UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-5263

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DIFANKH ASAR, a/k/a James Walter Gist,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Spartanburg. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Senior 

District Judge. (7:10-cr-00429-GRA-1)

Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: May 8, 2012

Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Andrew J. Johnston, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant. 

William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, William J. Watkins, 

Jr., Maxwell B. Cauthen, III, Assistant United States Attorneys, 

Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Difankh Asar pled guilty to one count of possession of 

a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony offense. 

The district court determined that Asar had three prior 

convictions for violent felony offenses and sentenced him under 

the armed career criminal provisions to 180 months imprisonment. 

Asar appeals, contending that he had only two qualifying violent 

felonies, and that the district court erred in determining that 

his prior convictions for pointing or presenting a firearm and 

for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature were 

qualifying violent felonies. We affirm.

A defendant qualifies as an armed career criminal if

he violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006) and has three prior 

convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2006). A violent felony is one that “has as 

an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 

force against the person of another . . . or otherwise involves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B); U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2(a) (2009). This court reviews de novo 

the district court’s determination that a prior conviction 

qualifies as a “violent felony.” See United States v. Green, 

436 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 2006).
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Asar challenges the district court’s determination 

that his two convictions for pointing a firearm, S.C. Code Ann. 

§ 16-23-410, constituted “crime[s] of violence” under 

§ 4B1.2(a)(1). The statute in question criminalizes:

(i) pointing or presenting; (ii) a loaded or unloaded firearm; 

(iii) at another person. State v. Burton, 589 S.E.2d 6, 8 (S.C. 

2003).

This court has held that pointing a firearm is a crime 

of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2), the career offender provision.

United States v. Byrd, 400 F. App’x 718, 720-21 (4th Cir. 2010), 

cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1835 (2011); United States v. Thompson, 

891 F.2d 507, 509-10 (4th Cir. 1989). The Guideline defining 

“crime of violence” under the career offender provision mirrors 

the definition of “violent felony” under the armed career 

criminal provisions, and therefore the court “rel[ies] upon 

precedents evaluating whether an offense constitutes a violent 

felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act [ ] interchangeably 

with precedents evaluating whether an offense constitutes a 

crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2(a).” United States v. 

Clay, 627 F.3d 959, 965 (4th Cir. 2010).

We conclude, therefore, that the district court 

correctly determined that Asar’s two offenses of pointing a 

firearm at another constituted violent felonies and were 

properly found to be predicate offenses for the armed career 
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criminal sentencing enhancement. See Byrd, 400 F. App’x at 721 

(holding that pointing or presenting a firearm under S.C. Code 

Ann. § 16–23–410, “constitutes a ‘crime of violence’ under 

§ 4B1.2(a)(2), even after Begay [v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 

(2008)]”).

In light of this determination and because Asar 

conceded that he had two other predicate violent felonies — for 

burglary and armed robbery — he had three predicate violent 

felony convictions and thus qualified for armed career criminal 

status. We therefore need not address Asar’s challenge to the 

district court’s determination that the assault and battery of a 

high and aggravated nature conviction also qualified as a 

predicate violent felony.

Accordingly, because the district court correctly 

determined that Asar had at least three prior convictions for 

violent felonies and thus qualified to be sentenced as an armed 

career criminal, we affirm Asar’s 180-month sentence. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED