded. They paid a tremendous price in the process of this

exchange. But they held together very well. They were

supportive of Duarte, not so much because they believed that he

had done the right thing with negotiations, but they recognized

that one of the goals of the FMLN, in this whole kidnapping

affair, was to try to split or drive a wedge between Duarte, the

civilian side of the government, and the military. They weren't

about to play into the guerrillas' hands. What ended up

happening was that the military went along with it, but it did

mark a low in terms of his relationship with the military. Since

then, it's improved. Economic considerations have come to the

forefront this year. He's enacted a series of economic measures,

austerity measures, which have not been very popular. And,

he's been subject of some criticism over that. At this point his

relationship with the military is probably as good as you could

expect it to be. There is a new effort now, as a result of the

National Plan (Unidos Para Reconstruir), which although

designed by the military, it's purpose is to integrate what the

military was doing with what the civilian side of the government

was doing, in trying to implement national strategy. Duarte has

been very effective in implementing that program. The way he

deals with the military has been interesting to watch because he

has consistently, when they've inaugurated projects under this

plan, attempted to put the military people into a position where

they were up front and giving speeches and so on. In doing so, I

think it reaffirms their role in protecting democracy.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 259

The Internal Political Environment

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-Now we have a president from

the Christian Democrats, for instance, with a National

Assembly in which the Christian Democrats have a majority and

still they have to deal with viewpoints from the Right. They still

have to work to get the votes they need for the policies of the

President. Even though the Christian Democrats have an

absolute majority in the National Assembly, their margin of

control is very small, and some accommodation with the Right

is necessary to assure passage of their policies. In any event, by

the tradition of Latin policies, they feel constrained to seek a

broader consensus than their slight voting majority. At the same

time, the military feels that it doesn't get all of the support that

it would like to get from the civilian government and laments

the fact that things take longer to accomplish with a democracy

than they do under a government that has all of the power in

their hands. They are struggling to come to terms with

pluralism, and they're struggling to do this with a society that

is, to a large extent, polarized.

Evolution and Political

Awareness

General Adolfo Bland6n-Before 1979 our Army was

composed of approximately 12,000 men; 12,000 men who had

been trained for conventional warfare and had very little

knowledge of an irregular war. Our evolution is based on a

dynamic system we developed in the tactical sense. During the

course of this war, we've had to make various changes on a

daily basis. But motivation has been our greatest advantage.

The fact that we know that we have to save this country from

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador. 1983 to

1985. interviewed in Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania. 4 March 1986.

General Adolfo Onecffero Bland6n. Chief of Staff of Salvadoran Armed

Forces, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 21 July 1987

and 26 September 1987.
260 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

the pretensions of the Soviet bloc of conquering this country.

Knowing what it's like to live in a democracy-with liberty,

justice, and opportunity for all-and making our officers

understand the true purpose behind this struggle have been our

biggest cornerstone. I think we are very well equipped, very

well trained, very well organized. We have tremendous aerial

support with experienced pilots, which I don't think are

anywhere else in Latin America with the same experience and

courage. We have an artillery brigade with an extraordinary

experience. These artillery men fire a projectile only some 5 to

10 meters away from their target, I know that for a fact. But I

think that the most important aspect of our evolution as an

Army and inclusive, all our armed forces, is the understanding

of what it has meant to be alienated from politics. That was

extremely harmful to us.

Unfortunately, we were used as instruments for the

politicians-a military president would be elected, and we

would appear in the eyes of the world as a military government.

But the truth of the matter is that the president was a military

man surrounded by civilians. Therefore, to say it was a military

government in El Salvador was only a front. The president

would act as a figurehead, puppet, and the true governing body

was composed of an elite sector, which practically ruled the

entire country. When these people did not like a president's

attitude-whom they themselves had originally appointedthey'd promote a coup within the Army and, thus, assign

another one to the position who would satisfy their purposes.

Now that we have allowed the people to elect their own

government, we have won moral authority, and we have won

just recognition, I think, on the part of the people. We have also

received international recognition. A government can be either

good or bad, but whoever decides to change it should not be the

armed forces but, rather, the people. It hasn't been easy to

inculcate the concept of democracy into the minds of our

officers. Actually, it has been extremely difficult. But we've

been lucky-for reasons of fate, the will of God, because God

wants to save this country-that four people who share the same

beliefs were assigned command positions: General Vides, Flores

mI mm mm ml m m lm lmmm m m lmmlm m mlll
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 261

Lima, Colonel L6pez Nuila, and myself. We have worked

together sharing and implementing those beliefs. At work,

we've served as examples by using harmony, austerity, and,

thus, preaching with those examples. We've managed to secure

a valid official status which can operate during this country's

historic moment. Tomorrow we are supposed to conclude a

military operation which has lasted 60 days-the Operation

Domingo Monterosa. The officiality has requested me to

continue the operation. Imagine what it must be like for an

officer, a soldier, or a corporal, having sacrificed 60 days of his

life and finding out he has to extend his days because someone

said, "Hey, this is such a great operation we have to continue

doing it'?" That calls for a lot of extra effort, sacrifice, and

professionalism that we have dedicated. There is also a

profound sense of understanding as to the significance of human

rights. I am in no way implying that we are perfect yet.

There is still a lot to accomplish with respect to that. It

makes it difficult when we have to command 52,000 or so

soldiers. It happens anywhere in the world where wars of this

type are being fought.

But we have improved tremendously. The last notice on

the human rights issue was delivered by Ruiz Rejo at the United

Nations. The notice was very favorable for El Salvador. We

have supported all of the efforts made by the President of tb

Republic in order to achieve peace through dialogue. At the

United Nations, we were very much surprised to hear when the

President announced his intentions to pursue the famous

dialogue in La Palma. Four days ago I held a news conference.

I was approached by a reporter who asked me, "General,

throughout the entire world it is being said that you, the

military, are still giving orders to the President." "That is

false," I said. "We do not give orders to the President of the

Republic. He is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces,

and he is in command, and according to the political

constitution, he is responsible for conducting the war, and he is

responsible for achieving peace. We, as military units, are

responsible for conducting the battles, the engagements, but the

war is lead by him. We have supported and backed the
262 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

President in these efforts, and we have also backed him in the

struggle to humanize the war."

Guerrilla Politics Is Part

of the Equation

Colonel Orlando Zepeda-The major ingredient of this war is

politics. It is the ambition for power and complete domination

by the leaders such as Ungo, who tried to run for the presidency

three or four times. He was at one time President Duarte's

running mate, but he was frustrated at the outcome of those

elections. The five guerrilla leaders are frustrated students who

lead a series of strikes at the universities and thus wanted to

achieve political power. They are not really interested in the

social-economic conditions of the country. They are petitbourgeoises who launched themselves into a political struggle.

Each group follows a different philosophy and abides by

different rules and leaders. For example, the ERP calls for

hegemony, but they will never agree with the doctrine of the

FPL. They have killed each other. The death of Cayetano

Carpio is an example. The RN was born as a result of a split

among the leaders of the ERP. They killed one in Mexico. The

PRTC was born as a result of a divergency among the ERP. The

ERP was born as a result of a divergency among the FPL. In

other words, there is too much personal ambition, and they will

never agree to anything among themselves. The creation of the

FMLN was forced by Fidel Castro. He threatened to cut off all

support if they did not unite under one force. But then, the FPL

decided that a percentage of the aid collected by the FMLN

would go to them. Each organization now follows the same

pattern and takes whatever they consider theirs. Some of these

funds come from Mexico and Nicaragua and then are

transmitted to the PRTC. That is how the PRTC functions. The

Clara Elizabeth front, which belongs to the Metropolitano, had

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda H.. C-2 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

1985 to 1987. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 22 January 1987.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 263

its own structure and logistic channels aside from those

provided by the FMLN. But apparently, they united under one

force, and the organization disappeared. The constant

divergencies, personal ambition, and caciquismo [semifeudal

exploitation] are contributing factors to debilitating the guerrilla

forces and preventing their unification. Mao Tse-tung once said

that in order to achieve victory in the revolutionary process, five

conditions have to be met.

First, there must be a Communist party which provides the

inspiration, ideology, and strategy. Second, there must be a

strong armed forces-a structured military force-located on the

vanguard, which abides by the regulations imposed by its party.

These rebel forces will then finally be able to defeat the former

regime, along with its armed forces. Third, there must be a

concentration of masas, which will support and provide the

basis for the revolutionary movement. Fourth, internal and

external logistics support must be provided. And fifth, a

territory, in which some control can be exercised, training can

be conducted and where supplies received from abroad can be

manipulated, must be available.

Unfortunately for them but fortunately for us, there are

only five parties, along with five armed forces in El Salvador.

The masas are almost completely debilitated. In 1985, their

greatest move, strategically, was the May I Committee. This

was an attempt to bring together all of the masas, workers,

campesinos, and students. It was never successful, and in the

end it was dissolved. In 1986, they created the Union de

Trabajadores Salvadorenos, UNTC (Salvadoran Workers

Union). Supposedly, this organization has managed to bring

together all of the masas, but it has also become very weak. The

last organization that was created was the Union de Politica

Democracia, UPD (Political Democracy Union), something or

other. As you can see, they are always trying to manipulate the

masas in some way. The only alternative they foresee for a

victory is a general insurrection of the masas. The people no

longer want to hear talks about the ideological theme of

Marxism. The insurgents claim they do. But that's a lie. Maybe

back in 1979 and 1980, there were many sectors who were

I
264 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

willing to give this ideology an opportunity, but I'm sure that is

not the case today.

Guerilla Propaganda as Part

of the Equation

Captured FMLN Document-The prospects of our struggle to

strengthen the organization and its revolutionary consciousness

depend upon the political power of the Farabundo Marti

National Liberation Front. Equally, the creation of favorable

conditions to counter and defeat North American military

intervention are intimately related with the level of politicization

of the popular sectors and their integration into the revolutionary

movement.

The achievement of these objectives, in addition to the

execution of the organizational tasks, [is] an important part of

the effort to convince the masses of their immediate work and of

their great strategic objectives.

In other words, the strategic task of organizing the masses

implies at the same time propagandizing them. Both are basic

tasks of the revolutionary militant. We can state that he who

does not know how to make propaganda does not know how to

organize. The foregoing is meaningful from the perspective that

the activist or cadre who does not concern himself with making

use of the technique of communicating clearly and simply to the

masses the causes of the revolutionary struggle and its great

objectives, and with reaching their conscience, motivating them

and in this way adding human force to the process, is simply

limiting and wasting his energies.

Propaganda in its various forms multiplies the effects of

concrete organizational work. Graphic or written propaganda

From "'Concerning Propaganda: Our Line of Propaganda." (a document

presented by the Popular Revolutionary Army at the meeting of the Command

of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, July 1984). in The

Comandantes Speak: The Military Strategy of the Farabundo Marti National

Liberation Front, translated and edited by Gabriel and Judith F. Marcella.

Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War Gollege.

March 1987. pp. 3-8.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 265

offers the advantage that the ideas last for a long time, and can

reach everywhere, including the enemy. In any case the correct

combination of propaganda with direct organizational efforts by

each activist will multiply the concrete political results.

Our work or propaganda should be clear about which

concrete elements should be the focus of our political messages.

These should indicate clearly the concrete tasks of the masses

and the expression of their principal aspirations, economic as

well as political, short as well as long term.

The central aspects of our propaganda are:

a. Propaganda to awaken class consciousness.

b. The great aspirations of the people: the greatest program.

c. Concrete political tasks.

d. The struggle for immediate justice and reforms.

e. The development of the war.

f. Propaganda against the enemy army.

This aspect plans to demonstrate to the masses that the

origin of the current political and military confrontation in our

country lies in the existence of two groups with different and

irreconcilable class interests. On the one hand are the imperialist

North Americans and the millionaire oligarchs-the high

expression of the dominant class, combined with their followers

and defenders-and on the other are the workers (laborers and

peasants) and the people in general.

We seek to awaken the masses' consciousness about their

situation in the social structure and to motivate them to join the

group that corresponds to them: the Revolutionary Movement.

Class propaganda has great power, it has an enormous influence

on the points of view it originates, since it is based on the

objective reality of the country.

All the enemy plans that are based on superficial and weak

reasoning are disarmed; for example, the foreign origin of the

war and the FMLN, the defense of democracy by the Army,

etc.

The graphic use of the terms "rich" and "poor" or "the

Army of the rich" and "the Army of the poor" makes our ideas

understandable and awakens sympathy among the masses who

have not had direct contact with our forces.

4
266 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

The same result is generated by pointing out the

exploitation of the workers-along with its consequences of

misery and humiliation, as the fundamental cause of the

differences between the rich and the poor.

To support these assertions we must use concrete data and

statistics which prove precisely the validity of our class

arguments and indicate the abysmal contrast of the conditions of

life (health, education, housing, family income, wealth, etc.)

between the people and the oligarchs, and the landowners.

Class propaganda has an important formation effect upon

the population, as well as upon our internal structures which

also hear it and have to diffuse it. It arouses such clarity and

motivation that it provokes radicalism, class hatred, willingness

to fight and spirit of sacrifice.

Similarly, propaganda has the power to affect the Army

troops, who are doubly exploited and oppressed. It can awaken

their conscience, weaken their morale and break up the

ideological work of the enemy, which is based on false and

abstract arguments. With the increase of our class focus in the

propaganda against the enemy, Monterrosa has made public

defensive declarations that state that the Armed Forces do not

defend privileged minorities, reflecting the explanation that he

must give to the troops to keep them fighting.

From this focus on classes arises the opposition from the

middle sectors or those who have expectations from the

"promises" made by the regime [the government]. These

advances are the result of the struggles of the Revolutionary

Movement-the small apparent social and economic

achievements of some sectors are the outcome of the

revolutionary efforts sustained in a profound and radical way.

The policies of the regime were implemented to counter these

efforts and not to carry them forward. As long as the struggle of

the people for justice did not come close to taking power, these

banners [political symbols] remained forgotten, or better stated,

condemned.

Class propaganda as consciousness raising should have an

important place in our work. It is the key which will open the

£i
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 267

door for us to win over the masses. However, we must be

careful not to fall into blind radicalism, into a political vision

which denies the role of other political forces and social sectors

in the struggle, and denies their participation in the

revolutionary political program.

Political objectives constantly appear in different ways in

the struggles of the people through the decades and generations.

These objectives have become permanent aspirations which are

present in the conscience of the masses, especially among those

who are to some degree politicized and who represent an

important portion.

Our revolutionary war is sustained by historical claims for

justice which possess an extraordinary attraction and following.

We must multiply this force by massive diffusion of

propaganda. They are all contained in our great program

(document of the FMLN, program of broad participation or

document of the society which we will construct from the

revolutionary school) whose contents we must propagandize

massively and each one of its points must be fully explained.

At the same time, to simplify almost to the level of

slogans, we must tell the masses that the central objectives of

the struggle of the FMLN are "the conquest of a popular

democracy" (as a synthesis of the political transformations), the

realization of the great economic changes, a true Agrarian

Reform, for a country without oligarchs, for an army as

defenders of the revolutionary conquests and national

independence.

Principal aspects of the program have more direct ties with

the conditions of life of various sectors of the population. This

allows us to propagandize some of the concrete points which

comprise these principal aspects and which have an important

value and general sense of justice for the masses.

For example, the economic and social transformations

imply resolving the grave problems of education, housing,

health, identifying the revolutionary struggle with the resolution

of those problems, and giving immediately to the masses an

exact idea of the achievements of the revolution.
268 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

These achievements in health, education, and housing have

particular value for the marginal sectors and the peasants who

until now are the most neglected in that respect.

The problem of realizing the true Agrarian Reform acquires

a special importance for the peasants because since in addition

to planting the possibility of having access to the land in

conditions no longer oppressive, it solves what now constitutes

a source of frustration, given the demagogic and incomplete

agrarian reforms of successive regimes; asserting the graphic

claim "the land will belong to the person who works it" makes

understandable one of the principal banners of struggle which

can mobilize the 60 percent of the Salvadorean people who live

on the land.

Moving to another aspect of the revolutionary program we

can affirm that the problem of power in propagandistic terms

can take two different forms: that of the struggle "for a

Government of the people and the workers," which reflect the

fundamental interests of the greatest importance within the

revolutionary program, and which, stated in that way in current

conditions, will have a great effect on the conscience and

organization of the masses and on their interests. On the other

hand, the form "Government of Broad Participation"

corresponds more properly not to a concept, but to a concrete

pragmatic proposal, already known, for the purpose of

convincing other social and political forces that within the

revolutionary program there is political space for their

participation.

The formula of the Government of broad national

participation is not meant for propagandistic purposes, but as a

direct instrument for alliances and political agreements with

other forces. Both formulas (revolutionary program and

program of Broad Participation) are not contradictory, they are

two different propaganda focuses of the problem of power,

articulated in different environments, in order to make

the process of [taking] power converge on two essential

and complimentary factors-the masses and the political alliances.
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 269

Guerrilla Strategy as Part

of the Equation

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-If you take a snapshot of

what was going on in 1982 and then what was going on in 1985

and, given the nature of the longer time in mustering large

concentrations, you didn't find a repeat of Perquin or Berlin.

You didn't have four or five hundred guerrillas massing for an

attack. If you did, it was a rarity. It was an exception rather

than commonplace. The Army had the ability to move reaction

forces around the country. The people provided an early

warning trip wire, and the numbers of those civil defense forces

that were saved or fought to protect the area that they were in

then were relieved by regular Army forces. There was an

increase in this kind of sophistication and a commensurate

decrease in the number of large unit operations that guerrillas

were able to muster when they returned to the cities. They

increased focus on the economic destruction-the telephone, the

power lines, which not only puts the lights out and announces

the guerrillas are at it again, but it also added impact to the

impact on the economy-such as the ability to irrigate, the

ability to process cotton, sugar, coffee and so forth. Those

targets were never abandoned, and they just became more and

more preferable by the guerrillas because the other things

became more and more painful for them to try to do.

Taking Perquin and taking Berlin were propaganda ploys.

Timing was always critical-critical votes in Congress, critical

congressional delegations known to be in the area. I always took

a look at where they spent most of their effort, and it seemed to

me in '82 that they were spending most of their effort on trying

to destroy the economy. I've seen very little to convince me that

that still isn't their main goal. If you view the war as fundable

from the Salvadoran government's point of view, it can be

viewed from two sources-that which she (Salvador) can raise

on the international market by virtue of sale of her

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 23 February 1987.

.4

.I
270 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

commodities for exchange and that which she gets from

Congress. I saw the war then, and even more so now, in terms

of an attack on the two sources of funding. Through Congress,

they sought to attack the security assistance and economic

support and to attack international support through their own

economy. If you could attack one or both of those you would

substantially impede Salvador's ability to conduct the war.

And of course, all this being fought in the public affairs

arena. Every attack, no matter what it was-publicized. Every

atrocity-publicized. Every fault in the Salvadoran government-publicized. That part of it was to convince

Congressmen, who were being deluged by letters from their

constituents, who were hearing from the visiting Maryknollers-who were coming in on the weekends and telling

them about all the abuses of power. And knowing, from the

Salvadoran's penchant for doing stupid things at the wrong

time, things like the nuns' case never being brought to justice or

the Sheraton murder case never being brought to justice.

Constant drumbeat of what was wrong with Salvadoran society

for American consumption. At the same time back home in

Salvador, they were knocking down crop dusters, blowing up

irrigation pipelines, burning, and blowing up railroad trains full

of coffee and cotton and sugar that were trying to get to the port

to be shipped overseas and so forth.

U.S. Actions at the Time

Dr. Jose Z. Garcia-United States Vice-President George

Bush was sent to San Salvador on December 11 essentially to

make a deal with the armed forces. He requested several things:

the arrest, exile, or retirement of military officers suspected of

complicity in death squad activity; the trial of soldiers

implicated in the 1980 murder of United States churchwomen

by National Guardsmen and resolution of the murder of two

Dr. Josd Z. Garcia provided his analysis of the situation in "El Salvador:

Legitimizing the Government," Current History 84. no. 500 (March 1985).

pp. 101-104; 135-36. Copyright 1985 by Current History. Inc. Reprinted by

permission of Current History, Inc.

I
MILITARY AND POLITICAL CENTERS OF GRAVITY 271

other United States citizens; and a repudiation of death squad

activity at the highest level of the Salvadoran military high

command. In return, the Reagan administration offered a

substantial increase in military assistance to the Salvadoran

armed forces in quantities sufficient to reduce the guerrilla

insurgency to manageable proportions. A deadline of January

10-six days before the date the administration had agreed to

provide evidence to Congress certifying that El Salvador was

making progress on human rights-was set.

By January 6, the armed forces had accepted. The military

high command signed a public statement condemning the death

squads. Suspected death squad leaders (many of whose names

had appeared on a list provided by Vice-President Bush) were

removed from their positions. An Army captain was arrested for

the 1980 murder of two United States labor leaders. More

important, death squad activity began a sharp decline. During

all of 1983, death squad murders averaged 140 per month. In

December, 1983, there were 25 reported murders; in January,

1984, 22; in February, 58; March, 46; April, 34; May, 14; and

in June, 11. Expanded military assistance from the United

States was forthcoming: nearly $200 million was approved by

Congress for fiscal year 1984, double the amount given in the

two-year period, 198 1-1982.

I
13E

Army Unity and

Ascendance

Garcia Replaced by Vides

Colonel John Cash-Waghelstein told Flores Lima, who was

the Chief of Staff, "You got a war to fight, and you can't just

let these political battles among your officer corps stop you at

the war effort." I was present and I watched Flores Lima tell

him that this was more important than the war right now. This

threatens the very fabric of our officer corps. Well we all know

the history of it.

What was surprising was that Bland6n, who was an old

Garcfa crony, who always used to sit in for Flores Lima as the

Chief of Staff, came in, went up there (Chalatenango) with a

commission of officers, and came back and told Garcia that

Ochoa was right, and he better go out there because he was

wrong and because he had no professional reputation. And, of

course, we know that Vides took over around May and many

things began to change. That's when I lost all my reticence

about El Salvador.

Colonel John Cash, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador, 1981 to 1983,

interviewed in Washington, D.C., 20 March 1987.

273
274 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Vides-The Right Man at the

Right Time

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-l think Vides has probably

had more to do with keeping the military unified than any other

single individual. He, Bland6n, and Bustillo were the right

people, in the right jobs, at the right times. Bustillo, keeping a

tight reign on the Air Force and within the constraints in the use

of air power-minimizing collateral damage, surgical use of air

power. Bland6n forced the commanders to get into the field to

operate, to think ahead, to act rather than react. But most of all

I think it was Vides who kind of just oversaw and nudged in the

right places and subtly cajoled and pushed and prodded that

Army into a new look at itself-its role in relationship with the

people. I remember on his first tours when he went out and

talked to the brigades. The things he talked about were the

abuses of power, as they euphemistically call human rights

violations. Sensitizing the officers and the soldiers in being part

of the people. He pushed that Army and prodded that Army into

doing the right thing. I think that is it, probably more than

anything else.

And, he wasn't afraid to be innovative. When it came to

the things at the tactical level, he didn't try to over control. If a

good idea would work he'd encourage it. The role of the

OPATTs, the fact that we finally got these people out to the

brigades. Of course, the Salvadorans resented having just

lieutenant colonels and then we downgraded them to majors so

it wasn't rank heavy. But the bottom line was that we got teams

working at the brigade level. The very specialized training

programs that were initiated. The whole responsiveness to

unconventional war counterinsurgency which Garcfa never

understood.

That was a major departure. Garcfa got good marks for

public affairs, for pushing the right buttons, for the land reform,

for supporting the reforms, for being vocal in support of the

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington. D.C.. 23 February 1987.
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 275

reforms. But tactically and strategically he had no vision, and

he wasn't well respected by the rest of the Army. Vides

Casanova was. He was a man who had come out, married into

the oligarchy, had a vested interest in the old way, and yet was

able to convince those same people that they needed a

departure, that they needed to clean up their act.

Unity in the Army: An Example

President Josi Napole6n Duarte-As negotiation over the

prisoner exchange [related to the kidnapping of Duarte's

daughter, lnds Guadalupe] dragged on, our political unity began

to crack. The emotional empathy of the first moments after the

kidnapping drained away and opportunism seeped in. Voices on

the Right began to say that I wanted to save my daughter no

matter what it cost the country. Other voices, trying to split the

Christian Democratic Party, said I would abandon the mayors in

order to free Inds Guadalupe. One newspaper published a story

from the Spanish Civil War of a mayor who let his son be killed

rather than give in to enemy demands. The article practically

suggested I let the kidnappers murder Inds Guadalupe.

Colonel Ochoa smelled a chance to weaken my influence

within the armed forces. He had cultivated the image of a

tough, uncompromising guerrilla-fighter. Ochoa had led a

mutiny against Defense Minister Garcfa in 1983, and had been

transferred to Washington. When I became president, Generals

Bland6n and Bustillo argued that they needed Colonel Ochoa to

take command in Chalatenango. where the guerrillas had been

hitting hard, even seizing the army base there in El Paraiso. The

generals said Ochoa had learned that political maneuvering was

no longer acceptable in the armed forces. Colonel Ochoa

himself gave me his word that his only ambition was to serve as

military combatant. He promised unswerving loyalty to the

democratic government.

Jos6 Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador, 1984 to present),

Duarte: Mv Story (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. 1986), pp. 256-59.

Copyright 1986 by Jos6 Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P,

Putnam's Sons.

Ni'
276 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Yet, one year after aggressively taking charge of the Army

troops in Chalatenango, Colonel Ochoa called in his officers to

consider whether or not they approved of my policies. Combatweary officers who had seen their comrades die in the struggle

with guerrillas were asked if they approved of my freeing the

prisoners they had captured. In this way, Ochoa manipulated his

junior officers including cadets at El Paraiso into signing a

declaration rejecting any concessions to the guerrillas.

The document that circulated among the armed forces was

tantamount to a call to rebellion. It said that, with due respect to

the feelings of a father, national security should come first.

"The price is too high and unju't for the freedom of one

citizen." The arguments in the document were identical to some

petitions that some Rightist organizations were promoting. After

I had studied Ochoa's declaration, I sounded out other Army

commanders to learn their thoughts. Their support reassured

me, and General Vides gave me shrewd advice on how best to

nullify Ochoa's insubordination.

"Let me manage this," the general said. "I v, ould rather

treat this declaration as an expression of concern, not incitement

to rebel. Instead of making it a matter for discipline, I would

present it to all the commanders for discussion." Vides

explained that in this way we would bring all the officers to a

well-understood consensus. Ochoa's ploy would be openly

rejected by his colleagues.

Over the weekend, Vides consulted the officers

individually. On Monday, he presented the matter to the

assembled commanders. He pointed out that the guerrillas' hope

for a revolution in El Salvador had been diminishing ever since

the armed forces united with the elected democratic

government. The guerrilla demands in the kidnapping were

intended to cause dissension, to split the officers from the

President. If the Army limited the President's power to

negotiate or withdrew its confidence from me, then the FMLN

would have its greatest victory.

"What was the value of a few prisoners compared to the

power to undermine the democratic government?" he asked.

That, not the release of the prisoners, was the guerrillas'
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 277

ultimate objective. As the general finished his argument, Ochoa

began to look as if he were a dupe of the guerrillas.

After eight hours of discussion, the matter was put to a

vote. Did the armed forces have confidence in the President's

ability to conduct these negotiations in the best interest of the

country? The officers voted in my favor. Seeing the

overwhelming support of the officer corps, Ochoa raised his

hand to make the vote unanimous.

Within three months, Ochoa's continued political posturing

would exhaust the patience of the High Command. He was

ordered off to a diplomatic post.

Vides' intuition about the armed forces' reaction had been

correct again. As happened in the past, his leadership was able

to keep the armed forces united. Instead of creating resentment,

his handling of the Ochoa challenge brought the officers

together on the issue.

Army Unity Surprised the FMLN

Miguel Casteflanos-When the Minister of Defense, General

Vides Casanova, frustrated the desires of the reactionaries

stating, "This is not a game; we are providing the bodies," the

FMLN was very much surprised to see the unification of the

High Command and the support they gave to the democratic

process and the Duarte Government. The other matter was that

within the Armed Forces there were no serious differences

between the members of the High Command. There are

variations with respect to the dialogue ... Bland6n [General,

Chief of Staff] who gave more support, then L6pez Nuila

[Colonel, Vice-Minister of Public Security] and ... in the end

... General Vides Casanova. This was very different to the

conception that Bustillo [General, Chief of Armed Forces],

Comandante Miguel Castellanos. former insurgent leader, 1973 to 1985,

interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 25 September 1987. As quoted in

Conversaciones con el Comandante Miguel Castellanos, edited by Javier

Rojas P. (Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andante, 1986), pp. 135-36. Copyright

1986 by Editorial Andante. Reprinted by permission of Editorial Andante.

w
278 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Ochoa and other militaries had with respect to the dialogue. But

there were not serious differences as they used to be, and they

could not achieve the influence or enough power to bring about

a coup d'etat. The support that came from the U.S. was decisive

in bringing the right wing attacks to a halt; although there were

rumors that some U.S. senators had told D'Aubuisson to

continue the attacks because they, as Pinochet in Chile, were

willing to recognize those whose intentions were to destroy

Marxism.

The Basic Understandings

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-I can only tell you that the

Salvadoran Army in 1982 was a mirror image of the United

States Army. We created an army based on the various security

assistance programs. It was our mirror image, reinforced by

Salvador's conventional war experience with the Hondurans.

They had no reason, as they saw it, to think otherwise. The last

war they fought was the one they won, and the tactics that won

for them were the conventional tactics against a conventional

enemy. The difficulties they were having in dealing with the

insurgency were no different from those that any other

conventional force-designed, organized, equipped, and trained

to fight another conventional force-would have in a similar

situation. It came as no surprise. It was with great difficulty that

we got the Army turned around.

First, we looked at the officer corps and the tanda system.

which produced 30 officers a year in peacetime environment.

We were expanding the Army from 10 or 12 thousand to 40

thousand. We needed more leaders, and we needed smarter

leaders and ones who weren't preoccupied with dress formations

and doing squat jumps. We were interested in producing enough

officers so that every key job on a battalion had one officer in

that job, and he wasn't dual, triple, or quadruple hatted, as was

the case in peacetime Salvadoran Army. So, we had to produce

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 279

a large number of officers. We did it at Fort Benning, Georgia.

We produced small unit leaders who were sensitized as best as

we could within the time constraints. You don't abuse your own

soldiers, and you don't abuse the campesinos. We attacked the

small unit problem by training a pilot program with the LRRPs

[Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol], who could prove that a

small group of guys could go out and achieve spectacular results

and come back and tell about it. When I asked the Salvadorans

in '82, "How come you don't use small unit operations?" They

say, "Well, we send companies out; they don't find anything;

we send platoons out; they don't come back." And so we

proved that six guys could go out and, with the proper training

and equipment, could track guerrillas and really make it very

uncomfortable for them-put artillery on them, put air strikes

on them, and they'd never know where it was coming from.

Once we proved that, everybody wanted to buy into the

LRRPs program. Everybody wanted their own LRRPs. By

extension, the next step is to train your brigade force to operate

the same way, give them the same kind of training, give them

the same kind of equipment and, most importantly, have a

reaction force capable of bailing them out if they get in a bad

situation. So, we attacked the officer corps. We attacked the

training and the doctrine, if you will, how they fought this kind

of war. We talked about-we didn't have to talk about human

fights per se-but we talked about how you treat people and

why it's important to get good intelligence from the

campesinos. And that the best kind of intelligence is the kind

they volunteer. I talked to infantry platoon leaders, and I didn't

talk to them about human rights. I talked to them about how

does a campesino in the village deal with you when your patrol

goes through his village? Does he tell you, don't go down that

trail because there are some bad guys down there, or does he

hide his daughters and his chickens? That's human fights, and

that's the perception of the population on what the military

stands for. Are they part of the problem, or are they part of the

solution?

If a Salvadoran or any other Central American would come

to a U.S. Army school in the decade preceding the blow-up in
280 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

El Salvador, what he was getting was essentially the

conventional view. There was very little counterinsurgency

taught at the War College, at the staff colleges, at the Infantry

School. By the late seventies it was a nonsubject. You know, I

was at Leavenworth (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the U.S.

Army's Command and General Staff College) when we cut the

40 hours we had down to 8 hours. And that was in 1979. A

critical year in which our opposition figured out how to fight the

war and how to win it after 20 years of disasters. And at this

time-at the very time when our opposition had finally got its

act together-we're doing away with the subject almost

completely. So, it's no wonder that the Salvadorans reflected

that. What little connection they were getting, what little

exposure they were getting from their Brother to the North, was

essentially one of the conventional war fought with conventional

means. We have got to maintain a cadre of people conversant in

how to fight small. We have got to continue to be able to do as

we say, and not as we do.

I don't expect the United States to ever get involved again

directly, the same way we got involved in Vietnam. I do expect

the United States to be able to intelligently advise its allies who

are involved in that kind of war. If we don't do that, we do our

allies a great disservice. They will continue right up until the

point where the enemy's grappling hooks are coming over the

wall, to fight the wrong kind of war-unless we steer them in

the right direction. Now, that doesn't mean we're going to have

our whole United States Army geared to fight the least

dangerous. We do have to have an element in the United States

Army prepared to advise and assist to fight the most likely. And

that's the basic problem. Sometimes we get so wrapped up with

a war in Europe, in a conventional war, that we lose sight of the

fact that our allies are never going to face-the Salvadorans are

never going to face-the Russians in the Fulda Gap.

You have to remember that what they're up against now is

essentially not a mirror image of an insurgent army but a mirror

image of perceived social, political, and economic inequality. A

whole different ball game.

Another problem in El Salvador is that the government was

unable to mobilize. There was business as usual in the city. You
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 281

know, with the exception of maybe the lights going out

periodically when the guerrillas had knocked down a power line

or a bomb would go off once in a while in the downtown area,

by and large the city was not on a war footing. The clubs, the

sidewalk cafes in the Zona Rosa, were going full blast. The

discos were jumping. There was gasoline. The war was being

fought by the military out in the bush, and it didn't affect the

city very much. And I think the government did not do a very

good job of mobilizing the population. They never declared a

state of emergency. With the exception of a curfew in the citythat was a sometime thing-you really didn't know there was a

war on. So I don't think that the government did a very good

job of selling the population on the fact that there was a war. It

didn't mobilize the population to the effort necessary to cope

with it. It was easy when we had an outside invader, but it is a

whole different ball game when the insurgents are 98 percent

Salvadoran.

We Must Understand That This

War Is Fought on

Diverse Fronts

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila-We must realize that

this type of insurrection must be fought on diverse fronts. Our

biggest mistake as military men is to assume that there is a

quick and rapid solution to this war and that all we need to do is

change a few tactics here and there. But this is simply not the

case. This type war is so new and it's so politically inclined that

its entire framework is very different. We must take political

actions in order to consolidate a political front among the

people. We have been able to accomplish this by focusing on

democratic values and human rights.

In dealing with the economic aspects of this war our goal is

to provide the people with the essential fundamental ingredients

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila. Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.

i
282 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

to survive. When you can control the stomachs, the hearts and

minds will follow. With respect to the diplomatic aspects of the

war, in order to maintain the support of the entire world, it is

fundamental that we manifest our activities in this country to be

legitimate and our enemy's activities as illegitimate. Not to say

that we are performing superbly. We still have a long way to go

for that, but it hasn't been because of any lack of will or

knowledge on our part.

There is a definite need for propaganda techniques,

internally and externally. People must know what is really going

on, not only with respect to the activities of the government and

armed forces, but also what the enemy's real intentions and

motivations are. That is fundamental. Of course when I speak of

propaganda I'm referring to the psychological aspects of it. It is

fundamental to influence an individual psychologically. Thus, a

psychological war. First, it is necessary to implant doubts in

people's minds and then implant certain principles and concepts

in them.

We've talked about the political and economic war. When

making reference to a social war we must consider first that,

regardless of the existence of moderately rich towns, there are

always some sections that are traditionally marginal. This

situation usually occurs in Third World countries where there

are cases of extreme poverty. This is the situation in El

Salvador. Unfortunately, in the past the more powerful

economic sections of this country did not recognize it and were

only conscious about benefiting personally. They never

considered sharing their wealth with those who needed it the

most. We must definitely focus on the social aspects of this

war. The state must take responsibility for offering a good

education, and public schools should be as good as private

schools. They should also concentrate on providing good

medical attention, and again, public hospitals should be as good

as private ones. In order to keep people happy, there must be

good communication services as well as public services and

transportation services. In sum, the people should be provided

with ideal living conditions.

We, the military, are doing the best we can to provide all

of these services. Certainly we are the ones at the front and
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 283

risking our lives, but we could not manage without the other

factors of this war I've already mentioned. If we didn't have a

political project we would have lost the war. If we didn't have

at this moment an economic project to help and improve the

living conditions of the needy, we could lose this war. If we had

maintained ourselves in a state of isolationism and not

reestablished international relations with other nations, with

international organizations and private organizations, we would

be in a very difficult situation. If we had not alerted our people

about the current situation in Nicaragua-the fact that there is a

Marxist political project in that country and El Salvador is

returning to a stable democratic country-we would also be in

trouble. Then, we've had to emphasize on our people that there

are two types of revolutions: a Marxist revolution and a

democratic revolution. Let's wait and see which wins. Our

countries are both the same. The Nicaraguans are the same as

the Salvadorans. We eat the same, drink the same, think the

same way, speak the same way. Then we have the opportunity

to demonstrate to the world that where there's a will, there's a

way, and where there is a true conviction to winning we can

reestablish true democracies. All of these factors are equally as

important.

We as soldiers always think that military actions are most

important and that 90 percent of the effort should be ours. Well,

that's wrong. The effort must be equal. If you take 100 and

divide it by 6, the result is the total military effort that must be

made. The less military effort is made, the less casualties,

destruction, violence, and danger there is. That is fundamental.

Toward a Permanent Offensive

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova-Our major

concern was to have a capable armed forces in order to confront

the subversives, who were in much greater numbers than we

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova. Salvadoran Minister of

Defense, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 19

December 1987.

A
284 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

had anticipated. We needed to acquire vehicles and helicopters,

to improve our infantry's equipment which included 13- to 14-

year-old guns. We needed to improve the armed forces'

professionalism, our units, improve coordination capabilities,

provide some security to our military installations, which were

not designed for an external or internal threat but, rather, as

housing facilities. We needed to improve our intelligence

systems. Accomplishing these tasks with resources is easy, but

lacking the necessary means to do so makes it very difficult.

Thank God we've been able to count on the support and aid

from the United States. It has allowed us to progress

substantially during the first 6 years, quite different from what

we had accomplished in the previous 25 years. For example,

back then we had the capability of transporting only 20 people

in helicopters. They were all very small helicopters and

commercial ones at that. I think today, if all the helicopters

were in good shape, we could transport some 500 people,

simultaneously. This is indicative of a significant evolution, at

least 20 to 25 times greater than the original capabilities we had

then. We also lacked the necessary airplanes to combat the

subversives. To date we have very few planes but are managing

to successfully defeat the insurgents. We also lacked sufficient

combat medics. Today, there are a little more than 2,000

professionally trained nurses to rescue combat victims. We

didn't have helicopters to rescue the wounded from

battlegrounds. Today we own five. We have established the

paramedics personnel and improved our health servicesmilitary health facilities. Our transportation vehicles were

extremely inefficient at one time, but now we have improved

mobilization capability. During the final offensive we were able

to defeat the enemy with 40 radios that had arrived eight days

before. I don't think the ESAF had more than 250 radios

(PRC-77's) at the time. Now we can communicate from 2,000

to 3,000 radios, and all of our units have their own radio

equipment. This has improved our communications capabilities

and our capacity to deliver instructions and coordinate actions of

our troops. Our combat equipment has increased

tremendously-artillery, infantry weapons-there's more
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 285

support for aerial equipment, etc. We have improved

professionally and with respect to the employment of weapons.

We have converted an armed forces prepared to fight a

conventional war into one that combats subversion. All of our

units are trained. The public security forces have been

professionalized, which is largely due to the efforts of Colonel

L6pez Nuila. We are in the process of creating special schools at

various levels in order to have truly professional security forces.

We have improved our investigation techniques and have trained

our units for a psychological war. This has enabled us to defeat the

enemy more effectively. Thanks to the support and efforts of the

United States, we've managed to legitimize our military forces.

I don't think many countries benefit from the means of

support and analytical capabilities that we have managed to

acquire. We have our own radio system that supports the armed

forces. We have respected the democratic process and human

rights, and we have improved our armed forces, not only

growing in numbers, but also growing professionally and in

moral virtues. In five and a half years our Army has increased

from 15,000 to 50,000. This growth also includes the

availability of communications, materials-weapons, vehicles,

ammunition-administrative and management capabilities,

uniforms, boots, underwear, etc. I believe that with the aid

we've received from the United States we have a professional

armed forces that is undoubtedly qualified to confront the

subversive forces in the future. I reemphasize this issue because

I merely want to point out the improvements we have had since

1981-1983, when the armed forces had a defensive position due

to the limited resources we had. Presently we hold a strong

offensive position.

Our position must be offensive. Back in '83, 1 remember

attending a meeting in the United States where government

officials were worried that El Salvador was going to fall within

15 days. I reassured them that this was not the case, and we

were going to fight until the end, if necessary, but we needed

aid. I also reassured them that we were progressing in the

democratic process and the human rights issue and that we were

winning the war. Thanks to the U.S. aid, the Salvadoran

,- - ~ -
286 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

people's cooperation and their support for the armed forces, we

were able to overcome those problems. Back then we faced

problems in organization, problems in unity of command, a

sharp division among the armed forces, serious political

problems. People were demonstrating in the streets. The

subversives were striking heavy blows everywhere. Democratic

countries were pressuring us, as well as the U.S. Congress.

Those countries wanted El Salvador to experience the same

radical changes as did Nicaragua. There was a certain insurgent

enthusiasm at the time when it was contemplated that there

might be five more Nicaraguas in Central America.

This coming December it will be three years since we

adopted a permanent offensive position throughout the entire

national territory. I received a lot of support from the officers

and troops. We've faced difficulties at times when having to

depend on our natioii, budget, but we've managed to come

through. We hav r, :ived aid from the United States according

to how it was planned under the Kissinger or Jackson program.

I'm not quite sure what it was called, but regardless of that it

enabled us to develop a strategy for five years.

I was quite satisfied with the outcome of my last visit to

Washington. Up to now, all of the promises that were made

then have been fulfilled. That has been very important to me

because when I travelled to Washington I was asked, "General,

are you going to respect the democratic process?" My response

was, "Give me some time and I will prove to you that you can

depend on us and that we won't go back on our word. Give us

an opportunity, and we will do it." Presently, the United States

recognizes that we have fulfilled our promises, and as a result

we are receiving a much more general support, not only from

the government, but also from the Senate and [the Housel,

which are constantly in disagreement with one another;

however, there has been more of a unanimous support with

respect to the problem in El Salvador.

I would like you to know, before we continue any further

with this interview, that the way I express myself throughout is

mostly my point of view. When I was learning how to read my

father used to tell me not to believe everything you read.
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 287

Rather, learn to formulate your own criteria. When you listen to people speak, talk to those who have been actively involved in the process so that your perception of things is more clear to

you and you can depend on your own interpretations rather than

someone else's. Sometimes people's interpretations of things

tend to be more opinionated than others. Nevertheless, I think

mine will help you in the long run.

When we took the offensive in '83, it boosted the armed

forces' morale significantly. It also enabled us to keep the

subversive forces on the run and decentralize their units. They

formed smaller groups because they knew we had the capability

to surround them and to destroy them. However, by forming

these smaller groups the subversives lost the support of the

people and the capacity to indoctrinate them. They became

wearied and fatigued and faced a lot of difficulties when trying to receive supplies and trying to transport them from one

location to another. This situation exhausted them physically

and morally. Due to these several factors and the psychological

operations campaign we launched, we were able to sustain our

offensive position and continue to strengthen our forces.

People started giving in to the armed forces. The armed

forces' humanitarian approach to this war continued during that

time, and those same people who have previously given in to

the humanitarian approach to this war continued during that

time. Those same people who had previously given in to the

humane tactics of our forces would one day try to convince

someone else that we are sympathetic toward the people. That

we are not a ruthless and brutal entity who kills people for the

pleasure of doing so. Instead, we would encourage people by

giving them a certain amount of money for every rifle they'd

come across, and if they stumbled on two or more, the price

would double. We used these people as personal messengers to

spread around our intentions, and coincidently there was

massive desertion from the subversive forces. I believe they

reached some 900 or so desertions, unlike years past where

there were none.

As soon as the desertions from the subversives became

evident, we noticed a decrease in the capabilities of the

N .4
288 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

subversives to fulfill certain actions or even lacking the ability

to control one of the 14 departments. They then resorted to

those tactics they had practiced years before when they were

ambushing small locations, destroying electric posts, destroying

small bridges, machine-gunning bus stops because people

continued to work and support the government rather than

acknowledging the efforts of the subversives. During this time,

our forces began to combat in small units.

We began to use intelligence sources more effectively,

lessen our consumption of ammunition, our use of vehicles, etc.

But we still had to insert two or three battalions into certain

areas as part of our offensive position, due to a strong resistance

on the part of the subversives. Beginning in January of this year

[19861, we entered these areas with very small units, but there

is a national-level response to this offensive approach we have taken. There is an increased awareness of the capabilities and

initiative taken by the armed forces, and the positive results the

military has had have become quite evident throughout the

national territory. Unit discipline and morale have become

strengthened characteristics of the armed forces. We have

learned to do with what we have.

A new system was introduced January of this year. We

have demonstrated to the insurgents that their impenetrable

sanctuaries can be taken and occupied for a considerable length

of time. For example, one of our battalions occupied the

territory of Guazapa for 12 months, in which their (insurgents')

control centers, logistics, and supplies were located. This has

been accomplished with four or five other insurgent installations

throughout the country. Such operations include the ChAvez

Carrefio operation in north Chalatenango, the Jers6n Calite

Operations in Usulutin, the Hero Operation in Morazzin (back

on October 23), and other operations we've carried out to

protect harvest, the elections, transportation, etc.

When I talk to North Americans I tend to compare the

armed forces to the stages of evolution of learning to play

soccer. During the first stage you can score points in the games

by kicking, fouling, and disregarding the rules of the game.

That was our first evolutionary stage. We didn't have any shoes
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 289

and fought barefoot, but in the end we won. However, during

that time we realized that we needed to improve our standards if

we wanted to win and save this country. A boy knows he has to

work if he wants to wear soccer shoes. He has to receive proper

training in order to learn the different stages of the game. He

needs to purchase the proper trunks so he can look presentable.

He must watch television and observe the different plays he

must learn. You can already see the formation of the individual

player, a small team.

During those first three years the team begins to improve

its image-abides by the rules of the game, respects the referee,

knows where to strike, knows how long to play. Of course, in a

strictly military sense, you see the individual soldier who wants

to develop a constant pace within the different units, among the

different elements, and he respects what the referee may have to

say with respect to human rights. He also is conscious of the

public's perception of how be is performing and tries to outdo

himself in order to receive applause and congratulations. I must

admit that we have yet to master this aspect of our armed

forces' degree of improvement; we are a little slow at this. The

game begins. We reach the goalie's line, but we are not able to

score as many points as we'd like. As a result, a General Staff

was created in order to better coordinate the air, land, and sea

operations. You then see an improvement in communications

and overall attitudes. There is hope for a team improvement, but

we need a Peld and a Maradona. We need a lot of people who

will have the initiative to fight in the fields and attack by

surprise. This is more or less how we've been playing this

game, and by the beginning of January of this year the armed

forces' analyses, strategic planning in the cuarteles, are fixed.

There is no more looking back on what happened, what could

have been done. Rather we focus on the improvements to make

for the future. What can we do for these people? What means

do we have to accomplish our goals? That is, the

accomplishment of those tasks heavily depends on how much

respect the referee receives.

We are conscious of the fact that in order to win this battle

we must follow the rules of the game because one foul play can
290 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

mean a goal. We then begin to see a team that better coordinates

its plays, and more intelligently. There is no need to exert as

much effort as before because we now have an improved,

coordinated plan to deal with the situation. The public sees the

winning team as a legitimate one. We don't need to play dirty in

order to win.

Another evolutionary stage of the armed forces that I've

seen so far is the consolidation of the democratic valuesrespect for human rights, a much higher degree of

professionalism where a member of the armed forces

acknowledges the fact that he is susceptible to the same

treatment as any other citizen is under the law. This is quite an

evolution in our forces, a more conscious awareness that there is

the possibility to excel in the future. But, unfortunately, things

were too good to be true. The earthquake introduced a drastic

change to what we were doing.

Regardless of the earthquake, the armed forces have managed

to fulfill most of their obligations. We have only experienced two

robbery cases in San Salvador since then. The people are hungry

and jobless, but, nevertheless, we've managed to successfully

accomplish our mission, and this is due mainly to the support

we've received from the people. We've been able to maintain

security all along the national territory despite the problems the

country faces. But, we are aware of the fact that the less affected

area, in terms of the war, is San Salvador. But due to the effects

of the earthquake, the capital looks like it's been under constant

subversion five or six months.

Finally, we can say with a lot of pride that our soldiers are

heroes of this country. Industrialists, agriculturalists, cattlemen,

professionals, doctors, lawyers, professors have also been

heroes, as well as the people who work daily at the market place

by selling their products and enabling our campesinos in

difficult areas to continue to produce out in the fields. I think

this is the first major bulwark the Communist front has

encountered because it proves what kind of governmental

system the people want to live under and be subject to. It has

demonstrated its capabilities to undergo much pain and suffering

in order to obtain what it really wants. The people have defied

... . ....
ARMY UNITY AND ASCENDANCE 291

the subversives' activities by impeding the latter's use of

transportation facilities. We have a very strong and courageous

people who, within the means available to them, have managed

to put up a fight against the enemy and cooperate in our efforts

to defend this country.

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Ldpez Nuila-Then, of course, our

recent successes are due to the product of time, the product of a

lot of effort, and the product of our highly trained officers who

have learned to combat. Our soldiers became more skillful, and

we could count on better equipment, much more knowledge,

and a more effective aerial support. All of these circumstances

have made it possible for us to change the course of the war-a

war that we were desperately losing back in 1983.

The Professionalization of the

Salvadoran Military

Colonel James J. Steele-When I say professionalize or assist

them in professionalization, that's not an easy task to define or

to accomplish if you look at the history of this military and its

involvement in politics. When we say professionalize, I'm

talking about developing, within the military, the respect for the

human rights of its citizens, to help protect the democratic

process, and so on. I think, as you look at those, there's been

some pretty significant progress. If you look at thL military and

say, "Okay, have we really changed their attitude towards

democracy, their role in the society. or have we just levered

them into a behavioral change?" The answer is, at this point.

it's too early to tell. It's going to take a while, whether you're

talking about the attitude of the military or the prospects for

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.

Colonel James 1. Steele, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1984 to 1986, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986; and. in Monterey, California, 5 November 1986.
292 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

democracy in El Salvador. It's going to take a couple of

presidential elections before you begin to really institutionalize

that process. If you look at the attitudes of not just senior

officers but also junior officers, you see a change in terms of

how they see the people and how they see their role in the

society. If you look at, and you're trying to judge, how you're

doing on professionalizing the military, look at the way it's

performed in the last elections, say, presidential elections in '84

or the assembly elections in '85.

The other thing is that they have accepted our advice and

we have accepted their views. There was a mutual

understanding and agreement on not just training but the whole

spectrum of the program including how many people would be

sent for training, what kind of equipment was going to be

brought in, how the course was going to be developed and

structured to deal with the threat.
Changes in Organization,

Training, and Operations

Evolving Organization, Training,

and Operations in the Army

Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce-As Chief of Operations of the

Combined General Staff of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, I will

focus on three aspects of the Army's evolution that are my

responsibility-organization, training, and operations. At the

outset of this conflict, between 1978-79, the armed forces had

battalions organized in the classical sense. That is, they were

prepared to fight a conventional war. We began to realize that

this type of organization was unsuitable for confronting the

internal problem at the time. As a result drastic changes were

made in organizing these units, and we initiated hunter

battalions made up of 220 men. That was in '80-'82. As the war

intensified, we realized that these new battalions were much too

small to encounter the organized units the subversives had back

then. In 1981-82 then we created rapid reaction battalions with a

total of i,200 men. Presently, we have five of these rapid

reaction battalions. As the hunter battalions slowly began to

disappear within the different brigades and military

Colonel Ren6 Emilio Ponce. former C-3 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces

and now Commander of the Third Brigade. interviewed in San Salvador. El

Salvador. 22 January 1987.

293
294 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

detachments, we formed anti-terrorist infantry battalions

composed of approximately 580 troops and countersubversion

infantry battalions composed of 390 troops. The location of

these battalions, whether anti-terrorist or countersubversion, is

in agreement with the conflict situation in the area. For

example, in the eastern sections, where most of the hostility

prevails, we have anti-terrorist infantry battalions in the brigade

and military detachments. There is much less hostility in the

western region of the country. We have positioned several

countersubversion battalions in this region because we believe it

is the most effective way to counteract the terrorist activities in

the region. Also, back in '82, we intensified training and the

organization of reconnaissance units and snipers in order to

provide more impulse to the military intelligence system we had

then. Additionally, some modifications had to be made with

regard to the territorial military division in the country.

We needed to have a territorial division that was in

accordance with the situation at the time and with the terrestrial

communication routes that existed back then, also because of

the economic importance of the areas. Therefore, we have to

establish military zones such as the Usulutfn Department. Due

to the territorial military division in this department there has

been an attempt to coincide with political division in our

country. We have managed to secure a tighter command and

control at the various levels of military hierarchy, since 1984.

I'm referring to colonels all the way down to corporals. Our Air

Force has also experienced an improvement with respect to its

troops. Due to its incrementation, it has reorganized completely.

The Navy had done the same; however, they depend on less

troops.

With respect to training, when we began to confront this

type of internal conflict, we were only prepared to deal with a

conventional war, a classical war. We had no idea what it was

like to fight a guerrilla war, a low-intensity conflict as it is

referred to by the Americans. But the development of this type

of war required us to accomplish certain training techniques at

all levels-chiefs, officers, cadets, Army/Air Force/Marine

troops-and prepare them ideologically, physically, technically,
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 295

and tactically to confront a subversive war, not only with regard

to the military field, but also the social, political, economic, and

psychological fields. But more importantly, that it is an external

threat. Working within this conceptual framework we needed to

prepare our forces to deal with the situation at hand by

inculcating into them the role they had to perform throughout

this type of conflict.

By that time we needed to modify the required military

service. At the beginning, only one year was required. We then

increased the time to 18 months, and presently the men are

required to serve 24 months. But due to the continuation of this

war, conflict, struggle, whatever you want to call it, we thought

it would be necessary to seek the assistance of highly

specialized, technically competent individuals in order to win

this war. Instead, we decided to reorganize our budget so that

by the end of the required 24-month period of service, the

soldier could choose to remain for a longer period of time and

increase his salary. This measure contributed significantly to

improving our forces and incrementing our troops. Additionally,

our government's image improved in the eyes of the

international world, along with the armed forces.

We began receiving offers from different countries to send

our officers, cadets, and troops to foreign schools to receive

proper education and training. I could point out that our only

source of training support was the United States, but by that

time, we began receiving scholarships from Belgium, England,

Italy, Spain, Germany, and most of the South American

countries, with the exception of Ecuador and Bolivia. To this

date, our officers, cadets, and troops are studying in foreign

schools and taking courses in technical specialization and

professionalization, at the different levels, In 1984, the Centro

de Entrenamiento Militar de la Fuerza Armada, CEMFA

(Armed Forces Military Training Center), was established in La

Uni6n. This resulted from a need to provide a better organized

training system and to free those units which were subject to

constant hostile enemy fire.

Since 1984, then, we have been training more capable

soldiers in a more organized manner. The outcome is very
296 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

positive. Our training periods were reduced from a 15-week

course to 12 weeks. As a result, there has been improvement in

combat efficiency, better treatment of the civilian population on

the part of the military, substantial progress with regard to the

human rights issue, and a successful attempt to minimize abuses

of authority. Each unit, respectively, has indoctrinated its troops

in all aspects ranging from promotions to technical training and

taught them to use a specific weapon and perform in special

units-reconnaissance units, francotiradores [snipers], etc.

The one commonality that is shared by all of these factors

is that they are all the product of foreign assistance and, as a

result, have provided a major professionalization of this

institution. I'm referring to the highest ranking general all the

way down to the corporal level. It has resulted in improved

relations with the civilian population, a betterment of combat

efficiency and analysis capabilities, especially at the higher

echelons of the military. Training has tremendously influenced

the members of this institution. The professionalism, training,

and military education we've had since 1983 has permitted the

armed forces to remain a united, more dedicated institution and

retain a military advantage in the struggle against the

subversives.

In 1984, with the restructuring of the commands, including

the high-ranking military commands, we saw a new stage in the

armed forces. Beginning with 1984, we created the Joint

Operations Center of the Armed Forces in order to deal with the

situation at a national level. The Tactical Operations Centers

were created in each brigade to improve command and control.

Commandants were replaced in order to better the conduct of

military operations out in the fields. We took the offensive at a

national level and since then we've been able to maintain the

initiative. We've obtained greater combat efficiency and great

operability of our units due to the following factors: (i) better

command and control and (2) greater dispersion of our troops

throughout the terrain. But the introduction of psychological

operations and the civic action activities, to improve our image

in the eyes of our people and to obtain their support and
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 297

sympathy, will help us win this war. It is also due to the

introduction of heli-transport systems, whether with specialized

units at the strategic level or by the employment of helitransport operations or specialized units at the brigade and

military detachment levels. There has been an increase of small

unit operations as well as ambushes. This represents rather

significant progress because, previously, we operated at great

levels and with large centralized units. Since 1984-85 we've

been operating with smaller units.

A third factor is our increased support in air power support

and artillery. I want to emphasize the fact that the Air Force has

evolved dramatically in its tactical procedures, in its vast

support to units on land, and has been very significant

throughout this struggle. Of course, this is also due to the

increased training capability and aerial equipment along with the

courage displayed by the pilots. Artillery has proved to be

efficient at all times.

Another factor involved the greater tactical mobility and

communications systems, which have been tremendously

upgraded. This is a result of the greater acquisition of

equipment such as trucks, pick-ups, jeeps, and adequate

communications equipment which better enable us to operate

our small units.

With much more limited resources, the Navy has also been

able to improve on some of its deficiencies. It has incremented

its naval resources and has created new units such as Marine

Infantry Battalion and the Marine Commando Battalion.

An additional factor that has contributed to the upgrading

of our military operations is the further development of our

military intelligence system; little by little we've improved on

that. But, unfortunately, we're not out of the woods yet. We

need to increase our capabilities in this field.

One more factor I would like to point out is that due to the

consistent support we've received from the U.S. Government,

our combat service support has improved. It has enabled us to

alter our logistics programs into a more practical system, as a

result, the Logistics Support Command.

I

&_I
298 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Another View of Organization

and Training

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-i'll start out and talk about the

organization of the Salvadoran military from the top. First you

have a Minister of Defense, who is a general officer and a

career military person. The Minister of Defense is General

Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova. He supports the President very

closely, has close rapport with the President, and he has

expended a lot of political capital in supporting President

Duarte. He has two Vice Ministers of Defense, a Vice Minister

of Defense for Military Matters, another general officer,

General Rafael Flores Lima, and a Vice Minister of Defense for

Public Security, Colonel L6pez Nuila.

Subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, you have the Joint

General Staff. The Chief of the Joint General Staff is General

Onecffero Bland6n. He has subordinate to him a C-1 section

responsible for personnel, a C-2 section responsible for

intelligence, a C-3 section responsible for operations, a C-4

section responsible for logistics, and a C-5 section responsible

for psychological operations and civil affairs. The formerly

separate signal section on the Joint General Staff has been

subordinated to the C-3 section-operations.

The country is divided into six military zones. Each

military zone is commanded by a full colonel. The slot, the job,

calls for a general officer, but they have promoted no one in

those positions to the grade of general, so the military zones are

commanded by colonels.

The six military zones are also territorial commands with

geographical limits. The person who is a military zone

commander is also a brigade commander. The commander of

the 6th Military Zone, for instance, is also the commander of

the 6th Brigade. Each of these military zones normally has

within it three departments which are the political subdivisions

of the nation. In one particular case the 4th Military Zone

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador. 1983 to

1985. interviewed in Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania. 4 March 1986.
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 299

consists only of one department. This department is divided into

two military command areas. The zonal command is exercised

from El Parafso. A subordinate destacamento or detachment has

its command center in the city of Chalatenango, the capital of

the Department of Chalatenango. And the 6th Military Zone

also consists of only one department. But, those are exceptions

to the rule.

Each departmental command normally has a lieutenant

colonel commanding at the departmental level, and that is a

detachment level command or a destacamento. These

commanders are then, in theory at least, subordinate to the

military zone commander. Your military zone or brigade

commander is located normally, with one exception, in a

departmental headquarters or in a departmental capital. In such

a case, he is at one and the same time both a military zone

commander and the commander of the forces which operate in

that particular department. Normally, in a given department,

there are two or three infantry battalions of differing sizes,

depending upon the threat, which are directly responsive and

subordinate to the departmental commander.

Where the military zone is located in a departmental

headquarters, the brigade commander has directly under his

control three infantry battalions plus the destacamento or the

detachment commanders of the other two departments which

form his military zone. So he's double-hatted. He's a military

zone/brigade commander under one hat, and he's also a

departmental commander of the department in which his

headquarters is located.

There is a long tradition of autonomy at the departmental

level. Each of the commanders in a department, although he is

directly subordinate to the military zone/brigade commander,

nevertheless by tradition feels that he has a great deal of

independent responsibility. Slowly but surely these departmental

commanders have been brought under the control of the brigade

commanders. But still there's a tendency for a departmental

commander, if he's not happy with an order he received, to

short circuit the chain of command and go directly back to the

Joint General Staff for clarification of his instructions. This

.4
300 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

problem is being largely solved, and pretty strong people have

been made brigade commanders so that they're able to control

the departmental commanders. But there are still problems as

far as cooperation between different military zones is

concerned. You may have a military zone which will have

anywhere from six, seven, eight, or nine battalions within the

military zone-three departments, three battalions per

department. You're talking about potentially nine infantry

battalions conducting an operation in one military zone which

has three military departments in it. And an adjacent military

zone will have another major operation going, and there's no

coordination between military zones. The blocking forces aren't

coordinated between military zones. So you have a breakdown

of coordination, not always but frequently, of operations

between military zones.

Within a military zone, within a brigade area, the

departments do coordinate their operations. The military zone

commander will run a military zone-wide operation and use the

forces of all the departments within his military zone to conduct

a larger operation, and those are fairly carefully planned and

coordinated. In fact, the battalions that normally operate in one

department may very well cross into another department within

the same military zone as part of an operation. However, it has

been noted from time-to-time that even within a military zone,

the military zone/brigade commander, that colonel, will hesitate

to issue a direct order to a departmental commander. There may

be bickering and discussing and haggling going on over what

the role of the subordinate really is for an operation. So this old

tradition of autonomy within a department is still there beneath

the surface, and it takes a really strong man as brigade

commander to demand compliance.

The problem is that the promotion system in El Salvador is

not really based on merit. It's based on time in grade and time

in service and certain school gates. I think you have to graduate

from Command and General Staff College to be promoted to

lieutenant colonel, for instance. But that being given, they will

all be promoted on the same day. Therefore you have a large

pool of guys from whom your commanders can be selected.
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 301

More and more, as time has gone on, the good guys have been

selected for departmental commands, for command of your

immediate reaction battalions, for brigade command. You've

got some pretty good people there, but the guys that aren't so

good don't get thrown out of the Army or left behind in the

promotion cycle. The first real selection, the narrowing down,

the peaking of the pyramid, really occurs when people who

don't get into the Command and General Staff College and

don't make lieutenant colonel. And some of them drop out

there. There's a selection process for their Command and

General Staff College, but once a guy has made lieutenant

colonel, he's going to make colonel right along with his

classmates. The narrowing point comes for promotion to general

officer. That's done by board selection and approved by the

president. But, the military pretty much controls selection to the

grade of general officer. Let me get back to this-while you

have some good guys who are getting into those positions of

command, you also have some mediocre and some poor guys at

the grades of lieutenant colonel and colonel for whom a home in

the service must be found somewhere. They're still out there

doing a little damage here and a little damage there because you

can't get rid of them. There's no procedure for booting these

guys out of the service or not promoting them. They get

promoted, and they've got to be assigned somewhere.

You have to understand that different areas of the country

are like night and day as far as the level of conflict is

concerned. There are some sleepy hollow type areas in the

western part of the country where they've had some real

zingers, some losers, because you could park the guy out there,

and he couldn't do too much damage. The eastern three

departments in the 3rd Military Zone, with its headquarters at

San Miguel, always has been a very active area. Likewise, the

4th Military Zone, which is really the Department of

Chalatenango, and the 6th Military Zone, which is one

department-the Department of UsulutAn-and the 5th Military

Zone headquartered at San Vicente with three departments.

These are conflict areas, and among the best people they can

find are chosen to head up those departments or to take those

military zone commands and the departmental commands.

A
302 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

We just scratched on the surface of the organization. As far

as the level of training is concerned, today the level of training

of the soldiers-the young recruits who come in for a two-year

period of service-has improved immensely. The Salvadorans

now have their own national basic training center located very

near La Uni6n, which is in the Third Military Zone in the

Department of La Uni6n. The training now is very good, very

professional. So we're getting young soldiers in the system who

are good. We sent a number of officers and enlisted personnel

to various places for training-Fort Bragg, Fort Benning, the

Regional Military Training Center in Honduras (which is closed

now and has been for some time)-and the training at the lower

levels has been good. We've done a lot of training of cadets at

the U.S. Army School of the Americans (USARSA), first in

Panama and now at Fort Benning, Georgia. So the young

leaders are getting good training.

The breakdown, the weakness, is among officers in midlevel grades which I would define as senior captains and junior

majors. The guys who are coming in and getting ready to take

over the command of your immediate reaction battalions or are

now battalion commanders. These are guys who really are

lacking in basic military training. Things you seldom seerange cards, fire plans, holes in the ground, night firing stakes,

flank security (we go right down ife line of the little nitty-gritty

things), proper use of direct fire support, for instance. These

things that mark the ability of a unit to go out and stay out in the

field and live are missing-terrain analysis, terrain appreciation.

You'll see a unit will set up a bivouac-using the term rather

loosely-on an operation potentially in contact with the enemy

in a location that is overlooked by a piece of higher ground one

or two hundred meters away and be completely unaware of the

fact that they could just be all shot to pieces by two or three

guerrillas from that location. There's no noise or light discipline

at night-fires get lit. It's like sort of a Civil War bivouac or

something like that-campfires here and there, people gathered

around the fires talking, and this sort of thing, with no evident

organization for the defense, no reserve, no positions. There

may be some listening posts out, I don't know. I'm not aware of
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 303

what steps they may have taken to tighten up this sort of thing,

but from what I have seen the professional things that need to be

done to fight successfully are simply not being done. This is not

a breakdown in the training of the individual soldier, and it's

not a breakdown in the training of the young cadets and

lieutenants. The breakdown is at the mid-leadership level and

the senior leadership level.

We bring guys back to the States, more senior people, send

them to our Command and General Staff Course-which, by the

way, isn't long enough to qualify them for their DEM (Diploma

de Estado Mayor). They don't get credit for going to our

Command and General Staff Course because it's too short. Very

interesting.

These guys are not getting the right kind of training in the

States. They come back, and they get a lot of very theoretical

training, a lot of very fine training in our training programs. The

courses that we should be offering to train their mid-level

officers, the guys we need to reach, should be at either the basic

or the advanced course level. USARSA has got a good basic

course, and I believe a good advanced officer course, but even

in those courses-and I spent nearly three years at USARSAwe're still not teaching the basics to the mid-level guy. We

assume that an officer coming into our schooling program at the

grade of captain or major has all of this stuff down pat.

We're making a lot of assumptions which are incorrect.

We assume that he has certain basic leadership skills, that he's

going to check on his guys, that he's going to go out himself

and make sure that things are being done, when that's probably

not the case. We assume that he appreciates terrain and knows

how to set up a defensive position properly. How to use his fire

support, how to mount a night patrol, or any other type of

offensive operation. That he stays off the roads and trails and

puts out flank security. We assume all of these things, and we

teach at a higher level. The fact is that these officers don't

operate that way. The way we're going now it will take a full

military generation-which I define as about 20 years-and

maybe more, before we get a trickle-up effect and we start

seeing professionalism at the battalion command level. In El

'I
304 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Salvador the battalion command level is captain and major.

Some of these guys are very, very good, but most of them are

lacking in some of the basic skills. We can train the lieutenant

colonels all we want, and we can train the cadets and the troops

all we want, but until we reach the guys in the positions of

command, the training that we give the young soldiers and the

young cadets won't get employed because they immediately

forget all of the good things they've learned and adapt to the

bad habits of their own chain of command.

One other thing is here that is a problem in all Third World

armies, and that is that the officer corps is usually not too well

paid. That is the case also in El Salvador, and, as a result, you

have some corruption. Suffice it to say that the system doesn't

cleanse itself, that the institutional solidarity is such that officers

who were known to be corrupt were not punished for their

corruption, and this causes a very serious degradation of

discipline throughout the structure. That corruption, while not 

a

dominating factor in the Salvadoran military, is there. There

were three to five individuals seriously involved with very

lucrative, corrupt practices. Some of them were rather senior,

and no steps were taken really to hold them accountable for

their actions.

Other lesser forms of what I would call traditional

corruption continue to play a role in the life support system of

the Salvadoran officer. These all have the effect of detracting

from discipline and detract, I believe, from the confidence that

the officers have in their own soldiers. They hesitate to demand

great things of them in some cases because they know that their

own basis for demanding sacrifice is a little bit on the weak

side. This is not as great a problem in El Salvador as it is in

many other places, and the problem, I think, is recognized by

many people. It's just that the institutional solidarity of the

officer corps is such that it's almost impossible at the present

time to do anything about it.

I might mention the chain of command. As in any very

small officer corps, you have a lot of personal friendships, and

you have people who are related to each other. From time to

time that chain of command, unfortunately, is circumvented.

N
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 305

The departmental commanders have traditionally had a great deal

of regional autonomy which they have jealously guarded. They

have a tendency, therefore, to bypass the chain of command which

passes through the brigade and go directly back to the Joint

General Staff. An officer might very well appeal directly to the

Chief of the Joint General Staff or to the Minister of Defense if he

were a personal friend, and he didn't like an order that he had

received from his immediate superior. There's a very strong

possibility that the order would be changed or that he would be

given to understand that he didn't have to worry about doing it.

This occurred, I know, on at least one specific occasion when the

Chief of the Joint General Staff ordered an officer in the 2nd

Military Zone to reorganize his battalions according to a new

Table of Organization and Equipment. He didn't want to do it. He

was a cousin of the Minister of Defense, called the Minister of

Defense, and that ended the matter right there.

Another factor acting in the chain of command is the

hesitancy to do anything that's confrontational. If you issue an

order to someone and it's a tough damn order, unless you're

willing to confront an individual and force him to do it, there is a

tendency not to follow through if you think there's some likelihood

that your order hasn't been executed, because it's very

embarrassing when you discover the guy isn't doing what you've

told him to do. This is not prevalent, but still the chain of

command doesn't work the same way (as ours). There is not that

obligation on the part of the senior officer to follow through and

make sure that his order has been executed according to its intent.

The sense of urgency and obligation to do that does not exist. It's

not there.

No Place in the Country the

Army Can't Go

Colonel John Elerson-I talked about the fact that early-on

the biggest thing that guys here did was to take the ESAF from

Colonel John C. Ellerson, U.S. Military Group Commander in El

Salvador, 1986 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 27 and 28

September 1987.
306 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

12-14,000 to 56,000 reasonably well equipped and trained guys.

They now have a lot more to work with than they did. They got an

Air Force that is an insurance policy. The ESAF can't win with it,

but they can't lose with it either. So we took them from the stage

where they were fighting six inches out in front of themselves,

worrying about whether they were going to survive from today

until tomorrow, to where they are going to survive tomorrow. But

now they are trying to figure out, how do I win, and how do I

finish this thing off?. How do I refine it?

As I would describe the situation now, we are fighting at

about two different levels. We do have these larger units, these

56,000 guys out and about beating the bushes, broken out into

smaller units operating increasingly at night, not terribly

sophisticated, not terribly polished yet, just 56,000 of our guys out

against 5,000 or 6,000 of theirs. They are saying, "I may be

stumble, bumble. I may be route step, but damn it, I'm out there

now, and I'm out there in smaller units. I'm out there at night. I'm

out there just throwing things up in the air, confusing the issue,

making it hard if not impossible for a guerrilla to stay any place

for more than a day or so." The people that we capture tell us that

24-36 hours tops, and they've got to be moving. Increasingly in

the core areas of the country it's the terrorists that you kill. Their

equipment is not in that good shape. Their uniform is not that

good. He doesn't look like he has been living a very good life.

So again, the picture I want to create is there are 56,000 out

and about and going anywhere they want. There is no place in this

country now that the ESAF doesn't go, can't go, in those smaller

operating units. Just throwing things up in the air, keeping the

guerrilla off balance, making life generally miserable for him.

They kill 2 or 3 of the ESAF this week, we kill 8 to 10 of them.

They kill 5 to 8 of the ESAF this week, we kill 18 to 20 of them

this week. That's about the way it seems to go. Once in a while,

we go to sleep at the switch, like in El Parafso, and we get our

nose bloodied, but by and large as we go along, they kill 10 of us,

we kill 20 of them. They kill 2 or 3, we kill 10. And we can

replace our 2 or 3 a lot easier than he can replace his 10. There is

ample evidence of that. Increased forced recruiting on their part.

Desertions that we know of are down because their numbers over-

,i
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 307

all are down. At that one level we are playing again with these

larger units just out and about, going anywhere, everywhere. More

often than not, just throwing things up in the air, taking the

initiative away from the guerrilla, making life generally

uncomfortable for them.

Beyond that, starting during Jim Steele's time the ESAF

began to try to develop at each brigade a special operating force, a

takeoff on the prowl, out at the air base. They all had different

names. They called them prowls; they called them "goeys"; they

called them "proeys"-but it's a 20- or 30-man, special, super

duper outfit, you pull off line. You give them one or two weeks of

training and a patch of their own. A different patch, with a lot of

colors; that is important. You slap them on the rear-end and tell

them they are important and they are different and mean and, son

of a gun, they believe you. Then you kind of hold them back for

that harder target where you do have some good intel, and you

need to be able to react against it. You send these guys out against

it, and they are having a good effect but not surprisingly so. They

are a little bit better trained, but more importantly they enter the

battle fresh. They are equipped fine, but they enter the battle fresh

and in response to pretty good intel, so they go in to this thing

anticipating combat. Which means they are wrapped a little bit

tighter. They aren't carrying their weapon by the muzzle, over

their shoulder. They go in looking for a fight with the initiative

because they've got a little intel, and it's, by and large, those guys

who are being very successful. In the units they are accounting for

an increasingly high percentage of the casualties we inflict on the

guerrillas, and they take remarkably few casualties themselves.

The picture I want to give you then is that we are playing

now on two levels. The large units just out and about, guarding

bridges, guarding posts, moving about, confusing things, keeping

the guerrilla off balance. And then the smaller units that each of

the brigades and DMs (military districts) hold a little bit more in

reserve, who are more precisely targeted against harder intel,

hopefully against the leadership. They go in on these strike

operations with pretty good effectiveness and inflict casualties, hit

the guerrillas hard, take very few casualties themselves. They are

accounting for, in the time I've been here, a fair number of the

I
308 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

cadre leadership. People who have names on the guerrilla side.

That is important. In 4th Brigade, I was talking to Gus Taylor

(probably six months ago now), but the way he described this

process was he went out and he waited and watched for a couple

of weeks until he identified this crusty NCO who had a reputation

for being mean and looked like it. Gus went over and grabbed him

and said, "Would you like to be in a kind of a special outfit that

goes out and kicks tail?" and the guy said, "Airborne"; then he

said, "Well, who are the two badest asses in this brigade?" This

guy points out these two fellows, and so Gus brings them over and

puts the same question to them. And yes, they are all for that, and

he asks them to each pick out the two badest asses that they know.

And he did that process until he had 20 people. He put them

through this two- or three-week course, gave them the patch, and

then sent them out against those hard targets. And at the time I

talked to him, that 20-man force had been accounting for about 60

percent of the total casualties inflicted by the 4th Brigade. That's

one of those kinds of things that I was talking about earlier-some

of the gimmicks or the tricks.

Yes, the ESAF is upgrading the overall force-the force

modernization, the force expansion business-but at the same

time, maybe they are also starting to look at that second tier to

create those special operating units that give them that rapid

reaction capability. That gives them that ability to go out and

enjoy some success while the overall ESAF is doing the longer

term infrastructure type business with the overall force as a whole.

It's just maybe one of those things that we want to consider and

think about.

Development of Intelligence

Was Difficult.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-We started out with some

basic ideas on force structure, with the fact that the heavy

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 August 1987.
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 309

battalions could provide us with enough muscle to meet the

guerrilla main force efforts. We had a program of expanding the

heavy battalions. We also started out with the fact that light

battalions had an important role. Partway through that process

as we began to expand those, people like Domingo Monterosa

and others made some suggestions for some improvements. We ended up with light battalions that were a little bit heavier and a

number of heavy battalions which could operate really in halfbattalion operations when they needed to. In addition, there was

a strong interest in adding A37s and UHIHs to the air to

provide a big medical program whose lack had been recognized.

And there was an effort to begin to develop a civil defense

program, which was almost single-handedly developed by one

of the sergeants (when we had to keep the heat on all the time to

keep from losing). While I was there we began to see some

successes. The development of intelligence, which always

proceeded very slowly, was difficult. The Salvadorans got good

at some of the technical intelligence collection. But in terms of

human intelligence, they were much less adequate, although

they worked better within the metropolitan areas. Then the

guerrillas began to break down into small units as a result of

their own strategic assessments of what they were up against,

since they had exhausted themselves in their main force

offensive. At the end of '83 and by '84, we were beginning to

see small guerrilla units exploit the vulnerable areas and expand

into other areas of the country. This seems to have been the

watchword of their operations, really, since '84-a few well

chosen, carefully timed, excellent strike operations to try to

keep the government off balance. Some of those have been

successful and some haven't; some succeeded and some failed.

Despite constant efforts on our part, we were never terribly

successful in dealing with the infiltration of essential supplies.

This was something we could keep track of but never get on top

of, in large measure, because there were difficulties with some

corruption in the process as well as obvious inabilities to stay up with highly developed, well-run, clandestine networks.

The guerrillas tended to lose sight, in their own exhaustion

as a result of the heavy operations, of how close they were to

1

I
310 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

success. They were very badly defeated in the ballot box,

which, in terms of their political-military concept of activities,

served to rock them back. In the meantime, we had begun

extensive training activities, initially out of the country and later

with the development of an in-country training establishment

when it became no longer possible to work in Honduras. We

worked very hard with the military to replace a number of the

key people at the level of the territorial commands and to

simplify the territorial commands, to use people who had some

proven battlefield experience, and to replace people who

showed weak leadership. It was very difficult for the

Salvadorans because seniority, rather than proven merit, was the

basic determinant of promotion. But the whole thing is replete

with complex problems and great difficulties. We were trying

new ideas all the time, not to the detriment basically of mainline

developments, but constantly working with the Salvadorans,

trying to develop new ideas and new tactical applications to deal

with their problems and, further, to integrate intelligence to get

real-time readings of opportunities and problems and to improve

our own integration in the Embassy.

The Organization for Intelligence

Colonel Orlando Zepeda--We have, presently, two intelligence

organizations at the national level-the National Directorate of

Intelligence (DNI), which depends directly on the Defense

Ministry, and the C-2 of the Combined General Staff of the

Armed Forces. Theoretically, the DNI was created to provide

strategic intelligence, political intelligence, national intelligence:

very high levels of intelligence. The type of intelligence developed

in the Combined General Staff is a military operational intelligence

at the strategic and tactical levels. Due to the current situation in

this country and despite a series of political elements, along with

social and economic repercussions, our struggle is still militaristic

because the original conception of this war was based on a military

attack by the insurgents.

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda H., C-2 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

1985 to 1987. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 22 January 1987.

A
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 311

The intelligence structure is focused on counteracting the

military struggle. The DNI produces intelligence for military

operations. It has not been very successful in terms of political

strategic intelligence and intelligence

at the state level because all of its

efforts, its equipment and personnel

training are geared towards

developing intelligence exclusively

for military operations.

The DNI receives internal and

external support. With respect to the

external support, the DNI receives

most of its aid from the Central

Intelligence Agency--CIA. The CIA

provides some support to the C-2,

such as direct training. But the whole

product, the handling of sources, COPREFA

such as communications, traffic Colonel Juan

analysis, and equipment, is handed Orlando Zepeda

over to the DNI.

The assistance I receive consists of whatever the U.S. Mil

Group provides me with. It includes analysis of operational

areas, photography and imagery interpretation, interception of

clandestine communiqu6s, and analysis of documents, along

with Mil Group personnel support.

Another source of external support is the CAJIT [Central

American Joint Intelligence Team). They work directly with us.

CAJIT's support consists of providing analysis of operational

areas, imagery interpretation, a summary of events, archives

and analysis, and exploitation of documents. Another source is

the 470th M! IMilitary Intelligencel Group in Panama that

provides support to all of Central America. We also receive

elements from the J-2 along with Air Force elements from

Howard (Air Base, Panama) and Marines from the naval bases.

But it's not much.

The principal idea consists of an effort to integrate an

intelligence system to support us. Most of this support is

provided in conjunction with the CAJIT, especially in relation

IPI
312 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

to imagery interpretation, aerial photography and analysis, and

exploitation of documents. Those are the three principal

contributions and all based on external support.

Now, internally, our direct intelligence support comes from

the S-2 or D-2 of the public security forces, which are the

National Guard, the National Police, and the Hacienda Police.

We have the capability, as an agency, to handle all of the

intelligence products from agencies at brigade level and military

unit levels such as the S-2, the BIRI (Rapid Reaction Battalion),

the detachments. And also, the D-2 of the Air Force and

national Marines that transmit, on a daily basis, all of the

information that is collected. The Salvadoran Air Force is also

being developed under my supervision. There are four

organizations that deal with intelligence and help me to perform

reconnaissance, area investigation, and photography in order to

execute special intelligence opqrations. At present, we are

structuring a special analytics center for the Air Force, which

will integrate the four intelligence organizations.

Now, with regard to how the C-2 functions, I, myself,

have different groups for tasks. I have a group that's dedicated

to counterintelligence, which deals basically with the physical

security of installations at the national level. It oversees the

investigations of its own personnel to determine whether or not

there are infiltrated elements. It also oversees the

communications security system, proper transmissions, and our

own monitoring equipment. Right now, we are working to

develop a program for supervision at the national level. We

have upgraded security measures on the handling of classified

documentation and carefully supervise the transferring of these

documents through our various intelligence channels. The

operations section is divided into several subgroups. One group

analyzes documents; another handles interrogation procedures

where most of the information gathering function is at a national

level, what the security forces do with the prisoners. number of

people involved, etc. Another group is the Intelligence Register

(RI). It registers all enemy activity at a national level and

attempts to understand how and why the enemy functions. The

RI performs the analysis and then transfers the information to
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 313

another group we refer to as Immediate Analysis. Other groups

are the Interception of Technical Signals, IST, which intercepts

clandestine communiqu6s, recordings that are signalled from

Radio Venceremos and other radio channels, such as

Farabundo, including those communiquds that originate from

our local channels.

The group that deals with general archives was conceived

to investigate specific dates which the enemy considers highly

important. Both the Archives group and the Order of Battle

group gather this information, analyze it. And, as a result we

are able to determine all of the enemy's activities, locations,

movements, personalities, tactics, and logistics activities. All of

this information is gathered on a daily basis and then transferred

to the Immediate Analysis group.

The Chief of Staff provides instructions as to how we are

supposed to mobilize units within the intelligence systems. I

have made a personal effort to see to it that this process

materializes, and our success in preventing enemy activities is

fulfilled by alerting our units to a possible enemy assault on

such and such a day. We are able to prevent the enemy from

attacking our installations due to 70-80 percent information with

regard to their activities. I congratulate my people on their

extreme precision. We function on a 24-hour basis. I have men

deployed throughout most of the country-east, north, central,

northeast-and I have specialized groups prepared to confront

terrorists factions like the FPL and ER. So, we have the

knowledge, and thus we are functioning.

The brigades have their own organizations, usually on a

smaller scale. They have groups to analyze documents, a group

for interrogations and some capability to intercept signals. But

through national direction we have provided them with proper

equipment for intercepting communiques. They also have an

intelligence register group. We then have a small group and the

Combined Analysis Center, which functions at the brigade and

S-2 levels. As a result you have a gathering of different garrison

components that are in the vicinity such as the guard, national

police, and the 30 or so different elements that work. I would

venture to say that since last July, we have increased our data

I

I

bi
314 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

collection capabilities due to the upgrading of our technical

resources.

I would venture to say that, since last July we have

increased our data collection capabilities due to the upgrading of

our technical resources. Today we are able to gather more

information because of the improvements we've made. Most of

our information regarding enemy movements, locations, and

activities derives from human sources. But our system enables

us to better determine the specific clandestine sites of the

enemy. Then, this system provides us with a location factor, but

since most of the information is encrypted we have to rely on

the human elements, the brigades and proper units. Each

brigade has its own network system. The DNI relies on its own

human sources and equipment, as does the C-2. I have some

sources who are ex-terrorists infiltrated in different zones.

Another View of Intelligence

Colonel James J. Steele-When I arrived here there was a

tendency to focus on technical indicators. Those are useful, and

I don't want to discount them, but in an insurgency the principal

focus has to be on human aspects. That means agent networks.

That means getting people to talk to you. It means

reconnaissance patrols, and so on. That has been the emphasis

for the last two years, and it has paid off. What happens is,

when you get the human intelligence working, the technical

indicators really do help. It fits together; you get a fusion and a

synergistic effect.

We've gone through an evolution of types of intelligence

trainers, and it's worked out pretty well. We have sergeants

who were working out there developing a basic capability at the

brigade level, starting off with basically getting them organized

in terms of maps and keeping logs, and trying to develop some

sort of data base. That was followed up with the development of

Colonel James J. Steele, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1984 to 1986, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986; and, in Monterey, California, 5 November 1986.
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 315

the Regional Intelligence Centers, which were able to build on

the basic capability that had been developed there and

eventually create a mini all-source analysis center or fusion

center at the brigade level. This takes not only what was being

gathered at the national level using platforms [aircraft and

satellites, for example], intercepts, agent reports, and so on but

also combining it with what was being developed at the brigade

level, either through collection by tactical units in the field or by

civil defense units. You have a lot of information sources to tap

into with various National Guard and police units and any other

source of information that may exist. It's a good effort. I think

it shows a lot of potential. We probably took longer in the

development of the intelligence effort than we should have, but

it finally did come.

If you're looking at it from a lessons learned perspective. I

would say that there are several lessons. One is to develop,

early on, human capability. The second thing is that platforms

can be extremely useful as long as they are complemented by

human intel. Now the platforms are providing either a

confirmation or they are providing some basis for focusing

human intelligence.

The other lesson is that the more expensive platforms are

probably something that the United States can provide. In other

words, it's probably a mistake to think in terms of trying to

develop a host country capability for sophisticated collection.

This is going to be dependent upon the level of sophistication of

the host country, its resources, and what it had before the war.

But, the platforms are a good thing that we can provide for them

during the crisis. The human capability is something that is

indispensable for them before, during, and after the crisis. So,

with heavy focus on developing their own indigenous capability

for HUMINT IHuman Intelligence], we provide the

sophisticated platforms during the period of the crisis, then we

withdraw them afterwards. Hopefully, their human capability

can provide them vith the necessary intelligence that they'll

need to maintain control after we've gone.

HUMINT has taken away the mystique or fear that ground

commanders would have that there might be thousands of

1A
316 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

guerrillas in a sector. You do the ground work, and you find out

that in the sector that you are going into, there may be 50

guerrillas. You know that there are 50 because you have their

names, the order of battle, and you know how they're equipped,

and so on. It just makes it an awful lot easier to go in there and

deal with them. Almost inevitably you can go in there with

smaller units and still have confidence that you can take those

guerrillas on.

So, for you to ask the commander, "Do you know where

all the guerrillas are right now?" the answer is probably,

"No." On the other hand, if you ask him, "Where do they

normally remain? Where are their base camps?" and "Are the

base camps occupied or not occupied?" he'll probably know

that. Things are getting better. That's a relative statement.

There's still a lot of room for improvement.

The Logistics of the Offense

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-Basically I would say that the

Army reacts as rapidly as it can. It doesn't have the capability to

make night insertions with its helicopters. They will, however,

now move in with their reaction force in the face of heavy

ground fire and, in fact, have taken heavy ground fire and had

lots of helicopters shot up and taken casualties while they were

making the insertion. They don't hesitate to go into a hot LZ.

This is greatly changed from when I first arrived in November

of 1983 when the forces which were inserted, were inserted in

relatively secure areas where they seldom made contact on the

insertion. In fact, their very disposition seemed to be designed

so as not to run too much of a risk of making contact at all. That

has changed completely. They appear to go in now and go in for

blood. They'll land in the face of fire, and, in fact, they get in

there as rapidly as they can. The attacks usually strike at about

0200 in the morning. That appears to be the favorite time, and

that's due to the back planning factors necessary for the

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador. 1983 to

1985. interviewed in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 4 March 1986.
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 317

guerrillas to make their final assembly and kick off an

, operation. But 0200 is the time it happens. The helicopters will

land on the ground. The first wave will be on the ground and

reacting somewhere around 0600 or 0630 in the morning. So

that, now, does not give the guerrillas time enough to conduct

an effective assault, exploitation, and evacuation. Every one of

their attacks within the last year and a half or so has been

stymied somewhere short of their being able to achieve their

objective because of the reaction of the helicopters. The

guerrillas now know that they have to clear the area before first

light, and this doesn't leave them enough time to exploit an

area. When I had first arrived, they would go in, assault an

area, take it over, exploit for the entire full day period following

the attack, and exit the area the following night. Even when the

Salvadorans deployed their military personnel in response, they

did not go in aggressively and retake the area. They waited until

the guerrillas left and (then) reoccupied the area. That has

stopped, so a great deal of progress has been made there.

Now the other type of reaction which occurs in the middle

of the night, of course, is to pile everybody available into four

to six 2-1/2 ton trucks and race off down the road to where the

action is. This has almost always resulted in a disaster because

the guerrillas always set up ambushes on one or several routes

leading from the point of nearest reinforcement to the area

where the action is. In fact, many times the majority of

casualties are taken by the reaction force being ambushed in the

vehicles in the wee hours of the morning as it speeds along 

a

country road heading for the action. Trying to determine ways

to react without losing more forces in your attempt to react is 

a

big problem. The Salvadorans, for some reason or anotherpartly out of bravado, and partly for lack of a better solutionconsistently responded in this fashion, piling everybody

available into trucks and blazing off down the road and driving

right into a very carefully established ambush. The helicopters

preclude this, although it appears now that the guerrillas are

getting better at setting up ambushes at the likely landing zones

surrounding the area they're attacking. This means that there's

an increased likelihood of the reaction force coming into a hot

LZ. 'I

I mimii ii an m llminn°i i m =.1
318 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Another problem is, I guess, twofold, because, as I

mentioned before, logistical support by the helicopter is

inadequate when they go out for several days at a time. They

have to carry everything with them or try to carry everything

with them, so they go out very heavily laden-30 to 50 pounds

of junk on their backs. In addition to that, we've provided them

with 81-mm mortars, with .50 caliber machine guns, 60-mm

mortars, 90-mm recoilless rifles. And for some reason which I

will discuss in a moment, but regardless of the reason, they

packed the stuff-they backpacked the stuff with them on

operations. So, you'll see one soldier carrying, to begin with, a

pack with 30 or 40 pounds of stuff and then a .50 caliber

machine gun tripod. Somebody else is carrying linked belts of

.50 caliber ammunition. Another guy with a 90 [90-mm

recoilless rifle] and another guy carrying 90-mm ammunition.

All of this, basically what it means is, and I think there's a

twofold result in this, that when they're so heavily laden, even

if they're not carrying heavy crew-served weapons, just the junk

they carry on their backs-I mean literally everything but the

kitchen sink, from foam rubber pads to make the ground more

comfortable to I don't know what the hell they have got stuffed

in their packs, but far more than they ought to be carryingwith respect to the guerrilla, they have much less, much less

mobility. Once, by the way, I did see them using animals to

pack the stuff, the same as the guerrillas do. It is a smart

move-they should use animals to pack the stuff rather than

carry it themselves. They're in fine physical condition. They

can haul stuff up and down hills all day long which would

exhaust most people. They're really in good physical shape, but

they simply can't move as fast as the guerrillas. When contact is

made, they don't have the foot mobility to maneuver around and

cover the ground fast enough to cut the guerrillas off. They are

simply far less mobile than the guerrillas.

The other problem that I see in an insurgency type of

environment is packing 90-mm recoilless rifles, 8 I-mm mortars.

There is a tendency when they have such weapons to use the

effective "standoff distance," if you will, of the crew-served

weapons and hammer away at suspected guerrilla positions with
ORGANIZATION, TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS 319

a .50 caliber machine gun, out of small arms range. I don't

think that this is a lack of desire to close with the enemy or a

lack of courage or anything like that. I see no indication that the

Salvadoran soldier isn't a tough, gutsy fighter. It's just that

because they've got this stuff, which we've given them, they

seem to think that the approved solution is to mount the .50 and

hammer away at the next hillside, much in the same manner as

in Vietnam when we pounded places with air strikes to

absolutely no avail. They do the same thing with whatever we

give them, when the effective solution in a counterinsurgency

war is to move off into the bush with your M-16 rifle and go

after the enemy. An awful lot of ammunition gets fired-off out

of range of the guerrillas, while they're probably still heading

off and getting away with very little danger to them. The

Salvadorans will be firing at them with their crew-served

weapons and not causing any casualties. It's simply one more

impediment to foot mobility and to closing quietly, stealthily,

effectively with the enemy and getting some results with the

M-16 rifle. To the extent that you convince them that their

TO&Es [Tables of Organization and Equipmentl should contain

all of these crew-served weapons, to that extent you're making

them into a conventional force, not an effective counterinsurgency force. In my opinion-and this is not the opinion. I

believe, of the security assistance personnel who are helping

them devise their TO&Es-it's counterproductive in many

instances. To provide weapons of this type and to create Tables

of Organization and Equipment that include these weapons

because, although it makes the unit much more effective in the

defense or the assault upon a fortified position, it makes it less

likely that they will have foot mobility and be thinking in terms

of closing into small arms range. They'll sit back and use their

crew-served weapons rather than getting up close. The only way

you can be effective is to get up close.
isE

Recognizing the

Psychological War

Psychological Operations and

Civic Action

Colonel James J. Steele-There is an interest in PSYOP

[Psychological Operations] and civic action within the

Salvadoran armed forces that's far greater than anything that we

saw in Vietnam. It's an integral part of what they're doing. The

idea of getting people to defect is central to the plans of every

brigade. They are training Psychological Operations experts for

every unit. We've played a role in that process, and I think it's

one of the things that we can really be proud of. They're putting

out a lot of leaflets. They're using loud speakers. They're using

radio spots very effectively. It hasn't always been that way, I

think we played a role in that education process, but they've

seen the results that've come from successful psychological

operations, and that's been an impetus to what has been done.

They've put some good people into the program. The guy

in charge of psychological operations who just [February 1987]

turned it over was truly an evangelist. I can recall that he got up

and gave a briefing-this was after a guy named Miguel

Colonel James J. Steele, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1984 to 1986, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 5. 6. 7, 8.

9, and 10 October 1986; and, in Monterey, California, 5 November 1986.

321
322 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Castellanos, who was one of the political leaders of the FPL.

They initiated a campaign around him. They put out posters.

They put him on the radio. They put him on television, and he

also helped them with their PSYOPS campaign. For example, it

changed the whole approach on how they would deal with the

guerrillas and deal with their supporters. For example, if you

look at some of the early posters and early leaflets, it would be

addressed to "terrorists," and then it would give the message.

He said, "That's ridiculous! If you call someone a terrorist,

you've immediately turned them off. They're not even going to

read your message. Call them compafiero or compa. That's

what their fellow guerrillas call them. Present it that way and

then get your message across. To the extent that you can make

your propaganda look something like theirs, you'll get them to

read it." Well that didn't sit well with all elements within the

Salvadoran military.

I can remember sitting in a meeting.* President Duarte was

there, the whole high command, all of the brigade commanders,

some of the departmental commanders, and the C-5 was giving

a briefing on Psychological Operations. He started by sayinghe was describing the campaign which revolved around Miguel

Castellanos-"Now I know that there are a lot of you out there

who don't agree with what we're doing. You don't like the idea

of glorifying Miguel Castellanos, who is a former guerrilla,

former terrorist, and so on. And you don't like the way we have

changed some of the posters and leaflets, in terms of the way

that we address the guerrillas, but I really don't care what you

think. This message is not for you. It's for them! What we're

trying to do is to get them to defect. We're not trying to make

you happy. I know that some of you have said that it looks like

what we are trying to do is get Miguel Castellanos elected as

President." There were a few snickers from Duarte. Then he

said, "That's not what we're trying to do. What we are trying

to do is to use Miguel Castellanos and use this message to

discredit the guerrilla organizations internally." Now you don't

*CPC. a periodic meeting between the Commander-in-Chief. U.S.

Southern Command and the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador.
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 323

find that kind of animosity. There's been an education process,

and every brigade commander (some obviously better than

others) is on board with psychological operations.

But, with the reduction of the number of insurgents there is

another problem-we're getting down to a more hard core

element. They're less susceptible to psychological operations. It

probably means, then, that they have to focus more on them in

an indirect way. In other words, focus on masas, family

members, because they're probably the only way that you will

get to these guys. You can talk to them directly with

propaganda with probably very little effect. But, if you can

convince people in their family that the situation has changed

and that what they went to the mountains for five or six years

ago has happened, really, in some respects, they've won, then,

you may get them to come in. That's where they have to be

increasingly focusing their attention in the years ahead.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-We struggled with thai. In

my time there it was just beginning. It was possible for them to

deal with the mechanics of it. It wasn't possible in my time to

evaluate the success or failure. One of the things that was most

interesting was that in my last six or eight months there were a

number of significant defections. My view was that they came

less as a result of psy-war campaigns than as a result of a very

tough evaluation by some of the more committed guerrilla

leaders as to the dichotomies and difficulties of their own

position. Some of it had to do with internal conflicts, but it was

more a question of the conflict that they saw between their own

objectives and where they saw the government going. So it was

really logic and reality that dictated why some of these guys

came over. Some were people who had been very important and

very influential in the guerrilla movement. Partly it was wearing

down; partly it was the lack of military success; partly it was the

beginning of the government's espousal of some of the basic

objectives that people had gone into the guerrilla movement to

achieve in the first place, and a feeling that the government

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel, 25 August 1987.
324 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

might be in a position of actually meeting their objectives, and a

beginning of confidence that the government wasn't going to

torture them or kill them all off or destroy them if they turned

themselves in.

So the notion of an amnesty campaign, the notion of

psychological warfare, gave that final opening to these

individuals. I don't think necessarily the publication of the

arguments made all that much difference. It may have helped. It

is very difficult to evaluate those kinds of things, and as I say,

someone who has been there for the last two years and seen

whether that made any indentation or not would be in a much

better position to evaluate that. When I was there it was just

beginning to be planned and put into effect. They had done

quite a bit of work and had begun leaflet campaigns and

loudspeaker campaigns. They began trying to get across to the

guerrillas in many other ways what was going on. The

elections, themselves, were one of the important psychological

activities, as was the failure of the guerrillas consistently to

move from military victory to military victory or to turn the

population radically in any direction. In addition, guerrilla

defections at high levels added to later defections.

In the Beginning They Took

No Prisoners

C-5 Spokesperson-I don't know if before 1983 they had

something comparable, but the current C-5 that exists was

created in 1983. When they first started, the main target was the

enemy forces. The origin of psychological operations in El

Salvador was part of a general change in the Salvadoran Army

behavior. During the 1980-1982 period they had a policy,

according to different sources (I am not just basing my

comments on one source), that they generally did not take

prisoners. The first change came as the U.S. advisors pressured

C-5 Spokesperson, name and position withheld by request of the

individual and with the concurrence of responsible U.S. and Salvadoran

officials, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 28 September 1987.
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 323

COPREFA

In San Francisco Chinadega, members of a newly formed civil defense

unit parade.

them to be morc humane in their treatment of prisoners for two

reasons. First is the human rights political situation; as long as

the Salvadorans were violating human rights, this presented a

problem in terms of getting aid, not only from the United

States, but also from European countries.

So, the improvement in human rights was presented to the

Salvadorans as a way of getting more military aid, which they

needed. It was a reasonable proposition and they accepted it. I

think they saw what happened to Somoza, when everybody in

the world turned their backs, and I think the Salvadorans,

themselves, realized that they had to improve their international

image. Now th -re has been a tremendous insurgent propaganda

campaign to th. effect that nothing has changed in El Salvador

and that the Army still doesn't take prisoners and still massacres

civilians. That simply is not factual any more. Sure, some

violations still occur, just like violations occurred in Vietnam

with the U.S. Army, and will occur in any army waging

counterinsurgency. But the situation has fundamentally

improved. There has been a fundamental change in attitude.
326 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

There has been a fundamental change in behavior of the

Salvadoran Army, towards prisoners and towards civilians.

The second reason for the change was common sense. It

was also because of practical utility and again, I think, was the

result of the pressure from the U.S. advisors. The advisors

convinced the Salvadorans that you can get intelligence out of

prisoners. That when treated properly the value of a prisoner

who decides to give information is much greater than the

prisoner who is dead. It may be more satisfying to see them

dead, but in terms of utility, it is better to have the guy alive.

Even if a prisoner does not collaborate, it's still good to keep

the guy alive because that bolsters your claim that you have

changed your procedures and that it's to his benefit to

collaborate with the armed forces.

Since '83 a large number of guerrillas, either captured or

who have turned themselves in, have provided valuable

information to the Salvadoran armed forces in terms of tactical

military intelligence. It is now quite commonplace in the

brigades to have informants who were former guerrillas. That

situation did not exist in '81 or in '82, as far as I know, but it

exists now, because the behavior and the strategy of the

Salvadoran armed forces have become more enlightened and

more sophisticated. I guess the level of sophistication and the

way the Salvadorans treat prisoners and treat defectors is not

evident in other countries. That is another thing that I think the

Salvadoran Army gets a bad rap for. The international press still

paints them as these troglodytes. But actually in terms of

sophistication of prisoner handling or defector handling, they

are light years ahead of many other Third World countries,

perhaps most other Third World countries. I don't think there is

a common awareness of that.

Successful psychological operations began as the Army

began to shift behavior. Forgetting about the international

human rights issue, at brigade level, the first shift or change in

attitude towards prisoners was that they were seen now as

sources of intelligence. As a logical outflow of that, they also

began to be seen as PSYOP collaborators. The emphasis

increasingly became, "How can we convince the guerrillas to

bI
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 327

COPREFA

Army troops present weapons to civil defense unit members. These units

form under community initiatives or at the request of the Army.

defect?" Obviously, the most convincing way to get guerrillas

to defect was to use former guerrillas. That is the whole process

that led to Commander Miguel Castellanos. In a former time, as

soon as Miguel Castellanos would have come in contact with

the police, they would have killed him. Just like they killed the

whole FDR leadership in one meeting. They just kidnapped the

whole leadership and killed them all. It has never been

established exactly who did that, but there was a time here when

political opponents were just assassinated out of hand. Now if

they get a guerrilla commander or he comes in contact with the

police, the first reaction is, well, how can we use this guy'? That

is a quantum leap. That is what separates El Salvador from a lot

of other countries.

The decision was made to start psychological operations,

and it was part of this whole process of change. The main target

I
328 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

was enemy forces. The Salvadorans themselves put out the first

message to these people. Since they were new at this, my opinion

is that they were not very good. For example, they would address

the guerrillas as terrorists. When I first came to El Salvador in '84,

it still was almost an unwritten rule that you could not call the

guerrillas, guerrillas. You could not use the term guerrilla here

within Army publications or Army audio-visual material. They

were terrorists. They had to be called terrorists. They were not

insurgents, they were not revolutionaries, they were terrorists.

There is a legal reason.

Everybody harped back on the legal reason, saying, well,

we don't want to recognize them as a belligerent force, and

basically we just want to treat them as criminals, as bands of

criminals. Well, that's fine except these bands of criminals, at

that time, were taking over major towns in the interior, were

overrunning cuartels, and, furthermore, by any kind of

analytical definition, they were not just terrorists. They had an

infrastructure. They had a political movement. They had

organized mass support. They had all the indicators that they

were a genuine insurgcnt movement. An interesting evolution

has happened. Nowadays [in September '871, more than ever

the term terrorist fits these guys. Because of the things they are

doing now-the mining, the transportation barriers, where they

machine gun even Red Cross ambulances. Now they really are

acting like terrorists. It's interesting that in the days when they

were really acting like insurgents, the Army insisted on calling

them terrorists. And now when the Army is more willing to call

them by a variety of terms, more and more they have become

real terrorists.

Evolution: The Integration of Psyops,

Civil Affairs and Intelligence

Major General James R. Taylor-it seems to me that there

are two things that are important. First of all, the greenhouse of

Major General James R. Taylor. Commander. U.S. 193d Infantry

Brigade (Panama), 1986 to 1987. interviewed at Fort Amador. Republic of

Panama. 14 December 1986.
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 329

DONEHOO

In November 1987, at Candelavin, La Paz, four civil defense members

died, kidnapped and murdered by the FMLN.

the revolution goes directly back to the role of the armed forces

in the society of Salvador. When the situation finally boiled up

and flamed over in the late seventies and early eighties, the

armed forces and the police structure in Salvador was much

smaller than it is now and much less responsive to the needs of

the people and particularly to the needs of the government.

They were, in fact, a government unto themselves. This came

about as a result of the standard kinds of things found in many

developing countries-a large percentage of land ownership by

a favorite few, the policies of the government which supported

the power structure that existed both in the government and in

the armed forces, and the interplay between those two

institutions.

All of that culminated in the student riots, against which

the armed forces were overly brutal. The creation of the death

squads and many other things gave a free entree to the leftists,

really to the FMLN and the people that have been trained in

Cuba and Nicaragua. But more importantly, it generated the

f
330 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

support from the people to give the revolutionaries a base of

power from which they could work.

Probably the most remarkable thing about the Salvadoran

experience is that we started from that low point with respect to

the armed forces and have overseen the growth and the training

of what is now approaching a very professional Army. Even

more important, a very professional national police organization

that is genuinely responsive and supportive of President Duarte

and, to a lesser degree, his administration.

Now we have the seeds, the beginning, of a mutual

working relationship between the various government

ministries, the armed forces, and the police which provides the

ability to conduct combined arms and joint operations in the

field on a continuing basis. Also we have the ability to

perpetuate those operations over time, as they have in the

Guazapa area over the last 12 months. Logistically, with

intelligence and with the common support, they have the ability

required to run those extended successful operations, to

integrate civil affairs operations and PSYOP operations, and,

maybe most important of all, with the creation and integration

of an intelligence infrastructure that is now generating real time,

fairly accurate intelligence, which the high command actually reacts to and acts against successfully.

As I said earlier, the integration of intelligence, PSYOP,

civil affairs, and, most importantly, an ability to react to what's

going on out in the field quicker than the enemy can react all

combine to show a positive evolution of the El Salvadoran

military.

Colonel Sigifredo Oehoa Pirez-I returned to Chalatenango,

with the democratic government in power and President Duarte

performing his functions. I was named Commander of the

Fourth Brigade in El Parafso, in August 1984-eight months

after the guerrillas had destroyed it IDecember 19831. The jDepartment of Chalatenango is a very mountainous department,

very difficult, and very poor. At that time there were too many

legendary stories about the guerrillas owning the department.

Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa PWrez, Fourth Brigade Commander. 1982 and

1984-1985. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 14 October 1987.
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 331

COPREFA

Ana Isabel Henriguez, March 1986, Morazan, the innocent victim of an

FMLN land mine.

Practically, I began by realizing that the troops had very

low morale. It was a unit that had been beaten in its garrison-a

very poorly built garrison in a valley surrounded by hills. It

would be very easy to attack-with a machine gun, the troops

would be paralyzed. We started by motivating, and we managed

to lift up the troops. I began looking for better advice from the

North Americans. Specifically, I asked them to give me

sergeants or captains but no colonels-the colonels who were

here spent their time playing mini-golf and swimming in the

pool. Sergeants and captains are people to train troops. From

this request, I had the opportunity to have two good officersCaptain Phillips and Captain Sheehan. Very good brigade

officers, worked 25 hours-a-day, very aware, and they helped

me a lot. I would tell them what I wanted, and they would look

around for means to help me solve the problem. I knew I

needed to mount a good intelligence unit. We managed to

mount a 24 hours-a-day tactical operations center, with good

communications and good training of the troops. I was also able

j
332 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

to mount a section of psychological operations with our own

pamphlets, spots on the local radios, broadcasting to the town's

people, to the guerrillas, to the troops themselves.

We began a different type of war with the objective to

penetrate the minds of the guerrillas and the minds of the

civilian population. The civilian population in Chalatenango

was very apathetic, with a lot of years of guerrilla presence, not

very receptive to the armed forces. A very poor people, people

with a lot of rancor. As we began the task, more than anything

else I was worried about the civilian population more than the

guerrillas. We began to execute operations with trained units,

units of 500 men-smaller battalions, more mobile and more

operational.

On 12 October 1984 (two months after taking command) in

a rather daring operation, surprisingly, we took the city of La

Palma-three days before the first meeting between the

President and the guerrillas. I believed that we, not the

guerrillas, should have been in La Palma when the President

arrived to speak. To my surprise we took the city in a night

motorized operation, without lights and without firing one shot.

We captured guerrillas by surprise, and they would say, " ...

compafieros, compas." "Yes, we are compas .... We

captured many guerrillas, many documents. I went in a

helicopter very early that morning. The troops were still

entering into La Palma, as I was landing. It was then we

realized that the guerrillas had been using propaganda in talking

about their strength. In reality, there were not great numbers of

guerrillas. We thought there were great numbers. Through

propaganda, with a presence of 10-15 men scattered all over,

they gave us the impression of being thousands of guerrillas. In

other words it was very easy to defeat the guerrillas militarily,

politically, and psychologically.

That triggered a spark in me, an idea, and we began to

locate the guerrillas everywhere. We began to receive

information from the civilian population freely, not purchased.

The information was not given in the cuartels but, rather, in

many different places. We had intelligence networks all over

I
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 333

such places as breweries, pupusa* stands, stores, buses, and the

bus depots. We began to understand the real strength of the

guerrillas. I saw a little bit of the FPL, a little bit of the FARN,

a little bit of the FAL. There was no ERP, no PRTC.

We consolidated the elements: first, with the presence of

the Army in the area in mobile form, not static. Secondly

organizing the communities with the mayor at the head.

Year after year, the Catholic church celebrates each patron

saints' holidays. The towns were organized, since the colonial

days, to celebrate patron saints' holidays. We use that

organization ourselves in the towns. With the mayor at the head

for two reasons: for the following civic development program

and to organize a self-defense-but not a civil defense, which is

different-not with arms. I was not in agreement with giving

the civil defense carbines or M-14 rifies, because they were not

yet "conscienticized." A civilian who is not aware doesn't

fight. It's better to have them without arms but, by creating an

ideological wall in the people, to have them help us give talks to

the students in the scholastic centers. In other words, participate

as informants but not as combatants. The guerrillas attack when

they are alone, attack them and obtain arms because they don't

fight. At that time, there was no need to give them arms but,

rather, the knowledge that they would get arms in one or two

years.

Another element of this great development plan was the

need to develop the areas which are consolidated. Develop them

with the efforts of the government, the infrastructure of the

government-mainly the ministries of agriculture and cattle,

education, public health, public works-and, with the support

of the Army, the private sector, and the support of the people

themselves. They are the four forces that must join together, for

example, to reconstruct roads, bridges, schools, clinics, open

new schools, new centers, to take potable water, telephones,

etc., etc., etc. I believe this to be the key thing, and perhaps

with the intelligence, dividing the areas by zones. Not

understanding how it was done in Vietnam where the red areas

*Indigenous cornmeal-based tortilla with cheese or Irk fat.
334 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

were bombed. No, rather, that the red, pink, and white areas we

would see signalled on the map would be the areas of major

guerrilla persistence to be able to follow up. In that way, I

believe success was obtained in Chalatenango. Unfortunately,

the political side never stops playing dirty tricks on the military,

and that is where the problem lies.

A Most Successful OperationCivil Affairs

Colonel Leopoldo Antonio Hern~ndez-The responsibility of

the First Brigade lies specifically in the area of Cerro Guazapa,

which, according to the guerrillas' propaganda, was a

stronghold of their operations. The hill is located 35 kilometers

northeast of the capital. It is a very small mountain range which

goes through the central part of the country and is surrounded

by cities like Aguilares, Suchitoto, Tenancingo, Oratorio de

Concepcion, San Jose Guayabal, Tonacatepeque, and Guazapa.

Through the use of their propaganda the guerrillas were able to

influence public opinion and convince people that they were the

owners of Cerro Guazapa.

The First Brigade has successfully conducted many

military operations in the area. But the most successful ones

have been since 1985. At that time, we began working with a

new policy of rescuing the masas, who were controlled by the

guerrillas in order to obtain supplies, information, agricultural

tasks, and to fortify the land. In 1985 we rescued approximately

500 masas, and with that rescue mission we gave the people the

understanding that the armed forces was respectful of human

rights, although that is not the way it is identified by the

communications media.

Colonel Lcopoldo Antonio Hcrnandcz. former First Brigade Commander

and now Vice-Chief of the Salvadoran General Staff. interviewed in San

Salvador. El Salvador. 23 January 1987.
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 335

As a result of the success of the

rescue missions, on January 9, 1986,

we initiated a program called

Operation Phoenix, in which we

were able to rescue once again 600

masas and deliver them to the Red

Cross and their families for

relocation somewhere else. With

Operation Phoenix we dismantled all

of the guerrilla's communication

system. Due to the configuration of

the terrain and the altitude which

rises 1,435 meters above sea level, it

was very propitious for a COPREFA

communication system to be set up Colonel Leopoldo

in Cerro Guazapa. You can see the Antonio Hernindez

different altitudes from the peak of Guazapa. That is how we

were able to dismantle their communication system, their

supplies, and their clandestine field hospitals.

With Operation Phoenix we've also improved certain

conditions in this country. We, as soldiers, have reopened roads

which had been closed previously due to natural defects,

vegetation overgrowth, and combat. We opened one road which

leads through San Francisco to Suchitoto, a length of 19

kilometers, and other roads in the same area. The road from

Hacienda Colima to La Caja. And other roads located in a

different area which has been cultivated for sugar cane. In 1986,

with the reopening of the road we encouraged the landowners to

cultivate their lands-from San Francisco mill to a town called

Los Almendros; Pueblo Viejo, as well as from Colima towards

La Caja, thus having increased the production of basic grains. It

is possible that this year the property owners will cultivate their

lands once again in larger acreage.

We have been -orking continually on Operation Phoenix

for the past year. The guerrilla screams that it is a failure. But it

isn't a failure because we have conveyed great confidence to the

people of Aguilares, El Paisnal, and Guazapa. We have also

performed work on the town of El Paisnal, which was attacked A
336 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

by guerrillas, who destroyed its health clinics, City Hall, and

ANTEL's telephone services. We have worked on the highway

that goes from Aguilares to El Paisnal and to another area called

Las Delicias. We have restored the electricity, telephone

services. With the plan Unidos Para Reconstruir, projects for

reconstruction have been developed for the units of health and

City Hall, telephone services and electrical services for

improvements of living conditions at El Paisnal. The Ministry

of Education has supported by placing teachers to provide

education for the children in that area. At the present time, we

are working on the reopening of the highway that goes from El

Paisnal to Tacachico, which is located in the Department of La

Libertad. The purpose for opening these roads is to provide the

landowners with the opportunity to make a living and to

reactivate the country's economy.

In addition to the military operations we have undertaken

during 1986, we have also developed civic action programs

providing medical attention, deliveries of food and clothing, and

recreational games for children (such as clown shows and pifiata

parties). And at night time, through the use of a 16-mm movie

camera, we show films which are rented in San Salvador.

Joining Civil Defense: A Vote

for the Government

Colonel John C. Ellerson-I haven't read much about civil

defense [CDI, maybe a very incomplete study. I guess we have

gotten into and out of civil defense a couple of times and El

Salvador has old civil defense and new civil defense. In fact,

civil defense was a part of the problem in the pre-coup and

shortly after the coup time frame. We now have 260-270

municipios [municipalitiesI in the country. There are a certain

Colonel John C. Ellerson, U.S. Military Group Commander in El

Salvador, 1986 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 27 and 28

September 1987.
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 337

number of other urban areas that are sufficiently large or

important to warrant having a civil defense site, so we say we

have a total goal of 303 civil defense sites throughout the

country. We have 104 of the new, and we have a total of about

220 old and new. Talking to the new, the idea was that you

would go into a municipality and try to generate in them the

interest and the support for the creation of a 50-man civil

defense unit. Once they bought into that, we held a civil defense

school where we trained five-man Salvadoran teams, who

would thefn go into the community and train up their force.

Then, once that force was trained, we would equip and arm

them. We started off with carbines; it's now M-14s. Basically

all this guy got was a weapon and two magazines, a slap on the

rear-end, and an insurance policy. If he gets killed his family

will get $1,000 compensation. No uniform, no pay. Very, very

little. It's a program that has had mixed reviews. If you go visit

one of these sites, and if you are looking for the Wehrmach, it's

going to bring tears to your eyes. Some of these guys have got

teeth, but not too many. I saw one who had shaved, and some

of them even have shoes.

Defense and local security isn't all that great in some

cases. I'm telling you the down side. The positive side is that a

lot of those guys actually fight and actually do, from time to

time, take on the guerrillas and win. The idea is that they are

not to be doing offense or even defensive patrolling. They are

just to help protect their little town. They go to sleep, and the

guerrillas walk in, cut their throats or shoot them, and walk

away with 50 weapons. Or they just don't do a very good job.

and the guerrillas decide they want to go in there. They can

mass and come at them and take them. There are some critics.

There is a tendency to say, "Well, if we are going to do this,

we really ought to do it better." I would just like to argue in

favor of the program we would have-as imperfect as it is. First

of all, it is a very cheap combat multiplier. We now have 104

new, or 220 total, of these little CD sites out there that, as

imperfect as they are, constitute a force that is on our side

versus the other side. As this war has progressed, there are areas

of this country where you still have a guerrilla presence, but it's
338 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

basically a three-, five-, or eight-man guerrilla presence, which

our little guys without very many teeth can handle itt a lot of

cases. Another point-what is one of the things that we talk

about in an insurgent war'? What's the term that Harry Summers

uses, "'center of gravity," or one of those key points, one of

those things that you absolutely have to do. One of the things

we say is that you have to isolate the guerrilla from the

population. Well, you create this little CD and you do that. If

I'm Joe Guerrilla walking down the trail and I know that there is

a CD in there, I don't just walk in there and get a Coke,

anymore. Now, if I want to, I can, but now my stomach has to

start pumping a little juice. Because I have my weapon and that

guy isn't very good, I can probably take him, but this just might

be the night I don't come back and so maybe I don't need that

Coke that bad. Maybe I'll just walk on down the road to

Smithville because they don't have a CD site. Or, people say

that they can just cache their arms and come in and get whatever

they want anyway. Well, they kind of can, but it's a different

guerrilla that walked in. It's not a guerrilla that walked in with

his weapon saying, "I'm a guerrilla, and look out for me. I'm

bad and I can do anything I want or take anything I want." Just

by my presence-my armed presence-I demonstrate the

inability or the weakness of the national government. To the

contrary, if I have to go hide my weapon and slip into town and

slip out of town, I have made a pro-government statement. For

nothing-a weapon and two magazines. We have gone a long

way. although imperfectly, towards accomplishing one of the

major things we say we have set out to do, which is isolate the

guerrilla from the population.

In a democracy like this one, or in many insurgencies.

what you find are large parts of the population who aren't either

terribly pro or terribly contra. They are just sitting on the fence.

When a community takes on a civil defense site, they have said,

"1 am now a government town." They may not believe that. or

they may not be completely convinced, but they just voted.

They have said, "No. I'm not on the guerrilla side. I'm on the

government side. Maybe not 100 percent. Maybe you can drive

me off of that, but we have, in effect, taken a vote." That is
RECOGNIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR 339

now a government town. That's a town that has taken a stance.

That is pretty powerful stuff for zip, next to nothing.

Leadership Is the Key to Success

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-There were a lot of people

that we had to work around in El Salvador that were in positions

of power. Departmental commanders who were sorry, who were

corrupt, who were cowardly. You just have to acquire patience

and just keep pressing for their removal and get the right guys in

the right jobs. Encourage emulation of that which works. One

of the things we tried to do, we kind of jokingly say we'd like

to do, is clone Ochoa because he was so effective out in the

countryside. If we could have gotten all 14 departmental

commanders to initiate barefoot patrols, to have mobile patrol

bases, to keep moving, to keep the guerrillas off balance, it

would have been a lot easier to deal with them. So, you know,

you identify leaders that have got things going, that are doing

things right, and you talk them up. We probably overdid it with

Ochoa by turning him into a media event, and he began to read

his own press clippings. You know, we did a pretty good job of

identifying people who needed to go and people who needed to

be emulated. Again, there's just no substitute for knowledge

and understanding of the area and doing your homework.

They also learned that you have to have good small unit

leaders. That the system that they were producing leadership

under wasn't sufficient to meet their needs, so they had to

modify it. They learned that you could train small units to

operate independently and survive. They have learned that you

have to have a well-trained or adequately trained civil defense to

provide the first line of defense. And in nuts and bolts things

you have to start with intelligence. All initiatives have to be

Colonel John D. Waghelstein. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 23 February 1987.

i
340 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

coupled with PSYOPS (Psychological Operations) with public

works, and the military has to be viewed as part of the solution,

not part of the problem. I think they learned that in many cases

they are their own worst enemy. The way they've always done

business-some of the corruption, some of their connections

with the oligarchy, some of the death squad activities-is really

counterproductive, not just in terms of their own population, but

definitely when it is going to have an impact on the U.S.

willingness to support. So they became very astute about the

need for a better image, both internally and internationally.

They have realized something they have always known

instinctively-that there is no substitute for good combat

leaders, competent leaders in the field. People like Monterosa

and others that were so effective. They were effective because

they put themselves at the head of the troops and shared the

risks. Garrison commanders could no longer behave the way

that their leadership did business. They had to go out and lead

the troops and go in harm's way with the troops. War has a way

of weeding out the nonplayers. The troops have a way of

weeding them out. Units perform well with leadership. Nothing

new; no secret there. But if you have good leadership and you

care about the troops, the troops will follow you to hell and

back.
16

The Armed Forces

at the End of 1986

THE EDITORS--Although there is ample evidence that the

armed forces made significant improvement between

1982 and the end of 1986, it appears that they have not

yet reached the point where they understand the

various centers of gravity and can deal effectively with

them. For example, intelligence organizations are still

not capable of knowing exactly where the insurgent

leadership is at a given point in time and thus are unable

to destroy or neutralize that particular center of gravity.

It appears that the war is at the point where the

insurgents cannot win, but neither can the military. A

major influence on the war and the government's

capability to prosecute the war was the impact of the

earthquake on 10 October 1986. In seven seconds the

earthquake did more damage than seven years of

insurgent violence.

The Different Services

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-When you talk about different

services, you're really talking about one large service,

excluding the security forces; people who belong to the armed

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense AttachW in El Salvador. 1983 to

1985. interviewed in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 4 March 1986.

341 4
342 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

forces. Although they have specialized training if they're in the

Air Force or in the Navy, or some specialized training in the

Army, and although the Navy and the Air Force wear different

uniforms, in effect they're essentially part of the same service

and respond to the same command system. If we look at the

services individually, I think we can say that the Army, in the

course of the period of time I was there, showed many

improvements. It went from a point where there was some

question as to whether it would stay the course and wouldn't

just simply disintegrate before the threat, to a point where we

could be assured that the Army can hold its own. There is no

question now, and there hasn't been for approximately a year

and a half, of the ability of the Army to stave off defeat by the

insurgents. They have reached a point where their basic skill

levels are adequate, and their morale and esprit de corps are

such that they won't be defeated by the insurgents.

But, the Army, still by virtue of its organization and its

armaments, tends to be more of a conventional force than a

counterinsurgency force, and the skills necessary for successful

counterinsurgency operations are not really as strong in the

Army as they need to be.

The real problem is that neither have they reached a level

where they, themselves, have the capability to defeat the

insurgents. The point appears to have been reached, or is about

to be reached, where infusions of additional training and

additional materiel will not result in improvements so that the

Army can go out and beat the insurgents. They've reached the

point where some definite institutional changes need to be

made.

Of the three forces-Army, Air Force, and Navy-perhaps

the Air Force, from the beginning and probably still, is the most

capable and most professional force. I think one of the reasons

for this is that airplanes, if not properly flown and properly

maintained, tend to fall out of the sky. So you have to have a

certain basic level of professionalism to even have an air force.

The Air Force operates under the command of General Juan

Rafael Bustillo, who is a very independent guy. A pilot, a

professional air force type. Unfortunately, in providing support
THE ARMED FORCES AT THE END OF 1986 343

to the Army, especially lift helicopters, he tends to hold his

resources back--conserving fuel, conserving flight hours, and

conserving his aircraft. The result being that the Army is only

marginally supported, sometimes adequately for an initial

insertion, but for follow-on logistical support the Army seldom

receives adequate support. Battalions were operating in northern

Morazdn with only two lift helicopters providing the logistic

support for all five battalions. The Air Force contains not only

the direct air support aircraft. But it also has the lift capabilitythe UH 1H helicopters-as well as the airborne battalion, which

belongs to the Air Force. General Bustillo tends to hold his

helicopters in what I can only describe as "in reserve" to

support his airborne battalion as an immediate reaction force so

that the full utilization of the lift assets is not employed.

The Navy was the weakest of the three services when I first

arrived. It slowly made improvements. It was initially alleged

that the Navy was involved in some sort of shrimp smuggling

operation, and the details of that are rather involved and

interesting. It appears that that has pretty much been put to a

stop, but the Navy has the longest way to go to become a

professional service. It still lacks sufficient personnel and

sufficient vessels to adequately patrol the coast of El Salvador

and stop the infiltration of goods across the shore.

The Army in 1986

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-There are a lot of people

saying that because the military portion has diminished

somewhat from a large scale to much smaller things that the war

is virtually won.

Yeah, but I'm not ready to have a victory parade yet.

There are too many things wrong with the Salvadoran economy.

There's too much yet to be done. Compensation's not complete.

Thc reforms are not complete. It's still a matter of will and

Colonel John D. Waghelstein. Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 23 February 1987.

I
344 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

there's still the matter of Salvadorans continuing to deal and

grapple with social, political, economic and military problems.

What concerns me is the professional class. Watch the

professionals. When they start bailing out, it will mean that they

no longer see a future. There's a lot of pessimism right now.

Part of it's due to Duarte's policies. Will they be able to ride

this out as they've ridden out all these other crisis? If you go

back and look at the newspapers in '82, '83, and '84, it was all

doom and gloom-they weren't going to survive. But they

mastered the 40 percent Salvadoran solution-they muddled

through it.

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-The Ambassador, the Mil Group

commander, the Deputy Chief of Mission and the

USSOUTHCOM commander were saying (and had been saying

for a year or so until the time I left) that the Salvadoran military

had taken the initiative from the guerrillas. I never agreed with

that, and I didn't hesitate to say so when I thought it was

appropriate. The Ambassador never called me down for

differing with him. He never chewed me out or told me to be

quiet. He let me write my reports, and he let me brief people as

I saw the situation and respected my intellectual independence

in that regard.

I believe that the initiative in an insurgency consists of a

great deal more than simply building oneself up to the point that

you can-normally, generally-effectively confront the

insurgents someplace in a firefight. It's more than simply

forcing the insurgents to regress to an earlier phase of an

insurgency.

The insurgents, in fact, had broken down into smaller

groups. They were no longer a constant threat to major

installations. The Army was no longer in danger of cracking or

coming apart. The situation had pretty much stabilized. This

contrasted sharply with when I first got there. This represented

success from the perspective of the Embassy and from the

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador. 1983 to

1985. interviewed in Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania, 4 March 1986.
THE ARMED FORCES AT THE END OF 1986 345

perspective of the security assistance effort. The country was

out of danger for the time being. Then we said, "Now they're

reverting to urban terrorism out of desperation. They've broken

down into smaller groups. They can no longer successfully

attack major targets. Therefore, we've got the initiative." I

said, "Uh, uh." The initiative consists of and is obtained only

at such time as the military and security forces are successfully

able to protect elected officials (they never were) and prevent

interdiction of traffic (they never were). Prevent the guerrillas

from coming in at night to various communities and

propagandizing people or collecting war taxes or policing up

young people for service with the guerrillas. The guerrillas were

always able, right up until the time I left, to require people to

grow cotton or to grow coffee. The guerrillas were determining

the wage structure for the workers. The guerrillas were

requiring planters to plant a certain amount of their cropland in

maize to feed the guerrillas. The guerrillas were collecting a

certain amount of money for every hectare that was planted or

every bushel that was harvested. In other words, there was still

a close interaction.

Even though the guerrillas were reduced in numbers, and

could no longer win in an open fight, they nevertheless, had

essentially the same direct interface with the population

whenever the military wasn't there to prevent it from

happening. I said "You can't say you have the initiative in an

insurgency until you can prevent that, until you zan get between

the guerrillas and the civilian population. And what's more, to

say they [the Salvadoran military and security forcesi have the

initiative implies that you have a campaign plan that sees you

through to a successful insurgency termination, which I define

as victory." I don't accept negotiated solutions 9s being even a

possible solution. The only final, acceptable solution is for the

guerrillas to say, "I quit! Here's my rifle. I'm going to vote

next time. Please don't shoot me," and the government pardor:;

him and says, "Okay, go back to whatever you used to do

before you were a guerrilla."

Ia
346 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Earthquake: The Military Loses

Momentum and Insurgents Re-Arm

Colonel John C. Ellerson-I got here in the wake of the

earthquake that colored everything. The earthquake was 10

October 1986. I got here October 25. We were very much in the

recovery mode, and that dominated just about everything that

we did. As a result, there was fairly strong cohesion within the

government at that time. just as you would expect in the wake

of a national disaster of that magnitude. People were still in the

mode of pulling together in the wake of that tragedy. So it was,

in that regard, a good time. The armed forces had acquitted

themselves very well. The government had recognized them for

having done so-pretty much of a honeymoon period. Militaiily

it was the beginning of a down turn for us. If you paint this

whole experience as a sine wave, a series of ups and downs,

this was the beginning of one of those downs. The year had

started out on a very positive note. Operation Phoenix, that

kicked off in January, 1986, was a major operation with major,

major ESAF successes. People were feeling pumped up and

positive about themselves, but, by the time I got here, there was

a series of things coming together to take the wind out of their

sails. You had the earthquake. You had a public statement that

"We are not going to turn inward. We are not going to let this

earthquake take the steam out of our war-fighting effort. We

understand that there is still a war to be fought." However, it

would be unrealistic to have expected the Altamondo, the

Administer of Defense, and the Bland6ns and those fellows in

the Estado Mayor, here in the city, not to have diverted a major

part of their effort just to digging out from underneath the

rubble.

Despite their best efforts not to do so and all their rhetoric

to the opposite, it did takc away some of their interest and effort

and energy, and that was felt in the field. The Salvadoran Army

Colonel John C. Ellerson, U.S. Military Group Commander in El

Salvador, 1986 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 27 and 28

September 1987.

Id'
THE ARMED FORCES AT THE END OF 1986 347

is no different than ours. If my boss is in my knickers from time

to time, it keeps me honest. Not that I am a bum or a goof-off,

but we all need somebody jabbing us with a sharp stick from

time to time just to keep us on our toes and keep us moving

and, especially, keeping us all moving in the same direction.

Absent some of that, the armed forces drifted a little in the wake

of the earthquake. You add to that the fact that the guerrillas

unilaterally declared a stand down or a truce in the wake of the

earthquake. They kind of went away for a while, which, again,

gave you the slack. It took the "ompf" out of things. It caused

the ESAF to lose some of that momentum, because for about 30

or 45 days, there was nobody out there to go against. Then you

add to that the fact that it is about this time of year you go into

the harvest season. You have to divert sizable chunks of your

armed forces to protecting the coffee, the cotton, and the sugar

cane harvests, as opposed to participating in the offensive

operations.

Those three factors together took the ESAF into a lull,

especially in comparison to what we had seen during the early

part of '86. 1 don't think anybody needs to be terribly apologetic

for that. It was kind of an inevitable or logical outgrowth of

those kinds of things. People were aware of it. They tried to

beat it off with words, but they were not very successful. No

great, earthshaking, long-term ramifications, but the question

was, "What did I find when I got here?"

I got here at the beginning of a three- or four-month dip, in

terms of tempo or the spirit of the armed forces. Right at the

first of the year the guerrillas came out strong. I think it was 29

December they hit Cerro Delicias, down by San Vicente.

Caught those folks sleeping at the switch and came on in and

did them dirt-killed about 16 or 17. Then the first week or two

of January, you had a series of incidents, up around Osicala,

Gc:' ,ra, Delicias Concepci6n, in which, quite frankly, the ESAF

inflicted fairly sizable numbers of casualties on the guerrillas,

but those were guerrilla-initiated exercises on a fairly large

scale. You could see a swing, in terms of initiative, from the

ESAF to the guerrillas.

In the one (attack], up around Osicala, the report was 500

or 400 insurgents, but it was probably a couple hundred, but

I,
348 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

they were young, and there were some women. They were well armed, with an awful lot of ammunition. That was one of the

comments that came through from everybody. They just had an awful lot of ammunition to shoot up. Much more than we are used to seeing. That business of following the earthquake with a unilateral truce or cease-fire-the insurgents backed off, went

away, rearmed, re-equipped, and here they are coming out of

the chute fresh.
17.1

Changes in Guerrilla

Strategy and Tactics

THE EDITORS-The strategic concepts of prolonged war as

applied to the situation in El Salvador seem to be

understood by the El Salvadoran and American military

leadership. Yet the understanding may not be complete.

There is both a rhetorical display of an understanding of

prolonged war strategy and tactics and an implied

manifestation of using semiconventional forces to win

militarily in the short term. The countercomments

indicate that, while the quantity of the insurgents has

decreased, the quality and strategy of the insurgents

have increased. The capability of the insurgents to wage

combined large scale military actions has decreased, but

the ability of the insurgents to wage a long-term

multidimensional war may have increased. The

rhetorical understanding of what is meant by prolonged

war does not appear to be matched with an equally

strong operational understanding of what it will take to

defeat an insurgent dedicated to a prolonged war.

349

It
350 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Diminished International Support

and Guerrilla Strategy

Miguel Castellanos-International solidarity has diminished

somewhat with respect to the economic aid that comes from the

solidarity committees in each country and from humanitarian

institutions. That was discussed during a meeting of the Central

Committee in February 1985. It was declared that in 1984, the

FMLN income did not reach the one million dollar mark ... and

their only hopes depended on the economic support received

from oil countries such as Iran and Libya; which had already

provided a part of that support.

We have observed what has been going on in countries that

traditionally practice solidarity-Nicaragua, Cuba, the Soviet

Union, Vietnam-and I think it is important to point out a

significant decrease in the diplomatic support of some countries

and international organizations. In Central America, for

example, due to the hard line of pro-imperialism of the

Government. Costa Rica has ceased to be the focal point from

which guerrillas received support and were able to practice their

political activities; not to mention Guatemala and Honduras. In

this sense, the United States continues to serve as a focal point

for the largest political activity (after Nicaragua).

The diplomatic approach, considered by th- FMLN to be

extremely vital for a revolutionary victory has considerably

weakened. The strongest support they counted on came from the

French and Mexicans, and that has weakened considerably

because both countries have renewed their relations with the

Government of El Salvador. The Central Committee concluded

that, "The Government has come back from being in a state of

international isolation." In Europe, countries like Spain,

France, Sweden, and Holland support the FMLN and provide

Comandante Miguel Castellanos, former insurgent leader. 1973 to 1985.

interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 25 September 1987. As quoted in

Conversaciones con el Comandante Miguel Castellanos, edited by Javier

Rojas P. (Santiago. Chile: Editorial Andante, 1986), pp. 151-152. Copyright

1986 by Editorial Andante. Reprinted by permission of Editorial Andante.
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TAcTICS 351

their solidarity. Contadora is considered a good example for a

politically negotiated solution ... besides, Contadora is very

positive for the FMLN because it realizes that it could prevent

any intervention of U.S. military forces in Nicaragua and El

Salvador.

Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo Ldpez Nui/a--Normally we should

point out the fact that from the strategic perspective the Left is

very experienced. They have been very successful in many

instances. One example of the strategy they use is

fragmentation, atomization. Between 10 and 15 groups are

created, and maybe it is just a name, and maybe they are the

same people in that specific location, but they always give the

impression of strength. Later on they appear together giving the

impression of being a great mass, a large organization. They use

this strategy quite frequently. They use it also with the popular

front system and align themselves with all of the forces. But

they always wind up controlling all of the forces. That's exactly

what happened in Nicaragua when the FAO, Frente Amplio de

Oposici6n [Wide Opposition Front], was established and where

the Sandinistas, the private sector, the church, political parties,

social, and labor sectors were integrated. And in the end, who

retained control? The Sandinistas and the Marxists retained the

power and control. The same approach was taken by Mao Tsetung in China.

That is what is called the popular front. We had here at one

time the popular forum and the FDR-FMLN front. The FDR

pretends to be a popular front, but it hasn't been able to capture

the necessary support from other organizations. It never had the

capability to do that; however, it did create "phantom"

organizations. They had six, seven, or eight organizations

characterized by their humanitarian approach. Among them

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvadr, 17

December 1986. 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.
352 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

were the Midwives, the Political Prisoner's Association, the

Marianela Garcfa Villa Association, the Governmental Human

Rights Committee, the Juridical Succor of the Archbishopric,

etc. They also had the MIPTES, Movimiento Independiente de

Profesionales y Tdcnicos [Independent Professionals and

Technicians Movement], but this was a small group that

belonged to the FDR. Then you had the Christian Social

Movement, which I believe were five to six people. The MNR

must have 10 or 15 people. The point is that they always give

the appearance of having large masses of people, of having

multiple organizations that at any given moment they get

together and give this impression. Their strategy, of course, is

to never admit that they are Marxists. They declare that they are

not Marxists, and their main objective is to fight for freedom,

social justice, for peace, and for the poor.

Then, anyone is susceptible to those declarations. They

stop to think, "Hey, these are good objectives, I'm going to

join one of these organizations." But they never admit that they

are struggling to establish Marxism in El Salvador. Then, these

groups always look for great objectives that are convincing,

sympathizing, that strike curiosity, that arouse sympathy within

the population focusing on the struggle for peace. Then you ask

yourself, "Who doesn't want to fight for peace?" But it is their

peace, the Marxist peace. It is a peace where one million people

are expelled, where they have 50,000 prisoners in jails-that is

the Marxist's peace. It is totally different. They tend to

manipulate the terms rather intelligently and speak in favor of

democracy, but it is their democracy, the Marxist's democracy.

They condemn imperialism quite frequently, but they never

refer to Russian imperialism, it's always in reference to the

North American imperialism They talk about solidarity, that the

people should be free, that they should be able to have selfdetermination. This self-determination suggests that there

should be no American interference, but there can be Russian

interference and Cuban interference. Then you have student

movements and labor movements which speak in favor of

vindicating workers' rights. Who doesn't want to vindicate

workers' rights? You have a lot of people joining these
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TAcTics 353

organizations who are so confused that they think they are truly

struggling to fulfill these objectives. But what they don't realize

is that they are struggling to accomplish these goals from an

ideological standpoint, from a strictly political Marxist point of

view.

There are several connotations to this strategy, not only

with respect to the organizations, but also with respect to

terminology, objectives, the way they run things. For example,

they are always willing to align themselves with anyone.

Presently, we have a labor union that was "once the BPR,

Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero, the FAPU. They are now

consolidated under a single organization" known as the UNTS,

Union Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadorefios [National Union

for Salvadoran Workers]. They have never come forward and

acknowledged any alliance with the Marxists, but they are

always attacking the government and the United States. They

claim that Salvador's problem is due to U.S. intervention, but

there has never been any reference made to either Nicaraguan or

Cuban intervention. There is a very defined political strategy

here. When one of these organizations disintegrates they always

seem to have the capability to establish a new one with new

programs, new leaders, new faces, but in the end it is always

geared to the same goals, objectives.

We have talked about military strategy before. Their

military strategy consists of creating groups, increasing their

size, and striking heavy blows against the government. The

insurgents believe that the best training a combatant can receive

is to actively participate in activities. This is in effect what

really happens. We also know for a fact that these groups

kidnapped people, held them hostage for 15 days while

attempting to inculcate their beliefs and indoctrinate them as to

the reason they're fighting, what are their objectives. They do

not tell their hostages, "We are Marxists." Rather they

convince them [the hostages] that they are fighting for the

people, to preserve their land, to improve their standard of

living, and to provide education for their children. That hostage,

then, starts to see things in a different perspective; the

objectives become more clear to him. But, when the 15 days are I
354 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

up the organization provides him with an unloaded weapon and

takes him to the battlefield to participate in a military activity.

He participates in a skirmish and then retreats. At the time of

withdrawal they remind him that he is already a part of the

organization, and if he retreats they will lay the blame on him,

and if there were any casualties he was responsible for them.

That is how they incorporate people into their groups.

Fortunately, we've been very successful with respect to the

psychological part of the war. Many people have withdrawn

from their forces, and I think that is why they've taken so many

reprisals lately. Their troops have decreased in size, which has

created a lot of confusion and chaos and lack of courage to

continue fighting.

As we have progressed and improved our image, militarily

their image has worsened, and they have given no indication as to

when they want to win this war. I want to win this war, but I don't

want to grow old fighting it, and I certainly don't want my

children to continue fighting it. I'm not interested in that type of

war.

In the tactical sense the terrorist forces began operating as

small independent groups. They established certain

communication mechanisms and later began assaulting banks,

killing policemen on the streets, assaulting relief trucks, and

while they would continue to develop this attitude they would

increment their forces, increment their troops. There have been

many people who have been incorporated into these activities

simply because of a salary, without any ideological motivation.

This is how they pursue their tactical approach. They proceed to

destroy bridges, blow up electrical posts, and, believe it or not,

these types of activities strengthen them ideologically. The

sense of danger, persecution, defiance, arouses a feeling of

accomplishment, that they have performed an illicit action

against the government and the whole structure of the state.

That is a strong enough motivation for them. Once they have

mastered the ability to operate at these lower levels, they begin

thinking of plotting and attacking on a grander scale, such as

attacking several towns and small military installations.

We talked about the three phases of a prolonged war. At a

given moment their strategic defensive attitudes lead them to
CHANGES iN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 355

search for an offensive position, besides being morally uplifting.

But when they manage to establish their own camp sites and when

they are able to remain for a week or two weeks at these sites,

receiving training and proper military instruction, their forces

strengthen considerably, and at the same time their political role as

well. That is, when they occupy a certain area they fulfill a

military role in controlling the site and a political role in trying to

indoctrinate the people at that specific location. All campesinos,

women, and children are summoned to special classes that are held

day and night in order to explain to them their purpose for fighting

and generate feelings of aggression against the government and

sympathy and thankfulness towards the guerrillas because the

people believe they are fighting to save them. If someone

approaches me and tells me that I will be able to own land and that

he is fighting to provide me this land, my first reaction to this will

be--of course be--that this guy's a hero. Then, as they increase

their forces politically and militarily they are able to strike heavier

blows against the government. The ideal solution would be for

them to control the areas.

At this point our mission is to prevent these forces from

remaining in one place for too long and continuing to

indoctrinate and incorporate these people into their ideological

movement. Their principal targets are roads, installations, a

central authority such as the Mayor's Jurisdiction,

communications offices such as the local command groups, the

National Guard, and the National Police. These sites become

their main targets for destruction because they represent the

central authority. By removing this central authority they are

able to establish what they call a local authority-a popular

government. At the same time, by controlling a designated area

and its people the guerrillas are able to use them as informants

and find out what the armed forces are doing. As a result of this

the guerrillas can anticipate the armed forces' next move and

evacuate the area. Back in '83 and '84 they confronted our

forces openly and with regular units just like ours. But ever

since they've been constantly on the run without offering any

resistance.

It has not been to our advantage during moments of worst

danger that the subversive forces have attempted a zero-level

'A
356 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

economy. They are attempting to reduce our economy to zero.

The guerrillas know that if factories shut down and are not able

to pay their employees and if the armed forces are unable to pay

their soldiers, they will inevitably win this war. Therefore, their

next approach is to destroy everything that represents the state's

infrastructure-tearing down bridges, destroying electrical

towers, destroying telephone booths, attacking trains-and

consequently create a general feeling of insecurity among the

people. Unfortunately, there comes a time when our people feel

so desperate that they are willing to accept anything. If you are

suddenly approached and offered security and peace with the

conditions of a Marxist government being established, you

would most likely accede to allowing this because all you care

about is having peace. This is what we are trying to avoid. This

type of war cannot be prolonged indefinitely because the people

become exhausted. They begin to doubt the state's capacity to

deal with the situation at hand and furthermore, the state's

capacity to deal with its armed forces. We must make an effort

to control and better safeguard the economic conditions,

production, and stability of this country.

Insurgents Revert Back to

"Creole" War

General Juan Rafael Bustillo-The guerrillas made several

mistakes that changed the course of the war. First, they grew in

such large numbers that they considered themselves stronger

than they actually were. The second mistake was a result of the

tremendous support in human personnel they were receiving

from Cuba and Nicaragua. No, let me rephrase that, because of

Fidel Castro and the Sandinistas. I don't want to give the

impression that I'm condemning these two countries because of

their political leaders. Then, the guerrillas' increase in size and

the tremendous military support they had made them think that

they were capable of confronting our armed forces. Those were

General Juan Bustillo, Chief of Salvadoran Air Force, 1979 to date,

interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 21 January 1987.
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 357

very big mistakes on their part, and after a whole year of having

one failure after another they were determined to resort back to

their "Creole" [prolonged people'sl type war.

Operational Modes We Will Use

Captured FMLN Document-Our strategy to confront the

enemy operations and patrols:

Countering this is our fundamental problem. That is to say

that our combat now will be against troops in movement.

Enemy patrols are trying to impede us from massing forces to

hit other targets. In other words, the enemy seeks to hit with

concentrated mass our forces, trying to disorganize and wear

them down. If we convert the enemy patrols to our most

important tactical objective, we then seize the initiative and the

offensive against that strategy. To face the enemy strategy, we

must implement the following elements:

a. Small units (platoons and squadrons) whose main mission is

to cause casualties and withdraw in echelon, using

sharpshooters and explosives. These units will have the

capacity to penetrate to the rear of the enemy advance,

taking advantage of their mobility, their knowledge of the

land and popular support.

b. Attempt to strike the troops as soon as they approach the

zone in trucks until they withdraw, always in small units.

c. High mobility of the command and units with constant

coordination to assure persistent attack.

d. Agility of movement and the reduction of all noncombat

elements, the optimum being that the entire structure be

organized into guerrilla units.

From "'Concerning Our Military Plans: The Military Strategy of the

FMLN" (a document captured and transcribed by the Atlacatl Battalion, near

Perqufn, El Salvador, date unknown, probably late 1983), in The

Comandantes Speak: The Military Strategy of the Farabundo Marti National

Liberation Front, translated and edited by Gabriel and Judith F. Marcella.

Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College.

March 1987. pp. 2-7; 19-22.

'I
358 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

e. Retain tl-' possibility of concentrating guerrilla platoons and

those of the mobile force in order to undertake ambushes for

annihilation and for requisition (sic), when the topography

and enemy behavior permit.

f. We will avoid using massed force in conventional lines of

fire.

We must understand that at this moment the most

important thing is to subject the Army to a profound attrition of

its forces. Constant operational casualties will provoke a process

of weakening the enemy which will create the conditions to

execute large scale operations. Casualties are the main cause of

desertion and demoralization.

Sabotage and destabilization of vital areas. This constitutes

the other fundamental element of our strategic plan. The enemy

plan is to take us out of the vital zones of the Southeast in order

to reactivate the economy. Our presence and our activities in

these zones is having strategic, economic, political, and military

repercussions. Productive economic activity in the whole the

Eastern region is in a very difficult situation and we must make

it worse so that we forestall enemy plans.

Great sections of highways, railroads, plus strategic and

secondary lines are within our reach and the enemy can do

nothing to impede us. The East is the center of the strategic plan

of reactivation; if we manage to prevent it from starting, many

millions of dollars will be lost, frustrating imperialism's plans

of assistance. We must work systematically in the following

areas:

a. Fuel (pipelines)

b. Electricity

c. Railroads

d. Telephonic communications (lines and microwave)

e. Cotton and coffee

All of these extremely weak points in the East, attacking

them constantly on a grand scale will provoke situations which

will have strategic repercussions even in the political

propaganda aioe. The two transport stoppages which we've

achieved in the East have brought news of international

jt

Iii l m m m
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 359

repercussion which have tarnished the image of the dictatorship,

causing loss of confidence in Duarte's ideas. The stoppages in

the East and the seizure of Cerron [Grande] Dam are actions of

the greatest impact for the FMLN. This gives us an idea of the

importance of destabilization. Our campaign of sabotaging the

cotton also has great economic, political, and propaganda

impact.

The destabilization will increase our political authority over

the entire region which will place the Army in an increasingly

difficult situation since it will lose control. This will cause

frustration, desertion, rejection of the enemy's recruitment, etc.,

in other words the weakening of his human reserves.

Ambush: The territory that we have conquered until now

opens up great possibilities for us to move to undertake

annihilation and requisition ambushes. We have within reach

many highways and roads where the enemy moves in vehicles.

We must work to learn how to conduct ambushes as we

maintain secrecy and cover. In this task political work among

the population and the use of minimum force play a basic role.

We must realize that ambushing allows the annihilation of

superior units without having to use much force, since we

already have the advantage of surprise and terrain, in addition to

the fact that massed troops moving in trucks are extreme* vulnerable.

Ambushes will allow us to conduct operations to

requisition arms and munitions, with the guarantee that we will

not lose manpower. We need to plan the ambushes in great

detail, assigning specific missions for annihilation, for assault,

for requisitioning, for containment, for the use of machine guns,

explosives, and other support fire.

If we learn to conduct ambushes we will begin to supply

ourselves with logistic means in large numbers.

Selective strikes: We will use the other mode against fixed

enemy positions. Our actions will be attacks against the most

isolated towns of the enemy, using explosives to annihilate them

quickly. These operations will also allow us to recover arms and

ammunition. The idea is to partially strike the enemy

dispositions; we are not in these cases interested in occupying
360 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

the position; the important thing is to cause casualties and

recover arms when possible.

To sum up, we can say that we will seek contact and rapid

annihilation in every mode of combat. This will help us prevent

the enemy from massing his force and applying air support. We

will apply the principle of massing our superior forces in

maneuver warfare until we have seriously weakened the enemy.

The Principal Organizations and

Their Activities

Colonel James J. Steele-The FMLN organization goes back

to the beginning of this insurgency when Fidel Castro got

representatives of all the five groups together and basically told

them that the price of his support was unification. They would

have to set their differences aside and work together, if he was

going to provide them with help. They've attempted to do that,

and I've seen, even in my two and a half years, an almost

cyclical, repetitive effort to try to unify the factions to a greater

extent. But, it's always fallen apart. For a while the guerrillas

were trying to paint themselves as FMLN. They weren't FPL

any longer or ERP or FAL. They were all part of one

organization, the FMLN. News people and others who would

run into guerrillas would ask which faction they were from, and

the guerrillas would tell them, "Well, we're FMLN now." But,

that hasn't really stuck.

So, now we're back to the factions. I'm not sure which is

good and which is bad, quite frankly. It's good that they're

divided, but an allegiance to those factions is like an allegiance

to a regiment or to a battalion. It plays an important role in

terms of morale, attitudes, and so on which can't be discounted.

There is a major difference in philosophy between some of the

groups. The ERP is a more militant group, and the focus has

always been very military. A military victory, fairly quick, A la

Colonel James J. Steele, Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1984 to 1986. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986; and, in Monterey, California. 5 November 1986.

,I
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 361

Nicaragua, has been their strategy. But, then they had to take a

step back, and they had to start talking about small unit

operations, protracted conflict: "Wait the Gringos out! Even if

it takes 10 years." That's a tough pill, and it's a particularly

tough pill for elements like the ERP.

The ERP approach, you can call it FOCO, you can call it

Chd Guevara-but it is essentially an insurgent strategy that is

focused on military operations and military success. That's not

to say they don't recognize the political implications, but it's

designed to do things relatively quickly. Contrast that with the

FPL, which is the major faction in the central part of the

country. They are more of a Maoist type faction. They think

more in political terms, developing infrastructure-developing

the sea so that the fish can swim. So the FPL is, by far, the

more dangerous group, even though it may be smaller than the

ERP, because they recognize what this war is about. The ERP's

strategy worked very well when you were looking at

overwhelming your opponent, but when you start talking

protracted conflict, they haven't adjusted well to that. They

don't handle propaganda well. They don't develop political

infrastructure very well.

I was in Perqufn two or three weeks ago, and I talked to a

teacher. Perquin is a case where more people have returned, and

there's a school functioning. But it's still one of those towns

where the Army's got it one month, and the guerrillas have it

.he next month, just by virtue of the fact that the military

doesn't maintain continuing presence there. And, even when the

military's not there, you find that, according to the people (and

I believe them), the guerrillas have made very little effort to try

to affect what's being taught in the schools. Again, the focus is

military.

If you go up into Chalatenango, and places like Aquilares,

you see a striking contrast. There, the guerrillas make an effort

to develop popular committees, even if they're little towns.

There's a major effort to build a political base or a base they can

maintain in a protracted conflict. That's a major difference.

There's a repopulation effort going on in the country. Some of it

driven by the government, some of it driven by the guerrillas.

I,
362 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

They're trying to bring people into areas where they think they

have influence, bringing them out of Mesa Grande, for

example, putting them into places like Aquilares. So, there is a

contest for the allegiance of the people.

But, what we had seen-if you want to talk in terms of

their changing strategy, particularly by the FPL-has a focus on

trying to develop a support base in the countryside, particularly

in the areas that it's difficult for the government to control. The

FPL has been at the center of that effort.

The number of guerrillas is subject to some question. But,

my estimate of the number of guerrillas in the countryside

now-when I say guerrillas, I'm talking about armed

insurgents-is probably about 5,000. Let me say, however, that

there are differences of opinion as to how many guerrillas there

are. I'm not certain where the answer is, but I feel fairly

comfortable with the number of about 5,000. Now, those are

armed combatants. There is another category that can't be

excluded, and that's a category that we would term masas.

Masas are defined as people who are actively supporting the

guerrillas. You could consider some of these people, perhaps,

as militia that could be mobilized to carry arms in the case of a

major mobilization by the guerrillas. Their numbers are really

loose, but again you're talking in terms of, perhaps 20,000 or

30,000.

Let's say there are 5,000 armed combatants out there now,

where a couple of years ago we were talking 10,000. Okay,

that's success. That's a measure of effectiveness. But 5,000

guerrillas can cause you a lot of trouble. Even if you get the

number down to 1,000, they can cause you problems. You go

back to Uruguay and look at the Topamaros there. I don't think

that there were probably ever more than a few hundred of those

guys, but they kept that government tied up in knots for years.

So, numbers are important, but keep in mind that even limited

numbers can cause problems.

Although the guerrillas are getting weaker, I don't want to

take too much away from them, because I think what we're

seeing in El Salvador today are some of the best guerrillas,

probably the best guerrillas, we've seen in this hemisphere to
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACICS 363

date. They are certainly better than anything we saw in

Nicaragua or in Cuba, but their numbers are smaller, their

support base has deteriorated, and they've had to adjust. For

example, the two major factions, the FPL and the ERP, both

have what they call "FEZ" or special forces units. The ERP

has incorporated those units into its war-fighting strategy to a

greater extent than the FPL has. In fact, if you look at the major

engagements that have occurred in the ERP's area of control:

the attack that was mounted at the CEMFA [Centro de

Entrenamiento Militar de la Fuerza Armada (Armed Force

Military Training Center)] in the fall of 1985, then the San

Miguel attack earlier this year, they were both conducted by the

same organization-the special forces units of the ERP.

Those attacks were almost carbon copies of one another,

operationally speaking. The level of training of the units of the

special forces-it numbers probably 75, or perhaps as many as

100, but no more-is very good. There is a heavy emphasis on

sapper techniques, infiltrating, and achieving surprise and so

on. In both cases, they experienced some success. They killed a

lot of people, and they did considerable damage to buildings

through the use of explosives. But, in both of those attacks,

they paid a very heavy cost. In fact, you could almost see the

time it took to put the unit back together after the attack on

CEMFA, because the number of guerrilla bodies left on the

battlefield was considerable. We're talking about those that

were found. They don't normally like to leave people behind.

The attack at San Miguel was the same kind of thing but with

even heavier casualties. They were heavily armed, with a lot of

demolitions. If you consider the size of the unit that made the

attack, it was a pretty significant percentage to have been killed. If

you consider wounded that were able to escape and so on, it

wouldn't surprise me to find that casualty figures for that unit

probably approached 50 percent in those attacks. It was possibly

even greater, who knows? But, again, the mission never was one

of trying to really take over those installations but instead to get in

there, cause havoc, and kill as many people as they could.

In the case of the CEMFA, the mission was to kill

Americans, then to try to get out before reinforcements and A
364 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

reorganization could take place. The FPL has tended not to use

those kinds of units. It appears to focus more on trying to put

together regular guerrilla forces to conduct an attack. It's been a

disaster every time they have done it since they broke down into

small units.

I can recall back in the summer of 1984, when they hit the

dam at Cerr6n Grande. Only part of the operation, from their

point of view, was highly successful. I went down and I looked

at the ground. They killed a lot of soldiers, but they never took

the dam itself. You could almost draw a line on the ground

between where one unit was to stop and another unit was to pick

up responsibility. There was an attack from the north and an

attack from the south. The attack from the south was very

successful. It overran a barracks, a comandancia [command

post], and a small sub-station. Then, they stopped! The attack

from the north got screwed up and was never able to take the

main powerhouse/dam complex. That illustrates the kinds of

problems that you have from a command and control point of

view when you're no longer operating in large units. They were

trying to pull dispersed units together and conduct an operation.

Guerrilla operations must be characterized by detailed planning,

rehearsals, surprise, and so on. If they don't have that, they are

at a severe disadvantage. It's difficult to do some of those things

when you're trying to pull people together when they're

dispersed.

A similar case in point was an attack on Suchitoto in

November of 1984. The attack was originally planned to occur

just prior to the U.S. elections in order to have an impact on

them. Again, because of what I would argue are problems of

command and control associated with their dispersed strategy,

they weren't able to pull it off until about two weeks after the

elections. The attack was in some respects a fiasco. This is

based on reports from defectors later, who had participated. One

of the guerrilla factions, a major faction out of the FPL as a

matter of fact, didn't get to the right place at the right time. This

was perhaps the largest attack in the last couple of years here,

involving about a thousand guerrillas, not all of them actually

focused on the town, some focused on protecting the egress
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 365

routes back to their base areas and also ambushing the road

coming into Suchitoto which they anticipated reinforcements

would use. But, there was still a heavy number of people

focused on attacking the town itself. They started the attack

piecemeal because one unit wasn't in place. The thing got

stalled. The result was that about 180 policemen and some civil

defense men held the attack off until first light when the

Airborne showed up with helicopters. The attack was pretty

much a fiasco. So, these are the kinds of problems that exist

when they're trying to do it that way.

A more recent example, Nueva Concepci6n, which occurred

about a week ago, as a matter of fact [the first week in October,

19861, was another example of what appears to have been a very

large-scale attack. When I spoke to them, the people in the town

indicated that they thought the number of guerrillas was about

1,500. Now, I'm sure that that's an exaggerated figure, but I'm

also sure that it was a major attack. It was perhaps the largest

attack that we have seen in terms of guerrilla numbers this year. It

was certainly bigger than what we saw at San Miguel. My guess is

perhaps 200 to 300 guerrillas, maybe more, participated in the

attack, again attacking a hacienda police unit of some 55 to 60

policemen, augmented with a civil defense unit. Again, in this

case because of good intelligence and a good effort on the part of

the defenders, a guerrilla attack-which was characterized by very

detailed planning, use of indirect fre, and so on--turned out to be

a fiasco for them. In one case where the guerrillas focused on one

of the defenders' emplacements, the defenders pulled back, and

the guerrillas moved into it, at the same time that their indirect fire

was starting to fall. So, it fell right on top of them. The guerrillas

sustained some pretty significant losses there. (The people showed

up for the attack in one case in a bus that they had stolen and

about eight or nine different vehicles from one direction, several

other vehicles from another direction, and on foot from another.)

The accounts of the guerrilla casualties that were seen as they were

trying to pull out were numerous. Again, these are the kinds of

spectacular shows for people, to make them think that you still

represent a significant military threat. I
366 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Objectives and Tactics

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-The guerrillas, as they were less

and less successful in their direct confrontation with the

Salvadoran military forces, began to look more and more for

what I call the "cheap target." These are road interdiction

operations where they stop civilian traffic on the road,

sometimes shooting up the vehicles. They shoot the vehicles up

if they don't stop. If they kill anybody-men, women,

children-it doesn't matter. If the vehicle doesn't stop they

shoot. Sometimes they bum vehicles, destroy them. Sometimes

they just collect taxes. Throughout the country, they will

declare a traffic stoppage for a period of two weeks or so. Then

they pop up here and there and set up road blocks to stop all the

traffic, lecture people, and collect war taxes and this sort of

thing. That's one type of target.

The other target is the power grid system. They dynamite

down, or use some type of explosive to blow down, metal

power poles. They pay farmers to cut or chop down the wooden

poles that have replaced the steel power poles. I forget what

sum they offer a farmer to do this, but it's something on the

order of $50 a pole or something like that. Then the farmer goes

out there in the middle of the night with an ax or saw, chops the

pole down, and collects his money.

There are many, many different ways to attack the

infrastructure. They were kidnapping mayors; they were

destroying public records; kidnapping youngsters-for a while

the guerrillas had a program of forced recruitment, which they

admitted themselves didn't work very well. They were going

after soft targets-targets for maximum propaganda impact,

maximum economic impact, maximum disruptive effect upon

the security and stability of an area, with a minimal amount of

risk to themselves. Conservatism, low risk, minimization of

casualties, careful expenditure of resources. These are guerrilla

tenets. The scenario could have been written by Clausewitz.

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea. U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador. 1983 to

1985, interviewed in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 4 March 1986.
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 367

Those are the standard guerrilla operations. They almost

consistently avoid actual contact with the armed forces-unless

it's upon a target of their choice at a time of their choosingwhen they have the time to do all the careful planning and

preparation necessary for such attacks. Occasionally, there

would be random confrontations of company- or battalion-size

forces in the countryside. Sometimes the Army came out ahead,

but just as frequently the guerrillas did.

They'll pick out an objective. That objective may be a

community, an entire town, or it may be a hydro-electric

facility, or it may be a communications site. But, essentially,

their planning for the assault upon such a facility is the same,

whether it's in the countryside or in the city. The planning

begins months ahead of time, with very careful training,

preparation, rehearsals, and so forth for the attack-the planned

assault phase, the planned exploitation phase, and the planned

withdrawal phase. And, they are prepared to abort the operation

at any stage if they feel that the operation has been

compromised or if something is not going according to their

plans. This is a standard guerrilla procedure and reflects their

conservation and sensitivity to avoid needless casualties.

There aren't really that many urban areas. You've got the

capital city of San Salvador. You've got San Miguel in the east

and Santa Ana in the west. You've got a few other areas like

San Vicente in the central portion of the country between San

Salvador and San Miguel that can be categorized as urban areas.

I think that, aside from a major attack on a military installation

within one of these cities-which would almost surely be

unsuccessful for the guerrillas*-their tactics, again, are to

employ booby traps or assassination attempts or kidnapping

mayors or destroying or burning town halls, destroying public

records. In other words, they're attacks aimed at either the

economic infrastructure or at the social infrastructure, if you

will, and don't necessarily have military targets specifically.

*1 have since been proven wrong-when the guerrillas a month or so ago

penetrated the 3rd Brigade cuartel in San Miguel and inflicted substantial

casualties IThe date of this statement is 30 July 1986-Eds.l.
368 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

These types of activities, of course, fade rapidly into acts

of terrorism and assassination. From their perspective, they, of

course, do not consider killing military officers assassination.

We call it assassination; it's just part of business as usual for

them. For that matter, and quite legitimately so, if they can find

some guy who leaves himself open to be shot in the middle of

the city, he's fair game there, just as if he were out in the

countryside. No matter how much of an issue you want to make

of it, from their perspective that guy is a fair target. So yes,

they do assassinate or kill people in the cities if they can

identify a target. But again, these things are carefully planned.

Weeks and probably months go into the planning of an

assassination attempt, of a hit on a guy. Months of planning go

into major attacks on economic targets or military targets. For a

major attack on a target in an urban or a rural area, they will

draw upon forces from different guerrilla organizations from all

over the country. It takes a week or two for them to collect and

gather and finally mass at about two o'clock in the morning for

their assault.

The Evolution of Guerrilla Strategy

and Tactics since 1980

Colonel Orlando Zepeda--When the military struggle and the

explosion of violence began in 1980, the insurgents launched

themselves into a military adventure. I will give you a brief

summary of the evolution of this war since then. In 1980, the

FMLN and FDR were founded. The FMLN is the military

structured organization. The FDR is the political diplomatic

front. They declared that their principal objective-to establish

Marxism and communism-could only be attained by defeating

the armed forces. Other forces, such as the political parties, the

church, the educational system, the productive sector, and the

labor sector, were all divided and heavily infiltrated and did not

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda H.. C-2 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

1985 to 1987, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 22 January 1987.
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 369

represent obstacles for the insurgents to be able to take power.

The only problem they foresaw was the armed forces. Their

goal was to defeat us by what they referred to as the

insurrectional method, that is, to seek a military defeat through

military actions, armed groups, and support of the masas. They

would call for an uprising of the political army of the masas.

Once the armed forces were defeated and the former regime

overthrown, a Socialist government would be instituted.

This new government would speak in favor of a proletariat dictatorship and a government based on popular

representation.

In 1980, we had 13,000 men against 10,000-12,000

guerrilla troops, in addition to 60,000-70,000 people supporting

them. Demonstrations were performed on a daily basis. They

would inundate the capital and occupy the church, the Plaza de

la Libertad, and the university. Their growing confidence led

them to believe they were strong enough to launch a successful

attack and defeat the armed forces-thus, the final offensive on

10 January 1981. This proved to be an exact scheme of what

occurred in Nicaragua. First, there would be a wearing down of

the military groups and their garrisons in order to create a sense

of demoralization. The people would then realize that the armed

forces was neither capable of defending itself nor counteracting

the massive attacks they were experiencing. Then, the first

phase was the process of wearing down. The next phase was a

call for a general strike of all public and private employees to

sabotage or impede a normal development of commercial and

bureaucratic activity. The final phase included the attacks

against the centers of power-the cuarteles, the Assembly and

the presidential house. This would inevitably lead to a military

defeat. That is what occurred in Nicaragua and that is what they

intended to do here.

The first insurrectional attempt was in 1981. It wore us

down a lot, but they also suffered heavy losses. The offensive

was a complete failure. On the first day we successfully

counteracted the military offensive and drove the enemy away
370 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

from the population centers all the way back to the mountains.

We began pursuing them. Neither the general strike nor the

attack against the centers of power was successfully executed.

The outcome of these attacks was a phase 1 referred to as a

development of their military forces. The insurgents realized

that they were not capable of confronting our garrisons. In order

to bring together all of their popular forces- students, workers,

campesinos-they needed to increase their size. They blamed

their defeat on the lack of military equipment, and as a result,

they withdrew their forces and began to strengthen themselves

militarily.

There was such a tremendous increase in supplies and

insurgent forces. The guerrilla movement originated in the

cities-the urban guerrilla. When they transferred their forces to

the fields, the change became noticeable, as taught by Mao. In

1982, they launched themselves into another military adventure

by attempting to boycott the elections. On March 28, we were

celebrating the election of a Constitutional Assembly, as the

beginning of the democratization process in this country. It was

not beneficial for the subversives to allow the people to cast

their ballots during the election in 1982. The insurgents' assault

against the armed forces was much stronger than the one back in

1981. They claimed they had total support from the masas and

peripheral areas like Mexicanos, Cuscatanzingo, San Marcos,

and Soyapango. But it turned out to be an even bigger failure

because the subversives didn't want elections. They declared

that the elections were a joke.

The armed forces demanded a response from the people as

to their choice between communism or democracy. Our people

are traditionally and authentically democratic. We respect the

religious values left behind by the Spaniards. We faithfully

practice the Christian beliefs, and we cannot commune with

communism. We are true lovers of liberty. Despite the various

attempts to indoctrinate our people in the schools and

universities, the subversives were unsuccessful in instituting
CHANGES IN GUERRILLA STRATEGY AND TACTICS 371

communism in this country. The people don't want to practice

this ideology. Therefore, it was never desired by the subversives

to allow the people to vote in 1982, thus, the choice between

boycotting the elections or a March 28 offensive. The attack

was more violent, but we once again managed to counteract it in

24 hours.

In my opinion, the attempt to boycott the elections was a

strategic objective. They realized the people did not want

communism. The Assembly was elected. A provisional

president was appointed, and the political parties were united.

This was a very important step for us because it meant the

establishment of a legitimate government through an electoral

process.

I think, at this point, the greatest problem the subversion

faces is the inability to indoctrinate the people of El Salvador.

Internally, our people are convinced that the FMLN is a

Communist-Marxist organization supported by Russia, Cuba,

and Nicaragua. The subversives' biggest error was having

identified themselves with this ideology and having tried to

establish their doctrine in this country. The people do not want

to accept communism. In order to strengthen their political and

military positions, the subversives will have to increase their

recruitment capability, and that is going to be very difficult, due

to the nature of their clandestinity. It has become increasingly

difficult for them to obtain internal and external support. The

channels through which the logistics supplies are provided are

difficult to access and, therefore, impossible to transfer arms.

For example, a network of logistic support originates in

Vietnam. It is then transferred to Cuba and from Cuba to

Nicaragua. In spite of having these channels carefully studied

and analyzed, it is becoming increasingly difficult to use them.

Another weakness, I think, is the problem of leadership or

caciquismo between the five guerrilla groups-FPL, FAL,

FARN, ERP, and PRTC. They have never achieved and never

will achieve a total unity of command. That is an internal

weakness caused by their struggle for power.

.I
372 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

The Primary Objective

Remains the Same

Joaquin Villalobos-Given all of this, if imperialism

stubbornly insists on impeding our people from building their

own destiny, we are sure that it will suffer a deeper defeat than

in Vietnam, since nothing can stop us from winning our

freedom. Our people and their vanguard are determined to win

and WE WILL WIN.

Joaquin Villalobos, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary

Army (ERP), one of the organizations which forms the FMLN. Interview by

Marta Harnecker was originally published in Mexico, November-December

1982, and later published in Revolution and Intervention in Central America,

edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis

Publications/CM Associates, 1983), p. 105. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.

4 m mm m mmm m lmmm m ~ - m . .
187

October-November 1984

Peace Talks

Negotiations as a Form of

Insurgent Conflict

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila-We must always

bear in mind that we are confronted by the Marxists, and the

Marxists have their own moral standards. They are different

morals. They are their own morals. They are neither your

morals nor mine. They are not the morals of a good man. They

are not the morals of the church. They are not the ethics by

which we base our studies and, a lot of times, our own

professional institutions. The Marxist moral states that one must

utilize whatever the means in order to achieve power. It

somewhat reflects the morals of Machiavelli. What is important

are the objectives. What is important is the power, and then, it

doesn't matter what mechanisms are used in order to achieve

this power. As a result, the use of negotiations and dialogue is

just another mechanism of war. It is just another instrument of

the conflict.

Another dimension. This is the dimension they refer to a

lot. It is also related to the people's front. The people's front

pursues to group the forces of the opposition. In addition to

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.

373
374 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

certain objectives such as national independence, expulsion

from the government, and peace-objectives we are in

agreement with. We want peace. We truly want prosperity for

our people. We want to improve the conditions for our people.

Those are objectives and feelings in which we all coincide.

Then, they exploit those feelings. They manage to group certain

sectors in order to incorporate them in the struggle and utilize

them as mechanisms of support in order to advance and

consolidate a front or force even stronger and more powerful.

During the dialogue, they utilized precisely the mechanism of

peace. They say, "Well, El Salvador wants peace. The

Salvadorans want peace ... ," and we are willing to work to

achieve that peace. "... But in order for us to achieve that

peace, you must permit us to constitute 50 percent of the

government. You must permit us to maintain an armed force in

the mountains. You must permit us to work openly through the

means of communication that are already existent, such as

indoctrination." That is to say, that is no more or no less than 

a

long-term suicide. It is like taking poison everyday, a little bit at

a time, and at the end of a year, maybe two or three years, we

will be totally wiped out.

The Nicaraguans did it. They created what is called the

FAO, Frente Amplio de Oposici6n [Wide Opposition Front], in

which they managed to group all the sectors, including the

capitalist sectors who opposed Somoza. And there they were.

The democratic sectors such as Alfonso Robelo and Violeta

Chamorro, who represented la Prensa [the pressi and who

represented practically the entire national opinion of the press

against Somoza, were grouped. And what happened later on'?

"To one side! People, you are no longer useful to us because

our goal is not this. Our goal is this. Therefore, out of our way

because we are going to fulfill our tasks." And that is precisely

what they have planned for the negotiations. That is why we

can't accept a ncgotiation in which the integration of the

government or the integration of the armed forces can be

questioned. Because those are precisely the principal

mechanisms of defense of democracy. Also, we cannot question

or permit that they restrict the liberties that are offered by

I _ L- -
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 375

democracy because they can be in the political field, but at the

same time, they can be in the military fields up in the

mountains. They must make a decision. Either they are here or

they are over there. But they can't be in both places.

The International Environment

Dr. Jose Z. Garcia-El Salvador depends only to a certain

extent on the legitimacy of the government and the vagaries of

domestic politics. In a civil war funded to a large extent from

abroad, the international climate is just as important.

If there is a single cause for the rebel decision to move

toward a negotiated settlement, it lies in the changing

international context affecting both the government and the

rebels. Just as the government has depended on United States

assistance, the rebels have relied on political, financial, and

military support from abroad-and on the withholding of

support to the government. In both respects, the rebels appear to

have lost ground. Duarte succeeded in increasing military and

economic assistance, not only from the United States, but, in

some ways more important from the standpoint of the rebels,

from several other countries as well.

In July, West Germany agreed to release to El Salvador

$18 million it had pledged several years ago but had

subsequently suspended because of pressures from rebel

sympathizers. Mexico restored full diplomatic representation to

San Salvador after four years of relative neutrality. The

European Economic Community (EEC) pledged renewed

assistance at the meeting of European and Central American

Foreign Ministers in Costa Rica in September 1984. In August,

Britain resumed assistance after a five-year break. United

Nations agencies will probably increase their assistance as well.

Thus, the international ostracism of the Salvadoran government

appears to have ended, because of perceptions that Duarte is the

Dr. Josd Z. Garcfa provided his analysis of the situation in "El Salvador:

Legitimizing the Government," Current 'Iistor. 84, no. 500 (March 1985),

pp. 101-104; 135-36. Copyright 1985 by Current History, Inc. Reprinted by

permission of Current History, Inc.

$
376 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

head of a legitimate government, likely to survive after two

rounds of elections, and because of improvements in

ameliorating human rights abuse.

On the other hand, there are indications that the climate of

support for the guerrillas is cooling. Guillermo Ungo, for

example, complained in June that the Mexican Foreign Office

had "scolded" him for making political statements in Mexico

City, although he had done so many times before.

The Military View of the Problem

Colonel John D. Waghelstein-I think that negotiating with

the insurgents is just propaganda. I don't think Duarte has that

much leverage to be able to deal. I think he's doing it because it

satisfies certain public affairs images. But the bottom line is that

the Salvadorans are not going to give away what they've

earned-what their politicians, what their leadership, have

earned at the ballot box. Not going to give away to the

guerrillas something that they've no right to. I mean he may

negotiate, just as the Marxists have always done, for a tactical

advantage. I think that's essentially what Duarte's doing.

When it gets to the bottom line and you get down to power

sharing, it's not going to happen.

I (also) don't think the Salvadoran's would sit still for the

United States enforcing or imposing a solution. I don't think

we've got enough leverage. When it comes right down to

saying, "O.K. you guys, we've talked about democracy and

due process and all that, but we're going to suspend that in

order to give the guerrillas a say in Salvador's future." I don't

think the Salvadorans would buy it.

The Army would not sit still for it. If you want the Army

to take over, force Duarte into negotiation with the guerrillas for

power sharing and see how long democracy lasts.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987.
OCrOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 377

The U.S. Invests

in the Peace Talks

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-The ultimate objective was

incorrectly drawn. We determined that we were going to

improve the capabilities of the Salvadoran military to the point

where they could hold their own, and we did that. But we

defined as our objective ultimately-and both on the political

and the military sides-obliging the President, or encouraging

the President and applying pressure across the board, to offer a

dialogue to the insurgents. Then, on the military side, we

intended that the Salvadoran military continue to apply

sufficient pressure to force the insurgents to the negotiating

table. Herein lies the basic difficulty: Our ultimate concept

appears to be, that by force of military pressure the guerrillas

would be obliged to negotiate some acceptable solution with the

Salvadoran government. My personal opinion is that this will

never occur. The government can't bargain away anything. It

has nothing whatsoever that it can bargain away. The President

is constrained by the Constitution, and the military will never

permit the President to make any unconstitutional concessions to

the guerrillas, and, on the other hand, the guerrillas believe that

they are going to win. They're certain that we will lose heart

eventually, greatly reduce our commitment to El Salvador, and

they're going to wait until that occurs, and they're sure it will

occur. Then they believe they're going to win. So there is no

incentive really for them to bargain. The hard-core Communist

leadership of the insurgency has no intention of ever settling for

anything less than controlling the country.

But, because of the two sides, the two political philosophies have a different concept of what negotiations are all

about. We, on the one hand, think of bargaining in good faith,

of reaching an agreement and complying with it. The insurgents

and Communists everywhere in the world, on the other hand, look

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador, 1983 to

1985, interviewed in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 4 March 1986.

i
378 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

at negotiating, dialogue, bargaining, treaties, or whatever as

merely one more step in the political process to ultimate control.

It's simply not possible to successfully emerge from a

negotiating process without having made some concessions

which ultimately will lead to the insurgency starting up again

but with the situation being even more disadvantageous. The

Salvadorans instinctively know that.

Their [the military's] objective of defeating the insurgency

is not in sync with our objective of forcing negotiations. They,

therefore, give lip service to our objective because we support

them, and we continue at least publicly to insist that what we're

looking for is a negotiated solution. The Salvadorans,

themselves, know that that's impossible. What I'm saying is

that at the political level, one of these days we have to come to

terms with what's happening in various parts of the worldparticularly in El Salvador.

I'm suggesting that in the final analysis the only viable

option that you can offer the insurgents is surrender with

pardon. In other words, you can offer them (as the government

is doing now) the option of rejoining society and participating in

elections and attempting to achieve political power through the

political process. That's the only thing you can do. You cannot

share power with them. You can't abrogate the current

Constitution, which is a legitimate constitution, and say we're

going to reconvene a new constituent assembly and that we're

going to divide up the membership in some governing body

between the insurgents and between the government. You can't

do that. It's unconstitutional. It violates the social contract that

the present government has with the people.

Negotiating with the Insurgents

President Josi Napole6n Duarte--In September 1984, a little

after my first quarter in office, I shut myself away with my pencil

Jos Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador, 1984 to present).

Duarte: My Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986), pp. 209-13,

215-26. Copyright 1986 by Josd Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of

G. P. Putnam's Sons.

..... ...... ----- -......
OCrOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 379

and paper, to go over my goals. That evaluation convinced me

that the minimal conditions for the dialogue with the guerrilla

were going to be in place sooner than I had expected-probably by February, 1985. 1 was receiving excellent cooperation from

the armed forces. The government's relations with the private

sector had started off well. The death-squad crimes had

decreased significantly.

I considered the timetable. If I waited until February, the

month before legislative elections, to begin talks with the

guerrillas, any offer I made would be treated as nothing more

than a campaign ploy. Either I took the initiative immediately or

I would have to postpone it until spring. I decided to make the

invitation to the guerrillas as soon as possible. The place I chose

was the United Nations General Assembly, and the time

October....

Standing at the podium of the world in the great hall of the

United Nations, I aimed my words toward the remote mountains

of my country, to those Salvadorans killing and dying, not those

dispatching messages from the comfort of Managua or Havana.

"I refer to the comandantes in the mountains of my

country, weathering the elements, able to see the real position

of the Salvadoran people when they attack villages," I said.

"To those waiting in vain to be received as liberators each time

they subjugate the people, to the comandantes whose ideals

conflict with this reality, who made a mistake about the people

and now confront the truth; to the comandantes who feel the

historic error they are committing."

I acknowledged that these revolutionaries may have had

good reason for taking up arms when there was no hope of

economic reform, social justice or free elections under the

tyranny of the oligarchy allied with the armed forces. El

Salvador, however, had changed over the last five years. "1 am

here to declare and proclaim that as President of the Republic

and Commanding General of the Armed Forces, I can uphold,

under a constitutional government, the means to permit you to

abandon a stand that runs counter to the history of the political

evolution of the Salvadoran people."
380 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

... I asked the guerrilla leaders from the mountains to meet

me, unarmed, in the village of La Palma, Chalatenango

province, at 10 A.M. on October 15. It was the anniversary of

the 1979 coup that turned El Salvador toward a new path. For

that day, we would establish a demilitarized zone in a tenkilometer radius around the mountain village.

Once my invitation for peace talks was made, my control

over the event was gone. The guerrillas decided to send in the

political leaders. They wanted to enlarge the delegations, to

change the date. I said no to changing the day. To begin by

making concessions would have weakened the initiative and lost

the momentum gained in the week following my U.N. speech.

The Salvadoran government would send five representatives

into the talks. The FMLN would send two former colleagues of

mine, Ungo and Zamora from abroad, plus two comandantes

and two "observers" from different guerrilla groups. The only

others present would be the Archbishop and Church dignitaries,

who would preside....

The presentation we would make to the guerrillas was

hammered out in a meeting of the political committee joined by

Generals Vides and Bland6n, Colonels Flores Lima and L6pez

Nuila. To accompany me into the talks, I chose the first and

second alternate vice-presidents: Abraham Rodriguez, one of

the founders of the Christian Democrats, and Rend Fortin

Magafia, head of the Democratic Action Party, the one centerright party allied with us. I asked the Minister of the

Presidency, Rey Prendes, and the Defense Minister, Vides, to

come as well.

On the eve of the talks, Joaquin Villalobos, the senior

military commander of the guerrillas, sent word that he would

not be able to get to La Palma in time.

The day before the talks, Ungo and Zamora arrived with

their flock of ambassadors in the airplane provided by

Colombia. They entered the Red Cross vehicles, speeding

directly to La Palma rather than spending the night in San

Salvador as expected. Ungo's family had a summer home in La

Palma, from which they slipped off to the guerrilla encampment

in Miramundo to confer with the comandantes.
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 381

At 5 A.M. on October 15, my party prepared to leave in a

caravan of a hundred cars from the presidential residence. The

Cabinet, the Christian Democratic leaders, everyone seemed to

be going with me, all of us unarmed....

People lined the road, waving white flags, crying,

"Peace!" Just outside La Palma, we stopped at Carlos Duarte's

mountain villa to have breakfast and pass the remaining two

hours before we were to walk down to the chapel in the town

square where the meeting with the guerrillas would take place.

... The local priest and a major came to tell us everything

was ready. We left the cars at the edge of town, but before

starting to walk down the winding street my friends and coworkers gathered around me.

Chachi and Abraham walked on either side of me, General

Vides just behind.... When I reached the steps of the chapel,

the Boy Scout in charge gave me the Scout salute and I returned

his handshake. The Archbishop and three other monsignors

waited in the arched doorway and led us into the modest

concrete chapel.

The pews had been pushed back. A long table was set in

the middle of the chapel with six chairs facing one another.

There was another table at the end for the clergymen who would

preside. We took the seats facing the altar. No protocol greeting

had been planned, but when the FMLN leaders filed in they

came to shake hands with every one of us.

Once seated, Archbishop Rivera Damas prayed, then said,

"Since it was Engineer Duarte who called us together, let's

have him speak first."

I started by saying that, as President of the Republic, I had

sworn to uphold the constitution. With the same faithfulness

with which I had taken that oath, I would look for a solution to

our problems within the constitution. I gave a copy of the

document to everyone across the table. Then I read the plan for

peace we had drafted. It suggested the creation of a special

commission: six members selected by the President, six by the

guerrillas, led by a moderator designated by the Church. This

commission would discuss the ways to end the violence, to

bring full political participation and democratic rights to I
382 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

everyone in El Salvador, permitting the guerrillas to return to

peaceful lives. The most important thing was for us not to leave

this chapel without providing people with a reason to hope.

That, I concluded, was needed more than anything else.

Ungo spoke next, saying it was necessary to find the way

to peace. He took issue with several points in my United

Nations speech-the history as I outlined it and the implication

that there was a discrepancy between the reality perceived by

guerrillas in the country and the ideals of those working abroad.

He said the conditions in the country had not changed since

1979. The FDR-FMLN was indivisible and had constantly

sought peace through negotiations.

Zamora seconded Ungo's analysis, talking about the whole

political and social structure that had to be changed. He said we

at the table represented the military power of both the guerrillas

and the armed forces, the political power both of the Left and of

the Christian Democrats which formed a majority of the

country. Therefore it was up to us to change the society. He was

all for eliminating the Rightist sectors, but I told him that his

theory was totalitarian, because I believe that the Right should

also be incorporated into the democratic process. Besides,

societies cannot be transformed overnight by an agreement.

Wouldn't it be more practical to perfect the country through a

democratic process and not through destruction?

Cienfuegos spoke longer than anyone else, nearly two

hours. He talked about the guerrillas' military achievements.

"We never studied it at school, but we've learned how to wage

war," he said. He began painting a picture of the country in the

harshest terms, highlighting the areas where the guerrillas saw

no improvement. But toward the end he admitted there had been

changes. The most obvious change was the fact that we were

sitting here talking, he said. At one point, realizing he had

talked for quite a while, the comandante wondered aloud if he

should stop.

"Please continue," Abraham Rodriguez spoke up. "I

know fairly well what everyone else at this table thinks"-he

looked at his former colleagues Ungo and Zamora as he said

it--but I'm deeply interested in what you have to say."
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 383

Cienfuegos continued, and then Facundo Guardado, the

other guerrilla commander, spoke briefly about the need for

peace.

When General Vides' turn came, he declined to speak,

saying he could not agree with the guerrillas' military analysis,

but we had come to talk about peace, not contradict one

another. He added that he supported the peace plan I had

presented.

One thing that must have bothered Vides, even more than

the rest of us, was Guardado's wearing the uniform of a dead

army lieutenant. The name badge had been torn off the dirty

uniform, but at the peace table the guerrillas should not have

flaunted the fact that they killed one of our men.

This was the only discordant note at La Palma. Otherwise

we shared a sense of commitment to peace and to our country,

the feeling of being one family. Cienfuegos made a point of

chatting with Vides, catching the general as he came out of the

bathroom. Cienfuegos also spoke privately to me, asking about

his parents, who have been my friends for years. Eduardo

Sancho Castafieda (Cienfuegos' real name) is the son of a Costa

Rican chemist who settled in El Salvador. I had known the

comandante as a little boy. During the day of the peace talks

many families held brief reunions in La Palma, where relatives

came looking for brothers, sons or daughters they knew were

fighting with the guerrillas.

When the time for lunch came, Monsignor Gregorio Rosa

Chdvez asked us if we wanted to take a break, but we decided

to continue talking....

Our time for talking was limited. There were air-travel

plans and logistics problems, so we set a deadline. A joint

document had to be prepared, and Ungo repeated my phrase

about not leaving without producing something to answer the

people's need for hope. Rey Prendes and Zamora had the task

of writing the agreement statement.

We decided to form a commission, with only four

representatives from each side, that would study the proposals

for peace, find ways to humanize the conflict, develop

procedures to incorporate all groups into the peace process, and

I,

I
384 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

do whatever necessary to bring peace as soon as possible. The

FDR-FMLN wanted to set a date for the commission to meet,

but I advised we work the date out through contracts with the

Church. There were too many factors to resolve now. Our joint

communiqu6 said the meeting would be held in the second half

of November. We left unwritten two agreements about the

exchange of prisoners and the Torola bridge. Both Ungo and I

had received petitions from villagers in Morazin, asking us to

agree to let the bridge over the Torola River be reconstructed.

The bridge, linking the villages north of the river with the rest

of the country, had been blown up twice by guerrillas. We

rebuilt the bridge in November, but Villalobos' men destroyed it

again despite the La Palma agreement.

I had watched the interaction among the guerrilla

delegation with interest to see how it reflected their division of

power. During the talks, Ungo took charge, but Cienfuegos

spoke with more authority. At the end, I watched Ungo turn to

Guardado, half apologizing for the lack of progress. Ungo

pointed to the bright side by saying, "At least there'll be a

second meeting in San Salvador."

We each made a brief statement outside the chapel. The

guerrillas then returned through the church to leave by the back

door. I said my few words, then followed them, picking up the

rest of my colleagues as we headed for the cars....

The next question was, how would everyone react to the

prospect of peace? I organized meetings with the private sector,

the unions and the military officers. With the High Command,

we concluded that the guerrillas would make a show of strength

to prove they were not going into the talks because they were

losing. The first guerrilla attack came the day after La Palma

and confirmed my suspicions that Villalobos intended to exert

his influence, scorning Cienfuegos' "weakness" in talking to

us. The Army stepped up their own operations throughout the

country.

In preparation for the second session of the peace talks, I

formed a working group to discuss proposals with each

interested sector: the political parties, the Church and the armed

forces. We wanted to propose a Christmas truce, a complete
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 385

cease-fire. The Church approved. With the military, I suggested

that the officers discuss the proposal among themselves without

my presence. The officers' discussion was inconclusive. They

felt inhibited, unwilling to approve or disapprove the truce.

"Well, then it's my turn to talk," I told the commanders.

For eight hours, the military officers and I went over the plan in

which I laid out my political and strategic analysis of what the

truce would mean.

To see how the guerrillas were thinking, I took advantage

of a forum in Los Angeles provided by an academic group that

wanted to stage a debate between the government and the

guerrillas. I decided to send Rey Prendes and a team with

instructions to raise certain points in the debate and see how the

FMLN representatives reacted. Afterward, we analyzed their

responses carefully. We found that the guerrillas had more

interest in a truce as a propaganda device than as a serious step

toward a solution. We realized they would not seriously

consider a cease-fire, so we reduced our next proposal. We

would ask for a limited Christmas truce and humanitarian

measures.

The problem of where to hold the second round of peace

talks led to more delays.... We settled on Ayagualo, a former

seminary on a hilltop, run by the Church as a retreat, close to

San Salvador and the airport.

Because the second round was meant to be a working

session, it didn't seem appropriate for me as President to go.

We assumed that my presence would be needed later, after

some concrete agreements were prepared. Still, I sent the

highest-level delegation I could. It included the Minister of the

Presidency, Rey Prendes; the Undersecretary of Defense,

Colonel L6pez Nuila; the Planning Minister, Chivez Mena; and

the first alternate Vice-President, Abraham Rodrfguez. The

guerrillas sent Rub6n Zamora, seconded only by low-level

representatives of the FMLN.

The guerrillas arrived at Ayagualo on November 29, 1984,

with their own proposal. It consisted of a three-stage peace plan

practically unchanged from the one they circulated in 1979.

They wanted an end to American military aid in the first stage,

, I4
386 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

guerrilla participation in the government and a cease-fire in the

second, and by the third stage guerrilla forces to be welded into

the "reorganized" armed forces. Then they would call for

elections. It was as if they wanted the clock turned back, as if

the people's effort in the 1982 and 1984 elections meant

nothing, as if the armed forces had not changed at all, as if a

Christian Democratic government did not exist, as if everything

we had said in La Palma were erased!

... The guerrillas ignored my effort to be realistic and

sincere and to work for the benefit of all. They refused to

discuss humanization, discarded our cease-fire proposal and

rejected even the Church's truce proposal.

After twelve hours of nearly futile discussion, the

Ayagualo communiqud announced an agreement to "facilitate

free movement on the roads for civilians from December 22 to

January 3," and to continue the dialogue. The announcement

was anticlimactic, but the speeches following Archbishop

Rivera y Damas' reading of the meager communiqu6 reached a

crescendo. Zamora gave a political diatribe that would have

caused consternation by itself, and Comandante Guardado

followed him with what sounded like a guerrilla recruitment

pitch. This was all being carried live on national television. I

think Zamora and Guardado directed their remarks to their

guerrilla comrades rather than the Salvadoran people. They

were sending the guerrillas a message of how tough they could

be.

No one missed the guerrilla message or its threat to the

peace process. It was so obvious that, in the mansions of the

Right, they uncorked the champagne to celebrate the demise of

my peace initiative. Everyone in the country felt the surge of

,4 frustration and anger. There were those in the armed forces who

thought Ayagualo meant the end of any compromise, leaving

only a military solution. As my delegation reported back to me,

I knew that if I did not do something to counteract the impact of

the guerrillas' provocation, we would soon face a crisis and

possibly a coup.

There was no time to wait. I went on television to respond

in kind to the guerrillas. Weakness on my part would have

Si nnulmmu u umn nnuuunnnnl N[ n u u mmi n
OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1984 PEACE TALKS 387

meant the end of the dialogue, and I couldn't let down the

people who had supported my effort. There are moments to be

magnanimous and moments to hold the line.

"Here, before the people," I said, "I state that I'm willing

to continue the search for peace, willing to continue the

dialogue. But I cannot accept-I categorically reject-any

position that is fundamentally unconstitutional. For this reason,

I ask those who have taken up arms to rethink their proposal and

come up with one in accordance with the spirit of the

Salvadoran people."

After Ayagualo, the peace talks stalled. The guerrillas

continued to seek more one-day stands, with access to all the

media, but I refused. I could net see how progress can be made

unless we sit down privately over a period of time, united by

some greater principle than a need to share the public platform.

Duarte's Political Motives

Colonel James J. Steele-Duarte got a lot of mileage, both

domestic and international mileage, out of the attempts to

negotiate; so, he went back to that well a couple of more times.

But, I think because of the intransigent attitude of the guerrillas,

it has become more of a tactical tool than anything else of late.

He saw that very clearly. I think that his expectations were such

that this is an opportunity to present the guerrillas essentially for

what they are. They are not interested in peace. They are not

interested in joining the process. What they're interested in is

power. They don't want democracy because they know that they

can't compete in that kind of a system. Duarte and the

politicians would love more than anything to get the Ungos and

the Zamoras back into the system because they know that they

can beat them in the system. It's the same reason why the

Ungos and the Zamoras aren't coming back into the system,

because they know that they don't have the political support

base here to win any elections.

Colonel James J. Steele. Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1984 to 1986, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986; and, in Monterey, California. 5 November 1986.
19W

U.S. Support for

El Salvador

The Insurgent View

U.S. Aid Reflects an Insolent

Pursuit of Supremacy

Guillermo M. Ungo-The anti-communism of the oligarchy

and of the Army that serves it caused the murder of 30,000

peasants in 1932 and has fueled an even greater massacre today.

This ruthless type of anti-communism has been supported by

successive U.S. administrations for several decades, chiefly in

the form of training for Army officers in military establishments

in both the United States and the Panama Canal Zone. These

efforts to teach officers to combat the so-called internal enemy

have been based on an ominous theory of national security. This

view of the problem and of its solution is essentially militaristic.

And this approach has cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of

men, women, and even children throughout Latin America. In

the name of anti-communism and of law and order, dictators

such as Nicaragua's Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Paraguay's

Alfredo Stroessner, and Chile's Augusto Pinochet Ugarte have

brought only death, disorder, insecurity, and instability to the

continent.

Dr. Guillermo Manuel Ungo (political leader of the FPL), "'The People's

Struggle," Foreign Policy 52 (Fall 1983). p. 52-53, 56-57. 60. Copyright

1983 by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Reprinted by

permission of Foreign Policy.

389

I
390 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Successive U.S. administrations have followed the same

dialectic of friend or enemy that Latin American dictators use,

one that confuses friendship with submission and that was

clearly rejected by Pope John Paul II during his March 1983

visit to San Salvador. The epithet of subversive or Communist

is applied immediately to any who do not submit. The anticommunist dictators, however, are not required to support

pluralism or to hold elections, nor are sanctions imposed,

credits withheld, or covert actions taken against them. They are

considered friends and allies of the United States.

In spite of the unequal strengths of the two belligerents, the

Salvadoran war is not being won by the Salvadoran

government. Yet the aid sent to the Salvadoran government by

the U.S. administration has not been modest or inadequate. It

has reached nearly $1 billion in three years. In a small country

such as El Salvador. where the great majority of the population

has a per capita income of less than $250 per year and where in

1979 the government allocated $9 per person for health and $24

for education, maintaining each Salvadoran soldier costs U.S.

taxpayers $10,000. The additional sums requested of Congress

for 1983 and 1984 would double the cost. Put another way,

accepting the Pentagon's own estimates that the guerrilla groups

number no more than 7,000 combatants the United States has

spent more than $135,000 per insurgent.

These guerrilla forces are a people's army that operates in a

small territory that lacks extensive mountain ranges, easy access

to all corners of the country, and other geographic conditions

favorable for guerrilla warfare. This people's army lacks

airplanes, helicopters, trucks, tanks, and heavy artillery. It has

nevertheless been able to resist, develop, and advance while

fighting against a much larger and better-equipped force.

U.S. military aid, however, only serves to strengthen the

militarist sectors inside El Salvador that oppose dialogue and

want to democratize the country by exterminating the

opposition.

But the best way to put the ideological, conservative

arguments on trial is to pose the question: What would happen

to the Salvadoran government if the United States stopped

I
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 391

sending military aid? The Salvadoran government and the

Reagan administration have already given a response: They

cannot afford to risk such a cutoff. The opposite question, about

the supposed Cuban, Nicaraguan, or Soviet aid to the guerrillas,

could also be asked. The FDR-FMLN has already responded:

That aid does not exist and it is not necessary. To dispel any

doubt about this matter, the FDR-FMLN has advocated a

negotiated solution to the conflict, sponsored by any

governments, witnesses, or international mediators who not

only possess respectable reputations but who also are friendly to

the United States.

The discussions and guarantees agreed upon during

negotiations will allow Salvadorans to resolve the conflict

without external interference. For two consecutive years the

United Nations General Assembly has approved resolutions

calling for the suspension of military aid to the contending

parties. Failure to agree to this step will only prolong, deepen,

and widen the war in which we Salvadorans provide the

corpses. The Reagan administration's responsibility for the

continuation, intensification, and regionalization of the war is

undeniable. The Reagan administration's role contrasts with the

position of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama,

and Venezuela), which has majority support in Latin America

and which rejects a strategy of pacification through a war of

extermination covered by a facade of elections.

The Reagan Administration claims that if military aid to

the Salvadoran government is terminated, the regime will

collapse and El Salvador will fall into the hands of Communists.

Consequently, since El Salvador is regarded as the back yard or

the front yard of the United States, it is said to be necessary to

step up the war and the massacres to save El Salvador. The

same mentality was apparent during the Spanish Inquisition,

when suspected heretics were burned alive to purify their souls.

This rationale reveals a primitive imperialist anti-communism. It

destroys the basis for international coexistence, which rests

upon a respect for political pluralism among states and upon the

right to self-determination and non-intervention. This mentality

is also used to justify covert operations intended to destablize or i
392 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

overthrow foreign governments. Such operations constitute

genuine acts of intervention and war and reflect an insolent

pursuit of supremacy.

Forms of U.S. Intervention in

El Salvador

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial")--There are various

degrees of intervention, for which imperialism has different

means at its disposal. Actually, intervention began some time

ago, not only with the U.S. Government's participation in the

Junta's programs, but also with military and economic aid and

by sending military advisers. But now it takes more concrete

and aggressive forms; among them, we can identify three levels.

The first would be to push for what we might call

"humanitarian intervention." Carter's administration, and

especially Bowdler [Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs-Ed.], has been claiming lately that a military

deadlock exists in El Salvador, meaning that neither of the two

sides can defeat the other.

... They must assist "humanistically," then, to stop the

bloodshed by proposing intervention by the OAS Commission

on Human Rights or the "good offices" of democratic

governments, so that a formula is found to intervene between

the warring groups and stop the hostilities. This would be

"merciful mediation," a dangerous and hypocritical mask of

imperialism.

But imperialism also has other, more militant means at its

disposal. The second level consists of urging the governments

of Guatemala or Honduras to intervene in different ways and

Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial"), primary leader of the Popular

Forces of Liberation (FPL), one of the organizations that make up the FMLN.

until his death in 1983. Interview by Adolfo Gilly originally published in

Mexico on 4 and 5 January 1981, and later published in Revolution and

Intervention in Central America, edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas

(San Francisco: Synthesis Publications/CM Associates, 1983), pp. 54- 56.

Copyright 1983 by CM Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM

Associates.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 393

carry out operations of military cooperation or direct

intervention itself. The Honduran Army is already

systematically crossing the borders of our country to combat

revolutionary forces.

The Honduran Army is being armed by the U.S.

Government. Within this strategy, the peace treaty between

Honduras and El Salvador is nothing more than a bloody pact

against the Salvadorean Revolution, conceived by the U.S.

Department of State to consolidate a counterrevolutionary

triangle of El Salvador-Honduras-Guatemala, and to try in this

way to destroy our movement and launch an offensive against

the Nicaraguan people.

In terms of training and military aid given to the

Salvadorean dictatorship, Venezuela and Israel stand in second

place after the United States. France sends no advisers, but sells

sophisticated arms to the Junta.

The third stage of intervention, now appearing with more

dangerous contours than ever, is direct intervention by the

Yankees themselves, a move of desperation if all other attempts

to contain our revolution fail. The FMLN once again

emphasizes the necessity for international solidarity from all

countries to stop direct military intervention of imperialism in

our territory.

The Salvadoran Government View

U.S. Support for El Salvador

President Jose Napoledn Duarte-And once the United

States learns that supporting democracies can serve its own

interests, then that great nation to the north would no longer be

part of our problem. It could contribute to our solution.

Josd Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador, 1984 to present),

Duarte. My Story (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1986), p. 92. Copyright

1986 by Jost Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G. P. Putnam's

Sons.

4
394 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

U.S. Support Represents a Great

Opportunity for Democracy

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova-I think that the

situation in El Salvador represents a great opportunity for the

United States. The type of struggle that we are dealing with here

is the best indication of a marked difference between a Marxist

revolution in Nicaragua and a democratic revolution in El

Salvador. We are going to provide our people with the support

they need to be able to work, to be able to shape their own

destiny, and to be able to become independent from us in the

future. While there is democracy, freedom of speech, and

freedom of politics, democratic institutions will be able to

flourish in this country. In spite of the internal crisis we have to

deal with, we are trying to accomplish these tasks. But we must

not only provide assistance in terms of military aid. Instead it

should be more substantial. The aid we were receiving before

the earthquake was very convenient. But, today the support is

more limited due to a series of external problems we have no

control over. This situation could prove to be counterproductive

for us in the future. As the smallest country in Latin America,

El Salvador will inevitably serve as an example for all other

Latin American countries. When we manage to stop the

progress of the Communist movement here, no other country

will want to stay behind in this struggle and watch El Salvador

with its very small armed forces accomplish this goal. They will

all want to try to surpass the efforts and successes of this

country. However, the most important aspect is that we must

receive the necessary aid and support now, not only to solve our

internal problems, but to successfully achieve independence in

the future, to generate more jobs to improve the welfare of our

population.

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, Salvadoran Minister of

Defense, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 19

December 1987.

I
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 395

Within the context of what we are discussing now, I must

refer to the need to acquire patience. The United States is very

impatient. [ keep telling them that we must provide a popular

prolonged resistance to a popular prolonged war. If the

subversives choose to fight constantly, I will constantly resist

and defend what is rightfully mine. We must be equally

persistent and patient in this struggle and not think about how

long the war has lasted in El Salvador six or seven years.

Instead, we must think positively and that El Salvador has been

able to resist the heavy blows it has suffered during this time,

and for that reason, neither Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,

Costa Rica, Panama, nor others have fallen. Then, if we

continue to maintain a strong front, it doesn't matter whether or

not the results are successful. If this barrier we have created

continues to resist the advance of enemy forces for the next

10-20 years, I believe we should not remove it simply because

we are bored of dealing with it. It is important that we remain

patient throughout this conflict. It is important, in my view, that

the United States' policy has remained consistent throughout

this war, and even more important is the constant support and

good will on the part of President Reagan during this crisis.

Then, sometimes we must resign to the fact that not enough aid

was received at a particular time. But we must realize that there

was someone who made an effort to provide us with what we

needed, and that boosts the people's morale, the armed forces'

morale. This also makes a good impression on future allies for

the United States.

It is very difficult to focus on democratic principles when

one is at war. Nevertheless, I am a firm believer that the best

way to approach this conflict and attain a peaceful solution is

through a democratic process and support for human rights

rather than ignoring these fundamental aspects and trying to win

through "quick fix" solutions. It is more important, in my

view, to win this war two or three years later. But once the war

has been won we should begin to attain peace and strengthen

our country. That is why democracy, respect for human rights,

and a professional and apolitical armed forces are vital to our

institution.

ia
396 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Were It Not for U.S. Support,

El Salvador Probably Would Not

Have Survived

General Juan Rafael Busti//o-We had quite an experience in

1981. However, due to several factors, we were very weak. First,

we could not rely on any support because none of the friendly

nations trusted the government and armed forces at the time-a

provisional government backed by a junta. We had neither

economic nor military support. We were in a very difficult

situation. We had no counselling at the time, and we barely

depended on ambassadors and military attaches to fulfill their

diplomatic missions. The work they performed was mainly as

observers. We were very interested in maintaining diplomatic

relations with other countries because we felt the need for some

foreign diplomatic representation to witness the outcome of the

events in this country. However, these foreign governments never

provided any aid for other democratic countries or those countries

seeking solutions to end their conflicts and establish democracies.

But on the side of the opposition, you do see a constant unity of

effort and mutual assistance being provided. In this respect, the

United States is the only country that has supported our cause.

Unfortunately, our Latin American neighbors have never provided

us with any assistance, and some day they could face a similar

problem. This is not to say that all the Salvadorans are goodhearted. Perhaps some day even we may develop similar attitudes

and refuse to help our neighboring countries who are facing the

same difficulties we are.

Venezuela's situation has improved somewhat, but Peru,

Ecuador, and Chile could face the same problems we have. Some

day they may even need Salvador to support them, even if it

means we have to provide moral support. Even to suggest the

possibility of providing economic aid is quite remote because

we've never received any. If it weren't for the support we've

received from the United States, this country would probably be

just another domino.

General Juan Bustillo, Chief of Salvadoran Air Force. 1979 to date.

interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 21 January 1987.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 397

Modern War Is Not Fought

with Rifles Only

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila--Our soldiers, guards,

and, most of all, our officers must learn to accept the fact that

today's war is not fought in a conventional way. During my last

visit to Fort Gulick in Panama, I attended a graduation

ceremony in honor of the last group of cadets. When they

showed me their core curriculum, I told them they lacked one

course which could teach them the basic facts, that today's wars

are no longer the conventional wars of the past. They no longer

have the fundamental characteristics of a regular war. Now,

they are totally different because the promoters start out by

looking for a motivation, then the), look for a cause, and finally

they manage to slowly win the will of the people. The military

must be prepared for this. Soldiers and officers must learn to

fight this new war, this modem war. They should no longer

depend on rifles only. That was yesterday's concept. Presently,

we are conscious of the fact that each military activity or

maneuver that we perform must be along the same lines as those

factors presented by today's war. If we happen to arrive at some

city and clean it up, the civilian forces must immediately come

in and restore the public services, talk to the people, create a

local infrastructure, and end corruption with the use of every

means Latin American or Third World countries have. Since

1981, we have been following this pattern.

We, as military men, fail in this regard because we have a

preconceived notion as to how to confront a military situation,

but we don't have the capabilities to confront a social or

political situation. The problem is rather complex. We must

regard, simultaneously, the six factors of the war, and in this

type of war they are equally important. If we happen to

disregard one of these factors, it would prove to be disastrous.

For example, if we wanted to improve militarily, economically,

in propaganda, and diplomatically and the social factor was

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 17

December 1986. 29 June 1987. and 23 September 1987.

i

tj.

atI
398 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

excluded, the result would be catastrophic. If the people are

unhappy there is really no purpose to continue improving in

other areas, because their contentment is crucial in order to be

able to improve in other areas and restore the country.

Views from U.S. Practitioners

An Unpredictable Ally

General John R. Galvin-The Salvadoran armed forces

would say that without the United States, they probably would

have been defeated by the so-called final offensive that took

place in 1981. The Salvadoran armed forces felt that we came to

their rescue. At the same time we are viewed as unpredictable,

unreliable allies who cannot find it in our hearts and minds and

pocketbooks to sustain anything that we do for very long. So

that, in the Salvadoran military thinking, there was always the

question of how much longer can we persuade the United States

to continue helping us, or when will the day come when once

again we are on our own. And, given the difficulties that the

Salvadorans were having with the economy, the military aid and

the economic aid-by the way that was on a ratio of one dollar

military aid to four dollars economic aid during the period that I

was there-that aid sustained the country and helped to fight the

war. But, the realization that it could end at any time, and very

often it was, in effect, hanging by its fingernails on the edge of

the cliff, the realization that it could end at any time, that the

Congress might vote it out, made it extremely difficult to plan

ahead.

I think that the U.S. military and the Ambassador and the

country team in El Salvador were respected for the most part by

the Salvadoran armed forces and by the Salvadoran government

during this period. I don't think that the Salvadorans felt that we

had a corner on the market of counterguerrilla operations by any

means. I think that we were assisting them by basically

providing resources for the fighting and, to some degree,

General John R. Galvin, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern

Command. 1985 to 1987, interviewed in Mons, Belgium. 18 August 1987.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 399

the doctrine of counterguerrilla operation. But a great deal of

that doctrine was also being produced in the form of the

"School of Hard Knocks" as the Salvadoran armed forces went

out to fight the war. This was basically good, this was very

good, because the Salvadorans had the confidence that came

from the fact that they indeed were the ones who were fighting

the war, and we were in a secondary position helping them.

Our military did not go out and fight. They didn't go lower

than brigade level. And this was good. The Salvadorans could

always maintain their pride. They were not puppets. They were

not somebody who had to have an advisor following along in

every military contact, telling them what to do. They knew what

to do in combat. What they needed was resourcing from us for

the most part. Now, I did find that they were always willing to

accept considered advice, and they were willing to act on it. But

that advice was normally intelligence. We had the means of

gaining intelligence about the guerrillas that we were able to

pass to them and that they accepted very much. We also tried to

study the war for them in terms of the logistics, the combat

operations, and where we could, we tried to provide advice. 

I

think most of that advice was good, and I think most of that

advice was accepted. But, we were not running the war. We

assisted them in making Plan Maquilishuat (later to become the

4National Plan). But we didn't write the entire plan for them.

When it came time to write Unidos Para Reconstruir, they were

much better at it then, and they, the Salvadorans, wrote that

whole plan with a little bit of assistance here and there from us.

That's the way it was done, and that's the way it should have

been done.

U.S. Legislative Debates Were

Not Helpful

Ambassador Deane Hinton-U.S. recognition of the place

was important. Some interesting things were happening that

Ambassador Deane Hinton. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1982 to

1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 10 September 1987.

IA
400 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

helped. There was a great deal of high-level interest in

Washington. At times it was too much and at other times it was

helpful. My view of that was, if they wanted to support what I

wanted to do, it was great, and if they wanted me to do

something I didn't want to, I'd just as soon there hadn't been

that much high-level interest. That's life.

I don't think the legislative debate, the uncertainty, was

helpful. Field commanders in El Salvador like to know where

they are and what resources they are going to have to do the

job. We lived with a great big rumpus over certification lof

progress in human rights], a continuing one over human rights.

I didn't like certification--don't like certification. I viewed it as

a way for the Congress to avoid its responsibilities and to dump

the hard decisions back on the President. Both to be for and

against something at the same time, that's their certification

procedures.

They didn't want to take the responsibility to deny

resources to the government of El Salvador, and on the other

hand they didn't want to endorse it, so they created a

certification procedure and made the rest of us jump through the

hoop. I guess I never did like it, don't like it. It comes close, in

my view, to being unconstitutional. If it isn't, then in any case

it is a political cop-out by a lot of Congressmcn.

U.S. and Southern Command Policy

toward El Salvador

Major General James R. Taylor-I think the U.S. policy is a

commitment to provide the material and economic support that

is required for Duarte to finish the war. That does not imply an

open-ended checkbook. We are not going to get as much money

this year as we got last year. But from what I can tell we have

been able to obtain most of what we need, or what we think the

ESAF needs, out of the Congress and the American people in

terms of money and equipment. There have been occasional

Major General James R. Taylor. Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry

Brigade (Panama), 1986 to 1987, interviewed at Fort Amador. Republic of

Panama, 14 December 1986.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 401

hiccups. At least right now, setting aside the Irangate fiasco (or

whatever it is that you want to call it), the ultimate impact is that

we are committed, probably at some decreasing level of effort

over the next decade, to support the government of Salvador as

long as it continues the way it is as a legitimate body, duly elected

by the people, cognizant of the human rights issues and the values

that we support.

I would say that, in basic terms, our (USSOUTHCOM)

strategy is to do everything that we can to assist the Mil Group and

their effort to assist the ESAF, to support the U.S. Ambassador in

El Salvador in his efforts to support the Salvadoran government,

and to represent the United States and U.S. interests up there.

USSOUTHCOM is dedicated to the organizational battle of

acquiring the resources that are needed in terms of the MAP and

IMET and FMS dollars that are available. Every functional system

that we have is geared towards providing (for example, the

intelligence systems) the support that the Salvadorans need.

Clearly, at least in my mind, there is a support from government

to government. But we are thinking too much of the shooting

phase of LIC [low-intensity conflict] and not thinking enough

about what we have to do before we get to that stage. We are

looking at it isolated in a vacuum of military balance. We're not

looking at all at other things that must be applied with that: the

civic action projects, the PSYOPS planning- and campaigning, and

the intelligence preparation. We are not looking at the type

organizations that are needed to support all of those functions or

some sort of unit that can be employed which could put those

functions together in support of our war plans (should we ever

have to go to war) but can also be forward deployed to work for

the CINC in that part of the conflict before the shooting starts. If

we do it right, we can win the war before we have to fire a round.

U.S. Policy and Support Has

Been Piecemeal

General Wallace H. Nufting-It's incredible. We've had carrier

battle groups. We've had battleship groups steaming off the coasts.

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

1979 to 1983, interviewed in Orlando, Florida, 29 January 1987.

Si

-4 n m m m m mm m • m ......... : - -
402 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 To LATE 1986

In my view, it's not totally but almost totally irrelevant to the

problem. And the cost of steaming one of those battle groups

for one day would have provided the kind of human and small

boat capability that we required to help the brown water navies

of the region perform professionally. So there's another

tremendous problem-trying to bring what resources existed in

DOD to bear. Then, when you focus on formulation of policy. I

went and talked to various departments and agencies, as I

mentioned, each time I visited Washington. At that time there

was a loose and informal structure called the Core Group,

chaired by Assistant Secretary of State ARA, with

representatives from DOD. CIA, NSC, who met, I think, on a

rather informal basis. My impression was the whole thing was

sort of played out of somebody's pocket, that there was not a

sufficient integrated, coordinated effort from the interested.

responsible departments and agencies put together on a

continuing basis. They met once in a while in an office for 30

minutes, an hour, two hours, I don't know how long they met. I

only attended a couple of the meetings ... so I may not be a

competent judge, but it appeared to be ... sort of off the top of

somebody's head. That, in my view, is no way to formulate

policy. I have since talked in a lot of places about my views of

how it ought to be done, and I've written some more recently.

I have frequently commented that I was the only senior

representative of a department or agency of the U.S.

Government in the region. When I looked around for my

counterparts in the State Department and the CIA, they were in

Washington, and I had to deal with individual country

ambassadors and station chiefs. That sort of arrangement just

doesn't work very well. In my view there is a problem in

Washington of assessing issues outside Washington. It's very

difficult for someone who works in Washington, whether it's in

DOD, the State Department, or the CIA, to objectively and

sensibly evaluate regional issues. Assistant secretaries deal with

ambassadors and station chiefs from one level to another,

country by country, and probably do a pretty good job. But I

don't think they do a very good job when they try to focus at

theater level, as we call it, or the regional level.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 403

I, therefore, believe, in a crisis period in particular-such

as I think we've been in since 1980 in Central America-we

should organize what I call superembassies on a regional level.

Not only should there be a theater commander who represents

DOD, but there should also be a State guy, assistant secretary

level, responsible for coordinating political/military issues, all

the ambassadors and so forth. He should be in the region. I

think the CIA guy responsible for the region should be in the

region. They should be collocated somewhere, wherever

whatever country allows us to put a superembassy together to

deal with U.S. regional interests. That's where they ought to be,

and they ought to be working together. They ought not to be in

Washington. I think we would be more successful in analyzing

regional problems, coming up with regional solutions, proposed

solutions, and inputs to the policy formulation effort in

Washington if you had all these representatives living and

working together in the region. I think you get a much more

relevant, a much clearer view of the problem in the region than

you get in Washington. Their responsibility should be to

provide inputs to the formulation process in Washington. They

should be principally responsible for the execution of the policy.

If they would work together in a superembassy kind of

framework, I think we would have seen in Central America a

hell of a lot better effort that we've achieved piecemeal.

Greater U.S. Military Support

Might Be Inappropriate

Colonel John D. Wagheistein-What we were doing was

trying to sell small technology. We kept a lid on the number of

helicopters. We weren't really enamored with the A-37 [small

fixed-wing combat aircraft], but we'd inherited it. We were

looking for more radios for the troops, better boots, rations that

would allow them to go out into more extended operations

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, Commander, U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983, interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 23 February 1987.
404 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

rather than taking all the kitchen out and then hearing the pitterpatter of the pans making tortillas at wee hours of the morning.

There's lots of little things that we thought were needed. The

Salvadorans had plenty of people to put on the ground, and

that's what we wanted. Saturate the countryside rather than have

them fly over the people they'd pledge to defend. And, so we

were interested in better patrol boats and better communications

and smaller units and all those things. We practitioners of

counterinsurgency through the years have always been saying,

"Hey, this is what you really need to do." You don't need to

do this and that. You don't need to write a check on the national

treasury. What you have to do is force these guys, give them the

training equipment and then force them, to do what needs to be

done, which is go out and show the people that you're out there

amongst them. And you know, we go Mao Tse-tung-the water

and the fishes. I think Hinton rightly viewed with some

suspicion USSOUTHCOM's desire to take over and gadgetize

the war, turn it into one that was going to be dependent upon

things rather than on people.

In this context, everybody wants to be a practitioner of

low-intensity conflict. Well, everybody, in order to be a

practitioner of low-intensity conflict, has got to think in terms of

something besides the 82nd Airborne [Division], the 1st

Marines, 101st, the 7th, or Light Division. And we're a long

way from that. Somebody needs to go in there with a hammer

or with a machete and just do a gut on those curriculums [at our

service schools] and get them back in line with what the real

world is all about. The Pacific and the USSOUTHCOM AOs

(Area of Operations] have got to be able to deal with something

besides the conventional threat. In order for us, the Army to

provide qualified staff officers who know the area and who are

willing to say, "We don't need two thousand widgets; we need

the host country to do X, Y, and Z." They don't need to buy

200 fast movers. They need to buy boots and rations, and we

need to train them in small unit tactics. They have to quit going

out and beating up on people at night. None of this has anything

to do with the Department of Defense's role in fighting the

Russians in the Fulda Gap [Germany] or Europe. But we don't
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 405

train our troops in this environment. We don't really effectively

train our officer corps in this environment. Only those few

Mavericks who insist on going to the sound of the guns that

aren't Russian (at least directly) are really qualified to deal with

those kinds of problems, and they're the exception to the rule.

Blessed with a Small Staff

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-In a way we were blessed

with a small staff but overwhelmed by the number of problems.

Everybody was constantly overworked, and we never got all the

things done in the way that we should have. We were only able

to focus on a few of our priority tasks. We constantly had to

reinvent wheels. One of the key examples was that the whole

civil defense program, when I was there, was in the hands of

one Special Forces sergeant. He did a superb job. It was the sort

of thing which, in other circumstances, you might have

expended a company of Special Forces on. But the real reason

why it got done well and right was because this guy had the

conceptual approach, the training, the experience, and the

background to put it rapidly on the back of the Salvadorans that

he had trained to get it done. In a sense, one of the things that

helped us the most-though and it was one of our biggest

problems in the eyes of a lot of people-was the limitation we

imposed on ourselves, in order to gain congressional confidence

in our approach, on the number of U.S. military people we had.

In the last analysis I would judge that that was an ingredient for

success rather than failure. It could have been an ingredient for

failure if the insurgency problem had gotten bigger much more

rapidly, but somehow we were able to contain the problem

within the scope of the limitations and with the number of

people we had. We were able to demand and we got Paul

Gorman's and Jack Galvin's support for absolutely top class

personnel. We had the people managing the military systems

mission attuned to moving military personnel in and out

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv, Israel. 25 August 1987.

3

i
406 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

very rapidly. We had a way of proceeding that in effect

guaranteed that we made the best use of the people that we had

and got rid of the people who didn't hack it very rapidly. That

was just about right for what we needed even though we were

stretched thin. But if we had been free to organize in the usual

fashion, we may well have had a top-heavy, inefficient,

unresponsive, unattuned, and lackadaisical approach to the

problem, which might have sunk us.

We were able to manage the military personnel side

because we had the full backing of the four-star Commander of

the Unified Command on the one hand and Washington on the

other. We were also able to manage by doing as many things

out of country as we could. That helped us because it reduced

our profile and vulnerability. And we were able to manage

because the military saw the need to give us absolutely topflight people and to put into the hands of the Military Group

Chief, who ran it, a lot of authority for shuffling people around

and moving people in and out and for constantly developing and

building new priorities. We had a good service from our people,

in terms of Spanish language capability, where they were really

needed in the Salvadoran military, and we tried to get people

out of places where they were superfluous. We were prohibited

from having anybody engaged with any combat unit, which

meant that the combat units didn't have the American crutch to

fall back on or to blame. They succeeded or failed, and their

own lives were at stake and so the immediate need for their

becoming self-reliant and successful was very real. We tried to

run the training program with as few Americans and as many

Salvadorans as possible and ditto with almost everything else. It

was training them to become the trainers rapidly. The out-ofcountry training gave us some breathing space, and it also

meant we could put more people into the training program

without having to carry the burden of them in-country. That

made a big difference to us in terms of being able to manage our

own relationships. It was an interesting model. We almost

backed into it. I wouldn't say that it's the tried and true formula

for dealing with every problem. You have to be careful. But in

the long run, it proves the general maxim that a lot of us had
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 407

who have dealt with these kinds of problems in the past. If you

can stay lean, trim, and mean for a very long period of time and

keep the lid on personnel bloat, you can win or at least you can

hold your own.

The View from the Mil Group

Colonel James J. Steele-The Mil Group provides basically

three things. We provide materiel, we provide training, and we

provide advice. We do that consistent with the policy of the

U.S. Government as implemented by the Ambassador.

Training is focused more and more on their [Salvadoran]

cadres, their instructors, and their leaders than to train their

soldiers and their units. Early on in the conflict we focused

heavily on training units over in Honduras, even in the States,

and that was probably absolutely critical at that time. One of our

problems is that there is the tendency for us to want to organize

their units around how we are organized. This gets right into the

issue of "What kind of people do you need here? How many do

you need?" and so on. Nobody has cursed the 55-man limit

more than I probably have in the last two and a half years, but I

just have to tell you that doing it with a low U.S. profile is the

only way to go. If you don't, you immediately get yourself into

trouble, because there is a tendency for Americans to want to do

things quickly, to do them efficiently- and the third step in that

process is to do it yourself. If you take that third step here, you

have lost the battle. What we've done is focus even though it

takes longer, and it's not as efficient, working with the

Salvadoran cadres and their leaders to do it.

Keep in mind that when you try to do it yourself, you're

imposing what is going inevitably to be viewed as a Gringo

solution. When you do that, you assume the responsibility to

make it work. They have a ready-made excuse if they don't like

it or don't want to support it, and that is to say, "Well, it's a

Colonel James J. Steele. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1984 to 1986. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 5-10

October 1986, and. in Monterey. California, 5 November 1986.

&
408 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

Gringo solution, and it won't work here." So to the extent that

you can make their institutions work or you can take what they

have, whether it's leadership in the form of people or it's

organization or even equipment, you ought to do that. It works

and it's worth the effort.

As you look at the issue of how to fight an insurgency, one

of the important questions is, "How much time do you have?"

The Brits have taken a different view in the past. They

recognized early on that leadership is probably the critical

ingredient. It's the one that probably takes the longest to

develop in the host country, if it doesn't exist there before. So,

their inclination is to assume the leadership role themselves. We

are far less inclined to do that. In Vietnam we played an active

role by sending advisors to the field, and, even though they

weren't actually commanding, they were, for all practical

purposes, doing just that. So, if you want things to happen

faster, that's an option that you can consider, short of actually

imposing your leadership on them. But, you pay a price,

because you don't develop the infrastructure; you undermine

their leadership in many ways when you do that.

The way we've done it in El Salvador has been expensive,

I suppose, in terms of dollars spent, and it's taken some time.

But, I think it's the way to do it. What's developing there is not

something that will go away as soon as we reduce our levels of

support. It's going to stay. Even though we're talking about a

program that ranges between $120 million and $196 million

over the past few years, when you talk about fighting a war,

that's really cheap. That's not to suggest that that is not a lot of

money and the U.S. taxpayers aren't making a major effort. It's

one of the largest programs in the world, but, when you

consider how much it costs in peacetime to field a U.S. division

and you consider the impact of losing a country here, it's pretty

cheap.

How do you fight their kind of war militarily? The

doctrinal answer is that you fight it with small units. You fight

it at night. You fight it with a lot of ambushes. That's been the

focus of the Mil Group trainers, certainly during my two and a

half years here. I know it was prior to my arriving here. When I
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 409

got here, I visited just about every battalion in the country. The

thing that struck me was, never mind the quality considerations

of leadership, but the quantity problem. You'd go to a battalion,

a 600-man unit, and it would be commanded by a lieutenant.

That's a lieutenant colonel's billet in anybody's army. Then you

go down to the company level, and it's commanded by second

lieutenant. Then you'd go down to what we would call a

platoon, or what they call a section, and you'd be hard pressed

to find anybody that you could really describe as an effective

leader.

Why did that situation exist? Well, it existed because there

was a tremendous force expansion-a 13,000-man force,

expanded dramatically to a force that now exceeds 50,000 in a

very relatively short period of time. Well, when you expand a

force like that, if you have someone like the U.S. helping you,

you can provide uniforms and weapons for the soldiers. There

are a lot of people in El Salvador, and recruiting is not such a

major problem, but you don't build battalion commanders,

company commanders, platoon leaders, and first sergeants in

six months. You don't do that in a year! So, what happened

was, as the force expanded, the leadership was diffused. The

lesson learned here is that you have to manage the force

expansion very carefully.

Anybody who gets caught up in this business of 10 to I

force ratio to beat an insurgency is naive. I'd like to get my

hands around that guy's throat! It's so simplistic! Every country

has its own force ratio. It's a product of how good the troops

are, how bad the guerrillas are, how many leaders you have to

begin with, and a whole host of considerations. As you expand

a force in a crisis you have to keep in mind what it takes to

continue to lead that force effectively. We've probably

expanded here too quickly for the leadership. If it hadn't been

for guys like Waghelstein and Stringham putting such an

investment in leadership training, sending cadets off to the

States for training and so on, we would still be way behind the

power curve. But, that situation has changed slowly, because

we've seen the force structure pretty much level off in terms of

numbers, and now the leadership is catching up. You go back
410 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

today to visit that same battalion, and now it's going to be

commanded by a captain and maybe a major. You go down to

the companies, and they'll be usually commanded by first

lieutenants. You go to the section or platoon level, and, lo and

behold, there's somebody down there; maybe he's a second

lieutenant. Maybe he's a cadet, or he might even be a senior

NCO. It's still not ideal. You don't have the kind of squad

leader, team leader leadership that you would want to have.

You've got a structure down there so that you can give that

platoon a mission to go out and set up an ambush at this

location tonight, and it'll happen. So, that's something that's

evolved over time, and it's significant. If you looked at a typical

operation in early 1984, unless you were talking about a special

unit, it was that lieutenant and 600 guys behind him. That was

an operation! I could talk, or my predecessor could talk, about

small unit operations until we were blue in the face, and it

wasn't going to happen when you have that kind of leadership

quotient.

Speaking to the equipment problem, let me say this. One

of the problems that we're going through right now is that we're

operating on a [U.S. Congressional] Continuing Resolution,

which means that we still don't know how much money we're

going to have for 1987. We only have a limited amount of

money to start with, which means that we're going to have to

put that money in the kinds of things that you can't afford to run

out of, like supplies and ammunition. Unfortunately, that means

that some of the end-items, helicopters, or whatever that require

greater lead times are going to have to be deferred until we get

full funding. That means that those items are not going to be

players for months and months from now.

When I first got here or when Stringham was here or when

Waghelstein was here, those guys, essentially, were living from

one Supplemental [Appropriation] to another, and so was I the

first year. It was very difficult for us to do any planning and

absolutely impossible for the Salvadorans to do any planning.

Even though 1984 was a big year when you tallied it all up, but

because it was a series of supplementals, at any one point up

until the last few months, you didn't know whether or not you

.
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 411

were going to have any more money coming in. So, rather than

doing any sort of planning or force development or investing in

some capital improvements, you spent the money on things that

you just couldn't afford to run out of. That usually meant

ammunition, personal equipment, and so on. Therefore, it

seems to me that one of the big lessons learned is that you just

cannot do that. You can't expect people to fight a war with that

sort of uncertainty. I think that even though levels for the last

two years have been lower than 1984, we've gotten a lot more

for our money. We knew how much we were going to get. We

were able to plan. We were able to buy the equipment that we

needed and at the same time keep the ammunition levels at

adequate levels. You knew when the next boat was going to

come, and you didn't take it down to zero, but you could take it

down to the point where you could anticipate the next delivery.

I have to tell you that the security assistance mechanisms

and procedures are not designed for fighting a war. We really

need a better legislative basis for supporting our friends who are

battling an insurgency.

Comments on the Period as the

War Changes Direction: A Look

at the Archers and the Forest

THE EDITORS-The mobile warfare stage of the conflict

was also a war of attrition. In those terms, government

forces had the advantage. They had more manpower,

more ability to replace manpower, and-with the help

of the United States-more equipment and other

resources than the insurgents. Those advantages,

coupled with significant reforms, allowed the

government and the regular Salvadoran armed forces to

reverse the tide of the struggle. At that point in time, it

appears that the insurgent leadership agreed there had

been another shift in the primary center of gravity-a

new strategic element. The shift was away from the

government's military force to the source of that force's
412 CHANGES FROM LATE 1984 TO LATE 1986

power-the aid provided by the United States. As a

result, borrowing heavily on the training and instruction

received from the Vietnamese, the strategy became one

of taking a relatively low profile militarily, negotiating,

targeting the U.S. Congress as the principal objective in

the war of information, and waiting for the United States

to disengage from Central America and the Salvadoran

conflict.

During this waiting time, the insurgents have taken

the operational defensive. But, in their doctrine,

defense is only a short-term situation in which

preparations are made for a new offensive. Thus, while

planning and staging semiannual large "spectacular"

attacks for propaganda and media effect, they have

broken down into small units with basically political and

psychological objectives. In this phase of "prolonged

people's war," the idea is to continue assassinations,

kidnappings, and general terrorism in order to

constantly harass and intimidate the population and the

government. Moreover, attacks on transportation and

communications nets, and other economic targets are

continued in order to sabotage government attempts to

do anything which might improve the economic aspect

of regime legitimacy. Other examples of these types of "military" objectives would include tying-up security

forces, which then allows general freedom of movement

and the security necessary for their renewed education

and recruitment of the masses; the mounting of

occasional large-scale attacks, which indicate formidable

military capabilities; and proving a continued will to

win. In short, their general purpose is to demoralize the

people, the government, the armed forces, and any

outside supporters-and accomplish indirectly what

cannot be won through direct military action.

The insurgent's objective and the general result of

their waiting strategy have been to produce a situation

in which the United States appears to be lessening its

commitment and interest in the conflict. Having shifted
U.S. SUPPORT FOR EL SALVADOR 413

their strategic centers of gravity away from the armed

forces and back to the legitimacy of the Salvadoran

government and the external support provided by the

United States to that government, the insurgents have

also generated a situation in which the regular

Salvadoran armed forces "can go anywhere they want to

in the country," but still have not been able to defeat

the insurgency. At the same time, the insurgents have

not won the war either. Neither side has won; neither

side has lost. The result is stalemate. But, Sun Tzu

reminds us that "There has never been a protracted war

from which a country has benefited."*

*Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 73.

--------------------
Part V

Stalemate:

1986 to the

Present

k.
20E

Prolonged People's War:

The Salvadoran Context

THE EDITORS-As the FDR/FMLN internalized the concepts

of a prolonged people's war, they settled into a long-term

defensive strategy. The forces at work within the

Salvadoran government also began to shift their position.

As a matter of survival, they had had to think and act in

terms of what was absolutely necessary at the moment.

For some time, it had been assumed that the military

component of the insurgency was a major center of

gravity and that if it were destroyed the FDR/FMLN would

lose its vitality and ability to act as a meaningful force in El

Salvador.

The fact is that this or any insurgency does not have a

single military center of gravity. It is a political organism

which uses terror and other more conventional military

means as only part of its arsenal. As a consequence, the

Salvadoran leadership began to reorient their thinking

from defeating the FMLN military, to engaging the other

dimensions of the war. Winners are generally those who

are flexible enough to disregard previous strategies and

fashion new ones. But, there is some risk in going against

established wisdom.

Several problems arise that can put the outcome of

the political-military effort at risk. First, having ostensibly

won the military battle, there is the problem of convincing

one's compatriots and allies--notably the United States--

that the war is not over. That, in order to secure real

* 417

I
418 1986 TO THE PRESENT

peace and democracy, a long-term commitment is

required. Second, there must be a balance of political

ends with military means. The failure to establish this

balance is a clear formula for ultimate disaster. Third, in

order to solve the first two problems, there must be a

clear vision of the threat, the means to deal with that

threat, and the political future. In an overall view, the

greatest risk of all is in continuing a primarily military

effort in a singularly political struggle.

Discontinuity of the Offensive

Joaquin Vilkaobos-The absence of continuity is not determined

by a conservative will, but rather it is determined by the same

characteristics that the war assumes. The vacuum that appears

between the distinct stages is due to a real expansion of our forces.

And this was of greater importance once we arrived at the stage of

forming our army. Here, the physical exhaustion, the exhaustion

of supplies, the exhaustion of logistical reserves is something very

real. The enemy himself passed from campaigns of 20 days to

campaigns of eight days and later of four or five days.

Why? Because each time the exhaustion factors affect him

more, because his behavior is that of an army and therefore the

exhaustion factor weighs more heavily upon him. There have been

moments in which physically we had to stop. There are those that

have argued for the need to maintain a quantitative continuity; in

other words, to be on the move, acting continuously. We feel that

it is preferable at a given moment to stop. to make an overall

reassessment, and to look for a new strategic target against which

we can use 100 percent of our forces with the goal of achieving a

significant change, a turnaround in the situation. You get better

results by executing a group of actions in one period than you get

Joaquin Villalobos, Commander-in-Chief of the People's Revolutionary

Army (ERP). one of the organizations which forms the FMLN. Interview by

Maria Harnecker was originally published in Mexico. Novembcr-Decemer

1982, and later published in Revolution and Intervention in Central America.

edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas (San Francisco: Synthesis

Publications/CM Associates, 1983), pp. 103-105. Copyright 1983 by CM

Associates. Reprinted by permission of CM Associates.
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 419

from the quantitative sum of operations that are not united within a

maneuver.

The 10th of January had that virtue. We could have used all

our armed potential accumulated for January 10 in another way,

more spaced out, more continuous, with successive operations.

That would have been a grave error. We would not have stopped

the enemy. Now, to have stopped it, to have strained it at the same

time, what did it mean? It meant the quartering of the army, the

cessation of offensives and the possibility for us to gain time to

secure ourselves in given territories. Now, did that bring a period

of relative stability? Yes, it did, but it was for our benefit. The

same will be true at other stages. We have achieved a strategic

accumulation of victories which will be expressed in a final

culminating moment. But because of the characteristics of our

situation, because of the decrease in the insurrection potentialespecially of the urban masses-the offensive cannot be

maintained in an ever ascending spiral.

Now, what will be the form in which the masses participate

in this final phase of the war? It is difficult to make a prediction

about this.

First, it must be repeated that the masses would never have

been able to create the powerful popular army which we have at

present. Now, it still remains to be seen whether the masses are

going to mobilize at this point in an insurrectional form, or in the

form of a general strike, or by way of a massive incorporation into

the revolutionary army. What we know is that the popular war

advances with giant steps, that the struggle itself consolidates more

and more unity among our forces, and this allows us to hit the

enemy each time more forcefully.

Prolonged People's War

Is Fundamentally Ideological

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuia--The situation began

to change. In July '84, a document was discovered which

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila. Vice-Minister of Public Security

for El Salvador. 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 17

December 1986, 29 June 1987, and 23 September 1987.

LN
420 1986 TO THE PRESENT

revealed the subversives' acknowledgment of the fact that they

had suffered severe blows and heavy setbacks, along with a

series of recommendations to change their tactics. They had

once operated in large units, but due to their misfortune they

had to group into smaller ones in order to try to avoid coming

into contact with us. I would like to point out one factor, within

the context of this situation, that is fundamental, one which is

normally not studied and learned through the experience of

others. We always want to learn from our own experience, and

we always want to reread the same books. I'm referring to a

concept which the subversives refer to as a popular prolonged

war. What does this popular prolonged war consist of? Well,

first of all it consists of developing small units, controlling

small territories, developing a national conscience, seeking

external support in other sectors, and creating capable command

groups.

When they talk about prolonged people's war, they clearly

establish that at the beginning they are a minority force. They

have to improve, and they have to undergo three stages of the

prolonged people's war, which are (1) the strategic defensive on

the part of the Marxist forces, (2) the strategic equilibrium, that

is, when a parity occurs in the results rather than in the forces,

and (3) the strategic offensive on the part of the Marxist forces.

We have to understand that the Marxists utilize what they call a

correlation of forces. For example, an armed military force

could be small, but its own operativity-its own simple

logistics, its own mobility, its own operational tactics, its own

respect for the laws of war, its own taking advantage of the

conditions that are presented throughout the war-will influence

in order for that small force at a determined moment-probably

smaller in numbers-to have a concurrence of those external

factors, a favorable situation that could oppose a much more

organized force. That is what they refer to as strategic

equilibrium.

The third phase is what is assumed when the Marxist forces

pass to the strategic offensive and the government forces pass to

the strategic defensive. That is to say, it is the decisive moment

in the battle, as they refer to it, and it is the moment where the
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 421

COPREFA

On 10 October 1986. a severe earthquake struck. These soldiers from the

Signal Corps School assisted in the cleanup effort after the massive

disaster.

final blow takes place in order to destroy the democratic forces,

to consolidate their movement, and to achieve political power.

That is what they have established as the prolonged people's

war. The prolonged people's war, then, has a distinct

expression of what a regular war is. It cannot be strictly

military. The military aspect of it is a component of the

prolonged people's war. But the prolonged people's war also

pursues a progressive wearing down of the government forces.

It pursues the indoctrination of the masas and a permanent

activity of the masas. It pursues the destruction of the state's

economy in order to take away the economic support for the

government forces. If we do not have a strategic rear guard,

economically speaking, we cannot operate. Then,

fundamentally, it seeks that. It also seeks to take away the

international political support the government receives from
422 1986 TO THE PRESENT

other countries, and it attempts to group those political forces

that oppose the government and are in favor of Marxist forces.

Anyone that is opposed by the government, the Marxist forces

try to win over in order to form the people's front, which is

another term used by Mao Tse-tung, developed at the outset of

his prolonged people's war.

Truly what is fundamental here is that the enemy is

motivated and has an ideological motivation. They want to

create a new society, while at the same time we are trying to

teach our own to defend and protect their own systems. But, if

our soldier is expected to defend his own system, he must be

able to believe in it and receive the proper benefits of the

system. I cannot go around ordering Soldier "X" to defend the

institution of democracy when he doesn't even know what

democracy really is. If he is barefoot, barely dressed, and

hungry, he can't be expected to believe in the benefits that a

democratic institution could provide him with. But, if one day,

that man feels he can expect to have the security of a job, a

family, a home, an opportunity, educated children, then that

man will be encouraged to defend democracy. On the other

hand, the opposition has a strong motivation. Their goal is to

establish a new society, which could prove to be a false one

such as Nicaragua's and other countries' in Europe, but

nevertheless, they are motivated by this idea. It could very well

turn out to be a more violent, exploitive, oligarchic, repressive,

and totalitarian society. But they believe in it. They have

something to struggle for, and this is what we have to teach our

soldiers. It is fundamental that our soldiers acquire the

motivation that is necessary to accomplish these goals.

Insurgent War against the People

General Adolfo Bland6n-At one time we allowed 400

crippled subversives to return to the Communist countries to

General Adolfo Onecifero Bland6n, Chief of Staff of Salvadoran Armed

Forces, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 21 July 1987

and 26 September 1987.
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 423

COPREFA

Seven years of conflict and the devastation of the 1986 earthquake

reduced parts of the countryside and San Salvador to rubble.

receive proper medical attention. Do you know what it meant

for a group of guerrilla terrorists to go around carrying 400

crippled men? Their mobilization capabilities were reduced, and

they had to be constantly on the go. From the tactical point of

view it was a tremendous burden. We, as military men, know

that. However, we have realized that in this type of war there

needs to be some degree of reasonable action taken. About 15

days ago we freed 98 prisoners at one time, and currently, we

are backing the President with respect to an amnesty decree that

is being prepared to liberate a certain number of political

prisoners. In spite of the fact that we are going through the best

times-militarily-the terrcrists have managed to disperse into

small units and are taking actions against the economy. In my

view they are actually taking actions against the people because

blowing up electric towers and, thus, leaving certain sectors of

the city without energy means that they are affecting the people.

To machine-gun a bus carrying innocent civilians and to

threaten to kill those who don't obey their orders mean that they
424 1986 TO THE PRESENT

are affecting the people. Those humble people who have to

walk to work because their means of transportation have been

destroyed are affected by these actions provoked by those who

claim to be defending them. They have chosen the wrong path.

I consider their actions as desperate attempts to try to regain

some control-up to now they have been unable to gain the

support of the people. There are three significant occurrences

which I will mention to you because I think they are worthy of

some consideration. The private enterprise organized a strike

against the government due to the war taxes the government

wanted to impose on the people.

Yes, the war taxes. As a result, the business sector held a

strike. The majority of the people responded favorably, and

almost all of the shops were closed, I would say about 98

percent of them in the three principal cities. To me it was a

successful civic demonstration, with no violence at all. The

country was very quiet that day. The next day everyone returned

to their normal activities and businesses reopened. But it was a

good civic demonstration. In response to this, the government

organized a demonstration with their party and gathered some

50,000 people and walked through the streets of San Salvador.

It was also a civic demonstration-without violence, without

graffiti, without vandalism, without breaking windows, without

burning tires, without beating anybody. Two days later, the

Communists held demonstrations at which only 250 people

attended. That meant a significant defeat for them.

Now they have changed their strategy and are fighting an

armed war in the rural areas. They will never win that way.

They are also trying to take advantage of the economic,

political, and social problems in the country in order to infiltrate

into the syndicates [labor unions]. They are capitalizing on

those problems such as unemployment and the effects of

inflation on the humble and poverty stricken people. They have

been moving the masas in order to materialize a plan they have

created called the "Final Strategic Offensive." The basis of this

plan is to create chaos and disorder in the capital, to accuse the

government of incompetence, to foment violent manifestations

in order to create a state of mistrust and insecurity among the
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 425

COPREFA

In 1987, Colonel Montano attended this civic action project. Such joint

military and community efforts have been credited with improving public

perceptions.

population. So they can start to question, "Well, what is going

on here?" They try to provoke the security groups and other

authority figures by touching their buttocks, spitting in their

faces, etc. Up to now, the security forces have behaved

professionally and have put up with the abuses they've

encountered. They are making a tremendous effort not to react

violently.

Thus, their attempt to cause someone to be killed in the

streets has not succeeded. They think that the day the first

person is shot we will stop receiving international support, and

our international image will be disgraced. That is their primary

objective. There is one important thing, though, that has

occurred during these last few weeks where they have

demonstrated daily with 20, 30, 40 people. That is, that the

demonstrations have been aggressive and they have used huge

nulnwmn mn mn nqn nw nm m~mm mnwmma~nnnm mum /
426 1986 TO THE PRESENT

clubs with nails stuck on the end. There was a problem at the

Social Security Institute, where several people were wounded,

including two TV photographers. A lieutenant was in command on

the police contingency. They surrounded him. That lieutenant

suffered a severe blow on his head. They hit him in the head with

one of those nailed clubs and smashed his skull. When the doctor

operated he discovered a coagulum which almost killed him.

There was another policeman who was in a state of shock in the

military hospital. He was tied to his bed because he was suffering

from severe convulsions as a result of being struck on the head.

They had no other choice but to shoot at the ceiling. As a

result, several splinters fell on the civilians, causing multiple

injuries. The two photographers were among the victims.

The subversives are constantly trying to instigate violence and

create more violence because it is not convenient for them that

there be elections. They are trying to make President Duarte

resign. If there are no elections, the democratic process will be

destroyed. They know that the elections for deputy and the

elections for a new president will only strengthen democracy in El

Salvador and will undoubtedly strengthen those democracies

elsewhere in Central America. It will also affect the Sandinista

regime. So, as you can see, it is all coordinated. They have

created a strategic plan that, in my opinion, will try and bring

down Duarte's government. But we have been very clear. We

have said that we do not defend any political party. We defend the

President of the Republic because that is what has been decreed by

the political constitution. They have wanted to involve us in

political actions. They have tried to instigate a coup but have not

succeeded, a very different situation to that one faced eight or nine

years ago.

Their Plan Wi Backfi

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar-l would say that the

subversion has practically lost its military capacity. That's

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova Vejar, former Second Brigade

Commander and now Director of the Military Academy. interviewed in Santa

Ana and San Salvador. El Salvador, 23 January 1987 and 23 July 1987.

respectively.
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 427

DONEIR0O

Haircut Day. The San Vicente 5th Battalion provides haircuts as part of a

local civic action effort.

why they designed the plan they referred to as a strategic

counteroffensive. That plan, just the name of it, suggests that

they are acting on the defensive and that they are planning to

retake the initiative they have lost, that is, strategically

speaking. But, we can truly see that, out of all the

demonstrations they have made up to this point, they haven't

been able to do more. They have managed to incorporate very

few followers-who have only made a lot of noise, vandalized,

publicly provoked the local authorities for the purpose of

producing a radicalization and, as a result of the wounded or

dead, producing a radicalization of the population in their favor

and against us. But, truly, it has failed for them completely. I

think we'll be seeing less of those movements.

The real purpose, as I was saying, is to produce a

radicalization. First, prepare an unfavorable political ambience

i
428 1986 TO THE PRESENT

and at the same time gather supporters. At the same time the

guerrillas radicalize the population, it is interesting to observe

how they go about establishing a platform to justify their

existence and actions. The government has recognized that the

salaries have decreased. This is due to a devaluation and an

increase in the cost of living as a result of the war which has

been provoked by the insurgents. Once they have established

this platform, they then try to incorporate more people into their

movements by saying, "... we are solidly behind the

employees of ANDA [governmental water authority], with those

of the university in their struggle. . . ." Fortunately, they haven't

been successful. I think, though, that what they would have

preferred is more dead people as a result of these

demonstrations because then their compaiieros could say,

"Listen, the only thing we asked for is that you increase our

salaries. Instead, one of ours has been killed. You killed this

guy, who was such a nice person. The only thing we can do to

combat your repressive regime is to take up arms."

They were successful at one point because one of their

leaders had been shot. But now, at this point, I think that this

situation is almost terminated. I think that by now, according to

their planning, they should have already stirred up a bubbling

cauldron a thousand times greater than the one diminishing

now.

It came to the point where we thought the situation was

going to worsen. The labor agitation has decreased once again.

Or, at least, if the labor agitation has not ceased, it no longer

has the characteristics it had principally during the month of

June. And this is because the population itself, with the actions

they've undertaken, have realized who the people are who are

truly promoting all of this. That is another example of the

rejection of Marxism. I think, the people realize that the

Marxists are behind all of this. And, even when they are

expecting to have material improvements, of a pecuniary type,

they have not wanted to be incorporated. Not even as a result of

the success in the agitation of the masas they have tried to

obtain and in some of the terrorist actions that are practically

controlled at this moment. I think that this maneuver, this

I
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 429

irk,

1q

In San Vicente, Medical Battalion members provide on-the-spot dentistry,

pulling teeth as part of a combined military and community civic action

project.

counteroffensive as planned by the terrorists, will constitute a

failure. Besides being a military failure, it will also fail to

motivate the masas and will inevitably produce a total alienation

of the subversion on the part of the population. As I understand

it, their plan will backfire.

Guerrilla Strategy Has Changed

during My Presidency

President Josi Napole6n Duarte-There has been a change

in the guerrilla strategy during my presidency. The series of free

elections has influenced the people's attitude toward the

government, undermining the guerrillas' call for violent

Josd Napole6n Duarte (President of El Salvador. 1984 to prCsCnt),

Duarte: M" Ston- (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1986). pp. 273. 275-77,

279. Copyright 1986 by Jos Napole6n Duarte. Reprinted by permission of G.

P. Putnam's Sons.

)

dt

I1
430 1986 TO THE PRESENT

revolution. The greatest setback to the FMLN, according to

defectors, was the peace talks in La Palma. The popular

response to my call for peace was overwhelming. The FMLN

saw that they were being pushed to a bargaining table where

they did not have the advantage.

This was why their military strategist, Villalobos, criticized

Cienfuegos after the talks. This is why at Ayagualo they took a

hard line-all or nothing, with emphasis on our differences.

Villalobos has taken the FMLN back to the strategy of Cayetano

Carpio-Prolonged People's War. The guerrillas will avoid

direct clashes, work on building cadres for the next five or ten

years, and use terrorism in the cities to destabilize the

government.

Their tactics have been designed to reduce the space for

dialogue, but publicly they must continue to call for

negotiations. The concept of peace talks has too much support

in El Salvador and abroad for the guerrillas to reject them

openly. Their actions-such as kidnapping of my daughter and

the mayors-simply sabotage the chances for talks.

The guerrillas (also] use the strategy of economic

destruction, without regard to who suffers. They blow up

bridges, destroy power lines, burn buses and trucks. The poor

are the ones left in the dark and stranded without transportation,

while the rich live in Miami. The guerrillas plant mines in roads

and footpaths. Many children and farm workers have been

killed or crippled by these mines, as have soldiers. The

guerrillas have even planted mines in the public park in Santa

Tecla, just because the police cadets would exercise in the park

some mornings. The risk to the hundreds of children who

played in the same park did not concern the terrorists. Their

object is to inspire fear in everyone.

Salvadorans are tired of living in fear ... The guerrilla

claims are inconsistent with their actions. They have shown

little humanity. Terrorism is inhumane because its proponents

assert that their political end justifies any means, no matter how

many innocent people suffer. The fear created is meant to bring

change, but terror will only engender more violence.

Humanitarian concern must come first before any bridges can be

built over the political differences dividing us.
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 431

t - *

116

'lo

COPREFA

This 1986 photograph of soldiers providing assistance is well-known in El

Salvador. The government promotes it and a changed image, saying the

military are part of the solution now, not part of the problem.

There will be no common ground as long as the guerrillas

believe violence is the only way they can gain power. There are

opportunities for all political beliefs within the democratic

system. The working class can organize to gain power within a

democracy. But the guerrillas, who claim to represent the

workers, seem more interested in attacking the economy and the

Army than trying to change the unjust structure of our society.

During the negotiations in Panama for the release of my

daughter and the mayors, the FMLN leader Mario Aguifiada

told my representative outright, "We cannot permit the

democratic process to be a success in El Salvador."

Why? If we can demonstrate that a democratic system can

bring about structural changes peacefully, then the choice

between domination by the Rightist oligarchy and violent

revolution by the Left will no longer be a valid options. The

new option for Central America and other countries would be

'Inuh • unn lm rnH
432 1986 TO THE PRESENT

the democratic revolution. El Salvador is creating this model,

while Nicaragua represents the leftist choice.

Nobody Wins without the Support

of the People

General Aldolfo 0. Bland6n-We had planned to take the

plan, -United to Reconstruct." throughout the 14 departments

of the Republic. The objective was to try to supply, try to help,

the rural people where they needed it most-undoubtedly, they

have suffered most as a result of this war. For this we needed a

concurrence of the government ministries. The President

appointed me as general coordinator of the campaign, and he

appointed a representative of the government to assist me at that

level. I should mention that not all the ministries of the

government cooperated in a way we would have liked them to.

Instead. you had some who did a lot, others who did very little.

and others who did nothing. However, even with that, the effort

has been huge. We believed we were going to terminate the

effort at the end of 1986. There were originally some 500 tasks

throughout all the national territory, and we ended up with more

than 900. To this date. I believe that, without having made a

detailed count of it, we have performed some 1,200 tasks

throughout all the national territory. I should be clear, and I

should also tell you that in the economic effort, the United

States has helped tremendously through AID-through the

provision of materials and the economic means in order to

reconstruct. What we were trying to demonstrate to the people,

was that the armed forces were proposing a strategy for

reconstruction rather than destruction. On the other hand, with

the terrorists it was contrary-destruction and more destruction.

They destroy the infrastructure, and we on the other hand try to

reconstruct what has been destroyed.

General Adolfb Onecifero Bland6n. Chief of Staff of Salvadoran Armed

Forces. 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 21 July 1987

and 26 September 1987.
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 433

I believe that the campaign, "United to Reconstruct," has

been the most effective campaign to benefit the people within

the last 10 years in this country. We are thinking of continuing

to implement it more for this year because, as the plan itself

states, "it's like a drop of oil that expands itself." We have

begun in a small nucleus, practically in the vicinities of the

departmental headquarters, and we want it to continue extending

towards the peripheral areas of the departments. Therefore, at

the end of 1988, the campaign, "United to Reconstruct,"

would have stretched throughout the entire national territory.

It is a very ambitious plan. It is a plan that has a great deal

of human feeling, a great deal of human sensitivity, and it is for

that reason that the terrorists have attacked with fury. They have

even made pamphlets. They have written in international

magazines. They have talked in Europe against the campaign,

"United to Reconstruct," and it is simply because the campaign

takes away their support of the people. Nobody can win this

type of war without the support of the civilian population. That

is our campaign, to win the minds and the hearts of all the

people in favor of democracy.

We Won't Be Able to Terminate

This War Completely

Colonel Oscar Campos Anaya-Every war brings its

casualties, and the only one which doesn't have casualties is one

which doesn't have combat. Every combatant will suffer

casualties during a war of this type. This is not a normal

conflict. It is an irregular conflict, and it is not a low-intensity

conflict as it may appear to some. It is of great intensity. The

only thing that we don't do is combat with nuclear weapons or

toxic gases, and that is why it may be referred to as a lowintensity conflict. But the bullets are the same as anywhere else,

and they kill just as effectively. We do claim it is a

Colonel Oscar Rodolfo Campos Anaya. former Fifth Brigade Commander

and now First Brigade Commander. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador.

21 July 1987.
434 1986 TO THE PRESENT

high-intensity war because we are feeling it, we are living it.

And perhaps its classification derives from the fact that a war

which does not employ nuclear weapons is a low-intensity

conflict. But the conflicts are of high intensity like in any other

part of the world where an irregular war is being fought. I claim

it is of high intensity because all of the sectors of a country are

involved. The merchants suffer, the transport industry suffers,

the owners of companies suffer, the ordinary salesperson

suffers, the market saleswoman suffers, the farmer suffers, the

poor people suffer, the rich people suffer. And the armed forces

suffer.

You can see why I claim this to be a high-intensity war,

because all of the sectors of a country, all of the population are

involved one way or the other. All the forces of a country and

its people are involved in this struggle, not just a few. One

example includes a student who goes to school to become

educated, and all of a sudden he is killed as a result of a

confrontation between two forces. He wasn't even directly

involved in the struggle, neither from one side nor the other. He

simply became involved due to the fact that he was living in a

country that is undergoing subversive warfare. I have lived the

intensity of this war in the three different places I've been. I

know that the subversives are scattered throughout the entire

country. They know what they are doing and where they are

doing it. They have analyzed all of the territory. They have

analyzed the causes. And unfortunately for us, like any other

underdeveloped country, we will always have to motivate the

people and give them reasons why they must continue to pursue

this struggle. We don't believe we will be able to terminate this

war completely. But we do believe, and we know, and we are

conscious of the fact that we are going to win it. We will win

this war with the help of other countries who wish to help us.

But we also want the countries who are helping us to understand

our actions, to understand what we are doing and why. We want

them to understand our idiosyncracies. We want them to feel

what we feel but in a sincere and real way just as we project it.
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 435

Insurgent Leadership: The Next

Center of Gravity

Colonel John C. Ellerson-Talking to the end game. What do

you do? I would argue that militarily (and I know that this isn't

very popular) what you do is continue to do exactly what we are

doing, you just do it better. That is not very dramatic, but I

really do think that the Salvadorans are militarily fighting this

war the way it needs to be fought. They are out and about,

broken down into small units, going after these guys night and

day. They just aren't doing it as well as they need to. That's

what we have to fight, how to make that happen. The business

of talks or the business of retraining programs and that sort of

thing are all ongoing efforts. That is what the Mil Group gets

paid to do, and that is what we are working at.

One other thing, if you want to close this thing out, you

target the FMLN leadership more directly, more specifically,

than we have. It is the one way that you can fundamentally alter

the equation. If we kill Villalobos or if we kill Shafik Handal or

if we kill Leonel, they will be replaced-but they won't really

be replaced. Villalobos has been out there since 1971 or 1972,

and Shafik before him. They are, in many people's eyes, the

revolution, if you will. The FMLN would have a very, very

difficult time replacing them if they were gone. Yet, to my

knowledge, we haven't done a very good job of going atter

them. To wit, I said, "I want pictures of those guys. I want to

see who these people are that we are going after." I couldn't get

those pictures from the Estado Mayor. I had to go to the U.S.

intelligence community to get those pictures. Well, if that is the

case, it's kind of hard to argue that we really are targeting those

guys or focusing against them to any extent.

They are a center of gravity. It ought to be like Butch

Cassidy and the Sundance Kid. Every time they turn around,

they ought to feel somebody breathing down their necks.

Colonel John C. Ellerson, U.S. Military Group Commander in El Salvador,

1986 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 27 and 28 September

1987.

a
436 1986 TO THE PRESENT

Now, going back to the Malayan experience. One of the

things they did was issue rewards. If they had a picture, they

put out a little piece of paper and had the guy's picture and his

name, and they said, "We will give you so many thousands of

dollars for information leading to the arrest or demise of this no

good SOB." We haven't done that. I am not sure why. I think

that, one, you might get him, but two, you would sure make

him nervous about, "Why is that guy looking at me so funny

from across the campfire?" I think we must do more in that

area.

There is some talk on the part of the Salvadorans about

doing more, but they haven't yet, and that's one of those things

which could make a difference.

To Win, We Need a Long-Term

American Commitment

General John R. Galvin-if there is something that is

difficult, it is the tendency of the U.S. Congress to assume the

role of the Executive and to carry out foreign policy by making

laws almost on an ad hoc basis or by using congressional

influence to, in effect, be the operator rather than providing

long-term guidance. By that I mean, we found ourselves at

times having to go back to Congress to get, say, two helicopters

to replace two disabled helicopters in the Salvadoran armed

forces.

I think when Congress is making decisions about individual

helicopters, you have reached the point where Congress is

presuming to do what the Executive Branch should do. That's

my opinion. However, I did not feel strapped by U.S. law. I

think U.S. law was basically supportive of what we were doing

in Latin America.

The other problem was that what we were doing costs

money, and the money comes out of the pockets of American

General John R. Galvin, Commandcr-in-Chict. U.S. Southern

Command. 1985 to 1987, intervicwcd in Mons. Belgium. IX August 1987.
PROLONGED PEOPLE'S WAR: SALVADORAN CONTEXT 437

tax payers. Congress looks very hard at that kind of expenditure

and wants to see success. it wants to see profit for the money

invested. There's nothing wrong with that except that the

congressional approach is short term. It's not long term. The

congressman wants to see something now, like next month or

before the end of this year, and many times we're talking about

something that can't be resolved in that short time frame. The

greatest success that democracy has had in fighting an

insurgency was Malaya. And Malaya took 14 years. It is almost

impossible, if not totally impossible, to talk to Congress about a

war in El Salvador that is going to last several years, even five

yearsThe congressman wants to know how we can win this war

within a year or two years. There is a great temptation on the

part of the people in the State Department and the Defense

li-partment to go along with that. To say. "Well, I'll have to

say we can be much better off within the next two or three

years, or Congress will just leave me out in the cold."

I think that we have to face the hard facts. and we have to

say this is going to be a war that will go 10 years. It might go

15 years. but it can be won. Then we have to get American

commitment to that. American willingness to sacrifice-the way

we sacrificed to rebuild Europe as a democratic region after

WWII.

I don't think it's a matter of learning it. I think we all know

it. The question is are we willing to face it. I found that when I

talked to senators and representatives, they would say to me.

"Look, I understand the problem, but we have farmers out in

the Middle West who are losing their farms, and we have a

budget that is looking very bad, and we have many other

problems, and we simply can't deal with that problem in the

way you would like to see it resolved." In other words they

have higher priorities, and they don't have a lot of time to spend

thinking about El Salvador because they are thinking about

Pocatello or some place else. It's difficult to convince people

that in the long run democracy will survive only if we are

willing to sacrifice in our own hemisphere.

" I I I _ II I I . . ... . . . l&
438 1986 TO THE PRESENT

This Is a Doubly Dangerous

Phenomenon

General Fred F. Woerner-United States' ability to respond

to a problem in the hemisphere is not a measurement of military

capability but, rather, of political will. As I've said, I think our

political will is transitory, abrupt, subject to radical changes in

direction, and driven episodically by perceptions of the moment

concerning the level of threat to the United States. This

phenomenon is dangerous in itself, obviously. But also, a clever

enemy can continue to build his capabilities against the United

States as long as he stays below the tolerance threshold of the

American body politic, and if he is clever enough, he can stay

below the threshold on multiple fronts, until he can combine

those capabilities and confront us with an aggregation of force

that is formidable.

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America, 1982 to 1985,

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco, California. 7 November 1986.
21fl

Preparation for

the Future

Warm-Up for the Future

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova-We face some

very difficult times. I think these last six years have been

more like warm-up sessions for what we really have to face,

but I have a lot of faith in the people of this country, and with

some effort, we will be able to survive. There is a strong.

professional armed forces with the capability to resist heavy

blows in the future, and I don't think that attacking the

national economy or carrying out heavy assaults against

various installations every six months will enable the

subversives to be successful. I hope one day the subversives

will realize the extreme damage they are causing to the

Salvadoran people. But mainly, they must understand that

they have a political option in which, given the circumstances

that the people might support them one day, they could attain

power and control as military men.

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova. Salvadoran Minister of

Defense. 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 19

Dccember 1987.

439
440 1986 TO THE PRESENT

Seizing the Moral High Ground

Colonel James J. Steele-Another related and important

aspect of this is the host country's willingness and ability to

pursue the war. When I first arrived here I got the distinct

feeling, particularly in talking to some of the middle class and

above, that there was this feeling that it really doesn't matter

how well the Salvadorans do because the United States will

come and save the day. The United States is not going to let this

place go down the drain. You don't hear that anymore. There's

a realization that the United States is not going to send the

Marines. The Salvadoran military has always wanted to fight

this war themselves. They want to win it themselves. So, the

point about the nationalistic view of things is on target. To me,

you undermine the long-term effort if you try to superimpose

your own military forces and solve the problem yourself. Maybe

if you look at a case of Grenada or other places where you're

dealing with a hostile government, you have to make a decision

to do that. That's fine but the ideal solution is to have them win

the war themselves, and you provide them with material

support, advice, training, or whatever. That, I think, in the long

term, is the way you build your image in the region, and you

develop the capability which allows you to not stay there

forever. It also enhances their own legitimacy and professional

image clearly.

They've pursued their own war in a way that, although it

hasn't been fully successful, it has had a lot of success. So they

see themselves in a lot of ways as more expert in this than we.

They've done as well as they've done because they, very

early on, recognized that even though they wanted our help,

they wanted to fight this war themselves and be successful.

They have done as well as they have because they've

recognized that legitimacy was an important part of it.

Democracy was an important part of it. Supporting those

principles was certainly key to external support from us but also

to developing a support base from within the country.

Colonel James J. Steele. Commander. U.S. Military Group in El

Salvador. 1984 to 1986, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 5-10

October 1986. and, in Monterey. California, 5 November 1986.
PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 441

Certainly, by electing a president through democratic means,

they seized the moral high ground. The guerrillas can say what

they want, but it's pretty hard to discredit.

Securing the High Ground

Colonel Oscar Campos Anaya-One specific lesson we have

learned from all of this is that every government, at any time.

has to look out for its people. It has to look out for the welfare

of its people and never forget that in our societies, as well as

any other society in this world, there will always exist a

difference of classes. We cannot deny this. There will always

exist natural rights, political rights, social rights, to which an

individual is entitled, and the government is responsible in

looking out to see that these rights are not violated. But this

country also has to require the individual who is demanding

these rights to fulfill his/her responsibilities as a citizen. That is

probably one of the things that we have lacked-to make our

people understand that the same way in which they claim their

rights from the government, the same way the government can

claim rights from its people.

And we believe that no where in this world is a

government capable of maintaining the stability of a country

unless its people contribute to helping the government maintain

that stability. A government becomes the administrator of a

state in which all the goods and benefits are derived from the

habitants of that state. At the same time we accomplish this, we

want to make other underdeveloped countries like our's see that

we can function better. That is one lesson we can learn. A

government should never overlook nor neglect the natural,

social, and political rights of its people. But the government

must demand certain responsibilities in return for those rights

that have been granted.

Colonel Oscar Rodolfo Campos Anaya. former Fifth Brigade Commander

and now First Brigade Commander, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador.

21 July 1987.

It
442 1986 TO THE PRESENT

Another lesson is that many times we want to attack social

conditions. Poor social conditions exist anywhere in the world.

You can go to Europe, the United States, South America, and

you will find poverty. Unfortunately, our underdeveloped

countries lack the capacity for industrialization and, thus,

improving the quality of living conditions of our people.

However, poverty will continue to exist unless we educate our

people. That is, education is fundamental, in order to prevent

certain conditions brought on by a subversive war to dominate a

people. The more educated a person may be, the less vulnerable

he/she is to Communist flagellation.

Another important factor I mentioned before is the honesty

in an administration. It serves no purpose to imitate other

countries economically if we aren't able to maintain certain

restrictions as required by law. The laws have been established

firmly in our country. But, unfortunately, the interpretation of

laws is based on human interpretation, and humans are known

to interpret the laws on their own behalf. So, no matter how

good a law may be, it may always be mocked. You can add to

that deficiencies that exist in the judicial system. For example,

the United States has very strict laws, and the people know that

if they violate them they will receive the proper punishment. In

countries like ours, for example, a sanction may be approved,

but because of the ways in which people interpret the laws on

their own behalf, the verdict on the part of a jury may be subject

to change. The structure of the subversive forces, which

sometimes threatens and exercises terrorist tactics, can also

affect honest consequences for the application of justice. Many

times a judge would like to see justice done, but he fears for his

life.

Maintaining the High Ground

General Adolfo Bland6n-I believe that from a politicalmilitary point of view, we have only one future. And that future

General Adolfo Onecifero Bland6n. Chief of Staff of Salvadoran Armed

Forces, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 21 July 1987

and 26 September 1987.

,...,

S
PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 443

is based on creating a conscience in national unity. We can talk

about democracy, we can talk about liberty, we can talk about

justice. But when we see that our interests-whether personal or

political-are in some kind of danger, that is a different story.

During these difficult times we are living, we should all

speak a common language, those of us who are truly democrats

or those of us who truly want a democratic system instituted.

We should make greater efforts to place our country's interests

before our personal interests or those of a particular party. The

upcoming elections should serve as an example of an honest

political campaign, a civic campaign, rather than one in which

insults and accusations about corruption would be suggested.

We have always been accused of corruption. That person

says we are corrupt, the other accuses the government of being

corrupt, the whole world accuses us of being corrupt. But

nobody acc.-es the terrorists of being corrupt. They are never

accused of anything.

We came up with a plan called Unidos Para Reconstruir,

which was based on the unification of all sectors to support the

goals for peace. Its specific objectives focused on solving the

people's problems and restoring those basic needs that they lost

during the course of the war. Our main objective was to get

closer to the public by working on public benefits. We repaired

schools, churches, the potable water system, telephone services,

roads, and bridges.

The President of the Republic named me as general

coordinator of the plan, and I personally spoke with all of the

sectors. I spoke with the church, the political parties, with the

contractors and managers, the students, the professors, the

agriculturists, etc. I delivered the same message everywhere 

I

went-We need to unite in order to attain peace. We cannot

allow ourselves to separate from each other. I used to say that,

in this country, if the armed forces would take your example,

we wouldn't be in this predicament nor would we be here

listening to what I have to say. Luckily, those who understood

the true meaning behind the effort to pursue the democratic

process were the armed forces. I think the church came in

second place. But we understood it far better than anyone else,

I'

]i
444 1986 TO THE PRESENT

and we are struggling to maintain and sustain the process

because we know that the only way to live is in a pluralist

democracy.

In that sense, we must all struggle together, including you

[the United States], to unite with the armed firrces. Those

managers and contractors who are at a constant difference with

the President of the Republic should try and seek a common

ground with which to patch up their differences. They must

think that if we lose, we will lose it all. For example, if the

Communists take over, they won't allow you to run your TV

channels freely. It will belong to the state, to the government.

Or, if you happen to own the station, a series of restrictions and

limitations will be imposed on you which will consequently lead

you to turn it into the state. I don't want to call on the

newspaper owners and ask them to write pretty things about us.

No! I want them to criticize us on those things we deserve to be

criticized on. But I also want them to praise us on those issues

we deserve to be praised on. It won't pay in the end to make

that much propaganda for the subversion, because the time may

come when you won't be allowed to express your thoughts and

feelings on an issue as freely as you've done under a

democracy. Those are the basics for the plan Unidos Para

Reconstruir.

Democratizaton, Human Rights,

and the Will to Win

Colonel John C. Ellerson-We talked about this the other

night, to quote General Bland6n, "There is not the slightest

possibility that the FMLN can hope to gain political power in El

Salvador through force of arms." I think that is a fair statement.

But why? There were some really very, very scary moments in

our experience, but one very key, key element is just the fact

that the armed forces have made up their minds that they are not

Colonel John C. Ellerson, U.S. Military Group Commander in El

Salvador, 1986 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 27 and 28

September 1987.
it?

PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 445

going to lose; they are not going to Miami. They are here for

the duration. This is their country, and whether the Gringos

come or go, they are not going to lose. The old will of the

commander (if you will), forcing his will on his troops and on

the enemy. You talk to these folks. They just are not going to

lose. That counts for a lot. If you go back to the final offensive,

we had supposedly reinitiated our aid program back in the

October-November time frame, but none of it had shown up.

They had units that ran out of ammunition during the final

offensive, but these folks just, flat, were not going to lose. And

that spirit, as imperfect as we are, as many things as we do

poorly, and as many things as we need to do better, that spirit is

terribly important-intangible but important.

A second point that's closely related to the first is the

quality of the Salvadoran soldier or the quality of the

Salvadoran as a soldier. These are good soldiers. These are

fighters. You might bloody their noses today. But they will pick

up their rucks [back packs]. They will pick up their weapons.

And they will go back out there the next day. They are not

afraid of a fight, and if they make contact, they aren't looking

for an excuse to break contact. The basic product, the

fundamental product, is there. This is a soldier, and this is an

institution that you can commit resources to, and you are not

throwing them down a bottomless pit, because there is

something there-there is a soldier, and it is a soldier who is

corn mitted to the proposition that he is not going to lose. He

may not be committed to doing it your way or my way or as

quickly as we would want, but he is not going to lose, and he is

not afraid of a fight. Very, very important.

The other point is that the armed forces and the government,

the country as whole, have made tremendous strides in terms of

democratization and human rights. That is not just puff-not just

pretty words. It has had a real concrete impact. It has taken away

the reason for the insurgency. They did have elections for a

Constituent Assembly in 1982, and they did have presidential

elections in '84, and they did have National Assembly elections in

'85, and they are getting ready to go through that process

j

If N f•H l nmm I•a HHK m f a
446 1986 TO THE PRESENT

again. Now when you go out and talk to people, you honestly

do hear them complain, but they complain about, "my

president" or "my government," as it should be in a

democracy. There is a growing awareness of the fact that there

is an alternative to taking up a weapon and going up into the

mountains to change things. There is, in fact, a functioning

democracy here, imperfect, but it is a functioning democracy. If

you want to throw rocks at the government, you are authorized

to do that. Read any newspaper any day, and you will see some

of the strongest, most emotional attacks on the government that

you will see anywhere. Not always fun to read, but again, it's

there. That's important.

The human rights dimension: When you talk to the

Embassy folks, they will tell you that in 1980-81 we were

killing 800 people a month-political killings. That is not a hard

figure, but that is the best guess, the best estimate. Eight

hundred political killings a month. That does not include

combat losses or include civilian combat losses. Most of those

800 being the work of your right-wing extremists. In 1986, and

continuing into 1987, the average is 22 a month. That is still 22

too many, but there is a whale of a difference between 800 and

22. And whereas in 1981 the majority were the result of the

right wing, the clear evidence is now that the majority of that 22

is a result of Left or guerrilla assassinations. Again, you have

undercut the reason for the insurgency.

You have those folks linsurgentsl that are hard core

committed people. They burn their bridges, and they are not

coming in. But in terms of their recruiting and their building up

the popular mass support that they are looking for-and that's a

part of their strategy-that mass movement, that mass uprising,

is hard to get. Democracy, as a matter of fact, works. In terms

of explaining why they haven't lost or why they have done as

well as they have, just look at the strides that they've made in

this democratization and improved human rights. I think that

that accounts for it to a significant extent.
PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 447

The Salvadoran Report Card

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr-The five areas that we address

from the point of view of the U.S. Government are human

rights, the consolidation of democracy, the search for peace, the

economy, and Salvador's role in Central America. Tremendous

progress has been made in human rights. We look at human

rights in three areas. We look at human rights in terms of

reducing the number of violations. In this, the progress, in an

historical time sense, has been phenomenal. We also look at the

efforts of the Salvadorans to improve their justice system. In

this, they are only just beginning. A National Advisory

Commission has been examining their penal and other codes

and their procedures for the administration of justice for about

two years. After a very intensive and broad effort,

encompassing many people, they are just now beginning to

make suggestions that will be enacted into law. That should

help to improve their justice system. In terms of the time

required to clean up and restructure the Salvadoran justice

system, they also are getting off to a good start.

There is a third area under human rights which involves the

prosecution of human rights offenders, and, unfortunately, there

are still critical cases that have not been resolved. And there has

been a very great difficulty in reaching a judgment or a

sentencing or a conviction of people who were allegedly

involved in notorious human rights cases, such as the Sheraton

case or the Romero case.

As I project into the future, I believe that there will

continue to be a lessening of violations. Although tremendous

progress has been made in human rights, there are now and then

dangerous blips and setbacks on the screen that we have to be

aware of, but I believe that progress will be maintained. I think

the comportment of the armed forces and of the public security

forces will continue to improve. I believe that we will continue

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr. U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1985 to

date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, I June 1987 and 24

September 1987.

i lI
448 1986 TO THE PRESENT

to see progress, but we must understand that it will take a long

time to redo adequately the justice system. That is something

that will require a decade or so even though there is a good

start. And, I also believe that if the high command of the armed

forces continues determined to let justice be served and not to

obstruct it and if the governments that follow Duarte's persist in

a commitment to achieve a just judicial system, that precedent

will be established in which no persons or sectors of society will

be immune from prosecution.

The second area of importance that the Embassy tries to

promote is the consolidation of democracy. Again, the country

has come a long way! In terms of institutionalization, El

Salvador has held a constitutional convention. It already has

elected two different sets of congressional members and is

getting ready to elect a third group of congressmen and mayors.

El Salvador has elected one president and is preparing for the

election of another. The Supreme Court has begun to establish

the practice of judicial review, and, equally important, the

Executive has complied with its rulings. I believe that the

practice of judicial review will probably continue.

As important as institutional measures are in consolidating

democracy, attitudinal changes are perhaps more important. The

most important attitudinal change, on which there has been

tremendous progress, is acceptance of the idea that military

authorities are subordinate to civilian control within the

framework of the constitution. I believe the armed forces have

shown over the last five or six years a willingness, a desire, to

be submissive to civilian authority. I, nevertheless, think that it

will probably require as many as three more presidential

elections to be certain the concept has been fully established.

This length of time would permit an entire generation of officers

to grow up from lieutenant through retirement under this

concept. This would be enough time to get this concept deeply

imbedded into the psyche, attitudes, and values of the armed

forces officer corps. Tremendous progress has been made, but

military submission will have to continue for some time before

we can be confident the change is lasting.
PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 449

In fact, the danger of a coup may become greater when the

war is over than it is now. Because the armed forces are

occupied with fighting a war, they presently are very patriotic,

loyal to their country, busy protecting national territory, and are

actually justifying their title of guardians of the republic. It may

be that once the war is over the political problems of a large

military establishment could become acute. The country just

cannot support in peacetime the size military establishment it

has now. Once the regional situation of an expansionist Marxist/

Leninist regime in Nicaragua is resolved, and once the

Salvadoran internal situation is put into order, it makes sense to

reduce the armed forces.

It will take great wisdom and skillful management by the

civilian authorities and by the military officer corps to go

through a demobilization. It has always been my opinion,

having observed Latin America for a number of years, that

Latin American military establishments are most dangerous

when their budgets and officers' perks are being reduced. The

period of demobilization will be a critical period.

I believe there has been tremendous progress made

institutionally and attitudinally in moving forward to a selfsustaining democracy. It will still probably be another decade

before we can state that El Salvador has definitely arrived. The

country is moving in the right direction. Liberty, freedom, and

democracy are something that each geneiation and each

administration of government has to continue assuring. El

Salvador is on the right track, and we can be proud that we are

supporting those Salvadorans, civilian and military, who are

committed to constitutional democracy.

If we look at the matter of the quest for peace, I also divide

this into two segments. One is the conduct of the war and the

other is national reconciliation. I use the word reconciliation and

not the words dialogue or negotiation because I believe that the

government and armed forces have been seeking to reconcile the

armed opposition, from the level of single individuals in groups

to the entire FMLN/FDR, and to bring them into the

mainstream, into the political process within the constitutional

framework. They have done this through bringing individuals
450 1986 TO THE PRESENT

back into society when they defect or desert, having decided

that the guerrillas cause is no longer needed nor worthy.

Secondly. small groups have begun to come in. We see now, as

we get ready to go into another one of these dialogues (the third

round of talks between the government and FMLN-FDR), that

perhaps more groups will split off and maybe eventually bring

in the whole FDR and maybe even the FMLN. At the same

time, I am not too sanguine that this will happen rapidly. But, I

do believe that there will continue to be a splitting off. The

maximum number of full-time guerrilla combatants may have

been as high as 12,000; it is now down to 5,000 to 6.000, and I

think that reduction will continue. That is the reconciliation that

I am talking about. Eventually the guerrillas will negotiate and

be renegotiated into society, or they will be marginalized and

finally eliminated.

With respect to the war, the armed forces have gone from a

period, as is so graphically demonstrated by portions of your

book, in which they had to confront battalion-size units to the

superior military position they enjoy today. They were

threatened by defeat in the guerrilla's declared "final

offensive" in San Salvador in January 1981. From 1981 until

the beginning of 1984, the armed forces confronted battalionsize units and at times were defeated in battles. They have now

reduced the number of guerrilla combatants. The FMLN has had

to break down into small units and disperse. And the guerrillas

are always on the move to escape defeat. No one believes that

the guerrillas have a chance of winning the war.

I often make a comparison of El Salvador with other cases

where countries have dealt with insurgencies, such as Uruguay,

Argentina. the Philippines, Colombia, Algeria, and Greece. The

case, to me, which is most pertinent to El Salvador for

comparison is the Malaysian case. Depending on how one

measures, eliminating the guerrillas in Malaysia took 14 years,

although the last 4 years are characterized as a "mopping up"

and were not nearly as intensive as the first 10. We are now in

the eighth year of conflict here. I believe that the guerrillas in El

Salvador have had more favorable conditions to win than the

guerrillas enjoyed in Malaysia. Salvadoran gue'rillas have a
PREPARATION FOR rftE FurURE 451

sanctuary. They have the support of the Nicaraguans. Cubans,

and Soviets in materiel, training, and diplomacy. In Malaysia

many of the guerrillas were of different ethnic and racial stock,

and the rest of the Malaysians were more easily united against

them.

Despite the advantages the FMLN-FDR has had, I believe

that within a couple more years the democratic society, the

government, and the armed forces will have broken the

backbone of the guerrillas and that the nation will continue to

keep the pressure on. Every stage of guerrilla warfare is critical,

however, and care must be taken to prevent retrogression. If the

mopping-up stage is not done correctly in all of its aspectsmilitary, social, developmental-the insurgency could go back

to a higher level. But I believe that the government is on the

right path and that either there will be a reconciliation or the

government and the armed forces will eventually grind down the

FMLN, marginalize them, and finally eliminate them over the

next five, six years.

With respect to the economy. I believe that this country has

a greater opportunity to replicate the successful Singaporean.

Taiwanese. Korean. or Hong Kong type models of economic

growth than any other Latin American country. Salvador has a

dense population- it is a small country. Salvadorans are very

hard working- they are aggressive. The civil war going on here

and the way the Salvadorans persist and endure show certain

characteristics-energy, hard work, commitment-that if

channeled into constructive economic activity could contribute

greatly to development here. I believe that if this country could

just get its act together it could address those three areas that we

always talk about in the economy: production, generation of

employment, and a more equitable distribution of wealth.

Production, because I think there are exceptional human

resources here, even though material resources are limited.

Salvadorans are very good entrepreneurs. and if we could create

the environment, laws, incentives, and disincentives and that

minimum amount of consensus on an economic model, I think

that this country could really move out in terms of productionrelative to its neighbors and many other developing countries.
452 1986 TO THE PRESENT

I also believe that we have to look at generating

employment, and that is a very difficult thing to do. We have to

help the Salvadorans generate a lot of jobs and at the same time

bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth. They have a

good chance to do so. They have the traits that can permit

success in this area. It is going to take leadership, and it will

take a greater sense of reconciliation, -getting rid of some of the

hatreds and resentments that are left over from this very strifeful

period in their history. If they want it, it is there for them to

have. We want to help them in this effort. I hope that they will

pull it together.

With respect to El Salvador's role in the region, no country

in this region, in my opinion, has been stronger vis-a-vis

Nicaragua than the Salvadoran government-to be precise, the

government of President Duarte. We are hopeful that there will

be some success in achieving democracy and peace in all

countries of Central America through the Esquipulas Plan. By

the time this is published it will probably be well-known

whether there has been or has not been success.

In some ways, the key to the future here lies in the United

States and not here in the region. It is up to the American

people, up to the two political parties of the United States

Congress, up to the United States Executive Branch to come

together in a commitment to and support for democracy, peace,

and development in the region. As President Duarte says, the

Marxist-Leninist guerrillas are fanatically dedicated to a

prolonged people's war, particularly in his country but also in

the region. President Duarte says he and the democratic forces

of his political system are committed to a prolonged strategy for

peace. And, what is needed from the United States, he says, is a

bipartisan and prolonged commitment to stay as long as

necessary and provide the resources essential to make certain

that democracy and peace finally are established.

If we, the American people, are willing to make that

commitment, patiently and wisely to insist on democratization

while respecting the sovereignty of the country and being

responsible to the American taxpayer in assuring our assistance

is well used, the American foreign policy objectives of denying
PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 453

Central America to our Communist adversaries, and fomenting

peace, democracy, and development for the people of the region

and protecting our national security can be attained. Not to do

so will be immensely costly to the United States in the medium

and long terms.

All five of these areas to which the Embassy gives

priority-human rights, the consolidation of democracy, the

search for peace, the economy, and Salvador's role in Central

America-are interrelated. If there is failure in any one of the

five areas there will be failure eventually in the other four. We

have to keep working on each of these.

As I look to the future of El Salvador-a small country

affected very greatly by external influences, whether one is

talking about the price of coffee or Cuban and Sandinista

support for the FMLN-I believe there is a reason for optimism.

If we can get help to make the external conditions more

favorable economically, in terms of having peace and true

democracy in the region, the Salvadorans have the ability, the

skills, the energy, and entrepreneurial knowledge that could

enable them to develop their beautiful country into an

increasingly prosperous and harmonious place to live. It is a

beautiful country made of nice and competent people.

No Political Will to Win

Colonel (Retired) Sigifredo Ochoa Nrez-ln general terms, I

could say that the armed forces of El Salvador have experience,

have leadership, have good equipment, good training. But the

problem I see-and I'd criticized it personally at the time I

retired from the Army-is that political decisions influence

negatively in the military actions. I believe that there has been a

misunderstanding of the democratic aspect. The armed forces do

not want to execute coups d'etats or return to the past. I believe

the democratic system is the best system. However, we believe

Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Prez. Fourth Brigade Commander, 1982. 1984

to 1985. interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador, 14 October 1987.

a
454 1986 TO THE PRESENT

that present government policies have not permitted certain

advances in the military, partly for fear of political reprisal. The

commander of El Parafso, for example, who relieved me,

stopped doing what I was doing for fear he would also be taken

out of the country. There is a political jealousy on the part of

the government toward the military leaders. In other words,

they don't want there to be military leadership, and that is a

mistake, because in all wars there is military leadership. The

war must be won-it's true, not only militarily-but the

military aspect is fundamental. If we have more military

victories, the government, as a result, will have more political

victories, and there will be more social victories and more

economic victories. Saying that wars are not won militarily, in

global form, is a mistake made by politicians. That thinking is

the root of the problem. The commanders are scared of losing

their positions if they do something that goes against the

political division.

I have the impression that there is no political will to win

the conflict. For me, the matter of sitting down and dialoguing

and all those things is not the solution to the conflict in El

Salvador. First, we believe we must be stronger militarily. It

has always been said that diplomacy is achieved by armies,

through ambassadors. An ambassador without military force is

nothing. That is the reality of things. During WWII we saw how

Hitler's Minister of Foreign Affairs signed treaties favorable to

Germany, for fear of the German forces' reprisals. This, I

believe, could be applied here as well. If we obtain more

military success, it will be much easier to obligate the Marxist

guerrillas to dispose of their arms and to incline towards the

political way. But if they see that the armed forces are held

back, they will easily develop in the military field. Look at the

result of so many talks that don't lead to anything. My point of

view is that the armed forces have the capability to defeat the

guerrillas, perhaps not defeat them 100 percent, but to lead

them towards a situation where it makes it easier for the

government to force them to put their arms down.
PREPARATION FOR THE FUTURE 45S

Total National Commitment by

El Salvador Is Still Lacking

General Fred F. Woerner-I find El Salvador still seriously

lacking in total national commitment to the war. There is still

too much of the military effort, not exclusively, but still too

much. Until there is a better balance between the military and

the other elements of national power, they will not achieve the

internal consolidation necessary to declare peace and make

peace prevail. I believe they will achieve this. I just wish they

were on a damn faster timetable than they appear to be.

A Democracy Based on Voting,

Not Weapons

General Adolfo 0. Bland6n-We are entering a very

interesting stage. On the one hand we are making an effort,

along with all the other sectors in the country, to support the

Government of the Republic in the efforts to achieve peace

through the Arias Plan. That means that we must be prepared

for any situation that arises all of a sudden, such as, for

example, a complete cease-fire or a more or less cease-fire. The

armed forces of El Salvador have reached such a great level of

professionalism that we are prepared. That does not mean that

we are constantly alert to any abnormal situation which could

possibly occur. Because we should not forget that we are

dealing with Marxists, and we shouldn't forget Paris, nor should

we forget about all the other maneuvers that the Communists

have signed on the negotiating table and at the moment of the

truth they have not fulfilled their commitments. However, as I

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America, 1982 to 1985.

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco. California. 7 November 1986.

General Adolfo Onecifero Bland6n, Chief of Staff of Salvadoran Armed

Forces, 1984 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 21 July 1987

and 26 September 1987.

I
456 1986 TO THE PRESEN r

was saying at the beginning, we are reasonable men. We are

men of peace, even though we are prepared for war. And even

yet, we believe our people deserve peace after more than seven

years of war. We want to live in tranquility. And as we were

saying, to those who still don't understand, democracy is based

on voting and on ideas, not weapons. Understand this situation

and incorporate into the democratic process.
22k

The U.S. Role

in the Future

Assisting Countries to Fight

Their Own Wars Is a

Viable Strategy

General Fred F. Woerner-I think the major lesson to be

learned is the viability of the U.S. strategy of assisting host

countries to fight their own wars of counterinsurgencies,

internal consolidations, whatever. That this represents a

viable strategy and that we do not have to intervene directly

with U.S. military forces or firepower. That is contrarily at

the far end of the force option spectrum. The techniques of

doing that are not new. They have been ignored. They have

led frequently to disaster or defeat. And they are articulated

in numerous documents, publications, etc., what I call the

tactics of counterinsurgency.

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America, 1982 to 1985,

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco. California. 7 November

1986.

457
458 1986 I0 THE PRESENT

Understanding the Nature of

Insurgent War and the Past

Failure of Leadership

General Wallace H. Nutting-We haven't talked about the

several dimensions of the problem yet. We've been talking

about the military dimension which in my view is the least

important. It's the sine qua non. If you don't have public order

and security you can't do the other things. But in the long run

the actions that are going to make the difference are the political

reform movements, the social improvements, health, sanitation,

education. housing, all of that business and economic

development. That is another main failing of our government's

approach. We don't put the several dimensions together. That's

the other big lesson-that it is a multidimensional challenge and

you have to respond in the same dimensions. It must be done in

a coordinated way, but our organization at strategic and

operational level does not allow us to do that. It does at tactical

level-the country team. But they're sort of out there, without

guidance and support from strategic and operational level. It's a

bad failing on our part. I don't think we understand, and we

don't put the dimensions together effectively at all. That's a

failure of leadership.

U.S. Needs a Pro-Democratic

Unified Strategy

General John R. Galvin-First let me state what the U.S.

policy should be, in my humble opinion. I believe that the U.S.

General Wallace H. Nutting. Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command. 1979 to 1983. interviewed in Orlando. Florida. 29 January 1987.

General John R. Galvin. Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command. 1985 to 1987. interviewed in Mons. Belgium. 18 August 1987.
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE FUTURE 459

policy is basically anti-Communist. It ought to be, basically,

pro-democratic. This is a fight for democracy, a fight for the

survival of democracy in the world. That is what we are really

into here. We need to realize that, and we need to realize that

we, the American people, must make sacrifices if we want to

live in a democratic world. We understand how important

democracy is, and if we were not opposed by people who would

like to destroy democracy, we probably wouldn't have to do

anything. But the hard cold facts of life are that we are opposed

by people who don't want democracy, who want to substitute

something else for it. They want to substitute MarxismLeninism. That is pure dictatorship and loss of all that we know

to mean democracy. But we can't try to simply do away with

our opponents. What we have to do is support our friends. So, it

has to be the fight for democracy, and it has to be our own

willingness to sacrifice by supporting, in whatever form we

deem appropriate, the fight for democracy in different parts of

the world, definitely in Latin America. That does not

necessarily mean that we need to provide U.S. troops on the

ground to fight. It means that we need to put money and

resources of other kinds, although in the last resort there might

be fighting.

I don't find that there is enough recognition of what I've

just said. I think that our policy is ad hoc. We live from day to

day. We don't look very far down the road to see what's

coming, and we don't spend enough time trying to understand

Latin America. I think that we come up with our plans for what

we might do. without that kind of full understanding. Why is

that so'? It is because we don't have the organization to

understand it. We have ambassadors in the countries, and many,

if not all. of these ambassadors are very good. But they are

dealing with this question one country at a time. There simply

isn't enough of a unified effort of the U.S. administration-the

Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the other

departments and agencies-somehow tied together in order to

carry out a unified strategy. The organization is not there and

the strategy is not there.
460 1986 TO THE PRESENT

United States foreign policy has to be under the control

of the Secretary of State and the State Department has to

lead. Now, obviously, the U.S. military will have a military

strategy, a worldwide military strategy, but that deals with

how to defend the United States against a worldwide threat or

any kind of threat. But you see, when you are talking about

how to defend the United States, once again you are talking

about something that's basically reactive. Now, what we need

is a better approach based on the goals of the United States. A

better approach to a worldwide strategy, one that is sponsored

by the State Department and one which is then supplemented

by other organizations-such as the Defense Department.

Obviously, with this kind of strategy you run up against

the difficulty [here one could be idealistic and say, we ought

to have a strategy, but everybody knows that] that if you had

a strategy you would have to express it to everybody, and

then people could have a counterstrategy to your strategy. So,

I don't mean [by that] that this has to be known in great

detail. The thing that has to be stated to the public and to the

world is that we understand where we are in the final years of

the 20th century-which is a position threatened (democracy

threatened) by Marxism-Leninism and by other totalitarian

elements. Democracy versus Totalitarianism.

If we want to survive as a democracy, we have to ensure

the survival of other democracies in the world. We have to

ensure the survival of the idea of democracy. We need to start

from that simple basis and build ourselves a strategy. With

reference to any given country or region it would be

classified. But everybody would understand that this strategy

has a basis that would have to be part of a series of

administrations in the United States, one after the other. It

would have to be the responsibility of, primarily, the State

Department to run, and we in the military would support that

strategy. That might be different from other military

strategies for defense of the country which we would continue

to do, such as the Maritime Strategy, the NATO Strategy,

etc.
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE FUTURE 461

Our Support Policy for

Democracy Is at Some Risk

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi-I do have one final area of significant

concern when I look at U.S. policy toward El Salvador in recent

years, and that is that our policy of support for democracy is at

some risk. Not because of the intentions of Washington policymakers or the nature of our policy in broad sweep, but because

we seem better able to transfer organizational effectiveness from

military to military than from civilian to civilian.

The Salvadoran military is significantly transformed. Not

only in levels of resources and number of personnel. Numbers

make a big difference, as former President Magafia knows better

than anybody else. He was the first to spot the fact that the

Salvadoran officer corps was big enough now so that not all

officers knew all other officers. Therefore, you were getting a

process of interrelationships based on abstract rules, which are

the bases of any kind of regulation, organizational bureaucracy

as opposed to a personal caste or family. What one really has

been seeing is an increase in efficiency by the military in the

ability to operate, in the ability to organize itself, to transfer

resources into rural areas, and so forth.

And while this has happened in the middle of a conflict,

the civilian side of the house, the public administration, the

political parties, and the like, do have undaunted freedom to

operate-to the point that, now, much of the Left has been able

to come back in from the cold. Nonetheless, they have not

turned that freedom into the kind of discipline, the kind of

organization, the kind of ability to bring health, schooling, and

transportation to rural areas, for example, that would be

commensurate.

The U.S. military has had to operate in El Salvador with

this 55-trainer limit. God knows how many hundreds of people

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy. Planning and

Coordination, Bureau of Interamerican Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

1977 to date, interviewed in Washington, D.C., 10 September 1987.

i

4
462 1986 TO THE PRESENT

associated with AID have been in El Salvador. My guess is that

one of the reasons the military has done somewhat better in

transferring attitudes and techniques is that the 55 guys are all

hands-on, whereas normally a very small number of AID guys

really are hands-on. Most of them are doing paperwork to

satisfy Washington requirements.

The fact is that you have to have some hands-on activity

and some hands-on involvement. At one level you have to have

resources of a material kind, and, unless you are prepared to put

money where your mouth is, you are not going to get many

people's attention. You also need resources of a human and

intellectual kind. You need to have people in-country. You need

to identify people in the country, local people, whom you can

support. We can do some things on our own, but for most we

need others. We need to be in there providing support to the

kind of people we want to provide support to. Not allowing, in

effect, our enemies to be the ones that are providing support to

their friends, while our friends, or people who could be our

friends, are left to their own devices.

U.S. Needs a Consistent Method

of Forming Strategic Policy

General Wallace H. Nutting-I think the National Security

Council (NSC) was organized in 1947 for a specific purpose.

That it was to become a coordinating, not an operating, agency.

It's an indispensable function !,ecause each of the departments

and agencies headed by a cabiiet member is equal to the other.

They are all co-equal and they all have their own agendas and

they all don't fit together. There has to be someone with

sufficient authority over those departments and agencies at

working level and at secretarial level to knock heads together in

order to define the issues and rationally estimate the problem

and come up with sustainable commitments. The NSC has not

recently performed that function. They've gone off into the easy

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command. 1979 to 1983, interviewed in Orlando. Florida, 29 January 1987.
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE FUTURE 463

side of things, which is operating. The most difficult problem,

in my view, is formulating policy. Everybody wants to be a

squad leader. Nobody wants to be a policy formulator. We

don't know how to do that very well, and the mechanism does

not work well to formulate and sensibly coordinate a policy to

meet specific challenges. Until the NSC or some other body

performs that role effectively, we're going to continue to mush

around the way we're doing right now.

In my view it is the NSC that has to perform that

coordinating function. They shouldn't be in the operating

business. They ought to pay attention to coordinated policy

formulation. They have to be organized on a continuing basis

for as long as necessary to focus on the war and win it....

Given our existing form of government and believing that

you're not going to make any major constitutional changes, the

only guy I see who can do that is the Vice-President. We have

one; he needs a job. I don't think the President can be expected

to do that. The Vice-President must take the cabinet members

and knock their heads together to define the issues and take

them to the President for final decision. Hopefully, the present

investigations in the Senate, the House, the Tower Committee,

and so forth will acknowledge that indispensable need for which

the NSC was created in 1947-but it is a role which it rarely has

played successfully.

Political Will Is the Crucial

Element in Determining Commitment

General Fred F. Woerner-We tend to segment our analysis

and address threats of the moment rather than the potential of

long-term threat. Our willingness, and thus our ability to

become directly involved, changes radically because our ability

to intervene and at the level of reasonable intervention is not

driven by the inherent capabilities of the armed forces but by the

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America. 1982 to 1985,

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco. California, 7 November 1986.

-1
464 1986 TO THE PRESENT

political will to employ them. That will has a very short life and

changes radically and abruptly. One can look at the last two

years, and perhaps even shorter period, of congressional

attitudes toward Nicaragua. I'm not even talking about

intervention but about the actual advance of support/nonsupport.

What emerges are dramatic shifts of attitude which are

reflections of political will and which translate into whether

there will be support for the commitment of U.S. resources.

Let Us Develop Our Own Democracy

Colonel (Retired) Sigifredo Ochoa Pirez-Unfortunatelyand this is a criticism of the North American Ambassador, a

very personal criticism-I believe the U.S. Ambassador has

turned out to be too partial to the government.

I am in agreement that U.S. policy protects the government

of El Salvador. But don't overprotect it.... There are other

sectors. An ambassador is for everyone. The Ambassador here

now ... in this sense, I believe, is very personally biased. It's

not meant to be a criticism of the North Americans. It's very

different, because I saw Ambassador Hinton, and I saw

Ambassador Pickering, who were very good ambassadors,

diplomats, and they earned the friendship of everybody.

However, the U.S. Embassy's actions today induce violence,

allowing the leftists to come and paint the Embassy, and other

demonstrations. It induces the conservative sectors themselves

to turn anti-U.S. Something very dangerous has begun to

happen in the country, not only are the leftists against the

United States, but also the conservative sector. That is very

dangerous because we are your friends, and you treat us poorly.

We believe there should be no interference in the political

aspect of El Salvador. Let us develop our own democracy. For

example, today in this ARENA party, I am a militant. It is a

rightist party, conservative, which has been leaning more

towards the Right, more center-Right-we believe in the

Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pdrez, Fourth Brigade Commander. 1982 and

1984-1985. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 14 October 1987.
THE U.S. ROLE IN THE FUTURE 465

Western capitalist system with social justice for all. But we

don't want someone to impose on us a system of government

similar to that of Mexico's, a PRI party dictatorship, with

tremendous corruption. Nobody can make a move unless the

PRI allows it. We had the feeling that North American policy is

what your ambassador represents here. It's as if they wanted the

Christian Democrats to remain in the government. And if that is

so, through a very refined imposition, with computers and

such-it has been said that the Christian Democrats achieved

power due to the U.S. support in computers. I believe it will be

very dangerous for the U.S. policy, because then there will be

violence from one side and the other. We believe that, in that

sense, the U.S. Ambassador has played a rather sad role, I'll

tell you sincerely. I am a friend of yours. I have been very

friendly with former ambassadors, and we consider this

ambassador to be too partial towards the Christian Democrats.

That's concerning us and is creating and generating a nationalist

feeling, very nationalist.

A
23W

Stalemate and the

Need for Strategy

The Economic Element of the

Plan Is Lacking

General John R. Galvin-A great deal of the dissatisfaction

of the people of El Salvador is based on economic conditions,

and we have not been able to help El Salvador to the extent that

the country has overcome economic stagnation. That may in

part be attributed to a lack of capability of the administration of

El Salvador, and it may be in part attributable to the ways in

which we have gone about helping them, or the lack of enough

support. Because of that, the guerrillas have been partially

successful in keeping up this discontent. After the earthquake,

where El Salvador and the city of San Salvador suffered

damages that amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars, there

wasn't any money around that could be used to reconstruct the

city. So, even today, in the city there is a great deal of

discontent. There are homeless people. There's great suffering

that has gone on. I had hoped that that would be recognized by

not only the United States but all the world and that the

democratic countries of the world would contribute something

General John R. Galvin, Commander-in-Chief. U.S. Southern

Command, 1985 to 1987, interviewed in Mons. Belgium, 18 August 1987.

467

Ii um mlm m lm mlllmmm m m lm~l I
468 1986 TO THE PRESENT

to help El Salvador. But that really never came about. The

United States contributed, I believe, 50 million dollars initially,

and I don't believe much more after that. I may be mistaken

there, but I don't think that our aid for that disaster went much

over 50 million dollars. You could check that out. At any rate,

the level of discontent has not gone down because the economic

situation has not changed, and that is the basic problem right

now. It's not so much the proselytizing by the Marxist guerrillas

of the FMLN, as it is the economic situation within the country

exacerbated by this disaster.

I think that President Duarte is right to stress democracy

and stress the democratic revolution. It is really a democratic

counterattack against Marxism, and, if Duarte is able to carry it

out at a full governmental scale, he has a good possibility of

winning this war. But, if there's one thing that I would say is

lacking in Duarte's plan, it is a way of dealing with the

economic situation. I don't believe, as of now, that he has dealt

with it adequately.

The War Has Turned into a Business

Colonel (Retired) Sigifredo Ochoa Pirez-lt would be a

major victory for the North Americans to terminate the conflict

in El Salvador and strengthen a true democracy in El Salvador. I

know the North Americans, and sometimes I feel somewhat

cheated by them when I realize that our President is right when

he says, "... I cannot take the decision because the North

Americans don't want. ... " That's the impression he gives at

the people's level, as if it were the Ambassador who rules here

in the country. The truth is that no ambassador has the right to

rule in another country. There can be talks, accords, but the

impression we have-and that is one of the things I've seen-is

that the war has turned into a business. Many say no, but I

believe it's true mainly for the politicians, not for those who are

out in the fields. The man who is out in the fields wants the

Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Prez, Fourth Brigade Commander. 1982 and

1984-1985, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 14 October 1987.
STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGY 469

war to end quickly because he is the one who is dying. We

believe the war has turned into a business so that there can be

more external aid. More than military aid, economic aid,

because military aid comes in the form of armament, advisors,

and training. It doesn't come as money. I believe that the

military part is not what is converted into riches. But aside from

that, I believe that those who turn out to be more favored by the

war are the government politicians, because being as we are, at

war, they ask for donations, and they ask for loans. The truth is

that the money ... if we take a look at U.S. aid, we'll see that

alone the U.S. aid to El Salvador in the economic aspect

exceeds two billion. Supposedly, that aid is for the economic

development of the country. But it hasn't served as economic

development. It has served as ... we've eaten up the capital.

We haven't made the capital productive. That is where the

frustrations come in, and that is why we see more and more

resentment on the part of the Salvadoran people towards the

government and for the continued U.S. policies. These people

have been a truly pro-North American people, and today they

are turning anti-North American. That is very dangerous, and

... they haven't wanted to see that. I believe that ... 1, being a

friend of the North Americans, I believe I must tell them the

truth, because a friend must be told the truth-the good, the

bad, and the ugly,

This Country Seems Stalemated

C-5 Spokesperson-Now we are in 1987, and the guerrilla

forces are smaller now than they were before. That is due to

defections, that is due to casualties, that is due to Army

operations, that is due to the difficulty of recruitment. So there

is a variety of factors as to why you have a smaller guerrilla

force than you had before. However, this guerrilla force that

you have now, I would say, is more effective and more

committed than the one you had before. Most of the guerrillas

C-5 Spokesperson, name and position withheld by request of the

individual and with the concurrence of responsible U.S. and Salvadoran

officials. interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 28 September 1987.

is
470 1986 TO THE PRESENT

who are still in the movement have now been through all the

different crises. They have been through this whole process.

They have been in the war now for seven years. And now these

guys have already adjusted themselves psychologically to

prolonged popular war. They have accepted the need to abandon

the large columns and operate in small units.

Furthermore, the progress of democracy now in this

country seems to be stalemated. The Christian Democratic party

itself had all kinds of internal struggles. Duarte does not have

the charisma that he once had. He has lost it I would say. He is

not seen as a national leader who embodies the popular will any

more. He is seen as just another politician with all sorts of

problems. There is widespread dissatisfaction across the board

with the Christian Democratic government. To the extent of.

even within the party, having serious internal conflicts. The

democratic elections and the coming of Duarte on the scene was

at one time a great morale depressor for the guerrillas. Now that

factor is removed. Now they see Duarte as gradually

weakening. They see the whole democratic process as

weakening. They see the economic problems of this country as

working in their favor.

The psychological attitude of the guerrillas has changed.

You don't have all the forced conscripts you had in there. If

they were forced at one time, by now they are convinced. They

are comprometidos [compromised]. Plus you have people who

really have no other alternative. Unemployment is at its highest

rate ever in this country, so if a guerrilla does turn himself in.

what is he going to go back to? One of the things that worked to

our favor in '84 and '85 was the hope that things were going to

improve. Now, everybody thinks that things are going to get

worse. I am not just talking about guerrillas. I am talking about

conservative parties, the Christian Democratic party,

everybody. They just see the economic, social, and political

situation of this country as going downhill. They see Duarte as a

political failure. All this motivates the remaining guerrillas to

stay in the movement. They are saying, "Maybe our

commanders are right. Maybe if we just hang in there, in the

end we'll triumph. Maybe this prolonged popular war will work
STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGY 471

out to our advantage." In the absence of any kind of viable

alternative for these people if they do turn themselves in-they

are going to stay with the guerrillas until they die. Plus, a lot of

people like being guerrillas. It's a lot better than being a

peasant, earning a dollar a day or whatever it is.

Reinforcing the Stalemate

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea-So we've nearly arrived at a

point where additional infusions of training, materiel, and

various other elements of security assistance won't move us

toward the ultimate goal of defeating the insurgency but will

merely reinforce the stalemate. We've reached the point of

diminishing returns, and we're going to reach a stalemate pretty

soon where all we can do is maintain our present position. The

guerrillas have had to change the way they operate. They

operate in smaller groups, pull back and hide out more in the

hills, resort to terrorism, and so forth. But they can continue in

that mode literally forever, and we have not yet developed a

strategy nor a policy with a proper objective.

But the government and the military must have a plan that

sees them from where they are right now, through final

insurgency termination, an acceptable termination. They must

determine what all the intermediate steps are and have plans for

mustering the necessary resources to achieve each one of those

intermediate goals. Only at that point can they say they have the

initiative. To stop in midstream and say, "We've got the

initiative," and not know where the hell you're going from

there is bullshit! That's why I said I understand what you're

saying. On a strictly military basis, you say you've got the

initiative. But in terms of El Salvador's goals as a nation to

survive politically and the conflicting and contrasting goals of

the guerrilla to obtain total power, the initiative is out there

someplace, and nobody has it right now because neither side

can see a way to the final conclusion.

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador. 1983 to

1985, interviewed in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 4 March 1986.
472 1986 TO THE PRESENT

The guerrillas believe that the United States will quit, and

they'll ultimately win. In that sense, they, the guerrillas, believe

that they still have the initiative. For us to say that we have the

initiative just because we've stabilized the situation and stopped

them for the time being is a misrepresentation of the situation.

To have the initiative in an insurgency implies much more than

simply a general stabilization.

They Don't Have a National Plan

Colonel John C. Ellerson-When I first talked to the CINC

about this job and received my charter, it was basically an

extended "kissss [sic]." It was-keep it small, keep it simple,

keep it sustainable, keep it Salvadoran. And, make the National

Plan go. Which implies that we have a National Plan. Talk to

anybody about what the National Plan is or isn't, and you will

get as many answers as you talk to people. Or if you get one

common answer it will be UPR lUnidos Para Reconstuirl. But

United to Reconstruct is not a National Plan. It's largely a

military-generated effort which talks to getting the government

back out into the rural areas, extending those government

services back out there, getting schools, clinics, water, streets,

getting your alcaldia [city hall] rebuilt.

Those sorts of things, which are all very important and a

part of a National Plan, but that is not the National Plan. The

National Plan would imply that it is an all encompassing,

centrally directed and coordinated effort; where UPR would be a

component part thereof. We don't have that. We don't have that

central organism that would drive it. We do have CONARA

INational Committee for Restoration of Areas], which is very

key in UPR, and we have an executive committee for UPR, but

it's not a National Security Council or any organization of that

level. That's a basic failing. It goes back to that earlier point.

We don't have a fully committed, coordinated effort at winning

Colonel John C. Ellerson, U.S. Military Group Commander in El

Salvador, 1986 to date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador. 27 and 28

September 1987.

_d"1
STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGY 473

this war. Can you get there from here without it? Probably, but

we're killing a lot of people unnecessarily in the meantime. And

so it's a big issue and it's a tough issue. They have a UPR.

They don't have a National Plan.

A positive development-two weekends ago, in a

conversation in the president's residence, I heard a suggestion

made as to the creation of sort of such a thing and some names

put next to it. It wasn't a good list, and it certainly wasn't as

complete as you would like to have, but at least it was a first

step, and given the person who was making the

recommendation, it's something that we might, hopefully, begin

to see some forward movement. A key failing-they don't have

a National Security Council. They don't have a National Plan.

Strategic and Tactical Objectives

Must Strike at Centers of Gravity

Colonel Orlando Zepeda-I think that one of our mai,

objectives should be to try and divide the FMLN-FDR 'ion.

Another objective is to weaken these factions. The FMLN

consists of five groups-FPL, ERP, PRTC, FAL, and FARN.

They are each directed by a comandante. I think today the most

powerful are the ERP and FPL. Our main objective here is to

confront the ERP, which deals with the military aspects of this

struggle as headed by Joaqufn Villalobos. Apparently, after the

death of Cayetano Carpio he took over the command of this

organization. Strategically, our goal is to weaken the structure

of such an organization because it is what drives the struggle

even further. Tactically, we must strike heavy blows against

them; probably not a guerrilla or a squadron commandant,

specifically, but we must strike at the centers of power, the

command groups. We must strike by the use of covert

operations, infiltration, surprise attacks, night attacks. And with

small units moving very rapidly. At this point we are no longer

using our battalion-size units but, rather, are training our men to

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda H., C-2 of the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

1985 to 1987, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 22 January 1987.

7j 1.

-- mmmmmmm -mm i -ill - | Imm mm mI
474 1986 TO THE PRESENT

organize in smaller units of 15-20 men. Our forces will then be

able to infiltrate more easily and strike heavier blows against the

guerrillas. However, I believe that our first priority must be to

divide this union, provoke and deepen the divergencies between

them, and deprive them of the logistics and economic support

coming from abroad. Unfortunately, most of their economic

support comes from humanitarian organizations in the United

States. Much of it also comes from Europe, and we have reason

to believe that most of their logistic support comes from Russia.

We must deprive them of this support. Their most immediate

access comes through Nicaragua, and that is the biggest

problem we face. If Nicaragua changes its government, we will

have won this war because that is the principal source of logistic

support for the guerrillas. Whether it be a base for their

propaganda and planning, it is still the epicenter of this conflict.

Most of the guerrilla leaders of El Salvador, such as Villalobos,

Ungo, Zamora, Shafik Handal, and Colindes, are constantly

traveling to Nicaragua.

The FMLN Cannot Win the War

Miguel Castellanos-The FMLN is in no condition to win this

war. Presently, it is in a period of weakness, of resistance. It is

no longer on the offensive. The sabotages, the mines, the

transportation strikes are all part of an operative line in 

a

defensive framework of resistance. In other words, they are

trying to maintain their position. The Sandinistas are no longer

providing the same logistical flow as before. There is much less

than before, because Nicaragua is being harassed politically.

The Contras and the Congress are exerting a lot of pressure.

Then, they don't want to provide evidence that they are helping

the FMLN. It is not convenient for them. They want to

consolidate their revolution even more, even if it means

sacrificing the FMLN. Then, the Cubans' Central American

Comandante Miguel Castellanos, former insurgent leader. 1973 to 1985.

interviewed in San Salvador. El Salvador. 25 September 1987.

J
STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGY 475

policy is to consolidate Nicaragua, even if other organizations

are weakened.

Now, that condemns the FMLN in their attempts to take

power. They are in no condition to do so. When the Vietnamese

took Saigon, they were successful because North Vietnam, with

its regular divisions, provided thousands of tons of help on a

daily basis. Not here. That is why the FMLN has diminished in

its operational capability. They ambush once in awhile, they

destroy a bridge here and there. In other words, militarily, the

FMLN does not have the capability to achieve power. That is

why now they have changed their strategy and have returned to

the insurrection. They claim that by 1988-89 they will have

achieved power through popular insurrection. Since there is an

economic crisis, since there is unemployment, there are no jobs.

Salaries are not increased, there is a high cost of living, they

want to take advantage of all that so that the people will rise

again. Now, the businessmen don't invest their capital here.

Since 1979-80, two billion dollars have fled the country and

gone to Miami. The sabotages caused by the FMLN have

totalled 1,500 million dollars. That is the result of the

sabotages. Then, they say that the economic crisis will cause the

people to rise. Now, not all economic crises generate

insurrections. You see Mexico, for example. There is no

insurrection or organization there. In other words, we have it

here because they want to provoke one. Now, we must prevent

another fascist government from coming along as in the past.

That plays into their hands, because they are able to justify

violence. They won't achieve power, but they will try to turn

back the democratic process. And that is what they want.

Now, what would happen if they took power? Well, they

would establish a democratic revolutionary government similar

to the one in Nicaragua. If they were successful militarily, they

would establish a popular army where they would incorporate

honest military men, not criminals. That would be the first

government. They would expropriate the oligarchy's lands and

put all services under state control. A false nonaligned policy at

the international level. They were going to align themselves

with Cuba and all the others to form a junta and try to make

elections in their own manner.
476 1986 TO THE PRESENT

Now, the fact is that that kind of government is based on a

military victory. But, since they no longer have the capability,

mhey insist on dialogues. Then, by means of a dialogue, they

make a provisional government where they only ask for a share

in the power. But, it is not really a share of power that they

want because they start from the point that they have an army,

and they are going to have more strength to fight. But the

purpose of that provisional government is to buy time slowly

and to continue developing in order to get ahead. That is their

objective. To go to a dialogue, present their government

proposal-a convergence as they refer to it-to have a share in

the power that allows them to remain in the rural zones with

their armed units. That is what they would ask for.

The FMLN Is Being Forced to

Develop a Protracted War Strategy

Dr. Guillermo M. Ungo-How-I don't know, you may

study what Villalobos and other comandantes say-but I don't

think that they have the notion of Prolonged War. They have a

notion that the war has become prolonged as a matter of fact.

And, they understand that it's going to take a long time.

Because even though they are doing well, ... they are not doing

so well. I won't say they're not doing so well. They're not

doing so bad. That's different. But, if the FMLN doesn't come

to some type of terms, the Army will get its victory in five or

six years. That's an optimistic approach! That doesn't mean a

complete victory, just a military win. Also, an important point

is that Reagan is finishing. No matter what kind of

administration follows his, the tendency will be to diminish

United States support to the (Salvadoran) government. At the

same time, the Soviet Union-which hasn't been nearly as

involved-is likely to do the same thing for the FMLN. Reagan

and Gorbachev are probably laughing together right now. Well,

Dr. Guillermo M. Ungo, President of the Revolutionary Democratic

Front (FDR), 1981 to date, interviewed in Panama City, R.P.. II December

1987.
STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGY 477

let's forget about them, and let's try to find a solution through

without them. [This interview was conducted shortly after the

Washington Summit.-Eds.] In any case, there is no solution

through surrendering and no solution through fighting. No

conditions for either. So, I believe a negotiated settlement,

instead of surrendering, is going to have to come first.

The FMLN, I believe, doesn't want to apply a Prolonged

War strategy in the sense that they want to prolong the war

deliberately in order to attain a maximalist solution-total

victory. One argument is that time is working in their favor.

But, time also deteriorates. As a result, they have developed a

Protracted War strategy. This kind of strategy is necessary

because they don't have the means which allow them to

confront the regular army directly. So, the only means by which

they can conduct the war is through a Protracted War strategy.

This requires a negotiated settlement you will understand, the

need to have a broad-based government-not made up of only

the FML.N/FDR. Now, this is not a total victory concept. We

can't afford to have a total victory. It's too costly. It's too good

to be true.

That's why I think a negotiated peace in El Salvador has a

good chance. But, the solution to the crisis has got to be a

Salvadoran solution. Consensus is growing among the various

sectors of society regarding the need to end the destruction and

bloodshed of the war. Regardless of one's ideology or political

party, we find that there is general agreement on the following

points. First, the country can't be governed in the present

situation of profound crisis and war. Second, the Duarte

government has failed and can't generate the necessary support

to overcome the crisis. Third, the government doesn't have the

capability to militarily defeat the FMLN. Finally, the

prolongation of the war will simply deepen the crisis. As long

as the war continues there will be no economic recovery, no

economic development-just war. And, everyone has to be

involved. That's the only way to put an end to the war.

There's another reason why I think negotiated peace in El

Salvador has a better chance than anything else. Right now,

there's no alternative. Today, tomorrow, the day after
478 1986 TO THE PRESENT

tomorrow-no one is surrendering. There is no chance to

negotiate a surrender. No one is willing to share power. There

are still no conditions for that. But, I think that in one year, two

years, or three, conditions will come about for a political

solution made out of ingredients we don't have now. I don't

know exactly what or when that will be. You still have two

armies, and you still have problems. But, I think peace is worth

the necessary effort to develop the conditions that will provide a

political settlement. I have learned that dreams sometimes come

true, but you have to have dreams even if they don't come true.

You want them to come true. You have to wait a little.

This is more than a military problem. It is political. The

solution will be more political than military. The policy is to

talk, and that's more political than military.

No Clear Vision of Where

We Want to Go

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova.Vjar-I think that, with

respect to the military, the various experiences obtained are the

fruits of labor of the general staff in order to produce a doctrine

with respect to this type of conflict. But, overlooking the entire

national field, truly, we have a lesson that we need to learn. The

unfortunate fact is, observing El Salvador as a state-at this

time, we are confronted maybe by the greatest of the problems

we've had as a nation, as a state. We are a conglomerate of five

million people located in a 20,000 square kilometer area,

without any clear vision of what we want to do or where we

want to go. At this point especially (independent of other

aspects of an international nature), I think there is more

confusion now than there ever has been. Really, if you observe

the national panorama, you will find that all of the democratic

forces-not Communist-are completely disunited. There

hasn't been any union.

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova-Vejar, former Second Brigade

Commander and now Director of the Military Academy. interviewed in Santa

Ana and San Salvador. El Salvador. 23 January 1987 and 23 July 1987,

respectively.
STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGY 479

Traditionally, subversion in all Communist countries looks

for coalitions with different political parties-at a given moment

when they search for the power through pacific meansthrough elections. Then, they united with other parties to

achieve power. Once this objective

has been met, the Alianzas

Coyunturales [Alliance of

Opportunity], as they refer to it, is

terminated. We have a clear example

of this in Nicaragua.

But here in El Salvador, at this

point, all democratic forces are

polarized and disunited. I believe

there is no unity, and there will be no

unity unless it is sought through a

national perspective. A national

perspective where all sectors of the

population are integrated. I believe coREFA

this is the only way. Even though Colonel Oscar

there would be a lot of disagreement, Edgardo Casanova-V6jar

if we work towards one goal-El Salvador-we will be able to

obtain a national consensus. We will be able to clearly

determine our national objectives. We will be able to visualize

where we want to go as a state. At this time 1 believe we don't

know. If we, through an understanding, are able to determine

our national objectives, I think that the polarization of forces

that exists today will end. There will be a union. It doesn't

matter what political party it is. The national objectives will be

determined, and whatever political party exists will have to

follow them, unless it is blind, because that will be the end

result of all social groups in El Salvador.

Then, I think that is the principal lesson that we must

learn, and we must learn it right now because the subversives

have been virtually defeated militarily. But you know that the

political situations produce divisiveness and these divisions can

continue to threaten this democracy that we are trying to push

forward. It is necessary and it is urgent to seek a unity within

the sectors, that they become integrated around common

I
480 1986 TO THE PRESENT

objectives. This should be as a result of a true appreciation

separate from passionate feelings. I think that can be achieved.

Some time ago we had a march for peace where-after

talking to the different political parties and their leaders-they

all managed to protest against Marxism. That we do have in

common. The problem is, once we end this war, if we don't

know what is to become of us, there really can't be a unity

because they think that at a given moment the government will

want to take a different path. And it may not be that way. Then,

i think, the government, as well as the interested sectors should

try to promote a gathering where distinct representatives of the

national tasks are integrated in order to produce this

understanding.

I think that is the principal lesson we must learn: no

government in the future will be able to continue or go ahead, if

there is not a national consensus.

Toward the Future

THE EDITORS-Understanding the past and correctly

interpreting the lessons of the past are the keys to

improving the present-and, possibly, the future. In

these terms, the ongoing conflict in El Salvador and the

combined U.S.-Salvadoran counterinsurgency effort

have shown several important insights. The first, and

arguably the most important, is that the defeat of

military forces-the knights, mounted or dismountedis not the central objective of either side in the battle.

The strategic center of gravity in an insurgency is the

legitimacy of the regime in power. The primary

objective of the insurgents is to destroy that

legitimacy-this is the heart of the concept of a

"Prolonged People's War." The primary objective of the

Salvadoran government must then be to protect,

maintain, and enhance its legitimacy.

Once understanding of the key center of gravity is

accepted, there are numerous other insights which

impact current and future counterinsurgency efforts. As

examples:
STALEMATE AND THE NEED FOR STRATEGY 481

It is not necessary or even desirable to introduce

foreign troops into a "people's war."

A Third World military, faced with armed struggle

and dynamic social change, can be developed into an

effective, professional force.

External support to an embattled government must

be consistent in order to be most effective.

Sanctuaries and external aid to guerrillas are

strategically critical to their ability to wage an

insurgency and, therefore, must be neutralized.

Democratic institutions and human rights can be

established, even under wartime conditions.

An organization which can determine, coordinate,

and set the necessary political-military objectives for

the conflict is a required element in a winning strategy.

The spread of totalitarian communism is not

inevitable, but progress to institute alternative

democratic solutions is slow in this kind of war.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that it is men

and women who lead, plan, execute, and support any

given conflict. As a consequence, a major concern must

be individuals. Leadership and public opinion are

particularly important. They are of even greater

importance in "revolutionary" war. If appropriate

intelligence apparatus and psychological operations are

not being used to neutralize subversives and their

internal and external sanctuaries, logic and experience

show that the conflict will continue indefinitely in one

form or another. This is a major center of gravity that

requires greater consideration and the highest priority

in the present and the future.

In sum, the Salvadoran conflict is not

unidimensional-it is multifaceted. Each part has its

corresponding threat and center of gravity. The basic

problem is to constantly reevaluate the principal threat

and to properly order the priority of the others. The

secondary problem is to develop the capability to apply

long-term political, psychological, economic, and moral
482 1986 TO THE PRESENT

resources-not just military-to the effort. In this

context, the first definitive step in the process has got to

be a complete analysis of the situation and the various

aspects implicit in it. Instead qf debating ad hoc any

given crisis as it arises, senior leaders, their staffs, and

allies must consider the problem as a whole and

develop the vision necessary for total success.

These are some of the major lessons that have been

or are being learned in the Salvadoran case. But, what

are the strategic imperatives as they are understood

now?

I i
Part VI

Thoughts for

the Future
24E

The Same Valley or

the Next Valley

The United States Must Have a

High-Level Coordinating Mechanism

Ambassador Thomas Pickering-I would say, first, that in

the failure of the United States effectively to study, assess, write

histories about, and reach conclusions on these types of wars we

are condemned to refight and rediscover them.

Secondly, it's very important when we deal with this kind

of a conflict that we deal with it on a coordinated basis.

The next stage after being able to understand what

happened before is to have some distilled wisdom to build on as

a result of having taken a look at what has gone before. I would

say that U.S. Government organization dealing with these kinds

of problems needs a lot of work. We understand, intrinsically,

the need for an integrated approach, but we haven't yet

developed the facilities to keep all tracks running smoothly, to

keep them all running along together, and to find ways to bring

the necessary people together who need to cooperate. One of the

things that has always seemed to me to make the most sense

was to try to find a way to have an integrated backup

mechanism in Washington to support all facets of the effort.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador. 1983

to 1985, interviewed in Tel Aviv. Israel, 25 August 1987.

485

A
486 THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

The Embassy was a natural focus of attention and cooperation in

the field, and together with the arrangements that we worked

out with the unified command, it gave us an in-the-field

opportunity to focus our time and attention on the important

question. But there was always a problem of disjointed,

uncoordinated backup in Washington. There was no

bureaucratic mechanism put in place to handle that aspect of

what was going ahead. I think problems that are likely to be

more serious than El Salvador-El Salvador is serious enoughwill require some real thought about reorganization. I would

think that a multiagency coordinating mechanism, particularly

for dealing with major policy decisions-it doesn't need to be a

daily mechanism but at least a weekly mechanism for running

through an entire review of all the issues devoted particularly to

the country involved-having high enough level people to make

decisions (assistant secretary and higher) would be very

important in order successfully to prosecute this kind of an

effort. It would require coordination of resources, time, and

attention. In addition, you need a more coordinated intelligence

backup and support. The CAJIT was developed, and it

functioned quite well. We had real-time communications

problems, though, problems of routing through SOUTHCOM.

routing through the intelligence community, routing through

technical intelligence support facilities in the United States. On

the other hand, they did good work and kept us up to date on

what they saw happening in operational intelligence.

Democracy Can Be Supported

General Fred F. Woerner-Another primary lesson that can

be learned, and it is not exclusively to be learned in the

Salvadoran experience, is that democracy is a suitable form of

government in the Third World. We've been through many

eras. We went through, certainly, an era of what I would call

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander. U.S. 193d Infantry Brigade

(Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central America. 1982 to 1985.

interviewed at the Presidio of San Francisco. California. 7 November 1986.
THE SAME VALLEY OR THE NEXT VALLEY 487

ideological arrogance in which democracy in the U.S. format

was the only acceptable form of government.... We find out

that democracy in its multiplicity of styles can serve a

multiplicity of conditions for peoples at varying levels of

development. I think this is a very important lesson because it

offers to us the opportunity to work together towards greater

commonality of purpose. We do not find ourselves in a dilemma

of believing that we must support a dictatorship because the

people are not ready for democracy because it's too complex for

them, and thus in our fundamental opposition to the spread of

communism, we align ourselves with the ultra-Right. What

Guatemala, along with many others-Salvador, along with

many others-has demonstrated is that this is fallacious. There

is a democratic design which is appropriate and can serve the

interest of people at varying levels of political and economic

development. And, thus we can align ourselves to, on the high

ground, that appropriate ideal that is compatible with our own

political ideal for mankind in our opposition to the spread of

Marxism/communism.

A Must: Support for Central

American Democracies

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr-So, we have gone from a

period of supporting the Sandinistas to suspending support to

defining exactly just who the Sandinistas are-Marxist/

Leninists, and that Sandinista goals are inimical to our national

interests-to a debate over how to respond to the Sandinistas

that focused primarily on containment versus democratization,

and, now, we have now reached a point that saying

democratization is necessary. We still are trying to work out

within our own society how to bring about the attainment of our

4

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1985 to

date, interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, I June 1987 and 24

September 1987.

WI
488 THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

three foreign policy objectives toward Nicaragua: (a) breaking

the Soviet/Cuban connection, (b) preventing Nicaraguan

subversion of its neighbors, and (c) democratizing Nicaragua.

During the past six or seven years, the success of El

Salvador in reducing human rights abuses, consolidating

democracy, fighting the war, and coping with economic

problems has made possible support for our entire Central

American foreign policy. Similar developments in Honduras

and Guatemala likewise have enabled greater support for

policies against Nicaragua. We must continue to support the

four Central American democracies and democratize the other.

Nicaragua, in order to protect our strategic interests and

contribute to a free and democratic world.

The Indispensable Requirement

for Intelligence

General Wallace H. Nutting-Another lesson is the

indispensable requirement for intelligence. If you do not have a

system, an intelligence collection system, with an analytical

capability and distribution process that can feed first and policy

formulation process in a sensible way and then coordinate an

execution, then you can't get to first base. And there is, in my

view, an unreasonable tendency still for a lot of reasons to rely

on technical means, which are much less relevant in this form of

conflict. We don't do the human intelligence thing very well.

The capability that we did have, we dismantled 10 years ago or

more. What we put back together is too slow in coming and

inadequate for long periods of time. I think we in the

government have to acknowledge the indispensable need for

intelligence and put together a system that combines the best

capabilities of technical means and human sources and locate

the analytical capability where it can operate most efficiently

and go from there. We haven't done that very well.

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern

Command. 1979 to 1983. interviewed in Orlando, Florida. 29 January 1987.
THE SAME VALLEY OR THE NEXT VALLEY 489

A Broad Program for Training

U.S. Personnel Is Needed

Ambassador Deane Hinton-I had been in Central America

once before in the sixties as an aid director in Guatemala, where

I first met Fred Woerner. He was in the civic action program at

the time, the military side. That was in connection with the

Alliance for Progress, and I learned a valuable lesson. I think

about if we had stayed in Central America, if we had continued

with modest amounts of resources. (We go by spurts, we take

an interest, we get tired of it. And we back away and in a year

or so we're sorry.) It's been said many times, and this is a good

example of what happens. During the Carter administration

some intelligence agencies extensions were closed; we didn't

have any activity. Our enemies in the world were very active

and were working hard to put things together. We had made

some difference in the sixties and made some programs, but in

the seventies we lost interest in the politics, and as we lost

interest we were no longer as important players. We didn't put

any money in, in fact, ... so I think the main lesson is that it is

a very difficult area, close to the United States. It is going to be

important to the United States for generations. So one had better

be prepared to be helpful, supportive in the long terrm. We

would never have been in the mess we got into if v e'd had

wiser policies. We wouldn't even have had Sandinistas, in full

control in Nicaragua, providing outside support for a revolution

in El Salvador. It never should have happened. Lots of mistakes

we made did damage. We should try and avoid them in the

future.... That lack of national interest and commitment.

Closing down their (intelligence) stations in countries like

that-they are small banana republics-they don't matter. If it

saves them money at the time. And they assume it won't ever

happen again.

Ambassador Deane Hinton, U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador, 1982 to

1983. interviewed in Washington, D.C.. 10 September 1987.
490 THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

Another thing that I harp on all the time, and I haven't

pressed it anywhere here, is that the Salvadoran situation

requires a broad program to deal with the problems. You can't

just have a military program or say, "let's have elections," and

everything will be honky dory or say, "let's have agrarian

reform." It requires a meshing of all kinds of elements in

society. Basic elements of Salvadoran society are sick, and it

takes a long time to fix it, with sophisticated mutual supportive

programs.

Some Interests Must Be Sacrificed

President Josi Napole6n Duarte-I have established up until

now three major policies. The first is the policy of "sliding,"

the second is the policy of devaluation, and the third is the

policy of consolidation. Each policy responds to a reality. In a

process of economic erosion, each one means a political

erosion. But it was an historical need to take those decisions

even though those pragmatic decisions didn't respond to all the

desires in a way in which I would have liked. In other words. I

have had to sacrifice some values of ideological thinking in

order to provide the country an escape-a hope towards a better

future. I am paying the political price today for the benefit of

tomorrow. I have had to sacrifice in each of the fields,

especially in the political field. This peace process, which is not

easy, ... the Central American peace process, the Arias Plan,

has impacted how we can act in spite of the political risks we

are running. The risks we've run are transcended by decisionssuch as the amnesty, the cease-fire, permitting a group of

leaders linked to the FMLN to come into the country-but have

caused us a lot of political commotion. It would be easy just to

tell them no, but the principles in this case outweigh the risks. If

I told you that I've followed certain rationale or suggestions,

there are others which haven't been followed. And that also

implies confrontations with U.S. policy, when I have had to

say, "... this is the position, and I don't accept changes nor

Jose Napole6n Duarte. President Republic of El Salvador. 1984 to

present, interviewed in El Salvador. 20 November 1987.
THE SAME VALLEY OR THE NEXT VALLEY 491

influences nor pressures in order to achieve our objectives."

And that is valid for a series of concepts. As a matter of fact,

there is a chapter which is not told, and it is probably what

could be referred to as, "is Duarte's government a puppet of the

U.S.?" or "Is he not a puppet of the U.S.?" That chapter

would be truly revealing if I could tell you some things which

you would want me to tell.

The People Are the Equation

General John R. Galvin-The major lesson concerns the

triangle. If you draw yourself a triangle and put the guerrillas at

one corner, the government at the other corner, and the people

at the third corner, you have the equation. The government must

fight the guerrillas in such a way that it achieves the confidence

of the people because, after all, that is what the guerrillas are

really seeking. Both the guerrillas and the government are

fighting to gain the people. Every action that is taken must have

that triangle as its base. That is the most important lesson to be

learned. Now, to move to the military, the lesson is th.vt the

military must fight the war in such a way that it, the nlitary,

maintains the confidence of the people. That means it must be

correct ethically and morally and, of course, professionally. It's

not good enough just to be good guys. You have to know how

to fight, too. There needs to be a balance of these elements.

You have to be good, solid fighters, and you have to be able to

gain the confidence of the people.

General John R. Galvin, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern

Command, 1985 to 1987, interviewed in Mons, Belgium. 18 August 1987.
Witnesses to the Conflict

in El Salvador

Oral History: The Interviews

THE MAJORITY OF THE CONTENTS

of this book is selected from interviews as listed below. The

interviews are recorded and now part of the collection at the

Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

General Adolfo Onecifero Blandon, Chief of Staff of the

Salvadoran Armed Forces, 1984 to date. He was interviewed in

San Salvador, El Salvador, 21 July 1987 and 26 September

1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

General Juan Bustillo, Chief of the Salvadoran Air Force,

1979 to date. He was interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador,

21 January 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

C-5 Spokesperson, no dates, interviewed in San Salvador,

El Salvador, 28 September 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Oscar Rodolfo Campos Anaya, former Fifth

Brigade Commander and now First Brigade Commander. He

was interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 21 July 1987, by

Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Oscar Edgardo Casanova-Vejar, former Second

Brigade Commander and now Director of the Military

Academy. He was interviewed in Santa Ana and San Salvador,

El Salvador, 23 January 1987 and 23 July 1987, respectively.

Both interviews were done by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel John Cash, U.S. Defense Attachd in El Salvador,

1981 to 1983. He was interviewed in Washington, D.C., 20

March 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

493
494 WITNESSES TO THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR

Miguel Castellanos, former insurgent Comandante,

1973-1985, He was interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador,

25 September 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Ambassador Edwin G. Corr, U.S. Ambassador to El

Salvador, 1985 to date. He was interviewed in San Salvador, El

Salvador, 1 June 1987 and 24 September 1987. Both interviews

were done by Max G. Manwaring.

JosO Napole6n Duarte, President of the Republic of El

Salvador, 1984 to date. He was interviewed in San Salvador, El

Salvador, 20 November 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Lyman C. Duryea, U.S. Defense Attach6 in El

Salvador, 1983-1985. He was interviewed in Carlisle Barracks,

Pennsylvania, 4 March 1986, by Lieutenant Colonel Emil R.

Bedard, U.S. Marines, and Lieutenant Colonel L.R. Vasquez,

U.S. Army.

Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi, Director, Office of Policy, Planning

and Coordination, Bureau of Interamerican Affairs, U.S.

Department of State, 1977 to date. He was interviewed in

Washington, D.C., 10 September 1987, by Max G.

Manwaring.

Colonel John C. Ellerson, U.S. Military Group

Commander in El Salvador, 1986 to date. He was interviewed

in San Salvador, El Salvador, 27 and 28 September 1987, by

Max G. Manwaring.

General John R. Galvin, Commander-in-Chief, U.S.

Southern Command, 1985 to 1987. He was interviewed in

Mons, Belgium, 18 August 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

General Josi Guillermo Garcia, Salvadoran Minister of

Defense, 1979 to 1984. He was interviewed in San Salvador, El

Salvador, 2 July 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

General Jaime Abdul Gutiirrez, member of the civilmilitary junta which took control of the Salvadoran government

after deposing General Carlos Humberto Romero on 15 October

1979. He was interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 18

December 1986, by Max G. Manwaring.

i
WITNESSES TO THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR 495

Colonel Leopoldo Antonio Herndndez, former First

Brigade Commander and now Vice-Chief of Staff of the

Salvadoran Armed Forces. He was interviewed in San Salvador,

El Salvador, 23 January 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Robert M. Herrick, Director, U.S. Southern

Command's Small Wars Operations Research (SWORD)

Directorate, 1986 to 1987 and Chief U.S. Investigating Officer

at El Paraiso, 1987. He was interviewed in Washington, D.C..

26 October 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Ambassador Deane Hinton. U.S. Ambassador to El

Salvador, 1982 to 1983. He was interviewed in Washington,

D.C.. 10 September 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Dr. Alvaro Magafia, Provisional President of the Republic

of El Salvador, 1982 to 1984. He was interviewed in San

Salvador. El Salvador, 18 December 1986, 30 June 1987, and

21 November 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Carlos Reynaldo L6pez Nuila, Salvadoran ViceMinister of Public Security, 1984 to date. He was interviewed

in San Salvador, El Salvador, 17 December 1986, 29 June

1987. and 23 September 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

General Wallace H. Nutting, Commander-in-Chief. U.S.

Southern Command, 1979 to 1983. He was interviewed in

Orlando. Florida, 29 January 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa Pirez, Fourth Brigade

Commander, 1982 to 1985. He was interviewed in San

Salvador, El Salvador, 14 October 1987, by Max G.

Manwaring.

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to El

Salvador, 1983 to 1985. He was interviewed in Tel Aviv.

Israel. 25 August 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Reni Emilio Ponce, former C-3 of the Salvadoran

Armed Forces and now Commander of the Third Brigade. He

was interviewed in San Salvador, El Salvador, 22 January 1987.

by Max G. Manwaring.
496 WITNESSES TO THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR

Colonel James J. Steele, U.S. Military Group Commander

in El Salvador, 1984 to 1986. He was interviewed in San

Salvador, El Salvador, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 October 1986; and,

in Monterey, California, 5 November 1986. All the interviews

were conducted by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Charles B. Stone IV, member of the team which

wrote the "Woerner Report," 1982. He was interviewed in

Panama City, R.P., 4 December 1986, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Joseph S. Stringham III, U.S. Military Group

Commander in El Salvador, 1983 to 1984. He was interviewed

in Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 29 May 1985, by Colonel

Charles A. Carlton, Jr., U.S. Army.

Major General James R. Taylor, Commander, U.S. 193d

Infantry Brigade (Panama), 1986 to 1987. He was interviewed

at Fort Amador, R.P., 14 December 1986, by Max G.

Manwaring.

Dr. Guillermo M. Ungo, President of FDR (Revolutionary

Democratic Front), 1981 to date. He was interviewed in Panama

City, R.P., 11 December 1987, by Max G. Manwaring.

General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, Salvadoran

Minister of Defense, 1984 to date. He was interviewed in San

Salvador, El Salvador, 19 December 1987, by Max G.

Manwaring.

Colonel John D. Waghelstein, U.S. Military Group

Commander in El Salvador, 1982 to 1983. He was interviewed

in Washington, D.C., 23 February 1987, by Max G.

Manwaring.

General Fred F. Woerner, Commander, U.S. 193d

Infantry Brigade (Panama) and Deputy USCINCSO for Central

America, 1982 to 1985. He was interviewed in San Francisco,

California, 7 November 1986, by Max G. Manwaring.

Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda H., C-2 of the Salvadoran

Armed Forces, 1985 to 1987. He was interviewed in San

Salvador, El Salvador, 22 January 1987, by Max G.

Manwaring.
WITNESSES TO THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR 497

Other Sources

THE FOLLOWING LIST OF BOOKS,

interviews, articles, and documents includes those items which

we found useful in writing this book. Where an interview or

other work has been republished, we provide the later publisher

and date.

Ferman Cienfuegos, "The Salvadoran Struggle: An

International Conflict." In Revolution and Intervention in

Central America, pp. 56-62. Edited by Marlene Dixon and

Susanne Jonas. San Francisco, CA: Synthesis Publications,

1983.

"Concerning Our Military Plans: The Military Strategy of

the FMLN," (document captured and transcribed by the

Atlacatl Battalion, near Perquin, El Salvador, date unknown,

probably late 1983). In The Comandantes Speak: The Military

Strategy of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, pp.

2-7, 19-22. Translated and edited by Gabriel and Judith F.

Marcella. Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S.

Army War College, March 1987.

"Concerning Propaganda: Our Line of Propaganda,"

(document presented by the Popular Revolutionary Army at the

meeting of the Command of the Ferabundo Martf National

Liberation Front, July 1984). In The Comandantes Speak: The

Military Strategy of the Fraabundo Marti National Liberation

Front, pp. 3-8. Translated and edited by Gabriel and Judith F.

Marcella. Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S.

Army War College, March 1987.

Josd Napole6n Duarte, Duarte: My Story. New York: G.P.

Putnam's Sons, 1986.

Josd Z. Garcfa, "El Salvador: Legitimizing the

Government." Current History 84, no. 500 (March 1985): 101-

104, 135-36.

Adolfo Gilly, "An Interview with Salvador Cayetano

Carpio ("Marcial"). In Revolution and Intervention in Central

America, pp. 47-56. Edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne

Jonas. San Francisco, CA: Synthesis Publications, 1983.

I

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498 WITNESSES TO THE CONFLICT IN EL SALVADOR

Marta Harnecker, "From Insurrection to War: An

Interview with Joaquin Villalobos." In Revolution and

Intervention in Central America, pp. 69-105. Edited by Marlene

Dixon and Susanne Jonas. San Francisco, CA: Synthesis

Publications, 1983.

Rafael Menjfvar, "The First Phase of the General

Offensive." In Revolution and Intervention in Central America,

pp. 63-69. Edited by Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas. San

Francisco, CA: Synthesis Publications, 1983.

Javier Rojas U., ed., Conversaciones con el Comandante

Miguel Castellanos. Santiago, Chile: Editorial Andante, 1986.

"The Role of Unity in the Revolutionary War: An

Interview with Juan Chac6n." In Revolution and Intervention in

Central America, pp. 40-46. Edited by Marlene Dixon and

Susanne Jonas. San Francisco, CA: Synthesis Publications,

1983.

Statement by the U.S. Official Observer Delegation to the

Elections in El Salvador, March 28, 1982. In Inter-American

Economic Affairs 36, no. I (Summer 1982): 61-62.

Guillermo M. Ungo, "The People's Struggle." Foreign

Policy 52 (Fall 1983): 51-63.
The Editors

Max G. Manwaring has been professionally involved in

Latin America since 1964. At that time, he was a FulbrightNDEA Fellow in Brazil, and he subsequently wrote his Ph.D.

dissertation at the University of Illinois on the military in

Brazilian politics. During the years since then, Dr. Manwaring

has studied, taught, written, and been involved in Latin

American political-military subject matter.

His interest in El Salvador dates from his service in the

Political-Military Directorate of the United States Southern

Command (J-5, USSOUTHCOM) from 1980 to 1982, and as

Chief of the Central America Section in the Research

Directorate of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1982 to

1984. It was during these periods that the insurgency in El

Salvador reached its greatest momentum and provided the

greatest challenge to United States' interests in Central America

and to the concept of democracy.

After leaving DIA, Dr. Manwaring served as the Latin

American regional security affairs analyst at the Strategic

Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, then returned

to Panama as the Deputy Director of the Southern Command's

Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD). He is

currently a senior analyst with Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc.

This book was written while both Max Manwaring and

Court Prisk were working in support of the SOUTHCOM

Commander-in-Chief's desire to revitalize strategic thinking as

it pertains to "small wars."

Court Prisk, a 1959 U.S. Military Academy graduate, with

master's degrees in Public Administration (Organizational

Behavior) and Business Administration (Finance), has been

involved in the strategic analysis of international and regional

499

4

1.a K
500 THE EDITORS

affairs since 1971. At that time, as a faculty member of the

Strategic Studies Committee, U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, Colonel Prisk was responsible for

developing major courses of instruction in ExecutiveCongressional Relations, Ideology, and Analysis of U.S.

Interests.

It was during this three-year assignment that he first

teamed with Max Manwaring to develop an interactive

international affairs board game entitled, Regional Advantage

Military-Political Affairs (RAMP).

After graduation from the Air War College in 1979,

Colonel Prisk served as the executive officer for the JCS

Representative to the SALT II negotiations, as an action officer

in the Strategic Negotiations Division, OJCS-J5, and as the

Chief, Middle East/Africa Regional Plans Branch, Political/

Military Affairs Division, OJCS-J5.

Colonel Prisk retired from the U.S. Army in December

1983. For the past two years he has served in Panama as a

Strategic Analyst for Booz, Allen & Hamilton in support of

USSOUTHCOM's Small Wars Operations Research Directorate

and most recently as a senior associate for Booz, Allen &

Hamilton in support of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

His interest in El Salvador combines a strong sense of the

fundamentally ideological nature of international affairs, a

desire to not see the United States commit the same strategic

errors he witnessed while in Vietnam in 1966-67 and 1969-70,

and the pressing need to develop an understanding of the current

and impending problems in Latin America

4

I

I
El SALVADOR AT WAR

An Oral History of Conflict from

the 1979 Insurrection to the Present

Composed in Times Roman and Optima, I I on 13 points, with 24 point bold italic

chapter headings; cover display in Benguiat, 48 and 14 point bold. Cover: Laszlo

Bodrogi. Maps: courtesy of the Defense Mapping Agency and Inter-American Geodetic

Survey. Panama, as annotated by Allison E. Letzer. Insurgent Organizations Chart:

Allison E. Letzer.

Advisorv Readers: Georges Fauriol, Center for Strategic and International Studies

(CSIS); Steve Ching, Captain, U.S. Navy Reserve: and John C. Bordeaux, Colonel,

U.S. Air Force. Editor and Book Designer: Janis Bren Hietala. Editorial Assistant: Lora

J. Conk.
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

Lieutenant General Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF

Presidenit

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Dr. John E. Endicott

Di rector

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Dr. Frederick Kiley, Director

Colonel John C. Bordeaux, UJSAF Dr. Joseph E. Goldberg

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Taibi, USAF

LRtputu Di Fectc'r

George C. Maerz, S,'nr Lcjt'r

Dr. Dora Alves. Writer-Editor Donald Schmoldt, Writer-Editor

Thomas Gill, Writer-Edittr Edward H. Seneff 11, kWritc'r-Editc'r

Janis Bren Hietala, Writer-Editior

L. 1. Conk, Prc'di~oiopi _Superzisor

Pat Williams, Lead Editorial Clerk Dorothy M. Mack, Editorial Clerk

Laura W. Hall, Liec itire Sncretau Miles Brewster, Office Manager