This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3

v. NO. 35,238 4 RICKY RAY HELT, 5 Defendant-Appellant. 6 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY 7 Gary L. Clingman, District Judge 8 Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General 9 Santa Fe, NM 10 for Appellee 11 L. Helen Bennett 12 Albuquerque, NM 13 for Appellant 14 MEMORANDUM OPINION 15 HANISEE, Judge. 16

{1} Defendant appeals his convi ction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, 17 asserting that his right to a speedy trial wa s violated. We previously issued a notice 182 of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to dismiss based on 1 Defendant’s apparent failure toreserve the right to appeal . [CN 2-3, 5] Defendant has 2 filed a memorandum in opposition in which heasserts he did enter a conditional plea 3 reserving the right to appeal the speedy trial issue and that a transcript of the plea 4 proceeding would reflect this. [MIO 1] We w ill assume the truth of this assertion and 5 proceed on that basis. See generally State v. Hodge , 1994-NMSC-087, ¶¶ 14, 21, 118 6 N.M. 410, 882 P.2d 1 (observing that although a guilty plea generally operates as a 7 waiver of the right to appeal, “an appellate court can pardon th e informalities of a 8 conditional plea so long as the record demons trates that . . . the defendant expressed 9 an intention to preserve a particular pretrial issue for appeal and that neither the 10 government nor the district court opposed such a plea” (internal quotation marks and 11 citation omitted)); Bustillos v. Constr. Contracting , 1993-NMCA-142, ¶ 2, 116 N.M. 12 673, 866 P.2d 401 (“We accept as true the undisputed assertions of fact stated in . . . 13 memoranda in opposition to our calendar notices.”). 14

{2} In our notice of proposed summary dispos ition, we indicated that we perceived 15 little merit to Defendant’s speedy trial claim. [CN 3-5] We explained that the limited 16 record before us reflected that this case could properly be characterized as a case of 17 intermediate complexity, [RP 73] and th e fifteen-month delay did not surpass the 18 applicable threshold. [CN 4] In his memorandum in opposition, Defendant contends 19 that this should be characterized as a simplecase, and as such, the delay should be said 203 to exceed the threshold by three months . [MIO 4-5] Without a more complete 1 development of this question on the record , we are disinclined to adopt Defendant’s 2 view. See generally State v. Rojo , 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 53, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 3 829 (“Where there is a doubtful or defici ent record, every presumption must be 4 indulged by the reviewing court in favor of the correctness and regularity of the 5 [district] court’s judgment.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); State v. 6 Manzanares , 1996-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 798, 918 P.2d 714 (“The question of 7 the complexity of a case is be st answered by a [district] court familiar with the factual 8 circumstances, the contested issues and available evidence, the local judicial 9 machinery, and reasonable expectations fo r the discharge of law enforcement and 10 prosecutorial responsibilities.”); State v. Jim , 1988-NMCA-092, ¶ 3, 107 N.M. 779, 11 765 P.2d 195 (“It is [the] defendant’s burden to bring up a record sufficient for review 12 of the issues he raises on appeal.”). 13

{3} Ultimately, even if we were to assume that this case should be characterized as 14 simple, we remain unpersuaded that Defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated. 15 At most, the length of the delay was three months beyond the threshold. [MIO 5] This 16 factor weighs only slightly in Defendant’s favor. See State v. Wilson , 17 2010-NMCA-018, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 706, 228 P.3d 490 (stating thatdelay of five 18 months beyond the guideline for a simple case was not so extraordinary or protracted 19 as to compel weighing the length of delay f actor against the state more than slightly). 204 Only administrative or negligent delay is suggested, [MIO 5] which does not weigh 1 heavily in Defendant’s favor. See State v. Samora , 2016-NMSC-031, ¶ 11, 387 P.3d 2 230 (observing that negligent or administrativ e delay must be considered because the 3 ultimate responsibility rests with the state, although such delay is not weighed as 4 heavily). Insofar as Defendant did not a ssert the right until he filed his motion to 5 dismiss, [RP 65] the third factor weighs only slightly his favor. See State v. 6 Suskiewich, 2016-NMCA-004, ¶ 24, 363 P.3d 1247 (concluding that this factor 7 weighed only slightly in the defendant’s favor where he did not make an explicit 8 demand for trial or assertion of his right before a motion to dismiss was filed). With 9 regard to the fourth and final factor—p rejudice—Defendant merely suggests that he 10 might have been inconvenienced by “hav ing to attempt to locate and identify 11 witnesses,” [MIO 6] and assert s in a generalized fashion th at delays may cause anxiety 12 and a variety of “societal” harms. [MIO6-7] Because this does not amount to a 13 substantiated claim of particularized ha rm, it cannot be regard ed as a showing of 14 prejudice. See State v. Valencia , 2010-NMCA-005, ¶ 29, 147 N.M. 432, 224 P.3d 659 15 (observing that a particularized showing of prejudice is required, and where the 16 defendant did not substantiate either any particular impairment to his defense or any 17 other cognizable form of prejudice, this Court would not indulge his speculative 18 claim). This is a fatal deficiency. See State v. Montoya , 2011-NMCA-074, ¶ 24, 150 19 N.M. 415, 259 P.3d 820 (observing th at a defendant’s failure to make an affirmative 205 showing of particularized prejudice preclude s a determination that his speedy trial 1 right was violated where the other three factors weigh only slightly against the state); 2 State v. Garza , 2009-NMSC-038, ¶ 40, 146 N.M. 499, 212 P.3d 387 (holding that 3 where the other factors do not weigh heav ily in the defendant’s favor and the 4 defendant has failed to demons trate particularized prejudi ce, we cannot conclude that 5 the right to a speedy trial was violated). We therefore conclude that Defendant’s 6 speedy trial claim was properly rejected. 7
{4} Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we affirm. 8

{5} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

__________________________________ 10 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 11 WE CONCUR: 12

_________________________________ 13 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 14

_________________________________ 15 STEPHEN G. FRENCH, Judge 16