FILED 

TN COURIOF 

V. ORKE.RS' CUllP.l . . SAIIO 

C1AD.JS 

Time> 10:40Ml 

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION CLAIMS 

AT NASHVILLE 

Patrick Riley, 

Employee, 

) Docket No. 2015-06-0886 

) 

v. 

Group Electric, 

Employer. 

) State File No. 48657-2015 

) 

) Judge Kenneth M. Switzer 

COMPENSATION HEARING ORDER DENYING 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

This matter came before the Court on April 21, 20 17, upon Group Electric's 

Motion for Summary Judgment filed under Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The determinative legal issue is whether Group Electric is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Due to significant deficiencies in Group Electric's motionnamely, its flawed factual recitation and its failure to support the motion with 

documentation in compliance with Rule 56-the Court holds that Group Electric is not 

entitled to summary judgment. 

History of Claim 

As this Court has already benefitted from an interlocutory evidentiary hearing, it 

incorporates by reference the factual recitation within its Expedited Hearing Order. For 

purposes of this motion, the Court reiterates only the facts germane to the appropriateness 

of summary judgment. 

Mr. Riley worked for Group Electric as a journeyman electrician. On June 8, 

2015, Mr. Riley injured his left hand and wrist while installing wire at work. The 

following day, he went to the Summit Medical Center Emergency Room, where 

providers referred Mr. Riley for an orthopedic consult. Group Electric offered a panel of 

orthopedists, and Mr. Riley chose Dr. Rosa Stone. In the meantime, Mr. Riley saw 

providers at Con centra upon his supervisor's direction. He saw three different providers 

at three visits. One of these Concentra providers, Dr. Saritha Reddy, ordered an MRI. 

When Mr. Riley ultimately saw the authorized treating physician, Dr. Stone, notes from 

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this visit do not provide an opinion on causation. Although he underwent the MRI, he 

never reviewed the results with Dr. Stone because she later refused to treat him. Group 

Electric ultimately denied the claim. 

In the Expedited Hearing Order, the Court found Mr. Riley a credible witness and 

rejected Group Electric's arguments that he was not injured on June 8, 2015. The Court 

reasoned that Mr. Riley's testimony, along with the histories at Concentra, supported this 

finding. The Court held Mr. Riley likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits that he 

suffered an injury by accident in the course of his employment and ordered Group 

Electric to provide another panel of orthopedists. 

After the Appeals Board affirmed, Group Electric offered a panel of orthopedists, 

from which Mr. Riley selected Dr. Todd Wurth. It is unclear when Mr. Riley saw Dr. 

Wurth and the nature and extent of his treatment, as neither party filed these medical 

records with the Court. Group Electric attached to its summary judgment motion a threepage, single-spaced letter seeking Dr. Wurth's opinion on causation. 1 Group Electric's 

letter asserted, "[t]he Summit Emergency Room records directly conflict with the history 

you were provided" by Mr. Riley. Group Electric attached these records to its letter to 

Dr. Wurth, along with the records from the visit with Dr. Speake, where he questioned 

the correlation between Mr. Riley's "story of injury and exam." The letter then detailed 

notations within the medical records that this Court found unpersuasive in establishing 

the date and mechanism of injury at the Expedited Hearing. It does not appear that 

Group Electric provided copies of other medical records from Concentra, which contain 

the alternative account of how Mr. Riley became injured. Group Electric's letter then 

asked Dr. Wurth: 

As the medical records from June 9, 2015 reflect that Mr. Riley's pain 

began three days earlier and that Mr. Riley denied an injury had occurred, 

can you say to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Riley's 

wrist condition primarily arose out of a June 8, 2015 workplace injury? 

(Emphasis in original.) 

Dr. Wurth circled "no." 

Law and Analysis 

The Court first addresses Group Electric's objection to Mr. Riley's response to the 

summary judgment motion on grounds of it being untimely filed. Group Electric also 

argued the response does not comply with Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil 

1 The Court observes that this letter references a previous letter to Dr. Wurth dated November I, 2016, 

which is not included in any filings with the court. Apparently, the November 1 letter also requested a 

causation opinion and might have contained additional background information. 

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Procedure because Mr. Riley did not support the factual allegations he disputes with 

citations to the record; rather, he offered varying factual assertions that are merely 

"personal statements" unsupported by affidavits. Mr. Riley, whose attempts to hire legal 

counsel have been unsuccessful, acknowledged he is held to the same standard as an 

attorney even though he represents himself. 2 

Rule 56.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party 

opposing a motion for summary judgment must, no later than five days before the 

hearing, file a response to each statement of undisputed fact alleged by the moving party. 

Mr. Riley failed to comply with both the time parameters of Rule 56.03 and with the 

substance of his response. In light of this noncompliance, the Court declines to consider 

his response. 

Turning now to Group Electric's written motion, Rule 56.03 requires it to be 

"accompanied by a separate concise statement of the material facts as to which the 

moving party contends there is no genuine issue for trial." The Court takes judicial 

notice of testimony heard and exhibits admitted into evidence at the prior, in-person 

expedited hearing. See Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp., 387 S.W.3d 453, 457 n.l (Tenn. 

2012), holding, "we are permitted to take judicial notice of the facts from earlier 

proceedings in the same action." 

After weighing the evidence at the Expedited Hearing, the Court found Mr. Riley 

sustained an injury on June 8, rather than June 6. Yet, Group Electric's "Statement of 

Undisputed Facts" continues to emphasize notations in the medical records suggesting 

the injury occurred on June 6 as "facts." Group Electric relied on a causation letter that 

bases this conclusion on a factual assertion rejected at the Expedited Hearing.3 Because 

Dr. Wurth's causation opinion depends on June 6 as the accurate date of injury, the 

causation question essentially asks Dr. Wurth to make a factual and credibility 

determination regarding the date of injury. These determinations are the province of this 

Court alone and not a medical expert. 

Aside from these deficiencies, the Court further notes that Rule 56.04 states, 

"Subject to the moving party's compliance with Rule 56.03, the judgment sought shall be 

rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as 

to any material fact[.]" (Emphasis added.) 

2 "It is well-settled ... that prose litigants must comply with the same standards to which lawyers must 

adhere." Burnette v. K-Mart Corp., 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 2, at *6 (Jan. 20, 2015). 

3 Notwithstanding this ruling, Group Electric may challenge the date of injury or any other issue 

previously determined at the Expedited Hearing at the final Compensation Hearing with the proper 

evidence as described later within this order. 

3 
Here, Group Electric submitted Dr. Wurth's opinion in the form of a letter rather 

than an affidavit or deposition testimony. The letter's reliability is suspect, because of 

the selective information Dr. Wurth relied upon in his response and the fact that the 

response is unsworn. The Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board recently 

expressed concern about a summary judgment motion supported by letters from 

physicians that "were not accompanied by an affidavit, were not attached to a deposition, 

were not attached to answers to interrogatories or admissions, and were not a part of a 

pleading as defined in Tennessee Rule of Civil procedure 7.01." Thomas v. Zipp Express, 

eta!., 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 22, at *11-12 (Mar. 15, 2017). The 

Appeals Board stopped short of addressing this failure because neither party raised as the 

issue on appeal. Id. at 12. However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Hensley noted that 

the Bureau's rules regarding the admissibility of causation letters state, "[a]t a 

compensation hearing, these letters or statements [addressing medical causation], even if 

in affidavit form may be excluded as appropriate through [a] valid objection made 

pursuant to the Tennessee Rules of Evidence." Thomas, supra, at * 17 (Hensley, J., 

concurring). On this basis, Judge Hensley held the employer failed to comply with 

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03. Guided by both the majority and concurring 

opinions in Zipp, this Court holds that Group Electric's supporting documentation is 

insufficient based on Rule 56's requirements. 

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 

1. Group Electric's motion for summary judgment is denied. 

2. This matter is set for a Status Conference on May 8, 2017, at 8:45a.m. Central 

Time. You must call 615-532-9552 or toll-free at 866-943-0025 to participate in 

the Hearing. Failure to call might result in a determination of the issues without 

your further participation. 

ENTERED this the 26th day of April, 2017. 

ourt of Workers' Compens ion Claims 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Compensation Hearing Order 

Denying Summary Judgment was sent to the following recipients by the following 

methods of service on this the 26th day of April, 2017. 

Name 

Patrick Riley, Employee 

T. Ryan Malone, 

Employer's Attome 

Certified Via 

Mail Fax 

X 

Via 

Email 

X 

X 

Service sent to: 

hrdwirdelect@yaho .com; 4001 

Anderson Rd., Apt. 0-36, 

Nashville TN 37217 

ryan@petersonwhite.com 

h um, Clerk of Court 

Court Workers' Compensation Claims 

WC.CourtClerk@tn.gov 

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