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1 

47–260 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 

111TH CONGRESS

1st Session 

S. PRT. 

2009

111–5 

CHANGING CUBA POLICY—IN THE 

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST 

STAFF TRIP REPORT 

TO THE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FEBRUARY 23, 2009 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web 

http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

Republican Leader designee 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

DAVID MCKEAN, Staff Director 

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ............................................................................................... V 

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 1 

Findings .................................................................................................................... 2 

The Cuban Regime Is Institutionalized ........................................................ 2 

Positive Developments Are Occurring in Cuba But They Should Not 

Be Mistaken for Structural Reform ............................................................. 3 

Popular Dissatisfaction With Cuba’s Economic Situation Is the Regime’s 

Vulnerability ................................................................................................. 4 

The Regime Appears To Be Open to Some Bilateral Dialogue and Cooperation ........................................................................................................ 5 

Recommendations .................................................................................................... 6 

The Resumption of Bilateral Talks on Drug Interdiction and Migration .. 7 

Investments in Alternative Energy ............................................................... 8 

Agricultural Trade .......................................................................................... 8 

Medical Trade ................................................................................................. 9 

Bipartisan Commission and a Multilateral Framework ............................. 10 

Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 11 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I ................................................................................................................ 13 

Appendix II ............................................................................................................... 15 


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(V)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

FEBRUARY 23, 2009. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: From January 11–14, 2009, I directed my 

senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member 

for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to evaluate U.S. policy towards 

Cuba. Mr. Meacham traveled to Cuba at the invitation of the Lexington Institute on official U.S. Government business under a general license for travel, as provided by the Cuban Assets Control 

Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 515 Section 101 et seq.). Peter Quilter, 

Senior Staff on the House International Relations Committee, was 

also on the delegation. 

During this trip, staff met with government officials, foreign diplomats, members of the clergy, international media representatives, 

Cuban entrepreneurs, and other Cuban citizens in a variety of informal settings outside the apparent presence of Cuban Government officials (Appendix 1). 

The proclamation by Cuba’s National Assembly making Rau ́l 

Castro President of Cuba on February 24, 2008, the election of 

Barack Obama as President of the United States, on November 4, 

2008, and the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution on January 1, 2009, have generated much discussion about U.S. policy towards the island. This debate is important because it has implications for security interests in the Straits of Florida, broader U.S.- 

Latin American relations, and global perceptions of U.S. foreign 

policy. Despite uncertainty about Cuba’s mid-term political future, 

it is clear that the recent leadership changes have created an opportunity for the United States to reevaluate a complex relationship marked by misunderstanding, suspicion, and open hostility. 

Economic sanctions are a legitimate tool of U.S. foreign policy, 

and they have sometimes achieved their aims, as in the case of 

apartheid South Africa. After 47 years, however, the unilateral embargo on Cuba has failed to achieve its stated purpose of ‘‘bringing 

democracy to the Cuban people,’’ while it may have been used as 

a foil by the regime to demand further sacrifices from Cuba’s impoverished population. The current U.S. policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances 

U.S. interests. 

Mr. Meacham’s report provides significant insight and a number 

of important recommendations to advance U.S. interests with 

Cuba. I hope you find the report helpful. We look forward to workVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:47 Feb 24, 2009 Jkt 047260 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 7633 Sfmt 7633 E:\HR\OC\A260.XXX A260

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ing with you on these issues and welcome any comments you may 

have on this report. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member. 


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1This statement was provided on January 12, 2009, as the response to the following two questions: (1) Cuba has been on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list since 1982. 

Please provide your views regarding why Cuba should or should not remain on the State Department’s State Sponsors of Terrorism list; (2) Please provide your views on U.S.-Cuban cooperation on energy security and environmentally sustainable resource management, especially 

as Cuba begins deep-water exploration for potentially significant oil reserves. 2This is the first visit by a Chilean leader to Cuba since President Salvador Allende visited 

in 1972. 

CHANGING CUBA POLICY—IN THE UNITED STATES 

NATIONAL INTEREST 

INTRODUCTION

We anticipate a review of U.S. policy regarding Cuba and 

look forward to working with members of the Committee 

and other members of Congress as we move forward to the 

consideration of appropriate steps to take to help advance 

U.S. interests and values in the context of relations with 

Cuba.—Hillary Clinton 1

Secretary of State Clinton responded to Senator Lugar’s questions for the record with this pledge to conduct a review of U.S. policy towards Cuba. Echoing President Obama’s campaign position, 

she also wrote that the Administration intends to lift restrictions 

on Cuban-American travel and remittances to Cuba while maintaining the U.S. trade and investment embargo. She left the door 

open for bolder policy changes, however, by expressing support for 

U.S.-Cuban cooperation in drug interdiction and suggesting a willingness to engage with Cuba on issues of mutual concern. 

Staff believes that the promised review of Cuba policy will reveal 

at least four weaknesses in current policy. First, because of Cuba’s 

symbolic importance to Latin America, U.S. policy towards the island nation remains a contentious subject with many countries in 

the region. Chilean President Michelle Bachelet’s February 2009 

visit to Havana,2 and Cuba’s admission in December 2008 to the 

Rio Group of more than 20 Latin American and Caribbean countries demonstrate the region’s convergence around a policy of engagement with Cuba, in sharp contrast to the U.S. policy of isolation. U.S. policy is also a source of controversy between the U.S. 

and the European Union, as reflected in the perennial transatlantic 

debate over sanctions versus engagement, as well as in the United 

Nations, which has passed a widely supported resolution condemning the embargo for the past 17 years. 

Second, the United States Government (USG) hurts broader national security interests by impeding cooperation with Cuba on 

matters of shared concern, such as migration and counternarcotics, 

among others. There is a precedent for such bilateral cooperation, 

yet the broad outcome of the last eight years was a near-total 


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breakdown in official interaction between the two governments; coordination of drug interdiction, for example, is where most official 

interaction occurs with Cuba, and only on a limited, case-by-case 

basis, while semi-annual U.S.-Cuba migration talks were suspended in 2004. 

Third, despite the ostensible goal of promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba, U.S. policy has instead provided the 

Government of Cuba (GOC) with both a convenient, though overblown, scapegoat for its economic difficulties and an external threat 

with which to justify its authoritarianism. 

Finally, current U.S. policy ignores recent developments that 

have the potential to redefine relations with Cuba. The sanctionsbased policy has significantly impeded the United States’ ability to 

influence the direction of policy in Cuba or gain a broader understanding of events taking place on the island. By directing policy 

towards an unlikely scenario of a short-term democratic transition 

on the island and rejecting most tools of diplomatic engagement, 

the U.S. is left as a powerless bystander, watching events unfold 

at a distance. 

FINDINGS

The Obama Administration’s review of policy towards Cuba will 

occur during a complex period on the island and in the United 

States, while the onslaught of a global recession provides an unpredictable environment for foreign relations. The following sections 

provide background and staff’s principal observations from travel to 

Cuba. 

The Cuban regime is institutionalized 

The Cuban government remains riddled with deep problems including resource constraints, inefficiency, and corruption, but it 

continues to function nonetheless. It exercises control over its territory, manages government functions such as taxation, policing, and 

delivery of social services, and engages in effective international diplomacy. 

Though the Cuban Revolution first emerged as a popular movement, the process of institutionalization that began in the 1970s 

has strengthened and formalized the political structure to the extent that the island’s institutions occupy an important role in the 

governance of Cuba. This process has been accelerated by Fidel 

Castro’s retirement in 2008 and the accompanying departure from 

his charismatic but erratic leadership style. Under Rau ́l Castro, decision-making relies on more regularized and predictable channels 

such as the Cuban Communist Party, the National Assembly, and 

government ministries. 

While a popular uprising against the government cannot be completely ruled out, staff concluded that a sudden collapse of the GOC 

is unlikely given the institutionalized nature of the regime and the 

absence of an external war or other catalyst. Moreover, the internal 

opposition does not appear sufficiently well developed to precipitate 

a negotiated transition, while external opposition efforts have been 


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3 According to a report released by Freedom House in September 2008, the general Cuban 

public lacks familiarity and interest in dissident organizations. Staff suspects that this disinterest stems from several factors, namely the prioritization of economic concerns, political apathy, the opposition’s lack of access to the mass media, and fear of the state’s repressive apparatus. 4 Cuba most closely parallels pre-1989 Bulgaria with its thin opposition movement. Unlike in 

Hungary or Czechoslovakia, the Bulgarian regime initiated and controlled the transition. 

Factionalization within the communist party led to a series of liberalizing steps and round-table 

talks coordinated and chaired by one of the party leaders of the internal coup. In Hungary, in 

contrast, the well-organized opposition set out firm principles of negotiation even before it 

agreed to enter talks, while in Czechoslovakia the established opposition groups headed a provisional government following regime collapse. 5Freedom House Special Report. (15 Sept. 2008). Change in Cuba: How Citizens View Their 

Country’s Future. 

proven peripheral.3 It is thus more likely that the post-Castro era 

will be led by factions of the current regime.4

Consequently, the basic premise of U.S. policy—that a liberal democracy will arise in the post-Castro era without political continuity from the current system—is unlikely. This is not to say that 

a democratic transition is either impossible or inevitable, but rather that Cuba’s future leadership will not be a tabula rasa. By limiting engagement with Cuba’s second-tier leaders, the USG forgoes 

the opportunity of establishing ties that might positively influence 

the advancement of U.S. interests in the near future. 

Positive developments are occurring in Cuba but they should not be 

mistaken for structural reform 

Change in Cuba cannot be assessed against a yardstick of full 

multi-party democracy, free-market capitalism, and civil rights. 

Nevertheless, since officially assuming the presidency in early 

2008, Rau ́l Castro has introduced a series of modest reforms that 

are regarded on the island as a departure from the orthodox policies of his long-ruling brother, Fidel Castro. For example, Cubans 

may now purchase cell phones and computers and stay at hotels 

previously reserved for foreigners, though the vast majority of the 

population cannot afford to take advantage of these reforms. The 

GOC is granting new licenses to private taxi drivers, who set their 

own prices, for the first time in a decade. Most significantly, private farmers are now permitted to purchase their own equipment, 

and the government is proceeding with a plan to hand over unused 

state lands to private farmers and cooperatives under long-term 

leases, including more than 45,500 land grants approved in February 2009. 

Rau ́l Castro has repeatedly acknowledged the need to increase 

efficiency and production, particularly in the agricultural sector, 

and his decisions have demonstrated a willingness to implement 

some reforms at a gradual pace, though it is not clear whether they 

will lead to structural change. He has also encouraged a series of 

town-hall meetings to publicly debate government programs, but he 

made it clear that decisions about changes would rest with the 

GOC, and many citizens feared retribution for expressing their real 

opinions.5

While limited economic opening is taking place, the government 

continues to ban most political activity that occurs outside the confines of the Cuban Communist Party. Opposition parties are illegal, 

virtually all media remain state controlled, and Cuba has the highest number of political prisoners of any country in the Americas. 


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6 Comisio ́n Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliacio ́n Nacional. (2 Feb. 2009). ‘‘Cuba en 

el an ̃ o 2009: La situacio ́n de derechos civiles polı ́ticos y econo ́micos.’’ 7 BBC News. (29 April 2008). ‘‘Cuba to commute death sentences.’’ 

Cuba regularly ranks at the bottom of most internationally recognized rankings on political and economic liberty, and the state controls most means of production. 

Still, recent developments in Cuba may indicate that the government while able and willing to exercise its machinery of repression, 

is showing some small signs of political moderation. According to 

the non-governmental Cuban Commission of Human Rights and 

National Reconciliation (CCDHRN), a respected domestic human 

rights group, Cuba had 316 political prisoners when Rau ́l Castro 

first took power on a provisional basis in July 2006, following the 

serious health setback suffered by his brother Fidel. By early 2008, 

when Rau ́l Castro formally assumed the presidency, that number 

had declined to 234. In February 2009, the CCDHRN reported that 

the number of documented political prisoners had dropped still further to 205.6 Rau ́l Castro has commuted most death sentences on 

the island, and the GOC signed two United Nations human rights 

treaties in February 2007.7 As a result, Cuba is about to undergo 

its first Universal Periodic Review in the United Nations Human 

Rights Council. 

Due in part to these modest shifts, Cuba’s ranking for civil liberties improved in 2008 from 7 to 6 (on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 

being the least free) on Freedom House’s annual survey, Freedom 

in the World—still a very low ranking of ‘‘not free’’ but the first 

change since 1989. The GOC, however, has increasingly used the 

practice of arbitrary short-term detentions to intimidate and repress human rights and democracy activists. According to the 

CCDHRN, there were more than 1,500 such detentions in 2008. 

The government also employs surveillance and travel restrictions 

against political dissidents, and ordinary Cubans still do not have 

the right to travel abroad and return to Cuba. 

While some positive developments have occurred, they do not appear to represent a long-term reform program, at least at this time. 

These changes are welcomed, but no one should be under the illusion that there might not be setbacks. 

Popular dissatisfaction with Cuba’s economic situation is the regime’s vulnerability 

Recent developments in Cuba respond to both urgent economic 

challenges and raised public expectations for economic change. 

Cuba has become increasingly reliant on food imports to feed its 

people, and most food crops show declining trends. Since mid–2008, 

the Cuban economy has suffered not only the impact of Hurricanes 

Gustav and Ike, which caused large crop losses and food shortages, 

but also the global financial crisis, with a resulting decline in credit, tourism revenues, remittance flows, and demands for nickel, the 

island’s chief export. An additional vulnerability lies in the island’s 

dependence on subsidized oil from Venezuela. 

Among ordinary Cubans, moreover, staff found that the harshest 

complaints are directed at the stark disparity between incomes and 

prices. The average monthly wage of a Cuban worker is US$17, but 

many goods are sold at prices equivalent to what they would cost 


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in the United States. This disparity is sustained through a dual 

currency system: local salaries are paid in pesos valued at about 

25 to the dollar, and many food products and consumer goods are 

sold in prices marked in convertible pesos (CUC) valued at parity 

with the dollar. Staff visited CUC stores that sold items such as 

Nike, Adidas, and Reebok apparel, and they were full of Cubans 

purchasing goods at U.S. market prices, while the peso stores that 

staff visited showed a meager selection of low quality goods. Those 

who benefit from remittances or work in the tourism industry are 

able to purchase goods at CUC stores. This is in sharp contrast to 

the majority of Cubans who, because monthly wages are insufficient to purchase even basic foodstuffs, engage in illegal economic 

activities reflected in popular Cuban jargon like ‘‘resolver’’ (to make 

do), ‘‘inventar’’ (to invent), and ‘‘hacer las cosas por la izquierda’’ 

(to do things ‘‘on the left,’’ i.e. transactions in the underground 

economy). 

Staff believes that popular dissatisfaction with the economic situation among Cuba’s youth is especially problematic for Rau ́l Castro. During an evening visit to the intersection of 23rd Street and 

‘‘Calle G’’ (G Street, a popular gathering place for college students 

in Havana) staff observed young adults dressed in fashions similar 

to average American youth. The contemporary music that staff 

could hear played was Reggaeton, a form of Latin urban music that 

became popular with Latin American youth in the early 1990s. Yet 

even relatively successful young people expressed frustration with 

the limits placed by the state on their prospects for upward mobility. Staff concluded that this generation, which came of age after 

the collapse of the Soviet Union plunged Cuba into profound economic crisis in the 1990s, has high expectations when it comes to 

the economy but has only the most tenuous link with the Cuban 

Revolution in political terms. 

Cuba’s economic challenges and vulnerabilities have important 

implications for U.S. interests, for they provide an incentive for the 

GOC to advance economic reforms that could provide commercial 

opportunities and markets for the United States. 

The regime appears to be open to some bilateral dialogue and cooperation 

Staff’s meetings with GOC officials revealed stark differences between Cuban and U.S. priorities in bilateral relations. Most of the 

U.S. policy reforms that are proposed in Washington center on liberalizing travel to the island, yet the GOC considers travel to be 

a domestic issue for the United States and therefore of less relevance to bilateral discussions. Most importantly, the GOC views 

the USG’s emphasis on conditionality (i.e., lifting U.S. economic 

sanctions in return for concrete movement toward democracy) as 

an unlikely starting point for future negotiations. When staff asked 

GOC officials about the human rights situation and the plight of 


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8Following staff’s trip, President Obama signed an executive order to close the Guanta ́namo detention camp. Fidel Castro has demanded a return of the base to the GOC. 9The Cuban Five are five Cuban unregistered intelligence agents who infiltrated South Florida exile groups in the 1990s and have been imprisoned in the United States since 2001. 10Sullivan, Mark P. (3 Feb. 2009). ‘‘Cuba: Issues for the 111th Congress.’’ Congressional Research Service. 11 Erikson, Daniel P. (2008). The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next 

Revolution. New York: Bloomsbury Press. 

Cuban dissidents, GOC officials countered with Guanta ́namo,8 Abu 

Ghraib, and the case of the ‘‘Cuban Five.’’ 9

When staff asked about what gestures the Cuban government 

would find positive, officials expressed concerns with programs by 

USAID intended to facilitate a transition to democracy in Cuba as 

well as Radio and TV Martı ́ broadcasts from Miami, which are intended to provide an alternative source of information for the 

Cuban people. They view these programs as interventionist tools of 

the United States intended to bring about regime change. 

On issues of national security and commerce, however, the GOC 

indicated a willingness to cooperate with the United States where 

mutual interests exist, echoing previous statements by Rau ́l Castro 

on his desire for dialogue with the USG. Since assuming power in 

2006, he has made several overtures to engage in dialogue with the 

United States with the condition that the dialogue is based on the 

principles of equality, reciprocity, non-interference, and mutual respect.10 According to State Department sources, the USG has also 

made overtures over the last 18 months to discuss narco-trafficking 

and current restrictions on travel for diplomats in Havana and 

Washington, but these efforts have proven unsuccessful thus far. 

RECOMMENDATONS

According to a recently published book on U.S. policy towards 

Cuba, only three avenues of regular official communication exist 

with the GOC: monthly meetings between U.S. and Cuban military 

officers at the Guanta ́namo Bay Naval Base, occasional cooperation 

between the U.S. and Cuban coast guards on drug enforcement and 

migration matters (through a U.S. Coast Guard attache ́ at the U.S. 

Interests Section in Havana), and frequent contact between U.S. 

and Cuban meteorologists who track hurricanes in the Caribbean.11

Given these precedents and the current state of U.S.-Cuban relations, staff concluded that progress could be attained by replacing 

conditionality with sequenced engagement, beginning with narrow 

areas of consensus that develop trust. A steady series of gradual 

measures has significant confidence-building potential and could 

ultimately create the conditions for effective dialogue over more 

contentious issues. By sequencing this process of engagement with 

Cuba, the USG would have the opportunity to continually reassess 

progress towards the advancement of national interests. In other 

words, a pragmatic, phased approach would allow the USG to halt 

the engagement process at any point if U.S. interests were no 

longer being served. 

Staff recommends assessing the viability of reinstating discussions on drug interdiction and migration, and incremental steps in 

other areas, in order to address issues of concern for both countries. These measures should build upon each other to establish 


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12 Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. Retrieved from http://www.cafc.gov. 

new foundations for dialogue. Initially, increased communication 

and cooperation between the GOC and USG can take place within 

the framework of the existing embargo, though staff suggests consideration of several exceptions to U.S. sanctions as talks progress, 

as detailed below. 

As an initial unilateral step, staff recommends fulfilling President Obama’s campaign promise to repeal all restrictions on 

Cuban-American family travel and remittances before the Fifth 

Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago on April 17–19, 

2009. The timing of this gesture would signal an important change 

and would improve goodwill towards the United States from Latin 

American countries, as the USG seeks regional cooperation on a 

wide range of issues. Congressional action to lift all current U.S. 

travel restrictions should be considered as an effort along these 

lines, as well. 

Staff suggests that efforts to lift current travel restrictions on the 

Cuban Interests Section personnel in Washington, whose diplomats 

may not venture beyond the Beltway without explicit permission 

from the USG, be supported. Such a move would encourage a reciprocal lifting of GOC restrictions on the ability of U.S. diplomats to 

travel outside of Havana, improving the USG’s ability to understand conditions on the entire island. 

In addition, staff recommends a review of the effectiveness of 

several components of U.S. policy in both the legislative and executive branches: first, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the 

Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996; and, the policy recommendations of the 2004 and 2006 reports of the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, an inter-agency commission established in 2003 that was tasked with developing recommendations to ‘‘hasten’’ a transition to democracy in Cuba.12

Beyond these immediate unilateral measures, the timing of policy reforms and elimination of embargo restrictions would depend 

on the evolution of negotiations, which should be spearheaded by 

the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs. The following are additional areas of reform for consideration 

in the short and mid-term: 

The resumption of bilateral talks on drug interdiction and migration 

Cuba’s geographic position makes it key to halting the rapid increase in drugs flowing through Caribbean routes to the United 

States. Yet anti-narcotics cooperation between the USG and GOC 

presently occurs on only a limited, case-by-case basis, despite the 

GOC’s expressed interest in signing a formal agreement with the 

USG. 

Staff encourages the USG to undertake comprehensive counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, including the provision of needed 

equipment and technical assistance. Working more closely with 

Cuba to combat the growth of drug trafficking would protect vital 

U.S. security interests in the region and would put the United 

States in a better position to help thwart any future strategies by 


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international drug traffickers to use Cuba as a transit point for 

drug shipments to the United States. 

Regarding migration, staff recommends the revival of U.S.-Cuban 

biannual migrations talks, which have been suspended since 2004. 

These talks provide an important venue for discussing the shared 

problem of illegal migration. The USG should remain committed to 

fully implementing its agreements under the 1994 Joint 

Communique ́ and the 1995 Joint Statement (collectively known as 

the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords) as effective tools for promoting 

safe, legal, and orderly migration. 

In addition, staff suggests an executive branch review of the 

‘‘wet-foot, dry-foot policy.’’ Under this policy, Cubans who are intercepted at sea are sent back to Cuba or to a third country while 

those who make it to U.S. soil are allowed to remain in the United 

States. The review should assess whether this policy has led to the 

inefficient use of U.S. Coast Guard resources and assets as well as 

the potential to redirect these resources to drug interdiction efforts. 

Investments in alternative energy 

Energy security has vaulted to the top of both the U.S. and 

Cuban political agendas amid concerns about supply interruptions 

and rising prices, sparking a renewed search for viable alternative 

fuels. For the USG, an important element of an effective energy 

strategy from both cost and environmental perspectives lies in forging technological and open trading relationships in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

For the GOC, upgrading the island’s decaying energy infrastructure and promoting alternative energy sources are national security 

priorities referred to as the ‘‘energy revolution.’’ GOC officials indicated to staff that they are particularly interested in wind power, 

while other renewable energy projects are receiving support from 

the United Nations Development Program, which maintains an office in Havana and finances, among other projects, household solar 

photovoltaics and hydro power for use in rural areas. In addition, 

the GOC is encouraging foreign investment to develop its oil fields, 

with probable hydrocarbon reserves of five billion barrels, according 

to estimates by the United States Geological Survey—significant 

for Cuban energy consumption and comparable to the oil reserves 

of Ecuador. 

In staff’s meetings, GOC officials particularly welcomed U.S. participation in renewable energy development. If restrictions were 

lifted, U.S. technology could help ensure environmentally-sustainable development of Cuba’s energy sector. Most importantly, cooperation in this area would be consistent with long-term U.S. interests in energy security and efficiency in the region. 

Agricultural trade 

Since the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act 

(TSRA) of 2000 lifted sanctions on sales of agricultural commodities, the U.S. has become Cuba’s most important food provider and 

its fifth largest overall trading partner. Yet many restrictions and 

licensing requirements remain in place, making it difficult for agricultural exporters to take full advantage of trade opportunities in 

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13 U.S. International Trade Commission. (July 2007). U.S. Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain 

Economic Effects of U.S. Restrictions. Retrieved from http://www.usitc.gov/publications/ 

pub3932.pdf. 14 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (Nov. 2007). Economic Sanctions: Agencies Face 

Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S. Embargo on Cuba. 15 U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet: Medical Sales to Cuba. Retrieved from http:// 

www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/fsjulydec/2612.htm. 

cial financing or credit, and a 2005 regulation by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) redefined the sales terms set 

forth in TSRA, stipulating that cash payment must be received by 

the seller prior to the shipment of goods, rather than prior to transfer of title and control of the goods, as had been the practice until 

2005.13 According to a 2007 Government Accountability Office report, smaller U.S. exporters have found OFAC’s licensing process 

to be cumbersome, nontransparent, and time consuming, while 

other exporters have complained that Cuban purchasing officials 

are routinely denied visas to travel to the United States for inspections of U.S. processing and facilities.14

Easing these restrictions would benefit U.S. economic interests 

and expand an important source of dialogue and engagement between the two countries. According to staff’s sources, the GOC welcomes this nascent trading relationship, due to the quality and 

proximity of U.S. goods, and the professionalism of U.S. exporters. 

This is especially true following Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, which 

badly depleted Cuban food stores, creating food shortages. Specifically, staff recommends assessing the viability of a combination of 

potential executive and legislative actions to: (1) review the ‘‘cash 

in advance’’ requirement; (2) authorize private financing for agricultural sales; (3) expand the types of products that may be sold 

to include agricultural machinery and supplies, which are especially needed for rebuilding in the wake of the recent hurricanes; 

(4) authorize general licenses for travel to Cuba for the marketing, 

negotiation, and delivery of agricultural goods; (5) facilitate the 

issuance of U.S. visas for Cuban officials to conduct activities, including sanitary inspections, related to such sales. 

Medical trade 

Because the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement 

Act did not clearly repeal or supersede the relevant Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) provisions on medical items, the latter’s requirements still apply. The CDA required the issuance of a specific license from the Department of Commerce as well as ‘‘proper enduse monitoring’’ to ensure that medical items would be used for 

their intended purpose.15 In contrast to U.S. agricultural exports, 

U.S. exports of medical products have not increased substantially 

since 2001 and remain a minor part of U.S. exports to the island. 

Staff recommends reviewing the viability of authorizing private 

financing for medical sales as well as general licenses for travel to 

Cuba for the marketing and sale of these goods. Appropriate legislative action could also include a review of the current end-use 

monitoring requirement, which is why some U.S. companies do not 

export medical products to Cuba. 

In addition, staff suggests reviewing the potential for legislative 

action to permit pharmaceutical imports from Cuba’s rapidly developing biotech industry. Cuba has made important strides in bioVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:21 Feb 24, 2009 Jkt 047260 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260.XXX A260

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16 U.S.-Cuban Scientific Relations. (17 Oct. 2008). Science. Vol. 322. 

technology, including the production of meningitis and hepatitis B 

vaccines, and U.S. scientists have called for enhanced research cooperation with their Cuban counterparts.16 In 2004, the Treasury 

Department allowed California’s CancerVax Corporation to conduct 

clinical trials of three cancer vaccines in conjunction with Cuba’s 

Center for Molecular Immunology, yet the embargo prohibits importation of medical products, and there is no permanent program 

of cooperation between Cuban and U.S. research institutions. 

Bipartisan commission and a multilateral framework 

In sum, increased dialogue through appropriate channels, coupled with looser trade terms, would lay the groundwork for more 

substantial discussions between the USG and GOC. Staff believes 

that the USG should begin treating Cuba as it does other nations 

with whom it has fundamental disagreements but where engagement advances broader interests. 

In the short-term, staff recommends the targeted sequencing of 

U.S. unilateral options in addition to the pursuit of a multilateral 

approach to Cuba. No U.S. strategy to reform its relationship with 

Cuba will be fully successful if it is pursued unilaterally. With this 

goal, the Administration should consider establishing a bipartisan 

commission to forge a new, multilateral strategy with Latin American and European Union partners. Just as the bipartisan Iraq 

Study Group proposed important recommendations based on a comprehensive policy review, a Cuba Study Group could complement 

the State Department’s ongoing policy review with a road map for 

future policy direction. 

A multilateral component of this road map could include reengagement with Cuba in international institutions. In the medium-term, the USG could review dropping opposition to Cuban 

participation in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, 

and the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuban membership of 

these financial institutions would increase the GOC’s accountability 

to the international community and encourage free-market reforms 

consistent with U.S. commercial interests. 

In addition, a member country of the Organization of American 

States (OAS) could call for the reincorporation of Cuba as a member of the OAS. This would require a resolution by the OAS General Assembly to revoke the 1962 decision that suspended the 

GOC’s membership privileges because it was concluded that Cuba 

was a Marxist-Leninist country, whose government was incompatible with the inter-American system. In the event of such a development, the GOC would be required to sign the Inter-American 

Democratic Charter in order to be considered a full member. 

On the diplomatic front, staff recommends the consideration of a 

mechanism for regular information-sharing and coordinated action 

between the USG and other countries that have a bilateral human 

rights dialogue with the GOC, including members of the European 

Union, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and Canada. An appropriate 

model is provided by the Berne Process in Beijing, which has afforded a framework for dialogue among diplomats in China, including from the USG, to enhance cooperation with other diplomatic 


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17The Special Period refers to the economic crisis caused by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet 

Union and the resulting loss of economic subsidies. 

missions interested in engaging the Government of China on sensitive human rights issues. A similar process should be considered 

as a framework for our diplomats in Havana. 

CONCLUSION

Cuba is important for the United States because of proximity, 

intertwined history, and culture. Cuba is important in Latin America because it is a romanticized symbol of a small country that 

stood up to the most powerful country in the world. The Cuban 

Revolution legitimizes some of the passions that fuel the outrage 

that many Latin Americans feel regarding the inequality of their 

own societies, and for 50 years, rightly or wrongly, Cuba has ably 

portrayed itself as having fought this fight for them, as well as for 

the downtrodden around the world. 

During the visit, a Cuban official stated to staff that ‘‘U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America goes through Cuba.’’ With the 

end of the Cold War, however, the GOC does not represent the security threat to the U.S. that it once did. The USG still has significant grievances with the GOC—mostly, its human rights practices 

and the stifling of political pluralism and property rights as well 

as the lack of adequate compensation for expropriated assets of 

U.S. firms and individuals. The remaining security issues, on the 

other hand, are limited to the potential for a migration crisis provoked by political or economic instability on the island. While 

Cuba’s alliance with Venezuela has intentions of influencing regional affairs, the GOC has not been positioned to ably export its 

Revolution since the collapse of the Soviet Union forced an end to 

Cuba’s financial support for Latin American guerrilla movements. 

The GOC’s program of medical diplomacy, which exports doctors to 

developing countries, bolsters the island’s soft power, but does not 

represent a significant threat to U.S. national security. Given current economic challenges, any revenue gained from economic engagement with the United States would likely be used for internal 

economic priorities, not international activism. 

For these reasons, the United States’ relationships with Brazil, 

Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, have taken priority in Latin America. 

Cuba, too, has demonstrated that relations with the United States, 

though advantageous, are not necessary to its survival, having 

forged closer relationships around the globe. Venezuela, China, and 

Canada are Cuba’s top three trading partners, and recent economic 

agreements with Brazil and Russia are examples of Cuba’s resourcefulness in this regard. As one GOC official told staff, ‘‘We’ve 

endured much harsher conditions during the Special Period. We 

can survive with or without the United States.’’ 17

In hindsight, the U.S. embargo has not served a national security 

agenda since Cuba ceased to be an effective threat to the security 

of the United States. In the immediate post-Cold War era, the cost 

of maintaining this policy was negligible in comparison to the domestic political benefit derived from satisfying Cuban-American 

groups in the United States. The USG justified the embargo policy 

as an incentive or inducement for negotiations with the Cuban govVerDate Nov 24 2008 06:21 Feb 24, 2009 Jkt 047260 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\A260.XXX A260

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ernment, the rationale being that the U.S. would lift the embargo, 

or parts of it, in response to reform on human rights and democracy. This narrow approach, however, has not furthered progress in 

human rights or democracy in Cuba and has come at the expense 

of other direct and regional strategic U.S. interests. 

Today it is clear that a reform of our policy would serve U.S. security and economic interests in managing migration effectively 

and combating the illegal drug trade, among other interests. By 

seizing the initiative at the beginning of a new U.S. Administration 

and at an important moment in Cuban history, the USG would relinquish a conditional posture that has made any policy changes 

contingent on Havana, not Washington. 

Reform of U.S.-Cuban relations would also benefit our regional 

relations. Certain Latin American leaders, whose political appeal 

depends on the propagation of an array of anti-Washington grievances, would lose momentum as a centerpiece of these grievances 

is removed. More significantly, Latin Americans would view U.S. 

engagement with Cuba as a demonstration that the United States 

understands their perspectives on the history of U.S. policy in the 

region and no longer insists that all of Latin America must share 

U.S. hostility to a 50-year-old regime. The resulting improvement 

to the United States’ image in the region would facilitate the advancement of U.S. interests. 

If reform in U.S.-Cuba policy were to occur in the direction of 

sequenced engagement, the impact on the region would be swift 

and to the benefit of the security and prosperity of the United 

States. In due order, we must correct the failures of our current 

policy in a way that enhances U.S. interests. 


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APPENDIX I 

Contributor 

Kezia McKeague, Legislative Assistant, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate 

MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN CUBA

U.S. diplomats 

Jonathan Farrar, Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section, and 

country team members 

Cuban government officials 

Vice Minister for Economy and Planning, Alfonso Casanova 

Vice Minister for Foreign Relations, Dagoberto Rodriguez 

Advisor to the President of the Cuban National Assembly, Miguel 

Alvarez 

Advisor to the President of the Cuban National Assembly, Ana 

Mayra Alvarez 

Alimport representatives 

Center for Molecular Immunology representatives 

Ministry of Basic Industries representatives 

Cupet (Cuban oil company) representatives 

Foreign diplomats 

Manuel Cacho Quesada, Spanish Ambassador to Cuba 

Susan McDade, United Nations Resident Coordinator for Cuba 

Bernardo Pericas, Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba 

Catholic Church 

Orlando Marquez, advisor to Cardinal Jaime Ortega and editor of 

archdiocesan monthly Palabra Nueva 

Foreign correspondents 

Gerardo Arreola, La Jornada 

Maurico Vicent, El Paı ́s 

Other individuals 

Omar Everleny Pe ́rez, Cuban economist 

Cuban farmers in private cooperative in Managua, Cuba 

Cuban citizens in Santa Marı ́a del Rosario 


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APPENDIX II 

Staff’s recommendations rely on actions by both the executive 

and legislative branches of the USG. For this reason, staff requested the following information from the Congressional Research 

Service (CRS). It summarizes the potential actions the executive 

branch could take on its own to move towards normalization of 

U.S.-Cuban relations versus actions that would require congressional action. 

POTENTIAL PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS

Travel restrictions 

The President has the authority to ease U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba that are in place today. Restrictions on travel are set 

forth in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) (31 CFR, 

Part 515), the main body of Cuba embargo regulations administered by the Department of Treasury that set forth 12 categories 

of permissible travel. The embargo regulations do not ban travel 

itself, but place restrictions on any financial transactions related to 

travel to Cuba, which effectively result in a travel ban. Under the 

CACR, certain categories of travelers (such as journalists and fulltime professional researchers) may travel to Cuba under a general 

license, which means that there is no need to obtain special permission from the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which implements the Cuba embargo. In addition, a 

wide variety of travelers engaging in family visits, and educational, 

religious, humanitarian, and other activities may be eligible for 

specific licenses. Applications for specific licenses are reviewed and 

granted by OFAC on a case-by-case basis. 

There have been various changes to the travel restrictions over 

time. For example, the Clinton Administration tightened family 

travel restrictions in 1994 by requiring a specific as opposed to a 

general license, and subsequently reversed this action in 1995. In 

1999, the Clinton Administration announced a number of changes 

to the travel regulations that allowed people-to-people exchanges in 

a variety of areas. In contrast, the Bush Administration tightened 

travel restrictions in 2003 by prohibiting people-to-people exchanges unrelated to academic coursework, and in 2004 restricted 

family travel in various ways. This included requiring a specific license, limiting such travel to once every three years with no exceptions, allowing visits only to immediate family (grandparents, 

grandchildren, parents, siblings, spouses, and children) for a period 

not to exceed 14 days, and reducing the amount that can be spent 

while in Cuba to $50 daily (from the State Department per diem 

rate of $179). 


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Just as President Bush tightened travel restrictions, President 

Obama could ease the restrictions by amending the CACR travel 

regulations. As a presidential candidate, Obama vowed to change 

U.S. policy toward Cuba by allowing unlimited family travel, which 

would require changes to the licensing procedures in the CACR. 

The 12 categories of permissible travel are defined in law, but 

within those categories the Administration has the authority to 

make changes to licensing procedures. For example, the President 

could choose to change the CACR travel regulations back to as they 

were during the first two years of the Bush Administration. This 

would include easing restrictions on travel for family visits, peopleto-people educational activities, academic educational activities (including for secondary schools), and participation in amateur or 

semi-professional sports competitions. 

Remittances 

The President has the authority to ease restrictions on remittances to Cuba. These restrictions are also set forth in the CACR 

and have changed over time. In June 2004, the Bush Administration tightened restrictions so that remittances may only be sent to 

nationals of Cuba who are members of the remitter’s immediate 

family (spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent, or sibling). 

Up to $300 in remittances may be carried by an authorized traveler 

to Cuba. Prior to those changes, remittances were not restricted to 

members of the remitter’s immediate family, but could be sent to 

any household in Cuba, provided the household did not include a 

senior-level Cuban government official or senior-level Communist 

Party official. Authorized travelers also could carry up to $3,000 in 

cash remittances compared to $300 now. Both before and after the 

June 2004 tightening, however, the level of remittances that can be 

provided per quarter remained the same, $300 per household. 

Gift parcels 

Consistent with the U.S. embargo of Cuba, the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), implemented by the Department of 

Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, require a license for 

exports of all items subject to the EAR to Cuba, with only a limited 

number of license exceptions. The President has the authority to 

make changes to the EAR. For example, in June 2004, the Bush 

Administration tightened restrictions on items that may be included in humanitarian gift parcels sent to Cuba. The new regulations prohibited gift parcels from including seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines and supplies, fishing 

equipment and supplies, and soap-making equipment (15 CFR 

740.12). The President could ease these restrictions on gift parcels. 

In June 2008, the Bush Administration added mobile phones and 

related accessories to the eligible list of gift parcel items, and increased the value of the gift parcel from $200 to $400 (which does 

not apply to the value of food sent in the parcel). 

U.S. agricultural exports 

The President has the authority to reverse the Treasury Department’s February 2005 amendment to the CACR that provides a 

definition of the term ‘‘payment of cash in advance’’ for exporting 


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18For a discussion of this approach, see CRS Report RL33622, Cuba’s Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, September 3, 2006. 19 U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing, Richard Boucher, January 

7, 2004. 20 ‘‘Migration Talks Cancelled,’’ Miami Herald, January 8, 2004. 

U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The Trade Sanctions Reform and 

Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA, P.L. 106–387, Title IX) allows for U.S. commercial agricultural exports to Cuba, but with numerous conditions and licensing requirements. TSRA requires that 

all transactions must be conducted by payment of cash in advance 

or financing by third country financial institutions. In February 

2005, the Treasury Department amended the CACR to define the 

term ‘‘payment of cash in advance’’ to mean ‘‘that payment is received by the seller or the seller’s agent prior to the shipment of 

the goods from the port at which they are loaded.’’ This was in contrast to past practice whereby the seller would receive payment 

while the goods were in transit or before they arrived at a Cuban 

port. U.S. exporters and some Members of Congress objected to the 

amendment as a new sanction that violated the intent of TSRA. 

There have been various legislative initiatives over the past several 

years to ease sanctions on U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba by preventing the Treasury Department from implementing the February 

2005 amendment defining payment of cash in advance. 

Bilateral talks and agreements 

The Executive Branch could choose to engage Cuba in bilateral 

talks in a range of areas or negotiate new bilateral agreements 

with Cuba. In 2002, Cuba proposed the negotiation of bilateral 

agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism, and migration issues. 

In the context of Fidel Castro’s departure from political power in 

2006, some observers called for a policy of engagement with Cuba 

in these areas as well as on efforts to combat human trafficking 

and environmental cooperation.18

For example, the President could choose to restart the semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks on the implementation of the 1994 and 1995 

bilateral migration accords. The Bush Administration cancelled 

those talks in January 2004 before the 20th round, and no talks 

have been held since. The State Department maintained that they 

cancelled the talks because Cuba refused to discuss five issues: (1) 

the issuance of exit permits for all qualified migrants; (2) cooperation in holding a new registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the 

need for a deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the 

repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) the issue of Cuba’s responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to monitor returned 

migrants; and (5) Cuba’s acceptance of the return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the United States.19 In response to the cancellation of the talks, Cuban officials maintained 

that the U.S. decision was irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the issues raised by the United States.20

Another example could be closer cooperation on anti-drug efforts 

or the negotiation of an anti-drug agreement with Cuba. Bilateral 

cooperation on anti-drug efforts has increased since 1999 when 

U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss ways to improve 

anti-drug cooperation, and Cuba accepted the stationing of a U.S. 


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21 Jose ́ Manuel Calvo, ‘‘Thomas Shannon Secretario de Estado adjunto para Latinoame ́rica: 

Serı ́a un acuerdo contra el narcotra ́fico entre Cuba y EE UU,’’ El Paı ́s, January 11, 2009. 

Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist (DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. In 2002, Cuba called for a bilateral antidrug agreement with the United States, but the Bush Administration indicated at the time that cooperation would continue on a 

case-by-case basis, not through a bilateral agreement. More recently, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs 

Tom Shannon maintained in an interview with Spain’s El Paı ́s 

newspaper in early January 2009 that a drug trafficking accord 

with Cuba would be logical, although he could not anticipate what 

the next Administration would do.21

Foreign assistance 

Numerous provisions of law prohibit U.S. assistance to Cuba, 

some without waiver authority. For instance, Section 620(a)(1) of 

the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 generally prohibits assistance 

to the present government of Cuba and does not authorize the 

President to waive its application. Nevertheless, the President does 

retain authority to provide certain types of assistance to Cuba. Pursuant to Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for example, the President is authorized to provide assistance to any foreign country, ‘‘on such terms and conditions as he may determine, 

for international disaster relief and rehabilitation, including assistance relating to disaster preparedness, and to the prediction of, and 

contingency planning for, natural disasters abroad.’’ Another example is Section 104(c)(4) of the Act, which allows for health-related 

assistance notwithstanding any other provision of law. Section 109 

of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 

1996 (P.L. 104–114) authorizes the President to provide support to 

individuals and independent nongovernmental organizations working to support democracy-building efforts for Cuba. In addition, annual foreign operations appropriations measures have had a provision (for FY2008, see Section 634(b) of P.L. 110–161, Division J) allowing for assistance to support tropical forestry and biodiversity 

conservation and energy programs aimed at reducing greenhouse 

gas emissions. This provision, however, has been subject to Section 

620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that prohibits assistance to governments supporting international terrorism unless the 

President determines that national security interests or humanitarian reasons justify a waiver. Such a waiver would be required 

for Cuba since it is on the State Department’s list of countries supporting international terrorism. 

Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act withholds the U.S. proportionate share from international organizations conducting programs in specific countries, including Cuba, with the exception of 

programs of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 

certain programs of the International Atomic Energy Agency 

(IAEA). This provision is largely symbolic, however, and does not 

prevent international organizations from conducting programs in 

Cuba. For example, the United Nations Development Program has 

an active program in Cuba. 


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The President also has special authority under Section 614 of the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize a limited amount of assistance each fiscal year ‘‘when the President determines and so 

notifies in writing to the Speaker of the House and the chairman 

of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that to do so 

is important to the security interests of the United States.’’ Before 

exercising this authority, the President needs to consult with and 

provide a written policy justification to the appropriations and foreign relations committees in both houses. 

Diplomatic relations 

While the President has the power to restore full diplomatic relations with Cuba, such an action would usually occur as part of a 

broader effort toward normalizing relations. For example, the normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam proceeded incrementally 

for a number of years, with Congress playing a significant role in 

the normalization process. A detailed roadmap for the normalization of relations with Vietnam was issued in 1991, although an 

Ambassador was not appointed until 1997, after President Clinton 

issued a determination that certain conditions had been met regarding Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA issues. The President has the power to appoint Ambassadors with the advice and 

consent of the Senate. 

Terrorism lists 

The President has authority to remove Cuba from various terrorist lists in U.S. law. Under Section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90–629; 22 U.S.C. 2781), the Secretary of State 

makes an annual determination listing those countries that are not 

cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts. Being on the list 

prohibits the export of defense articles and defense services, but 

the President may waive the sanction if he determines that the 

transaction is important to the national interests of the United 

States. Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states 

sponsoring international terrorism in 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) 

of the Export Administration Act (P.L. 96–72). Exports of dual-use 

good and services require a license to any country identified as a 

state supporter of terrorism. Being listed under Section 6(j) also 

triggers other laws that limit economic transactions. Pursuant to 

provisions in the Act, the President may remove a country from the 

list in two ways. The first option is to submit a report to Congress 

certifying, before the removal would take effect, that: (1) there has 

been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the 

government; (2) the government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and (3) the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the 

future. The second option is to submit a report at least 45 days before the removal of the country from the list certifying that: (1) the 

government has not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period, and (2) that the government has provided assurances that it will not support acts of 

international terrorism in the future. 


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ACTIONS REQUIRING LEGISLATIVE ACTION

Embargo 

Lifting or substantially easing the U.S. economic embargo on 

Cuba today as set forth in the CACR would require legislative action to amend or repeal certain provisions in the Libertad Act (P.L. 

104–114) and other Acts. Section 102(h) of that law codified the 

economic embargo, including the CACR restrictions. While the 

CACR itself includes licensing authority that provides administrative flexibility, totally lifting or substantially easing the embargo 

regulations would appear to violate the intention of Congress. Additional provisions of the Libertad Act, Sections 204–206, require 

that certain conditions be met before the President may suspend or 

ultimately terminate the economic embargo. For the suspension of 

the embargo, these conditions require that a transition government: does not include Fidel or Rau ́l Castro; has legalized all political activity; has released all political prisoners; has dissolved several coercive elements of state security; has made commitments to 

free and fair elections for a new government in 18 months; has 

ceased interference with Radio and TV Marti broadcasts; is making 

demonstrable progress in establishing an independent judiciary, respecting international recognized human rights and basic freedoms, 

and allowing the establishment of independent trade unions and 

social, economic, and political associations; and has given assurances that it will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban people. The actual termination of the embargo would require additional conditions, including most significantly, 

that an elected civilian government is in power. 

Travel 

Lifting travel restrictions altogether would require legislative action. This is because of the codification of the embargo in Section 

102(h) of the Libertad Act discussed above, although, as noted 

above, the Administration retains flexibility through licensing authority to ease travel restrictions. In addition, a provision in the 

TSRA (Section 910(b) of P.L. 106–387, Title IX) prevents the Administration from licensing travel for tourist activities, and defines 

such activities as any activity not expressly authorized in the 12 

categories of travel set forth in the CACR regulations. This legislative provision essentially circumscribes the authority of the Executive Branch to issue travel licenses for activities beyond those already allowed, and would have to be amended or repealed in order 

to expand categories of travel to Cuba or lift travel restrictions altogether. 

Agricultural and medical exports 

Further lifting restrictions on the sale of agricultural and medical exports to Cuba would require legislative action. TSRA allows 

for the granting of one-year export licenses for shipping food and 

medicine to Cuba. However, no U.S. government assistance (including foreign assistance, export assistance, credits, or credit guarantees) can be made available to finance such exports. The law also 

denies exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or 

credit, and, as noted above, all transactions must be conducted 


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22Donna Rich Kaplowitz, Anatomy of a Failed Embargo, U.S. Sanctions Against Cuba (Lynne 

Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 152. 

with payment of cash in advance, or with financing from third 

countries. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102–484, Section 1705) allows commercial medical exports to Cuba under certain conditions. The law requires specific licenses for such transactions, and requires onsite verification to determine that the exported item is to be used for the purposes for which it was intended 

and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people. 

U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba 

Allowing U.S. foreign subsidiaries to trade with Cuba would require legislative action. A provision in the Cuban Democracy Act 

of 1992 (P.L. 102–484, Section 1706) prohibits U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba. When this provision went into effect, U.S. 

foreign subsidiary exports to Cuba amounted to over $400 million.22 This provision would have to be repealed for such trade to 

be allowed. 

Æ 


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