1

NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

DAVID RAYMOND EDWARDS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0238

FILED 03/11/2014

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015CR201101261

The Honorable Derek C. Carlisle, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Myles A. Braccio

Counsel for Appellee

Mohave County Legal Defender’s Office, Kingman

By Diane S. McCoy

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. EDWARDS

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 David Raymond Edwards appeals his convictions and 

sentences for possession of marijuana and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Edwards argues the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress evidence seized from his home pursuant to a search 

warrant. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In October 2011, Peter McCluney was arrested and found in 

possession of marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and narcotic pills. The 

arresting officers notified the Bullhead City Police Department’s narcotics 

bureau of the arrest, and Officer Marvin Harris interviewed McCluney, 

who admitted possession of the drugs and paraphernalia and reported 

that he purchased the marijuana from Edwards. McCluney explained that 

he purchased several ounces of marijuana from Edwards every month, 

sometimes weekly. McCluney informed Officer Harris that “Edwards 

would have anywhere from two pounds to as high as twenty one pounds 

of marijuana at his residence at one time.” 

¶3 Officer Harris drove McCluney to Edwards’ neighborhood 

and McCluney identified Edwards’ former and current residences located 

on the same street. Officer Harris drove McCluney down the street twice, 

and McCluney identified Edwards’ current residence both times.

¶4 Following the interview, Officer Harris learned that 

Edwards had a previous conviction for possession of marijuana. Officer 

Harris also determined that the contract for utilities for the residence 

McCluney identified was in Edwards’ wife’s name. Based on this 

information, and the interview with McCluney, Officer Harris submitted a 

probable cause affidavit and obtained a search warrant for Edwards’ 

residence.

¶5 Police officers executing the search warrant at Edwards’ 

residence found drug paraphernalia and more than a pound of marijuana.
STATE v. EDWARDS

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The State charged Edwards with one count of possession of marijuana for 

sale, a class four felony, and one count of possession of drug 

paraphernalia, a class six felony. 

¶6 Edwards filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from 

his residence, arguing that the affidavit supporting the search warrant 

failed to demonstrate McCluney’s reliability and that the warrant was 

therefore invalid. The State responded that the search warrant affidavit 

set forth sufficient probable cause to support the warrant. The State 

further argued that, even if the search warrant affidavit was facially 

invalid, the officers acted in good faith and therefore the motion to 

suppress should be denied. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, 

the trial court denied Edwards’ motion to suppress, finding “there was 

sufficiently reliable information” in the affidavit to establish the necessary 

probable cause and the officers acted in good faith even if probable cause 

was lacking.

¶7 The matter proceeded to trial and a jury found Edwards 

guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury acquitted him of 

possession of marijuana for sale, but convicted him of the lesser-included 

offense of possession of marijuana. At sentencing, the court suspended 

imposition of a sentence and placed Edwards on probation for a period of 

three years. Edwards timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Edwards argues that the trial court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress. He contends that the seized evidence should not 

have been admitted because the search warrant was deficient and the 

police officers lacked good faith in executing it.

¶9 “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

requires that search warrants be issued only upon a showing of probable 

cause supported by oath.” State v. Collins, 21 Ariz. App. 575, 576, 522 P.2d 

40, 41 (1974); U.S. const. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrant shall issue but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”). The Arizona 

Constitution provides similar protections. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8 (“No 

person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, 

without authority of law.”). 

¶10 In determining whether the requisite probable cause exists, 

the “task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 

affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of 
STATE v. EDWARDS

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persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The duty of the reviewing court, 

then, is “to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for 

concluding that probable cause existed.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

¶11 We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Crowley, 202 Ariz. 80, 83, ¶ 7, 41 P.3d 618, 

621 (App. 2002). “[W]e defer to the trial court’s factual determinations, 

but the ultimate ruling [whether suppression of evidence is warranted] is 

a conclusion of law we review de novo.” State v. Box, 205 Ariz. 492, 495, 

¶ 7, 73 P.3d 623, 626 (App. 2003). “We restrict our review to consideration 

of the facts the trial court heard at the suppression hearing.” State v. 

Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 631, 925 P.2d 1347, 1348 (1996). Search warrants 

are presumed valid and the defendant carries the burden of proving the 

invalidity of the warrant. Crowley, 202 Ariz. at 83, ¶ 7, 41 P.3d at 621; see 

also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2(b) (explaining that the State has the burden of 

proving the lawfulness of all evidence to be used at trial, but if such 

evidence is obtained by a valid search warrant, it is the defendant’s 

burden to establish a “prima facie case that the evidence taken should be 

suppressed”).

¶12 Edwards first contends the search warrant was defective 

because it was predicated on information provided by an informant 

lacking personal knowledge. Citing State v. Williams, 184 Ariz. 405, 407, 

909 P.2d 472, 474 (App. 1995), for the proposition that “an unreliable 

informant who lacks personal knowledge cannot provide probable cause,” 

Edwards argues the warrant lacked sufficiently specific detail to establish 

McCluney’s personal knowledge and to demonstrate that the information 

was not stale. 

¶13 “An affidavit relying on hearsay is not to be deemed 

insufficient . . . so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is 

presented.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-42 (internal quotation omitted). An 

officer may validly “rely upon information received through an 

informant, rather than his direct observations, so long as the informant’s 

statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer’s 

knowledge.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). When “an informant is 

right about some things, he is more probably right about other facts,” 

including claims regarding illegal activities. Id. at 244. “It is enough, for 

purposes of assessing probable cause, that corroboration through other 

sources of information reduced the chances of a reckless or prevaricating 

tale, thus providing a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.” Id. at 
STATE v. EDWARDS

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244-45 (internal quotation omitted). Corroboration of “entirely innocent 

activity” may be sufficient to demonstrate probable cause. Id. at 245 n.13. 

¶14 Contrary to Edwards’ argument, the affidavit in this case 

demonstrates McCluney had personal knowledge that Edwards possessed

drugs at his residence. As set forth in the affidavit, McCluney purchased 

several ounces of marijuana from Edwards at least monthly and, at times,

on a weekly basis. Although not expressly stated, the affidavit also 

implied that McCluney had purchased drugs from Edwards for an 

extended period of time, as demonstrated by McCluney’s knowledge of 

the location of Edwards’ previous residence and the length of time 

(approximately ten years) Edwards occupied that home. Edwards 

correctly notes that the affidavit did not specify when McCluney 

purchased marijuana from Edwards, but McCluney’s disclosures

regarding the duration and frequency of his purchases, in addition to his 

statement that Edwards kept “anywhere from two pounds to as high as 

twenty one pounds of marijuana” at his residence at any given time, 

established that “there [wa]s a fair probability that contraband or evidence 

of a crime [would be] found” at Edwards’ home. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238. 

¶15 Before applying for a search warrant, Officer Harris drove 

McCluney to Edwards’ residence to verify that McCluney knew its 

location, and Officer Harris confirmed that Edwards occupied the home

by checking the named party responsible for the utilities to the property 

(Edwards’ wife). In addition, Officer Harris checked Edwards’ criminal 

history and discovered that he had a previous conviction for possession of 

marijuana. McCluney’s information, as corroborated by independent 

police investigation, was sufficient to establish probable cause for the 

warrant.

¶16 Edwards also argues that McCluney lacked credibility and 

therefore the warrant is invalid. We disagree. In general, a named 

informant is “more reliable than an anonymous . . . tipster [because] the 

former runs the greater risk that he may be held accountable if his 

information proves false.” United States v. Salazar, 945 F.2d 47, 50-51 (2d 

Cir. 1991). Here, McCluney’s identity was clearly known to police and set 

forth in the affidavit. Edwards contends, however, that McCluney’s 

motivation in providing information to the police was suspect because, as 

disclosed at the suppression hearing, McCluney expressed great concern 

to Officer Harris that his wife could be charged with a crime and, 

although Officer Harris was certain he never offered McCluney “anything 

himself,” the officer could not recall whether he had made any assurances 

with regard to McCluney’s wife. It is not clear from this record whether 
STATE v. EDWARDS

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McCluney received any promises on behalf of his wife, but even assuming 

he was offered favorable treatment in exchange for his statements, this 

would not render them per se unreliable. United States v. Patayan Soriano, 

361 F.3d 494, 505 (9th Cir. 2004). In Patayan Soriano, the court noted an 

offer of favorable treatment to an informant and explained that the 

informant “was presumably motivated to provide information after his 

arrest out of hope that his cooperating would result in more lenient 

treatment for himself by the authorities. [The informant] could not 

achieve that goal if he gave false information, so the circumstances in 

which he provided the information further served to corroborate its 

reliability.” Id.; see also United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971)

(“That the informant may be paid or promised a ‘break’ does not eliminate 

the residual risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal conduct.”);

United States v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (noting that an 

admitted criminal participant has strong incentive to tell the truth because 

“should he lie to the police,” he “risks disfavor with the prosecution”). 

¶17 Additionally, an informant’s inculpatory statements may 

demonstrate credibility. Patayan Soriano, 361 F.3d at 505-06 (explaining 

that reliability may be demonstrated by an “admission against penal 

interest”) (internal quotation omitted). Here, McCluney admitted 

possession of the drugs and drug paraphernalia found on his person. 

Although Edwards correctly notes the police already had substantial 

evidence McCluney committed those crimes, McCluney’s admissions 

were nonetheless incriminating. And, McCluney’s information regarding 

Edwards in no way exculpated him from possession charges. We 

conclude McCluney’s status as a named informant, his motivation to 

cooperate with the police to procure favorable treatment for himself and 

his wife, and his incriminating statements were sufficient to establish his 

credibility as an informant.

¶18 Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the record 

supports the trial court’s finding that McCluney was a reliable and 

credible informant. Accordingly, because probable cause existed for the 

search warrant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Edwards’ motion to suppress.1

 

1 Edwards also argues the warrant was so lacking in probable cause 

that the good-faith exception to the warrant requirement does not apply. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3925. Because we conclude the warrant was 

supported by probable cause, we need not address this argument.
STATE v. EDWARDS

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CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, Edwards’ convictions and 

sentences are affirmed.