IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIN ROUPP, :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-04cv2020

:

: Judge Jones

v. :

:

SUSQUEHANNA HEALTH :

SYSTEM, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

January 13, 2006

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s, Susquehanna Health System

(“Defendant” or “SHS”), Motion Summary Judgment (“the Motion”) (doc. 21)

filed on November 1, 2005.

Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331 and 29

U.S.C. § 2601 et seq., The Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).

For the following reasons, we will deny the Motion. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 

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Fed .R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp., 901 F.2d 335,

340 (3d Cir. 1990). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of

showing "there is no genuine issue for trial." Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 357

(3d Cir. 1992). Summary judgment should not be granted when there is a

disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences which a fact finder could

draw from them. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir.

1982). 

Initially, the moving party has a burden of demonstrating the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986). This may be met by the moving party pointing out to the court that there is

an absence of evidence to support an essential element as to which the non-moving

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that, where such a motion is

made and properly supported, the non-moving party must then show by affidavits,

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that there

is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The United States Supreme

Court has commented that this requirement is tantamount to the non-moving party

making a sufficient showing as to the essential elements of their case that a

reasonable jury could find in its favor. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23. 

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It is important to note that “the non-moving party cannot rely upon

conclusory allegations in its pleadings or in memoranda and briefs to establish a

genuine issue of material fact." Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511

(3d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). However, all inferences "should be drawn in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party's

evidence contradicts the movant's, then the non-movant's must be taken as true." 

Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir.

1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 912 (1993) (citations omitted).

Still, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties

will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the

requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)(emphasis in original). "As to

materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. at 248. A

dispute is considered to be genuine only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS:

SHS, a Pennsylvania corporation, is a healthcare facility comprised of the

former Williamsport, Divine Providence, and Muncy Valley Hospitals. SHS first

employed Plaintiff, Erin Roupp (“Plaintiff” or “Roupp”), as a part-time Unit Clerk

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on August 23, 1999. About May 14, 2002, SHS employed Plaintiff on a full-time

basis as an Emergency Medical Technician (“EMT”), which was the position

Plaintiff was employed in at the time of her termination. Plaintiff suffers from

Crohn’s disease, a chronic disorder.

SHS’s “Leave of Absence Policy,” (“the Policy”) requires that “medical

certification will be required to support a request for a [Family and Medical Leave

(“FML”)] leave involving the serious medical condition of an employee.” (Rec.

Doc. 22, Ex. A at 3). The Policy also states that “an employee on [FML leave] is

required to use sick time first and PTO thereafter if the leave is for their own

serious medical condition.” (Rec. Doc. 22, Ex. A at 3) (emphasis in original).

“Once the employee has exhausted all available sick and PTO benefits, and incur a

full a pay period without any paid time, their employment will be terminated

effective the last day of that pay period.” (Rec. Doc. 22, Ex. A at 1). Further,

after taking FML or a Leave of Absence (“LOA”), a returning employee had to

provide a “return-to-work” note from his or her treating physician. (Rec. Doc. 22,

Ex. A at 5). At the time of her hire, Plaintiff executed an acknowledgment of the

Policy.

On December 10, 2002, SHS issued a written warning to Plaintiff for

excessive absenteeism. (Rec. Doc. 22, Ex. B). At or about the same time that

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Plaintiff received this warning, her immediate supervisor, Steve Wilson (“Wilson”)

alerted her to the possibility of taking FML. (Rec. Doc. 22 at 3 and Doc. 32 at 2). 

Thereafter, Plaintiff went to Human Resources and obtained FML papers and on

December 12, 2002, Plaintiff executed her application for intermittent FML leave

and after her treating physician, Dr. Jerome Ellis, completed the paperwork, she

returned it to the Human Resources Department. 

On January 3, 2003, SHS notified Plaintiff by letter that her request for

intermittent FML leave was granted retroactive to December 23, 2002. The letter

also stated that “while on leave, [Plaintiff] will be required to furnish [SHS] with

periodic reports of [Plaintiff’s] status and intent to return to work. [Plaintiff] will be

required to notify [SHS] at least two work days prior to the date you intend to

report to work.” (Rec. Doc. 22, Ex. D at 2). Plaintiff was requested to and did file

an intermittent leave recertification in July, 2003.

During 2003, Plaintiff was treated by Dr. Ellis for her condition and on June

10, 2003, Plaintiff stopped working due to her disorder. On June 18, 2003,

Plaintiff underwent abdominal surgery due to her condition. Plaintiff experienced

no complications from the surgery other than post-surgical soreness.

On June 12, 2003, Plaintiff requested FML for the time she was to be absent

due to her abdominal surgery. On June 13, SHS sent to Plaintiff a written,

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 Plaintiff alleges that she had already given Dr. Ellis recertification paperwork to complete prior

to her receipt of the July 17, 2003 letter from SHS. 

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conditional approval of her continuous, family and medical leave request pending

the receipt of medical certification within fifteen days of the Plaintiff’s receipt of the

letter. The letter stated that if SHS did not receive the certification within fifteen

days, her leave request would be delayed or denied. (Rec. Doc. 22, Ex. G). 

Plaintiff disputes either that the letter was sent or that it was received by her. 

Plaintiff never turned in a medical certification in support of her continuous FML

request.

On July 17, 2003, SHS sent a letter to Plaintiff advising her that it was

denying her request for continuous FML because it had not received her medical

certification to evaluate her leave request. (Rec. Doc. 22, Ex. H). This letter

informed Plaintiff that she may still be eligible for non-FML leave if she returned a

non-FML medical certification form within fifteen days of the letter. 

Following her receipt of the July 17, 2003 letter, Plaintiff picked up a new set

of recertification paperwork from Human Resources and delivered it to Dr. Ellis’

office, with instructions that the paperwork had to be completed by August 1,

2003.1 Plaintiff alleges that she told a Human Resources person that she told Dr.

Ellis that the paperwork had to be done by August 1, 2003 and that the Human

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Resources person told her “that wouldn’t be a problem.” (Rec. Doc. 22 at 32). 

Plaintiff thereafter assumed that Dr. Ellis would promptly complete and return the

paperwork to SHS and did not call Dr. Ellis’ office to see if the paperwork was in

fact completed and delivered. By the close of business on August 4, 2003, SHS

had received no medical certification for Plaintiff and consequently sent Plaintiff a

termination of employment letter on August 5, 2003. (Rec. Doc. 22, Ex. I).

It is disputed by the parties whether Plaintiff had exhausted all available sick

and PTO benefits as of August 4, 2003. SHS claims that Plaintiff had exhausted

her sick and PTO benefits, however Plaintiff claims that her pay stubs for the pay

periods 6/28/03 through 8/9/03 show a balance of 3.2081 PTO hours and 4.4651

Sick Time Hours. (Rec. Doc. 32, Ex. B). 

On August 6 or 7, 2003, Plaintiff contacted SHS to determine what shift she

would be working when she returned to work on August 9, 2003. Plaintiff alleges

that she had not received the August 5, 2003 termination letter from SHS when she

placed this call. She was told over the telephone that SHS had already terminated

her employment. On that day or the next day, Plaintiff called Dr. Ellis’ office to

inform him that she had been terminated because her recertification paperwork had

never been received by SHS. Dr. Ellis ultimately completed the recertification

paperwork on August 11, 2003, after informing Plaintiff that he had been on

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vacation and “just hadn’t gotten to it.” (Rec. Doc. 32 at 8).

Plaintiff filed a complaint (doc. 1) with this Court on September 13, 2004,

alleging that SHS violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C

§ 2601, et seq.

DISCUSSION:

Pursuant to §2613(a) of the FMLA, an employee shall provide, if requested

by an employer, a physician’s certification of the need for FMLA leave “in a timely

manner.” The regulations promulgated under the FMLA provide that an employee

shall provide the employer with the requested recertification documents within the

time frame requested by the employer (which must allow at least 15 calendar days

after the employer’s request), “unless it is not practicable under the particular

circumstances to do so despite the employee’s diligent, good faith efforts.” 29

C.F.R. §825.308(d).

Plaintiff argues that it was not practicable for her FMLA certification

documentation to be timely submitted to SHS, despite her diligent, good faith

efforts to do so. Plaintiff argues that it is disputed as to whether she ever received

the July 13, 2003 letter from SHS conditionally approving her continuous FML

leave pending receipt of a medical certification within 15 days. Plaintiff argues that

she remembers receiving recertification forms, not forms for continuous FML

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leave. Plaintiff states that she provided Dr. Ellis with all the forms she received

from SHS, and no “form for continuous leave has ever surfaced.” (Rec. Doc. 31

at 12).Further, Plaintiff argues that it was reasonable for her to believe that Dr. Ellis

would complete the forms by August 1, 2003 and that she had no reason to doubt

that Dr. Ellis would return the forms by that date. Plaintiff argues that she had no

control of Dr. Ellis’ inaction concerning the completion of the forms. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to FMLA leave because she did

not comport with the requirements of the FMLA and the regulations promulgated

thereunder. Further, Defendant argues that even if she never received the July 13,

2003 letter, Plaintiff was nonetheless aware of the deadline of August 1, 2003

requiring her to turn in to SHS her medical certification forms to receive non-FML

leave. In support of this argument Defendant points out that Plaintiff had received

the July 17, 2003 letter from SHS denying her continuous FML-leave because she

had not given a medical certification to SHS. Therefore, Defendant argues that it

did not terminate Plaintiff in violation of the FMLA because Plaintiff was not

entitled to FMLA leave due to her failure to supply SHS with the proper medical

certification paperwork.

It is apparent to this court that issues of material fact presently exist in this

matter. A genuine issue of material fact exists whether or not it was practicable

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under the circumstances for the FLMA documentation to be completed and

returned to the employer within the time frame set by the employer. It is also

disputed whether Plaintiff employed diligence and good faith in her quest to have

the certification paperwork completed. Plaintiff argues that she did employ those

measures, and that Dr. Ellis’ vacation during the relevant time period rendered

completion of the paperwork within the time frame set by SHS impracticable. In

response, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s efforts to have Dr. Ellis submit a

recertification for intermittent leave does not justify the more than seven weeks of

continuous leave that she actually took, and that Plaintiff’s actions regarding Dr.

Ellis do not support her contention that she acted diligently and in good faith.

The foregoing demonstrates that it would be improvident for us to enter

summary judgment in favor of Defendant, and accordingly we decline to do so.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The Motion (doc. 21) is DENIED.

s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

 

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