COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Alston and AtLee Argued by teleconference

TERRANCE KEVIN HALL OPINION BY v. Record No. 0481-17-3 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. JANUARY 9, 2018 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG F. Patrick Yeatts, Judge Yvonne Z. Schewel (Yvonne Z. S chewel LLC, on brief), for appellant. John I. Jones, IV, Assistant Atto rney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on bri ef), for appellee.
A judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg sentence d Terrance Kevin Hall to three mandatory minimum periods of incarceration in connection with his pleas of guilty to certain drug distribution offens es. On appeal, Hall argues tha t the circuit court erred when it imposed those mandatory minimum sentences. We disagree, and af firm.
I. B ACKGROUND The evidence is undisputed. O n three dates in late 2014, Hall sold cocaine. The Commonwealth charged him with t hree counts of distribution of c ocaine, second or subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and the circuit court later convicted him of those offenses. 1 Sentencing occurred in Febru ary 2017. On the day of sentenci ng, just before Hall’s hearing was to begin, his attorne y provided the Commonwealth a copy of a two-page summary

1 Because two of the drug sales oc curred near a school, the circ uit court also convicted Hall of two separate felony count s of distribution of drugs in a school zone. Hall did not challenge those convictions.PUBLISHED- 2 - of the three drug transactions tha t formed the basis for his ch arges. The document was handwritten by Hall, and the last paragraph stated: I’m sorry I don’t have any infor mation as far as the supplier g oes. The only knowledge I had of the man was a phone number. We did not really associate on a pers onal level[;] the relationshi p was purely business. I only called a nd placed an order and I’d mee t him, that was the extent of our relationship. He would only be recognizable to me by sight. During the sentencing hearing, Hal l moved the cir cuit court not to impose the mandatory minimum periods of incarceration (“the mandatory minimums”) oth erwise required upon a conviction of a second or subseque nt offense of distribution of cocaine. Hall provided a written motion to the circuit court, which included the h andwritten doc ument as an attachment. Code § 18.2-248(C) contains a five-f actor test (“the safety val ve provision”). If a trial court finds that a defendant ha s complied with all five factors , the mandatory minimums do not apply. Hall’s motion addressed e ach factor, and he argued that because he had satisfied all five factors, the mandatory minimum s were inapplicable. The only fa ctor about which the parties disagreed was subpart “e,” which r equires that “[n]ot later tha n the time of the sentencing hearing, the person has truthfully provide d to the Commonwealth all information and evidence the person has concerning the offe nse or offenses that were par t of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” The circuit court denied Hall’s m otion, finding that “the motion is not timely and there has not been compliance with the statut e.” For each of the three counts of cocaine distribution, second or subs equent offense, the circuit court sentenced Hall to five years in the penitentiary, with two year s suspended, for a total sent ence on those charges of fifteen years in the penitentiary with s ix years suspended. Hall then noted this appeal.
II. A NALYSIS We review sentencing decisions f or abuse of discretion. Common wealth v. Greer, 63 Va. App. 561, 567, 760 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2014). When those deci sions “involve the- 3 - interpretation of a statute or t he common law, such an interpre tation is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.” Id. at 568, 760 S.E.2d a t 135. In this case, the circuit court convicted Hall of three counts of distribution of cocaine, seco nd or subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248(C). Tha t subsection provides that any person convicted of a second or subsequent offense of distri bution of cocaine “may, in the d iscretion of the court or jury imposing the sentence, be senten ced to imprisonment for life or for any period not less than five years, three years of which shall be a mandatory minimum term o f imprisonment to be served consecutively with any other sen tence.” However, later in Code § 18.2-248(C), the safety valve provision states as follows: The mandatory minimum term of imprisonment to be imposed for a violation of this subsection shall not be applica ble if the court finds that: a. The person does not have a prior conviction for an offense listed in subsec tion C of [Code] § 17.1-805; b. The person did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firear m or other dangerous weapon in connection with the offense or i nduce another participant in th e offense to do so; c. The offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to any person; d. The person was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the o ffense, and was not engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise a s defined in subsection I; and e. Not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the person has truthfully provid ed to the Commonwealth all information and evidence the person has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the person has no relevant or useful other info rmation to provide or that the Commonwealth already is aware of the information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has complied with this requirement.- 4 - This appeal raises a question s imilar to that in Sandidge v. Co mmonwealth, 67 Va. App. 150, 793 S.E.2d 836 (2016). In that case, Sandidge’s attempt t o invoke the safety valve provision of Code § 18.2-248(C) came only after the start of th e sentencing hearing. As is the case here, the only factor at issu e in Sandidge was subpart “e. ” Sandidge argued on appeal that the statutory language from subpart “e” requiring that the disc losure of information be made “[n]ot later than the time of t he sentencing hearing” meant onl y that the disclosure of information needed to occur prior to the e nd of the sentencing hearing. Id . at 158, 793 S.E.2d at 840. The Commonwealth argued that such lan guage meant that the disclosur e needed to occur prior to the beginning of the sentencing hear ing. Id. A panel of this Cour t agreed with the Commonwealth and held that “the phrase ‘[n]ot later than the time of the sen tencing hearing’ means prior to the commencement of the sentenc ing hearing.” Id. at 160, 793 S.E.2 d at 841 (alterati on in original). Because Sandidge had not provided his information until after t he sentencing hearing had begun, it was untimely and his sentence was affirmed. Here, Hall argues that he complie d with the requirement that di sclosure occur prior to the beginning of the sentencing hearing. He acknowledges that Sand idge held that providing the information at any time after th e commencement of the sentencin g hearing is per se untimely. He urges us to validate his suggest ed corollary: providing tha t information at any time before the commencement of the sentencing hearing is per se timely, and thus Hall’s disclosure here satisfied subpart “e.” This is an oversimplification, because it fails to account for the requirement that the information disclosed be truthful and comp lete. The safety valve provision of Code § 18.2-248(C) is unambiguous . Sandidge, 67 Va. App. at 157, 793 S.E.2d at 840. Thus we apply the plain me aning of the words rather than resorting to any rule of statutory constru ction. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 294 Va. 57, 65, 803 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2017). Furthermore, “it is ou r duty to interpret the several parts- 5 - of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effe ctuate the legislative goal.” Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Bd. of Ct y. Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 387- 88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983). Subpart “e” contains not just a timing component for the provis ion of information (“[n]ot later than the time of the sentenci ng hearing”) but also an accuracy and completeness component (“truthfully provided . . . all information and evidence”). This requirement of truthfulness is meaningless unless the Commonwealth has an opportunit y to assess and validate the defendant’s information. Without t he ability to test a stateme nt for veracity and completeness, cour ts would be required to assume t he truth, and the full disclosure , of statements given by a felon at sentencing for the purpose of a voiding a decade-long mandatory prison term. Given the strong i ncentive any defendant has to a void such a lengthy sentence, the Gen eral Assembly quite reasonably drafted a statute that permits t he courts and the Commonwealth to guard against the provision of fal se and/or incomplete informat ion. Sandidge, 67 Va. App. at 159- 60, 793 S.E.2d at 841. In order t o comply with subpart “e,” a defendant must provide the inf ormation not just “prior to the c ommencement of the sentencing hearing,” id. at 160, 793 S.E .2d at 841, but far enough in adva nce of that heari ng to permit the Commonwealth to “test [the] state ment for veracity and complete ness,” id. at 159, 793 S.E.2d at
841. 2 Only when information is verifie d in this way can a trial cou rt determine that a defendant has complied with subpart “e.” Although we recognize the utility a brighter line would provid e, we cannot prospectively declare that providing inform ation a certain number of hours or days before the start of a

2 There is no practical reason evide nt from the record that Hall could not have provided his information further in advance of the sentencing hearing. Although we recognize that frequently, a defendant does not decide to plead guilty to a cr iminal charge until shortly before trial, in the cases on appeal he re, Hall entered his pleas over the course of several months in the Fall of 2016. On December 28, 2016, he pleaded guilty to the f inal charge on appeal, and the circuit court continued al l of the cases to February 22, 2017 f or sentencing. That left Hall with nearly two months during which to decide whether to attempt to avail himself of the safety valve provision, and to provide informa tion necessary to comply with subpart “e” of that provision.- 6 - sentencing hearing will or will not be timely. 3 “[S]ince such restrictive language is not written in the statute it may not be added unde r the guise of interpretati on.” S. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 831, 836, 147 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1966). Trial courts must make that determination case-by-case, because the assessment of timeliness (like the re lated requirements of truthfulness and completeness) is a qualitat ive undertaki ng, not a quantitat ive one. Here, we find that Hall’s disclosure of information moment s before the start of the sente ncing hearing was untimely, because it did not afford the Co mmonwealth the opportunity “to test [the] statement for veracity and completeness.” Sandidge, 67 Va. App. at 159, 793 S.E.2d at 841. 4 This failure left the circuit court unable to determi ne whether Hall had complied wit h subpart “e.”
III. C ONCLUSION Hall’s attempt to avoid imposition of the mandatory minimum se ntences by complying with the safety valve provis ion of Code § 18.2-248(C) came too late, failing to afford the Commonwealth the opportunity to a ssess his information “for ver acity and completeness.” Id. at at 159, 793 S.E.2d at 841. This failure left the circuit court unable to determine whether Hall had complied with subpart “e” of the safety valve provision. For t hese reasons, the c ircuit court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the mandatory minimum sentences upon Hall. Affirmed.

3 Indeed, as the Commonwealth ack nowledged at oral argument in t his case, there could be circumstances when disclosure just before sentencing, as occ urred here, might satisfy subpart “e.” Oral Argument Audio a t 11:31 to 11:46 (Dec. 7, 2017).

4 Bearing further on the issue of ve racity and completeness, it is noteworthy that during the presentence investigation, H all was uncooperative when aske d by the probation officer about his level of drug involvement i n the community. Additionally, Hall denied affiliation with any gang, despite, according to Virginia Department of Corrections records, being a confirmed member of the “Crips” gang.