C o urt of A p p eal s R ul e 1 0 (b): 1 T h e Cou r t , w i t h t h e co n c u r r e n c e of al l j u dg e s pa r t i c i pa t i n g i n t h e c a s e , ma y a f f i r m, revers e o r mo d ify the a ct i o ns o f t he t ri al co urt by me m o randum op i ni o n when a for mal opi n i on w ou l d h av e n o pr ec ede n t i al v al u e. W h en a c as e i s d eci d ed by
m e m o ra n d u m o p inio n it sh a ll b e d e sig n a te d “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N ,” sh a ll
no t be pub l i shed, and s hal l not b e ci t ed or rel i ed on f o r any reas o n i n a s ub sequent
u n re la te d c a se
. 

### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary6, 200 4
DEN NIS L EE BE EDL E v. S TEP HAN IE J. B EED LE Ap pe a l f ro m th e Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s Co urt f or Whit e Cou nty No

. C V5 4 3 6 S am m i e E

. Be n n i n gfi el d , J r. , J u d ge

No. M2003-00755-COA- R3-CV - F iled Janu ary 27, 2004

I n th is d ivo rc e app e a l th e Hu sb a ndc ha lle ng e s th e dis tribu tio n of the on ly sig nif ic a nt mari ta l a sse t, the Husband’ s retire ment benef it. The trial court divi ded that benef it by ordering the Husband to pay $5 30 .8 2 o f e a c h mo nth ly

pay me nt t o th e Wif

e . We a ff irm. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e G eneral Sessions Court Aff irm ed and Rem anded
W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., MS., and P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., joined.
J . Hilton Conger , Smit hville, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Dennis L ee B eedle

. Shawn McB rien, L ebanon, T ennesse e, for the appe llee, Stephanie J. Bee dle.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1
This divorce a

ppeal c oncerns the division of the only signific ant marital prop er t y , the husband’s retirement benefit. Husband Dennis Be edle worked for GM for 31 y ear s. He wor ked for sevente en of those y ear s during the marriag e. At the time the pa rties wer e divorc ed by

decr ee of the Whit e Cou nty

Ge ne ra l Se ssi on s Co urt, Mr . Be e dle ha d re c e ive d fiv e y e ars of his re tir e me nt b e ne fi t. The trial c ourt chose not to asse ss the Wife’s share of the re tirement by its “prese nt day

value” using the mortality

tables. I nstead, the court simply determined that sevente en y ear s was 54% of thirty -one y ear s, divided th e fu l l monthlypension bene fit of $1966.00 by 54%, then divided the r esulting-2-

$1061.64 by

two and orde red the husband t o pay $530.82 out of hi s $1966.00 net monthly retire ment rec eipts to the Wi fe f

or the re mainder of

the bene fit period.
The Husband does not and c annot dispute the trial court’s classification of the vested retire ment benef

it as marital prope rty

. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36- 4-121(b)

. T h e o nly issue the Hu sb a ndtake s w iththede c isi on is w he the r th e tr ial c ou rt e rre d inor de ri ng thepe ri od ic mon thl y payment to be distributed to the Wife rathe r than determining the prese nt c ash value. Husband urg es o n ap p e a l t h a t t h e p r e s e n t c a s h v a l u e a w ar d c o u l d b e d i s tr i b u t e d p u r s u a n t t o a q u a l if ie d d ome sti c relations order. The starting point to any appellate revie w of the tria l c ourt’s choice s of valuation and distribution of marital prope rty is the rec og nition t h at s u ch d ecisions rest within t hat court’s sound discretion. See Cohe n v. Cohen , 937 S.W .2d 823, 831 (Tenn.1996) ; Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4- 12 1( a )( 2) ; see also Kendrick v. Kendrick , 902 S.W .2d 918, 929 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990). Contrary to A p p el l an t’s arg ument, none of the authorities cited by the Husband “ require ” either the “pre sent value” or “retained jurisdiction” method of distribution of marital property . Our Supreme Court’s discussion i n Cohen re late s o nly to t wo op tio ns c ou rt s h a veus e d a s a pp ro priate under the equities of ea ch ca se:
Most courts use one of two te chniques. In re Ma rri ag e of B ro wn , 126 Cal.Rptr. at 63 8, 54 4 P.2d a t 56 6; In re Ma rri ag e of Gall o , 75 2 P.2 d a t 54 ; Janssen v . Janssen , 331 N. W

. 2 d at 755. The f irst approa ch, known a s the prese nt cash va lue method, re qu ir e s th e tria l c ou rt

to pla c e a pr e se nt va lueon there tir e me nt b e ne fi t a s o f the date of the fina l decr ee. Kendrick v. K en drick , 902 S.W .2d at 927. To dete rmine the pr e se nt c a s h v a l u e , t h e a n t i c i p a t e d n u mb e r o f m o n t h s t h e e m p l o y e e s p o u s e wi ll collect the be nefits (ba sed on l ife ex pectancy ) i s multipl ied by the cur rent re tirement benef it pay able unde r the plan. In re Ma rri ag e of Gall o , 7 52 P.2 d at 54 . T his g ro ss benef it figur e is then discounted to pre sent v al u e allowing for va rious fac tors such as mortality , interest, inflation, and any applicable taxes. Id. See also In re Marriage of Grubb , 745 P.2 d at 66 6; In re Marriage of Hunt , 78 I ll.App.3d 653, 34 I ll.Dec. 55, 6 3 , 3 9 7 N

. E

. 2 d 5 1 1 , 5 1 9 (1 97 9) ; De er i n g v. De ering , 437 A.2d at 891. Onc e the prese nt cash va lue is calc ulated, the c ourt may awa rd the re tirement benef

its to the e mpl oy e e -s po us e a ndof

fs e t t hat aw ardby

dis tribu tin g to the oth e r s po us e so me portion of the marital estate that is equivale nt to the spouse’s shareof the re tirement interest. In re Ma rri ag e of Gall o , 752 P.2 d at 54. Th e pr e se nt ca sh va lueme tho d is pr e fe ra ble if the e mpl oy e e -s po us e ’s re tir e me nt be ne fi ts can b e a c c ur a te ly va lue d, if retire ment is l i k ely

to occur in the near

future, and if the marital e state includes sufficie nt a ssets to of

fset the awa

rd. Kendrick v . Kendrick , 9 02 S.W. 2da t 92 7; In re Ma rri ag e of Gall o , 752 P.2d at 54.
Cohen , 937 S.W .2d at 831.
The “ reta ined jurisdiction” method of distribution is precisely the method chosen by

the trial judgein this case. Under such method “the marital property interest is often e x presse d as a f rac tion-3-

or a pe rce ntag e of the em p l oy ee spouse s’ monthly benef it. The perc entag e may

be derived by dividing the number

of months of the marria g e during which the be nefits ac crue d by the total number of months during which the r etireme nt benef its accumulate .” Cohen , 937 S.W .2d 823, 831 (Tenn.1996)

. As furthe r g uidance , the court in Cohen pr ov ide d th e fo llo wi ng dis c us sio n:
The choice of va luation method remains within the sound discre tion of the tria l cou rt to de te rm ine a ft e r co ns ide ratio n of al l re le va nt f a c tor s a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s. Whil e the pa

rties ar e entitled to an equitable division of their marital prope rty , that division need not be mathematica lly prec ise. Kendrick v . Kendrick , 902 S.W .2d at 92 9; Thompson v. Thompson , 797 S.W .2d 599, 604 (Tenn.A pp.1990).
Cohen , 937 S.W .2d at 831-32.
Wit h reg ard to the G M pension at issue, the trial court enter ed the following specific fac tual fi n d i n g:
The Court fu rt her f inds that based upon the statutory law, ca se law and marital assets, that the Court must divide the GM pension. The H usband worke d 31 y e ars a t Ge ne ra l Mo tor s, 14 y e ars prior to thi s marria g e a nd 17 y e ars du ri ng thi s marria g e. The Hus b an d h as been r etired f or 5 y ear s and re ceive s $1,966.00 net pension bene fits per month. The Court finds that 54% of t h e Husba nd’s pension acc rued during the marria g e is marital prope rt y
. The Court further finds that the Wife is entitled to 1⁄2 of the acc rued be nefits in the a m o u n t o f $ 5 3 0.82 per month. Wif e sh a ll r e c e ive$5 30 .8 2 p e r m on th f ro m H us ba ndon Au g us t 1, 20 02 a ndthe1s t of ea ch month until the QUADRO is in effec t. The Wife shall remain as the Survivor o f B e n e f i t s u n d e r t h e H u s b a n d ’ s p e n s i o n p e r m a n e n t l y.
Husband ha s prese nted no Transcript of the Evide nce nor has he pr esent ed a Rule 24c Statement of the Evidence

. The Husband urg es that the trial court somehow err ed by not apply ing the “p rese nt-day ” valuation and distributing the marital estate ove r time. I n the fa ce of overw helmin g s t atutory

authority

vesting trial courts with broa d discretion in valuation and distribution of the marital estate based on the equiti es of eac h case , and in the absence of a re cord showing an abuse of that discretion, this Court is c onstrained to a ffirm the judgme nt of the trial court in a ll r e sp e c ts.
As a re sult of the clea

r authority contra

ry to the Husband’s arg ument on appea l and the lac k of any showing of an abuse of the trial court’s discretion, this Court finds the a ppeal to be f

rivolous within th e meaning of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 27-1-122. See B ursack v . W ilson , 982 S.W. 2d34 1, 34 5 (T e nn .Ct .A pp .1 99 8)

. Th e or de r of the tria l c ou rt is a ff irme d in a ll r e sp e c ts. Al l costs are assessed to A p p el l an t . This cause is remande d to the trial court f or the a ssessment of a t t o r n e y’ s f

e e s a n d s u c h o t h e r

p r o c e e d i n g s a s m a y b e n e c e s s ar y.-4- ___________________________________ WI LL I AM B. CAIN, J UDGE