Contents

Executive Summary

Description of the

Accident

Probable Cause

Safety Issues

Recommendations

NATIONAL

TRANSPORTATION

SAFETY

BOARD

Marine Accident Brief Report

DCA95MM012

Fire On Board the

U.S. MODU ROWAN ODESSA

Gulf of Mexico

December 1, 1994

PB96-917007

NTSB/MBR-96/01
Abstract: This brief report explains the accident that resulted when workers struck and ruptured a

submerged natural gas pipeline while positioning a mobile offshore drilling unit, the ROWAN

ODESSA, in the Gulf of Mexico. Escaping gas ignited, engulfing the drilling rig in flames. The rig

manager remains missing and is presumed dead. Damages to the drilling unit and the pipeline were

estimated at $13 million.

As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board made one new safety

recommendation and reiterated one safety recommendation to the U.S. Coast Guard.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting

aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the

agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate

transportation accidents, determine the probable cause of accidents, issue safety recommendations,

study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident

reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews.

Information about available publications may be obtained by contacting:

National Transportation Safety Board

Public Inquiries section, RE-51

490 L’Enfant Plaza East, S.W.

Washington, D.C, 20594

(202) 314-6551

Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from:

National Technical information Service

5285 Port Royal Road

Springfield, Virginia 22161

(703) 4874600
Description of the Accident

On December 1, 1994, the ROWAN

ODESSA, a U.S. flag jack-up mobile offshore

drilling unit (MODU) with 37 persons aboard,

departed South Timbalier Block 341 in tow of a

lead tug, the NITA T, and an assist tug, the

HARVEY COMMANDER. The ROWAN

ODESSA had just completed a work assignment.

Its owner, Rowan Companies, Inc., had hired

the two tugs to move the rig to Bay Marchand

Block 4, where it was to be spudded2 and hotstacked3 until the next work assignment. See

Figure 1.

On the following day, the ROWAN

ODESSA was being maneuvered into position in

1 South Timbalier and Bay Marchand, located south

of Belle Pass, Louisiana, are two of the many oil and

gas lease sites managed by the Minerals Management

Service, U.S. Department of the Interior. The block

numbers, such as South Timbalier Block 35 or Bay

Marchand Block 5 correspond to the lease numbers. 2 Spudded is an industry term describing a barge that

has anchored by lowering its legs to the bottom.

When a jack-up MODU is spudded, the barge is

normally lifted clear of the water.

3 Hot stack is the term use for an anchored rig that

is temporarily unemployed and has a full crew on

board. Long-term anchorage with only a fire or

security watch on board is called a cold stack.

the Gulf of Mexico approximately 1 mile south

of Belle Pass, Louisiana. About 0110,4 the

ROWAN ODESSA’s port leg struck a submerged 16-inch natural gas pipeline. Escaping

natural gas bubbled up around the port leg and

enveloped the MODU.

Figure 1 – Accident site.

The rig manager realized that a gas pipeline

had been ruptured and ordered the rig evacuated. He radioed the assisting tugs and told

them to prepare for moving the rig off location.

He then began to raise the legs of the MODU.

Shortly thereafter, the escaping gas ignited near

the port leg, probably as a result of the electric

motors mounted on the leg. Almost immediately,

the rig was engulfed in flames.

4 Central Standard Time based on a 24-hour clock.
2

Twenty men evacuated the rig in the starboard survival capsule. Fourteen men jumped

from the helicopter pad, and two others jumped

from the rig’s bow. One of the attending tugs,

the NITA T, recovered 36 men. The rig manager remains missing and is presumed to have

drowned. Five of the men who jumped from the

Cans

Elevation View

Bow

A

Plan View”

Figure 2 — The ROWAN ODESSA

helicopter pad received minor injuries, including

second- and third-degree burns, groin injuries,

and one fractured knee cap.

This area, like many others in the Gulf of

Mexico, is crisscrossed with submerged pipelines from numerous offshore oil wells, and the

Gulf of Mexico has no designated pipeline-free

areas where MODUs, liftboats, and other vessels

in the offshore oil industry can anchor safely. In

addition, although some charts show the major

pipelines, many of the smaller pipelines do not

appear on any standard navigation chart.

Because the NITA T was the lead tug in the

tow, its master was responsible for navigation.

He stated that he had used NOAA specialpurpose chart 1116A, which is the chart most

commonly used by the offshore industry for this

section of the Gulf of Mexico. NOAA chart

1116A shows the offshore oil and gas lease

blocks and the LORAN-C overprints, and it is

practical and suitable for most offshore oil

industry navigation. However, because it covers

a large area, it does provide the detailed

information, such as locations of pipelines or

other obstructions, that is needed for anchoring

or stacking a vessel.

NOAA chart 11357,5 which also shows the

accident area and the LORAN-C overprints,

covers a smaller area and is drawn on a larger

scale. It clearly shows the two major pipelines

south of the Belle Pass sea buoy, including the

one ruptured by the ROWAN ODESSA. Therefore, when vessels intend to anchor or spud

down, the navigator should use charts that show

greater detail, such as NOAA 11357.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board

determines that the probable cause of the

accident, in which the ROWAN ODESSA

ruptured the natural gas pipeline, is the lack of

5 Because the NITA T is less than 1,600 gross tons

and the ROWAN ODESSA is not self-propelled, the

chart requirements of 33 CFR 164 do not apply.
3

designated pipeline-free areas in the Gulf of

Mexico where MODUs, liftboats, and other

vessels in the offshore oil industry can anchor

safely. Contributing to the accident was the

NITA T master’s use of NOAA chart 1116A

instead of NOAA chart 11357, which shows the

location of the pipeline that was ruptured.

Safety Issues

During December 1994, about 110 jack-up

MODUs and 40-50 liftboats were in the Gulf of

Mexico. The U.S. Coast Guard has the authority

to designate anchorage areas under 33 CFR 109

and 110, and it has the authority to regulate

Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) activities under

33 CFR 140 through 147. However, the OCS in

the Gulf of Mexico has no designated pipelinefree anchorages where out-of-service MODUs,

liftboats, and other offshore oil industry vessels

can safely anchor or spud down. Furthermore,

no Coast Guard or Minerals Management Service6 (MMS) regulations address such activity.7

This accident probably would not have

occurred if a designated anchorage free of pipelines had been available, and similar accidents

are likely in the future unless such anchorages

are provided. The National Transportation

Safety Board therefore believes that the Coast

Guard, in consultation with the MMS, the Office

of Pipeline Safety (OPS), the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, and

the offshore oil industry, should identify and

designate pipeline-free anchorage areas for

mobile offshore drilling units, liftboats, and

other industry vessels; these anchorages should

be located near offshore oil and mineral industry

staging ports throughout the Gulf of Mexico.

6 In 1982, all OCS leasing by the U.S. Department

of the Interior was consolidated within the MMS.

7 The Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTPs)

require notification only if a rig is to be anchored in

their zone indefinitely, and they may impose special

requirements, such as minimum crew and anchor

lights. There are no requirements if a rig, such as the

ROWAN ODESSA, is to be anchored temporarily

with a full crew on board.

The Safety Board has investigated several

accidents in which submerged pipelines were

struck by MODUs or fishing vessels.8 Because

the safety of the subsea pipeline system has been

questioned following such accidents, the MMS

and the OPS commissioned the Marine Board of

the National Research Council to study the technical, regulatory, and jurisdictional issues affecting the safety of marine pipelines in U.S. offshore waters. The study, which was published in

1994, notes that 20,000 miles of submerged

pipelines, much of them uncharted, lie along the

U.S. coast of the Gulf of Mexico.9 The study

concludes that vessels and their gear constitute

one of the most important risks to marine

pipelines.

The accident involving the ROWAN

ODESSA underscores the need for Coast Guard

COTPs to know the number and location of all

pipelines that traverse their zones. On September

11, 1990, as a result of the NORTHUMBERLAND investigation (footnote 4), the

Safety Board issued Safety Recommendation

M-90-62, which asked that the Coast Guard:

Require all Captains of the Port to have

access to information about the number,

location, and owners of all submerged

hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines that traverse their zones.

8 Pipeline Accident Report--Fire on Board the F/V

NORTHUMBERLAND and Rupture of a Natural Gas

Transmission Pipeline in the Gulf of Mexico Near

Sabine Pass, Texas, on October 3, 1989 (NTSB/

PAR-90/02); Pipeline Accident Brief--Accident involving the menhaden fishing vessel SEA CHIEF and

an offshore CSX pipeline in the Gulf of Mexico on

July 24, 1987 (NTSB/DCA-87-FP-013); Pipeline

Accident Report--Southern Natural Gas Pipeline

Company Rupture and Fire of a 14-inch Gas Transmission Pipeline Southeast of New Orleans, Louisiana

(Offshore), July 15, 1979 (NTSB/PAR-80/01);

Marine Accident Report--Crane Barge C.L. DILL 10

Fire in Garden Island Bay, Mississippi River Delta,

on June 5, 1979 (NTSB/MAR-80/09).

9 Committee on the Safety of Marine Pipelines,

Marine Board of the National Research Council, Improving the Safety of Marine Pipelines, 1994, p. v.
4

On May 22, 1991, the Coast Guard replied

that it concurred with the recommendation. The

Coast Guard stated:

The DOT is fully aware of the need to

create a national inventory system for oil

pipelines. Since pipelines do not fall

within the purview of the Coast Guard,

the Office of Pipeline Safety is preparing

a regulatory package that covers an

inventory of pipelines. This inventory

will be a useful tool for the Coast Guard

in contingency planning and discharge

response activities. In the interim, before

this regulatory package is completed,

Section 4202 of OPA 90 provides the

authority for having such information

reported to the Coast Guard, or EPA as

appropriate, as part of the required

facility response plans.

On October 22, 1991, Safety Recommendation M-90-62 was classified “Open--

Unacceptable Response.” The Safety Board

stated:

The Safety Board understands the role of

the Joint Task Force on Offshore Pipelines in creating a national inventory

system for oil and gas pipelines in U.S.

waters. However, it will be perhaps

years before the inventory is completed.

The Safety Board continues to believe

that the Coast Guard in the meantime

should require that all COTPs either

compile the recommended information

or be capable of contacting the owners

or operators of pipelines in their zones at

any time, day or night. We note from

the Coast Guard’s response that OPA 90

provides the authority for having such

information reported to the Coast Guard

as part of the required facility response

plans. Therefore, we strongly urge the

Coast Guard to initiate action to compile

the recommended information. We

would appreciate a further response

from the Coast Guard on this matter.

On March 23, 1994, the Coast Guard again

expressed its concurrence with this recommendation. The Coast Guard stated:

The Office of Management and Budget

recently disapproved the OPS regulatory

package that would have included a

requirement for facilities handling hazardous liquid and natural gas to

inventory all submerged pipelines. OPS

has no plans to pursue this aspect of

their regulatory package, and until pipeline inventories are required, such information will not be available to the

COTPs. Since the Coast Guard is unable

to implement this recommendation without the applicable OPS rules, I request

that this recommendation be classified

“Closed--Reconsidered.”

On May 30, 1990, then Secretary of

Transportation Skinner noted in his response to

companion Safety Recommendation P-90-4 that

the MMS has a complete file on each of the

pipelines it has authorized, whether under an

OCS oil and gas lease, a right-of-use and

easement, or a right-of-way. The file consists of

maps, records, and a data base. The Secretary

also noted that every approved OCS pipeline has

been plotted on maps that are maintained at the

regional director’s office of the Gulf of Mexico

OCS Region. The information on each pipeline

includes the owner/operator, approval date,

construction date, diameter, length, originating

and ending points, reported burial depth, other

pipelines crossed, product transported, and

modifications and repairs.

Based on the former Secretary’s 1990 letter,

on the authority granted the Coast Guard by

OPA 90 (Section 4202, Facility Response Plans),

and on the Port and Waterway Safety Act, the

Safety Board believes that the requirements of

M-90-62 can and should be implemented. The

Board urges the Coast Guard to reconsider its

position on this issue. Pending a further reply,

M-90-62 will remain classified “Open -- Unacceptable Response. ”
Recommendations

The National Transportation Safety Board

recommends that the U.S. Coast Guard:

In consultation with the Minerals

Management Service, the Office of Pipeline Safety, the National Oceanographic

and Atmospheric Administration, and

the offshore oil industry, identify and

designate, near offshore oil and mineral

industry staging ports throughout the

Gulf of Mexico, pipeline-free anchorage

areas for mobile offshore drilling units,

liftboats, and other industry vessels.

(Class II, Priority Action) (M-95-31)

In addition, the National Transportation

Safety Board reiterates Safety Recommendation

M-90-62, which asked that the U.S. Coast

Guard:

Require all Captains of the Port to have

access to information about the number,

location, and owners of all submerged

hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines that traverse their zones.

BY THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

JAMES E. HALL

Chairman

ROBERT T. FRANCIS II

Vice Chairman

JOHN A. HAMMERSCHMIDT

Member

JOHN J. GOGLIA

Member

September 22, 1995