Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-IF-853 | September 27, 2018 Page 1 of 6

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Evelyn Lecia Keaton

Law Office of Evelyn Keaton

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr. 

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Islom Niyozov,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 27, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-IF-853

Appeal from the Whitley Superior 

Court

The Honorable Douglas M. Fahl, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

92D01-1709-IF-3132

Najam, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-IF-853 | September 27, 2018 Page 2 of 6

Statement of the Case

[1] Islom Niyozov appeals the trial court’s infraction judgment entered against him

for disregarding a red traffic signal following a bench trial. He presents two 

issues for our review:

1. Whether Indiana Code Section 9-21-3-7 applies to traffic 

signals located at intersections.

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support 

the infraction judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On September 4, 2017, Indiana State Troopers Aaron Cook and Todd Reed 

were monitoring the intersection of State Road 109 and U.S. 30 in Whitley 

County when Trooper Reed saw Niyozov, who was driving a semi-truck, drive 

through the intersection against a red traffic signal. Trooper Reed radioed 

Trooper Cook, who was parked “a couple hundred feet” past the intersection 

on S.R. 109, and told him to stop the truck. Tr. at 5. Trooper Cook, who could 

see the intersection from his location but could not tell from his vantage point 

what color the traffic signal was when vehicles entered the intersection, 

immediately identified the truck, initiated a traffic stop, and confirmed with 

Trooper Reed that he was stopping the correct truck. After Niyozov stopped 

his truck, Trooper Cook issued him a citation for running the red traffic signal.
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[4] At a bench trial on March 21, 2018, Niyozov argued that he could not be cited 

for the infraction under Indiana Code Section 9-21-3-7 because, he asserted, it 

does not apply to traffic signals at intersections. The trial court rejected that 

argument and entered the infraction judgment. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Indiana Code Section 9-21-3-7

[5] Niyozov first contends that Indiana Code Section 9-21-3-7 (“the statute”) 

cannot support an infraction judgment for disregarding a red traffic signal at an 

intersection. The statute provides in relevant part as follows:

[(b)](3) Steady red indication [on a traffic signal] means the 

following:

(A) Except as provided in clauses (B) and (D), 

vehicular traffic facing a steady circular red or red 

arrow signal shall stop at a clearly marked stop line. 

However, if there is no clearly marked stop line, 

vehicular traffic shall stop before entering the 

crosswalk on the near side of the intersection. If there 

is no crosswalk, vehicular traffic shall stop before 

entering the intersection and shall remain standing 

until an indication to proceed is shown.

* * *

(5) This section applies to traffic control signals located at a place 

other than an intersection. A stop required under this 

subdivision must be made at the signal, except when the signal is 

supplemented by a sign or pavement marking indicating where 

the stop must be made.
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Ind. Code § 9-21-3-7 (2018) (emphases added). Niyozov contends that, because

subsection (b)(5) states that “This section” applies to traffic control signals 

located at a place other than an intersection, that means the entire statute is 

inapplicable to traffic control signals located at an intersection. We cannot 

agree.

[6] Our first task when interpreting a statute is to give its words their plain meaning 

and consider the structure of the statute as a whole. ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre 

Dame Police Dep’t., 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195 (Ind. 2016). “We ‘avoid 

interpretations that depend on selective reading of individual words that lead to 

irrational and disharmonizing results.’” Id. (quoting West v. Office of Ind. Sec’y of 

State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 355 (Ind. 2016)). As we interpret the statute, we are 

mindful of both what it does say and what it does not say. Id. (citation 

omitted).

[7] Here, subsection (b)(3)(A) of the statute clearly applies where, as here, a vehicle 

disregards a red traffic signal at an intersection. However, subsection (b)(5) 

clearly applies only where a traffic signal is located “at a place other than an 

intersection.” I.C. § 9-21-3-7. It would be irrational to read subsection (b)(5) as 

nullifying subsection (b)(3)(A). It is clear that subsection (b)(5) was merely 

unartfully drafted,

1 and we interpret that subsection to be the only part of the 

 

1

 Rather than stating “This section,” it should perhaps state “This paragraph of subsection (b).”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-IF-853 | September 27, 2018 Page 5 of 6

statute that applies to a place other than an intersection. Accordingly, the State 

properly issued the citation to Niyozov.

Issue Two: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] Niyozov contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support the 

infraction judgment. Traffic infractions are civil, rather than criminal, in nature 

and the State must prove the commission of the infraction by only a 

preponderance of the evidence. Rosenbaum v. State, 930 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2010), trans. denied. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses. Id. Rather, we look to the evidence that best supports the judgment 

and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. If there is substantial 

evidence of probative value supporting the trial court’s judgment, it will not be 

overturned. Id.

[9] Without citation to authority, Niyozov asserts that, “in a traffic case, for a 

conviction to be valid, the citing officer must witness the violation itself and 

identify the vehicle involved and the driver of the vehicle at the time of the 

violation.” Appellant’s Br. at 10. In essence, he maintains that the State 

presented insufficient evidence here because Trooper Cook, who issued the 

citation, had not witnessed the infraction, but relied on Trooper Reed’s report 

that Niyozov had disregarded the red traffic signal. We cannot agree.

[10] Both Trooper Cook and Trooper Reed testified at Niyozov’s bench trial. 

Trooper Reed testified that he saw Niyozov disregard the red traffic signal, and 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-IF-853 | September 27, 2018 Page 6 of 6

Trooper Reed immediately notified Trooper Cook, who could see the truck 

approaching him from the intersection. Trooper Cook initiated a traffic stop, 

confirmed with Trooper Reed that he was stopping the right truck, and issued 

the citation to Niyozov. Trooper Reed testified that he had “no doubt” that 

Trooper Cook had stopped the same truck Trooper Reed had seen run the red 

light. Tr. at 10. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Niyozov’s 

infraction judgment.

[11] Affirmed.

Crone, J., and Pyle, J., concur.