!" #

 	$ %	

  &

 '"(($)

 ##

*++,

-.

##

 	$

/ !"0

	1	2

		

,	1

 %	 #	

	 


#		3$4

3,3	

56---+6	$,,

3%
,

"7	

 %	 
Combating WMD 

3 A New Era in Combating WMD 

 By Dr. James A. Tegnelia 

5 CBRNE Corps and Combating WMD— 

 A “Not-So Modest” Approach 

 By COL David P. Fiely 

11 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Educational Programs at the Air Force Institute of Technology 

By LTC David LaGraffe and 

Col Patricia Coomber

16 Respiratory Protection Guidance During a 

Radiological Emergency Response 

By MAJ Eugene V. Sheely and 

Lt Col Steven E. Rademacher 

25 The Army Organizes for Combating Weapons 

of Mass Destruction 

By Ms. Janet Strafer 

29 Sticks and Stones may break my bones, but 

TICs will never hurt me? 

By Mr. Gwyn Winfield 

31 U.S. Army 20th Support Command (CBRNE) 

Organization/Transformation 

By PAO, 20th Support Command (CBRNE) 

36 DODI 3222.3 and Army System HEMP Survivability 

By Robert A. Pfeffer and 

MAJ John L. Carter 

5	$8	


International 

58 At Home On The Range

By Mr. Gwyn Winfield 

Science and Technology 

41 Davis Gun: Simulation of Severe Mechanical 

Environments 

By Roy S. Batty, Ron Lundgren and 

Garth Reader 

46 Developing Decon Procedures, a Primer for 

Army Program Managers 

 By Joseph C. Nellis and 

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes 

History 

50 MAD and the Road to SALT 

By Dr. Jerry Gideon and 

CPT. Thomas M. Genter 

55 Lest We Forget 

By Mr. Rick Barker 

27

39

56
From The Director 

1 Army Combating WMD 

Update

By Mr. Peter Bechtel 

 

 

 

Do You Know...

40 DARPA Urban Grand 

Challenge 2007

By Mr. Robert Pfeffer 

Notes from the Field

61 Missile Defense Battle 

Tracking

By MAJ Andrew Pache 

 

Combating WMD 

Resources 

62

 

COLUMNS 

Combating WMD Resource Page 

Published by the 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA) 

Director 

Mr. Peter Bechtel 

Managing Editor 

MAJ Andrew Pache 

Editorial Board 

 Mr. Joseph Nellis, LTC Kathy Gilmartin, 

and MAJ Andrew Pache 

Design/Layout 

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes 

Ms. Helen M. Stewart 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United 

States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are 

those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal’s content does not necessarily reflect the US Army’s position 

and does not supersede information in other official Army publications. 

Distribution: US Army organizations and activities with NBC-related missions, to 

include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear 

surety programs, to each FA52 officer, and to Army attachés. The Secretary of 

the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the 

transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of 

funds for printing this publication have been approved by HQ, TRADOC, 12 Nov 

98, IAW Army Regulation 25-30. 

Article Submission: We welcome articles from all US Government agencies and 

academia involved with NBC matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Submit articles in Microsoft Word and include photographs, graphs, tables, etc. as 

separate files. 

Mailing Address: Director, US Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency ATTN: MONACWO, Suite 101, Springfield, VA 22150-3164. 

Telephone: 703-806-7855, DSN 656-7855, fax 703-806-7900 

Electronic Mail: andrew.pache@us.army.mil / dcsg3usanca@conus.army.mil 

9

34
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

FROM THE DIRECTOR 

Army Combating WMD Update 

Mr. Peter Bechtel, Director 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

1 

elcome to the first issue of the US Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Journal. Since my 

last writing, USANCA continues to improve its 

planning and analysis capabilities to assist the Army Service Component Commands, in coordination and support 

of the Army Staff. We are also increasingly engaged in the 

Army’s capabilities process, in concert with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 

process, and through international forums as well. I want 

to highlight just a few of the activities and issues our Army 

is now addressing in these areas. 

Current Activities 

 Two Combating WMD Planning Assistance Teams are 

forming to assist Echelon Above Corps Army elements 

with CWMD planning capability. Their initial focus will be 

the Pacific and domestically in the US. Key to their success is close coordination with the Defense Threat Reduction Planners (for COCOM level integration) and HQDA 

Strategy, Plans and Policy Elements (for Army Component integration). Additionally, we are providing CWMD 

subject matter experts to the Battle Command Training 

Program in support of exercises held at Corps level and 

above. Information from these interactions is used by 

USANCA in reviewing Joint Capability documents as well 

as guiding analysis efforts to better understand the operational impact of specific WMD challenges. One key to 

successful integration of CWMD tasks and strategy is the 

consideration of Security Cooperation efforts in light of 

those called for in the Contingency Planning Guidance. 

Beyond the obvious 'Phase 0' connection, the demand on 

Army resources across both areas is viewed concurrently 

providing a more holistic perspective. 

 We all must continue to improve the integration of 

Army-related CBRN materiel survivability capabilities 

throughout the Defense Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics Life Cycle Management Framework. Army and DOD 

weapon system programs’ capability documents must ensure compliance with Army and DOD survivability standards. We have also developed and are striving to implement the Netcentric Survivability HEMP Improvement Plan 

(NetSHIP). NetSHIP aims to improve HEMP survivability 

of mission critical systems and strengthen overall Army 

CBRN survivability processes. This plan targets improvements through a unified approach to countering electromagnetic environmental effects (E3), a lifecycle sustainment program, and improved integration of CBRN survivability throughout the JCIDS process. We are also assisting the Defense Science Board and Army Science Board 

initiatives, development of an Army staffing strategy to 

support the OSD Action Plan for Reducing Vulnerability to 

EMP, and the development of DODI 3150.cc, The Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Survivability Program. On the international front, the Army’s goals are to 

enhance the capabilities of multi-national forces in CBRN 

environments and to build partner capacity worldwide. We 

have been actively pursuing CBRN standardization and 

interoperability through NATO and American British Canadian Australian (ABCA) program engagement. A NATO 

team of experts will soon revise STANAG 4521 (AEP-7), 

NBC Defence Factors in the Design, Testing and Acceptance of Military Equipment, and to develop a set of operational-based CBRN scenarios that can be used as a standard across NATO CBRN forums. Since we do not have 

a monopoly on all the good ideas, this international involvement is critical to the increased spread of best pracMr. Peter Bechtel 

Director 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 2

tices and can only improve the overall response capability 

world-wide. 

 The Nuclear Weapons Effects Database System 

(NWEDS) upgrade project is in its last year and NWEDS is 

being incorporated into DTRA’s Integrated WMD Toolset 

(IWMD) and their Nuclear Capability Server (NuCS), 

thereby designating USANCA’s NWEDS code to be the 

nuclear effects engine for the web-based codes. Internationally, we have assisted in the development of Allied 

Engineering Publication (AEP)“Radiological Aerosol Challenge Levels” for peacetime operations, the rewrite of 

STANAG 2473 “Commander’s Guide to Radiation Exposure of Groups during War,” and revisions of AEP “NATO 

Handbook for Sampling and Identification of BCR Agents.” 

 In this issue we have continued and expanded our collaborative relationship with other CWMD publications. 

Three previously published articles are presented in this 

issue. The good people at NBC International 

(www.defenceinternational.co.uk), an outstanding publication out of Britain, and the Nuclear Weapons Journal of 

Los Alamos National Lab have submitted articles that we 

thought the readers would find interesting. It’s important 

that we engage our community as widely as possible, in 

order to propagate relevant information and ideas to as 

many friends as possible. We encourage all readers to 

participate in this very important discussion by sending us 

your comments and any information on work you want to 

express to others. The CWMD community is diverse and 

we seek to break down some of the stove pipes that still 

exist. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 2
 3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

A New Era in Combating WMD 

Dr. James A. Tegnelia, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

he President’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction describes 

such weapons in the hands 

of hostile states and terrorists as one 

of the greatest security challenges 

facing the United States. This strategy reinforces the need for the Department of Defense (DOD) 

to continue developing an integrated 

and comprehensive approach to 

counter the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat. As an essential step toward that approach, the 

Secretary of Defense assigned the 

commander, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), as the lead 

combatant commander for integrating 

and synchronizing DOD efforts in 

combating WMD. 

 The combating WMD mission entails the integration and synchronization of DODwide efforts across the 

doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. The 

President further codified responsibilities and authorities assigned to the 

USSTRATCOM commander in the 

Unified Command Plan of May 5, 

2006. In answer to this assignment, 

the commander established the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC–

WMD), which is collocated with the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. To 

support this vital mission further, the 

Secretary of Defense dual-hatted the 

director of DTRA as the director of 

the SCC–WMD. This mission and 

collocation allow USSTRATCOM and 

SCC–WMD to leverage DTRA’s vast 

technical expertise. 

 At the strategic level, preventing 

hostile states and nonstate actors 

from acquiring or using WMD is one 

of the four priorities identified in the 

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR). This is the first time a QDR 

has devoted such attention to the 

threat of WMD. Also at the strategic 

level, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff on February 13, 2006, 

issued the first-ever National Military 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. This strategy 

builds on the three pillar structure of 

the 2002 national strategy. As defined in the national military strategy, 

these pillars are: 

• Nonproliferation: actions to prevent the proliferation of WMD by 

dissuading or impeding access 

to, or distribution of, sensitive 

technologies, materiel, and expertise

• Counterproliferation: actions to 

defeat the threat or use of WMD 

against the United States, U.S. 

Armed Forces, allies, and partners 

• Consequence Management: actions taken to mitigate the effects 

of a WMD attack or event and 

restore essential operations and 

services at home and abroad.

 At the next level, the national military strategy identifies eight mission 

areas that span the pillars in the national strategy: offensive operations, 

elimination, interdiction, active defense, passive defense, consequence 

management, security cooperation 

and partner activities, and threat reduction cooperation. This new strategic framework is the DOD vehicle for 

dividing the broad combating WMD 

mission into specific, definable military activities that better address 

the DOTMLPF spectrum with more 

focus on the budget, training, doctrine, and policy 

processes. 

 Initially established in August 

2005, the SCC–WMD develops and 

maintains global situational awareness of WMD activities, advocates for 

combating WMD capabilities, and 

assists with WMD planning, while 

shifting emphasis from a DOD-centric 

approach toward interagency solutions. 

 The SCC–WMD has faced and 

overcome many of the challenges 

associated with standing up a new 

organization and is making significant 

progress. It continues to forge enduring relationships throughout DOD and 

other governmental organizations and 

has embraced DTRA’s existing capabilities and expertise by capitalizing 

on its traditional areas of chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear 

expertise and its longstanding relationships with the combatant commands, Services, national agencies, 

and other governmental organizations. 

 The SCC–WMD was declared 

“fully operational capable” on December 31, 2006, with initial emphasis on 

the WMD elimination and interdiction 

mission areas. Elimination supports 

the systematic seizure, security, removal, disablement, or destruction of 

a hostile state or nonstate actor’s capability to research, develop, test, 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 4

produce, store, deploy, or employ 

WMD, delivery systems, related technologies, or technical expertise. Interdiction is defined as operations to 

track, intercept, search, divert, seize, 

or stop trafficking of WMD, delivery 

systems, related materials, technologies, and expertise to/from state or 

nonstate actors of proliferation concern. 

 SCC–WMD successes in the 

elimination mission area include the 

development of a concept of operations that describes the overarching 

mission area at the strategic level and 

defines the desired capabilities for 

both a Joint Task Force–Elimination 

and the Joint E limination Coordination Element. A capabilities-based 

document designed to support policy 

and combatant command planning in 

the near term (2–7 years), the elimination concept of operations enumerates the roles and responsibilities of 

DOD components and interagency 

partners while outlining a construct 

for operational planning for the elimination mission. The elimination concept is currently out for final general 

officer/flag officer review and should 

be published as a handbook in the 

spring or summer of 2007 by the director of the Joint Staff. 

 The 2006 QDR directed DOD to 

establish a deployable joint task force 

headquarters for WMD elimination 

that is able to provide immediate 

command and control for forces executing those missions, as well as expand the Army’s 20th Support Command’s capabilities to enable it to 

serve as a joint task force capable of 

rapid deployment to command and 

control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions. In support of this 

task, the SCC–WMD successfully 

executed the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 

DOTMLPF Change Recommendation 

process to gain Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council recommendation 

for the Joint Elimination Coordination 

Element, which will be a rapidly deployable, 30-person command and 

control component capable of augmenting either an established joint 

force component command or joint 

task force headquarters specifically 

tasked to conduct WMD elimination 

operations. It will also coordinate with 

combatant commands, components, 

Services, Defense agencies, and 

units that may conduct WMD elimination missions on a day-to-day basis 

for WMD elimination training and exercise support. 

 The SCC–WMD is also leading 

USSTRATCOM support for the WMD 

interdiction mission and Proliferation 

Security Initiative activities. In support 

of the WMD interdiction mission, center personnel provide support to the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, and combatant commands to implement the 2006 QDR 

unity of effort paradigm in coordination with the National Counterproliferation Center and several National 

Security Council–established interagency forums focused on the WMD 

interdiction mission. The center also 

provides operational and exercise 

support for Proliferation Security Initiative activities and exercises, most 

recently as a participant in Exercise 

Leading Edge 07, which focused on 

maritime interdiction. 

 To track all of these efforts, the 

SCC–WMD maintains 24-hour situational awareness of critical combating WMD efforts and information. 

Combating WMD situational awareness is achieved through fusing regional expertise, open source knowledge, and technical information; connecting evidence, knowledge, and 

information related to past and current events; then applying analytical 

rigor to anticipate future events. The 

DTRA Operations Center’s 24/7 collaborative environment supports the 

SCC–WMD and facilitates tracking of 

WMD operations by depicting these 

events globally through a common 

operational picture, which went online 

at the classified level in the spring of 

2007. The combating WMD common 

operational picture will provide a Web

-based forum for community planners, analysts, and decisionmakers to 

increase awareness of global combating WMD activities and to serve as 

a one-stop shop for global combating 

WMD situational awareness. 

 As the threat of WMD proliferation 

grows, the SCC–WMD stands ready 

to meet the challenges. Through innovation and collaboration, the center 

is helping members of the WMD community to anticipate, counter, and 

respond to threats. The SCC–WMD 

leadership and personnel understand 

the need for constant vigilance, and 

they share the President’s vision to 

protect the United States, its forces, 

and allies from weapons of mass destruction. 

Dr. James A. Tegnelia is Director of 

the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency. He is also Director of the 

U.S. Strategic Command Center for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

Originally printed in the Joint Forces 

Quarterly, 3rd Quarter, July 2007 reprinted with permission. 

French sailors train as part of multinational Proliferation Security Initiative exercise Photo: U.S. Navy (Justin Thomas) 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 4
 5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

CBRNE Corps and Combating WMD 

– A “Not-So-Modest” Approach 

COL David P. Fiely 

Chief, Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation Policy Division 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

COMBATING WMD 

OL Robert D. Walk proposed 

the creation of a new Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 

Nuclear, and High Explosive 

(CBRNE) Branch - the Army CBRNE 

Corps - in an article published in the 

Army Chemical Review (A Modest 

Proposal: Shatter the Retorts, Defuse the Bomb, and Stabilize the 

Atom!). 1

 This Corps would be an 

amalgamation of the current Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) subspecialty, Chemical Branch, and 

Functional Area (FA) 52 Nuclear and 

Counterproliferation officer Corps. 

The purpose of this article is to further 

examine the CBRNE Corps concept 

as well as alternative solutions that 

recognize both the new Combating 

WMD (CWMD) paradigm adopted by 

the Army and the unique training and 

educational requirements necessary 

for officers to perform in assignments 

– particularly at strategic levels within 

DOD. This article, however, limits its 

focus to the respective officer Corps 

involved in CWMD – as FA52 does 

not have enlisted personnel – and 

discussion of NCOs within the EOD 

sub-specialty is an additional complication. 

Combating WMD – The Approach 

 The National Military Strategy 

(NMS) to Combat WMD, published in 

2006, lays out a comprehensive approach to deal with the complex and 

broad scope of WMD proliferation 

and potential use by US adversaries.2

 

This strategy uses the three pillars of 

Nonproliferation (NP), Counterproliferation (CP) and Consequence Management (CM) described in the 2002 

National Strategy to Combat WMD, 

and identifies eight mission areas: 

Security Cooperation, Threat Reduction, Offensive Operations, Active 

Defense, Passive Defense, Interdiction, Elimination, and Consequence 

Management (Figure 1).3

 

 This strategy acknowledges the 

potential synergy between the seemingly disparate approaches of NP, CP 

and CM. It also recognizes that together, the eight mission areas provide a stronger approach than when 

executed individually (Figure 2). 

While there may be disagreement as 

to the efficacy of this approach, this 

strategy does, in effect, describe a 

seamless and holistic environment 

that leverages the unique contribution 

of each pillar/mission area. 

 Organizational changes as a result 

of both National and Military Strategies to CWMD have been significant. 

The May 2006 Unified Command 

Plan assigns US Strategic Command 

(USSTRATCOM) the responsibility to 

serve “...as lead combatant commander for integrating and synchroFigure 1. CWMD Approach is outlined in NMS. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 6

nizing DOD CWMD efforts...”, 4

 and 

OSD, Joint, Air and Navy Staffs have 

reorganized to include specified 

CWMD organizations. These reorganization efforts have not resulted in 

a complete centralization of CWMD 

efforts within respective levels of 

DOD, however, they do represent a 

significant improvement. In certain 

cases, personnel and expertise shortfalls dictate leveraging ‘sister’ organizations focused on specific mission 

areas (e.g., Homeland Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense). While one 

may hope for complete centralization 

of expertise and responsibilities to 

enable ‘one-stop shopping’, personnel constraints and political sensitivities will likely serve as insurmountable roadblocks. 

 Anticipating the NMS approach, 

and recognizing the lack of an integrated articulation of concepts and 

policy for Army CWMD efforts, the 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 reorganized and refocused the National 

Security Policy Division within G-35 

on 1 October 2005. It became the 

Combating WMD and Proliferation 

Policy Division (DAMO-SSD) with the 

principal mission of “...developing 

Army CWMD and proliferation policies consistent with national strategy....” The intent of this new organization is to provide an Army Staff 

(ARSTAF) focal point for CWMD; 

however, there was no intent to duplicate CBRN functions already being 

performed by other ARSTAF organizations. Leveraging other Divisions’ 

expertise and responsibilities was 

expected and necessary due to similar personnel and resource constraints facing all DOD organizations. 

This reorganization, in conjunction 

with the reassignment of the US Army 

Nuclear and CW MD Agency 

(USANCA) as a G-3/5/7 CWMD Field 

Operating Agency (FOA), demonstrated G-3/5/7’s commitment to approach CWMD holistically, and allows 

for appropriate cognizance of and 

facilitation for multiple programs supporting Army CWMD efforts. It also 

provides for improved interface 

across multiple levels of the Army 

and DOD, and formulation of coherent Army CWMD strategies and policies, articulated via the components 

of The Army Plan (TAP). This will 

ultimately inform appropriate Army 

Commands as they develop 

DOTMLPF solutions pertaining to 

Army CWMD capabilities – with 

“P” (personnel) most germane to the 

focus of this article. 

Army Officer Corps Supporting 

CWMD Missions 

 Before responding to COL Walk’s 

specific recommendations for adjustments in officer assignments to support CWMD, it is important to identify 

Army officer Corps specialties that 

are involved in CWMD efforts/mission 

areas. It is also important to note that 

the full-range of CWMD functions is 

shared by multiple entities, supported 

by various Branches and FAs. 

Though the list (Table 1) of specialties and specified mission areas is 

not necessarily comprehensive, it 

does give one an appreciation for the 

scope/breadth of CWMD. This 

scope/breadth also highlights another 

important distinction: just as combat 

arms operations require careful balance and leveraging of unique armor, 

infantry, and fires skills; CWMD requires the same leveraging - albeit for 

CBRN expertise. In short, CWMD is 

broad, multidisciplinary and complex, 

and requires an approach that leverages multiple officer competencies 

through cooperation, coordination 

and integration of effort – informed by 

clearly articulated Army CWMD concepts and doctrine. Merging of 

unique skills is not necessarily the 

best answer. 

 It is also important to note the distinction between a Branch, a Branch’s 

associated sub-specialties and Functional Areas (FA). COL Walk’s proposal merges all three into a single 

CBRNE Branch; however, he fails to 

note potential second and third order 

effects resulting from this merger. A 

Branch assesses its officers as Second Lieutenants, providing initial 

training and company grade experience at tactical levels. Their development continues through operational 

experience, military education and 

training within their respective 

Branch, and culminates with field 

grade assignments at tactical, operational and strategic levels. Senior O3 officers may choose to ‘single-track’ 

in the operational career field and 

continue the remainder of their career 

in their Branch. A sub-specialty 

within a Branch (e.g., EOD within the 

Ordnance Branch) provides officers 

additional training in order for them to 

perform specific functions within their 

respective Branch. FA officers are 

assessed later in their careers (at the 

senior O-3 level) through a centralized process, are usually offered advanced civil schooling within their 

specialty, and are given follow-on 

assignments as field grade officers 

primarily at operational and strategic 

levels. 

 Though COL Walk’s approach is 

novel, his proposal does not recognize the unique contributions of the 

respective Branches and FAs involved in CWMD. He tacitly dismisses the rationale behind the orFigure 2. Interfusion of CWMD mission areas. 
 7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

ganizational approach adopted by 

designers of the current Officer Professional Management System 

(OPMS), and fails to adequately describe shortfalls with the current system before laying out a rather dramatic (vice modest) proposal – particularly for the EOD and FA52 Corps. 

He appears to base his proposal on 

“...insufficient chemical positions to 

cover higher-level staff requirements.”; “...high demand for (EOD) 

skills and (their inability to) provide 

the needed explosive coverage.”; 

FA52 lack of “...the broad background in CBRN operations that 

chemical officers possess.”; and the 

overall assessment that the Chemical, EOD and FA52 Corps “...

represent the continuance of Cold 

War ideas and may not represent the 

best fit for today’s modular Army.” 5

His article did not discuss the “B” in 

the CBRNE Corps concept – surprising in light of the medical community’s role in the CWMD regime and 

the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) decision to shift considerable funding to biological defense 

research at the expense of chemical 

programs. 6

 Similarly, inclusion of “E” 

in this proposed Corps appears to 

contradict efforts by Joint Staff and 

the Combating WMD community to 

focus on CBRN matters – particularly 

in Counterproliferation (CP) and Consequence Management (CM) arenas 

– vice attempting to incorporate high 

explosives (e.g., truck bombs) or an 

‘all-hazards’ approach (e.g., hurricane 

relief operations) for CM. 

 Can all three officer Corps be 

merged? In theory – yes, but in practice such a merger would be very difficult, and likely detrimental to the 

original purpose for each Branch/subspecialty/FA as well as for the officers 

themselves. For example, merging a 

FA into a Branch effectively eliminates the FA as designed under 

OPMS. This option should be considered only if one believes the capability provided by the effected FA is no 

longer required. FAs were established to create highly specialized 

officer Corps - leveraging tactical experience and providing additional 

graduate-level education – to support 

specific Army requirements, but also 

allowing for the same promotion opportunities as officers in the more 

traditional ‘operational’ career field. 

Similarly, sub-specialties within a 

Branch such as 89E provide additional training on particular skills in 

order to provide additional expertise 

in execution of critical Army missions. 

FA and sub-specialty managers generally have an advantage by working 

with smaller number of officers (~160 

FA52s and 275 EOD officers). This 

allows them significant flexibility in 

adapting to emerging ‘customer’ requirements, and also provides a 

unique opportunity for advanced civil 

and military schooling that many 

Branches simply cannot provide nor 

afford due to operational requirements. With these facts in mind, the 

potential result of creating a CBRNE 

Corps -- essentially eliminating FA52 

and the perhaps diminishing the capabilities provided by the EOD subspecialty – might be CBRNE officers 

who are “jack of all trades and master 

of none”. 7 

What Requires Improvement? 

 It does not seem that any Branch, 

sub-specialty or FA that supports 

CWMD missions are ‘broken’, and 

therefore requires ‘fixing’. For example, FA52 is, by any measurement, a 

successful FA. The FA52 proponent 

(G-3/5/7’s US Army Nuclear and 

CWMD Agency) sends more than 

70% of its assessed officers to advanced civil schooling for highly technical degrees ranging from physics to 

nuclear engineering – including 

PhDs. It has an OPMS ‘pyramid’ or 

grade ratio that allows for a tremendous promotion opportunity for offiBranch/FA CWMD Mission Area

Branch 14 – Air Defense Artillery Active Defense

Branch 15 – Engineers CWMD Enabler

Branch 18 – Special Forces CWMD Enabler

Branch 35 – Military Intelligence CWMD Enabler

Functional Area 40 – Space Active Defense

Functional Area 52 - Nuclear and CP Offensive Operations, Threat Reduction, Interdiction 

and Elimination

Branch 67 - Medical Service

67C - Preventive Medicine Sciences

67C/72A - Nuclear Medical Science

Passive Defense and CM

Functional Area 71 – Medical

71A - Microbiology

71B – Biochemistry

Passive Defense and CM

Branch 74 – Chemical

74A - Chemical, General

74B - Chemical Operations and Training

74C - Chemical Munitions and Materiel Management

Passive Defense, Interdiction, Elimination, Security 

Cooperation, Threat Reduction, and CM

Branch 89 – Ordnance

• 89E - Explosive Ordnance Disposal

CWMD Enabler

Table 1. Listing of Branches and Functional Areas Supporting CWMD. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 8

cers at all field grade ranks. COL 

Walk’s article also perpetuates misconceptions regarding the FA52 officer Corps: 1) FA52 represents the 

continuance of Cold War ideas; 2) 

that FA52 officers working at higher 

level staffs are there due to the scarcity of Chemical officers, and FA52 

responsibilities were expanded solely 

to fill a niche formerly overseen by 

the Chemical Corps; and 3) FA52 

officers do not possess the breadth 

and experience required to perform at 

these levels. 

 First and foremost, FA52 officers 

provide a unique capability to DOD 

and Interagency organizations that is 

hardly ‘Cold War’. FA52 officers focus primarily on offensive operations 

– both nuclear and conventional operations against WMD-related targets 

– leveraging Branch tactical and operational experience, and translating 

this into valuable advice and products 

at the strategic level. Yes, the Army 

gave up its nuclear weapon arsenal 

following a Presidential Nuclear Initiative in 1991; however, nuclear weapons remain an important part of the 

New Triad as described in the 2001 

Nuclear Posture Review. FA52 officers represent the only officer Corps 

in DOD specifically designed to possess training and education in nuclear 

weapon and reactor design, nuclear 

physics and nuclear weapon employment. This capability readily translates to a number of post 9/11 requirements throughout DOD and the 

Interagency community within several 

mission areas of CWMD. 

 Secondly, FA52 customers – 

Combatant Commands (COCOM), 

Defense Agencies, OSD, and Joint 

Staff – articulate their requirements 

for skills regarding officer billets to the 

respective Services. While COL 

Walk infers that the Chemical Corps 

may have challenges associated with 

filling these billets to the levels required by the respective organizations, it is an unfair characterization to 

state that these organizations are 

adding or recoding billets to FA52 or 

other specialties as a result. Nuclear 

focused organizations (Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, USSTRATCOM, divisions within the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, and Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

(Nuclear Matters)) have made a concerted effort to retain or increase the 

number of FA52 billets, and these 

decisions had nothing to do with capabilities or skills provided by US 

Army Chemical Corps officers. 

These organizations, as well as other 

organizations less focused on nuclear 

issues, appear very satisfied with the 

FA52 officers filling their respective 

positions, and the demand for FA52 

expertise is increasing as measured 

by increased authorizations. FA52 

officers are not trained to have 

equivalent expertise in CB defense as 

Chemical or medical officers; however, they do possess expertise in 

kinetic offensive operations against 

WMD-related targets not readily replicated by Chemical or Medical Corps 

officers. 

 Finally, the implication that FA52 

officers’ lack of a “...broad background in CBRN operations...” 8 renders them less qualified to perform in 

higher-level staff positions is unfair. 

FA52 officers are highly qualified to 

assume strategic CWMD positions 

within the Army, the Joint community 

and OSD. Indeed, no single CWMD 

specialty can accurately lay claim to 

possessing a depth of expertise obtained from years of education, training and operational experience in 

multiple disciplines; however, this 

depth is not necessarily a prerequisite 

to success at the operational and 

strategic levels of DOD. 

 Similarly, the EOD Corps appears 

to be extremely successful in developing highly qualified professional 

officers, and now are a ‘text book’ 

example of success within the Ordnance Corps. Formerly relegated to 

the ‘backwaters’ of strategic and operational thinking, current combat 

operations have made terms such as 

IED (Improvised Explosive Device), 

EFP (Explosively Formed Penetrator) 

and CEXC (Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell) commonly used terms 

in operational lexicon. EOD (89E) 

officers have a successful career path 

recognized by personnel officers as 

attributable to a strong pyramid of 

progression. This is in sharp contrast 

to the situation 20 years ago when 

Ordnance officers alternated between 

ammunition and EOD billets - as a 

result, Maintenance officers typically 

stole the limelight. In fact, the 89E 

career field is a ‘growth industry’ – 

growing from a sub-specialty fundamentally ‘capped out’ at Lieutenant 

Colonel with a large handful of majors 

and approximately 50 Captains in 

either staff or detachment command 

positions. EOD opportunities now 

include seven CSL battalion commands and two CSL group commands. Now, EOD officers are assigned to G3 staff from Division to 

Army Service Component Command 

level. 9 

First and foremost, FA52 

officers provide a unique 

capability to DOD and 

Interagency organizations that is hardly ‘Cold 

War’. FA52 officers focus primarily on offensive operations – both 

nuclear and 

conventional operations 

against WMD-related 

targets – leveraging 

Branch tactical and 

operational experience, 

and translating this into 

valuable advice and 

products at the 

strategic level. 

 The Chemical Branch has the 

unique distinction within the Services 

as being the only Branch with a 

specified mission to provide maneuver commanders personnel with a 

high degree of training and expertise 

in order for units to operate and survive in a CBRN environment. Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3 10

clearly describes the Chemical 

Branch’s primary focus as CBRN defense. This translates into support for 
 9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

commanders and staffs particularly in 

CWMD mission areas of Passive Defense and Consequence Management. To this end, the Chemical 

Branch is making significant strides in 

training, doctrine and organizational 

changes in response to operational 

experience and changing Army priorities. 

 So what requires improvement? A 

very real problem was tangentially 

broached by COL Walk - insufficient 

CBRN billets – particularly on Combatant Command and other strategic 

level staffs. This, however, is a Joint 

problem not readily solved by a merging of Army officer Corps, but only 

can be addressed by senior leadership responsible for these staffs. For 

example, most geographic COCOMs 

have a single Chemical Corps officer 

(O-5) assigned to their staff. This 

shortfall cannot be mitigated by assignment of a newly minted CBRNE 

Corps officer responsible for the entire breadth of CWMD. The ability of 

a Branch, sub-specialty or FA to assign sufficient numbers of officers is 

another issue. Though adding additional officers to a Chemical /CBRNE 

Corps (e.g., 89E and FA52) might 

appear to be a viable course-ofaction, it assumes that the new 

Branch will adequately train and educate these officers to handle the diverse roles and responsibilities inherent in CWMD mission areas. Though 

COL Walk acknowledges that creation of a new Branch must be done 

carefully, and that no one entity 

should have “...a disproportionate 

amount of power...”, 11 the fact remains that the Chemical Corps officer 

pool size and influence currently far 

exceeds those of 52s and 89Es. If 

the issue is lack of Chemical billets 

available for CBRN assignments at 

higher echelons, there may be a 

strong temptation to use 89E or FA52 

billets (to be recoded ‘CBRNE Corps’) 

to fill the gap – at the expense of the 

organizations relying on the current 

expertise these officers provide. 

 Even if the Army addressed the 

apparent shortfalls in creating and 

filling CBRN billets at higher-level 

staffs, there is a more pressing issue: 

a lack of coherent Army concepts, 

policy and doctrine that addresses all 

three pillars and eight mission areas 

in a holistic fashion. The CWMD entities identified in Table 1 undoubtedly 

are addressing their respective ‘piece’ 

of CWMD across DOTMLPF in an 

outstanding manner; however, there 

does not appear to be a concerted 

effort in HQDA to prioritize efforts, 

requirements and capability development across the spectrum of CWMD. 

There appears to be an apparent 

‘disconnect’ between concepts (G35), requirements (G-37), and capability development (G-8) insofar as 

Army CWMD efforts are concerned. 

Solutions 

First and foremost, open and frank 

dialogue between the stakeholders 

within the CWMD officer Corps is 

critical. Interpretation and rebuttal of 

articles and DA PAM language does 

not appear to be an effective approach. Dialogue between members 

of respective Branch/sub-specialty/FA 

Council of Colonels would be a prudent start, and would be viewed as 

less ‘threatening’ than a more direct 

approach through official channels 

with inevitable staffing actions. 

Through a careful and, if necessary, 

lengthy process, the stakeholders 

may find common ground, and provide Army senior leaders with prudent 

and practical options to improve the 

effectiveness of the CWMD officer 

ranks. 

 The creation of the Combating 

WMD and Proliferation Policy Division 

and ACCWMD within G-3/5/7 was 

undertaken to address the lack of 

concepts and policy emanating from 

HQDA regarding CWMD, but there 

remains a great deal of work to be 

accomplished to breakdown the persistent ‘stove-piping’ occurring within 

a number of Army CBRN programs 

and organizations. To this end, there 

must be better communication and 

coherent effort between the Army 

organizations charged with Army 

CWMD policy, requirements, and capability development. Application of 

Lean Six Sigma (LSS) principals to 

the CWMD-related piece of the concepts-to-capabilities (C-C) process 

would be a prudent start and, as previously mentioned, insertion of appropriate language into TAP would inform ARSTAF and Army Commands 

regarding the Army’s strategic direction in CWMD. 

 To address the lack of CBRN billets on COCOM, OSD or Joint staffs, 

there should be a concerted effort to 

carefully scrub COCOM billets to 

identify potential conversion opportunities – keeping in mind that CWMD 

is not an Army-only problem. The 

Navy, Air Force and Marines contribute personnel to high level DOD 

staffs with a WMD focus; though admittedly they do not necessarily have 

a specified WMD ‘specialty’. The 

addition of an EOD, Chemical and/or 

FA52 officer to augment the existing 

Chemical officer on a higher-level 

staff with limited CBRN billets 

(through conversion of an existing 

O1A or O2A billet) would increase 

capability, and provide synergy by 

leveraging existing expertise. 

The Chemical Branch 

has the unique distinction within the Services 

as being the only Branch 

with a specified mission 

to provide maneuver 

commanders personnel 

with a high degree of 

training and expertise in 

order for units to operate 

and survive in a CBRN 

environment. 

 Though DA PAM 600-3 offers a 

description of roles and responsibilities for each respective Branch, FA, 

and sub-specialty, and recognizing 

that renaming is clearly not a panacea to solve problems, one might 

consider a renaming convention in 

order to more clearly identify the respective Corps’ to the Joint commander seeking a particular skill-set. 

For example, the Chemical Corps 

could be renamed to the “CBRN Defense Corps” – in recognition of their 

passive defense focus and operational-response capability against 

CBRN hazards. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 10

Likewise, FA52 “Nuclear and Counterproliferation” could be renamed 

“Nuclear CWMD” in recognition of its 

primary focus on nuclear weapons, 

their employment and effects, and 

application of these skills to other 

CWMD mission areas including offensive operations (nuclear and nonnuclear) against WMD sites. 

 No matter what problem one feels 

is pertinent to current Army CWMD 

issues, the Army should consider the 

effects it wants to achieve before 

reaching into the solution kit-bag. If 

the desired end-state is appropriate 

numbers of CBRN billets on respective staffs, and sufficiently trained and 

focused officers to fill them, then 

merging of Branches and FAs is not 

necessarily the best approach. 

Conclusion 

CWMD is a broad and conceptually 

complex subject. For this reason 

alone, there is no ‘silver bullet’ or 

panacea to resolve the multiple issues and challenges facing the Army 

in this arena. Additionally, while there 

is a relative dearth of CBRN specialists to populate sufficient numbers of 

Army, Joint Staff, OSD and Interagency billets, merging of three distinct officer Corps with complimentary 

capabilities is not necessarily the best 

answer. Increased dialogue between 

Army CWMD stakeholders and an 

effort to improve efficiencies within 

current higher-level staffs – keeping 

in mind the purpose of the new 

OPMS construct – is a prudent start. 

COL David P. Fiely is currently serving as Chief, Combating WMD and 

Proliferation Policy Division in the G35 Directorate, G-3/5/7, Headquarters 

Department of the Army. He has 

been a Functional Area (FA) 52 officer since 1998, and has served in 

multiple FA52 assignments including: 

Instructor of Physics at the US Air 

Force Academy; Nuclear Effects Officer with the Defense Special Weapons Agency; Special Weapons Planner in USFK J-5; and Deputy Division 

Chief and WMD Planner for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. His 

degrees include a BS from the United 

States Military Academy, MS in Physics from the Naval Postgraduate 

School, MS in Strategic Studies from 

the US Army War College.

ENDNOTES 

1 Robert Walk, “A Modest Proposal: 

Shatter the Retorts, Defuse the 

Bomb, and Stabilize the Atom!”, Army 

Chemical Review (January-June 

2006), 35-38. 

2 Peter Pace, National Military Strategy to Combat WMD, Office of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

13 February 2006, 7-11. 

3 George Bush, National Strategy to 

Combat WMD, White House, December 2002, 2-5. 

4

 George Bush, Unified Command 

Plan, White House, 5 May 2006, 12-

15. 

5

 Walk, “A Modest Proposal”, 35. 

6 Donald Rumsfeld, 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, 6 February 

2006, 52-53. 

7Howard Rudat, 

[howard.rudat@hqda.army.mil], “RE: 

Article.” Private e-mail message to 

David Fiely, 

[david.fiely@hqda.army.mil], 26 October 2006. 

8

 Walk, “A Modest Proposal”, 35. 

9

 Rudat, “Private e-mail message”. 

10 Department of the Army Pamphlet 

600-3, Headquarters Department of 

the Army, 28 December 2005, 242-

252. 

11 Walk, “A Modest Proposal”, 37. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 10
 11 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

he Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), located at 

Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 

has a long history of educating military officers. The Institute traces its 

roots starting in 1919 from the Air 

School of Application at McCook 

Field in Dayton, Ohio. With the creation of the Army Air Corps in 1926, 

the school was renamed the Air 

Corps Engineering School and 

moved to Wright Field. When the Air 

Force became a separate service in 

1947, the Institute was renamed the 

Air Force Institute of Technology. 

Today, AFIT falls under the Air 

Force’s Air University as part of Air 

Education and Training Command. 

 The overall mission of AFIT is to 

provide responsive, defense-focused, 

education, research, and consultation 

to improve Air Force and joint operational capability. AFIT provides both 

graduate level education and continuing professional education through 

three schools: the Graduate School 

of Engineering and Management, the 

School of Systems and Logistics, and 

the Civil Engineer and Services 

School. All graduate level education 

is handled through the Graduate 

School of Engineering and Management. The mission of the Graduate 

School of Engineering and Management is to produce graduates and 

engage in research activities that enable the Air Force to maintain its scientific and technological dominance. 

The school's mission reflects its focus 

on preparing students with the skills 

required to maintain the world's best 

Air Force, with the recognition of research as a critical element in quality 

graduate education. 

 Students at AFIT come primarily 

from the Air Force, but there are also 

significant numbers of students from 

the other services as well as government civil servants and surprisingly, 

some “true” non-government civilian 

students. There are also students 

from several foreign countries. Currently, the Graduate School of Engineering and Management is host to 

over 900 students. 

 The Department of Engineering 

Physics in the Graduate School offers 

Masters of Science and Doctorates of 

Philosophy degree programs in Applied Physics, Material Science and 

Engineering, Electro-optics, and Nuclear Engineering. The standard program length for military officers is 18 

months for a M.S. and three years for 

a Ph.D. program. The department 

also offers compressed one year 

M.S. degrees available only to Air 

Force officers selected for Intermediate Developmental Education (this 

program is equivalent to the Air Command and Staff Course). Prior to beginning their graduate degree, more 

senior officers that have been out of 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Educational 

Programs at the Air Force Institute of Technology 

LTC David LaGraffe, USA, Assistant Professor 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Air Force Institute of Technology 

Col Patricia Coomber, USAF, Senior Military Professor 

Dr. James Petrosky, Assistant Professor 

Air Force Institute of Technology 

Figure 1. Ph.D. candidate MAJ Michael Anderson works with a lead-lined "Pig" 

and a High Purity Germanium Gamma Spectrometer at the Air Force Institute of 

Technology Nuclear Engineering Laboratory. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 12

the academic environment for an extended time, have the opportunity to 

take some refresher undergraduate 

courses at Wright State University 

(also in Dayton) through a cooperative agreement between the two 

schools. 

 The traditional Engineering Physics Department focus on weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) has been 

through the graduate nuclear engineering program. Many current Army 

Nuclear and Counterproliferation (FA 

52) Officers are graduates of this program. In fact, they comprise the bulk 

of the students in the nuclear engineering program. Research in the 

nuclear engineering program ranges 

from basic science and engineering 

research to more applied and operationally oriented work. Some examples of recent research results include: a study of the sensitivity of 

fallout calculation codes to input parameters; development of neutron 

transport codes; performance evaluation of a new field-portable, mechanically cooled, high-purity germanium 

gamma spectrometer; and a study of 

weathering effects on uranium oxides 

for attribution purposes. 

 With technology changing almost 

daily, the need to keep education current while anticipating future needs is 

a demanding role for AFIT. The 

Quadrennial Defense Review 2006 

addresses combating WMD as an 

important focus and suggests reorienting capabilities to meet defense 

needs. It specifically discusses combating WMD: 

The future force will be organized, trained, equipped and resourced to deal with all aspects 

of the threat posed by weapons 

of mass destruction. ... The 

Department will develop new 

defensive capabilities in anticipation of the continued evolution 

of WMD threats. Such threats 

include EMP, man-portable nuclear devices, genetically engineered biological pathogens and 

next generation chemical 

agents.

The National Security Strategy for 

Combating WMD tasks DOD to: 

Defeat and deter use of 

WMD and, if used by an enemy, deter the next use; Protect from, respond to, and 

recover from WMD use; Defend, dissuade or deny WMD 

possession or proliferation; 

and Reduce, destroy or reverse WMD possession. 

A primary tool needed to accomplish 

these tasks is a well educated force 

that can fully understand the technologies used in WMD. As part of its 

responsive educational mission, AFIT 

is standing up new combating WMD 

graduate education programs specifically aimed at meeting these tasks. 

 There is, however, already a plethora of training opportunities now 

available for individuals under the 

guise of Combating WMD. Combating WMD programs are cropping up 

throughout the country. Does it make 

sense for AFIT to start yet another? 

The answer is “yes,” because several 

factors make the new AFIT programs 

distinct from other programs. 

 The AFIT Combating WMD programs are distinct because it is education, not training; technical not policy; and it is graduate-level education 

at an accredited institution. Almost all 

the currently available combating 

WMD programs around the country 

focus on either training or on policy. 

Training programs are generally designed for the first responders, civil 

support teams, or front-line personnel 

to prepare them for a WMD event. 

Very few are focused on education 

and almost none are taught at the 

graduate level (certainly none in 

DOD). The current educational programs are often very elementary and 

aimed at policy and decision makers 

rather than designed to grow technical experts. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Outreach 

program is an excellent example of 

an educational program designed to 

provide familiarization of WMD for 

decision-makers, but again the technical level is fairly elementary. Policy 

and strategic studies programs 

abound and often have a strong educational aspect, but they are not technically oriented. Training, policy studies, and a familiarization with WMD 

alone are not sufficient to prepare the 

expert technical advisors, inspectors, 

analysts or researchers needed in the 

fight against WMD. AFIT, with a long 

history of expertise in nuclear effects, 

and a faculty with a strong military 

operational experience, is uniquely 

suited to put together a comprehensive combating WMD educational 

program. 

Figure 2. Majors Tom Gray and Lonnie Carlson take data from a Phoswich Detector in the Nuclear Instrumentation Laboratory 
 13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

 Starting in the Fall 2006 Quarter, 

AFIT will begin offering two Combating WMD programs to meet different 

educational requirements. These two 

requirements include the need to supply short-term education for people 

with limited time, and the need to 

meet long-term educational requirements for people needing advanced 

degrees. The first program, the 

Graduate Studies Program (GSP), is 

a short course leading to an AFIT 

Graduate Certificate. Although it is 

not an advanced degree granting program, the GSP does earn the students 16 graduate credit hours. The 

second is an 18-month Professional 

Science Master’s (PSM) degree program. 

Graduate Studies Program

 The GSP is one academic quarter 

(10 weeks) in length leading to an 

AFIT Graduate Certificate in Weapons of Mass Destruction. Certificate 

is somewhat of a misnomer for this 

program as this term is often associated with training, but again the focus 

here is on graduate level education in 

the technical aspects of WMD technology. The GSP is designed to 

meet the educational needs of a person newly assigned to a WMD related 

position who lacks the requisite technical background. An example student would be an Air Intelligence officer with an undergraduate degree in 

mathematics newly assigned to the 

Southwest Asia WMD desk at DIA. 

The goals utilized during the design 

of the GSP were to develop an educational program that would enable 

the students to achieve the knowledge, comprehension, and application levels of Bloom et al’s taxonomy 

of cognitive learning.2

 Knowledge is 

defined (here) as the remembering of 

appropriate, previously learned information. Comprehension is grasping 

the meaning of informational materials. Application is the use of previously learned information in new and 

concrete situations to solve problems 

that have single or best answers. Job 

positions requiring an understanding 

beyond these levels would ideally be 

filled by a person with specific education or expertise in WMD (such as a 

graduate of AFIT’s master’s degree 

program). 

 As designed, the GSP consists of 

four courses taken simultaneously. 

Three of the courses will each specifically address nuclear, chemical and 

biological weapon technologies. The 

fourth course, the Combating WMD 

Practicum, consists of a combined 

seminar, laboratory and exercise 

course designed to emphasize operational aspects of the material. By 

necessity, each of the nuclear, chemical and biological courses is somewhat stove-piped in its presentation of 

material. However, the curricula are 

organized so that each course will be 

covering the same types of material 

at the same time. For example, all 

three courses will cover mitigation at 

the same time. One goal of the seminar course is to provide a unifying 

backdrop to the other three courses. 

 Each of the three main courses 

nuclear, chemical and biological (N, 

C, and B), will individually cover the 

scientific foundations, production, 

weaponization and effects, and protection and mitigation. Examples of 

coverage of the foundations are nuclear structure, cell physiology and 

chemical reaction kinetics. Example 

topics in production are the nuclear 

fuel cycle, fermentation and dual use 

chemical precursors. Example 

weaponization and effects coverage 

are electromagnetic pulse effects, 

agroterrorism and defoliants. Examples of protection/mitigation topics are 

radiodosimetry, biosensors and medical prophylaxis. 

 There is a lot of interest in distance learning education at this time 

and the GSP is an excellent candidate to offer in this manner. However, as a new program, the GSP is 

currently only offered in-residence at 

Wright-Patterson AFB. AFIT is hoping to develop the program enough to 

offer the GSP as a distance learning 

choice over the next two to three 

years. 

Professional Science Master’s Degree Program in Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 3

 Some readers may be unfamiliar 

with the concept of a Professional 

Science Master’s Degree (PSM). It is 

a relatively recent trend in academics, 

but has achieved widespread acceptance. The PSM was developed in 

response to studies demonstrating 

the need for science and math oriented “professional” master’s degreelevel education. “Professional” indicating that graduates would be best 

prepared for a career in the industrial 

and government employment sectors 

as opposed to academics. Traditionally, the Ph.D. has been perceived as 

the only significant gateway to career 

Figure 3. Assistant Professor LTC David LaGraffe at a Hall Effect Apparatus, 

Nuclear Engineering Lab, Air Force Institute of Technology. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 14

opportunities in math and science – 

and academics as the only career 

path. The PSM represents a shift 

towards programs that prepare 

graduates for non-teaching careers. 

It also offers an alternative model to 

combat the common perception of a 

Master of Science as the “default” 

degree of a failed Ph.D. attempt. 

 PSM degrees are recognized by 

the American Council of Graduate 

Schools. There are nearly 100 PSM 

degree programs currently offered by 

institutions such as Stanford, Case 

Western, Rice, Michigan State and 

Boston Universities. There is a wide 

variation with curricula and structure 

among PSM programs. Each is designed to prepare graduates for success in the business or government 

fields rather than further academic 

s t u d y . T h i s i s t h e 

“professionalization” aspect of the 

programs. Although each PSM program is individually designed to meet 

specific goals, some common themes 

are: 

• An inter- or multidisciplinary nature to course 

work. 

• Certificates, within or in 

addition, are a common 

element 

• Allows “focusing” or 

“specialization” within latter 

portions of program 

• Uses a “cohort” model for 

students to develop teamwork 

• The use of case studies 

and group projects 

• A few are “entrepreneurial” 

in nature 

• Research is closely linked 

with business or government organizations 

• Inclusion of an oral examination or exit interview 

• Graduates place in traditional industries (vice academics) 

 As will be discussed later, the 

AFIT PSM Degree Program in Combating WMD is designed along these 

same themes. Further information on 

PSM programs can be found at the 

Science Masters web site. 

 The AFIT PSM Degree Program in 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction is a six-academic quarter 

(18 month) degree program as is typical of other AFIT masters programs. 

Graduates of the program will have 

established a broad base of knowledge in all areas of WMD and will 

have demonstrated the ability to conduct research in a specific area of 

WMD. The goals utilized during the 

design of the MS program were to 

develop an educational program that 

would enable the students to achieve 

the analysis, synthesis and evaluation 

levels of cognitive learning. Analysis

is the breaking down of informational 

materials into their component parts, 

examining such information to develop divergent conclusions by identifying motives or causes, making inferences, and/or finding evidence to 

support generalizations. Synthesis is 

creatively or divergently applying prior 

knowledge and skills to produce a 

new or original whole. Evaluation is 

judging the value of material based 

on personal values/opinions, resulting 

in an end product, with a given purpose, without real right or wrong answers. 

 Developing this level of learning in 

all three areas; nuclear, chemical and 

biological is an unachievable goal. 

What is realistic is to develop a broad 

scientific base of knowledge in each 

area with specific, advanced expertise in one of them. Students will first 

start establishing this broad base of 

knowledge in the first quarter of the 

program. Completion of the GSP is 

part of the first quarter – the certificate element of a PSM. Additional 

interdisciplinary course work continues the PSM theme in later quarters. 

In quarters two through five, students 

will also spend time in their focus 

area, biological, nuclear or chemical. 

Students will take a four course sequence and four other electives in 

their specialty area. This is the period where they gain the in-depth understanding of a specific area. This 

period of study will also lead to a research project completed during their 

fourth through sixth quarters. This 

research project is professionalized to 

the greatest extent possible in coordination with customer organizations 

like DTRA, Air Force Technical Applications Center, and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons and Counterproliferation Agency. Many of the skills and 

abilities gained in the program, such 

as the ability to conduct advanced 

research, use of the scientific 

method, and a host of experimental 

and mathematical skills, are applicable in all three areas and reinforces 

the multidisciplinary approach of the 

program. 

 Finally, during their sixth and last 

quarter, the students will take a capstone course. The content of the 

capstone course is based loosely on 

the Department of Homeland Security’s Five Cities Study. The goals of 

the capstone course are to once 

again present a unified (N, C and B) 

approach to combating WMD and to 

prepare graduates to be technical 

advisors. The capstone course is 

group-oriented and project-oriented 

emphasizing the teamwork and group 

project orientation of a PSM. 

Figure 4, (see following page) 

shows sample educational plans students may embark upon. At the outcome of the program, students will 

have conducted research in a specific 

specialty area, and will have established a broad enough educational 

base to be a versatile combating 

WMD advisor rather than just say a 

biological warfare specialist. 

 A valid argument may be made 

that this program is developing a 

“Jack of all trades, Master of none.” 

However, the realities of personnel 

manning requirements needs to be 

addressed. Most organizations cannot afford to support separate biological, chemical, and nuclear experts. 

An expert in any of these areas is 

frequently asked to provide advice or 

guidance in the other areas – regardless whether they know anything or 

not! The intent of this program is to 

recognize this limitation and address 

it. 

 Graduates will have a reasonable 

level of expertise in one track, yet still 

have enough understanding in the 

other areas to provide sound advice 

or know how to get the correct 

information. 
 15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

 Despite the increased development of many WMD training and familiarization programs, there is still a 

gap in advanced, graduate-level, 

technical education in weapons technology. Leaders, program managers, 

researchers and operators will need 

the educational background to stay 

on top of the vast and ever changing 

WMD issues present in our current 

military missions. The AFIT Graduate 

Certificate program will meet the 

needs of a person who has a technical background and needs additional 

specialization in WMD technology. 

The PSM program fills the need for 

DOD to grow technical expertise in 

combating WMD. The fight against 

WMD will be an enduring one and it is 

vital that we commit the resources to 

develop the technical expertise and 

advisors for now and in the future. 

People interested in taking either 

of AFIT’s Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction programs should 

contact: 

Dr. Robert Hengehold 

Head, Department of Engineering 

Physics Air Force Institute of Technology Wright-Patterson AFB, 

OH 45433 

(937) 255-3636 x-4502 

Robert.hengehold@afit.edu

ENDNOTES 

Information on the DTRA Outreach 

program is available on the DTRA 

website: http://www.dtra.mil. 

2

 Bloom B. S. (1956). Taxonomy of 

Educational Objectives, Handbook I: 

The Cognitive Domain. New York: 

David McKay Co Inc. 

3

 Information on the PSM in general 

is available at: http://

www.sciencemasters.com/; listings of 

specific programs are also available 

at: http://www.gradschools.com/. 

Figure 4. Example six quarter education plans for each possible track. 

15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 16

Respiratory Protection Guidance During a Radiological 

Emergency Response 

MAJ Eugene V. Sheely 

Frederick M. Scudiery 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Lt Col Steven E. Rademacher, Air Force Safety Center 

he authors have noted that 

there are several publications 

and Department of Defense 

(DOD) consultation letters which provide erroneous guidelines with respect to airborne radiation exposure 

during radiological emergency responses. The errors in these publications result from two sources: 1) incorrect determination of airborne activity, 1,2,3,4,5,6 and 2) incorrect guidelines on when respiratory protection is 

needed. 6,7,8 This paper will deal with 

the second of these two issues, determining when and what level of respiratory protection is needed. 

 When responding to a suspected 

radiological release, accurate data on 

airborne radiation levels may not be 

available and this could be due to 

time or equipment constraints. It is 

important to have appropriate methods to estimate the concentration of 

radionuclides in air, not only when air 

sampling equipment is available, but 

also when it is not. This paper will 

look at both of these situations. 

Methods using the primary instruments in the Army and Air Force inventory will be discussed. 

 Although it is certainly desirable to 

have response guidelines for all conceivable radiological events, this paper only outlines guidelines for potential releases of uranium and/or plutonium. 

Methods 

To determine respiratory protection 

requirements during a radiological 

event or emergency response, it is 

necessary to know the hazards associated with varying levels of airborne 

radiation, and know what levels available equipment are capable of adequately quantifying. 

Terms Defined:

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) is responsible for regulating 

the exposure of occupational workers 

to NRC-licensed radioactive materials. In this scope they have specified 

dose limits for internal and external 

exposures, for partial and whole body 

conditions. To understand these limits, several terms need to be defined. 

1. Dose Equivalent (H)---The dose 

equivalent was developed to relate 

the relative risks of different types of 

radiation. Each type of radiation is 

assigned a quality factor (Q) (see 

Table 1) that reflects its associated 

potential to cause biological effects. 

The dose equivalent (H) is the absorbed dose (D) times the quality 

factor. 

The quality factors currently used in 

the US were originally published in 

ICRP 26, 9 then later in NCRP 91 10

(see Table 1. below). 

2. Equivalent Dose (H)---Most countries, other than the United States, do 

not use dose equivalent in their radiation protection regulations, rather they 

use a similar term, equivalent dose 

(defined in ICRP 60). 12 The equivalent dose differs from dose equivalent 

in that it averages the dose over an 

entire organ, rather than looking at a 

= DQH

* Quality factors for neutrons of known energy are listed in the “Handbook of 

Health Physics and Radiological Health, Third Edition,” Table 13.1.2. 11

Type of Radiation

Quality 

Factor

X-ray or gamma 1

Beta 1

Thermal neutrons 2

Neutrons of unknown energy* 10

High energy protons 10

Alpha particles, multiple-charged particles, fission fragments and 

heavy particles of unknown charge

20

Table 1. Quality factors from ICRP 26 and NCRP 91. 

 17 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

specific point in an organ, as does the 

dose equivalent. Additionally, the 

term quality factor is not used when 

determining equivalent dose, but a 

similar term called a weighting factor 

(WR) is used. The ICRP 60 weighting 

factors differ somewhat from the 

ICRP 26 quality factors (see Table 

2.). 

3. Committed dose Equivalent 

(CDE or H50,T)---The dose equivalent 

delivered over a 50-year period to an 

organ or tissue as the result of an 

intake of radioactive material. 

4. Committed effective dose 

equivalent (CEDE or H50,E)---The 

sum of the CDE (H50,E) for different 

organs or tissues in the body multiplied by appropriate weighting factors 

(WT), 

Table 3 lists the weighting factors 

currently used in the United States 13, 

whereas Table 4 lists those used by 

most other countries. 13 

5. Total Organ Dose Equivalent 

(TODE)---The sum of the Committed 

Dose Equivalent (CDE) and the dose 

equivalent from external exposure to 

the organ or tissue of interest, 

TODE = CDE + external exposure 

6. Total Effective Dose Equivalent

(TEDE)---The sum of the dose 

equivalent from external exposure 

and the committed effective dose 

equivalent, 

TEDE = CEDE + external exposure 

 Why do we need to understand 

these terms and definitions as used in 

other countries? First, our military 

forces are deployed to countries that 

use different standards. Also, since 

regulatory guidance changes over 

time, it is likely that the US will adopt 

the same international recommendations (ICRP 60) that are used 

throughout most of the world. 

Dose Limits

 The NRC has set maximum acceptable dose limits for occupationally-exposed adults to NRC-licensed 

materials. These same recommendations are made by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 

the Department of Energy (DOE), and 

are contained in Federal Guidance 

Report No.11 (FRG 11). 14 Occupational workers may receive a total 

organ dose equivalent (TODE) of up 

to 50 rem per year (0.5 Sv/year) from 

the intake of radioactive material. 

 External whole-body exposure is 

limited to 5 rem per year (NRC and 

DOE) or 1.25 rem per calendar quarter (OSHA) for occupationally exposed workers. These values are 

expressed as a Total Effective Dose 

Equivalent (TEDE) 15 which is the 

sum of all external sources of exposure as well as all internal sources 

which contribute to the total body exposure. In addition to these limits, all 

exposures must be kept as low as 

reasonably achievable (ALARA). 

 In emergency situations, the regulatory standards do not set a hard 

limit for the maximum exposures to 

response personnel. Based on which 

part of the law the personnel are 

working under, the Protective Action 

Guidance (PAG) for emergency personnel may have different recommended limits. Each PAG is listed 

based on the emergency actions required. These actions are (1) protecting major property (normally defined 

as property in excess of $100,000), 

(2) protecting large populations, and 

=( ) E WH TT TH ,50 ,50

Table 2. Weighting Factors (WR) from ICRP 60.13 . 

Type of Radiation Quality Factor

Photons 1

Electrons and muons 1

Protons (other than recoil protons of energy > 

2 MeV)

5

Neutrons

< 10 keV

10 keV to 2 MeV

> 100 keV to 2 MeV

> 2 MeV to 20 MeV

> 20 MeV

5

10

20

10

5

Alpha particles, fission fragments, heavy nuclei20

Table 3. Organ Dose Weighting Factors (WT)

a

. 

Organ or Tissue WT

Gonads 0.25

Breast 0.15

Red bone marrow 0.12

Lung 0.12

Thyroid 0.03

Bone surface 0.03

Remainderb

0.30

a

 10 CFR 20.1003 

b

 0.06 for each of 5 “remainder” organs (excluding the skin and the lens of the 

eye) that receive the highest doses. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 18

(3) lifesaving. In general, DOE is 

more conservative in guidance than 

the NRC and EPA. In DOE guidance, 

population and lifesaving should not 

exceed 10 rem. NRC and EPA PAG 

guidance states a 25 rem limit. In 

both cases the maximum exposure 

may be exceeded based on the 

emergency situation at hand and 

must be voluntary. In all regulatory 

guidance, certain criteria must be met 

prior to allowing an exposure in excess of the 5 rem TEDE for emergency responders. When developing 

an emergency response plan for an 

organization, we recommend referencing ESH Document 22.6 Exposure to Radiation in an Emergency 

UCRL-MA-133867 dated SEP 2003, 

16, 17 EPA Protective Actions For Nuclear Incidents # 400R92001 which 

superseded 520/1-75/001, 18 and 

NRC NUREG 0654; FEMA-REP-1 

Criteria for Evaluation of Radiation 

Emergency Plans in Support of Nuclear Power Plants. 19 Tables 5 and 6 

outline the basic emergency exposure criteria based on the above guidance. 

 In FRG 11, the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) specifies 

maximum quantities of radionuclides 

that if ingested, or inhaled at the annual occupational exposure limit will 

result in these levels being reached. 

20 These limits for inhalation and 

ingestion, which are also used by the 

NRC, are known as the Annual Limit 

on Intake (ALI). The calculations presented in this paper assume that responders will not ingest significant 

quantities of radionuclides during a 

response. Therefore, the only significant source of internal exposure to 

the radioisotopes will come from inhalation. The ALI for a radionuclide can 

vary from one chemical form of an 

isotope to another. For the specific 

cases of uranium and plutonium being addressed in this paper it is assumed that the radionuclides are present in chemically unreactive forms. 

This is the primary form responders 

will encounter during a response to a 

nuclear weapons accident, and most 

other types of emergency responses 

involving these isotopes. 

 In addition to the ALI, there is another term used by FGR 11 that 

needs to be defined. This term is the 

Derived Air Concentration (DAC). 

The DAC is the airborne concentration of a radionuclide that if someone 

inhales for 40 hours per week, for 50 

weeks in a year would result in the 

Table 5. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)/ Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) Guidance. 

Dose Limit

(rem)

Activity Condition

5 All

10 Protecting Valuable Property Lower dose is not 

practicable

25 Life Saving or Protecting 

Large Populations

Lower dose is not 

practicable

> 25 Life Saving or Protecting 

Large Populations

Only voluntary basis to 

person who is fully 

aware of risks

* Additional conditions apply of who may authorize these exposures and who 

must concur with that authorization. 

Table 6. Department of Energy (DOE) Guidance. 

Whole Body 

Dose (rem)

Activity Condition*

<5 All Any emergency

5-10 Lifesaving or Protection of large 

populations

Voluntary

> 10 Lifesaving or Protection of large 

populations

Voluntary

a

 ICRP 60 

b

 Muscle, stomach wall, small intestine wall, lower large intestine wall, kidneys, 

pancreas, spleen, thymus, uterus, adrenals and bladder wall. 

Organ or Tissue WT

Gonads 0.20

Red bone marrow 0.12

Colon 0.12

Lung 0.12

Stomach 0.12

Bladder 0.05

Breast 0.05

Liver 0.05

Esophagus 0.05

Thyroid 0.05

Skin 0.01

Bone surface 0.01

Remainderb

0.05

Table 4. Tissue Weighting Factors (WT)

a

. 
 19 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

 ALI being obtained. In determining 

the DAC it is assumed that an occupational worker inhales 2400 m3

 of air 

per year, while at work. See Table 7 

for a list of DACs for non-chemically 

active forms of Pu and U. 

 It is recommended that initial responders who are going to be exposed to greater than 1 DAC wear a 

full faced respirator, if one is available. Making the conservative assumption that a full faced respirator 

has a maximum protection factor of 

100, 21 it is then recommended that 

initial responders exposed to greater 

than 100 DAC use a pressure demand Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA). Depending on response conditions health physicists or 

other professionals with experience in 

radiation protection may be able to 

recommend exposures to higher levels without respirators, or SCBA. 

This decision will be based on exposure times and the work being performed. The safety of personnel involved in the event and response 

must be the primary consideration. In 

order to keep exposures ALARA, it is 

important to consider what hazards 

are present, and how the use of personal protective equipment will affect 

the time personnel will be exposed to 

these hazards. 

 The numbers given in the previous 

paragraph are only recommendations. During an emergency response there may be no choice but to 

exceed these levels. In such cases it 

is important for first responders to 

know what levels they can be exposed to, without unacceptable risk to 

their lives or health. If C is the concentration of radionuclide in air, and 

the maximum exposure during an 

emergency response is 5 ALI, then 

the maximum time in minutes that a 

responder can be present in an area 

contaminated with Pu is: 

If uranium is the only contaminate of 

concern the equations become: 

If the possibility of Pu and U being 

present at the same time exists, as is 

the case in most weapons accident 

scenarios, the more conservative Pu 

equation should be used. 

Estimation of Airborne Radiation

Levels

During an emergency response air 

sampling equipment may not be 

available. It is important to have a 

method to estimate the concentration 

of radionuclide in air in this situation. 

The Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP) recommends that alpha measurements be 

made on the ground and that these 

results be used to estimate the concentration of radionuclides in air 8

. If 

sufficient time has passed for smoke, 

and other airborne forms of the radionuclides to have settled, and no 

better method of estimating the airborne contamination levels exists, 

this should be done. 

 In this case, it is assumed that the 

only source of airborne contamination 

is from resuspension. The resuspension factor (Rf) is the ratio of the airborne concentration of a radionuclide 

to the surface contamination level. 

Activity in Air (Ci/m3) = Activity on 

Ground (Ci/m2

) x Rf (m-1) 

 The Rf value depends on many 

factors, including wind, soil movement in the area (e.g. vehicles moving in the area), surface properties 

(e.g. soil, asphalt, etc), particle size, 

etc. A conservative estimate for Rf of 

soil during a typical response scenario is 10-5 m

-1. Using these values, 

it is possible to determine surface 

contamination levels where respiratory protection is recommended, and 

maximum stay times in contaminated 

areas. 

Minimum detectable concentration

After determining what levels of radiation exposure can be considered acceptable for first responders, the next 

step is to determine if available equipment is capable of discerning these 

levels from naturally-occurring background radiation. To do this, a value 

known as the Minimum Detectable 

Concentration (MDC) is determined. 

22,23,24,25 The MDC is the net activity 

concentration above background that 

an instrument can be expected to 

detect. It is reported to a given confidence level, usually 2 (95%). 

The MDC can be defined as follows: 

 Where Rb is the average back-

( )













=













=

−

3

3

3

106.515.

min,

m

Ci C

x

m

MBq C

Put

μ













=













=

−

3

2

3

101.130.

min),(

m

Ci C

x

m

MBq C

Ut

μ

s

b

s

sb

Kt

t

t

tR

MDC

















+ +

=

129.33

Table 7. Derived Air Concentration (DAC). 

Isotopes*

DAC (MBq/m3) DAC

(Ci/cm3)

DAC

(dpm/m3)

U-233 6 x 10-7 2 x 10-11 40

U-235 6 x 10-7 2 x 10-11 40

U-238 7 x 10-7 2 x 10-11 40

Pu-238 3 x 10-7 8 x 10-12 20

Pu-239 3 x 10-7 7 x 10-12 20

Pu-240 3 x 10-7 7 x 10-12 20

Pu-241 1 x 10-5 3 x 10-12 6

* Non-chemically reactive form of the isotopes. Taken from Federal Guidance 

Report No. 11 (1988). 15
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 20

ground count rate taken over time tb. 

tb and ts are the background and 

sample count times respectively. K is 

a proportionality constant that relates 

the detector response to the activity 

level in a sample. In the specific case 

of measuring contamination on a surface, K could be defined as the total 

detector efficiency (T) in counts/

disintegration times the physical 

probe area (A) in cm2. 

 When the probe is used to measure radiological material collected on 

an air filter, the MDC of the air that 

was sampled can be calculated using 

the same equation as for surface contamination, however, in this case K

becomes: 

where V is the volume of air sampled 

and k is a constant that converts time 

and distance to the desired units. 

 Ratemeter is a term that describes 

an instrument in which the number of 

interactions is integrated over a 

specified period of time. If a ratemeter is used, instead of a scalar to 

measure radiation levels, the equations change a little. 26 In this case 

the background and sample count 

times tb and ts are equal. As a result, 

the equation for the MDC simplifies 

to: 

where Cb is the number of background counts measured in time t. 

For a ratemeter t can be considered 

to be approximately equal to 0.88 

times the instrument response time 

(TR , time interval required for the instrument reading to change from 10% 

to 90% of the final reading [or vice 

versa]). The MDC then becomes: 

Response times are usually determined by injecting a fixed pulse rate 

from a pulse generator. 

 A more accurate determination of 

the MDC can be made for a ratemeter if the instrument time constant () 

is known. is the product of an in-

= ε T AK

= ε TVkK

Kt

C

MDC

+ 65.43 b

=

R

b

KT

C

MDC

+ 10.464.2

=

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

0 40 80 120 160

Time (s)

Count Rate (cpm)

Trial 1

Trial 2

Trial 3

Mean of Trials

 Figure 1. Displayed Count Rate as a function of time. 
 21 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

strument’s resistance (R) and capacitance (C), RC. In this case, the MDC

becomes: 

 Whereas the above methods for 

determining the MDC of a ratemeter 

work for most instruments, they are 

not sufficient for the ADM-300 and 

AN/PDR-77 used by the US military. 

With these instruments the instrument 

response time (TR) and the 

“instrument time constant ()” are not 

constant. These instruments vary 

these “constants” through the use of 

a combined mathematical, electronic 

procedure. 27,28,29 Additionally the 

time over which measurements are 

averaged varies with these instruments. No one answer can be given 

as to how long these instruments 

should be held in one place before 

recording a measurement. 

 Figure 1 (previous page 18 ) shows 

the alpha count rate displayed by an 

ADM-300 attached to an AP-100 

probe as a function of time post exposure to a radiation source. Four 

measurements were made with the 

same source and the same positioning of the probe. The time required 

for the instrument to display a count 

rate close to the true count rate varies 

with the activity of the source. As can 

be seen from this plot, at one minute 

the instrument was still underestimating the true count rate.  for these 

measurements is estimated to be 47 

seconds, based on the mean of the 

three trials. 

 Ratemeters, or instruments used 

in a rate mode are never preferred for 

estimating the concentration of radionuclides in air. This is, however, 

especially the case when dealing with 

the ADM-300 and the AN/PDR-77. 

These instruments should never be 

used in the rate mode when being 

used to estimate the concentration of 

radioactive material in air! 

Results 

 As noted previously, two methods 

were described for estimating the 

concentrations of radionuclides in air. 

First is the case of indirect assessment of airborne radionuclides based 

on ground contamination levels when 

air sampling equipment is not available. The second case is for direct 

assessment with air monitoring equipment. 

 First, for indirect assessment using scalar mode, if the background 

count rate is assumed to be 1.00 

(NUREG 1507 Table 5.1), 30 the matrix transmission is assumed to be 

100% (no self-absorption of alphas 

particles by soil), and a one minute 

count time is used; then the MDC for 

the ADM-300 with an attached AP100 or the PD-77 with a DT-669/PDR

-77 probe, is calculated to be 41 

dpm/100cm2

. For a more realistic 

transmission factor of 50%, the MDC

increases to 83dpm/100cm2. By increasing the count time to 5 minutes, 

these values can be decreased to 15 

dpm/100cm2

 and 29 dpm/100cm2

respectively (see Table 8.). 

 In the case of direct assessment, 

using a minimum of 1000 ft3

 of sampled air volume, 32 the MDC is 0.17 

dpm/m3 for 1 minute count times, 

and .060 for 5 minute count times 

(see Table 9.). 

 From the discussion and DACs

presented in the previous section, it 

can be concluded that below 18 dpm/

m

3

 plutonium, or 36 dpm/m3uranium, 

it is safe to enter an area without respiratory protection. 

 Table 10 gives recommended respiratory protection for emergency response to radiological incidents involving uranium and/or plutonium. It 

τ

τ

K

R

MDC

+ 29.312.2 b

=

Table 8. MDC as a function of Count Rate and Matrix Transmission, determined 

by monitoring ground activity. 

Rb t(s) t(b) ε T

* A Matrix

Transmission MDC

(cpm) min min cm2

Transmission Factor dpm/m3

1 1 1 0.15 123 1 1.00E-05 0.041

1 1 1 0.15 123 0.5 1.00E-05 0.083

1 1 1 0.15 123 0.25 1.00E-05 0.166

1 5 5 0.15 123 1 1.00E-05 0.015

1 5 5 0.15 123 0.5 1.00E-05 0.029

1 5 5 0.15 123 0.25 1.00E-05 0.058

*The 4 efficiency T was obtained from the manufacturer. 31

Table 9. MDC when using air monitoring equipment. 

Rb t(s) t(b) ε T V MDC

(cpm) min min m

3

dpm/m3

1 1 1 0.15 300 0.170

1 5 5 0.15 300 0.060

Table 10. Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for emergency workers 

Airborne Alpha Activity

above background

dpm/m3 Respiratory Protection

< 18 No respiratory protection needed

< 1800 Full-face respiratory protection required

 1800 Pressure demand SCBA
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 22

should be noted that these recommendations are significantly different 

than those published in the Nuclear 

Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP Appendix 11, see Tables AP11.T1, AP11.T2, and 

AP11.T3). 8 

 If the time or equipment needed 

to measure airborne radiation levels 

is not available, respiratory protection 

recommendations may be made 

based on ground alpha levels. To 

accurately convert between Ci/m2

and CPM it is necessary to know the 

instrument efficiency under the conditions the instrument is being used. 

The efficiency is dependant upon the 

instrument and the type of surface 

being measured. The manufacturer 

of the ADM-300/AP-100 and the DT669/PDR-77 has determined the instrument 4 efficiencies to be 15% 

when there is 100% transmittance of 

the radionuclide to the surface. In 

soil this is clearly not the case. The 

authors have assumed a 50% transmittance to the surface in determining 

the CPM column of Table 11. This 

yields a resulting efficiency of 7.5%. 

Accurate determination of this value 

can only be determined through carefully performed laboratory experiments. It should be noted that the 

7.5% efficiency is considerably less 

than that published in Appendix 13 of 

the Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures (NARP). 33 The 

values in the NARP for the ADM-300 

assumed an efficiency in soil of 

12.2% (transmittance of alphas in soil 

of 81%). The authors believe the soil 

efficiency used in the calculations 

presented in the NARP is high. 

Seven-an-a-half (7.5) is a more reasonable value, and represents a more 

conservative approach. As more accurate measurements of the efficiency of this probe in soil become 

available, the values in Table 11 

should be adjusted to reflect these 

values. 

 Noted that ground measurements 

should only be used to determine 

respiratory protection recommendations if other more accurate methods 

are not available. These values can 

only be trusted if sufficient time has 

passed for the particles released during the incident to have settled. In 

most accident scenarios involving 

uranium and/or plutonium, this is expected to occur in less than 1 hour 

from the end of the release. 

Conclusions 

It is recommended that initial responders exposed to greater than 1 

DAC of radiation use, as a minimum, 

a full faced respirator. Anyone exposed to greater than 100 DAC

should use SCBA. Depending on 

response times and conditions a 

health physicist or other professional 

trained in radiation protection may be 

able to recommend higher levels for a 

specific response. DACs for uranium 

and plutonium are listed in Table 7. 

Recommended levels of respiratory 

protection as a function of air concenTable 11. Recommended Respiratory Protection Levels for Emergency Workers 

as a Function of Surface Contamination. 

Surface Alpha Activity above 

background

CPM* MBq/m2

 Ci/m2

Respiratory Protection

< 1600 < 0.03 < 0.81 No respiratory protection required

1600 to 0.03 to 3 0.81 

160,000 to 81

Full-face respiratory protection required

> 160,000 > 3 > 81 Pressure demand SCBA

• CPM was calculated using conversion factors determined for ADM-300 with 

an AP-100 by Canberra Dover, Inc. The conversion factors can be determined from Table AP13.T5 in Appendix 13 of the NARP. The conversion 

assumes that the measurements are being made in soil. Appropriate conversion factors for Concrete, wood and stainless steel can be obtained from 

Table AP13.T.5.

• Assumes a 4 efficiency in soil of 7.2%. This is an instrument efficiency of 

15% times a transmittance of 50%, with the result rounded down 

(conservative approximation) to 2 significant figures. 

• A resuspension rate of 1 x 10-5 m

-1 was used in these calculations.
 23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

tration are listed in Table 10. 

Air sampling and alpha monitoring 

equipment typically found in Army 

and Air Force inventories are capable 

of seeing these levels of airborne radioactivity. 

 If air sampling material is not available, or if time constraints do not permit their use, acceptable levels of 

respiratory protection can be estimated using ground monitoring 

equipment and previously determined 

resuspension factors (see Table 11). 

This method should only be used if 

more accurate methods are not available and sufficient time has passed 

since the release that resuspension is 

the only significant source of radioactivity in air. This is typically the case 

an hour or more post release. 

 During an emergency response it 

may be necessary for rescue personnel to enter an area without the recommended level of respiratory protection. In such cases the following 

times should be considered maximum 

stay times for personnel involved in 

lifesaving activities. 

When Pu, or Pu and U are present: 

When only U is present: 

Acknowledgement: A special thanks 

is given to CPT Todd Hathaway of 

the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency for his assistance in contacting instrument manufacturers and 

obtaining information from them. 

MAJ Eugene Sheely is a former infantry officer, currently working as the 

Academics Director of the Defense 

Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) in 

Albuquerque NM. He has a B.S. 

in Chemistry from Brigham Young 

University, an M.S. in Physical Chemistry from the University of Idaho, and 

a Ph.D. in Theoretical Physical 

Chemistry, also from the University of 

Idaho. His major areas of research 

involve nuclear fusion and molecular 

dynamics. He was previously assigned as the Chief of Environmental 

Health Physics and the Chief of Occupational Health Physics at the Air 

Force Institute for Operational 

Health. His email address is 

Eugene.Sheely@abq.dtra.mil. 

Mr. Frederick Scudiery is a Health 

Physicist at the Defense Nuclear 

Weapons School (DNWS) in Albuquerque NM. He has a B.S. in biology 

from the State University of New 

York. He was previously assigned as 

a Nuclear Medical Science Officer in 

the US Army. His email address is 

Frederick.Scudiery@abq.dtra.mil. 

Lt Col Steven Rademacher is the 

Chief of Radioactive Materials Licensing and Safety at the Headquarters, 

AF Safety, Kirtland AFB, NM. He has 

a B.S. in Biomedical Engineering 

from Marquette University, an M.S. in 

Health Physics from Texas A&M University, and a Ph.D. in Health Physics 

from Colorado State University. He 

was previously assigned as a Medical 

Inspector at the AF Inspection 

Agency and as the Director of the 

Radiation Surveillance Division at the 

Air Force Institute for Operational 

Health. Lt Col Rademacher has led 

the cleanup of several nuclear weapons accident sites. His email address 

is steven.rademacher@kirtland.af.mil. 

ENDNOTES 

1

 Scott, J.R, “Broken Arrow Checklist 

for Bioenvironmental Engineers,” 

U S A F O E H L R e p o r t 8 4 -

001RZ111KXX, USAF Occupational 

and Environmental Health Laboratory, Brooks AFB TX, (Oct 1983). 

2

 Nichelson, S.M., “Correction Factor 

for ADM-300 AP-100 Alpha Probe,” 

AFMC, AF Consultative Letter, IOHSD-BR-CL-2004-0058, USAF, Air 

Force Institute for Operational Health, 

(29 June 2004). 

3

 Nichelson, S.M., “Broken Arrow 

Response & the ADM-300,” AL/OE 

Newsletter, Vol. 20, No. 3, Brooks 

AFB, TX, (December 1996). 

4

 Nichelson, S.M., “Broken Arrow Response & the ADM-300 Part II,” AL/

OE Newsletter, Vol. 21, No. 1, Brooks 

AFB, TX, (April 1997). 

5

 Occupational and Environmental 

Health Laboratory (OEHL), “A Broken 

Arrow Guide for Bioenvironmental 

Engineers,” USAF Occupational and 

Environmental Health Laboratory Report 83-115RZ111CXX, USAF OEHL/

RZ (1983). 

6

 Air Combat Command (ACC), 

“Bioenvironmental Engineering Environmental Field Manual,” vol. 2, 

Pocket Reference Guide, Air Combat 

Command, Langley AFB, Virginia 

(2000). 

7

 Department of Defense (DOD), 

“Nuclear Weapon Accident Response 

Procedures (NARP),” DoD 3150.8-M, 

Appendix 11, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics (2005). 

8

 Air Combat Command (ACC), 

“Bioenvironmental Engineering Environmental Field Manual,” vol. 1, 

Desktop Reference Guide, ACC, 

Langley AFB, Virginia (2000). 

9

 International Commission on Radiol o g i c a l P r o t e c t i o n ( I C R P ) , 

“Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological 

Protection,” ICRP publication 26, Annals of the ICRP, 1:3, Pergamon 

Press, Oxford, (1977). (Superseded 

by ICRP 60)(Supersedes ICRP 1, 6 & 

9). 

10 National Council on Radiological 

 Protection (NCRP), 

“Recommendations on Limits for Exposure to Ionizing Radiation,” NCRP 

publication 91, (June 1987). 

11 Shleien, Bernard; Slaback Jr., Lester A. and Birky, Brian K.; “Handbook 

of Health Physics and Radiological 

Health,” Third Edition, Table 13.1.2, 

Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, 

1998. 

12 International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), “1990 

Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological 

Protection,” ICRP publication 60, Annals of the ICRP, 21:1-3, Pergamon 

Press, Oxford, (1991). 

( )













=













=

−

3

3

3

106.515.

min,

m

Ci C

x

m

MBq C

Put

μ













=













=

−

3

2

3

101.130.

min),(

m

Ci C

x

m

MBq C

Ut

μ
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 24

13 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Standards for Protection 

against Radiation,” U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 20, section 

1003, (2003). 

14 Eckerman, K.F.; Wolbarst, A.B. and 

Richardson, A.C.B., “Limiting Values 

of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and 

Ingestion,” Department of Energy 

(DOE) Federal Guidance Report No. 

11, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, EPA-5201/1-88-020, Washington, D.C., (1988) (supersedes 

Federal Guidance Report No. 10). 

15 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Standards for Protection 

against Radiation,” U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 20, section 

1201, (2003). 

16 Department of Energy (DOE), 

“Exposure to Radiation in an Emergency,” Lawrence Livermore’s 

(LLNL’s) Environment, Safety and 

Health Manual, UCRL-MA-133867, 

(Sep 2003). 

17 Department of Energy (DOE), 

“Occupational Radiation Protection,” 

10 CFR 835, (1999). 

18 Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA), “Manual of Protective Action 

Guides and Protective Actions for 

Nuclear Incidents,” EPA 400R92001, 

(1992) (supersedes 502/1-75001). 

19 Nuclear Regulatory Commision 

(NRC) and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), “Criteria for 

Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans 

and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants,” NUREG-0654, 

FEMA-REP-1, (2002). 

20 Eckerman, K.F.; Wolbarst, A.B. and 

Richardson, A.C.B., “Limiting Values 

of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and 

Ingestion,” Department of Energy 

(DOE) Federal Guidance Report No. 

11, U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, EPA-5201/1-88-020, Washington, D.C., (1988) (supersedes 

Federal Guidance Report No. 10). 

21 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), “Standards for Protection 

against Radiation,” U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 20, Appendix A, (2003). 

22 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC); Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA); Department of Energy 

(DOE) and Department of Defense 

(DoD), “Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual 

(MARSSIM),” NUREG-1575, EPA 

402-R-96-018, NTIS-PB97-117659, 

Washington D.C., (1999). 

23 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), “Minimum Detectable Concentrations with Typical Radiation 

Survey Instruments for Various Contaminants and Field Conditions,” 

NUREG-1507, (1997). 

24 Borak, T.B. and Kirchner, T.B., “A 

Method for Computing the Decision 

Level for Samples Containing Radioactivity in the Presence of Background,” Health Physics, 69:892-896, 

(December 1995). 

25 Hickey, E.E.; Stoetzel, G.A.; Storm, 

D.J; Cicotte, G.R.; Wiblin, C.M. and 

McGuire, S.A., “Air Sampling in the 

Workplace, Final Report ,” Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission, NUREG1400, (1993). 

2 6 Hall, B. and Cantu, R., 

“Determining Minimum Detectable 

Activity (MDA),” Ludlum Report 12-

1:2-3, (Sep 2002). 

27 Noback, C.V., United States Patent 

Number 4,605,859; Nuclear Research Corp, Warrington Pa. (Dec 

1986). 

28 Noback, C.V., United States Patent 

Number 4,631,411; Nuclear Research Corp, Warrington Pa. (Aug 

1986). 

29 Pesek, J., Canberra Dover, Peronal 

Conversation (Jan and Feb 2006). 

Note: Jiri Pesek of Canberra Dover 

stated that although the patents 

4,605,859 and 4,631,411 refer to Geiger-Mueller instruments, the timing 

routines used in these patents were 

also used with the ADM-300/AP-100 

probe and the DT-699/PDR-77 

Probe. 

30 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC), “Minimum Detectable Concentrations with Typical Radiation 

Survey Instruments for Various Contaminants and Field Conditions,” 

NUREG-1507, 1997. 

31 NRC Industries, “Operator’s Manual, ADM-300 Multi Function Survey 

Meter,” RemRad Radiation Monitoring Systems, Nuclear Research Corporation (1991). 

32 Department of Defense (DOD), 

“Nuclear Weapon Accident Response 

Procedures (NARP),” DOD 3150.8-M, 

Appendix 7, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics (2005). 

33 Department of Defense (DOD), 

“Nuclear Weapon Accident Response 

Procedures (NARP),” DoD 3150.8-M, 

Appendix 13, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics (2005). 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 24
 25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

ombating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Proliferation 

Policy Division, Capabilities Based Assessments (CBAs), 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Joint Integrating Concept 

(JIC), Joint Coordination Element for 

Elimination (JEC-E), Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 

(JCIDS), DOTMLPF Change Recommendation (DCR), Force Design Update (FDU), WMD-Elimination (WMDE), WMD CONOPS ---These terms, 

now emblematic of the common combating weapons of mass destruction 

(CWMD) lexicon, are but a small 

sample of the many concepts, issues, 

and areas of concern facing the 

Army’s CWMD community. The requirement to repeatedly address 

these or similarly important topics 

triggered an important question often 

asked by organizations internal and 

external to the Army. “Who is the 

Army’s lead for CWMD?” 

 Prior to 1 October 2005, the response to that question was unclear 

and ambiguous. There were many 

disparate organizations working diligently to address Army CWMD issues, but their work was executed in 

stove-piped fashion and their efforts 

were often redundant, counterproductive, or not executed by the appropriate Army organization. The requirement for a definitive answer to the 

question was underscored by the dramatic increase in CWMD OPTEMPO 

following September 11, 2001, the 

subsequent Global War on Terrorism, 

and publication of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (December 2002). 

 Since that time, CWMD has become a primary area of concern in 

several overarching military strategic 

documents. One of the six Military 

Strategic Objectives cited in the National Strategic Plan for the War on 

Terrorism (NMS-WOT) dated 

1 February 2006 addresses WMD; 

the 9 February 2006 National Military 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD) presents comprehensive guidance and a 

framework that provides the Department of Defense (DOD) with a construct for deliberate planning, operations and capabilities development. 

Additionally, the 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) identified 

CWMD as one of four focus areas to 

be considered during the QDR assessment of the National Defense 

Strategy (published March 2005) and 

review of the DoD force planning construct. However, Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA) was 

not organized to meet the challenges 

of unconventional and asymmetrical 

warfare, nor did it have the ability to 

provide sustained and holistic oversight of development of Army policy 

to combat WMD. 

 The purpose of this article is to 

highlight the Army Staff’s (ARSTAF) 

organization and approach to meet 

Army CWMD challenges and establishment of an Army lead agent for 

CWMD. 

Addressing the Need 

Between the events ensuing from 

attacks upon the United States on 

September 11, 2001 and the guidance set forth by the QDR in February 2006, a series of events within the 

National Security arena emphasized 

the requirement for an Army focal 

point for CWMD. National Security 

policy documents identified WMD in 

the possession of terrorists and potential adversaries as our nation’s 

greatest security threat. In January 

2005, the Secretary of Defense 

(SecDef) designated US Strategic 

Command (USSTRATCOM) as the 

lead combatant command within 

DOD for synchronizing and integrating CWMD efforts. This directive was 

codified in the May 2006 Unified 

Command Plan. Concomitant with 

the January 2005 SecDef directive, 

USSTRATCOM was directed to use 

its Army Component (ARSTRAT) to 

lead the inter-service effort in coordinating the development of WMD 

elimination capabilities. The Office 

of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 

and the Joint community worked diligently to develop the NMS-CWMD. 

In his endorsement of the NMSCWMD, the Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, 

stated that “We must possess the full 

range of operational capabilities to 

protect the United States, US military 

forces, and partners and allies from 

the threat or actual use of WMD.” 1

 

 

 Careful assessment of the Army’s 

approach to addressing CWMD capability requirements revealed that 

HQDA was not effectively organized 

to meet the challenges posed by the 

use and effects of use of WMD. The 

Army’s National Security Policy Division, within the Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7, was the 

office responsible for the development of Army CWMD policy, but was 

little known across the Army and 

The Army Organizes for 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Ms. Janet Strafer 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation Policy Division 

Headquarters, Department of the Army 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 26

lacked sufficient personnel dedicated 

to the development and execution of 

Army CWMD policy. In recognition of 

this major shortfall, the DCS, G-3/5/7 

reorganized the National Security 

Policy Division, renamed it the Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

and Proliferation Policy Division (G35

-SSD), and refined its mission to 

“develop Army Combating WMD and 

proliferation policies consistent with 

national strategy to provide trained 

and ready forces capable of supporting combating WMD missions.” 2 

 The intent of the reorganization 

was not to replace existing organizations that addressed chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 

(CBRN) concerns, but rather to be 

the office responsible for the development of Army CWMD policies consistent with national and military strategies. G35-SSD is the Army’s focal 

point for CWMD and ensures coordination across the ARSTAF, Army 

Service Component Commands 

(ASCCs), Direct Reporting Units 

(DRUs) and Army Commands 

(ACOMs) on key Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Logistics, Personnel, and Facilities (DOTMLPF) 

concerns. The Division synchronizes 

Army CWMD efforts within HQDA to 

improve Army capabilities across the 

eight CWMD mission areas (security 

cooperation, threat reduction, offensive operations, active defense, passive defense, interdiction, elimination, 

and consequence management). 

Having an office of primary responsibility for development of Army CWMD 

allows for better articulation of Army 

positions to OSD and Joint Staff organizations, as well as support to the 

senior Army leadership concerning 

the full spectrum of CWMD, conventional weapons proliferation, and 

other emerging CBRN matters. 

 The organizational framework mirrors the pillar alignment outlined in 

the national and military CWMD 

strategies (Figure 1). It consists of 

Nonproliferation (NP), Counterproliferation (CP), and Consequence Management (CM) branches. A fourth 

branch - Integration and Analysis - 

ensures Army CWMD activities are 

synchronized with OSD and Joint 

Staff activities, provides analysis of 

overarching CWMD documents, and 

serves as the Executive Secretary for 

the Army Council for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

 Although the reorganization of 

G35-SSD improved the Army’s ability 

to develop and oversee Army CWMD 

strategy and policy, a gap remained 

between policy development and policy execution. To fill this void, the US 

Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA), formerly a Training and 

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) element, was transferred to the Office of 

the DCS, G-3/5/7 in April 2006 and is 

undergoing transformation to become 

the US Army Nuclear and CWMD 

Agency. USANCA now performs 

functions as a Field Operating 

Agency (FOA) for G-3/5/7. The stand

-up of the FOA will assist the Army in 

addressing shortfalls in CWMD policy 

implementation. 

 Together G35-SSD and USANCA 

provide key linkages across the 

CWMD community within DOD. Figure 2 is a representation of the broad 

CWMD network requiring interface 

and coordination. It shows the 

breadth and depth of OSD, Joint, and 

CP CBRN CM NP

Integration and Analysis

Strategic Documents

Army Council for CWMD

High-level Support

Active Defense

Elimination

Offensive Ops

Interdiction

Passive Defense

Surety

CBRN Response

Threat Reduction

Agreements

Treaties

Chemical

Biological

Nuclear

Conventional

Figure 1 – Combating WMD and Proliferation Policy Division

CP CBRN CM NP

Integration and Analysis

Strategic Documents

Army Council for CWMD

High-level Support

Active Defense

Elimination

Offensive Ops

Interdiction

Passive Defense

Surety

CBRN Response

Threat Reduction

Agreements

Treaties

Chemical

Biological

Nuclear

Conventional

Figure 1 – Combating WMD and Proliferation Policy Division

Figure 1. Combating WMD and Proliferation Policy Division. 

G-8

G-37 CIC

G-33 ODF

ASCCs

AMC

FORSCOM

20th SUPCOM 

(CBRNE)

IMCOM

ATEC

I&E

SA ASA(ALT)

CAC

Chemical School

TRADOC

OTSG

MEDCOM

ACSIM

G-35 SSW/P

USD (P) OSD

USD (I)

USD (AT&L)

J5

J8/JRO

J39 J7

J3

JS 

G-35 

SSS

STRATCOM

DTRA

ARSTAF

Interagency

DAMI-FIA (G-2)

NGB

G-37 

FM

ATSD (NCB)

J34

OTJAG

State Dept.

DALO-SIF (G-4)

DAPE-PR (G-1)

Figure 2 – CWMD Coordination Network

OCAR

G-8

G-37 CIC

G-33 ODF

ASCCs

AMC

FORSCOM

20th SUPCOM 

(CBRNE)

IMCOM

ATEC

I&E

SA ASA(ALT)

CAC

Chemical School

TRADOC

OTSG

MEDCOM

ACSIM

G-35 SSW/P

USD (P) OSD

USD (I)

USD (AT&L)

J5

J8/JRO

J39 J7

J3

JS 

G-35 

SSS

STRATCOM

DTRA

ARSTAF

Interagency

DAMI-FIA (G-2)

NGB

G-37 

FM

ATSD (NCB)

J34

OTJAG

State Dept.

DALO-SIF (G-4)

DAPE-PR (G-1)

Figure 2 – CWMD Coordination Network

OCAR

Figure 2. CWMD Coordination Network. 
 27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

Army entities that influence the overall CWMD effort across the full spectrum of DOTMLPF. 

 Figure 3 portrays the G35-SSD 

approach. The “green donut” represents the G35-SSD focus within the 

ARSTAF to provide interface and coordination within the CWMD community, as well as OSD and Joint entities, while the “red donut” represents 

the FOA’s focus across ASCCs, 

DRUs, and ACOMs. This approach 

provides not only linkages between 

ARSTAF policy development and 

execution, but also addresses the 

gap discussed earlier. 

 To assist in the orchestration of 

Army CWMD efforts, the Army established the Army Council for Combating WMD (ACCW MD). The 

ACCWMD, chaired by Office of the 

Director, Strategy, Plans and Policy 

(G-35), provides Colonel and General 

Officer forums that address crosscutting Army CWMD issues and concerns. The ACCWMD provides: integration and synchronization of 

CWMD issues across DOTMLPF; a 

mechanism for identifying Army 

CWMD capability requirements; and 

a means for moving key issues forward to the Army leadership for resolution and/or decision. It also serves 

as a conduit to CWMD organizations 

within OSD, the Joint Staff, ASCCs, 

DRUs and ACOMs. 

Improvements in CWMD Activities 

Reorganization for CWMD has improved Army coverage and influence 

within the respective pillar areas. The 

following summary highlights Army 

activities and initiatives: 

 

 Nonproliferation: The Army adheres to national implementation and 

compliance initiatives for cooperative 

threat reduction, treaties, agreements, export controls and international programs aimed at preventing, 

dissuading, and denying access to 

WMD capabilities. To support these 

initiatives, the Army is working to 

achieve two nationally directed goals. 

First, the Army is helping to shape the 

future security environment as directed by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and National 

Defense Strategy. On every level, 

the Army is transforming and shifting 

from a reactive posture and becoming 

more proactive in its efforts to implement timely and preventive measures 

to preclude the need for crisis intervention and response relating to 

WMD. Second, the Army is fostering 

an atmosphere for expanding foreign 

partnerships and building partnership 

capacity, an established goal of the 

NMS-CWMD, and a crosscutting enabler to win the Global War on Terrorism. Army cooperation in export controls and meeting its international 



G-8 G-37 CIC

G-33 ODF

ASCCs

AMC

FORSCOM

20th SUPCOM 

(CBRNE)

IMCOM

ATEC

I&E

SA

ASA(ALT)

CAC

Chemical School

TRADOC

OTSG

MEDCOM

ACSIM G-35 SSW/P

USD (P)

OSD

USD (I)

J5 J8/JRO USD (AT&L)

J39 J7

J3

JS 

G-35 

SSS

   	


(USANCA)

Policy Execution


	

(CWMD and Proliferation Policy Div)

Policy Development

STRATCOM

DTRA

ARSTAF

Interagency

DAMI-FIA (G-2)

NGB

G-37 

FM

ATSD (NCB)

J34

OTJAG

State Dept.

DALO-SIF (G-4)

DAPE-PR (G-1)

Figure 3 – G35-SSD CWMD Coordination Approach

OCAR



G-8 G-37 CIC

G-33 ODF

ASCCs

AMC

FORSCOM

20th SUPCOM 

(CBRNE)

IMCOM

ATEC

I&E

SA

ASA(ALT)

CAC

Chemical School

TRADOC

OTSG

MEDCOM

ACSIM G-35 SSW/P

USD (P)

OSD

USD (I)

J5 J8/JRO USD (AT&L)

J39 J7

J3

JS 

G-35 

SSS

   	


(USANCA)

Policy Execution


	

(CWMD and Proliferation Policy Div)

Policy Development

STRATCOM

DTRA

ARSTAF

Interagency

DAMI-FIA (G-2)

NGB

G-37 

FM

ATSD (NCB)

J34

OTJAG

State Dept.

DALO-SIF (G-4)

DAPE-PR (G-1)

Figure 3 – G35-SSD CWMD Coordination Approach

OCAR

Figure 3. G35-SSD CWMD Coordination Approach 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 28

treaty obligations contribute to this 

effort. 

Counterproliferation: The Army 

assessed its capabilities and capacity 

to conduct WMD-Elimination operations with an Operational and Organizational and Force Design update for 

the 20th Support Command (CBRNE). 

 Enhancements to the 20th Support 

Command (CBRNE) will ensure the 

Army will be able to fulfill a QDR tasking to expand its capabilities, by 

2007, to serve as the core element of 

a Joint Task Force capable of rapid 

deployment to command and control 

WMD elimination and site exploitation 

missions. The Army is the Executive 

Secretary for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program – providing 

a strategic ‘roadmap’ for providing 

critical chemical and biological protection and defense for the men and 

women of the Armed Forces. 

Consequence Management: The 

Army is supporting efforts to provide 

consequence management capabilities that support both homeland defense from WMD attacks in domestic 

consequence management (DCM) 

and assists friends and allies in foreign consequence management 

(FCM). The Army remains focused 

on protecting its forces with passive 

defense measures and enabling them 

to mitigate the effects of WMD use in 

combat operations (Combat CM), to 

include WMD-Elimination operations. 

These efforts include working with the 

National Guard in developing unique 

capabilities such as the CBRN Emergency Response Force Packages 

(CERFP) for DCM, developing capabilities in Hazardous Response and 

Decontamination (HRD) for Army 

Chemical decontamination platoons 

that can be applied to DCM, FCM, 

and Combat CM. The Army is integrating CBRN consequence management into various Army efforts such 

as Multi-Service Force Development 

– Steady State Security Posture review and the WMD Consequence 

Management Capabilities Based Assessment. The Army is also engaged 

in protecting installations through the 

Installation Protection Program (IPP) 

in both CONUS and OCONUS Army 

Installations. The activation of Headq u a r t e r s , U S A r m y N o r t h 

(ARNORTH), US Northern Command, provides an Army headquarters capable of supporting a range of 

homeland defense operations and 

disaster assistance, including 

DCM. ARNORTH reached full operational capability in September 2006. 

 In addition to improvements within 

the pillar areas, the Army supports 

and has implemented other CWMD 

policies and initiatives. In an effort to 

improve and employ critical CWMD 

capabilities, G-35, through revision of 

Army Regulation 5-22 (The Army Proponent System) recommended respective proponents per priority 

CWMD mission area – WMDElimination, CBRN Offensive Operations, CBRN Passive Defense and 

CBRN Consequence Management. 

Assignment of proponents provides 

oversight to mission areas with capability or resource shortfalls, optimizes 

extant Army CWMD-related capabilities to ensure readiness for these 

priority missions, and efficiently allocates finite resources. The Army 

continues to operationalize its role in 

WMD- Elimination operations, and is 

developing solutions to improve Army 

contributions to Homeland Defense 

as it relates to CBRN consequence 

management. 

The Future for Army CWMD 

 The ARSTAF will continue using 

its new organizational construct to 

assess its ability to address CWMD 

issues across the spectrum of 

DOTMLPF and improve its CWMD 

capabilities and capacity. Synchronizing and integrating Army CWMD 

activities allows the Army to speak 

with one voice, protect Army interests, reduce inefficiencies, link existing capacities, and exploit potential 

capabilities by engaging key stakeholders across the Army.

 A major activity planned for 2007 

is the second annual Army CWMD 

Conference. The first Army CWMD 

Conference, held in May 2006, gathered OSD, Joint Staff, Sister Services, DTRA, Combatant Commands, 

and other pertinent government agencies together to exchange ideas on 

CWMD and to establish relationships 

to facilitate cooperative efforts 

throughout DOD. A major goal of the 

2007 conference is to provide an interactive forum to identify and recommend solutions to key CWMD issues 

affecting ASCCs and examine the 

Army’s ability to support Combatant 

Command plans relating to CWMD. 

Conclusion 

 The Army is a key player in the 

Global War on Terrorism and response to unconventional and asymmetric threats like those posed by 

proliferation and use of WMD. The 

Army provides unique expertise and 

capabilities across the CWMD 

mission areas - particularly in 

CBRN Offensive Operations, WMDElimination, Passive Defense and 

CBRN CM. DOD and the nation rely

on the Army to provide a fully capable, organized, trained and equipped 

force with the capabilities to deny, 

destroy, or respond to and mitigate 

the effects of WMD. The organizational efforts outlined herein allows for 

improved interface across multiple 

levels of the Army and DOD, and 

postures the Army to formulate coherent Army CWMD strategies and policies, articulated within the components of The Army Plan. These will in 

turn generate the capability requirements essential to CWMD across the 

DOTMLPF spectrum and the eight 

CWMD mission areas. 

 

Ms. Janet Strafer is a Headquarters, 

Department of the Army Civilian and 

Chief, Integration and Analysis 

Branch of the Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction and Proliferation 

Policy Division within the Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7. Ms. 

Strafer has B.A. and M.A. Degrees in 

Education from the College of William 

and Mary and is a graduate of the 

Army Management Staff College and 

US Army War College.

ENDNOTES: 

1

 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

Memorandum, CM-0194-06, 13 February 2006, National Military Strategy 

to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

2

 Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction and Proliferation Policy Decision Briefing to DCS, G-3/5/7, 

1 September 2005. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 28
 29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

he threat from toxic industrial 

chemical/material (TIC/TIM) 

facing military forces on deployed operations is undoubted: there 

is a lot of it around; in fact, there is an 

awful lot of it around. Whether it is 

hydrogen fluoride in petro-chemical 

plants or ammonia in milk processing 

plants, there is no shortage of TICs in 

the urban environment. Neither is 

there a shortage of desire to use 

them. US troops in Fallujah found a 

paint sprayer and chemicals that insurgents wanted to mix together as a 

weapon against coalition troops. 

These two factors have spawned a 

whole threat cottage industry in the 

military, with policy people dreaming 

up doomsday scenarios and procurement individuals rapidly backfilling the 

capability gap. 

 While over-match is a military doctrine to be warmly embraced, in my 

opinion it is not justified by the threat. 

Any individual sitting down with the 

Bumper Book of Organic Chemistry 

can come up with an Armageddon 

agent. There are tens of thousands of 

toxic industrial materials (water, for 

example, can be classed as a TIM 

since you can’t breathe in H2O) and it 

seems to be a military parlour game 

to come up with one that no-one else 

has heard of and tell you how little it 

takes to kill you. Yet a lot of this is 

down to faulty risk assessment, or 

rather accurate risk assessment not 

being filtered down. Everyone knows 

what the worst chemicals are, the 

ones that can survive being explosively disseminated, that don’t disperse or get burned off too quickly, 

that can affect individuals with a minimum dose (either dermal or respiratory), that are odourless and colourless, etc. How do we know? Well, we 

spent million of dollars, pounds and 

roubles on them and we call them 

chemical warfare agents. Those 

chemicals that didn’t fit the bill were 

never weaponised for good reasons 

because they would not fit into one of 

those categories. 

 Despite this it is the quantity of 

agent that fixates the military. The 

most popular scenario is that a terrorist could take a truckload of ammonia/

chlorine/methyl-ethyl-dead-by-noon, 

drive it up to a base and explode it. 

This is undoubtedly true, but equally 

a terrorist could fill a van with chemical explosive, drive it up to the base 

and explode it. The death toll from the 

latter would be far more likely to outweigh the former. Equally, our friend 

in Fallujah who created his homegrown chemical sprayer could have 

easily decided to create a homegrown flame thrower – equally difficult 

to defend against (in fact you could 

argue more difficult as the user doesn’t give the game away by having to 

use it in PPE). Yet you don’t see 

theoreticians and procurement wonks 

beset by the flame-thrower problem in 

the same way as TICs. 

 The solution to the TICs problem 

seems to be to deploy detectors 

down the food chain to proliferate the 

battlefield with detectors. But TICs 

detectors are not the same as IMS 

CWA detectors. They have a higher 

training burden (and if they are 

GCMS then they have an high training burden), a high price ticket and 

require regular calibration and maintenance programmes . Sebastian 

Meyer Plath of Bruker Daltonics 

pointed out that it was even more 

complicated than that. “The whole 

thing needs to be thought through 

and to a certain extent you can come 

out with an application that is more 

useful to a fire brigade or first responder. You, as a military user, will 

have an instrument which will detect 

50,000 TICs. So when you get an 

alarm, that doesn’t help you at all. 

You don’t know what to do next because you might not have encountered that chemical before. You need 

a direct link to a database in a system 

that tells you what to do now, how to 

behave and what not to do. In all the 

military requirements that I have seen 

in the past that this is not part of it.” 

 Chris Wrenn, Senior Director of 

Sales for RAE Systems, agreed that 

proliferation down to the lowest level 

was not the wisest option. “What RAE 

Systems have been successful in 

doing is fielding products to be a 

more sophisticated subset of the military. The tricorder in Star Trek was 

never given to the idiot; it was always 

given to the smartest guy. Detectors 

need detectives behind them; it all 

comes down to training. One problem 

is that you [as a soldier] are trained to 

be a general officer, not an expert on 

anything and once you get trained up 

to something you then move on. Historically, being a chemical officer 

used to be looked upon as a deadend job and didn’t attract the best.” 

 The previous way of dealing with 

TICs was through mass spectrometry 

(MS). MS used to be so large that it 

needed a substantial vehicle to deliver it, such as a Fox/Fuchs or VAB 

Reco. With Inficon’s Hapsite, mass 

spectrometry suddenly became mobile and proliferated without a great 

deal of thought of what was next. 

Carrier gases, calibration and training 

seemed small issues compared to 

being able to defeat the TICs threat. 

“The biggest thing that holds back the 

MultiRAE in the military,” said Chris 

Wrenn, “is the logistics of calibration. 

The military wants products that can 

just sit on the shelf for years and then 

be picked up and used. If you take a 

gas monitor off the shelf and it has 

been there 20 months it is most likely 

Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, 

but TICs Will Never Hurt Me? 

Mr. Gwyn Winfield

NBC International Looks at the Military Obsession With Toxic Industrial Chemicals 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 30

that a lot of it won’t work,” he continued. 

 

 Now that first flush of innocence is 

over, it would make sense for TICs 

detection to go back to being vehicle 

borne. This puts it back in the hands 

of specialists and people who know 

what the sensor is doing. One of the 

disadvantages of taking IMS detectors down to the front line is that it 

erodes common sense. Soldiers believe technology when it says there is 

an alarm and when everything around 

them is clearly shrieking that it was a 

false alarm. CWA IMS have a small 

window of agents, meaning that their 

window of false alarms is also small. 

With a TICs detector that can analyse 

over 50,000 chemicals the system 

may either be alarming all the time 

(because the PPM is set too low) or 

because the chemical signatures of 

the benign agents are close to the 

malign ones. All operational tempo 

goes out the window until chemical 

officers turn up to turn the common 

sense on. “You could make mass 

spec even smaller than Hapsite or 

MM2, but MS will always be an expensive piece of kit, coming in at 

about $90,000. The question is why 

would you want to take this expensive 

piece of equipment into the contamination when you could keep it outside 

the contamination and bring the minute sample to the MS. If that is true 

keep it simple, don’t miniaturise MS 

further, leave it with a high-spec technical capability which is directly correlated with its size – due to the laws of 

physics – and keep it outside the contamination.” 

 MS is certainly the gold standard 

of TICs detection and is better left 

with the experts, but there surely 

should be a silver standard, something that provides 80 percent of the 

capability but without the training burden and cost. Sebastian Meyer Plath 

doubted it but suggested it depended 

on your time scale. “It is hard to say, 

it depends on the horizon that you are 

looking at. With regard to the number 

of compounds that you are able to 

detect at one time MS will always be 

much more powerful than anything 

else. I don’t see anything that can 

compete with MS, it is not IMS and 

you can build up huge arrays of electro-chemical cells, for example, but 

that is going to be complicated and 

expensive as well.” 

 Chris Wrenn suggested that some 

IMS did have a place in TICs detection, like Environics Chempro 100, 

but that the best way to deal with the 

TICs threat was to network arrays of 

sensors rather than relying on a detector or needing to bring the MS to 

the contamination. “It comes down to 

best protection being the pervasiveness of the sensing technology. In the 

TIC world the question is how many 

sensors do they need? If you can 

propagate as many reliable TIC sensors as you can, then you get a reliable picture of what is going on.” 

 The furore around TICs will die 

down soon and they can take their 

place in the threat spectrum rather 

than being the latest way of furthering 

people’s careers (“I solved the deadly 

TICs problem”). There also needs to 

be an accepted list of TICs agents 

that the military can agree on. This 

happened in 1998 and accepted as 

ITF-25 by the British, Canadians and 

Americans, yet does not seem to 

have achieved ubiquity despite bearing a resemblance to other lists such 

as the US National Institute of Justice’s list. Once an agreed list can be 

provided, a silver or even bronze 

standard of detection – that just detects those agents – can be engineered and deploying a TICs capability down to the front line will follow. 

Hopefully ITF-25 can be further embraced in the military and we can be 

free from the fear of osmium tetroxide 

and other chemicals dug out of the 

organic chemistry mine. 

Reprinted by permission from NBC 

International Summer 2006 
 31 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

s the Army transforms to 

meet current and future requirements, it is being driven 

by the need to build adaptive, flexible 

capabilities to deal with a wide range 

of threats and adversaries. Over the 

past 10 years, there has been a dramatic increase in disruptive, irregular, 

complex and improvised threats. 

This shift in paradigm, from traditional 

threats with organized formations to 

an adaptively networked asymmetric 

environment, requires a comprehensive transformation of all of key capabilities and enablers which mitigate 

these current and emerging challenges. As the Army has transformed 

its Brigade Combat Teams, and all 

the supporting functional enablers, a 

parallel transformation effort is also 

underway spearheaded by the 20th 

Support Command (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

High-Yield Explosives). This parallel 

transformation will increase command 

and control while providing multidisciplined CBRNE and combating 

WMD capabilities to the Army. These 

changes will better focus efforts and 

resources towards combating weapons of mass destruction while adding 

new capabilities to meet new requirements. This effort is in concert with a 

wide range of specialized CBRNE 

and Combating WMD capabilities 

within the Joint Force. This model 

builds on the concept of joint interdependency, leveraging the best capabilities available in order to provide 

responsive, ready forces to Combatant Commanders. 

 In the 2006 Quadrennial Defense 

Review, the Army was directed to: 

“Expand the Army's 20th Support 

Command (CBRNE) capabilities to 

enable it to serve as a Joint Task 

Force capable of rapid deployment to 

command and control WMD elimination and site exploitation missions by 

2007.” 

 Leveraging a wide range of Army, 

Joint, DOD, and interagency efforts, 

the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) 

quickly developed a transformation 

strategy that will deliver an Initial Operational Capability (IOC) in 2007. 

This strategy will provide a JTF for 

WMD-E capability and equally important, it will designate a single Command assigned all of FORSCOM’s 

active component CBRNE capabilities packaged into cohesive, modular, 

and expeditionary formations. The 

power of this new HQ C2 element 

and integration of forces is extraordinary. It provides Army Commanders, 

Joint Commanders and Lead Federal 

Agencies a full spectrum, expeditionary CBRNE capability, with the capacity to execute simultaneous 

OCONUS and CONUS missions for 

CBRNE/WMD Elimination missions. 

Once Final Operational Capability 

(FOC) is complete, this Command will 

be rapidly deployable, equipped with 

rugged and specialized equipment, 

and built to support all of the standing 

and emerging CONOPs. The documentation authorizing the new manpower and equipment for these expanded capabilities has already been 

approved, and the Command is expected to reach IOC by October 

2007, in line with the QDR. FOC will 

be reached in three phases, culminating in October 2009. 

 To meet the QDR requirements, 

the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) 

is undergoing a major reorganization. 

It is taking a response-focused, nondeployable HQ and turning it into a 

HQ able to quickly deploy and operate effectively in joint, combined, and 

interagency operations. This transformation also builds a unit that is able 

to deploy in support of major contingency operations, while still maintaining a ready state to support first responders and homeland defense 

throughout CONUS. 

 Key elements in the HQ include 

both an Operational Command Post 

(OCP) and a Main Command Post 

(MCP). The OCP will deploy forward 

to command and control specialized 

CBRNE capabilities assets, both from 

within and outside the command. By 

design, the OCP can serve as a Joint 

Task Force headquarters for WMD 

Elimination, support a larger Combined Joint Task Force, or provide 

direct support to the Combatant Commander. Meanwhile, the MCP remains in place providing 24/7 realtime reach-back support, connectivity 

with lab and scientific assets, and C2 

of CONUS-based forces. The MCP 

stays in the rear managing the many 

homeland defense and other peacetime commitments, preparing the rest 

of the Command for future missions, 

and providing support to the deployed 

forces. 

 The 20th will provide specialized 

CBRNE response forces and elements to support both the homeland 

and overseas contingencies. The 

organization will leverage sanctuary 

reach back in order to link subject 

matter experts in America's defense, 

U.S. Army 20th Support Command (CBRNE) 

Organization/Transformation 

Prepared by the Public Affairs staff at the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 32

scientific and technological communities with deployed elements and possibly first responders. See Figure 1. 

Staff Organization Chart. 

 

 "In addition to the typical Army 

staff found at an organization like 

ours, our headquarters includes a 

number of operational teams, not 

found in any other Army command," 

said Colonel Barry Lowe, Chief of 

Staff for the Command. "This presents unique challenges such as ensuring these teams receive the appropriate rest, training and reset time 

outlined in the Army's force generation model, known as ARFORGEN, 

as well as meeting unique training 

requirements for these very technical 

military and civilian forces." 

 WMD Coordination Elements, 

Nuclear Disablement Teams, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Teams and 

Chemical and Biological Response 

Teams are all part of the command’s 

specialized assets, but when it comes 

to eliminating weapons of mass destruction these forces are not enough. 

Other assets from within DOD and 

other government agencies will partner with the CBRNE command to get 

the job done. 

 To help ensure the Army’s specialized CBRNE forces are available 

when needed, all CONUS based Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 

and Chemical battalions will be 

aligned under the 20th Support Command (CBRNE). Both the EOD and 

Chemical structures are undergoing 

major force redesigns to ensure they 

have the personnel, equipment and 

training to meet the challenges on the 

battlefield of today. Aligning them 

under one headquarters also helps 

create efficiencies, enabling them to 

better align with ARFORGEN, and 

become more supportive to the Brigades Combat Teams and divisions 

they will deploy with. 

 Existing CONUS-based Army 

EOD forces under the 52d Ordnance 

Group (EOD) and the 22d Chemical 

Battalion (Technical Escort) joined 

the command when it activated in 

October 2004. Later, the 110th 

Chemical Battalion (Technical Escort) 

was activated in September 2005, 

and the 71st Ordnance Group (EOD) 

was activated in October 2005. 

When the 48th Chemical Brigade activates later this year, the remainder 

of the CONUS-based conventional 

chemical battalions and separate 

companies will become subordinate 

units of that new brigade. 

 Most of the operational capabilities 

of the Command are found in the 

chemical brigade and the two EOD 

groups, but the headquarters also 

has specialized operational teams to 

Figure 1. Staff Organization Chart. 
 33 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

support the operational command 

post and other elements. See Figure 

2. Cbrne Command (FY09) . 

 The WMD Coordination Elements, 

or CEs, from the headquarters are a 

liaison team that provides staff augmentation, technical subject matter 

expertise, planning support, and hazard modeling or prediction to Joint or 

Army Commanders. The standard 

CE configuration is built around 

Chemical, Nuclear, and EOD Officers 

and Soldiers, with organic intelligence 

and communications support. Additional on-call assets from other commands include biological and disease 

specialists, environmental scientists, 

and industrial hygienists. All CEs 

deploy with robust communications 

that include the worldwide technical 

reach back capability mentioned earlier. 

 Nuclear disablement teams are 

another operational asset embedded 

in the headquarters. These teams 

have the ability to exploit, dismantle, 

and disable nuclear WMD infrastructure (facilities); package, transport, 

and safeguard nuclear and/or radiological material that poses an immediate threat to friendly forces; collect 

and transport samples of radiological 

material or nuclear WMD intelligence 

for forensic analysis, and conduct 

sensitive site exploitation operations 

on identified nuclear sites. 

 Joint Staff and STRATCOM/SCC 

WMD modeling, CONOPs and mission analysis studies showed Service 

and Joint doctrine was inadequate 

while command and control relationships were ill-defined. Planning was 

insufficient and not integrated into 

training and exercise programs. Part 

of the solution to eliminate those capability-gaps was to establish a joint 

enabling capability for WMD-E in order to enable the rapid deployment of 

a JTF-E headquarters capable of providing command and control of exploitation and elimination operations. 

After much work with the Joint Staff, 

the Army staff, STRATCOM, JFCOM, 

and SCC WMD, approval was gained 

to stand up the Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) (as a subordinate element of STRATCOM) and 

co-locate this outfit with the headquarters of the 20th SUPCOM 

(CBRNE). While the roles and missions of the JECE are still being defined, its broad function is to improve 

planning and coordination for WMDElimination operations, help this 

headquarters better support the combatant commanders, and to assist the 

20th in rapidly forming a JTF-E when 

directed. 

 Another unique capability embedded within the 20th will be a deployable integrated lab. This lab will have 

Figure 2. CBRNE Command (FY09) . 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 34

the requisite equipment and personnel to analyze the full range of 

CBRNE threats, fused with a developing forensic and biometric capability. When fully operational, this lab 

will provide a chemical and biological 

analytical capability to provide timely, 

accurate analysis of unknown samples; as well as a near real-time 

chemical/biological monitoring platform. 

 The deployable labs will provide 

commanders in the field the timely 

information required to make operational decisions related to CBRNE 

hazards with a very high confidence 

of what the hazard is and the best 

methods to mitigate and eliminate 

that hazard. While this capability 

does not provide the “gold standard” 

of analysis that can be obtained from 

permanent, fixed laboratory structures in the U.S. and throughout the 

world, the mobile labs are efficient 

and effective in a tactical environment 

to provide more detailed or “silver 

standard” analysis commanders require. This is far beyond the capabilities of the standard military detection 

equipment presently in use. The mobile lab section of the 20th will also 

complement the capabilities found 

with both the medical and intelligence 

communities. 

 The final major operational element within the command headquarters is the Very Important Persons 

Protective Support Activity (VIPPSA), 

an element of this command that 

really works in direct support of 

JFCOM and JDOMS. The management of EOD protective assets and 

missions in support of the United 

States Secret Service has been the 

Army's responsibility for some time 

now. Whenever any individual designated as a VIP is traveling and needs 

to ensure no explosive hazard exists 

where they are, military explosive 

ordnance disposal technicians do 

much of the work and VIPPSA coordinates those efforts. These requirements continue with the support being shared across all of the services. 

 When you put these teams together with an operational command 

post that can provide intelligence, 

planning, and synchronization of operations, you have a WMDelimination asset able to meet the 

requirements of the QDR and our 

nation. See Figure 3. Elimination 

Conops Schematic. 

 "Our number one priority is supporting the warfighter, providing 

trained and ready forces to execute a 

wide range of specialized CBRNE 

missions." said Brigadier General 

Kevin R. Wendel, Commander of the 

20th Support Command. "Our transformation objectives will deliver a reliFigure 3. Elimination CONOPS Schematic.
 35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

able, rapidly deployable and increased capability to Combatant 

Commanders to deal with WMD and 

CBRNE threats. We are building on 

some very effective, long-standing 

CBRNE capabilities that have been 

employed in every theater; this effort 

integrates, synchronizes, and is designed to deploy the right capability, 

at the right time and place." 

 "We have a strong network of 

partners who are helping us rapidly 

increase our capabilities and become 

better integrated into all of the potential responses to these threats," 

Wendel said. 

 The majority of the 20th Support 

Command's efforts are engaged in 

WMD counter-proliferation operations 

with a secondary mission in consequence management. 

 WMD-elimination sounds simple 

but is really a combination of a number of complex capabilities and synchronized efforts across DOD, and 

with many other government agencies as part of the National Strategy 

for Combating WMD and the National 

Military Strategy for Combating WMD. 

These strategies consist of three pillars – Non-Proliferation (NP), Counter

-Proliferation (CP) and Consequence 

Management (CM). There are eight 

military mission areas under these 

three pillars: Threat Reduction Cooperation and Security Cooperation & 

Partnership Activities under the NP 

Pillar; Interdiction, Offensive Operations, Elimination, Active Defense, 

and Passive Defense under the CP 

Pillar; and Consequence Management under the CM Pillar. 

 Some of those agencies the Command provides support to and interacts with include STRATCOM, 

NORTHCOM, all the other geographic Combatant Commands, US 

Secret Service, Department of State, 

Department of Justice, DTRA, National Labs, R&D activities and technical reach back agencies like CMA, 

ECBC, COE, JIEDDO and DOD Program Boards, as well as training development with the Chemical School, 

the Ordnance School, and the Navy 

School of EOD. 

 WMD-elimination is defined as 

“Operations to support the systematic 

seizure, security, removal, disablement or destruction of a hostile state 

or non-state actor’s capability to research, develop, test, produce, store, 

deploy, or employ WMD, delivery systems, related technologies, infrastructure and/or technical expertise.” (JP 3

-40) 

 "The 20th Support Command 

(CBRNE) is well suited to serve as 

the core of a joint command focused 

on WMD elimination," said Lt. Col. 

Steve Smith, who heads the command’s coordination elements. 

"Many of the command’s components 

(EOD, Tech Escort, and the Coordination Elements) currently provide 

capabilities to joint and multi-national 

commands and has both the joint 

experience and an established record 

of excellence in the joint arena." 

 Whether supporting a major combat operation, some other lesser 

scale CBRNE response, environmental cleanup operation, recovery of 

unexploded ordnance, or homeland 

defense support to civil authorities, 

this command ensures that when a 

CBRNE threat is encountered, specially trained and equipped military 

assets are available to respond, assess, mitigate and eliminate the hazard. 

Additional information: 

This article was prepared by the Public Affairs staff at the 20th Support 

Command (CBRNE). Additional information is available at the command web site at: 

http://www.cbrne.army.mil/index.html 

 For Army officers and NCOs interested in finding out more about the 

command and assignment opportunities, please contact the following: 

The senior EOD officer is the Deputy 

Commander, COL Paul Plemmons, 

DSN 584-0330. The senior Nuclear 

officer is the Chief of Staff, COL Barry 

Lowe, DSN 584-0330. The senior 

Chemical officer is the G3 Operations 

Officer, COL Ray Van Pelt, DSN 584-

6226. The Command Sergeant Major 

is CSM Marvin Womack, DSN 584-

0330. 

 WMD-elimination 

sounds simple but 

is really a 

combination of a 

number of 

complex 

capabilities and 

synchronized 

efforts across 

DOD, and with 

many other 

government 

agencies as part 

of the National 

Strategy for 

Combating WMD 

and the National 

Military Strategy 

for Combating 

WMD. 

35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 36

ackground 

The conflicts of the 21st Century have brought significant 

change to the way the Army thinks 

and fights. The threat has changed, 

and with it the way the Army is structured. No longer is the emphasis on 

an all-out nuclear exchange with another superpower. Instead, the most 

likely conflict will be with less sophisticated enemies using less conventional methods of warfare. One can 

therefore conclude that future conflicts will be less decisive and could 

last for long periods of time. 

 At present, the strategic advantage of just using high tech to create 

“shock and awe” on concentrations of 

adversaries is gone. One must also 

use high tech on the extended battlefield to respond to small concentrations of adversaries who themselves 

use high tech commercial-off-theshelf (COTS) electronics to communicate and detonate conventional munitions or relatively unsophisticated 

chemical, biological, radiological or 

nuclear weapons. 

 The one consistent thread between Cold War and 21st Century 

conflicts is the reliance on new technologies to improve the Army fighting 

capability. By far, the most dramatic 

revolution in technology has been in 

improved semiconductor technology. 

With it, subsystems have physically 

shrunk even while their capabilities 

have improved with lower power requirements. This improvement, unfortunately, is available to adversaries 

as well: cell phones are an example. 

 COTS electronics and electrical 

equipment provide the most advanced technology available for commercial and military applications. For 

the military, however, there are potential pitfalls of using just any COTS 

materiel solution. In the commercial 

arena, equipment life expectancy is 

four years or less in relatively benign 

environments, while military equipment is often used in harsher battlefield environments for longer periods 

of time. These environments include 

extreme heat and cold as well as severe electromagnetic environments 

(e.g., high-altitude electromagnetic 

pulse (HEMP)). Such recognition has 

prompted the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to direct additional requirements on all their electronic and electrical systems that support critical 

missions. One of these is the requirement that they operate in a wide 

range of electromagnetic environments and are protected from their 

associated electromagnetic environmental effects (E3). 

 This article provides the reader an 

overview of the evolving directive and 

instruction process and explains 

some of the immediate implications to 

new Army acquisitions and their E3 

(including HEMP) control. 

 

DOD Directives and Instructions 

 The Constitution of the United 

States establishes the framework for 

our government. The legislative 

branch then writes legislation and the 

executive branch signs or otherwise 

allows this legislation to become public law (e.g., Public Law 108-375, 

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense 

Authorization Act for FY2005). At the 

top of the directive pyramid, is the 

President, who issues classified or 

unclassified Presidential Directives 

DODI 3222.3 and Army System HEMP Survivability 

Robert A. Pfeffer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

MAJ John L. Carter, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 



Abrams tank undergoing EMP testing 
 37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

(PDs) or Executive Orders that explicitly identify executive priorities on national issues (e.g., National Security 

Presidential Directive 43/Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 14, 

Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 

2005). If those issues include military 

equipment and/or facility protection, 

for example, the DOD develops policy 

and implementation guidance called 

Directives and Instructions. DOD 

Directives (DODDs) are the formal 

process used by DOD to provide 

broad policy guidance on specific 

issues of concern to the SECDEF 

and the President. Directives state 

the issue and identify the responsibilities of OSD and subordinate organizations. Policy implementation guidance is then given in associated DOD 

Instructions (DODIs). Historically, 

both Directives and Instructions are 

divided into eight subject groups. 

 

 One subject group known to most 

of the nuclear weapons effects 

(NWE) community is the 5000 series. 

DODD 5000.1 stated (in E1.10. Information Superiority.) “Acquisition managers shall provide U.S. Forces with 

systems and families of systems that 

are secure, reliable, interoperable, 

compatible with the electromagnetic 

spectrum environment, and able to 

communicate across a universal information technology infrastructure, 

including NSS, consisting of data, 

information, processes, organizational interactions, skills, analytical 

expertise, other systems, networks, 

and information exchange capabilities.” To implement the directive, the 

Joint Staff prepared the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 

3170.01B. With this guidance each 

Service prepared its own implementing documents called regulations. 

For the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 

70-75 is the current implementing 

regulation for NWE (including HEMP) 

survivability. 

DODD 3222.3 

 DODD 3222.3 is a 3000 series 

Directive. It is entitled Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Program and has an effective date of 8 

September 2004. The Directive was 

updated September 2005. 

 DODD 3222.3, 8 September 2004, 

supersedes DODD 3222.3, Department of Defense Electromagnetic 

Compatibility Program, 20 August 

1990. It was reissued “...to update 

policy and responsibilities for the 

management and implementation of 

the DOD Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) Program to en1000 – Manpower and Personnel (Civilian, Military, and Reserve) 

2000 – International and Foreign Affairs 

3000 – Plans and Operations, Research and Development, Intelligence, and Computer Language 

4000 – Logistics, Natural Resources, and Environment 

5000 – Acquisition and Administrative Management, Organizational Charters, Security, and Public and Administrative 

Affairs 

6000 – Health 

7000 – Budget, Finance, Audits, and Information Control 

8000 – Information Management 

Figure 1. DODD and DODI Major Subject Groups. 

Typical Military EMP Hardened equipment Photo: Ft. Monmouth 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 38

sure mutual electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) and effective E3 control 

among ground, air, sea and spacebased electronics and electrical systems, subsystems and equipment, 

and with the existing natural and man

-made electromagnetic environment 

(EME).”1

 

 The directive explicitly identifies a 

five-part policy: 

 1. “All electrical and electronic systems, subsystems, and equipment, 

including ordnance containing electrically initiated devices, shall be mutually compatible in their intended EME 

(electromagnetic environment) without causing or suffering unacceptable 

mission degradation due to E3.”2

 2. “Military E3 specifications, standards, and handbooks stressing interface and verification requirements, 

establishing operational performance, 

and specifying developmental and 

operational test methodologies shall 

be developed following guidance outlined in DOD 4120.24.”2

 3. “Analytical tools and databases 

for EMC analysis and E3 assessment 

shall be developed and maintained to 

predict, prevent, and correct E3 deficiencies of military systems in the 

intended operational EME.”2

 4. “The Department of Defense 

shall maintain measurement capability to quantify E3 of military systems 

to and from their intended operational 

EME.”2

 5. “E3 awareness and training 

shall be promulgated throughout the 

Department of Defense.”2

 

DODI 3222.3

 Supporting this directive will be 

DOD Instruction (DODI) 3222.3. 

Originally scheduled for completion in 

2006 by the Joint Spectrum Center 

(they also prepared the Directive for 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Networks and Information Integration (ASD(NII)), the Instruction lays 

out the Directive implementation 

process. It is now scheduled for release in 2007 (see additional comments in the postscript). 

Army HEMP Survivability 

 Congress, in reestablishing the 

2004 EMP Commission, reiterated its 

concern for homeland security by 

raising the issue of HEMP protection 

of our national assets, especially 

those supporting critical missions. 

That concern, plus the implementation and enforcement of DODD 

3222.3 and DODI 3222.3, should 

have a significant impact on Service 

acquisitions. For example, the well 

documented Legacy equipment audit 

trail for Army NWE survivability will be 

strengthened by the DODD 3222.3 

statement that HEMP survivability is 

now an operational requirement. 

Figure 2. Typical Nuclear Survivability Program Flow Diagram. 
 39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

This conclusion leads to the following: 

• DOD will enforce E3 protection 

through the DOD Directive and Instruction process

• E3 (including HEMP) protection 

cannot be traded off because it is 

now an operational requirement E3 

protection must be applied to manned 

platforms and systems and to unmanned platforms and systems that 

keep personnel out of harm’s way.

 Since the 60’s the Army has exercised a NWE survivability program 

that included survivability to HEMP. 

Its success was due, in part, to the 

audit trail established to monitor the 

progress of new systems that support 

Army critical missions. A typical flow 

diagram is shown in Figure 2 , (see 

previous page). 

 New Army acquisitions that have a 

NWE survivability requirement and 

that have to meet that requirement 

through hardware protection must, at 

a minimum, survive the high-altitude 

EMP (HEMP) environment specified 

in Military Standard (MIL-STD) 

2169B. Over the years, this requirement has not been a major cost driver 

for new Army systems; in fact, a survey of several legacy equipment acquisition programs shows they met 

the NWE survivability requirement for 

less than three percent of the total 

system cost. Of that three per cent, 

HEMP hardening costs accounted for 

about one percent. This modest increase in per-unit cost usually means 

few program managers request a 

HEMP criteria waiver. A look at the 

Army HEMP survivability records kept 

at USANCA shows only one system, 

the Intermediate Forward Test Equipment, was ever granted a HEMP criteria waiver. 

Future Impact to Army/Service Acquisition Programs

 If properly enforced, DODD 

3222.3 and the new DODI 3222.3 will 

further strengthen the existing NWE 

survivability document trail. One can 

now read into DODD 3222.3 that the 

HEMP survivability requirement is 

now an operational requirement that 

must be met by all military electronic 

and electrical systems, not just those 

that support a critical mission. This 

implies E3 protection from such 

EMEs as HEMP, HPM, and ESD are 

no longer in the trade space for materiel developers. 

 In addition, by addressing E3 protection in a single directive, DODD 

3222.3 will encourage system designers to design in all E3 protection at 

the same time, thus sharing and even 

reducing E3 protection costs. This 

protection philosophy is consistent 

with the unified approach to ElectroMagnetic Environmental Effects Protection discussed in QSTAG 10513

(see Fall/Winter 1999 NBC Report 

article, p. 25, Reducing Army EM Protection Costs) and used in the aircraft 

hardening MIL-STD (under development). 

Summary 

• “DOD Directives establish or describe policy, programs, and organizations; define missions; provide authority; and assign responsibilities.”4

• DODD 3222.3 is the first Directive that specifically deals with EMC 

and E3 control of all electronic and 

electrical systems. More importantly, 

it places an operational requirement 

on E3 (including HEMP) survivability, 

thus taking it out of the trade space 

traditionally associated with NWE 

survivability.

• DODD 3222.3 could have a significant technical and monetary impact on future Army equipment acquisitions.

DODI 3222.3 is presently in draft 

form. It is now scheduled for release 

in 2007.

Postscript

During the preparation of this article 

the author learned of two new initiatives. The first is the result of a recent policy memo from DSD Gordon 

England. In the memo, future DOD 

Directives and Instructions will be 

written as one document and will be 

called DOD Instruction. Thus, the 

existing DODD 3222.3 will be cancelled and the DODI 3222.3 now being written will be revised to include 

both DODD 3222.3 and DODI 3222.3 

information. 

In addition, ATSD(NCB) is now preparing a draft DODI on HEMP protection of military systems. This document and the current investigations of 

the Defense Science Board and Army 

Science Board on HEMP protection 

will be the subject of a future article. 

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer is a Physical 

Scientist at the United States Army 

Nuclear and CWMD Agency in 

Springfield, VA, working on nuclear 

weapons effects. He has a B.S. in 

Physics from Trinity University and an 

M.A. in Physics from The Johns Hopkins University. Previous government 

experience includes Chief of the 

Harry Diamond Laboratory (HDL) 

Electromagnetics Laboratory and 

Chief of the 400-acre Woodbridge 

Research Facility, both in Woodbridge, VA. 

Major John Carter is a FA 52 officer 

working as a Physicist/System Integrator and serves as the Deputy 

Technical Manager, Smart Threads 

Integrated Radiological Sensors 

(STIRS) Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) at DTRANTDD. He has a M.S. degree in Nuclear Engineering from the University 

of Maryland. He was previously assigned as a Nuclear Physicist at the 

United States Army Nuclear and 

Chemical Agency (USANCA). Other 

FA52 experience includes Senior Reactor Operator at the Armed Forces 

Radiobiology Research Institute. His 

email address 

is John.Carter@DTRA.Mil. 

Further Reading: 

1.https://acc.dau.mil/

CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=30512 

2. http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/

corres/html/32223.htm 

3. Quadripartite Standardization 

Agreement (QSTAG) 1051, edition 1; 

American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Standardization Program; 

6 October 1998.

4. http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/

index.html

39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 40

DARPA Urban Grand Challenge 2007 

Robert A. Pfeffer, Physical Scientist 

o more negotiating the 1.5-mile Beer Bottle Pass 

thru the Lucy Gray Mountains of the southern 

Mojave Desert: the next Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand Challenge moves to the city! 

 After the impressive success of DARPA Grand Challenge 2005 (see Spring/Summer 2006 NBC Report), 

DARPA will sponsor a third competition on 3 November 

2007, this time realistically simulating safe operation of 

autonomous vehicles on a 60-mile mock urban area 

course. The first competitor to cross the finish line in less 

than six hours will win $2 million. Second prize is $1 million, and third prize is $500 thousand. If there are favorites in this one, consider the entries from Stanford University and Carnegie Mellon University. 

 On 20 May 2006 DARPA held an Urban Challenge 

Participants Conference in Reston, VA to outline to potential entrants the Grand Challenge 2007 details. Of particular interest was the course provided in the solicitation 

notice: 

“At the capstone event, performers will demonstrate a vehicle that exhibits the following behaviors: safe vehiclefollowing; operation with oncoming traffic; queuing at traffic signals; merging with moving traffic; left-turn across 

traffic; right-of-way and precedence observance at intersections; proper use of directional signals, brake lights, 

and reverse lights; passing of moving vehicles; and all the 

other behaviors implicit in the problem statement. Vehicles will also demonstrate navigation with limited waypoints and safe operation in complex areas such as parking lots. Recognition of traffic signals, street signs or 

pavement markings is considered outside the scope of the 

program, as this information will be furnished by DARPA. 

High-speed highway driving is also outside the scope of 

the program.” 

 I know some people that would find this course a challenge. 

 

 Originally mandated by Congress and the DOD, the 

DARPA Grand Challenge is a field test intended to accelerate research and development in autonomous ground 

vehicles to save lives on the battlefield. With even modest 

success in the urban environment, next-generation 

autonomous vehicles armed with Grand Challenge technology could be a major part of the future Army fighting 

force, especially in software engineering and such integration concepts as drive-by-wire. 

 This growing interest in autonomous vehicles is not 

unique to the US Army. In 2006 Europe conducted their 

version of the Grand Challenge called Robotic Challenge. 

It was held in Germany in May and consisted of three different events: urban, non-urban, and landmine detection 

and removal scenarios. Unlike all three Grand Challenges, the European Robotic Challenge entries were not 

required to be autonomous – semi-autonomous and even 

remotely operated vehicles were allowed to compete. 

Thus far, no event results are available. 

 

Further Reading: 

Spring/Summer 2006 NBC Report . 

The official DARPA Grand Challenge web site 

http://www.grandchallenge.org. or 

Google search on DARPA Grand Challenge 



DO YOU KNOW... 

The Stanford University entry and GC 2005 winner Stanley. 

Can it repeat in GC 2007? 

Photo by Stanford University. 
 41 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

mpact deceleration events are 

challenging to measure and 

quantify. However, the Davis gun 

project team can simulate deceleration events by tailoring acceleration 

events in which experimental variables can be controlled. This research is timely because an experimental method that successfully 

simulates decelerations for test articles weighing up to 2000 lb would 

have significant application in a wide 

range of severe impact and vibration 

environments for weapon development and certification. 

 Several experimental methods for 

weapon testing can simulate large 

deceleration environments for short 

duration (2–3 ms). However, few experimental methods are available to 

simulate large deceleration environments for long duration (intervals of at 

least 10 ms). 

 In large-caliber guns, the launch 

accelerations of the projectiles are 

repeatable to within a few percent 

from shot to shot, making them a very 

useful experimental tool for studying 

severe mechanical environments. We 

define a severe mechanical environment as a deceleration of full-scale 

components or subsystems of up to 

2,000 times the force of gravity (2,000 

g’s) for 10 ms. The Davis gun is commonly used for earth-penetrating 

weapon (EPW) development. The 

original Davis gun was a large-caliber 

recoilless cannon invented by Commander Cleland Davis of the US 

Navy in 1912 for use against naval 

craft and ground targets. A Davis gun 

is recoilless because it fires two 

masses simultaneously out of each 

end of an open gun tube: a projectile 

is fired out of one end of the gun, and 

a reaction mass is fired out of the 

other end. 

 The technical goal of our research 

is to determine if a Davis gun launch 

environment can be tailored to simulate the severe mechanical environment of an EPW impact event. In 

principle, if acceleration rise time 

could be shortened and a superposition of pressure pulses could produce 

a constant acceleration for 5–10 ms, 

the Davis gun could generate a 

nearly square-wave acceleration 

pulse, which would be an excellent 

simulation of an EPW impact deceleration event. That is, on impact an 

EPW experiences a sudden deceleration that, when graphed, rises quickly 

to an amplitude that persists for 5-10 

ms and then abruptly falls to zero. 

 Historically, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) maintained and operated the Davis guns used in Nuclear 

Weapons Complex programs. The 

SNL Davis guns are now maintained 

and operated by the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center 

(EMRTC) of the New Mexico Institute 

of Mining and Technology (NM Tech) 

in Socorro, New Mexico. SNL has 8–, 

12–, and 16–in.-bore Davis guns, 

while EMRTC has its own 2–, 6–, and 

15–in. Davis guns. Applied Research 

Associates (ARA) also participates in 

the Davis gun tests at NM Tech. The 

SNL/EMRTC Davis gun capability is 

unique in the US. 

Davis Gun: Simulation of Severe 

Mechanical Environments 

Roy S. Baty, LANL 

Ron Lundgren, Applied Research Associates, Inc. 

Garth Reader, Lawrence Brooks, and Peter Sandoval, LANL 

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY 



The goal of this research is to produce Davis gun accelerations that simulate earth penetration decelerations. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 42

 For our feasibility study, we performed a five-shot subscale Davis gun test series at EMRTC with an approximately 60–in.–long EMRTC gun that had a 2–in. bore. The 

gun was hung on a ballistic pendulum to provide a qualitative check that the momentums of the projectile and reaction mass were balanced. 

 To generate a superposed pressure pulse to tailor the 

projectile and reaction mass launch accelerations, we designed and built a 12–in.–long, four-tube charge bank to fit 

inside the 2–in. Davis gun tube. The charge bank was 

similar to a multiple rocket motor assembly with four parallel propellant 

tubes, one or more of them loaded 

with black powder. Each tube in the 

charge bank could be loaded and fired 

independently of the other three tubes. 

For each shot, we loaded a charge 

bank and inserted it into the gun tube 

between the projectile and the reaction 

mass. The charge bank attached to 

the gun tube with two bolts screwed 

into the barrel from the outside surface 

of the gun. A hole drilled through one 

of the attachment bolts provided wiring 

access into each propellant tube. Very 

light end caps closed the ends of the 

charge bank tubes. We ignited the 

multiple tubes of the charge bank in 

sequence using an individual fire set 

for each tube, timed with a Stanford 

signal generator. 

 Each shot in the test series fired a 

projectile and reaction mass. Commander Davis used a reaction mass 

consisting of grease and lead shot; we 

used a machined projectile shape as reaction mass because we wanted to take pressure, acceleration, video 

(against a lattice background), and other measurements 

from it as well as from the projectile. We designed both 

the projectile and reaction mass as cone-nosed soil penetrators and fabricated them from 304 stainless steel. The 

projectile weighed 3.9 lb, while the reaction mass weighed 

12.3 lb. We instrumented both the projectile and reaction 

mass with accelerometers to measure axial launch accelerations. 

 In each shot, we fired the projectile and the reaction 

The Davis gun four-tube charge bank assembly. Each tube, loaded with black powder, could be fired independently. 

The charge bank was 12 in. long and fit inside the 2–in.–i.d. Davis gun. 

The 2–in. Davis gun suspended on a ballistic pendulum. The reaction mass 

protrudes from the gun barrel on the right. Accelerometer wires attached to 

the noses of the projectile and reaction mass led to oscilloscopes, and the two 

wires near the middle of the gun were for pressure transducer measurements. 

The ignition wires are not shown. The 4-in. grid behind the gun shows any 

movement of the gun during a shot and provides a reference background for 

real-time video. 
 43 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

mass into two plywood boxes that were 4 ft in each dimension. The boxes were open at the top and were filled with 

sand. In each shot, we recorded both high-speed video 

and real-time video. Additional test instrumentation measured the ignition times and timing delays and the approximate times that the projectile exited the gun barrel and 

impacted the outer surface of the target box. All tests used 

FFF black powder. (The F designations for black powder 

indicate the screen sizes—and resultant grain sizes—

used in manufacturing the black powder, with FFF being 

smaller and faster-burning than F and FF.) The five-shot 

test series included shots that fired one, two, and three 

tubes of the charge bank with ignition delays of up to 5.0 

ms: 

• Test 1: single charge

• Test 2: two charges, no ignition delay, pulse superposition 

• Test 3: two charges, one at a 3.5-ms ignition delay, 

 pulse superposition

The reaction mass (top) and projectile (bottom) fired from the Davis gun, with accelerometer wires attached to their nose 

cones. The reaction mass weighed 12.3 lb, and the projectile weighed 3.9 lb. Each had three lengthwise grooves for 

phenolic resin runners that provided support in the gun barrel and reduced friction. Plastic disks (not shown) at the base 

ends of the reaction mass and projectile acted as pressure seals. 

A typical composite high-speed video photograph showing the projectile (left) and reaction mass (right) just after they 

exited the Davis gun tube. The black powder gases appear to be of different colors because of differences in the available lighting. The real-time video showed that the Davis gun exhibited little to no pendulum motion during the five test 

shots, indicating that the momentums of the projectile and reaction mass were balanced. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 44

• Test 4: two charges, one at a 5.0-ms ignition delay, 

pulse superposition

• Test 5: three charges, two at 5.0-ms ignition delays, 

pulse superposition.

 When the reaction mass was loaded into the Davis 

gun, its nose protruded from the end of the gun tube and 

was visible from time zero forward. Therefore, we obtained good displacement (position-time) measurements 

for the reaction mass from the high-speed video on all five 

tests. No direct position-time data were obtained for the 

projectile from the high-speed video. This was expected 

because the projectile was inside the barrel for almost the 

entire time interval of interest, and when the projectile did 

emerge, it was shrouded in propellant gases. 

Video photograph showing the projectile as it exited the Davis gun tube. The shroud of hot propellant gases enveloping the projectile made video measurements difficult: in fact, the reaction mass provided better measurements because its nose cone already protruded from the gun barrel before firing and so traversed clear air ahead 

of propellant gases. 

Measured reaction mass displacement in inches from 

the Davis gun barrel as a function of ignition time in 

milliseconds. For this shot, two tubes of the charge 

bank were fired with a 5.0–ms delay. Displacement 

data are useful because reaction mass velocity can be 

computed from such data. 

Reaction mass velocity computed from displacement 

data for a shot in which two tubes of the charge bank 

were fired with a 5.0–ms delay. Scatter in the velocity 

approximation is attributable to jitter in the video position-time data. 
 45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

 Because the subscale Davis gun shots exhibited little 

recoil on the real-time video, the motion of the projectile 

can be closely estimated from the motion of the reaction 

mass by assuming that the momentums of projectile and 

reaction mass are equal. We used a symmetrical, fourpoint, finite-difference formula to compute the velocity of 

the reaction mass. The scatter in the velocity approximation is due to jitter in the visual position-time data. Applying the velocity estimate to the projectile, assuming that 

the momentum of the projectile and reaction mass are 

equal, indicates that the projectile experienced an average 

acceleration of around 1100 g’s over the first 3 ms of the 

shot in test 4. 

 In addition to the position-time data, we measured time

-dependent gun chamber pressures for each shot in the 

test series. We used two pressure transducers in the 

Davis gun chamber, one located near the initial position of 

the projectile base and one located near the initial position 

of the reaction mass base. The pressure data show that 

the initial rise time of the pressure pulse can be shortened 

as a function of the propellant amount and burn rate. The 

pressure data also show that the charge bank design allows individual propellant tubes to be ignited with timing 

delays to produce superposed pressure pulses. The decrease of the pressure rise time and the use of ignition 

timing delays and pressure pulse superposition indicate 

that a 2–in. Davis gun tube acceleration pulse may indeed 

be modified to have some of the features of an idealized 

square-wave acceleration pulse. 

 The next step in this research will be to tailor a specified pressure pulse by using timing delays and pressure 

superposition. This approach will provide insight into how 

to generate a gun tube acceleration pulse that approximates a square wave. In concert with the pressure pulse 

tailoring, research will begin to extend the charge bank 

concept and design to a 6–in. Davis gun. 

 The severe mechanical environment of interest will be 

simulated by the launch acceleration in the gun tubes using a reverse ballistics technique. The test articles will be 

orientated backwards along the centerline inside the projectiles fired from the Davis guns. The test projectile will 

be shot into a soft target, inducing a well-defined deceleration on the projectile and test article of a substantially 

lower magnitude than the gun tube launch acceleration. 

To test EPW components, a reliable soft catch target can 

be constructed from layered plywood and sand. A 6–in. 

Davis gun will allow projectiles large enough in diameter to 

carry self-contained data recorders and test small components and materials samples in severe mechanical environments. 

Point of contact: 

Roy S. Baty, 667-9319, rbaty@lanl.gov 

Also contributing to this research were Ron Lundgren 

(Applied Research Associates, Inc.) and Garth Reader, 

Lawrence Brooks, and Peter Sandoval (LANL). 

Previously printed from the "Nuclear Weapons Journal", 

a publication of Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

Measured Davis gun chamber pressure for a shot in which 

one tube of the charge bank was fired to provide a baseline for multiple-tube shots. Of particular interest here is 

the pressure rise time because it is one of the variables 

we want to tailor to simulate an acceleration square wave. 

Measured Davis gun chamber pressure for a shot in which 

two tubes of the charge bank were fired with a 5.0–ms 

delay. Fast-burning black powder is fired in two or more 

tubes to achieve both a rapid rise time and pressures that 

remain high for up to 10 ms. The goal of tailoring the pressure pulse is to produce an acceleration pulse that approximates a square wave such as occurs during projectile 

earth-penetration deceleration. 

45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 46

s technology advances and 

weapon systems become 

more sophisticated, the need 

is increasing for development of specialized procedures to decontaminate 

more complex and sensitive military 

equipment. Special tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for 

decontamination operations are developed for certain systems and 

equipment used by the soldier on the 

battlefield. If the current decon 

(decontamination) procedures are too 

general under FM 3-11.5 or in the 

equipment manuals and a deficiency 

exists, a TTP must be developed. 

 Program managers (PMs) responsible for fielding Army systems must 

ensure that mission-critical systems 

are decontaminable under AR 70-75 

survivability regulation dealing with 

chemical, biological, and radiological 

(CBR) contamination. Program managers often request guidance from 

USANCA on how to proceed to develop decon TTPs for their new or 

improved system. 

 Frequent questions include: 

“What are TTPs and how are they 

developed? When does a system 

need to have TTPs? Where to go to 

develop decon TTPs for my system? 

What are the acceptable contents 

and who approves them? Do you 

have a template?” This article addresses these questions, while focusing chiefly on decontamination problems that need special attention. 

Definition. TTPs are a set of instructions designed specifically for a system or item of equipment. For decontamination, essentially the ideal TTP 

delineates procedures to accomplish 

field decon or simply to avoid contamination of an item. They should 

also contain training procedures for 

all military in joint forces operations 

and for civilian first response teams. 

Purpose. TTPs are written primarily 

for use by the unit or Soldier – the 

ultimate user of the item in combat. 

They are intended for the decon unit 

that comes in to accomplish Thorough decon on the system. The ultimate goal of a good set of decon 

TTPs is to protect Soldiers by reducing contamination levels, allowing 

field operations to continue by unprotected personnel. The final output is 

a new decon procedure specific for 

the system, followed by formal inclusion in the equipment training manual 

(TM) or field manual (FM). 

Requirement. If there is a requirement written into a document, such 

as the Capability Development Document, then the mission critical system 

must comply with regulations and 

criteria in AR 70-75 Survivability of 

Army Personnel and Materiel. The 

requirement is normally written by the 

combat and materiel developers. 

After the system is tested and evaluated against those criteria, a TTP is 

required if a deficiency or shortfall is 

identified during the decon procedures and the system does not meet 

the requirements. A deficiency may 

also be discovered during reevaluation of a legacy system, or 

when a CBR engineering analysis 

(paper study) is performed on a system or equipment. Essentially, survivability criteria that are not met can 

be compensated by appropriate TTPs 

for the system. However, the mere 

statement that a problem will be addressed using TTPs is not sufficient, 

and the PM must show the documented decon procedures for the 

system or equipment. Often the necessary procedures are not fully covered in published FMs available to 

the warfighter. Still another reason to 

require TTPs occurs when a PM requests a waiver on particular military 

equipment that does not meet AR 70-

75 survivability criteria, 1

 and then an 

authority such as the Army G-3 imposes a condition or caveat that goes 

with the waiver. These are typical 

reasons that may trigger the need for 

developing a set of TTPs and that 

must be considered before submitting 

a request for waiver. 

Developing TTPs

 

Currently, there is no generic template or recipe to prepare TTPs for 

decon procedures. Each procedure 

must be specifically tailored for the 

particular system or equipment item. 

The basic contents of TTPs for a system must include how the system’s 

shortcomings are addressed (unless 

it is for normal routine tasks by the 

decon unit). The development of 

techniques and procedures normally 

follows the steps in Table 1 (see following page). Each step is briefly 

explained in this article. 

 TTPs are necessary when a gap 

or failure has been recognized during 

an evaluation or testing effort using 

Developing Decon Procedures, 

A Primer for Army Program Managers 

Mr. Joseph C. Nellis 

Chemical Engineer, USANCA 

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes 

 Targeting Officer, USANCA 

 47 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

test operations procedures. The main 

goal is to provide detailed information 

as to what is the best approach to 

decon that equipment. The TTPs 

must offer procedures to mitigate 

those decon gaps or deficiencies. 

 The initial action rests with the PM 

group who is responsible to develop 

procedures to fill any decon gap(s) 

before fielding the system. The PM 

shop must first coordinate with the 

Combat Developer (CBTDEV) -- the 

Army entity whose personnel have 

the most knowledge or have developed the operational requirements for 

the equipment or system. CBTDEV 

makes the determination if the equipment is mission critical and requires 

hardening. In this case the survivability requirement can be met via operational TTPs, which specify if the gap 

or shortcoming can be solved by mitigation, redundancy, or resupply. 

 Coordination on specific decon 

procedures and other technical issues are done with testers and 

evaluators such as Dugway Proving 

Ground (DPG), Army Evaluation Center (AEC), Army Research Laboratory 

(ARL), and other agencies that identified the deficiencies. While Armywide problems are identified by 

evaluators, system specific fixes are 

recommended for implementation 

through TTPs. 

 When developing decon procedures for a system, initially one needs 

to consult the approved decontamination procedures in FM 3-11.5. However, the manual procedures are too 

general for use in most sophisticated 

or sensitive equipment, particularly 

those equipped with electronics, computers, plastics, avionics, or hard to 

reach areas or crevices (nooks and 

crannies). For fielded systems the 

decon procedures are contained in 

the back of operations manuals. The 

back section of FM 3-11.5 also contains decon procedures for some particular platforms. But some of the 

current decon procedures are harsh 

and normally result in degradation of 

sensitive equipment. In the case of a 

platform with sensitive equipment, 

one must take into consideration its 

engineering configuration, materials 

of construction, and how the components are assembled. A technical 

examination of the equipment by testers and evaluators will give a “better 

feel” on how to develop the specifics 

to include in the TTPs. 

 When appropriately developed, 

TTPs are incorporated in TMs and 

FMs. Through these manuals the PM 

conveys to the soldier those proven 

techniques that mitigate decon problems on the system. For instance, a 

component X of a system is typically 

damaged by Y decontaminant. As 

such, there is a need to first clean it 

using Z, then cover to protect it while 

decontaminating the surrounding areas. In all cases, the TTPs must provide detailed information on the best 

approach and equipment to decon 

the system or item of equipment. Figure 1 shows Soldiers learning new 

decon procedures to eventually develop TTPs. 

 While the Multiservice FM 3-11.5 

may serve as a guide for decon procedures, TTPs can not be a simple 

regurgitation of wordings from that 

manual; but rather a methodic approach consisting of thought out 

steps or technical procedures designed with that particular missioncritical equipment in mind. TTPs 

must address the engineering design 

and components peculiar to the system, and how a soldier will proceed 

safely during the decon process in an 

o Recognition of a need to develop or refine specific TTPs to decon the system.

o Gathering of information based on full knowledge of the system.

o Development of step-by-step procedures specific for that item or system.

o Identify locations where decon is more difficult.

o Techniques to mitigate and accomplish decon operations.

o Review of procedures by experts on the system.

o Test prove out and approval of TTPs for the system or equipment.

o Implementation of TTPs in field or technical manuals or documentation for 

the system.

Table 1. Steps for TTPs Development. 

Figure 1. Soldiers learning new decon TTPs using the M17 Decon System. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 48

operational environment. 

 Thorough research must be conducted on the system to determine 

what is available that could be used 

during development of special decon 

procedures. For instance, if the AR 

70-75 survivability test or assessment 

has been performed on the equipment, the test result is a source of 

valuable information because it may 

identify areas that are more difficult to 

decon. There might be other publications or test reports on the system 

containing specific information about 

decon requirements or procedures for 

newly added equipment in latest versions. Normally, a CBRN test report 

indicates whether the equipment is 

decontaminable to safe levels in the 

DA-approved criteria, and where potential decon problems exist. A TTP 

needs to address the issue when the 

system is not decontaminable down 

to a negligible risk level, and must 

provide quick fixes. It must emphasize troop safety procedures including 

stand-off, crew rotation, protective 

clothing, and monitoring. It can also 

indicate how long it typically takes for 

the system to air-out and self-decon, 

or if it will continue to present a hazard to unprotected individuals on the 

battlefield.

 TTPs should contain information 

on how to conduct immediate, operational and thorough decon for the system. The procedures must be presented in an easily, concise language 

on how the techniques mitigate and 

accomplish the decon operation. 

TTPs must indicate if a battalion, a 

team or only an individual is sufficient 

to complete the decon process, and 

what equipment is needed to accomplish the tasks successfully. A fallacy 

in TTPs is to simply state that 

“thorough decon will eliminate all 

CBR agent hazards.” It will not. Often a thorough decon does help to 

reduce the contamination considerably for personnel working, maintaining, and resupplying the system. But 

in some cases the equipment needs 

more than one cycle of thorough decon or needs time to weather out to 

render it below negligible risk values. 

For example, after one decon cycle, 

some existing gaps, crevices, engine 

compartments or absorbent materials 

may still remain a hazard to the warfighter. In all cases, the TTPs need to 

show specific provisions to decon 

these hard-to-reach surfaces. The 

TTPs preparer makes a judgment on 

this aspect. 

 Field samplers for liquid and vapor 

offgassing of agents show the level of 

decon, and are useful to indicate 

“how clean is clean”. For instance, if 

the extent of contamination on vehicle 

rubber tires is unknown, point detectors are used to establish the vapor 

levels before soldiers can unmask. 

Also, secondary contamination issues, which can easily be addressed 

in TTPs, occur when a contaminated 

individual transfers contaminants to a 

non-contaminated surface. A typical 

case is when a contaminated soldier 

in mission oriented protective posture 

(MOPP) gear enters a vehicle or shelter to perform an operation, or if a 

vehicle travels through a contaminated area and the agent contaminants are transferred to clean surfaces. The TTPs must have warnings 

indicating if the item remains a health 

hazard to the crew, soldier units or 

maintenance personnel for extended 

periods of time after decon is completed. Perhaps the appropriate 

wording such as, "The crew (squad or 

maintainers) are required to remain in 

MOPP IV level after hasty or thorough decon until the hazard is reduced to a safe level." Additionally, 

FMs often specify what protection 

level is the most appropriate to wear 

during the decon process. A planned 

MOPP demo can verify those developed TTPs to ensure the ability of the 

operators to continue the assigned 

mission wearing MOPP gear in a contaminated environment. Figures 2 

and 3 show soldiers in MOPP gear 

conducting decon operations and 

learning TTPs skills.

Contamination Avoidance. It is 

often said that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” Thus, 

contamination avoidance and protection of the item before a CBRN attack 

must always be considered during 

development of TTPs as a mitigation 

technique for the unit or soldier. 

Some ways to minimize, prevent, or 

avoid contamination of equipment 

include temporary protective shrouds 

and covers using canvas, plastic 

sheeting, and shrink-wrap, which can 

all be quickly treated or discarded 

safely. These materials must be especially designed to avoid being easily blown off and torn. On the other 

hand, the item of equipment may also 

reside protected inside a tent, vehicle, 

or shelter. Whenever appropriate, 

these easy field mitigation solutions 

become part of TTPs to enhance surFigure 2. Soldiers in MOPP IV gear practicing decon operations to develop 

new TTPs. 
 49 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

vivability of a system in an agentcontaminated environment. 

Decontaminants. The TTPs must 

indicate what decontaminant and exact procedures are appropriate for the 

system. All fielded decontaminants 

available to the Soldier are listed in 

FM 3-11.5; except for DS2, which has 

been deemed by the Services to be 

an Army excess item in July 2004. 

There are other fielded decontaminants still available for use by the 

Soldier, but there are ongoing efforts 

to procure updated decon equipment 

and decon solutions for sensitive 

equipment, platform interiors, as well 

as typical platform exteriors. A comprehensive article on emerging decontaminants is available in 

USANCA’s NBC Report, Spring/

Summer 2004 issue. That article 

gives a list of possible candidates for 

the future decon while the search 

goes on for a less damaging and less 

corrosive replacement for DS2. In 

some instances, existing decon methods in FM 3-11.5 can be altered or 

modified to enable the Soldier to 

achieve acceptable decon standards 

(See Figures 2 and 3). Thus, in the 

future, a combination of more than 

one decon might become a possible 

solution for an item’s TTP rather than 

using only one decon for the entire 

system. The goal is to achieve a safe 

level that causes minimal risk hazard 

to a soldier operating, resupplying or 

maintaining the system. 

Approval of TTPs

 The approval of TTPs involves 

several organizations. In most cases, 

the CBTDEV, Chemical School Doctrine Division, and Field Artillery 

School play a role in reviewing the 

documented decon procedures. 

These Army agencies determine 

whether the procedures are adequate 

for core competency training, and 

useable by the soldier in the battlefield and by all other military or civilian response teams. To aid in the 

approval process, those preparing 

TTPs must also request a thorough 

review and recommendations from 

experts in the field such as ATECAEC, ARL, DPG, and others who 

may have operational experience with 

the system. In all cases, the agency 

that initially required the TTPs, along 

with TRADOC and Chemical School, 

will determine if the proposed TTPs 

are adequate and sufficient for decon 

purposes. Before approval, all recommendations from reviewers and 

approving authorities are given utmost consideration. The approved 

TTP procedures must be well documented for implementation upon fielding of the system or item. For fielded 

systems the PM is responsible to develop new fixes and to provide the 

solution(s) to the end user. 

 

 The approved TTPs must become 

part of a test program and be validated for that system. This approach 

determines if the TTPs are indeed 

sufficient and effective to overcome 

the inability or vulnerability of that 

system to meet decontaminability. 

This can be done during the Test 

Validation Phase. It is equally important that appropriate battle staffs 

properly integrate the TTPs into the 

training plans, orders, and staff estimates. After the procedures are 

proven out, and demonstrated that 

they work, it is necessary to publish 

them in appropriate technical or field 

manuals. 

 Finally, closure on TTP requirements is reached when the document 

is fielded along with the system or 

equipment. The ultimate benefit of 

having approved TTPs for a system is 

to give the warfighter a better edge 

on the battlefield when decon is necessary to continue and accomplish 

the mission. 

Mr. Joseph C. Nellis currently works 

as a Chemical Engineer/Staff Officer 

at USANCA. His 22 years of work in 

NBC Survivability for the Department 

of the Army include duties as Test 

Officer and Test Director at US Army 

Dugway Proving Ground, and as 

NBC analyst for ARL/SLAD at Aberdeen Proving Ground. He earned his 

Master of Science degree in Geochemistry of Uranium/Radioactive 

Materials from the University of Utah, 

and M.B.A. degree in Management 

Science from the University of California, Riverside. His email address is 

joe.nellis@us.army.mil

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes is a Nuclear 

Targeting Officer assigned at 

USANCA. He was previously assigned as the MOS 131A Targeting 

Technician Program Manager, Ft. Sill, 

OK. He is also a graduate of the 

Joint Targeting School, Dam Neck 

 VA. His email address is 

stephen.gomes@us.army.mil 

1

 See the DA approved criteria summarized in article “Emerging Decontaminants and Replacement of DS2”, 

USANCA’s NBC Report, Spring/

Summer 2004. 

Figure 3. Soldiers practicing decon operations with a 

 Back-Pack Portable Unit. 

49 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 50

MAD and the Road to SALT

Dr. Jerry Gideon 

American Military University 

CPT. Thomas M. Genter 

AW570 – National Ballistic Missile Defense 

HISTORY 

UTUAL ASSURED 

DESTRUCTION 

 The theory of Mutually Assured 

Destruction (MAD) defined for US 

policy makers the uncontrollable nature of nuclear war and ultimately led 

to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 

(SALT) with the Soviet Union. The 

very real possibility of unleashing 

cataclysmic events of thermonuclear 

war with unprecedented destruction 

greatly influenced US nuclear strategy during the Cold War (1960s). 

Contrary to popular believe, MAD 

was neither US military doctrine, nor 

official US policy.1

 MAD, however, 

was the defining concept for deterring 

the use of nuclear weapons. It continues today to serve as a reminder to 

many that “toe to toe nuclear combat 

with the Ruskies” 2

 was insane, irrational and should be avoided at all 

costs. 

 In order to examine the influences 

of MAD and corresponding impacts to 

US and Soviet policy; this analysis 

will introduce how theories of war 

were impacted by the use of nuclear 

weapons, examine the dynamics of 

the US/Soviet arms race, and conclude with, that despite criticisms, 

MAD was the driving factor in introducing arms control as the stabilizing 

solution to the arms race. 

A MAD Beginning 

The origin of MAD can be found in 

the influences of Clausewitz’s On 

War. His timeless theories of war 

define the complex nature between 

the political and military components 

of government and their interdependent relationship on one another. As 

Clausewitz observes, “War is merely 

the continuation of policy by other 

means” and there is no better example of a military capability (war) being 

a true political instrument than the 

atom bomb. 3

 Mere possession of a 

nuclear capability, no matter how rudimentary can greatly enhance a nation’s ability to achieve its political 

objectives by increasing its bargaining power. The sheer magnitude of 

“the bomb” and the accompanying 

threat of apocalyptic destruction 

serves as a deterrent to those who 

wish to harm or impose its will over a 

nation that has acquired nuclear 

weapon technology. In the current 

geopolitical atmosphere, North Korea 

and Iran clearly hold to the idea that 

nuclear weapon technology is the 

best defense against western aggression and serves as an effective deterrent to possible invasion by hostile 

forces. 

 The military utility of nuclear weapons resides in its ability to directly 

attack an opponent’s will. Paramount 

to any m ilitary strategy is 

Clausewitz’s center of gravity, which 

may be found in a nation’s “armed 

forces, the country, and the enemy’s 

will.” 4

 Regardless of the weapon 

used, the aim of war is to compel the 

enemy to accept another’s will. 5

 

 Further, nothing short of maximum 

force will suffice in attainment of war’s 

purpose. Some enemies are more 

capable and more resolute than others and require greater skills in order 

to be defeated; such skills may be 

derived from the employment of certain technologies. Key to any military 

victory is attacking the enemy’s center of gravity with relentless and overwhelming force. 

 Clearly, nuclear weapons can easily destroy an enemy’s army, its cities, 

and in turn deflate the enemy’s will 

and cause it to sue for peace. With 

the creation of nuclear weapons and 

their means of delivery, bypassing the 

enemy’s field army or other obstacles 

in an attempt to attack a nation’s will 

has become more efficient, less 

bloody and seemingly easy to those 

that possess nuclear weapons. As 

witnessed by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the mass devastation caused by only two atomic 

bombs demonstrated to the world the 

all but unlimited power of nuclear 

weapons and their direct effect on a 

national will. 

 Nuclear tipped missiles have compressed the battle space, and have 

enabled a combatant, with relative 

ease, to target the military industrial 

capacity of another nation. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) can 

reach any point on the globe within 

30 minutes and with amazing accuracy. These unmanned missiles can 

be easily directed to any military, industrial or geopolitical target. 

 For decades the US and Soviet 

Union have relied upon vast arsenals 

of ICBMs as a replacement for and 

augmentation to bomber fleets. The 

flexibility of rapid response, reprogrammable target capability, low 

maintenance cost and less susceptibility to enemy missile defense systems made ICBMs the weapon of 

choice. Now more than ever, both 

sides (US and Soviet) would be vulnerable to the other side’s colossal 

fleet of missiles. 

More Recent MAD History 

Simply put, the MAD concept outlined 

for strategists the probable outcome 

	 51 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

of a full-scale use of nuclear weapons 

by two opposing forces. During the 

height of the Cold War the perception 

of nuclear exchange between US and 

Soviet Union was a very real possibility. Adding to the fears of nuclear 

holocaust were the horrible visions of 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors. 

The possibility of surviving something 

so devastating led people to readily 

accept death as opposed to living in a 

world affected by nuclear fallout. Regardless of cause; accidental launch, 

invasion of Western Europe by Soviet 

conventional forces (crossing of the 

Fulda Gap), or rogue military commanders, the perception was that if a 

single nuclear weapon was launched 

by one side the other would respond 

with overwhelming force (massive 

retaliation). 

 With the idea of nuclear annihilation in mind, MAD theorized that two 

rational opposing nations (US and 

Soviet Union) with near equal nuclear 

capabilities would not employ nuclear 

weapons against one another. And 

therefore, should be considered a de 

facto deterrent to any form of armed 

conflict for nations that possess near 

equal nuclear capability. Deterrence 

was mutual because both sides possessed a massive retaliatory capability. 

 The first evidence of mutual deterrence can be found in the book The 

Absolute Weapon by Arnold Wolfers. 

6

 Even before the Soviets attained 

nuclear weapons, this Yale professor 

theorized the conditions of mutual 

deterrence: “Nothing could be less 

tempting to a government, provided it 

were in possession of its senses, 

than a war of mutual destruction ending in stalemate. It would not be surprising, therefore, if a high degree of 

Soviet-American ‘equality in deterring 

power’ would prove the best guarantee of peace and tend more than anything else to approximate the views 

and interests of two countries.”7

 It 

wasn’t until the increase of Soviet 

nuclear capabilities (arms race) did 

the idea of “assured destruction” 

penetrate US nuclear weapon strategy. 

 Perceived nuclear disparity, fear of 

conflict (nuclear or conventional) with 

the Soviets, rapid nuclear and missile 

advancements, and the general uneasiness of the 1960s heightened 

tensions and led to shifts in military 

and strategic policy. The formal origin of the term “assured destruction” 

can be found in a series of RAND 

studies conducted by Colonel Glen 

Kent. 8

 “These studies . . . applied 

systems analysis methods to evaluate various strategic nuclear postures 

in terms of American lives saved per 

dollar spent. For the purpose of 

these studies, Kent developed two 

accounting devices which were called 

‘damage limiting,’ and ‘assured destruction’.” Damage limiting measures included hardening of silos, decoys and civilian protection posturing. 

Regardless of what was done, the 

idea of damage limiting could be easily discounted because no matter how 

many dollars were spent on damage 

“limiting measures”, the technology 

that was available during the early 

1960s yielded minimal results in the 

number of lives saved. 9

 

 As with most studies, a rough idea 

of the study’s conclusion was determined even before the study began. 

As theorized by some, this study was 

thought to be contrived by then Secretary of Defense McNamara in order 

to limit the US Air Force’s request for 

thousand of Minuteman missiles. 10 It 

appears that McNamara realized by 

the early 1960s the US and Soviet 

nuclear arsenals possessed enough 

nuclear weapons with increasing 

yields and effective means of delivery 

that each side would suffer beyond 

what was acceptable (assured destruction). 

 In McNamara’s book, In Retrospect, he concludes with “the gravity 

of nuclear war is extreme, the consequences are dire and mistakes may 

spiral into uncontrollable and unreversible events with global ramifications.” Regardless of the course of 

action, military leaders could not prevent harm to the civilian population in 

thermonuclear war. 11 Obviously, the 

idea of no winners in a nuclear war 

led some to question the rationality of 

accumulating more and more nuclear 

weapons. When was enough, 

enough? Therefore, the jump from 

assured destruction to MAD was 

“based on the observation that, since 

only a few nuclear weapons delivered 

on a city could produce vast damage, 

why buy more than the number 

needed to assure that?” 12

 

A Race for Arms 

Fueling the debate of nuclear strategy 

was the potentially destabilizing arms 

race. With ever increasing size and 

number of nuclear weapons (US and 

Soviet), technological advancements 

in missile delivery, aircraft and ballistic missile defense, fears of nuclear 

war, and a perceived missile gap, 

President Kennedy sought to reappraise US defense strategy. 13 Despite suggestions of increasing civil 

defense force protection measures, 

missile defense, and sensible nuclear 

exchange doctrine (preemption, first 

attack, massive retaliation, attack on 

warning, and limited tactical use) 

McNamara concluded that nuclear 

weapons were of limited military utility. 

 “there would be such severe damage done to this 

country that our way of life 

would change, and change 

in an undesirable direction. 

Therefore, I would say we 

had not won. In another 

sense of the word “win” we 

would win. We would win in 

the sense that their way of 

life would change more than 

ours because we would destroy a greater percentage 

of their industrial potential 

and probably destroy a 

greater percentage of their 

population than they destroyed of ours. By “ours” I 

am speaking of the United 

States. I suspect that in 

terms of facilities the 

amount of industrial destruction in the West would 

exceed that of the Soviet 

Union. This is so because 

you would have to add to 

the destruction in the United 

States the probable destruction of Western Europe. My 

personal opinion is. . . we 

cannot win a nuclear war, a 

strategic nuclear war, in the 

normal meaning of the word 

“win.” 14

 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 52

 Central to the idea of MAD was 

the arms race. 15 Any arms race is a 

dangerous contest of zero-sum 

game. As one side achieves a technological advantage or a position of 

numerical superiority the other side 

simply matches capabilities or adds 

additional nuclear forces. 

 Another key ingredient to an arms 

race is a requirement for both sides to 

possess significant nuclear destructive capability and reliable delivery 

methods in order to assure complete 

destruction of the adversary’s country. Simply acquiring several missiles 

armed with nuclear warheads is not 

enough to deter the other side or become a bona fide member of the nuclear club. 

 Also required as a deterrent, was 

the assumption that if attacked, the 

receiving nation would respond with 

overwhelming force. Clearly both 

sides possessed massive retaliation 

capabilities necessary to make this 

perception a reality. 

 Demonstrated proficiency in nuclear capability (testing) by the Soviets during the late 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s caused the arms 

race to heat up significantly. Increasing the weapon yields had reached its 

point of diminishing returns at about 

20 megatons. Although the Soviets 

in 1961 detonated a 60-megaton 

weapon, which caused great alarm 

and angered the Kennedy administration, the effects of that detonation 

weren’t that much greater than a 20-

megaton weapon. 16

 

 Advancements in nuclear weapon 

technologies now began to focus on 

improvements to delivery system efficiency and effectiveness, and aircraft 

and ballistic missile defense. The 

appeal of missile defense was promising, however, in the end; senior civilian leadership at the Department of 

Defense concluded that the dynamics 

of mass raid, Multiple Independently 

Targeted Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV), 

decoys/penetration aids and the 

sheer number of Soviet missiles 

would overwhelm any missile defense 

system. 17 Other arguments against 

missile defense were; difficultly in 

justifying high R&D expense while in 

an environment of fiscally constrained 

resources, and, most importantly, 

perceptions that missile defense systems had the potential for destabilizing the arms race. 

 In the end, the realization that 

however hard both sides worked, 

their increases in nuclear forces and 

advances in technology came without 

giving either side military superiority. 

Seasoned with lessons learned from 

the Cuban missile crisis, it was the 

US that first recognized the danger in 

continuing the nuclear arms race. 

Controlling Arms 

A shift in US policy from a threat of 

massive retaliation towards arms control occurred shortly after the Cuban 

missile crisis. “Based on the experience of the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy recognized the unacceptability 

of a national military strategy over 

dependent upon nuclear weapons.” 18

 

A moderate move towards arms control while still retaining the flexibility of 

nuclear weapon use and increasing 

conventional forces was seen as a 

logical approach to slow the arms 

race. The possibility of arms control 

was probable because both the US 

and Soviet Union had a “mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the 

costs and risks of the arms competition and in curtailing the scope of violence of war in the event it occurs.” 19 

 While the logic of MAD indirectly 

impacted US policy, the Soviets continued to race forward with the belief 

that victory in nuclear warfare was 

attainable, which was due in part to 

their confidence in their retaliatory 

strike force capabilities. 

 Rejecting the ideas of MAD, the 

“Soviet approach to nuclear warfare 

as ‘war fighting’ to win, in comparison 

with the US approach of ‘deterrence’ 

via the threat of mutual assured destruction.” 20 Soviet leadership didn’t 

believe the MAD theory because of 

military uncertainties. “This is because there was no guarantee in 

practice that a retaliatory strike would 

be launched or inflict unacceptable 

damage on the enemy.” 21 The foregone conclusion made by some is 

that the theory of MAD wasn’t relevant because the Soviets questioned 

the probability of America’s ability to 

retaliate. Therefore it could be inferred that the Soviet view was assured destruction wasn’t mutual at all. 

This line of reasoning, when taking 

the Soviets’ statements at face value 

seems to be correct. However, upon 

scrutinizing actions by the Soviets, 

the conclusion is that the Soviet leadership also rejected the idea that nuclear confrontation with the US was 

winnable or worth the likely risk. 

 The Soviets’ public rejection of 

MAD was suspect given their willingness to enter into treaties with the 

US. Language found in the treaty 

banning nuclear weapons tests in the 

atmosphere, outer space, and under 

water of 1963 is a clear indication that 

the Soviet Union was interested in 

ending the arms race. In part, the 

treaty states its principal aim is to 

achieve an agreement “which would 

put an end to the armaments race 

and eliminate the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of 

weapons, including nuclear weapons.” 22 If this isn’t enough evidence 

of Soviet commitment to ending the 

arms race, the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 

1968 contains strong language warning against proliferation of nuclear 

weapons. “Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all 

mankind by a nuclear war and the 

consequent need to make every effort 

to avert the danger of such a war and 

to take measures to safeguard the 

security of peoples.” Entering into 

these treaties and other agreements 

(Hot Line, 1963) is clear evidence 

that the Soviet Union was warming up 

to the idea of nuclear balance and the 

necessity of maintaining the status 

quo of missile inventory and technological achievements. 

 On September, 18, 1967, the US 

announced that it would begin deployment of a “thin” antiballistic missile (ABM) system. 23 With the Soviets vastly overestimating our ABM 

capability, (which was only introduced 

as a solution to a possible Chinese 

ICBM attack) the Soviets were motivated to try and negotiate in order to 

limit our perceived advantage. 24 The 

Soviets saw SALT as an opportunity 

to stop or limit the arms competition 
 53 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

while they retained the lead. 

 Of course, by this time the US was 

already willing to enter into cooperative agreements with the Soviets because of the illogical notion of spending large amounts of money to produce capabilities that would be superseded by future Soviet expenditures – 

all in the sake of producing or developing more capabilities that weren’t 

necessary to begin with. Gerard 

Smith, former ACDA Director and 

chief SALT I negotiator, intelligently 

observed, “The strategic competition 

was not unlike a game of tic tac toe. 

If one knows how to play it and 

makes no mistakes, one cannot lose. 

And if both sides know how to play it, 

and make no mistakes, neither can 

win.” 25 The US realized that SALT 

represented an opportunity to end the 

seemingly endless cycle of aggrandizing nuclear weapons and missiles. 

 The salient points of SALT were 

the limitation on growth of strategic 

offensive forces and the agreement to 

set low limits for ballistic missile defenses. When commenting on SALT 

during an interview, former Secretary 

of Defense, Dr. Harold Brown, observed “In particular, both sides 

agreed not to mount a nationwide 

defense that might be capable of preventing a strategic ballistic missile 

attack from succeeding. In that 

sense, both sides accepted the idea 

of mutual assured destruction, and I 

think that was perhaps the greatest 

achievement of the SALT discussions.” 26

 

CONCLUSION 

 With the benefit of hindsight, MAD 

has been heavily criticized for its 

shortcomings. For example, the theory of MAD has been labeled morally 

repugnant, lacked Soviet acceptance 

- therefore not mutual, wasn’t a deterrent, and innocent civilians were unnecessarily placed at risk. However, 

as examined, the common perceptions of people during the height of 

the Cold War (mid 1960s) leads one 

to understand why events transpired 

as they did. Nuclear Armageddon 

was the driving force that ultimately 

led to arms control agreements. The 

concept of MAD was a reality to political and military strategists of the 

1960s and early 70s on both sides of 

the nuclear divide. 

Heavily influenced by the Cuban Missile Crisis, US and Soviet leaders 

witnessed first hand the potential disasters of nuclear war. Fortunately, 

both Kennedy and Khrushchev (and 

future Soviet and US leaders) chose 

wisely when dealing with this crisis 

and other conflicts during times of 

heightened tensions. The greatest 

benefit to all of mankind is the realization that the only solution to the US/

Soviet arms race was cooperative 

agreements. The acceptance of 

MAD and the ensuing Strategic Arms 

Limitation Talks signaled an evolution 

of policy that tipped the scales toward 

arms control and away from nuclear 

weapon centered strategy. 

Captain Thomas Genter is the Executive Officer at the Directorate of Combat Developments, US Army Air Defense Artillery School in Fort Bliss, 

TX. He has a BA in Business Administration from Grand Valley State University. His email address is 

thomas.genter@us.army.mil 

ENDNOTES 

1 Charles J. Fairbanks, Jr. “MAD and 

US Strategy,” in Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its 

Origins and Practice, ed. Henry D. 

Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2004), p. 137. 

2

 Taken from a quote by Major T.J. 

“King” Kong, aka Slim Pickens in the 

movie Dr Strangelove: or How I 

Stopped Worrying and Learned to 

Love the Bomb. 

3

 Carl Von Clausewitz, On War ed 

and translated by Michael Howard 

and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 

1984), p. 87. 

4

 Ibid. p. 90. 

5

 Ibid. p. 75. 

6

 Michael Krepon, Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons & Arms Control in American Politics (New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1984), p. 38. 

7

 Ibid 

8

 Fairbanks. Op. Cit. p. 144. “What 

dampened enthusiasm for non-MAD 

strategic postures even further were a 

series of RAND studies done by 

Colonel (later General) Glen Kent in 

the Pentagon’s deputy directorate of 

Defense Research and Engineering 

(DDR&E). These studies were published from July 1963 to January 

1964.” 

9

 Ibid. “Pentagon official were frustrated in their efforts to justify spending on damage limiting measures. 

Each measure suggested was very 

expensive and produced improvements that were not very grand. 

Starting in Fiscal Year 1965, tables 

printed in the Defense Department’s 

annual posture statements showed 

that, for each large increase of expenditure, the projected number of 

lives saved increased. The problem 

was the number of lives saved was 

unimpressive against the enormous 

projected number of casualties the 

United States would suffer even with 

the most expensive damage limiting 

capability in place.” 

10 Henry S. Rowen. Introduction to 

Getting MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and 

Practice, ed. Henry D. Sokolski 

(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004) p. 

4. Also Doctor Gideon wrote in a personal email to the author “MAD was a 

creation of Robert Strange McNamara; and, it was devised to justify 

his cuts in nuclear forces.” 

11 Available online at http:// 

www.gwu.edu/^nsarchiv/coldwar/

interviews/episode-12/brown3.html. 

Taken from an interview with Former 

Secretary of Defense, Dr. Harold 

Brown. “The thought that, no matter 

what you did to build up your military 

forces – conventional or strategic – 

your population, your nation was at 

risk of destruction anyway, because if 

the Soviets were crazy enough to 

launch a nuclear attack or to launch a 

conventional attack that escalated to 

a nuclear attack, it would end up in 

mutual destruction through strategic 

thermonuclear war – that was disconcerting to the US military leadership, 

as it was also to the Soviet military 

leadership. After all, the first function, 

primary function, of a military force 

and a military leadership is to preserve the physical nature of their 

country; and in a thermonuclear world 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 54

they cannot give that assurance, no 

matter what they do.” 

12 Rowen. Op Cit. p. 4. 

13 William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper & 

Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 47. President Kennedy’s State of the Union 

Address early 1961. “We are moving 

into a period of uncertain risk and 

great commitment in which both the 

military and diplomatic possibilities 

require a Free World force so powerful as to make any aggression clearly 

futile. Yet in the past, lack of a consistent, coherent military strategy, the 

absence of basic assumptions about 

our national requirements and the 

faulty estimates and duplication arising from inter-service rivalries have all 

made it difficult to assess accurately 

how adequate-or inadequate-our defenses really are.” 

14 Ibid. p. 95. 

15 Rowen. Op. Cit. p. 6. 

16 Available online at http://

www.gwu.edu/^nsarchiv/coldwar/

interviews/episode-12/brown3.html. 

Taken from an interview with Former 

Secretary of Defense, Dr. Harold 

Brown. 

17 Ibid. 

18 David P. Kirby, “Strategic Defense 

and Security,” in Essays on Strategy, 

(Washington DC: National Defense 

University Press, 1988) p. 118. 

19 Krepon. Op. Cit p. 9. 

20 John A. Battilega, “Soviet Views of 

Nuclear Warfare: The Post-Cold War 

Interviews,” in Getting MAD: Nuclear 

Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, ed. Henry D. 

Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2004). This article represents a summation of the Hines Report. From 

1989-94 a team of American Soviet 

specialists conducted personal interviews in Moscow with former Soviet 

officials, which included high ranking 

military officers, which was led by 

Robert Hines. 

21 Ibid p. 160. 

22 J.A.S. Grenville and Wasserstein, 

The Major International Treaties 

Since 1945. A history and Guide with 

Text (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 

1987) p. 442. 

23 Available online at 

 http://www.state.gov/www/global/

arms/treaties/salt1.html. 

24 Available online at 

 http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

coldwar/interviews/episode-12/

brown3.html 

25 Krepon. Op. Cit. p. 39. 

26 Interview is available online at 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/

coldwar/interviews/episode-12/

brown3.html 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Grenville, J.A.S., and Bernard Wasserstein. The Major International Treaties Since 1945: A History and Guide 

with Texts. London: Methuen & Co. 

Ltd., 1987. 

Howard, Michael and Paret, Peter, 

ed. and Translated. Carl Von 

Clausewitz, On War. Princeton, New 

Jersey: Princeton University Press, 

1976. 

Kaufmann, William W., The McNamara Strategy. New York: Harper & 

Row Publishers, 1964. 

Krepon, Michael. Strategic Stalemate: Nuclear Weapons & Arms Control in American Politics. New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 1984. 

McNamara, Robert S., and Brian 

VanDeMark. In Retrospect. New 

York: Random House, Inc., 1995. 

National Defense University, Essays 

on Strategy. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1988. 

Nye, Joseph S., ed. The Making of 

America’s Soviet Policy. New Haven, 

CT: Yale University Press, 1984. 

Sokolski, Henry D., ed. Getting MAD: 

Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, 

Its Origins and Practice. Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 

War College, 2004. 

Strange, Joe, Perspectives on Warfighting, Number Four, Centers of 

Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities: 

Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That We Can All Speak the 

Same Language, 2nd ed. Quantico, 

VA: Marine Corps University Foundation, 1996. 

Walmer, Max. Strategic Weapons. 

London: Salamander Books Ltd., 

1988. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 54
 55 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

he Spanish philosopher 

George Santayana is widely 

quoted as saying that those 

who ignore the lessons of history are 

condemned to repeating them. Today 

successful organisations in the private sector and the public domain 

heed this adage and put systems in 

place to eliminate the duplication of 

costly mistakes. 

 As the term NBC gives way to 

CBRN and first responders join militaries in assuming key roles in defending against these weapons of 

mass destruction, the time is opportune to look back into history to see 

what worked, what did not and how 

defences were developed and adjusted. Modern militaries have formal 

programmes to record positive and 

negative lessons, develop strategies 

to take advantage of them and track 

the success of their implementations. 

The lessons learned process is an 

integral part of pre-mission planning 

and post-mission analysis, particularly in the current context of dangerous peace enforcement missions. 

 Apart from relatively minor combats like the Iran-Iraq war, chemical 

warfare has been largely absent from 

battlefields since World War I. Nuclear and biological warfare have 

been even less evident, except for 

the two nuclear bombings in the 

spring of 1945. But adversaries in 

World War II and later conflicts were 

prepared to engage in chemical warfare. A number of reasons prevented 

them from doing so, one of the most 

important being the quality of protective devices. 

 Modern planning staff working in 

NBC defence might be forgiven for 

failing to examine the conduct of the 

chemical attacks of the 1914-1918 

period. The early development stages 

of the chemicals, and the fact that the 

attacks were directed against relatively static and highly concentrated 

adversaries, can easily lead military 

and first responder staff to mistakenly 

conclude that lessons from that era 

do not apply to the asymmetric 

threats that we face today. 

 Much has been written about the 

chemical warfare component of World 

War I and it tends to focus more on 

the offensive aspect than on the defensive. Historians see World War I 

as the watershed of combat: it started 

in 1914 in a manner not dissimilar to 

the Napoleonic wars of a century before, and finished as a precursor to 

the more modern, all-arms conflict of 

World War II. 

 Once strategy, tactics and technology had solved the stalemate of two 

well-armed adversaries firmly entrenched just metres apart, the concept of joint all-arms military became 

reality. It would have many components, each with their particular 

strengths and weaknesses, leaving 

commanders to choose which to employ, and where, to maximise the 

chance of success. 

 Chemical warfare fits well into this 

concept. At first it was an end unto 

itself and later grew into a weapon 

that was used effectively as an enabler for other weapons and tactics, 

especially the reduction of enemy 

morale. The first attacks at Ypres in 

the spring of 1915 are good examples 

of the use of chemicals in independent fashion. Although they did create 

a gap in the allied line, there was no 

follow-up to exploit this weakness and 

adjacent forces moved quickly to plug 

the hole. 

 Later in the war, chemicals were 

used to eliminate gun batteries that 

were largely invulnerable to shelling 

and pave the way for infantry to advance on foot. Other applications included the severing of the rear lines 

of communication and disruption of 

the progress of reserve forces. When 

used in this way, chemical attacks 

were carefully co-ordinated in time 

and space, the fire plan, and the 

overall assault scheme. 

 At first glance, these descriptions 

lead one to question how lessons 

from chemical warfare could apply to 

the use of NBC agents by a furtive, 

small-scale, asymmetric adversary. 

From a somewhat narrow perspective, that feeling might be understandable but from viewpoints of science, 

technology and even meteorology, 

there is much to be learned. 

 Successful comedians will tell you 

that they can get a laugh or two from 

breaking a chair over a stooge’s head 

but that they will have a much 

stronger and more prolonged reaction 

from the audience by bending a chair 

over his head. The enduring vision of 

the bent chair serves to prolong the 

humour. This is analogous to the long

-term effects of NBC attacks, where a 

combatant might be killed by a bullet 

or shell with attendant effects on morale, national support and logistic burden but gas can have a much more 

pervasive and long-lasting effect. 

 While gas certainly has the capacity to kill, it can also impose extended 

suffering and, like the bent chair, 

serve as a constant reminder of what 

has occurred. NBC contamination 

can deny the use of terrain to militaries and civilians for extended periods, 

it can put victims into lengthy medical 

treatment at great financial cost, it 

may cause suffering for friends and 

family, and the prospect of its repetition can erode the national will to continue the fight. 

 To avoid these plights, we need 

not just a suite of protective devices 

but rather a well-thought-out system 

of defence. Modern gas masks offer 

protection well above what is considered the minimum necessary against 

classical NBC agents and a selection 



Lest We Forget 

Rick Barker 

NBC International Summer 2006 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 56

of toxic industrial materials (TIMs). 

Unbroken skin is an effective barrier 

to some chemicals as well as most 

biological and radiological substances. 

 The drawbacks are that gas 

masks are not suitable for continuous 

wear and that the rest of the body still 

needs protection against blistering 

and nerve agents as a minimum, and 

body suits impose a significant thermal and fatigue burden on the 

wearer. While combatants have good 

reason to be confident in their individual protection, they want to minimise 

the time that they spend “cocooned”. 

 There is a requirement for a 

broader protective system; we need 

to have the protective devices but 

also the means to restrict the wearing 

of them to essential periods. Such a 

system begins with counterproliferation efforts, and progresses 

through pre-mission assessments, 

the intelligence preparation of the 

battle space and the installation of 

effective warning measures to efficient decontamination systems. A 

counter-proliferation mechanism was 

in place before 1914 via The Hague 

Convention of 1899 to prohibit the 

use of chemical warfare, but its wording was overly specific and left a 

technical loophole. To be effective, 

agreements and treaties must be 

crafted carefully to deny all means of 

use and be supported by inspection 

regimes to validate national compliance or alert signatories to breaches. 

 The advance parties for any mission bear the responsibility for surveying the operating area for potential 

hazards. They also select encampments with due consideration for the 

vulnerability to intentional and unintentional releases of contaminants. 

This involves assessing possible industrial sources of hazards, determining prevailing local weather conditions and taking advantage of natural 

defences and terrain. The advantages of high ground are important in 

NBC combat as they are in conventional warfare. If forces in World War I 

been able to select their battlegrounds with this consideration it is 

likely that many casualties would 

have been averted. 

 History records that allied intelligence services had reported evidence of preparations for chemical 

attacks in the days leading up to the 

first use at Ypres. With the advantage 

of hindsight, we can imagine the 

great amount of suffering that could 

have been avoided had the allies 

acted upon that information. In the 

modern context, intelligence remains 

as crucial, but it is also critical to ensure that operational staff and their 

commanders fully understand the 

implications of NBC intelligence and 

the techniques for countering the 

threat. To be able to take full advantage of NBC intelligence requires 

thorough training at all levels as well 

as the availability of effective decision 

aids. This can best be achieved by 

ensuring that exercises from sub-unit 

to national levels involve NBC inputs, 

decisions, and actions. The attitude 

“NBC – a way to ruin a good exercise” can no longer be tolerated. 

 The earliest attempts to shield 

individuals from the effects of gas 

were rudimentary at best. Initially they 

consisted of advising soldiers to 

breathe through urine-soaked cloth. 

This was followed by supplying gauze 

pads that provided a modicum of protection until they became wet, when 

they blocked the passage of air and 

suffocated the user. Ultimately, troops 

of both sides were equipped with precursors of modern gas masks, but the 

breathing resistance and visual restrictions that they imposed made the 

soldiers less efficient and more vulnerable to other battlefield hazards. 

 Ninety years later, the NBC industry is still trying to reduce breathing 

resistance and the thermal and fatigue burdens of individual personal 

protection. As a complementary 

measure, comprehensive systems of 

NBC defence are being developed 

and fielded comprising detection, 

identification and monitoring; warning 

and reporting; physical protection; 

hazard management; and medical 

counter-measures and support. 

 By establishing this system-ofsystems, forces maximise the time 

that their personnel can operate without being encumbered with personal 

protective devices. Yet one of the 

principal effects of gas attacks in 

World War I was the effect on morale. 

Once troops had witnessed the horrors of gassing and after having undergone the training regimens, they 

were fully cognisant of what they 

faced to the point of almost complete 

preoccupation. Fears of inadequacies 

of protective equipment coupled with 

frequent gas alarms conspired to 

erode their morale and increase their 

fatigue. To counter this factor, troops 

must be infused with confidence 

firstly in the reliability of masks and 

clothing to shield them from the egregious effects of the agents and also in 

the system’s overall ability to warn 

them in sufficient time for troops to 

don protective equipment. 

 The ultimate confidence booster is 

witnessing the passage of contamination through an operating area with 

no adverse effects on personnel or 

equipment but this tends to come a 

little late for most users. Testing personnel’s masks against simulated or 

real agents goes a long way to instilling confidence; although care must 

be taken to ensure the fidelity of the 

simulants so that false confidence is 

not encouraged. An aggressive information distribution programme 

(posters, brochures, training films, 

etc) serves as an effective adjunct to 

gas hut exercises. 

 The great quantities of gas used in 

the attacks of World War I often saturated the gas masks in use, rendering 

them useless and frequently prompting wearers to remove them. At the 

same time, it was recognised that 

masks needed to be removed from 

any chance of collecting dirt and dust 

when not in use. We do not face such 

massive attacks today but the requirement for mask care remains 

paramount and the issue of filter life 

prevails. The R&D community should 

be strongly encouraged to pursue 

promising technologies in providing 

service life indicators for gas masks. 

 Weather, particularly wind direction and speed, was a primary factor 

in the use of chemical weapons and 

merits serious consideration in defence planning. World War I users 

found that stiff winds tended to limit 
 57 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

the effects of gas attacks through 

higher dispersion and narrower contamination footprints. Conversely, 

light and variable winds often caused 

the gas to return to the point of origin 

and affect friendly forces. 

 A common mistake today is to 

base camp sitings solely on prevailing 

winds. Meteorological services can 

supply “wind roses” that indicate the 

most common wind directions. Planners, however, must allow for seasonal, diurnal, and frontal variations. 

Concentrating point sensors on the 

normal upwind approach to an area is 

fine until the wind shifts, at which 

point the formation must have the 

ability to rapidly adjust the placements. A more sensible plan is to 

have all contingencies covered. 

 Experience in World War I showed 

that the ideal wind speeds to derive 

the maximum benefit from a gas release were between five and 15 mph 

(8-24 kph). When intelligence reports 

point to a heightened risk of attack, 

NBC staff should monitor wind 

speeds and consider recommending 

increased readiness levels when 

winds approach this range. Between 

sunset and sunrise winds often become light and variable due to lowlevel atmospheric inversion caused 

by radiation cooling. This becomes 

particularly important if a release occurs within a protected area. There 

must be sensors placed well within 

the perimeter to detect an omnidirectional spread of contaminants. 

 Weather has its good side too. 

Rain and cold have generally disabling effects on chemical and biological NBC hazards. The attendant 

danger, however, is that when the 

weather improves the dangers can 

reappear. In other effects, wind tends 

to disperse contaminants while sun 

and time often reduce their toxicity. 

 Like any other technical aspect of 

warfare, the offensive and defensive 

aspects of NBC have played leapfrog 

since 1915. No sooner was a counter

-measure developed than a new 

threat appeared. This situation prevails today and operational and R&D 

staff must remain vigilant to new developments, both technical and procedural. Binary releases, phased releases, and attacks combined with 

other weaponry can confuse defences and render them unprepared 

for deadly secondary assaults. 

 The soldiers who first were faced 

with gas in World War I did not have 

the benefit of experience or training in 

protecting themselves. Some chose 

to run away from the approaching 

clouds only to be overtaken and overcome, rather than running upwind 

towards the cloud and minimising the 

time spent within it. Modern NBC defence courses need to teach this and 

similar basic NBC survival lessons. 

 Sometimes a little knowledge can 

be dangerous. In the face of an approaching cloud, a soldier might reason that it is heavier than air and attempt escape by climbing. But if there 

is any degree of atmospheric instability the contamination is likely to extend to any height that a fugitive is 

likely to scale due to the nature of 

cloud density. At the same time, 

climbing normally removes the soldier 

from protective ground cover and renders him more liable to conventional 

attacks but descent is sure to bring 

disaster. 

There were occasions when 

one side had the opportunity to employ chemical weapons but demurred, apparently lacking confidence in the ability of the gas to have 

a significant impact in the face of the 

defenders’ protective equipment. This 

factor is cited as a possible reason 

that NBC attacks did not occur in the 

first Gulf War and even in World War 

II. The same sort of information programme used to instil confidence in 

the protective equipment can be extended to potential perpetrators to 

discourage them from using contaminants. 

 The threat of a gas attack had 

greater effect when combined with a 

lack of confidence in protective equipment. Troops tended to dwell on the 

ever-present danger, lowering their 

morale, losing sleep and incurring 

fatigue from wearing gas masks and 

other protection almost constantly. 

This gradual wearing down was a 

major factor in the overall effectiveness of chemical weapons and underlines the need for an efficient NBC 

defensive system, confidence in 

equipment, and thorough training. 

 The use of NBC weapons in an 

asymmetric attack is almost certain to 

be on a much smaller scale than was 

witnessed in World War I and for 

somewhat different purposes. Attacks 

are unlikely to be accompanied by 

follow-on offences and not intended 

to inflict mass casualties. What they 

would have in common is an attempt 

to shape the conflict and, more importantly, erode morale in the mission 

and at home. Here, the countermeasure has not changed – an effective system of defence coupled with a 

broadly applied information programme should prevent adversaries 

from gaining the upper hand. 

 During World War I, both sides 

made much progress in chemical 

warfare and chemical defence. Today, the details have changed but the 

underlying principles of defence remain essentially unchanged. The lessons learned from both the attacks 

and their counter-measures provide 

valuable tools and checklists for modern NBC defence planners. Those of 

us who choose to ignore these lessons are condemned to repeating 

them. 

NBC Interna- tional Summer 

2006 

(Reprinted with kind permission) 

57 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 58

At Home On The Range 

Mr. Gwyn Winfield 

 NBC International visits Porton Down’s “range” to look at the work that 

Defence Science and Technology Laboratory is doing on demilitarization

INTERNATIONAL 

hose aspirant scholars of British chemical warfare prowess 

would do well to visit “the 

range” at Porton Down. This area 

was at the cutting edge of British 

prowess in delivering offensive CWA 

during the 1950s. Shells would pour 

down from the Iron Age fort at Figsbury, just outside Salisbury, onto the 

“bowl”, or some of the hard target 

sites around it, at Porton and scientists would examine how well the 

burster, or ejector, munitions worked 

and what the spread of agent was 

likely to be. It is fitting then that the 

range is now the home of the UK’s 

chemical demilitarisation project. 

Unlike the US and Russia, which 

have far larger and more varied arsenals, the UK’s is a more... parochial 

affair. 

 

 The UK never had the stocks of 

nerve agent held by the two major 

Cold War adversaries, and neither did 

they keep them so long. With the exception of the minute amounts allowed under the Chemicals Weapon 

Convention (CWC) for improving 

NBC defence, the UK disposed of all 

its chemical weapons in the 1950s, 

which was a much less sophisticated 

time for such an event. Free from 

things like Health and Safety and EU 

Environmental Guidelines, the 1950s 

saw a jamboree of chemical weapons 

disposal; some went into the oceans 

(dilution being the solution to pollution) to be picked up by trawler nets, 

some went into poorly marked pits to 

be found when digging bunkers on 

golf courses, and the majority was 

incinerated. 

The big round-up 

The (CWC) has no such approach to 

demilitarisation; each munition must 

be tagged, with documented proof 

given of its final demise. Signatory 

countries to the CWC have until 2007 

to clear their stocks, but it is widely 

expected that this will be extended – 

at least for the US and Russia that 

have immense stocks of these munitions still to be safely destroyed. The 

UK and Germany fit into a second tier 

of countries that have a historical legacy of these weapons – other countries that have a First World War legacy of these munitions, such as Belgium or France, are not covered as 

the Convention includes only post1925 munitions. 

 The majority of the 200-300 finds 

that the UK has to destroy each year 

comes either from the ranges where 

these weapons were used or developed (such as Winterbourne Gunner), 

or from (stretching an allusion) 

“orphaned sources” meant to be destroyed but lost either in the 1950s 

Ministry of Defence (MoD) bureaucracy or misplaced in the UK. The majority are mustard, of varying quality, 

but occasionally phosgene and BBC 

(Bromo Benzyle Cyanide – a less 

lethal version of hydrogen cyanide) 

turn up as well. The UK’s approach to 

the destruction of these agents is 

commensurate with the amount and 

virulence of the agent; the majority 

are incinerated at 1,000 degrees C, 

though some are now going through 

a process of hydrolosis. 

 Richard Soilleux, Technical 

Leader for Defence Science and 

Technology Laboratory (DSTL) demilitarisation program, described the 

procedure: “When we receive a munition, it has already been examined by 

a military EOD team who has decided 

that it is explosively safe to move”. 

“Once they have done that we send 

our experts up to assess whether or 

not it is a chemical munition. It is then 

packed into suitable sealed containment – so that if there is an accident 

we know it won’t be spilled all over 

the public highway – and it all goes in 

convoy. Once it arrives at Porton 

Down it goes into storage, is given a 

unique tag and is then x-rayed, which 

is done at a 45 degree angle so we 

can see the liquid – this also allows 

us to see the fusing mechanism and 

whether there has been any corrosion 

or decay there.“ 

 “Once we know it is chemical, we 

take it for further examination by 

PINS (Portable Isotopic Neutron 

Spectroscopy), which uses thermalised neutrons to penetrate the munition where they react with the nuclide 

acids in the shell and give a gamma 

spectrum. This gamma spectrum has 

characteristics of the matter it reacts 

with, so we look for signature atoms 

such as chlorine or sulphur, both of 

which are found in mustard – the software then analyses these spectra 

and says we have chemical agent 

and it is likely to be mustard. It gives 

us a good indication, but it is not foolproof because you can have mixtures 

that can confuse it, or small munitions 

with small quantities of agent. It is 

very good for high explosive (HE) and 

white phosphorous; those two things 

are rather dangerous and we wouldn’t 

want to put them thorough our processing system – so it is good screening method to remove the hazardous 

items to allow us to concentrate on 

the chemical items.” 

 As Dr. Soilleux remarked, PINS 

does allow a certain amount of knowledge to be gleaned from a closed 

container, but it still requires skilled 

operators to run it. Some of the telltale elements that you would be looking for are also found in benign substances – such as sea water. 

 59 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

The latter is not as esoteric a conclusion as one might think, as sea water 

was used in test shells because it 

was deemed to have the same density as mustard – allowing spread 

patterns to be judged with a safe liquid. At the various testing grounds 

where these trials took place, these 

test shells are not uncommon; it requires a precise understanding of the 

spectra to appreciate what is likely to 

be mustard and what is likely to be 

sea water. 

 Whatever the chemical payload, 

most of the shells have a small explosive device to disperse the agent over 

a wide area. In later devices these 

were small explosive rods in the centre of the munition that would split the 

canister in a useful manner while incinerating as small a proportion of the 

agent as possible – some US manufactured shells that turn up in the UK 

are pressurised as well (as are some 

UK shells that have had a secondary 

chemical reaction inside the shell) 

which poses additional problems. 

 “The chemical munitions usually 

only have relatively small explosive 

bursters,” said Richard Soilleux, “so it 

is a lot safer to deal with those than 

conventional munitions, explosively 

speaking; chemically it is a different 

matter. If that is the case then we will 

drill them to take a sample and send 

that to a lab for definitive analysis. 

Once we have done that, we can decide on a disposal method. If it is 

phosgene, we will drill it out and neutralise it; if it mustard or BBC it goes 

to the incinerator, which is straightforward and gives good results. We are 

developing a hydrolysis method as a 

fallback. Having done that, we need 

to treat the shells before we can release them for scrap – which we do in 

an incinerator – we have far less environmental restrictions on that as the 

contamination is only residual.” 

 The hydrolysis method is a new 

procedure that the range team are 

developing. While it has been used in 

the past by the US, for example, the 

smaller quantities in the UK make 

incineration an easier and more cost 

effective, solution. “Basically, our demilitarisation method is incineration,” 

said Dr Soilleux. “Mustard burns very 

well – it burns like diesel, and with our 

pollution abatement system we can 

get very good clean-up rates. We 

don’t have any Crown immunity; we 

have to meet all the environmental 

guidelines, we are regularly inspected 

by the Environment Agency and we 

have to meet all the statutory requirements. It is a very good way of dealing with mustard, we didn’t talk about 

phosgene, because it is a lesser 

Live Excavation 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 60

problem, but when we do find it we 

drill the munition and pump it into sodium hydroxide at the facility and that 

neutralises it.” 

 “We decided to develop hydrolysis 

as a second string to our bow. We 

had reliability problems with the incinerator – it is getting older – and we 

were looking for a replacement. After 

2007 we are going to have to come 

up with another solution for these old 

munitions, so we are studying that 

now – and it may or may not involve 

an incinerator. Because we have 

these reliability problems, and because we wanted to make sure we 

were compliant with CWC, we came 

up with another method which is hot 

water hydrolysis. We then neutralise 

it with some bacteria – otherwise 

we’d end up with thiodiglycol, which is 

controlled as a schedule two compound under the CWC as it is one of 

the base chemicals of mustard.” 

Working with the natives 

In an example of “nature will find a 

way”, the bacteria that Porton Down 

uses to break down thiodiglycol is 

naturally occurring. The range is now 

working closely with Oxford University 

to come up with a natural chain reaction that will render mustard completely harmless. “We found that 

there were one or two sites where 

there were residual elements in the 

soil from the disposal efforts in the 

1950s – which wouldn’t meet modern 

standards but were deemed fine for 

the day. We revisited these sites and 

we, together with Oxford University, 

found that the normal soil bacteria 

had adapted and had become much 

more tolerant to mustard and could 

work in that environment much better 

than normal bacteria. Normal bacteria 

will break it down eventually, but 

these bacteria are just more efficient 

because they have decided to use 

the elements found in mustard. We 

are planning to use some of those 

bugs to destroy our thiodiglycol, and 

some of the other by-products of the 

hydrolysis of the mustard. All we are 

doing is speeding up a naturally occurring process – there is not one 

super bug that deals with it; it is a 

whole family, or consortia, of bugs. 

One of them will take thiodiglycol 

down to an acid and another will take 

it down to another stage, so each one 

makes a waste product that the next 

one eats. They all support themselves in other ways too, feeding nutrients into the others to take advantage of this food source and eventually they will reduce it to an innocuous 

sulphate.” 

 While it may end up an innocuous 

sulphate, this mustard is anything but 

innocuous when it is brought up. 

While mustard degrades and can polymerise – turning into a rubber-like 

substance – part of the agent remains 

as deadly as it was when it was first 

created. Richard Soilleux explained, 

“The problem with mustard is that 

even though it does polymerise – 

which accelerates as it comes up to 

the surface and is likely to be something to do with the rapid change in 

temperature from day to night – it is 

variable. The ones from Woburn Golf 

Course, for example, were in very 

good condition – it also depends on 

how pure it was to start with – so we 

brought them up in absolutely beautiful condition, they were well stored 

and there is nothing to say that in 50 

year’s time they wouldn’t be as lethal 

as they are now. It is a long term 

problem.” 

 While there may be some clues 

from their location as to what their 

likely state might be – those that were 

fired at a target are likely, due to impact, to be in a worse state than 

those that were buried intact – it is 

often not until the team is able to extract a sample that they have a clear 

idea of what they are dealing with. 

Due to the bursters running the length 

of the munition, often it is not practical 

to saw the top off, as is done with 

base eject munitions, and the team 

have to drill the munition, either to 

take a sample or drain it completely. 

Previously they had relied on a large, 

static, industrial drill to do this, but 

now the team are using the Monica 

system, which allows them to take the 

drill to the munition – especially useful for any munitions that need to be 

drilled in the field. 

Dr Soilleux admitted that the 

system is not as sophisticated as the 

US version, but pointed to the fact 

that it is easy to maintain (all maintenance is done on site by members of 

the team), train people on and is, 

most importantly, safe. All operations 

are done remotely, ensuring that the 

operator is protected, and that by adhering to the filtered negative pressure working environment (and the 

stringent Environmental Agency regulations) that the system is clean – the 

public and staff are never at risk. The 

site focusses strongly on history – the 

team need to be able to differentiate 

between 12 versions of a four-inch 

mortar shell, for example, and is soon 

likely to be history itself. 

 There is currently no provision for 

legacy chemical munitions after the 

end of the CWC in 2007 and, while 

this is a problem that will lessen as all 

the low hanging fruit (such as the 

1,000 odd shells that were recovered 

from Winterbourne Gunner) are destroyed, it will never completely disappear, as finds will appear over time 

that will need to be dealt with. While 

the range is not prohibitively expensive to run, unlike the US and Russian systems, there is a cost attached 

to it in terms of training and staffing 

that the MoD would no doubt like to 

minimise. There is already a touch of 

nostalgia from staff, who have clear 

enthusiasm for this unpalatable job, 

over what will happen to the range 

post-2007 when much of the work will 

dry up. While the OPCW deliberates 

over what will be the fate of nations 

like the UK post-2007, the final testaments to Britain’s CWA past are being fed into the incinerator and this 

page of warfare slowly erased. 

NBC International Summer 2006 

(Reprinted with kind permission) 

 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 60
 61 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

or the past year and a half, I 

attended several exercises as a 

CWMD subject matter expert 

with a team from one of the Army’s 

foremost training programs (due to 

attribution concerns the group will 

remain un-named). The team is organized by doctrinal warfighting function and serves in an observer/trainer 

role for the unit being exercised. 

Combating weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) falls under the Protection function along with air and missile defense (AMD), NBC passive 

defense, EOD, and provost marshal, 

and the majority of focus for this element is in the rear area, now doctrinally referred to as part of the Joint 

Security Area (JSA). One thing I’ve 

seen at every single exercise deserves note because of its potential 

impact on military operations and civilians in the JSA. 

 Two things generally happen 

when US forces detect an inbound 

enemy missile. If not headed towards 

a facility on the Defended Asset List 

(DAL), the missile is not usually engaged. This incoming missile lands 

somewhere and presumably explodes. The second situation has the 

missile being engaged and destroyed. This is good news, except 

that the pieces fall back to earth and 

depending on where the incoming 

missile was hit, the warhead could 

still be intact. This was made painfully evident during the Gulf War 

when 28 reservists were killed when 

the remnants of a “killed” Scud exploded in the warehouse they were 

using as a temporary barracks. The 

Protection staffs that I observed did 

not have workable TTP’s in place to 

track these hits or to get any timely 

battle damage assessment (BDA) at 

the impact site. This doesn’t mean 

that the information is not available. 

The likely impact zone for all missiles 

is determined but the AMD staff and 

is shown on the Common Operating 

Picture (COP) network. However, if 

the zone does not contain friendly 

troops and is outside an area on the 

DAL, the launch is ignored and not 

followed up on. 

 These impacts can have substantial effects on the civilian infrastructure and populations, which in turn 

can translate into problems for the 

ground forces in the JSA. Conventional warheads are bad enough, but 

the problems multiply if the warhead 

is other than conventional. Chemical 

and biological munitions not only produce effects in the immediate area, 

but also produce a hazard downwind 

of the strike. This plume can extend 

into populated areas, troop concentrations or across main supply routes 

(MSR) and can last for days or 

weeks. This hazard exists regardless 

of whether the missile gets intercepted or not. The chemical fill may 

actually be more effectively dispersed 

over a wider area if the warhead is 

destroyed in flight. A secondary but 

no less disruptive effect of these attacks is the induced terror in the civilian population. A population in panic 

will hamper first responders and large 

scale evacuations, whether warranted 

or not, will clog busy MSR’s. This 

effect may have more impact on operations than the strikes themselves. 

Clearly, situational awareness of 

these impacts and their effects are 

crucial to any battle tracking effort yet 

it is being largely ignored by operational level staffs. 

 An assumption is this problem 

exists in “exercise world” and would 

be dealt with more effectively during 

real world operations. However, the 

TTPs and battledrills that a staff operates with are developed during these 

exercises, and if no method of tracking and disseminating this information 

exists during peacetime, the first few 

events will come as unpleasant surprises after the shooting starts for 

real. The responsibility for tracking 

missile strikes in the JSA should reside with the Protection Cell, specifically within the AMD section. Unless 

the errant missile falls on or near a 

friendly unit, host nation civilians, law 

enforcement or other first responders 

will be the first on the scene. Both 

the BDA and the type of warhead 

need to be determined as quickly as 

possible to gauge potential impact on 

operations, and this information 

should flow from the responders 

through the host nation military to our 

Protection Cell. This information 

should be briefed to the Joint Task 

Force (JTF) commander during the 

Battle Update Brief in addition to the 

number of missiles launched and 

number intercepted (usually the only 

info on the briefing slides). Sometimes it may not be possible to get 

this information in a timely manner for 

any number of reasons, but procedures need to be in place to track 

these strikes the best we can. 

 I have not seen every staff in the 

Army and there may be some out 

there that are doing an excellent job 

tracking any and all missile strikes in 

the JSA. Bravo to those that are. To 

those that are not, however, I hope 

that by pointing out this issue we can 

all put our heads together and come 

up with a solution that best fits each 

command’s varying operational environment. 

Missile Defence Battle Tracking 

MAJ Drew Pache 

NOTES FROM THE FIELD 


 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 62

 Combating WMD Resource Page 

Introduction to Combating WMD 

This course introduces students to US Government and Department of Defense combating 

WMD (CWMD) strategy, policy and operations. 

16-18 Oct 2007 – NCR 

8-10 Apr 2008 – NCR 

Locations: 

National Capitol Region (NCR) and Defense 

Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 

Advanced Planners Course for 

Combating WMD 

Apply aspects of the Joint Operational Planning 

Process and Effects Based Approach to Joint 

Operations to plans and operations relating to 

Combating WMD. 

10-14 Dec 2007 

Location: 

Tyson’s Corner, VA 

Registration (DNWS):

505-846-5666 

246-5666 DSN

DNWS@abq.dtra.mil 

Online Registration:

https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil/StudentArea/

AdmissionsForm.asp 

These courses are available as a mobile training 

team (MTT) to any COCOM location.

Specific Military Requirements (SMR) 

The FY 08/09 SMR preparation process has been temporarily 

halted. JRO now has the responsibility for assembling all 

Service NWE requirements. USANCA continues to wait for JRO 

guidance. 

Related 2007 Technical Meetings 

26th Hardened Electronics and Radiation 

Technology (HEART) Conference 31 March-4 April 2008 

2008 DoD E3 Program Review TBD 2008 

2008 IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Conference (NSREC) TBD 2008 

POC is Mr. Robert Pfeffer @ 703-806-7862 

FA52 Courses of Interest 

Theater Nuclear Operations Course 

(TNOC) 

TNOC is the only course offered by a Department of Defense 

(DOD) organization that provides training for planners, support 

staff, targeteers, and staff nuclear planners for joint operations and 

targeting. The course provides overview of nuclear weapon design, 

capabilities and effects as well as U.S. nuclear policy, and joint nuclear doctrine. TNOC meets U.S. Army qualification requirements 

for the additional skill identifier 5H. The course number is DNWSRO13 (TNOC). Call DNWS at (505) 846-5666 or DSN 246-5666 

for quotas and registration information. 

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer Course 

(NCP52) 

NCP52 is the Functional Area 52 qualifying course. Initial priority is 

given to officer TDY enroute to a FA52 assignment or currently 

serving in a FA52 position. For availability, call the FA52 Proponent Manager at (703) 806-7866. 

Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 

(HPAC) 

HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of 

hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and the collateral 

effects of these releases on civilian and military populations. HPAC 

employs integrated source terms, high resolution weather and particulate transport algorithms to rapidly model hazard areas and human collateral effects. 

Registration, Software Distribution and Training: 

(703)-325-1276 Fax: (703) 325-0398 (DSN 221) 

https://acecenter.cnttr.dtra.mil acecenter@cnttr.dtra.mil 
 63 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 

Pantex Plant Operations

 Participants will learn about nuclear weapon 

(programmatic) high explosive operations and tests, the 

US nuclear weapon complex, nuclear weapon design history, production operations, and US nuclear weapon dismantle issues. This training course will provide educational overviews and tours of actual facilities and equipment used in the US nuclear weapons production, transportation, and storage process. This course will also provide an overview of the CI threat to the nuclear weapons 

operations at the Pantex Plant.

 There is no tuition charge, agencies are responsible for 

their trainee’s travel and per diem expenses. This workshop consists of lecture sessions and Plant tours and 

demonstrations. All workshop sessions are conducted at 

the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas. There are two scheduled workshops: 

18-21 September 2007 

30 October—2 November 2007 

Registration Deadline: 60 days before course date; participants will receive reporting instructions 30 days before 

course start date 

For further information please contact the Training Coordinator at (865) 574-9226. 

WMD Terrorism 

 This workshop provides a basic overview of the technical and terrorist threat aspects of nuclear, chemical, 

and biological weapons. 

 Participants will be introduced to the various Federal 

Response Elements and the role that each plays when 

responding to a WMD event as well as counterterrorism 

policy. The first day concluded with Trends in Terrorism 

Overview. Nuclear technology briefings on the infrastructure required to support a nuclear weapons effort 

will be provided. Production of materials useful for radiological threat devices will also be covered. Briefings 

on illicit nuclear materials and scams will lead to a threat 

analysis exercise (an analytical methodology useful for 

any WMD type threat). Technical briefings on the 

chemical, and biological terrorism threat, materials and 

methods, and agents and effects are followed by a demonstration of detection and personal protection equipment. 

There is no tuition charge, agencies are responsible for 

their trainee’s travel and per diem expenses. This workshop is conducted at Ft. Story, Virginia, September 10-

13 2007. 

For further information please contact the Training Coordinator at (865) 574-9226. 

Do you have information to share with the “CWMD 

Community?” 

Get it posted here. Send your input to 

The editors at dcsg3@conus.army.mil 

Note: The editor retains the right to edit and choose 

which submissions are printed. 

Army Knowledge Online (AKO) users: 

Electronic back issues available! 

Open up AKO and type in: Nuclear and Counterproliferation in the Search for... dialog box on the right 

side of the web page. Following that you will receive 

a page showing all unrestricted content in AKO. 

Select: Nuclear and Counterproliferation 

This will bring you to the Nuclear and Counterproliferation page. Scroll towards the bottom and you will 

see Combating WMD Journal. There you can find 

back issues. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 1 64

Operation IVY was an atmospheric nuclear weapons test series held in the Atomic Energy Commission's 

(AEC) Pacific Proving Ground at Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands during autumn 1952. This is a shot 

of IVY Mike, 	
on 
	with a yield of 10.4 megaton, detonated 1 November 

1952. 

Courtesy DTRA http://www.dtra.mil/newsservices/fact_sheets/display.cfm?fs=ntpr_ivy 

Image: US Government