[Cite as State v. Pearson , 2021-Ohio-520.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO Plaintiff-Appellee

v. SHELDON K. PEARSON Defendant-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-11

Trial Court Case No. 2019-CR-190 (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas Court)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 26th day of February, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . SAMANTHA B. WHETHERHOLT, Atty. Reg. No. 0092010, Assistant Pros ecuting Attorney, Champaign County Prosecutor’s Office, 200 North Main Street, Urbana, Ohio 43078 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee TRAVIS DUNNINGTON, Atty. Reg. No. 0096519, 117 South Main Stree t, Suite 400, Dayton, Ohio 45422 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

WELBAUM, J.-2- {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Sheldon K. Pearson, appeals from his convi ction in the Champaign County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of aggravated possession of drugs and one count of failure to appe ar as required by recognizance. In support of his appeal, Pearson claims that th e trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Pearson also claims that the t rial court erred by accepting his guilty plea to the failure-to-appear charge becau se the charging indictment

was defective in that it did not include all essential elements of that offense. For the reasons outlined below, the judgm ent of the trial court will be affirmed.

Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 2} On August 5, 2019, a Champaign County Grand Jury returned an in dictment charging Pearson with one count of aggravated trafficking in dr ugs, a fourth-degree felony, and one count of aggravated possession of drugs, a fift h-degree felony. The trial court thereafter released Pearson on a personal recognizance bo nd and ordered Pearson to appear for an arraignment hearing on August 26, 2019. Howev er, Pearson failed to appear, and the trial court issued a capias for his arrest. Sh ortly thereafter, Pearson telephoned the trial court and explained that he had been mista ken about the time of the arraignment hearing. As a result, the arraignment hearing was continued to later in the day on August 26th. Pearson thereafter appeared at the arraign ment hearing and entered a plea of not guilty to the indicted charges. The tria l court then recalled the capias and reinstated Pearson’s personal recognizance bond. {¶ 3} On September 5, 2019, the trial court was advised that Pearson had violated the conditions of his bond by testing positive for cocaine, met hamphetamine,-3- amphetamine, MDMA, alcohol, and THC. Although it found Pearson guilty of the bond violation, the trial court continued Pearson’s personal recogni zance bond. The trial court, however, advised Pearson that his bond violation would b e a sentencing factor if he were convicted, and that he would be incarcerated pending hi s trial if he violated his bond again. {¶ 4} Three weeks after the trial court continued Pearson’s personal recognizance bond, Pearson’s pretrial services officer notified the trial co urt of another bond violation. Specifically, it was alleged that Pearson failed to attend two pretrial services appointments on September 6 and 20, 2019, and several TCN counseling treatme nt sessions. As a result of these alleged violations, the matter was set for a bo nd violation hearing on October 3, 2019. Pearson failed to attend the hearing. {¶ 5} Due to Pearson’s failure to attend the bond violation hearing, the trial court suspended Pearson’s personal recognizance bond and issued a cap ias for his arrest. Pearson was also indicted on one count of failure to appear as required by recognizance in violation of R.C. 2937.29 and R.C. 2937.99(A)/(B), a felony of the fourth degree. {¶ 6} On October 25, 2019, after Pearson was taken into custody, Pear son appeared at an arraignment hearing for the failure-to-appear ch arge and pled not guilty to the failure-to-appear charge; the trial court continued the suspension of Pearson’s bond. Then, on November 7, 2019, the trial court released Pear son on a bail bond in the sum of $10,000. The bail bond included several standard and sp ecial conditions. These conditions included, but were not limited to, Pearson’s b eing placed on house arrest via electronic home monitoring and his not possessing or using any controlled

substances.-4- {¶ 7} On December 16, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Pearson ’s alleged bond violations. During the hearing, the trial court found Pea rson guilty of the earlier violations for failing to attend two pretrial services appointm ents and several TCN counseling treatment sessions. Also during this hearing, Pears on admitted to violating his bond by failing to attend the October 3, 2019 bond violatio n hearing. Pearson further admitted to violating his bond on December 12, 2019, by testing positive for THC. The trial court found Pearson guilty of all the admitted bond viola tions and continued his bond with the modification that Pearson’s brother was not permitted to visit his residence for

any reason. {¶ 8} Following the bond violation hearing, Pearson pled guilty to ag gravated possession of drugs and failure to appear as required by recogn izance. In exchange for Pearson’s guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the charge f or aggravated trafficking in drugs and to recommend a presentence investigation (“PSI”) for purposes of sentencing. The State also agreed to recommend community control sanctions with special conditions if Pearson had no criminal history other than what was disclose d in his discovery packet. It was agreed that if Pearson’s PSI revealed any additional cri minal history, or if Pearson was charged with another criminal offense or violated the condi tions of his bond, the State was not bound to its recommendation of community control. Pear son further agreed to pay court costs and any court-appointed counsel fees that may b e imposed at sentencing. {¶ 9} After conducting a plea colloquy, the trial court accepted Pear son’s guilty plea, ordered a PSI, and scheduled the matter for sentencing on January 9, 2020. Then, one day after Pearson entered his guilty plea, the trial court received notice of an alleged bond violation for Pearson’s failing to abide by his house arre st. Specifically, it was-5- alleged that on December 16, 2019, Pearson engaged in unauthori zed travel to a McDonalds in Urbana, Ohio. In light of this allegation, the tr ial court scheduled a bond violation hearing to take place at the time of Pearson’s senten cing hearing. {¶ 10} On December 30, 2019, the trial court received notice of two mo re alleged bond violations. It was alleged that on December 23, 2019, Pea rson engaged in unauthorized travel to a business in St. Paris, Ohio, and that on December 25, 2019, Pearson engaged in unauthorized travel to a residence in St. Pa ris, Ohio. The trial court ordered these alleged bond violations to also be heard at the t ime of Pearson’s sentencing hearing. {¶ 11} On January 7, 2020, the trial court received yet another notice of Pearson’s violating his bond. This time it was alleged that on January 6 , 2020, Pearson engaged in unauthorized travel to a residence in St. Paris, Ohio, and a llowed the battery in his electronic home monitoring device to go uncharged. Again, the trial court ordered these allegations to be heard at the time of Pearson’s sentencing hea ring. The trial court also suspended Pearson’s bond and issued a capias for his arrest. {¶ 12} On January 9, 2020, Pearson failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. Pearson was thereafter arrested on February 25, 2020. The sent encing and bond violation hearings were then rescheduled for March 3, 2020. At the bond violation hearing, Pearson admitted to all the alleged bond violations an d the trial court found him guilty of the violations. The trial court thereafter advised t he State that, in light of Pearson’s bond violations, the State was no longer bound by its agreement to recommend community control sanctions at sentencing. {¶ 13} During the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that pursu ant to R.C.-6- 2929.13(B)(1)(b), Pearson was not amenable to community control sanctions because of his bond violations and because he had previously served a pris on term. The trial court then sentenced Pearson to 9 months in prison for aggravated pos session of drugs and 18 months in prison for failure to appear as required by recogn izance. The trial court ordered those sentences to be served consecutively for a total prison term of 27 months. The trial court also ordered Pearson to pay a $250 fine, court costs, and court-appointed

counsel fees. {¶ 14} Pearson now appeals from his conviction, raising two assignment s of error

for review.

First Assignment of Error {¶ 15} Under his first assignment of error, Pearson contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. Although Pearson does not dispute that the trial court made the statutorily-required findings for imposing consecutive sentences under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), Pearson asserts that his sentence sho uld be vacated because those findings were not supported by the record. We disagree. {¶ 16} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a trial court may impose consec utive sentences if it finds that: (1) consecutive service is necessar y to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender; (2) consecutive sentenc es are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public; and (3) one or more of the following three findings are satisfied: (a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanc tion-7- imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior off ense. (b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as pa rt of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness o f the

offender's conduct. (c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates th at consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender. R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(a)-(c). {¶ 17} “[A] trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R .C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its fin dings into its sentencing entry[.]” State v. Bonnell , 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, syllabus. “[W]here a trial court properly makes the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), an appellate court may not reverse the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences unless it first clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the trial court's findings.” State v. Withrow , 2016-Ohio-2884, 64 N.E.3d 553, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.). See also

State v. Marcum , 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 22 (“R. C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a) compels appellate courts to modify or vacate s entences if they find by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support any relevant findings under * * * [R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)]”). This is a very deferential standard of review, as “the-8- question is not whether the trial court had clear and convincin g evidence to support its findings, but rather, whether we clearly and convincingly find that the record fails to support the trial court's findings.” (Citation omitted.) Withrow at ¶ 38. In applying that standard of review, “the consecutive nature of the trial court’ s sentencing should stand unless the record overwhelmingly supports a contrary result.” (Citation omitted.) Id . at ¶ 39. {¶ 18} As previously noted, Pearson does not dispute that the trial co urt made the consecutive-sentence findings required by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing and in the sentencing entry. Indeed, the record establishes that the trial court found that: (1) consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish Pearson; (2) consecutive sentences were not disproportio nate to the seriousness of Pearson’s conduct and the danger he poses to the public; (3) Pearson committed one or more of his offenses while he was awaiting trial or sentenci ng; and (4) Pearson’s history

of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by him. {¶ 19} Pearson contends, however, that the record does not support the se findings. Specifically, Pearson claims that the record does no t support a finding that consecutive sentences were necessary to protect the public from future crime by him or that consecutive sentences were not disproportionate to the dan ger he poses to the public. To support this claim, Pearson argues that his convict ed criminal behavior— possessing a small amount of methamphetamine and failing to app ear at court—did not jeopardize the health and safety of anyone but himself. {¶ 20} Nevertheless, for purposes of sentencing, this court “ ‘is not confined to-9- [considering] the evidence that strictly relates to the convict ion offense because the court is no longer concerned * * * with the narrow issue of guilt.’ ” State v. Waggoner , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28453, 2020-Ohio-212, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Bowser , 186 Ohio App.3d 162, 2010-Ohio-951, 926 N.E.2d 714, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.). Sentencin g courts may consider “facts related to charges that were dismissed pursuant to a ple a bargain, and allegations contained in a PSI report.” State v. Bautista , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2015-CA-74, 2016-Ohio5436, ¶ 12, citing State v. Clemons , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26038, 2014-Ohio-4248, ¶ 8; Bowser at ¶ 15; State v. McNeil , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-51, 2020-Ohio-3202, ¶ 14. {¶ 21} The record establishes that Pearson had a third charge for aggr avated trafficking in drugs that was dismissed pursuant to a plea agre ement. Concerning that charge, the PSI report indicated that law enforcement officers discovered several items of drug paraphernalia inside of Pearson’s residence. The offic ers also discovered three individuals in the home using methamphetamine with Pearson. Tw o of the three individuals were on probation and one of them had a warrant for her arrest. When interviewed by the officers, Pearson admitted to giving methamp hetamine to the individual with the warrant and to using methamphetamine himself. Because Pearson’s criminal conduct involved him providing individuals with drugs and a pla ce to use drugs, we cannot say that the record clearly and convincingly fails to support t he trial court’s finding that there was a need to protect others from Pearson’s criminal cond uct and to punish him. {¶ 22} We also cannot say that the record clearly and convincingly fai ls to support the trial court’s finding that consecutive sentences were not d isproportionate to the danger Pearson posed to the public, as Pearson had an extensive crimin al record. Between-10- 1995 and 1999, Pearson received juvenile adjudications for assa ult, theft, counterfeit controlled substance, and criminal trespass. Then, over the ne xt 20 years, Pearson received felony convictions for receiving stolen property, brea king and entering, theft, burglary, complicity to felonious assault, menacing by stalking , telecommunications harassment, domestic violence, and forgery. Pearson also had m ultiple OVI convictions, community control violations, and several misdemeanor convictio ns for assault, criminal trespass, underage consumption, disorderly conduct, driving und er suspension, telephone harassment, theft, receiving stolen property, possess ion of drugs, possession of drug paraphernalia, and unauthorized use of property. {¶ 23} Although Pearson does not dispute his criminal history, he argu es that the record failed to support the trial court’s finding under R.C. 2 929.14(C)(4)(c), i.e., that his criminal history demonstrated a need to protect the public from future crime by him. We could not disagree more. The PSI report established that Pears on had continually flouted the law over the past 24 years by engaging in a wide ra nge of criminal activity that involved violence, drugs, alcohol, theft, and deception. The P SI also established that Pearson had not responded favorably to past sanctions, which in cluded several fines, probation, substance abuse treatment, and multiple jail and pri son sentences. Given the

nature and extent of Pearson’s criminal record and his unfavora ble response to previously-imposed sanctions, we cannot say that the record cle arly and convincingly failed to support the trial court’s finding that Pearson’s crim inal history demonstrated a need to protect the public from future crime by him. {¶ 24} That said, even if the record had not supported the trial court ’s criminalhistory finding under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(c), the trial court al so made a finding under R.C.-11- 2929.14(C)(4)(a), i.e., that Pearson committed one or more of t he multiple offenses while he was awaiting trial or sentencing. This finding is not in dispute and was not unsupported by the record, as Pearson committed the offense of failure to appear as required by recognizance while he was awaiting trial/sentencing . Because only one of the three findings under division (a) through (c) of R.C. 2929. 14(C)(4) must be present, the trial court’s finding under division (a) was sufficient to impose consecutive sentences. Therefore, for all the foregoing reasons, Pearson’s claim that the record failed to support

the trial court's consecutive- sentence findings lacks merit. {¶ 25} Pearson’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Second Assignment of Error {¶ 26} Under his second assignment of error, Pearson contends that the trial court erred by accepting his guilty plea to failure to appear as requ ired by recognizance in violation of R.C. 2937.29 and R.C. 2937.99(A) and (B). In supp ort of this claim, Pearson argues that the charging indictment was defective because it di d not specify that Pearson

had been released on his own recognizance, but simply stated that he “fail[ed] to appear as required by recognizance.” Pearson asserts that being relea sed on his own recognizance was an essential element of the offense at issue, and that the failure to include that element in the indictment warrants vacating his co nviction. Pearson, however, waived this claim for appeal. {¶ 27} This court has consistently held that “a defendant waives any d eficiency in the indictment by failing to object to the indictment and plead ing guilty to the offense.”

State v. Edwards , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22648, 2009-Ohio-1408, ¶ 34, citing State v.-12- Barton , 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, 844 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 73; State v. Easter , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22487, 2008-Ohio-6038, ¶ 27 ; State v. Portis , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2008-CA-62, 2009-Ohio-3770, ¶ 4; State v. Akhmedov , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28185, 2019-Ohio-3586, ¶ 10. “This is true even when an indictment fa ils to include an essential element of the charged offense.” (Citations omitted.) Portis at ¶ 4. {¶ 28} Pearson concedes that he did not object to the alleged deficien cy in the

indictment at the trial court level and that he has waived all but plain error for appeal.

See State v. Baker , 2018-Ohio-3925, 119 N.E.3d 987, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.) (“[a]n object ion to an indictment that is not raised prior to trial or entering a p lea as required by Crim.R. 12(C)(2) is waived unless it constitutes plain error”). “An er ror qualifies as plain error only if the error is obvious and but for the error the outcome of the proceeding clearly would have been otherwise.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Molen , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 21941, 2008-Ohio-6237, ¶ 9. “The burden of demonstrating p lain error is on the party asserting it.” State v. Quarterman , 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16, citing State v. Payne , 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio-4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 17. {¶ 29} In an attempt to establish plain error, Pearson cites this cour t’s holding in

State v. Yslas , 2007-Ohio-5646, 173 Ohio App.3d 396 (2d Dist.). In Yslas , count two of the defendant’s indictment included a fourth-degree felony char ge for possession of crack cocaine “in an amount that equals or exceeds five grams but is less than twenty-five

grams ” in violation of R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(b). (Emphasis added.) Id . at ¶ 12. The defendant entered a no contest plea to the charge and thereafte r appealed from his conviction. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial cou rt erred in accepting his no-13- contest plea because his indictment was fatally defective in th at it charged him with possessing crack cocaine when he actually possessed powder coca ine. Id . at ¶ 9. Because the defendant never raised an objection to the indictme nt in the court below, we found that he had waived all but plain error for appeal. Id . at ¶ 10. {¶ 30} After reviewing the matter, we held that: “Even though defendan t's nocontest plea waived any error or defect in the sufficiency of t he state’s evidence or proof under which defendant was convicted, * * * including any varian ce between the particular controlled substance alleged in the indictment and that actuall y possessed by defendant, the more fundamental problem in this case is that count two of the indictment charges an offense that does not exist in the section of the Revised Code charged, R.C. 2925.11(C)(4), or any other .” (Emphasis added.) Id . at ¶ 14. We noted that under R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(b), an individual commits fourth-degree felo ny possession of crack cocaine if he or she possesses crack cocaine in an amount that “equals or exceeds one gram but is less than five grams. ” (Emphasis added.) Id . at ¶ 18. We then explained

that: The problem here is that count two of the indictment charged defendant with possession of crack cocaine in an amount more th an five but less than 25 grams by weight, the quantity which R.C. 2925. 11(C)(4)(b) applies to possession of powder cocaine. That section does not prohibit possession of crack cocaine in that same gross quantity. There fore, count two of the indictment to which defendant entered a plea of no c ontest fails to charge a valid statutory offense. Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantees the a ccused-14- that the essential facts constituting the offense for which he is charged will be found in the grand jury’s indictment. * * * The identity of a controlled substance involved in a drug offense is an essential element of the crime

that must be included in the indictment. The omission of that information cannot be cured by amendment pursuant to Crim.R. 7(D), because to do so would change the very identity of the offense charged. (Citations omitted.) Yslas , 2007-Ohio-5646, 173 Ohio App.3d 396 at ¶ 19-20. {¶ 31} In light of this, we found plain error existed because “[t]he i ndictment charged defendant with possessing a particular controlled subst ance, crack cocaine, that is not only different from the controlled substance that he act ually possessed, powder cocaine, but in a gross amount that does not constitute an offe nse under R.C. 2925.11(C)(4)(b).” Id . at ¶ 21. We therefore reversed the defendant’s conviction fo r possession of crack cocaine. Id

. {¶ 32} Pearson attempts to analogize Yslas by claiming that the indictment in the instant case charged him with an offense that does not exist un der the Ohio Revised Code. Specifically, Pearson claims that under R.C. 2937.99, th e offense of failure to appear as required by recognizance includes the essential eleme nt of being placed on an own-recognizance bond, an element that Pearson claims was absen t from the indictment. For this reason, Pearson claims that the indictment charged him with a non-existent offense, which resulted in plain error that warrants the revers al of his conviction. We disagree. {¶ 33} Although we agree with Pearson’s claim that R.C. 2937.99 only c riminalizes a defendant’s failure to appear when he is released on his own recognizance per R.C.-15- 2937.29, see State v. Fusik , 4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA28, 2005-Ohio-1056, ¶ 11; we nevertheless find that Pearson’s indictment provided sufficient notice of the ownrecognizance element and thus correctly charged Pearson with an existing offense under

R.C. 2937.99. We reach this conclusion because Pearson’s indic tment charged him with violating R.C. 2937.29 and R.C. 2937.99(A)/(B). R.C. 2937.29 p rovides that an “accused may be released on his own recognizance” and that “a failure to appear as required by such recognizance shall constitute an offense subject to the pe nalty provided in [R.C. 2937.99].” Pursuant to R.C. 2937.99(A), “[n]o person shall fai l to appear as required after having been released pursuant to [R.C. 2937.29]” and “[w] hoever violates this section is guilty of failure to appear and shall be punished as set forth in division (B) or (C) of this section.” Section (B) of the statute then goes on to provide that: “If the release was in connection with a felony charge or pending appeal after conviction of a felony, failure to appear is a felony of the fourth degree.” R.C. 2937 .99(B). {¶ 34} Pearson’s indictment closely tra cks the foregoing statutory lan guage and charged the failure-to-appear offense as a fourth-degree felony . The indictment specifically alleged that Pearson “did fail to appear as requir ed by recognizance and the release was in connection with a felony charge or pending appea l after conviction of a felony.” Although the indictment did not specifically include the phrase “own recognizance,” it did refer to a violation of R.C. 2937.29, whi ch pertains solely to releasing an accused on his own recognizance. Given the reference to R.C . 2937.29, the indictment sufficiently included the own-recognizance element a nd fairly informed Pearson of the charged offense. See State v. Cassel , 2016-Ohio-3479, 66 N.E.3d 318, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Buehner , 110 Ohio St.3d 403, 2006-Ohio-4707, 853 N.E.2d-16- 1162, ¶ 9 and State v. Horner , 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 45 (“An indictment is sufficient if it contains the elements of th e offense charged, fairly informs the defendant of the charge, and enables the defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.”). Therefo re, unlike in Yslas , Pearson’s indictment charged him with a valid statutory offense

. {¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, we are not convinced that the indict ment contained an obvious error for purposes of the plain-error anal ysis. Even if the absence of the phrase “own recognizance” in the indictment had been an obvious error, unlike

Yslas , that error did not affect the identity of the charged offense . Moreover, Pearson failed to argue, let alone demonstrate, that he would not have entered his guilty plea had the phrase “own recognizance” appeared in the indictment. Ther efore, Pearson did not satisfy his burden to establish that the outcome of the proceed ing would have been different but for the alleged error. Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, Pearson has failed to establish plain error for purposes of reversing h is conviction. {¶ 36} Pearson’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Conclusion {¶ 37} Having overruled both of Pearson’s assignments of error, the ju dgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

TUCKER, P.J. and DONOVAN, J., concur.-17-

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Samantha B. Whetherholt Travis Dunnington Hon. Nick A. Selvaggio