IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHARLIE EAKLE, :

:

Plaintiff : CIVIL NO. 4:CV-04-1526

:

v. : Judge Jones

:

FRANKLIN TENNIS, :

 Superintendent, et al., :

:

Defendants :

ORDER

September 15, 2005

Charles Eakle (“Plaintiff” or “Eakle”), an inmate presently confined in the Smithfield

State Correctional Institution, in Huntingdon, Pennsylvania, filed this civil rights action

filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His complaint centers around several alleged

constitutional violations which occurred while he was confined in the Rockview State

Correctional Institution. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he found a piece of metal in his

food on April 13, 2004, and that he was threatened by a corrections officer when he

attempted to report the incident. He also alleges that several corrections officers used

“shockguns” and lasers to torture him on several occasions. Named as Defendants are

the following employees and entities of SCI-Rockview: Program Review Committee

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1. Defendants originally filed the Motion as a Motion to Dismiss. However, because

matters outside of the record would be considered in deciding the Motion, by Order

dated January 25, 2005, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss was converted into a Motion

for Summary Judgment. (Rec. Doc. 24). 

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(“PRC”); Superintendent Franklin Tennis; Deputy Superintendent Gregory Gaertner,

Ph.D.; Deputy Superintendent Joel Dickson; Former Deputy Superintendent Anthony

Biviano; Program Manager Ray Coffman; Corrections Counselor Michael Knapp;

Lieutenant Dale Walker; and Corrections Officers Timothy Watson, and Timothy

Gensamer. Presently pending before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (“the Motion”). (Rec. Doc. 17).1 The Motion is fully briefed and is ripe for

disposition. Defendants assert entitlement to the entry of summary judgment in their favor

because Eakle failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. For the reasons set

forth below, the motion will be granted.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) requires the court to render summary

judgment “ . . . forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some

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alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of

material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis

in original). 

A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect

the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of

material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514,

United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d

Cir. 1991).

When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must

view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Moore

v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 963

F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56,

59 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party

may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. When the party

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2. Eakle was provided with copies of M.D. Pa. Local Rules 7.1 through 7.8, Local

Rule 26.10, and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). In relevant part, Rule 56(e)

states:

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as

provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse

party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must

set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If

the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party. 

Local Rule 7.4 provides in relevant part:

All material facts set forth in the statement required

to be served by the moving party will be deemed to be

admitted unless controverted by the statement required

to be served by the opposing party.

(See doc. 6, Standing Practice Order).

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seeking summary judgment satisfies its burden under Rule 56(c) of identifying evidence

which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party

is required by Rule 56(e)2to go beyond the pleadings with affidavits, depositions,

answers to interrogatories or the like in order to demonstrate specific material facts which

give rise to a genuine issue. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

The party opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is some

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metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith

Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). When Rule 56(e) shifts the burden of production to

the nonmoving party, that party must produce evidence to show the existence of every

element essential to its case which it bears the burden of proving at trial, for "a complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp.,

967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). 

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On April 13, 2004, while housed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) at SCIRockview, Plaintiff claims that Officer Hagg placed a piece of metal in the food on

Plaintiff’s lunch tray.(Rec. Doc. 1 at 2). Further, Plaintiff alleges that while picking up the

lunch trays, Officer Hagg threatened Plaintiff, stating that if he “did not stop acting like

a female, he would kill [Plaintiff].” (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2). 

On April 24, 2004, Plaintiff spoke with Lt. Vance about the incident. Plaintiff

claims that Lt. Vance confiscated the piece of metal and gave Plaintiff a confiscation

receipt, claiming that the piece of metal would be put in the evidence safe in the security

office. (Rec. Doc. 1 at 2).

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On May 10, 2004, Plaintiff wrote a letter the Superintendent, concerning the April

13, 2004, incident. He claims to have received no response. (Rec. Doc. 1 at Ex. 1).

On June 4, 2004, Plaintiff sent a letter to the members of the SCI-Rockview PRC,

informing them of “all the times Officer Hagg and other officers had taken shockguns,

mirrors, and lazorlights” to try and “force [him] to change [his] feminine ways.”(Rec.

Doc. 1 at Ex. 1). On June 10, 2004, Plaintiff spoke with two members of the PRC, who

informed him that they would investigate. (Rec. Doc. 1 at Ex. 1) Plaintiff, was

subsequently released from the RHU, and transferred to SCI-Smithfield on June 17, 2004.

(Rec. Doc. 1 at Ex. 1). 

On June 17, 2004, upon his arrival at SCI-Smithfield, Plaintiff filed Grievance No.

88108, regarding the food contamination incident, the use of stun guns and incidents

relating to mail tampering, which occurred while he was housed in the SCI-Rockview

RHU. (Rec. Doc. 20 at Ex. 1-A). Attached to his grievance were copies of letters that

were allegedly sent to the SCI-Rockview Superintendent and the PRC. (Rec. Doc. 20 at

Ex. 1-A). 

On June 29, 2004, the SCI-Smithfield Grievance Coordinator returned Plaintiff’s

grievance to him. (Rec. Doc. 20 at Ex. 1-B). Although it was clear from the grievance that

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the alleged food contamination incident occurred sometime before May 10, 2004, it was

impossible to tell when the remaining incidents occurred. (Rec. Doc. 20 at Ex. 1, Aff. of

Jeffrey Rackovan, SCI-Rockview Grievance Coordinator, at ¶ 6). Thus, the Grievance

Coordinator returned Eakle's grievance to him due to: (1) his failure to submit the

grievance within fifteen (15) calendar days of the food contamination incident; and (2) his

failure to state the dates on which the mail tampering and excessive force events occurred.

(Aff. of Jeffrey Rackovan, at ¶ 6). Eakle did not resubmit the grievance with supporting

dates or appeal the decision of the Grievance Coordinator to the Superintendent, or the

Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals. (Aff. of Jeffrey Rackovan, at ¶ 6).

On July 14, 2004, Plaintiff filed the instant action in which he seeks compensatory

and punitive damages and to “prevent [defendants] from any other forms of harassment.

(Rec. Doc. 1 at 3). 

DISCUSSION

Defendants contend that Eakle's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies

entitles them to an entry of summary judgment in their favor. In pertinent part, the Prison

Litigation Reform Act provides:

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No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

Exhaustion requires completion of the entire administrative process. See Ahmed

v. Sromovski, 103 F. Supp. 2d 838, 843-44 (E.D. Pa. 2000). If a prisoner fails to follow

the required administrative procedures, including meeting deadlines, the inmate’s action

cannot be maintained. See Buckner v. Bussanich, No. 1:CV-00-1594, slip op. at 6 (M.D.

Pa. April 3, 2001) (Caldwell, J.)(“an administrative remedy is not made unavailable simply

because a prisoner failed to timely exercise his rights under the procedure. Otherwise, the

prisoner could avoid the exhaustion requirement simply by refusing to pursue

administrative remedies”).

The Pennsylvania DOC has established procedures for the filing of complaints.

First, the Pennsylvania DOC Consolidated Inmate Review System provides for three

levels of administrative review of inmate grievances: the initial grievance submitted to the

Facility Grievance Coordinator, an intermediate level of appeal to the Facility Manager,

and a final level of appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals.

(See Doc. 20 at Ex. 2-A, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Corrections,

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Consolidated Inmate Grievance Review System, Policy No. DC-ADM 804 § VI). See

also Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n. 2 (3d Cir.2000) (outlining the grievance

review process).

 The grievance procedure requires a prisoner to submit a grievance for initial review

within fifteen working days after the event upon which the grievance is based. (See Rec.

Doc. 20 at Ex. 2-A, DC-ADM 804 § VI, Part A(1)(h)). The inmate should state the facts

upon which he is entitled to relief. (See Rec. Doc. 20 at Ex. 2-A, DC-ADM 804 § VI,

Part A(1)(g))(“The inmate shall include a statement of facts relevant to the claim. . . The

inmate should identify any persons who may have information that could be helpful in

resolving the grievance. The inmate should also include information on attempts to

resolve the matter informally.”). Indeed, in Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3d

Cir.2004), the Third Circuit recognized the significance in identifying the relevant facts and

persons in order to bring a subsequent federal lawsuit: 

On this matter, the text is mandatory, or nearly so. . . To the extent that

Brown's identity is a “fact [] relevant to the claim.” – and it is– it was

mandatory for Spruill to include it. To the extent that Brown was a “person

[] who may have information” or someone with whom Spruill made

“attempts to resolve the matter informally” – and he was – Spruill was

required to identify Brown if practicable. 

Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234. Moreover, the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) is not

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satisfied simply "whenever there is no further process available to the inmate within the

grievance system (which would happen if, say, an inmate fails to file an administrative

appeal)...." Spruill, 372 F.3d at 227-28. Rather, § 1997e(a) requires that an inmate "avail[

] himself of every process at every turn (which would require all appeals to be timely

pursued, etc.)." Id.

In applying the above analysis to the factual background surrounding this action,

it is readily apparent that Plaintiff has procedurally defaulted on his claims and summary

judgment will be granted in favor of the Defendants. Plaintiff's grievance was returned to

him because Plaintiff's claim regarding the metal in his food was patently untimely and it

was unclear when the alleged incidents of abuse occurred. (Rec. Doc. 20 at Ex. 1-B).

The record discloses that Eakle failed to either resubmit a grievance with the necessary

information, or timely file an appeal from the Grievance Coordinator's decision. Thus,

Eakle has sustained a procedural default under the applicable DOC regulations. 

Spruill cited with approval the Seventh Circuit decision in Pozo v. McCaughtry,

286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). See Spruill, 372 F.3d at 231. In Pozo, the Seventh

Circuit ruled that “to exhaust remedies, a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the

place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1025

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(emphasis added). Eakle offers no justification for his failure to resubmit his grievance,

or file an appeal therefrom, within the deadline set by regulation. Thus, Eakle is now

foreclosed from litigating this claim in this Court. 

In Spruill, the Third Circuit found that a procedural default component to the

exhaustion requirement served the following congressional objectives: “(1) to return

control of the inmate grievance process to prison administrators; (2) to encourage

development of administrative record, and perhaps settlements, within the inmate

grievance process; and (3) to reduce the burden on the federal courts by erecting barriers

to frivolous prisoner lawsuits.” 372 F.3d at 230. In Pusey v. Belanger, No. Civ. 02-351,

2004 WL 2075472 at *2-3 (D. Del. Sept. 14, 2004), the court applied Spruill to dismiss

an inmate’s action for failure to timely pursue an administrative remedy over the inmate’s

objection that he did not believe the administrative remedy program operating in Delaware

covered his grievance. In Berry v. Kerik, 366 F.3d 85, 86-88 (2d Cir. 2004), the court

affirmed the dismissal of an inmate’s action with prejudice where the inmate had failed to

offer appropriate justification for the failure to timely pursue administrative grievances.

In Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1186 (10th Cir. 2004), the court

embraced the holding in Pozo, stating that “[a] prison procedure that is procedurally

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3. On February 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Amend”, in which he seeks to add

Defendants and claims that are wholly unrelated to the instant action. Although the

addition of new defendants is permitted by Fed.R.Civ.15(d), it is only to be allowed

when a supplemental complaint is not “a new cause of action but merely part of the

same old cause of action.” Griffin v. County Sch.Bd of Prince Edward Cty, 377 U.S.

218, 226 (1964). Plaintiff’s new claims arise out of events which occurred subsequent

to Plaintiff’s transfer from SCI-Rockview to SCI-Smithfield on June 17, 2004, while all

claims against the already served Defendants relate to events before that date. Thus,

Plaintiff’s “amendment” constitutes a “new cause of action” involving persons who

are strangers to the existing action. Such a new cause of action would be more

appropriately filed as a new complaint. 

barred and thus is unavailable to a prisoner is not thereby considered exhausted.” These

precedents support dismissal of this action for Eakle's failure to pursue his administrative

remedies with respect to his claims. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for summary

judgment will be granted. 

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants' Motion (doc. 17) is GRANTED. Judgment is

hereby entered in favor of Defendants and against the Plaintiff.

2. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 26) is

DENIED. 

3. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend3 (doc. 27) is DENIED. 

4. The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this case. 

5. Any appeal taken from this order will be deemed frivolous,

without probable cause, and not taken in good faith.

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s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

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