DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

ARLYNE BETH HELFENBEIN,

Appellant,

v.

ESTELLE BAVAL,

Appellee.

No. 4D13-2366

[February 18, 2015]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Mel Grossman, Judge; L.T. Case No. 10-5600.

Scott A. Weiss of Selzer & Weiss Attorneys at Law, Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellant.

Douglas F. Hoffman of Rudolf & Hoffman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for 

appellee.

STEVENSON, J.

Arlyne Helfenbein (“Daughter”) appeals an order granting Estelle 

Baval’s (“Wife”) motion for summary judgment and finding that she is 

entitled to take an elective share of her deceased husband’s estate. We 

find that a genuine issue of material fact remains and reverse and remand 

for further proceedings.

Facts

Bernard Baval (“Testator”) died on October 29, 2010. Daughter was 

named personal representative of Testator’s estate. Seeking clarification 

of the correct will to admit to probate, Daughter submitted two wills signed 

by Testator: one from 1982 (“1982 Will”) and one from 2007 (“2007 Will”). 

The 1982 Will contained Wife’s waiver of her right to an elective share. 

Under the 2007 Will, which revoked all previous wills and did not contain 

a waiver of Wife’s right to an elective share, Daughter was afforded

discretion to give Wife $150,000 from Testator’s estate. 

Before any will was admitted to probate, Wife filed a petition to take her 

elective share under Testator’s estate and filed a motion for summary 
2

judgment on her entitlement to an elective share. Daughter responded to 

Wife’s motion and argued that the 2007 Will was invalid.1 To support this 

assertion, she attached the affidavit of Murray Adler, a witness to the 2007 

Will. Murray Adler alleged that he did not sign the will in the presence of 

the other witness and that he did not see Testator sign the will.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted Wife’s motion, finding that 

the 2007 Will was not facially invalid “simply because the self-proving 

affidavit was executed at a date subsequent to the date of execution of the 

2007 will” and quoting section 732.503, Florida Statutes (2007), in 

support thereof. It also found that the waiver attached to the 1982 Will 

applied to only that will and not to any subsequent will. Following 

Daughter’s motion for rehearing, the trial court clarified that the 2007 Will 

was executed in conformity with section 732.502, Florida Statutes (2007).2

Analysis

This case turns heavily on the validity of the 2007 Will. Section

732.503(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides:

1 Hypothetically, if the 2007 Will was found to be invalid, then the 1982 Will 

arguably could be revived under the doctrine of dependent relative revocation,

and Wife would not be entitled to an elective share due to her waiver. See Rosoff 

v. Harding, 901 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (stating the doctrine of 

dependent relative revocation “‘simply . . . means that where testator makes a 

new will revoking a former valid one, and it later appears that the new one is 

invalid, the old will may be re-established on the ground that the revocation was 

dependent upon the validity of the new one, testator preferring the old will to 

intestacy’”) (quoting Stewart v. Johnson, 194 So. 869, 870 (Fla. 1940)). 

2 Section 732.502(1)(a)–(c), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: 

Every will must be in writing and executed as follows:

(1)(a) Testator’s signature.--

1. The testator must sign the will at the end; or

2. The testator’s name must be subscribed at the end of the will by 

some other person in the testator’s presence and by the testator’s 

direction.

(b) Witnesses.--The testator’s:

1. Signing, or

2. Acknowledgment:

a. That he or she has previously signed the will, or

b. That another person has subscribed the testator’s name to it,

must be in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses.

(c) Witnesses’ signatures.--The attesting witnesses must sign the 

will in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each other.
3

A will or codicil executed in conformity with s. 732.502 may 

be made self-proved at the time of its execution or at any 

subsequent date by the acknowledgment of it by the testator 

and the affidavits of the witnesses, made before an officer 

authorized to administer oaths and evidenced by the officer’s 

certificate attached to or following the will . . . . 

Section 732.503(1) contemplates that the will is already in compliance with 

section 732.502 before turning to section 732.503(1). Murray Adler’s 

affidavit, wherein he alleged he did not sign in the presence of the other 

witness, suggests that the March 2007 execution failed to comply with 

section 732.502. In order to properly execute a will under section 732.502, 

“[t]he attesting witnesses must sign the will . . . in the presence of each 

other.” § 732.502(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2007). Adler’s allegation that he did not 

sign in the presence of another witness creates a genuine issue of material 

fact as to the initial execution of the 2007 Will. See Simpson v. Williamson, 

611 So. 2d 544, 547 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (finding there was a genuine 

issue of material fact as to the execution of a will when a witness submitted 

an affidavit stating he was not present when three others signed the will).

The second set of signatures, dated April 23, 2007, which served to act 

as a self-proof clause, is also problematic. The notarized paragraph lists 

four people (Testator and three witnesses); however, only Testator and two 

witnesses signed.3 On its face, the self-proof clause raises an issue as to 

the veracity of Testator and the two signing witnesses because they “were 

sworn and declared to the undersigned . . . that each of the Witnesses, in 

the presence of the Testator and each other, signed the will as a witness.” 

This discrepancy concerning who was present raises an issue as to the 

entire execution of the self-proof clause. 

In Simpson, the testator, two witnesses and the testator’s attorney (in 

the capacity of a notary public) signed a will and a self-proof clause. 611 

3 The self-proof clause provided: 

We, Edward Hessing, Murray S. Adler, Nancy J. Leyton, and 

Bernard Baval (Testator) the Testator and the Witnesses, 

respectively, whose names are signed to the attached and foregoing 

instrument, were sworn and declared to the undersigned that the 

Testator signed the instrument as his or her Last Will and 

Testament and that each of the Witnesses, in the presence of the 

Testator and each other, signed the will as a witness. 

Testator, Nancy Leyton and Edward Hessing all signed the self-proof clause; 

despite being listed, Murray Adler did not sign.
4

So. 2d at 545. One of the witnesses later submitted an affidavit, alleging 

that he did not see the testator sign the will nor did he sign in the presence 

of the other witness. The witness further alleged that, at the time he signed 

the self-proof clause, the testator and the second witness had already 

signed it, but it had not yet been notarized. Id. The notary public (the 

testator’s attorney) submitted an affidavit, in which he alleged that he, the 

testator and the two witnesses all signed in the presence of each other. Id. 

Proponents of the will argued that the witness’s affidavit was not 

dispositive because the notary public could serve as the required second 

witness. Id. at 546. 

The Fifth District disagreed with the proponents of the will and, instead, 

found there was a genuine issue of material fact remaining as to the 

execution of the will. The court found that, although the notary public 

could serve as the required second witness, the witness’s affidavit 

contradicted that of the notary public in that the witness attested the four 

signatories were not together at signing, while the notary attested all four 

were present. Id. at 547. 

Similar to Simpson, there is an apparent conflict as to who was present 

at the time the self-proof clause was executed. The notary public attested 

that four people were “sworn and declared to the undersigned,” yet only 

three people signed. Further, the three signatories swore that four people 

were present at the signing. This issue remains unresolved. 

Accordingly, we reverse the entry of final summary judgment and 

remand for further proceedings. In so doing, we note that we agree with 

the trial court’s conclusion that the waiver attached to the 1982 Will 

applied to only that will, and not to future wills executed by Testator.

Reversed and remanded.

MAY and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.