IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0191

Filed May 22, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF A.W., J.B., and K.W.,

Minor Children,

T.L., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Joan M. Black, 

Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three children. 

AFFIRMED.

Kristin L. Denniger, Mount Vernon, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Sue Kirk of Arnott & Kirk, PLLC, Iowa City, attorney and guardian ad litem 

for minor children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

The mother appeals termination of her parental rights to three children: A.W. 

(born 2014), J.B. (2020), and K.W. (late 2022). (The children have different 

fathers, each of whose rights were also terminated; none of the fathers appeal.) 

After reviewing the history of this case—including the ups and downs of the 

mother’s progression and regression—we affirm.

Background Facts and Proceedings. The Iowa Department of Health 

and Human Services (HHS) began investigating the family in early 2022 for two 

reasons. First, a report from the mother’s probation officer that the mother kept 

marijuana in the home in a place accessible to the children. And second, a report 

from another source that the mother left the children in the care of an intoxicated 

family member and had not arranged to pick them up. 

An HHS worker conducted a safety assessment of the mother’s home and

discovered a child’s training “potty” filled with feces and urine on the ground in the 

living room, a plastic fork in a child’s crib, and a knife on the kitchen counter. 

During this assessment, J.B. fell off a bed and the mother “flung” the child by one 

arm back onto the mattress. HHS had also confirmed that A.W. was truant and 

rarely attended school. The mother was uncooperative with this assessment, 

much as she had been during previous HHS encounters, including one report of 

A.W. ingesting marijuana. She yelled profanity at the worker in front of police and 

children and resisted releasing information or participating in services. 

At the time of this assessment, the mother was on probation for child 

endangerment and assault. Her other criminal history mostly consists of nonviolent offenses such as theft, providing false identification information, trespass, 
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criminal mischief, harassment, and public intoxication. And she had a history of 

prior involvement with HHS, including a confirmed child-abuse assessment in 

2018. She had violated probation multiple times and had at least one outstanding 

warrant as of the assessment. In late February, the mother was jailed—on a 

probation violation and new charges—for two weeks. 

HHS attempted to arrange family preservation services after her release;

the mother made an appointment but then wasn’t home when the worker arrived 

at the scheduled time. About a month later, the mother no-showed for a meeting 

with her probation officer. The mother failed to appear at court hearings removing 

the children from her care and adjudicating them as children in need of assistance 

(CINA). The children were placed with their maternal grandmother.

Following adjudication, the mother participated in some services and 

attended some weekly visits with her children. But providers noted she was not 

meaningfully engaged with the children and talked on her phone through visits. 

She remained “very angry” that the children had been removed. The mother’s 

participation gradually improved somewhat, she obtained new housing, and she 

completed a substance abuse evaluation. 

The mother appeared in court for the first time at the permanency hearing. 

The juvenile court granted the mother six months of additional time to work toward 

reunification, and the court expressed “optimism” that a “corner had been turned” 

and the family could reunify successfully. But the court also ordered the mother to 

complete a psychological evaluation and follow any recommendations. The 

mother gave birth to K.W. shortly after, and she progressed to semi-supervised 
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visitation with the other children. Providers observed generally improved visits, 

including the mother interacting with A.W. about school and homework. 

In late 2022 and early 2023, police responded to multiple domesticdisturbance calls originating from the mother’s home. HHS became concerned 

that family members were smoking marijuana in the mother’s home and that K.W.’s 

father had an altercation with the mother while she was holding the infant. When 

HHS attempted to investigate, the mother was again uncooperative and would not 

allow the department access to K.W. 

The juvenile court ordered K.W.’s removal. At the hearing, the mother 

admitted other adults were smoking marijuana in her home while K.W. was present 

and that she had been in a violent confrontation while holding K.W. She 

specifically admitted to biting and stabbing K.W.’s father with a key in front of the 

child. The juvenile court observed that the mother blamed police for not obtaining 

a no-contact order between herself and K.W.’s father. And the court found a “lack 

of insight” on the mother’s part, in that she did “not . . . grasp the significance of 

her inability to display protective capacity towards her children.” 

Before K.W.’s removal, the mother had progressed to overnight visits with 

A.W. and J.B. But after the issues that prompted removal of K.W., visits returned

to fully supervised. Initially these visits did not go well, with the mother refusing to 

engage and leaving at least one visit after only ten minutes. The situation improved 

some over time, but the mother continued to struggle with her mental health. A 

provider noted some issues with the mother’s inattentiveness, including her paying 

attention to one child while another was trying to eat candy out of the trash can 

and playing with scissors. And the mother struggled to supervise all three children 
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on her own. HHS informed the mother she needed to attend therapy to address 

her “anger and aggression,” work on “healthy relationships,” and discuss “her 

choices that lead to her children not being safe with her.” 

The State petitioned to terminate the mother’s rights to all three children, 

but then moved to continue the scheduled trial and requested authorization for a 

trial home placement in light of the mother’s recent progress. The trial home 

placement never happened, despite HHS efforts to make arrangements with the 

mother. Around the same time, the grandmother moved out of state and the 

children were moved to foster placements. As the HHS worker put it, things “went 

downhill” after the grandmother moved. The HHS worker opined the grandmother 

was “doing a lot more work” than anyone realized. 

Although the mother was scheduled for overnight visits in August, the visits 

were cancelled because the mother was not home when the visits were scheduled 

to begin, and she became combative with HHS. The mother shouted and cursed 

at workers, and she withheld information about her whereabouts, schedule, and

who was living with her. She also resisted engaging with mental-health therapy, 

only attending two sessions. 

Visits returned to fully supervised after these setbacks, and the mother’s 

participation again grew inconsistent. She stopped attending most of the children’s 

medical appointments and refused to approve therapy for one of the children—

requiring HHS to step in with court approval. She similarly refused to sign visitation 

expectations. The court appointed special advocate (CASA), who had previously 

supported reunification, changed her recommendation to termination.
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The mother testified at trial and described her housing and employment 

situation. She explained that she worked third shift, but—as the juvenile court put 

it—“[h]er testimony got confusing when the topics of her work schedule and 

childcare were raised.” At one point, when unable to explain how she could care 

for the children after an all-night shift without another person to help or childcare, 

the mother said she had “trained” her body to not need sleep. When asked how 

she was trying to improve her mental health, she said “definitely not therapy,” 

which she described as “pointless.” She also admitted she was required to attend 

domestic violence programming but had not done so. In response to a question 

about whether the children could be safely placed with her, the mother responded 

“umm, maybe, yeah” and gave meandering answers about people that could 

potentially help provide childcare while she worked. When her attorney asked if 

she would cooperate with HHS going forward, the mother said: “I guess.” 

Overall, the juvenile court described the mother’s trial testimony as 

“somewhat combative and impatient,” noting at times the mother “appeared angry 

and frustrated” or “emotional.” In an exchange the juvenile court described as 

“enlightening,” the mother discussed her interactions with the children during visits 

and explained, “I’m grown; I’m an adult. I’m not going to play with little kids’ toys

and sit and pretend.” The mother also said she did not think her inconsistent visits 

and erratic behavior over the life of the case had any effect on the children, even 

though workers and the guardian ad litem (GAL) recognized that the children were 

upset or “devastated” over missed visits. Despite this, the mother acknowledged 

her “attitude” had been a problem. She also described her bond with the children,

which the juvenile court ruling noted when describing the mother’s “deep and 
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abiding love for [her] children.” The mother ended her testimony by declaring: 

“What more do you all want? Because I’ve done everything already.”

HHS workers testified that the mother had progressed and regressed 

throughout the case. The workers identified the key points of regression as the 

domestic-violence incident with K.W.’s father, the grandmother moving away, and

the mother reacting poorly to an HHS meeting after missing more than a month of 

visits. A worker described the mother’s behavior at that meeting as “out of control,”

“cussing after every sentence,” and “very, very angry.” 

The department identified the mother’s mental-health issues—and related 

inability to regulate her emotions, temper her anger, or accept feedback—as the 

biggest barrier to reunification. According to the department, these concerns were 

almost entirely unaddressed: the mother did not consistently attend mental-health 

therapy, wouldn’t sign case plan expectations or provide a work schedule, and 

overall refused to engage in services that would remedy parenting deficits. The 

mother also resisted mental-health and speech therapy for the children, 

contending “they don’t need those services.” 

The county attorney, the children’s GAL, the CASA, and HHS all 

recommended termination of parental rights at trial. The juvenile court terminated 

the mother’s parental rights to A.W. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2023), 

and to J.B. and K.W. under section 232.116(1)(h). The mother appeals, and we 

review de novo. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021).

Statutory elements as to A.W. and J.B. The mother first challenges 

termination of her rights to A.W. and J.B. under section 232.116(1)(f). The court 

terminated the mother’s rights to J.B. under paragraph (h), not paragraph (f), based 
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on the child’s age (three years old at the time of termination). Compare Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(1)(f)(1), with id. § 232.116(1)(h)(1). But we recognize our analysis of 

the mother’s argument as to A.W. applies equally to J.B.

The only element the mother challenges is whether the children could be 

returned to her custody at the time of trial. See id. § 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4). This 

is the entirety of her argument:

Regarding the case at hand, [the mother] believes that her 

children can absolutely be returned to her care. She testified at the 

termination trial that she has stable housing, they have rooms to 

come home to, she has a plan to get them to school and to care for 

them. [The mother] does not feel that the State has proven by clear 

and convincing evidence that A.W. and J.B. cannot be returned to 

her at the present time.

Much like in her testimony at trial, the mother fails to reckon with the core concerns 

preventing reunification: her mental-health struggles, unreliability and 

disorganization (particularly when it came to arranging childcare), failure to engage 

with services, and lack of insight into how her lack of progress endangered her 

children. The mother also fails to address her struggles to provide adequate care 

for the children on her own during two-hour visits, which forecasted poorly for fulltime care. The mother’s “plan” to care for the children was, at best, confusing.

And we note at the time of trial the mother had regressed for a second time to fullysupervised visits because of her behavior, which generally weighs against her 

argument the children could safely be returned to her immediate care. As the GAL 

put it in her report, “Cancelling visits weeks before the termination trial really shows 

that the children are not a priority.” We agree with the juvenile court A.W. and J.B.

could not safely be returned to the mother’s custody as of trial.
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Statutory elements as to K.W. The mother first questions whether K.W. 

was “actually adjudicated” CINA as to the mother. See id. § 232.116(1)(h)(2). We 

appreciate the candor displayed by the mother’s attorney, as she acknowledges 

that all involved understood a written adjudication had been entered. This is 

confirmed by the juvenile court’s termination ruling, which specifically indicated that 

adjudication was ordered on April 17, 2023. We agree with the mother that no 

formal written adjudication was entered as to her. But, because CINA 

adjudications are child-specific rather than parent-specific, and there is no question 

K.W. was adjudicated with reference to K.W.’s father, we discern no reversible

error on this basis. See In re S.G., No. 22-1248, 2022 WL 10804241, at *3 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2022) (“A child is either in need of assistance or is not, and the 

request for adjudication is either granted or denied accordingly. There isn’t a 

separate adjudication for each parent.”).

The mother also separately challenges whether K.W. could be returned to 

her custody as of the termination trial, and we reject this claim for the same reasons 

we rejected it as to A.W. and J.B.

Best interests. The mother contests whether termination was in the best 

interests of the children. On review, we give primary weight “to the child’s safety, 

to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, 

and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa 

Code § 232.116(2). 

The mother argues that removal was traumatizing for the children, and HHS 

“should have forgiven her outburst at the meeting and followed through with the 

original plans for trial home placement.” To the extent this is an adequate best-
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interests argument, we reject it. As the State observes in its response to the 

mother’s petition, this is “one of those unfortunate cases in which a parent 

progresses and regresses, the progress is not enough to have the children 

returned to their care, and matters simply reach a point at which the child’s best 

interests command permanency and stability.” See In re I.S., No. 20-0976, 2020 

WL 6481088, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2020). The need for stability is 

particularly strong here, where the mother has already squandered a six-month 

extension of time and a continuance of the termination trial, and is no closer to 

reunification today—indeed, perhaps farther—than she was when additional time 

was granted. We also recognize the record shows the children were upset when 

the mother failed to follow through on planned visits, which highlights the need for 

stability in the future. Consistent with the arguments made by the CASA and GAL, 

we find termination in these children’s best interests.

Permissive bond exception. A single sentence of the mother’s petition 

urges she believes “irreparable harm will come to the children’s mental health if 

that bond is now severed permanently.” To the extent that sentence was intended 

to invoke appellate review of the permissive bond exception, this “sprinkled” 

mention of an issue without analysis is insufficient. See, e.g., In re J.R., 

No. 22-1470, 2023 WL 2148760, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2023). And even if 

the claim was properly briefed, we would reject it because the mother has not 

carried her burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that any harm 

caused by severing the bond outweighs the stability and safety afforded by 

termination and adoption for the reasons we have already expressed in this 

opinion. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c) (the statutory permissive bond 
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exception); In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 225 (Iowa 2016) (noting we consider the

parent-child bond in the context of a case’s unique circumstances and the child’s 

best interests). 

AFFIRMED.