IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 16-1689

Filed August 16, 2017

ROBERT J. SCHULTZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

IOWA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,

Defendant-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lucas County, David L. 

Christensen (first petition) and Terry Rickers (second petition), Judges.

Plaintiff appeals the district court opinion affirming the agency’s decision 

denying his request for a resident hunting license. AFFIRMED.

Verle W. Norris, Corydon, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and David L. Dorff, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.

Robert Schultz appeals the district court opinion affirming the agency’s 

decision denying his request for a resident hunting license. We find the agency 

properly applied the law after the case was remanded back to the agency by the 

district court. The agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Other 

issues raised on appeal have not been preserved for our review. We affirm the 

district court’s opinion affirming the agency’s ruling Schultz was not entitled to a 

resident hunting license.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

Schultz purchased a resident hunting license in Iowa for several years 

prior to 2010. In 2009, the legislature amended the residency requirements for 

fishing and hunting licenses. See 2009 Iowa Acts ch. 144, §§ 34, 35. A 

conservation officer noticed Schultz was at a trailer on his father’s property only 

on weekends or during hunting season, and this raised “red flags” about his 

residency in Iowa.

The Iowa Department of Natural Resources (DNR) sent Schultz a letter 

requesting information about his residency status. Schultz responded he was 

employed in Medina, Minnesota; he did not receive mail in Iowa; he did not pay 

any utility bills, as his father paid them; he considered his father’s home in 

Chariton, Iowa, to be his residence; and he had no vehicles registered in Iowa. 

The DNR additionally determined Schultz listed a Minnesota address on his tax 

returns, he paid property taxes in Iowa, his job in Minnesota was a five-hour drive 

from Chariton, and Schultz did not own a vehicle—he either drove a company 

vehicle or his father’s vehicle. In June 2010, the DNR informed Schultz “the 
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totality of the circumstances indicate that Mr. Schultz was claiming Iowa 

residence solely for hunting purposes,” and he therefore, did not meet the 

residency requirements found in Iowa Code section 483A.1A(10)(a) (2010).

Schultz appealed the agency’s decision. A hearing before an 

administrative law judge (ALJ) was held on May 27, 2011. During the hearing, 

evidence was presented to show Schultz had both Iowa and Minnesota driver’s 

licenses. The ALJ noted under section 483A.2, a person cannot obtain a 

resident hunting license if the person claims any resident privileges in another 

state. The ALJ determined Schultz had claimed resident privileges in Minnesota 

by obtaining a driver’s license there and so could not be considered a resident of 

Iowa for purposes of obtaining a hunting license. The DNR affirmed the ALJ’s 

decision.

Schultz filed a petition for judicial review (CVCV032267). The district court 

entered a decision on December 6, 2012, making the following rulings: (1) the 

2009 amendments to section 483A.1A did not operate retroactively; (2) Schultz 

was required to meet current residency requirements; (3) the statute was not void 

for vagueness; (4) the statute did not violate the Privileges and Immunities 

Clause; (5) the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause; (6) the statute 

did not violate the Due Process Clause; and (7) Schultz had the burden of proof 

to show he was a resident of Iowa. The court determined a Minnesota driver’s 

license was not a resident privilege of Minnesota and the DNR should not have 

based its decision on section 483A.2. The court also determined the ALJ should 

not have made an adverse inference because Schultz did not specify how much 
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time he spent in Iowa. The court reversed the decision of the DNR and 

remanded for further proceedings.

The ALJ held a hearing on remand on June 27, 2013. No new evidence 

was presented, and the hearing consisted solely of legal arguments. Looking at 

the evidence previously submitted, the ALJ concluded:

In light of the paucity of relevant evidence produced by 

Schultz, and the other evidence submitted by the department 

showing Schultz’s extensive physical and legal ties to the state of 

Minnesota, I must conclude that Schultz has not carried his burden 

of proof to establish that he is a resident of the State of Iowa for 

purposes of enjoying resident hunting privileges. Accordingly, the 

department’s decision must be affirmed.

The DNR affirmed the decision of the ALJ.

Schultz filed a new petition for judicial review (CVCV032487) on 

November 8, 2013. The official agency record from the remand was never 

transmitted to the district court. Schultz filed a report stating he had not been 

able to obtain the complete agency record from the DNR but he submitted the 

record from CVCV032267 and his copies of the proceedings on remand. 

The district court found the earlier decision on judicial review affirmed 

parts of the DNR decision. The court stated the ALJ “then confined his decision 

on remand to the issues of Schultz’s driver’s license, the usage of an adverse 

inference, and substantial evidence,” and concluded these were the only issues 

properly before the court. The court concluded there was substantial evidence in 

the record to support the DNR’s decision finding Schultz was not a resident of 

Iowa within the meaning of section 483A.1A(10)(a). The court affirmed the 

decision of the DNR. Schultz now appeals the decision in CVCV032487.
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II. Agency Records

On its own motion, the Iowa Supreme Court noted pursuant to Iowa Code 

section 17A.19(6), the original or a certified copy of the entire agency record 

must be transmitted to the district court upon the filing of a judicial review petition 

in a contested case. The supreme court pointed out it had previously held the 

absence of an agency record in the district court left it unable to reach the merits 

of the case and such a deficiency required summary affirmance of the district 

court’s decision. Alvarez v. IBP, Inc., 696 N.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Iowa 2005). The court 

asked the parties to submit statements concerning the lack of the agency record 

in this case and to address whether summary affirmance was warranted. The 

issue was ordered to be submitted with the appeal.

Schultz stated he asked the DNR to transmit the agency record to the 

district court but the DNR was unable to locate the records. Schultz stated he 

asked the DNR to transmit the agency record in CVCV032267 to the district court 

and he submitted his own copies of the proceedings on remand, so the record 

was substantially complete. The DNR agreed it had not fulfilled its duties under 

section 17A.19(6) to transmit the agency record to the district court but stated the 

district court had before it everything necessary to rule on the petition for judicial 

review. The DNR stated summary affirmance would be unjust in this case.

The Iowa Supreme Court has stated, “While transmission of less than the 

full agency record would not necessarily mandate dismissal of an appeal, there 

must at least be substantial compliance with the law requiring such transmittal 

and a showing of no prejudice.” Id. at 4. We conclude there was substantial 

compliance with the requirement in section 17A.19(6) to transmit the agency 
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record to the district court. The district court had a certified record of all of the 

proceedings in CVCV032267, when the case was remanded back to the DNR. 

No additional evidence was taken during the hearing on remand, and Schultz 

provided the district court with his copies of the remand proceedings. 

Furthermore, neither of the parties is claiming prejudice, as both ask for the 

appeal to proceed on the current record. We conclude summary affirmance 

would not be appropriate here.

III. Decision on Remand

A. Schultz claims the ALJ did not follow the directives of the district 

court in the remand decision. In the ALJ’s first decision, the ALJ stated, “I find 

dispositive to the ultimate issue the parties’ stipulation that Schultz holds both 

Iowa and Minnesota driver’s licenses.” The first decision was based on the ALJ’s 

application of section 483A.2. The court’s ruling on the first petition for judicial 

review stated,

The ALJ’s determination that a driver’s license is a resident 

privilege of Minnesota was incorrect. . . . While Petitioner should 

not have held two driver’s licenses under the laws of each state, the 

fact that he held a Minnesota Driver’s license did not make him a

resident of the state. The ALJ should not have found that “the 

appellant holds a privilege of residence in another state” because 

he held a Minnesota driver’s license, and his reliance on that fact to 

find him statutorily ineligible for resident hunting privileges in Iowa 

was in error. It should not have been a fact in his determination.

The district court’s decision became the law of the case on remand. See 

State ex rel. Goettsch v. Diacide Distribs., Inc., 596 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 

1999). “The doctrine of the law of the case represents the practice of courts to 

refuse to reconsider what has once been decided.” State v. Grosvenor, 402 

N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 1987). “It is a rule which provides that the legal principles 
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announced and the views expressed by a reviewing court in an opinion, right or 

wrong, are binding throughout further progress of the case upon the litigants, the 

trial court and this court in later appeals.” Id.

In the remand decision, the ALJ improperly stated he believed “this was 

an erroneous conclusion by the district court.” Whether the district court’s 

decision was right or wrong, it still must be followed on remand. See id. The ALJ 

did not rely on this factor alone, however, but noted several other factors, as well 

as Schultz’s Minnesota driver’s license, to reach the conclusion Schultz was not 

a resident of Iowa for purposes of chapter 483A. In the ruling on the second 

petition for judicial review, the court found the consideration of the Minnesota 

driver’s license as one factor among many was not an erroneous application of 

law.

The Iowa Supreme Court has stated chapter 483A “provides a list of 

nonexclusive factors to consider in determining whether a person has a ‘principle 

and primary residence or domicile’ in Iowa.” Democko v. Iowa Dep’t of Nat. Res., 

840 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Iowa 2013). On remand, rather than relying upon the 

Minnesota driver’s license as the dispositive factor to determine residency under 

section 483A.2, the ALJ considered it as one factor in a list of nonexclusive 

factors under section 483A.1A(9), defining “principal and primary residence or 

domicile,” and section 483A.1A(10)(a), defining “resident.” We conclude the ALJ 

did not make an erroneous interpretation of the law. See Iowa Code 

§ 17A.19(10)(c).

B. Schultz claims the ALJ continued to draw an adverse inference 

from the fact he did not testify at the first administrative hearing, contrary to the 
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ruling on the first petition for judicial review. The first decision by the ALJ noted 

Schultz had the burden of proof to establish he met the requisites for a resident 

hunting license. The ALJ stated it would have been helpful to have information 

about the amount of time Schultz spent in Iowa versus Minnesota and noted 

Schultz did not testify at the hearing, where this issue could have been raised. 

The ALJ stated he could have made an adverse inference based on the lack of 

information provided by Schultz on the issue. In the ruling on the first petition for 

judicial review, the district court stated the ALJ was not entitled to draw an 

adverse inference against Schultz on this issue because Schultz answered 

questions in an interrogatory, “although not as thoroughly as the agency might 

have liked.”

On remand, the ALJ did not use the term “adverse inference.” The ALJ 

again noted Schultz had the burden of proof and did not present evidence on the 

amount of time he spent in Iowa. The ALJ did not make any inferences based on 

Schultz’s lack of evidence on this issue but found Schultz failed to meet his 

burden of proof. In the ruling on the second petition for judicial review, the district 

court stated the ALJ’s decision “was based on relevant evidence submitted by 

Schultz and stipulated to by both Schultz and the DNR. His remand decision 

was not influenced by an adverse inference like his initial decision.” We 

conclude the ALJ did not make an erroneous application of the law on this issue.

IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Schultz claims the decision finding he was not entitled to a resident 

hunting license is not supported by substantial evidence. Schultz states there 

was not sufficient evidence in the record to support the agency’s decision finding 
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he did not meet the definition of a resident found in section 483A.1A(10)(a). He 

claims the evidence showed he was a resident of Iowa. We will uphold an 

agency’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).

Section 483.1A(10)(a) provides a “resident” is a person who:

Has physically resided in this state as the person’s principal 

and primary residence or domicile for a period of not less than 

ninety consecutive days immediately before applying for or 

purchasing a resident license, tag, or permit under this chapter and 

has been issued an Iowa driver’s license or an Iowa nonoperator’s 

identification card. A person is not considered a resident under this 

paragraph if the person is residing in the state only for a special or 

temporary purpose including but not limited to engaging in hunting, 

fishing, or trapping.

The phrase “[p]rincipal and primary residence or domicile” is defined as:

the one and only place where a person has a true, fixed, and 

permanent home, and to where, whenever the person is briefly and 

temporarily absent, the person intends to return. Relevant factors 

in determining a person’s principal and primary residence or 

domicile include but are not limited to proof of place of employment, 

mailing address, utility records, land ownership records, vehicle 

registration, and address listed on the person’s state and federal 

income tax returns. A person shall submit documentation to 

establish the person’s principal and primary residence or domicile 

to the department or its designee upon request. The department or 

its designee shall keep confidential any document received 

pursuant to such a request if the document is required to be kept 

confidential by state or federal law.

In determining whether a person is a resident having a principal and 

primary residence in Iowa, the statute contains “a nonexclusive list of factors, and 

thus requires the use of a multifactor, totality-of-the-circumstances approach.” 

Democko, 840 N.W.2d at 290. On remand, the ALJ considered the following 

factors in determining Schultz was not a resident of Iowa: (1) he listed a 

Minnesota address on his tax returns; (2) he worked in Medina, Minnesota, which 
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was a five-hour drive from Chariton, Iowa; (3) he held a Minnesota driver’s 

license; and (4) his Minnesota address was used on some bills. While there was 

also evidence showing Schultz’s ties to Iowa—he paid property taxes in Iowa, he 

had an Iowa driver’s license, and he received mail at his parents’ address in 

Chariton, Iowa—the ALJ could properly conclude Schultz had “extensive physical 

and legal ties to the state of Minnesota.” These extensive ties to Minnesota 

showed Iowa was not the one and only place where Schultz had his principal and 

primary residence. See Iowa Code § 483A.1A(9).

“Substantial evidence supports an agency's decision even if the 

interpretation of the evidence may be open to a fair difference of opinion.” Gits 

Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 855 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Iowa 2014). “Accordingly, the district 

court and the appellate court should not consider the evidence insubstantial 

merely because the court may draw different conclusions from the record.” Id. 

We determine the agency’s conclusion Schultz was not a resident of Iowa, as the 

term is defined in section 483A.1A(10)(a), is supported by substantial evidence.

V. Other Issues

On appeal, Schultz raises other issues. He claims: (1) the 2009 

amendments to section 483A.1A are void for vagueness; (2) the agency 

improperly applied the 2009 amendments retroactively; (3) the Iowa Savings 

Statute precludes retroactive application of the amended statutes; and (4) the 

agency improperly determined he had the burden of proof to establish residency.
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Schultz’s notice of appeal was filed in CVCV032487.1 The district court’s 

decision in CVCV032487 stated:

In particular, [the district court on the first petition] held that the 

2009 amendments to Iowa Code Section 483A.1A do not operate 

retroactively; that the Iowa savings statute does not operate to 

preclude the DNR from requiring Schultz to meet residency 

requirements; that the amended residency law is not void for 

vagueness; that the amended statute does not violate the

Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or 

the Due Process Clause; and that the administrative tribunal did not 

err in holding that Schultz had the burden of proof.

However, [the district court] reversed [the] ALJ with respect 

to [the] ALJ’s consideration of Schultz’s Minnesota driver’s license; 

his adverse inference relating to Schultz’s reluctance to provide 

additional information; that [the] ALJ erroneously applied applicable 

law and regulations; and the decision was not supported by 

substantial evidence.

[The] ALJ then confined his decision on remand to the 

issues of Schultz’s driver’s license, the usage of an adverse 

inference, and substantial evidence. Accordingly, [the district court]

did not issue a general remand and those affirmed issues are not 

subject to further review.

“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily 

be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on 

appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). “When a district 

court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the 

issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.” 

Id. Here, Schultz did not file a motion requesting the district court to enter a 

ruling in CVCV032487 on the additional issues he now wishes to raise on appeal. 

We conclude Schultz has not preserved error on these issues, and we do not 

address them. See id. at 541.

 

1

 Schultz’s statement addressing the question about the agency record raised by the 

Iowa Supreme Court states this case involves an appeal of two separate decisions and 

lists both case numbers, but the record does not show a notice of appeal was filed in 

CVCV032267.
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We affirm the district court’s opinion affirming the agency’s ruling Schultz 

was not entitled to a resident hunting license under chapter 483A.

AFFIRMED.