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44–537 PDF 2008

S. HRG. 110–506

NATO: ENLARGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 11, 2008

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

BOB CORKER, Tennessee

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Asmus, Ronald D., executive director, Transatlantic Center, German Marshall

Fund, Brussels, Belgium ..................................................................................... 42

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 45

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 1

Craddock, GEN John, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, NATO Headquarters, Mons, Belgium ................................... 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15

Fried, Hon. Daniel, Acting Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 8

Gordon, Dr. Philip H., senior fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC ........................................................................................... 50

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 53

Jackson, Bruce, president, Project on Transitional Democracies, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 59

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 61

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 3

Townsend, James J., Jr., director, International Security Program, Atlantic

Council, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 67

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

DeMint, Jim, U.S. Senator from South Carolina, prepared statement ............... 86

Obama, Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, prepared statement ........................ 85

(III)

(1)

NATO: ENLARGEMENT AND EFFECTIVENESS

TUESDAY, MARCH 11, 2008

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Menendez, Casey, Lugar, Hagel,

Voinovich, and Isakson.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,

U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Assistant Secretary, welcome back. It’s been only about a

couple of days since you’ve been here. It’s good to have you back.

And, General Craddock, welcome. And thank you both for being

here today.

Next month, the 26 Member States of the NATO Alliance will

gather in Bucharest, Romania. And central to the discussions will

be the questions of Ukraine and Georgia, bringing them closer to

the Alliance, and Croatia, Albania, and FYROM—or Macedonia, as

our Government refers to it—into the Alliance. The other major

issues that will be front and center is the effectiveness of NATO

in its first out-of-area military commitment in the ongoing war in

Afghanistan.

Summits have a tendency to force events and a time for actual

decisions on hard issues, so it’s no surprise that, in the runup to

this summit, disagreements among allies sometimes get the spotlight. Even so, I am deeply concerned that, on the eve of this summit, the Alliance is especially fractured and incoherent. And, quite

frankly, Senator Lugar and I have been here a long time. I don’t

know how many conferences I’ve attended about whether NATO

will survive? I know we always have these discussions, but this is

a particularly difficult moment.

First, there appears to be a total lack of clarity on how to respond to the applications of Ukraine and Georgia for Membership

Action Plans, or MAP. I believe—speaking for myself only, that we

should encourage Ukraine and Georgia by granting their requests

for MAP. Both countries have made substantial progress toward

consolidating gains of the Orange and Rose Revolutions, and have

made substantive contributions to NATO operations. A Membership Action Plan, as you both know better than anyone, is not an

irrevocable step for either the applicant state or for the Alliance.

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The decision on an invitation to join the Alliance can take as long

as NATO wants or the applicant state requires.

Second, there is no apparent consensus on the three countries

who are candidates for actual membership. During the 1990s,

NATO became a force for promotion of a Europe whole and free in

ways that its founders, I don’t think, ever fully imagined. The prospect of membership encouraged Europe’s newly liberated countries

to settle longstanding disputes, to deep-root democracy and human

rights, and, of course, to build competent militaries. I am proud,

along with Senator Lugar and my deceased colleague Senator Roth

and others, to have played a part in helping the initial enlargement

of NATO after the wall came down. It remains my conviction that

we should extend an offer of NATO membership to any country

that applies and meets the criteria.

As a strategic matter, the admission of Croatia and Albania and

Macedonia to NATO would bring the Balkans closer to the European future its people deserve, and it would strengthen, in my

view, regional security. But, that doesn’t mean these three candidates, in my view, must enter as a block. Each country should

be judged against the established criteria and on its own merits.

Of course, NATO’s current members must still agree on the decision to invite new ones, period.

I’ve strongly urged Greece and FYROM, or Macedonia, to find a

reasonable compromise to the name dispute that stands as a bar

to Macedonia’s membership. If they’re unable to do so in time for

the summit, that failure should not, in my view, penalize the prospects of Croatia or Albania. I expect our witnesses to address the

readiness of these three countries to join NATO, and our second

panel includes two prominent experts who disagree on whether

these countries are ready. And it’s important, I think, to hear this

debate here in the Foreign Relations Committee.

And finally, the other critical issue in this summit is Afghanistan—the forgotten war, in my view. I was there, along with Senator Lugar and Senator Kerry, just a few weeks ago. Each of us

has spoken to our deep concern that, while Afghanistan remains

winnable, we are not winning. In my view, we need a new strategy

for success and a new NATO commitment, in terms of the individual countries and their rules of engagement. This should not be

America’s fight, alone. Our allies joined this war from the very

start. This was not a war of choice; this was a war of necessity.

And they have as much at stake as we do, I’d respectfully suggest.

Since 9/11, Europe has been repeatedly targeted for terror, and

virtually every attack can be traced back to the Afghan-Pakistan

border regions. The heroin Afghanistan produces winds up in the

streets of Madrid and Berlin, not in New York. In fact, since 2001

far more Brits have lost their lives to Afghan drugs than to Taliban

arms. Many of our NATO allies thought they were signing up for

a peacekeeping mission, not a counterinsurgency operation. And

many are fighting like it is a peacekeeping operation: Not fighting.

Some are fighting with incredible bravery, particularly in the

south. But, the so-called national caveats are making a mockery,

in my view, of NATO and the notion of a unified mission. One ally

can fight here, but not another place; another ally can do this, but

not that. In my view, you’re either in this fight or not you’re not,

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and it’s time for NATO to be fully in the fight. I believe that the

future of NATO is at stake in Afghanistan.

The NATO summit must bring these issues to a head. We are

right to expect more from our allies and from NATO, but they are

also right to expect more from us. When I first went to Afghanistan, right after the Taliban fell, in January 2002, I asked the commander of British Forces how long his people would allow him to

stay in Afghanistan, and I’ll never forget what he told me. He said,

‘‘We Brits have an expression, Senator. As long as the big dog is

in the pen, the small dogs will stay. When the big dog leaves, the

small dogs will go home.’’ Well, the big dog left, in my view, in

2002. The big dog left, and we diverted so much of our attention

and so many of our resources to Iraq, there wasn’t a lot left for

Afghanistan. Instead of finishing the war of necessity, we started

a war of choice. I’m not here to debate that war of choice. I’m here

just to make the point that we—and interesting to me, and I don’t

know whether my colleague from Nebraska found the same thing—

whether we were talking to diplomats, military personnel, or

NGOs, they all, when we asked them about the situation in

Afghanistan, they’d all say something to the effect of, ‘‘It is true,

from 2002 to 2006 we didn’t do much, but we began to change policy and make—regain some ground in 2006—late 2006,’’ an interesting admission that we heard uniformly, across the board.

I commend Secretary Gates, who acknowledged, last month, that

the Europeans tend to project the hostility they feel for the war in

Iraq onto the fight in Afghanistan. I would also point out, I think

that’s happening here in the United States. The hostility toward

the war in Iraq is being—coloring the attitude of Americans toward

the war in Afghanistan.

I think this represents a fundamental misreading of the facts.

But, we have done a poor job in distinguishing the case for one war

from the other. And I’m glad Secretary Gates has dedicated himself

to correcting the record.

We always say that the summit is critical, but I think this one

really is; it’s critical for the construction of Europe, for the war in

Afghanistan, and, I think, the future of the Alliance, itself.

So, I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses, particularly our colleagues sitting before us, and I would now yield to my

colleague Chairman Lugar.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR

FROM INDIANA

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate this opportunity for the committee to once again talk

about and examine the future of NATO, and I join you in welcoming our very distinguished witnesses.

The NATO Alliance is preparing for an historic summit in Bucharest, Romania, next month. And the Bucharest summit finds

NATO facing new challenges, adjusting to new priorities. Much

attention is being focused on NATO’s role in Afghanistan, which is,

as you pointed out, the most demanding and defining combat operation in Alliance history. European troop contributions to the

Afghanistan operation and the removal of caveats restricting how

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troops are employed will be the subject of intense discussions,

surely, at the summit.

But, even as we work through the important issues related to

Afghanistan, I would urge the administration to bring an even

broader vision to deliberations in Bucharest. The recent announcement of independence by Kosovo; President Putin’s statements that

we are in the midst of a new arms race; Russian threats against

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Ukraine; and Moscow’s intransigence on issues ranging from the shutting down of British cultural affairs offices to abandonment of the CFE Treaty, require

strategic leadership from the United States and close cooperation

with NATO allies.

At the summit, I believe the Alliance must invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. Each is working hard to meet

the specified requirements for membership. They occupy critical

geostrategic locations, and are best situated to deter any efforts by

any party to destabilize the Balkans through violence. These three

candidate countries also have proven their commitment to making

meaningful contributions to the International Security Assistance

Force in Afghanistan.

NATO also must extend Membership Action Plans to Georgia

and Ukraine. The governments of both countries have clearly

stated their desire to join NATO, and both have made remarkable

progress in meeting Alliance standards. Both countries have made

as much progress on democratic, economic, and military reform as

Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania had made when they

received MAPs in 1999.

I understand that Georgia and Ukraine must accomplish much

more before they can be offered NATO membership, but extension

of these MAPs is an important symbol of Alliance intent.

In January, I traveled to both Georgia and Ukraine. And during

my visit in Georgia, President Saakashvili reiterated his hopes for

a MAP. In Ukraine, President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko, and the Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to the

NATO Secretary General signifying the unity of purpose behind

their MAP request. If NATO is to continue to be the preeminent

security alliance and serve the defense interests of its members, it

must continue to evolve, and that evolution must include enlargement. Potential NATO membership motivates emerging democracies to make important advances in areas such as the rule of law

and civil society. A closer relationship with NATO will promote

these values and contribute to our mutual security.

In addition to membership issues, we must ensure that meaningful progress is made on energy security. Today, the denial of energy

resources is a weapon that can cripple a state as effectively as traditional armies. NATO must recognize the risks we face and begin

to implement a strategy to prepare us for future energy contingencies.

Ukraine, Georgia, Estonia, and Lithuania have all faced hostile

energy supply actions from Russia. Today, Germany, Bulgaria,

Greece, Italy, Hungary, and others have signed bilateral deals with

Russia that could have serious implications for European energy

security and for the NATO Alliance. In my judgment, NATO is the

only institution capable of uniting the transatlantic community

5

under a common energy policy with the urgency that this threat

warrants.

Three years ago, the U.S. Senate unanimously voted to invite

seven countries to join NATO. Today, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,

Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia are making important

contributions to NATO, and are among our closest allies in the

global war on terrorism. It is time again for the United States to

take the lead in urging its allies to recognize the important efforts

underway in Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Georgia, and Ukraine,

and offer them membership and Membership Actions Plans, accordingly.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, thank you very much. I’ll suggest, Mr. Chairman, we

have 7-minute rounds when the testimony is finished. We have

good attendance here.

Let me begin with you, Mr. Secretary. Why don’t you begin your

testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. FRIED. Thank you, Chairman Biden, Ranking Member

Lugar, and members of the committee. I’d like to thank you for the

opportunity to appear before you to discuss the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization, the world’s most successful alliance.

NATO is more than a military alliance, it is an alliance of values.

NATO’s mission remains the same: The defense of its members.

But, how NATO fulfills this mission is evolving.

During the cold war, NATO was superbly prepared to face the

Soviet Army across the Fulda Gap. It never fired a shot in anger,

but, by maintaining the peace in Europe, the Alliance provided

time for the internal decay of the Soviet system.

NATO’s other historic achievement is also important, though

sometimes less remarked. It was the security umbrella under

which Europeans settled centuries-old national rivalries. On September 12, 2001, NATO invoked, for the first time, the Washington

Treaty’s Article V Clause of Collective Defense. I was in the White

House on September 11 and 12. I remember, and greatly appreciate, NATO’s solidarity, as did all of us there on that day.

But, let me be frank, in 2001 NATO lacked the capacity to respond to the challenge of September 11; yet, within months, several

allies had joined us in Afghanistan, and by August 2003, NATO

took over the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance

Force, the ISAF mission, in Kabul. This accelerated NATO’s geographic and capabilities transformation.

NATO has also tried to build a new kind of relationship with

Russia, although we’ve been disappointed that the NATO-Russia

Council has not yet fulfilled its potential. President Putin’s plan to

attend the summit in Bucharest next month represents both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is to renew efforts to

work together with Russia. The challenge is to make sure that

NATO takes decisions on issues based on what is good for the Alliance, not based on a veto by outside actors. Whether on enlargeVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
6

ment, missile defense, or granting aspirants a Membership Action

Plan, NATO must make its own decisions, for the right reasons.

Mr. Chairman, Senators, you will find in my written statement

a section on how NATO has strengthened, and is strengthening, its

capabilities. This includes ongoing work in two areas where this

committee has provided leadership: A NATO Cyber Defense policy

and a new focus on energy security.

Today, I will report to you about NATO’s ongoing transformation,

and indicate how we believe this can be addressed in Bucharest

and beyond: First, how NATO is bringing its new capabilities to

bear in ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo; and, second,

about enlargement.

NATO is in action in two major operations: Afghanistan, through

ISAF, and in Kosovo, through KFOR. More than anywhere else,

Afghanistan is the place where our new capabilities are being developed and tested.

Now, let me be blunt. The Alliance faces real challenges there.

Levels of violence are up, particularly in the south. The border

areas with Pakistan provide a haven for terrorists. Civil/military

cooperation does not work as well as it should. We welcome, in this

regard, the appointment of Kai Eide, a special representative of the

U.N. Secretary General for Afghanistan, which will help. Narcotics

remains a serious problem. Efforts to counter this challenge, this

scourge, are working in some, but not all, parts of the country.

There is good news, also. Operationally, NATO has had real successes. It’s worth recalling that 6 million Afghan children now go

to school, one-third of them girls; that’s 2 million girls in school,

when, under the Taliban, there were none. Zero. Afghan soldiers

are increasingly at the forefront of operations. And the number we

have trained and equipped has swelled to almost 50,000. This

spring, we will send an additional 3,500 Marines to capitalize on

these gains and support the momentum.

NATO commanders, with strong U.S. support, are looking at

force contributions, and hope to have more forces identified at

Bucharest. In addition, we must give allied commanders on the

ground more flexibility.

I had the privilege of testifying on Kosovo before this committee

last week, and so I’ll keep my remarks on this topic brief.

I was there last Friday, and I found the Kosovo leadership

rightly focused on building their country and reaching out to the

Kosovar-served community. I also met with Serbian community

leaders, including two members of the Kosovo Government. They

said they intend to remain in Kosovo. They hope their communities

will remain in Kosovo. And this is good news.

NATO, through KFOR, is continuing to provide security, freedom

of movement, and protection for minorities and religious and cultural sites in the world’s newest state. Almost 90 percent of the

KFOR forces are European, and I am happy to report to this committee that, so far, the security situation in the country is as good

as we expected, and much, much better than we had feared.

Let me turn to NATO enlargement. Now that Kosovo is independent, we need to look at how to help the entire Balkans region

leave behind the crises of the 1990s and strengthen, stabilize,

secure, and democratize their societies in the 21st century. To comVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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plete this job, the administration strongly supports the aspirations

of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. They have made

significant progress in their reforms. All three have shown a clear

commitment to bearing the responsibilities of membership; for example, by sending troops to Afghanistan and supporting NATO’s

mission in Kosovo. Supporting their aspirations following Kosovo’s

independence helps us take the Balkans into the 21st century and

demonstrates to the world that NATO’s enlargement process, a

great success, is still running.

Albania has made steady progress on combating corruption, with

arrests of high-level government officials, substantial progress on

judicial reform, and progress on laws to increase judicial transparency.

Croatia has a proven track record of political and economic maturity, and is also an important partner on the battlefield. Significant

progress on military reforms has created a more modern armed

forces.

Macedonia has made strides since 2001 in building a multiethnic

democracy. It has taken strong steps on the rule of law by implementing critical laws on its courts and police, and by taking action

against trafficking in persons.

One issue threatens Macedonia’s candidacy: The dispute with

Greece over Macedonia’s name. Without a resolution, Greece has

said that it will block an invitation for Macedonia to join NATO.

The administration is urging both parties to work together, and

with U.N. negotiator Matt Nimetz, to come to a solution before

Bucharest. And if we can do so—if our Government can help these

countries on a national basis, we are also prepared to do so.

All three aspirants have work to do, but they’ve already done significant work, and, critically, they have put themselves on a trajectory for success. The United States and our allies need to consider

whether it is better for the security of the Alliance and the stability

of the Balkans to invite these countries in or to keep them out. We

know, from experience, that countries who join NATO continue to

reform.

Ukraine and Georgia have expressed an interest in joining

NATO. They are not ready to be members now, as they recognize.

But, we can help them help themselves and prepare themselves

through NATO’s Membership Action plan, as they have requested.

The timing of that step will be a key issue at the Bucharest

summit.

Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia were invited to join

NATO’s Partnership for Peace in November 2006. While it was a

controversial issue then, I think the doubters now see that it was

the right decision. NATO’s door must remain open. The Alliance’s

decision to invite a country must be made according to that country’s performance, willingness, and ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area and its desire to join. No country outside of NATO has the right to decide these questions for them.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, other members of the committee, several administrations have worked to build a Europe whole, free,

and at peace. NATO has been an indispensable instrument of this

noble objective, and NATO is becoming a multilateral instrument

8

of transatlantic security for the 21st century. This administration

will strive to hand over to the next this great undertaking.

Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fried follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL FRIED, ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR

POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar, members of this committee, thank you

for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the most successful political-military alliance the world has

ever known.

NATO is not just a military alliance; it is an alliance of values, and NATO’s success in the past and promise for the future reflect its fusion of strength and democratic values. I will speak today about how the alliance is transforming itself to address global security challenges; its current missions and challenges, including ongoing operations in Afghanistan; and our goals for the Bucharest summit and beyond.

NATO provided a foundation for freedom’s victory in the cold war. It is now evolving into its 21st century role: Defending the transatlantic community against new

threats and meeting challenges to our security and values that are often global in

scope.

NATO’s mission remains the same: The defense of its members. But how NATO

fulfills this mission is evolving. Much of what I discuss today has to do with this

important ongoing adaptation.

During the cold war, NATO was superbly prepared to face the Soviet Army across

the Fulda Gap, but never fired a shot. Yet, by maintaining the peace in Europe, the

alliance provided time and space for the internal decay of the Soviet system and the

Warsaw Pact, and for forces of freedom in Warsaw, Vilnius, Budapest, Prague,

Bucharest, Kyiv, and even Moscow to prevail.

NATO’s other historic achievement is not mentioned often, but is no less important: It served as the security umbrella under which centuries-old rivalries within

Europe were settled. NATO provided an essential precondition for the European

Union, a united Europe, to take shape. Since 1945, Western Europe has enjoyed its

longest period of internal peace since Roman times.

After the end of the cold war, NATO faced two fundamental challenges: First,

should it remain fixed in its cold-war-era membership? Second, should it remain

fixed in its cold-war activities?

Three successive American administrations—those of President George W. Bush,

President Bill Clinton, and President George H.W. Bush—have demonstrated leadership in helping transform NATO from a cold war to a 21st century profile. Members of this committee played, and continue to play, a major part in that bipartisan

policy effort.

In the 1990s, under American leadership, NATO enlarged its membership for the

first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It did so again in 2002.

Also in the 1990s, NATO engaged in its first military combat operations to force

an end to ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. NATO’s operational role has continued

to grow since then.

On September 12, 2001, a day after the attacks on New York and Washington,

NATO invoked for the first time the Washington treaty’s critical article 5 clause of

collective defense. In the 52 years of NATO’s existence prior to that date, no one

ever expected that article 5 would be invoked in response to a terrorist attack; an

attack on the United States rather than Europe; and an attack plotted in Afghanistan, planned in Pakistan, Malaysia, and Germany, carried out inside the United

States, and financed through al-Qaeda’s fund-raising network.

I was in the White House on September 11 and 12; I remember and greatly appreciate NATO’s act of solidarity. That decision, and its implications, eventually

brought an end to NATO’s now seemingly ‘‘quaint’’ debate about going ‘‘out of area.’’

But let me be frank: In 2001, despite this decision, NATO lacked the capability

of responding to the challenge of September 11. And, to be even franker, at that

time the United States had not thought through how to work within NATO so far

afield as Afghanistan. But within months, several individual allies had joined us in

Afghanistan, and on August 11, 2003, NATO took over the U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Kabul. From that moment,

NATO had crossed into a new world, and transformation became an operational as

well as a strategic necessity.

9

NATO has come far since the cold war. In the early 1990s, NATO was an alliance

of 16 countries, which had never conducted a military operation and had no partner

relationships. By the middle of this decade, NATO had become an alliance of 26

members. And its soldiers and sailors had experienced:

• Bringing security and stability to Afghanistan; • Maintaining security in Kosovo and Bosnia; • Supporting and training peacekeepers in Africa; • Training the Iraqi security forces; • Delivering humanitarian aid in Pakistan after the earthquake and in Louisiana

after Katrina; and • Patrolling shipping in the Mediterranean to prevent terrorism.

NATO also has established partner relationships with over 20 countries in Europe

and Eurasia, seven in North Africa and the Middle East, four in the Persian Gulf,

and has global partners such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore,

which are working with NATO in Afghanistan.

I should also add that one of the transformations we have tried to make at NATO

is to build a new kind of relationship with Russia—one where NATO and Russia

can work together to address common interests. This was the thinking behind the

NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997, and the NATO-Russia Council, created in

2002. I must admit that we have been disappointed that the NATO-Russia Council

still has not lived up to its potential.

The Russian Foreign Ministry has announced that President Putin plans to attend the meeting in Bucharest. This represents both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity is to renew efforts to work together on issues where NATO

and Russia really do have common interests—from nonproliferation, counterterrorism, to border controls and counternarcotics with respect to Afghanistan. The

challenge, however, is to make sure that NATO takes decisions on issues on their

own merits—based on what is good for the alliance and good for the issues at

hand—without undue pressure from any outside actors. Whether on enlargement,

missile defense, or a Membership Action Plan, NATO must make its own decisions

for the right reasons.

Fifteen years ago, no one would have predicted such far-reaching changes for

NATO. So we must be modest about predicting the future challenges NATO will

face, and the way NATO will adapt to them.

But I can report to you about NATO’s ongoing transformation to address global

security challenges, and indicate how we believe this will be addressed at NATO’s

summit in Bucharest next month and beyond.

• First, I will deal with capabilities NATO must build in this new era. NATO is

making progress, but this task is not done.

• The second issue is how NATO is bringing these new capabilities to bear in ongoing operations, particularly:

Æ In Afghanistan, where NATO is helping establish security and stability, to

enable reconstruction, development, and good governance.

Æ And in Kosovo, where NATO is maintaining peace and freedom of movement

in a now independent and sovereign country.

• Third, I will speak about enlargement. NATO is taking on new members and

helping others prepare to become members in the future if they so desire.

CAPABILITIES

NATO must strengthen its capacity in three key areas: An expeditionary capacity

to operate at strategic distance against new and diverse threats; a comprehensive

capability to better integrate military and civilian activities; and a missile defense

capacity to protect alliance territory and populations against emerging missile

threats.

First on hard capabilities. NATO is developing these step by step. NATO has established:

• A NATO Special Operations Coordination Center in Mons, Belgium, that boosts

the effectiveness of allies’ special operations forces by increasing interoperability

between nations, sharing key lessons learned, and expanding and improving

training, all of which are yielding concrete gains on battlefields in Afghanistan.

• A NATO Response Force that is being ‘‘updated’’ to make it more usable and

deployable if the need arises.

• A strategic airlift consortium to allow interested allies and partners a mechanism to pool limited resources to own and operate C–17s.

• An initiative to enhance NATO helicopter capacity, first in Afghanistan, to lease

private helicopters for nonmilitary transport. In the medium- and long-term, we

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are examining ways to pool support and maintenance functions and to acquire

additional helicopters. • A NATO Cyber Defense Policy, to be endorsed at Bucharest, will enhance our

ability to protect our sensitive infrastructure, allow allies to pool resources, and

permit NATO to come to the assistance of an ally whose infrastructure is under

threat. I thank the Senators on this committee for focusing attention on this

issue following the cyber attacks against Estonia. • A new focus on Energy Security, for example, by reviewing how NATO can help

mitigate the most immediate risks and threats to energy infrastructure. I appreciate the leadership of Senators on this committee for their involvement in

energy security and believe NATO is building a response to the concerns you

have raised.

• A Defense Against Terrorism Initiative, in which allies have improved their precision air-drop systems and enhanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance technologies to detect terrorists. The allies have also equipped large aircraft to defend against Man-Portable Air Defense (MANPADs) weapons, and

worked together on technologies to detect and counter improvised explosive

devices.

• A NATO Maritime Situational Awareness initiative, to ensure Information Superiority in the maritime environment, thus increasing NATO’s effectiveness in

planning and conducting operations.

I could go on. But let me stop here just to note that, notwithstanding all the concerns we have about levels of defense spending among the allies, and allies’ need

to develop and field more expeditionary forces for NATO operations, NATO’s military capabilities are better off than they were 7 years ago. We are continuing to

work to make them better still.

Many of these new capabilities are being tested in Afghanistan—which is also

where we are learning how to better integrate civilian and military efforts. With

each passing month, all of us allies learn more about what it takes to wage a 21st

century counterinsurgency effort—a combined civil-military effort that puts soldiers

side by side with development workers, diplomats, and police trainers. Whether flying helicopters across the desert at night, embedding trainers with the Afghan military and police, conducting tribal councils with village elders, or running joint civilian-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams, our institutions are reinventing the

way we do our jobs.

As Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said, this requires new training, new

equipment, a new doctrine and new flexibility in combining civil and military efforts

in a truly comprehensive approach to security.

And a final point on capabilities is missile defense. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty

says NATO allies will provide for collective defense. It does not allow for exceptions

when the threat comes on a missile. NATO has been studying missile defense for

years, and we expect that at the Bucharest summit, NATO will take further steps

to acknowledge growing missile threats, welcome U.S. contributions to the defense

of alliance territory, and task further work in strengthening NATO’s defenses

against these new threats. We have taken on board advice from some in Congress,

and some of our allies, as we have advanced a more NATO-integrated approach to

missile defense.

NATO’s work is focused on the short-range missile threat, technical work regarding future decisions on possible long-range threats, and possible opportunities for cooperation with Russia. The United States and NATO efforts are complementary and

could work together to form a more effective defense for Europe.

AFGHANISTAN

NATO is in action in two major operations, ISAF in Afghanistan, and KFOR in

Kosovo.

More than anywhere else, Afghanistan is the place where our new capabilities are

being developed and tested. Allies are fighting and doing good work there, but

NATO—all of us—have much more to do and much more to learn.

Let me be blunt: We still face real challenges in Afghanistan. Levels of violence

are up, particularly in the south, where the insurgency has strengthened. Public

confidence in government is shaky because of rising concerns about corruption and

tribalism. And the border areas in Pakistan provide a haven for terrorists and

Taliban who wage attacks in Afghanistan.

Civilian-military cooperation does not work as well as it should, and civilian

reconstruction and governance do not follow quickly enough behind military operations. In this regard, we welcome the appointment of Kai Eide as Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Afghanistan. In this capacity, AmbasVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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sador Eide will coordinate the international donor community and raise the profile

of the U.N.’s role in Afghanistan, in supporting the Government of Afghanistan. The

United States will lend its strongest support to Ambassador Eide’s efforts. It will

be critical to ensure that he is empowered to work in concert with NATO and to

coordinate broad civilian efforts—and go back to capitals for more resources—in

support of the sovereign Government of Afghanistan. We look forward to Ambassador Eide’s confirmation by the U.N. Security Council later this week and hope he

will be present at the Bucharest summit in April.

Narcotics remain a serious problem. Efforts to counter this scourge are working

in some but certainly not all parts of the country. The Taliban are using the profits

from drug revenues and the instability spread by corruption and lawlessness to fund

their insurgent activities. Helmand province continues to be the epicenter, with fully

53 percent of total cultivation, and our eradication efforts there have had insufficient traction, significantly due to the absence of adequate force protection for our

eradication force. Yet there is good news too. In much of the north and east, poppy

cultivation is down. In a secure environment, farmers can more easily exercise alternatives and are not subject to the same threats and intimidation by insurgents. According to U.N. data, we expect that this year 22 of 34 provinces are likely to be

either poppy free or cultivating fewer than 1,000 hectares of poppies. With improved

governance and security conditions, we believe it will be possible to achieve reductions in cultivation in the remaining provinces in coming years.

NATO is working hard, but needs to focus on counterinsurgency tactics, provide

both more forces in order to facilitate increased and faster reconstruction assistance

and improve performance in supporting robust Afghan counternarcotics efforts. Fundamentally, NATO needs to show greater political solidarity and greater operational

flexibility for deployed forces.

But while we are sober about the challenges, we also must recognize our achievements. There is good news. NATO had some real operational successes last year

with our Afghan partners. Despite dire predictions, the Taliban’s much-vaunted

spring offensive never materialized in 2007. Think back to a year ago, when the

Taliban were on a media blitz threatening to take Kandahar. Today we hear no

such claims because we stood together—Afghans, Americans, allies, and our partners—to stare down that threat.

We pursued the enemy last year, and over the winter we maintained NATO’s

operational tempo, capturing or killing insurgent leaders and reducing the Taliban’s

ability to rest and recoup. Some districts and villages throughout eastern and southern Afghanistan are more secure today than they have been in years or decades.

Roads, schools, markets, and clinics have been built all over the country. Six million Afghan children now go to school, one third of them girls. That is 2 million girls

in school when under the Taliban there were none—zero. Some 80 percent of

Afghans have access to health care—under the Taliban it was only 8 percent.

Afghan soldiers are increasingly at the forefront of operations and the number we

have trained and equipped has swelled from 35,000 to almost 50,000 in the last

year. This spring, the United States will send an additional 3,200 marines for about

7 months to capitalize on these gains and support the momentum. Of this number,

2,000 marines will be added to ISAF combat missions in the south and 1,200 more

trainers for the U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan. We

are urging allies to match these contributions so they can take on the same roles

when our Marines leave this autumn.

Afghanistan is issue No. 1 for NATO’s Bucharest summit next month. NATO is

preparing a common strategy document on Afghanistan that will help explain to

publics the reasons we are fighting in Afghanistan, and how we are going to succeed.

We will also look at force contributions, and hope to have more forces identified

at Bucharest. All contributions are valuable—from all 26 allies and the 14 partners

there with us.

Some allies deserve special praise for taking on the hardest missions in the

south—particularly the Canadians, British, Dutch, Danes, Australians, Romanians,

and Estonians.

Others deserve recognition for increased contributions over the past year. Top of

that list is Poland, a new and committed ally that has twice sent in more troops

to eastern Afghanistan—first in fall 2006 when it added 1,000 and then again in

this winter with a pledge for 400 more troops and eight vital helicopters. Australia

more than doubled its forces in 2007, to a total of 1,000 in the southern province

of Uruzgan. The U.K. has added over 1,400 troops in Helmand province since late

2006 to meet increased security needs, while Denmark added 300 to double its contribution in the same area. France meanwhile has moved six fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to Kandahar, and pledged four training teams.

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Do we need more allies fighting? Yes. With this in mind, we very much welcome

President Sarkozy’s pledge that ‘‘France will stay engaged in Afghanistan for as

long as necessary because what is at stake there is the future of our values and

that of our Atlantic alliance.’’

We also need allies and partners to do more to train and equip the Afghan national security forces—the Army and the police. NATO is providing small embedded

teams directly into Afghan forces to serve as coaches, trainers, and mentors to the

Afghan Army units. Currently, there are 34 NATO training and mentoring teams

(called Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams—OMLTs) deployed in Afghanistan. But we need at least 22 more by this time next year and we are asking all

of our allies and partners to step up and do more.

In addition to more troops, we need to give allied commanders on the ground more

flexibility so they can use their forces most effectively. We understand the political

constraints under which our allies operate, but less flexibility requires more troops

and prolongs the mission.

At the same time that we build a more capable NATO, we also want to see a

stronger and more capable EU. If Afghanistan has taught us anything, it is that

we need a better, more seamless relationship between the two. Bureaucratic hurdles

should not put soldiers’ lives on the line. We can’t keep showing up side by side in

far flung parts of the world and play a pickup game. We must work together to develop better NATO–EU cooperation.

KOSOVO

Let me now turn to Kosovo, NATO’s second largest operation after Afghanistan.

We all know the history. In fact, I was there a few days ago. As I had the privilege

of testifying on Kosovo before this committee last week, I will keep my remarks

brief.

Kosovo’s declaration of independence ends one chapter but our work is not yet

done. We must deal with short-term challenges of security and longer term challenges of Kosovo’s development. These are serious. But the status quo was

unsustainable; and seeking to sustain it would have led to even greater challenges.

NATO, through KFOR, continues to provide security, freedom of movement, and

protection for minorities and religious and cultural sites in this, the world’s newest

state. There has been no significant interethnic violence, no refugees or internally

displaced persons, and no trouble at patrimonial sites. KFOR remains authorized

to operate in Kosovo under UNSCR 1244. Almost 90 percent of the KFOR forces are

European.

We expect that NATO will also play a key role in the establishment of a new,

multiethnic Kosovo Security Force and a civilian agency to oversee it, as well as in

the dissolution of the Kosovo Protection Corps. Kosovo is eager to contribute to

NATO, the organization that intervened to save the people of Kosovo during their

darkest hour.

Our current challenge is dealing with Serbian extremists who seek to foment violence, chaos, and perhaps de facto partition of Kosovo. NATO and UNMIK are responding to this challenge firmly, defusing conflicts before they escalate, and KFOR

deserves credit for its prompt, effective actions thus far. KFOR however is just one

piece of the puzzle, and we are working closely with the U.N., EU, and the Kosovo

Government itself.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Now, let me speak about NATO enlargement, a major part of the Bucharest

summit.

NATO enlargement has been a major success, thanks to the work of many on this

committee. The administration strongly supports the aspirations of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO. They have all made substantial progress, especially over the past 1 to 2 years. Their forces serve with us in Afghanistan and other

global peacekeeping operations. They continue to play important roles on Kosovo.

In short, they have shown a clear commitment to bearing the responsibilities of

NATO membership.

Albania has made steady progress on combating corruption, with arrests of highlevel government officials among others, substantial progress on judicial reform, and

progress on laws to increase transparency and efficiency within the court system.

In addition to the strong support and leadership on Kosovo, Albania is the greatest

per-capita contributor to NATO and coalition operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Croatia has a proven track record of political and economic maturity and is also

an important partner on the battlefield. Significant progress on military reforms has

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created more modern and deployable armed forces, in addition to Croatia’s support

in promoting regional stability.

Macedonia has made significant strides since 2001 in building a multiethnic democracy. The government has taken strong steps on rule of law by implementing

several critical laws on its courts and police and taking action against trafficking

in persons. Macedonia, like the other aspirants, is punching above its weight in operations, and its progress on defense reforms has been impressive.

One issue threatens Macedonia’s NATO candidacy—the dispute between Greece

and Macedonia over Macedonia’s name. Without a resolution of this issue, Greece

has said it would block an invitation for Macedonia to join NATO. The administration repeatedly has emphasized its support for the ongoing U.N.-facilitated talks on

the name issue. It has urged both parties to work together and with U.N. negotiator

Matt Nimetz to use the time remaining before Bucharest to come to a win-win solution—and not to allow this issue to prevent Macedonia from being invited to join

NATO.

Are the aspirants perfect? No. Have they done significant work and put themselves on a trajectory for success? Yes. The United States and our allies need to consider whether it is better for the security of the alliance and the stability of the Balkans to have these countries in or to keep them out. We know from experience that

countries who join NATO continue to address remaining reforms, and build security

in their region and the world. An invitation for membership is not a finish line and

these countries know that.

Ukraine and Georgia have expressed an interest in joining NATO. We have

always supported their aspirations. They are not ready to be NATO members now,

as they themselves recognize. We can help them to help themselves, as they are

asking, just as we have helped others, through the Membership Action Plan (MAP).

MAP is the next step for them, and the timing of that step will be a key issue for

the Bucharest summit.

Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia joined NATO’s Partnerships for

Peace in November 2006. While it was a controversial issue at the time, I think that

doubters now see that it was the right decision. These countries are also members

of the Euro-Atlantic community and must be supported in their efforts to join its

institutions, to the degree they are prepared and seek to. Montenegro and BosniaHerzegovina have expressed interest in beginning an Intensified Dialogue (ID) on

membership issues with NATO, and we believe that NATO should extend those

offers at Bucharest. And when the day comes and Serbia is prepared to take up its

European future, make further reforms, and seek closer cooperation with NATO, we

will welcome that as well.

NATO’s door to enlargement must remain open. Every country has the right to

choose its relationship with NATO, and the alliance’s decision to invite a country

to become a member will be made according to its performance, willingness, and

ability to contribute to the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, and desire to join. No

country outside of NATO has a right to decide that question for them. No amount

of outside pressure or intimidation should sway allies from doing what is in NATO’s

best interests.

Depending on the decision at Bucharest, we look forward to working with the Senate to ratify additional protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty for each state’s new

membership.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Lugar, and other members of the committee, several administrations have worked assiduously to help build a Europe that is whole, free, and

at peace. NATO has been an indispensable instrument of this noble objective and

NATO is becoming a multilateral instrument of transatlantic security for the 21st

century—far afield but closely tied to its original purposes and values. We will

strive to hand over to the 44th President of the United States in 2009, whoever he

or she may be, this great undertaking.

The CHAIRMAN. General.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN CRADDOCK, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, NATO

HEADQUARTERS, MONS, BELGIUM

General CRADDOCK. Chairman Biden, Ranking Member Lugar,

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear

14

before you today to discuss NATO’s operation in Afghanistan,

NATO enlargement, and the future of NATO.

I have submitted a written statement, Chairman, and I ask that

it be inserted into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be, without objection.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you.

I am especially fortunate to be here today with Secretary Dan

Fried. I couldn’t ask for a more capable wingman, and I am grateful for the opportunity. We have appeared at other times in the

past, in other committees.

Dan, thank you.

The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan—

ISAF—remains NATO’s most important and challenging mission,

one that includes more than 47,000 forces from 40 nations, including some 19,000 from the United States.

The security situation remains difficult, especially in the southern and eastern parts of the country. Our metrics highlight that 70

percent of the recorded security incidents in 2007 occurred in only

10 percent—or 40—of the 398 districts in Afghanistan. These 40

districts are home to approximately 6 percent of Afghanistan’s population. The Afghan National Army, the ANA, continues to grow in

size, in combat capability, and will exceed the size of ISAF in 2008.

We are seeing an increase in the number and complexity of operations led and executed by the ANA; and in the most hotly contested regions, it participates in more than 90 percent of all ISAF

operations, that is in the east and the south.

The Afghan National Police Force has grown quickly in numbers,

but it continues to lag significantly behind the ANA. Police performance needs to be urgently enhanced. Recent pay and structural

reforms will help, but corruption, criminality, and lack of qualified

leadership remain the most pressing issues.

In the development area, the World Bank reported some 32,000

projects are underway, with some 15,000 completed. Phone usage

has increased from just 25,000 land lines in 2001 to nearly 4 million cell phones today. The child mortality rates have decreased by

25 percent since 2001. And 7 million children have been immunized

against polio. The education of Afghanistan’s children continues to

move forward. Enrollment now exceeds 6 million students, including more female students than ever before.

Security progress in Afghanistan is slowed by force shortfalls in

some key locations and capabilities. We are at a critical juncture

in Afghanistan, and the ISAF mission needs its military requirements filled immediately. Our opponents in Afghanistan operate

and sustain their opposition against the international community

within the gap that exists between the forces we need and the

forces we have in theater.

Additionally, the numerous national caveats restricting the use

of NATO forces limit the employment of forces both among and

within regional commands. These caveats, like shortfalls, increase

the risk to every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine deployed in

theater.

Having said that, I still remain firm in my conviction that

NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan are making a difference. We are succeeding, but, indeed, not as fast as we, the international commuVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
15

nity, are capable of succeeding, but I believe we are making

progress. We are improving the lives of many Afghan citizens. We

are creating the conditions for a better future. But, the reality

today is, NATO and its partners throughout the international community can, and must, do more.

Turning to the subject of enlargement, I believe that NATO enlargement has been a historic success, strengthening our alliance

and serving as a powerful incentive to promote democratic reforms

among expiring members. I believe the process of NATO enlargement is not complete. NATO’s door must remain open. Candidate

nations must provide added value to the Alliance. They must be

contributors to security, not consumers of it.

In this transitional period, I’m concerned about the Alliance’s collective ability to match its political will to its level of ambition.

Forces in ongoing operations, the command structure, theater and

strategic reserves, and the NATO response force are demands on

the NATO force pool, demands that, arguably, may be draining the

force pool into a puddle. Key capability resourcing is crucial to

ensuring NATO’s ability to simultaneously execute its main task:

Respond to crises and transform to meet future challenges.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Craddock follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN BANTZ J. CRADDOCK, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, NATO HEADQUARTERS, MONS, BELGIUM

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, thank

you for the opportunity to appear before you today in order to provide an update

on NATO enlargement, NATO’s operations in Afghanistan, and the future of NATO

as it pertains to military activities. I intend to devote the majority of my testimony

to NATO’s operations in Afghanistan, but I would like to comment briefly on NATO

enlargement and the future of NATO.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

To fully appreciate the NATO enlargement decision, it is important to provide the

committee a context for the decisions under consideration. NATO has an open-door

policy on enlargement. Any European country in a position to further the principles

of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area

can become a member of the alliance, when invited by the existing member countries. At the 2006 Riga summit, NATO heads of state and government declared that

the alliance intends to extend further invitations to countries that meet NATO

standards to join NATO during its summit in 2008.

Aspirant countries are expected to participate in the Membership Action Plan to

prepare for potential membership and demonstrate their ability to meet the obligations and commitments of possible future membership. In particular, countries seeking NATO membership must be able to demonstrate that they are in a position to

further the principles of the 1949 Washington treaty and contribute to security in

the Euro-Atlantic area. They are also expected to meet certain political, economic,

and military goals, which are laid out in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement.

These include:

• Each nation possesses a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy;

• Each nation treats minority populations in accordance with the guidelines of

the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE);

• Each nation works to resolve outstanding disputes with neighbors and makes

an overall commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes;

• Each nation has the capability and willingness to make a military contribution

to the alliance and to achieve interoperability with other members’ forces;

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• Each nation commits to democratic civil-military relations and institutional

structures.

Accession talks follow the formal invitation. They are the dominion of NATO

headquarters in Brussels and bring together teams of NATO experts and representatives of the nations pursuing the Membership Action Plan. Their aim is to obtain

formal confirmation from the candidate nations of their willingness and ability to

meet the political, legal, and military obligations and commitments of NATO membership, as laid out in the Washington treaty and in the aforementioned Study on

NATO Enlargement.

As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe I believe NATO enlargement has been a

historic success, strengthening our alliance and serving as a powerful incentive to

promote democratic reforms among aspiring members. The process of NATO enlargement is not complete, and NATO’s door must remain open. I also believe that

candidate nations must provide added value to the alliance. They must be contributors to security, not only consumers of security. At present, three countries—Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are members of

NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). While there is a military component of

MAP, and while Allied Command Operations has been working with the three nations in MAP on defense and military reforms, enlargement is a political decision

under the control of the 26 NATO members. It is not a strategic military decision,

nor is it a political decision in which I participate. Since the Riga summit, the 26

NATO nations have discussed and assessed the progress of these three countries in

the MAP process. I have been asked to provide my input in the enlargement process

at this time, and I confirmed that the security of NATO members will continue to

be maintained with the inclusion of these nations into the alliance. In Bucharest,

heads of state and government will provide an authoritative statement with respect

to invitations for membership or continue to encourage the nations to make more

progress.

NATO IN AFGHANISTAN

While NATO enlargement is a critical aspect of the alliance’s adaptation to the

evolution of security in Europe, NATO’s role in Afghanistan is a vital security mission and critical to enhancing security at the national, regional, and strategic levels

in the 21st century. It is also critical to demonstrate NATO’s ability to operate and

provide security at strategic distance, and to address the important challenges we

face in the 21st century. NATO’s approach in Afghanistan is three-pronged:

• First, NATO provides leadership of the U.N.-mandated International Security

Assistance Force (ISAF), an international force of more than 47,000 troops (including National Support Elements) that assists the Afghan authorities in extending and exercising its authority and influence across the country, creating

the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction; • Second, NATO has a Senior Civilian Representative, responsible for advancing

the political-military aspects of the alliance’s commitment to the country, who

works closely with ISAF, liaises with the Afghan Government and other international organizations, and maintains contacts with neighboring countries; and • Third, NATO has a substantial program of cooperation with Afghanistan, concentrating on defense reform, defense institution-building, and the military aspects of security sector reform.

I would like to focus my comments on NATO’s ISAF operation. The International

Security Assistance Force remains NATO’s most important and challenging mission.

With over 47,000 forces from 40 nations, including 19,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen,

and marines from the United States, the alliance has responsibility for ISAF operations throughout Afghanistan. Working alongside an additional 11,500 U.S.-led coalition forces of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and other international

actors, ISAF’s role is to provide a secure and stable environment in which Afghan

institutions can develop and expand their influence, while simultaneously developing an enduring Afghan capability to provide for its own security. The mission in

Afghanistan is a complex one, involving the cooperation of NATO and non-NATO

nations, the Afghan Government, and many international and nongovernmental organizations. The opposing militant forces (OMF) consist of disparate groups, including the Taliban, Haqanni, and the Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), tribal warlords,

drug traffickers, and other extremists. While in most cases the OMF does not work

in an organized fashion, they do work toward a common goal—that of preventing

the democratically elected Government of Afghanistan from extending its control

and reach throughout the nation. In addition to the ISAF forces conducting security

and stability missions across the country, the 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams

(PRT) under ISAF are at the leading edge of NATO’s efforts for security and reconVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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struction, and are an important component of a comprehensive approach that works

with local and national authorities and the various organizations of the international community to achieve our goals as stated in the United Nations Security

Council Resolutions and NATO OPLAN 10403(rev).

ISAF UPDATE: CAMPAIGN PROGRESS

Progress in Afghanistan continues. NATO has three lines of operation: Security

and stability; enhancing governance; and facilitating reconstruction and development. Over the past 6 months, NATO has adopted Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)

to assess its performance in Afghanistan. Our intent is to more accurately provide

objective trend analysis to inform our assessment of progress. We developed 63

metrics to measure progress toward our three stated campaign objectives from the

operational plan approved by NATO’s North Atlantic Council. As we gain fidelity

over time, we expect to see trends develop. I will now provide a look into our advancement on these three objectives.

Our first objective is the extension of the Afghan Government’s authority across

the country. ISAF’s high operational tempo and focused, intelligence-led operations,

have forced the OMF to resort to terrorist tactics to pursue their strategic objectives.

Their indiscriminate but calculated attacks are designed to strike at the resolve of

the Afghan people and those committed to progress in Afghanistan. While the security situation remains difficult, especially in the southern and the eastern parts of

the country, our metrics highlight that IED incidents and numbers killed and

wounded are decreasing. The increased attacks aimed at ISAF and the Afghan

National Security Forces (ANSF) does not reflect a deterioration of the security situation but are a consequence of our successful tactical activity. Seventy percent of

recorded security incidents in 2007 occurred in only 10 percent, or 40, of the 398

districts in Afghanistan. These 40 districts are home to only 6 percent of Afghanistan’s population.

Despite this analysis, recent surveys have indicated a decrease in the perception

of security amongst the population of Afghanistan. I offer three reasons for this.

First, by its nature, terrorism aims to incite fear in the population—while actual

attacks are not far-reaching, the fear of a potential attack remains. NATO works

diligently toward timely and relevant communications to mitigate the informationbased effects of OMF tactics. Second, NATO’s inability to fill its stated military requirements in order to deny the OMF freedom to operate and to better create the

conditions for reconstruction and development undermines the confidence of the

local population. Third, widespread corruption, especially amongst the Afghan police, and the pervasive influence of the narcotics industry further serves to instill

doubt in the local populace. Public perceptions will change when it becomes clear

that good governance is a better choice than tyranny, and the rule of law a better

choice than terror. NATO’s strategy is sound, but it will only prevail if it has the

forces needed without caveats that constrain its use. Closing the gap between what

we have and what we need will deny the OMF the space it needs to operate against

us.

Our second objective is the development of the structures necessary to maintain

security in Afghanistan without the assistance of international forces. The Afghan

National Army (ANA) continues to grow in size and combat capability. The successful operation to retake Musa Qala, an operation planned and controlled by the ANA

with ISAF in support, was evidence of its increased effectiveness. In support of this

objective, NATO aims to deploy more than 70 Operational Mentor and Liaison

Teams (OMLT) across the country. These teams provide mentoring, training, and

a liaison capability between the Afghan National Army and ISAF, coordinating the

planning of operations and ensuring the Afghan units receive vital enabling support.

The Afghan National Police has grown quickly in numbers but continues to lag significantly behind the Afghan National Army in professional ability. Collectively,

therefore, the Afghan National Security Forces still lack the capacity to hold and

stabilize areas that ISAF has secured. Unquestionably, this slows progress toward

a safe and secure environment and has an adverse effect on the public’s perception

of progress.

Our third and final objective is the development and maintenance of a countrywide stable and secure environment by Afghan authorities, in which sustainable reconstruction and development efforts have taken hold. NATO, however, is not the

lead organization for most aspects of Afghanistan’s nation-building. The tasks of stabilizing and rebuilding the country include development of democratic institutions,

which extend effective governance and rule of law throughout the country, in a manner developed by, and acceptable to, the Afghan people. These tasks include many

key subtasks: Training of government officials at all levels, reduction of corruption,

18

effective counternarcotics efforts, and delivery of social services and economic infrastructure. Although many major projects are underway, measuring advancement is

difficult, as the periodicity of reporting differs among the agencies involved. Nonetheless, it is clear we are experiencing progress, as evidenced by projects such as

the ring road and the Kajaki dam. The World Bank reported some 32,000 projects

underway and 15,000 completed.

Macroeconomic reporting indicates that the Afghan economy has recovered to

1978/1979 prewar levels. Phone usage has increased from the 25,000 landlines in

2001 to nearly 4 million cell phones today with a current growth of 150,000 cell

phones per month. Additionally, we have seen an increased medical capacity as well

as improved health care. Child mortality rates have been reduced by 25 percent

since 2001 and 7 million children have been immunized against polio. The education

of Afghanistan’s children continues to move forward in most regions. Enrollment exceeds 6 million students, including more female students than ever before. Although

NATO does not have the lead for those efforts, what NATO does, or does not do,

has a far-reaching impact. The unique value of NATO’s network of partnership with

the Afghan Government and the international community is that it allows likeminded countries that have a shared responsibility for international peace and stability to unite efforts and pool resources.

ISAF UPDATE: OPERATIONS

ISAF operational tempo throughout 2007 was high. In 2007, 144 members of ISAF

were killed in action; 970 more were wounded. Casualties amongst Afghan forces

rose as their involvement became more significant. A heavy price is being paid to

achieve the alliance’s and our national security objectives.

ISAF has developed a series of rolling, theaterwide operations designed to maximize the impact of our effort in building a secure and stable environment. For example, in late fall of 2007, ISAF initiated Operation PAMIR, a theaterwide operation that was designed to maintain the initiative through the winter and into the

spring. The operation exploited the historical migration of the opposing militant

forces to their winter sanctuaries, both inside and outside of Afghanistan. ISAF and

Afghan National Security Forces have conducted intelligence-driven operations oriented toward interdicting logistical support, disrupting command, control and communications, and degrading OMF leadership, while simultaneously supporting the

Afghan Government’s winter outreach efforts. Targeted Information Operations

were designed to enhance public confidence in the Afghan Government, Afghan

National Security Forces, and ISAF. These efforts were focused on strengthening

the support of the loyal, gaining the support of the uncommitted, and undermining

the will of those left behind to fight during the winter. Particular emphasis was

given to publicizing the authority, capability, and effectiveness of the Afghan Government, as well as supporting the promotion of reconstruction and development.

By demonstrating the linkage between security and the government’s ability to deliver development, ISAF seeks to drive a wedge between opposing militant forces

and the Afghan population.

The trend toward more complex, rolling, theaterwide operations is having a positive impact on the security situation. Operations this spring will exploit the success

of Operation PAMIR with focused operations against the OMF where their influence

and freedom of movement is greatest. We are already witnessing an increase in the

number and complexity of operations led and executed by the Afghan National

Army. Improved security will allow for improved governance at district and provincial levels and set the conditions for coordinated, focused reconstruction and development into the summer and beyond.

Local liaison between Pakistan, ANSF, and ISAF in the border area is increasingly effective, and at a higher level, the Tri-Partite Commission remains an effective mechanism for coordination. The situation in Pakistan could have an impact on

the stability and security in Afghanistan and we continue to work closely in all

these forums with the Pakistani military to enhance our mutual understanding and

advance ISAF military operations.

ISAF UPDATE: CJSOR AND NATIONAL CAVEATS

Contrary to some reporting, the number of NATO troops in Afghanistan including

some retained under national control has risen by more than 8,700 over the past

year and continues to increase. It is also not well-recognized that ISAF exceeds

requirements in many areas. Yet, ISAF still has shortfalls against the minimum

military requirement in some key locations and in certain key capabilities. Specifically, a major shortcoming in the ISAF Combined Joint Statement of Requirements

(CJSOR) is the deficit in Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams. The absence of

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OMLTs undermines the development of the Afghan National Security Forces,

largely because U.S. Embedded Training Teams that could be supporting police development are compensating for OMLT deficiencies. ISAF’s stated strategy is to secure, and where and when necessary, hold until competent, capable ANA forces are

able to take over. Competent ANA forces are essential in order to move to the transition phase of the ISAF operation. We will need to field 22 OMLTs between now

and the end of the year to keep pace with ANA growth. In addition, the absence

of two Provincial Reconstruction Teams, three infantry battalions, shortcomings in

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities, shortfalls in rotary wing

aircraft for lift, medical evacuation, air support, as well as the need for forcewide

enhancements in Counter-Improvised Explosive Device measures are the key unfilled elements of ISAF’s minimum military requirements as stated in the Combined

Joint Statement of Requirements.

There are over 80 restrictions or constraints, or caveats, on the use of NATO

forces imposed on national contributions by national authorities. These are political

constraints, which limit the employment of forces both among and within regional

commands. ISAF needs the freedom to make the most effective use of its forces if

NATO is to prevail. In particular, national caveats constrain ISAF’s freedom to concentrate force and prevent it from compensating, where necessary, for CJSOR shortfalls. Caveats, like shortfalls to the CJSOR, increase the risk to every Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine the alliance deploys as part of ISAF. Our Nations’ forces

are exceptional, but they need as much flexibility as possible to be effective on this

asymmetric, irregular battlefield.

ISAF UPDATE: AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

The development of the Afghan structures necessary to maintain security in

Afghanistan without the assistance of international forces is a strategic objective of

ISAF. Capacity-building is central to the long-term success of Afghanistan and to

reaching NATO’s end state. The Afghan National Army continues to grow in size

and combat capability and will likely exceed the size of ISAF in 2008. To reiterate,

the successful operation to retake Musa Qala, planned and controlled by the ANA

with ISAF in support, was clear evidence of increased effectiveness and a template

for the future. Today, in the most hotly contested regions, the ANA participates in

more than 90 percent of all ISAF operations—this is certainly a positive trend. It

is important to note that OMLTs have played a critical role in nurturing this capability and have been a critical link to ISAF assets in operations. They are our most

important military contribution to Afghanistan’s long-term future.

Leaders across Afghanistan agree that improved policing would lead to improved

security overall. The Afghan National Police has grown quickly in numbers, but continues to lag significantly behind the Afghan National Army in professional ability.

This distracts the ANA who are required to take on police tasks. Collectively, therefore, the Afghan National Security Forces still lack the capacity to hold and stabilize

areas that ISAF has secured. This sets back advancement toward security and has

an adverse effect on the public’s perception of progress. In the longer term, slower

capacity-building in a more fragile security environment delays the point at which

we can hand responsibility for security to the Afghans. Consequently, police performance needs to be urgently enhanced. Recent pay and structural reforms will

help, but corruption, criminality, and a lack of qualified leadership remain the most

pressing issues. In an effort to address these concerns, a focused and intensive

training program was recently implemented by the Combined Security Transition

Command–Afghanistan (CSTC–A), a program which holds promise in facilitating

more rapid police reform. Finally, the lack of police mentors below provincial level

is a significant impediment. I again point out that, by providing more OMLTs, the

coalition can divert more of its teams to develop the police force. In sum, while there

are positive indications, there is much more work to be done toward building an indigenous security capacity.

ISAF UPDATE: SUPPORTING RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

ISAF is also focused on the strategic objective of establishing a countrywide stable

and secure environment by Afghan authorities, in which sustainable reconstruction

and development efforts have taken hold. NATO does not compete with other organizations for the humanitarian and development space. Our efforts to establish security and assist with capacity-building allow other international and nongovernmental organizations to work more effectively in this complex environment. This is,

in effect, the comprehensive approach undertaken by NATO and its partners. NATO

policy recognizes the essential requirement to work with Afghan national authorities and numerous organizations in the international community to deliver human

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security in a coordinated way. The North Atlantic Council’s approved Operations

Plan articulates the need for a comprehensive approach. Our Provincial Reconstruction Teams spearhead this effort on a daily basis. Their impact is significant at the

tactical level and we are now seeing progress in the implementation of a cohesive

approach at the operational and strategic levels with Afghan authorities and the

international community.

As I mentioned earlier, it is clear we are experiencing progress, as evidenced by

numerous nation-building projects, the positive indications of macroeconomic activity, improved health care, and advances in the reach of education. The Afghan

National Development Strategy is Afghanistan’s chosen path for the future. It is an

important next step which must be supported by robust implementation at all levels. The international community needs to make every effort to assist the Afghan

Government in achieving its objectives in national development. Regardless of military success, we will struggle to succeed in Afghanistan unless others meet their

responsibility to build governance and stimulate sustained development in a coordinated manner. The international community moves into the space created by our

security operations to commence work. Lack of progress in reconstruction and development undermines public opinion at home, erodes support within Afghanistan for

ISAF, and jeopardizes hard-fought security.

ISAF UPDATE: COUNTERNARCOTICS

Eliminating the illicit production of opium in Afghanistan is vital to the long-term

security, development, and effective governance of Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation

continues to be a problem in areas where there is a relative lack of strong governance. The narcotics trade, encouraged and supported by Taliban extremists, funds

and supports the insurgency, drains the legal economy, promotes corruption, and

undermines public support.

NATO does not have the lead for the counternarcotics effort. The Afghan Government, supported by the international community and in particular, the United Kingdom as the lead G–8-nation, has the primary responsibility for counternarcotics

efforts.

While supporting the Afghan government counternarcotics programs is an ISAF

key supporting task, ISAF is not directly involved in poppy eradication. ISAF is not

a direct action force in counternarcotics and it is not resourced for this role. When

requested by the Afghan Government, ISAF’s support consists of the sharing of information, the conduct of an efficient public information campaign, and the provision of in-extremis support to the Afghan National Security Forces conducting counternarcotics operations. ISAF also assists the training of Afghan National Security

Forces in counternarcotics related activities and provides logistic support, when requested, for the delivery of alternative livelihood programs.

ISAF is committed to the full implementation of its counternarcotics tasks as outlined in the current ISAF mandate. NATO, at the strategic political level, must do

what it can to support and encourage those in the lead and to ensure ISAF is

resourced to perform assigned counternarcotics tasks. At the operational and tactical level, ISAF is effectively coordinating its support efforts with the Afghan Government’s counternarcotics forces as well as other CN actors from the international

community. ISAF is operating at the limit of its existing authority to synchronize

and coordinate its actions with those of Afghan counternarcotics efforts as provided

for in the OPLAN.

UPDATE: STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

NATO’s action plan on strategic communications reflects a growing recognition

that we still have much room to improve in this area, an area that comes with a

significant resource bill for nations. To ensure that we are properly supporting

NATO and national strategic communications we need to ensure our public affairs

capabilities are effective and relevant for the 21st century. We need action at two

levels. In theater, nations need to ensure we have the right caliber people, properly

trained and with appropriate equipment and resources for the job. The appointment

of a General Officer spokesman in ISAF is a positive step. I asked Chiefs of Defense

to ensure they now place talented people at every level of our public affairs organization. Nations need to make significant investment to build and sustain these

capabilities.

At the strategic level, we have made some progress in public affairs but have a

way to go. We need to invest more effort now to ensure we are able to take the information provided from theater and to use it to support our common messaging

themes. In the end, strategic communications is more about what we do as an alliance than about what we say. Our inability to resource the CJSOR, the effect of

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national caveats, and other issues play into the hands of our opponents in Afghanistan. We need to avoid the consequences of losing the information war with the

Taliban, and we cannot afford to lose the support of our public. An integrated, harmonized strategic communications plan, both in and outside of the operational theater, is vital.

UPDATE: CONCLUSION

A recurring theme in my testimony is NATO’s inability to completely fill our

agreed upon statement of requirements for forces in Afghanistan. We are still short

key capabilities and enablers; enablers such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communications, engineering, and air support. It is noteworthy that none

of today’s priority shortfalls are the result of nations reneging on an agreement to

provide resources. Rather, offers against those stated requirements have never been

made. Each nation has its own internal issues that it must address, but a completely resourced force sends a clear message to our adversary and the Afghan people—the message that NATO is committed to achieving success. We are at a critical

juncture in Afghanistan, and the ISAF mission fundamentally needs minimum military requirements as outlined in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements

filled immediately. Our opponents in Afghanistan operate and sustain their opposition against the International Community within the gap that exists between the

forces we need in-theater and the forces we have in-theater. In particular, the aforementioned Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams are an urgent priority. By January 2009, we need NATO nations to provide 22 additional OMLTs to train and

mentor the Afghan National Army in order for it to more rapidly and successfully

assume responsibility for security. At every opportunity, I continue to encourage the

NATO nations to make their offers to fill the remaining OMLTs before the Bucharest summit to provide for timely and effective deployment to theater by January

2009.

To conclude, I remain firm in my conviction that NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan

are making a difference. We are succeeding, indeed not as fast as we, the international community, are capable of succeeding, but we are making progress. We are

improving the lives of the vast majority of Afghans and we are creating the conditions for a better future. Yet, NATO and our partners throughout the international

community can and must do more. Success in Afghanistan will never be attributed

to operational military victories alone. It is only through a comprehensive approach

that true success can be realized. NATO, the military, will set the conditions to

allow the people of Afghanistan, the governments, whether they are provincial or

national, to provide infrastructure to create jobs. It is the long-term investment and

development by the international community and the growth of commercial activity

that will, in the end, make the real difference. It is an endeavor in which the international community must succeed in integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing

its efforts. It cannot afford to fail or appear to be failing. Finally, everything we do

must be seen in the context of how it helps the Government of Afghanistan achieve

its good governance mandate. We need to work diligently with the Government of

Afghanistan, at all levels, to reduce corruption and enable better governance.

FUTURE OF NATO

With respect to NATO’s future, heads of state and government endorsed its ‘‘Comprehensive Political Guidance’’ at the Riga summit, laying out broad parameters for

how NATO should develop in response to the challenges of the 21st century. The

document captures the future direction of the alliance and I highlight for the committee the following key points from the document:

• The alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999

Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out,

namely security, consultation, deterrence and defense, crisis management, and

partnership.

• The alliance will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to

contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including through non-Article 5 crisis response operations. A premium

will be placed on NATO’s ability to cooperate with partners, relevant international organizations and, as appropriate, nongovernmental organizations in

order to collaborate more effectively in planning and conducting operations.

• The alliance must have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major

joint operations and smaller operations for collective defense and crisis response

on and beyond alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance.

• Among qualitative force requirements, the following have been identified as

NATO’s top priorities:

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Æ Joint expeditionary forces and the capability to deploy and sustain them;

Æ High-readiness forces;

Æ The ability to deal with asymmetric threats;

Æ Information superiority; and

Æ The ability to draw together the various instruments of the alliance brought

to bear in a crisis and its resolution to the best effect, as well as the ability

to coordinate with other actors. In this context, the NATO Response Force

(NRF) is a fundamental military tool in support of the alliance and a catalyst

for further transformation and will have the top priority together with operational requirements.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

NATO has demonstrated a remarkable capability to adjust to the rapid changes

confronting North American, European, and global security since the end of the cold

war. The alliance has been confronted with instability, humanitarian crises, regional

conflict, and terrorism on a multinational scale. Simultaneously, we witnessed an

increase in the speed of global change, the emergence of new threats and risks to

our collective security, and the direct impact of second and third order effects of

these types of threats from events around the world. In my view, human insecurity

knows no borders in this interdependent, interconnected world. This is the reality

of the 21st century and NATO has responded with capabilities at hand and has developed new capabilities, new policies, and new partnerships to meet these challenges beyond the expectations of the 2002 Prague summit.

NATO is now entering its most challenging period of transformation, adapting not

only to the realities of a changed Europe, but also to those of a changed world. This

is essential if we are to affirm the alliance’s role as a modern instrument of security

and stability for its members. NATO is taking important steps to complete its transformation from a static, reactive alliance focused on territorial defense to an expeditionary, proactive one that works with nations to deter and defeat the spectrum of

21st century threats confronting our collective security. The alliance is overcoming

institutional inertia, out-dated business practices, and a cold-war-era stereotype understanding of its role, thereby eliminating self-imposed limits that directly reduce

the security of its members and partners, both individually and collectively. At the

same time, the alliance is assessing the threats we face, understanding better their

interaction, and developing new capabilities and partnerships to successfully address these threats.

NATO has a narrow margin for error in this new world. We must balance a cross

section of global interests, 21st century threats, and the asymmetric warfare utilized

by terrorists. At the same time, NATO cannot ignore the challenge of dealing with

the unresolved problems of 20th century Europe in order to realize the fundamental

objective of a ‘‘Europe whole and free.’’ These 20th century legacy security problems

are difficult, real, and impact on the sense of security of the alliance and its members. As we assume new roles and new capabilities to deal with new problems, we

must continue to devote our efforts to resolve those legacy issues such as Kosovo,

Bosnia-Herzegovina, frozen conflicts, uncompleted economic, social, and political reforms in the former Soviet Union, nationalism, and ethnic conflict.

Consequently, alliance transformation reflects the requirements of this transitional period. Most significantly, it retains the commitment between its members on

mutual defense and maintains the alliance as a Trans-Atlantic Forum for strategic

dialogue on an ever-expanding array of security challenges, while simultaneously

operating at strategic distance to address direct and indirect challenges to our collective security. The 60,000 deployed NATO military forces on three continents

under my command as Supreme Allied Commander–Europe, are a visible and effective demonstration of NATO’s resolve to collectively meet global security challenges.

The men and women of the alliance plus other non-NATO troop-contributing nations

are essentially redefining the role of NATO by their actions in operations.

The alliance is adapting, will continue to adapt, and will successfully meet the diverse and complex challenges in the future. However, in this transitional period, I

am concerned about the shortcomings that directly impact on the alliance’s collective

ability to respond and react to crises. NATO’s adoption of a crisis management role

at the Brussels summit in 1994 opened a new chapter in the alliance’s history, with

capabilities, policies, and operations evolving over the last 14 years. Forces in ongoing operations, the command structure, theater and strategic reserves, and the

NATO Response Force (NRF) are the force pool to meet current responsibilities and

unforeseen crises. By not resourcing these key elements of the alliance’s overall

military capability, we place at risk NATO’s transformation to meet future chalVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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lenges, as well as its ability to execute its main tasks while simultaneously responding to crises.

During the cold war, NATO did not conduct any combat operations, but today it

is involved in six operations on three continents performing a variety of missions—

the NATO military structure is operating at an unprecedented operational tempo.

The delta between our political will to take on missions and our political will to resource them translates into a delta between success and nonsuccess. It is the linkage between under-resourced operations at the tactical level, under-resourced theater and strategic reserves, under-resourced NRF, and under-resourced manning in

the command structure that combine to place enormous limitations on the ability

of the alliance to prosecute its missions at the tactical, operational, and strategic

level. I continue to encourage NATO nations to further examine their ability to resource adequately all NATO operations and the NATO Response Force in order to

minimize the risk to ongoing operations and secure the alliance’s crisis management

capabilities for current and future challenges.

It is my view that the alliance also continues to be questioned about its political

will to meet both new 21st century challenges and unresolved 20th century challenges. Demonstrating political resolve and reaffirming NATO’s unity of purpose

and mission in addressing challenges to our security are vital requirements. At the

end of the day, this cannot be demonstrated in words, but can only be demonstrated

in the commitment made by nations, the leadership provided by nations, and the

resources allocated by all nations to NATO’s ongoing operations. NATO’s role and

credibility as a security provider in the post-cold-war era will be determined and

judged by how the alliance performs in its military operations.

The overarching agenda for the alliance in the 21st century is deeply rooted in

its operations, how the alliance functions and performs vis-a-vis current and future

challenges and how our publics judge our success or lack of success. We must ensure

at the highest political and strategic level that the ‘‘State of the Alliance’’ to defend

and secure our vital interests is strong, that our strategy is correct, and that our

resources flow in support of our vital interests and priorities.

In shaping the NATO of the future, we also need to ensure that we forge a common strategic perspective on the security environment, on our operations with strategic impact, and on the implications of success and failure. Strategically communicating these views to our publics is vitally important. Much is at stake. In this

context, there is no strategic message to communicate about NATO’s future absent

strategic success. Success depends on adequate resourcing.

NATO operations should be the beneficiaries of a resource system that accords its

top priority to deployed forces. Quite simply, NATO’s deployed forces need to be

fully resourced. It is the single most important means to demonstrate political will

and symbolize our collective accountability to the servicemen and servicewomen put

in harm’s way. It is clear that absent real progress in resourcing the alliance’s mission, our message will remain hollow with our publics and critics. I strongly encourage NATO nations to reinvigorate their political commitment to sustaining alliance

operations. In so doing, we protect the tactical and operational successes in multiple

theaters in order to achieve the strategic successes we desire in the context of a

challenging security environment.

I am convinced that the alliance will successfully meet the diverse and complex

challenges of the future. As we prepare for that future, it is important to remember

that in the same way our opponents in Afghanistan operate and sustain their activities in the gap between the forces we have in-theater and the forces we need intheater, our future opponents will operate and sustain their activities against the

alliance in the gap between the capabilities and policies we have and the capabilities and policies we need.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General, let me start where you left off, the forces we need and

the forces we have, as it relates to Afghanistan. How big is that

gap?

General CRADDOCK. Chairman, it is a moving gap, and it’s—it

deals with assignment of forces against the minimum military requirement. NATO has a combined joint statement of requirements

for every operation they do, and they have one for ISAF. In terms

of numbers, I don’t know the numbers. We talk capabilities—battalions, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, aircraft, things

like that.

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We have, over the past year, increased the number in Afghanistan upward of 12–13,000, but not all of those forces have been assigned against this CJSOR. So, they come in under national control, essentially working for the commander at ISAF—some with,

some without constraints—the caveats. So, the shortfall, right now,

is—against the CJSOR is about three infantry battalions, it’s some

heavy-lift helicopters, medium-lift helicopters, and some significant

numbers of enablers, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance, streaming full-motion video, things like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that’s exactly what the ISAF commander

told us when we were there a couple of weeks ago. He said—I’m

not quoting him, but the way I read it, he needs 10,000 folks that

can shoot straight and kill people if they have to, and—and are

willing to shoot—and which leads me to—I have been a strong proponent, as the Secretary knows and my colleagues know, along

with those up here, of the expansion of NATO. I don’t think there’s

any argument about the political rationale for the expansion. I

mean, it’s overwhelming. But, if I can be devil’s advocate for a moment, some have suggested that the political aspect of it, or, to use

your phrase, a slightly different way of saying it, that we have

more consumers than contributors, that we may build this so big

that it can’t function, it becomes a jerry-rigged operation. As you

expand it to 30, or heading toward 30, it becomes more cumbersome. If you look at the GDP of most of our European allies—

I’m not even talking about the aspirants, their allocation of resources, percent of their GDP to their defense budgets, in relative

terms, is embarrassing. And so, how do you respond to the notion

that bringing in three countries—potentially, three countries—who

have strong political rationale for it—how is that really going to enhance or further drain NATO’s resources in trying to integrate

them and actually make up for some obvious shortcomings?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Chairman. I think if one looks

at the aspirants today and what they are contributing to, for—let

me use Afghanistan as an example—ISAF—if we look at those

three nations in the context of the 14 non-NATO troop-contributing

nations, in terms of the numbers of personnel they are providing,

they rank number 3, 4, and 5 of 14. If you look at the 26 NATO

nations who are participating, they rank ahead of five. We are—

we’ve looked at, through the MAP process over time, their securitysector processes, reforms, innovations, transformation, and all the

aspirants have made progress to the standard that we believe is

acceptable. Because they are contributing now and we find them

continuing to do so in a larger manner, we think that’s a positive

signal.

The downside for membership would be air defense. There is a

requirement in NATO to provide for your own national air defense.

We have assessed that they are not capable of doing that. One nation has some MIG–21s, but they are not operationally ready. So,

that would be a burden assumed to NATO. There is precedent for

that. We are doing that now in the Baltic nations and Iceland. So,

we don’t see that as an overwhelming burden. It’s manageable for

the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, the first time around, the administration, in 1996, concluded that Romania wasn’t ready for memVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
25

bership, and it held off the invitation at the Madrid summit. Romania used that decision to redouble its efforts to get prepared; and

a few years later, it got an invitation to join. Did the Alliance make

the right decision, in 1996, with Romania?

Mr. FRIED. It certainly turned out well; that is, Romania has

been a good NATO member, a contributing member. And we saw

that, both before the invitation, in 2002, which was then they got

it, and afterward, they’ve continued their reforms.

In retrospect, could we have invited them in 1997? Possibly. They

made good time. They did well, over the next 5 years, getting

ready. Had we known then what we know now, we might have invited them. But, the honest truth is that we’ve seen NATO enlargement in practice, and we have the track record, and we now know,

with great confidence, that NATO enlargement does work, both in

theory and in practice, and that when nations are invited to join

the Alliance, and do join, their reforms continue.

The CHAIRMAN. General, in 2007, the Secretary General of NATO

wrote about the need for better integration in the Alliance and

more reform in NATO headquarters. In an article, he claimed that

there are still too many vestiges of the cold war in the way in

which NATO’s structure is organized. I know that’s probably—

actually, it’s unfair to ask you that one, only 20 seconds left in my

time, but what kind of success have we had with NATO reform?

And what’s on the agenda for 2009?

General CRADDOCK. Well, Mr. Chairman, I can’t speak for 2009,

at this point. I think that’s work in progress. I absolutely agree

with the Secretary General, we are still hidebound into the cold

war, planning and preparing for something that never happened,

thank goodness. And we must transition to the 21st century fact

of life, which is fast-paced operations, requirements for support of

the soldiers, the commanders in the field, and break through this

enormous number of committees and this bureaucracy, that it just

beats us back all the time with a never-ending set of questions. At

the end of the day, it doesn’t make any difference anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I wish you luck.

Let me, with the permission of my colleague, point out one thing

to the Secretary. In 1998, in the context of giving its advice and

consent, the Senate, with regard to Poland, Hungary, and the

Czech Republic—the Senate required the President to submit

reports to the appropriate congressional committees on states being

considered for NATO membership prior to an invitation to such

states being—to begin accession talks and prior to conclusion of

any protocol providing for such accession. To date, we’ve not received the required report for this proposed round of enlargement.

Is it due to anything we don’t understand? Because it’s due prior

to the invitations being extended in Bucharest. Are you planning

on submitting that?

Mr. FRIED. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. OK, good. Thank you. Some parts of the administration don’t think they have to respond to us. It’s nice to know you

think you should.

Mr. FRIED. We look forward to sending it before Bucharest.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much.

I yield to my colleague.

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Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Fried, just along the same line, you’ve indicated, in

your testimony, the administration favors accession of Albania,

Croatia, and Macedonia, and MAP programs for Georgia and

Ukraine, but what kind of personal dialogue or advocacy is the

President of the United States prepared to give to this effort? In

other words, as many of us read press accounts, quite apart from

your testimony, it would appear that there are several—in fact,

maybe a couple of major European countries—that have grave

doubts about these proposals. Is there a danger that we could all

go to Bucharest and sit down around the table, and suddenly we

learn that we’re not all on the same page at all. So, I’m simply asking, between now and early April, what is the President prepared

to do? What sort of program are you going to prescribe for him, if

he hasn’t made up his mind?

Mr. FRIED. Senator, we are working within the Alliance on this

issue. Secretary Rice discussed this at last week’s NATO ministerial at length. The case we’re making, that you already are aware

of, is roughly as follows: MAP is not the same as membership;

Ukraine and Georgia have a long way to go before they would qualify for membership; at the same time, no country outside the Alliance, should have a veto; these countries have to be considered for

MAP according to their own merits and the interests of the Alliance; and, quite honestly, it’s hard to say no to young democracies.

A compelling case can be made for MAP for both of them. We’re

consulting with our allies, and discussing the best timing and the

best way to move ahead.

As you know, and as you pointed out, there is not yet a consensus. We’re working within the Alliance to try to find one.

Senator LUGAR. Well, that’s reassuring. And, you know, we obviously wish you success, because, otherwise, it’s likely to be an, unfortunately, unsuccessful meeting, at least in my judgment.

Now, let me just add this thought, to be provocative. Many people writing about Europe, as a whole, would say that the continent

does not anticipate a war; does not anticipate aggression against its

Member States. And, therefore, rationally, parliaments do not support spending additional money on defense that they might have,

because they don’t see the threat in light of other priorities—social

programs, subsidies, safety nets, economic advancements. They believe the rational thing to do is spend money there, and they’re

doing so.

Likewise, although we talk about Afghanistan, and we discuss

various potential threats to Europe, as well as the United States,

European capitals do not feel the urgency of the terrorist threats

as we do here in the United States. European colleagues do not see

this as a worldwide war. There are unfortunate incidents but those

are perhaps better addressed by immigration policies, diplomacy,

and developmental assistance.

Now, under those circumstances, NATO has invited President

Putin to the summit meeting at Bucharest, after the heads of state

have met for a day or so. It would be a wonderful thing if President

Putin came in as a European and suggested how we all might work

together. But, most recently, President Putin held a press conference with President Yushchenko of Ukraine, in which YushVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
27

chenko went to Moscow to solve an energy crisis regarding debts

that Russia alleges are owed to Gazprom. During the press conference, the President of Russia indicated that, because

Yushchenko has written a letter to NATO, Russia may target nuclear-tipped missiles at Ukraine to ensure the defense of Russia.

President Putin made similar threats to the Czech Republic and

Poland, who have been discussing missile defense cooperation with

the United States. This occurred even as Secretaries Gates and

Rice are visiting Russia to meet with President Putin about how

we all might work together in a more comprehensive missile defense situation, as opposed to threats to the Poles and the Czechs

for having the temerity to discuss such a thing.

And my point is, given the indecision, right now, of major European countries as to whether we should invite new members to join

NATO, extend Membership Action Plans to two new governments,

increase defense spending, or increase expeditionary forces, to invite President Putin into this situation is, I suspect, to give him a

meeting in which he intimidates them further. Now, they will say,

‘‘We’re not intimidated,’’ but, the fact is, on energy issues, they

have been, and they are in a box because of it.

If you were a European President, and you faced dire economic

circumstances, granted you don’t face an invasion, but you’re in

trouble. What would you do in such a situation? as a result, I question the strategy, at this particular moment. I’m certainly for one

of visiting with President Putin at every opportunity, but, in this

context, this seems to me to be very dubious.

Now, what thought do you have about all that?

Mr. FRIED. Secretary Rice responded, I believe, in testimony, or

to questions afterward, about President Putin’s reference to targeting Ukraine with nuclear weapons, and she responded very

strongly and rightly.

President Putin’s presence at the NATO summit is going to be,

as I said, a challenge. And it will be a challenge for the allies to

find the right balance of willingness to work with Russia on a common agenda, which is in our interests, and determination to conduct the Alliance’s business without reference to threats from Russia, such as the threat to target Alliance members, such as Poland,

with nuclear weapons. Finding that balance is easier to articulate

than it is to do in practice, but I’m convinced the Alliance can do

it. It means that the Alliance has to work hard on decisions like—

for example, on missile defense or Georgia-Ukraine MAP—and to

do so for the right reasons. I think the Alliance can handle this,

and it will be one of the more interesting summits, I’m sure.

Senator LUGAR. Well, best of luck. You know, I hope that——

[Laughter.]

Senator LUGAR [continuing]. You and the Secretary are well prepared, because at least this hearing will have had an early warning

signal that there is a challenge.

Mr. FRIED. We are aware of that, and you outlined the challenge

accurately.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, sir.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Senator Menendez.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Senator Lugar.

Thank you both for your testimony.

28

Mr. Secretary, one of NATO’s fundamental successes is its commitment of its membership to that core mission. That’s how it was

created, 60 years ago, it’s what’s made it successful. And, in that

respect, I want to focus on one country’s dedication, in particular,

because it’s at the core of whether this enlargement takes place, at

least as it relates to one of the countries under consideration, and

that is Greece. You know, whether it has been staffing NATO operations, contributing to NATO’s defense efforts, or providing vital

operational logistical support, Greece has been a vital member of

NATO. And last year alone, it supplied nearly 2,000 soldiers, between Kosovo and Afghanistan, in NATO and U.N.-led efforts. In

terms of our own interests in a bilateral context, it has, in Operations Desert Storm, Desert Shield, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, provided some critical aircraft refueling support and provided

for military transiting and free passage. It has made one of the

most significant investments in the Balkans, with nearly $20 billion, created over 200,000 jobs, and contributes over $750 million

in development aid to the region. So, it’s been a very significant

ally. And, as we speak, and you referenced it in your opening statement, these negotiations between Athens and Skopje are going on.

And over the issue of the use of the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, this administration announced that it

would use the name of the Republic of Macedonia. NATO and the

United Nations continue to refer to the country as the Former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Some think that this is just semantics. Obviously, it’s not, as it relates to this process. It’s about

history and territorial integrity. It’s about a whole host of things.

I’m sure the United States would be alarmed if, all of a sudden,

our neighbor to the north or the south would call themselves the

United States of America.

So, my question is, Where are we in terms of the negotiations?

What role are we playing, if any, in this regard, to move this to

a successful conclusion?

Mr. FRIED. Senator, you’re certainly right that the issue of Macedonia’s name is not just a semantic issue; it resonates deeply with

the people of Greece and the people of Macedonia. So, it’s laden

with emotion and complication.

You’re also right that Greece has been a good ally in NATO. We

all recognize this, and we appreciate Greece’s contribution to the

Alliance.

The United States has supported, and continues to support, the

efforts by Matt Nimetz, who’s the U.N. negotiator, on the issue of

the name. In addition to that, we stand ready, because we have

good relations with both governments, to facilitate progress that

they may want to make.

I should add that on Friday night I was in Skopje. I met with

the leadership of Macedonia, the President and the Prime Minister.

I encouraged them to work to try to resolve this issue in a fair way

before Bucharest, and made clear that the United States was willing to do what it could to help.

Senator MENENDEZ. What’s your sense of it, at this point in

time? Do you think it’s going to resolve before——

Mr. FRIED. I honestly don’t know. I think that the Macedonians

are thinking very hard about the prospect of a NATO membership

29

invitation and how good this would be for their country, how this

would help them. I think their point of view is one of frustration.

The Greeks have a point of view, also, I suppose, of frustration.

But, we have encouraged both governments to look to a future in

which this is resolved, which will be better for everyone in the

region.

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, clearly, we start off with those who are

NATO members presently. And I doubt very much that Greece

wants to use its veto, or its lack of invitation; but, at the same

time, if it comes to such a high standing in their government that

this is an issue, I would hope that we would be looking at how we

are responding in this respect, outside of just simply saying, ‘‘Well,

we stand ready to be helpful.’’ If we think that the inclusion of

Skopje is that important, then I would hope that we are more than

just a passive bystander——

Mr. FRIED. Well, that——

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. At the end of the day.

Mr. FRIED [continuing]. That’s why I went down to Skopje on Friday night.

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me just shift gears for one moment and

ask General Craddock, Why are some governments reluctant or unable to send combat forces to fight in southern and eastern Afghanistan? And what’s been the response to Secretary Gates’s letter appealing for another 7,000 troops for ISAF?

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator. The second question

first. I don’t know the response, because those letters were sent on

a bilateral basis, and, as a NATO commander, I just don’t have the

view of that.

Senator MENENDEZ. It hasn’t been shared with you, a response?

General CRADDOCK. No; it has not.

First, ‘‘Why are nations reluctant to do that?’’—I think there are

a few reasons. I think there is, as stated earlier, some positions

being held by nations, that they didn’t fully appreciate what they

were getting into. They thought it was peacekeeping, though it was

never billed that.

Second, I think that there are sensitive political coalitions that

watch very carefully where the winds are blowing, and they do not

want to commit to unfavorable positions that could topple a government, so they don’t want to push out, even at the request of NATO

to do so.

And, last, I think that there is some hesitancy because their

forces, while wanting to do all they can, lack some of the capabilities of their neighbors, because they’re not yet fully transformed

into these agile, capable formations. Too often, they are still heavy

territorial forces, not like what’s needed in Afghanistan. They don’t

go with the enablers. An infantry battalion shows up with no helicopters, no transportation, no international capability, and these

are things, then, we have to add on. So, we have—we are building

that; it’s getting better, but it takes time, and it’s expensive.

The 26 nations, right now, NATO benchmarks 2 percent of GDP

for their security forces, for their Ministries of Defense. Six of the

twenty-six are meeting the benchmark. And, when you talk about

the cost of deploying forces, it’s very expensive, the cost of transformation is——

30

Senator MENENDEZ. General, one very quick question,

because——

General CRADDOCK. Yes.

Senator MENENDEZ [continuing]. My time is up. I appreciate your

answer. Isn’t the first part of your answer a dangerous precedent?

The political will and decisionmaking that you describe, which I accept, isn’t that a dangerous precedent for NATO, in terms of when

members of the Alliance decide they will or will not participate

based upon those considerations?

General CRADDOCK. Indeed it is. I don’t dispute that at all. I

think, as I have said, that NATO’s level of ambition has exceeded

its—has exceeded its political will to support. I will say that in a

blanket statement. Indeed.

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Welcome, gentlemen.

Secretary Fried, you noted, in your statement, the appointment

of Kai Eide as the new Special Envoy, United Nations Special

Envoy for Afghanistan. And my question is, Can you tell this committee what authorities he will have, what flexibilities he will

have, within his portfolio as the Special Envoy for Afghanistan representing the United Nations? More coordination? What will he do?

What will be his role?

Mr. FRIED. His role will be to pull together the international

effort in—the international civilian effort in Afghanistan, and help

link up the civil and military efforts by liaison with the ISAF commanders. He will formally report—he will formally have only a

U.N. hat. He won’t be triple-hatted. But, he will have—he will have

an ability to coordinate the international effort.

We have learned, and learned the hard way, that success in

Afghanistan will come if, and as, we’re able to observe and practice

the theory of combined civil/military operations, which is a bit of

a jargon-laden way of saying that you have to get the security

right, and you have to get the development right, just about district

by district in Afghanistan. And when you have the United Nations,

the European Union, the United States, other bilateral donors, all

playing, if there’s going to be a successful effort, it has to be coherent, it has to be focused, and there has to be somebody—someone

at the end of the telephone with whom you can work to bring to

bear our resources in a focused way. That’s really his job. And, of

course, paramount is his ability to work with the Afghan Government. It’s their country, their development strategy that he is supporting.

Senator HAGEL. Any additional authorities, would you say, as opposed to past U.N. Special Envoys, in situations like this?

Mr. FRIED. We have a lot of experience with Special Envoys—

with similar cases. His position will not—he’s—he is a—an actor in

support of the Afghan Government and pulling together the international effort. He’s not any kind of viceroy. It looks as—it looks,

now, as if his powers are sufficient, but I’m saying that in advance

of the launch of his mission. I think that the relationships he creVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
31

ates on the ground are going to be more important than the pieces

of paper that give him various authorities.

Senator HAGEL. Let me ask you this, Mr. Secretary, because I

want to get to a couple of other questions. One last question on

this. Would his authorities, his presence, be the same as would

have been the situation with Paddy Ashdown?

Mr. FRIED. No; because Paddy Ashdown was, in a sense, had a

kind of overseer role. And in Afghanistan, you have a government

which is in charge, so he doesn’t have the Paddy Ashdown role. I

understand the question. It is a little different than that. He will—

he’s supposed to bring to bear the international community, focus

it, work with the Afghan Government, and then make this work,

help us make it work on the ground, where it’s needed.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Also, in your testimony, you singled out allies that deserve special praise—in your words, ‘‘for taking on the hardest missions in

the south, particularly the Canadians, the British, Dutch, Danes,

Australians, Romanians, Estonians.’’ What can you tell us about

where the Canadians are in—with their force in the south, especially in regard to comments they have made over the last few

weeks? If they don’t get some help and replacements in the south,

then they may well—my understanding is—replace those troops, or

bring those troops out.

Mr. FRIED. I should also add to that list the Poles, who have

stepped up with some very significant contributions of combat

forces, without caveats, plus combat helicopters. So, they have—

they have really stepped in—since we’ve talked about NATO enlargement, they’re really pulling their weight and more.

With respect to the Canadians, they have made it clear that they

want more Alliance help, about a battalion strength, down in

Kandahar. They’ve said that they need that politically, but also

militarily. And I’ll defer to General Craddock, but we’ve been working diplomatically to see what can be done. They have done a terrific job, suffered casualties, and, frankly, we think they deserve

the help.

Senator HAGEL. But, so far, unless General Craddock has anything to add, nothing new, as far as any replacements for the Canadians or anyone stepping up to take on some of that role?

General CRADDOCK. Senator, I do not have any hard, positive answers, at this point. There’s a lot of give-and-take machinations,

‘‘What if,’’ ‘‘Could you then’’—but we don’t have a solid commitment, at this point.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Let me ask another manpower issue of you, Mr. Secretary. You

also note, on the same page of your testimony, that the new President of France has pledged that France will stay engaged in

Afghanistan for as long as necessary, so on. What does that mean?

Are they adding troops, or have they committed new troops?

Mr. FRIED. Obviously, I don’t want to speak for a foreign government, but it is clear that the French are thinking through their

contributions in Afghanistan. President Sarkozy is looking at his

options, and we’re working with the French.

Senator HAGEL. General, you want to add anything to that?

32

General CRADDOCK. We have been engaged with the French for

the last 15 months that I’ve been the SACEUR. Obviously, they’ve

added a few helicopters. We think there’s a possibility for some

movement of forces in-country, and we’re always prodding and poking to try to get additional forces. We, again, don’t have anything

firm, at this time.

Senator HAGEL. So, nothing in addition to what the President

said, that he’ll stay engaged.

General CRADDOCK. Yes, sir.

Senator HAGEL. OK.

One last manpower issue. This is for both of you. It was noted

here in your testimony, as well, Mr. Secretary, that the 3,200 marines that will be soon moving into Afghanistan. Your testimony

notes that about 2,000 will be added to the ISAF combat missions

in the south. When Senators Biden and Kerry and I were there a

couple of weeks ago, the same time General Craddock was there—

in Afghanistan—a senior general told us that he believed that it

would require another two combat brigades in the south, in addition to the 3,200 marines going in—2,000 to the south is what he

felt he really needed. I’m going to ask each of you to comment on

that, because I doubt if he’s going to find two more combat brigades, at least from the American Army or Marines. And if he

doesn’t get this, which is probably unlikely, but I would like for

each of you to respond to that, then what might be the consequences?

General, let’s start with you.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Senator.

We periodically review the CJSOR. I’ve asked COMISAF to assess his requirements and forward whatever revisions are required.

That is in process now; I should have it by the end of this week.

We’ll review it. It may well show two combat brigades for the

south. The likelihood? As you said, probably unlikely. What’s the

impact? It will take longer. It will cost more, in terms of fiscal resources. It will cost more in terms of national treasure, in terms

of sons and daughters who will get banged up in the fight. Eventually, we will prevail, but I think it will take much longer and at

greater cost.

Senator HAGEL. May I add—Mr. Chairman, I know I’m a little

over on—but, I—for me, this is an important point, because if I understand what the General is saying, that means more American

casualties.

General CRADDOCK. That is correct.

Senator HAGEL. If we don’t find the kind of force structure required to do the job that this senior general thinks that we can do,

but it—what would be required by additional manpower.

General CRADDOCK. More American, more British, more Canadian, all in the regional command south.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary.

Mr. FRIED. You’re rightly focused on the job that has yet to be

done, but I want to point out that, since we started pushing for additional forces in late 2006, non-U.S. NATO and other contributions

have accounted for about 6,500 troops in Afghanistan since late

2006. So, it’s right to focus on what’s undone, but we should keep

33

in mind that those 6,500 troops are 6,500 troops that would otherwise not be there, or be filled by Americans. So, that’s important.

The U.K.’s put in an extra 1,800; Italy, an extra 1,000; Poland, an

extra 1,000, with another 400 on the way; Canada, 800—you get

the——

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Secretary, my time’s up. Let me ask you just

this very simple question. How many American forces are in Iraq?

Mr. FRIED. Now? 165,000.

Senator HAGEL. And how many American forces in Afghanistan?

Mr. FRIED. 25.

General CRADDOCK. About 29, 30. I’ve got 19——

Mr. FRIED. OK.

General CRADDOCK [continuing]. In ISAF—19,000.

Mr. FRIED. All right. Forgot the Marines. Sorry.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Can I—a point of clarification. The

additional 6,500 troops you referred to from various nations, do

they have national caveats in their participation, those troops you

referenced, Mr. Secretary?

Mr. FRIED. Some do, some don’t. The British—the largest contributions—the U.K., 1,800—do not. The Poles do not. The Canadians and Australians are in the south, where the fighting is. Others do. I think the Italians do, in the west. But, someone has to

be in the west, someone has to be in the north. There are over

3,000 German troops in the north. And, while we would obviously

like the caveats to be gone, they are doing a good job. And if they

weren’t doing it, somebody else would have to be.

The CHAIRMAN. Well—thank you.

Senator Dodd is prepared to yield, Senator Casey.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. He said, ‘‘Let’s not make this a habit, Mr. Chairman.’’ [Laughter.]

Senator CASEY. Thank you, Senator Dodd. Thank you, again,

Senator Dodd. [Laughter.]

He’s also a chairman, the Banking Committee. [Laughter.]

Which I’m on.

But, first of all, General and Mr. Assistant Secretary, we appreciate your presence here, your testimony, and your service.

This weekend, I’m going to be chairing the United States Congressional Delegation visit to the Brussels forum. And, among

other things that I want to say, if our budget gets through and we

can actually make opening remarks, is to remind all of us there,

especially our European friends, about the importance of Afghanistan. A topic that we’ve already spoken of, today, and, really the

central nature of that battle against the terrorists, not just there,

but around the world. And I think—you know the history—both of

you know the history better than I do, of NATO—it’s been successful over all these generations because of the unity of purpose. And,

in this case, if there was ever an example of that—of what we have

to do—it’s the unity of purpose with regard to Afghanistan.

And there will be some there who are friends of ours who will

say, ‘‘Well, look, you’re part of the American Government, and all

we hear from the American Government, in terms of rhetoric in

this administration, is that the President often refers to Iraq as the

34

leading front against the terrorists, the leading front on the war

against the terrorists.’’ The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

recently said, ‘‘In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in Iraq, we do

what we must.’’ So, it’s the impression conveyed, intended or not,

is the downgrading of the importance of Afghanistan, and, frankly,

classifying as ranking of second; at least that’s the impression

that’s conveyed to too many people around the world, too many nations.

So, I would ask you, not just in the context of what I might hear

this weekend, but in the more important context of what we tell

the world, the message we’re sending to the world, especially our

allies, when they interpret some of the rhetoric by the administration, as I just outlined. What do we tell them? What’s the response

from the administration when that charge is made?

Mr. FRIED. We respond that the mission in Afghanistan was an

immediate response to the attack on the United States on September 11, that it is, as the chairman quite rightly pointed out, a

war and a fight of necessity, not of choice; it is a struggle we have

to win; and that it is a struggle whose outcome will affect the security, not just of the United States, but of Europe. And that—and

I believe it important to make that case to the Europeans. And, in

that context, I wish you all luck and godspeed at the Brussels

forum, a very good place to make that case.

Secretary Gates certainly made clear that—in his Munich speech

last month—that Afghanistan is not a secondary or forgotten theater, it is much on his mind. It is a struggle we’ve got to—that we

are getting better at, and have to get right. And it is something

that the Alliance, as a whole, has to learn to get right. It is, as I

said, where the Alliance’s new challenges are being met directly,

and where the Alliance is learning, and has to learn, new skills

and adopt new capabilities.

Senator CASEY. Mr. Secretary, would you agree with what the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said, when he said that, ‘‘In Afghanistan, we do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must’’?

Mr. FRIED. I wouldn’t want to differ with my colleague. I would

put it this way. Both Iraq and Afghanistan are separate fights, but

we must succeed in both of them. The solution in both of them will

be found through the right combination of political efforts, security

and military efforts, and development. The challenges are different,

but it is in our national interest to prevail in both cases. And we

have to.

Senator CASEY. And I would argue—and I want to move to another question, but I would argue that—in your testimony, when

you say that—and we all know we need more help there. When you

list the countries that have helped most recently—but, as you and

the General just pointed out, our contribution far exceeds even the

recent help in—when some countries are adding 1,000 or a couple

of hundred, we’re still at current force—American forces total is

what?

General CRADDOCK. Assigned against NATO, 19,000, out of about

47,000. We’ll be at 44 percent of the force when the Marines get

there, of the NATO——

Senator CASEY. Forty-four percent.

35

But, in light of that—and then, Mr. Secretary, you say, on page

8, ‘‘Do we need more allies fighting?’’ You say, ‘‘Yes.’’ And you both

assert that. But, I think it would be helpful for the administration,

and especially for the President, when he’s talking about the battle

for the ages, not the battle for 2008—in this administration or the

next—the battle for the ages is against the terrorists. And I think

it would be helpful to improve our relations with our European

friends and other allies specifically in terms of seeking their help

in Afghanistan, to include Afghanistan in rhetoric about what’s

most important, or what’s the central front against the terrorists.

So, I would urge you to reiterate that—iterate or reiterate that to

those in the administration, because rhetoric, I think—as you know

better than I—rhetoric, in the international context, has consequences, especially when it comes to the grave question of war

and the fight that we’re in.

I’m almost out of time—but, General, I wanted to ask you for a

brief assessment of where you think we are—and a good bit of this

is in your testimony—nonetheless a brief assessment of where we

are on the ground in Afghanistan, militarily.

General CRADDOCK. I think we’re making progress in the security

area, but not near fast enough. We’ve localized, essentially, the

fight to the insurgents, the Taliban in the south, some of the other

groups—Agakhani in the east. I think if one now looks at that, you

find that the rest of the country is pretty secure. The desire would

be for the rest of the countries’ NATO forces, then, to pile on, south

and east—has yet to happen. We’ll work it. But, I think, also, if

you overlay the poppy cultivation areas, you’ll find—where we still

have the hard fight is where those areas are. That’s the next focal

point.

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor.

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, as you know, I’ve been a

very, very strong advocate of NATO expansion. One of the great

days of my life was during the Prague summit of November 2002,

when I was in the room with Secretary Fried and others, and thenSecretary General of NATO Lord Robertson announced that Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

were going to join NATO. I think some people have forgotten that

in 2001 the President made it clear, in a very important speech in

Poland, that he was not going to negotiate NATO expansion on the

altar of working out his differences on the Anti-Ballistic Missile

Treaty. And I’m pleased that, more recently, he has said he supports granting full NATO membership to Albania, Macedonia, and

Croatia, and offering Membership Action Plan status to Ukraine

and Georgia.

I agree with Senator Lugar that securing President Putin’s cooperation in extending MAP status to Ukraine and Georgia is going

to be a bit difficult. It also seems that some of the preliminarily

work for the 2002 Prague summit was handled more aggressively

than preparations for the Bucharest summit next month, specifically in terms of the countries that are going to be invited.

I’d like to know where Georgia and the Ukraine stand today in

relationship to where Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Albania

36

stood when those countries received their MAP status in 1999. How

do they compare, from an objective point of view?

Mr. FRIED. In terms of their military, political, economic accomplishments, a bottom-line judgment would have to be that they’re

in roughly the zone of Macedonia and Albania—when they received

their MAP invitations. They are obviously very different countries,

so it’s hard to compare. Georgia has progressed in its reforms extraordinarily fast since the Rose Revolution. Its political consolidation and the strengthening of democratic institutions has a way to

go. We saw that, last November. Its economy is moving ahead. Its

military is reforming. So, it’s on a good trajectory. It isn’t nearly

ready for NATO membership.

Ukraine is a far more developed country. It’s had free and fair

elections. Within Ukrainian society, there is not yet a strong consensus for NATO membership. However, we’ve learned from experience that the prospect of NATO membership—that a Membership

Action Plan can help crystalize a pro-Western consensus.

And, as I said earlier, the Alliance is debating and working

through the issues of when is the best time to offer a Membership

Action Plan to these countries? And that debate, I think, as you all

know, is going on. These are legitimately tough issues.

Senator VOINOVICH. Where do you think our allies are on this?

Mr. FRIED. I think——

Senator VOINOVICH. The other members of NATO.

Mr. FRIED [continuing]. Different countries have different views.

Some are more forward-leaning, some are not. And the discussion

within the Alliance is continuing, which is where the bulk of our

efforts now are. We’re working with our allies, and consulting

rather closely with them, about all of these issues.

And, as I said, the criteria ought to be with respect to Georgia

and Ukraine and the interests of the Alliance, not having to do

with an outside veto.

Senator VOINOVICH. General, prior to NATO granting MAP status, we usually discuss niche capabilities with the respective countries. While I was able to visit MAP candidates several years ago,

I have not had a chance to visit Georgia or the Ukraine this time

around. Where are Georgia and the Ukraine in terms of their niche

capabilities, as potential members of NATO?

General CRADDOCK. With regard to the aspirants, I don’t think

that there is a developed niche capability, like, for example, the

Czech Republic, with the chemical capability that they have. They

have focused—the aspirants, by and large—on providing support to

designated operations, because this is a new area. In the past, we

were not focused on operations, to the extent that we are today, in

Afghanistan. We had some in Kosovo, but of a different nature. The

aspirants are providing quite a bit of support, based upon the size

of their militaries. And we are satisfied with what we see their

capacity and capability in Afghanistan.

With regard to the MAP countries, we’ve had several exercises—

PFP exercises—I think, six to eight for each country over the last

year, and about the same number in this coming year. Ukraine, for

the first time, is in Active Endeavor, a maritime operation in the

Med. They’ve joined that. Very proud to have them there with us.

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37

ing now. And, you know, they’ve got an enormous contribution in

other coalition operations.

Senator VOINOVICH. Switching subjects, Kai Eide, the former

Norwegian Permanent Representative to NATO, is heading to

Afghanistan as U.N. Special Representative. I’m familiar with his

work. In fact, he laid out the blueprint for the issue of the status

of Kosovo, and as the Secretary knows, I’ve been underscoring how

important the suggestions in his reports are to the future of stability in Kosovo. Hopefully we will find out whether the EU and

others can implement them. Will one of Ambassador Eide’s new responsibilities be to try to talk NATO International Security Assistance Force members into taking a more active role and getting rid

of national caveats, so that NATO is a more effective force there

in Afghanistan?

Mr. FRIED. He won’t be working directly on the military and

NATO side. He will have, let us say, his hands full pulling together

the international civilian efforts, getting the different international

actors in the civilian side to pull together, and working with the

Afghan Government to advance their development plans. So, he’s

more on the civilian side and the coordination side, working the

politics of the caveat issue, but he will have a very busy portfolio.

Senator VOINOVICH. My point is that if NATO operations are

enhanced with more work on the civilian side, then maybe NATO

allies will understand how important Afghanistan is to the Alliance

and international community, particularly to the NATO forces that

need reinforcements. Not fully appreciating Afghanistan’s importance is a big problem. Secretary Gates made a real pitch for our

NATO allies to become more involved. And I think that unless a

very aggressive effort is undertaken toward that end, I will be

really concerned about the future of our NATO relationship.

Mr. FRIED. I agree with that. And one of our objectives in the

Bucharest summit is to pull the alliance together behind a strategy

of success in Afghanistan, to make sure that if there is any lingering impression that it is not a front-burner international

priority, that is dispelled, because it is a front-burner priority.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank our witnesses, as well. And, I, like other members,

will be in Brussels on Monday, as well, and looking forward to

some meetings there. And let me join in thanking you for your

service, as well, and those who are with you here.

Let me pick up on the question that Senator Voinovich has

asked. And it occurs to me, this question of who’s going to lead in

setting policy. Is it going to be the European Union or NATO? And

what plans do we have to try and ease the tensions that exist

between the European members of NATO and the European

Union? It seems to me that—the European Union looks at U.S. foreign policy in terms of one word: Iraq. And it seems like their political reactions are based on their views of our policy in Iraq. At

least, it strikes me as that. I don’t want to oversimplify this, but

the difficulty, politically, in getting the European Union to be more

supportive of a NATO presence in Afghanistan is contingent upon

the ability to see beyond just the Iraq issue.

38

And I think the question that Bob Casey raised, and that Senator Voinovich was talking about—this question of the war in

Iraq—is a question of what we must do, and, in Afghanistan, of

what we can do. Again, I don’t want to hang a lot on one phrase

or two, but whether or not that is a political reality in Europe, and

that’s how they see it. And, second, whether or not some of the language we use and the sense that we’re questioning the European

community’s willingness to be tough enough, to stand up and willing to be go into harm’s way. And I wonder if that language, in

some ways—or at least that impression—is contributing to some of

the political reaction that is affecting the European membership in

NATO’s reaction to all of this. Does that make any sense?

Mr. FRIED. There are several—I have to answer it in a couple of

ways, because you’ve raised some separate and interesting issues.

First, you mentioned the relationship between NATO and the

European Union. We all—that is, we, Americans——

Senator DODD. I should have asked you, Do you accept that

there’s a tension there?

Mr. FRIED. No; I accept that there has been, historically, a sense

that a strong NATO means a weak EU, a strong EU must mean

a weak NATO. And that’s not good for either organization.

Senator DODD. I agree.

Mr. FRIED. It’s not good for the United States. We need to get

past this. And we and the Europeans need to think of NATO and

the European Union being able to work together seamlessly, because future challenges are not going to be purely military, they’re

not going to be purely civilian. NATO and the EU need to work to

develop a spectrum of capabilities. We talk about civil/military.

That’s an easy phrase to throw around. What it means is that the

European Union and NATO and other organizations need to work

together on the ground. It means that we, Americans, have to be

ready to work with the European Union as an organization, and

the European Union needs not to be defensive about NATO. If we

can get past this, we can strengthen the transatlantic capability of

working together.

We’ve come a long way, actually. We have more to do. But, the

theory of what you’re talking about is now more accepted and far

better understood than it was 10 years ago. So, that’s good.

The issue of, you know, ‘‘war of necessity, war of choice, do what

we can, do what we must,’’ I think, is—I think, as you suggest, is

a bit of a distraction. We have to succeed in Afghanistan, we have

to succeed in Iraq. There is a whole political history of both of

these issues, which is—I really can’t get into, or pointless to get

into—but, we need to succeed in Afghanistan. We are doing better

in Iraq.

And the language we use has to be forward-looking. That’s easy

to say and hard to do. President Bush spoke about Afghanistan, I

think, today, and, I think, spoke to—spoke in a way which reflects

the common view that this is a critical fight, not a second-order

one. So, I think we are getting there.

Senator DODD. General, do you have any comments on this?

General CRADDOCK. Well, ‘‘what we can’’ and ‘‘what we must,’’ I

think, resonates in a way that’s not helpful. However, I think the

fact of the matter is that what we can do ought to be matched by

39

our allies, and it is not. What we can do is put billions of dollars

to build an Afghan National Army, and the European Union is putting 250 police trainers in, we’re putting thousands in—2,500–

3,000. What we can do is put all these forces in, to include 3,200

more marines in the south. Let’s see if we can get our allies to at

least match what we can do, and see if they can do that.

Senator DODD. Yes. Well, I agree with that. And I’m not disagreeing with your conclusion. The question is, What plans do we

have to try and exactly get to the point that the Secretary talked

about, recognizing this tension, and, to the extent that because of

our language, there is some problem here. Because the question of

how we approach the political problem within the European Union

to gather the support that you accurately describe here in NATO,

is serious and I wonder if we’re creating more obstacles to that because of the language we’re using and how the European Union is

reacting?

General CRADDOCK. If I could, Senator—I can’t speak—and I’ll

let my colleague speak to the political aspect of it—but, I think

there is, as he stated, a bit of an awakening, a renaissance, a realization that NATO and the European Union must find areas for

cooperation, not continue areas of competition.

Senator DODD. I agree with that.

General CRADDOCK. And we are—we are—NATO—a military—

big military, little civil organization. They are a big civil, little military.

Senator DODD. Right.

General CRADDOCK. We’ve got to find the space and the Venn

diagram to take the challenge and leverage it.

Senator DODD. Yes. Well, that’s the heart of the question.

Let me ask a couple of specific questions that, in some ways, relate to this very issue. And it has to do with—in fact, there are two

questions; I’ll ask them as one question and give you a chance to

respond.

There appears to be an almost inevitable political battle emerging—I’ll address this to you, Mr. Secretary, first—between

Musharraf and the Pakistani Parliament. It seems almost inevitable. And I wonder if you can speak about the impact that these

elections and this conflict, and what impact it’s going to have on

our operations in Afghanistan.

And, second, I was intrigued, recently, to see where the Russian

Ambassador to NATO, Dmitri Rogozin, I think is how you pronounce the name——

Mr. FRIED. Rogozin.

Senator DODD [continuing]. Rogozin—has indicated that the Russians would be willing to open its borders to nonmilitary materials

bound for NATO operations in Afghanistan. I wonder how that will

impact the ISAF’s ability to operate in Afghanistan. And how is the

State Department planning to build upon this seeming thaw in the

Russian-NATO relations? And maybe I’m overstating the case in a

‘‘thaw,’’ but I found it intriguing—that offer—in light of some of the

hostility that we’ve heard in years past about NATO expansion.

I wonder if you could respond to both those questions.

And, General, I’d invite you to respond, as well, if you’d care to.

40

Mr. FRIED. We would welcome greater cooperation between

NATO and Russia, including on Afghanistan. They have a role—

they could play a role, particularly in transit, as you suggested.

I’ll take a look at Ambassador Rogozin’s comments, and if this

is an offer of cooperation with NATO, we will welcome it and look

into it.

Senator DODD. Are you familiar with him?

Mr. FRIED. I’m familiar with him. I wasn’t familiar with the

details of this particular offer. And so, I need to look at this, and

I thank you for raising it.

With respect to Pakistan, there are others more qualified than I

to get it—to deal with the complexities and discuss the complexities

there, but let me say that there was an election in Pakistan, it was

a credible election. We now in a—we’re watching a political process, affirming a new government. We hope that however this comes

out, there is a political leadership in Pakistan with credibility, legitimacy through an election, and an effective leadership with

which we can work. Clearly, Afghanistan isn’t an island. We

have—success there will require also success in working with Pakistan. So, we’re following that situation very closely.

Senator DODD. Yes.

General, any comments on that?

General CRADDOCK. Just very quickly, Senator.

Diversification of enroute infrastructure to move personnel and

goods is always important. Right now, NATO moves, basically, by

the southern route, through Pakistan. We need to look at this. This

may provide alternatives that are very helpful.

Second, with regard to Pakistan, the commander in Afghanistan,

COMISAF, tells me he expects to have a stiffer, tougher fight this

year in the east because of the lack of control yet established,

maybe lessening control, in the border area.

Senator DODD. So, you’re anticipating an increase in problems in

the border area.

General CRADDOCK. His indication is, right now, we’ll see more

foreign fighters.

Senator DODD. Yes.

General CRADDOCK. Yes.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. General, that’s exactly what he told us last week

in—it’s interesting—it’s interesting what the ISI’s take on it was,

when we met them.

But—then, let me go back to one thing before—and I’ll ask my

colleague——

Dick, do you have any additional questions?

Senator LUGAR. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. When Senator Dodd was going into some detail

about, quote, ‘‘the tension between the EU and NATO’’—and it’s

real, it’s been around since the EU emerged—but, it seems to me

that the, really, basic, basic problem we have here—and I’m wondering if you would each be willing to tell me how your civilian and

your military comrades in NATO talk about what I’m about to

raise—and that is, the lack of political will among the European

population to actually support their militaries. I mean, when we

cut through it all, my observation, of all the years of working with

41

NATO, has been that you probably have less pushback from your

military colleagues. I don’t know many German military officers

who don’t want to fight if they’re put in a position where there’s

a fight. I don’t know many of our NATO allies who, when they sit

around the table with you, aren’t prepared to shed the caveats.

Maybe I’m wrong. Maybe I’m missing something. But, when we go

and have the meetings with the civilian representatives—as you all

know, obviously, the ambassadors represent the civilian side of

NATO and their governments—they’re not getting that signal from

their Parliaments, they’re not getting the signal from their Prime

Ministers or their Presidents, because they’re not getting it from

their publics. And I get the sense, when I’m there, that there is no

distinction made between America’s war in Iraq and America’s war

in Afghanistan. You know, it’s all about terror, and ‘‘Americans

aren’t fighting terror the right way.’’ I mean, when you sit in the

coffee shops, or you walk the streets, you talk to people, this is

what you hear. Am I missing something? Isn’t all this, you know,

much ado about nothing? Until there’s the political will to actually

pull the economic—pull the budget trigger, you know, in each of

these Parliaments to say, ‘‘We’re actually going to support the military.’’ I mean, isn’t that the lack of resources from our allies the

bottom-line problem?

Mr. FRIED. There is, as you rightly point out, an issue in Europe

of support for militaries, in general, and military operations, specifically. Europeans have lived in—for two generations in a Europe

of general peace, the longest period of general peace in Europe

since Roman times. And it’s thanks to NATO, in large part. It’s a

great irony. Thanks to a military alliance, and, under the alliance

umbrella, the European Union formed. That’s known, and that’s

part of the reality.

So, you’re not missing something. But, it is true that, nevertheless, even given those politics, there are thousands of non-U.S.

NATO troops in Afghanistan. Over half the forces are European.

They are there in the south.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, if I could interrupt you, because

I think the point you’re making is valid, but, let me ask you, Do

you get a sense, when you talk to your colleagues, your civilian

counterparts or your—I don’t get a sense that there are many citizens walking the streets of, you know, any capital in Europe who

think they’re threatened by what’s going on in Afghanistan. I don’t

get a sense any average people think that their well-being will be

affected by success or failure in Afghanistan. I don’t get that.

I don’t want to belabor the point, but it seems to me, until they

get to the point where there’s strong enough political leadership to

connect that this affects their well-being, until that happens, it’s

kind of hard to get a lot of this done which raises the question: Has

NATO become a political organization, primarily? Or, was it always

just a political organization? I mean, the expansion of NATO—

when I speak to people in those countries—they want to join NATO

because it’s, sort of, the ticket to membership to the West. It’s not

about, ‘‘By the way, we’re going to join NATO, and I’m going to

send my son to Afghanistan.’’

Mr. FRIED. The countries that joined NATO after 1989 wanted to

be in NATO for hard security reasons, and for good ones. And those

42

countries have contributed their forces, their soldiers to missions

far afield.

You’re obviously right that there are—that European publics are

much more ambivalent about military missions than the American

public, on average. But, given that, it’s interesting that Parliaments in Europe regularly reauthorize their contingents in

Afghanistan—not as much as we’d like; we’ve talked about the caveats, which we think should be eliminated; they’re not as capable,

they’re not as numerous, but they are, nevertheless, there. The

Dutch are in Uruzgan. The Canadians are in Kandahar. So, there

are European NATO members in the hot fights. That doesn’t mean

the problem doesn’t exist; it means that, even given that—some of

the political challenges we face, NATO is in action. After all, during the cold war, that we all look back on and say it was the

Golden Age of NATO, NATO actually didn’t ever fire a shot in

anger. Now it’s engaged in operations all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you—I thank you both. I personally

think there’s a need for a change in the political climate there that

generates greater confidence there. I’m not referring to the military, General, per se.

Well, look, we could talk about this for a long while, and I—we

have a very talented panel that comes up behind you fellows. And

I want to thank you both very, very much for being here, and we

look forward to continuing to work with you both. And hopefully

this expansion can be rational and effective.

I thank you both very much.

Mr. FRIED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General CRADDOCK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Our next panel is a very distinguished panel,

every one of whom we are accustomed to having before us, and

we’ve listened to with great interest: Ron Asmus, Bruce Jackson,

Phil Gordon, and Jim Townsend. Would you all, when you get a

shot, come to the witness table?

[Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you for being here. You’re all

very familiar with the committee; we’re familiar with you, and

happy you’re here.

I will submit, for the record, a little bit about each one of you,

but there’s been many, many times you’ve been here.

Let’s start in the order that you were called up—start with you,

Ron, if you would. Welcome, and thank you for being here.

STATEMENT OF RONALD D. ASMUS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

TRANSATLANTIC CENTER, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Dr. ASMUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator

Dodd.

I’ve submitted my longer statement for the record. I want to associate myself with many of the comments each of you has made

about the overall health of the Alliance in Afghanistan. I share

those. But, I think you’ve invited me here largely to focus on NATO

enlargement; and, in my very brief comments, I’ll focus on that.

I’m in the unusual position of having—of being one of the longtime supporters of NATO enlargement who, in a sense, is the skepVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
43

tic up here today on this panel. My skepticism is not about NATO

enlargement, which I think has been a great success, and I want

to be clear that I want these countries we’re talking about today

to succeed and be in the Alliance.

I have three concerns that I’d like to briefly touch upon today.

My first concern is the integrity of the process of NATO enlargement. A decade ago, we wrestled with this question of, How do we

ensure that as NATO gets bigger, it doesn’t become weaker?—one

of the questions we’ve been talking about. And we came to the compromise that, as we enlarge, we had to be tough on performance

and set standards that we would stick to, in an attempt to

incentivize these countries to do their homework as they came in,

recognizing full well that these were often poor, weaker countries

who had a long ways to go.

And if we ask ourselves, ‘‘Why was performance so important?’’

it was both to keep NATO strong, but also because we understood

that reform in these countries was a contribution to stability, that

it would resolve nationalism, the residual historical conflicts, et

cetera, et cetera. And I think what we’re seeing is that, if I can call

them the Class of 1997, the Class of 2002, and what will be the

Class of 2008; each class is a bit weaker, each of the classes we’ve

seen thus far has some success stories, but, if we’re honest, has

some nonsuccess stories. And we’re wrestling with this dilemma,

is—are we gradually lowering the bar, or are we keeping it high?

And I want to raise my hand and say we need to focus on that

question, because I’m not convinced that the countries we’re talking about today, the Adriatic three—Albania, Croatia, Macedonia—

who I want to see succeed, have all received the same level of scrutiny and are being asked to meet the same standards as in the

past. If they are, I’m in favor of them. I’m not convinced, as of

today, that they have met those standards.

My second concern—and I’m going to recall a conversation we

had, Senator Biden—is——

The CHAIRMAN. That’s unfair. [Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. It’s a good conversation, though—and

it’s this issue of—because of Kosovo, we have to do this now, because we now need to stabilize this region; otherwise, it will fall

apart. And you may remember, in 1997 you made a visit to one of

the countries that was trying to get in then, that we considered to

be unqualified. You spoke to the President of that country, and he,

in my words now, not his, more or less said to you, ‘‘If you don’t

bring us in at Madrid, we’re going to commit political suicide. We

will fail. It’ll be the end of reform, and you will be to blame, you

Americans.’’ And my recollection is that you said to him, ‘‘That’s

the worst argument I ever heard for NATO enlargement, and

please don’t make it ever again, because that is not why we want

to bring countries into NATO. We want strong, confident, successful countries be coming to NATO, not countries that think they’re

on the edge of failure.’’

And there’s a little bit of that in this debate today, if we’re honest, that just gives me pause. I, too, want to stabilize the Balkans

after Kosovo, but I want to make sure we do it right.

And my third concern, very briefly, is Ukraine and Georgia, because, I believe, if there are any countries out there that are truly

44

vulnerable today, it’s much more Georgia and Ukraine than the

three Adriatic countries in the Balkans. And I think success in

Bucharest is both doing the right thing in the Balkans and doing

the right thing for these countries. And my concern has always

been that we will have underperforming weak rounds of enlargement in the Balkans and get nothing on Ukraine and Georgia. And

if you ask me today, that is the most likely outcome of the summit,

unless we see a very serious, high-level, Presidential effort to turn

this around, and I don’t believe that would be a definition of success as any of us would understand it.

I’m also—you know, so my idea was that we should wait and do

a bigger round of enlargement later, but I’m also a realist, and I

realize this administration—and living in Brussels, I can say, except for the Greek-Macedonia issue, there is a consensus to do A3—

A2 or A3, depending on this issue—so, I think it is going to happen—raises the question of, How do we ensure that this round is

successful, that these countries do perform, and that we keep the

door open? And I just want to mention three things, very briefly,

that I think we should be thinking about.

The first one—Senator Biden, you mentioned it—I’m very glad

you recalled that resolution of ratification and the reports that the

administration was required to write, having written a number of

those reports. They are a good test of forcing the administration to

put down in writing, on paper, where these countries qualify, and

don’t. So, let’s get an objective benchmark.

I happen to disagree with a couple of things that my friend Dan

Fried said in his assessment of some of these countries, that we

can go back to; but maybe he’s right, and maybe I’m wrong; maybe

I’m right. We don’t have a baseline that we all agree on, at the moment, where these countries truly are.

Second, if I look at the calendar, when are we going to vote on

these countries? I think—I defer to your judgment on this—it may

not happen in this administration, it may be something that slips

over into the next President’s term. So, we’re going to have 18

months. I think our leverage over these countries is at its highest

when they think they’re going to get in, but they’re not quite sure.

So, we should use these 18 months to identify their weaknesses, incentive them to as much homework as possible, and maybe take

another hard look at where they are before you actually vote in the

U.S. Senate on accession, and let’s try to get as much additional

homework done before we come to that vote.

Last and finally, I think we need to consider, if we understand

that the countries coming in are—have further to go, because—not

their own fault, but they’re coming from a different place. Georgia

was a failed state. Georgia has made huge progress, but Georgia

is nowhere near where the countries that received MAP in 1999

were. Georgia needs help. Maybe it should get MAP. But, you

know, they have such a long way to go, they more guidance. But,

let’s understand that, when we bring them in, 70 percent of their

homework still needs to be done. And we, sort of, bring them in,

check the box, and think that everything’s going to work smoothly.

And, again, I think you can see two classes of new members:

Those who have succeeded and are working hard to be first-tier

allies, and those that aren’t. So, I think we—we need to think

45

through whether we come up—I suggest an amendment, in my testimony. There may be other ways to do this. We need clear benchmarks to guide these countries, even after they accede to the Alliance, and to incentive them and put a little bit more scrutiny and

publicity on some of the shortcomings that are there, to help them

stay on track. And I will tell you that I truly believe, from talking

to their ambassadors and to reformers in these countries, they

want you to pay attention to them, because that attention helps the

people, who truly want to reform in these countries, succeed, and

they will welcome the attention of the U.S. Senate and of the U.S.

Government to how these reforms are doing, the people who truly

want to change these countries.

I’ll limit my opening remarks to that.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Asmus follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RONALD D. ASMUS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,

TRANSATLANTIC CENTER, GERMAN MARSHALL FUND, BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify today before the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee on the state of the NATO alliance in the run up to the Bucharest summit April 2–4, 2008. It has been a privilege to working closely with you as well as

Senator Lugar and the committee more generally on NATO enlargement issues

since the early 1990s. Your leadership on these issues has been essential. Bucharest

looks like it could become an exciting and potentially controversial summit. The

agenda is full and includes difficult issues such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, NATO enlargement, missile defense and relations with Russia. While I will focus my comments today on NATO enlargement, I would first like to touch briefly on two other

critical issues—the overall health of the alliance and Afghanistan.

NATO’S OVERALL HEALTH

The first is the overall health of this alliance and the trans-Atlantic relationship

more generally. To be honest, it is not good. NATO today is weaker and less central

and relevant than it was a decade ago. That is disturbing because I believe the need

for trans-Atlantic cooperation is actually going up, not down. As I look out at the

world we face, I see more challenges and problems where the U.S. and Europe need

to find a common approach. They don’t all involve NATO but many do, at least in

part. That is why I am worried about the very real dramatic decline in public support for the alliance and the United States more generally, especially in countries

that have historically been among our closest allies. As an American currently living

in Brussels, NATO’s relative marginalization and decline are striking. I know full

well that I am not the first person to testify before this committee that NATO is

in crisis. But reversing the decline in support for the United States and the alliance

will be a key challenge facing the next President. I am glad you are holding this

hearing so we can start to shed some light on what is wrong and what needs to

be done.

AFGHANISTAN

The second issue is Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I know you recently returned

from a trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have had the chance to read your

thoughts on that trip. I, too, had the chance to visit Afghanistan for a week last

fall with NATO. I came away with three impressions I would like to share as well,

in part to reinforce the message that a number of Senators on this committee have

been trying to send.

The first one is that this is indeed a make or break issue for this alliance and

for the Western world more generally. This conflict was not a war of choice, but of

necessity. It has every conceivable form of international and multilateral legitimacy.

My impression is that the vast majority of the Afghan population wants the international community, including NATO, to be there helping them end this conflict and

rebuild their country. In short, many of the prerequisites that were or perhaps still

are not in place in Iraq do exist in Afghanistan. Yet, one cannot help but come away

from a visit there feeling that we are fighting this war with one hand tied behind

our back, without sufficient attention, priority or resources. If we were to fail in

Afghanistan—especially if such a letdown were to follow on the heels of failure in

46

Iraq—the consequences for Western security would be devastating. So the stakes

are extremely high.

Second, the fate of Afghanistan and Pakistan are linked. They are two sides of

the same conflict. That means we need a much more integrated strategy—and not

just for the border region but more generally. We are currently not set up to do that

well. NATO is deeply involved in Afghanistan, for example, but it has little knowledge of, and no role in, Pakistan—even though events there play a key role in determining the alliance’s success or failure. Our own policies vis-a-vis both countries

need to be better integrated and then coordinated with our closest allies.

Third, NATO can do everything right as a military alliance but we can still lose

this war. As important as military and security forces are, NATO and the Afghan

Army cannot by themselves prevail in this conflict for the simple reason that the

equation determining success is not just, or even primarily, a military one. The key

challenge is providing better governance. That is how we will eventually defeat the

Taliban. Visiting Afghanistan, I think we are all struck by the vast discrepancy between our ability as Western governments to marshal and deploy military power on

the one hand, and our limited ability to do the same when it comes to the task of

reconstruction and helping to provide better governance. Yet the latter are essential

to winning the peace in Afghanistan. Our armed services are doing a terrific job but

where we are falling down is in our ability to organize and deploy experts to help

in areas like development, agriculture, narcotics, etc.

Mr. Chairman, I know that you and others have proposed legislation to strengthen our national capacity to do so and I strongly support such steps.

Last, but not least, I want to offer a thought on why it has been so hard to get

our allies to increase their commitment to Afghanistan. Clearly we missed the

chance to forge a new coalition and common strategy after September 11 when

NATO declared article 5. While we eventually realized we had made a mistake, we

have been playing catchup ever since. Allies have come on board in a piecemeal

fashion with different understandings of their mission they were signing up for.

Making the shift from peacekeeping to a counterinsurgency mission is a political difficult step for many allies.

But I think the fundamental problem we face is that our allies do not really believe the United States has a strategy to win this conflict—and thus are reluctant

to take the political risks involved in doing more. If they were convinced the U.S.

was serious and had a credible comprehensive strategy to prevail, and if the President of the United States was directly involved in personally selling this to his counterparts, then I believe we would be having a different and more productive conversation. With all due respect to Secretary of Defense Bob Gates, who has been

working hard to increase allied contributions in Europe, in Europe this issue requires Presidential engagement with his counterparts. But I suspect that task will

unfortunately fall to the next administration.

GETTING NATO ENLARGEMENT RIGHT

This brings me to the focus of my testimony today which is NATO enlargement

and effectiveness. I have been a strong supporter of NATO enlargement dating back

to the early 1990s. It has been one of our great success stories of the last decade.

After the Iron Curtain lifted, Western leaders seized a historic opportunity to open

the doors of NATO and the European Union (EU) to Central and Eastern Europe.

By consolidating democracy and ensuring stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea,

we redrew the map of Europe for the better. As a result, the continent today is more

peaceful, democratic, and free. All one need do is imagine what Europe today would

look like today if NATO had not enlarged. I suspect there would be instability in

Central and Eastern Europe and more tension with Russia. The continent would be

even more self-absorbed with its own problems and we would thus have even fewer

allies willing and able to work with us to address crises around the world.

That success came about because a lot of people worked hard to make sure we

got NATO enlargement right. That brings us to the question we are here to discuss

today—what does it mean to get NATO enlargement right at the upcoming summit

in Bucharest? In my mind, there are two central questions we need to answer. The

first is whether this is the right time to extend invitations to the so-called Adriatic

3—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—to join NATO. That requires us to assess

whether these countries are qualified and meet the minimal standards we set for

new members a decade ago in NATO and in close consultations with the U.S. Senate, as well as to decide whether such a move now would enhance the stability of

the Western Balkans and serve NATO’s interest in further consolidating stability

in Europe.

47

The second key question we need to address at Bucharest is the future of our

vision of enlargement. Do we, as an alliance have a consensus to go beyond the

original vision of the 1990s—an expanded NATO from the Baltic in the north to the

western edge of the Black Sea in the south—and take real and meaningful steps

to extend the alliance deeper into Eurasia to Ukraine and across the Black Sea to

the southern Caucasus by reaching out to Georgia? Bucharest can either be the last

enlargement summit which addresses the Western Balkans and completes the

vision of the 1990s, or the summit where NATO takes the first real step in sketching out a new and bigger vision of enlargement for the next decade. We need to be

clear that taking such a step, which I support, will have far-reaching political and

strategic ramifications for NATO, Europe, and our relations with Russia. It is not

just ‘‘more of the same’’ but a bold new strategic move that would again redraw the

map of Europe. In my view, the potential strategic benefits of such a step would

be considerable. But we should have no illusions. It will be difficult and require a

new strategic narrative, sustained U.S. political attention and diplomatic heavy lifting by this country with close allies and with Moscow if it is to succeed.

WHY PERFORMANCE MATTERS

Mr. Chairman, in an op-ed in the Washington Post last month entitled ‘‘A Better

Way to Grow NATO,’’ I expressed my skepticism about the administration’s current

approach on enlargement for Bucharest. That skepticism was and still is rooted in

three factors. The first is performance. As a veteran of these NATO enlargement

debates, I am worried about how performance has become less and less of a factor

in our deliberations. I am not yet convinced the Adriatic 3—Albania, Croatia, and

Macedonia—are qualified for membership. While I do not claim to be the world’s

leading expert on these countries, I am skeptical whether they really meet the minimal standards we set a decade ago. I have spoken to experts in and outside the alliance who share that skepticism. If we are honest, these countries are probably

weaker and have received less scrutiny than any of the new members we have

brought into the alliance since the end of the cold war. I therefore commend the

committee for holding this hearing and insisting that the administration report on

these countries’ qualifications before the President makes a final decision on

enlargement

I am often asked why I am so focused on performance. Can’t or shouldn’t we just

bring these countries in ‘‘as is’’ and fix their problems later? Isn’t that the job of

the State Department, OSD, and JCS—to fix those problems? Unfortunately, the

real world is a bit more complicated. A decade ago we debated how high or low we

should set the bar for new members. We consciously set the performance bar higher

than it had been during the cold war. We adopted this ‘‘tough love’’ approach because we felt that their internal reform was an essential building block of European

security and because there was no immediate external threat to these countries. Nowhere is this more true than in the Western Balkans today where the real risks

to instability are largely internal and due to the lack of reform. That is why I believe strongly that it would be a mistake to lower NATO’s bar for these countries.

We should ask no more but also no less of them than we did for previous countries

like Poland, the Baltic States, or Romania.

BALKAN STABILITY

This brings me my second concern with the administration’s approach to Bucharest. It seems to me that the crux of the administration’s argument is that we need

to do this round of enlargement now to shore up Western Balkan stability in the

wake of Kosova independence. I agree with the administration on the need for Balkan stability. If anything, I fault this administration for not paying enough attention to the Western Balkans earlier. I feel the administration is trying to compensate for its past inattention by now accelerating the enlargement debate. But I

am not convinced by the argument that we should lower our performance standards

because of the potential instability generated by Kosova.

Mr. Chairman, I also want these countries to join NATO and the European Union.

But I want them to do it in the right way when they are truly ready. Enlarging

NATO entails logrolling. There are pressures to include more countries to keep all

allies happy. The temptation to bend criteria is real. But what is good politically

can be bad strategically. I get a bit nervous when I hear the argument that if we

don’t bring this or that country in now, it or the region may be destabilized. I remember a conversation we had in the spring of 1997 in the runup to the Madrid

summit. You had just met with the President of a country that was pushing hard

for an invite but which we did not consider fully qualified. That country’s President

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had told you that if it did not receive an invitation to join NATO, its government

would fall and reform would fail.

In short, the argument was that if we did not invite them to join NATO, they

would essentially commit political suicide. You told him—correctly in my view—that

this was the worst argument you had ever heard for enlargement and that if the

reform project in his country was that fragile you would oppose his country’s candidacy. What happened? We stuck to our guns on the performance issue. That country survived not getting an invitation, it actually accelerated its reform efforts and

when it joined NATO a few years later, it did so without controversy because it was

a stronger candidate and with fewer doubts about its qualifications.

I also think we need to keep our eyes on the key strategic issue in the region

which is the future of Serbia. As important as they are, it is not Albania, Croatia,

or Macedonia which hold the key to future Balkan stability. That key lies in Belgrade. There is a real danger at the moment that Serbia is moving in an anti-Western direction. That is what we need to change but this enlargement move now could

actually reinforce the wrong trend in Serbia. I worry that the administration’s proposal is strategically shortsighted. Coming after a messy declaration of independence by Kosova, the admittance of weak, not-yet-qualified candidates could actually

bring regional instability into NATO rather than the other way around. It ignores

the real prize—getting Serbia to embrace a westward course.

UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

Mr. Chairman, my third concern about the administration’s approach at Bucharest has to do with Ukraine and Georgia. I am worried that the administration’s

approach does not connect the Western Balkans and the wider Black Sea region and

countries like Ukraine and Georgia. I believe that how NATO addresses the aspirations of these countries is every bit as important as what it does in the Western

Balkans. If we are honest, Ukraine and Georgia are more vulnerable strategically

than the Adriatic 3 today. They are vulnerable not only because of their internal

problems and the lack of reform but also because they are subject to external pressure from Moscow. They face repeated Russian efforts to interfere in their internal

affairs and prevent them from anchoring themselves to the West.

As I mentioned earlier, the alliance is at a critical turning point in terms of our

future vision of enlargement. The challenge of the past decade was to secure democracy in Europe’s eastern half, from the Baltics in the north to the western edge of

the Black Sea in the south. The challenge today is to extend security further east—

into Ukraine and across the wider Black Sea to the southern Caucasus which is

caught between an unstable Middle East and an increasingly assertive Russia. Bucharest can either be the last summit in completing the original vision of the 1990s

or the first summit where the alliance embraces a bigger and more ambitious vision.

In the current issue of foreign affairs, I have argued that NATO must make this

second strategic leap. But I also underscore just how challenging it will be and what

it will take.

My concern is that Bucharest will produce a round of enlargement to underqualified candidates in the Western Balkans along with little or nothing for Ukraine and

Georgia.

Mr. Chairman, I know and applaud the fact this committee has sent an important

signal to allies by passing Senate Resolution 342, which supports MAP for both

Ukraine and Georgia. But I also think we need to be realistic. Many of our allies

do not believe the enlargement process should be continued, or even if these countries are truly part of Europe. Many doubt the solidity of the democratic and Western orientation of Ukraine and the commitment of the leadership of that country

to NATO. Others doubt the solidity of Georgia’s democratic experiment or how we

are going to resolve the so-called ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ on Georgian soil. Many have concerns about the reaction of Russia and whether we have a strategy to manage a

more assertive Russia that is likely to be more determined in its opposition to further enlargement.

These are really issues and concerns that we need to address. The odds of sorting

them out by Bucharest are low. Extending NATO to Ukraine and Georgia is not just

more of the same process of enlargement as we have known it over the last decade.

It would be a new and fundamental strategic move with potentially far-reaching

consequences. Giving these countries MAO would not necessarily mean a commitment to full NATO membership but it certainly is an important step in that direction. We also have a complicated doctrinal debate within NATO as to what MAP

actually means. Initially, MAP was indeed intended for countries that were only a

few years away from an invitation and was designed to help them in essence complete their final round of preparations. Neither Ukraine or Georgia are at that point

49

today. But I think we can and should redefine MAP to loosen this linkage for countries like Ukraine and Georgia which still have a longer way to go but which clearly

need a closer alliance embrace.

I believe that would such a result—enlargement to a weak set of Adriatic countries plus little or nothing for Ukraine and Georgia—would not be a policy success.

I have argued that a better approach would be wait or to do a small round of enlargement, perhaps limited to Croatia, to give the other candidates more time to bolster their credentials, for the West to sort out regional security in the Balkans after

Kosova, and to work toward a second big bang round of enlargement down the road

that would stretch from the Western Balkans and embrace Ukraine or Georgia.

I would point to the historical parallel with the Baltic States in the 1990s. The

United States fought a dramatic political battle at the Madrid in 1997 summit to

limit that initial round of enlargement, in part because we did not think that Romania and Slovenia were qualified but also to protect the Baltic States. We knew that

some of our allies wanted to make this first round the last and to exclude the Baltic

States. We wanted to keep the door open. The result: Romania and Slovenia, while

disappointed, redoubled their reform efforts; the Baltic States grabbed their chance

to catch up and qualify and did so; and we laid the foundation for a later but ultimately successful enlargement that redrew the map of Europe in 2002. Being firm

on criteria and thinking strategically about the long term paid off.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, nothing has happened since I wrote my op-ed in the Washington

Post a month ago to alleviate the concerns I expressed then. I remain concerned

that we are going to invite countries from the Western Balkans that are not yet

qualified, that such a step will not necessarily stabilize the region and that Bucharest will do too little to support Ukraine and Georgia or make the shift to this bigger vision of NATO that I am calling for. To be honest, I hope I am wrong. I hope

that in the weeks and months ahead the administration can show that these candidates are better qualified than I think they are, and that allies will come together

in Bucharest and in the end achieve a positive result on Ukraine and Georgia.

I am also a realist. This administration has made up its mind to go forward with

invitations to the so-called Adriatic 3 countries at the Bucharest NATO summit in

spite of the concerns people like me have raised. I am occasionally asked whether

I will then oppose the accession of these countries. I have concluded that I will not

for the simple reason that I do not want NATO or these countries to fail. For the

U.S. Senate to vote down a candidate country that the administration has invited

would, in my opinion, do grave damage to our standing in the alliance and potentially kill the enlargement process. But we do need to guard against the risks I have

pointed to. Our Constitution envisions a key role for the U.S. Senate in this ratification process. I believe this committee should assume a leadership role to reduce

those risks I have pointed to today by considering several steps.

First, we should actively use the period between possible invitations at the Bucharest summit and and an eventual Senate accession vote to scrutinize these countries’ performances and to maximize their incentives for making additional progress.

These candidates have thus far received less scrutiny than any previous candidates

since the 1990s, even though they are weaker and potentially less stable. We should

ask no more, but also no less, of them than their predecessors. As in the past, the

administration should be asked to testify and report—in open and classified hearings—on how well they are performing and whether they fulfill the requirements

laid down for membership. I am glad that the administration has now been asked

to report on these qualifications before a final decision on extending invitations is

made, in accordance with previous Senate resolutions on ratification.

That final Senate vote should not be scheduled until this committee is confident

they fulfill those requirements. If I look at the legislative calendar, it seems unlikely

a Senate vote on enlargement will happen before the end of this administration.

Thus, this vote is likely to take place under the next President. Given the time required for the next President to assemble his or her team, one could imagine it taking place in the summer or fall of 2009. We should use this delay to our advantage.

It provides us with another 18 months to engage these countries, identify their

weaknesses and maximize the incentives for them to address those weaknesses. In

my view, the committee should ask for another progress report on these countries

early on in the next administration before a final vote. Using this period in this

manner can focus the attention of these countries and help ensure they will be effective allies. I would hope they would view this as an opportunity to strengthen their

candidacies and erase any doubts about their qualifications. If they have done their

homework and meet those standards, they have nothing to fear from such scrutiny.

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Second, we should also consider establishing clearer benchmarks for new members to continue to meet after they joined the alliance. We need to understand that

these countries joining NATO does not actually mean they are ready to be full members. We are asking them to meet a set of very minimal standards—with the expectation that the lion’s share of reform and work will still take place after they join.

It is increasingly clear that many of these countries continue to need guidance and

support—as well as political scrutiny—after they have become members. While the

NATO system seeks to provide that guidance, it doesn’t work as well as it should.

I am sometimes asked whether there are new members I regret seeing join the alliance. I do not. But I do also regret not having pushed some countries harder. And

I am disappointed at how reform has dissipated in some new members. I know from

talking to ambassadors and senior officials in these countries fighting for reform

that they, too, have often wished we had at times been tougher with them—precisely because the voice from Washington can be so critical.

We should recognize this larger problem of the performance before it gets any

worse. In part, it is the challenge of bringing in successive waves of new members

who are weaker than their predecessors. But it is amplified by the disappointing

performance of some new members from previous classes of enlargement. With the

addition of these three new members in the Western Balkans, NATO will now have

30 members, nearly half of whom have been members for a decade or less. All of

these countries are still going through difficult reform processes. There is clearly

one group of countries who aspire to be premier allies and who have become real

contributors in a very short period of time. But there is a second group of allies who

are not where we want them to be and who seem content to do as little as possible.

This of course undermines the credibility of the whole enlargement process.

Therefore, I would like to recommend that the committee call for a thorough assessment, of the political and military performance of the two enlargement classes

of 1997 and 2002. Such an assessment should review the promises made by these

countries as well as the testimony and estimates of our own Department of Defense—both the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as the Joint Chiefs of

Staff. We should compare those pledges and estimates with actual military capacities and performance. This would give us a clear baseline to determine the size of

the gap between past pledges and actual subsequent contributions—and how well

or poorly these members are doing. It will also help us determine realistic benchmarks for these countries as well as potential new members going forward.

The lessons from such an exercise should be incorporated into an amendment to

this round of enlargement. Such an amendment could set clear benchmarks for

these countries to fulfill after they join NATO. These benchmarks would augment

the NATO system. Our goal would be to use the influence and expertise the United

States enjoys to help ensure their reforms stay on track. We could set a time limit

of, for example, 5 years, with an option for a further extension. I believe such an

amendment will help those leaders in the region who are serious about reform. We

also need to consider what we do about the poor performance of some of our poor

performers from the enlargement classes of 1997 and 2002, as well as so-called older

or traditional allies whose performance is also lacking.

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to work with the committee to develop such an

amendment to ensure that enlargement can continue to be a success story. Taking

such steps now can help ensure that down the road we have more effective allies

who can perform in places like Afghanistan and whose forces can fight without national caveats. I would also urge the committee to stay fully engaged in and providing leadership on the issues of Ukraine and Georgia. If the Bucharest summit

produces a weak outcome on these issues, it will be of critical importance that we

find other ways for the U.S. and NATO to step up our engagement with them to

provide the kind of political and strategic reassurance that can reduce their vulnerability and send the signal that we are serious about our efforts to anchor them to

the West over time.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good testimony.

Doctor.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It’s an honor to be back

here, and nice to see you all.

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I never thought I’d be at a hearing on NATO enlargement at

which I was more forward-leaning than my friend Ron Asmus, but

that’s the position in which I find myself, and I’d like to suggest

why, and then also share a few comments about Afghanistan.

On enlargement, I think, anytime we talk about enlargement the

discussion has to begin with the overall strategic argument that

the process of enlargement, that began in the early nineties and

that you all supported so strongly, has contributed to security and

prosperity in Europe. The incentive has led these countries to reform their economies and their military structures and resolve territorial disputes and improve human rights. And, once in, they’ve

contributed to missions in places like the Balkans, Afghanistan,

and Iraq. And, in turn, I think, NATO membership has reassured

many of their populations of the political and military solidarity of

the United States and the European Union, and that enables them

to focus on the well-being of their people. All of that is a good

thing, and it’s in that context that I think that NATO should

extend invitations, at this summit, to Albania, Croatia, and the

Republic of Macedonia.

There is a debate, a legitimate debate, about how ready they are.

I think at a certain point one has to decide that a line is crossed.

You could—perhaps, in an ideal world—you would always have

countries on the verge of getting into NATO, always with an incentive to do better. At some point, I think you have to say, 6, 8 years

into a process, with significant progress made, that this is a credible process, and it actually does have an end point. I think it’s

time to do that with those three countries.

On the question of MAP for Georgia and Ukraine, which I think

is even more controversial, for reasons that have been spelled out:

There’s Russian opposition, there’s even more questions about their

readiness. Despite those concerns, I also think that NATO should

respond positively to their requests to join the MAP, and I’ll tell

you why. We can get into it in more detail. But, for me, the bottom

line is that those requests have come from democratically elected,

reform-minded governments that have pledged, in this context, to

seek consensus within their countries—which is not yet there—and

to continue the reforms to meet NATO standards. And I don’t see

how we can or why we should say no to that. I think that tendency

should be encouraged rather than discouraged.

Again, we can elaborate on the reasons. But let me just address

two of the main objections to the position that I have advocated

here on MAP to Georgia and Ukraine.

The first is that it’s premature because it would be a signal of

imminent membership, for which they’re not ready. I think Ron

has suggested this concern; it’s a legitimate one. We should be honest, we shouldn’t kid ourselves. If we give them a Membership

Action Plan, they’re going to see it as a ticket to membership, and

the Russians will see it that way, and their people will see it that

way. It’s a legitimate concern.

But, I think, as long as we are clear at the summit—and I would

encourage summit leaders to be clear—that participation in this

program, which is meant to facilitate their efforts to get ready for

NATO, is not a guarantee of future membership. NATO, I think,

is quite clear about that. And it is also clear that you only actually

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cross that final bar of membership when you’ve met all of the important standards on territorial disputes, human rights, and so on.

So, I think that that very high bar should be in between the

Membership Action Plan and actual membership, not in what I

would consider to be an artificial place between an intensified dialogue for NATO and the MAP. That doesn’t really make sense to

me.

The second objection that one hears in the context of MAP to

Georgia and Ukraine is about Russian opposition. I think Russian

concerns should obviously be taken into account in any discussion

of European security, but I also think that Moscow can’t have a

veto over the choices of neighboring democratic governments.

NATO enlargement is not, and has never been, a threat to Russia,

which should understand, actually, that it can benefit from security

and prosperity in these countries.

Senator Lugar, you referenced President Putin’s threat to target

nuclear missiles at Ukraine, in the context of a NATO enlargement. I think that’s simply unacceptable as part of European diplomacy in the 21st century, and perhaps more of a reason to extend

NATO’s links with Ukraine, rather than reject its hopes to get

them.

The last point on this is in terms of timing. Because this is such

a controversial issue, there may be something to be said for getting

it off the table now, at this summit, before there’s a new Russian

President, and at the end of our own President’s tenure, and then,

hopefully, the new administration can start to develop positive relations with Russia, which I think are critically important.

Let me very briefly share just three points on Afghanistan,

which, I think, is equally important and deserving of our attention.

In my written testimony, I have provided detailed analysis of what

the challenge is and what we should do about it, but here let me

just underline three big themes.

The first is that, despite all of the challenges and deficiencies

and failures we’ve heard about, some here today, some which have

been outlined in some recent reports that I know have been briefed

to you—rising violence, weakening resolve, opium, divisions among

allies—despite all of those, I think we shouldn’t forget, in a NATO

context, how extraordinary this mission is when you put it in perspective.

Ten years ago, the idea that NATO would be running a major

military operation halfway around the world was preposterous.

Even 5 years ago, we all remember conversations with European

allies about how this was beyond what NATO should even consider.

And yet, today that theoretical debate is over. NATO’s there. Every

single member of the Alliance has forces there and is committed—

42,000 troops, 28,000 of which are non-Americans. We shouldn’t

lose sight of that. And, even in the context of questions about Europeans losing faith in the mission—which are legitimate; I share

those concerns—it is, nonetheless, the case that there are 5,000

more non-American troops in Afghanistan this year than there

were last year. So, as we focus on the problems, I think we

shouldn’t lose sight of that.

Second, and related to that point, I do think NATO can succeed

in Afghanistan, despite all of these problems. I reject the concluVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
53

sion that Afghanistan is lost. It’s not lost in the United States,

where more than 65 percent of Americans believe that overthrowing the Taliban was the right thing to do, and believe that

we should stay, and that has bipartisan support. It’s not lost in

Europe, where, despite public apprehensions, every single NATO

government still supports the mission. And, more importantly, it’s

not lost in Afghanistan, where more than 75 percent of Afghans

say the overthrow of the Taliban was a good thing, and a majority

still says they’re grateful for the presence of foreign soldiers.

Everyone on this committee knows how important succeeding in

Afghanistan is. I think one of our most important challenges is

making sure that the American public, and, even more importantly,

European publics, understand what is at stake.

And my final point—and, again, we can get into all sorts of

details about troops, aid, strategies, drugs, Pakistan, and so on—

I think, in all of that, we need to remember the most important

thing is the sustainability of this mission. Our wish list for Bucharest will, frankly, not be entirely fulfilled on all of these scores. It’s

easy to hope for a quick fix, it’s easy to dream that the Europeans

will lift all their caveats and send 10,000 more troops. They won’t.

The author and British diplomat Rory Stewart, who now lives in

Kabul, likes to say that if everything goes perfectly well in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, it will attain a level of development

around that of Pakistan. It’s a mountainous, landlocked, arid, and

very poor and divided country, and we shouldn’t expect to transform it overnight, but we also shouldn’t lose faith when our efforts

run into inevitable setbacks, and we shouldn’t conclude that they’re

too difficult or costly. We’ve already seen the costs of abandoning

Afghanistan, and I think those costs vastly exceed those we are experiencing in what we’re trying to do today.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gordon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP H. GORDON, SENIOR FELLOW FOR U.S. FOREIGN

POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to

testify today on the critical issues facing NATO on the eve of the Bucharest summit

in April. This will be the final NATO summit of the Bush administration. It comes

at a time when there are serious questions about NATO’s vital mission in Afghanistan, and serious internal debates within the alliance about what to do about enlargement. Leaders in Bucharest will also have to address a number of other important issues, including Europe-based missile defense, the NATO Response Force,

Kosovo, European Defense, and the NATO budget. But here I want to focus on the

two that I believe are most essential to U.S. national security interests and the future of the alliance: Afghanistan and enlargement.

Mr. Chairman, I commend you, Senator Lugar, and the other members of the

committee for the leadership you have shown on both of these critical issues and

hope my comments can contribute to your ongoing work.

NATO’S MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN

Several prominent reports on Afghanistan have been published in recent weeks.

All underscored the serious and growing challenges to the NATO mission posed by

rising violence, weakening international resolve, expanding opium production, divisions among allies, and daunting regional challenges. I will address these serious

challenges, but before focusing on them and what NATO needs to do to meet them,

I think it is worth putting NATO’s Afghanistan mission into some perspective.

Ten years ago, the idea that NATO would be running a major military operation

half way around the world would have seemed preposterous. Even 5 years ago, just

after the U.S.-led ouster of the Taliban, I can still remember officials in many allied

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countries questioning whether the alliance should take on such a challenging task

so far beyond its original mission. Today that theoretical debate about missions is

over—every one of NATO’s 26 members not only supports but has forces in Afghanistan. NATO has 42,000 troops in-country, 28,000 of which are from countries other

than the United States. NATO’s mission began in 2003 with the provision of a single headquarters in Kabul alone, when no single country was willing to take on that

task and it has gradually expanded to the north, west, south, and east so that it

now covers all of Afghanistan. Despite the perception that European allies are losing faith in the mission—indeed a serious concern—it is none the less the case that

there are 5,000 more non-U.S. troops in Afghanistan this year than there were last

year, and there are decent prospects that more European (likely French and British)

troops will be pledged at the Bucharest summit and deployed later this spring.

These facts in no way diminish the reality of the challenges NATO faces in

Afghanistan today or the deficiencies in the alliance’s efforts to meet them. But they

do remind us that the slow and difficult process of transforming NATO from a Europe-only defense alliance into an effective peacekeeping and global counterterrorism alliance is not destined to fail. As we focus on the challenges and even

failures of the NATO mission in Afghanistan we should not forget how much worse

the situation would be were NATO not involved there at all and if the United States

had to bear all the burdens there alone.

That said, no one can deny that NATO is at a crossroads in Afghanistan. The

challenges it faces in 2008—as serious as at any time since the mission was

launched—include all the following:

Rising Suicide and IED Attacks. Prior to the overthrow of the Taliban, and despite the horrific violence that country experienced for decades, suicide bombings

were virtually unheard of in Afghanistan. Even after the NATO mission began, the

practice did not begin until 2005, when 17 suicide bombings took place. Since then,

however, there have been 123 suicide bombings in 2006, 140 in 2007, and the number is rising further in 2008—a sign that the Taliban and al-Qaeda realize they cannot defeat NATO with conventional means and instead hope to undercut support for

the mission in ways similar to those that were effective in Iraq. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has also proliferated over the past several years. In

January 2008, the Taliban in Afghanistan crossed a new line with a suicide attack

on the Serena hotel in Kabul, a luxury hotel frequented by Western diplomats and

journalists, which killed eight people. Many fear that the Taliban have been regrouping and will continue to expand their attacks on Western forces and civilians

as the weather improves this spring.

Weakening Allied Resolve, and Growing Internal Divisions. Another threat to the

NATO mission is the growing resentment over the vastly diverging military missions of different national forces. While all NATO members have soldiers in the

country, national ‘‘caveats’’ place strict geographical or functional limitations on

what those forces can do and where they can do it. Thus, whereas United States,

British, Dutch, and Canadian forces often find themselves fighting and taking casualties in the more dangerous southern and eastern provinces, German, French,

Italian, Spanish, and other troops are limited to relatively less dangerous duty in

the north and west. Defense Secretary Gates provoked controversy in Europe recently when he made this point and appealed to allies to lift some of their caveats,

but his central point cannot be denied: Allied forces are not bearing equal risks or

burdens in Afghanistan. The inequality is exacerbated by NATO’s budgetary rules

according to which the costs of any deployment are borne by the deploying country.

The result is that a Member State that agrees to deploy additional troops or airplanes not only bears disproportionate risk but also has to pay for the new deployment—a further disincentive to new and badly needed force contributions.

It is important to understand why most NATO allies are so reluctant to send

more forces to Afghanistan and so determined to limit the mandates of those that

are there. For 50 years, with the exception of Britain and France, NATO militaries

focused almost exclusively on a territorial defense role, leaving global missions to

the United States and others. Their publics are not accustomed to coping with the

challenges and costs of global security missions—causing and taking casualties.

Some key European leaders are in fragile government coalitions, which constrains

their ability to take controversial actions abroad. In addition, the unpopularity of

the Bush administration and the psychological link in many European minds between the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq makes it difficult for European

leaders to stand up in Parliament and make the case for supporting what is all too

often (and wrongly) seen as an ‘‘American’’ war.

Growing Opium Production. Opium production, a major source of funding for the

Taliban and a cause of much of the corruption of the Afghan Government, has also

risen in each of the past several years. Today some 193,000 hectares are devoted

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to poppy cultivation (up from 165,000 in 2006), and Afghanistan is providing 90 percent of the illicit global opium trade. NATO officials on the ground in Afghanistan

insist that counternarcotics is the responsibility of the Afghan Government and not

Western soldiers. Regardless of whose formal responsibility it is, however, the reality is that Afghanistan will never have a stable, functioning government, and the

Taliban will never be defeated, unless the profits stemming from drug production

are significantly curbed.

A Struggling Afghan Government. President Hamid Karzai, long seen as a model

of the moderate, pro-Western yet authentic and legitimate leader needed in a place

like Afghanistan, is increasingly unpopular after struggling to bring peace and prosperity to the country after 6 years in power. Seeking to position himself in advance

of likely Presidential elections in 2009, he has alienated some key ethnic constituencies by trying to consolidate his Pushtun base. The Afghan police forces are riddled with corruption and despite real gains in well-being since the Taliban were

overthrown (in areas like health care and education), many Afghans are becoming

disenchanted with the lack of security and pace of social progress. NATO officials

have challenged Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell’s recent estimate

that the Afghan Government only controls 30 percent of the country’s territory, but

what is certainly true is that Afghanistan’s tribal, ethnic, and regional divisions

make it difficult for the central government to extend its writ outside of Kabul. This

makes Afghanistan even more susceptible to regional leaders willing and able to cut

separate deals with warlords, drug barons, or the Taliban.

Instability in Pakistan. NATO of course has no role in Pakistan, but those responsible for the NATO mission must understand that no strategy for Afghanistan can

succeed without a Pakistan strategy to accompany it. Pakistan, after all, is where

Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other al-Qaeda leaders are likely hiding,

where the Taliban and other insurgents receive financing, training, and sanctuary,

and where the majority of Pushtuns—the ethnic group from which the Taliban

draws its recruits—live. Frankly, even if Afghanistan could somehow magically be

‘‘solved’’ (which of course it cannot), the United States and its allies would still face

a major terrorism challenge from the extremists based on the eastern side of the

border. And Afghanistan certainly cannot be solved so long as Taliban and other insurgents can operate with impunity in the ungoverned Pakistani tribal areas, sadly

the case today.

Despite these challenges and problems, and contrary to the impression given by

much recent press reporting, Afghanistan is not ‘‘lost,’’ and the NATO mission there

has not ‘‘failed.’’ It is not lost in the United States, where more than 65 percent of

Americans believe that overthrowing the Taliban was the right thing to do, more

than 60 percent believe we should keep our forces there, and leaders from across

the political spectrum still see the mission as legitimate and necessary. It is not lost

in Europe, where despite public apprehensions every single NATO government still

supports the mission and is still contributing forces to it. And most importantly it

is not lost in Afghanistan, where more than 75 percent of Afghans still say that the

overthrow of the Taliban was a good thing and a majority says they are grateful

for the presence of foreign soldiers—even if they are increasingly critical of the lack

of a coherent international strategy for the country. Even amidst rising violence, the

Afghan economy is growing and many Afghans remain hopeful. Succeeding in

Afghanistan is not only essential to prevent it from again becoming the sort of failed

state in which al-Qaeda could thrive, but it is possible if the United States and its

allies accept what is at stake and step up to the challenge. I believe NATO needs

to do all of following to increase the prospects for success of the NATO mission:

Deploy Additional Troops. NATO needs at least 5,000–10,000 additional troops in

Afghanistan, to provide adequate security for the population and to avoid relying

so extensively on airpower, which causes the civilian casualties that put the entire

mission at stake. If NATO had as many troops per capita in Afghanistan today as

it did in Bosnia in 1995, it would have some 400,000 (instead of 42,000). Even the

current NATO mission in Kosovo today (17,000) would be over 270,000 if scaled to

the size of Afghanistan. The point is not that such troop levels are realistic for Afghanistan or even necessary, but simply to put in perspective the relative commitment we have made to Afghanistan given the importance of the mission. The new

U.S. contribution of 3,200 marines should give the United States the legitimacy to

call on its European allies to make at least an equivalent new contribution and

President Bush should challenge them to do so at the Bucharest summit. Collectively, the European NATO allies have several hundred thousand troops in their

standing armed forces only a small percentage of which are deployed abroad, and

they should be reminded not only that deploying them in Afghanistan is a common

interest but that the American public’s support for NATO is in many ways a function of European allies’ willingness to bear a fair share of that burden.

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Provide Increased and More Sustained Development Assistance. Improving the security and daily lives of the Afghan people is critical to defeating the Taliban—as

former U.S. Commander General Karl Eikenberry used to say, ‘‘The Taliban begin

where the roads end.’’ Yet we have not been building enough roads. Again to make

the Balkan comparison, U.S. and European financial assistance to Afghanistan has

over the past 6 years been less than one-tenth the level of funding provided to Bosnia and Kosovo. Ensuring stability in the Balkans is clearly in the United States

and European national interest, but meeting the same goals in Afghanistan is arguably just as important. President Bush’s February 2007 request for $11.8bn over 2

years was a belated but welcome step in right direction. It must be funded and sustained by Congress and matched by NATO allies.

Focus on Training and Resources for the Afghan National Army and Police. For

many poor Afghans, the choice between supporting the Afghan Government and

joining the Taliban has nothing to do with ideology, but is simply a matter of who

will better help make ends meet. None the less, many Afghan soldiers are still paid

only around $100 per month, while admittedly imprecise reporting suggests that the

Taliban pays many of its fighters around $300 per month. (This can be compared

with costs for each NATO soldier in Afghanistan of around $4,000 per month.) At

these rates, the monthly pay for all 57,000 members of the ANA could be doubled

for $5.7 million—roughly the cost of six of the Tomahawk cruise missiles we used

to overthrow the Taliban in 2001. Tripling their pay would come to some $137 million per year, a fraction of the $1.5 billion annual NATO budget for Afghan operations or the more than $15 billion in financial assistance we have provided since

2002. Strengthening the ANA is essential not only to build its capacity to fight

alongside NATO, but to help NATO put an Afghan face on military operations,

which is critical to their success.

Improving the effectiveness of the Afghan police forces will require more than just

resources; it will also require a significant mentoring and monitoring effort. The

Afghan police has reportedly reached 90 percent of its projected end strength of

82,000, but it is riddled with corruption and not trusted by the Afghan population.

Police reform will have to be accompanied by greater efforts to establish the rule

of law, including through greater training for Afghan judges and lawyers.

Crack Down on Drug Labs and Corrupt Officials. There is no easy solution to

Afghanistan’s drug problem, but NATO cannot ignore it either. Large-scale spraying

and eradication efforts are counterproductive, because they tend to turn poor poppy

farmers—who polls suggest would prefer to grow licit crops but simply cannot afford

to—against NATO and the United States. Rather, NATO should focus its efforts on

helping the Afghan Government identify and punish corrupt officials who facilitate

and benefit from the drug trade. This will require greater coordination between the

international community’s counterinsurgency efforts and its counternarcotics efforts,

which at present are disjointed. And while avoiding attacks on farmers, NATO

forces should not hesitate to conduct operations against the labs that turn poppies

into opium and the trade routes that carry opium to foreign markets, all of which

generate profits that are used by the Taliban.

Adapt Our Strategy in Pakistan. The outcome of the recent election in Pakistan—

where both President Musharraf’s party and the religious parties suffered major setbacks—provides an opportunity to develop a new relationship with Pakistan that

will serve our mutual interest. I applaud Senator Biden’s proposals to triple our

nonmilitary assistance to Pakistan and to sustain it for a decade and to provide a

$1 billion ‘‘democracy dividend’’ to the new Pakistani Government if it is formed and

governs democratically. I spent a week in Pakistan last May and am going back

there next week. My sense is that the Pakistani public is getting fed up with the

growing al-Qaeda attacks against them and they will support efforts to fight

al-Qaeda if we can demonstrate that we are prepared to help them do so. Pakistanis

have long tended to view Americans as ‘‘fair weather friends’’ and have resented

seeing too much of our assistance end up in the hands of the Pakistani military

(who use it to buy high-tech weaponry) rather than be put to use for schools and

hospitals and jobs. Standing with the Pakistani people will make our counterterrorism cooperation more palatable to the public and the government, and in the

long run providing jobs and economic development in the tribal areas will make it

easier to isolate and root out al-Qaeda.

A Public Relations Campaign in Europe. The weakening of European resolve in

Afghanistan stems less from a lack of official good will than from the fact that European publics doubt that NATO’s mission can succeed and fail to see the mission’s

direct relevance to them. To combat this perception, the United States and its

NATO allies should sponsor a public relations campaign to draw attention to the

good NATO is doing in the country and the consequences of abandoning Afghanistan

to its fate. Europeans need to be reminded that our adversaries in Afghanistan are

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the same ones not only who attacked the United States in 2001 but who killed 193

people on Spanish trains in Madrid in April 2004 and 54 London commuters in July

2005. U.S. and NATO governments should sponsor nonofficial speakers—from the

United States, Europe, and Afghanistan—to talk to publics and the media about the

situation in Afghanistan and the stakes. Europeans are often quick to dismiss the

Afghan mission as an unnecessary part of President Bush’s ‘‘war on terror,’’ but I

believe they can be persuaded that the mission is actually in Europe’s own strategic

and humanitarian interest.

Better International Coordination. As in many international nation-building

efforts, our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan suffer from the lack of coordination

among various international agencies. Unfortunately, the recent proposal to send

Lord Ashdown as a strong U.N. Special Representative tasked with eliminating

redundancies and maximizing international assistance was vetoed by the Karzai

government. The new U.N. Special Representative, Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide,

will need strong backing from the United States and other NATO members if he

is to succeed in his mission to better coordinate what is a currently disparate and

disjointed international effort.

I realize that even with the best of intentions, not all of these recommendations

can or will be implemented immediately. The United States and other NATO Member States have many competing priorities, and resources—both military and financial—are tight. The key to success, I believe, is to understand what is at stake and

to do a better job of explaining those stakes to our own public and our NATO partners. While it would be nice to achieve all of these goals in the short term, what

is truly essential is to commit to Afghanistan for the long-term, and to put our mission on a sustainable basis. The author and former British diplomat Rory Stewart—

who now lives in Kabul—likes to say that if everything goes almost perfectly well

in Afghanistan for the next 20 years, it will attain a level of development no higher

than that of Pakistan. Afghanistan is a poor, arid, mountainous, and ethnically divided country that is emerging from 30 years of civil war and mismanagement. We

should not expect to transform it overnight or lose faith when our efforts to help

it run into inevitable setbacks. Nor, however, must we conclude that those efforts

are simply too difficult or costly. We have already experienced the costs of abandoning Afghanistan, which exceed those required to satisfy its basic interests and

keeping it from threatening ours.

ENLARGEMENT

NATO’s second major challenge at the summit is enlargement. At Bucharest,

leaders must address two enlargement-related issues, a decision on current candidates (Albania, Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia) and responses to requests

to join the Membership Action Plan (MAP) by Georgia and Ukraine.

I believe that the process of NATO enlargement, begun in the early 1990s, has

contributed to security and prosperity in Europe. The incentive of NATO membership has led aspiring countries to reform their political systems, liberalize their

economies, root out corruption, resolve territorial disputes with neighbors, rationalize their military establishments, and improve minority rights. Once in the alliance new members have contributed troops for vital NATO missions in the Balkans

and in Afghanistan and many sent forces to join the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. In

turn, NATO membership has reassured their populations of political and military

solidarity with the United States and members of the European Union, enabling

them to focus on improving the well-being of their citizens rather than worrying

about the types of military threats they had lived with for centuries.

In this context, I support the entry into NATO of the current candidates, Albania,

Croatia, and the Republic of Macedonia. Each has been part of NATO’s MAP process

for 6 or more years and has made significant progress in reforming their political

systems, economies, and military establishments. All have contributed troops to the

NATO mission in Afghanistan and made progress toward other goals like civilian

control of the military and respect for minority rights. None is yet a model democracy—but all are moving in the right direction and have made at least as much

progress as those that have preceded them in the accession process. In the wake

of the turbulence surrounding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, I believe that

the extension of NATO membership to these neighboring countries will contribute

to security in the Balkans and underscore NATO’s commitment to it. Their accession after years of preparation will also demonstrate the sincerity of NATO’s pledge

that membership genuinely is open to those European democracies that meet its

stringent criteria.

The question of MAP accession for Georgia and Ukraine is perhaps even more

controversial. Russia is strongly opposed to their participation in the program, and

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both countries have in recent years experienced the sort of political instability that

suggests more progress must be made before membership should be considered. Despite these concerns, I believe NATO should respond positively to their requests to

join the MAP. Those requests came to NATO from democratically elected governments which have pledged to seek to build consensus about NATO within their

countries and to continue to work to meet NATO’s rigorous standards. So long as

NATO makes clear that a MAP is not a guarantee of future membership, which can

only be granted when an aspirant meets all of NATO’s criteria and a consensus exists among NATO members, there is no basis for rejecting their requests to participate in this program. The MAP is a logical extension of the Intensified Dialogues

in which they already take part. Their reformist governments’ desire to come closer

to the West should be encouraged, not discouraged.

Despite its recent political problems, including the Saakashvili government’s excessive use of force in response to street protests in November 2007, Georgia has

made significant political progress since the ‘‘Rose Revolution’’ of November 2003.

The elections that followed the November 2007 turbulence were seen to be free and

fair, and were won easily by Saakashvili, who got 53 percent of the vote compared

to 26 percent for his rival. In a referendum accompanying the Presidential vote, 73

percent of Georgians came out in support of eventual NATO membership. The

World Bank has recently given Georgia good marks on economic reform and

anticorruption efforts, even if the November 2007 protests were a warning shot that

much of the population remains dissatisfied with perceived authoritarianism. A

positive signal about the prospect of eventual NATO membership sent by MAP participation will help encourage positive political trends. It will also encourage Georgia

to seek to resolve the ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that continue

to plague its efforts to achieve national unity—a Georgia with realistic aspirations

to join NATO is more likely to work energetically to resolve these conflicts than a

Georgia with no hope of joining the alliance. Georgia has a long way to go—both

in meeting NATO’s democratic standards and in terms of resolving its internal

conflicts—before it can seriously be seen as a near-term candidate for NATO membership. The question now is how best to keep it moving in the right direction.

Ukraine has also made significant political progress since its 2004 ‘‘Orange Revolution.’’ Its parliamentary elections in March 2006 were judged to meet international standards and took place after free debate and without incident. While

even eventual NATO membership is far from a matter of consensus among Ukrainians—indeed most are currently opposed to it—President Yushchenko and Prime

Minister Tymoshenko have encouragingly pledged to work to foster national unity

and to consult the Ukrainian people in a referendum prior to any move toward

membership. The Ukrainian opposition itself once favored NATO membership and

even sought to participate in the MAP but it now opposes NATO for apparent partisan political reasons. I believe that agreeing to allow Ukraine to participate in the

MAP program at the Bucharest summit would encourage it to continue to move in

the direction of democratic and peaceful reform.

Some would argue that giving a MAP to Georgia and Ukraine is premature because it would be a signal of imminent membership, for which they are not ready.

But NATO’s own literature on the MAP states that ‘‘participation in the MAP does

not guarantee future membership . . . Decisions to invite aspirants to start accession talks will be taken within NATO by consensus and on a case-by-case basis.’’

NATO also emphasizes that ‘‘aspirant countries are expected to achieve certain

goals . . . [including] settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and

human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and promoting

stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice and environmental

responsibility.’’ These statements make clear that the real bar to NATO membership

is and should be between the MAP and membership, not between the Intensified

Dialogue and the MAP. NATO leaders should reiterate this point at the summit.

Others will argue that MAP for Georgia should be opposed because it is opposed

by Russia. However, while Russian concerns should obviously be taken into account

in any discussions of European security, Moscow cannot have a veto on the choices

of neighboring democratic governments. NATO enlargement is not and has never

been a threat to Russia, which should understand that it can benefit from democracy, stability, and prosperity in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. President

Putin’s threat to target Ukraine with nuclear missiles if it seeks to join NATO has

no place in 21st century diplomatic relations and should be taken more as a reason

to increase Ukraine’s ties to NATO than to cut them off. Russia’s opposition, then,

is perhaps a further reason to act on MAP for Georgia and Ukraine at Bucharest

rather than waiting. With a new Russian President taking office in May and a new

U.S. administration to take office in January 2009, it makes sense to get this conVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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troversial issue off the table now rather than to have to confront another MAP decision at NATO’s planned 60th anniversary summit in spring 2009. That way the new

U.S. administration could seek to make a fresh start in rebuilding relations with

Russia, which should be one of its early priorities.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the Bucharest summit provides an important opportunity

to advance U.S. interests by bolstering NATO’s mission in Afghanistan and moving

forward on enlargement. I commend your own leadership in both of these areas and

thank the committee for inviting me to testify before you.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be a staggering transformation, to

get to Pakistan.

Mr. Jackson.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON

TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me try to be

equally succinct.

With regard to enlargement, let me put this in historical perspective. This is not the third enlargement. There have actually been

five enlargements, up to this point. Your committee will be considering the sixth. Certainly, the three countries that may be in the

sixth enlargement are more qualified than Greece and Turkey

were, originally; have larger armies than Germany did in the fifties; and had more social work done on their behalf than Spain did

after Franco. So, these countries are in a very strong position. I can

discuss their qualities.

It’s also important to remember that this is the smallest expansion this committee has ever been asked to consider. The total populations of these three countries are less than the Czech Republic,

and they have been in a Membership Action Plan for 9 years. Instead of—in 1997, in the Visegrad expansion, the State Department

looked at the credentials. One single country out of 26—at that

time, 16—looked at these countries for a couple of years. Instead,

now all 26 countries looked at them for 9 consecutive years—all 26

of them—and with much smaller countries. So, the scrutiny has

been microscopic. And I think this committee really should get the

annual reports on these countries, going back over the 9 years.

Just to put this in proportion, Macedonia is only 16 years old. It

has spent 60 percent of its entire nation’s history trying to be

qualified for a Membership Action Plan. This is extraordinary,

what they’ve done.

If we look at, basically, objective criteria—let’s take, say, markets, because the—they say all of the information is the price. The

real estate values around Dubrovnik went from $20,000 per an

apartment, to over $2 million, in this last 10 years. The market is

trying to tell us something. These countries are now, in development terms, on par with Slovenia, which is already in. And we’re

seeing this kind of convergence. Already, they’re delivering security

goods. There is no longer traffic in cigarettes running out of Albania across the Adriatic; as it was, earlier on. The sexual trafficking

throughout has been arrested. And, frankly, they have done so well

that Albanian troops, on one occasion, were basically protecting the

perimeter of our forces in Baghdad. They had the outside mission.

So, they’re contributing. And that was years ago that they were

doing it. On a per-capita basis, these countries are, as you just

heard, contributing to a larger extent than some of our allies.

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So, in terms of qualifications—and if we look at Macedonia, this

country, which is barely an infant, in European terms, has implemented the Ohrid Framework Agreements, has basically—is reconciling its remaining bilateral issue, and has built a multiethnic society. This is nothing short of extraordinary. It seems to me that,

in the objective criteria, these countries—as, I think the chairman

and Senator Lugar have said—have performed the objective

criteria.

I do think there’s a danger, in my good friend Ron’s remarks,

that this process becomes essentially a social-work process, and we

begin to regard NATO as, sort of, an engineer of European souls.

I think that’s a mistake. I think, you said in your opening statement, sir, that, basically, the Americans played a supporting role.

The transformation of Europe is really a European responsibility.

NATO can only support them.

As we turn to Ukraine and Georgia, it seems to me the greater

danger of the Membership Action Plan is that they’re overqualified.

They’ve been left so long in the waiting room of Europe that

they’ve completed the IPAP, they completed an intensified dialogue, and most military experts will tell you they’ve done most of

the military reform and the interoperability reforms normally required of the countries which came through in the last round.

Georgia, just to name one, has a rotating battalion system that

goes into Iraq, and they’re moving from three battalions to four

battalions; and basically, they always have a battalion rotating into

Iraq. That looks like interoperability to me. Also, when you look at

airlift and the stuff the Ukrainians can contribute, they do contribute. We stack it up, hour for hour, we’ll find that they contribute more than half of our European allies. So, they are

delivering.

It seems to me what is being asked of us is, At what point do

we have a dialogue with a country like that, where we’re trying to

discovery its way? I don’t think it’s correct to say that Ukraine has

basically asked for NATO membership. In fact, they’ve said that

they need to have a referendum—a future referendum about it.

They’ve asked for a dialogue.

And I’m sorry Senator Dodd has left, because I thought his question about EU and NATO was really kind of profound in this context. It’s precisely—if you look back, the first piece, after 1949, was

built largely by the wartime alliance. The second piece, after 1989,

was built as Americans and members in this committee supporting

the heroes at Lech Walesa, Vaclav Havel. It was a cooperative

piece with democracy in central and eastern Europe.

The third piece that you’re now considering is basically a partnership that was forged in the Balkans, between the EU and

NATO, that they had certain commitments. At the Thessaloniki

summit, the EU said that they would have membership for all the

Balkan countries. In those terms, it looks like NATO has fallen behind. Croatia is now on the cusp of a membership decision, and

we’re still making a membership decision. Commissioner Rehn is

opening SAAs, perhaps with Serbia, with Macedonia, but NATO

still doesn’t know their membership status. It seems to me NATO

needs to keep up with our European allies as they take over for us

in Kosovo and they take security cognizance for southeast Europe.

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Already, the European Union is ahead of us in eastern Europe,

they have opened action plans with Ukraine and Georgia under the

neighborhood policy. We have not. And we’re starting to lose the

complementarity with our partners on the other side of the Atlantic. If we want to solve Senator Dodd’s question, we have to make

decisions at Bucharest to keep the parallelism between these two

great organizations, the security organization that this country has

a defining role in, and the European political experiment that is actually beginning to build things in Brussels.

Finally, I would just express some reservations about the suggestion that the Senate would ever consider conditions, beyond, obviously, the powers that this company already has not to send things

to the floor until they’re ready, and to require the information to

make an informed decision. But, having pressured the Europeans

not to impose national caveats or any limitations on the soul of the

Washington Treaty, it would be impossible if we did the same kind

of thing, and avoid any suggestion that, ‘‘If you have a bad election,

we may not honor our commitments.’’ We did suffer through a period with Greece, in the sixties; with Portugal, in the seventies; occasionally, dare I say, with Turkey, on human rights, even today.

These are—these may be handled by European courts, by foreign

policy. We can handle those ruptures in our relations. But, we cannot place limitations which weaken the foundation that sits under

the Transatlantic Alliance.

So, why don’t I just stop there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jackson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE PITCAIRN JACKSON, PRESIDENT, PROJECT ON

TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify

before you on ‘‘NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness’’ as we approach the NATO

Summit in Bucharest, which is now less than 3 weeks away. The NATO allies face

a range of decisions at Bucharest including missile defense and operations in

Afghanistan, as well as the very important question of NATO expansion and the

preparation for membership of potential candidates. I would like to offer some context for this complex expansion question confronting NATO heads of state, which,

if it goes forward, requires the advice of this committee and consent of the entire

Senate. I believe that the choices for the United States appear in sharper relief once

we understand the role NATO expansion has played in the development of modern

Europe so far.

For centuries, the Balkans and Europe’s East have deserved their reputations for

igniting wider European wars and have given to European history the place-names

of genocide and mass starvation. In 1949, the creation of NATO secured the postWorld-War-II peace in Western Europe. Since the end of the cold war, the alliance

has played a transformational role in building a second peace—this time in Central

and Eastern Europe.

Now NATO has an opportunity to lay the foundation for a third European peace—

this time in the Balkans—and to open a dialogue that could lead to a fourth: A more

constructive relationship between Europe and Russia.

The transatlantic allies will face two critical questions when they gather for their

summit in Bucharest in April. The first is whether to invite Albania, Croatia, and

Macedonia to join NATO, a decision that is the culmination of a 15-year effort to

end the wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. The second is what relationship Ukraine and Georgia will have with NATO in the turbulent early years of their

development: Will they be set on a course that could lead to eventual NATO membership, or will they be excluded?

Regarding the Balkans, critics say that Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are not

ready for NATO membership. Farther east, they worry about the fragility of democratic institutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and they have concerns about the effect

that NATO’s engagement with those countries would have on relations with Russia

and on European publics skittish about further enlargement of the European Union.

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These larger questions give rise to a series of interrelated questions which will

shape the decisions of the 26 NATO leaders at the Bucharest summit on April 2–

4, 2008.

(1) How have the two recent expansions of the alliance—in 1999 to include

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and in 2004 to include Lithuania,

Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria—affected U.S. and

European security and the integrity and capability of NATO? What does this

experience tell us about the prospect of further enlargement?

(2) What are the qualifications of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, as measured against NATO standards and relative to previous candidates at the point

of entering the alliance?

(3) Actually, what criteria does NATO use in making these important decisions? Are we moving the bar upward or downward?

(4) What is the status of the Western Balkans as a whole and how will the

entry of three new NATO members affect the stability of Southeast Europe and

the security of Europe more generally?

(5) Assuming that the alliance takes a major step forward in the Western Balkans, what is being done for the democracies of Europe’s East, such as Ukraine

and Georgia, which will not be considered for membership at Bucharest? Are

they being left behind?

(6) What about Russia? How will the third expansion of NATO since 1989 and

our engagement with Ukraine and Georgia affect Russia’s perceptions of the

West and its relations with our European allies?

(7) Finally, what are the implications of the Bucharest summit for the foundation of the Atlantic alliance, for how the United States and Europe share burdens, and for our effectiveness working together in global politics?

Although these questions are demanding, we have accumulated a great deal of experience since the fall of the Berlin Wall in the development and integration of

newly freed European states. There is extensive empirical evidence informing us of

how NATO expansion has helped build the Europe we see today on which we can

base an assessment of the role further expansion will play in Europe’s future.

BACKGROUND ON NATO EXPANSION

The post-cold-war expansions of NATO to the Visegrad countries (named for a

1991 summit in Visegrad, Hungary) of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary

and then to the larger and more diverse Vilnius Group (named for a 2000 summit

in Vilnius, Lithuania) were actually very different in terms of the process as it unfolded and its significance for Europe. In terms of process, particularly in the United

States, an organized examination of the democratic credentials and institutions of

the Visegrad countries took a back seat to issues the Senate (and this committee

in particular) might focus on in the course of a ratification debate. The substantive

debate turned on how expansion would affect relations with Russia and whether the

United States needed to remain in Europe at all. Especially telling was the moral

import of the struggle for freedom in the Visegrad states: The Hungarian uprising

of 1956, the 1968 Prague spring, the birth of Solidarity in 1980—and the brutal

Communist suppression of each.

Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were invited to join NATO in the first

post-cold-war expansion because of the historical and moral claim they had to return to the community of European states from which they had been separated by

20th century totalitarianism. In addition to the moral claim, the Visegrad accession

was the last step in ending the danger of war on the historically bloody north German plain, which stretches from Moscow through Poland and Germany into northern France. More than 10 years after this decision was taken in July 1997 at the

Madrid summit, the NATO allies have every reason to be proud of their decision.

The second phase of expansion began at NATO’s 50th anniversary Washington

summit in April 1999, when the so-called Membership Action Plan (MAP) process

was established for new aspirants in Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

The list of such aspirants soon grew to include Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia,

Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia. The MAP process

was a response to unwillingness of the NATO allies to go forward with invitations

to Slovenia and Romania at the Madrid summit in July 1997. While many observers

thought these rejections were unfair, NATO leaders believed that inadequate reform

and weak democratic institutions, particularly in Romania, made the prospect of

NATO accession premature for these countries. They reasoned that the next generation of NATO candidates would need a self-improvement course before invitations

could be extended.

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With this decision, NATO formally entered the business of democracy support.

There were several immediate consequences of the creation of a class of candidate

countries in the process of trying to qualify for membership. The class of countries

granted a potential avenue toward membership through MAP but no specific date

for invitation could be quite large. The process made it possible to sever the question of whether one was legitimately an aspirant for membership from the question

of whether a country would actually be invited to join. Ten candidates came in virtually overnight, some with very weak credentials and a limited history as democracies. In addition, through MAP, the class of candidates could be diverse both historically and geographically, since the Vilnius Group was not claiming a single,

overarching strategic rationale.

In essence, the Vilnius Group claimed to represent a social and political restoration of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe that would render ‘‘whole’’ a Europe divided in the 20th century. The unifying character of the second expansion

can be seen in the frequent references to the concept of ‘‘a Europe that is whole,

free, and at peace,’’ as President George W. Bush put it in his speech at Warsaw

University in 2001, in which he maintained that Europe must extend ‘‘from the Baltic to the Black Sea’’ to achieve this objective. The Vilnius Group did precisely that,

and seven countries from the group, a self-help political club formed during a conference in Lithuania in May 2000, were invited to join NATO at the Prague summit

in June 2002. Although both the process of qualification and the significance for Europe were different from the Visegrad round, the result has clearly strengthened the

NATO alliance and Europe itself.

QUALIFICATIONS OF ALBANIA, CROATIA, AND MACEDONIA

In terms of enlargement, the first question facing the NATO allies as they gear

up for the Bucharest summit is whether 9 years into the Membership Action Plan,

Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are qualified to enter NATO. Critics say that they

are not. But the fact is that Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia have spent 6 more

years in rigorous preparation for NATO membership than the seven other original

members of the Vilnius Group, and it shows.

Today, Croatia has the most impressive all round economic performance of any

country in southern Europe. In recent years, Albania has contributed more soldiers

to missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and international peacekeeping than most NATO

allies. And, since the end of the Balkan wars in 1999, Macedonia has arguably covered more ground in building an integrated, multiethnic society in a short time than

any other European nation. We now have a chance to bring Catholic Croatia, secular-Islamic Albania, and multiethnic Orthodox Macedonia into the Euro-Atlantic

community of democracies. If it remains the case that qualification for NATO is predominantly determined by the ‘‘social criteria’’ of democratic reform as well as military contributions to international peacekeeping, then the three so-called ‘‘Adriatic

Charter’’ countries in the Western Balkans are fully qualified.

But since NATO has changed or adjusted its criteria for membership and its rationale for expansion in the recent past, perhaps a third expansion might be driven

by different criteria and have unique characteristics.

In addition to democratic criteria, the NATO allies seem to view Albania, Croatia,

and Macedonia strategically in terms of Southeast Europe, politically in terms of

European integration, and geopolitically in terms of the partnership in the Balkans

between the European Union and NATO.

Strategically, invitations to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia bring the NATO security architecture inside the Western Balkans, which remains the last unstable region in Central and Eastern Europe. The Balkan candidates claim to be instituting

a system of shared security that will contribute to reducing the political instability

of the Western Balkans and thereby strengthening Southeast Europe, in both political and economic terms.

The strategic claim is closely linked with the political understanding of the question. NATO’s early extension of a membership perspective to Albania, Croatia, and

Macedonia and its tenacity in preparing the Adriatic Charter candidates for membership clearly reflects a political understanding of what the European Union decided at the EU summit in Thessaloniki. In the communique ́ from Thessaloniki, the

European Union ‘‘guaranteed’’ all the countries of the Western Balkans eventual

membership in all of Europe’s institutions. If it is the intention of the European

Union to bring the Western Balkans into the political and market institutions of Europe, then it is only common sense for NATO to help strengthen these candidates

where it can and to ensure that a security structure will be in place so that EU

integration goes forward when its leaders see fit. Since Croatia is already closing

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in on the final chapters of EU candidacy, NATO invitations are, if anything, somewhat behind schedule.

The complementarity of European Union and NATO objectives is even more pronounced if we look at the qualifications of the candidates in geopolitical terms. Since

1994, the Western Balkans, more than any other place in the world, has taught

NATO and the European Union as well as the United States and Europe how to

work effectively together across the entire spectrum of human rights, intervention,

peacekeeping, reconstruction, capacity-building, and integration missions—to name

but a few of the tasks that have been undertaken in this defining collaboration to

rescue and rebuild the former Yugoslavia.

What NATO and the European Union achieve or fail to achieve in the Western

Balkans may well define what we will undertake, or fail to address, in the future

throughout the Euro-Atlantic. In this analysis, the NATO allies face an obligation

to take any and all steps to ensure that the Western Balkans has the highest probability of success. The issuing of invitations to three qualified candidates is one of

those steps, but the alliance should not stop there. Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia

need the so-called ‘‘Intensified Dialogue’’ with NATO on membership issues. This is

the preliminary dialogue anticipating formal adoption of a Membership Action Plan

setting forth a path to membership invitation.

Viewed from the perspective of objective democratic, strategic, political, and geopolitical criteria—and viewed comparatively in relation to accessions in the two previous rounds of expansion—the candidates for invitation at the Bucharest summit

have an overwhelming case in their favor. Moreover, a failure to decide exposes the

alliance to significant risks and negative effects. Any further delay on the candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia would diminish regional stability just

as Kosovo begins its extended period of supervised independence. Delay would also

confuse and undercut the European Union as it takes over chief security responsibilities from the United States and NATO throughout the region. Finally, inability to

close the book in the Balkans would also dangerously slow our engagement with Europe’s East, to which I now turn.

THE REMAINING QUESTION OF EUROPE’S EAST

Assuming that the Balkan accession goes forward at the Bucharest summit, there

remains the question of Europe’s East—which might someday become the territory

on which a fourth expansion will take place. Both Ukraine and Georgia have sent

letters to the NATO Secretary General formally requesting entry into the Membership Action Plan process.

Both countries have long since completed the Individual Partnership Program,

and they have breezed through the Intensified Dialogue on membership. Their senior officials argue, and Western military analysts broadly agree, that Ukraine and

Georgia have been in NATO’s waiting room for so long that they have completed

the majority of the technical military reform tasks usually delineated in the MAP

process and are already interoperable with NATO forces. For Ukraine, the Bucharest summit is the second try for the Membership Action Plan. During the Istanbul

summit in 2004, President Kuchma requested MAP, but the alliance refused on the

grounds that Ukraine had sold radars to Iraq. Although that charge turned out to

be false—we did not find Ukrainian radars in Iraq—the NATO allies undoubtedly

made the right decision.

As we have seen from Poland to the Adriatic Charter countries, the processes of

NATO accession and its purposes evolve over time. Looking at the requests of

Ukraine and Georgia, we already know that military criteria play very little role in

how we define our interest in the success of the two countries. In fact, these countries are not now asking for NATO membership, although they would be delighted

if we treated them as prospective members. They are asking for the tools with which

to complete their reforms and ultimately to qualify for membership consideration.

In effect, the Membership Action Plan has become a preschool for countries seeking

to improve their credentials for an EU perspective, or more extensive engagement

with the European Union. In this respect, the MAP process runs parallel to (while

remaining distinct from) the EU’s Neighborhood Policy.

What NATO must decide is how NATO should engage with Ukraine and Georgia

in the course of an extended process of strengthening democratic institutions, resolving so-called ‘‘frozen conflicts,’’ and establishing their political orientation toward

the West. To the degree that political and democratic criteria will determine the

speed and extent of their integration into the EU and NATO, Ukraine and Georgia

closely resemble Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia at the time the three entered the

Membership Action Plan

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Many NATO allies note that despite the astounding pace of reform since the Rose

Revolution in 2003, Georgia stumbled in November 2007 when it cracked down on

an opposition demonstration. Likewise, despite the vibrant political pluralism of

Ukraine and its repeated free and fair elections, it seems that the country cannot

maintain a governing coalition or reach a political decision without a fistfight in

Parliament and a collapse of the government. But these are the familiar juvenile

delinquencies of young democracies finding their way in the post-Soviet world. Helping them past this early fragility is an important reason for them to be offered a

collaborative relationship with NATO.

As important as it is to understand that NATO’s criteria on expansion are constantly changing, it is also important to understand what NATO’s engagement and

preaccession programs are not. A Membership Action Plan offers no guarantee of

future membership in NATO, let alone in the European Union. To be precise, MAP

would initiate an open-ended process that anticipates that Georgia and Ukraine will

spend many years resolving critical national questions of stability, territorial integrity, institutional capacity, and the resolution of frozen conflicts before either NATO

or the candidate country can make an informed political decision on NATO membership. In this sense, the first phase of engagement in Europe’s East will be a process

of discovery wherein Europe learns more about the character, capability and political intentions of Ukraine and Georgia—and these countries understand the evolving requirements of both NATO and the European Union.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA

Critics of NATO often cite past expansions as a decisive factor in the deterioration

of Russia’s relationship with NATO, the United States and Europe. Although NATO

has an influence on the security, integration, and engagement of Europe in the East

and, therefore, an influence on Europe’s relationship with Russia, it can be argued

that NATO has exerted a positive influence on Russia over the longer term.

To the extent that NATO and the European Union succeed in the stabilization

and integration of the Western Balkans, Serbian insecurities and historical anxieties may cease to be a neuralgic issue in Russia’s relations with the international

community. Similarly, closer relations with Ukraine and Georgia will remove the security concerns that make addressing ‘‘frozen conflicts’’ extremely difficult and will

serve to further demilitarize the unstable regions of what Russia once regarded as

its ‘‘Near Abroad.’’

Over time, Ukraine and Georgia will become more stable and undoubtedly more

prosperous. Invariably, countries in the process of building closer relations with

NATO find they can safely demilitarize and devote more of their energies to multilateral resolution of conflicts with neighbors. Ultimately, closer relations between

Europe and Ukraine and Georgia would bring Russia closer to Europe and would

make the needed dialogues with Russia on democracy and energy that much easier.

As a historical rule, the persistence of political vacuums between Europe and Russia and the isolation of the fearful, fragile states trapped within this belt of political

instability are a danger to and a barrier to cooperation between Europe and Russia.

Since the mid-1990s, NATO has done more than any institution to remove the physical insecurity and end the isolation of Europe’s East and Russia. As a result of

NATO’s success in these areas, it is now possible to envision new kinds of relationships with Russia, of which the Russia-NATO Founding Act and the Russia-NATO

Council are distant, cave-dwelling ancestors.

If the Bucharest summit succeeds, both in the completion of a Southeast European security system in the Balkans and a decisive, long-term engagement with

Ukraine and Georgia, it is not too early to speculate about a new Russian relationship.

In the short term, the military dimension of the relationship between Russia and

the West is likely to continue to decline. We are unlikely to find ourselves embarking on interminable negotiations on the levels of nuclear and conventional forces

reminiscent of the late 1970s and 1980s. These issues are no longer central. The

pretense of the last few years that Russia and the United States had found common

cause in areas such as North Korea, Iran, and counterproliferation generally has

generally proven false. Not only is the Russian Government reluctant to help Europe and the United States on problems of the potential development of an Iranian

nuclear program, Russia seems to have even less influence with North Korea than

does the United States. As a result, the Russia-NATO Council remains little more

than a vehicle to allow the Russian President to appear at NATO summits.

By the same token, it is clear that Russia and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community are not going to reach a common understanding on the nature of democracy,

the standards of human rights, the protection of the press, the limitations on state

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power, and many other political values that are the foundation of NATO and EU

Member States.

However, the decisions at the Bucharest summit may set the stage for recognition

that Russia and Europe have common economic interests and should begin to

discuss the terms of trade. Already, the European Union is about to open free trade

discussions with Ukraine, and NATO has put Europe’s energy security on its

agenda. While it is more likely that the European Union will take the leading role

in whatever relationship develops on energy supply and related issues in trade and

development, it may fairly be said that NATO created the conditions that made closer relations between Russia and Europe on economic matters possible—primarily by

means of three expansions and a new engagement in Europe’s East

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUMMIT FOR NATO

When the NATO allies met at Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, they described

their next meeting in Bucharest as ‘‘an expansion summit.’’ Since then, equally consequential issues concerning the success of NATO operations in Afghanistan and

how missile defenses will work in the overall security architecture of Europe have

been added to the agenda. Success or failure on any of these questions will affect

the strength and integrity of NATO for years to come.

Still, it was the question of NATO membership that first signaled that the Bucharest summit is likely to be an historic event in the NATO alliance and in the development of modern Europe more generally. If the Bucharest summit does invite

Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join NATO, if the alliance formally invites Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia to start on the path to NATO and European integration, and if NATO invites Georgia and Ukraine to enter the Membership Action

Plan, thus beginning a serious and sustained relationship with Europe’s East, what

affect will NATO have had on modern Europe?

Mr. Chairman, in my view:

• NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia would be a major step

toward the complete integration of Southeast Europe into Euro-Atlantic institutions and would provide the security foundations for an enduring peace in the

Western Balkans.

• Invitations to Bosnia, Montenegro, and Serbia to begin a dialogue on NATO

would formally parallel the policies of the European Union toward the countries

of the Central Balkans. This would be an important signal that NATO and Europe’s Security and Defense Policy are equal partners in future challenges.

• Invitations to Georgia and Ukraine to enter NATO’s Membership Action Plan

would signal a breakthrough engagement with Europe’s East which would

strengthen the democratic and economic development of both countries and

may, ultimately, set the stage for closer relations with Russia.

• Finally, the decisions at the Bucharest summit, taken as a whole, would announce that there is a new balance in burden-sharing between the European

Union and NATO. In each affirmative decision at Bucharest, NATO will be

either anticipating an EU decision (for Croatia, NATO membership would precede EU membership) or following appropriately on the lead of EU policy

(Ukraine’s MAP would follow the EU’s Neighborhood Policy by 2 years).

In conclusion, NATO’s adaptability to the changing needs and various objectives

of Visegrad, Vilnius, the Adriatic Charter, the Western Balkan, and now the postSoviet democracies in Europe’s East is nothing short of extraordinary. The NATO

allies seem quite agile in changing their mission from ending insecurity in the north

German plain, to completing Central and Eastern Europe, to stabilizing and helping

to integrate the Western Balkans, to strengthening democratic institutions where it

can, and in providing the relationships with Ukraine and Georgia that may bring

them to a political decision on NATO membership and an EU perspective. NATO’s

Open Door policy has clearly played a critical role in the development of modern

Europe after 1989 and stands as one of the most clearheaded decisions made by the

alliance since the Marshall Plan. Looking back on the history of NATO’s initial engagements and expansions, there is no positive decision which the allies have had

cause to subsequently regret. Each NATO dialogue, membership action plan, and

NATO invitation has made the trans-Atlantic alliance more effective and has served

to unite and strengthen the political order of modern Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Townsend.

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STATEMENT OF JAMES J. TOWNSEND, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. TOWNSEND. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. And it’s a great

honor and privilege for me to appear before Senator Biden and

Senator Lugar to talk about these very important issues.

I’ve also submitted a written testimony for the record, and that

I’d like to have submitted there. Thank you very much.

The candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join

NATO bring with them both the strings that come with new members, as well as the complex issues reflecting their history and their

geography. Drawing on the core of what is known as the ‘‘Perry

Principles,’’ after what Secretary of Defense Bill Perry identified as

the standards for new members, these principles—civilian control

of the military, civil societies based on democracy, rule of law, a

market economy, and good relations with neighbors—still provide

important guidelines for candidates to know what the Alliance is

looking for, in terms of an ally, and it can also guide our own decisionmaking.

All three countries have reform efforts underway for years,

shaped by the NATO Membership Action Plan and by EU criteria,

as well. Strong majorities favor membership. Defense spending levels are close to or over 2 percent of GDP.

On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with affirm

that all three nations have enthusiastically met and implemented

most of the military reform suggestions made to them through the

MAP, and are in better shape militarily than most of the newest

members were when they first entered the Alliance.

But, metrics alone do not provide the justification for why we

may want these nations in NATO. To do that, we must consider

their membership in the context of why we bring in new members

and what our experience has been since 1999.

Since the end of the cold war, the Article 10 standards for new

allies took on a new interpretation based on Alliance security considerations of a new time. Security was defined in a more broadly

political/strategic way as assuring transatlantic security through

the creation of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Bringing former

adversaries into NATO and the EU became an important part of

creating this more stable and integrated Europe. This led to

NATO’s largest period of enlargement, when 10 former adversaries

entered the Alliance, beginning in 1999.

Now Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are following in the train

of those first 10. We have to consider their candidacy in the same

context we used to consider the latest 10 new members. Will their

membership help create a Europe whole, free, and at peace? The

answer to that question is that NATO membership for these three

is just as logical, just as consistent with past decisions, and just as

important for Alliance security as was membership for the 10 newest allies, if not more so, given Alliance security concerns in their

region, especially with Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings

peer pressure on members to act responsibly. Nations, if left on

their own, are freer to exploit regional problems to their advantage.

The pressure by peers and by the institutions will make it very difVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
68

ficult for members to engage in acts that contribute to regional

instability.

This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the reasoning behind Slovenia’s NATO and EU membership as the first

nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions, which

was partially based on the importance of enhancing regional

stability.

NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will

bring to bear that role of NATO as agent for regional stability, as

described above. Membership will give these three nations a focus

on regional stability and on the responsibility for security that

comes with NATO membership, which will make these three nations regional activists.

Like with Slovenia, admission of these three nations to NATO

will send an important signal to other nations in the region that

the door to membership is open to those nations that accept the

values and the institutions shared by the allies.

However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that remains to be done and the usefulness of a carrot of NATO membership in helping governments make decisions about reform. Therefore, I would like to recommend to the committee that, at the

NATO summit in Bucharest, invitations for membership be extended to Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia, but it should be recognized explicitly that each nation still must meet, or make credible

progress toward meeting, an achievable, but essential, capability,

goal, or goals in civil or military areas. If nations do not meet these

goals, or if NATO planners cannot certify that significant progress

is being made toward meeting them, then accession to NATO membership is postponed until such time as progress can be certified.

I have no doubt that this committee and the full Senate will want

to be assured of that progress.

As far as Georgia and Ukraine MAP are concerned, arguments

are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO’s Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit.

But, I also share my colleagues’ views that it must be understood

that being given MAP participation does not mean membership in

NATO is assured.

And in the case of Georgia, the Georgian people and government

have made clear they would like to join the Alliance, and Georgia

has made great strides in military and civil reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and

especially by improvements in the Georgian economy.

The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one. MAP

should be extended to Georgia at the Bucharest summit. If, however, the events during last November’s crackdown on political opposition has weakened allied consensus to extend MAP at Bucharest, I would like to offer a suggestion made by former Ambassador

to Ukraine, Steven Pifer, that NATO Ministers or Ambassadors decide the question of MAP after the spring parliamentary elections.

However, in the minds of some observers, the questions surrounding MAP for Georgia is whether the offer of MAP is worth it

if were to provoke a harsh reaction by Russia to what it sees as

a hostile NATO penetrating into an area that some Russians consider a part of its sphere of influence. At its root, the issue is not

69

MAP, but what MAP represents: The ability of a sovereign Georgia

to decide for itself whether it wants to join a transatlantic institution that Russia sees, at least here, as encroaching upon its own

interests in a way it regards as unacceptable.

Russia has legitimate interest in the security policies of its

neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if those neighbors wish to join NATO.

For Ukraine, participation in MAP is a logical next step, and

MAP should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit.

Unlike Georgia, however, support for NATO membership by the

Government of Ukraine has been inconsistent, and support for

membership by the Ukrainian people is weak, reflecting the internal divisions in that country over the nature of its relationship

with Russia and its Western neighbors. However, after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine’s President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking to participate in the

MAP process. Low support by the public for NATO membership

has not kept MAP from being extended to other aspirants in a

similar situation. Those nations have used the MAP, and that time

in the MAP process, to help build support in their country for

NATO membership. Despite this weak support for NATO membership—and membership is not the issue here—MAP should be extended so that reforms can become sharper and more focused,

while the Ukrainians sort out their future relationship with NATO.

But, there is a similarity with the Georgia case for MAP, and

that is Russia. Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic

center of gravity for Russians, and Ukrainian membership in

NATO raises, for Russians, not just misplaced fears of NATO encroachment on its borders, but a shrinking of what Russian strategists see as their sphere of influence. But, Russian pressure should

have no control over the decisions that a sovereign nation like

Ukraine should make about what institutions it wants to affiliate

with.

Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and for

Ukraine and for NATO. One of the great disappointments of the

past 10 years is the deterioration in the relations between Russia

and many nations and institutions in the transatlantic community,

even as democracy itself has deteriorated in Russia. Since Russia

joined PFP, the NATO/Russia relationship has been based on practical cooperation, with NATO/Russia joint operations in the

Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean.

A Russian flag officer is even posted at SHAPE, and NATO-Russia

Council II meets regularly. But, recently there has not been much

movement on joint NATO/Russian initiatives. Just as the history of

cooperation should demonstrate that Russian perceptions of NATO

as a threat are misplaced, and there is a foundation of cooperation

that can be built upon to help dispel this perception, one of the

many challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and

strengthen the NATO/Russia relationship. This will take hard work

on both sides. Russia and the nations of NATO will have to want

to make the relationship work, which we all have an interest in,

given our—given that our security is bound up with each other.

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The new President of Russia would be pushing on an open door

at NATO if he chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new strategic

partnership.

Thank you very much for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Townsend follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JAMES J. TOWNSEND, JR., DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY PROGRAM, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, it is a great honor and privilege for me to be invited to testify before you and this committee on NATO enlargement and other security issues impacting the broader Euro-Atlantic relationship, recognizing the fact that one cannot

talk about NATO enlargement in isolation from other security issues which will also

shape NATO’s future direction.

The Chairman of the Atlantic Council, GEN James Jones, has brought together

from the U.S. and Europe a group of well-regarded experts and former senior level

government officials well-versed in transatlantic security that he calls his ‘‘Strategic

Advisors Group.’’ This group frequently comes together to work through these issues

and to offer policy recommendations to NATO and allied governments. Many of the

ideas in my testimony grow out of the work of this group. That said, the opinions

expressed here are my own.

NATO Enlargement: Should Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia be invited to join

NATO?

When the alliance began to enlarge again at the end of the cold war, we all knew

the day would come when enlargement would present us with candidates whose histories, geography, and struggles with building democracies and establishing relations with neighbors would bring more complex issues into the debate than we had

to address in the first rounds. The candidacies of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia

to join NATO bring with them both the strengths that come with new members as

well as the complex issues reflecting their history and geography.

Many of the questions and issues about their candidacy are familiar:

• Have these nations successfully used the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to

structure their armed forces to be able to work with allied forces and be ‘‘producers of security, not just consumers’’ and is there civilian control of those

armed forces? • Are the civil societies of these candidate nations based on democracy, rule of

law, and do they have a market economy and civil institutions which foster

these values—and is there broad support in their societies for NATO membership? • Will all NATO nations be prepared to commit to come to these countries’ aid

if they are attacked militarily? • Do the candidates have and can they maintain good relations with their neighbors?

Drawing on the core of what is known as the ‘‘Perry principles,’’ after what Secretary of Defense Bill Perry identified as the standards for new members, these

principles still provide important guidelines for candidates to know what the alliance is looking for in an ally and for allies to consider as they decide on accession.

They also remind allies what those values are that we share and that make the

transatlantic community more than just a treaty construct, but a real community

strong enough to stand the tests of time and tensions, which we have seen in abundance over the past few years.

As we consider whether to invite Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to join us as

allies, how well these nations are doing in meeting these principles can guide our

decisionmaking. All three countries have had reform efforts underway for years in

both their civil and military sectors, shaped by their participation in NATO’s Membership Action Plan, their efforts to meet EU Stabilization and Association Agreements as well as EU membership criteria, and by their work with the U.S. and

other allied nations.

An important indicator of the readiness of these nations to join NATO is whether

their people support membership: Strong majorities in all three countries favor

membership, majorities that should withstand any changing political winds. Levels

of defense spending are another indicator, with levels close to or over 2 percent of

GDP being consistently maintained, which hits the NATO 2-percent target and is

above the level of defense spending for most allies.

On the military side, NATO planners I have spoken with affirm that all three nations have enthusiastically met and implemented most of the military reform sugVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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gestions made to them through MAP and are in better shape militarily than most

of the newest members were when they entered the alliance. Their armed forces

have been downsized and professionalized, obsolete equipment and facilities removed, and brigades reorganized. Croatia has particularly made great strides in

building a deployable and interoperable force. Its Strategic Defense Review has set

a goal of developing ‘‘usable forces’’ with 40 percent of its forces deployable, and 4

percent deployed at any one time. It even hosted a NATO Response Force exercise

last year. All three nations have forces abroad as part of U.N., NATO, or EU missions, including ISAF operations in Afghanistan and operations with coalition forces

in Iraq (Albania and Macedonia).

While such metrics show progress and a clearly positive reform trajectory, there

remains work to do by all three nations, especially on the civil side. But metrics

alone do not provide the justification for why we may want these nations in NATO.

To do that, we must consider their membership in the context of why we bring in

new members and what our experience has been with enlargement since 1999.

Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty says that the parties may invite any other

European states in a position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area (emphasis added). I find the treaty

drafters did a good job of using just a few words to describe what we want a new

ally to be able to do, while leaving enough latitude for future decisionmakers to take

into account the security requirements of their day as they consider new members.

Under article 10, NATO has steadily increased its ranks with nations’ allies concluded would further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to

the security of the alliance. Each decision was made on the merits of the candidate

nation, both their current capability and their future potential. Most importantly,

each decision was shaped by how the decisionmakers of the day interpreted the security needs of the alliance and how that candidate could contribute.

In 1949, as the alliance was going through its first effort to bring in members,

the priority for an allies’ contribution to the security of the alliance was primarily

a military one, given the military threat the West was under from the Soviet Union

and the Warsaw Pact. But even during the cold war, an allies’ contribution to the

security of NATO did not require that each ally provide military forces, given that

one of the first allies, Iceland, did not even have a military force. But despite this

fact, Iceland was welcomed into the alliance because it contributed to alliance security in ways other than by providing military forces (such as political solidarity with

the West and strategic geography).

Since the end of the cold war, the article 10 standards for new allies to be in a

position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of

the alliance took on a new interpretation based on alliance security considerations

of a new time. No longer was the security of the North Atlantic area seen in the

context of facing off against the military threat from the Soviet Union; instead, security was defined in less immediate military/strategic terms but in a more broadly

political/strategic way as assuring stability through the effort to create a Europe

‘‘whole, free, and at peace.’’

Bringing former adversaries into NATO (and the EU) became an important part

of creating this Europe ‘‘whole, free, and at peace’’ and thereby ensuring North

Atlantic security. NATO membership provided assurance of security and hence provided the psychological underpinnings for countries to get on with the business of

democratization and developing liberal, Western economies.

The new allies were given NATO membership not because of their military prowess (though all were expected to modernize their military forces and did so in fits

and starts), but because their membership helped repair the divisions of Europe left

by the cold war. And NATO membership would help these nations develop the potential we knew they had for developing over time the Western military and civil

institutions important to the alliance.

So the alliance grew over the past 10 years: First in 1999 came Poland, Hungary,

and the Czech Republic, followed in 2004 by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,

Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The alliance consensus was that all 10 candidates

met the article 10 standard that they were in a position to further the principles

of the treaty and would contribute to the security of the alliance. They also met the

Perry principles. However, all of these new allies were given membership despite

still having work to do to meet NATO military requirements and complete civil reform efforts at home.

Now, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia are following in the train of those first 10

new members and are being considered for membership after working closely with

NATO for years through membership in the Partnership for Peace and participating

in the Membership Action Plan. But unlike the 10 nations that preceded them just

a few years ago, there is debate about their readiness for membership.

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But we have to consider their candidacy in the same context we used to consider

the latest 10 new members—will their membership contribute to alliance security

by creating a Europe ‘‘whole, free, and at peace’’? Like the 10 nations that preceded

them as candidates, do Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia meet the article 10 requirements, as we interpret them today, that they be in a position to further the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the security of the alliance? Will today’s

NATO allies be willing to honor their article 5 commitments if any of these countries were subject to aggression?

The answer to those questions is that NATO membership for these three is just

as logical, just as consistent with past decisions, and just as important for alliance

security as was membership for the 10 newest allies—if not more so, given alliance

security concerns in their region, especially with Kosovo’s declaration of independence last month.

Bringing in new members to NATO as a way to address European regional security concerns has been an important role for NATO, dating back to the inclusion

of Germany as a member in 1955 as part of an agreement to allow Germany to

rearm. At the end of the cold war, as the West began to deal with simmering ethnic

tensions, NATO’s role as an agent for regional stability became even more useful,

especially in the Balkans.

This newest round of enlargement would also build upon the reasoning behind

Slovenia’s NATO (and EU) membership as the first nation from the former Yugoslavia to join these institutions, which was partially based on the importance of

enhancing regional stability by increasing Slovenia’s clout as a leader in organizing

and promoting regional confidence-building initiatives. NATO and EU membership

for Slovenia also sent a signal to nations in the region, many with ethnic problems

and civil dysfunction like corruption, that reforming domestic laws and institutions

to conform to European standards can lead to integration into European institutions.

Membership in such institutions as the EU and NATO brings peer pressure on

members to act responsibly; nations if left on their own are freer to exploit regional

problems to their advantage. The pressure by peers and by the institutions will

make it very difficult for members to engage in acts that contribute to regional instability. The personal relationships that develop between leaders, and the peer

pressure and institutional help that come from NATO membership, is one reason

why Turkey and Greece have not engulfed the Eastern Mediterranean in war over

the past 60 years.

NATO membership for Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will bring to bear that

historic role of NATO as agent for regional stability as described above. Membership

will give these three nations a focus on regional stability, and the responsibility for

security that comes with NATO membership will make these three nations regional

activists for stability. All three have already demonstrated such efforts through

their work in the Southeast European Defense Ministerial initiatives, participation

in its regional peacekeeping force (SEEBRIG) and leadership hosting PFP exercises

and programs. Finally, like with Slovenia, admission of Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia to NATO will send an important signal to other nations in the region, like

Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, that the door to membership is open to

those nations that accept the values and institutions shared by the allies.

But most importantly, the peer pressure both from fellow allies and from NATO

as an institution will ensure that as the Balkans continue to move beyond its painful and violent transition to a stable and democratic region, these three nations will

themselves ratify their roles as part of the solution to regional issues, and not be

part of the problem. These three nations have shown by their actions that they understand the responsibilities which come with NATO membership, and are already

acting as agents of stability and security in the Balkans.

Europe truly cannot be said to be ‘‘whole, free, and at peace’’ without the Balkan

nations being part of those institutions, NATO and the EU, that produce and guarantee that state. It is illogical to leave these three outside of an integrating Europe

at a time when Balkan tensions can be lessened by adding the presence of three

NATO allies in the region.

However, I am also concerned about the amount of work that remains to be done

and the usefulness of the ‘‘carrot’’ of NATO membership in helping governments

make difficult decisions about reform. My experience with NATO enlargement from

its earliest days is that reform efforts can lose momentum after a nation enters the

alliance, as political imperatives go elsewhere. Increases in military spending and

painful civil reform decisions become harder to make when NATO membership no

longer tops the Prime Minister’s priority list.

Therefore, I would like to recommend to the committee that at the NATO summit

in Bucharest, invitations for membership be extended to Albania, Croatia, and MacVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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edonia. But it should be recognized explicitly that each nation still must meet or

make credible progress toward meeting an achievable but essential capability goal

or goals in civil or military areas. A summit deadline to accelerate civil reform

efforts was used with good effect during the first round of enlargement, when allies

felt aspirant progess in key areas was too slow. If nations do not meet these goals

or if NATO planners cannot certify that significant progress is being made toward

meeting them, then accession to NATO membership is postponed until such time

as progress can be certified.

Timing is key. Invitations extended at Bucharest must then be ratified by each

of the 26 NATO allies, some pro forma and some, like the approval of the U.S. Senate, both rigorous and systematic. While time is short for this ratification period,

which ideally should be completed before NATO’s 60th anniversary summit in 2009

where it is intended that new allies will be welcomed into the alliance, there should

be enough time to begin an intensive effort to make significant progress in important civil areas. I have no doubt that this committee and the full Senate will want

to be assured of that progress.

While I leave the specific capability goals to be determined by NATO planners

and experts, the three nations could use the next year to intensify efforts to make

civil reforms, such as fighting corruption or organized crime, or military reforms to

improve the deployability, sustainability, or interoperability of their forces. The requirement to meet civil-military capability goals for NATO accession should provide

ministries political clout in capitals to meet important goals before the NATO accession process is completed, rather than afterward, when NATO is no longer the

priority.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia should be offered invitations to join the alliance at the Bucharest summit, invitations that will continue

the construction of a Europe whole, free, and at peace. But let us use the time between invitation and accession to initiate an intensive effort to make further

progress toward meeting important objectives in their civil-military reform efforts.

Should NATO offer to Ukraine and Georgia participation in the Membership Action

Plan (MAP)?

Arguments are similarly strong for offering participation in NATO’s Membership

Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. While MAP, in and

of itself, is not assurance of membership, it is a powerful tool when used by planners in MAP countries to accelerate reform efforts, many of which are shaped by

the MAP

Georgia

Since the end of the cold war, NATO has developed a number of ways for nations

to establish a relationship with the alliance short of membership. For example,

membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) offers many nations a way to

tailor their relationship with NATO so that it suits their nation’s ambition and abilities and has always been a necessary way station to NATO membership for those

who want it. The Membership Action Plan, by contrast, is a step beyond PFP and

is offered as a further and deeper relationship with NATO for countries that want

to become members. Work with NATO through MAP helps aspiring members make

those additional civil and military reforms necessary to be considered a viable candidate for membership. But participation in MAP is no guarantee of membership

in NATO, it merely offers a path in that direction . . . the decision is up to the

allies. However, NATO should not offer—and has never in the past offered—MAP

to an aspirant whom allies collectively do not think has the potential for eventual

membership, or to a nation where the people do not want NATO membership.

Georgia has been in PFP since 1994 and took another step toward membership

by beginning an Intensified Dialogue with NATO in 2006. The Georgian people and

government have made clear they would like to join the alliance and Georgia has

made great strides in military and civil reform efforts, illustrated by Georgian forces

deployed in Iraq and in Afghanistan and especially by improvements in the Georgian economy. Participation in MAP will help Georgia continue to make progress in

its march toward membership, especially in judicial reform, where NATO has

stressed the need for a more independent Georgian judiciary. The frozen conflicts

in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia complicate Georgia’s relationship with

NATO and make some allies squeamish about extending MAP. Progress must be

made in finding a solution to these problems, and U.S. leadership in helping Georgia to find a way forward is critical. But as the process toward membership continues, Georgia should not be penalized if it works to resolve these problems and

others do not.

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Georgian aspirations were dealt a blow last November when, in response to opposition protests, a state of emergency was declared and there was violence in the

streets. Efforts at political outreach by the Saakashvili government and upcoming

parliamentary elections this spring may help restore faith that Georgian democracy

is back on track.

The issue of MAP for Georgia should be an easy one: MAP should be extended

to Georgia at the Bucharest summit. If, however, there is not consensus to do so,

I would like to offer a suggestion made by former Ambassador to Ukraine, Steven

Pifer, for NATO at ministerial or ambassadorial level to decide the question of MAP

after the spring parliamentary elections, if allies need reassurance that democratic

reform is working again in Georgia. At a minimum, the alliance could offer a program of intensive military reform assistance to Georgia similar to that between

NATO planners and Ukraine to give Georgian reform efforts a boost until there is

consensus at NATO to offer Georgia participation in MAP.

However, in the minds of some observers, the question surrounding MAP for

Georgia is not just whether it (and NATO) are ready to move to a closer relationship. The question is whether the offer of MAP is worth it if it were to provoke a

harsh reaction by Russia to what it sees as a hostile NATO penetrating into an area

that some Russians still cannot accept as no longer a part of its sphere of influence.

At its root, the issue is not MAP, but what MAP represents—the ability of a sovereign Georgia to decide for itself whether it wants to join a transatlantic institution

that Russia sees, at least here, as encroaching upon its own interests in a way it

regards as unacceptable. Russia has legitimate interests in the security policies of

its neighbors, but has no legitimate reason for concern if those neighbors wish to

join NATO. At the end of the day, the long-term NATO-Russia relationship cannot

be built on the basis of a cordon sanitare between Russia and its NATO neighbors.

The issue is not new. When the three Baltic Republics expressed a desire to join

NATO, there was Russian concern about that as well. But the Baltic nations and

NATO pressed ahead with developing a relationship based on the simple but important truth that the decisions of sovereign nations were theirs alone to make and not

the province of third parties. Georgia as a sovereign nation has the right to seek

NATO membership, and the alliance should make that decision based on its needs

and its criteria.

Ukraine

NATO has a special relationship with Ukraine and even a special committee devoted to developing NATO-Ukraine initiatives—the NATO-Ukraine Commission.

NATO has worked closely with Ukraine for years, and has established an office

there, to develop and implement initiatives that help Ukraine with reform efforts,

especially on the military side.

Participation in MAP is a logical next step for Ukraine, and MAP should be extended to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit. This will take Ukraine one step closer

to NATO membership. Progress in economic reform in Ukraine since independence

in 1991 is impressive, with a growing market economy, foreign investment, and consistently some of the highest growth rates in Europe.

Its military reforms, lacking adequate funding and not keeping pace with reforms

on the more successful civil side, have created smaller, more deployable units that

have deployed abroad, taking part in NATO operations in the Balkans and in coalition operations in Iraq. Ukraine is also one of the few European nations with strategic lift. All indicators show extending MAP to Ukraine at the Bucharest summit

as a logical next step in the NATO-Ukraine relationship.

However, unlike Georgia, support for NATO membership by the Government of

Ukraine has been inconsistent and support for membership by the Ukrainian people

is weak, reflecting the internal divisions in that country over the nature of its relationship with Russia and its Western neighbors. While this lukewarm support for

NATO membership should not be an obstacle to extending MAP to Ukraine, it

makes allies doubt Ukraine’s commitment and ultimate direction toward membership. However, after years of indecision, in January of this year Ukraine’s President,

Prime Minister, and Speaker of the Parliament signed a letter to NATO Secretary

General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer asking to participate in the MAP process.

Low public support for NATO membership has not kept MAP from being extended

to other aspirants in a similar situation, who have used the MAP to help build support in their country for NATO membership. But clearly, successful MAP participation will require on Ukraine’s side not only a clear and unambiguous desire and

commitment to undertake the work that comes with MAP participation, but also

real confidence that that commitment is backed by a broad consensus of the Ukrainian people. The outreach effort in Ukraine will be hard, especially given the difficulty in solidifying support for NATO in the government. Despite this weak supVerDate 11-MAY-2000 19:57 Dec 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 NATO sforel1 PsN: sforel1
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port for NATO membership—which is not the issue here—MAP should be extended

so that reforms can become sharper and more focused, while the Ukrainians sort

out their future relationship with NATO.

But there is a similarity with the Georgian case for MAP, and that is Russia.

Ukraine represents both an emotional and strategic center of gravity for Russians,

and Ukrainian membership in NATO raises for Russians not just misplaced fears

of NATO encroachment on its borders, but a shrinking of what Russian strategists

see as their ‘‘sphere on influence.’’ Like with Georgia, some Russians still have a

hard time adjusting to a sovereign Ukraine. But, Russian pressure should have no

control over the decisions that a sovereign nation like Ukraine should make about

what institutions it wants to affiliate with. Russia should have no veto in Kyiv,

Tbilisi, or in Brussels.

Russia

Good relations with Russia are important for Georgia and Ukraine and for NATO.

One of the great disappointments of the past 10 years is the deterioration in the

relations between Russia and many nations and institutions in the transatlantic

community, even as democracy itself has deteriorated in Russia.

Since Russia joined PFP, the NATO-Russia relationship has been based on practical cooperation, with NATO-Russia joint operations in the Balkans and in Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) in the Mediterranian. A Russian flag officer is even

posted at SHAPE. The NATO-Russia Council, too, meets regularly, but recently

there has not been much movement on joint NATO-Russia initiatives. Just this history of cooperation should demonstrate that Russian perceptions of NATO as a

threat are misplaced and that there is a foundation of cooperation that can be built

upon to help dispel this perception. But the mistrust that has grown recently between Russia and the West has caused us to lose a historic opportunity to work together at NATO to ensure transatlantic security—security just as important to Russia as it is for the other nations of the transatlantic community.

One of the many challenges of the period ahead will be to renew and strengthen

the NATO-Russia relationship. This will take hard work on both sides; Russia and

the nations of NATO will have to want to make the relationship work, which we

all have an interest in given that our security is bound up with each other. This

will call for creative ideas and determined leadership within NATO and in Moscow

to figure out how we can get the relationship moving forward again in a practical

direction.

The new Russian President would be pushing on an open door at NATO if he

chooses to pursue mutual trust and a new strategic partnership. He could begin to

demonstrate such leadership by supporting joint NATO, U.S., and Russian work in

missile defense for Europe.

Afghanistan

In my judgment, a vibrant NATO depends on enlargement to bring in new allies

with energy, new ideas, and capabilities to keep NATO relevant and robust. The

NATO of the future that new allies will join will be shaped by many things, chief

among them the outcome of the international effort to help Afghanistan stand on

its own feet as a sovereign nation and not become a failed or failing state. NATO

plays a critical role in that effort by providing a safe and secure environment for

the international community to assist the Afghans in rebuilding their country, as

well as assisting the Afghan Government in security-related development, including

mentoring Afghan security forces.

The Atlantic Council released an issue brief last month here in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee room that expressed great concern with the state of this

recovery effort in Afghanistan by both the international community (including

NATO) and the Kharzai government. This study was concerned about NATO efforts

because allies were not providing the capabilities requested by military commanders

and lacked a sense of commitment to see the job through.

Mr. Chairman, I will let our study speak for itself, but among the recommendations we made, I would like to highlight the need for a comprehensive strategy that

coordinates the civil and military security and reconstruction effort by the international community in Afghanistan. We recommended that NATO host with the

Afghan Government a conference that pulls together the parties in the international

community (such as the World Bank, the EU, the major NGOs) who are the primary

contributors to Afghan civil reconstruction. Together with NATO, the international

institutions represented at the conference could develop such a strategy. Once completed, this comprehensive strategy could be given U.N. approval and used by the

Afghan Government and U.N. Representative Kai Eide to better coordinate and implement international reconstruction efforts with the Kharzai government. At the

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Bucharest summit, the alliance must address not only the shortfalls in its ISAF

mission in Afghanistan, but its ‘‘Vision Statement’’ on Afghanistan should be strong

enough to move the international community to better organize its reconstruction

efforts as well.

Missile Defense in Europe

A future mission for the alliance that new members will face is missile defense.

At one end of the missile defense spectrum, NATO is considering how best it should

protect deployed NATO forces in theater from missile attack. At a more strategic

level, the United States has embarked on a bilateral—actually trilateral—program

to build a third ballistic missile defense site with elements in Poland and the Czech

Republic to provide most of NATO. Europe with protection from ballistic missile

threats, both today but especially from prospective threats in the future. NATO has

begun internal discussions about expanding NATO’s own planning to include a capability to defend those parts of alliance territory—in southeast Europe and Turkey—that because of proximity to the potential Iranian threat will be outside the

coverage of the Third Site.

The Atlantic Council hosted a conference on the U.S. ‘‘third site’’ effort last year,

and it was clear that most nations, including the two hosts for the site, were anxious to have the U.S. and NATO efforts joined together. Having NATO involved in

an appropriate way in the Third-Site effort helps both host nations build support

domestically for participating in the U.S. project and helps build acceptance more

broadly across Europe and makes clear that the U.S. initiative is genuinely directed

at contributing to multilateral security and is not a manifestation of supposed

American unilateralism. There may be other ways where the U.S. and NATO could

cooperate on European missile defense. NATO and Russia have worked together on

missile defense as well, and it would be a natural fit for NATO, Russia, and the

United States to work jointly on missile defense and so ease the paranoia that has

grown up around the U.S. program, especially in Moscow. Such a joint approach,

should be raised at the Bucharest summit with Russian President Putin should he

participate.

NATO and the New Threats

Another issue that will shape NATO is how it prepares for a future security environment that includes security threats that are not the traditional military ones,

but can have their own destructive impact, such as cyber attack or the use of energy

access as a weapon. Certainly, Estonia considered itself under attack last year when

its cyber space was invaded and computer systems brought down.

These new types of nonmilitary threats to the Transatlantic community call for

a new way of thinking for allies as we consider NATO’s role in dealing with a future

security environment that includes such nontraditional threats as cyber attack and

energy security. These issues are difficult at NATO because there is no agreement

among allies that these threats should even involve NATO. If NATO did become

involved, questions are raised about what NATO could do on a practical basis in

response.

First, energy security needs to be recognized at NATO as a legitimate security

issue for the alliance where it has a role to play; a role perhaps not even imagined

today. Therefore, allies need to think through possible NATO roles in energy security and include them in NATO defense planning. Ensuring energy security can be

an important NATO–EU mission as well, where both institutions have equities at

stake in ensuring the security of their member’s access to energy supplies. Both institutions would bring to the table important tools to provide for that security. For

example, the alliance could work with the EU and with nations to help protect vital

energy infrastructure in Europe which much of Europe depends on for energy transport. Both could also develop together better maritime domain awareness, which

would help NATO and the EU respond to any threats to sea movement of energy

resources. Finally, NATO and the EU could help train the military forces or law enforcement in energy-producing nations where security of energy infrastructure is a

problem.

Summary

In summary, Mr. Chairman, while I have touched on many issues today, they all

involve NATO’s future. I believe bringing Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia into the

alliance is important to NATO’s future, but even more important for stability and

security in Europe, especially in the Balkans. These three cannot rest on their oars

however; they have much work to do. Extending a membership invitation at Bucharest with accession in 2009 made contingent by NATO nations in the ratification

process on their meeting or making progress on priority civil-military capability

goals will help them accelerate their work. I also believe extending MAP to Ukraine

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and Georgia is important for NATO’s future; MAP will help these countries take forward their already impressive reform efforts so that, one day, when NATO membership for these two countries is before this committee, they will be ready.

The NATO that nations continue to want to join as members must remain as

vibrant, relevant, and capable into the future as it was when the North Atlantic

Treaty was drafted and signed in 1949. Those first transatlanticists who drafted the

North Atlantic Treaty wrote a document that continues to speak directly to issues

of security and peace almost 60 years later, when countries unimaginable in 1949

as allies either have joined or are on the cusp of joining the alliance. These new

nations will meet the challenges laid out by the treaty drafters in article 10, and

will be in a position to take forward the principles of the treaty and to ensure the

security of the alliance. I hope Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia will be joined by

other new members over time. But one thing is certain, members, new and old, will

face new threats to that security, and the alliance needs to begin planning for those

new challenges now.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been

a very good panel.

Let me—because you’ve answered, succinctly, a number of the

questions each of us have had, I’m going to focus on two things, if

I may.

One is, let me ask a rhetorical question. If we don’t grant MAP

status to Ukraine and Georgia, what in the devil does that say?

The Russians threaten to target Ukraine and we conclude not to

offer the status? It seems to me it’s almost an overwhelming reason

why you almost have to offer the status. Anybody disagree with

that notion?

Yeah, Ron.

Dr. ASMUS. You know, we—just want to add a dose of European

reality to this conversation, since I live in Brussels. And I’m in

favor of MAP for Ukraine and Georgia, but I would say the chance

of it happening at NATO in Bucharest are about 10 percent today;

and they were zero percent a couple of months ago. And they’ve

only become 10 percent because of the Russians saying the things

they have.

And, when I listen to European colleagues, the first thing is,

many of them don’t—start with the question, Are Georgia and

Ukraine part of Europe? And even some, like Vaclav Havel——

The CHAIRMAN. You said they ‘‘do not start.’’

Dr. ASMUS. They do start with the fundamental question, which

is not fully answered in NATO——

The CHAIRMAN. Gotcha.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. About whether these countries are part

of the Europe that they think should be in the Alliance. And even

a hero of ours, Vaclav Havel—I was stunned—at NATO, gave a

major speech, 2 weeks ago, saying that Georgia is not part of Europe and should never become a member of NATO. Just to show

you how complicated this debate is. Not some soft French or British

or German—Vaclav Havel, freedom fighter hero, saying, ‘‘I think

Ukraine is in, but Georgia isn’t.’’

Second, you know, we have this vision of the nineties that you

all contribute to, and we all helped, Baltic to the Black Sea.

Ukraine and Georgia is not like adding Estonia or Hungary. This

is a major strategic move deep into Eurasia and across the Black

Sea. It’s not just a little bit more of the same, it is a fundamental

strategic move to transform Eurasia, and, you know, a huge part

of what I still think of as Europe. And I’m in favor of that. But,

not all Europeans have crossed that strategic bridge and said, ‘‘Yes,

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we’re going to spend 10 years, again, trying to transform the next

part of Eurasia.’’ And when you—when I go to Berlin—of course,

some people, it is the Russia factor, let’s be honest, Senator—but

there’s a lot of people—when I go to talk to Chancellor Merkel’s adviser—it’s not Russia, it is the—the questions they have about

Misha’s democratic credentials, about the solidity of the Western

orientation of Ukraine, and they say, ‘‘MAP, for us, means a country’s in NATO over the next 3 or 4 years.’’ Now, I disagree with

that. I think we should redefine MAP to get away from this issue,

and we’re not willing to cross that bridge.

So, I think we make it too easy for ourselves if we really want

to convince the Europeans to go down this road with us, which is

what I want to do, to say, ‘‘It’s all because of Russian this, that,

and the other thing.’’ They’re fundamental strategic questions here

that many of us have answered for ourselves, but which haven’t

been fully thrashed out in the Alliance, as a whole, which is why

we don’t have consensus. And if we’re honest—and I—one or two

of you asked the question to, you know, Dan Fried, our good

friend—the United States is not playing a leader—this Government, this administration, at this moment, has not made up its

mind on the question of whether MAP should be granted. I think,

Senator, you were very gentile in the way you put the question.

But, we know that, without strong and assertive American leadership, for months, you’re not going to build this consensus and

achieve this kind of strategic breakthrough that I think everyone

on this panel, and probably the vast majority of your colleagues,

want.

So, this is a big move. It’s a hard move. If we had 6 months to

go, I would have been much more optimistic. But, to think that we

can turn this around in a couple of weeks, unless the President

gets on the phone and really engages, personally, with key leaders,

to move them, I think we’re going to end up with very little for

Georgia and Ukraine, and then people will be asking the question,

Senator, that you asked, in spite of all this stuff; then, the Georgians and Ukrainians are going to be very, very nervous, and we

will understand exactly why they feel vulnerable.

The CHAIRMAN. Phil. And then you, Bruce.

Dr. GORDON. Yes, I’ll—just two very brief points.

Ron is absolutely right that the Europeans, at present, are quite

hostile to this invitation. But, I would remind us all—and those of

us who have watched NATO for a number of years have seen this

so many times—an issue on which the Europeans were uncomfortable, skeptical, and opposed, and eventually, after United States

leadership, came around. And that’s true whether it was enlargement to the initial countries who got in, or to the Baltic States, or

the NATO Response Force, or—earlier, I gave the example of

Afghanistan, where, just a few years ago, it was just—not even a

prospect to imagine NATO doing this mission; and, of course,

NATO has now taken it over. So, I do think that it is possible, with

United States leadership and a bit more help from the Russians,

who are making the case for Ukraine. and NATO, that we could

move this ball.

The second thing I would say, Senator Biden, in response to your

specific question, ‘‘What happens if we don’t?’’—well, here’s what

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happens. Then NATO holds a 60th anniversary summit very early

on in the new President’s administration, and this comes up again,

because, of course, the Georgians and the Ukrainians will ask for

it again. And then we get to be in the position then of saying no

again, which sort of says, well, every time the Russians rattle their

sabers, we say no, or saying yes and being able to begin a new administration by having this crisis with Russia. Not an approach

that I would recommend.

The CHAIRMAN. Well stated.

Bruce.

Mr. JACKSON. Sir, can I suggest that this—a rejection at Bucharest would be even worse than you have sketched out.

One, undoubtedly, President Putin will announce at Bucharest

that, under his administration, he has succeeded in closing

Europe’s open door, and there is now a Russian space of influence.

And, frankly, the world press will undoubtedly agree with him, because it appears to be true.

Second, the EU has said, ‘‘If we wait a little bit more, it’ll be

easier for us.’’ Actually, the reverse is the case. What you cannot

do at Bucharest—Chancellor Merkel is not going to want to do in

Germany, in 12 months; it’ll be harder there. And, frankly—if we

delay—we’re talking about an extended period of time.

Also, this will not be the first rejection for Ukraine, this will be

the second, because we rejected the request of the Kuchma Government on the quality of the government, and on arms traffic issues

at Istanbul. And we said that, ‘‘If you get a democratic government,

conduct free and fair elections, and ask us again in a clear way,

we will say yes.’’ Well, they did. It would be devastating to our

credibility if we said, ‘‘Under those circumstances, where you

have’’——

The CHAIRMAN. Bruce, do you disagree? Ron says that, no matter

what we all say right now, unless somewhere there’s a transformative moment at the White House and the President wakes up

tomorrow morning and decides to make this a priority, that there

is a 10-percent chance that such an invitation will be made. Do

you——

Mr. JACKSON. I always get in awkward situations. But, I think

if you’re making the case that the administration was late to the

game, and does not get fully engaged in the game, I think that’s

a fair criticism, that accounts for——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m not making a criticism, I’m just making

an observation. I mean——

Mr. JACKSON. That’s——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Short of the President deciding this

is critical, this is important for Bucharest——

Mr. JACKSON. Short of that——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Short of him making that clear, is

there any——

Mr. JACKSON. Both Paris and Berlin have said we won’t be the

only one opposing it, you know, if the others agree. They’re still

hiding behind that—if America really wants it, and the rest of the

Europeans come, they will go along. They have said that. Now, the

vote count today is somewhere—we’re short of that position, but

there’s 3 weeks to go.

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I should also point out that, you know, there is a security liability, basically defining a security perimeter. Today we do not have

a dialogue with these countries. That’s devastating. And also, a

point that’s persuasive to President Sarkozy. In the new United

States administration, and in 2009, under the Lisbon Treaty, there

are things we need to talk about, such as energy security and the

Russian relationship. The two countries, we need to participate in

that, are Georgia and Ukraine. We will not be able to begin the

dialogues on energy security without having a relationship with

these countries.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you—my time is up, but let me ask

you one other question. Am I misreading this, or is it likely that

we’re not going to get an agreement negotiated between FYROM—

Macedonia and Greece? Greece is going to veto, if that occurs.

What about the other two? Is it all or none?

Mr. JACKSON. Well, sir, I——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. Right now, it doesn’t look likely. They are going

back again, I guess negotiations are beginning again, but they are

far apart, and, frankly, I didn’t—Senator Menendez isn’t here—the

Greeks have been hardening their position for the last 3 or 4

months, and they don’t really want an agreement. And both governments, both in Skopje and in Athens, are too weak to cut the

Gordian Knot, and both of them need this standoff as a political

plus.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the other two? They’re in? You

mean—you know some are making the argument ‘‘all or none,’’ you

know, the way to put pressure on the Greeks is to say, you know,

‘‘If you veto, you know, Macedonia’’——

Mr. JACKSON. You get into—it seems to me, you’re probably

going to find it’s one or three. You could probably get away with

Croatia, if you wanted to do an entire round for—what is it? Three

million people. But taking only Albanians after Kosovo, and then

leaving out the only multiethnic Slav community in the south, basically, it could break the Ohrid Framework structure.

The CHAIRMAN. Anybody have a view on—I’d like all of your——

Dr. ASMUS. I——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Opinions on that, and——

Dr. ASMUS. Senator, I think——

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Then I’ll cease.

Dr. ASMUS. I think you said it in your opening remarks. You

have to treat these countries as individual countries on their own

merits while then thinking about the regional context. We had this

discussion. There was one point, in the late nineties, where we seriously considered doing two out of three Baltic countries, because

one was falling behind. It scared the bejesus out of the one that

was falling behind, and it caught up again. Thank God it did. And

it was the threat of leaving it behind that scared it. But, this—

Macedonia is hostage to someone that’s a little bit above its head

and its paygrade to being resolved here. I think, in theory, we

should be willing to do A2, but A2—I mean, leave my skepticism

aside for a second—if the goal here is to stabilize the region, the

most fragile country is Macedonia, of these three. So, if you leave

the most fragile country outside and vulnerable, in terms of what

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you’re accomplishing strategically, you know, I—you know, I—because, you know, Macedonia is part of the Albanian/Kosovo, you

know, set of issues. And if that’s what—if that’s what this round

of enlargement is supposed to be about, strategically, then, I think,

you know, you’ve got to bring Macedonia in as part of solving

that—or your contributing to progress on that set of issues.

And——

The CHAIRMAN. But, you can’t bring Macedonia in if the Greeks

say no and it seems pretty clear to me, in my meetings, that it’s

not likely, between now and Brussels, there’s going to be an agreement.

Dr. ASMUS. I think—I have—and I don’t mean this as a—you

know, these are issues—if you want to get these issues right, this

really requires some heavy lifting from our President. You know,

this is a—these are Presidential——

The CHAIRMAN. Ron, I tried.

Dr. ASMUS. You know?

The CHAIRMAN. I tried. [Laughter.]

You know, I mean——

Dr. ASMUS. I mean——

The CHAIRMAN. You know——

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. You’re prodding——

The CHAIRMAN. And we’ve both tried.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. And if you make it absolutely——

The CHAIRMAN. You know, I mean——

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. Positively——

The CHAIRMAN. The hell. [Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS. You know, I think this could be an issue——

The CHAIRMAN. I can’t help you there.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. Like Madrid, that goes—that is unresolved going into Bucharest, into the meeting of heads of state, and

they have to resolve it at, you know, a closed meeting——

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. Just like we had to do that in Madrid.

The CHAIRMAN. I’m sorry, Mr. Townsend. I—you’ve——

Mr. TOWNSEND. Thank you, Senator. Not a problem.

I just wanted to say that, while the issue on the name and—between Greece and Macedonia is a hard one, I will put in a little

bit of optimism, saying, I guess, kind of, what Ron was saying

there, that I have certainly seen, in the past, very, very tough

questions that seemingly look like they’re not going to be resolved

by two countries, that melt away as you get closer to a summit,

particularly if one of those countries wants to become a NATO ally.

So, I certainly expect there will be lots of skirmishing, lots of handwringing in the days to come, but it could very well be, in the day

or so, or maybe even at the summit, as Ron suggested, the doors

will close, and all of a sudden there’ll be a new name that pops out

for what we call ‘‘Macedonia.’’

And one more point, Senator, if I may, with Ron. Ron, I also

lived in Brussels, and, in fact, worked at NATO, where I had to exercise that leadership to move allies that were very reluctant, in

a lot of ways, to move in certain directions. And I think the example of the first round of enlargement is one of those, as we all

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worked on that, and we had a lot of heavy lifting to do, in terms

of leadership.

And I just want to go back, as far as Georgia and Ukraine and

MAP is concerned. It is about U.S. leadership. I think we do have

a strategic window of opportunity here to go to just the Membership Action Plan, and I think we ought to not lose sight of what

we’re talking about here. We always say that, when you into the

MAP, obviously there is—membership is an ultimate goal, but, as

far as MAP is concerned, by itself as a tool, it’s a very strong one

that nations can use to refine and to sharpen their ability to take

on reform. And I think Ukraine and Georgia are there for that.

And it’s—again, it’s a strategic question, here. And I think MAP is

the right way to go. But, we’ll never get there unless we have

strong leadership. We can turn those—the same European nations

that I dealt with, that you’re dealing now with, Ron.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar, I’m sorry for going over.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me just continue on the conversation that you’ve initiated

here. Dr. Asmus and Dr. Gordon, and Bruce Jackson have been

very helpful to both of us for many, many years as we have

thought about the future of NATO and prepared for summits. I recall before the Riga summit, we had a number of dinner discussions with leaders like GEN Jim Jones and others who were working in Europe—our colleagues pointed out that while there wasn’t

a lackadaisical attitude of the Europeans, but there was not an

overwhelming interest in Riga. People were going to show up and

at least record their attendance, sort of like Senators going over to

make sure they vote, but there was no passion for reform, reformation, and what have you. There was nothing really in the offing.

And, therefore, we weren’t going to take up membership questions

at Riga. At Riga, I recall that the greatest news story was whether

President Putin would come. President Chirac reportedly was going

to invite him. And so, the whole area, for 48 hours, was clouded—

will he come, or will he not? You know, the discussion going on

around the table, about Afghanistan was lost, it seems to me, in

translation. Ultimately, President Putin didn’t come, and, therefore, life went on. But, that was the end of the summit.

Now we come around to another one, but this time the suggestion is a more serious one, and we’re talking about membership invitations and the extension of MAPs. And so, that really calls, as

we’ve all said today, for heavier lifting. I’m hopeful that this hearing may be helpful in ensuring that occurs. Our friend Secretary

Fried has testified, that he’s heard us many times. I know he is

working very hard on behalf of the President. But, I think the

President, the Secretary of State, and others, will really have to

focus on this. It’s a short period, but it appears to me that Europeans will once again show up with little initiative. I am just concerned that there will not be a sense of urgency at Bucharest with

regard to membership. I think the future of NATO is countermanded by a feeling that, all things considered, Europe is not at

war and they don’t want to rile up the Russians. President Putin

has been extremely aggressive, to say the least, and he has clearly

threatened European governments with violence should certain actions be taken at Bucharest—almost any action, for that matter.

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Russia, at this point, even though it has a relationship with NATO,

really doesn’t want to have a better one, under his regime at least.

And that’s too bad. We wish that that was not the case.

But, I would say that this has to be a decision on our part—that

is, the United States—as to what we believe is in the transatlantic

interest, including our own security. And if we are lackadaisical

about the situation, and decide that we’ll just show up and things

will just fall into place, I am afraid it will be a disappointing experience. This is especially true given that this was supposed to be

the year of membership action—the disappointment and ramifications of why certain things didn’t happen are more severe.

I would just say, with regard to Ukraine, specifically—all of you

have pointed out, correctly, that not only has Mr. Yanukovych and

his supporters demanded a referendum, so has the President of the

country and Prime Minister Tymoshenko. And you can still, I suppose, take polls in Ukraine that find a majority of people in that

country are not in favor, although they may be more willing to consider it. At the same time, the MAP program is an opportunity for

a dialogue with a very important country.

Some of you have testified, as we have, it would be well if Europe

included Russia. This is not an impossibility. Therefore, Ukraine

should not be out of the question.

Now, Georgia, everyone said, ‘‘Well, that really is provocative.’’

People farther away from Georgia than, say, the Poles, would say,

‘‘You’re really asking for it, there. We didn’t want to come to a

summit just to have an argument, and then, worse still, to see

President Putin, the next day, issuing threats that generally censure our activities. This is just a mess.’’

I am afraid that is where we’re headed, without leadership on

the part of our country, defining what we believe is in our own security interests and those of Europe, and trying to be more persuasive to countries that may feel their stake in all of this is not that

great.

I want to emphasize the energy picture. When I was in Ukraine,

Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan we discussed

about how Europe might gain a degree of security if some of the

natural gas and oil moved along a southern course through the

Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline or various other pipelines that are

suggested going into Europe. The Russians responded rapidly.

President Putin was on the phone with the President of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and concluded a very large agreement,

which doesn’t obviate other possibilities, but is a symbolic step.

This represented personal diplomacy on Putin’s part. Likewise, 3

weeks after I was in the region, Bulgaria and Serbia reached an

agreement with Russia that included turning over 50-percent control of their pipelines to Gazprom.

While we’re quibbling over NATO membership, the realities are

that the energy situation is being solved to the detriment of

Europe. These countries are choosing to conclude bilateral agreements with Russia. It has become a bilateral situation, an existential problem for individual countries. So, it’s all well and good to

have a NATO Alliance. The fact is, the whole thing might crumble,

simply because the individual countries have these very, very

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tough energy problems they have to solve if they’re going to have

economies at all, and Russia is the answer.

And, finally, Russia is the answer, because it’s wealthy. It’s

wealthy because it has the natural gas and the oil. It is not because it developed a sophisticated economy, a rule of law, courts,

all the rest of it. It found more gas and oil. And it will have a lot

more, as a matter of fact.

So, those are the realities that need to be discussed at the summit. This really isn’t even on the agenda. It’s always said to be an

EU issue, ‘‘We don’t deal with economics in NATO.’’ Well, why not?

You know, if there was ever a security issue or that threatened the

future of these countries, energy is it.

So, this is my own opportunity to give a statement, a point of

view. But, I ask if any of you have any reaction to all of this.

The CHAIRMAN. By the way, before you do, I rest my case why

he should be Secretary of State.

But, go ahead, answer the questions. [Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS. Senator, I think—I suspect many of us agree with

you. And, as I think Bruce pointed out, if you want an energy security policy, Ukraine and Georgia have got to be part of it. But, I—

you know, I think—you know, we’re at this, sort of, awkward

moment in the Alliance, where, you know, this administration’s

coming to an end, some of the damage has been repaired, some of

it hasn’t. Europeans are also, let’s be honest, calculating, ‘‘How

much do you invest in this last summit,’’ versus waiting for the

next President? Do we save the big moves for the first summit

with—I mean, there’s a lot of political calculation going on. And,

I mean, Phil and I were just in Moscow together, and I have—we

had some meetings together, and I had one very interesting one,

where Phil couldn’t join me. The Foreign Ministry called me in late

at night, and wanted to talk about Bucharest. And I was very curious to see what their agenda was, because it goes to a lot of these

issues. Well, you know, they were—first, they were going to make

their views on Kosovo well known to the Alliance. OK. I understood

what that means.

And then they said, ‘‘Well, you know, no MAP for Ukraine and

Georgia is a precondition for the President coming—the President’s

coming.’’

And I said, ‘‘Well, what does that mean?’’

And they said, ‘‘Well, we don’t expect any surprises, and we’ve

been assured there won’t be any surprises.’’

And I said, ‘‘Well, what does that mean?’’ You know?

And they said, ‘‘A3’’—they said, ‘‘we don’t care. We don’t care

about A3. But, Ukraine and Georgia are red lines. No visit if

there’s movement on there, but our assessment is, you will do nothing.’’

And he said, ‘‘When—and our big goal is to do a deal with Bush

on missile defense.’’ That’s the Russian priority for Bucharest. And,

you know, that’s a different agenda.

And I look at that and say, ‘‘Well, how do I reconcile that with

what I hear in Brussels and what I hear in Washington? And

where are we going to be? And could we—could this be a very exciting, interesting, controversial—in other words, messy—summit?’’

Absolutely. What are we headed into? And do we really have this

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thing under control so that we can take steps that we can build on,

you know, with the next administration?—et cetera, et cetera. I—

the pucker factor is going up to——

[Laughter.]

Dr. ASMUS [continuing]. To use an old Midwestern expression.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you.

Dr. GORDON. Can I just say to Senator Lugar, your—we’ve talked

about this a number of times—your leadership on the energy issue

has been formidable, and your arguments always compelling. I

think you know the reaction to your statement as well or better

than we do, which is, as compelling as the arguments are, the

Europeans, as I think you pointed out, can’t even agree among

themselves—I mean, they say, ‘‘No; this is an EU matter. Don’t get

NATO into it.’’ But, they won’t even do it as the EU. Every single

time Russia has offered a national gas deal to a European country,

they have taken it. So, I think, you know, again, that—it would be

terrific if we could add energy to the Bucharest summit and get

people to do it. It’s not going to happen at Bucharest. Maybe it’ll

wait until you’re Secretary of State to show leadership on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, I thank you very, very much. Your

testimony is always helpful. I hope folks down the street were listening. And I hope we figure out what it is this Bucharest summit

is about.

But, at any rate, thank you very much.

We’re adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the enlargement and effectiveness of NATO.

This is certainly a timely hearing. In 3 weeks, leaders of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) will meet at a summit in Bucharest, Romania, to address issues critical to American national security and the future of the Euro-Atlantic community. NATO leaders must seize this opportunity to strengthen transatlantic ties, augment alliance members’ contributions to common missions and

continue to build the integrated, stable, and prosperous Europe that is a vital interest of the United States.

A top priority for the summit must be to reinforce NATO’s critical mission in

Afghanistan. The contributions there of all the NATO allies alongside more than a

dozen other countries bear testimony to how the alliance can contribute to the 21st

century missions that are vital to the security of the United States and its allies.

NATO’s involvement provides capabilities, legitimacy, and coordination in Afghanistan that simply would not be available if NATO did not exist.

Success in Afghanistan is vital to the security of the United States, to all NATO

members and to the people of Afghanistan. NATO’s leaders must therefore send an

unambiguous message that every country in NATO will do whatever needs to be

done to destroy terrorist networks in Afghanistan, to prevent the Taliban from returning to power, and to bring greater security and well-being to the Afghan people.

This will require adequate numbers of capable military forces and civilian personnel

from NATO members, and putting more of an Afghan face on counterinsurgency operations by providing more training and resources to the Afghan National Army and

police forces, and by embedding more Afghan forces in NATO missions. We must

also win long-term public support through assistance programs that make a difference in the lives of the Afghan people, including investments in infrastructure

and education; the development of alternative livelihoods for poppy farmers to undermine the Taliban and other drug traffickers; and increased efforts to combat corruption through safeguards on assistance and support for the rule of law.

86

Success in Afghanistan will also require the removal of restrictions that some

allies have placed on their forces in Afghanistan, which hamper the flexibility of

commanders on the ground. The mission in Afghanistan—legitimized by a United

Nations mandate, supported by the Afghan people, and endorsed by all NATO members after the United States was attacked—is central to NATO’s future as a collective security organization. Afghanistan presents a test of whether NATO can carry

out the crucial missions of the 21st century, and NATO must come together to meet

that challenge. Now is the time for all NATO allies to recommit to this common

purpose.

The summit must also address the question of the alliance’s expanding membership. NATO’s enlargement since the end of the cold war has helped the countries

of Central and Eastern Europe become more stable and democratic. It has also

added to NATO’s military capability by facilitating contributions from new members

to critical missions such as Afghanistan.

NATO enlargement is not directed against Russia. Russia has an important role

to play in European and global affairs and should see NATO as a partner, not as

a threat. But we should oppose any efforts by the Russian Government to intimidate

its neighbors or control their foreign policies. Russia cannot have a veto over which

countries join the alliance. Since the end of the cold war, Republican and Democratic administrations have supported the independence and sovereignty of all the

states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and we must continue to do

so. President Putin’s recent threat to point missiles at Ukraine is simply not the

way to promote the peaceful 21st century Europe we seek.

NATO stands as an example of how the United States can advance American national security—and the security of the world—through a strong alliance rooted in

shared responsibility, and shared values. NATO remains a vital asset in America’s

efforts to anchor democracy and stability in Europe, and to defend our interests and

values all over the world. The Bucharest summit provides an opportunity to advance

these goals and to reinforce a vital alliance. NATO’s leaders must seize that opportunity.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DEMINT, U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

Chairman Dodd, Ranking Member Lugar, I want to thank you for holding this

hearing today and moving forward quickly with the protocols of membership for

Albania and Croatia. I am excited by the prospects of these two nations joining

NATO, but I must also express my disappointment that Macedonia was not invited

at the Bucharest summit. It is unfortunate that the security of Europe must take

a back seat to other issues—especially at a time like this.

Over the last several weeks we have seen a remarkable shift of events in Eastern

Europe and a reemerging Russia that should make us all take pause. Clearly, the

expansion of NATO is in the best interests of Europe and the United States, but

more importantly it is a matter of security and safety for our friends and allies in

Eastern Europe.

As we all know, no one is ever forced to join NATO, in fact if a nation wants to

become a member, they must work diligently to live up the standards of NATO,

make changes to their political and military structures, and meet other benchmarks.

For this reason, I reject the notion some have made that NATO enlargement is

designed to threaten the security of other nations. Rather it is these nations that

fear a weakening of their power and influence because they offer little in the way

of prosperity and security. There may be a lot of tinsel and wrapping, but there is

no substance they can offer. Their power is based on nothing more than threats and

coercion. In this world of competing interests, the prosperity and security of the

West are far more appealing than the old tired habits of propaganda, corruption,

and oligarchs.

Hence, each country has the right to choose if they want to side with the U.S.

and Western Europe or with Russia and the East, but if they choose the West we

should not feel constrained by the tirades of former KGB officers. We cannot, and

should not, abandon the desires of a sovereign nation to protect and defend their

own freedom.

We have seen the security that NATO can provide. In 2004 we welcomed Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania into the alliance. The same countries that once fell under the

Soviet ‘‘sphere of influence,’’ are now conveniently excluded from the sphere of influence that Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev speak of today. We should

not erect fences to others who wish to follow in their footsteps.

In fact, it is the newest members of NATO that have been some of the most powerful voices and, through their example, models to their older counterparts of what

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it means to confront threats and challenge aggression. They do not place caveats

on their forces like other NATO members, and they are willing to make the case

to their citizens about NATO’s missions and why it is important to fight. These

newer members bring a fresh perspective that is healthy for the alliance.

And that brings us to the central point. Under U.S. leadership, NATO has been

and remains the preeminent guarantor of security in Europe. We should not allow

the alliance to be diluted or challenged by other organizations and policies that duplicate the structures of NATO, but remove the voice of the United States and other

allies. This is especially true when rival organizations will call on the equipment

and resources the United States provides.

I am especially concerned that these discussions are particularly distracting when

there is a lack of consensus on the strategic threats that face Europe and NATO.

Without a strategic focus, no organization can be successful for long. And despite

the very real threat of terrorism in Europe, many NATO members feel the war on

terror in Afghanistan is not worth their time or effort. While some in Europe ignore

the terror threat, there are emerging threats to Europe’s energy security. Russia is

hording oil and gas and building a network of pipelines to encircle and individually

manipulate each European country.

Countries like Albania and Croatia, know all too well the threats that can emerge

quickly and need to be vigilant. Their voices in NATO will serve the interests of

NATO and Europe well. They have provided leadership and demonstrated their

commitment to the security and stability of Europe. It is time we welcome our close

friends into NATO.

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