Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Jindra, 2018 IL App (2d) 160225

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

PAUL E. JINDRA, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-16-0225

Filed July 10, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Stephenson County, Nos. 

15-CM-646, 15-CM-647; the Hon. James M. Hauser, Judge, 

presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Thomas A. Lilien, and Andrew Smith, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.

Carl H. Larson, State’s Attorney, of Freeport (Patrick Delfino, David 

J. Robinson, and Marshall M. Stevens, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Hudson and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Following a bench trial, defendant, Paul E. Jindra, was convicted of two counts of 

disorderly conduct (720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1) (West 2014)) and one count of assault (id.

§ 12-1(a)) for an incident involving the “village animal catcher” and one of defendant’s cats. 

The court sentenced defendant to conditional discharge plus a fine and a fee. After defendant 

was convicted and sentenced, he filed a pro se four-sentence motion to reconsider. The only 

issue raised on appeal is whether the contents of that motion mandated that the court conduct 

a preliminary inquiry into a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, consistent with the 

procedure set forth in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 189 (1984). We affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 Prior to trial, defendant’s attorney, Assistant Public Defender Travis Lutz, subpoenaed 

Brissa Cuthbertson to testify. Cuthbertson appeared for trial on the originally scheduled trial 

date. However, at the State’s request, the trial was continued to a later date. The court 

informed Cuthbertson that her subpoena was continued to the new date set for trial and 

issued her a reminder slip for the new date. On the new date set for trial, Cuthbertson failed 

to appear. Despite Cuthbertson’s absence, Lutz did not request a continuance and answered 

that the defense was ready for trial. Cuthbertson was not mentioned in any witness’s 

testimony. 

¶ 4 The court found defendant guilty of all counts, sentenced him to one year of conditional 

discharge, and ordered him to pay a fine and a fee. 

¶ 5 On the same day as sentencing, defendant filed a pro se motion, titled “Motion (To 

Reconsider),” based on Cuthbertson’s nonappearance. In his motion, defendant wrote the 

following: 

“I would like the judge to reconsider this case. [T]he key witness, Brissa 

Cuphbertson [sic], did not appear in court, nor was her written statement submitted to 

the judge. The public defender was Mr. Travis Lutz. This eye witness [sic] is crucial 

to this defense.”

¶ 6 At the next court date, Lutz was unsure of how to proceed with the case because 

defendant had filed a pro se motion and Lutz had subsequently filed a motion for a new trial. 

Lutz informed the court that he was ready to proceed on the motion for a new trial. The court 

then reminded defendant that he was represented by counsel, that he was “not to file any 

pleadings,” and that, instead, he should do so through his counsel. Defendant responded that 

he understood. The court asked if Lutz would like time to consult with defendant about his 

motion to reconsider. Lutz responded “yes,” that he would speak to defendant, and that, “if

that’s what we’re going to do,” Lutz would file a proper motion to reconsider.

¶ 7 When the court set a date to hear the motions, defendant interjected, “That’s an important 

point. New information is supplied by Brissa—Brissa Cuthbertson.” The court instructed 

defendant to speak with his attorney about that, but defendant continued, “Yes. She doesn’t 

care. She’ll come tomorrow, if you ask her. She says it was a mistake. She didn’t think she 

was supposed to show up last week.” The court again admonished defendant to speak with 

his attorney. 
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¶ 8 At the next court date, Lutz addressed the matter of the pro se motion to reconsider. Lutz 

told the court, “I don’t think we’re looking to proceed on that in any fashion. I’d rather ask to 

proceed on the motion for new trial that I had filed.” This motion, which did not mention 

Cuthbertson, was heard and denied. Defendant timely appeals. 

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 10 The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court should have conducted a preliminary 

inquiry pursuant to Krankel into defendant’s alleged claim that he was denied the effective 

assistance of counsel because of counsel’s failure to secure the presence of a key witness and 

to notify the judge of the witness’s statement. Defendant’s posttrial motion stated:

“I would like the judge to reconsider this case. [T]he key witness, Brissa 

Cuphbertson [sic], did not appear in court, nor was her written statement submitted to 

the judge. The public defender was Mr. Travis Lutz. This eye witness [sic] is crucial 

to this defense.”

¶ 11 The State responds that no Krankel inquiry was necessary because defendant’s pro se 

motion did not make an explicit or clear complaint about counsel’s performance. The State 

maintains that defendant’s claim pertained to his belief that Cuthbertson was a necessary 

witness, with no indication that he was dissatisfied with his counsel. 

¶ 12 When a defendant presents a pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

the trial court should conduct an inquiry to examine the factual basis of the claim. People v. 

Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29; People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78 (2003). If a defendant’s 

pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel show possible neglect, new counsel is 

appointed to represent the defendant in a full hearing on his claim. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. 

¶ 13 However, if a defendant does not sufficiently raise an ineffective assistance claim, he 

does not trigger the need for the trial court to inquire. People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 68, 75-77 

(2010). 

¶ 14 Recently, the supreme court in People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, considered whether the 

defendant’s bare allegation of “ineffective assistance of counsel” contained in a motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence was sufficient to trigger the trial court’s duty 

to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry, even though the allegation lacked any explanation 

or supporting facts. Id. ¶ 18. The court concluded that a defendant’s “clear claim asserting 

ineffective assistance of counsel, either orally or in writing, *** is sufficient to trigger the 

trial court’s duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry.” Id. Thus, to be sufficient, the complaint must 

be clear. 

¶ 15 We must determine therefore whether defendant did enough to trigger the trial court’s 

duty to inquire. In other words, whether defendant brought a clear claim to “the court’s 

attention.” Id. ¶ 24. We find that defendant’s statements fell short of a clear claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel that would trigger the trial court’s duty to conduct a 

preliminary Krankel inquiry. 

¶ 16 Defendant never stated, orally or in writing, that counsel was ineffective. Although 

defendant’s motion mentioned his counsel, it is unclear that defendant, in fact, was 

complaining about counsel. In short, defendant failed to make a clear claim asserting 

ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to prompt the court’s duty to conduct a Krankel 

inquiry. 
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¶ 17 In People v. Thomas, 2017 IL App (4th) 150815, ¶ 31, the court held that the defendant 

was not entitled to a Krankel inquiry. The defendant did not mention his counsel in his letter 

to the trial court or reference his counsel in any way. In addition, by the time it received the 

defendant’s letter, the trial court was aware that both parties had been operating under the 

misconception that the defendant’s charges were subject to sentencing at 85%, and the 

defendant was present when the State and the defendant’s counsel learned of the error. Thus, 

the defendant’s letter, wherein he stated that he would not have entered his plea if he had 

known that he could have received 50% if he had gone to trial, “could have easily appeared 

to be his hoping to somehow get another chance at a lesser sentence.” Id. ¶ 27. As he made 

no mention of his counsel, or any assertion of ineffective assistance, the letter was subject to 

many interpretations, including the defendant’s ex post facto regret at not taking the State’s 

alleged offer. Id. ¶ 28. 

¶ 18 In Taylor, the defendant stated during allocution that he did not take a previously 

tendered plea deal only because “ ‘I had no idea what I was facing’ ” and that “ ‘I would 

[have] jumped into it with both feet if I knew that I was facing this type of situation.’ ” 

Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d at 73. There was nothing in the defendant’s statement specifically 

informing the court that he was complaining about his attorney’s performance. Nor did the 

defendant even mention his attorney. Further, because his statement was “rambling,” it was 

“amenable to more than one interpretation.” Id. at 77. According to the State, the statement 

merely showed regret at rejecting the more advantageous plea deal before trial and not that 

he rejected the offer due to a material misunderstanding of what sentence he faced. Id. The 

supreme court agreed with the State that the statement did not constitute an implicit pro se

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel sufficient to trigger the trial court’s duty to conduct 

a Krankel inquiry. Id.

¶ 19 The same is true in the present case. While defendant did mention counsel in his motion, 

he did not complain about counsel’s performance. Nor did he complain about counsel in his 

oral statements to the court. “In instances where the defendant’s claim is implicit and could 

be subject to different interpretations, a Krankel inquiry is not required.” Thomas, 2017 IL 

App (4th) 150815, ¶ 26. As in Thomas and Taylor, defendant’s statements could be subject to 

differing interpretations. He easily could have been hoping for the trial court to reopen the 

proofs in order to hear the witness. Absent a clear claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 

the trial court’s duty to conduct a Krankel inquiry was not triggered. See Ayres, 2017 IL 

120071, ¶ 18 (a defendant’s “clear claim asserting ineffective assistance of counsel, either 

orally or in writing, *** is sufficient to trigger the trial court’s duty to conduct a Krankel

inquiry”).

¶ 20 We disagree with defendant’s suggestion that People v. Peacock, 359 Ill. App. 3d 326 

(2005), is sufficiently similar to the facts presented here. In Peacock, the court held that the 

defendant had triggered a preliminary Krankel inquiry when he complained to the trial court 

that his attorney had not represented him to the full extent of his ability, specifically by 

failing to subpoena the defendant’s witnesses and by ineffectively cross-examining witnesses 

at trial. Id. at 339-40. The defendant’s statements contained express accusations of 

ineffective assistance against the defendant’s attorney. In contrast, here, defendant’s 

statements concerned his belief that Cuthbertson was a necessary witness, with no clear 

indication that he was dissatisfied with Lutz’s performance as counsel. There simply is no 

clear accusation of ineffective assistance, in defendant’s pro se motion or anywhere else in 
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the record. As defendant’s statements fell short of a “clear claim asserting ineffective 

assistance of counsel” (Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 18), he was not entitled to a Krankel

inquiry. Accordingly, we conclude that defendant did not sufficiently raise a pro se claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a 

preliminary Krankel inquiry. 

¶ 21 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Stephenson County is 

affirmed. As part of our judgment, we grant the State’s request that defendant be assessed 

$50 as costs for this appeal. 55 ILCS 5/4-2002(a) (West 2016); see also People v. Nicholls, 

71 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1978). 

¶ 23 Affirmed.