NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. 

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ESTHER ODIGWE, et al., Plaintiffs/Appellants, 

v.

STONE OAKS APARTMENTS LLC, et al., Defendants/Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0595 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2017-092530 

The Honorable David M. Talamante, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Wyer Law PLLC, Gilbert

By Ian Wyer 

Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants 

Law Offices of Scott M. Clark, P.C., Phoenix

By Paul A. Henderson

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees

FILED 5-17-2018
ODIGWE, et al. v. STONE OAKS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Esther Odigwe, Ijeoma Odigwe, and Uzoma Odigwe 

(collectively, the “Odigwes”) appeal the judgment dismissing their case 

with prejudice and awarding attorney’s fees in favor of Stone Oaks 

Apartments, LLC, Mark-Taylor Residential, Inc., and Gina Camacho 

(collectively, “Stone Oaks”). Because the doctrine of claim preclusion bars 

the Odigwes’ claims, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 In August 2015, Chuks Odigwe (“Chuks”) filed a complaint

in superior court against Stone Oaks, alleging (i) violations of Title VIII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1968 as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988

and (ii) a claim for emotional distress. Odigwe v. Stone Oaks Apartments, LLC,

Maricopa County Super. Ct., CV 2015-094208 (Odigwe I).1 In November 

2015, the superior court, sua sponte, dismissed the complaint without 

prejudice, concluding that issues based on a federal statute were more 

properly resolved in the federal district court. Later that month, Chuks filed 

the same complaint in the district court seeking actual, punitive, statutory, 

general, consequential, and incidental damages. Odigwe v. Stone Oaks 

Apartments, LLC, CV-15-02284-PHX-SPL (Odigwe II). On cross-motions for 

summary judgment, the district court dismissed the complaint in March 

2017, explaining: 

Plaintiff alleges that he is a member of a ”protected 

class” because of his ”race, national origin and disability.” . . . 

Plaintiff’s current allegations are that Defendants charged 

him fees in addition to his rent. When he refused to pay 

 

1 We take judicial notice of the record in Odigwe I. See In re Sabino R., 

198 Ariz. 424, 425, ¶ 4 (App. 2000) (the superior court may take judicial

notice of another action tried in the same court, and an appellate court may

take judicial notice of anything of which the superior court could take

notice). 
ODIGWE, et al. v. STONE OAKS, et al.

Decision of the Court

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certain fees, Defendants moved to evict him. The eviction was 

dismissed, the disputed fees were refunded prior to initiation 

of this action, Plaintiff signed a new lease in January 2016, and 

he still lives at the complex today. Plaintiff claims Defendants’ 

behavior was intimidating, coercive, harassing, retaliatory, 

interfering, threatening, and humiliating. He claims 

Defendants are punishing him ”for asking ’why’ they are 

being charged for what they do not owe.” . . . Because Plaintiff 

has failed to make any showing of his protected status, an 

element that he bears the burden of proof at trial, the Court 

will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants. 

(citations omitted).

¶3 In May 2017, Chuks and the Odigwes brought this action

against Stone Oaks, alleging abuse of process, breaches of contract and the 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and emotional distress arising from 

the utilities-billing dispute and subsequent eviction action. They sought 

actual, punitive, statutory, general, consequential, and incidental damages. 

Stone Oaks moved to dismiss, arguing that (i) Chuks’s claims were barred 

by claim preclusion and (ii) the Odigwes’ claims were barred by issue 

preclusion. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In the reply, Stone Oaks posited 

more broadly that claim preclusion barred all four plaintiffs’ claims. The 

superior court granted the motion “for the reasons set forth in the 

memoranda of Defendants,” entered final judgment dismissing the 

complaint with prejudice, and awarded Stone Oaks $1650 in attorney’s fees. 

The Odigwes timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1). 

DISCUSSION

A. We Review the Dismissal of a Complaint De Novo. 

¶4 Generally, we review the superior court’s dismissal of a 

complaint de novo, Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 (2012), 

assuming the truth of, and indulging all reasonable inferences from, the 

well-pled factual allegations, Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 218 Ariz. 417, 

419, ¶ 7 (2008). 

¶5 Because we may affirm the judgment for any reason raised 

below and supported by the record, see KB Home Tucson, Inc. v. Charter Oak 

Fire Ins. Co., 236 Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 14 (App. 2014), we first consider de novo

whether the Odigwes’ claims are barred by claim preclusion. Howell v. 

Hodap, 221 Ariz. 543, 546, ¶ 17 (App. 2009). 
ODIGWE, et al. v. STONE OAKS, et al.

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B. Claim Preclusion Applies to the Odigwes’ Claims. 

¶6 Federal law determines what preclusive effect a federal 

court’s decision has on further state-court litigation. In re Gen. Adjud. of All 

Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 212 Ariz. 64, 69, ¶ 13 (2006)

(citations omitted). Under federal law, “[c]laim preclusion . . . bars a claim 

when the earlier suit ‘(1) involved the same claim or cause of action as the 

later suit, (2) reached a final judgment on the merits, and (3) involved 

identical parties or privies.’”2 Howell, 221 Ariz. at 546, ¶ 17 (quoting Mpoyo 

v. Litton Electro–Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

¶7 The first element examines whether the two suits arise out of 

“the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Howell, 221 Ariz. at 546−47, 

¶¶ 18−20 (analyzing tests articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit). Although the legal theories differ here, Odigwe II and this 

action undisputedly arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts and 

the claims asserted here could have been raised in the federal action.3 See 

id. at 547−48, ¶¶ 21−25; see also id. at 548, ¶ 23 (damages allegations were 

the same in both suits). Claim preclusion applies and the case was properly 

dismissed. See id. at 548, ¶¶ 22−23 & n.8 (plaintiffs’ tort claims and claims 

under the Arizona Constitution arose out of the same transactional nucleus 

of facts); see also id. at 549, ¶ 26 (plaintiffs’ claims were barred by claim 

preclusion because they arose out of the same nucleus of facts and could 

have been raised in an earlier federal suit); see generally Tr.s of Constr. Indus. 

& Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maint., Inc., 333 

F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing supplemental jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1367).

 

2 Privity between a party and a non-party exists if “there is ‘substantial 

identity’ between parties, that is, when there is sufficient commonality of 

interest.” Tahoe–Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 322 F.3d 

1064, 1081 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th 

Cir. 1983)); see also Hall v. Lalli, 194 Ariz. 54, 57, ¶ 8 (1999) (privity requires 

both a “substantial identity of interests” and a “working or functional 

relationship,” in which the non-party’s interests “are presented and 

protected by the party in the litigation”) (quotation omitted). The Odigwes 

do not dispute a final judgment on the merits was properly entered in the 

district court or that they are in privity with Chuks.

3 Appellants copied nearly all factual allegations from the Odigwe II

complaint into the complaint here.
ODIGWE, et al. v. STONE OAKS, et al.

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CONCLUSION

¶8 We affirm the judgment. Stone Oaks requests attorney’s fees 

on appeal pursuant to “the lease contracts” and A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Regarding the former, Stone Oaks offers no supporting record citation;

therefore, we deny the request. Regarding the latter, in the exercise of our 

discretion, we deny the request. We award costs to Stone Oaks upon 

compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.