alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 21.1



SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT



|                                             |  |                      
|-------------------------------------------- |  | ---------------------
|NAME                                         |  | STATE OF ORGANIZATION
|US Oncology Corporate, Inc.                  |  | Delaware             
|AOR Real Estate, Inc.                        |  | Delaware             
|RMCC Cancer Center, Inc.                     |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Indiana, Inc.      |  | Delaware             
|AOR Holding Company of Indiana, Inc.         |  | Delaware             
|AOR of Indiana Management Partnership        |  | Indiana              
|AOR Management Company of Oregon, Inc.       |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Missouri, Inc.     |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Arizona, Inc.      |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Oklahoma, Inc.     |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Pennsylvania, Inc. |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Virginia, Inc.     |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of New York, Inc.     |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Texas, Inc.        |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Ohio, Inc.         |  | Delaware             
|AOR Management Company of Kansas, Inc.       |  | Delaware             
|AORT Holding Company, Inc.                   |  | Delaware             
|AOR of Texas Management Limited Partnership  |  | Texas                
|AOR Synthetic Real Estate, Inc.              |  | Delaware             
|Greenville Radiation Care, Inc.              |  | Delaware             
|Physician Reliance Network, Inc.             |  | Delaware             
|US Oncology Research, Inc.                   |  | Texas                
|Physician Reliance Holdings, LLC             |  | Delaware             
|PRN Physician Reliance, LLC                  |  | Texas                
|Physician Reliance, L.P.                     |  | Texas                
|Michigan Pharmaceutical Services, LLC        |  | Delaware             
|Iowa Pharmaceutical Services, LLC            |  | Delaware             
|New Mexico Pharmaceutical Services, LLC      |  | Delaware             
|California Pharmaceutical Services, LLC      |  | Delaware             
|Washington Pharmaceutical Services, LLC      |  | Delaware             
|North Carolina Pharmaceutical Services, LLC  |  | Delaware             
|SelectPlus Oncology, LLC                     |  | Delaware             
|Florida Pharmaceutical Services, LLC         |  | Delaware             
|Nebraska Pharamaceutical Services, LLC       |  | Delaware             
|Alabama Pharmaceutical Services, LLC         |  | Delaware
No. 00-7200.

#### Rodriguez v. United States.

C. A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Hibbing Taconite

 2010 performance testing

o Line 1 – 56.0 lb SO2/hr

o Line 2 – 63.0 lb SO2/hr

o Line 3 – 64.0 lb SO2/hr

o With all lines operating at their limits, total would be 183 lb/hr

 Facility suggested following limits:

o Line 1 – 720 lb SO2/day [equivalent to 30 lb SO2/hr]

o Line 2 – 1912 lb SO2/day [equivalent to 80 lb SO2/hr]

o Line 3 – 1032 lb SO2/hr [equivalent to 43 lb SO2/hr]

o With all lines operating at their limits, total would be 153 lb SO2/hr

 State set BART at 0.207lbs SO2/LT for each line

o State cites report with Hibbing production rate of 384 LT fired pellets/hr, so 

State’s limit would be equivalent to 80 lb SO2/hr for each line

o With all lines operating at their limits, total would be 240 lb SO2/hr

 Propose following limits on a 30 day rolling average:

o Line 1 – 56.0 lb SO2/hr

o Line 2 – 63.0 lb SO2/hr

o Line 3 – 64.0 lb SO2/hr
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

══════════

No. 18-0431

══════════

TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, PETITIONER,

v.

RODERICK LYDELL BONNER, RESPONDENT

══════════════════════════════════════════

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

══════════════════════════════════════════

JUSTICE BOYD, concurring.

I agree with the Court that (1) Bonner’s claims arise from the County’s conduct “in 

connection with” an inmate treatment activity and (2) no evidence exists that the County acted 

intentionally, with willful or wanton negligence, or with conscious indifference or reckless 

disregard for the safety of others. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE § 42.20(a); TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 497.096. But I do not agree that (1) conscious indifference is “the same as” gross negligence or 

(2) a person cannot be consciously indifferent to a risk that is less than “extreme.” Ante at __; see 

Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 21 (Tex. 1994) (explaining that for gross negligence to 

exist, “the defendant must be ‘consciously indifferent’ and his or her conduct must ‘create an 

extreme degree of risk’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Williams v. Steves Indus., Inc., 699 S.W.2d 

570, 573 (Tex. 1985)).1 And I would not address whether the Tort Claims Act waives the County’s 

 

1 See also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 41.001(11) (defining gross negligence as an act or omission that 

(1) objectively “involves an extreme degree of risk” and (2) the actor proceeds to perform “with conscious 

indifference” despite an “actual, subjective awareness of the risk”).
2

immunity from a claim based on the County storing the chair in the multipurpose room because 

(as the Court explains) Bonner does not assert that claim. Ante at __. I respectfully concur in the 

Court’s judgment.

_____________________

Jeffrey S. Boyd

Justice

Opinion delivered: May 24, 2019
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5


<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1999
<CASH>                                                 414
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                            0
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                              0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                       414
<PP&E>                                                   0
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                         702
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                    0
<BONDS>                                                  0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                    0
<PREFERRED>                                              0
<COMMON>                                               885
<OTHER-SE>                                               0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                           702
<SALES>                                                  0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                         0
<CGS>                                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          213
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                        18
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                       0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                       (231)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                   (231)
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                          0
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                          (231)
<EPS-BASIC>                                         0.00
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         0.00





</TABLE>
COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS

JOE ANTONY CABRAL , Appellant ,

v . THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

. § § § § § § No. 08

- 1 9

- 00 0 4 8

- C R

Appeal from the
409 th District Court

o f El Paso C ounty, Texas (TC# 201 80D01243 )

MEMORANDUM OPINION This appeal is before the Court on its own motion to determine whether it should be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction . Finding that the order denying Appellant’s motion to recuse the trial judge is not subject to an interlocutory appeal, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction

. This Court’s jurisdiction is derived from the Texas Constitution which provides that the courts of appeals have appellate jurisdiction “under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law.” T EX .C ONST
. art. V, § 6(a). Consequently, a party may appeal only that which the Legislature has authorized. Olo wosuko v. State , 826 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Article 44.02 provides that a defendant in any criminal action has the right of appeal under the rules hereinafter prescribed. T EX .C ODE C RIM .P ROC .A NN
. art. 44.02. This statutory right of appeal
h as been interpreted as allowing appeal from a final judgment of conviction. Se e State v. Sellers ,- 2

-

790 S.W.2d 316, 321 n.4 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Ex parte Culver , 932 S.W.2d 207, 210 (Tex.App.

-

- El Paso 1996, pet. ref ’ d) . The courts of appeals do not have j urisdiction to review interlocutory orders unless that jurisdiction has been expressly granted by law. Apolinar v. State , 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Culver , 932 S.W.2d at 210. Rule 18a(j) expressly provides: “An order denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion on appeal from the final judgment.” T EX .R.C IV .P. 18a(j)(1)(A) ; s ee Leija v. State , 456 S.W.3d 157, 158 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015)(“When a motion to recuse a trial judge is denied, review occurs only after final judgment in the trial court.”). The Clerk of the Court sent Appellant notice that the Court intended to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because there is no final judgment or appea lable order

. Appellant ’s response does not address the issue of jurisdiction. Citing Leija , the State argues that the Court does not have jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order denying Appellant’s motion to recuse. We agree with the State. A c c ordingly, we dismiss the attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice February 20 , 2019 Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ. (Do Not Publish)
#### C. Paul JACKSON, Appellant, v. ATLANTA BRAVES, INC., a Delaware corporation, and City of West Palm Beach, a municipal corporation, Appellees.

No. 1879.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.

Sept. 22, 1969.

Rehearings Denied Occ. 29, 1969.

Larry Klein, of Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, McKeown & Dell, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

John R. Beranek, of Jones, Adams, Paine & Foster, West Palm Beach, for appellee Atlanta Braves, Inc.

Peter T. Fay, of Frates, Fay, Floyd & Pearson, Miami, for appellee City of West Palm Beach.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff below, C. Paul Jackson, from a summary final judgment entered in favor of the defendants, Atlanta Braves, Inc. and the City of West Palm Beach, Florida. The complaint charges that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide an adequate screening behind home plate in a municipal stadium owned by the City and leased to the Atlanta Braves, Inc. As a consequence, the complaint alleges, the plaintiff was struck by a foul ball which was tipped over the vertical backstop behind home plate. The complaint alleges that at the time of the accident the plaintiff as a business invitee was seated in the stadium behind home plate during the public exhibition of a baseball game played by a team owned by the defendant Atlanta Braves, Inc.

We have thoroughly reviewed the briefs of the parties and the record on appeal. While there does not appear to be substantial conflict in the evidentiary facts, it appears to us • that various conclusions reasonably might be drawn as to the ultimate factual issues of negligence, contributory negligence, and assumption of *64risk. The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. See Jones v. Stoutenburgh, Fla.1956, 91 So.2d 299, and Weber v. Porco, Fla.1958, 100 So.2d 146.

Reversed.

CROSS, C. J., REED, J., and BOOHER, STEPHEN R., Associate Judge, concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to the requirement set forth in Rule 13a-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the
Exchange Act) and Section 1350 of Chapter 63 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 U.S.C. §1350), Paul Hawran, Principal Financial and Accounting Officer of Sequenom, Inc. (the Company), hereby certifies that,
to the best of his knowledge:



| | 1. | The Companys Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2008, to which this Certification is attached as Exhibit 32.2 (the Quarterly Report)
fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d), of the Exchange Act, and
| | -- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition of the Company.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or its staff upon request.

This certification accompanies the Form 10-Q to which it relates, is not
deemed filed with the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the date of the
Quarterly Report), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.

IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, the undersigned has set their hands hereto as of the 31st day of July, 2008.



/s/ Paul HawranPaul HawranChief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
# L_2020079EN.01000101.xml

| 16.3.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 79/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 79/1

---

DECISION (EU) 2020/400 OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES

of 11 March 2020

appointing an Advocate-General to the Court of Justice

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 19 thereof,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Articles 253 and 255 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | Pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and following the death of Mr Yves BOT, an Advocate‐General should be appointed to the Court of Justice for the remainder of the term of office of Mr Yves BOT, which ends on 6 October 2024. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pursuant to Articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and following the death of Mr Yves BOT, an Advocate‐General should be appointed to the Court of Justice for the remainder of the term of office of Mr Yves BOT, which ends on 6 October 2024.

| (2) | Mr Jean RICHARD DE LA TOUR has been nominated for the vacant post. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Mr Jean RICHARD DE LA TOUR has been nominated for the vacant post.

| (3) | The panel set up by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has given an opinion on the suitability of Mr Jean RICHARD DE LA TOUR to perform the duties of Advocate‐General of the Court of Justice, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The panel set up by Article 255 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has given an opinion on the suitability of Mr Jean RICHARD DE LA TOUR to perform the duties of Advocate‐General of the Court of Justice,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Mr Jean RICHARD DE LA TOUR is hereby appointed Advocate‐General of the Court of Justice for the period from 23 March 2020 to 6 October 2024.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 11 March 2020.

The President

M. CLAUSS

---
**EXHIBIT 15.1**

 

Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form F-3 No. 333-141489) on Form F-3 and related Prospectus of Progen Pharmaceuticals Limited of our report dated December 22, 2010, with respect to the consolidated financial statements of Progen Pharmaceuticals Limited included in this Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended June 30, 2010.

 

 
| /s/ Ernst & Young |
|----------------------------|
| Brisbane, Australia        |
| December 22, 2010     |

 

----
#### William J. FORBES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida and Louie L. Wainwright, Director, Division of Corrections, Respondents.

No. 38320.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 23, 1969.

Rehearing Denied May 23, 1969.

William J. Forbes, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and James McGuirk, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of habeas corpus. We issued the writ and have considered the return of the Attorney General and the attached exhibits. It now appears that the contentions of the petitioner are without merit. The writ of habeas corpus heretofore issued is discharged and petitioner is remanded to custody.

It is so ordered.

ERVIN, C. J, and ROBERTS, DREW, ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
**CERTIFICATION
      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**


**AS
      ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE**


**SARBANES-OXLEY
      ACT OF 2002**






In
      connection with the Quarterly Report of Diatom Corporation, a Nevada corporation
      (the "Company"), on Form 10-QSB for the third quarter ended September 30, 2006
       as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, J.
      Dan Sifford Sole Officer/Director of the Company, certify, pursuant to 906
      of
      the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350), that to my
      knowledge:






(1)
      The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2)
      The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:
      November 13, 2006






/s/J.
      Dan Sifford


J.
      Dan
      Sifford


Sole
      Officer/Director
Electronically Filed Intermediate Court of Appeals CAAP-10-0000181 26-FEB-2016 08:47 AM
[Federal Register Volume 62, Number 168 (Friday, August 29, 1997)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 45962]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 97-22831]



Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 168 / Friday, August 29, 1997 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 45962]]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Office of the Chief Financial Officer

7 CFR Parts 3015, 3016, and 3050

RIN 0505-AA09


Audit Requirements for OMB Circular A-128

AGENCY: Office of the Chief Financial Officer, USDA.

ACTION: Withdrawal of proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On October 17, 1995, USDA published a proposed rule (60 FR 
53717) to simplify USDA audit requirements for State, local, and Indian 
Tribal governments that receive USDA financial assistance. USDA is 
withdrawing that proposed rule because the amendments to Parts 3015 and 
3016 and the proposal to establish a new Part 3050 refer to audit 
requirements that have been replaced by the Single Audit Act Amendments 
of 1996. The updated audit requirements for USDA are published 
elsewhere in this Federal Register.

DATES: The proposed rule is withdrawn as of August 29, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Patricia Wensel, Director, Office of 
the Chief Financial Officer, Planning and Accountability Division, 202-
720-1175.

List of Subjects

7 CFR Part 3015

    Accounting, Grant programs--Agriculture, Indians, Insurance, 
Intergovernmental relations, Loans programs, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements.

7 CFR Part 3016

    Accounting, Grant programs--Agriculture, Indians, Intergovernmental 
relations, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

7 CFR Part 3050

    Accounting, Indians, Intergovernmental relations, Grant programs--
Agriculture.

    Issued at Washington, D.C., on August 21, 1997.

    Approved:
Irvin T. David,
Acting Chief Financial Officer.
Dan Glickman,
Secretary of Agriculture.
[FR Doc. 97-22831 Filed 8-28-97; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-KS-P
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF

THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Adolor Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Stephen W. Webster, Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



|                                                          
|----------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Stephen W. Webster                                    
|Stephen W. Webster                                        
|Senior Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer
|July 30, 2009
#### Hiram STRICKLAND, as Tax Assessor of Manatee County, Florida, et al., Appellants, v. W. R. GRACE & CO., a Connecticut corporation, Appellee.

No. 69-169.

District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District.

Sept. 3, 1969.

Robert E. Knowles of Knowles, Mann & Blalock, Bradenton, for appellant Hiram Strickland.

Robert J. Boylston of Goodrich, Hampton & Boylston, Bradenton, for appellants G. E. Johnson and Dan P. McClure, Board of County Commissioners and Fred O. Dickinson.

Frank Bezoni of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed on authority of Matheson v. Elcook (Fla.App.3d 1965), 173 So.2d 164. *See*also, our recent decision in Walden v. Borden Co. (Fla.App.1969), 221 So.2d 771.

PIERCE, A. C. J., and MANN and McNULTY, JJ., concur.