NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0183n.06 F iled: April 4, 2008 No. 06-4134 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. GL EN N WI L L I AM S, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.

__________________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P E AL F ROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

T H E N O R T HE RN D IS T R IC T O F O H IO

B EF OR E: MA RTI

N, GI B B ON S, a

nd GR I F F I N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. GRI FF I N, Circuit J udg e. Def endant Gle nn Wil liams appea l s fr o m his convictions for possession of a c ontrolled substance w ith intent to di stribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and beinga fe lon in possession of a f irea rm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1). He arg ues that the district cour t erre d in denying his moti on to suppress evidenc e obtained during an Aug ust 17, 2005, searc h of his home by a SWAT team of Canton, Ohio, police office rs. Specific ally , Wil liams contends t h a t s u p p r e s s io n was re quired beca use the sea

rch w arr ant was not supported by probable cause , the SWAT team used a no- knock entry without permission by

the war rant-issuing mag istrate, and beca use statements he made during his arre st were elicited in violation of Miranda . Finding eac h of t hese a rg uments to lack merit, we aff irm Wi lliams’s convictions.No. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 2 - I. I n 2005, Detec tive J ames Da niel, assig ned to the Canton Police Depa rtment’s vice unit and responsible for

investigating dr

ug complaints and under cover operations of drug purcha ses, re ceive d “[t] wo or thre e” c omplaints of illega l drug activity occur ring at 1539 Br

y an Ave nue in Canton, Ohio. Da nie l f oll ow e d the se c omp la int s by sp e a kin g wi th a c on fi de nti a l in fo rm ant ( “ CI ” ), wh o to ld h im that the re side n t o f t he B ry an Ave nue home sold cr ack c ocaine from the house . The CI provided reliable information to a diffe rent de tective dur ing pr ior unrelated investig ations. Da niel beg an surve illance on B ry an Ave nue on Jul y 22, 2005, watching

the house on ten separ ate dates. Duringthis period, Daniel observed “people stoppi ng basica lly for short times, many short trips to the r esidenc e,” w hich was c onsistent with his past observations of other houses used to sell crac k coca ine. Danie l then used the CI to conduct three controlled purc hases of cra ck coc aine at the B ry an Ave nue house. The informant identified Williams as the seller. A se arc h of Will iams’s criminal history

reve aled that Wil liams had bee n convicted of ag g ravated robbe ry

in 1997 and later char g ed, thoug h not prosecute d, for f elonious assault and discha rg ing a wea p o n i n t o a home or school. Ba sed on this information, Daniel requested a s ear ch warra nt for the Bryan Ave nue house. Be cause of Will iams’s criminal history , an d b eca use Da niel’s experienc e had inf ormed him that people who se ll crac k coca ine often c arr y firea rms and pre sent a da

ng er to pol i ce o ff

i ce rs, Daniel
so ug ht a no- kn oc k warr ant. Th e a ff ida vit state d th a t D anie l pe rf

or me d s ur ve ill anc e and

a ssi ste d inNo. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 3 - the controlled buy s from J uly 22, 2004, until August 16, 2004. The Ca nton Municipal Court gr anted Da nie l’ s r e qu e st f

or the wa rr ant. A SWAT team of Canton police off icer s executed t he sea

rch w arr ant on the B ry an Ave nue h o u s e o nAu gu s t1 7 , 2 0 0 5
. T h e o ff i ce rs d i d n o tkn o ck

an d an n o u n ce t h ei r p re s en ce b ef o re en t er i n g. They found defendant W illiams aslee p on a couch i n the front room of the house. Af ter the of fice rs ha nd c uf fe d Wil liams a

nd se a te d him up ri g ht on the c ou c h, De te c tiv e Ry an Da vis no tic e d Wil liams
re a c h r e pe a te dly

fo r a c e ra mic plate that wa s vis ibl e un de rn e a th the fr on t of the c ou c h. B e c a us e in Davis’s e x perie nce suc h plates ar e ofte n used for cutting c rac k coca ine and ther efor e tend to have razor blade s on them, he ins tructed the police officer s to remove Wil liams from the couch. As they
we re do in g s o, Dav is a sk e d Wil liams w he the r t he re we re any

we a po ns in t he ho us e . Wil liams
re pli e d th a t a

we a po n wa s upst a ir s; a s ub se qu e nt s e arc h o f t he up sta ir s r e ve a le d Wil liams’ s r e sp on se to be fa lse. As the off

icer s continued to move Will iams awa y from the c ouch, Willi ams then stated that a fire arm “ was a ctually underne ath the couc h.” This turned out to be true
. On September

28, 2005, Wil liams was cha rg ed in a tw o - c o u nt i n dictment in the United States Di str ic t Cour

t for the No rt

he rn Di str ic t of Ohi o, a lle g ing on e c ount of po sse ssi ngwi th t he int e nt t o d i s t ri b u t e aco n t ro l l eds u

b s t an ce , i nv i o l at i o no f 2 1 U. S
. C
. § 8 4 1 (a )( 1 ), an d o n e c o u n to f b ei n g a felon in possession of a f irea rm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g ). Wil liams the n filed a pr etrial motion to suppress evidenc e obtained during the Aug ust 17 searc h of his home, contendingthat the
sear ch wa s not supported by probable cause , that the pol ice improperly failed to knoc k and announc e the ir p r e s e n c e , an d th a t h is s tate me n t c o n c e r n in g th e lo c a ti o n o f th e g u n w a s ta k e n in v io lati on ofNo. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 4 - Miranda . After

the district court de nied Will iams’s motion, W illiams entered into a plea ag ree ment wher ein he pr eser

ved his rig ht to appeal the c ourt’s denia l of his motion t o suppress. T h e district court e ntere d judgme nt ag ainst Wi llia m s an d s entenced him to a term of 120 months of imp ri so nme nt o n e a c h c ount, to b e se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y . Wil liams n owa

pp e a ls. II. Willi a ms fi rs t argue s that any e vid e nc e ob ta ine d a s a re su lt of the se arc h o f h is h ome sh ou ld have be en suppre ssed bec ause the sear ch wa s not supported by pro b ab l e ca u s e. On r eview of the sufficie ncy

of the a ffidavit, the que stion “‘is whether the mag istrat e h ad a substantial basis for finding that the af

fidavit established probable cause to believe that the evidenc e would be f ound at the place cited.’” United States v. Gre ene , 2 5 0 F. 3 d 4 7 1 , 4 7 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 1 ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Dav idson , 9 36 F .2 d 8 56 , 8 59 (6 th C ir . 1 99 1) ). “ Pr ob a ble c a us e ex is ts wh e n th e re is a ‘f a ir probability ,’ g iven t he tot ality of t he circumstance s, that contra band or evidence of a c rime will be f o u n d in a p arti c u la

r place .” Gree ne , 250 F.3d at 479 (internal quotation omitted). We g ive the p ro b ab l e c au s e d et er m i n at i o no f t h e w arra n t -s i gn i n g m agi s t ra t e “ g r e at d ef er en ce , ” a s i t s fi n d i n gs “should not be set aside unle ss arbitrar ily exercised.” United States v. W eave r , 99 F.3d 1372, 1376 (6th Cir. 1998) (interna l quotation om i t t ed ). Fur thermore , we c onduct our re view of the mag istrate’s de termination in a “c ommo n s en s e, rather than hy perte chnica l manner,” Gree ne , 250 F.3d at 479, and judge the suffic iency of the a ffidavit on the totality of the c ircumstance s, rather than eng ag ing in line- by -line scr utiny
. United States v. W oosley , 361 F.3d 924, 926 ( 6th Cir. 2004).No. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 5 - Wil liams’s probable ca u s e cha lleng e is predic ated on the dates listed in the affidavit that identified whe n Detec tive Daniel c onducted surve illan ce of Will iams’s reside nce a nd executed controlled purc hase buy s throug h the CI
. The aff idavit stated that the surve illance ope rations and controlled pur ch as es occur red in July

and August of 2004, one y ear befor e the e x ecution of the
sear ch wa rra nt. Thus, acc ording to Williams, the evidence supporting D aniel’s r equest for a wa rra nt was stale. When apprised of

the discre pancy

betwee n dates, Da

niel testified that it was t he result of a “cle rica l error ,” and that the inves t i gat i o n occur red in 2005 rather than 2004. The district court
acc epted Da

niel’s explanation: The issue that has been raised by counsel as to the discre pancy in the date, the c ourt is c on vin c e d a ft e r he ari ng the te sti mony , tha t any dis c re pa nc y in t he date , p ri mari ly the dis c re pa

nc y that re la te s to wh e the r or no t the e ve nts in q ue sti on , th e ob se rv a tio ns , the controlled buy s, occur red in 2004 a s opposed to 2005. Ibelieve that matter has been adequately addre ssed throug h the testimony , it is clea rly a scribner ’s [si c] error and has no dire ct bea

ring on the validity

on the sea

rch w arr ant. We revie w t he dis trict court’s finding for clea r er ror, see United States v. Miggins , 302 F.3d 384, 397 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) , a

nd Willi ams h a s n ot of

fe re d any e vid e nc e to c on tr a dic t th e c ourt ’s fi nd ingon thi s issue. Willi a ms o ff

e rs no oth e r c ha lle ng e to t he ma g istra

te ’s pr ob a ble c a us e de te rm inatio n, wi th g oo d re ason. The a ffidavit wa s supported by a stateme nt from a r eliable CI that defe ndant was
se lli ngc ra c k c oc a ine fr om h is h ou se on B ryan A ve nu e , b y

Da nie l’ s d e ta ile d s ur

ve ill anc e of

the ho us e in which he observe d repe ated vehicle and foot traff ic consistent with the sale of cr ack c ocaine , and by three controlled purc hases c onducted by the C I and supervised by Daniel. This provided moreNo. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

Even a ssuming that the affidavit lacke d probable cause , there is no evidence indicating that 1 De te c tiv e Da

nie l and the SWAT te a m e xec ute d th e se arc h wa rr ant in b a d f

a ithor wi tho ut r e a so na

ble g rounds to believe that the warra n t wa s p roper ly issued, such that the Leon g ood faith exception would not apply
. See United States v. Leon , 4 68 U. S. 8 97 , 9 25 (1 98 4) (p ro vid ingfo r g oo d- fa ith e xce pti on to warr ant re qu ir e me nt) ; United States v. Rice , 478 F.3d 704, 711- 12 (6th Cir. 2007) (e xpla ini ngthat Leon exception is inapplicable whe re of fice r’s re l i an ce o n war

rant’s va lidity

was not objectively

rea sonable). - 6 - than a suff

icient basis for the mag istrate to conc lude that a “ fair pr obability ” ex i s t ed that drug
co n t rab an d wo u l d b e fo u n d at t h e Bry an Av en u e h o u s e. T h u s , W i l l i am s ’s p ro b ab l e c au s e c h al l en ge to t he wa rr ant i s w ith ou t me ri t. 1 III
. Willi a ms n e xt a

r g u e s th a t t

h e d is tr ic t c o u rt s h o u ld

h a v e s u p p r e s s e d th e e v id e n c e s eized duri ngthe se arc h o f h is h ome be c a us e the SWAT team e nte re d Wil liams’ s h ou se wi tho ut f ir st knocking and announc ing its pre sence . The g overnme nt r esponds that, even a ssuming the SWAT t e a m d i d c o m m i t a kn o c k

- an d

- an n o u n c e v i o l a t i o n , W i l l i a m s ’ s ar g u m e n t i s f o r e c l o s e d b y Hudson v. Michigan , 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The g overnme nt is corre ct. I n Hudson , Detroit police office rs forc ibly enter ed the de fe nd ant’ s h ome aft er waitin g on ly thr e e to f

ive se c on ds a ft e r k

no c kin g and

ann ounc ingthe ir prese nce. Id. at 588. This, conce ded the g overnme nt on appea l, was a knock-and- announce violation. Id. a t 59 0. De sp ite the po lic e ’s e rr or , th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld t hat th e e xclu sio na

ry ru le did not apply beca

use the office rs inevitably would have disc overe d the evidenc e upon the e x ecution of the va lid searc h war

rant they had obtained. Id. at 593-94. Rather t h an suppression of theNo. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 7 - evidenc e, the Court held that the proper reme dy for a failure to knock and a nnounce is a

civil action broug ht pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 597-98. B e c a us e su pp re ssi on is no t an a va ila ble re me dy fo r Willi ams’ s kn oc k a nd ann ounc e c la im,
we ne ed not consider

whether the SWAT team was re quired to announce its prese nce a nd there fore de ny Willi a ms’ s c la im. I V. Finally , Wil liams a

rg ues that the district c ourt should ha ve suppre ssed his statement made
c on c e rnin g the loc a tio n o f a fi re arm in h is h ou se . T he g ov e rn me nt c on te nd s th a t th e state me nt i s admissible under the public sa fety exception to Miranda . We ag ree . We expl ained r ece ntly

the public safe ty

exception in the following ma nner: Under the familiar rule of Miranda v. Arizona , “ the pr os e c uti on may no t us e statements, whethe r exculpatory or inculpatory , stemmi ng from custodial interrog ation of the de fenda nt unless it demonstrates the use of proce dural saf

eg uards eff ective to se cure the privileg e ag ainst s el f-incrimination.” 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1 96 6) . H ow e ve r, wh e n o ff ic e rs a sk “ qu e sti on s n e c e ssa

ry to se c ur e the ir

ow n s a fe ty or the sa fe ty

of the pu bl ic” a s o pp os e d to “ qu e sti on s d e sig ne d s ole ly to e lic it t es t i m o n i al ev i d en ce fr o m a s u s p ec t , ” t h ey d o n o tn ee d

t o p ro v i d e t h e w arn i n gs r e qu i r e d b y Miranda
. New Y

ork v. Q uarles , 467 U.S. 649, 659 (1984). United St ates v. W

illiams , 483 F.3d 425, 428 (6th Cir. 2007). This exception applies “whe n office rs have a rea sonable b el i ef

based on a

rticulable f

acts that they

are in dang er.” Id. (q u o t i n g United States v. Talley, 275 F.3d 560, 563 ( 6th Cir. 2001)). I n W illiams , we se t forth the standa rd the g overnme nt must satis fy in order f

or custodial
s t a t e m e n t s , m a d e p r i o r

t o t h e i s s u an c e o f

an y Miranda war

nings, to be admissible under the Quarles public safe ty

exception. “For an office r to ha ve a rea sonable belief that he is in dang er,” and thusNo. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 8 - for t h e ex ce ption to apply , “he must have rea son to believe (1) that the def endant mig ht have ( or
rec ently have ha d) a w eapon, a

nd (2 ) that someone other than police mig ht ga in acc ess to that
wea pon and inflict harm with it.” Id. at 428. We explained further that the public safe ty

exception applies “if a

nd only if” e ach of these two c onditions i s met. Id. We conclude that the g overnme nt ha s me t it s b ur de n to satis fy the tw o r e qu ir e me nts
. F ir st, the po lic e of

fi c e rs plai nly

ha d a re a so na ble be lie f t

hat Will iams m ig ht p os se ss a
we a po n. Willi a ms h a d a

c ri min a l hi sto ry

that su g g e ste d n ot o nly

that he po sse sse d w e a

po ns , b ut a lso that he was willing to use forc e, as evidenc ed by his ag g ravated robbe ry

conviction and his ar

rest for discharg ing a

wea pon into a home or school. Moreove r, Wil liams w as a suspe cted de aler of cr ack
coca ine and, a s Detec tive Daniel testified a t the motion to suppress hear ing, in D aniel’s e x perie nce

“ t h e m a j o r i t y o f p e o p l e w h o t r a f f i c , e s p e c i a l l y i n c o c a i n e , o w n a g u n o r h a v e a g u n . . . a t th e ir
rea dy .” We have often re cog nized the propensity of drug traff

icker s to carr

y firea rms. See United Sta te s v . Ti ll , 434 F.3d 880, 884 ( 6 t h C i r. 2006) (aff irming district c ourt’s evide ntiary ruling that dr ug s f ound in p os se ssi on

of the de fe nd ant c on sti tut e d re le va nt e vid e nc e “ be c a

us e of the pr op e ns ity of pe op le inv olv e d w ithdr

ug s to c arr

y we a po ns ” ); Un ite d Sta te

s v . S waf for d , 385 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) (h old inga dmi ssi ble po lic e of fi c e r’ s te sti mony

that f ir e arm s a re c omm on ly

us e d in dr ugtr a ff ic kin g ); se e als o United States v. Estrada , 4 3 0 F. 3 d 606, 613 (2d Cir. 2005) (“ We have often re cog nized that firear ms are tools of the dr

ug trade that are commonly kept on t he pre mises of
ma jor na rc oti c s d e a le rs .” ). Un de r t he se c ir cum st anc e s, it w a s r e a so na ble fo r D e te c tiv e Da

vis to believe that Wi lliams mi g ht have a wea pon at the time of the a

rre st.No. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 9 - I t w a s a lso re a so na

ble fo r D a vis to b e lie ve that so me on e ot her th an the p oli c e mig ht g a in
acc ess to a we apon and inflict harm with it. Wil liams a rg ues that beca

use he wa s not questioned by Davis until after

he wa s place d in handcuf fs, he wa s no longe r a thre at to g rab a ny potential wea

pon. The Quarles public safe ty exception, however , has long permitted questions posed to a def endant in handcuf

fs. Most notably , in Quarles itself, the defe ndant was chase d and place d in ha ndcuff s befor e the
arr esting office r noticed that the defe ndant was wea ring an empty

holster. Quarles , 467 U.S. at 652. When the office r asked the defendant where the g un was, the de fenda nt nodded in the direc tion of empty car tons a nd responde d that the “g un is ove r there .” Id. The off icer found a loa ded .38-c aliber revolve r in the direc tion pointed to by the def endant. Id. I n rec og nizi ng the public safe ty exception to Miranda , the Court held t hat t he defenda nt’s statement and the gun wer e admissible. Id. at 659- 60. S i m i l ar l y , o u r s i s t er ci rc u i t s i ni n t er

p re t i n g Quarles have he ld that the public safe ty exception applies to inquirie s made whe n the def endant is handc uffe d. See, e .g., United States v. Lack ey , 334 F .3 d 122 4, 12 28 (1 0th

Cir . 2 00 3) ; United States v. Edwards , 885 F.2d 377, 384 n.4 ( 7th Cir. 1989); see also Estrada , 430 F.3d at 613 (holding that public sa fety exception applied when police asked, while handc uffingthe def endant, whet h er any

g uns were prese nt). But see United States v. Brath wai te , 4 58 F .3 d 3 76 , 3 82 n. 8 ( 5th Cir . 2 00 6) (f

ind ingpu bli c sa fe ty

e xce pti on

ina pp lic a ble wher e the de fenda

nts were handcuf

fed outside of their house a nd police off

icer s asked whe ther a

nyNo. 06-4134

United States v. W

illiams

- 10 - g uns were “ in theho us e ”). Thus, the fac t that Williams wa s handcuf fed at the time of his statement does not fore close the a

pplication of the Quarles exception. He re , w he n D a vis e nc ounte re d d e fe nd ant, he ob se rv e d Wil liams re a c hin g tow ard s a c e ra mic plate under

neath the couch, which Davis feare d had razor blades on it. As a re sponse to Wil liams’s movement, Davis instructe d other police office rs to move Wil liams away from the c ouch. I t was at this ti me that Davis asked Wil liams, f or “saf ety rea sons,” whether there wer e any wea pons involved in order “ to make sure there [were] n o we ap o n s in [ a nea rby chair or couc h] before w e move a suspect to it.” I t is evident from this context t hat Davis’s que stion was not posed as an investigatory interrog ation, but rather

as an attempt to prevent Will iams from ga i n i n g ac cess to a da ng erous
we a po n. Ac c or din g ly , w e ho ld t hat th e dis tr ic t c ourt

did no t e rr in d e nyingWilli a ms’ s mo tio n to suppress his statement and e vidence of the office r’s discovery of the fir ear m underne ath the couc h. V. For these rea sons, we af

firm the denia l of Wil liams’s motion t o suppress and his re sulting convictions.