J-A11030-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

LUCRETIA MOYE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BAKARY NJIE

Appellant No. 1591 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered April 29, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at No(s): 01-70094

 PACSES 103103717

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MUNDY, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JULY 06, 2016

Appellant, Bakary Njie (Father), appeals from the April 29, 2015 order 

granting in part and denying in part his petition for special relief, seeking 

modification of his child support obligation due to Appellee, Lucretia Moye 

(Mother). After careful review, we affirm.

A summary of the history of this case follows.1 The parties are parents 

of a son (Child) who was the subject of a support case initiated in 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 2001, with a final order issued in July 2004. 

Mother and Child reside in Philadelphia and Father resides in Atlanta, 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1

For the purpose of this recitation, we glean the history of this case from 

the summaries provided by the trial court’s September 3, 2015 opinion and 

Father’s brief, due to the paucity of the certified record as discussed infra.
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Georgia. Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), 

the Pennsylvania support order was registered in Georgia as a responding 

state and tribunal. See generally 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7101-7901. On 

November 17, 2008, the Georgia court closed the case and set arrears at 

zero. 

 On September 22, 2011, Father was the victim of a shooting that left 

him permanently disabled. Father thereafter sought and was awarded Social 

Security Disability Income (SSDI). On April 19, 2012, the Philadelphia 

Domestic Relations Office (DRO) administratively reinstated the support 

order retroactive to November 17, 2008, because the order had been 

terminated by Georgia in error. On December 1, 2014, the underlying 

support order was terminated effective November 17, 2014, upon the Child 

turning 18 years of age, but an arrears only order was entered for $645.48 

per month.2

Thereafter, Father’s retroactive lump sum payment of his SSDI was 

garnished by the DRO, which Father asserts was the first he became aware 

that the Georgia termination order had been reversed. Subsequently, Father

filed a petition for special relief on March 11, 2015, and an amended petition 

for special relief on April 13, 2015. On April 29, 2015, the trial court held a 

hearing on Father’s petitions, with Father to appear telephonically. After an 

attempt to call Father at the commencement of the hearing found him 

____________________________________________

2 The accumulated arrears at the time exceeded $50,000.00.
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unavailable, the hearing proceeded in his absence. At the conclusion of the 

hearing, the trial court denied Father’s request to discharge the current 

arrears, denied Father’s request to modify the basic child support retroactive 

to the date of Father’s disability, and denied Father’s request to designate 

the matter as complex in order to permit discovery. The trial court did grant 

Father’s request for an audit of his support case and granted a reduction in 

Father’s monthly arrears payment from $645.48 per month to $300.00 per 

month. Father filed a timely notice of appeal on May 28, 2015.3

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review.

[1.] Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it 

failed to allow [Father] a hearing on the question of 

whether the state of Georgia had the authority to 

terminate [Father’s] child support obligation, and 

whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 

erroneously reinstated the underlying child support 

order?

[2.] Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by not 

allowing [Father] to offer evidence that the Order 

exceeds his Social Security Disability payments and 

as such the Order exceeds the [Self Support Reserve 

(SSR)]?

[3.] Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by not 

designating this matter as complex and allowing 

[the] parties to engage in discovery so that [Father] 

could see changes in [Mother’s] income since the 

entry of the Order in 2004?

[4.] Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by not 

eliminating and remitting all arrears accrued on this 

____________________________________________

3

Father and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925.
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account since the time that [Father] became 

disabled?

Father’s Brief at 3.4

We initially note that the certified record provided to this Court 

contains only the trial court’s September 3, 2015 opinion filed pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), together with a “case 

financial summary” attached as a court exhibit.5 This Court has long 

admonished as follows.

This Court cannot meaningfully review claims raised 

on appeal unless we are provided with a full and 

complete certified record. This requirement is not a 

mere “technicality” nor is this a question of whether 

we are empowered to complain sua sponte of 

lacunae in the record. In the absence of an 

adequate certified record, there is no support for an 

appellant’s arguments and, thus, there is no basis on 

which relief could be granted.

Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6–7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc). 

Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the appellant to ensure the 

completeness of the certified record. Id. at 7.

____________________________________________

4 Mother did not file an appellee brief.

5 On July 15, 2015, this Court, per curiam, issued an order directing Father 

to order and pay for the trial court transcripts no later than July 24, 2015. 

We issued a second per curiam order on July 31, 2015, acknowledging that 

Father had complied. The transcript, however, was not forwarded by the 

prothonotary to this Court. Father has included a copy in his reproduced 

record. As Father was not on notice the transcript was not supplied to us, 

we conclude Father is not at fault for this gap in the certified record. 

Nevertheless, even considering the transcript as discussed within, we 

conclude Father is not due any relief.
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The certified record consists of the “original papers 

and exhibits filed in the lower court, the transcript of 

proceedings, if any, and a certified copy of the 

docket entries prepared by the clerk of the lower 

court.” Pa.R.A.P.1921. Our law is unequivocal that 

the responsibility rests upon the appellant to ensure 

that the record certified on appeal is complete in the 

sense that it contains all of the materials necessary 

for the reviewing court to perform its duty.

Id.; see also Pa.R.A.P. 1931 cmt. (noting appellant is responsible to take 

steps to correct any omissions from the list of record documents prepared 

for transmission to this Court by the clerk of the trial court). For these 

reasons we could deem Father’s issues on appeal waived. See Preston,

supra.

To the extent Father’s issues are reviewable on the existing certified 

record and transcript, we note the following.

When evaluating a support order, this Court may 

only reverse the trial court’s determination where 

the order cannot be sustained on any valid ground. 

We will not interfere with the broad discretion 

afforded the trial court absent an abuse of the 

discretion or insufficient evidence to sustain the 

support order. An abuse of discretion is not merely 

an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion, 

the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the 

judgment exercised is shown by the record to be 

either manifestly unreasonable or the product of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, discretion has 

been abused. 

Summers v. Summers, 35 A.3d 786, 788 (Pa. Super. 2012), quoting

Krebs v. Krebs, 944 A.2d 768, 772 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citation 

omitted).
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Father first asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to 

afford Father a hearing on whether Georgia had the authority to terminate 

Father’s support obligation in 2008 and whether Pennsylvania was correct in 

administratively reinstating the support order in 2012. Father’s Brief at 9. 

Father claims the trial court inappropriately relied on laches in refusing to 

address the issue. Id. We conclude the extant record and the applicable 

statutory law belie Father’s assertions.

First we note that while Pennsylvania reinstated Father’s support order 

administratively on April 19, 2012, Father was granted a hearing on his 

modification motion on April 29, 2015. Contrary to Father’s assertion, at the 

April 29, 2015 hearing Father never asked the trial court to address the 

propriety of Georgia’s termination or Pennsylvania’s reinstatement of the 

support order. The only mention of the Georgia action occurred as follows.

THE COURT: I have it. I have -- first of 

all, the arrears are $14,635.32 which are all –

they’re all owed to the obligee here. There are no 

welfare arrears. Let me ask you a question, under 

what authority do you have to join the Philadelphia 

County Domestic Relation Section as an additional 

defendant or respondent?

[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: My 

understanding from reviewing your records, Judge, is 

that the Domestic Relations Section transferred this 

under the interstate proceedings to Georgia where 

there was some litigation, but ultimately it was 

closed because the Domestic Relation Section 

refused to comply or cooperate with Georgia. And 

the reason that this is important, Judge, is because 

ultimately the facts of the case are pretty sad. Mr. 

Njie, in 2011 was shot and injured and as a result, 
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he’s been disabled and he is receiving disability 

benefits.

N.T., 4/29/15, at 4-5. 

Discussion then took place about the amount of Father’s SSDI 

payments, and the issue of Georgia’s termination was not mentioned again. 

Furthermore, the trial court’s later reference to laches was in response to 

Father’s claim that Mother had failed during the life of the support order to 

report any changes in her income. The trial court did not mention laches in 

connection with the termination and reinstatement of the order. Id. at 9-

10. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not preclude Father from 

having a hearing on this issue. Rather, Father has waived the issue by 

failing to present it to the trial court when he had an opportunity to do so. 

“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the 

first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).

Furthermore, we conclude Father’s legal position is without merit. In 

support of his contention that Georgia, as the responding tribunal, possessed 

the authority to modify the support order, Father cites Ga. Code Ann. § 19-

11-124. That statute provides in pertinent part as follows.

§ 19-11-124. Duties and powers of responding 

tribunal

(a) When a responding tribunal of Georgia receives 

a petition or comparable pleading from an initiating 

tribunal or directly pursuant to subsection (b) of 

Code Section 19-11-120, it shall cause the petition 

or pleading to be filed and notify the petitioner 

where and when it was filed.
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(b) A responding tribunal of Georgia, to the 

extent not prohibited by other law, may do one 

or more of the following:

(1) Establish or enforce a support order, 

modify a child support order, determine the 

controlling child support order, or determine 

parentage of a child;

...

(4) Determine the amount of any arrearages 

and specify a method of payment;

...

Ga. Code Ann. § 19-11-124 (emphasis added). Father fails to cite the 

controlling portion of Georgia’s enactment of UIFSA, to wit, as follows.

§ 19-11-170. Modification of child support 

order of another state

(a) If Code Section 19-11-172 [(pertaining only to 

situations where all parties and the children reside in 

Georgia)] does not apply, upon petition a tribunal of 

Georgia may modify a child support order issued in 

another state which is registered in Georgia if, after 

notice and hearing, the tribunal finds that:

(1) The following requirements are met:

(A) Neither the child, nor the obligee who 

is an individual, nor the obligor resides in 

the issuing state;

(B) A petitioner who is a nonresident of 

Georgia seeks modification; and

(C) The respondent is subject to the 

personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of 

Georgia; or
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(2) This state is the residence of the child or a 

party who is an individual, is subject to the 

personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of Georgia, 

and all of the parties who are individuals have 

filed consents in a record in the issuing tribunal 

for a tribunal of this state to modify the 

support order and assume continuing, 

exclusive jurisdiction.

...

Ga. Code Ann. § 19-11-170.

Clearly, at the time Georgia terminated Father’s support order, both 

Mother and the Child continued to reside in Pennsylvania. Therefore, the 

conditions of Section 19-11-170(a)(1)(A) and (B) were not met. 

Additionally, Mother never consented to Georgia assuming continued 

exclusive jurisdiction, so Section 19-11-170(a)(2) did not apply. We thus 

conclude Georgia lacked authority to modify the support order, and 

Pennsylvania was not bound to recognize the termination. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

7612. For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in not revisiting the issue of the April 19, 2012 reinstatement of the 

underlying support order.

In his second and fourth issues Father claims the trial court abused its 

discretion by not allowing him to offer evidence of his SSDI income, by 

declining to discharge all arrears, or alternatively by setting a monthly 

support obligation on arrears that exceeds his SSR. Father’s Brief at 12. 

Again, our review of the transcript belies Father’s assertion. First, Father did 

not make himself available to participate in the hearing via telephone 
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despite adequate notice of the hearing. N.T., 4/29/15, at 3. Furthermore, 

during the course of the hearing, Father’s counsel indicated to the trial court 

that he had documentation of amounts Father received in SSDI. Id. at 6, 

10, 11. However, counsel never offered those documents into evidence, and 

nowhere in the record did the trial court preclude Father’s attorney from 

doing so. See generally id. Remission of arrears by a trial court is 

permitted only where an order is unenforceable or where “the obligor is 

unable to pay, has no known income or assets and there is no reasonable 

prospect that the obligor will be able to pay in the foreseeable future.” 

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.19(f). Father has not met this burden. Consequently, we 

conclude, based on the state of the record before it, that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining to remit Father’s arrears or in reducing 

Father’s monthly arrears payment from $645.48 to $300.00.

Father finally claims the trial court abused its discretion by denying his 

request to designate the case as complex and permitting him to engage in 

discovery. Father’s Brief at 13; see Pa.R.C.P. 1910.9, 1910.12(c). We 

agree with the trial court’s determination “that a designation of this support 

matter as complex was not necessary or appropriate because the 

establishment or modification of a running support order was not at issue, 

[]Father had been making payments on an arrears only order, [and] he has 

verifiable income from his Social Security disability benefits.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 9/3/15, at 8. 
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For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude Appellant’s issues on appeal 

are either waived or without merit. We discern no abuse of discretion by the 

trial court in denying in part Father’s petition for special relief. Accordingly, 

we affirm the trial court’s April 29, 2015 order.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/6/2016