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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 

PROGRAMS OVERSIGHT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2008 

Serial No. 110–208 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan, Chairman 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

ADAM B. SCHIFF, California 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

CHRIS CANNON, Utah 

RIC KELLER, Florida 

DARRELL ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TOM FEENEY, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PERRY APELBAUM, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SEAN MCLAUGHLIN, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia, Chairman 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

BOBBY VASSAR, Chief Counsel 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

SEPTEMBER 18, 2008 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, 

and Homeland Security ....................................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and 

Homeland Security ............................................................................................... 4 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Jeffrey L. Sedgewick, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Justice 

Programs (OJP), U.S Department of Justice, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 6 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 10 

Mr. Shay Bilchik, Research Professor, Georgetown Public Policy Institute, 

Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 44 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 46 

Mr. Bill Piper, Director, Office of National Affairs, Drug Policy Alliance 

Network, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 55 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 57 

Mr. Ronald E. Brooks, President, National Officers’ Association Coalition, 

San Francisco, CA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 61 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 64 

Ms. Mary Lou Leary, Executive Director, National Center for Victims of 

Crime, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 75 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 78 

Mr. Peter Marone, Chairman of the Consortium of Forensic Science Organizations, Richmond, VA 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 89 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 91 

Mr. Charlie Sullivan, National CURE, Washington, DC 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 93 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 95 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Prepared Statement of the Honorable Louie Gohmert, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 

on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security ................................................... 4 

APPENDIX 

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record .......................................................... 99 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF 

JUSTICE PROGRAMS OVERSIGHT 

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 2008 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:36 a.m., in 

room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Robert 

C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Scott, Weiner, Gohmert, and Coble. 

Staff present: Bobby Vassar, Majority Chief Counsel; Ameer 

Gopalani, Majority Counsel; Jesselyn McCurdy, Majority Counsel; 

Mario Dispenza (Fellow) BATFE Detailee; Veronica Eligan, Professional Staff Member; Kimani Little, Minority Counsel; and Kelsey 

Whitlock, Minority Staff Assistant. 

Mr. SCOTT. The Subcommittee will now come to order, and I am 

pleased to welcome you today to the oversight hearing before the 

Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, the 

Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. 

The mission of the Office of Justice Programs, or OJP, is to increase public safety and improve the fair administration of justice 

across the United States. To accomplish this mission, OJP provides 

information, conducts research and development, publishes statistics, and conducts training—all of which is geared toward helping 

the justice community meet its public safety goals through local decision-making. 

Since enhancing public safety is OJP’s objective, the success or 

setbacks affect the quality of life for all Americans. The Subcommittee’s oversight is therefore critical to ensure that OJP is fulfilling its mission and that Congress is providing OJP with the resources it needs. 

Today we will focus the oversight on the OJP component organizations, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice 

Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Victims of 

Crime, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 

OJP has been successful in many areas. For example, the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance funds critical programs such as the Byrne 

Justice Assistance Grant program, or the Byrne JAG, that assists 

States and local governments in improving their criminal justice 

system. 

2 

The National Institute of Justice funds state DNA efforts, particularly in trying to reduce the large backlog of untested DNA evidence samples in the Nation’s forensic labs. 

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention funds 

programs and funds training of community leaders and model programs for keeping youth productive, in school, and away from 

crime, which is probably the part—away from crime is perhaps the 

best policy of all. 

However, the Office of Justice Programs has encountered a number of challenges and criticisms within these successful endeavors. 

For example, the Byrne JAG program, when used appropriately, 

can fund a range of crime-fighting approaches incorporating law 

enforcement education, community programs, drug treatment, technology improvement, and victim and witness programs. But the 

current funds have not always been used appropriately. 

Advocacy groups have criticized some States for using the funding for drug task force to target low-level drug users or other poorly-chosen objectives that do not reduce overall crime. The Subcommittee will inquire about what steps VJA has taken to ensure 

that such mistakes do not occur. 

Further, the NIJ’s forensic evidence program may need enhancement. That program has made great strides in aiding local forensic 

labs, which are now receiving DNA samples from crime scenes and 

convicted offenders faster than they can examine and enter them 

into the State and local databases. 

The increased sample collection has resulted in an enormous 

backlog of untested evidence, and the agency has funded State and 

local law enforcement agencies to test nearly 104,000 DNA cases 

from 2004 to 2007. And it has funded 2.5 million convicted offender 

and arrestee samples. 

Yet these efforts have not significantly reduced the Nation’s 

backlog. So we must continue to assess this issue and possibly increase support for DNA initiatives. However, concerns have been 

raised by OJP customers that the heightened funding for DNA 

technology has neglected the vast majority of forensic science, creating an even larger backlog of non-DNA evidence. 

Although critical, DNA evidence only represents approximately 9 

percent of crime lab backlogs, because DNA is not the type of evidence that police collect in examining most crime scenes. Evidence 

such as fingerprints, fibers, ballistics, and many other kinds of evidence comprise the other 91 percent of the evidence backlog in police labs needing Federal support. 

The Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Act of 2000 supports States in general development and maintenance of their 

criminal forensics science program, but it has never been funded. 

Thus, congressional support requesting DNA assistance may be incomplete, and the Subcommittee will discuss whether this is indeed 

the case and how to correct it, and why NIJ has not been advocating for stronger funding and support for non-DNA forensic evidence testing. 

Another concern for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention programs is the core juvenile justice objective. 

Critics maintain that over the past several years, OJJDP has conVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:47 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\091808\44494.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44494
3 

ducted less research into juvenile delinquency prevention than is 

warranted, suggesting disengagement in this area. 

The agency was created through the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act of 1974 with a mandate to research juvenile justice 

issues and to provide information to provide effective juvenile justice policies. Therefore, if the criticism is accurate, we should ascertain why it has occurred and how to refocus the agency’s efforts. 

Underlying each challenge has been decreased funding. The Byrne JAG funding has been reduced from over $560 million in fiscal year 2007 to just over $170 million this fiscal year. Funding for 

assisting victims of crime has also been dramatically reduced, and 

the OJJDP appropriation has plummeted from almost $7 million in 

fiscal to 2001 to only $700,000 in fiscal year 2008. Yet the administration has asked for further decreases in funding for the next upcoming fiscal year, when there remains great concern about crime. 

The prospect of continued decreased funding for the criminal justice system is troubling. It is important to know how OJP plans to 

address its customers’ needs. 

Finally, the Subcommittee will discuss potential NIJ research 

projects that may have far-reaching effects in the criminal justice 

system. In January 2008 the Columbia Law Review article, entitled 

‘‘Judging Innocence’’ by Professor Brandon Garrett of the University of Virginia Law School, leveled serious criticisms of forensic 

science. After reviewing the first 200 cases in which DNA evidence 

exonerated a wrongfully convicted defendant, Professor Garrett 

concluded that in 57 percent of those cases, forensic evidence was 

introduced against the defendant at trial, and that forensics was 

questionable from a scientific point of view and was given undue 

weight at the trial. 

In July 2008, John Collins and Jay Jarvis of the Crime Lab Report, an organization that provides media and public policy analysis for the forensic science community, published ‘‘The Wrongful 

Conviction of Forensic Science.’’ The authors of the report also evaluated the first 200 wrongful convictions that were overturned 

through DNA evidence and came to a different conclusion. 

Although they concluded that in some instances evidence based 

on poor scientific principles contributed to the wrongful convictions, 

it was far less common than Professor Garrett has concluded. They 

found that although 57 percent of the first 200 wrongful convictions 

did indeed employ forensic evidence against defendants, it was not 

the case that in each of these cases, that evidence was the fault for 

the wrongful conviction, but other factors, such as poor defense 

lawyering and ethical violations by prosecutors played a more significant role. 

Forensic science has taken an increased role in criminal trials, 

and the extent of its accuracy and the proper context for presentation must be clear to the jury for the jury to render a legitimate 

verdict. As the Department of Justice’s research arm for criminal 

justice, NIJ is in the best position to study this issue and report 

its findings to bolster the fairness of criminal trials. 

Another area warranting study is the decreased death rates in 

the Nation’s prisons and jails and the impact that this oversight in 

general and the Deaths in Custody Reporting Act of 2000 has had 

in the decreasing death rate. Since the enactment of the Deaths in 

4 

Custody Reporting Act, BJS has compiled a number of statistics regarding prisoner deaths, and the statistics show that oversight 

works. 

The latest BJS report, August 2005, shows that since the oversight emerged in the mid-1980’s, there has been a 64 percent decline in suicides and 93 percent decline in homicide rates in prison. 

The Deaths in Custody Reporting Act thus appears to be successful 

in the—oversight, keeping prisoners safer, and the ability of statistics has proven useful in shedding light on a potential problem. 

In fact, recently The Washington Post ran an article about excessive death rates from violence in the Prince George County, Maryland, jail. The Washington Post used statistics published on the 

BJS website which were compiled through the Deaths in Custody 

reporting requirement. However, there are no NIJ studies to support whether the reporting requirements have enhanced safety and 

no studies to detail the best practices for prisoner safety. Such 

studies would be important evidence for developing policy in the future. 

It is now my pleasure to recognize the esteemed Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, the Honorable 

Judge Gohmert. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Chairman Scott. 

I appreciate this hearing. I have a statement that I would ask 

unanimous consent that it be submitted in writing for the record 

so that I won’t review that and waste further time with Acting Assistant Attorney General Sedgewick. But I would like, if that is—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Without objection. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gohmert follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LOUIE GOHMERT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON

CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

Today, the Crime Subcommittee is holding an oversight hearing on the activities 

of the Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs (OJP). 

Exercising oversight of the federal agencies within this subcommittee’s jurisdiction is part of our jobs as Members of Congress. Conducting oversight hearings is 

a responsible use of our time and I commend the Chairman for holding this one. 

The Office of Justice Programs has the mission to increase public safety and improve the fair administration of justice across America through innovative leadership and programs. OJP disseminates information, training, coordination, and innovative strategies for effective law enforcement to federal, state, local and tribal 

agencies. 

OJP oversees a number of components that have important law enforcement roles 

and responsibilities. Among those components are the Bureau of Justice Assistance, 

the National Institute of Justice, the Office for Victims of Crime, and the Office of 

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 

The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provides leadership and assistance to 

state and local law enforcement officials. BJA has the goals to reduce and prevent 

crime, violence, and drug abuse and to improve the way in which the criminal justice system functions. 

BJA is probably best known as the component that administers the Byrne JAG 

Grant program, which allows states and local governments to support a broad range 

of activities to prevent and control crime. Byrne JAG funding has diverse uses including multi-jurisdictions drug task forces, alternatives to incarceration like drug 

and community courts, and equipment purchases for cash-strapped law enforcement 

officials. 

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) is the research, development, and evaluation component of OJP. NIJ is dedicated to researching crime control and criminal 

5 

justice issues. NIJ also produces print and electronic publications, tools, and training materials about crime and justice. 

The Office for Victims of Crime (OVC) has the mission to enhance the country’s 

capacity to assist crime victims. OVC also provides leadership in changing attitudes, 

policies, and practices to promote justice and healing for all victims. 

Each year, OVC provides funding for some 5,500 victim assistance programs serving 4 million crime victims. OVC also supports state compensation programs that 

serve an additional 180,000 victims. 

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) provides national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent and respond to juvenile delinquency and victimization. 

OJJDP’s mission is to support states and communities in their efforts to develop 

and implement effective and coordinated prevention and intervention programs. 

OJJDP also works to improve the juvenile justice system so that it protects public 

safety, holds offenders accountable, and provides treatment and rehabilitative services tailored to the needs of juveniles and their families. 

This is first Crime Subcommittee oversight hearing on this important DOJ agency 

and its components in the 110th Congress. In fact, we have not held an oversight 

hearing on OJP since 2002. 

Although this hearing comes towards the end of this session, I believe that the 

Subcommittee’s Members will benefit from hearing testimony about OJP’s mission 

and activities, as well as the challenges it faces. 

I welcome Acting Assistant Attorney General Sedgewick to our subcommittee. I 

look forward to your testimony and the testimony of the other witnesses. 

I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. GOHMERT. And then I would like to mention that I am glad 

we are having this hearing; I appreciate your calling this hearing. 

This is the first hearing, since I have been in Congress, of oversight 

in this area. And it is an important thing to have. 

Some of the figures that we have just heard, though, trouble me. 

I think it is difficult for anyone to come in and say 57 percent of 

any number of convictions have been wrongful convictions. I will 

bet that if we had a trial of whoever came up with 57 percent exactly of convictions being wrongful, we could probably convict him 

of giving an inappropriate percentage, but—because I am familiar 

with trials and know how hard it is to come in and say ‘‘this was 

wrongful, this wasn’t,’’ when you have had a jury come in and find 

beyond reasonable doubt that someone was appropriate to convict. 

I have also seen cases—one, for example, in my court—where the 

forensics and the DNA evidence all pointed to the guilt of the defendant having had sexual relations with an under-aged child, his 

own. It turns out it was planted and he was not actually guilty. 

But that would probably have been one that would have gone on 

as a part of the 43 percent that was an accurate conviction, when 

it would not have been at all. 

So anyway, this is such a difficult area. But it is important that 

we have funding to assist in appropriate programs. It is also hard 

for me to say that we overfunded this important DOJ area if funds 

were wasted. I wouldn’t want to extend more funds to an area 

where it is wasted. 

So it is quite important we have this oversight—find out where 

it has been effective and we need more funding to be more effective; find out where it has been wasted, where we can cut and put 

that in more effective areas. 

So with that, I yield back the balance of my time and look forward to hearing from the acting assistant attorney general. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

6 

We have two panels of distinguished witnesses with us today to 

discuss OJP’s mission, accomplishments, and challenges. The first 

witness is Mr. Jeffrey Sedgwick, Acting Assistant Attorney General 

for the Office of Justice Programs. He is responsible for providing 

overall management and oversight of OJP. He has held this position since January 2008, and in April President Bush nominated 

him to be the Assistant Attorney General. He has an A.B. degree 

from Kenyon College, a master’s degree and PhD from the University of Virginia. After earning his PhD, Mr. Sedgwick joined the 

University of Massachusetts faculty and is presently on leave from 

that position. 

Mr. Sedgwick, your written statement will be made part of the 

record in its entirety. I would ask you to summarize your testimony 

in approximately 5 minutes or less, if you can. To help you stay 

within that time, there is a lighting device at the table that will 

go from green to yellow when 1 minute is up, and then to red when 

the 5 minutes are up. 

We look forward to your testimony. 

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY L. SEDGWICK, ACTING ASSISTANT 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (OJP), 

U.S DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Ranking Member Gohmert, and Members of the Subcommittee. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss our efforts to 

continuously improve the operations and management of the Office 

of Justice Programs. We appreciate the Subcommittee’s continued 

interest in eliminating duplication and waste, as well as improving 

the operations of Federal grant programs. 

As the Acting Assistant Attorney General, I am responsible for 

the overall management and oversight of OJP. This includes setting policy, ensuring that OJP programs reflect the priorities of the 

President, the attorney general, and the Congress, and promoting 

coordination among the OJP offices and bureaus. OJP provides approximately $2 billion annually to the criminal 

justice community and State, local and tribal law enforcement to 

help develop the Nation’s capacity to prevent and control crime, improve justice systems, increase knowledge about crime and related 

issues, and assist crime victims. 

Today, Mr. Chairman, I would like to highlight some of OJP’s recent accomplishments, our work to improve the transparency and 

management of grants, how we measure the effectiveness of the 

programs, as well as our efforts to implement the Department of 

Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 that established our Office of 

Audit, Assessment and Management. 

As Acting Assistant Attorney General, I also have the pleasure 

to serve as the national Amber Alert coordinator. Since the 

AMBER Alert program became a federally coordinated effort, we 

have expanded our base of partners and continue to work with 

States and communities to strengthen plans. Today, all 50 States 

have AMBER Alert plans, and we expanded the network into Indian Country. We partnered with the wireless industry to distribute AMBER Alerts through voluntary text messages, and these 

7 

accomplishments have assisted in the recovery of over 400 children. 

We continue to look for ways to improve this system. 

In fiscal year 2008, our Office for Victims of Crime awarded more than $480 million to State crime victim assistance and compensation programs. The States use these funds to award some 5,000 victim assistance grants annually to domestic violence shelters, rape 

crisis centers, child abuse programs, and victim service units and 

law enforcement agencies, prosecutors’ offices, hospitals and social 

service agencies. In fiscal year 2007, States reported providing direct services to over 4 million crime victims using OJP funds. 

To understand why an increasing number of girls are entering 

the juvenile justice system and to better understand how to prevent and intervene in girls’ delinquency, OJP’s Office of Juvenile 

Justice and Delinquency Prevention convened a girls’ study group. 

The group made significant progress in understanding patterns of 

offending among adolescents and how these patterns differ between 

girls and boys, risk and protective factors associated with delinquency, including gender differences, and the importance of these 

issues when developing effective prevention and intervention programs. 

In May 2008, OJJDP released ‘‘Violence by Teenage Girls: 

Trends and Context,’’ the first in a series of bulletins based on the 

findings of the study group. OJP provides support and funding for 

law enforcement and criminal justice initiatives nationwide. In fiscal year 2008, our Bureau of Justice Assistance administered $466 

million through approximately 1,700 grant programs. 

One of BJA’s most significant accomplishments is the Targeting 

Violent Crime Initiative. Through TVCI, BJA administers 106 

grants to 103 State, local and tribal law enforcement agencies. 

Since February of this year, TVCI agencies have reported more 

than 5,000 violent felony arrests, more than 2,700 guns seized, 

nearly 400 gangs disrupted, and 50 gangs dismantled. The TVCI 

is designed to create immediate support for jurisdictions suffering 

increases in violent crime, while encouraging adaptation of intelligence-led policing. 

In addition to BJA’s activity, the Bureau of Justice Statistics 

plays a critical role in supporting criminal justice programs 

through the improvement and sharing of criminal justice information. In 2008, BJS awarded over $8 million to 35 jurisdictions to 

support the National Criminal History Improvement Program, or 

NCHIP. NCHIP provides grants to States to improve the accuracy, 

completeness and availability of the Nation’s criminal history 

records, which are used for criminal justice and non-criminal justice background checks. 

In 2008, BJS also made 13 awards to States totalling almost $3 

million for the Stalking and Domestic Violence Record Improvement Program. This program provides grants to States to improve 

processes for entering criminal justice data regarding stalking and 

domestic violence into local, State and national crime information 

databases. 

The National Institute of Justice has also found ways to make 

a relatively small investment benefit law enforcement agencies nationwide. One example is the National Missing and Unidentified 

Persons initiative, or NamUS, launched in 2007. When fully operVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:47 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\091808\44494.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44494
8 

ational in 2009, NamUS will provide a powerful tool for law enforcement, medical examiners and coroners, victim advocates and 

the general public to search for matches between missing persons 

and unidentified human remains records. 

NamUS will be the first national on-line repository for missing 

persons and unidentified dead cases. It will also provide central access to information from other websites, State clearinghouses, and 

other important resources. 

Exonerating the innocent is a key component of the President’s 

DNA initiative, and in August 2008, NIJ awarded five grants 

under the post-conviction DNA testing assistance program. NIJ has 

also undertaken several new initiatives to increase understanding 

of and to assist States in obtaining the resources they need to address those conviction issues. 

Our Community Capacity Development Office, or CCDO, is another OJP component that helps States and local communities 

make the most out of limited resources. CCDO’s strategic threepronged approach is comprised of direct grant assistance, training 

and technical assistance, and program development through promotion of partnerships and best practices. This approach provides 

a broad return on investment of Federal dollars that is unlike any 

other Federal criminal justice program. 

CCDO’s flagship program, the Weed and Seed Initiative, is a 

community-based, comprehensive, multi-agency approach to public 

safety. There are currently 320 neighborhoods across the country 

where Weed and Seed is being implemented. The Weed and Seed 

strategy brings together Federal, State and local crime-fighting 

agencies, social service providers, representatives of public and private sectors, prosecutors, business owners, and neighborhood residents under the shared goal of weeding out violent crime and/or 

gang activity while seeding in social services and economic revitalization. 

In fiscal year 2008, $28 million for new Weed and Seed sites will 

be awarded. 

Finally, OJP’s newest office, the Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking office, also known 

as the SMART office, recently established the Support for Adam 

Walsh Act implementation grant program to assist communities in 

developing and/or enhancing programs designed to implement the 

requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 

SORNA, which is Title I of the Adam Walsh Act. 

In fiscal year 2007, the SMART office awarded more than $11 

million to support various projects across the United States. In fiscal year 2008, the SMART office will provide more than $4 million 

in direct grant assistance to further these efforts, along with continued support through training and technical assistance. 

On July 1st of this year, we released the final guidelines for 

SORNA. These guidelines provide direction and assistance for jurisdictions in their efforts to meet the minimum standards of the 

SORNA. The guidelines detail who must register as sex offenders, 

how long they must register, the type of information they must disclose, how frequently and under what circumstances they must update that information, and how these requirements should be enforced. 

9 

OJP is committed to ensuring that our Federal funds for all of 

these worthy programs are spent wisely and have a maximum impact on our community, which brings me to the vital importance 

of our grant selection process and grant monitoring. 

OJP has concentrated on becoming more results-oriented, more 

efficient, and more effective, so that we can provide Federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime to promote our Nation’s 

security. To that end, OJP is committed to an ongoing analysis of 

what works and what doesn’t, so criminal justice policy makers at 

all levels of government can better decide how to invest limited 

public dollars. 

As you know, OJP administers both formula and discretionary 

grants. While we make every effort to process grant applications 

promptly, all applications must satisfy rigorous grant financial 

management standards to ensure that OJP fulfills its fiduciary responsibility to the American taxpayer. Every application passes 

through a multi-stage process to ensure that all applicable requirements are satisfied. 

In fiscal year 2008, OJP increased its emphasis on measuring the 

results of the programs funded through OJP and focused our resources on the most effective programs. In an effort to improve 

transparency during the grant application and selection processes, 

we combined the peer review support contract of each individual 

OJP office into a single OJP-wide contract to streamline and standardize the peer review process. 

In addition, any grant award decisions this year that varied from 

peer reviewed are fully documented, including the reasons why 

such decisions were made. Further, we instituted a grant monitoring tool, known as GMT, which grant managers use to monitor 

grants and cooperative agreements consistently across our program 

offices. The GMT requires grant managers to review all grants 

against a set of 22 standard review categories to determine administrative and financial compliance with grant management policies, 

procedures and regulatory requirements, as well as to evaluate the 

programmatic progress and success of efforts funded through the 

grant. 

The GMT is helping us increase the oversight of our grant program by ensuring that the funds awarded to grantees are being 

properly managed and that grant objectives are being met. 

To further enhance the grants management process, we have developed better grant management skills and capabilities for our 

staff. For example, we revised the OJP grant manager’s manual to 

document policies and procedures for administration and management of all OJP grant programs. To ensure these policies are implemented, OJP held training for over 400 grant managers, staff 

accountants, and other OJP employees. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedgwick follows:] 

10 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEFFREY L. SEDGWICK


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Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Sedgwick, we have had votes that are called, so 

we are going to have to ask you to suspend at this point so we can 

go vote. We will be back as soon as we can. There are two votes, 

so it will be about 10 or 15 minutes. 

The Subcommittee stands in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. SCOTT. The Subcommittee will come back to order. 

Mr. Sedgwick, do you have a concluding comment? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Let me begin by thanking you for your forbearance, as I violated your time guidelines. I have got about a page 

left, but I would happily have that read into the record and use the 

Committee’s time—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Mr. SEDGWICK [continuing]. To address the questions that you 

have. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Thank you very much. I now recognize myself 

for 5 minutes of questions. 

What have you published in terms of best practices and most 

cost-effective approaches to juvenile crime? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. The issue of juvenile crime is obviously one of 

growing importance. I just noticed during your break that today 

there is a news report on the declining age at which juveniles become involved in violent crime. It is an issue that has taken considerable attention for us in OJP. 

One of the things that we have discovered and studied quite a 

bit since 2006, when I was fortunate enough to be part of the 18- 

city tour that went around the United States examining why crime 

is increasing in some communities and decreasing in others—one 

of the principal things that we learned was that for those communities that are experiencing increases in crime, it seems to be concentrated among youth. 

So this is a very serious issue that we have identified and are 

focusing on with a great deal of interest. There is clearly something 

going on out there in our communities that has led a number of 

people, at decreasingly young ages, to cross the line from committing property crimes into violent crimes. And that is an issue that 

we are currently working on with a great deal of attention and emphasis. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you have research to show what works and what 

doesn’t work to reduce violent crime amongst juveniles? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Amongst juveniles? As I mentioned in my opening comments, we have done extensive work recently in the Office 

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to identify the 

causes and correlates of increased violence, particularly among 

young girls, juvenile girls. 

Do we have a sufficient level of knowledge of what is causing the 

changing nature of crime in the United States at this point? I 

would have to say to you, ‘‘no, we don’t.’’ But that is a prime issue 

on our research agenda to continue to look at, because quite frankly this is a moving target. This is something that is changing under 

our feet as we speak. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do you have a list of initiatives that work and don’t 

work? 

38 

Mr. SEDGWICK. We have a number of best practices in terms of 

gang violence, which predominantly occurs among juveniles. Those 

have grown out of, for example, our funding programs and our 

work in both the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 

BJA, of course, we have our G.R.E.A.T. program. And through juvenile justice we have a variety of programs and studies of best 

practices to reduce juvenile—— 

A number of initiatives that are dealing with gang violence, a 

number of programs that are dealing with—prevention programs to 

try to defer or delay the entry of juveniles into violence. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do prevention programs reduce juvenile violence? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. There are prevention programs that do work, yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Do we reduce juvenile violence by trying more juveniles as adults? Or do we increase juvenile violence by trying more 

juveniles as adults? Not try some juveniles, try more juveniles. 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I think that is a very difficult question to answer 

as kind of a generalization. There very well may be types of crimes 

and juveniles at particular ages that are still classified as juveniles 

that are—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Most of the studies that I have seen have concluded 

that if you try more juveniles as adults, violent crime will go up. 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I would be happy to review the state of the research on that question and get back to you on that. 

Mr. SCOTT. You mentioned sex offense registry. Does your sex offense registry differentiate between who has to register and for 

how long based on the seriousness of the crime? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Right now as I understand it, the SORNA guidelines are an attempt to bring a very wide variety of disparate sex 

registry standards among the States up to a common Federal level. 

And make sure that those sex offender registries are available 

across State jurisdictions, so that an offender cannot escape accountability or scrutiny by moving from one jurisdiction where the 

offense was committed to another jurisdiction. 

The actual particulars of what goes into getting one onto a sex 

offender registry is a matter, as I understand it, of State law. And 

so I can’t give you a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction characterization of 

how each jurisdiction operates its registry or operates the criterion 

by which a person gets onto a sex offender registry. 

Mr. SCOTT. And just very quickly, because my time is expiring, 

the Deaths in Custody Act, have you subjected the information we 

have gained from the Deaths in Custody Act to research to find out 

what we can do to reduce deaths in custody? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. The primary work that we have done at OJP on 

deaths in custody has been the data collection effort, which has, as 

you noted in your opening comments, identified where the characteristics of—what are the characteristics on deaths in custody and 

where they tend to happen most frequently. But also, on what the 

nature of those deaths is. 

You quite correctly identified that what we know now is a declining incidence of violent deaths in custody, particularly in prison 

and jail. We are continuing to push forward on our attempt to get 

better data from law enforcement on deaths that occur in the process of taking persons into custody, which of course presents some 

39 

unique challenges, as you and I have had the opportunity to discuss previously. 

And I think one of the gratifying things about the collection of 

data that we have done through OJP, and particularly through the 

Bureau of Justice Statistics, is we have seen declining death rates, 

except through illness. 

Mr. SCOTT. You haven’t had research to help target why the reduction occurred or what we can do to continue the reduction? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Well, beginning to know where to do that research depends on knowing what the nature of the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. And we haven’t done this research yet, is that true? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Gohmert? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

Appreciate, Mr. Sedgwick, your being here. Appreciate your testimony. There is no need for you to apologize for going over the allotted time. We have the 5-minute rule and actually, when the bell 

went off for us to go vote, my thought was, okay, we have got time 

for him to do his 5-minute statement, and Chairman Scott and I 

both get our questions in, and you will be done before we get to 

voting. But when you went over twice as long for your allotted 

time, it kind of ensured you had to come back—— [Laughter.] 

And it also ensured that there would be more chances for other 

Members to get here and have time to ask you questions. So I am 

not the one that is being punished for you going overtime. 

But I would like to ask you—you know, you spent time talking 

about the formula—we know the formula and discretionary awards. 

Can you tell me specifically the manner in which the formula is 

calculated for the formula grants? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Well, it would depend on the program. Some formula grants distribute funds according to the incidence and prevalence of particular types of crimes in a jurisdiction. And—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. How is the formula arrived at? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Well, the formula is very often specified in legislation. And then what happens is, the Bureau of Justice Statistics 

cooperates with the grant-making agency. Let’s use as an example 

a program where funds are distributed on the basis of the crime 

rate in a particular jurisdiction. 

In cases like that, typically what happens is, let’s say the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance will go to the Bureau of Justice Statistics and 

say, you are statisticians, you guys know what the crime rate is in 

particular jurisdictions or you can get access to that data through 

the FBI’s UCR program. So please go and calculate for us what the 

crime rate is by jurisdictions that are eligible to apply for 

funds—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Okay, but that goes into how you get the factors 

to plug into the formula. I am still going back to the formula itself. 

It seems that there is discretion even when the formula is specified 

in legislation, that there is still discretion in how you go about arriving at the information on exactly how to interpret the formula 

itself to gather that information. 

40 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Yes, though depending on how narrowly the statute is drawn, the discretion that we have to kind of come up with 

a formula is more or less restricted. By and large—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Who actually makes that decision? Does the secretary him or herself actually make that decision, or is it submitted 

from a certain level within the department? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Typically when it is a question of the formula, 

that precise definition of the formula, we don’t get directions for 

the formula from outside of OJP. What we typically do is we will 

read the legislation very carefully, the Office of General Counsel 

will look through the legislation. And then the precise definition of 

the formula is typically done by the agency that has responsibility 

for administering the formula program. 

So there are formula grants that are distributed, for example, by 

the Office of Victims of Crime. They are responsible for coming up 

with the formula. There are formula programs that are administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance. The director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance would actually—in consultation with the 

Office of General Counsel—come up with the specific characteristics of the formula that is applied, and so on. 

So this is not a matter of someone outside the administering 

agency saying, this is the formula you will use. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, in deciding an award of competitive grants, 

discretionary grants, does OJP look at how well States use their 

formula funding before awarding those discretionary grants? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I am thinking about—being very close to the end 

of the process of making grants for fiscal year 2008, I can’t think 

of a situation where, in judging the appropriateness of a discretionary grant, we would look or we have looked at a State’s experience with formula grants, for this reason: Very often, discretionary 

grants are going to a different recipient than the formula grants 

would go to. 

So certainly we are concerned, when we make a discretionary 

grant, the history of the recipient of that grant in terms of using 

Federal funds appropriately. As far as formula grants go, which 

are—what I am getting at is the question of how carefully we monitor the use of formula awards or whether we simply kind of say, 

‘‘Well, the formula says we give these guys this much money,’’ we 

give it to them and move on to other tasks. I want to reassure you 

that we take the proper use of even formula awards quite seriously 

and attach to formula grants special conditions that assure that 

they are used appropriately. 

Because there has been concern about the use of formula awards 

in the past in ways that violate civil rights, we routinely to each 

of our formula awards, as to all of our awards, include a letter from 

our Office of Civil Rights about the expectations and the requirements of the proper use of Federal funds. 

And on top of that, we also use grant monitors from our offices 

that administer formula awards to visit the jurisdictions that receive formula awards and make sure that those funds are used appropriately. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, that is touching on my concern. My time has 

expired, though. Let me just finish by saying that is part of my 

concern. But part of my concern also, having been involved in a 

41 

number of aspects of the judicial system and justice system, is that 

sometimes the reason entities need funding is because they use it 

so very badly. 

And that there are indicators, perhaps, in formula funding use 

that may be indications, yeah, it looks like they sure need discretionary grants, because they blow their money and they waste it, 

whether intentionally or negligently, use it inappropriately. And 

that is a concern I continue to have and hope will be better monitored. 

Thank you. Yield back. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

The gentleman from New York. Mr. Weiner? 

Mr. WEINER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

What is the backlog of untested DNA kits in the Nation right 

now? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I don’t have that specific information at my fingertips, but I would be happy to get back to you with our current 

count of—— 

Mr. WEINER. NIJ released some data on it in 2003. We haven’t 

heard much since. Do you have any sense of whether another report is going to be forthcoming? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I believe there is another report forthcoming, and 

I will try to get you the information on when you can expect that. 

Mr. WEINER. Does any of your staff have it handy, by any 

chance? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I don’t believe anybody would have it with them 

today. 

Mr. WEINER. We recently, in the House, we authorized that they 

be sent back and some language was included by Chairman Scott 

requiring that we get that information more frequently. Part of the 

problem with the backlog challenge is that localities and sheriffs’ 

departments, police departments, are reluctant to reveal it because, 

frankly, it is not a great thing to be telling your citizens—we have 

a lot of evidence that we haven’t had the opportunity, haven’t had 

the funds, haven’t had the technology to analyze. 

So I think if your office and NIJ don’t do it, frankly, it would be 

very hard for anyone else to do it and make it very hard for us to 

tackle the problem, notwithstanding the amount of money that has 

gone into it. 

Do you have any proof that points to the premise that the Federal effort to reduce the backlog, to get grants out into the States, 

has been a success? I mean, do you have some data showing where 

that money has gone, showing how many kits have been able to get 

done? If you were to say—I mean, I think it is one of the successes 

of Federal involvement in helping solve local crimes. 

What would be some of the things you have, notwithstanding 

your not having the number of outstanding rape kits? Are there 

other things you can point to to say that hey, this is an example 

of how we have gotten the Federal role in reducing the DNA backlog and how it has worked in number of crimes solved, number of 

kits you get in, anything like that? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I can tell you that in terms of the Coverdell program grants, which are primarily focused on precisely the issue 

that you have outlined, is funding State forensic capabilities so 

42 

that we reduce the backlog, while also at the same time maintaining the kind of quality and integrity of forensic evidence that is 

used not only to convict or hold accountable the guilty, exonerate 

the innocent, but also increasingly using DNA evidence to address 

the very natural anguish that families have over missing family 

members. 

Since fiscal year 2002, we have put out in the field $80 million 

in funds through the Coverdell program, precisely to build capacity 

and reduce backlog at the State and local level in forensic science. 

I would like to get back to you with what the backlog was at the 

beginning of the Coverdell program and what progress we have 

been able to make in terms of reducing that backlog with the $80 

million. 

Mr. WEINER. And also, I would be interested, and maybe you 

know this: Is it getting cheaper? Is it getting less expensive, is 

technology making it possible to do more DNA tests per dollar? 

Is it making it—are there advances that are going on as the Federal money primes the pump as there is more demand? Is it getting 

less expensive—do you have some data on that, as well? 

Mr. SEDGWICK. I will look into that for you and get back to you. 

Mr. WEINER. That would be great. I think in one of the areas of 

crime and law enforcement where people really do look at programs 

through the lens of their own experience and certainly come to different conclusions, when it comes to DNA testing, the libertarians 

see it as you have explained it, as a place to make sure that those 

who are innocent of crimes are freed. 

Those of us who believe very strongly in tough penalties for 

crime, DNA is the way to get it done. For families, they look at 

DNA testing as a way to try to solve cases and find justice for ones 

that they haven’t had. 

And we have had good consensus around here for the idea that 

we need to increase the Federal role. The missing parts, though, 

you have in your possession to some degree—you know, being able 

to quantify. 

And also being able to get to the next place, which are reticent 

police departments and police agencies who we need to use carrots 

and stick to say, you know what? You might not want to share 

your data, but you have to now. Or here are some examples of best 

practices that are used in one area that are not used in others, we 

are going to require them. 

In order to take that next step beyond just the funding, we need 

some data to work with. And frankly, it has been very hard to come 

by, and your office is marginally the only place that we are really 

going to be able to get that kind of data. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Sedgwick. We may have additional written 

questions for you that we didn’t get to, and we will forward them 

to you so that you can respond in writing. 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. SEDGWICK. Members of the Committee. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. If our next panel will come forward. 

43 

The next panel is a group of expert witnesses who work with the 

beneficiaries of OJP’s programs, and they are here to give us their 

perspective and recommendations for improving OJP performance. 

Our first witness will be Mr. Bill Piper, director of national affairs for Drug Policy Alliance Network, an organization committed 

to reducing problems associated with both drugs and punitive drug 

policies. He is the author of a recent report, ‘‘A Four Pillars Approach to Methamphetamines: Policies for Effective Drug Prevention Treatment, Policing, and Harm Reduction.’’ 

His organization is experienced in the Byrne JAG program, and the Drug Policy Alliance Mexico office received a $500,000 Byrne 

discretionary grant in 2007 to conduct a statewide youth methamphetamine prevention program. He has a bachelor’s degree in 

economics and political science from Indiana University. 

The next witness will be Pete Marone, chair of the Consortium 

of Forensic Science Organizations. He is a member of the forensic 

educational program accreditation commission for the American 

Academy of Forensic Sciences and the National Academy of 

Sciences committee on identifying the needs of the forensic science 

community. He is also the director of the Virginia Department of 

Forensic Science. He has a bachelor’s degree and master’s degree 

in chemistry, each from the University of Pittsburgh. 

The next witness will be Mr. Ronald Brooks, the national president of the Narcotics Officers Association Coalition, representing 

44 State narcotics officers’ associations with a combined membership of over 60,000 law enforcement officers around the Nation. He 

is a 32-year California law enforcement veteran, with 24 of those 

being in drug, gang, and violent crime enforcement. He has been 

the primary investigator, supervisor or manager for thousands of 

enforcement operations and has written policies and procedures for 

managing undercover operations and for managing informants. 

Next will be Mary Lou Leary, former executive director, National 

Center for Victims of Crime. During her career Ms. Leary has held 

numerous positions with the Department of Justice, including acting assistant attorney general for the Office of Justice programs 

from February 2000 to September 2001. She now oversees the National Center for Victims of Crime, which works directly with victims and with over 15,000 grassroots organizations to help victims 

receive the information, support and resources they need to rebuild 

their lives. She has a bachelor’s degree from Syracuse University, 

a master’s degree from Ohio State, and a juris doctorate from 

Northwestern. 

The next witness will be Mr. Shay Bilchik, who is the research 

professor at Georgetown Public Policy Institute, the former administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the founder and director of the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform at Georgetown University. He participates in public forums and teaches courses on juvenile justice policy and practice to 

students at Georgetown Public Policy Institute. He has a bachelor 

of science degree from the University of Florida and a juris doctorate from the University of Florida Holland Law Center. 

And our final witness will be Mr. Charlie Sullivan, from Citizens 

United for the Rehabilitation of Errants, or CURE. CURE is a 

grassroots organization dedicated to reducing crime through reform 

44 

of the criminal justice system. CURE was instrumental in passing 

a deaths in custody reporting act in the state of Texas in 1983 and 

has worked with Members of Congress toward a national reporting 

deaths in custody bill which became the Deaths in Custody Reporting Act of 2000. He has a bachelor’s degree from St. Mary’s College 

and a master’s degree from Notre Dame Seminary, New Orleans, 

Louisiana. 

As I stated to the previous witness, all the witness statements 

will be made part of the record in their entirety. I would ask each 

of the witnesses to summarize their testimony in 5 minutes or less, 

and you have the timing device at the table. 

I understand, Mr. Bilchik, you have a time problem. So—— 

Mr. BILCHIK [continuing]. Flight at 2:20. 

Mr. SCOTT. So we will take you first, out of order, so that you 

can testify and make your plane, hopefully. 

TESTIMONY OF SHAY BILCHIK, RESEARCH PROFESSOR, 

GEORGETOWN PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. BILCHIK. Thank you. 

Good afternoon, Chairman Scott and Ranking Member Gohmert. 

I appreciate the opportunity to be before you today to testify at 

the oversight hearing for the Office of Justice Programs and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, in particular. 

As the founder and director of the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform at Georgetown University and former Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, I have a tremendous amount of interest in OJJDP’s leadership role on Federal 

juvenile justice matters. In the testimony I submitted for today’s 

hearing, I highlight six main areas of improvement for OJJDP: 

One, realigning focus on the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention Act, which I will call ‘‘the Act’’ from this point forward, 

and its core protections; focusing on assistance to States; restoring 

the comprehensive nature of the agency; engaging the juvenile justice field; increasing transparency; and six, developing the juvenile 

justice workforce. 

In my oral testimony I will focus on the core protections, field engagement, and transparency. 

OJJDP was created by the Act. Its purpose is to assist State and 

local governments in preventing and encouraging accountability for 

juvenile delinquency, as well as providing technical assistance, research, training, evaluation, and the dissemination of information 

on effective programs for combating juvenile delinquency. 

The juvenile justice field and communities around the country 

count on OJJDP to serve as a leader in supporting their efforts to 

prevent and address delinquency. Unfortunately, in recent years 

there has generally been a decreased level of activity and information from OJJDP, including the amount of research created by the 

agency and the number of conferences and convenings and 

trainings focused on juvenile justice issues. 

This lack of activity has been particularly concentrated around 

issues surrounding the Act and its implementation. In this regard, 

the office has shifted away from its core mission as established by 

the Act to such a significant degree that it has effectively disengaged from the field it is charged with serving. 

45 

OJJDP first needs to refocus its efforts on youth at risk of becoming involved or who are already involved in the juvenile justice system and the Act’s core protections. The agency also must better 

support States in their efforts to come into compliance with the 

Act’s core requirements, including regularly updating regulations 

through a rulemaking process designed to obtain feedback from the 

States and other interested parties on specific implementation 

issues. 

Second, provide States with an updated compliance guide with 

practical, specific information on what the Act’s provisions means 

for the States. 

Third, train individuals in State agencies to implement the Act. 

And fourth, provide specific assistance and policy models to overcome State barriers to implementing certain portions of the Act. 

With regard to these duties, the office’s efforts have been less 

than fully effective. First, although the office recently updated its 

compliance guide, it is incomplete and it does not include provisions on the most recent legislative iteration of the disproportionate 

minority contact core protection that was updated back in 2002. 

Second, there seems to be a diminished capacity within OJJDP 

to work with States to train individuals and help guide State compliance efforts. 

Finally, the office has issued major policy changes in executive 

memos that do not abide by the Federal rulemaking standards. As 

the sole Federal agency providing leadership in the juvenile justice 

arena, it is also critical that the office have the capacity to perform 

a comprehensive set of functions, including gathering data; conducting and disseminating research; identifying and disseminating 

best practices; leading demonstration projects; providing training 

and technical assistance; and promoting the expansion of effective 

practices. 

However, in recent years the office has declined in both capacity 

and in stature. The agency has experienced a dismantling of its 

functions over the past 8 years, along with significant decline in 

staff and funding levels. For example, much of the research previously conducted by the office is now conducted by the National 

Institute of Justice. 

The juvenile justice field expressed great concern to OJJDP and 

OJP about this change, with good reason. The change has resulted 

in a less robust and targeted effort to develop new knowledge and 

disseminate new research findings to the juvenile justice field. I encourage both Congress and the department to work to restore the 

comprehensive nature of the agency, including a significant increase in resources to bolster expertise and capacity within the office. 

An additional area of concern is the office’s apparent unwillingness to actively engage the field and juvenile justice stakeholders 

across the Nation, including youth, parents, families, advocates, researchers, policy makers, practitioners, and State and local governments, including State legislatures and governors’ offices. Open 

and honest engagement with each of these groups is critically important, not only to promote forward movement in the juvenile justice community, but also to help develop expertise and align and 

formulate priorities at the Federal level. 

46 

This type of engagement has not taken place under the current 

administration. While OJJDP has reached out to certain groups 

within the juvenile justice field, its outreach has been too narrow 

and has excluded much of the field from the work of the office. 

For example, the office frequently formulates positions and priorities at the Federal level without consulting with this more broadly 

defined field. As a result, individuals or groups with significant expertise in the field who have opposing views or differing priorities 

do not have input into these decisions. And the opportunity for the 

office to make fully informed decisions for the broader field of juvenile justice is lost. 

In addition, over the past several years, the office has had limited interaction with the juvenile justice field through the grantmaking process. Under the prior administration, grants from 

OJJDP frequently went to knowledgeable and well-respected content experts in the juvenile justice field. Some of those people still 

get those grants. However, in recent years, many of these very 

knowledgeable experts and organizations have seemingly been cut 

out of the grant-making process. 

OJJDP is in a unique and critically important position of being 

able to work collaboratively with juvenile justice stakeholders in 

identifying issues facing juvenile justice systems and formulating 

nationwide efforts to address them. However, in order to be able 

to carry out these tasks, the office must be in contact with the very 

diverse group of stakeholders representing the juvenile justice field, 

and it is not. 

Complicating the situation is that the current OJJDP leadership 

has shown a lack of transparency in how it carries out its responsibilities. Over the past 8 years, information from OJJDP has been 

difficult to obtain on a variety of issues—from which States are utilizing certain exceptions under the Act, to the office’s current priorities. 

This lack of transparency was evident in the most recent OJJDP 

grant-making process, where several highly ranked and long-time 

productive office grant applicants were passed over for lower 

ranked applicants without a proven track record. It was and remains unclear why the office selected lower-ranked applicants, and 

on June 19th of this past year, the House Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform held an oversight hearing on this issue. 

While the administrator has a certain amount of discretion in 

managing the office, I believe it is the administrator’s duty to be 

candid and clear about the priorities of the office and the criteria 

being used to distribute taxpayers’ dollars through its grant programs. This lack of information, including failing to file an annual 

report since 2005, and lack of clarity and transparency has made 

it difficult for OJJDP to effectively engage States, subject matter 

experts, and other stakeholders. 

Members of the Committee, I would be glad to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bilchik follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SHAY BILCHIK

Good morning Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and members of the 

House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 

Security. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify at this oversight hearing 

47 

1The term ‘‘youth’’ is used in this testimony to describe an individual under the chronological 

age of 18 years. 2 Recent data show a dramatic reduction in the rate and seriousness of juvenile delinquency 

over the past ten to twelve years with juvenile arrests dropping a staggering 24%. 3 According to the FBI, youth under age 18 accounted for only 15.4% of all arrests. 

on the Office of Justice Programs and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 

Prevention (OJJDP). 

My name is Shay Bilchik and I am the Founder and Director of the Center for 

Juvenile Justice Reform at the Georgetown University Public Policy Institute. Prior 

to my current position, I served as President and CEO of the Child Welfare League 

of America, the oldest and largest association of agencies that directly help abused, 

neglected, and otherwise vulnerable children and their families. Prior to my tenure 

at CWLA, I served as the Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (‘‘OJJDP’’) at the U.S. Department of Justice. 

BACKGROUND

OJJDP is the agency established by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (JJDPA) to lead the effort to address the public safety issues of 

juvenile justice and child and youth victimization. In place since 1974, OJJDP is one 

of several offices under the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) within the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Let me begin by noting that the focus of my testimony today 

will be on those youth 1 whose behavior has brought them to the attention of the 

justice system and not on children and youth who are victims of abuse, neglect, or 

exploitation. While OJJDP has a significant role in preventing and ameliorating 

child and youth victimization, and has maintained an effective focus on this area, 

that focus has not been adequately maintained on issues related to juvenile delinquency, including efforts to prevent the involvement of youth in the juvenile justice 

system. Unfortunately, this drift in OJJDP’s focus comes at a critically important 

juncture for the juvenile justice field and an opportunity to drive juvenile crime to 

lower levels is being lost. 

First, the good news: today, youth crime and delinquency in the United States remain near the lowest levels seen in the past three decades.2 In addition, youth commit only a small portion of the nation’s crime.3 These numbers are contrary to the 

dire predictions of many ‘‘experts,’’ whose ominous warnings of a coming generation 

of ‘‘super-predators’’ shocked many state legislators into abandoning the core principles that have guided juvenile justice systems across the country for the last century. Those principles, separating delinquent juveniles from hardened criminals, 

treating youth as developmentally different from adults, and viewing young people 

as being inherently malleable and subject to positive change in a rehabilitative setting, are still fundamentally sound. 

In addition, in the past decade we have learned a tremendous amount about what 

works to prevent and reduce juvenile delinquency. From the growing body of research on the development of the adolescent brain, to knowledge of effective, evidence-based programs and practices, we now know significantly more about what 

works in turning these young lives around and correcting their behavior than we 

did a decade ago. Additionally, we have increasingly recognized the importance of 

evaluating programs in order to enhance their effectiveness and foster replication, 

and ensure that programs that don’t work are no longer funded. 

While we celebrate these significant and positive developments, the juvenile justice field also faces urgent challenges, such as the over-reliance on detention and 

incarceration as a response to juvenile crime; the continued detention of status offenders despite federal prohibitions; pervasive racial disparities in the justice system; and the increased placement of children at risk of abuse, sexual assault and 

suicide in adult jails, despite the JJDPA’s intent to recognize the difference between 

youth and adults involved in the justice system. Every year, juvenile courts handle 

an estimated 1.6 million delinquency cases and the daily census of youth under age 

18 who are incarcerated is 97,000. Many of these confined youth have committed 

non-violent offenses and are highly amenable to the benefits of rehabilitative services and supports provided in non-institutional home and community-based settings. 

Additionally, some researchers estimate as many as 200,000 youth have their cases 

processed in adult criminal court each year. As a result of increased prosecution of 

youth in adult criminal courts in the states, the number of youth in adult jails has 

increased so that, on any given day, an estimated 7,500 youth under the age of 18 

are inmates in adult jails. This data represents both the lost opportunity to build 

on the gains described above and the adoption of policies that according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and OJJDP have actually contributed to increases in crime. 

48 

In my testimony today, I will highlight six main areas of improvement that 

OJJDP should pursue: 1) realigning the agency’s focus to the JJDPA and its core 

protections, 2) focusing on assistance to States, 3) restoring the comprehensive nature of the agency, 4) engaging the juvenile justice field, 5) increasing transparency, 

and 6) developing the juvenile justice workforce. 

REALIGNING THE AGENCY’S FOCUS TO THE JJDPA AND ITS CORE PROTECTIONS

OJJDP was originally created by the JJDPA, which was first passed in 1974 and 

most recently reauthorized in 2002. The purpose of the JJDPA, as outlined in the 

legislation, is to assist State and local governments in preventing and encouraging 

accountability for juvenile delinquency, as well as addressing juvenile delinquency 

by providing ‘‘technical assistance, research, training, evaluation, and the dissemination of information on effective programs for combating juvenile delinquency.’’ 

These purposes are carried out through several grant programs to States overseen 

by the Administrator. Under Title II of the JJDPA, each State receives formula 

grant money to support activity undertaken pursuant to the JJDPA and to comply 

with its four core protections—jail removal, sight and sound separation, disproportionate minority contact, and the deinstitutionalization of status offenders. If States 

are not in compliance with any one of the four core protections, a portion of the federal funding they receive can be withheld. In order to ensure the appropriate distribution of these federal funds, OJJDP monitors the States’ compliance with the 

core protections. 

The focus of the JJDPA was intended to highlight issues facing youth who are 

at risk for becoming involved in or already involved in the juvenile justice system. 

Recognizing the difference between youth and adults, the JJDPA also created 

OJJDP as a separate agency to deal with issues facing youth involved in the juvenile justice system. Although the focus of the JJDPA is on the four core protections 

mentioned above, it also establishes OJJDP as the lead federal agency on issues 

being confronted by the juvenile justice field. These include, for example, providing 

guidance on research-based programs to prevent delinquency, conditions of confinement in juvenile facilities, combating substance abuse, and identifying and redirecting youth with mental health disorders to appropriate agencies. 

The current OJJDP has shown some focus on these types of issues. For example, 

in the next several weeks, an OJJDP grantee is holding a think tank to evaluate 

establishing a national recidivism measure. Unfortunately, over the past eight 

years, there has generally been a decreased level of activity and information from 

OJJDP in this regard, including the amount of research created by the Agency and 

the number of conferences and convenings focused on juvenile justice issues. This 

lack of activity has been particularly concentrated around issues surrounding the 

JJDPA and its implementation. 

As I believe any Administrator must do, OJJDP has chosen to focus on certain 

issues facing the juvenile justice field more than others. This prioritization is only 

natural given the Administrator’s wide range of responsibilities. However, OJJDP 

has shifted away from its core mission as established by the JJDPA to such a significant degree that it has effectively disengaged from the field it is charged with 

serving. OJJDP needs to refocus the efforts of the office on youth at risk of becoming 

involved, or already involved in the juvenile justice system, and the core protections 

provided under the JJDPA. 

FOCUSING ON ASSISTANCE TO STATES

One of OJJDP’s major duties is to partner with the States in implementing the 

various provisions under the JJDPA. In addition to the broader support and engagement of the juvenile justice field I address below, OJJDP does this in two ways. 

First, OJJDP is to work with States to come into compliance with the JJDPA’s 

core requirements. This process is to include 1) regularly updating regulations 

through a rule-making process designed to obtain feedback from States and other 

interested parties on specific implementation issues, 2) providing States with an updated compliance guide with practical, specific information on what the Act’s provisions mean for States, 3) training individuals in State agencies to implement the 

Act, and 4) providing specific assistance and policy models to States to overcome 

State barriers to implementing certain portions of the Act. 

With regard to these duties, OJJDP’s efforts have been less than fully effective. 

First, although OJJDP recently updated its compliance guide, neither the compliance guide nor the agency’s regulations include provisions on the most recent legislative iteration of the Disproportionate Minority Contact core protection, which was 

last updated in 2002. Second, there seems to be a diminished capacity within 

OJJDP to work with the States to train individuals and help guide State compliance 

49 

efforts. Finally, OJJDP has issued major policy changes in executive memos that do 

not abide by federal rule-making standards. For example, OJJDP recently issued 

guidance on changes as to who could be considered an adult inmate, which restricted States from keeping youth convicted in adult court in juvenile facilities up 

to the State’s permitted extended age of juvenile jurisdiction. This guidance came 

to States in memo form and gave States three years to comply, yet there was no 

public notice or dialogue between the agency and the States. 

OJJDP’s second duty related to the JJDPA is to work with the States to ensure 

they remain in compliance with the JJDPA. In this light, OJJDP should be 

partnering and working closely with the States to ensure that compliance monitors 

are in place in each State with the capacity to effectively determine the State’s compliance with the conditions placed on receiving juvenile justice funding—and address problems as they arise. This need for compliance is especially important for 

the youth served by the JJDPA. For example, the jail removal core protection requires that youth in the juvenile justice system be kept out of adult jails and lockups except in very narrow circumstances. One of the reasons for this provision is 

that youth are 36 times more likely to commit suicide in an adult jail than in a 

juvenile detention facility, particularly when they first arrive at an adult facility. 

OJJDP should also be clear and timely in informing States when they are out of 

compliance with the Act. Unfortunately, in this realm, OJJDP again falls short in 

assisting States. Compliance monitors are currently required to visit sites or facilities that fall under the JJDPA at least once every three years, but are not required 

to monitor each facility or site every three years. This pattern can, and does, result 

in a nine-year gap between visits to a particular facility—the time for a youth to 

go from age 10 to 19. Additionally, it is not always clear—either to States or to the 

public—which States are or are not in compliance with the JJDPA and which States 

are meeting de minimus requirements or going above and beyond the requirements 

listed in the Act. Finally, OJJDP has in two ways been inconsistent in determining 

whether States are in compliance with the Act. First, the responsibility for determining State’s compliance has been changed frequently. Second, as these staff 

changes have taken place, the criteria used and how the compliance determination 

is made, has also changed. This has left some States in the difficult situation of 

making a good-faith effort to comply with the Act, but having to meet changing 

standards of what constitutes compliance. 

Some of the difficulties OJJDP has experienced in helping States comply with the 

Act stem from a lack of resources. In the last 7 seven years, federal juvenile justice 

funding has decreased by 60% and the OJJDP operating budget has been reduced 

90%—from $7 million in FY01 to only $700,000 in FY08. This decrease in juvenile 

justice appropriations is a major concern, but its impact has been exacerbated by 

OJJDP not directing a more significant portion of its remaining resources towards 

the compliance needs of the States. I would strongly urge OJJDP to more actively 

partner with the States around compliance issues and make providing support to 

the States as they work to implement the provisions of the JJDPA a more significant priority—and request the appropriations it needs to fulfill the purposes on the 

Act. 

RESTORING THE COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF THE AGENCY

As the sole federal agency providing leadership in the juvenile justice arena, it 

is critical that OJJDP have the capacity to provide a full range of services needed 

to carry out the roles discussed above. This requires that OJJDP be able to perform 

a comprehensive set of functions, including conducting research and gathering data, 

identifying and disseminating best practices and relevant information, leading demonstration projects, providing training and technical assistance, and promoting the 

expansion of effective practices in the field. Empowering OJJDP with the ability to 

perform these functions is essential within an organizational entity as diverse in 

focus as those found within DOJ as a whole. 

However, in recent years OJJDP has declined in both capacity and stature. The 

Agency has experienced a dismantling of its functions over the past eight years, 

along with a significant decline in both staff and funding levels. This change has 

been reflected in many of the areas in which OJJDP formerly had expertise being 

moved to other agencies within OJP. For example, much of the research previously 

conducted by OJJDP is now conducted by the National Institute of Justice. The juvenile justice field expressed great concern to OJJDP and OJP about this change. 

That concern has proven to be well founded, as it has resulted in a less robust and 

targeted effort to develop new knowledge and disseminate new research findings to 

the field. 

50 

Finally, the past several Presidential budgets have called for the consolidation 

and significant reduction of funding for juvenile justice programs supported by the 

federal government. If enacted, this approach would create a single, discretionary 

grant program providing less support to the states and local communities than currently provided. This is yet another example of how the current OJJDP has turned 

away from both the young people and the field it was created to serve. This consolidated grant program would also take money from specific grant programs designed 

to address a range of critical, but specific issues and allow these grants to be distributed for use in targeting a wide variety of issues. This goes directly against the authorization and creation of these specific grant programs, which were designed to 

address specifically identified juvenile justice issues of importance to the juvenile 

justice field. 

I encourage both Congress and the Department of Justice to work to restore the 

comprehensive nature of the agency, including investing significant resources to bolster expertise and knowledge in the agency itself. This investment would help to 

solve many of the issues identified above by reinvigorating the office and rebuilding 

the capacity that established OJJDP in previous years as a pre-eminent federal 

agency—one well equipped to serve juvenile justice stakeholders and the public. 

ENGAGING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE FIELD

An additional area of concern is OJJDP’s apparent unwillingness to actively engage the field and juvenile justice stakeholders across the nation. When I refer to 

the juvenile justice field, I am referring to a broad range of groups, including youth, 

parents, families, advocates, researchers, policymakers, practitioners, and State and 

local governments, including State legislatures and Governor’s offices. The open and 

honest engagement with each of the groups is critically important—not only to promote forward movement in the juvenile justice community, but also to help develop 

expertise and align and formulate priorities at the federal level. 

This type of engagement has not taken place under the current Administration. 

While OJJDP has reached out to certain groups within the juvenile justice field, this 

outreach has been too narrow in nature. In essence, the current Administration has 

redefined the juvenile justice field in such a limited way, that much of it has been 

excluded from the work of the office. For example, OJJDP frequently formulates positions and priorities at the federal level without consulting with this more broadly 

defined field. As a result, individuals or groups with significant expertise in the field 

who have opposing views or differing priorities do not have input into these decisions and the opportunity for OJJDP to make fully informed decisions is lost. 

In addition, over the past several years, OJJDP has limited interaction with the 

juvenile justice field through the grant-making process. Under the prior Administration, grants from OJJDP frequently went to knowledgeable and well respected content experts in the juvenile justice field. These organizations were entrusted to provide research and other forms of support to OJJDP, assisting it in moving the juvenile justice community forward. These relationships, if reestablished, would help to 

re-grow the expertise of this critically important office. However, in recent years, 

many of these very knowledgeable experts and organizations have seemingly been 

cut out of the grant making process. 

OJJDP is in the unique and critically important position of being able to work 

collaboratively with juvenile justice stakeholders in identifying issues facing juvenile 

justice systems and formulating nation-wide efforts to address them. However, in 

order to be able to carry out these tasks, OJJDP must be in contact with a very 

diverse group of stakeholders representing the juvenile justice field. That work 

should have been ongoing over the past eight years. It must certainly be renewed 

immediately. 

INCREASING TRANSPARENCY

As indicated above, a major concern under the current OJJDP leadership is the 

lack of transparency in how the office carries out its responsibilities. Over the past 

eight years, information from OJJDP has been difficult to obtain on a wide variety 

of issues—from which States are utilizing certain exceptions under the JJDPA to 

OJJDP’s current priorities. For example, last year, OJJDP began working on a juvenile justice initiative focusing on the health needs of youth in the juvenile justice 

system. In partnership with the U.S. Surgeon General’s office, OJJDP invited experts for an all-day program on March 9, 2007 to discuss this issue and explore 

ways to improve the system. Throughout this meeting the Surgeon General expressed concern about the issue and made a commitment to determine ways to better provide health care for youth in the system. However, OJJDP later issued a document stating that health care in juvenile justice facilities was not an issue of conVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:47 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\091808\44494.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44494
51 

cern. This document clearly contradicted both the results of the summit and the 

Surgeon General’s commitment to address this issue. 

This lack of transparency also was evident in the most recent OJJDP grant making process, where several highly ranked and long-time, productive OJJDP grant applicants were passed over for lower-ranked applicants without a proven track 

record. Throughout the process, it was unclear why OJJDP selected lower-ranked 

applicants and on June 19, 2008, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform held an oversight hearing to examine the entire process. 

While I understand that the Administrator has a certain amount of discretion in 

managing OJJDP, I believe it is the Administrator’s duty to be candid and clear 

about the priorities of the office and the criteria being used to distribute taxpayer’s 

dollars through its grant programs. This lack of information, clarity and transparency has made it difficult for OJJDP to effectively engage States, subject matter 

experts, and other stakeholders, thereby limiting the input they otherwise would 

provide. 

Finally, under the JJDPA, the OJJDP Administrator is required to submit an annual report to Congress. This report must contain annual data on youth involved 

in the juvenile justice system, as well as how the funds under the Act are being 

spent, whether the State’s plan is in compliance with the Act, and an evaluation 

of the programs funded under the JJDPA and their effectiveness in reducing the incidence of juvenile delinquency, particularly violent crime, committed by juveniles. 

However, since 2005, OJJDP has not issued this annual report. The failure of the 

office to provide this annual ‘‘status report’’ has inhibited the ability of Congress and 

other interested parties to understand and assess the activities and priorities pursued by OJJDP over the past year. 

I strongly encourage the OJJDP Administrator to take immediate and concrete 

steps to increase the agency’s transparency. These steps could include making documents such as JJDPA State plans and OJJDP’s grant making documents publicly 

available on the agency’s website. In addition, Congress should conduct oversight to 

ensure that OJJDP submits its required annual report. 

DEVELOPING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE WORKFORCE

The final area of focus I encourage OJJDP to pursue, is the juvenile justice workforce. It is this workforce that carries out the intent of the JJDPA and the work 

undertaken each day with our youth in the system. It is a group of dedicated, but 

too frequently poorly supported workers—intake, caseworker, court, probation and 

parole, detention and correctional facility, as well as legal and judicial staff. This 

workforce is spread across public and private agencies (private agencies contract 

with states and localities to carry out the state and local public agencies’ responsibilities). 

We have seen a poor track record in the recruitment and retention of this staff, 

similar to what we have seen in other child serving areas, such as child welfare. 

They too often are paid too little, inadequately trained, given too few of the tools 

they need to do their work, poorly supervised and given unreasonably high workloads. Efforts need to be made through the JJDPA to further support and professionalize this workforce. This can de done through adoption of programs that support workforce development in partnership with the states, as is done in child welfare through Title IV-E. This would allow for the development of State agency/university partnerships to be partially federally supported in providing entry level and 

in service training for juvenile justice staff. It would also allow for recruitment partnerships between state agencies and universities to help identify and support the 

development of a career track for students interested in working with youth and 

families involved in the juvenile justice system. This career track would include internship experience and tuition subsidies for any student who commits to work in 

a juvenile justice agency within the state for a minimum period of time. Time and 

again we hear from young people in the juvenile justice system who succeed in turning away from crime, that what made the difference was a connection to a person 

in the system—a caseworker, probation officer, lawyer, or judge, who had a profound 

impact on their life. While the juvenile justice system certainly needs to utilize research-based programs and practices, it also needs a strong workforce to implement 

those programs in order to be successful. This workforce, plagued by heavy workloads and high turnover rates, needs to be better supported to do its life changing 

work. When we think of the severe problems recently plaguing the juvenile correctional system, e.g. in Texas, California and Indiana, we can better understand how 

strengthening the workforce is a key strategy to safeguarding our youth. 

52 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

In summary, I provide the following recommendations related to the operations 

of OJJDP: 

• Enhance OJJDP’s focus on the implementation of the JJDPA and its core requirements; 

• Significantly increase OJJDP’s support to States to come into and stay in 

compliance with the JJDPA, including the provision of additional training 

and technical assistance; 

• Restore the expertise and capacity of OJJDP to carry out the broad range of 

tasks it is required to perform; 

• Actively engage the wide range of individuals, organizations, and entities 

with expertise in the juvenile justice field to support OJJDP in establishing 

its positions and priorities and in carrying out its responsibilities; 

• Significantly increase the transparency of OJJDP with the juvenile justice 

field and the public; 

• Take concrete steps to strengthen the juvenile justice workforce so it is better 

equipped to serve the youth in its care and provide for the public’s safety. 

The adoption of these recommendations would contribute significantly to strengthening OJJDP and improving our nation’s juvenile justice system. The improvements 

that would flow from them would not only provide much-needed help to youth and 

families struggling in the system every day, but benefit society as a whole by helping to reduce juvenile delinquency and putting our most challenged and challenging 

young people on a path to becoming law abiding and contributing members of our 

society. Ensuring that these recommendations are adopted, therefore, is essential— 

and doing so will require strong leadership at OJJDP and oversight from Congress. 

Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, and Members of the Committee, 

thank you again for the opportunity to provide input on the operation of this vitally 

important federal agency. I look forward to working with the Committee through 

the Center for Juvenile Justice Reform at Georgetown University as your work proceeds. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Do you have any questions you would like to ask Mr. Bilchik at 

this point? 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, I am curious. I agree with you, there needs 

to be a good deal more transparency. But I am curious. I mean, you 

come down pretty hard on the agency, and yet you note in your 

own statement that delinquency in the U.S. remains near the lowest levels in three decades. Do they get any credit at all, any modicum of—— 

Mr. BILCHIK. Sure they do. I think they have done a lot of good 

work. The problem I have, Mr. Gohmert, is that I am looking at 

taking juvenile crime down even lower. And so, when we hit 2000, 

2001, we had seen this tremendous decrease in juvenile crime. We 

had a chance, if the office kept its eye on the ball, of driving it even 

lower. And it has just taken its eye off the ball. 

It has moved its focus in different directions and hasn’t listened 

to the field and said, ‘‘Wait a second. We have gotten good results. 

Why wouldn’t we continue them?’’ 

Mr. GOHMERT. Your statement obviously—your written statement is a lot longer and you give us more information. But is there 

something you could point to specifically where they have had success, so maybe that is an area we can build as well? 

Mr. BILCHIK. Sure. I would like to comment on that. 

I think in the area of gangs, I think the office has stayed focused. 

I think they have tried to build on the prior research and the demonstration programs that took place. And I think the office should 

be commended for that kind of work. 

53 

I think they are trying to convene some work around measurements of recidivism, and that is also good work. But we need to 

take that and multiply it about 20-fold to get the kind of robust 

agenda this office should reflect in representing the juvenile justice 

field. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Anything else you would like to add? With regard 

to the transparency, you see the difficulty we have in a hearing like 

this, where we get 5 minutes to ask questions. And it is not exactly 

a difficult grilling when you are limited to 5 minutes. 

Mr. BILCHIK. I agree with you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. We appreciate any further written input you 

might have, suggestions, and—— 

Mr. BILCHIK. I found, Mr. Gohmert, that when I was appearing 

as a witness, the best way that you got information from me when 

I was in charge of the office was through your follow-up questions. 

Because it gave you a chance to explore these issues in greater 

depth and really cultivate that kind of dialogue with the office. 

Mr. GOHMERT. You are talking about questions in writing—— 

Mr. BILCHIK. Yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I agree. It is our most effective way of getting information. If we get responses. 

Mr. BILCHIK. I guarantee you I responded very promptly to those 

questions with the—fear of God. 

Mr. SCOTT. Professor Bilchik, is there a consensus in the juvenile 

justice community as to appropriate strategies to reduce gang violence? 

Mr. BILCHIK. I think there is a growing consensus around gang 

prevention and gang intervention. And it really is reflecting a balanced approach. I think there have been some very good efforts undertaken—in Boston a number of years ago, recently in Chicago— 

balancing a crime suppression approach with a prevention approach. 

So if we are going to lock up the gang leaders, we need to pull 

away the middle-range, lower-range gang members into positive activity. You don’t have to have that balance in attacking gangs—and 

this is what the research has shown—there was a great work in 

Boston done 8, 9 years ago through the 10-Point Coalition. 

Go into the street. Make sure you are working with law enforcement, U.S. attorneys, local prosecutors. Lock up the gang leaders. 

But give those other gang members something to turn to. 

And then the wannabes at the front end of the system, give them 

prevention programs that they can turn to. Gangs turn a positive 

youth development frame on its head. They give skills; they give 

opportunities to use skills; and they give recognition and safety. We 

as a society need to do that for our youngest members of the community who might turn to gangs. 

Mr. SCOTT. Within the community, I am sure the community recognizes that we already lock up more people in the United States 

than anywhere on earth, and some communities it is 10, 20 and 40 

times higher than the international average. Is there any other 

people in the juvenile justice community that think we are not 

locking up enough people? 

Mr. BILCHIK. I imagine there are an isolated few who believe we 

should be locking up more. The consensus opinion is that we are 

54 

locking up too many, that we are locking up mid-level offenders 

who do not need to be put into institutions and could be treated 

in community-based programs. And we should be saving those institutional beds for the very worst offenders. 

This goes back to your question, Mr. Scott, about transfers, and 

the thought that somehow if we transferred enough kids who were 

the bad kids into the criminal justice system, we would reduce 

crime. 

And the research is clear—from the Centers for Disease Control 

and, a recent report issued by OJDDP itself, another thing for 

them to be commended about—that if you transfer young people 

into the criminal justice system, you will accelerate recidivism, it 

will happen with more serious crime and more frequent. This is the 

trifecta of bad criminal justice policy. That is strong research with 

clear findings. 

Mr. SCOTT. And if we increase the number, we would be talking 

about the marginal ones that are not now treated as adults, which 

would be a virtual certainty that you would increase the violent 

crime rate. 

Mr. BILCHIK. I believe so. I sit here as an ex-prosecutor for 16 

years. I know what those most horrific offenders look like, and I 

know that we need to protect our communities from them. But 

there are far too many people in those beds. 

Mr. SCOTT. And in just about every community already, those 

kinds of offenders are already treated as adults. 

Mr. BILCHIK. Many of them are treated as adults, Mr. Scott, and 

yet then the juvenile justice system in many communities has been 

set up in a way with extended jurisdiction to also work with those 

young people. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. GOHMERT. You had mentioned the security, safety training 

that so many in gangs get from the gangs, and I have heard in so 

many criminal cases when you get down to sentencing, ‘‘This is my 

family. I have no father. They took me in. They made me feel like 

I had a family.’’ So aren’t there other socioeconomic factors that 

come into play that are not necessarily addressed by the Justice 

Department or any agency below that? 

I know 40-plus years ago, Congress felt sorry for poor single 

women trying to raise kids with deadbeat dads. So we started giving them checks. And so for 40 years we paid people to just have 

as many kids as you can out of wedlock, and it seems that there 

are conditions there that we have helped spurn that perhaps might 

need looking at as well. 

Mr. BILCHIK. I think you raise a really excellent point. One of the 

hallmarks of the office in the 1990’s and continuing to a certain degree more recently is the work around risk and protective factors, 

and the cause and correlates research that the prior witness talked 

about. You can’t attack this problem in a silo. You need to be working with—and the office has worked with the educational system, 

the child welfare system, the social services system—that all those 

systems have to use that approach and work together. 

The office, through its Title V program and through that cause 

and correlates research, traditionally has invested resources in how 

55 

to use that multi-system stakeholder group in attacking those 

issues way upstream. The office is to be credited for that. 

But as we mention the cause and correlates, when I talk to the 

cause and correlates researchers, they are telling me that their resources from the office are being diminished, that they are being 

phased out. And that is taking the eye off the ball and not getting 

the work done the right way. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you, Professor. 

Thank you, Chair. 

Mr. BILCHIK. Thank you. 

I apologize to people for hijacking the agenda here and going 

first. 

Mr. SCOTT. We resume with Mr. Piper. 

STATEMENT OF BILL PIPER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF NATIONAL 

AFFAIRS, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE NETWORK, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Mr. PIPER. Thank you. 

I would like to talk broadly about some of the structural and institutional problems with the Byrne JAG program. The Byrne program is set up in a way that unintentionally rewards failure. Byrne 

grants are distributed to States in part based on whether or not 

their crime rates are increasing. 

Now this makes sense intuitively, because it is based on need, 

but it also turns a merit on its head. States that fail to enact effective crime prevention policies are actually rewarded with more 

money the following year, while States that adopt effective policies 

that reduce crime are punished by losing Federal aid. 

Moreover, many of the program’s performance measures are inadequate, measuring largely bureaucratic statistics, such as how 

many specialized gang units are in operation, how many warrants 

are being served, how many people are being arrested, et cetera. 

And this ignores effectiveness and creates incentives for States just 

to play a numbers game. 

This is especially the case when it comes to drug law enforcement, where law enforcement officers can be placed under enormous pressure to arrest as many people as possible, as quickly as 

possible, even if it is just for minor drug offenses. Or incentive 

structures combined with pressure from elected officials creates an 

environment in which focusing on major traffickers is difficult, 

while focusing on lower-level or non-violent drug offenders is encouraged. 

Additionally, counter-productive performance measures can lead 

some officers to cut constitutional corners. We have seen scandal 

after scandal of good officers doing bad things, in part to meet formal or informal warrant and arrest quotas. Fabricating—raiding 

homes to false evidence, lying to judges, planting evidence—for instance, the rush to make a quick arrest and seizure led to the 

shooting death of 92-year-old Katherine Johnson in Atlanta last 

year. I know the Subcommittee had hearings on that scandal earlier this year. 

Now, this incentive structure is troubling where talking about 

city, State and Federal law enforcement. It is especially troubling 

when it comes to regional narcotics tasks forces. Their cross-jurisVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:47 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\091808\44494.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44494
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dictional operations and ability to perpetuate themselves through 

acts of forfeiture and Byrne funding make them less accountable to 

local taxpayers and governing bodies. 

The most notorious Byrne task force-related scandal, of course, 

is the Tulia, Texas scandal, where dozens of African American residents were arrested and wrongfully sentenced to decades is prison, 

even though the only evidence against them was the 

uncorroborated testimony of one white undercover officer with a 

history of lying. 

In Herne, Texas, the judge found that a regional narcotics task 

force that was Byrne-funded routinely targeted innocent African 

Americans as part of an effort to drive Blacks out of the majority 

White town. Both of these scandals are somewhat dated, but they 

remain powerful symbols of a Byrne grant system that is yet to be 

reformed, and also both subjects of major motion pictures that will 

be in theaters soon. 

In the wake of numerous Byrne-related scandals, Texas implemented a set of reforms that are models for Federal reform. The 

State eliminated all Byrne grant funding to a regional narcotics 

task force, passed legislation prohibiting anyone from being convicted of a drug offense based solely on the uncorroborated word of 

an undercover informant, and adopted new statewide performance 

measures. 

Instead of grading narcotics officers on how many warrants they 

serve and how many people they arrest, Governor Peary is grading 

them on how well they disrupt and dismantle dangerous crime organizations. Gathering intelligence and building connections takes 

a precedent over arresting low-level offenders. 

The Texas Department of Public Safety reports that drug arrests 

have fallen by more than 40 percent, but their drug seizures have 

more than doubled. Congress should work with the Office of Justice 

programs to develop similar performance measures for Byrne-funded operations. I would recommend that it also pass H.R. 253, the 

No More Tulias Act, which would encourage States to adopt some 

of the Texas reforms. 

At a minimum, Congress should require any local or State law 

enforcement entity receiving Byrne money to document its arrests 

and traffic stops by race and ethnicity. But also it would be extremely useful to researchers if Congress created a searchable public database detailing where exactly Byrne grant money is going 

and what it is being used for. This could be similar to the earmark 

database that Congress has created. 

Finally I would just add that Congress should set a new bottom 

line for U.S. drug policy more broadly. One way of doing that would 

be requiring Federal agencies to set short and long-term objectives 

to reduce the problems associated with both drugs and punitive 

drug policies. So to get at looking at both reducing drug use and 

drug overdoses and HIV AIDS from injection drug use, but also get 

at reducing racial disparity, the number of people who can’t vote 

because of felony conviction, etc. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Piper follows:] 

57 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL PIPER

INTRODUCTION

The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program was created in 

1988 in a slightly different form, and under a slightly different title, to provide federal crime prevention grants to states. It was named in memory of Edward Byrne, 

a New York City police officer gunned down by thugs. The program has provided 

billions of dollars to local and state law enforcement, as well as drug courts, juvenile 

justice programs, and other crime prevention initiatives. In recent years, however, 

the Byrne Grant Program has been criticized from groups across the political spectrum. 

Sentencing reform advocates have accused it of fueling the rapid growth in the 

number of nonviolent Americans behind bars, and note that as long as states do not 

have to pay the full cost of their criminal justice system they will never have to consider alternatives to incarceration. Civil rights leaders warn that the Byrne Grant 

Program is perpetuating racial disparities and civil rights abuses. A growing number of critics on both the left and right question why the federal government is paying for day-to-day local law enforcement activities that states could pay for themselves while other federal needs, such as health care and border security, go underfunded. 

Dozens of civil rights and criminal justice reform groups have urged Congress to 

reform the Byrne Grant Program, including the ACLU, the Brennan Center, the National Association of Blacks in Criminal Justice, the National Black Police Association, NAACP, and National Council of La Raza. At least four leading conservative 

organizations want to go further and completely eliminate the program, including 

the American Conservative Union, Americans for Tax Reform, Citizens against Government Waste, and the National Taxpayers Union. 

The Bush Administration has been extremely successful in cutting funding to the 

program, slashing it by hundreds of millions of dollars. There is a bipartisan consensus in Congress, however, that these cuts have been far too steep and come far 

too quickly, and momentum is building to completely restore funding to the program. Given the state of the federal budget, it may be impossible to significantly 

increase funding to the program any time soon. In any event, it is imperative that 

Congress pass legislation fixing the program’s many faults. Because of the size of 

the Byrne Grant program and the number of local and state law enforcement agencies that depend on it, Congress has an enormous opportunity to use the program 

to bring about change across this country. 

GENERAL PROBLEMS WITH FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT SUBSIDIES TO THE STATES

Some of the Byrne Grant Program’s problems stem from inherent problems with 

federal subsidies to local and state law enforcement. For instance, a recent report 

by the Justice Policy Institute (JPI), titled ‘‘The Vortex: The Concentrated Racial 

Impact of Drug Imprisonment and the Characteristics of Punitive Counties’’, found 

that the more money counties had to spend on law enforcement the more nonviolent 

drug offenders they imprisoned, and the more likely it was that those imprisoned 

were disproportionately people of color. 

Greater county jail admission rates for drug law offenses were associated with 

how much was spent on policing and the judicial system, higher poverty and unemployment rates, and the proportion of the county’s population that is African American. These relationships were found to be independent of whether the county actually had a higher rate of crime or drug use. For example, although Rockingham 

County, NH, has a larger percent of its population reporting illicit drug use, Jefferson Parish, LA, sent more people to prison for a drug offense at a rate 36 times 

that of Rockingham. 

Phillip Beatty, co-author of the JPI study, concluded: ‘‘Laws—like drug laws—that 

are violated by a large percentage of the population are particularly prone to selective enforcement. The reason African Americans are so disproportionately impacted 

may, in part, be related to social policy, the amount spent on law enforcement and 

judiciary systems, and local drug enforcement practices.’’ 

The United States ranks first in the world in per capita incarceration rates, with 

5% of the world’s population but 25% of the world’s prisoners. The U.S. locks up 

more of its citizens on a per capita basis than China, Cuba, Mexico, Russia or any 

other country in the world. The racial disparities are even more startling. Black 

Americans are incarcerated at a rate approximately six times greater than that of 

whites. The U.S. now incarcerates more black men on a per capita basis than South 

Africa at the height of Apartheid. Congress should have hearings examining what 

role, if any, federal funding has played in driving overincarceration, and how federal 

58 

grant programs can be used to encourage alternatives to incarceration and reduce 

racial disparities. 

STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE BYRNE JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT PROGRAM

There are at least three structural and institutional problems with the Byrne 

Grant Program: 

Creating an Unhealthy Culture of Dependence 

The program was established to provide four-year grants to encourage innovation. 

For example, Dallas’ first drug court was paid for with a Byrne grant; then the 

county took over the funding of the program when the grant ran out. Narcotics task 

forces, however, were never subject to the four-year limit, and the limit was eliminated for all programs in the last Congress. It is worth investigating whether that 

was a good idea. Criminal justice decisions on which crimes to prioritize and which 

crime prevention strategies to utilize should be based on what is best for public safety and not what is needed to continue receiving federal money. 

Rewarding Failure 

Byrne grants are distributed to states, in part, based on whether or not crime 

rates are increasing. This has intuitive appeal because it is based on need, but it 

turns merit on its head. States that fail to enact effective crime prevention policies 

are rewarded with more money, while states that adopt effective policies that reduce 

crime are punished by losing federal aid. 

Perpetuating Poor Performance Measures 

The performance measures the Office of Justice Programs uses to judge the Byrne 

Grant Program are troubling and in many ways counter-productive. Some make 

sense, like computing how many offenders successfully complete alternative to incarceration programs. Most, however, measure bureaucratic statistics like how 

many new gang units are in operation, how many warrants are being served, and 

how many people are being arrested. These criteria not only fail to measure effectiveness, they provide dangerous incentives for states to play a numbers game. 

This is especially the case when it comes to drug law enforcement. Because the 

amount of funding that narcotics task forces receive is often formally or informally 

based on how many people they arrest, individual officers are under enormous pressure to make a large number of arrests, even if they are just for minor offenses. 

In fact, narcotics task forces that focus on major traffickers actually risk losing federal funding because they have fewer arrests to report than those that focus on lowlevel offenders who are easier to catch and far more plentiful. 

The FBI’s 2007 Crime in the United States Report, released this week, found that 

law enforcement made more than 1.8 million drug arrests last year. 83% of those 

arrests were for simple possession. 775,000 were for nothing more than possession 

of small amounts of marijuana for personal use. These arrests pad the official reports, but do nothing to stop major traffickers or reduce the problems associated 

with substance abuse. 

This perverse incentive structure also encourages law enforcement officers and informants to cut constitutional corners. We see in scandal after scandal good officers 

doing bad things to meet warrant and arrest quotas. Fabricating informants, raiding 

homes on false evidence, lying to judges, and planting evidence—anything to increase the numbers. 

For instance, look at the recent shooting death of 92-year-old Kathryn Johnston 

in Atlanta. Blinded by misinformation that her house contained illegal drugs, police 

officers fabricated evidence to obtain a warrant, shot and killed her in a botched 

military-style raid, and then planted drugs when they realized she was innocent. 

Federal prosecutor David Nahmias told The New York Times: 

‘‘The [Atlanta] officers . . . were not corrupt in the sense that we have seen before. They are not accused of seeking payoffs or trying to rob drug dealers or 

trying to protect gang members. Their goal was to arrest drug dealers and seize 

illegal drugs, and that’s what we want our police officers to do for our community. But these officers pursued that goal by corrupting the justice system, because when it was hard to do their job the way the Constitution requires, they 

let the ends justify their means.’’ 

Corrupting the justice system, however, is what happens when policymakers tie 

budgets, promotions, and salaries to statistics like arrests and seizures. As the plea 

agreement in this case made clear, the Atlanta officers cut corners in order to ‘‘be 

considered productive officers and to meet [the agency’s] performance targets.’’ This 

is a story one hears in state after state. It is not publicly known if Atlanta used 

59 

federal Byrne Grant money to pay for the raid, but bad performance measures have 

become widespread and are generally instituted from the top down. 

REGIONAL NARCOTICS TASK FORCES

In addition to looking at structural problems with the Byrne Grant Program, Congress should look at the problems associated with some of the entities it funds. In 

particular, it should hold hearings on the program’s funding of hundreds of regional 

narcotics task forces around the country. These task forces, which lack very little 

state or federal oversight and are prone to corruption, are at the center of some of 

our country’s most disturbing law enforcement scandals. Connecting these task 

forces to HIDTAS or other regulated entities might significantly reduce the problems associated with them. 

The most notorious Byrne-funded scandal occurred in 1999 in Tulia, Texas where 

dozens of African-American residents (representing nearly half of the town’s adult 

black population) were arrested, prosecuted and sentenced to decades in prison, 

even though the only evidence against them was the uncorroborated testimony of 

one white undercover officer with a history of lying and making racial epithets. The 

undercover officer worked alone, and had no audiotapes, video surveillance, or eyewitnesses to corroborate his allegations. Suspicions arose after two of the defendants 

were able to produce firm evidence showing they were out of state or at work at 

the time of the alleged drug buys. Texas Governor Rick Perry eventually pardoned 

the Tulia defendants (after four years of imprisonment), but these kinds of scandals 

continue to plague the Byrne grant program. 

In another Byrne-related scandal, a magistrate judge found that a regional narcotics task force in Hearne, Texas routinely targeted African Americans as part of 

an effort to drive blacks out of the majority white town. For the past 15 years, the 

Byrne-funded task force annually raided the homes of African Americans and arrested and prosecuted innocent citizens. The county governments involved in the 

Hearne task force scandal eventually settled a civil suit, agreeing to pay financial 

damages to some of the victims of this discrimination. 

While both of these Texas scandals are somewhat dated, they remain powerful 

symbols of a failed system that has yet to be reformed. They are also both subjects 

of major motion pictures that will soon be in theaters across the country. Oscar-winning actress Halle Berry is starring in a feature film based on the Tulia, Texas 

scandal, currently being produced by Lionsgate Films. Uncommon Productions recently completed a feature film titled ‘‘American Violet’’ that is loosely based on the 

Hearne scandal, and stars Oscar-nominated Alfre Woodard. 

These scandals are not the result of a few ‘‘bad apples’’ in law enforcement; they 

are the result of a fundamentally flawed bureaucracy that is prone to corruption by 

its very structure. Byrne-funded regional narcotics task forces are federally funded, 

state managed, and locally staffed, which means they do not really have to answer 

to anyone. In fact, their ability to perpetuate themselves through asset forfeiture 

and federal funding makes them unaccountable to local taxpayers and governing 

bodies. 

The Criminal Jurisprudence Committee of the Texas House of Representatives is 

one of the few governing bodies to examine Byrne-funded regional narcotics task 

forces and why they are so engulfed in scandals. After comprehensive hearings, the 

Committee concluded that the state should cut off all state and federal funding to 

the task forces because they are inherently prone to corruption. The Committee reported, ‘‘Continuing to sanction task force operations as stand-alone law enforcement entities—with widespread authority to operate at will across multiple jurisdictional lines—should not continue. The current approach violates practically every 

sound principle of police oversight and accountability applicable to narcotics interdiction.’’ 

A 2002 report by the ACLU of Texas identified seventeen scandals involving 

Byrne-funded anti-drug task forces in Texas, including cases of falsifying government records, witness tampering, fabricating evidence, stealing drugs from evidence 

lockers, selling drugs to children, large-scale racial profiling, sexual harassment, 

and other abuses of official capacity. Recent scandals in other states include the 

misuse of millions of dollars in federal grant money in Kentucky and Massachusetts, 

false convictions based on police perjury in Missouri, and making deals with drug 

offenders to drop or lower their charges in exchange for money or vehicles in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 

THE TEXAS REFORM INITIATIVE

In the wake of numerous Byrne-related scandals, the Texas Legislature and Texas 

Governor Rick Perry (R) implemented a set of reforms that are reducing racial disVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:47 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\091808\44494.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44494
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parities, police corruption, and the number of nonviolent offenders behind bars, 

while attacking major crime and making Texas safer. The state banned racial 

profiling, reformed its asset forfeiture laws, established alternatives to incarceration, eliminated Byrne Grant funding to regional narcotics task forces, passed legislation prohibiting anyone from being convicted of a drug law offense based solely 

on the uncorroborated word of an undercover informant, and adopted new statewide 

performance measures for judging the effectiveness of drug law enforcement. 

Instead of grading narcotics officers on how many warrants they serve and how 

many people they arrest, the Perry Administration is grading them on how well 

they disrupt and dismantle dangerous crime organizations. Gathering intelligence 

and building connections takes precedent over arresting low-level offenders. Drug 

arrests have fallen by more than 40%, but drug seizures have more than doubled. 

The state is reportedly moving closer to its goal of taking down the top Texas ‘‘gatekeepers’’ to the major drug cartels. 

Testifying in front of this subcommittee in 2007, Texas Department of Public Safety representative Patrick O’Burke described the Texas Reform Initiative this way: 

‘‘To define success by measuring only the sheer volume of arrests would mean that 

more arrests would equate with greater achievement. This clearly does not move towards the goal of crime reduction. Arrest numbers also do not attach any quality 

to that work product when the arrest of one drug user equals the arrest of one drug 

‘kingpin’.’’ 

The new drug law performance measures adopted by the Perry Administration 

are relatively simple. The state defined a drug trafficker as a person who works to 

illegally sell drugs with profit or income as the primary motivation. A Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) was then defined as five or more drug traffickers who 

work to illegally sell drugs outside of their immediate conspiracy. Narcotics officers 

are required to assess the number of DTOs working in their area and are then graded on the number of DTOs that are dismantled. 

Texas narcotics officers are also required to compute the percentage of arrests 

that are ‘‘End Users’’, defined as a person who is the intended user of illegal drugs 

and generally motivated by addiction. Under the Perry Initiative, impacting the behavior of an End User may involve law enforcement activities, but it is generally 

assumed that treatment and mental health services are better equipped to deal with 

those problems. As such, narcotics officers that waste time and resources investigating and arresting drug users are negatively graded. 

FEDERAL REFORM

The Texas Reform Initiative is a good model for federal reform. 

First, Congress should pass H.R. 253, the No More Tulias: Drug Law Enforcement 

Evidentiary Standards Improvement Act of 2007. This legislation, introduced by 

Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee, would use the Byrne Grant program to encourage states 

to emulate many of the Texas reforms. It would prohibit states from funding regional narcotics task forces with Byrne Grant money unless they have enacted a law 

preventing people from being convicted of a drug law offense based solely on the 

uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of just one law enforcement officer or informant. This protection has prevented numerous innocent people from being wrongly 

convicted in Texas. 

The No More Tulias Act would also require local and state law enforcement agencies receiving federal Byrne Grant money to document their arrests by race and ethnicity. This provision is essential to ensuring that federal money is not being used 

to facilitate racially disparate enforcement. The Drug Policy Alliance recommends 

expanding this provision to also require the documentation of traffic stops and 

searches by race and ethnicity. Such information should be available to Congress, 

the U.S. Attorney General and the public. 

Congress should also pass legislation setting new performance measures for the 

Byrne Grant Program and state and federal drug law enforcement in general. The 

groundbreaking performance measures adopted by Texas are a good place to start. 

Drug law enforcement agencies should be graded on their ability to break up crime 

networks and apprehend violent offenders. Arrests and seizures should be strategies 

for achieving these goals, not measurement criteria to judge success or failure. A 

recent book by the American Enterprise Institute explains this strategy: 

‘‘Retail-level drug enforcement should focus on what it can accomplish (reducing 

the negative side effects of illicit markets) and not on what it can’t achieve (substantially raising drug prices). Thus, instead of aiming to arrest drug dealers 

and seize drugs—the mechanisms by which enforcement seeks to raise prices— 

retail drug enforcement should target individual dealers and organizations that 

engage in flagrant dealing, violence, and the recruitment of juveniles. Arrests 

61 

and seizures should not be operational goals, but rather tools employed, with 

restraint, in the service of public safety.’’ (An Analytic Assessment of U.S. Drug 

Policy, February 2005) 

Instead of grading law enforcement operations on how many search warrants 

were issued, how many arrests were made, how many officers were solely dedicated 

to gang interdiction activities, and other Vietnam-like ‘‘body count’’ performance 

measures currently utilized by the Office of Justice Assistance, Congress should establish more meaningful criteria. Such criteria could include whether or not local 

crime rates are falling because of effective policies or how close law enforcement 

agencies are to dismantling major crime syndicates. 

The formula by which Byrne Grant funding is distributed should also be changed. 

At a minimum, the Office of Justice Programs should prioritize funding according 

to demonstrated reductions in crime. Cities and states that adopt effective policies 

should be rewarded, not punished. The Byrne Grant Program should be used to promote evidence-based crime prevention strategies, not to fund cities and states year 

after year. 

One tool that would enhance the ability to measure performance and increase 

transparency would be the creation of a searchable public database that lists where 

Byrne Grant money is going and what it is being used for. This database would not 

only be invaluable to Congress, it would aid efforts by researchers and criminal justice experts to document ineffective spending and determine where Byrne Grant 

money is tied to corruption. It could be similar to the public database that tracks 

earmarks. 

Finally, Congress should pass legislation setting a new bottom line for U.S. drug 

policy more generally. The failed drug war policies of the last 30 years persist in 

part because of ineffective evaluation and assessment. There are three problems. 

First, the key measurements—drug seizures, arrests and annual surveys of drug 

use—tell us little of importance and mostly distract from more important criteria. 

Second, the Office of National Drug Control Policies (ONDCP) is statutorily obligated to set objectives for reducing drug use and availability, but not obligated to 

set objectives for reducing the public health threats associated with drug abuse 

(overdose fatalities, the spread of HIV/AIDS), or the harms associated with the war 

on drugs (the number of nonviolent Americans behind bars, racial disparities in the 

criminal justice system). Finally, drug war programs persist even in the face of overwhelming evidence that they are failing to meet their own stated objectives. 

Legislation to set a new bottom line in U.S. drug policy could take many forms. 

It might take the form of requiring the Office of National Drug Control Policy 

(ONDCP) to report annually on the impact of federal policies on the number of nonviolent drug offenders in prison, HIV transmission rates, and overdose fatalities, 

and to commission independent cost-benefit analyses of federal drug policy expenditures. Or requiring federal agencies to provide annual reports on how many people 

are penalized by federal drug policies, such as the number of people denied student 

loans, housing, food stamps, and the right to vote because of a drug conviction. 

At a minimum, federal agencies should be required to set short- and long-term 

goals for reducing the problems associated with both drugs and punitive drug policies. ONDCP is already statutorily required to set national goals for reducing drug 

use and drug availability. Why not also require the agency to set goals for reducing 

overdose deaths, the spread of HIV/AIDS from injection drug use, racial disparities 

in the criminal justice system, the number of Americans who cannot vote because 

of a felony conviction. 

The urgent need to overhaul the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance 

Grant Program provides Congress with a great opportunity to evaluate drug and 

crime prevention more broadly. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Mr. Brooks? 

STATEMENT OF RONALD E. BROOKS, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL 

OFFICERS’ ASSOCIATION COALITION, SAN FRANCISCO, CA 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Judge Gohmert, Members of the Subcommittee. 

I want to thank you for inviting me to share my perspectives on 

the Office of Justice programs. 

For years I have worked closely with the Office of Justice programs, primarily the Bureau of Justice Assistance, as a public polVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:47 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\091808\44494.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44494
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icy partner, program beneficiary and grant recipient. Our communities are safer today because OJP and its bureaus play a critical 

role in providing much-needed assistance to law enforcement agencies through its training, grant funding, policy development, and 

technical assistance programs. 

I have some specific ideas related to OJP grant management, but 

first I want to highlight the most important OJP program from the 

perspective of America’s narcotic officers: the Byrne Justice Assistance Grant, or JAG formula program. 

Byrne JAG is the cornerstone of multi-jurisdictional drug and 

gang enforcement in America. It provides incentives for State and 

local agencies to pool resources, share information, and pursue organizational targets in gang, firearm, money laundering and drug 

trafficking investigations. 

This program is essential, and yet the White House has zeroed 

it out in the past four budgets. Funding has declined dramatically, 

but thanks to bipartisan actions in this Subcommittee, Byrne JAG 

reauthorization passed the House in June and President Bush 

signed the bill into law. 

The administration’s actions toward this program should be tested against a few simple questions: Is the drug trade dangerous to 

America’s communities and families? Is drug production and smuggling interstate and international in nature? Does the Federal Government have a responsibility to help State and local law enforcement when it fails to secure our borders and ports through which 

the majority of drugs are shipped? 

To me the answer is clear. The Federal Government must share 

responsibility to contribute to task force efforts that will make our 

communities safer. Last year Byrne was cut from $520 million to 

$170 million, and this is down from $1.1 billion in 2004. Supported 

by the coalition of more than 30 organizations representing more 

than a million members throughout the country, bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate urged emergency supplemental funding to restore the cut. 

We were certainly disappointed when the administration and 

congressional leadership agreed to include more than $670 million 

in emergency funds for foreign law enforcement agencies around 

the world, but nothing for Byrne JAG. I am hopeful that Congress 

will remedy this oversight by ensuring that program in one of its 

Federal funding packages. 

While the Byrne JAG program is indispensable, I share the Subcommittee’s concern over the program’s measurement. OJP needs 

to act, but we don’t want to see the administration or Congress 

throw the baby out with the bathwater. Proposing a system of 

grant review and approval, basically on a scoring system subject to 

the bias of a few individuals, is a poor substitute for accountability. 

It doesn’t measure the real impact that these programs have in 

their communities. 

Two years ago I approached OJP and suggested they develop performance measures for Byrne-funded task forces. BJA took our suggestion and commissioned a study to develop performance measurement possibilities. The report was provided to BJA; however, no action was taken. Whether it was OMB or other components of the 

63 

administration that prevented it, this valuable tool never saw the 

light of day. And as a result, JAG has continued to go unmeasured. 

Some have suggested that horrific events like those that occurred 

in Tulia, Texas and other places demonstrate that Byrne JAG is 

not working and that law enforcement across the country is abusing Federal assistance. What happened in Tulia was shameful. 

However, it was not representative of Byrne-funded task forces. If 

anything, Tulia demonstrates the urgency of ensuring that training 

and performance management be instituted as soon as possible. 

In addition to performance measures and training, information 

sharing is critical to successful task force management. The regional information sharing system, RISS, is indispensable. It allows 

officers to deconflict case information and maintain a culture of collaboration while protecting privacy and civil liberties. 

In OJP’s global justice initiative, it has developed the much-needed policies and guidelines critical to creating a robust informationsharing environment that will support intelligence-led policing. The 

Center for Task Force Training is a BJA-funded program that provides training for task force managers to help them understand 

safe and effective practices. Tragedies like Tulia can be avoided if 

this training, which emphasizes a culture of integrity, risk management, and safety during enforcement operations, is well funded and 

widely available throughout the country. 

I would suggest that OJP consider taking three actions with regard to the Byrne JAG program. The first is to commit to developing a performance measurement system and ensure that BJA 

has the resources necessary for that system. The second, to ensure 

that BJA works with stakeholders to develop realistic measures. 

And finally, to ensure that training and information-sharing are 

available to everyone as part of the Byrne JAG strategy. 

I want to thank you for inviting me to testify today. And Chairman Scott, I want to thank you, Ranking Member Gohmert, full 

Committee Chair Mr. Conyers, and certainly Congressman Johnson 

for all the efforts that you have led to support Byrne reauthorization and refunding of the Byrne program. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks follows:] 

64 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RONALD E. BROOKS


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Ms. Leary? 

STATEMENT OF MARY LOU LEARY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. LEARY. Thank you, sir. Thank you very much. 

Good morning, Chairman Scott, Ranking Member Gohmert, 

Members of the Subcommittee. 

I am Mary Lou Leary, the executive director of the National Center for Victims of Crime. That is a national non-profit organization 

that has, for almost 25 years now, worked to secure rights and resources to victims of crime or types of crime across this country. 

We do this through advocacy, direct services, technical assistance 

and training, and public outreach from public education. 

I am here today to try to lend some understanding to how grant 

funding through the Office of Victims of Crime at OJP benefits 

crime victims nationwide. OVC was established to enhance America’s response to crime victims, to enhance assistance to crime victims. And people across the country, and people in this field, look 

to OVC to play a leadership role in changing attitudes, changing 

policies, changing practices—to promote justice and healing for 

crime victims. 

One of OVC’s functions in this regard is to administer formula 

grants for crime victim compensation and victim assistance under 

the Victims of Crime Act fund, better known as the VOCA fund. 

That is made up of criminal fines that are collected from Federal 

offenders. 

I can tell you, these funds are the lifeblood of victim assistance 

across this country. They fund criminal justice agencies, as well as 

non-profit organizations that serve almost four million victims 

every single year. It is absolutely critical to maintain services to 

victims in America. 

We want to recognize the Members of this Subcommittee who 

have really worked so hard over the years to make sure that VOCA 

funds continue to be available for victim compensation and assistance. 

The other primary role of OVC is in discretionary grant-making, 

where I will focus my remarks today. You know there is a statutory 

formula by which OVC gets a percentage of the VOCA distribution 

every year for discretionary grants. And these grants should be 

combined where they can service the field with information about 

promising practices. They should be fostering learning and collaboration among a host of organizations. 

This year, unfortunately, there was a combination of circumstances that resulted in VOCA funds being reduced to a level 

that was lower than what Congress had intended. More than $30 

million was diverted for management and administration costs 

within OJP. And additional money was taken from VOCA to fund 

the management and administration of—the setup, actually—of the 

Department of Justice’s Office of Audit, Assessment and Management, a new office. 

So these two reductions cut that funding by one-third in 2008, 

and it reduced the formula grants also that States rely on to help 

76 

crime victims. I understand that this issue will be addressed in the 

2009 legislation, and we are glad to hear that. 

Let me share with you just a few of the highlights of the National Center for Victims of Crime’s experience and work as an 

OVC grantee. OVC funding over the last 20 years and the number 

of grants to the National Center have helped us to bring victim advocates and professionals from a whole variety of fields together so 

that we can find new ways to address pressing challenges that face 

victims and those who serve victims. 

One example of this kind of project is one called ‘‘Focus on the 

Future: A Systems Approach to Prosecution and Victim Assistance.’’ In the early 1990’s, prosecutors were facing a real challenge 

in implementing crime victims’ rights statutes that had been 

passed. I was a prosecutor at that time, and I can tell you it was 

not an easy thing to figure out how to take on all the proposed provisions and do it right. 

And the National Center stepped up to the plate and collaborated 

with Mothers Against Drunk Driving, American Prosecutors Research Institute, and others to develop training, assistance—and it 

really led the way to coordinate on victims’ issues and victims’ 

services among a whole host of criminal justice agencies and community groups. And today, if you walk into any prosecutor’s office 

in this country, you will almost always see that victims’ services 

are now an integral part of prosecutor offices. 

OVC funding enabled us to do similar work in the corrections 

system. There was virtually no activity within the corrections field 

regarding victims’ services. You would have parole hearings, people 

didn’t get notified, there weren’t victim impact statements allowed—they didn’t really have a notion of, ‘‘Hey, maybe we share 

in this responsibility, too. Maybe we should be doing something 

about victims’ services through the correction services.’’ 

So the National Center collaborated with a whole group of national and California state criminal justice agencies to develop a 

whole protocol and program for correction to integrate victims’ 

services into their work. And today, just about every State corrections system has a victims’ services component, and we are very 

proud of that. 

We are always looking for new ways to address emerging challenges, to help policy makers and legislators address the need for 

victims and particularly, in order to foster systemic change, we 

work with OVC funding to help them write laws that will benefit 

victims. And one of our most recent projects is called VictimLaw, 

and I would encourage any and all of you and your staff to use 

VictimLaw. It is a very user-friendly database created by the National Center. It includes all local, Federal and tribal laws that 

have anything to do with victim rights. 

And if you are in a State legislature and you want to know, 

‘‘what kind of a law should I draft in order to cover these new technology tools that are using to victimize people? I would like to 

know what they are doing in other places that worked, and I would 

like to know what kind of challenges have been brought to those 

laws.’’ You can use VictimLaw to accomplish that and to create 

policies and to craft laws that will actually do the job in your community. 

77 

So we are very grateful to OVC for funding and for leadership 

on initiatives like this, initiatives like serving the needs of special 

populations and under-served populations, folks with disabilities, 

teenagers, elderly, et cetera. 

So I hope, in conclusion, that—you can read my testimony and 

see more of the kinds of examples of what OVC grant-making can 

accomplish to lend some light to the broad impact that targeted 

discretionary funding can have in terms of improving our response 

to victims. And I will say, crime victims in this country deserve 

nothing less than top-level leadership from OVC and from the Department of Justice. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Leary follows:] 

78 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY LOU LEARY


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Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Leary. 

Mr. Marone? 

STATEMENT OF PETER MARONE, CHAIRMAN OF THE CONSORTIUM OF FORENSIC SCIENCE ORGANIZATIONS, RICHMOND, 

VA 

Mr. MARONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Gohmert. 

It is certainly a pleasure to be here before you today. I testify not 

as a director of the Department of Forensic Science in Virginia, but 

as chairman of the Consortium of Forensic Science Organizations. 

The CFSO was founded in 2000 and represents members of the forensic science community, which are comprised of the American 

Academy of Forensic Scientists, the American Society of Crime 

Laboratory Directors, the International Association for Identification, National Association of Medical Examiners, the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors—Laboratory Accreditation 

Board, and Forensic Quality Services. Our goal is to educate the 

public and policy makers on the truth of how the forensic community works and what our needs and requirements are. 

But I would like to bring to your attention today two things: 

First, the lack of funding that the forensic community is receiving 

in disciplines other than DNA, and second, the problems that our 

labs are working under with restrictions in funding and turnaround expectations. 

Our community has clearly grown to a technological revolution 

that has been singularly focused. While the use of forensic science 

dates back nearly 100 years in the U.S., our community has not 

prospered from the benefit of many of the technological advancements except in the discipline of DNA, primarily due to the lack 

of funding and visibility, as well as the newness and the impact of 

that particular science. 

As I stated, there are numerous examinations our labs perform, 

such as processing of controlled substances, firearms and tool 

marks, latent prints, trace evidence, toxicology and computer 

science crimes, just to name a few. In fact, these disciplines have 

a larger backlog and we receive more of these types of cases than 

we do with DNA cases. 

According to the 2005 Bureau of Justice statistics report which 

was released in 2008, our country’s 389 State and local crime labs 

received 2.7 million cases in 2005 and ended that year with a backlog of 435,879 versus 252,810 at the beginning of the year. Of that 

backlog, the largest number was not DNA. DNA was the third largest backlog discipline and the fourth largest discipline in case receptions. 

Some of that can be attributed to the fact that with the increased 

visibility of this particular since, we received DNA samples on an 

increased number of crimes, such as touch evidence on packaging 

of drugs and firearms. That is why DNA is higher than it has been. 

It is increasing. 

To provide perspective, the median number of forensic requests 

each laboratory received in 2005—and I wanted to qualify that by 

saying the median number laboratories will go in size from a labVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:47 Feb 10, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00095 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\091808\44494.000 HJUD1 PsN: 44494
90 

oratory of—our Richmond laboratory is 150 examiners. We have 

got a lot of laboratories with two and three-person examiners. 

So a median is not necessarily a true number of what the output 

is or the reception is for any particular laboratory. But the median 

number for that group were 2,716 for controlled substances. I get 

that much in a month. For toxicology, 909 for latent prints, 358 for 

biology screening, 337 for DNA analysis, and 257 for firearms and 

tool marks. 

Now, this is going to differ—the numbers of these in the different 

sections is going to differ from laboratory to laboratory, depending 

on what the reception is. Our backlog numbers show similar relative statistics. Controlled substances remains the largest for the 

median backlog, accounting for 51 percent of the backlog of the 

cases, with latent fingerprint identification 16 percent, and as 

Chairman Scott noted himself, DNA being 9 percent. 

Yet the funding we receive from the government to process these 

cases—I am talking Federal Government—consistently remained at 

100 percent funding for DNA requested by the Department of Justice. Fortunately Congress, particularly the U.S. Senate, funded the 

Paul Coverdell Act, which allows crime labs the flexibility to apply 

funds where they have the most need. 

However, that need has never been funded fully by Congress more than $20 million a year, and that has never been requested 

by the Department of Justice in their budget. 

Mr. Chairman, we support the funding of DNA initiatives and 

have been very excited by the continued advances in this particular 

science. But we can’t support it to the exclusion of all the other disciplines. We are not saying get rid of the DNA, or put DNA for the 

other disciplines. We need additional funding for those other disciplines. 

There are still many crimes that do not have DNA involved, and 

those victims also deserve to have their cases done on a priority 

basis. Solving crimes means more than solving cases with DNA. 

We need to address all the disciplines of forensic science. On the 

many occasions that we have discussed this with the Department 

of Justice, we have heard responses ranging from ‘‘there is no data 

to support your claims’’—and to their defense, when you look at the 

publications, the 2002 census was published in 2005, the 2005 census was published in 2008—or that only DNA had the political support. 

As a result, our association requested a commission to examine 

needs and requirements of all the disciplines. We are very pleased 

that the Senate Appropriations Committee asked the National 

Academy of Science to conduct this study. We eagerly await its release and findings later this year—probably the beginning of next 

year. We hope that this Committee will take that study and work 

toward comprehensive forensic legislation that gives us resources 

to complete the processing of all untested evidence on a priority 

basis. 

However, with the dawn of DNA, we have seen a revolution 

occur that has changed the way we had to work at potentially all 

the cases. Realistic expectations from both the judicial system, the 

attorneys, and the juries expecting capabilities that just aren’t 

there. Some call it the CSI effect, if you will. A lot of people really 

91 

think that we can do things in 47 minutes. In point of fact, the 

turn-around time in many instances takes days or weeks. 

I can give you one particular example in toxicology. It is very 

simple with a one-drug application, an individual maybe has an 

overdose of a particular drug, or DUI. But there are a lot of instances where an individual—it is unfortunate that we have this 

term—we are looking at a drugstore, where the individual may 

have dozens of drugs. And they have to spend time, first looking 

for those drugs, maybe identifying all of them, and then having to 

quantitate them to find out if there is a therapeutic level, an overdose, or what have you. 

And so this is not something that can be done in a moment’s notice. They are sequential in how you have to apply them. It takes 

personnel, financial resources, and an environment that permits an 

understanding of what we face and what our requirements are to 

ensure timely processing of evidence. Not all labs have the same 

capabilities, and not all of the numbers and types of cases each 

month. However, we are seeing our funding having onerous restrictions placed on them that some labs don’t even apply for them. 

Quite often, requirements and solicitations for DNA funding 

changes annually, which requires laboratories to reprioritize their 

case approach to comply with the requirements. Now, I will say 

that this has changed in the last year, where they have become a 

little less specific, giving the laboratories the ability to adjust their 

protocols less and actually apply for more of those grants. 

Requirements for the Bloodsworth Act were such that even the 

few agencies which did apply were told they didn’t meet the requirements. The requirements were later changed, but with a delay 

of almost a year. And you heard Mr. Sedgwick announce that those 

Bloodsworth grants were just recently awarded. 

Mr. Chairman, we would like to work with this Committee to 

shape the funding from Congress so that it is representative of the 

needs of laboratories and not reflective of what the perceived needs 

are from the outside influences. 

I thank you for your time, and I will answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Marone follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PETER MARONE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify before your Committee today. I testify today not as the Crime Lab Director for 

the Commonwealth of Virginia but as the Chairman of the Consortium of Forensic 

Science Organizations. The CFSO was founded in 2000 and represents members of 

the forensic science community which are comprised of the American Academy of 

Forensic Sciences, The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, the International Association for Identification, the National Association of Medical Examiners, the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation 

Board, and Forensic Quality Services. Our goal is to educate the public and policymakers on the truth of how the forensic community works and what our needs and 

requirements are. 

What I’d like to bring to your attention today are two things. First the lack of 

funding that we are receiving in disciplines other than DNA and second, the problems that our labs are working under with increased restrictions on our funding and 

unrealistic turnaround expectations. 

Our community has clearly gone through a technology revolution but it has been 

singularly focused. While the use of forensic science dates back nearly 100 years in 

the U.S., our community has not prospered from the benefit of many of the technological advancements, except in the discipline of DNA, primarily due to lack of funding and visibility as well as the ‘‘newness’’ and impact of the science. As I stated 

92 

earlier, there are numerous examinations that our labs perform such as the processing of controlled substances, firearms and toolmarks, latent prints, trace evidence, toxicology, and computer crimes to name a few. In fact, these disciplines have 

a larger backlog and we receive more of these types of cases than we do cases with 

DNA. 

According to the 2005 Bureau of Justice Statistics Report, which was released in 

2008, our country’s 389 State and Local crime labs received 2.7 million cases in 2005 

and ended the year with a backlog of 435,879 cases versus 252,810 at the beginning 

of the year. Of that backlog the largest number was not DNA. DNA was our third 

largest backlogged discipline and fourth largest discipline in case receptions. Some 

of that can be attributed to the fact that with the increased visibility of this science 

we have received DNA samples on an increased number of crimes, such as touch 

evidence on packaging of drug evidence and firearms. To provide perspective, the 

median number of forensic requests each lab received in 2005 were 2,716 for controlled substance, 1,234 for toxicology, 909 for latent print, 358 for Biology screening, 337 for DNA analysis, and 257 for firearms and toolmarks. Our backlog numbers showed similar relative statistics. The controlled substances discipline was the 

largest with a median backlog accounting for 51% of our backlog, with latent print 

identification being 16% and DNA analysis being 9%. 

Yet the funding we have received from the government to process these cases has 

consistently remained at 100% for DNA requested by the Department of Justice. 

Fortunately, Congress, particularly the US Senate, has funded the Paul Coverdell 

Act which allows the Crime Labs the flexibility to apply the funds where they have 

the most need. However, that has never been funded by the Congress for more than 

$20 million a year and has never been requested by the Department of Justice in 

their budget. 

Mr. Chairman, we support the funding of the DNA initiatives and have been very 

excited by the continued advances in the science, but we cannot support this to the 

exclusion of the other disciplines. There are still many crimes that do not have DNA 

involved and those victims also deserve to have their cases be a priority. Solving 

crimes means more than solving cases with DNA. We need to address all of the disciplines of forensic science. On the many occasions that we have discussed this with 

the Department of Justice we have heard responses ranging from ‘‘there is no data 

to support your claims of backlog in other disciplines’’, to, ‘‘only DNA has political 

support’’. As a result, our association requested a Commission to examine the needs 

and requirement of all the disciplines. We were very pleased when the Senate Appropriations Committee asked the National Academy of Sciences to conduct this 

study and we eagerly await its release and findings later this year. We hope that 

this Committee will take that study and work toward comprehensive forensic legislation that give us resources to complete the processing of all untested evidence a 

priority. 

However, with the dawn of DNA, we have also seen a revolution occur and it has 

changed the way we can solve and potentially prevent crimes. BUT what has come 

with that are unrealistic expectations from the public and the government as to 

what our capacity and capabilities are and ever changing rules put upon us by the 

policy makers. We have found ourselves in a situation of increased visibility due to 

the dawn of popular television series, like CSI. Many expect that we can have a 

turn-around of a case in the hour it takes for CSI to air their show. In fact, it can 

take us from days to weeks, depending on the number of samples and the types of 

examinations to process evidence. But it takes personnel, financial resources, and 

an environment that permits an understanding of what we face and what our requirements are to ensure timely processing of evidence. Not all labs have the same 

capabilities and the number and types of cases vary each month. However, we are 

seeing our funding having such onerous restrictions placed on them that some labs 

do not even apply. Quite often, requirements in solicitations for DNA funding 

change annually which require laboratories to reprioritize their case approach to 

comply with the requirements. Requirements for the Bloodsworth Act were such 

that even the few agencies which applied were told they did not meet the requirements. These were later changed, but with a delay of almost a year. Mr. Chairman, 

we would like to work with this Committee to shape the funding from Congress so 

that it is representative of the needs of the laboratories and not reflective of what 

the perceived needs are from outside influences. 

Again, I thank you for inviting me to speak and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And Mr. Sullivan? 

93 

STATEMENT OF CHARLIE SULLIVAN, NATIONAL CURE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gohmert. 

CURE began in Texas in 1972, and we started with the bus service for families to the State prison in East Texas—so we are very 

familiar with Texas. Then we were a State organization. We became a national organization in 1985. Back then I attended meetings of the—in the 1970’s in Texas in the State criminal justice 

planning agency, which was funded by then the Law Enforcement 

Assistance Administration. 

As you know, LEAA was the forerunner of the Office of Justice 

Programs. At these Texas meetings, I pointed out that LEAA funding neglected rehabilitation. Even LEAA nationally recognized this 

omission by creating a new grant funding section called Part E. 

And I remember—and I think, Mr. Gohmert, you probably knew 

our district attorney, Henry Wade, of Dallas County actually defended this Part E on rehabilitation to me 30, 35 years ago. 

But 30 years later, I still feel that its successor, OJP, places too 

little emphasis in supporting evidence-based adult corrections. I 

think in 35 years—we are a prison reform group that works with 

families of prisoners, former prisoners—we have never received a 

call from OJC to do a research project. And let me explain further. From 1996 until 2001, almost $3 billion was given by the Bureau of Justice Assistance of OJP to States 

to build or expand prisons and jails. And this was the result of a 

Democratic administration and a Democratic Congress passing the 

Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth in Sentencing incentive 

program in the crime bill of 1994. 

Half of the funding was formula grant. But a condition of the 

other half was that States were encouraged to abolish parole. And 

I feel a strong case can be made that this program is one of the 

reasons why the United States, with only 5 percent of the world’s 

population now has 25 percent of the people in prison in the world. 

Also, by removing the flexibility of parole, violent offenders would 

actually be released earlier under this no-parole policy. Neither 

during the crime bill debate nor in the 6-year implementation of 

this massive prison building program did I see much information 

communicated to Congress by OJC regarding how this would dramatically increase our national incarceration rate. 

In my opinion, OJC basically went along to get along. Only after 

the intense criticism by a few members of both parties in Congress 

did this prison grant program open up the funds to alternatives 

and other correctional needs. But by then, however, the damage 

had been done. Many States were willing to build prisons even if 

they were not needed, and OJC knew this was wrong, and sadly, 

they kept quiet. 

This prison grant program came about when the Democrats controlled the executive and Congress. In the same way, the recently 

passed Adam Walsh Act also became law when the White House 

and leadership on Capitol Hill were of the same party. But this 

time, it was in Republican hands. And similar to what happened 

a dozen years earlier in the crime bill, the Adam Walsh Act, in my 

opinion, can be characterized as the political tail wagging the policy 

dog. 

94 

Basically, the Act perpetuates three myths. One: the recidivism 

rate for sex offenders is high. In fact, a study by OJC’s Bureau of 

Justice Statistics shows that recidivism rates for sex offenses are 

among the lowest of all types of crimes. The lowest, I think, is murder. 

Most sex offenses are committed by strangers. Again, a BJS report states that most sex offenses occur in families, and a 2000 

study points out that 93 percent of victims of child sexual abuse 

knew the perpetrator. 

Three: treatment does not work. On the contrary, national respected programs, like Dr. Fred Berlin’s in Baltimore, have a success rate of near 90 percent. And I have visited that program. Although there are token mentions of treatment in the act, the 

SMART office created in OJP by the bill doesn’t even include treatment, rehabilitation, or even management in its acronym. 

Like the prison grant program, there will probably be an amelioration down the road on the Adam Walsh Act. In the meantime, 

however, the country is spending precious resources, and many 

people—especially the young—will have already been ruined for life 

by having criminal records that are based on sin, not crime. Not 

committing crime, but sin. 

In both these examples, OJ’s staff knew these policy decisions 

were wrong. But no one spoke up. I suspect that was because of 

staff allegiance to those who hired or appointed them. Thus, firstly, 

I would suggest that there be a bipartisan leadership at the top of 

OJP similar to the Federal Communications Commission or the 

Equal Economic Opportunity Commission, EEOC or FCC. 

In fact, LEAA, back when it was in the 1970’s, had a bipartisan 

structure. Although this will not completely eliminate politics from 

OJP decisions, it will go a long way toward reducing the extremism 

that occurred in the prison grant program and is going on now in 

the Adam Walsh Act. 

In addition, there must be an independent advisory committee 

that is also bipartisan and reaches out to grassroots organizations 

like ours. Most groups like ours—and there are many, based on the 

Second Chance Coalition—have no idea what OJP is and what it 

is doing with its $2.4 billion budget. 

Secondly, I would recommend that before we rush to judgment, 

a new policy on a national scale, we should pilot the program. The 

program should have an appraisal conducted by an impartial party 

which must not in any way have a conflict of interest. That 

means—to me this is very important—absolute prohibition on receiving any money from OJP in the future or even in the past. 

In summary: I strongly recommend bipartisanship in decision 

making; an advisory committee where liberal and conservative organizations provide advice that is taken seriously; and the creation 

of robust pilot programs. If this is done, I think that the Office of 

Justice Programs will substantially improve its most important evidence-based crime reduction policies, and be in a much better position to communicate objective information—not subjective, but objective information to legislative and executive decision makers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan follows:] 

95 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES SULLIVAN

For the past 35 years I have co-directed a grassroots criminal justice reform organization, Citizens United for Rehabilitation of Errants or CURE. CURE’s members 

are families of people in prison, people in prison, people formerly in prison and other 

concerned individuals. 

When CURE began in Texas in the 70s, I attended meetings of the Texas state 

criminal justice planning agency which was funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). As you know, LEAA was the forerunner of the Office 

of Justice Programs. 

When I had the opportunity to testify at these Texas meetings, I always pointed 

out that LEAA funding neglected rehabilitation. Even LEAA nationally recognized 

this omission by creating a new grant funding section called Part E. I remember 

then the well-known Dallas County prosecutor Henry Wade pointed this out to me 

at a hearing. This Part E in LEAA funding helped somewhat. But, 30 years later, 

I still believe that its successor, OJP, places too little emphasis in supporting evidenced-based adult corrections. 

POLITICS MUST BE REMOVED FROM POLICY-MAKING

Let me explain. In 1985, CURE expanded to a national organization and we 

moved to Washington. Since being here, I have been extremely upset by the politics 

within OJP in regard to two major initiatives. These are The Truth in Sentencing 

Prison Grants and the Adam Walsh Act. 

I believe that policy initiatives of this sort occur when members of Congress are 

near elections and a sure vote-getter is being perceived as ‘‘hard on crime’’. Another 

contributing factor is that the OJP does not encourage the involvement of grassroots 

or nonprofit agencies. At least in our case, we tried but we had no input with the 

sponsors during the congressional debate on both theses landmark bills. 

PAROLE WAS ABOLISHED AND PRISONS BECAME PORK

From 1996 until 2001, almost three billion dollars was given by the Bureau of 

Justice Assistance of OJP to states to build or expand prisons and jails. This was 

the result of a Democratic Administration and Democratic Congress passing the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Program in the 

Crime Bill of 1994. 

Half of the funding was formula grants but a condition of the other half was that 

states were encouraged to abolish parole. A strong case can be made that this program is one of the reasons why the United States with only 5% of the world’s population now has 25% of the people in prison in the world. Also, by removing the flexibility of parole, violent offenders would actually be released earlier under this new 

no-parole system. 

Neither during the Crime Bill debate nor in the six-year implementation of this 

massive prison building program, did I see much information communicated to Congress by OJP regarding how this would dramatically increase our national incarceration rate. 

In my opinion, OJP basically went along to get along! Only after intense criticism 

by a few members of both parties in Congress did this prison grant program open 

up the funds to alternatives and other correctional needs. By then, however, the 

damage had been done! Many states were willing to build prisons even if they were 

not needed and OJP knew this was wrong. Sadly, they kept quiet. 

ADAM WALSH ACT: USING A SLEDGEHAMMER WHEN A HAMMER IS NEEDED

The VOI/TIS grant program came about when the Democrats controlled the executive and Congress. In the same way, the recently passed Adam Walsh Act (AWA) 

also became law when the White House and leadership on Capitol Hill were of the 

same party. But this time. it was in Republican hands. And similar to what happened a dozen years earlier in the Crime Bill, AWA, in my opinion, can be characterized as the political tail wagging the policy dog. 

Basically, AWA perpetuates three myths 1) The recidivism rate for sex offenders 

is high. In fact, a study by OJP’s Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that recidivism 

rates for sex offenses are among the lowest of all types of crimes. 

2) Most sex offenses are committed by strangers. Again, a BJS report states that 

most sex offenses occur in families and a 2000 study points out that 93% of victims 

of child sexual abuse knew the perpetrator. 

3) Treatment does not work. On the contrary, nationally respected programs like 

Dr. Fred Berlin’s in Baltimore have a success rate of near 90%. Although there are 

96 

token mentions of treatment in AWA, the SMART Office created in OJP by AWA 

doesn’t even include treatment, rehabilitation or management in its acronym. 

OJP again failed to communicate this most important information in the AWA debate in Congress and now in its implementation of the Act. Because of these failures 

and because of the violation of civil liberties, AWA has been described as falling 

apart at its seams. Daily we read about the courts ruling against it. 

Like the prison grant program, there will probably be an amelioration down the 

road. In the meantime, the country is spending precious resources and many people, 

especially the young, will have already been ruined for life by having criminal 

records based on sin not crime. 

SOLUTION 1: BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP AND ADVISORY COMMITTEE

In both these examples, OJP staff knew these policy decisions were wrong. But, 

no one spoke up. I suspect that was because of staff allegiance to those who hired 

or appointed them. I would suggest that there be bipartisan leadership at the top 

of OJP similar to the Federal Communications Commission or the Equal Economic 

Opportunity Commission. 

In fact, LEAA had a bipartisan structure. Although this will not completely eliminate politics from OJP decisions, it will go a long way toward reducing the extremism that occurred in the prison grant program and is going on now in the Adam 

Walsh Act. 

In addition, there must be an independent advisory committee that is also bipartisan. In my opinion, the Reporting of Deaths in Custody legislation is a model of 

what OJP can do. This bill has always had strong bipartisan leadership. Staff of 

the Bureau of Justice Statistics, which implements this reporting bill, has met with 

myself and even made a presentation at a national CURE convention. 

In effect, they have reached out to a grassroots organization like us and I can say 

we have a real partnership. This is somewhat true too with a few past and present 

staffers of the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of OJP. But, being on 

a first name basis with OJP is an exception not the rule. Thus, most organizations 

like ours have no idea what OJP is and what it is doing with its 3 billion dollar 

budget. 

SOLUTION 2: UTILIZE PILOT PROGRAMS

Criminal justice policy is much more complicated than many people realize. It 

tends to be an emotion-charged subject involving millions of unique people, millions 

of unique crimes, and thousands of unique communities. Many communities are fiscally strapped. 

It seems obvious to me that, before we rush to implement a new policy on a national scale, we should pilot the program. Any pilot should begin with clear expectations and should include an appraisal of problems and successes conducted by an 

impartial party which must not in any way have a conflict of interest. This means 

an absolute prohibition on receiving any money from OJP in the future or in the 

past. In my opinion, this did not happen before Congress passed the Truth in Sentencing Prison Grant Program in ’94 nor in the Adam Walsh Act two years ago. 

In summary, I strongly recommend bipartisanship in decision-making, an advisory committee where liberal and conservative organizations provide advice that is 

taken seriously, and the creation of robust pilot programs. If this is done, I think 

that the Office of Justice Programs will substantially improve its most important 

evidence-based crime-reduction policies and be in a much better position to communicate objective information to legislative and executive decision-makers. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Sullivan. 

We have votes pending, so I will recognize the gentleman from 

Texas. We have a few minutes we can ask questions. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Ms. Leary, how many States, if you know, have 

a victims’ fund which is funded by fees by defendants that have to 

pay into the fund and/or State budgets financing as well? 

Ms. LEARY. Well, VOCA, the Federal, is completely comprised of 

fines from criminal offenders on the Federal level. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Right, but on the State level, do you happen to 

know how many States have that same type of program? 

Ms. LEARY. I know that Texas has one. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I know that. 

97 

Ms. LEARY. You know, we will get the information for you about 

other States—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. I would be curious about that. 

Ms. LEARY [continuing]. That have about that, yes. 

Mr. GOHMERT. I do like to help States and people that are willing 

to help themselves. 

Ms. LEARY. Sure. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Also, Mr. Sullivan, you have mentioned that you 

never got a call for one of those studies. Has CURE applied for 

grants? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. We are an advocacy organization; we are not a 

service. We don’t get into it—that is where we can be objective. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Oh, okay. Thank you. 

Let’s see. 

Let me ask Mr. Marone. You know, we have had hearings on the 

DNA backlogs and had a lot of testimony over that issue. And we 

passed the Debbie Smith Bill to help address the problem. One of 

the concerns I have had is that it seems some labs are very efficient, do a terrific job, and have worked like crazy to reduce their 

backlogs. I am concerned that some that are not as efficient, don’t 

do as good a job, don’t have as good a work product, are the ones 

that end up screaming they need more money than anybody else 

because they have got the bigger backlog. 

Do you know of anything presently that may deal with that issue 

to try to encourage better efficiency and less inefficiency in the 

award of those type of grants? 

Mr. MARONE. Well, one of the things we have to do is determine 

what the actual backlog is. I know a number of issues with laboratories is, someone will ask the question, how many cases are backlogged? And that is really not the number that the lab made. They 

ask the police department. They may have a particular number, 

and they are giving anything that is in the inventory, when in 

point of fact some of those cases might be cases that are there, 

but—— 

Mr. GOHMERT. Our time is limited, but if you could. I understand 

the problems with getting to a number. I am just talking about the 

process that may encourage inefficiency and discourage efficiency. 

Mr. MARONE. Well, certainly one of the big-ticket items as far 

as—from an increase in productivity standpoint, is not just throwing more people at it. What some laboratories do is they just add 

more people to do the same operation, and that then spirals to 

more equipment, meaning more space, meaning everything. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Well, the laboratories—— 

Mr. MARONE. What we really need to do is move to robotics and 

that type of application, where you can actually have the same 

number of people doing more work. 

Mr. GOHMERT. But I guess what I am really asking from you 

would take more time if it is done right. Would you mind submitting suggestions in writing to this Committee—— 

Mr. MARONE. Absolutely. 

Mr. GOHMERT [continuing]. On ways that we could encourage 

more efficiency by the awarding of grants and discourage less efficiency. 

Mr. MARONE. Sure. 

98 

Mr. GOHMERT. If you wouldn’t mind, because of your specialty, 

that would be a huge help. 

Mr. MARONE. Absolutely. 

Mr. GOHMERT. Thank you. 

Mr. SCOTT. The gentleman yields back, and we just have a couple 

of minutes before we have to leave. 

So let me ask Mr. Marone. As chairman of the Consortium of Forensic Science Organizations, do you have a recommended level of 

funding or what we could do? 

Mr. MARONE. Mr. Scott, I remember you asked me that question 

before. And the answer is, I don’t have a particular number. What 

we need to do is, we need to assess actually what the numbers are, 

what the requirements are. As I said before, we need to really get 

a good number as to what we are talking about. 

We need to ask the right question when we are asking for those 

surveys as to what is a case, what is a sample. Laboratories don’t 

use that same terminology, and that is part of the problem. 

Mr. SCOTT. And Mr. Sullivan, you mentioned the abolition of parole. Has there been a study to ascertain whether or not that has 

reduced crime or not? 

Mr. SULLIVAN. Mr. Scott, I looked for that on the web. And basically what I saw evaluating the entire prison grant program were 

in-house studies promoting it. I never saw any study that actually 

looked at the prison grant program, whether abolishing parole, did 

this help in general? We, like I say, placed $3 billion into it, but it was all either promoting it, saying that it has worked and what it has been, but 

nothing really objective. And that would certainly seem to me 

would be one of the things OJP would have contracted out and 

making sure they don’t give it to someone who is getting money 

from this. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, as you have heard, we have to get to the floor 

just about immediately. So I would like to thank the witnesses for 

their testimony. Members undoubtedly will have additional questions in writing which we will forward to you and ask that you answer as promptly as you can so that your answers may be made 

part of the record. 

Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 1 

week for the submission of additional materials. 

And without objection, the Subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:48 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(99) 

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SHEILA JACKSON LEE, A REPRESENTATIVE

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE

CONSTITUTION, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this oversight hearing on Department 

of Justice Office of Justice Programs (OJP). I look forward to hearing from and 

questioning Acting Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Sedgewick of OJP regarding 

OJP and its component’s missions, accomplishments, and its challenges. I also look 

forward to hearing testimony and questions our witnesses from organizations that 

represent the interests of OJP’s customers and will provide their assessment of 

OJP’s accomplishments and challenges. 

This hearing will examine the mission of OJP. The mission of OJP is to increase 

public safety and improve the fair administration of justice across America through 

innovative leadership and programs. The agency seeks to accomplish its mission by 

providing and coordinating information, research and development, statistics, training, and support to help the justice community, meet its public safety goals, and 

embrace local decision-making, while encouraging local innovation through national 

policy leadership. OJP implements is methods through the specific missions of its 

constituent organizations including, among others, the Bureau of Justice Assistance, 

the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Institute of Justice, the Office of Victims of Crime and the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 

OJP serves a crucial role in supporting the Nation’s criminal justice systems and 

as such its programs affect eth quality of life for all Americans. OJP’s successes are 

many. However, OJP has also incurred a number of controversies, which the subcommittee will explore by examining testimony about programs its administers. The 

following sections detail the areas of OJP responsibility where the Subcommittee 

would like to concentrate. 

I look forward to hearing from the many representatives from the Bureau of Justice Assistance; the National Institute of Justice; the Office of Juvenile Justice and 

Delinquency Prevention. 

The Bureau of Justice Assistance provides leadership and assistance to local 

criminal justice programs that improve and reinforce the nation’s criminal justice 

system. BJA’s goals are to reduce and prevent crime, violence, and drug abuse and 

to improve the way in which the criminal justice system functions. 

To accomplish its goals, BJA administers numerous grant programs intended to 

support the nation’s criminal justice systems. Many of these programs have enjoyed 

success with little controversy such as the Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Program, 

which provides death benefits, educational opportunities and other assistance to 

survivors of fallen law enforcement officers, firefighters, and other first responders. 

There are programs that have also had serious setbacks, we will explore those programs in this hearing. Some of those will include Byrne-JAG and other grants. 

Byrne-JAG is important because it has experienced serious cutbacks. There have 

been serious backlogs and problems with DNA samples. 

The National Institute of Justice is the research, development, and evaluation 

agency of the Department of Justice and is dedicated to researching crime control 

and justice issues. The Subcommittee will question NIJ officials about the number 

of criminal justice issues that the agency has researched and evaluated. In addition, 

the Subcommittee will discuss as to NIJ’s plans for researching future issues. 

Forensic Science is one of NIJ’s most important research and funding areas. It 

has been affected give the President’s cuts on DNA and because of changes to programs like the Debbie Smith Act. 

The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention provides national leadership, coordination, and resources to prevent and respond to juvenile delinquency 

100 

and victimization. It’s mission is to support states and communities in their efforts 

to develop and implement effective and coordinated prevention and intervention programs. Also, its mission is to improve the juvenile justice system so that it protects 

public safety, holds offenders accountable, and provides treatment and rehabilitative 

services tailored to the needs of juveniles and their families. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome today’s witnesses. I yield back the balance 

of my time. 

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1 VOCA Funding Survey. (2008). National Center for Victims of Crime. http://www.nnedv.org/ 

docs/Policy/VOCAlSurveyResults.pdf 2Domestic Violence Counts 07: A 24-hour census of domestic violence shelters and services 

across the United States. (2008) National Network to End Domestic Violence. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUE ELSE, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL NETWORK TO END

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (NNEDV) 

Chairman Scott and Ranking Member Gohmert and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to submit written testimony for this hearing on the oversight of the Office of Justice Programs. We are grateful to the subcommittee for your leadership and your ongoing work to improve the safety and 

well-being of our nation. 

The National Network to End Domestic Violence (NNEDV) is a membership and 

advocacy organization representing the 54 state and U.S. territory domestic violence 

coalitions. NNEDV is the voice of these coalitions, their more than 2,000 local domestic violence member programs, and the millions of domestic violence survivors 

who turn to them for services. 

The Victims of Crime Act (VOCA) fund state victim assistance grants are a key 

source of funding for programs that directly assist crime victims, including crisis 

intervention, assistance with the criminal justice process, safety planning, counseling, support, court accompaniment, and much more. Domestic violence, sexual assault, and general victim services programs all have pressing needs to expand their 

outreach and service components. Some 4,400 agencies rely on continued VOCA 

funding to serve over 4 million victims a year. 

In a recent survey, over 99% of domestic violence service providers indicated that 

VOCA funds were a ‘‘very important’’ source of funding.1 When the FY 2008 Budget 

cut $35 million from the VOCA Fund, our member programs were understandably 

shocked and very distraught. They knew that this cut would have a devastating impact on domestic violence service providers, who serve victims and their children 

who are often fleeing from life-threatening violence. 

According to the survey, as a result of the VOCA cuts, over 58% of victim service 

providers said they would serve fewer victims and over 46% said they would provide 

fewer services. A clear message from the survey was that funding cuts would have 

an immediate and significant impact. 

Even before the VOCA cuts, domestic violence service providers were already 

hampered by a lack of funding and resources. The National Census of Domestic Violence Services found that in one 24-hour time period domestic violence programs 

across the nation served over 53,200 women, men and children. Unfortunately, due 

to a lack of resources, 7,707 requests for services were unmet during that same 

day.2 Funding cuts widen the gap caused by an increased demand for services and 

declining resources. 

These devastating funding cuts were exacerbated by the delay in distributing the 

VOCA state victim assistance grants. While waiting for VOCA assistance grants to 

be distributed in June, over 86% of states surveyed indicated that their VOCA funding was in a serious, very serious, or dire situation because of the delay. 

Victim service providers serve vulnerable victims with very limited resources. 

Waiting with uncertainty for an essential and significant funding stream cripples 

programs’ planning processes, jeopardizes staff positions, and, most importantly, endangers victims who rely upon services in times of crisis. 

As a coalition of domestic violence advocates and service providers, we know that 

the services provided by our member programs are critical and life-saving. As the 

demand for services continues to increase, victim service providers struggle to meet 

the needs of all the victims who come forward for help. The VOCA state victim assistance grants are essential for victim service providers to keep their doors open 

and provide services to victims in crisis. Therefore, we urge Congress to continually 

provide oversight to ensure that the VOCA state victim assistance grants are distributed in a timely manner. 

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