Cover 

The virtually projected dragons, figuratively depicting the dynamic tensions and 

electrifying complexities of confrontation between strategy and technology, churn up a 

stormy ocean of theoretical concepts that stretches across a full spectrum of dimly 

masked actions and operations. Entwined like strands of DNA, this interlocking and 

encrypted relationship, coded by the Chinese approach to science and philosophy, shapes 

methods of engagement and manages their use of information within the multi-layered 

cultural mix now digitally manipulated and formed by the effects of world views. The 

vivid image provides an apt metaphor, both for the art of war and for information 

warfare, which accurately reflects this book’s decryptic focus on specific evolutions 

within the growing thrust and influence of Chinese thought. 

 
Decoding the Virtual Dragon

Timothy L. Thomas 

Foreign Military Studies Office 

Fort Leavenworth, KS 

2007 
The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the 

official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US government. 

The author works for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. FMSO is a component of the US Army's Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC). The office is charged with preparing studies and assessments based on the 

reading of foreign and domestic publications and through contacts with a network of 

foreign and US military and civilian security specialists. FMSO researches, writes, and 

publishes from unclassified sources about the military establishments, doctrines, and 

practices of selected foreign armed forces. It also studies a variety of civil-military and 

transnational security issues affecting the US and its military forces. FMSO products are 

prepared for the US Army and other services, the Department of Defense, as well as 

nonDoD organizations to include the Treasury and Justice Departments. 
FOREWORD 

This book expands upon Dragon Bytes, the author’s earlier work on Chinese information 

warfare (IW) activities from 1999-2003. Decoding the Virtual Dragon explains how Chinese IW 

concepts since 2003 fit into the strategic outlook, practices, and activities of the People’s 

Liberation Army (PLA). The book offers IW explanations directly from the pens of Chinese 

experts. There are few intermediate filters. In some cases direct translations of key Chinese terms 

are offered. The Chinese authors discuss the application or relation of IW to strategic thought, the 

transformation plans of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the revolution in military affairs 

(RMA), and the revolution in knowledge warfare and cognition. The book thus serves as a source 

for the fundamentals of Chinese military thought and demonstrates how IW/IO has been 

integrated into the art of war and strategy. 

China’s methodological and thought paradigms with regard to strategic IW issues are 

quite different from US paradigms. The PLA’s science of military strategy, for example, 

examines basic and applied theory as well as the objective and subjective aspects of strategy. US 

military strategy, on the other hand, uses a very different set of analytical tools and thought 

processes. It is more focused on ends, ways, and means or, more recently as US joint publications 

note, prudent ideas or sets of ideas. Decoding the Virtual Dragon underscores this difference in 

thought processes and explains how China’s strategic approach leads to different applications, 

methods, and conclusions with regard to IW. 

Decoding the Virtual Dragon is designed to update analysts about Chinese IW theory and 

practice. Of special interest is the Chinese focus on topics scarcely mentioned by US IW 

specialists such as mobilization exercises, the development of IW countermeasures, the theory of 

a science of information operations, the holistic and comprehensive approach to strategic issues, 

and a focus on preemption and IW stratagems. 

Both the general military reader and the Chinese security specialist will enjoy this 

integrated and progressive look at China’s IW development over the past several years. 

 Karl Prinslow 

 Director, Foreign Military Studies Office 

 July 2007
DEDICATION 

This book is dedicated to my children, 

Sally, Michael, and Matthew; and to my wife, Christine, who reviewed the manuscript 

and made it much better. I thank my children for their encouragement, support, and help 

along the way, and I thank my wife for her patience and willingness to ask probing 

questions that enabled me to get at the essence of Chinese IW. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 

The author used only open-source translations for the construction of this 

document. Since the author does not speak Chinese, he fully utilized the translation 

talents of the Open Source Center (formerly the Foreign Broadcast Information Service 

or FBIS) and other Chinese translators in order to write this book. The author is solely 

responsible for the selection and analysis of the material others translated. 

In particular, the author would like to acknowledge the support of five individuals 

who assisted with this project. First, and foremost, is Navy Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the 

Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command who is responsible for much of 

the translation support. Chief Zobel translated the entire contents of both On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs and An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare. He 

translated nearly half of the contents of Deciphering Information Security and selected 

sections of Direct Information War. Without his assistance, this work would not have 

been possible to assemble. Second, the author would like to thank Mr. Charles A. 

Martinson III of Fort Leavenworth who designed the cover artwork. Mr. Martinson’s 

visualization of the contents of this book is unique. His creativity is truly his trademark. 

The author would like to thank SPC Hommy Rosado and Mr. Randy Love of the Foreign 

Military Studies Office. SPC Rosado is responsible for the graphic work on tables found 

at the end of Chapters One and Two. Mr. Love monitored commercial translations of 

some material used in this work. Mr. Karl Prinslow, Acting Director of FMSO, ensured 

that funding for the translation of all Chinese material was available. 

Finally, the author would like to express his thanks to the Air Force Information 

Center in San Antonio, Texas for providing the financial support behind the printing of 

this book. Without their support this work would never have reached the multitude of 

analysts studying this topic. 
INTRODUCTION 

Over the past several years, Chinese information warfare (IW) and information 

operation (IO) capabilities have become more visible and troubling. These capabilities 

have been used actively in a series of events aimed at a variety of countries. It is 

unknown exactly how many Chinese IW reconnaissance or offensive events have 

transpired or the actual intent of these incursions. Several episodes have leaked into the 

public domain. Among the most notable are: 

 Espionage conducted against the US Department of Defense (DoD) 

computers, reported in Time magazine. The report concerned a Chinese 

cyber espionage ring that federal investigators code-named Titan Rain. Its 

target was DoD computers.1

 Chinese attempts to blind a US satellite, reported in Defense News. The 

report discussed high-powered Chinese laser attacks on a US satellite.2

 Chinese hacker attacks on the US Naval War College’s net capability, 

reported in Federal Computer Week. This attack purportedly originated 

from China and took systems off-line.3

 The Chinese destruction of an old Chinese weather satellite with an 

antisatellite missile, reported on National Public Radio. The report cited a 

Beijing People’s University commentator. He noted that “satellite killing 

technology is logical in the development of missiles and an IW 

capability.”4

 Hacker attacks against Japan or Taiwan, reported in the Japanese and 

Taiwanese press.5 The reports noted that these attacks were retaliations for 

Japan’s anti-Chinese interpretations of history and for Taiwanese claims 

for independence, respectively. 

The growing intensity of these IW attacks demands a closer look at China’s 

IW/IO philosophy and how it has evolved. This work attempts to accomplish that goal. 

Of particular interest is how IW has imbedded itself into the peacetime strategic activities 

of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and IW’s potential use as a preemptive strategy. 

Decoding the Virtual Dragon examines the views of prominent Chinese military 

theorists on the integration of IW/IO and strategy. It consists of an analysis of seven 

Chinese books and one Chinese journal article, all focused on information 

 

1

 Nathan Thornburgh, “The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies,” Time, 29 August 2005, downloaded from 

http://www.time.com on 23 January 2007. 2

 Vago Muradian, “China Tried to Blind US Sats with Laser,” Defense News, 25 September 2006, p. 1. 

3

 Josh Rogin, “Network Attack Disables Naval War College,” Federal Computer Week, 30 November 

2006, downloaded from http://www.fcw.com. 4

 Anthony Kuhn, National Public Radio, 19 January 2007, interview with Beijing representative. 5

 “Chinese Hackers Attack Taiwan Military Computers,” Taipei P’ing-kuo Jih-pao (Internet Version) 15 

May 2006, as reported in Open Source Center report CPP20060516310002. 
2 

warfare/information operations (IW/IO) related topics. Additionally, a chapter on strategy 

and information warfare from the author’s previous book Dragon Bytes is included. The 

chapter serves as a link between the old and the new on IW/IO and strategic issues. 

The books and article under consideration were chosen for their comprehensive 

approach and originality in the realm of strategic information warfare theory. Decoding 

the Virtual Dragon attempts to utilize the expertise of prominent authors to establish a 

framework behind the PLA’s understanding of developments and concepts and their IW 

application. These developments and concepts include such issues as the revolution in 

military affairs, war control, preemption, information superiority, and network centric 

warfare. In many ways Decoding the Virtual Dragon serves as a one-stop shop for IW/IO 

concepts and terminology. 

The Chinese authors or editors used for this scrutiny are not only some of the 

most well-known figures within the PLA but also some of the most creative and 

authoritative. This makes the present work more credible and germane. 

Shen Weiguang (Colonel, retired), the father of IW in China, is the author of 

Deciphering Information Security (Chapter Six) and he was a contributor and editor of 

the work On the Chinese Approach to the Revolution in Military Affairs (Chapter Three). 

Dai Qingmin (Major General, retired) authored Direct Information Warfare (Chapter 

Five) and was the Chief Examiner of the work Study Guide for Information Operations 

Theory (Chapter Eight). Yao Youzhi and Peng Guangqian, the editors of the work The 

Science of Military Strategy (Chapter One), are, respectively, the Chief of the Strategic 

Studies Department at the Academy of Military Science (AMS) and a research fellow of 

the same department. Both are active duty Major Generals in the PLA. Yao also was the 

Editor-in-Chief of Warfare Strategy Theory (Chapter Nine). These are just some of the 

outstanding authors whose works are analyzed herein. In addition, at the end of Chapters 

Five through Nine, the Tables of Contents of the books under consideration are provided 

for the reader. This will enable better comprehension of the broad sweep of issues that 

these authors examined. 

However, the reader should also be aware that this volume represents only a very 

small sampling of the number of books and articles on IW/IO in China. Further, the 

reader should be aware that the terminology used herein is Chinese and not US 

terminology. The term “informationization,” for example, is used often. It is another term 

for the US term “cyberization” according to The Science of Military Strategy. The term 

“informatized war,” according to the Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, is 

the Chinese equivalent of “network-centric warfare.” These are only a few of the new 

terms with which the reader will want to become acquainted. 

Not only do the Chinese use different IW vocabulary but they use different 

definitions, thought processes, and institutions for the study of IW. These issues include: 

 A different definition for strategy that examines basic and applied theory 

as well as the objective and subjective aspects of strategy. 
3 

 The use of an Academy of Military Science (an institution that does not 

exist in the US) to study the science of information operations (an 

academic discipline that does not exist in the US) 

 The use of stratagems to direct packets of electrons 

 The development of a University of Information Security 

 An updated version of Mao’s People’s War strategy that includes 

information warfare techniques and procedures 

 A focus on developing IW countermeasures (both technical and cognitive) 

to Western IW strengths 

 The frequent practice of information-related mobilization exercises. 

Chapter One is an analysis of China’s science of military strategy and thus 

provides the context from which to view the other works on IW/IO. The book under 

examination is a product of the Chinese Academy of Military Science and is titled The 

Science of Military Strategy. This academy, as does its Moscow counterpart (also called 

the Academy of Military Science, headed by Russian General Mahkmut Gareev at the 

time of this writing), offers rigor and an anchor for military (and information-related) 

thought. The US armed forces lack a similar dedicated think tank (an academy) for 

military science. The Science of Military Strategy provides a thorough analysis of the 

basic and applied aspects of the theory of strategy. The Chinese define and understand 

strategy differently than their US counterparts. The Chinese translated this book into 

English four years after its Chinese version first appeared in 2001, and the English 

version is used for this analysis. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter offer this 

author’s understanding of China’s military strategy in outline form. 

Chapter Two is a review of one article from the journal China Military Science. 

However, this article is of some importance because Major General Xu Xiaoyan, former 

Director of the Communications Department (also thought to handle IW issues) of the 

Chinese General Staff, was its author. The article outlines the military scientific approach 

to information operations, also known as the science of IO. Instead of the traditional 

subdivisions of basic and applied theory, the article’s author adds a third theoretical 

subdivision, technical theory. Major General Xu recommends more practical and less 

theoretical IO activity on the part of the PLA. Perhaps this is why Titan Rain and similar 

incursions are gaining in popularity in China. An outline of the science of IO is depicted 

in a diagram at the end of the chapter. 

Chapter Three takes a look at selected essays on the revolution in military affairs 

and the impact of this revolution on strategy and information operations. Several key 

military authors, to include the authors of the controversial Unrestricted Warfare, wrote 

essays for this book, titled On the Chinese Approach to the Revolution in Military 

Affairs. The work offers some key insights into how Chinese strategy will adapt to the 

demands of the information age. All of the chapter’s authors are well-known Chinese 

analysts of either strategy or information operation topics. 

Chapter Four is a reprint of a chapter from this author’s previous book Dragon 

Bytes. The chapter discusses the impact of the information age on strategy. It is included 
4 

in this volume since it provides background and continuity on the subject matter of IW 

stratagems. The chapter also allows readers not familiar with Dragon Bytes to know what 

discussion of strategy, stratagems, and their applicability to IW preceded this work. 

Chapter Five presents the thoughts of Dai Qingmin on networks and network 

warfare from his book Direct Information Warfare. The book is a compendium of 

definitions and examinations of the various aspects of network warfare. It also includes 

recommendations on what type of educational process the PLA needs to field a force 

capable of handling the intricacies of network theory and practice. Dai, former head of 

the IW Directorate of the Chinese General Staff, points out Chinese interest in two 

concepts: information supremacy and “integrated network-electronic warfare.” This 

chapter is, for the most part, a summary of Dai’s thoughts. The Table of Contents of the 

book is listed at the end of the chapter.

Chapter Six discusses the important information security work of Shen Weiguang, 

and is titled Deciphering Information Security. Shen describes a host of information 

security issues and lays out an entire program for an Information Security University. Of 

particular interest to military specialists is Shen’s description of the curriculum of the 

military studies section of the university. The curriculum stresses not only military issues 

but also economic ones. The Table of Contents of the book is listed at the end of the 

chapter.

Chapter Seven is a summary of the book An Interpretation of Network Centric 

Warfare. This book offers a Chinese understanding of the US network-centric warfare 

(NCW) concept and how the Chinese might adapt to it. The book is divided into twelve 

chapters. Its discussion and analysis are very detailed and indicative of how closely China 

studies all US military documents and lessons learned with regard to NCW, to include 

US military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The chapters of greatest interest are those on 

information superiority and NCW, how to integrate weapons into C4ISR and NCW 

systems, and battlefield management of NCW. Only the last chapter offers specific 

comments on China’s approach to NCW. The book’s Table of Contents is listed at the 

end of the chapter. 

Chapter Eight contains key IW/IO terms from the Study Guide for Information 

Operations Theory. This book contained 400 IO related questions. For Decoding the 

Virtual Dragon over a hundred pages of concepts from this work were translated in the 

identical question-and-answer format found in the original text and then these concepts 

were summarized/paraphrased for inclusion in this work. The chapter attempts to provide 

a Chinese understanding of selected IO related concepts in the words of the PLA. Terms 

such as informatized war, asymmetric war, principles and forms of IW, and other related 

ideas are discussed and defined. Some questions and answers selected for this chapter 

focus on how the Chinese view US concepts and policy such as network centric warfare. 

The Table of Contents is listed at the end of the chapter. 

Chapter Nine ends the book in much the way it began—with a look at strategy 

through the eyes of Yao Youzhi, who served as co-editor of The Science of Military 
5 

Strategy (2001), the focus of Chapter One in Decoding the Virtual Dragon. In Chapter 

Nine Yao edits Warfare Strategy Theory (2005). The chapter summarizes the parts of the 

book that focus on IW/IO and asymmetric warfare. Warfare Strategy Theory has four 

sections: warfare concepts, features of war, war preparations, and implementation. The 

Table of Contents is listed at the end of the chapter. 

Chapter Ten lists the analytical lessons that one takes from this decoding of the 

virtual dragon in the cyber age. They are very different from the conclusions that a US 

audience might take from a similar US study of IW/IO. Naturally, this is because the 

Chinese are greatly affected by their military science approach to armed conflict, their 

historical tradition of relying on strategy and stratagems, and their reliance on the 

dialectic as a way of thought among many other issues. 

There are four appendices to the book. Appendix One lists the titles of the articles 

in China Military Science, the journal of the Chinese Academy of Military Science, that 

discuss information warfare and related issues from 2004-2006. Appendix Two is a 

translation of approximately three pages on IW/IO concepts found in the Chinese 

Military Encyclopedia: information warfare, information warfare technology, and 

operations research and analysis of information warfare. Appendix Three is a summary of 

essays on information warfare collected by the author during his attendance at Sun Tzu 

Art of War conferences in China. Appendix Four is a translation of a key section from the 

book Forms of Information War by Dong Zifeng. The translation covers the mathematics 

of computing the strength of combat systems. 

On the following pages are photos of the book covers of the works under 

consideration listed from left to right, top to bottom in accordance with chapter 

chronology. 

Finally, to reiterate, this work serves as an extension to its predecessor, Dragon 

Bytes. The purpose of Decoding the Virtual Dragon is to look closely at China’s IW/IO 

philosophy and how it has evolved in accordance with the PLA’s strategic culture; and to 

assist analysts as they examine the development of Chinese IW/IO in the near and distant 

future. 
6 

 

MG Yao, MG Peng, editors, 

The Science of Military 

Strategy, 2001 

Col (ret.) Shen, editor, On 

the Chinese Revolution in 

Military Affairs, 2003 

MG (ret.) Dai, Direct 

Information War, 2002 

MG (ret.) Xu, “The Science 

of Information Operations,” 

China Military Science, 

2004
7 

Col (ret.) Shen, Deciphering 

Information Security, 2003 

Wong Zien Deh, editor, 

Interpretation of Network 

Centric Warfare, 2004 

MG (ret.) Dai, Director, A 

Study Guide for Information 

Warfare Theory, 2005 

MG Yao, editor, Warfare 

Strategy Theory, 2005 
8 

CHAPTER ONE: THE SCIENCE OF MILITARY STRATEGY 

This chapter summarizes The Science of Military Strategy edited by Peng Guangqian and 

Yao Youzhi, 2001.6

Introduction 

How to have our feet firmly planted in China and have the whole world in view, 

and in the strategic chain of the past, present, and future how to grasp the laws of 

the evolution of strategic theory and the macro tendency of the development of 

strategic theory to serve reality, that is the question crucial to the vitality of our 

strategic studies.7

The topic of strategy has long held a central place in Chinese military theory. 

From the earliest philosophers and tacticians to modern day military pundits, strategy and 

stratagems8 have formed a focal point for Chinese military writers. China’s ancient 

scholars, when assessing the character of China’s military culture, highlighted a specific 

military style thinking that “is good at strategy and adept at the use of the indirect 

method.”9 A recent report on China’s military culture noted the following: 

... Chinese scholars’ way of thinking was essentially a kind of wisdom and war, 

this lively confrontation between people with all its variables, this arena with all 

the traits of a game, which provided them with the best stage for giving free rein 

to their marvelous imaginations and creativity. While it is true that they attached 

importance to the substance of war, they attached even greater importance to 

bringing into play the subjective, dynamic roles of people, using strategy to gain 

victory, and they especially advocated not following one pattern and using the 

indirect to gain the upper hand.10 

Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong are probably the two most respected and often quoted 

Chinese strategic practitioners. There is hardly a bookstore in the US that does not have a 

copy of Sun Tzu’s Art of War on its shelves. Today even Western businessmen study 

 

6

 This author reviewed Peng and Yao’s The Science of Military Strategy and credits the content, concepts, 

and ideas to the book’s editors and authors of the individual chapters. The content of the book is reviewed 

based on translated material. Translation credit belongs to the PLA. 7

 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, editors, The Science of Military Strategy, Military Science Publishing 

House, Academy of Military Science of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, English version, 2005, p. 

32. 

8

 Stratagem generally refers to scheming and military strategy (or tactics—taolue); the war planning (or 

scheme, plot—mohua) employed by the two opposing combatants to be used at different levels of military 

strategy, military campaign, and military tactics in order to obtain victory. Military stratagem is a product 

of the development of war, the concrete manifestation of human subjective actions upon material forces. It 

reflects the general principles of military struggles, possessing a corresponding stable nature and vigorous 

liveliness. See the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Officer’s Handbook, Qingdao Publishing House, 

June 1991, p. 197. 

9

 Wang Xingsheng, “Chinese Intellectuals Paying Close Attention to Military Issues: Tradition and Its 

Impact on Military Culture,” China Military Science, 2002, No. 6, pp. 23-27. 

10 Ibid. 
9

Chinese strategic methods, to include the 36 stratagems of war, to enhance sales and 

negotiation techniques. 

According to Chinese theorists, stratagems and strategy have witnessed an 

evolutionary change over the past 30 years, especially in their application. The cause of 

change was the introduction of information technology and the miniaturization of 

weapons and equipment. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the introduction of 

microtechnologies, advanced missile technologies, the “cyberization” of weaponry (that 

is, the use of computer chips in weapons for guidance and precision, etc.), and the spread 

of military technologies into the civilian arena via the Internet. The Chinese also took US 

forces high-tech experiences in the 1991 Gulf War into strategic account. 

Such changes caused Chinese military planners to question the impact of 

information technology on military strategy and how future wars would be fought. Of key 

interest was how strategy and technology would be integrated, a question often proposed 

in articles, books, and official presentations. In addition to the integration issue, Chinese 

strategists attempted to keep the “big picture” or long term development of the military in 

view as another important focal point. Chinese strategists think holistically, having “the 

whole world in view” as well as the “strategic chain of the past, present, and future” 

when pondering how to fight future wars. 

Two major open source Chinese military works attempted to take these 

developments and interests under consideration. In 1987, General Gao Rui, a former Vice 

President at the Academy of Military Science (AMS), China’s premier military think 

tank, edited a comprehensive open source update of Chinese views on strategy. The 

manuscript was titled The Science of Military Strategy. It was the first book written and 

published on strategy in the history of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). A decade 

later in 1997, the Chinese military published the Chinese Military Encyclopedia. The 

encyclopedia’s index contained a comprehensive overview of strategic concepts. For 

example, the word “strategic” was followed by other terms (pivot, thought, surprise, etc.) 

seventy-eight times in the index while terms associated with the words strategic or 

strategy were used twenty-one times. A 2002 addendum to the encyclopedia added 

another twelve strategy-related items. 

However, the pace of change soon overtook not only Gao’s book but also the 

military encyclopedia’s information. Informationization,11 nanotechnologies, economic 

globalization, the multipolarization of the strategic situation, and the emergence of hightech local war continued to recast Chinese military thinking on strategic issues. As a 

result, AMS decided in 2000 to update Gao’s work in a volume under the same title.12

The book was published in 2001 with new editors Yao Youzhi and Peng Guangqian. 

They are, respectively, the Chief of the Strategic Studies Department at AMS and a 

research fellow of the same department. Both are Major Generals in the PLA and are 

 

11 The Chinese note on page 492 of The Science of Military Strategy that the term informationization is the 

same as cyberization. The author will use informationization in this text but the reader may insert the more 

familiar term cyberization in its place. 

12 Peng and Yao, p. 503. 
10

known for their thoughtful (and sometimes controversial) strategic analysis. Peng, for 

example, was recently quoted in the Chinese press as stating that the US would not come 

to Taiwan’s aid in case of a war between Taiwan and China. Yao was identified as 

President of the China Research Society of Sun Tzu’s Art of War (CRSSTAW). 

Interestingly, the 2001 book appeared just two years after a 1999 recasting of Chinese 

rules and regulations (the Chinese equivalent of doctrine). Therefore, the book should 

offer a look at how new rules and regulations affect strategy. 

Peng and Yao’s Science of Military Strategy is an examination of Chinese 

military strategy from a historical, cultural, and contemporary vantage point. The 

postscript to the book notes that 

The project team tried their best to write a theoretical work which is guided by the 

Marxist scientific concepts of war and strategy and based on our national and 

military situation; combines inheritance and development, imitation, and 

innovation; has the Chinese characteristics and features of the current time; and 

can play a guiding role in implementing the military strategic guidelines in the 

new era.13

Work on the volume began in earnest only in July of 2000, so the product represents a 

fairly quick turnaround. 

A well-qualified cadre of professors from China’s Academy of Military Science 

along with a few other noted scholars helped write the book. Thirty-seven names are 

listed as contributors (the book’s postscript noted that more than forty people contributed 

to the work). Twenty-three of the thirty-seven are members of the Academy of Military 

Science’s Department of Strategic Studies, three are members of the AMS Department of 

Research Guidance, three are from the AMS Department of Military Systems Studies, 

two are from the AMS Institute of Operations Research, and one is from the AMS 

Department of Operations and Tactical Studies. Non-AMS participants included one 

person from the Center for Peace and Development Studies, the vice editor-in-chief of 

China Military Science, the chief of the editorial board of Military Art Journal, a former 

chief of Military Science Press, and one person who had no affiliation listed and was 

listed as just candidate for PhD in Military Science. There is no listing as to who wrote 

each chapter, however, so Peng and Yao are cited as the editors in all footnotes. 

The book has three parts: The Basis of the Science of Strategy; The General Laws 

of War and the Conduct of War; and High Tech Local War and Strategic Guidance on It. 

The editors introduce the concept of “science of strategy” (SOS) in the first chapter as 

well as the SOS’s two subdivisions, basic strategy and applied strategy. The book’s 

chapters follow the basic outline of these subdivisions, which the authors establish in the 

first chapter. Chapters Two through Five of Part One discuss basic strategy. Chapters Six 

through Nineteen of Part Two discuss applied strategy. Chapters Twenty through 

Twenty-Four in Part Three discuss how high-tech local war affects the application of 

strategy. The subdivisions of the SOS give the volume the needed rigor and definitive 

 

13 Ibid. 
11

outline required to cover such an expansive topic. It is important to remember, however, 

that the book was written before 9/11/2001. As a result this work represents Chinese 

strategic thinking prior to (and without the hindsight of) the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The discussion below attempts to capture the essence of contemporary Chinese 

strategic thought as it appeared in the 2001 publication. It is designed to serve as a 

reference point on Chinese military strategy for the reader, a contextual framework from 

which to view Chinese IW concepts and their impact on Chinese policy and thinking. IW 

viewed in isolation offers little of interest. Understanding China’s strategic framework is 

of significant interest as a way to forecast how IW might be employed and which 

methodologies the PLA might choose. 

Peng and Yao devoted one entire chapter of the text to a specific analysis of 

strategy’s relation to information operations/warfare. A summary of this chapter can be 

found below under the section titled “Strategic Information Operations.” 

In 2005 the Academy of Military Science published an English version of the 

2001 edition of The Science of Military Strategy and this version is used for the summary 

analysis that follows. 

Understanding the Chinese Concept of Strategy 

Official Definitions 

For purposes of contrasting different ways that strategy is understood, both the 

US and Chinese military definitions of strategy will be compared. Official US 

publications, such as Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms, defined strategy until 2006 as “the art and science of 

developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and 

integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”14 A 

shortened version of this definition is just “the art and science of applying power to 

achieve objectives.” In September 2006 the term was redefined in JP 1-02 as “a prudent 

idea or set of ideas for employing instruments of national power in a synchronized and 

integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives.”15 Within 

the umbrella of strategy the JP also defines strategic psychological activities, strategic 

plan, strategic mission, strategic level of war, strategic concept, and strategic advantage. 

The PLA’s Military Encyclopedia defines strategy in the following way: 

Strategy is the analytical judgment of such factors as international conditions, 

hostilities in bilateral politics, military economics, science and technology, and 

geography as they apply to the preparation and direction of the overall 

military/war plan. It is advantageous: to study the occurrences and developments 

 

14 Joint Publication 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001, downloaded 

from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html, for all terms as amended through 31 August 

2005. 

15 Ibid., as amended through September 2006. 
12

in war forecasting/predictions; to formulate strategic policy, strategic principles, 

and strategic plans; to make warfare preparations; and to put into place directives 

on the actual principles and methods of warfare.16

The PLA’s The Science of Military Strategy defines strategy in shorter fashion. 

First, in a chapter on strategic thinking, strategy is defined as “a general plan to prepare 

and direct the preparation and implementation of war.”17 Second, Peng and Yao refer to 

two Chinese classics that defined strategy. In the 1936 work Problems of Strategy in 

China’s Revolutionary War, Mao Zedong defined strategy as “the study of the laws of a 

war situation as a whole.”18 By “war situation as a whole” Mao meant that a war situation 

requires a comprehensive consideration of its various aspects and stages. The 1997 book 

Military Terms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army defined the term strategy in the 

same way as Mao, according to Peng and Yao.19 Finally, Peng and Yao note that strategy 

is designed to address the following problem: who takes what means in how large a scope 

to gain what purpose? This latter understanding of strategy is somewhat similar to a US 

discussion of strategy by J. Boone Bartholomees, who writes for the US Army War 

College. He noted that strategy asks questions such as “what is it I want to do? What do I 

have or what can I reasonably get that might help me do what I want to do? And what is 

the best way to use what I have to do what I want to do?”20 Another definition of strategy 

used at the US Army War College is in broader use. It is attributed to Art Lykke who 

stated that “strategy = ends + ways + means.” Lykke added that if these three elements 

were not in balance, then there must be an assumption of greater risk.21

Factors Affecting Strategy: Chinese Views 

The editors of The Science of Military Strategy note that when determining 

strategy, strategists must take into consideration national interests, war strength, and war 

potential of opposing forces. They must also consider both international and domestic 

political situations. International political situations include international political 

configurations, international coalitions and international organizations, the strategic 

intentions of major states, and the overall balance of power. Strategists must also 

consider the influence and restrictions of domestic politics. That is, strategists must take 

into consideration the nature of state politics (military strategy is determined by politics 

and military strategy’s aim is subject to that of politics); the classes, nationalities, 

religions, and interest groups of a state; and the political situation in a state.22

Strategy is affected by geo-strategic relationships as well, the editors add. There 

are natural geographic elements (a state’s geographic position, size, and shape of 

territory; natural resources; national capital; national boundaries; distance between states; 

 

16 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Vol. 3, July 1997, p. 699. 

17 Peng and Yao, p. 130. 

18 Ibid., p. 9. 

19 Ibid., p. 10. 

20 J. Boone Bartholomees, “A Survey of the Theory of Strategy,” editor, US Army War College Guide to 

National Security Policy and Strategy, Second Edition, 16 June 2006, p. 81, as downloaded from the 

Internet on 5 July 2006 at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/policy_strategy.pdf. 21 Ibid., p.110. 

22 Peng and Yao, pp. 53-55. 
13

and grand strategic space) and human geographic elements that affect strategy. Based on 

this relationship, an assessment of the security environment and an orientation of a state’s 

strategic role must be made to include judgments on the direction of the main strategic 

threat and a determination of the key points of strategic attack and defense. There are 

vital interests between states, between the interests of nations and religions, between 

various strategic alliances, and between geo-economic relations that may determine the 

lineups of certain players.23 Thus, a strategic study must be comprehensive, and it must 

view war from various aspects and stages (space, time, etc.).24 

Peng and Yao looked at operations from the aspect of strategy and noted that 

according to its nature and form, strategy is described as offensive and/or defensive; that 

the time feature of strategy is either quick decision or protraction; that the space feature 

of strategy is ground, air, sea, and outer space strategy; that the application feature of 

strategy is war-fighting and deterrence strategy; and that the major means of strategy are 

nuclear, conventional, and high-tech.25 Mao noted that war is a contest in subjective 

ability between commanders of opposing armies for the initiative and attainment of 

superiority on the basis of material conditions such as military forces and financial 

resources. Science and technology, the economy, politics, and military power and 

potential formulate the objective elements for military strategy.26 

Factors Affecting Strategy: US Views 

The “Guidelines for Strategy Formulation” (found in Appendix One of the US 

Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy) are a scientific, 

creative art that follows certain patterns requiring a common understanding of 

terminology and adherence to certain principles. Strategy is developed according to time, 

place, and personalities involved. Enduring values and beliefs are the start point for 

national purpose, representing the legal, philosophical, and moral basis for the 

continuation of the American system. Core interests (ends) are physical security, the 

promotion of values, and economic prosperity. The ways and means to obtain these 

objectives are based on the national leadership’s strategic vision which has ranged from 

isolationism, global engagement, containment, and primacy. Grand strategic means 

involve America’s national elements of power at the broadest level.27 The strategist must 

be able to develop strategies employing all of these elements. 

Policy is the start point for strategy formulation at the national level. This 

involves identifying US interests; level of intensity of each; an evaluation of issues, 

trends, and challenges; determination of objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and 

resources (means) to achieve the objectives; feasibility of options; conduct of risk 

management; and presentation of policy recommendations. The analysis must also 

identify opportunities and threats to US interests. Strategy formulation at any level 

 

23 Ibid., pp. 62-72. 

24 Ibid., p. 9. 

25 Ibid., pp. 15-17. 

26 Ibid., p. 57. The three stages of protracted war were listed as the enemy’s strategic offensive and friendly 

strategic defense, the enemy’s strategic consolidation and friendly preparation for the counter-offensive, 

and friendly counter-offensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat. 27 Bartholomees, pp. 387-389. 
14

employs a strategic thought process based on balancing ends, ways, and means.28

Strategy should always be end-driven to ensure maximum opportunity to achieve 

objectives. Each option considered must be examined according to feasibility, 

acceptability, and suitability, and must be subjected to a risk assessment. The latter is 

essential to assess consequences if full success is not attained, to include unforeseen 

second and third order effects.29

National security interests are the start point for defining strategic objectives for 

national security related strategies. Interests are fundamental concerns of the nation and 

are written as conditions without verbs, action modifiers, or intended actions. The 

intensity of interests determines the priority accorded to them, whether they are vital, 

important, or peripheral. It is important that interests NOT become a function of a threat 

since this may skew how commitments and resources are allocated.30

The Science of Strategy 

The focal point for the broader concept of strategy in the 2001 version of The 

Science of Military Strategy is the term “science of strategy (SOS).” There is no 

definition in JP 1-02 for the “science of strategy.” The SOS is defined as the military 

science that studies the laws of war, the laws of the conduct of war, and the laws of the 

evolution of strategic thought. Its role is to reveal the essence of war and strategy, the 

various objective elements that influence strategy, and the operating functions and 

inherent laws that govern strategic thinking activities and strategic “guidance” activities 

in war.31 The SOS affects military organization, management, law, mobilization, training, 

and equipment. It also absorbs the achievements of natural science and other social 

sciences and disciplines. Peng and Yao note that the SOS is a military science 

characterized by politics, antagonism, comprehensiveness, stratagem, practice, and 

prediction.32 

This last sentence is extremely important because it contains the essence of many 

Chinese strategic elements discussed over the years. Peng and Yao refer to politics, for 

example, as the soul of strategy. Antagonism most likely refers to contradiction and the 

dialectic, or the idea that concepts are always in competition with one another (first there 

is a thesis, then an anti-thesis, resulting in a synthesis, etc.). The dialectic is a Hegelian 

concept concerning the process of change in which a concept is converted into its 

opposite. 

Comprehensiveness, the third item in the list, is expressed as a comparison of 

either certain factors in international relations or various Chinese internal factors. The 

term “comprehensive” is an all-inclusive method for examining a state’s power base. It is 

different from the old Soviet term meaning correlation of forces in that it is a more 

holistic consideration of the impact of many issues on strategy and power: the economy, 

 

28 Ibid., pp. 389-390. 

29 Ibid., p. 391. 

30 Ibid., p. 390. 

31 Peng and Yao, p. 2. 

32 Ibid., p. 27. 
15

culture, the military, and other such issues. Examples of Peng and Yao’s use of the term 

“comprehensive” in their book include the following: 

 Comprehensive national power (CNP) 

 Comprehensive sea power (CSP) 

 Comprehensive strategic interest (CSI) 

 Comprehensive strategic targets (CST) 

 Comprehensive strategic benefits (CSB) 

 Comprehensive cyberized war (CCW) 

 Comprehensive confrontation capacity (CCC) 

 Comprehensive national defense construction (CNDC) 

 Comprehensive support efficiency (CSuE) 

 And comprehensive national strategy (CNS). 

The term comprehensive national power is calculated year by year by specific institutes 

in China based on select criteria. 

The concept of stratagems is perhaps the most important characteristic of the SOS 

since it represents the methodology of expressing strategy in practical terms. According 

to the records of the Han Dynasty, ancient Chinese military strategists were classified 

according to one of four groups: power and stratagem, disposition and capability, Yin and 

Yang, and technique and skill.33 The purpose of the group known as power and 

stratagem was “to defend the state by orthodox methods and to use force by unorthodox 

methods” with the latter sounding quite similar to the US concept of asymmetric war. 

Modern day Chinese strategists are closest to the power and stratagem group according to 

Peng and Yao. They note that the SOS is “a science of wisdom to sum up the laws of 

using stratagems.”34 Peng and Yao add that Caesar thought stratagem was more 

important than arms, and that Lenin said there cannot be war without stratagems. Western 

strategic theories, the editors note, appear to be more disordered and not very systematic 

in comparison with China’s strategic abstraction and generalization.35 

Finally, the editors note that practice and prediction are also characteristics of the 

SOS. Practice means that strategy is not simply based on pure thinking. The science of 

strategy rests with practice.36 However this may be the weakest link in the PLA’s theory 

of strategy. They have not “practiced” much in the past 50 years other than in local 

exercises. Prediction is not based on simple analogy or inference but rather from a deep 

analysis of all relevant elements and intentions based on a full and complete 

understanding of the objective conditions.37 Again, Chinese theorists may not be able to 

predict as well as they might expect due to a lack of practice. 

 

33 Ibid., p. 5. 

34 Ibid., p. 27. 

35 Ibid., p. 94. 

36 Ibid., p. 26. 

37 Ibid., p. 28. 
16

The SOS is very precise and detailed. It has two classes or subdivisions: basic 

strategic theory and applied strategic theory. The next two sections of this chapter, 

devoted to these issues, are short summaries of the important points of each. These 

summaries are paraphrases of key issues intended to allow the reader to attain for her or 

himself a Chinese view on each issue. 

A detailed outline of the science of strategy is located at Diagrams 1A-1C at the 

end of this chapter. These diagrams are the result of this author outlining Peng and Yao’s 

final discussion of the theoretical system of the science of strategy. The diagrams are 

unique for their visualization of the elements of strategy from a Chinese perspective, a 

dissection not familiar to US audiences.38 

Basic Theory of Strategy: Basis of the Science of Strategy 

General: Primary Divisions of Strategy’s Basic Theory 

The Chinese military subdivides the basic theory of strategy as follows: 

 Concept of Strategy (the relationship between war and strategy, targets 

and categories of SOS studies, scientific connotations of strategy, status of 

SOS in military art, strategic elements, strategic classifications, and 

stratified structure) 

 Related Elements of Strategy (politics, economy, science and technology, 

national interests, geography, cultural tradition, military force) 

 Development History and Evolutionary Laws of Strategic Theory (study 

of historical paths leading toward the development of strategic theory) 

 Essence and Laws of Strategic Thinking (considers strategic thinking as 

the top level of military art based on the dialectic) 

 Methods of Science of Strategy Studies (scientific theories of knowledge 

and methodology in the strategic field. They orient, process, and examine 

strategy and look at the integration of abstraction, logic, systems, and 

Marxism and case studies). 

Concept of Strategy 

Peng and Yao note that there are strategic concepts called the determinants of 

strategy. However, before listing these, the editors made the following statement that 

gives an overall view of strategy from a Marxist viewpoint: 

The objective physical conditions of war determine the laws of war as well as the 

guiding laws of war. Although strategy manifests itself in a war conductor’s 

activities of subjective guidance, it is by no means the war conductors’ personally 

extemporary elaboration. Instead it is based on given objective physical 

conditions and restricted by a certain social mode of production and certain social 

conditions of history. Therefore, it is an important task for studies of the science 

 

38 The words that served as the basis for this diagram can be found on pages 29-35 of the English version of 

The Science of Military Strategy. 
17

of strategy to correctly analyze the objective elements having a bearing on war 

strategy and reveal their inherent connections with war strategy.39

Many of the primary characteristics of the Chinese concept of strategy shine 

through in this quote. First, Chinese strategists look at objective conditions such as the 

number of forces opposing them, the terrain, the level of science and technology in a 

country, a country’s defense budget, and so on. They then use creativity and stratagems 

(subjective guidance) to manipulate these objective factors to their benefit. Strategists are 

limited based on the economic conditions of the regime (social mode of production 

determines the type of weapons available) and military history and culture (social 

conditions of history that influence when force will be used and when diplomacy will be 

used). 

Related Elements of Strategy 

Even though strategy is determined by the application of subjective guidance to 

the objective conditions before it, there are other determinants as well. The editors list 

seven elements of strategy—politics, economy, science and technology, geography, 

cultural tradition, military force, and national interest. The latter element is the most 

important. It is both the starting point and destination of military strategy according to the 

editors.40 

The editors define national interest as the first determinant of strategy. It is an 

aggregate of objectively physical and spiritual requirements of a state whose existence 

and development depend on such interests being protected. Spheres of national activities 

can be divided into national political interest, national economic interest, national 

military interest, and so on. Generally speaking, national interests involve national 

territory, security, sovereignty, development, stability, and dignity.41 

War strength and war potential are a second determinant of strategy. Both 

elements help determine the material base for strategic planning, are the fundamental 

means to win wars and secure military strategic objectives, are the means to contain and 

restrict war, and are the most active elements in the ability to change military strategy.42

A third determinant is the geo-strategic relationship. This includes the components of the 

geo-strategic relationship, such as geographic position, size and shape of territory, natural 

resources, the national capital’s location, frontiers and national boundaries, relative 

distance between states, and grand strategic space (maritime, atmospheric, and outer 

space).43

Another determinant of extreme importance is culture. The editors define culture 

as “the sum total of a state or a nation’s spiritual and material precipitations accumulated 

under a long-period of influence of its natural circumstances, social pattern, and 

 

39 Peng and Yao, p. 39. 

40 Ibid., p. 30. 

41 Ibid., pp. 39-44. 

42 Ibid, pp. 55-62. 

43 Ibid., pp. 62-72 
18

economic level.”44 Strategic thought is always formed on the basis of certain historical 

and national cultural traditions, and the formulations and performance of strategy are 

always controlled and driven by a certain cultural ideology and historical cultural 

complex.45 Different cultures bring various understandings of our world to the table. The

significance of strategic culture, the editors note, primarily lies in providing a 

fundamental paradigm for decision makers to cognize and judge the strategic 

environment. 

China has developed the concepts of peaceful coexistence and a virtuous 

interaction between states as its model while Western mainstream culture, Peng and Yao 

believe, stresses a struggle for existence (Darwinist) or the law of the jungle.46 Conflictoriented strategy still holds a strong place in Western strategic culture. Expansion and the 

seizure of hegemony are Western strategic targets while China’s has been an introverttype behavior whose targets are peace, safeguarding national territories, and seeking 

unification and resisting aggression.47 Clearly, Yao, Peng, and the other contributors to 

this The Science of Military Strategy view Chinese intentions and their interpretation of 

Western strategic culture differently than do many in the West! 

Further, with regard to culture (and indirectly to the issue of Taiwan) it was noted 

that 

The cultural history of the Chinese nation lasted more than 5000 years without 

interruption, forming a national cultural tradition with its unique characteristics. 

The benevolence and self-discipline of the Confucius school, the slight to force 

and indifference to fame and fortune of the Taoist school, the diligence and 

sincerity of the Mohist school, the tactics and stratagem of military science, the 

sizing up of situations of political strategists and the education on farming and 

warfare of legalists all had tremendous influence on Chinese strategic thinking 

and strategic culture. Chinese philosophy values identity and unification. Chinese 

history is a history of a unified multi-national state for more than 2000 years. All 

these imprint firmly and deeply the idea of unification on the psychology of the 

nation.48

A final determinant of strategy is international law. It is a code of conduct having 

a legally binding force on every state in international relations. Subcomponents of 

international law include systems and fundamental principles, influences and restrictions, 

and the relativity and limited validity of international law. This latter point implies the 

Chinese envision a degree of flexibility in their interpretation and use of international 

law. 

 

44 Ibid., p. 31. 

45 Ibid. 

46 For a more detailed explanation of China’s view of US culture, see Ren Xiangqun, “The Influence of 

Mainstream Cultural Traditions on US War Decisions,” China Military Science, Issue 4, 2004, pp. 127-

136. This is one of the best Chinese interpretations of US culture to appear in this journal. 47 Peng and Yao, pp. 72-77. 

48 Ibid., p. 128. 
19

History and the Evolution of the Laws of Strategic Theory 

An important subdivision of the basic theory of strategy is the evolution of the 

laws of strategic theory. The editors highlight Marxist theory as the forerunner of a 

revolution in strategic theory, and PLA writers today and in the future are expected to 

continue to stress the importance of Marxism. Peng and Yao note that 

The scientific world outlook of Marxism, like an illuminating light, brightens 

military science, founding military strategic theories on the scientific base of 

historical materialism, so it becomes a science in a real sense. Marx’s principle on 

People’s War and his strategic thought of active defense and concentration of 

forces are of epoch-making significance in the history of the development of 

strategy.49

The historical influence of Marxism cannot be overestimated. In 1849, Peng and 

Yao note, it was Engels who suggested the People’s War concept. That is, Engels and not 

Mao is the father of the concept of People’s War. Both Marx and Engels held that the 

most effective defense is active defense, where one can influence the enemy by defensive 

actions and thereby not be controlled by the enemy.50 Mao Zedong’s military strategic 

theory is the practical application and specific reflection of Marxist military theory in the 

Chinese revolutionary war. “Mao Zedong’s military strategic theory is a China-styled 

Marxist military strategic theory,” the editors note.51 The editors state that the main parts 

of Mao’s Marxist view of strategy shows that the law directing war as a whole reflects an 

essential relationship among component parts and factors of the entire war.52 Mao’s main 

role is serving as the integrator of thoughts. 

According to Peng and Yao it is the political objective that forms the fundamental 

basis of military strategy. Political mobilization and political programs are the “soul of 

military strategy.” Strategy must be formulated with the characteristics and development 

of war in general taken into consideration. Each war (revolutionary war, general war, 

etc.) has its own specific laws. 

Finally the implementation of strategy is a contest between the subjective ability 

of commanders of both sides to direct the war.53 Mao noted that war is a contest in 

subjective ability between commanders of opposing armies for the initiative and 

superiority on the basis of material conditions such as military forces and financial 

resources.54 

Laws of Strategic Thinking 

The laws of strategic thinking are another subdivision of the basic theory of 

strategy. Strategic thinking formulates, according to strategic factors, strategic thought, 

 

49 Ibid., p. 126. 

50 Ibid., p. 102. 

51 Ibid., p. 104. 

52 Ibid. 

53 Ibid., pp. 104-107. 

54 Ibid., p. 107. 
20

strategic guidelines, and strategic decisions. Strategic thinking is the specific 

manifestation of thinking at the top level of military art and the specific application of 

epistemology and methodology in military arenas.55 All modes of thinking such as logicthinking, image-thinking and inspiration-thinking can theoretically raise the quality of 

strategic thinking. These modes reflect practice and are the specific processes of thinking 

by the strategic conductor.56 The characteristics of strategic thinking that Peng and Yao 

describe include: 

 Totality (comprehensive look at the parts and elements) 

 Confrontation (contest of material and spiritual forces) 

 Certainty (start with the fact that war is full of uncertainty about the 

enemy situation but end with certain conclusions about the enemy) 

 Foresight (use history, current factors, wisdom, and resolution to visualize 

future war) 

 Creativity (the soul of strategic thinking requires subjective initiative to 

surpass experience and tradition) 

 And inheritance (culture).57

Peng and Yao listed five models of strategic thinking. Objective and subjective 

thinking is one model. Objective strategic thinking refers to thinking activities which, 

taking war as a start point, reflect the objective laws of war and strategy. Subjective 

strategic thinking refers to thinking activities that make strategic judgments and decisions 

based on subjective will, especially the data and experience in one’s mind. Closed and 

open strategic thinking is a second model. Closed strategic thinking relies on experience 

and tradition and does not make or rely on information exchanges with the outside world. 

Open strategic thinking means models that exchange information with the outside world 

and are good at substituting old thinking methods with methods full of vigor and 

adaptability.58

A third model of strategic thinking is the stratagem type and force type, divided 

according to the application of strength (soft stratagem or hard force) applied by the 

strategic subject. Winning by stratagem has always “been the main idea of traditional 

Chinese strategic thinking. It means the use of limited force to achieve victory or to 

realize the aim of the war.” Western thinking, according to Peng and Yao, pays more 

attention to contests of strength, emphasizing direct confrontation or force type models.59

Two final models are conservative versus creative strategic thinking; and unitary versus 

systematic strategic thinking.60

 

55 Ibid., p. 130. 

56 Ibid., p. 131. The Chinese military often use the term “strategic conductor.” It can have singular or plural 

meaning. 

57 Ibid., pp. 132-133. 

58 Ibid., pp. 134-135. 

59 Ibid., p. 135. 

60 Ibid., pp. 136-137. 
21

The laws of strategic thinking according to Peng and Yao also include “ways” 

that strategic thinkers direct wars in order to understand the problems of war as a whole. 

Also called methods, these “ways” include the following: 

 Macro operations (know the situation as a whole) 

 Historical deductive methods (discover general laws, apply them under 

new conditions) 

 Methods of system integration (introduce the achievement of system 

science into the process of strategic thinking, examine and view wars as a 

total unit) 

 Methods of mathematical reasoning (rely on quantitative analysis, the 

collection, collation, computation, and analysis of data using numerical 

value as a measuring criterion) 

 Methods of dynamic tracking (how a subject dynamically understands the 

situation by following flows of personnel, material, and information—

studying the fluidity of war to understand its development and feel its 

pulse) 

 Methods of stratagem confrontation (thinkers must confront the enemy 

through deducing the war in his/her mind and directing strategic activities 

with better wisdom–analyze truth and falseness, compare strength and 

weakness, and employ orthodox and unorthodox tactics via dialectics. A 

stratagem is made up of dialectics, logic, math, and other scientific 

methods) 

 Methods of prediction (make correct inferences or judgments based on 

knowledge of the objective laws of war) 

 And methods of experiment and simulation.61

Chinese Methods of Strategic Studies 

Strategic studies are cognitive activities in the sphere of strategy, a process to 

raise, analyze, and solve strategic problems. The Chinese believe that Marxist methods 

provide a golden key to analyze strategic problems comprehensively, dialectically, 

objectively, systematically, continuously, concretely, and connectedly.62 Just and unjust 

wars fall under this category of methods as well. Just wars facilitate the progress of 

society and promote the liberation of productive forces, such as People’s War, 

revolutionary, and anti-aggressive war. Wars are unjust if they hinder society’s progress 

and strangle new productive forces. 

General methods of scientific study are cognitive methods and include specific 

applications of the Marxist philosophical method. Frequently used methods in strategic 

studies, which differ little from US methods, are the inductive (method of inference from 

individual to general), deductive (deduce from general to individual), analogy (inference 

from similarity between two things to that of two other things), and mathematical (judge 

 

61 Ibid., pp. 138-143. 

62 Ibid., p. 150. 
22

the development of something from its quantity). Specific methods of scientific study, on 

the other hand, include: 

 Systematic analysis (view war as a whole by taking mutual relations and 

the influence of exterior environments into consideration) 

 Statistical analysis (collect data and then calculate or categorize according 

to qualitative definitions to express quantity in the form of figures) 

 Comparative study (philosophical, historical, political, strategic, and 

cultural viewed in time, space, and qualitative and quantitative 

comparison) 

 Cause and effect analysis (for example, finding the relation between 

history and reality from a dialectical materialist interpretation of events) 

 And social investigation (using sample or model investigations).63

Chinese specific study methods also deal with case studies. They include the 

study of selected battles, war simulations, live operational demonstrations, and the 

synthetic analysis of military situations (which sums up all military intelligence and 

strategic information gathered from various sources to determine their inherent 

relation).64 

Applied Theory: General Laws of War and the Conduct of War 

General: Primary Divisions of Strategy’s Applied Theory 

The second subdivision of the Science of Strategy (SOS) is applied theory. 

Applied theory is the practical system that studies the laws of strategic guidance. It 

consists of two parts, strategic formulation and strategic performance. These two parts are 

further subdivided as follows: 

Applied Theory of Strategy 

1. Strategic Formulation 

a. Strategic Judgment (nature of a threat, posture, intention) 

b. Strategic Decision making (strategic aim, mission, guidelines, and 

deployment) 

c. Strategic Planning (pre-arrangements for war) 

2. Strategic Performance 

a. Strategic Guidance for the Construction of Military Force 

b. Strategic Guidance for the Employment of Military Force (operations 

such as strategic command; strategic maneuver, strategic offense and 

strategic defense; strategic air raid and anti-air raid; strategic IW; 

strategic psychological warfare; and strategic support. Developing 

laws for high-tech local wars is a new field in this subset) 65

 

63 Ibid., pp. 152-155. 

64 Ibid., pp. 156-158. 

65 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
23

Only one subset of strategic formulation (strategic planning) and one subset of strategic 

performance (strategic guidance for the employment of military force) will be covered 

below. Short summaries are presented of each. 

Strategic Planning: Subset of Strategic Formulation 

Strategic planning is of particular interest. Peng and Yao note that the task of 

strategic planning is to restrict war, make war preparations, and win victory in war, in 

that order.66 A wise strategist’s first step is to soberly estimate the war strength and 

potential of an opposing force in order to analyze the basis of war.67 Intimidation, 

efficient war power, limited deterrence means, and some form of parity are the best ways 

to contain and restrict war.68 There are three elements to carry out a deterrence strategy: 

appropriate military strength, resolve, and the will to use force. It is necessary to persuade 

an opponent to perceive such strength and resolve. Deterrence strategy can be subdivided 

as follows: according to purpose and nature into offense and defense; according to degree 

into superiority, parity, limited, and minimum; according to scope into overall and 

partial; and according to structure into conventional, nuclear and bio-chemical weapons.69

War preparations should be underway even in peacetime in case strategies to contain and 

restrict war fall short. 

Strategic Guidance for the Employment of Military Force: Subset of Strategic 

Performance 

This section offers short summaries (usually one or two paragraphs) of chapters 6-

19; and a short summary of Part Three (“High-Tech Local War and Strategic Guidance 

on It”) of The Science of Military Strategy. The titles of each chapter are listed in italics

at the start of each section. The purpose of these summaries is to highlight for the reader 

the various elements of Chinese strategic thought. Again, all of the following sections are 

elements of the applied theory subdivision of the science of strategy; and all of the 

summaries are based on Peng and Yao’s PLA definitions and discussions. 

Strategic Information Operations (IO) and Strategic Psychological Warfare (SPW) 

This first summary is a combination of two chapters (Strategic Information 

Operations; and Wartime Political Work and Strategic Psychological Warfare). It is 

longer than the other summaries since IW/IO is the prime focus of Decoding the Virtual 

Dragon. 

Peng and Yao define strategic information operations as strategic actions that 

employ information weapons to influence the enemy’s information and information 

systems while simultaneously protecting one’s own information and information systems 

so as to gain “information superiority” on the battlefield. The term information weapon 

indicates that the cyberization of weapon systems have supplemented traditional 

weapons.70 An information weapon is a term not in current use in the US lexicon. 

 

66 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 

67 Ibid., p. 59. 

68 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 

69 Ibid., pp. 15-18. 

70 Ibid., pp. 336-337. 
24

The editors note that the use of information weapons and other information 

related products has raised information operations from the operational and tactical level 

to the strategic level. IO now can guarantee the seizure of the initiative in war where a 

major pattern of operations has become information confrontation. The outcome of a war 

now depends in part on another term unfamiliar to Western audiences, information 

control.71 

Strategic information operations have specific characteristics according to Peng 

and Yao. One characteristic is that the level or degree of cyberized weapons can decide a 

country’s war strength, and thus the seizure of information has become a primary task of 

modern warfare. A second characteristic is that small-scale tactical operations can 

sometimes achieve strategic results owing to the fact that geographical distance has lost 

much of its traditional significance in the information age. A third characteristic is that 

targets have changed. In traditional warfare, targets were the enemy’s weapons and 

equipment. Now targets include intelligence, reconnaissance, communication, and 

command and control systems which make information systems and decision making 

processes important targets in every phase of a war. Finally, IO is an important element 

of any holistic or comprehensive strategic operation. This increases battle space (where 

information and cyberized processes work) and reduces force density since fewer people 

are needed on the battlefield.72

Peng and Yao list five types of strategic information operations. They are: 

 Intelligence warfare. It provides support for making decisions, and it can 

be divided into intelligence reconnaissance (space, network, etc.) and 

intelligence protection (information security) 

 Command and control warfare. This includes the use of various means to 

attack an enemy’s command and control element and destroy his 

information flow. This is the primary task of IO whose essence is to 

capture the battlefield initiative 

 Electronic warfare. Its purpose is to seize electromagnetic command on 

the battlefield. Attack, defend, and support are three types. Space 

electronic warfare is a potential future method 

 Cyber warfare. It consists of soft kill (damage or destroy computers and 

networks) options and is a new operational pattern consisting of attack and 

protection 

 Destructive warfare of information sources. It consists of hard kill 

(precision-strike cyberized weapons that destroy C4ISR and other relevant 

systems) options.73

Finally, Peng and Yao stress the importance of strategic guidance when 

implementing strategic information operations. They note that information superiority 

 

71 Ibid., p. 338. 

72 Ibid., pp. 339-340. 

73 Ibid., pp. 340-343. 
25

and information dominance must be maintained in order to keep the battlefield initiative 

and bring the power of information systems and cyberized weapons to bear. Operations 

must remain integrated to defeat an opponent in a system-to-system confrontation.74

Further, war preparations must be made ahead of time (to include the recruitment of 

information talent) to ensure that an IO can be conducted suddenly with the use of all 

civil-military links.75 

However, the most important idea regarding strategic guidance, and one of the 

most important ideas for Peng and Yao’s book in general, is that IO is directly linked to 

the gain or loss of the initiative in war and thus “priority should be given to the attack and 

combining the attack with the defense.” Launching preemptive attacks to gain the 

initiative includes “striking the enemy’s information center of gravity and weakening the 

combat efficiency of his information systems and cyberized weapons.”76 This allows one 

to weaken the enemy’s information superiority and reduce his holistic combat 

efficiency.77 One can only guess if the Titan Rain incursions and other similar events 

were designed to recon Western information systems and prepare the way to strike these 

information centers of gravity in time of conflict or leading up to conflict. 

In addition to the book’s chapter on strategic information operations, the text of 

The Science of Military Strategy is spotted with references to information operations 

throughout that add additional points of interest to the discussion. In most cases the 

discussion is very different from that encountered in the strategic information operations 

chapter recounted above. 

One such discussion covered information control. Peng and Yao noted that the 

essence of IO is to use information flows to control the energy and substance flow on the 

battlefield and thereby seize the command of battlefield information. It is important to 

seize information control, they add, because it will become the prerequisite for seizing 

the command of air, sea, and land in future battles.78 Weapon platforms, command, 

control, intelligence, communications, and logistics are integrated into operational 

systems. Integrated systems offer a new field in which to play. One who controls the 

information process can seize the strategic initiative or deliver precise, paralyzing 

strikes.79 One writer not associated with Peng and Yao’s work has even suggested that 

control be considered a new form of war along with offense and defense.80

It is clear that as acquisition, awareness, transmission, and control of information 

becomes more and more important in modern wars, the establishment of a full 

dimensional, long-range and multilayer space detectable, strategic reconnaissance system 

 

74 Ibid., p. 344. 

75 Ibid., p. 345. 

76 Ibid. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Ibid., p. 336. 

79 Ibid., p. 244. 

80 Dong Zifeng, Discussion of the Forms of Information Warfare, PLA Publishing House, Beijing, 2004. 
26

is of great value. A highly responsive, reliable, smooth command, communication, and 

intelligence system can be of decisive significance in winning the initiative in war.81

Peng and Yao stated that defense science and technology efforts provide the key 

indicators for the development of IW/IO. Chinese scientists must develop modern 

weapons and equipment, particularly “trump card” weapon systems that enhance strategic 

operational capabilities.82 Commanders must employ operations research, systems theory, 

and information theory in order to make profound qualitative and quantitative analysis of 

battlefield actions.83 Battlefield construction should be directed against an enemy’s 

reconnaissance. This means that concealment and camouflage techniques need to include 

antioptical, anti-infrared, and antiradar reconnaissance devices.84 

The editors also discussed the impact of information weapons on society as a 

whole and on military art in particular. First, since IW offers a more powerful soft 

destructive force, the line between peacetime law and wartime law is more blurred 

according to the editors. Laws must be created to reduce the potential destructiveness of 

high-tech warfare.85 Second, high-tech war, especially informationized warfare, involves 

all sides of social life, and the entire society of China must be mobilized to fight such a 

war. Scientific and technological mobilization involves high-tech workers, those with 

high academic degrees and expertise in scientific research institutions, universities, 

colleges, and high-tech corporations. These individuals, once mobilized, will be enrolled 

in the reserve forces.86 This indicates that, with more science and technology in weapons 

and equipment, knowledge will become the dominant factor of combat power, and the 

contest eventually will be between highly qualified personnel.87 

Third, peacetime IW/IO requires standardized laws, regulations, and statues for 

various aspects of the military field.88 The initial battles are usually of a determined 

nature and the period of transition from peacetime to wartime can be quite short in the 

informationized age. A national political system that can integrate national economic 

construction with war preparations must be developed.89 This development may mean an 

enhanced role for information deterrence, deterrence that depends on the powerful 

performance of information science and information technology when put into effect by 

the momentum and power of information warfare. Information deterrence’s features are 

“permeability, replaceability, transmissibility, diffusibility, shareabilty, predictability, 

ambiguousness, two-way containment, People’s War, and diversity.”90 

 

81 Peng and Yao, p. 306. 

82 Ibid., p. 185. 

83 Ibid., p. 172. 

84 Ibid., p. 191. 

85 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 

86 Ibid., p. 184. 

87 Ibid., p. 188. 

88 Ibid., p. 180. 

89 Ibid., p. 178. 

90 Ibid., pp. 220-221. 
27

Fourth, with regard to military art, the information age has brought about the 

advent of the concept of information warfare strategy. This is a new concept and type of 

strategy, according to the editors. Its goal is to seize and maintain strategic information 

superiority and battlefield information superiority and secure strategic objectives through 

information control and information attack that includes both soft damage and hard 

destruction. This, of course, includes cyber attacks on the infrastructure and information 

resources or systems on which a country’s armed forces depend.91 Here one is reminded 

of the recent Chinese reconnaissance activities at the US Naval War College. Struggles in 

the field of information between opposing sides will lead to changes in the form of 

strategic maneuver as well. Maneuver of a strategic information operations force may 

become a new form of strategic maneuver in future wars.92

Information has gradually become a force multiplier in the opinion of Peng and 

Yao, and the modes and means of strategic support enhance the collection, transmission, 

and utilization of information.93 Strategic operational support’s emphasis will be on 

countermeasures based on information systems and information technology in such fields 

as counter-reconnaissance and the safety of an information network.94 For example, an air 

attack in the absence of IW and EW support results in an 8-10% chance of being shot 

down, while with IW and EW chances of being shot down plummet to .03%.95 Thus it is 

clear why the “three abilities” needed for air defense systems are cyber attack, cyber 

defense, and information handling ability, which is the collection, transfer, processing, 

and storage of information. EW is also a major task for the command and control of 

strategic air defense in modern times.96

Psychological operations are a component part of information operations in both 

China and the US. Peng and Yao’s book included a chapter on “Wartime Political Work 

and Strategic Psychological Warfare.”97 Of the two topics, strategic psychological 

warfare (SPW) is more relevant and useful since most Western organizations do not have 

political officers. SPW is defined as strategic confrontational actions in which 

psychological offensives are launched according to psychological principles to 

undermine the morale of enemy troops and civilians or to eliminate the consequences of 

an enemy force’s deceptive propaganda. It is a component part of wartime political 

work.98

SPW is conducted in both peacetime and wartime. Peng and Yao write that the 

West has promoted psychological warfare in peacetime in many ways. These include 

attempts to advance their political system and life style, to use economic aid as bait, to 

seek economic infiltration and control, and to promote western values via radio, TV, 

 

91 Ibid., p. 18. 

92 Ibid., p. 317. 

93 Ibid., pp. 348, 349. 

94 Ibid., p. 353. 

95 Ibid., p. 323. 

96 Ibid., p. 330. 

97 This chapter appeared in English in the Number 3, 2005 issue of the Chinese Academy of Military 

Science’s publication China Military Science. 

98 Peng and Yao, p. 362. 
28

movies, newspapers and journals, audio and video products, and especially over the 

Internet.99 Modern psychological war, Peng and Yao add, is getting more integrated into 

society but is often concealed. They list five methods of concealment. First is the news, 

where psychological influence is often accepted by people without their realizing what is 

happening to them. Second is the way culture and art exchanges permeate psychological 

warfare’s content. Third are academic activities which also exercise psychological 

influence. Fourth is the conduct of psychological warfare via unofficial people-to-people 

exchanges. Finally there are special psychological warfare activities conducted by special 

service agencies.100 

The editors also note many military uses of SPW in wartime. They state that the 

primary target of strategic psychological warfare is enemy strategic decision makers. The 

purpose of SPW is to cause them to make mistakes in perception, judgment, and decision 

making and thereby enable one to subdue the enemy without fighting. Today military 

objectives are more closely integrated with political and psychological objectives than in 

the past primarily due to the information factor. Military strength, however, remains as 

the material basis of psychological warfare whether it is for deterrent value or for 

precision strike value.101

Modern science has provided new military means of psychological warfare. The 

future conduct of battlefield propaganda will be by smart unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAVs) and leaflets that have both audio and visual functions. Information denial will be 

used to cause psychological vacuums, tension, and confusion; computer viruses will be 

used to make computer operators psychologically perplexed; and false information will 

be implanted into command and control systems to cause psychological misconceptions 

when utilizing these systems.102

Peng and Yao note in conclusion that China’s objective requirements to ensure 

that the PLA will gain the strategic initiative in future high-tech wars will require: 

 Acting from the demands of high-tech wars and the international 

psychological struggle 

 Exploring effective ways to strengthen the PLA’s psychological warfare 

force 

 And developing a complete set of psychological warfare tactics and 

methods with PLA characteristics.103

Wartime political work, the other part of the chapter on psychological warfare, 

refers to the ideological and organizational work of the armed forces while performing 

combat tasks. Such work can dispel any negative political or spiritual factors in the force 

while also magnifying any factors in the enemy camp that are to the PLA’s advantage. 

 

99 Ibid., p. 372. 

100 Ibid., p. 374. 101 Ibid., pp. 372-373. 102 Ibid., p. 374. 103 Ibid., p. 376. 
29

Wartime political work is an important guarantee, from the Chinese perspective, of the 

following factors: 

 Realizing the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership over military 

operations 

 Conducting People’s War under modern conditions 

 Bringing into play the efficacy of weapons and equipment 

 Bringing into play the human factor and making up for a deficiency in 

weapons and equipment (to include the use of the subjective initiative) 

 Improving and maintaining joint operational capabilities 

 And sustaining the troops fighting capabilities and accomplishing combat 

tasks.104

Basic tasks in wartime were also listed. These included the following: 

1. Carry out mobilization and propaganda before, during, and after combat 

2. Adjust and strengthen organizations in a timely manner to ensure the 

uninterrupted and effective filling of vacancies caused by combat 

3. Promote military democracy, which is relying on the masses to provide 

wisdom 

4. Publicize heroic deeds and spread the news of victories 

5. Maintain battlefield discipline 

6. Fight against an enemy’s psychological warfare capability and incite 

defection 

7. Annihilate enemy forces but treat prisoners of war leniently 

8. Carry out political work on militias and laborers to get them to join the 

battle 

9. Take care of the wounded and disabled 

10. Perform ideological work on military dependents and those working in the 

rear.105

Finally, there were three other lessons for the conduct of psychological warfare in 

the information age. First, the collection, analysis, storage, and transmission and 

processing of battlefield information was deemed very important. These missions keep 

one up to date on recent changes and enable the conduct of effective psychological 

warfare. It is more important than ever to respond promptly to change in the information 

age. Second, mobilization activities should be continuously held. The reason again is that 

change is so rapid that emergency measures only implemented in wartime will lead “to 

being at a loss at a critical moment.” Third, it is now apparent that quality counts more 

than numbers and that wisdom and skill count more than physical stamina and courage.106

 

104 Ibid., pp. 363-364. 105 Ibid., pp. 364-368. 106 Ibid., pp. 369-370. 
30

Local War under High-Tech Conditions 

Emphasis should be unswervingly placed on preparation for two successive 

operational tasks in two strategic directions, that is to say, carrying out decisive 

operations in the main strategic direction and carrying out preventive and 

controllable strategic operations in the other strategic direction at the same 

time.107 

This summary, which also has IW/IO overtones, is Part Three of The Science of 

Military Strategy. Part Three is titled “High-Tech Local War and Strategic Guidance on 

It.” This concept is considered as a new addition to Chinese strategic theory, and is 

denoted in the diagram of the science of strategy at the end of this chapter as a dotted line 

in the applied theory diagram. 

Peng and Yao started the section with a description of the new international 

environment in which China must operate. Competition, they note, has moved from a 

bipolar pattern to competition involving comprehensive national power (CNP). War is 

now more controllable, smaller in scope and size, and efficient. Strategic powers are now 

more mutually dependent and restrained.108 There is concurrent emphasis on both 

deterrence and war-fighting. Political objectives are limited, force utilization is more 

integrated, operational means are based on information, and more stress is placed on 

comprehensive strategic interests (CSI) than on war’s destructive power.109

China will not ally with any big power or group of states.110 China might face two 

types of local wars: outside aggression and invasion, or a fight over reunification. Wars 

for China will remain defensive in nature and just. Wars will be fought on China’s 

strategic front lines and not deep inside the country which is disadvantageous to China. 

This is because the battlefield is limited for maneuver, the natural environment will affect 

operations, and border areas are the real centers of conflict of nationalities and religions. 

Threats may come from multiple directions.111 China has to fight a People’s War under 

modern conditions with regard to war preparations and implementation. As a result, unity 

of the masses remains vital.112

The editors then describe high-tech war. They state that it is continuous and of 

high-tempo, reflecting the rational control of war based on unprecedented military 

capability.113 The twenty-first century has brought information age developments, 

economic globalization, multipolarization in world politics, and militaries armed with 

advanced technology. Those with advanced technologies possess militaries that can 

impose their will on others.114 

 

107 Ibid., p. 471. 108 Ibid., pp. 397-398. 109 Ibid., p. 404. 110 Ibid., p. 447. 111 Ibid., pp. 448-449. 112 Ibid., p. 451. 113 Ibid., p. 406. 114 Ibid., pp. 435-439. 
31

To win in high-tech local war, China must not be intimidated, and it must always 

seek to maintain the initiative. It must never fight at a time and place the enemy expects, 

and never fight in a style that the enemy anticipates. It must attack an enemy’s weak 

points with China’s strong points.115 The definition of asymmetry is not only limited to 

combat forces but also covers operational domains, weaponry, operational modes, and 

methods. These means are used to gain the initiative, reduce loss, and defeat the enemy 

quickly. A weak side in a conflict may employ stratagems to change operational methods 

and thereby reduce loss and gain victory.116 These are old methods that can utilize new 

high-tech means to employ forces in ways never before imagined. 

A People’s War philosophy will still be relevant and can help with preparing the 

country both materially and spiritually for battle. One must mobilize, organize, and arm 

the masses according to the requirements of high-tech local war.117 Rapid mobilization 

based on prior preparation is the key. It is also necessary to create new People’s War 

strategies and tactics to give full play to China’s CNP; to combine high-tech weapons 

with low-tech weapons; and to combine military warfare with political and economic 

warfare.118 Defense is based on deterring war while preparing for war in peacetime and 

on the unity of a strategic defense combined with operational offense and defense in 

wartime.119 Since there is little or no difference between the initial and subsequent phases 

of battle, tactical and operational battles can have strategic significance. China must 

stress conducting active strategic counterattacks on exterior lines to achieve the aims of 

strategic defense.120

China’s specific understanding of the characteristics of local war and its context is 

not terribly extensive due to a lack of experience in the area, but interesting nonetheless. 

First, China’s military strategists look at war space as the objective environment in which 

a war is prepared and implemented. This environment is divided into direct combat space 

of offensive and defensive operations and space indirectly related to the implementation 

of war. Today direct combat space is reduced and related war space has increased (put 

another way, operational space is reduced and strategic space has increased).121

Operational space is reduced since (1) there are limited political aims today (2) interests 

are now more integrated (3) the morality and justice of war plans are of greater 

importance and (4) the risks and costs of a war’s expansion restrain war.122 Now it is easy 

to obtain the objective of war through one campaign or one battle. 

Second, the steps in a high-tech local war are: crisis development, international 

mediation, confrontation intensification, outbreak of war, peace negotiations, and 

peacekeeping activities. The idea of sudden attack has changed. It doesn’t mean 

“surprise” but rather that one side can’t correspondingly react even though the situation is 

 

115 Ibid., pp. 453-454. 116 Ibid., p. 415. 117 Ibid., p. 455. 118 Ibid., p. 457. 119 Ibid., p. 459. 120 Ibid., p. 460. 121 Ibid., p. 415. 122 Ibid., p. 416. 
32

known due to one side possessing high-tech and the other only low-tech means. 

Preparation and mobilization are more important than ever before.123 One has to know 

how to seize the initiative first and take calculated risks to win in high-tech war.124 The 

subtlety of strategy lies in the concentration of strength125 which allows for good risk 

taking. 

Third, victory depends on the comprehensive confrontation capacity (CCC) of the 

whole combat system. Systems confrontation and one’s overall strike potential is more 

important than the concept of independent operations.126 

Fourth, a new war pattern of “strategic decision making--operational command--

tactical action” has come into being. Weak sides should make good strategic preparations 

and organize to take quick actions against an enemy. Full play must be given to human 

subjective initiatives and using cost cutting measures to counteract the technology gap.127

The inferior side should give full play to its subjective initiative.128 Concentration in time 

is more important than concentration in terms of space.129 

Finally, future military operations will include preventive strategic actions or 

operations (deterrence operations such as rehearsals, alerts, no-fly zones, etc.), 

controllable operations (restore and stabilize a situation where a war crisis has 

appeared—includes air attacks, island attacks and defense, frontier counterattack, and 

medium- to large- scale joint ops in special situations), and decisive operations (mediumlarge scale high-intensity operations next to general war).130 No agreements can be 

reached in negotiations without a display of adequate strength and determination. 

Fundamental interests can never be compromised.131

Short Summaries of Other Chapters 

Listed below are summaries of other chapters of The Science of Military Strategy 

that allow the reader to gain a better appreciation of “strategy” from a Chinese 

perspective. Again, chapter titles are in italics. 

Strategic decision is defined as decision making and planning on problems of war 

preparation and implementation as a whole. Peng and Yao state that it includes the 

identification of strategic objectives and strategic tasks, the determination of strategic 

directions and strategic deployments, and the formulation of strategic plans and strategic 

preparation of options. It is the dynamic reflection of the objective strategic situation.132

Strategic guidelines and actions are broken down into the following components: 

 

123 Ibid., pp. 418-419. 124 Ibid., p. 425. 125 Ibid., p. 461. 126 Ibid., p. 420. 127 Ibid., p. 428. 128 Ibid., p. 432. 129 Ibid., p. 429. 130 Ibid., p. 470. 131 Ibid., p. 473. 132 Ibid., p. 164. 
33

 Nature of the action (violent or nonviolent, deterrence or war fighting, 

positive or negative, decisive or nondecisive, annihilation or attrition) 

 Type and style (general or local offensive or defensive, to include strategic 

direction, area, and services) 

 Forms and scope of action (maneuver warfare or mobile warfare, position 

or guerilla warfare, special operations, regular or irregular operations on 

interior or exterior lines in land, sea, air, or outer space) 

 Patterns and content (blockade or counter blockade, air attack or counter 

air attack, etc.) 

 And process and time of action (beginning of a war, during a war, 

protracted or quick decision war, withdrawal, pursuit, or decisive 

battle).133 

The contents of a strategic plan include strategic judgment, intent, tasks, deployment, 

support measures, and rear area work. Strategic conductors must employ initiative and a 

creative spirit according to objective reality.134 

War preparations are political, economic, military, scientific, and technological 

preparations made by the state or political groups to restrain or wage a war. There is 

preparation in peacetime, preparation just before a war, and preparation in the process of 

war. The development of comprehensive national power becomes the fundamental base 

for war preparations while scientific and technological preparation becomes the focus of 

war preparations.135 The National Defense Mobilization Committee under the State 

Council and the Central Committee of the CPC are institutions that discuss and 

coordinate the organizational works of preparing the country for war.136 The theater of 

war or strategic war zone is a region for carrying out strategic tasks. It is a level of 

military command that lies between the supreme command and the strategic operational 

army group.137 

War control138 is an important Chinese concept. Peng and Yao define it as the war 

conductor’s behavior to limit and consciously restrain the occurrence, development, 

scale, intensity, and outcome of war. The essence of war control is the strategic 

conductor’s initiative in controlling and mastering war. National interests should strictly 

control military strength. The selection of war means must correspond with the object of 

interest to be obtained, and the war’s conductor should adjust military strategy according 

to the national interests at stake.139 Arms control, crisis control, and armed conflict 

control are all components of war control.140 Arms control is divided into vertical arms 

control and horizontal arms control, with the former aimed at limiting or reducing the 

 

133 Ibid., pp. 170-171. 134 Ibid., p. 173. 135 Ibid., p. 177 136 Ibid., p. 179. 137 Ibid., p. 189. 138 This chapter later appeared in English in the Number 6, 2005 issue of the Chinese Academy of Military 

Science’s publication China Military Science. 

139 Peng and Yao, p. 209. 140 Ibid., p. 197. 
34

scope of military potential and the latter aimed at limiting the proliferation of certain 

weapons.141 Crisis control is the control of the tense political and military situations 

caused by intensified contradictions of national interests. One must strive to remove the 

negative factors leading to a crisis. A crisis is a dynamic process, and it includes the 

stages of inception, escalation, de-escalation, and termination. The measures for crisis 

control and management are confidence-building (measures to prevent the emergence of 

a crisis), increased transparency, enhanced personnel exchanges and contacts, joint 

disarmament and arms control, the establishment of regulations, and the creation of 

supervisory organizations.142 To control a crisis one must find the intersection of 

interests, compromise appropriately, and strive for benefit for both sides; keep 

uninterrupted communications; and adopt coercive measures to prevent negative 

influences (weapon embargos, economic sanctions, and military blockades).143 The 

control of armed conflict includes the control of its aim, means, targets, methods, 

duration, and space of the conflict.144

Strategic deterrence control145 is one method the Chinese may use to win without 

fighting. They define strategic deterrence control as the military conduct of a state or a 

political group in displaying force or showing the determination to use force to compel 

the enemy to submit to one’s volition and to refrain from taking hostile actions or 

escalating the hostility. Strategic operations and strategic deterrence are dialectically 

related. The former secures strategic objectives though direct engagement with the enemy 

on the battlefield while strategic deterrence’s objective is to contain the outbreak of war 

or limit its scope.146 One must possess a deterrent force, have the determination (the soul 

of deterrence) to use it, and make approaches urging the opponent to perceive the abovementioned points, creating psychological pressure on an enemy.147 One must grasp and 

understand the basic condition of the deterred opponent and his cultural specifics.148 The 

goal is to control the enemy and not be controlled by him. Strategic deterrence requires a 

combination of nuclear, conventional, space force, information, and People’s War 

deterrence.149 One must change the opponent’s psychological pattern, leave leeway for 

compromise, and assess the result of deterrence in time. One must also battle factors of 

uncertainty and the growth or decline of strength, external interference, and 

psychological imbalance.150

Principles of strategic actions are the guidelines to plan and direct the overall 

situation and the whole process of war.151 Strategic action guidelines help set a strategic 

 

141 Ibid., pp. 199-200. 142 Ibid., pp. 202-204. 143 Ibid., pp. 205-206. 144 Ibid., pp. 207-208. 145 This chapter later appeared in English in the Number 5, 2004 issue of the Chinese Academy of Military 

Science’s publication China Military Science. 

146 Peng and Yao, p. 213. 147 Ibid., p. 215. 148 Ibid., p. 225. 149 Ibid., p. 226. 150 Ibid., pp. 227-228. 151 Ibid., p. 230. 
35

direction, the latter defined as the reflection of the principal contradictions between the 

PLA and the enemy affecting the overall strategic situation.152 Strategic conductors are 

the ones to establish strategic directions. According to the “job description” provided by 

Peng and Yao, strategic conductors should: 

 Have an intimate knowledge of all the circumstances, correctly analyze 

the international strategic situation, follow developments and changes in 

the security situation, make detailed analysis of foreign policies and 

strategic trends, examine military deployments of pertinent countries, 

correctly evaluate the level of threat to national security and dominant 

trends, and be knowledgeable of hot issues in disputes and struggles 

within one’s own country153

 Keep guidance focused on the main strategic direction; comprehend and 

deal with operations on the main strategic direction; and utilize creative 

strategic thinking, careful planning, and clever arrangements to organize 

strategic coordination and cooperation with other directions to form an 

overall strategic objective 

 Take the subjective initiative based on objective conditions. This includes 

the other side’s war potential and capability, how it could be supported by 

others, the growth and decline of the two side’s military forces, and how a 

war could be started with the ratio of forces offering one an assurance of 

victory.154 War is not only a race of objective or material forces (politics, 

economy, and science and technology) but also a race of subjective forces 

such as will, stratagem, initiative, planning, and command155

 Be able to control the overall situation and look after all the parts. This 

requires knowledge of the impact of time on international strategic 

situations, the global strategic setup, the strategies of major powers, the 

level of the threat to national security, the impact of the geographical 

environment on military actions, and the impact of succeeding stages156

 See through the fog of war to predict development trends and seize the 

most favorable opportunity in time to conduct the offensive resolutely.157

Overall objectives, Peng and Yao note, govern the whole process of a strategic 

situation and directly reflect the political goal of a military operation.158 It is most likely 

that China’s overall objectives have already been determined. These objectives must 

conform to China’s national interests.159 It is important to ascertain the success or failure 

of an objective linked to the center of gravity since the latter can affect the fundamental 

interest of the overall situation and strategy. In a certain time and space, the manifestation 

 

152 Ibid. 153 Ibid., p. 232. 154 Ibid., p. 239. 155 Ibid., p. 244. 156 Ibid., p. 247. 157 Ibid., p. 293. 158 Ibid., p. 234. 159 Ibid., p. 237. 
36

of the center of gravity (COG) includes the acquisition of major strategic goals and action 

on the principal strategic direction. It is the focal point of confrontation and struggle 

between China and the enemy. There should be only one strategic COG in a given time 

and space as there will be no COG if there are too many according to Peng and Yao.160

COGs are not fixed or unchangeable. Any change in the ratio of forces between the 

enemy and China may transform the strategic COG. The latter should reflect how to 

improve China’s military capability of winning local wars under high-tech conditions.161

Peng and Yao define Strategic Command as the organization and guidance of 

activities performed by the strategic commander and strategic command authorities 

during strategic operations with the troops under their command. A strategic commander 

is a command group, not a single person whereas the supreme military commander is a 

specific strategic commander, not the whole of strategic commanders.162 Once politicians 

decide to resort to war, they cannot violate the laws of strategic command. Politicians 

must not interfere in the normal performance of strategic command activities if the 

political goal is to be realized.163

Strategic command is based on the objective reality of war. This refers to all the 

objective conditions to include material factors like combat forces, battlefield posture, 

space-time environment and command system, and spiritual factors such as 

consciousness, morale, and the feelings of the troops. Subjective factors of strategic 

command are the directing and waging of war and man’s conscious dynamic role in it, a 

role that can change to some extent the objective conditions.164

In planning for war, the strategic commander must seize the strategic pivot. This 

is the key point having a decisive significance on the overall war situation. The strategic 

pivot (which sounds similar to the COG concept) can include those stages and processes 

having decisive influences on the outcome of war. Important battle areas, strategic strong 

points, and the main strategic direction can all become strategic pivots having a decisive 

influence on the overall war situation.165 

Strategic Offensive refers to attacks that help realize the aim of war. The party 

conducting the offensive has the initiative in selecting the operational direction and the 

time to commence war.166 This requires at least relative superiority in certain time and 

space according to Peng and Yao,167 who break the strategic offensive direction into four 

types: point the offensive toward the center of political domination of the opposing side; 

point the offensive toward the major economic region of the opposing side; point the 

offensive toward the major enemy groups; or point the offensive toward the 

 

160 Ibid., pp. 248-249. 161 Ibid., p. 250. 162 Ibid., p. 251. 163 Ibid., p. 266. 164 Ibid., p. 266-267. 165 Ibid., p. 269. 166 Ibid., p. 274. 167 Ibid., p. 276. 
37

geographically disadvantageous areas of the opposing side.168 The main strategic 

offensive direction (one per time period) should try to threaten several strategic targets at 

once to help maintain flexibility.169 Main targets should be chosen only after choosing the 

main strategic offensive direction. Mao believed that the weak enemy should be struck 

first and the strong enemy second.170 The major patterns of the strategic offensive are the 

unidirectional offensive, the multidirectional offensive (composed of the converging, 

fanning-out, and parallel offensives), the decisive strategic campaign, strategic pursuit, 

strategic blockade, air offensive, vertical-landing offensive, strategic nuclear assault, and 

space offensive.171 The editors noted that 

If the strategic offensive aim is annihilation of the strategic groups of the 

opposing side, such patterns as the multidirectional offensive, the decisive 

strategic campaign, and the strategic pursuit are usually adopted. When the 

strategic offensive aim is the destruction of the economic strength and war 

potential of the opposing side, the patterns of air offensive and multidirectional 

offensive are usually adopted. When the strategic offensive aim is seizure of the 

areas under the opposing side’s control, the pattern of the naval and air vertical 

landing offensive will surely be adopted if in areas bordering on the sea or in 

large islands; and the multidirectional offensive pattern will be adopted if on 

land.172 

A successful strategic offensive requires proper preparations and mobilization, a 

favorable time to go on the offensive (for example, when the enemy is transitioning from 

the defense to the offense), and sufficient forces to conduct successive attacks and 

persistent breakthroughs on a defense in depth (which usually requires setting up two 

strategic echelons and one strategic reserve in the main offensive direction for 

deployment in depth).173 

Peng and Yao define strategic defense as defensive operations or war stage 

adopted for war as a whole. Its main tasks are to preserve strategic forces, protect 

strategic points and important resources, minimize one’s losses, wipe out the enemy’s 

troops, and create conditions for moving to the strategic offense.174

The major patterns of strategic defense are: 

 Defense in place (which includes carrying out the “active offense-defense” 

or implementing the offensive within the defense) 

 Mobile defense (includes the skillful use of timing, terrain, use of 

stratagems, and planning and organizing the defense among different 

troops) 

 

168 Ibid., pp. 278-279. 169 Ibid., pp. 279-280. 170 Ibid., pp. 280-281. 171 Ibid., pp. 281-286. 172 Ibid., p. 287. 173 Ibid., pp. 288-293. 174 Ibid., p. 295. 
38

 Strategic counterair raids and counterblockades 

 Guerrilla warfare (helps establish the initiative and flexibility and includes 

establishing protracted defensive warfare on interior lines and quickdecision offensive warfare on exterior lines) 

 Strategic retreat (a type of strategic maneuver to that starts preparations 

for a counteroffensive which can be launched quickly or slowly) 

 And strategic nuclear counterattack (which does not mean taking a beating 

passively and requires great timing and coordination with conventional 

forces).175 

The strategic defensive system includes combat forces, operational facilities, 

weapon systems, and all support systems.176 The essence of the active defense is the 

offensive defense. Strategic defense doesn’t mean waiting passively. Carl von Clausewitz 

noted that defense is a shield formed of blows delivered with skill, and the enemy’s 

blows must be returned. Antoine-Henri Jomini said passive defensive is doomed, and 

Friedrich Engels emphasized that active defense carried out by the offensive is the most 

effective defense. The active defense lays emphasis on the strategic interior-line defense 

and the exterior-line offense. It is the latter that must be sought.177 

Strategic Maneuver refers to army operations to move troops and weapons and to 

shift firepower in an organized way for the realization of certain strategic aims. It is the 

essential condition for annihilating major enemy groups.178 Space maneuver will soon 

include manned, unmanned, and firepower space maneuvers.179 The main roles of 

strategic maneuver include: adjusting strategic deployments, changing strategic direction, 

seizing and creating the opportunity for operations, turning from sitting passively to 

taking the initiative, and serving as the lever for the shift between offense and defense.180

Forms of strategic maneuver include ground, air, sea, firepower, and space.181 Principles 

of strategic maneuver include seizing the initiative (making full preparations ahead of 

time; doing the unexpected; and forecasting complicated circumstances); being flexible; 

strengthening coordination; and combining the pre-positioning of weapons, equipment, 

and materials with maneuver and combat operations.182 

Strategic Air Raid (SAR) and Defense against Air Raid (DAAR) are forms of local 

war under high-tech conditions that may replace ground operations as the main 

operations to achieve strategic aims. Strategic air raid is a strategic offensive operation 

that features massive air attacks against an enemy’s political, economic and military 

targets. Strategic defense against air raids are defensive operations designed to resist, 

 

175 Ibid., pp. 296-305. 176 Ibid., p. 305. 177 Ibid., pp. 307-308. 178 Ibid., p. 311. 179 Ibid., p. 313. 180 Ibid., pp. 313-314. 181 Ibid., pp. 315-316. 182 Ibid., pp. 318-320. 
39

counterattack, or protect against an enemy attack.183 The latter has extended its range to 

defense in outer space.184 

Peng and Yao state that penetration under high-tech conditions is possible for 

those with high-tech weapons, especially those able to control the sea, air, and 

electromagnetic field (or the ability of the “three controls”).185 To divert the enemy’s 

attention or to deceive him, target demonstration, air route demonstration, altitude 

demonstration, and radio demonstration would be used. Nearly 70% of the total 

penetration force should be used against the most important enemy targets in a sudden 

and fierce attack. Later on one can move to predetermined but intact targets, to newly 

emerging targets, or to previously attacked targets for complete destruction. A 

counterattack is a defensive action within an offensive operation.186

Defense under high-tech conditions includes striking at command systems, 

defending against precision strikes, and defending against cyber attacks, reconnaissance, 

and surveillance. Electronic warfare (EW) will be conducted at the start of a war and 

throughout it. Strategic weapons include an outer layer fire network to intercept an 

enemy’s high- and medium-altitude air weapons, while ground-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery form an inner layer to counter medium- and low-altitude air raid 

weapons. Mobile forces made up of ground-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft units will 

conduct mobile operations as required.187

Finally, the editors note that an integrated national strategic air defense system 

requires a zone defense under the unity of command principle. This should be established 

By breaking up the country (theaters of strategy) into several air defense zones 

based on elaborate planning. With the well-defined three forms of air defense 

such as the key area air defense (KAAD), field air defense (FAD), and people’s 

air defense (PAD), a complete and yet focused strategic DAAR system should be 

established through integrating the air defense forces of services and arms as well 

as units from other military branches.188

Strategic Support, the editors note, consists of operational support, logistic 

support, equipment support, and other such measures.189 Strategic operational support 

includes but is not limited to strategic intelligence, communications, electronic 

countermeasures, meteorology, mapping, jamming, Chinese disruption of enemy C3I 

systems, and deceiving and bewildering the enemy.190 Each component has its own 

unique characteristics which limits the bundling of their capabilities.191 The universal rule 

 

183 Ibid., p. 321. 184 Ibid., p. 323. 185 Ibid., p. 326. 186 Ibid., p. 327. 187 Ibid., pp. 330-331. 188 Ibid., p. 332. 189 Ibid., p. 347. 190 Ibid., p. 350. 191 Ibid., p. 351. 
40

of war to “hit the enemy’s vital and weak points” is now applicable to support systems in 

the reconnaissance, intelligence, early warning, communications, and command and 

control fields.192 It was noted that the center of gravity of the overall strategic situation 

should be strategic logistics support. In terms of space, the emphasis is usually placed on 

the major battlefield, the main strategic direction and major theaters of operations.193

One chapter not listed under strategic guidelines but significant simply for its 

directions to war conductors is Conclusion of the War. The editors wrote that war 

conductors must be prepared to handle three types of circumstances as the end of a war 

nears: concluding the war under favorable conditions (the primary goal), in a stalemate, 

or under unfavorable conditions.194 With regard to concluding the war the editors again 

called upon the objective-subjective paradigm: 

There are subjective and objective implications for the timing of concluding the 

war. Objectively, it means that the war has developed to a certain extent and 

satisfies the conditions for its conclusion within a certain timeframe. Subjectively, 

it means the choice made by the war conductors on the timing for concluding the 

war according to changes in war conditions. To end the war, objective conditions 

and proper timing are equally important.195

That is, one must create conditions for ending the war when in unfavorable 

circumstances using subjective creativity. One must seek partial military victories.196 If 

national interests are maintained, the editors note, then a war is concluded under 

favorable conditions even if some aims aren’t achieved.197 

Taiwan

No formal section on Taiwan was included in The Science of Military Strategy. 

However, as one of the key topics always on China’s radar screen, the issue came up 

continuously in the book and a summarized treatment is offered here. 

Peng and Yao state that Taiwan was founded due to a regime change on a piece of 

China’s sovereign land. This fact does not allow for a claim of sovereignty over this 

territory by anyone other than China nor for any claim for status as a subject of 

international law. Taiwan’s status is as an inalienable part of China. It is essentially an 

issue of China’s internal affairs. Taiwan, Peng and Yao note, is important since it is a key 

area for sea routes in the Pacific, is a sea transport hub connecting Shanghai and Hong 

Kong, is where China can breach the chain of islands surrounding it in the West Pacific, 

provides a maritime defense system in depth, is a large area of water territory with rich 

reserves, and guards its trade routes from exposure and surveillance.198

 

192 Ibid., p. 352. 193 Ibid., p. 356. 194 Ibid., pp. 377-380. 195 Ibid., p. 381. 196 Ibid., pp. 384-385. 197 Ibid., pp. 390-391. 198 Ibid., pp. 442-443. 
41

China aims to resist aggression, maintain unity, oppose separation, and safeguard 

the motherland. If there is any foreign occupation of Taiwan, or if the Taiwanese 

authorities refuse to conduct negotiations with the mainland to settle the 

reunification issue, then the Chinese government would have to resort to forceful 

measures, including military force. China abides by the “one China” principle, 

and wants to solve the Taiwan issue through “peaceful reunification, one country, 

two systems.”199

Earlier in The Science of Military Strategy, Peng and Yao had addressed the 

sovereignty issue. They noted that if hostile forces such as religious extremists, national 

separatists, and international terrorists challenge a nation’s sovereignty it could be 

considered as firing the first shot on the plane of politics and strategy.200 Strategic 

conductors will have the chance to fire the first shot on the plane of tactics if territory or 

sovereignty is disrupted, they note. Local war always has the potential to become 

unlimited depending against whom the attacks are initiated.201 Thus Peng and Yao make 

it clear just how special Taiwan is to the PLA and what strategic implications the island 

holds. 

Conclusions 

Peng and Yao’s book has no formal chapter devoted to conclusions. However the 

book did have a Postscript. It stresses what the editors deemed important as they 

concluded their lengthy work. A set of general conclusions that can be drawn from a 

review of the book’s contents follows the postscript discussion. Finally a comparison is 

made of the major elements of this book as compared and contrasted against the US 

theory of strategy. Other important points in The Science of Military Strategy can be 

found in the concluding chapter of Decoding the Virtual Dragon. 

Postscript 

Peng and Yao stressed three issues in the postscript. They are the essence of war, 

the laws of war, and the requirement of the science of military strategy to improve the 

theoretical system of strategy. The latter issue focused on providing new thoughts for 

winning local wars under modern conditions. In the editors’ opinion, war and strategy 

have “never experienced such dramatic and profound changes before.” The direction of 

these developments is difficult to predict and their nature is difficult to recognize 

according to Peng and Yao. This implies that the book’s results can only be tested or 

improved by practice. Further, the postscript states “dramatic developments in the 

practice of wars urgently require new theoretical explanations about the emerging 

situation.” In the opinion of the editors, the RMA and high-tech local war have produced 

new problems and new conclusions for evaluating the laws of war and the conduct of 

war.202

 

199 Ibid., p. 445. 200 Ibid., p. 426. 201 Ibid., p. 427. 202 Ibid., p. 503. 
42

Review of the Book’s Contents 

The editors appeared to have taken several favorable steps toward improving the 

theoretical system of strategy in their work. Noting that military science is characterized 

by antagonism, politics, comprehensiveness, stratagem, practice, and prediction, they 

highlighted the need for each to work in harmony throughout the book. The editors 

focused on the characteristics of strategic thinking—totality, confrontation, certainty, 

foresight, creativity, and inheritance—and this sharpened the reader’s thoughts on 

harmony of effort. The editors’ development of a host of applied strategic issues 

(strategic decision, strategic command, strategic maneuver, strategic offense and defense, 

strategic air raid and anti-air raid, strategic deterrence, strategic action principles, and 

strategic support along with war preparation, war control, and war conclusions) indicated 

their continued comprehensive approach to the issue of adopting strategy to high-tech 

war. 

The editors identification of two issues, change and new problems, may be the 

reason behind this new discussion of strategy. It is also interesting that the PLA has 

added a few new types of “comprehensiveness” into their planning. No longer does CNP 

seem to be enough. The one that stands out of course is comprehensive cyberized war 

although the editors did little more than just mention the concept. To old China hands, the 

other items on the “comprehensive list” developed for this chapter (comprehensive 

strategic targets, comprehensive national defense construction, comprehensive 

confrontation capacity, etc.) may be old news. They do remain indicative of the truly 

holistic strategic approach that PLA theorists take into account when considering their 

environment. 

The editors integrated several issues into their narrative that ring familiar to 

Westerners. These included concepts such as centers of gravity, asymmetric thinking, 

national interests, and principles of strategic action. Other issues were more Chinese and 

Marxist in nature and less easily understood, such as objective versus subjective thought; 

the nature, form, means, application and time features of strategy; and the division of 

strategy into basic and applied aspects. The Western reader is left with a feeling that the 

Chinese concept of strategy is much more comprehensive than Western strategic 

concepts. Western readers should also be impressed by the careful preparation and 

research of this work that allowed for their entire editorial staff to explain issues clearly. 

Readers are also left with the impression that, speaking in very general terms, 

there are three levels of military art, strategic, operational, and tactical, and each level has 

a country of expertise. Countries can learn from one another in this regard. For strategic 

issues, the Chinese have a long historical perspective and expertise. The Science of 

Military Strategy only adds to their legacy in this area. For issues of operational art, the 

Russian military developed some of the more creative ideas such as the operational 

maneuver group, and they continue to focus much of their writings on this level of war. 

And for issues of tactics, the US armed forces, based on a long practical history in this 

area, remains the resident center of expertise and knowledge. 
43

Summary Comparison of Chinese and US Strategic Views 

The definitions of the military term “strategy” in China and the US have some 

similarities. There are several distinct differences, however, in the logic and structure 

used to apply the term. It should be emphasized, however, that two distinct and different 

institutions were accessed to analyze the meaning of strategy. One is a branch of service 

(the US Army War College, an army institution) and one is a representative of an armed 

forces as a whole (China’s Academy of Military Science). 

The differences demonstrate various approaches in analysis, understanding, 

development, and application of the term strategy in China and the US. These differences 

are: 

 Basis for analysis: the Chinese apply subjective criteria to objective 

conditions in the development of strategic judgments. This is most 

evident in the widespread use of stratagems, a creative form of 

subjectivity. The US views strategy as the relationship among ends, 

ways, and means. Stratagems are seldom mentioned in the US 

understanding of strategy. 

 Comprehensive focus: China takes a comprehensive view of most 

issues, offering holistic assessments of national power, cyberized war, 

and many other issues as listed in this document. US views are more 

focused and less holistic although the term comprehensive is 

mentioned. Henry Eccles, for example, described strategy as the 

comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in 

order to obtain objectives.203 There is seldom, however, a further 

reference to what “comprehensive” means. 

 Strategy and military science: China tends to take a more scientific 

view of strategy. There is a “science of strategy” that divides strategy 

into basic and applied categories. There is no such subdivision of the 

term in US parlance. 

 Role of specialists: In the US, the viewpoints of several famous 

strategists serve as the basis for the understanding of strategy. The 

works of foreign strategists in this regard (Clausewitz, Jomini, Liddell 

Hart, etc.) are probably discussed more than the works of US 

strategists. In China, foreign strategists do play a role. However, the 

two most important military writers with an influence on strategy 

appear to be Sun Tzu and Friedrich Engels, the latter for his work on 

People’s War theory and the active defense concept. Mao was the 

integrator of their thoughts and remains on a par with both men 

concerning strategic thought in Chinese eyes. 

 Strategy versus operational art and tactics: A point of interest is that 

China, for the past 30 years, has not been involved in the continental 

deployments of forces as has the US nor been engaged in combat with 

the same frequency. As a result, the US is much more focused (and 

 

203 Bartholomees, p. 107. 
44

most likely much more adept) at operational art and tactics. China, less 

battle-proven, perhaps focuses more on strategy because it has not 

been engaged in conflict. Political, economic, and now information 

strategies occupy much of the military academies time and effort. 

 Hard versus soft strategy: Chinese strategy, due to its subjective focus, 

places emphasis on both the use of hard power and the use of soft 

“stratagem theory.” That is, the Chinese explore how stratagems, 

culture, and law can be used as adjuncts to hard power. US strategy 

addresses soft power adroitly but still places more emphasis on hard 

power. In fact the term power is used in the JP 1-02 version of 

strategy’s definition. This reference to power is also apparent in the 

most often used US definition of strategy, that being “the relationship 

among ends, ways, and means.” 

The US Army War College, of course, does possess other methods for examining 

strategy and remains a preeminent US installation dedicated to understanding strategy’s 

many aspects. The purpose of this chapter was to emphasize differences in the Chinese 

and US approaches and not to negate in any way the major contributions made by the 

War College to this subject. For example, one such method to analyze strategy at the War 

College was by categories and another method was via premises. Categories were listed 

by J. Boone Bartholomees in the US Army War College Guide to National Security 

Policy and Strategy. He categorized strategy’s aspects as follows: declaratory, actual or 

ideal; sequential, simultaneous, and cumulative; organizational and hierarchical; and 

miscellaneous, alternative, and possibly-strategic concepts.204 US analyst Harry Yarger, 

writing in the same volume, listed “premises” of strategy. They are: being proactive and 

anticipatory; knowing what is to be accomplished (the end state); identifying an 

appropriate balance among objectives sought, methods to pursue the objectives, and 

resources available; allowing political purpose to dominate strategy; noting that strategy 

is hierarchical and comprehensive; developing strategy though analysis and knowledge of 

the situation; and understanding that some risk is inherent to all strategy.205 

Author David Jablonsky of the US Army War College stated that people know 

from experience that there are limits to the scientific approach when dealing with human 

endeavors and “as a consequence, they can appreciate the art of mixing ends, ways, and 

means, using for each element the part subjective, part objective criteria of suitability, 

feasibility, and applicability—the essence of strategic calculation.”206 Thus he comes 

closest to the Chinese definition of strategy. He adds: 

Thus, the mix of ends, ways, and means at the national military strategic level will 

affect directly (and be affected by) the same paradigm operating at each level of 

 

204 Bartholomees, pp. 83-84 and 93. 205 Harry Yarger, “Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” in 

J. Boone Bartholomees, editor, US Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 

Second Edition, 16 June 2006, pp. 107-110, downloaded from the Internet on 5 July 2006. 

206 David Jablonsky, “Why is Strategy Difficult?” in J. Boone Bartholomees, editor, US Army War College 

Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, Second Edition, 16 June 2006, p. 115, downloaded from 

the Internet on 5 July 2006. 
45

the vertical continuum. Adding to the complexity is the interplay on the horizontal 

plane of national military strategy with the other strategies derived from the 

elements of national power, each operating within its own strategic paradigm and 

all contributing to the grand design of national strategy, as that strategy evolves 

within its own overall mix of ends, ways, and means.207

How US political, economic, and military strategies interact on horizontal and 

vertical planes is one issue. How US national military strategy interacts with the Chinese 

outline of military and national strategy presented above is quite another, one that will 

require much analysis, foresight, and simulation on the part of US strategists. 

 

 

207 Jablonsky, p. 123. 
46

Diagram 1A 
47

Diagram 1B 
48

Diagram 1C 
49 

CHAPTER TWO: THE SCIENCE OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

This chapter summarizes Xu Xiaoyan’s article “Advancing the Science of Information 

Operations,” which was published in China Military Science, Volume 3, 2004.208

Introduction 

In July 2006, China’s Xinhua Domestic News Service, recounting the 

achievements of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the past five years, noted that 

progress was made in the “principal contradictions, development concept, and relevant 

countermeasures in the informatization of our armed forces, the relationship between 

development by leaps and bounds and sustainable development, and the development of 

the informatization battle capability in our military units.”209 In theoretical work, 

important developments were made in the new or cross disciplines of international 

military science, military sociology, and, most important for this chapter, the science of 

information operations (SIO).210 

Major General Xu Xiaoyan, former head of the Communications Department of 

the Chinese General Staff, is an experienced author on the topic of SIO. In 2002 he wrote 

a book titled The Science of Information Operations. In 2004 he published an article on 

SIO in the journal China Military Science. This chapter will review Xu’s journal article 

as it demonstrates the extension of the military science paradigm (basic and applied 

theory) in the previous chapter. Since SIO is a concept that the US military does not 

employ, it provides new content for US consideration. 

Xu defined what he meant by the science of information operations and outlined 

many details of such an academic system. He believes that the science of IO is now 

mature and that an academic system for its study must be established. Xu stated that it is 

imperative for the PLA to make preparations now for combat under new (IO) conditions. 

His SIO article demonstrates the extent of that urgency. The Chinese hope that this new 

science will meet the innovative needs of the PLA and enable it to organize and win at 

informationized warfare. 

The Science of Information Operations 

The science of IO is a relatively new branch of Chinese military science. It is 

defined as 

A branch of military science that studies the rules of IO and gives guidance to the 

practice of IO. Its main tasks are to use scientific methods to reveal the essence of 

 

208 This author reviewed Xu Xiaoyan’s article in China Military Science and credits the content, concepts, 

and ideas to the article’s author. The content of Xu’s article is reviewed based on translated material. 

Translation credit belongs to the Open Source Center. 

209 Bao Guojun and Guo Ruihong, “Great Achievements in All-PLA Military Scientific Research in the 

Period of the 10th Five-year Plan,” Xinhua Domestic Service, 6 July 2006 as downloaded from the Open 

Source Center website on 18 July 2006. 

210 Ibid. 
50

IO and the influence of various objective factors on IO, the operational 

mechanisms and internal rules for command and control of IO, and practical 

activities thus providing theoretical guidance for the practice of IO.”211 

Xu states that three conditions are required to create an academic discipline such 

as SIO. They are a common understanding of the unique qualities of an area, a more 

unified understanding of the structure of the discipline within the area, and the 

dissemination of statements compelling those in academic circles to acknowledge the 

existence of the discipline. These three conditions are now present in the Chinese system, 

and the time appears ripe to conduct the study of SIO. The construction of a system for an 

information-based, military-academic discipline within military studies also promotes 

topics that encourage military reform.212

The science of IO addresses a way to develop methods to win future 

informationized wars. Chinese theorists describe the theoretical system of the science of 

information operations (IO) as composed of three parts: basic IO theory, applied IO 

theory, and technical IO theory. (See Diagram 2 at the end of this chapter.) Basic IO 

theory reveals the laws that govern IO, studies the rules and principles of IO, and 

provides structure for the organization and command and control of IO. Applied IO 

theory reveals the special features of organizing and implementing various types of IO 

and studies rules and operations of IO. It is the concrete implementation of the basic 

theory. IO technical theory reveals the overall mechanism and development of IO 

technology; studies the principles and methods of implementing, building, and 

developing IO technology; and plays a role in providing technological support for basic 

and applied theory.213 The science of IO is different from the science of military strategy 

since strategy does not have a technical component. 

Major General Xu stated that a second level of disciplines also needs to be 

developed for IO. He described what he termed “branch disciplines” that should be 

created. They are command and control during IO, IO technology, IO transmission, IO 

intelligence, IO countermeasures, IO buildup, IO strategy, and IO training.214 

IO’s theoretical research aims to explore and discover the various phenomena and 

patterns of IO.215 IO not only sits at the center of all activities of two warring sides on 

today’s battlefield but, due to its nature, is more independent and unique than any other 

academic branch in Xu’s opinion.216 IO’s logical start point is information 

countermeasures or confrontation measures which are activities designed to oppose 

hostile forces IO activities217

 

211 Xu Xiaoyan, “Advancing the Science of Information Operations,” China Military Science, Vol. 3, 2004, 

pp. 37-43. This article was taken from a FBIS translation, a translation that also does not list specific pages 

but only the “to-from” pages in the original Chinese document. 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid. 214 Ibid. 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid. 
51

Basic IO Theory 

There are twelve sub-elements of basic IO theory. They are concepts, weapons 

and armaments, strength, categories, principles, command and control, combat methods, 

organization and planning, resource management, logistics support, education and 

training, and result appraisal. 

“IO Concepts” was also a sub element of the science of military strategy and 

includes definitions for the terms IO, information warfare, and informationized war. 

“Concepts” reveals the basic characteristics of IO and the status and role of IO in war. 

“IO weaponry” is “the general name for various weapon systems and armaments 

that are built with information technology as the core and are directly used to destroy, 

damage, and weaken information and information systems on the enemy side and to 

protect the information and information systems on one’s own side.” Combat forms 

(weapons) that Xu lists are those that the US associates with the capabilities of IO (some 

were in past US IO definitions: some are in current definitions): intelligence warfare, 

computer network warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, and physical 

destruction warfare. IO weaponry also addresses types of destructive effects, types of 

platforms, and degrees of versatility of IO weapons.218

“IO strength” refers to all available forces for IO, both actual and potential. 

Stating that there are IO forces in the army, navy, air force, and second artillery corps, Xu 

defined the characteristics (information reconnaissance, attack, and defense), scale 

(strategic, campaign, and tactical IO forces), mission (command, attack, defend, and 

support forces), and force formations (military services and branches, armed groups, or 

IO missions).219

“IO categories” refers to actions defined by certain standards. These actions 

include intelligence, electronic, psychological, computer network, and physical 

destruction warfare methods. The latter focuses attention on the destruction of 

information facilities. Definitions are listed for each. They are: 

 

 Intelligence warfare: the ability to seize information supremacy 

 Electronic warfare: the electromagnetic fight for use of electronic 

equipment and devices 

 Psychological warfare: a type of warfare that adopts special methods 

and means to affect, constrain, and change the thinking, feeling, and 

behavior of the enemy through psychological factors and at the same 

time consolidate the psychological defense of one’s own side 

 Computer network warfare: IO between two warring sides to seize 

domination of computer operations through weakening and sabotaging 

the enemy’s computer network systems 

 

218 Ibid. 219 Ibid. 
52

 Information facility destruction, also called physical destruction or 

hard destruction warfare: use of IO weaponry as well as military 

troops and firepower for destruction and damage purposes while 

protecting one’s own side.220

“IO principles” are the basic norms to follow in the conduct of IO. They are 

concrete forms of the laws of IO that include peacetime and wartime integration of 

actions to ensure preparedness for emergencies, unified command and coordination, 

military and civilian integration for full-dimensional force deployment, simultaneous 

offensive and defensive operations that include hard and soft means, strict security, 

flexible use of combat methods, and integrated support and well-planned actions.221

“IO command and control” refers to the organization, command, and control of 

IO. Commanders compose the main body of this group, and troops and weapons are the 

subjects of their commands. They perform missions. The command automation system is 

the means to perform command and control, and the basic element of command and 

control is information flow. The scope of command and control is the informationized 

battlefield.222

“IO command methods” are the methods to conduct IO. They include methods at 

the strategic, campaign, and tactical levels and include characteristic actions such as 

information reconnaissance, offense, and defense. IO can also be used in landing 

operations, cities and mountains, air attacks, special operations, counterair raids, border 

counterattacks, and antilanding operations.223 

“IO organization and planning” is the scientific planning and arrangement for IOrelated military actions. It is the core of command and control. It includes collecting and 

processing intelligence, IO decision making, IO planning, and IO combat completion. It 

also refers to the actions of commanders and command organs that collect or expose 

intelligence after receiving missions. Based on this data, information is processed, sorted, 

and analyzed further to provide decision makers with the required data to ascertain 

objectives and activities. Strategic IO decisions are thus turned into combat actions.224

“IO resource management” is the management of the battlefield spectrum as well 

as data and civilian information resources. The term spectrum refers to the management 

of advanced technical means and to flexible tactical measures for managing and using the 

electromagnetic spectrum to achieve information supremacy. Data refers to the transfer, 

processing, and use of IO data to form an “information capacity” for winning operational 

victories. Civilian IO resources must manage civilian information that is related to IO 

mobilization and logistical activities.225

 

220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Ibid. 224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 
53

“IO logistics support” refers to providing information resources, material, 

equipment, and technical support to IO combat activities. Support can be independent in 

form for each branch of service or unified for all services. Methods include regional, 

delivery, distribution, network, and long-distance mobilization support.226 

“IO education and training” refers to activities associated with IO knowledge and 

theory. Training must be focused on confrontation and the enhancement of joint actions. 

Rules and regulations must be perfected based on top-down design. Methods of IO 

education and training include theoretical discussions, simulations, online confrontations, 

training at military bases, and war games with troops.227

Finally, “IO results” must be evaluated. To do so Xu recommended the 

examination of several issues. They are: evaluating IO characteristics via four categories 

(reconnaissance, offense, defense, and support for IO); evaluating IO forms via the five 

forms (intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, etc.); evaluating IO confrontation targets 

via information evaluation, information systems effectiveness, and information weaponry 

appraisal; and evaluating IO methods via practice assessment, mathematical analysis, and 

computer simulation. Implementation of these results relies on decisions regarding the 

method of appraisal, the organization of the implementation of appraisals, and the 

analysis and use of conclusions reached.228

Applied IO Theory 

Applied IO refers to IO conducted by the specific military services: 

 Army IO is a series of combat actions carried out by the army’s IO 

force, on land or on islands. It focuses on the army’s campaign and 

tactical intentions and is accomplished either independently or in 

conjunction with other services. Army IO includes armor, artillery, air 

corps, signal, antiaircraft, electronic confrontation, engineering, and 

chemical defense corps IO. 

 Navy IO is a series of combat actions that serve the navy’s campaign 

and tactical intentions. It includes submarine, surface fleet, naval air 

force, coast guard, and marine IO theory. 

 Air force IO is a series of combat actions in the course of air battles to 

serve campaign or tactical intentions. IO theory includes the aviation 

and air defense corps as well as radar units. 

 Second artillery corps IO is a series of combat actions taken in the 

course of performing a nuclear counterattack operation or a 

conventional missile operation to serve general military intentions. IO 

theory includes short, medium, long-range, and intercontinental 

missile corps.229

 

226 Ibid. 227 Ibid. 228 Ibid. 229 Ibid. 
54

Xu listed only joint theory as a sub-branch for applied IO theory in contrast to 

basic theory’s many sub-branches. Joint IO theory included theories for island blockades, 

firepower and island attacks, resisting air raids, border counterattack campaigns, and 

resisting enemy landings.230 Individually, each theory is comprised of the following IO 

aspects: 

 Blockading islands: studies IO use to form a blockade, to seize control 

over blockaded areas, to maintain a sustained three-dimensional 

blockade, and to add support to resisting enemy antiblockade 

operations 

 Firepower attacks: studies IO use to fix attack targets, conduct 

firepower attacks, resist enemy firepower counterattacks, and assess 

results 

 Launching attacks on islands: studies IO use in early aspects of a 

campaign, during force assembly and maritime navigation, and during 

landing and on-island operations 

 Resisting air raids: studies IO use during air defense operations, during 

actions to resist enemy air attacks, and during counterattack operations 

 Border counterattack campaigns: studies IO use during combat force 

campaign mobilization, preemptive actions, defensive battles, 

counteroffensive operations, and campaign results 

 Resisting enemy landing: studies IO use in preemptive resistance 

actions against an enemy, during battles when attacking enemy forces 

in assembly areas and when loading, during navigation, during battles 

to defend islands and key coastal positions, and in support of antiair 

drop and antiraid actions.231

Technical IO Theory 

A third aspect of the science of IO is the technical aspect. Si Laiyi edited a 1998 

book on this topic titled The Science of Information Operations Technology. Thus the 

topic is now at least nearly ten years old. 

Xu subdivided technical IO theory into basic, main, and comprehensive applied 

technology. Basic IO technology is the technology for the production of components for 

IO weapons and devices. Main IO technology is the development, design, and production 

of equipment and systems that collect, transfer, process, reproduce, and control 

information (thus the term “main”). Comprehensive applied IO technology is that which 

integrates and applies IO technical systems. Comprehensive technology further integrates 

elements of basic and main IO technology.232 

 

230 Ibid. 231 Ibid. 232 Ibid. 
55

Of the three components of IO theory, Xu only further subdivided main technical 

IO theory. The areas are as follows: 

 Information collection technology—expands the function of human 

sensing organs and enhances the human capability of perceiving and 

understanding things 

 Information transmission technology 

 Information processing technology—the integration, categorization, 

calculation, storage, etc. of information to support planning and decision 

making processes through simulations, comparisons, and so on 

 Control technology—control via the input of commands 

 Electronic countermeasure technology 

 Network confrontation technology—intercepting, utilizing, corrupting, 

and damaging the enemy’s information and using false information, 

viruses, and other means to sabotage normal information system functions 

through computer networks 

 System integration technology—coordination and optimization one strives 

to achieve the general objective of IO.233 

Xu further stated that an IO technical development strategy was required. This strategy 

would plan and guide the general development of IO technology. Further, 

The science of IO will integrate the key development points of the national 

information industry and the development trends of information warfare currently 

in our armed forces and in foreign armed forces and put forward the key points, 

policies, methods, and main measures that should be adopted for developing IO 

technology, including computer and artificial intelligence technology, battlefield 

information sensing and collection technology, communications and networking 

technology, and information confrontation technology, in accordance with the 

strategic requirements of our armed forces’ informationization building and the 

requirements for winning informationized warfare.234

Xu’s Recommendations/Conclusions 

There were several recommendations that Xu made in the article. First, he noted 

that breakthroughs must be made as quickly as possible in the science of IO. The PLA 

cannot just copy what other armed forces are doing. The PLA has its own strategic 

guidance, objectives, and developmental foundation, and it must apply these issues in an 

asymmetric manner. The PLA needs to develop theories about space IO and computer 

network warfare that create breakthroughs in these theories as well.235

Second, Xu noted that the PLA must quickly build platforms with integrated 

hardware and software for the science of IO. Only with high quality academic platforms 

 

233 Ibid. 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid. 
56

can new scientific theories of IO be developed. Training and experimental bases are 

needed to include an all-army research center to advance informationization and IO in the 

PLA.236

Third, Xu noted that creative guidelines must be developed that include 

establishing a systematic science of IO. The system must follow strategic thinking 

regarding the revolution in military affairs (RMA), act on military strategic principles 

from the Central Military Commission, and adhere to general ideas of scientific proof, 

long-term planning, and incremental implementation. Military communication theory, 

command automation theory, electronic confrontation theory, and military intelligence 

theory are the basic developmental requirements to properly address the science of IO.237

In addition to providing three recommendations, Xu also developed three 

problems for the PLA to solve. They are: 

 The necessity to stop neglecting applied theory and only attaching 

importance to basic theory 

 The necessity to stop neglecting practical verification while only attaching 

importance to theoretical research 

 And the necessity to stop neglecting the settlement of major difficult 

issues (in preparing for military struggle) while only attaching importance 

to researching general issues. Concepts must be changed into actions.238

Xu concluded his article by noting that the basic principles of the science of IO 

must include integrating theories (via systems theory) into the IO field, practicing IO in 

accordance with the needs of the armed forces, and developing science to meet the needs 

of the armed forces. The science of IO must objectively “reflect the character of IO and 

the rules that govern the development of such military operations...we should strive for 

unity between its character of development and its character of being realistic.”239 

The issue of theory and practice is an important one. The PLA has not fought as 

extensively as have many Western governments and thus has only limited experience in 

operational art and tactics. But they have developed lots of theory during these years. If 

Xu’s suggestions were accepted (he wrote the article in 2004), then one might expect to 

see more active reconnaissance and intelligence activities on the part of the PLA (as 

seems to be occurring!) than on the pure development of theory. 

There were other areas of interest in Xu’s discussion of the science of IO to point 

out. First, the focus of the means of physical destruction on “information facilities” is of 

interest. It is not known if these are military or civilian facilities but the intent to go after 

IO targets and destroy them is of interest. Second, there is a huge difference in the 

subdivisions of basic and applied theory if one compares the Chinese version of the 

 

236 Ibid. 237 Ibid. 238 Ibid. 239 Ibid. 
57

science of military strategy with the science of IO. The former has several subdivisions 

under “applied theory” which indicates that military strategy has an active role to play in 

peacetime. Applied theory means theory that is being practiced. With the science of IO, 

the emphasis is reversed. There is much more emphasis on basic theory than on applied 

theory. This indicates that the PLA either is still considering how to implement the 

science of IO or it is a classified section. In any regard, Xu’s recommendation to increase 

the PLA’s emphasis on applied theory should not be forgotten. Third, much of the focus 

of the PLA’s joint theory applied aspect (the sole subdivision of applied theory) was on 

islands. This is not usually the case with Western nations and reflects not only China’s 

Taiwan problem but also probable future worries over sea lane chokepoints. 

Studying the Chinese method of military science and its subdivisions by category 

is an excellent way for US theorists to take a more comprehensive look at various fields 

of study. Our historical experience and methodologies do not lead us down the path of 

basic and applied theories. The latter are beneficial in causing theorists to develop a more 

comprehensive and methodological look at a topic and its various subtopics and to 

develop more precise terminology.
58
59

CHAPTER THREE: CHINA’S REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS 

This chapter summarizes key points from editor Shen Weiguang’s book On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs, 2004.240

Introduction 

A topic that has received much attention during the past ten years is the revolution 

in military affairs (RMA). The US took the initial lead in developing this concept and its 

related technological effort. For example, two of the US armed forces most prominent 

military journals, Joint Forces Quarterly and Parameters, have published more than fifty 

articles on the concept of the RMA in the past decade. 

Fewer people in the US, however, have tried to define the concept and make sense 

of it. A check of the US Military’s Dictionary of Terms and Concepts reveals that, as of 

December 2006, the term still has not been officially defined. Steven Metz and James 

Kievit defined RMA in 1995 as a “discontinuous increase in military capability and 

effectiveness” arising from simultaneous and mutually supportive changes in technology, 

systems, operational methods, and military organizations.241 Jeffrey Cooper, also writing 

in 1995, added that changes in the tools of war, changes in the behavior of militaries, and 

changes in the nature of warfare are the keys to understanding a RMA.242 Andrew 

Krepinevich wrote in 1994 that the RMA was what occurs “when the application of new 

technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative 

operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the 

character and conduct of conflict.”243 Finally, in 1999 Richard O. Hundley of RAND 

defined RMA as “a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which 

either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant player; 

or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimension of warfare; or 

both.”244 Others have added slightly different twists to the concept. 

The Chinese military has studied the meaning and impact of the RMA for the past 

decade as well. Like the US, the Chinese have been reluctant to offer an official 

definition, relying in the 1990s on the definitions of Western specialists such as 

Krepinevich and Hundley. While it might be assumed that China’s understanding of 

RMA would thus be similar to that of the US or other nations, it is not. For example, in 

 

240 This author reviewed Shen Weiguang’s On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs and credits the 

content, concepts, and ideas to the book’s editor and authors of the individual chapters. The content of 

Shen’s book is reviewed based on translated material. Translation credit belongs to Senior Chief Bart Zobel 

of the Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command. 

241 Steven Metz and James Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: from Theory to 

Policy,” June 27 1995. As downloaded from the Internet at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine on 29 August 

2005. 

242 Jeffrey Cooper, “War in the Information Age: The Changing Technology of the Battlefield,” paper 

presented at a conference entitled “Rethinking Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era,” England, December 

1995. 

243 Richard O. Hundley, Past Revolutions, Future Transformations, RAND, 1999, footnote 12, p. 11. 244 Ibid., p. 9. 
60

2001 retired Chinese Major General Wang Baocun defined the term as a process of 

military informationalization where theory and practice are the focus. He added that 

Chinese progress toward an RMA is signaled by its C4I modernization, network-based 

war-gaming, information warfare (IW) personnel training and field exercises, and 

informationalized equipment.245 Thus Wang’s Chinese perspective indicates that the 

information revolution is the key component of the current RMA. 

For purposes of this chapter, the RMA focus is on a 2004 Chinese book titled On 

the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs. A number of influential Chinese strategic, 

information warfare, and media specialists (which includes the authors of the much 

publicized Unrestricted War) provide important RMA insights to the volume. The book 

provides one of the most comprehensive Chinese RMA conceptualizations to date and 

provides an updated assessment of the RMA’s impact on strategy, control, and 

innovation. The traditional US focus has been on technology and capabilities. Common 

ground with the US is found over organizational changes and information technology. 

The US and Chinese differences over RMA benefits are intriguing. The 

differences in emphasis most likely are a direct reflection not only of capabilities but also 

of culture. The US lead is in technology while the Chinese rely on theory and strategy to 

enable (in their opinion) their inferior force to overcome US superiority. One Chinese 

author in the book under review noted that the RMA is really a cognition system 

revolution and a new phase in military strategy research. Another author in the volume 

noted that the essence of the RMA is the reflection of informationization (the Chinese 

preferred term for cyberization or digitalization) in the military field. Yet another of the 

work’s authors added that the RMA involves a series of changes to military theory, 

methods of operations, weaponry, systems organization, command organization, and so 

on, an understanding closer to most US RMA concepts. 

This chapter’s findings on China’s RMA focus may surprise some US analysts, as 

the Chinese try to develop an RMA concept with Chinese characteristics. As one Chinese 

general wrote about the information warfare aspect of the RMA: 

Only with superior thought processes and superior moves, and by seeking a 

developmental strategy of “imbalance” will we truly be able to avoid traveling the 

“path that the enemy expects.” In the realm of information warfare (IW), trying to 

keep up with the Jones’ by developing whatever they possess will lead to falling 

into traps set by others; regardless of how rapidly we develop, it will still be hard 

to escape being controlled by other people.246 

This chapter will explain what new paths the PLA is seeking. Their emphasis on 

superior thought processes, their development of information age strategies, and their 

 

245 Wang Baocun, “China and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” China Military Science, No. 5 2001, pp. 

149 and 154. 

246 Dai Qingmin, “Discourse on Armed Forces Informationization Building and Information Warfare 

Building,” [this chapter appeared verbatim as an article in a 2002 China Military Science journal] On the 

Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, 2004, pp. 39-47. 
61

focus on concepts such as control, perception, and cognition that have led to new theories 

for offensive and defensive activities. The resulting “new” fog of war they intend to cast 

may be something never before contemplated. 

Early Chinese RMA Thoughts 

The Chinese apparently utilized the term “military revolution” interchangeably 

with the term RMA in the mid-1990s. A 1996 Chinese article on IW theory, for example, 

defined a military revolution as “a reflection of social, economic, and scientific and 

technological changes in the military field.”247 Another 1996 article defined a military 

revolution as “a major qualitative change which can correctly integrate, with good timing, 

advanced technologies and weapon systems with new military theories and military 

establishments; bring permanent changes to modes of operations; considerably improve 

military efficiency; and enhance the combat effectiveness of armies by several orders of 

magnitude.”248 

One RMA definition reportedly in the 1997 Chinese Military Affairs Dictionary, 

defined RMA in the following way: 

Starting from the premise that social transformation is a prerequisite for a 

revolution in military affairs, the military field experienced a series of 

fundamental and profoundly influential transformations. It is primarily a 

reflection of qualitative changes in military technology, weapons and equipment, 

unit structure, war fighting methods, and military thought and theory.249

A year later, the tone and substance of Chinese articles on the RMA became more 

cautious. One article noted that “a mammoth revolution currently underway in the 

military sphere is producing an unprecedented impact on, and shock waves in, man's 

military activities.”250

Several Chinese authors in On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs note 

that China must find its own unique techniques and skills during its investigation of the 

RMA.251 The country should not simply follow Western thinking and add only Western 

developments and technologies to the existing framework since 

Due to their different economic and scientific development levels, as well as their 

different cultures, traditions, and ways of thinking, different countries will be 

 

247 Hai Lung and Chang Feng, “Chinese Military Studies Information Warfare,” Kuang Chiao Ching, No 

280, 16 January 1996, pp. 22-23 as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-035, 21 February 1996, pp. 33-34. 

248 Zhang Feng, “Historical Mission of Soldiers Straddling the 21st Century,” Jiefangjun Bao, 2 January 

1996, p. 6 as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-061, 28 March 1996, p. 29. 

249 Definition obtained by the author during a trip to China in 1997. 250 Cheng Yawen, “Keep Abreast of the Development Pattern of the New Military Revolution,” Jiefangjun 

Bao, 7 July 1998, p. 6 as downloaded from the FBIS web page on 21 July 1998. 

251 Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command translated this 

book into English. The author is indebted to his linguistic talents and assistance that made this chapter 

possible. 
62

subjected to different impacts produced by military revolutions; as a result, they 

will adopt different approaches toward new things and accept the new military 

revolution in varying degrees. Therefore, there will be a growing trend toward 

diversification in the pattern of war at the initial stage of the military 

revolution.252 

China’s RMA Theory in 2004: Now with Chinese Characteristics 

A number of RMA-related articles were written for Chinese military journals 

from 1999 to 2004. However, in 2004 Chinese publications focused so intensely on the 

RMA issue that the topic appeared to be a directed PLA leadership discussion forum. 

On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs was selected for review in this 

chapter because it has a sharp strategic and information focus. Chinese subject matter 

experts authored several of the chapters, further increasing the book’s valuable insights. 

As Chinese authors Major General Niu Li, Colonel Li Jiangzou, and Major Xu Dehui (all 

of the Communications and Command Institute) noted in 2000: 

Traditionally, Oriental people emphasize stratagems, and Occidental people 

emphasize technology...Occidental soldiers would seek technological means 

when encountering a difficulty, while Oriental soldiers would seek to use 

stratagems to make up for technological deficiencies without changing the 

technological conditions.253

Thus this book may provide hints as to the strategies used when applying IW/IO. 

On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs has several intriguing sections of 

value for US policy planners and military theorists that illuminate how Chinese thinkers 

combine strategy with electronic data. An example is a statement by Major General Li 

Bingyan, a stratagem specialist, regarding the flood of information available to modern 

analysts: 

In the information age there is information excess, information overload, 

information surplus, information inflation, and information overflow, and that is a 

new factor of war friction. One philosopher said that absolute light and absolute 

darkness have the same effect—we cannot see anything. With information 

overflow, the modern battlefield is more richly colorful and an area for cunning 

and deception.254 

Other authors presented equally stimulating thoughts. Two such ideas were on the new 

objective of war and China’s strategic frontiers, respectively: 

 

252 Cheng. 253 Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, “Planning and Application of Strategies of Information Operations 

in High-Tech Local War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), No. 4, 2000, pp. 115-122 as 

translated and downloaded from the FBIS Website on 9 November 2000. 254 Li Bingyan, “Applying Military Strategy in the Age of the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” The 

Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, 2004, pp. 2-31. 
63

War with the objective of expanding territory has already basically withdrawn 

from the stage of history, and even war with the objective of fighting for natural 

resources is now giving way to war with the objective of controlling the flow of 

financial capital. Although this kind of war really does not require that military 

actions be synchronized with the flow of global financial capital, yet it will 

influence and control this flow, and it does require that military actions take place 

within a few days or even a few hours.255 

Our strategic frontiers must be greater than our territorial frontiers; they simply 

cannot be smaller than our territorial frontiers. For a country without ambition and 

with unclear security and strategic objectives, the RMA is a march with no 

objective.256

In addition to such key assessments, this RMA book also includes a host of definitions of 

military concepts, several Chinese viewpoints on the war in Iraq, and the RMA’s impact 

on decision making. 

Thirteen different Chinese authors wrote chapters for this book. Some of the 

chapters were actually articles that the authors had published a year or two earlier in 

Chinese journals. The chapter titles and authors are listed here not only for ease of 

reference but also to familiarize readers with this list of professional PLA RMA 

specialists. 

1) “Applying Military Strategy in the Age of the New Revolution in Military 

Affairs” by Li Bingyan. He is the senior editor of the Chinese People’s Liberation 

Army’s (PLA) newspaper Liberation Army Daily. Li is a Major General and an expert in 

military strategy. The author of several prominent military books, Li’s chapter discussed 

how the revolution in military affairs (RMA) changed the face of warfare and the 

application of military strategy. He foresees a merging of Eastern and Western military 

cultures as an unforeseen consequence. 

2) “The New Revolution in Military Affairs and Changes in Strategic Thinking” 

by Li Jijun. He is a professor and assists doctoral students in their study of strategy. He is 

a retired PLA Lieutenant General. One of China’s most well-known historians and 

strategists, Li’s chapter stressed the need for serious work to develop China’s hightechnology weapons. 

3) “Discourse on Armed Forces Informationization Building and Information 

Warfare Building” by Dai Qingmin. He is an Army Major General and a former head of 

an unspecified department in the headquarters of the General Staff of the PLA. Since he 

writes often on information warfare topics, it is assumed that he was the head of the IW 

 

255 Liu Yazhou, Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui—“Taking War to the Air and China’s Air Force,” The 

Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp. 48-62. 256 Li Bingyan. 
64

Department. Dai’s chapter discussed the strategic position of IW and information age 

attack and defense capabilities. 

4) “Taking War to the Air and China’s Air Force” by Liu Yazhou, Qiao Liang and 

Wang Xiangsui. Liu is a Lieutenant General in the Air Force and a very prominent writer. 

Qiao is a Senior Colonel in the Political Department of the Air Force. Along with Wang, 

also a Senior Colonel in the Political Department of the Air Force, Qiao wrote the book 

Unrestricted Warfare that gained great notoriety in the West as an example of Chinese 

military thinking. The book stated that all methods (nuclear, chemical, etc.) were 

acceptable in warfare today. Liu, Qiao, and Wang’s chapter discusses the primary place 

of the offensive in modern combat and the important role of the Chinese Air Force in 

fulfilling that requirement. 

5) “The Development of the New World Revolution in Military Affairs and its 

Strategic Influence” by Wang Baocun. He is a Major General (retired) and expert on both 

RMA and IW topics in foreign countries. Wang’s chapter discusses steps to transform a 

mechanized force into an informationized force via the RMA. 

6) “The Extent and Depth of the Worldwide Revolution in Military Affairs” by 

Wang Pufeng. He is a former director of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science’s 

Strategy Research Department. A Major General (retired), he authored two chapters in 

the book. The first was on the IW aspect of the RMA, and the second was on the US 

strategy of preemption. 

7) “The ‘New’ in the New Revolution in Military Affairs” by Tong Weibing. He 

is an army Lieutenant Colonel (retired) who wrote on the Internet under the pseudonym 

of the Old Staff Officer. He has established a “strategist” website. Tong’s chapter 

discusses how information and ideas are used to win wars and influence populations. 

8) “A Few Thoughts on Advancing Military Informationization Building” by Ma 

Yaxi. He is a Major and staff officer at the General Staff. An author of several books, his 

chapter was on the necessity of improving information warfare capabilities in order to 

meet the challenges of the RMA and thereby win the initiative in future wars. Ma served 

as an assistant chief editor of this volume. 

9) “Fully Calculating the Costs and Profits of War” by Qiao Liang and Wang 

Xiangsui, previously mentioned with Chapter Four above. 

10) “Reviewing US ‘Strike First’ Strategy” by Wang Pufeng, who also wrote 

Chapter Six. 

11) “The Media in Modern Warfare” by Xie Xizhang. He is the Chief Editor of 

the Beijing Daily—Literature and Arts Weekly. His chapter discusses the growing role of 

the media in information war. Xie was an assistant chief editor of On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs. 
65

12) “Trends in the Development of World Warfare—Reducing Destructive 

Force” by Shen Weiguang. Shen is sometimes called the Chinese father of IW. He has 

written extensively on IW topics since 1985, and he has published numerous books and 

articles on the subject. His chapter discusses, not unexpectedly, how IW is reducing the 

destructive force of warfare. According to Shen, this is important if countries are to keep 

warfare within bounds as this ultimately could have an effect on the destiny of humans. 

Shen also served as the chief editor for On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs. 

13) “China’s Advancing the New Revolution in Military Affairs” by Wu 

Chenguang. He is a correspondent for Nanfang Weekend. His chapter discusses PLA 

problems associated with moving from a mechanized to an informationized force. 

How Do These Experts Define a Revolution in Military Affairs? 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analysts have used the term RMA in their works 

since the mid-1990s. Wu Chenguang wrote that the first time a high-ranking Chinese 

Communist Party official used the phrase RMA was in 2002 at the 16th National 

Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) by Jiang Zemin. In March 2003 Jiang 

stated publicly that the RMA must have Chinese characteristics.257 However, as will be 

noted below, there is no common understanding of the RMA with Chinese 

characteristics. Each author quoted has a slightly different comprehension of the term. 

Li Bingyan wrote in his chapter in On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs 

that the characteristics of a period of revolution are declining stability and increasing 

uncertainty in the military field, increasing the value of chance, and eliminating neutrality 

which allows both extremes to coexist. Li feels an RMA changes the face of war, and it 

changes the application of military strategy.258 Li added that a successful RMA requires 

the ability to clearly see the future as it unfolds, to move toward one’s own strategic 

objectives, to control new strategic spaces, to maintain great flexibility and elasticity, and 

to move toward innovative ideas. Victory in war is nothing more than victory in military 

construction and building.259 Li added that if military reconnaissance is thought to be the 

beginning of war, then we have been in a blurred war and peace situation ever since 

satellites were put up.260

Li divided military systems into action systems (attack, mobile, defensive, and 

support strengths) and cognitive systems (information collection, transmission, 

processing, and man/machine integration systems). Most important, Li stated that the 

current RMA is really a cognition system revolution.

261 

Li noted that cognition is a major reason why people/soldiers are often unprepared 

for an attack. There are a host of factors that can influence analysis and judgment: limited 

 

257 Wu Chenguang, “China’s Advancing the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp. 147-153. 258 Li Bingyan. 259 Ibid. 260 Ibid. 261 Ibid. 
66

foresight, slackened vigilance due to repeated false intelligence from the enemy, 

complicated warnings, indecisiveness, impact of new technology that isn’t understood, 

conservative ideas; prejudice; self-deception; pursuing a certain political intention with 

the wrong policy, bungling attack opportunities, and finding difficulty in deciding 

whether to keep within limits or to accept a challenge and fight. Also of cognitive 

significance is the issue of surprise which may be utilized on battlefields in terms of time, 

space, technology, or methods with the latter two as the primary ways to implement 

RMA-type surprise.262 

Li stated that the RMA is not so much a revolution as a military innovation 

mechanism. It involves absorbing a new philosophical spirit, and it is a new phase in 

epistemology and methodology. Change gradually arises from uncertainty and it must be 

regulated.263 

Li noted that an RMA is a new phase in military strategy research. Further, a 

successful RMA requires the development of asymmetric thinking, and it must support 

future asymmetric operations. It must create asymmetry on the battlefield using 

asymmetry in military scientific research.264 

Wang Baocun offered another RMA definition. He defined the RMA as 

A process of shifting from an industrial society toward an information society as 

its fundamental cause; with the rapid development of high technology, especially 

information technology, as its direct driving force; with information as its ‘genes;’ 

with improving information capabilities as its basic objective; and with ‘systems 

integration’ as its primary method that is changing the mechanized military 

patterns of the industrial age into informationized military patterns of the 

information age.265

Wang stated that high-technology warfare has five characteristics: a high degree of 

control, a movement from electronic warfare to information warfare, a greater role for 

information dominance, greater prominence for precision attack, and a shorter period of 

duration. Wang noted that an informationized armed force would have a six dimensional 

capability: ground, sea, air, space, information, and perception. Li would undoubtedly 

agree with perception since it is a cognitive factor. This RMA will be finished when there 

has been a revolutionary change to a country’s military organizational system, according 

to Wang.266

Wang believes US forces used the RMA to set up a complete system of 

informationized weaponry to include a comprehensive strategic-level, campaign-level, 

 

262 Li Bingyan. 263 Ibid. 264 Ibid. 265 Wang Baocun, “The Development of the New World Revolution in Military Affairs and its Strategic 

Influence,” On the Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp. 63-

82. 

266 Ibid. 
67

and tactical-level electronic information system. The RMA has also caused theorists to 

develop innovative warfare and operations concepts (such as IW, network-centric 

warfare, etc.), established a four-step mechanism for producing combat strength (suggest 

operations ideas; develop new equipment; carry out tests and exercises; and utilize them 

in warfare), and practiced virtual warfare in order to accelerate military 

informationization building. China’s military, Wang noted, needs just such an innovative 

operational style.267

Li Jijun noted that an RMA is not the same as either military reform or a 

revolution in military technology (RMT). Military reform is a gradual adjustment, and an 

RMT is limited to weaponry. An RMA involves a series of changes to military theory, 

methods of operations, weaponry, systems organization, command organization, and so 

on.268 China’s industrial RMA was complete only after the appearance of People’s War, 

which included guerrilla warfare theory and practice. A necessary component of the 

RMA is countercontrol measures for high-technology warfare. There must be a 

conventional, asymmetric warfare method of operation that has nuclear equivalent 

deterrence measures according to Li.269 

Wang Pufeng wrote that an RMA is a complete change in military systems. 

Presently, the worldwide RMA is a very systematic RMA that was initiated after a group 

of super technologies entered the military arena. The RMA includes a new kind of nature 

in warfare, a new form of warfare, a new method of operation, a new warfare theory, and 

a new organizational structure for warfare.270

Further, Wang Pufeng believes, an RMA has three elements: military technology 

and weaponry (material base of the RMA); organizational structure and authorized 

strength of the armed services (reflections of the achievements of the RMA); and military 

theory, strategy, and tactics (the innovation aspect of the RMA, or the soul of the effort). 

These elements are interrelated. In addition, the information-age RMA greatly affects 

command and control. This is because the revolution has produced automated command 

or C4ISR systems with a global information grid (GIG), opened up a new field of 

struggle (the C4ISR confrontation on the networked battlefield and in the domain of 

computers), and created new kinds of special operations to sow confusion into systems or 

to destroy them.271

Author Tong Weibing added that China’s goal in carrying out a new RMA is to 

keep war within limits: it is not to promote war. Actual strength in modern warfare does 

not refer to numbers of tanks but to the measures to control information and to paralyze 

information in war. This is a revolution in the whole military architecture and system of 

operations. Supporting Li’s idea of the importance of cognition, Tong stated that the key 

 

267 Ibid. 268 Li Jijun, “The New Revolution in Military Affairs and Changes in Strategic Thinking,” On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp.32-38. 

269 Ibid. 270 Wang Pufeng, “The Extent and Depth of the Worldwide Revolution in Military Affairs,” On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp. 83-90. 271 Ibid. 
68

point of a transformation is the innovation of ideas. The US military continuously carries 

out reforms in the areas of ideas, systems, and technology.272 

What Is Strategy? 

Li Bingyan wrote that strategy is a special way of one side’s decision makers 

using information to influence or control the direction of an opponent’s decision making 

activities.273 It is the wisdom, intelligence, and intellect of decision makers put into a plan 

in competitive activities. It is the way decision makers gain the upper hand in a 

competitive environment by calculating the future, grasping the situation, making 

comprehensive plans, and seeking gains while avoiding harm.274 

Li wrote that military strategy should absorb the new methodologies, such as 

systematology, cybernetics, synergetics, mutationism, information theory, dispersion 

theory, function theory, intelligence theory, optimality theory, homology theory, and 

fuzzy theory.275 If absorbed and understood properly strategy will not only be updated but 

able to take advantage of contemporary conditions. 

According to Li Chinese thinking tries to entice the opponent to adopt the strategy 

that will lead China to the greatest gains. In this sense risk and opportunity coexist.276

Fighting in the physical, information, and perception realms leaves a wide space for the 

application of strategy. How strategy is used must change, however, and its capabilities 

must improve.277

Li wrote that the fog of war is used to execute, conceal, and develop strategy. 

Strategists hope to know the situation on the other side so that their use of strategy and 

concealment can add to the opponent’s fog of war. Planning and designing strategy calls 

for knowing the enemy while implementing strategy requires that you use a channel of 

information to send the things you want the opponent to know.278

To thwart the enemy’s plans, friendly forces must analyze the size of the interests 

and contradictions of the two sides. One should arrange factors and see if one’s own 

 

272 Tong Weibing, “The ‘New’ in the New Revolution in Military Affairs,” On the Chinese Revolution in 

Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp. 91-95. 

273 Li Bingyan. 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid. Situations that commanders’ talk about in military strategy refer to different locations in space and 

different distributions of forces. Creating a situation that strategy can exploit requires mastery of the 

following principles: high-position situations restrict low-position situations; external situations (exterior 

lines) restrict internal situations; network situations restrict satellite-point situations (force must be 

dispersed, extended, multi-point); one flank situations (focus flow of energy, grasping the heart of an 

operation) restrict multiple flank situations; “bearing” situations (those that are mutually codependent and 

interact—an example is ball bearings that play a role together) restrict “plate” situations (if you injure one, 

you injure all); and important-point situations restrict line situations and surface situations (“point” refers 

not to size but to the location in the overall situation—for example, the US’s 16 sea ports, as well as its 

high-technology campaign operations and precision attack are point operations). 

276 Ibid. 277 Ibid. 278 Ibid. 
69

interest objectives can be realized by influencing or destroying the opponents’ cognition 

systems or by changing the opponent’s decision making.279 

Li added that Western game theory can be characterized as “no matter what game 

the opponent uses, the game we use must assure the greatest gains and the least losses, 

that is, the so-called ‘maximum/minimum principle’.” It is a “connotative solving 

method” that resolves a contradiction within the contradiction. Game theory is called the 

algorithm method, and it can be expressed in precise mathematics. It strives for certainty 

and reliability. Strategy attempts to make the opponent commit errors in the realization of 

one’s own goals. It is a “denotative solving method” in that it resolves a contradiction 

outside of the contradiction.280 The new strategic culture must learn to use rules such as 

international law and maritime law to their advantage.281 

Li added that the development of IW is a low-to-high escalating development 

process. US battlefield IW is still using only data and understanding. It cuts off an 

opponent’s flow of information and assures information flows for its side. It will move 

toward the knowledge layer or knowledge warfare. It will lift information dominance to 

decision making dominance.282 

How Does the RMA Impact Strategy? 

Li Bingyan stated that high-technology warfare has hastened the appearance of 

many new characteristics of military strategy. As a result, Eastern strategy must shed 

some old thinking and take into account six new features: 

 Methods are new. 

 Information is abundant. 

 Content is vast. 

 Summaries are strong. 

 Preplanning is detailed. 

 Resolution is quick. 

This implies that the RMA is changing a commander’s concept of time, space, 

and strategy. Military theory can now emerge from the labs, and military strategy can be 

previewed in the labs.283 

As examples of strategies and technologies, Li asked how a weak country could 

fight a technologically superior opponent? Using the comparison of a weak mouse 

operating against a huge cat, he asked “How could a mouse hang a bell around a cat’s 

neck?” His answer: “Entice the cat to put on the bell himself (that is, make the cat hang 

the bell around his own neck).” In similar fashion, with regard to a strategy of making a 

technical opponent do something they don’t want to do, he asked the following: “How do 

 

279 Ibid. 280 Ibid. 281 Ibid. 282 Li Bingyan. 283 Ibid. 
70

you make a cat eat a hot pepper?” His answer was as follows: “You can stuff it down his 

throat (the most difficult), you can put the pepper in cheese and make him swallow it, or 

you can grind the pepper up and spread it on his back. The latter method makes the cat 

lick itself and receive the satisfaction of cleaning up the hot pepper.”284 The cat is 

oblivious to the end goal. This is strategy. 

General Dai, discussing the importance of using RMA-generated information as 

strategies, stated that 

Today we should grasp the historical opportunity afforded by making these 

transformations in this information age and establish the position of methods of 

IW, especially the “assassin’s blade” method from IW for strategic campaigns, 

and elevate it to the level of a strategy and lend it a sufficient degree of emphasis, 

make it a focal point of development, and formulate an effective threat and IW 

combat capability as soon as possible, thereby gaining the strategic initiative in 

the military struggles of this new century and even in international struggles.285

What Is IW, and How Does It Relate to the RMA and Strategy? 

Li Bingyan defined IW differently than most IW specialists, stating that it is the 

use of information networks or informationized weapons to attack an enemy’s cognition 

systems. Cognition systems include knowledge systems plus belief systems. Knowledge 

systems refer to decision making systems built to understand or observe verifiable 

phenomena and to change the phenomena into perceivable reality. Belief systems refer to 

systems that carry out guidance for testable empirical information and for information 

and awareness that cannot be tested or is difficult to test. The patterns of guidance are 

restricted by the cultural traditions of the people.286 

Information (and therefore cognitive) supremacy allows for what Li terms 

“control power.” One must prevent the enemy from understanding your information 

while knowing everything about the enemy’s situation. Strategy both needs information 

supremacy and influences information supremacy. While information dominance can 

allow unidirectional transparency on the battlefield, the side with information inferiority 

can also send information it wants the superior side to know. Using strategy to control an 

opponent is creating information misdirection287 and is increasingly an issue both sides 

must contend with on today’s battlefield. 

Wang Pufeng added to Li’s cognitive focus. He wrote that the most important 

reflection of the RMA is the extension and expansion of the functioning of human 

thought by which it makes the release of energy more precise, more scientific, more 

rational, richer in organization, and more effective. This is intrinsically different from the 

pure expansion of power.288

 

284 Ibid. 285 Dai. 286 Li Bingyan. 287 Li Bingyan. 288 Wang Pufeng. 
71

Li warned that one couldn’t follow rules established by the US (as forerunner) of 

a concept such as IW. China must guard against strategic misdirection. The real phase of 

the RMA is informationization, and it is a double-edged sword. It can improve 

operational efficacy but must adhere to the principles of autonomy and controllability at 

the same time. Without autonomy there is no initiative.289 Warfare has crossed the 

informationization threshold according to Li and concepts such as values, real space, 

superior and inferior, and benefit and harm have changed.290 

Dai Qingmin described IW in a different way, focusing on systems rather than 

cognition. He defined IW as an effective method to attack combat systems supported by 

information systems to bring about their complete destruction. This is the basic 

characteristic that differentiates the construction of military informationization from the 

construction of national informationization. IW is controllable, cost-effectiveness, and 

represents the developmental needs of advanced combat strength. IW is not only an aide 

to tactical combat activities, Dai notes, but an important campaign activity. It can appear 

separately from tactical campaigns of pure firepower. Information is important for the 

efficient circulation of energy on the informationized battlefield. Interestingly, in his 

chapter Dai never once referred to the RMA. However his chapter focused on two 

important Chinese RMA aspects: informationization and new organizational 

constructs.291

Finally, Wang Pufeng noted that the RMA of the information age is different from 

past RMAs because it is manifested in the reduction of power and in an increase in 

precision.292 By advancing military informationization building with the goal of 

improving IW capabilities, it is possible to meet the challenges of the new RMA and to 

adapt to the requirements of informationized warfare and thereby win the initiative in 

future wars.293 

IW Will Reduce Destruction 

The crux of complete victory is making both warring sides, especially the 

offensive side, know the outcome without fighting. If it is already known 

beforehand that war will be detrimental to both sides, then there is a chance that 

both sides will mutually make concessions and stop the war. This happened at 

Dayton in the 1990s.294

Li Bingyan believes that, with the advances of the RMA, future war should try to 

reduce destruction. Even Sun Tsu said that the ultimate goals of war are peace and 

 

289 Li Bingyan. 290 Ibid. 291 Dai. 292 Wang Pufeng. 293 Ma Yaxi, “A Few Thoughts on Advancing Military Informationization Building,” On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp. 96-104. 

294 Li Bingyan. 
72

growth and that destruction is not a necessary channel for reaching the goals of war.295

Perfect war will be war in which neither enemy nor friendly sides have casualties. This 

will direct attention to weapons such as magnetic kill weapons.296 IW expert Shen 

Weiguang suggested “ideal warfare” as a concept and referred to a large number of 

conflicts between countries in the not-too-distant future that could be controlled early by 

using simulated warfare to resolve them.297 The Chinese admired the Dayton Talks that 

allowed the war in the former Yugoslavia to end based on simulations. 

RMA advances will also impact on the conduct of war. People should effectively 

restrict both the political and military objectives of war. RMA advances in the IW sphere 

remold ideas on the use of violence. Noncontact war, IW, asymmetrical war, and 

nonlinear operations can help control the enemy’s use of combat power.298 Chief targets 

should be computer network systems that connect the country’s politics, economy, 

military and all of society. If the destructive effect of war is reduced, then attacks on the 

spirit of the enemy can be increased. Attacking the spirit will be based on the enemy’s 

rational knowledge and will be renewable.299 

IW will gradually evolve into the primary form of war, and military objectives 

will shift from eliminating the enemy and preserving oneself to controlling the enemy 

and preserving oneself.300 The development of weapons has a restrictive effect on the 

destructive force of warfare. The forms of war are strategic IW, precision attack, 

leadership warfare (warfare with reduced destructive force will attack leaders and their 

purposes using direct measures, pushing leaders to the front of war), virtual warfare 

(network confrontation, network influence like in the Dayton talks, online campaigns, 

etc.), and incapacitation (nonlethal) warfare.301

IW is tangible war moving toward intangible war. To transform the PLA’s force, 

China must enhance research and planning and study how to win a war with reduced 

force and how to prevent the destructive force of warfare from escalating. 

Informationization must play a leading role in reforms, and there must be an increased 

long-distance precision attack capability.302 IW may even replace simple firepower 

warfare. Informationized weaponry forms a system and includes all kinds: of guidedprojectile missiles, torpedoes, and other informationized ammunition; of informationizedoperations platforms that connect to the networked battlefield; of microprocessor-based 

individual soldier equipment; and of C4ISR systems, GIG systems, and programmed 

digital weapons such as viruses, hacker technologies, and so on.303 The RMA has reduced 

 

295 Shen Weiguang, “Trends in the Development of World Warfare—Reducing destructive Force,” On the 

Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, pp. 131-146. 296 Li Bingyan. 297 Ibid. 298 Li Jijun. 299 Shen. 300 Li Bingyan. 301 Shen. 302 Ibid. 303 Wang Pufeng. 
73

the number of people per square kilometer on the battlefield while the area occupied by 

each person has increased. 

IW Transforms the Military 

General Dai, on the other hand, focuses more on IW’s destructive power. He 

notes that the purpose of a military transformation in the information age is to utilize 

modern scientific information technology to reform the army; to elevate the ability of the 

military to develop, utilize, and control information resources; and to comprehensively 

raise the army’s combat effectiveness, enabling the military to have the ability to acquire 

both deterrent and real-combat capabilities. This requires the construction of information 

systems, the informationization of weapons and equipment, and the construction of IW 

theory. 

There are fundamental differences in the construction of a military 

informationization plan from a national informationization plan. These differences are in 

strategic environments, strategic goals, strategic focal points, and strategic avenues.304

Thus military strategy differs from national strategy as a result. 

Military informationization building refers to the process of using information 

technology to carry out a complete transformation of the basic elements that make up the 

armed forces, to optimize information operations capabilities, and ultimately to build an 

informationized military. Its main tasks include bringing forth new ideas in military 

theories and operational thinking, improving military organizational structure, bringing 

about informationization of weapons, and training informationized personnel.305

IW’s Technological Impact 

Wang Baocun noted that an RMA-based, informationized military has two 

components: military sensing and military communications. The former has increased the 

surveillance distance of platforms by 5-times and the amount of information surveyed by 

25-times. The latter helps ensure unimpeded command, attack, and damage evaluation 

information, and assists in surveillance, intelligence, tracking, and fire control. This 

enables an overall synthesis of effort.306 Thus the technological impact of the RMA on 

the PLA is expected to significantly increase its military capabilities. 

Wu Chenguang notes that Chinese General Xiong Guangkai believes the essence 

of the new RMA is a reflection of the informationization revolution in the military field. 

The US military, Wu states, believes that the combat effectiveness ratio of a digitized 

armed force is one to four over a mechanized force. A military training information 

network that links the whole military together has already tentatively been activated.307 

Control of the frontlines by the rear lines is becoming a new trend in warfare 

thanks to informationized forces. Drones circling over Afghanistan can be controlled 

 

304 Dai. 305 Ma. 306 Wang Baocun. 307 Wu. 
74

from stateside.308 Liu, Qiao, and Wang note that the war in Afghanistan was the first 

appearance of drone airborne warfare. The air is where China can win limited war under 

informationized conditions. Air attack forces have a high degree of controllability, are 

able to select targets and attack methods, and their intensity is based on the war and 

operational objectives. This is not just the air force, but the army and navy air assets as 

well—the joint air attack force.309

IW Imparts an Offensive Nature to Modern Conflicts 

Ma, like Dai, stresses the offensive. IO with electronic warfare and network 

warfare as its key contents stresses that an offensive nature is an intrinsic, essential 

requirement. Only by actively taking the initiative and attacking and by carrying out 

omnidirectional interference and suppression of the enemy’s command, control, 

communications, and reconnaissance systems will the enemy be rendered unable to fend 

for itself.310 It is the RMA that enables this strategic application of the IW tool. 

China must avoid being passive in future wars. Developing countries must 

enhance the construction of information operations forces, particularly assault forces. EW 

and network warfare are the main methods of information attack. They are the core and 

the mainstay of IO. Presently the electronic warfare forces of the US military is 2.6% of 

its total, and the electronic warfare forces of the Russian military is 3% of its total. 

Compared to this the electronic warfare forces of the Chinese military is too small and 

must be increased.311

Wang Baocun notes that China views the information infrastructures and systems 

of militaries of even developed countries as still somewhat weak. Therefore, the “trump 

cards” of the Information Age (as distinct from the nuclear trump cards of the Industrial 

Age) are: computer viruses; hackers; and high-power electronic-interference units, 

passive-interference units, high-energy non-nuclear electro-magnetic pulse bombs, 

antisatellite weapons, and other offensive information warfare weapons.312

General Dai noted that information attacks not only destroy forces, but they can 

also lead to significant financial, transportation, electronic messaging, and electric system 

shortcomings that can inflict political, economic, and moral harm. IW attacks can 

paralyze command and control and produce “unbalanced combat.” IW is an “assassin’s 

blade” that is strategic, offensive, targeted, extraordinarily effective, and threatening. As 

Dai notes, IW/IO is not just a military weapon. Further, 

Methods of IW represent the fundamental trend of the development of offensive 

weapons in the information age. Selecting the construction of IW as the strategic 

focal point in the construction of the informationization of the military is a 

 

308 Qiao and Wang Xiangsui. 309 Liu, Qiao, Wang Xiangsui. 310 Ma. 311 Ibid. 312 Wang Baocun. 
75

necessary demand to accommodate the development of combat in this age and the 

urgent conditions of military combat.313

How Did the RMA Influence US Actions in Iraq? 

Chinese analysts were surprised, Li Bingyan wrote, over the extent of the US’s 

RMA achievements witnessed during the fight for Iraq. They overestimated Saddam 

Hussein’s strategy, and they were fooled by the information the US let out publicly. The 

US, Li adds, used Sun Tzu to balk the enemy’s plans and avoid direct confrontation with 

the Iraqi military. The Art of War deeply affected what the US and British militaries did 

on the battlefield. What the Chinese saw was the integration of Western technology and 

indirect Eastern strategy. “Win without fighting” was discussed, and it appeared that 

Western militaries were changing from On War to the Art of War. Clausewitz used 

Hegel’s dialectic and Newton’s mechanics to analyze war. It is representative of westernstrength type military theory. The Art of War uses an Eastern method of dialectic 

thought, exploring the rules of war and bringing up rich and intriguing thoughts on 

strategy. It reflects the requirements for warfare in an information society. The US 

military also is trying to use strategy together with their RMA achievements to overcome 

Iraq’s military strength according to Li.314

Before the war started, strategic planning developed on three levels. They are the 

political and diplomatic level, using morality to attack injustice; the mind, such as 

psychological attacks and IW; and operations, or carrying out planned destruction and 

placing target selection, evaluation, and reevaluation at the heart of strategy.315 Sun Tzu 

said that the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won. Victory 

first includes knowing fires, calculating first, and preparing first. Making preparations, 

fighting with the assurance of weaponry, and conducting scientific decision making helps 

ensure this.316

The US military turned the war into a live telecast which was more like a strategic 

cognitive event. It limited the main points of attack to military targets according to Tong. 

This outcome made the common man in Iraq feel the “benevolent” side of war. People 

were less likely to turn against US forces. Iraq was a generation behind the US in 

technology and concepts and this is the main reason that the Iraqi military ultimately 

lost.317

Xie stated that media warfare included two important aspects in regard to Iraq. 

Internally, the country’s people must be won over to support the war, the legal system 

must be on board, and the morale of the troops must be inspired. Externally, alliances 

must be won, and a joint battlefront must be established. The opponent must be isolated, 

bogged down in injustice, and demonized. The media became an instrument for the 

government to win public opinion. It also played the role of a “morale bomb” for the 

 

313 Dai. 314 Li Bingyan. 315 Ibid. 316 Ibid. 317 Tong. 
76

military. Media warfare now includes intelligence warfare (that is, use of the media to 

gain intelligence) as a part of total warfare. 

US operational measures with the media included threatening (decapitation, etc,), 

kidnapping, and blocking (using force to suppress an opponent’s voices). The Gulf War 

of 1991 was easier for the US media because there was only one voice. In 2003 there 

were competing media voices from the Arab world, and in this war Iraq was not the 

invader.318 The US began a broadcast offensive starting in December 2002 that used five 

different frequencies inside Iraq to persuade Iraqi soldiers to stop supporting Saddam. It 

also called on the Iraqi military not to attack allied British and US forces’ aircraft. A total 

of 480,000 leaflets were distributed with broadcast times and frequencies. Operational 

plans were leaked as well which sent a strong psychological shock to soldiers and 

civilians alike.319

There were different motives at work in Iraq according to Qiao Liang and Wang 

Xiangsui. US President George Bush wanted to lay a foundation for his reelection: 

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld wanted to use the war to promote lightening reforms in 

the US military: and General Franks wanted to prove that the Army still had an 

irreplaceable role in modern warfare. The best example of maximizing results in the war 

was not the use of the air force but bribing Iraqi generals. It was much less expensive. 

Other countries should learn from the US and not only about advanced military 

technology and methods of operation. They should also learn that before each war is 

fought it is necessary to fully calculate one’s own costs and benefits, and not to fight a 

war in which there is no way to reap profits.320

What Is Decision Making? 

Strategy is the core of decision making, and information is the material of 

decision making.321

Information that computers produce is greater than the information they process. 

Because of this, the distance between strategists and the battlefield is also 

expanding at the same time. In just this way, the next move in the US military’s 

RMA will be to try to carry forward information dominance into decision making 

dominance.322

Li Bingyan defines decision making as a process of information gathering, 

processing, working, and producing. It can be simplified as reconnaissance, analysis, 

judgment, determination, and deployment. Obviously RMA-designed forces assist in 

each of these missions. To move from information gathering to military action requires 

 

318 Xie 319 Shen. 320 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, “Fully Calculating the Costs and Profits of War,” On the Chinese 

Revolution in Military Affairs, ed. Shen Weiguang, New China Press, 2004, pp. 105-112. 

321 Ibid. 322 Ibid. 
77

obtaining, processing, confirming, and transforming information into action. The 

information formulation chain is developed from data, understanding, knowledge 

(analysis and evaluation), and wisdom, with the latter being the most important for 

decision makers.323 Li added that wisdom is people’s ability to understand, analyze, 

judge, and produce creative thought. Intelligence is the ability to use information to 

realize a certain goal or objective in various environments. Intellect is the ability to 

understand a matter and use knowledge and experience to solve problems.324

Conclusions 

Prominent US Chinese scholars Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, writing about the 

Chinese RMA in 1996, noted that China might approximate an RMA reflecting Chinese 

needs and characteristics in the next 15 years (or by the year 2010). Gill noted that 

China’s self-reliant economic tradition, its Soviet and Maoist legacy, and decentralization 

of decision making would make RMA progress slow. But, he added, the Chinese had 

already begun the debate on the RMA shortly after the 1991 Gulf War. They recognized 

that opportunities for exploitation and potential applications were growing rapidly. And 

China’s leaders understood that its large population offered the chance for significant 

advances quickly. Economic and socio-cultural factors however may determine how 

quickly China can adapt to the RMA.325 China will have to measure its economic 

capability to initiate an RMA as well as whether there are enough trained personnel to 

institute it. 

Henley added that even if China could not achieve an information-based RMA in 

the foreseeable future, this 

Does not necessarily mean the Chinese cannot achieve an RMA. It is possible 

they will make significant breakthroughs in some other direction entirely. In fact, 

this could do more to shift the military balance in their favor than either of the 

more conventional alternatives. We would be much more likely to recognize, 

understand, and cope with a Chinese RMA if it followed the same path we were 

already on; and less likely to deal effectively with an RMA based on concepts and 

approaches that are unfamiliar to us...China will not achieve any major 

breakthrough in the innovative application of technology to military 

operations...for at least the next quarter century.326

There is an implied warning in Dr. Henley’s interesting analysis. If China makes 

an RMA breakthrough in a direction unfamiliar to us, how will we know? How will we 

recognize “unfamiliar concepts?” Perhaps our recognition will come via books such as 

The Chinese Revolution in Military Affairs for in such volumes we find ideas and 

 

323 Ibid. 324 Ibid. 325 Bates Gill and Lonnie Henley, “China and the Revolution in Military Affairs,” 20 May 1996, Strategic 

Studies Institute, Carlisle Pa., paper downloaded from the Internet on 9 September 2005 at 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/chinarma.pdf. 

326 Ibid. 
78

concepts foreign to our mostly information-based technological RMA approach. As 

General Dai pointed out 

If we go our own path to develop military theory, weapons and equipment, and 

systems of authorized strength we will develop something never seen before in 

places that no one has ever thought of before; others will be unable to anticipate 

or resist our “self-accommodating systems;” that way, our military systems will 

be even more flexible, acquire even more survival vitality and competitive 

capabilities.327

From a military theory vantage point what was most striking about the work 

under consideration? To this author it was, first, the idea of offering to foreign 

competitors ideas they will “be unable to anticipate or resist.” Li Bingyan was the best 

representative of this purely Chinese way of thought (How do you hang a bell around a 

cat’s neck? How do you make a cat eat a hot pepper?) that US analysts often do not 

explore. A second point is how the RMA is changing the application of strategy. Chinese 

theorists foresee new phases in military strategic research focused on developing 

strategies to deceive or influence not only decision makers but also large military 

systems. Strategy now, under the auspices of virtual preparation, “emerges from the 

laboratories” and must be studied as a military strategic engineering topic. Further, since 

the RMA changes our conceptualization of time and space and how the two interact, this 

opens up a command and control revolution with all its strategic implications. 

Another striking RMA conclusion of the book is that IW imparts an offensive 

nature to modern conflicts. Authors noted that not only are offensive operations cheaper 

in contemporary times, but they are also a way to gain and keep the initiative in a world 

where wars are short and much more intense and precise. Time and initiative are 

intertwined with strategy and the offensive. 

China’s emphasis on strategy is closely integrated with another popular Chinese 

RMA topic—the cognitive factor. Strategy’s core issue is fooling an opponent’s decision 

makers. One Chinese theorist felt the heart of the RMA was a cognition system 

revolution and that this was the key to gaining control of the future. Another author 

believed that a sizeable proportion of future war will be conducted in aerospace, 

information space, and perception space (that is, the cognitive factor). Intellectualized 

warfare thus is an important component of this cognitive confrontation. Closely related to 

cognition is media warfare. 

Many of the authors in this book, and several in related articles, have highlighted 

the concept of innovation. This creative noun may be the term most familiar to Chinese 

RMA readers as it appears often in RMA articles. It was the subjective application of 

creativity (innovation?) to objective conditions that Peng and Yao referred to as the 

essence of the Chinese concept of strategy. Wang Baocun, who unlike Henley firmly 

believes China can produce an information-based force, wrote that China’s military 

 

327 Dai. 
79

“urgently needs an innovative operational style.”328 Wang also summed up his thoughts 

on the RMA better than other authors of this book. 

First, Wang noted that China must establish a “world military outlook.” This 

outlook includes a world strategy outlook, a world war outlook, and a world national 

defense and military development outlook. In other words, Wang suggests taking a 

comprehensive view of world affairs. China’s military must move in the direction of 

integration based on the world strategic situation and China’s strategic interests in order 

to plan and realize China’s national defense and military strategies.329

Second, Wang noted that a revolution in military thought should focus on 

information warfare, information awareness, and information construction. Layers of 

command must be reduced, organizations diversified according to operational missions, 

and armed forces structures established. In military education this requires giving priority 

to IW exercises, offering IW and information technology courses, and training people in 

IW systems and technology. The final goal is to assemble many military systems into one 

large military system. This requires early warning detection systems, command 

automation systems, and precision firepower attack systems seamlessly linked. Systems 

integration thinking must be built into the training process.330

Finally, Wang noted that China must learn to use a virtual-practice methodology 

suited to the new RMA developments. All of this requires innovative operational 

concepts, theories, and military technology if combat effectiveness is to be quickly 

shaped and applied. Laboratory exercises will be particularly valuable.331

The Chinese specialists who participated in On the Chinese Revolution in 

Military Affairs clearly believe that the RMA is a revolution of an entire military 

architecture—its theory, organization/construction, and application—much like the US 

analysts of the 1990s predicted. But the manner in which it is understood through the 

prism of Chinese military culture has produced some conclusions that differ radically 

from those a US counterpart might develop, especially with regard to the RMA’s impact 

on strategy. China’s RMA focus is on ideas as much as technology, such as what 

constitutes a benefit or harm and how the superior and inferior interact. 

China may indeed be on the verge of fielding “unfamiliar concepts” as their RMA 

research unfolds. The concepts appear to be information-based. The US must consider 

this fact seriously as it prepares its forces for the coming years. China has made these 

changes much faster than the US expected, which means the US must be a quick study of 

the “RMA with Chinese Characteristics” if it is to understand where the PLA is headed in 

the next few decades. 

 

328 Wang Baocun. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid. 331 Ibid. 
80

CHAPTER FOUR: CHINA’S IW-STRATEGY/STRATAGEM LINK 

This chapter is a reprint from Dragon Bytes. It addresses the issue of strategy and IW 

from 1999 through 2003.332

Introduction 

Stratagems have historically been a key component of China’s military culture. 

They are found in almost every aspect of Chinese military thought, to include command 

and control and information war. A Chinese PLA Officer’s Handbook offered the best 

definitions of stratagem from a purely military viewpoint for purposes of this chapter. 

The handbook defined two related concepts: the science of military stratagem and 

military stratagem. The science of military stratagem is 

Both related to and distinguished from strategic science, campaign science, and 

tactical science. Strategic science, campaign science, and tactical science research 

problems related to either the full scope or specific aspects of war; however, the 

science of military stratagem researches problems related to the creation and 

application of stratagem that cut across all three of these sciences. Strategic 

science, campaign science, and tactical science research the general principles of 

war guidance; however, the science of military stratagem researches how to 

flexibly apply these general principles in war. If the former’s research focuses on 

the “positive path,” then the latter focuses on the “deceptive (or scheming) path”; 

if the former’s research focuses on the “constant,” then the latter focuses on the 

“variable...”333

Military stratagem was defined in the following way: 

Stratagem generally refers to scheming and military strategy (or tactics—taolue); 

the war planning (or scheme, plot—mohua) employed by the two opposing 

combatants to be used at different levels of military strategy, military campaign, 

and military tactics in order to obtain victory. Military stratagem is a product of 

the development of war, the concrete manifestation of human subjective actions 

upon material forces. It reflects the general principles of military struggles, 

possessing a corresponding stable nature and vigorous liveliness.334

There is mention of stratagems in many Chinese military articles. In a 2000 article 

in the Chinese journal China Military Science, authors Major General Niu Li, Colonel Li 

Jiangzou, and Major Xu Dehui (all of the Communications and Command Institute) 

 

332 Timothy L. Thomas, Dragon Bytes, 2004, Foreign Military Studies Office, pp. 80-96. 333 Chinese People’s Liberation Army Officer’s Handbook, Qingdao Publishing House, June 1991, p. 197. 

Translation support for the terms science of military stratagem and science of military stratagem was 

provided by Mr. John Tai, a George Washington University PhD candidate and consultant on Chinese 

affairs. Dr. Gary Bjorge of the Combat Studies Institute of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas made his PLA 

Handbook available for use. 

334 Ibid. 
81

defined IW stratagems as “schemes and methods devised and used by commanders and 

commanding bodies to seize and maintain information supremacy on the basis of using 

clever methods to prevail at a relatively small cost in IW.”335 The 1992 book Thirty-Six 

Stratagems offered another definition, noting that 

Yin and Yang are two complementary qualities in the universe and everything in 

the world is thought to belong to one or the other. Yin, the female element, is 

associated with the dark and hidden while Yang, the male element, is associated 

with light and openness. The ancient Chinese regarded ploys and stratagems often 

hatched and carried out in secrecy, to belong to the Yin. Yin in the Book of 

Changes is represented by the hexagram for earth which is composed of six lines, 

with each line broken into segments, resulting in two columns of six short lines, 

whose product is thirty-six.336

Chinese-English dictionaries referenced for this chapter used the words “plan, scheme, 

astuteness, resourcefulness, strategy, plot, and trickery” most often as an equivalent for 

stratagem. Thus there is some common understanding of a stratagem from a Chinese 

viewpoint. The word is understood to imply some measure of scheming, trickery, or 

deception. 

The US Armed Forces does not recognize stratagem as part of its military 

philosophy. The US Department of Defense’s Dictionary of Military Terms, Joint 

Publication (JP) 1-02, does not define the term. It does define strategy and tactics. The 

former is defined as “the art and science of developing and employing instruments of 

national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, 

and/or multinational objectives.” Tactics are defined as “the employment of units in 

combat. The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or 

to the enemy in order to use their full potentialities.”337 

The term stratagem is not absent from the English language, of course. One US 

dictionary defined a stratagem as “a maneuver to deceive or outwit an enemy in war. It is 

a device for obtaining advantage; trick.”338 Strategy is defined as “the science and art of 

conducting a military campaign on a broad scale: distinguished from tactics. The use of 

stratagem or artifice, as in business or politics. A plan or technique for achieving some 

end.”339 Tactics are defined as “the science and art of military and naval evolutions; 

especially, the art of handling troops in the presence of the enemy or for immediate 

objectives; distinguished from strategy. Any maneuvering or adroit management to gain 

 

335 Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, “Planning and Application of Strategies of Information Operations 

in High-Tech Local War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), Number 4 2000, pp. 115-122 

as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Website on 9 November 2000 

336 Koh Kok Kiang, and Liu Yi (translators), Secret Art of War: Thirty-Six Stratagems, 1992, Asiapac 

Books, Singapore, Forward. 

337 See http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/, as amended through 17 December 2003. 338 Funk and Wagnalls Standard College Dictionary, Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1968, p. 1323. 339 Ibid. 
82

an objective.”340 This indicates that the US understanding of the term also is related to 

trickery and deception. 

Still, it is difficult to capture the overall essence of a stratagem and what it implies 

to Chinese theorists who use the term. Dr. William Whitson, an American who has 

studied the Chinese for many years, offered an interpretation of a stratagem from what 

might be termed an overarching perspective of a Chinese specialist with years of 

experience in the field of military studies: 

I have never seen a Western term that adequately expresses what it means. 

Westerners don’t understand the essence of the concept. They seek oversimplified 

words like ‘deception’ or ‘disinformation.’ The practitioner of mou lue zhan starts 

from the premise that he is engaged not in destroying the enemy physically but in 

confusing him mentally, hopefully so confusing the enemy that he will become 

paralyzed. The idea is based on a deeper philosophical idea that any situation is 

not objectively real. It is instead a projection of many perceptions, especially the 

perception of leaders. So the focus of mou lue zhan is an enemy leader’s 

perception...it might be translated as ‘attitude warfare’ or ‘perception warfare.’ In 

effect, military strategy itself and the deployment of troops are made subordinate 

to the overarching stratagem of creating the enemy’s perception. Westerner’s 

don’t understand it because they are taught to believe that victory comes to those 

with things that make the loudest noise and are the most destructive. To the mou 

lue warrior, such a viewpoint is childish and wasteful.341

Dr. Deborah Porter is a Chinese language specialist at the University of 

Washington. She added a supporting yet slightly different interpretation of the term. In 

the ancient dictionary Erya, Dr. Porter writes, mou is defined as “heart.” An annotator of 

the definition commented that “mou” is using the heart to think (in a calculating way). 

Mou is also defined as the type of thought that assesses the difficulty or easiness of some 

action. Sixteen synonyms of the term were listed in the Erya dictionary, including to plan, 

to delimit, to surprise, to search, to investigate, to visit, and to observe (for the purpose of 

calculation).342 In the section on “Shi Yan” (explanations of verbal expressions) where 

mou is defined by itself, the same definition of “relying on the heart to think” is listed but 

with more commentary: “the heart is [like] the finest of thread; [its ability] to 

recognize/discern the minutest [details] ensure that there is no object that cannot be 

penetrated; the heart is the residence of cognition.”343 

The Chinese word zhan, Dr. Porter adds, was usually used in the context of 

warfare and had an ancient meaning more to do with the emotion/sensation of fear. In a 

military context, an understanding of the objective would be how fear is manipulated, 

 

340 Ibid., p. 1363. 341 E-mail correspondence with Dr. William W. Whitson, 13 April 2004. Dr. Whitson is the author of The 

Chinese High Command, a comprehensive study of China’s military elite. He served as a military attaché 

to Taiwan and Hong Kong, and received his PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 342 Erya, Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1982, Vol. 1, p. 19a. Footnotes based on e-mail correspondence with 

Dr. Deborah Porter, University of Washington, 18 April 2004. 

343 Ibid., p. 52b. 
83

created, and taken advantage of—often in tandem with an element of “surprise” in a 

battle context. It is also understood as a word for trembling, such as a shaking movement 

as a response to fear.344

The term lue is not as ancient as the other two, at least as is recorded in 

paleographic and dictionary sources, according to Dr. Porter. The initial sense of the term 

was agricultural. The semantic sense of the term may have evolved to include the sense 

of plot or ploy. It has nothing to do with battle. The word lue in mou lue zhan refers to 

the plan/plot and calculations/observations conducted with the object of manipulating 

(psychologically) opponents’ emotions, especially those associated with fear, Dr. Porter 

concludes.345 Thus, with this complicated etymology, it is not surprising that “stratagem” 

is a concept not entirely understood by Western audiences. 

The Chinese are integrating stratagems into their information-age thinking at 

many levels. For example, the book Command Decision making and Stratagem, 

published in 1999, took a historical look at China’s tradition of using stratagems. Author 

Zian Ruyi noted that “historical wars needed stratagems and future high-tech wars also 

need stratagems even more. We must ...make them more scientific and modern.”346 Jia 

Fengshan, writing in Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) in 2003, noted that science 

and technology boost traditional stratagems to a new level. They can be derived from and 

applied to not only the human brain but also high-tech means. Jia noted that “some 

military experts believe that the ‘differences in stratagems’ lie in the ‘differences in 

technologies’ under high-tech conditions” and that integrating high-tech with stratagems 

is going to be an inevitable trend in the future.347 

The term is often used with other concepts. When discussing the term asymmetry, 

for example, one Chinese theorist chose to mix the term stratagem with the term tactics. 

Kang Hengzhen, writing in China Military Science in 2002, noted that “12 crafty tactics” 

demonstrate the abnormal logic that defines asymmetry. Further, asymmetric operations 

are no longer constrained spatially due to the advent of high-tech (which has information 

technology as its core). Traditional fighting space has changed. Now ground forces must 

be prepared to consider the effect of satellites that spy on their every move as well as the 

opponent’s ground forces. It is necessary to consider the stratagems that fool these 

satellites.348 

These constant references to stratagems indicate that they play a key role whether 

directly or indirectly in the development of Chinese IW theory and practice. This chapter 

explains how China uses stratagems in conjunction with IW. First, China is studying how 

 

344 Ibid., p. 73a. 345 E-mail exchange with Dr. Porter, 18 April 2004. 346 Zian Ruyi, Command Decision making and Stratagem, Kunlun Publishing House, Beijing 1999, pp. 4-5, 

76-87, 92-97 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Website on 24 April, 2003. 

347 Jia Fengshan, “Strategists Embrace High-Tech,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 9 April 2003 

(Internet version), as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Website on 10 April 2003. 

348 Kang Hengzhen, “The Origin and Development of Asymmetric Strategy,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 

(China Military Science), Number 3, 2002, pp. 70-76 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Website 

on 6 March 2003. 
84

to deceive and manipulate the decision making capability of commanders through the 

integration of IW and stratagems. Second, the Chinese military is studying how 

stratagems and high-tech equipment work together. For example, Chinese planners are 

learning how to gather reconnaissance data (obtained from satellites, sensors, etc.) from 

the battlefield, compare that data with other data stored in computers, and generate 

computer stratagems for action (similar to the US courses of action) based on this 

comparison. Third, based on a network analysis highlighting its critical aspects, attack 

stratagems are tailored to the different characteristics of the network under consideration. 

And finally, there is the implication that electron packets are capable of being used as 

stratagems against networks much as forces were used on a battlefield in the past. 

The term stratagem is used often by the PLA, and it is a term that Western 

audiences must come to understand. It utilizes perception management techniques to fool 

or paralyze enemy forces. Understanding how the PLA interprets the terms also allows 

better contextual and philosophical understanding by Westerners of Chinese military 

writings. This chapter explores China’s use of both IW strategies and stratagems. 

Integrating High-Tech Weaponry with Stratagems 

The topic of developing information warfare strategies and tactics has taken 

center stage as a key discussion point over the past few years. Even former Chinese 

President Jiang Zemin underscored the strategic task of “developing the strategies and 

tactics of People’s War in the context of high technology” in his report to the 16th CPC 

National Congress. 

Major General Dai Qingmin, director of the PLA’s Communication Department 

of the General Staff (responsible for IW/IO), is one Chinese thinker who has done as 

Jiang directed. He wrote in the Number 4, 2000 issue of China Military Science that 

...new technologies are likely to find material expression in informationalized 

arms and equipment which will, together with information systems, sound, light, 

electronics, magnetism, heat, and so on, turn into a carrier of strategies.349

Dai’s comments imply that China may intend to use electrons as they once used forces. 

That is, electrons might be used to fulfill the stratagems “kill with a borrowed sword” and 

“exhaust the enemy at the gate and attack him at your ease.” Electrons might, for 

example, help destroy another country’s information infrastructure or overcome 

deficiencies in technology just as forces did in the past. A comparable equivalent to this 

theoretical development in military art would be Russia creating a virtual operational 

maneuver group (OMG) of electron forces to attack inside a country, maneuvering 

electrons as forces were once manipulated. 

General Dai’s article is an important benchmark in PLA military philosophy. 

First, as the prior commander of the PLA’s Information Warfare Center in Wuhan, 

 

349 Dai Qingmin, “Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue 

(China Military Science), Number 4 2000, pp. 72-77 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Website 

on 9 November 2000. 
85

General Dai is a very credible and responsible figure, giving his ideas the stamp of 

official thinking. Second, in the article quoted above, General Dai broke with tradition 

and advocated an active offensive to gain the initiative and seize information superiority 

by attacking first. This offensive emphasis contradicts China’s military strategy of active 

defense and indicates new missions for IW forces. Finally, he noted that integrated and 

joint IO, two subjects rarely discussed by Chinese specialists, gives more scope and 

purpose to a People’s War. Dai’s support of stratagem-based activities and the writings of 

other Chinese analysts on the subject should be closely followed by Western analysts. 

Another important article in China Military Science that should be reviewed is 

“Planning and Application of Strategies of Information Operations in High-Tech Local 

Wars.” Authors Major General Niu Li (a professor), Colonel Li Jiangzhou (an associate 

professor), and Major Xu Dehui (a lecturer) at the Communications and Command 

Institute offered several ways in which stratagems could be applied in the information 

age.350 

The authors defined information warfare stratagems as “schemes and methods 

devised and used by commanders and commanding bodies to seize and maintain 

information supremacy on the basis of using clever methods to prevail at a relatively 

small cost in information warfare.”351 According to Niu, Li, and Xu, Orientals and 

Occidentals view the combination of stratagems and technology in different ways. This is 

because their military and social cultures, not to mention their economic prosperity, have 

evolved in different ways which results in different thought processes. The authors noted: 

Traditionally, Oriental people emphasize stratagems, and Occidental people 

emphasize technology...Occidental soldiers would seek technological means 

when encountering a difficulty, while Oriental soldiers would seek to use 

stratagems to make up for technological deficiencies without changing the 

technological conditions. An Oriental soldier’s traditional way of thinking is not 

conducive to technological development, but can still serve as an effective way of 

seeking survival in a situation of danger.352

There is certainly a Western proclivity to look for technological fixes that has long been 

recognized and critiqued by analysts. A simple check on when the latest US article was 

written on IW stratagems would most likely turn up empty. Western audiences have 

underappreciated the less recognized Oriental fix on strategies and perhaps their 

importance in general. A proper mix of the two is required, it would seem, to ensure that 

all sides of a situation are properly assessed. 

Authors Niu, Li, and Xu believe that stratagems can help China make up for its 

deficiencies in high-technology based weaponry. Stratagems are not developed in 

isolation but by combining human qualitative thinking with computer-assisted 

quantitative calculations. There are reports of Chinese efforts to use computers to 

 

350 Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui. 351 Ibid. 352 Ibid. 
86

generate military stratagems as a battle unfolds in field exercises. In such scenarios, the 

operations department of a field unit would collect information from sensors, satellites, 

and other reconnaissance assets, and enter the data into a computer. The computer would 

generate stratagems from this input for a Chinese commander’s consideration. That is, 

current battlefield information is compared with established models stored in computers, 

and from this stratagems are generated. US operations personnel, on the other hand, 

generate courses of action for their commander’s consideration. This is usually done by a 

combination of map and terrain analysis and knowledge of enemy locations. 

The PLA Science and Technology University reportedly has developed an 

auxiliary decision making system for military operations research. This may be the 

machine that produces these calculations. The system improves the PLA’s simulated 

operations capability. It should enhance their combat prognosis capability and ability to 

grasp tactical situations. This is particularly helpful when considering operational factors 

such as troop strength, firepower, and sea/air control capabilities, and when performing 

force-on-force exercises on the network.353

The Chinese believe that the models stored in computers will standardize 

responses to the huge number of contingencies and uncertainties on the battlefield. 

Computers and the human brain interact to develop IW stratagems under these 

circumstances. As these authors put it, it is necessary to “let stratagems be integrated into 

the genes of high technology.”354 

One goal of the use of stratagems is to cause enemy commanders to make 

mistakes by influencing their cognitive elements and system of beliefs. The idea is to 

force enemy commanders to develop decisions in the direction set by the Chinese side.355

Another idea is to fool the high-tech systems, such as sensors and satellites, with fake 

troop movements or locations. In this way enemy commanders are shown a false picture 

of what is developing which influences the decisions they eventually make. 

LTC Liu Aimin, a staff officer in a General Staff Department of the PLA, added 

to this idea. He wrote that deception warfare is rising quietly on virtual battlefields. By 

this he means the insertion of simulated information into an enemy’s command and 

control system. This could cause an enemy to mistake what is false for what is true, or it 

could throw an enemy command and control scheme into chaos. Liu concluded that 

“virtual reality information network deception will become an important combat measure 

on the future virtual battlefield.”356

Cybernetics, information theory, systems theory and futurology, and decision 

making systems and theories assist this effort. Chinese theorists use these tools to search 

 

353 China News Agency, http://www.chinanews.com.cn/n/2003-04-07/26/291859.html, 7 April 2003. 354 Li Nui, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui. 355 Ibid. 356 Liu Aimin, “The Characteristics of Informationized War,” Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military 

Science), 1 August 2001, pp. 69-72 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS Website on 20 November 

2003. 
87

for critical points and weak spots in an enemy’s system, and then they find ways to 

paralyze the system. To make this work, junctures and areas of interaction between 

technology and stratagems must be identified. Stratagems must be devised to be 

compatible with the characteristics of different networks, and they must be used by a 

system capable of ensuring information acquisition, transmission, and processing. They 

must control the entire process in a targeted manner that requires an understanding of 

how an information contest develops in different stages and time periods. Here, Chinese 

authors place emphasis on attacking first. This is yet another indication that in the 

information age an active offense may be more important than an active defense.357

In the acquisition or preparation phase, stratagems must interfere with, damage or 

destroy listening and antilistening measures, camouflage and anticamouflage devices, 

reconnaissance and antireconnaissance measures, and stealth and antistealth measures 

among other items. Stratagems may be included in information flows to sever channels of 

communication while keeping friendly flows of information secure. Some of the methods 

of influencing information flows are to carry out interference and anti-interference 

efforts, deciphering and antideciphering efforts, and destruction and antidestruction 

efforts. Finally, the processing phase requires stratagems that, in addition to the 

transmission task, include misleading and antimisleading efforts targeting the enemy’s 

information processing system to cause the enemy to make decision making errors.358 

The basic goal of stratagems is to intimidate, use perception management, and 

create fictitious objects (such as fake networks and equipment in an information system) 

as part of a deception plan whose intent is to hide “true reality.” The intellectual battle is 

now more important than contests in bravery, the authors note, and wide-ranging 

knowledge and superior wisdom, boldness, and scheming ability are required.359 

A stratagem can be as simple as misleading the enemy by pretending to follow his 

wishes. If one knows the enemy’s intentions, the enemy can be led into a trap. 

A contest in information warfare stratagem is usually conducted in a non-contact 

manner, and contains efforts to create cognitive errors on the part of the enemy 

and to influence the contents, process, and direction of thinking on the part of the 

enemy’s commanders and relevant personnel for information warfare; the purpose 

is to make enemy commanders make wrong decisions or even stop fighting, so as 

to achieve the objectives of information warfare without fighting.360

Of course, the actual effectiveness of this strategy would need to be evaluated based on 

the enemy’s perceived awareness of the strategy’s intent and subsequent response. 

Finally, Niu, Li, and Xu offered ten specific stratagems (which read more like methods) 

that can be applied to IW. These stratagems include: 

 

357 Li Nui, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui. The Chinese use “thought directing” in this article in the way a US 

analyst would use perception management. 

358 Ibid. 359 Ibid. 360 Ibid. 
88

(1) Thought-Directing—Direct others’ thinking in the wrong decision by attacking 

cognitive and belief systems and force commanders to make errors. Use schemes with 

regard to enemy doubts and exploit information relays between enemy units and 

departments. 

(2) Intimidation through Momentum-Building—Generate heavy psychological 

pressure via intimidation by signaling inevitable victory, concentrating forces, and 

coordinating information networks. This is to be achieved by creating a situation 

favorable to China and unfavorable to the enemy. Intimidation is to be achieved via 

momentum building, achieved by enhancing one’s own position, situation, and posture 

while blocking the flow of information to the enemy. 

(3) Information-based Capability Demonstrations—Intimidate by demonstrating 

capabilities, an action that should not appear to be intentional. The right time, occasion, 

and modality must be chosen to make information believable to the enemy. At the same 

time, a unit’s true strength should not be revealed, and one should be unpredictable, using 

both true and false information. 

(4) Prevailing over the Enemy with Extraordinary Means—Adopt active and 

effective measures to generate surprise, and use decisive technical equipment and means 

of information warfare. Develop and hide information warfare “killer weapons.” 

(5) Using Fictitious Objects to Hide the True Picture—Hide true reality by creating a 

fictitious reality. Simulate combat forces using high-tech means, to include the creation 

of nonexistent objects (such as fictitious networks and information system, as well as 

fictitious strategic and operational objectives). 

(6) All-Encompassing Deception—Apply deceptive schemes simultaneously or 

consecutively according to strategic or operational intentions. Actions taken should be 

coordinated and corroborated with one another to ensure the enemy will have no 

suspicion. 

(7) Prevailing over the Enemy with All-round Strength—Use all means of 

information warfare to maintain supremacy. Electronic soft attacks (reconnaissance 

satellite systems, etc.), hard attacks (informationized precision-guidance weapons, 

strategic bombings), and C3I battlefield control and management must all be present. 

(8) Going with the Flow—Mislead the enemy by pretending to follow his wishes. 

Pretend to “go with the flow” by exploiting one’s knowledge of an enemy’s intentions 

and the detection of enemy moves in order to lead the enemy into a trap. 

(9) Releasing “Viruses” to Muddy the Flows—Release viruses to contaminate 

information flows. Using viruses, the authors note, is an important combat operation. A 

virus attack is “a technical act, which will have to be based on the use of stratagems in 

order to play an important role in IW.” Stratagems should create a favorable time for 
89

releasing viruses. It is important not only to seize opportunities but also to create 

opportunities, and to “attack first.” 

(10) Controlling the Time Element—Control of the time element is crucial. Conducting 

information “inducement,” “deception,” concealment,” and “containment” operations 

will help achieve the desired amount of control. 361

In conclusion, the authors noted that “there are many ways of seizing information 

supremacy and the initiative in IW, and the use of stratagems is one of the most efficient 

ways.” The goal of the use of stratagems to Niu, Li, and Xu is to force an opponent to 

refrain from deciding to launch information attacks in order to achieve objectives without 

direct fighting. The point of these strategies is to create cognitive errors in the enemy; to 

influence the contents, process, and direction of thinking on the part of enemy 

commanders; and to create a multidimensional threat with which the enemy must 

contend.362

Focus on Science and Technology, Not Just Strategy 

China’s focus on stratagems is a cultural and historical fact. However, some key 

Chinese theorists recently questioned whether there it too extensive a reliance on 

stratagems. If stratagems are being stressed at the expense of technology, then perhaps a 

weakness has emerged in Chinese military thought that must be corrected. As a result 

some theorists are trying to better harmonize an integration of high-tech with stratagems. 

One of the most prominent Chinese theorists to challenge the stratagem-centered 

approach is Major General Li Bingyan, Senior Editor of the Liberation Army Daily 

(Jiefangjun Bao). More importantly he is the author of several works on stratagems and is 

considered a Chinese expert in the field of strategy. In 2002 Li wrote in support of 

placing more effort on scientific innovation. He also noted that, traditionally, Easterners 

put more emphasis on strategy, and Westerners put more emphasis on technology.363 

Li writes that Western military power cultures see coordination and struggle as 

mutually incompatible, whereas Chinese culture emphasizes coordination within 

competition to seek a point of equilibrium between the interests of the two aspects. 

 

361 Ibid. 362 Ibid. 363 Li Bingyan, “Emphasis on Strategy: Demonstrating the Culture of Eastern Military Studies,” Zhongguo 

Junshi Kexue (China Military Science), 20 October 2002, pp. 80-85 as translated and downloaded from the 

FBIS Website on 9 January 2003. Li notes that when Westerners consider a problem, they stress “is it a 

matter of this or of that?” which is helpful in scientific research. Easterners stress “what is this like, and 

what is that like?” which is helpful in reaching a profound understanding of societal relationships. As a 

result, research in China into the “cultural genes and methodologies of Chinese military science and 

strategy” takes into consideration the Yin and Yang (negative and positive), which is said to have 

originated in the Book of Changes, or I Ching, and the five-elements (water, fire, metal, wood, and earth) 

theory. In ancient times, odd- and even-numbered changes referred to changes in battle formations, while 

true and false changes referred to deception methods to set up an enemy for an attack. Each of China’s 

stratagems is based on this doctrine of changes according to Li. The “Yin-Yang and five-elements theory” 

addresses mutual attraction and the achievement of overall equilibrium and balance through system 

coordination in addition to the elimination of contradictions. 
90

Chinese strategists pursue a battle of wits instead of relying on force. As a result, victory 

beyond the battlefield is a reflection of “big system ideology” in Chinese military 

strategy. All of these elements must remain a part of Chinese military strategy, but 

another element must be established—the emphasis not only on trickery and stratagems 

but on technology. Li notes: 

While we are the inheritors of our own outstanding cultural tradition, we should 

be boldly collecting cultural genes from Western military science and its 

emphasis on technology. We should make traditional strategy merge with modern 

science and technology and scientific methods, so as to restore the original intent 

of ‘Sun Tzu strategy.’364

In view of Li’s criticism of his system, should Western theorists spend more time on 

thinking in terms of strategy and the stratagems of warfare? Isn’t it a known fact that 

Western armies already spend too much time and focus on technology to answer and fix 

every problem? Wasn’t a focused reliance on technology at the expense of stratagems 

part of the reason that NATO’s air forces did not hit targets as well as expected during 

the fight for Kosovo?365 The answer to all of these questions is obvious and indicates that, 

indeed, the US should spend more time on developing stratagems. 

Chinese authors Niu, Li, and Xu, mentioned above, also touched on the subject of 

the integration of stratagems and technology. They noted that information acquisition and 

processing capacities, and a system's overall anti-interference and survival capacities, will 

greatly affect the use of information warfare stratagems.366 Today, China is in an inferior 

position in regard to other developing countries and their technological capabilities, 

although their capabilities are quickly rising. Therefore, it may be necessary to defeat 

superior equipment with inferior equipment until this ratio can be improved. To do this 

will require a combination of technology and stratagems in order to allow the “all 

rounded superior” to defeat those superior in equipment only. 

Chinese experts recognize that every piece of equipment has vulnerabilities (even 

high-technology equipment) and that methods must be developed to attack these 

vulnerabilities. Examples include subjecting night vision devices to intense light or 

exploiting existing vulnerabilities, such as the Abrams tank’s vulnerability to sand that 

was exposed during Desert Storm. Likewise, using operational security measures as the 

Serbs did in Kosovo (not turning on systems, placing mockups where equipment once 

was located, positioning tanks near other heat sources in villages, etc.) limited the combat 

effectiveness of high-tech NATO weapons. The most important point is that man must 

create these conditions, according to the Chinese. He must take advantage of enemy 

errors or force them to happen since man cannot entrust a nation’s destiny only to the 

 

364 Ibid. 365 For further discussion of this issue, see Timothy L. Thomas, “Kosovo and the Current Myth of 

Information Superiority,” Parameters, Spring 2000, pp. 13-29. 

366 Niu, Li , and Xu. 
91

errors that the enemy makes. That is why Chinese scientists and theorists must study 

“methods of operation and performance parameters” in depth.367 

All these offensive and defensive methods of operation must be based on a 

thorough understanding of the operational and technical performance of the 

enemy’s and our own weapons and equipment...we must have a thorough 

knowledge of the enemy’s situation, our own situation, and the situation in the 

battleground....we should study, in depth, the weapons and equipment of our 

enemy in the operation, identify their Achilles’ heel, and work out ways to 

overpower them.368

General Dai on IW Strategies 

In the same issue that China Military Science published Niu, Li, and Xu’s article, 

it also published Major General Dai’s article on “Innovating and Developing Views on 

Information Operations,” mentioned earlier in this chapter. Dai defined an information 

operation as “a series of operations with an information environment as the basic 

battlefield condition, with military information and an information system as the direct 

operational target, and with electronic warfare and a computer network war as the 

principal form.”369 Since these operations are a confrontation of forces and arms as well 

as a trial of strength focusing on knowledge and strategies, Dai recommended a “focus on 

strategies.” 

Dai noted that scientific and technological developments have given strategies a 

new playing field. A strategy may carry different contents under different technological 

conditions. Thus, there is room for traditional strategies, but also room for mapping out 

new strategies using new technological means. Options include new informationconfrontation strategies.370 Overall a good strategy may 

Serve as a type of invisible fighting capacity; may make up inadequate material 

conditions to a certain extent; may narrow a technological or equipment gap 

between an army and its enemy; and may make up a shortage of information 

fighting forces or poor information operational means.371

Some specific strategies include: 

 Jamming or sabotaging an enemy’s information or information system 

 Sabotaging an enemy’s overall information operational structure 

 Weakening an enemy’s information fighting capacity 

 Dispersing enemy forces, arms, and fire while concentrating one’s own 

forces, arms, and fire 

 

367 Information Warfare. 368 Ibid. 369 Dai, “Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations.” 370 Ibid. 371 Ibid. 
92

 Confusing or diverting an enemy and creating an excellent combat 

opportunity for oneself 

 Diverting an enemy’s reconnaissance attempt and making sufficient 

preparations for itself 

 Giving an enemy a false impression and launching a surprise information 

attack on an enemy at the same time 

 Blinding or deafening an enemy with all sorts of false impressions 

 Confusing an enemy’s mind or disrupting an enemy’s thinking 

 Making an enemy believe what is true is false and what is false is true 

 And making an enemy come up with a wrong judgment or take a wrong 

action.372

Dai also emphasized that future operations must be integrated, this time meaning 

to include the use of military and civilian information fighting forces. Information 

systems are offering more modes for people to take part in IO and offer people a chance 

to serve as a major auxiliary information fighting force in a future information war.373 

According to Dai the attainment of information superiority (General Dai used the 

term information superiority thirty-two times in this article and the term information 

control, which Dr. Shen used so often, eleven times) is crucial to the utilization of these 

strategies in a People’s War. This will require several steps. First, General Dai noted that 

professional forces (probably the PLA) would obtain, transmit, and process war 

information, and jam or sabotage enemy information or information systems. 

Nonprofessional forces (possibly the reserves) would protect specific targets and injure 

the effective fighting strength of the enemy. Second, electronic-warfare means (designed 

to sabotage information gathering and transmission) should be integrated with networkwarfare means (designed to sabotage information processing and utilization). Third “soft 

and hard”374 forces and offensive and defensive operations should be used. Offensive 

operations consist of electronic, network, and other units that are used to destroy enemy 

electronic systems. Defensive operations consist of telecommunications, technical 

reconnaissance, radar, and other units. The fourth and final step is the employment of an 

all-dimensional operation that includes integrated and joint operations of ground, sea, air, 

and space activities. 375

General Dai remarked that compared to traditional air, ground, and naval 

operations, to actively contend with an enemy for information superiority, the Chinese 

need to “establish such a view for information operations as ‘active offense.’” The 

subsequent China White Paper that stressed China’s adherence to an active defense 

 

372 Ibid. 373 Ibid. 374 Ibid. “Soft” means of employment (temporary sabotage or deception) refer to electronic jamming, 

computer-virus attacks, network infiltration, carbonized-fiber bombs, virtual reality attacks, psychological 

attacks and so on. “Hard” means of employment (permanent sabotage, weakening the overall fighting 

capacity of an enemy) include conventional arms, sabotage attacks with forces, attacks with 

electromagnetic pulses, attacks with arms carrying direction finders, and so on. 375 Ibid. 
93

posture contradicts this viewpoint. However, Dai’s position does support Shen’s 

proposition that China needed an “offensive-based defense,” and Dai added that for 

defense to be positive it must be an “active offensive defense.” A negative information 

defense is one that is passive. This word game may be designed to keep the “information 

active offense” in line with the White Paper. Dai recommended the active model of 

resistance used in Kosovo by Serbian forces against the coalition instead of the passive 

model of resistance used by Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. 

Dai added that stratagems can be used to formulate a strategy before launching or 

fighting a war, to serve as a sharp sword that sabotages and weakens a superior enemy 

while protecting or enhancing its own fighting capacity, to serve as a type of invisible 

fighting capacity, and to evade combat with a stronger enemy.376 Dai stated that new 

developments had created challenges to some traditional strategies while promoting 

excellent conditions for others. He did not specify which strategies he had in mind. 

However, if defeating strong forces with weak forces in future IW is a goal that 

stratagems can support or supplement, then stratagems may be one of China’s 

asymmetric means to combat US high technology.377 In this sense, stratagems would be 

one of the “magic weapons” that the Chinese are always stressing. 

In summary, the August 2000 article by General Dai in China Military Science 

may represent one of the most important IW articles written in China in the past three 

years. These thoughts included his reference to electronics as a potential carrier of 

strategies; the requirement for an active offense in IW; and the need in China for an 

integrated network-electronic warfare (INEW) concept. The INEW concept is a close 

equivalent to the US “network centric warfare” concept. Many of his thoughts in 2000 

were later reflected in 2002 in the China White Paper. 

Further Thoughts on Stratagems 

As mentioned above, Jia Fengshan wrote in 2003 that there is a “growing 

incorporation between science and technology on the one hand and traditional military 

stratagems on the other.” He continued that “this trend will not only provide war 

conductors with new material means by which to work out their strategies, but also make 

the elevation of the traditional stratagems to a brand new level possible.”378 Information 

technologies such as computers, man-made satellites, and optical fiber communications 

have created more room for commanders to work out stratagems.379 Military strategists 

working on stratagems must take high-tech factors into account, as it could lead to a 

boost in fighting capacity. Technical means possess the ability to take the enemy by 

surprise. Due to the ever-increasing application and integration of high-tech with 

stratagems commanders must change “their way of thinking, renew their knowledge, and 

improve their capability to master automatic command systems.”380

 

376 Ibid. 377 Ibid. 378 Jia Fengshan, “Strategists Embrace High-Tech.” 379 Ibid. 380 Ibid. 
94

In a February 2002 issue of China Military Science author Kang Hengzhen, a 

Senior Colonel and research fellow at General Staff Headquarters, discussed asymmetry. 

He defined it as “abnormal logic bringing together two sides that are pitted one against 

the other. It radiates the dialectic with 12 crafty tactics.”381 Asymmetrical thinking 

includes understanding the nature and attributes of the other party, plus their needs and 

capabilities. This thinking is “hidden in China’s active defense, and it has become a 

complete system of theories about preparing for war, strategic defense, strategic 

counterattack and offense, and so on.”382 High technology with information technology 

as the core has broken the spatial restraints that confined asymmetrical operations in the 

past, according to Kang. Characteristics of asymmetrical operations are their uncertain 

objectives, time of use, location, and means of employment. Finally, the author noted that 

those who can fight asymmetrical wars are those with superior scientific-technological 

strength and those with superior art of command.383 

Another way that the information age (not mentioned in Dai’s article except 

tangentially, when he noted that information systems and electronics could be carriers of 

strategies) might affect China’s selection of a form of warfare is whether China can find 

ways to apply electrons to the thirty-six stratagems of war. Some three hundred years 

ago, an unknown scholar decided to collect all of China’s thirty-six stratagems and write 

them down. His work was called The Secret Art of War: The 36 Stratagems. The work 

emphasized deception as a military art that can achieve military objectives. In the 

information age, which is characterized by anonymous attacks and uncertainty (for 

example, virus attacks or the existence of backdoors in programs, making anyone feel 

vulnerable), the stratagems might acquire an electronic identity that is used to fool or 

deceive. It should be easier to deceive or inflict perception management injuries 

(“guidance injuries” according to some translations of Chinese writings) as a result. Thus, 

the information age is developing into the age of anonymous persuaders and 

manipulators. 

Some argue that in today’s high-tech world, these ancient stratagems are no 

longer applicable. However, a look at just the first five stratagems demonstrates that this 

is not the case. Stratagem One is “fool the emperor to cross the sea.” This means that in 

order to lower an enemy’s guard you must act in the open while hiding your true 

intentions under the guise of common, daily activities. The IW application would be to 

use regular e-mail services or business links over the Internet to mask the insertion of 

malicious code or viruses. Stratagem Two is “Besiege Wei to rescue Zhao.” This means 

that when the enemy is too strong to attack directly, then attack something he holds dear. 

The IW application is that if you can’t hit someone with nuclear weapons due to the 

catastrophic effects on your own country, then attack the servers and nets responsible for 

Western financial, power, political and other systems stability with electrons. Stratagem 

Three is “Kill with a borrowed sword.” This means that when you do not have the means 

to attack your enemy directly, then attack using the strength of another. The IW 

application is simple—send your viruses or malicious code through a surrogate or another 

 

381 Kang Hengzhen. 382 Ibid. 383 Ibid. 
95

country. Stratagem Four is “Await the exhausted enemy at your ease.” This means that it 

is an advantage to choose the time and place for battle. Encourage your enemy to expend 

his energy in futile quests while you conserve your strength. When he is exhausted and 

confused, you attack with energy and purpose. The IW application here is to use the 

People’s War theory to send out multiple attacks while saving the significant attack for 

the time when all of the West’s computer emergency response teams (CERT) are 

engaged. Finally Stratagem Five is “Loot a burning house.” This means that when a 

country is beset by internal conflicts, then it will be unable to deal with an outside threat. 

The IW application is to put hackers inside the West (under the guise of a student or 

business) and attack from the inside. While chaos reigns, steal from information resource 

bases. 

Interestingly enough, in Chapter Two it was noted by Dr. Shen that “people have 

come up with 36 ways to disrupt the Internet and 36 ways to defend against such 

disruption.” Is it possible that Shen was referring to the thirty-six stratagems of war? 

Most Chinese will probably think of the thirty-six stratagems since this magic number is 

a classic ingredient of Chinese numerology, which remains a major part of modern 

Chinese rhetoric. 

Finally, as mentioned earlier, information technology is the core and foundation 

of the military revolution according to many Chinese military theorists. Invisible forces 

must be considered in calculating the correlation of forces today. These forces include 

computing capabilities, to include capacity, communications capacity/volume, system 

reliability, and the increasing competency and ability of reconnaissance systems to 

foresee situations.384 Each of these elements could be victims of a manipulation stratagem 

and consequently affect the perception of the user of the system in question. That is, an 

information strategy can be employed against adversaries by toying with a side’s 

information infrastructure’s capacity, capabilities, and reliability, all of which are crucial 

elements in maintaining infrastructure stability. Since information technology possesses 

global reach, speed of light transmission due to the Internet, and comprehensive 

integration, the use of stratagems against information infrastructures can have immediate 

and perhaps long-lasting consequences. 

Psychological Manipulation 

In its essence, a stratagem is about out-thinking the opponent, forcing the enemy 

to believe something that is not true. The idea is to manipulate an opponent into a 

decision or into a movement that is advantageous to friendly forces. Thus stratagems 

have a significant psychological aspect. Knowledge war also includes the development 

of superior strategies based on superior knowledge. 

Future war may be characterized by chessboard type competition. High-tech 

knowledge embedded into the circuitry of weaponry will be “directed by master’s degree 

holders, commanded by university students, and conducted by experts.” In addition the 

speed of turning knowledge into weapons will increase as will network competence, 

 

384 Hai Lung and Chang Feng, “Chinese Military Studies Information Warfare,” Kuang Chiao Ching, 

Number 280, 16 January 1996, pp. 22-23 as translated in FBIS-CHI-96-035, 21 February 1996, pp. 33-34. 
96

automation and real-time systems of early warning, reconnaissance, control and 

guidance, and attack. This will enable weapons to automatically conduct analysis, and 

differentiate and identify targets. People and weaponry that are more technologically 

competent will enable military systems to replace “quantity and scale” with “quality and 

effectiveness.”385 Such advantages will give friendly forces a significant psychological 

advantage as well. 

 

385 Jia Xi and Shi Hongju, “Analysis on Key Elements of Knowledge Warfare,” Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation 

Army Daily) (Internet Version-WWW), 18 September 2000 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS 

Website on 18 September 2000. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: DIRECT INFORMATION WARFARE 

This chapter summarizes three of four chapters from Major General (retired) Dai 

Qingmin’s book Direct Information Warfare, 2002.386

Introduction 

Future war will be fought between or among high-tech systems if current trends 

continue. An important Chinese work explaining the new information-age battlefield 

concepts on which these systems are based is the 2002 book Direct Information Warfare. 

The book’s author is General Dai Qingmin, who served as head of the Chinese General 

Staff’s Communication Department and thus is assumed to have served as the head of IW 

as well for the Chinese General Staff. The book’s focus is network forces and network 

warfare. 

Defining Terms 

Dai defines a host of terms in his description of “direct IW.” Among others, these 

terms include information warfare, network warfare, strategic network warfare, computer 

network space, computer network attack, digitized armed forces, network security, 

network psychological warfare, information operations, and integrated networkelectronic warfare. This chapter begins with a listing of key terms found in Direct 

Information Warfare. They provide an excellent overview of Chinese theory and 

understanding of information-related concepts in 2002: 

Battlefield Information Environment. This environment is described as the general 

designation of the various information and information systems pertaining to the 

battlefield, its periphery, and its operations. It is the information space in which two 

warring sides carry out information operation activities. It has expanded from tangible 

geographical space to virtual information space. It is primarily made up of three basic 

elements: electromagnetic-spectrum information space, computer-network information 

space, and psychological information space.387

Campaign for Capturing Information Supremacy. This type of campaign is 

represented by the sum of a series of mutually connected actions that include 

electromagnetic attack, network attack, psychological attack, and firepower destruction 

carried out in a joint campaign battlefield space and time using information operation 

forces. It is based on electronic warfare and network warfare and pertinent army, navy, 

air force, and second artillery operational forces arrayed against the enemy’s campaign 

 

386 This author reviewed Dai Qingmin’s Direct Information Warfare and credits the content, concepts, and 

ideas to the book’s author. The content of Dai’s book is reviewed and paraphrased based on translated 

material. Translation credit belongs to Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy Reserve Navy Information 

Operations Command. This chapter includes information from Chapter Two, “Click Network Warfare,” pp. 

53-154; Chapter Three, “An Informal Discussion of Information Warfare,” pp. 155-253; and Chapter Four, 

“Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare,” pp. 255-303 of Dai’s book. 

387 Dai Qingmin, Direct Information Warfare, National Defense University Publishing House, 2002, p. 164. 
98

and strategic information systems that hold together his operational systems. The IO 

campaign is developed for the purpose of capturing information supremacy.388

Computer Network Attack (CNA): The various measures and actions taken to make 

use of security flaws in the enemy’s computer network systems to steal, modify, 

fabricate, or destroy information and to reduce or destroy network utility.389

Computer Network Space (CNS): This is a physical space that actually exists. Civilians 

call it bit space, and the military calls it the bit battlefield. Thus it may be limited to a 

building or cover an entire war zone. It is now an important component of military 

power. It mainly includes six elements: computers, communication networks, software, 

information, network users, and network infrastructure. It also has four functions: a 

communication function, a database storage function, an information processing and 

control function, and an information services function. Computers are the key part of 

networks, and they are used for the functions of information entry, transmission, 

processing, and control.390

Digitized Armed Force (DAF): This is an armed force that is supported by computers, 

uses a digital technology network with digital communications technology, and provides 

individual soldiers, commanders, and various combat support and support systems with 

the capabilities to collect, transmit, and process battlefield information.391

Information Operations (IO): This is the general designation for the various operational 

activities and measures carried out to weaken or destroy the useful efficacy of the 

enemy’s information systems on the battlefield, to include ensuring that one’s own 

information systems retain their efficacy. It is an important component in joint 

operations. It stands side-by-side with firepower and mechanized power as a third attack 

measure, and it is also the prerequisite and the basis for capturing the battlefield initiative. 

These operational measures have designated operational goals, operational objectives, 

and operational forms.392

Information Operations Theory. This is a rational understanding of the essence of IO. 

It is a high-level summarization of the laws of IO, the guiding rules of IO, and the force 

construction and rules of use for IO. The theory of IO has three parts—technical theory 

(special technical aspects), fundamental theory (general laws), and applied theory. The 

latter explains the special laws for the various specific practices of IO and provides the 

theory for the direct foundation for IO. Applied branch theories include electronic 

warfare, computer network warfare, and psychological warfare.393

 

388 Ibid., p. 198. 389 Ibid., p. 112. 390 Ibid., p. 73. 391 Ibid., p. 121. 392 Ibid., p. 240. 393 Ibid. 
99

Information Supremacy. This term refers to controlling the dominant position in 

battlefield information within the scope of a particular time and space. It consists 

primarily of the right to access information, the right to transmit information, the right to 

process information, and the right to use information. It means having the rights of 

freedom and initiative when using information and controlling battlefield information 

initiative within certain space-time limits.394

Information Warfare (IW): This term refers to the use of computer network systems to 

gain enemy intelligence and destroy enemy systems in order to improve the military’s 

defense and attack capabilities as well as the intelligence capabilities of one’s own side. 

Applications include attacking the enemy’s “nervous system” with viruses and various 

long-range control measures, paralyzing the computer network system of enemy 

headquarters, or entering wrong intelligence and wrong commands into the enemy’s 

military command system, thereby enabling the goal of victory in war.395 

Integrated Network-Electronic Warfare (INEW): This is the composite use of the two 

measures of electronic warfare and network warfare on the informationized battlefield. It 

consists of adopting a series of operational actions to destroy the enemy’s networked 

battlefield information systems and ensuring the normal operations of the networked 

battlefield information systems of one’s own side. Its goal is to seize battlefield 

information supremacy.396

Network Psychological Warfare (NPW): This is an operational activity that uses the 

theory of psychology, has computer networks as its carrier, and uses measures such as 

psychological propaganda, psychological deception, and psychological deterrence to 

break down the spirit of the enemy’s military and people...NPW will certainly play an 

even greater role in future wars and will exhibit extraordinary power.397

Network Security (NS): This is the use of various computer, network, encryption, and 

information security techniques to protect the secrecy, integrity, and authenticity of the 

information transmitted, exchanged, and stored on public communication networks. 

These techniques have the capability to control the dissemination and content of 

information.398

Network Warfare (NW): This is any kind of information attack or defense operation 

that is carried out on the entire network space and that has computers and computer 

networks as the main targets and advanced information technology as the basic measures. 

Types of network warfare include attacks (penetration, obstruction, and dismemberment) 

and defense. There are two battlefronts: strategic network warfare based on the Internet 

 

394 Ibid., p. 192. 395 Ibid., p. 108. 396 Ibid., p. 257. 397 Ibid., p. 142. 398 Ibid., p. 124. 
100

and battlefield-network warfare based on battlefield networks. NW is intellectual warfare 

that highlights competition between knowledge and algorithms.399

Psychological Information Space. This is the information-dependent space that is 

composed of the numerous actions and organizations that fight against the understanding, 

sentiments, and wills of battlefield commanders and troops. For example, news media, 

nongovernmental organizations, unauthorized parties, intelligence organizations, and so 

on are all considered part of this space.400

Psychological Supremacy. This is the ability to change the will of the adversary and 

influence his motives by influencing the way he looks at all that is going on around him 

and the causes of things.401

Strategic Network Warfare (SNW): This is a kind of indirect operational measure 

based on the Internet. It can be initiated in peacetime or in wartime.402

Direct IW Concepts 

Dai wrote about several information-related topics in Direct Information Warfare. 

Those highlighted in italics are based on their relevancy and interest to a US IO audience. 

They are information operations, information supremacy, networks, network-warfare 

units and personnel, network psychological warfare, IO mobilization, and INEW. Each is 

discussed separately below. 

Information Operations 

Dai states that information operations are soft-kill measures designed to make an 

enemy force lose effectiveness, conduct faulty decision making, and institute ineffective 

command measures. Effective IO will create imbalances in enemy force coordination and 

limit its control of weapon systems. IO has specially designated operational goals, 

objectives, forms, and measures. IO’s features are its inclusiveness (from start to end of 

an operation) and ability to conduct operations in the rear areas of enemy forces. Flexible 

methods of operation include deception, confusion, deterrence, and other measures such 

as electromagnetic-jamming suppression, computer-network attacks, and comprehensive 

firepower destruction.403 Dai notes that soft weapons cover the ears, block the eyes, and 

kill the nerves and can include feints, bluffs, and harassing attacks to cause confusion. 

Hard weapons, on the other hand, sever the arms, hinder the legs, and destroy the body. 

They include new concept weapons such as electromagnetic-pulse bombs, directedenergy weapons, carbon-fiber bombs, and other new IO weapons. A final information 

measure is the use of Special Forces to airdrop on and infiltrate into a region and jam or 

destroy nodes and crucial targets of an enemy’s information system.404

 

399 Ibid., p. 148. 400 Ibid., p. 166. 401 Ibid., p. 196. 402 Ibid., p. 68. 403 Ibid., p. 285. 404 Ibid., p. 171. 
101

Information operations are a combat force multiplier in that they are devoted to 

getting the greatest results with the least investment. This is especially true for joint 

operations that use IW techniques. Battlefield space, operational areas (electromagnetism, 

psychology, computer networks, social sciences), and operational actions (offense, 

defense, mobilization, support) are all “omnidirectional” in joint operations.405

Electronic camouflage is known as the magician of the informationized battlefield 

according to Dai. Electronic camouflage uses electromagnetic and thermal technological 

measures to simulate and duplicate the environment and make friendly targets blend in 

with their background. This “hides what is true” and “displays what is false” about the 

target. It can help thwart enemy electronic attacks and protect one’s own systems. Metal 

foil strips, angular radar reflectors, colored smoke screens, plasma, multifrequencyelectromagnetic screens, photochromatic coatings, and optical bait are examples of such 

measures. Smoke camouflage now includes smoke made up of metallic chemical 

compounds and plasma which, when mixed with certain polymers in specific ratios, make 

smoke screens that can fluctuate to be consistent with the target and its background.406

The 1999 conflict between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is 

viewed as a type of IO defensive case study according to Dai. He refers to this operation 

often to describe how various information defensive measures offset NATO’s 

asymmetric offensive advantage. Lessons learned include concealing to the greatest 

degree information radiated from one’s own information systems, controlling radiation, 

using deception and camouflage, and hiding signals among other measures. Radar 

operators had to learn how to confront the following NATO threats: reconnaissance 

jamming; attack by antiradiation weapons; attack by stealth aircraft and missiles; and 

penetration by ground and air defense missiles and aircraft. “Active defense” and 

“offensive defense” are two operational measures Dai recommends to confront these 

threats. If the “offensive defense” is used, targets must be attacked in some order of 

priority, attack measures must be rationally selected, and the correct opportunity to attack 

must be chosen.407

Dai believes that the essence of IO is intelligence warfare and strategic warfare 

under high-technology conditions yet IO will, like past operations, include specific 

stratagem use. “Making appearances, creating circumstances, using spies, and balking the 

enemy’s plans” will be included in the struggle for information dominance. Indirect 

tactics imply the use of strategies to “appear where the enemy is not expecting you,” 

“make changes the enemy cannot understand,” and “make appearances” (the best way to 

avoid reconnaissance is not being invisible but creating false appearances). Science, 

diversity, and multiple channels of information are needed to convince someone that 

what is false is true. Lures must be used to make people take the bait. One must seize, 

create, and control opportunities to fight. To work, these soft measures must be combined 

with hard weapons.408

 

405 Ibid., p. 169. 406 Ibid., p. 222. 407 Ibid., p. 248. 408 Ibid., p. 283. 
102

The idea of combining subjective guidance (creativity) with asymmetric 

operations was explored further by Dai. He writes 

On the informationized battlefield, the side that is in the inferior position carries 

out asymmetric operations mainly by giving full rein to the subjective dynamic 

effects of operational guidance and the comprehensive efficacy of other factors 

for gaining the upper hand, by exploring asymmetric postures that are beneficial 

to one’s own side, by checking the strengths of the opponent, by exposing and 

enlarging his weaknesses, and by gaining limited superiorities and 

initiative...what this form of operations basically touches upon is primarily not 

satellites, cables, and computers; it is people.409

Further, Dai states that to conduct asymmetric information operations requires 

adherence to certain principles. The first principle is to attach importance to independent 

operations, which means selecting the time, place, and conditions favorable to one’s side. 

A second principle is to use strengths to attack weaknesses. The third principle is to 

simultaneously develop all kinds of measures to offset enemy dominance. This was 

demonstrated in excellent fashion by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s use of 

corrugated iron and smoke to obscure the vision of pilots or to misdirect radar signals 

generated by incoming attack aircraft and missiles according to Dai.410

He points out that there are strategies of blind spots, nodes, weak points, and 

questionable points (the latter being areas where the enemy has not yet sized up the 

situation). Another strategy is to create situations that are beneficial to one’s own side. 

This requires that one integrate science and art, strategy and tactics, and enticement and 

concealment to create an exploitable situation.411

People create strategies and Dai notes that the initiative, flexibility, and creativity 

of people are the real keys that IO personnel must exploit. He states that 

Laying all one’s hopes on technology is dangerous. The road to future losses may 

not be from a fall in technology, it may be primarily poor strategy. In reality the 

informationization of the forms of warfare has opened up an even broader space 

for playing tricks and using strategy and for using the indirect to gain the upper 

hand.412

Dai stresses that since warfare is showing a “plebification” trend, the emphasis on 

people’s talents and creativity must increase. The populace can now participate to a 

greater degree than ever before by taking part in network warfare far from the front lines. 

As a result of their participation, the populace and civilian networks are now subject to 

attack just like military networks. 

 

409 Ibid., p. 294. 410 Ibid., p. 207. 411 Ibid., p. 297. 412 Ibid., p. 295. 
103

Dai not only feels that civilian networks are subject to attack but also that the 

Internet allows countries to be subject to penetration by different values, ideologies, ways 

of life, and histories. The Internet exports culture and serves as a carrier and channel for 

cultural factors. 

Internet actions have produced cries of a digital invasion or the spread of 

information colonialism from some countries. Dai states, however, that it is US “network 

frontiers” that have already penetrated into other countries and threatened their “network 

sovereignty.” China must build its own “digital Great Wall” to keep out such influences 

he adds.413

Information Supremacy 

Dai writes that achieving information supremacy is an important part of campaign 

planning. Campaigns for capturing supremacy will be subcampaigns of joint campaigns 

and one of the latter’s independent objectives. In campaign operations a series of 

interrelated IW operations will be carried out on campaign and even on strategic levels, 

and they will be organically integrated with other operational actions to arrive at the 

campaign objective of capturing information supremacy.414

There are four main actions associated with this action. First is carrying out 

information harassment and reconnaissance in the form of intelligence warfare, 

psychological warfare, and military deception among other means. Their main objectives 

will be to gather intelligence from information systems and networks and to conceal 

information used in deception, political, and diplomatic struggles. In other words, the 

goal is to hide the operational intentions of the friendly side.415

Second, the subcampaign must focus on carrying out information attacks. It is 

vital to gain the initiative here. Main targets of attack are the information processing and 

decision making centers of the enemy. Third, friendly forces must take advantage of 

blinded radars and paralyzed command structures from subcampaign actions to initiate 

more firepower and supporting information attacks. These attacks will be targeted at 

command and control centers, air defense systems, electronic-warfare centers, missile 

launch positions, and other point targets. In addition to firepower attacks, soft attacks will 

be conducted using electronic interference, network attacks, antiradiation destruction, and 

directed-energy weapon attacks. Finally, joint firepower and support-information attacks 

will take place. Air force, navy, and some long-distance army firepower units will be 

involved. Supplemental attacks will be organized based on information reconnaissance 

that determines the degree of destruction imposed on the enemy.416 Whether Dai’s fourstep process will only serve campaign planning and the acquisition of information 

supremacy or be the manner in which China initiates an information attack in general is 

not known. 

 

413 Ibid., p. 121. 414 Ibid., p. 302. 415 Ibid., p. 300. 416 Ibid., p. 301. 
104

Dai believes that Eastern nations are adept at being resourceful and overcoming 

obstacles. In such ways, an inferior military, if it controls the commanding height of 

information supremacy or even a limited portion of it, has a chance to gain military 

success. There are more chances now to do so since the information field has expanded 

exponentially. There are reconnaissance satellites, aircraft, ground, and sea stations along 

with electronic and early-warning aircraft, stealth, antiradiation and radiation weapons, 

network-warfare equipment, and intelligent radar. These developments further enable the 

strategic goal of “subduing the enemy without fighting” via information warfare. 

Whoever controls information supremacy, Dai adds, controls war initiative.417

In joint operations under high-tech conditions, in order to achieve information 

supremacy, a difficult series of steps must be initiated. Each of the two sides must use all 

capabilities to include information deterrence, information interdiction, information 

deception, and information contamination. This makes the substance of command and 

coordination extensive and complicated.418 Offensive and defensive information warfare 

actions and systems must be integrated in joint operations. Further, civilian informationwarfare forces must be included in army, navy, and air force information warfare 

forces.419 The combination of integrated, all-purpose forces will enable supremacy. Dai 

did not mention any coordinating mechanism for this integrative process. 

In addition to the four sub campaign measures for attaining information 

supremacy in a campaign, Dai visualizes three states in the battle for information 

supremacy. The initial battle is between information carriers. This period or stage of 

battle is usually called electronic-information warfare. Since information carriers are 

becoming harder and harder to attack, the focus is now shifting to a confrontation over 

information content, Dai writes. A content battle, the second stage, ensures that 

intellectual information warfare will become the intermediate stage in the development of 

the battle for information supremacy. Thought-information warfare, the third state, is the 

highest stage of information warfare because, by directly destroying the thinking of the 

information users, it is possible to fundamentally destroy the enemy’s operational 

intentions and operational capabilities with the highest efficacy. Such destruction affects 

the overall war situation. Thought-information warfare will become a reality when 

biotechnology and information technology are closely tied together. These three stages 

make up the basic means for developing information supremacy.420 Thus once again, as 

he did in the section on IO that emphasized asymmetry and strategy, Dai emphasizes the 

cognitive aspect of IW. 

IW coordination to capture information supremacy includes close coordination 

between IW and firepower-attack actions, coordination among IW actions of the troops, 

and coordination between various IW forces and actions.421 Information supremacy is the 

 

417 Ibid., p. 170. 418 Ibid., p. 172. 419 Ibid., p. 173. 420 Ibid., p. 199. 421 Ibid., p. 303. 
105

commanding height of current and future warfare. Without it, one can lose other 

supremacies. That is, capturing control depends on information supremacy. Dai added 

that information supremacy is primarily made up of electromagnetic supremacy, network 

supremacy, and psychological supremacy.422

Networks 

Information systems such as networks are the adhesive that link operational 

elements and forms together. They affect the stability and progress of an operation; 

require flexibility, mobility, and a tight defense; and need an innovative command 

system, force structure, operational plan, and thought process.423 

Network space is composed of bit streams made up of the digits “0” and “1.” The 

power of this bit stream is superior to the power of conventional weapons. This is 

because bit streams now control, Dai believes, not only the collecting, transmitting, 

processing, and distributing of information but also operational weapon systems and 

potentially the thinking of command decision makers and operational personnel. This 

implies that operational objectives of network space now include the will, feelings, and 

cognitive processes of an enemy. Network space causes new operational thinking and 

methods. Further, network space changes the limitations imposed by geography. 

Traditional boundaries are no longer military boundaries.424

Network space and information networks/systems are now of such importance 

that they are key objects of attack according to Dai. Computers and networks are the 

main targets, and network warfare will become the main operational form of IW. In this 

day and age, there is no distinction between peacetime and wartime network warfare. 

Network attacks could as easily be conducted against telephone networks or gas pipelines 

(the diversification aspect of network warfare), and they can be covert thus making early 

warning difficult.425 

Network warfare (NW) ensures concealment, omnidirectional intrusion, and 

otherwise unobtainable operational results than if traditional military measures were 

used. NW has four levels: physical (the computer network’s equipment); transmission 

(signal paths for information); logic (software and data in computer networks); and superlogic (applications that support computer networks and the results that are produced).426

The expansive nature of integrated operational space allows for more types of operations 

than currently exist. Strategic, campaign, and tactical centers can be attacked without the 

problem of creating a large-scale destruction area. Network warfare systems can attack 

communication hubs, finance centers, and traffic hubs thereby directly influencing the 

strategic situation and decision makers. These attacks have the potential to paralyze the 

enemy’s political, military, economic, and cultural systems.427

 

422 Ibid., p. 194. 423 Ibid., pp. 284-287. 424 Ibid., p. 79. 425 Ibid., p. 110. 426 Ibid., p. 151. 427 Ibid., p. 266. 
106

However, network warfare could develop in another direction and work to create 

“network deterrence” or “network containment.” That is, it may be more valuable for 

both sides to simply comply with the rulebook of not attacking one another’s networks if 

two sides attain a mutual balance of network power.428

A main focus of computer network war (CNW) is to seize intelligence related to 

operational objectives. This process is also called computer-network reconnaissance. 

Software must be developed to help scan online information and to intercept and crack 

valuable information codes. The latter includes the hardware configuration of the 

topological structure of all network nodes, communication systems, encryption methods, 

and network protocols. Data mining and fusion processing tools are valuable as aides to 

gather information on system platforms, the system capabilities of application software, 

and the geographical location of target nodes. Reconnaissance can be entirely secretive, 

or it can be deceptive. The latter includes gaining the trust of the mainframe of the side 

under observation. Computer network reconnaissance is the prerequisite for seizing 

victory in warfare. It helps choose opportune moments, places, and measures for 

attack.429

IW represents the integration of network warfare and electronic warfare, and its 

goal is to achieve information superiority. For example, introducing a computer virus into 

the C4ISR system of an opponent may become a significant method for the conduct of 

IW. Network warfare is designed to attack the brain of the enemy’s C4ISR system, 

according to Dai, and this affects strategic decision making and the overall strategic 

situation. Dai believes that battlefield network warfare (focused on C4ISR) has evolved 

from hacker warfare. EW attacks the transmission links, and network warfare operations 

attack the processing links. As a result some believe that whoever has integrated-network 

and electronic-warfare dominance in system-versus-system confrontations will control 

future war.430

Network Warfare Units and Personnel 

Dai believes that network warfare units should look for and infiltrate the network 

routes to be attacked. This is apparently a peacetime function, for he adds that in time of 

war, units must be “able to organize and implement virtual reality and virus attack and 

other network warfare operations under unified plans.”431 Since these units may affect the 

war’s overall situation, Dai recommends in wartime putting them under the control of the 

most senior battlefield command, and in peacetime strategic command organizations 

should centrally organize them. Network units will lead to new forms of operations and 

new arms of service. Whoever controls information and controls networks will have the 

whole world at his feet, according to Dai.432

 

428 Ibid., p. 58. 429 Ibid., p. 96. 430 Ibid., p. 263. 431 Ibid., p. 59. 432 Ibid., p. 66. 
107

Personnel strength plays a huge role in making key operational decisions about 

the network and in maintaining the security of network space. For example, network 

warfare commanders must be very proficient in networks and network technology. They 

must know what technological measures are feasible to obtain their operational objectives 

or understand staff suggestions of even better ways of attaining operational intentions.433

Personnel must have excellent ideological qualities, such as a steadfast political nature 

and good moral qualities. They must have a desire to succeed and a competitive and 

innovative nature. Finally, they must have the ability to handle psychological pressure.434

Other special qualities include a talent for organizational skills, innovative capabilities, 

and the ability to make forecasts and strategic decisions. Finally, they must be able to 

flexibly meet contingencies.435

There are three basic ways to train network-warfare personnel. These ways are in 

colleges and universities, in on-the-job training, and in recruiting from among the people 

since there is such a social context to network warfare. It will be difficult for anyone to 

differentiate between military and civilian personnel since so much of network warfare is 

conducted behind closed doors. Dai states that this also means there must be a strong 

network-warfare reserve force. Reserve forces will play a huge role in hacker attacks and 

in spreading viruses against enemy countries. He added 

The multitudes of netizens around the globe will without a doubt play an 

important role in future network warfare. Effectively mobilizing and organizing 

wide-spread netizens and computer personnel to carry out a ‘people’s network 

war’ will be a magic weapon for gaining the upper hand in network warfare.436

Building competent personnel remains the primary task above all other issues. 

Three kinds of people are needed: high-science and technology experts, resourceful 

commanders, and professionalized troops. For the most part these people must 

understand information offense according to Dai. This may imply that “network 

warriors” are under consideration as a new arm of the services as has been suggested by 

several Chinese authors over the past five or so years. 

Network Psychological Warfare 

Regarding network warfare in general, Dai notes that the more humankind relies 

on computer networks to gather information, knowledge, and intelligence, the greater the 

ability of networks to influence people’s understanding of events. He noted that 

Network warfare will also rise from currently being focused on confrontation on 

the physical level and logic level to confrontation on the super-logic level and that 

is the level of perception. The computer field will penetrate deeply into the 

thought processes of the human brain, influencing the spirit, moral, and 

consciousness of the adversary, disturbing the adversary’s decision making 

 

433 Ibid., p. 130. 434 Ibid., p. 133. 435 Ibid., p. 134. 436 Ibid., p. 139. 
108

mentality and the direction of decision making, forcing the enemy to give in to 

our intentions and demands, and forcing the enemy to submit by not fighting or 

by ‘psychological warfare.’437

Network Psychological Warfare (NPW) combines traditional psychologicalwarfare thinking with modern network-information technology. This type of warfare has 

several characteristics according to Dai. It can transcend the nature of time-space. It cuts 

across national boundaries (space) and can take place in peacetime or wartime. It can

influence people’s awareness and feelings in many fields, to include politics, economics, 

culture, and military affairs via propaganda, intimidation, deception, enticement, bribery, 

and deterrence. Virtual deception is of particular concern as a network psychological 

technique. Technology can edit or piece together different visual scenes and 

environments to create a picture or incident that confuses truth with falsehood. 

Information can be published under any name and wishes can be displayed in wanton 

fashion. Most important, NPW is extremely timely. It can take place literally minutes 

after an event. This can make the substance of the material appear more pertinent, 

reliable, and effective without the benefit of a proper timeframe to check out the facts. In 

turn this has the potential to enhance psychological panic or create social chaos.438

The goal of NPW is to attack the enemy by way of network media and win 

victory without fighting or with the least amount of fighting possible. It is a form of 

psychological warfare. NPW attempts to capture a moral strategic initiative, shake the 

enemy’s will and determination, and make the enemy passive and lose confidence. One 

of the methods to achieve these aims is to establish special websites for the conduct of 

psychological warfare and publish all types of deceptive, disturbing, leading and 

deterring information. The idea is to disrupt normal judgment, block other information 

channels, and create misconceptions in the enemy.439

Dai believes that future fighters will battle for psychological superiority. This will 

include fights for knowledge, decision making, and command authority. Psychological 

control, especially of decision making personnel, will become the highest stage of 

capturing information superiority. Information and psychology cannot be separated. 

There will develop a repeated confrontation for psychological supremacy, a battle of the 

consciousness of one side to affect the consciousness of the other side by means of 

computer networks. NPW’s power comes from the Internet’s traits of being interactive, 

open, timely, widespread, diversified, and influential. People’s recognition systems are 

the target. When the media misrepresents their environment it is very difficult for humans 

to test or verify it in Dai’s opinion.440

Information Operations Mobilization 

A Chinese IO strength seldom discussed in the West is information mobilization. 

In fact the concept is almost foreign to US audiences in particular. The Western substitute 

 

437 Ibid., p. 153. 438 Ibid., p. 143. 439 Ibid., p. 145. 440 Ibid., p. 153. 
109

for mobilization is usually associated with the concept of information integration or with 

a nation’s information or cyber-security policies. The Chinese believe that to sustain the 

IO battlefield the national economy, information infrastructure, information goods, 

reserve forces, and information technology forces must be mobilized. Dai’s discussion of 

network personnel supports this concept.441

Traditional mobilization included the pursuit of quantitative and qualitative 

superiority in manpower, financial, and material resources. Information mobilization adds 

superiority in comprehensive information topics (information networks, groups with high 

intelligence, etc.) to that list. It includes numerous mobilization exercises and can be 

viewed as an additional deterrent force that fuses technology with comprehensive 

national strength, forces, and weapons. Mobilization for information operations supports 

the nation in both peace and war and supports both military and nonmilitary areas. 

Information mobilization laws and mobilization leadership are under development to 

guide exercises and to provide well-developed contingencies in case of war.442 

Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare (INEW) 

With regard to INEW, Dai wrote that EW and network warfare are the two main 

forms of information operations. They cannot be mutually independent but must be 

comprehensively used and coordinated. INEW shapes battlefield information warfare, 

Dai added, and it will become the main expressed form of information operations. It can 

also be called physical IW. Academia divides IW into operational secrecy, military 

deception, psychological warfare, EW, computer network warfare, and physical 

destruction. Network warfare and EW, however, are the main means of conducting 

operational activities.443

Dai notes that only through the integration of electronic warfare and computer 

network warfare will it be possible to master IW. INEW will have as its goal the capture 

of information supremacy in electromagnetic and network space on the two battlefield 

trends that have developed, the informationization of weapons systems and the 

networking of information systems.444 

Further, INEW’s elements are reciprocally complementary and require 

coordination to bring out the best in each. This is a comprehensive form of operation that 

integrates command, power, targets, and operational methods with the goal of destroying, 

controlling, and paralyzing the command and control system of the enemy’s military. 

INEW’s focus is the core issue of capturing information supremacy and carrying out 

omnidirectional information attacks.445 Operational INEW methods include: 

 Interfering and destroying 

 Blockading and intimidating 

 

441 Ibid., p. 226. 442 Ibid., p. 230. 443 Ibid., p. 278. 444 Ibid., p. 252. 445 Ibid., p. 264. 
110

 Luring and pinning down 

 Creating false realities and paralysis 

 Feigning attacks 

 Sowing discord and making suggestions 

 Suppressing and overloading 

 Impeding information transmission and enemy network utilization 

 And capturing the initiative in electromagnetic and network space.446

Battlefield transparency will increase with the use of INEW, making the entire 

information domain a potential space for confrontations. The enemy’s strategic, 

campaign, and tactical centers can be attacked simultaneously.447

Dai points out that operational secrecy, military deception, and psychological 

warfare have been used since ancient times. However, INEW allows them to be fused 

together in ways never before possible.448 Dai also called for attacking vital targets to get 

twice the result with half the effort and to adopt tactical and technological measures to 

lower the effect of enemy attacks. With regard to the latter point, Dai wrote that multiple 

methods of flexible resistance should be developed. These include creating net-shaped 

dispositions, jamming wireless reconnaissance equipment, carrying out reverse tracing 

and counterdestruction of enemy websites, and creating situations. With regard to the 

latter point, situations will be created through the integration of science and art, strategy 

and tactics, and enticement and concealment methodologies.449

The Commanding Heights of Future War 

In future wars, the focus on the fight for this ‘commanding elevation’ of 

information supremacy will be more and more complicated, and more and more 

fierce. Even though a force may be superior, once it has lost this ‘commanding 

elevation,’ it will still become a ‘blind person,’ a ‘deaf person,’ and a ‘target,’ and 

it will fall into circumstances of passivity and coming under attack. A military 

with inferior strength, if it controls this ‘commanding elevation,’ even if it is a 

limited ‘command elevation,’ will have the possibility of gaining military 

successes that are not bad.450

Dai discusses in some detail the contradictions, forms, nature, methods, and 

targets of IW. He also focused attention on future war’s major characteristics. Dai stated 

that there are five “contradictions” in getting to the essence of IW. First, even in the face 

of so much information, it is difficult to know the enemy. Second, an individual can 

threaten an entire country in the information age. Further, in some cases the more 

technologically advanced a country becomes, the more vulnerable it becomes as well. 

The flood of information is so great today that accurate analysis, evaluation, and 

synthesis are the most valuable parts in making judgments and decisions. One must 

 

446 Ibid. 447 Ibid., p. 283. 448 Ibid., p. 278. 449 Ibid., p. 297. 450 Ibid., p. 161. 
111

ensure that information is not contaminated, since contaminated information will produce 

nothing of value on the enemy’s intentions. Regarding individuals who threaten to 

damage a country’s information assets, these individuals are often hard to find or retaliate 

against. Third, a country can become so dependent on networks that it can suffer great 

economic and security losses if attacked. Fourth, one can have strategic depth but little 

security if information systems are not protected. Finally, a military victory does not 

equate to strategic or political success in the information age.451

Dai next comments on the forms, nature, and methods of information warfare. 

These forms include intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, computer-network warfare, 

psychological warfare, and virtual warfare. Three of these forms, network war, 

psychological war, and virtual war, are important due to their unique characteristics. 

First, computer network personnel can determine the success or failure of a network 

attack. Such attacks can be totally independent of a nation’s power or its number of 

troops. CNW can be conducted at any time in different weather conditions or regions of 

the world. Second, psychological warfare has as its goal the capture and maintenance of 

battlefield psychological supremacy. Finally virtual warfare is the use of virtual reality 

and computer imaging technology to manipulate technology (make it appear that enemy 

commanders are giving speeches against the war), develop virtual air fleets so that the 

enemy sees false information on satellites or radar, and create virtual battlefields and 

insert them into the enemy’s command and control system. The use of holographic 

religious icons is also a possibility in Dai’s opinion.452

Dai notes that IW has “five natures:” precursory nature (begin before other 

operations); whole course nature (will run throughout an entire operation); high 

efficiency nature (get the greatest results with the least investment, maximizes 

simultaneity of operations); omnidirectional nature (permeates all aspects of campaign 

operations); and complex nature (multi-element forces take part and operations are 

diversified). IW is composed of the “two –tions:” diversification and integration.453 

There are many methods of operation in regard to information warfare. 

Omnidirectional reconnaissance is one such method. In peacetime it is important for 

reconnaissance work to focus on collecting technical parameters and specific properties 

of all categories of information weapon systems and electronic information products used 

for military objectives. Once technical parameters are collected it might be possible, for 

example, to artificially make gas, fog, and heat products that interfere with the 

operational parameters of high-tech equipment. During wartime, the focus should be 

operational mission requirements, collecting battlefield information in a timely manner, 

reconnoitering troop locations, and establishing an omnidirectional ground, sea, air, 

space, electromagnetic, and network-information reconnaissance system. Information 

reconnaissance is growing. It is precise, real-time, and comprehensive. Future war is 

thought of as the victory of the detector, and this is the role that information 

reconnaissance will play. Information reconnaissance consists of electronic warfare, 

 

451 Ibid., pp. 174-178. 452 Ibid., p. 182. 453 Ibid., p. 187. 
112

radar, radio technology, and network reconnaissance. Reconnaissance platforms include 

ground, sea, aviation (to include unmanned aircraft), and space platforms (which utilize 

electronic, photographic, and early warning radar satellites). Dai noted that electronic 

information systems are the foundation of space systems, making up some 75% of the 

systems in various satellites and weapons. Like other systems, they are also susceptible to 

information attacks.454

Targets of electronic attack are C4ISR systems, which are like a person’s system 

of perception (or his eyes and brain). Interfering with these systems interferes with 

intelligence collection and paralyses command and coordination. Weapons control is lost 

as well. Once hard kill measures are developed fully, these targets will be destroyed and 

not merely jammed.455 

Dai appears to enjoy quoting statistics from the Gulf War as supporting evidence 

for his focus on information warfare. For example, he notes that in the Gulf War the 

volume of communications in only 90 days surpassed the volume of 40 years of 

communications in Europe. That, he notes, is the importance of establishing the right of 

information control. Grabbing control or obtaining information supremacy must begin 

before warfare is initiated. The US launched electronic warfare and intelligence warfare 

more than six months before the war began. Such actions are in line with Sun Tzu’s 

concept that “the clever combatant seeks battle after the victory has been won.”456

With regard to future war, Dai notes that a major characteristic of future 

operations is to destroy an opponent’s information control and coordination capabilities. 

Information attack methods are conducted according to the following priority listing: 

attack information sources, attack information channels, attack information targets, and 

attack information equipment. Information defense methods include information 

counterattack, information protection, and information restoration. Operational methods 

include combining the old with the new, the military with the civilian, using the 

indigenous to attack the foreign, and using the weak to attack the strong.457 Finally, via 

network links and nodes, efforts will be made to infiltrate an opponent’s networks used 

for economic and military purposes. Databases will be altered, false orders issued, and 

computer viruses planted. Political, economic, and military intelligence will be stolen.458

Dai’s Recommendations/Conclusions 

Dai recommended establishing a new national security concept suited to the 

information age and elevating network-based strategies to the level of the national 

security plan. He advised speeding the pace of informationization within the country as a 

whole and speeding the establishment of rules and laws for an information network-based 

security regime. He added that controlling the initiative in war and destroying the 

adversary’s operational intentions will enable Chinese forces to control the course and 

 

454 Ibid., p. 210. 455 Ibid., p. 249. 456 Ibid., p. 196. 457 Ibid., p. 191. 458 Ibid., p. 250. 
113

development of a war. This must be the operational standard for network warfare 

forces.459

Dai also noted that Chinese theorists have recognized the importance of 

information operations in periods of peace, competition, conflict, crisis, and war and then 

from war back down to peace. Reconnaissance monitoring and intelligence collection are 

very important, as is information warfare in the political, economic, cultural, and media 

fields. Strategic deterrence, fights for public opinion, economic competition, and political 

developments are all attempts to achieve information supremacy. Combat now includes 

the nonmilitary arena as well as the military arena when it comes to information. The line 

dividing the military from civilians is more blurred than ever before, and the armed 

forces cannot totally protect the civilian infrastructure as it once did.460

Dai’s recommended trends for capturing information campaign supremacy 

include the following: 

 Carry out scattered and concealed information harassment and attacks to 

gather intelligence from systems and networks while concealing ones 

operational intentions 

 Carry out the suppression of enemy information attacks that are focused 

on key points such as the processing and decision making centers of 

systems 

 Carry out missile firepower and supporting information attacks to take 

advantage of the confusion caused from disrupting enemy radar signals, 

interrupting communications, paralyzing command, losing coordination, 

and losing control of weapons. Simultaneously conduct electronic 

interference, network attacks, antiradiation destruction, and directedenergy weapons attacks 

 Carry out joint firepower and supporting-information attacks on command 

posts, communication hubs, electronic-warfare centers, guided-missile 

positions, radar positions, and other targets.461

Dai notes that the overall ratio of information operations forces to other forces 

must be increased and new operational measures developed. In the end, the commanding 

height on the informationized battlefield will be the attainment of information supremacy 

and with it battlefield initiative. The latter can be developed fully with subjective 

guidance and with the establishment of an asymmetric operational ideology. Information 

systems are the adhesive that links operational elements and forms operational 

functions.

462

Dai’s discussion focuses heavily on obtaining key information via reconnaissance 

of foreign computer systems in peacetime. It is only through reconnaissance that victory 

 

459 Ibid., p. 140. 460 Ibid., p. 201. 461 Ibid., p. 300. 462 Ibid., pp. 289-292. 
114

in future wars can be assured. As he states, “Computer network reconnaissance (CNR) is 

the prerequisite for seizing victory in warfare.”463 His focus on CNR provides added 

context to current Chinese operations aimed at the reconnaissance of US systems. This 

includes both the Titan Rain attack on US systems and the reconnaissance operation 

conducted against the US Naval War College. 

Of added interest was his focus on network psychological warfare. It is interesting 

that, like Li Bingyan, Dai focuses on the cognitive aspect of IW more than most senior 

IW leaders. Not only does he direct the reader’s attention to the virtual space that the 

media and propagandists try to influence but also to the virtual-based command and 

control decisions that leaders must make. He also focuses attention on the use of 

stratagems in both defending against high-tech weapons and in manipulating the 

perceptions of enemy forces. This implies that the will, feelings, and cognitive processes 

of an enemy are the operational objectives of network space. Network space causes new 

operational thinking and methods. 

Finally, Dai focuses on the power of bit streams (or “0s” and “1s”) to control the 

collection, transmission, processing, and distribution of information and weapon systems 

and potentially the thinking of command decision makers and operational personnel. 

Network space changes the limitations imposed by geography. Traditional boundaries are 

no longer military boundaries.464

 

 

463 Ibid., p. 96. 464 Ibid., p. 79. 
115

直面信息战

Direct Information Warfare 

Dai Qingmin 

2002

Table of Contents 

Chief Author: Dai Qingmin 

Publisher: National Defense University Publishing House 

Date of Publication: 2002 

Chapter 1: Approaching Electronic Warfare - "Spears" and "Shields" in 

the Field of the Electromagnetic 

Spectrum...............................................................................................................1 

Electronic Warfare—A Leader in High Technology Warfare....................... 3 

Looking Back 100 Years—Talking about the History of Electronic Warfare..... 8 

A Virtual Trial of Strength—Communications Confrontation...................... 13 

Covering the Eyes—Radar Confrontation............................................. 19 

Chasing Light and Pursuing Electricity—Antiradiation Confrontation.......... ...25 

Electromagnetic Thunderbolts—Opto-electrical Confrontation..................... 30 

There Is Skill in Concealment—Stealth and Counter-stealth........................ 35 

Terrifying Waves—Acoustic Confrontation........................................... 40 

The Thunder God's Eye in the Sky - Satellite and Strong Radiation Weapons 

Confrontation........................................................................................................ 47 

Chapter 2: Click Network Warfare - The New Plane of Subduing the Enemy 

without Fighting...................................................................................................53

Network Warfare Is Rising Abruptly; Have You Made Adequate Preparations? 55 

Network Psychological Warfare—Taking Off Your Bridal Veil...................142 

Future Roads—Developmental Trends in Network Warfare........................147 

Chapter 3: An Informal Discussion of Information Warfare.................. 155 

Gradually Tending Toward Information Warfare that Leads War—an Informal 

Discussion of the Status and Use of Information Warfare...........................157 

The Imperceptible Information Space—the Information Environment of the 

Information Operations Battlefield...................................................... 163 

Informally Talking about the New Characteristics of Information Warfare...... 169 

The New Face of the “Five Warfares” of Information................................179 

Information Warfare...................................................................... 182 

The Methods of Operation of Information Warfare Are Not Suppositional...... 189 

Information Supremacy—the “Commanding Elevation” of Informationized 

Warfare..................................................................................... 192 

On the Informationized Battlefield—Information Warfare Units.................. 202 

Deception Techniques in Informationized Warfare.................................. 211 

An Equal Number of Antennas and Firearms—Greeting the Age of 

Information Reconnaissance............................................................ 214 
116

The Magicians of the Informationized Battlefield.................................... 220 

Information Operations Mobilization—the New Form of War Mobilization 

Under Modern Conditions............................................................... 225 

The Essence Is Weapons; the Wise Will Triumph—New Ideas about 

Information Operations Personnel..................................................... 231 

Gaining the Upper Hand by Scientific Theories..................................... 240 

Building a Solid Shield for Information Warfare..................................... 242 

Exploring Information Warfare in the Twenty-first Century....................... 248 

Chapter 4: Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare—Taking the Pulse of 

the Information Battlefield of the Future.......................................... 255 

The Basic Connotation of “Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare”........ 257 

The Basic Characteristics of “Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare”.... 261 

“Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare” Is the Inevitable Result of the 

Development of Electronic Warfare and the Sudden Appearance of Network 

Warfare.................................................................................... 267 

“Integrated Network and Electronic Warfare” Is the Inevitable Product of the 

Development of Information Operations Theory and Practice to Certain 

Levels...................................................................................... 272 

The Main Groups and Rules of the Information Battlefield Called Out by the 

Integration of Networks and Electronics”............................................. 275 

The Trial of Information Strength in Joint Operations.............................. 279 

The Transformation of Dominance on the Information Battlefield............... 289 

Paying Close Attention to Campaigns for Seizing Information Supremacy..... 298 

Postscript.................................................................................304 
117

CHAPTER SIX: DECIPHERING INFORMATION SECURITY 

This chapter summarizes several sections from Colonel (retired) Shen Weiguang’s book 

Deciphering Information Security, 2003. 465

Introduction 

Information security is of huge concern to Chinese military and civilian planners. 

In China, as in the US, millions of dollars have been spent putting firewalls in place and 

securing networks. Chinese planners are cognizant of the information security problems 

the US has encountered and realize their implications for Chinese specialists. While 

aware that they cannot eliminate all of these problems, Chinese planners nonetheless 

have worked to minimize them and continue to seek creative ways to overcome known 

and projected deficiencies. 

Colonel (retired) Shen Weiguang’s Deciphering Information Security provides an 

incisive look into Chinese methods to thwart information security problems. It examines 

Chinese planning for the construction of an information security regime. The selected 

sections under examination here are Shen’s lectures and articles on information security 

and IW issues in 2002 and 2003. Deciphering Information Security also provides a 

detailed (more than 100 pages) design plan for a Chinese Information Security 

University. Work on the university was to be completed between 2002-2005 according to 

Shen, although the location of the university was not specified. Perhaps it is located at 

Wuhan where other PLA command and control and IW organizations are located. The 

university has a military security specialty among others. 

The various section headings below represent this author’s selection of the most 

important items from a separate lecture or article in the book. The books’ Table of 

Contents is listed at the end of this chapter for easy reference. 

10 July 2002, Baoguo Temple, Beijing466

The issue of information and network security, which accompanies the 

development of informationization, and the rise and increasing prominence of 

information warfare, the form of warfare that is invisible and non-violent, is an 

issue of technology, but above all else it is an issue of strategy.467

In this lecture Shen discusses information security’s impact on national security in 

general. As the quote above indicates, he considers IW to be an issue of technology but 

warns the reader not to forget that more importantly IW is an issue of strategy, continuing 

the main theme of Decoding the Virtual Dragon. Shen covers specific aspects of 

 

465 This author reviewed Shen Weiguang’s Deciphering Information Security and credits the content, 

concepts, and ideas to Shen. Translation credit belongs to Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy Reserve 

Navy Information Operations Command who translated portions of this book. 

466 Shen Weiguang, Deciphering Information Security, Xinhua Publishing House, July 2003, pp. 26-67. 467 Ibid., p. 26. 
118

information security such as its technological and cognitive aspects and the impact of 

holes in information security on politics, economics, culture, and the media. 

Shen believes that the old tangibles of national security (borders, etc.) are being 

replaced by intangibles (information, knowledge, etc.). The concept of “information 

territory” has extinguished the overall importance of traditional boundaries. Information 

territory “is distinguished by the information radiation space of the propagation power 

and power of influence of a country or a political bloc. Information boundaries are 

invisible, irregular boundary lines that divide the information territories of all countries or 

political blocs.” 468 Shen discusses the possibility of “network countries” springing up 

overnight. The “silification” (use of computer chips to control many aspects) of politics 

may enable information alliances in the hands of the masses to develop at the expense of 

national boundaries, regions, and governments. This could lead to the dissolution of 

traditional countries in Shen’s opinion.469

As a result, old concepts must be shed and new ones developed. At the same time, 

China must avoid appearing weak, and its leaders must move along the pathways that are 

the most viable for the country. One of the most important strong points that must be 

developed is information security. It must be made a part of the national security base for 

any developed country. Further, information warfare and information operations are 

strong points that must be leveraged along with information security. Technological 

shortcomings in these areas can affect the security of a nation in the information age and 

affect the ability of a nation to defend itself. 

 Shen states that IW is a fight for information supremacy and has at its heart 

winning without fighting. Forms of IW include electronic warfare, network warfare, 

psychological warfare, ideological warfare, and media warfare.470 IW is focused on 

infrastructures and on leadership. It can destroy or damage both equipment and the mind. 

With regard to equipment, strategists examine infrastructures and suggest theories 

to drive the development of new technologies. Superiority comes from applying the 

proper thinking about how to use new technologies. Shen believes that military 

information and network security building are priority developments. It is very difficult 

to determine who the network opponent is, from where the threat emanates, and whether 

a war has indeed started or not. Shen asks whether viruses will cause weapons to misfire 

or navigation systems to malfunction, and whether battlefield information will be 

encrypted, falsified or fabricated to manipulate an opponent?471 These developments will 

impact on the subjective ability of commanders to see through the electronic fog of war 

as the movement of electrons becomes a permanent fixture on the battlefield. Network 

 

468 Ibid., pp. 28-30. 469 Ibid., pp. 30-34. 470 Ibid., p. 55. In another place in the text, Shen lists the forms of IW as electronic, network, intelligence, 

psychological, hacker virtual command and control, and economic warfare. He adds that strategic 

competition; theoretical threats; potential counterbalances; and media, philosophical, precision, stealth, and 

firepower warfare are other means worthy of consideration. 471 Ibid., pp. 34-35. 
119

reconnaissance, the collection of intelligence, and the impact of such wars on public 

opinion will all be affected by this change.472

Shen warns about cognitive information security as well as technological security. 

IW attempts to keep an opponent’s strategic and military actions within limits while 

working to destroy morale. The human factor is more important in the information age 

than in the agricultural age since human creativity has the potential to cause the 

destruction of entire economies if properly developed. Shen cites the example of the Cold 

War. It is an older example of a strategic information war that was very successful for 

NATO in his opinion and enabled it to overcome the Warsaw Pact, a type of 

nondestructive war that wouldn’t have been possible in the agricultural age.473

Shen has more to say about what damage IW can cause to the mind. He believes 

that the Internet has assisted in integrating all kinds of information, to include ideology 

and Eastern and Western cultures, almost without restraint. This is a danger to the 

information security of the mind in that “the side that starts out with various goals can use 

this to shake the other country’s social systems and convictions and spread an opposing 

ideology.”474 This is of particular concern because information is the resource that best 

represents overall national strength according to Shen. If information’s content is 

manipulated in accordance with the goals and plans of an opposing nation, then moral 

and spirit decrease as well as the country’s overall national strength. Since Chinese 

researchers and academicians go to great lengths to compute comprehensive national 

power or strength, Shen’s concern is understandable. 

Holes in information or network security can affect other areas of comprehensive 

national power such as politics, economics, or military issues. The power to penetrate 

invisibly into a country’s military, economic, diplomatic, cultural, educational, scientific, 

and political affairs and to affect a nation’s spirit, psychology, and ideas, can directly 

influence international events through the use of such information warfare means.475

Shen seems particularly impressed with the ability of information to influence 

political events. He notes that computer networks include newspapers, videos, 

periodicals, and other media forms that transmit information quickly making politics 

more transparent and participatory. Of greater concern, he notes, is the ability of 

networks to establish antigovernment groups, to launch reactionary public opinion 

propaganda, to pass false information, to alter the contents of information, to carry out 

spying activities, and to steal national political intelligence. The spread of network 

technology also allows international political events to influence local political issues. 

Shen does not, however, ignore the benefits of the Internet such as exerting pressure on 

decision makers and resolving issues without the intercession of politicians.476 

 

472 Ibid. 473 Ibid., pp. 55-59. 474 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 475 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 476 Ibid., pp. 30-33. 
120

Shen foresees a major shift from Clausewitz’s dictum that war is a continuation of 

politics by other means. Rather he sees the information age as empowering individuals, 

nonpolitical groups, and other insurgent-type groups: 

War is also not merely a continuation of politics, and it is not merely the highest 

form of struggle between people, countries, classes, and political groups; rather, it 

has also become a measure for nonpolitical groups and even for individuals who 

are in pursuit of their own interests to demonstrate their existence. Enterprises, 

religious groups, terrorist organizations, tribal guerrilla warfare groups, drug 

trafficking groups, and other criminal gangs can all set a war into motion. The 

concept of war has undergone a revolutionary change.477

In this respect Shen believes that issues other than politics, all inspired and empowered 

by information technology, will rewrite Clausewitz. Is war now capable of becoming a 

continuation of criminal/guerrilla/religious/drug activities by other means? Shen notes 

that countries possess thousands of targets susceptible to attack while terrorists, 

criminals, and drug organizations, for example, possess relatively few.478

 Shen devotes as much attention to economics as he does to political and military 

views. He believes that economic security is the most important element of 

comprehensive security and that competition is war in the economic sector. To corner a 

market one must attain a lead in the possession and analysis of information. This will 

guarantee the ability to assure quality, variety, price, services, and deliveries on time. 

Again, only information and network security will guarantee this superiority.479

Of somewhat lesser importance, but still vital to a nation’s well-being, is the issue 

of cultural security. Culture is defined by Shen as the bonding agent of a society, the 

basis for social stability, the provider of social norms for people, and the designer and 

portrayer of all kinds of social systems. National cohesiveness can only be maintained if 

equilibrium is maintained between one’s culture and the imported culture represented by 

the information age. The information age can result in values, political views, and 

images being broadcast in a country that result in damage to relations among races, 

religions, or even countries. Confused citizens may not be able to separate fact from 

fiction thereby causing chaos, panic, or fear and affecting a country’s political framework 

and society’s security.480 

The media is of concern when it comes to damaging a country’s cultural 

cohesiveness. Shen is aware of information’s power to penetrate into a country and 

damage the spirit of a country or person. He notes that countries should strengthen the 

guidance of direct public opinion propaganda, and they should screen, sort, reject (if 

necessary), or refuse information that is useless or damaging to the nation’s or the 

 

477 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 478 Ibid. 479 Ibid., pp. 36-38. 480 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
121

people’s ideological culture. At times, and under specific environmental situations, the 

government should increase control over the media according to Shen.481

To counter information-related political, military, economic, cultural, and media 

developments, Shen recommends the creation of an information security strategy that 

reflects the country’s traditions and characteristics. There must be goals, tasks, and focal 

points for both an information defensive and information offensive strategy with the 

emphasis on the former. This may include the development of information age deterrence 

forces and their information age weapons. The country’s ability to produce information 

products and technologies directly reflects on China’s national strength, making 

information capabilities a new element of overall strength. A unit of investment in 

software is more effective than ten units of investment in hardware in Shen’s opinion. 

Those who possess advanced technology thus control the initiative and are restricted only 

by investment and development in the field of scientific and technological research where 

the real competition in national strength lies. Cooperation in international security fields 

also helps to expand stability. 

Key technologies to research in Shen’s opinion include computer-virusconfrontation weapons, nuclear electromagnetic-pulse weapons, lasers, ion beams, and 

other opto-electrical beam weapons. He believes national information products must be 

substituted for foreign parts and equipment. This includes network designs, operating 

systems, routers, and chips.482 Further, an “information-security confrontation lab” must 

be built, a lab that allows confrontations between offensive and defensive systems. Then 

China can find its problem areas and solve them. The development of intellectual 

property, simulated research, and innovative research is essential if China does not want 

to be dependent on someone else’s inertia in the information field.483

Laws and regulations must also be strengthened in the information-security area. 

This includes building a solid information-security management system, establishing 

information-security standards and a classification protection system, building 

information-defense forces and a unified intelligence system, and enhancing law 

enforcement contingents assigned to information-security issues.484

With regard to training specialists, Shen recommends developing an information 

security university with Chinese characteristics. This most likely means training that 

introduces stratagems, INEW, and other Chinese-specific terms and techniques. Training 

of various types must be afforded to employees of national departments; and government, 

industry, service organizations, network security industries, businesses, and 

authentication organizations. This also requires the development of information security 

as an applied science that studies issues of information, information systems, and 

information and network-security defense in the field of information application.485

 

481 Ibid., pp. 59-60. 482 Ibid., p. 47. 483 Ibid., p. 48. 484 Ibid., p. 51. 485 Ibid., p. 54. 
122

Summarizing this speech, Shen notes what must be done in seven steps: 

1. Leaders must be responsible and take charge of network security and 

information building. 

2. The military, People’s Armed Police, and other departments must defend 

and counterattack hostile forces and terrorists who take advantage of 

networks. 

3. Macroscopic planning must be developed. 

4. Software and hardware must be developed at lower costs and increased 

efficiency. 

5. Defense and offense must be developed simultaneously. 

6. Close attention must be paid to publishing information security laws. 

7. The propagation and education of public opinion must be enhanced.486

August 2002, Baoguo Temple, Beijing487

In this speech a month later at the same location, Shen states that information 

security is the foundation for national security. He expresses concern that IW has 

dramatically changed the traditional forms of war. IW can use EW, network warfare, 

intelligence warfare, psychological warfare, hacker warfare, virus warfare, media 

warfare, and firepower warfare to destroy information installations and attack enemy 

knowledge and belief systems in unforeseen ways. IW is manifested in deception, 

isolation, containment, contamination, and guidance (perception management may be 

what Shen meant by guidance).488 

Shen notes that the focal point of national security has changed in the time of 

global informationization. Summarizing his earlier speech he notes that nations must 

have a strategic understanding of IW because it touches not just the military but all areas 

of politics, economics, the spirit, and society. Now, information security must be 

guaranteed to keep economics from becoming chaotic, politics from becoming unstable, 

the military from losing its efficacy, and culture from losing its direction. A country’s 

strategic objectives now include defending information territory and resources and 

improving national and social information-security support capabilities. Threats to 

information security are present in the information infrastructure, its resources and 

contents, and information management.489

To counter these threats Shen recommends the development of informationdeterrence forces. Their job is to contend with adversaries, focusing on reconnaissance 

and other capabilities while paying attention to countercontrol measures, seizing the 

initiative, and offsetting and controlling the threats of information power from other 

countries.490 

 

486 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 487 Ibid., pp. 3-25. 488 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 489 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 490 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
123

Shen recommends the development of a national information security support system. 

The system appears to be a further refinement of his July comments in the Baoguo 

Temple. He lists the main tasks of establishing a national information security support 

system491 as follows: 

(1) Set up an information security strategy with Chinese characteristics. The 

strategy should rationally define strategic developmental objectives and 

tasks to include what to do and what not to do. There should be emphasis 

placed on the subjective role of mobilizing the masses to include strategic 

personnel reserves and emphasis on the utilization of key mental 

(information security specialists) resources. Building prominence in the 

areas of spirit and moral is a key point and includes strengthening the 

guidance of “open public opinion propaganda.” This will help develop and 

expand Chinese ideological culture. China must counter foreign 

information, screening and sorting information and rejecting, resisting, 

and stopping damaging information. 

(2) Enhance the building of a legal system for the information security field. 

This includes developing the proper system of laws and regulations for 

China’s information-network security and establishing a national 

information-security law-support center to study techniques for tracking 

crimes and gathering evidence. 

(3) Start a national information security infrastructure program. This requires 

that China promotes domestic production of information-security products 

and uses technology that China can control such as operating systems, 

routers, and chips. 

(4) Strengthen information-security evaluation and authentication systems. 

China needs to develop its own security-evaluation system and to conduct 

an evaluation of the country’s key information infrastructure and key 

systems and networks as soon as possible. This includes the four office 

work resource systems (Golden Customs, Golden Tax, and financial 

monitoring and management projects) and the eight service system 

projects (Golden Finance, Golden Shield, Golden Audit, social security, 

Golden Agriculture, Golden Quality, Golden Water, and the 

telecommunications related information systems). 

(5) Promote standardized research and application. 

(6) Establish a mechanism for handling emergencies in information security. 

This includes establishing better monitoring, early warning, and 

containment of harmful information. In other words, a crisis management 

system focused on information security. As Shen notes 

We should build a national information security crisis handling center, 

assemble crack troops and capable commanders, be responsible for 

organizing and coordinating the work of detection, be on guard against 

counter-control of national information network security and information 

 

491 Ibid., pp. 14-22. The bulleted points 1-9 are taken from those pages. 
124

content security, improve rapid response capabilities, and answer the 

information security crisis that is confronting China.492

(7) Formulate a complete set of special policies for implementing these 

measures as quickly as possible. Shen recommends using market 

mechanisms to start the industrialized development of informationnetwork-security technologies, products, and services. 

(8) Expand research into information-security conflicts. China must establish 

a mechanism for simulating information-security conflicts. This will help 

researchers to discover, understand, study, and solve problems while 

enhancing domestic capabilities. 

(9) Enhance information-security training and education. China must build a 

national information-security education and training center that is 

responsible for the organization and guidance of training and educational 

work in the national information security field. 

To strengthen the management field, Shen recommended establishing six centers 

and one agency. The agency would be called the National Information Security Support 

Management Agency. The centers would be: the National Information Security Center 

for Supervising Law Enforcement; the National Information Security Evaluation and 

Authentication Center; the National Information Security Crisis Handling Center; the 

National Information Security Legal Support Center; the National Information Security 

Education and Training Center; and the National Information Security Conflict Research 

Center.493

The Information Security University494

As mentioned above, Shen also submitted a plan in Deciphering Information 

Security for an Information Security University. This entry was not dated, so it is 

assumed that Shen included the university concept as an example of his future intentions. 

Shen outlines the university’s strategic orientation, its resources and conditions, 

the policy for running the university, developmental objectives, and other important 

management activities. Investment expenditures are listed along with the equipment 

required to run an information-security-technology laboratory and research and 

development center. Specific information security (IS) departments include: political IS, 

economic IS, science and technology IS, social IS, international IS, national defense IS, 

IS technology, IS engineering, IS management, and the national IS department.495 

With regard to the National Defense Information Security Department, Shen 

writes that specialties would include national defense and military affairs issues. The 

department would train specialized personnel who understand IS defense and attack 

techniques and theory in the military arena. All specialties would emphasize training in 

 

492 Ibid., p. 20. 493 Ibid., p. 23. 494 Ibid., pp. 127-241. 495 Ibid., p. 54. 
125

military science and practical information attack and defense techniques. After 

graduation all students should be able to work in national defense and military 

departments at all levels.496

Shen emphasizes that network-information technologies and methods can threaten 

the political, military, economic, and social order of a country if information security 

means are not in place. These technologies have no traditional past comparative aspect, 

so they are unique. Network informationization has thus turned into a struggle between 

information defense and information attack and is manifested as a struggle for capturing 

information control.497 The focus of the university is to learn information-security system 

as attack and defend means. 

Written in February 2002, the plan laid out short-, mid-, and long-term goals. The 

short-term goal is to establish within one to three years the first common, full-time 

university in the information-security field and in the country, centered on undergraduate 

education with supplemental professional training and nondegree education. The midterm goal is to establish within three to eight years a domestic university in the 

information security field with an integrated undergraduate degree education and a 

graduate master’s degree education. The long-term goal is to establish within eight to 

thirteen years China’s first university in the information-security field with integrated 

bachelors, masters, and doctoral degrees with integrated education, scientific research, 

and production capabilities. The teacher to student ratio is expected to be about 1:29.498

Shen noted that the university’s policy will be “study for the purpose of application.” Six 

of these teaching plans follow. All of the plans (to include the economic plan) are part of 

the military information security specialty, demonstrating the attention even the military 

pays to economic affairs.499

 

496 Ibid., p. 141. 497 Ibid., p. 149. 498 Ibid., p. 170. 499 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 
126

Teaching Plans/Course Outlines for Military Information Security Studies500

 (2-1) Teaching Plan for Fundamental Specialty Courses for Military Information 

Security 

Course 

Classification 

Information Security University 

Information Security Branch 

Academy 

Military Information Security 

Specialty 

Periods/Lab 

Hours Credits Semester Schedule 

Required Courses 

(A) Electives (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 

Fundamental Specialty Courses 

Required Courses 

Fundamental 

Military Command 

Science 

20 1 1 

Military Command 

Automation Systems 36 2 1 

An Outline of 

Information Warfare 36 2 2 

Information 

Operations 

Technology Science 

36 2 3 

Compiler Language 72/54 4 5 

C Language Program 

Design 54/40 3 3 

Data Structures and 

Algorithms 54/30 3 4 

Information Theory 36 2 5 

Network Principles 

and Communication 

72/40 5 6 

Database 

Fundamentals and 

Application 

54/30 3 4 

Coding Principles 72/40 4 5 

Operating Systems 54/36 3 4 

Introduction to 

Codes 72 4 6 

An Introduction to 

Information Security 20 1 3 

Information Security 

Laws and 

Regulations 

 20 1 3 

Total Number of Credits for Required Fundamental 

Specialty Courses 35 

 

500 Ibid. These charts (six in all) were on pages 198-204 of the text. 
127

 (2-2) Teaching Plan for Fundamental Specialty Courses for Military Information 

Security 

Course 

Classification 

Information Security University 

Information Security Branch 

Academy 

Military Information Security 

Specialty 

Periods/Lab 

Hours Credits Semester Schedule 

Required 

Courses (A) Electives (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 

Fundamental Specialty Courses 

Electives 

 Strategics 20 1 2 

 Campaign Science 20 1 2 

 Tactics 20 1 3 

 Military Strategy 20 1 3 

US Military 

Strategy 20 1 4 

US Operations 

Philosophy 20 1 5 

The Basics of the 

Taiwan Situation 20 1 5 

 Code Algorithms 36/20 2 7 

Military 

Intelligence 36 2 3 

 Military Planning 54/36 3 4 

Computer 

Fundamentals 36/20 2 1 

Science and 

Technology 

Document Retrieval

 20/12 1 2 

Multimedia 

Technology 36/20 2 4 

Signals and 

Systems 54 3 4 

 Complex Functions 54 3 3 

 Numeric Analysis 72 4 6 

Fundamental 

Circuit Theory and 

Experiments 

 54/36 3 3 

Analog and Digital 

Circuits and 

Experiments 

 90/40 3 4 

Total Number of Credits for Elective Fundamental 

Specialty Courses (at least 15 elective credits for each 

student) 

 35 
128

 (3) Teaching Plan for the Specialty Courses for Military Information Security 

Course 

Classification 

Information Security University 

Information Security Branch 

Academy 

Military Information Security 

Specialty 

Periods/Lab 

Hours Credits Semester Schedule 

Required Courses (A) Electives 

(B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 

Specialty Courses 

Required Courses 

Network Security 

Protocols 36/20 2 4 

Network Security 

System Structures 36/12 2 4 

Security Evaluation 

Standards for 

Information 

Technology 

36/12 2 5 

Scanning for Hidden 

Troubles in Networks 36/20 2 5 

Security Certification 

Technology and 

Application 

36/20 2 5 

Computer Virus 

Program Design and 

Application 

54/36 3 5 

Preventing and 

Remedying Computer 

Viruses 

36/20 2 6 

A Study of Hacker 

Attack Methods 36/20 2 6 

Network Intrusion 

Detection and 

Defending Against 

Attack 

54/36 3 6 

Emergency Response 

and Mishap Recovery 36/20 2 7 

Technology for 

Protecting Against 

Electromagnetic 

Radiation Leaks 

 36/20 2 7 

Network Management 36/20 2 7 

Information Attack 

and Defense Tactics 36/20 2 7 

Total Number of Credits for Required Specialty 

Courses 26 
129

Course 

Classification 

Information Security University 

Information Security Branch 

Academy 

Military Information Security 

Specialty 

Periods/Lab 

Hours Credits Semester Schedule 

Required 

Courses (A) Electives (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 

Specialty Courses 

Electives 

Information Warfare 

and the New 

Revolution in Military 

Affairs 

 20 1 3 

 C4I Confrontation 20 1 3 

Fundamentals of 

Mathematic Modeling 54/30 2 4 

Foreign Military 

Command Systems 36 2 4 

Target-Oriented 

Program Design and 

Application 

 54/36 3 5 

Management 

Information Systems 36 2 6 

An Introduction to US 

and Taiwan Social 

Information Systems 

 36 2 6 

 Software Engineering 54/36 3 7 

Lectures on Systems 

Security Technology 36 2 8 

Introduction to 

Systems Security 

Systems Engineering 

 36/20 2 7 

Synthetic Experiments 

for Information 

Security Technology 

 54 3 7 

Total Number of Credits for Elective Specialty 

Courses (at least ten elective credits for each student) 23 
130

 (4) Teaching Plan for the Fundamental Specialty Courses for Economic Information 

Security 

Course 

Classification 

Information Security University 

Information Security Branch 

Academy 

Military Information Security 

Specialty 

Periods/Lab 

Hours Credits Semester Schedule 

Required Courses (A) Electives 

(B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 

Fundamental Specialty Courses 

Required Courses 

Management 36 2 3 

Management 

Information Systems 36 2 4 

A Survey of 

Electronic Commerce 36 2 3 

Security Technology 

for Operating 

Platforms 

54/36 3 4 

Security Technology 

for Databases 54/36 3 4 

Oracle Language 72/54 4 6 

C Language Program 

Design 54/40 3 3 

Data Structures and 

Algorithms 54/30 3 2 

Information Theory 36 2 5 

Network Principles 

and Communication 72/40 5 6 

Database 

Fundamentals and 

Application 

54/30 3 3 

Coding Principles 72/40 4 3 

Operating Systems 54/36 3 4 

An Introduction to 

Codes 72 4 6 

Introduction to 

Information Security 20 1 3 

Information Security 

Laws and Regulations 20 1 3 

Total Number of Required Fundamental Specialty 

Credits 45 
131

Course 

Classification 

Information Security University 

Information Security Branch 

Academy 

Military Information Security 

Specialty 

Periods/Lab 

Hours Credits Semester Schedule 

Required 

Courses (A) Electives (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B) 

Fundamental Specialty Courses 

Electives 

Macroscopic 

Economics 36 2 2 

Microscopic 

Economics 36 2 2 

 Marketing 20 1 2 

 Accounting 36 2 3 

Financial 

Management 20 1 3 

Computer 

Fundamentals 36/20 2 1 

Science and 

Technology 

Document Retrieval 

 20/12 2 2 

 Compiler Language 72/54 4 4 

Applied Planning and 

Management 54/36 3 4 

Multimedia 

Technology 36/20 2 5 

 Complex Functions 54 3 3 

Basic Circuit Theory 

and Experiments 54/36 3 3 

Analog and Digital 

Circuits and 

Experiments 

 90/40 5 4 

Total Number of Elective Fundamental Specialty 

Credits (at least 12 elective credits for each student) 32 
132

16 April 2003, Chengdu Command501

At Chengdu Command, one of Shen’s previous military units, he focuses on IW 

instead of information security. He gave a briefing on how “hot” IW has become 

particularly in the cognitive area. Shen notes that the center of gravity in the Iraq war 

revolved around the psychological war as much as it did around the US’ comprehensive 

military operations. IW attacks on the psyche, he states, target the cognitive system. He 

states that a person without energy, a soul, or thought processes is nothing more than a 

corpse. This indicates to Shen that the cost-effectiveness of IW is far higher than that of 

armed warfare. Shen’s focus on the media’s involvement in PSYOP indicates to him that 

the scope of war has become broader. Like other authors, Shen also writes that the Iraq 

war was a performance for a global audience, a display of IW’s comprehensive and 

intangible aspects. 

Shen states that one must understand the impact of IW attacks on the psyche from 

the perspective of strategy. While information is objective, people’s powers of 

observation, judgment, and decision making are subjective. The objective conditions of 

war in Iraq must be viewed from the ideological perspective of IW according to Shen. He 

further notes 

The objective of IW is to achieve control. The key to achieving effective control 

is in controlling the psyche but this is extremely difficult. War today is no longer 

a tool to be operated independently by politicians, as people outside of the 

political realm have more means and capabilities of suppressing war. 

Shen believes that US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was correct in 

stating that advanced weapons and the information threat were as important as the use of 

ground forces. He notes that IW is the center of gravity for the RMA and summarizes the 

rise of IW in two points. First, the function of information is continually increasing, and it 

has become a third major strategic resource after material and energy (with the media at 

the front line). Second, the destructiveness of war is based on precise information 

weapons far in excess of what people can imagine. But he believes Rumsfeld was not 

thoroughly informed on Sun Tzu’s theory of war and therefore neglected the fact that IW 

is a People’s War in the true sense of the term and includes different means of combat. 

He also states combining China’s Art of War and China’s thinking about guerrilla 

warfare together with modern technology reveals infinite power. US efforts relied too 

much on advanced technology and overlooked the use of stratagems and tactics. Modern 

war requires fusion among the old and the new, the soft and the hard, and brains and 

brawn. 

Shen believes that IW’s technological-equipment developments need to occur in 

tandem with improvements in tactics and thinking with a focus on the guiding role of 

theory. This stands in sharp contrast to US thinking, he believes, whose primary focus is 

 

501 Ibid., pp. 336-359. No further page delineation can be provided for this section and the next two 

sections. The translation was performed by a private company and they did not provide exact page numbers 

from the Chinese original. 
133

on technology. The imagination is the source of IW tactics and IW has brought about 

changes in global strategic trends. A fertile imagination is a key to developing a trump 

card weapon, which is thinking about something that others cannot. China is not far 

behind the US in IW equipment and it is definitely ahead in the area of theory according 

to Shen. 

June 2003 Interview in Warrior News502

The article in Warrior News used in Deciphering Information Security was a 

question and response period between Shen Weiguang and officers and troops of the 

Guangzhou Command. During the interview process he continually emphasized the 

importance of personnel, both their physical capability to endure long deployments and 

their mental capabilities to handle the requirements of the information age. As Shen notes 

Even though modern war is moving in the direction of high technology and overthe-horizon radar, the decisive factor determining victory on today’s battlefield is 

still personnel, especially individual combat personnel. Enhancing the degree to 

which common soldiers are able to control technology requires large investments 

in terms of time and money, which is why the educational requirements for 

soldiers are going up, and is one of the main reasons that most countries place 

high demands on educational backgrounds when selecting soldiers. 

Shen answered a question regarding the PLA’s current communications 

equipment and how it could function in future wars. He states that when confronting 

electronic interference, one must make use of instantaneous message transmissions or the 

use of intermittent message transmission. If there is interference over the entire frequency 

range one must engage in command and control via radio platforms using modulation or 

an unfixed frequency band. The best method to confront interference, he notes, is to 

update equipment and enhance its technological content. 

Another question was directed at the character of war. Shen answered that the 

conventional patterns of war have been discarded in favor of new terms such as 

information control, integrated air-ground operations, joint operations, and soft 

countermeasures. Psychological warfare, propaganda warfare, economic warfare, trade 

warfare, grain warfare, and personnel warfare continue to appear on the scene. For 

military operations, a nonlinear, extensive model characterized by psychological 

penetration, air strikes, long-range strikes, and joint ground operations is currently the 

most appropriate model. It is designed to control the enemy’s information acquisition and 

transmission capabilities and to restrict the life and activities of the enemy. 

China must put an extensive effort, Shen noted, into incorporating networks 

among firepower platforms, operational units, and their combat systems. Information 

operations can only be enhanced by the horizontal and vertical coordination of these 

combat systems. At the same time Shen warns about the psychological effects or 

 

502 Ibid., pp. 360-379. No further page delineation can be provided for this section. The translation was 

performed by a private company and they did not provide exact page numbers from the Chinese original. 
134

espionage potential of all of this integration. For example, he states that a cell phone 

might be a signal source that produces electronic interference in the brain and that a 

keyboard in front of the computer may be a platform for making someone (via control of 

their thoughts) to divulge secrets. Shen concludes that one needs to be cognizant how 

modern information technology has turned signals and text into weapons. 

28 May 2002, Armed Police Forces503

Shen’s lecture to the People’s Armed Police was dedicated to antiterror operations 

under new conditions. While this was the first lecture he presented chronologically it was 

left until last due to its antiterror theme. 

Shen began by explaining several characteristics of the information age as he 

normally does when lecturing. IW’s strategic goal, he states, is to destroy the enemy’s 

will to start and engage in a war. At the level of combat, it is to disrupt the enemy’s 

decision making processes. At the level of tactics it is to paralyze the enemy’s system of 

force. Now nonviolent types of war are directed against leaders. War can be unseen, and 

it need not involve bloodshed. The trend toward nonviolent and soft war is characterized 

by the following features. 

 First, the goals of war have changed from territorial expansion and 

economic aggression to information plundering and targeting 

psychological elements. A concept such as network warfare is designed to 

attack the opponent’s central nervous system, which is his C4I system. 

 Second, the function of information has undergone a transformation from 

a subservient status to the status of a guide. 

 Third the patterns of war are evolving from the tangible to the intangible. 

 Fourth, victory is sought by nonviolence. 

 Fifth, the goal of war is zero deaths. 

 Sixth, war is developing in the direction of miniaturization. 

 Seventh, one should learn how to make use of the media since information 

can either strengthen or break up national cohesiveness and national 

power. 

 Finally, computer programmers can fight wars from either their offices or 

homes. Remote manipulation of warfare is now a given and IW might be 

considered fighting war from indoors. 

Given this background, Shen then proceeds to tell the audience that the new 

century has witnessed the introduction of terrorism as the new form of war. To prevent 

terrorism in China, Shen recommends that the country continue to rely on prevention, 

prevention, prevention. This includes gaining an understanding of the characteristics of 

terrorist activities and gaining a grasp of the operational rhythms of the war against 

terror. This includes focusing on areas where terrorists choose to act and where no one 

 

503 Ibid., pp. 380-405. No further page delineation can be provided for this section. The translation was 

performed by a private company and they did not provide exact page numbers from the Chinese original. 
135

takes notice such as areas under no one’s jurisdiction or areas where specific populations 

support their cause. Terrorist actions in China are usually carried out by groups devoted 

to dividing the nation, organized crime, and individual criminal elements. To fight these 

elements will require increased coordination among the various combat forces and the 

proper division of responsibilities between the military and the police Shen notes. New 

types of tactics must be developed. Tactics, he adds, refers to a complete collection of 

elements such as operational thinking, stratagems and methods, and operational 

initiatives which can be manipulated. That is, a good tactic must be able to be converted 

into a combat plan and be flexible. Police training must be expanded and include special 

operations as a key component and not as an optional element. 
136

解密信息安全

Deciphering Information Security 

Shen Weiguang 

July 2003 

Table of Contents 

Chief Author: Shen Weiguang 

Publisher: Xinhua Publishing House 

Date of Publication: 2003 

Introduction: Courageously Climbing the Summit of Military Theory...1 

Foreword: Ten Tasks Facing China's Information Security Field...1 

Information Security Research 

1. Studying a Framework for a National Information Security Support System...3 

2. Strengthening China's Information and Network Security Building...26 

3. China's Present Information Security Situation and Tasks...68 

4. Extremely Urgent Training for Information Security Personnel...119 

University Programs for Information Security 

1. Foreword...127 

2. Strategic Orientation...127 

3. Program Architecture...132 

4. Moving Plans Forward...190 

5. Risk Management...192 

6. Conclusions...193 

7. Attachments...194 

Information Warfare Research 

1. Ideal War and New Trends in War...241 

2. Information Warfare Research and Theory Innovation...259 

3. Development Trends in World War—Reducing Destructive Force...285 

4. The Media Field Is Becoming the Forward Position in Information Warfare...320 

5. "Hot" Cold Thoughts on Information Warfare—Talking about the Use of 

Information Warfare in the Iraq War...336 

6. Operations and Training under Informationized Conditions—Linking Answers from 

Situations in the Iraq War with Questions from Some Officers and Enlisted Personnel 

in Guangzhou Military Region...360 

7. Antiterrorist Operations under the New Circumstances...380 

8. A Proposal that the People's Armed Police Establish an Information Warfare 

Center...406 

Postscript....519 
137 

CHAPTER SEVEN: AN INTERPRETATION OF NETWORK CENTRIC 

WARFARE 

This chapter summarizes key chapters of editor Wong Zieh Deh’s An Interpretation of 

Network Centric Warfare, 2004.504

Introduction 

PLA academicians and policy makers closely study current US military 

developments. Perhaps no issue has come under closer scrutiny than the concept of 

Network Centric Warfare (NCW). The PLA has followed the doctrinal development and 

practical application of this concept in the various US branches of service and also in the 

policy and vision statements that the Defense Department issues periodically. 

The PLA’s stated purpose for publishing An Interpretation of Network Centric 

Warfare is to study foreign military methods, absorb their experiences, and master the 

rules of military-informationization building in order to help the transformation of the 

Chinese military from a mechanized to an informationized force.505 Chinese military 

leaders believe that NCW is one of a handful of key concepts that China must master if it 

is to be truly competitive on today’s battlefield. Further, the work demonstrates to the US 

reader how thoroughly the Chinese understand US NCW theory and practice (the book is 

better than most US explanations of NCW). An Interpretation of Network Centric 

Warfare underscores for the US reader that the Chinese truly believe in the stratagem of 

“know the enemy and know yourself and you will win every battle.” On a much smaller 

scale the book covers how the PLA is implementing a Chinese-based NCW concept. 

The Forward to An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare notes, “this book 

systematically analyzes the underlying framework, development strategy, and component 

elements of network centric warfare and offers enlightenment for enhancing the 

informationization building of China’s military.”506 Chief Editor Wong Zieh Deh and his 

associates (referred to hereafter as “the authors”) appear to have accomplished this goal. 

Chapter headings include the following topics: a description of NCW, the meaning and 

model of NCW, the C4ISR system of NCW, the global information grid, information 

superiority and NCW, support technologies for NCW, military mapping and NCW, 

weapon components of NCW, information security and NCW, operational support for 

NCW, and battlefield management of NCW. Only the last chapter in the book addresses 

China’s NCW equivalent concept but does so in not nearly the detail as the first eleven 

chapters. The book’s Forward states that “the last chapter of this book specifically 

suggests a response to network centric warfare and ways to realize leapfrog-style 

 

504 This author reviewed Chief Editor Wong Zieh Deh’s An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare and 

credits the content, concepts, and ideas to Editor Wong and authors of the individual chapters. Translation 

credit belongs to Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command 

who translated this book. 

505 Wong Zieh Deh, editor, An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare, National Defense Industry Press, 

Beijing, 2004, pp. v-vi. 

506 Ibid. 
138

development.”507 Unfortunately, the book actually doesn’t go this far. Perhaps there is a 

classified version of the book not available to the public that does. 

The book was researched and written by the PLA’s Information Engineering 

University. Central Military Commission member and PLA Chief of Staff General Liang 

Guanglie wrote the Preface. Only a few of the book’s twelve chapters will be examined 

in detail due to the book’s length and the familiarity of most US military readers with the 

US NCW concept (the main aspect of the book). For example, Chapter One, “A 

Summary of Network Centric Warfare,” is just that, an extensive look into the documents 

that both developed the theory of NCW and how the US put it into practice. The chapter 

discusses US battle labs, theoretical concepts and documents (Joint Vision 2020 and the 

NCW concepts of the US Navy, Army, Air Force, Ballistic Missile Defense, and the 

Marines), the fundamental principles and basic structure of NCW, the functional domains 

(physical, information, and cognitive) of NCW, and the key areas, prerequisites, and 

appraisals of NCW among other issues. The chapter concludes with the problems 

confronting NCW. 

Four chapters were chosen for further examination. They are 

 Chapter Three—The C4ISR System of Network Centric Warfare 

 Chapter Eight—Integrated Weapons in Network Centric Warfare 

 Chapter Eleven—Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

 Chapter Twelve—Welcoming New Challenges, the Leaps and Bounds 

Achievable by Further Development (Chinese views of their NCW 

equivalent) 

The reader is reminded that Chapters Three, Eight, and Eleven are interpretations 

of how the Chinese visualize the component parts and integration of the US NCW 

concept. Whether this is a correct interpretation or not is not discussed. What is important 

is that these are the issues on which the PLA focused attention, what they think is 

important in our theory. 

The C4ISR System of Network Centric Warfare 

In this chapter, the authors described the importance of C4ISR to future war, its 

impact on the mobility of combat forces, and its structural layout and interoperability 

potential. It is clear that the PLA is very impressed with US advancements in this area, 

and they are keen to learn everything they can about the functioning of US C4ISR. 

Future warfare, the authors note, will be carried out on a six dimensional 

battlefield composed of ground, sea, air, space, information, and knowledge. Future war 

will utilize to the maximum extent possible the C4ISR information system due to its 

fusing and force multiplier effects. The Chinese feel that the C4ISR system is NCW’s 

foundation for network operations and its basic command system. The authors give the 

US credit for developing not only the C4ISR system but also for adding kill (K) 

 

507 Ibid. 
139

capabilities to the system. This has transformed C4ISR into a C4KISR system since there 

are now capabilities for target discovery, precise identification, and tracking and 

killing.508 However, it is unclear who actually developed the C4KISR concept. The 

Chinese discussed this concept in an October 2005 article in Xiandai Fangyu Jishu 

(Modern Defense Technology) without mentioning that this is a US system.509 The 

C4KISR concept also does not appear in any US text. 

The authors of An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare write that C4ISR 

characteristics include its ability to transmit basic battlefield situations in a timely, 

comprehensive manner; to assist in selecting optimal operational plans; to automatically 

transmit orders and rapidly report situations to higher authorities; and to produce a highly 

mobile and tactical C4ISR system. Further the C4ISR system improves the operational 

capabilities of the military since it has the ability to collect, process, and transmit 

information that is used for command, control, and logistical purposes and to assist 

firepower, mobility, and defensive capabilities. The system also allows strategists at the 

highest levels to directly monitor and, in some cases, directly control tactical actions.510

The C4ISR system increases the mobility of combat actions as it increases the 

speed at which a force or weapon system operates according to the authors. A C4ISR 

system also increases command efficiency since commanders can plan strategies at great 

distances from combat actions and can unify their command orders for all operational 

actions. Simultaneously, preparation time is decreased due to the collection, processing, 

and transmission capabilities of the system. Once battle commences, C4ISR allows one to 

understand which places are most critical on the battlefield and what resources are 

available to mobilize and assist friendly forces to destroy enemy forces or systems in key 

areas.511 As a result, for the next ten years or so, the security of C4ISR systems will be a 

focus of attention as forces improve their ISR capabilities and move toward multiservice 

connections, communications, and interoperability. Stovepipe systems will fall into 

disuse as integrated, networked, and diversified capabilities replace them. Real-time 

sensor to shooter responses will be achieved.512

This chapter devotes the end of its discussion on C4ISR to the architecture and 

composition of the C4ISR system. It notes that “the entity that is created by connecting a 

number of objects together is called a system, and the arrangement and ordering of all the 

component parts within the entity is called the structure.”513 The integration of systems 

constitutes the architecture. For the C4ISR system architecture, the authors list three 

layers. The first layer is the C4ISR overall structure. It includes four layers, strategy-level 

(national), strategy/campaign level (theater), campaign level (group army or military), 

and tactical level (division or brigade). There are also service systems (army, navy, air 

 

508 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 509 Bai Jianlin, Zhang Pingding, and Liu Peng, “Expert System for C4KISR System Decision,” Xiandai 

Fangyu Jishu (Modern Defense Technology), Beijing, 1 October 2005 as translated and downloaded from 

the Open Source Center website on 1 February 2007. 

510 Wong, pp. 72-75. 511 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 512 Ibid., pp. 78-79. 513 Ibid., p. 80. 
140

force, and missile forces) in the overall structure. The second layer is the service C4ISR 

system structure. It has the same four layers as the overall structure but also specialized 

military systems and some key individual subsystem elements. The third layer is the 

structure of the functional elements of the C4ISR system. These elements are the 

processing, monitoring, transmission, security, and secrecy elements. Large scale 

operational platforms (strategic missiles and aircraft carriers, for example) have C4ISR 

systems as their functional elements.514

The concept of interoperability requires that systems have a framework when 

being developed. Frameworks are studied from the perspective of operations (tasks and 

activities and information exchanges required), systems (associated system capabilities 

and characteristics with operational requirements), and technology (a minimal set of rules 

governing the arrangement, interaction, and interrelationships of some of the system 

components).515

With regards to the composition of the C4ISR system, it is composed of command 

and control systems, an intelligence subsystem, a communication subsystem, and a 

surveillance and monitoring subsystem. Only the integral components of each will be 

listed here: 

 Command and control hardware and software subsystems: information 

processing, transmission, and monitoring hardware systems; and 

battlefield (terrain mapping, analysis, and environmental processing 

software), combat analysis (situational maps), simulations (exercises), 

evaluation (combat loss and efficacy), staff operations, monitoring and 

detection, mobilization, firepower support, and air defense software 

systems 

 Intelligence subsystems: optical detection system (visible light, infrared, 

and TV), radar detection, radio reconnaissance, ground sensors, and data 

fusion systems 

 Communications subsystems: internal communications (telephones, 

intercoms, broadcasts, multicasts, and audio recordings) and external 

communications (command post links to information sources, operational 

forces, neighboring units, and upper and lower command centers). 

 Surveillance and monitoring subsystems: space-based monitoring system, 

an aviation monitoring system, a ground-based monitoring system, and a 

sea-monitoring system.516

Integrated Weapons in Network Centric Warfare 

Informationized weapons are those that use computers, networks, 

microelectronics, information, data fusion, and other technologies in unison. 

Informationized weapons include, but are not limited to, munitions, operational 

platforms, special reconnaissance equipment, detection and jamming equipment, 

 

514 Ibid. 515 Ibid., pp. 81-82. 516 Ibid., pp. 86-89. 
141

digitized individual soldier equipment, and automatic command systems. The Chinese 

break informationized weapons into categories that include special-use information 

weapons for IO (such as strategic or tactical C4ISR systems), electronic warfare aircraft 

and early warning aircraft, electronic jamming equipment or electronic jamming bombs, 

reconnaissance and early warning satellites, computer virus weapons and network logic 

bombs, new information weapons (such as various missiles, munitions, bombs, and land 

mines), and traditional weapons that have been “informationized” (filled with 

information technologies). 

The authors of An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare state that NCW 

weapons are of four types: inner space, outer space, information space, and psychological 

space. Inner space weaponry includes the weapons of the army, navy, and air force. Army 

weapons in NCW include ground battlefield monitoring systems, mobile ground 

weapons, and air attack weapons. Navy weapons include surface combat weapons such as 

the Nimitz Class nuclear powered aircraft carriers and Burke Class destroyers. 

Underwater combat weapons include Seawolf Class submarines and Los Angeles Class 

nuclear-powered attack submarines. Air Force weapons include tactical aircraft such as 

the F-117 Stealth Bomber and the F-16 Fighter. Strategic bombers include the B-2A 

Stealth Bomber and the B-52 Stratofortress. Early warning aircraft include the E-3 Sentry 

Early Warning Aircraft and the E-8 Battlefield Surveillance Aircraft. 

Outer space weaponry includes those weapons that engage in combat more than 

100 kilometers from the surface of the earth. The objective of outer space weaponry is to 

take and maintain space supremacy with military space forces as the main combat force. 

Weaponry in this category includes space reconnaissance and monitoring weaponry such 

as satellites. China considers twenty-first century space weapons to include laser 

weapons, particle beam weapons, microwave weapons, and antisatellite weapons. 

Information space weapons include computer virus weapons, network attack 

weapons (solid-state virus attack weapons, computer virus guns, chipping attack 

weapons, silicon-eating bacteria, and nanometric robots), and electronic countermeasure 

weapons (radar countermeasure equipment, communications countermeasure equipment, 

photoelectric countermeasure equipment, and hydro-acoustic countermeasure 

equipment). 

Finally there are psychological space weapons. The authors consider the status of 

psychological warfare to be more prominent than ever before, stating that it has become 

the highest form of combat in information operations as well as an important component 

of a force’s combat strength. In this sense, the book is in agreement with Dai Qingmin’s 

appraisal of the rising importance of PSYOP in the information age in Chapter Five. 

Psychological warfare is defined as the purposeful and intentional transmission of 

specific information to the enemy’s military and civilian populations via operational 

methods such as psychological propaganda, psychological deterrence, psychological 

interference, and psychological deception. The three distinguishing traits of 

psychological warfare are that, first, it is combat against the will of the people and it has 

an ideological element. Second, the main weapons are the media and information. 
142

Spoken and written language, music and song, graphs and pictures, and audio and video 

recordings are the main information methods used in psychological warfare. Third, 

psychological warfare does not differentiate between peacetime and wartime.517 

Strategic psychological warfare is psychological operational actions carried out at 

a country’s diplomatic or national defense level to influence the overall war decisions of 

foreign leaders and foreign command organizations before and during war. Campaign 

psychological warfare is carried out in important stages of war and tactical psychological 

warfare refers to psychological operational actions carried out on the level of operations 

of ordinary scale.518 

There is both offensive and defensive PSYOP. The fundamental concept of 

offensive psychological operations includes psychological propaganda, deterrence, 

harassment, and deception. Propaganda now includes network and mobile phone 

propaganda. Such propaganda is voluminous, timely, specific, true, and vivid. Deterrence 

uses the principles of restraint and intimidation for its power. Harassment includes 

electronic howling devices and weapons that attack the mind with images. The Chinese 

accuse the US of using high-powered sound transmission or Hypersonic Sound Systems 

(HSS) that disturb the enemy’s judgment or cause clear-headed soldiers to become 

confused. Finally, deception includes several different types of strategies where the goal 

is to win and defeat the enemy via stratagems. Defensive psychological weapons and 

measures include patriotism, the ability to adequately prepare for psychological defensive 

operations, the necessity to carry out the required management of wartime news and 

public opinion, the necessity to occupy the frontlines of propaganda in the fight for public 

opinion, and the unleashing of psychological counterattacks against the enemy’s 

psychological attacks.519 

Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

Battlefield management in network centric warfare is defined as relevant 

measures taken to carry out the unified organization, planning, control, and utilization of 

the information environment, information facilities, frequency spectrum resources, 

societal elements, and personnel in the theater of operations. NCW enables real-time 

discovery and destruction, and it alters the traditional operations cycle of observe-orientdecide-act. NCW characteristics are “small, extensive, far, direct, fast.”520 This will cause 

Chinese forces to overhaul or reform the way they think in terms of command and 

management according to the authors of An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare. 

Even though watching the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq from afar, the PLA 

nonetheless listed several principles facing battlefield management. First NCW makes the 

ground battlefield three-dimensional in the sense of being tactical (direct and kinetic 

energy weapons), operational (intelligent robots), and strategic (nuclear, biological, and 

chemical). Second, the sea battlefield is multidimensional in the sense of utilizing the 

 

517 Ibid., p. 230. 518 Ibid., p. 231. 519 Ibid., pp. 234-238. 520 Ibid., pp. 288-290. 
143

ground, sea, air, space, and electromagnetic spectrums. This includes mobile airfields and 

launch platforms, over-the-horizon vessel formations, dirigibles, shore-based aircraft and 

missile boats, and cruise missiles. Third, the air battlefield is becoming even more 

violent. This is due to the precision and the added power of modern munitions. Fourth, 

the electromagnetic battlefield densely covers the ground, sea, air, and space fronts. 

Finally, the first battle is now more decisive due to NCW. The science and technology of 

NCW now determines techniques, tactics, and strategies.521 

The forms, measures, and methods of NCW operations are fundamentally 

different from traditional operations. The battlefield is more expansive and includes the 

function of managing the battlefield due to the increased demands caused by weapons 

management, managing computer network systems and military and civilian information 

systems, and managing frequency spectrum resources.522 Management must be 

systematic. NCW also requires strict regulations and a legal basis for battlefield 

management.523 The central goal of battlefield management in NCW is to improve 

NCW’s operational capabilities and to lower personnel casualties and the loss of 

equipment. Such improvement ensures that operational forces carry out their combat 

missions safely, orderly, quickly, and with cover. 

A basic task of battlefield management is to create a systems’ effect that is 

organized and coordinated.524 One such system is the system of frequencies. Effective 

methods and measures must be taken to assign, monitor, and manage the frequency 

spectrum resources on any battlefield. A separate organization must be created to 

organize frequency resources since they are a special type of weapon. People forming this 

organization should come from the communications department of all units. They should 

plan, allocate, monitor, and manage the use of the frequency spectrum in a theater of 

operations or on the informationized battlefield. This requires knowing both enemy and 

friendly capabilities and making judgments on strong and weak points in these 

capabilities. Even in peacetime, repeated testing of strategic-level, campaign-level, and 

tactical-level operational networks in special operations labs must be conducted.525 This 

will enable the development of a systematic principle with a function of increased 

efficiency in which 1 + 1 is greater than 2.526

The Chinese view NCW as placing increased emphasis on psychological 

battlefield management. This is because of two factors. First, highly precise and 

intelligent weapons make war more brutal, intense, and complex than ever, placing an 

additional psychological load on combatants. There is also an increased soft destruction 

of the psyche caused by the use of special media that utilizes speeches, texts, images, 

sounds, and emails to carry out this type of mental combat. This requires militaries to 

psychologically mold their officers and enlisted personnel, to teach the development of 

 

521 Ibid., pp. 291-292. 522 Ibid., pp. 293-294. 523 Ibid., pp. 296-297. 524 Ibid., pp. 298-299. 525 Ibid., pp. 300-301. 526 Ibid., pp. 302-303. 
144

control over one’s emotions and judgments, to pay attention to the methods and measures 

by which the enemy launches psychological warfare, and to control public opinion and 

negative psychological influences.527 

Meeting Challenges and Achieving Leapfrog-style Development 

This chapter discusses in more detail how the Chinese might apply NCW. First, 

the PLA considers NCW to be a new form of warfare. NCW has changed how strategies, 

campaigns, and tactics are applied and requires adjustments in the functions, authorities, 

missions, and focus of commanders at all levels.528 Second NCW links together 

situational awareness, command and control, software attacks, and other capabilities.529 It 

is likely that Chinese theorists are discussing how NCW is changing traditional military 

thinking. Such talk must also be objective and realistic in the establishment of superiority 

and trump cards. 

NCW involves ingraining “jointness” in the minds of participants. Dividing lines 

among systems must be shattered and strength created through joint technology, tactics, 

regulations, and organization. This ensures that the entire combat effectiveness of the 

system will be brought into play.530 

A challenge for PLA network administrators is to properly set up information 

fusion technology for subscribers as the web becomes more complex. Just as Metcalf’s 

law states that there is a direct ratio between a network’s power and the square of the 

number of nodes on the net, so too an increase in the number of nodes increases the 

degree of complexity of the network. This raises stricter demands on the operation and 

management of the system. There appears to be a direct relation between the cube of the 

number of nodes on a system and the system’s complexity according to the authors. 

Informationized warfare has also influenced operational objectives, a weapon 

technology’s composition, and an armed forces organizational structure. The foundation 

for informationized war is composed of two issues, integrated comprehensive 

information system and informationized weapons. Backward systems of organization 

usually reject advanced military theories. In the information age new systems of 

organization must be developed to capture these advanced information theories. There 

remains the need for an authoritative department to carry out centralized and unified 

management and coordination and for a mechanism to develop strategy and support.531

The RMA has set off a worldwide adjustment to military strategy in many 

countries, and this has pushed the transformation of organizational systems to center 

stage. Future work entails developing an operational theory for informationized warfare 

that can counter the US military’s NCW concept. Future work also includes the 

development of the functions and missions of China’s military. Technology determines 

 

527 Ibid., pp. 302-306. 528 Ibid., p. 326. 529 Ibid., p. 315. 530 Ibid., pp. 316-319. 531 Ibid., pp. 322-325. 
145

tactics and tactics determines organization. It is hoped that the armed forces integration 

concept will result in a multifunctional force with information weapons and with 

operational units grouped together based on their different missions.532 The national 

defense science and technology management system must also be transformed, with topdown design programmed to yield analysis, research, and demonstrations. Top-down 

design should continue in conjunction with the Central Military Commission’s strategies 

and policies for the new period that include preparations for military struggles such as 

high-technology based limited wars. The Chinese believe authoritative management is 

needed, and thus it is recommended to establish a leading organization for military-wide 

informationization building.533 

The PLA is moving ahead with the production of informationized equipment. 

They continue to improve system countermeasure capabilities, to promote the transition 

from electronic warfare toward NCW, and to achieve leapfrog-style development in the 

information operations building of the armed forces. The PLA notes in this chapter, for 

example, that China has already joined the ranks of leading world producers of highperformance computer industry technology and parallel processing technology. China has 

made great advances in its own research and development of Linux source code-based 

operating system software and all kinds of trade application system software. It has 

domestically produced databases, information security software, and application software 

for electronic government, electronic commerce, and industry informationization. A 

situation that was completely dominated by foreign countries and that threatened China’s 

information security software industry is being ameliorated bit by bit. Thus China sounds 

confident in its information-age developments and ability to catch up with the West.534

This focus on civilian industry is not by accident. Military authors note that, 

without a doubt, information technology personnel are a resource that will have to be 

relied upon when high-technology warfare unfolds. The personnel system of the armed 

forces will have to enlist computer hackers or treat them as wartime reserves and give 

them preferred treatment to provide technical support for military building and 

operations.535 Information system building must focus on integrated information support 

capabilities, information countermeasure capabilities (focused on informationized 

firepower attack capabilities), and comprehensive full-spectrum protection capabilities 

(focused on information system protection). A comprehensive battlefield information 

system should become the basis for achieving the transformation for operations centered 

on platforms to operations centered on informationized warfare. Confrontation between 

systems will occur in future wars. This means that China must have a systems’ strategy 

that is long-term, radial, and collapsible backed up by a unified standard using common 

software. Communication networks, computers, database management systems, 

interfaces with weapon systems, data, and secure services must be integrated. Further the 

global information grid must support the “three nets in one”—the sensor net, the weapons 

 

532 Ibid., pp. 328-329. 533 Ibid., pp. 329-332. 534 Ibid. 535 Ibid., pp. 333-334. 
146

platform net, and the information net—in informationized warfare theory.536 There is also 

a need to research and explore the development of future strategies in IW and joint 

operations capabilities.537 The PLA is researching trump card developmental strategies as 

well as trump card capabilities for strategic and campaign IW measures. The PLA hopes 

to create, among other things, IW deterrence and real-war capabilities.538 

Conclusions of this author with regard to An Interpretation of Network Centric 

Warfare are contained in Chapter Ten, Conclusions. 

 

536 Ibid., pp. 335-337. 537 Ibid., p. 338. 538 Ibid., p. 339. 
147

 An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare 

Wong Zien Deh, Chief Editor 

2004 

Table of Contents 

Chief Editor: Wong Zien Deh 

Publisher: National Defense Industry Press, Beijing, China 

Date of Publication: May 2004. 

1. A Summary of Network Centric Warfare 

1.1 The Origin of Network Centric Warfare 

1.1.1 How Network Centric Warfare Came into Being 

1.1.2 The Model of Network Centric Warfare 

1.1.3 A Distant View That Is Becoming Clearer 

1.2 The Concepts and Composition of Network Centric Warfare 

1.2.1 Operational Concepts Related to Network Centric Warfare 

1.2.2 Fundamental Principles of Network Centric Warfare 

1.2.3 The Basic Structure of Network Centric Warfare 

1.2.4 The Functional Domains of Network Centric Warfare: The Physical Domain, the 

Information Domain, and the Cognitive Domain 

1.2.5 The Strategic Commanding Elevation in Network Centric Warfare 

1.3 The Key Areas of Network Centric Warfare and Their Technology Goals 

1.3.1 The Key Areas of Network Centric Warfare 

1.3.2 Technology Goals of the Key Areas 

1.4 Prerequisites for Network Centric Warfare 

1.4.1 Creating an Environment for Innovation 

1.4.2 Accelerating Transformation in Military Affairs 

1.5 Network Centric Warfare Appraisal Analysis 

1.5.1 The Fundamental Substance of Network Centric Warfare Appraisal Analysis 

1.5.2 A Model for the Degree of Maturity of Network Centric Warfare 

1.5.3 Operational Tests of Network Centric Warfare 

1.5.4 Conclusions of the US Military's Study of Network Centric Warfare 

1.6 The Difficult Problems That Network Centric Warfare Is Facing 

1.6.1 Theoretical Problems That Network Centric Warfare Is Facing 

1.6.2 Technical Problems That Network Centric Warfare Is Facing

2. Network Centric Warfare: Its Meaning and a Model 

2.1 The Substance of Network Centric Warfare 

2.1.1 The Aims of Network Centric Warfare 

2.1.2 The Essence of Network Centric Warfare 

2.2 Fundamental Model of Network Centric Warfare 

2.2.1 The Fundamental Model of Network Centric Warfare of the US Army 

2.2.2 The Fundamental Model of Network Centric Warfare of the US Navy 

2.2.3 The Fundamental Model of Network Centric Warfare of the US Air Force 

2.3 Fundamental Characteristics of Network Centric Warfare 

2.3.1 Real-Time Sharing of Battlefield Information, Accelerating the Operations Tempo 
148

2.3.2 The Flattening of the Chain of Command; Command Efficacy Is Notably 

Enhanced 

2.3.3 All-Service Joint Operations; the Degree of War Integration Is Improved 

2.3.4 Operational Actions Are Highly Coordinated; Warfare Is Conducted in All 

Directions 

2.3.5 Battlefield Transparency Is Increased; Victory or Defeat in War Depends on 

Information Supremacy 

2.4 The US Military's Strategy for Realizing Network Centric Warfare 

2.4.1 Study Real War Problems; Come Up with a Development Strategy for Network 

Centric Warfare 

2.4.2 Attach Importance to Top-Down Design; Accelerate the Building of the 

Information Infrastructure 

2.4.3 Reform the Military System; Adapt to New Forms of Operations 

2.4.4 Advancing System Tests and Developing Network Centric Warfare Theory 

2.4.5 Building a New Force and Enhancing the Build Up of the Informationized 

Battlefield 

2.5 The Concepts and Role of Network Centric Warfare 

2.5.1 Network Centric Warfare Is a Necessity for the Development of Warfare in the 

Information Age 

2.5.2 The Philosophy Manifested by Network Centric Warfare 

2.5.3 The Role of Network Centric Warfare in Future Wars 

2.5.4 The State of Development of US Network Centric Warfare Capabilities 

2.5.5 The US Military Is Determined to Fight Network Centric Warfare 

3. The C4ISR System of Network Centric Warfare 

3.1 The Evolution of the C4ISR System of Network Centric Warfare 

3.1.1 From C2 to the C4ISR System 

3.1.2 The Main Characteristics and Functions of the C4ISR System 

3.1.3 The Status and Role of the C4ISR System in Future Warfare 

3.1.4 The Impact of the C4ISR System on Future Operations 

3.1.5 The State of Development of the C4ISR System 

3.2 C4ISR System Architecture 

3.2.1 A Model of C4ISR System Architecture 

3.2.2 The Architectural Framework for a C4ISR System 

3.3 Basic Composition of the C4ISR System 

3.3.1 The Command and Control Subsystem 

3.3.2 The Intelligence Subsystem 

3.3.3 The Communications Subsystem 

3.3.4 The Reconnaissance and Monitoring Subsystem 

4. The Global Information Grid 

4.1 The Connotation of the Global Information Grid 

4.1.1 The Definition of the Global Information Grid 

4.1.2 The Global Information Grid Is the Application of Information Grid Technology in 

the Military Arena 

4.1.3 A Reference Model for a GIG Network Environment 
149

4.2 The Architecture of the Global Information Grid 

4.2.1 Implications of GIG Architecture 

4.2.2 The Overall Framework of the GIG 

4.2.3 Operations System Architecture of the Global Information Grid 

4.3 The Role and Status of the Global Information Grid 

4.3.1 The Global Information Grid Is an Important Channel for Pursuing Information 

Superiority and Decision Making Superiority 

4.3.2 The Global Information Grid Is the Cornerstone of Network Centric Warfare 

4.4 The State of the Buildup of the US Military's Global Information Grid System 

4.4.1 The Basic State of the Grid Being Built by the Navy and the Marine Corps 

4.4.2 The Basic State of the Grid Being Built by the Air Force 

4.4.3 The Basic State of the Grid Being Built by the Army 

4.5 Development Trends of the US Military's Global Information Grid 

4.5.1 Complete Fusion with the C4ISR System 

4.5.2 Developing New Functions 

4.5.3 Achieving Information Security Assurance 

5. Information Superiority in Network Centric Warfare 

5.1 Capturing Information in Network Centric Warfare 

5.1.1 Ground-Based Reconnaissance in Network Centric Warfare 

5.1.2 Air-Based Reconnaissance in Network Centric Warfare 

5.1.3 Sea-Based Reconnaissance in Network Centric Warfare 

5.1.4 Space-Based Reconnaissance in Network Centric Warfare 

5.1.5 Network Reconnaissance in Network Centric Warfare 

5.2 Information Fusion in Network Centric Warfare 

5.2.1 Cognitive Information Processing 

5.2.2 Data Fusion Technology 

5.2.3 The Joint Service Imagery Processing System (JSIPS) 

5.2.4 The All Source Analysis System (ASAS) 

5.3 Information Distribution in Network Centric Warfare 

5.3.1 Individual Soldier Information Systems 

5.3.2 The Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) 

6. Support Technologies for Network Centric Warfare 

6.1 Network Technology under Network Centric Warfare Conditions 

6.1.1 Technology for Linking Networks 

6.1.2 Network Transmission Technology 

6.2 Gateway Technology under Network Centric Warfare Conditions 

6.2.1 Gateway Functions 

6.2.2 Difficulties with Gateways 

6.2.3 Hierarchical Structure of Gateways 

6.3 Sensor Network Technology in Network Centric Warfare 

6.3.1 Sensor Network Architecture 

6.3.2 The Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Unmanned Vehicles 

6.3.3 Sensor Networking 

6.4 Early Warning Technology in Network Centric Warfare 
150

6.4.1 Space Early Warning Technology 

6.4.2 Airborne Early Warning Technology 

6.4.3 Computer Network Early Warning Technology 

6.5 Information Transmission Technology in Network Centric Warfare 

6.5.1 Broadband Communications Technology 

6.5.2 High Fidelity Information Security Transmission Technologies 

6.5.3 Compatible and Interoperable Technology 

6.6 Tactical Data Link Technology in Network Centric Warfare 

6.6.1 A Summary of Tactical Data Links 

6.6.2 The Present State of Development of Tactical Data Links 

6.6.3 Development Trends in Tactical Data Links 

6.7 Identification Friend or Foe Technology in Network Centric Warfare 

6.7.1 Network Defense Technology 

6.7.2 Cipher Technology 

6.7.3 Integrated Identification Friend or Foe System Technology 

6.8 Network Confrontation Technology in Network Centric Warfare 

6.8.1 Spears in Network Confrontation: Network Attacks 

6.8.2 Shields in Network Confrontation: Network Defense 

7. Military Mapping in Network Centric Warfare 

7.1 The Digital Battlefield and Military Mapping 

7.1.1 The Digital Battlefield 

7.1.2 The Digital Spatial framework 

7.1.3 Remote Sensing Technologies and the Space-Based Comprehensive Information 

Network 

7.1.4 Military Geographical Information Systems 

7.1.5 Military Mapping Support 

7.2 The Role of the US Military's National Imagery and Mapping Agency in Network 

Centric Warfare 

7.2.1 Goal and Mission of the US Military's National Imagery and Mapping Agency 

7.2.2 The US Military's National Imagery and Mapping Agency's Concept of Network 

Centric Warfare 

7.2.3 The US Military's National Imagery and Mapping Agency's Ideas on Network 

Centric Warfare Operations 

7.2.4 Contributions of the US Military's US Imagery and Geospatial Information 

System to the Global Information Grid 

7.3 Network Centric Warfare and the Global Satellite Positioning System 

7.3.1 The Concept of the Global Positioning System and Its Support Base 

7.3.2 The Most Recent Developments in the Global Positioning System Technology of 

the US Military 

7.4 Network Centric Warfare and Space-Based Network Information Fusion 

Technology 

7.4.1 Space-Based Network Information Fusion Technology 

7.4.2 Space-Based Information Networks' Support of Network Centric Warfare 

7.4.3 The Substance of Information Fusion Processing in Network Centric Warfare 

7.4.4 The Function of Space-Based Information Fusion Technologies in NCW 
151

 

8. Integrated Weapons in Network Centric Warfare 

8.1 Inner Space Weapons 

8.1.1 Informationized Weapons Munitions 

8.1.2 Army Weapons 

8.1.3 Navy Weapons 

8.1.4 Air Force Weapons 

8.2 Outer Space Weapons 

8.2.1 Space Reconnaissance and Monitoring 

8.2.2 Twenty-first Century Space Weapons 

8.3 Information Space Weapons 

8.3.1 Computer Virus Weapons 

8.3.2 Network Attack Weapons 

8.3.3 Electronic Countermeasure Weapons 

8.4 Psychological Space Weapons 

8.4.1 Psychological Offense Weapons and Methods 

8.4.2 Psychological Defense Weapons and Methods 

9. Information Security in Network Centric Warfare 

9.1 The Main Security Threats Confronting Network Centric Warfare 

9.1.1 The Threat of Potential Danger to Systems 

9.1.2 Threats to the Physical Environment 

9.1.3 The Threat of Information Attacks 

9.1.4 Threats from Inside Personnel 

9.1.5 Threats from Poor Management 

9.2 Key Information Security Technologies in Network Centric Warfare 

9.2.1 Information Security Technologies in Identification-Friend-or-Foe Systems 

9.2.2 Security Control Technologies in Weapons Control Systems 

9.2.3 Security Safeguard Technology in Information Transmission Systems 

9.2.4 Security Technology for Networking Various Network Platforms 

9.2.5 Network Defense Technology in the Network Centric Warfare System 

9.2.6 Electromagnetic Information Protection and Network Survivability Technology 

9.3 Information Security Support Systems for Network Centric Warfare 

9.3.1 Building a Secure Network Platform 

9.3.2 Building Information Security Infrastructure 

9.3.3 Building a Support System for Organization Management 

9.3.4 Formulating a Strategy for the Development of Information Security 

10. Operational Support in Network Centric Warfare 

10.1 Command Support in Network Centric Warfare 

10.1.1 Command Support Requirements in Network Centric Warfare 

10.1.3 The Thinking Behind Building Command Support for Network Centric Warfare 

10.2 Battlefield Building Support in Network Centric Warfare 

10.2.1 Requirements for Battlefield Building Support in Network Centric Warfare 

10.2.2 The Keys for Building Up the Battlefield in Network Centric Warfare 

10.2.3 The Thinking Behind Battlefield Building in Network Centric Warfare 
152

10.3 Organizational Structure Support for Network Centric Warfare 

10.3.1 The Requirements for Organizational Structure Support for Network Centric 

Warfare 

10.3.2 The Key Points of Organizational Structure Support in Network Centric Warfare 

10.3.3 The Thinking Behind Building the Organizational Structure for Network Centric 

Warfare 

10.4 Logistics Supply Support for Network Centric Warfare 

10.4.1 The Requirements of Logistics Supply Support for Network Centric Warfare 

10.4.2 The Key Points of Logistics Supply Support in Network Centric Warfare 

10.4.3 The Thinking Behind Building Logistics Supply for Network Centric Warfare 

10.5 Military Personnel Support for Network Centric Warfare 

10.5.1 The Requirements for Military Personnel Support for Network Centric Warfare 

10.5.2 The Quality Makeup of Military Personnel for Network Centric Warfare 

11. Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

11.1 The State of Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

11.1.1 Fundamental Characteristics of Force Organization and Operational Actions 

11.1.2 The Circumstances Facing Battlefield Management for Network Centric Warfare 

11.2 The Characteristics of Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

11.2.1 Expansion of the Range of Battlefield Management 

11.2.2 Making the Substance of Battlefield Management Specific 

11.2.3 Making Management Measures Intelligent and Management Objectives 

Systematic 

11.3 Implementing Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

11.3.1 Basic Requirements for Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

11.3.3 Implementation of Battlefield Management in Network Centric Warfare 

11.4 The US Military's Operational Management of Network Centric Warfare 

11.4.1 Battlefield Networking, Quick and Easy Management, Weapons with Increased 

Effectiveness 

11.4.2 On the Digital Battlefield, Control Is Strong, and Operations Are More Powerful 

11.4.3 "Network Logistics," Precision and High Efficiency, Powerful Support 

12. Meeting Challenges and Achieving Leapfrog-Style Development 

12.1 Challenges to China's Armed Forces Posed by the New Forms of Warfare 

12.1.1 Conceptual Challenges 

12.1.2 Technological Challenges 

12.1.3 The Challenge of Organization 

12.2 New Thinking for Achieving Leapfrog-Style Development 

12.2.1 Innovating Military Theory 

12.2.2 Building a New Combat Command System 

12.2.3 Transforming the National Defense Science and Technology Management System 

12.2.4 Enhancing the Training of Military Informationization Personnel 

12.2.5 Technical Equipment for Developing Informationization 

 
153

CHAPTER EIGHT: STUDY GUIDE FOR IO THEORY 

Chapter Eight is a selection of translated questions and answers to key concepts and 

terms from a Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, 2005.539

Introduction 

One of the primary purposes for writing Decoding the Virtual Dragon is to help 

Westerners better understand Chinese terms and concepts that are information-age 

related. If one wants to “decode” the Chinese virtual dragon, then one must see how the 

Chinese define terms. One of the primary Chinese sources that helps enable this goal is 

the November 2005 Study Guide for Information Operations Theory. Xu Genchu edited 

the book and the Chief Examiner/Director was Dai Qingmin, a PLA general with whom 

the reader is now quite familiar. Xu and Dai’s work offers an interesting glimpse into 

Chinese home-grown concepts and definitions. There are also discussions and 

descriptions of US and a few other national concepts. The entire volume is published in a 

question and answer format. In all, there are 400 questions in the text. The Academy of 

Military Science’s Press printed 10,000 copies of the work. 

The text is divided into the several sections listed below (numbers in parenthesis 

do not represent page numbers for that section but rather the number of the question and 

its answer listed in the book. For example, “information” contains questions and answers 

for question 1 through question 20.). 

Forward 

Part One: Information and Informationization 

 Information (1-20) 

 Informationization (21-38) 

 The New Revolution in Military Affairs (39-51) 

Part Two: Informationized Operations 

 Information Warfare, Informationized Operations, and Informationized 

War (52-88) 

 Producing and Developing Informationized Operations (89-93) 

 The Characteristics, Rules, and Principles of Informationized War (94-

106) 

Part Three: Information Technology (107-137) 

Part Four: Informationized Forces 

 

539 This author reviewed the Table of Contents and selected terms from Editor Xu Genchu and Director Dai 

Qingmin’s Study Guide for Information Operations Theory. Translation support was provided by a private 

company. 
154

 Informationized Armed Forces (138-154) 

 Informationization of the Armed Forces (155-170) 

Part Five: Informationized Weaponry 

 Informationization of Weaponry (171-182) 

 Informationized Weapons (183-199) 

 New Concept Weapons (200-220) 

Part Six: Informationized Battlefield Environment 

 The Informationized Batlefield (221-239) 

 Battlefield Information Systems (240-267) 

Part Seven: Informationized Operations Command (268-292) 

Part Eight: Informationized Operational Support 

 Informationized Operational Logistics and equipment Support (293-305) 

 Operational Information Security Assurance (306-322) 

Part Nine: Forms of Informationized Operations 

 Joint Operations (323-349) 

 Informationized Operations of the Military Branches (350-359) 

Part Ten: The Military Informationization Buildup and Development in Some Countries 

 The State of Development of the US Military’s Informationization (360-

377) 

 The State of Development of the Russian Military’s Informationization 

(378-384) 

 The State of Development of the Japanese Military’s Informationization 

(385-391) 

 The State of Development of the Indian Military’s Informationization 

(392-400) 

Short summaries and descriptions of key concepts are provided below. There are 

full translations for a few select definitions as well. The book’s Table of Contents is listed 

at the end of the chapter. It provides the reader with the entire list of all four hundred 

questions. This provides the reader with the full picture of the scope of the book. 

In some places the Chinese concept as described matches well with a similar US 

concept, such as information operations or information warfare. In other cases 

(informatized war, informationization of the armed forces, etc.) it does not. Types of 

operations new to the US that are discussed include integrated network-electronic warfare 
155

and navigational warfare. In addition, the PLA’s focus on a few issues (countermeasures, 

control, comprehensive) will be stated in bold to highlight their use. These terms are not 

used in IW discussions in the West nearly as much as they are in China. They are terms 

to be studied for their meaning as potential application measures against non-Chinese 

forces. Identifying these concepts is an important part of the decoding exercise. As an 

example, comprehensive was used over 50 times, countermeasure nearly 70 times, and 

nearly the same number for control (and that number did not include “control” when used 

in the sense of command and control) excluding the in the definitions below. 

Forward 

In the Forward to the book Dai Qingmin states that he is the director of the text 

and a member of the Advisory Committee for the Informatization of the Military (as of 

August 2005). He notes that the informatization of military affairs is accelerating both the 

fundamental transformations in the patterns of war and the comprehensive

transformation of the military. The strategic objective of the PLA, according to Dai and 

the Central Military Commission, is to “build up the information-based armed forces and 

win information-based wars.”540 This objective includes comprehensively enhancing 

operations more suited to information warfare requirements. Dai feels that knowledge 

and information are overtaking materials and energy in importance and this will breed 

new operational patterns of warfare. 

Dai notes that information systems are the focus of attention and now include the 

global information grid (GIG) and C4KISR systems. The K factor in the latter is 

described as the “kill” factor (Dai later defines the factor as being of US origin). These 

systems “exhibit a high degree of fusion between real-time information transmission, 

intelligent information processing and scientifically assisted decision making, allowing 

integrated information support capabilities to become the foundation and support for a 

new model of operational competencies.”541 

Multifaceted and comprehensive defense capabilities have become the core of 

operational capabilities and a decisive means of strategic attack in Dai’s opinion. 

Information countermeasure capabilities have become the most significant independent 

element of these operational capabilities. Dai calls for five types of informatized542

operational capabilities (the “Five Competencies”), namely integrated information 

support; fully dimensional early warning reconnaissance; informatized firepower attacks; 

multifaceted comprehensive defending; and multi-level information 

countermeasures.

543 

Dai believes it is necessary to incorporate informatization at every level but also 

notes that China’s informatization foundation is comparatively weak. Three issues are 

 

540 Xu Genchu and Dai Qingmin, Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, Academy of Military 

Science Press, November 2005, pp. 1-3. All of the information that follows in this chapter are short 

summaries of selected sections taken from this work. The footnote after each section heading indicates the 

pages from which the information was taken. 

541 Ibid. 542 For a description of informatized operations, see question 54 below. 543 Xu and Dai, pp. 1-3. 
156

holding China back: ideology is insufficiently unified, knowledge is not profound 

enough, and research is not penetrating enough. The PLA has commissioned the 

Information Operations Theoretical Research Office of the Operations Theory and 

Doctrine Research Department at the Department of Military Sciences to research the 

basic issues of informatized operations and help overcome these shortcomings. This 

volume, Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, is a result of this research 

effort. It is Dai’s hope that the guide “will have a definite value as a guide and reference 

for unifying ideology and awareness, spreading foundational knowledge and deepening 

theoretical research to become a friend and scholar to officers, soldiers and theoretical 

workers.”544

Informationization 

24. What Is Informatized Military Thought?545

Dai states that military thought reflects the general characteristics and patterns of 

military matters. Informatized military thinking is the combination of informatized 

thinking and military thinking expressed as informatized military activities. The key to 

informatized military thought is in achieving information superiority, and the goal is to 

protect the information frontier and information sovereignty, to solidify information 

defense at the national level, and to win future wars. The core of informatized military 

thought is information guidance, which is grasping the essential characteristics of 

information and understanding the form in which the value of information is expressed. 

One must gain control over the impact that information and information activities have 

upon war. 

33. How Do We Establish a Theory of Informatization with Chinese Military 

Characteristics?546

Dai states that there are three requirements for building an informatized force. 

The first requirement is for applied research to set out strategic guidance. He lists a 

number of research topics (which again highlight the Chinese focus on strategy) for 

study, to include the strategic environments of military informatization around the world; 

the overall strategy for the building of informatization forces; the development and 

utilization of the military’s information resources; strategies for the buildup of the 

military’s information networks; strategies for incorporating information technology into 

weapons and equipment; the structural organization of informatized armed forces; 

strategies for military informatization security; and strategies for training personnel. 

Another requirement for the informatized buildup of the military is developing the 

guiding theory for information operations. This primarily involves establishing a basic 

framework for a theoretical system of information operations, to include research into the 

militaries of advanced nations around the world, especially the US military. A final 

requirement is fused theoretical research. This primarily includes the fusion of 

informatized operations theory with the theory of People’s War; the fusion of 

 

544 Ibid. 545 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 546 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 
157

informatized operations theory with active defense strategy; the fusion of informatized 

operations theory with deterrence strategy theory; the fusion of military informatization 

buildup with the theory of strong science and technology in the military; and the fusion of 

military informatization buildup theory with spatial military power buildup theory. 

The New Revolution in Military Affairs 

39. What Is the Relationship between the Informatization of the Armed Forces and the 

New Revolution in Military Affairs?547

Dai writes that the new revolution in military affairs is the process of changing the 

mechanized military into an informatized military. Instituting the informatization buildup 

of the armed forces is what the new revolution in military affairs fundamentally entails. 

Building up informatized armed forces and winning information wars are the basic goals 

of the new revolution in military affairs and are the goals of the buildup of the 

informatized armed forces. 

41. What Is the Essence of the New Revolution in Military Affairs?548

Dai notes that the essence of the new revolution in military affairs lies in the 

transformation of the pattern of mechanized military affairs from the industrial era into 

the pattern of informatized military affairs in the information era. The pattern of military 

affairs is a general term referring to all manifestations of military affairs during a specific 

period of historical development. It includes military theory, warfare practices, military 

organization, weapons and equipment, military personnel, logistical safeguards, systems 

of military service, and war mobilization. 

44. What Are the Main Characteristics of the New Revolution in Military Affairs?549

The first characteristic is making contact with every aspect of the patterns of 

military affairs, and every realm they touch upon, so that they are fundamentally 

transformed. This includes objective factors such as the budget for national defense, 

military technology, weapons and equipment, the leadership and command structure for 

the armed forces, the organization of the forces, military training, the caliber of military 

personnel, logistical safeguards, reserve forces, the system of military service and the 

structure of war mobilization. The subjective factors include military theory, military 

thought, military ideas, and ways of thinking about the military, etc. A second 

characteristic is that this reform is occurring in many countries, particularly the major 

nations of the world. (Author’s note: Dai’s explanation of objective and subjective factors 

in this section fits well with Peng and Yao’s description of these topics in Chapter One of 

Decoding the Virtual Dragon.) 

45. What Are the Possible Developmental Trends of the New Revolution in Military 

Affairs?550

 

547 Ibid., pp. 45-46. 548 Ibid., p. 48. 549 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 550 Ibid., p. 52. 
158

Dai writes that prior to the year 2020, the new revolution in military affairs may 

occur primarily in the military technology and equipment sectors. This includes 

microelectronic technology, computer technology, communications technology, sensor 

technology, and information technology groups related to software engineering 

technology. Newly-developed weapons and equipment containing a high degree of 

information technology are intelligent weapons systems. The various reconnaissance and 

warning systems, C4ISR systems, precision-guided munitions, and information warfare 

weapons are produced one after another, pushing simple mechanized military technology 

and equipment from its historical stage. 

From the beginning of 2020 to early 2040, the development and creation of 

military thought and theory may become the mainstream of the new revolution in military 

affairs. In one respect, military theory will be guided by the revolution in technology and 

equipment. In another respect, military theory will learn from information and technology 

outside military affairs. It will utilize this information to guide the entire reform. Military 

concepts will experience a revolutionary change and military theory will become 

innovative. From early 2040 to the middle of this century, the revolution in the structural 

organization of the military may become the mainstream for the new revolution in 

military affairs. 

47. What Are the Main Effects of the New Revolution in Military Affairs on War?551

The impact of the new revolution in military affairs on war is primarily as 

follows: 

 First, the causes for wars are becoming more complex. While economic 

interests may remain as the basic impetus for war, the increase in interaction 

between nations and between various political forces may lead to more 

conflict between nations, peoples, and social groups in terms of political, 

diplomatic, and psychological factors. This has led to an upswing in religious 

and ethnic conflict. These types of conflicts act as a type of predisposition for 

future wars. 

 Second, war objectives are even more limited now. In the information era, 

where war is becoming more “transparent” to the majority of people, leaders 

will need to place severe restrictions on the progress and goals of war. 

 Third, there are now many new types of warfare. War in the information era 

involves not only countering the armed forces of other nations and weakening 

the enemy’s industrial base, but also involves destroying its information 

systems. Multiple types of new operations will appear, such as information 

warfare, precision warfare, controlled warfare, paralysis warfare, invisible 

warfare, and computer virus warfare. 

 Fourth, death and destruction in war have been reduced, comparatively 

speaking. The object will be to avoid indiscriminate bombing that causes an 

enormous loss of life and to avoid desperate and decisive battles between 

large groups of soldiers. 

 

551 Ibid., pp. 55-57. 
159

 Fifth, the duration of war will be shortened. The rhythm of war will be 

quickened, and operational actions will occur in real-time to a degree. This 

means that real-time detection and the discovery of targets will result in realtime command, real-time mobilization, real-time strikes, real-time evaluations 

of destruction, and real-time support. Tasks which in previous wars took 

several hours or even longer to complete now take only a few minutes or even 

just a few seconds. Wars will be much shorter owing to restricted war 

objectives and the smaller scale of warfare. 

 Sixth, there will be a greater degree of transparency on the battlefield. In 

future wars, the side with information superiority will have its information 

network systems working nonstop to transfer real-time intelligence to its 

computers. Combat personnel who are dispersed over the battlefield will 

receive these images at the same time, enabling them to better understand the 

conflict. 

 Seventh, the fight to achieve information supremacy will be especially fierce. 

A superior brigade becomes “deaf, dumb, and blind” the minute it loses 

control over information. A weaker force that gains superiority in the area of 

information can also control the initiative on the battlefield. 

 Eighth, the degree to which warfare is integrated will be unprecedented. 

Distinctions between levels of strategy, campaigns, and tactics will become 

blurred. The various types of operational systems such as combat forces, 

combat support forces, and combat logistical support forces will connect with 

the various operational functions such as battlefield intelligence, command, 

control, communications, and strikes to form an organic whole. 

 Ninth, command over operations will be very difficult and demanding. There 

are four areas for consideration. Command is performed in real-time, or near 

real-time—if not, opportunities are lost and a person becomes passive. 

Command is always performed in the midst of action. Command requires a 

frequent need for vertical-lateral communications. And coordination is 

complex, especially laterally-coordinated missions. 

 Tenth, there are new aspects as to how force is concentrated. For example, 

quantity is being replaced by the concentration upon capability and quality. 

The large scale use of precision-guided weapons and stealth weapons means 

that battles or strategic objectives can be realized with just one or two artillery 

strikes. Integrated, joint operations will become the basic form of operations. 

48. What Are the Main Effects of the New Revolution in Military Affairs on Operation 

Theories?552

Dai notes that as reforms push forward, modern operations theory is entering a 

period of profound change. First, there are new theories of force. While traditional 

operations forces revolve around troops and tangible objects (destructive force and 

mobility of tanks, ships, planes, artillery, and munitions), information exerts an enormous 

impact on combat, serving as a critical amplifier of combat power and strength. 

 

552 Ibid., pp. 57-58. 
160

Computational capabilities, communication capacities and reliability, real-time 

reconnaissance capabilities, and computer simulation capabilities are becoming key 

elements in weighing military power. Military force is premised today on an intangible 

and enormous potential which is difficult to quantify. It comes from the structural power 

of information weapons systems. 

Second, the vertical, stratified relationship between strategy, combat, and tactics 

is changing. Information weapons systems have formed new space-time relationships 

where space has expanded and time has shrunk. This, in turn, has caused a fundamental 

change in the vertical and stratified relationship between strategy, combat, and tactics. 

Information weapons systems can exceed time and space in terms of communication and 

command. They also possess near real-time long-range precision strikes, which means 

that tactical strikes can achieve their strategic objectives immediately. 

Third, we are moving beyond traditional concepts of attacking and defending. 

Future wars will witness greatly enhanced capabilities in the areas of vertical depth 

reconnaissance, long-range communication, precision strikes, and long-range attacks. 

Operational actions will be conducted simultaneously at every layer, in every direction, 

and in every aspect of the entire operations space. The stable front and the fixed 

battlefield no longer exist. The line between attacks and defensive actions is also no 

longer so clear owing to the high degree of flow and uncertainty on the battlefield. As 

such, the view of operations theory guiding defense and the comparatively stable battle 

lines for attacks is being replaced by an entirely new theory of thinking. (Author’s note: 

One Chinese military author, Dong Zifeng, who Dai did not cite, writes that control is 

the operational concept whose importance is now equal to that of attack and defend.) 

Fourth, the basic operational principles of the past are being broken down. On the 

information-based battlefield of the future, for example, the goal of annihilating the 

enemy’s effective strength will be replaced by attacks upon the center of gravity and 

information nodes of the enemy’s operational system. There will be more focus on the 

principle of concentrated force. 

49. What Are the Main Effects of the New Revolution in Military Affairs on Forms of 

Operations?553

The new revolution in military affairs, Dai states, will further accelerate the 

changes to forms of operations. First, controlling the information is a precursor to 

contending for dominance on the battlefield. Controlling the information refers to fully 

grasping the power to acquire, control, and use battlefield information, while not 

allowing the opponent to exercise these powers. Information is the anchor for decision 

making and strategy in war. Controlling battlefield information means dominating 

battlefield information and providing the initiative in war. Control enables a weaker 

opponent to defeat a stronger one. 

Second, the basic form of attack has become a full-depth precision strike. “Fulldepth” refers to an attack on the primary targets in the entire operational space. Full-

 

553 Ibid., pp. 58-60. 
161

depth precision strikes will become the basic form of firepower attacks on future 

battlefields. 

Third, direct combat is no longer the primary form of combat. Instead of engaging 

in direct contact with the opponent, various types of long-range indirect firepower 

weapons and munitions placed at long distances are used to destroy and defeat the 

opponent in place of tanks and other types of direct-aim weapons. This is why future 

combat will not be conducted at close range. 

Fourth, countermeasures will involve entire systems. In future wars, 

countermeasures between sides will involve all services, multiple departments, and 

multiple types of weapons and equipment. These comprehensive countermeasures will 

depend upon large systems which will include advanced information, monitoring and 

reconnaissance systems, advanced command and control systems, and precision-guided 

munitions. There are two aspects to these overall systems: First, the information systems, 

nonfatal technology systems, and precision strike systems will form an integrated 

weapons and equipment system that is integrated into the entire structure of the armed 

forces to form an even better comprehensive countermeasures capability. Second, 

enemies need to be visualized as a system made up of connected elements. The system, 

or the centers of gravity of the system (nodes), needs to be targeted for attack such that 

the entire combat system is paralyzed and broken down. 

51. How Do We Understand the Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese 

Characteristics?554

For an understanding of a revolution in military affairs with Chinese 

characteristics, one needs to take a scientific approach to the five basic issues guiding the 

revolution: the target tasks, the core, the model, the path, and the developmental steps. 

(1) Target tasks. The goal of the Chinese military has changed from winning local 

wars under general conditions to winning regional wars under conditions of modern 

technology, especially high technology. China needs to build up their informatized armed 

force since that is the starting point for theory and practice for the revolution in military 

affairs with Chinese characteristics. 

(2) The core of the revolution. It is vital that the informatization of the armed 

forces be at the core of the revolution in military affairs. The Central Military 

Commission totally supports this contention, indicating that there has been a critical 

change to the benchmarks and primary technical paths for building up the Chinese 

military. The transformation of the structural organization of the armed forces must be 

beneficial to the fast and ordered flow of information, along with utilizing information 

flow to control the flow of materials and energy to develop weapons and equipment. 

(3) Building a model. The demands placed upon the armed forces model by 

informatized warfare require excellent soldiers, decisive information victories, and high 

quality science and technology to determine the military’s combat power (represented by 

 

554 Ibid., pp. 62-64. 
162

information technology). The goal of the intensification of science and technology, along 

with quality and efficiency, is to grasp the results of the transformation of the conditions 

of modern warfare and to possess the sharp features of the revolution in military affairs. 

(4) The basic path. As China attempts to institute the leapfrog development of its 

military transformation, stress must be placed on informatization without discarding 

mechanization, as the latter is an objective requirement of informatized warfare. The 

acceleration of the integration of mechanization with informatization must continue. 

(5) Developmental steps. The “Three-Step Development Strategy” and the “Two 

Major Strategies”555 stipulate the goals and steps for the revolution in military affairs 

with Chinese characteristics. China will have continuity and stability in its policies if it 

can adapt to the developmental trends and strategies of the world revolution in military 

affairs and combine them with the actual conditions of the Chinese nation and the 

Chinese military. Today not advancing means retreating, and this requires that China 

finds a consensus in the area of theory so that patterns of informatized operations can be 

found. 

Information Warfare, Informatized Operations, and Informatized War 

52. What Is Information Warfare?556

The prominent status of information as an important strategic resource and a 

guiding factor in deciding wars has allowed the concept of information warfare to 

develop. The primary operational mean in information warfare is information energy 

while operational targets are the enemy’s information, information systems, and systems 

of knowledge and belief. The fundamental goal remains to gain information superiority. 

A scientific definition of information warfare requires an objective analysis of the 

structural elements of war and these are materials, energy and information. They help 

form the objective world, and they are the basic structural elements of war. In the 

information era, however, information is the lead element. IW increases not only the 

destructiveness and mobility of materials (primarily weapons), but adds more important 

and completely new capabilities such as intelligence and structural power. Intelligence 

refers to materials with intelligent (human) capabilities, such as unmanned vehicles, 

robots, smart bombs, and intelligent C4ISR systems. Structural power refers to individual 

operational units that are decentralized on the battlefield (including personnel and 

weapons) and connected by information into an enormous organic whole that forms a 

formidable and monolithic resultant force. This implies that information now controls

materials and energy dependent on whether the free flow of information is obstructed or 

not. Information flow includes the acquisition, transmission, processing, and utilization of 

information. IW’s actions must permeate into every node in the information flow. 

 

555 Actual strategies not listed in the book. 556 Xu and Dai, pp. 68-69. For questions 52 and 53 (IW and IO), near exact translations from Study Guide 

for Information Operations Theory are used. 
163

Historically, information warfare first appeared as an item in Military Terms Used 

by the People’s Liberation Army of China published by the Academy of Military 

Sciences in September of 1997 according to Dai. It was defined as “countermeasure

activities in the information realm performed by two sides in a conflict, primarily in 

contending for information resources, in gaining the initiative in the production, 

transmission and processing of information, and in destroying the enemy’s information 

transmission as a means of creating favorable conditions for containing or winning a 

war.”557 Thus this focus on countermeasures has been in the Chinese IW definition for 

ten years now. 

Broadly defined, IW is also known as strategic information warfare, and refers to 

two sides use of countermeasures and combat using information and information 

technology to gain information superiority in politics, the economy, science, technology, 

diplomacy, culture, and the military, during peacetime or in times of war. The narrow 

sense of information warfare is that it is the information countermeasures that two sides 

utilize to gain information superiority. Dai states this is what the US military calls 

“battlefield information warfare.” It includes intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, 

network warfare, and psychological warfare. Electronic warfare serves as IW’s 

foundation. The broad and narrow IW concepts are often intertwined and act upon one 

another. This was demonstrated during the 1999 war in Kosovo when Yugoslavia and its 

supporters instigated fierce network attacks against NATO countries that also affected, in 

Dai’s opinion, military actions on the battlefield. 

The Chinese military was among the first to propose the idea of information 

warfare. The definition currently employed by the Chinese military typically uses the 

narrow sense of information warfare. The more consistent view holds that information 

warfare consists of military countermeasure actions using information operations and 

other related operational powers to achieve and maintain information superiority.558 

While defining IW later in the text (Author’s note: see question 74, Intelligence 

Warfare) Dai listed numerous methods for the classification of information warfare. In 

the area of the various types of operations, you have offensive information warfare and 

defensive information warfare. In the area of information sources, you have public 

information warfare and secret information warfare. In the area of the layers of 

operations, you have strategic information warfare, combat information warfare and 

tactical information warfare. When it comes to geographical area, you have domestic 

information warfare and international information warfare. In the area of intelligence 

itself, you have political information warfare, economic information warfare, military 

information warfare, commercial information warfare and diplomatic information 

warfare. When it comes to the methods of information acquisition, you have human 

information warfare and technical information warfare.559

 

557 Ibid. 558 Ibid. 559 Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
164

53. What Are Information Operations?560

The concept of information operations is controversial according to Dai. There is 

no consensus whether IO encompasses information warfare or whether the opposite is 

true. Many believe that information operations actually equate to the narrow sense of 

information warfare while other analysis reveals two separate layers of meaning within 

the concept of IO. One layer refers to using operational powers that focus on military 

countermeasure actions to gain and maintain information superiority. Here this refers to 

the information operations phase or the form of information operations. The second layer 

refers to the utilization of professional operational powers that focus on military 

countermeasure actions that target the information systems of the enemy. So layer one is 

focused on gaining information superiority and layer two is focused on targeting. The 

latter includes electronic warfare or network warfare. The layers are different in methods, 

means, purposes, and organizational planning. 

There are three IO definitions. The first is as follows: 

“Information operations refer to operations used to gain and maintain control

over information.” This definition expands IO’s domain since there are quite a few ways 

to gain and maintain control over information. For example, firepower attacks obviously 

fall under the category of firepower warfare, and they cannot be defined as information 

operations just because they are capable of destroying information equipment and 

systems. 

The second definition is: 

“Information operations refer to a series of operational actions employed by two 

sides in a conflict in which the enemy’s information systems are used or destroyed and 

one’s own information systems are protected as a means of gaining the power to acquire, 

control, and use information.” There are many methods for the use, destruction, and 

protection of information systems. Many firepower wars, special operations, and 

techniques and tactical means for protecting information systems are also clearly not 

covered by information operations. 

The third definition is: 

“Information operations refer to a series of operational actions undertaken to gain 

and maintain information superiority on the battlefield or control over information. The 

two sides in a conflict use electronic warfare or computer network warfare to use or 

destroy the information and information networks of the enemy and protect one’s own 

information networks as a means of acquiring, controlling and using information.” This 

defines IO in terms of content but not patterns. It is not rigorous or scientific. 

Information operations are conducted around information with the aim to gain 

control over information. This requires that information media be controlled as well as 

information’s content and efficiency. Information media refer primarily to signals 

 

560 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
165

controlled by destroying the transmission and reception of the enemy’s signals while 

protecting one’s own. Controlling the content of information means that one must use 

information’s content to attack an enemy and to prevent an enemy attack. The efficiency 

of information refers to information’s function. Information eliminates uncertainty and 

serves people. Control of people’s minds lies at the core of controlling the efficiency of 

information. The two major goals of IO are to destroy the enemy’s information and 

information systems while protecting one’s own and to destroy the enemy’s cognition 

and beliefs while protecting one’s own. This implies attack and defense attitudes and 

fully explains why information operations are not electronic warfare centric (the use of 

information media such as signals to destroy information transmissions) but also include 

computer network warfare and psychological warfare (the use of information’s content to 

destroy information systems along with human cognition and beliefs). 

The targets of information operations are information, information systems, and 

the cognition and beliefs of people. The means employed in information operations 

include information (both information media and information content) and weapons and 

equipment dedicated to attack information systems. Information operations involve both 

attacking and defending. The domain of information operations revolves around 

information countermeasures on the battlefield. In summation, information operations 

are defined as a series of countermeasures employed by two sides in a conflict in which 

information or weapons and equipment controlled by information and dedicated to the 

destruction of information systems are used in order to influence and destroy the enemy’s 

information, information systems, and cognition and beliefs, along with preventing the 

influence and destruction of one’s own information, information systems, and cognition 

and beliefs in the same manner by an enemy. 

54. What Are Informatized Operations?561

Dai notes that the concept of informatized operations was an original creation of 

the Chinese military based upon the changes it experienced in the areas of the patterns of 

war and the forms of operations. Broader than IO, it is the same or similar in many 

respects to the concepts of “integrated operations” and “network-centric warfare” 

held by militaries abroad. 

Dai states that the Chinese military’s comprehension of informatized operations is 

not yet consistent. The war in Iraq offered one view, that the signature patterns of warfare 

have shifted from mechanized war to informatized war. This means that a new model for 

countermeasures on the battlefield has already been formed. Another view is that the 

patterns of war are still in the beginning stages of the transition from mechanization to 

informatization and that future informatized war has not completely moved beyond the 

mechanized warfare model. An analysis from the perspectives of historical and dialectical 

materialism shows that the latter understanding makes more sense. One can say that 

informatized operations are the advanced stage of operational patterns in an informatized 

war. They represent the future direction of military countermeasures on the battlefield. 

 

561 Ibid., pp. 71-73. 
166

So what exactly are informatized operations, then? They can be defined as 

follows: two sides in a conflict rely to a high degree upon information, information 

systems, informatized weapons, and equipment. This involves information flow and 

systematic countermeasure actions undertaken in multiple spaces and realms such as on 

land, on the sea, in the air, in space, in the electromagnetic realm, in the realm of 

information, and in the realm of cognition. 

The most prominent feature of informatized operations is that they are integrated 

operations guided by information and seeking information superiority. Their internal 

mechanism involves the effective control of other systems via the use of intelligent 

decision making systems so that information superiority can be converted into superiority 

in the areas of space-time, decision making, and action to create and exercise better 

efficiency. Their outer manifestations are characterized by comprehensive precision 

operations which are the circular, seamless links formed by precision perception 

detection, precision transmission distribution, precision decision making control, 

precision attack evaluation, and precision support safeguards. The elements thus formed 

include informatized weapons and equipment, combined operations powers, the fulldimensional digital battlefield, networked information systems, and integrated operations 

actions according to Dai. 

56. What Is Informatized War?562

Qian Xuesen, a renowned scientist in China, notes that the war model for the 

twenty-first century is informatized war under the nuclear deterrent. 

Dai writes that the basic way energy is released is in the form of an integration of 

information with energy whose platform is information network war. Informatized war is 

a new pattern of war, a high-technology war that exploits the knowledge economy and 

information era for its energy. Informatized war corresponds to the patterns of the 

informatized military. 

Dai adds that a comprehensive understanding of informatized war requires that 

two faulty understandings about it are corrected: namely, that informatized war is 

“politics without bloodshed,” and that victory comes solely by relying upon information. 

First, war involves fierce military countermeasure activities undertaken by two sides in 

a conflict for specific political and economic purposes. It is the continuation of politics by 

the use of violent means. Informatized war is one type of war and is still within the 

categorical domain of war. The fundamental view of Marxism is still valid for 

understanding future informatized wars. The essential political nature of war, the just and 

unjust nature of war, and the hierarchy of the scales of war have not changed due to the 

advent of informatized war. Therefore the view that informatized war is “politics without 

bloodshed” is wrong. Second, from the perspective of the moving status of war, each new 

pattern of war supersedes the existing pattern of war. The meaning of “supersede” here 

does not refer to complete negation. Without the weapons and equipment of mechanized 

war, information and energy have no material support and no platform from which to 

 

562 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
167

operate. The idea that the goals of war can be achieved by relying upon information only 

is impractical. 

Shen Weiguang would disagree with Dai on the first point. He notes that due to 

information, wars can be won without bloodshed in some instances. Many communist 

party members of the old Soviet Union would agree with Shen. They feel that NATO 

defeated the Warsaw Pact through the use of information technology and psychological 

operations. 

57. What Are the Various Concepts for Informatized War?563

The concept of informatized war, Dai writes, includes the concepts of time and 

space, of energy, of systems, of control, and of the success or failure of informatized 

war. For informatized war, the choice of time and space for military action is the 

reflection of using one’s superior military art skills. Military art skills are reflected when 

the right military unit is deployed at the right time and into the right space. This often 

decides whether or not the operational effectiveness of an operational element is fully and 

successfully exploited. 

Informatized war quite naturally takes less time. Long-range precision strikes 

have expanded the battlefield space. These types of time and space changes have had a 

direct impact upon creating operational theory, choosing operational methods, and 

building operational power. Energy use in informatized war is reflected primarily in 

information capabilities that can achieve operational objectives on their own or by 

guiding the release of mechanical and chemical capabilities. 

In terms of the concept of systems for informatized war, the countermeasure

features of time and space for systems have brought forth great changes. First, the 

strategy, combat, and tactics for informatized war are integrated as are the various 

military services. Second, information networks are the foundation and support for an 

integrated operational system, unifying various operational spaces into one whole entity. 

This forms a larger system for informatized operations. Third, the integration of the 

military with civilian society is tighter and interlinked. The construction of an operational 

system is based upon civilian support to a certain degree now. 

In terms of the concept of the control of informatized war, the scale, range, and 

the degree of attacks in traditional wars often far exceed the ability of the instigator to 

control them which often works against the original intentions of the instigator. Now the 

scale of war, size of war zones, and the force of attacks can be controlled precisely. 

When it comes to strategy, the commander-in-chief relies on an information network 

spread across the globe to gain a clear understanding of the status of an entire war zone 

and to exert continuous control over an entire war. When it comes to combat, 

commanders in war zones rely upon an information network on the battlefield to exert 

real-time control over operations. When it comes to tactics, operations personnel on the 

battlefield can use precision control over weapons platforms and weapons systems to 

make precision strikes on targets and reduce collateral damage. Now commanders in 

 

563 Ibid., pp. 74-76. 
168

informatized war not only control their troops and their weapons systems and 

information networks, but exert control over enemy personnel and weapon systems 

thought the use of information deception and obstruction. 

In terms of the concept of the success or failure of informatized war, the goal is to 

control the enemy and preserve oneself. The objective of controlling the enemy and 

preserving oneself was exemplified during the war in Kosovo. Here, in 1999, the US 

military conducted large-scale air raids on Yugoslavia and forced them to surrender under 

duress without penetrating deep into Yugoslav territory. The success or failure of 

informatized war is not determined by the ratio of casualties on either side or whether one 

side has captured the other side’s territory, but rather in forcing the enemy to submit to 

one’s will. This again indicates why Dai is so focused on psychological operations. 

61. What Is Information Terrorism?564

This term refers to the use of information tools such as the Internet to engage in 

terrorist activities or to provide accommodation for the same. It includes the 

implementation of premeditated, political attacks on information systems, computer 

network systems, and computer programs and data, along with the abuse of information 

systems and the use of information systems to engage in fraud or criminal acts. 

Terrorist organizations might use information systems in the following ways: 

1. To collect sensitive data on their target 

2. To raise funds 

3. To keep in contact with members of the organization and transmit secret 

information 

4. To engage in extortion 

5. To engage in the spread of propaganda 

6. To engage in deception and impose psychological terror upon people 

7. To engage in information attacks upon the nation’s information infrastructure, 

such as its financial systems, power grid, and traffic control systems. 

62. What Are Information Actions?565

Information actions are undertaken in times of peace or in times of crisis or war to 

attack, destroy, or disrupt an enemy’s information and information systems while 

protecting one’s own information and information systems. In this sense, Dai’s definition 

of information actions is the same as the US definition of IO. The concept of information 

actions is larger than that of information warfare, in that information warfare is only a 

part of information actions, i.e. information actions undertaken during times of war. 

In 2003, a US Defense Report heightened information actions to the level of 

strategy, explicitly stating that “information actions refer to the strengthening of one’s 

own information superiority and exerting influence upon foreign perceptions of posture 

as a means of ensuring that national security strategic objectives are achieved.” 

 

564 Ibid., pp. 80-81. 565 Ibid., p. 81. 
169

There are five main pillars to information actions. They are information 

safeguards built into computers, the defense of key information infrastructure, the 

attainment of information superiority, the management of perceptions, and operational 

efficiency. 

63. What Is Information Space?566

Information is intangible and does not exist in a solid dimension. It has no 

independent operational space, though it can permeate and influence all spaces and play a 

key role in them. A major change to informatized war in terms of operational space has 

been the advent of the concept of information space, which includes electromagnetic 

space, network space, and cognitive space. Electromagnetic space refers to electronic 

warfare. Network space refers to network warfare. Cognitive space is more complex and 

refers primarily to psychological warfare, warfare of public opinion, and legal warfare. 

Focus needs to be placed on operations in intangible space, especially in cognitive space. 

64. What Is Strategic Information Warfare?567

Strategic information warfare refers to information warfare conducted at the 

strategic level. Its main features are as follows: it has a broad scope, it involves special 

forms (psychological warfare, warfare of public opinion, warfare of deception, and media 

warfare), it involves special targets (especially cognitive ones), it is enormously 

formidable, and its personnel are specialized. The personnel involved in strategic warfare 

are not necessarily soldiers but may involve computer experts, international criminal 

groups, or hackers or terrorist organizations with ulterior motives. 

65. What Is Battlefield Information Warfare?568

Battlefield information warfare is information warfare occurring within battle or 

combat space. It refers to the comprehensive utilization of the means of information 

technology and various informatized weapons, operations platforms, and C4ISR systems 

both in preparation or while conducting battle or combat. It includes comprehensive 

countermeasures in warning, detection and reconnaissance, information transmission 

and processing, weapons control and guidance, operations command and control, 

camouflage, deception, interference, and military stratagems. Since battlefield 

information warfare interferes with or disrupts the enemy’s decision making process it 

must be conducted before influencing enemy actions so that the enemy cannot implement 

coordinated and consistent actions. The steps in this process are winning an advantage in 

the electromagnetic realm and attaining superiority in the air and on the sea. Controlling

information means gaining the initiative in combat space according to Dai. 

66. What Do the Contents and Forms of Battlefield Information Warfare Entail?569

The primary content of battlefield information warfare includes operational 

confidentiality, military deception, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and 

 

566 Ibid., p. 82. 567 Ibid. 568 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 569 Ibid., p. 83. 
170

firepower destruction. The core objective is to gain the initiative in the acquisition, 

control, and use of information in the combat space. Battlefield information warfare 

refers to countermeasures against information systems that directly impact battlefield 

success. The primary operational forms for battlefield information warfare are electronic 

warfare and network warfare. Electronic warfare involves activities such as trickery, 

interference, damage, and destruction conducted against the enemy’s communications 

and radar. 

68. What Is the Main Content of an Information Operations Plan?570

Dai states that information operations plans are the specific embodiment of the 

resolve of commanders and the preparations and actions conducted by informatized 

operations forces. Their content is primarily composed of information operations tasks 

(the primary means and power to be used); the important aspects of the protection of 

information systems and information security; the important targets, primary means, and 

weapons to be used; methods of action for information attacks; a force’s tasks; the 

composition and configuration of tasks for combat; the division of operational stages and 

the expectations and solutions for each stage; the organization of command and 

coordination; and the time needed to complete preparations for information attacks or to 

implement them. 

Information attack plans include the status of the information environment, the 

tasks and major targets of information attacks, the specific initiative and deployment of 

force for information attacks, and the coordination of information attacks. Information 

defense plans include the status of the information environment, the primary means and 

impact of the enemy’s information attacks, the major targets and primary means of 

information defense, the specific initiative for information defense, and the coordination 

of the information defense system. 

In order to draft the best information operations plans, a person needs to 

implement the resolve of the leaders and use modernized means of command; to start 

from the most difficult and complex situation in the operational relationship to foresee 

potential developments; and to do your utmost to shorten the time needed to draft up the 

plan. In no situation should the implementation of information attacks or defense be 

delayed due to the drafting of the plan. 

69. What Are Information Attacks?571

Information attacks refer to the use of comprehensive means such as electronic 

interference, electronic deception, computer virus attacks, network penetration, and 

psychological attacks that commanders and their command organizations launch under a 

unified command, with a unified operational objective using dedicated information attack 

forces or nondedicated forces, to achieve and maintain control over information. In 

addition, information attacks are actions to weaken, destroy, or break down the enemy’s 

entire operational effectiveness to the greatest extent possible. Information attacks are the 

primary operational means of achieving control over information. 

 

570 Ibid., pp. 84-85. 571 Ibid., pp. 85-87. 
171

Information attack forces include electronic countermeasure forces, network 

attack forces, information entity attack forces, and other information attack forces. 

Among them, electronic countermeasure forces interfere and suppress or deceive and 

confuse the enemy’s information acquisition, transmission, and command and control 

systems. Network attack forces work in computer networks to pilfer, alter, disturb, and 

destroy information processing and the normal operation of information systems. 

Information entity attack forces use anti radiation weapons and various types of 

precision-guided weapons and other firepower to engage in the physical destruction of 

the enemy’s information systems. Other information attack forces, primarily 

psychological warfare forces, make use of media organizations, intelligence 

organizations, and propaganda organizations, to cause military deception and 

psychological disruption in enemy forces. 

The major tactics used in information attacks include: 

 First, information deterrence. This refers to the concentration and 

integration of superior troops and weapons to form a military deterrent 

that shakes the enemy psychologically so that he either dares not act 

without careful consideration or submits due to fear. 

 Second, an information blockade. This refers to the concentration of 

superior information attack troops implementing large-scale suppressive 

electronic interference against the enemy’s electronic information systems 

in a given area within a prescribed period. 

 Third, information power creation. This refers to the use of electronic 

camouflage, electronic deception, network deception, and “virtual reality 

warfare” to conceal what is real and reveal what is false, to confuse, 

deceive, and arouse the enemy. This causes the enemy’s information to be 

false and judgments and decisions to be mistaken. 

 Fourth, information contamination. This refers to the contamination of the 

enemy’s information networks with false information, useless information, 

and “toxic” information to block the enemy’s information channels, or to 

use information to create “pathologies” or to infect the operating 

environment for information systems. 

 Fifth, information harassment. This is the use of information to attack 

equipment and systems on the enemy’s front line or in rear areas by 

implementing electronic deception, radio propaganda, and electronic 

interference to secretly release viruses and engage in guerrilla attacks upon 

the enemy’s information system as a means of inflicting psychological 

pressure. This is guerrilla warfare within the realm of information actions. 

 Sixth, nodal destruction. This refers to troops and weapons information 

attacks on the enemy’s strategic positions (one or more nodes) which have 

a decisive function for his information and electronic systems. This 

reduces or destroys the entire operational efficiency of the enemy’s 

electronic system. 
172

 Seventh, system paralysis. This refers to the implementation of a high 

intensity, hidden surprise attack using electronic interference, a virus 

attack, electronic weapon or firepower destruction attacks upon an 

electronic information system or equipment, or certain types of electronic 

targets integrating soft and hard destruction. This either disrupts system 

operation or efficiency, or renders it completely inoperable. 

 Eighth, entity destruction. This is a planned operation using anti radiation 

weapons, directed energy weapons, and other conventional weapons of 

hard destruction behind enemy lines that, in conjunction with information 

reconnaissance, implements firepower destruction upon electronic 

information equipment (system) to permanently disable enemy equipment. 

70. What Are the Basic Requirements of Operations for Capturing Information 

Supremacy?572 

Dai’s description of the basic requirements for obtaining information superiority 

focuses on the attack and the use of strategy. He notes that regardless of whether it is the 

combat stage during the fight for information supremacy or a fusion of the support 

actions for information operations in joint (cooperative) actions, the following basic 

requirements must be followed. 

First, attention needs to be focused upon the attack. The special features of the 

techniques and tactics of information operations emphasize attacking even more than 

traditional ground, sea, or air warfare. Weaker armed forces must actively master these 

basic requirements. 

The attack is the reflection of the dialectical relationship between annihilating the 

enemy and preserving oneself, along with aggressive defensive thinking. This is because 

information defense can only be enacted vigorously when it is integrated with 

information support actions. It is completely possible that an enemy which is weaker in 

the area of information will implement an asymmetrical information attack which allows 

for the special advantages of a People’s War. 

The requirements for focusing on attacking are that first, substantial intelligence 

information is required. Second, information attack forces and resources must be focused 

at the key time and into the key directions. Third, efforts must be focused on launching 

information attacks before the enemy does to gain the advantages of acting first and 

achieving information supremacy. Fourth, multiple forms of uninterrupted information 

attack actions must be adopted in combination to prevent the enemy from catching his 

breath. Fifth, actions must be coordinated and comprehensive and address key points. 

Second, the Chinese will focus upon the entire attack. Information operations 

combine attacking with defending using electronic warfare, computer network warfare, 

and psychological warfare. With “integrated network-electronic warfare” at their core, 

information operations also involve means such as keeping operations secret, intelligence 

warfare, and hard destruction to execute integrated warfare. This is the key to information 

 

572 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
173

supremacy. Information systems are human-machine systems with complex structures. A 

combination of soft means of destruction such as electromagnetic suppression, virus 

attacks, and network countermeasures; hard destruction means such as electronic 

weapon attacks, Special Forces destruction, and firepower destruction; and mental means 

of attack such as psychological operations and virtual operations can result in effective 

operations characterized by a mutual increase in strength and mutual support. 

Third, technology and strategy need to be given equal weight. Operations for 

gaining information supremacy have the significant features of high technology along 

with a strong strategic component. The objects of these operations not only include the 

enemy’s information technology systems, but also his cognitive systems. Emphasis must 

be placed upon technological countermeasures (to include “trump cards”). Chinese 

forces need to fully exploit strategy and intimately combine soft, hard, and mental means. 

In particular, Chinese forces must give full reign to the initiative of the people, their 

creativity, and flexibility. 

71. What Is Information Defense?573

Information defense refers to a plan unifying the intentions of commanders and 

the command organizations to protect the security of one’s own information and 

information systems by engaging in tactics to counter reconnaissance, interference, and 

computer attacks. They are comprehensive means and actions that include attacks and 

the protection of information systems to ensure information supremacy. 

Electronic defense, network defense, systems of military secrecy, and other 

information defense forces form the backbone of information defense. The primary tasks 

are to implement measures against deception, reconnaissance, interference, and 

destruction within the electromagnetic spectrum; to implement measures against invasion 

and virus attacks in the realm of computer networks; to prevent the physical destruction 

of electronic equipment by the enemy; and to engage other information defense forces, 

such as intelligence organizations and news media to conduct deception against military 

and intelligence countermeasures and psychological countermeasure activities. 

Information defense requires excellent measures against blockades, destruction, 

and interference, along with early-warning and information recovery capabilities. 

Chinese forces need to make comprehensive use of information retaliation, proactive 

interference, psychological attacks, information deception, and physical destruction, 

along with implementing effective defensive measures integrating the overall with the 

targeted and the active with the passive. The primary tactics are as follows: 

 Concealed defense methods (radiation control and signal concealment) 

 Deceptive defense methods (combined use of technical means and tactical 

measures of information deception such as signal source deception, signal 

channel deception, and information (content) deception) 

 

573 Ibid., pp. 88-90. 
174

 Network defense methods (to include multiple types of electronic 

information equipment and systems that guard against interference, 

destruction, and concealment) 

 Antistrike defense methods (interference suppression [or virus attacks] 

against command communication systems and the implementation of 

information attacks where the concept is offense as defense) 

 Information barrier methods (the comprehensive use of active and passive 

electronic interference to conduct interference against the enemy’s 

electronic reconnaissance systems where, again, the concept is offense as 

defense) 

 Management and control methods (targeted measures and actions to 

strengthen the management of personnel involved with secrecy and secret 

media). 

The side with the weaker information operations capabilities must make full use 

of nondedicated information operations forces to include civilian information systems 

and personnel. The comprehensive use of various types of information defense measures 

and gaining the initiative are of critical significance in winning at information defense. 

72. What Is Information Security?574

Information security includes both security for information resources and security 

for information operating systems. Security for information resources includes 

guaranteeing the integrity, serviceability, and confidentiality of information and data and 

controlling access permissions and the methods for data storage and extraction. The 

security of information operating systems refers to the operation of hardware and 

software, operating system security, disaster recovery, and prevention of electromagnetic 

information leaks. The traditional sense of property security no longer applies, as 

information security is a type of resource and strategic security. National security is no 

longer composed mainly of territory and resources but rather of intangibles such as 

information and knowledge. Information has become more important as a resource than 

materials and energy, Dai notes. 

73. What Is Network Psychological Warfare?575

Network psychological warfare is a special product of psychological operations 

during the information era. Computer network technology allows computer networks to 

act as the medium which makes the difference in the information age. This enables two 

sides to engage in measures such as psychological propaganda, psychological deception, 

and psychological deterrence over the Internet in order to break down the resolve of the 

enemy’s military and civilians. 

74. What Is Intelligence Warfare?576

 

574 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 575 Ibid., p. 91. 576 Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
175

Intelligence warfare is essentially a struggle for the right to acquire and the right 

to know information. Two sides in a conflict adopt various means to gather and steal 

information from one another. 

There are both broad and narrow definitions of the term “intelligence.” The 

narrow concept refers to “reconnaissance measures or other methods to acquire 

knowledge of the various aspects of the situation regarding the enemy’s military, politics, 

and economics, as well as the results of analysis and study of these situations. This is an 

important basis for military action.” Narrowly defined, it refers to intelligence combat 

undertaken in the realm of the military. Broadly defined, intelligence refers to “the latest 

intelligence reports.” The broad sense of intelligence warfare includes intelligence 

combat between two sides in a conflict in the areas of politics, economics, military 

affairs, science and technology, culture, and diplomacy. 

75. What is Precision Warfare?577

Precision warfare utilizes informatized and intelligent high-precision weapons and 

equipment to engage in operational actions. Precision warfare (or “precision operations”) 

cannot be understood simply as precision strikes that use precision-guided weapons. 

“Precision” reflects the countermeasures in which two sides engage, as well as the entire 

process itself. The process includes: 

 Accurately observing the battlefield 

 Accurately acquiring and processing information 

 Precisely determining the location of the enemy’s forces, weapons, 

equipment, and incoming fire 

 Implementing command and control precisely and in real-time 

 Using operational forces and measures precisely 

 Precisely implementing attacks 

 Accurately assessing the effectiveness of operations 

 Precisely implementing logistical safeguards. 

In summation, precision warfare includes precision information, precision 

control, precision movements, and precision strikes. Precision warfare can greatly 

enhance the combat power of the armed forces, reduce their size, and lower casualties. 

The political and strategic nature and limitations of high tech warfare require that 

military actions and operations stay in step with national policy. The targets, force used, 

and duration and style of strike must be chosen to maximize effectiveness and to conform 

to political requirements and the goals of combat and strategy. 

The main features of precision warfare are as follows: 

 First, it features a high degree of integration between information and 

firepower, using information to control firepower. 

 

577 Ibid., pp. 93-94. 
176

 Second, it is a direct strike to the enemy’s center of gravity. The center of 

gravity is the “center upon which all force and actions rely” for an army, 

and it is where the armed forces get their freedom of action, combat force, 

and combat will. 

 Third, geographical factors such as distance, altitude, terrain, objects on 

the ground, the features of the terrain, and international borders have little 

effect on precision strikes. 

 Fourth, its operational area is tiny. Targets are extremely concentrated to 

within a very limited and narrow space. 

 Fifth, its space is expanded. Long-range precision-strike platforms can hit 

targets from thousands of kilometers away. 

 Sixth, material destruction, human casualties, and collateral damage are 

limited. 

76. What Is Electronic Warfare?578

Electronic warfare (EW) is also known as electronic countermeasures. It is 

defined as follows: “The general term for the various measures and actions used to 

weaken or destroy the effectiveness of the enemy’s electronic equipment (systems) and to 

protect the effectiveness of one’s own electronic equipment (systems). It consists mainly 

of electronic countermeasure reconnaissance, electronic interference and electronic 

defense.” There are differences in EW and IO. Computer network space differs from 

electromagnetic space in that the important elements in the computer connect to form an 

organic and whole space, a new and particular space, in which the computer penetrates 

throughout the land, sea, air and outer space. It has been called the “sixth space.” By 

contrast, actions in electronic warfare take place primarily in the realm of 

electromagnetic space. The operational targets for information operations include 

information acquisition, transmission, and processing systems. EW includes systems 

using electronic equipment to acquire and transmit information. The IO objective is to 

obtain information supremacy while for electronic warfare it is to acquire 

electromagnetic supremacy. Of course, one must first achieve supremacy in the 

electromagnetic realm in order to gain information supremacy. 

EW is one aspect under information operations, and it creates a foundation for the 

creation of information operations. The advent of information warfare has pushed 

electronic warfare up to a higher realm. 

77. What Is Electronic Reconnaissance?579

Electronic reconnaissance includes gathering and analyzing the enemy’s 

electromagnetic radiation signals using electronic countermeasure reconnaissance 

forces. It includes signal intelligence, warnings of threats, direction finding, and position 

fixing, and it enables attacks and defense. Electronic technology reconnaissance primarily 

refers to radar reconnaissance, optical reconnaissance, night vision reconnaissance, laser 

reconnaissance, and television cameras. Electronic countermeasure reconnaissance 

 

578 Ibid., pp. 93-94. 579 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
177

primarily refers to radar, communication, optoelectronic, and underwater acoustic 

countermeasure reconnaissance. 

The tasks for electronic reconnaissance include discovering and determining the 

tactical technical parameters and position of enemy radiation sources for electronic 

systems and equipment, ascertaining the patterns of activity and deterrence qualities of 

electronic targets, and analyzing strong and weak points. This enables one to test the 

effectiveness of a friendly electronic attack and to organize and implement electronic 

attacks and electronic defense. Electronic reconnaissance includes direct and advanced 

reconnaissance, and it must integrate comprehensive reconnaissance with targeted 

reconnaissance. 

78. What Are Electronic Attacks?580

Electronic attacks are operational actions that utilize electronic attack forces to 

conduct electronic interference and destruction. The unified command carries out these 

attacks with the goal of weakening and destroying an enemy’s electronic effectiveness. 

This is an important and aggressive operational means of gaining and maintaining 

information supremacy. When organizing the implementation of electronic attacks one 

must concentrate forces and adopt multiple means of destroying the enemy’s important 

electronic equipment. 

79. What Is Electronic Defense?581

Electronic defenses are the comprehensive measures to prevent the enemy from 

uncovering the electromagnetic signals and operational technical parameters emitted 

from one’s electronic equipment. Electronic defense attempts to eliminate or weaken the 

harmful impact of electronic interference from the enemy’s equipment. This EW aspect 

entails working against electronic reconnaissance, electronic interference, and attempts to 

destroy friendly equipment. 

Electronic defense’s primary tasks are to take multiple measures to prevent the 

position and electronic radiation of one’s own electronic equipment from being 

discovered, to minimize damage, and to maintain the effective operation of major 

electronic equipment. When organizing the implementation of electronic defense, one 

must coordinate entire actions to counter reconnaissance, interference, and destruction; 

make comprehensive use of multiple means of electronic defense such as concealment, 

deception, prevention, avoidance, and repair; and use offensive actions to ensure the 

stability of electronic defense. 

80. What Is Computer Network Warfare?582

Computer network warfare is a series of actions designed to interfere with or 

destroy the enemy’s network information systems while ensuring the normal operation of 

one’s own network information systems. The goal is to gain and maintain network 

information superiority. 

 

580 Ibid., p. 95. 581 Ibid., p. 96. 582 Ibid., pp. 96-97. 
178

There are broad and narrow definitions for computer network warfare. In the 

broad sense, computer network warfare is the use of technology and network means of 

countries, ethnic groups, armed groups, and even terrorists to attain network supremacy 

and destroy information networks. In the narrow sense, computer network warfare refers 

to information operation actions where operational command systems weaken or destroy 

the information and effectiveness of the enemy’s computer network systems enabling the 

attainment of network supremacy. 

Computer network warfare is composed of computer network reconnaissance, 

computer network attacks, and computer network defense. Operations mainly involve the 

use of armed and equipped network warriors. The means of operations include various 

types of viruses, logic bombs, and chip weapons developed from computer technology. 

Computer network warfare will act as both a deterrent and a means of warfare, 

and it can have a large and profound impact upon the enemy’s politics, economics, and 

military. It is also an important means of battle for a less well-equipped military against 

one with formidable strengths in high technology. 

81. What Is Command and Control Warfare?583

Command and control warfare is the integration and utilization of operational 

confidentiality, military deception, psychological warfare, electronic warfare, and 

firepower destruction with the support of intelligence. Proper use of this ability enables 

one to obstruct the enemy from acquiring information and to influence, weaken, or 

destroy the enemy’s command and control capabilities while ensuring that one’s own 

command and control systems and capabilities are not destroyed by the enemy. 

Command and control warfare uses attacking and defending among other 

methods. Countering command and control refers to not allowing the enemy to acquire 

information. Reliable intelligence is required to support the implementation of command 

and control warfare. 

82. What Is Structural Destruction Warfare?584

Structural destruction warfare (SDF) is a form of operations that destroys the 

structure of the enemy’s force thereby limiting its effectiveness. The effectiveness of 

structural deception is that it breaks down overall combat strength. Some experts believe 

that nodal destruction warfare is part of structural destruction warfare. SDF uses direct 

firepower strikes or special agent sabotage to destroy the physical facilities for the 

enemy’s computer networks. Special agent and Special Forces sabotage might include 

bombing, high energy laser weapons, electromagnetic pulses, microwave bombs, and 

biological bacteria to strike key nodes and paralyze the entire network system. 

The nodes in a system are connection points between important elements and 

subsystems within an operational system. The sources for information, materials, and 

 

583 Ibid., pp. 97-98. 584 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
179

energy within an operational system are the nodes of a system, and the US used this 

method during the Gulf War. Strategic targets were government organizations, command 

systems, key production facilities, power and energy systems, production facilities for 

weapons of mass destruction, the railroad, ports, bridges, airports, and missile positions. 

The destruction of these nodes “mutilated” the system and eliminated its functioning. 

The creation of functional chaos limits an enemy’s combat capability. Future 

battlefield C4ISR systems are such that “pulling one hair affects the whole body”: hitting 

a part affects the whole. Carrying out nodal destruction warfare at the right time might be 

more effective than other operations. 

The Characteristics, Rules, and Principles of Informatized War 

94. What Are the Characteristics of Informatized Operations?585

The characteristics of informatized operations include the following items. 

First, battlefield spaces are transparent to an unprecedented degree. The various 

operational platforms are able to share operational information and share information 

resources. With the battlefield information network, passive and active operational 

information can be seen clearly allowing for near real-time transmission and processing 

of information. 

Second, with operational effectiveness so high, operations have shortened in 

duration. Operations carried out under informatized conditions can fuse information 

networks and combat networks between remote precision strikes and battlefield space, 

resulting in integrated real-time responses. This allows for an even faster decision cycle. 

Third, information superiority has become the key to operations. Both sides in a 

conflict place extreme importance upon surveillance, using aerospace reconnaissance 

satellites, airborne reconnaissance planes, ground reconnaissance devices, and 

intelligence personnel to establish an integrated detection system. Informatized 

operations are the process of attaining information superiority. 

Fourth, the characteristics of integrated operations are prominent. The weapons 

and equipment used in information warfare with other firepower attack weapons makes 

for enormously effective attacks that have shown exponential growth. Informatized 

weapons and equipment are becoming the main type of equipment in war. Informatized 

operations are integrating joint operations and information and firepower, where 

reconnaissance and surveillance work in concert together with firepower attacks. 

Fifth, information systems have an important position. Both information attacks 

and information defenses are required. Information superiority requires electronic 

suppression, network attacks, and hard destruction. Information defenses require setting 

up defensive structures, using wired communications, engaging in deception and 

propaganda, and implementing electronic interference. 

 

585 Ibid., pp. 111-112. 
180

95. What Are the Patterns of Informatized Operations?586

Informatized operations possess both the universal patterns of military operations 

and unique patterns. Problems are listed below. 

First, guiding information. In past operations, battle strength was the integration 

of energy with materials. By contrast, in informatized wars, information has become the 

combat force multiplier, in that combat force is equal to the combination of energy and 

materials multiplied by information. Information has already become the basis and 

guiding element for the full exploitation of energy and materials. The neutralization of 

information can cause the neutralization of combat force on today’s battlefield. 

Second, the survival of the fittest. The survival of the fittest is the general 

principle for every war. The weak side can still gain an advantage if its strategic tactics 

are played right and if it properly utilizes the will of the people, morale, the terrain, and 

preparations. In the information era, whether a person is subjectively willing or not, one 

needs to keep up with the developments in the global military revolution, adapt to the 

requirements of informatized war, accelerate the buildup of the information-based armed 

forces, and unceasingly improve capabilities for informatized operations. 

Third, technical advancement. Informatized operations rely upon network-based 

military information systems, and by adapting information technology to the utilization of 

strategic tactics, the force of informatized operations be maximized. Chinese forces need 

to apply information technology to command and control, intelligence and 

reconnaissance, communications, weapons, and equipment. They also need to continually 

innovate tactics and means for informatized operations. 

Fourth, system countermeasures. Informatized operations amount to 

countermeasures undertaken between one system and another. This prevents any one 

military service or weapons system from dominating the battlefield. Superiority in 

perception, intelligence, or decision making is transformed into superiority in operational 

actions overall—this has become the basic formula for informatized operations. 

Fifth, the influence of critical nodes. Several critical nodes in an informatized 

system have key functions. These nodes are surrounded by unceasing action, 

development, and changes. Any damage to them greatly reduces their effectiveness 

immediately or leads to paralysis of the system. These critical nodes are the major points 

of defense, and they are targets of attack. The initial targets during informatized 

operations are typically command and control centers and important nodes linking a 

country’s political, economic, military infrastructure, and battlefield information network 

systems. 

Sixth, victory in the realm of aerospace. Whoever has the advantage in aerospace 

will control the air, land, and sea from a commanding height. In informatized military 

countermeasures, communication relies upon satellites as does the transmission of 

 

586 Ibid., pp. 113-115. 
181

information and battlefield surveillance. Airplane and ship navigation, along with 

missiles, are guided by using satellites, as is troop positioning. Gaining aerospace 

supremacy must of necessity become the center of gravity of future informatized 

operations. 

96. What Are the Main Features of Informatized Operations?587

The following items explain the main features of informatized operations. 

First, operational forces are becoming informatized. Information has replaced 

materials and energy to become the guiding factor in combat force. The degree to which 

troops, battlefields, weapons, and equipment have become informatized directly 

determines how effective combat force and operations are. Armed forces with a high 

degree of informatization will gain a firm grasp of the initiative on the battlefield whether 

or not they are outnumbered. 

Second, operational actions have become more precise. The greatest deterrent is 

no longer measured in formidable numbers but rather in the degree of informationization 

at the decision making level, the command and communication systems that are relied 

upon, and their informatized weapons and equipment. With the progressive increase in 

transparency on the battlefield, operational actions are becoming more precise. 

Third, attacking and defending actions have become integrated. The lines have 

blurred between several factors such as attacking and defending, front lines and depth, 

strategy and tactics, air and ground, civilian and military, and soldiers and civilians. The 

fluidity of the armed forces has increased greatly, and the operational battlefield can 

change at any time. All operational activities closely revolve around the intent to gain 

information supremacy. The operational space is arranged like a jigsaw pattern, forming 

an irregular, nonlinear front. 

Fourth, operational space has expanded. In informatized operations, information 

space has become a critical realm for operational actions manifesting in electromagnetic 

space, network space, and psychological space. Electromagnetic space is the most 

intensive of future battlefield operation countermeasures. Network space is the result of 

the permeation of computer networks throughout the various layers, realms, and time 

segments of informatized operations. Psychology helps to control and determine how 

people think and act. Psychological warfare under conditions of informatized operations 

can cause an enemy to surrender with even no fighting at all. This has made for a new 

manifestation of information war space, namely psychological operations space. 

Countermeasures in psychological space in future wars, together with the struggle for 

psychological supremacy, will be even more fierce and widespread. 

Fifth, countermeasures will become systematic. Informatized operations are 

countermeasures engaged in between systems and not a test of strength between 

individual battlefields or weapons. Information networks not only form tight systems 

composed of a spatial realm, an individual military service, the operational command for 

 

587 Ibid., pp. 115-117. 
182

a department, weapons and equipment, and operational actions; they also turn the devices 

on the battlefield into a tight system where operational strength is dependent primarily 

upon the formation and function of the entire system. This system is interlaced in a crisscross pattern, and it is agile in its response, has information sharing and confidentiality, is 

strong in anti-interference, has fewer layers of command, and can fully coordinate and 

exploit the prominent features and strategic functions of every level of personnel. It is an 

important support for informatized operations. 

Sixth, operational means are diverse. Operational countermeasures for future 

informatized wars have brought forth higher standards, demands, and a greater diversity 

of operational measures. First, operational measures can perform both “soft” and “hard” 

attacks in a full-dimensional battlefield space. Second, there is a clear hierarchy of 

operational means, to include strategic means, combat means, and tactical means. Third, 

operational means have integrated multiple types of new technology, high technology 

weapons, and highly efficient tactics based upon information technology. 

97. What Are the Principles of Informatized Operations?588

There are general principles to which informatized operations ought to conform. 

First, the principle of breaking down the enemy’s combat abilities while 

maintaining one’s own combat abilities. In informatized operations the center of gravity 

for annihilating the enemy involves the use of information attacks along with suppressing 

and interfering with the enemy’s information systems, disrupting the enemy’s 

psychological cognition, disrupting the enemy’s operational systems, and breaking down 

the enemy’s combat abilities. Preserving oneself refers to preserving one’s strengths and 

the security and stable operation of one’s information and information networks in order 

to maintain combat abilities. 

Second, the principles of comprehensive integration and overall 

countermeasures. “Concentrating the best forces to annihilate every single one of the 

enemy” has always been the basic principle of the Chinese military. This type of 

concentration is manifested in a high degree of information-guided integration. 

Informatized operations are characterized by the overall countermeasures engaged in 

between the operational systems of both sides in a conflict. Information networks are 

used to link together operational forces into an integral operational system. The result is 

an overall coordinated movement that maximizes operational efficiency. 

Third, the principles of hard and soft integration and attacking and defending 

nodes. Information attacks include electronic interference and firepower strikes on the 

enemy’s information systems, the integration of tangible strikes and intangible 

destruction, the integration of direct action with indirect effects, the combination of the 

results occurring at the time of the strikes together with long term effects, and the 

maximization of interference, clampdowns, and cutting off the enemy’s information 

activities. Protecting friendly systems, especially critical nodes is, in effect, “catching a 

 

588 Ibid., pp. 117-119. 
183

whale with a minnow,” i.e., accomplishing a great task with little effort by means of 

clever maneuvers. 

Fourth, the principles of information sharing and self-coordination. Close 

coordination has always been an important guarantee for the success of an operation. 

However, coordination methods for informatized operations have developed into selfcoordination, where action is primary. Network-based battlefield information systems 

enable information sharing and real-time perception of battlefield conditions. This 

enhances one’s subjective initiative or creativity, self-coordination, and proactive 

coordination due to better understanding of a higher commander’s intent. 

Fifth, the principles of precision operations and comprehensive safeguards. With 

reliable intelligence information, informatized operations can realize precision of 

perception, precise transmissions, precise decision making, precise strikes, and precise 

movements. This establishes a material and technical basis for precision operations and 

attacks against critical nodes and important targets in hostile operational systems. In 

future wars, where countermeasures between systems will increase, precision strikes 

means taking out a whole area just by targeting one small part of it. Precision operations 

will become the goal and basic operational principle of every military. 

Objective demands are such that logistics must respond quickly and 

comprehensive safeguards must be implemented to fully utilize information technology. 

Meticulous and precise planning and utilization of logistical safeguards provide troops 

with the right types, quantities, and quality of material and technical safeguards at the 

designated times and places, thereby increasing effectiveness. Chinese forces must move 

from quantity-based logistics to quality- and speed-based logistics in accordance with the 

principle of “reasonable sufficiency.” Logistics need precision safeguards suited to a 

time, place, and volume as a means of adapting to trends of future informatized 

operations. 

Sixth, the “Three Negation” operational principles foster strengths while 

circumventing weaknesses. “No-contact operations” means utilizing superior firepower 

means to keep the enemy under a barrage of firepower and unable to form a threat. “Nonlinear operations” means separating the enemy’s head from his tail while attacking his 

front lines, his depth, and his rear area. “Asymmetrical operations” means that “you 

conduct your war and I’ll conduct mine, but I can hit you while you cannot hit me.” One 

must use the right operational methods based on actual conditions to foster one’s 

strengths and circumvent one’s weaknesses and use one’s strengths to hit the enemy 

where he is weak. 

98. What Are the New Changes to Informatized Operations?589

Recent regional wars have uncovered several changes in the development of 

informatized operations. Three of these changes are: 

 

589 Ibid., pp. 119-121. 
184

First, strike targets for informatized operations often come down to conducting 

operations in a specific order—psychological shock, material destruction, and 

physiological annihilation. In future informatized wars, information transmission and 

attack venues have changed war’s traditional emphasis on annihilating the enemy 

physically to shocking the enemy psychologically. Concentrating attacks on 

psychological targets, selectively destroying physical targets, annihilating a limited 

number of physiological targets, and complementing strikes on traditional targets with 

strikes on non-traditional targets is the new operational targeting selection process. 

Special actions such as warfare upon public opinion, psychological warfare, and legal 

warfare have attained a prominent function in war. 

Second, informatized operations forces typically involve information 

concentration, firepower concentration, and troop concentration. Selected targets are then 

hit. Information guides the war: firepower is primary to the war: troops assist in the war. 

This is the new force utilization model. In Iraq the information aspect was activated 

before troops and weapons arrived. The US military’s first step was to deploy various 

types of satellites above the operational area, up to one hundred at a time, for a multilayer reconnaissance and surveillance network composed of satellites, reconnaissance 

planes, and various types of early-warning and detection equipment. These systems 

monitored the battlefield and created favorable conditions for the concentration of 

firepower and troops. 

Third, the informatized operations attack process involves the command and 

control level, the support level, and the combat level. Troops and weapons systems are 

the combat or base level, the material safeguard system is the support system or middle 

level, and the command and control system is called the control level or top level. 

Traditional wars typically start against the enemy’s operational troops in order to destroy 

the enemy’s effective strength. After that, the middle support level is broken down, 

followed by the annihilation of the command and control level to attain victory. In 

informatized operations, striking directly at the enemy’s command system has become a 

possibility. First, the enemy’s ability to organize operations is stripped, and then his base 

systems and material systems are disrupted. The enemy is unable to engage in war. 

Finally, Chinese forces strike at the enemy’s combat systems, a new operational 

objective. In informatized operations, the base-middle-top level order of strikes has 

turned into top-middle-base. 

99. What Systems Support Informatized Operations?590

At least four major systems will be needed for support in the informatized 

operations of the future. 

First, integrated battlefield information reconnaissance systems. These systems 

implement informatized operations. During the war in Iraq, the US military used 

command center display monitors to observe conditions on the battlefield in real-time. 

They observed Iraqi tanks in motion, assault forces deployed in Baghdad, and Tomahawk 

 

590 Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
185

cruise missiles. These systems enhanced both US military battlefield awareness and 

operational effectiveness. 

Second, highly effective joint command and control systems. These systems are 

the key to implementing informatized operations since they allow commanders to remain 

in contact with their troops or individual soldiers, and they provide orders to operational 

troops in real-time which connects the force. This enables joint operations to conduct 

decentralized deployment, concentrated command, comprehensive control, and random 

strikes. 

Third, intelligent precision strike systems. These systems conduct informatized 

operations. Imbedded information flows are connected together to form an attack network 

for intelligent weapons systems. The various weapons platforms and firepower units for 

different services are the equivalent of a node in the network. Battlefield information can 

be shared immediately. When informatized equipment, command and control, and 

operations platforms are integrated and connected on the battlefield, an intelligent 

weapons system firepower force develops. 

Fourth, precision operational support and safeguard systems. An integrated 

precision support and safeguard network helps implement informatized operations. The 

desire is to change the traditional model for logistical safeguards and fuse elements such 

as information logistics and transfers together. This will provide operational troops with 

comprehensive logistical support safeguards featuring the right quantities in the right 

place at the right time. 

Information Technology 

112. What Are Information Countermeasure Technologies?591

Information countermeasures are the disruption or destruction of the enemy 

information systems’ normal acquisition of information while ensuring the normal 

function of friendly abilities to acquire, transmit, process, and use information. 

Information countermeasure technologies refer to the various technologies to conduct 

information countermeasures such as information attack and defense technologies. They 

form comprehensive application technologies and are the manifestation of information 

operations technical level. 

The development of information countermeasure technologies will result in 

informatized operations becoming a type of systematic countermeasure action. The use 

of a new information technology in war necessarily results in the creation of a new 

countermeasure technology which then drives the further development of said 

information technology. The result of the interaction of these two aspects (the dialectic at 

work) has driven the development of information countermeasure technology and the 

patterns of informatized war. 

 

591 Ibid., pp. 145-146. 
186

Information countermeasure technologies are the comprehensive applications of 

many information operations technologies. Information countermeasures are of key 

significance to the comprehensive improvement of informatized operations technologies. 

The latter places new demands upon information countermeasure technologies to 

include the complete coverage of frequency, round-the-clock coverage of time, multidimensionality in the area of space, and comprehensiveness when it comes to methods. 

118. What Are Comprehensive Integration Technologies?592

Comprehensive integration is the organic combination of several units for 

systems that were not connected (or not closely connected) to form a new coordinated 

and optimized system. Comprehensive integration includes system engineering, software 

integration, demonstrations for comprehensive integration, and scientific planning and 

management. Comprehensive integration technologies are engineering technologies and 

an art. They are important ways and means to transform engineering technologies into 

combat capabilities. The essence of comprehensive integration is the integration of 

scientific theory with experiential knowledge, the integration of human thinking with 

computer analysis, and the integration of individual judgment with the group to exploit 

the overall advantages of comprehensive systems. The goal is a major system with a 

high degree of antidestruction capability that is interoperable and works in real-time. 

The use of comprehensive integration technologies in the military enhances the 

operational efficiency of weapons and equipment and the overall operational caliber of 

troops. As the informatized operations component takes over, it will trigger the launch of 

systematic comprehensive integration across the board and provide embryonic form to 

informatized operational systems. There will be revolutionary changes to operational 

means and methods during this stage. 

Comprehensive integration technologies have five major linked aspects: 

 First, hardware integration, the integration of weapons platforms, various 

types of information operations hardware, and the subsystems they make, all 

supported by computer networks. Hardware integration is the foundation for 

comprehensive integration. 

 Second, software integration, the integration of all system software, tools 

software, and application software in the system. The major software 

integration issue is that of ports which work between heterogeneous software. 

The various kinds of software must conform to the requirements for 

international standards and open-source software as much as possible. At 

times, it is necessary to formulate unified standards and regulations to enforce 

this. 

 Third, data and information integration, the rational unified planning and 

arrangement of data to avoid unnecessary or harmful redundancy and to 

provide consistent and transparent interfaces for information sharing. 

 

592 Ibid., pp. 154-156. 
187

 Fourth, function integration, the coordination of the functional aspects of 

command, control, and management of operational systems and their 

integration into an advanced operational function. 

 Fifth, the integration of individuals and organizations, viewing individuals and 

organizations as integral components in a system and as the most critical and 

active elements in the system to achieve coordination. The coordination of 

individuals and organizations with other components of the system results in a 

system maximizing its overall effectiveness. 

123. What Are Anti-Information Strategy Technologies?593

“Anti-information strategy technologies” means that when targeting weaknesses 

in the enemy’s operational command information platforms, great efforts go into 

developing interference with, obstructions of, and disruptions of information transmission 

and destroying technology related to the command chain as a means of creating favorable 

conditions for gaining information supremacy and winning victory by stealth. 

While information advantages are the equivalent of the functional advantages of 

“1 + 1 > 2,” a serious structural defect is the equivalent of “100 – 1 < 99,” a congenital 

deficiency which is difficult to eliminate. As such, once the weaker side trains its sights 

on the weaknesses in the enemy’s system and attacks them effectively, it just may snatch 

victory from the jaws of defeat. Dialectically speaking, information supremacy leads to 

the defeat of the enemy, but it may also be a “weak” supremacy at the same time. Antiinformation strategy technologies can make use of this “weakness” in the supremacy to 

find a turning point for countermeasures. Contests on the battlefield are vastly different 

from those in sports as there are no rules and most any means can be used. With antiinformation technologies Chinese forces can defeat a stronger opponent and make up for 

some shortcomings. 

Foreign military experts believe that new anti-information strategy technologies 

have functioned “like a sharp sword to slice information strategies in two.” Possessing 

them is equivalent to a new type of nuclear weapon that can become a wild card for the 

weak when they employ information countermeasures as a form of strategic 

containment. The broad use of new anti-information strategy technologies will create 

enormous capacities to break down an enemy and huge advantages for producing 

effective and formidable information deterrence capabilities. A foreign expert in military 

information warfare noted that it is very difficult to establish information ‘TMDs’ in 

information space. Someone always seems to find a way to get into information systems 

and make you deaf, dumb, blind, and weak in useful intelligence. 

126. What Are the New Technologies for Intelligence Reconnaissance?594

Intelligence reconnaissance systems technologies include signal reconnaissance 

for spread spectrum communications, software-based detection systems, spatial spectrum 

estimation for direction finding, stratospheric balloon-borne reconnaissance, signal 

fingerprint reconnaissance, remote battlefield reconnaissance radar, and comprehensive 

 

593 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 594 Ibid., pp. 164-168. 
188

intelligence reconnaissance. Only signal reconnaissance, remote battlefield 

reconnaissance, and comprehensive intelligence reconnaissance are discussed here. 

Signal reconnaissance technologies for spread spectrum communications include 

capturing and dehopping frequency-hopping communications signals. There are basically 

three procedures for intercepting frequency-hopping signals: capturing, sorting, and 

dehopping. Owing to the fact that frequency-hopping signals hop quickly, great demands 

are placed on the search speed of the receiver. Present signal channel receivers and digital 

receivers using fast fourier transform (FFT) technology search quickly and retain 

communication information. The frequency, time, and spatial features make it possible to 

sort the frequency group of the frequency-hopping network platform for fixed-hopping 

speeds or variable hopping speeds. Cache and splicing techniques work to dehop the 

frequency-hopping signal. After dehopping, the frequency-hopping signal becomes the 

same as regular signals, where demodulation and decoding can produce a communication 

signal. 

The second type of signal reconnaissance for spread spectrum communications is 

to detect and despread direct-sequence spread spectrum communication signals. The 

power spectrum density for direct-sequence spread spectrum communication signals is 

low making it difficult to detect their presence using conventional reconnaissance 

receivers. The premise of despreading is in detecting the presence of direct-sequence 

spread spectrum signals and in estimating their parameters. Feasible and effective 

methods include energy detection, the inverse-spectrum method, autocorrelation 

detection, and cycle-spectrum density detection. All of these methods have their good and 

bad points. The energy detection method is quick, but does not make use of the special 

characteristics of spread spectrum code which decreases detection. The implied 

processing in the inverse-spectrum method can increase the signal-to-noise ratio for 

output, but detection is slow. Cycle-spectrum density detection can detect various 

characteristic parameters for signals comprehensively and accurately, but at low speed. 

Autocorrelation detection can be used once the detailed structure (variable patterns such 

as frequency, phase, and code width) of the enemy’s spread-spectrum communication 

signals is known. Despreading is fast and highly effective, but the engineering is still very 

difficult. 

Remote battlefield reconnaissance radar is a type of detection sensor installed on 

an airborne platform, and works by looking down. It can detect, position, and recognize 

distant (100–200 kilometers) moving targets, including targets on land, sea, and in the air. 

It can be used as a synthetic aperture to acquire radar images from objects on the ground, 

and it can monitor fixed military targets. Real-time processing turns into war zone 

intelligence. Remote battlefield reconnaissance radar can work in harsh climate 

condition. It combines adaptive moving target detection (AMTD) and synthetic aperture 

radar to enable reconnaissance of live and fixed targets. 

Comprehensive intelligence reconnaissance refers to the use of rational system 

structures since reconnaissance sensors are connected with multiple reconnaissance 

platforms to form an organic entity which fuses intelligence to produce prompt, accurate, 
189

and complete intelligence. In comprehensive intelligence reconnaissance systems the 

information comes from multiple sensors and can be both complementary and redundant. 

Information fusing procedures such as detection, connection, correlation, amalgamation, 

the assessment of target recognition, posture description, sensor management, and 

database processing can incrementally increase the degree of abstraction in primary 

information so that more valuable intelligence is the result. Comprehensive intelligence 

reconnaissance systems have large coverage in terms of time-space and the 

electromagnetic spectrum, strong detection capabilities, good accuracy in target 

positioning and recognition, strong timeliness and predictive nature of the intelligence 

gathered, good system for errors, and multiple sensors and platforms working together. 

127. What Are the New Technologies for Early Warning Detection?595

Early warning detection systems include two types: information fusion 

technology in multisensors in early warning systems and target positioning technology in 

passive detection systems. 

129. What Are the Principles for the Function of Information Warfare?596

Basic principles for the function of information warfare follow. 

First, the influence and impact of information upon cognitive systems will cause 

personnel on the battlefield to make different decisions and take different actions. 

Information keeps the basis for decisions and actions on the battlefield from becoming 

aimless and random. This is a basic principle of information warfare. 

The influence of information upon cognitive systems is manifested in three ways. 

First, information can be true or false. It can steer a commander into making the right or 

wrong decision or action. Second, the complexity of information makes it difficult for 

commanders to make quick decisions. The simpler information is, the easier it is for 

people to make decisions and take actions. Information volumes in informatized wars are 

enormous. This makes it difficult to make high quality decisions in a limited amount of 

time and to coordinate actions. Third, the variability of information can result in 

commanders missing prime opportunities because they are too busy or acting in haste. 

Variable operational means, fast-changing operational rhythms, and shifts between 

attacking and defending all present serious challenges to those processing information. 

Second, the effect information has upon materials and energy enhances one’s own 

combat capabilities and weakens those of the enemy. How much information can be 

controlled, how precise it is, and how free-flowing regulates action on materials, energy, 

and weapons systems to varying degrees. The information struggle enhances or reduces 

the control, free flow, or precision of information. This has become one of the active 

principles of information warfare. 

The regulating action information exerts upon materials and energy is manifested 

in two areas. First, the control and precision of information can act to distribute materials 

 

595 Ibid., pp. 168-170. 596 Ibid., pp. 171-173. 
190

and energy. How they are distributed and where they are distributed are two aspects 

which are controlled by information. The distribution of materials and energy must 

develop in the direction of meeting operational goals. Second, the free flow of 

information can help guide the flow of materials and energy. Information is an effective 

“carrier” of materials and energy and can act as an intermediary for the fusion and 

distribution of materials and energy. On the battlefield, the side with information 

supremacy will have stronger combat capabilities and a more formidable space for 

initiative. 

Informationized Armed Forces 

141. What Are Electronic Warfare Units?597

Troops conducting electronic countermeasure reconnaissance and electronic 

interference are known as electronic countermeasure units. They are divided into 

communications countermeasures units and radar countermeasures units, according to 

their targets. Electronic warfare units exist in each military service. Ground electronic 

countermeasure units are organized into regiments, battalions, and companies, and even 

brigades in some countries. Electronic countermeasure air force units are organized into 

companies and squadrons. Units on naval ships are organized into electronic warfare 

ships. 

Electronic warfare units’ primary tasks are to: 

 Conduct electronic countermeasure reconnaissance 

 Acquire information such as the technical parameters for the enemy’s 

electromagnetic radiation signals and the type and configuration of their 

equipment 

 Interfere with targets 

 Weaken or destroy the enemy’s electronic equipment and weapons 

systems 

 Support and coordinate with the combat actions of operations units 

 Create favorable conditions for victory in combat. 

142. What Are Network Warfare Units?598

Network warfare units are dedicated units that use information technology to 

conduct attacks and defensive operations throughout network space against computers 

and computer networks. Dai believes that the United States and the United Kingdom have 

begun setting up network warfare units while Russia, Japan, South Korea, and India are 

looking to set up dedicated network warfare units in the future. 

The structural organization of network warfare units is based upon the basic 

operational principle of gaining the initiative in warfare and destroying the enemy’s 

intentions to act, thus controlling how a war proceeds. Network warfare units analyze 

 

597 Ibid., p. 186. 598 Ibid., pp. 186-187. 
191

and predict based on how events look in general. Units must engage in precise 

communication and coordination to promptly and accurately make the right analysis of 

battlefield conditions. Judging the enemy’s posture and intent helps to make actions more 

effective. Their basic function is to gain information supremacy. 

In future information wars, Dai states that network warfare units will take orders 

directly from each of the military services/command units and will be tasked with 

safeguarding the secure operation of the strategic, combat, and tactical computer systems 

and networks for the various armed forces. “Tangible tasks” will include computer 

security firewalls, antipiracy, defense against attacks, and guarding against static and 

security electromagnetic radiation leaks. “Intangible tasks” include reconnaissance, 

defense, and antispy and antivirus protection that safeguards network security. 

152. What Are the Trends in the Informatization of Military Strategy?599

Just as the nuclear trend in military strategy appeared with the advent of nuclear 

weapons, modern day military strategy concepts are centered on information. Dai notes 

that military leaders and theorists in some countries are currently using the following 

jargon: information supremacy, information deterrence, information monopoly, 

information attack, information defense, information threat, information umbrella, and 

information safeguards. These terms were first used with nuclear issues. 

Of the terms given above, information deterrence, information umbrella and 

information safeguards are more frequently used. Dai states that Professor Roger Barnett, 

of the United States Naval Academy, asserts that the foundation for information 

deterrence is in having formidable information attack capabilities. The threat of an 

information attack is similar to that of a nuclear attack in that it can paralyze cities, 

regions, and industry. Dai also states that William Owens, former vice-chairman of the 

US Joint Chiefs of Staff, believes that the function of the information umbrella is, in a 

significant sense, greater than that of the nuclear umbrella since it can be used in 

peacetime. During times of war, it allows the US to provide strategic, combat, or tactical 

information support to its allies, thus amplifying combat capabilities. 

Informationization of the Armed Forces 

157. What Are the Main Characteristics of the Informatization of China’s Military?600

There are five main aspects to the informatization of the military with Chinese 

characteristics. First, there are strategic objective limitations. The informatization of the 

military with Chinese characteristics is an essential expression of a military strategy of 

vigorous defense. The goal is to enhance defensive capabilities under conditions of 

informatized war to safeguard the nation’s security and development. Dai states that this 

is an essential difference between China and Western countries. 

Second, there is unification of the organization of leadership. Dai believes that the 

absolute leadership of the Party over the armed forces is an excellent tradition in the 

 

599 Ibid., pp. 195-196. 600 Ibid., pp. 202-203. 
192

Chinese military and offers a unique political advantage, a military revolution led by the 

Communist Party of China. It is a top-down approach, unified and progressive. It is a 

fundamental guarantee that informatization proceeds smoothly in terms of organization 

and the system. 

Third, there is the dual nature of the environment of the revolution. The 

informatization of the Chinese military is proceeding in an environment where the 

transformation of the military and the socialist economy are occurring almost 

simultaneously. This creates a “dual revolution.” The country must perform 

comprehensive planning for the social revolution happening across the entire country. 

Military informatization must be incorporated and in step with political, social, and 

economic reforms. At the same time, the informatization of the military cannot overstep 

the capacity of the social reform to accept it. 

Fourth, there is a difference in foundations for development. The informatization 

of the military with Chinese characteristics is still comparatively weak. In essence, a 

revolution with strategic directorial thought leading the way is driving successive 

revolutions in other important elements of the military realm such as for military 

technology, weapons, and equipment. 

Fifth, there is the factor of leapfrog development. The Chinese military is 

undergoing reform and moving toward the era of informatized war on the foundation of 

only partial mechanization. The informatization of the Chinese military must leapfrog 

over one or several of the developmental stages that the West experienced. 

158. What Are the Key Elements Promoting the Informatization of China’s Military?601

Military informatization touches upon many areas. There are four key elements 

promoting military informatization at present and into the future. 

 First, the establishment of new military thought. New military thought 

has hastened innovation. 

 Second, enhancing independent innovation in the area of science. 

Advanced scientific technology drives the military revolution. 

 Third, holding firm to the idea that people are the foundation of the 

buildup of the military. China must find the right personnel, strategy, 

and engineering. Having the right military commanders, planners, 

scientists, technical experts, and soldiers is critical. 

 Fourth, strengthening concentrated and unified leadership. The unified 

leadership of the Central Committee of the Party and the Central 

Military Commission is supporting the following: the unified planning 

of programs, principles, policies, and procedures for the 

informatization of the military to ensure military and political 

coordination; maintaining the special characteristics of the Chinese 

military; learning from the experiences of foreign militaries; and 

 

601 Ibid., pp. 203-204. 
193

reform and stability. The goal is to enhance informatized operations 

capabilities and heighten the scientific and democratic aspects of 

policy-making. 

160. How Do We Make Full Use of Civilian Information Resources to Raise the 

Informatization Level of China’s Military?602

China’s military needs to hold fast to the principle of integrating military and 

civilian personnel and integrating peace and war. This particularly applies to the use of 

reserve forces. China must incorporate the buildup of civilian information systems into its 

overall plans. Civilian network distribution should consider wartime requirements, and 

technical systems should be compatible with the military. Information reserve forces 

must be built up and given a prominent position in national defense mobilization. Highlevel information technology personnel must be prepared and methods to appropriate 

civilian information systems defined. China must absorb information reserve forces into 

combat training and exercises, put research into the characteristics and patterns of 

operations conducted under informatized conditions, and conduct drills for operational 

tactics under informatized conditions. 

161. What Are the Basic Elements of the Informatization Buildup of China’s Military?603

The informatization buildup of China’s military must grasp foundational elements 

such as information technology applications, the development and utilization of military 

information resources, the buildup of military information networks, training for 

dedicated information personnel in the military, and the policies, laws, regulations, and 

standardization of military informatization. 

First, information technology applications. China must adopt methods to enhance 

the informatization of single weapons platforms to increase their operational efficiency. 

The systematic nature of information technology allows China to adopt comprehensive

integration to enhance the operational capabilities for weapons and equipment. A “onestop method” in the development of weapons and equipment allows China to skip over 

mechanization and move directly to informatization. Studying advanced technology of 

foreign militaries and adopting some items from the civilian sector will accelerate 

informatization’s progress in weapons and equipment. The virtual nature of information 

technology allows for simulations that imitate weapons and equipment and shorten the 

research and development stage. 

Second, the development and utilization of military information resources. The 

direct objective of military informatization is to use more information resources and to 

optimize the coordination and utilization of material and energy resources. This speeds 

the buildup of the armed forces. The development and utilization of military information 

is the core task in the buildup of military informatization. 

Third, the buildup of military information networks. Military information 

networks are at the core of the buildup of informatization. The construction of advanced 

 

602 Ibid., pp. 205-206. 603 Ibid., pp. 206-207. 
194

information networks allows the military to fully exploit the overall effect of the 

informatization of the armed forces. 

Fourth, the development of professional personnel in the area of military 

information. Information technology and information resources require people for 

research, development, and innovation. Fostering professional personnel in the area of 

information will have a decisive impact on the speed and quality of the progress of the 

informatized armed forces. 

Fifth, the formulation of policies, laws, regulations, and standards for military 

informatization. These elements work to standardize and coordinate relationships among 

the various elements in informatization and to guide their implementation. They assure 

the fast, continuous, orderly, and sound development of military informatization. The 

policies, laws, regulations, and standards for military informatization must be scientific, 

advanced, practical, and operational to assure a swift, orderly, and sound buildup. 

164. How Do We Understand the System of Regulations and Standards That Must Be 

Perfected in Promoting the Informatization Buildup of China’s Military?604

The system of policies, laws, regulations, and technical standards for 

informatization regulates the informatization buildup and is a guarantee for a quick and 

sound resolution of the issue. By 2002 the State Council and various ministries had 

enacted over thirty laws, regulations, policies, and technical standards for 

informatization. Various levels of local government enacted specific policies and 

standards, and a system of laws and regulations were formed at the national and local 

levels to unify regulations and technical standards for informatization. 

At present there is still no conventional system of policies, laws, regulations, and 

technical standards for the informatization buildup of China’s military. A related system 

of laws, regulations, and standards needs to be further perfected under the unified 

national regulations. 

First, the Central Military Commission and the General Headquarters of the PLA 

must develop a system of policies, laws, and regulations to develop the informatization 

buildup of China’s military. Specific laws, regulations, and doctrine regarding the 

acquisition, exchange, and use of military information must be revised and perfected 

along with supporting management mechanisms and rules. Information security for 

national defense and the operation of information network security requires that China 

must focus on the confidentiality, integrity, serviceability, reliability, and controllability

of information security laws and regulations. A legal and regulatory framework allows 

China to manage and ensure military information security. 

Second, China must accelerate the formation of a system of technical standards 

for military informatization. The critical topics are the fusion and integration, 

comprehensive operation, and secure defense of military information systems. The 

 

604 Ibid., pp. 209-210. 
195

formulation of standardization policies and certification systems must be compatible with 

national standards. 

165. What Is Top-Down Design?605

As people pay more attention to relationships, a shift in the center of gravity will 

occur to a high-level design with emphasis on a system of matters and things. This is how 

top-down design was created. Top-down design refers to planning for the buildup and 

development of the informatization of the armed forces. It is a strategic objective design 

featured by macro transformation and a long-term nature. It is essentially about designing 

the directions, objectives, and paths for military development. Scientific top-down design 

fuses scientific technology and military thought together into a whole, can fuse strategy 

and tactics together, and can fuse space and time together to form an integrated military 

system. Top-down design is macro, authoritative, stratified, time-sensitive and targeted. 

Top-down design primarily entails the following: 

 The goals, paths, and developmental steps for the informatization buildup 

of the armed forces 

 The systems of command organization, expert consultants, and 

examinations and estimations for the informatization buildup of the armed 

forces 

 The informatization of weapons and equipment systems 

 The informatization of battlefield systems 

 The informatization of the structure and structural organization of the 

military 

 The developmental planning and standards for the informatization of 

personnel teams and operational theory 

 The schemes, policies, laws, regulations, technical systems, technical 

standards, and systems of evaluation for the informatization buildup of the 

armed forces. 

Top-down design takes into consideration the current conditions of the country 

and the military and military expenditures. When it comes to issues affecting the whole, 

such as the structure of the military and its structural organization, the informatization of 

weapons, equipment, the battlefield, and the informatization of personnel teams, Chinese 

forces must proactively coordinate with related areas while either commissioning others 

to do work or work cooperatively with them. 

166. How Do We Properly Make a Top-Down Design in the Informatization of China’s 

Military?606

The Central Committee of the Communist Party and the State Council take a 

strategic perspective of the nation’s development. They place great importance on macro 

decision making and policy adjustments for the national development of informatization. 

 

605 Ibid., pp. 210-211. 606 Ibid., pp. 211-213. 
196

They have enacted a series of plans and programs to incorporate informatization into the 

master plan for national development allowing it to develop in concert with 

industrialization. In April of 1997, the State Council enacted the “Ninth Five-Year Plan 

for National Informatization and Far-Reaching Objectives for 2010,” along with the 

“Tenth Five-Year Special Plan for National Informatization.” These plans have 

elucidated the definition and content of what national informatization entails, have 

determined its systematic structure and established its basic targets, developmental goals, 

elements of the buildup, and specific tasks to form a more complete top-down design. 

Three aspects of the top-down design of the informatization buildup of China’s 

military must be mastered. First, scientific strategies must be developed. The 

developmental strategies for the informatization of China's military should have as their 

basis the strategic programs drawn up by the Central Military Commission, and they 

should be guided by the developmental strategies for national informatization. The focus 

is on objective factors such as the existing scientific and technological strengths in 

national defense, military expenditures, and current conditions of the buildup of the 

armed forces. 

Second, a systematic scientific structure must be established that is assured by 

laws and regulations, policies, doctrines, and technical standards for informatization, with 

the development of information resources as the objective. The goal is for military 

personnel to be knowledge-based, to have intelligent weapons and equipment, to have a 

network-based battlefield environment, scientific structural organizations, epochal 

military theory, and informatized military activities. China wants network platforms 

integrated for the three armed services and for strategy, combat, and tactics. This will 

bring about effective, secure, and reliable transmission of operational information for 

early warning detection, intelligence reconnaissance, command and control, electronic 

countermeasures, the operation of weapons and equipment, the implementation of 

operations, and the perception of battlefield posture. 

Third, Chinese forces need to choose the right path of development. China must 

expand investment in the military’s information infrastructure, to include C4ISR systems 

and data link equipment. China’s military must give prominence to resolving system 

integration problems; interlinking and controllability problems; and advancing military 

information networks toward the development of comprehensive, wide band, and 

integrated military information base networks. Weapons systems construction must be 

sped up and work focused on informatized weapons systems which integrate multiple 

dimensions of space. 

Battlefield Information Systems 

256. What Is C4IKSR?607

C4IKSR is the abbreviation for a system with command, control, 

communications, computer, intelligence, strike, reconnaissance, and surveillance 

capabilities. The elements are integrated into one network when using the C4IKSR 

 

607 Ibid., pp. 294-295. 
197

system. This makes for automated control of early warning detection, intelligence 

reconnaissance, surveillance, identification friend or foe, tracking, and electronic 

countermeasures on various enemy targets right up to the hit, along with a seamless 

connection for the entire operational flow involving reconnaissance, decision making, 

kill, and loss evaluation. Commanders initiate operational actions and control and 

manipulate remote precision-guided weapons systems thus expanding the range of 

command activities. 

Informationized Operations Command 

270. What Are the New Changes in a Comparison of Operational Command under 

Informatized Conditions and Traditional Operational Command?608

Informatized war exhibits many changes which have led to many changes in 

operational command. 

First, precision command has become the main trend. Precision command exploits 

the advantages in the integration of man and machine by allowing command personnel to 

integrate their subjective initiative with precision quantitative calculations and analysis. 

Precision command entails concise decision making, seamless planning, and control. 

Precision control emphasizes creating overall momentum in strategy and combat and 

focuses upon grasping specific operational actions by emphasizing a shift from the 

previous general strikes and control in a given area to the precision strikes and control 

on a “point.” 

Second, nonprogrammed command is becoming more prominent. Informatized 

weapons have rigorous technical standards and workflows which is why the armed forces 

have become even more programmed. Yet the development of command information 

systems has created conditions for nonprogrammed command. The seamless integration 

of information collection networks, information transmission networks, and information 

processing networks makes for a high degree of transparency on the battlefield where 

posture is shared and actions are self-synchronized. Commanders can implement 

stratagems, demonstrate their talents, and engage in daring innovation. 

Third, concentrated and decentralized command will interact closely. On the 

network-based battlefield, every operational unit and soldier will have advanced 

information equipment allowing for smooth exchanges and communication among them. 

In future informatized war, operational units can participate in command activities 

formerly limited to command bodies. Decentralized command will increase leading to a 

higher degree of interaction between concentrated and decentralized command. 

Fourth, the status of real-time control will continue to increase. Operational 

command is evolving from aggregate planning to aggregate control. During the war in 

Iraq, US military planes were equipped with systems for receiving intelligence rapidly, 

and about two-thirds of the planes were not given explicit tasks to perform before takeoff. 

 

608 Ibid., pp. 314-316. 
198

Instead, they waited in the air above the battlefield for real-time operational intelligence, 

and then launched their strikes. 

272. What Are the Basic Demands of Informatized Operations on Organizational 

Command?609

First, operational effectiveness needs to be enhanced. Informatized operational 

space has expanded, time has become concentrated, operations have sped up, and 

attacking and defensive actions have become very fast. Chinese forces must do their best 

to shorten the decision making cycle and keep the emphasis on being “fast” from 

beginning to end. Being fast is the very soul of operational command. Initiative is won 

and advantages are gained by being fast. 

Second, command needs to be implemented accurately. Information deception 

and interference, the coexistence of real and false information, the unprecedented 

complexity of the information environment, and the changes occurring from minute to 

minute result in the complexity of the information environment and difficulty to conduct 

accurate operations. This all requires that commanders be extremely good at sensing the 

larger picture from small clues, be apt at discovering things promptly and capturing the 

smallest of irregularities on the battlefield, and be good at grasping the posture of the 

entire battlefield and predicting how it will progress and change. They need to fully 

exploit the intelligence and cleverness of strategists, along with the systems which assist 

in decision making, to conduct accurate operations. 

Third, command needs to be flexible. On the informatized battlefield there is no 

tangible dividing line between the two sides in a conflict. There is a lot of movement, and 

battlefield posture can change in an instant. Flexible command and flexible coordination 

of command bodies are required. Commanders need to be good at making use of tactics 

and troops, adjusting deployments, changing attack methods in a timely manner, and 

turning passivity into initiative under changing conditions. 

Fourth, the security of command systems must be protected. Operational 

command systems are the nerve centers for action and troop actions descend into chaos 

when they are broken. This is why the primary objective for both sides in a conflict is to 

strike at the enemy’s command system. There is an enormous threat to the survival of 

command system making security for them especially critical. 

273. What Elements Should Be Controlled to Improve Command Effectiveness under 

Informatized Conditions?610

The following four elements should be controlled in order to improve operations 

conducted under informatized conditions 

First, information transmission. It is imperative that the transmission, processing, 

exchange, and acquisition of intelligence are prompt, accurate, continuous, and reliable, 

and that computer data, digital voice information, video, and static images can be 

 

609 Ibid., pp. 317-318. 610 Ibid., pp. 318-319. 
199

transmitted promptly. Good anti-interference, anti-acquisition, reliable network and 

information security, and confidentiality are essential as well to improve the integration 

of comprehensive command systems. 

Second, information resource sharing. The goal of information resource sharing is 

for military organizations and individuals within a prescribed domain to use information 

resources as much as possible, to coordinate information resources in terms of timeliness 

and quantity to provide a rational information layout, and to satisfy user demands for 

information to the greatest extent possible. 

Third, command and decision making. Decision making support systems connect 

two or more command bodies using visual communication equipment. Electronic 

facsimile technology can organize meetings and enable decision making. Each person’s 

plans (developed using his or her computer or terminal within the same command post) 

are combined and produced for discussion. A large screen display shows the plans of the 

individual decision makers, and the results are provided as statistical data. This method 

connects command posts which are far away using computer networks, telephone 

networks, electronic blackboards, video, and large screen displays. This is the modern 

way of making decisions collectively. 

Fourth, lateral integrated operations. The informatized battlefield demands that 

command and control are highly concentrated and integrated with each other. However, 

the integration of command can only occur when technology is integrated. As such, 

elements such as reconnaissance, command and control, communications, strikes, and 

damage assessment must be integrated into a whole by means of information networks 

and systems in order for effect real-time target discovery, real-time command, real-time 

strikes, and real-time safeguards. 

Joint Operations 

332. What Are the New Changes in Information Operations under Informatized 

Conditions?611

Information operations began with electronic warfare. In wars during the 

information era, information operations will be reflected in integrated joint information 

operations. These are, in effect, the total intentions of integrated joint operations under 

informatized conditions, and they involve the unified overall goals of information 

operations. Each of the elements of information operations are fused together, and they 

are characterized by the combined actions of dedicated information operations forces 

linked together with nondedicated information operations forces. Integration refers to 

information operations units with similar functions coming together to form a single 

system on the basis of information technology, particularly network technology, to 

achieve information sharing and thus enhance the overall capabilities for information 

operations. 

 

611 Ibid., p. 392. 
200

The term “joint” here refers to the fusion of the various elements in information 

operations as a means of exploiting their overall actions. This is the premise and 

foundation of integration. Information operations are viewed as integrated joint actions 

between the various military services. It is important to keep the different elements in 

harmony with one another and work toward total synthesis. This improves the 

effectiveness of information operations. 

335. What Is System Sabotage Warfare?612

The basic characteristics of informatized wars are that they are guided by 

information and that they consist of two systems fighting each other. This is why system 

sabotage is so important as it is the decisive mechanism of informatized operations, and it 

is the basic path to victory in informatized wars. 

The key point to system sabotage is in “gaining control, precision strikes for 

maximum damage, and paralyzing the enemy to subjugate his will.” This primarily 

entails using asymmetrical operations where the emphasis is on the “destruction” part of 

the equation. Methods to attack weaknesses in a system include blocking network 

connections, breaking down the system architecture, and lowering operational 

effectiveness. 

This is a key paragraph in Dai’s book. He notes that to make system sabotage 

effective, there needs to be a basic mode of thinking where the Chinese “destroy before 

conducting war, using destruction to aid in the fight.” This is because, under informatized 

conditions, the core elements and mechanisms for victory in war have undergone critical 

changes. There are significant differences in the procedures and the center of gravity for 

operations in comparison with how they were in the era of mechanized war. Not 

destroying the material and technical foundation upon which a system of integrated 

operations and operational actions depends, i.e. the network-based information system, 

makes it impossible to convert negatives into positives on the battlefield. Obviously, 

conducting system sabotage requires an emphasis on destroying the network first before 

engaging in war. 

For “destruction,” this refers to concentrated and continuous strikes on perception 

and information transmission systems on the battlefield. Implementing strikes where 

Chinese forces “kill two birds with one stone” means cutting off the “seamless link 

between sensors and launchers” to greatly hamper reconnaissance and detection 

capabilities, rapid response capabilities, and precision-strike capabilities in an integrated 

operational system, thus creating the opportunity for continuous operations and the 

chance to “divide and rule.” When it comes to “combat,” this primarily refers to the 

favorable conditions in war for reducing the effectiveness of an operational system by 

conducting long range precision-strikes as the primary means of nonlinear, noncombat 

operations. Continued strikes on weak points break down an enemy’s operational actions, 

shatter his operational intentions and shake his will to resist. Of course, there is combat 

occurring during destruction, and vice versa so the two are connected but the focus and 

aim are different. 

 

612 Ibid., p. 395-396. 
201

336. What Is Network-Centric Warfare?613

Dai states that the concept of network-centric warfare was first proposed by the 

US military. He adds that the US believes it will be one of their main forms of operations 

in the future. Dai noted that the US military definition of network-centric warfare is as 

follows: “Network-centric warfare” is a military action conducted by a network-based 

unit and occurs in the physical realm, information realm, and cognitive realm 

concurrently and between them. The physical realm refers to the tangible realm that 

includes weapons and equipment (physical networks, communication networks, and the 

physical space in which war occurs). Here network-based units conduct operations. The 

information realm is the realm in which information is created, gathered, processed, 

transmitted, and shared. The cognitive realm refers to the consciousness, thinking, and 

psychology of operations personnel. This includes their perceptions, understandings, 

beliefs, and values, along with the decisions they make based upon them. They also 

involve the abilities of military leaders, the morale and cohesiveness of troops, the caliber 

of training, experience in combat, the ability to perceive posture, and public opinion. 

Simply put, network-centric warfare refers to operations in which computer 

networks are used to conduct the unified command of a military unit. The operational 

units in network-centric warfare are all network-based, and information superiority is 

converted into operational action superiority so that the various units collectively control

and are aware of battlefield posture. This allows for control over battlefield posture, 

quicker decision making, fewer errors in decision making, faster command, and better 

coordinated operations with which to engage in enemy strikes. 

To conduct network-centric warfare requires a network-based armed forces. The 

four key elements of network-centric warfare are as follows: First, the “information 

structure,” meaning a system in which all of the sensors are connected to a network and 

the system conducts data fusion and information management. Second, “operational 

space perception.” The establishment of an “information structure” makes operational 

tasks, actions, and terrain transparent so that individual units can perceive the everchanging battlefield posture at the same time. Third, “real-time coordinated actions.” It is 

important that one’s own operational actions are always one step ahead of the enemy and 

one has the initiative. Individual units can intuitively execute operational orders. Fourth, 

the “final effect” of the information structure, operational space perception, and actions 

coordinated in real-time is that the rhythm of operations is accelerated, responsiveness is 

strong, the risk in operations is reduced, there is a lower cost to operations (primarily in 

terms of casualties), and the effectiveness of operations is increased. 

There are several special features to network-centric warfare. First, it is 

significantly proactive and caused the US to seek comprehensive superiority. Second, 

the flow of information has replaced the traditional flow of human resources and 

materials thus reducing operational risk and consumption while strengthening combat 

capabilities. Third, network integration warfare will bring new changes to the structural 

organization of the military and to weapons and equipment. A whole host of new 

 

613 Ibid., pp. 396-399. 
202

information weapons systems are going to appear. Fourth, bringing network integration 

warfare to fruition is a comparatively longer process both theoretically and practically. 

Network-centric warfare will result in five operational advantages. First, it will 

make comprehensive use of decentralized military forces. Second, it lowers the risk of 

operations. The enemy will not be presented with high-value targets thus reducing the 

risk in operations. Third, it will reduce the strain on logistics. The workload for medical 

services and material transport and reserve supplies of fuel and munitions will be greatly 

reduced. Fourth, military units will have a thorough grasp of the situation they are in. 

Fifth, military units will be able to maximize operational effectiveness. The various 

operational units in the operational space will be connected by networks into an 

integrated whole. 

Network-centric warfare has some inherent drawbacks. First, those engaged in it 

need to set up an information-gathering system on an enormous scale. This includes 

reconnaissance satellites, for example. This means that substantial financial resources are 

required. Second, information quantities are increased, which places greater demands on 

the various levels of command. Third, it relies too much on computer systems which 

gives the enemy an effective target. 

339. What Are Asymmetrical Operations?614

Asymmetrical operations refer to operational actions by two sides in a conflict 

which are asymmetrical in terms of their force. Asymmetrical operations use the 

terminology of natural science to express the concept of the relative relationship between 

one’s own force and that of the enemy, and the antithesis is asymmetrical operations. 

Asymmetrical operations can refer to a conflict between two forces of different types, 

such as between an air force and a naval force, an air force and a ground force, or a 

ground force against an air force and a naval force. Asymmetric operations leverage the 

objective difference between different types of forces as a means of using one’s 

advantages to attack an enemy’s weaknesses and preserving one’s own initiative. 

[Author’s note: this definition of asymmetrical operations is slightly different than the 

definition offered in the next chapter, and vastly different from the definition offered by 

author Kang Hengzhen, a Senior Colonel and research fellow at General Staff 

Headquarters, in a 2002 issue of China Military Science. Kang defined asymmetry as 

“abnormal logic bringing together two sides that are pitted one against the other. It 

radiates the dialectic with 12 crafty tactics.” Thus it appears that there remains wide 

divergence in what the term actually means.] 

344. What Is “Threefold Warfare?”615

“Threefold warfare” is a completely new concept proposed by the Chinese 

military as a lesson learned from watching US activities during and after the 2003 

intervention into Iraq. The three elements are warfare of public opinion, psychological 

warfare, and law warfare. They encompass operations conducted on the basis of news, 

public opinion, human psychology, and law. “Threefold warfare” is a comprehensive

 

614 Ibid., pp. 400-401. 615 Ibid., pp. 403-404. 
203

concept in which the country and the armed forces, guided by military strategy, integrate 

various societal resources to win the political initiative and the psychological advantage. 

Attacking and counterattacking are the basic forms of combat. The goals are to fortify 

oneself as much as possible, win friends, and break down the enemy. The main entities in 

“threefold warfare” are the state and the military. It is a form of special operations. It 

features the ability to outflank opponents and can be used indirectly as opposed to 

weapon power. Psychological warfare is the core of threefold warfare. 

345. What Is “Psychological Warfare?”616

Psychological warfare refers to countermeasure activities conducted in the 

spiritual and psychological realm by two sides in a conflict. It is backed up by actual or 

potential military force. Weapons are various forms of information media and the 

combined use of various communication methods. Psychological factors exert their 

influence, restricting and altering the enemy’s thinking, feelings, and behavior, while 

increasing and solidifying the psychology on one’s own side. 

Modern conflicts which erupted in the Gulf, Kosovo, Chechnya, and Iraq saw the 

use of multiple types of psychological warfare. In particular, the US military conducted 

omnidirectional psychological warfare against the Iraqi military during the war in Iraq, 

making it fully deserving of the epithet “the second battlefield.” 

There are broad and narrow definitions for psychological warfare. In the broad 

sense, psychological warfare includes propaganda warfare, news warfare, and media 

warfare. In the narrow sense, psychological warfare refers only to the impact and the awe 

inflicted on enemy forces psychologically on the battlefield. The requirements for 

psychological warfare in the broad sense are as follows: you (the Chinese) need to attack 

the legality and reputation of the sovereignty and political systems of the enemy; you 

need to mobilize the people to support military, paramilitary, security, and intelligence 

activities; you need to mobilize the people to support political, societal, and economic 

plans; you need to spread propaganda about plans for reform which are beneficial to the 

people and which will be implemented once the enemy government is toppled; and you 

need to convert forces loyal to the enemy and their supporters into ones who are friendly 

to you. The requirements for psychological warfare in the narrow sense are as follows: 

you need to fully understand the enemy’s psychological strengths and weaknesses, you 

need to focus on breaking down enemy commanders psychologically, you need to 

combine the measures of psychological warfare with operational actions as a means of 

exerting psychological pressure on the enemy, and you need to strengthen your own 

psychological training so that you can promptly recognize and avert psychological 

warfare conducted by the enemy. Commonly used methods of psychological warfare 

include propaganda, terror, deterrence, deception, confusion, trickery, mollification, and 

bribery. Dai notes that psychological warfare could be defined as selected information 

and information media transmitted to listeners (or viewers or readers) in foreign militaries 

to first influence their feelings, motivation, and objective rational capacity and then to 

influence the actions of their government, organizations, and groups. 

 

616 Ibid., pp. 404-405. 
204

346. What Is Public Opinion Warfare?617

Public opinion warfare refers to the use of various mass media by two sides in a 

conflict to conduct the suppression of information and public opinion in a planned and 

targeted manner, along with controlling international opinion, to create trends in opinion 

favorable to oneself but unfavorable to the enemy. 

Public opinion warfare plays a prominent role in operations conducted under 

informatized conditions. Public opinion warfare is an important weapon for achieving 

strategic goals. In the face of the enormous pressure of public opinion, no country or 

political authority dares to be labeled as the instigator of a war. In order to achieve 

strategic goals, both sides in a conflict use the news media to transmit planned and 

incremental strategic news to guide public opinion and gain popular and international 

support and sympathy. Good reasons for going to war are manufactured, and the war 

enables the country to achieve its national interests. Regional conflicts since the 

beginning of the twenty-first century have clearly shown that news and public opinion 

warfare sit center stage and have become a critical factor in controlling how war 

progresses and indeed determine victory or defeat. Public opinion warfare is an effective 

means of solidifying a war that emphasizes spiritual domination. 

347. What Is Law Warfare?618

Law warfare refers to the use of laws as weapons by two sides in a domestic or 

international conflict, but it refers especially to the laws of war. Multiple means and 

methods are used to expose the illegality of the enemy’s conduct during war and to flaunt 

one’s own conduct as legal. 

At the 17th International Symposium on Military Law and War Law, a 

representative stated that law warfare was a “new weapon” that no other weapon could 

replace. Whoever masters it will possess the initiative in war. The primary topic in law 

warfare is war law which includes laws about the use of force, laws about actions in war, 

laws of neutrality, and laws for punishing war criminals. 

According to the Geneva Convention, Dai notes, armed forces need to be 

accompanied by legal consultants. The ratio of legal consultants in foreign militaries to 

the total number of personnel in armed forces varies. In the US military it is 1 to 550, 

while in the Australian military it is 1 to 750. The ranks of legal consultants (lawyers) in 

foreign militaries are the same as for commanders at the same level, the highest rank 

being lieutenant general. Civilian staff are ranked as assistant professors. During the Gulf 

War, the US military sent out more than 2,000 lawyers with the Army. Regardless of 

whether it was the Gulf War or the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq, law warfare has 

played an important role in all of these conflicts. Law warfare employs legal 

countermeasures as its primary means of combat. 

348. What Is Space Warfare?619

 

617 Ibid., pp. 405-406. 618 Ibid., pp. 406-407. 619 Ibid., pp. 407-408. 
205

Space warfare is composed of the forces of aerospace, and it involves gaining, 

maintaining, and using superiority in space by conducting a series of operational actions 

in cosmic space. Space warfare has special forms and methods of operation due to the 

nature of its operational space and its special weapons systems. Space warfare is divided 

into different categories: there are space-to-space operations, in which military aerospace 

weapons engage in combat in outer space; space-to-ground operations, where space 

weapons platforms utilize attack weapons against targets on the ground; ground-to-space 

operations, where guided missiles, kinetic energy, and directed energy weapons are used 

from the ground to strike against aerospace weapons or work stations on the ground 

which support them; atmospheric space-to-cosmic space operations, where operational 

aircraft in atmospheric space carry anti-satellite weapons to launch anti-satellite, antispacecraft, and anti-space-platform missiles; and atmospheric space and ground 

integrated operations, in which aerospace forces play the major role and army, navy, and 

air forces coordinate closely with them in joint operational actions. In terms of targets, 

space warfare can be divided into the categories of satellite attacking-and-defending 

warfare, missile interception and anti-interception warfare, spacecraft and airborne 

weapons platform attacking-and-defending warfare, space-to-ground attacking-anddefending warfare, ground-to-space attacking-and-defending warfare, and ground-based 

system destructive warfare. In terms of operational objectives and tasks, space warfare 

can be divided into forms of operations such as space clampdowns, space attacks, space 

breakthroughs, space defense, and space information support. Space warfare is the peak 

of informatized operations. Space is going to become a major battlefield in informatized 

war. It will be the “commanding height” from which to view military conflicts, and the 

“high frontier” of national security. 

349. What is Chip Warfare?620

 “Chip warfare” refers to countermeasures and combat used in attacking and 

defending the central processing units (CPUs) in computer subsystems within 

information systems by two sides in a conflict. At present, this refers to the opponent’s 

C4ISR systems, weapon strike systems, and logistical support systems which are 

controlled by people, and thus will impact operational actions. Chip warfare is 

unconventional with no boundaries between military and nonmilitary systems, strategy or 

tactics, or moral or psychological taboos. The primary way of implementing chip warfare 

is to preset artificial traps in the military information computer systems of the enemy and 

interfere with or destroy their operation. There are two types of preset traps: hardware 

and software traps. Hardware traps primarily refer to “fixing” a virus onto the chip in the 

central processor of a computer so that when it is installed and used the virus is implanted 

directly onto the computer, thus destroying the computer system. Some countries are 

currently developing military viruses which are fixed onto integrated circuit chips and 

incubate for a long time. They can be activated remotely or when they receive a specified 

frequency signal. They can also send out a wireless telecommunications signal which 

identifies their position. According to reports, during the war in Iraq the US military 

replaced chips so that computer viruses were injected into the anti-air control systems of 

the Iraqi military, the effect of which was to make the war a breeze for the Americans. 

 

 

620 Ibid., pp. 408-409. 
206

Study Guide for Information Operations Theory

400 Questions on Information Operations 

Academy of Military Sciences Press 

 2005 

Table of Contents 

Editor in Chief: Xu Genchu 

Chief Examiner: Dai Qingmin 

Publisher: Academy of Military Science Press 

Date of Publication: 2005 

Executive Editor in Chief: Jiang Lianju 

Compiled By: Ye Zheng, Jiang Lianju, Hao Yeli, Jing Jisheng, Lu Zhian, Wang Liwen, 

Rong Hui, Ji Yubo, Ruan Guangfeng, Yang Yilin, Ling Shan, Li Li, Wang Yonghua, 

Guo Peng, Zhang Chunyu 

Copy Editing By: (Listed by number of strokes in surname) Wang Baocun, Liu 

Jinsheng, Li Deyi, He Lei, Wu Daiming, Lin Congguang, Cha Jinlu, Hou Xigui, Huang 

Xing 

ISBN 7-80137-911-X, Issued by the Academy of Military Sciences Press (Qinglong 

Bridge, Haidian District, Beijing 100091), Tel: (010) 6288262 

FORWARD.......................................................................................................... (1) 

PART ONE INFORMATION AND INFORMATIONIZATION................. (1) 

 (I) INFORMATION........................................................................... (4) 

 1. What Is Information?..................................................................... (4) 

 2. What Are the Basic Elements That Make Up Information?........... (5) 

 3. What Are the Relationships Between Matter, Energy, and 

 Information?.................................................................................. (6) 

 4. What Is an Information Society?................................................... (6) 

 5. What Is Information Science?....................................................... (7) 

 6. What Are Information Resources?................................................ (8) 

 7. What Are Information Activities?................................................. (9) 

 8. What Are Information Networks?................................................. (10) 

 9. What Is Information Dominance?................................................. (10) 

 10. What Are the Main Characteristics of Information Dominance?.. (11) 

 11. What Are the Main Criteria for Information Dominance?............ (12) 

 12. What Is Information Supremacy?................................................. (13) 

 13. What Is Information Deterrence?................................................. (14) 

 14. What Is an Information Monopoly?............................................. (16) 

 15. How Do We Understand Information Power?............................. (17) 

 16. What Are Information Borders?.................................................. (19) 

 17. What Is a Country's "Information Territory"?.............................. (20) 

 18. What Is "Information Fatigue"?................................................... (22) 

 19. What Is Meant by Striving for Information Dominance, 

 Decision making Dominance, and Action Dominance, and How 
207

 Have the Three Changed?........................................................... (23) 

 20. What Is the Relationship Between Information and Combat?..... (25) 

 (II) INFORMATIONIZATION........................................................ (26) 

 21. What Is Informationization?....................................................... (26) 

 22. What Is National Informationization?........................................ (27) 

 23. What Is the Idea Behind Informationization?............................. (28) 

 24. What Is Informationized Military Thought?............................... (29) 

 25. What is the Relationship Between Informationization and 

 Modernization?.......................................................................... (31) 

 26. What Is the Impact of Informationization on the National 

 Defense Modernization Buildup?............................................... (32) 

 27. How Do We Understand "Disaster Recovery" in the 

 Informationization Buildup?...................................................... (33) 

 28. What Are the Material Domain, Information Domain, and 

 Cognition Domain, and How Are They Related?....................... (35) 

 29. What Is the "Digital Earth"?....................................................... (35) 

 30. What Is the "Information Frontier"?........................................... (37) 

 31. What Is the "Theory of Reasonable Sufficiency"?...................... (37) 

 32. What Is the "Theory of Comprehensive Suitability"?................. (38) 

 33. How Do We Establish a Theory of Informationization with 

 Chinese Military Characteristics?............................................... (39) 

 34. How Do We Create Informationized Military Theories?........... (40) 

 35. What Is the Relationship Between Informationization of the 

 Armed Forces and National Informationization?........................ (42) 

 36. What Is the Relationship Between Informationization of the 

 Armed Forces and Informationized War?................................... (42) 

 37. What Is the Relationship Between Informationization of the 

 Armed Forces and Mechanization of the Armed Forces?............ (44) 

 38. What Are the Main Differences Between Mechanization and 

 Informationization?..................................................................... (44) 

 (III) THE NEW REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS............. (45) 

 39. What Is the Relationship Between Informationization of the 

 Armed Forces and the New Revolution in Military Affairs?...... (45) 

 40. How Did the New Revolution in Military Affairs Arise?........... (46) 

 41. What Is the Essence of the New Revolution in Military Affairs? (48) 

 42. What Were the Causes that Produced the New Revolution in 

 Military Affairs?........................................................................ (48) 

 43. How Should We Regard the New Revolution in Military 

 Affairs?...................................................................................... (49) 

 44. What Are the Main Characteristics of the New Revolution in 

 Military Affairs?........................................................................ (51) 

 45. What Are the Possible Development Trends of the New 

 Revolution in Military Affairs?................................................. (52) 

 46. What Are the Main Effects of the New Revolution in Military 

 Affairs on the Buildup of the Armed Forces?........................... (53) 

 47. What Are the Main Effects of the New Revolution in Military 
208

 on War?.................................................................................... (55) 

 48. What Are the Main Effects of the New Revolution in Military 

 on Operation Theories?............................................................ (57) 

 49. What Are the Main Effects of the New Revolution in Military 

 on Forms of Operations?.......................................................... (58) 

 50. What Are the Main Different Understandings Concerning the 

 World Revolution in Military Affairs?..................................... (60) 

 51. How Do We Understand the Revolution of Military Affairs 

 with Chinese Characteristics?................................................... (62) 

PART TWO INFORMATIONIZED OPERATIONS............................... (65) 

 (I) INFORMATION WARFARE, INFORMATIONIZED 

 OPERATIONS, AND INFORMATIONIZED WAR.............. (68) 

 52. What Is Information Warfare?.................................................. (68) 

 53. What Are Informationized Operations?.................................... (70) 

 54. What Are Informationized Operations?.................................... (71) 

 55. What Are Operations under Informationized Conditions?........ (73) 

 56. What Is Informationized War?.................................................. (73) 

 57. What Is the Outlook of Informationized War?.......................... (74) 

 58. What Is Information Security Strategy?.................................... (76) 

 59. What Are "Non-State Actor" Threats?...................................... (78) 

 60. What Are Diversified Security Threats?................................... (79) 

 61. What Is Information Terrorism?............................................... (80) 

 62. What Are Information Operations?.......................................... (81) 

 63. What Is Information Space?..................................................... (82) 

 64. What Is Strategic Information Warfare?.................................. (82) 

 65. What Is Battlefield Information Warfare?................................ (82) 

 66. What Do the Contents and Forms of Battlefield Information 

 Warfare Entail?....................................................................... (83) 

 67. To What Issues in the Development Trends and the Process of 

 Developing References in Informationized War Should We 

 Pay Attention?......................................................................... (83) 

 68. What Are the Main Contents of Plans for Information 

 Operations?.............................................................................. (84) 

 69. What Is Information Offense?.................................................. (85) 

 70. What Are the Basic Requirements of Operations for Capturing 

 Information Supremacy?.......................................................... (87) 

 71. What Is Information Defense?.................................................. (88) 

 72. What Is Information Security?.................................................. (90) 

 73. What Is Network Psychological Warfare?................................ (91) 

 74. What Is Intelligence Warfare?.................................................. (91) 

 75. What Is Precision Warfare?...................................................... (92) 

 76. What Is Electronic Warfare?.................................................... (93) 

 77. What Is Electronic Surveillance?............................................. (94) 

 78. What Is Electronic Offense?..................................................... (95) 

 79. What Is Electronic Defense?.................................................... (96) 

 80. What Is Computer Network Warfare?...................................... (96) 
209

 81. What Is Command and Control Warfare?................................. (97) 

 82. What Is Structural Destruction Warfare?.................................. (98) 

 83. What Is Hard Destruction?........................................................ (100) 

 84. What Are Soft Kills?................................................................. (100) 

 85. What Is Integrated Electronic and Network Warfare?.............. (100) 

 86. What Is Virtual Warfare?.......................................................... (101) 

 87. What Is Navigation Warfare?.................................................... (101) 

 88. What Is Military Deception?..................................................... (102) 

 (II) PRODUCING AND DEVELOPING INFORMATIONIZED 

 OPERATIONS.......................................................................... (103) 

 89. What Are the Stages of Development of Informationized 

 Operations?............................................................................... (103) 

 90. Why Do We Say That the Gulf War Was the Embryonic Form 

 of Informationized War?........................................................... (105) 

 91. From the Stance of Informationization, What New 

 Characteristics Did the Kosovo War Have?.............................. (106) 

 92. What Aspects of the Afghanistan War Demonstrated the 

 Characteristics of Informationized War?................................... (108) 

 93. Why Was the Iraq War a Typical Informationized War?........... (109) 

 (III) THE CHARACTERISTICS, RULES, AND PRINCIPLES OF 

 INFORMATIONIZED WAR.................................................... (111) 

 94. What Are the Characteristics of Informationized Operations?... (111) 

 95. What Are the Rules of Informationized Operations?.................. (113) 

 96. What Are the Main Features of Informationized Operations?.... (115) 

 97. What Are the Principles of Informationized Operations?........... (117) 

 98. What Are the New Changes in Informationized Operations?..... (119) 

 99. What Systems Support Informationized Operations?................. (121) 

 100. What Are the Basic Contents of the "Dual Historic Tasks" of 

 Mechanization and Informationization?..................................... (122) 

 101. What Are the Differences Between Informationized Operations 

 and Mechanized Operations?..................................................... (124) 

 102. What Is the Relationship Between Informationized Operations 

 And Mechanized Operations?.................................................... (126) 

 103. What Are the New Characteristics of Offensive Operations 

 Under Informationized Conditions?........................................... (127) 

 104. What Are the New Characteristics of Defensive Operations 

 Under Informationized Conditions?........................................... (130) 

 105. What Are the New Characteristics of Battlefield Mobility 

 Under Informationized Conditions?........................................... (131) 

 106. How Is the Joint Integrated Operations System Constructed 

 and How Does It Operate?......................................................... (133) 

PART THREE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY............................ (137) 

 107. What Is Information Technology?............................................... (140) 

 108. What Is Artificial Intelligence?................................................... (140) 

 109. What Is the Military Expert System?.......................................... (141) 

 110. What Is Model Building Technology?........................................ (142) 
210

 111. What Is Simulation Technology?................................................ (143) 

 112. What Are Information Countermeasure Technologies?.............. (145) 

 113. What Are Non-Information System Counter-Detection 

 Technologies?............................................................................ (146) 

 114. What Are Information Jamming Technologies?......................... (147) 

 115. What Are Information Anti-Jamming Technologies?................. (150) 

 116. What Are Information System Destruction Technologies?......... (152) 

 117. What Are Information System Counter-Destruction 

 Technologies?............................................................................ (153) 

 118. What Are Comprehensive Integration Technologies?................ (154) 

 119. What Are Optimization Technologies?...................................... (156) 

 120. What Are Computer Viruses?..................................................... (157) 

 121. What Are Information Concealment Technologies?................... (159) 

 122. What Are Information Prototype Technologies?........................ (160) 

 123. What Are Anti-Information Strategy Technologies?.................. (161) 

 124. What Are Radio Frequency Identification Technologies?.......... (162) 

 125. What Are the Identification Friend or Foe Technologies on the 

 Informationized Battlefield?...................................................... (163) 

 126. What Are the High and New Technologies in Intelligence 

 Reconnaissance?......................................................................... (164) 

 127. What Are the High and New Technologies in Early Warning 

 Detection?.................................................................................. (168) 

 128. What Are the Main High and New Technologies in Detecting 

 and Stealing Information?.......................................................... (170) 

 129. What Are the Principles for the Functions of Information 

 Warfare?.................................................................................... (171) 

 130. What Are the Five Kinds of Technology in Non-Contact 

 Operations?............................................................................... (173) 

 131. What Are the Main Technologies for Information Security 

 Assurance in China's Armed Forces?......................................... (173) 

 132. What Main Energy and Power Technologies Does the Military 

 Currently Have?........................................................................ (173) 

 133. What Is Military Opto-Electronic Technology?........................ (174) 

 134. What Are new Military Material Technologies?....................... (175) 

 135. How Do We Fully Bring into Play the Role of Information 

 Technology in the Informationization Buildup of the Armed 

 Forces?..................................................................................... (175) 

 136. What Are the Detection Technologies for the Maritime 

 Battlefield Environment?.......................................................... (176) 

 137. What Geographical Environment Information Acquisition 

 Technologies Exist for Littoral Space?..................................... (178) 

PART FOUR INFORMATIONIZED FORCES............................. (181) 

 (I) INFORMATIONIZED ARMED FORCES............................. (184) 

 138. What Is an Informationized Armed Force?............................... (184) 

 139. What Are the Main Characteristics of an Informationized 

 Armed Force?........................................................................... (184) 
211

 140. What Are Digitized Units?........................................................ (185) 

 141. What Are Electronic Warfare Units?........................................ (186) 

 142. What Are Network Warfare Units?.......................................... (186) 

 143. What Are Rapid Reaction Units?.............................................. (187) 

 144. What Are "Hackers"?................................................................ (188) 

 145. What Are "Informationized Troops"?....................................... (189) 

 146. What Is an "All-Round Armed Force"?.................................... (191) 

 147. What Are Traditional Forces, Transitional Forces, and 

 Objective Forces?..................................................................... (191) 

 148. What Are "Modular" Units?..................................................... (192) 

 149. What Is an Expeditionary Air and Space Force?...................... (193) 

 150. What Is an Informationized Global Engagement Task Force?.. (195) 

 151. What Is an Information Warfare Aviation Force?..................... (195) 

 152. What Are the "Trends in the Informationization of Military 

 Strategy"?................................................................................. (195) 

 153. What Is the "Strategy for Information Dominance"?................ (196) 

 154. What Is the "Strategy for Information Warfare"?..................... (197) 

 (II) INFORMATIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES....... (199) 

 155. What Is Informationization of the Armed Forces?................... (199) 

 156. What Are the Main Features of Informationization of the 

 Armed Forces?........................................................................ (201) 

 157. What Are the Main Characteristics of the Informationization 

 Of China's Military?................................................................ (202) 

 158. What Is Promoting the Key Elements of the 

 Informationization of China's Military?................................... (203) 

 159. What Are the Main Contents Included in the 

 Informationization of the Armed Forces?................................ (204) 

 160. How Do We Make Full Use of Civilian Information 

 Resources to Raise the Informationization Level of China's 

 Military?................................................................................. . (205) 

 161. What Are the Basic Elements of the Informationization 

 Buildup of China's Military?.................................................... (206) 

 162. What Are the Relationships Among the Informationization 

 Buildup, High Technology War, and Informationized War?.... (207) 

 163. What Relationship Does the Informationization Buildup of 

 the Armed Forces Have with Other Buildups?......................... (208) 

 164. How Do We Understand the System of Regulations and 

 Standards That Must Be Perfected in Promoting the 

 Informationization Buildup of China's Military?...................... (209) 

 165. What Is Top-Down Design?..................................................... (210) 

 166. How Do We Properly Make a Top-Down Design in the 

 Informationization of China's Military?.................................... (211) 

 167. How Do We Establish a Scientific and Highly Effective 

 System for Guiding the Informationization Buildup?................ (213) 

 168. What Is Our Understanding of the Need to Adhere to a 

 Coordinated Development Strategy for Informationization of 
212

 the Armed Forces and National Informationization?................ (214) 

 169. What Is Our Understanding of How the Informationization 

 Buildup Should Be Centered on Command and Control 

 Systems?................................................................................... (214) 

 170. What Are the Main Principles of the Information Security 

 Buildup?.................................................................................... (215) 

PART FIVE INFORMATIONIZED WEAPONRY................................... (219) 

 (I) INFORMATIONIZATION OF WEAPONRY......................... (222) 

 171. What Is Informationized Weaponry?......................................... (222) 

 172. What Is Informationization of Weaponry?................................. (223) 

 173. What Are Informationized Ammunitions?.................................. (223) 

 174. What Are Informationized Operations Platforms?...................... (224) 

 175. What Are Informationized Single Soldier Weapons Systems?... (225) 

 176. What Are the Main Features of the Use of Weapons Systems in 

 Informationized War?................................................................ (227) 

 177. What Are the Relationships That Building Informationized 

 Weapons Systems Should Handle Well?.................................... (227) 

 178. What Is the "Theory of Critical Mass"?...................................... (229) 

 179. What Is "Embedding" Informationization?................................. (230) 

 180. What Are the Development Trends in Weaponry Integration?.... (230) 

 181. Where Should the Focus Be Placed in Accelerating the Buildup 

 Of Informationized Weapons?..................................................... (231) 

 182. How Do We Control the Relationship Between the Buildup of 

 Weaponry Informationization and the Mechanization Buildup?.. (232) 

 (II) INFORMATIONIZED WEAPONS............................................ (234) 

 183. What Are Informationized Weapons?.......................................... (234) 

 184. What Are Stealth Weapons?......................................................... (234) 

 185. What Are Intelligent Anti-Helicopter Mines?............................... (235) 

 186. What Are Electromagnetic Pulse Bombs?..................................... (236) 

 187. What Are Graphite Bombs?.......................................................... (237) 

 188. What Are Offensive Computer Network Weapons?...................... (238) 

 189. What Are Defensive Computer Network Weapons?..................... (238) 

 190. What Are Computer Virus Weapons?............................................ (239) 

 191. What Are "Trojan Horse" Programs?............................................. (240) 

 192. What Are Logic Bombs?................................................................ (240) 

 193. What Are Computer "Traps"?........................................................ (241) 

 194. What Are Micrometer/Nanometer Robots?.................................... (241) 

 195. What Are High Energy Radio Frequency Guns?............................ (242) 

 196. What Are Knowbots?..................................................................... (242) 

 197. What Are Robot Soldiers?.............................................................. (243) 

 198. What Are Chip Bacteria?................................................................ (244) 

 199. What Are Power Destruction Bombs?............................................ (244) 

 (III) NEW CONCEPT WEAPONS....................................................... (245) 

 200. What Are New Concept Weapons?................................................ (245) 

 201. What Are the Main Characteristics of New Concept Weapons?.... (245) 

 202. What Are Directed Energy Weapons?........................................... (246) 
213

 203. What Are Laser Weapons?............................................................. (246) 

 204. What Are High Power Microwave Weapons?................................ (248) 

 205. What Are Electromagnetic Weapons?............................................ (249) 

 206. What Are Ion Weapons?................................................................. (249) 

 207. What Are Genetic Weapons?........................................................... (250) 

 208. What Are New Materials Weapons?............................................... (251) 

 209. What Are High Temperature/High Pressure/Cold Temperature 

 Weapons?....................................................................................... (252) 

 210. What Are Lightning and Solar Weapons?...................................... (252) 

 211. What Are Fog Weapons?................................................................ (252) 

 212. What Are Artificial Environment Weapons?................................... (253) 

 213. What Are Oxygen Absorbing Weapons?......................................... (253) 

 214. What Are Particle Beam Weapons?................................................ (254) 

 215. What Are Kinetic Energy Weapons?.............................................. (255) 

 216. What Are Non-Lethal Weapons?..................................................... (255) 

 217. What Are Subsonic Wave Weapons?............................................... (256) 

 218. What Are New Concept Explosives?.............................................. (257) 

 219. What Are Space Planes?................................................................. (258) 

 220. How Are Space Weapons Categorized?......................................... (259) 

PART SIX INFORMATIONIZED BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT.... (263) 

 (I) THE INFORMATIONIZED BATTLEFIELD............................... (266) 

 221. What Is the Informationized Battlefield?......................................... (266) 

 222. What Is the Digitized Battlefield?................................................... (266) 

 223. What Is the Battlefield Information Environment?.......................... (267) 

 224. What Characteristics Does the Informationized Battlefield Have?.. (267) 

 225. What Are the Characteristics of the Battlefield Information 

 Environment?................................................................................... (268) 

 226. What Effect Does the Atmospheric Environment Have on War?..... (269) 

 227. What Is the Maritime Battlefield Environment?............................... (270) 

 228. What Are the Main Characteristics of Building Up the Maritime 

 Battle Environment?......................................................................... (272) 

 229. What Effect Does the Physical Maritime Environment Have on 

 Military Activities?........................................................................... (272) 

 230. What Is the Space Battlefield?.......................................................... (276) 

 231. What Is Outer Space?....................................................................... (276) 

 232. What Is Space Supremacy?.............................................................. (277) 

 233. What Is Air Supremacy?................................................................... (278) 

 234. What Is Electromagnetic Supremacy?.............................................. (279) 

 235. What Is Rapid Dominance?.............................................................. (280) 

 236. How Are the Orbits of Space Vehicles Categorized?...................... (281) 

 237. What Huge Benefits Does Outer Space Include?............................. (282) 

 238. What Is the Distributed Virtual Battlefield Environment?............... (284) 

 239. What Is the All-Inclusive War Drilling Field?................................. (285) 

 (II) BATTLEFIELD INFORMATION SYSTEMS.............................. (286) 

 240. What Are Information Systems?...................................................... (286) 

 241. What Are the Basic Architecture and Functions of Information 
214

 Systems?........................................................................................... (286) 

 242. What Are Military Electronic Information Systems?....................... (286) 

 243. What Are the Basic Functions of Military Electronic Information 

 Systems?.......................................................................................... (287) 

 244. What Are the Categories of Military Electronic Information 

 Systems?.......................................................................................... (287) 

 245. What Are the Development Trends for Military Electronic 

 Information Systems?...................................................................... (288) 

 246. What Are the Security Assurance Systems for Military Information 

 Systems?......................................................................................... (289) 

 247. What Are Command and Control Systems?.................................... (290) 

 248. What Are Information Retrieval Systems?...................................... (290) 

 249. What Are Communications Systems?.............................................. (291) 

 250. What Are Electronic Countermeasures Systems?............................ (291) 

 251. What Are Navigational Systems?.................................................... (291) 

 252. What Are Space Surveillance Systems?.......................................... (292) 

 253. What Are Comprehensive Assurance Systems?............................... (292) 

 254. What Are Space Vehicle Launch Sites?.......................................... (293) 

 255. What Are Space Monitoring Networks?......................................... (294) 

 256. What Is C4

IKSR?........................................................................... (294) 

 257. What Is MIDS?............................................................................... (295) 

 258. What Are Data Links?..................................................................... (295) 

 259. What Are the Main Developments in the Data Links of Foreign 

 Militaries?....................................................................................... (296) 

 260. What Is the "Global Information Grid"?......................................... (298) 

 261. What Is FBCB2............................................................................... (301) 

 262. What Is GPS.................................................................................... (301) 

 263. What Is a Geospatial Database?....................................................... (302) 

 264. What Is a Digital Elevation Database?............................................. (303) 

 265. What Is a Multiple Resolution Orthophoto Database?..................... (305) 

 266. What Is a Basic Features Database?................................................. (305) 

 267. What Is a Target Positioning Database?........................................... (306) 

PART SEVEN INFORMATIONIZED OPERATIONS COMMAND... (309) 

 268. What Is Informationized Operations Command?............................. (312) 

 269. What Are the New Characteristics of Informationized Operations 

 Command?...................................................................................... (312) 

 270. What Are the New Changes in a Comparison of Operational 

 Command under Informationized Conditions and Traditional 

 Operational Command?.................................................................. (314) 

 271. What Are the Development Trends in Operational Command 

 under Informationized Conditions?................................................. (316) 

 272. What Are the Basic Demands of Informationized Operations on 

 Organizational Command?............................................................. (317) 

 273. What Elements Should Be Controlled to Improve Command 

 Effectiveness Under Informationized Conditions?.......................... (318) 

 274. How Do We Create a Command System That Is Suited to 
215

 Operations under Informationized Conditions?............................... (320) 

 275. What Demands Do Informationized Operations Impose on 

 Building Command Systems?.......................................................... (321) 

 276. What Are the New Features of the Revolution in Command 

 Methods Under Informationization Conditions?.............................. (322) 

 277. How Do We Fortify Command Information Systems under 

 Informationized Conditions?............................................................ (323) 

 278. What Kinds of Ideas for Operational Command are Brought About 

 under Informationized Conditions?.................................................. (324) 

 279. How Is a High Degree of Intelligence Sharing Brought About 

 Under Informationized Conditions?.................................................. (325) 

 280. What New Changes Are There in Command Communications in 

 Informationized Operations?............................................................ (326) 

 281. What New Developments Are There in Military Mapping in 

 Informationized Operations?............................................................ (326) 

 282. What Is the Main Role of Remote Sensing Imaging in 

 Informationized Operations?............................................................ (328) 

 283. What Are Global Command Systems?.............................................. (330) 

 284. What Are Imaging and Geospatial Information Service Systems?....

 (330) 

 285. What Is the Visualization of Scientific Calculations?....................... (331) 

 286. What Is the Visualization of the Battlefield?.................................... (332) 

 287. What Is the Main Substance of the Visualization Products for the 

 Digitized Battlefield?........................................................................ (332) 

 288. What Is Simulation of Battlefield Environments?..............................

 (333) 

 289. What Are the Main Uses for Electronic Maps?..................................

 (334) 

 290. What Are Pocket-Sized Electronic Map Systems?........................... (335) 

 291. What Are General Operational Maps?.............................................. (336) 

 292. What Are New Concept Military Maps?.......................................... (339) 

PART EIGHT INFORMATIONIZED OPERATIONAL SUPPORT.... (339) 

 (I) INFORMATIONIZED OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS AND 

 EQUIPMENT SUPPORT................................................................ (342) 

 293. What Is Informationized Support?.................................................... (342) 

 294. What Are Focused Logistics?............................................................ (342) 

 295. What Are Visual Logistics?............................................................... (343) 

 296. What Is Immediate Logistical Supply?.............................................. (344) 

 297. What Is the "Revolution in Military Logistics"?................................

 (344) 

 298. What Is the Impact of Informationization on Logistical Support.......

 (345) 

 299. How Do We Improve Informationized Logistical Support 

 Capabilities?...................................................................................... (346) 

 300. What Are the Characteristics of Goods and Materials Support for 
216

 Informationized Operations?..............................................................

 (347) 

 301. What Are the New Measures for Goods and Materials Support for 

 Informationized Operations?............................................................. (347) 

 302. What Is the Impact of Informationized Operations on Medical 

 Services Support?............................................................................. (349) 

 303. What Are the Impact and Demands of Informationized Operations 

 On Equipment Support?.................................................................... (350) 

 304. What Are the New Changes in Equipment Support in 

 Informationized Operations?.......................................................... (352) 

 305. What Are the Main Characteristics of Equipment and Technology 

 Support in Informationized Operations?........................................ (352) 

 (II) OPERATIONAL INFORMATION SECURITY ASSURANCE.. (353) 

 306. What Is Operational Information Security Assurance?................... (353) 

 307. What Are Network Sentries?......................................................... (354) 

 308. What Are Information Defense Encryption Systems?.................... (354) 

 309. What Is a Firewall?........................................................................ (354) 

 310. What Are Multi-Layered Network Defense Systems?.................... (355) 

 311. What Is Operational Secrecy?........................................................ (355) 

 312. What Are the Main Threats Facing Information Security?............. (356) 

 313. What Are the Main Tasks of Operational Information Security 

 Assurance?..................................................................................... (367) 

 314. What Are the New Issues Confronting Operational Information 

 Security Assurance?........................................................................ (368) 

 315. What Are the New Situations and New Issues Presently 

 Confronting the Information Security Assurance of China's 

 Military?.......................................................................................... (369) 

 316. What Matters Should Be Attended To and Resolution in Enhancing 

 Operational Information Security Assurance?................................. (370) 

 317. What Is the Status of Information Security in Informationized 

 Operations?.................................................................................... (371) 

 318. What Are the Main Threats Confronting the Security of 

 Information Systems?..................................................................... (372) 

 319. What Are the New Characteristics of Defending the Security of 

 Information Systems?..................................................................... (373) 

 320. What Technical Measures Are There for Assuring the Security of 

 Information Networks?.................................................................. (374) 

 321. How Do We Enhance Information Network Security?.................. (374) 

 322. What Are the Development Trends for Defending the Security of 

 Information Systems?..................................................................... (375) 

PART NINE FORMS OF INFORMATIONIZED OPERATIONS............... (377) 

 (I) JOINT OPERATIONS................................................................... (380) 

 323. What Are the Concepts and Characteristics of Integrated Joint 

 Operations?..................................................................................... (380) 

 324. What Are the Major Changes When Informationized War Is 

 Compared to Mechanized War?...................................................... (380) 
217

 325. What Are the New Characteristics and Contents of Joint Firepower 

 Engagement Operations Under Informationized Conditions?.......... (384) 

 326. What Are the New Characteristics and Contents of Offensive Island 

 Operations Under Informationized Conditions?............................... (384) 

 327. What Are the New Characteristics and Contents of Island Blockade 

 Operations under Informationized Conditions?................................ (385) 

 328. What Are the New Characteristics and Contents of Anti-Landing 

 Operations under Informationized Conditions?................................ (387) 

 329. What Are the New Characteristics and Contents of Counterattack 

 Operations under Informationized Conditions in Border Areas?...... (388) 

 330. What Are the New Characteristics and Contents of Anti-Air Attack 

 Operations under Informationized Conditions?............................... (389) 

 331. What Are the Main Changes in Air Defense Operations under 

 Informationized Conditions?........................................................... (390) 

 332. What Are the New Changes in Information Operations under 

 Informationized Conditions?........................................................... (392) 

 333. What Are the New Characteristics of Special Operations under 

 Informationized Conditions?........................................................... (393) 

 334. What Are the Main Characteristics of Anti-Terrorism Operations 

 under Informationized Conditions?............................................... (394) 

 335. What Is System Sabotage Warfare?............................................... (395) 

 336. What Is Network Centric Warfare?............................................... (396) 

 337. What Are Non-Contact Operations?.............................................. (399) 

 338. What Are Non-Linear Operations?................................................ (400) 

 339. What Are Asymmetric Operations?................................................ (400) 

 340. What Is "Operations Centric Warfare"?......................................... (401) 

 341. What Are "Omni-Directional High Level Operations"?................. (402) 

 342. What Are "Full Spectrum Operations"?......................................... (402) 

 343. What Are "Stable Operations"?..................................................... (403) 

 344. What Is "Three Warfare"?............................................................. (403) 

 345. What Is Psychological Warfare?.................................................... (404) 

 346. What Is Public Opinion Warfare?.................................................. (405) 

 347. What Is Law Warfare?.................................................................... (406) 

 348. What Is Space Warfare?................................................................. (407) 

 349. What Is "Chip Warfare"?............................................................... (408) 

 (II) INFORMATIONIZED OPERATIONS OF THE MILITARY 

 BRANCHES.................................................................................. (409) 

 350. What Are the Characteristics of the Informationized Operations of 

 the Army?....................................................................................... (409) 

 351. What Are the Features That Are Displayed on the Informationized 

 Ground Battlefield?........................................................................ (410) 

 352. In What Ways Are the Status and Role of Army Reflected in 

 Informationized Operations?........................................................... (413) 

 353. What Are the Characteristics of the Informationized Operations of 

 The Navy?....................................................................................... (413) 

 354. What Are the Features That Are Displayed on the Informationized 
218

 Sea Battlefield?............................................................................... (414) 

 355. In What Ways Are the Status and Role of the Navy Reflected in 

 Informationized Operations?........................................................... (415) 

 356. What Are the Full Dimensional Detection Measures for Submarines 

 in the 21st Century?.......................................................................... (416) 

 357. What Are the Characteristics of the Informationized Operations of 

 the Air Force?.................................................................................. (417) 

 358. What Are the Features That Are Displayed on the Informationized 

 Air Battlefield?................................................................................ (418) 

 359. In What Ways Are the Status and Role of the Air Force Reflected 

 In Informationized Operations?....................................................... (419) 

PART TEN THE MILITARY INFORMATIONIZATION BUILDUPS 

 AND DEVELOPMENTS IN SOME COUNTRIES.................. (421) 

 (I) THE STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE US MILITARY'S 

 INFORMATIONIZATION............................................................ (424) 

 360. What Is the US Military's "Joint Vision 2010"?.............................. (424) 

 361. What Is the US Military's "Joint Vision 2020"?.............................. (426) 

 362. What Is the State of Development of the US Military's Operational 

 Theories for Informationization?..................................................... (429) 

 363. What is the State of Development of the US Military's Information 

 Systems?.......................................................................................... (431) 

 364. What is the State of Development of the US Military's 

 Informationized Weaponry?............................................................ (434) 

 365. What is the State of Development of the US Military's 

 Informationized Force?.................................................................... (436) 

 366. What is the State of the Building of the US Military's 

 Informationized Battlefield?........................................................... (438) 

 367. What Is the State of the US Military's Informationization 

 Training?.......................................................................................... (439) 

 368. What is the State of the Adjustments to the US Military's 

 Organizational Structure?............................................................... (440) 

 369. What Are the Development Trends of the Informationization of 

 The US Military?............................................................................ (441) 

 370. What Is the Goal of the US Army's Informationization 

 Development?.................................................................................. (442) 

 371. What Is the Goal of the US Navy's Informationization 

 Development?.................................................................................. (443) 

 372. What Is the Goal of the US Air Force's Informationization 

 Development?.................................................................................. (443) 

 373. In the End, Is the US Strategic Missile Defense System Useful?.... (445) 

 374. What Space Surveillance Forces Does the US Have?..................... (446) 

 375. What Is the Current Status of US Electronic Reconnaissance 

 Satellites?........................................................................................ (448) 

 376. How Is the Buildup of the US Military's Future "Net Force"?........ (449) 

 377. What Is the State of Development of US Early Warning Satellites? (452) 

 (II) THE STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN 
219

 MILITARY'S INFORMATIONIZATION..................................... (453) 

 378. What Is the State of Development of the Russian Military's 

 Theories on Informationized Operations?...................................... (453) 

 379. What Is the State of Development of the Russian Military's 

 Informationized Weaponry?........................................................... (454) 

 380. What Is the State of Development of the Russian Military's 

 Information Systems?..................................................................... (455) 

 381. What Is the State of the Adjustments to the Russian Military's 

 Organizational Structure?............................................................... (456) 

 382. What Are the Development Trends of the Information Systems of 

 the Russian Military?...................................................................... (456) 

 383. What Are the Development Trends of the Informationized 

 Weaponry of the Russian Military?................................................. (457) 

 384. What Is the State of Development of Russia's Early Warning 

 Satellites?....................................................................................... (457) 

 (III) THE STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE 

 MILITARY'S INFORMATIONIZATION..................................... (459) 

 385. What Is the State of Development of the Japanese Military's 

 Theories on Informationized Operations?...................................... (459) 

 386. What Is the State of the Buildup of the Informationized Force 

 of the Japanese Military?............................................................... (460) 

 387. What Is the State of the Buildup of the Information Systems of 

 the Japanese Military?................................................................... (461) 

 388. What Is the State of Development of Informationized Weaponry 

 of the Japanese Military?.............................................................. (463) 

 389. What Are the Development Trends of the Information Systems of 

 the Japanese Military?.................................................................. (465) 

 390. What Are the Development Trends of the Informationized 

 Weaponry of the Japanese Military?............................................. (465) 

 391. What Are the Development Trends of the Informationized 

 Operational Capabilities of the Japanese Military?...................... (466) 

 (IV) THE STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDIAN 

 MILITARY'S INFORMATIONIZATION................................... (466) 

 392. What Is the State of Development of the Indian Military's 

 Theories on Informationized Operations?..................................... (466) 

 393. What Is the State of Development of the Informationized 

 Weaponry of the Indian Military?................................................. (467) 

 394. What Is the State of the Building of the Indian Military's 

 Information Systems?.................................................................... (469) 

 395. What Is the State of the Indian Military's Preparations for 

 Informationized Operations?........................................................ (470) 

 396. What Is the State of the Indian Military's Development and 

 Making Use of Information Resources?........................................ (470) 

 397. What Are the Development Trends of the Informationization of 

 the Indian Military?....................................................................... (471) 

 398. What Are the Development Trends of the Indian Military's 
220

 Information Systems?.................................................................... (472) 

 399. What Are the Informationization Development Trends of the 

 Indian Military's Weaponry?......................................................... (472) 

 400. What Is the State of India's Development of a New Missile 

 Defense System?........................................................................... (473) 

MAIN REFERENCES AND MATERIALS.................................................... (474) 
221

 CHAPTER NINE: WARFARE STRATEGY THEORY 

This chapter focuses on informationization topics discussed in Warfare Strategy Theory, 

2005.621

Introduction 

The discussion in this chapter ends Decoding the Virtual Dragon in much the way 

it began—with a look at IW/IO through the eyes of Major General Yao Youzhi. Yao 

served as a co-editor of the book reviewed in Chapter One (The Science of Military 

Strategy) and as the Editor-in-Chief of this chapter’s focus, Warfare Strategy Theory. 

This provides an opportunity for the reader to compare Yao’s information warfare 

analysis in 2001 with this 2005 work. 

The 2001 book had only one chapter on informationization and that chapter 

focused on strategic IW. The 2005 book specifically highlights the informationization 

topic in seven of the book’s 37 chapters. In that respect Yao has expanded his 

informationization focus. In addition, the latter work provides an expanded look at the 

features of war in the twenty-first century. These include examinations of the Chinese 

definition and discussion of asymmetric, nontraditional, antiterror, and nuclear warfare 

concepts among others. The asymmetric discussion is included in this chapter due to its 

relevancy to informationization forces. For example, Yao noted that network centric war 

uses information technology to gain an asymmetric information advantage.622

Yao’s new work has four sections: warfare concepts, features of war, war 

preparations, and implementation. He and his co-editors use US Gulf War and Iraq War 

experiences for emphasis whenever possible. The Table of Contents is located at the end 

of the chapter. 

Informationized Warfare 

 Yao devotes an entire chapter in Warfare Strategy Theory specifically to 

informationized warfare. Here Yao defines informationized war as warfare conducted 

with both sides engaged in war mainly using informationized weapons and the methods 

of operations that go along with it. He believes it is possible for informationized warfare 

to be waged by just one side in a conflict. Information-age warfare is a broader concept 

that represents the integration of various kinds of warfare.623 

Yao notes that the first person in China to use the term “informationized warfare 

under conditions of nuclear deterrence” was scientist Qian Xuesen in 1995. Before long 

this term was widely used in China. Thus while Shen is noted as the father of information 

 

621 This author reviewed editor Yao Youzhi’s Warfare Strategy Theory and credits the content, concepts, 

and ideas to the book’s editor and the authors of the individual chapters. The content of Yao’s book is 

reviewed and paraphrased based on translated material. Translation credit belongs to Senior Chief Bart 

Zobel of the Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command who translated portions of the text. 

622 Yao Youzhi, Editor-in-Chief, Warfare Strategy Theory, Liberation Army Press, 2005, p. 349. 623 Ibid., p. 328. 
222

warfare in China (writing first in 1985), Qian is seen by Yao as the developer of the 

informationized warfare under nuclear deterrence concept.624

Informationized warfare has four main elements: 

 An informationized weaponry system that includes three systems: an 

informationized weapons system, an informationized sensor system, and 

an informationized command and control system 

 An informationized operations theory that includes warfare supremacy 

theories, new operational principles (attacking a center of gravity, 

decapitation, simultaneous operations, full-spectrum dominance, etc.), and 

new combat theories and forms of combat (asymmetry, noncontact and 

nonlinear operations, network-centric warfare, and so on) 

 An informationized military organizational structure that gives 

prominence to: flattened and networked systems; downsizing and 

modularizing the force structure; increasing the proportion of the navy, air 

force and strategic missile force; building an integrated joint force with all 

branches and services; and developing new branches and services (such as 

IW, network warfare, and space warfare) 

 And personnel suited to informationized warfare.625

In addition to these concepts, informationized warfare exhibits new characteristics 

that include transparency, real-time attacks, precision, and effective use of force. 

Transparency allows the battlefield to become clearer for friendly forces while providing 

opportunities to increase an opponent’s “fog of war” via information overload. This also 

means trapping the enemy in the fog of war through the degradation of his information 

collection source, through the monopolization of high-technology information resources, 

and through the establishment of information traps. 

Chinese estimates are that during the Iraq War of 2003 the US knew more than 

90% of the significant events on the battlefield through the use of sensors. The battlefield 

sensor system included space, airborne, and ground/sea sensors capable of integrating 

their findings and creating a multilayered omnidirectional deployment system.626 This 

allowed the US to increase the enemy’s fog of war through the methods described. 

Sensor technologies help a force to stay current to the rapidly changing 

information situation around them and conduct real-time attacks. These attacks include 

obtaining information, making decisions, taking action, and completing attacks in the 

immediate future. The lifespan of information has grown shorter and battlefield 

awareness must be constantly updated. The Chinese believe that the cycle of discovering 

targets and attacking them changed from twenty-four hours in the Gulf War to two hours 

in Kosovo to ten minutes in the Iraq War. This quick response mechanism has been aided 

 

624 Ibid. 625 Ibid., pp. 328-329. 626 Ibid., pp. 330-331. 
223

by a highly developed C4ISR system and a developed global information grid (GIG) in 

the US.627

Informationized weapons are precise and controllable, and they are practically 

unaffected by clouds, mist, dust, or thick smoke. Precision target, firepower, and attack 

intensity control are the main precision operations. Due to precision operations, the use of 

force and the function of information power is now more effective in terms of killing 

power, integration power, and psychological attack power than ever before. Previous 

psychological effects that could only be attained with mass destruction can now be 

attained using informationized conventional weapons. According to Yao the US military 

can track victims or uncover their whereabouts at a moment’s notice and this places 

tremendous psychological pressure on an enemy force. Precision-guided munitions can 

quickly attack and catch combatants completely unaware. Psychological warfare has 

transformed into a form of strategic operation and has moved into politics, economics, 

diplomacy, and culture.628 

Informationization integrates man and machine to an extent never before possible 

and the US has capitalized on this point to enable the rapid development of 

countermeasures and counterstrategies. A new phase of integrated-information 

countermeasures and firepower destruction has also arisen. The Chinese note that the US 

did not relax its countermeasure research in the areas of knowledge, intelligence, and 

strategy because it possessed advanced weapons.629 

Informationized weapons are also forcing the further integration of the armed 

forces and the masses, leading theorists to proclaim that “information warfare is, to a 

certain degree, another form of ‘People’s War.’” 630 Now there are even higher demands 

for personnel with science and technology skills to support and participate in 

informationized war. This also means that informationization can open new territory for 

unconventional operations and make the latter more powerful. It has already made it 

easier for guerilla groups to recruit and organize personnel and to command activities. 

Noncontact operations will be the most typical form of operations in the era of 

informationized warfare. This mainly occurs in space, air, and on sea but not as often on 

the ground in the Chinese opinion since network warfare, electronic warfare, air and 

missile attacks, and counterattacks are the most prevalent form of noncontact operations. 

Informationization’s most notable impact on future war is its ability to make 

informationized weapons such as these into combat force multipliers. 

Yao discusses the organic integration of soft and hard kills. New forms of 

electronic-information countermeasures are attracting attention such as navigation 

warfare, which focuses on navigational and guidance information. Developing the ability 

to jam the US military’s cruise missiles is one such issue. Attacking networks is another 

 

627 Ibid., pp. 331-333. 628 Ibid., pp. 334-337. 629 Ibid., p. 338. 630 Ibid., pp. 339-340. 
224

form of informationized warfare. Networks are usually the softest spot in operational 

systems according to Yao.631 

Yao goes on to describe in more detail the form of network-centric warfare. He 

notes that it will take place in the physical, information, and cognitive domains. The 

physical domain is the tangible arena of real existence where platforms exist. The 

information domain is where the real and false are mixed together and where the fight for 

information dominance and supremacy is conducted. The cognitive domain refers to the 

mental space of operational personnel. Here is where ideas, awareness, psychology, 

perception, understanding, emotions, sense of values, and other mental activities exist. 

The network-centric architecture is made up of sensor systems, information systems 

(communication satellites, etc.), and a processing system. Network-centric architecture 

allows, according to Yao, for “decentralized concentration.” In stovepipes of the past, the 

sum of a force’s combat strength was calculated by adding together all of its parts. 

Today, the sum of a force’s combat strength is the product of all operational elements, 

where combat strength conforms to the principle of multiplication: it is the rule of 

exponential multiplication.632 

In the opinion of the author of Decoding the Virtual Dragon it is difficult to see 

how informationized war differs from information war. Perhaps the distinction is 

reflective of a turf battle in the PLA for information terminology rights. As was evident, 

most of the points covered above were accounted for in earlier discussions of IW. 

Associated Informationized Aspects of Warfare Strategy Theory 

 In addition to the separate chapter on informationized warfare discussed above, 

there are specific sections of other chapters that address the topic of informationization. 

These sections are 

 Reconceptualization of Warfare Objectives under Informationized 

Conditions 

 Features of Informationized Warfare 

 The Scale of High Technology Partial War Is Becoming Increasingly 

Controllable 

 New Time and Space Characteristics of Informationzed Warfare 

 Fully Revised War Concepts Must Be Implemented for Warfare Thought 

in the Information Age 

 Basic Transformations in the Method of Thinking Must Be Implemented 

for Warfare Thought in the Information Age. 

Yao writes that informationized warfare has changed the traditional significance 

of attack, capture, control, and defend. This is because precision attacks have made 

possible the destruction of the enemy’s entire war system. The primary attack target has 

become the strategic information system of an enemy force. All activities now revolve 

 

631 Ibid., pp. 341-345. 632 Ibid., pp. 346-349. 
225

around gaining battlefield supremacy whose foundation is information supremacy. Direct 

destruction of an enemy’s will has supplanted total annihilation of an enemy force’s 

military capability. This will invite completely new methods of warfare in future wars.633 

With regard to features of informationized warfare, Yao lists its main features as 

follows: 

 Informationized weapons are the dominant weapons on the battlefield in 

the form of platforms and ammunition. 

 Information energy (reconnaissance, precision guidance, electronic 

warfare, etc.) is the principal capability unleashed on the battlefield in that 

it can control substance and capability. 

 Informationized warfare is the principal form of war 

 The principle objectives of informationized war are the three major 

systems of battlefield cognition (surveillance, survey, navigation, etc.), 

battlefield communication (transmission of information), and battlefield 

guidance and control. 

 Information superiority is the pinnacle of the battlefield struggle. Through 

information superiority other levels of dominance (airpower, naval space) 

are then possible.634

Yao also notes that since the objectives of a high-tech war are generally limited 

and total victory (annihilation of the enemy, occupation of the entire territory of the 

enemy, etc.) is not required, it is important to control the scale of a high-tech war. War 

control is closely related to the efficiency of the use of the means of war. Instead of 

taking out troops, the focus becomes attacking nodal points and taking out systems.635 As 

a result 

Vying for information superiority takes precedence over air superiority and naval 

superiority, precision attacks are better than city sieges and blanket attacks, 

destruction of the opposition’s will to resist is superior to complete annihilation of 

the enemy’s combat capability, and noncontact war is more powerful than major 

combat.636 

 With regard to time and space, Yao notes that time is more important due to the 

speed of transactions. Operations and tempo are accelerated and the combat process is 

greatly shortened. Now platforms and personnel are integrated and observation tools have 

broken through prior limitations (night vision, etc.) such that war is becoming all-weather 

and all-time. Traditional warfare’s sequential steps are being modified/disrupted. For 

example, the US strives for rapid decisive combat and not a slow pace, phase by phase 

approach. With information transmitted at the speed of light beams, battlefield awareness 

and decision making have changed. Decisions are made quickly as situations are updated 

 

633 Ibid., pp. 99-101. 634 Ibid., pp. 153-156. 635 Ibid., pp. 215-219. 636 Ibid. 
226

in near real-time. Prewar preparations and the adoption of specific strategies and tactics 

must take time and space into account if they are to remain effective. 637 Time must be 

compressed by decreasing the number of links and increasing the information 

transmission speed.638

Another time and space factor is that with the military occupation of intangible 

(virtual) space, vying for cognitive space has increased in importance as an 

informationized trend. Cognitive space must be treated as an independent space since the 

occupation of natural geographical space is moving to an occupation of information and 

cognitive space.639 He states that 

The war objective of informationized war is manifested even more apparently as 

forcing the enemy to succumb and accept control rather than the traditional war 

objectives of taking cities, seizing territories, and directly taking possession of 

resources. It should be understood that the ultimate objective of war is to take 

possession of the enemy’s cognitive space. Cognitive space is based on the 

military theory of cognition of combat outcome...the struggle for cognitive space 

is the highest level of informationized warfare and the objective of the strategic 

mind war of modern warfare.640

 Yao also writes that the development of informationized forces must be closely 

followed so that the PLA can stay abreast of changes in the nature and orientation of 

warfare. There are ten renovations to carry out in this regard. 

 First, he writes that information resources have undergone a qualitative 

leap forward. This requires renovating and reorganizing information 

resources into system resources, dominant resources, and strategic 

resources. Information resources will dominate the entire process of 

war. 

 Second, informationized forces have renovated the concepts of time 

and space mentioned earlier. It is now difficult to barter time for space 

since time processes in war have shrunk to such a great extent. 

 Third, the forms of war and forms of operations must be renovated. 

 Fourth the goals and objectives of war must be renovated. Now instead 

of focusing on annihilating the enemy, the focus must be on 

controlling the enemy. This means focusing on command centers, 

information systems, and information capabilities. The psychological 

intensity of war has also risen. 

 Fifth, weapon concepts must be renovated. EW, early warning, 

reconnaissance, and surveillance equipment must be made to act as 

one whole system in order to realize their potential overall effect. 

 

637 Ibid., pp. 226-229. 638 Ibid. 639 Ibid. 640 Ibid. 
227

 Sixth, combat strength assessments must be renovated. Objective 

assessments must be made of both sides’ information capabilities and 

system structures. A comprehensiveness estimate of the warfare 

strength of the sides’ operational systems must be made. 

 Seventh, there must be a renovation in the concept of troop 

concentration. The focus now must be on qualities and not on numbers 

that emphasize only firepower concentrations. 

 Eighth, combat support must be renovated. Measures must now be 

synchronized and real-time. The support system must be more 

centralized than before. 

 Ninth, the composition of the armed forces must be renovated. 

Attention must be paid to the high-tech development of the Second 

Artillery, Air Force, and Navy even at the expense of ground forces. 

 Tenth, the People’s War concept must be renovated. Now there is 

more space into which People’s War can be extended. The masses can 

still control the enemy as before but in a different fashion.641

Finally, informationized warfare must be accompanied by a change in the way 

war conductors think. For example, information deterrence is a concept that must be 

considered and developed further at the strategic level. It can help achieve national 

strategic objectives and military strategic objectives. Basic methods include information 

technology, information weapons, and information-resource deterrence. 

Counterinformation deterrence theories must also be considered. 

Confrontations are moving in the direction of systemization. The fog of war 

created by information overload must be overcome by a complex system engineered for 

war thought. A commander’s ingenuity is important but no longer sufficient by itself.642

This has become so important in Yao’s opinion that 

If the assistance of electronic computers and artificial intelligence is taken away, 

the principals of war thought basically have no way of planning, managing, and 

responding to information age warfare. Only by achieving the optimal 

combination of the principals of war thought with electronic computers and 

artificial intelligence; utilizing a method of comprehensive systems integration; 

organically and completely integrating the information reasoning, analysis, 

judgment, strategy, and planning capabilities and experiences of the principals of 

war thought with information retrieval and storage, processing, transmission, and 

certain logical reasoning and judgment capabilities of electronic computer 

systems and artificial intelligence systems;...only then is it possible to greatly 

stretch and extend the functions of war thought and make it possible to solve the 

complex, huge, systematic problem of modern warfare.643 

 

641 Ibid., pp. 469-472. 642 Ibid., pp. 475-476. 643 Ibid., pp. 477-481. 
228

Yao states that war strategy has developed to the point where strategy is made 

technological and the use of technology is made strategic. Man-machine integration, 

strategy and tactics integration, and leveraging tactics to carry out strategy are the points 

of emphasis. Any strategy that removes itself from the use of high-technology weapons 

has no useful value according to Yao.644 This includes countermeasure weaponry 

It is necessary to be proficient at utilizing the information superhighway, creating 

misleading information, spreading the fog of war, and jamming and destroying 

the enemy’s strategic awareness, thereby using strategy to control the adversary. 

It is necessary to be proficient at using electronic feints, electronic camouflage, 

electronic jamming, virus attacks, and space satellite jamming and deception, 

leading the enemy to draw the wrong conclusion and attaining the goal of 

strategic deception.645

Asymmetric Warfare 

Asymmetric warfare, in the opinion of the author of Decoding the Virtual Dragon, 

is one of the most often used, seldom defined, and misunderstood concepts in the US 

vocabulary. To date, the US military has still not defined the term in its dictionary of 

military terms. The PLA picked up on the term from its early use in the US and continues 

to write about the concept. Asymmetric war, to many US tacticians, implies the ability of 

a weak force to strike a strong force and perhaps therein lies its popularity to the Chinese. 

It has applicability and ties to ancient Chinese military history and their use of 

stratagems. 

The PLA has defined asymmetric war in a host of ways. The most interesting, and 

most removed from any US understanding of the term, was provided by the journal China 

Military Science. A 2002 article stated that “asymmetric warfare is abnormal logic 

bringing together two sides that are pitted one against the other. It radiates the dialectic 

with 12 crafty tactics.”646

The chapter on asymmetric warfare in Warfare Strategy Theory defines 

asymmetric warfare differently which shows that they too are having trouble explaining 

the term. Initially editor Yao suggested that asymmetric warfare is war in which “there 

are great disparities in the numbers of the armed forces or distinctive superiorities and 

inferiorities in the quality of weapons of the antagonistic sides.”647 Yao stated that it is 

not proper to believe that an “age gap” in weaponry can be called asymmetric warfare 

since it is not all that asymmetry implies. Viewing asymmetry from a comprehensive 

perspective, Yao then states that the fundamental meaning of asymmetry is 

An imbalance in strength, so asymmetric warfare, simply speaking, is warfare in 

which there is a great disparity in the strengths of the two sides engaged in 

 

644 Ibid. 645 Ibid. 646 Kang Hengzhen, “The Origin and Development of Asymmetric Strategy,” China Military Science, No 3, 

2002, pp. 70-76 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 6 March 2003. 

647 Warfare Strategy Theory, pp. 253-256. 
229

combat. Strength is the composite force that includes military strength and 

economic strength. The degree of strength is determined, generally speaking, by 

the differences in the industrial and technological levels of both sides.648

 There is also a difference, Yao notes, between asymmetric operations and 

asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric operations consider methods of operations and forms of 

operations. It is a kind of measure taken to win an advantage in asymmetric warfare and 

falls in the campaign and tactics realm. Asymmetric operations refer to the side with 

weaker science and technology strengths calling upon its own strategy to curb the 

opponent, while the side with stronger science and technology strengths uses its own 

relatively superior science and technology to suppress the opponent.649

Asymmetric warfare, on the other hand, includes the initiation, conduct, and 

conclusion of wars. It is a category of warfare and is a part of the strategic level and must 

take into consideration factors such as politics, economics, culture, religion, psychology, 

geography, and weather. Asymmetric warfare is operational patterns for controlling 

strategic or campaign initiative while avoiding the enemy’s strengths and attacking his 

weaknesses.650 In this latter sense, Yao agrees with some US tacticians. 

A superior side can initiate asymmetric warfare 

 When it considers its own national interests absolute and magnifies 

them and encroaches on the national interests of a smaller country 

 When it uses the values of strategic culture and superiority in a 

country’s ideological makeup 

 When it uses its lead in science and technology to its benefit 

(information technology has laid out a foundation for asymmetric war) 

 When there are a lack of international arrangements for constraint 

 And when the strong appear capable of defeating the weak.651 

The inferior side can initiate asymmetric warfare 

 When it adopts a strategy of limited aims/fait accompli 

 When the inferior side has short-term offensive capabilities 

 When it has the support of powerful allies 

 Or when there is a change in the political power structure of a country 

or when extremist organizations and radical military organizations 

gain control of making policy.652 

Yao also lists expected outcomes for the following types of clashes: direct offense 

of a superior force versus the direct defense of an inferior force (superior side wins), 

 

648 Ibid. 649 Ibid. 650 Ibid. 651 Ibid., pp. 257-259. 652 Ibid., pp. 259-261. 
230

direct offense of a superior force versus the indirect defense of an inferior force (inferior 

side or indirect defense will win as long as it has sanctuary and society’s support), 

indirect offense of a superior force versus the direct defense of an inferior force (superior 

force loses), and indirect offense versus indirect defense (superior side will win if it 

adopts brutal tactics).653

Yao lists characteristics of asymmetric warfare in the post-Cold War era. They are 

interesting and worthy of consideration. Yao initially discusses asymmetries between the 

forces of opposing sides. First, he states that there is now asymmetry in the principles of 

war. This is because instead of one country fighting another country, now we have 

countries fighting terrorists, drug cartels, and criminal groups. Second there are 

asymmetries in military strength due to the advancements in science and technology that 

some states have made as well as the economic support that some countries possess. 

Third, there is asymmetry in international support for operations where allies join in to 

confront a single country. Finally there is asymmetry in combat capabilities as a result of 

technology and economics. 

Second, Yao notes that there is now asymmetry in operational space that is 

becoming more and more evident. The operational space of a superior side is increasing 

while that of the inferior side is decreasing. Further, nontransparency (superior side) and 

transparency (inferior side) of operational space exist side by side which gives even more 

initiative to the superior side. 

Third, Yao states that increased asymmetry exists in time. Here he is referring to 

time spent on combat in general. While the superior side usually desires a quick decisive 

victory, an inferior side often wants a protracted conflict. In unconventional warfare the 

initiative is often controlled by the inferior side and time is on the side of the group that 

can drag out the conflict the longest. 

Fourth, Yao states that combat is getting more and more diverse. Now analysts 

talk about mobile warfare, maneuver warfare, position warfare, noncontact and nonlinear 

warfare, and many other standard operations along with guerilla warfare, special 

operations, antiterrorism operations, and other nonstandard operations. Analysts also 

discuss virtual network attacks, economic warfare, and trade-embargo warfare among 

other issues. Yao recommends a close study of these issues. He notes that these new 

characteristics and rules are important for China to study and learn so they can capitalize 

on lessons learned by others who have preceded them.654

Conclusions 

 Yao’s book is worthy of consideration as a solid source on contemporary Chinese 

military thinking with regard to warfare in general. This chapter only focuses on the 

informationization aspects of Yao’s book and their relation to strategic issues. Yao 

implies that the relationship is quite important when he notes that “any strategy that 

removes itself from the use of high-technology weapons has no useful value.” 

 

653 Ibid., pp. 261-265. 654 Ibid., pp. 265-267. 
231

Also of particular interest to the IW specialist is the spotlight Yao places on 

cognitive, systems, and control issues. System issues are discussed quite frequently in 

the Western military circles and do not require explicit attention here. But the cognition 

and control issues are less often discussed and merit our attention. 

Both Dai and Shen stressed cognition and control in their earlier works so Yao’s 

attention to them appears to continue a trend established a few years ago. Whether this is 

part of the strategy of “winning without fighting” is not known for certain, but it does fit 

that paradigm. If one can control the will and emotions of a foe or control the information 

that an enemy commander is receiving on the battlefield, then it will be much easier to 

conquer that foe. Even winning without fighting is a possibility. Dai covers the cognition 

element well in his discussion of network psychological war. 

Control deserves a few more words, however. War control is defined as a 

“commander’s implementation of restricting and limiting behavior on the occurrence, 

development, scale, strength, and end result of war.” In the information age this can 

include the use of information deterrence measures to contain war. But other factors are 

also at work. Precision-guidance weaponry has become a tool to control war. Information 

technology has produced both battlefield and socio-political transparency, and this has 

increased control by placing every move under close scrutiny. Economic and technical 

means are now more effective than the use of direct military means to secure interests, 

and this has improved control.655 

With regard to asymmetric warfare, perhaps informationization will become an 

important element of asymmetric warfare (or vice versa!). Many of the points that Yao 

stresses about informationization (the change in the importance of time and space, in the 

principles of war, and in the diversity of warfare) are also addressed in the asymmetric 

warfare discussion. This indicates a close link between the two. He recommends a close 

study of these issues and hopes that China can capitalize on lessons learned by others. 

The information-generated fog of war may, for example, be one of Yao’s asymmetric 

methods of attack. 

In short, even though Yao’s new work does not offer much new in the area of 

informationization, it is nonetheless impressive for its breadth and depth of analysis of 

warfare. It is worthy of close examination by military specialists in general. 

 

655 Ibid., pp. 577-580. 
232

Warfare Strategy Theory 

Yao Youzhi, Editor-in-Chief 

2005 

Table of Contents 

Yao Youzhi: Editor-In-Chief 

Chen Yikang: Chief Editor 

Ma Debao, Yu Miao: Assistant Editors 

Publisher: Liberation Army Press 

Date of Publication: 2005 

Introduction ............................................................................................. 1 

Section I – Warfare Concepts 

Chapter 1 Warfare Concepts ....................................................................................... 1 

 (1) Theoretical Analysis of Warfare Concepts – Compositional Elements and 

 Current Circumstances .............................................................. 1 

 (2) Actual Rules for Warfare Behavior – Circumstances and Indications of 

 Warfare Start and End .............................................................. 8 

 (3) Misconceptions about Warfare Concepts – Errors and Misinterpretations 

 of the “General Discussion of the Theory of Warfare” ...................... 12 

Chapter 2 War Motivation ........................................................................ 19

 (1) The Motivations for War Are Continually Developing....................... 19 

 (2) The Motivations for War Are Varied and Complex................................. 23 

 (3) Problems with Looking Historically at Motivations for War ............... 27 

Chapter 3 Warfare Force ....................................................................... 34 

 (1) War Is an Organized Confrontation of Force ................................. 34 

 (2) Modern Warfare Developments and Resultant Changes to the Nature of 

Its Force ............................................................................ 37 

 (3) Warfare Violence Characteristics and Manifestations ....................... 43 

Chapter 4 Characteristics of War .............................................................................. 49 

 (1) Western Justice Warfare ......................................................... 49 

 (2) Warfare Characteristics within the Boundaries of International Law ..... 52 

 (3) Theory of Marxist Warfare Characteristics .................................... 56 

 (4) Questions of Justice in Current Warfare .................................................. 58 

Chapter 5 The Effects of War ................................................................. 68 

 (1) The Effect of Warfare Is Historical ........................................... 68 

 (2) The Effects of Warfare Are Different because Its Characteristics Are 

 Different ........................................................................... 71 

 (3) There Are Many Direct Effects of Warfare ............................................. 75 

 (4) Manifestation of the Effects of Modern Warfare is Changing ................ 83 
233

Chapter 6 War Objectives ........................................................................................ 88 

 (1) Connotations of Warfare Objectives and Their Relationship to the 

 Purpose of War ........................................................................................ 88 

 (2) Primary Characteristics of the Objectives of War ................................... 93 

 (3) Selection and Planning, Management and Control of Warfare 

 Objectives ................................................................................................ 95 

 (4) Reconceptualization of Warfare Objectives under Informatized 

 Conditions ................................................................................................ 99 

Chapter 7 Warfare Morality and Justice ................................................................. 102 

 (1) Four Basic Positions on Warfare and Morality ...................................... 102 

 (2) Basic Principles of Modern Warfare Morality and Justice .................... 108 

 (3) Contributions of the Chinese Government to Modern Warfare Morality 

 and Justice .............................................................................................. 120 

 (4) Development Prospects for Modern Warfare Morality and Justice ....... 123 

Chapter 8 Warfare Victory and Defeat ................................................................... 128 

 (1) Historical Evolution of Warfare Victory and Defeat Concepts ............. 128 

 (2) Challenges to Traditional Warfare Victory and Defeat Concepts ......... 132 

 (3) Establishment of New Types of Warfare Victory and Defeat Concepts 

that Embody the Characteristics of the Era ............................................ 136 

Section II – The Features of Warfare 

Chapter 9 Forms of Warfare .................................................................................. 148 

 (1) Characteristics and Signs of Historical Forms of Warfare .................... 148 

 (2) Features of Informatized Warfare ......................................................... 153 

 (3) Inevitability of Evolution of Warfare Forms ......................................... 156 

 (4) Developmental Patterns of Warfare Forms ........................................... 160 

 

Chapter 10 Modes and Styles of Warfare ................................................................ 166 

 (1) Modes of Warfare .................................................................................. 166 

 (2) Styles of Warfare ................................................................................... 183 

Chapter 11 Scale of Warfare .................................................................................... 207 

 (1) Historical Trends of Changes in the Scale of Warfare and Determining 

 Factors .................................................................................................... 207 

 (2) Principal Measurement Indices for the Scale of Warfare ...................... 209 

 (3) World War and Local War ..................................................................... 211 

 (4) The Scale of High Technology Local War Is Becoming Increasingly 

 Controllable ............................................................................................ 215 

Chapter 12 Warfare Time and Space ........................................................................ 219 

 (1) Warfare Time and Space and Associated Characteristics ...................... 219 

 (2) Important Effects of Recognizing Warfare Time and Space ................. 226 
234

 (3) New Time and Space Characteristics of Informatized Warfare ............ 229 

Chapter 13 Warfare Structure ................................................................................... 235 

 (1) Features of Prominent Structural Force in High Technology Warfare .. 236 

 (2) Warfare Systemization Is a Product of the Grand Development of 

Military Science and Technology .......................................................... 242 

 (3) Taking Hold of Structural Force Becomes the Core of Strategic 

Direction ................................................................................................ 247 

Chapter 14 Asymmetrical Warfare ........................................................................... 253 

 (1) Internal Rules for Asymmetrical Warfare .............................................. 253 

 (2) Generation Mechanisms of Asymmetrical Warfare .............................. 256 

 (3) Outcome Analysis of Asymmetrical Warfare ........................................ 261 

 (4) Features of Asymmetrical Warfare in the Late Cold War Period .......... 265 

Chapter 15 Nontraditional Warfare .......................................................................... 268 

 (1) Boundaries of Nontraditional Warfare and Their Motivations ............. 268 

 (2) Principal Types of Nontraditional Warfare ........................................... 270 

 (3) Several Points for Consideration of Nontraditional Warfare ................ 273 

Chapter 16 Quasi-warfare ......................................................................................... 276 

 (1) Quasi-warfare and Its Forms .................................................................. 276 

 (2) Features of Quasi-warfare ...................................................................... 279 

 (3) Differences and Connections between Quasi-warfare and Warfare ...... 281 

 (4) Reasons for Frequent Incidence of Quasi-warfare ................................. 284 

 (5) General Guidance Rules for Quasi-warfare ........................................... 286 

 (6) Development Trends of Quasi-warfare .................................................. 289 

Chapter 17 Antiterror Warfare ................................................................................. 291 

 (1) Outline of Antiterror Warfare ................................................................ 291 

 (2) Causes and Sources of Antiterror Warfare ............................................ 296 

 (3) Features of Antiterror Warfare .............................................................. 301 

 (4) Development Trends of Antiterror Warfare and Effects of Antiterror 

 Warfare on the International Structure and Security Strategy of 

Principal Countries and its Development Trends .................................. 304 

 

Chapter 18 Nuclear Warfare ..................................................................................... 312 

 (1) Basic Rules of Nuclear Warfare ............................................................ 312 

 (2) Modern Nuclear Military Theory .......................................................... 320 

 (3) Nuclear Warfare in the Information Age ............................................... 323 

Chapter 19 Informatized Warfare ............................................................................. 328 

 (1) Informatized Warfare Is an Historical Leap of the Shape of Warfare ... 328 

 (2) Informatized Warfare Is the Abandonment of Traditional Warfare ...... 337 

 (3) Network-centered War Will Become the New Style of Informatized 

 Warfare .................................................................................................. 346 
235

 

Section III – War Preparation 

Chapter 20 Concepts of War Preparation ................................................................. 350 

 (1) There Is Serious Danger of War, and Strategic Concepts are 

Absolutely Necessary ............................................................................. 350 

 (2) War Preparation Is Related to National Security, and the Strategic 

 Concepts of All People Are of Utmost Importance ............................... 352 

 (3) The Side that Can Fight Can Also Hold Back the Fighting, Constant 

 War Preparation Is the Army’s Iron Rule .............................................. 356 

 (4) Only Preparation Can Relieve Concern, War Preparation Will Always 

Be the Key .............................................................................................. 359 

Chapter 21 War Planning ......................................................................................... 361 

 (1) War Planning Basic Theory and Historical Experience ........................ 361 

 (2) The “Network-centered War” Cannot Be Separate from War Planning 366 

 (3) Information Technology Is the Mainstay of the “Star Wars" Plan ........ 367 

 (4) Modern Warfare Relies Even More on Well-Conceived War Planning 370 

 

Chapter 22 War Power ............................................................................................. 374 

 (1) War Power Operating Rules .................................................................. 374 

 (2) Overall Structure of War Power ............................................................ 380 

 (3) Basic Features of War Power ................................................................ 384 

 (4) Quantification Assessment of War Power ............................................. 388 

 (5) Changing Trends of War Power ............................................................ 391 

 

Chapter 23 Weaponry ............................................................................................... 394 

 (1) Weaponry Emergence and Development are Important Driving 

Forces Needed for War .......................................................................... 395 

 (2) Technological Progress is the Decisive Factor in the Development 

of Weaponry ........................................................................................... 398 

 (3) Scientific Weaponry Theory is the Guide for Weaponry Development 400 

 (4) Promoting Ever Increasing Troop Combat Strength by Constantly 

 Updating Weaponry ............................................................................... 402 

 (5) Weaponry Building Must Be Done Hand in Hand with Cultivation of 

High Quality Personnel .......................................................................... 404 

 (6) Relying on the Internal Impetus of Weaponry to Promote Development 

of Weaponry along the Right Path......................................................... 407 

 (7) The Development of Weaponry Brings New Military Transformations 

and Is One of Its Main Components ...................................................... 410 

 (8) Controllable Weapons That Restrain War Such as Small-scale Nuclear 

 Weapons Are Becoming Increasingly Important ................................... 412 

Chapter 24 Combat Organization ............................................................................ 416 

 (1) Basic Theory of Combat Organization ................................................. 416 

 (2) Combat Organization in High Technology Warfare ............................. 421 
236

 (3) Effect of New Military Changes on Combat Organization ................... 428 

 

Chapter 25 Rules of Warfare .................................................................................... 432 

 (1) Warfare Rules Have Demonstrated Civilization and Progress in 

Human Society ....................................................................................... 432 

 (2) Warfare Rules Play an Important Role in Restricting War and its 

 Perniciousness ........................................................................................ 435 

 (3) Efficacy and Limitations of a Dialectical View of Warfare Rules ........ 441 

 (4) Application of a Correct Understanding and Grasp of Warfare Rules 

in Modern Warfare ................................................................................. 445 

Chapter 26 Mobilization of War ............................................................................... 448 

 (1) Practical Paths and Theoretical Evolution of War Mobilization ........... 448 

 (2) Problems Related to War Mobilization .................................................. 451 

 (3) New Models for War Mobilization in the Twenty-first Century............ 454 

Section IV – Implementation of Warfare 

Chapter 27 Warfare Thought .................................................................................... 466 

 (1) The Essence of Warfare Thought and Its Significance for Warfare 

 Guidance ................................................................................................ 466 

 (2) Fully Revised War Concepts Must Be Implemented for Warfare 

Thought in the Information Age ............................................................ 469 

 (3) Basic Transformations in the Method of Thinking Must be 

Implemented for Warfare Thought in the Information Age .................. 473 

Chapter 28 Means of Warfare .................................................................................. 481 

 (1) Force Is Still the Essence of Modern Warfare, but Shades of 

"Humanity" Are More Involved ............................................................ 481 

 (2) The Expansion of Modern Means of Warfare ....................................... 484 

 (3) Operating Features of Modern Means of Warfare ................................. 487 

 

Chapter 29 People’s War .......................................................................................... 490 

 (1) The Essence of Mao Zedong’s People’s War Ideology ......................... 492 

 (2) People’s Warfare Faces Opportunities and Challenges ......................... 492 

 (3) Innovation and Development of People’s War Ideology ....................... 498 

Chapter 30 War Assurances ..................................................................................... 504 

 (1) Historical Track of Logistical Assurances ............................................. 504 

 (2) Logistical Assurances Are a Strategic Problem that Impacts the 

Success or Failure of War ...................................................................... 508 

 (3) War Assurances Are Becoming Increasingly “Precise”......................... 518 

Chapter 31 Warfare Guidance .................................................................................. 521 

 (1) Rules for Warfare Guidance .................................................................. 521 

 (2) Basic Links of Warfare Guidance .......................................................... 524 
237

 (3) Understanding New Warfare Rules ....................................................... 527 

 (4) Developing the Ideology of Warfare Guidance for China’s Army ........ 530 

 

Chapter 32 Warfare Supremacy Theory ................................................................... 536 

 (1) The Concept, Component Factors, and Characteristics of Supremacy.. 536 

 (2) Supremacy Theory and Its Evolution .................................................... 538 

 (3) Interrelationships between Each of the Supremacy Theories ................ 552 

 (4) Development Trends of Supremacy Theory .......................................... 554 

Chapter 33 Theory of Initial War Stages .................................................................. 557 

 (1) The Initial Stages of War Receive General Emphasis ........................... 557 

 (2) New Features of the Initial Stages of Modern War ............................... 561 

 (3) Only with Thorough Preparation Can the Right to War Initiative Be 

Won in the Early Stages of Conflict ...................................................... 568 

 (4) Evaluating the Military Strategy of “Gaining the Initiative by Striking 

 First” ...................................................................................................... 570 

Chapter 34 War Control Theory ............................................................................... 572 

 (1) War Control and Its Relationship to Local War .................................... 572 

 (2) The Origins and Evolution of War Control Ideology ............................ 574 

 (3) The Premises and Conditions of War Control ....................................... 577 

 (4) Principal Content of War Control Theory ............................................. 581 

 (5) The Significance of War Control Theory .............................................. 584 

Chapter 35 War Conclusion Theory ......................................................................... 588 

 (1) War Conclusion Content to Be Studied ................................................. 588 

 (2) Restrictive Factors in the Conclusion of War ........................................ 592 

 (3) General Principles of War Conclusion .................................................. 595 

 (4) Basic Principles of Conclusion of High Technology Local War ........... 598 

 

Chapter 36 Benefits of War ...................................................................................... 603 

 (1) Boundaries of the Benefits of War ........................................................ 603 

 (2) Principal Factors Affecting the Benefits of War ................................... 606 

 (3) Pursuit of War Benefits Is an Objective Requirement and Necessary 

Trend in Economic and Military Development ..................................... 609 

 (4) Controllability of Modern Warfare Makes Pursuit of Comprehensive 

 Benefits Possible .................................................................................... 612 

 (5) Innovation Is the Basic Path for Pursuit of Optimal Comprehensive 

War Benefits .......................................................................................... 614 

 

Chapter 37 Arms Theory .......................................................................................... 618 

 (1) Historical Development of Arms Theory Cognition ............................. 618 

 (2) Foundation for the Consideration of Arms Theory ................................ 625 

 (3) Predicaments and Directions of Arms Theory Practice ......................... 631 

Primary References ........................................................................................................ 643
238
239

CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS 

Decode: 1. to convert into intelligible form. To recognize and interpret. 2. decipher. To 

discover the underlying meaning of.656

Introduction 

The development of military affairs in the twenty-first century has caused Chinese 

theorists to rethink how to apply stratagems and strategy. The main causes of change 

were the recognition of the impact of information and system technology and weapon 

miniaturization on military affairs. 

The information factor has offered a new vector for Chinese military pursuit. In 

recent Chinese White Papers on national defense this vector was described as the 

requirement to informationize the armed forces. The 2006 White Paper, for example, 

stated that the RMA is developing worldwide and, based on informationization, military 

competition is intensifying. The White Paper added that informationization will be used 

as the main criteria to measure the qualitative improvement of the People’s Liberation 

Army (PLA); that for China to build a strong defense, it must build informatized armed 

forces and be capable of winning informatized wars by the middle of the twenty-first 

century; and that the PLA has built virtual laboratories, digital libraries, and digital 

campuses to support the training and teaching needed to field this informatized force.657

 

The mission of Decoding the Virtual Dragon was to illuminate for the Western 

reader Chinese thinking on these changes and how the PLA is integrating them into the 

force as the PLA transforms from a mechanized to an informationized force. This was 

accomplished in three stages. First, there was a discussion of the Chinese definition of 

strategy (its basic and applied aspects) and how information warfare/information 

operations (IW/IO) fits into the PLA concept of military science, specifically into the 

science of information operations. In a similar fashion, there was a discussion of how the 

revolution in military affairs, which is information-technology based, affected strategy. 

Second, there was an examination of two books regarding information operation concepts 

that were not available to this author when his first Chinese IW book, Dragon Bytes, was 

published. That examination covered the 1999-2003 period and discussed some of the 

concepts and first steps to teach the force about information technology’s (IT’s) impact 

on military affairs. Finally, there was a review of three works from 2004 through 2006. 

One explored how China views network-centric warfare in the US and in China. The 

second examined a host of terms that are defining informationization issues. The third 

looked at Major General Yao Youzhi’s 2005 perspective on warfare strategy. These 

works indicate how IO has taken hold of military affairs in China. 

 

656 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition, Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1998, p. 299. 657 China’s White Paper on National Defense 2006, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 29 December 2006, 

as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website on 31 December 2006. 
240

In the course of the investigation, a number of issues were raised that shed greater 

light on these Chinese concepts, their integration, and potential meaning. It is the purpose 

of this chapter to consolidate these items into eight key issues and some final thoughts. In 

this manner it is hoped that one can decode or “convert into intelligible form” what 

Chinese IO is all about and how it fits into a larger geo-strategic picture for the PLA. 

Exploring Components of the Strategy-IO Relationship 

One of the key lessons of this research was discussing the difference in how US 

and Chinese military professionals define strategy. Strategic studies are looked upon by 

the PLA as cognitive activities. In this endeavor Chinese military academicians still 

utilize Marxist cognitive methods, believing they provide a golden key to analyze 

strategic problems comprehensively, dialectically, objectively, systematically, 

continuously, concretely, and connectedly.658 This implies that methods of stratagem 

confrontation; methods of prediction; and methods of experiment and simulation are 

used.659 

In stratagem confrontation the subject must confront the enemy through strategic 

activities with better wisdom. He must analyze truth and falseness, compare strength and 

weakness, and employ orthodox and unorthodox tactics via dialectics. Stratagem is made 

up of dialectics, logic, math, and other scientific methods. In methods of prediction, one 

must make correct inferences or judgments based on knowledge of the objective laws of 

war. Methods of experiment and simulation are important means of coming up with an 

analytical judgment and, therefore, strategy.660 Cognitive activities thus become the 

indirect method to defeat an opponent. 

Chinese strategists emphasize objective and subjective factors as a focal point and 

way of viewing and applying strategy. US professional do not use this technique. While 

the Chinese attach great importance to the substance and laws of war, they attach equal 

importance, it appears, to the application of subjective creativity to objective conditions. 

Objective conditions include the distribution of forces, defense budgets, level of 

science and technology, the economy, politics, military power, and the general potential 

of nations to generate power. These are some of the criteria a war conductor or strategic 

commander must consider in the development of strategy. 

Subjective creativity applies experience and knowledge to these objective 

conditions in the form of strategic judgments and decisions. The characteristics of 

strategic thinking include totality (comprehensive look at the parts and elements), 

confrontation (contest of material and spiritual forces), certainty (start with the fact that 

war is full of uncertainty about the enemy situation but end with certain conclusions 

about the enemy), foresight (use history, current factors, wisdom, and resolution to 

visualize future war), creativity (the soul of strategic thinking requires subjective 

initiative to surpass experience and tradition), and inheritance (culture). It takes into 

 

658 Ibid., p. 150. 659 Ibid., pp. 138-143. 660 Ibid. 
241

consideration the subjective will of the opponent. When subjectivity is applied to 

objective conditions the result is the creation of strategy. The Chinese war conductor 

attempts to find ways to creatively manipulate, deter, or overcome deficiencies and 

exploit opportunities.661 

This objective-subjective prism has become the basis for many Chinese 

definitions or explanations for war and strategy. For example, the Science of Military 

Strategy notes: 

The objective physical conditions of war determine the laws of war as well as the 

guiding laws of war. Although strategy manifests itself in a war conductor’s 

activities of subjective guidance, it is by no means the war conductor’s personally 

extemporary elaboration. Instead it is based on given objective physical 

conditions and restricted by a certain social mode of production and certain social 

conditions of history. Therefore, it is an important task for studies of the science 

of strategy to correctly analyze the objective elements having a bearing on war 

strategy and reveal their inherent connections with war strategy.662

Mao as well noted that war is a contest in subjective ability between commanders of 

opposing armies for the initiative and attainment of superiority on the basis of material 

conditions such as military forces and financial resources.663 

Yao and Peng subdivided the science of military strategy into basic and applied 

theoretical aspects. In the basic theory field of the strategy of military science, they listed 

a host of factors that defined objective conditions. Some were situational, some material, 

some cultural, and some ideological. These factors included: 

 National interests, war strength, and war potential of opposing forces 

 International and domestic political situations (the international 

political configuration, international coalitions, and international 

organizations) 

 The strategic intentions of major states 

 The overall balance of power 

 The influence and restrictions of domestic politics664

 Geo-strategic relationships 

 Natural geographic elements (a state’s geographic position, size and 

shape of territory, natural resources, national capital, frontiers and 

national boundaries, distance between states, and grand strategic 

space) 

 

661 Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, editors, The Science of Military Strategy, Military Science Publishing 

House, Beijing, English Edition, 2005, pp. 132-133. 

662 Ibid., p. 39. 663 Ibid., p. 57. The three stages of protracted war were listed as the enemy’s strategic offense and friendly 

strategic defense, the enemy’s strategic consolidation and friendly preparation for the counteroffensive, and 

friendly counteroffensive and the enemy’s strategic retreat. 

664 Peng and Yao, pp. 53-55. 
242

 Human geographic elements 

 Vital interests between states, interests of nations, and religions 

 Various strategic alliances 

 Geo-economic relations665 

 And a comprehensive view from various aspects and stages (space, 

time, etc.).666 

The applied aspect of theory is the actual application of thinking to basic criteria. 

This includes the formulation of strategy (judgment, planning, decision making), and 

performance of strategy (guidance for the employment and construction of military 

forces). In general these issues included in their explanations both objective and 

subjective criteria. For example, Peng and Yao wrote that strategic command is based on 

the objective reality of war. This refers to all the objective conditions such as combat 

forces, battlefield posture, space-time environment and command system, and spiritual 

factors such as consciousness, morale, and the feelings of the troops. Subjectivity is the 

directing and waging of war and man’s conscious dynamic role in it. Subjective efforts 

become an important manifestation of the strategic art of command.667 

Even for concluding a war it was noted that objective and subjective factors are 

important: 

There are subjective and objective implications for the timing of concluding a 

war. Objectively, it means that war has developed to a certain extent and satisfies 

the conditions for its conclusion within a certain timeframe. Subjectively, it 

means the choice made by the war conductors on the timing for concluding the 

war according to changes in war conditions. To end the war, objective conditions 

and proper timing are equally important.668

There are, of course, alternate Chinese definitions and explanations of strategy for 

the reader to consider. One source that can be considered as authoritative, at least in its 

open source (publicly available) nature, is the Chinese Military Encyclopedia. It defines 

strategy in the following way: 

Strategy is the analytical judgment of such factors as international conditions, 

hostilities in bilateral politics, military economics, science and technology, and 

geography as they apply to the preparation and direction of the overall 

military/war plan. It is advantageous: to study the occurrences and developments 

in war forecasting/predictions; to formulate strategic policy, strategic principles, 

and strategic plans; to make warfare preparations; and to put into place directives 

on the actual principles and methods of warfare.669

 

665 Ibid., pp. 62-72. 666 Ibid., p. 9. 667 Ibid., pp. 266-267. 668 Ibid., p. 381. 669 Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Academy of Military Science Press, Volume 3, July 1997, p. 699. 
243

In brief, the encyclopedia states that strategy is an analytical judgment of how certain 

factors apply to the preparation and direction of a war plan. It does not appear to 

emphasize objective-subjective conditions except in a circumstantial way. 

 A second key issue of this research was discovering how the PLA’s definition of 

IW and IO has changed through the years. This point can determine how informationbased equipment is applied in conflict or battle and is worthy of examination. Chapter 

One of the book Dragon Bytes covered this item extensively for the years 1999-2003. 

Major General (retired) Dai Qingmin’s Direct Information War was written and 

published during this time period but was unavailable to this author when Dragon Bytes 

was written. It was covered in this volume since it offered one more definition for both 

IW and IO. The 2005 book he directed, Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, 

offered yet another more updated definition of IW and IO. One can see from the 

discussion below that the definition of the terms (with Chinese characteristics) is 

progressing. 

In his 2002 work Direct Information War, Dai defined information war in the 

following manner: “This term refers to the use of computer network systems to gain 

enemy intelligence and destroy enemy systems in order to improve the military’s defense 

and attack capabilities as well as the intelligence capabilities of one’s own side....it is 

attacking the enemy’s ‘nervous system’ with viruses and various long-range control 

measures, paralyzing the computer network system of his headquarters, or entering 

wrong intelligence and wrong commands into the enemy’s military command system, 

thereby reaching the goal of victory in war.”670 The work in which this definition 

appeared was about network warfare. 

In the 2005 Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, Dai and his coworkers defined information war quite differently: 

Information warfare first appeared as an item in Military Terms Used by the 

People’s Liberation Army of China published by the Academy of Military 

Sciences in September of 1997. It was defined as ‘countermeasure activities in the 

information realm performed by two sides in a conflict, primarily in contending 

for information resources, in gaining the initiative in the production, transmission 

and processing of information, and in destroying the enemy’s information 

transmission as a means of creating favorable conditions for containing or 

winning a war.’ 

Information warfare is a broad concept, and is defined in both broad and narrow 

senses. The broad sense of information warfare, also known as strategic 

information warfare, refers to countermeasures and combat using information and 

information technology by two sides in a conflict as a means of gaining 

information superiority in the areas of politics, the economy, science, technology, 

diplomacy, culture, and the military, both in the civilian and military realms, 

during peacetime or in times of war, either on the battlefield or off of it. The 

 

670 Dai Qingmin, Direct Information War, National Defense University Publishing House, 2002, p. 108. 
244

narrow sense of information warfare is that it is the information countermeasures 

performed in the information realm by two sides in a conflict as a means of 

gaining information superiority, i.e. what the US military calls ‘battlefield 

information warfare.’ The narrow sense of information warfare manifests itself 

mainly in the form of intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, network warfare, 

and psychological warfare. It is developed on the foundation of electronic 

warfare, which is supported by electronic technology. It is, in the main, still 

electronic warfare. The broad and narrow senses of information are not 

completely distinct from each other, but are often intertwined, each advancing and 

acting upon the other. 

The more consistent view holds that information warfare consists of military 

countermeasure actions using information operations and other related operational 

powers to achieve and maintain information superiority. The definition currently 

employed by the Chinese military typically uses the narrow sense of information 

warfare.671

 There are three points of importance in these definitions. First, the Direct 

Information War definition is offensive, designed to destroy enemy systems to improve 

one’s attack capabilities, and it is targeted against network systems and includes 

deceiving the enemy’s system as much as possible. Second, the Study Guide for 

Information Operations Theory definition of IW is not as offensive oriented, stating 

simply that countermeasures using IO are necessary to achieve information superiority. 

This reliance on countermeasures is recounted in all of the definitions (broad and narrow) 

offered by Dai and will require further investigation by analysts as to what this means. 

Finally, Dai and his coworkers break IW into strategic and battlefield IW. Strategic IW 

includes “politics, the economy, science, technology, diplomacy, culture, and the 

military, both in the civilian and military realms, during peacetime or in times of war, 

either on the battlefield or off of it.” Battlefield IW includes “intelligence warfare, 

electronic warfare, network warfare, and psychological warfare.” This latter definition, of 

course, is close to how the US defines its IO capabilities. 

While these definitions are recent, it would be remiss not to mention how the 

Chinese Military Encyclopedia defined IW. In this case, IW appeared in a year 2000 

addendum to the original 1997 version. Here IW was defined in the following way (the 

complete entry, plus other IW related entries in the Chinese Military Encyclopedia are 

listed in Appendix Two): 

Information Warfare [xinxizhan]- Operations carried out to seize and maintain 

information supremacy (FBIS translators consulted for this definition defined this 

term as control instead of supremacy). According to the time, it can be divided 

into peacetime information warfare and wartime information warfare. Peacetime 

information warfare refers to commonly conducted hostile, two party information 

confrontation in periods of peace in areas such as politics, economics, science and 

 

671 Xu Genchu and Dai Qingmin, Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, Academy of Military 

Science Press, November 2005, pp. 68-69. 
245

technology, foreign relations, culture, and military affairs. Wartime information 

warfare refers to hostile, two-party information warfare carried out in periods of 

war. It includes using many kinds of measures to attack the enemy's information 

and information systems; to damage or sever the enemy's flow of information; 

and to influence, weaken, or destroy the enemy's information operations 

capabilities, while safeguarding the information operations capabilities of one's 

own side. Information warfare includes two mutually connected aspects, and 

those are information attack and information defense.672

Dai apparently used an aspect of this definition in his 2005 work. 

In Direct Information War Dai defines IO in the following manner: “This is the 

general designation for the various operational activities and measures carried out to 

weaken or destroy the useful efficacy of the enemy’s information systems on the 

battlefield, to include ensuring that one’s own information systems retain their efficacy. It 

is an important component in joint operations, it stands side by side with firepower and 

mechanized power as a third attack measure, and it is also the prerequisite and the basis 

for capturing the battlefield initiative.”673 These operational measures have designated 

operational goals, operational objectives, and operational forms. Here Dai limits his 

description to simply operational activities and measures (the latter has goals, objectives, 

and forms) to weaken or destroy enemy systems. 

In Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, there are several definitions of 

IO. They appear to be an attempt to list how the definition has progressed over time. Dai 

and his coworkers note: 

At present there are three main definitions for information operations. The first is 

as follows: ‘Information operations refer to operations used to gain and maintain 

control over information.’ This definition expands the domain of information 

operations, as there are quite a few ways to gain and maintain control over 

information. Second, ‘Information operations refer to a series of operational 

actions employed by two sides in a conflict in which the enemy’s information 

systems are used or destroyed and one’s own information systems are protected as 

a means of gaining the power to acquire, control, and use information.’ Third, 

‘Information operations refer to a series of operational actions undertaken to gain 

and maintain information superiority on the battlefield or control over 

information. The two sides in a conflict use electronic warfare or computer 

network warfare to use or destroy the information and information networks of 

the enemy and protect one's own information networks as a means of acquiring, 

controlling, and using information.’ 

An analysis of the three points given above reveals the two major goals of 

information operations: the first is to destroy the enemy’s information and 

 

672 Tan Haitao and Yang Jie, “Information Warfare,” Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Military Science 

Publishing House 2002, pp. 527-528. 

673 Direct Information War, p. 279. 
246

information systems while protecting one's own; the second is to destroy the 

enemy's cognition and beliefs while protecting one's own. This fully explains why 

information operations are not comprised only of electronic warfare (the use of 

information media, i.e. signals, to destroy information transmissions), but also 

include computer network warfare and psychological warfare (the use of the 

content of information to destroy information systems along with human 

cognition and beliefs). 

It is clear, then, that the targets of information operations are information, 

information systems, and the cognition and beliefs of people. The means 

employed in information operations include information (both information media 

and information content) and weapons and equipment dedicated for attacks on 

information systems. Information operations involve both attacking and 

defending.674

One item common to all three definitions is the requirement to control 

information. From a look at these definitions, control appears more important than 

supremacy. The emphasis in the last paragraph on cognition and beliefs is also a point to 

take seriously, as this was also listed as a key aspect of understanding strategy. 

But Dai and his coworkers added one more definition of IO and it is the last one 

known to this author as this book goes to press (no definition of IO was listed in the 

Chinese Military Encyclopedia). The description lists the targets of IO (information, 

information systems, and the cognition and beliefs of people) and the means employed 

(information [both information media and information content] and weapons and 

equipment dedicated for attacks on information systems). This definition of IO states 

that: 

Information operations are defined as a series of countermeasures employed by 

two sides in a conflict in which information or weapons and equipment controlled 

by information and dedicated to the destruction of information systems are used in 

order to influence and destroy the enemy’s information, information systems, and 

cognition and beliefs, along with preventing the influence and destruction of one’s 

own information, information systems, and cognition and beliefs in the same 

manner by an enemy.675

Again, just as in the definition of IW, countermeasures are used in the definition. Further, 

it is stated that information, weapons, and equipment must be controlled by information 

but dedicated to destroying information systems while protecting Chinese systems. The 

items of countermeasures and control are absent from US definitions and probably are 

worthy of further investigation by analysts.676 The issue of countermeasures will be 

covered in the section on Final Thoughts below. The US focus in IO has been on 

 

674 Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, pp. 70-71. 675 Ibid. 676 The concept of control was covered quite extensively in Dragon Bytes and in Yao’s book Warfare 

Strategy Theory (Chapter 34). 
247

information supremacy, influence operations, and other means while US targets are 

similar to Chinese targets (systems, etc.). Only the Chinese recognition of cognition and 

beliefs as separate items serve as a point of variance in target sets. US analysts, of course, 

argue that psychological operations are the equivalent of cognitive actions. 

Integrating Strategy and IO 

The third key issue of this research was discovering the extent to which Chinese 

authors described the integration of strategy with the influence of IW, IO, and 

information technology. Peng and Yao noted that the PLA must be “guided by the 

principles of military strategy in the new era to bring forth new ideas to push ahead the 

principles of strategic actions for local war under high-tech conditions...”677 This 

strategy-IO or strategy-technology integration was also highlighted by other authors. 

Perhaps the most notable comments were made by IW specialists Shen Weiguang and 

Dai Qingmin. Shen noted, “The issue of information and network security, which 

accompanies the development of informationization, and the rise and increasing 

prominence of information warfare, the form of warfare that is invisible and non-violent, 

is an issue of technology, but above all else it is an issue of strategy.”678

Dai offered a similar statement about the importance and probability of an IW/IOstrategic integration. He noted that “Laying all one’s hopes on technology is dangerous. 

The road to future losses may not be from a fall in technology, it may be primarily poor 

strategy. In reality the informationization of the forms of warfare has opened up an even 

broader space for playing tricks and using strategy and for using the indirect to gain the 

upper hand.”679 Even conditions of technological superiority will not allow for success in 

all cases if strategy is overlooked according to Shen and Dai. Of course such thinking 

also coincides with traditional Chinese thinking and with viewing a situation from a 

position of being the weaker of two contestants in a battle. 

IO has provided the PLA with a new means for applying strategy, one that 

enables a new information-based use of manipulation, deception, and soft (computer) 

destruction as much as hard (physical) destruction. Noted strategist Li Bingyan offered 

the best example. He made three observations: first, how too much information can be 

blinding and prohibit or stilt strategy; second, how there is a way for weak information 

technology nations to successfully attack strong information technology nations with the 

use of stratagems; and third, information technology can serve strategy as an effective 

deterrent and prevent war from ever breaking out. These are direct examples of how IO 

and strategy are being integrated into Chinese thinking. 

In addition to Shen, Dai, and Li, other concepts that fit the strategy-IO paradigm 

were explained in The Science of Military Strategy. These concepts were the result of 

how information affected applied theory. For example, Peng and Yao, writing about the 

strategic maneuver aspect of applied theory of strategy, stated that the struggle in the 

information field may lead to changes in strategic maneuver. In particular, a “strategic 

 

677 Peng and Yao, p. 231. 678 Deciphering Information Security, pp. 26-67. 679 Direct Information War, pp. 292-297. 
248

information operations force may become a new form of strategic maneuver in future 

wars.”680 If such a type of maneuver actually does develop, then other questions must 

also be explored in the applied theory arena. Will there be cyberflanking, 

cyberpenetration, and other cyber activities? One would think so based on the articles that 

have appeared in authoritative Chinese military journals. For example, it was the China 

Military Science article noted in Chapter Four that listed several types of IW stratagems 

for use in the information age. 

A fourth key issue is the Chinese focus on a comprehensive approach in the 

broadest terms. As noted in Chapter One of this work, China tends to view many 

concepts from a comparative comprehensive framework just as they do in their CNP 

analysis. Those items listed in Chapter One were: 

 Comprehensive national power (CNP) 

 Comprehensive sea power (CSP) 

 Comprehensive strategic interest (CSI) 

 Comprehensive strategic targets (CST) 

 Comprehensive strategic benefits (CSB) 

 Comprehensive cyberized war (CCW) 

 Comprehensive confrontation capacity (CCC) 

 Comprehensive national defense construction (CNDC) 

 Comprehensive support efficiency (CSuE) 

 And comprehensive national strategy (CNS). 

CCW represents the most significant integration of strategy and IW. There are 

comprehensive comparative lists in other publications as well. The 2006 Chinese White 

Paper on National Defense, for example, used the term “comprehensive” fifteen times in 

describing its national defense posture. 

The Chinese method of viewing objective factors of power comprehensively is 

different than the methodology used in the US to measure power. While the Chinese CNP 

method uses nine or so elements to develop a power rating, the traditional US focus has 

been on diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) issues; or more recently 

on political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) 

parameters for an understanding of power. 

It is instructive for US analysts to learn China’s CNP methodology for predicting 

their national power assessments. Otherwise, how would a US analyst understand a 

Chinese strategic perspective that is influencing the latter’s thinking? It is worthy of note, 

however, that this is not a military assessment of Chinese power, just a civilian 

assessment. The military assessment would likely include other parameters of which we 

are not aware at this time 

 

680 Peng and Yao, p. 317. 
249

Integrating technology into strategy may also generate new ways for computing 

the CNP of China and other countries. It is an interesting subset of the integration topic 

and should be considered further from the perspective of its strategic framework. CNP is 

a holistic way of looking at objective factors that might be creatively influenced in an IO 

or technical way. Competition would thus not be looked at by the Chinese in a typical US 

bipolar pattern but rather in a manner involving comprehensive national power (CNP) 

issues.681 

An example of CNP (and indicator of how important IO has become to CNP and 

strategy) is implied by a product known as the 2006: World Political Security Report 

(Yellow Book of International Politics). It is a Chinese work that, among other things, 

takes a look at the Chinese concept of comprehensive national power. Wang Ling wrote a 

chapter titled “Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive Power of Major World 

Countries.” In it he asks, “How does international power look at the beginning of the 

century?”; “How does China’s comprehensive power compare with other major 

countries?”; and “How do you determine the criteria for assessing the strength of 

individual countries?”682 For examining national power, Wang’s assessment looked at 

science and technology, human capital, capital resources, information power (he focused 

on infrastructure), natural resources, government regulatory power, military power, 

diplomatic power, and economic power.683 Wang’s assessment could also be considered a 

look at the world’s objective conditions. Naturally, subjective creativity (strategy) could 

be applied against this outlook to manipulate the conditions and factors exposed by the 

analysis. 

When examining the civilian information infrastructure, Wang included factors 

such as computer users, Internet users, broadband users, number of mobile phones, fixed 

telephone trunk lines, and passenger loads for major airlines, highways, and railroads. 

The number of Chinese mobile phones per thousand households in 2003, for example, 

was stated as 214.8 versus 545.8 mobile phones per thousand households in the US.684

These figures indicating a huge US lead are quite misleading in a comprehensive sense 

since we don’t know how many households are in China and how many in the US. 

Instead of using households, let’s use a figure we do know, the population of both 

countries, and apply the criteria of the numbers for mobile phones per thousand 

households against it. Using 1.3 billion Chinese versus 300 million Americans, the 

number of total Chinese mobile phone users (214.8 mobile phones per thousand people in 

China) would be 279 million versus 164 million US mobile phone users (545.8 mobile 

phones per thousand Americans) or close to twice as many in China. A recent Wall Street 

Journal article noted that China now has 450 million mobile phone subscribers or more 

 

681 Ibid., pp. 397-398. 682 Wang Ling, “Comparative Studies of the Comprehensive Power of Major World Countries,” 2006: 

World Political and Security Report (Yellow Book of International Politics), Li Zhenming and Wang 

Yizhou, editors, Social Sciences Academic Press, p. 240. 683 Ibid., p. 267. 684 Ibid. 
250

than one per person in the US.685 The clear Leninist characterization here is that quantity 

still has a quality all its own. When examining numbers in China analysts must be 

prepared to extrapolate what Chinese percentages mean across the spectrum of this 

massive population. 

Further, as high-tech conditions continue to advance by leaps and bounds, 

information production modes will keep on developing and global integration will move 

forward. Simultaneously, a new pattern (as Peng and Yao call it) of comprehensive 

cyberized war will appear.686 This could imply that one takes an objective snapshot of the 

world’s information resources and connections and then subjectively decides how to 

creatively conduct reconnaissance, manipulation, and destruction of these assets; or that 

the point of informationized war is to weaken or destroy the command and control 

systems of an enemy, the primary task of IW, IO, or NCW. In this way the initiative can 

be captured on the battlefield and the enemy’s strategy can be disrupted.687 IO doesn’t 

just assist friendly forces’ strategic interests, it can also be used to offset an enemy’s use 

of strategy by destroying or disrupting his information technology. 

A fifth key issue is the Chinese focus on strategic information. When discussing 

IW above, it was noted that in the broad sense, IW refers to strategic information warfare 

and that IO was a subcomponent of IW. Peng and Yao stressed the importance of good 

strategic guidance when developing and implementing strategic information operations. 

They noted that information superiority and information dominance must be maintained 

in order to keep the battlefield initiative and bring the power of information systems and 

cyberized weapons to bear on strategy. Operations must remain integrated if one desires 

to defeat an opponent in a system versus system confrontation.688 

Peng and Yao list five types of strategic information operations. They are: 

 Intelligence warfare—this type provides support for making decisions, and 

it can be divided into intelligence reconnaissance (space, network, etc.) 

and intelligence protection (information security). 

 Command and control warfare—this type uses various means to attack an 

enemy’s command and control element and destroy his information flow. 

This is the primary task of IW/IO whose essence is to capture the 

battlefield initiative 

 Electronic warfare—this type’s purpose is to seize electromagnetic 

command on the battlefield. Attack, defend, and support are three types. 

Space electronic warfare is a potential future method 

 Cyber warfare—this type consists of soft kill (damage or destroy 

computers and networks) options and is a new operational pattern 

consisting of attack and protection 

 

685 Loretta Chao, “Cellphone Ads are Easier Pitch in China,” The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007, p. 

B5. 

686 Peng and Yao., p. 406. 687 Ibid., p. 342. 688 Ibid., p. 344. 
251

 Destructive warfare of information sources—this type consists of hard kill 

options (precision-strike cyberized weapons that destroy C4ISR and other 

relevant systems).689

The Theme of Collecting Technical Parameters and Preemption 

A sixth key issue of research was the continued Chinese emphasis on collecting 

technical parameters and developing preemptive attack plans, subjects also noted in 

Dragon Bytes. The Chinese collection of US technical parameters is probably the one 

factor most often reported in the US press. Titan Rain and China’s computer operations 

against the Naval War College are examples of this collection effort. Peacetime 

collection of information of US sites via reconnaissance allows China to prepare attacks 

against US vulnerabilities in the event they will ever need them. 

When technical parameters of other systems are collected, countermeasures to 

them can be constructed as a sort of asymmetric response. China’s 2006 White Paper, 

when discussing army projects, noted that information countermeasure units were one of 

three units that required priority development.690 The primary reason behind the 

development of this force may have been to construct IW countermeasures. 

The US launched reconnaissance in the form of electronic warfare and 

intelligence warfare more than six months before the Gulf war began the Chinese note. 

Such US actions are in line with Sun Tzu’s concept that “the clever combatant seeks 

battle after the victory has been won.” This implies that China’s vision of future war will 

first involve information reconnaissance to collect technical parameters. This will ensure 

victory before the first battle. Reconnaissance consists of electronic warfare, radar, radio 

technology, and network reconnaissance. This concept of reconnaissance in peacetime 

fits perfectly with Dai’s preemption concept and Sun Tzu’s stratagem.691 

Dai noted that there must be a focus on collecting technical parameters and 

specific properties of information weapon systems and electronic information products. 

This, combined with his focus on information attacks, implies a preparation for 

preemption. Computer network reconnaissance is viewed by the Chinese as a prerequisite 

for victory in warfare. It helps them choose which opportune moments, which places, and 

which attack measures will result in maximum success if war ever breaks out. 

When discussing preemption, Peng and Yao, for example, stated that IO is 

directly linked to the gain or loss of the initiative in war and thus “priority should be 

given to the attack and combining the attack with the defense.” Information technology 

has enhanced Chinese thinking with regard to preemption. Chinese military academics 

state that those who do not preempt lose the initiative in what may be a very short-lived 

IO war. Combatants in present day conflicts find it easier to obtain the objective of war 

through one campaign or one battle than at any other time in history. The idea of sudden 

 

689 Ibid., pp. 340-343. 690 China’s White Paper on National Defense 2006, Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, 29 December 2006, 

as translated and downloaded from the Open Source Center website on 31 December 2006. 691 Direct Information Warfare, pp. 219-220. 
252

attack has changed. It doesn’t mean “surprise” in the old sense but rather that one side 

can’t correspondingly react even though the situation is known. This is because one side 

possesses high-technology equipment and the other side only low-technology means. As 

a result preparation and mobilization are more important than ever before.692 War 

preparations must be made ahead of time (to include the recruitment of information 

talent) to ensure that, if needed, an IO can be conducted suddenly with the use of all civilmilitary links.693 Launching preemptive attacks to gain the initiative includes “striking the 

enemy’s information center of gravity and weakening the combat efficiency of his 

information systems and cyberized weapons.”694 This allows one to weaken the enemy’s 

information superiority and reduce his holistic combat efficiency.695 

General Dai, writing in 2003, also noted the importance of carrying out 

information attacks. Whoever controls information supremacy controls war initiative in 

Dai’s opinion.696 Whether this process will only serve campaign planning and the 

acquisition of information supremacy or will be the manner in which China initiates an 

information attack in general is not known. However, Dai did write that IW has five

natures and the first of these natures is that IW is precursory (begins before other 

operations) and whole course (runs throughout an entire operation). Perhaps the current 

emphasis on gaining the initiative and on short wars that are over quickly are the main 

reasons that Dai gives the impression that preemption via IW is a necessity in future 

war.697 He notes that 

Actions such as intelligence warfare, psychological warfare, and campaign 

deception in advance of combat seem to be even more important to the 

unimpeded implementation of planning and ensuring war. For this reason, 

information warfare must be started in advance of other combat actions before 

making war plans and while making war plans.698

Weak combatants, on the other hand, are unable to conduct such preemptive 

attack preparations. They must make good strategic preparations and organize to take 

quick actions against an enemy. Full play must be given by weak opponents to human 

subjective initiatives and the use of cost gap measures to counteract such a technology 

gap.699 Clearly the observation is that the superior side uses technology to preempt when 

conflict appears imminent while the weaker side must employ subjective creativity to 

offset these attacks. A constant tension is thus established between strategy and 

technology in this regard. 

In a sense, the Chinese note, it is the special features of IO tactics and techniques 

that enable the increased emphasis on attack more than traditional ground, sea, or air 

 

692 Peng and Yao, pp. 418-419. 693 Ibid., p. 345. 694 Ibid. 695 Ibid. 696 Direct Information War, p. 170. 697 Ibid., p. 169. 698 Ibid. 699 Peng and Yao, p. 428. 
253

warfare. A weaker force, for example, can inflict much damage on a superior force with a 

properly timed and precisely defined asymmetric information attack. Such an attack may 

not be possible by traditional means. Multiple information attack actions must be 

adopted, the offense must be considered as defense, and information barrier methods 

must be developed by weaker opponents. Attack tactics include information deterrence, 

information blockade, information power creation (electronic camouflage, network 

deception, etc.), information contamination, information harassment, nodal destruction, 

system paralysis, and entity destruction. 

China’s specific understanding of the intersection of strategy and information 

technology, especially as it relates to conflict, is not terribly extensive in a practical sense 

due to a lack of recent experience with conflict. From a theoretical perspective, however, 

China has written extensively on the use of information technology and preemption and 

given both much thought. 

1999-2003 Books 

A seventh issue discussed in Decoding the Virtual Dragon was the additional 

material from the 1999-2003 time period not available when Dragon Bytes was written. 

Dai Qingmin, in the 2002 work Direct Information War, focused primarily on the 

importance of networks and C4ISR. He also stressed quite dramatically the importance of 

cognitive activities. As a Chinese IO superstar, Dai’s emphasis on this latter factor is 

important. For example, he noted that 

 

Network warfare will rise from its current focus on confrontation on the physical 

level and logic level to confrontation on the super-logic level and that is the level 

of perception. The computer field will penetrate deeply into the thought processes 

of the human brain, influencing the spirit, morale, and consciousness of the 

adversary, disturbing the adversary’s decision making mentality and the direction 

of decision making, forcing the enemy to give in to our intentions and demands, 

and forcing the enemy to submit by not fighting or by “psychological warfare.”700

Dai believes that technology can be used to influence perception. He stated that 

electronic camouflage uses electromagnetic, opto-electrical, and thermal technological 

measures to simulate and duplicate the environment and make friendly targets blend in 

with their background. This “hides what is true” and “displays what is false” about the 

target. It can help thwart enemy electronic attacks and protect one’s own systems. Metal 

foil strips, angular radar reflectors, colored smoke screens, plasma, multifrequency 

electromagnetic screens, photochromatic coatings, and optical bait are examples of 

measures that can deceive or change how one understands reality. Smoke camouflage 

now includes smoke made up of metallic chemical compounds and plasma which, when 

mixed with certain polymer ratios, makes smoke screens that can fluctuate to be 

consistent with the target and its background.701

 

700 Ibid., p. 154. 701 Ibid., pp. 206, 222. 
254

Dai also explained his concept of network psychological war (NPW). NPW 

combines traditional psychological warfare thinking with modern network information 

technology. This type of warfare has several characteristics. It can transcend the nature of 

time-space according to Dai. It cuts across national boundaries (space) and can take place 

in peacetime or wartime. It can influence people’s awareness and feelings in many fields, 

to include politics, economics, culture, and military affairs via propaganda, intimidation, 

deception, enticement, bribery, and deterrence. One of the methods to achieve these aims 

is to establish websites for psychological warfare and publish all types of deceptive, 

disturbing, leading, and deterring information. The idea is to disrupt normal judgment, 

block other information channels, and create misconceptions in the enemy.702

However, network warfare could develop in the direction of “network deterrence” 

or “network containment.”703 Bit streams in network space now control, Dai notes, not 

only the collection, transmission, processing, and distribution of information but 

potentially the thinking of command decision makers and operational personnel. 

Operational objectives of network space can now orient on the will, feelings, and 

cognitive processes of an enemy according to Dai.704 

In addition to psychological/cognitive themes, Dai mentioned the potential for 

introducing a computer virus into the C4ISR system of an opponent, a method that may 

become a significant way to conduct IW. Network warfare of this type is designed to 

attack the brain of the enemy’s C4ISR system, according to Dai, and this affects strategic 

decision making and the overall strategic situation. 

Dai added that integrated network-electronic warfare (INEW) shapes battlefield 

information warfare. It can also be called physical IW.705 INEW allows operational 

secrecy, military deception, and psychological warfare to fuse.706 This implies that 

science and art, strategy and tactics, and enticement and concealment are integrated 

creatively.707

Dai recommended establishing a new national security concept suited to the 

information age, one that elevated network-based strategies to the level of a national 

security plan. He advised speeding the pace of informationization within the country as a 

whole and speeding the establishment of rules and laws for an information network-based 

security regime. He added that controlling the initiative in war and destroying the 

adversary’s operational intentions will enable Chinese forces to control the course of the 

development of a war. This must be the operational standard for network warfare 

forces.708

 

702 Ibid., pp. 142-143. 703 Ibid., p. 58. 704 Ibid., pp. 75-76. 705 Ibid., pp. 272-274. 706 Ibid. 707 Ibid., p. 296. 708 Ibid., pp. 257-261. 
255

Shen, on the other hand, focused mainly on the issue of information security in his 

2003 work Deciphering Information Security. Of particular interest in his work was the 

creation of an Information Security University. The university was laid out in great detail 

and had an extensive military orientation, with an added military specialty of economics. 

2004-2006 Books 

 An eighth issue was the discussion of three books written after the 2003 

timeframe. There is less to say analytically about these books since much of what the 

Chinese wrote was simply their interpretation of US network-centric warfare (NCW) 

doctrine or, in the case of Study Guide for Information Operations Theory, simply 

discussing Chinese terms. 

The key points from An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare are listed here. 

Selected chapters from this text were used to prepare this summary. Specifically, the 

chapters on weapons integration, C4ISR, battlefield management, and the book’s 

concluding chapter which discussed the Chinese version of NCW were used. The 

following were the key findings from a Chinese perspective: 

 C4ISR is NCW’s foundation, a key tool in future war due to its fusing and 

force multiplier effects, and thus its security will always be an issue. 

 A C4ISR system architecture has three layers: an overall structure, a 

service C4ISR system structure, and a functional element structure. 

Frameworks are studied from the perspective of operations (tasks), 

systems (capabilities and characteristics), and technology (a minimal set of 

rules governing the relationships among system components). 

 NCW allows strategists to directly monitor events at great distances and 

sometimes control tactical actions. An operational theory for 

informationized warfare needs further work since the first battle is now 

more decisive in the overall course of the war. 

 NCW’s integrated weapons include inner space, outer space, information 

space, and psychological space weaponry (the latter category includes 

propaganda, deterrence, interference, and deception weapons). 

 NCW enables real-time discovery and destruction, altering the traditional 

cycle of observe-orient-decide-act. 

 NCW management must be on a systematic and network level with strict 

regulations and a legal basis. 

 NCW should be incorporated into the Central Military Commission’s 

strategies and policies immediately. 

 In informationized warfare theory three nets must be supported—the 

sensor net, the weapons platform net, and the information net. 

The book Study Guide for Information Operations Theory listed over 400 military 

terms. The book was chosen for inclusion in this volume because it is one of the few 

current sources and compendiums that list contemporary definitions. It has been over 20 

years since Shen Weiguang first wrote about IW in 1985. Thus such a source does a few 

things: it allows one to track changes in definitions of old terms, it lists the meanings of 
256

new terminology, and it enables policy makers and analysts to view how the Chinese 

interpret and revise concepts and ideas that may have originated in other countries with 

their own “Chinese characteristics.” 

In addition to the general definition of IW presented earlier, the Study Guide 

subdivided the Chinese concept of information warfare into several topic areas. These 

included: types of IW operations (offensive and defensive), IW sources (public 

information warfare and secret information warfare), layers of IW operations (strategic 

IW, combat IW, tactical IW), geographical IW areas (domestic IW, international IW), 

intelligence IW (political IW, economic IW, military IW, commercial IW, and diplomatic 

IW), and methods of IW acquisition (human IW, technical IW). 

 Another interesting Chinese emphasis in the Study Guide is on battlefield IW. 

The definition states that it revolves around “comprehensive countermeasures and combat 

conducted in the areas of warning, detection and reconnaissance, information 

transmission and processing, weapons control and guidance, operations command and 

control, camouflage, deception and interference, as well as around military stratagems.” 

Here again we see those terms that are often emphasized in Chinese military jargon when 

discussing IW: comprehensive, countermeasures, control, reconnaissance, and 

stratagems. With regard to the latter, the Chinese also defined what were deemed antiinformation strategy technologies. Thus their writings show consistency over time with 

particular emphasis on a common set of IO terms of reference. 

There is one term that is a Chinese equivalent of a US term that should not be 

overlooked. That term is informatized operations which the Study Guide states is the 

same or similar to integrated operations and NCW. The Chinese targeting order for 

informatized operations is somewhat new and includes psychological shock, material 

destruction, and physiological annihilation in that order. Again, the initial emphasis is on 

cognitive issues. The basic formula for informatized operations is the transformation of 

superiority in perception, intelligence, and decision making into operational actions. It is 

also important for informatized operations to prevent an enemy force from organized 

operations. The Study Guide defined informatized operations as 

Two sides in a conflict relying to a high degree upon information, information 

systems, and informatized weapons and equipment. These operations involve 

information flow and systematic countermeasure actions undertaken in multiple 

spaces and realms such as on land, on the sea, in the air, in space, in the 

electromagnetic realm, in the realm of information, and in the realm of cognition. 

Thus even this NCW equivalent concept also contains countermeasures and cognition. 

This Chinese emphasis must not be overlooked by US analysts since it appears in all of 

their key information-related terms. Informatized support operations include integrated 

reconnaissance systems, command and control systems, intelligent precision-strike 

systems, and operational-support and safeguard systems. 
257

Other items of interest from the Study Guide that should be included in a 

concluding summary are the following: 

 A list of the key elements of military power included computation, 

reconnaissance, simulation capabilities, communication capacities, and 

reliability. [Author’s note: this type of military power does not appear 

to have a relation to CNP or comprehensive military power.] 

 Information weapons have shrunk time and expanded the space in 

which they can operate. Strategy, combat, and tactics are so 

compressed that they almost coincide. 

 The IO planning process includes: IO tasks (power to be used), 

information security and protection; important targets, a force’s 

configuration and tasking, operational stages, the organization of 

command and coordination, and the time needed to complete 

preparations for information attacks and the ability to implement them. 

 The basic thread in military thought about operational goals has been 

that one must lock onto an enemy’s strength, consume his potential for 

war, and target the remnants of his will to fight with a final blow. 

 Combat force is equal to the combination of energy and materials 

multiplied by information. Technology and strategy must be given 

equal weight, however, as cognitive systems are as important to attack 

as technological systems. 

 Precision warfare includes precision information, precision control, 

precision movements, and precision strikes. 

 Countermeasures to the concepts of time, space, and systems have 

brought about great changes to informatized war. 

 The five major command and control elements are operational 

confidentiality, military deception, psychological warfare, electronic 

warfare, and firepower strikes. 

The final book under review in the 2004-2006 timeframe was Warfare Strategy 

Theory. Also edited by Yao, the book continued the emphasis demonstrated in the Study 

Guide and in the Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare on cognition and strategy 

issues. With regard to features of informationized warfare, Yao listed its main features as 

follows: 

 Informationized weapons are the dominant weapons on the battlefield 

in the form of platforms and ammunition. 

 Information energy (reconnaissance, precision guidance, electronic 

warfare, etc.) is the principal capability unleashed on the battlefield in 

that it can control substance and capability. 

 Informationized warfare is the principal form of war. 

 The principle objectives of informationized war are the three major 

systems of battlefield cognition (surveillance, survey, navigation, etc.), 

battlefield communication (transmission of information), and 

battlefield guidance and control. 
258

 Information superiority is the pinnacle of the battlefield struggle. 

Through information superiority other levels of dominance (airpower, 

naval space) are then possible.709

Final Thoughts 

 It was noted in the introduction to this work that the primary authors whose works 

were utilized were Shen Weiguang and Dai Qingmin. This obviously has created in the 

author and reader a bias of sorts toward their points of emphasis and description. In that 

regard, one point to address in this section is the extent to which these issues coincide 

with or deviate from other specialists views on IW/IO. A brief look through open source 

(publicly available) materials in the civilian and military sectors over the past three years 

demonstrates that the material falls into four categories: those items that coincide with 

Dai and Shen’s views; those items that coincide with issues from Dragon Bytes; those 

items that are completely new; and those items that contradict either material in Dragon 

Bytes or in this volume. 

A quick analysis of hundreds of reports from 2004-2006 shows the following 

general breakout of topics: 

 Hackers/network warriors or reconnaissance units scanning the net for 

weaknesses 

 The use of stratagems in conjunction with technology 

 C4KISR discussions 

 Network counterattacks or network weaknesses 

 Optical fiber being laid in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and under the 

ocean (by Verizon) 

 Development of high-technology devices such as UAVs, simulation 

labs, chip-design labs, artillery munitions 

 Thoughts on the war in Iraq 

 Red versus blue confrontations in exercises designed to improve the 

informationization techniques of the force 

 Space warfare, to include antisatellite warfare 

 Psychological warfare techniques 

 People’s War in the information age 

 Law as a weapon. 

About three-fourths or more of these issues were discussed in either Decoding the Virtual 

Dragon or Dragon Bytes, so the coverage has stayed basically the same over the past 

eight years. New items included further explanations of IW/IO concepts or applications 

of concepts. Thus using Shen and Dai’s description of IW/IO as a base for understanding 

Chinese concepts does not appear to lead the analyst too far astray. 

The topic of countermeasures appeared often in all the definitions of important 

terms (IW, IO, informatized operations, etc.) and in explanations of how an inferior force 

 

709 Ibid., pp. 153-156. 
259

fights a superior force. Dai, for his part, discussed countermeasures, specifying that 

multiple methods of flexible resistance (countermeasures) should be developed: netshaped dispositions, jamming wireless reconnaissance equipment, carrying out reverse 

tracing and counterdestruction of enemy websites, paralyzing vital points, and developing 

situations using creativity. Over the past few years, the Chinese press carried articles on 

information countermeasures, Google Earth countermeasures, information construction 

countermeasures, electronic countermeasures, information gap and equipment 

countermeasures, and laser countermeasures, among other countermeasure issues. Most 

were discussed in important journals such as China Military Science. 

A 1999 Chinese description of information countermeasures described Serbian 

countermeasures against coalition forces during the Kosovo conflict. The Chinese also 

discussed reports that the Russians had provided the Iraqis with frequency devices 

(countermeasures) that would offset the frequency control of cruise missiles or precisionguided missiles the coalition used in 2003 in Iraq. The Chinese most likely viewed these 

uses of technology as terrific examples of how to use countermeasures to offset hightechnology equipment or how the inferior could offset the power of the superior. This 

emphasis on countermeasures should be expected to continue. 

Is the term countermeasure simply an expression of the dialectic in action 

(measure, countermeasure) or does it have a deeper meaning? If it implies that an 

information-based conflict has such active offensive and defensive components that one 

must be thinking countermeasures from the start, then the Chinese definition has a leg up 

on the US simply for its focus on this issue. The only “counter” term present in the 

current US explanation of IO is counterintelligence. JP 3-13 does not even have 

counterpropaganda in its general discussion of IO (listing it only in an appendix at the 

back of the Joint Publication). This US reluctance to put more thought into “counter” 

concepts may come back to haunt it someday. For example, both the terms 

counterpropaganda and counterinfluence took on more significance in Iraq once combat 

with the insurgents began and the latter began using the Internet to spread its ideology. 

The Chinese focus on cognition and beliefs as a major and growing component of 

its home grown IW/IO definitions indicates that it will be emphasizing countercognitive 

activities of some type to thwart anyone who tries to manipulate perceptions. There will 

be extensive internal and external efforts to shape or control domestic thinking as well as 

efforts to exploit holes in counterpropaganda efforts of foreign decision makers and 

foreign audiences. Cognitive activities are a way to win without fighting. 

 Another very interesting point to consider when examining IW/IO is the extensive 

knowledge that the Chinese have about our concepts and systems. When visiting a 

bookstore in downtown Beijing or Shanghai, for example, the military section (usually on 

the third or fourth floor) contains Chinese translations of thirty or forty (perhaps more, 

depending on the size of the store) US military books. Several are translations of IW/IO 

books by US authors or authors from other nations. Translations of US field manuals are 

almost always available. The point to be made is that the Chinese do a much better job at 

“know the enemy and know yourself, and you’ll never fail in battle” than most nations. In 
260

the US, for example, much less is known about Chinese military theory and practice. A 

US military bookstore usually is limited to five Chinese titles: Art of War, Unrestricted 

War, Seven Military Classics, 36 Stratagems of War, and The Book of Changes. It would 

be a rare occurrence to find all of these titles in one place. 

In addition to compiling an impressive list of Western military translations, the 

Chinese military has also assembled a host of agencies, centers, laboratories, universities, 

and other organizations involved in the study or application of IW, IO, or information 

security research. For example, the following were identified just in the research for this 

volume, which used a very limited number of sources: 

 The National Information Security Support Management Agency 

 Centers include: the National Information Security Center for 

Supervising Law Enforcement, the National Information Security 

Evaluation and Authentication Center, the National Information 

Security Crisis Handling Center, the National Information Security 

Legal Support Center, the National Information Security Education 

and Training Center, and the National Information Security Conflict 

Research Center 

 Advisory Committee for the Informatization of the Military 

 Information Operations Theoretical Research Office of the Operations 

Theory and Doctrine Research Department at the Department of 

Military Sciences 

 Information Security University 

 Information Confrontation Laboratory. 

Finally, The Science of Military Strategy discussed Taiwan and implied what 

China’s strategy might be in an information-based environment. Strategic deterrence 

control was emphasized as one way to keep the Taiwan situation under control. Strategic 

deterrence control is the military conduct of a state or a political group in displaying force 

or showing the determination to use force to compel the enemy to submit to one’s 

volition and to refrain from taking hostile actions or escalating the hostility. Strategic 

operations and strategic deterrence are dialectically related, the book states. The former 

secures strategic objectives though direct engagement with the enemy on the battlefield 

while strategic deterrence’s objective is to contain the outbreak of war or limit its 

scope.710 One must possess a deterrent force, have the determination (which Peng and 

Yao state is the soul of deterrence) to use it, and make approaches urging the opponent to 

perceive the above-mentioned points, creating psychological pressure on an opponent.711

Today China’s deterrent force is based not just on missiles but increasingly on its 

information-based concepts and equipment, and it is integrating this technology into its 

overall strategy. 

 

710 Peng and Yao, p. 213. 711 Ibid., p. 215. 
261

Further with regard to Taiwan, if strategic deterrence fails, then another potential 

course of action might be the following: 

When the strategic offensive aim is seizure of the areas under the opposing side’s 

control, the pattern of a naval and air vertical landing offensive will surely be 

adopted if in areas bordering on the sea or in large islands; and the 

multidirectional offensive pattern will be adopted if on land.712 

One might say that there is concurrent emphasis on both deterrence and war-fighting in 

this regard since both of these options are clearly available to Chinese strategists. When 

political objectives are limited, and force utilization is more integrated and operational 

means are based on information, then more stress is placed on comprehensive strategic 

interests (CSI) than on war’s destructive power.713 

This concludes the decoding of the virtual dragon. The meaning of strategy and 

the extent of China’s in-depth study and analysis of information-age issues should be 

apparent to the reader. Terms were laid bare and the application of Chinese 

characteristics to these terms was discussed. Hopefully the reader has gained a greater 

appreciation for the Chinese approach to IW/IO issues and how they may be fused with 

strategy. While these capabilities are looming larger every day, and more media pundits 

are highlighting the “Chinese threat” for us (as well they should, especially for the 

Chinese proclivity for overt reconnaissance) let us remember that the US still has more 

powerful capabilities. US policy makers must learn, however, to integrate strategy and 

technology as the Chinese have done, albeit in our case with “US characteristics,” to 

remain aware and focused on the Chinese capability in this arena. Let us also hope that 

the full fury of either force is never used against one another and that US-ChineseTaiwanese relations remain as peaceful tomorrow as they are today. 

 

712 Ibid., p. 287. 713 Ibid., p. 404. 
262

APPENDIX ONE: IW ARTICLES IN CHINA MILITARY SCIENCE: 2004-2006 

The titles listed in English below are from the journal China Military Science and 

are representative of the IW content of this PLA journal. Dragon Bytes listed the IW 

articles in this journal from 1999-2003. This section thus updates that list. The titles in 

this section are listed as they appeared in China Military Science, starting with the most 

current issue available and working backward to 2004. As noted earlier, all PLA journals 

and newspapers continue to write extensively on the subject of informatization in China. 

To continue a procedure initiated in Dragon Bytes, only those titles with “hightech,” “digitalization,” “precision,” “network,” “system of systems” or “information” in 

the title are listed. Any Chinese discussion of US IO is also listed as are articles about 

psychological operations since they are an ingredient of Chinese IW. 

Number 6, 2006 

None 

Number 5, 2006 

None 

Number 4, 2006 

“Guiding Military Informationization Building with Scientific Development Concept,” 

Zhang Xuncai, pp. 20-23. 

“Basic Laws of Operations of Military Information Command Systems,” Wang Liyong 

and Huang Tao, pp. 97-102. 

“Strengthening Studies on Combat System Confrontations of Naval Campaigns,” unclear 

from a list of names who authored this article, pp. 141-142. 

“Issues to be Stressed in the Informationization Building of our Military from the 

Transformation of the US Military,” unclear from a list of names who authored this 

article, pp. 147-149. 

Number 3, 2006 

“Guide the Creative Development in Military Training under the Information Conditions 

with Scientific Development Concept,” Wang Jianmin, pp. 1-7. 

“Network Warfare and Complex Networks,” Li Deyi, Wang Xinzheng, and He 

Gangfeng, pp. 111-119. 

“The Development of Warfighting Platforms and their Impact on the Military,” Li 

Daguang and Liu Yanjun, pp. 120-130. 

Number 2, 2006 

“Fully Improving Informationized Operational Capabilities of the Military under the 

Guidance of a Scientific Development Concept,” Zheng Zhanping, pp. 11-16. 

“Views on the Development of an IPV6 System for Military Information Networks,” 

Chen Peng, Gu Xiaoming, and Dai Hao, pp. 124-130. 
263

Number 1, 2006 

“On Creating Military Theories under Information Conditions,” Sun Haicheng, Lin 

Huasheng, and Liang Huan, pp. 84-88. 

“Development of CPLA Psychological Warfare Thinking in War Times,” Jiang Yibin, 

Wu Juncang, pp. 109-114. 

Number 6, 2005 

“General Reflections on Integrated Training under Informational Conditions,” Zhunag 

Xuncai and Qiu Guijin, pp. 99-104. 

Number 5, 2005 

None 

Number 4, 2005 

“On the New Requirements of Information Warfare on Combat Spirits,” Ma Gensheng 

and Wong Yi, pp. 80-83. 

“An Analysis of Combat Spirits of Military Talents under Information Conditions,” Shen 

Guoquan and Zhu Fangqin, pp. 84-89. 

“Adhering to Putting People in the First Place in Promoting Information Construction,” 

Zhang Yonggang, pp. 108-115. 

“Concept and Characteristics of Strategic Psychological Warfare,” Jiang Jie and Wu 

Juncang, pp. 126-129. 

“A Study of the Operational Mechanism of Psychological Warfare,” Hao Weixue and He 

Lingfeng, pp. 130-133. 

“Characteristics and Trends of US Strategic Psychological Warfare,” Wang Lianshui, 

Zhou Jianxin, and Dong Jianmin, pp. 144-150. 

Number 3, 2005 

This issue had an entire section devoted to psychological operations titled “Theoretical 

Study of Strategic Psychological Warfare.” The first five articles below are in that 

section. 

“On Cultural Identification and National Reunification,” Yang Yuling, pp. 57-63. 

“Modern Cultural Diffusion and National Security,” Wang Shudao, pp. 64-69. 

“Media Warfare in Informationalized Conditions,” Cui Changfa and Tang Fuquan, pp. 

70-76. 

“Important Issues Concerning Strategic Psychological Warfare under Informationalized 

Conditions,” Chang Yan’e and Ou Lishou, pp. 77-83. 

“Characteristics of Psychological Strategy in US Strategic Thinking,” Xu Jia, pp. 84-87. 

“Issues of the Study of War Complexity under Informationalized Conditions,” Shen 

Shoulin, Zhao Shuchun, and Zhang Guoning, pp. 118-125. 

Number 2, 2005 

This issue has the entire first section devoted to “Strategic Thinking of Military 

Information Construction.” 

“Scientific Guidance to Building Informationalized Armed Forces,” Yang Yeli, pp. 2-11. 
264

“Guiding Military Information Construction with the Concept of Scientific 

Development,” Wang Fa’an, pp. 12-17. 

“Strategic Thinking and Countermeasures in Military Information Construction,” Liu 

Jixian, pp. 18-25. 

“Deliberation on Military Information Development Strategy,” Chang Wen, pp. 26-30. 

“Discussion on Status Quo and Countermeasures of Military Information Construction,” 

Zheng Qin, pp. 31-38. 

“On Technological Organization and Leadership in Military Information Construction,” 

Sun Haicheng, Ji Shidong, and Mi Guoqing, pp. 39-46. 

“Military Strategic System of the Information Era,” Zhang Feng, Liu Zengliang, and Lu 

Dehong, pp. 90-99. 

“On Digital Logistical Management in Modern Armed Forces,” Wang Qihua, pp. 100-

106. 

Number 1, 2005 

“An Analysis of the Features of Information Warfare,” Wang Mingliang, pp. 20-26. 

“Differentiation of Command Automation and the Prospect of Informationalization of the 

Armed Forces,” Chang Guocen, pp. 72-78. 

“Considerations of Improving Mobilization in Regional Information Warfare,” Chen 

Ying, pp. 91-97. 

“Summary of Symposium on the Informationalization of the Army Political Work 

Theory and Practice,” Tan Zhixing, Zhang Yu, and Liu Yongdan, pp. 148-151. 

“Summary of Symposium on the Study and Application of Sun Tzu’s Art of War in the 

Information Age,” Xue Guoan and Chen Xiangling, pp. 152-156. 

Number 6, 2004 

“Sun Tzu’s ‘Winning Conception’ and Air-Space Power in the Information Age,” Zhang 

Zhiping, pp. 35-39. 

“Understanding the Duty of Army Propaganda and Cultural Work and Taking the Lead in 

Building Advanced Culture,” Wu Changde, pp. 60-67. 

“Trends in the Development of Operations Command under Informationized 

Conditions,” Li Zhangrui, Song Guangshou, Liu Kui, and Deng Zhao, pp. 90-96. 

Number 5, 2004 

This issue has an entire section devoted to information warfare titled “Theoretical Study 

of Information Warfare.” The six articles below are in that section. 

“Decision on Further Promoting the Development of the Philosophy and Social Sciences 

Doctrine of the Guidance of Information Operations,” Che Xianming and Wang Wei, pp. 

9-16. 

“Basic Features of Information Operations,” Li Yinnian, Sun Qiangyin, and Sun Jianjun, 

pp. 17-24. 

“On Information-based Warfare,” Zhang Zhanjun, pp. 25-36. 

“On Integrated Joint Operations Based on the Military Information Network,” Cui Yafu, 

pp. 37-42. 
265

“Views of Creation in Information Operations Command,” Li Chunli, Chen Yilai, Jin 

Guomin, and Wang Yunlei, pp. 43-49. 

“Information Warfare and Changes in the Essentials in Military Thinking,” Yan 

Gaohong, pp. 50-55. 

Number 4, 2004 

This issue has an entire section devoted to psychological operations titled “Study of the 

Theory of Strategic Psychological Warfare.” 

“A Study of the Theory of Marxist Strategic Psychological Warfare,” Han Qiufeng, pp. 

34-41. 

“On the Basic Features of Strategic Psychological Warfare,” Wang Baoshan and Li Peng, 

pp. 42-47. 

“Theoretical Consideration of Strategic Psychological Warfare,” Zhu Huaqing and Yi 

Dazhang, pp. 48-56. 

“Competition and the Contest of National Culture,” Yan Xiaofeng, pp. 57-68. 

“On Religious Psychological Factors in National Conflicts in the Contemporary World,” 

Wang Zhiping, pp. 64-68. 

“Developing Trends of Psychological Warfare in Grand Strategy,” Yao Zhenqing and 

Meng Yan, pp. 69-74. 

“The Direct Manifestation of the Operational Role of Political Work—On Media 

Warfare, Psychological Warfare, and Law Warfare,” Lin Ronglin, pp. 91-95. 

 “Characteristics of Information Mobilization,” Sun Haicheng and Zhang Zhen, pp. 101-

105. 

Number 3, 2004 

“Creatively Advancing the Science of Information Operations with PLA Characteristics,” 

Xu Xiaoyan, pp. 37-43. 

“An Outline of the Theory of a System of Systems,” Zhao Cunru, pp. 44-49. 

“Views on Pushing Forward the Informationization of the PLA,” Liu Jianguo, pp. 97-

101. 

“Dialectical Understanding of the Issues of Defeating a Powerful Enemy with a Weak 

Force in High-Tech War,” Deng Feng, pp. 107-111. 

Number 2, 2004 

“On Jiang Zemin’s Theory of Army Informationization,” Niu Li, pp. 30-37. 

“Details of the Psychology of Oriental Strategies,” Wang Zhenxing, Zhou Jianxin, and Yi 

Hui, pp. 120-130. 

“Study of Protective Engineering under the Conditions of Informationized War,” Zheng 

Yingren and Li Xiudi, pp. 142-147. 

“Realizing the Transformation of Military Form from Mechanization to 

Informationization,” Xia Zhengnan, pp. 148-156. 

Number 1, 2004 

None 
266

APPENDIX TWO: IW DEFINITIONS IN THE CHINESE MILITARY 

ENCYCLOPEDIA714

In the summer of 2004, the book Dragon Bytes was published. The publication 

described Chinese information warfare (IW) developments from 1999-2003. The present 

book covers Chinese IW developments from 2004-2006. However, the author obtained 

several important IW related items from the 1999-2003 timeframe only after the 

publication of Dragon Bytes. One of these items was the Chinese Military Encyclopedia. 

The encyclopedia contains a more detailed, and perhaps more authoritative, 

definition of information warfare, information warfare technology, and operations 

research and analysis of information warfare than those obtained from journals. These 

three entries are listed below in this appendix in their entirety with topic headings in 

English and Chinese. These are the most “official” or authoritative definitions of Chinese 

IW obtained to date, to include the post-2003 timeframe. 

Information Warfare [xinxizhan]—Operations carried out to seize and maintain 

information supremacy (FBIS translators consulted for this definition defined the term 

supremacy as “control”). According to time, it can be divided into peacetime information 

warfare and wartime information warfare. Peacetime information warfare refers to 

commonly conducted hostile, two-party information confrontation in periods of peace in 

areas such as politics, economics, science and technology, foreign relations, culture, and 

military affairs. 

Schematic Diagram of the Composition of IW Forces 

Wartime information warfare refers to hostile, two-party information warfare 

carried out in periods of war. It includes using many kinds of measures to attack the 

enemy’s information and information systems; to damage or sever the enemy’s flow of 

information; and to influence, weaken, or destroy the enemy’s information operations 

capabilities while safeguarding the information operations capabilities of one’s own side. 

 

714 Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command translated the 

entries in this Appendix. 

Information Support 

Deceptive Camouflage Forces 

Psychological Warfare 

Information 

Operations 

Forces 

Information Defense 

Information Attack 

Forces 

Electronic Jamming Forces

Special Operations Forces 

Firepower Attack Forces 

Communications Support Forces

Reconnaissance and Intelligence 

Early Warning Surveillance 
267

Information warfare includes two mutually connected aspects, and those are information 

attack and information defense. Information attack is fully utilizing various information 

technology measures to influence and weaken the adversary’s information operations 

capabilities via methods such as information blockade, information deception, 

information interference, information contamination, and information destruction. 

Information defense uses information secrecy, information safeguards, and other methods 

to safeguard the information, information systems, and information operations 

capabilities of one’s own side from the influence of enemy information attack. 

Information warfare is various actions to expropriate, utilize, damage, or destroy the 

enemy’s information, information systems, and information operations capabilities while 

safeguarding and fully utilizing the information, information systems, and information 

operations capabilities of one’s own side. Its goals are to capture and maintain 

information dominance; to fully control the right of access to, the right of control of, and 

the right of use of information; and thus gain the initiative and the advantage in war. 

Brief History 

Information warfare is a new form of operations that emerged in the transition 

from the industrial age to the information age following the informationization of society 

and military informationization. Since the 1970s, following the swift development of 

information technology and the unceasing enhancement of the informationization of 

society, information technology has become an important basis for the development of 

society, the rapid rise of the economy, the progress of science and technology, and the 

power and prosperity of the nation. Information has already become an important 

resource for the growth of society. At the same time, informationization has also become 

an important part of armed forces modernization building. Gaining information 

dominance and controlling information supremacy have become crucial links in winning 

war dominance. Under these circumstances, hostile, two-party confrontations and 

contentions in the field of information are becoming more and more intense. All kinds of 

specialized information weapons are continually coming forth, and traditional 

information confrontation is gradually evolving into a new form of operations. American 

T. Rona was the first to bring up the idea of information warfare. In 1976, he pointed out, 

“Information warfare is combat between decision making systems.” (US Military 

Intelligence magazine, January-March 1997, D. Diersi, “Content, Characteristics, and 

Influence of Information Warfare”) [Note: The name transliterated above may be Diels, 

Deers, or another similar sounding name.] In the mid-1980s, in keeping with the reality 

of the increasingly fierce information confrontations in all operational fields, the US Air 

Force and Navy formally used information warfare concepts. After the Gulf War, many 

of the countries in the world progressively followed information warfare with interest and 

attached importance to it. They used information warfare as an important measure to 

realize their military strategies, and they launched extensive research and practice. In 

1992, the US Department of Defense issued secret orders about enhancing information 

warfare research, asking all services and arms to launch extensive theoretical research 

and preparations for information warfare. In January 1995, the US Department of 

Defense set up an information warfare implementation committee, and it established the 

“National Defense Information Bureau.” The Army, Navy, and Air Force also each set up 

“information warfare centers” that were specifically responsible for researching and 
268

directing information warfare. Since 1996, the US military has issued a series of policies, 

rules, laws, regulations, and doctrine, including “Naval Operations Department 

Instruction 3430.26: Implementing Instruction for Information Warfare and Command 

and Control Warfare;” the Air Force’s “Cornerstones of Information Warfare;” Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regulations “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 

3210.01: Joint Information Warfare Policy,” “Joint Doctrine for Command and Control 

Warfare,” “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 6510.01A: Defensive 

Information Warfare Implementation,” “Joint Vision 2010,” and “Joint Information 

Warfare;” the Army’s “Field Manual 100-6: Information Operations;” the Defense 

Science Board’s “Defensive Information Warfare Strategy,” “FM 100-6: Information 

Warfare,” etc., to regulate military and civilian information warfare activities. At the 

same time, the US also put as much as one hundred billion US dollars toward research 

and development for all kinds of new information warfare weapons. In order to 

effectively carry out preparations for information warfare, the US conducted a large 

number of information warfare simulation exercises and increased the information 

confrontation content at all levels and in all kinds of military exercises. In 1995 and 1996, 

RAND Corporation held two large scale information warfare simulation exercises. Russia 

established the National Information Policy Commission, subordinate to the president, 

and it set about organizing corresponding functional organizations, enhanced the 

technical and personnel training required for information warfare, emphasized developing 

key information warfare technologies and weapons, and increased technology imports 

from abroad. Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and India also established related 

organizations to direct information warfare and enhanced direction and coordination for 

researching and preparing for information warfare. From this point, information warfare 

has already been widely accepted in world military circles as a kind of new form of 

operations in modern war. At the same time they enhanced research into information 

warfare theory, all the principal countries in the world also intensified technological and 

tactical preparations for information warfare. They organized information warfare units 

and gradually used some information warfare measures and methods in real war during 

the limited wars of the 1990s. The Gulf War in 1991 and the Kosovo War in 1999 were 

important test beds for information warfare, and they showed that information warfare 

had in all respects moved from theoretical research toward utilization in real war. 

In the 1990s, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army had fully developed 

theoretical research into information warfare, and in 1990, it published the book 

Information Warfare, the earliest monograph to study information warfare. Following 

this, a large number of theoretical research achievements were published in succession, 

including “The Science of Information Operations Command and Control,” “The Science 

of Information Operations Technology,” “An Outline of Information Operations,” and 

“An Introduction to Information Operations.” At the same time, information warfare 

technology attained rapid growth, and the work of training combined arms commanders 

in information warfare abilities made significant progress. Information warfare had 

already permeated joint operations exercises. 
269

Characteristics 

Information warfare is a form of operations in which information plays the 

dominant role. It has the following prominent characteristics. (1) Intensity in the Fight for 

Information Supremacy. In modern and future wars, information has already become a 

key factor in gaining the upper hand. Forming and bringing into play the combat 

effectiveness of an armed force primarily depends on obtaining, processing, transmitting, 

controlling, and using information. Because of this, in joint operations, the struggle for 

information supremacy will be unusually incisive and intense, and it will run through the 

entire course of war. (2) Immediacy in Reaching Operational Objectives. Information 

warfare has enemy information, information systems, and information operations 

capabilities as its immediate targets. It really attacks the enemy’s command decision 

making systems or support systems, and once it damages or destroys these targets, it can 

directly shake the enemy’s decision making intentions and operational determination, 

thereby immediately attaining the operational objective. (3) Integration of Operational 

Actions. Information warfare is highly integrated warfare. It is mutually coordinated and 

highly integrated with land, sea, air, and space operations, and operations in other 

spheres. It is an entire information confrontation and struggle that unfolds simultaneously 

across the battlefield space. (4) Indistinct Wartime and Peacetime Boundaries. Not only 

can information warfare attack the enemy’s military information systems to disintegrate 

its military information capabilities, it can also attack the enemy’s civilian information 

systems and national information infrastructure to damage or destroy its entire 

information operations capability. Not only can this kind of attack occur during wartime, 

it can even occur in peacetime, further blurring the boundaries between wartime and 

peacetime. (5) Highly Efficient Attack Results. By directly attacking the enemy’s 

information, information systems, and information operations capabilities, information 

warfare can damage or destroy its entire military and socio-economic systems, which are 

supported by information and information systems affecting and weakening its overall 

national strength. 

Forms 

Information warfare includes many forms, such as command and control warfare, 

intelligence warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, network warfare. 

Command and control warfare is the core of information warfare. It is essentially using 

methods such as physical destruction and electronic attack to interfere with, damage, and 

even destroy the enemy’s command and control system, weakening or damaging the 

enemy’s command and control capabilities while protecting one’s own command and 

control systems from the effects of similar enemy actions, ultimately seizing information 

supremacy and controlling battlefield initiative. The goal of intelligence warfare is to use 

various information surveillance measures to capture information, allowing one’s own 

commanders to receive timely and accurate intelligence information while using various 

measures and means to leave enemy commanders no way to obtain required intelligence 

information. Electronic warfare is an electro-magnetic fight to weaken or damage the 

usefulness of the enemy’s electronic equipment and ensure that one’s own electronic 

equipment operates normally. It includes a series of actions to prevent the enemy from 

using the electro-magnetic spectrum while ensuring that one’s own side can make full use 

of the electro-magnetic spectrum. Psychological operations influence the enemy’s 
270

understanding and decision making systems by information propaganda, information 

deception, and information deterrence, thereby in essence, breaking down one kind of the 

enemy’s information operations. This is a new development of psychological operations 

under modern high-technology conditions. Its goal is to psychologically attack the 

enemy, achieving victory without fighting, or fighting and winning. Network warfare is 

operational activities to interfere with, damage, destroy, or control the enemy’s 

information network by using measures such as damaging computer software, attacking it 

with viruses, and destroying its hardware. In this way network warfare influences or 

damages the military systems and national information infrastructure which are based on 

information networks while protecting one’s own information network-based military 

systems and national information infrastructure from the effects of similar enemy actions. 

In information warfare, the main operational forms above are interrelated and 

intertwined. 

Looking Ahead 

Information warfare will rapidly develop in the following respects. (1) Improving 

Information Warfare Theory. Based on the results of research into current information 

warfare, further exploration of the characteristics and laws of information warfare and 

study of the relationships between information warfare and other forms of warfare will 

take shape as informationized warfare theory. (2) Developing Information Warfare 

Technology. IW will utilize the newest achievements in modern information technology, 

research and development of new information warfare technologies, especially highefficiency information warfare weapons. (3) Innovation of Information Warfare Methods 

of Operation. This includes research and innovation under different conditions to realize 

effective tactics and methods for information warfare. (4) Strengthening and Developing 

Information Warfare Units. Based on informationization of the armed forces and 

digitization of the battlefield, they will organize special information warfare units and 

fendui to specifically engage in information attack and defense to make preparations for 

information warfare. Along with the ever-increasing perfection of information warfare 

tactics and methods of operation, information warfare will play an increasingly important 

role in future war.715

Information Warfare Technology [xinxizhan jishu]—Technology used to seize 

information dominance in order to influence the opponent’s information, information 

systems, and basic information structure and protect one’s own in hostile, two-party 

confrontations conducted in the realm of information. Information warfare technology is 

an important measure for conducting information warfare. 

Information warfare technology involves all fields of information technology, 

including information gathering, information processing, information transmission, 

information management, and information application. According to operational models 

for information warfare, information warfare technology can be classified as information 

warfare attack technologies, information warfare defense technologies, and information 

warfare support technologies. 

 

715 Tan Haitao and Yang Jie, “Information Warfare,” Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Military Science 

Publishing House 2002, pp. 527-528. 
271

Information warfare attack technologies include the following. (1) Information 

Deception Technology. That is, technology that transmits false information to the 

enemy’s information systems, various sensors, and media. This includes various 

deception and camouflage technologies and stealth technology, and it causes the enemy 

to make erroneous decisions when the information is received. (2) Electronic Attack 

Technology. That is, technology that uses electronic jamming, deception, or directionfinding weapons to weaken or destroy the enemy’s ability to make use of the electromagnetic spectrum. (3) Computer Network Attack Technology. This is attack technology 

for computers and computer network hardware and software. “Hackers,” computer virus 

weapons, “worm” programs, “trojan horse” programs, logic bombs, system traps, and 

“hardware tricks” are frequently used attack technologies. They make computer hardware 

and software ineffective, or they delete, append, replace, and steal data. (4) Material 

Destruction Technology. That is, using precision guidance weapons and other weapons to 

carry out hard kills against enemy information systems and their power and supply 

support systems. Material destruction technology includes viruses that attack hardware, 

antiradiation weapons, nuclear electro-magnetic pulses, microwave weapons, laser 

weapons, etc. (5) Psychological Warfare Attack Technology. This is information 

processing technology that is implemented to psychologically influence the enemy using 

television, radio broadcasts, computer networks, and other media. 

Information warfare defense technologies include the following. (1) Information 

Encryption Technology. This mainly refers to using low probability of intercept 

technology for one’s own information. (2) Antimilitary Deception Technology. This 

mainly refers to identifying fake facilities in the enemy’s deployment and using 

identification friend-or-foe technology to identify false enemy information. (3) Electronic 

Defense Technology. This includes electronic jamming countermeasures, electromagnetic reinforcement, frequency allocation, information secrecy, antistealth, and other 

technologies. (4) Computer Network and Software Security Defense Technology. This 

mainly refers to computer security technology including isolation and screening, access 

control, cryptographic techniques, nonstandard design, system monitoring, integrated 

management, and other technologies. (5) Material Destruction Countermeasures and 

Psychological Warfare Technology Countermeasures. 

Information warfare support technologies mainly refer to technologies for 

stealing, intercepting, and using the enemy’s information. These include information 

reconnaissance technology, information processing and cracking technology, etc. It is the 

basis and prerequisite for conducting information attack and information defense. 

Comprehensive electronic information systems are main battle weapons that seize 

information dominance. In information operations, they perform many kinds of 

operational functions, including command, control, communications, intelligence, 

monitoring, reconnaissance, navigation, information attack and defense, etc. 

Electronic warfare technology is an important component of information warfare 

technology. Its earliest rudiments were in the early 20th century. Wireless 
272

communications countermeasures emerged during the First World War, and 

following that, radar countermeasure, opto-electric countermeasure, and hydroacoustic countermeasure technologies emerged. Since the 1970s, because of the 

extensive use of information technology, information has become a key element of 

systems, and information warfare has become a new form of operations. Information 

warfare technology has attained rapid growth. The main development trends of 

information warfare technology are: developing information warfare support 

measures (ISM) [sic], information warfare command and control systems, computer 

security and attack technologies, and researching new concept weapons such as laser 

weapons, microwave weapons, and nanometric weapons.716

Operations Research and Analysis of Information Warfare [xinxizhan yunchou fenxi]—

This theory includes a quantitative analysis of information warfare issues and selects the 

optimal plans, methods, and actions for their use. This mainly includes operations 

research and analysis of electronic confrontation and operations research and analysis of 

computer network confrontation. The two primary functions of operations research and 

analysis of information warfare are planning and preparing the optimal disposition and 

the best plans for military action to acquire the biggest operationally effective 

information weapons system; and analyzing, evaluating, and calculating the operational 

efficacy of information warfare weapons systems and plans for military action. The goal 

is to provide theoretical guidance and a quantitative basis for supplemental decision 

making in information warfare. 

Forms and Development 

Operations research and analysis of information warfare is gradually developing 

along with the continually deepening understanding of information warfare. During the 

periods of the First World War and the Second World War, the technology of using radio 

to disseminate information gradually matured. The main forms of information warfare, 

which was in its rudimentary period, were using codes and breaking codes, and specific 

examples of using operations research and analysis of information warfare were 

becoming more common. For example, the US military’s successful breaking of the 

Japanese military’s code directly led to the shooting down of the aircraft in which the 

Japanese military’s Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto was riding. In the wars of the Middle 

East and the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s, along with massive use of missiles 

and other informationized weapons and the consequential development of operations 

research decision making and efficacy analysis, operations research and analysis of 

information warfare began in the modern sense. In the 1980s, high-technology measures 

were used for capturing, transmitting, processing, and storing operational information, 

and the theory and practice levels of operations research and analysis of information 

warfare raised a great degree. During Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli 

military used electronic confrontation and reconnaissance measures to successfully entice 

Syria into revealing the technical parameters of its radar in Bekaa Valley. Then it used 

 

716 Su Jianzhi, “Information Warfare Technology,” Chinese Military Encyclopedia, Military Science 

Publishing House, 2002, p. 528. This section was translated by Senior Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy 

Reserve Navy Information Operations Command. 
273

highly directional radar countermeasures to successfully attack and destroy the Syrian 

military’s air defense missile bases. After the mid-1980s, following the rapid 

development of computer network technology, operations research and analysis of 

network attack and network defense as another important part of operations research and 

analysis of information warfare effectively penetrated and disrupted the enemy’s 

information systems and protected friendly information systems, becoming an important 

subject in operations research and analysis of information warfare. During the Gulf War 

in the early 1990s, the multinational force headed by the US used the theory and methods 

of operations research and analysis of information warfare throughout the war which 

basically assured the centralized coordination of air attacks, the precision of airborne 

attacks, and the accurate evaluation of damage results. During the Kosovo War at the end 

of the 1990s, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with the support of its enormous 

information network, actively used operations research and analysis of information 

warfare methods to plan airborne attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also used operations research and analysis of information 

warfare methods such as camouflage and deception to avoid a number of losses. During 

this war organized network attack activities also emerged, making computer network 

confrontation and its operations research and analysis become an organic part of 

information warfare for the first time. The development of operations research and 

analysis of information warfare entered into a relatively mature phase. 

Research Content and Methods 

Research content of operations research and planning of information warfare 

includes: optimal disposition of information warfare weapons systems, selection of the 

best plan for information warfare actions, information warfare countermeasures, optimal 

design and operation of information warfare equipment, evaluation and analytical 

calculation of the effectiveness of information warfare operations and equipment. 

Frequently used methods are mathematical planning, game theory, queuing theory, 

computer operations simulation, and virtual computer confrontation testing. 

Mathematical planning theory can be used to help come up with the best plan for 

information warfare actions and for problems in information warfare concerning 

allocating weapons, selecting positions, organizing operations, and arranging personnel. 

Problems with information warfare countermeasures can be analyzed using game theory 

methods but with only a little pure strategy and with a lot of mixed strategy. Static state 

optimal design and operation of information warfare equipment can be analyzed using 

queuing theory methods, and various queuing models can be set up according to the 

characteristics of the input processes, queuing rules, and service systems. Moreover, 

calculating and comparing the service probability and the nonservice probability of 

information warfare equipment provides a basis for normal use of information warfare 

equipment. Simulated network confrontation testing is a special technical measure for 

resolving operations research and analysis issues for computer network confrontation 

based on specific types of computer network confrontation installations and software. It 

establishes a generalized mathematical model of network confrontation operations 

environments, confrontation actions, and confrontation processes by setting up a virtual 

network confrontation testing environment and imitating an opponent’s network 

operating systems, database systems, and encryption mechanisms. By numerous attack 
274

tests against the target network and counting the capture frequency, it can assess the 

operational efficacy of network attack technology and equipment, calculate the results of 

tactics and plans, compare the strengths and weaknesses of different scenarios, and debug 

network attack software. It can provide decisive or quantitative references to make 

decisions for attacking the enemy’s networks. 

More and more, efficiency assessments and analyses of information warfare 

actions and equipment is beginning to use computer operations simulations. They can 

establish digital models of information operations environments, operational actions, and 

operational procedures and equipment based on the scope of the information warfare 

actions and the specific equipment types. It can evaluate the operational efficacy of the 

information actions and equipment, calculate the results of tactics and plans, compare the 

strengths and weaknesses of different scenarios, and revise the tactical and technical 

parameters of equipment by numerous computer simulation tests and processing 

statistics. Based on the size of the scope involved in the model, information warfare 

operations simulations are classified into four types: one-on-one confrontation, which is 

confrontation of an individual piece of electronic equipment against another individual 

piece of electronic equipment; many-on-many confrontation, which is confrontation of 

many pieces of electronic equipment against many pieces of electronic equipment; 

system-on-system confrontation, which is confrontation between both sides’ operational 

information systems; setup-on-setup confrontation, which is confrontation between both 

sides’ operational information setups. 

Development Trends 

Along with the continual deepening of theoretical research into information 

warfare and the progressive perfection of technical measures, information warfare is 

developing toward being more intelligent and being made into platforms. This places 

even higher demands on operations research and analysis of information operations. 

Along with the continual development and perfection of information warfare theory and 

practice, operations research and analysis of information warfare will increasingly make 

use of computer simulation decision making activities to reduce the subjective nature of 

researching to make decisions.717

 

717 Chen Yongguang, “Operations Research and Analysis of Information Warfare,” Chinese Military 

Encyclopedia, Military Science Publishing House, 2002, pp. 528-529. This section was translated by Senior 

Chief Bart Zobel of the Navy Reserve Navy Information Operations Command. 

. 
275

APPENDIX THREE: SUN TZU ART OF WAR CONFERENCES AND IW 

SUBJECTS718

 In November 2004, China held its 6th International Symposium on Sun Tzu’s Art 

of War. In addition to hundreds of Chinese military and civilian officials, guests from 

Taiwan, France, India, Russia, and the US attended. Approximately 127 papers were 

listed in the program. Chinese speakers accounted for 109 of the presentations while five 

papers were from Taiwan, five from Hong Kong, and the remaining eight papers were 

from other foreign guests. Not all of the people listed in the program were able to be 

present, but abstracts of their papers were provided. 

Chinese speakers stressed several themes. One was that US successes in Iraq were 

due to a reliance on Sun Tzu’s theories more than those of Clausewitz. Five papers 

discussed some aspect of the war in Iraq. Another theme was that Sun Tzu’s theories are 

applicable to the information age. Therefore the wisdom of Sun Tzu must still be 

followed and not discarded. Finally, several of the presentations discussed strategic 

culture or one of its aspects. 

The Chinese presentations that addressed Sun Tzu’s impact on psychological and 

information operations, the focus of this book, were few in number and are listed below. 

1. “A Few Issues Concerning Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Strategic Psychological 

Warfare” by Hao Yinglu and Zhao Xiaomin. 

2. “The Basis for the Psychological Warfare Planning of Sun Tzu” by Zhou Min 

3. “Enhancing the Psychological Warfare Capability against Taiwan by Learning 

from Sun Tzu’s Military Thoughts” by Yu Jiang and Xiong Yuiang 

4. “Sun Tzu’s Strategic Thought and Its Inspiration for Informationized Warfare” by 

Chai Yuqiu 

5. “Sun Tzu’s Thoughts on War and Reflections on Informationized Warfare” by 

Jiang Lei 

6. “Sun Tzu’s Thought of ‘Subduing’ and Aerospace Power of the Information Era” 

by Zhang Zhiping 

7. “Sun Tzu’s Idea of ‘Deception’ and Information War” by Wang Huqiang 

8. “Sun Tzu’s Ideas on Psychological Warfare and their Direction in Modern 

Psychological Warfare” by Ai Songru 

Three articles, those by Yu Jiang and Xiong Yuiang, Zhang Zhiping, and Wang 

Huqiang, were not available as handouts in complete length. However, abstracts of their 

presentations were available and will be noted in the discussion below. 

 

718 The author would like to thank Senior Chief Bart Zobel for translating all of the articles used in this 

chapter from the Sixth International Seminar on Sun Tzu’s Art of War. 
276

A Few Issues Concerning Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Strategic Psychological 

Warfare719

One key lesson that Chinese military authors have frequently cited over the past 

two years regarding Iraq is that psychological warfare (PSYWAR) now has strategic 

significance. Authors Hao Yinglu and Zhao Xiaomin of the Xian Political Academy 

continued this discussion at the Sun Tzu conference. They defined strategic psychological 

warfare (SPW) as 

a competition, a comparison, and a match of the overall forces of the enemy and 

friendly sides. It is a form of international political struggle that is related to the 

rise and fall of a nation and the waxing and waning of its strengths and 

vulnerabilities...it is a strategy for persuasion that uses psychological attack as the 

primary measure and confrontation as the main contradiction. 

SPW reflects the interests and requirements of a country and their political intentions 

according to Hao and Zhao. On the military level, SPW reflects political objectives, 

making war an extension of politics and SPW (and not just politics as Clausewitz noted). 

This is a striking statement in its own right, and it demonstrates the focus the Chinese 

have placed on SPW. 

The authors restated several of Sun Tzu’s sayings, and they gave the clear 

impression that warfare is an offensive oriented task. One must contend for the initiative 

and control it. Hao and Zhao also stressed the offensive necessity to “impose one’s will 

on the enemy but not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed on oneself.” SPW cannot 

have an inactive defense or be purely defensive. The focus must be on attack in order to 

gain the initiative. It must also utilize excellent forecasting and deep insight, and control 

preemptive opportunities. SPW must flexibly lay down strategic policies and plans for 

psychological war and use them to counteract an enemy’s high-level decision makers. 

The authors stated that one must be good at “temple calculations” or planning as 

well. Moral law, heaven, earth, the commander, and method and discipline govern temple 

calculations. Here one must ask of a confrontation 

Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with Moral Law? Which of the two 

generals has the most ability? With whom lie the advantages derived from heaven 

and earth? On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? Which army is 

stronger? On which side are officers and men more highly trained? In which army 

is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment? 

To properly utilize SPW requires an understanding of the objective and subjective 

conditions of the enemy and friendly sides. Calculations based on this understanding 

ensure that strategic decisions are properly made, the authors contend. These decisions 

must take into consideration the strategic focal points, orientation, and missions of a 

 

719 Hao Yinglu and Zhao Xiaomin, “A Few Issues Concerning Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Strategic 

Psychological Warfare,” paper for the Sixth International Seminar on Sun Tzu’s Art of War, November 

2004. All Chinese comments in this section are taken from this paper. 
277

country. It is necessary to combine all of one’s strategic resources and to employ direct 

and indirect uses of SPW in combination. SPW requires military, technological, 

economic, and information superiority. Further, 

Superiority in ideological culture can have an effect on the enemy’s ideological 

concepts, ideology, and cultural traditions; it can subdue and control the mind of 

the enemy; it can create changes in the relationship of the authorities of the two 

sides. 

Any psychological struggle must be backed by substantial military strength. This 

has also been a longstanding proposition of the PLA, much like the focus on SPW. 

PSYWAR and power are related because together they intimidate. 

The Basis for the Psychological Warfare Planning of Sun Tzu720

 Author Zhou Min, from the Sun Tzu Art of War Application Consultation Center, 

discussed the values, methods, forms, and thoughts on PSYWAR in his dissertation. To 

Zhou, PSYWAR was about penetrating the enemy soldier’s mind or that of the command 

decision maker with deception. He also wrote briefly on the theory of morale and 

associated it with times to attack and the condition of a soldier’s hypothalamus gland 

(clearly, this is a surprise to most Western specialists!). 

Zhou noted that planning for deception depends on correctly using the “form of 

units,” suggestion, and what is known as “breakthrough” in psychological lines of 

defense. Unit “form” means moving units around, camouflaging them, and reducing or 

increasing their numbers. These various forms put suggestions into the heads of 

opponents. Suggestions capitalize on veiled language or information as well as indirect 

action to have an effect on the psychological behavior of people. Suggestion based on 

form then produces breakthroughs in the ability to control the logic, morale, and lines of 

defense of the enemy’s decision makers. Morale is a type of combat strength of an 

enemy, an expression of the collective spirit and collective will of military personnel. It is 

best to attack morale in the evening. Scientifically, this works because when under stress 

the feedback control loop between the hypothalamus, the pituitary glands, and hormones 

in the brains of military personnel can fall out of balance due to excessive releases by the 

hypothalamus, lowering moods and excitement. 

Today psychological pressure on commanders and national decision makers is 

greater than at any time in the past. Psychological warfare operations include strategic 

deception, forms of electronic information, propaganda, and shock and awe types of 

information. These PSYWAR operations are designed to attack lines of defense and 

produce faults in policymaking and induce compromise in policy makers. 

Of interest is Zhou’s formulation of what he terms “operational forms of 

PSYWAR.” These forms of psychological war now include propaganda PSYWAR, 

 

720 Zhou Min, “The Basis for the Psychological Warfare Planning of Sun Tzu,” paper from the Sixth 

International Seminar on Sun Tzu’s Art of War,” November 2004. All material in this section is credited to 

Zhou. 
278

deterrence PSYWAR, conscious PSYWAR, ideological PSYWAR, and network 

PSYWAR, among others. Unfortunately he did not go into depth and explain any of these 

forms. The ultimate goal is to gain psychological supremacy and change the cultural 

values of PSYWAR targets. 

In addressing US armed forces in particular, Zhou noted that they operate on five 

principles. These are initiative, depth, agility, coordination, and multiple abilities. The US 

military aims to destroy forces materially and “what is even more important” to create 

intense psychological shock and awe in the enemy’s mind to destroy cohesion and the 

will to fight. 

Sun Tzu’s Ideas on Psychological Warfare and Their Direction in Modern 

Psychological Warfare721

Author Ai Songru of the Shenyang Military Region offered a longer, more 

detailed perspective on psychological operations. His remarks covered the use of 

PSYWAR in Iraq, the abundance of new PSYWAR techniques available, and a 

discussion of how China must prepare itself to exploit the wisdom of Sun Tzu. He also 

focused attention on the elevation of PSYWAR to a position of strategic prominence 

affecting political, military, and diplomatic struggles. 

Ai noted that he studied the use of PSYWAR in Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan, 

and Iraq and paid attention to the psychology of both sides. He discovered problems for 

coalition forces that included coordinating PSYWAR strategy, measures, and support 

before, during, and after these wars. Problems arose in Ai’s opinion because people did 

not “completely decipher Sun Tzu’s ideas on PSYWAR or use PSYWAR as it should 

have been applied.” He felt that Eastern wisdom and Sun Tzu’s ideas on PSYWAR are 

required if the world is ever to experience peace and growth. 

Ai stated that the widespread use of modern broadcast technology, network 

technology, stealth technology, virtual reality technology, three-dimensional imaging 

technology, composite audio-visual information technology, and so on has made 

PSYWAR measures more abundant. This allows for PSYWAR to be used during the 

entire course of a war. In Iraq, Ai believes the US made PSYWAR strategy the basic 

strategy of the war. PSYWAR improved the result of operations and accelerated the 

progress of the war. After May of 2003, however, events turned against the US and 

psychological operations (PSYOP) and its PSYWAR effort did not do enough. Three 

lessons learned were that post-combat PSYWAR is an important part of PSYWAR 

operations; that the focal point of post-combat PSYWAR is psychological pacification of 

the broad masses and the psychological softening of any antagonistic forces; and that 

PSYWAR policy and tactics before, during, and after a war must be consistent both 

toward the domestic population and international opinion. 

 

721 Ai Songru, “Sun Tzu’s Ideas on Psychological Warfare and Their Direction in Modern Psychological 

Warfare,” paper from the Sixth International Seminar on SunTzu’s Art of War, November 2004. All 

information in this section is credited to Ai. 
279

US forces in Iraq demonstrated that PSYWAR plays a key role in political, 

military, and diplomatic struggles. They made breakthroughs in PSYWAR since they 

held the political banner of antiterrorism, they diplomatically used mediation to isolate 

Iraq, and they threatened Iraq militarily. The comprehensive effect of these measures was 

that the Iraqi military and people felt an increased psychological burden, which hastened 

their collapse. The US controlled all dimensions of the war which meant they controlled 

the attitudes and beliefs of the domestic population and enemy morale. 

Ai adds that PSYWAR must have depth and be present on the strategic, 

campaign, and tactical levels. Strategic commanders stress guidance, campaign 

commanders stress scheming, and tactical commanders stress planning according to Ai. 

This is a cause and effect affair that must be mutually supportive, coordinated, and 

complementary. 

Ai postulated that Sun Tzu’s ideas on PSYWAR must permeate all dimensions of 

war. To balk the enemy’s plans, Ai recommended the use of PSYWAR deterrence, 

PSYWAR deception, and PSYWAR propaganda. “Shock and awe” was seen as a 

refurbished version of Sun Tzu’s PSYWAR theory of shock and awe [note: this author is 

unaware to what Sun Tzu lesson Ai is referring.]. Another lesson learned was that 

everything should be done not only to balk enemy plans but also to prevent the junction 

of enemy forces. To accomplish these two issues it is necessary to make contact, 

dialogue, exchange ideas, and communicate to change the other side’s attitudes and 

resolutions. 

The US based their policy solely on military force and this backfired on them. In 

Afghanistan, it was clear that when the US entered they had little cultural awareness and 

relied too much on military force. Psychological warfare personnel did not compose 

convincing messages and in some cases promoted terrorism unwittingly (for example, 

one leaflet warned and threatened the Taliban with death. However, since death is a way 

to see Allah, the Taliban were not intimidated. The words crusader and justice were also 

used in speeches and broadcasts and this was an affront to the Muslim world, since only 

Allah could provide infinite justice.). 

Another lesson learned from US forces in Iraq is that it is easy to invade but 

difficult to occupy, and it is easy to attack cities but difficult to attack mentalities. 

Fighting and winning is not the same as fighting and convincing; and the results of 

conquering by military force are temporary while the results of conquering by 

psychology are permanent. PSYWAR as a national strategy should be understood as 

PSYWAR policy, tactics, measures, and actions for national politics, military affairs, 

economics, diplomacy, and culture. 

Three problems warrant attention for China. First, a strategic think tank for 

PSYWAR is becoming increasingly important. Second, it is necessary to see the overall 

strategic situation when making plans. How PSYWAR is integrated into the overall plan 

is important. Finally, one must make simultaneous and composite use of many kinds of 

measures. There are also five faults that can endanger a military General: recklessness, 
280

cowardice, a hasty temper, a lack of honor, and over-soliciting his men, leading to worry 

and trouble. 

Ai noted that war is not just about the use of force but also about the use of wit, 

most importantly the use of form, deception, and falsehood. Form is the basic operational 

intent of commanders to carry out PSYWAR activities. Deception involves varying the 

actual situations of terrain and military formations. Deception usually glimmers with Sun 

Tzu’s wisdom of form. Ai believes the US military used deception and form very well as 

it moved from the south to the north in Iraq. 

Today, Sun Tzu’s ideas on deceptive PSYWAR contain three points for 

consideration. First, a flat form must be changed to a three-dimensional model containing 

hyperspace and range. Second, there are now comprehensive forms and not just a single 

form. Great use must be made of high-tech acoustics, optics, electronics, smoke, 

shadows, and images. Finally there is now a 24-hour form of military activities that is 

different from the past division of peace and war. This form permeates both peace and 

war. 

In the end a righteous war is the backbone for PSYWAR. It provides the initiative 

for PSYWAR, and it causes the people to be in accord with the ruler and encourages 

them to follow him regardless of the danger. Ai believes US PSYWAR lost its foundation 

after the initial fighting because it had lost its righteous cause. PSYWAR could not be 

brought into play. Whereas Western strategic culture uses power to gain victory, Eastern 

culture uses strategy. This allows for the use of PSYWAR where inequity and imbalance 

are present. PSYWAR in such instances can permeate, neutralize, and influence. 

Sun Tzu’s Thoughts on War and Reflections on Informationized War722

Jiang Lei, from the PLA’s Navy Command Academy, offered an interesting view 

on information war in general and the meaning of Sun Tzu’s theory in the information 

age in particular. He noted that informationized warfare has introduced new patterns and 

new forms of warfare where crisis and peace are more intertwined than before. 

Decapitation operations are one such form. They take advantage of Sun Tzu’s notion to 

“begin by seizing something that your opponent holds dear.” Now warfare has become a 

confrontation between setups, between systems, and between networks. Systems can now 

determine the course of a war and enable victory or defeat. Informationized war is a trial 

of strength of the knowledge and action capabilities of both sides. The side with 

knowledge can see through the fog of war better than the other side and firmly control 

war’s initiative and information supremacy, the latter being the key to victory in war. 

But Jiang states that the basic character of war hasn’t changed (wars will still be 

just or unjust, war will breed unpredictable consequences, etc.). He noted that 

 

722 Jiang Lei, “Sun Tzu’s Thoughts on War and Reflections on Informationized War,” paper from the Sixth 

International Seminar on Sun Tzu’s Art of War,” November 2004. All information in this section is 

credited to Jiang. 
281

The new forms of informationized warfare...have not created a new modality for 

realizing the political objectives of warfare or new methods for preventing the 

disaster of war...the fundamental and crucial reason lies in the political objectives 

and nature of war, and it does not lie in changes or an escalation in the methods or 

forms of warfare, regardless of actual strength or technology... 

Jiang concedes that wars can be shortened, casualties reduced, and precision destruction 

increased. 

Major powers may think it is easier and more advantageous to launch wars due to 

these latter criteria. War seems more “doable.” Jiang warns that war still has unexpected 

consequences that should make any major power hold back on the use of an 

informationized force. For example, an information force will drive smaller opponents to 

adopt extreme, irrational measures, or terrorist type methods of response and retaliation. 

Jiang quoted Sun Tzu, stating “he will win who knows when to fight and when not to 

fight. He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces.” 

To keep unexpected consequences from happening, Jiang recommends that major 

powers pay extra attention to Sun Tzu’s guidance. Major powers should be more careful 

and not think that warfare has become easier. They should not put troops in the field to 

satisfy their own ego. They should also be careful not to go after primary decision makers 

since a series of unknown consequences could follow and responsibility for the main 

consequences of war will rest on the major power’s shoulders. He quotes Sun Tzu, stating 

that “one may know how to conquer without being able to do it. He will win who, 

prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared.” 

Sun Tzu’s Strategic Thought and Its Inspiration for Informationized Warfare723

Author Chai Yuqiu of the Nanjing Army Command Academy divided his paper 

into two parts. The first part covered the historical significance of Sun Tzu, and the 

second part discussed six ways that Sun Tzu’s writings were relevant in the information 

age. Initially, Chai noted how Sun Tzu utilized what he termed “naïve materialistic and 

dialectic thought.” This was embodied in Sun Tzu’s discussions of the offense and 

defense, the direct and the indirect, advantages and disadvantages, night and day, work 

and rest, and so on. He called Sun Tzu a grand strategist without parallel in history. 

Chai noted that Sun Tzu fused the thought of Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism, 

and Mohism and absorbed the laws of many professions. These included industry, 

agriculture, commerce, medicine, and military laws. 

Regarding Sun Tzu’s applicability today, Chai noted that the “quintessence of 

knowledge is wisdom, and the quintessence of wisdom is strategy.” While knowledge can 

become antiquated with the passage of time, strategy cannot. That is why history is so 

relevant even today. It embodies the use and methods of strategy from the past. 

 

723 Chai Yuqiu, “Sun Tzu’s Strategic Thought and Its Inspiration for Informationized Warfare,” paper from 

the Sixth International Seminar on Sun Tzu’s Art of War, November 2004. Credit for all information in this 

section belongs to Chai. 
282

Chai’s six ways to use Sun Tzu’s thinking include the following: 

 “Breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” is the ultimate goal of 

informationized warfare. 

 “Knowing victory” is a prerequisite for being the first to win and gain a 

complete victory in informationized warfare. 

 “Direct and indirect” warfare is revealed and developed even more in 

informationized warfare. 

 “Quick decision” is the inevitable choice for informationized warfare in 

the pursuit of benefits in war. 

 “Modifications and changes” have an even greater real significance in 

informationized warfare. 

 “Psychological attack” has an even greater inspirational role in 

informationized warfare. 

“Breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting” is reflected primarily in the 

planning of the offensive. However, in the information age, an offensive can mean a 

fighting method that doesn’t spill blood or that doesn’t depend on the use of force. Sides 

engaged in conflict in the twenty-first century will attempt to protect their own forces and 

yet produce a victory that is complete. This can be accomplished with informationized 

warfare and is the result that is sought by both sides. 

“Knowing victory” refers to knowing several important things about an enemy. 

One must fully understand information in order to deliver victory. This means knowing 

the evils of war, a profitable way of conducting war, the army’s condition, the power of 

opposing armies, the place and time of battle, enemy plans, the devious and the direct 

methods of attacking, the designs of the enemy and your neighbors, and the advantages 

accompanying one’s tactics, among other issues. The side that controls the power to gain, 

use, and control information will be prepared to analyze and decide how to use one’s own 

forces. 

“Direct and indirect” refers to using the correct type of tactics for the force at 

one’s disposal. One must learn how to bring into play one’s own strengths and how to 

spot enemy weaknesses. Information age technologies can make the weak very strong. 

“Quick decision” is a Sun Tzu thought that emphasizes the need to avoid 

prolonged warfare and exhausting one’s strength. Even in the information age it is 

important to stop expending large sums of money over extended periods of time. The 

expense of modern weapons can cause financial losses to happen quickly. Therefore 

quick victories are needed, even in the information age. 

“Modifications and changes” emphasize that one side should not be constrained 

by conventional methods of fighting. One must adapt to crises and take appropriate 

actions. Even in the information age it is necessary for commanders to master changes in 

situations on the enemy’s side and one’s own side, the situation on the ground, and 
283

situations elsewhere in order to make timely decisions and to seize the initiative and 

victory. 

“Psychological attack” depends on studying moods and awaiting the appearance 

of chaos or disorder. The same views hold in the information age. Only the methods have 

changed. 

Today, no matter what the profession (politics, diplomacy, market operations, 

economic, or physical competition), strategy is still relevant. It is the only key to 

determining success or failure. Economic globalization, the use of high-technology by 

militaries, and the development of multivariable competition among businesses all 

indicate that strategies using information and information technologies will be part of our 

present and immediate future. 

Abstracts of a Few Papers Not Issued724

 Yu Jiang and Xiong Yuxiang of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science stated 

that PSYWAR has never been abandoned, even in the age of high-technology. Therefore 

Sun Tzu’s well-known thesis that “The ‘Qi’ of the three Armies can be snatched away 

and the commanding general’s mind can be seized” is still applicable. In fact, PSYWAR 

has become “wars outside wars and wars on top of wars.” It is a strategic means to realize 

national interests. Today PYSWAR has greater attack potential and its means are more 

diversified. 

 Author Zhang Zhiping of the Chinese Air Force’s Command College wrote that 

“subduing” is the core and essential aspect of Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Today aerospace 

power armed with information is the leading actor on the modern warfare stage, and it is 

the main method to subdue an enemy. An aerospace “net of awareness” can dispel the fog 

and friction of war. Complete victory can be obtained from afar. Aerospace power can be 

applied flexibly. It is the optimal way to deal with local wars and conflicts. 

 Finally, Wang Huqiang of the PLA’s Shenyang Military Area Command noted 

that Sun Tzu pays great attention to the effect of strategy in war. Deception becomes the 

golden rule guiding strategy. It is focused on avoiding strength, striking weaknesses, and 

using extraordinary force to win. Even in the age of information weapons, it is possible to 

find weaknesses in an enemy force. These weak points must be exploited and 

countermeasures worked out to strike them. 

 

724 Yu Jinag and Xiong Yuxiang, “Enhancing Psychological Warfare Capability by Learning from Sun 

Tzu’s Military Thoughts”; Zhang Zhiping, “Sun Tzu’s Thought of ‘Subduing’ and Aerospace Power in the 

Information Age”; and Wang Huqiang, “Sun Tzu’s Idea of ‘Deception’ and Information War,” papers from 

the Sixth International Seminar on Sun Tzu’s Art of War. Only abstracts of these presentations were 

available. 
284

APPENDIX FOUR: DISCUSSION OF THE FORMS OF INFORMATION 

WARFARE 

The following is a direct translation of a section of Chapter Three, “Total 

Emergence of Troop Combat Strength Systems,” pp. 109-121, of the book Discussion of 

Forms of Information Warfare by Dong Zifeng. The book was published by the PLA 

Publishing House in Beijing in 2004. It describes a way of looking at the combat strength 

of a unit under conditions of “informationization.” This portion of Dong’s book was 

translated by a private company. 

IV. A Dynamics Equation for Military Combat Strength “Quantization” 

 The question of quantitative assessment of military combat strength has always 

been a difficult point in military science research. From Carl von Clausewitz’s quantity 

formula to Lanchester’s equation and T. N. DuBois’ new square law, military theorists 

over the world have done vast amounts of work to establish a series of mathematical 

models with definite results. For most of these models, however, a “metal-ized,” 

“gunpowder-ized,” and mechanized military is the object of the research, and they are set 

up on the foundation of combat strength as a continuous function. It cannot explain the 

“quantization” phenomenon of combat strength, nor can it resolve the issue of the 

emergence of combat strength brought on by the information structure. It is no longer 

suited to the reality of an “informationized” military. Based on the basic thinking of the 

quantitative characterization above, we have set up a combat strength “quantized” 

dynamic equation followed by a general discussion of the equation. 

1. Combat Strength Quantum Mathematical Model 

The combat strength quantum is a basic component unit of the informationized 

military combat strength system. It is a systematic mechanism established with the 

network as its core, information as the key element, and the information chain as the 

foundation, and it integrates the system of the traditional combat strength key elements 

and transforms it from platform-centered combat to network-centered combat. 

 The combat strength quantum should have the following basic characteristics: (1) 

independent fighting functionality; (2) capability to communicate within and without; (3) 

ability to receive outside information in an unsealed network; (4) changeable structure 

that, when the information chain is broken, can switch from an information network 

structure to a mechanical linear system; (5) under normal linked circumstances, the 

outside function and effectiveness of a combat strength quantum of any component form 

gradually tends to converge and become equivalent, but the value obtained is not 

continuous; (6) possession of one information advantage, a transparent battlefield, and 

direct-aim firing as a possible equivalent. 

 
285

First, we examined the classic Lanchester equation for modern combat725: 

 

In the formula, x (t) and y (t) each represent the time t for the survival number of the two 

sides’ combat members after combat has begun; α and β are the coefficients of the 

proportion of casualties, respectively representing the average rate of combat member 

demise of the opposite side for Y and X. This differential equation shows that the 

proportion of casualties for one side of combat members is directly proportional to the 

number of combat members of the opposite side that are firing at that time. This 

conclusion implies the following assumptions: 

 Each side has combat members using only one of the same type of weapon, that 

is, they have the same combat function and combat effectiveness. 

 There are a sufficient number of combat members to act as continuous variable 

handling. 

 The combat members of both sides are exposed, information is completely 

symmetrical, and they are in effective firing range of the opposing side’s 

weapons. 

 The combat members of each side all know the position of the other friendly 

members, and there will be no accidental casualties. 

 Straight-aim firepower of members of the opposing side is evenly distributed, and 

they can immediately carry out a precise appraisal of the combat results and 

determine which of the opposite side's targets have already been destroyed. 

 

 Based on the military combat strength quantization assumptions and the basic 

characteristics of the combat strength quantum, other than the potential for incorrect 

symmetry of information on the informationized battlefield, the circumstance of networkcentered combat726 is the assumption criterion of the Lanchester equation. This has made 

it possible for us to use the Lanchester combat theory to establish a combat strength 

quantum mathematical model. In view of the fact that the square law combat model is 

appropriate for describing the military strength changes in modern combat straight aim 

warfare, its proportion of casualties coefficient primarily reflects the effect of the C4

ISR 

 

725 Zhang Zuiliang, et. al., Military Operational Research, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993, p. 203. 726 See [US] United States Department of Defense: “Network-centered Combat – Report of the United 

States Department of Defense to the State Department,” Translation of the Chinese Center for Defense 

Science and Technology Information, Beijing: Chinese Center for Defense Science and Technology 

Information, 2002, pp. 3-4. 
286

system on straight-aim firing. We have used the Lanchester square law combat model 

after adjusting it:727

In the formula, r and b are the respective times t of the military strength of the two sides, 

red and blue; nr and nb are the respective tactical firing rates of the two sides, red and 

blue; Rkr and Rkb are the respective weapon casualty radii for the two sides, red and blue, 

and Rlr and Rlb are the respective indeterminate radii for the opponent target positions of 

both sides, red and blue; K1r and K1b are the target information resolution rate coefficients 

for the two sides, red and blue, where K1 ≥ 1; K2r and K2b are the combat result 

assessment rate coefficients for the two sides, red and blue, where 0 < K2 ≤ 1; and K3r and 

K3b are the target discovery delay coefficients for the two sides, red and blue, where 0 < 

K3 ≤ 1. Under conditions of a precision attack, Rkr = Rlr, Rkb = Rlb, and (3.2) can be 

simplified as: 

 When t is set equal to zero for both sides, the initial military strength of the two 

sides, red and blue, is r0 and b0. For the sake of simplicity, assuming that the C4ISR 

system only affects the casualty coefficient of the red side against the blue side, then the 

military strength multiplication coefficient after using the new C4

ISR system for the red 

side is: 

 Achieving given combat results 

 

727 Zhang Zuiliang, et. al., pp. 131-134. 
287

In the formula, ac is the casualty coefficient after using the new C4ISR system, a0 is the 

casualty coefficient before using the new C4

ISR system. Using formulas (3.2) and (3.4), 

GR can be obtained. Similarly, the military strength multiplication coefficient GB for the 

red side against the blue side can be obtained. 

 The combat strength quantum is calculated based on the following formula: 

In the formula, GR is the military strength multiplication coefficient, Pm is the combat 

effectiveness before informationization of the combat unit which can be obtained from 

the combat effectiveness index of the key elements that make up the combat unit. In 

addition, the average value of the entire troop combat effectiveness indices can be 

obtained, but this does not take into consideration their specific calculation problems. 

 2. Mathematical Model for Information Structural Strength 

(1) Required Assumptions

 First, in peacetime, there is sufficient time to set up and informationize a troop 

combat strength system, far longer than in wartime. In wartime, the wartime period is 

sufficiently short, far less than the recovery time for an informationized troop combat 

strength system, and the ability to transform war potential into actual military strength is 

limited. For these reasons, the growth process of troop combat strength can be seen as a 

continuous growth process, and chaotic phenomena such as “branching off,” which is a 

continuous process of dispersal, exist with the disintegration of troop combat strength. 

 Second, under a network structure, the combat strength of a platform medium 

system is relatively constant. Creation of information structure strength is based on the 

chain movement of the information platform, digital chain, and information factors. With 

regard to single soldiers and weaponry itself, the informationizing process is an 

information factor embedding process; therefore, it is natural that weaponry and soldiers 

that have been remolded through informationization will have higher combat 

effectiveness and strength than originally. For example, some sensors that have higher 

attack precision are installed in guided missiles. What we are even more concerned about, 

however, is the problem of the leap in combat strength of these combat units acting under 

networks composed of particles, or the problem of information structural strength. To 

make analysis of this problem easier, then, we have converted the combat effectiveness 

before “particle-ization" into a corresponding combat effectiveness CEV, and in this way 

the combat strength of the combat unit under the network structure is constant and 

becomes a constant, Pm. 

 (2) Metcalfe’s Leap
288

 Information structural strength is an independent increment, and its size follows 

the “Metcalfe Law.” Information structural strength is formed on the basis of the 

information platform network structure after the warfare unit has been fully particle-ized. 

Under these circumstances, we treated each combat strength quantum as a nodal point on 

the network and observed and studied the number of nodal points and changes in the 

system structural strength caused by differences in the relationships between them. We 

did not focus on the structural and operating processes inside the nodal points. However, 

this partial increase in value exceeds the Pn value independent increment, and we called it 

“Metcalfe’s Leap.” It is expressed in the following formula: 

In the formula, Pn is the combat strength exponent of the combat strength quantum; T is 

the combat strength quantum number within the effective battlefield space, that is, the 

network nodal point number, and the solid space derived from the battlefield space, the 

upper limit of which is the altitude that the satellite reaches, and the distance from the 

earth’s surface is 120,000 meters; k is the network structure correction coefficient 

(between 0 ~ 1) determined by the structure between the nodal points, and its expression 

is the level of troop informationization for which different values are taken from each of 

the different network connection methods as Internet, Web, and Grid and are determined 

by the “Hall for Workshop of Metasynthetic Engineering” (HWMSE). Under ideal 

circumstances of normal exchange of Internet interoperability, the value of k is 1. 

 (3) Information Structural Strength

 The Metcalfe Leap for the combat strength system of the entire military refers to 

the information structural strength, and its size is: 

3. Formula for Calculation of Troop Combat Strength under Different Media 

Systems 

 When there are phase transformations in the troop combat strength system, the 

changeover of the system structure is carried out according to the following model: (1) In 

keeping with the component principles of an open, complex, huge system—troop combat 

strength is determined by the quality and quantity of the elements of combat strength as 

well as by the system structure, i.e., the interrelationship between the combat strength 

quantities. (2) The growth process for combat strength of informationized troops can be 

explained as a time continuous function P = f (M, E, I), but the decay happens suddenly, 

and combat strength immediately disintegrates. “Quirks” exist in the system, and this 

turning point is the critical value in the loss of combat strength quanta. (3) The growth 

process of the combat strength of informationized troops is different than the path of 

quantization disintegration; when there are too many network nodal points, i.e., when 
289

combat strength quanta are too many, the system has redundancy and compensation; 

when disintegration occurs, it does not happen in reverse of the growth process. The 

regional area encompassed by combat strength growth and disintegration reflect the 

ability of the troop combat strength system to resist attack; the smaller the area, the 

weaker the system, and vice versa. (4) This type of troop combat strength disintegration 

is changeover of the system structure, i.e., a phase transformation. The human warfare 

medium system has undergone the three processes of fraternal media (substance), 

platform media (capability), and network media (information) and, therefore, in a war or 

battle, there exists the potential for three types of system structures in the troop combat 

strength system. When the information factor is fractional, it switches to the capability 

system; when the capability factor is fractional, it switches to the substance system; when 

the substance factor is fractional, the troops have completely lost their fighting capacity. 

 The formula for calculating troop combat strength under circumstances of the 

different media systems is as follows: 

 (1) The substance system is the same as the cold weapon troop combat strength 

system, and the combat strength unit for the system is 1 person + 1 weapon. The combat 

strength for the entire force is:728

In the formula, N is the number of troops for one of the battle opponents, V is the factor 

variable for conditions of one of the battle opponents, and Q is the quantified value of the 

troop quality of one of the battle opponents. 

 (2) The capability system is the same as the thermonuclear weapon troop combat 

strength system, and its combat strength unit is 1 person (certain person) + 1 platform + 

voice communication system. The combat strength for the entire force:729

In the formula, S represents the troop military strength; Vf represents the troop military 

strength variable, which is determined by the environment variable, war variable, and 

action variable; CEV represents the corresponding battle effectiveness index. Of these, 

the military strength S is the total value of the actual operational lethality index of each 

type of weapon that an army has after taking into account the effect of special battlefield 

conditions on the usage results of this type of weapon: 

 

728 [US] T. N. DuBois: “Grasping War – Military History and War Theory,” Translation of the Military 

Science Institute Foreign Military Research Department, Beijing: Military Science Press, 1993, p. 87. 729 Ibid., p. 97. 
290

In the formula, Wi is the total value of the actual operational lethality index (OLI) of a 

specific weapon, and Vi is the factor affecting the effectiveness of the specific weapon. 

The actual operational lethality index is:730

In the formula, TLI is the theoretical lethality index, DI is the dispersal factor, and τ is the 

performance factor for each weapon. TLI is determined from the following formula: 

In the formula, RF is the rate of fire, R is the reliability, A is the accuracy, C is the target 

hit number of each firing, and Rn is the firing range. It is worth noting that, under 

conditions of an informationized battle, DI should be solid space. 

 The combat effectiveness value, CEV, is derived from the following formula731: 

In the formula, CEVr is relative combat effectiveness value of the red side, Rr/Rb is the 

actual battle result of the red side against the blue side, which is the ratio of the two sides’ 

actual combat strength; Pr/Pb is the theoretical battle results of the red side against the 

blue side, which is the ratio of the two sides’ combat potential. Of these, the battle results 

Rr (or Rb) are derived from the following formula: 

In the formula, MF is the mission factor, which reflects the capability of an army to 

achieve its accepted mission or self-understood mission as determined by military 

specialists; Esp is space performance, which measures the capability value of an army to 

capture or hold a position; Ecas is the casualty results, and it is the combat strength of an 

army measure on the basis of the casualty rate. 

 The combat strength quantum basic battle effectiveness index is: 

 

730 Ibid, pp. 90-91. 731 Ibid, p. 95. 
291

In the formula, T is the combat strength quantum number in the battlefield space. 

 (3) The information system is the structural characteristic of an informationized 

army. A mature informationized army or mature digitized battlefield has a normally 

linked network, the chain of information movement is unimpeded, and, after the battle 

unit is particle-ized, a combat strength quantum is formed with diffuse distribution on the 

battlefield, thereby causing a leap in the combat strength of the army to follow Metcalfe’s 

law.” For these reasons, the combat strength of an informationized army should be 

composed of two parts – one part is the sum of independent combat strength quanta, and 

the other part is the information structural strength produced by the networked combat 

strength quanta. From formulas (3.5), (3.7), and (3.15), we get: 

4. A Variable Structure Mathematical Model for the Combat Strength System of 

an Informationized Army 

From the previous analysis, we know that the combat strength system of an 

informationized army actually implies three types of structures: (1) The hand-foot 

intermediary system with substance as the guiding factor; (2) the platform intermediary 

system with capability as the guiding factor; and (3) the network intermediary system 

with information as the guiding factor. They each correspond to physical-centered war, 

platform-centered war, and network-centered war of the human war intermediary system 

in revolutionary history. The following system of equations is obtained when formulas 

(3.8), (3.9), and (3.16) are linked: 

 Formula (3.17) is the variable structure mathematical model for the 

informationized troop combat strength system. 

 The required discussion is carried out below in order to deepen understanding of 

its military significance. 
292

 (1) Formula (3.17) shows that, during the process of informationizing an army, 

the structure of the military system is variable. When the combat strength quantum 

number T is greater than 2, when the networking coefficient k ≠ 0, the military system is 

at the network-centered war structure, Metcalfe’s Leap exists, and the army combat 

strength system engenders information structural strength. When the combat strength 

quantum number T = 1, and the networking coefficient k = 0, PI = PE, and the military 

system is transformed into a platform-centered war structure. When the combat strength 

quantum number T = 0, and the networking coefficient k = 0, this means that the army 

system has lost its capacity and support of the information factor, and the military system 

has transformed into a physical-centered war structure and entered face-to-face combat 

with hands-and-feet as the intermediary. 

 (2) If the combat strength quantum number T is large enough, PE can be 

overlooked and, therefore, we can deduce the formula for the army combat strength 

system battle effectiveness index under conditions of a mature network system: 

 The formula above shows that, under ideal conditions of complete 

informationization, networking, and “intellectualization,” the army combat strength 

comes primarily from the information structural strength, and it becomes a direct 

proportion with the square of the number of combat strength quanta. This is precisely the 

description of Metcalfe’s Law. 

 (3) In the simultaneous set of equations, the formula for calculating PI is actually 

the dynamic formula after the growth process of an informationized army combat 

strength is completed. During the course of a war, if the war time t is short enough, and 

the combat strength quantum number T is large enough, then PI can be seen as a 

continuous function that follows the changes in T. The following is derived from formula 

(3.18): 

 The formula above shows that disintegration of the combat strength of an 

informationized army declines linearly with the combat strength quantum number. If it is 

assumed that the two sides are both carrying out resistance using network-centered 

combat, then the following equation is obtained: 
293

resulting in: 

to obtain: 

 With minor conversion,732 the following can be derived: 

In the formula, θ and ξ are the network casualty coefficients for the red and blue sides, 

respectively, against their opponent. Tr and Tb are the combat strength quantum numbers 

for the red and blue sides, respectively. Formulas (3.22) and (3.23) are derived from 

Metcalfe’s Law, and are isomorphic with Lanchester’s square law. We have called it the 

“Metcalfe-Lanchester Equation.” The military significance of the Metcalfe-Lanchester 

Equation is obvious – it shows that, under network-centered war conditions, the combat 

strength disintegration of both fighting sides is determined by the product of the network 

casualty coefficient and the combat strength quantum number. This reflects the essential 

characteristics of an informationized war in the network-centered war phase attacking the 

structure and the nodal points. At the same time, compared with the α and β values, the θ

and ξ values are much larger, which shows that, under conditions of an informationized 

war, troop combat strength will rapidly change in keeping with the changes in the combat 

strength quantum number. This provides a theoretical basis for the phenomenon of 

“crumbling” combat strength. 

 

732 Zhang Zuiliang, et al., pp. 116-117. 
294

 (4) Because of the redundancy and complementation functions of a combat 

strength quantum network, the impact of the combat strength quantum number T on PI is 

relatively small before arrival at the critical point, and it cannot be reduced according to 

the PI growth locus, there exists a difference, ΔT, between the variable critical value TP 

and the TG value that corresponds to PI in the growth process, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 

Figure 3.1 – Envelope Curve Diagram of the Combat Strength of an 

Informationized Army 

 In the diagram, the military significance of the area of the envelope curve formed 

by the rise and fall of PI reflects the resistance fighting capability of an informationized 

army. As the area increases, the resistance fighting capability becomes stronger, and as 

the area decreases, the system surplus diminishes, and the resistance fighting capability 

becomes weaker. This means that, under network-centered war conditions, there exists a 

“virtual combat strength quantum” in the military system. In order to measure this 

capability of an informationized military system, we have introduced the combat strength 

quantum surplus coefficient ρ: 

 Because ΔT = TG – TP , the system resistance fighting coefficient is: 

 The formula above shows the relationship between the combat strength quantum 

surplus coefficient and the system resistance fighting coefficient such that when ΔT = 0, 
295

TG = TP, and in this case ρ = 1 and ζ = 0, which shows that the system’s resistance 

fighting capability is very poor, and the military system is very weak. With regard to one 

specific war or battle, establishment of many large-scale network-centered battles will 

obtain a suitable T value, which has decisive significance when using the smallest cost to 

get the greatest combat success. This advances the potential prerequisite conditions for 

the “intimidation theory.” 

 (5) The system theory mechanism for the combat strength crumble phenomenon. 

In 1943, B. O. Koopman used the variable substitution method to get a square law format 

solution for the Lanchester equation (see formula [3.1]), and the results were published in 

1963. Actually, we can directly derive its accurate solution directly from the Lanchester 

square law differential equation, and the result is a hyperbolic function set of equations. 

 We know that a hyperbolic function solution is characterized by accelerated 

process effect as it nears the conclusion. In the past, we generally used this to explain the 

reasons for the accelerated process during the period following a battle. “The time it took 

to annihilate the losing side during the second half of the battle unit is shorter than the 

annihilation time during the first half. This is because the winning side can concentrate 

the entire firepower of its battle unit on the remaining portion of the losing side and, 

therefore, speed up the annihilation.”733 Obviously, under conditions of a networkcentered war, this is not complete because, from what we can see from the MetcalfeLanchester Equation, the information structural strength first needs to be considered in 

addition to the effect of the concentrated firepower. As long as the combat strength 

quantum number T for the entire war space is not less than the critical value, the army 

combat strength system will not experience a “collapse.” Actually, this reasoning is 

obvious because, in a mature network-centered war, the distribution-type war will 

become the primary method, and it does not matter where the combat strength quantum is 

as long as the combat strength quantum network still exists. Just as the United States 

Army says, “By using advanced technology of the information age, the military can apply 

new military concepts of the information age in its work and realize distribution-type war 

by simply transmitting information rather than moving personnel, using information in 

place of goods and materials.”734

 (6) After the chain-type movement of information in an informationized army is 

cut off, and the system structure changes from a “network-type” to a “platform-type,” 

how is it any different from the combat strength of an army that always was a platformtype mechanized army? In other words, can an informationized army that has lost its 

information platform fight as effectively as before it became informationized? This is the 

current question that must be answered and resolved by the changing structural system. 

Just as a newly established economic system will engender a corresponding systemic 

 

733 Xu Xuewen, Wang Shouyun, Modern War Models, Beijing: Science Publishing House, 2001, p. 91. 734 [US] United States Department of Defense, “Network-centered Combat – Report of the United States 

Department of Defense to the State Department,” Translation of the Chinese Center for Defense Science 

and Technology Information, Beijing: Chinese Center for Defense Science and Technology Information, 

2002, p. 48. 
296

culture and form “method dependencies,”735 the establishment and development of an 

informationized military system will similarly engender certain dependencies on 

information platforms such as C4

ISR and its command control models. Once an 

information platform encounters a destructive attack, whether tactical, technical, or 

psychological, people have the potential for not knowing which way to turn. As a result, 

the speed of the military system goes from a state of order to a state of disorder, and it 

loses its original combat capability. These circumstances exist for combat strength quanta 

and for the entire army and pose an important question for war and training: How do you 

make an army adapt to these changeovers to the system structure during peacetime 

military training, and how do you answer to these changeovers in wartime war battle 

plans? 

 In research of the forms of informationized warfare, we found that the 

phenomenon of troop combat strength quantization needs to be explained using complex 

system theory and mathematical models. This only gives one type of formal dynamic 

formula, and there may be a different way of expressing it if a different mathematical tool 

is selected. We know that it is very difficult for any mathematical method to describe 

precisely an action rule for a troop combat strength system or accurately predict the 

outcome of a battle. Perhaps we will never find an army or a battle for which the actual 

circumstances completely coincide with the mathematical model border circumstances. 

However, a mathematical model can bring to light the basic characteristics of an army 

combat strength system, and at a minimum show the significance of changes to the 

components and structure of the army combat strength system in view of a system’s 

emergence. In addition, these changes can also happen during the course of a battle, and 

this will have successfully explained the appearance of such phenomena as a leap in 

combat strength in an informationized military, the presence of combat strength 

crumbling in an informationized military, and the “algebraic” law of diminishing 

weapons, the reasons for which can be the presence of low-grade weapons, different 

usage conditions for different weaponry, different usage phases, and different usage 

targets. On the whole, a general rule for quantitative recognition of the system’s 

emergence allows us to deeply grasp the substance of the informationized military 

revolution and equitably build and use the army to our benefit. 

 

735 [US] Douglass C. North: “System, System Changes, and Economic Achievements,” Liurui Huashi, 

Taiwan: Times Cultural Press, 1994, p. 113.