Issue 6 Fall / Winter 2010

Selection of Simulants 

for Barrier 

Material Permeation 

Testing

5th Annual Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Conference Computed Image Backscatter Radiography: 

A Novel Method for Non-Destructive 

Examination

More than Just Breaking Things...

The 20th Support Command Nuclear 

Disablement Teams in Action

The Use of Sentinel Animals for 

Detection of a Biological 

Weapons Attack

Electromagnetic 

Threats to the 

National Power Grid 

(NPG): 

An Update

Government Medical 

Countermeasures and 

Public Acceptance, 

a Mismatch?

Validation of the Chemical 

Warfare Agent Simulant Selection 

Process for Barrier 

Material Permeation Testing 
45

COMBATING WMD

3 5th Annual Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction Conference 

By MAJ Robert Cox

4 The Use of Sentinel Animals for 

Detection of a Biological Weapons Attack 

By LTC Doug Lewis

11 Government Medical Countermeasures 

and Public Acceptance, a Mismatch?

By LTC Doug Lewis 

17 More Than Just Breaking Things...

The 20th Support Command Nuclear 

Disablement Teams in Action 

By LTC Bret C. Kinman, and 

LTC Paul Argo

Inside the Journal 

HISTORY

51 A Brief History of the Defense Nuclear 

Weapons School

By LTC Eugene V. Sheely

 

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

22 Electromagnetic Threats to the National 

Power Grid (NPG): An Update

By Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer

28 Selection of Simulants for Barrier Material 

Permeation Testing

By Darren Jolley, Brad Rowland, Laurence Adair, 

Mark Hanning-Lee, Gregory Bottelberghe, 

Frank Hanson, Kaushik Gandhi, John Walther, 

Lindsey Wurster, Patrice Abercrombie, Ray 

Jablonski, Ann Butrow

35 Validation of the Chemical Warfare Agent 

Simulant Selection Process for Barrier Material 

Permeation Testing 

By Darren Jolley, Brad Rowland, Brian Bennett, 

Laurence Adair, Aaron Orland, Gregory Siddoway, Jean Baker, Mark Hanning-Lee, Gregory 

Bottelberghe, Michael Giessing, Adam Green, 

Cody Castagno, Richard Warby, Tsenu Mamo, 

Jon Kaufman

45 Computed Image Backscatter Radiography: A Novel Method for Non-Destructive 

Examination

By MAJ Christopher Meng,

COL Jeffery Musk, and 

Dr. Edward Dugan

49 Collaborative Technology Advances 

Secure Global Communications

By Mr. Jack Reigel and

Mr. Glen L. Scott

Observant? Find all 13 clouds they’re hiding in plain sight!

22
1 From The Director

By Mr. Peter Bechtel 

 

 

DO YOU KNOW...

20 The Size of One Nanometer?

By Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer 

Book Review

53 One Second After

By Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer 

54 Combating 

WMD Resources 

COLUMNS

Published by the 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA)

Director

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Editor

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Editorial Board

Mr. Mark W. Fishback, Operations Division 

Mr. Joseph Nellis, Capabilities Division 

Dr. Jon Calomiris, Analysis Division

Design/Layout

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United 

States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are 

those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal’s contents does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army 

positions and does not supersede information in other official Army publications.

Distribution: U.S. Army organizations and activities with CBRN-related missions, 

to include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear 

surety programs, and FA52 officer. The Secretary of the Army has determined that 

the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law. 

Article Submission: We welcome articles from all U.S. Government agencies and 

academia involved with CBRN matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Submit 

articles in Microsoft Word without automatic features, include photographs, graphs, 

tables, etc. as separate files, please call or email us for complete details. 

The editor retains the right to edit and select which submissions to print.

Mailing Address: 

Director, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA)

5915 16th Street Bldg 238 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-0529.

Telephone: 703-806-7858, DSN 656-7858, Fax 703-806-7900

Electronic Mail: USANCA2@conus.army.mil

Subject line: ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal (enter subject)

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

Combating WMD 

Resource Page 17
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

T 

FROM THE DIRECTOR

Framing the Debate

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Director 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

1

he challenges posed by WMD are acute, 

persistent, and complex. Naturally occurring health threats and the constant drumbeat from terrorism at home and abroad keeps 

Combating or Countering WMD (CWMD) in the 

forefront. CWMD with its 3 pillars and 8 mission 

areas crosses all six of the Army‟s major warfighting functions. CWMD operations and the 

development of versatile Army capabilities and 

capacity to support those operations, now and 

into the future require a coordinated effort 

throughout the Army enterprise as well as synchronization with on-going Joint, Interagency 

and Intenational efforts. USANCA has made it 

an agency priority to work with the CWMD enterprise to ensure appropriate level discussions 

and actions are taken to address CWMD challenges. 

 USANCA is shaping strategic thinking concerning CWMD. Under the OSD concept of “Big 

Think” that addressed the challenges and risk 

from various “loose-nuke” scenarios, USANCA 

planners developed a framework under which 

the Army would likely operate. Using this framework, the Army Staff looked at established force 

structure and potential tasks and requirements 

as they might impact current strategies for force 

deployment, force development and acquisition. 

These discussions were informed by and shared 

with the enterprise at various levels. A major 

outcome of these deliberations is a TRADOC led 

capabilities based assessment on the Army‟s 

roles, responsibilities and capabilities for land 

interdiction of nuclear weapons and materials. 

Interdiction is one of the CWMD mission areas 

not specifically assigned a proponent within the 

Army and is illustrative of the requirement to 

synchronize CWMD across the warfighting functions. WMD interdiction is predominately maneuver enabled by intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance (ISR) and CBRN forces. Synchronization and collaboration are paramount to 

the Army‟s success. Furthermore, a holistic 

CWMD strategy that is part of the Army Campaign Plan will assist greatly in moving key strategic issues forward.

 USANCA is reviewing and reinforcing a doctrinal foundation. After a top to bottom review of 

current doctrinal products concerning WMD, 

working with Geographic Combatant Commands 

( G C C s ) , U . S . S t r a t e g i c C o m m a n d 

Mr. Peter Bechtel 

Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 2

(USSTRATCOM), and Amry Service Component 

Commands (ASCCs) in development of CWMD 

plans, and anticipating the need for an Army 

CWMD strategy, USANCA identified several 

doctrinal disconnects and gaps. Some parts of 

doctrine were merely outdated such as the language in FM 100-30 (Nuclear Operations). 

Some parts of doctrine were missing. For example, JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for CWMD, provides 

great strategic-level doctrine defining the 8 mission areas. FMs and TTPs exist and are adequate for tactical level execution of most CWMD 

tasks. However, the operational doctrine defining how commanders organize and C2 CWMD 

on the battlefield and operationalize the tenants 

of JP 3-40 still requires development. This lack 

of clear operational-level CWMD doctrine was 

noted and many lessons learned as a result of 

planning efforts with the 20th SUPCOM (CBRNE) 

in its JTF-Elimination role and its integration into 

the larger scheme of maneuver. Additionally, 

current doctrine does not fully address nuclear 

weapon employment or the nuclear weapon risk 

in an asymmetric environment. One of these 

gaps came from the cancellation of JP 3-12 

(Joint Doctrine for Nuclear Operations). Recently the Joint Staff approved the reestablishment of this doctrine. USANCA is working 

closely with the Joint community to develop a 

new joint nuclear doctrine that meets the needs 

of the joint warfighter, now and in the future. 

While on the surface nuclear doctrine may appear to be the purview of USSTRATCOM, the 

ASCC, normally established as the Land Component Commander, is significantly impacted by 

nuclear weapon use. Doctrine development is a 

slow and methodical process and be assured 

that our efforts require support and input from 

the field. 

 USANCA‟s primary method for gaining support from the field is through our continuing planning support. USANCA has remained engaged 

with the supporting planning efforts at the ASCC 

and Field Army level. As is endemic across the 

force, resources are limited, and so too are the 

number of USANCA planners. Fortunately 

CWMD supporting plans are being worked on 

separate timelines and have not been due at the 

same time. This has allowed USANCA planners 

to move from one theater to another, focusing 

support. Interestingly, planning support has not 

been limited to CWMD, but has included engagement with theater campaign plans for partnership capacity building and other supporting 

annexes. The Army G-3/5/7 is looking at ways to 

use the Civil Military Emergency Preparedness 

(CMEP) program and resources as a tool to support the ASCCs. The current thinking is to establish CMEP as a global “tool” that will serve as 

an umbrella to pull in consequence management, health affair, security, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and combating WMD. 

Much work on that front remains ahead of us, 

but great strides have been made in a relatively 

short time. A key objective is to plan and execute Theater Security Cooperation and Building 

Partner Capacity that support and shape the 

later phases of theater CWMD plans and objectives.

 The Army CWMD conference in September 

has been the foundation and catalysis for much 

of USANCA‟s activities. Building consensus and 

developing relationships through planning and 

coordination have been paramount as we‟ve begun moving the enterprise forward. At the last 

conference we agreed to host periodic operations coordination world-wide SVTCs to continue 

the collaboration beyond the conference. The 

first session is scheduled for late January. I fully 

anticipate that the outcome from that will further 

shape the CWMD enterprise, provide insight for 

the Army CWMD strategy, and drive the community toward a more synchronized and focused 

CWMD operational stance.
3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

T 

5th Annual Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Conference

MAJ Robert Cox

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

he United States Army Nuclear and Combating 

Weapons of MassDestructionAgency (USANCA) 

conducted the 5th Annual Army Combating WMD 

Conference from September 14th to 16th on Ft. Belvoir, 

Virginia. The focus of this year‟s conference was the 

development of Phase 0 shaping tasks, specifically Security Cooperation and Building Partner Capacity.

 BG Leslie C. Smith, Commanding General, 20th

Support Command CBRNE provided the keynote address for the conference with a presentation that expanded upon the concept of Building Partner Capacity 

utilizing a real world example with the Iraqi Chemical 

Defense Company. BG Smith‟s presentation set the 

stage for a successful conference that included presentations that encompassed the gamut of the CWMD 

community of interest including the CWMD Enterprise, 

Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness (CMEP), National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF), Counter 

Nuclear Threats (CNT), and the role of the Technical 

Escort Chemical Battalion.

 Representatives from each Army Command 

(ACOM), every Army Service Component Command 

(ASCC), and several Direct Reporting Units (DRU) as 

well as invited service staffs attended the conference. A 

highlight this year was a brief from each ASCC highlighting expected enemy course of actions, CWMD exercises and engagement highlights, as well as activities 

specifically directed towards theater campaign plans 

and security cooperation.

 The Army CWMD Conference provided a forum for 

cross-theater coordination and information sharing on a 

personal level, and the sharing of perspectives, insights, and lessons learned that is not normally available to members of the CWMD community thus allowing more efficient integration, implementation, and execution of CWMD policy and strategy. Numerous actionable items emerged from the conference including 

planned quarterly SVTC. 

 The next Army CWMD Conference is tentatively 

scheduled 13 - 15 September 2011.

MAJ Robert M. Cox serves in the Nuclear Counterproliferation Officer career field as a Nuclear Effects Officer at 

the United States Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction Agency at Ft. Belvoir, VA. He was 

previously assigned as Commander, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company, 1st Engineer Brigade, Ft. Leonard 

Wood, MO. His email address is

robert.matthew.cox@us.army.mil.

COMBATING WMD

BG Leslie C. Smith addresses the 5th Annual 

Army CWMD Conference
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 4

I 

ntroduction

 The scarcity of historical data 

regarding attacks with biological 

weapons means any attempt to assess the biological weapons threat is 

largely based upon modeling and 

individual interpretation. While many 

argue as to the real threat of biological weapons, most can at least agree 

that however small the threat is not 

zero. The military considers biological weapons a real threat and has 

invested in the development of detectors and protective capabilities. Currently the military has several systems to detect a biological attack. 

These systems are based upon three 

basic detection technologies; polymerase chain reaction, antibody detection or laser based detection. 

 Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) 

and antibody based sensors rely 

upon an aerosol collection device 

which feeds a sample into a separate 

detection unit. Sensors based upon 

PCR are more sensitive but can take 

several hours to detect after the sample is collected. Antibody based detection is faster (15-30 min) than PCR 

but much less sensitive, and subject 

to false positives from environmental 

contamination. Both of these technologies are point detectors, detecting agent at the location of the detector, which does not provide a “detect 

to warn” capability.

 The only capability to provide 

“standoff” detection (detection at a 

distance from the sensor) uses sensors based upon lasers. These sensors rely upon absorption and florescence of laser light by biological particles to characterized clouds of organisms which can be meters to kilometers from the sensor. These sensors 

are the least developed to date and 

face significant issues with range and 

discrimination from background contamination. 

 The reality of the deployed or austere military environment places stringent requirements on sensors such 

as power consumption, weight, durability, interoperability, cost, consumables etc. When a military unit is in 

an operational environment biological 

detection is only one of many concerns the unit may have, and may be 

of low priority based upon other 

threats the unit may be facing and 

intelligence estimates of the threat 

environment. 

 For all these reasons a military 

unit or base may not deploy operational biological weapons sensors. A 

system or detection scheme that can 

reduce logistical or manpower constraints has a better chance of being 

utilized. Is it possible that animals 

could serve as detectors for biological 

agents? If so the military could deploy sentinel animals with units to 

provide detection of biological agents. 

This paper will attempt to identify and 

characterize candidate sentinel animals for several biological agents of 

concern. 

Sentinel Animals

 Sixty one percent of human diseases are zoonotic (diseases of animals) 1

so many biological agents will 

affect multiple host organisms. It may 

be possible to identify, and then deploy animals with military units to provide early warning to a biological 

weapons attack. A classic example 

of a sentinel animal detection system 

is the case of veterinarians reporting 

dead crows weeks prior to West Nile 

Virus emerging in humans.2 

 An animal detection system could 

be designed in several ways. A 

straightforward use of animals is to 

deploy an animal sentinel in a cage 

on a base where it will be exposed to 

the same environment as the military 

personnel. The animals are then 

checked periodically for indicators of 

disease. Any change in the animal‟s 

health would alert medical personnel 

to a deviation from the environmental 

baseline. Ideally the animal would be 

killed by the agent, making determination of health status a binary decision, not subject to interpretation or 

requiring physical examination such 

as temperature measurement.

 Animals need not be in cages on 

the base to serve as sentinel. Local 

domestic or farm animals can serve 

as sentinels. Personnel outside the 

base should be aware of any diseased or dead animals which could 

indicate the presence of a biological 

agent. Wild animals can serve as 

sentinels as well. If a good match is 

present between a suspected threat 

agent and a local wild animal, that 

animal can be periodically observed 

or actively trapped and examined for 

the presence of the biological agent.

 For an animal to serve as a useful 

sentinel it must offer some advantage 

over a human target. One characteristic that would define a successful 

animal sentinel model is the animal 

succumbs to the agent faster than a 

human, providing medical personnel 

an opportunity to implement medical 

countermeasures prior to the human 

exhibiting symptoms. It should be 

noted that these detection methods 

will not provide an alert to prevent 

infection as the base population 

would be exposed with the animal. 

However, for many biological agents 

providing countermeasures prior to 

emergence of symptoms greatly improves the chance of survival.

 Another characteristic that would 

define a candidate sentinel animal is 

greater susceptibly, where a lower 

dose of agent would cause infection 

in the sentinel animal but not the human population. This can serve to 

The Use of Sentinel Animals for 

Detection of a Biological Weapons Attack

LTC Doug Lewis

PhD Student, George Mason University
5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

alert medical personnel of possible 

failed attacks, collateral exposure 

from a different attack, or even local 

endemic disease state. A sentinel 

animal should also demonstrate easily identifiable clinical signs as a result 

of infection allowing quick identification.3 Any test that requires blood 

work, swabs, necropsy etc would add 

additional requirements on military 

personnel and will reduce the utility of 

the sentinel model system. 

 Animal sentinels detection may 

also use a vaccinated vs. unvaccinated population.3

 An example of 

this would be a colony of mice used 

as a sentinel against Tularemia. The 

colony would be divided into a vaccinated and unvaccinated population. 

Upon exposure to the threat agent 

the unvaccinated mice should demonstrate symptoms while the vaccinated mice remain health. This strategy provides a built in control/

confirmation capability and can help 

rule out other diseases that may be 

causing illness in the mice. A variation of this approach could utilize susceptible and resistant strains of the 

same species. 

 To have a military utility, candidate animals have several desirable 

characteristics. Generally, smaller 

animals would be better requiring less 

space and a reduced logistical footprint. The animal should be easy to 

care for, require no exotic food, bedding, environment etc. It must be 

able to survive transport with the military unit as it is deployed, and be able 

to survive exposure to the local environment.

 The literature did not reveal a 

dedicated research effort (Department 

of Defense (DOD) or civilian) to methodically test animals for the capability to serve as sentinels against threat 

agents. There are some older descriptions of affects on animals produced by researchers from the United 

States (U.S.) Army Medical Research 

Institute of Infectious Diseases, 

(USAMRIID), most likely a result of 

the U.S. offensive biological weapons 

program. These sources are extremely useful as the researchers 

often exposed animals to aerosolized 

agents, as would be expected from 

an actual attack. As the United 

States has abandoned its biological 

weapons program, most recent data 

has been generated for other purposes with varying degrees of applicability to biological weapons.

 Current research predominantly 

falls into two categories; disease affects on animals as described in the 

veterinary literature, or researchers 

seeking to identify animal models for 

drug or vaccine development. However, caution must be taken as many 

researchers utilize specific strains of 

the causative agents or special 

strains of the animal model. These 

data points may provide useful to 

identify potential sentinel animal candidates, but sentinel animals would to 

be tested specifically for exposure 

route and causative agent purpose 

prior to use in the field.

 Literature searches revealed only 

two attempts to develop a systematic 

description biological weapons affects 

on animals; “Animals as Early Detectors of Bioevents” by Diane Gubernot 

and “Animals as Sentinels of Bioterrorism Agents” by Peter Rabinowitz. 

Peter Rabinowitz has also produced 

the “Canary Database” (http://

canarydatabase.org) which attempts 

to cross reference diseases and 

chemicals of interest with animals 

that have some capability to serve as 

sentinels. Within these efforts, as 

would be expected, greater information is available on higher threat 

agents like Anthrax, with less information available on agents such as 

Glanders . Event within these databases, the available references are 

spotty at best.

Anthrax

 Anthrax is caused by the bacteria 

Bacillus anthracis. A spore forming 

bacteria that primarily infects grazing 

animals. As a biological weapon the 

spores are extremely effective if dispersed as an aerosol allowing infection via the respiratory tract, causing 

pulmonary Anthrax. For humans the 

infectious dose is relatively high, estimated in the thousands of spores. 

Inhalation Anthrax is deadly with a 

mortality rate of 45% treated and 90-

100% untreated. 4 The literature on 

the incubation period for inhalation 

Anthrax in humans is variable, Iowa 

State‟s Anthrax site states two days 

to several weeks 6 while USAMRIID„s 

Medical Management of Biological 

Casualties Handbook, (known as “the 

blue book”) states 1-6 days. 5

 Mice, guinea pigs and rabbits are 

routinely used in the laboratory as 

models to study Anthrax. These studies provide information on lethal 

doses (LD) for the animals, and also 

highlight the effect of animal strains 

and infectious dose on survival. In 

mice lethal doses ranged from 1,900 

spores to 34,000 spores depending 

upon the strain of mouse used, while 

time to death was approx 2-3 days 

after receiving a dose of 100 LD50. 

6 

Studies using a lower infectious dose 

of 5 LD50 saw 20% survival in mice 

with a time to death of 2-8 days. 7 

Rabbits showed similar results, animals exposed to 100 lethal doses (1 

lethal does is 1 x105spores) died in 2

-4 days. 8In guinea pigs the lethal 

dose is reported as 7.9 X 104spores. 

Exposure of 216 LD50 resulted in 

death an average time to death of 2.3 

days.45

 

 From a military operational standpoint any of these animals could be 

candidate sentinels based upon size, 

logistical requirements and relative 

ease of care. Mice would probably 

be preferred based upon size. If one 

assumes the human LD50 is 2,000-

5,000 spores, all of these animals 

have similar susceptibility. The advantage of these animals is that, with 

higher doses, they start to die after 

about two days. This is when human 

symptoms would start appearing, so 

sentinel death may provide a small 

opportunity to initiate treatment prior 

to the majority of human cases demonstrating symptoms, or at a minimum could serve to corroborate initial 

symptoms being reported by medical 

personnel.

 Studies from the Sverdlovsk Anthrax release indicate that two animal 

species, sheep and cows may have 

greater susceptibility to Anthrax when 

compared to humans. Analysis of the 

release indicated that in several 

towns along the predicted axis of 

deposition sheep and cows died of 

Anthrax while no humans in the vil-
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 6

lages became sick. Computer modeling of the release predict these animals received a dose of Anthrax one 

order of magnitude less than the areas reporting human outbreaks. 9 

Analysis of Anthrax outbreaks in 

Texas indicated that horses and 

mules had greater incidence of Anthrax when compared to cows, possibly due to different grazing habits 

which expose horses to more soil 

than cows. 10

 As militarily significant animals, 

cows, sheep and horses would not be 

useful sentinel animals. However, as 

ruminant animals are a natural host of 

Anthrax, and are exposed to any 

ground contamination through grazing, they may have some utility. In 

the case of a failed or remote Anthrax 

attack local ruminant animals may be 

affected by an attack that did not impact military personnel. Military doctrine already teaches soldiers to be 

aware of wildlife deaths as an indicator of hazardous environments 

(chemical or biological). Likewise 

monitoring local pastures may be a 

possible indicator of a low level exposure. Any military unit located near 

farmland should be especially aware 

of the health status of these animals

 One animal that the military specifically deploys with are military 

working dogs. However, canines are 

extremely resistant to Anthrax and 

would not serve as a sentinel species. Researchers from Ft. Detrick 

subjected pigs and dogs to Anthrax 

aerosols. Both animals developed 

pulmonary lesions, and researchers 

were able to recover viable Anthrax 

from the animals. However, they did 

not develop systemic Anthrax, or exhibit high mortality rates.11 

Plague

 Plague is caused by the bacteria 

Yersinia pestis. As a disease, Plague 

can present in humans in three forms; 

bubonic, septicemic and pneumonic. 

The most common natural route of 

infection for humans is through the 

bite of an infected flea. As a biological weapon, Y. pestis would most 

likely be delivered via an aerosol, 

resulting primarily in the pneumonic 

manifestation. USAMRIID‟s stated 

infectious dose is 500-1,500 organisms. 5

 Most human symptoms would 

appear 2-4 days post attack with a 

range of 1-6 days. Case mortality 

rate without antibiotics approaches 

100%. 12

 Over 200 mammalian species can 

be infected with Plague. 13 Animals of 

interest include; coyotes, skunks and 

raccoons which can seroconvert without symptoms. Plague is fatal to 

chipmunks, wood rats, ground squirrels, deer mice and vols. The animal 

with the highest mortality rate is prairie dogs where it approaches 100%. 

14

 The high mortality rate and relative ease of maintenance in captivity 

would make prairie dogs a candidate 

sentinel animal. However incubation 

time between prairie dogs and humans is similar.15 

 At best prairie 

dogs could serve to confirm an attack 

but would do little to assist with preemptive medical intervention.

 Cats are relatively susceptible to 

Plague. Infection of cats via infected 

mice producing illness in 81% of cats. 

16 Cats may provide a small window 

for early medical intervention. There 

is evidence indicates that for inhalation acquired Yersinia pestis the incubation period for cats is 1-2 days 

while human incubation can take from 

1-6 days. 17 While the incubation 

times overlap, the average onset time 

for cat infections appears earlier than 

in humans. 

 As with Anthrax, dogs appear relatively resistant to Plague with fever 

reported from infection but no mortality. 18

 It is good that military working 

dog assets have a natural resistance 

to Plague, but removes readily available and deployed animal from contention as a sentinel species. The 

ability of dogs to harbor Plague without severe symptoms 19 may be of 

concern as they could serve as a reservoir for human spread

Tularemia

 Tularemia is a bacterial disease 

 Military working dog in Afghanistan. Photo Credit: DOD
7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

caused by Francisella tularensis. Two 

sub species exist with the type A 

strain much more infectious and 

deadlier than the B strain. 20 It is a 

naturally occurring disease in rabbits, 

hares and some ticks. 21 As a biological weapon, deployed as an aerosol, 

Pulmonary Tularemia would have a 

mortality rate of approx 50% untreated, but with antibiotics that would 

be reduced to approximately 2%. 20 In 

humans (and most animals) Tularemia has an extremely low infectious 

dose, on the order of ten organisms. 5

For this reason there is little expectation that a sentinel animal species 

could be selected based upon greater 

susceptibility. 

 In addition to its low infectious 

dose Tularemia affects humans and 

many animals rapidly. In humans 

the disease latency period is approximately 3-5 days, 21

 but can range 

from 1-14 days. 20 Many standard 

laboratory animals (mice, rabbits and 

guinea pigs) are susceptible to Tularemia and are killed too “rapidly” to be 

suitable laboratory models. 22 Mice 

challenged with an aerosol delivery 

die within 4-7 days of exposure 23

which is similar to human parameters. 

Infected marmosets also follow a disease course similar to humans. With 

a dose of one LD50 (less than 10 organisms), temperature rise was observed approximately 2.5 days after 

infection followed by death 12-18 

hours later. 24

 Researchers looking for vaccine 

modes using mice report that numerous species of mice can withstand up 

t a 105injection of Tularemia post 

vaccination, but all species were still 

susceptible to aerosol challenge 

(vaccinated or unvaccinated) with 

time to death ranging from 5-21 days 

depending upon species. 23 The wide 

range in time to death between species highlights an additional challenge 

for selecting sentinel animals. Most 

laboratory work is done with specific 

species and strains of animals. Any 

data regarding mortality or susceptibility may not be universal for all. Any 

detection scheme must ensure that 

the correct strain is picked for deployment.

 It might be possible to use animals 

as sentinels for Tularemia utilizing a 

susceptible species and nonsusceptible species scheme. A laboratory animal that demonstrates much 

greater resistance to Tularemia is 

Sprague-Dawley rats (dosed at 105

organisms).22 Death of a susceptible 

mouse strain, accompanied by survival of the Sprague-Dawley rats 

could indicate a Tularemia attack.

 Other animals that show resistance 

to Tularemia include pigs, where experimental does of 106 organisms 

were required to induce mild symptoms appeared. 25

 Likewise, dogs 

and chickens demonstrate much 

greater resistance to Tularemia. 26 

This is good because military working 

dogs will have natural immunity while 

performing their duties, but unfortunate in that if they were susceptible 

they would serve as good, mobile 

sensors.

Encephalitis Viruses

 Multiple Encephalitis viruses exist 

in nature and have the potential to be 

weaponized. Most of these viruses 

are maintained in animal reservoirs 

and are transferred to humans 

through infected mosquitoes. This is 

one area where public health programs have initiated sentinel animal 

programs. The USAMRIID blue book 

states that in natural outbreaks 

equine mortality “always” precedes 

disease in humans. 5In outbreaks 

where human deaths are reported the 

ratio of equine deaths to humans runs 

approximately 100:1. 27

 A relatively robust sentinel system 

has been established domestically for 

many Encephalitis viruses using birds 

as sentinel animals. Reports of dead 

crows preceding West Nile Virus in 

humans is a classic example of sentinel animals. 2 Chickens are used as 

sentinels for St. Louis Encephalitis in 

Florida, where detection is based 

upon weekly blood draws or PCR on 

nasal swabs. 28

 

 Michigan‟s Encephalitis surveillance plan depends upon trapping 

and testing mosquitoes for the West 

Nile Virus and Eastern Equine Encephalitis viruses. Reporting and 

testing of dead birds has been discontinued as evidence indicated wild 

birds had become relatively resistant 

to lethal viral infections. 29

 While these plans are successful 

in gauging the natural background of 

Encephalitis viruses and predicting 

possible outbreaks, they would be of 

limited utility against a biological attack. The testing schemes rely upon 

periodic sampling of animals via 

blood draw or swabs to check for the 

presence of virus. These types of 

tests would require additional time 

and equipment that would not be conducive for a military unit.

Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis 

(VEE)

 VEE was considered for use as a 

biological weapon by the United 

States. It has an extremely low infectious dose (tens of virons), with an 

incubation period of 2-6 days. 5 Additionally while the disease is highly 

infectious it is relatively benign in that 

only 1% of infected individuals will 

develop Encephalitis, with a subsequent 10% of those individuals dying.30 From a military standpoint this 

agent has been investigated as a 

more “humane” biological weapon, 

designed to incapacitate prior to an 

attack, without mass mortality. 

 Hamsters were also used in an 

attempt to survey for VEE in Florida. 

In the study 35 hamsters were exposed for approx 16 days. Sixteen of 

the hamsters died, but VEE was only 

recovered from one animal. Combined results from other sites recovered 6 VEE positive hamsters from 

60 sentinel animals. Of the 6 two 

died and 4 were described as “sick” 

but survived for 2 months.31 While 

these animals/collection techniques 

would not serve tactical sentinels they 

could work for medical or environmental personnel conducting a site 

survey of a base to help determine 

the local disease load.

Glanders 

 The causative agent of Glanders 

is Burkholderia mallei. Glanders is a 

relatively common zoonotic disease, 

but relatively rare in humans. Data 

on infectious dose, especially aerosol 

delivery, is not well documented but 

the disease is categorized as “highly 

infectious” with most laboratory infec-
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 8

tious acquired via routine handling vs. 

accidental inoculation. 32 USAMRIID 

does not have a specific infectious 

dose simply stating “low” for infectious dose.5

 When deployed in an 

aerosol attack the incubation period is 

expected to be 10-14 days. Untreated pulmonary infections usually 

proceed to the septicemic form of the 

disease. Death often occurs 1-2 days 

after septicemia develops.33

 Glanders is primarily a disease of 

horses, mules and donkeys. Cattle, 

pigs, mice and birds are highly resistant. Hamsters, guinea pigs and cats 

are also susceptible.46 Death in mules 

usually occurs in 3-4 weeks.5 Cats 

infected with Glanders develop yellow nasal discharge which becomes 

bloody, death usually occurs in 1-2 

weeks.33

 Research from (then) Camp 

Detrick provides an excellent summary of relative susceptibility for several species to Glanders and Melioidosis (discussed in next section). 

The study showed that Hamsters and 

ferrets were the most susceptible. 

Hamsters had a Minimum Lethal 

Dose (MLD) of 20 organisms and 

death occurred in approx 3 days, the 

MLD for ferrets was <90 organisms 

with death in 8-15 days. Guinea pigs 

were also susceptible with death in 1 

day to 3 weeks depending upon infectious dose (23-500,000). Rabbits 

were resistant, surviving an IV dose 

of 300 million organisms; as were 

white rats surviving infectious doses 

of 1 million. Mice were only slightly 

susceptible requiring a dose of 2.5 –

30 million organisms to kill, while infections of less than 450,000 organisms causing no death. For monkeys, doses of 1.5 million organisms 

caused abscesses, increased temperature and weigh loss.34

 Based upon the Fort Detrick data 

hamsters and guinea pigs could 

serve as sentinel animals for Glanders. They are susceptible to low infectious doses, respond to the infection quickly, and the disease is lethal 

for them. They are small, easy to 

care for and would have a relatively 

small logistics footprint. However, 

because of the relatively little amount 

of human data, it is not possible to 

compare sensitivity data. Also mortality rates are similar to what has 

been observed in humans. They 

might work better for low level exposures, but it would not be possible to 

know for sure how the animals or humans would respond to a massive 

dose associated with a near field biological release.

Melioidosis 

 Melioidosis is the disease caused 

by an infection with Burholderia pseudomallei. This bacterium is very similar to B. mallie, exhibiting over 70% 

DNA-DNA homology.35 In the literature and medical references Melioidosis and Glanders are often discussed together. The USAMRIID 

blue book gives guidance that the 

disease and symptom of Melioidosis 

is expected to be similar to Glanders 

in the case of a large scale aerosol 

inoculation expected in a biological 

attack. Infectious dose for humans 

via aerosol is categorized as “low,” 

with an incubation period of 1-21 

days and death in 2-3 days after development of septicemia.5

 In addition to aerosol research on 

Glanders (above), researchers from 

Camp Detrick also examined Melioidosis . The study showed that hamsters had a MLD of 60 organism 

(mortality in 80 hours); and ferrets 

had a MLD of <72 organisms (8-15 

days to mortality). These were the 

most susceptible animals.34 Hamsters 

and ferrets are relatively easy to care 

for and could be candidates as sentinel animals for Melioidosis , however 

the low incubation period in humans 

of possibly one day (but possibly up 

to years)5 would not assure every 

attack would be detected by animals 

prior to initial human casualties.

 Other animals can be ruled out as 

possible sentinels. Rabbits and rats 

are resistant. Rabbits survived an IV 

dose of 300 million organisms and 

rats showed mortality only after inoculations of 1 billion organisms. 

Monkey response was similar to 

Glanders, a 1.5 million organism dose 

was required to produce abscesses, 

elevated temperature and weigh loss. 

Results on guinea pigs were inconstant with mortality and survivors observed for every infectious dose over 

a range of 26 – 2.6 x 105organisms.34

 Other literature lists the disease as 

common among sheep and goats, 

rare in cows, and resistant in pigs and 

birds. Camels, grey seals and dolphins, fish, monkey and even crocodiles have been documented hosts 

for the bacteria.35

 Research into non-mammalian 

models has identified the ability of B. 

pseudomallei to kill nematodes. 

Nematodes were allowed to feed on a 

bacterial lawn and monitored for affects. In this study death occurred 

(LT50) occurred 10-15 hours post 

feeding.36 Nematodes would make a 

good sentinel organism as they are 

cheap and easy to maintain. However, this study did not measure a 

lethal dose, as a bacterial “lawn” was 

used to infect the nematodes through 

feeding. Additional study would have 

to be conducted to establish a 

mechanism for capturing environmental samples and exposing it to the 

nematodes.

Q Fever

 The causative agent of Q fever is 

Coxiella burnetii. USAMRIID‟s blue 

book gives the following characteristics of Q fever. The infectious dose is 

extremely low, 1-10 organisms. Human incubation of inhaled Coxiella is 

7-21 days, varying with infectious 

dose, while naturally occurring infections can range up to 45 days. The 

disease has a low lethality rate, 

among patients exhibiting symptoms 

only 5% will require hospitalization. 

For those developing pneumonia lethality is less than 3%. However the 

disease is extremely persistent lasting from 5-57 days untreated, with 

approx 5% developing a chronic infection lasting for years.5

 As with humans, symptoms in animals are relatively mild. In animals 

the incubation period is 1-3 weeks, 

with the predominant symptom being 

an increase in abortions.15 The similarity in incubating period and the low 

occurrence of overt disease symptoms makes animal sentential detection unlikely. 

 In rural areas the disease is rela-
9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

tively common in the environment 

with 10% of humans and 50% of 

sheep having antibodies against 

Coxiella.

37

 Environmental surveys in 

California detected seroconversion in 

Dogs (48%), Horse (26%), cat (9%) 

and cattle (32%). The authors suggest that dogs may be a sentinel species capable of reflecting the environmental prevalence of Coxiella.

38

 

However the ability of significant 

numbers of these animals to survive 

asymptomaticaly, and the need to 

test for antibody presence would not 

make them candidates for field deployable detection.

 Two animals that logistically are 

good sentinel animals are mice and 

guinea pigs. However their ability to 

survive large infectious does (when 

compared to 1-10 organisms for humans) would prevent them from serving as sentinel animals. In mice aerosol challenge studies using 102

, 104, 

and 106infectious doses did not 

cause mortality among CB-17 

(immune competent) mice whereas 

the LD50 for immune compromised 

mice was 102 organisms.39 Immune 

competent mice demonstrated ruffled 

fur fro 4-13 days after an 106infection, but no other symptoms were 

observed. Some studies have suggested that the LD50 for mice may be 

as high as 108 organisms.40 

 Guinea pigs given the same aerosol challenge as the mice exhibited 

death in 7-9 days for some strains, 

while in other strains no fever or clinical signs of disease were observed.39

 

Additional guinea pig studies show an 

LD50 of approx 106organisms resulting in death in 7-10 days post infection. Illness severity and mortality 

was directly correlated with dose. 

Lower doses caused fever and weigh 

loss but no mortality. 40

Hemorrhagic Fevers

 “Hemorrhagic fevers” is a category 

that includes several viral infections 

that have bleeding as a symptom. 

There are several viruses of interest 

in this category including Ebola and 

Marburg. Infectious dose can be as 

low as 1-10 particles,41 and the 

prevalence of natural infection scan 

range from a handful of infections per 

year (Ebola, Marburg) to hundreds of 

thousands per year (Lassa) Incubation can range but can be as low as 2 

days. Specific incubation periods are; 

Ebola 2-21 days, Marburg 2-14 days, 

Lassa 5-16 days, Rift Valley fever 2-

6days. Mortality for some agents is 

low as 5% for yellow fever, and can 

be as high as 90+% for Ebola and 

Marburg.41

 These viruses are relatively rare, 

often occurring in lesser developed 

countries. In many cases the natural 

reservoir and/or vector(s) is still unknown. For diseases such as Ebola 

there is little data and few good animal models have been developed to 

study the viruses. Most current animal research is based upon attempts 

to identify animal strains to serve as 

models, or efforts to modify the viruses to allow infection of common 

laboratory animals. Therefore there 

is little evidence to identify even candidate sentinel animals.

 To create an acceptable mouse 

model for Marburg, the virus was 

passed through several rounds of 

immune compromised mice to reduce 

death from 50-70 days to 7-10 days.42 

This process in essence “evolves” the 

virus into a form that will infect the 

model animal, but the resulting laboratory virus strain is no longer identical to the wild type strain.

 Small animals have been examined in attempts to understand natural 

reservoirs of Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic fever. Exposure showed low 

level viral titers and antibody production was observed in scrub hares, 

cape ground squirrels, red veld rats, 

white tailed rats, bush veld gerbils, 

striped mice, and guinea pits. South 

African hedgehogs did not develop 

viremia. Of importance when looking 

for sentinels, none of the animals 

were observed sick during the experiment.43

 Non human primates are known to 

be susceptible to Ebola, with some 

human outbreaks thought to be a result of contact with infected primates. 

Environment sampling of chimpanzee, ape and duiker carcasses for the 

presence of Ebola was able to predict 

human outbreaks with several weeks 

warning.44 While primates serve as 

laboratory models for Ebola they 

would be extremely difficult to care for 

in a field environment. In an area 

with a natural primate population sudden die offs should serve to alert 

medical officers.

Conclusions

 The literature reveals many challenges in establishing sentinel animal 

models to detect biological weapons. 

There are very few animals that will 

provide significant reaction to a biological attack prior to initial human 

casualties. This is partly due to the 

fact that for many agents the infectious dose for humans is in the 10‟s to 

100‟s of organisms giving an extremely small window where an animal could be affected but not a human. The two agents with higher 

LD50 values (Plague and Anthrax) are 

possible exceptions, where guinea 

pigs and ruminant animals show to be 

more susceptible.

 Selecting sentinel animals based 

upon incubation time is also a challenge. For all the agents examined 

the incubation time between model 

animal and humans overlapped. The 

best candidates in this category are; 

cats, which may provide a 1-2 day 

warning for Plague, and hamsters /

guinea pigs which may provide a 1-2 

day warning for Glanders. The advantage sentinel animals may offer is 

that they are often exhibiting mortality 

at about the same time human symptoms start to appear. Depending 

upon the event this may or may not 

provide any advanced warning, but 

animal mortality combined with any 

unusual symptoms at the clinic 

should put medical personnel on alert 

as to an extraordinary event.

 The literature also highlighted the 

species/strain affect on infection and 

mortality. For the same agent animal 

sensitivity can range at least one order of magnitude based upon which 

strain of animal is selected. Similarly 

most research is done using specific 

strains of the biological agents. 

Again different strains cause different 

responses in animals, so extrapolation from one strain of bacteria to all 

possible biological agents may not be 

valid.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 10

 Another challenge is finding unique 

symptoms for each disease. An example listed in “Animals as Early Detectors of Bioevents”15 summarizes 

some possible symptoms and their 

causes. For canines sudden death 

could be; Anthrax, botulism, toxins, 

Plague or Tularemia. Likewise acute 

respiratory disease could be Anthrax, 

Plague, Tularemia, Melioidosis or 

Naipah. It is therefore unlikely that a 

single animal/threat agent system 

could be worked out. Therefore the 

most likely and realistic use of animals would be to key medical or environmental personnel to conduct reconnaissance of the area and hopefully provide enough lead time to initiate effective counter measures.

 A final challenge is extrapolating 

dose and incubation values from the 

different types of data that have been 

generated. As the majority of the 

biological agents are lethal, values for 

human lethal dose and incubation 

time cannot be determined through 

rigorous laboratory experiments. 

Most data is derived from laboratory 

accidents or naturally acquired disease and may not represent what 

would occur in a deliberate release 

via aerosol. 

 Based upon the available data, it 

is difficult to envision a dedicated program to utilize animals as sensors for 

biological weapons. In some instances animals may provide 1-2 

days advanced warning of an incident, which would allow for medical 

care prior to emergence of human 

symptoms. Most animals would show 

affects at the same time they appeared in humans. However, this is 

not to say that animals are useless. It 

is likely that in an attack at least one 

local domestic or wild animal would 

be affected. Astute military medical 

personnel should be aware of this 

potential and incorporate animals as 

one of the many data streams used 

for situational awareness.

LTC Doug Lewis is a Doctoral Student in the Biodefense Program, in 

George Mason University, Virginia. 

He has a B.S. in Biology from the US 

Air Force Academy, a M.S in Genetics from the Pennsylvania State University. He was previously assigned 

to C-WMD programs at DTRA, Air 

Staff and DIA, and served as an

exchange officer at Porton Down, UK. 

His email address is 

doug.lewis1@us.army.mil

ENDNOTES

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11 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

T 

he federal government, 

through the departments of

Homeland Security and the 

Centers for Disease Control, has 

taken steps to mitigate the effects of 

a biological attack against the United 

States (U.S.). With minimal ability to 

detect a biological attack in time to 

provide enough advanced warning to 

avoid the hazard, medial countermeasures are the prime modes of defense against a biological attack. 

One of the key components of the 

government plan is the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). The stockpile 

is composed of medical equipment, 

vaccines and antibiotics and is designed for rapid deployment in the 

event of an attack.

 The effectiveness of the government response is dependent upon 

several key variables. The attack 

must be detected in a timely manner, 

the decision to distribute the Strategic 

National Stockpile must be made, the 

stockpile must be delivered to the 

attack site, the countermeasures 

must be distributed to the population 

in a timely manner and the population 

must correctly utilize the medical 

countermeasures. The government 

has the least amount of control over 

this last step, yet countermeasures 

are worthless if not used correctly. 

This raises an important question 

concerning attack response; will the 

public take advantage of the countermeasures provided by the government?

 There are many opinions on what 

effect a biological attack would have 

on a city. Casualty estimates range 

from hundreds to hundreds of thousands. However, there is no question 

that the timeliness of initiating medical countermeasures has a direct 

impact on the number of casualties. 

Time is critical because with most 

biological agents there is a point 

where medical countermeasures 

cease to be effective in preventing 

casualties. It is usually at the point 

where an individual starts to demonstrate symptoms of the agent when 

countermeasures cease to be effective. 

 Fortunately there is relatively little 

historical data reading mass casualty 

attacks utilizing biological agents. 

Therefore, predicting public acceptance of countermeasures must be 

extrapolated from several different 

sources of data. The most applicable 

data source is the “Amerithrax” attacks, where the rate of antibiotic use 

by U.S. Postal personnel has been 

well documented. In addition to the 

Amerithrax case studies, examination 

of Anthrax vaccine uptake by U.S. 

military personnel, studies that examine the general attitude of Americans 

towards government public health 

efforts, and the results of war games 

can provide insight on how the public 

will respond to countermeasures.

The Effects of Biological Weapons 

- Anthrax

 While the issues addressed in this 

paper would apply to any biological 

agent, Anthrax will be predominantly 

utilized as the model attack organism. 

There are several reasons for this. 

The predominant reason is that the 

2001 biological weapons attack utilized Anthrax, which provided a large 

amount of data utilized in this article. 

Additionally, the ability of Anthrax 

spores to resist antibiotics and remain 

viable for an extended period of time 

represents a worst case scenario for 

officials trying to mount an effective 

countermeasures campaign 

(assuming the weapon used has effective countermeasures).

 Even with the current detection 

capabilities available in some US cities it is still extremely unlikely that a 

biological attack will be detected in 

real time. The most likely scenario 

for an attack against a city equipped 

with Biowatch sensors would be detection of the attack 12-24 hours after 

the attack occurred. At this point 

most people who will be affected by 

the attack have already been exposed. In the event of a positive sensor reading, the government would 

then need to confirm the attack, make 

a decision how to respond, and then 

issue the order to utilize the national 

stockpile. It is realistic to assume that 

antibiotics would most likely arrive 24-

48 hours after the attack occurred. 

 For an agent such as Anthrax, 

affects in humans will be observed in 

1-6 days after attack. Symptoms 

start off as “flu like” which can last 2-5 

days. The patient may then feel better for a day or so but will develop 

severe respiratory symptoms, with 

death occurring 24-36 hours later. 

Death is caused by severe respiratory 

symptoms and septicemic shock. 

Patients administered antibiotics post 

infection, but prior to the emergence 

of symptoms have a high survival 

rate. The traditional medical belief is 

that if antibiotics are initiated after the 

appearance of symptoms the case 

fatality rate is >85%. Information 

gained from the mail attacks showed 

the fatality rate can be lowered to 

45% but requires intensive care facilities and aggressive medical treatment.1

Affects of Time and Antibiotics

 It is this in small time window between exposure and symptoms that 

the government must provide antibiotics if they are to effectively reduce 

casualties without overwhelming 

medical facilities. For a weapon such 

as Anthrax this timeline is essential, 

Government Medical Countermeasures and 

Public Acceptance, a Mismatch?

LTC Doug Lewis

PhD Student, George Mason University
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 12

as the after the first 24- 48 hours antibiotics have a reduced effectiveness 

of up to 80%.2 As cases of human 

inhalation Anthrax are relatively rare, 

most information on antibiotic efficiency is based upon animal studies. 

Research has shown that in rabbits, 

delay of antibody treatment by 24 and 

48 hours post exposure reduced survival to 80% and 60%, respectively.3

Similar data was obtained in mice 

where treatment initiated 6, 24 and 48 

hours post exposure had respective 

survival rates of 90%, 65% and 10%.4 

 A characteristic of Anthrax spores 

which complicates medical treatment 

is their ability to remain infectious in 

the lung for extended periods of time, 

where they can germinate asynchronously and often cause infection long 

after exposure.3 As long as viable 

spores remain in the lungs it is possible to develop an Anthrax infection. 

Compounding this issue is the fact 

that current antibiotics do not kill the 

spores, but kill the vegetative bacterial that emerge from the spores. 

Therefore to ensure that antibiotics 

are present in the patient‟s body 

when the spores germinate antibiotics 

must be taken for extremely long periods. Sixty to 100 days is recommended for Anthrax.5

 

 Modeling efforts demonstrate the 

pronounced affects time and access 

can have on the number of casualties 

from a biological attack. A simulation 

run by Wein attempted to include factors such as adherence to prophylaxis and time to distribute antibiotics. 

Based upon their calculations the 

impact of prophylactic adherence is 

large, the death toll is 50% higher if 

prophylaxis adherence is reduced to 

from 90 to 80 percent.6 They also 

found that the death count is sensitive 

to the number of antibiotic distributors 

per capita, and the number of deaths 

can be nearly halved by eliminating 

queuing, which can be achieved by a 

7.5-fold increase in the distribution 

capacity or by pre-attack distribution.

6

 Another model predicts two important factors in preventing mortality. 

In a mass attack, the rate of antibiotic 

delivery capability dominates mortality calculations. Once the delivery 

rate is greater than 420,000 persons 

per day antibiotic adherence becomes the dominant variable. 7

 

National Response Plans –

The Strategic Stockpile

 The government response plans 

are dependent upon rapid delivery, 

dispersal and use of antibiotics or 

vaccines. The Centers for Disease 

Control (CDC) Cities Readiness Initiative assumes a twelve hour delivery of antibiotics from the Strategic 

National Stockpile, followed by a local 

distribution of the pharmaceuticals. 8

In many ways national response policy to utilize the stockpile is still in 

development. Most recently Executive Order 13527 was signed on 30 

Dec 2009 which gave the U.S. Postal 

service 180 days to develop plans to 

distribute antibiotics from the stockpile. 9

 While the resulting plans are 

yet to be published, concerns have 

been raised over security, postal 

worker abandonment and even how 

to treat P.O. boxes. 

 While most planning document 

and simulations appear to focus on 

delivery timelines and effective distribution, it is unclear if any assumptions are made regarding uptake of 

countermeasures. For example, areas of concern identified in “Top Off” 

exercises include complication with 

distribution, synchronization between 

state and federal authorities and 

quarantine but issues of public acceptance of countermeasures were not 

listed. 10

 Likewise the issues of communication and education regarding the 

treat and countermeasures do not 

seem to get significant emphasis. 

Executive Order 13527 focuses on 

distribution but does not address education or communication. 9

 In planning guidance for local communities 

developed by the Department of 

Homeland Security there is information on arrival of casualties, distribution of drugs, flow plans, staffing, facility set up, and paperwork etc. The 

need for effective communication is 

addressed but not stressed relative to 

importance and uptake of antibiotics.

11

Observations from Postal Workers

 While the need for timely and correct use of countermeasures has 

been documented, there is evidence 

that a significant portion of the population may not use available countermeasures. In 2001 Anthrax spores 

were sent through the U.S. Mail. In 

this attack several distinct populations; postal workers, media, and 

Senate workers were exposed to Anthrax spores either through letters 

received or while working in the 

postal facilities that processed the 

letters. A cohort of approximately 

10,000 individuals was recommended 

to follow a sixty day course of antibiotics. The largest population was the 

Brentwood mail facility (2,743) and 

the smallest was the Hart Senate 

Building (600). 12 These populations 

have been the subject of intense 

study and offer significant insight into 

the behavior of individuals facing a 

biological attack. 

 Medical records and subsequent 

research using focus groups and interviews provide data regarding the 

use and effectiveness of antibiotics 

and help identify factors influencing 

uptake of countermeasures. The 

data shows that while antibiotic use 

was relatively high, there were significant numbers of individuals who; did 

not accept antibiotics, accepted but 

did not start antibiotics, or started 

antibiotics but discontinued use prior 

to completing the full course of treatment. A gross analysis of the 10,000 

individuals offered antibiotics showed 

97% received an initial supply, 83% 

received a full 60 day dose, 10% took 

no prophylaxis, and only 44% took 

the full course of antibiotics.12

 Deeper analysis of the data reveals several variables that influenced acceptance of medical countermeasures. Unsurprisingly the more 

an individual believes themselves to 

be at risk of exposure, the greater 

their likelihood to initiate and continue 

antibiotic treatment. Stein reports 

“People who were informed that their 

swab was positive concluded that 

they were at highest risk. In contrast, 

many participants mistakenly interpreted negative swab results as a 

signal that they were at low risk” 13 

Shepard reported “Strong association 

between risk perception and completion of antibiotics.” 12
13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

 Specific evidence linking risk perception to antibiotic use is documented in several studies. In the 

Connecticut postal facility overall refusal rate for antibiotics (32 of 100 

surveyed) was higher than the average number of 10% cited by Shepard. 

The Connecticut facility was identified 

and tested 30-40 days after likely exposure, making detection unlikely. As 

expected all 485 nasal swabs were 

negative for Anthrax. In that facility of 

those refusing antibiotic nineteen 

(59%) stated that they did not feel 

they were at personal risk for Anthrax. and (47%) cited negative nasal 

swabs of workers13 Additionally of 

the 68 postal workers that did start 

antibiotics twenty one discontinued, 

over half citing lack of personal risk 

as the reason.13 Shepard‟s study 

looked multiple populations and found 

43% stopped antibiotics prior to 60 

days, with 25% of those individuals 

citing personal risk as the determining 

factor. 12 

 Similar to lacking fear of exposure, 

the sentiment “since I do not feel sick, 

I do not need to take medicine” was 

also identified as a factor. 13,14 This 

sentiment is dangerous for at least 

two reasons. As already discussed 

the effective treatment of Anthrax is 

highly time dependant and Anthrax is 

extremely fatal once symptoms develop. Secondly, the possible long 

term germination of Anthrax spores 

makes it possible for infections to 

develop many weeks after exposure. 

This attitude affected both decisions 

to stop antibiotics prematurely13 or 

not to take antibiotics in the first 

place. 14

 Personal risk assessment also appeared to influence personal decisions on what type of countermeasure to use. In addition to antibiotics, 

the Anthrax vaccine was also offered 

as a supplement to antibiotic treatment. The use of the vaccine post 

exposure was experimental and was 

offered voluntarily. In the Senate 

population 38% of the high risk individuals chose to receive the vaccine. 

However the same offer was only 

accepted by only two percent of the 

Brentwood postal workers. 15 The 

likely factors influencing of the two 

different response rates is communication and trust in public health which 

will be discussed in greater depth 

later.

 Another reason influencing antibiotic compliance commonly cited in 

the literature is adverse reactions to 

the antibiotics. The antibiotic initially 

administered to most exposed individuals was Ciprofloxin. As with any 

drug there are side effects associated 

with antibiotics which include can 

range from intestinal problems, itching, swelling and even difficulty 

breathing.16 For individuals expected 

to take at least sixty days of antibiotic 

treatment it is not unrealistic to expect 

side affects to have a significant role 

in compliance. In fact issues associated with adverse reactions were observed in all of the locations studied.

 Studies of Brentwood employees 

report that approximately 20% reduced their dosage (without consulting a physician) because of side effects.17 Surveys of those exposed in 

Florida showed 19% reporting adverse reactions and over 6% stopping 

antibiotics because of side effects. 16

The Brentwood study also identified a 

possible compounding factor in that 

normal stress response (fatigue, crying, headaches etc) were mistaken 

for antibiotic side effects, which adversely impacted compliance. 17

Other facilities all reported about the 

same number of individuals stopping 

antibiotics because of side affect concerns. Surveys of the six sites receiving antibiotics showed 43% of those 

stopping antibiotics cited adverse 

reactions. 12 Surveys of the Connecticut facility also found that 43% of individuals prematurely stopping antibiotic treatment cited side effects. 14

 The surveys also identified additional smaller but measurable reasons for not taking antibiotics. 

Shepard reported that seven percent 

of individuals ceasing antibiotic treatment cited long term fear of antibiotics. 12

 At the Connecticut facility 13% 

of workers cited concern about antibiotics/side effects as reason not to 

even start treatment. Also captured 

at the Connecticut facility was the 

sentiment “many postal workers reported obtaining the antibiotics to 

„have on hand‟ in the event „I start to 

feel sick.” 12

 Communication, education and 

the available support structure all had 

an important role in the decision to 

continue or stop antibiotic treatment. 

In the Senate and Brentwood facilities 

Stein found that statements of encouragement from family and friends 

were most common among those 

who completed the full antibiotic regiment and were “far less common” 

among those who did not complete 

the full sixty day treatment. 13 Among 

Brentwood employees repeated visits 

by health officials and the ability to 

ask questions resulted in greater use 

of antibiotics. 17

 The delayed detection and perceived lower risk at the Connecticut 

facility appears to have influenced the 

approach used by Postal Service and 

union officials to communicate with 

potentially exposed workers. They 

conducted “town meetings in an effort 

to reassure postal workers, while still 

emphasizing that a period did occur 

when spores were in the air.” 12 As 

already discussed, the Connecticut 

facility had the lowest use of antibiotics reported in the surveys.

 The importance of public health 

and primary care physicians was also 

highlighted in Stein‟s surveys where;

“Of participants who reported that 

their physician told them to take the 

medication as directed by public 

health officials, all but one did so. In 

contrast, of participants who reported 

that a private physician did not 

“clearly advise them to adhere to public health recommendations” either by 

being vague about the public health 

recommendations regarding antibiotics or contradicting the recommendations, fewer than one in five took the 

antibiotics as recommended.” 13

 The relationship with public health 

officials will be discussed further, but 

the affect of medical experts must be 

recognized. The good news is that 

effective communication and support 

from doctors seems to have a significant positive influence on use of antibiotics. However, the Anthrax attacks 

were relatively limited and large numbers of resources (relative to the exposed population) were available. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 14

One must question if the same level 

of support would be available in a 

mass casualty event and what impact 

that would have on antibiotic use and 

untimely the number of casualties.

Observations on the Anthrax 

Vaccine

 Another source of data that can be 

used to gauge the acceptance of 

countermeasures uptake is the response to the Anthrax vaccine by 

U.S. military personnel. The Anthrax 

vaccine had been in use for many 

years, but became famous when 

members of the military began to refuse the vaccine. Use of the vaccine 

was challenged in court, twice resulting in injunctions against its use. The 

vaccine was subsequently administered under FDA emergency use 

rules, and is currently mandatory for 

personnel deploying to high risk areas, but voluntary for other military 

members. 18

 Resistance to the vaccine by military personnel is significant for many 

reasons. First is reflected in the linkage of personal risk and countermeasure acceptance as observed in 

postal workers. If any population can 

be considered high risk for the exposure to biological weapons it is the 

military, so military personnel should 

be motivated to receive protection. 

Second, military members can be 

legally (at this time) ordered to receive the vaccine. For military personnel the negative incentives associated with vaccine refusal are far 

greater than for civilians. The fact 

that members of the military population refuse the Anthrax vaccine is 

concerning when making predictions 

about behavior of the civilian population.

 The response of personnel at Dover U.S. Air Force Base, Delaware 

serves as a case study for public reaction to a vaccination campaign. 

The vaccination effort at Dover was 

uneventful until an article appeared in 

Vanity Fare magazine citing anonymous military members stationed at 

Dover who were experiencing medical complications they claimed were 

caused with the vaccination. A link 

between Gulf War Syndrome and the 

vaccine was also proposed, as were 

accusations of vaccine contamination 

and the presence of additives 

(squalen). Rumors and resistance 

quickly spread among the base, and 

at the height of the situation members 

were even handing out anti-vaccine 

literature at the front gate. 19

 In efforts to restore faith in the 

vaccination program officials tried a 

general education campaign through 

town hall meetings. These meetings 

were characterized as “high risk, low 

reward” for the presenters as many in 

attendance were unlikely to be 

swayed and in some cases the meetings turned into adversarial shouting 

matches. 19 These meetings appeared to have little impact on the 

vaccine controversy.

 It was eventually recognized that 

the best results were obtained by 

general education, with strong support from the medical community especially from primary care providers. 

It was found that the providers, who 

were most willing to listen, provide 

support and continue to investigate 

concerns had the best results. 19 

While this may provide an encouraging model to be followed in public 

medicine, it is also worrisome in that 

the military population was relatively 

small, dedicated free healthcare was 

available for the military, and there 

was minimal time constraint on the 

situation. Similar conditions may not 

exist in a large scale, civilian attack.

 The military currently utilizes the 

Anthrax vaccine for members deployed to high risk areas. Although it 

is mandatory, the military is still working to catch up from the various legal 

issues. Surveys conducted in 2009 

showed that only 40.6% of personnel 

had received all the required Anthrax 

shots, 16% had received some shots, 

while 28% had declined. 18 This is 

roughly equal to the vaccination rate 

of 50% reported during the period 

where vaccination was entirely voluntary.20 This is also lower than the 89% 

rate Dover was able to obtain when 

the vaccination was mandatory. 19 

 Of current military members older 

members, and members of the Army 

were the most likely to have received 

the vaccine. The most significant 

indicators for not receiving the shots 

were concerns with vaccine safety, or 

a general lack of concern/information.

19

 The finding of greater acceptance 

in the Army is consistent with a 2003 

study which found only 5 of 10,000 

soldiers deployed to Korea refused 

the vaccine. 21

 The fact that military members 

refused the vaccine should be an 

area of great concern for public officials responsible for emergency planning, and can provide several areas 

they must focus on when preparing 

local response plans. The “high” 

number of refusals relative to the nature of the population must not be 

dismissed, but can serve as a sentinel for the level of distrust inherent in 

the general population. Officials can 

also look to the military efforts to generate acceptance of the vaccine 

(education, communication and role 

of medical personnel) as key areas 

that they must address in any plans 

that involve medical countermeasures 

for the general public. One confounding factor in military data not applicable to civilians is that some military 

members have use vaccine refusal as 

a means to get out of the military prior 

to serving their full commitment. 21

Implications for Public Health

 The behavior of individuals exposed to the Anthrax letters was similar to what surveys of the general 

population predict regarding use of 

countermeasures. A survey conducted by the Harvard School of public health showed 89% would most 

likely obtain antibiotics, but 39% 

would not take them immediately. 

Only two thirds were confident that 

there would be enough antibiotics at 

the site. Other concerns included 

security, exposure while receiving 

antibiotics, and safely of the antibiotics. 22 These results are important to 

help estimate casualties from an attack, but also represent areas of focus for public health officials.

 Generating trust in both the government‟s ability to handle and attack, 

and the countermeasures themselves 

represents a large challenge for public health officials. While there is a 

general trust of public health policies 

in this country, officials still face a 
15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

certain amount of resistance. While 

there are numerous e-mails and web 

sites that question every new drug, 

there are also professional refereed 

journals that continue to question 

countermeasures from the Anthrax 

and smallpox vaccines to Gulf War 

Syndrome. 23 Compounding the need 

for communication to build trust, in 

the event of an attack communication 

and response efforts may also be 

hampered by competing interest between health and law enforcement 

officials24 which may make the government response appear less than 

well coordinated and effective.

 There is also a small but significant 

underlying level of distrust by the 

general public in medicine itself. 

Distrust of the MMR vaccine in the 

United Kingdom resulted in a 10% 

decrease in vaccination rate, with an 

increase of measles from approximately 50 cases in 2005 to nearly 

1000 in 2007. 25 Release of the H1N1 

swine flu vaccine was also met with 

several e-mails warning of side effects. Adding to potential reluctance 

by the public is the policy of the government to include experimental” (requiring emergency licensing 

from the FDA for use in emergencies) 

drugs in its response plan. 26

 Effective communication of the 

threat and those exposed is paramount and is recognized in the literature as demonstrated by subjects 

such as; “Provide Information, which 

is as important as providing medicine” 

and “Assume the public will not take 

the pill if it does not trust the doctor”.

27 An effective use of communication 

was demonstrated when the Australian military faced issues over the 

Anthrax vaccine. The military used 

trusted and nationally known senior 

leadership to mount a communications campaign. In addition to education military leadership publicly took 

the vaccine and media coverage 

changed from supporting the military 

to supporting the vaccine. 28

 Communication between public 

officials and postal workers in 2001 

cannot be characterized as effective. 

Postal workers related instances 

where they learned of their exposure 

from the media vs. an official which 

was compounded by the fact that 

many initial reports were factually 

incorrect. 13 Interviews reported that 

initial views of public health officials 

were positive, but as they began to 

view the response as “confused and 

disorganized” they lost confidence. 13

 Even worse than providing poor 

information, inefficient communication 

can cause situations where different 

populations feel they are treated differently and even feel discriminated 

against. Thirty three Brentwood employees reported media as their initial 

source of information (most common 

response) which contrasted Senate 

workers who cited internal communication such as the Capitol Physician‟s 

Office. 15 Brentwood workers also 

seldom mentioned any type of advocate and became angry with the lack 

of results from nasal swabs. 13

 Ultimately the lack of organization 

and communication cost health officials the respect of the victims, which 

degraded the countermeasure campaign. One quote from a Senate 

member characterized this distrust 

“This „circus of specialists‟ came 

through and said that they had „seen 

hundreds of cases of Anthrax, and 

everything would be fine.‟ Hundreds 

of cases of Anthrax? Where? In 

goats? It wasn‟t helpful or trustworthy 

when people were clearly bluffing.” 13 

The lack trust became so deep some 

members of the Brentwood facility 

began to believe they were receiving 

substandard care because of their 

race and all four focus groups raised 

the specter of the Tuskegee syphilis 

experiments. 15 Other studies identify 

issues of race and trust as well. Surveys of public attitudes towards public 

health and bioterrorism in Los Angeles indicate overall 72% feel the response will be fair but it is only 63% 

among African Americans. 29

 A final confounding factor that 

must be considered by public health 

is the behavior of the emergency response personnel. In a simulated 

attack utilizing rift valley fever 95% of 

responders would stay on the job, 

however only 78% of spouses wanted 

them to remain on the job. This is 

significant in that a slim majority cited 

family and loved ones as keys to remaining on job. Additionally 26% 

considered quid-pro-quo of vaccine 

for their family as a condition to remain on job. Compounding the effort 

to communicate and educate the 

population, the exercise showed journalists had the least knowledge about 

the event and was the most likely to 

stay away from the event. None of 

participants would base decisions 

solely upon government supplied information. 30

Conclusion

 Both exercises and real world 

events demonstrate that a small but 

significant percentage of the population will most likely not utilize available countermeasures. Both sources 

of data indicate that about ten percent 

of an affected population will not take 

countermeasures if available, and 

that another 10 to 30 percent may 

take possession of countermeasures 

but will wait for additional stimuli, 

such as symptoms in self or others, 

prior to initiating treatment. Given 

that countermeasures will most likely 

not be available for at least a day after an attack timely implementation of 

countermeasures when received becomes critical. Every one percent 

that does not take countermeasures 

could easily become hundreds of additional casualties in a large scale 

release. Examining the behavior of 

postal workers and attitudes reflected 

in public research it may be realistic 

to expect up to 40% of the population 

may not take adequate steps to protect themselves from an attack.

 The data that are available highlight important public behaviors must 

be addressed in any emergency response plan to maximize countermeasure effectiveness. The amount 

of concern or fear that the individual 

has been exposed to an agent appears to have a strong influence on 

their use of countermeasures. However, the most compelling evidence 

cited in the post office workers was 

positive nasal swabs, or possibly 

positive hits on postal machines. The 

implications for a large scale attack 

are that nasal swabs may be impossible on all potentially exposed individuals. Warnings will most likely be 

general and conservative 

(overestimating) when identifying who 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 16

was exposed and may not create the 

personal fear needed to start and 

maintain antibiotic treatment. The 

significant question is, will the public 

internalize sufficient fear from warning such as, “anyone who was in the 

Pentagon Metro station over the last 

5 days may be at risk for exposure to 

Anthrax?”

 It is possible to argue that the 

postal workers do not represent a real 

mass exposure situation, because the 

postal attack was limited with relatively few deaths. The data indicate 

that person assessment of risk plays 

a large role in use of countermeasures. There is no doubt that if large 

numbers of individuals start to die the 

public demand for antibiotics will 

greatly increase. However, the concern must be in the 2-4 day period 

post detection and prior to symptoms 

when the only reason to take countermeasures will be government warnings. In a large scale attack will the 

fear of the unknown and the resulting 

panic result a greater acceptance of 

antibiotics than those seen in postal 

worker? This is possible, but the 

most troubling attitude may be the 

one of “obtaining antibiotics just in 

case,” or waiting for symptoms to initiate prophylaxis. In the case of an 

attack with Anthrax, most individuals 

who exhibited this attitude would 

most likely become casualties.

 Ultimately the only way to truly 

know the prophylaxis rate is in the 

event of an actual attack. However, 

postal workers and military personnel 

have demonstrated that there will be 

a percentage of the population which 

will not respond as desired. For planners and responders this means they 

must take every effort to understand 

and combat these factors, and unfortunately must account for this factor 

when calculating casualties and estimating medical requirements.

LTC Doug Lewis is a Doctoral Student in the Biodefense Program, in 

George Mason University, Virginia. 

He has a B.S. in Biology from the US 

Air Force Academy, a M.S in Genetics from the Pennsylvania State University. He was previously assigned 

to C-WMD programs at DTRA, Air 

Staff and DIA, and served as an 

exchange officer at Porton Down, 

UK. 

His email address is 

doug.lewis1@us.army.mil

ENDNOTES

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Control. Oct 8, 2002. URL: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/

EID/vol8no10/02-0400.htm (accessed April 22, 2010).

25. McIntyre, Peter, and Julie Leask. "Improving 

Uptake of MMR Vaccine." BMJ 336 (April 2006): 729-

730.

26. Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 

and Response. Project BioShield Annual Report to 

Congress, August 2007-December 2008. US Departmetn of Health and Human Services.

27. Glass, Thomas, and Monica Schoch-Spana. 

"Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a City 

Against Panic." Clinical Infectious Diseases 34 

(2002): 217-223.

28. Ackermann, Deonna, Simon Chapman, and Julie 

Leask. "Media Coverage of Anthrax Vaccinaiton 

Refusal byt Australian Defense Force Peronnel." 

Vaccine 23 (2004): 411-417.

29. Eisenman, D, et al. "Will Public Healht's Response to Terrorism be Fair? Racial/ethnic Variation 

in Perceived Fariness Durring a Bioterrorist Event." 

Biosecurity and Bioterroism 2, no. 3 (2004): 146-56.

30. DiGiovanni, C, B Reynolds, R Harwell, E Stonecipher, and F Burkle. "Comunity Reaction ot Bioterrorism: Prospective Study of Simulated Outbreak." 

Emerging Infectious Disease 9, no. 6 (June 2003): 

708-715.

Other referenced works:

Centers for Disease Control. Emergency Preparedness and Response. 2010. http://www.bt.cdc.gov/

stockpile (accessed Feb 23, 2010).

Jefferds, Mariaelena, et al. "Adherace to Antibicrobial 

Inhalation Anthrax Prophylaxis among Postal 

Workesr." Emerging Infectious Diseases 8, no. 10 

(October 2002): 1138-1145.

Meridith, LS, Eisenman DP, Rhodes H, Ryan G, and 

Long A. "Trust influences response to public health 

messages during a bioterrorist event." Journal of 

Heath Communications 12, no. 3 (Apr-May 2007): 

217-232.

Stanwyck, C, J Davila, L Wake, and M Koshak. 

"Assesment of Kindergarted Inmmunization Rates in 

Colorado: School Self-Report vs. Health Department 

Audits, 2004-2005." Public Health Reports 122 (JulAug 2007): 461-466.
17 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

T 

he Nuclear Disablement 

Teams (NDTs) represent a

unique capability for the 

U.S. Army. The NDTs possess the 

ability to conduct surveys of an area, 

facility or building for nuclear and radiological hazards, they can conduct 

on-site assessment in a high-hazard 

environment, provide initial laboratory 

analysis and as needed, disable nuclear weapons infrastructure. NDTs 

provide a Combatant Commander, 

Joint Force Commander or Ground 

Component Commander a well 

equipped, cross functional team that 

has the training to plan and execute a 

unique and high-visibility operation. 

The NDT is an 11 person team with 

multiple skill sets including Nuclear 

and Counterproliferation, Explosive 

Ordinance Disposal (EOD), Chemical 

and Health Physics experts. The NDT 

is augmented by communications, 

laboratory and intelligence experts. 

The NDT, when fully augmented is 

equipped with state-of-the-art radiological and chemical detection equipment, laboratory analytic equipment 

and command and control tools. 

 Recently, NDT personnel spent 

two weeks at the Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory and the nearby Y-12 National Security Complex for Operation 

Hardtack-Poplar. The team spent 13 

days training on the NDT mission and 

refining team level tactics, techniques 

and procedures for nuclear disablement. The team spent the 1st week 

in an Oak Ridge National Laboratory 

classroom environment learning the 

intricacies of the gas centrifuge and 

the principles behind centrifuge enrichment. The team then moved to 

the Y-12 compound and established 

its command post, analytical laboratories, hotlines, and prepped its vehicles and equipment for operations. 

Once equipment checks were completed and all communications were 

in order the team was ready to begin 

the hands-on portion of the operation.

NDT Structure and Capability

 The NDT utilizes several subelements to execute its mission. The 

primary sub-teams are: Initial Entry 

Team (IET), Contamination Control 

Team (CCT), Characterization Team 

(CT) and as needed a Disablement 

Team (DT). Additionally, there is a 

Command Post (CP) element which 

includes the team chief and operations officer along with communications specialists and maintenance 

support. All sub-elements have secure handheld communication for 

More Than Just Breaking Things...

The 20th Support Command 

Nuclear Disablement Teams in Action

LTC Bret C. Kinman, Team Chief NDT 2, 20th Support Command

LTC Paul Argo Laboratory Manager, 1st Area Medical Laboratory

NDT Initial Entry Team (IET) team member gains entry to a suspected lab.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 18

coordination on-site; team members 

also carry digital cameras and handheld computers for recording and 

documenting a facility. Given the 

environment the team members work 

in, determining the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) 

level is essential. NDT utilizes industry standard PPE to include disposable protective clothing, gloves and 

overshoes as well as full face respirators. The team also possesses several Level A PPE kits which is the 

highest level of protection from vapor, 

gas and liquid and includes a selfcontained breathing apparatus.

 The NDTs also possess a wide 

variety of nuclear and radiological 

detection equipment. This equipment 

spans from aerial and vehicle 

mounted systems, to backpack/

manportable and handheld systems. 

The vehicular systems include the 

Airborne Radiological Detection Monitoring System (ARDIMS) pods which 

can be carried on UH-1 and UH-60 

helicopters to provide the NDTs a 

wide areas search capability. The 

Vehicle Mounted Detection Systems 

(VMDS) has 2 versions which mount 

on a HMMWV trailer or M-Gator vehicle. These systems allow for a closer 

in survey of buildings to determine 

those with elevated radiation readings. The backpack and manportable 

systems allow for point survey of a 

particular room or piece of equipment 

or material. The handheld detectors 

are also used to check equipment but 

are mainly used to survey personnel 

for contamination once they have 

been inside a suspect facility. All of 

the detectors minus the handhelds 

are lined into the CP via the Mobile 

Field Kit (MFK) which allows for near 

real time reading and spectroscopy in 

some cases.

 The IET has the task of first entry 

into a suspect building, the IET does 

an exterior survey and also attempts 

to determine interior hazards, especially the quality of the air inside. 

Once this initial survey is done the 

IET will select its PPE level and enter 

the building, the IET will do a deliberate search of the interior-looking for 

hazards and making an initial assessment of what the facility purpose. 

After this initial survey the IET will call 

back to the CP and call for the CT to 

come forward. The CT will do a thorough and deliberate search of the 

building. The CT will collect numerous samples, take pictures of high 

interest items and collect documents 

and material of intelligence value. 

The samples will be brought back to 

the command post and the CT will 

begin an initial confirmatory analysis. 

The CT can be augmented be an element form the 20th Support Command (SUPCOM)(CBRNE) Analytical 

and Remediation Activity (CARA). 

The combined CT and CARA team 

will produce a detailed chemical and 

spectrographic analysis. Depending 

on the size of the buildings and overall size of the facility, this process of 

on-site survey work and laboratory 

analysis could take a number of 

weeks. 

 Once each building has been surveyed and assessed, the NDT will set 

to work developing a disablement 

plan. This plan will take into account 

guidance from higher headquarters 

NDT Characterization Team (CT) members make an initial assessment. 

CT Team collect samples of high interest items.
19 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

and how disablement actions impact 

the surrounding area. Given the nature of nuclear weapons production, 

the facilities needed to produce them 

represent heavy industrial infrastructure and large amounts of the most 

dangerous chemical and radiological 

hazards known. Security of nuclear 

weapons material as well as the safe 

near-term disablement of the supporting infrastructure is the primary focus 

of the NDT. Long-term disablement 

is a deliberate process and one that 

will eventually be turned over to a 

military or government contract entity. 

The Future

 The 20th SUPCOM is establishing 

a total of four Nuclear Disablement 

Teams in accordance with U.S. Army 

guidance and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2010. Both 

teams will be fully operational by the 

summer of 2010. The NDTs utilize 

DOE facilities because they are able 

to replicate the nuclear weapons infrastructure and likely operating environment that the NDTs may face. 

Additionally, the DOE facilities have 

radiation training sources that allow 

NDT members to practice using their 

detection systems. This is critical as 

NDT members must be proficient in 

their ability to quickly and accurately 

identify nuclear and radiological hazards in order to ensure appropriate 

precautions are in place for team operations.

 The NDTs have ongoing work with 

the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) Nuclear Detection 

Division to continuously improve detector capabilities. The NDT recently 

spent several weeks at Idaho National Lab testing the ARDIMS pod 

which provides the team an aerial 

search capability. This new system 

coupled with the teams vehicle 

mounted systems expands the NDT 

search or survey capability. The 

team is also working with DTRA to 

improve the Mobile Field Kit for better 

command and control. All of this 

means that the NDT can do much 

more than just break things.

LTC Bret Kinman is the Team Chief 

for NDT 2 at the 20th SUPCOM in 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. He 

has a B.A. in Political Science from 

North Georgia College, a M.A. in Defense Decisionmaking and Planning 

from the Naval Postgraduate School. 

He was previously assigned as the 

Warfare Support Division Chief and 

Command Group Executive Officer at 

the EUCOM Joint Analysis Center, 

RAF Molesworth, UK His email address is bret.kinman@us.army.mil. 

LTC William P. Argo is the Laboratory 

Manager for the 1st Area Medical 

Laboratory in Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, MD. He has a B.S. in Health 

Physics from Francis Marion University, a M.S. in Nuclear Engineering 

from the University of Florida. He 

was previously assigned as the NDT 

1 Chief, 20th SUPCOM, Aberdeen 

Proving Grounds. His email address 

is william.argo@us.army.mil. 

CT take inventory of suspect materials.

Suspect materials are further analyzed.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 20

ntroduction

 In the space of a few years, many sci-fi ideas seem 

on their way to becoming reality. Communication 

systems the size of Dick Tracey‟s watch or Star Trek communication pendants are almost here, while near noninvasive treatments of serious medical problems are not 

far behind. All these and many other engineering applications are due to the rapid emergence of nanotechnology. 

Just how low can we go? To talk about extremely tiny 

sizes, science has adopted very small units.

 Let‟s begin with the term nanotechnology. Wikipedia 

says “Nanotechnology is the understanding and control of 

matter at dimensions between approximately 1 and 100 

nanometers, where unique phenomena enable novel applications.”1

 

 And just how small is this? A nanometer (nm) is onebillionth of a meter, or 10-9 meters. To give you a feeling 

for this length, a sheet of paper is about 100,000 nanometers thick; a single gold atom is about a third of a nanometer in diameter. A nanometer is also about the width of 10 

carbon atoms laid side-by-side. One nanometer is also 

equal to 10 Angstroms, the Angstrom being the internationally recognized non-standard unit of length. One Angstrom is less than the diameter of two hydrogen atoms 

placed side-by-side. Finally, a micrometer (μm) is 1000 

nm.

Possible Applications

 As you can see one-atom-thick planar sheets of carbon 

atoms (sometimes called graphene) can be very thin, and 

when rolled into nanotubes they can have extremely small 

diameters. Such small feature sizes allow engineers to 

create sensors that can be integrated into many military 

DO YOU KNOW...

The Size of One Nanometer?

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer

Physical Scientist

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

I 

FITC – fluorescein isothiocyanate GFP – green fluorescence protein PE – phycoerythrin 
21 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

systems, including uniforms. Several other applications 

come to mind that would significantly reduce the weight a 

soldier must carry (it is not uncommon for a soldier to 

carry 50-75 pounds of gear) yet increase his/her fighting 

effectiveness. Some of these applications include: 

weapon, systems, body armor, Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information (C4I), batteries, 

and medical supplies.

 Consider a small military force of the future. It will be 

extremely stealthy, capable of being dropped off near or 

behind enemy lines and execute its mission with no support. To do this, all members must be in constant contact 

with the team leader and must know what time it is and 

where each unit member is. They must carry light armor 

and weapons, and wear smart uniforms that contain communications, computers, sensors, energy packs and medical monitors. The use of nanotechnology would improve a 

wide range of military equipment: 

Weapon systems – lighter, longer lasting weapons and 

more penetrating ammunition can be constructed from 

nano materials.

Body armor – vehicles, aircraft, helmets and body armor 

can be made stronger and lighter than conventional 

equivalents with nanotube yarn.

Uniforms – camouflage properties similar to those of an 

Octopus, able to change and adaptive to a host of environmental patterns.

Communications – the 2008 Combating WMD Journal, 

Issue 1 reported on the development of a working carbon 

nanotube radio.

Computers – carbon nanotubes could be used to make 

small computers that could be woven into uniforms. Graphene sheets could be used for display screens.

Sensors – recent Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA) studies show that relatively dumb microbots could be distributed over the battlefield to provide 

substantial battlefield info.

Energy packs – power requirements for nanotube technology could be integrated (woven) into military uniforms.

Medical monitors – Military uniforms could be used to 

monitor the wearer‟s health. It could identify the presence 

of allergens. If injured, information on the wearer‟s injuries 

could even be relayed to medical units in the rear and 

could be used in the meantime to staunch blood flow and 

sterilize wounds.

Scanners – terahertz-ray (T-ray) scanners could be used 

in medical and airport scanning devices. Is this the forerunner of the “Star Trek” Tricorder?

 And to increase the thermal insulating properties of 

uniforms, they could be layered with aerogel, a solid material that not only has the lowest known density, it is the 

best insulator known. It is created by replacing all the liquid in a gel - usually silica gel - with gas, by means of supercritical drying, a process similar to freeze-drying. This 

creates a nanofoam, a foam with most of its bubbles under 100 nanometers in size, giving the aerogel its unusual 

properties.2

 Andre Geim and Konstantin Novoselov (Nobel Prize 

winners in physics in 2010) started something with their 

initial scotch-tape experiments. Who would have thought 

taking a thin layer of graphene off a block of pencil lead 

with scotch-tape would have accelerated the development 

of so many innovative applications of nanotechnology? 

REFERENCES:

1. Wikipedia – nanometer.

2. Wikipedia – aerogel. The discussion on aerogel was 

derived from or taken directly from Wikipedia.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 22

I 

ntroduction

 The National Power Grid (NPG) 

is a fundamental part of the U.S. 

infrastructure. Without it the national 

economy would fail and the results on 

the civilian population would be 

catastrophic. Such an occurrence is 

a real possibility, since the NPG continues to be vulnerable to a wide 

range of natural and man-made 

threats. Damage to key nodes in just 

a single region could take months, 

even years, to resolve, and during 

such a shutdown, the regional grid 

would not provide essential electrical 

power to process and refrigerate food 

and medicine, pump fuel/water/

sewage, assure communications, 

maintain bank and stock market records or other critical databases, or 

even provide light, heat, and air conditioning. In other words, society in 

that region would disintegrate 

[Further Reading 1]. If the threat 

were multi-regional, as it clearly could 

be, it would cause a national disaster.

 While the NPG vulnerability to 

different kinds of EM threats has 

been the subject of numerous technical assessments, only recently has it 

become a national political issue. 

Congress now has the political will to 

address this issue in separate House 

and Senate bills that explicitly identify 

the most serious EM threats as cyber 

attack, naturally occurring EM pulse 

(EMP) caused by solar storms and 

lightning, non-nuclear EMP (also 

known as intentional electromagnetic 

interference (IEMI), and nuclear 

EMP. No longer do they believe that 

one of these events might materialize; they now agree it is only a matter 

of time until it happens.

What is a Power Grid?

 A power grid is an enormous 

power generation, transmission, and 

distribution system. It consists of: (1) 

thousands of coal, hydro, natural gas, 

and nuclear power plants that generate medium-voltage (several thousand volts (kVs)) electric power which 

is sent to step-up transformer substations, (2) high-voltage transmission 

lines that take the stepped up highvoltage (hundreds of kVs) electric 

power and pass it on to (3) distribution centers with substations that then 

reduce (step down) the voltage and 

redistribute the electrical power via 

medium-voltage (1 to 100 kV) and 

low-voltage lines (below 1 kV) (either 

above ground or below ground) to 

such government and commercial 

users as military facilities, businesses 

and homes. A typical grid is shown in 

Figure 1 [Further Reading 2 and 3].

 In its simplest form, a power grid 

does not store the power it generates. Every bit of that power is immediately distributed throughout the connected system (electricity coming out 

of a wall socket was generated less 

than a millisecond ago). This means 

power plants must constantly generate an enormous amount of power to 

accommodate grid losses and power 

usage spikes. These grid conversion 

and transmission losses could be 

substantial: for generation facilities 

that have high combustion and heat 

losses due to the use of older boilers 

and turbines, as little as one-third of 

the total power produced might eventually be delivered to the user.

 Since most industrialized nations 

have grids that consist of these three 

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

Electromagnetic Threats to the

National Power Grid (NPG): An Update

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer

Physical Scientist

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Editor’s Note: The original article appeared in the Winter 2010 edition of the Army Chemical Review. Both articles reflect the findings and opinions of the author and are not meant to identify the position of the Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Energy

Regulatory Commission (FERC), or electric power industry. First, the articles describe a typical power grid. Next, they identify the 

basic elements of the U.S. National Power Grid (NPG). Then, they identify potential NPG vulnerabilities and discuss the importance 

of protection options for specific types of electromagnetic (EM) threats. These vulnerabilities are also discussed from a political 

standpoint. This article provides an important update to the original political discussion.

Figure 1. Typical electric power grid.
23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

basic parts, it is reasonable to assume that the discussion on NPG 

vulnerability applies to other national 

power grids, although exact sensitivities vary due to system-level differences.

What is the NPG?

 The NPG is a complex network of 

independently owned and operated 

power plants, transmission lines, and 

distribution subsystems interconnecting the continental U.S. Although this 

network is not owned by the U.S. 

government, as a natural monopoly it 

is regulated by the government. This 

means the government has the authority to regulate electric power as a 

commodity and ensure network reliability.

Figure 2 shows that the NPG consists 

of three interdependent but separate 

networks:

The Eastern Interconnection,

The Western Interconnection, and

The Electric Reliability Council of 

Texas (ERCOT) Interconnection.

 Besides their connection to each 

other, they are connected to the Canadian and the Mexican grids, forming the North American Power Grid. 

A clear illustration of the NPG and its 

eight North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Regions is 

provided in Further Reading 4. 

NERC and others have completed 

NPG vulnerability studies and have 

proposed ways to protect it against 

some of the more serious EM threats. 

[Further Reading 5]

 It is important to emphasize that 

the NPG has grown over the years to 

accommodate an increasing population with a growing appetite for electrical energy. Today, 40% of the energy consumed in the U.S. is used by 

the NPG to produce electricity (in 

1940, it was 10%, and in 1970 it was 

North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) regions.

FRCC - Florida Reliability Coordinating Council

MRO - Midwest Reliability Organization

NPCC - Northeast Power Coordinating Council

RFC - ReliabilityFirst Corporation

SERC - SERC Reliability Corporation

SPP - Southwest Power Pool, RE

TRE - Texas Regional Entity

WECC - Western Electricity Coordinating Council

Figure 2. The three interconnections of the U.S. National Power Grid and the Eight North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation regions (NERC). 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 24

25%). [Further Reading 4] The NPG 

now consists of a patchwork of old 

and new power plants, transmission 

lines and substations tied together 

over many years to form the three 

separate networks mentioned above. 

The continued expansion of the grid 

to meet the increasing power needs 

has had the unintended consequence 

of slowly increasing grid vulnerability 

to EM threats.

NPG Vulnerability: 

A Technical Assessment

 NPG vulnerability has been studied and documented by numerous 

organizations, both in the private sector and the DOD. One study, begun 

in 2001 by the House Armed Services 

Committee, looked at NPG vulnerability to a specific type of nucleargenerated EMP [Further Reading 5]. 

Other studies looked at actual regional shutdowns due to several different threats including naturally occurring EMP and even personnel error. Their conclusions are the same 

as the others: either upgrade the existing NPG or start over.

 Three of the more recent regional 

shutdowns of the NPG were the result of naturally occurring EMP 

caused by multiple lightning strikes 

on transformers (New York blackout 

of 1977), a localized solar storm 

(Quebec, 1989), and an operational 

control problem in what is referred to 

as “The Lake Erie Loop” (Midwestern 

U.S., Northeastern U.S., and southern Canada, 2003). In the first two, 

the results were of modest intensity 

(compared to the massive solar storm 

of 1859) and the loss of power was 

somewhat controlled. Nevertheless, 

the economic cost ran into the hundreds of millions of dollars with portions of the grid down for weeks. The 

March 1989 solar storm cost two 

large utilities, Hydro-Quebec in Canada and Public Service Electric & 

Gas (PSE&G) in New Jersey, an estimated $30 million in direct costs. Hydro-Quebec also spent $1.2 billion on 

installing protection devices to block 

future storm-induced currents. In one 

recent assessment, the Quebec solar 

energy field strength (about 5 volts/

kilometer (V/km)) and duration 

(several minutes) was shown to compare favorably to the late-time field 

strength and time duration characteristics of a nuclear-generated highaltitude EMP (HEMP) [Further Reading 6]. This means HEMP also has 

the capacity to knock out portions of 

the NPG. If either natural or nuclearinduced EMP were to damage one of 

the custom-ordered 500 kV 1200 

megavolt-ampere transformers, it 

likely would take more than a year to 

replace since most of these handwound extra high voltage transformers are today made in China, India, 

Japan and Europe.

 Unlike the unpredictability of a 

nuclear-generated HEMP event, solar 

storms, due to an 11-year cycle of 

solar activity, are cyclical. Many 

times during each cycle, the sun 

ejects a stream of charged particles 

(called coronal mass ejections 

(CMEs), some of these are recaptured by the sun while others stream 

into space (Figure 3(a)).

 Those that travel toward the earth 

in the enhanced solar wind are eventually captured by the earth‟s magnetic field and bent, causing the flow 

of charged particles downward toward the lower ionosphere 

(approximately 100 km altitude) 

where they eventually produce a horizontal current flow (Figure 3(b)).

 As these particles travel downward, they produce a visible glow 

through various ionization processes. 

In the northern hemisphere, this 

aurora phenomenon is known as the 

Northern Lights (Figure 4(a)). It is 

also similar to the glow seen in the 

upper atmosphere after a highaltitude nuclear detonation due to the 

flow of charged particles from the 

nuclear detonation (Figure 4(b) page 

25).

 The current solar cycle #24 (as 

described by the sunspot number) is 

predicted to peak around 2013. 

While no one can forecast how serious it will be, it is reasonable to assume that this or one of the future 

solar cycles will produce a storm that 

will rival or exceed the 1-2 September 

1859 storm, sometimes referred to as 

the Solar Superstorm or the Carrington Event. This killer storm was the 

strongest ever recorded. It has been 

estimated to be many times the 

strength of the 1989 regional storm 

over Quebec, and even though it 

caused less damage to the rugged 

 a. CMEs leaving the Sun. (b) CMEs interacting with Earth‟s Geo Field.

Figure 3. Typical solar activity. 
25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

and primitive1859 electrical systems 

than more recent storm damage to 

electronics and electrical systems in 

Quebec, it still caused fires and the 

failure of telegraph systems over 

Europe and North America. In addition, auroras caused by the 1859 

storm were seen around the world as 

far south as Cuba, and over the 

Rocky Mountains the sky was so 

bright that the glow woke up gold 

miners [Further Reading 6 and 7].

 Another major threat to the existing NPG is a cyber attack or some 

other form of information attack. The 

NPG. like many modern systems , is 

computer controlled and net-centric 

and potentially vulnerable to compromise. Unlike natural and nucleargenerated EMP, which cause immediate and detectable catastrophic 

damage or unacceptable upset to the 

NPG, an information attack could go 

undetected for some time. 

 In an effort to minimize protection 

costs, treating cyber attacks (usually 

in band with the electronics operating 

frequencies and at normal operating 

levels) as another EM threat is the 

preferred approach of the author. To 

accomplish this for the least cost, the 

EM Environmental Effects (E3) and 

Electronic Warfare (EW) protection 

communities must be integrated and 

a unified protection scheme must be 

part of a new system design. This 

protection must then be maintained 

throughout the NPG lifetime. A discussion on addressing E3 and EW 

protection together was the subject of 

a recent article in the CWMD Journal 

[Further Reading 8].

NPG Vulnerability: 

A Political Assessment

 Political support for the protection 

of the NPG is again growing. In late 

2009, tri-lateral support pushed forward bills in both the Senate and the 

House. Representative Yvette D. 

Clarke (D-NY), Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, Science and Technology, 

and Representative Roscoe G. Bartlett (R-MD), member of the Armed 

Services Committee, supported 

House Resolution (H.R.) 2195. 

Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) 

supported Senate (S.) 946. Both bills 

propose “To amend the Federal 

Power Act to provide additional authorities to adequately protect the 

critical electric infrastructure against 

cyber attack, and for other purposes.” 

Other electromagnetic threats emphasized in the bills are EMP caused 

by both solar storms and nuclear 

detonations.

 At about the same time, The 

House Energy and Commerce Committee‟s Subcommittee on Energy 

and Environment held a legislative 

hearing on H.R. 2195 and another bill 

(H.R. 2165, the Bulk Power System 

Protection Act of 2009) intended to 

protect the grid from cybersecurity 

threats. This hearing was followed by 

a classified briefing to Members of 

the Energy and Commerce Committee by Administration officials on 

threats to the electric grid. Since then 

Majority and Minority staff members 

for the Energy and Commerce Committee worked to develop a bipartisan 

discussion draft to amend the Federal 

Power Act to “...give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 

new authorities to protect the electric 

grid against cybersecurity and other 

threats as well as from geomagnetic 

storms created by solar flares.” This 

bill (H.R. 5026) passed the Energy 

and Commerce House Committee on 

March 9, 2010 by a vote of 47-0 

[Further Reading 9] and then passed 

in the House by a voice vote on June 

9, 2010. On September 27, 2010 the 

bill was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. 

Calendar No. 617. H.R. 5026 is now 

referred to as the “Grid Reliability and 

Infrastructure Defense Act” or the 

“GRID Act.”

 Should Congress approve a single 

bill, the question becomes just how 

robust one must make the entire NPG 

or the most critical parts of it. Either 

way, the cost is significant. Making it 

more robust has led to several ideas, 

including the redesign of the NPG 

into a commercial digital Smart Grid 

regulated by the FERC and capable 

of energy storage [Further Reading 

10].

 Until a permanent solution is 

funded, the DOD must consider options that assure their continued ability to complete critical missions. 

 (a) Northern Lights. (b) STARFISH U.S. high-altitude nuclear test con-

 ducted in 1962 near Johnston Island in the midPacific.

Figure 4. A comparison of Northern Lights to Johnston Island nuclear detonation.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 26

One of these options is the isolation 

of military posts, bases, and facilities 

from the civilian NPG. This isolation 

could be achieved with the development and deployment on each site of 

modular, small (10-25 megawatt 

(MW) electric) nuclear power reactors 

(NPRs). The idea of using small 

NPRs is not new. In fact, about fifty 

years ago the U.S. Army used fixed 

NPRs to provide electrical power to 

Fort Belvoir, VA and Fort Greely, AK. 

In addition, mobile NPRs were used 

at Sundance, WY, Camp Century in 

Greenland and McMurdo Sound in 

the Antarctic. And finally, a 45 MW 

(thermal) NPR mounted on a floating 

barge (MH-1A Sturgis) provided the 

Panama Canal Zone with electricity 

for eight years (1968-1976) [Further 

Reading 11]. The proper integration 

of small NPRs into a comprehensive

civilian and military EM threat protection scheme, including both hardware 

and software protection could protect 

Army sites from cyber attack as well 

as other forms of EM threats.

Conclusion

 Both the technical community and 

Congressional policy makers recognize the vulnerability of the NPG to 

different forms of EM threats. Technical assessments have identified potential weak points/nodes and have 

provided protection options. On the 

policy side, Congressional H.R. 2195, 

H.R. 2165, H.R. 5026, and S. 946 

bills include cyber attack, severe geomagnetic storms, IEMI and EM weapons as significant EM threats. This 

combination of diverse threats can 

only be addressed by integrating 

hardware and software protection into 

an overall (end-to-end) system design. The integrated protection must 

then be maintained throughout the 

lifetime of the NPG. And while the 

least expensive approach to protecting hardware and software is to include it into the original system design, the existing NPG requires a 

more expensive form of retrofit protection involving the support and involvement of many private businesses. For this reason, the author 

concludes oversight for such a massive protection scheme must be the 

responsibility of one civilian organization, possibly the Office of Electric 

Reliability, FERC [Further Reading 

12]. 

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer is a Physical 

Scientist at the United States Army 

Nuclear and CWMD Agency at Fort 

Belvoir, VA, working on nuclear 

weapons effects. He has a B.S. in 

physics from Trinity University and an 

M.A. in physics from The Johns Hopkins University. Previous government 

experience includes Chief of the 

Harry Diamond Laboratory (HDL) 

Electromagnetics Laboratory and 

Chief of the 400-acre Woodbridge 

Research Facility, both in Woodbridge, VA. His e-mail address is 

robert.pfeffer@us.army.mil

Further Reading

1. Forstchen, William R, One Second 

After, Forge Books, 350 Pages, ISBN

New York City blackout.
27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

-13: 978-0-7653-1758-2, 2009. A realistic description of what could happen to society if the NPG Eastern 

Interconnection went down.

2. Electric power transmission, http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electric power 

transmission.

3. Brain, Howard, How Power Grids 

Work, http://www.howstuffworks.com/

power.html.

4. North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation (NERC) Regions, http://

www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/

chg_str_fuel/html/fig02.html, and 

NERC Interconnections, http://

www.ercot.com/content/news/

mediakit/maps/

NERC_Interconnections_color.jpg; 

U.S. DOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Overview 

of the Electric Grid, http://

sites.energetics.com/gridworks/

grid.html.

5. NERC Executive Brief, Electromagnetic Pulse & Geomagnetic 

Storm Events, http://www.nerc.com/

fileUploads/File/CIP/EMPGeomagnetic-Exec-Brief(1).pdf; Commission to Assess the Threat to the 

United States from Electromagnetic 

Pulse (EMP) Attack, http://

www.empcommission.org/; and HighImpact, Low-Frequency Event Risk to 

the North American Bulk Power System, North American Electric Reliability Corporation, June 2010.

6. Radasky, William, Kappenman, 

John, Pfeffer, Robert; Nuclear and 

Space Weather Effects on the Electric Power Infrastructure; pp. 37-42; 

NBC Report Fall/Winter 2001.

7. Solar Storms Cause Significant 

Economic and Other Impacts on 

Earth, http://

www.magazine.noaa.gov/stories/

mag131.htm; Solar Storm of 1859, 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Solar_storm_of_1859; Coronal Mass 

Ejection, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Coronal_mass_ejection; Geomagnetic Storm, http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/Geomagnetic_storm; and Solar 

Superstorm, http://science.nasa.gov/

science-news/science-atnasa/2003/23oct_superstorm/

8. Pfeffer, Robert, The Need to Redefine Electromagnetic (EM) Protection: A Think Piece, pp. pp. 33-40, 

CWMD Journal, Issue 5, 2010.

9. Grid Security Legislation, March 9, 

2010.

10. Smart Grids: the Energy Storage 

Problem, http://www.nature.com/

news/2010/100106/full/463018a.html, 

and Brady, Jeff, An Aged Electric 

Grid Looks To A Brighter Future,

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/

story.php?storyId=103327321.

11. Pfeffer, Robert A.; Macon, William 

A.; Jr., Nuclear Power: An Option for 

the Army’s Future; pp. 4-8; Army Logistician, September-October 2001.

12. Private conversations with Dr. 

William Radasky, Metatech Corporation, April 2010.

Front article picture: City Skyline by 

CW5 Stephen Gomes

27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 28

I 

ntroduction

 Military forces need to assess 

the performance of equipment, such 

as masks, tents, or vehicles, prior to 

deployment on the battlefield. Developmental tests assess the performance of the equipment and operational tests assess how readily personnel can use it. Equipment designed to protect against chemical 

agents must be tested. For reasons 

of cost, safety, and to comply with 

international law, only certain types of 

testing are performed with toxic 

chemical warfare agents. All other 

tests are performed with a substance 

(simulant) that is expected to have 

similar characteristics as an agent 

and is convenient for use in a given 

test environment. Simulants have 

been used extensively since World 

War I. Since the U.S. abandoned 

outdoor chemical releases in 19691, 

simulants have been used exclusively 

for field testing of defensive equipment.

 To understand the significance of 

test results performed with simulants 

and to predict how the equipment will 

perform when tested with agent, it is 

necessary to measure the agent to 

simulant relationship (ASR). For protective equipment, the simplest ASR 

is the ratio of agent concentration to 

simulant concentration, when measured concurrently under the same 

conditions.

 The selected simulant must meet 

the following criteria: (1) a simulant 

should match the properties of the 

agent that are relevant to the equipment being tested, (2) the data used 

to choose the simulant should be reviewed and traceable, and (3) the 

simulant should be usable in a 

planned test. Since no individual 

simulant can perfectly match an 

agent, input from scientific, operational, and test perspectives must be 

considered and balanced. A simulant 

selection process that does not meet 

the criteria will produce limited or inaccurate test results. Such results 

will produce misleading conclusions 

regarding the performance of the 

equipment against agents on the battlefield.

 

 Simulants have been selected 

previously for testing protective 

equipment.2,3.4 In this study, simulants were selected for permeation. 

Permeation was chosen because the 

permeation of agent is a risk to both 

individual protection (suits, gloves, 

and masks) and collective protection 

(tents, ships, and vehicles). Further 

impetus was provided by a collective 

protection acquisition program that 

needed a traceable, validated simulant selection method that was required to base decisions on peerreviewed technical data, together with 

well-documented input of subject 

matter experts (SMEs).

 In this project, simulants were selected for four nerve and blister 

agents. All compounds are liquids at 

ambient conditions. To understand 

the permeation of a compound 

through protective equipment, physical processes were identified and 

related to physical and chemical 

properties that could be found in 

Chemical Abstracts Service (CAS) 

database5and in Beilstein CrossFire 

Commander 6database. Values of 

each physical property were collected 

for agents and for candidate simulants. Decision models were developed to evaluate candidate compounds to be used as simulants in 

laboratory, chamber, and field test 

environments.

 In laboratory tests, small amounts 

(grams) of a compound are used with 

the appropriate engineering controls 

to test samples of material and small 

equipment. For these tests, compound toxicity and cost are less important than its ability to mimic agent. 

However, in chamber tests larger 

quantities (several grams) of agent 

can be used with the appropriate engineering controls to test mediumsized equipment. In contrast to the 

laboratory tests, a balance between 

the toxicity of the compound and its 

similarity to agent is necessary before 

chamber testing. In open air (field) 

tests agent cannot be released under 

any circumstances and generous 

amounts (kilograms) of simulants are 

used to test large equipment; cost 

and environmental safety are paramount. The usability of each candidate simulant for testing was assessed.

 Simulants were selected for laboratory testing to validate that the performance of the selected simulants 

was similar to that of the agent. 

7 The 

Selection of Simulants for 

Barrier Material Permeation Testing

Darren Jolley, Brad Rowland, Laurence Adair

U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, TEDT-DPW-CTC, Dugway, UT 

Mark Hanning-Lee, Gregory Bottelberghe

Jacobs Dugway Team, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah 

Frank Hanson, Kaushik Gandhi

Chemical Engineering Department, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah

John Walther, Lindsey Wurster, Patrice Abercrombie, Ray Jablonski, Ann Butrow

Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Aberdeen, Maryland
29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

results of agent and simulant tests 

were compared to establish a pilot 

ASR. 7 The selection process was 

successful since the rank ordering of 

simulants agreed with the model predictions. 

 Future programs will be able to 

predict simulant performance against 

agents, using a well-characterized 

candidate simulant, an ASR, and a 

system performance test with simulant.

Methods

 Although the process for the selection of simulants was implemented 

for permeation simulants, it is broadly 

applicable to other simulant selection 

testing. The selection process had 

five stages: problem definition, simulant identification and screening, 

simulant selection, simulant usability 

assessment, and simulant validation. 

The approach was based on established operational analysis principles 

8

combined with scientific knowledge 

of the permeation process. Operational analysis guidance was provided 

by the Decision Analysis Team at 

Edgewood Chemical and Biological 

Center (ECBC). The evaluation 

methodology utilized a decision 

analysis process called Multi-Criteria 

Decision Making (MCDM). Decision 

analysis and MCDM were based on 

the established principles of operations research. MCDM was used 

previously4and was relevant for this 

work. The MCDM evaluation model 

consisted of a finite set of evaluation 

criteria, derived from the physical 

properties and usability factors. The 

criteria chosen were relevant to the 

situation being addressed, independent from one another, and distinguished between the different simulants being considered. Commercial 

MCDM software, Logical Decisions 

for Windows (LDW, Logical Decisions, Fairfax, VA) was used for 

model development and to support 

the assessment process. At each 

test stage, the number of candidate 

simulants was reduced to optimally 

use time and resources for the next 

stage. A research team was assembled with expertise on operational 

analysis, agent and simulant chemistry, database searching, and material 

testing to guide the selection process.

Problem Definition

 The main simulant properties were 

identified that affected permeation 

through protective material. Different 

types of contamination events were 

defined. Physical processes such as 

evaporation and diffusion governed 

each type of contamination event. 

Information on the rate of each contamination event for a given compound was typically unavailable; 

therefore, further analysis was used 

to relate those processes to the 

physical properties that could be 

found in databases. Properties were 

also defined that affected the usability 

of a simulant in the testing environment. The specific criteria for usability differed between laboratory, chamber, and field environments. The 

relative importance of each property 

was determined and given a weight 

by the research team.

Simulant Identification and 

Screening

 The value of each property (Table 

1) was determined for each agent. 

The chemical literature was consulted 

to determine the value of each property for each candidate simulant. The 

initial search returned a large number 

of candidate simulants that was reduced by screening criteria. Essential steps in reducing the initial search 

numbers were to obtain missing property values and resolve conflicting 

data. Candidate simulants with property values close to the agent value 

were considered for selection.

Table 1. Contamination events related to physical properties.

Simulant Selection

 Each candidate simulant was converted to a score. This score was 

multiplied by the pre-determined 

weight for that property. The 

weighted scores were then totaled to 

yield the utility value for that simulant. 

Candidate simulants were ranked by 

utility and the top-ranked simulants 

were selected for technical assessment.

Table 1. Contamination events related to physical properties.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 30

Simulant Technical Assessment

 Each candidate simulant was further assessed to determine if it was 

technically suitable for field or chamber test environments. Simulants 

deemed usable were submitted for 

validation.

Simulant Validation

 The selection and usability assessments yielded simulants that 

were predicted to have permeation 

characteristics that are similar to 

agent. The selected simulants and 

agents were subjected to laboratory 

permeation testing by determining the 

permeation rate of each compound 

through a reference material. Simulants were ranked by how closely permeation rates resembled agent 

rates. 7

Results and Discussion

Problem Definition

 Once the assessment and validation process was completed for the 

simulants, the number of possible 

compounds was reduced to a small 

number of selected simulants. The 

process is illustrated in the selection 

pyramid in Figure 1.

 To start the process, it was necessary to frame the problem. Contamination events were defined by the 

manner in which the contamination 

might occur on different types of materials that could be found on the battlefield. Materials were classified as 

semi-permeable (air can pass 

through material) or as impermeable 

(air cannot pass through). Five contamination events were identified: 

drops on semi-permeable materials, 

drops on impermeable materials, 

aerosol on semi-permeable material, 

vapor challenge on carbon filters, and 

liquid contamination tracked into the 

tent. Each contamination event is 

described in Table 1. Contamination 

events were deliberately chosen not 

to be specific for any particular type 

of material.

 Each contamination event was 

mapped to the physical properties 

found in CAS 5and Beilstein CrossFire Commander 6

databases. Contamination events that were more 

likely to happen and/or had a higher 

consequence to the soldier were assigned a higher relative importance 

(weighting). The weighting of each 

event was somewhat arbitrary; however, the conclusions indicate that the 

choice of simulants was insensitive to 

the exact event weighting values.

 The physical properties corresponding to each test are listed in 

Table 1. The main physical properties were heat of vaporization, molecular dipole, molar volume, vapor 

pressure, surface tension, and viscosity. It was determined that the 

physical properties listed first had 

more impact on the choice of simulant. Each property was assigned a 

weighted value, distinct from the 

event weighted values described in 

the previous paragraph. Other properties were defined that would affect 

the ability of each simulant to be used 

in testing. In MCDM, the evaluation 

model was structured in the form of a 

hierarchy. Higher-level criteria, referred to as goals, represented categories of criteria (e.g., physicochemical and usability). The simulants 

were evaluated against the lower 

level criteria, referred to as measures. 

The measures were quantitative in 

nature (e.g., vapor pressure) or qualitative (e.g., operating conditions). 

Each measure was defined specifically for the scenario under consideration. The definitions were important to ensure common understanding, so that those conducting the assessment evaluated the simulants as 

similarly as possible. Usability criteria 

were defined by team members with 

experience in testing.

 Some simulant properties were 

defined continuously as a positive, 

real number. Other properties were 

defined as discrete values (e.g., high/

medium/low). A performance scale 

was developed for each measure and 

was used to identify how well a simuFigure 1. Simulant selection pyramid, showing the selection process.
31 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

lant performed relative to a specific 

measure. Values of 100 and 0 were 

assigned to the upper and lower ends 

of the scale, respectively, and intermediate values were then derived 

based on the principles of utility theory. 

8

 This translated dissimilar information into common units, and allowed for the comparison of scores 

across different measures. Table 2 

lists the properties used for selecting 

simulants, and the associated scales.

Simulant Identification and 

Screening

 It was necessary to find values for 

the properties of the agents to compare the similarities of simulants to 

agents. Agent property values were 

compiled by the Agent Chemistry 

Team at ECBC. CAS 5and Beilstein 

CrossFire Commander 6databases 

were searched for simulant property 

values.

 Over 10 million organic compounds were found, each with unique 

CAS number. This number was reduced using the following screening 

criteria: Candidate compounds were 

to be commercially available liquids; 

radioactive, extremely toxic, malodorous, hygroscopic, unstable, or reactive compounds were excluded. 

Other compounds were rejected if 

they produced toxic or corrosive products in common use, i.e., in the presence of air, water, or light. Because 

agent molecules do not donate protons (aprotic), only candidate simulants that were also aprotic were accepted, because they were more 

likely to mimic the interaction of 

agents with substrates. It was required that all compounds could be 

detected using the MINICAMS® (a 

miniature, automatic, continuous airmonitoring system; OI Analytical, College Station, Texas) gas chromatograph fitted with a flame photometric 

detector; therefore each compound 

had to contain phosphorus or sulfur. 

The criteria were reduced to mathematical operators that could be understood by the search software. For 

example, the liquid criterion was 

specified as: melting point available 

AND melting point < 0°C AND boiling 

point available AND boiling point > 

60°C at 1 atmosphere pressure. 

 Only single compounds were considered. It might be possible to mix 

compounds to match some agent 

properties. However, it was considered too complex to tailor a mixture to 

match many properties of an agent. 

The theory of mixtures does not allow 

the confident prediction of all significant properties of a mixture from its 

composition. Furthermore, mixtures 

would change their properties during 

testing because differential evaporation of different components would 

change the composition. Lastly, mixtures would change composition due 

to chromatographic separation of 

composition within the material being 

tested.

 Additional data were obtained 

from Agent/Simulant Knowledge Database (ASK), a governmental information repository of physical and 

chemical properties, toxicological 

data, applications, and environmental 

fate and effects information. ASK is 

available from the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear DeTable 2. Simulant Properties and Performance Scales.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 32

fense Information Analysis Center 

(CBRNIAC). The ASK user interface 

permits a chemical agent/simulant 

comparison search based on properties of interest.

Simulant Selection

 Initial searches were performed 

using the properties for which data 

were most commonly available in the 

Beilstein CrossFire Commander 6

database: vapor pressure and liquid 

density. Only compounds with at 

least one literature value for each 

property were accepted (e.g., all compounds having a liquid density within 

20 percent of the agent). For each 

property, a search window was used 

on each side of the agent value. A 

wider search window would return 

more hits. The search windows were 

varied iteratively to return a manageable number (approximately 200) of 

compounds that met the criteria.

 Paper usability studies were conducted and included cost and availability, thermal stability, storage requirements, interaction with battlefield 

contaminants, disposal, flashpoint, 

and explosive limits of vapor in air 

criteria. Cost and availability were 

determined from vendors. Other 

properties were determined from the 

chemical literature, the Material 

Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), or by 

review.

 For physicochemical properties, 

the score was calculated as the ratio 

of the value for the simulant to the 

value for the agent, multiplied by 

100.9 If the value for the simulant 

exceeded the value for the agent, the 

ratio was inverted before multiplying 

by 100, to keep the score less than 

100. This approach is summarized in 

Equation 1. The scores were used 

both to screen simulants, and in the 

evaluation model to score the simulants: 9

 Discrete properties were converted to scores using the scales in 

Table 2. The scores and weights 

were calculated for each simulant and 

each property. The formula expressed in Equation 2 was used to 

calculate the utility value for each 

simulant:

Equation 2

 Where the sum was performed 

over all properties, and the index i 

was used to label the property. 

Weights were chosen by the team 

and were adjusted to sum to 100.

 Weightings were defined for laboratory, chamber, and field tests. In 

addition, weightings were slightly different for each agent. Example 

weightings are shown in Table 3. 

Weights were entered directly into the 

MCDM software.

 The MCDM software combined 

the values and the weights for each 

property and ranked the simulant by 

utility value. The contribution of each 

score and weight for the most highlyranked simulants is shown in Figure 

2. The best match for a blister agent 

was predicted to be methyl salicylate 

(MeS, CAS number 119-36-8). An 

intermediate match was triethyl phosphate (TEP, CAS number 78-40-0) 

and a poor match was phenyl acetate 

(PA, CAS number 122-79-2). Simulants 3-hepten-2-one (HP, CAS number 1119-44-4) and trimethyl phosphate (TMP, CAS number 521-56-1) 

were predicted as the good and intermediate matches for a nerve agent 

respectively. For another nerve 

agent, 4-chlorobutyl acetate (CA, 

CAS number 6962-92-1), TEP, and 

diisopropyl fluorophosphate (DFP, 

CAS number 866-23-9) were predicted to be the best, intermediate, 

and poor matches respectively.

 MeS and TEP were ranked in the 

top five blister agent simulants for 

laboratory, chamber, and field testing. 

In addition, TEP is a simulant that is 

frequently used. Compounds with a 

cost of US $0.02/gram or less when 

purchased in bulk are most practical 

for field use, and the only blister 

agent simulant candidate that met 

this threshold was TEP at $0.01/

gram. Other blister agent simulant 

candidates cost significantly more. 

 

i

U ScoreiWeighti

Table 3. Property Weightings for a simulant of a nerve agent, for laboratory, 

chamber, and field testing.

















 

simulant

agent

agent

simulant

Value

Value

Value

Value Score 100 min ,

Equation 1
33 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

The intermediate simulant PA was 

also chosen to test the selection process across a wider range of property 

values.

Simulant Technical Assessment

 Technical studies were performed 

on each candidate simulant to assess 

whether the simulant would be suitable for use in the test environment. 

By theoretical analysis, it was determined that these simulants would not 

react in a hazardous manner with 

contaminants commonly found in the 

test or operational environment.10 

Furthermore, the candidate simulants 

were unlikely to be depleted by reaction with these contaminants. Lastly, 

it was determined that these simulants could be quantified in the presence of some level of these contaminants during swatch, chamber, and 

field testing.

 Laboratory usability studies included interaction with test facility 

surfaces (which affected the persistence of the compound on facility surfaces after a test), presence in the 

test environment, ease of dissemination, ability to be detected at the minimum detection limits needed in testing, interaction with safety monitoring 

systems, and the ability to be removed after testing.

 Simulants were selected by considering different properties. The 

properties that yielded the most information for selection were those that 

were highly weighted, and for which 

the value differed greatly between 

simulants. Vapor pressure, dipole 

moment, and liquid viscosity were the 

most selective physical criteria.

Simulant Validation

 The measured ranking of simulants agreed with the predicted ranking, once the properties were 

weighted more specifically for the 

reference material. ASRs were successfully established between each 

agent and at least one simulant 

Figure 2. Stacked bar chart showing the contribution of each property to the utility value for the highest-ranked 

simulants of a Blister Agent for test in the laboratory.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 34

chosen by the selection process. 

Further details are provided in the 

validation paper. 7

Conclusions

 Simulants were selected for permeation through protective materials 

using a documented, traceable process. Peer-reviewed literature data 

were used, together with commercial 

data sources, and SME input. The 

results of the selection operation 

were successfully correlated to the 

results of the pilot ASR test [7].

 Validation was successful and the 

selection process was accepted for 

use by a collective protection acquisition program. Furthermore, a simulant selection Test Operating Procedure was drafted for use by all Department of Defense testing laboratories.11

 Ongoing work for the acquisition 

program has selected simulants using 

revised criteria for the nerve and blister agents. The performance of the 

revised list of simulants is being determined under different test conditions. The usability of simulants will 

be assessed in more detail.

Acknowledgement

This work was funded by Joint Science and Technology Office - Defense Threat Reduction Agency under contract number CA06TAS438. 

A sincere thanks to Dr. Jonathan 

Kaufman at the Threat Agent Science 

(TAS) office of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA) - Joint 

Science and Technology Office 

(JSTO) for supporting this work under 

contract number W911S6-06-D-0001. 

The work of Tsenu Mamo, Michael 

Giessing, Gary Brimley, Gail BowersIrons, and Tess Dragovich of the 

Dugway Data Services Team with 

discussions, database searching and 

extensive administrative assistance 

was indispensable and greatly appreciated.

Mr. Darren Jolley is a physical scientist and the collective protection test 

subject matter expert at the West Desert Test Center at Dugway Proving 

Ground, Utah. He has a B.S. in Geology from Southern Utah University, a 

M.S. in Geology from Texas A&M 

University. He previously worked as 

a Sr. scientist for Framatome ANP 

working on the geochemistry of the 

waste package environment as part 

of the Department of Energy’s Yucca 

Mountain High Level Nuclear Waste 

Repository. Prior to this time, he was 

a Platoon Leader inn a Patriot missile 

battery and was deployed as part of 

Operations Desert Shield, and Desert 

Storm. His email address is 

Darren.jolley@us.army.mil

ENDNOTES

1. United States Code 1512, Title 50, 

Chapter 32, Chemical and Biological 

Warfare Program – Transportation, 

Open Air Testing, and Disposal, 08 

January 2008.

2. A. K. Stuempfle, W. E. White, P 

Lockwood, I Lawston, and K. Chinn, 

International Task Force-8 Simulants 

and Training Agents, Final Report, 

CRDEC-SP-003, U. S. Army Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center, Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, MD, December 1988.

3. A W Brence; R Matz; S Laughlin; L 

Garrett; G Drown (10 March 2005), 

Agent to Simulant Selection Methodology for Artemis (Chemical Agent 

Standoff Detection System), Battelle, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico.

4. Simulant Plan of Action Working 

Group, Business Area Manager, Supporting Science and Technology, 

Joint Science and Technology Panel 

for Chemical Biological Defense 

(JSTPCBD), Chemical Biological 

Threat Agent Simulant Plan of Action

DRAFT, 31 December 2002, unpublished, limited distribution.

5. Chemical Abstracts Service Database (CASD), American Chemical 

Society, Columbus, Ohio.

6. Crossfire Beilstein Database Suite, 

Elsevier Publishing, Amsterdam, The 

Netherlands.

7. B. Rowland, D. Jolley, B. Bennett, 

B. Johnson, G. Moffett, L. Adair, M. 

Hanning-Lee, G. Bottelberghe, T. 

Mamo, J. Kaufman. Test method and 

simple analysis model for off-gassing 

studies of military-relevant surfaces 

contaminated with chemical warfare 

agent simulants. Polymer Testing 

2010; 29(7):777-783.

8. C W Kirkwood (1997), Strategic 

Decision Making: Multiobjective Decision Analysis with Spreadsheets, 

Duxbury Press: Belmont, CA. 

9. Crosier R (March 1989), Methods 

for the Selection of Chemicals for 

Simulation of Chemical Warfare 

Agents Experiments, CRDEC report 

number CRDEC-TR-88105, AD-B131 

871. 

10. D M Jolley; J D Walther; J B Rowland; K Gandhi; F Hanson; L R 

Wurster; M A Hanning-Lee; G L Siddoway; G A Bottelberghe; R E 

Jablonski; P L Abercrombie; T Mamo 

and L P Adair (2007), FY07 Annual 

Report for Simulant Selection for Protective Equipment Testing, West Desert Test Center, U.S. Army Dugway 

Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah 

84022-5000.

11. U.S. Army Developmental Test 

Command (DTC), Test Operations 

Procedure (TOP) 8-2-196 Simulant 

Selection for Laboratory, Chamber, 

and Field (DRAFT), Aberdeen, Maryland 21005.
35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

I Militaries have a long history of 

using surrogates to study hazardous 

materials. However, surrogates for 

hazardous military chemicals have a 

relatively recent history, dating from 

the First World War. Simulants have 

been used in U.S. weapon development since the 1940s when everything from water to methyl salicylate 

(MeS) was used, to the 1980s when 

alternatives were used to assess 

Russian binary weapons [1]. Simulants selected for offensive programs 

adequately addressed the primary 

need at the time; however, less effort 

was placed on developing simulants 

for defensive purposes, such as protection, detection, and decontamination [2, 3]. Furthermore, past programs selected simulants to mimic 

relevant physical properties such as 

vapor pressure, evaporation, and/or 

viscosity. In 1969, the U.S. ceased 

outdoor CWA releases [4]. Since that 

date, it became necessary to use surrogates, also known as simulants, to 

reduce the risk of exposure to toxic 

warfare chemicals during training, 

developmental testing, and equipment evaluation in field testing [5].

 Traditional test protocols, based on 

historically used simulants, have 

shown that past simulants had limitations for testing the field performance 

of equipment that defends the warfighter against CWAs [6]. In addition, 

limitations placed on the testing of 

defensive materiel through treaties, 

regulations, and safety requirements 

demand simulant correlation with 

CWAs and relevant simulant selection.

 Validated simulant selection is 

vital to the statistical correlation of 

simulant performance to CWAs. An 

improperly implemented simulant selection (due to a lack of relevant 

physical or chemical property values) 

will produce simulant field results that 

either mislead or provide information 

of limited use. Significant efforts 

have been made in both simulant 

selection and testing methods to provide accurate correlation of simulants 

to CWAs for standoff detection [6-8]. 

Recently, improved methods have 

been developed to correlate simulants based on detector performance 

[9, 10]. Individual protection (suits 

and masks), collective protection 

(tents, vehicles, and buildings), and 

decontamination technologies will 

benefit from improved simulant selection based on relevant properties [11]. 

Finally, the chemical biological defense material development program 

should use a validated traceable 

simulant selection method [12].

 A previously developed simulant 

selection process determined the important physical properties necessary 

to adequately challenge a defense 

technology. Then these parameters 

and others describing human, programmatic, and environmental concerns were weighted according to 

their importance [13, 14]. This approach can be used for any CWA 

defense technology if the relevant 

properties are considered. Examples 

of important physical properties for a 

technology are: the infrared (IR) 

spectrum for passive IR detection at a 

distance, mass fragmentation for a 

mass spectrometer, or reaction rate 

for decontamination. Use considerations were human (e.g., toxicity), programmatic (e.g., cost, availability), 

and environmental concerns (e.g., 

environmental permits). This process 

focused on using available database 

information and required estimation of 

physical property data when the database information was in question.

 The simulant selection process 

initially considered protective performance of generic barrier materials 

that could be either semi-permeable 

or impermeable. To simulate the protective performance of barrier material against agent, the relevant physical properties considered were vapor 

pressure, surface tension, heat of 

vaporization, dipole moment, and 

viscosity. These parameters were 

weighted depending on use and 

Validation of the Chemical Warfare Agent 

Simulant Selection Process for 

Barrier Material Permeation Testing

Darren Jolley, Brad Rowland, Brian Bennett, Laurence Adair, 

Aaron Orland, Gregory Siddoway, Jean Baker

U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, TEDT-DPW-CTC, Dugway, UT

Mark Hanning-Lee, Gregory Bottelberghe, Michael Giessing, 

Adam Green, Cody Castagno, Richard Warby

Jacobs Dugway Team, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, Utah

Tsenu Mamo

Science and Technology Corporation, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT 

Jon Kaufman

Joint Science and Technology Office – Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Patuxent River, MD

ntroduction
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 36

physical values obtained by querying 

standard databases. Use considerations were human, programmatic, and 

environmental. The initial selection 

process searches yielded hundreds 

of potential chemical simulants. 

These searches were refined with 

more restrictive property searches 

and screening criteria, to reduce the 

number of chemicals to approximately 25.

 The selection process generated 

quantitative ranking of simulants for 

HD [bis(2-chloroethyl) sulfide, Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) number 

505-60-2], GB (isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate, CAS number 107-44

-8), and GD (pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate, CAS number 96-64-

0). The best simulants based on defense technology, database values, 

and user needs were selected. After 

the selection process was developed 

and simulants were selected, process 

accuracy was determined with validation testing [13, 14].

 The simulants were originally 

ranked for any generic barrier material, either liquid or vapor contamination and independent of the permeation test method. This general ranking was refined to select a simulant 

specifically for vapor challenge of an 

impermeable material, like the nitrile 

reference material used in this validation test. This test did not include a 

liquid challenge; therefore liquid challenge was excluded from the refined 

ranking. The refined scoring ignored 

less relevant physical properties such 

as surface tension, and focused on 

properties such as dipole moment 

and heat of vaporization. Refinement 

changed the simulant rank/order from 

the original ranking. This was expected since the original ranking did 

not consider the specifics of a swatch 

test.

 To validate the process, a selection of ranked simulants were chosen 

as representatives of good, intermediate, and (when possible) poor 

matches to the agent. For HD, the 

best match predicted was MeS (CAS 

number 119-36-8), the intermediate 

match was triethyl phosphate (TEP, 

CAS number 78-40-0), and a poor 

match was phenyl acetate (PA, CAS 

number 122-79-2). Simulants 3-

hepten-2-one (HP, CAS number 1119

-44-4) and trimethyl phosphate (TMP, 

CAS number 521-56-1) were predicted as the good and intermediate 

matches for GB respectively. For 

GD, 4-chlorobutyl acetate (CA, CAS 

number 6962-92-1), TEP, and diisopropyl fluorophosphate (DFP, CAS 

number 866-23-9) were predicted to 

be the good, intermediate, and poor 

matches respectively. Previous testing quantified the breakthrough of 

agent and simulant vapor after a liquid challenge and derived values of 

the diffusion coefficient [15].

 This article focuses on validation 

testing and the accuracy of the selection model by comparing the predicted rank/order of a simulant/agent 

match with a laboratory measured 

rank/order. The experimental test 

fixture and procedures will be described, as will the environmental 

controls and monitoring equipment. 

A theoretical approach for analysis of 

permeation data will be discussed by 

comparing measured experimental 

results with modeled results. Results 

of the time-dependent permeation 

modeling results, performance envelope equations, diffusion coefficients, 

activation energies, and ranking will 

be discussed and analyzed. Finally, 

the validation accuracy and value of 

the results will be described in the 

conclusion section.

Experimental

Materials

The experimental permeation test 

fixture configuration is capable of collecting time-resolved permeation concentration data at concentrations 

ranging from 0.03 to 100 mg/m3. 

Subsequent to the work reported 

here, fixture improvements have reduced the lower detectable concentration limit. The test fixture design 

provides vapor challenges, effluent 

concentration measurements, rapid 

changes of relative humidity (RH), 

and environmental controls. The 

endpoint test configuration provided a 

fixture with environmental control that 

would fit inside a standard fume 

hood. The test methods were developed under this work and produced 

data compatible with a standard 

American Society for Testing and 

Materials (ASTM) method [16].

 The Dugway Fixture (dFIX) (Figure 

1) was built around a small thermoelectrically temperature-controlled, 

thermally insulated Lexan®chamber. 

A mass flow controller regulated the 

flow of dried and oil-filtered laboratory 

air. A vapor challenge was produced 

by adding liquid simulant or agent 

through a heated tee, where it evaporated. Deionized water was also fed 

at a controlled rate through a liquid 

chromatography (LC) pump and 

evaporated into the air stream. The 

challenge was thoroughly mixed in a 

mixing chamber, and then split 

Figure 1. Vapor Permeation Test 

Fixture. Humid chemical vapor challenges were generated by the syringe and LC pumps and flowed 

over the top of the material in the 

cup. Sampling was done through a 

sequencer and MINICAMS® 

(a miniature, automatic, continuous 

air-monitoring system) by sweeping 

the bottom of the cup with dry air. 

The dFIX provided temperature 

control.
37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

equally among three standard military 

swatch permeation cells mounted in 

the dFIX. The temperature gradient 

of the dFIX has been shown to be 

within ±1°C across the chamber. The 

temperature can be reduced to 0°C 

or increased to 55°C in very short 

time periods (within an hour for most 

temperatures and four hours for extreme temperatures).

 The permeation cells were the 

standard military swatch cups that 

can be disassembled, decontaminated and reused. The Aerosol Vapor Liquid Assessment Group 

(AVLAG) used these permeation cells 

for testing swatches of material [17]. 

The swatch cup design provided airflow above and below the 5.1-cm (2.1

-in) diameter swatch material. Orings secured by a bolt-and-nut assembly sealed the perimeter of the 

swatch. The referee system showed 

less than 1 percent carry-over when 

switching between permeation cups. 

The current system ran for four 

months with no failures. Earlier tests 

were performed using nitrile rubber 

cut from the palm of a KimberlyClark®

(Irving, Texas) purple nitrile 

powder-free medical examination 

glove (product number 55083). The 

nominal thickness was 0.15 mm 

(0.006 in).

 Vapor that permeated the swatch 

was entrained by a flow of clean air to 

a sequencer valve (model number 

E16CMS) from Chemical Monitoring 

Systems (CMS) (CMS Research Corporation, Pelham, Alabama). The 

valve directed the 0.5 L/min sample 

flow from each cup to a gas chromatograph (GC) [MINICAMS®

(a 

miniature, automatic, continuous airmonitoring system)] from CMS. The 

MINICAMS® was fitted with a flame 

ionization detector (FID) that measured concentration every 5 minutes 

(every 15 minutes for each of the 

three cups).

 All agents (GB, GD, and HD) were 

obtained from the Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center, Maryland. 

Agent purity was greater than 95 percent as determined by Fourier Transform Nuclear Magnetic Resonance 

(FT-NMR) analysis. The simulants 

MeS, TEP, and CA were purchased 

from Fisher Scientific (Hampton, New 

Hampshire). The simulants PA and 

HP were purchased from Alfa-Aesar 

(Ward Hall, Massachusetts). The 

simulant DFP was purchased from 

Sigma Aldrich (St. Louis, Missouri). 

All simulants were used as received 

from the vendor and were at least 97 

percent pure. The reference material 

used for characterization and subsequent GB and GD validation testing 

was a nitrile material deposited on a 

nylon mesh substrate. Reference 

material was cut from a sheet of nitrile rubber (product number SS-

.017X36-34000, AAA-Acme Rubber 

Company, Tempe, Arizona).

Methods

Theory

 The core component that affects 

every aspect of this effort is the fit of 

a physically meaningful permeation 

equation to the previously collected 

data. Information extracted from this 

fit will provide the fundamental values 

for comparison between process and 

measured correlation results. Additionally, the information will contribute 

to the design of future performance 

envelope test methods and provide 

values necessary for computational 

modeling. The literature permeation 

equation used is Equation 1 [18]. An 

example of how well Equation 1 fits 

permeation data is shown in Figure 2. 

Typically, fits have a correlation r2of 

0.993.

 A physics-based treatment of 

swatch permeation assumed that diffusion of vapor through swatch followed Fick‟s first and second diffusion 

laws. It was also assumed that the 

swatch was homogeneous, and that 

the value of diffusion coefficient (D) 

was independent of agent concentration. The model uses the “free diffusion” assumption, which states that 

diffusion occurs through a previously 

vacant semi-infinite slab [19]. Implicit 

in this model is the assumption that 

agent diffused more quickly through 

the boundary layer on each side of 

the swatch than through the swatch 

material itself. These assumptions 

involve a certain degree of approximation; however, it was expected that 

the resulting model would describe 

the material performance in a satisfactory manner. The diffusion equation was solved for one-dimensional 

diffusion at short times (Equations 1 

and 2):

(Equation 1)

Where:

C(t) = the permeated concentration 



















Dt

h

C t A erfc

4

( )

Figure 2. Fit of permeation data from two cups (closed and open circles) using 

Equation 1 (solid line) to determine the steady state permeation value (A) and 

diffusion coefficient (D).
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 38

measured in mg/m3.

A = the steady state concentration 

(mg/m3) related to the challenge concentration and to the sweep flow rate 

below the swatch.

h = the swatch thickness (cm).

D = the diffusion coefficient (cm2/s).

t = the time since the start of the test 

(s).

(Equation 2)

Where:

erfc(x) = the complementary error 

function.

x = independent variable.

u = variable of integration.

 A detailed theoretical analysis suggested that Equation 1 was valid for a 

short time (t < h

2

/4D); however, in 

practice, Equation 1 fit the data well 

over longer times. The quality of the 

fit suggests that the approximations 

made during the modeling process 

were sufficiently modest to yield a 

realistic model.

Experimental Design

 Experimental design was used to 

determine the minimum number of 

trials and conditions necessary to 

determine the coefficients A and D. 

Experimental design offers considerable reduction in cost and schedule 

compared to the method of varying 

one parameter at a time. Typical Doptimal designs assume that permeation rate has a polynomial dependence on each continuous variable 

(challenge concentration, temperature, and RH) across the range of 

conditions considered in the experiment [18].

 One hundred thirty five (135) sets 

of conditions (agent or simulant, challenge concentration, temperature, 

and humidity) were chosen for comparison. The method of comparison 

required integration of the permeation 

curves. In the chemical defense 

community, the integrated concentration I is referred to as concentrationtime (Ct).

 (Equation 3)

Where:

I = the integrated concentration (mgminutes/m3

).

t85% = the time when the trial was 

terminated.

C(u) = the concentration at time u 

(mg/m3).

u = the variable of integration 

(minutes).

 The parameter I is important for 

chemical defense as it can be related 

to the total amount of agent vapor 

that would be inhaled by a warfighter 

inside the protective equipment. Permeation experiments were terminated 

at a time t85% when it was estimated 

that the concentration had reached 

85 percent of its steady state value. 

Therefore, the concentration is integrated from start of trial (time 0) to 

t85%. Concentrations were integrated at each set of conditions for 

each agent and its corresponding 

simulant. The complete comparison 

between agent and simulant was rep-









x

u

erfc x e du 2 2( )







85%

0

( )

t

I C u du

Figure 3. Example permeation curves through nitrile reference material at a challenge concentration of 200 mg/m3 and 

35°C for soman (GD) and its simulants 4-chlorobutyl acetate (CA), diisopropyl fluorophosphate (DFP) and triethyl phosphate (TEP).
39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

resented by the average over 135 

sets of conditions (Equation 4). The 

agent simulant relationship can be 

expressed as the ratio between performance with agent and performance with simulant.

(Equation 4)

Where:

Comp = the average comparison ratio 

of agent to simulant over 135 trials.

V = the normalized agent/simulant 

performance value.

j = the trial number.

 Using the values of I, a “reduced 

mass” calculation was used to determine how closely the simulant value 

matched the agent. For a perfect 

match, the value in Equation 5 would 

be 100 percent. The final comparison 

of the measured rank/order results 

were compared with the simulant selection process.

(Equation 5)

Where:

V= the normalized agent/simulant 

performance value.

Isimulant = the integrated concentration 

for simulant.

Iagent = the integrated concentration 

for agent.

Results and Discussion

 Permeation results were collected 

for ten compounds at three temperatures (35, 45, and 55°C), three challenge concentrations (50, 125, and 

200 mg/m3) and three water vapor 

concentrations (0, 10, and 20 g/m3). 

Examples of typical permeation results are given in Figures 3 through 5 

for tests conducted at 200 mg/m3and 

25°C. The plots are typically for two 

to three cups run simultaneously, 

which show remarkably low cup-tocup variability. As the plots show, the 

permeation curve from each cup 

overlaps well with the other cups in 

the tests. The exceptions were the 

HD, MeS, and PA trials (Figure 5) 

where a simple test material was 

used (nitrile gloves with varying thicknesses). The cup-to-cup variability 

rose from less than ±1 percent to well 

over ±10 percent when testing gloves 

were used instead of reference material.

 The curves in Figures 3 through 5 

are grouped to place agent performance curves with the simulant performance curves. For example, Figures 3 shows GD, TEP, CA, and DFP 

135

100%

135 1

 

Vj

Comp

simulant agent

simulant

I I

I

V





2

Figure 4. Example permeation curves through nitrile reference material at a challenge concentration of 200 mg/m3 and 

35°C for Sarin (GB) and its simulants 3-hepten-2-one (HP) and trimethyl phosphate (TMP).
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 40

data. Visual inspection would indicate that CA would be the best match 

for GD. Similarly, GB (Figure 4) is 

best matched by TMP and not HP. 

Inspection of the nitrile glove plots 

would also correctly assign MeS 

(Figure 5) as the best simulant for HD 

instead of PA which permeated rapidly.

 All permeation curves were collected following the experimental design, and fit using nonlinear least 

squares fitting to the permeation 

equation given by Equation 1. The r2

value for each fit ranged from 0.904 

to 0.999 with the average being 

0.993. Diffusion parameters and 

steady state values for all environmental conditions are given in Tables 

1 and 2. Two tested compounds, 

DFP and PA, were excluded from 

Tables 1 and 2 because DFP underwent a chemical reaction on the surface of the nitrile that stopped permeation, and the rapid permeation of 

PA swiftly exceeded the detector‟s 

operational range. Thus, PA and 

DFP could not be correlated over the 

temporal range of the test.

 Information extracted from Tables 

1 and 2 using the experimental design yielded a better understanding of 

how the environment affects permeation. Based on the information in Tables 1 and 2, temperature and challenge concentration had the most 

effect on permeation rate while RH 

had little effect on permeation. This 

result is important because most permeation test designs in materials science are set up for RH and may over 

emphasize the significance of RH.

 The following comparison can be 

made between the reference material 

and glove results for TEP. The glove 

data (Table 2) were over an order of 

magnitude different for the same 

thickness. Potential reasons for this 

difference include formulation and 

production methods (dipped coated 

versus deposition onto a nylon mesh 

support). The cup-to-cup variability 

increased by a factor greater than five 

as noted above. Again, the glove 

material validated the process using 

real world items as well as pristine 

reference material.

NOTE: Any correlation between 

agents and simulants must be made 

on the specific material of interest. A 

general agent-simulant correlation 

based on material class may be incorrect.

 The A and D parameter values 

were fitted as a function of temperature and challenge concentration, 

using least-squares fitting. The 

steady state permeation concentration A was not understood historically, 

but is critical for protective acquisition 

programs to estimate threat, dosage, 

and countermeasures. In addition, 

understanding steady state values 

Figure 5. Example permeation curves through glove material at a challenge concentration of 200 mg/m3 and 35°C for 

distilled mustard (HD) and its simulants triethyl phosphate (TEP), phenyl acetate (PA), and methyl salicylate (MeS).
41 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

will reduce test costs by eliminating unnecessary future testing and guiding statistical test design. Testing showed A did 

not depend on RH or temperature for any of the chemicals. 

All chemicals had an increase in the values of A at 200 versus 50 mg/m3

challenge concentration C0, as expected but A

was not exactly proportional to C0. The lack of simple proportionality probably arose from approximations and experimental uncertainties. The equation for calculated steady 

state concentration values is given by a linear Equation 6 (as 

expected for increasing concentration). The coefficient values are given in Table 3.

(Equation 6)

Where:

A = the steady state concentration.

Coef0 = the minimum value of A.

Coef1 = the dependence of A on challenge concentration.

C0 = challenge concentration.

A  Coef 0 Coef1C0

Table 1. Test results and conditions for the reference material.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 42

 Determining the diffusion coefficient D through a material is a standard measurement that determines 

the temporal profile of the permeation 

curve. As with A, understanding the 

experimental factor for determining D

will optimize future testing by quantifying the effect of environmental conditions, and focus efforts on the parameters that matter most. Diffusion 

coefficients for the reference nitrile 

only depended on temperature, and 

not the challenge concentration or 

RH. For gloves, temperature was the 

dominant contributor, but a weak dependence was observed for RH. No 

dependence was observed for challenge concentration. The strong dependence on temperature was expected, and the relationship can be 

used to calculate permeation activation energies. 

Values of D were fitted to Equation 7; 

coefficients are given in Table 4:

ln(D) = Coef2 + Coef3/T + Coef4 × RH

(Equation 7)

Where:

ln(D) = is the natural log of the diffusion coefficient.

D = the diffusion coefficient in cm2/s.

T = the temperature in K.

Coef2 = limiting value of ln(D) for 0%

RH and T approaching infinity.

Coef3 = the dependence of ln(D) on 

temperature that is related to activation energy.

Coef4 = the dependence of ln(D) on 

RH.

RH = the relative humidity in percent.

 Using Equation 7, the parameter D

is predicted to within an average of 

approximately 25 percent for the 

glove material, and 65 percent for the 

reference material. Random errors 

were expected to be present in glove 

thickness because of manufacturing 

variations. Because the concentration that permeated depended on (h/

ÖD), the error is quadratic in h. A 

thickness error of 5 percent would 

translate into an error of about 10 

percent in the value derived for D. 

Similar thickness errors in the reference material were not observed, but 

sheet production may be a concern in 

trial-to-trial variability. Determination 

of the diffusion coefficient provided 

the data necessary to calculate HD, 

GB, and GD diffusion activation energies that were estimated at 16, 12±2 

and 23±3 kilocalories per mole (kcal/

mol), respectively. Table 5 compares 

the values of each compound as a 

simulant for the corresponding agent 

using three different quantities: the 

global prediction, the specific prediction, and the measured value. Each 

quantity is discussed below.

 The performance-envelope equations employed to predict values of A

and D were used over a wide range 

of conditions to compare agent-tosimulant performance over the same 

range. As described above, 135 sets 

of conditions were selected over the 

testing envelope. Integrated concentrations of the permeation curve at 85 

percent of the steady state concentration were used for comparison. The 

concentration-times were only used 

here to calculate agent-simulant performance by using a normalized ratio 

of agent concentration-time to simulant (Equation 5). The resulting 

measurements were averaged over 

135 sets of conditions, and then compared with predicted values from the 

selection process (Equation 4, Table 

5). The predicted values were the 

sum of weighted performance values 

of properties for agent and simulant 

(Equation 5) [13]. A simulant that 

matched an agent perfectly would 

score 100 percent.

 The predicted results in Table 5 

show two sets of data: the global 

prediction made for any material, 

challenge method, and laboratory 

permeation test and the specific prediction refined for impermeable material with vapor challenge testing. The 

measured values are also scored 

where 100 percent is a perfect match. 

Magnitudes of the predicted values 

over the measured performance envelope are not directly comparable to 

the predicted values. The reason for 

the lack of comparability is because 

the predicted values used a weighting 

scheme where measured results 

were derived from laboratory experiments. The inability to compare magnitudes between predicted and measured values requires the use of rank/

order for assessing accuracy.

 

 These values were reduced to 

rankings as follows. If the score for 

Table 2. Test results and conditions for Nitrile Glove material. 
43 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

two simulants differed by less than 3 

percent, the two simulants were 

ranked equally for that agent. Rank/

order results derived from Table 5 are 

given in Table 6. For the global prediction, the predicted rank/order 

matched the observed rankings only 

63 percent because the original ranking was determined for any type of 

challenge on all materials with no 

laboratory permeation specificity. 

When the selection process was refined to look at properties and weightings that affected permeation through 

an impermeable material by a vapor 

challenge, the observed ranking 

matched the predicted rankings in 

100 percent of the cases. The selection process was adequate for broad 

and excellent for specific requirements with all selected simulants that 

were correlatable to the agent except 

the poorest of matches (PA and 

DFP).

Conclusions

 The use of surrogates to replace 

dangerous material in the military has 

a long history; however, military use 

of surrogate chemicals (simulants) in 

place of toxic chemicals is rather recent. Simulants provide a safe and 

less expensive way to test chemical 

warfare equipment, and have become 

increasingly important due to regulatory, safety, and environmental considerations (e.g., prohibition on open 

air agent releases). Concerns exist 

regarding the use of legacy simulants 

because of limited traceability of 

simulant selection and correlation 

documentation. Well-chosen simulants and a validated correlation 

should produce good performance 

assessments of chemical warfare 

equipment for personnel protection.

 Concerns regarding simulant selection arose during a prior program 

to develop a simulant selection process based on relevant physical properties and user requirements, such as 

safety. A process was developed 

and implemented to select simulants 

for permeation and collective protection materials (e.g., tents) testing. 

The selection process ran multiple 

times with increasingly restrictive criteria to reduce hundreds of potential 

simulants to 25. The results provided 

weighted scores for HD, GD, and GB 

simulants. Once a rank/order list of 

simulants was generated, the best, 

intermediate, and poor scoring simulants were selected for each agent to 

validate the process. MeS, TEP, and 

PA simulants were selected to assess 

permeation relative to HD. CA, TEP, 

and DFP simulants were selected 

assess permeation relative to GD. 

GB permeation simulants included 

HP and TMP. The suitability of the 

selection process was determined by 

comparing the predicted order of permeation rates with the laboratory 

measured order of permeation rates.

 Laboratory testing measured 

agent and simulant vapor permeation 

Table 3. The coefficients for Equation 6 to calculate the Steady State Concentration, A.

Table 4. The coefficients for Equation 7 to calculate the diffusion coefficient, 

Table 5. Simulant Quality Percent Score.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 44

Table 6. Rank/order comparison demonstrating the accuracy of the simulant 

selection process.

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 44

through standard nitrile material and 

nitrile gloves. Experiments used a 

new hood-size temperature controlled 

fixture (dFIX) that controlled temperatures ranging from 0 to 55°C with less 

than 1°C variability. Vapor challenges used a LC pump (RH) and a 

syringe pump (agent/simulant) generation system to produce agent/

simulant vapor challenges and RH, 

respectively. Permeation monitoring 

used a sequencer and miniature GC 

instrument to simultaneously monitor 

three permeation test cups that provided permeation curves with very 

little difference between cups. Concentration, RH and temperature were 

used to map the permeation performance. Each of the resulting data 

curves was fit to a standard permeation equation to determine the diffusion coefficient and steady state concentration. Fits had an average r2

of 

0.993. ASRs illustrated how well the 

simulant corresponded to the agent 

over a wide range of concentrations, 

RHs, and temperatures (135 sets of 

conditions). Activation energies for 

permeation were derived from the 

dependence of D on temperature 

(Table 4 and Equation 7).

 

 The primary goal of validating the 

simulant selection process was 

achieved. The validation process 

demonstrated that the process adequately selected simulants for a 

broad range of permeation tests, 

which improved when specific tests 

were considered. Adequacy was determined by comparing the global 

(unknown material, challenge, and 

permeation test method) predicted 

simulant rank/order to the measured 

order. Adequacy improved by comparing the specific (impermeable material in a vapor challenge) predicted 

simulant rank/order to the measured 

order. Rank/order values for the predicted global simulant rank/order 

matched the measured order by 63 

percent and the predicted specific 

order matched the measured 100 

percent of the time. Based on the 

rank/order comparison, the validation 

of the selection process for protective 

equipment is accurate enough to be 

used for acquisition program simulant 

selection that will test fielded equipment to be used by soldiers and potentially used by first responders. 

Conclusions from this validation study 

resulted in the development of a 

sound test procedure, data analysis 

method, and testing fixture.

 The dependence of the permeation rate upon experimental variables 

discovered in simulant selection will 

be applied during acquisition testing. 

This information should facilitate the 

planning of acquisition testing to reduce the number of trials or select the 

trials of most importance while more 

accurately determining values of 

physical properties (e.g., diffusivity).

 Future efforts will focus on repeating these experiments and results in 

another laboratory, as well as applying the simulant selection process to 

another technology. Permeation 

through other materials will be assessed. Offgassing from materials 

after a vapor exposure will be assessed with the breakthrough of vapors through filters. The data analysis, physical models, performance 

metrics, and agent-simulant relationships will be revised accordingly. 

This process must be repeated before it is standardized and its potential 

is known.

Acknowledgement

 A sincere thanks to the Joint Science Technology Office-Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency (JSTODTRA) for their support of this project 

under contract number W911S6-06-D

-0001.

Mr. Darren Jolley is a physical scientist and the collective protection test 

subject matter expert at the West Desert Test Center at Dugway Proving 

Ground, Utah. He has a B.S. in Geology from Southern Utah University, a 

M.S. in Geology from Texas A&M 

University. He previously worked as 

a Sr. scientist for Framatome ANP 

working on the geochemistry of the 

waste package environment as part 

of the Department of Energy’s Yucca 

Mountain High Level Nuclear Waste 

Repository. Prior to this time, he was 

a Platoon Leader inn a Patriot missile 

battery and was deployed as part of 

Operations Desert Shield, and Desert 

Storm. His email address is 

Darren.jolley@us.army.mil

ENDNOTES

1. Army Support to BIGEYE OPEVAL: Supplementary Information 

on the Effectiveness Evaluation of the Operational Evaluation 

(OPEVAL) Testing of the BIGEYE (BLU – 80/B) Weapon. Report is 

classified, Site Holding DW-540703, 1988.

2. Rogers, A.; Orland, A.; White, J.; Beier, D. Technical Analysis 

Report for the Joint Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance 

System I (JNBCRS I) Production Qualification Test (PQT) Chemical 

Warfare Agent (CWA) Simulant Correlation Study; project number 

2008-DT-DPG-JSLNB-D6984, 2009.

3. Chinn, K., The Effect of Time and Temperature on Evaporation 

and Transfer of Thickened GB and Thickened GD Simulants; 

TECOM Project Number: 2-CO-210-049-005, 1979.

4. United States Code 1512, Title 50, Chapter 32.

5. Bagley, F.D.; Howard, P.L.; Fuller, D.F.; Chinn, K.S.K. Simulant 

Review and Selection, TECOM Project Number: 2-CO-210-049-

007, 1977.

6. National Research Council, Test and Evaluation of Standoff 

Chemical Agent Detectors, ISBN-13: 978-0-309-08687-5, 2003.

7. Blackburn, A.R.; Chinn, K.S.K.; Fortney, S.D.; Ivancic, W.A.; 

Judd, A.K.; Lerner, B.D.; Ontiveros, J. The Use of Chemical Agent 

Simulants in Standoff Detection Testing. Battelle Memorial Institute, 

Columbus, Ohio, CBIAC Contract No. SPO700-00-D-3180. CBIAC 

Task No. 75. 2001.

8. Marshall, M.S. Background Study for Chamber and Field Tests 

of the Joint Services Lightweight Standoff Chemical Agent Detector 

(JSLSCAD), 2001.

9. Rowland, B.; Green, R., et al., Agent-Simulant Correlation In 

Fifth Joint Conference on Standoff Detection for CBD, Williamsburg, VA, 24 - 28 September 2001.

10. Rowland, B.; Harter, G., et al., “Development of Chemical 

Warfare Agent Simulants for Point Detectors”, In NBC Report, 2006 

and republished by NBC International, Spring 2007.

11. Kocher, T., In JSTO and TEO 2008 Chemical and Biological 

Simulant Workshop, Falls Church, VA, Oct 2008.

12. Joint Expeditionary Collective Protection (JECP) ACAT III Test 

and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) Supporting System Development and Demonstration Phase Version 1.0, Program Element: 

0604384BP, 2009.

13. Hanning-Lee, M.; Rowland, B.; Bottelberghe, G.; Adair, L.; 

Gandhi, K.; Hanson, F.; Walther, J.; Wurster, L.; Jablonski, R.; 

Abercrombie, P.; Butrow, A.; Kaufman, J.; Jolley, D. Selection of 

Simulants for Barrier Material Permeation Testing, in preparation 

for JORS, 2009.

14. Jolley, D.; Walther, J.; Rowland, B.; Gandhi, K.; Hanson, F.; 

Wurster, L.; Hanning-Lee, M.; Siddoway, G.; Bottelberghe, G.; 

Jablonski, R.; Abercrombie, P.; Mamo, T.; Adair, L. In FY07 Annual 

Report for Simulant Selection for Protective Equipment Testing, 

Document Number CA06TAS438, West Desert Test Center, U.S. 

Army Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, November 2007.

15. Rivin, D.; Lindsay, R.S.; Shuely, W.J.; Rodriguez, A. Journal of 

Membrane Science 2005, 246, 39–47.

16. ASTM F739, Standard Test Method for Permeation of Liquids 

and Gases through Protective Clothing Materials under Conditions 

of Continuous Contact, Revision / Edition: 07 1 July 2007.

17. U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM), Aberdeen 

Proving Ground (APG), Maryland, Test Operations Procedure 

(TOP) 8-2-501, Permeation and Penetration Testing of AirPermeable, Semipermeable, and Impermeable Materials with 

Chemical Agents or Simulants (Swatch Testing), 3 March 1997.

18. Neter, J.; Kutner, M.; Nachtsheim, C.; and Wasserman, W., 

Applied Linear Statistical Models. McGraw-Hill, 1996.

19. Cussler, E. L., Mass Transfer in Fluid Systems, Cambridge 

University Press, Chapter 2. 1984.
45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

N 

on-destructive examination 

techniques are playing an 

increasingly larger role in 

the border security of the 

United States (U.S). The need to 

quickly (and often discreetly) query 

containers, cargo and even personnel 

entering the U.S. for hidden contraband is a challenging engineering 

problem. Fundamentally, we would 

like to be able to “see” into suspicious 

containers without having to resort to 

opening them. Backscatter x-ray radiation, a key non-destructive examination technology, is currently being 

used at ports, border crossings, and 

in airport security, to do just that. As 

will be seen, the advantages of backscatter radiography are significant, 

including increased probability of detecting hidden contraband, improved 

scanning and output control, and the 

ability to unobtrusively query targets 

by controlling the penetration depth of 

the radiation. 

 This article outlines the basic science behind x-ray backscatter radiography and describes a new technique 

developed to improve acquisition time 

- Computed Image Backscatter Radiography (CIBR). This work was completed at the University of Florida as 

thesis research for a Master of Science degree in Nuclear Engineering 

enroute to the Department of Physics 

& Nuclear Engineering at the United 

States Military Academy. This work 

was originally inspired by the need to 

develop a fast target acquisition 

method to find improvised explosive 

devices (IED) however, it quickly 

evolved into the alternative scanning 

method presented here.

 Backscatter radiography relies on 

x-rays Compton-scattered back towards a detector on the same side of 

the target as the radiation source. 

This positioning of both the source 

and detector on the same side of the 

target is the primary advantage of 

backscatter radiography. This method 

of positioning, coupled with the ability 

to reduce the visible angle of the detectors to the radiation (collimation), 

allows the user to select the depth to 

which they would like to examine, 

which, in turn, allows objects to be 

recognized that were previously hidden by high density materials or inaccessible due to the inability to place a 

detector behind the target.

 At present, the primary disadvantage of x-ray backscatter radiography 

is acquisition time. The relatively 

small numbers of x-rays backscattered, compounded with the low efficiencies of the most common types of 

x-ray detectors, results in long acquisition times (depending on scan size, 

from minutes to days). Acquisition 

time can be adjusted based upon the 

image quality needed, the strength of 

the radiation source, and the size and 

number of detectors, but is ultimately 

limited by the maximum dose that can 

be applied to the target. 

 Most current methods of backscatter radiography use a rastering technique with a pencil beam source to 

gather data (Figure 1). As the pencil 

beam passes over each differential 

volume (or voxel) in the target of interest, the detectors gather data from 

that particular voxel. The beam 

moves in a continuous motion, rastering back and forth until the entire target area has been scanned. The 

atomic properties of the target determine the amount of backscatter. Differences in the absorption and scattering cross sections of the target 

create the contrast observed in the 

image captured by the detectors. 

 CIBR differs from conventional 

backscatter radiography in three significant ways: 1) it utilizes a fan 

beam x-ray source instead of a pencil 

beam; 2) it utilizes rotational motion 

instead of a rastering technique; and 

3) it requires specialized image reconstruction techniques. CIBR is an 

innovation derived from the Radiography by Selective Detection (RSD) 

rastering backscatter radiography 

method patented by the Scatter XRay Imaging (SXI) group led by Dr. 

Edward Dugan at the University of 

Florida.

 In CIBR, the fan beam source 

changes the data acquisition method, 

the strength required of the radiation 

source, and amount of backscattered 

radiation generated. The basic principles of backscatter radiography remain the same however. That is, 

differing absorption and scattering 

Computed Image Backscatter Radiography:

A Novel Method for Non-Destructive Examination

MAJ Christopher L. Meng

United States Military Academy

COL Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Dr. Edward Dugan

University of Florida

Figure 1. Typical Rastering Technique for Backscatter Radiography.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 46

cross-sections are responsible for 

image contrast. However, instead of 

creating the image voxel by voxel, as 

done in conventional backscatter 

techniques, CIBR images are created 

directly from the scanned data, using 

advanced post-processing image reconstruction techniques. 

 The fan beam precludes data acquisition using rastering techniques, 

and instead requires rotational motion. In CIBR, the fan beam must be 

as wide as the target area of interest. 

The fan beam sweeps from one side 

to the other in a direct line. The target then is rotated in relation to the 

fan beam (or vice versa), and another 

sweep taken. This process continues 

in uniform increments through a 360° 

rotation. The size of the angle increments determines quality of the reconstructed image as well as acquisition time. An example of the CIBR 

rotational collection technique is 

shown in Figure 2. above. 

 The data acquisition method 

shown in Figure 2 is only one of several different possible techniques for 

CIBR. For example, the method of 

rotation can be changed, the x-ray 

source can be rotated instead of the 

target, or a rotating fan beam aperture can be used instead of rotating 

the entire generator or the target. 

Instead of moving the generator 

across the target for the scan, the 

generator can simply be pivoted, creating a sweep. The target itself could 

also be moved in relation to the generator. The possibilities are many 

and varied. Regardless of exact mechanical method of data acquisition, 

the basic principles of the scan and 

rotation remain the same.

 

 Another advantage of a fan beam 

is that it uses orders of magnitude 

more photons than the typical pencil 

beam, resulting in increased scan 

speeds, shorter image acquisition 

times, and a reduction in power. This 

higher number of photons also results 

in a higher number of backscatter 

photons, leading to higher contrast. 

As an example, a 30.5 x 0.5 mm fan 

beam aperture is 15.25 times larger 

than a 1 mm square RSD pencil 

beam aperture. Since the number of 

photons incident on the target is proportional to aperture size, a larger 

source aperture leads to more backscatter photons. With an increase in 

the number of backscattered photons, 

the output of the x-ray generator may 

be lowered and the image scanning 

speed may be increased, if desired. 

 Currently, CIBR uses a filtered 

back-projection technique to reconstruct the image. Filtered backprojection was originally designed for 

use in tomography, most notably 

Computed Tomography (CT) systems, which use a similar rotational 

method of data acquisition for transmission images. Although this 

method of image reconstruction 

works for CIBR, it does not adequately account for all the CIBR data 

and degrades the image. Therefore, 

design of a CIBR-specific reconstruction technique is essential for CIBR to 

reach its full potential.

 Fundamentally, CIBR requires a 

different type of image reconstruction 

technique than that used in conventional rastering backscatter radiography. Conventional image acquisition 

techniques gather the data in a voxelby-voxel method, creating the image 

as the scan runs. The next voxel 

does not affect the previous voxel 

reconstruction. All that changes from 

voxel to voxel is the relative contrast. 

Using CIBR, however, the image cannot be reconstructed until the scan is 

complete as the reconstruction requires all the scan data. This reconstruction currently takes place almost 

instantaneously, but cannot be done 

until the scan is complete and all the 

data has been collected.

 Theoretically, CIBR poses many 

advantages over the current backscatter systems with several orders of 

magnitude decrease in image acquisition time. To demonstrate this, a 

prototype CIBR machine was designed and built by the University of 

Florida‟s SXI group. This prototype, 

utilizing filtered back-projection image 

reconstruction, showed improvements in acquisition time of up to two 

orders of magnitude.

 Initial tests were performed with a 

compact x-ray generator system and 

four Yttrium Oxyorthosilicate (YSO) 

scintillation detectors (Figure 3). The 

system scanned back and forth over 

a target placed below it on a rotating 

table. 

Figure 2. CIBR Rotational Collection Technique example. X-ray generator start and finish locations, along with fan 

beam and scanned area, are shown. Arrows on the target within the scanned area show the direction of the scan.

X-Ray Generator

Target

Fan Beam

Fan Beam Path

Table 

Rotation
47 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

 After initial success scanning simple geometries, the CIBR system was 

then tested on a more complex geometrical object- a lead “SXI” on a nylon backing. The target and the resulting scan images are shown in 

Figure 4.

 As can be seen, the letters “SXI” 

are clearly visible and are easily discerned in the reconstructed image, 

demonstrating that the system can be 

used for complex geometries using 

the filtered back-projection reconstruction method. Note that the reconstructed image is a mirror image 

of the actual target. This is corrected 

by inverting the data before image 

reconstruction.

 Figure 5 shows a CIBR reconstructed image compared to that of a 

traditional pencil beam RSD image. 

Although the RSD-generated image 

is clearer, these images show that 

CIBR can also take complex geometric scans of high contrast surface objects and resolve them to create recognizable images. With the development of CIBR-specific reconstruction 

methods, image quality will continue 

to improve until it is comparable with 

the RSD pencil beam scan quality. 

Even with current methods, however, 

CIBR can create images of reasonable quality.

 CIBR is also able to shorten the 

acquisition time compared to RSD, 

but there are tradeoffs. RSD cannot 

scan at the low power that CIBR can 

because it cannot generate enough 

counts to produce an image. The 

RSD image in Figure 5 had to be created with a power setting an order of 

magnitude higher than that of the 

CIBR image. Using RSD, the count 

rate can be adjusted by either adjusting the pixel size, the dwell time per 

pixel, or by increasing the power 

(current and/or voltage) of the generator. However, even with the current at its maximum setting, the count 

rate for RSD is still so low that images are often difficult to create. If 

pixel size is to be kept the same, the 

dwell time must be longer. However, 

as seen in Table 1, when the acquisition times of RSD versus CIBR are 

compared, it is seen that CIBR offers 

significant promise for reducing the 

Figure 3. CIBR scanning system setup for proof of principle. This system 

consists of a compact x-ray generator and four scintillation detectors that 

move linearly over a rotating target table.

Figure 4. Lead “SXI” on nylon backing test object and its CIBR reconstructed Image.

Figure 5. CIBR image compared with 

RSD Image. A) CIBR reconstructed 

image. B) RSD pencil beam image.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 48

time needed for a scan.

 To date, CIBR has proven that it 

can resolve surface scans of complex 

images and that it has the possibility 

for significant image acquisition time 

gains over RSD. The remaining 

problems lie with subsurface scanning capability. The usefulness of xray technology is not primarily in surface scans, but in subsurface scans, 

at which RSD excels. By taking the 

same SXI lead-on-nylon target and 

placing it under varying depths of 

foam, CIBR was able to reconstruct 

the images in Figure 6, proving that it 

is also a viable subsurface interrogation technique.

 Current research has demonstrated the proof-of-principle for the 

CIBR method. Tests have shown the 

ability to generate subsurface, highcomplexity images using highcontrast objects at speeds greater 

than current RSD scanning capabilities. These images have been generated utilizing image reconstruction 

methods designed for CT systems, 

which do not directly correlate to the 

CIBR method of scanning. As CIBRspecific image reconstruction methods are developed and improved, 

image acquisition time is expected to 

continue to decrease. Continued research and development will continue 

to improve image quality, acquisition 

time, and overall quality of CIBR images. With the increase in speed, 

CIBR will become a more desirable 

choice for non-destructive testing. 

MAJ Christopher Meng is a Course 

Director and Instructor at the United 

States Military Academy, in West 

Point, NY. He has a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering from the United 

States Military Academy, a M.S. in 

Engineering Management from the 

University of Missouri - Rolla, and a 

M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the 

University of Florida. He was previously assigned as a student at the 

U.S. Army Student Detachment with 

duty at the University of Florida. His 

email address is christopher.meng@

us.army.mil. 

Count Rate

(counts/

sec)

Time

(sec)

Count Rate

(counts/

sec)

Time

(sec)

Count Rate

(counts/

sec)

Time

(sec)

RSD 7000 545 200,000 15,570 650,000 50,605

CIBR 650,000 470 650,000 470 650,000 470

% Reduction

in Time for 

CIBR

16% 3200% 10,650%

Table 1. Comparison of image acquisition time for the images shown in Figure 5 based on a typically achievable CIBR 

count rate. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 48

Figure 6. Subsurface CIBR scan images of lead “SXI” letters on nylon placed under varying amounts of foam. A. 3.5 cm 

of foam overlay. B. 5 cm of foam overlay.

A. B. 
49 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

C 

 The United States Army Nuclear and Combating 

WMD Agency (USANCA) as a Headquarters, Department of Army, G3/5/7, Field Operating Agency 

provides the U.S. Army's core expertise in nuclear 

and related matters and advises and assists other 

Department of Defense, government and international organizations. USANCA is located at Fort Belvoir and is staffed with world-renowned military and 

civilian experts, principally scientists, physicists, and 

nuclear engineers.

Challenge

 Translating the Agency Senior Leadership‟s vision 

as articulated by Dr. Martin Moakler, Chief of the 

CWMD Analysis Division was key in implementing an 

actionable solution. USANCA is small in size but it 

has far reaching impact with a large audience. In order to go about its business it needs to be able to set 

up, often at a moment‟s notice, secure communication channels to other military and government agencies worldwide. Jack Riegel, then Chief of Information Management at USANCA, said, “Voice communications alone is often not enough, face-to-face contact is very important.”

 This need to communicate regularly with various 

military and government activities around the world, 

and other security agencies means that USANCA 

team members spent a lot of time travelling. Implementing a responsive video conferencing solution 

served the dual purpose of reducing costs and decreasing coordination preparation time. Jack Riegel 

continues, “Our move into a newly renovated building 

at Fort Belvoir was planned to address our requirements for remote collaboration. A state-of-art enhanced secure video conferencing capability was 

high on the list of features envisioned by the Agencies‟ Senior Leadership.” USANCA needed a supplier that could design and implement a state-of-theart replicable solution that would cost effectively and 

meet U.S. security standards. 

Solution

 Cisco TANDBERG technology. The solution comprises multiple TANDBERG 6000 video conferencing 

units driving independent 65” displays suitable for up 

to 54 people in the main conference room; and other 

units driving six independent 65” displays in the 

separate multi-purpose conference room.

 The video network was designed so that each 

video conferencing unit can independently support 

both unclassified and classified conversations. The 

system has IP-based connections for in house connectivity and ISDN connections for remote video conferencing; and the Cisco TANDBERG technology 

interoperates seamlessly with third-party terminals.

 The encrypted network features the TANDBERG 

Media Processing System 800 developed specifically 

with security and compliance in mind for government 

departments. Two video communication servers, one 

for each network, control content distribution to all 

end-points, while an MCU 4500 conference bridge 

supports high-definition video distribution. 

TANDBERG Management Suite provides complete 

visibility and control for all on-site and remote video 

systems.

 This was a complex and time constrained project, 

from start to finish the majority of the implementation 

Collaborative Technology Advances 

Secure Global Communications

Mr. Jack Riegel

National Security Advisor, Office of Protective Services, 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

Mr. Glen L. Scott 

Chief Information Technology / VTC Facilitator, 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

USANCA is using a secure multi-point video conferencing 

solution allowing the Agency to conduct remote collaboration

lient
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 5050

took just 45 days. The contractors selected by 

G/3/5/7 continued to work proactively with us to iron 

out any issues necessary for us to operate and meet 

Department of Defense security benchmarks.”

 USANCA also has ongoing support to via a One 

Care maintenance agreement. This features a single 

point of contact, online fault reporting and tracking, 

help desk support around-the-clock, and 

next business day parts replacement – as well as the 

options of remote systems monitoring and quarterly 

performance reports.

 Mr. Glen Scott, the Acting IM Division Chief, and 

system manager, stated “Dr. Moakler and Mr. Riegel 

have put in place an excellent VTC solution that will 

pay dividends for years to come.”

Value

 The new TANDBERG video conferencing solution 

is already delivering on its promise. USANCA has 

much improved communication and collaboration 

facilities and now able to hold multi-agency conferences on demand, bringing together people face-toface without the need to travel. This is enabling enhanced information exchange and faster decision 

making.

 Avoiding the need for air travel is also improving 

unit productivity as well as saving money. Early estimates suggest that annual travel cost savings could 

be significant. 

 The video conferencing technology has also 

opened up new opportunities. For example, it will be 

used for training sessions to extend the central 

knowledge base to remote and partner agency staff. 

Event recording capabilities will allow on-demand 

playback of training sessions for people unable to 

join the live event, overcoming boundaries of distance and time and helping to extend the reach and 

influence of USANCA still further.

 The quality of project management, solution engineering, professional installation is very high, and 

USANCA is pleased with the outcome. The people 

we worked with had the right experience and the 

technical support has been second-to-none. Above 

all, the system has been extremely reliable. We have 

had no equipment failures, and right now everything 

is working perfectly.” 

G3/5/7 chose the partnership of BT Conferencing, 

EMW, Slye Electronics, and Zane Networks, for the 

extended project. The partnership gave USANCA 

real confidence that they understood the stringent 

security considerations for our working environment.

Mr. Jack F. Riegel, CISSP, CISA, CISM, is the National 

Security Advisor in the Office of Protective Services at the 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 

Headquarters in Washington, DC. He has a B.A. in Anthropology from Eastern Washington University. His previous civilian assignments include Chief, Information Management, USANCA, Information Assurance Program Manager (IAPM) NASA Special Programs, IAPM US Army 

Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). 

Mr. Glen L. Scott is the Information Technology Manager/

VTC Facilitator at the U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA) in Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia. He was previously assigned as a Project 

Manager at the US Army Criminal Investigation Command 

(USACIDC). 

His email address is glenn.scott@us.army.mil
51 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

T 

he Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) has 

a prestigious past that spans a 60 year period. During this time many organizational and name 

changes have occurred. 

 In 1947, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project 

(AFSWP) was formed to provide military training in nuclear 

weapons‟ operations. The Nuclear Weapons Technical 

Training Group was organized as part of this Agency to 

provide resident and nonresident training in support of 

nuclear weapon training programs worldwide. The Group, 

created the Special Weapons School on the U.S. Army‟s 

Sandia Base, which is now part of Kirtland AFB. 

 In the 1950‟s, the name of the school (the Special 

Weapons School) was changed to the Atomic Weapons 

Training Group. By the end of the 1960‟s the training programs at the school had burgeoned with more than 90,000 

graduates. In May of 1959 the school‟s parent organization, AFSWP changed its name to the Defense Atomic 

Support Agency (DASA).

 In 1970 the school name was changed again, this time 

to the Nuclear Weapons School. The school was transferred to the U.S. Air Force in 1971 and the name was 

expanded to the Interservice Nuclear Weapons School. 

 During 1971 the Defense Atomic Support Agency 

(DASA) also had a name change. Its name was changed 

to the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA). In 1993, the 

school was transferred back to its former parent organization, which was by this time called the Defense Nuclear 

Agency. In 1996 the name of the school‟s parent agency, 

DNA was again changed, this time to the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency.

 In 1997 the school name was again changed, this time 

to the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS). In November of this same year, the Defense Reform Initiative 

directed that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) be created to strengthen and improve Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (WMD) threat reduction. DTRA, a designated combat support agency, was officially established 

on Oct. 1, 1998. This new organization absorbed the Defense Special Weapons Agency, the On-Site Inspection 

Security Administration, along with selected other elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff. The 

Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) has been a 

part of DTRA since this time.

 Throughout its history, the DNWS has supported the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, the military services, and the combatant commands 

by providing training advice and services in the field of 

nuclear weapons. Training has been offered in weapons 

maintenance and emergency response. With the estabHISTORY

A Brief History of the 

Defense Nuclear Weapons School

LTC Eugene V. Sheely

U.S. Air Force Institute of Technology

Defense Threat Reduction University.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 52

lishment of the DTRA in 1998, the DNWS expanded into 

WMD/CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and high explosive) response training, although, nuclear 

weapons instruction remains the core competency.

LTC Eugene Sheely is a former infantry officer, currently 

working as the combating weapons of mass destruction 

curriculum chair at the Air Force Institute of Technology. 

He has a B.S. in Chemistry from Brigham Young University, an M.S. in Physical Chemistry from the University of 

Idaho, and a Ph.D. in Theoretical Physical Chemistry, also 

from the University of Idaho. His major areas of research 

involve nuclear fusion and molecular dynamics. He previously served as the Academics Director of the Defense 

Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS), as a team leader on 

consequence management advisory teams and as the 

Chief of Environmental Health Physics and the Chief of 

Occupational Health Physics at the Air Force Institute for 

Operational Health. 

His email address is: Eugene.Sheely@AFIT.edu. 

From top: Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), Defense Special Weapons Agency

Center: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Bottom: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), and Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) 

 CW5 Gomes Collection
53 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

T 

oo often technical writers concentrate on facts 

and fail to emphasize to their audience the importance of the topic. For example, those that 

write on high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP) 

effects on systems inevitably begin with a description 

of a nuclear detonation and how its detonation products interact with the upper atmosphere to produce 

the HEMP that eventually interacts with the ground 

and systems. While interesting to other scientists, 

HEMP phenomenology is not the important message 

to most: what is often on the minds of the readers is 

the short and long-term implications a HEMP event 

could have on the military and civilian population.

 The novel “One Second After” by William R. 

Forstchen follows the life of a professor in a small 

North Carolina town just before and immediately after most all modern electronics fail in the East 

Coast. Immediate and long-term implications to civilian and military life become evident, creating massive long-term blackouts of the National Power Grid 

(NPG) and the catastrophic failure of individual electronic systems. Deaths, first to the very young, the 

sick and the very old, begin to create societal traumas that lead to first local and then regional violence 

that threatens the very society they live in.

 The culprit that creates a HEMP environment is 

never identified, nor is the phenomena that creates 

HEMP, but the psychological and sociological implications of the event is portrayed in gory detail. While 

somewhat exaggerated, the story describes the implications of not being prepared for a low-probability, 

high-impact threat to the United States.

NOTE: Although HEMP is the threat for this story, 

one can substitute a severe solar storm as a similar 

electromagnetic (EM) threat to the NPG. Another 

EM threat that could be significant, but is also not 

covered in the novel, is cyber attack. For this reason, it is recommended that one read this novel to 

understand how the military and society in general 

could be affected once we no longer have electricity 

and electronics to maintain electrical power to process and refrigerate food and medicine, pump fuel, 

water, and sewage, maintain bank and stock market 

records and other databases, and provide light and 

air conditioning. 

Editors note:

Please see the article in this issue titled, 

“Electromagnetic Threats to the National Power Grid 

(NPG): An Update” as a reference to this book to 

realize the scope of damage.

Source:

Forstchen, William R., One Second After, Forge 

Books, 352 pages, ISBN 978-0-7653-1758-2, March 

2009.

One Second After 

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer

Physical Scientist

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

Book Review
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 54

Combating WMD Resource Page 

Highlighted Courses available at the 

Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) 

and 

Defense Threat Reduction University (DTRU)

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11 Jul - 5 Aug 2011

Combating WMD Courses

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency hosts two Combating WMD courses, the Introduction to Combating WMD 

and Advanced Combating WMD. 

The introductory course provides an overview of U.S. 

Government and Department of Defense strategy and policy relating to Combating WMD and instruction is focused 

around the three pillars of Combating WMD and the eight 

military mission areas. 

The advanced course applies aspects of the Joint Operation Planning Process to Combating WMD related plans 

and operations. Both courses are taught using a combination of instructor-led modules and practical tabletop exercises. 

For more information on course dates and registration information, visit the Defense Nuclear Weapons School‟s 

website at: https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil. 

Mobile Training Teams are available upon request.

U.S. Nuclear Policy

This course covers U.S. Nuclear Policy and its history; 

reviews NATO policy; discusses nuclear deterrence: theory, principles, and implications; discusses instruments of 

national power and implications for nuclear weapons; reviews nuclear surety and intelligence; discusses nuclear 

treaties and arms control. 

This course is taught at the Defense Nuclear Weapons 

School (DNWS) 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 

Email: dnws@abq.dtra.mil

Fax: (505) 846-9168 or DSN 246-9168 

Online registration:

https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil/StudentArea/Login.asp 

Next class availability:

25-29 Apr 2011

CWMD Journal

Limited Hard Copy Distribution

Please submit your request for a hard copy at the following email address: USANCA2@conus.army.mil in the subject line please state CWMD Journal hard copy request. 

If you do not desire a hard copy and prefer an email notification regarding the latest electronic issue, use the same 

email address as above and in the subject line state 

CWMD Journal Email notification. This notification will 

inform you that the latest Journal is available on 

USANCA‟s ACIP and CBRNIAC Key Documents page:

https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil/Products/Links/

KeyDocs/Pages/USANCA.aspx

Past Issues Available Online!

USANCA is partnered with Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information Analysis Center 

(CBRNIAC) to bring you the latest Journal in electronic 

format as well as some previous issues of The NBC Report. 

https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil/Products/Links/

KeyDocs/Pages/USANCA.aspx
55 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6

MONA-CWO 

Plans and Operations Division

Chief * x7855Deputy Plans and Operations 805-4677Nuclear Operations Branch Chief x7859Targeting Officer x7858CWMD Plans Branch Chief x7882

MONA-CWA 

Analysis Division

Chief * x7860FA52 Proponent Manager x7866Army Reactor Office x7861Biology BranchChief x7878Microbiologist x7879Chemical BranchChief x7877Chemical Engineer x7881Nuclear BranchChief x7863Nuclear Effects (EMP/HEMP) x7862Nuclear Medical Science x7864Nuclear Effects (Modeling) x7867Nuclear Effects x7865Nuclear Effects x7880Information Management/Web PortalIM Chief x7848VTC Manager x7849Portal Manager x7801On-Site IT Specialist x7875

MONA-CWZ 

CWMD Command Group

Director** Office ManagerDeputy Director *Executive OfficerBudget AnalystAgency Secretary

MONA-CWC 

Capabilities Division

Chief * x7883International Programs x7871CWMD Capabilities x6500NATO Standardization x7874CBRN Survivability x7870CBRN Survivability x7873

USANCA5915 16th Street, Building 238Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-0529Commercial (703) 806-XXXXDSN 656-XXXFAX x7900 STU III FAX x7842* indicates secure capable phone

U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency

(USANCA)

**Director, Pentagon, Room 2E366, USANCA

Exec Admin Asst: (G-3/5 ARSTAF)(703) 692-6855 DSN 222-6855 

x7851

x7852

x7857x7853x7846
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 6 56

The Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) and it‟s parent organization has changed names over some 60 years. 

It is the only school dedicated to nuclear weapons operations. Since 1998, it expanded to WMD/CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive) response training. 

From top to bottom: Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA), Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA), Defense Special Weapons 

Agency (DSWA), Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)

Second row: Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), and Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS)

 CW5 Gomes Collection