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S. HRG. 110–703

WAR AT ANY COST? THE TOTAL ECONOMIC

COSTS OF THE WAR BEYOND THE FEDERAL

BUDGET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 28, 2008

Printed for the use of the Joint Economic Committee

(

(II)

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

[Created pursuant to Sec. 5(a) of Public Law 304, 79th Congress]

SENATE

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania

JIM WEBB, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

JOHN SUNUNU, New Hampshire

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York, Vice Chair

MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York

BARON P. HILL, Indiana

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Ranking Minority

KEVIN BRADY, Texas

PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania

RON PAUL, Texas

MICHAEL LASKAWY, Executive Director

CHRISTOPHER J. FRENZE, Minority Staff Director

(III)

C O N T E N T S

MEMBERS

Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from New York ............... 1

Hon. Jim Saxton, Ranking Minority, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey . 4

Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Vice Chair, a U.S. Representative from New York .. 6

Hon. Ron Paul, a U.S. Representative from Texas ............................................... 7

Hon. Loretta Sanchez, a U.S. Representative from California ............................ 9

Hon. Brownback, Sam, a U.S. Senator from Kansas ............................................ 10

Hon. Lloyd Doggett, a U.S. Representative from Texas ....................................... 12

Hon. Maurice Hinchey D., a U.S. Representative from New York ...................... 14

Hon. Amy Klobuchar, a U.S. Senator from Minnesota ......................................... 15

WITNESSES

Statement of the Honorable Joseph E. Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate; Professor,

Columbia University, New York, NY ................................................................. 18

Statement of the Honorable Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs

(International), New York, NY ............................................................................ 22

Statement of Dr. Rand Beers, President, National Security Network, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 26

Statement of Dr. Scott Wallsten, Vice President for Research and Senior

Fellow, iGrowthGlobal, Washington, DC ........................................................... 28

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman, a U.S. Senator

from New York ..................................................................................................... 54

Prepared statement of Hon. Jim Saxton, Ranking Minority, a U.S. Representative from New Jersey ......................................................................................... 56

Prepared statement of Hon. Carolyn B. Maloney, Vice Chair, a U.S. Representative from New York ................................................................................. 57

Prepared statement of Hon. Ron Paul, a U.S. Representative from Texas ........ 58

Prepared statement of Hon. Brownback, Sam, a U.S. Senator from Kansas ..... 59

Study entitled, ‘‘Democrat JEC Report Hints at Existence of a Value

Creation Machine: Over $1 Trillion of Estimated Costs in Question’’ ..... 61

Report entitled, ‘‘Financial Impact of the World Trade Center Attack’’ ...... 71

Prepared statement of the Honorable Joseph E. Stiglitz, Nobel Laureate;

Professor, Columbia University, New York, NY ................................................ 125

Study entitled, ‘‘Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: The Longterm Costs of Providing Veterans Medical Care and Disability Benefits’’ ................................................................................................................. 131

Study entitled, ‘‘The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal

Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict’’ ...................................... 152

Prepared statement of the Honorable Robert Hormats, Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs (International), New York, NY ........................................................ 211

Prepared statement of Dr. Rand Beers, President, National Security Network,

Washington, DC ................................................................................................... 216

Prepared statement of Dr. Scott Wallsten, Vice President for Research and

Senior Fellow, iGrowthGlobal, Washington, DC ............................................... 220

Working Paper entitled, ‘‘The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq’’ ............. 222

Joint Economic Committee Report, ‘‘War at Any Price? The Total Economic

Costs of the War Beyond the Federal Budget,’’ February 2008 ....................... 253

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WAR AT ANY COST? THE TOTAL ECONOMIC

COSTS OF THE WAR BEYOND THE FEDERAL

BUDGET

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2008

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,

JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met at 9:30 a.m. in room SH–106 of the Hart

Senate Office Building, The Honorable Charles E. Schumer (Chairman) presiding.

Senators present. Schumer, Klobuchar, and Brownback.

Representatives present. Maloney, Sanchez, Doggett, Hinchey,

Cummings, Saxton, and Paul.

Staff present: Christina Baumgardner, Stephanie Dreyer, Anna

Fodor, Chris Frenze, Tamara Fucile, Nan Gibson, Rachel Greszler,

Colleen Healy, Aaron Kabaker, Tim Kane, Israel Klein, Tyler

Kurtz, Brian Larkin, Michael Laskawy, Dan Miller, Robert

O’Quinn, Jeff Schlagenhauf, Marcus Stanley, Robert Weingart, Jeff

Wrase, and Adam Yoffie.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES E.

SCHUMER, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

Chairman Schumer. Good morning, everybody. I’d like to

thank all of you for coming to our Joint Economic Committee hearing today on the costs of the war in Iraq.

This is a contentious topic, and so I’m going to ask our audience,

of course, to be respectful of the witnesses, their opinions, and the

Committee, as we proceed.

We have a very distinguished panel, including Professor Joseph

Stiglitz, the Nobel Laureate economist now at Columbia; Robert

Hormats, a National Security Council Advisor under both Democratic and Republican Presidents, and now co-chairman of Goldman

Sachs; Rand Beers, the president of the National Security Network

and former NSC Advisor, who has written so many astute things

on national security, and Scott Wallsten, an economist and formerly of the American Enterprise Institute.

I’d like to take a few moments to talk about the war, its costs,

and what I believe is a turning point in our arguments against the

war, for those of us who are against it.

Then I’ll recognize our Members for opening statements, and formally introduce the panel.

Now, the case against the war in Iraq has been building for a

long time. Too many young American men and women have given

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their lives or suffered terrible, life-altering injuries, with little to

show for their sacrifice.

The American people are baffled by the lack of political progress,

despite the good works of our troops, and now Americans are trying

to comprehend the eye-popping dollar figures that this war is costing our budget and our economy.

It’s becoming clear to all Americans—Republicans, Democrats,

and Independents—that by continuing to spend huge amounts in

Iraq, we’re prevented from spending on important goals and vital

needs here at home.

So, the turning point is this: The lack of progress, particularly

on the political front, continues; the tragic loss of life continues, but

the cost of the war and the inability to use those funds to help us

here at home and to properly go after the real nexus of terror,

which is to the East in Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, has become the clinching argument that we must quickly and soon

change the course of this war in Iraq.

I went to Iraq over New Years and spent time with our soldiers.

I can tell you, they’re wonderful. They’re awe- inspiring.

But I can also tell you from my trip to Iraq, at least my estimate—and I don’t think this is different than many others—that

if everything worked out well and we followed General Petraeus’s

general playbook, which I think is a good one, it would take us 5

years to gain maybe a 50–percent chance of bringing stability to

Iraq—not democracy. I think democracy is a forlorn hope at this

point. It’s maybe a little bit of western arrogance to think we can

impose an American style democracy on a country like Iraq—but

just stability.

Now, I would ask anybody here in this audience, of any ideological stripe, is that your number one goal for the country? Is it number two? Is it number three? Where does it rank with improving

healthcare, improving our education system, gaining an energy policy that’s important.

And where does it rank with foreign policy goals such as dealing

with the triad, the nexus of terror, over at the Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iranian theater? I don’t think very many Americans

would rank it such a high priority, and yet, in terms of the amount

of money we are spending there, as well as our focus, our energy,

it is number one or number two or number three in occupying

America.

And so we have to put this in perspective. The cost of the war

has become the $800 billion gorilla in the room. The backbreaking

costs of this war to American families, the Federal budget, and the

entire economy, are beyond measure in many ways, and it’s becoming the first thing after the loss of life that people think about and

talk about.

Let me just give you some numbers: For the amount of money

the Bush administration wants to spend per day in Iraq—that’s

$430 million—we could: Enroll an additional 58,000 children in

Head Start for a whole year; put about 9,000 police officers on the

streets per year; provide health insurance for 329,000 low-income

children through CHIP per year; hire 10,700 Border Patrol agents

per year. This is Iraq for one day, and these equivalents are on a

yearly basis.

3

* The Joint Economic Committee Report, ‘‘War at Any Price? The Total Economic Costs of the

War Beyond the Federal Budget,’’ updated Feb. 2008, appears in the Submissions for the Record

on page 253.

We could make college more affordable for 163,000 students per

year; help 260,000 American families keep their homes, with foreclosure prevention counselling this year. In the Fiscal 2008 budget, we put $159 billion into Iraq, double

the amount we did for our entire transportation budget—roads,

bridges—6 times as much as what we put into the National Institutes of Health to discover cures for diseases like cancer and diabetes; 7 times what we spend on helping young Americans get a college education; and 30 times as much as we do to ensure the

health—what it would cost to ensure the health of every single

child.

So, the costs are mountainous. As this world changes, technology

is changing our world and America has to adapt to it. We’re not;

instead, we’re taking so many of our resources and just putting

them into Iraq.

Again for what end? At best, stability in a small part of the

world, when there is so much instability in more dangerous places,

at least to the United States, elsewhere.

I’ve read the testimony from the witnesses, and particularly from

Professor Stiglitz. We’re grateful to him here. His book’s title

speaks for itself: The Three Trillion Dollar War.

I was dismayed to learn that Professor Stiglitz had trouble getting information from the Government about what this war is costing us, from the Pentagon and the Veterans Administration.

And I was also tremendously disappointed to read in the paper

today that the White House has already disparaged Professor

Stiglitz and the work he has done. It’s the height of hypocrisy for

an Administration that has been so secretive and so unwilling to

face the truth and the true costs of their policies in this war, to

disparage the courage and conviction of someone like Professor

Stiglitz.

So I plan to ask Senator Levin, who chairs the Armed Services

Committee, to work with me to make sure the Administration is

more transparent and forthcoming about the billions in taxpayer

money we are spending, going forward.

Professor Stiglitz estimates that, conservatively, this war could

cost $3 trillion for budget costs, alone. That is a trillion, with a T.

These estimates make our JEC estimates, which knocked people’s

socks off when we did them a couple of months ago, seem small.*

His higher estimates of the total economic costs, dwarf all other estimates, at up to $5 trillion.

So, for this reason and others, we desperately need a change of

course in Iraq. We can’t continue to police a civil war built on ageold enmities of the various factions in Iraq; we can’t afford the

costs, which are increasing exponentially, according to expert

economists; and we can’t allow this skyrocketing spending in Iraq

to displace just about every other domestic and foreign policy priority.

If you look at the President’s budget this year, everything is

slashed dramatically, even Medicare and Medicaid, the lifeblood of

healthcare systems, all to make room for the war in Iraq.

4

History will look up this Iraq war in two ways: I believe it will

certainly admire the bravery of our soldiers, from the armies to the

generals; it will acknowledge that going through the Iraq process,

General Petreaus’s rewriting of the Army Manual, will allow us to

more effectively fight the next war.

But, at the same time, history will be amazed at the mistakes

made by this Administration in starting this war and continuing

this war for far too long.

[The prepared statement of the Senator Schumer appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 54.]

Chairman Schumer. With that, let me call on my colleague,

Vice Chair Maloney—oh, no, sorry. I always get this wrong.

[Laughter.]

Chairman Schumer. Ranking Member Saxton.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM SAXTON,

RANKING MINORITY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW

JERSEY

Representative Saxton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you this morning, and I would

just say at the outset, that I’d like to welcome our witnesses. I

thank them all for being here.

Mr. Chairman, there are different views on the situation in Iraq.

You and I have had a different view, historically, on this subject,

for quite some time, and I listened carefully to your opening statement, and nothing has changed.

So——

Chairman Schumer. Except all the additional money we’re

spending and additional lives we’re losing.

Representative Saxton. This is my time, and I’ll reclaim it,

thank you.

The Iraq war obviously has many dimensions, including foreign

policy, defense policy, and policy related to terrorism.

While debate about past policy in Iraq will continue, the most

important question facing policymakers, is this: What should U.S.

policy in Iraq be today and in the future?

Since the implementation of the surge strategy in Iraq, the military situation has improved dramatically, as noted by a variety of

independent experts from the Brookings Institute, as well as the

American Enterprise Institute, and publications such as the Washington Post.

In fact, a recent Washington Post editorial urged critics of the

war to take the success of the surge into account in setting future

policy.

And in this week’s National Review, an article entitled ‘‘Re-Liberators,’’ the author writes the following:

Iraq is a mind-bogglingly complex country that defies generalizations, except for

one. Where U.S. troops have a substantial presence, there is more security, more

grass roots political activity, and more economic progress. Hence, the success of the

surge and the imperative not to draw down too quickly, is immensely important.

The leader of the small village where this author was writing,

said this: ‘‘We are very serious, we are going to go all the way to

the end of the path, and we don’t want you Americans to leave.’’

5

After a year, that view of the surge is not uncommon. However,

another attempt to force a hasty retreat from Iraq is now underway, following the many failures to do the same thing earlier in

this Congress.

Now that the surge is proving successful, a quick exit from Iraq

would be especially costly. The virtually immediate withdrawal advocated by some politicians, is not militarily feasible, and even a

premature withdrawal could produce immense costs, both in

human terms, as well as in economic terms.

For example, if the United States withdrew quickly, the biggest

winners would include terrorists and the Iranian regime, which is

designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iranian influence would

further spread to Iraq, potentially expanding Iranian military influence in the Persian Gulf, including the Straits of Hormuz, and

leading to Iranian control of significant Iraqi oil resources.

Iran has already threatened to cutoff western oil supplies, and in

such a situation, would be well positioned to act on such a threat.

Consider also that the scenario of a rapid U.S. pullout could lead

to a civil war in Iraq, drawing in surrounding nations and leading

to a regional conflagration.

Unfortunately, this is not a remote possibility, but something

that must be considered. The economic, military, and human costs

of this outcome to the United States and its allies, would be enormous.

All wars impose costs in terms of life and treasure, and the Iraq

war is no exception. These costs must be considered as the U.S.

weighs its options in Iraq. In determining future policy, we have

to consider whether the situation in Iraq is improving significantly,

as well as to consider the cost and benefits of our various other policy options.

Ss economic costs and benefits are considered, it is important to

recognize that estimates will range widely, because they are, necessarily, based on questionable data. A variety of assumptions and

speculation about the events is also included in most analyses. As

Dr. Wallsten has warned, the data are not of high quality and, further, each calculation requires several assumptions.

He also has pointed out that even meticulous cost estimates contain a great deal of error, and thus such analysis, quote, ‘‘cannot

determine whether the benefits of war exceed the costs.’’

I would note that it is important—the important elements of Dr.

Wallsten’s work are also incorporated in Dr. Stiglitz’s research,

which shares the same limitations.

In their 2005 paper, Dr. Wallsten and a co-author, acknowledged

the inherent ‘‘imprecision,’’ of the cost estimates, but they provided

a significant analytical framework for the policy debate.

It is important to repeat their warnings regarding this inherent

imprecision which makes it impossible to determine the relative

costs and benefits of the Iraq war.

In closing, I would just note this: Last week, the Washington

Post covered the new attack advertising on the Iraq war, sponsored

by the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. I would like to

think that the timing of this ad campaign, this hearing, and the

Iraq pullout vote this week, is a remarkable coincidence, but I’m

sorry I can’t draw that conclusion.

6

[The prepared statement of Representative Saxton appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 56.]

Chairman Schumer. Vice Chair Maloney.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CAROLYN B.

MALONEY, VICE CHAIR, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW

YORK

Vice Chair Maloney. Good morning. I thank my colleague and

friend, Chuck Schumer, for holding this hearing to examine the

economic cost of the Iraq war, and I want to welcome our distinguished guests, many of whom have served in Government, and

thank them for their service and for their testimony here today. Over the past 5 years, the President has requested some $665

billion from Congress to fund the war in Iraq. The more than $180 billion that the President wants the Government to spend on Iraq just this year, including interest on war

debt, totals almost half a billion dollars a day.

But the untold story, one every American needs to hear, is that

the costs of this war go well beyond these budget numbers. At my

request last year, the Joint Economic Committee prepared a report

showing that if the President’s 2008 funding request is approved,

the full economic cost of the war will total $1.3 trillion—just by the

end of this year.

This figure includes the hidden costs of deficit financing, the future care of our wounded Veterans, and disruption in our oil markets. And if the war continues, the costs will only mount higher.

In his new book, Dr. Stiglitz estimates that the total economic price tag for the war could reach $3 trillion to $5 trillion over the

next decade, if we remain in Iraq.

The numbers may feel abstract, but the costs are real.

The burden of the war debt handed down to our children is real.

It’s been called the Iraq 100-year mortgage.

The lost opportunities to invest here at home in jobs—green technologies, roads, bridges, healthcare, and education—are real. And

the nearly 4,000 lives, almost 200 from New York State alone are

real.

We are all paying for the colossal costs of this war, one way or

another.

Last year alone, the President asked Congress to spend more on

the Iraq war than the $130 billion our Nation spends annually on

the entire American road and highway system. At a time when our

levies and bridges are crumbling, as we saw during Katrina, we

cannot afford to stop investing in our infrastructure.

And the President has been squabbling with Congress about

money for children’s healthcare when about 3-months’ worth of

Iraq war spending would have covered the entire 5-year S–CHIP,

Children’s Health Insurance Program funding increase he vetoed

last year.

The Administration is reportedly negotiating for an indefinite

U.S. troop presence in Iraq. We know we cannot continue the continued loss of life. The economic costs have also become unbearable.

The JEC report has estimated that the difference between staying the course with our current troop commitment in Iraq, versus

a more rapid drawdown favored by many Congressional Democrats,

7

is about $1.8 trillion in additional economic costs over the next decade.

That is above and beyond what we’ve already spent on the war,

and it’s money that will continue to be diverted from important national priorities.

A productive debate over the long-term economic impact of the

war and its cost to future generations is long overdue. It’s no surprise, however, that this is a debate that the Bush administration

would rather hide from.

OMB Director Nussle took issue with our JEC report last year.

Chairman Schumer and I wrote to invite him to appear before this

Committee to present the Administration’s estimates of what the

full economic cost of the Iraq war have been so far and will be

going forward. Not surprisingly, Director Nussle has not responded

to our open invitation.

I want to call on the Administration to produce their own estimates, as we and many of our witnesses have done, and appear before this Committee to have a productive dialog about this critical

issue facing our Nation.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your hard work on this

and so many other issues.

[The prepared statement of Representative Maloney appears in

the Submissions for the Record on page 57.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Vice Chair Maloney. We’re

going to have opening statements for any Member who wishes to

make one, just being careful of the time.

So, the next person in the order of people who came in is Representative Paul. Welcome back.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RON PAUL, A U.S.

REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS

Representative Paul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate

you holding these very important hearings, and appreciate the

panel appearing today. I realize that the issue here is the cost of

war, but it’s hard for some of us to think about the war without

thinking about policy, as well.

And this is something I’ve put a little bit of thought into and

think it’s a very serious problem. Nations, when they go to war,

generally, especially with our country, people resist it.

The large majority don’t want to go to war. They have to be convinced of it, so then there has to be threat buildup and say, well,

we will be threatened, and the people join in and they are willing

to go along with the war.

But the war doesn’t end easily and quickly, and if it’s prolonged,

people turn against the war, and that’s where we are today, just

as we were in the 1960s, because what they realize is, it’s very

costly in terms of lost lives and serious injuries, but then there is

the cost of paying for the war.

We’ve gone through that cycle, and something has to give. Some

of us who have argued strongly against going in there in the first

place really will win this argument, that we will have to leave no

matter what the strength of the opposition is on the argument, because we won’t be able to afford it.

8

And this is what we’re coming to, because our ability to afford

the war will be measured in terms of the value of our currency, and

that is, obviously, going down.

But Randolph Bourne, during World War I, wrote a paper and

he called it ‘‘War Is the Health of the State’’, and this is one reason

why I have been alerted early on to be very cautious about going

to war, because I don’t like a big state, because if you have an omnipotent state, you undermine personal liberties, and that, of

course, should be our greatest concern in a free country, protecting

personal liberties.

But also, there are some myths, I think, economic myths associated with war, because you hear too often that war is good for the

economy. And we certainly heard that. This came out of getting out

of the Depression.

I don’t happen to believe that the war ended the Depression. People didn’t feel good until after the war was over.

I remember rationing and a lot of other things, so war does not

end—it’s not healthy for the economy. I think it’s very damaging

to the economy because we always have to pay for it.

And there was a study made not too long ago, and the result of

the study showed that all wars lead to inflation.

I mean, this was the claim, and whether he’s absolutely right or

not, I don’t know, but generally speaking, if you think of our history, even from the Revolutionary War on, we’ve had inflation,

which means the people are never required to pay for the war.

Maybe if they were required to pay for the war there wouldn’t

be so many wars. Direct taxation to pay for a war would end it

rather quickly because we couldn’t afford it, but if we can pass it

off to the next generation, we seem to be able to get away with it.

So we tax as much as we can, and then we borrow as much as

we can, and then we still don’t have enough money to run the war,

so we resort to the true source of the high cost of living, and that

is the inflation of the monetary system.

And it’s been notorious, back to Roman times. Then they ran out

of productive capacity to fight the wars, the clipped their coins and

diluted the metals.

Now, it’s more sophisticated. We just create credit and print the

money and we pay these bills. Then who gets stuck with the bills?

It’s the middle class and the poor, because they get hit with the

high cost of living.

This is where we are today. Unfortunately, the tragedy with the

middle class today, is being recognized, but the blame isn’t being

put on the right spot, because they’ll say, well, if we just redistribute more money, we’re going to help the poor. I don’t see that

as an answer.

But paying for a war, of course, is very important. In the 1970s,

we had to pay a high price for guns—and butter in the 1960s—and

we nearly had a collapse of the dollar in 1979 and 1980, and we’re

facing that same situation once again, although I think it’s much

worse because I think we’re not nearly the productive Nation that

we used to be, and I think our international debt and our domestic

debt and national debt is so unbelievable that we have to quickly

come to our senses.

9

We have to take recognition that Osama Bin Laden has been

quoted as saying that he doesn’t mind us being over there one bit,

because he believes he can financially drain us. This is frightening

to me, that we have fallen into a trap, and I am scared to death

that we will financially drain ourselves and end up in a really

tough situation of not only loss of our financial well being here, but

the undermining of our liberties. I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Representative Paul appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 58.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, and thank you for respecting

the time limits.

Representative Sanchez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LORETTA

SANCHEZ, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA

Representative Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Schumer.

I really appreciate you having this hearing.

I think that it’s an incredibly good time to talk about the real

costs of this war. I mean, I’ve been talking about it for the whole

time, but I think a lot of Americans really don’t understand what

it is costing us to be in Iraq.

And as a majority of Americans now realize, it probably wasn’t

a good idea to go into Iraq the way we went into Iraq, without

enough allies, without people paying a fair share, if we’re supposed

to be the top cops around the world, or supposed to put in democracy someplace.

And, unfortunately, the cost is in the lives of our people over

there; the cost is in the opportunity costs of not being able to spend

that money here on the domestic front, to improve the lives of our

people; the cost is in the way the world views us and how that sets

us up for other conflicts, an inability to diplomatically settle differences among other countries, or with us, so I think there’s a lot

of cost to this war going on.

I would also say that I didn’t vote for this war, I didn’t vote to go into this war. It costs us $3 billion a week to be in Iraq, and

that’s pretty much the operating costs of that war.

It doesn’t take into account—and I sit on the Armed Services

Committee—it doesn’t take into account, that we’re stressing our

military, in particular, our Army and Marines, to a point where

people don’t want to be in those Services.

It costs us more to recruit people to get into those Services. Families of our military are being affected.

All of the costs of planes and automobiles and tanks and sitting

in that fine dust in the desert, none of that has been accounted for

and what it will take to replace that.

And, you know, few—about 6 months ago, we held some top secret hearings within the Armed Services arena, about what it

would take to bring back the readiness of our military, and I can’t

speak too much about that, except that some of it was leaked to

the New York Times, so it appeared in print, so I can say that it

would probably take us about 5 years to get back to the readiness

that our military was at before we even began this Iraq war, and

that’s if we had no conflict on our hands, if we were out of Iraq

and we had unlimited resources to throw at the readiness issue.

10

So, you know, I have seen this from a lot of different areas, as

to what is happening to our country with respect to that. And

Americans need to know what it is costing them.

By the way, most Americans don’t realize that when the President put in three sets of tax cuts and when the President said go

out and spend, that’s what you can do for the war, they don’t really

realize that, pretty much, we’re on—we’ve borrowed all this money.

They have not—the American people have not paid for this war

yet, and that will end up on the shoulders of the next generation

or generations.

And it’s reflected in the world that’s seeing this.

They’re beginning to understand that the economic instability

that is happening out of Washington, DC—how is that reflected?

Well, the euro is 50 percent up against the dollar. In other

words, the dollar is devalued; the devaluation is happening to the

dollar, and there’s a reason why.

Let me just end by saying, Mr. Chairman, what is $3 billion a

week? What does that get you? What does that mean? These numbers are so huge.

I would like to say that I’ve been in Congress for 12 years. For

the last 12 years, I’ve been flying into Washington Dulles. That

place is always a mess; it’s been under construction for the whole

12 years. The little bus goes different ways, each and every time

that I come, every single week.

One day, I went down to the carousel. I had a staff member with

me; they pulled off their baggage. I was sitting around waiting for

the first time and there’s that thing, sorry for the dust, but we’re

trying to improve the place.

It says we’re going to put in a new big runway; we’re going to

put in a mattress system here; we’re putting in a new terminal;

we’re doing this; we’re doing that; everything is going to look great;

it’s going to take another 2 or 3 years. It’s already been 10 years,

and it says—and all of this is going to cost us $3 billion.

Imagine how much we could have done for our country, with just

$3 billion, 1 week’s worth of money that we spend. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Representative Sanchez.

Senator Brownback.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SAM

BROWNBACK, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

Senator Brownback. I normally fly out of National Airport.

During the week of 9/11, I flew out of Dulles.

That’s the only place I could get a plane out of. There was no

crowd there on that Friday, it was eerie.

There wasn’t anybody around, there were only a few planes. I

flew on a plane that had eight people on it.

I think 9/11 had an enormous cost on this country, has a continuing, ongoing, increased insurance cost for a number of buildings that people are having to protect now, concerned about planes

flying into them.

It seems as if security has some value to it, and a lack of security

has a cost associated with it to our economy. That is one of the

11

**See ‘‘Democrat JEC Report Hints at Existence of a Value Creation Machine: Over $1 Trillion of Estimated Costs in Question,’’ in the Submissions for the Record, page 61.]

things that troubles me about the report today from the Majority

Staff and some of the assumptions made.

I appreciate the hearing. I think there are some real questionable methodologies involved in this study, but I think that at the

root, what troubles me the most, is that we’re just not putting any

value on security and on keeping on offense. Maybe that’s just not

something we possibly can do.

Perhaps it is. I don’t know. Economics, it seems to me, is a

science that makes a lot of assumptions, so there ought to be some

assumption of what staying on offense and security is worth.

I don’t like war. I’ve got a nephew that’s a Marine, that’s now

over in Iraq. He’s a wonderful young man. I don’t like the idea of

him being over there. We’re proud of him, we’re proud that he’s

there.

We want him to have the best equipment; we want him to be

there as safe as possible, yet we’re very, very pleased.

He’s the first member in our family to go into the military for

a number of years, and yet he’s providing something of economic

value, too.

I don’t know how you make those assumptions.

I appreciate knowing how the conclusions were arrived at in this

report, although we only got them late yesterday afternoon. I must

note that we continue to believe, that I continue to believe that the

report’s methodology and assumptions are, at the very least, controversial and debateable—very controversial and highly

debateable.

Moreover, by making really just some standard economic assumptions, slightly differently, over a trillion dollars of war cost estimated in the report, vanish. With results this sensitive to reasonable changes in economic assumptions, it seems that use of the

findings in this report to guide policy, would not be warranted.

As an example of questionable assumptions used in the report,

let me note that the report asserts that war costs have been debtfinanced and a portion borrowed domestically; 60 percent displaces

private investments that would have generated a 7-percent real

rate of return, which, according to analysis, seems to be riskless.

It would have been more proper to do this evaluation using the

risk-adjusted rate of return, which, in real terms, would be on the

order of 3 percent. In any case, taking the report’s assumptions to

heart, we’re informed that there are riskless private investment opportunities available that pay 7 percent returns.

Using the report’s methodology, we also learn that effectively,

every dollar of Government borrowing or tax revenue displaces

around two dollars worth of social value. Now, perhaps we should

take this to heart also, and immediately begin to cut spending,

taxes, and borrowing, and let’s allow our private citizens to enjoy

the 7 percent real rates of return that are evidently available to everyone.

I’ve got a more detailed statement** addressing questions in this,

but let me provide a couple of questions that the Majority Report

can be—I would hope, would address, and would look at.

12

These are just really questions. Should the present Social Security system be scrapped in favor of a system of personal accounts,

given the assumptions put in the report on Government spending

and using these funds. According to the report’s methodology, the

answer would be yes.

Do the deficit-financed tax cuts, create a net benefit for the economy? Using the report’s methodology, apparently, the answer is

yes.

The report totally ignores economic savings and benefits that

may have resulted from attacks or disruptions that have been prevented by our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan? As I noted at the

outset, I guess that’s the thing that probably troubles me the most.

I note that according to some estimates, the economic cost to the

United States associated with the tragic attacks on 9/11, centered

here and in the Chairman’s State of New York, amounted to the

loss of life, well over $1⁄2 trillion of economic activity, and millions

of lost jobs, like what happened at Dulles Airport the week after

the attack when I was flying out of there.

The loss of economic activity alone, is more than the cost of direct spending in Iraq and Afghanistan to date. If our war efforts

prevent another tragedy like the one on 9/11, prevent it here in

Washington, prevent it in New York, prevent it in my home State

of Kansas, tremendous benefits are obtained by nephew being on

the ground there in Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I must remark for the record, that I think there

are a number of things that aren’t properly valued. I do want to

associate myself with one comment you made at the outset, about

the problem of Iran and the great challenge that Iran presents to

us, because, I think, as we look down the road—and we don’t even

have to look down the road, as we look now we can see that it is

the centerpiece, the lead funder of terrorism as a state, around the

world.

I agree with you, that this is a significant problem.

Do we encourage them or not, by pulling out of Iraq now, and

the likelihood of it being taken over by Shiite fundamentalists?

Does that help stabilize our situation overall? I think these are

unknowns, but I would certainly not want to risk them.

I look forward to questioning some of the panelists. I appreciate

your being here, so we can go through some of this, but I think

there’s a lot of questions in this report.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Brownback, along with the

report, ‘‘Democrat JEC Report Hints at Existence of a Value Creation Machine: Over $1 Trillion of Estimated Costs in Question,’’

appear in the Submissions for the Record on pages 59 and 61 respectively.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator Brownback.

Representative Doggett.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LlOYD DOGGETT,

A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS

Representative Doggett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and

thanks to our witnesses. Of course, we know well by now, that

9/11 has absolutely nothing to do with the topics that we’re disVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:44 Jan 30, 2009 Jkt 042773 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\42773.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
13

cussing today, other than providing the most dramatic phony excuse for this unwise war.

We approach the fifth anniversary of President Bush’s tragic

choice to launch an invasion of Iraq. And as the time has past, the

excuses for the war have shifted and shifted again, and so has the

cost.

In September of 2002, we remember that White House Economic

Advisor Lawrence Lindsay, estimated that the war could cost as

much as $100 to $200 billion. Mitch Daniels, over at OMB, said,

oh, that’s very, very high, not a penny over $50 or $60 billion.

And, of course, most people think that Mr. Lindsay’s message’s

frankness, even though it was wildly optimistic, was the main reason that he was dismissed from his White House job.

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Mr. Wolfowitz, essen- tially said that it would be something under $50 billion, paid for

with Iraqi oil, and about the only cost that American taxpayers

would have, would be the brooms to sweep up the rose petals.

Well, we’ve reached 2008, and we’re fortunate to have all of our

witnesses. I’ve followed, particularly, the work of Dr. Stiglitz and

his associate, Linda Bilmes, who testified recently before our House

Budget Committee, who has estimated, originally, a war costing $2

trillion, that was criticized by the Administration.

I will say that I will agree with President Bush about one aspect

of his criticism of your work, because you said we don’t go to war

on the calculations of green-eye-shaded accountants or economists.

And that’s right. He didn’t go to war on calculations. He entered

this ideologically driven conflict on miscalculations, misleading figures, and chronic repression of the truth, a picture that started before the war and continues through this morning.

We hear some sobering testimony today from all of our witnesses. What could even one, just one of the trillions of dollars involved here, do for America? Eight million housing units; 15 million

public school teachers; healthcare for 530 million children a year;

scholarships to a university for 43 million students.

Think of the impact that might have had, in a positive way, on

our economy. And bringing it closer to home, since everyone has

someone that they care about, who’s got cancer, 2 weeks in Iraq

would pay for the entire cancer research budget of the National Institutes of Health for a year.

But we know the real cost of this war, is not just the money

we’re hemorrhaging, but the blood of the brave and the blood of

tens of thousands of innocent civilians who have been caught up in

this conflict.

And the real cost is also measured around the globe. Frankly,

we’ve had some important candor from Admiral Fallon, who noted,

as head of Central Command, within the month, that the reason

we’ve got so many problems over in Afghanistan with the resurgence of the Taliban, is, to use his term, because, quote, ‘‘we’ve had

a little bit of neglect after the invasion of Iraq, as resources were

diverted there.’’

A little bit of neglect, a little bit of misallocation of resources?

What a tragedy.

And one of the reasons this war costs so much, that we’re apparently paying for both sides or all sides. We are arming all sides in

14

a civil war, the Pentagon can’t keep track of the weapons that it

supplies there.

The Government Accountability Office estimated, last August,

that 30 percent of the weapons are unaccounted for, that the have

lost track of 190,000 AK47 assault rifles and pistols give to Iraqi

security forces.

It doesn’t take an accountant with green eye shades, to see that

there is no accountability in Iraq.

And the real cost of this war, it’s also paid every time we go to

the gas pump, as we’ve seen the cost of oil go up and up and up.

The President can veto our attempts to end this costly, bloody,

and unnecessary conflict, but he cannot repeal the laws of economics. American families will be footing this bill for this war for generations, with compounded interest on the borrowed money, long,

long after President Bush returns to Texas to clear brush full time.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Representative Doggett.

Before I recognize our next speaker, Representative Hinchey, I

would ask unanimous consent that the full statement of Congressman Paul be added to the record, and unanimous consent that any

other statements from Members here or not here, be added to the

record at this point.

[Prepared statements appear in the Submissions for the Record;

See Table of Contents for listing.]

Chairman Schumer. Representative Hinchey.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MAURICE

HINCHEY, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK

Representative Hinchey. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you

very much for holding this very necessary hearing, so that we in

this Congress and the people across the country, can begin to better understand the costs that are associated with this illicit invasion and subsequent disastrous military occupation of Iraq, which

is being called a war, but which is not a war at all. It is just that,

an illegal activity followed by military occupation over the course

of the last now almost 5 years.

I want to thank all of you gentlemen, all four of you, very, very

much, for being here with us today, for helping us, in the context

of your testimony, and the people of our country, draw better attention to this issue and to understand it more effectively.

There is no question that there have been very serious negative

economic impacts of this illegal activity by this Administration,

with regard to the engagement in Iraq, as has been said.

One of those issues is the price of energy and the price of food,

both of which now have jacked up so high that it’s causing disastrous consequences for middle-income, lower- middle-income, blue

and white collar working people all across this country.

The decline in the value of the dollar, has been a major contributor to the increase in the cost of oil and the price of gasoline at

the pump. And the value of our dollar is extremely low, and the

ability to overturn that, is going to be very difficult.

What are the economic consequences? We now have 47 million

people without health insurance—more than that, more than 47

15

million people without health insurance in our country, struggling

with their lives.

We have now more than 37 million people living below the poverty level, and all of that is having a disastrous consequence on

this economy.

And as a result of the way in which this Administration has not

just managed this war, but managed the American tax code, we

now have the greatest concentration of wealth in the wealthiest 1

percent of Americans, that we have had in this country since 1929,

interestingly enough.

There are some people who might point out that we could very

well be on the edge of depression here. There’s no question that

we’re on the edge of recession; the only question involved in that,

is, how deep is that recession going to be? How long is it going to

last? What will be the financial impacts of that recession on our

economy?

What are we going to do to be able to deal with this economic

issue more effectively? As my colleague, the Senator who left just

a few moments ago, suggested, there definitely is a motivation on

the part of this Administration, for increasing this huge national

debt, which is now up above $9 trillion, and for depressing the

economy in this way.

What is that motivation? In my opinion, the motivation is to enable them to come back with the argument that we are in such dire

economic circumstances, that we can’t afford the most essential cultural ingredients for many people in our country—Medicare, Social

Security—they want to undermine both of those programs, and

they’d like to eliminate them, if they could.

And that’s part of the motivation for increasing this debt, slowing

down this economy. So we have an awful lot to deal with here.

This 1 percent now has, as I think I mentioned, something in the

neighborhood of, I think, 38 percent of the wealth of our country

in the top 1 percent. The top 5 percent has close to 60 percent of

the wealth, largely as a result of the misspending of this Administration and the way in which they have altered the tax code.

We, this Congress, must have the courage to stand up to this situation, address it properly and effectively, so that we can turn it

around and begin to have a set of economic circumstances in America that deal with the needs of the people of this country.

So I thank you very, very much for being here, and I am very

anxious to hear what you have to say. Thank you very much.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Congressman Hinchey. Last,

but certainly not least, is Senator Klobuchar from Minnesota.

OPENING STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE AMY KLOBUCHAR,

A U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

In the time it will take me to give this opening statement, the

Iraq war will cost our country another $1.2 million. That’s $1.2 million every 4 minutes, adding up to $430 million every day, $12 billion every month. I don’t think this hearing could

have come at a more crucial time.

The President seems intent on leaving the current situation for

the next Administration to resolve.

16

Unfortunately, our soldiers in the field don’t have the luxury of

sitting back while we staying endlessly in this war, with no plan

to end it in sight.

I don’t think we can continue to give this President a blank

check. We will ensure the safety and well being of our troops,

which is so important for me. I have a brother in the National

Guard, and we must plan for a reasonable withdrawal.

I heard some of my colleagues talk about the cost of treasure.

They talk about something is priceless. What is this treasure we’re

talking about?

First of all, we know, by some estimates, looking at both the direct and indirect costs of the war, that it’s about $1.5 trillion. Second, there is the lack of accountability and money that has just disappeared.

Last year, military officials admitted that contracts worth over

$6 billion to provide essential supplies to troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, are under criminal investigation and $88 billion in contracted programs are being audited for financial irregularities.

Three top auditors overseeing reconstruction projects in Iraq, reported that of the $57 million awarded in contracts, they investigated, approximately $10 billion has been wasted. Another $4.9

billion was lost through contract overpricing and waste, and $5.1

billion was lost through unsupported contract charges. That’s the

treasure, that’s the price.

What other price is there? Well, there’s the price of our standing

in the world and what we’ve lost in terms of the work that we

could be doing elsewhere in the world.

And then there’s the price of our soldiers. I went and visited Iraq

in March, and I saw firsthand, the bravery of the Minnesota troops.

They would come up to me in the cafeterias and they’d come up

to me in the airport tarmacs, and they didn’t complain about a

thing; they didn’t complain about their equipment or their tour of

duty, which had been extended over and over again, or the weather.

They just asked me if I’d call their moms and dads when I got

home, to tell them they were OK.

And when I talked to their moms—I talked to over 50 parents—

I saw the other cost of the war, because they told me a few things

that the soldiers over there didn’t want to talk about, and that was

their families waiting and waiting for them to return, the loss of

jobs, especially for these National Guard members and Reservists,

who were only supposed to go over maybe for 3 or 4 months, and

then they have their livelihoods at home, which can’t wait a year,

can’t wait 2 years.

They talked about how some of them had come home and found

out that their education benefits that they were supposed to get,

their full education benefits, weren’t there. The average age of a

soldier in Vietnam, was 19; the average age of the Minnesota National Guard is 33. Half of them have kids.

It’s a different kind of war. When you look at the cost——

[Protest placards displayed.]

Chairman Schumer. Could we have order? The rules of the

Committee are no—thank you.

17

Senator Klobuchar [continuing]. When you look at the cost of

this war, you look at the price tag, you look at the money that has

actually been wasted because of a lack of accountability, and you

look at our standing in the world, but you also have to look at the

cost for these brave men and women who’ve done everything

they’re supposed to do—they deposed an evil dictator, they’re guaranteed free elections in Iraq. That is the price of this war. Thank

you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar.

Now we’re ready to hear from our witnesses, and I first want to

introduce each of them. First, professor Joseph Stiglitz is university professor at Columbia, chair of Columbia University’s Committee on Global Thought; he was awarded the Nobel Prize in

2001; he was chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic

Advisors, before becoming chief economist and senior vice president

of the World Bank.

He is the author of numerous books and articles, including his

latest book, which I’ve already mentioned, and is most relevant for

our discussion today, ‘‘The Three Trillion Dollar War.’’ Dr. Stiglitz

received his Ph.D. from MIT.

Dr. Robert Hormats is vice chairman of Goldman Sachs, and an

international managing director of Goldman Sachs. He has a

lengthy record of public service. He’s served in both Democratic

and Republican administrations as Assistant Secretary of State for

Economic and Business Affairs; Ambassador and Deputy U.S.

Trade Representative; and Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Economic and Business Affairs at the Department of State.

He’s the author of numerous books, as well, including ‘‘The Price

of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars From the Revolution to the

War on Terror.’’

Dr. Hormats holds a Ph.D. in international economics from the

Fletcher School.

Mr. Rand Beers is currently president of the National Security

Network. Before joining the NSN, he spent over three decades in

public service, again, under both Democratic and Republican administrations.

From 1988 to 1998, Mr. Beers served on the National Security

Council staff at the White House, as Director of Counterterrorism

and Counternarcotics, Director for Peacekeeping and Senior Director for Intelligence Programs.

More recently, he was Special Assistant to the President and

Senior Director for Combating Terrorism at the NSC. He also has

a distinguished record of military service as a Marine officer and

Rifle Company Commander in Vietnam.

Dr. Scott Wallsten is currently a vice president of research and

a senior fellow at the iGrowth Global, as well as senior fellow at

the Georgetown Center for Business and Public Policy, and a lecturer in public policy at Stanford University.

He’s been a director of communications policy studies and senior

fellow at the Progress and Freedom Foundation; a senior fellow at

the AEI Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, and a resident scholar at AEI.

In addition, Dr. Wallsten has served as a economist at both the

World Bank and the President’s Council of Economic Advisors. His

18

research has been published in numerous academic journals; his

commentaries have appeared in newspapers and news magazines

around the world, and he holds a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford

University.

Gentlemen, you may each proceed. We’ll start from my left with

Dr. Stiglitz and work our way over to the right.

I guess that’s appropriate here——

[Laughter.]

Chairman Schumer [continuing]. And your entire statements

will be read into the record.

Dr. Stiglitz.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, NOBEL

LAUREATE; PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW

YORK, NY

Dr. Stiglitz. First, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the

economic costs of the Iraq war with you. March 19 marks the fifth

anniversary of what was supposed to be a short venture to save the

world from the threat of weapons of mass destruction, which simply weren’t there.

It is now the second longest war in America’s history, and after

the all-encompassing World War II, the second most costly, even

after adjusting for inflation.

In terms of cost per troop, it is by far the costliest, some eight

times as expensive as World War II.

Before turning to the cost beyond the Federal budget, which is

the subject of these hearings, I want to make three prefatory remarks:

We went to war to fight for democracy, but democracy is more

than just periodic elections. It involves broader notions of democratic accountability. Citizens have the right to know what they are

spending their hard-earned dollars on.

They have a right to know what their Government is doing and

the consequences of its actions. Over the past 2 years, I have

worked with a colleague at Harvard, Linda Bilnes, to estimate the

full cost of the Iraq war.

We published our initial study in January of 2006, and I would

like that paper to be entered into the record.

Chairman Schumer. Without objection.

[The study, ‘‘Soldiers Returning from Iraq and Afghanistan: The

Long-term Costs of Providing Veterans Medical Care and Disability

Benefits’’ appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 131.]

Dr. Stiglitz. We published a second study concerning the cost of

providing medical care and disability benefits to our returning Veterans, in January 2007. I would ask for that also to be entered into

the record.

Chairman Schumer. Without objection.

[The study, ‘‘The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal

Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict’’ appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 152.]

Dr. Stiglitz. We have now published a book, ‘‘The Three Trillion

Dollar War,’’ which estimates the cost, the true cost of the war, including the veterans’ costs and the impact on the U.S. economy.

19

We should not have needed to write this book, and when we

came to write it, it should have been a far easier task. The Administration and Congress should have provided these numbers to the

American people.

Five years after the beginning of this war, you should not be

funding this war with emergency appropriations, which escape the

normal budget scrutiny. We should not have had to resort to the

Freedom of Information Act to find out how many Americans have

been injured in this war.

This Administration has said that it will provide everything that

our troops need. We should not have had to use the Freedom of Information Act to discover that more than 3 years ago, senior officers in the Marines were already sending urgent requests for

MRAPs, which would have saved the lives of a large fraction of

those killed, if we had provided these vehicles for them at that

time.

The second remark is that the budgetary costs themselves, have

been enormous, far, far larger than the some $50 billion that the

Administration estimated at the beginning of the war. We are now

spending that amount on operations alone every 3 months.

But the costs to the Federal budget are far larger than the dayto-day operational costs. The war has raised overall military costs.

We have to pay more to recruit and retain our troops, and even

with these increased expenditures, standards for troops have had

to be lowered.

It will also be costly to restore our military to its pre-war standing, both in terms of personnel and material.

There are costs hidden in other parts of the budget.

Not only are the direct costs of contractors high, but we are paying for their insurance, for death benefits and disability.

The most important costs that go well beyond the operational

costs are the expenditures required to provide healthcare and disability for returning Veterans. These are likely to be very, very

high. We will be paying these bills for decades to come.

Almost 40 percent of the 700,000 who fought in the 1-month-long

Gulf War have become eligible for disability benefits, and we are

paying more than $4 billion a year for disability benefits from that

short war.

Imagine then, what a war that will almost surely involve more

than 2 million troops and will most surely last more than 6 or 7

years will cost. Already, we are seeing large numbers of returning

Veterans showing up at VA

Hospitals for treatment, large numbers applying for disability,

and large numbers with severe psychological problems.

My third prefatory remark is this: We will be facing these budgetary costs for decades to come. Even the CBO methodology, which

looks 10 years into the future, is too short for these liabilities

which we have incurred.

In the case of World War II Veterans, VA expenditures peaked

more than four decades after the cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, because the Administration actually cut taxes as we went to

war, when we’re already running large deficits, this war has effectively been entirely financed by deficits.

20

There has been much discussion of unfunded entitlements in recent years. This war has created a new unfunded entitlement—future benefits of Iraq Veterans that may total half a trillion dollars

or more.

The focus of my remarks today, however, is on the large costs

that go beyond these budgetary costs. We classify these into two

categories: microeconomic costs and macroeconomic costs.

We have consistently understaffed, under-invested, and underfunded the medical and disability programs that serve our veterans. As a result, our servicemen and women returning from the

battlefield in Iraq often face a new battle with the bureaucracy to

get the benefits to which they are entitled and which they deserve.

When they cannot get the healthcare to which they are entitled,

or they have to wait months just to schedule an appointment to see

a VA doctor, those who are fortunate enough to have families who

can afford to do so pay for it on their own.

This doesn’t diminish the cost to society; it just shifts the burden

from the Federal budget to these people who have already sacrificed so much.

There are many other ways in which the costs to society exceed

the cost to the budget, often by considerable amounts, which we detail in our book.

I have so far emphasized the direct economic costs and there has

already been a lot of discussion about the opportunity costs, the diversion of funds that could have been used in so many other and

better ways. I would be remiss, however, if I did not note that

there are other costs in the long run, like the squandering of America’s leadership role in the international community, which I hope

will be discussed a little bit later.

Finally, I want to turn to the macroeconomic costs: First, I want

to dispel a widespread misconception that wars are good for the

economy, a misconception that arose from the role that World War

II may have played in helping the United States emerge from the

Great Depression.

But, as Congressman Paul pointed out, that was perhaps not an

accurate account of what actually happened. But at least since

Keynes, we know how to maintain the economy at or near full employment, in far better ways. There are ways of spending money

that stimulate the economy in the short run, while at the same

time leaving it stronger for the long run.

This war has been especially bad for the economy. Some of the

costs are only becoming apparent now; many we will face for years

to come.

There are four major categories of impacts. The first is through

its impact on oil prices, which, at the beginning of the war, was

$25 a barrel and now is $100 a barrel.

In our estimates, we are very conservative and only attribute $5

to $10 of the increase to the war, and we assume the price increase

will last for only 7 to 8 years. We think those assumptions are unrealistically conservative.

For instance, futures markets today expect that the price will remain in excess of $80 a barrel for at least the next decade.

21

Money spent to buy oil is money not available to be spent here

in the United States. It’s as simple as that. Lower aggregate demand leads, through a multiplier, to lower national income.

The second impact arises from the fact that Iraq expenditures do

not stimulate the economy in the short run, as much as expenditures on, say, infrastructure or education, that are so badly needed

here at home.

The third impact is that, both directly and indirectly, through

the mounting deficits, Iraq expenditures are crowding out investments that would have increased America’s productivity in the future.

The mounting Iraq war debt has meant that we have had to borrow more and more money from abroad, and America, as a country,

is far more indebted to others than it was 5 years ago.

Until recently, it was a surprise to some that in spite of these

obvious ways in which the Iraq war was weakening the American

economy, the economy seemed as strong as it did. Was there something after all to the old adage about wars being good for the economy?

To me and to other serious students of the American economy,

there was, however, an obvious answer: These weaknesses were

being hidden, just as much of the other costs of the war were being

hidden from easy view.

The exposure of these weaknesses, was, it seemed to me, just

around the corner, perhaps even more than the long vaunted victory that remained elusively just around the corner.

The macroeconomic effects were being hidden by loose monetary

policy, a flood of liquidity, and lax regulation. These allowed household savings rates to plummet to zero, the lowest level since the

Great Depression, and fed a housing bubble, allowing hundreds of

billions of dollars to be taken out in mortgage equity withdrawals

that increased the irresponsible consumption boom.

The cost to the economy of this downturn will be enormous. We

do not know, of course, how long or how deep the downturn will

be, but it’s likely to be the worst than any we have experienced in

the last quarter of a century.

Even if growth this year is .8 percent, as the IMF forecasts, and

next year growth starts to resuscitate to 2 percent, and in 2010, returns to its potential growth of, say, 3.5 percent, which would be

a quicker recovery than most would expect, the total lost output

over those 3 years, the discrepancy between the economy’s actual

output and its potential, will amount to some $1.5 trillion.

America is a rich country. The question is not whether we can

afford to squander $3 trillion or $5 trillion. We can, but our

strength will be sapped.

We will be less prepared to meet the challenges of the future,

and there are huge opportunity costs. Some of our children will not

have the medical care that they should have a right to, a right

every citizen born in a country as rich as ours should have. Some

will bear the scars for life.

We are not investing as we should in technology and science.

Economists are fond of saying that there is no such thing as a

free lunch. It is also the case that there is no such thing as a free

war. This is not the first time that an Administration tried to enlist

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support for an unpopular war, by trying to hide the true and full

cost from the

American people, and this is not the first time that America and

the American economy has suffered as a result.

The inflationary episode that America went through beginning in

the late 1960s, was at least partly a consequence of President

Johnson’s failure to fully own up to the costs and adjust other taxes

and expenditures appropriately.

This time, the underlying economic situation is different, and, accordingly, the consequences have been different, but in many ways,

even more severe.

The budgetary costs of this war have been huge, but the costs

that go beyond the budget, are at least as large and the meter is

still ticking. Every year of this war has seen the costs rise.

But even if they stay where they are, staying another 2 year, will

add, conservatively, another $500 billion to the total tally. No one

can know for sure, whether, when we depart, things will get better,

as most Iraqis seem to believe, or worse.

No one can know for sure whether staying an extra 2 years will

make the chaos that might follow less or greater.

But it is your solemn responsibility to make the judgment, is this

the best way of spending $500 billion? Is it the best way to

strengthen America’s capacity to meet future challenges, to promote democracy around the world, to help create the kind of world

here and abroad that we would like our children to inherit?

Is it the best way of providing for our security? For too long, this

Congress and this Administration have approached the problem by

dribs and drabs, a little more today might just do the trick, a little

more later will help us turn the proverbial corner.

But as the late Senator Dirksen said, a billion here, a billion

there, and pretty soon you’re talking about real money.

Today, we would have to say that a trillion here, a trillion there,

and pretty soon, you’re talking about real money.

Even a rich country ignores costs of this magnitude at its peril.

[The prepared statement of Joseph E. Stiglitz appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 125.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Professor Stiglitz.

Dr. Hormats.

STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT HORMATS; VICE CHAIRMAN,

GOLDMAN SACHS (INTERNATIONAL), NEW YORK, NY

Dr. Hormats. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I want to start by associating myself with

Joe Stiglitz’s point that this is a very valuable hearing, because it

presents an opportunity to discuss an issue that has not received

sufficient consideration—the true cost of the war—and, beyond

that, that there are hidden costs of the war that the Committee described in its report, and that Joe has put so eloquently in a book

that he has just published.

Let me just make a few broad points, and then try to address a

couple of the issues that were raised to by Members of the Committee. In my view, democracies function best when policies are

based on the informed consent of the governed.

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Here, I emphasize the word, ‘‘informed.’’ In most wars, there is

a tendency to underestimate the cost of that war at the outset, in

part, because of wishful thinking that the war will be short and

cheap, and, in part, because leaders often cannot immediately

judge the true costs of the war, at the outset of that war.

This was certainly the case during the Civil War, World War I,

the Vietnam War, and others. But there was generally a very candid, open, and robust debate in the Congress and among the American people, about how to pay for a war, once its cost became apparent, and, in some cases, even anticipation of rising costs.

During this war, there has been a surprising absence of vigorous

public or Congressional debate over war costs and how to pay

them. In large measure, that is because the war represents only a

small portion of American GDP, roughly 1 percent annually in direct budgetary terms, compared to World War II, which was about

40 percent of GDP, at its peak; the Korean War, about 15 percent;

Vietnam around 10.

So, paying for the current war has not appeared to impose large

visible costs on the American economy, although, as I shall point

out later, and Professor Stiglitz has mentioned just now, that is a

deceptive illusion.

Also, in other wars, higher taxes and elevated borrowing that

pushed up interest rates, as in the case of, say Vietnam, forced

Americans to come to grips with the cost of the war and political

leaders to feel a greater sense of accountability about war costs.

This war, so far, has seen taxes lowered, and has had no direct

or immediate impact on interest rates. In fact, for the better part

of this war, the Federal Reserve was cutting interest rates and

long-term bond rates were quite stable.

Moreover, the fact that this war has been financed entirely by

emergency budget supplementals, that circumvent the normal

budget process, has meant that the Executive Branch and the Congress have been able to skirt the issue of tradeoffs in the budget.

There is a great deal of unnecessary and non-essential spending,

including climbing numbers of earmarks, that has occurred, despite

the increasing costs of the war, a development that never before

has occurred in American wartime history.

Normally, when America goes to war, non-essential spending

programs are reduced to make room in the budget for the higher

costs of war. Individual programs that benefit specific constituencies, are sacrificed for the common good.

FDR himself slashed, or removed from the budget entirely, many

of his pet New Deal programs. And taxes have never been cut, in

the entire history of the United States, during a major American

war.

For instance, President Eisenhower adamantly resisted pressure

from Senate Republicans to cut the income tax during the Korean

War.

Let me make a couple of points about how leaders have addressed specifics. Let me just quote a couple of thoughts that are

worth keeping in mind.

FDR, in his State of the Union speech after Pearl Harbor, in January 1942, said, ‘‘War costs money and that means taxes and bonds

24

and bonds and taxes; it means cutting luxuries and other non-essentials.’’

Higher taxes, as well as cuts in luxuries and non-essential spending, have been hallmarks of fiscal policy during every war in which

the United States has engaged, until now.

The Iraq war, as Joe indicated, has been paid for in a very different way. It’s the first war during which taxes have been cut and

non-essential spending has increased, and, quite substantially, at

that.

It has meant that the bond part of FDR’s equation, i.e., Federal

borrowing, has been the sole source of funding for the costs of this

war. That has made it easier for Americans to avoid coming to

grips with the cost of the war, because no popular programs were

cut, no new taxes were levied, no inconvenience to anyone, except

our troops and their families, who are suffering mightily from this

war.

Let me just make a few specific points relating to what Members

of the Committee have mentioned, and then I’ll conclude. One is

the ‘‘opportunity costs’’ of the war.

This is a very important point, and let me quote someone who

you might not normally think of in this context—Dwight Eisenhower. I think this statement makes an important point. Said Eisenhower, ‘‘Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every

rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who

hunger and are not fed and those who are cold and are not

clothed.’’

This is not a pacifist speaking; this is the Supreme Allied Commander of World War II. He wasn’t saying, ‘‘don’t go to war if you

need to.’’ Obviously, he supported World War II with enormous enthusiasm, with great historic success.

He was saying, when you go to war, understand the tradeoffs,

understand the tradeoffs. If it is a war of choice, as the Iraq war

has been—not Afghanistan, but Iraq—understand the tradeoffs,

the choices that you’re going to make.

The second comments goes to the point that Congressman Paul

mentioned, and that is the debt that is built up in a war. This goes

back to President Washington, who urged Congress and his fellow

citizens to ‘‘Discharge the debts which unavoidable wars. . . ’’ he

meant the Revolution ‘‘may have occasioned, not ungenerously

throwing upon posterity the burdens we ourselves ought to bear.’’

I think that message often tends to be forgotten in our country.

Let me just make a couple of final points in terms of recommendations.

It seems to me that there are four or five points that are well

worth recognizing, as we try to learn the lessons of this war. This

has been a bitterly divided country over this war, but it seems to

me, there are a few lessons that should be able to unite us as we

try to figure out how to do it better next time.

One is, avoid paying for wars almost exclusively by

supplementals. This distorts the entire budget process.

Even during Vietnam, where the Administration, Johnson and

McNamara, tried to do this, the Senate leadership—the Senate was

Democratic, White House was Democratic—the Senate leaders

went to the President and said, you cannot continue to do this. And

25

even, the Vietnam war, which was mis-financed and non-transparently financed, only about 25 percent of that war was financed

by supplementals, because the Congress went to the President and

said stop doing this, it distorts the budget process. Lyndon Johnson, who was not exactly an easy guy to convince, understood that

he was losing credibility by doing this.

Second, cut way back on unnecessary spending when you go to

war. This should have been done after 9/11. In fact, domestic

spending rose, earmarks rose, and the same thing prevailed after

the beginning of the Iraq war in 2003.

Third, exercise more Congressional oversight over war spending.

A lack of this undermines the credibility of a war, if a lot of the

waste is palpable and obvious to the American people.

Let me cite one historical reference. The so-called Truman Committee, during World War II—again, Democratic President, Democratic Congress—the Democratic Congress exercised enormous

oversight. Truman’s Committee went around the country and

looked at military bases; it insisted on procurement reforms that

saved the country roughly $15 billion during World War II.

And it made the whole war effort more credible in the eyes of

Americans, because it reassured them that money was being spent

wisely.

Now we need the money more than ever, we need efficiency more

than ever, so this watchdog role of Congress and a permanent oversight committee, or at least using the existing committees, makes

enormous sense to me.

It’s also important that we look at the issue of veterans and veteran spending, because, that is going to be an important problem

over the long term, for wounded Veterans.

In every other war, there has been a sacrifice by the American

people. When American troops went to war, Americans at home

have had a tradition of sacrificing for those troops on the battlefield.

Woodrow Wilson’s Treasury Secretary, William Gibbs McAdoo,

called it ‘‘capitalizing patriotism.’’ He said, the troops are sacrificing, Americans should give up something at home to support

those troops, whether you agree with the war or you didn’t agree

with the war.

And it seems to me, one point that’s very important here is that

these wounded veterans are going to have enormous medical expenses for a long time. I think the American people would support

a surtax or at least a voluntary surtax, if not a mandatory one, on

upper income taxpayers, of a relatively small amount of money that

would go entirely to a fund dedicated to paying for the costs of

wounded veterans. This would constitute at least some measure of

sacrifice on the home front for people who are making sacrifices

abroad, and our troops are doing this.

Finally, we need to take a long look at national finances in this

country. We have the long-term costs of this war, the long-term

costs of national security; we have growing costs of Social Security,

Medicare and Medicaid, a whole host of things, and we’re leaving

burdens that the next generation and generations beyond are going

to have to pay off.

26

And, you know, this goes back to the Washington quote about the

theft from the future, if we don’t exercise fiscal responsibility in the

current environment.

So I think this is a bigger issue than the war; the war is not the

only reason for our budget deficits. A lot of spending has taken

place at home that shouldn’t have. Some of the tax cuts during war

have been unusually high and prolonged.

We need to make sure that Federal revenues and spending begin

to converge. Given current policies, they are going to diverge very

dramatically in the next decade and beyond. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Robert Hormats appears in the

Submisions for the Record on page 211.]

Vice Chair Maloney [presiding]. Thank you.

Dr. Beers.

STATEMENT OF DR. RAND BEERS; PRESIDENT, NATIONAL

SECURITY NETWORK, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Beers. Thank you very much, Congresswoman Maloney and

all of you, for asking me to take a somewhat different tact from the

other testimony today, and take a look at the strategic costs of the

war.

Senator Brownback, you raised the questions of the costs of security, and I hope that we can engage in a dialog on that issue, because that’s what I want to talk about, as well.

Iraq does not occur in a strategic vacuum; it is part and parcel

of a much broader range of issues and security challenges that the

United States faces.

I think it is important, as we think about Iraq, that we look at

what those other challenges are, and whether or not we have been

able to deal with them and meet them while we have been bogged

down in Iraq.

I sat in the White House working on the National Security Council staff at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003, and the strategic environment that I saw at that time, included a number of

the issues that are on the table today.

But I want to focus first on Al Qaeda. At that particular point

in time, we had just experienced the Bali bombing, in which almost

200 people were killed by a bomb in that vacation resort, and we

became very clearly aware that Al Qaeda had moved from being an

organization, to becoming a movement, a movement that was global in nature, a movement that was capable of operating around the

globe with deadly force.

At the same time in the fall of 2002, it was also clear that the

number of incidents that were caused by the Taliban in Afghanistan, had begun to rise.

At the same time, it was also clear that the opium poppy, which

had not been grown in Afghanistan for a year, was suddenly back,

and, as we know, would continue to grow.

Last, Osama Bin Laden was still on the loose.

Now, if I was Bin Laden and I was sitting in a cave in Pakistan

or Afghanistan or wherever I was at that particular point in time,

what would I want, from a strategic viewpoint to have happen, that

would allow me to continue to pursue my aims around the world?

27

Well clearly, the first thing I would want is for the United States

to go away, to go someplace else and become involved. And if they

went someplace else, what would I want them to do?

Well, I would want them to stay there. So we did, and so he

looked at the strategic situation again.

Well, they’re there, and how do I keep them there? I don’t have

a presence in Iraq. There was no Al Qaeda presence in Iraq before

our invasion.

He sent some people there, in order to provoke the conflict further, in order to get others, who weren’t even members of his organization, to become involved in that same conflict.

And then what would he do? He would want to publicize the fact

that the United States was heavily involved, was seen as an occupier, and was involved in casualties that he could label as innocent

civilians.

What was the result? The National Intelligence Estimate on Terrorism said that Al Qaeda has reconstituted along the Pakistan-Afghan border and is again capable of attacking the homeland. That’s

us; that’s a strategic cost of our involvement in Iraq.

Let me do one more like that: You’re Iran and you’re sitting

there, you have, one, cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan, publicly to create the Bonn Declaration and set up the new

government in Afghanistan.

You have offered the United States, a terrorist that you have

captured, and you are put on Axis of Evil. You then have a situation at the beginning of the war in which there is a chance for dialog, so that conflict can be avoided, and within the U.S. Government, there was a move to offer that dialog, in order to discuss

whether or not the Al Qaeda members who were known to be in

Iran, and known to be under the watch of the government, might

be available to the United States, in return for our agreement to

do something about their terrorists, terrorists who we also called

terrorists, the Mujahaddin-i-Khalq, but we were too preoccupied,

and, after all, we had listed them as the Axis of Evil, and that particular option was not pursued.

So after we invade, the first thing you’re going to do in Teheran,

is probably pray that something intervenes in order to leave you

in a situation with a huge U.S. force next door, you are not the

next victim of that military force.

And then what you do is, you think, are there any options that

you have to play in Iraq? Of course, there are. A lot of the Shia

leadership spent time in your country; you know them; you can

work with them.

And what you do, of course, at the same time that we’re invading

is send your own operatives into Iraq in order to work with the

Shia there, and in order to do what you can to make sure that the

United States is unable to do anything to you.

And so what do we have today? We have a U.S. military that’s

strained. We have a limited capacity to be able to use force against

Iran should we choose to do so, and we have ignored all of the opportunities for engagement with Iran, that might have ameliorated

the situation in Iraq and the global challenges that we face from

the Iranian nuclear program.

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I want to end with those two points and just close and say, what

happens when you rely on military power to demonstrate your

strength, so that others will follow you and you do not win? What

happens when you ask others to act consistently with the Geneva

Convention and the International Convention on Torture, and then

when the tragic situation at Abu Ghraib is revealed, you quibble

about whether or not enhanced interrogation might be something

that we wanted to reserve as an option in the global environment?

What happens when you seek help for Afghanistan or Darfur or

elsewhere, and no one comes?

The strategic cost of the war in Iraq is not just our inability to

deal with problems like Al Qaeda, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East peace process, and our strained military; it is also, and

more importantly, the limitations on our ability to get others to

work with us, to support us, to look at us as a role model in the

world. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Beers appears in the Submissions

for the Record on page 216.]

Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Beers. Let me apologize to

both you and Dr. Hormats, that I was unable to hear the testimony. I did read what had been submitted.

Dr. Wallsten.

STATEMENT OF DR. SCOTT WALLSTEN; VICE PRESIDENT FOR

RESEARCH AND SENIOR FELLOW, iGROWTHGLOBAL, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. Wallsten. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee,

thank you for inviting me to testify today on the costs of the war.

I estimate that the expected net present value of the total direct

costs or microeconomic costs, as we refer to them, of the war are

approximately $1 trillion to the United States, and closer to $2 trillion globally.

The real direct economic costs of the war include not only expenditures from the U.S. budget allocated for the war, but also injuries, lives lost, and lost productivity from reservists who cannot

do their civilian jobs because they have been called up for service,

and other costs, as well.

My co-author, Katrina Kosec, and I began this project in 2005,

and have updated our numbers periodically since then. I have submitted the original 2005 paper, which explains our methodology in

detail, to the Committee, and I would hope that it could be introduced into the record.

[The paper referred to, ‘‘The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq,’’

appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 222.]

Dr. Wallsten. We have found that the total direct economic cost

at any given point in time tends to exceed budget appropriations

by about 20 to 25 percent.

As wealthy as our Nation is, our resources are limited and must

be spent carefully. Other areas of policy attempt to explicitly take

into consideration the full economic costs and benefits of Government actions.

President Ronald Reagan signed an Executive order requiring

certain agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for any proposed

29

major regulation, and to adopt it, quote ‘‘only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the regulation justify its costs.’’

President Bill Clinton renewed that order, as did the current

President. Now cost-benefit analysis has become an important and

accepted, though certainly not the only, tool for evaluating many

proposed policies.

But this approach has yet to be explicitly incorporated into decisions regarding defense and security. Admittedly, the current tools

we have for evaluating costs and benefits are not perfectly suited

for evaluating the costs of war, since they were developed for use

in a different setting.

The tools are blunt and imprecise, meaning that the cost estimates all of us are presenting today are measured with error.

That’s why Katrina and I included in our paper ranges of estimates, and also built an online estimator that allows people to

change underlying assumptions to see how these affect the costs.

Nevertheless, this type of analysis can provide valuable information to help inform policymakers as to the best course of action

going forward.

In addition, we supply these tools to other related areas like

homeland security. The Office of Management and Budget estimated last year that major homeland security regulations imposed

a cost of $2.2 to $4.1 billion a year on the economy.

But those rules were passed with no estimates of their expected

benefits. Those costs may sound small compared to the cost of the

war, but they are not. The net present value of those costs is close

to $100 billion.

Estimating the benefits of homeland security measures or of any

military operation is difficult, because, as OMB acknowledges, they

depend on the probability and severity of outcomes like terrorist attacks, which are difficult to quantify.

But just because expected costs and benefits are difficult to estimate doesn’t mean they don’t exist, and if you can’t estimate the

benefits, you should still follow through on a policy only if you have

good reason to believe that those benefits exceed the costs, and if

you believe that it’s the best way to achieve those benefits.

Professor William Nordhaus of Yale was the first to do this exercise for the war in Iraq, and he did it before the war when it could

have helped inform policy.

He acknowledged that there would be some benefits of a war; the

world would be better off if Sadam Hussein were not in power. But

Professor Nordhaus meticulously estimated ranges of the likely

costs under different scenarios, and concluded that a war in Iraq

could cost between $100 billion and $2 trillion.

And he further qualified the results by noting factors that he did

not include, such as costs to other countries, or as he put it, quote,

‘‘fallout that comes from worldwide reaction against perceived

American disregard for the lives and property of others.’’

The point—aside from noting that Professor Nordhaus was far

more insightful than any of us by doing this exercise in advance—

is that even under tremendous uncertainty these tools can provide

us with useful information to help inform decisions.

If Congress and the public had seriously considered Professor

Nordhaus projected cost estimates, would we still have gone to

30

war? Perhaps some might have believed it was still worthwhile, but

perhaps not.

We can’t do anything about the costs we’ve already incurred;

those resources are gone, but we do have some control over what

happens next. The lesson, I believe, is that policymakers can use

the tools of cost-benefit analysis to help evaluate whether proposals

regarding what to do next in Iraq are likely to yield enough benefits to us and the world, and hopefully that additional information

will lead to better decisions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Scott Wallsten appears in the

Submissions for the Record on page 220.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Dr. Wallsten. I want to thank

all of our witnesses for their just outstanding testimony.

I have a few questions here, and we’ll try to stick to the 5-minute

limits with questions for everybody, including myself.

First, to Dr. Stiglitz, let me just ask you this: In your book, you

state that if we consider the total macroeconomic costs of the war,

the price tag for a continued presence in Iraq increases from approximately $3 trillion up to $5 trillion.

I was wondering if you could expand on how we here in Washington should consider those macroeconomic costs. They don’t appear in our budgets, but they do affect our economy and constituents.

I mean, how should we change the way we look at things here,

if at all?

Dr. Stiglitz. I think this goes back a little bit to what Scott was

saying, that when you’re making a decision, there are the direct

budgetary costs that you’re very aware of that go through your appropriation process, but there are costs to our society and to our

economy that are not as obvious.

You look at these other costs, in effect, when you’re discussing

regulations; you’re saying, is a safety regulation worth the costs

that it’s going to impose? In that case, both the benefits and the

costs of the regulation are outside your budget, but you’re making

a public policy decision and making that judgment.

I think what all of us are saying, in a sense, is that you need

to be aware of what those likely costs are going to be. As you look

at those costs and say, OK, there may be benefits in the budgetary

sense, as well as hard to quantify non-budgetary benefits that you

weigh with the budgetary costs.

But in a war, the non-budgetary costs are so much greater that

to ignore them is really wrong.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you. You spoke at length in your

testimony about how you and your colleague, Linda Bilmes, faced

difficulty in getting information from the Defense Department, the

Department of Veterans Affairs, and you state repeatedly that you

had to rely on Freedom of Information requests to get information.

Can you provide some more details about the specific types of information you had difficulty in obtaining and what can we do, so

that the next researcher who comes along and validly wants this

information can get it more easily?

Dr. Stiglitz. Probably the most dramatic and perhaps most upsetting data was the number of injuries. When the Department of

31

Defense releases the number of fatalities, they differentiate between whether the fatalities are hostile or non-hostile.

When it comes to the injuries, they only release the number of

hostile injuries, and they get to choose whether a particular injury

is hostile. For instance, if you have a convoy and the first vehicle

in the convoy gets blown up, that’s clearly hostile, but if the second

vehicle runs into the first and somebody gets injured, is that just

another automobile accident?

They may classify the injury in the second vehicle as not hostile.

After all, he didn’t actually get injured by an IED or some other

weapon.

If a helicopter has to fly at night because it’s too dangerous to

fly in the day, and he crashes because he’s flying at night, that’s

not hostile, but it would not have occurred had the guy been in his

home in New York or Washington.

The Department of Defense has tried to make it difficult to access these non-hostile injury numbers, for the obvious reasons that

not only do they not want the American people to feel that there

is a greater cost of war than what we’ve all talked about, but they

didn’t even want them to know what those costs of the war are in

the first place.

One of things I emphasized in my testimony was that there

needs to be more systematic procedures to make available not just

the budgetary numbers, but also the kinds of things like injuries.

We are going to have to pay for those injuries in health care and

disability benefits, whether they are hostile or not hostile.

Chairman Schumer. I understand it, and we’re going to have

to look at that, I think, as a Congress.

Final question to both Dr. Hormats and Dr. Beers: You both

talked about—when we talk about the costs of the war, I think

most people look at domestic needs because that’s the thing that

affects the most immediately, but we also have lots of foreign policy

needs, which you two focused on.

Could you just—does focusing on the, our weak fiscal position—

how does that weaken us in dealing with potential future crises,

wherever they may occur? Could you each talk a bit about that?

Dr. Hormats. I’d like to make two points on that, one, to follow

up one point that Rand made earlier. He stressed the importance

of the global leadership or loss thereof, as a result of this.

One of the things that we can take away from this is that we

would have done a lot better in paying for the war and prosecuting

the war and in getting legitimacy for the war if we had had a coalition that was anything like the coalition that first George Bush put

together in the first Gulf War.

That seems to me one of the lessons, coalition diplomacy in a

modern war is critically important. There’s a very interesting book

about Eisenhower and Marshall called, ‘‘Partners in Command.’’

They understood the importance of a successful coalition in winning World War II.

It’s just as important today, as Iraq has demonstrated.

The second, in specific response to your question, Mr. Chairman,

is that a country that is in a weak financial position has fewer resources to spend on any contingency.

32

It reduces the resilience of our country to deal with a national

security threat, to deal with a pandemic at home, to deal with a

terrorist act at home. The weaker we are fiscally and the more in

debt we are to ourselves and to the rest of the world, the fewer resources we have to deal with future contingencies, with future wars

or future emergencies of any sort.

Forty percent of the debt that has been incurred in this war, is

being financed from abroad. You could say, well, that’s fine, because it reduces the American people’s contribution to the war effort, if one looks at it that way.

But the other part of it is, that makes us more vulnerable, if in

fact, some terrible thing should happen here, that money may not

be available to us. It’s the first time since the Revolution that we

have needed to borrow abroad to pay for a war. Then, we had to

do it from France and the Netherlands.

This time, let’s suppose, heaven forbid, there’s an act of terrorism

at a point in time where we have this current credit crisis, and we

have a big budget deficit that is going to get bigger over the next

10 or 20 years. Because of the war and entitlements and various

other things, we’re more dependent for Capital on foreigners.

Suppose the economy is disrupted by a terrorist act? Then what

happens? Then their confidence in our economy and their willingness to lend us money, deteriorates. The budget deficit skyrockets,

because we have to pay for the response to that act of terrorism,

in terms of recovery and retaliation, and the dollar goes down, interest rates go up.

The last point is this: One of the things—and Rand also pointed

this out—in the book that I’ve written, I go back and look at a lot

of what Bin Laden said.

One of his goals is to ‘‘bankrupt’’ the United States, as he’s put

it. He concluded that he had bankrupted the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Their goal is specifically—specifically, they’ve said it

time and time again—to cripple our economy.

And if they see us economically vulnerable because of big budget

deficits and high dependence on foreign capital, and a credit crisis

at home, that makes them even more emboldened to go after us,

because they think they can not only disrupt the United States in

a specific way, but really weaken the economy.

Chairman Schumer. Dr. Beers.

Dr. Beers. It’s hard to follow that, because you took away several of the points that I was going to make.

[Laughter.]

Dr. Beers. But that’s fine. Let just be very specific.

The dollars that are held by China and the dollars that are held

by the oil sheiks in the Gulf mean that when our interest is that

they should do something differently, our leverage to get them to

do something differently is diminished, so, as the cost of the war

increases and it is financed by the deficit, our ability to operate in

specific leveraged situations is diminished when the holders of

those dollars are the people whose behavior we want to change.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you both.

Congressman Paul.

Representative Paul. Thank you very much. I have two very

brief comments. First, I think the Founders talked about building

33

coalitions too, and it was called a declaration of war and then the

people would come together.

And I think that’s one of our problems is that we don’t develop

that coalition.

But also, the holders of our dollars, yes, may have some leverage,

but we also—you argue that we have leverage on them, but they

have leverage on us, just as well, so I think that’s a two-way street.

But I want to get back to the question of inflation, with Dr.

Stiglitz and Dr. Hormats, about war and inflation, because there

is obviously a relationship.

We live in an age where we have a lot of moral hazard, whether

it’s the building of the housing bubble or whether it’s the promise

that there will always be a bailout and a rescue. Ultimately, I see

the biggest moral hazard as the lender of last resort.

And in many ways, this is what happens if we can’t afford the

war and we don’t tax, and then we start borrowing, interest rates

go up. We ask the Fed, you know, to keep interest rates low, and

they can’t do that other than by expanding the money supply, and

that’s when we start getting into trouble, because we devalue our

currency.

And this is what I think our basic problem is because it’s always

out there. I’ve talked a lot about monetary policy over the year, and

I have my ideas of what should be done.

But is there anything—do you sort of agree with what I’m saying, that this ultimate lender of last resort to finance war is a problem, and if it is, is there anything you could suggest as to how we

could rein this in and not permit this endless creation of credit and

deceitful way of financing war?

Because to me, it’s so deceitful because it delays the inevitable

and it hides the cost, and the innocent suffer.

I would just like to know if either one of you have a suggestion

along those lines?

Dr. Stiglitz. I agree with you. What’s so unusual about this war

is, as you remarked, we haven’t seen the inflation so far. Part of

the reason is in the way that the war has imposed the cost on the

economy, which is that it led to high oil prices.

We were spending lots of money, sending checks abroad to the

oil exporters. Normally, spending that much money abroad would

have weakened the economy, and it was, in fact, weakening the

economy.

So, the Fed and the regulators took on the view, very myopically,

let’s keep the economy going, and the way to keep the economy

going is flood it with liquidity and look the other way when you

needed to strengthen regulations on the economy from the increased spending on oil. They did this to offset the deflationary

pressure.

And the Fed kept it going, but the point is that there were bills

that were going to have to be paid from those huge deficits. The

weakness in the economy that we see today is directly related, I

believe, to the war, but the other problem is the overhang of the

national debt.

It’s an overhang in which there’s always the risk of trying to inflate that away.

34

Dr. Hormats. Since Joe won the Nobel Prize and I didn’t, I basically agree with everything he said, but I’d just add one point.

And it’s really not adding a point, it’s just underscoring the point

that Joe made, and that is that—and you touched on it, Congressman Paul, in what you said at the outset and just now.

The deferral of the costs here, makes it look at if the war is

cheap, but it isn’t cheap.

It makes it look to the current generation of taxpayers, like it’s

not very expensive because we don’t suffer any inconvenience. We

have not seen much inflation, the interest rate, in part, has been

kept low by the Fed and by the foreign capital that’s come in, also.

But when you look at the spending that’s going to occur to replenish the military costs, to pay for the veterans, to do all the

other things that are going to have to be done over the next several

decades, and to deal with a number of other programs that also are

competing for resources out there, then the cost to the overall economy becomes higher.

Then, what happens to our children? Our children pay higher

taxes, or, if they don’t pay higher taxes, they have to give up certain Government programs which we take for granted, or there is

more borrowing.

All of those things will tend to weaken the economy down the

road, and then it puts a lot of pressure on the monetary authorities

to try to offset that with more and more monetary creation.

And the problem is this, in a economy people say, ‘‘well, we have

a very sound economy,’’ and in many ways the structure is very

good—very entrepreneurial—we’ve got a lot of talented people, but

we’ve built a lot of our growth over the last several years on debt—

Government debt and individual debt.

Just to give you one number. Borrowing against homes, using

your home as an ATM machine, in effect, between mid-2005 and

mid-2006, Americans borrowed $1 trillion against the value of their

homes. We call it mortgage equity withdrawal.

These kinds of debt by the Government and by the American

household are going to be paid back somewhere down the road.

They’re not free. That’s the problem.

Chairman Schumer. Vice Chair Maloney.

Vice Chair Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Stiglitz, the Three Trillion Dollar War—your co-author has

written an article in Foreign Policy entitled, ‘‘Iraq’s 100-Year Mortgage.’’ Is that about how long it will take us to pay off this war?

Dr. Stiglitz. The reality probably is it won’t be paid off even in

a hundred years. The fact is, just going back to what we’ve already

been saying, the increase in national debt as a result of the war

will be $2 trillion, we estimate, by 2017. We have lots of other demands on our budget, and so the tendency will be just to roll it on

and hope the Chinese or others are willing to finance the money

that we have borrowed.

Let me put it another way. If we didn’t finance it now, while

we’re fighting, through increased taxes, why do we expect that we

will raise taxes next year to finance the war that we’ve just been

through?

Vice Chair Maloney. Dr. Beers, this war was supposed to make

us safer at home. Has it?

35

Dr. Beers. I think, based on the analysis—not of me, but a hundred foreign policy experts—the answer to that, overwhelmingly, is

no. The strategic environment that we live in today has become

more problematic than it was before we entered into Iraq, and as

I said in my testimony, our ability to work with others has been

diminished, and our attention to our security here at home, while

it has improved, still has a very long way to go.

So it is hard to say that we are safer today than we were before

our entry into Iraq.

Vice Chair Maloney. Thank you.

We’ve been called for a 5-minute vote, and I’m going to be leaving shortly. But I can read this in the record.

My last and final question to the panelists is, the Administration

has suggested that it wants to maintain a long-term presence in

Iraq, but just as before the war began, they are still refusing to

give any estimates of what future costs of that presence might be.

Our own Committee, the Joint Economic Committee report, estimated that the U.S. economy could incur up to $1.9 trillion in additional economic costs over the next decade if we, quote, ‘‘stay the

course’’ with our current troop commitment in Iraq, as compared to

a more rapid withdrawal favored by many House and Senate

Democrats.

Dr. Stiglitz, what are the true costs of staying the course in Iraq

over the next decade? And Dr. Hormats, can you put this in a historical context for us? How would the length, loss of life, and

wounded compare to past conflicts?

And Dr. Beers, can you explain the costs to our military and national security if we stayed the course in Iraq?

Thank you for really a very enlightened testimony today from all

of you. Thank you so much.

Dr. Stiglitz. The analysis of what it will cost to stay for another

decade really parallels the kind of analysis that we’ve done here.

There’s the upfront budgetary cost, the $12 billion that we are

spending a month. Obviously, that could grow if we increase our

troop commitments.

Then there is the fact that there are lots of military costs hidden

in the Defense Department budget, such as the depreciation of the

equipment that has to be replaced. One of the reasons that the

operational costs have gone from $4 billion a month to $12 billion

a month is that we couldn’t defer maintenance forever, and we are

now paying for some of the maintenance that we deferred at the

beginning of the war.

Then there are the costs of the people who are being injured, and

these will go on for decades. The longer we are there, the more

troops we send to Iraq, the higher the injury rate. And this war

has had a ratio of injuries to fatalities of 15 to 1. It’s a testimony

to modern medicine, but it is a cost to the taxpayer, and our disability benefits do not really measure the loss to these individuals

and to their families.

After the budgetary costs, you start looking at the cost to our

economy and to our society, and the cost of the injuries, including

the opportunity costs that you’ve been talking about. Finally, you

start looking at the macroeconomic costs, the disturbance that it

brings to our macroeconomy in a whole variety of ways, including

36

in the fact that we aren’t investing in the infrastructure that we

need. That reduces the productivity of our whole private sector. We

aren’t investing in the research that we ought to be, and that reduces future potential growth of our economy.

So yes, I think those numbers you’re talking about are probably

conservative.

Dr. Hormats. Just one more thought to add on, just as a little

parenthetical note to the last question. The long-term costs of the

war—I’ll give you a number that’s stuck in my mind.

The last war pension that was paid for the Revolution was paid

in 1907, because it was paid to dependents of people who fought

in the Revolution. So, these things last a very long time.

The second point—there’s a notion in this war that the best defense is a good offense, and therefore if we fight in Iraq we won’t

have to deal with these terrorist issues on the home front. That is

what has been troublesome in looking at this.

We have a lot of unmet needs at home—needs that are not being

met on the national security front. You talked about our infrastructure. Our infrastructure has been neglected—our physical infrastructure, our public health service, training and equipment for police and firemen and women. These things are really important to

dealing with what is going to be a long-term terrorist threat.

Whatever happens in Iraq, that terrorist threat is going to be

there for America. If you don’t spend the money at home to improve the public health service, to harden up and improve our infrastructures so that bridges don’t fall down in Minneapolis—these

are the kind of things, these affect our national security too. And

yet we’re really not addressing a lot of them.

Again, it’s a question of priorities, a question of how you allocate

resources. The longer we think a good offense is our best defense,

the more we’re going to neglect what we need to do at home, again

for very legitimate national security purposes, so people don’t fall

through bridges or have dikes destroyed in New Orleans or elsewhere.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Dr. Hormats.

Sam Brownback has been very nice. The House has a voice. Congressmen Doggett and Hinchey are each going to ask one quick

question. We’d ask the answer to be brief, and then we’ll move on

to Senator Brownback and Senator Klobuchar.

I’d ask you both to ask the questions seriatim, and then they can

answer them together.

Representative Doggett. I’ll ask mine because time has expired, and I’ll ask my staff and the public to take note of your answer.

Yesterday, as a Member of the House Budget Committee, I questioned Secretary Gordon England in what seemed to me to be very

bizarre testimony, that the war might go on for a very long time,

but it’s impossible to tell us what it will cost after a few months,

because I was told we have an unpredictable foe.

As military historians, perhaps you’re aware of a time when we

haven’t had an unpredictable foe, but I’m wondering if you could

outline, for the record, any reasons why we can’t get a reasonable

estimate, for budget purposes, over the next several years as to the

cost of this war, or whether this is just part of the pattern of duVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:44 Jan 30, 2009 Jkt 042773 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\42773.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
37

* The Information to be provided by witnesses was unavailabe at press time.

plicity that has characterized the entire handling of the cost of the

war.

Thank you.

Chairman Schumer. I’ll ask unanimous consent that each of

the panelists submit that answer in writing, so that Congressman

Doggett and Congressman Hinchey can make their votes. We’ll do

the same with Congressman Hinchey after he asks his question,

can submit in writing as well.

Representative HINCHEY. Before I leave, I want to express my

appreciation to all four of you. It’s been very interesting and very

informative, what you have had to say, and I deeply appreciate

your being here, and I’m going to give close examination to your

testimony and look at other things that you’ve written, including

the book. So thank you very, very much.

The economic circumstances that we’re confronting is just one of

the reasons why we should be developing a very serious plan for

the withdrawal of our military forces from Iraq over a specific period of time, which would take place very, very quickly. And those

economic circumstances are becoming increasingly complex.

One of the things that the Administration says, of course, is that

inflation is not really high. And if you look at the numbers they

produce, then it’s true: inflation is not really high.

But if you look at some other elements—the cost of oil and the

cost of food, the cost of energy generally, but particularly the cost

of oil and the cost of food—you see the inflation rate goes up much

higher. And unless there is a global recession, then the likelihood

is that those increases are going to continue, and they are going

to continue even more rapidly, depending on the set of circumstances that we’re confronting.

That, combined with the general decline in the economy that

we’re confronting, even though the stock market right now doesn’t

reflect that decline, nevertheless, there is a very serious decline for

the vast majority of people. The cost of living for them has gone

up; the ability for them to live is going down.

I think that we may be engaging in that situation of stagflation

once again—declining economy, increasing cost of living. And I

would appreciate it if you would give us your thoughts on that and

what we might do, both to get us out of the situation there in the

military context of Iraq as quickly and effectively as possible, and

what we need to do to deal with the complexity of these economic

circumstances that are going to prevail upon us for an extended period of time.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for doing this hearing. And gentlemen, thank you very much for your contribution

here. I deeply appreciate it.

Chairman Schumer. Those answers will be submitted in writing, and I’m sure Congressman Hinchey will review them carefully,

knowing him as I do since 1974, when we were young assemblymen

together.*

We now have two final questioners.

Chairman Bernanke is up in the Banking Committee. I’m supposed to question him. I’m the last one. I waited till the end. So

38

I’m going to let Senator Klobuchar chair the hearing. Senator

Brownback goes, then Senator Klobuchar.

I want to thank you gentlemen for your great testimony, and

you’ve helped us move the debate forward. You really have. Thank

you.

Senator Brownback.

Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,

panelists. I appreciate your presentation.

I want to enter into the record a study done by the State Senate

of New York, the Finance Committee, on the financial impact of

the World Trade Center attack. And I’d ask unanimous consent,

when Senator Klobuchar gets there, to enter this into the record,

just on the cost of 9/11.

And they’re saying here, and I don’t know if anybody will dispute

this, but they’re saying here that the estimated 3-year cost of 9/11

was $639.3 billion over 2001, 2002 and 2003. Does anybody dispute

that number particularly?

[No response.]

Senator Brownback. Just note the panel, no particular disputing of that number.

Madam Chair, if I could, I’d ask unanimous consent that this

study be placed in the record.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. It will be placed in the record.

Thank you.

Senator Brownback. Thank you very much.

[The study, ‘‘Financial Impact of the World Trade Center Attack,’’ appears in the Submissions for the Record on page 71.]

Senator Brownback. Do any of you have a longer estimate of

the cost of 9/11 to our economy? Have any of you seen a number

on the cost of 9/11 to our economy?

[No response.]

Senator Brownback. I guess the panel would reflect that

there’s nobody that has that. I’ve got a 3-year number here.

I would note Bin Laden put out a cost estimate to us of 9/11, and

I may be missing his number by a few zeroes. But I think he said

it cost him $500,000. It cost us $500 billion.

Dr. Hormats. Right.

Senator Brownback. If so, he’s a better economist than he is

a lot of things, because he’s not far off what the New York Senate

said in doing that.

Dr. Stiglitz, does your study—which I have not had a chance to

review—include the Afghanistan war as well as the Iraq war?

Dr. Stiglitz. We try to break it out. We have both Afghanistan

and the Iraq war, and then we divide it.

Senator Brownback. So it does have both of them in it?

Dr. Stiglitz. We identify them separately. The $3 trillion is for

the Iraq war itself.

Senator Brownback. What is your cost for the Afghanistan

war?

Dr. Stiglitz. Roughly, the Afghanistan war is 25 percent of the

operational cost and about 10 percent of the disability and veterans’ costs, the health care costs.

Senator Brownback. Of $3 trillion? Then you’re saying somewhere below a trillion on total costs?

39

Dr. Stiglitz. Considerably, yes. Because the veterans costs are

only about 10 percent, and the operational costs are 25 percent to

Afghanistan, 75 percent to Iraq.

Senator Brownback. Are your policy recommendations the

same for Afghanistan as they are for Iraq? I mean, you’re looking

at costs, and you’re trying to put a cost analysis on this.

Dr. Stiglitz. Our basic recommendations are more on the policy,

for instance, on how you fund the war, not through emergency appropriations. We would agree that that principle would apply to

both the Afghanistan and Iraq war. We also address transparency,

so that people know what the total costs will be, and the recommendations for both wars are exactly the same on that. Also, we

must fully fund the future disability and health care costs for veterans from both wars, so that they aren’t made subject to the future Congress’ whims and so that we don’t create another unfunded entitlement. Those kinds of recommendations are relevant

for both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Senator Brownback. What about any sort of military action?

This has been not a good investment, I guess is what your analysis

is. Would the same analysis apply to Afghanistan on that, that this

is the time to kind of—let’s end this thing, because this hasn’t been

good for us economically?

Dr. Stiglitz. No. Let me try to emphasize.

Our analysis was focusing on the cost, and saying that in the

end, people are going to have to make their own judgment of the

benefits. Some people think there are benefits, some people don’t.

Senator Brownback. That’s the point I’m wanting to get at. Is

your same analysis for Afghanistan the same as it is for Iraq?

Dr. Stiglitz. No, they’re quite different, because of the sense of

consensus on Afghanistan. For instance, NATO is in Afghanistan.

The circumstances of the two wars are different; how we got into

Afghanistan was related to the attack of 9/11. Iraq was not related

to 9/11.

Senator Brownback. I just wanted to get your assumptions on

this. Afghanistan does have higher security value, in your estimate,

than Iraq has a higher security value in your estimate.

Dr. Stiglitz. We didn’t actually do that kind of security analysis.

Clearly, there are differences in the circumstances in Iraq and Afghanistan that could very well lead to a different conclusion.

Senator Brownback. I know I’m over my time, but I just want

to be sure I’m clear on that.

You believe there is value in Afghanistan that’s not in Iraq?

Dr. Stiglitz. That’s right.

Senator Brownback. But you don’t quantify that.

Dr. Stiglitz. That’s right. We’re only looking at the cost, and

what we’re saying is that anybody engaged in this war has to make

a decision whether the benefits are worth those costs. It’s very difficult to see the benefits in Iraq and very difficult to see what additional benefits we will gain by staying another 2 years in Iraq.

That seems pretty clear.

In Afghanistan, we have a coalition. In Iraq, we’ve become a coalition of one. NATO is in Afghanistan, so it’s a very different situation.

40

Senator Brownback. But you don’t estimate, and I take it nobody on the panel does, the security value of Afghanistan, or the

security value of Iraq, if any. Some of you would question whether

there’s a negative security value. You don’t estimate that.

Madam Chair, I’ll stay for another round, because I went way

over my time. So I’ll just wait till you’re done to come back to that.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. Thank you very much.

Thank you to our panelists. This was, I thought, a very good

hearing and helpful to all of us. People often don’t want to go

through these actual economic costs, but being a graduate of the

University of Chicago Law School, this isn’t surprising to me. I

think it’s been very helpful.

As I said, I hear my colleagues, really for the best of intentions,

talk about the war as priceless, and talk about vague notions of

treasure, and I think it very important that the American people

understand exactly what we’re talking about.

Dr. Hormats, you were talking about the cost of this war and the

cost on the American family. And I was thinking back to in March

of 2006, when the Washington Post published a piece on the typical

American family and how they’re doing right now. They said that the typical American family had about $3,800 in

the bank. No one had a retirement account. There were no stocks,

no bonds, very little equity in the house, and even making over

$43,000 a year, the average American family in 2006 couldn’t manage to pay off a $2,200 credit card balance.

This American family is far different than the families that we

saw during World War II, or even the Vietnam War, when our

economy was different, when the opportunities were there for these

families to get jobs and kind of pull themselves out if they had

some temporary credit trouble or money problems. And with the

economy slowing, unemployment rising, and the housing market

continuing to spiral downward, we can safely say that today’s family is in a much worse and more precarious circumstance.

And I agree—if we are going to pay for this war, we all must sacrifice. But at the same time, many middle-class families are in financial ruins, with no safety net. They can barely hold on. I see

this all the time in our State.

Aren’t we too late to try to spread out the costs of this war? And

how can we simultaneously address the need to pay for the war

now, with the demands of a looming recession that sits really on

the back of the typical American family?

Dr. Hormats. Your point is a very good one. We should have

really done this several years ago if we were going to do it. Now,

I think, the American family is sacrificing—is in dire straits in

many cases. Look at the housing crisis, and look at the fact that

people are behind in their credit cards or paying a lot of interest

to borrow. We’ve borrowed a lot of money, and people are feeling

very vulnerable.

My point on sacrifice was that it needn’t have been through tax

increases. It could have been, if people had wanted to hold taxes

the same, through giving up certain domestic programs which were

not needed and characteristically are cut when you go into war,

nonessential domestic spending. That would have been fine. We

didn’t do that either.

41

That’s my basic point. We could have done one or the other or

both, but we didn’t do any of them.

The point about the veterans is a point that Joe made, and I very

much agree with and discussed in my testimony as well. And that

is, someone’s going to have to pay for them at some point, because

they’re going to need health care for a very long time, and it’s going

to be in the billions and billions of dollars—hundreds of billions,

perhaps.

So the question then is, how do we best pay for it? It is sort of

an unfunded moral liability—I wouldn’t even use the word liability;

moral obligation is a better word, unfunded moral obligation. And

at some point, we have to figure out how we’re going to pay for

that.

Again, we can cut other programs to make room in the budget

to pay these costs. We can borrow the money, which just raises the

Federal debt beyond what it’s already going to be, which is going

to be quite substantial. Or we can find some way for upper-income

people, maybe through a check on their taxe form or through a

mandatory tax, to pay. It’s the first time they haven’t ever had to

do this.

And you’re absolutely right. It may be too late. The reason I

mentioned it, and Joe talked about it in his testimony, is it’s a reality. We have a moral obligation, and the question is, how do we

best fund it? I was providing one idea; it can be done out of general

revenues, too, or it can be done by cutting spending. But somehow

or another, we have a moral obligation to make sure they get the

best health care. For many of them, it’s going to be a lifetime of

health care, and paying for it is an obligation. How do we do it?

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. I think that’s one of the most

miscalculated repercussions from this war. When I was going

around our State for the last 2 years, people would come up to me

and they clearly had some mental health issues.

They said they’d served in the war. I didn’t know if they were

telling the truth.

Then I got to Washington and I saw these numbers, where the

Pentagon had underestimated the number of people coming back

from Iraq and Afghanistan that would need health care.

I think in 2005, four times as many people needed health care

as they imagined. So it just wasn’t budgeted for.

Dr. Hormats. Frequently these symptoms don’t present for several years after a man or woman returns from the battlefield. So

you really don’t know what the long-term cost is going to be, particularly on psychological considerations.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. I think the problem we’re

struggling with is a lot of these things you’re talking about that

could help the middle class, that’s struggling right now—you know,

if we have to look at more unemployment insurance or those kinds

of things. That’s why I’m of the belief that we need to really talk

about rolling back some of the tax cuts for the wealthiest to pay

for things.

We won’t go into the hedge fund issue, Dr. Hormats. But there

are many ways we could consider paying for things that people

haven’t been willing to do. Dr. Stiglitz, do you want to add anything to this?

42

Dr. Stiglitz. I agree very much. The point is that already there

have been 100,000 returning veterans diagnosed with serious psychological problems, and the numbers will be increasing. Over

263,000 have already gone to a VA hospital. What was so striking

was that in 2005, 2006, the VA were still basing their appropriations requests for money on prewar numbers, as if there were going

to be no disability payments, no people injured in this war, and

this meant that there were not going to be the necessary resources

available. Either you crowd out other veterans, or you don’t give

these veterans the benefits to which they’re entitled, or both. You

force the cost onto their families. But these costs don’t go away.

They’re going to be there for decades.

One of the issues that we’ve been discussing is the issue of national security. When you think about national security, one of the

questions is: As the world has changed a great deal in the last 15

years, are we spending this money on national security in the best

way?

There’s a quip that we’re spending a lot of money on weapons

that don’t work against enemies that don’t exist.

The fact is that we are spending close to one out of two defense

dollars around the world. So the question is, where can we save

money?

Thinking more about about how to spend on defense will allow

us to spend less on it. The other point that was made is, there’s

been a lot of waste in the military, including in this war, because

of inadequate accountability. The Department of Defense has not

passed the kind of scrutiny that businesses must undergo.

Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley to hold CFOs accountable for

their corporations. But we are not holding officials in the Department of Defense accountable for their spending, and there are huge

gaps. This is another place where you’ll be able to get some funds

to help pay for these entitlements.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. I have a few questions of Dr.

Beers.

I’ll wait for my final round here and let Senator Brownback go.

Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Senator

Klobuchar.

If Bin Laden says it costs us $500 billion, and the New York Senate says it costs us $600-some billion, it seems like if we haven’t

been attacked again since 9/11, there is some value to the economy

that we haven’t been attacked again since 9/11. Dr. Wallsten,

would you agree with that?

Dr. Wallsten. Sure, there’s value to the economy in that. The

question is whether our presence in Iraq is part of that, and I’m

not the one to speak on that question, I fear.

Senator Brownback. That’s the whole point here, really.

There’s clearly value to security. There’s clearly value to the

economy that we haven’t been hit again since 9/11. I’m not saying

why that has taken place, but clearly there is high, extraordinary

value to that. Is that correct?

Dr. Wallsten. Yes. In fact, I think you and Joe are actually saying the same or very similar things. One of the goals from all of

this is security, and the question is how best to achieve it. And are

we spending our scarce resources in the most effective way for a

43

given amount of security? Once we ask that question clearly, then

we can try to figure out the right answer.

Senator Brownback. It also seems like we ought to ask the

right question there, too. Your analysis, or some of the analysis

here would be, OK, the best security answer is for us to pull out

of Iraq on some sort of basis right now, and that’s the best answer

because it cuts our costs and you believe it provides more security.

Fair enough.

But isn’t there also a realistic possibility that if we pull out of

Iraq, that Iraq fails and becomes a terrorist state? And isn’t there

a reasonable possibility that if we pull out on a slow basis out of

Iraq, maybe like we did in Vietnam, that Iraq fails and becomes

a satellite of Iran?

Those would seem to be reasonable assumptions, possibilities

even, to take place.

Now, I’m not saying that they’re going to take place.

But if we’re doing an economic analysis, one would take the extremes on either side of it and say, OK, let’s say it’s going to be

a perfectly stable state when we pull out, and so here’s what we’re

going to save by doing this. And there’s also a reasonable assumption to say it’s going to be a failed, terrorist state if we pull out

on a slow basis, and there is a reasonable set of assumptions that

we should do based on that.

It looks like to me that we’re getting one side of this economic

picture here. And if we’re doing an economic analysis on this, that

we ought to look at these assumptions.

I put that to you—and you guys are all smarter than I am. I

readily admit that. I don’t have any basis to think differently. But

I met a business guy a few months ago. He was the president of

a corporation. He said, you know, business people don’t know anything—Dr. Hormats, I don’t mean to say this to you at all.

Dr. Hormats. That’s all right. I’ve heard it before.

Senator Brownback. But he says, all we’re doing is really trying to plan for contingencies down the road, and we make our best

guess at this, and that’s the way we play the game. Sometimes we

win, sometimes we lose.

And you know, that’s what we’re trying to do here. I don’t like

war. I don’t want my nephew in Iraq or in Afghanistan. I want him

home in Kansas.

But you’re looking and, OK, I see the world this way.

You see the world that way. And so you’ve got a set of assumptions here.

I would hope maybe somebody has done the economic assumptions of what does it cost us if Iran takes over Iraq, or if Iraq becomes a terrorist state. There ought to be some economic assumptions based on that side of it, too, just to give kind of a, let’s look

at the full picture.

Or if you’re going to have a security environment that’s possibly

less secure—now Dr. Beers might say it’s going to be more secure.

But there’s also a reasonable prospect and there are military personnel who believe it’s going to be less secure. What’s that going

to cost us?

So you really get kind of the full range of this, if we’re going to

do a true economic analysis. And that’s where I have some probVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:44 Jan 30, 2009 Jkt 042773 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\42773.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
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lems with the hearing overall, frankly. I think we’re making one

set of assumptions that this is all bad, therefore this is the cost,

when we’re not looking at really what the full picture—Republican,

Democrat, conservative, liberal. We’ve got a tough problem here,

and we’ve got to figure it out.

I appreciate the economic analysis on it. I think that’s good. That

puts another picture on it. I just don’t think it’s complete, and

that’s what I would hope we could get in trying to make these sort

of conclusions.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. We seem to have widespread

interest in your question. Maybe we can start with Dr. Wallsten

and go down.

Senator Brownback. I hope we can get some good answers and

recommendations. Maybe you’ve got people for us to read on that,

too.

Dr. Wallsten. I actually think that’s a really good point, and

why I framed my testimony in the context of cost- benefit analysis,

because all of those tools were designed to be forward-looking and

to try to incorporate the fact that we’re always dealing with uncertainties.

To do something like this, you should get together people who

are knowledgeable about the various probabilities involved, and

what the likely costs and benefits of those are, and then you can

try to come up with what’s a sound decision.

Senator Schumer started off the hearing by saying that he believed that we would have to be there 5 years for a 50 percent

chance of stability. If you believe that stability is worth something,

you could use those numbers to begin some type of calculation, and

then we would also know the costs of staying there for that time,

and we could begin to see whether that was worthwhile.

I mean, there are lots of other things involved. But that’s exactly

why we set up this process, and why most regulatory agencies now

have to go through that. Everything is always measured with error,

but the future is uncertain, and the only way we can make good

decisions is by putting together all of the information we have for

our best guesses to put probability estimates on things. Then you

have the results, and you then feed it into the decision process.

It can’t be the only tool, certainly, but I think it’s an important

one.

Senator Brownback. Has anybody done that, that you know of;

any economist done that?

Dr. Wallsten. Like I said, there were estimates, at least one, before the war, where he tried to. And one of the problems with doing

this—and I don’t want to make it sound easier than it is—is that

we’re dealing with, as you pointed out, events that can have very

high costs but occur with very low probability. We’re sort of not

very well-equipped to handle that, and that makes it more difficult.

Then, the question again comes back to what Dr. Beers was saying: How do we best reduce those probabilities?

Dr. Beers. That’s what I was going to add to this.

You’re certainly correct in saying that there is another half,

which is, what’s the cost of scenarios that are unappealing to the

United States as a counter to the cost of remaining in Iraq. But

45

when you do that, it seems to me you’ve got to take two points into

consideration.

The first is the probability of those scenarios, because you’ve got

to assign some value to whether or not you’re likely to experience

that. You can then, after you understand the value of that, then

you can do that calculation and you can decide whether, against

that probability, you want to pay that cost.

But the second thing you have to do, and that’s what I was trying to say, is a decision to spend time and effort in Iraq means that

you’ve made the decision not to devote time and effort to dealing

with other foreign policy problems as well. And if you’re going to

go down that road, then you also have to look at the probability

of things getting worse in other locations around the world, and the

cost of dealing with that.

The one that you have been particularly concerned with is, what

could happen with respect to Iran? And I think that’s a very serious question, and what are the costs downstream if we’re unable

to change some of the actions that are happening in Iran that

might affect American security in the future?

We have to weigh those and decide what we’re prepared to do.

Not all of it is in economic costs—what we’re prepared to do in

order to prevent Iran, for example, from acquiring weapons of mass

destruction. Or what can we do that will reduce the likelihood that

they will acquire weapons of mass destruction? And the answer to

that may be diplomacy, not necessarily the use of force, or sanctions.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. Dr. Hormats.

Dr. Hormats. I think you’ve asked a very legitimate question,

and it should be looked at along with a whole panoply of other

issues that we’ve been describing. I would just like to make two

basic points.

The position I’m taking is not that economic issues are or should

be the determinative factor in whether we stay or go in Iraq, or

what the mission level of our troops ought to be. That needs to be

based primarily on national security issues, foreign policy issues,

the questions of the future stability of Iraq, questions of the future

stability of the Middle East, and the broader opportunity cost

issues that Rand has just discussed.

My basic point is that in making these decisions, we should be

looking at the resource costs, along with other implications of various outcomes. So I see this as one input, but it’s been a neglected

one.

In the outset of the war, when the decision was made, recognizing it was a war of choice, we didn’t look at all the resource implications, both in terms of direct resource drains on our system

and the broader, longer-term implications that have been discussed. We may have made the decision to go in anyway, but at

least we should have weighed the cost more carefully, and in a

more considered way.

The second question is, once we decided going to war was the

right thing to do, or as we were considering whether or not it was

a good thing to do, how do we pay for it in a responsible fashion?

From the history of how we’ve paid for the wars in the past, other

Administrations have concluded that it was not a wise thing to borVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:44 Jan 30, 2009 Jkt 042773 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\42773.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
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row the entire cost of the war. No Administration has ever concluded that.

So they’ve all debated, over a period of time, what portion of the

war should be paid for by borrowing, and what portion through

lower spending in other areas, and what portion through higher

taxes. When you embark on a war of choice and even a war of necessity you still need to make those calculations. And we didn’t do

that in a thoughtful way.

Whether we should stay, what level our troop commitment ought

to be, what its mission ought to be—that involves things other than

economics, but economics should be a component. And as you say,

the pluses and the minuses of failure and success have economic

implications as well.

They should be weighed, I agree with that entirely, to have a

thoughtful debate with an informed public.

But the public hasn’t been informed, because the debate hasn’t

been a very open one. It’s been a very closed one, and we need to

do better in the future. That’s my basic conclusion.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. Thank you.

Dr. Stiglitz.

Dr. Stiglitz. Briefly, three points. First, you’re absolutely right

that there are a lot of risks, and much of what we have been discussing concerns risk management. But one has to look at not just

the risk here, in Iraq, but risk globally. We face global security

risks, but is spending all of these resources in Iraq the best way

to manage these global risks?

That brings me to the second question: How do you frame this

particular decision about withdrawal from Iraq? The question is

first, if we leave now versus if we leave, say, in 4 years, what will

be the probability of that changing stability? Those are the kinds

of judgments that will have to be made by security experts. It could

be very little, it could be a great deal, both in the probability and

the value.

But in making the judgment, you have to evaluate that change

in the stability in light of the costs. It may be disastrous if we leave

now, it may be disastrous if we leave in 4 years. It may be wonderful if we leave now or in 4 years. There are differences of view.

But we must ask, how much extra will it cost us to stay in Iraq

for another 4 years? Up front, every month is costing us $12 billion.

That’s up front. And then there are all the other costs that probably double that. And then there are costs to the global economy.

So you have to say, if you’re going to stay another 4 years, is it

worth that change in the probability of stability? That comes to the

third point—given the opportunity costs, is another $2 trillion

worth that uncertain change in stability, given all the other problems we are facing, including in the security field?

Let me emphasize, it’s not just the opportunity costs in terms of

dollars, but the focus on the war. While we were focusing on weapons of mass destruction that did not exist in Iraq, another country

joined the nuclear club—North Korea—because, arguably, we

weren’t focusing on it, arguably. So there are security costs of focusing on the wrong thing.

Senator Brownback. Maybe that can be your next Nobel Prize.

But I would hope you could do a complete analysis on this, because

47

otherwise it just kind of looks partisan. Because there is value to

security. You all agree with that. Certainly people from New York

City know that there’s value to this. I would just hope maybe you’d

look at that.

You’ve been very patient. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. Senator Brownback’s my neighbor in the Hart Building, so.

I just want to explore this a little bit more with you, Dr. Beers.

Senator Brownback’s point seems to be, well, we need a fuller analysis. And I think what you’ve done today is incredibly helpful with

showing the economic repercussions domestically, and he’s talked

about the fact that there’s security issues that should be taken into

account.

I wonder, Dr. Beers, if you could just elaborate a bit on—just

talk about some of these issues with some of these other countries,

with this global view from Kosovo to Pakistan, Kenya. I always use

the example of Lebanon.

Maybe if we’d put just a fraction of the money from Iraq into

Lebanon, we wouldn’t have what we saw with Hezbollah and what

happened with Israel, if we’d helped some of these fledgling democracies with just a fraction of the money that we spent in Iraq.

So could you talk about what you see as the opportunity costs

and, because we were putting so much attention and focus on Iraq,

what we could have done with these other countries?

Dr. Beers. Yes, and thank you for the opportunity to talk about

that.

Let me do a couple of things with respect to Iraq, and then come

back and do some work on a variety, but not exhaustive list, of

what those other opportunities were.

With respect to Iraq, if the level of troops in Iraq remains

140,000, which is what the joint staff is saying is likely to be the

case through the end of the surge and for an indefinite period after

that—if the number remains at 140,000, it basically means that we

cannot sustain an increase of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, despite

the fact that the commander of U.S. Central Command believes

that we need to do that, and the Secretary of Defense does as well.

If the level of troops in Iraq goes down, but not below 90,000, we

cannot begin to reconstitute our military. We will not deal with any

of the readiness problems, and we will still have to find ways to

rob Peter to pay Paul to keep those troop levels in the field. It will

mean that the dwell time—that is, the time that U.S. forces come

home before they have to go out again—will continue to exceed the

length of their tours. And so we will have the continued effect on

America’s military at roughly that level. If you go below that, you

can begin to think about some of those savings.

But I think it’s important to just think in rough terms that that’s

what the consequences are about the level of U.S. presence for any

extended period of time.

I’ve talked about Bin Laden. Let me talk about Afghanistan. The

fact that the United States has only been prepared to work in Afghanistan as a secondary theater has meant, one, that the government in Kabul has been unable to actually become the true government of Afghanistan. The Afghan security forces who could have

been mentored by the United States and an increased NATO presVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:44 Jan 30, 2009 Jkt 042773 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\42773.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
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ence—because NATO would be more willing to be at higher levels

in Afghanistan if their publics didn’t conflate being in Afghanistan

with being in Iraq, and I think that Secretary Gates has made that

clear when he has sought to increase troop levels in Afghanistan

from our NATO allies.

So it’s both a question of what they could do on their own for security, but also what they could do in mentoring Afghan security

forces so that they would be in a better position to take over those

missions and our mission in Afghanistan. Our NATO mission in Afghanistan could then even begin to think about reducing, which

we’re not in a position to be able to do today, and are unlikely to

be in a position to do at this point in time and for the foreseeable

future.

With respect to Pakistan, our reliance on General Musharraf,

who was seen as a reformer when he entered power, and throughout Prime Minister Sharif, who was regarded as an exceedingly

corrupt leader, our dependence on General Musharraf, as he descended further, further and further into becoming an autocrat and

reflective of some of the corruption that the army had been untainted with before Sharif was thrown out, has meant that we

failed effectively to anticipate and deal with the burgeoning political crisis in Pakistan, and have remedies if you will to work with

the people of Pakistan rather than just the Musharraf government.

So that, one, the instability that has resulted from terrorist attacks; but two, the instability that has resulted from civil society

believing that they didn’t have a role in the government, has left

us with a situation in which we don’t know where the political situation is going to go. The election was good. The talk of a coalition

government between the two leading political parties is good. But

the situation is still very problematic.

Lebanon—a wonderful event there when the Syrians were forced

to leave Lebanon. No follow-up other than to cheer them on, leaving us in effect with a situation that then blew up later on when

the Israelis went into Lebanon after Hezbollah and created an even

more turbulent situation there. We, who have normally sought to

end hostilities almost immediately when they have occurred in that

region of the world—because the longer the hostilities have gone

on, the more instability has resulted—were unwilling or unable to

intervene with the Israelis and the government of Lebanon to try

to stop those hostilities immediately.

The government of Turkey is now in a state of incursion, intervention or occupation in northern Iraq because we were inattentive

to their needs and concerns about the PKK that existed in northern

Iraq, because we were focused on Baghdad and Anbar and the security concerns and problems that we were facing down there,

when we should have been working with our Turkish allies to keep

their situation from getting out of control.

And then on to places like Kenya and Darfur and West Africa to

Indonesia and the Philippines, and other places where Al Qaeda

and the forces of instability are active and we are unable to devote

the time, effort and cooperation with those governments—who, by

and large, would be prepared to work with us if we had the time

and effort and resources to be able to intervene in those; and, if we

49

were not in Iraq, have a reasonable expectation that others would

help us in doing that.

Thank you.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Beers, for that

thorough answer. I appreciate it.

One last question. We had a hearing a few weeks ago with this

Committee on sovereign wealth fund investments.

And with our housing market crumbling and more and more of

our U.S. companies turning to oil-rich countries, which continue to

flourish as these oil prices rise, do you see any danger in the surge

of foreign investment in terms of our national security?

Dr. Beers. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United

States was established particularly and specifically to look at those

very issues. It seems to me that the activities of that committee—

and Bob, you can talk to this one probably better than I can—are

part and parcel of, I think, our security considerations about what

is an appropriate investment in the United States from a security

perspective, as well as from an economic perspective. And those

kinds of discussions ought to be available in some kind of public

fashion and, I would hope, in consultation with the Congress of the

United States. Because they obviously have both an economic and

a security effect.

But I want to give Bob the floor on that.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding.] Dr. Hormats.

Dr. Hormats. I think Rand’s put it very well. Just let me add

one point.

There’s been concern expressed in some quarters, and your question reflects it, about sovereign wealth funds, and broader dependence on foreign capital. It’s important to have a dialog with the

American people, and certainly within the halls of this Congress,

on this topic.

I think Americans don’t fully understand how dependent this

country has come to be on foreign capital. Now one can regard it

as a good or a bad thing.

I’m not going to get into that at this point, because there are different people who perceive it differently.

I would make a more fundamental point—that it is a mathematical necessity for a country that has a very low savings rate—

the household savings rate is very low; in some quarters it’s been

negative. The Government is borrowing, and it’s going to borrow a

lot more over the course of the next several decades.

A country with low savings rates that consumes a great deal, in

part based on borrowing against homes or credit cards or whatever,

and a country that has a huge appetite for imported oil—60 percent of our oil comes from abroad—is going to depend more and

more on foreign capital to fuel our capitalist economy. If we don’t

generate the savings to invest in this country, then we will have

to get the money from countries that have a higher savings rate.

And those countries are mostly emerging market economies, and

some oil countries, that have very high savings rates.

We have it fully within our capability of reducing this dependence on foreign capital for those who are concerned about it by raising our savings rate, not borrowing as much to consume, reducing

our dependence on imported oil, and running tighter fiscal policy.

50

And I don’t think that broad debate has really been engaged very

much.

It’s easy to look outside and say, there’s this problem.

It’s much more difficult to look internally and say, what can we

do if we’re concerned about this problem.

I would hope that this Committee, which is in a perfect position

to address this issue, might do so at some point in the future, because it’s a broad issue, and we’re only going to get more dependent because our savings rate is low. We may borrow a little less

now because of this housing crisis, but still we have a very chronically low savings rate.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. One last answer, Dr. Stiglitz.

Dr. Stiglitz. I agree with everything that’s been said so far. I

just want to add two points.

The Iraq war has contributed to the dependency, or to the nature

of the problem, in two ways. One, because we financed the war entirely by deficits, it has meant that we’ve had to borrow more. And

second, by driving up the price of oil, it’s created a liquid source

of funds outside the United States. We weren’t saving and they had

the money when we needed it.

It’s an inevitable consequence of what had gone on before. But

the second point I want to make is, a lot of the way the discussion

has gone on about dealing with the sovereign wealth funds I find

inadequate, in the following sense. The major discussion has focused on increasing transparency, asking the sovereign wealth

funds: Will you act in a commercially sound way? And they say:

Trust us, we’ll be good.

It seems to me a little bit naive, on the one hand. And second,

asking transparency of the sovereign wealth funds while we maintain non-transparency of hedge funds only encourages sovereign

wealth funds to invest through hedge funds and offshore centers,

because we don’t know who owns a lot of the hedge funds.

If you’re concerned about transparency, the issue has to be dealt

with in a systemic way. You can’t just pick out a little piece and

say: We’re going to make that transparent. If there are non-transparent parts of the financial system, they’ll go through the nontransparent parts.

What is good about this recent debate is that it highlights our

belief that we have an inadequate regulatory structure that is not

up to the task of dealing with some of the risks that might be

posed. But so far, the discussion has not addressed how we might

really adequately regulate in an effective way.

Senator Klobuchar [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Stiglitz.

I want to thank all our witnesses for your professional and

thoughtful testimony. I also want to thank the people here for the

hearing. I know this is a very emotional and heartfelt issue for so

many, and I want to thank you for the respect that you showed all

of our witnesses here. Because as you know, we talk about this a

lot in terms of, as I do, the people we know and we see, and the

families that have been touched by this war.

But I think it’s very important, and this is why we have this

hearing today, that we also step back and look at the actual costs.

And I think we’ve heard a lot about, not just the obvious costs of

going into war and the money that has been lost because of a lack

51

of accountability, but also on the debt and what’s happening there,

and the price of oil—as Mr. Beers has pointed out, our standing in

the world and what that’s done in terms of opportunity costs of

helping with other countries.

So I appreciate this far-ranging discussion, and the willingness

of our panelists to try to step in and put some price tags on something that people never really want to put a price tag on.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled

matter was adjourned.]

(53)

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

54

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER, CHAIRMAN

Good morning. I’d like to thank you for coming to our Joint Economic Committee

hearing today on the costs of the war in Iraq. This is a contentious topic, so I will

ask our audience at the outset to be respectful of the witnesses, their opinions, and

the committee as we proceed today.

We have a very distinguished panel including:

Professor Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Laureate economist;

Robert Hormats, a former National Security Council adviser under both Democratic

and Republican Presidents and a co-Chairman at Goldman Sachs International;

Rand Beers, the president of the National Security Network and also a former NSC

adviser; and

Scott Wallsten, an economist and formerly of the American Enterprise Institute.

I would like to take a few moments to talk about the war, its costs, and what

I believe is a turning point in our argument against this war. Then I will recognize

our members for opening statements and formally introduce our panel.

The case against this war has been building for a long time. Too many young

American men and women have given their lives, or have suffered terrible, life-altering injuries, with little to show for their sacrifice. The American people are baffled by the lack of political progress, despite the good work of our troops,. And now,

Americans are trying to comprehend the eye-popping dollar figures that this war is

costing our budget and our economy.

It is becoming clear to all Americans—Republicans, Democrats and Independents

that by continuing to spend huge amounts in Iraq we are prevented from spending

on important goals and vital needs here at home.

So the turning point is this: the lack of progress, particularly on the political

front, continues. The tragic loss of life continues. But the cost of the war and the

inability to use those funds to help us here at home and to properly go after the

nexus of terror, which is to the east—in Pakistan and Iran—has become the clinching argument that we must, quickly and soon, change the course of this war in Iraq.

I went to Iraq over New Year’s. I spent time with our soldiers. They’re wonderful.

They’re awe-inspiring—from the private I met just out of a Queens high school who

had enlisted 8 months previously and who had been in Iraq only 3 weeks, to the

majors and colonels who had served 10 years in the Army or the Marines and had

made the military their life’s work. All of them see a greater good than just themselves. I spent time with General Petraeus and General Odierno. There’s no doubt

they are fine, intelligent, good people.

When I went to Iraq, I assured our soldiers, from the privates to the generals,

that one good thing that would come out of this war is that the esteem in which

we hold both the military and our soldiers would be greater than when the war

started. This is far different from the Vietnam War, one of the more disgraceful

times in America, when our soldiers were often vilified for serving their country.

But after leaving Iraq, I came to this conclusion. Even if we were to follow general

Petraeus’ game plan, which involves not just military success and security but winning the hearts and minds of the people, it would take us a minimum of 5 years

and even then, have only about a 50 percent chance of success of bringing stability

to Iraq—not democracy but just stability to large portions of the country.

That’s not the military’s fault and that’s not America’s fault. That’s because of the

age-old enmities within Iraq—Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds—and then within the

groups themselves—that make it very hard to create long-term stability without a

permanent at-large structure of troops.

We have too many pressing national security and economic priorities that require

the attention, energy and resources that we are spending on a policy in Iraq that

has too high a risk of failure.

Our education system is declining. Our health care system doesn’t cover too many

people. We are paying $3.30 for gas because we don’t have an energy policy. And

if your goals are primarily foreign policy, wouldn’t our time and effort be better

spent focusing on the dangerous triangle composed of Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, not Iraq?

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We must ask ourselves, is it worth spending trillions of dollars on such an uncertain and unpredictable outcome?

The cost of the war has become the 800 billion dollar gorilla in the room. The

backbreaking costs of this war to American families, the Federal budget, and the

entire economy are beyond measure in many ways, and it is becoming one of the

first things after the loss of life that people think and talk about.

A report issued by the majority staff of this committee estimated that the total

costs of the war will double what the Administration has spent directly on the war

alone—$1.3 trillion through 2008, and that is a conservative estimate.

According to budget and Iraq spending figures, for the amount the Bush Administration wants to spend PER DAY in Iraq, over $430 million, we could:

• Enroll an additional 58,000 children in Head Start per year;

• Put an additional 8,900 police officers on the streets per year;

• Provide health insurance for 329,200 low-income children through CHIP per

year;

• Hire another 10,700 Border patrol agents per year;

• Make college more affordable for 163,700 students through Pell Grants per

year; and

• Help nearly 260,000 American families to keep their homes with foreclosure

prevention counseling this year.

In the fiscal year 2008 budget, we put $159 Billion into Iraq:

• That doubles our entire domestic transportation spending to fix roads and

bridges of $80 billion.

• It dwarfs all the funds we provide to the National Institutes of Health to discover cures for diseases like cancer and diabetes—$29 billion.

• Iraq spending is seven times our spending to help young Americans get a college education—$22 billion.

• And spending in Iraq is 30 times greater than what we set aside to ensure the

health of every single American child—$5 billion.

The costs are mountainous, and in this changing world where we have to fight

to keep America No. 1, we cannot afford such costs—despite the great efforts that

our soldiers are putting into Iraq.

I’ve read the testimony from Professor Stiglitz. And we are grateful to have him

here before his new book comes out. His book’s title speaks for itself—‘‘The $3 Trillion War.’’

I was dismayed to learn that Professor Stiglitz had trouble getting information

from the government about what this war is costing us, particularly from the Pentagon and the Veterans Administration.

I plan to ask the Senator Levin, who chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, to work with me to make sure this administration is transparent and forthcoming about the billions in taxpayers’ money that we are spending going forward.

Professor Stiglitz estimates that conservatively, this war could cost $3 Trillion for

budget costs alone—and that is TRILLION with a ‘‘T.’’ These estimates make our

JEC estimates seem small. His higher estimates of the total economic costs dwarf

all other estimates at up to 5 trillion.

So we desperately need a change of course in Iraq. We can’t continue to police

a civil war built on age-old enmities of the various factions in Iraq. We can’t afford

the costs, which are increasing exponentially according to expert economists. And

we can’t allow this skyrocketing spending in Iraq to displace other very real domestic and foreign policy priorities.

History will look upon this Iraq War in two ways. It will admire the bravery of

our soldiers, from the privates to the generals; and it will be amazed at the mistakes made by this Administration in starting and continuing this war, for far too

long.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JIM SAXTON, RANKING MINORITY

I would like to join in welcoming the witnesses appearing before the Joint Economic Committee this morning.

The Iraq War obviously has many dimensions including foreign policy, defense

policy, and terrorism policy. While debate about past policies in Iraq will continue,

the most important question facing policymakers is: What should U.S. policy in Iraq

be now and in the future? Since the implementation of the surge strategy in Iraq,

the military situation has improved dramatically, as noted by a variety of independent experts from the Brookings Institution to the American Enterprise Institute, and publications such as the Washington Post. A recent Washington Post editorial urged critics of the war to take the success of the surge into account in setting

future policy.

However, another attempt to force a hasty retreat from Iraq is now underway, following the many failures earlier in this Congress. Now that the surge is proving

successful, a quick exit from Iraq would be especially costly. The virtually immediate withdrawal advocated by some politicians is not militarily feasible, but even

a premature withdrawal could produce immense costs.

For example, if the U.S. withdrew quickly, the biggest winners would include terrorists and the Iranian regime that is a designated state sponsor of terrorism. Iranian influence would further spread in Iraq, potentially expanding Iranian military

influence in the Persian Gulf including the Straight of Hormuz, and leading to Iranian control of significant Iraqi oil resources. Iran has already threatened to cutoff

Westem oil supplies, and in such a situation would be well positioned to act on such

a threat.

Consider also the scenario that a rapid U.S. pullout could lead to civil war in Iraq,

drawing in surrounding nations and leading to a regional conflagration. This unfortunately is not a remote possibility but something that must be considered. The economic and potential military costs of this outcome to the U.S. and its allies would

be enormous.

All wars impose costs in terms of life and treasure, and the Iraq War is no exception. These costs must be considered as the U.S. weighs its options in Iraq. We also

must consider the fact that there have been no terrorist attacks such as 9/11 following the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq that disrupted the Taliban

and Al Qaida terrorist networks. The benefits of preventing a second or third attack

on the scale of 9/11 are very high in both human and economic terms, and failure

to do so would be very costly indeed.

In determining future policy, we have to consider whether the situation in Iraq

is improving significantly as well as the costs and benefits of our various policy options. As economic costs and benefits are considered, it is important to keep in mind

that estimates will range widely because they are necessarily based on questionable

data, a variety of assumptions, and speculation about related events. As Dr.

Wallsten has warneded, ‘‘the data are not of high quality . . . and . . . each calculation requires several assumptions.’’ He also has pointed out that even meticulous

cost estimates ‘‘contain a great deal of error,’’ and thus such analysis ‘‘cannot determine whether the benefits of the war exceed the costs.’’ I would note that important

elements of Dr. Wallsten’s work are also incorporated into Dr. Stiglitz’s research,

which shares the same limitations.

In their 2005 paper, Dr. Wallsten and a coauthor acknowledge the ‘‘inherent imprecision’’ of war cost estimates but provide a significant ‘‘analytical framework for

the policy debate.’’ It is important to repeat their warning that this ‘‘inherent imprecision’’ makes it impossible to determine the relative costs and benefits of the Iraq

War.

In closing, I would note an article in the Washington Post last week covers the

new attack advertising on the Iraq War sponsored by the Democratic Senatorial

Campaign Committee. I would like to think that the timing of this ad campaign,

this hearing, and the Iraq pullout vote is a remarkable coincidence, but others may

draw different conclusions.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CAROLYN MALONEY, VICE CHAIR

Good morning. I would like to thank Chairman Schumer for holding this hearing

to examine the economic costs of the Iraq war. I want to welcome our distinguished

panel and thank them for testifying here today.

Over the past 5 years, the President has requested some $665 billion from Congress to fund the war in Iraq. The more than $180 billion that the President wants

the government to spend on Iraq just this year, including interest on the war debt,

totals almost half a billion dollars a day.

But the untold story—one every American needs to hear—is that the costs of this

war go well beyond these budget numbers. At my request, last year the Joint Economic Committee prepared a report showing that if the President’s 2008 funding request is approved, the full economic cost of the war will total $1.3 trillion just by

the end of the year. This figure includes the ‘‘hidden costs’’ of deficit financing, the

future care of our wounded veterans, and disruption in oil markets. And if the war

continues, the costs will only mount higher. In his new book, Dr. Stiglitz estimates

that the total economic price tag for the war could reach $3 trillion to $5 trillion

over the next decade if we remain in Iraq.

The numbers may feel abstract, but the costs are real. The burden of war debt

handed down to our children is real—it’s been called the Iraq 100-year mortgage.

The lost opportunities to invest here at home in jobs, green technologies, roads and

bridges, health care and education are real. And, the nearly 4,000 lives lost are real.

We are all paying for the colossal costs of this war one way or another.

Last year alone, the President asked Congress to spend more on the Iraq war

than the $130 billion our nation spends annually on the entire American road and

highway system. At a time when our levees and bridges are crumbling, we cannot

afford to stop investing in our infrastructure. And the President has been squabbling with Congress about money for children’s health care, when about 3 months’

worth of Iraq war spending would have covered the entire 5-year Children’s Health

Insurance Program funding increase he vetoed last year.

The administration is reportedly negotiating for an indefinite U.S. troop presence

in Iraq. We know we cannot afford the continued loss of life. The economic costs

have also become unbearable. The JEC has estimated that the difference between

‘‘staying the course’’ with our current troop commitment in Iraq versus a more rapid

draw down favored by many Congressional Democrats is about $1.8 trillion in additional economic costs over the next decade.

That’s above and beyond what we’ve already spent on the war, and it’s money

that will continue to be diverted from important national priorities.

A productive debate over the long-term economic impact of the war and its cost

to future generations is long overdue. It’s no surprise, however, that this is a debate

the Bush administration would rather hide from.

OMB Director Nussle took issue with our JEC report last year. Chairman Schumer and I wrote to invite him to appear before this Committee to present the Administration’s estimates of what the full economic costs of the Iraq war have been

so far, and will be going forward. Not surprisingly, Director Nussle has not responded to our open invitation. I want to call on the Administration to produce their

own estimates, as we and many of our witnesses have done, and appear before this

committee to have a productive dialog about this critical issue facing our nation.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE RON PAUL

Mr. Chairman,

I thank you for calling a hearing on this very important topic. In recent months

the undeclared war in Iraq seems not to have been on the minds of most Americans.

News of the violence and deprivation which ordinary Iraqis are forced to deal with

on a daily basis rarely makes it to the front pages. Instead, we read in the newspapers numerous slanted stories about the how the surge is succeeding and reducing violence. Never does anyone dare to discuss the costs of the war or its implications.

There are the direct costs of the war, the costs of maintaining bases, providing

food, water, and supplies, which the administration vastly underestimated before

embarking on their quest in Iraq. These costs run into the tens of billions of dollars

per month, and I shudder to think what the total direct costs will add up to when

we finally pull out.

Then there are the opportunity costs, those which decisionmakers in Washington

almost never discuss. Imagine that the war in Iraq had never happened, and the

hundreds of billions of dollars we have spent so far were still in the hands of taxpayers and businesses. How many jobs could have been created, how much money

could have been saved, invested, and put to productive use?

Unfortunately, it appears too many policymakers in Washington still cling to the

broken window fallacy, long since discredited by the 19th century French economist

Frederic Bastiat, that destruction is a good thing because jobs are created to rebuild

what is destroyed. This pernicious fallacy is unfortunately widespread in our society

today because those in positions of power and influence only recognize what is seen,

and ignore what is unseen.

Running a deficit of hundreds of billions of dollars per year in order to fund our

misadventure is unsustainable. Eventually those debts must be repaid, but this

country is in such poor financial shape that when our creditors come knocking, we

will have little with which to pay them. Our imperial system of military bases set

up in protectorate states around the world is completely dependent on the

conntinuing willingness of foreigners to finance our deficits. When the credit dries

up we will find ourselves in a dire situation. Americans will suffer under a combination of confiscatory taxation, double-digit inflation, and the sale of massive amounts

of land and capital goods to our foreign creditors.

The continuation of the war in Iraq will end in disaster for this country. Parallels

between the Roman empire and our own are numerous, although our decline and

fall will happen far quicker than that of Rome. The current financial crisis has

awakened some to the perils that await us, but solutions that address the root of

the problem and seek to fix it are nowhere to be found. There must be a sea change

in the attitudes and thinking of Americans and their leaders. The welfare-warfare

state must be abolished, respect for private property and individual liberties restored, and we must return to the limited-government ideals of our Founding Fathers. Any other course will doom our nation to the dustbin of history.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When the Committee released the majority staff report

‘‘War at Any Price? The Total Economic Costs of the War Beyond the Federal Budget’’, Ranking Republican Member Saxton and I questioned much of the methodology

and many of the assumptions made in the report.

Before I address those issues, I want express my appreciation for the fact that

the Democratic staff of the Committee took the time to sit down with my staff yesterday afternoon to walk through the methodology and assumptions used in the report. One of our initial criticisms was that reports of this nature should include sufficient detail as to data and methods so that other researchers could replicate the

results as well as raise questions about the analysis.

We appreciate knowing how the conclusions were reached. We continue to believe

that the report’s methodology and assumptions are, at best, very controversial and

debatable. Moreover, by making standard economic assumptions, over $1 trillion of

war costs estimated in the report vanish. With results this sensitive to reasonable

changes in economic assumptions, it seems that use of the findings in this report

to guide policy would be unwarranted.

As an example of questionable assumptions used in the report, let me note that

the report asserts that war costs have been debt financed, and the portion borrowed

domestically (60 percent) displaces private investments that would have generated

a 7 percent real rate of return which, according to the analysis, seems to be riskless.

It would have been more proper to do this evaluation using the risk adjusted rate

of return—which, in real terms, would be on the order of maybe 3 percent. In any

case, taking the report’s assumptions to heart, we are informed that there seem to

be riskless private investment opportunities available that pay 7 percent real returns.

From the report, we also learn that effectively every dollar of government borrowing or tax revenue displaces around two dollars worth of social value. Perhaps

we should take this to heart also and begin immediately to cut spending, taxes, and

borrowing. Let us allow our private citizens to enjoy the 7 percent real returns that

are evidently available to them all.

If the methods and assumptions used in the report are valid to analyze the ‘‘true

costs’’ of military operations, those methods and assumptions should also be valid

to analyze the ‘‘true costs’’ of many other government spending and taxation programs. The answers arrived at by employing the majority staff report’s methodology

and assumptions could give rise to unease among several members of the committee, particularly on the other side of the aisle. Let me use the majority staff report’s approach to address some key questions:

1. Should the present Social Security system be scrapped in favor of a system of

personal accounts? According to the report’s methodology, the answer is ‘‘yes.’’

2. Should the U.S. resist domestic borrowing in favor of borrowing from foreigners? According the report’s methodology, the answer is ‘‘yes.’’

3. Do deficit financed tax cuts create a net benefit for the economy? Using the

report’s methodology, the answer would be ‘‘yes.’’

Let me also note that the report totally ignores economic savings and benefits

that may have resulted from attacks or disruptions that may have been prevented

by our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Note that, according to some estimates, the

economic costs to the U.S. associated with the tragic attacks on 9–11 amounted to

loss of life, well over half a trillion dollars of economic activity, and millions of lost

jobs. The loss of economic activity alone is more than the costs of direct spending

in Iraq and Afghanistan to date. If our war efforts prevent another tragedy like 9–

11, tremendous benefits are obtained.

We can debate extensively whether and how those unprovoked attacks might have

been prevented. Some might argue that by allowing our Defense expenditures as a

percent of GDP to fall by nearly 45 percent in the 1990’s from 5.4 percent of GDP

to 3.0 percent left us exposed. That may or may not have been a contributing factor.

It is clear, however, that the losses were real—real in human costs and real in economic costs. It necessarily follows that preventing future attacks provides benefits

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both in economic and human terms. To dismiss out of hand or to ignore potential

benefits is an improper approach when undertaking this type of analysis.

Mr. Chairman, I must remark for the record what a coincidence it is that this

hearing’s scheduling coincides so closely with the Democratic Senatorial Campaign

Committee’s new anti-Iraq advertising campaign against Senator McCain and incumbent Republican Senators up for re-election.

I look forward to the exchange of views between members of the committee and

our witnesses. My staffs more detailed analysis of the problematic nature of the majority reports follows.

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1 University Professor at Columbia University and Chair of the Committee on Global Thought.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZI,1 NOBEL LAUREATE, PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NY

Thank you for this opportunity to discuss with you the economic costs of the Iraq

War. March 19 marks the fifth anniversary of what was supposed to be a short venture to save the world from the threat of weapons of mass destruction—which simply weren’t there. It is now the second longest war in America’s history, and, after

the all-encompassing World War II, the second most costly, even after adjusting for

inflation. In terms of costs per troop, it is by far the costliest—some eight times as

expensive as World War II.

A WAR FOR DEMOCRACY

Before turning to the costs beyond the Federal Budget, I want to make three prefatory remarks. We went to war to fight for democracy; but democracy is more than

just periodic elections. It involves broader notions of democratic accountability. Citizens have the right to know what they are spending their hard earned dollars on.

They have a right to know what their government is doing and the consequences

of its actions. Over the past 2 years, I have worked with a colleague at Harvard,

Linda Bilmes, to estimate the full costs of the Iraq war. We published our initial

study in January 2006, and I would like that paper to be entered into the record.

We published a second study, concerning the costs of providing medical care and

disability benefits to our returning veterans, in January 2007. I would ask for that

to also be entered into the record. We have now published a book, The Three Trillion

Dollar War, which estimates the true costs of the war, the veterans’ costs, and the

impact on the U.S. economy. I want to point out that it required an enormous

amount of work to write our book We should not have needed to write it, and when

we came to write it, it should have been a far easier task. The Administration and

Congress should have provided these numbers to the American people. Five years

after the beginning of this war, you should not be funding this war with emergency

appropriations, which escape the normal budget scrutiny. We should not have had

to resort to the Freedom of Information Act to find out how many Americans have

been injured in this war. This Administration has said that it will provide everything that our troops need. We should not have had to use the Freedom of Information Act to discover that more than 3 years ago, senior officers in the Marines were

already sending urgent requests for MRAPs—which would have saved the lives of

a large fraction of those killed if we had provided them at that time.

THE SOARING BUDGETARY COSTS

The second remark is that the budgetary costs themselves have been enormous—

far, far larger than the some $50 billion that the Administration estimated at the

beginning of the war. We are now spending that amount in operations every 3

months. But the costs to the Federal Budget are far larger than the day-to-day operational costs. The war has raised overall military costs: we have to pay more to recruit and retain our troops, and even with these increased expenditures, standards

for recruits have had to be lowered. It will be costly to restore our military to its

pre-war standing, both in terms of personnel and materiel. There are costs hidden

in other parts of the budget—not only are the direct costs of the contractors high,

especially as a result of single source contracting and low levels of oversight (the

defense contractors and oil companies have been the only true winners in this war,

evidenced by what has happened to their stock prices), but we are also paying for

the contractors’ insurance for death benefits and disability. Even with these high

insurance premiums, remarkably the government often winds up paying the benefits as well. In our calculations, we have not included the full costs of these, simply

because it is impossible for ordinary citizens to find out what they are.

The most important costs that go well beyond the operational costs are the expenditures required to provide health care and disability for returning veterans.

These are likely to be very, very high, and we will be paying these bills for decades

to come. Almost 40 percent of the nearly 700,000 troops who fought in the 1 month

long Gulf War have become eligible for disability benefits, and we are paying more

than $4 billion a year for disability benefits from that short war. Imagine, then,

what a war that will almost surely involve more than 2 million troops and will almost surely last more than 6 or 7 years will cost. Already, we are seeing large numbers of returning veterans showing up at VA hospitals for treatment, large numbers

applying for disability, and large numbers with severe psychological problems.

These problems increase disproportionately with every tour of duty and with longer

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tours of duty; and with more than one-third of our men and women being asked

to do two or three tours of duty, the numbers will almost surely mount. While in

previous wars, the ratio of injured to fatalities was 2.5 to 1, in this war it is 7 to

1, and if we include those that have to be medically evacuated because of what are

classified as non-hostile accidents or illnesses, the ratio soars to 15 to 1. Many of

the injuries are horrific and will require a lifetime of care. It is a testimony to modern medicine—though clearly we could have done a lot more to spare our troops

than we did. Most of the costs will be borne by the VA, but there will be a burden

on our social security system as well. We have estimated the total costs (in present

discounted value terms) in what we call our ‘‘realistic’’ (but still highly conservative)

scenario as $630 billion.

BILLS WE WILL BE PAYING FOR DECADES

My third prefatory remark is this: we will be facing these budgetary costs for decades to come. Even the CBO methodology, which looks 10 years into the future, is

too short-sighted for these liabilities which we have incurred. In the case of World

War II veterans, VA expenditures peaked more than four decades after the cessation

of hostilities. Furthermore, because the Administration actually cut taxes as we

went to war, when we were already running huge deficits, this war has, effectively,

been entirely financed by deficits. The national debt has increased by some $2.5 trillion since the beginning of the war, and of this, almost $1 trillion is due directly

to the war itself. But the meter is still ticking. By 2017, we estimate that the national debt will have increased, just because of the war, by some $2 trillion.

There has been much discussion of unfunded entitlements in recent years. This

war has created a new unfunded entitlement—future benefits of Iraqi veterans that

may total a half a trillion dollars or more. But this is an entitlement which they

have earned, and from which we should not, we cannot walk away. What we should

do, now, is to recognize the financial obligations that we have incurred, that we are

incurring today, and that we will incur before this War is over, and fully fund them.

These obligations are much like deferred compensation: we require private firms to

fully fund such obligations, and for good reason. There should not be a double standard.

When, of course, we add together all of these costs of the war, we are talking

about budgetary impacts that are not just $12 billion a month (or $16 billion if we

include Afghanistan), but greater than that by at least 40 percent. Our full cost of

the war—our $3 trillion dollar tally—is twice the direct operational budget. We

should remember that every month we stay in Iraq and Afghanistan is really costing us some $22 billion; every year, more than $250 billion. In another 2 years, the

tally will exceed another half trillion.

MICRO-ECONOMIC COSTS

The focus of my remarks today, however, is on the large costs that go beyond

these budgetary costs. We classify these into two categories, micro-economic costs

(to individuals, especially to the troops that have served us so well and their families, and to firms) and macroeconomic costs (to our overall economy, today and into

the future).

We have consistently understaffed, underinvested in, and underfunded the medical and disability programs that serve our veterans. As a result, our servicemen

and women returning from the battlefield in Iraq often face a new battle—with the

bureaucracy to get the benefits to which they are entitled and which they deserve.

When they cannot get the health care to which they are entitled, or they have to

wait months just to schedule an appointment to see a VA doctor, those who are fortunate enough to have families who can afford to do so, pay for it on their own. This

doesn’t diminish the cost to society; it just shifts the burden from the Federal budget to these people who have already sacrificed so much.

There are other ways in which the costs to society exceed the costs to the budget,

often by considerable amounts. When the government evaluates whether a safety

regulation is worth instituting, it balances the costs with the benefits, that is, the

savings in lives; as unpleasant as it may seem, it places a dollar value on people’s

lives, which includes the loss in output. The typical numbers, called the value of

statistical lives, are $7 to $8 million. But to the budget, the cost of the life of a troop

is only the $500,000 death benefit. I have already noted that in this war, we have

been penny wise and pound foolish—a little extra spending earlier on would have

made the war, in the short run, seem more costly, but it would have saved us billions in the long run. But the billions that it would have saved the budget pale in

comparison to what it would have meant to those who have died unnecessarily or

who face a lifetime with disabilities far worse than needed to have been the case.

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2This is a point that even conservative commentators have emphasized. Anne Applebaum, for

instance, noted that ‘‘Countries that would once have supported American foreign policy on principle, simply out of solidarity or friendship, will now have to be cajoled, or paid, to join us. Count

that along with the lives of soldiers and civilians, the dollars and equipment—as another cost

of the war.’’ Anne Applebaum, ‘‘Why They Don’t Like Us,’’ Washington Post, October 2, 2007,

p. A19.

I am not a lawyer, but I do know this: any private employer who had acted in this

way, with consequences as serious, would be liable for a suit for gross negligence.

There are other costs: for instance, the Dole-Shalala Commission estimated that

in one of five families with a seriously disabled veteran, someone in the family has

to give up their job to provide the necessary care.

Some of the costs are hard to quantify, but nonetheless real: Reservists and members of the National Guard who are forced to serve in Iraq find their lives and careers interrupted. Their employers lose the services of these often highly valued employees.

Economists emphasize the concept of opportunity costs. Resources devoted to the

war could have been used for other purposes. One of the main responsibilities of

the National Guard is to serve as a first responder in times of an emergency; their

services are invaluable, and when they are not available—because they are in

Iraq—everyone suffers when an emergency occurs. We saw that so clearly in Hurricane Katrina.

More broadly, we are today less equipped to handle a variety of challenges that

might arise. If we are lucky, we may muddle through. We may not be so lucky. Already, one of the opportunity costs is apparent: while we were focusing on the weapons of mass destruction that did not exist in Iraq—and that we should have known

did not exist—a new country joined the Nuclear Club.

Our country and our businesses are suffering due to America’s changed standing

in the eyes of the world because of the war and the way it has been conducted, as

shown in survey after survey. These surveys show a clear relation between attitudes

toward America more generally and attitudes toward American businesses. In many

quarters, the supposed war for democracy has even given democracy a bad name.

I have, so far, emphasized the direct economic costs as well as the opportunity

costs—the diversion of funds that could have been used in so many other and better

ways. I would be remiss, however, if I did not note that there are other costs: in

the long run, the squandering of America’s leadership role in the international community, the diversion of attention from critical global issues, including issues like

global warming and nuclear proliferation in North Korea—that simply won’t go

away on their own, and that cannot simply wait to be addressed—may represent

the largest and most longstanding legacy of this unfortunate war. 2

MACRO-ECONOMIC COSTS

Finally, I want to turn to the macroeconomic costs. First, I want to dispel a widespread misconception that wars are good for the economy—a misconception that

arose from the role that World War II played in helping the US emerge from the

Great Depression. But at least since Keynes, we know how to maintain the economy

at or near full employment in far better ways; there are ways of spending money

that stimulate the economy in the short run while at the same time leaving it

stronger for the long run. This war has been especially bad for the economy. Some

of the costs are becoming apparent only now; others we will face for years to come.

There are four major categories of macroeconomic impacts. The first is through

the war’s effect on oil prices. Before the war, 5 years ago, the price of oil was under

$25 a barrel. As you know, now it has hit $100 a barrel. Before the war, future markets expected the $25 price to persist for at least a decade. Yes, there would be increased demands from China and India; but in well-functioning markets, supply responds to meet new demands. With large supplies and low extraction costs in the

Middle East, markets expected production would increase in tandem with demand.

The war changed this equation. How much of the increased price should be blamed

on the War? In our book, we have taken a very conservative position that only $5

to $10 of the increase is due to the war, and that the price increase will last for

only 7 to 8 years. We think those assumptions are unrealistically conservative. For

instance, futures markets today expect that the price will remain in excess of $80

for at least the next decade. We chose to be excessively conservative, simply because

we did not want to have an unnecessary squabble: as it was, even with these very

conservative estimates, the costs of the war are vastly higher than its advocates

were willing to admit. (Even the CBO, at the time we did our earlier study in 2006,

was projecting that the total cost of the war would amount to only a half trillion

dollars, still ten times greater than the Administration had estimated at the beginVerDate 11-MAY-2000 11:44 Jan 30, 2009 Jkt 042773 PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\42773.TXT DianeA PsN: DianeA
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ning of the war. Our objective was the more modest one of trying to get people to

realize that this war was going to be far more expensive than that.)

Money spent to buy oil is money not available to be spent here in the U.S. It’s

as simple as that. Lower aggregate demand leads, through a multiplier, to lower national income.

The second impact arises from the fact that Iraq expenditures do not stimulate

the economy in the short run as much as expenditures on, say, infrastructure or

education that are so badly needed here at home. A dollar spent to hire a Nepalese

contractor—or even an Iraqi—in Iraq does not have the first round, second round,

or nth round impacts that a dollar spent here does.

The third impact is that both directly, and indirectly, through the mounting deficits, Iraq expenditures are crowding out investments that would have increased

America’s productivity in the future.

The mounting Iraqi war debt has meant that we have had to borrow more and

more money from abroad—America as a country is far more indebted to others than

it was five years ago. We and our children will be paying interest on this debt. The

fact that we borrowed rather than paid the bills as they came due does not mean

that the war was for free; it only postponed the payments. The payments we will

have to make to service this debt will lower the standard of living of Americans

from what it otherwise would have been—an outcome which is particularly harsh,

given that median American income today is lower than it was 5 years ago (which

is simply to say that, adjusting for inflation, most Americans are worse off now than

they were 5 years ago). This was true even before America went into its current

downturn.

It should have come as no surprise that, when America’s great financial institutions, Citibank and Merrill Lynch, needed money quickly, there were no pools of liquid cash available here. High oil prices and high national savings in China and elsewhere have created huge pools of wealth outside the United States, and it was to

these that our financial institutions had to turn. It is, and should be, a cause of concern.

Until recently, it was a surprise to some that, in spite of these obvious ways in

which the Iraq war was weakening the American economy, the economy seemed as

strong as it did. Was there something, after all, to the old adage about wars being

good for the economy? To me, and to other serious students of the American economy, there was, however, an obvious answer. These weaknesses were being hidden,

just as much of the other costs of the war were being hidden from easy view. The

exposure of these weaknesses was, it seemed to me, just around the corner—perhaps even more than the long vaunted victory that remained elusively just around

the corner. The macroeconomic effects were being hidden by lose monetary policy,

a flood of liquidity, and lax regulation. These allowed household savings rates to

plummet to zero, the lowest levels since the great Depression, and fed a housing

bubble, allowing hundreds of billions of dollars to be taken out in mortgage equity

withdrawals that increased the irresponsible consumption boom. As I once put it

somewhat graphically, the subprime mortgages and lending programs with slogans

like ‘‘qualified at birth’’ meant that easy credit was available for anyone this side

of being on a life support system. Our financial institutions and credit rating agencies came to believe in financial alchemy, that these toxic mortgages could somehow

be converted into AAA assets. We were living on borrowed money and borrowed

time. There had to come a day of reckoning, and it has now arrived. The games we

played—which for a time allowed us to hide the true costs of the Iraq war—are now

over. And, just as our troops paid a high price for our penny wise pound foolish policies, so too will our economy.

The cost to the economy of this downturn will be enormous. We do not know, of

course, how long or how deep the downturn will be, but it is likely to be worse than

any we have experienced in the last quarter of a century. Even if growth this year

is 0.8 percent (as the IMF forecasts), and next year growth starts to resuscitate, to

2 percent, and in 2010 returns to its potential growth of, say, 3.5 percent (a quicker

recovery than most would expect), the total lost output over those 3 years—the discrepancy between the economy’s actual output and its potential—will amount to

some one and a half trillion dollars.

REFORMS

This war has been very costly. We have made many mistakes. Some have been

honest errors of judgment. But when there are repeated mistakes of this size, as

social scientists, we have to ask, are there some systematic patterns? Also, as policy

analysts, we have to ask, are there things that we can do to avoid their repetition?

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In our book, we set out a list of eighteen recommendations for reform. Here, I want

to highlight five.

First, we should not be funding any war years after the beginning through emergency appropriations. If we do, it should be a sign that things are not going as expected, and there should be a detailed, written explanation to Congress. Second,

there should be a full, comprehensive, accrual-based consolidated accounting of all

the budgetary and non-budgetary national defense costs; with so many of the costs

years, even decades, down the line, cash accounting not only fails to provide an accurate picture of the cost but encourages what we have seen: short-sighted decisions

to keep today’s costs down which simply raise the overall costs. And unless the accounting is comprehensive, it encourages cost shifting. Furthermore, the accounting,

particularly of military expenditures, must be auditable, with those in charge held

responsible. Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley to hold private firms accountable; but

the Defense Department has not lived up to these same standards. The President

has not presented, on a regular basis, an accounting of how much the war in Iraq

has cost us. These costs span the Departments of Defense, State, Labor, Veterans

Affairs, Energy, Social Security, and other agencies. It is only through hard work

that we, and others, have been able to piece together the accounts.

Third, if we think a war is worth fighting, we must force Americans to pay up

front and not shift the costs to our children; we cannot pretend that one can have

a war for free. We must set aside the money required to pay health care and disability benefits for the returning veterans. We require companies to do this, and we

should ask nothing less of ourselves. We cannot let what they receive be hostage

to the whims of a future political process, and we should not be creating enormous

new unfunded entitlements.

Fourth, we must not place the burden on so few who are asked to do repeated

tours of duty. It is unfair, and in the long run, as we have seen, it is costly, not

just because of the toll it puts on those put through such repeated stress, but also

because it will inevitably make it more difficult and more expensive for the armed

forces to recruit in the future.

Fifth, we should be wary of privatizing the military to the extent that we have;

it has been expensive, in so many ways. There are some things that should be

privatized, but there are some things which should not: this is one area where economic theory and historical experience suggests that we should not. To the extent

that private contractors are used, there is a need both for greater reliance on competitive bidding and more oversight; and we need a full accounting of the costs, including those costs taxpayers will pay outside the defense department budget.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

America is a rich country. The question is not whether we can afford to squander

$3 trillion or $5 trillion. We can. But our strength will be sapped. We will be less

prepared to meet challenges in the future, and there are huge opportunity costs.

Some of our children will not have the medical care that should be a right to every

citizen born in a country as rich as ours; some will bear the scars for life. We are

not investing as we should in technology and science, to make our economy as competitive as it should and needs to be. We worry about the inroads China is making

in Africa—but our foreign aid budget in Africa amounts to but a few days fighting

in Iraq. With a fraction of the amount spent on this war we could have had a new

Marshall plan, which would have done so much to win the hearts and minds of

those around the world. We have talked about the huge problem facing our social

security system, putting into jeopardy the economic security of our elderly. But for

a fraction of the cost of this war, we could have put Social Security on a sound footing for the next half century or more.

Economists are fond of saying that there is no such thing as a free lunch. It is

also the case that there is no such thing as a free war. This is not the first time

that an Administration tried to enlist support for an unpopular war by trying to

hide the true and full costs from the American people. And this is not the first time

that America and the American economy have suffered as a result. The inflationary

episode that America went through beginning in the late 1960’s was at least partly

a consequence of President Johnson’s failure to own up fully to the costs and adjust

other tax and expenditures appropriately. This time, the underlying economic situation is different, and, accordingly, the consequences have been different but in many

ways even more severe.

The budgetary costs of this war have been huge. But the costs that go beyond the

budget are at least as large, and the meter is still ticking. Every year of this war

has seen the costs rise. But even if the troops stay where they are, two more years

will add, conservatively, another $500 billion to the total tally. No one can know

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for sure whether, when we depart, things will get better (as more Iraqis seem to

believe) or worse. No one can know for sure whether staying an extra 2 years will

make the chaos that might follow less—or greater. But it is your solemn responsibility to make the judgment: is this the best way of spending $500 billion? Is it the

best way to strengthen America’s capacity to meet future challenges, to promote democracy around the world, to help create the kind of world, here and abroad, that

we would like our children to inherit? For too long, this Congress and this Administration has approached the problem by dribs and drabs: a little more today might

just do the trick; a little more later will help us turn the proverbial corner. But as

the late Senator Dirksen said, ‘‘a billion here, a billion there, and pretty soon you’re

talking about real money.’’ Today, we would have to say, a trillion here, a trillion

there, and pretty soon you’re talking about real money.

Even a rich country ignores costs of this magnitude at its peril.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT D. HORMATS, VICE CHAIRMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS

(INTERNATIONAL)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Joint Economic Committee,

It is a great pleasure for me to appear before this Committee once again, and especially so because the topic you have chosen to consider today—the cost of the Iraq

War—is of great importance to our country. This hearing also is particularly timely,

because next month will mark the beginning of the fifth year of that war. What was

originally expected to be a short and cheap military exercise has become the second

longest war in American history (Vietnam being the longest) and the second most

expensive (World War II having been considerably more costly).

Now is a good time for a deeply divided nation to develop a better understanding

of the costs of this war and to use that information—factoring in a variety of other

national security considerations as well, of course—to determine whether these costs

are still worth paying. And if they are considered worth paying, we need to consider

how to cover the costs in a way that is fiscally responsible and that will put America’s longer-term finances on a stronger footing.

To be sure, the decision on whether, and at what level, to continue the American

military presence in Iraq is not primarily an economic one—nor should it be. It

must depend heavily on a range of considerations that relate to the positive or negative consequences of changes in troop levels (or of the in-country mission of our

troops) for US national security and for the future stability of Iraq and the Middle

East. It must also factor in other important considerations such as whether political

reconciliation and stabilization in Iraq are moving forward rapidly enough, and

whether or not the continued loss of life and the injuries suffered by Americans are

worth the outcomes we seek. Whatever the case, the Congress should use this period

to consider—in as non-partisan a way as possible—how in the future this country

can avoid the mistakes that have been made in the funding of this conflict.

LACK OF A CANDID NATIONAL DEBATE ON WAR COSTS

Democracies function best when policies are based on the informed consent of the

governed. And here I emphasis the word informed. In most wars there is a tendency

to underestimate the cost at the outset—in part because of wishful thinking that

they will be short and cheap and in part because leaders often cannot immediately

judge at the outset. That was certainly true in Civil War, World War I and the Vietnam War. But there was generally a very candid, open and robust debate in the

Congress and among the American people about how to pay for a war once its costs

became apparent—and in some cases even in anticipation of rising costs.

During this war there has been a surprising absence of vigorous public or Congressional debate over war costs and how to pay them. In large measure that is because this war represents only a small portion of American GDP—roughly 1 percent

annually in direct budgetary terms—compared to World War II (around 40 percent

at its peak) the Korean War (around 15 percent) and Vietnam (around 10 percent).

So paying for the current war has not appeared to impose large visible costs on the

American economy—although, as I shall later point out, that is a deceptive illusion.

Also, in other wars higher taxes, and elevated borrowing that pushed up interest

rates, forced Americans to come to grips with the price of the war and political leaders to feel a greater sense of accountability about war costs. This war so far has

seen taxes lowered and has had no impact on interest rates; for the better part of

the war the Federal Reserve was cutting rates and long term bond rates were quite

stable.

Moreover, the fact that this war has been financed almost entirely by using

‘‘emergency budget supplementals’’ that circumvent the normal budget process has

meant that the executive branch and the Congress have skirted the issue of tradeoffs in the budget. Thus a great deal of unnecessary and non-essential spending, including climbing numbers of ‘‘earmarks,’’ has occurred even as the cost of the war

has increased—a development that never before occurred in American wartime history.

Normally when America goes to war, non-essential spending programs are reduced to make room in the budget for the higher costs of the war. Individual programs that benefit specific constituencies are sacrificed for the common good. FDR

himself slashed or removed from the budget entirely many of his pet New Deal programs to pay for World War II. And taxes have never been cut during a major

American war; for example, President Eisenhower adamantly resisted pressure from

Senate Republicans for a tax cut during the Korean War.

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PAYING FOR PAST WARS—COMPARED TO THIS ONE

One month after the attack on Pearl Harbor plunged America into World War II,

President Roosevelt appeared before Congress to deliver his 1942 State of the Union

Address. He was straightforward about the massive expenses the war would require. ‘‘War,’’ he said, ‘‘costs money. That means taxes and bonds and bonds and

taxes. It means cutting luxuries and other non essentials.’’

Higher taxes as well as cuts in luxuries and non-essential spending have been

hallmarks of fiscal policy during every major war in which the U.S. has engaged—

until now. The Iraq War has been paid for in a very different way. As noted above,

it is the first war during which taxes have been cut and non-essential government

spending has increased, and quite substantially at that. This has meant that the

bond part of FDR’s equation (i.e. Federal borrowing) has been the sole source of

funding for the costs of this War. This has made it easier for Americans to avoid

coming to grips with the cost of the war, because no popular programs were cut and

no taxes were levied—no economic inconvenience to them.

By the end of fiscal year 2008, the Iraq War will have cost $608 billion in direct

budgetary appropriations, plus another and far larger set of costs that are not directly in the budget. These have been described in a Joint Economic Committee Report entitled ‘‘War at Any Price?’’ released in November 2007, and in my friend and

co-panelist Joe Stiglitz’s recent book entitled The Three Trillion Dollar War. This

$608 billion figure also does not include the interest that has been paid on funds

previously borrowed to cover the costs of the war since 2003 (which itself must be

borrowed). That brings total borrowing for the war close to $650 billion dollars. [The

direct costs of the War in Afghanistan for the U.S. come to around $200 billion so

far, although I do not include them in this analysis, even though many of the same

considerations apply; but that war is dissimilar in one major respect, because it was

and is a ‘‘war of necessity,’’ and there is far greater foreign engagement.]

The Iraq War differs from other major American wars of the past in yet one more

respect as well: a substantial portion of the money borrowed to pay for it (roughly

40 percent) comes from abroad. That has been the case on only one other American

War—the Revolution, when borrowing from France and the Netherlands proved critical to the success of the Continental Army.

I make these points of differentiation between this war and past wars because it

is important to understand the unique character of the funding of this war and to

put it in historical perspective. The methods by which American wars have been

paid for since 1776 are described in greater detail in a book I have written recently

called The Price of Liberty: Paying for Americas Wars from the Revolution to the War

on Terror. There is merit in studying how presidents and Congresses have paid for

wars in the past as we attempt to put the policies used to pay for this war in historical context—and seek to do a better job in the future.

ABSENCE OF SHARED SACRIFICE

There is another point of history worth emphasizing: war financing is not simply

about money. Clearly wars, as FDR emphasized, cost a lot of money. But throughout

history national leaders also have recognized the importance of conducting war financing in ways that connect Americans at home to the armed forces abroad, demonstrating that as American forces are making sacrifices on the battlefield—and

many thousands of them are making major sacrifices every single day during this

war—the American people are making sacrifices in their behalf at home. Woodrow

Wilson’s Treasury Secretary, William Gibbs McAdoo, stated during the early months

of World War I that ‘‘a man who could not serve in the trenches of France might

never the less serve in the financial trenches at home’’ by buying war bonds (called

Liberty Bonds). He coined the term ‘‘capitalizing patriotism’’ to emphasize that patriotism required all Americans to make financial sacrifices to support the nation’s

troops when they were at war, putting their lives at risk. He did not see this as

a partisan measure—but as one of support for American troops.

FDR was even more blunt, emphasizing the need for shared sacrifice. ‘‘‘Battles are

not won,’’ he stated, ‘‘by soldiers or sailors who think first of their own safety. And

wars are not won by people who are concerned primarily with their own comfort,

their own convenience and their own pocketbooks.’’ Yet the American people as a

whole have been asked to give up nothing for this war—they have been treated to

tax cuts and increases in government programs of various sorts. The only sacrifices

are those being made by the troops and their families.

I believe that in the current environment Americans would willingly support enactment of a ‘‘tax surcharge for veterans’’ levied on citizens in the top income bracket. The tax would not be to pay for the war itself—because so many Americans either oppose this war or find it futile and therefore would not, at this point, support

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a tax that appeared in any way to perpetuate an American presence in Iraq. The

tax revenues would go into a fund dedicated specifically to ensure that wounded and

disabled veterans receive the highest quality care for as long as they need it, which

for many will be their entire lifetimes.

The cost of treating the many thousands of returning men and women who receive

various kinds of serious wounds, among which are the much discussed traumatic

brain injury (TBI), or are victims of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), will be

enormous. These wounds and conditions also take a heavy toll on the families of

victims. I believe that even Americans who are bitterly opposed to this war would

support such a tax to ensure the provision of lifelong disability and medical care

for these veterans; estimates for such costs range into the hundreds of billions of

dollars over many decades, especially since disabilities often manifest themselves

years after veterans have come home from the battle field.

BORROWING FOR THE WAR

I have been asked by the Committee to focus a portion of my remarks on the issue

of borrowing for this war—which, sadly, receives little public attention. In all major

wars in our past (with the exception of the first Iraq War when President George

H.W. Bush, Secretary James Baker and Secretary Nicholas Brady organized massive and direct financial support from America’s friends and allies to pay the lion’s

share of the war), a significant amount of additional Federal borrowing has occurred. This is because administrations and Congresses did not want to place the

entire burden of the war cost on the current generation of tax payers and sought

to spread out the cost over time. Such a policy was prudent, because the Nation

could not absorb tax increases large enough to pay the full cost of the war during

the course of the conflict without crippling the economy. But they also believed that

taxes should pay some portion of the cost, i.e. that the entire cost burden should

not be shifted to future generations of taxpayers through borrowing.

So before, or in the early stages of, every major war in the past there was an active debate in the Congress and the Executive branch—and in parallel among the

American public—over what proportion of the war should be paid for by taxes and

what proportion by borrowing. This was true in the Civil War, in which Secretary

Salmon P. Chase informed President Lincoln and the Congress that he proposed to

divide up the incremental costs of the war on the basis of 25 percent taxes and 75

percent borrowing; Secretary McAdoo set and nearly achieved the goal of paying for

one third of World War I through taxes; and Secretary Henry Morgenthau set a goal

of paying half the cost of World War II through taxes, although in the final analysis

he only got to 45 percent (a nonetheless impressive feat); President Harry S. Truman aimed to pay almost all of the Korean War through taxes, although he fell

short.

The underlying point is that during all of these conflicts there was a vigorous national debate on how best to pay the bill—how much current taxpayers should pay

and how much should be borrowed and therefore shouldered by future taxpayers

through debt service. Usually there were frequent and well attended Congressional

hearings on the matter. Sadly, we haven’t had that kind of debate regarding this

war.

The notion that national security can be paid for ‘‘on the cheap’’—using borrowed

funds alone—is a dangerous one, especially for a nation that is likely to be engaged

for several decades in what the Pentagon refers to as the Long War on Terrorism.

If that is the case, and there is good reason to believe it is, Americans should be

candidly told the costs and exactly how the money will be used. The American public should understand the long term resource requirements not only for the military

but also for national intelligence, improved diplomacy, increased foreign assistance,

augmented homeland defense, and better support for police, firefighters and public

health authorities. The last of these will also be important if the Nation is hit by

a pandemic—for which all authorities acknowledge we are grossly ill-prepared.

Funding this war on terror or any other war without presenting Americans with

a comprehensive package that relates the various components to the overall goal

does not enable the electorate to understand the full costs or consider the most appropriate way of paying them. Once they understand these, they will be better able

to decide whether they wish to give up other programs to make room in the budget

to cover some of the costs, or pay higher taxes, or borrow more or simply not fund

some of these national security items at all.

A robust debate on the topic of war spending (for this or for any other war) and

how to allocate the burden between current and future taxpayers is an unambiguously good idea for our democracy, in part because in debating taxes and borrowing

for a war, Americans can also debate the wisdom of the war itself when it is—as

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the Iraq War is—a war of choice. It also brings into play the issue of budgetary priorities and tradeoffs. In debating whether to engage in a ‘‘war of choice,’’ Americans

should be cognizant of the important government programs that could be paid for

with the resources that would otherwise be devoted to paying for that war. Dwight

Eisenhower—certainly no pacifist but a former Supreme Allied Commander—recognized that war diverts resources from other purposes and therefore a decision to

enter one should be thoughtfully and carefully taken. He put the tradeoffs as follows: ‘‘Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies

in the final sense a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are

cold and are not clothed.’’

The November JEC Report points out that the money spent on the Iraq War during one single day could enroll an additional 58,000 kids in Head Start, make college more affordable for 160,000 low-income students through Pell Grants, hire

nearly 11,000 border patrol agents, or put an additional 14,000 police officers on our

streets. The large sums so far spent also could have helped to put Social Security

and Medicare on a more sustainable basis. And a small fraction of them could have

helped to eradicate or contain diseases that devastate the lives of millions in Africa

and Asia. But we have had no such debate over what economists call the ‘‘opportunity costs’’ of war spending and thus no such tradeoffs were considered.

The broader implications of paying for the war entirely by increasing the Federal

debt are inter-generational. Borrowing to pay the full cost of the war passes the cost

wholly to future taxpayers. The JEC Report calculates that by the end of fiscal year

2008 the additional Federal debt resulting from the war will total $660 billion—and

that this figure will grow to $1.7 trillion by the end of 2017. It further points out

that within the coming year the debt service cost for Iraq War spending alone will

exceed Federal spending for education and health research.

Again, the point is that there are major tradeoffs here. Is the continued cost of

the Iraq War worth the commitment of resources that potentially could be used otherwise for national social programs or to shore up homeland security or for other

purposes? Or, if we do wish to pursue the war at current troop levels—or bring

troop levels down to a Korean War-like presence as suggested by Secretary Gates,

or engage in a sharp drawdown as recommended by the House Plan—are we willing

to give up other programs that are now being funded to pay the costs? These questions cannot be decided here, but what can be agreed on is that a vigorous debate

should be held about national priorities and tradeoffs for the use of Federal budgetary resources before any new decisions are taken about whether to undertake a

war of choice. It may well be that we will undertake such a war after all the considerations are aired, but at least then Americans will understand the resource implications of the decision, and recognize that certain things must be given up to pay

the price of that war. And even in a war of necessity, resource decisions need to

be taken in the context of a transparent dialog about the optimum way to pay the

bill.

There is also the issue of the degree to which borrowing for the war draws money

away from productive investment. (Of course, it is worth noting that higher taxes

would do that too, but I will focus in the borrowing side of the equation here.) It

is difficult to know precisely the degree to which money not borrowed by the Federal

Government to pay for the war would have gone into productive private sector investment as opposed to one-shot consumption. Presumably less Federal borrowing

for the war would have lowered the cost of capital and thus encouraged some additional private sector investment—although there is little evidence in recent years

that the cost of capital was an inhibiting factor in capital investment in the United

States. So it is difficult to measure with any precision how much private investment

was actually displaced by Federal borrowing for the war. Conceivably, the major impact of less Federal borrowing and thus a lower cost of capital could simply have

been to encourage even more consumer borrowing (which was already enormous)—

and that would have contributed little to national productivity.

More troubling is that borrowing for war, or for any other current purpose for that

matter, will impose a large debt burden on future generations at a time when Federal borrowing in the future will climb dramatically to pay for the skyrocketing costs

of social security and health care for the aged and the poor. These vital but costly

programs will put enormous stress on the Federal budget in coming decades, causing an additional increase in borrowing and/or taxes—or cuts in other programs.

Placing added burdens on Federal finances by accumulating additional war debt

now simply makes the management of this problem more difficult. In his celebrated

Farewell Address, President Washington enjoined Congress and his fellow citizens

to ‘‘discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not

ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burdens we ourselves ought to bear.’’

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But it is not simply war debt that is the problem. Our analysts at Goldman Sachs

anticipate that overall Federal borrowing over the next 10 years will amount to over

three trillion dollars—so there are other fiscal issues at play here besides the war.

There has been a general absence of fiscal discipline in Washington for nearly a decade. War costs would not have added to Federal debt to the degree that they have

if non-essential programs had been cut and earmarking been better contained—or

if taxes had been raised to pay for even a portion of the added costs of America’s

military efforts in Iraq.

A century and a half after President Washington’s Farewell Address, President

Eisenhower gave his own Farewell Address in which he counseled Americans ‘‘to

avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for our own ease and convenience the precious resources of tomorrow’’ and to avoid ‘‘mortgaging the material assets of our grandchildren. . . ’’ And yet we seem to have heeded neither of these

calls in recent years. That is not the fault of the war but of a less than rigorous

process of budgeting and resource allocation in Washington—and a seeming indifference to that by Americans in general.

Finally, as noted above, because roughly 40 percent of all Treasury securities are

sold abroad, that portion of war borrowing is financed by China, Japan, the Middle

East and Westem Europe. Thus, Americans are accumulating large interest and

debt repayment obligations to a number of other nations because of our budget deficits. After the US had accumulated debts to France and the Netherlands during the

Revolution, Treasury Secretary Hamilton and the Federalists, followed by the Jeffersonian Republicans, insisted that they be paid down promptly to preserve American creditworthiness.

That will not happen this time; America’s debt to other nations and its continued

dependence of their capital will climb dramatically in coming years. To be sure, this

country can sustain large foreign obligations today far better than the America of

the late 18th century, but growing amounts could still present problems. It is worth

noting here that while there appears to be consternation among many Americans

about this nation’s growing dependence on foreign capital, there is little apparent

recognition that we Americans have it in our power to reduce this dependence. We

can do so by saving more, running government surpluses, curbing the rate of growth

of consumption financed by borrowing, and using less imported oil. So far we are

moving in the wrong direction on all four counts (although consumer borrowing now

appears to be slowing) and thus will depend increasingly on foreign capital inflows.

It is also worth noting that this dependence constitutes a security vulnerability.

Were there to be another catastrophic terrorist attack in the near term, at a time

when foreign confidence in American finances is already low due to the crisis in our

credit markets and to the expectation of rising Federal deficits in coming years, the

massive sums of foreign funds that we count on—roughly $2–3 billion net every

working day—could decline precipitously. That would sharply slow an already weak

U.S. economy that would have been weakened further by the attack. It is worth recalling that in September 2001 the Federal Government had been running a budget

surplus for 4 years and the Nation was only half as dependent on foreign capital

as it is today—and we had no credit crisis. At that time foreign capital inflows

slowed for a while but resumed quickly, and the dollar proved remarkably resilient.

In current circumstances a drop on foreign flows could last longer, push up interest

rates due to a fall in available capital, and cause the dollar to plunge.

CONCLUSIONS

Several lessons can be drawn from the way this war has been paid for:

(1) Avoid paying for wars by supplementals. The process circumvents the need to

make budgetary tradeoffs, set resource priorities or sufficiently scrutinize how the

funds are being used. Even during the very poorly and non-transparently financed

Vietnam War, emergency supplementals were used to finance only about a quarter

of the costs. Democratic leaders in the Senate insisted that President Johnson and

Defense Secretary McNamara stop using this technique as it was undermining support for their policies in the Congress.

(2) Cut way back on earmarks, especially during war. During wars, such programs

divert budgetary funds from higher national priorities. Moreover, they create the notion that America can pay for its national security with no sacrifices—and indeed

new programs not on the national priority list can be funded with no heed being

paid to the need for even slight national sacrifices.

(3) Exercise more rigorous Congressional oversight over war spending. It is possible that even if the party in control of the White House and the party in control

of Congress are the same, there can be rigorous oversight of spending to curb waste.

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vestigate the National Defense Program) reportedly saved the American taxpayer an

estimated $15 billion during World War II. As historian David McCullough wrote,

‘‘Unquestionably [Truman’s] relentless watchdog role . . . greatly increased public

confidence in how the war was being run.’’ In the future the demands of the country

for greater attention to social programs at home will grow, so the military will need

to demonstrate that it is using its funds with maximum efficiency and on essential

requirements.

(4) Recognize the advantage of coalition diplomacy in paying for a war. The first

Iraq War demonstrated the military and the financial benefits of forging a strong

international coalition. That coalition provided additional fighting forces, greater legitimacy for the effort and foreign funds that helped to relieve the burden on the

American taxpayer.

(5) Take a long-term look at national finances. If the US allows its finances to deteriorate in coming years there will be serious consequences for the nation’s security

and its ability to address growing social needs such as education and health care—

as well as to provide for the requirements of what will soon become a rapidly retiring group of 76 million baby boomers. A new administration and a new Congress

will need to examine closely the future resource requirements of this nation—including the obligations we are accruing to retirees through Social Security and Medicare—and the likely budgetary resources that will be available to meet them. Congress and the president will need to find ways to ensure that projected outlays and

resource availability converge as opposed to diverge—which will be the case absent

changes in anticipated spending and revenue trajectories. It is difficult to see how

America’s growing needs can be met without tax increases, and if they are required,

they should be structured in ways that boost growth and savings and are consistent

with the longstanding principle on which the income tax was based starting during

the Civil War—fairness and progressivity.

I thank the Committee for giving me the opportunity to testify at this hearing

and welcome your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. RAND BEERS, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY

NETWORK, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Chairman Schumer, Vice Chair Maloney, Ranking Member

Brownback, Ranking Member Saxton and other Distinguished Members of the Committee, for giving me the honor of testifying today on the additional costs to our national security as a result of the War in Iraq.

The cost of the war in Iraq in terms of lives and treasure has been tremendous:

nearly 4,000 American troops have been killed; 30,000 American serviceman and

women have been wounded; and according to a report released by this committee,

the American economy has already incurred $1.3 trillion dollars in costs—a sobering

$16,500 per family of four.

What has that spending bought us? Diminishing respect for America around the

globe; the reconstitution of our terrorist and extremist enemies; and the over-extension of our military and diplomatic capacity. In Pakistan and Afghanistan Al Qaeda

and the Taliban have regained their strength and now operate with impunity. In

the broader Middle East, Iran has been let out of its strategic box and now wields

greater power. The war has severely overstretched and depleted our military, leaving us vulnerable and unable to respond effectively elsewhere. Freedom and democracy around the world have slid backwards, as American moral authority has been

tarnished and our ability to mobilize others to meet global challenges and the needs

of our citizens has been undermined.

AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND TERRORISM

The most direct costs to America’s security have come in the fight against Al

Qaeda. The war has empowered Al Qaeda and undermined American interests. It

has acted as a distraction, causing the United States to divert assets that were necessary to fight Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and put that time and energy

into Iraq—a country that had no operational relationship with Al Qaeda. Thanks

to this Administration’s strategic misallocation of resources, today Al Qaeda’s central leadership has established a new safe haven in northwest Pakistan even as Afghanistan continues to deteriorate.

The National Intelligence Estimate, released this past summer on The Terrorist

Threat to the U.S. Homeland, concluded that the greatest threat to the American

homeland emanates from Al Qaeda’s ‘‘central leadership,’’ which is based in the tribal areas of northwest Pakistan. The NIE also concluded that, thanks to its new safe

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haven the organization has increased its capacity to directly attack the United

States.

Al Qaeda is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan

federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its

top leadership.’’

The security situation in Afghanistan also continues to deteriorate as the Administration focuses its energy on Iraq. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral

Mullen, admitted that the main focus of U.S. efforts is on Iraq: ‘‘In Afghanistan, we

do what we can; in Iraq, we do what we must.’’ As a result, the Taliban has returned to lead a growing insurgency against the Afghan government and U.S. and

NATO forces. The security situation has grown worse every year since late 2002

when we were preparing to invade Iraq—a concern which I raised while still in government in the months before the invasion to no avail. 2007 was the deadliest on

record for U.S. forces in Afghanistan, with fatalities four times higher than in 2004.

The number of suicide bombings has also increased dramatically and civilian casualties have also increased. The Taliban has regained strength and confidence and operates with impunity in large parts of the country. Though unable to hold territory,

the Taliban remain a force for intimidation and instability, increasingly operating

in battalion-sized units of 400 or more. And despite the near-total eradication of

poppy during the Taliban’s time, opium production has again become a routine part

of life in rural Afghanistan—providing more than 90 percent of the world’s supply

while helping corrupt the government and fund terrorism and the insurgency.

In the last year, we have also seen our Iraq preoccupation contribute to Pakistan’s

political instability. While we focused on the ‘‘surge’’ in early 2007, we ignored a

brewing crisis in Pakistan—a country that is not only at the heart of our struggle

against terrorism but also happens to be a nuclear power. We were slow to realize

that our strategy of using Musharraf to keep Al Qaeda at bay was failing, and that

instead his autocratic rule was creating instability in Pakistan proper. By conducting a Musharraf policy, instead of a Pakistan policy we alienated the people of

Pakistan. The hope that Benazir Buhtto would bridge the divide collapsed with her

assassination. While the election last week was a welcome step forward, the attendant instability and the questions about how to deal with Al Qaeda and Taliban elements remain serious strategic issues—issues that that this Administration could

have addressed more carefully and thoughtfully if its efforts weren’t so heavily focused on Iraq.

Meanwhile, the conflict in Iraq has also given terrorists a new tool for recruitment, fundraising, training and indoctrination of terrorists. Prior to 2003, Al Qaeda

had no formal presence on the ground in Iraq. But, as a result of the U.S. invasion,

Iraq has become a magnet for foreign fighters—many of whom pledge allegiance to

Al Qaeda. In 2006, the nation’s 16 intelligence agencies agreed that the war has created a ‘‘cause celebre’’ for terrorists around the world. And the July 2007 National

Intelligence Estimate concluded that ‘‘its association with Al Qaeda in Iraq helps

al Qaeda to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and

to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.’’

Thus, it is no surprise that 84 percent of foreign policy experts recently told an

independent bipartisan survey by the Center for American Progress and Foreign

Policy Magazine that they do not think the United States is winning the war on

terror.

IRAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The War in Iraq has also had grave consequences for our position in the Middle

East. Iran has been one of the greatest beneficiaries of the Iraq War. For years,

American policy in the Persian Gulf was based on playing Iran and Iraq off each

other, thus containing both. The Bush Administration’s catastrophic Iraq policy

tipped the balance, allowing Iran to step into the power vacuum inside Iraq and increase its influence in the region. Iran is now an ascendant power, which uses its

influence to oppose American interests.

In Iraq, Iran’s influence has increased tremendously. Many of the Shi’a political

leaders, whom the United States has empowered, spent years in exile in Iran during

Saddam Hussein’s rule. They maintain close political ties with Tehran. To take just

one example, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which represents one of

the two largest Shi’a political movements in Iraq, was originally formed in Iran. In

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addition, there is little doubt that Iran has contributed weapons and tactical guidance to some of the insurgent groups that have attacked American forces.

Meanwhile, Iran also increased its influence throughout the Middle East. While

Iran spent the 1990s and early parts of this decade concerned primarily with the

security of its own borders against the threat of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban,

today it finds itself unfettered. This has left it free to pursue a more aggressive and

anti-U.S. strategy throughout the region through the support for extremist groups,

most notably Hezbollah and Hamas. As a result, it is more difficult to achieve any

progress in ending the Arab-Israeli conflict or stabilizing Lebanon.

The Iraq War has also improved Iran’s position vis-a`-vis its uranium enrichment

program. The fact that the United States went to war based on the threat of weapons of mass destruction, only to find none, undermined our global authority on this

issue, making it more difficult to bring allies together to oppose Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Moreover, our large military presence in Iraq today makes any

military threats against Iran’s nuclear facilities less credible. Limited attack capabilities reduce the likelihood of success against difficult known targets and the uncertainty of having identified all the targets only complicates the situation. With no

assurance of success, an attack will invite an asymmetric insurgent/terrorist response against our forces in Iraq as well as attacks in Lebanon and Israel.

Thus, on just about every measure Iran finds itself more powerful today then it

did 5 years ago—before the start of the war.

THE STRAINS ON OUR MILITARY

The Iraq war has severely overstretched our ground forces and has taken a tremendous toll on the Army, the Marines and National Guard. Not since Vietnam

have our ground forces been in such a state.

Of the Army’s more than 40 combat brigades, all but the First Brigade of the Second Infantry Division, which is permanently based in South Korea, have served at

least one tour, often longer than the 12 month ‘‘limit.’’ More than three fourths have

served more than one tour in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army has been continually

forced to violate its own dwell-time policy, which calls for troops to receive 24

months for recuperation and retraining for every 12 months deployed. In many

cases soldiers have been sent back to Iraq after being home only 9 months.

The pace of deployments is severely affecting combat readiness. Two-thirds of the

Army—virtually all of the active Army’s combat brigades not currently deployed to

Iraq or Afghanistan—are rated ‘‘not combat ready.’’ In fact General Casey, Chief of

Staff of the Army, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Tuesday that, ‘‘The

cumulative effects of the last six-plus years at war have left our army out of balance, consumed by the current fight and unable to do the things we know we need

to do to properly sustain our all-volunteer force and restore our flexibility for an uncertain future.’’

The war is also placing great strain on the Marine Corps. The Marines were

charged with pacifying Anbar province and signs of severe strain are appearing in

America’s 911 force. As the Marine Corps Commandant James Conway has noted,

as reported in the Los Angeles Times, ‘‘back-to-back deployments were stretching

the Marine Corps thin, giving it little or no time to train young enlisted personnel

and officers for amphibious assaults, cold-weather warfare and other ‘core competencies. ’

Just as worrisome is the state of our Army National Guard. The National Guard

and Reserve are already suffering from severe shortages of equipment and available

combat personnel. The National Guard has become a shell of its former self and in

many states around the country the Guard would struggle to respond to a natural

or man-made disaster—just as the Kansas National Guard struggled to respond to

the severe tornados last year.

WORKING WITH OUR ALLIES,

The Iraq War has also caused the world’s respect for America—one of the fundamental sources of our strength—to evaporate, even among our closest allies. The latest Pew Global Attitudes survey from June 2007 found some disturbing trends regarding how America is viewed in the world.

In Germany, one of our most strategically important European allies, only 30 percent of the people have a positive view of the United States, down from 78 percent

in 2000. In Turkey, a Muslim democracy and NATO ally, approval ratings of the

United States have dropped from 52 percent to a dismal 9 percent. In Britain—our

partner in Iraq and most reliable ally—favorability ratings have dropped from 83

percent in 2000 to only 51 percent last year.

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This is not just a question of wanting other countries to like us. It is a question

of being able to mobilize others around our ideas and interests. It is a question of

having the moral authority to press others not to torture political prisoners. It goes

to the very questions of America’s ability to lead. These are among the most significant strategic costs associated with the unpopularity that has come from the Iraq

War.

Take for example the question of more NATO troops for Afghanistan. We need

a greater military commitment from the Alliance, to help stabilize Afghanistan and

prevent the reemergence of a terrorist haven—one of our core national interests.

Yet, public opinion in Europe has conflated the necessary war in Afghanistan with

the unnecessary war in Iraq. The whole venture is now so unpopular, and the domestic political cost of providing more troops for Afghanistan has become so high,

that it has created a major impediment in getting the support we need for the mission. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the United States’ unpopularity has made it much more

difficult for the current government to show restraint in pursuing the PKK into

Iraq.

For months the Turkish government beseeched the United States to do more, but

its calls went unanswered as we were preoccupied in Baghdad and Anbar. As a result, America’s popularity dropped and domestic pressure to respond grew ever

stronger. Now, we are faced with an even more dangerous situation in Northern

Iraq. Finally, in countries across the Muslim world from Pakistan to Morocco our

image is so tainted that local politicians who work closely with the United States

are viewed with suspicion or simply discredited, making it far more difficult for us

to win the ideological struggle with Al Qaeda.

These are only some concrete examples of the very real strategic costs that we

face because of our damaged image around the world.

THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC FOCUS

Finally, there is the question of strategic focus. Iraq has occupied the majority of

our political leadership’s attention and a huge proportion of the national security

budget. As long as our troops remain there in large numbers this will not change,

nor should it. But the question is: should our troops be there or should our focus

be elsewhere?

As a government servant, who spent thirty-five years working on national security

issues, I understand that we can never address all of the serious national security

concerns that we face at once. Tradeoffs need to be made on time and resources,

and the day is never long enough. But the reality is that as long as this government’s efforts are so strongly focused on Iraq, other priorities will not get the attention they deserve, other national security issues will find funds limited; and, when

situations around the world explode, we will find ourselves surprised and trying to

make up time.

To understand this dynamic one need only take a look at some of the most recent

serious international incidents: Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the burning of the American embassy; the ongoing crises in Pakistan and Kenya; the increasing tensions between Turkey and the PKK in Northern Iraq and the looming

friction with a muscle-flexing Russia. In all of these cases, the United States was

caught off guard and had to scramble for the right policy, instead of seeing the crisis

coming in advance and acting to mitigate the danger. This is not to say that our

people on the ground did not see the development building, but that those in Washington are so absorbed with Iraq that they did not have the capacity to respond effectively. As long as we are in Iraq with such large numbers of troops, we will continue to be in a reactive posture to events in the rest of the world. Other threats

and opportunities such as an increasingly powerful China, Russia’s turn away from

democracy, instability in Africa or growing anti-Americanism in Latin America will

be neglected to the detriment of our security.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Iraq war has not only made the world a more dangerous place,

but has distracted the United States from pivotal foreign policy priorities, harmed

America’s prestige and international credibility, and hurt our ability to respond to

emerging challenges.

The world is a complex place full of threats and dangers, and the United States

has many interests and values to protect. By its strategic misstep into an ill-conceived war in Iraq, this Administration has found itself unable handle more significant threats elsewhere—and that is costing us abroad and at home.

For years now the debate in this country has been about whether the situation

in Iraq is getting better or worse, whether this benchmark or that benchmark has

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1White House Office of Management and Budget. 2007. ‘‘Draft 2007 Report to Congress on

the Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations.’’ Washington, DC.

been met, or whether or not violence in Iraq is down by this percent or that percent.

I fear that these arguments miss a central point. It is not a question of whether

or not the surge is working—the surge is a short-term security band-aid to a longerterm political problem.

The question we need to be asking is one of opportunity costs and strategic costs

to the United States. We’re seeing a new debate emerge—one where we look at the

financial costs of Iraq and their impact on U.S. priorities. I want to make sure

Americans fully understand the global consequences of where we are now. The strategic sinkhole in Iraq means that our priorities at home and around the world are

not being met. It is difficult to see how remaining in Iraq will offer this country the

opportunity to move forward on any of these concerns. And it is equally difficult for

me to understand how remaining in Iraq without a disengagement strategy will

break the culture of dependency and ensure an Iraqi government and security force

more committed to Iraq’s future than we are.

Thank you for the opportunity to present these ideas, and thank you to the Committee for highlighting such an important topic.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SCOTT WALLSTEN, PH.D., VICE PRESIDENT FOR RESEARCH

AND SENIOR FELLOW, IGROWTHGLOBAL, SENIOR FELLOW, GEORGETOWN CENTER

FOR BUSINESS & PUBLIC POLICY

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the costs of the war.

I estimate that the expected net present value of the total direct costs of the war

are approximately $1 trillion to the U.S., and closer to $2 trillion globally.

The real direct economic costs of the war include not only expenditures from the

U.S. budget allocated for the war, but also injuries, lives lost, and lost productivity

from reservists who cannot do their civilian jobs because they have been called up

for service.

My coauthor, Katrina Kosec, and I began this project in 2005 and have updated

our numbers periodically since then. (I submitted the original 2005 paper, which explains our methodology in detail, to the Committee). We have found that the total

direct economic costs of the war at any given point in time tend to exceed budget

appropriations by about 20–25 percent.

As wealthy as our nation is, our resources are limited and must be spent carefully. Other areas of policy attempt to explicitly take into consideration the full economic costs and benefits of government actions. President Ronald Reagan signed an

executive order requiring certain agencies to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for any

proposed major regulation and to adopt it ‘‘only upon a reasoned determination that

the benefits of the regulation justify its costs.’’

President Bill Clinton renewed this order, as did the current president.

And now cost-benefit analysis has become an important and accepted, though certainly not the only, tool for evaluating many proposed policies.

But this approach has yet to be explicitly incorporated into decisions regarding

defense and security.

Admittedly, the current tools we have for evaluating costs and benefits are not

perfectly suited for evaluating the costs of war since they were developed for use

in a different setting. The tools are blunt and imprecise, meaning that the cost estimates all of us are presenting today are measured with a great deal of error. That’s

why Katrina and I included in our paper ranges of estimates and also built an online estimator that allows people to change underlying assumptions to see how those

affect the costs.

Nevertheless, this type of analysis can provide valuable information to help inform policymakers as to the best course of action going forward.

In addition, we should apply these tools to other, related, areas, like homeland

security. The Office of Management and Budget estimated last year that major

homeland security regulations imposed a cost of $2.2 to $4.1 billion dollars a year

on the economy.1 But those rules were passed with no estimates of their expected

benefits. Those costs may sound small compared to the costs of the war, but they

are not. The net present value of those costs is close to $100 billion.

Estimating the benefits of homeland security measures or of military operations

is difficult because, as OMB acknowledges, they depend on the probability and severity of outcomes like terrorist attacks, which are difficult to quantify.

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2 Nordhaus, William D. 2002. ‘‘The Economic Consequences of a War With Iraq.’’ NBER Working Paper. Cambridge, MA.

Just because expected costs and benefits are difficult to estimate doesn’t mean

they don’t exist. And if you can’t estimate the benefits, you should still follow

through on a policy only if you have good reason to believe those benefits exceed

the costs.

Professor William Nordhaus of Yale was the first to do this exercise for a war in

Iraq, and he did it before the war when it could have helped inform policy.2 He acknowledged that there would be some benefits of a war. The world would be better

off if Saddam Hussein were not in power. But Professor Nordhaus meticulously estimated ranges of the likely costs under different scenarios and concluded that a war

in Iraq could cost between $100 billion and $2 trillion. And he further qualified the

results by noting factors that he did not include, such as costs to other countries

or, as he put it, ‘‘fallout that comes from worldwide reaction. . . against perceived

American disregard for the lives and property of others.’’

The point, aside from noting that Professor Nordhaus was far more insightful

than any of us by doing this exercise in advance, is that even under tremendous

uncertainty, these tools can provide us with useful information to help inform decisions. If Congress and the public had seriously considered Professor Nordhaus’s projected cost estimates, would we still have gone to war? Perhaps. Some might have

still believed it was worthwhile. But perhaps not.

We can’t do anything about the costs we have already incurred. Those resources

are gone. But we do have some control over what happens next. The lesson, I believe, is that policymakers can use the tools of cost benefit analysis to help evaluate

whether proposals regarding what to do next in Iraq are likely to yield net benefits

to us and to the world.

And hopefully that additional information will lead to better decisions.

Thank you.

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