1 

2024 IL App (5th) 231093-U 

NO. 5-23-1093 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the

 ) Circuit Court of

 Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Edgar County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 23-CF-138 

 ) 

ROBERT E. PORTER, ) Honorable 

 ) Matthew L. Sullivan, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.

Justice McHaney concurred in the judgment.

Presiding Justice Vaughan specially concurred.

 

 ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The order of the circuit court of Edgar County denying the defendant’s pretrial

release is vacated and remanded where the trial court erred in granting the State’s

untimely motion to deny pretrial release and that the error affected substantial rights

of the defendant under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine.

¶ 2 The defendant, Robert Porter, appeals the trial court’s order regarding his pretrial release 

pursuant to Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability, 

Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act (Act).1 See also Pub. Acts 101-652, § 10-255, 102-

1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting 

1

“The Act has also sometimes been referred to in the press as the Pretrial Fairness Act. Neither 

name is official, as neither appears in the Illinois Compiled Statutes or public act.” Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 

129248, ¶ 4 n.1.

NOTICE

This order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1).

NOTICE

Decision filed 04/09/24. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Petition for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
2 

effective date as September 18, 2023). Pretrial release is governed by the Act as codified in article 

110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2022)). 

¶ 3 A defendant’s pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited situations.

Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1. After filing a timely verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, 

the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the 

presumption great that defendant has committed a qualifying offense, that defendant’s pretrial 

release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, 

and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any 

person or the community and/or prevent defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-

6.1(e), (f). The trial court may order a defendant detained pending trial if defendant is charged with 

a qualifying offense, and the court concludes defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety 

of any person or the community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or there is a high likelihood of willful 

flight to avoid prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)). If the court determines that defendant should be 

denied pretrial release, the court is required to make written findings summarizing the reasons for 

denying pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1(h). 

¶ 4 The Code provides a nonexclusive list of factors that the trial court may consider in making 

a determination of “dangerousness,” i.e., that defendant poses a real and present threat to any 

person or the community. Id. § 110-6.1(g). In making a determination of dangerousness, the court 

may consider evidence or testimony as to factors that include, but are not limited to, (1) the nature 

and circumstances of any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence 

involving a weapon or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of defendant; (3) the 

identity of any person to whom defendant is believed to pose a threat and the nature of the threat;

(4) any statements made by or attributed to defendant, together with the circumstances surrounding 
3 

the statements; (5) the age and physical condition of defendant; (6) the age and physical condition 

of the victim or complaining witness; (7) whether defendant is known to possess or have access to 

a weapon; (8) whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, defendant was on 

probation, parole, or supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors including those 

listed in section 110-5 of the Code (id. § 110-5). Id. § 110-6.1(g). 

¶ 5 In order to reverse a trial court’s finding that the State presented clear and convincing 

evidence showing that mandatory conditions of release would fail to protect any person or the 

community, and/or that defendant had a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, or 

defendant failed to comply with previously issued conditions of pretrial release thereby requiring 

a modification or revocation of the previously issued conditions of pretrial release, the reviewing 

court must conclude that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

See In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001) (setting a similar standard of review for requirement of 

clear and convincing evidence by the State in juvenile proceedings). “A finding is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding 

itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 

Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). “Under the manifest weight standard, we give deference to the trial court 

as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the 

parties and witnesses.” Id. Additionally, questions regarding whether the court properly considered 

one or more of the aforementioned factors in determining dangerousness are reviewed for an abuse 

of discretion. See People v. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶¶ 9, 15 (in considering the trial 

court’s decision to deny bail, the reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the 

trial court merely because it would have balanced the appropriate factors differently).
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¶ 6 If the trial court finds the State proved a valid threat to a person’s safety or the community’s 

safety and/or defendant’s likely willful flight to avoid prosecution, or defendant’s failure to abide 

by previously issued conditions of pretrial release, then the court must determine what pretrial 

release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the 

safety of any other person or the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant 

with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). In reaching its

determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 

charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against defendant; (3) the history and characteristics of 

defendant;2 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat to any person that 

would be posed by defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing 

or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id. The statute lists no singular factor as 

dispositive. Id. The trial court’s pretrial release determination, modification of pretrial release 

determination, or revocation of pretrial release determination will not be reversed unless the 

determination was an abuse of discretion. See People v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1977); 

People v. Etherton, 2017 IL App (5th) 140427, ¶ 15 (setting a similar standard of review for the 

sentence imposed on the defendant after the trial court’s consideration of statutory factors and 

evidence presented at sentencing).

¶ 7 On August 25, 2023, the defendant was charged with six counts of possession of child 

pornography, all Class 2 felonies. The trial court set the defendant’s bond at $500,000. On 

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Defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and mental 

condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community 

ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning appearance 

at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on 

probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an 

offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A), (B) (West 

2022). 
5 

September 11, 2023, the defendant was indicted on all six counts. On September 29, 2023, the 

State filed a petition for the defendant’s pretrial detention arguing that the proof was evident or the 

presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense under the Act and that the 

defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.

On October 20, 2023, the court held a detention hearing on the State’s petition. On October 31, 

2023, the court entered a written order for detention finding that the State offered by way of proffer 

that the defendant possessed approximately 50 videos and images of child pornography depicting 

children aged 5 to 10 years old naked or engaged in an act of sexual penetration. The videos and 

images were found on the defendant’s phone. The defendant admitted to viewing child 

pornography and exchanging child pornography with other users. The court found that viewing 

and trading child pornography perpetuates the existence of child pornography, continues to harm 

the victims of child pornography, and stimulates the creation of new child pornography. The 

defendant admitted to viewing the child pornography as recently as a week before being taken into 

custody. The defendant admitted to viewing the child pornography videos for the purposes of 

sexual gratification. The defendant did have access to his 3-year-old granddaughter that he used to 

babysit. For these reasons offered by the State, the court found that the proof was evident or the 

presumption great that the defendant committed the offense of possession of child pornography 

under age 13 and that the defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community 

based on the specific articulable facts listed above and no condition or combination of conditions 

could mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of the community. The defendant timely 
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appealed.3 Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Oct. 19, 2023). On appeal, the defendant claims that the 

trial court’s order denying pretrial release was in error. 

¶ 8 In support, the defendant argues that the State’s petition to deny pretrial release was 

untimely and that this court must reverse and remand. The State asserts that, because of the stay 

on the Act, the State was in compliance with the effect of the statute where it filed a petition for 

detention on the effective date of the Act or 21 days thereafter. 

¶ 9 The record demonstrates that the defendant was charged with six counts of Class II 

felonies. As to dangerousness, the defendant made a full confession. He took ownership of the 

phone and indicated that he did use the application Kik, which was from where the tip in this case 

originated. The defendant said he would save videos and images from a messaging app or Kik and 

would go back and look at them. He indicated he had saved approximately 20 files. Digital forensic 

examiners found approximately 50 files and the children in the files ranged from 5 to 10 years old.

He indicated he had been doing this for many years. The trial court found that a threat to the 

community existed and that detention was appropriate. 

¶ 10 This court recently considered this issue in People v. Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724. In 

applying a de novo standard of review, the Rios court noted that section 110-6.1 sets forth the 

prerequisites for denial of pretrial release. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. The court considered subsection (c)(1), 

which mandates the timing of a petition to detain, and states as follows:

 “(1) A petition may be filed without prior notice to the defendant at the first 

appearance before a judge, or within the 21 calendar days, except as provided in Section 

110-6, after arrest and release of the defendant upon reasonable notice to defendant; 

3

Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(5) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023), our decision in this case 

was due on or before February 6, 2024, absent a finding of good cause for extending the deadline. Based 

on the high volume of SAFE-T Act appeals currently under the court’s consideration, and due to the 

complexity of issues and the lack of precedential authority available, we find there to be good cause for 

extending the deadline.
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provided that while such petition is pending before the court, the defendant if previously 

released shall not be detained.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(c)(1) (West 2022).

¶ 11 In interpreting subsection (c)(1), the court noted as follows:

“The plain language of this section sets forth the deadline for the State to file a petition to 

detain. The State may file a petition to detain at the time of the defendant’s first appearance 

before a judge; no prior notice to the defendant is required. Alternatively, the State may 

file a petition to detain the defendant within 21 calendar days after the arrest and release of 

the defendant; however, reasonable notice is to be provided to the defendant under this 

circumstance. The exception to these timing requirements is set forth in section 110-6.” 

Rios, 2023 IL App (5th) 230724, ¶ 10. 

¶ 12 The court then discussed section 110-6, which addresses the revocation of pretrial release, 

the modification of conditions of pretrial release, and sanctions for violations of conditions of 

pretrial release. Id. ¶ 11. Section 110-6 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

 “(a) When a defendant has previously been granted pretrial release under this Section 

for a Class A misdemeanor, that pretrial release may be revoked only if the defendant is 

charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor that is alleged to have occurred during the 

defendant’s pretrial release after a hearing on the court’s own motion or upon the filing of 

a verified petition by the State.

* * *

 (b) If a defendant previously has been granted pretrial release under this Section for 

a Class B or Class C misdemeanor offense, a petty or business offense, or an ordinance 

violation and if the defendant is subsequently charged with a felony that is alleged to have 

occurred during the defendant’s pretrial release or a Class A misdemeanor offense that is 

alleged to have occurred during the defendant’s pretrial release, such pretrial release may 

not be revoked, but the court may impose sanctions under subsection (c).

* * *

 (i) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the State’s ability to file a 

verified petition seeking denial of pretrial release under subsection (a) of Section 110-6.1 

or subdivision (d)(2) of Section 110-6.1.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6 (West 2022).

¶ 13 In interpreting section 110-6, the Rios court found that it did not apply to defendants who 

had not been released following arrest and had not committed any new offenses. Rios, 2023 IL 

App (5th) 230724, ¶ 12. Further, the exception to the timing requirements set forth in section 110-
8 

6.1(c)(1) did not apply to such defendants. Id. Thus, “the State’s petition to detain pursuant to 

section 110-6.1 was untimely, and the circuit court did not have the authority to detain [defendant] 

pursuant to the untimely petition.” Id.

¶ 14 Here, the State’s verified petition to detain pursuant to section 110-6.1 was untimely 

because the defendant had already appeared before a judge at the time of the filing of the State’s 

verified petition. Additionally, as in Rios, section 110-6 does not apply to the defendant because 

he was not released following arrest and did not commit any new offenses. Accordingly, as in 

Rios, the exception to the timing requirements set forth in section 110-6.1(c)(1) does not apply to 

this defendant, and the State’s petition to detain pursuant to section 110-6.1 was untimely.

¶ 15 Though the defendant admits that this issue was forfeited, this court can review the issue 

for plain error. “Under the second prong of plain-error review, a reviewing court may consider a 

forfeited error when the error is so serious that it deprives the defendant of a substantial right.”

People v. Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 12 (citing People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 170 

(2005)). 

¶ 16 Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in granting the State’s untimely motion to deny 

pretrial release and that the error affected substantial rights of the defendant under the second prong 

of the plain-error doctrine. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967); People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 

551, 564-65 (2007); Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 230698, ¶ 23. 

¶ 17 We vacate the order denying the defendant pretrial release and remand to the circuit court.

On remand, the defendant may elect to stand on the terms of his original pretrial conditions—an 

election that would require no action on his part—or he may file a motion for a hearing under 

section 110-5(e) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5(e) (West 2022)). Vingara, 2023 IL App (5th) 
9 

230698, ¶ 23. As this issue is dispositive, we will not consider the defendant’s other claims of 

error. 

¶ 18 Vacated and remanded. 

¶ 19 PRESIDING JUSTICE VAUGHAN, specially concurring: 

¶ 20 While I agree with my colleagues that the trial court erred in granting the State’s untimely 

motion to deny pretrial release, I do not find such error “affected substantial rights of the defendant 

under the second prong of the plain-error doctrine” (supra ¶ 16). Accordingly, I would hold 

defendant to his forfeiture of the issue. 

¶ 21 Whether this error constitutes second prong plain error was addressed in People v. Presley, 

2023 IL App (5th) 230970, ¶¶ 27-42. In Presley, as here, the defendant claimed the trial court did 

not have authority to rule on the State’s untimely petition requesting defendant’s detainment. Id.

¶ 27. As shown in Presley, mere acceptance that an error occurred is insufficient by itself to find 

second prong error; the error must “affect the framework within which the trial proceeds.” Id. ¶ 34. 

The rare instances where second prong error is found are those necessary to ensure “certain basic, 

constitutional guarantees” that “define the framework of any criminal trial” are met. Id. ¶ 35. In 

Presley, this court considered defendant’s rights under both the United States and Illinois 

Constitutions and found that defendant’s rights were not violated under either and therefore 

defendant was not entitled to relief under second prong plain error. Id. ¶¶ 39-42. In the current 

case, no additional or novel argument was presented. As such, I would hold the claimed error is 

not entitled to second prong plain error review.

¶ 22 Defendant also raised two other issues on appeal. His first issue asserted that the court erred 

in finding the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that defendant posed a real and 

present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. In regards to this issue, 
10 

defendant contends that the enumerated factors to be considered in making a dangerousness 

determination and the list of detainable offenses demonstrate that “ ‘threat to the safety’ of persons 

or the public” means “risk of violent criminal acts.” He explains that the list of factors that courts 

may consider in determining defendant’s dangerousness has an “unvarying focus on the 

defendant’s violent acts to another person’s body without their consent” (see 725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(g) (West 2022)) and stresses the consideration of defendant’s tendency toward “violent, 

abusive, or assaultive” behavior (id. § 110-6.1(g)(2), (9)). He further contends the vast majority of 

detainable offenses are intentional crimes of violence or crimes associated with intentional crimes 

of violence. See id. § 110-6.1(a)(2)-(4), (5). Defendant acknowledges this court recently held that 

dangerousness under the Act is not limited to a risk of violence (People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App 

(5th) 230714, ¶ 21), but argues we should reject Johnson due to its failure to engage with the 

ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction that states “when a statute lists several classes of 

persons or things but provides that the list is not exhaustive, the class of unarticulated persons or 

things will be interpreted as those ‘others such like’ the named persons or things” (Board of 

Trustees of Southern Illinois University v. Department of Human Rights, 159 Ill. 2d 206, 211 

(1994)). 

¶ 23 Despite defendant’s arguments, we find no reason to depart from Johnson. The primary 

objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Accettura

v. Vacationland, Inc., 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11. We “may consider the reason and necessity for the 

law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimate aims.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 

People v. Taylor, 2023 IL 128316, ¶ 45. The most reliable indicator of such intent is found in the 

plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Accettura, 2019 IL 124285, ¶ 11. “We do 
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not depart from the plain language of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or 

conditions that conflict with the expressed intent.” Id.

¶ 24 While the Johnson court did not explicitly mention “ejusdem generis,” it engaged in such 

analysis and simply disagreed that all the factors under section 110-6.1(g) focused on unlawful 

violent acts to another person’s body. See Johnson, 2023 IL App (5th) 230714, ¶ 21. Johnson

explained that “[s]ection 110-6.1(g) of the Code includes factors three through eight, which fail to 

make any reference to violence.” Id. (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(3)-(8) (West 2022)). It further 

stated that while the first factor under section 110-6.1(g) refers to violence, it also “begins with the 

catchall phrase ‘[t]he nature and circumstances of any offense charged.’ ” Id. (quoting 725 ILCS 

5/110-6.1(g)(1) (West 2022)). We agree with Johnson and find the similar argument presented in 

this appeal unpersuasive. 

¶ 25 Under similar reasoning, we also disagree with defendant’s argument that the list of 

detainable offenses demonstrates the legislature intended “threat of safety” to mean threat of 

violent behavior. While many of the listed detainable defenses relate to violent behavior, not all 

detainable offenses necessarily encompass violent behavior. For example, under section 110-

6.1(a)(1), all felonies—other than forcible felonies—“for which, based on the charge or the 

defendant’s criminal history, a sentence of imprisonment, without probation, periodic 

imprisonment, or conditional discharge, is required by law upon conviction” is a detainable 

offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022). Not all felonies involve violent behavior. See 

People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 193 (2003) (recognizing felonies can be classified as nonviolent); 

People v. Washington, 55 Ill. 2d 521, 524 (1973) (same); People v. Lenoir, 125 Ill. App. 3d 260, 

267 (1984) (same). Another example is the detainable offense of involuntary servitude (725 ILCS 

5/110-6.1(a)(6)(L) (West 2022)), as one can commit involuntary servitude without violent 
12 

behavior (see 720 ILCS 5/10-9(b)(4), (5) (West 2022)). Therefore, defendant’s ejusdem generis

argument is unpersuasive, as not all detainable offenses under the Act involve violent behavior or 

physical harm. 

¶ 26 As Johnson holds, the plain language of the statute requires only that defendant’s pretrial 

release pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community. 

Johnson, 2023 IL App (5th) 230714, ¶ 21 (citing 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)). We 

therefore decline to depart from the statute’s plain language and read into it a limitation not 

imposed by the legislature for such action is contrary to law. Id.; see In re Justin M.B., 204 Ill. 2d 

120, 124 (2003) (“If statutory language is plain, the court cannot read limitations or conditions into 

the statute.”). 

¶ 27 Defendant further argues that the State failed to prove that he posed a real and present threat 

to the safety of any person or the community where possession of child pornography does not pose 

an immediate threat to the safety of any child. He contends “[o]nce a piece of child pornography 

has been produced, the act of possessing, viewing, or copying it does not physically harm the 

depicted child a second time.” 

¶ 28 Defendant’s arguments are misguided. The State did not need to prove that defendant 

actually harmed a child or that he would physically harm any of the children depicted in the child 

pornography he possessed. Rather, the State was required to prove that defendant “pose[d] a real 

and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” (Emphases added.) 

725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). 

¶ 29 Our supreme court and the United States Supreme Court have acknowledge that “child 

pornography is intrinsically related to child sexual abuse and states have a compelling interest in 

safeguarding the physical and psychological health of children.” People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 
13 

112754, ¶ 18 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-59 (1982)). “[T]he harm to the child 

is exacerbated by [the] circulation” of child pornography. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 759. “[T]he 

distribution network for child pornography must be closed if the production of material which 

requires the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively controlled.” Id. Defendant even 

admits, in his memorandum to this court, that possession of child pornography “could suggest a 

risk of a criminal nonconsensual sex act.” 

¶ 30 The facts of this case demonstrate the high risk here, as police obtained, from defendant’s 

phone, about 50 files of child pornography of children ranging in age from 5 to 10 years old. 

Defendant also indicated that he had been downloading child pornography for “many years.” The 

State further proffered that defendant had access to a young child as defendant babysat his threeyear-old granddaughter. Defendant’s admitted significant and long-standing possession of child 

pornography demonstrates the threat he poses to any child to which he has access, including his 

three-year-old granddaughter. See People v. Collins, 2024 IL App (2d) 230577-U, ¶ 20 

(recognizing the “significant body of caselaw, as well as the common sense understanding that 

individuals who collect child pornography do so because they sexually desire children”). 

Defendant’s persistent and sustained downloading of child pornography is also evidence of a real 

and present safety threat to children ensnared for the purpose of maintaining a distribution network 

of child pornography. See People v. Geever, 122 Ill. 2d 313, 326-27 (1988) (addressing the injury 

suffered by the child victims of pornography); see also People v. Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d 585, 589 

(1999) (“Child pornography is particularly harmful because the child’s actions are reduced to a 

recording which could haunt the child in future years, especially in light of the mass distribution 

system for child pornography.”). Defendant’s attempt to claim his offenses are essentially 

victimless and nondangerous to the public or a community has no merit. We therefore find the trial 
14 

court’s finding that defendant posed a threat to community was not against the manifest weight of 

the evidence. 

¶ 31 Defendant’s second issue contends the State failed to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that there were no conditions that could mitigate the threat posed by defendant. Citing to 

People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, defendant contends that the State failed to present any 

evidence or argument on whether any conditions could mitigate any potential threat and the court 

failed to consider any pretrial conditions or explain why pretrial release conditions could not 

mitigate any potential threat posed by defendant as required by section 110-6.1(h)(1) of the Code 

(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(h)(1) (West 2022)). 

¶ 32 If the trial court determines that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, the court 

is required to make written findings summarizing the reasons for denying pretrial release. Id.

Section 110-6.1(h)(1), in relevant part, provides:

 “(h) Detention order. The court shall, in any order for detention: 

 (1) make a written finding summarizing the court’s reasons for 

concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including 

why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to 

the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific 

articulable facts of the case ***.” (Emphasis added.) Id.

¶ 33 The court here failed to explain, in the preprinted order or at the detention hearing, why 

less restrictive conditions would not ensure the safety of the victim or the community. The State 

also made no argument regarding why less restrictive means would not ensure the safety of any 

person or the community. We therefore do not know the basis for the court’s finding. The trial 

court therefore failed to comply with section 110-6.1(h)(1) with respect to its less restrictive 
15 

conditions finding. The trial court’s failure to include its explanation why the less restrictive means 

could not mitigate the threat posed by defendant precludes this court from determining whether 

the trial court erred in denying defendant pretrial release. Accordingly, I would vacate the trial 

court’s order and remand for compliance with section 110-6.1(h) by providing written reasons 

regarding its finding that no less restrictive conditions could mitigate the threat posed by defendant.

¶ 34 For these reasons, I specially concur.