Filed 1/17/24 P. v. Bates CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and 

Respondent,

v.

PRENTISS BATES,

Defendant and 

Appellant.

 B327277

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA450278)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Stephen A. Marcus, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark Yanis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Prentiss Bates appeals from an order denying his petition 

for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 His appellate 

counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 

216 (Delgadillo), and appellant filed a supplemental brief. We 

review the contentions appellant raises in his supplemental brief 

and affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The underlying facts presented at appellant’s trial are 

discussed in detail in this court’s prior nonpublished opinion, 

People v. Brown (Nov. 26, 2019, B287726). We briefly discuss 

them here to provide context for the trial court’s ruling. We 

otherwise do not rely on this factual background in resolving the 

issues presented in this appeal. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) 

The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged 

appellant, along with four co-defendants, with the first degree 

murder of Trevon Lark (§ 187, subd. (a); count one), conspiracy to 

commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count two), and shooting at 

an occupied motor vehicle (§ 246; count three). The information 

also included firearm enhancement allegations (§ 12022.53; 

counts one and two) and gang enhancement allegations (§ 186.22, 

subds. (b)(1)(B) & (C); count three). The information further

alleged prior serious felony and strike convictions for appellant 

under section 667, subdivisions (a)(1) and (b)-(j), respectively.

The prosecution presented evidence at trial that appellant, 

his co-defendants, and the victim were all members of the Hoover 

gang. In the early hours of August 29, 2015, the group attended 

a party at a marijuana dispensary in Los Angeles. Two of the co1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code 

unless otherwise indicated.
3

defendants left the party, returned with guns, and then the group 

got into three cars and left with a plan to kill rival gang 

members. Appellant drove one car, occupied by two armed codefendants. At one point, those co-defendants opened fire on the 

car containing the victim, who was shot and died a short time 

later.

In September 2017, the jury found appellant guilty as 

charged and found true all enhancement allegations. The court 

found that appellant had suffered a prior conviction qualifying as 

both a strike and a prior serious felony. The court sentenced 

appellant to a total of 80 years to life in prison. A different panel 

of this court affirmed appellant’s conviction, but struck certain 

enhancements and remanded the matter to allow the trial court 

to exercise its discretion whether to strike the prior serious felony 

conviction enhancements as to appellant and Brown. (People v. 

Brown, supra, B287726).

In July 2021, appellant filed a form petition for 

resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6.

2

The court appointed counsel for appellant. The People opposed 

the petition, arguing that appellant was ineligible for relief as a 

matter of law because the jury was not instructed on the theories 

of natural and probable consequences or felony murder. The 

People asserted that instead, the sole theory pursued at trial was 

that appellant “was an aider and abettor to a gang murder as 

well as a participant to a conspiracy to commit murder,” and that 

the jury was instructed only as to direct aiding and abetting. The 

People further argued that appellant’s conviction for conspiracy 

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was 

renumbered to section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 

2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
4

to commit murder precluded relief. The People attached as 

exhibits the jury instructions and verdict forms from the trial, 

this court’s opinion from appellant’s direct appeal, and the 

transcript from appellant’s sentencing hearing. Appellant filed a 

reply brief, arguing that he was not the actual killer or a major 

participant, the trial court should not rely on the prior appellate 

opinion to make factual findings, and appellant had established a 

prima facie case.

The superior court denied the motion on the grounds that 

appellant failed to demonstrate prima facie entitlement to relief. 

At the hearing on the petition, the court noted that in addition to 

the submitted materials, it had reviewed the transcript of closing 

arguments from the trial. The court summarily denied relief on 

the basis that no jury instructions were given regarding natural 

and probable consequences or felony murder. The court also 

found support from “the fact that I was the trial judge in this 

matter, . . . did read the closing argument last night . . . and I 

determined that all the People did was pursue a malice murder 

theory in this case.” The court also stated it had considered that 

appellant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, “which 

had the implications that the jury found, that he had specific 

intent.” The court thus concluded that appellant failed to make 

the requisite prima facie showing for relief under section 1172.6.

Appellant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Appellant’s appointed attorney filed a brief raising no 

issues and requesting that this court proceed pursuant to 

Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. This court advised appellant of 

his right to file a supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14 
5

Cal.5th at pp. 231-232), and appellant did so. We evaluate the 

arguments set forth in that supplemental brief. (See id. at p. 232 

[“If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or 

letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific 

arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written 

opinion”].)

Appellant’s supplemental brief does not raise any 

arguments relevant to his section 1172.6 petition for 

resentencing. Instead, he asserts his innocence and argues that 

there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. He also 

raises issues of jury instruction error and ineffective assistance of 

counsel. None of these arguments establish any error with 

respect to the trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition for 

resentencing at the prima facie stage. We therefore affirm.

DISPOSITION

The order denying the petition for resentencing is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.