Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1035 | February 4, 2020 Page 1 of 13

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Tara L. Cragen

The Nice Law Firm, LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Benjamin J. Shoptaw

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Paul J. Kinnaman,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff,

February 4, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-1035

Appeal from the Johnson Superior 

Court

The Honorable Lance D. Hamner, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

41D03-1607-F1-6

Robb, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1035 | February 4, 2020 Page 2 of 13

Case Summary and Issues

[1] Following a jury trial in Johnson County, Paul Kinnaman was convicted of

attempted murder, a Level 1 felony; pointing a firearm and resisting law 

enforcement, both Level 6 felonies; unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; and was found to be an habitual 

offender. The trial court sentenced Kinnaman to forty-seven and one-half years 

in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) for his crimes, enhanced by 

fifteen years based on Kinnaman’s habitual offender status, for a total sentence 

of sixty-two and one-half years. Kinnaman appeals, raising two issues for our 

review, which we restate as: 1) whether the trial court erred in denying his 

Criminal Rule 4(B) petition for discharge, and 2) whether venue was proper in 

Johnson County. Concluding the trial court did not err in denying Kinnaman’s

petition for discharge and venue was proper in Johnson County, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History 

[2] On June 27, 2016, Officer Adam Bandy of the Greenwood Police Department 

was conducting a traffic stop when he noticed Kinnaman driving by him 

without a seatbelt on. Kinnaman pulled into a cul-de-sac behind Officer Bandy

and after Officer Bandy completed his traffic stop, he waited for Kinnaman to 

pull out of the cul-de-sac. Approximately five minutes later, Kinnaman drove 

off and Officer Bandy followed behind him for a period of time, observing 

Kinnaman commit several traffic infractions. Officer Bandy then attempted to 

initiate a traffic stop on Kinnaman on State Road 135 at Michelle Lane in 
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Johnson County, Indiana. However, Kinnaman fled Officer Bandy and drove 

through a red light. Moments later, Officer Bandy’s pursuit of Kinnaman ended 

in “a bad crash” on Shelby Street and Stop 11 Road in Marion County, 

Indiana. Transcript, Volume 2 at 209. When Officer Bandy arrived at the 

accident, he saw Kinnaman trying to escape through the driver’s side window

of his car. Officer Bandy used his vehicle to pin the driver’s side door of 

Kinnaman’s vehicle to try to prevent him from escaping. Kinnaman then 

escaped his vehicle through the passenger’s side door and began running. While 

Kinnaman was running away, Officer Bandy observed Kinnaman reach in his 

waistband and pull out a firearm. Kinnaman then pointed the firearm towards 

Officer Bandy and pulled the trigger. Although Kinnaman tried to shoot Officer 

Bandy, the firearm did not fire any bullets because the trigger on Kinnaman’s 

gun was dysfunctional and prevented it from being fired. See Tr., Vol. 3 at 100. 

Officer Bandy fired his service weapon striking Kinnaman in his waistline. 

Kinnaman was escorted to the hospital thereafter.

[3] On July 1, 2016, the Johnson County Prosecutor’s Office charged Kinnaman

with attempted murder, a Level 1 felony; unlawful possession of a firearm by a 

serious violent felon, a Level 4 felony; resisting law enforcement and pointing a 

firearm,

1 both Level 6 felonies; and alleged Kinnaman was an habitual offender. 

After the charges were filed, the following occurred: 

1 The pointing a firearm charge was added later. 
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• July 1, 2016 – The trial court issued a warrant for Kinnaman’s 

arrest. 

• July 12, 2016 – The arrest warrant was served on Kinnaman. 

• July 20, 2016 – A video conference was scheduled for 

Kinnaman’s initial hearing, but it was rescheduled to July 27 

due to Kinnaman being housed in Marion County Jail; the 

trial court issued a transport order for the July 27 hearing.

• July 27, 2016 – The trial court was informed that Kinnaman 

had to appear for court in Marion County on this date; the 

initial hearing was reset for August 10. 

• August 9, 2016 – The trial court rescheduled the August 10 

initial hearing for August 17 because Kinnaman needed to be 

transported from Marion County Jail; the trial court issued a 

transport order for the August 17 hearing. 

• August 15, 2016 – Kinnaman, pro se, filed a motion for early 

trial under Criminal Rule 4(B). 

• August 17, 2016 – Kinnaman’s initial hearing was held via 

video conference. Kinnaman pleaded not guilty and the trial 

court appointed him a public defender. Kinnaman’s trial was 

set for November 15.

• August 31, 2016 – The trial court granted Kinnaman’s public 

defender’s motion to withdraw.

• September 2, 2016 – Kinnaman’s trial date of November 15 

was cancelled. 
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• September 14, 2016 – Kinnaman, pro se, appeared for a pretrial conference and the trial court appointed him a new 

attorney. The trial court set his early trial date for October 11, 

2016.

• September 26, 2016 – Kinnaman filed a petition for discharge 

pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B) and a motion to transfer 

venue to Marion County. 

• September 28, 2016 – The trial court held a hearing on 

Kinnaman’s petition for discharge and motion to transfer 

venue and denied both motions. 

[4] On September 29, 2016, Kinnaman filed a motion for continuance to prepare 

for trial and filed seventeen motions for continuance thereafter. A jury trial 

commenced on March 19, 2019, and the jury found Kinnaman guilty as

charged. Kinnaman waived his right to jury for the habitual offender phase of 

the trial, and the trial court found Kinnaman to be an habitual offender. The 

trial court sentenced Kinnaman to an aggregate sentence of sixty-two and onehalf years to be served in the DOC. Kinnaman now appeals.

Discussion and Decision 

I. Criminal Rule 4(B)

[5] Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 

section 12 of the Indiana Constitution protect the right of an accused to a 

speedy trial. Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1027 (Ind. 2012). Indiana 
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Criminal Rule 4 implements this constitutional right.2Id. When a defendant 

moves for speedy trial, he invokes the procedures and deadlines of Criminal 

Rule 4(B). Jenkins v. State, 809 N.E.2d 361, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). As 

relevant to this case, Criminal Rule 4(B) provides:

If any defendant held in jail on an indictment or an affidavit shall 

move for an early trial, he shall be discharged if not brought to 

trial within seventy (70) calendar days from the date of such motion, 

except where a continuance within said period is had on his 

motion, or the delay is otherwise caused by his act, or where 

there was not sufficient time to try him during such seventy (70) 

calendar days because of the congestion of the court calendar. 

Ind. Crim. Rule 4(B)(1) (emphasis added). The overall goal of Criminal Rule 4 

“is to provide functionality to a criminal defendant’s fundamental and 

constitutionally protected right to a speedy trial.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1037. 

“It places an affirmative duty on the State to bring the defendant to trial, but at 

the same time is not intended to be a mechanism for providing defendants a 

technical means to escape prosecution.” Id. “The determination of whether a 

particular delay in bringing a defendant to trial violates the speedy trial 

guarantee largely depends on the specific circumstances of the case.” Wheeler v. 

State, 662 N.E.2d 192, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). When we review Criminal 

Rule 4 claims, we review questions of law de novo and the trial court’s factual 

2 As our supreme court has noted, however, reviewing a Criminal Rule 4(B) challenge is “separate and 

distinct from reviewing claimed violations of those constitutional provisions.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 

1027, 1037 n.7 (Ind. 2013).
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findings for clear error. Mefford v. State, 51 N.E.3d 327, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2016). “Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction 

that a mistake has been made.” Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1040 (quotation omitted). 

In reviewing for clear error, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the 

credibility of the witnesses; instead we consider only the probative evidence and 

reasonable inferences supporting the judgment. Id. Kinnaman contends that the 

trial court erred in denying his petition for discharge pursuant to Rule 4(B), 

claiming that he was not brought to trial within the seventy-day time limit.

[6] It is well established that when a defendant files a petition under Rule 4(B), he 

is required to maintain a position which is reasonably consistent with his 

speedy trial request; therefore, he must object at the earliest opportunity to a 

trial setting that is beyond the seventy-day time period. Hill v. State, 777 N.E.2d 

795, 797-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (opinion on reh’g), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 832 

(2003). If an objection is not timely made, the defendant is deemed to have 

acquiesced to the trial date. Hampton v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2001), trans. denied. 

[7] Kinnaman is not entitled to discharge under Rule 4(B). Kinnaman was arrested 

on July 12, 2016. On August 15, Kinnaman made his first written demand for a

speedy trial by filing a letter with the trial court; therefore, the seventy-day clock 

would have expired on October 24, 2016. On August 17, Kinnaman had his 

initial hearing and the trial court, without objection, set Kinnaman’s trial date

for November 15, 2016. Because Kinnaman did not object when he learned of 

the November 15 trial date (a date that exceeded the seventy-day time period), 
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he waived his right to a speedy trial. See Goudy v. State, 689 N.E.2d 686, 691

(Ind. 1997) (holding that the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial by 

failing to object to a pre-trial hearing set beyond the seventy day limit); see also 

Sumner v. State, 453 N.E.2d 203, 206-07 (Ind. 1983) (holding the defendant 

acquiesced in the delay when he failed to object to the scheduling of a pre-trial 

conference for a date after the expiration of the seventy-day period). 

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, Kinnaman would still not prevail on his claim that the 

trial court erred in denying his petition for discharge. Kinnaman’s initial 

counsel withdrew on August 31 and Kinnaman’s November 15 trial date was 

cancelled. The trial court then appointed different counsel for Kinnaman at a 

pre-trial conference on September 14. At that time, the trial court set

Kinnaman’s early trial date for October 11, which would have been within 

seventy days of Kinnaman’s motion for early trial and thus, would not have 

implicated Rule 4(B).

3 The State argues, and we agree, that because the October 

11 trial date was within the seventy-day period, Kinnaman’s petition for 

discharge on September 26 was premature and thus, it was properly denied. See 

Banks v. State, 402 N.E.2d 1213, 1214 (Ind. 1980) (holding the defendant’s 

motion for discharge was properly denied because the defendant’s motion was 

3 The record is unclear as to whether Kinnaman’s new counsel moved for early trial again or whether the trial 

court reset Kinnaman’s trial to October 11 based on his previous motion for early trial. In any event, October 

11 would have been within the seventy-day period.
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made on the sixty-ninth day following his early trial motion and was thus 

premature). 

[9] Kinnaman argues that the trial court deprived him of his right to have an early 

trial when the trial court “grossly delayed” conducting an initial hearing and 

therefore, the delay should retroactively apply for purposes of his petition for 

discharge.4 Brief of the Appellant at 25. He contends that if his initial hearing

had been prompt, he would have been advised of his right to an early trial.5 We 

reject his contention for two reasons: First, Kinnaman cites to no authority that 

would suggest that a Rule 4(B) discharge is the proper remedy for a violation of 

his right to a prompt initial hearing or that the delay in time should be 

retroactively applied. Moreover, we do not ignore the fact that Kinnaman’s 

initial hearing was unreasonably delayed. But Kinnaman must also show that 

he was prejudiced by the delay, which he has not done. See Anthony v. State, 540 

N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ind. 1989) (finding no reversible error in the delay of the 

defendant’s initial hearing when he failed to prove he was prejudiced by the 

delay). Second, Kinnaman claims that but for the trial court’s delay in 

4

Indiana Code section 35-33-7-4 provides, “A person arrested in accordance with the provisions of a warrant 

shall be taken promptly for an initial hearing before the court issuing the warrant or before a judicial officer 

having jurisdiction over the defendant. If the arrested person has been released in accordance with the 

provisions for release stated on the warrant, the initial hearing shall occur at any time within twenty (20) days 

after his arrest.” Kinnaman was arrested on July 12 and his initial hearing did not occur until August 17 – a 

date that was beyond twenty days.

5

Indiana Code section 35-33-7-5 provides in relevant part: “At the initial hearing of a person, the judicial 

officer shall inform the person orally or in writing: 

* * *

(3) that the person has a right to a speedy trial[.]” 
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conducting his initial hearing, he would have been advised of his right to a 

speedy trial. But the record shows that Kinnaman, pro se, requested an early 

trial before his initial hearing. Therefore, he clearly knew of his right to an early 

trial whether he had a prompt initial hearing or not. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not err in denying Kinnaman’s petition for discharge under Rule 4(B).

II. Venue

[10] Kinnaman also argues that the State failed to prove that venue was proper in 

Johnson County. He claims that venue should exist in Marion County because 

the attempted murder and other crimes occurred there. 

[11] In Indiana, a defendant has the constitutional and statutory right to be tried in 

the county where the crime was committed. Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13(a); see also

Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1(a) (“Criminal actions shall be tried in the county where 

the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.”). Venue must 

be proved, but as it is not an element of the offense, the State must only prove 

venue by a preponderance of the evidence. Baugh v. State, 801 N.E.2d 629, 631 

(Ind. 2004); see also Bryant v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1031, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) 

(stating that the State’s burden of proof may be satisfied with circumstantial 

evidence). We treat a claim of insufficient evidence of venue in the same 

manner as other claims of insufficient evidence, Chavez v. State, 722 N.E.2d 885, 

895 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), and therefore, “[w]e neither reweigh the evidence nor 

resolve questions of credibility, but look to the evidence and reasonable 
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inferences therefrom which support the conclusion of requisite venue[,]” Eberle 

v. State, 942 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. 

[12] Our supreme court has stated that “where a crime is commenced in one county 

and the perpetration continues into another county, the venue lies in either 

county for the prosecution of such a crime.” Stone v. State, 531 N.E.2d 191, 194 

(Ind. 1988) (noting that the defendant was not misled or harmed in any way

when his entire case was tried in a county where all the events did not take 

place); see also Floyd v. State, 503 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 1987) (holding that 

venue was proper in the county where the crime began or any other county in 

which the crime continued). Kinnaman does not dispute that he resisted Officer 

Bandy in Johnson County. Rather, he argues that venue is not proper in 

Johnson County because all of the elements of the attempted murder and other 

charges occurred in Marion County, which should be the proper venue. See Br. 

of the Appellant at 24. 

[13] We note that “[v]enue is not limited to the place where the defendant acted.” 

Baugh, 801 N.E.2d at 631. Instead, “[i]f all charges are integrally related—in 

other words, if one thing led to another—then the crimes may be considered a 

single chain of events for purposes of venue.” Abran v. State, 825 N.E.2d 384, 

392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Applying this standard to the instant 

case, the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Kinnaman’s 

actions were integrally related and part of a chain of events that began in 

Johnson County. The evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s 

ruling is that Officer Bandy attempted to conduct a traffic stop on Kinnaman
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while in Johnson County. Kinnaman fled Officer Bandy while still in Johnson 

County and continued to flee into Marion County, which resulted in a car 

accident. At this point, Kinnaman escaped from his vehicle and attempted to 

shoot Officer Bandy. It is clear that Kinnaman’s act of resisting Officer Bandy

was “integrally related” to the attempted murder because the attempted murder 

would not have occurred but for his resisting. Further, the State did not only 

present evidence that Kinnaman committed the actions, but it presented 

evidence that they were committed contemporaneously with one another and 

therefore, Kinnaman’s act of resisting was part of a single chain of events that 

culminated in other charges. 

[14] Citing Neff v. State, 915 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied, 

Kinnaman argues that if the State could pick any county it deems appropriate 

for venue then it could engage in “forum shopping,” which would allow the 

State to obtain a trial in a county it believes to be “harsher” on the defendant. 

Br. of the Appellant at 22. In Neff, the defendant was convicted of child 

solicitation in Hamilton County. His messages were sent from Madison County 

to an out-of-state recipient. Although the defendant thought the recipient lived 

in Hamilton County and arranged to meet “the child” in Hamilton County, his

messages were not directed to any person “actually existing in Hamilton 

County” and he did not “engage in any conduct in furtherance of the crime in 

Hamilton County” because the crime of child solicitation was complete when 

he sent the messages. Id. at 1034. Accordingly, a panel of this court reversed,

noting that Hamilton County was not a proper venue. Neff is clearly 
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distinguishable. Unlike the defendant in Neff, Kinnaman actually committed, 

and acknowledged that he committed, crimes in both counties and therefore, 

there is no possibility of “forum shopping.” As noted above, Kinnaman began 

resisting Officer Bandy in Johnson County which ultimately ended in Marion 

County where he committed his other crimes, namely attempted murder, 

unlawful possession of a firearm, and pointing a firearm. Therefore, the issues 

of concern in Neff do not arise here at all. 

[15] Because the State presented evidence that Kinnaman’s offenses were integrally 

related such as to constitute a single chain of events, we conclude that venue 

was proper in Johnson County. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

denying Kinnaman’s motion to transfer venue.

Conclusion

[16] We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Kinnaman’s Criminal 

Rule 4(B) petition for discharge and venue was proper in Johnson County. 

Therefore, we affirm Kinnaman’s convictions. 

[17] Affirmed.

Bradford, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.