IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

PINE RIVER LANE TRUST, A NEVADA 

TRUST, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

HSBC BANK USA N.A., AS TRUSTEE ON 

BEHALF OF ACE SECURITIES CORP. 

HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 2007-HE1 

ASSET BACKED PASS-THROUGH 

CERTIFICATES, A NATIONAL 

ASSOCIATION, 

Respondent. 

No. 83703 

FILED 

oui 11 2012 

ELWABETH DRO,NN 

F SU 

DEPU lERX 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a district court order granting a motion 

to dismiss in an action to quiet title. Eighth Judicial District Court, Gloria 

Sturman, Judge. Reviewing the order de novo, Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. 

Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008), we affirm.' 

In dismissing appellant's complaint, the district court assumed 

that a February 2010 Notice of Default was sufficient to trigger NRS 

106.240's 10-year limitations period but concluded that an October 2010 

Notice of Rescission effectively reset that period. After this appeal was 

docketed, this court decided SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted. 

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N.A., 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d 194 (2022), which, as appellant 

acknowledges, is consistent with the district court's reasoning.2

Nonetheless, appellant contends that it should have been 

allowed to conduct discovery into whether respondent's predecessors 

accelerated the loan either before or after the October 2010 Notice of 

Rescission. We are not persuaded that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying appellant's request. See Aviation Ventures, Inc. v. 

Joan Morris, Inc., 121 Nev. 113, 118, 110 P.3d 59, 62 (2005) (reviewing a 

district court's refusal to allow discovery for an abuse of discretion). 

Contrary to appellant's interpretation SFR, we held that a Notice of 

Rescission was effective to reset any acceleration that may have occurred 

before the Notice of Default. See SFR, 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d at 

197 ("Thus, we reject SFR's argument that some prior unidentified 

acceleration remained intact after the bank rescinded the notice of 

default."). And to the extent that appellant articulated its desire to conduct 

discovery into whether there was an acceleration after the Notice of 

Rescission that would have also implicated NRS 106.240's 10-year time 

frame, the district court was well within its discretion to deny that request. 

See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) ("District 

courts need not condone the use of discovery to engage in fishing 

2In SFR, the deed of trust beneficiary made a superpriority tender, 

such that the deed of trust remained as an encumbrance following the 

HOA's foreclosure sale. 138 Nev., Adv. Op. 22, 507 P.3d at 196. In this case, 

the record is unclear why the HOA's foreclosure sale did not extinguish the 

deed of trust. 

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Op I947A ,,"5;0•:,: • 

2 
Parraguirre 

Herndon 

j. 

Gi 

Sr.J. 

expeditions." (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 

Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.3

cc: Hon. Gloria Sturman, District Judge 

Persi J. Mishel, Settlement Judge 

Roger P. Croteau & Associates, Ltd. 

Houser LLP 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

3The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Senior Justice, participated in the 

decision of this matter under a general order of assignment. 

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