IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Estate of

CALVIN T. RAY, a/k/a CALVIN 

THOMAS RAY JR. and TOD RAY.

MARK D. STINE,

Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE,

DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE,

Respondent.

No. 79904-5-I

DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

APPELWICK, J. — Stine appeals from an order granting summary judgment 

for and dismissing claims against the Washington State Department of Revenue. 

Stine contends the trial court erred in determining he had no legal right to inherit 

intestate from his stepfather, Calvin T. Ray, Jr. Stine argues this court should 

interpret RCW 11.04.095 to grant him the right of inheritance. Alternatively, he 

argues the court should use its equitable powers to allow him to inherit Ray’s estate 

by holding that he was de facto adopted by Ray, or that Ray was Stine’s de facto

father. We affirm. 
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FACTS

On April 5, 2011, Calvin T. Ray, Jr., passed away. Ray died intestate 

without being survived by any person entitled to his estate under Washington law. 

Ray was a resident of the State of Washington at the time of his death. Mark Stine 

was his only stepchild

Stine’s mother, Nancy Skinner, married Ray when Stine was 10. Stine, 

Skinner, and Ray lived together in the same home until Stine left home at the age 

of 21. Skinner and Ray dissolved their marriage on January 3, 1990. Ray and 

Stine remained close after the dissolution of his marriage to Ray’s mother. 

Counsel for Stine declared that Ray expressly stated to several individuals his 

intent to make Stine his beneficiary. Ray never formally adopted Stine. 

On March 27, 2012, the King County Superior Court issued a final order in 

probate directing his estate escheat to the State of Washington. The Washington 

Department of Revenue (DOR) holds Ray’s estate, which totaled $3,650,000 in 

2018. In July 2018, Stine filed a postprobate petition in King County Superior Court 

for a determination of his right to inherit. Stine asserted two legal theories in his 

petition. First, he claimed that he was entitled to inherit under RCW 11.04.095, 

which provides limited circumstances by which stepchildren may inherit intestate. 

Second, he argued that the court should rule that he was de facto adopted by Ray. 

The DOR moved to dismiss. In November 2018, the court ordered the parties to 

first proceed to mediation under RCW 11.96A.300. Mediation was unsuccessful. 

The DOR then moved for summary judgment. On March 29, 2019, the trial 

court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. 
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Stine appeals. 

DISCUSSION

This court reviews summary judgment rulings de novo. Activate, Inc. v. 

Dep’t of Revenue, 150 Wn. App. 807, 812, 209 P.3d 524 (2009). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if the record shows there is no genuine issue of material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Anica 

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 Wn. App. 481, 487, 84 P.3d 1231 (2004). A material 

fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends. Clements v. 

Travelers Indem. Co., 121 Wn. 2d 243, 249, 850 P.2d 1298 (1993). The court 

must consider the facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from those facts 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. The motion should be 

granted only if, from all the evidence, reasonable persons could reach but one 

conclusion. Cochran Elec. Co. v. Mahoney, 129 Wn. App. 687, 692, 121 P.3d 747 

(2005). 

I. RCW 11.04.095

Whether Stine should inherit under RCW 11.04.095 is a legal question that 

this court reviews de novo. See Bank of Am., NA v. Prestance Corp., 160 Wn.2d 

560, 564, 160 P.3d 17 (2007) (holding whether equitable relief is appropriate is a 

question of law). 

Intestate succession is governed by Washington’s general descent and 

distribution statute. RCW 11.04.015. Where a person dies intestate with no 

surviving spouse or domestic partner, their estate descends next to their issue. 

RCW 11.04.015(2)(a). “Issue” is defined under Title 11 RCW to include all lineal 
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descendants, including adopted individuals. RCW 11.02.005(8). “Stepchildren”

are not expressly included within the definition of “issue.” See id. If an individual 

dies intestate and is not survived by anyone entitled to their estate, their property 

escheats to the State. RCW 11.08.140. RCW 11.04.095 provides a narrow set of 

conditions under which stepchildren may inherit intestate from their stepparents. 

Stine asserts this court should interpret RCW 11.04.095 to allow him to inherit 

Ray’s estate, in keeping with the policy underlying RCW 11.04.095. 

The language of RCW 11.04.095 lays out several requirements which must 

be met for a stepchild to inherit intestate. First, the stepchild’s parent must 

predecease the surviving stepparent. Id. Second, substantially all of the parent’s 

property must pass to the surviving stepparent either in death or conveyed before 

death. Id. Third, the stepparent subsequently dies intestate resulting in escheat 

but for inheritance by the stepchild. Id. Thus, where the natural parent dies first, 

and their property is transferred to a stepparent, this statute provides a way for 

property of the natural parent to return to the stepchild upon the death of an 

otherwise intestate stepparent.

Stine asks this court to interpret RCW 11.04.095 broadly to include his 

circumstances “consistent with the underlying purpose of the code” and broadened 

understandings of what constitutes “family.” 

A. Evolution of Washington Probate Law

First, Stine argues probate law has moved beyond anachronistic bloodline 

conceptions of property inheritance. Stine highlights the enactment of RCW 

11.04.095 as part of a comprehensive probate code revision in 1965. He cites to 
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a law review article discussing the Legislature’s repudiation of the “‘anachronistic 

doctrine of ancestral property.’” (Quoting Robert A. Stewart & John R. Steincipher, 

Probate Reform in Washington, 39 WASH. L. REV. 873, 878-879 (1965)). However, 

Stine does not provide any caselaw in which the court has used the 1965 probate 

reforms to assign more inclusive meaning to an eligible class of takers under 

current probate statutes. 

Stine highlights several other shifts in probate law, such as changes to 

antiquated notions of “legitimacy” in defining children. Here, Stine relies on In re

Matthias’ Estate, 63 F. 523, 525 (C.C.D. Wash. 1894). Matthias’ Estate did not 

address the question of law in this case, but concerned the third section of “‘[a]n 

act in relation to marriage,’” which expressly provided “‘all children born of persons 

living and cohabiting together, as man and wife’” were eligible to inherit. Id.

(quoting LAWS OF 1854, p. 404). The question before the court was whether the 

plaintiff’s parents, who never legally wed, lived together as man and wife. Id. The 

court did not interpret the statute beyond its plain language to reach its conclusion. 

Id.

Additionally, Stine argues the recognition of stepchildren as beneficiaries 

under taxation provisions and in wrongful death actions evidences a legislative 

intent for stepchildren to inherit. Stine cites In re Estate of Bordeaux, 37 Wn.2d 

561, 594, 225 P.2d 433 (1950), which recognized stepchildren as belonging to the 

same class as natural children for purposes of inheritance taxation. However, the 

relevant inheritance tax statute specifically designated that any “‘child or stepchild’”

of the deceased belong to class A for determining rates of taxation. Id. at 562-63
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(emphasis omitted) (quoting Rem. Supp. 1943, § 11202, P.P.C. § 974-21). Here, 

“stepchild” is not expressly provided in the language of RCW 11.04.095. Similarly, 

stepchildren are now entitled to recover in wrongful death actions, but Stine himself 

concedes this change occurred through statutory reform. 

Additionally, Stine contends that amendments to Title 11 RCW recognizing 

increased rights of nontraditional heirs and domestic partnerships are evidence of 

the legislature’s desire for broadened interpretations of Title 11 RCW. But, again, 

these changes also evidence the legislature’s ability to amend Title 11 RCW to 

comport with its new policy positions. 

Had the legislature intended to make stepchildren equivalent to children in 

all instances of intestate law, it could have simply amended the definition of “issue”

in RCW 11.02.005(8) to include “stepchildren,” but it has not. To this point, the

DOR cites to In re Estate of Henry, 189 Wash. 510, 513-14, 66 P.2d 350 (1937), 

detailing the legislature’s modification of Washington’s former inheritance tax code 

to classify both “children” and “stepchildren” as the same class of beneficiaries. If

Title 11 RCW is inconsistent with trends in escheat or expanding notions of family, 

it is for the Legislature to enact changes in policy.

B. Policy Disfavoring Escheat in Washington

Next, Stine contends escheat is disfavored in Washington. He cites In re 

Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 284, 721 P.2d 950 (1986), to support his claim. 

This case is distinguishable from Little. That case concerned a dispute between 

two groups of potential heirs over the estate of an intestate decedent. Id. at 281. 

Reading Washington’s general descent and distribution statute and its ancestral 
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estate statute literally, their rights to inherit extinguished each other, resulting in 

escheat under RCW 11.08.140. See Little, 106 Wn.2d at 283-84. The court held 

the legislature could not have intended for those two statutes to conflict, resulting 

in escheat. Id. at 284. Therefore, the court gave preference to the more specific 

ancestral estate statute. Id.

Here, there is no dispute between two groups of potential heirs or two 

conflicting statutes. Additionally, the outcome of Little, 21 years after the 1965 

probate code reforms, highlights the enduring recognition of bloodlines and 

ancestral property. Robert A. Stewart & John R. Steincipher, Probate Reform in 

Washington, 39 WASH. L. REV. 873, 878-879 (1965). This rebuts Stine’s earlier 

arguments regarding the evolution of Washington probate law. 

A general policy disfavoring escheat does not mean the legislature intended 

that escheat will never occur under any circumstances. On the contrary, the 

legislature provides for intestate escheat expressly under Title 11 RCW, barring 

exceptional circumstances outlined in statutes such as RCW 11.04.095. 

C. Plain Language of Statute

Stine concedes that, under the plain language of the statute, he does not 

meet the first two statutory requirements since his mother did not predecease Ray. 

Only the third statutory requirement, that Stine’s stepparent subsequently died

intestate resulting in escheat but for inheritance by the stepchild, is present here. 

RCW 11.04.095(3). Stine does not cite caselaw in which a court has interpreted 

RCW 11.04.095 to allow for inheritance in similar circumstances. 
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Still, he argues this court should interpret the statute to allow him to inherit 

“consistent with other state statutes and caselaw and the unstoppable evolution of 

society’s view of family.” He contends “[i]t is a natural and logical progression for 

the [c]ourt to equitably fill this statutory gap.” For this assertion, he cites In re 

Parentage of L.B., 121 Wn. App. 460, 475-476, 89 P.3d 271 (2004), rev’d in part 

on other grounds, 155 Wn.2d 679, 122 P.3d 161 (2005). The L.B. court recognized 

its ability to grant common law remedies where they are not preempted by 

legislation. 121 Wn. App. at 476 n.2. But, the court also clearly stated 

“unambiguous statutes are not open to judicial interpretation.” Id. at 473.

The plain meaning rule directs courts to apply words per the meaning they 

are ordinarily given. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 

11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). It is unnecessary to resort to aids of construction where a 

statute is unambiguous. See Id. at 12. In recognition of separation of powers, 

courts “should resist the temptation to rewrite an unambiguous statute to suit our 

notions of what is good public policy.” State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 725, 976 

P.2d 1229 (1999). Where a statutory mandate exists, courts will not employ 

equitable principles in derogation of that mandate. See Rhoad v. McLean Trucking 

Co., Inc., 102 Wn.2d 422, 427, 686 P.2d 483 (1984). This court has declined to 

judicially modify a statutory child support scheme where a partner did not formally 

adopt the child. State ex rel. D.R.M v. Wood, 109 Wn. App. 182, 194-95, 34 P.3d 

887 (2001). 

Here, there is no gap in the statute. This court does not need to look further 

than the plain language of the statute. A stepparent has clear options to ensure 
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their stepchild inherits their estate. Here, the legislature has expressly carved out 

limited exceptions to a bar on intestate inheritance by stepchildren with RCW 

11.04.095.

It may be true, as Stine contends, that his stepfather Ray always intended 

that he would be his heir. But, Ray never pursued any of the available instruments 

to ensure succession. The legislature enacted a narrowly-tailored intestate 

exceptions for stepchildren, rather than add stepchildren to the definition of issue. 

Neither general policy considerations nor evidence of the likely intentions of the 

decedent are a sufficient basis to override clear legislative policy in the name of 

equity.

D. RCW 11.04.095’s Section Heading

Finally, Stine argues the “title” of the statute, “Inheritance from stepparent 

avoids escheat,” indicates the legislature’s intent to broadly extend inheritance 

rights to stepchildren as well as its general disfavoring of escheat under RCW 

11.04.095. This argument lacks merit. 

Stine relies on Klossner v. San Juan County, 93 Wn.2d 42, 47, 605 P.2d 

330 (1980), which described RCW 11.04.095, to assert that “[w]ith this statute, the 

legislature has extended inheritance rights to stepchildren when the property would 

otherwise escheat to this state.” But, this statement was to distinguish the wrongful 

death statute at issue in Klossner, which unlike RCW 11.04.095, was silent with 

regards to stepchildren. Id. Additionally, Klossner cites RCW 11.04.095 to 

evidence how enhancements of stepchildren’s rights have come by statute and 

have been narrow in scope. Id. at 46-47. 
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Further, RCW 11.04.095’s section heading has no relevance to this case. 

Where a statute is ambiguous, section headings enacted as a part of the act may 

assist in determining legislative intent, but they do not control the plain meaning. 

See State v. Lundell, 7 Wn. App. 779, 781-82, 503 P.2d 774 (1972). These 

headings are only relevant if “they are placed in the original act by the legislature 

without any limiting provisions.” Id. at 782 n.1. Here, the statute is unambiguous, 

so section headings are not needed to determine legislative intent. Additionally, 

the “title” Stine cites is the section heading for RCW 11.04.095. And, Title 11 RCW 

contains an express limiting provision stating section headings within Title 11 RCW 

do not constitute any part of the law. RCW 11.02.001.

We hold that Stine is not permitted to inherit Ray’s estate under RCW 

11.04.095.

II. Ray As Stine’s De Facto Father

In the alternative, Stine argues that Ray was his de facto father. A lawfully 

adopted child is entitled to all rights of a natural child with regards to the adoptive 

parent, including rights of inheritance. RCW 26.33.260. Whether to assign 

equitable relief is a legal question, and as such, review is de novo. Niemann v. 

Vaughn Cmty. Church, 154 Wn.2d 365, 374, 113 P.3d 463 (2005); Norean 

Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 483, 254 P.3d 835 

(2011). 

An individual must be alive at the time a parentage action is commenced,

and must claim to be the de facto parent of a minor child while the child is alive. 

RCW 26.26A.440(1)-(2). Here, Ray is deceased, Stine is not a minor child, and 
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Stine does not argue that Ray was ever adjudicated to be Stine’s de facto parent. 

Stine argues that Ray was never adjudicated as such because such claims only 

arise during familial disputes, of which there were none here. Yet, that is precisely 

why this doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this dispute. De facto parentage 

was never designed as an equitable relief for children to establish rights of 

inheritance. The statutory requirement that both parties be alive at 

commencement evidences the doctrine’s inapplicability to probate law. 

This court declines to expand the doctrine of de facto parentage to cover 

the circumstances of this dispute.

III. De Facto Adoption

Stine also argues in the alternative this court should utilize its equitable 

powers to hold that he was de facto adopted by Calvin Ray. Stine asserted this 

theory in his postprobate petition. 

De facto adoption, also referred to as “equitable adoption” or “adoption by 

estoppel” is a common law doctrine entitling a person to the same rights they would 

have if legally adopted. Modern Status of Law as to Equitable Adoption or 

Adoption by Estoppel, 122 A.L.R. 5th 205 (2004). 

Citing Thier, the DOR asserts that de facto adoption has never been 

recognized by a Washington appellate court. In re Marriage of Thier, 67 Wn. App. 

940, 947 n.5, 841 P.2d 794 (1992) (noting no Washington case had recognized 

the doctrine). Stine is unable to cite any case where a Washington court has 

recognized the doctrine since Thier, but notes many foreign jurisdictions have as 

of 2004. 
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In Washington, adoptions are governed by statute, not common law. In re 

Estate of Renton, 10 Wash. 533, 542, 39 P. 145 (1895). In Renton, our Supreme 

Court held that stepchildren were prohibited from inheriting from their intestate 

stepfather as de facto adoptees because adoption in Washington is “purely 

statutory.” Id.

Stine asserts that Renton is no longer controlling because it “would have 

been decided differently” today rendering it “simply not applicable and controlling.” 

Stine’s argument that Renton is no longer binding precedent is unsupported by 

caselaw. Therefore, we decline to recognize the common law doctrine of de facto 

adoption. 

Stine is not eligible to inherit intestate under RCW 11.04.095. His other 

arguments lack merit. The trial court did not err in granting the State’s motion for 

summary judgment and dismissing the action.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR: