The Lorna Prieta, California, Earthquake of 

October 17, 1989-Fire, Police, Transportation, 

and Hazardous Materials 

CRAIG VAN ANNE and CHARLES SCAWTHORN, Editors 

SOCIETAL RESPONSE 

DENNIS S. MILETI, Coordinator 

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY PROFESSIONAL PAPER 1553-C 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON : 1994 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR 

BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary 

U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY I 

GORDON P. EATON, Director 

Any use of trade, product, or firm names in this publication 

is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement 

by the U.S. Government 

Manuscript approved for publication, November 12, 1993 

Library of Congress catalog-card No. 92-32287 

For sale by 

U.S. Geological Survey, Map Distribution 

Box 25286, MS 306, Federal Center 

Denver, CO 80225 
CONTENTS 

By Craig Van Anne and Charles Scawthorn 

The first day's response by the Oakland Fire Department 

to the earthquake-the Cypress Freeway collapse----- 3 

By Reginald Garcia, Neil Honeycutt, and Craig Van Anne 

Recovery in the midst of disaster-managing access 

to the Cypress Freeway collapse ........................ 11 

By Anthony J. Hare, Robert W. Nichelini, and Peter C. Sarna 

Hazardous materials problems due to the earthquake ----- 29 

By Jeanne B. Perkins and G. Edward Wyatt 

By Paul J. Penn 
THE LOMA PRIETA, CALIFORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17,1989: 

SOCIETAL RESPONSE 

FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

INTRODUCTION 

By Craig Van Anne and Charles Scawthom, 

EQE International, San Francisco, Calif. 

The papers in this chapter discuss some of the failures 

and successes that resulted from the societal response by a 

multitude of agencies to the Loma Prieta earthquake. Some 

of the lessons learned were old ones relearned. Other lessons 

were obvious ones which had gone unnoticed. Still, knowledge gained from past earthquakes spawned planning and 

mitigation efforts which proved to be successful in limiting 

the aftermath effects of the Loma Prieta event. 

At least four major areas of response are presented in 

this chapter: the Oakland Police Department response to 

the challenge of controlled access to the Cypress freeway 

collapse area without inhibiting relief and recovery efforts; search and rescue of the freeway collapse and the 

monumental crisis management problem that accompanied it; the short- and long-term impact on transbay transportation systems to move a large work force from home 

to business; and the handling of hazardous material releases throughout the Bay Area. 

Loma Prieta pointed out the unique problem associated 

with the interface of business and residential populations. 

Shortly after the earthquake, owing to the location of the 

cypress freeway collapse, business people and local residents had to be admitted to the area. Many businesses 

which could support the rescue and restoration efforts were 

located within the area of greatest damage and thus the area 

of controlled access by the Oakland Police Department. 

Loma Prieta pointed out that effective response after 

such a disaster follows the implementation of specific 

steps: (1) Quick assessment of the needs of the scene and 

access control to essential personnel, (2) crisis response 

to specific problems, and (3) support recovery through the 

planned withdrawal of resources, thus opening up access 

to the area in a controlled manner. 

Loma Prieta served as a reminder of the issues surrounding the handling of hazardous material releases and, 

being a rnidsized event, pointed out the likelihood of serious releases resulting from a great earthquake. We have 

learned that complete recordkeeping of the storage of hazardous materials is one of the major factors in effective 

management of an earthquake-induced release. 

The Oakland Fire Department experienced its greatest 

challenge to date with the collapse of the Cypress freeway. 

Coordination of relief efforts, managing an unpredictable 

response of citizen volunteers, an effective incident command structure, and equipment logistics are a few of the 

areas in which significant experience which can be drawn 

from to prepare for a future event. Considering the magnitude of the aftermath, the freeway collapse was a firm but 

gentile lesson learned. 

A major metropolitan area, the San Francisco Bay Area, 

supports a large mobile work force. The geography of the 

area creates interesting challenges for traffic planners on a 

day-to-day basis. Loma Prieta created a need to put into 

place quickly a transportation system which could move a 

sizable work force around and through disaster-impacted 

areas. With outage of the San Francisco Bay Bridge immediately after the earthquake, a major conduit for supporting normal operations of the Bay Area economy was 

eliminated for a significant period of time. Lorna Prieta 

pointed out that even a formerly little-used transportation 

system could quickly fill a void by moving a work force 

of significant numbers on a daily basis over an extended 

period of time. Through the spirit of cooperation of several different public agencies to meet the demand, the necessary contractual agreements were put into place in a very 

short time. 
THE LOMA PRIETA, CALIFORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17,1989: 

SOCETAL Rl3SPONSE 

HREiy POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

TliE FIRST DAY'S RESPONSE BY THE OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT TO 

THE EARTHQUA-THE CYPRESS FREEWAY COLLAPSE 

By Reginald Garcia and Neil Honeycutt, 

Oakland Fire Department, Oakland, Calif.; 

and 

Craig Van Anne, 

EQE International, San Francisco, Calif. 

CONTEiNTs Though the earthquake was a natural disaster which tested the Oakland Fire De~artment to its limits. the lessons 

learned and experienced gained were invaluable for prepar- Absmct .......................................................... c3 ing a more effective response to the next one. ~&o(juction ....................................................... 3 

Mdcd response ------- - ---------- - ------------- - -------------- 4 

Extended operations ----------- -- 4 

Overview of earthquake operations October 17, 1989----- 5 INTRODUCTION 

Initid calls ...................... - ----------- ---- --------- 6 

cypress commande----- ------ ------ -------- ----- 7 The resources of the Oakland Fire Department were effecDispatch and co~u~catio~ 8 tively exhausted within minutes of the earthquake. Because 

Mutual aid -- ------- ----- -------- ---- --- ------------ 8 of the extraordinarily large volume of calls received regarding 

Critical incident stress debriefing---------------------- 9 numerous major incidentsy fire company availability and staCiti~n voluntem ---------------------------*-------------- 9 tus was impossible to maintain. The problems were exacersummary ...................................................... lo bated by power outages at stations and a breakdown of the 

communications system. It was not possible to get a clear 

picture of conditions throughout the city or gather damage 

ABSTRACT assessments before critical deployment decisions were made. 

The Oalcland Police Department helicopter, which was down 

Lessons learned from the earthquake became evident for repairs and service, was not available for aerial survey of 

within hours of the initial response by the Oakland Fire damaged areas. In addition, there was a critical shortage of 

Department. Coordination of relief efforts of multiple available command staff to manage operations during the first 

agencies and the unpredictable response from citizen vol- hour. Recalled off-duty personnel had to be assigned before 

unteers soon became a major management task. The usual many essential tasks could be accomplished. 

management plan to respond to such a challenge was One of the major incidents due to the earthquake was the I 

quickly overcome by the extraordinary demands placed on collapse of the Cypress Street section of Interstate 880. During 

the emergency system's Incident Command System. Man- the first night all but one of the chief officers who managed 

aging the response effort was severely limited by inade- the Cypress collapse were recalled from home. Over 100 

quate emergency communication systems. firefighters were also recalled during the evening of October 

Equipment logistics proved to be a major bottleneck. 17 to assist with the Cypress collapse and other emergency 

Once field management of a search and rescue effort was operations. The department and the city were fortunate that 

effectively mountedy a shortage of heavy equipment for so many officers and firefighters could immediately return to 

shoring the dangerously unstable Cypress Street freeway duty. 

section and to extricate trapped victims was a significant Recall was achieved through a general broadcast on comimpedance. Here tooy the citizen volunteer played a major mercial radio- and television stations ordering all off-duty 

role by responding with whatever personal equipment fire and emergency personnel to return to their duty stacould be mustered and by making use of natural materials tions. There was neither time nor personnel to activate a 

at hand to support trained search and rescue personnel. telephone notification system. Considering that much of the 

c3 
c4 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MA'ERIAL,S 

telephone system was not working, the general broadcast 

was the best means available. Time pressures and lack of 

personnel also created problems in requesting mutual aid. 

The limited staff at the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) and 

headquarters did not have sufficient time to make the required calls necessary to initiate mutual aid. The first dispatch of mutual aid was initiated by the chief of the 

Fremont Fire Department who on his own reacted to televised news reports about the collapse of a portion of the 

San Francisco Bay Bridge. 

Effective coordination of units in the field, especially at the 

Cypress collapse, was hampered by continuing problems 

with communications. Part of the difficulty was due to a radio 

system which did not provide sufficient channel capacity to 

support multisite operations. Other problems were caused by 

the dual use of the primary dispatch and command frequency 

to transmit unit status changes, as well as reports on conditions from units in the field. This caused an interruption of 

many vital messages. Radio procedures which serve to handle 

routine emergency communication proved inadequate to 

meet the demand caused by earthquake-related operations. 

Cellular telephones which might have helped to relieve some 

of the early strain placed upon the radio system were not 

available until the second day of the Cypress operations. 

Management and coordination of the Cypress operation 

were also impaired by difficulties in establishing an effective 

command structure to control overall operations. The Fire 

Department began to establish an Incident Command System 

(ICS) at the Cypress collapse with the arrival of the first 

chief officers at the scene. However, problems in comunications and general unfamiliarity with the system limited the 

effectiveness of ICS. During the first night of operations, 

each agency (fire, police, paramedic, and Caltrans) was operating within its own version of ICS. Coordination of the 

overall response was therefore tenuous at best. Coordination 

was hampered by the lack of a command van or trailer to 

serve as a Mobile Incident Command Post. Decision making 

was hampered because critical planning was conducted on 

the hood of a car or standing on a street corner. Several hours 

into the Cypress operation, the Fire Department's Hazardous 

Material Response Van was placed in service as a mobile 

command post, but this proved inadequate to meet the needs 

of a command staff running a major rescue operation. 

Rescue operations at Cypress were also hampered by a 

lack of specialized heavy rescue equipment and adequate 

portable lighting equipment. Equipment, especially shoring 

and lifting tools, generally were not available until late into 

the first night. Operating under conditions of darkness was 

a problem. It was not until the early morning of the 18th that 

portable lighting equipment was available to safely continue 

search and rescue operations. 

Despite the problems encountered, Oakland Fire Department personnel conducted rescue and extrication operations 

throughout the length of the Cypress structure, which saved 

the lives of dozens of trapped victims. During seven hours 

of intensive search and rescue operations, 18 Oakland Fire 

companies assisted by 15 mutual aid companies and dozens 

of ambulance and paramedic units performed a heroic effort. 

These people worked under a severely damaged and unstable 

structure which threatened to collapse at any time. The destruction and damage was beyond comprehension. Firefighters ignored their own personal safety to rescue the many 

crushed and dismembered victims trapped in the wreckage. 

Over 200 firefighters worked at the Cypress scene during 

the first night of operations. Each of these firefighters was 

given a Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) session 

before they were relieved. The sessions were conducted by 

trained Fire Department peer counselors at Station 1. In the 

4% years since the earthquake, not one case of stress related 

injury or illness has been reported. " 

MEDICAL RESPONSE 

After the earthquake, management personnel from several area ambulance providers immediately responded with 

supplies and resources to the Cypress collapse. Each responded to an area which they thought was the major 

problem. As trained paramedics, they immediately began 

administering medical care, but on-scene condition reports 

were not relayed through Alameda County Medical Dispatchers to the Fire Dispatch Center (FDC). Though the 

county medical authority had declared a major medical 

"red alert," the Oakland Fire Department received a delayed report of conditions. 

The ALCO county medical central dispatch frequency 

was knocked off the air soon after the earthquake. Individual ambulance providers had to rely on their own radio 

frequencies, public telephone, and runners. 

Many victims were able to evacuate the cypress structure with the aid of ladders and other equipment provided 

by the fire department or citizen volunteers; others required an average of three to four hours of extrication. 

Ambulance transportation was readily available where 

needed. Of the more than 10 agencies with paramedics 

and Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) who responded to the Cypress collapse, only four reported transporting 

victims. These four agencies transported over 113 victims 

from the Cypress structure to 15 county hospitals during a 

period of 6 hours. Thirty five ambulances and other vehicles (including two Alameda County transit buses) were 

also used to transport victims. 

EXTENDED OPERATIONS - 

By early Wednesday, October 18, primary search and 

rescue operations had been completed. Collapsed section 

had been divided into north and south divisions. Both had 

been searched several times and Division Supervisors 
THE FIRST DAY'S RESPONSE BY THE OAKLAND FIRE DEPARThlENT TO THE EARTHQUAKE (3 

were confident that all living victims had been found. 

Oakland and San Leandro Police dogs were used to search 

the structure, but they proved inadequate. After a safety 

survey was completed, each marked section was again 

searched using a search and rescue dog team from the California Rescue Dog Association (CARDA). Neither the 

CARDA, nor police dog teams were able to detect any 

additional signs of life. 

Around 8:W a.m., search operations were halted because 

of continuing aftershocks and concerns, over the collapse 

of the structure. Caltrans began shoring operations, which 

continued around the clock for the next 48 hours. Preliminary attempts to use heavy equipment in the rescue effort 

had to be discontinued until adequate shoring was in 

place. This demonstrated the need for unified command 

and control of the entire Cypress operation. The Fire Department as the primary agency for search and rescue established operational priorities: 

Continue the search for live victims with established 

heavy rescue teams 

Prioritize search areas 

Complete body recovery operations 

Three specialized multidiscipline recovery teams of approximately 25 persons each were established. Numerous 

"eyewitness" reports concerning survivors were investigated and proven to be false. Specialized fire and heavy rescue mutual aid units which had begun to arrive on the 

18th were assigned to rescue operations or to cover vacant 

Oakland fire stations. 

During the morning of 18th, the Incident Command Post 

(ICP) at West Grand and Cypress was expanded to a unified 

command center representing all agencies. The Department's Hazardous Materials Response Van was then used as 

the Fire Operations Command Post. The limitations of this 

SOOQ became apparent, and other command vehicles were 

moved to the command site to support extended operations. 

Fire Prevention personnel provided logistical support in 

the early phase of extended operations and were also detailed to escort government officials through damaged areas. As the scale and complexity of the operation 

expanded during the 18th and 19th, it became apparent that 

managing the incident would require greater resources 

than the Oakland Fire Department could provide. A State 

Office of Emergency Services (OES) fire coordinator arrived on the 19th to identify additional required resources. 

A Management Overhead Team, composed of California 

Department of Forestry (CDF) F~R Officers, began arriving on the afternoon of the 19th. By the evening of Friday 

the 20th, this team had established an incident management system that would serve continuing Cypress operations over the next three weeks. 

By Saturday October 21, (the day Buck Helm was rescued after surviving in the collapse for 86 hours) the 

Overhead Team consisted of 82 Emergency Management 

specialists providing: 

Command Post Staffing 

Operations and Planning 

Logistics and Base Support and Records Management 

Finance 

At the height of the operation, over 500 incident personnel representing law enforcement (Oakland Police Department, California Highway patrol: Sheriffs Coroner), 

Caltrans, California State OES, Oakland and mutual aid 

fire departments, county EMS and ambulance paramedics, 

and private contract personnel were assigned to Cypress 

rescue operations. 

OVERVIEW OF' EARTHQUAKE 

OPERATIONS OCTOBER 17,1989 

When the earthquake struck at 504 p.m., (1704 hr) 

Tuesday evening, most of Oakland was fairly quiet. All of 

the Oakland Fire Department's companies were in service 

at quarters, except Engine 13 which was answering an 

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) call. This unusual 

(for this time period) lack of activity was probably due to 

the start of the third game of the World Series. 

All 23 of Oakland's Fire Stations experienced violent 

shaking and ground movement. None of the stations sustained major damage. But most stations experienced partial or total power outages, Along with loss of power, 

many stations also lost telephone and telecommunications 

service. The interruption of power and communication to 

the fire stations hampered and delayed initial earthquake 

response efforts. 

Owing to. the loss of electrical power, many companies 

had to manually operate station overhead doors in order to 

move apparatus out of the stations. This added three to 

five minutes to normal response times. 

The Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) located at Station 1, 

the Department's headquarters station, also experienced violent shaking. The dispatch tape log recorded the sound 

of the earthquake and the nervous reaction of the emergency 

dispatchers working the dispatch consoles. Fortunately, 

the dispatch computer and radio equipment remained in 

operation. 

Assistant Chief John Baker, the Shift Commander, was in 

the FDC at the time of the earthquake. As the ranking Fire 

Department Officer on duty, he immediately established a 

Headquarters Command post at FDC. The FDC was staffed 

by two dispatchers and one dispatch supervisor. FDC, normally stfled by nonuniform dispatchers, is headed by a Fire 

Captain. Chief Baker was the only officer in FDC in the first 

moments after the earthquake. Immediately after the quake, 

Chief Baker began monitoring the status of calls and dispatches, in order to make strategic decisions concerning unit 

assignment, recall, and mutual aid. 
FIRE, POLICE, "fRANSFORTA~ON, ANTI HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

Earlier in the afternoon of the 17th, members of the Fire 

Department staff had met at Station 1 with the staff of the 

City's Office of Emergency Services (OM). The meeting 

had been scheduled to discuss plans for moving the Emergency Operations Center (Em) to the Fire Department 

administrative offices. The existing EW originally set up 

as a Civil Defense structure was deemed unreliable because of its proximity to the Hayward Fault. Ironically, the 

meeting concluded at 4:30 p.m. with a discussion of which 

desks would be assigned to OES personnel in the event of 

earthquake or similar emergency. Within m hour, most of 

those at the meeting would be back to establish a working 

EX at the headquarters fire station. (Later when City 

Hall became unusable owing to earthquake damage, other 

city offices would be opekting out of the Fire Department's administrative offices at Station 1 .) 

INITIAL CALLS 

Immediately after the quake, the FDC dispatch consoles 

lit up with incoming calls. The first emergency call at 5:05 

p.m. came from Oakland City Hall reporting a person trapped 

in a stuck elevator. According to Oakland Fire Department 

(Om) dispatch rules, Truck 1 was dispatched for the elevator 

rescue. At the same time near the watedront, another call 

reported a building collapse at 4th and Martin Luther King 

Jr. Way (MLK); three units responded to this incident. Chief 

Baker, as Battalion 2 Commander, normally would have 

responded to the incident, but he decided not to respond 

so that he could maintain Headquarters Command. He also 

directed FDC not to dispatch the remaining two Battalion 

Chiefs to incidents. (The Fire Department is organized administratively and operationally into three districts or Battalions. 3ho of these districts are headed by a Battalion 

Chiec the third is managed by the Assistant Chief.) At this 

point, the extent of earthquake damage was very unclear, 

and Chief Baker, anticipating major fires, wanted the chief 

officers available to respond to these expected fires. 

While units were responding to 4th and MLK, another 

report of a building collapse in West Oakland came in. 

Three more units were sent to this call. By 506 p.m., two 

minutes after the quake, all fire companies in the west end 

of Oakland were committed. These are the same companies 

which would have been dispatched to Cypress Street. No 

calls had yet been received reporting the Cypress collapse. 

The FiDC was swamped by the volume of incoming calls 

reporting fires, natural gas leaks, building collapses, electrical lines down, and medical emergencies. There was 

also an overload of radio traffic from companies trying to 

report conditions, asking for clarification, or further assignments. Since the dispatchers were answering incoming 

phone calls, they were unable to quickly respond to radio 

reports. Many radio messages were not heard. The problem was compounded by mobile data status transmissions 

"covering" many of the voice transmissions. These data 

"bursts" are transmitted as a static squelch each time a 

unit activates its operating status console. Normally, a unit 

may change status three or four times while responding to 

an incident. 

The first dispatch for the Cypress collapse occurred at 5: 10 

p.m. Engine 1 reporting nothing found at 4th & ML,K. FDC 

idormed Engine 1 that the freeway was reported down at 1- 

880 and Cypress. Engine 2, meanwhile, was calling FDC to 

report they were available for assignment. The radio log 

between Engine 1, Engine 2, and FDC describes the first 

dispatches for the Cypress incident. At this point, there was 

still no clear indication of either the extent of the freeway 

collapse or the magnitude of damage. 

Engine 1: Nothing found at 4th and Martin Luther King Way, but we are 

going to cruise this area. Cancel 

the truck, you can send them 

rnaybe to those other incidents. 

Dispatch: Engine 1, 880 and Cypress the 

freeway is down we need you. 

Engine 1: Check, at 880 and Cypress 

Engine 2 to Dispatch: We got our apparatus doors 

forced open. Give us an assignment. 

Dispatch: Engine 2 standby 

Dispatch to Truck 3: You are assigned to 4th and 

Martin Luther King Way. Can 

you wait? No building found. 

Respond to 1600 14th Street at 

this time. 

Dispatch to Engine 2: Engine 2, go ahead 

Engine 2: You can give us an assignment. 

Do you want us to respond to 

8th and Cypress? 

Dispatch: Engine 2 that is correct; we 

have report of the freeway collapsing at 8th and Cypress, 880. 

Engine 2: Do you want us to go up on the 

freeway or do you want us to 

stay low? Do you have any idea 

or just 8th and Cypress? 

Dispatch: They said, "the freeway collapsed, so it would be on the 

ground." 

Engine 1 and Engine 2 were responding to 1-880 and 

Cypress, but no precise location had been indicated. Originally the companies were dispatched to the vicinity of 8th 

and Cypress, eight blocks from the south end of collapse. 

At 5111 p.m., Engine 5 was heading for the north end of 

the collapsed freeway near 32d and Cypress. 

Engine 5, originally dispatched for a building collapse at 

1600 14th Street, was delayed getting out of their station 

because of inoperable apparatus doors. But radio reports 
THE FIRST DAY'S RESPONSE BY THE OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT TO THE EARmQUAKE c7 

from the first companies on the scene at 1600 14th Street 

indicated that Engine 5 was not needed there. When Lieutenant Jarrett, Engine 5's officer, noticed large columns of 

dust and smoke from the vicinity of the Cypress freeway 

structure at 32d Street, he responded to that location to 

investigate. Upon arrival, Lt. Jarrett realized the magnitude of the problem and attempted to radio FDC to report 

the situation and ask for help. An excerpt from Lt. Jarrett's 

incident report written a few days later, describes the actions taken. 

At 1704 hr the earthquake struck. All power at quarters 

was lost. Engine 5 was dispatched to a building collapse in 

the vicinity of 16th & Cypress. The engine was backed out 

of quarters and as this took a few minutes, I heard the 

other responding companies saying they could not locate a 

collapse (1600 14th Street). While getting the engine outside, I could see smoke and dust in the direction of the 

Cypress structure. We responded to 32d & Cypress, and on 

arrival we found complete collapse of the 2d level onto the 

1st level. We could see people running on the top of the 

structure and calling for help. An automobile was burning 

on the west side of the structure on Cypress. Engine 5 was 

positioned on the west side of Cypress next to the burning 

auto. W~th the aid of some civilians, one 1 '12 inch (hose) 

line was pulled off and the fire extinguished while Engine 

5's crew was able to climb up to the structure. We found a 

van with six occupants; two were injured, and four were 

fatalities. There were other injured lying on the ground. It 

was obvious that a truck company was needed as well as 

an ambulance. Somewhere in the initial moments, I asked 

for them. 

FIX was not able to acknowledge Engine 5's initial 

radio request for assistance, owing to interference from 

other units trying to give radio messages. During the first 

half hour after the quake, most of the fire department's 

communication was dependent on radio, since many of the 

station phones had been knocked out of service. Engine 

5's report from Cypress was not heard by the dispatchers 

above other radio transmissions. 

As the first units at the Cypress scene began to arrive, 

many other earthquake-related responses were occurring. 

lbo available units were quickly dispatched to elevator 

rescues. Two other units were sent to natural gas leaks. 

Another two units were dispatched to medical calls. Oakland Fire Department's Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) 

System was not able to keep up with the quickly changing 

status of multiple responding units. 

The confusion at FDC was increasing each minute as 

calls kept pouring in. Companies were being assigned to 

incidents before they were entered into the computer. In 

some cases, companies unable to communicate with FDC 

were "self dispatching" to incidents. Truck 15, returning 

from a call where it was not needed, stopped at 32d and 

Cypress and began rescue operations. In other cases, companies without power or phones were unaware that they 

had been assigned to incidents. Because dispatchers could 

not keep up with the volume of incoming calls and the 

rapidly changing status of units in the field, headquarters 

was unable to generate an accurate picture of which companies were available for assignment, or where committed 

companies were working. 

cwmss COMMAND 

As it became obvious that managing the increasing number 

of emergency operations and responses would require a headquarters s@, Chief Baker called Battalion 3, Chief Reginald 

Garcia, and directed him to respond to headquarters and 

then to the Cypress. 

It was nearly impossible to gain a clear picture of conditions 

around the city, especially at Cypress and 1-880. Radio 

reports were either fragmented or too sketchy to indicate 

conditions. A few accurate "size-ups" were radioed by companies on the scene, but these were not heard in the confusion 

of other phone and radio messages. Chief Baker had called 

the Oakland Police Department helicopter for an aerial survey of the city, but the police helicopter was down for 

repairs. The loss of an "eye in the sky" proved to be a great 

handicap to initial Fire Department operations. During that 

first hour headquarters staff relied on the television monitor 

in FDC for local news coverage of earthquake damage. 

Some of the early information about the Cypress collapse 

came from pictures transmitted by 'IV news helicopters. 

Since (most of the reports on the Cypress collapse had 

come in from companies at the south end (near 18th 

Street), additional units responded to that location. It was 

still not clear that the Cypress collapse extended from 18th 

Street to 34th Street. Without an aerial view, the Fire Operations Center (FOC) was uncertain of the extent of the 

Cypress collapse. When the full extent of collapse was 

lcnown, it was initially thought there might be hundreds of 

people trapped between the freeway decks. 

Off-duty Assistant Chief Sigwart responded to the Cypress collapse, which allowed Chief Baker to manage the 

FDC. Once at Cypress, Chief Sigwart moved the command post to West Grand and Cypress, where the Police 

Department had already established their command post. 

The transfer of command from Battalion Chief Garcia to 

Assistant Chief Sigwart began the process of establishing 

an Incident Command System (ICS) to manage the Cypress collapse. 

The extent of the collapse (1.25 miles) required dividing 

the rescue operation into separate actions which could be 

more easily managed. A South Division was established to 

manage rescue operations between West Grand and 17th 

Street. A task force consisting of two engines and a truck, 

supported by ambulance and paramedic units, operated on 

the west side of the collapse. Under the Direction of Captain Baleria, this group conducted search and rescue and 
c8 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

several technically challenging extrications of people 

trapped in crushed vehicles. On the east side of this same 

area, two additional engines and a truck worked on the 

very long and difficult rescue of two young children, Julio 

and Cathy Berumen. 

By 6:00 p.m., Cypress operations were organized into 

two major divisions--North commanded by Battalion 

Chief Navarro, and South by Battalion Chief Garcia. The 

ICS was maintained by Assistant Chief Sigwart from the 

West Grand command post. 

During the next 72 hours, the Oakland Fire Department 

would have varying success as it employed ICS to manage 

the Cypress collapse. As the scale and complexity of this 

operation escalated, it became increasingly evident, however, that it would not be possible to manage the incident 

without using ICS. 

DISPATCH AND COMMUNICATIONS 

The Fire Dispatch Center (FDC) serves as the nerve center 

of the Fire Department. All calls for emergency service are 

handled by civilian operators that dispatch units. The dispatchers also serve as radio operators communicating with 

the fire units in the field. In a typical emergency, the dispatcher will receive a call, enter the information into the dispatch 

computer, make the dispatch, and then monitor the radio 

traffic from the responding units. FDC staffing consists of 

two dispatch operators and one supervisor. The communication section is managed by a Captain and a civilian assistant. 

The Oakland Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) system 

combines a set of computers with a voice and data radio 

system to support fire operations in the city. It provides 

the means to dispatch units, track incidents, monitor unit 

status, and communicate with stations or companies by 

telephone, speaker, or radio. Emergency calls are received 

by Fire Dispatch from 

9 1 1 via Police PSAP 

PoliceIFire agency direct lines 

Seven digit emergency number 

Fire stations or city telephone 

PFAS direct line 

When a call is received, the dispatch operator enters the 

incident information into the CAD system. The computer 

identifies the location from the geographical data base and 

recommends the appropriate unit response based on the type 

of incident. The operator may dispatch the recommended 

units or modify the response as necessary. The computer 

assigns the units to the incident, sends dispatch information 

to all stations, and alarm notification to responding stations. 

Units not in stations must be contacted by radio. 

Each fire apparatus has a push-button status reporting 

console. It is used to report company status to the CAD 

computer via radio. The mobile status units interface with 

a status controller in the FDC. The status controller provides acknowledgment signals to reporting units and passes status changes to the central computer system. The 

status signal is transmitted on the same frequency as the 

primary dispatch and command channel. Each time a status signal is transmitted it is heard as a loud static squelch 

over the radio. This squelch "covers" any voice message 

being transmitted at that same time. 

During the first hour after the earthquake each dispatcher tried to answer calls as they came in and then make the 

required company notification and dispatch. But within a 

few minutes, the dispatchers were overwhelmed by the 

volume of calls. As more companies were dispatched, the 

volume of radio traffic and data transmission status 

"bursts" added to the dispatch overload. 

After the first 15 minutes, FDC was unable to maintain 

communication with the number of companies in the field. 

FDC personnel did not know which companies were in 

service and available for response, or which were out of 

service at an incident. Compounding the problems was the 

loss of telephone communications to many stations. Many 

companies had to rely on radio communication to verify 

their status and availability, further adding to radio "clutter" 

and confusion. 

At approximately 6:00 p.m., the FDC supervisor assigned 

one dispatcher to handle radio traffic and the other dispatcher to work phone lines. This reduced confusion and 

began a smoother information flow. Near the end of the 

second hour emergency call volume had begun to decrease. 

MUTUAL AID 

During the evening of October 17, Mutual Aid Engine 

& Truck Companies arrived from Fire Departments throughout Alameda and Contra Costa Counties. Many of these 

companies were sent directly to the Cypress collapse. Others 

were sent for staging at Station 1. The quick response of . 

the Mutual Aid System was invaluable in providing much 

needed resources necessary to conduct earthquake-related 

operations. Oakland was fortunate that most of the surrounding counties escaped the quake with little damage. 

The manner in which the call for mutual aid was made 

indicates the kind of difficulties the department faced just 

after the quake. Within 15 minutes, over half of the department, including all of its Truck Companies, was responding to incidents. Based on the information available, 

the prospect of a complete depletion of fire resources seemed 

imminent. There was very little time to react to the changing 

situation or to try to equalize coverage by seeking outside 

assistance. There simply was not enough staff available in 

the FDC to initiate recall or request mutual aid. 

At 1725 hr, Chief Baker received a call offering assistance from Fremont Fire Chief Dan Lydon. The following 

was established: 
THE FIRST DAY'S RESPONSE BY THE OAKLAND FIRE DEPARTMENT TO THE EARTHQUAKE c9 

1. Oakland Fire Department had most Fire Companies 

committed. 

2. Requests for service were escalating. 

3. Preliminary information on the Cypress collapse was 

coming in. Ladder truck companies were needed immediately. 

Chief Baker asked Fremont to notify the Contra Costa 

County Fire Department of Oakland's need for additional 

ladder trucks. South Zone Coordinator Chief Lydon placed 

the South Zone truck companies on yellow alert for response 

to Oakland. Two Fremont Chief Officers and their aides 

were dispatched at Chief Baker's request. 

The responsibility for coordinating mutual aid in North 

County was passed to Fremont--the South County Zone 

Coordinator. 

Contra Costa County sent two Mutual Aid Groups to Oakland. Battalion Chief Herman Walden led a Heavy Rescue 

Task Force consisting of San Ramon Truck 34 and Consolidated Truck 1. Battalion Chief Stice led a Qpe One 

Engine Strike Team composed of two Contra Costa County 

Engines and Engines from Moraga, Orinda, and Riverview 

Fire Departments. 

The Heavy Rescue Task Force was assigned to rescue 

operations at Cypress in the North Division. Conpa Costa 

County Engine Strike Team responded to OFD Station 1 

at approximately 2000 hr. One engine was assigned to the 

station and the remainder of the strike team was assigned 

to Cypress staging and later to secondary search operations. 

During the next 10 hr, other OES Region I1 Mutual Aid 

Units provided relief personnel and equipment necessary 

to sustain a continuous rescue effort. During the remainder 

of the week, Mutual Aid Units continued to work on the 

difficult task of search, rescue and extrication of victims. 

CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS DEBRIEFING 

The Oakland Fire Department organized a Peer Counseling 

Program in 1988. Since early 1989, the department has used 

this approach to assist personnel after stressful emergency 

situations. The critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) 

peer counselors began training in February 1989 and are 

representative of a cross-section of OFD personnel. 

The CISD team was activated following the earthquake 

by Lt. Donald Parker at the direction of Assistant Chief 

Andy Stark. The team members assembled at Fire Station 

1 at approximately 11:00 p.m. the night of the earthquake. 

Paul Saxton, a psychologist with Life Care Systems, met 

with team members prior to the debriefing sessions and 

participated in some of the group sessions. 

As fire and medical personnel were released from the 

Cypress collapse, they were directed to Fire Station 1 for 

food, rest, and CISD counseling. Oakland and Mutual Aid 

Firefighters as well as ambulance personnel were included 

in the sessions. The groups consisted of 10 to 15 persons 

(2-3 fire companies) and lasted 30 to 45 minutes. 

The purpose of these debriefing sessions was to allow 

personnel to talk about the rescue experience, express their 

feelings, and have peer counselors outline symptoms of 

postincident stress. Firefighters and other rescue workers 

were encouraged to examine their feelings about the rescue 

work and were counseled on symptoms of delayed reaction 

stress. Peer counselors also attempted to look for initial 

signs of stress-related behavior and to let all personnel 

know the types of follow-up services that were available. 

Another debriefing area was set up by the Alameda 

County Health Department. Services were available to all 

incident personnel. On October 19, a group of trained firefighter peer counselors from LA County Fire Department 

was assigned as a debriefing team. Their services were 

available to all incident personnel, but as firefighters, they 

were most helpful with fire and rescue personnel. Over 

200 fire and rescue personnel took part in these sessions. 

The success of the CISD program is evident from the 

absence of any reported cases of lost time stress-related 

sickness or injury. However some problems with the program have been identified, and other aspects of stress 

counseling should be considered. 

Two significant groups were left out of the initial stress 

counseling sessions. These were the Peer Counselors 

themselves, and the Fire Dispatchers. Both groups reported feeling drained and exhausted from the stress induced 

during the height of emergency activity. Dispatch personnel were especially affected by both the increased call volume and the anxiety caused by working in a highly 

pressured environment. Yet, no provision was made for 

CISD counseling for dispatchers. 

Another aspect of CISD which should be considered is the 

anxiety related to emergency workers' insecurity about their 

own families well-being. In a major earthquake, devastating 

effects are likely to be spread over a large area. Emergency 

workers responding to scenes of great damage and destruction, need to be reassured that their families are safe and 

taken care of. Many of the firefighters working the Cypress 

collapse that night expressed anxious concern for the welfare 

of their families. They had no way of knowing whether their 

homes were still intact. A plan should be in place to relay 

family information to the firefighters and also information 

about the firefighters back to families. 

CITIZEN VOLUNTEERS 

The success of the Cypress rescue operation was due, 

in large measure, to the efforts of hundreds of citizens 

volunteers. 

These volunteers, coming from residences and business 

in the neighborhood, or passersby on the street and freeway, 

performed some of the first rescues of trapped motorists. 
c10 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

Using makeshift ladders, ropes, and even trees growing beside the freeway, these volunteers scrambled up onto the 

broken structure to render first aid and help the injured 

to safety. As fire and paramedic personnel arrived to take 

over and organize the rescue operation, volunteers continued 

to augment and assist the professional rescue workers. 

Throughout the night, volunteers continued to pour into 

the rescue area. Some, having heard about the tragedy 

from news reports, felt compelled to offer help in some 

fashion. Others arrived with supplies and equipment which 

they thought might be needed. Contractors and construction workers volunteered their services and whatever 

equipment they had with them. Much of the movement of 

people and equipment off of and onto the Cypress was 

done on civilian equipment. A roofing supply yard provided an elevated roofing material conveyor which was used 

to carry rescue workers and their equipment up to trapped 

and injured people. Forklifts seemed to materialize out of 

nowhere to help bring down injured people. 

As daylight quickly faded, Cypress Command issued a call 

for portable lighting equipment. Soon contractors began arriving with generators, electrical cords, and lighting units. 

No one asked for payment, voucher, or receipt. They brought 

whatever they had and offered it for use without question. 

At the south end of Cypress operations, a concrete sawing 

expert arrived with tools and equipment to assist in the 

rescue of 6-year old Julio Berumen. Tow truck operators 

from Berry Brothers Towing also helped in this rescue effort, using inflatable air bladders to try and move part of the 

crushed auto pinning the boy. Down below, other citizens 

stockpiled air tools and hoses, compressors, wood blocks 

for cribbing, and anything else which might be of use. 

There were many people hastily working below the, 

damaged structure, trying to clear Cypress Street of rubble 

and debris. These people, working without direction, took 

it upon themselves to clear the street for rescue workers 

trying to move injured victims to safety. Brooms, shovels 

and bare hands were used to sweep a clear path. 

Somewhere near 32d Street, Truck 1 was working with a 

hydraulic tool on a difficult rescue. They had placed the 

power unit for the tool on a ladder rung near an opening 

between the two collapsed freeway decks. While the crew 

worked inside, a volunteer stood on the ladder, outside the 

opening, holding the power unit in place. He remained 

there holding it for nearly three hours. 

Jack Stein, Lieutenant at Engine 4, recounts his experience with citizens helping at Cypress: 

A citizen ran up to us at that time, saying they had located 

a live victim trapped in a vehicle on the west side of the 

structure at 24th Street. We grabbed our New York Hook 

and hand lights and proceeded to that location. About 30 

citizens were present and eager to help. They already had 

two forklifts in place and several people, including two CHP 

officers, were up on the structure. 

As the upper roadway continued to settle, we realized we 

needed to shore the area we had to work in. Two of the 

citizens left and returned with a forklift load of 4x4's, which 

were promptly cut and sent aloft. Just prior to this, I had sent 

Engineer Mark Fraser to find an electrical source. He had 

returned with lights and cords, but no generator. A citizen 

had his semi-truck parked nearby and we used his on board 

generator for the duration. Others supplied more electrical 

cords and adapters. I asked for a sawzall. A man returned 

with his sawzall and I sent him aloft. He had volunteered to 

change blades, as needed. 

These examples show a few of the many ways that ordinary 

citizens responded in extraordinary fashion to offer aid and 

assistance. In many cases citizen volunteers worked upon, 

within, and underneath the Cypress structure without thought 

for their own safety. Their efforts were significant and effective. Yet, as the long night wore on, it became evident that 

there was very little control or coordination of the volunteers. 

There were no centralized resources or equipment pools. 

People bringing equipment were directed to Cypress Command. But the command post was not set up to handle 

volunteer help. Later that night, a staging area was established, but it served mainly to receive Fire Department mutual 

aid resources. 

Many of the volunteers worked at great personal risk. In 

some cases, the risk exceeded the needs of the situation. No 

one was able to monitor or supervise all of the people trying 

to work the incident. At each rescue undertaken that night, 

there were a number of people trying to offer assistance. In 

many cases, the firefighters could not employ this help. 

Though well-intentioned, these people became a hindrance. 

In the confusion of the night, it was impossible to identify 

who were the essential volunteers and who were the curious 

and extraneous. 

SUMMARY 

The Loma Prieta earthquake presented the severest test 

to the Oakland Fire Department's ability to manage a disaster situation up to that time. The October 1991 Oakland 

Hills fire was an equally challenging disaster which also 

tested the system to its limits. As different as these two 

events were as threats to life and property, the lessons 

both offered were quite similar. Soon into the response to 

both disasters, field communications proved to be woefully inadequate to meet the need. The shortage of equipment 

available for response quickly became a bottleneck in both 

disasters. Management of personnel presented a significant 

logistical challenge. 

It is hoped that other departments can learn from these 

experiences of the Oakland Fire Department and use this 

knowledge to improve upon their ability to respond in a 

disaster situation. 
THE LOMA PRIETA, CALWORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17,1989: 

SOCIETAL WPONSE 

HRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

RECOVERY IN THE MIDST OF DISASTER-WNAGmG ACCESS 

TO THE CYPRESS FREEWAY COLLAPSE 

By Anthony J. Hare and Robert W. Nichelini, 

Oakland Police Department, Oakland, Calif.; 

and 

Peter C. Sarna, 

East Bay Regional Park District, Oakland, Calif. 

CON'mN'rs initial phase is characterized by efforts to isolate the scene 

and to size up the nature and extent of the chaotic incident. 

Emergency responders establish perimeters to keep nones- Abstract -- ------------- - ------------- - ............................. Introduction ----- .................................................. cll sential persons and threatened populations out of the afl1 fected area, and they begin to identify and request the Selecting a site for the business access point --------------- Initial operations - ---- ----- ---- -----------------------------b ----- l2 

resources necessary to contain the problem. The second 

Record keeping-- ----- --- ------ ---------- ------ --- ;i phase encompasses the activities the public associates with 

Characteristics of an adequate location for an access crisis management. Experts do their specialized jobs to 

control site .................................................... 14 neutralize the problem: the fire is fought, the leaking gas 

Access dmumena ----------------------------------.--- ---- ----- 14 valve is closed, or the gunman is confronted. The third 

concl~sion -------- ---- ----- ---- .................... ---- ----- ---- 16 phase begins the process of recovery; limited access is reReferences citd------------------------------------------------ 16 stored, resources begin winding down, and damage repair 

begins. Eventually normal services are resumed and fill 

access to the incident scene is restored. 

ABSTRACT The importance of the first two phases is obvious. The 

activities associated with this period are inherently urgent. 

Controlling access to emergency and disaster scenes is Evacuation, exclusion, isolation, treatment, and emergency 

always difficult. Generally, emergency managers attempt response are c1e~b critical and mark the stages a 

to evacuate popu~a~~ons immediately following disasters disaster. In fact, it is the ability of the incident manager to 

(where this is impractical they may shield them in place), prioritize efforts effectively-to expedite the essential 

they exclude nonessential persons until the problem is re- ad t0 defer other activities-that m2lXimizes life saving efduced, and they do not readmit resident populations and ficiency in a crisisrestore access until the recovery phase. When the Cypress the the street pohon 

freeway section of Interstate 880 collapsed during the Interstate 880 in Oakhnd during the ehquake, interehquake, the unique characteristics of the lwal residen- esting anomaly developed. h activity that is usually retial and business poiulations challenged the scene manag- served the reCOveV phase was in the veV 

ers to readmit persons almost immediately following the s@%es the 

quake. The Oakland Police Department developed an ac- Large numbers of em~lo~ees, vendors, and P~PI~ who 

cess pass system which wm puti into place quicuy ad lived inside the police perimeter were screened ad readworked extremely well. It provides a model for other natu- mitted after the quake. the 

ral disasters and crowd control situations. need for emergency access and concern for the safety of 

I persons who live and work in the yea results in their ex- / 

elusion from the scene. In fact, a major challenge for manINTRODUCTION agers of incidents from toxic leaks to public disorders has 

been the rapid evacuation and exclusion of residents and 

Critical incident response is often divided into three dis- workers, followed by the need to control crowds and selectinct stages for analysis and instruction (Sarna, 1984). The tively readmit those with legitimate business in the area 

Cll 
c12 HM, POLICE, TRANSF'ORTA~ON, ANJ3 HAZARDOUS MA'l'J3RTALS 

(Scanlon, 1975; Coleman, 1983; U.S. Department of Justice, 1986). There are models for the controlled admission 

of crowds to scheduled events, but even these may break 

down with tragic consequences (U.S. National Bureau of 

Standards, 1982; Security World, 198% New York Times, 

1991, 1992). There are serious concerns about the management of crowds during disasters, and there is limited 

guidance for expediting civil populations back into large, 

spontaneous, tragic scenes. 

Two significant lessons learned from the Cypress scene 

have relevance for critical incident planners: (1) There was 

an early need to restore business activity in the area immediately surrounding the collapse and (2) the means of screening, credentialing, and admitting persons based on simple 

forms of identification was quick and effective. 

Deputy Chief Robert Nichelini, head of the Department's 

Bureau of Field Operations, identified the early need for 

access. Within 48 hours of the earthquake he recognized the 

disastrous potential of excluding residents, employees, and 

business traffic from the homes and industries that ringed 

the 2-mile long section of collapsed freeway. 

Considerable moderate and light industry was located adjacent to, and even under, the freeway. (The Police Department's vehicle fleet was parked beneath the freeway 3 miles 

from the collapsed structure.) Steel and construction industries essential to recovery efforts were concentrated within 

blocks of the roadway. Curtailing the operations of these 

firms would limit access to their supplies of steel and plastic 

pipe, rebar, cement, structural steel, and shoring materials 

essential to the recovery effort. 

On the second m~rning~following the quake, Deputy Chief 

Nichelini directed a Patrol Division captain to establish a 

pass or permit point (subsequently term&' the "Business 

Access Point") to expedite both emergency and legitimate 

business access to the Cypress Street perimeter and to restrict 

unauthorized persons from this area. He selected two police 

, sergeants to staff the initial operation. 

SELECTING A SITE FOR THE 

BUSINESS ACCESS POINT 

East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD), the local 

water company, had offered to provide space and some office support to the Police Department for this activity. 

Their administrative offices, repair shops, and corporation 

yards were within a mile of the collapsed freeway structure. The department tentatively accepted this site. 

At 3:W p.m. the staff began drafting application forms and 

access letters in preparation for their move to EBMUD. They 

designed a tentative record keeping system for the passes 

they would issue, defined the criteria for admission to the 

area, and made a final evaluation of the proposed site for the 

operation. Unfortunately, the EBMUD location lacked sufficient phone lines to support a public point of contact. (Pacific 

Bell was already taxed to the limit resto~g subscriber service and providing additional emergency services). Other 

EBMUD locations had adequate phones9 but would not accommodate the heavy vehicle traffic which was anticipated. 

At 6:OO p.m. the Police Department opened the Business 

Access Point at deFremery Multicultural Arts Center, a 

city recreation center in a historic Victorian house surrounded by a 10-acre park. DeFremery had several features which the EBMUD location lacked and which 

should be considered in locating any reentry operation. 

It had sufficient phones in place to serve until additional 

lines could be installed. The phone numbers were already known so that they could be included on access 

passes and in advance media announcements. 

The parking lot and adjoining streets could accommodate business and staff vehicles. The park was bounded by a four-lane thoroughfare that would handle large 

trucks en route to the scene for commercial or rescue 

purposes. 

It was close enough to the Cypress scene that vehicles 

denied entry to the perimeter could divert to the access point, apply for passes, and return with minimal 

impact on traffic. 

The building was large enough for the staff and public. 

Because it was a city facility, it had been inspected 

shortly afier the quake, which simplified obtaining approval for its use. 

It was within one block of a Red Cross shelter and dining facility and a county crisis counseling center. The 

Business Access Point staff directed victims to each of 

these services over the next several days. The 24-hour 

police dresence at deFremery provided security and 

support to victims and the staffs at these facilities. 

INITIAL OPERATIONS 

The initial access permits into the Cypress Street perimeter were limited to small areas and restricted hours and 

were valid for less than one week. The sergeants who 

evaluated requests and issued these permits instructed each 

permit holder to return before the permit expired to obtain 

a renewal for a longer period. They planned to issue renewals based on the first week's traffic in the rescue area. 

They also cautioned permit holders that they might be 

contacted if traffic conditions or safety required the further 

restriction or withdrawal of permits. 

The staff issued 2,659 permits in the first 7 days. Larger 

firms (those with 8 or more employees) were given a version 

of the access permit which authorized the bearer to enter 

with a photocopy of the permit together with specific indicia. 

The indicia varied from case to case, including a company 
REEOVERY IN M MIDST OF DISASTER C13 

identification badge, a pay stub, or the company truck itself. 

The staff evaluated requests from business tenants and residents of the area based on utility bills, rental receipts, business cards, and phone listings in a reverse directory. 

To produce forms in volume, company representatives 

were given an original permit on Police Department stationery and were asked to photocopy and collate enough copies 

of the permit and attachments for each of their employees. 

The largest firms (more than 60 employees) sorted their 

forms by shift or division to simplify distribution. These 

firms were asked to provide an employee to help distribute 

materials on Monday, October 23, 1989, the day most employees were expected to return to work for the first time. 

Other procedures streamlined the operation. For instance, unscheduled deliveries to businesses within the perimeter were admitted without passes if they could show 

proof of their destination and a valid pickup or delivery. 

The officers maintaining the perimeter used bills of lading, 

invoices, addressed packages, and dispatch slips to verify 

the legitimacy of business in the perimeter. They advised 

the Business Access Point staff by police radio when they 

made these common sense exceptions. 

CITY OF OAKLAND 

POLICE ADMINISTRATION BUILDING 455 - 7th STREET OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94607-3985 

Police Department Telephone Device for the Deaf 273-3227 

NJTRORIaED ACCESS 

The person listed below is authorized to enter the Cypress 

Street Emergency Area for dates and times indicated, 

NAME : 

DATE: 27 Oct 89 to 30 Nov 89 

. TIME: to 

LOCATION : 

This ~ermits access to the s~ecified location onlv. Please use the most direct safe route. 

Follow all police and emergency workers directions. 

Valid ~hoto identification must be resented with this 

permission. 

FOR : 

George T. Hart 

Chief of Police 

Phone: (415) 832-0360 
c 14 HRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTAmON, AND HAZARDOUS MAmRIALS 

RECORD KEEPING 

The Business Access Point lacked the staff and quipment to automate their records. The sergeants who established the operation requested and screened citizen 

volunteers who had called the community volunteer hotline and who came to the center offering to help. They 

selected a local businessman and service club member 

who provided a copy machine, a personal computer, and a 

network of other professionals. This volunteer used his 

computer to develop a database (Application Database) of 

businesses and persons who had been issued access passes. He printed daily alphabetical listings by name and by 

street address showing the employees1 or visitors' names, 

phone numbers, and the contact persons for each pass. The 

Oakland Police, California Highway Patrol, and the California State Department of Transportation (CalTrans) used 

these lists to verify passes and to contact the owners of 

business where hazardous conditions were reported. 

The pass application form included questions about lost 

time and hazardous materials stored at the business. Information from the application forms was used to evacuate 

occupants and businesses from locations where hazardous 

conditions developed. For example, some of the buildings 

close to the freeway structure were inspected soon after the 

quake and reoccupied. Subsequent analysis suggested that 

these areas were too close to the structure itself and that it 

might be destabilized by rescue efforts. The Business Access 

Point staff used the Application Database to print lists of 

contact persons and their phone numbers by street address 

to evacuate the endangered buildings. The application also 

attempted to capture some measure of the economic impact 

of the quake. For months after the quake, firms with work 

interruption and lost revenue insurance contacted the department for verification of their down time and lost production. 

The Business Access Point first operated from 6:W a.m. 

to 6:W p.m. for 7 days a week. Within 2 days it was open 

round the clock and operated the public "Earthquake Hotline." It was staffed by two sergeants 24 hours a day with 

an additional two officers, one police trainee, and community volunteers during business hours. Within 2 weeks of 

the earthquake the Business Access Point began reducing 

its hours of operation and its staff. After 6:W p.m. the 

hotline phone numbers were placed on call forwarding to 

the Police Department's main Patrol Desk. The Desk Officer was provided the resource lists and a limited number 

of one-day passes for late night arrivals. 

Cm~cTERIsTICs OF 

AN ADEQUATE LOCATION FOR 

AN ACCESS CONTROL SITE 

1. Proximity to the disaster scene.-Vehicles that attempt to enter the scene will be referred to the access 

point. They should not have to drive far, minimizing the 

impact on congested streets. 

2. Situated on or near major arterials.-The access 

point should be on or near the main supply route to the 

incident scene. 

3. Adequate turn around and parking space.-The location must accommodate trucks and heavy equipment and 

provide adequate parking for staff and clients. Parking 

signs, cones, and barricades will help channel traffic. 

4. Well hown and easily recognizable.-The access 

point must be announced early in the operation. If it is an 

established landmark (like a park or school) it will appear 

on area maps, and emergency crews, volunteers, and citizens will be able to give adequate directions. 

5. Suficient size and facilities.-It should include rest 

rooms, a dining area, secure rooms for computers and supplies, and staff break areas. It must have adequate space to 

permit applicants to wait protected form the weather. Separate rooms for interviews or to mediate disputes are helpful. Non-public space may also be used to temporarily 

house detainees. The public areas must provide wall space 

or bulletin boards for maps and information. Parks, recreation centers, and elementary schools have art supplies for 

improvising maps and signs. They also have varying 

akounts of duplicating and word processing equipment. 

6. Phones.-Phone companies can supply banks of portable pay phones to almost any location within hours. 

They can also upgrade service by delivering additional 

lines, commercial phone equipment, and voicemail. However, the existence of working phone numbers permits the 

immediate announcement of these numbers in news broadcasts and their inclusion in printed forms. Additional lines 

can be configured to serve the existing numbers. 

ACCESS DOCUMENTS 

1. The access pass.-A form letter on distinctive stationery is quick to produce and is not easily duplicated. Official stationery (for example, police chief, city manager, or 
REKOVERY IN l7-E MIDST OF DISASTER CIS 

OAKLAND POLICE DEPCYPRESS STREET EMERGENCY AREA 

Application for Access 

Firm Name: 

Location: 

Authorized Representative: 

(Last Name) (First Name) 

Telephone numbers - Business: 

Home : 

Nature of Business: 

Normal Days and ours of Operation: 

Total Number of Employees: Days Lost to Quake: 

Potentially hazardous materials located at the business: 

Perishable materials on site: 

Employees Authorized Access: 
C16 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

mayor) is available in quantity and limited to official 

sources. Personal authorizing signatures make forging 

passes difficult. The bearer of the pass is required to 

present photo identification and supporting documents 

unique to his business or reason for entry. 

2. Keep records.-Business representatives who apply 

for employee access must name their employees and provide evidence of employment. The access point can confirm all valid passes by name, and businesses are 

discouraged from authorizing non- employees access. 

CONCLUSION 

The Oakland community's response to the Loma Prieta 

earthquake centered on the failure of several miles of Interstate 880 known as the Cypress freeway. The management of this disaster reinforces several lessons common to 

natural disasters and other events. 

There is no substitute for anticipating and planning for 

the hazards which your community is likely to face, and 

for studying the national experience with how disasters 

strike and how communities respond to them. 

Emergency managers must remain flexible. Emergencies 

are not created equal. The unique local circumstances of a 

disaster may require you to adapt the standard approaches 

to your population and event. In this case, actions that are 

usually taken in the later stages of an incident were required very early on. 

Some solutions cause problems of their own. The police 

perimeter which was established to simplify emergency 

access and to ensure the safety of employees and residents 

had two unintended consequences. As soon as the perimeter was in place, it began "downtime" for the businesses 

which it isolated, adding business losses to the expenses 

from quake damage. More seriously, the evacuation and 

exclusion of employees restricted the flow of essential materials and supplies from these sites closest to the disaster 

scene. 

Oakland's process for evaluating individuals' requests for 

access and for credentialing them worked very well. It was 

put in place rapidly and used simple controls. It used commonly available materials and volunteer help. It tailored 

its staff and services to the need. And it kept simple 

records and a log of its major activities for future operations. Postscript: On October 20, 1991, the Oakland-Berkeley Hills suffered a major fire which required the 

evacuation of more than 5,000 families from their homes. 

The day following the fire the Oakland Police Department 

assigned a police sergeant and three officers to prepare a 

fire access point modeled after the Business Access Point 

at the Cypress perimeter. Within 4 hours this team had selected a school building, assembled maps, drafted passes, 

and obtained computers to operate an access site. The access point was not required for the Hillfire perimeter, but a 

lesson learned from Loma Prieta was exercised, and it 

continued to work well. 

REFERENCES CITED 

Sarna, P.C., 1984, Training police commanders and supervisors in the 

management of critical incidents: Training Aids Digest, v. 9, no. 12, 

p. 3 and 5. 

Scanlon, J., and Taylor, B., 1975, The warning smell of gas: Emergency 

Communications Research Unit, Carlton University, Ottawa, Canada, p. 10. 

Coleman, R.J., 1983, The delicate art of mass evacuation: Western City, 

April 1983, p. 13-1 8. 

U.S Department of Justice, FBI Bomb Data Center, 1986: Investigators 

Bulletin, no. 86-4, 7 p. 

U.S. National Bureau of Standards, 1982, Crowd ingress to places of 

assembly, summary and proceedings of an experts' workshop: U.S. 

Department of Commerce Technical Information Service, Washington, D.C., 146 p. 

Security World, 1980, Controlling the rock concert crowd: June 1980, 

p. 40-43. 

New York Times, 1991, Surge of rock fans; death, grief and anger: January 27, 1991, p. 1. 

1992, Promoter gives his account of 9 deaths at City College: 

January 5, 1992, p. 16. 
THE LOMA PRIETA, CALIFORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17,1989: 

SOCIETAL RESPONSE 

FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

BAY AREA EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICETRANSPORTATION RELIEF AFTER THE EARTHQUAKE 

By Richard M. Fahey and George E. Gray, 

California Department of Transportation, Oakland, Calif. 

CONTENTS 

ABSTRACT 

The earthquake's most noticeable impact on the San 

Francisco Bay Area's transportation system, from a commuter's standpoint, was the temporary loss of the use of 

the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge (SFOBB). An 

emergency ferry service was developed immediately to 

provide transportation between San Francisco (in the West 

Bay) and Oakland, Alameda, Richmond, and Berkeley (in 

the East Bay), all under one contract with the Red & 

White Fleet (owned by Crowley Maritime). This service 

lasted from October 23, 1989 through March 23, 1990. 

The California Department of Transportation (Caltrans) 

also chartered three Washington State ferries to supplement 

the preexisting Vallejo-to-San Francisco service from Octoher 30 to January 9. Red & White also operated this service as sub-charterer of the Washington vessels. 

Some of the problems that arose in operating the ferry 

service were the constant need to revise the different service contracts and ferry schedules, especially early on, as 

well as the uncertainty of reimbursement by the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. Overall, however, the 

program was successful in providing an alternative commute mode for transbay travelers while the SFOBB was 

inoperative, and even after it was repaired. Evolving from 

the emergency service was the one year Oakland/Alarneda 

to San Francisco ferry service pilot program as well as the 

development of a long-range plan for permanent Bay Area 

ferry service. 

This report will discuss the problems and successes of 

the emergency ferry service from start up activities, 

through operations, to its present status. The main items of 

focus will include ridership trends, operation costs and reimbursement, public sentiment, and legislation relating to 

the service. 

BAY AREA FERRY SERVICE 

BACKGROUND (PRE-EARTHQUAKE) 

On the morning of the day the earthquake struck, the 

commute around the Bay Area was typical. Those who live 

in the East Bay and work in or near San Francisco were 

commuting by one of the two available transbay modes: 

riding transit (the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) or the 

Alameda-Contra Costa Transit (AC Transit)) or driving 

across one of three bridges linking the East Bay and the 

West Bay, mainly the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge 

(SFOBB). Although there was no direct commuter ferry 

service connecting the East Bay to the West Bay at this 

time, there was ferry service serving various North Bay 
FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION. AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

communities. Specifically, Golden Gate Transit ran daily 

commuter ferries from Larkspur and from Sausalito to San 

Francisco. Similarly, the Red and White Fleet operated 

ferry service from Vallejo and Tiburon to San Francisco. 

Very few if any of that morning's commuters were more 

concerned with how they would get home that night rather 

than who would win that evening's scheduled third game 

of the World Series between transbay rivals the San Francisco Giants and the Oakland A's. That all changed shortly 

after the earthquake struck at 5:04 p.m. 

EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE IN 

AFTERMATH OF EARTHQUAKE 

EARTHQUAKE DAMAGE 

PROMPTING FERRY SERVICE 

Damage from the earthquake was extensive throughout 

and even outside the Bay Area. Within the Bay Area, however, the transportation system sustained some of the most 

comprehensive damage. Most significantly, a section of 

the Bay Bridge had collapsed rendering it unusable for 

some 31 days. The SFOBB, which connects Oakland to 

San Francisco, was the main travel artery between the East 

and West Bay, handling an average of 243,000 vehicle 

trips per day (Metropolitan Transportation Commission, 

unpub. data). All Bay Bridge commuters were forced to 

find another route. 

Another significant transportation problem created by 

the earthquake was the collapse of a 1-mile section of the 

1-880 Freeway, which was the main connector for people 

traveling from Oakland and areas south of Oakland to the 

Bay Bridge. This closure would force drivers to use either 

the already overcrowded 1-580 connector, or BART'S Fremont line. 

Other earthquake-related damage hampering East BayWest Bay travel were the closures of many of the San 

Francisco freeways. The closures of 1-480 (the Embarcadero freeway), 1-280 from 101 to 6th St., the Fell St. onramp, and the 8th St. and 5th St. on-ramps to 1-80 east all 

made travel within San Francisco very difficult. Even after 

the Bay Bridge did reopen, most of these freeways and 

on-ramps have remained closed, which continues to have 

an adverse effect on transbay travel. 

EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE 

START-UP ACTIVITIES 

On a typical day before the earthquake, the average number 

of peak-period (5:OO-10:00 a.m.) westbound vehicle trips 

across the SFOBB was about 42,000 (Metropolitan Transportation Commission, unpub. data). The vehicle-occupancy 

rate of westbound morning peak-period SFOBB commuters 

is about 1.42 (Metropolitan Transportation Cornmission/Caltrans, unpub. data). Thus about 59,640 San Francisco-bound 

commuters had to find alternative means of crossing the bay 

for the next 31 days. Unfortunately, what was left of the Bay 

Area's transportation system was ill-equipped to handle this 

extra load. It was decided that the best way to get commuters 

across the bay, and at the same time get them out of their 

automobiles, was to provide transbay ferry service until most 

of the damaged roadways could be repaired. Successful commuter and recreational ferry systems were already operating 

on the bay, and in recent years, there had been serious 

discussions among transportation officials about providing 

East Bay-West Bay commuter ferry service on a permanent 

basis. 

On Thursday, October 19, a meeting with all the major 

transit service providers and select public officials was held 

to discuss special emergency services. Each transit agency 

reported on the status of their operations and its ability to 

provide services. It was here that emergency ferry service 

between San Francisco and the East Bay was developed. 

Specifically, ferries would be run between the Ferry Building 

in San Francisco and four points in the East Bay: (1) Jack 

London Square in Oakland, (2) Todd Shipyards in Alameda, 

(3) the Container Terminal in Richmond, and (4) the Berkeley 

Marina in Berkeley. Also, plans were made to supplement 

the existing runs between Vallejo and San Francisco. Most 

of the East Bay transit services modified their schedules to 

accommodate the new, temporary ferry terminals, and adjust 

to the SFOBB closure (fig. 1). 

In order to provide this additional service, more ferryboats would be needed. Therefore, Crowley Maritime 

(which owns and operates the Red and White Fleet) arranged to have four of its Catalina ferries from Southern 

California brought north to the Bay Area. Also, arrangements were made with the State of Washington's Department of Transportation to send down three of their vessels 

from Puget Sound, which were not being used at the time. 

The Washington ferries would primarily be used to supplement the Vallejo ferry service. 

CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS 

Once the basic ferry service was formulated, contracts 

and agreements between the California Department of 

Transportation (Caltrans) and the ferry operators had to be 

drawn up. This took place over the weekend of October 

21 in order to get the service up and running by Monday, 

the 23. Three different agreements were drawn up to provide emergency ferry service. One agreement, entitled 

"RM-25," between Caltrans and Harbor Carriers required 

the Red and White Fleet (a subsidiary of Harbor Carriers) 

to provide ferry service between San Francisco and Richmond, Alameda, Oakland, and Berkeley. A second agree- 
BAY AREA EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE C19 

ment executed between Caltrans and Harbor Carriers, 

"RM-26," was developed to supplement the already existing service between Vallejo and San Francisco with three 

extra vessels. However, Harbor Carders did not own 

enough ferry boats to both supplement the Vallejo service 

and operate the East Bay service. Therefore, a third 

Agreement, "the Bare-Boat Charter Agreement," between 

Caltrans and the State of Washington Department of 

Transportation-Marine Division, was executed. The BareBoat agreement named Caltrans Charterer of three Washington State vessels which were brought down to the Bay 

Area. Caltrans named Harbor Carriers as sub-charterer to 

operate these ferries as part of the provisions in RM-26. 

ROUTES AND SCHEDULES 

On Monday, October 23, less than one week after the 

earthquake, the emergency ferry service began operating 

using an aggressive schedule. The Oakland to San Francisco 

ferry left Oakland every 20 to 30 minutes beginning from 

6:00 a.m. to midnight. The ferries returned on the same 

schedule. This made up 90 trips back and forth each day. 

The Alameda ferry operated 12 runs per day on an hourly schedule only during the morning and evening peak periods. The Richmond ferry ran under an almost identical 

schedule also with 12 trips each day. The Vallejo ferry operated on a similar schedule with 10 runs per day, and the 

Berkeley ferry made 19 trips each way, running hourly 

during peak periods and every 2 hours off peak. 

The Golden Gate Ferry Service catering to the North 

Bay also added extra runs to its already existing Larkspur/Sausalito to San Francisco ferry service. Throughout 

the entire 5 months of emergency ferry service operation, 

the schedule changed 17 times. The majority of changes, 

however, were minor; usually a slight time change in one 

of the routes for various reasons. These changes will be 

discussed later in the report. 

LARKSPUR1 

TIBURONI 

SAUSALITO 

SAN FRANCISCO 

Figure 1 .-Ferry service in San Francisco Bay Area following the earthquake. 
c20 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

OPERATIONS HISTORY: OCTOBER 23,1989 TO 

MARCH 23,1990 

RIDERSHIP 

PRE-QUAKE FERRY RIDERSHIP 

Of the emergency ferry routes established, only the 

Vallejo-to-San Francisco service existed prior to the earthquake. The Red & White Fleet carried an average of 440 

passengers per day between the two cities. Half of these 

daily passengers rode the ferries during peak periods. In 

the aftermath of the earthquake, this service was supplemented through the use of the Washington Sate ferries. 

POST-QUAKE FERRY RIDERSHIP 

While the daily ridership of the four East Bay ferries 

(Oakland, Alameda, Richmond and Berkeley) varied 

greatly in total numbers, each system followed the same 

basic ridership pattern throughout the 5-month emergency 

program. Service initiation on October 23, 1989, resulted 

in average daily ridership increasing dramatically through 

mid-November, when the ridership figures peaked out and 

began to drop off. The reopening of the SFOBB on November 18 contributed to the steady decline in ferry patronage through December 22. On December 23, major 

service cuts were initiated, which eliminated most weekend and midday ferry runs in order to utilize the emergency funding in a cost-effective manner. This produced 

a sharp reduction in daily ridership levels, although it did 

not noticeably effect peak-period ridership. From this 

point, the average daily ridership figures began to level 

off until mid-January, after which they remained fairly 

constant through the end of service on March 23, 1990 

(fig. 2A-F). 

The Vallejo service showed similar ridership trends at 

first. As soon as the supplemental service started, the daily 

ridership increased sharply from the pre-earthquake levels 

of 440 riders per day. It also peaked out in mid-November 

and began to drop off after the reopening of the SFOBB. 

However, ridership figures leveled off more quickly and 

averaged around 700 people per day through mid-December. From this point, the passenger count began to drop 

off slightly each week through the end of State service on 

January 9, 1990; this drop was probably due to the continuing uncertainty as to whether this service would be extended or canceled. The Vallejo data in figure 227 show 

the average daily ridership through March 23. Note that 

even though the ferry service there returned to pre-quake 

conditions after January 9, the ridership remained above 

its pre-quake average of 440 passengers per day. 

COSTISUBSIDY ANALYSIS 

Even though some of the Federal reimbursement funding 

for the ferry service at the time this report was written was 

still in doubt, the majority of the costs involved in setting 

up and operating the emergency service have been identified. The total cost involved in operating the emergency 

ferry service from October 23, 1989, through March 23, 

1990, was $6,450,578. These costs are detailed in table 1. 

The following section compares the operating costs of the 

emergency ferry service with the ridership figures at varying times during the 5-month operation. Table 2 shows the 

cost per passenger for both the Vallejo service and the East 

Bay service during the three different phases of the East 

Bay contract (discussed in more detail in the next section). 

The four East Bay routes are grouped into one category 

because Caltrans' contract with Crowley Maritime specified compensation for all four services in one fixed amount, 

rather than a separate cost for each service. The slightly 

higher cost per rider for the Vallejo service is most likely 

the result of higher operating costs due to the longer trip 

lengths than those from the East Bay. The one-way trip 

length from Vallejo to San Francisco is 26.4 miles, whereas 

the average East Bay trip was 8 miles long. 

The last column in table 2 (subsidylrider) is simply the 

difference between the operating cost of the service and 

the revenue credited to Caltrans, divided by the number of 

riders for that period. As expected, the cost per passenger 

increased as the ridership decreased throughout the service. In fact, near the end of the service period when the 

East Bay ridership was averaging about 1,000 people per 

day and Caltrans was paying Red & White $26,000 a day 

to operate, the cost per passenger was therefore $26.00, a 

primary reason for terminating the service. 

The total cost per passenger associated with the entire 

emergency ferry service operations includes all costs, including additional costs that were not included in contracts 

with the ferry operators such as operations plus dredging, 

ferry charter, ticket collection, and so forth. This indicates 

that the total cost per passenger was $11.79, or $9.85 per 

rider with State revenue subtracted from the cost. 

CONTRACT AMENDMENTS 

FERRY SERVICE AGREEMENT RM-25 

The following section discusses the different amendments to the three basic ferry contracts (RM-25, RM26lsub-charter, and The Bare-Boat Charter Agreement) 

that occurred during the service period. As was mentioned 

earlier, the original service agreement (RM-25) between 
BAY AREA EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE C21 

ALAMEDA FERRY SERVICE AVERAGE OAILY RIDERSHIP BY WEEK 

10/28 11/11 11/25 12/0912/23** 01/6 01/20 02/03 02/17 03/03 03/17 

WEEK 

OAKLAND FERRY SERVICE AVERAGE OAILY RIDERSHIP BY WEEK 8 

RICHMOND FERRY SERVICE AVERAGE DAILY RIDERSHIP BY WEEK 1 

WEEK 

BERKELEY FERRY SERVICE 

EAST BAY FERRY SERVICE (TOTAL) AVERAGE DAILY RIDERSHIP BY WEEK 

1 llllll Ill! 

PRE-QK~ 1/04111/18*1 12/021 l2/161 12/30~01/13~01/27~02/10~02/24~03/10~03/24 10/28 11/11 11/25 12/0912/23** 01/6 01/20 02/03 02/17 03/03 03/17 

WEEK 

VALLEJO FERRY SERVICE AVERAGE DAILY RIDERSHIP BY WEEK AVERAGE OAILY RIDERSHIP BY WEEK 

2.1 

2 

0' 7 Â¥* 

PRE-OK& 1/04 11/18 12/021 l2/l6ll2/30l0l/l3l0l/27l02/l0l02/24l03/l0l03/24 

I 

10 11~11 $25 12/0912/23**01/6 01/20 02/03 02/17 03/03 03/17 

lllllll~ll 

WEEK 10/28 11/11 11/25 12/0912/23**01/6 01/20 02/03 02/17 03/03 03/17 

WEEK 

Figure 2.-Ridership on San Francisco Bay emergency ferry service following the earthquake. 
FIRE. POLICE. TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

Table 1 .Ã‘Cos of operating emergency ferry service 

Ferry Boat Facility Investigation 

by Army Corps of Engineers ..................... $ 100,000 

Ferry Boat Facility Dredging by 

Army Corps of Engineers ....................... $ 325,000 

Labor Cost of Ticket Vendors.................... $ 222,082 

Consultant Services ........................... $ 15,324 

Parking lot & access road 

construction, and signage ..................... $ 145,946 

Auditor Contract .............................. $ 2,787 

Accounting services; 

ticket counting ............................... $ 11,436 

Ticket printing ............................... $ 15,441 

Caltrans Staff (10/26/89-1/25/90) ............. $ 20,300 

Washington ferry boat charter, 

insurance, expenses, & repairs ................ $ 384,718.11 

Total Operating Cost of 

East Bay Ferry Service ........................ $4,466,555.50 

Total Operating Cost of 

Vallejo Ferry Service ......................... $ 740,988.75 

Total Emergency Ferry Service Costs ........... $6,450,578.36 

Table 2.Ã‘Cost-per-passenge analysis of emergency ferry service 

Contract Operating Cost/ Caltrans Subsidy/ 

period Service costs Riders rider revenue rider 

10/23-11/17 East Bay $1,239,556 234,341 $5.29 $651,735 $2.51 

10/30-11/19 Vallejo 201,982 20,046 10.08 102,643 4.96 

11/18-12/22 East Bay 1,615,000 144,265 11.19 133,920 10.27 

11/20-12/24 Vallejo 371,402 23,340 15.91 126,993 10.47 

12/23-3/23 East Bay 1,612,000 116,548 13.83 0 13.83 

12/25-1/9 Vallejo 167,605 8,707 19.25 41,272 14.51 

Total East Bay 4,466,556 495,154 9.02 785,655 7.43 

Valle jo 740,989 52,093 14.22 270,908 9.02 

Non-contract 

additional costs 1,243,033 

Grand total $6,450,578 547,247 $11.79 $1,056,563 $9.85 

Caltrans and Harbor Carriers, executed October 22, 1989, ticket collected. No contract termination date was identirequired Harbor Carriers to provide ferry service between fied, but instead a 2-day cancellation notice by either party 

San Francisco and three East Bay points: Richmond, Ala- was required to terminate the agreement. 

meda, Oakland, and Berkeley. As compensation, Caltrans About a month later, Restatement and Amendment #1 

was to transmit all the revenue from $5.00 round-trip tick- modified the compensation clause so that Caltrans would 

et sales to Harbor Carriers plus $4.50 for each return trip reimburse Harbor Carriers $4.75 for each one-way ticket 
BAY AREA EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE C23 

sold. The price per round-trip ticket was set at $5.00, with 

Caltrans to receive 100 percent of the revenue from ticket 

sales. Under this formula Caltrans was providing a $4.50 

per passenger subsidy for each round-trip ticket sold. This 

payment schedule was only effective from October 23 

through November 17. The revised contract also added a 

new compensation clause effective November 18 so that 

Caltrans would pay Harbor Carriers $47,500 per day of 

operation plus 60 percent of the revenue collected from 

ticket sales. It stated that the total payments from Caltrans 

to Harbor Carriers was not to exceed $2,765,000. 

Also, under this restated contract, the agreement was to 

terminate on December 1, 1989, the date that the Federal 

Highway Administration (FHWA) agreed to extend reimbursement for the emergency ferry service. With the passage of Senate Bill #SB36X(89), which redirected 

$2,000,000 in Transit Capital Improvement funds to Caltrans to sustain the emergency ferry service, and the 

mounting public pressure to continue the program, the service was extended three different times during December 

(with Letters of Agreement). 

By this time, Caltrans was also in contact with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) requesting 

FEMA participation in reimbursement for ferry service 

costs. With the seemingly relative abundance in funding 

sources, and the outside pressure to continue the ferry service, a second amendment to the contract (San Francisco 

Bay Purchase of Ferry Service Agreement RM-25, 

Amendment 2) was executed, which extended the ferry 

service through March 23, 1990, and increased the limit 

that Caltrans could pay Harbor Carriers to $4,000,000. 

The compensation clause was also changed again to produce a simpler payment scheme. Under this amendment, 

effective December 22, Caltrans was to pay Harbor Carriers $26,000 per day to operate the East Bay ferry service. 

Also taking effect were major schedule changes (discussed 

in the next section), which eliminated most of the weekend and off-peak trips in order to stretch the subsidy as far 

as possible for peak-period users. 

SERVICE AGREEMENT AND BAREBOAT SUB-CHARTER RM-26 

The other two contracts, the Bare-Boat Charter and RM26 Sub-charter, were interrelated. As was mentioned earlier, the RM-26 Sub-charter agreement between Caltrans 

and Crowley Maritime named Red & White Fleet as Subcharterer of the Washington State vessels, along with other 

provisions to supplement the Vallejo ferry service. Although this contract was never amended throughout the 

service period, it did contain some gray areas open to interpretation, which required certain negotiating between 

the two parties afterwards. , 

First, the original compensation provision stated that 

Caltrans would reimburse Harbor Carriers its total costs 

plus an additional 10 percent of such costs, and that the 

two parties would meet, sometime after the first week of 

service, to agree on a cost plus fixed fee compensation 

amount. Months after the State's involvement in the Vallejo service had ended and after continued negotiations the 

following provision was agreed upon: "For the first week 

of service, Caltrans shall reimburse Harbor Carriers for the 

actual costs of conducting the Vallejo ferry service plus a 

fixed fee of $5,323.95," which was 10 percent of the first 

week's operating costs. The Agreement also obligates Caltrans to pay a $6,191-per-week fixed fee for the remainder 

of the service period. 

Another item in the sub-charter section of the original 

contract needing revision was the insurance clause. The 

original insurance clause required Caltrans to add Harbor 

Carriers as additional assured to the hull and machinery 

insurance maintained by Caltrans and by Washington, 

when, in actuality, Harbor Carriers maintained their own 

insurance covering the Washington State vessels. 

Finally, there was a question as to which party was responsible for specific repairs to the Washington State ferries. Even though the Red & White Fleet operated the 

vessels during the service period, Caltrans was ultimately 

responsible for the vessels. The contract language did not 

clarify matters either. It stated that "Harbor Carriers shall 

only be responsible (i) for ordinary maintenance and (ii) 

for repairing any damage Harbor Carriers may cause due 

to (their) failure to comply with Section VI of the Bareboat charter." Section VI requires the charterer not to operate the vessels at more than 25 knots and not more than 

16 hours per day. Although Harbor Carriers appeared to 

stay within these boundaries while operating the Washington ferries, there was some minor damage to the boats, as 

well as some missing items. 

The logical solution was to have Caltrans pay only for 

damages obtained during the trips between Seattle and San 

Francisco, while Crowley Maritime should be responsible 

for repair costs resulting from their operation. unfortunately, 

the damages were not easily distinguishable because there 

was no on-hire survey done in Seattle, and only a quick one 

was done in San Francisco due to time constraints and the 

urgency of beginning emergency service. Therefore, the various repair costs are currently being negotiated between the 

two parties, and the contract language regarding repairs will 

not be amended at this point. 

BARE-BOAT CHARTER AGREEMENT 

The Bare-Boat Charter Agreement between Caltrans and 

the State of Washington, as mentioned earlier, allowed 

Caltrans to use three Washington State ferries (which were 

sub-chartered to Crowley Maritime as described above) at 

a rental rate of $18,300 per month, plus an additional 

charge of $2.00 per operating-hour per engine. The original agreement was to expire on December 1, 1989. Caltrans was also responsible for the costs involved in 
C24 FmE, POUm, TRANSPORTATION, AND I-LYZARDOUS MAmRIAL,S 

transporting the ves&ls from Seattle to San Francisco and 

back again, including the off-hire survey/iispection and 

repairs. The agreement also required Caltrans to provide 

insurance for the ferries from the time they left Seattle 

until the time they were returned. 

On November 27th, Supplement No.1 to the Bare-Boat 

Charter was executed for two main reasons: (1) the Urban 

Mass Transportation Administration (WA) requested 

the Charter agreement include a federal inkrest clause as a 

condition of approval, and (2) Harbor Carriers requested a 

restatement (Bare-Boat Charter Agreement Supplement 

No.1) of the hull and machinery insurance coverage in a 

format acceptable to their underwriters. Also, this Supplement clarified that Caltrans would be responsible for the 

costs relating to travel and redelivery of the vessels. On 

December 1, 1989, an extension agreement (Bare-Boat 

Charter Agreement Supplement No. 2) was signed to continue operating the service under the original charter 

agreement on a day-to-day basis. This was necessary because it was still unclear at this point as to how long the 

ferry service would continue. 

Table 3 summarizes the contract amendment and supplement information for the thee main emergency ferry service contracts. 

SCHEDULES 

Between the beginning of the emergency ferry service 

on October 23, 1989, and the last day, March 23, 1990, 

there had been 17 different schedules. Most of the schedule changes were minor, such as a slight time change to 

one of the five routes. Also, most of the schedule refinements took place within the first month or two of service. 

Other reasons or events prompting schedule changes included pier availability, citizen group requests, transit connections, and reductions in service to maximize the 

subsidy. Although these schedule changes did not have a 

noticeable impact on ridership, the early* continuous 

changes drew criticism from the public in that the fluctuations and uncertainty may have scared off potential ,riders. 

At the same time, however, the schedule changes may 

have helped attract new riders who could not use the service under the previous schedules. 

As ridership declined, certain ferry runs within various 

routes were eliminated in an effort to keep the service costeffective. By mid-December, about 75 percent of the riders 

were using the service during peak hours. It was determined that by eliminating the weekend and off-peak runs, 

the State could save about $175,000 per week in operating 

costs and therefore stretch the subsidy through mid-March. 

The most significant schedule change occurred on December 22, when most of the remaining mid-day and weekend 

runs were eliminated. The last schedule change occurred on 

February 17, 1990, and was used throughout the remainder 

of the service. Table 4 shows both the first schedule (full 

service) and the last (reduced service) for comparison. 

As was mentioned at the beginning of the report, emergency relief funding to operate the ferry service while the 

SFOBB was being repaired was secured from the Federal 

Highway Administration (MA). Eventually, Caltrans received a finding extension from the MA through December 1, 1989. By this time, it was estimated Caltrans 

had spent $1,635,997 in operating the emergency service, 

which was reimbursed by the MA. Also by this time, 

an extra $2,000,000 had become available to extend ferry 

operations with the passage of Senate Bill #SBX36(89). 

During this time, Caltrans had been submitting Damage 

Survey Reports (DSRs) to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as part of the process to receive 

reimbursement for the costs of all repairs and services 

made necessary by the earthquake. All requests for Federal 

aid were made through the State Office of Emergency Services (OES), which would request FEMA participation 

based on Caltrans' requests. It was originally understood 

that FEMA would reimburse Caltrans from the time 

MA funding stopped (1211189) through a period when 

traffic patterns on and around the SFOBB returned to normal. It was difficult to predict when this might happen* but 

by cutting out most midday and weekend ferry runs, and 

eliminating the Vallejo subsidized service (1/9/90), it was 

determined that the East Bay service could be maintained 

through mid-March of 1990 by utilizing the available 

funding. 

Unfortunately, Caltrans did not learn until January 9, 

1990, that FEMA had planned to terminate financial assistance on December 31, 1989. In spite of this* Caltrans decided to stick to their original plan of operating the service 

through March by utilizing SBX36(89) funds and, at the 

same time, appeal FEMA's December 31, 1989, cut-off 

date. In mid-April (3 weeks after ferry service termination) Caltrans learned that FEMA had rejected the appeal, 

prompting a second level appeal to be submitted. lbo 

weeks later it was learned that FEMA had decided not to 

participate in any ferry service related funding at all. This 

instigated a meeting between Caltrans, FEMA, and OES 

to resolve matters. FEMA officials indicated they would 

consider reimbursement for the service for as long as ridership warranted running such service. Caltrans submitted 

a supplement to the second appeal, which specifically 

pointed out that FEMA should provide financial aid for 

the ferry service at least through February 9, the approximate date that SFOBB traffic volumes had begun to return 

to normal levels (B. Crockett, unpub. data). 

Outstanding service costs to Caltrans during this period 

totaled $2*9107555. With Caltrans providing a 25 percent 
BAY AREA EMERGENCY FEiRRY SERVICE 

Table 3.4ontract amendment summury for emergency ferry service 

Original 1st Amend/ 2nd Amend/ 3rd Amend/ 

Contract Supplement Supplement Supplement 

RM-25 

(10123-11\17) (11/18-12\22) (12126-3/23) ( 2/23\90 1 

$4.75/ticket $47,5OO/day $26,OOO/day $4,852,635 Revenue - CT Revenue Split: Revenue - HC . Pay cap 

60%-HC:40%-CT 

RM-26 

(10/30-1\91 (Unsigned) 

Cost plus 10% 1st week's costs + 10%. 

fixed fee. Op. Costs + $6,19l/week. 

Modified insurance clause. 

BAREBOAT 

(10/30-1211) (11/27/89) (12/1/89) 

Charter three Federal clause. Charter extension: 

WA ferries. Insurance modify. day by day agreement. 

Redelivery costs. 

(CT = Caltrans, HC = Harbor Carriers) 

Table 4.-Emeqency ferry service schedule I and schedule I7 

SCHEDULE 1 SCHEDULE 17 

prom 0-d to S.F. Feirv Buiu (40 wtesl 

I 

-Leave 6,7,8,9 a.m. and 5,6 p.m. 

-Leave at 6 a.m. & every 20-30 min. 

thereafter until midnight. 

-Ferries return on same schedule . 

-Leave hourly from 6~15-10:15 a.m. & every hour until 4:45 p.m., 

then hourly until 8:15 p.m. 

-Leave at 6 a.m. & every hour 

therafter until 1O:OO p.m. 

-Ferries return on same schedule. 

From BerWev to S.F. Pier 3 (40 minutes (m 10/30/69~1 

I 

-Leave at 6:OO a.m. and every hour -Leave at 6:OO a.m. & every other 

(two hours, mid-day) until 8:OO p.m. 1 hour until 8:30 p.m. 

-Return 7,8 a.m. and 4,5,6,7 p.m. -Return on similar schedule. 

Ri-ond to S.F. Pier 9 (45 luh&&4 

-Leave 6,7,8,9 a.m./5:3016:30 p.m. 1-Leave 6,7,8 a.m. / 5:25 p.m. 

-Return at 7:OO a.m. and every hour -Return on similar schedule. 

(two hours, midday) until 7:OO p.m. 

Uom valei-[v E&i$dbu (60 minutea 

- Ferries leave 6:OO and 6:30 a.m. 

- Rettirn at 5:15,6:15,and 7:40 p.m. 

-subsidized service ended 1/9/90. 

I 

FEMA match [using SBX36(89) funds], the total amount ble reimbursement scenarios: (1) FEMA provides financial 

Caltrans requested from FEMA was $2,182,916. Figure 3 aid through February 9, 1990, and (2) FEMA provides no 

shows the entire financial spreadsheet, including costs and aid for ferry service. The first scenario would leave Calfunding sources for the emergency ferry service. trans with a balance of $518,362 in SBX36(89) funds, 

To date, Caltrans has not received a response from which would be returned to the State Legislature, whereas 

F%MA either accepting or rejecting the second appeal. the second leaves Caltrans (with a deficit of $1,664,553. 

Therefore, table 5 shows the breakdown of the two possi- The Caltrans cost figure of $5,947,632 refers to the total 
Op-ttlg COMS-W~& WT: 

lflsm 

Monthly Fees ($1 8,30O/mo) 

Ewim Horn (S?/op-hrhg.) 

Expemes-&8bor,Tmvei,etc.) 

off Hremw.hckiirops. 

Repairs @&W Respomibk) 

Stib-W-ToW 

Figure 3.-Emergency ferry service reimbursement and expenditure report. 

F@W dm: 10pO-12Jl 

bsumes: FEW reim: 10/30-2/a3 
' BAY AREA EMERGENCY FERRY SERVICE C27 

Table 5.-Reimbumement sources for operation of emergency ferry service NET COST BREAKDOWN 

TOTAL = $5,947,632 

SOURCE With FEHA aid Without FEMA aid 

FEMA $2t182t916 $ 0 

FHWA $lt635/997 $1,635#997 

CALTRANS $ 222,082 $ 222#082 WA STATE (6.0%) 

ARMY CORPS $ 425#000 $ 425#000 

25% FEMA MATCH $ 727#639 

SBX36 FUNDS $ 753,998 $2t000t000 VALLEJO (1 1.5%) 

TOTALREIMB.: ' $5#947!632 $4#283#079 

CALTRANSCOSTS: $5#947/632 $5#947#632 EAST-BAY (69.2%) 

SURPLUS SBX36: $ 518#362 $ 0 

DEFICIT: $ 0 $1~664~553 

net costs, derived from all costs less revenue and other 

credits. 

Figure 4 shows a proportional breakdown of the net REIMBURSEMENT BREAKDOWN 

costs and reimbursement sources involved. The 3.7 per- TOTAL = $5,947,632 

cent contributed by Caltrans under the Reimbursement 

Breakdown chart reflects the labor costs of the toll collectors who sold and collected ferry tickets while the SFOBB 

was inoperative. The 7.1 percent reimbursed by the Army SBXI-36 FUNDS ( 

Corps of Engineers was for its postquake port investigations and Berkeley channel dredging related to the ferry FEMA (36.7%) 

service. 

PUBLIC SENTIMENT ARMY CORPS (7.1%) 

Although ferry ridership began to subside after the 

SFOBB reopened, the amount of public support for the 

ferries, and for continued ferry service did just the opposite. The more the State threatened to eliminate the ferry FHWA (27.5%) 

service due to decreasing ridership, the more letters that 

were received by Caltrans and the legislators from angry Figure 4.-Net cost breakdown and reimbursement breakdown. 

support groups and individuals. For example, Caltrans received many letters from commuters riding the Vallejo ferries when they learned that Caltrans planned to terminate 

the supplemental service. One ferry support group, "The and the Port of Oakland as a one year demonstration 

Berkeley Ferry Committee," submitted a letter with over project. Some of the different ferry support groups which 

2,300 signatures, and approximately 150 separate letters, were formed included the following: The Berkeley Ferry 

to the Caltrans District Director requesting that the State Committee, The Richmond Ferry Run, The North Bay 

keep the Berkeley ferry service operating on a permanent, Water Commuters out of Vallejo, The Tiburon Commuters 

subsidized basis. Similarly, many East Bay politicians from Marin County, and The Bay Organization for Aquatic 

were the recipients of letters from their constituents who Transit (BOAT). The latter was originally formed to supwanted to see the Oakland and Alameda ferries kept run- port the Oakland and Alameda ferry runs, but eventually 

ning on a permanent basis. reorganized to include representatives of all the other supAs it turned out, perhaps partly due to public pressure, port groups to create an alliance to help facilitate the dethe Oakland and Alameda ferry service was continued, velopment of a Bay Area ferry system. These groups were 

after State involvement ceased, by the City of Alameda all successful in recruiting volunteers, distributing sched- 
C28 FIRE* POLICE* TRANSPORTATION* AND HAZARDOUS MATE!RIALS 

ules and informational newsletters, and keeping local politicians informed of their concerns. 

LEGISLATION 

Many measures were passed during the 5-month period 

that fisted the emergency ferry service, most of which 

were authored by Senator Quentin Kopp (San Francisco), 

or Senator Keene (Vallejo). Most of the State bills passed 

during this time provided funds or authorization for earthquake damage relief of all types, not strictly ferry service 

activities. The following section, however, describes how 

the different measures related specifically to the ferry service. 

Immediately after the earthquake, the Governor declared 

a state of emergency. This allowed for quick implementation of the emergency ferry service. Many of the approvals 

and regulations that would normally apply to ferry operation on the bay were now superseded under the state of 

emergency. This situation enabled dredging, parking lot 

construction and service contract negotiations. 

A few weeks later, on November 2, Senator Keene introduced Senate Bill #SBX37, which required the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (M'TC) to develop a 

permanent ferry plan for the San Francisco Bay and the 

City of Vallejo to determine the feasibility of acquiring 

ferries on a permanent basis. Two days later, Senator 

Kopp introduced Senate Bill #SBX36 (adopted 11/7/89) 

which, among other things, transferred $2,000,000 from 

Transit Capital Improvement funds to Caltrans to sustain 

emergency ferry services. It also reallocated $1,500,000 

from the same funding source to MTC for allocation to 

transit operators for continuation of their emergency bus 

and rail services. 

Senate Bill #SBX39 by Senator Kopp, introduced on 

January 23, required MTC to develop objective criteria 

(including ridership per run, fare-box recovery ratio, and 

local financial support) to determine which ferry runs were 

the most cost-effective so that the limited funding could 

be utilized efficiently. Although this bill was not adopted 

until July 7, 1990, these criteria (among others) were 

being used all along by the State in an effort to stretch the 

limited funding by eliminating the least cost-effective 

runs, such as the midday and weekend service. 

Senate Bill #SBX2169, adopted at the beginning of 

1990, authorized MTC to develop and adopt a long-range 

plan for implementing high-speed water transit on the San 

Francisco Bay. By this point, the emergency service was 

winding down, so this bill was introduced to help develop 

a more permanent transbay ferry service. 

Finally, Proposition 116 on the California ballot was 

passed by voters in the June election. Although this pmposition had no effect on the emergency ferry service, it will 

provide $30,000,000 for water-borne ferry systems 

through bonds. Specifically, it provides $lO,WO,OOO to the 

City of Vallejo for capital improvements to the Vallejo 

ferry service. It also allocates $20,000,000 to local agencies through competitive (statewide) grants for construction, improvements, acquisition, and other capital 

expenditures for ferry service. 

OVERVIEW 

Although problems were encountered throughout its operation, the emergency ferry service successfully transported thousands of people across the San Francisco Bay on a 

daily basis. 

Two obvious problems encountered during the 5-month 

period of emergency service were (1) the constant contract 

revisions required and (2) the continually changing ferry 

schedules. Considering the circumstances however, these 

were minor complications. The original contracts were developed and executed quickly in order to implement service as soon as possible. Most of the eventual factors 

which necessitated contract revisions, such as additional 

funding sources, ridership levels, insurance needs, public 

pressure, and so forth, could not have been foreseen when 

the contracts were first developed. In hindsight, the contract with the fewest problems was the simplest: RM-25 

amendment #2, which required Caltrans to pay a fixed, 

daily fee of $26,000 for the East Bay ferry service. This, 

of course, was developed after the finding sources had 

been identified and the operation duration specified. 

Another problem, which still exists, is the indecision by 

FEMA as to whether they will reimburse Caltrans for 

some or any of the costs in operating the ferry service. It 

is not known if this dilemma could have been avoided. 

On the positive side, there was tremendous and unprecedented cooperation between the local transit operators; 

Federal, State, and local officials; local politicians; and the 

private sector in developing and operating an alternative 

public transportation system on such short notice. Also on 

the plus side, the emergency ferry service carried over 

547,000 passengers over the 5-month period and averaged 

over 4,200-person-trips per day. Another benefit to emerge 

from this situation was the long-range plan to provide 

transbay ferry service, which MTC is now developing. Finally, one of the most important secondary developments 

is that the City of Alameda, the Port of Oakland, and 

MTC are now jointly subsidizing a 1-year trial ferry service program between Oakland, Alameda, and San Francisco, which is simply a continuation of the emergency 

ferry service. If successful, it will become permanent. 
THE LOMA PRIETA, CALIFORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17,1989: 

SOCIETAL RESPONSE 

FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROBLEMS DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE 

By Jeanne B. Perkins and G. Edward Wyatt, 

Association of Bay Area Governments, Oakland, Calif. 

CONTENTS 

Abstract - ....................................................... C29 

Background ------- ----- ............................ 30 

Data coflwtion --- ------- - ........................................ 30 

Qpes of problems 3 1 

A&estos ---- - ................................................ 3 1 

Pipelines - ----------- - ........................................ 3 1 ................................................ --------- 3 1 

Cylindrical tanks ...................................... 3 1 

Sloshing ------------ ------------ - ....................... 32 

Pressure vessels and cylinders---------------------- 32 

Valves --------------------------- .................... - ---- 32 

Shelving ----- --------- - ------- -- ------------------- - -------- 32 

Equipment - .............................................. 32 

Structural and other indirect problems----------------- 33 

Utilities --------------------- ........................... 33 

Emergency response ...................................... 33 

Frequency of problems - ------------ 33 

M&i& ........................................................ 34 

Containment ---- 34 

Cleanup ............................................................ 35 

Conclusions -----.------------ .................................... 35 

Acknowledgments -- ........................................... 35 

References -------------------------------+---------------------- 35 

Appendix: ABAG database of hazardous materials 

problems from the Loma Prieta earthquake ------------- 36 

ABSTRACT 

The problems with hazardous materials associated with 

the Loma Prieta earthquake, as with other recent earthquakes in California and other industrialized areas, have 

resulted from a number of different types of nonstructural, 

rather than structural, failures: 

(1) Dislodging of asbestos or encapsulated asbestos 

(2) Underground pipeline breaks due insufficient flexibility to withstand soil movement 

(3) Above-ground pipeline breaks due to breaks in short 

connector pipes due to differential movement between 

pipes, tanks and buildings; impact from other structures or 

equipment; or damage from failing pipe supports 

(4) Cylindrical storage tank failures due to "pitting" corrosion, "elephant's foot" buckling, or sloshing of contents 

(5) Toppling of elevated tanks 

(6) Shifting and overturning of horizontal tanks 

(7) Sloshing of liquids from open tanks or secondary 

containment 

(8) Falling shelving or inadequate lipslrestraints on shelves, 

particularly in hospital, school or private company laboratories, in liquor, drug or grocery stores, or in warehouses 

(9) Industrial equipment sliding, swinging, overturning, 

or failing internally 

(10) Breakdown in utilities, including communications, 

water, and power. 

Clean-up of most incidents was handled by in-house 

personnel. 

The survey effort for collecting data on the extent of these 

problems in the Loma Prieta earthquake extended from Santa 

Cmz County through all affected counties in northern California. Leads on hazardous materials releases were obtained 

from a variety of sources; among them the California Department of Health Services, the Environmental Protection Agency-Region DC, county, health departments, local fire 

departments, hospitals, and schools. All companies were surveyed individually to clarify or correct initial reports. 

Documented hazardous materials releases due to this 

earthquake total 495, excluding innumerable leaks in Pacific 

Gas and Electric Company's natural gas distribution system. 

This study indicated certain areas which should be singled out for future hazard reduction efforts, and more effective cleanup preparation and response. 

The specific measures for minimizing potential problems 

are often nonstructural and include the following: 

(1) Using an adequate factor of safety when designing 

tanks and pipeline supports 

(2) Designing pipelines so that they can withstand differential movement 

(3) Accounting for sloshing when designing open-topped 

tanks and secondary containment 

C29 
C30 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

(4) Using appropriate restraints for cylinders 

(5) Bracing and anchoring shelving systems, equipment 

or raised floors 

(6) Incorporating adequate lips or other restraints on 

shelves 

(7) Applying redundancy to utility systems 

Other potential mitigation strategies relate more to controlling the risk (through removal of the material, inventory 

control, or secondary containment) or improving emergency 

response. 

BACKGROUND 

During 1988 and 1989, the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) compiled a database of known hazardous 

materials releases in approximately 30 recent earthquakes. 

Because of the availability of supplemental funding from the 

National Science Foundation, ABAG was able to gather more 

complete information on the Loma Prieta earthquake than 

on other earthquakes listed. 

In performing the original NSF-funded study, ABAG determined that, although some information is available on 

hazardous materials problems in prior earthquakes, no studies had attempted to systematically compile data on problems 

of this nature. The project was an interdisciplinary analysis, 

as neither professionals in earthquake planning nor in hazardous spill prevention and response normally consider the 

effects of problems in the other field. 

ABAG designed a flexible, accessible database to store 

this information, and documented releases from those earthquakes. The database contains 17 pieces of information for 

each event: the name and the location of the earthquake, the 

date and the time of the earthquake, the magnitude of the 

earthquake, the company where the release occurred, the 

street address of the company, the city and the county in 

which the release occurred, the type of problem, the material 

released, the quantity released, the units defining the quantity 

of materials, the comments on details of the release, whether 

the release was contained, the companies involved in the 

clean-up of the release, and the source of the information. 

After creating the database, we slowly added data on individual incidents. 

Thus, ABAG was in an excellent position to collect extensive data on the Loma Prieta event in a timely manner. 

DATA COLLECTION 

The collection of data on hazardous material releases in 

the Loma Prieta event was confined primarily to the 

southern six counties of the Bay Area and the four counties to the south and east. These 10 counties are listed 

below: 

(1) Santa Cruz 

(2) Monterey 

(3) San Benito 

(4) Santa Clara 

(5) San Mateo 

(6) San Francisco 

(7) Alameda 

(8) Contra Costa 

(9) San Joaquin 

(10) Marin 

The data were compiled using references from a number 

of different sources. Books, magazine and journal articles, 

and written records from public agencies were examined. 

However, conversations with representatives from firms or 

organizations with first-hand knowledge of these releases 

were the most valuable when documenting the problems. 

ABAG staff contacted regulatory agencies, local government departments, businesses, and clean-up companies. 

These sources are listed below: 

(1) 12 local cleanup companies 

(2) U.S. Coast Guard 

(3) U. S. Environmental Protection Agency 

(4) California Office of Emergency Services 

(5) California Highway Patrol 

(6) Regional Water Quality Control Boards (San Francisco and Monterey Bay Areas) 

(7) Air Quality Management Districts (San Francisco 

and Monterey Bay Areas) 

(8) 10 county Offices of Emergency Services 

(9) 10 county Environmental Health Departments 

(10) All Fire Departments with hazardous materials teams 

(1 1) 4 selected business groups 

(12) All hospitals in the 10 counties 

(13) All universities and colleges in the 10 counties 

(14) All public high schools in the 10 counties 

Each of these organizations was contacted to determine 

whether it had any knowledge of specific hazardous materials events which occurred due to the earthquake. The 

most useful sources on this list were the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the California Office of Emergency 

Services, and the local fire and health departments. Most 

of the companies which experienced releases were also 

called to confirm reports received from the organizations 

listed above, and these interviews were very valuable. 

Data compiled indicated releases occurred in 41 different 

cities within the 10 affected counties. 

Problems in hospitals, public high schools, and both 

public and private colleges and universities are represented 

more completely than other facilities because all of these 

facilities were contacted. Dozens of additional spills occurred in laboratories and plating shops. If these spills 

were cleaned up by in-house "hazmat" response teams or 

by the researchers themselves and if they were not report- 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROBLEMS DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE c3 1 

ed, they do not appear in this database. All information 

presented in this database is as accurate as the sources allowed at the time of compilation. 

Information was obtained in a variety of forms, making 

it difficult to compare directly the sizes of various spills. 

For example, five basic categories of units were given by 

the sources, including liquid, volumetric, and mass measures, and as well as location and spill types. Several unit 

measurements were given in each of these categories. 

TYPES OF PROBLEMS 

ASBESTOS 

Asbestos contamination is a poorly publicized form of 

hazardous materials release which can result in very expensive clean-up costs and unplanned temporary loss of 

use of buildings that can last for months. 

The most common causes of contamination are the asbestos in ceiling tiles or sprayed-on insulation shaking 

loose and falling with the suspended ceiling. The other 

major cause of asbestos contamination is the rubbing loose 

of insulation on pipes due to contact with the pipe supports, other pipes, or a building structural member. 

Asbestos may need to be cleaned up prior to building 

demolition, delaying and complicating that problem. 

PIPELINES 

Because of their widespread distribution, natural gas leaks 

are the most common releases during earthquakes and are 

responsible for most of the resulting explosions and fires. 

This type of damage demonstrates the vulnerability of all 

underground pipelines. They can be broken by soil movement, particularly if there is some pre-existing deterioration 

in the lines. Such movement can be caused by liquefaction, 

landsliding, lateral spreading, and other forms of ground 

failure. Recent underground storage tank regulations tend to 

promote the identification and containment of leaks in pipelines associated with underground tanks. 

Above-ground piping is especially vulnerable to breakage from differential movement between pipes, tanks, and 

buildings. Typically, the sliding of an unanchored tank or 

piece of equipment ruptures short spans of connection 

pipe. Pipelines which cross building expansion joints, or 

where pipes intersect at right angles, also may be subject 

to failure. Another damage-prone area is at threaded, rather than welded, joints, probably because the threading 

process leaves grooved areas of thinner material. Ground 

failure can trigger damage to tank foundations and pipeline supports. Damage can also occur from falling pipe 

supports and impact from other equipment or structures. 

Even if the pipeline itself contains water, rather than hazardous materials, the loss of that water can impede firefighting capability. 

Several large releases did occur from pipes, the most difficult of which to clean up was in a cold-storage food processor. In this case, a carbon-steel line was sheared, causing 

several thousand pounds of anhydrous ammonia to spill. This 

liquid rapidly transformed into the gaseous state and required 

a controlled, water-diluted release to the atmosphere over a 

period of several days to allow use of the facility again. 

Several petroleum above-ground tanks suffered loss of 

product through breaking of connecting piping. Most contents were contained within diked areas. 

Performance data from the Loma Prieta and other recent 

California earthquakes emphasize, however, that well-designed process pipelines can perform well in an earthquake. In those earthquakes, the damage to pipelines was 

usually limited to sections that were corroded or anchored 

at two locations experiencing large relative displacement. 

TANKS 

CYLINDRICAL TANKS 

Large cylindrical storage tanks are vulnerable to several 

types of failure. "Elephant's foot" buckling failure at the 

base of tanks is caused by horizontal forces and often results 

in the loss of contents. Such failures are not limited to 

petroleum tanks but can occur in tanks containing everything 

from water to wine. The sloshing of contents can cause 

tank roofs to collapse or failure of the upper portions of 

tank walls. Sliding is common for unanchored tanks during 

earthquakes. If there is enough flexibility in the connecting 

pipelines, such movement can occur without any loss of 

contents. Storage tanks at industrial facilities did not leak 

in spite of sliding 4 inches in the Loma Prieta earthquake. 

Since there was not a spill, the owner has requested that 

the site remain unnamed. Such movement can easily lead 

to a loss of contents if "pitting" corrosion has occurred at 

the base of a tank. Even anchored tanks can move. Tanks 

also can settle into gravel pads, pointing to a need for concrete 

foundation pads. Tank walls can be damaged due to inadequate detailing at connections with external pipes, valves, 

and ladders. Leaks can also occur due to the failure of 

internal baffles. 

The largest tank spill in this earthquake occurred when 

1.7 million pounds of caustic sodium silicate escaped from 

a ruptured tank, 40 percent of which entered a storm drain 

and disrupted sewer plant operations downstream. A portion 

of this was not treated and flowed into San Francisco Bay. 

Even taking a tank out of service may not render it harmless! 

In Hollister, an empty silo fell on an adjacent building, 

causing extensive damage. Elevated tanks can topple if inadequately supported. Elevated tanks typically perform 

worse in earthquakes than ground-mounted structures. 
FIRE, POLICE. TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

SLOSHING 

Another type of tank "failure" is not a structural failure 

of the tank, but a problem with open-top tank design. Earthquakes can cause sloshing of various liquids, such as plating solutions, and lead to mixing of incompatible chemicals 

and materials on the building floor. Such mixing can generate toxic gases. If the secondary containment trenches are 

shallow, continued sloshing can result in a loss of containment and material escaping to the storm drain or sanitary 

sewer. Although rarely documented in past earthquakes, 

ABAG staff documented sloshing problems in at least 40 

locations from the Loma Prieta earthquake. 

PRESSURE VESSELS AND CYLINDERS 

Pressure vessels can shift and bounce on their supports. 

They can even roll over if inadequately anchored. This occurred at several locations in the Santa Cruz Mountains as 

a result of the Loma Prieta earthquake. 

Because they are so tall relative to their diameter, 150- 

pound gas cylinders are prone to falling over in earthquakes. 

Therefore, many companies routinely chain their cylinders. 

This requires people to chain them, which sometimes does 

not happen. In addition, the restraint must be adequate. Cclamps routinely come loose in earthquakes. Flimsy chains 

can break, and chains anchored into gypsum board pull out. 

Cylinders can slip out from under single chains. 

VALVES 

A valve may also be the location for a material leak, 

although problems with valves are rare. Each incidence 

has its own unique circumstances. For example, after the 

earthquake, when power was restored hours after it had 

failed at a plating facility, production pumps began pumping a caustic solution into a holding tank. A float valve, 

which had unknowingly jammed during the earthquake, 

prevented the pumps from shutting down and the tank 

overflowed (company staff, oral commun., 1989). At another site, a small leak of ammonia occurred at a cold 

storage facility in Watsonville when the packing on a 

valve failed (Watsonville Fire Dept. and company staff, 

oral cornmuns., 1990). 

SHELVING 

One of the biggest problems for laboratories (at schools, 

hospitals, and private companies) results from the falling 

and breaking containers of chemicals (many of which are 

incompatible). In addition, shelves holding chemical bottles can collapse or bow, causing the chemical bottles to 

fall to the ground. This problem emphasizes that shelves 

need to be anchored and braced. 

"Biological" spills occurred in at least one hospital's 

specimen library in the Whittier earthquake of 1987. The 

worker who went to clean up the mess was overcome by 

the formaldehyde fumes and passed out in an adjacent hall 

(hospital safety manager, oral commun., 1989). A spill of 

similar size and materials occurred at a Bay Area hospital 

during the Loma Prieta earthquake. These clean-up workers were not affected by the formaldehyde because they 

were using proper equipment (hospital environmental safety staff, oral commun., 1989). 

Problems of falling containers and shelves are not limited 

to laboratories. Falling containers in retail stores and warehouses also create problems. At a retail store in Mountain 

View, containers containing malathion and chlorine fell and 

mixed, resulting in the evacuation of the building (store staff, 

oral commun., 1990). Even homes contain liquor bottles and 

cleaning materials. A garage often contains petroleum products, pesticides and other hazardous materials. Pool chemicals are also common. These chemicals often spill and mix 

during earthquakes. 

In the container category, the largest incident was caused 

by a set of tall racks containing a large inventory of cans 

of paint which toppled over in a warehouse, spilling 

100,000 gallons of paint-primarily latex, but some enamel. A portion of this spill also entered the bay. 

Existing "solutions" are often inadequate. Chemicals in 

small (approx. 1 liter) bottles have fallen off shelves with 

1 to 1112 inch high lips. Cabinet doors routinely open because of the lack of positive latches, allowing the contents 

to fall to the floor. 

EQUIPMENT 

Equipment can slide, causing damage to attached pipelines. Broken gas lines can ignite and cause fires. If ceiling-mounted equipment is not adequately braced, it can 

swing and break attached piping. An evaporator at a freezing facility had such a bracing deficiency, causing a release of several thousand pounds of ammonia in the Loma 

Prieta earthquake (Watsonville Fire Dept. and company 

personnel, oral communs., 1990). 

There is a common myth that something can be "too 

heavy" to move. Unanchored biological safety hoods slid 

and refrigerators containing hazardous chemicals fell over. 

Even anchored equipment is vulnerable to damage. A 

screw on a Nuclear Magnetic Resonance Imager (NMR) 

unthreaded in the Loma Prieta earthquake, allowing the 

NMR to become misaligned (company personnel, oral 

commun., 1989). Anchors can also break. Even if the anchor holds, this is no guarantee that the equipment internal~ willhot shake apart. 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROBLEMS DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE c33 

Sometimes the building contents can be so large and 

massive that it, rather than the direct shaking, can lead to 

structural failure. Following the Loma Prieta earthquake, 

ABAG staff observed severe damage (even partial collapse) to tilt-up and light metal warehouses in Hollister 

caused by overturning pallets of cans containing tomato 

products. Interestingly, ABAG staff observed that the tiltup buildings were being repaired while the light metal 

building was being torn down during a return visit in 

March 1990. Luckily, tomato sauce is not hazardous! 

STRUCTURAL AND OTHER INDIRECT 

PROBLEMS 

Although nonstructural failures are the most common 

causes of hazardous materials releases, other problems, including structural failures, severe ground failures, and indirect or "domino" effects can lead to releases. In one 

storeroom, a structural beam collapsed on a 55- gallon 

dmm of liquid pesticides. The material leaked to surrounding soil, causing a large clean-up problem. 

UTILITIES 

Although utility malfunctions were not the primary 

cause of hazardous materials releases during the Loma Prieta earthquake, they exacerbated problems with control 

and clean-up operations. 

Water supply may be disrupted for both process and fire 

fighting applications. Excessive water, such as from broken sprinkler lines, can also lead to problems with pyrophoric chemicals and computer-driven process control 

systems. 

Power may be disrupted for several days, rather than 

just a few hours. Battery back-ups designed to provide 

power for a few minutes to a few hours may not be adequate or advisable. For example, because of the fear of 

ignition of natural gas, PG&E did not restore electrical 

power in some areas for several days following the Loma 

Prieta earthquake. 

Telephone communications may be disrupted because of 

overuse or equipment failures (particularly with internal 

PBX systems). If repeaters on walkie-talkie or radio systems are not on back-up power, these systems can be crippled, as occurred at one Bay Area hospital in the Loma 

Prieta earthquake (environmental safety staff at hospital, 

oral commun., 1989). Back-up power for communications 

can also be inadequate. The battery back-up for the telephone equipment at San Francisco's City Hall lasted about 

10 hours, but the electrical service from PG&E was not 

restored for several days (Frank Lew, San Francisco Bureau of Building Inspection, oral commun., 1990). 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE 

Several actors related to nonstructural deficiencies can 

contribute to emergency staff being less available than 

planned. Fallen lights and equipment overturn and block 

corridors. Offices in shambles also disrupt building evacuation. Transferring emergency responders to emergency locations becomes difficult. The emergency response staff 

can even be injured in the original shaking. 

Manual alarms or emergency shut-off systems may not 

be triggered because the person responsible for pushing 

the buttons is under a desk. This scenario actually happened to one company in the Loma Prieta earthquake; that 

company is now installing shut-off devices triggered by 

shaking (company staff, oral commun., 1989). 

Finally, emergency response facilities themselves may 

be damaged. In the Loma Prieta earthquake, the San 

Mateo County Emergency Operations Center had to be 

evacuated and moved upstairs in the County Administration Building for about an hour due to a leaking natural 

gas line. One of two sprinkler line breaks threatened essential communications equipment (Kent Paxton, San 

Mateo County Office of Emergency Services, oral commun., 1990). 

FREQUENCY OF PROBLEMS 

Known hazardous material releases occurring as a result 

of the Loma Prieta earthquake are documented in 184 

records representing 495 actual releases. A total of 155 

unique companies are listed. 

Although many types of releases occurred in this earthquake, they can be classified by 11 fundamental types: 

laboratory spills; asbestos releases; tank, pipe, container, 

and valve breakage; cylinder and equipment failure; sloshing problems; transportation accidents; and indirect releases which occurred due to a "domino" effect. Table 1, 

below, presents data for each of these problem types. 

As is evident from table 1, the most frequent type of 

hazardous spill occurred in laboratories. This category includes spills from shelves, countertops, cabinets, and 

bench-top apparatuses. It cannot be expected that for all 

earthquakes occurring in urbanized areas that laboratory 

spills would always be most frequent; because stricter 

seismic codes are in force in California than in many other 

areas of the world, other types of problems may be more 

likely to occur elsewhere. In the Bay Area, however, this 

result is predictable. 

Surprisingly, the second most frequent type of observed 

problem was with asbestos. Surviving asbestos stock in 

older buildings is often overlooked as an earthquake hazard, and structural shaking can-and did-loosen this 

material. 
c34 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION. AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

Other problems which occurred somewhat frequently 

were due to failures of three types of objects generally 

containing liquids (tanks, containers, and pipes). In 40 

documented cases, open-topped tanks allowed sloshing to 

take place. 

The remaining five problem types accounted for less 

than 4 percent of the spills Few difficulties occurred because of equipment failures, and most of those were from 

electrical devices spilling mineral oil. Also surprising, 

given the extensive criticism of existing written guidelines 

for securing these items and the call for more stringent 

requirements, was the small number of problems that were 

seen with cylinders. Only two of the four reported leaks 

from cylinders resulted in confirmed hazardous material 

releases. Problems with valves were also unusual. 

By examining these problems more closely, we see that 

certain types of releases were of concern-not due to frequency, but due to magnitude; we defined large releases as 

at least 100 gallons, 100 pounds, or 100 cubic yards. The 

percentages, of these large releases are given in table 2. 

Although the number of equipment failures was small, 

all but three of them resulted in a large release. One-third 

of the releases caused by sloshing were large. 

MATERIALS 

As expected, a wide range of hazardous materials was 

released as a result of this earthquake. They included fuel 

and petroleum products, asbestos, plating solutions, fertilizers and pesticides, acids, paints, ammonia, alkaline materials, formaldehyde, and chlorine. In several instances, 

Table 1.-Types of problems in verified hazardous materials releases occurring from the earthquake 

Number of Percentage of 

Problem occurrences known events 

Laboratory 226 45.6 

Asbestos 81 16.4 

Tank 49 9.9 

Container 44 8.9 

Sloshing 40 8.1 

Pipe (not including 36 7.3 

numerous leaks in Pacific 

Gas and Electric Company's 

natural gas distribution 

system) 

Equipment 8 1.6 

Cylinder 4 0.8 

Valve 3 0.6 

Indirect 3 0.6 

Transportation 1 0.2 

495 100.0 

however, the chemicals spilled were not identified and, 

therefore, were not classifiable. 

CONTAINMENT 

Approximately two-thirds of the available data indicates 

whether or not a hazardous materials release was contained. Of this information, about 57 percent of the releases were fully contained. Thus 43 percent, or 3 releases out 

of 7, resulted in some material reaching the local environment. Approximately 16 percent of the releases were partially contained, while 27 percent were not contained. All 

of these known uncontained releases involved fluids (liquids or gases) that had five general destinations (table 3). 

The most common destination for these uncontained releases was the atmosphere. All of the liquids which escaped 

this way were either compressed and entered the gaseous 

state upon release or were volatile and simply vaporized 

over time. Flammable fluids or their combustion products, 

also escaped to the atmosphere by fire. Other common destinations were surface waters (via drains) and soil. 

In one location, a tank containing 35,000 gallons of an 

unidentified acid shifted, rupturing a pipe connection and 

spilling both the tank's entire contents and an additional 

15,000 gallons from the pipe. Although secondary containment was in place, it was inadequate, and an unknown 

quantity of acid reached San Francisco Bay. Similarly, another inadequate secondary containment system allowed 

Table 2.-Petcentages of total occurrences of large hazardous materials releases for selected problems from the earthquake . 

['L,arge' defined as greater than 100 gallons, pounds, or cubic yards] 

Number of large occurrences Percentage of 

Type of problem this problem 

Equipment 5 63 

Sloshing 14 3 5 

Tank 11 22 

Container 

Pipe 5 13 

Table 3.-Destination of uncontained fluid releases from the earthquake 

Destination Liquid Gas 

Atmosphere 10 11 

Drain 16 0 

Soil 7 0 

Fire 3 0 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROBLEMS DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE 

approximately 200 gallons of a 5,500-gallon sloshing incident at a plating shop to flow to surface waters. 

CLEANUP 

For those releases which were contained, four principal 

methods were used to clean up the spills: in-house personnel, local health departments, local fire departments, and 

private contractors (table 4). 

Most cleanup was done in-house by untrained staff or 

trained response teams, often in conjunction with outside 

help. Both health departments and fire departments from 

local governments were called in, and in many cases other 

private contractors were used. In some locations, local 

agencies (health and fire) were overwhelmed, creating the 

need for private cleanup contractors. 

CONCLUSIONS 

In looking at the available information on hazardous material incidents related to earthquakes, several key messages appear. 

1. A moderate-sized earthquake (such as the Coalinga 

(1 983), Livermore (1 98O), or Whittier (1987) earthquakes) 

can create serious hazardous material releases. Bigger 

earthquakes (such as the Loma Prieta earthquake) cause 

more numerous and widespread releases. 

2. When working with hazardous materials in earthquakeprone areas, system design should be performed by trained 

and experienced professionals. When adequate earthquake 

protection measures are used, facilities perform well during 

moderate and destructive earthquakes. Based on experiences 

Table 4.-Frequency of response for cleanup organizations after the 

earthquake 

[Frequency percentages sum to more than 100 percent because, for many of the cases, 

more than one cleanup organization was used] 

Cleanup organization Frequency of response 

In-house personnel 70.4 

Local health departments 24.6 

Local fire departments 11.2 

Private contractor 19.6 

Unknown 30.2 

from the Loma Prieta earthquake, laboratory spills, asbestos 

releases, spills in plating shops, and gasoline/petroleum product leaks are specific cases for which the most concern and 

attention should be paid. Certainly, difficulties with hazardous material releases from earthquakes could be reduced 

with improvements in these systems. 

3. Some existing "solutions" may not be adequate restraints in violent ground shaking. Examples include single 

chains on gas cylinders and 1 to 1112 inch shelf lips. Some 

existing design standards ignore seismic considerations or 

provide inadequate or incomplete criteria on how seismic 

design considerations should be considered. It is the responsibility of professionals who live and work in earthquake-prone areas to help minimize or eliminate possible 

hazardous materials problems from future earthquakes. 

4. Additional hazards may be caused or exacerbated by 

lack of power (such as with tanks requiring refrigeration 

or pumping), water, or communications. 

5. Only through keeping more comprehensive and specific records of nonstructural problems in past earthquakes 

can we design better solutions to future earthquakes. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

The authors wish to thank the National Science Foundation for funding this effort. In addition, without the assistance of Leslie Freeman, many of the data regarding 

individual releases could not have been obtained. We also 

thank Dr. Guna Selvaduray of San Jose State University 

and his,staff, who began the research into past hazardous 

materials problems from historical earthquakes. Finally, 

the 10 members of ABAG's Earthquake and Hazardous 

Materials Review Committee provided thoughtful comments on the data collection and organization efforts resulting in the database on which this paper was based: 

Rosemary Corbin, Eileen Baumgartner, Daniel Benjamin, 

Ron Eguchi, John Ellis, Ruben Grijalva, Marjorie Greene, 

Jerry Haag, Frank Lew, and Bob Reitherman. 

REFERENCES 

Perkins, Jeanne B., and Wyatt, G. Edward, 1990a, Hazardous materials 

problems in earthquakes-A guide to their cause and mitigation: 

Association of Bay Area Governments, Oakland,California, 72 p. 

1990b, Hazardous materials problems in earthquakes-Database: Association of Bay Area Governments, Oakland, California 

[diskette], 
C36 FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

APPENDIX 1: ABAG DATABASE OF HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROBLEMS 

FROM THE LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE 

As discussed earlier, ABAG has developed a standard database file which can be used with dBASE, Foxbase, Foxpro, or 

Clipper. The database contains 184 records related to 495 hazardous materials incidents from the Loma Prieta earthquake. 

Each record contains 17 fields, each described below. The 9 fields marked with an asterisk (*) are printed in the following 

table. Only those recods pertaining to the Loma Prieta earthquake are included. 

NAMEOFEQ: 

LOCATION: 

DATEOFEQ: 

TIMEOFEQ: 

MAGNITUDE: 

*COMPANY: 

ADDRESS: 

*cm 

*COUNTY: 

*PROBLEM: 

/ ASBESTOS: 

CONTAINER: 

CYLINDER: 

EQUIPMENT: 

INDIRECT: 

LABORATORY: 

PIPE: 

SLOSHING. 

STRUCTURE: 

TANK: 

Names the earthquake which caused the release described. 

Identifies the general area where the earthquake occurred. 

Specifies the date on which the earthquake occurred. 

Specifies the time at which the earthquake occurred. 

Lists the accepted Richter-scale size of the earthquake. 

Identifies the company which experienced the release, when possible. If no specific company 

name, listing is indented 2 spaces. 

Gives the street address of the company involved, when possible. 

Gives the city in which the company is located, when possible. 

Gives the county in which the company is located, when possible. 

Specifies the type of problem which occurred. There are 13 categories: 

Indicates an asbestos release of some kind. 

Indicates a container break and release of some contents. 

Indicated a specific container with the potential of a gas release. 

Indicates an equipment failure resulting in a release. 

Indicates a release occurred due to a secondary cause. 

Indicated a spill of laboratory chemicals of some kind. 

Indicates a leak in a pipeline, main, tube, or hose. 

Indicates a liquid spill over the edge of a tank or vat. 

Indicates a structural problem resulted in the release. 

Indicates a collapse, rupture, leak, or failure of a storage tank. 

TRANSPORTATION: Indicates a hazardous material problem in a transportation network. 

TSUNAMI: Indicates an earthquake-generated wave damaging facilities containing hazardous materials. 

VALVE: Indicates a release from valve failure in a mechanical system. 

*MATERIAL: Lists the type of material released in the event. 

*QUANTITY: Gives the amount of the material released, if known funk" = unknown). 

*UNITS: Gives the units of measure for the material released, if known funk" = unknown). 

COMMENTS: Further describes details of the release. 

*CONTAINED: Tells how much of the release was contained ("unk" = unknown). 

CLEANUP: Lists known companies which assisted in the clean-up. 

*SOURCE: Lists the sources from which this information was culled. Complete source citations are provided in the "Earthquake Reference List" on the ABAG diskette (Perkins, et d., 1990b). Common abbreviations are "CA OES" for California Office of Emergency Services, "FD" for Fire 

Department, "ERA" for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, "PG&E9' for Pacific Gas and 

Electric Company, and "SFRWQCB" for San Francisco Regional Water Quality Control 

/ 

Board. 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS PROBLEMS DUE TO THE EARTHQUAKE c37 

APPENDIX 2: KNOWN HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASES 

DUE TO THE LOMA PRIETA EARTHQUAKE 

[Note: many small lab 6 plating spills not included] 

Company City ' County Problem Material Quantity Units Containment Source 

14 additional lab spills 

16 various companies 

ARCO--11 gasoline stations 

Kaiser Hospi tats 

PCtE 

Chipman Middle School 

APOC Corporation 

Davlin Coatings 

Davlin Coatings 

ECI Systems 

Haukins 6 Hawkins 

Hustead8s Garage 

Pacific Coast Chemical 

Philadelphia Quartz (PO) 

Ver i f lo Corp. 

Western Roto Engravers 

Global Plating 

Electro Plating Service 

National Sanitary Supply east of 5625 Brlsa Ave. 

880 freeway 

various 

various 

various 

various 

various 

Alameda 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Berkeley 

Fremont 

Hayward 

Hayward 

L i vermore Oakland 

various 

various 

var i oua various 

various 

Alameda 

Alameda 

At da 

Alameda 

Alameda 

Alameda 

Alameda 

Alameda 

Alda 

Alameda 

Alda 

Alameda 

AlftMfida 

Alameda 

Alameda 

A l ameda 

LABORATORY various chemicals 

ASBESTOS asbestos 

TANK nasol fne 

LABORATORY misc. lab chemicals PIPE natural gas 

ASBESTOS asbestos 

CONTAINER liquid asphalt tar CONTAINER solvents 

SLOSHING mineral soiri ts SLOSHING plating solution 

INDIRECT solvent 

CONTAINER solvent 

CONTAINER titanium dioxide/paint 

TANK sodium silicate (caustic) 

SLOSHING plating solution 

SLOSHING sulphuric acid 

SLOSHING various plating chemicals 

SLOSHING plating solution 

CONTAINER muriatic acid (35%) 

14 labs unknown 

30 bldgs unknown 

0 ink unknown 

Ounk unknown 

0 unk no 1 bldg unknown 

1000gat all 

20nal all 

80gal all 

70gal all 

0 unk unknown 

0 unk no 

Ounk all 

1700000 lb some 

1000gal most IS nal all 

2000 gat at1 200gal all 

250 liter all 

CONTAINER various paints 

TRANSPORTATION ditStl/oi l/gaSol ine 

recycling center Oakland Alameda CONTAINER miscellaneous chemicals 

Alameda Co. Envirm. Health Oakland Alameda LABORATORY 

Highland General Hospi tat Oakland A~ameda LABORATORY 

private residences various Contra Costa CONTAINER 

Castrol, Inc. Richmond Contra Costa TANK 

Richmond Treatment Plant Richmond Contra Costa TANK Texaco Terminal Richmond Contra Costa P4PE 

Uni tank Terminal Richmond Contra Costa TANK 

Unocal Terminal Richmond Contra Costa TANK 

Unocal Terminal Richmond Contra Costa PIPE Golden Gate Ferry Terminal Larkspur Harin PIPE 

Specification Chromium Corp. San Rafael Marin SLOSH I NG 

U. Granger, Inc. SanRafael Marin CONTAINER 

Western Plating & Polishing San Rafael Harin SLOSHING 

Fort Hunter-Leggett SU-King City Monterey TANK 

Beacon Station Castrovi l le Honterey TANK 

winery Gonzales Monterey TANK 

Nyatt Regency Honterey Monterey CONTAINER 

PG6E Moss Landing PouerPlant Moss Landing Honterey PIPE PG6E MOSS Landing S~bstation MOSS Landing Monterey EQUIPMENT 

Unlkool Cooling Plant Pajaro Monterey PIPE AV Gas Hollister San Benito PIPE BP station Hollister San Benito PIPE BÂ¥roneS Beauty Supply Hot 1 ister Sm Beni to CONTAINER 

BÂ¥nuellosExxonStatio Hollister SanBenito PIPE Naxel Hawkins Hospital HoI 1 ister San Beni to CONTAINER 

McAbee Trucking Hotlister San Benito TANK 

Mini -Hart HolKster San Benito PIPE 

R.L. Ahlport Beacon Station Hollister San Benito PIPE Ranch Milk Hollfster San Benito PIPE 

San Benito Plating Hollister San Benito TANK residences San Francisco San Francisco ASBESTOS 

unknown San Francisco San Francisco PIPE Academy of Sciences San Francisco Sen Francisco ASBESTOS 

Asian Art Huseuro San Francisco San Francisco ASBESTOS 

Balboa High School San Francisco San Francisco CONTAINER 

Balboa High School San Francisco San Francisco LABORATORY 

Cat Trans San Francisco San Francisco CONTAINER 

California Meat Co. San Francisco San Francisco PIPE Ferry Building San Francisco San Francisco ASBESTOS 

Goodman Lumber San Francisco San Francisco PIPE John ODComtll High School San Francisco San Francisco CONTAINER 

John 08Connell High School San Francisco San Francisco LABORATORY 

John D8Comel High School San Francisco San Francisco CONTAINER 

Laguna Honda Hospi tal San Francisco San Francisco ASBESTOS 

Lowell High School San Francisco San Francisco LABORATORY 

Pay @No Pack San Francisco San Francisco CONTAINER 

Presidio San Francisco San Francisco LABORATORY 

SF Unified School District San Francisco San Francisco ASBESTOS 

San Francisco City Hall San Francisco San Francisco ASBESTOS 

San Francisco State Univ. San Francisco San Francisco ASBESTOS 

Son Francisco State Untv. San Francisco San Francisco CONTAINER 

University of Cat i fornia Mod San Francisco San Francisco LABORATORY 

Newark Sierra Paperboard Stockton San Joaquin SLOSHING 

S.F. International Airport unincorp. San Mateo TANK S.F. International Airport unincorp. San Mateo PIPE 

S.F. International Airport unincorp. San Mateo ASBESTOS 

Stanford Linear Accelerator Menlo Park San Mateo SLOSHING 

Builders Emporium Redwood City San Hateo CONTAINER 

Leslie Salt Redwoodcity SanMateo PIPE 

Home Depot San Carlos San Mateo CONTAINER 

Kelly-Moore Paint Co. San Carlos San Hateo CONTAINER 

PG6E San Mated substat ion San Mateo San Mateo EQUIPMENT 

DJ Sinpson Co. South S.F. San Mateo CONTAINER 

Pri-Nova Co. South S.F. San Mateo LABORATORY 

San Bruno Treatment Plant South S.F. San Hateo PIPE 

Ueatmont High School Ca@ell Santa Clara CONTAINER 

PG6E Metcalf substation Coyote Santa Clara EQUIPMENT 

private residences Cupertino Santa Clara CONTAINER 

private residences Los Gatos Santa Clara CONTAINER 

~ecton-Dickinson Los Gatos Santa Clara SLOSHING 

T.C. English Middle School Los Gatos Santa Clara LABORATORY 

private residences Morgan Hi 11 Santa Clara CONTAINER 

acid 

benzene, hexanes 

pool chemicals 

lube oil additive 

digester gas 

diesel fuel 

coconut oil 

gasoline (3) lube oil (1) 

gasoline, lube oi l 

diesel fuel 

zinc plating solution 

enamel paint 

plating solutions 

petrow products 

petroleum products 

wine 

ammonia, cleaning agents 

natural gas 

mineral of 1 

~vnonta 

aviation fuel 

petroleum products 

peroxide. mia 

petroleti products 

formaldehyde 

fertilizer rinsate 

petroleum products 

petroleum products 

petroleum products 

chromic solution 

asbestos 

contaminated soi l 

asbestos 

asbestos 

formaldehyde 

misc. lab chemicals 

HEK/peroxide 

mia 

asbestos 

~rooane 

oi 1-based paint 

misc. lab chemicals 

mercury 

asbestos 

mist. lab chemicals 

pesticides 

mercury 

asbestos 

asbestos 

asbestos 

vanillin 

various + lab specimens 

oil 

fuel 

chlorine 

asbestos 

alkaline +cyanide +acids 

paint,acid,f l0m.l iq.,pest 

concentrated'brine 

paint 

latex paint (some enamel) 

mineral oil 

lacquer 

muriatic acid 

chlorine 

formaldehyde 

mineral oil 

pesticides 

pesticides 

copper wlfate solution 

lab chemicals 

pesticides 

5 gal unknown 

5 fires no 5 oz all 

1 quart all 

2 pints all 

0 unk unknown 

3 gal all 

0 unk unknown 

0 unk all 

4000 lb some 400000 gal most 

500 gal most 

300 gal unknown 

SOgal all 

20 gal unknown 

370nal all 

0 unk unknown 

200 gal no 20000 gat unknown 

Ounk most Ounk unknown 

200 gal all 

1000nal no 

0 unk unknown 

Ounk unknown 

4gal unknown 

Ounk unknown 1 gal all 

4000 gal unknown 

0 ink unknown 

0 unk all 

0 unk unknown 

1300 gal unknown 2 bldgs unknown 

0 unk unknown 1 bldg unknown 

1 bldg unknown 

Ounk all 

0 unk all 

0 unk no 

0 unk unknown 

1 bldg unknown 

0 unk all 

5 gat all 

0 unk all 5 oz all 

1 bldgs unknown 

Ounk unknown 

Olmk unknown 

10 lb all 

5 bldns unknown 1 bids unknown 

2 bldgs all 1 oint unknown 

30 labs all 

5 bbl all 

0 unk unknown 

0 ink unknown 1 blda all 

500 gal- most 

28gal all 

0 unk no 

319 gal all 

100000 gal most 

500gat all 

500 gal all 

1 gal all 

0 unk unknown 

2 qts all 

800gal all 

0 unk unknown 

oink unknown 

200 gal all 

0 unk all 

0 unk unknown 

clean-up companies 

clean-up companies 

CA OES 

conversation u/Kaiser staff 

conversation u/PGSE 

Alameda Unified School District 

â‚¬P CA OES\ Berkeley FD (Falstead) 

â‚¬P CA OES\ Berkeley FD (Falstead) 

â‚¬P CA OES\ Berkeley FD (Falstead) 

â‚¬P CA OES\ Berkeley FD (Falatead) 

clean-up company/Berkeley Fire Dept conv. u/Berkeley F.D. (Falstead) 

â‚¬P CA OES\ Berkeley fD (Falstead) 

CA OES \ Berkeley F.D. (Falstead) 

â‚¬P CA OES\ Berkeley FD (Falstead) 

EPA\ CA OES\ Berkeley FD (Falstead) 

EPA \ CA OES 

CA OES 

conv. u/Hayward F.D. (S. Fales) EPA \ Livermore F.D. 

Cat Trans conv. u/Houetl a Ala Co Envr Health 

conv. u/Howell 8 Ah. Co Env Health 

Chang a Alameda Co. Env. Health Lab 

conv. w/ContraCosta Co. Health Dept 

EPA \ CA OES \ Richmond Fire Dept. 

SFRWCB 

Erickson \ Richmond Fire Oept. 

EPA \ CA OES \ SFRWCBV Richmond FD CA OES \ SFRUQCB \ Richmond FD 

CA OES \ SFRWCB \ Richmond FD EPA 

CA OES 

EPA 

CA OES 

Jennings 8 Honterey Co. Health Dept 

Jennings 8 Monterey Co. Health Dept 

EOE- - 10/89 

Monterev Co. Health & Fire Deots. 

Benuska(ed.), â‚ Spectra, Hay 1990 

EPA \ CA OES \ PGSE 

CA OES \ Monterey Co. Public Health 

Hollister Fire Dept. 

Hollister Fire Dept. 

Hollister Fire Dept. 

Holl ister Fire Dept, 

Hazel Haukins HOSV. \ Hot lister FD 

conv. w/Monterey RUQCB (Jones) 

Hol l ister Fire Dept . Holllster Fire Dept. 

Hollister Fire Dept. 

Holl ister Fire Dept. 

SF County Environmental Health 

clean-up company 

SF county Envirkntal Health 

SF County Environmental Health 

CA OES\ S.F.Fire+Health+School Dist 

CA OES\ S.F.Fire+Health+School Dist 

CA OES\ S.F.FO, Miranda a Cal Trans 

S.F. Fire Dept \ S.F. Health Dept. 

SF County Environmental Health 

conversation w/Grey a SF Fire Dept. 

CA OES\ S.F. Fire Dept\ S.F. Health 

S.F. Health Dept\ S.F. School Dist. 

S.F. Health Dept\ S.F. School Dist. 

SF County Environmental Health 

S.F. Fire+Health Devts +School Dist 

S.F. Fire Dept\ s.<. Health Dept 

Erickson 

M. Sheykhzadeh at SF Unified S.D. 

SF County Enviroiwental Health 

SF State EH6S 

SF State EH6S 

conversation w/UCSF EPA \ Conv. u/Mike Rogey 8 Newark 

EOE report on the Luna Prieta quake 

SFRWCB 

SF County Environmental Health 

SFRWCB \ SLAC (Jensen) 

clean-up company (Scott Soden) 7/91 

SFRWCB 

clean-up company (Scott Soden) 7/91 EPA \ CA OES \ SFRWCB 

PGSE \ Earthquake Spectra, 5/90 

EPA \ CA OES 

CA OES 

SFRWCB 

Uestmont High School 

EPA \ CA OES \ PG6E conv. w/Central Fire District 

conv. w/Central Fire District 

conv. w/Central Fire District 

Sonta Cruz Co. EH&S, Dist. off ice 

conv. w/Horgan Hill Fire Dept. 
FIRE7 POLICE, TRANSPORTATION7 AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

APPENDIX 2: KNOWN HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RELEASES 

DUE TO THE EARTHQUAGContinued 

canpaw city county Problem Material Ouanti ty Units Contaimnt Source 

plat ing shops Mmtain Vieu Santa Clara SLOSHING 

GTE Mwtain View Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Target dept store Mmtain Vien Santa Clara CONTAINER 

Alza Pharmceut icals Palo Alto Santa Clara LABORATORY 

Ford Aerospace Palo Alto Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Hwlett-Packard Pa10 Alto Santa Clara VALVE 

Hewlett-Packard Pato Alto Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Heulett-Packard Palo Alto Santa Clara PIPE 

Specific Plating Palo Alto Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Stanford University Palo Alto Santa Clara LABORATORY 

Stanford University Hospital Pato Alto Santa Clara LABORATORY 

syntex corp. Palo Alto Santa Clara ASBESTOS 

Syntex Corp. Palo Alto Santa Clara LABORATORY 

Veteranas Abin. Med. Center Palo Alto Santa Clara CONTAINER 

Veteranas Ahin. Med. Center Palo Alto Santa Clara LABORATORY 

plating shops San Jose Santa Clara SLOSHING 

~ood Samaritan Hospital San Josa Santa Clara CONTAINER 

Ham Club Sen Jose Santa Clara CONTAINER 

Home Club San Jose Santa Clara CONTAINER 

Mirassou Vineyards San Jose Santa Clara TANK OIConnor Hospi tat San Jose Santa Clara CONTAINER 

San Jose State University San Josa Santa Clara LABORATORY 

San Jose State University San Josa Santa Clara ASBESTOS 

San Jose State University San Jose Santa Clara PIPE 

Sm Jose-Santa Clara WCP Son Jose Santa Clara EWlPMENr 

Smta Clara Co. coroner Son Jose Santa Clara LABORATORY 

Smta Fe-Pacific Pipeline San Jose Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Uillw Glen High School San Jose Santa Clara CONTAINER 

San Martin Uinery SM Martin Smta Clara TANK A-1 Plating Sonta Clara Santa Clara SLOSHING 

AUEX Plating, Inc. Santa Clara Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Airco Santa Clara Santa Clara CYLINDER 

Devco Metal Finishing Santa Clara Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Hero Enterprises Santa Clara Santa Clara SLOSHING 

K-Mart Santa Clara Santa Clara CONTAINER 

Linde Gas Santa Clara Santa Clara CYLINDER 

National Semiconductor Santa Clara Santa Clara PIPE 

Sntft Metal COV. Smta Clara Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Val ley Plating Santa Clara Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Varian Associates Santa Clara Santa Clara SLOSHING 

apartment c-18~ Sunnyvale Santa Clara EQUIPMENT 

American Hoecht Sunnyvale Santa Clara TANK 

nwlett-Packard Sumpale Santa Clara SLOSHING 

num Depot Sunnyvale Santa Clara CONTAINER 

Kentucky Fried Chicken Sumpale Santa Clara EOUIPUENT 

Lockheed Miss. k Space 0-102 Sunyvale Santa Clara EWIPUENT 

Lockheed Miss. k Spue @-to3 Sunnyvale Santa Clara SLOSHING 

Lockheed Miss. Space 0-182 Sunnyvale Santa Clara SLOSHING 

U.S. navy Sunnyvele Santa Clara ASBESTOS 

Verbatim Stmyvale Santa Clara EOUIPUENT 

private residences various Santa Cruz TANK 

private residence8 various SantaCruz PIPE 

Aptos High School Aptos Santa Cruz ASBESTOS 

Vessey Drug Store Aptos Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

Scarborough Lhr Boulder Creek Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

Uest Coast Beauty Supply capitols Santa Cruz CONrAINER 

unknown clinic Santa Cruz Santa Cruz LABORATMY? 

Cobri 110 Cot lege Santa Cruz Santa Cruz LABORATORY 

Cobrillo College Santa Cruz Santa Cruz ASBESTOS 

Smta Cruz High School Smta Cruz Smta Cruz ASBESTOS 

Smta Cruz Metro Tt-~it Die Santa Cruz Santa Cruz TANK Univarsity of California Santa Cruz Santa Cruz LABORATORY 

Scarborwh ldr Scotts Valley Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

fruit ranch (Nikw8s?) Uatsonville a Santa Cruz INDIRECT 

irrig./ferti lization stn. Uatsonville Santa Cruz PIPE 

private residence Uatsonville Santa Cruz CYLINDER 

Apple Growers Ice C Storage Uatsmi lle Santa Cruz PIPE 

Wok Fruit Co. Uat8onville Santa Cruz PIPE Ourchell wing station Uatsonville Smta Cruz CYLINDER 

Del Mar Cold Storage Uatsonvi l la Santa Cruz VALVE 

Dr iscol I Strawberry Assoc. Uatsonvi l te Santa Cruz PIPE 

gt Cmino Crop Supply Inc. Uatsonville Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

Hansen Bott 1 ing Uatqonville Santa Cruz PIPE Horsnyder Pharmacy Uatsonvi lle Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

Johnson Drug Co. Uatsonvi 118 Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

Ketm-Pacif ic Extrusion Div Uatsonvi lle Santa Cruz SLOSHING 

Wil service station Uatsonville Santa Cruz PIPE 

myer Products Im. mt8mille Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

MorCal-Crosetti Frozen Foods Uatmmille Santa Cruz VALVE 

Pillstwry-Green Gimt Co. Uatsonvi lle Smta Cruz PIPE Puregro Uatsonville Santa Cruz TANK 

S. Martinelti C Co. Uatsonvi l le Santa Cruz INDIRECT 

Santa Cruz Metro Transit Dis Uatsonvi lla Santa Cruz TANK 

Value Drug Mart Matsonvilla Santa Cruz CONTAINER 

Uatsonvi lie Comun. Hospital UatSonvi lle Santa Cruz LABORATMY 

Uatsmille Comm. Hospital Uatsonville Santa Cruz PIPE 

ihtsmil la Conmum. Hospital Uatsonvit le Santa Cruz SLOSHING 

ihtsmille Comnm. Mospi tat Uatsonville Santa Cruz TANK 

bbtsonvi I le Hioh School Uat8onvi lle Santa Cruz LABORATORY 

Wll-Ptct lnc. Uatoonvi l le Smta Cruz PIPE 

plating chemicals 

plating solutions 

chlorine 6 malathion 

solvent acids k bases 

plating baths 

caustic water (10-30%) 

various caustics & acids 

copper chtoridelacid 

plating solutions 

lab chemicals and buffers 

formalin (10%) 

asbestos 

flanm./corr./rad./biohaz. 

fomlde* 

lab chemicals 

plating chemicals 

f orlnal&h* 

paints* pest., pol chem. 

paints, pest.* pool acid 

wine 

fowl in miscel lanews chemicals 

asks tos unknown 

methane gas 

fomldeh* 

petrolmm 

hydrochloric acid 

wine 

hydrochloric acid (10%) 

sulfuric acid (16%) 

Unkm 

acidic solution (12% mx) 

plating solution 

janitoriat chemicals 

silane 

aqueous sblution* pH 2 various plating chemicals 

nickel plating soh~tion 

chromic acid 

naturaL gas 

phosphene gas 

various platfng chemicals 

paint 

~tural 90s 

photo#raphic solution 

chromic Cplattng) sol In 

plating solution 

asbestos 

~tural gas 

Pf-ne 

natural gas 

asbes tos malathion 

paint and paint products 

beauty swly chemicals 

ph-1 

lab chemicals 

asbest08 

asbes tos 

dieset fuel 

various 

paint and pint pr&ts 

pesticides 

liquid fertilizer 

oxygen 

amoni a 

mia 

chlortne 

ammnia 

almlonia 

liquid pesticide 

alnmnia 

var i w pharmceuticals 

sulfuric acid k caustic 

gas01 ine 

pesticides 

mnoni a whydrow mlnonia 

ferti lizers k pesticides 

fuel 

diesel fuel 

malathion (5% solution) 

variow lab chmicals 

~tur~l gas 

radiolog. process fluid 

oxygen 

chemicals 

-18 

6 shops all 

150gal most 11 gal all 

2 labs all 

225 gal no 

200 gal no 

0 unk all 

10 gal no 500 gal all 

109 labs all 

10 pints all 

Dunk all 

25 labs all 

0 unk unknown 

0 unk unknoun 

6 shop all 

1 pint unknoun 

565 gal all 

76 gal all 

3500 gal unknown 

1 gal all 7 labs sme 

21 room mkm 

3 leaks Unknown 

Ounk unknonn 

0 unk all 

100 gal all tat all 

0 link unknown 

500 gal moat 

20 gal all 

0 unk no 

207 gal most 6oOgal most 0 unk all 

0 unk no 50000 gal some 

70 gat all 

3dgal at1 soat most 

0 unk no 0 unk no 

10 gal all 

350gal all 

0 unk no 36981 half 

15 gal all 

5500 gal most 

Ounk unknoun 

0 unk no 30 tanks no 4' fires no 

0 unk unknown 

4 ~ints all 

0 kk unknown 

4 02 all 

0 unk unknown 

ow mknowI 

10 bldgs tmknoun 1 bldg tmknoun 

1500~d3 no 23 labs most 

Dunk OIL 

55 gal all 

0 unk unknown 

0 unk sme 0 unk no 0 unk no 150 lb no 

.o unk no 

omk no 2 02 all 

0 unk no 0 unk all 

0 unk unknoun 

Dunk all 

Ounk no 

5 gal all 

0 unk nb 

5000 lb no 200 lb unknonn 

5 gat no 15000 yd3 no 1 pint all 

0 unk all 

0 unk no olnk all 

0 unk no 

Ounk all 

OLmk no 

Mtn. View Fire Dept. (Leinweber) 

SFRWCB \ Mtn. Vien Fire Dept \ GTE 

â‚¬ \ Mtn. View Fire Dept. \ Target 

SFRMCB \ conv. w/Alza 

SFRWCB \ Healy Ford Aerospace 

SFRWCB \ H-P 

SFRWCB \ H-P 

â‚¬ \ CA OES \ H-P 

CA OES conv. w/Stanford EH&S 

Stanford EH6S \ Stanford Hospital 

conv. w/J. Haag a Syntex 

conv. w/J. Haag a Syntex 

S. Bailey & J. DeNiro a Med Center .I. DeNiro a Med Center 

San Jose Fire Dept. (J. Carter) 

Good Samaritan engineering dept. 

clean-up company (Scott Soden) 7/91 

clean-up ccqmny (Scott Soden) 7/91 

conversation w/Keller a Mirassou 

08Connor Hospi tat Engineering Dept . Staley a San Jose State Univ. 

Staley a San Jose State Univ. 

Staley a San Jose State Univ. 

SFRWCB report - - 11/3/89 

Santa Clara Co. OES 

CA OES 

Santa Clara School District 

EaE - - i 0189 

EPA \ CA OES 

CA OES 

conv. w/Santa Clara F.D. (Parker) 

â‚¬ \ CA OES 

CA OES 

conv. WSanta Clara F.D. (Parker) conv. n/Santa Clara F.D. (Parker) 

SFRWCB \ Santa Clara F.D. (Parker) 

â‚¬ \ CA OES 

â‚¬ \ CA NS 

â‚¬ \ CA mS 

conv. w/Sunnyvale F.D. (Uilliatns) 

EPA\ CA OES\Sunnyvale Public Safety 

EPA \ CA OES \ U-P 

clean-up company (Scott Soden) 7/91 

conv. w/Stmyvale F.D. (Uillims) 

Lockheed 

EPA \ CA OES \ Lockheed 

Lockheed 

conv. w/Sunnyvale F.D. (Uilliam) 

SFRWCB 

CA Dept. of Forestry\Salsipuedes FD 

conv. w/Calif. Division of Forestry 

Pajaro Valley School District 

Santa Cruz Co. EMS* Robt. Vessey 

Santa Cruz Co. EH 6 S 

Santa Cruz Co. EMS, conv. w/Murphy 

Santa Cruz Co. EH 6 S 

C&ri l lo Col lege, Santa Cruz EH&S 

Cabri I lo Col lege 

Santa Cruz Unified School District 

Santa Cruz Co. EH&Sa S.C. Metro TD 

UCSC Env. Health 6 Safety 

Santa Cruz Co. EHkS, Matt 3 store 

Satsipuedes Fire Dept. 

EaE--io/w 

uatsonvi tte Fire Dept. 

Green Giant \ Uatsmille Fire Dept 

Salsipuedes Fire Dept. 

CA OES\ Uatsonv. FD\ C.Uales @lent 

Uatsonvi lle FD \ U. Jordan a co. 

Salsipuedes Fire Dept. 

Uatsonvill8 FD \ conv. w/plant ingr. 

Uatsonville Fire Dept. 

Uatsonville Fire Dept. 

Uatsonville FD \ conv. w/drug CO. 

Uatsonville FD \ K-Bryan a Ketema 

Uatsonville Fire Dept. 

Uatsonvi t la FD \ conv. w/Emi l a to. Uatsonville Fire Dept.\ conv. w/co. 

CA OES \ Uatsonville Fire Dept. 

Uatson. FD \Mont. RWCB \Satsip. FD Uatsonville FD \ L.Haskins a co. Sonta Cruz Co. EHCS* S.C. Metro 10 

CA OES\ Uatsonv. FD\ 0.Bell a store conv. w/G.Mills U. Cm. Hospital 

cm. n/G.Mills a U. Corn. Hospital cm. w/G.Mills a U. Cum. Hospital 

COW. W/G.MillS a u. ~~. H0Spit81 

Uatsonville Fire Dept. 

Uatsonville Fire Dept. 
TJ3E LOh4.A PRIETA, CALIFORNIA, EARTHQUAKE OF OCTOBER 17,1989: 

SOCIETAL RESPONSE 

m, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

EARTHQUADS AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS-A STATE EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE FOCUSING ON THE EARTHQUAKE 

By Paul J. Penn, 

California Conservation Corps, Sacramento, Calif. 

.Most of the impacts were to residential areas and not industrial facilities. 

ABSTRACT *Many of the mitigation measures implemented by handlers of hazardous materials were effective. 

 mard do us material emergencies, more than most other *There were most likely many incidents that were not reported. 

hazards, require a multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional 

response. Combined, hazardous material incidents stemming from an earthquake can create impacts beyond the THWAT SCENARIO 

sum of the individual events. This paper explores several 

aspects of hazardous material emergency management as Hazardous material emergencies due to earthquakes can 

it relates to seismic activity, focusing primarily, but not conceivably occur any place or time in ~alifo~a and will 

exclusively, on the Loma Prieta earthquake. threaten the public heal& and safety and the environment. It 

is most likely that significant hazardous material incidents 

will occur in large population centers where hazardous maINTRODUCTION terials are present in business and transportation. Other, more 

remote areas with lower populations but less available reThe dramatic increase in use of hazardous materials in sources are also vulnerable. These include the Humboldt Bay 

this century has created a potential impact from earth- area with its concentration of chlorine at pulp mills and the 

quakes of exposure to released chemicals. One need only Long Valley caldera with its numerous military facilities. 

look back to the Lmma Prieta and Whittier (1987) earth- Small spills in nonindustrial (residential and rurdagriculturquakes to gain an understanding of the potential associated al) locations may also result. Examples include 10,000 

with hazardous material emergencies during a catastrophic pound ammonia spill at a packing plant in Watsonville during 

earthquake. During the Whittier earthquake a large chlo- the Loma Prieta event that took several days and over a million 

rine gas leak occurred; fortunately meteorological condi- gallons of water to mitigate; the release of pesticides, solventsy 
HREi, POLICE, TRANSPORTAmON, AND MARDOUS MAmRIALS 

fbels, and other materials from individual residences; spills 

of pesticides at farms and agricultural supply facilities; and 

the release of cyanides and heavy metals at mining facilities. 

The California transportation system including the roads, 

rails, and sea lanes is especially vulnerable to seismic activity. While bridges are designed and are being retrofitted 

to withstand earthquake shaking, other aspects of the 

transportation system are expected to cause hazardous material emergencies. These include accidents involving 

trucks transporting hazardous materials during the shaking 

and train derailments due to damage to tracks. Seiches and 

possibly tsunamis can impact ships near shore, within harbors, and along the inland cargo routes. 

All of these scenarios require emergency planners to expect that a catastrophic earthquake may create a significant 

number of large and small hazardous material incidents 

that will result in the overwhelming of any one jurisdiction's ability to respond, abate, and mitigate their impact. 

PLANNING 

Planning for hazardous material release due to earthquakes in California is often addressed separately and 

lacks coordination. Figure 1 identifies many of the plans 

that may be encountered. 

Locally each level in the planning diagram should be 

fully coordinated with those within their grouping and 

above and below. Unfortunately, this is not always the 

case. One technique to avoid the conflict inherent in multiagency coordination is to combine planning for the identified hazards that may be encountered within a particular 

area (jurisdiction or facility). In Federal parlance this is 

known as "all-hazard planning," while the state of California refers to this method of emergency planning as "multihazard fbnctional planning." 

IMPACTS 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

During an earthquake many basic services generally provided by government and utilities will likely be interrupted due to hazardous material releases. These include: 

*Transportation system.-Roads, airports, port facilities and 

rail lines may be impacted. Even if the facilities or corridor 

are intact, incidents not related to the transportation mode 

may render that mode unusable. For example, a major highway and rail line run parallel in an area that is impacted 

by an earthquake are spared from major damage. However, 

a hazardous material release from a fixed facility upwind 

that wafts over the transportation corridor makes the highway and rail line unavailable for evacuation or transporting 

resources. 

*Energy.-Liquid and compressed gas fuel tanks and lines 

are susceptible to explosion at the time of an earthquake 

and afterwards, including when gas is turned back on if 

pilot lights and appliances are damaged. Electrical generating plants which use fuels such as oil, natural gas, and 

nuclear fuels are susceptible to catastrophic releases. (Nuclear power plants are theoretically engineered to withstand anticipated tremors.) Petroleum fuels pipelines carry 

product over long distances and are vulnerable to failure. 

According to the State and Federal Hazard Mitigation Survey Team Report for the Loma Prieta earthquake, about 

840,000 gallons of petroleum products were lost from 

their vessels at the Unocal Corporation's facility in Richmond, Calif. The material was contained in a berm and 

largely recovered. Foam was used to prevent ignition. The 

destruction of refineries and electrical systems could affat 

areas far outside the impacted area due to dependence on 

pipelines of refined product and an integrated energy grid. 

A large number of the phone calls reported to the Santa 

Cruz County 911 consisted of reports of gas leaks from 

residences. 

*Freshwater and wastewater facilities.-Almost all water 

treatment facilities have considerable amounts of chlorine 

and other hazardous materials on site that could be released 

during an earthquake. These water treatment plants are 

often near residential and industrial areas. During the hma 

Prieta event, 150 lb of in-service bottles containing compressed, liquefied chlorine at two city well sites in Watsonville leaked because they were attached to the building by a 

chain at the top one-third of the tank. These bottles sheared 

off the lines at the metering valves during the earthquake 

when the unsecured bottom portion of the tanks moved. 

Further, hazardous materials may infiltrate into freshwater 

sources and distribution lines. For example, the failure of 

an underground storage tank can lead to the intrusion of 

flammable liquids into sewer systems which can cause explosions far from the source of the release. 

Wastewater facilities rely on microbial action to digest 

wastes. Infiltration due to the breakdown of industrial pretreatment and other sources could cause a sewage plant to 

cease functioning. Without wastewater capabilities and supplies of freshwater most residential areas are uninhabitable. 

Failure of freshwater delivery systems will make unavailable large quantities of water for fire suppression and 

other hazardous material response techniques. 

SPECIAL POPULATIONS 

Special populations are those who are not able or permitted to act independently. Generally facilities that hold 

special populations are schools, hospitals, prisons, skilled 

nursing facilities, and so forth. These are difficult to evacuate and present other problems. For example, while many 

hospitals are able to isolate their ventilation systems from 

external plumes, hospitals and academic institutions often 
EARTHQUAKES AND HAZARDOUS MAT93IUALS C41 

HAZARDOUS MATERIAL PLAN RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN CALIFORNIA 

National Oil and Hazardous 

Federal 

Substance Pollution Contin~encv - 

Radiological 

Emergency 

Response Plan 

(FRERP) 

" * 

Plm (NCP) Plan for Federal 

Response to a 

Catastrophic 

Earthquake 

ESF #10 

Region IX Oil and Hazardous (National and 

substance Pollution 

Contingency Plan (RCP) 

FEDERAL 

PLANS 

I b 

C A 

b State STATE WIDE 

Emergency Plan PLANNING 

Contingency Plan 

Bay Area and Southern REGIONAL Regional + SARA California Catastrophic 

HWMP Regional Plan Earthquake Response 

Plans (Fire, Re~cue~and 

Toxic Hazards Annex) 

I 

I 

County bcal 

Mu1 tiHazard LOCAL 

Hazardous Waste 

Functional Standard GOVERNMENT 

Management Plan Plan Operating PLANNlNG 

(H WMP) 

z 

Communications* 

h 

CityICounty 

Area Plan 

Inventories, Standard Inventories, Standard Inventories, Standard 

Operating Procedures, Operating Procedures, PRIVATE Operating Procedures, 

Spill Prevention Plans, Spill Prevention Plans, Spill Prevention Plans, SECTOR 

Risk Management and Risk Management and Risk Management and PLANNING 

Prevention Program Prevention Program Prevention Program 

Pigure 1 .-Hazardous materid planning relationships in California. 
FIRE, mLIcE, TRANsmRTATIoN* ANJI HAZARDOUS MAmRIALs 

have large amounts of hazardous materials on site (in laboratories) which may be spread internally if spilled. If exposed patients are brought from a prehospital setting to an 

emergency room without adequate decontamination, the 

chemical may also be spread throughout the facility. During the Loma Prieta earthquake, numerous secondary 

schools and university laboratories experienced chemicals 

falling off shelves. Similarly hospitals experienced chemical releases following the earthquake, and one hospital 

found that its liquid oxygen tanlc outside the facility was 

structurally compromised. 

\ 

RESPONSE 

Gd pre-incident planning requires the assumption that 

hazardous materials incidents in the area impacted by a 

catastrophic earthquake will quickly exceed local response 

capabilities. Nondedicated teams may be responding to nonhazardous material incidents (for example, extrications, 

structure fires) if those are the first emergencies reported. 

Communications systems may not be operable to receive or 

dispatch emergency responders. During the Loma Prieta 

earthquake, Watsonville's emergency communications were 

disrupted and the Fie Department had to set up makeshift 

communications capabilities with two communications vehicles in the Fire Department's parking lot for 2 hours before 

normal service could be restored. San Francisco experienced 

interruption of telephone service on the first day of the 

earthquake, which prevented the San Francisco Health' Department from deploying. Transportation system elements 

may be compromised, as indicated at the Cypress Freeway 

and Highways 1 and 17 after the earthquake. Crews dispatched to incidents will likely have minimal backup or relief 

when response agencies are fully committed. 

The collapse of the Cypress Freeway (an overpass near 

the Oakland Bay Bridge) was a major nonhazardous material incident which required a massive and protracted response. A major hazardous material incident in a similar 

setting, either from a fixed facility or transportation accident, would also require extended operational and logistical support during an earthquake. Further, if one of the 

vehicles involved in the failure of the roadway contained a 

hazardous material, the rescue efforts would have been delayed and made more complicated. As local resources become fully committed, some hazardous material releases 

may have no one to abate or mitigate the incident. 

A catastrophic earthquake will require the mobilization 

of all of the capabilities within the state to adequately 

manage the multiple incidents, many of them long term. 

As currently envisioned in local multihazard functional 

plans, the Southern California Earthquake Response Plan 

(San Francisco Earthquake Research Project, 1990) the 

California Emergency Plan (published by the California 

Office of Emergency Services), and the Federal Response 

Plan, the response begins locally in the cities and counties. 

When resources are used up locally, requests are made by 

the operational areas (counties) to the OES mutual aid region. It is important that, except in limited cases, operational areas do not attempt to acquire the resources 

independently to avoid problems in resource management. 

At the regional level resoyrces are acquired, as available, 

within the region. When regional capabilities are exceeded, the regional emergency operations center will contact 

the State Operations Center to meet outstanding current 

and anticipated needs. The State Operations Center will 

then attempt to fblfill the requirements statewide or pass 

the request up to the Federal level, if necessary. 

The statewide hazardous material response is addressed 

in the Southern California Earthquake Response Plan in 

the Fire, Rescue and Toxics Section. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency @PA) is the primary agency for 

the Federal counterpart in the Federal Response Plan, 

Emergency Support Function #lo (Hazardous Material). 

The State and Federal activities are designed to be colocated at the State operations Center in order to facilitate 

coordination. The California Office of Emergency Services 

Hazardous Material Division and the U.S. EPA along with 

the other State and Federal agencies with hazardous material responsibilities will coordinate the disaster intelligence 

gathering and analysis, operations, and logistics support 

for hazardous material incidents during an earthquake with 

the other functions for the overall response. 

'As in other hazards (for example, wildland fires) logistical 

support is best carried out using the Incident Command 

System (ICS) or the Multi-agency Coordination System 

(MACS). (The Incident Command System was developed 

following a massive wildland fire in Southern California in 

1970. What followed was a Federal, State and local project 

to develop a common organizational structure, terminology, 

communications, and span of control. ICS has been refined 

over the years to become the preferred management tool for 

management of all emergencies. Federal [29 CFR 19 10.120] 

and state [5192 California Code of Regulations] regulations 

for Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response 

require the use of an ICS at a hazardous material incident.) 

When resources are requested they should be by type and 

function so that they can be acquired and distributed appropriately. Examples include 100 pairs of butyl rubber gloves, 

a team capable of performing hot tapping of 10,000 lb of 

liquid propane with the necessary equipment, and a fblly 

equipped hazardous material emergency response team 

trained to the specialist level. The use of a common organizational structure and a common terminology is key to this 

process. The definition of terms for hazardous material emergency response has been developed and distributed by the 

Fquipment and Training Subcommittee of the California 

Chemical Emergency Planning and Response Commission 
EARTHQUAKES AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS c43 

(which serves as the State Emergency Response Commission, pursuant to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Tide 111). 

Therefore, it is important that resources are requested 

, with a clear and concise description so that the logistics 

function can meet the need from as many sources as possible. At the Emergency Operations Centers and State Operations Center request orders will be consolidated. For 

example, the 100 butyl rubber gloves requested from one 

site may be consolidated with an order for 50 Viton gloves 

that would be procured from a glove distributor. 

Those resources that have been activated from outside 

the impacted area would come to a mobilization center at 

the periphery of the region in need of the resources. The 

resources would then be dispatched to staging areas close 

or adjacent to the actual incident site. 

Some incidents will not be responded to for extended 

periods of time. With minimal resources available, an emergency management decision may be to evacuate the area and 

let the incident stabilize by itself. This would require a 

prioritization of which incidents present the greatest threat 

to the public health and safety and the environment and 

whether sufficient resources are accessible to be effective. 

A release of material that requires special equipment that is 

not available to emergency responders may be isolated and 

resources applied elsewhere. A release of an extremely hazardous substance in a remote area that would require a long 

term and personnel intensive response is also a candidate for 

self-stabilization. Emergency managers should prepare for 

developing decisionmaking processes for multiple incidents 

occurring simultaneously and exercise those scenarios. 

MUTUAL AID AND FUNDING 

Unlike fire, law, and public works emergencies, for 

which agencies use mutual aid on a regular basis and 

have the ability to reciprocate, mutual aid for hazardous 

material emergency response is often not mutual. Since 

hazardous material emergency response is expensive and 

labor intensive, many jurisdictions do not have an adequate capability to respond to incidents during nondisaster times. To address the problems of cost recovery, 

liability, and local coverage, many agencies have developed methods of sharing costs such as Joint Powers 

Agreements or have refused to respond out of their political boundaries. It is expected that during a catastrophic 

earthquake the economic and political constraints of nondisaster modes will fall apart, at least during the initial 

response period. Mutual aid will be covered under the 

Master Mutual Aid Agreement signed by all California 

cities and counties in the 1950s. (The Master Mutual Aid 

Agreement has been amended over the past 40 years but 

does not specifically address hazardous material mutual 

aid issues.) Further, cost recovery and the traditional 

funds used by responders may be augmented by other 

funding sources, such as the Robert Stafford Amendments 

to Public Law 93-288, and special appropriations made 

available after major events. 

MITIGATION 

As in all forms of emergency management, the most effective methodology of minimizing the impacts of hazardous materials incidents during an earthquake is preventing 

the release from occurring. Simple and inexpensive actions can be effective in preventing hazardous material 

emergencies. Examples include securing vessels in place 

and not relying on their weight to hold them in place, installing flexible piping where they make connections, separating incompatibles that may commingle, and installing 

automatic cutoff systems. Northern California is known 

for its fine wines and the area impacted by the Loma Prieta earthquake has many large and small wineries. As with 

other temblors in the region, a number wineries received 

substantial damage. Shifting of large tanks filled with 

product and welding failure were recorded, including the 

loss of about 20,000 gallons of wine. Buckling, "elephant 

footing" (a bulging at the base of vessels containing liquids caused by earthquakes), and piping failure are typical 

of all industries that contain liquids, including hazardous 

materials, in bulk. Damaged structures during the Loma 

Prieta earthquake highlighted that many of theunreinforced masonry buildings contained asbestos. This caused 

a hazard for demolition workers and created a waste management problem. 

The best overall techniques involve eliminating and minimizing the use of hazardous materials at any one site. These 

are all important during any period, but the results may mean 

the difference between minor impacts and major damage that 

could result in death, human health consequences, or extensive environmental cleanup. For both business and govemment, mitigation is the most cost effective approach. 

CONCLUSION 

A catastrophic earthquake will be the ultimate peacetime 

test of California's ability to function. Even without the 

chemicals that have become so ubiquitous in our daily 

lives, the impacts associated with a catastrophic event will 

test the mettle of all segments of society. The addition of 

hazardous material emergencies will have far reaching impacts on the capability to respond and recover from a significant seismic event. By recognizing the hazards and 

addressing them forthrightly, our ability to prevent and respond will lessen but not eliminate the impacts of hazardous materials release from earthquakes. 
FIRE, POLICE, TRANSPORTATION, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 

REFERENCES CITED 

Association of Bay Area Governments, 1991, Toxic gas releases in earthquakes: Existing programs, sources, and mitigation strategies, Oakland, California, 64 p. 

Bailard, Earl E., 1991, Disaster management: Role of the Environmental 

Protection Agency in regional hazardous materials response and recovery operations: Hazardous Materials and Environmental Management Conference/West, 7th, Long Beach California, 1991, 

Proceedings, p. 410-426. 

Faurot, Paul, 1991, Hazardous materials response experiences near the 

epicenter of the Loma Prieta earthquake: Hazardous Materials and 

Environmental Management ConferenceJWest, 7th. Long Beach 

California, 1991, Proceedings, p. 397-400 

EQE Engineering, 1989, The October 17, 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake: 

A quick look report: San Francisco, California, 40 p. 

Federal Emergency Management AgencyJState of California, 1990, After 

action report Response 89; an exercise involving a coordinated federallstate response to a simulated earthquake in northern California: 64 p. 

Penn, Paul, 1991, Earthquakes and hazardous materials: A state emergency Management Perspective, Hazardous Materials and Environmental Management Conference/West, 7th, Long Beach California, 

1991, Proceedings, p. 401 -409. 

Perry, Bruce, September, 1990, The Loma Prieta quake- a hazmat perspective: HAZMAT WORLD, v. 2, no. 9, p. 71-72. 

San Francisco Earthquake Research Project, 1990, Santa Cruz County 

9-1-1 recording transcript October 17, 1989 beginning at 5:04 p.m.: 

61 p. 

StatelFederal Hazard Mitigation Survey Team, 1990, State and Federal 

hazardous mitigation survey team report for the October 17, 1989 

Loma Prieta earthquake, California: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 43 p. 

State of California overn nor's Office of Emergency Services, 1991, California hazardous material incident contingency plan, California, 1 16 p. 

State of California ~overnors Office of Emergency Services, 1989, Excerpts from state response plan for a catastrophic earthquake in the 

San Francisco Bay region, California: 72 p. 

State of California overn nor's Office of Emergency Services, 1990 

Southern California earthquake response plan, California: 145 p. 

State of California overn nor's Office of Emergency Services, 1989, 

State Emergency Plan, California, p. 1-13. 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Health and Emergency Planning Region IX San Francisco California, 1990, Lorna 

Prieta response San Francisco and Monterey Bay areas summary 

and analysis of hazardous materials response and recovery operations following the Loma Prieta Earthquake October 17 1989: 

64 P. 

* U. S. QWEBIWasa PRINTING OFFICE: 1994-583-048/10002