UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

________________________________ 

 ) 

CHARLES LUDLAM, et al., ) 

 ) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) Case No. 11-1570 (EGS) 

v. ) 

 ) 

 ) 

UNITED STATES PEACE CORPS, ) 

 ) 

Defendant. ) 

________________________________) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 This Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) case is before the 

Court on defendant the United States Peace Corps’ Motion to 

Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. For the 

reasons explained below, the Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED 

and the Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiffs Charles Ludlam and Paula Hirschoff are former Peace 

Corps volunteers. Both plaintiffs have been advocates for 

strengthening and revitalizing the Peace Corps; they have served 

on the boards of non-profit organizations supporting returned 

Peace Corps volunteers and testified before Congress on behalf 

of current Peace Corps volunteers. Compl. ¶¶ 3-5. 
2 

On April 15, 2009, plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request seeking 

production, in electronic format, of a country-by-country 

breakout of the Peace Corps’ 2008 survey of its Volunteers. 

Compl. ¶ 18. The Peace Corps acknowledged the information 

existed, but stated that it “is not available in the format 

[plaintiffs] asked for.” Compl. ¶ 24. The Peace Corps informed 

plaintiffs that it would cost anywhere from approximately $850 - 

$3100 for the Peace Corps to search for and produce the 

information, and that production would not be electronic. Id.

¶¶ 24-28. 

On May 27, 2009, plaintiffs filed an appeal of the Peace 

Corps’ decisions regarding the document production format and 

costs. Id. ¶ 29. While the appeal was pending, plaintiffs were 

approached by a Peace Corps staffer who informed plaintiffs that 

the country-by-country breakout of the 2008 survey was 

available, in electronic format. Id. ¶ 31. The staffer emailed 

the information to plaintiffs, who then posted it on the 

PeaceCorpsWiki website. Id. ¶ 31. On June 24, 2009, the Acting 

Director of the Peace Corps Office of Management emailed Ludlam, 

noted that the information he sought was available on 

PeaceCorpsWiki, and concluded “it doesn’t appear necessary for 
3 

[the Peace Corps] to continue to staff your request for these.” 

Id. ¶ 33. 

On December 16, 2010, Ludlam submitted a second FOIA request, 

seeking “a copy of the Peace Corps comprehensive survey of the 

Volunteers for 2009 and 2010, [including] the worldwide results 

and the breakouts of the results country by country and program 

by program for each country.” Id. ¶ 40.1 On March 17, 2011, the 

FOIA officer provided aggregated worldwide summary results of 

the 2009 and 2010 Annual Volunteer Surveys (“AVS”), but informed 

Mr. Ludlam that the individual country and program survey 

results were withheld under Exemptions 5 and 6 of FOIA. Id. ¶ 

48. Specifically, the agency claimed the information sought was 

exempt from disclosure because it was covered by the 

deliberative process privilege, or because it involved matters 

of personal privacy. Id. 

Mr. Ludlam appealed the decision on March 18, 2011. In his 

appeal, Mr. Ludlam narrowed his request to omit Volunteer 

responses to “open-ended questions” in the AVS. Id. ¶ 49. On 

April 15, 2011, Earl Yates, Associate Director for Management at 

the Peace Corps, released to Mr. Ludlam the 2009 and 2010 

results on a regional level. See Miller Decl. ¶ 17. However, 

                                                            

1

 Each Peace Corps post has a number of programs or “projects” 

such as education, health and agriculture. Defendant’s Motion 

to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (“Def.’s Mot.”) Att. B, 

Declaration of Denora Miller (“Miller Decl.”) ¶ 16. 
4 

Yates denied his appeal for country-by-country and program-byprogram responses, citing the same Exemptions. Id. ¶ 12, 17. 

Plaintiffs filed this action on August 31, 2011, challenging 

only the denial of the December 16, 2010 FOIA request. Shortly 

thereafter, the Peace Corps released additional information to 

Mr. Ludlam. On or about January 31, 2012, the Peace Corps 

provided Ludlam a significant portion of the country-by-country 

and program-by-program AVS results for 2009 and 2010. Miller 

Decl. ¶ 14. The Peace Corps continued to withhold, in whole or 

in part, Volunteer responses to seven questions in the 2009 AVS 

and ten questions in the 2010 AVS on a country-by-country and 

program-by-program breakouts. Id. On February 2, 2012, the 

defendant moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary 

judgment. The motion is now ripe for the Court’s decision. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

A. Motion to Dismiss 

Exhaustion of administrative remedies in FOIA cases is 

“generally required before filing suit in federal court so that 

the agency has an opportunity to exercise its discretion and 

expertise on the matter and to make a factual record to support 

its decision.” Oglesby v. Dep’t of Army, 920 F.2d 57, 61 (D.C. 

Cir. 1990) (overruled in part on other grounds). FOIA requires 

the requester to exhaust administrative remedies; when a 
5 

defendant disputes that a FOIA plaintiff has done so, the matter 

is properly the subject of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Hidalgo v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 344 F.3d 1256, 1260 

(D.C. Cir. 2003). 

B. Summary Judgment 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary 

judgment should be granted if the moving party has shown that 

there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving 

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986); 

Waterhouse v. District of Columbia, 298 F.3d 989, 991 (D.C. Cir. 

2002). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, 

the court must view all facts in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Likewise, in ruling on 

cross-motions for summary judgment, the court shall grant 

summary judgment only if one of the moving parties is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law upon material facts that are not 

genuinely disputed. See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in 

Wash. v. Dep’t of Justice, 658 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224 (D.D.C. 

2009) (citing Rhoads v. McFerran, 517 F.2d 66, 67 (2d Cir. 

1975)). 
6 

C. FOIA 

FOIA requires agencies to disclose all requested agency 

records, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), unless one of nine specific 

statutory exemptions applies, id. § 552(b). It is designed to 

“pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency 

action to the light of public scrutiny.” Dep’t of Air Force v. 

Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (citations omitted). “Given the 

FOIA’s broad disclosure policy, the United States Supreme Court 

has ‘consistently stated that FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly 

construed.’” Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Dep’t of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 8 (1988)). 

“FOIA’s strong presumption in favor of disclosure places 

the burden on the agency to justify the withholding of any 

requested documents.” Dep’t of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 173 

(1991) (citation omitted). The government may satisfy its 

burden of establishing its right to withhold information from 

the public by submitting appropriate declarations and, where 

necessary, an index of the information withheld. See Vaughn v. 

Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973). “If an agency’s 

affidavit describes the justifications for withholding the 

information with specific detail, demonstrates that the 

information withheld logically falls within the claimed 

exemption, and is not contradicted by contrary evidence in the 
7 

record or by evidence of the agency’s bad faith, then summary 

judgment is warranted on the basis of the affidavit alone.” 

ACLU v. Dep’t of the Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 

2011); see id. (an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA 

exemption is sufficient if it appears logical or plausible) 

(internal citations omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Dismissal as to Plaintiff Hirschoff 

The Peace Corps argues that plaintiff Paula Hirschoff must 

be dismissed from this case because she did not file the 

December 16, 2010 FOIA request, which is the only request at 

issue in this lawsuit. Def.’s Mot. at 6-8. The plaintiffs do 

not oppose defendant’s argument. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to 

Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 5-6 (“Pls.’ 

Opp’n”). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss 

plaintiff Hirschoff is GRANTED. 

 The parties also do not dispute that the remaining 

plaintiff, Charles Ludlam, has properly exhausted his 

administrative remedies. Accordingly, the dismissal of Ms. 

Hirschoff does not impact the Court’s ability to consider the 

case on its merits. 
8 

B. Waiver 

As a threshold matter, plaintiff argues that the Peace 

Corps has waived the right to invoke Exemptions 5 and 6 

regarding the withheld responses from the country-by-country and 

program-by-program breakouts of the 2009 and 2010 AVS. 

Plaintiff claims waiver because (1) the agency previously 

disclosed the responses from substantially similar questions in 

the 2008 Volunteer survey, and (2) Peace Corps leaders are 

encouraged to, and do, share the 2009 and 2010 AVS responses 

with other with other Peace Corps staff. Pls.’ Opp’n at 31-34. 

Defendant, by contrast, contends that the plaintiff cannot 

demonstrate that the responses to the 2009 and 2010 AVS surveys 

match the responses to the 2008 surveys; therefore, the Peace 

Corps has not waived any FOIA exemption. Def.’s Reply at 24-25. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court agrees with defendant 

and finds that no waiver occurred. 

 In this Circuit, the “public-domain doctrine” has emerged 

as the dominant paradigm for evaluating the waiver of a 

potential FOIA exemption. “Under [the] public-domain doctrine, 

materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA lose 

their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a 

permanent public record.” Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The logic of this 

doctrine is that “where information requested ‘is truly public, 
9 

then enforcement of an exemption cannot fulfill its purposes.’” 

Id. (citations omitted). “[A] plaintiff asserting that 

information has been previously disclosed bears the initial 

burden of pointing to specific information in the public domain 

that duplicates that being withheld.” Public Citizen v. Dep’t 

of State, 11 F.3d 198, 201 (D.C. Cir. 1993). An allegation that 

similar information has been released is not sufficient. Id.

In this case, plaintiff’s waiver argument fails because he 

has not shown that the withheld responses match any information 

already in the public domain. He argues only that the questions 

contained in the 2009 and 2010 AVS are substantially identical 

to the questions in the 2008 survey. However, as defendant 

notes, it is the responses to the surveys that plaintiff seeks, 

not the questions. Def.’s Reply at 25. Considering that the 

responses to the later surveys were provided by a different 

group of volunteers, regarding their experiences during a 

different time period, the responses will not be identical to 

those provided in 2008. Certainly, the plaintiff has not 

demonstrated, with specificity, that the previous disclosure 

duplicates withheld information. 

The fact that the Peace Corps encouraged readers of the 

surveys to share information with other staff cannot salvage 

plaintiff’s claim of waiver. While agency leaders may have 
10 

disseminated the survey results within the agency, the plaintiff 

has not shown that Peace Corps officials were authorized to, or 

did, release 2009 or 2010 survey results to the general public 

outside the agency. See Muslim Advocates v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Justice, 833 F. Supp. 2d 92, 100 (D.D.C. 2011). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Peace Corps has not 

waived its right to invoke Exemptions 5 and 6 with respect to 

the withheld material.

C. Exemption 6 

Exemption 6 covers “personnel and medical files and similar 

files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 

unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). 

A determination of proper withholding under Exemption 6 proceeds 

in two stages. First, the Court must decide if the information 

is subject to protection, specifically, whether the information 

is contained in a personnel, medical, or similar file, and if 

so, whether “disclosure would compromise a substantial, as 

opposed to a de minimis, privacy interest. If no significant 

privacy interest is implicated, (and if no other Exemption 

applies), FOIA demands disclosure.” Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. 

Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1989). If, on 

the other hand, a substantial privacy interest is at stake, the 

Court must then “weigh the privacy interest in nondisclosure 
11 

against the public interest in the release of records in order 

to determine whether, on balance, the disclosure would work a 

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Lepelletier 

v. FDIC, 164 F.3d 37, 46 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The agency bears the burden to persuade the 

Court that the exemption applies. Ripskis v. HUD, 746 F.2d 1, 3 

(D.C. Cir. 1984). 

The Peace Corps argues that Exemption 6 applies to three 

types of questions in the 2009 and 2010 AVS. The Court will 

address them in turn. 

1. First Type of Question: Rating Staff Performance 

The Peace Corps withheld complete or partial answers to 

several questions regarding staff performance. First, it 

withheld the answers to questions F2 in the 2009 AVS survey and 

F3 in the 2010 survey.2

 These questions are identical, and ask 

“How satisfied are you with the health care received from your 

PCMO(s) [Peace Corps Medical Officer]?” The Volunteers can 

provide six possible responses (“Not at all, Minimally, 

Adequately, Considerably, Exceptionally and Not Used”). 

                                                            

2

 Unless otherwise noted, the Court takes all facts regarding 

the questions and withheld responses from the Defendant’s 

Motion, Exhibit 10 (Table of Withheld Responses); Exhibit 1 

(2009 AVS), Exhibit 2 (2010 AVS), and Exhibit 14 (Vaughn index), 

as well as Plaintiff’s Opposition, Exhibit 1 (Chart of Withheld 

Responses). 
12 

The Peace Corps also withheld partial answers to identical 

questions F3 (2009 AVS) and F4 (2010 AVS). These questions ask 

“How satisfied are you with the following support provided by 

in-country Peace Corps staff?” and permitted the following 

responses: “Not at all, Minimally, Adequately, Considerably, 

Exceptionally and Not Used.” The questions were then broken out 

into separate sub-questions for ten different staff positions/ 

functions. Of these ten, the Peace Corps withheld responses as 

to four: Medical, Safety and Security, Site Selection and 

Preparation, and Technical Skills. 

Partial responses to identical questions F6 (2009 AVS) and 

F6 (2010 AVS) were also withheld. These questions ask “How 

would you rate your interaction with post staff?” and permitted 

the responses of “Adequate” or “Not Adequate.” The questions 

were broken into separate sub-questions as to four topics: 

“responsiveness to my issues,” “informative content,” “My 

comfort level discussing issues,” and “Adequacy of Visits/Visits 

to your site.” They were further broken out into separate subquestions for eight different staff positions. Of these eight, 

the Peace Corps withheld responses for six: Country Director, 

Program Training Officer/Sub-Regional Program Training 

Coordinator, Associate Peace Corps Director/Program Manager, 

PCMO, Safety and Security Coordinator, Training Manager. 
13 

Finally, questions F7 (2009 AVS) and F9 (2010 AVS) ask “To 

what extent is your Country Director aware of Volunteer issues 

and concerns through interactions with Volunteers?” and permits 

responses of “Not at all, Minimally, Adequately, Considerably, 

Completely/Exceptionally.” 

2. Second Type of Question: Insensitive and 

Discriminatory Conduct/Harassment 

The Peace Corps partially withheld the answer to question 

G2 (AVS 2010). This question asks whether Volunteers “[H]ave 

encountered insensitive comments or behavior toward you based on 

your race, ethnicity, age, gender, or sexual orientation from 

any of the following sources?” Volunteers could respond Yes, 

No, or Not Applicable. The question is separated into four 

categories of people who might have engaged in such conduct. 

The Peace Corps withheld responses for two categories: 

Host/Homestay Family and Community members. 

Responses to question G3 (AVS 2010) were also partially 

withheld. This question asks Volunteers to report any 

discrimination/harassment they have encountered. The question 

identifies several types of discrimination: age, anti-American, 

disability, gender, racial/color, religious, sexual orientation, 

sexual (physical) and sexual (verbal). Volunteers could respond 

with the number of times they had (i) encountered that type of 

harassment/discrimination, and (ii) reported it to the Peace 
14 

Corps. The question is further broken down into seven different 

categories of persons responsible for the harassment. The Peace 

Corps has withheld responses for two of the categories: 

“counterpart, supervisor, co-worker (not Peace Corps)” and “Host 

Country Family Member.” 

3. Third Type of Question: Crime 

The Peace Corps partially withheld responses to question G4 

(2010 AVS), which asks whether Volunteers were victims of any of 

several different types of crime committed by several different 

categories of individuals. Volunteers could respond by 

identifying the number of times they had (i) experienced that 

type of crime, and (ii) reported it to the Peace Corps. The 

Peace Corps has withheld the responses to three of the crimes 

listed -- sexual assault, rape, and attempted rape –- for two 

categories of individuals – “counterpart, supervisor or coworker (not Peace Corps)” or “host country family member.” 

4. Analysis 

a. Only the Questions Rating Staff Performance 

Satisfy The Threshold Requirement for Exemption 6 

Exemption 6 allows an agency to withhold personal 

identifying information, such as “place of birth, date of birth 

. . . employment history, and comparable data,” if disclosure of 

such information “would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
15 

invasion of personal privacy.” Dep’t of State v. Washington 

Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 600 (1982). By contrast, “[i]nformation 

unrelated to any particular person presumably would not satisfy 

the threshold test.” Id. at 602 n.4. Specifically, Exemption 6 

does not apply if there is no “substantial likelihood that any 

concrete facts about a particular individual could be inferred” 

as a result of the release of the withheld information. Horner, 

879 F.2d at 878; see also Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 

at 380 n. 19 (“Exemption 6 was directed at threats to privacy 

interests more palpable than mere possibilities”); Arieff v. 

Department of the Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 

(Exemption 6 only applicable where the release of information 

leads to likelihood of actual identification; release of 

information leading to increased speculation about individuals 

is not subject to withholding). 

In this case, the Peace Corps has met the threshold with 

respect to the first category of questions withheld – those 

related to staff ratings. The agency has explained that it 

withheld responses that rate specific staff positions, and at 

the country or project level, these positions are “typically 

filled by one person or a few at most.” Benjamin Decl. ¶ 14. 

The plaintiff has provided no information to the contrary. 

Accordingly, there is more than a “mere possibility” that 
16 

employment ratings data could be linked to a particular 

individual if this information were released. Moreover, 

employees have a substantial privacy interest in their 

employment ratings data. See, e.g., Fed’l Labor Relations 

Authority v. Dep’t of Commerce, 962 F.2d 1055, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 

1992) (employee ratings containing either favorable or 

derogatory information is personal information subject to 

Exemption 6); Ripskis, 746 F.2d 1 (same).3 

 The Peace Corps has not met the threshold exemption, 

however, for responses to the second or third types of 

questions. As set forth above, the second type of question 

relates to insensitive comments or behavior from Volunteers’ (a) 

host families or (b)community members, or discrimination/ 

harassment they have encountered from their (a) counterparts, 

supervisors, or co-workers, or (b) host families. On their 

face, these categories seem very likely to include a large 

number of individuals, and the agency has provided no indication 

to the contrary. The Peace Corps relies on the declarations of 

                                                            

3

 Plaintiff argues that any privacy interest in the ratings data 

has been abolished because the readers of the country-by-country 

reports are “encouraged to share the results with staff and 

Volunteers.” Opp’n at 12. Courts have held, however, that the 

mere fact that some information may be known to certain members 

of the public does not negate an individual’s privacy interest 

in preventing further dissemination to the public at large. 

See, e.g., Forest Serv. Employees v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 

1021, 1025 n.3 (9th Cir. 2008); Barnard v. Dept of Homeland 

Sec., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2009) (collecting cases). 
17 

employees Denora Miller and Esther Benjamin for support, but 

these declarations do not demonstrate any likelihood that the 

withheld information could be linked to a particular individual. 

Ms. Miller states that there were 7671 Volunteers in 2009 

and 8655 in 2010, that the country-by-country and program-byprogram numbers are significantly smaller, and then concludes 

“it would be possible for anyone familiar with the Peace Corps . 

. . to determine the identities of individuals . . . identified 

as sources of improper behavior or comments, or pointed to as 

criminals.” Miller Decl. ¶ 33. This is insufficient; as 

discussed supra, the “mere possibility” of a threat to privacy 

interest is not sufficient to justify withholding under 

Exemption 6. Rose, 425 U.S. at 380 n. 19. Ms. Benjamin’s 

declaration is also insufficient. She states that disclosure of 

information regarding discrimination, harassment and crimes on 

the “smaller” country or project basis, 

[M]ay easily identify or be perceived in the host country 

as identifying specific host family/homestay family 

members, specific host country citizen members of the 

community where the Volunteer lives and works, and 

counterparts/co-workers (such as co-teachers, co-workers in 

a health clinic, or other host country colleagues with whom 

a Volunteer works), or management (such as school 

principals, health clinic directors, agricultural 

cooperative managers, and other non Peace Corps management 

personnel). 

Benjamin Decl. ¶ 15. The bare assertion that a specific 

individual “may easily [be] identif[ied],” unsupported by any 
18 

information such as the number of Volunteers in any country or 

program, the typical size of the host families with whom 

Volunteers stay, or the size of the communities or workplaces in 

which Volunteers are placed, is simply not enough for the agency 

to meet its burden to demonstrate that the exemption applies. 

See, e.g., Gardels v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 689 F.2d 1100, 

1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (agency affidavits must be reasonably 

specific, not merely conclusory, to show that the documents are 

exempt from disclosure). Accordingly, because the Peace Corps 

has provided no reasonable basis to determine that any 

particular individuals will be identified by disclosure of the 

AVS questions regarding discrimination/harassment or crime 

victimization, the agency’s invocation of Exemption 6 fails. 

b. Weighing the Privacy Interest in Nondisclosure 

Against the Public Interest in the Release of 

Records 

Once an agency has established  a substantial privacy 

interest is at stake, the Court must then “weigh the privacy 

interest in nondisclosure against the public interest in the 

release of records in order to determine whether, on balance, 

the disclosure would work a clearly unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy.” Lepelletier, 164 F.3d at 46 (citations 

omitted). The phrase “clearly unwarranted” within the statute 

“instructs the court to tilt the balance in favor of 
19 

disclosure.” Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 674 (D.C. Cir. 

1971). 

In the FOIA context, the definition of “public interest” is 

limited. ““The only relevant public interest in the FOIA 

balancing analysis [is] the extent to which disclosure of the 

information sought would ‘shed light on an agency’s performance 

of its statutory duties’ or otherwise let citizens know ‘what 

their government is up to.’” United States Dep’t of Defense v. 

FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (citations omitted). The court 

must therefore weigh the privacy interest of Peace Corps staff 

in the non-disclosure of the survey questions rating their 

performance against the extent to which the disclosure of this 

information would shed light on the agency’s “performance of its 

statutory duties” or otherwise let citizens know “what their 

government is up to.” Id.

In this case, plaintiff claims the requested information 

will serve the public interest by revealing information about 

“the safety of and the support given to Peace Corps Volunteers,” 

mandated by Congress in the Kate Puzey Peace Corps Volunteer 

Protection Act of 2011 (“Volunteer Protection Act”), which 

amended the Peace Corps Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2507. Opp’n at 18-19. 

The new provisions charge the Peace Corps with providing a 

variety of protections for Volunteers who are victims of sexual 
20 

assault. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2507a – 2507d. More generally, the new 

provisions institute robust reporting requirements about 

Volunteers and Peace Corps staff. Congress has directed the 

Peace Corps to provide it with the results of Annual Volunteer 

Surveys, and also with Inspector General Reports containing, 

inter alia, “reports received from volunteers relating to 

misconduct, mismanagement or policy violations of Peace Corps 

Staff.” Id. §§ 2507e(c) and (d). Congress further directed the 

President to perform a country by country portfolio review for 

each country the Peace Corps serves. Id. § 2507e(e) (emphasis 

added). The portfolio review, which must be provided to 

Congress upon request, “shall at a minimum include,” inter alia, 

(i) an analysis of the safety and security of Volunteers, and 

(ii) an evaluation of the effectiveness of management of each 

Peace Corps post. Id. Finally, the new provisions of the Act 

require the President to submit to Congress, on an annual basis, 

a report including “the annual rate of early termination of 

volunteers, including demographic data associated with such 

early termination.” Id. § 2507i. 

Plaintiff argues that this legislation demonstrates the 

public interest in “the safety and well-being of the Volunteers, 

[which] depend[s], in large part, on the effectiveness of and 

professionalism of the Peace Corps staff.” Opp’n at 19. The 
21 

government, for its part, does not acknowledge the Kate Puzey 

Peace Corps Volunteer Protection Act of 2011. Rather, it claims 

that the information in the staff ratings data would not 

contribute to the public’s understanding of the Peace Corps’ 

operations or activities. Reply at 15. Even if there is public 

interest in the information, the government claims that interest 

is satisfied by the disclosure of the information aggregated at 

the global or regional level. Id. at 13-14. 

Upon consideration, the Court concludes that there is a 

significant public interest in disclosure of the responses to 

questions regarding staff performance. The 2011 Amendments to 

the Peace Corps Act make clear that the Agency’s mission 

includes protecting the safety and security of the Volunteers, 

as well as ensuring that Peace Corps personnel are effectively 

managing the agency’s operations at a country by country level. 

These are precisely the concerns addressed in the AVS questions 

relating to staff performance: Volunteer access to health care, 

support from staff in substantive areas including safety and 

security, and staff awareness of and responsiveness to 

Volunteers’ concerns. See AVS 2009 and 2010 Questions F2, F3, 

F4, F6, F7. Disclosure of this information would therefore 

serve the very public interest central to the purposes of FOIA 

by furthering the right of the public to know “what their 
22 

government is up to.” United States Dep’t of Justice v. 

Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989). 

The Court further concludes that there is a significant 

public interest disclosure of this information on a country-bycountry basis. As plaintiff explains, Volunteers are invited to 

serve in specific countries, where they are overseen by a Peace 

Corps Country Director “who is the executive leader of the Peace 

Corps for that country.” Opp’n at 11. Moreover, plaintiff 

contends, it was the “safety of Volunteers, and the inadequate 

support some victims of violence received from the Peace Corps 

and the host country in which they serve,” which prompted the 

media attention that led to the Volunteer Protection Act of 

2011. Id. at 18. Finally, as set forth above, Congress has 

recognized the importance of having access to this information 

on a country by country basis. See 22 U.S.C. § 2507e(e). By 

contrast, Plaintiff has not produced any support for his claim 

that there is public interest in program-by-program survey 

results within each country. The Court therefore cannot 

conclude that the program-by-program data is relevant to the 

public’s ability to monitor whether the agency is correctly 

doing its job. 

Through the new reporting requirements, the amendments to 

the Act provide that much of the information plaintiff seeks 
23 

will be publically available in future years. However, the 

information obtained in the 2009 and 2010 AVS predates the new 

requirements. Accordingly, without the data from the AVS, the 

public would have more difficulty determining whether the Peace 

Corps has been, and is, carrying out its mission to protect and 

support its Volunteers. See Multi AG Media LLC v. Dep’t of 

Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1231-32 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding a 

strong public interest in disclosing data the Department of 

Agriculture collects to monitor its program administration). 

Having found greater than a de minimis privacy interest and 

a significant public interest in disclosure of the country-bycountry staff rating questions in the AVS, the Court must now 

“balance the two to determine whether the agency has met its 

burden to show that the substantial interest in personal privacy 

is not outweighed by the public interest in disclosure. . . 

[U]nless the invasion of privacy is ‘clearly unwarranted,’ the 

public interest in disclosure must prevail and the agency may 

not withhold the files under Exemption 6.” Id., 515 F.3d at 

1232 (citations omitted). 

In this case, the Peace Corps’ employees’ privacy interests 

are modest. As set forth above, plaintiff seeks survey 

responses to multiple choice questions regarding Volunteer 

experience with staff performance. The survey responses are not 
24 

official performance reviews or ratings, nor do they contain 

names or any other personal details regarding any staff members. 

By contrast, there is a strong public interest in monitoring the 

Peace Corps’ protection of Volunteers’ safety and security, 

which must necessarily include effective management within each 

country. Accordingly, release of this information would not 

“constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” 

under Exemption 6. 

D. Exemption 5 

Exemption 5 allows an agency to withhold “inter-agency or 

intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available 

by law to a party . . . in litigation with the agency.” 5 

U.S.C. § 552(b)(6). Citing Exemption 5’s deliberative process 

privilege, the Peace Corps has withheld responses to all of the 

AVS questions also withheld under Exemption 6, as well as 

responses to all or part of three additional questions. 

First, the Peace Corps withheld the response to question F1 

(2009 and 2010 AVS), which are identical in both surveys.4

 It 

asks volunteers how prepared the host country people were for 

their arrival when they first arrived at their host community, 

                                                            

4

  Unless otherwise noted, the Court takes all facts regarding the 

questions and withheld responses from the Defendant’s Motion, 

Exhibit 10 (Table of Withheld Responses); Exhibit 1 (2009 AVS), 

Exhibit 2 (2010 AVS), and Exhibit 14 (Vaughn index), as well as 

Plaintiff’s Opposition, Exhibit 1 (Chart of Withheld Responses). 
25 

and permits responses of “not at all,” “minimally/poorly,” 

“adequately,” “considerably/well” and “exceptionally/very well.” 

Responses to question J1 (2009 and 2010 AVS), also 

identical in both surveys, were partially withheld. The 

question asks how personally rewarding Volunteers found their 

Peace Corps service, and provides five separate categories for 

“Overall Peace Corps Service,” “Community Involvement,” 

“Experience with Other Volunteers,” “Work with 

Counterparts/Community Partner,” and “Experience with other Host 

Country Nationals/Individuals.” Volunteers could respond “not 

at all,” “minimally,” “adequately,” “considerably,” and 

“exceptionally.” Of the five categories, the Peace Corps 

withheld responses as to one: work with counterparts/community 

partner. 

Finally, the Peace Corps withheld the responses to 

identical questions F6 (2009 AVS) and F5 (2010 AVS). These 

questions ask Volunteers whether their host country would 

benefit the most if the Peace Corps program was discontinued, 

reduced, refocused/redesigned, maintained as it, or expanded. 

Volunteers could choose one of these options. 

The deliberative process privilege “covers documents 

reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberation 

comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and 
26 

policies are formulated.” Dep’t of the Interior v. Klamath 

Water Users Protective Ass’n, 532 U.S. 1, 8 (2001) (citations 

omitted). The purpose of this privilege is to “prevent injury to 

the quality of agency decisions,” by protecting from disclosure 

confidential, pre-decisional advice and counsel on matters of 

policy. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150 (1975). 

In order for the deliberative process privilege to apply, the 

material must be both “predecisional” and “deliberative.” 

Public Citizen, Inc. v. OMB, 598 F.3d 865, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(citation omitted). A document is predecisional if it was 

generated before the agency action was finally adopted, and 

deliberative if it “reflects the give-and-take of the 

consultative process.” Id. at 874 (citation omitted). 

The Peace Corps asserts that each of the survey responses 

withheld is predecisional because (1) Peace Corps officials rely 

heavily on these responses in the continuing process of 

formulating agency strategies and policies; and (2) the surveys 

themselves state that they will “be used by the Peace Corps to 

identify best practices and implement program improvements” and 

“will contribut[e] to the improvement of the Peace Corps’ 

operations and, ultimately, to the success of the Peace Corps.” 

Def.’s Mot. at 38-39, see also Declaration of Alice-Lynn Ryssman 

at ¶¶ 10-13. In her declaration, Peace Corps official Esther 
27 

Benjamin states that “AVS data are used in agency strategic 

planning and performance activities . . . assessments of agency 

performance . . . [and] internal monitoring at cohort, project, 

post, regional, and global levels[.]” Benjamin Decl. ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff responds that “the generalized and aspirational agency 

goals and functions” set forth in the agency declarations “are 

not decisions within the meaning of the statute. . . . Indeed, 

virtually any action or information considered by the Peace 

Corps conceivably could fit within this definition and thus be 

withheld from public disclosure.” Opp’n at 27. 

The Court agrees with plaintiff. Although the government 

need not pinpoint a specific decision or policy in connection 

with which predecisional material is prepared, the deliberative 

process must be capable of some definition. Compare Access 

Reports v. DOJ, 926 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding an 

agency’s study of how to shepherd a FOIA bill through Congress 

to be a defined process) with Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 

1143 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding an agency’s efforts to evaluate 

and change its personnel policies, rules and standards too 

amorphous to qualify as a process for the purposes of the 

deliberative process privilege). 

In Vaughn, the agency asserted that reports appraising the 

performance of agency supervisors were protected under the 
28 

deliberative process privilege because they were part of an 

“ongoing [] process” in which “the agency evaluates and changes 

its personnel policies, regulations and standards.” 523 F.2d at 

1143. The Circuit rejected the argument, finding that the 

agency could not classify its ongoing, continual task of 

appraising, evaluating and making recommendations for 

improvement as a seamless “process” for the purposes of the 

deliberative process privilege, since such a definition places 

virtually no limit on the privilege. Id. at 1145. To allow 

such an expansive definition of the term process under Exemption 

5, the Court reasoned, “would swallow up a substantial part of 

the administrative process, and virtually foreclose all public 

knowledge regarding the implementation of . . . policies in any 

given agency.” Id. 

Defendant’s arguments fail for the same reason as the 

government’s did in Vaughn. The Peace Corps asserts generally 

that the AVS surveys are part of the agency’s processes for 

ongoing, continuous appraisals and improvements in all manner of 

agency activities, from strategic planning, to program 

improvement, to assessment of agency performance and beyond. 

Ryssman Decl. ¶¶ 10-13; Benjamin Decl. ¶¶ 10-13. To permit the 

Defendant to assert the deliberative process privilege for every 

piece of information which could be used, in some way or 
29 

another, in the continuous process of improving the Agency would 

set virtually no limit on the privilege. Exemption 5’s 

protections do not reach nearly this far. 

Further contradicting the Peace Corps’ stated rationale for 

withholding under Exemption 5 is the fact that the agency 

produced most of the responses to the surveys. The Court is 

particularly puzzled by this because the Agency asserts that the 

entire AVS results are used to shape agency policy and 

decisionmaking. See Ryssman Decl. ¶¶ 10-13, Benjamin Decl. ¶¶ 

10-13. The Agency offers no explanation as to why the withheld 

information constitutes pre-decisional deliberations connected 

to an agency policy or action, while the other responses in the 

same documents are not. In order to show that material is 

deliberative, the agency must identify “what deliberative 

process is involved and the role played by the documents at 

issue in the course of that process.” Coastal States Gas Corp. 

v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F. 2d 854, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Here, 

the Peace Corps has failed to do either. Accordingly, the Court 

finds the agency has not met its burden to demonstrate that the 

withheld materials are both pre-decisional and deliberative, and 

therefore that the documents are not properly withheld under 

Exemption 5. 
30 

E. Segregability 

Plaintiff does not dispute that all reasonably segregable 

information was produced to him. Even after determination that 

documents are exempt from disclosure, however, FOIA analysis is 

not properly concluded unless a court determines whether “any 

reasonably segregable portion of a record” can “be provided to 

any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions 

which are exempt.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). “So important is this 

requirement that ‘[b]efore approving the application of a FOIA 

exemption, the district court must make specific findings of 

segregability regarding the documents to be withheld.’” Elec. 

Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, 826 F. Supp. 2d 157, 173 

(D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 

1106)). The Court errs if it “simply approve[s] the withholding 

of an entire document without entering a finding on 

segregability or the lack thereof.” Powell v. U.S. Bureau of 

Prisons, 927 F.2d 1239, 1242 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citations 

omitted). 

“It has long been the rule in this Circuit that non-exempt 

portions of a document must be disclosed unless they are 

inextricably intertwined with exempt portions.” Mead Data 

Cent., Inc. v. Dep’t of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 260 (D.C. Cir. 

1977). The agency should, for example, “‘describe what 
31 

proportion of the information in [the] documents,’ if any, ‘is 

non-exempt and how that material is dispersed through the 

document[s].” Elec. Frontier Found., 826 F. Supp. 2d at 174 

(citing Mead Data Cent., Inc., 566 F.2d 242, 261 (D.C. Cir. 

1977)); see King v. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 219 (D.C. 

Cir. 1987) (agency must sufficiently identify the withheld 

material to enable the district court to make a rational 

decision whether the withheld material must be produced without 

actually viewing the documents). 

Upon review of the documents, the Court finds that the 

defendants have made very limited, specific redactions with 

respect to the program-by-program survey results, and have 

explained in detail the basis for those redactions. See Miller 

Decl. ¶¶ 14, 16, 18, 35. It appears that defendants have 

redacted only what was necessary to protect the exempt 

information, and defendants are not withholding any documents in 

full. Accordingly, the Court finds that all segregable 

information in the program-by-program results of the 2009 and 

2010 AVS has been disclosed to plaintiff. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to 

dismiss is GRANTED. The Court concludes that the Peace Corps was 

justified in withholding the Volunteer responses in the program-
32 

by-program breakouts for the following questions: 2009 AVS - 

F2, F3, F6, F7; 2010 AVS – F2, F3, F4, F6. The Peace Corps did 

not justify withholding of any other document at issue. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED 

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. An appropriate Order accompanies 

this Memorandum Opinion. 

Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan 

United States District Judge 

March 29, 2013