Issue 3 

Chemical Warfare Decontamination of 

Eurofighter Materials

A Case Study of the SX34 System

Russian Assessment of 

HEMP Tests

Spartans Make 

Their Home in 

Texas Army Role in 

U.S. Nuclear Capability

Tactical Nuclear Weapons 

in the Cold War Era...

A Blast from the Past

 Detection Systems for Biological Agents, 

Present and Future

A History of Chemical 

Warfare Part 1

3rd Annual Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference

NSERC’s Participation in the Proliferation of Weapons and 

Materials Round Table at the 59th Student Conference on 

U.S. Affairs (SCUSA)
Combating WMD

4 Detection Systems for Biological Warfare 

Agents, Present and Future

 By LTC Mitchell L. Wise and

Jon J. Calomiris, Ph.D.

14 Undergraduate Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy, A Report on the Proliferation of 

Weapons and Materials Round Table at the 

59th Annual Student Conference on United 

States Affairs (SCUSA)

By LTC Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D.,

Ms. Lesley Young, J.D. and

2LT Zachary W. Furst

19 Spartans Make Their Home in Texas

By Cathy Kroop

Inside the Journal History

39 Army Role in the U.S. Nuclear Capability

By LTC James Demyanovich

43 Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War 

Era... A Blast from the Past

By CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

56 Chemical Warfare: Part I

By A. Mark Diglio

Science and Technology

23 Chemical Warfare Decontamination of 

Eurofighter Materials—A Case Study of 

the SX34 System 

By Renato Bonora, Ph.D.

33 A Russian Assessment of Several USSR 

and US HEMP Tests

By Robert Pfeffer and

D. Lynn Shaeffer, Ph.D.

23

14

38
From The Director

1 CWMD Integration

By Mr. Peter Bechtel 

 

3 3rd Annual Combating 

Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Conference

By COL Robert Kolterman 

and

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

 

Do You Know...

21 One Carbon 

Nanotube Molecule Does 

An Operable Radio Make?

By Mr. Robert Pfeffer 

61 Combating 

WMD Resources 

COLUMNS

Combating WMD 

Resource Page 

Published by the 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA)

Director

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Managing Editor

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Editorial Board

 Mr. Mark W. Fishback, Mr. Joseph Nellis, 

and MAJ Joseph Beckman

Design/Layout

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United 

States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are 

those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal’s content does not necessarily reflect the US Army’s position 

and does not supersede information in other official Army publications.

Distribution: US Army organizations and activities with CBRN-related missions, 

to include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear 

surety programs, to each FA52 officer, and to Army attachés. The Secretary of 

the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the 

transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of 

funds for printing this publication have been approved by HQ, TRADOC, 12 Nov 

98, IAW Army Regulation 25-30. 

Article Submission: We welcome articles from all US Government agencies and 

academia involved with CBRN matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Submit articles in Microsoft Word and include photographs, graphs, tables, etc. as 

separate files, please call or email us for complete details. The editor retains the 

right to edit and select which submissions to print.

Mailing Address: Director, US Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency ATTN: MONACWO, Suite 101, Springfield, VA 22150-3198.

Telephone: 703-806-7858, DSN 656-7858, fax 703-806-7900

Electronic Mail: dcsg3usanca2@conus.army.mil 

Subject line: ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal 

 Observant? Find the cloud, it’s been hiding in plain sight!

4

62 USANCA’s New Facility

By CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

63 USANCA Organization Chart

USANCA Update
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

S 

FROM THE DIRECTOR

CWMD Integration

Mr. Peter Bechtel, Director 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

1

ince the publication of the National Military 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD), much has been done to develop, 

coordinate, operationalize, and institutionalize functions and capabilities to achieve the CWMD strategy. 

Through integration efforts, including key activities in 

planning, doctrine, and survivability, we are beginning to see the realization of our efforts.

 Participation in the development of a joint doctrine 

for CWMD will result in the necessary foundation 

from which continued integration and development of 

CWMD capabilities may occur. The Joint Publication 

for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (JP 3-

40, revision first draft, 23 April 2008), was recently 

staffed for Joint Planning and Execution Community 

(JPEC) review. Organized around tenets of joint operations, this revision offers a translation of CWMD 

guidance toward operational consideration across 

the full range of military operations (e.g., emphasizing Phase 0 operations, full spectrum operations 

[FSO], and the imperative of interagency coordination). The comprehensive review of this keystone 

document demonstrates both the evolutionary nature 

of the CWMD enterprise and the high degree of joint 

group of people engagement.

 The Army continues to better integrate CWMD 

strategy and policy supporting its role in national security. U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT) 

was the first to operationalize DOD strategy to 

CWMD. In July 2008, the U.S. 3rd Army/USARCENT 

completed its operational plan to CWMD. Key to 

success was iterative and persistent planning between USARCENT, various agencies (e.g. Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency [DTRA], Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA], and the Defense Logistics 

Agency [DLA]), the Army Staff, and USANCA. The 

approval of USARCENT’s CWMD plan will provide 

the necessary guidance for the Army to prepare, plan 

and execute CWMD activities in the U.S. Central 

Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. 

Additionally, lessons learned, especially those in the 

form of requirements, are paramount in determining 

and solving Army capability needs.

 U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and 

U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are 

leading and are heavily engaged in global aspects of 

combating weapons of mass destruction and identifying complementary efforts from the respective Command’s operational focus. Aggressive planning synchronization efforts have a unifying effect that is tied 

to a commitment to strong, interagency outreach 

across the U.S. Government. CWMD/CBRN personnel assigned to supporting Army Commands, Components, and staffs play a crucial role in coordinating 

across the CWMD community to ensure awareness 

of and attention to identified Army requirements and 

desired capability development.

Mr. Peter Bechtel 

Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 22

 Continued integration of CWMD strategy is crucial to better enable Army forces to operate effectively and to prevent the alienation of the field in the 

all-to-often seen stovepipe. Secretary Geren and 

General Casey in the 2008 Army Posture Statement 

articulated aspects of the environment in which our 

Army will engage - ―As we look to the future, we believe the coming decades are likely to be ones of 

persistent conflict—protracted confrontation among 

state, non-state, and individual actors who use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends.‖ 

An integrated strategy, and not one that stands 

alone, will best serve our nation.

 As we rely to an even greater degree upon electronic systems and communications, we can be sure 

our adversaries are working on ways to attack those 

capabilities. Potential vulnerabilities are not limited 

to a high altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) 

event. A future enemy could use directed energy or 

radiating devices in an asymmetric attack, which 

could affect our networked force in ways we have not 

anticipated. The Army now includes electromagnetic 

effects as an emerging technology of concern, to be 

evaluated during the Unified Quest 2009 exercise 

next spring. The event promises to increase awareness of EM threats; it could also identify critical 

nodes for further analysis. USANCA is coordinating 

technical input to provide realism in the exercise scenarios.

 The Army must continue efforts to ensure the integration of Army-related CBRN materiel survivability 

capabilities throughout the Defense Acquisition, 

Technology, & Logistics Life Cycle Management 

Framework. A key aspect is review of Army and 

DOD weapon system programs' capability documents to ensure compliance with Army and DOD 

survivability standards. In particular, the Future 

Combat System must include the tools needed to 

field a future Army that is poised to deal with the 

growing threat of WMD on the battlefield. Paramount 

to these activities is effective Army implementation of 

the new DOD Instruction (DODI) 3150.09, The 

CBRN Survivability Policy. This is both a challenge 

and an opportunity. It is a challenge because the instruction mandates significant reporting requirements 

and sets standards that will take time and money to 

meet. It is an opportunity because the DODI will focus attention on CBRN survivability and help set a 

common standard for the Joint Force. 

 In cooperation with our Allies, the Army continues 

efforts on two products aimed at improving the U.S. 

ability to influence and shape the way NATO approaches CWMD and CBRN defense. The first is a 

Program of Action and Milestones (POAM) that is 

guiding USANCA-led U.S. delegations to the NATO 

Joint Capability Group on CBRN (JCGCBRN) defense and the NATO CBRN Operations Working 

Group (CBRNWG). The JCGCBRN & CBRNWG 

POAM establishes program objectives based upon 

both U.S. and NATO strategic guidance and objectives for CWMD. This program management tool fosters attainment of delegation objectives (shaping and 

improvement) and fulfillment of U.S. obligations to 

the JCGCBRN and CBRNWG. The recently published US-NATO CBRN Delegate Handbook complements the POAM by providing delegates a tool kit of 

essential information and tips needed to participate 

effectively as a member of the U.S. team to the 

JCGCBRN and CBRNWG.

 Additional benefit emerges as we synchronize the 

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and 

CWMD strategies and activities. Numerous Allied 

and Partner nation combined exercises, training, and 

capacity developing efforts result in increase the 

depth and scope of capability. This effort begins 

within each respective staff by CWMD/CBRN personnel coordination with DSCA personnel. Situational awareness and staff heads-up actions truly 

result in optimizing activities and preserving resources. Building partner capacity in consequence 

management operations and preventing proliferation 

through interdiction operations are two examples of 

the convergence of CWMD and security cooperation 

strategies and operations.

 Integration of CWMD will continue to advance as 

we develop, coordinate, operationalize, and institutionalize functions and capabilities to achieve the national, DOD, and Army strategies. And just as important, integration relies upon continued coordination 

horizontally within staffs and vertically from the strategic to operational domains. Through integration 

efforts, including key activities in planning, doctrine, 

and survivability, we will continue to increase the effectiveness of our force and better the protection of 

our personnel.
3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

U 

3rd Annual Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference

COL Robert F. Kolterman

Chief, CWMD Training and Operations, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes 

Joint Nuclear Targeting Officer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

SANCA conducted the 3rd

Annual Army Combating 

WMD Conference on 9 and 

10 September 2008 in Arlington, VA.

 The focus of this year’s conference was the integration and synchronization of Army CWMD efforts 

with regard to policy, and strategy to 

include activities with security cooperation, contingency planning, and 

informing the capabilities requirements to solutions‖ process. 

 Mr. Michael Evenson, Associate 

Director Operations Enterprise of the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) provided the keynote address 

informing about the directions and 

scope of numerous DTRA efforts, 

military integration of U.S. Government activities, Counter Threat Reduction (CTR), Counterproliferation 

(CP) Weapons of Mass Destruction 

(WMD) Planning, and Global CTR 

concepts.

 Representatives from Army Commands (ACOMs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), and 

invited Services Staffs identified actions to increase integration of 

CWMD strategy and optimize effects 

for geographic implementation of activities to CWMD and invited members of the Army Council for Combating WMD (ACCWMD).

 The ACCWMD provide forums 

that address crosscutting Army 

CWWMD issues and concerns. The 

ACCWMD provides: integration and 

synchronization of CWMD issues 

across DOTMLPF; a mechanism that 

identifies Army CWMD capability requirements; and a means for moving 

key issues forward to the Army leadership for resolution and/or decision. It also serves as a conduit to 

CWMD organizations within the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), the Joint Staff, Army Service 

Component Commands (ASCCs), 

and Army Commands (ACOMS).

These key organizations enable the 

Army to identify, define, focus and 

increase the effectiveness of Army 

CWMD Non Proliferation (NP), 

Counter Proliferation (CP) and Consequence Management (CM) activities.

 Actions for near and mid-term engagement include: increasing both 

internal staff visibility across functions 

as well as between commands; codifying support for specialized CBRN 

training; developing tracking mechanism for ASCC efforts in CWMD exercises (particularly those involving 

building partner nation capacity); developing process to infuse CWMD 

objectives in training (particularly unit 

level through joint force); and identifying and monitor gaps in CWMD capability. 

 On behalf of Chief of Plans COL 

Steve Mitchell and USARCENT staff, 

a plaque was presented to Mr. Mark 

Fishback for his diligence and expertise to complete the Army’s first Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Component Plan. A key lesson 

learned during this effort was the requirement for an upfront, tailored 

CWMD planning vignette to the component Staff. USANCA’s Combating 

WMD Planning Assistance Team 

(CPAT), as outlined in AR 10-16, was 

validated during this major planning 

effort and the planning assistance 

was favorably endorsed by the 

USARCENT G-3 and Chief of Plans. 

 A big thanks to the conference 

planner and coordinator Ms. Elizabeth Calhoun and her staff from 

(CSC), G-35-D for ensuring that the 

conference went smoothly.

 The conclusion of the conference 

established initial goals for Army 

CWMD efforts for FY09. 

COMBATING WMD
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 4

O 

n 9 December 1979 the 

World Health Organization 

(WHO) declared the world 

free of smallpox. The last known 

naturally-occurring case was identified in Somalia in 1977 (in 1978 a 

laboratory technician working with 

smallpox died of the disease in England). All known stocks of the virus 

were destroyed except those held by 

the Centers for Disease Control and 

Health Promotion (CDC) in the United 

States and the State Research Center of Virology and Biotechnology 

(VECTOR) in Koltsovo, Russia. An 

international debate ensued concerning destruction of these remaining 

stocks until 2002, when WHO determined it best to retain, for research 

purposes, this vestige of a by-gone 

scourge. While the debate took 

place, the Soviet Union secretly 

weaponized smallpox virus and packaged tons in missile warheads.1

 

Smallpox, an extremely contagious 

disease with a mortality rate as high 

as 50 percent for some strains, remains a biological weapon threat to 

this day.

 Biological warfare is nearly as old 

as organized war itself. As early as 

the 6th century BCE the Assyrians 

used ergot (a fungus) to poison the 

drinking water of their adversaries. 

Hannibal is reputed to have used clay 

pots filled with poisonous snakes 

against his enemies in a naval battle 

with the Emperor of Pergamene in 

184 BCE, and the Mongol’s use of 

human carcasses catapulted over 

castle walls at the siege of Kaffa 

(Theodosia, Ukraine) is believed to 

be one source for the spread of Black 

Plague or ―Black Death‖ in Europe 

during the 14th century. During the 

French-Indian war the British attempted to infect the Delaware Indians besieging Fort Pitt by giving them 

blankets contaminated with smallpox 

virus; the efficacy of this tactic is subject to debate.

 In modern times germ warfare has 

seen limited use. During WW I, the 

Germans attempted to infect allied 

horses with Burkholderia mallei, the 

bacterial species that causes Glanders. The effort was spearheaded by 

Dr. Anton Dilger, an American expatriot serving in the German army, 

while he was living in Baltimore prior 

to official U.S. involvement in the conflict. Although generally thought to be 

ineffective, these efforts marked the 

beginning of agricultural biowarfare.2 

 In the lead-up to the siege of 

Stalingrad thousands of German and 

Soviet soldiers developed pneumonic 

tularemia (which is caused by the 

bacterium Francisella tularensis). Dr. 

Ken Alibek 1later speculated that the 

Soviets had utilized the bacterial 

pathogen for activities leading to the 

siege of Stalingrad. As the implied 

consequence, thousands of German 

and Soviet soldiers succumbed to 

pneumonic tularemia

 Probably the most widespread 

employment of biological warfare in 

World War II was promulgated by 

Japan’s infamous Unit 731 commanded by General Shiro Ishii. Allegations still exist that the Japanese 

deliberately infected thousands of 

Chinese with Yersinia pestis,2the 

bacterium that causes the plague. As 

in nearly all allegations of biological 

warfare, the actual employment is 

shrouded in secrecy and the effects 

typically obfuscated by the possibility 

of a natural-disease outbreak. Nevertheless, it is well known that Unit 731 

engaged in human experimentation 

with biowarfare agents and could 

count its victims in the thousands. 

 Since WW II, there are no confirmed large-scale employments of 

biological weapons. However, the 

Soviets are suspected of using fungal 

mycotoxins (trichothecenes) against 

Hmong tribesmen in Southeast Asia 

during the Vietnam War. Although 

plausible, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate this activity. In 

recent years the threat and practice 

of biological attacks has come largely 

from non-state sponsored terrorists. 

In September 1984, for instance, the 

Rajneesh religious cult attempted to 

sway local elections in The Dalles, 

Oregon, by poisoning the salad bars 

in several popular local restaurants 

with Salmonella typhimurium. The 

hope was that with a significant portion of the local population ill, the 

Ranjeeshes could capture key political positions in an up-coming election. Although there were no fataliDetection Systems for Biological Warfare Agents, 

Present and Future 

LTC Mitchell L. Wise, USAR

Jon J. Calomiris, Ph.D.

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

ties, 751 individuals were infected 

and 45 required hospitalization. Only 

after two years and serious in-fighting 

among the membership of the Raanjeesh organization, which resulted in 

law suits, was the etiological basis for 

these food poisoning outbreaks determined. 

 The Aum Shinrikyo sect, notorious 

for the Tokyo subway nerve agent 

attacks, attempted biological attacks 

on several occasions during the 

1990s using botulinum toxin (a highly 

potent neurotoxin) and Bacillus anthracis spores (the causative agent of 

anthrax). In October 2001, shortly 

after the 9/11 terrorist attack, probably the most widely publicized act of 

bioterrorism in history was perpetrated through the U.S. Postal Service 

with mailings of Bacillus anthracis

spores to various media outlets and 

the U.S. Senate offices of Patrick 

Leahy and Thomas Daschle. The 

spores were carefully prepared in a 

fashion that allowed them to disseminate profusely through the air when 

the envelopes were opened. In addition, the particles were a size that 

allowed them to efficiently enter the 

lungs, which was the primary site of 

infection. Consequently, these attacks killed five people and infected 

at least 22 in addition to causing 

widespread panic. Less well publicized was a second bioterror attack in 

2004 in which ricin, a plant toxin, was 

mailed to Senator Bill Frist. Although 

no one was injured, Senate offices 

were closed for several days. For the 

―anthrax letters‖ case after almost 

seven years of investigation, one suspect was identified and subsequently 

committed suicide. These events 

illustrate the dire consequences we 

can face when microbial pathogens 

are employed for nefarious activities.

 From this brief history it should be 

clear that the threat of biological attack is of grave concern. A glance at 

world news should convince anyone 

that the terrorist threat, especially that 

from Islamic jihadist, has no bounds; 

they will take any measure to inflict 

suffering on their perceived enemies. 

 At some point, terrorists or adversary states could use biological 

pathogens to attack U.S. forces or 

civilians. Consequently, there is a 

dire need for defense capability that 

would avert or remediate such an 

attack. Central to biological defense 

is technology for detection or identification of biological agents released to 

critical sites of the battlefield or civilian populations. To be reliable, detection of biological threats must be 

effective for agents that could be released in a variety of sites, including 

air spaces, surfaces, water supplies, 

and food. Ideally, detection systems 

should provide results in time to prevent infection (detect-to-warn) or, 

lacking that, the capability to control 

spread of the biological agent (detectto-treat). A key factor for reliable detection is its accuracy with respect to 

a ―signal‖ being generated only when 

a biological threat is present. Conversely, the system should have no 

―signal‖ when the biological threat is 

not present. This article will describe 

the fundamental technologies currently available for bioagent detection 

and the prospects for future improvements.

Sample Collection and Recovery of 

Biological Material for Detection

 The first task for bioagent detection is to recover target microorganisms from samples collected from the 

attack site or site of concern. In a 

scenario such as the ―anthrax letters‖ 

this is a relatively easy task since 

there would likely be a sufficient 

amount of material and a major component of the material would be Bacillus anthracis spores. However, with 

respect to all the possible avenues for 

a biological attack, sample collection 

is usually a formidable task. To devise an effective sampling strategy, 

allowing reliable detection, a variety 

of factors must be addressed. For 

example, the concentration of the 

target biological agent in a sample is 

critical to the ability to detect the 

agent. Because any given detection 

system requires a certain number of 

organisms to generate a detection 

signal (i.e. detection sensitivity), a 

sample with a low density of target 

organisms requires a larger sample to 

be collected. With air samples, it may 

be possible simply to sample the air 

for a longer period to collect a larger 

volume, hence a larger number of 

organisms. In contrast, with complex 

samples such as blood, muddy water, 

or food, recovery and concentration 

of target microorganisms can require 

complex, cumbersome, and timeconsuming procedures. Even then, 

other components may interfere with 

the detection process. In particular, 

many materials which are commonly 

present in clinical specimens (heme 

of red blood cells), environment samples (clay, tannins, humic acids, and 

metals), and foods (lipids) are reported to inhibit Deoxynucleic Acid 

(DNA) based detection.

 A variety of sampling systems 

have been developed to recover microorganisms from air, water, solid 

surfaces, and clinical specimens. 

Some systems are highly complex, 

especially those with automated sample preparation. Because aerosol 

delivery represents one of the likely 

scenarios for biological attack, this 

article will describe basic systems 

employed to sample air. As for any 

type of sampling, aerosol sampling 

strategies must address design and 

operational considerations to meet 

military requirements. For example, 

air sampling devices must operate 

over an array of environmental conditions including extreme temperatures, 

extreme levels of humidity, dust and 

fog. For most detection systems, 

transfer of the biological agent to a 

liquid phase is necessary. Hence, 

collection of sub-freezing air must be 

accomplished without freezing the 

liquid phase. The power requirements for aerosol collection can be 

impressive.

 Aerosol collectors can be classified into two general types: cyclone 

and impactor (Figure 1). The cyclone 

design involves a cylindrical chamber, 

usually with a cone shaped bottom. 

The inlet is on the side and the outlet 

is formed by an interior tube with its 

opening near the bottom of the chamber. Thus, incoming air is forced into 

a vortex, creating a centrifugal force 

on any entrained particles; the heavier ones being forced to the outer 

walls of the chamber. In some applications the walls of the cyclone 

chamber are ―wetted‖ with a solvent 

or aqueous solution to facilitate an 

 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 6

aerosol-to-hydrosol transfer stage 

(AHTS). 

 Impactor collectors work on a 

somewhat different principle analogous to the way that heavy, wet snow 

impacts on the windshield of a moving automobile while lighter snowflakes are diverted into the main airflow around the windshield. Impactors rely on the momentum of heavier, denser particles to maintain their 

trajectory onto a collecting surface 

while lighter particles are swept away 

into the effluent airstream. Virtual 

impactors are an adaptation where 

the impact surface is replaced by another collecting tube in which air flow 

is highly restricted. Thus the heavier 

particles are swept into a collecting 

tube for transport to an AHTS. There 

are practical limitations to each of 

these technologies. The cyclone collectors generally have a larger dynamic range for particle size but, especially for use in sub-freezing environments, can have excessive power 

requirements to avoid the problem of 

freezing. Because of the lower air 

flow rates at the AHTS, virtual impactors do not suffer this liability and 

relatively low power input can effectively prevent freezing. But the orifice 

sizes necessary to capture smaller 

diameter particles may restrict their 

ability to capture larger particles without becoming clogged. Limiting the 

size range of particles collected can

facilitate collection efficiency. Particles from 1 to 10 m are considered 

most important due to enhanced 

deposition in lung tissue. 

 

 Aerosol samplers are available 

that are capable of collecting in excess of 1,000 liters of air per minute 

and concentrating the particulate matter to a relatively small volume 

(approximately 1 milliliter).

Detection Technologies

 One of the hallmarks of bioweapons is the extremely small amount of 

agent required to produce casualties. 

This, coupled with the complex 

chemical makeup of biological 

agents, precludes many of the technologies used for detection of chemical agents. The principle chemical 

components of biological particles 

are, in terms of physicochemical 

properties, rather uniform. These 

components consist of nucleic acid 

polymers (DNA and RNA), amino 

acid polymers (proteins) and lipids 

(molecules soluble in non-polar solFigure 1. Bioaerosol Collectors. (A) Impact collector (B) Virtual impact 

collector (C) Cyclone type collector. 

Figure 2. (DNA). (A) Chemical structures of the four bases responsible for 

complementary binding in DNA. Dashed lines represent hydrogen bonding between the base pairs. (B) Two anti-parallel strands of DNA showing the specific A:T and C:G complementation. 
7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

vent and largely composed of hydrocarbons with specific functional 

groups). On a gross level these 

classes of molecules are quite similar 

and cannot be used to differentiate 

pathogenic and non-pathogenic organisms. But, as will be addressed 

below, they can be exploited, at a 

molecular level, to provide quite specific identification of essentially any 

microorganism. 

 There are four basic detection 

technologies currently available. 

These are based on: (1) nucleic acid 

sequence, (2) molecular structure, (3) 

chemical property and (4) function.3 

In this section the rationale of each of 

these is examined and their relative 

merits and weaknesses are explored.

Nucleic Acid Sequence

 In all living organisms the genetic 

code is inscribed by the sequence of 

bases in the nucleic acid polymers, 

deoxynucleic acid (DNA) (some viruses employ the chemically less stable ribonucleic acid (RNA)). DNA 

contains four distinct heterocyclic 

bases: adenine (A), cytosine (C), 

guanine (G), and thymine (T). It is 

the particular sequence of these 

bases as they are arranged in genetic 

material that dictates all the characteristics of any living organism. 

These four bases are linked into a 

linear polymer by sugar and phosphate molecules to form a long single 

strand of DNA. DNA, then, consists 

of two single-stranded polymers 

joined together side-by-side in a spiral staircase fashion, commonly referred to as a ―double helix.‖ The two 

single strands are held together by 

hydrogen bonds between complementary bases, with A’s and T’s always bonding with each other and 

C’s and G’s always bonding with 

each other (see Figure 2 page 6). 

Thus, each linear polymer will always 

bind to a complementary polymer to 

form double-stranded DNA. Moreover, these hydrogen bonds are weak 

and can be disrupted by relatively 

mild temperatures, increases in salt 

concentrations, pH changes or combinations of these parameters. The 

fidelity of DNA sequence complementation can be exploited in numerous 

ways to identify specific DNA sequences and thus the organism from 

which they originate. 

 One tool to employ DNA sequence 

for detection is the polymerase chain 

reaction (PCR), arguably the most 

significant development in biochemical technology in the twentieth century. This technique relies on the 

thermal lability of DNA complementation as well as the discovery of certain DNA polymerases that withstand 

the temperature regimes necessary 

to denature the double-stranded 

DNA. DNA polymerases are enzymes (proteins) that biosynthesize 

linear strands of DNA from the individual nucleic acids, given a complementary strand and a short segment 

(10 to 25 nucleotides) of doublestranded DNA (Figure 3 above). By 

combining pairs of short DNA oligomers (―primers‖) which complement a segment of DNA on opposite 

strands and distal to one another, 

with a template of target DNA, along 

with thermally-stable DNA polymerase in a solution of individual nucleotides in a thermocycler (a device 

to alternatively heat and cool the solution to prescribed temperatures for 

specific time periods) it is possible to 

amplify the target DNA exponentially.

 If a sequence of DNA in an organism is known it is quite simple and 

inexpensive to synthesize short DNA 

primers of a prescribed sequence. 

Complete gene sequences for an 

ever expanding library of organisms 

are being determined and literally 

millions of partial sequences are now 

known and readily available from 

public databases on the internet. By 

Figure 3. Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). A sample of DNA serves as 

template for amplification of a target segment. Short nucleic acid oligomers 

with target specific sequence serve as primers. The reaction mixture also contains a thermally-stable DNA polymerase and a supply of individual nucleotides. 

The original template DNA (solid blue and gray) is only depicted in cycle 1 and 

2.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 8

alternately raising the solution temperature to the point that the doublestranded DNA denatures into two 

complementary single strands, then 

lowering the reaction temperature to 

a point that allows complementary 

DNA strands to re-anneal, some of 

the primers will spontaneously bind to 

their complementary segments on the 

single-stranded DNA. These short 

segments of double-stranded DNA 

serve to initiate polymerization, 

through the action of DNA polymerase, which fill out the complementary strand until the reaction vessel is 

re-heated and again denatures the 

double strands into single strands. 

Because DNA strands have directionality (the ends are termed 5’ and 3’) 

and DNA polymerase only works by 

extending the DNA polymer in the 5’ 

to 3’ direction, and because the primers are designed to complement the 

double-stranded DNA on opposite 

strands, only the intervening sequence is amplified during a single 

thermal cycle. As the reaction vessel 

is subjected to repeated cycles of 

high and low temperatures the intervening sequence is doubled with 

each round. Hence, with X thermocycles 2X

copies of the original sequence are generated. Thermocyclers are now available that can complete 3 to 4 cycles per minute. In addition, clever use of fluorescent labels 

for the generated amplicons 

(amplified segments of DNA) has 

substantially improved detection levels. Other nucleic acid hybridization 

techniques are also being exploited 

for the identification of biowarfare 

agents.4

 Currently, detection methods 

based on DNA hybridization are generally considered the most specific. 

Unfortunately, while the hybridization 

of specific DNA sequences to target 

DNA can and does occur in a milieu 

of competing DNA sequences, interference by other substances or DNA 

polymerase inhibitors, such as those 

found in crude extracts of environmental samples, can be severely limiting. Preventing ―carry-over‖ of target DNA from one analysis to another, resulting in false-positive signals, must also be avoided. Employment of fluorescent-labeled hybridization probes for the nascent amplified 

sequences can substantially lower 

the amount of PCR product required 

for detection. Although fairly rapid 

thermal cycling instruments have 

been developed, even the best PCR 

detectors require tens of minutes to 

amplify detectable levels of target 

sequence.

Molecular Structure-Based 

Techniques

 Immunization is a concept familiar 

to most people. One of the cornerstones of the immune response is the 

generation of antibodies. Antibodies 

are proteins expressed on the surface 

of and secreted into the blood stream 

by white blood cells (leukocytes) 

termed B-cells. These proteins form, 

in essence, a Y-shaped structure with 

the tips of the Y convoluted into a 

three-dimensional configuration with 

pockets shaped to accommodate the 

three-dimensional shape of surface 

molecules on the invading organism 

(termed antigens) like a hand fits into 

a glove. In addition to the complementation of the antigen-antibody 

three-dimensional configuration, 

chemical and electrostatic interactions between the bound antigen and 

the antibody are also possible (Figure 

4). Recent advances in biotechnology have allowed the production of 

clones of individual B-cells, i.e. a collection of cells from a single parent, 

expressing a specific antibody, in artificial culture. Indeed, it is now even 

possible to generate specific antibodies in genetically engineered yeast 

cells. Mammals may be able to produce antibodies to more than a billion 

unique antigens. In addition there are 

well developed methods to chemically 

Figure 4. Antibody Molecules. (A) A ribbon structure depicting the protein molecules composing an antibody. (B) Stylistic representation of antibody molecules. 
9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

modify antibody molecules, allowing 

them to be attached to other molecules such as fluorescent dyes or to 

other surfaces like polymeric beads.

 Exploitation of the high specificity 

of the antibody-antigen interaction for 

identification of biological molecules 

has led to numerous bioassay techniques. 5

 One familiar example is the 

over-the-counter pregnancy test. 

Similar ―enzyme linked immunosorbant assays‖ (ELISA) are now 

available for biowarfare agent detection. The Hand-Held Immunochromatographic Assays (HHA) and 

SMART®tickets are examples of immunoassay-based detectors (Figure 

5). Immunochemistry-based detection systems can be quite rapid 

(seconds to minutes) and fairly specific but, because there is no inherent 

amplification of the target molecules, 

they cannot rival PCR-based detection for sensitivity. There are, however, numerous mechanisms for signal transfer from antibody-based detectors that portend their utility, especially in detect-to-warn systems 

where response time is a critical consideration.

 One approach, for example, is a 

system developed by Luminex Corporation that uses styrene beads coated 

with bioagent-specific antibodies. 

The beads are impregnated with a 

fluorescent dye that can be illuminated by a laser. The agent specific 

beads are thus ―color coded‖ to indicate the particular bioagent detected. 

Analysis by flow cytometry, i.e. passing the fluorescent-antibody-labeled 

cells or beads through a narrow tube 

allowing only one bead at a time and 

illuminated by a laser coupled with a 

light detector to measure the fluorescence, allows identification of a biohazard. This device is incorporated 

into the Autonomous Pathogen Detection System (APDS), developed by 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and currently used by the Department of Homeland Security.

Chemical and Physical Methods

 As indicated earlier, biological 

agents are composed of certain 

classes of chemicals. In general 

terms these are encompassed by: 

proteins (polymers of the 20 common 

amino acids), carbohydrates (sugar 

molecules), nucleic acids, lipids 

(metabolites soluble in non-polar solvents, typically variations of hydrocarbons with associated functional 

groups) and relatively low molecular 

weight metabolites. Although the 

bulk properties of these classes of 

compounds are indistinguishable between organisms, certain aspects of 

their occurrence can be exploited to 

identify individual agents. We have 

already seen how nucleic acid sequence information can be used. 

Proteins, likewise, have specific sequences. Indeed the central dogma 

of biology describes the relationship 

between the DNA sequence and the 

amino acid sequence of proteins. 

Unfortunately, the hybridization approach used for DNA sequencing is 

not possible to determine protein sequences. Nevertheless, methods are 

available to allow protein sequence 

determination. One of these is 

through mass spectrometry. 

 The principal of mass spectrometry is really quite simple. A particle 

moving through a force field will, due 

to inertia, be more or less affected as 

a consequence of its mass. Early 

models of mass spectrometers emFigure 5. Lateral Flow Immunoassay. A sample solution is loaded into the well 

containing free, labeled antigen-specific antibodies. The antibodies, bound and/

or unbound to antigen, are wicked up the chamber where they encounter a line 

of antigen specific antibodies and a line of anti-antibody antibodies. A similar 

technology is employed with the Smart Ticket® and the JPBDS.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 10

ployed large magnetic sectors to influence the path of charged molecules and had substantial space requirements. In the past few decades 

far more compact mass selectors 

have been designed. Based on the 

use of radiofrequency alternating voltage as well as direct current electric 

fields to manipulate the trajectory of 

ions, these instruments are configured as either quadrupole mass filters 

or ion-traps. Quadrupole mass spectrometers are small and physically 

robust, permitting use in mobile laboratories such as the M93A1 FOX 

chemical reconnaissance vehicle. 

Early designs for the E31 Biological 

Integrated Detection System (BIDS) 

included a mass spectrometer but 

they are not included in the currently 

fielded version.

 Typically the quadrupole or iontrap is interfaced with a gas or liquid 

chromatography system that allows 

separation of complex solutions into 

individual components. As the individual analytes elute from the chromatographic column they are ionized 

(electrically charged). In the case of 

liquid chromatography the process is 

called electrospray ionization (ESI). 

The charged particles can then be 

subjected to mass spectral analysis. 

Another format for mass spectral 

analysis particularly useful for analysis of biological material is termed 

Matrix Associated Laser DesorptionTime of Flight (MALDI-TOF). This 

approach uses a light absorbing 

chemical matrix to embed the analyte 

of interest, which is then subjected to 

a pulse of high intensity laser light. 

The solid matrix volatilizes almost 

instantly and at the same time imparts an electrical charge on the analyte. The charged analyte is subjected to a voltage potential in a vacuum where it is accelerated to a detector. The lower molecular weight 

analytes are accelerated more rapidly 

than the heavier ones; thus molecular 

weights can be determined by ―timeof-flight‖. Using sophisticated computer algorithms it is now possible to 

determine protein sequences from 

mass spectral data obtained by either 

ESI-quadrupole mass spectrometry 

or MALDI-TOF. While the sizes of 

the quadrupole-type mass spectrometers are comparable to a large 

coffee cup (TOF instruments are 

somewhat larger), they both require 

high vacuums, usually supplied 

through a rotary vane rough pump 

and a diffusion or turbomolecular 

pump. These hardware requirements 

substantially increase the size, 

weight, and power requirements of 

the system. Mass spectrometry is 

also useful for identification of lipids, 

carbohydrates, and small metabolites.

 Another common analysis system 

is gas chromatography. This instrument is limited to analysis of volatile 

compounds such as lipids (molecules 

soluble in non-polar organic solvents) 

or chemically derivatized lipids. The 

typical laboratory gas chromatograph 

is about the size of a large microwave 

oven and requires external gas tanks 

to provide a ―carrier‖ gas to carry the 

volatilized analytes through a long, 

narrow tubular column. By heating 

the column as the mixture of particles 

passes through, advantage can be 

taken of the differing affinities of the 

sample admixture for the material 

coating the wall of the column as well 

as their different volatilities. Various 

components can be separated and, 

with a detector to determine retention 

time, an indication of the analyte’s 

identification is obtained. Additional 

information is afforded depending on 

the detection method used. Quadrupole mass spectrometers are commonly employed; thus the chromatographic characteristic as well as a 

mass spectrum is obtained providing 

substantial evidence for identification 

of a chemical component. Microorganisms often produce unique chemical signatures allowing presumptive 

identification. For the purposes of 

bioagent detection the inlet to the GC 

can be interfaced with a pyrolysis 

chamber. A system that utilizes aerosol pyrolysis (thermal decomposition 

without oxygen) with gas chromatography and ion-mobility spectrometry 

is currently under development at the 

U.S. Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC). 6

 Ion-mobility 

is analogous to a TOF-MS; however, 

the charged particle traverses an air 

filled chamber (rather than through a 

vacuum) and the time of transition 

under defined voltage conditions provides some indication of the analyte’s 

identity. Although not nearly as definitive as mass spectrometry, this 

methodology is considerably less expensive and far more compatible to 

field application. The currently fielded 

M41 chemical agent alarm uses this 

technology.

Surface Active Sensors 

 Optical and acoustic waveguide 

technology is being employed for bioagent detection. Waveguides are 

simply structures that propagate electromagnetic (e.g. light) or acoustic 

waves along a specific path. Fiber 

optics is a familiar application of 

waveguide technology. Waveguide 

technology is more accurately termed 

a signal transduction mechanism. 

Optical and acoustic waveguides are 

typically linked to one of four biological recognition elements: enzymatic, 

immunochemical, nucleic acid, or 

whole-cell sensors.7 The advantages 

of waveguide signal transduction are 

the rapidity with which the signal is 

transmitted, the relatively simple design of the detectors and potentially 

low costs and durability. Signal initiation can be generated by a variety of 

mechanisms, e.g. enzyme reaction 

with a substrate to generate an optically active (light absorbing or fluorescent) product that alters the incident 

light to the detector. For example the 

system could involve linkage to a bioluminescent reaction catalyzed by 

luciferease (an enzyme that yields 

light as a product) or to green fluorescent protein. Alternately, singlestranded DNA molecules might be 

employed to attract a complementary 

sequence which in turn binds, 

through a down-stream DNA sequence, to another complementary 

sequence covalently linked to an optically active probe.

 The basic principle of waveguide 

transducers involves a core fiber, 

suitable for transmission of a light or 

acoustic wave that is surrounded by a 

cladding with different optical or 

acoustic properties (e.g. refractive 

index). Light or sound waves are 

transmitted by reflectance between 

the two surfaces with little or no attenuation. Some detector designs 

incorporate an analyte binding molecule, e.g. an antibody or DNA probe, 
11 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

into the cladding, resulting in an alteration in the optical or acoustic 

properties of the cladding material 

upon binding of the target. This, in 

turn, results in changes in signal 

transfer efficiency that can be determined electronically. 

 A similar type of biosensor that 

uses refractive index to generate a 

signal is termed surface plasmon 

resonance (SPR). When plane polarized light of a particular wavelength 

impinges at a specific angle on a thin 

(50 to 100 nm) metal film (e.g. gold) 

interfaced on one side with a dielectric medium, some of the energy can 

be adsorbed through interaction with 

the metal lattice electrons in the form 

of a charge density wave or plasmon. 

This adsorbed energy results in a 

reduction of intensity of the reflected 

light, which can be measured with 

high precision. The precise incidence 

angle at which the surface plasmon 

occurs is a function of several factors, 

one being the refractive index of the 

underlying (dielectric) surface. By 

including a biomolecular recognition 

element, e.g. an antibody or DNA 

probe, at or near the surface of the 

metal, the reflective index will be altered upon binding of the target 

(Figure 6). The advantage of SPR is 

that no fluorescent or otherwise labeled molecules are needed for signal elicitation. This technology also 

lends itself to miniaturization and offers the potential for detect-to-warn 

bioagent detection.3,8

Currently Fielded Systems

 The Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS) is the principal 

biological agent detection system 

fielded by the DOD. This system employs a Biological Agent Warning 

Sensor (BAWS) as a triggering device. Developed by the MIT Lincoln 

Laboratory and manufactured by Intellitec Products LLC, the BAWS constantly draws environmental air and 

monitors for a surge in biological material. Using a laser beam to stimulate fluorescence of the particles in 

the air stream, photomultiplier tubes 

measure the fluorescent and backscattered light at particular wavelengths. An algorithm translates 

these light signatures and interprets 

whether they derive from biological 

material; a sudden increase in particle count triggers the JBPDS cyclone 

aerosol collector to begin operation. 

The aerosol is transferred through an 

AHTS and streamed into a immunochemistry based detector. Aliquots 

are simultaneously collected and 

stored for follow-up confirmatory 

analysis. This system is currently 

capable of detecting 10 biowarfare 

agents and provides results in less 

than 30 minutes. The JBPDS is the 

detection system employed in the 

Biological Integrated Detection System (BIDS) used by the U.S. Army, 

Navy, and Air Force.

 A PCR-based detection device 

called the Joint Biological Agent Identification and Detection System 

(JBAIDS) is also in the DOD inventory. This instrument evolved from 

the Ruggedized Advanced Pathogen 

Identification Device (R.A.P.I.D.® System) developed by Idaho Technology, 

Inc. The R.A.P.I.D.® System weighs 

about 50 pounds (23 kg) and measures 19 x 14 x 10 inches (49 x 36 x 

27 cm); it is man portable and battery 

operated. The PCR instrument’s detection signal is termed "real-time,‖ 

meaning it uses fluorescent probes to 

signal PCR amplification of a target 

DNA sequence enabling electronic, 

hence real-time, detection of the amplification. The reagents employed in 

the JBAIDS are freeze-dried for improved shelf-life and are reported to 

be stable for 12 months at 28 ̊C or 2 

months at 45 ̊C. Many of the National Guard Civil Support Teams 

(CSTs) and other first responders as 

well as the U.S. Army 1st and 9th Area 

Medical Laboratories (AMLs) employ 

the JBAIDS. As the ―next generation‖ 

R.A.P.I.D.® System, the RAZOR® was 

recently developed by Idaho Technologies, Inc., for simpler operation 

using a plastic pouch for easier sample handling. 

 A similar device, the Hand-Held 

Advanced Nucleic Acid Analyzer 

(HANAA), was developed largely at 

the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory. Smiths Detection, a 

United Kingdom-based technology 

company, has commercially developed this instrument with the trade 

name Bio-SeeqTM. The HANAA marketed by Smiths Detection is a compact (13 x 7 x 4 inches or 34 x 19 x 

10 cm), light-weight (approximately 5 

pounds or 2.6 kg), battery operated, 

field-deployable PCR instrument and 

Figure 6. Surface Plasmon Resonance. At the angle where the incident light 

energy vector (ky) coincides with the charge density wavelength along the metal 

– dielectric interface, the adsorbed energy results in a sharp decrease in reflected light.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 12

costs about $35K. This device can 

monitor for Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Yersinia pestis and 

orthopox virus simultaneously and 

provide identification in less than 30 

minutes. The machine is robust and 

requires relatively little training. 

These systems require user sample 

preparation but little technical expertise. As the ―next generation‖ unit, 

the Bio-SeeqTM PLUS was developed 

as a fully field-deployable detector 

that is more amenable to hand-held 

operation.

 Complementing the JBAIDS on 

many CSTs and the AMLs is the BioVeris M1M electrochemiluminescence (ECL) detector. ECL allows 

substantially lower limits of detection 

than conventional immunoassay techniques. This is accomplished through 

a light signal generated by the antigen-antibody complex. Basically this 

instrument employs ELISA technology in which one antigen specific antibody is linked to a magnetic bead 

and a second antigen specific antibody is bound with ruthenium-tri 2,2’-

bipyridine (Ru(bpy)3). When both 

antibodies bind the target antigen (a 

bioagent or toxin) a magnet attracts 

the complex to the proximity of an 

electrode in a solution of tripropylamine (TPA). Application of an 

electric potential oxidizes both the 

TPA and the Ru(bpy)3 complex. 

These two chemical species interact 

resulting in the Ru(bpy)3 emitting a 

photon, which can be detected with a 

photomultiplier tube and converted to 

an electric current. By rapid alteration of the electrode potential multiple 

photons are emitted from each of the 

bound Ru(bpy)3 labeled antibodies 

(Figure 7). This advent allows exquisite sensitivity; femtomolar levels 

(10-15 moles per liter) of analyte can 

be detected.

Future Directions

 The ―anthrax letter‖ attacks in the 

aftermath of 9/11 clearly illustrate our 

nation’s vulnerability to biological terrorism. As safeguards to provide 

homeland defense against future biological attacks, bioagent detection 

systems, like those described in this 

article, are employed to monitor key 

government buildings, transportation 

hubs, and special events. Systems 

are also employed to protect military 

installations and the warfighter on the 

battlefield. While these systems provide reliable detection capability, they 

are costly and require operators with 

specialized training. In order to field 

a more comprehensive, responsive 

detection capability, we need small, 

inexpensive, autonomous, and highly 

sensitive bioagent detectors a concept similar to today’s ―smoke detector‖. Such devices could be mounted 

in multiple locations or worn by soldiers, left un-attended or under remote control, and would be relatively 

inexpensive to maintain. 

 Nearly all the bio-recognition 

chemistries described in this article 

necessarily occur in solution. Transfer of aerosolized bioagents to solution at detectable concentrations is a 

major technological hurdle. At present there are numerous biodetection 

systems available. A 2007 survey of 

systems with utility for homeland security catalogs over 100 bioagent detection devices commercially available.9

 However, they all suffer serious shortcomings, especially in the 

area of cost, speed of operation, and

maintenance requirements. The 

JBPDS, for example, has a fairly 

rapid response time and requires little 

on-site operation, but system size, 

power requirements and capital as 

well as operating costs limit its employment. A U.S. Army BIDS company, for example, is a Corps-level 

asset consisting of 35 mobile units. 

The APDS, which combines automated sampling with automated immunochemical detection, sample 

preparation and PCR confirmation, is 

an impressive system in terms of 

autonomous operation, but also carries an impressive price tag and it 

occupies the space of a three-drawer 

file cabinet.

 Nevertheless, tremendous strides 

are being taken in the field of biodetection. For example, the MicroChem station, in development by 

Sandia National Laboratory since 

1996, was originally designed as a 

chemical agent and explosives detector. This device employs microfabrication technology to miniaturized 

chromatography and detection components. Early models intended for 

chemical agent detection included a 

gas-chromatography column the size 

of a nickel (Figure 8 page 13). Recent developments have incorporated 

a liquid chromatographic capability, 

with a working volume of picoliters 

(10-12 liter), which allows detection of 

non-volatile biological material including bacteria, viruses and toxins. 

Separation of complex mixtures is 

Figure 7. Electrochemiluminescence (ECL). One antibody is bound to a magnetic bead facilitating transport of the complex to the proximity of an electrode. 

The other antibody is linked to ruthenium tribispyridine (Ru(byp)3) which yields 

a photon of light upon stimulus through a reduction-oxidation reaction with 

tripropylamine (TPA) in the presence of a charged anode. This technology is 

employed with the BioVeris M1M.
13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

accomplished by electrokinetic mobility of extremely small volumes of ionic 

solvents through semi-porous media 

under the influence of a small electric 

field. Although presently of limited 

applicability for the detection of biological warfare agents, this system 

illustrates some of the remarkable 

advances being made in miniaturization of biosensors, the so-called ―labon-a-chip‖ or micro total analysis systems. It has been likened to the 

―tricorder‖ used by Bones, the pixilated ship’s doctor in the Star Trek 

television series of the 1960s. 

 Since 2001 the U.S. Federal Government has provided over $40 billion 

for biodefense, a significant portion 

going to research and acquisition of 

biodetection devices.10 While there 

has been legitimate criticism for these 

expenditures,11 we need still more 

investment to counter the emerging 

bioterrorism threat. Furthermore, like 

the advances in computer technology 

and materials science resulting from 

our national space program, research 

on bioagent detection technology is 

also having an impact outside the 

arena of biodefense, including medicine, forensics, and food safety. The 

DOD should help guide future investment in the field to expedite improvements in bioagent detection systems. 

Strategies to advance biodetection 

capability must address development 

of systems that not only provide reliable, accurate and sensitive detection 

(essential features) but also focus on 

minimal cost, operation speed and 

simplicity, minimal operator burden, 

field utility, and effective sample handling. 

LTC Mitchell L. Wise is a Project Officer (IMA) with the US Army Nuclear 

and Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Agency, Ft Belvoir, VA. 

He has a B.S. in Zoology from the 

University of Georgia, an M.S. in Fish 

Pathology from Auburn University, 

and a Ph.D. in Biochemistry and Biophysics from Oregon State University. He was previously assigned as 

the Chemical Officer for Headquarters, Multi-National Forces, Iraq. 

His email address is 

mitchell.wise@us.army.mil. 

Jon J. Calomiris is a microbiologist at 

USANCA, Fort Belvoir, Springfield, 

VA. He has a B.S. in microbiology 

from the University of Maryland, a 

M.S. in microbiology from Oregon 

State University, and a Ph.D. in microbiology from Johns Hopkins University. He was previously assigned 

as a director of microbiology research 

with the Air Force Research Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Edgewood, Maryland. His email

address is jon.calomiris@us.army.mil. 

References

1. Alibek, K. Biohazard; Random 

House: New York, 1999.

2. Sidell, F. R.; Takafuji, E. T.; Franz, D. 

R. Medical Aspects of Chemical and 

Biological Warfare; United States Government Printing: Washington D.C., 

1997; Vol. 3. 

3. Vitko, J. J.; Franz, D. R.; Alper, M.; 

Biggins, P. D. E.; Brandt, L. D.; Burge, 

H. A.; Ediger, R.; Hollis, M. A.; Laughlin, L. L.; Mariella, R. P. J.; McFarland, 

A. R.; Schaudies, R. P. "Sensor systems for biological agent attacks: Protecting buildings and military bases," 

National Academies of Science, 2005.

4. Ivnitski, D.; O'Neil, D. J.; Gattuso, A.; 

Schlicht, R.; Calidonna, M.; Fisher, R. 

BioTechniques 2003, 35, 862-869.

5. Peruski, A. H.; Peruski, L. F. J. Clinical and Diagnostic Laboratory Immunology 2003, 10, 506-513.

6. Snyder, A. P.; Maswadeh, W. M.; 

Wick, C. H.; Dworzanski, J. P.; Tripathi, 

A. "Correlation of mass spectrometry 

identified bacterial biomarkers from a 

fielded pyrolysis-gas chromatography 

ion mobility spectrometry biodetector 

with the microbiological gram stain classification scheme," Edgewood Chemical Biological Center, 2005.

7. Monk, D. J.; Walt, D. R. Analytical 

and Bioanalytical Chemistry 2004, 379, 

931-945.

8. Homola, J. Chemical Reviews 2008, 

108, 462-493.

9. Fatah, A. A.; Barrett, J. A.; Arcilesi, 

R. D. J.; Ewing, K. J.; Lattin, C. H.; 

Moshier, T. F.; Justice, D. O., Ed., 

2001; National Institute of Justice Guide 

101-00; pp 41.

10. Franco, C. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice 

and Science 2008, 6, 131-146.

11. Shane, S. In http://

www.nytimes.com/2005/03/0 /

politics/01petition.html?

_r=1&oref=slogin; New York Times, 

2005.

Figure 8. Key components of Sandia’s ChemLab compared to ―peas in a pod‖. 

Advances in micro-fabrication portend rapid development in the field of micro 

total analysis (or ―lab-on-a-chip‖) instrumentation.

13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 14

E 

ach autumn, undergraduate1

students from all over the U.S. 

and around the world converge 

on the United States Military Academy (USMA) to meet, discuss, and 

debate U.S. foreign policy at the Student Conference on United States 

Affairs (SCUSA). In 2007, SCUSA 

took place from 31 October to 3 November and was attended by 274 

students and cadets from 100 universities and 30 countries. Student delegates from all four service academies 

were joined by civilian counterparts 

from universities such as Columbia, 

Stanford, Michigan, Southern California, and Alaska. International students from Canada, Cameroon, 

China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, and seven European 

nations also participated. Distinguished guests included former Central Command commander GEN (R) 

John P. Abizaid and Medal of Honor 

recipient COL(R) Jack Jacobs. 

 SCUSA is organized and administered by the faculty and staff of the 

USMA Department of Social Sciences and 2007 marked the 59th time 

USMA has hosted SCUSA. USMA 

―continues to sponsor SCUSA in the 

belief that it can foster the growth of 

mutual understanding among potential civilian and military leaders of the 

country (U.S.) and thus make a significant contribution toward the future 

security of the United States.‖2The 

objectives of SCUSA are: to produce 

an informative examination and discussion of selected aspects of U.S. 

public policy, primarily foreign relations; to facilitate an increased appreciation for the complex nature of the 

policy-making process among a 

group of outstanding college students; and to broaden the student 

participants’ contact with their contemporaries in an academic endeavor.3

 Each SCUSA has a theme 

around which discussions center. In 

2007, the theme was ―Uncertain Future: Freedom, Security, and Responsibility.‖ Recognizing the uncertainty 

inherent in today’s security environment, delegates were asked to come 

to some agreement on the purpose 

and goals of American power in crafting their foreign policy proposals. 

 SCUSA is organized as a series of 

―round tables‖, each one discussing 

and debating a specific aspect of U.S. 

foreign policy. Each round table has 

from twelve to sixteen student delegates and is moderated by two cochairs. Students choose their round 

table prior to the conference, giving 

them the opportunity to prepare in 

advance by reading an on-line ―table 

paper‖, prepared by the table cochairs, outlining the background, key 

issues, and current events for their 

chosen topic. Table co-chairs are 

selected by the SCUSA organizers 

for their subject-matter expertise. In 

2007 there were eighteen SCUSA 

round tables, ranging from those with 

a regional focus such as Middle East 

Gulf States, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 

Russia and Central Asia, to those 

with a topical focus such as State 

Building and Democratization, the 

Role of Non-State Actors, Globalization, Homeland Security and the 

Challenges of Insurgency. Over the 

four days of the conference, the delegates for each table met for four discussion sessions, and produced and 

presented a policy paper. Outside of 

the formal sessions, civilian student 

delegates were exposed to life at 

Undergraduate Perspectives on U.S. Nuclear Policy,

A Report on the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials 

Round Table at the 59th Annual Student Conference on 

United States Affairs (SCUSA)

LTC Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D.

Director, Nuclear Science and Engineering Research Center

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Ms. Lesley Young, J.D.

Strategist, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning

Office of the Secretary of Defense

2LT Zachary W. Furst

International Relations Major, Class of 2008

United States Military Academy

SCUSA 59 logo, Uncertain Future: 

Freedom, Security, and Responsibility.
15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

USMA. They stayed in the cadet barracks, ate in the mess hall, viewed 

static weapons displays and even 

relaxed and had some fun at a dinner/dance. Both the civilian students 

and the cadets benefited from the 

opportunity to exchange views and 

learn from others’ academic and personal experiences. 

 This year, for the first time, 

SCUSA included a round table on the 

Proliferation of Weapons and Materials (PWM). This article by the table 

co-chairs and the cadet-in-charge 

chronicles the events of this first-ever 

PWM round table, and presents the 

policy recommendations made by the 

students. We hope that the Nuclear 

and Counterproliferation community 

finds these perspectives by the student delegates to be fresh, interesting, and thought-provoking.

Organizing the Proliferation of 

Weapons and Materials Round 

Table

 In preparing for the conference, 

the co-chairs wrote a ―read ahead‖ 

table paper for the PWM student 

delegates. To narrow the scope of 

the discussion, the PWM table paper4 

focused on four main areas of nuclear 

proliferation: the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran’s and 

North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, and nuclear terrorism. USMA 

faculty in the Department of Social 

Sciences and the Department of 

Physics provided invaluable assistance in preparing the table paper.5

Several weeks prior to the start of the 

conference, the table paper was 

made available to the student delegates.

 Eight civilian student delegates 

served on the PWM table. They 

came from American University, Farleigh Dickinson University (three students), George Washington University, Piedmont College, Wellesley 

College, and Wilfrid Laurier University 

(Canada). The PWM table also had 

four USMA cadet delegates: one international relations major with a nuclear engineering core engineering 

sequence,6two nuclear engineering 

majors, and one freshman planning to 

major in international relations.7 In 

the weeks leading up to SCUSA, 

three USMA ―table advisors‖8assisted these cadets in preparing for 

the conference by discussing key 

issues with them and directing them 

towards articles and references of 

interest on the subject of nuclear proliferation. 

 The primary role of the table cochairs was to keep the student discussions focused on the key issues 

and serve as resident subject matter 

experts. By design, the PWM cochairs had expertise in both policy 

(Ms. Young) and in scientific and 

technical issues (LTC Musk), and so 

were able to answer the full range of 

student questions on the complex 

topic of nuclear proliferation. The 

goal of the student delegates was to 

fully discuss the issues, come to a 

group consensus, and capture the 

table policy recommendations in a 

final five to ten page policy paper. At 

the conclusion of the conference, all 

policy papers were published on the 

SCUSA website so they could be 

viewed by interested policy makers 

and others. Delegates display their 

creativity (and in some cases, humor) 

by presenting their table recommendations to all SCUSA attendees on 

the morning of the final day.

Student Discussions, Consensus, 

and Preparing the Policy Paper 

 Using the ―read ahead‖ table paper as their starting point, the PWM 

delegates quickly realized the enormity of their task and spent the first 

couple of sessions collectively defining the problems of nuclear nonproliferation. The delegates with an 

understanding of the technical characteristics of nuclear weapons or the 

intricacies of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty were complemented by those who had regional 

expertise in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, or global non-proliferation 

policy. After much discussion 

(including, for example, whether total 

nuclear disarmament was attainable 

and in the interest of the United 

States), delegates defined what they 

saw as a realistic and attainable policy objective: a severely decreased 

likelihood of nuclear attack, nearly to 

the point that such an attack would 

not be possible for those who might 

seek to perpetrate it. In formulating 

their policy objective the delegates 

used four main assumptions: 1. as 

the number of nuclear weapons 

states increase, so does the risk of 

use of nuclear weapons by both state 

and non-state actors, 2. extensive 

diplomatic engagement by the U.S. is 

required due to the global nature of 

the issue, 3. norms alone will not prevent proliferation; enforcement or 

Delegates and co-chairs for the first SCUSA Proliferation of Weapons and 

Materials Round Table.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 16

threat of enforcement may be necessary, and finally 4. the U.S. must play 

a significant role in solving this problem.

 Once the delegates had agreed on 

the objective and the assumptions, 

they broke up into teams to discuss, 

formulate, and outline their policy recommendations. Three teams were 

formed to address the perceived main 

areas for concern for nuclear nonproliferation U.S. policy: methods and 

materials, nuclear fuel cycle protections, and counter-proliferation. Each 

team presented their outline to the 

group for comment and discussion. 

 In the discussion of methods and 

materials, specifically highly enriched 

uranium and nuclear expertise, delegates identified the tension that existed between the desire to 

strengthen existing control regimes or 

to create new ones. They also discussed the balance needed between 

domestic law enforcement mechanisms and multilateral international 

regimes such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. In discussing nuclear 

fuel cycle protections, the delegates 

discussed the ambiguity in Article III 

of the NPT and how best to ensure 

that energy poor states acquire the 

fuel they need while at the same time 

ensuring that states do not use this 

ambiguity to pursue weapons. The 

final outline on counter-proliferation 

addressed enforcement. Here, the 

delegates did an excellent job of considering costs, benefits, and risks of 

various courses of action. A consistent theme throughout the discussions was the need for the U.S. to 

show leadership while at the same 

time stressing the importance of diplomacy and multilateralism in addressing the issue. The discussions 

and outline formed the basis for the 

final student policy paper and recommendations summarized in the following section. 

Student Policy Paper and 

Policy Recommendations

 The PWM student delegates 

agreed early on that a multilateral 

approach is vital to any nonproliferation or counter-proliferation 

initiative. The students believed that 

the U.S. would not be effective in preventing nuclear terrorism and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons if 

it failed to garner international support 

for its policies. From this basic principle, the students developed three 

major policy recommendations. 

 First, the regulation and control of 

highly-enriched uranium requires domestic revisions for nuclear technology protections as well as the development and expansion of international regimes to regulate the production, transportation, and use of highlyenriched uranium (HEU). To provide 

the best deterrence against U.S. export violations, Congress should pass 

the U.S. Department of Commercesupported Export Enforcement Act, 

which, after being introduced by 

Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT) in 

August 2007, was effectively killed in 

committee.9 At the international level, 

nuclear non-proliferation regimes 

should increase the level of control 

and tracking of non-military nuclear 

material and technology. Existing 

efforts to track and secure HEU 

should continue to expand under the 

direct purview of the IAEA, as an 

―independent‖ body for the promotion 

of nuclear security. Existing IAEA 

inspection agreements fail to address 

security concerns at nuclear facilities, 

placing sole responsibility for protection in the hands of the individual 

state. Through the IAEA, states 

should be able to acquire additional 

security assistance. As the nonproliferation norm globalizes, these 

expanded security programs should 

be mandated and formulated into additional protocols or reforms to the 

existing NPT.

 Some delegates expressed concern about emphasizing international 

regimes in non-proliferation efforts. 

The scope of these regimes might 

increase, but, in the view of some 

delegates, an expansion would do 

little to include states such as China, 

North Korea, and Pakistan, that 

would be unlikely to participate in any 

restrictive non-proliferation effort. 

Most delegates recognized this problem, and also believed that existing 

international regimes for nonproliferation and nuclear security did 

little to influence current nuclearweapons states to ensure the safety 

of their own nuclear material. In Russia, for example, relaxed security 

measures due to funding cuts have 

deteriorated their ability to adequately 

secure all HEU within the country.10 

An international system for assisting 

states in nuclear fuel protection would 

go far in alleviating the many concerns associated with unsecured nuclear materials.

 Second, the actions of Iran have 

shown the danger that comes from 

states developing their own entirely 

indigenous nuclear fuel cycles. On a 

global scale, there are environmental 

and security-related issues associated with numerous states developing 

and running their own nuclear fuel 

cycles. In theory, such problems can 

be significantly reduced by expanding 

programs such as the Global Nuclear 

Energy Partnership to include current 

non-weapons states that have a need 

for an expanded energy infrastructure, but lack the capital and technology to safely and securely conduct 

such a program. Regardless of which 

multilateral enrichment regimes are 

supported by the United States, efforts towards nuclear fuel cycle protection must be multilateral.

 One area that caused heated disagreement among the table delegates was whether the United States 

should utilize its broad economic and 

diplomatic assets to expand and internationalize the Additional Protocol 

of the NPT.11 While many thought 

that full acceptance would serve to 

change the international norms surrounding nuclear proliferation, others 

argued that the states most willing to 

develop nuclear weapons would be 

unlikely to sign the Additional Protocol anyway. Instead, they argued, 

the U.S. should place an emphasis 

on funding programs to prevent the 

theft of nuclear material and technologies (such as the Nuclear Cities Initiative or the revised Nunn-Lugar agreement).

 Third, the delegates agreed that in 

all counter-proliferation efforts, the 

United States should use military 

force only as a last resort and for immediate threats. First and foremost, 

international diplomatic efforts should 
17 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

be used to garner support from 

friendly states to increase the costs of 

noncompliance to proliferating countries. Because of the technology and 

material required for nuclear weapons 

development, non-state actors must 

either steal nuclear material or enlist 

the support of a proliferating state. If 

states understand that even their implicit cooperation with terrorist organizations will be met with severe international punishment in the event of 

an attack, much of the non-state actor 

problem is reduced to preventing the 

theft of nuclear materials.

 Although there were minor differences in opinion among PWM delegates, all agreed that the U.S. has 

been largely unsuccessful in its efforts to prevent the proliferation of 

nuclear weapons. Many programs, 

such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, have done great work in this 

field, but the standard for success is 

necessarily high. The development 

of nuclear weapons by North Korea 

and Iran and the failure of Russia to 

adequately protect all of its existing 

HEU stores place the U.S. at a 

greater risk of nuclear attack in the 

near future. While experts predict 

that this attack will most likely be from 

an Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization, 

preventing the proliferation of technology to rogue states will also decrease 

the availability of unprotected nuclear 

fuel and information.

Lessons Learned

 A number of valuable lessons 

were learned from this first SCUSA 

roundtable on the proliferation of 

weapons and materials. Foremost 

was the value of having both policyoriented and technically-oriented 

delegates and co-chairs participate in 

the proliferation discussions, since in 

the opinion of the co-chairs, routine 

interactions between these groups of 

experts are infrequent and thus limits 

the types of solutions they offer to 

decision makers. Having one table 

co-chair from the policy side and one 

from the technical side is a model that 

should be continued for SCUSA in 

the future.

 At a two-day conference, some 

major proliferation topics, deterrence 

and U.S. nuclear weapons policy for 

example, could not be addressed. 

Deterrence is a concept that was 

fairly well understood in the Cold War 

but it is not clear how it applies in today’s uncertain security environment 

with multiple state and non-state actors. The U.S. nuclear weapons policy is to rely on its nuclear stockpile 

as the ―ultimate deterrent‖, and will 

likely be so for the foreseeable future, 

but it is not clear that the current 

stockpile is sized and shaped to meet 

the challenges of today, nor that we 

have a strategy that outlines our 

ends, ways, and means with regards 

to nuclear weapons. Country and 

region-specific issues could also have 

been addressed more directly. Although countries such as Iran and 

North Korea were frequent topics of 

discussion during the conference, the 

discussions were not systematic. A 

more robust discussion of the history 

of the weapons programs in these 

countries in the ―read ahead‖ table 

paper may have helped the delegates 

better tailor deterrence and nonproliferation policies to these particular countries of concern. 

 Finally, the student delegates felt 

that they would have liked to have 

had more time to discuss the economic underpinnings of their policy 

recommendations. While many readers understand the idealist nature of 

some of the student recommendations, it should be noted that the delegates did try to support ideas that 

could be economically feasible. For 

example the delegates, as part of 

their analysis, noted that a U.S.-led 

multilateral fuel cycle would require 

billions of dollars of start-up capital. 

 Overall, the table-discussion format was an excellent medium for the 

student delegates to express their 

opinions on the issues. Because the 

co-chairs allowed the debate to flow 

from the feasible to the idealistic, students were put at ease and could 

concentrate on logically evaluating 

the proposed policy recommendations. Breaking up the round table 

into smaller groups to work on policy 

recommendations in specific areas 

proved to be an efficient use of delegates’ time. Finally, the ―out-of-thebox‖ imagination and creativity displayed in the final presentation of the 

student policy paper is a plus. The 

use of humor and skits in the final 

presentations was particularly effective at grabbing the audience’s attention. This should be emphasized to 

future delegates, as should the importance of adequately rehearsing their 

presentations.

Final Thoughts

 Participation in SCUSA was a rewarding experience for all involved, 

co-chairs and delegates alike. In addition to the thought-provoking discussions on key components of U.S. 

foreign policy, SCUSA gave students 

from around the country and around 

the world the opportunity to experience USMA and to interact with cadets and subject-matter experts from 

academia and the U.S. Government. 

SCUSA co-chairs had the unique opportunity to educate and inform a 

wider and more diverse audience 

than they normally have access to. 

With the high caliber of student representation, it is possible that some of 

the delegates from SCUSA today, 

may be the policy makers of tomorrow.

 If you are interested in participating in SCUSA 2008 in early November as a table co-chair, please contact Ms. Joy Pasquazi in the USMA 

Department of Social Sciences at 

(845) 938-6401 

(Joy.Pasquazi@usma.edu). 

LTC Jeffrey H. Musk is the Director 

of the Nuclear Science and Engineering Research Center, a Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency field activity 

located at the United States Military 

Academy in the Department of Physics. He has served in multiple FA52 

assignments including: Nuclear 

Physicist at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute; Assistant 

Professor and Nuclear Engineering 

Program Director at the United States 

Military Academy Department of 

Physics; and a Defense Programs 

Staff Officer at the National Nuclear 

Security Administration. His degrees 

include a BS from the University of 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 18

Maine in Engineering Physics, a MS 

from M.I.T. in Nuclear Engineering, 

and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Science from 

Cornell University. 

Ms. Lesley Young is a Strategist in 

the Office of the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Policy Planning, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In this capacity, she is responsible for analysis 

and policy recommendations related 

to deterrence, non-proliferation, and 

future trends in conflict. Prior to this, 

Ms. Young held several assignments 

in various OSD offices including: 

DASD for Strategy, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, Office of the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, and 

the DASD for Resources and Plans. 

Her degrees include a Juris Doctor 

from Northwestern University School 

of Law, a MSc in National Security 

Strategy from the National War College in Washington, D.C. an MA from 

the London School of Economics in 

International History, and a BA in 

modern European History from Brown 

University.

Second Lieutenant Zachary Furst is a 

2008 graduate of the United States 

Military Academy, where he majored 

in International Relations with a Nuclear Engineering sequence. As a 

four-year member of the West Point 

Model United Nations team, he has 

discussed non-proliferation issues in 

crisis simulations at Oxford, Harvard, 

and Princeton Universities. Second 

Lieutenant Furst is currently serving 

in the U.S. Army's Military Intelligence 

Branch.

ENDNOTES

1. Though SCUSA is primarily attended by undergraduate students, 

some graduate students also attend. 

SCUSA 59 was attended by 22 

graduate students, all Fulbright scholars.

2. SCUSA 59 Handbook, p. 6.

3. Ibid, p.6.

4. Full text of the Proliferation of 

Weapons and Materials table paper, 

and all the other SCUSA table papers 

can be accessed on-line at

http://www.dean.usma.edu/sosh/

Conferences/scusa/index.html.

5. Assistance in preparing the table 

paper was provided by Captain 

Amanda Gookins, (USAF) from the 

Department of Social Sciences, MAJ 

Geoffrey Bull from the Department of 

Physics, and MAJ Robert Schlicht 

from the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency’s Nuclear Science and Engineering Research Center (NSERC).

6. All USMA cadets not majoring in 

engineering are required to take a 

three-course core engineering sequence in an engineering discipline of 

their choice. Cadets in the nuclear 

engineering core engineering sequence take Nuclear Reactor Analysis, Nuclear Reactor Design, and Nuclear Systems Design (i.e., nuclear 

weapons and weapons effects).

7. USMA cadets serving on the Proliferation of Weapons and Material 

round table were: CDT Zachary W. 

Furst, ’08 majoring in international 

relations with a nuclear engineering 

sequence, CDT Josh A. Caldwell, ’08, 

nuclear engineering major, CDT Brett 

A Shaffer, ’09, nuclear engineering 

major, and CDT Sahm Cho, ’11.

8. The table advisors for the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials round 

table were Captain Amanda Gookins, 

(USAF) from the Department of Social Sciences, MAJ Doug Rothenbush 

from the Department of Physics, and 

MAJ Robert Schlicht from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s 

Nuclear Science and Engineering 

Research Center (NSERC).

9. Information on the Export Enforcement Act can be found at

http://www.bis.doc.gov/

adminbillexportcontrol.htm. 

10. Matthew Bunn, Securing the 

Bomb 2007, white paper by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 

2007, p. 26.

11. ―The essence of the Additional 

Protocol is to reshape the IAEA's 

safeguards regime from a quantitative 

system focused on accounting for 

known quantities of materials and 

monitoring declared activities to a 

qualitative system aimed at gathering 

a comprehensive picture of a state's 

nuclear and nuclear-related activities, 

including all nuclear-related imports 

and exports. The Additional Protocol 

also substantially expands the IAEA's 

ability to check for clandestine nuclear facilities by providing the 

agency with authority to visit any facility-declared or not-to investigate 

questions about or inconsistencies in 

a state's nuclear declarations. NPT 

states-parties are not required to 

adopt an Additional Protocol, although the IAEA is urging all to do 

so.‖ Such a model ―Additional Protocol‖ was adopted by the IAEA in 

1997, http://www.armscontrol.org/

factsheets/IAEAProtocol.asp

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 18
19 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

T 

hey call themselves Spartans. 

"As the Spartans of the past, 

we too are trained and ready 

to respond when our nation calls," 

said COL Vance P. Visser, commander of the 48th Chemical Brigade.

 Marking the first time since World 

War I that a brigade-level headquarters has been available to command 

and control chemical forces in support of a war, the 48th Chemical Brigade was activated in September 

2007. Headquartered at Ft. Hood, 

Texas, these modern-day Spartans 

include close to 2,800 chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 

(CBRN) Soldiers in five battalions 

with 27 operational companies 

spread across nine military installations. 

 While fully supporting operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan, the brigade 

is simultaneously training to demonstrate its initial operational capability 

during an exercise in September 

2008. Still, to support the Army’s 

overall modularization and the revolutionary transformation of U.S. Army’s 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear and High Yield Explosives 

(CBRNE) assets, more growth and 

reorganization may be in the brigade's future. 

 As part of the Army’s overall 

modular transformation the 20th Support Command (CBRNE), higher 

headquarters for the 48th Chemical 

Brigade, is initiating a comprehensive 

review of its subordinate chemical 

and explosive ordnance disposal 

(EOD) organizations and evaluating 

strategies that combine both the 

CBRN and the EOD capabilities 

within standardized multi-capable 

expeditionary CBRNE brigades and 

battalions. This same valuable mix 

has already been proven effective in 

the 48th Chemical Brigade's technical 

escort battalions.

 Of the five battalions in the brigade today, two are technical escort 

battalions. Technical escort battalion 

assets are strategically responsive, 

rapidly deployable and can be tailored to the specific mission. They are 

designed to rapidly respond to mitigate and eliminate CBRNE hazards 

both at home and overseas. Each 

specially trained and equipped 

CBRNE response team has the capability to sample, detect, and monitor 

CBRNE hazards. They are able to 

mitigate initial hazards, package hazardous material for transport, provide 

technical escort of that package, and 

decontaminate themselves and their 

equipment. They also have the capability to render unexploded ordnance 

safe, or when necessary eliminate or 

disable CBRNE hazards or production facilities. Their analysis, munitions assessment, and CBRNE advice are invaluable to the decision 

makers they support. 

 The remaining three conventional 

chemical battalions, in both heavy 

and light configurations, are outfitted 

with various arrays of specialized reconnaissance, smoke, Biological Integrated Detection Systems (BIDS) or 

decontamination companies to support the operational force. 

 The primary mission of these conventional units is to improve the survivability and mobility of ground 

forces. Using CBRNE vehicles and 

equipment, such as the Fox and 

Stryker CBRN reconnaissance vehicles, reconnaissance units are able to 

detect, identify and mark areas of 

chemical and radiological contamination. Recon units also collect and 

transport air, water and ground samples to identify nuclear, biological and 

chemical contamination and convey 

real-time detailed hazard information 

to supported commanders. 

 Like recon, smoke units are employed to increase warfighter survivability. Their mission is to buy maneuver time for friendly forces and to 

protect assembly areas and other 

high-priority targets. Using equipment such as the M56 and M58 

smoke generation systems, these 

units can lay vast amounts of obscurants as camouflage, a decoy or to 

counter new generation smart weapons. 

 The BIDS consists of biological 

detection, identification and sampling 

equipment. The BIDS units are capable of detecting when a biological 

attack has occurred and can also provide presumptive identification of biological agents and produce a sample 

for detailed analysis at a laboratory.

 

 The final possible configuration of 

a conventional chemical company is 

as a decontamination unit. The primary mission of a decontamination 

unit is to return units to the field for 

future combat operations. Using 

equipment such as the M12A1 and 

Spartans Make Their Home in Texas

Cathy Kropp

20th Support Command PA Staff
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 20

M17 decontamination apparatus the units can rapidly decontaminate a vehicle and return it to the fight. The units 

are undergoing a significant modernization effort to enable 

them to conduct hazard response operations.

 However, impressive equipment and technology are 

not the sole indicators of success. As Visser points out, 

"humans are more important than hardware; quality is better than quantity; CBRNE forces cannot be mass produced; and competent CBRNE forces cannot be created 

after emergencies occur."

 With a full-time focus on countering CBRNE threats at 

home and abroad, the Spartans of the 48th Chemical Brigade are using the lessons learned in today's operations 

to transform and evolve to meet the needs of the nation to 

combat the WMD and CBRNE threats of tomorrow. 

"We stand ready with sharp swords and polished shields 

to deploy on short notice anywhere in the world to provide 

CBRNE support to protect the nation," said Visser. 

"Spartans, leading to victory!" 

Cathy Kroop is a staff writer for the 

20th Support Command PA Office. 

Photo Credit

48th Chemical Brigade website http://www.cbrne.army.mil/

subordinates/48th/leadership.html

48th Chemical Brigade 

Distinctive Unit Insignia

48th Chemical Brigade Activation Ceremony at Fort Hood, TX 19 September 2007.

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 20
21 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

C 

arbon nanotube technology is still in its infancy but 

it is now starting to flex its muscles in a wide 

range of applications; some of them, in my opinon, could have enormous military applications.

 So just what is a carbon nanotube (CNT)? Wikipedia1

says it is a ―carbon allotrope, a pure form of carbon that 

differs in structure from other carbon forms (e.g., diamond, 

graphite, amorphous carbon, and fullerene).‖ A singlewalled CNT (SWCNT) happens to be a fullerene, a oneatom thick sheet of graphite (called graphene) rolled into a 

seamless cylinder having a diameter of the order of a 

nanometer (10-9 meter). A nanometer is about the length 

of ten atoms side-by-side, so we are talking about a small 

diameter! This single-layer wrap is called a chiral wrap. 

 The article says SWCNT had already been made into 

operational discreet devices and integrated circuits. What 

Wikipedia doesn’t say is that a SWCNT molecule has alDO YOU KNOW...

One Carbon Nanotube Molecule Does

An Operable Radio Make?

Robert A. Pfeffer

Physical Scientist, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Artists’s concept of a SWCNT chiral wrap 1
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 22

ready been configured to be an operating radio.

 So what about this single-walled carbon nanotube radio? The U.S. Department of Energy Lawrence Berkeley 

National Laboratory and the University of California at 

Berkeley first used SWCNT to make ―... an exceptionally 

sensitive force sensor. Nanotubes are like tiny cat whiskers. Small forces, on the order of attonewtons (10-18 newton), cause them to deflect a significant amount. By detecting this deflection, you can infer what force was acting 

on the nanotube. This incredible sensitivity becomes even 

greater at the nanotube’s flexural resonance frequency, 

which falls within the frequencies of radio broadcasts, cell 

phones and GPS broadcasting. Because of this high 

resonance frequency, Alex (Zettl) suggested that nanotubes could be used to make a radio.‖ 2

 And that is just 

what happened. Dr. Zettl oversaw the work of one of his 

graduate students (Kenneth Jensen), who designed and 

then constructed the radio.

 ―Incoming radio waves interact with the nanotube’s 

electrically charged tip, causing the nanotube to vibrate. 

These vibrations are only significant when the frequency 

of the incoming wave coincides with the nanotube’s flexural resonance frequency, which, like a conventional radio, can be tuned during operation to receive only a preselected segment, or channel, of the electromagnetic 

spectrum. 

 Amplification and demodulation properties arise from 

the needle-point geometry of carbon nanotubes, giving 

them unique field emission properties. By concentrating 

the electric field of the DC bias voltage applied across the 

electrodes, the nanotube radio produces a field-emission 

current that is sensitive to the nanotube’s mechanical vibrations. Since the field-emission current is generated by 

the external power source, amplification of the radio signal 

is possible. Furthermore, since field emission is a nonlinear process, it also acts to demodulate an AM or FM 

radio signal, just like the diode used in traditional radios.‖ 2

 SWCNTs have been made to function as an antenna, a 

tunable bandpass filter, an amplifier, and a demodulator, 

so says Dr. Zetti, the leader of the radio nanotube research effort. This means SWCNTs can function almost 

as an entire radio, the exception being the speaker. For 

more technical information on the radio and to actually see 

a SWCNT and then hear the theme music from Star Wars 

by John Williams (first transmitted to it, and then recorded 

off it), go to http://www.lbl.gov/Science-Articles/Archive/

MSD-nanoradio.html. 

Absolutely incredible!

 

 In my opinion, SWCNT radios are just the tip of the 

nanotube application iceberg. They represent the first of 

many military and intel applications that can range from 

weapons systems to sensors to C4I and medical applications. And now that SWCNT has been made into flexible 

discrete components (i.e., transistors on a thin film substrate) using nanonet technology,3

their applications could 

be realized even sooner. Some applications include: 

SWCNT radio(s) woven into uniforms for short-range communication links powered by solar cells made with quantum dots (another nanotube application); tiny sensors attached to aircraft to detect surface cracks or hidden virtually anywhere to monitor real-time battlefield conditions. 

Nanotubes, under the proper control, are even small 

enough to be injected into the bloodstream for medical 

monitoring or treatment. Finally, SWCNT particles could 

be used to compromise electronic equipment. 

 Expect to hear about many more technology breakthroughs once the cost for producing SWCNTs is reduced 

from the year 2000 cost of $1500 per gram. 

Now if only I could find a carbon nanotube speaker.... 

 

Further Reading 

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carbon_nanotube.html.

2. Yarris, Lynn, Make Way for the Real Nanopod: Berkeley Researchers Create First Fully Functional Nanotube 

Radio, Research News Berkeley Lab, 30 October 2007.

3. Google SWCNT and nanonet technology.

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 22
23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

T 

he European Fighter Aircraft 

(Eurofighter) Typhoon currently is the most advanced 

aircraft designed for high performance multirole in aerial maneuvers. 

This twin-engine fighter aircraft is distinguished for its air agility, canarddelta wing, interface optimized manmachine systems, fusion of sensory 

data, integrated networks of military 

data, and equipped with the most 

modern armament and new technologies. The aircraft was built by a consortium of three partner companies: 

Alenia Aeronautica, BAE Systems, 

and EADS1 working through a holding 

company formed in 1986. The Eurofighter has entered into service with 

the U.K. Royal Air Force, the German 

Luftwaffe, the Italian Air Force, the 

Spanish Air Force and the Austrian 

Air Force.2 The aircraft is still in the 

beginning phase of expanding the 

development of its own abilities, as 

agreed among the participant nations.

 Several construction materials 

from the Eurofighter have been selected for testing their maximum resistance against penetration of 

chemical warfare (CW) agents. Concerning aircraft operation in a CW 

environment, the joint commission of 

experts from the four partner countries sorted the materials in four lists3

based on their chemical and physical 

properties. The material resistance to 

agent penetration was rated as: 1. 

Poor, 2. Sufficient, 3. Good, and 4. 

Excellent. The decontamination experiment was carried out with the purpose of evaluating the efficacy of a 

new concept of decontamination system, the SX34, which was designed 

for ―thorough decontamination‖ of 

―sensitive equipment‖. The SX34 

decontamination system has been 

developed at the University of Padua, 

Italy, and sponsored by the Italian 

Company Cristanini. The evaluation 

test was carried out at the Centro 

Tecnico Logistico Interforze NBC 

(NBC Technical Logistic Interforces 

Centre), in Civitavecchia, Italy.

 ―Sensitive equipment‖ includes all 

materials that are particularly vulnerable to degradation in a CWcontaminated environment and need 

to be reused after decontamination. 

Sensitive equipment and environments include avionics, electronics, 

optics, aircraft/vehicle interiors and 

associated cargos.4 These are generally difficult to decontaminate due 

to their construction characteristics, 

component materials, and location on 

the aircraft. Some of these materials 

may be damaged by humidity and 

become corroded with current decontamination products. Weaponized 

chemical and biological agents are 

designed to resist decontamination 

by penetrating the surfaces they 

touch.5 For these reasons the SX34 

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

Chemical Warfare Decontamination of 

Eurofighter Materials

A Case Study of the SX34 System

Renato Bonora, Ph.D.

Professor of Chemical Engineering, University of Padua, Italy

Figure 1. Eurofighter Typhoon.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 24

decon system excludes the chemical 

deactivation of the agent directly on 

the contaminated surface and the 

destruction of CW agent is performed 

in a confined device. In contrast, 

current decontaminants available on 

the market are strong enough to deal 

with such agents, but they are so 

harsh that they cause damage to the 

sensitive equipment they are intended to cleanse. Apart from materials damage, the runoff and seepage 

of the agent/decontaminant into the 

aircraft gaps normally cause crosscontamination.

 The SX34 decontamination system has been developed with the 

purpose of satisfying the following 

objectives: 

Ready-for-use system, active for different chemical, 

biological, and radiological 

(CBR) agents, as well as 

any other substance that 

may contain them

No liquid form in order to 

avoid spread of contamination

No chemical reaction on the 

surfaces except removal of 

agents

Detoxification/disposal of 

the decon residue remotely

Virtually useable on all surface material and shape 

without causing damage, 

even after multiple application cycles

Environmental friendly

Suitable for military and civil 

application

Long life span

Easy to handle and store

Simple to use with no need 

for specific training

EVALUATION TEST

 The aim of the test was to assess 

the SX34 decontamination efficacy 

on ―sensitive materials‖ that should 

be reused after the decontamination 

process. The procedures were conducted according to NATO Document

-STANAG 4653-AEP 58 Chapter 3, 

para 3.5. One goal was to determine 

the SX34 efficiency and ability to extract Yperite (sulfur mustard gas)

from contaminated sensitive materials. The decontamination yield provides the measure of such capability 

at the n-decontamination cycle. The 

yield is defined as ηn= [(C0-Cend)/C0] x 

100 (where C0 is the initial concentration of the chemical weapon and Cend

is the corresponding concentration 

after the decontamination treatment). 

The results obtained have been compared with solvent washing using 

isopropyl alcohol and scrubbing with 

absorbent paper.

 Chemical agents used in the experiments were Yperite HD Mustard 

Agent (this HD agent is a colorless 

and odorless liquid with a great blistering power). The threshold amount 

of mustard vapor required to produce 

a skin lesion varies greatly depending 

on a number of factors, including temperature, humidity, moisture on the 

skin, and exposure site on the body. 

HD has very low solubility in water 

(< 1%), but once dissolved, it readily 

hydrolyzes forming the thiodiglycol. 

Its low solubility and low vapor pressure (~ 0.11 mmHg at 25°C) contribute to its high persistence. The penetrability of HD depends on the amount 

used, the temperature and the nature 

of the contaminated material.6 

Materials

 Ten different materials in group 2, 

commonly employed in the internal 

parts of the aircraft, were chosen by 

the CSV (Centro Sperimentale di 

Volo – Experimental Flight Centre) of 

"Pratica di Mare", Italy. The different 

materials tested in this study are 

listed in Table 1 (Above).

Contamination procedure

 The selected aircraft materials 

Commercial 

Name Description and Applications

Fluorined rubber 

sheet type 6000

Sheet based on FKM (fluorinated rubber) highly resistant 

to high temperatures, oils, fuels and ozone. Excellent 

flame resistance and use at elevated temperatures with 

chemical. Maximum working temperature 200°C. Good 

mechanical properties.

Fluorined rubber 

sheet type Viton®

6000

Sheet based on FKM (fluorinated rubber) highly resistant 

to high temperatures, oils, fuels and ozone. Excellent 

flame resistance and use at elevated temperatures with 

chemical. Maximum working temperature 200°C. Good 

mechanical properties.

Chloroprene 

sheet type 3012

Sheet based on CR (polychloroprene rubber) and SBR 

rubber with good resistance to oils at room temperature 

and atmospheric agent. Good mechanical properties.

Super Chloroprene 

sheet type 3015

Sheet based on CR (polychloroprene rubber) with excellent resistance to oils, atmospheric agents and flame. Excellent mechanical properties.

Fuel-resistant 

sheet type 2026

Sheet based on NBR (nitrile rubber) with good oil and fuel 

resistance and with good mechanical properties. Maximum working temperature 100°C.

Oil-resistant 

sheet type 2001

Sheet based on NBR (nitrile rubber) resisting to oils and 

animal fats. Good mechanical properties. Maximum working temperature 100°C.

Polymethyl 

metacrylate

Plexiglas sheet, transparent and light material, with high 

optical and mechanical properties.

PVC

Polyvinyl chloride sheet resisting to alkali, acids and general electrolytes and also quite good resisting to organic 

solvents; soluble in esters, ketones and chlorinated solvents. Good mechanical properties.

ULTEM® 

1668A (29)

Extruded Polyetherimide sheet resisting to a wide range 

of solvents and chemical cleansing; it’s attacked from 

chlorinated solvents and ketones.

Table 1. Names and descriptions of materials used in the test.
25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

were size 5 × 5 cm (25 cm2). Each 

sample was contaminated with 2 g/

m

2 (0.2 mg/cm2

) of HD agent corresponding to a chemical weapon release amount of 5 mg (i.e. 3.9 μl; 0.2 

mg/cm2× 25 cm2= 5 mg; 5 mg/

dHD=3.9 μl). This is ten times more 

than that amount given in NATO 

Document (STANAG 4653–AEP58, 

Ed. 1, “Decontamination Triptych”, 20 

Sept 2005) as the expected CW contamination (0.2 g/m2

) for interior surfaces of military equipment. The 

contamination was performed by using a ―mold‖ instrument specifically 

designed for the test and calibrated 

to dispense 2 g/m2 of agent. The 

mold consists of a metal support with 

a cylindrical tube fixed on one side, 

the mold’s handle, and 25 metal tips 

located on the opposite side where 

each tip is attached to a spring piston 

(Figure 2).

 To perform the contamination, the 

25 mould tips were placed in a vessel 

containing 5 ml of HD corresponding 

to 6.4 g (such excessive volume is 

required to ascertain immersion of all 

metal tips). The agent-soaked tips 

were placed on the sample and then 

the mold was slightly swung, making 

a gentle pressure on the material. 

The mold with pins-spring system 

allowed a uniform contamination on 

the entire material, even if the surface was uneven, and deposited 25 

small droplets (0.16 μl each) reaching a total volume of 4 μl per sample 

(Figure 3).

 This contamination pattern would 

have been impossible to achieve using the traditional method (Hamilton 

pipette) by which only one drop of 1 

μl can be dispensed at the most. Using the mold also allowed a much 

faster contamination on several samples in a short time, thus representing 

another advantage of performing a 

simple but not trivial ―stamping‖ pattern over the material (Figure 4).

Decontamination procedure

 The SX34 decontaminant product 

is a multiphase aerosol system contained in a pressurized metal canister 

(pressure equals 8 to 5 bar with continuity, ready to use (see Figure 5).

 The pressurized system was composed of a liquid part (solvent), a 

solid part (sorbent) and the propellant. The generated aerosol was 

chemically inert towards the toxic 

agent and it does not damage the 

materials on which it was applied, 

thus making it possible to reuse the 

material. The aerosolized physical 

state also made it possible to decon 

those surfaces hard to reach. SX34 

system is equipped with a vacuum 

device designed to remove the product and it cleaned the surfaces once 

the decon treatment was completed. 

The vacuum device contained two 

filters (HEPA and ULPA) to assure a 

powder free-air ejection, while contaminated residuals were collected in 

a small bag placed inside the device 

that was safely disposable afterwards. It was possible to deactivate 

the agent by using the BX247decon 

solution previously placed inside the 

bag. 

Figure 2. The "mold" with metal pins.

Figure 3. Yperite drawing .
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 26

 The decontamination procedure 

for SX34 employment in the laboratory was performed by defining one 

―decontamination cycle‖ composed of 

three consecutive stages:

1. Application: SX34 was sprayed like 

paint directly on the contaminated 

surface in order to cover it with a thick 

layer.

2. Drying: once the product was applied, it was necessary to wait for it 

to dry and turn into a powder; the 

waiting time can vary slightly depending on the weather conditions 

and the amount of product used in 

the treatment (a standard time of 30 

min was set for laboratory tests). 

The dried surface appeared covered 

with a thick and compact, white 

layer.

3. Removal: after 30 min of contact 

time the layer was vacuumed. The 

residue was easily removed with the 

toxic agent trapped inside; if the decontamination was successful the 

surface will appeared perfectly clean.

Laboratory procedure

 A contamination of five samples 

was consecutively carried out for 

each different material available; the 

five samples were named as follows: 

sample A (control), sample B 

(washing), samples 1, 2, 3 

(respectively processed with 1, 2 and 

3 decontamination cycles). After contamination, sample A was extracted 

with 100 ml of a solvent mixture; an 

amount of this solution was collected 

and analyzed by GC-MS; sample B 

was washed with isopropyl alcohol, 

then extracted and analyzed; samples 1, 2 and 3 were extracted and 

analyzed in this order at the end of 

the corresponding consecutive decontamination cycle. The decontamination treatment was repeated up to 

five or six times for the materials less 

resistant to chemical weapon effect. 

 Samples A and B were placed in a 

glass vessel provided with a cover, 

while samples 1, 2 and 3 were fixed on 

laboratory bench and then covered by 

upside-down beakers after being contaminated (Figure 7, page 28).

 After 30 min, samples 1, 2 and 3 

were treated with SX34 decontaminant spray, sample A was extracted 

with 100 ml of heptane acetone and 

sample B was washed with 20 ml of 

isopropyl alcohol. The washing procedure was performed by raising the 

sample with steel tweezers and pouring the solvent over it using a Pasteur 

pipette, and collecting the solvent in 

the same vessel. The sample was 

then dried with blotting paper and put 

in a second clean vessel where it was 

extracted with 100 ml of extraction 

mixture. Then extracts A and B were 

collected and analyzed by ultrasonic 

vibration (40 min, room temperature ~ 

20°C). For samples 1, 2 and 3, the 

decontamination residues, once dried 

and turned into a powder (t=30 min), 

were removed using the vacuumdevice (Figure 8 page 28). Sample 1 

was extracted with 100 ml of solvent 

mixture and analyzed. Samples 2 

and 3 were treated again with the 

decontaminant and successively removed once dried. Sample 2 was 

extracted and analyzed, while sample 

3 was subjected to the third decontamination cycle and finally extracted 

and analyzed.

CHEMICAL ANALYSIS

Instrument specifications

 Capillary column gas chromatography-tandem mass spectrometry 

technique (GC-MS) was applied to 

the extracted samples of HD for identification and quantification. The ion 

fragmentation was performed by electron impact (EI) (mass spectrometer 

running in EI mode) and the mass 

identification was attained by an ion 

trap analyzer operated in full scan 

mode. The GC-MS system employed 

was a PolarisQ mass spectrometer 

(Thermo Fischer Scientific) interfaced 

to a Trace GC gas chromatograph 

(Thermo Fischer Scientific), both run 

by Xcalibur software.

Figure 5. SX34 decontaminant canister

Figure 4. Oil-resistant nitrile rubber (type 2001) one minute after contamination.
27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

 

Figure 6 shows a typical chromatogram of HD with its corresponding 

mass spectrum, showing the characteristic ions provided by fragmentation (111, 109) with the molecular 

peak (molecular ion 158), which all 

together allowed the identification of 

the target compound. Among these, 

the ion 109 was the one with greatest 

abundance in the full scan-MS spectrum of HD. 

C:\Xcalibur\...\ST_HD_1ppm 11/21/2007 4:26:34 PM

RT: 6.74 - 7.60 SM: 9 G

6.8 6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6

Time (min)

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

100 

7.09

6.79 6.83 6.87 6.94 7.01 7.20 7.26 7.31 7.35 7.37 7.46 7.50 7.55 7.59

NL:

4.31E4

m/z= 

108.50-

109.50 F: 

MS 

ST_HD_1p

p m

ST_HD_1ppm #142 RT: 7.09 AV: 1 NL: 6.29E4

T: + c Full ms [ 45.00-250.00]

6 0 8 0 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240

m/z

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

100 

109

158

7 3

160

111

5 9

4 7

6 3 9 6 5 8

6 5 9 8 162 5 7 7 9 8 1 123 4 9 7 0 9 5 105 120 130 137 147 157 163 175 180 191 194 207 210 219 229 235 246

Figure 6. (a) Extracted ion GC-MS chromatogram for m/z 109 of HD standard solution (1ppm); (b) Electron impact 

mass spectrum of Yperite corresponding to the above chromatogram peak (full spectral scan).
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 28

 The instrument was operated at 

the following GC-MS experimental 

conditions:

Injection volume: 1 μl

Injection mode: PTV 

splitless

Injector temperature program: initial temperature 

70°C, +14.5°C/min. up to 

250°C, held for 1min

Split flow: 20 ml/min

Splitless time: 1 min

GC Column: 30 m ×

0.25 mm × 0.25 μm (max. 

temp. 250°C); enabled the 

analytical separation of 

HD from its degradation 

and hydrolysis products

Gas carrier: He, 1 ml/min

Oven temperature program: initial temp. 50°C 

(held for 1 min), +20°C/

min up to 235°C, held for 

2 min

Source temperature: 

 250°C

Solvent delay: 6.8 min

Mass range: EI full scanning MS data were acquired over a mass range 

of 250-45 amu

Calibration

 HD sample concentrations were 

calculated by external standard calibration. Known amounts of HD were 

weighed and dissolved in heptaneacetone (9/1) to give stock solution 

having a concentration of ~100 mg l-1; 

appropriate dilutions of the stock solution where then used as working 

standards. HD levels were chosen in 

function with the concentration range 

investigated during the measurements (0 to 60 ppm), which depended 

on the amount of chemical agent 

used in the initial contamination and 

the dilution volumes employed in the 

successive extractions (5 mg /100 ml 

= 50 mg/l). A calibration curve was 

established plotting the measured 

quantity (instrumental signal) towards 

the different levels of HD. The standards analyses were performed by 

using the same electron impact MS 

operating conditions employed for 

samples analyses. Data were acquired in triplicate at each concentration level. The external standard calibration curve was prepared based on 

the peak area of the quantitation ion 

at m/z 109 (extracted ion chromatogram) vs. concentrations (range: 

~0.5 to ~60 mg/l). A good linearity 

was observed in the investigated 

range using the full scan acquisition 

mode and quantifying only the base 

peak of HD. 

 In the course of experiments the 

instrumental calibration curve was 

periodically checked by injecting two 

standard solutions whose concentrations belong to the work range of interest (0 to 50 ppm), and testing the 

analytical response. The detection 

limit (LoD) of the chromatographic 

method was estimated from extracted 

ion chromatogram for m/z 109 corresponding to HD standard solution at a 

low level (0.64 ppm) and calculated 

as the peak having a signal to noise 

ratio of 3. Experimental LoD was 

found to be ~ 7 μg·l-1(Figure 9 page 

30).

Chemicals

 All solvents (heptane, acetone and 

isopropanol) were High Performance 

Liquid (HPLC) grade (purity > 99%

Chromasolv®, Sigma-Aldrich Corp.).

Figure 7. Arrangement of samples A, B, and 1, 2, and 3.

Figure 8. SX34 applied (white powder) on material and removal of residues.
29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

Test Results

 GC-MS results obtained for all 

extracted samples reported in Table 2 

are expressed as decontamination 

yields (%), calculated for each repeating SX34 treatment and for the isopropanal, 99.5%, and washing (ηB).

(see Table 2).

 Materials on Table 2 are arranged 

in order of growing sensitivity to the 

chemical agent. A greater quantity of 

agent penetrates into inner surfaces 

of the more sensitive materials making its complete extraction by simple 

solvent washing unreachable; therefore such materials show a lower 

washing yield value (ηB). The observed effects induced by contamination represent an experimental proof 

of such high sensitivity to the chemical agent: the ―liquid‖ droplets disappear and leave a swollen surface after only a few minutes after placing 

HD on the sample. This effect is 

shown on Figure 4 (page 26).

Considerations

 The test results obtained show 

some fundamental aspects of the 

decon mechanism of SX34, thus 

helping to understand the effects influencing the efficiency of the decontamination process. For this purpose 

it is useful to focus on the differences 

between the SX34 decontamination 

yields and the solvent-wash ones.

Comparison of Decontamination 

and Solvent Washing

 The SX34 treatment gives a 

greater decontamination performance 

for all tested materials when compared with solvent-washing (sample 

B), with differences in overall yield 

ranging from 0.05 to 91.4%. Table 3 

shows the differences calculated at 

the end of the third decontamination 

cycle and at the end of the fifth and 

sixth decontamination cycles for the 

less chemically resistant materials. 

The results show that the greatest 

differences are related to the more 

sensitive materials, which are those 

with less resistance to the HD penetration after 30 min of contact time. A 

reasonable interpretation of the data 

is that the HD penetrated into the material is effectively extracted by SX34 

decontaminant and proves the high 

SX34 extraction capability. Moreover, such large differences with the 

SX34/solvent-wash yields (Δ3 = 43.2-

87.4) suggests that the SX34 employment should be more suitable in 

these cases than with the chemically 

inert materials. On the other hand, 

the SX34 capability to extract the 

toxic agent from the more resistant 

materials, in which the chemical aliquot remaining over the surface is the 

most from the total contamination 

amount, are partially hidden by solvating process, which is the primary 

process by which the toxicity is removed. 

Material

(Commercial 

Name)

Decontamination Yield (%)

*ηn= [(C0-Cend)/C0] x 100

ηB η1 η2 η3 η4 η5 η 6

Solvent

Washing

SX34 Treatment

Polymethylmetacrylate 

sheet

99.5 98.3 100

Fluorinated 

rubber sheet 

type Viton® 

6000

99.0 93.5 98.7 99.8

PVC sheet 98.7 99.9 100

ULTEM® 1668A

(29) sheet 98.6 98.6 99.8 99.9

Fluorinated 

rubber sheet 

type 6000

97.9 93.5 99.2 99.5

Painted metal

(CARC paint) 92.2 88.1 98.1 99.4

Chloroprene 

sheet type 3012 43.9 66.1 78.5 87.1 89.0 93.2

Fuel-resistant 

sheet type 2026 9.3 32.1 58.9 73.8 77.3 86.4

Super 

chloroprene 

sheet type 3015

1.8 44.3 80.7 89.2 90.7 93.2

Oil-resistant 

sheet type 2001 1.4 31.8 44.8 63.3 73.0 80.0 83.9

Table 2. Decontamination yields (ηn)

*C0 = HD initial concentration (mg/l), sample A.

 Cend = HD concentration (mg/l) at the end of SX34 treatments (from 1 to 6) and 

after the solvent washing (sample B). 

 n = number of repeating decontamination cycle. [Average of three acquisitions; LoD (Limit of Detection) ~7 ppb] (Figure 10).
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 30

Thus, SX34 achieved excellent decontamination yields because of its 

good solvent power and its concomitant extraction activity that removes 

the chemical residual traces not eliminated by the solvent action. In two 

cases (PVC and Polymethyl 

methacrylate), the 100% of the decontamination yield was gained since 

the second SX34 treatment. 

 For the remaining materials 

(CARC-painted metal, Ultem®1668A

(29), fluorinated rubber 6000, fluorinated rubber Viton®

6000), a high 

percentage level of decontamination 

was achieved (99.4 <ηdec <99.9) at 

the end of the third treatment.

C:\Xcalibur\...\ST_HD_0,64ppm02 2/5/2008 3:26:57 PM

RT: 6.85 - 8.58 SM: 9 G

6.9 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5

Time (min)

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

100 

RT: 7.09

AA: 101153

SN: 265RMS

NL:

5.36E4

m/z= 

108.50-

109.50 F: 

MS ICIS 

ST_HD_0,6

4ppm02

ST_HD_0,64ppm02 #4 3 RT: 7.09 AV: 1 NL: 7.63E4

T: + c Full ms [ 45.00-250.00]

6 0 8 0 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240

m/z

0

1 0

2 0

3 0

4 0

5 0

6 0

7 0

8 0

9 0

100 

109

158

7 3

111 160

5 9

4 7 6 3 9 6

5 8 162 6 5 4 9 5 7 9 8 123

6 8 7 9 8 3 8 9 9 5 105 113 128 141 145 151 163 175 185 189 193 207 218 225 232 239 245

Figure 9. Limit of detection (LoD) calculated from the GC-MS (extracted ion) chromatogram of 

HD standard solution (0.64 mg•l-1)
31 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

CONCLUSIONS

Mechanism evidence

 This evaluation test has highlighted the two chemical-physical 

steps by which the multiphase system 

SX34 works: the liquid phase dissolves the toxic agent and the solution diffuses into the porous solid system where the agent is trapped. This 

double solvation-absorption action is 

particularly successful in the removal 

of the HD penetrated deeply into the 

material that cannot be removed with 

just the solvent.

Workability

 After testing SX34 decontamination system, its operation effectiveness was evaluated. The experimental activity and test results show that 

SX34 has considerable capability as 

a decontaminant based on its dualphase operating process. A special 

feature of this system is that it can be 

easily used by personnel with lowlevel training. Another peculiarity of 

its designed operating process 

emerged during the comparative tests 

with the solvent.

 In fact, the solvent, or possibly the 

emulsion/micro-emulsions, transports 

the chemical agent into the subsurface layers not affected by the original contamination in a way that is not 

easily detectable, thus originating a 

secondary contamination. This inconvenience can be overcome in a laboratory by completely washing the surface. It is clear that in actual military 

operational conditions this behavior 

could have other consequences such 

as agent penetration into grooves, 

gaps of sensitive devices, or on rough 

surfaces, which would inevitably increase the contaminated area. An 

example of this possibility is in the 

complex Eurofighter cockpit area.8

 Conversely, using the SX34 decontaminant it is possible to attain 

coverage of the entire surface with 

the drying characteristic of the product as a white powder. This paint-like 

decontaminant allows specific intervention only in the area where SX34 

was sprayed. For odd surfaces that 

are difficult to decontaminate due to 

their construction characteristics, the 

component materials or locations can 

also be reached by the aerosolized 

product. Finally, the test showed that 

SX34 neither damaged nor caused 

loss in weight of the materials on 

which it was applied. This is a desirable property for a product designed 

to decontaminate sensitive equipment 

that would normally be damaged by 

the moisture and corrosivity of other 

decontaminants. The SX34 decontamination kit is a rapid and effective 

system for the resolution of unexpected situations requiring immediate 

action.

Dr. Renato Bonora is a professor of 

Chemical Engineering at the University of Padua, Italy. His broad field of 

expertise includes remediation of 

contaminated sites, CBR decontamination, and conventional and nonconventional ammunition demilitarization 

processes. He has delivered numerous research papers in worldwide 

conferences on the aspects of CBR 

decontamination. His email address 

is: renato.bonora@unipd.it

ENDNOTES

1. European Aeronautic Defence and 

Space Company EADS N.V.

Le Carré · Beechavenue 130-132, 

1119 PR Schiphol Rijk, Paesi Bassi

EADS Deutschland GmbH, 81663 

Monaco di Baviera, Germany.

EADS France S.A.S., 37, boulevard 

de Montmorency, 75781, Paris Cedex 

16, France. EADS CASA · Ava. de 

Aragón, 404, 28022 Madrid, Spain.

http://quicklink.all.googlepages.com/

eurofighter.htm

2. ht tp :/ / www. e urof ig h ter .com /

default.asp - European Aeronautic 

Defence and Space Company EADS 

N.V.

Materials Δ3 Δ5 Δ6

Oil–resistant sheet type 2001 61.9 78.6 82.5

Super chloroprene sheet type 3015 87.4 91.4

Fuel-resistant sheet type 2026 64.5 77.1

Chloroprene sheet type 3012 43.2 49.3

Painted metal

(CARC paint) 7.2

Fluorinated rubber sheet type 6000 1.6

ULTEM® 1668A(29) sheet 1.3

PVC sheet 1.3

Fluorinated rubber sheet type Viton® 6000 0.8

Polimethyl metacrylate 0.5

Table 3. Differences between decontamination yields obtained at the end of the 

third, fifth and sixth SX34 treatments.

Table 3. Differences between decontamination yields obtained at the end of the 

third, fifth and sixth SX34 treatments (η3, η5, η6) and the solvent-wash ones (ηB); 

Δ3(5,6) are the differences between η3(5,6) and ηB. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 32

3. Aeronautica Militare Italiana, Comando Logistico, 

Personal Communication. 

4. NATO Document - STANAG 4653 – AEP 58 Ed. 1 

―Decontamination Triptych‖, 20 Sept 2005.

5. Navy Training System Plan For The Joint Service Sensitive Equipment Decontamination System N78-NTSP-A50-0117, April 2002.

6. Experimental Research on SX34 Decontaminant System, Technical report, Centro Tecnico Logistico Interforze 

NBC, Civitavecchia, Italy, May 2009.

7. http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189724c.pdf, http://

www.cristanini.it/mil/bx_24.htm 

8. http://www.eurofighter.ch/1024/it/eurofighter/cockpit/

displays.htm

Eurofighter Typhoon picture:

http://quicklink.all.googlepages.com/typhoon_002.jpg

Figure 10. SX34 Kit Components.

1. 10 canisters (0.75 liter capacity each) of SX34 decontaminant

2. 1 storage / transportation box, drop shock resistant

3. 1 Deco Vacuum [weight 9.5 kg (20.9 lbs), 220 to 240V, 50 to 60HZ, 1200 W]

4. 1 HEPA and N°1 ULPA filter

5. 5 bags for collection of contaminated materials

6. 6 various accessories for access to those ―hard to reach‖ places

7. 2 brushes

8. 10 nozzles

9. 1 decontamination/detoxification system PSDS1,5 MIL

10. 2 containers for correct dosage of the detoxification / decontamination product BX24

11. 1 bottle (1 kg) of detoxifying /decontaminating product BX 24

12. 1 removable decontamination box for Deco Vacuum hose

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 32
33 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

I 

ntroduction

 Immediately after the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union the United States 

and Russia began a period of cooperation in several technical areas. 

One of those areas included the 

documentation of U.S.S.R. nuclear 

test results. In the 1990s, several 

technical exchanges on this subject 

took place, both in the United States 

and in Russia. Additionally, a number 

of Russian scientists were funded to 

document some of their work. This 

article provides a short history of Russian openness and looks at two unclassified Russian articles published 

in international journals,1,2 one published in 1998 on long line response 

to high-altitude electromagnetic pulse 

(HEMP) and the other in 2004 on 

geomagnetic effects caused by several high-altitude nuclear explosions 

(HANEs). Their findings are then 

compared to several other unclassified Russian and United States 

sources.3-10 

Short History of Russian 

Openness

 There was a period of time after 

the Soviet era during which the Russians became somewhat open in their 

willingness to share information pertaining to their nuclear test program. 

Scientists at the Russian nuclear 

laboratory – VNIEF in Sarov, Russia 

– produced reports11,12 under contract to the Defense Special Weapons 

Agency (DSWA), one of the forerunners of the current Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA) – that 

chronicled the history and provided 

many technical details of their nuclear 

test program. In 1995, Dr. Lynn 

Shaeffer, under the auspices of 

LLNL, invited two scientists from the 

Central Institute of Physics and Technology (CIPT) in Sergei Posad, Russia, viz., General Major Loborev 

(head of CIPT) and Lt. Col. 

Kondratiev, to come to the U.S. to 

talk about the functional outages that 

occurred along a telecommunications 

line during the last three Soviet 

HANEs over Kazakhstan in October 

and November of 1962. That invitation was prompted by talks presented 

by Loborev and Kondratiev on this 

subject at a conference in Bordeaux, 

France in 1994.4 Although very little 

additional information was revealed 

by Loborev and Kondratiev, their visit 

to the U.S. did set the stage for further engagement between U.S. scientists and the Russians on the subject 

of HEMP.

 In 1996, Loborev and several of 

his colleagues attended the Nuclear 

Electromagnetic Pulse (NEMP) Conference held in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico. This is a biennial conference 

originally organized by Dr. Carl Baum 

of the former Air Force Weapons 

Laboratory (AFWL) that has since 

been subsumed under the Air Force 

Research Laboratory. At this meeting, 

several Russian scientists were inducted as fellows in the NEMP honor 

society. A number of poster papers 

authored by Russian scientists were 

presented at this meeting. Subsequent to this time, Dr. William 

Radasky, who attended the meeting 

with Loborev and Kondratiev at LLNL, 

established close working relations 

with scientists at CIPT. He assisted, 

through his company called 

Metatech, the Russians in their attempt to publish a paper.1 That article 

reported the telecommunication outages that occurred in Kazakhstan 

during the last three Soviet HANEs in 

1962. Metatech also supported Russian research in HEMP with internal 

research and development funding. 

 In addition to these interactions, 

A Russian Assessment of Several 

U.S.S.R. and U.S. HEMP Tests

Robert Pfeffer

Physical Scientist, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

D. Lynn Shaeffer, Ph.D., 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)

Figure 1. Dusk or Second Sunrise...
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 34

the Russians have provided input to 

the US congressionally-appointed 

EMP Commission. This information 

has been valuable in helping to understand the effects of HANEs over 

land. Finally, the Russians, under the 

auspices of the International Science 

and Technology Center (ISTC), have 

performed some work to harness certain HEMP phenomena for industrial 

applications. ISTC was funded by the 

U.S. and other countries to assist 

Former Soviet Union (FSU) nuclear 

scientists to make the transition to 

non-nuclear work.

HEMP Effects on National Power 

Grids

 One of the earliest recorded results of a high-altitude (400 km) nuclear detonation possibly affecting 

commercial electronics and electrical 

systems occurred during the July 

1962 Starfish Prime Event13,14 over 

Johnston Island. About 1300 km 

(800 miles) away in Hawaii, the detonation seemed to trigger a number of 

electrical problems. Unfortunately, 

U.S. scientists failed to conduct a 

rigorous cause and effect assessment until years later, when Charles 

Vittitoe5of Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, NM, concluded 

HEMP from Starfish did, indeed, trigger problems with commercial electronics.

 Prior to the Vittitoe assessment, 

several US scientists e.g., Randy 

Barnes of Oak Ridge National Laboratory,10 predicted HEMP-like environments could bring down the U.S. 

power grid. These predictions, however, were based upon limited test 

results and analytical predictions. 

Real nuclear test results over ground 

were not available to further validate 

predictions. The two Russian articles 

discussed below provided independent non-U.S. assessments that supported the U.S. prediction of potential 

power grid vulnerability to HEMP. 

 Vasily N. Greetsai was the principal author of the 1998 article on long 

line response to HEMP.1 He and his 

co-authors, all from the Central Institute of Physics and Technology, reported the analysis of the effects generated by the last three Soviet 

HANES that occurred in 1962 over 

Kazakstan in which a HEMP protected 500-kilometer long line was 

exposed to a significant HEMP signal. 

Protection device failures were noted 

and calculations made to determine 

which part of the HEMP environment 

(early-, mid-, or late-time) caused the 

damage. The work was supported by 

Metatech Corporation under 

Metatech Project 96-1.

1300 km or

800 miles

High-Altitude Burst

• STARFISH PRIME EVENT, July 1962

• 400 KM (248 MILES) ABOVE Johnston Island

1300 km or

800 miles

The Starfish Prime flash as seen through heavy 

cloud cover from Honolulu, 1,300 km away. 

Figure 2. Starfish Prime Event, July 1962.6

 STARFISH Prime Event, July 1962

 400 km (248 Miles) Above Johnston Island

High-Altitude Burst
35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

 Early-time HEMP is the prompt 

EMP (E1) that occurs in times less 

than about 1 micro-second (μs) and 

is caused by photon-generated 

Compton electrons turning about the 

geomagnetic field lines. Mid-time 

HEMP (E2) occurs between about 1 

ms and tens of milliseconds (μs) and 

is caused by multiply-scattered gammas and by neutron-induced gammas 

from neutron interactions with air and 

the ground. Late-time HEMP (E3) 

occurs between tenths of a second 

and hundreds of seconds and is 

caused by the HANE-induced magnetic bubble and by upward motion 

across geomagnetic field lines of 

heated air that is ionized by ultraviolet 

and x-ray radiation from the HANE.

 Based upon the test data, Greetsai et al. computed the early-time 

HEMP E-field to be between 5 and 

7.5 kV/m (Figure 3), which they concluded to be sufficient to cause the 

observed arrestor damage. In addition, the maximum amplitude latetime E-field was calculated to be no 

more than 5 V/km, an amplitude capable of causing the observed fuse 

failures. This 5 V/km amplitude is 

also similar to the amplitude of geomagnetic field disturbances created 

by solar flares known to have disturbed numerous power grids in the 

Northern Hemisphere. Examples include the geomagnetic storm of 

March 198915,16 that caused a blackout in Canada and damaged a transformer, valued at $10,000,000, in 

New Jersey, and the storm of August 

28, 1859 that was the fiercest geomagnetic storm ever recorded.17 

 Yu. I. Zetser (Institute of Geosphere Dynamics (IGD), Russian 

Academy of Sciences, Moscow) was 

the principal author of the 2004 article 

on geomagnetic effects caused by 

high-altitude nuclear explosions.2 He 

and his co-authors (from IGD and the 

Institute of Experimental Physics, 

Russian Federal Nuclear Center, 

Sarov) used the data from eleven 

U.S. and U.S.S.R. atmospheric explosions that occurred in the late 1950s 

and early 1960s to assess the primary cause of monitored geomagnetic disturbances. Of particular interest was the correlation of the amplitude and duration of what is now 

called late-time EMP (E3) to the amplitude and duration of naturally occurring-geomagnetic disturbances 

(i.e., solar storms). 

 Table 1 provides specific information on all eleven high-altitude detonations, including coordinates for latitude and longitude, height of burst, 

and yield. An interesting point is all 

five (K-1, K-2, K-3, K-4, and K-5) Soviet explosions occurred over land, 

while all six U.S. explosions occurred 

over water.

 It should be noted it is not a simple 

matter to correlate all E3 waveshapes 

from even the six U.S. explosions, 

Figure 3. Computed Early-time HEMP Amplitudes from 1962 Kazakstan 

Event.1 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 36

since their parameters differ significantly. 

 Figure 4 illustrates just how different the explosions can look due to 

such conditions as varying heights of 

burst and weapon yield. The figure is 

composed of five U.S. events, three 

of which (Orange, Starfish, and Teak) 

are cited in Zetser’s Table 1.

 Figure 5 is used by Zetser to support the conclusion that geomagnetic 

field variations caused by nuclear 

induced explosions are similar to 

variations caused by natural geomagnetic storms.

 One noticeable difference between the two waveshapes in his figure is the front end. The text states 

the nuclear induced signal has a 

sharper front end than the geomagnetic storm induced signal; however, 

this seems to conflict with the above 

figure. It is possible there is a typographical error or (a) and (b) are reversed.

 Long before high-altitude nuclear 

detonations were identified with longline problems (as early as August 28, 

1859), nations in the upper Northern 

regions of the globe (e.g., Sweden, 

Canada) correlated solar flare disturbances with power grid problems. 

One of the earliest documented 

events was on March 13, 1893, when 

there was a total blackout of the 

Montreal, Quebec power grid for 9 

hours. More recent authors calculated the actual amplitude of more 

recent geomagnetic disturbances. 

Magnus Wik of the Swedish Institute 

of Space Physics, Lund, Sweden, 

determined that a disturbance of the 

order of 1 V/km caused power grid 

problems on the Swedish power 

grid.7 The similarity of the disturbances from nuclear explosions and 

geomagnetic storms led scientists to 

correlate the natural geomagnetic 

disturbances caused by solar flares 

and the electromagnetic environment 

caused by a high-altitude detonation. 

This comparison was the subject of 

numerous reports, including the 2004 

EMP Commission Report to the 

House Armed Services Committee.8 

Another is a qualitative assessment 

reported in an earlier USANCA publication, the NBC Report,9 which is coauthored by Mr. Robert Pfeffer.

Summary

 The two Russian articles cited 

above1,2 provide experimental data 

for HANEs occurring over land to 

support what the U.S. had already 

concluded from data obtained for 

HANEs occurring over water. Qualitatively, the two Russian articles ascribe at least some of the HEMP 

damage on long lines to coupled E3 

(or late-time portion of HEMP). Both 

articles, however, fail to provide detailed experimental data to support 

their calculations. This lack of detail 

makes a rigorous assessment impossible. Nevertheless, their conclusions fall in line with conclusions 

documented earlier by Loborev and 

other Russian scientists3,4 on the 

same Soviet nuclear explosions, and 

by Vittitoe5 on the 1962 Starfish Prime 

Event, a high-altitude detonation over 

Johnston Island. All results for nuclear detonations over land or water 

support the conclusion that HEMP 

environments can be severe enough 

to upset or damage even 1960s electronics/electrical systems. 

 Late-time HEMP has the ability to 

couple sufficient energy onto long 

lines and affect attached electrical/

electronic hardware, even though the 

radiated E3 amplitude is low (a few V/

km) compared to the early-time 

HEMP (a few to tens of kV/m). This 

is because the signal duration can be 

many seconds and cause significant 

overheating of critical parts. An electromagnetically similar natural event 

is solar flares, which on several occasions has caused power grid brown 

outs and black outs to occur (e.g., 

power grids in Canada, U.S.A., and 

Europe). 

Table 1. Parameters of High-Altitude Nuclear Explosions.

NE

Coordinates of ground zero

Altitude, 

km

Equivelant, 

kton

Geographic Geomagnetic Data

Latitude Longitude Latitude

Longitude

Ground Zero

Orange 17o n.lat. 192o e.l. 14o n.lat. 257o e.l. 43 2000-4000 1958.08.12

K5 50o n.lat. 70o e.l. 41o n.lat. 141o e.l. 60 300 1962.11.01

Teak 17o n.lat. 192o e.l. 14o n.lat. 257o e.l. 80 2000-4000 1958.08.01

Above layer B

K1 50o n.lat. 70o e.l. 45o n.lat. 138o e.l. 150 1.2 1961.10.27

K4 50o n.lat. 70o e.l. 45o n.lat. 138o e.l. 150 300 1962.10.28

K2 50o n.lat. 70o e.l. 45o n.lat. 138o e.l. 300 1.2 1961.10.27

K3 50o n.lat. 70o e.l. 45o n.lat. 138o e.l. 300 300 1962.10.22

Starfish 17o n.lat. 192o e.l. 14o n.lat. 257o e.l. 450 1400 1962.07.09

Argus 1 38o n.lat. 12o w.l. 36o s.lat. 45o w.l. 480 1-2 1958.08.27

Argus 2 50o s.lat. 8

o w.l. 45o s.lat. 45o w.l. 480 1-2 1958.08.30

Argus 3 50o s.lat. 10o w.l. 44o s.lat. 44o w.l. 480 1-2 1958.09.06

Figure 4. From left to right, the ORANGE, TEAK, KINGFISH, CHECKMATE, 

and STARFISH high-altitude nuclear tests conducted in 1958 and 1962 by the 

United States near Johnston Island in the mid-Pacific. Burst conditions for each 

were unique, and each produced strikingly different phenomena and different 

enhancements of the radiation belts. 18
37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

Prologue

The time for close cooperation on this 

subject between the U.S. and Russia 

may have passed. Though conditions are not the same as they were 

in the Cold War, the open dialogue on 

HEMP effects between the two nations is once again getting cold. 

These open literature documents provide a unique opportunity to see not 

only how the U.S.S.R. was organized 

to handle such research and technology but also to see some of the results of their testing.

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer is a Physical 

Scientist at the United States Army 

Nuclear and CWMD Agency in 

Springfield, VA, working on nuclear 

weapons effects. He has a B.S. in 

Physics from Trinity University and an 

M.A. in Physics from The Johns Hopkins University. Previous government 

experience includes Chief of the 

Harry Diamond Laboratory (HDL) 

Electromagnetics Laboratory and 

Chief of the 400-acre Woodbridge 

Research Facility, both in Woodbridge, VA.

Dr. Shaeffer is a research physicist at 

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. He has a 

B.S. in physics from Carnegie Institute of Technology and a Ph.D. in 

plasma and space physics from the 

University of Pittsburgh. Dr. Shaeffer 

has worked for many years in the 

field of nuclear weapons effects and 

phenomenology and has published 

extensively in the open and classified 

literature.

Further Reading

1. Greetsai, Vasily N., et al; Response of Long Lines to Nuclear High

-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse 

(HEMP); IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility, VOL. 40, 

NO. 4; November 1998.

2. Zetser, Yu. I., et al; Geomagnetic 

Effects from Expanding Plasma Formation of a High-Altitude Nuclear Explosion; Combustion, Explosion, and 

Shock Waves, Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 638

-648; 2004.

3. http://nuclearweaponarchive.org//

News/Loborev.text.

4. Loborov, Vladimir M., et al; Up to 

Date State of the NEMP and Topical 

Research Directions; 1994 EURO EM 

Conference, Bordeaux, FRA; 30 May 

– 4 June 1994.

5. Vittitoe, Charles N., Did HighAltitude EMP Cause the Hawaiian 

Streetlight Incident?, Sandia National 

Laboratory report SAND88-3341, 

April 1989.

6. Figure provided by Joint Spectrum 

Center from their 2008 EMP Training 

Course.

7. Wik, Magnus, et al; Simulation of 

Geomagnetically Induced Currents: 

Past, Present and Future Events; 

Third European Space Weather 

Week; Brussels, Belgium; November 

13-17, 2006. 

8. Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States 

from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) 

Attack, Volume 1: Executive Report, 

2004.

9. Radasky, William A.; Kappenman, 

John; Pfeffer, Robert A.; Nuclear and 

Space Weather Effects on the Electric Power Infrastructure; NBC Report, Fall/Winter 2001.

10. http://www.ornl.gov/ORNLReview/

rev26-34/text/tecmain.html.

11. Tchernyshev, A.K., Andryushin, 

I.A., Zelentsov, S.A., Mikhailov, V.N., 

and Tsyrkov, G.A., ―General Characteristics, Objectives, 

Figure 5. Frequency Spectra of the H-component of the Geomagnetic Disturbance During the Substorm on July 15, 2000 (a) and a Calculated Spectrum of 

the Signal from an Explosion at an Altitude of 300 km (K-3) (b).2
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 38

Arrangement of USSR Nuclear Testing,‖ Contract DNA 001-

95-C-0153 between PTC/VNIEF, Sarov, Russia and Defense 

Special Weapons Agency, unpublished draft report, 1996.

12. Tchernyshev, A.K. et al., ―Nuclear Testing in the USSR: 

Facts, 

Technologies and Environment (U), Contract DNA 001-92-C0179 between PTC/VNIEF, Sarov, Russia and Defense Special Weapons Agency, unpublished draft report, 1995 (CFGI).

13. Glasstone, Samuel, and Dolan, Philip J., The Effects of 

Nuclear Weapons, Third Edition, prepared and published by 

the United States Department of Defense and the Energy 

Research and Development Administration, 1977.

14. Dyal, Palmer, , ―Particle and Field Measurements of the 

Starfish Diamagnetic Cavity,‖ J. Geophys. 

Res., 111, A12211, doi:10.1029/2006JA011827, 16 December 2006.

15. Kappenman, J. G. and V. D. Albertson, ―Cycle 22: Geomagnetic Storm Threats to Power Systems Continue,‖ IEEE 

Power Engineering Review, pp. 3 – 5, September 1991.

16. Robertson, D. F., ―Predicting the Storm,‖ SPACE, pp. 22 -

26, February–March 1992.

17. Odenwald, Sten F. and Green, James L., ―Bracing for a 

Solar Superstorm,‖ Scientific American, August 2008.

18. McCormac, Billy M., Ed., Radiation Trapped in the Earth’s 

Magnetic Field, Gordon and Breach/Science Publishers, New 

York, 1966.

Figure 6. Johnston Island shot observed in downtown Honolulu.
39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

A 

Historical Perspective

The United States and the 

U.S. Army have been intimately connected in nuclear capabilities 

throughout our Nation’s nuclear history. An Army Engineer led the, 

―Manhattan Engineer Project‖ during 

World War II with the Army Air Forces 

employing the project’s ―deliverable‖ 

– atomic / nuclear weapons. From 

the end of World War II in 1945, nuclear weapons became an element of 

national power. Nuclear research 

advanced rapidly along with an evolution in both the weapons and their 

place in national military strategy. 

Heavy Air Force bombers were required to deliver the massive nuclear 

weapons in the early days. This air 

delivery of nuclear bombs provided 

the initial nuclear military force structure. This new force structure and 

military needs evolved in parallel. 

The Services’ needs framed eventual 

production of various nuclear warheads for use on land, in air, and at 

sea. 

 Though the doctrinal construct 

envisioned nuclear capabilities distributed in the Army from tactical levels to higher levels, nuclear weapons 

deployment and employment authorization consistently required Presidential approval. The Army’s organic 

nuclear capabilities became refined 

over time. At the end of the Cold 

War, Army forces planned for nuclear 

capabilities worldwide.

 Army nuclear capability needs 

were provided by the nuclear weapons complex. Army nuclear doctrine 

evolved over time and focused on 

their substantial and tailorable target 

effects that made nuclear weapons a 

true force multiplier. Nuclear weapons required a very small logistic 

―footprint‖ to tactical forces while providing highly significant potential effects on targets. Army nuclear doctrine described organic, nuclear 

weapons capabilities at a variety of 

tactical and higher levels of commands. Over time, nuclear weapons 

shrank in physical size to a point 

where even some short range rockets, cannon artillery, and demolitions 

charges were nuclear capable. Army 

nuclear employment doctrine provided each of these capabilities a 

framework for their effective use as 

weapons of war. 

 For much of the Cold War, nuclear 

weapons provided U.S. forces with a 

―combat multiplier.‖ Once authorized 

by the President, the use of nuclear 

weapons allowed commanders to 

include those at the lower levels, the 

ability to employ a variety of weapons 

with different yield configurations.

 Smaller yield weapons were designed to give the equivalent of extremely large conventional explosions. Equivalent conventional weapons would require hours-long, continuous, cannon and rocket fires, or 

repeated bombing runs and still not 

get the required effects to the target. 

Nuclear weapon(s) could provide a 

greater effect in a smaller package, or 

survivable platform in a relatively 

short period of time. The employment of nuclear weapons would have 

significant effects on targets with little 

or no warning. Nuclear weapons offered land forces the ability to realistically engage massed enemy formations, key installations, and fortified 

targets at high risk. 

 Following the fall of the Berlin 

Wall, U.S. Presidential Nuclear Initiatives in early 1990s resulted in a draw 

down and elimination of Army nuclear 

weapons and associated Army nuclear programs. The Army performed a methodical weapons turn in 

process with the U.S. Department of 

Energy (DOE). The Army completed 

its nuclear weapons drawdown by the 

mid 1990s. During the nuclear drawdown, Army leadership decided to 

retain a core of Army officers designated for initial and continued development as functional experts in nuclear operations. This group of officers is a subset of the Army officer 

corps initially assigned with a single 

basic branch from their initial commissioning and later selected as Functional Area 52 (FA 52 Nuclear and 

Counterproliferation Officer). Under 

current career development paths, 

officers typically are assessed as 

FA52 by their seventh year of service, 

attend advanced degree programs in 

approved specialties, and serve in 

strategic level assignments at the 

Army Staff, the Defense Department 

(DOD), Defense organizations, 

(DOE), and Combatant Commands. 

They are also assigned to the Army 

War College, West Point, Air Force 

Institute of Technology, and the Defense Nuclear Weapons School.

 While the Army no longer posArmy Role in the U.S. Nuclear Capability

LTC James Demyanovich

Combating WMD Operations Officer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

HISTORY
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 40

sesses an organic nuclear weapons 

capability, the Army continues to be 

engaged in DOD and Service development in key military capabilities; of 

which nuclear capabilities are part. 

Military nuclear capabilities are vetted 

at the Joint level and are under consistent oversight of senior DOD, Joint, 

and Military Department representatives. The Army, as a part of the 

Joint Services, fully participates in the 

staffing of current and planned nuclear capabilities as well as nuclearweapons related issue deliberations. 

DOD nuclear weapons programs are 

resident and led by the Navy and Air 

Force; with day-to-day responsibilities 

for nuclear planning and employment 

performed by U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). The unification of US nuclear weapons issues 

and capabilities are performed jointly 

by DOD and DOE Nuclear Weapons 

Council (NWC). 

 The NWC is chaired by the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics (USD 

(AT&L)) with four organizations providing NWC membership. Those 

members are the Vice Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), the 

Undersecretary of Energy, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD 

(P)), and Commander, US Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM). For the 

NWC activities, VCJCS obtains Service input on NWC issues of concern 

and for NWC decision items. Technical details of most issues and program decisions are addressed by the 

Nuclear Weapons Council Standing 

and Safety Committee (NWCSSC) 

who makes recommendations on significant actions to the NWC. Significantly, the Army has an equal voice 

with the other Services in providing 

input on Joint actions to the NWC 

through the VCJCS and directly in the 

NWCSSC as a Member on nearly all 

nuclear weapons issues and actions. 

The NWCSSC’s primary mission is to 

advise and assist the NWC and to 

provide preliminary approval for many 

Pershing missile, once a part of the U.S. Army’s nuclear arsenal.
41 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

NWC Activities. The NWCSSC is 

composed of flag-level representatives or civilian equivalents from the 

DOE and DOD. In this body, the 

Army has an equal weighting of input 

with the Navy and Air Force. Army 

teaming and dialogue on Nuclear Issues with other Services provides our 

military with a total force multiplier.

 The Army Staff lead for nuclear 

weapons issues is the Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Operations, Plans, and 

Training, G3/5/7. Within the G3/5/7, 

G3/5 has been delegated daily responsibility for Army both nuclear 

weapons issuers and Army FA52 

Personnel Proponency. G3/5 leads, 

coordinates, and provides formal 

Army staffing and input into a variety 

of DOD and Joint issues, to include 

nuclear weapons. Nuclear issues 

span the breadth of nuclear doctrine 

and policy to future nuclear force 

structure, plans and programs. NWC 

and supporting bodies work on issues 

and perform activities occurring in 

parallel with having a level of required 

coordination and approval. At senior 

levels, formal NWC and NWCSSC 

meetings occur (nearly) monthly, with 

action officer level meetings occurring 

weekly that refine and present the 

progress of ongoing and planned activities that will be presented to the 

senior level meetings. The meetings 

address myriad issues requiring recommending actions and decisions for 

senior leaders up to and including the 

President of the United States. 

 Within the Army Staff, the responsibility for Nuclear issues reside with 

the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans and Training, G-3/5/7. 

The G3/5/7 has delegated day-to-day 

nuclear issue leadership and management to the Deputy Director G3/5, 

Plans and Policy, who is dual hatted 

as the Director, U.S. Army Nuclear 

and Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Agency (USANCA). The 

Director of USANCA provides representation of Army interests at both 

the NWC and NWCSSC meetings 

and all staff actions. Within the G3/5 

resides the core of the Army's expertise in nuclear issues which is supported by FA52s and other branch 

officers; Army Civilians, and contractors at the Army Staff’s G3/5 Nuclear 

and CWMD Policy Division as well as 

those assigned to USANCA.

Understanding Operational 

Nuclear Effects

 Operational conditions can be 

significantly affected by employment 

of friendly nuclear weapons. As most 

conflicts are fought on or over land, 

nuclear employment supporting National objectives will likely occur on or 

over those same or adjacent land 

areas where the Army is lead as the 

Joint Force, Land Component Commander (JFLCC). The Army in particular, therefore, requires resident 

expertise in understanding potential 

nuclear weapons effects on the adversary that may also affect friendly 

forces, allies, and partner nations. 

The Defense Nuclear Weapons 

School offers the Theater Nuclear 

Operations Course (TNOC), that provides instruction on nuclear policy, 

planning, a comprehensive end of 

course exercise, and a tour of the 

Weapons Display Area. Army personnel are awarded an additional skill 

identifier (ASI) of 5H, Nuclear Target 

Analyst. Please see the CWMD Resource page under TNOC at the end 

of the Journal for more specifics.

Army concern on battlefield effects 

on targets

 The overall effects whether intended or unintended are considered 

as part of consequences of execution. It is the totality of the nuclear 

strike that must be considered by 

land forces and the targeting criteria 

most often seen in consideration of 

the physical damage caused by the 

nuclear weapon. As a consequence 

of execution, nuclear target planning 

expertise found in FA52 officers remains a singular skill set in our Army. 

Political effects on the Campaign

 Nuclear weapons remain an element of national power. While the 

use of nuclear weapons by the military must be a consideration, direct 

effects of nuclear employment must 

be balanced against the totality of 

effects: physical as well as political. It 

is the full consideration of all physical 

effects that can better inform policy 

leaders that address the potential 

political effects of all issues nuclear: 

from nuclear force development to 

nuclear force deployments to nuclear 

employment itself. 

Equipment Hardness and 

Survivability

 An additional effect of nuclear 

weapons of Army concern is the effects of nuclear detonations on military force equipment. The ability for 

mission critical military equipment to 

withstand and continue operations 

following nuclear detonations or in the 

presence of radiation is called 

―nuclear hardness.‖ Critical equipment is often designed and built to 

standards which withstand environments induced by nuclear detonations that include a variety of electromagnetic, blast, thermal, and radiation effects. Each of these effects 

may independently as well as collectively pose challenges to equipment. 

It is known that equipment can be 

designed to withstand many nuclear 

effects and incorporate requisite 

hardening, backed up by testing, to 

confirm resiliency of the equipment to 

continue to operate under challenges. 

It is the testing as well as the knowledge of effects on equipment that 

forms a vital element of ensuring continued Army mission accomplishment 

even in the most challenging, potentially nuclear operational environment 

– regardless of whether the effects 

are from friendly force or adversary 

nuclear detonations. 

Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

 USSTRATCOM is the military 

command responsible for sustaining 

the enduring U.S. Government capability for nuclear command, control, 

and employment. The Navy and Air 

Force provide and manage their Service nuclear weapons programs as 

well as the associated delivery platforms. Regular assessments of and 

reports on the U.S. nuclear weapons 

capabilities and supporting processes 

are approved by the NWC in actions 

that are normally first coordinated 

through the NWCSSC. Army input 

into these capability development and 

supporting processes is regular, informed, and consistent. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 42

 The Army, no longer possessing 

nuclear weapons programs, is in a 

unique position to provide an objective viewpoint to and be an impartial 

participant in DOD’s nuclear capability discussions. The impartiality must 

be supported by a keen awareness of 

the nuclear capabilities possessed by 

the other Services. The Army ensures continued engagement into 

how those capabilities are maintained, enhanced, and transitioned 

into the future as part of our Nation’s 

capabilities and their potential and 

planned roles in U.S. military operations world-wide as part of its membership in the NWCSSC and input to 

VCJCS actions in the NWC .

Army View of Other Services and 

Command Nuclear Roles

 The Navy and Air Force are our 

Nation’s Military experts in nuclear 

weapons and systems; to include 

their hardness and survivability. The 

Navy and Air Force are individually 

responsible for managing their nuclear weapons as well as delivery 

systems. This is a challenging programmatic responsibility that addresses land and sea based missiles 

and aircraft based weapons. All aspects of the weapons and delivery 

systems that provide the DOD and 

Nation with capabilities fall within the 

Services for their leadership and 

management into the future. 

 Army nuclear expertise facilitates 

not only being an informed member 

of the Joint Service team, but also 

can provide objective input for seeking a balanced force among the Services. FA52 officers are engaged in 

strategic level nuclear and counterproliferation issues and often find 

themselves engaged in related issues 

with the requisite nuclear-focused, 

professional education and career 

development. FA 52 officers also find 

themselves as providing a linkage 

between operational requirements 

and policy adherence in nuclear and 

counterproliferation issues. The 

Army remains engaged in the Nation’s nuclear capabilities and is supported by FA52 officers serving 

worldwide at Combatant Commands; 

but are heavily weighted at Army and 

Joint Staffs, Defense Agencies, and 

the DOE both in serving those organizations and providing a greater depth 

of knowledge back to the Army during 

their careers.

LTC James Demyanovich is a Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Operations Officer at the US Army 

Nuclear and Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA), 

Fort Belvoir, VA. USANCA is a field 

operating agency of the Army Staff 

G3/5/7,Operations, Plans and Policy. 

He has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering (Energy Technology) from 

Penn State University and a M.S. in 

Operations Research/Systems Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate 

School. He was previously assigned 

as a CBRN Advanced Technology 

Demonstration Manager at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Fort 

Belvoir, VA. His email address is 

james.demyanovich@us.army.mil. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 42
43 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

cannon battery is standing 

by, ready in a moments notice for a fire mission... 

 Suddenly the radio crackles to life, 

―DMV05 this is SMS27 Fire Mission, 

Number 3 and Number 4, 1 Round 

Shell AFAP, Lot MD, Charge 7 Fuze 

PD, Deflection 2870, Quadrant 320‖ 

 This fictional artillery Fire Mission 

request to send an Atomic Field Artillery Projectile (AFAP) down range 

would have allowed the tactical 

ground commander a rapid way to 

change the course of battle to his 

favor with nuclear rounds, but this is 

now a distant memory.

 The specter of nuclear war was 

very real during the cold war era as 

the two predominant super powers 

were postured for the advent of nuclear exchange. This series will 

cover tactical and strategic weapons 

of the cold war. Part 1 covers nuclear 

weapons typically employed by the 

U.S. Army. In the interest to keep 

services together, I will incorporate 

U.S. Army anti ballistic missile and Air 

Defense weapons in the last portion 

of the article to separate tactical from 

sub strategic weapons. Strategic and 

sub-strategic nuclear weapons employed by the U.S. Air Force and surface and subsurface nuclear weapons employed by the U.S. Navy will 

be covered in future articles.

The Army’s role during the 

Cold War

 Employment of U.S. Army nuclear 

delivery systems once authorized by 

the President offered the tactical 

ground commander almost an immediate response, and could range the 

entire area of responsibility (AOR) 

from very short ranges, as close as 

several hundred meters to well over 

hundreds of kilometers. 

 The U.S. Army Field Artillery (FA) 

surface-to-surface delivery systems 

at the time consisted of cannon, free 

rockets and guided missiles. 

 The U.S. Army Engineers (EN) 

primarily employed atomic demolition 

munitions (ADM). These were used 

to deter and deny key installations, 

and land features. 

 The U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) provided the force with 

protection from air threats. 

 The U.S. still retains a nuclear 

inventory for deterrence. However, 

the U.S. Army is out of the delivery 

business since turning in their nuclear 

arsenal in the early 1990’s.

 Employment Times varied for different platforms, as you can see 

within the table, the ground comTactical Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War Era... 

A Blast from the Past

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Joint Nuclear Targeting Officer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

A 

Delivery 

System

Assumed Planning Times after 

Decision to Fire Time between 

Targets of Successive Rounds

Opportunity

Preplanned 

Targets

CANNON 

Short Range 10 min 5 min 1 round per tube per 10 min

Medium Range 15 min 5 min 1 round per tube 

per 10 min

Long Range 30 min 10 Min 1 round per tube 

per 15 min

FREE 

ROCKET 

Small

30 min 5 min 1 round per launcher 

per 15 min

Large 1 hour 10 min 1 round per launcher 

per 30 min

GUIDED 

MISSILE 

Light

30 min 10 min 1 round per launcher 

per 15 min

Medium Range 1 hour 20 min 1 round per launcher 

per 30 min

Heavy 3 hour 30 min 1 round per launcher 

per 2 hours

ATOMIC 

Demolition 

Munition

2 hours required to emplace and 

prepare for firing. not applicable

Table 1. Employment Times.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 44

mander could apply different systems 

resulting in an overwhelming attack. 

(Table 1).

Delivery Systems

Cannon

The capability of cannon to fire nuclear shells capitalized on their great 

flexibility and high degree of reliability 

and accuracy. Cannon was exceptionally responsive to the tactical 

ground commander because of the 

long established means of command 

and control inherent in artillery employment, and because of the relative 

ease with which individual rounds can 

be fired. Nuclear ―shells‖ delivered by 

cannon are relatively invulnerable to 

enemy countermeasures while in 

flight, because of the speed at which 

they travel. Although target acquisition and observed fire techniques are 

adversely affected by poor visibility 

and bad weather, cannon can deliver 

nuclear weapons regardless of these 

conditions. 

 The cannon systems employed by 

the U.S. Army during the cold war era 

were the 280-mm gun commonly referred to ―Atomic Annie‖, the 8-inch 

howitzer and the 155-mm howitzer.

M65 280-mm Atomic Cannon 

The M65 Atomic Cannon, affectionately called "Atomic Annie" was the 

Army's largest artillery piece. The 

M65 was the first and only cannon 

designed specifically to deliver an 

atomic projectile; it was also capable 

of firing conventional warheads. The 

cannon weighed in at 47 tons alone 

and with carriage an incredible 83 

tons, requiring two tractors to move 

the artillery piece. It proved to be a 

highly mobile weapons system despite its size and adaptable to most 

road conditions with a top road speed 

of nearly 35 miles per hour. The M65 

fired a projectile weighing over 500 

pounds and had an approximate 

range of 20 miles (32 km). 

 This artillery piece enabled the 

US. Army to have a tactical nuclear 

capability for U.S. land forces. One 

atomic test was conducted at the Nevada Test site in 1953. This heralded a new era for tactical nuclear 

weapons as the Atomic Cannon test 

was history's first atomic artillery shell 

fired from the Army's new 280-mm 

cannon. 

 The first atomic cannon went into 

service in 1952, and the M65 was 

retired in 1963. There were twenty 

atomic cannons produced, stationed 

in Europe and the Far East. The design of the cannon was based in part 

on the successful German 280-mm 

German K5 Railroad gun of WWII.

 On a side note, the atomic cannon 

was part of the inaugural Parade for 

Gen. Dwight Eisenhower when he 

became President of the United 

States in January 1953.

8-inch (203-mm) Howitzer

This was an improvement over the 

280-mm cannon, and could fire both 

conventional and atomic projectiles. It 

was quite mobile and had a very high 

degree of accuracy. 

155-mm Howitzer

The 155-mm could fire both conventional and atomic projectiles. The 

155-mm was the final development in 

cannon delivered atomic projectiles. 

Free Rockets and Guided Missiles

 Nuclear delivery provided by the 

U.S. Army during the cold war derived from two distinct platforms; they 

were free rockets and guided missiles. 

 The free rocket was an unguided, 

rocket propelled missile. It was directed toward the target by establishing initial azimuth and elevation, as 

with a conventional artillery piece; 

then launched from a rail or beam. 

Since the free rocket uses no external 

guidance, and travels at a high 

speed, it was relatively immune to 

known enemy countermeasures at 

the time. The free rocket has adequate range and flexibility for close 

support. It was less reliable than tube 

cannon, but more reliable than longer 

range Army missiles. It was as responsive to cannon and utilized a 

larger more efficient warhead.

 The U.S. Army arsenal of free 

rockets were the Honest John, Little 

John and the Davy Crockett. Many 

times the system designator, munition 

nomenclature and model are used 

interchangeably. As this may lead to 

some confusion, the munition model 

designation will be used in this article 

for clarity.

M65 Atomic Cannon ―Atomic Annie.‖
45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

MGR-1 “Honest John”

The M31 ―Honest John‖ system was the U.S. Army's first 

nuclear-armed surface-to-surface rocket. The M31 used 

the MGR-1, an unguided 762-mm artillery rocket, powered 

by a solid-fuel rocket engine, and spin-stabilized in flight 

by two spin motors. 

 The Honest John was a rocket 27 feet long and 2.5 

feet in diameter and launched from a simple monorail 

mounted on a 5 ton truck. The Honest John had a range 

between 3 and 15 miles (5 and 24 km). 

MGR-1 Honest John in firing configuration.

Honest John Test flight demonstrating the Spin Motor Stabilization.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 46

MGR-3 “Little John”

The M51 ―Little John‖ system was the smallest nuclear 

capable rocket in the U.S. Army arsenal. The MGR-3 was 

a small and compact surface to surface artillery rocket, 

armed with a nuclear only warhead and fired from a monorail incorporated onto a trailer and was a lighter version of 

the Honest John. 

The system could be towed by a jeep or 3⁄4 ton tuck. It had 

a length of 14 feet 5 inches, and a range of over 11 miles

(18 km). 

MGR-3 Little John in launch configuration.

MGR-3 Little John in traveling configuration.
47 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

M388 “Davy Crockett”

The M388 Davy Crockett was one of the smallest nuclear 

weapons developed in the 1950s, and fielded for use 

against Soviet troops. 

 The M388 munition used a version of a very small subkiloton device. The Davy Crockett could be launched from 

two types of launchers: the M28, with a range a little over 

1 mile (2 km), or M29, with a range of 2.5 miles (4 km). 

Both weapons used the same projectile, and could be 

mounted on a tripod launcher or carried by truck or armored personnel carrier, operated by a three-man crew. 

 Production of the Davy Crockett began in 1956, and 

deployed with U.S. Army forces from 1961 to 1971. Versions of the W54 warhead were also used in the Special 

Atomic Demolition Munition project and the AIM-26A Falcon.

1

M338 Davey Crockett mounted on ground tripod launcher.

U.S. officials view a Davy Crockett casing.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 48

Striking the Enemy Deeper

 

 The surface-to-surface guided missiles also called 

SSMs included a variety of types from short-range missiles used against fortifications and other hard, pin-point 

targets, to the long-range missiles capable of attacking 

area targets deep inside enemy territory, a distinct advantage over cannon and the free rocket. 

 The speed of the ballistic missile and its independence 

of weather in the target area gave it a unique advantage to 

some aircraft delivered weapons. Army guided missile 

systems were responsive to the ground commander; however some systems required greater time for placement, 

preparation for firing such as fueling, and guidance operations. Some missile systems could be employed more 

rapidly and were more flexible than nuclear cannon. The 

SSMs in the U.S. Army inventory were the Lacrosse, Corporal, Sergeant, Redstone, Lance and the Pershing missile.

MGM-18 “Lacrosse”

The Lacrosse originally was developed by the U.S. Navy 

to fill a U.S. Marine Corps requirement for a short-range 

guided missile to supplement close-support artillery. The 

Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the U.S. Army would 

be responsible for short-range ballistic surface-to-surface 

missile development. Shortly thereafter, the Lacrosse was 

officially turned over to the U.S. Army. 

 The M4 Lacrosse system fired the MGM-18, a mobile 

close-support missile designed for use against hardened 

point and area targets. It was a solid propellant missile 20 

feet long, 2 feet in diameter, and weighed over a ton. This 

missile was accurate to 19 miles (30 km). It was guided to 

the target by a forward observer, and quick to respond to 

fire missions. 

MGM-18 Lacrosse in launch configuration.
49 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

MGM-5 “Corporal” Missile

The Corporal held many ―firsts.‖ It was the first operational guided missile, and the first to be approved for a 

nuclear payload. The Corporal could deliver either a nuclear or high-explosive warhead up to a range of 86 miles 

(138 km).

 The Corporal was a deep corps support missile. It 

was 45 feet long 3 feet in diameter. It was a liquid fueled 

missile which fired from a vertical position and used a 

combination of preset guidance and radar command. The 

first U.S. Army Corporal battalion was deployed in Europe 

in 1955. Six U.S. battalions were deployed and remained 

in the field until 1964, when the system was replaced by 

the solid-fueled MGM-29 Sergeant missile system.

MGM-51 Corporal during a demonstration, setting up for launch configuration.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 50

MGM-29 “Sergeant”

The Sergeant was a short range ballistic missile (SRBM)

replacement to the Corporal. it was 30 feet long and utilized solid propellant which provided better safety and storage capability. At the time it used advanced inertial guidance to navigate to the target. The Sergeant was fielded 

in 1962, deployed overseas by 1963, and only carried a 

nuclear warhead. It was replaced by the MGM-52 Lance 

and the last U.S. Army battalion was deactivated in 1977. 

This missile was highly mobile and could be placed and 

fired by a small crew under all conditions of weather and 

terrain. 

PGM-11 “Redstone”

The PGM-11 Redstone was a mobile liquid fueled missile 

designed to support the field army by attacking targets up 

to a range of 201 miles (about 323 km). The Redstone 

was 65 feet long and had a massive 6 foot diameter. It 

used inertial guidance to navigate to the target. Having a 

long range, its firing position could be placed to the rear 

combat zone far out of enemy range. The Redstone missile was in active service with the U.S. Army from June 

1958 to June 1964. Some Redstone missiles were modified in the mid to late 1960's for follow-on special test projects. 

 For its role as a U.S. Army field artillery theater ballistic 

missile, Redstone earned the nickname "the Army's Workhorse." 

MGM-29 Sergeant.

PGM-11 Redstone shortly after launch.
51 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

MGM-52 “Lance”

The MGM-52 Lance was a mobile field artillery tactical 

surface-to-surface missile system, often called a ―combat 

ballistic missile.‖ It was used to provide both nuclear and 

conventional fire support. The Lance was 20 feet long, 

and had an operational range of about 75 miles (about 

120 km).

 The first Lance missiles were deployed in 1972, replacing the less reliable Sergeant SRBM. The firing rate per 

unit was approximately three missiles per hour. This 

speed provided the U.S. Army with a very formidable 

SRBM force.

 In 1973, the Lance replaced the MGR-1 Honest John 

system and the MGM-29 Sergeant. It was deactivated in 

1992 with the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987, the U.S. 

Army began withdrawing Lance missiles from Europe. By 

1992, all nuclear Lance warheads were in storage awaiting destruction.

 The Lance used one of the first warheads to be battlefield-ready with an "enhanced radiation" (neutron bomb) 

capability. Once removed from active service, Lance was 

used as a target drone.

MGM-52 Lance going into in launch configuration.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 52

MGM-31 “Pershing” Family of Missiles

Pershing2 was a family of solid-fueled two-stage mediumrange ballistic missiles (MRBM) designed to replace the 

Redstone missile as the U.S. Army's primary theater-level 

weapon deployed by the U.S. Army Field Artillery Corps. 

The Pershing systems lasted over 30 years from the first 

test version in 1960 through final elimination in 1991. 

 In the military science of ballistics, circular error probable (CEP)3

or circular error probability is an intuitive 

measure of a weapon system's accuracy. It is defined as a 

circle, centered about the mean, whose boundary is expected to include 50% of the population within it. 

MGM-31 Pershing I 

In service 1960–1986

Number Built 24 tactical 

launchers

754 missiles,

(including 

Pershing IA)

Blast Yield Variable yield 

nuclear warhead

Operational 

Range

Over 450 miles 

(724 km)

Accuracy Under 1,400 ft 

(427 meters) 

(CEP)

MGM-31A Pershing IA 

In service 1969–1986

Number Built 180 tactical 

launchers,

754 missiles

(including 

Pershing I)

Blast Yield Variable yield 

nuclear warhead

Operational 

Range

Over 450 miles 

(724 km)

Accuracy Under 1,400 ft 

(427 meters) 

(CEP)

MGM-31A Pershing II 

In service 1973–1981

Number Built 108 tactical 

launchers,

276 missiles

Blast Yield Variable yield 

nuclear warhead 

Operational 

Range

Over 1,000 miles 

(1,609 km)

Accuracy Under 200 ft 

(61 meters) 

(CEP)

MGM-31A Pershing shortly after launch.
53 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM)

ADMs were primarily employed against material targets 

rather than personnel, to deter the enemy and deny use of 

key structures, installations and terrain. Lowest yields 

consistent with military and political necessity were employed to prevent collateral damage to civilian casualties, 

over destruction of manmade and natural features, or unacceptable radiation hazards. 

Medium Atomic Demolition Munitions (MADM)4

Were tactical weapons designed to be used as a nuclear 

land mine and for other tactical purposes, such as a 

demolition munition with a relatively low explosive yield 

from the warhead. They were slightly more powerful than 

the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. They were produced 

between 1965 and 1986. 

Other U.S. Army systems

 The U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery (ADA) provided 

protection from air and missile threats, a role normally associated with the Air Forces of other countries. Nuclear 

missiles employed by ADA played an important part to 

protect the continental U.S. as well as friends and allies 

during the Cold War.

MIM-14 “Nike-Hercules” Missile 

Nike-Hercules was a solid-fuel-propelled surface-to-air 

missile (SAM), used by US and NATO armed forces for 

high-and medium-altitude air defense. The Nike-Hercules 

system was developed during the Cold War to destroy 

enemy bombers and enemy bomber formations, as well 

as serve as an anti-ballistic missile system.

 The Nike-Hercules Missile could employ a nuclear warhead, or a conventional fragmentation warhead. The missile was 41 feet 6 inches long with a wingspan of 6 feet 2 

inches. A total of 145 missile batteries were deployed during the Cold War. The missile had a range of about 86 

miles (138 km). Because of the missile's effectiveness 

against certain ICBMs, it was made a part of the SALT I 

treaty.

 The U.S. Army continued to use Nike-Hercules as a 

front-line air defense weapon in Europe until 1983, when 

Patriot missile batteries were deployed.

MIM-14 Nike-Hercules.8
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 54

LIM-49A “Spartan”

The Spartan5 was a U.S. Army anti-ballistic missile (ABM). 

It was a long-range, three-stage, solid-fuel missile that 

carried a thermonuclear warhead to intercept incoming 

enemy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at high 

altitude out to a range of approximately 460 miles (740 

km). The missile was launched from an underground silo 

and radio command guided. 

 The Spartan missile was in operational service for only 

a few months, (October 1975 to early 1976) due to high 

costs and the SALT I Treaty.
55 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

Anti Ballistic Missile “Sprint”

The Sprint6 was a two-stage, solidfuel ABM, armed with an enhanced 

radiation thermonuclear warhead. It 

was designed as the short-range, 

high-speed counterpart to the longerranged LIM-49A Spartan as part of 

the Sentinel program. The Sentinel 

never became operational, but the 

technology was deployed briefly in a 

downsized version called the Safeguard program. The Sprint, like the 

Spartan, was in operational service 

for only a few months in the Safeguard program, from October 1975 to 

early 1976. A combination of high 

costs, and congressional opposition 

resulted in a very short operational 

period.

 The Sprint accelerated rapidly, 

reaching a speeds of Mach 10+ in 

seconds. It was designed for close-in 

defense against incoming ICBMs. As 

the last line of defense it was to intercept the reentry vehicles that had not 

been destroyed by the Spartan, with 

which it was deployed.

 The Sprint was housed in a protective silo. To make the launch as 

quick as possible, the cover was 

blown off the silo by explosive bolts. 

As the missile cleared the silo, the 

first stage fired and the missile was 

tilted toward its target. The first stage 

burned out shortly after launch followed by the second stage fired 

within a few seconds of launch. Interception at an altitude taking at most a 

few seconds rather than minutes.

Final thoughts

 During the Cold War the tactical 

ground commander had many nuclear delivery platforms to deter and 

defeat the enemy. The ability of 

close ground coordination and integration allowed the commander to 

swiftly decide on the appropriate delivery system to swing the battle to his 

favor. Although the U.S. Army has 

been out of the delivery business, it 

still maintains a core of experts and 

can deploy the Nuclear Employment 

Augmentation Team (NEAT) from 

USANCA for offensive nuclear planning. After all, should deterrence fail 

and the nuclear option be invoked, 

the ground commander like the 

ground commander of yesteryear 

would still be responsible for what 

happens on the ground and how the 

use of nuclear weapons may affect 

the scheme of maneuver.

ENDNOTES

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Davy_Crockett_(nuclear_device)

2.MGM-31 Pershttp://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/MGM-31_Pershinghing

3. Circular Error Probable (CEP), Air 

Force Operational Test and Evaluation 

Center Technical Paper 6, Ver 2, July 

1987, p. 1 (from Wikipedia)

4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Medium_Atomic_Demolition_Munition 

5. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sprint_

(missile)

6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LIM49A_Spartan

7. http://www.smdc.army.mil/

SMDCPhoto_Gallery/Missiles/124-

SprintLaunch-102870.jpg

8. http://www.redstone.army.mil/history/

chron2b/1957.html

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes is a Joint 

Nuclear Targeting Officer assigned at 

USANCA. He was previously assigned as the MOS 131A Targeting 

Technician Program Manager, Ft. Sill, 

OK. He is a graduate of the Joint 

Targeting School, Dam Neck, VA. 

His email address is 

stephen.gomes@us.army.mil

Sprint shortly after take off.

55 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 56

S 

ince September 11, 2001, 

Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (CWMD) has taken 

a deeper meaning than ever before. 

We must be right 100 percent of the 

time to avoid harm by terrorists. We 

must be thorough in our education, 

intelligence, our planning, and constantly vigilant in our resolve. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) have 

many definitions. In general, WMD is 

meant to be Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) 

materials or agents. For this series, 

an exact definition is unimportant except for how CWMD applies to 

Chemical Warfare (CW). CW is the 

oldest form of WMD. For this article, 

we will consider toxic compounds 

produced by biological sources as 

chemical agents. The dictionary defines CW as ―warfare using incendiary mixtures, smokes, asphyxiating, 

poisonous, or corrosive gases, oil 

flames, etc.” For subsequent articles 

on modern CW, biologically-derived 

compounds will be considered a part 

of biological warfare to remain consistent with contemporary Department of 

Defense definitions. To combat the 

mass destruction effects of CW, it is 

important to be familiar with its strategic use over the ages, the means by 

which it is employed, and the ease in 

which it can be utilized in the future. 

This is the first in a series of articles 

exploring CW from its origin to modern times, and anticipated future applications will be presented in an effort to better equip the planner and 

Warfighter in combating the chemical 

part of WMD. 

 This first article covers a brief history of CW developments from 1000 

B.C. until 1900 A.D. In the earliest 

times chemicals were used for fumigation, riot control, denial of fertile 

crop lands, demoralizing effects, denial of passage, making arrows more 

deadly and swaying the tide of battle. 

For centuries, chemicals have been 

deemed an inhumane form of 

weapon. Despite treaties denouncing 

its use, many countries continued to 

research the next generation of CW 

agents and some even stockpiled 

those agents. This led to the eventual use of CW in WWI, WWII and as 

recently in the war with Iran and Iraq 

in the 1980s. It is hoped that by providing this information, individuals will 

gain a better understanding of CW on 

both strategic and anti-terrorism 

fronts. These articles are prepared 

by pulling from a broad search of articles from the World Wide Web, books 

and recognized authorities. It is 

therefore necessary to provide a look 

at CW over the ages to anticipate, 

prepare, and plan for ways to combat 

CW. Relatively old methods of warfare could be used to significantly 

multiply CW effects in present day.

 By modern standards, Wikipedia1

defines CW as follows: ―CW involves 

using the toxic properties of chemical 

substances to kill, injure or incapacitate an enemy.‖ However, Science 

Clarified2goes into greater breadth 

and depth: ―CW involves the use of 

natural or synthetic (human-made) 

substances to disable or kill an enemy or to deny them the use of resources such as agricultural products 

or foliage in which to hide. The effects of chemicals may last only a 

short time, or they may result in permanent damage and death. Most of 

the chemicals used are known to be 

toxic (poisonous) to humans or plant 

life. In some cases, normally harmless chemicals have also been used 

to damage an enemy’s environment. 

Such actions have been called ecocide and are one method for disrupting an enemy’s economic system.‖ 

For this article, please use the Science Clarified definition as we cover 

a chronological review of CW development and use prior to WWI. 

Ancient Times

 

 The history of CW goes back to 

Ancient times. It has swayed the outcome of battles and wars for centuries. Chemical warfare dates back to 

Chemical Warfare: Part I

Mr. A. Mark Diglio

Chemical Engineer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

Example of land infertile by Salt.

Source: Death Valley 

(photo courtesy of pdphoto.org).
57 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

the earliest use of weapons. Poisoned arrows and darts were used for 

hunting by primitive peoples as well 

as weapons in battles between tribal 

groups before 1000 B.C. In 431 B.C., 

the Spartans used burning sulfur and 

pitch to produce clouds of suffocating 

sulfur dioxide in their sieges against 

Athenian cities. When the Romans 

defeated the Carthaginians of North 

Africa in 146 B.C., they destroyed the 

city of Carthage and spread salt on 

surrounding fields to destroy the agricultural capability of the land 

(ecocide). The Romans' intent was to 

prevent the Carthaginians from rebuilding their city.

 Noxious agents have been used in 

wars for centuries. Review of literature indicates the Chinese were the 

original masters of CW. As early as 

1000 B.C. the Chinese used arsenical smokes to sicken enemy troops 

and make them combat ineffective. 

The Chinese reportedly used chemicals in the fumigation of dwellings to 

eliminate fleas, practiced by the Chinese as early as the seventh century 

B.C. Chinese writings contain hundreds of recipes for the production of 

poisonous or irritating smoke for use 

in war, and many accounts of their 

use. We know of the arseniccontaining ―soul-hunting fog‖ and the 

irritating ―five-league fog,‖ made from 

low-burning gunpowder to which a 

variety of ingredients, including the 

excrement of wolves, was added to 

produce an irritating smoke. The use 

of a riot control agent, finely divided 

lime dispersed into the air, is described in a Chinese account of the 

suppression of a peasant revolt in 

178 A.D. Delivery systems were not 

neglected; descriptions of weapons 

with such poetic names as the 

―poison fog magic smoke eruptor‖ 

may be found in the artillery manuals 

of the Chinese Army.

 Writings of the Mohist sect in 

China, dating from the fourth century 

B.C., tell of the use of ox-hide bellows 

to pump smoke from furnaces in 

which balls of mustard and other toxic 

Greek ―Sea Fire,‖ an oil based flame that could not be put out with water 

depicted here in a naval conflict. 3

1000 BC Chinese use arsenical smokes to sicken enemy troops making them combat ineffective

590 BC Solon of Athens puts hellebore roots in the drinking water of Cirrha to kill inhabitants

429 & 424 BC Spartans use noxious smoke during Peloponnesian War against Athenians

400 BC Scythian archers use arrows dipped in blood and manure to prevent healing of wounds

200 BC Carthaginians used Mandrake root left in wine to sedate the enemy

190 BC Hannibal hurls venomous snakes onto enemy ships to panic and injure enemy sailors

178 AD First riot control agents used by the Chinese to suppress peasant revolt

678 AD Greeks defeat Arab fleet using ―Greek / Sea fire‖ oil based inextinguishable fire

683 AD Moslems siege Mecca catapulting naphtha based fire balls

1241 AD Mongols use poison gas in the Battle of Legnica

1456 AD Arsenic bombs, grenades and rags are fired by Belgrade defenders against the Turks

15th Century Leonardo da Vinci proposed tossing fine sulfide of arsenic powder upon ship galleys

1618 to 48 

AD Anglo-French 30 Years War, ―Stinking Jars‖ and toxic bombs are used in great quantities

1672 AD Bishop of Munster used incendiary devices with belladonna to try to take Groningen

Summary of CW use prior to WWI.

Data extracted from various sources
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 58

vegetable matter were being burned 

into tunnels being dug by a besieging 

army to discourage the diggers. The 

use of a toxic cacodyls (arsenic trioxide) smoke is also mentioned in early 

Chinese manuscripts. Gunpowderlike mixtures containing charcoal, 

sulfur, and saltpeter were known in 

China by 1044 A.D. and used primarily as incendiaries, since the proportions were not right nor were they 

confined for a detonation to occur. 

From small fireworks, the Chinese 

developed bombs. By 1232, the Chinese had developed rockets and a 

weapon they called ―heaven-shaking 

thunder,‖ an iron bomb attached to a 

chain that could be lowered from the 

walls of a city to explode among attackers.

 It was reported by the ancient 

Greek, Solon of Athens, that an aqueduct from the Pleistus River was deliberately polluted with hellebore 

roots, a purgative (strong laxative), in 

590 B.C. during the siege of Cirrha, to 

render the entrenched enemy unable 

to conduct battle. In 423 B.C., during 

the Peloponnesian War, Spartan allies took an Athenian-held fort by directing smoke through a hollowed-out 

beam into the fort. Incendiary devices and sulfur-based gases were 

blown by the wind onto the besieged 

Spartan city of Sphacteria by 

Demosthenes during the same war. 

Sparta used the toxic smoke generated by burning wood dipped in a 

mixture of tar and sulfur during at 

least one of its periodic wars with Athens. A primitive type of flamethrower 

was employed as early as the fifth 

century B.C.

 The biggest use of chemicals in 

war in ancient times was in the area 

of flame weapons. A number of recipes existed for producing incendiary 

compositions, such as a mixture of 

pitch, sulfur, tow, granulated frankincense, and pine sawdust in sacks 

that were set alight. The most famous incendiary mixture is certainly 

the Greek fire of the Byzantine Empire. Greek fire is the modern name; 

the Byzantines called it ―sea fire‖ and 

their Moslem enemies called it 

―Roman fire.‖ It was an oil-based 

compound that could not be extinguished with water and would burn on 

water. This was successfully employed to defeat the Arab fleet in 678 

A.D., against the Moslems again in 

717 to 718 A.D. and against Russian 

attacks in 941 and 1043 A.D. Greek 

fire remained Byzantium’s secret 

weapon against the Turks for five 

centuries. Later, the Turks acquired it 

to conquer the Greek Empire in the 

fourteenth century. Greek fire was 

used to such a degree that it could 

also be considered a psychological 

weapon. The recipients of a barrage 

of Greek fire could not explain how 

the fire would ignite spontaneously, 

rise up, be projected downward, or 

why the liquid flame could not be extinguished. The secret of Greek fire 

was held so closely that its exact 

composition has been lost to history. 

Those knowing the secret recipe often responded to inquiries by saying 

that the formulation had been revealed by an angel to the Constantines, and that any attempt to discover it would provoke the vengeance 

of God. It may even have been lost 

to the Byzantines because, when 

Constantinople fell into the hands of 

the Crusaders in 1204 A.D., Greek 

fire was not used.

 Moslems lacked Greek fire and 

developed their own oil-based incendiaries. In a siege of Mecca in 683 

A.D., the Umayyads used catapults to 

hurl naphtha-based incendiary projectiles against the defenders, accidentally setting the cloth covering the 

Ka’bah on fire. In 813 A.D., Baghdad 

would be essentially destroyed by 

naphtha barrels thrown into the city, 

and in 1167 A.D, Cairo was destroyed by naphtha pots and bombs 

to deny it to the Crusaders. Distillation of petroleum to produce fractions 

like ―white water naphtha,‖ suited for 

incendiaries, was also known. However, the Moslems are believed to 

have avoided use of toxic additives in 

their flame weapons because of injunctions in the Koran against poisoning the air and water.5

Medieval Times

 In 1672, during his siege of the 

city of Groningen, Christoph Bernhard 

van Galen, the Bishop of Münster, 

acquired a nickname, "Bommen Berend" (Bomber Berend), for his profligate use of artillery. Among the explosive and some of the incendiary 

devices he used were filled with the 

plant Atropa or belladonna, intended 

to produce toxic fumes. (Belladonna 

means ―beautiful woman‖ in Italian.) 

Also known as ―deadly nightshade,‖ it 

Greek Fire Catapult: Harper’s Engraving. 4
59 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

is one of the most toxic plants in 

Europe, North Africa and Western 

Asia. Two to five berries in children 

and ten to twenty in adults are lethal, 

but the root is the most poisonous 

part. In low dose (alkaloid content 

below 0.001% and used as diluted 

extract) isolated atropine from the 

plant has medicinal uses. The general plant toxins in low dose can exhibit hallucinogenic effects. Higher 

doses are lethal.6

 The weapons failed to prove decisive, however, because at least in 

part they were used without taking 

wind direction into account. In the 

end, the Bishop had to withdraw, lifting the siege on the 28th of August, 

an event still celebrated in the city.7

 

 In 1854 Lyon Playfair, a British 

chemist, proposed using a cyanidefilled artillery shell against enemy 

ships during the Crimean War. 

(Cyanide, a type of ―blood agent,‖ is a 

chemical compound that affects bodily functions by preventing the normal 

utilization of oxygen by body tissues. 

The term "blood agent" is a misnomer, because these agents while carried by the blood throughout the body 

do not typically affect the blood.)9The 

British Ordnance Department rejected 

the proposal as "as bad a mode of 

warfare as poisoning the wells of the 

enemy." Playfair’s response was 

used to justify chemical warfare into 

the next century:

―There was no sense in this 

objection. It is considered a 

legitimate mode of warfare to 

fill shells with molten metal 

which scatters among the 

enemy, and produced the 

most frightful modes of 

death. Why a poisonous vapor which would kill men 

without suffering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is 

incomprehensible. War is 

destruction, and the more 

destructive it can be made 

with the least suffering the 

sooner will be ended that 

barbarous method of protecting national rights. No doubt 

in time chemistry will be used 

to lessen the suffering of 

combatants, and even of 

criminals condemned to 

death.‖ 

 Later, during the American Civil 

War, New York school teacher John 

Doughty proposed the offensive use 

of chlorine gas, delivered by filling a 

10 inch (254 millimeter) artillery shell 

with 2 to 3 quarts (approximately 2 to 

3 liters) of liquid chlorine, which could 

produce many cubic feet (a few cubic 

meters) of chlorine gas. Doughty’s 

plan was apparently never acted on, 

as it was probably presented to Brigadier General James Wolfe Ripley, 

Chief of Ordnance, who was described as being congenitally immune 

to new ideas.10

 Discussion and planning of this 

kind of CW activity caused fear 

amongst countries in the realization 

of its powerful ability to impact 

masses. Treaties were formed to ban 

CW. But for fear of being at a disadvantage, each country continued to 

develop CW agents. 

 The Germans were the first to successfully use chemical agents in 1915

Artist Rendition of Medieval Incendiary Conflict. 8
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 60

during WWI, which launched what is 

now known as the modern era of CW. 

The modern era of CW will be discussed at greater length in the next 

article in this series.

 What is important to take from this 

discussion is the origins of CW. Prior 

to 1915, chemical agents were not 

stockpiled nor were they used for 

mass destruction. Instead, they were 

used to sway the tide of battle. Instead, poisons and incendiary devices were used to increase the effectiveness of individual weapons or to 

create a psychological advantage and 

to decrease the combat effectiveness 

of an enemy. Poisoning of water supplies and wells was considered barbaric by the Roman Empire and later 

the entire West, yet it was a frequently used technique by weaker 

adversaries and villagers. 

Closing Remarks

 Many anti-terrorist planning activities provide for protection against 

modern warfare CW agents such as 

nerve and blister agents. Combating 

CW analysis grows more burdensome when considering stored toxic 

industrial chemicals, but this topic will 

be explored more expansively in future articles. It is only through awareness, planning and constant vigilance 

that we will combat chemical WMD 

and ecoterrorism.

Mr. A. Mark Diglio serves as a 

Chemical Subject Matter Expert at 

the USANCA, in the G-3/5/7 at Ft. 

Belvoir, VA. He has a B.S in Chemical Engineering from the Pennsylvania State University and a Masters 

in Business Administration with a minor in Procurement from the Florida 

Institute of Technology. He recently 

served 12 years at the Chemical Materials Agency as an Associate Project Manager and expert in Chemical 

Demilitarization. His career began 

with 16 years as a Combat Developer 

of NBC Protective Equipment at 

RDECOM, an expert in air filtration 

and barrier materials.

His email address is: 

mark.diglio@conus.army.mil. 

ENDNOTES

1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Chemical_warfare

2. http://www.scienceclarified.com/Ca

-Ch/Chemical-Warfare.html

3. Source: http://

commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

Image:Greekfire-madridskylitzes1.jpg

4. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

Image:Greek_Fire_Catapult_

(Harper%27s_Engraving).png

5. R. Everett Langford; Introduction to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction: Radiological, Chemical and Biological, 

Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

6. Committee for Veterinary Medicinal 

Products, Atropa Belladonna Summary Report, The European Agency 

for the Evil of medicinal Products Veterinary Medicines Evaluation Unit, 

EMEA/MR/540/98-FINAL, December 

1998

7. http://www.cbwinfo.com/History/

History.html A Brief History of 

Chemical-Biological Warfare

8. Source: www.meristation.com Medieval II: Total War

9. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Blood_agent

10. http://www.safebiology.com/

biological_warfare/

Chemical_Warfare.html Chemical 

Warfare: The rediscovery of chemical warfare

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 60
61 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3

Combating WMD Resource Page 

Advanced Combating WMD Course

This course introduces students to US Government and Department of Defense Combating 

WMD (CWMD) strategy, policy and operations.

Next class: 3-6 Feb 2009 

Location:

National Capitol Region (NCR) 

U.S. Nuclear Policy

This course explains the U.S. policy and it’s history; reviews NATO policy; discusses nuclear 

deterrence: theory, principles, and implications; 

discusses instruments of national power and implications for nuclear weapons; reviews nuclear 

surety and intelligence; discusses nuclear treaties and arms control.

22-26 Jun 2009

21-23 Jul 2009

This course is taught at the

Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS)

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Email: DNWS@abq.dtra.mil

Fax (505) 846-9168 or DSN 246-9168

Online Registration:

https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil/StudentArea/Login.asp 

FA52 Courses of Interest

Theater Nuclear Operations Course 

(TNOC)

TNOC is the only course offered by a Department of Defense organization that provides training for planners, support staff, targeteers, and staff nuclear planners for joint operations and targeting. The course provides overview of nuclear weapon design, capabilities and effects as well as U.S. nuclear policy, and joint nuclear 

doctrine. TNOC meets U.S. Army qualification requirements for the 

additional skill identifier 5H. The course number is DNWS-R013 

(TNOC). Call DNWS at (505) 846-5666 or DSN 246-5666 for quotas and registration information.

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer Course 

(NCP52)

NCP52 is the Functional Area 52 qualifying course. Initial priority is 

given to officer TDY enroute to a FA52 assignment or currently 

serving in a FA52 position. For availability, call the FA52 Proponent Manager at (703) 806-7866.

Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability

(HPAC)

HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of 

hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and the collateral 

effects of these releases on civilian and military populations. HPAC 

employs integrated source terms, high resolution weather and particulate transport algorithms to rapidly model hazard areas and human collateral effects.

Registration, Software Distribution and Training:

(703)-325-1276 Fax: (703) 325-0398 (DSN 221)

https://acecenter.cnttr.dtra.mil. 

Email: acecenter@cnttr.dtra.mil 

Do you have information to share with the

“CWMD Community?” 

Get it posted here. Send your input to 

dcsg3usanca2@conus.army.mil, in the Subject line: 

ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal

Note: The editor retains the right to select, edit and 

print submissions.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 62

Excavation work at the front of the building.

USANCA’s transformation provides both Nuclear and 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) planning and execution expertise for the implementation of 

Army CWMD strategy and policy at the operational and 

theater levels. This allows the Army to meet joint operational requirements in achieving national objectives to 

combat WMD.

Project Overview

 USANCA currently is within the larger footprint of the 

new National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) preferred site location. As the current USANCA building is 

old and outdated, this was an opportunity derived by FY07 BRAC program to secure another facility that would 

increase capabilities to support the transformed USANCA 

mission. USANCA will locate from the Engineering Proving Grounds to Bldg 238, Fort Belvoir in the South Post 

area. There are still some major milestones over the horizon, among them: Construction completion ~ 31 Jan 09, 

System testing ~ 28 Feb 09, and Furnishings, and equipment installed ~ 31 Mar 09. The new facility is scheduled 

to be operational on or about 15 May 09. 

Renovated Bldg 238 Capabilities 

 The new facility was constructed with safety and security in mind. The facility will be accredited up to top secretlevel and can accommodate up to 50 employees. We 

have 15,500 total floor space dedicated to our mission, 

along with two SCIF areas at 1100 sq ft. There is one 

large and 3 small conference rooms configurable for exercise/training use. The conference activities are separated 

from routine work areas to minimize impact on normal 

work by modular work areas. The new facility is designed 

for flexibility and growth, and provides the following:

Activity center

 – Large conferences, off-sites

 – Configurable Tabletops for Exercises and training

Virtual outreach

 – Virtual meeting capability – telephone, VTC

 – Connectivity up to TS level

Information sharing

 – Records and references (DTRIAC)

 – Web portal

 – Internet & telephone drops adjacent to conference 

areas

Work Process Transformation 

 We will have a state of the art communications suite 

with a fiber optic network Internet, voice, VTC capabilities 

at non-secure, secret, and top secret levels. Should we 

have local power outages, the new facility incorporates 

backup power for mission systems.

 We look forward to the ribbon cutting ceremony in the 

coming New Year and will share that experience in 

another article in the Combating WMD Journal.

Standing in doorway 114 looking into NIPR room; 

orange paint on the ground identifies space ESTech 

will need for their access system equipment (includes 

rack, and 4x8 plywood that will be mounted on wall)

USANCA’s New Facility

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Joint Nuclear Targeting Officer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
63 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 x7868 x7851 x7852 x7857 x7853

x7850x7846

MONA-CWZ x7850

CWMD Command Group

Director *Office ManagerDeputy Director *Executive OfficerBudget AnalystAdministrative NCOAgency Secretary

x7883

x7871x6500x7874x7873x7870

MONA-CWI x7883

CWMD International Programs & 

Capabilities Development

Chief International Programs *CWMD CapabilitiesNATO StandardizationCBRN SurvivabilityCBRN Survivability

x7855

x7847x7882x7859x7844x7858x7856

x7854

MONA-CWO x7855

CWMD Training and Operations

Chief *Global Plans and OperationsPlans and OperationsDomestic Plans and OperationsPlans and OperationsTargeting OfficerTraining/ExerciseReserve Component Coordinator

USANCA7150 Heller Loop, Suite 101Springfield, Virginia 22150-3198Commercial (703) 806-XXXXDSN 656-XXXFAX x7900 STU III FAX x7842* indicates secure capable phone

x7860

x7866x7876x7879x7864x7881x7877x7878x7862x7880x7865x7861x7863x7848

MONA-CWA x7860

CWMD Analysis Branch

ChiefFA 52 Proponent ManagerCBRN OfficerMicrobiologist *Nuclear Medical Science OfficerChemical EngineerChemical OfficerBiological ScientistPhysical Scientist/EMPNuclear PhysicistORSA AnalystArmy Reactor OfficeNuclear Physicist

Web Portal / Technology Support

IT Manager

U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 64

Pershing round 32 launched from Hueco Range, Texas by A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 

44th Field Artillery, targeted for White Sands Missile Range on August 20, 1963

 US Army File Photo