SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1049 

KA 13-02163 

PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

WILLIE BROWN, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (PHILIP ROTHSCHILD OF

COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (VICTORIA M. WHITE

OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Anthony F.

Aloi, J.), rendered September 4, 2013. The judgment convicted

defendant, upon a jury verdict, of assault in the second degree and

criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him

upon a jury verdict of assault in the second degree (Penal Law 

§ 120.05 [2]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree

(§ 265.01 [2]). Defendant’s conviction arose from an incident in

which he cut the victim’s face after the victim failed to pay

defendant $15 allegedly owed in connection with a drug transaction. 

Contrary to defendant’s contention, County Court did not err in

permitting the victim to testify with respect to the nature of the

debt inasmuch as the court, in engaging in the requisite two-part

inquiry, properly determined that the evidence was material with

respect to the relationship of the parties and motive and that the

probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect (see

generally People v Cass, 18 NY3d 553, 560). In any event, following

the court’s curative instruction, “defense counsel neither objected

further nor requested a mistrial, and thus . . . the curative

instructions must be deemed to have corrected the error to the

defendant’s satisfaction” (People v Elian, 129 AD3d 1635, 1636, lv

denied 26 NY3d 1087 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

We reject defendant’s further contention that the court erred in

denying his Batson objections to the prosecutor’s exercise of

peremptory challenges for two prospective jurors. We note at the

outset that defendant concedes that the court did not err in denying

his Batson objection with respect to the exercise of a peremptory
-2- 1049 

KA 13-02163 

challenge for a third prospective juror. With respect to the first

prospective juror, the prosecutor explained that the prospective juror

failed to disclose that she knew someone who had been convicted of a

crime, i.e., her uncle; that some of her answers led the prosecutor to

believe that she would not be fair to the victim; and that she knew

the Chief of the Syracuse Police Department, who had well-publicized

disputes with the District Attorney. The court’s credibility

determinations with respect to Batson objections are entitled to great

deference (see People v Luciano, 10 NY3d 499, 505), and we will not

disturb the court’s determination that the prosecutor provided raceneutral explanations for the peremptory challenge. With respect to

the second prospective juror, we conclude that the court properly

determined that the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation for

the challenge by explaining that the prospective juror had previously

worked with troubled young adults, which might cause her to be biased

toward defendant (see People v Holloway, 71 AD3d 1486, 1487, lv denied

15 NY3d 774).

Viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes as

charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we

conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence

(see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495). Contrary to defendant’s

contention, the testimony of the victim and his girlfriend, who was an

eyewitness, was not incredible as a matter of law (see People v

Hailey, 128 AD3d 1415, 1417, lv denied 26 NY3d 929). Moreover, the

jury was entitled to credit the testimony of the victim and his

girlfriend that they had a long-standing relationship with defendant

and that defendant went to the victim’s home and cut his face after he

failed to pay defendant $15, while rejecting the testimony of defense

witnesses that defendant did not know the victim well and that he was

not in the vicinity of the victim’s home at the time of the crime. We

perceive no basis to disturb the jury’s credibility determinations

(see People v Brown, 140 AD3d 1740, 1740). 

The sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: December 23, 2016 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court