No. 251, December 2009 Strategic Forum 1

out a vision of U.S. policy toward the region. 

The vision relies on longstanding treaty 

allies in Southeast Asia—the Philippines, 

Thailand, and Australia—as “cornerstones 

of U.S. foreign policy.” However, that vision 

does not stop there: it is designed to build 

a “new comprehensive partnership” with 

Indonesia and Singapore, to increase cooperation with Malaysia and Vietnam, and “to 

forge new partnerships in places long disregarded. This includes our emerging dialogue 

with Cambodia, as well as developments with 

Laos.” The dialogue with Cambodia thus 

holds out the prospect of a new partnership 

with a “long disregarded” country.

The record of U.S. engagement with the 

Cambodian military in the years following 

the 1993 United Nations (UN)–supervised 

election suggests that Cambodian military 

officers were open to the idea of developing a 

bilateral relationship with their U.S. counterparts, relished the possibility of access to U.S. 

training and technology, welcomed opportunities to train in U.S. professional military 

educational institutions, and quickly learned 

the meaning of partnering through a variety of humanitarian assistance programs that 

paired the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces 

(RCAF) with American military counterparts 

from U.S. Pacific Command.

The relationship evolved through difficult periods marked by legislatively mandated 

restrictions on U.S. economic and security assistance in reaction to the 1997 coup. A prolonged 

Cambodia’s lax border controls, widespread corruption, extremely active arms 

trade, and surfeit of small arms remaining from 

the Third Indochina War have made Phnom 

Penh an attractive platform for transient interests, as well as a staging ground for numerous 

activities that challenge the safety and wellbeing of the region.

China has actively pursued security ties 

with Cambodia through modest assistance 

programs whose significance has been 

magnified by the lack of similar U.S. efforts, 

which were severely curtailed as a result of 

congressionally imposed restrictions in the 

aftermath of the 1997 coup.

U.S. interests in Southeast Asia would 

be well served by a stepped-up program of 

cooperation with Cambodia in areas such as 

counterterrorism, peacekeeping, counternarcotics, disaster response, and stability operations. 

U.S. early investment in Cambodia’s future, 

beginning with support for the regional peace 

process, would provide a useful foundation for 

cooperation between the two countries that 

would have beneficial impact for Southeast 

Asia as a whole.

A Prospect of Partnership

In his speech to the International 

Institute for Strategic Studies annual 

Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in late May 

2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates laid 

 Strategic Forum No. 251

December 2009

Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University

http://www.ndu.edu/inss

Key Points

U.S.-Cambodia Defense Relations: 

Defining New Possibilities

by Lewis M. Stern

tug of war over Hun Sen’s reluctance to adhere 

to U.S. Government conditions for Cambodian 

compliance with basic international standards 

of behavior on human rights, religious tolerance, and practices of good governance ensured 

close congressional scrutiny of U.S.-Cambodian 

relations. Hun Sen’s imperious way of dealing 

with political opposition and his high-handed 

manner with a struggling legislature intent on 

preserving its independence heightened congressional concerns. Successive U.S. administrations approached bilateral relations with 

Cambodia as limited to narrowly defined lanes, 

drawn to prevent direct U.S. assistance to Hun 

Sen’s government until such time as improvements in policies and practices could be certified to Congress by the President.

However, with tensions following the 

1997 coup receding over time, the domestic situation in Cambodia began to change. 

The dynamic of U.S.-Cambodian relations improved and developed. Gradually, 

Cambodia has evolved into a responsible 

regional actor. It demonstrated a willingness 

to take steps against terrorist threats by making critical arrests of members of a network 

accused of planning attacks in the country and by breaking up a local branch of an 

international network of Islamic extremists. Increasingly, the basic practices of governance improved, and countervailing 

powers within the Cambodian political system reshaped the more egregious authoritarian practices of political leaders, though the 
No. 251, December 2009 Strategic Forum 2

Cambodians continued to be plagued by old 

patterns of capital city politics, corruption 

and malfeasance, irregularities in the conduct of elections, and lingering bad attitudes 

toward the emergence of interest groups, new 

political parties, and opposition to the longruling Hun Sen.

In this context, relations between 

Washington and Phnom Penh matured and 

evolved in a way that allowed a much more 

direct path of engagement between the U.S. 

military and RCAF, which adopted rational 

approaches to institutional growth, civil-military 

relations, human rights practices, and modernizing requirements. The Cambodian military, by 

2008–2009, recognized the need to integrate the 

lessons of defense reforms, develop a new doctrine and modern organizational practices, sort 

out the issues surrounding the emerging need to 

improve maritime security capacity, and commit to multilateral cooperation in this and other 

areas of defense cooperation.

As one U.S. military security cooperation expert observed, RCAF modernization is 

on the fast track, but there are a lot of gaps 

in authorities, and there is a serious need to 

realign resources to meet requirements in 

order to develop a sound approach to securing inland waterways and ground borders 

and expanding RCAF capacity in peacekeeping, counterterrorism, civil-military operations, and disaster response.

Historical Context

To understand Cambodia today and discern the basis for the flexibility and adaptability that have shaped the first steps toward a 

new, more effective military engagement with 

RCAF, one has to go back to the origins of the 

coalition that shaped the last 10 years of fighting in Cambodia, before the UN-supervised 

settlement of a generation of war there.

The government in exile was concocted 

as a marriage of convenience between noncommunists and the Coalition Government of 

Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)—the rump 

of the Khmer Rouge (KR) party government 

evicted from Phnom Penh by the Vietnamese. 

That coalition was aimed at making sure 

the Vietnamese invasion and occupation 

of Cambodia would not go unpunished. In 

many ways it seemed that the world united to 

protect the idea of sovereignty, not to guarantee the survival of the Cambodian people.

This coalition assembled along the borders with Thailand, along a large arc from 

Trat Province to Sisaket. It was composed 

of survivors, escapees, and refugees. They 

were students, military officers and troops, 

government officials and functionaries, 

businessmen, the middle class, and farmers. They were also overseas Cambodians, 

privileged elites, and professors. Thrown 

together in the camps, they coalesced on 

the basis of their own vigorous nationalism 

and their own identity as victims and survivors. The Sihanoukist National Army, the 

organizational heir to the royalist power of 

the Norodom line, and the Khmer People’s 

Liberation Front, a paper tiger organization of nationalists intent on clinging to the 

embers of modernizing Cambodia, emerged 

in this context. They formed the core of the 

Non-Communist Resistance (NCR), and they 

were hopelessly outclassed by the Khmer 

Rouge, with whom they found themselves 

in uneasy alliance—the CGDK. The NCR 

was poorly organized, emotionally charged, 

and motivated in a detached and dangerous 

way. They were unprepared for the challenge 

of cohabiting in an artificial coalition with 

the Khmer Rouge and confronting KR forces 

in the field. They were politically naive and 

inexperienced, and unpracticed in the kind 

of command and control necessary to cope 

with the Khmer Rouge, a more sophisticated, better organized, ideologically motivated force.

From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, 

working the Cambodian issue from the 

defense and security perspective was—in 

the U.S. interagency context—a distressing assignment, requiring one to explain 

why a country that had long been understood as strategically irrelevant should suddenly attract Department of Defense (DOD) 

attention, U.S. resources, diplomatic energy, 

and international investments. And the truth 

is that for the longest time, Cambodia was 

indeed an afterthought—a “side show,” 

to use the dramatic metaphor William 

Shawcross selected as the title of his book 

on the Cambodian crisis. But the challenge 

of actually resolving the impasse, and ending decades’ worth of internal conflict, 

pressed interested parties to urge this course 

of action, to involve the United States in local 

Southeast Asian efforts to define a framework 

for achieving peace, and to establish a stable government on the basis of the ruins of 

a civilization with a range of highly factionalized interest groups intent on being part of 

this equation.

The Defense Department became 

invested in the peace process, providing military observers to the UN peacekeeping force 

deployed to Cambodia and responding to the 

requirement for unique DOD airlift capabilities in association with efforts to position 

the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 

(UNTAC). And DOD ultimately agreed to a 

long argument on behalf of the idea of placing a U.S. Defense Attaché in Phnom Penh as 

early as 1994, in the context of the establishment of the Royal Cambodian Government.

That outpost contributed to modest and 

nonlethal efforts to shape a national army 

from the assortment of noncommunist forces 

that were involved in the long slog to peace:

■ The Khmer People’s National 

Liberation Front (KPNLF), a motley assortment of modernists, self-proclaimed democratizers, anti-Sihanoukists, antimonarchists, 

and artifacts of the last government in 

Cambodia under Lon Nol, was headed by the 

aging Son Sann and his intellectual, Frencheducated son, Son Soubert. This force was 

supported in the field by the KPNLF armed 

forces, led by a range of former generals and 

statesmen, and well armed during the height 

of the conflict, but only marginally capable 

of anything more than brief (and frequently 

self-destructive) military acts.

■ The Sihanouk National Army (Armee 

National Sihanouk, or ANS) was an 

unabashedly royalist-minded group devoted 

exclusively to Norodom Sihanouk and his 

son, Prince Norodom Ranarith, who served 

Lewis M. Stern is a Visiting Research Fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National 

Defense University.
No. 251, December 2009 Strategic Forum 3

as the chief executive officer for the armed 

forces and the political wing of the ANS.

■ The People’s Republic of Kampuchea, 

Hun Sen’s government, garnered legitimacy 

for itself in the form of the State of Cambodia 

as the force that bore the brunt of opposition to the Khmer Rouge, after having driven 

into Phnom Penh in 1978 as the leading edge 

to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia, and as 

the core of the coalition that emerged under 

the protection of the Vietnamese forces in 

Cambodia.

■ The Coalition Government of 

Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge in 

temporary coalition with the NCR, arrogated 

a role for itself in the coalition that assembled 

a government following the UNTAC-supervised 

election by accepting (but not adhering to) 

guarantees to disarm and sequester itself in distinctive and controllable zones.

The Emergence of 

Postwar Cambodia

The challenge for all concerned—

the Cambodians, the UN, the United States, 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 

(ASEAN) members, and especially the former 

“frontline states” of Thailand and Singapore, 

the architects of the original peacekeeping 

structure (the Indonesians), and the international community—was to shape the framework to accommodate all these players, 

sustain the basic equation for a coalition government, and assemble a respectable national 

army and a workable structure of government 

on the ruins of these bloodied factions.

The framework called for a quadripartite 

formula for all national level instruments of 

governance. Ministries would reflect the four 

parties that participated in the peacekeeping and electoral process under UN supervision. Fashioning a unified national army, or 

a coherent, stable government, from this formula seemed impossible. The KPNLF, ANS, 

and proliferation of parties that emerged to 

contest in the election demanded a stake in 

the process. Between 1995 and 1997, none 

of the elements that were allowed to remain 

armed and to enter into the formation of a 

national army adopted a form of thinking 

that would have enabled the creation of a single, coherent national military. The KPNLF 

and ANS, and Hun Sen, continued to speak 

in terms of their own interests and organizations, making claims for a fair and balanced 

equation for selecting senior generals, promoting general officers, and making defense 

policy and military strategy that served narrow organizational (not national) interests.

There were serious centrifugal forces at 

work here. The PRK showed itself to be far 

more adept at basic organizational tasks. 

The small group of Cambodians competing 

for influence who made up the core of the 

State of Cambodia—the rubric under which 

the PRK competed for influence during the 

peacekeeping period—retained the ministerial organization, the structure of departments bequeathed by PRK. They functioned 

with a cadre-like set of staffing practices. 

They ran effective, organized meetings, and 

they deferred to a clear leadership. They took 

notes and sustained attention to key policy 

issues. They were familiar with bureaucratic 

practices and were a studied contrast with the 

monarchists, the Sihanoukist organization 

under the tight control of Norodom Ranarith 

and ultimately beholden to him personally; 

the monarchists were long on royal symbolism and protocol, but essentially incapable 

of the process, organization, and leadership 

needed to sustain a modern government. The 

KPNLF focused most of its attention on coping with Sihanoukist politics. From that core 

sprang Sam Rainsey, given to a virulent form 

of Cambodian nationalism that translated 

into an unbridled anti-Vietnamese platform 

preoccupied with confronting Hun Sen and 

undermining his iron lock on national power 

by any means possible.

Early U.S.-Cambodian 

Military Relations 

These patterns dominated Cambodian 

politics through the late 1990s and the early 

2000s, from the conflicted efforts to define 

common cause through the Hun Sen coup 

against his own government in 1997, and the 

subsequent uneasy years that focused primarily on coaxing Cambodia toward elections, 

a peaceful and fair-minded way of solving 

tough national issues, and reintegration into 

the region (and ASEAN membership).

Following the factional fighting in 

July 1997, U.S. legislation prohibited bilateral assistance to the central government. 

Other legislation required the United States 

to oppose International Financial Institution 

lending to the Cambodian government for all 

but basic human needs. A section on foreign 

operations in the Consolidated Appropriations 

Act for 2003 included “notwithstanding” language allowing bilateral assistance for basic 

education, cultural preservation, and combating human trafficking.

U.S. military assistance to the Royal 

Cambodian Armed Forces ceased in 1997. 

From that time forward, the United States 

invited a few RCAF representatives to multilateral meetings on humanitarian issues. 

Otherwise, support for the military and interaction with RCAF counterparts ceased.

In the aftermath of the July 1997 coup 

against Norodom Ranarith and the National 

United Front for an Independent, Neutral, 

Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Party, 

Hun Sen developed a closer relationship with 

China, in part to make up for the manner 

in which the U.S. cessation of economic and 

security assistance dried up the possibility of 

Cambodian military access to U.S. training 

and hardware. In the late 1990s, Cambodia 

closed Taiwan’s office in Phnom Penh and 

developed close trade relations with the 

People’s Republic of China, with which it 

became enmeshed in a full program of public diplomacy including progressively higher 

level visits from Beijing and RCAF visits to 

China in the late 1990s and early 2000s in 

search of Chinese assistance. During 2000–

2003, China promised Cambodian military delegations assistance in footing the 

the challenge was 

to sustain the basic 

equation for a coalition 

government, and assemble 

a respectable national 

army and a workable 

structure of government
Younger, better educated, increasingly cosmopolitan Cambodian professionals have begun to articulate their interests, 

to act on what they know and have learned, 

and to make a difference in some meaningful if narrow ways. Cambodian officers have 

attended the Asia Pacific Center for Security 

Studies, studied at the Industrial College 

of the Armed Forces, used IMET monies 

to study English, and participated in other 

professionalizing, capacity-building training experiences.

These have made some differences, 

though they have not necessarily dulled the 

old instincts, cultural preferences, and historical patterns when it comes to conducting politics, managing relationships, exerting 

influence and authority, and undertaking the 

responsibilities of governance and defense.

Rebuilding Defense 

Relations 

In 2004, after almost a year’s worth of 

consultations with Congress, DOD launched 

modest efforts to rebuild defense relations 

with Cambodia, focusing on:

■ reintegrating Cambodia into a system of multilateral conferences on terrorism, transnational issues, humanitarian 

disaster response conferences, and seminars 

on regional security; Cambodian government officials were invited to the Asia Pacific 

Center for Security Studies in Hawaii

■ seeking to utilize appropriate resources 

on bilateral activities including demining, 

engineering training, search and rescue and 

disaster response, medical seminars, peacekeeping, and excess property programs

■ acting in practical ways, such as planning a ship visit and dispatching assessment 

teams to work with RCAF on facility development; DOD also continued to explore opportunities for training, using IMET, and for foreign 

military sales supporting the development of 

a professional Cambodian military and relying on programs such as the Defense Resource 

Management program.

At this point, the Department of Defense 

continues to encourage Cambodia to adopt 

transparent governance, sustain the rule of law, 

bill for RCAF’s demobilization, construction of training and demobilization facilities, and unspecified hardware. Cambodia’s 

frustration with the limits on U.S. assistance and the legislative parameters imposed 

on direct U.S. Government assistance to the 

Cambodian government and military in the 

aftermath of the 1997 coup promoted Phnom 

Penh’s shopping expeditions.

Domestic Change

By the early 2000s, the domestic situation in Cambodia had changed. The 

dynamic of U.S.-Cambodian relations 

improved and developed, after years of congressional ire at Hun Sen and complex and 

restrictive legislation prohibiting direct 

U.S. assistance to the Royal Cambodian 

Government. Cambodia:

■ demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the regional association on transnational crime and efforts to control the flow of 

illicit narcotics

■ sustained its work with the United 

Nations Development Program’s countermine 

efforts

■ sent officials to the International 

Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, and 

worked with the U.S. Joint Interagency Task 

Force–West on counternarcotics missions 

focused on the Mekong, Poipet, Koh Kong, 

and Gulf of Thailand

■ expressed an interest in working with the 

United States to gain a peacekeeping capability.

In 2003–2004, the Washington interagency policy community began to explore 

possibilities for resuming programs with 

RCAF. For example, in the Congressional 

Budget Justification for fiscal year 2004, the 

State Department proposed the use of international military education and training 

(IMET) funds for human rights and rule of 

law training to help professionalize RCAF.

Beijing had 6 years to develop relations 

with the Cambodian military in a vacuum 

created by the U.S. suspension of military 

relations in 1997:

■ During 2000–2003, Cambodian military delegations visiting China were promised 

No. 251, December 2009 Strategic Forum 4

that Beijing would help foot the bill for RCAF 

demobilization.

■ Beijing invested in the construction of 

military training and demobilization facilities, offered training to RCAF, and promised 

unspecified hardware.

■ Senior Cambodian government and 

military officials privately expressed frustration with the limits on U.S. assistance and 

the legislative parameters imposed on U.S. 

Government assistance.1

Cambodia began to evolve into a responsible regional actor, demonstrating a willingness 

to take effective steps against terrorist threats:

■ Cambodia made critical arrests of foreigners associated with Jemaah Islamiyah.

■ Phnom Penh crafted a new national 

policy on Islamic issues.

■ Hun Sen defined his goal as seeking to 

exclude Wahhabism.

■ Cambodia cooperated in the destruction of its stocks of surface-to-air missiles.

Party politics matured. Hun Sen became 

more strategic in his thinking about internal politics, and Norodom Ranarith factored 

himself out of the equation by failing to modernize his political organization, alienating 

friends and allies, and attempting to thrive on 

the fumes of diminishing royal influence.

Some old patterns endured, though. 

Cambodian politics remain a traditional 

capital city politics, removed from the interests of the countryside, highly personalized, 

and potentially primordial with a tendency 

to resolve conflict through violence. And 

while the drive-by politics that characterized Phnom Penh in the post-UNTAC period, 

through the late 1990s, has been somewhat 

civilized over time, the instincts for settling 

disputes in zero-sum terms have not quite 

been bled out of the Cambodian system.

Civil society has adapted, and begun to 

emerge, perhaps slightly less hesitantly than 

was the case after the UN-sponsored election 

in the mid-1990s. Cambodian officials have 

had exposure to other ways of doing business, organizing for impact and effectiveness, 

and conducting the business of government 

in accordance with standards of behavior and 

rule of law.
No. 251, December 2009 Strategic Forum 5

and hold fast to a democratic path. Cambodia 

has assumed a larger role in enhancing 

regional stability and sustaining cooperation on 

counterterrorism and counternarcotics cooperation. It has contributed demining troops to 

peacekeeping in Sudan and volunteered for 

peacekeeping in East Timor. Cambodia cooperates with the State Partnership Program, 

which pairs U.S. National Guard units with 

Cambodian provinces for practical cooperation, for example, on humanitarian assistance 

capability development. Cambodia is being 

encouraged to use IMET and foreign military 

financing resources for mainstream military 

purposes such as vehicle maintenance, logistics 

training, and peacekeeping operations capability development. And Cambodia has agreed 

to place a defense attaché in Washington, 14 

years after we opened a Defense Attaché office 

in Phnom Penh.

Basis for Ongoing 

Cooperation

RCAF is now committed to a longterm process of reform and force structure 

review. The United States and other countries such as Australia are cooperating with 

the American-educated officers responsible for drafting three iterations of a forwardlooking Cambodian defense white paper.2

A core group of reformers within RCAF and 

the Royal Cambodian Government is committed to structural reform, which has had 

some initial success in the form of a maritime security initiative and the creation of a 

central coordinating authority for maritime 

security. The Cambodians have embraced 

a multiphased plan that began with a midAugust 2009 visit by representatives from the 

Naval Postgraduate School Center for Civil 

Military Relations; the school conducted 

a 1-day defense policy development workshop for senior defense leaders and 2 days 

of RCAF discussions on current defense policy. A high-level RCAF working group has 

been formed to take the outcomes from those 

discussions and develop new defense policies and a sound basis for a force structure 

review.3 In mid-September 2009, the working group was scheduled to visit Washington, 

DC, for discussions with U.S. defense experts, 

funded under Title 10 Asia Pacific Regional 

Initiative funds. In the same time frame, 

Cambodian Minister of Defense Tea Banh 

visited the Pentagon for meetings with the 

Secretary of Defense.4 The Defense Strategy 

Review Working Group has been tasked with 

updating RCAF’s defense strategic policy by 

the second quarter of fiscal year 2010. Key 

priorities are force modernization, border 

security, maritime security, counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations capacity, and 

civil-military operations. The top priority is 

addressing force structure and bureaucracy 

reforms, specifically how to reduce overlapping bureaucracies within the ministry of 

defense, the high command, and the army; 

and how to implement compulsory military 

service and fix the legal authorities to eliminate the estimated 10,000 personnel who are 

still on the rolls but are either retired, need 

to retire, or already deceased.

Cambodia is intent on enhancing bilateral defense relations with the United States 

and hopes for U.S. involvement in RCAF’s 

modernization process. The Cambodian military leadership is prepared to discuss strategic policy development, plans and intentions 

for force modernization, border and maritime security, counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations capacity, and civil-military 

operations capacity.

The Way Forward

The United States joined the international community in making a commitment, 

through the UN, to help rebuild Cambodia. 

That mission carried with it a range of continuing responsibilities: building RCAF into a 

credible national institution from its origins 

as an army of competing factions, promoting 

security, supporting economic development 

and better governance, and encouraging 

political reconciliation.

To sustain that commitment, and to 

ensure that U.S.-Cambodian defense and 

security cooperation continues on a positive 

trajectory, the two countries need to take specific deliberate steps.

First, the United States and its 

Cambodian partner need to continue the 

longstanding commitment to humanitarian 

mine action, the flagship program of successful collaboration between the United States 

and Cambodia since 1993. Cooperation with 

the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), 

Cambodia’s national institution entrusted 

with clearing landmines and unexploded 

devices, needs to be sustained by the tandem 

effort of cultivating the continuing interest 

of international nongovernmental organizations in demining programs and developing 

an indigenous demining capacity through 

CMAC and the Cambodian Mine Action and 

Victim’s Assistance Authority. Continuing cuts 

to foreign assistance funding to Cambodia 

will have a severe impact on a humanitarian mine action program that has, since 

the early 1990s, been a true model program 

in the region. Cambodia’s contribution of a 

demining company to the UN Darfur mission 

beginning in April 2006 and its commitment 

to establishing a regional peacekeeping center are the most positive regional dividends 

from this early investment.

Second, Washington and Phnom Penh 

need to continue to take concrete steps 

toward cooperation in counterterrorism, 

including the development of Cambodia’s 

potential as a force provider for stability operations, and cooperation on counternarcotics activism. Cambodian participation in 

peacekeeping exercises, involvement in development of resources such as the National 

Counterterrorism Center, and collaboration with the U.S. joint interagency task force 

on counternarcotics (including the development of a national training center) are notable models for future training cooperation 

that underscore Cambodia’s commitment 

to playing a larger role in international and 

regional security. The effective utilization of 

IMET and Global Peacekeeping Operations 

Initiative resources available as the result 

Cambodia is intent on 

enhancing bilateral 

defense relations with 

the United States 

and hopes for U.S. 

involvement in its military 

modernization process
Notes

1

 Some observers are concerned with the practice of 

Chinese defense and security engagement, specifically pointing to Beijing’s support for an extensive program of “schools” 

in Southeast Asia (such as in Cambodia). The level, intensity, 

and continuity of that support might be far less than initially 

suspected. China committed to providing barracks for RCAF 

troops, and indeed publicly stated its willingness in 1997–

1998 to provide training for RCAF, to make up the deficit 

resulting from the suspension of U.S. economic and security 

assistance in the aftermath of the Hun Sen quasi-coup. There 

may not be any RCAF officers or foreign military attachés in 

Phnom Penh prepared to say that the Chinese investments in 

the Cambodian military establishment were profound, systematic, and of enduring value. They were made at a time 

when a pittance would have been heralded by the leadership 

in Phnom Penh as a major windfall in the face of the end of 

the U.S. assistance program, such as it was in the 1996–1997 

period. Frankly, China’s willingness to make up the difference between the pre-coup level of U.S. foreign military sales 

and military training for Thailand in September 2006 is a 

much more compelling argument on behalf of the idea that 

China has designs to replace the United States, or at least to 

underscore how much more reliable Beijing is as a friend and 

ally and source of hardware and support.

2

 As a senior U.S. Army officer serving the security cooperation part of the relationship observed, the first 

white paper “was written by the only U.S. Army War College 

Alum[nus] and read by his boss. The second version was written by the same person and read within MoND [Ministry of 

National Defense]. The third version was written, printed, and 

read by the prime minster and others who have been quoting it. At this stage, they’re ready to take it to the next level by 

bringing together all the leadership to review and comment 

on the strategy.” Author email correspondence with senior 

U.S. Army officer, August 2009.

3

 The Defense Security Review Working Group consists of Lieutenant General Nem Sowath, General Director for 

Policy and International Affairs Affairs, Ministry of Defense 

(MOD); Lieutenant General Suon Samnang, Deputy to 

Sowath and Director of Policy and Plans; MOD Major General 

Mam Sam, Chief of Cabinet to the Chief of General Staff; 

Major General Khiev Saphat, Deputy Director of Personnel 

Department; MOD Major General Phat Vibolsopheak, Director, 

International Relations Department; and MOD Brigadier 

General Hun Manet, Commander, National Counterterrorism 

Special Forces.

4

 Tea Banh visited Washington in 1995 as Co-Defense 

Minister, when the State of Cambodia and the noncommunists were dividing the top seats of several strategic ministries. Co-Defense Minister Tea Chamrath visited Washington, 

DC, in 1994.

of shifts in the congressional view of 

Cambodian-U.S. cooperation allows concrete 

steps in these areas. Foreign military funding 

of communications and surveillance equipment and small boats that enabled Cambodia 

to begin addressing border security deficiencies needs to be continued.

Third, the bilateral commitment to 

highly visible acts of naval diplomacy, including ship visits and port calls by U.S. hospital ships such as the USNS Mercy, contribute 

to goodwill and stoke joint efforts to develop 

medical training, humanitarian assistance, 

and disaster relief capabilities.

Fourth, Cambodia needs to be unwavering in its commitment to the Defense Resource 

Management Study (DRMS) program, aimed at 

offering RCAF professional guidance on management practices, methods for enhancing transparency and accountability, means of acquiring 

new capabilities, and steps that could be taken 

to deepen bilateral staff and senior level military exchanges. RCAF has recognized the need 

to do more effective work in the area of retaining 

trained officers and specialists. The United States 

needs to follow through on the DRMS program 

as a mechanism for focusing on such issues.

Fifth, RCAF needs to place a defense attaché in Washington. The United States has had 

an Attaché in Phnom Penh since the establishment of the Royal Cambodian Government 

at the culmination of the UNTAC mission. 

The United States has long recommended 

that Phnom Penh consider the utility of opening a small defense attaché office in its modest embassy in Washington; this would be an 

important link in the chain of communications necessary to help the two countries work 

together on mutual security issues in a way 

that would enhance bilateral defense engagement. Cambodia is indeed committed to placing a defense attaché in Washington and 

should take the steps necessary to do so quickly 

in a way that would signal recognition that 

such an act would be a part of the formula for 

invigorating bilateral defense relations.

In Southeast Asia, the challenges are 

developing the new relationships singled out 

by the Secretary of Defense in his mid-2009 

speech and cultivating the possibilities that 

spring from inventive forms of cooperation 

and newly created niche capabilities in the 

context of severely constrained resources.

Cambodia is predisposed to a wide array 

of collaborative activities, including facility 

access, unique training, a robust schedule of 

ship visits, peacekeeping cooperation, and a 

much broader range of multilateral engagement aimed at taking on new challenges and 

transnational threats. Cambodia appears to be 

prepared to conduct port calls and ship visits, 

and might very well be amenable to underwriting these efforts with a cross-servicing 

agreement, diversifying ship visit activities to 

include flyouts, passing exercises, tandem port 

calls, and refueling exercises. Cambodia was 

very predisposed in the early 2000s to work 

with U.S. Pacific Command survey teams to 

discern military airport and maritime seaport 

modernization requirements.

After a generation of devastating armed conflict that imprinted severe 

divisions among several warring factions on Cambodia’s political DNA, sapped 

national strength, and made Cambodia 

one of the world’s neediest basket cases, the 

Royal Cambodian Government and Royal 

Cambodian Armed Forces appear to be positioned to commit to a partnership, are 

inclined to extend training opportunities and 

facility access to the United States, and are 

less hobbled by severe allergies to alignment, 

engagement, and the active presence of U.S. 

forces on Cambodian soil.

This makes Cambodia one of the building 

blocks of U.S. engagement policy in Southeast 

Asia, a potentially important part of the framework of alliances and friendships energized by 

a new approach to existing threats and contemporary challenges and founded in the effort to 

build partnership capacity.

No. 251, December 2009 Strategic Forum 6

The Strategic Forum series presents original research by 

members of NDU as well as other scholars and specialists 

in national security affairs from this country and abroad. The 

opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied 

within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect 

the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of 

the Federal Government. NDU Press also produces Joint Force 

Quarterly (JFQ) for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For 

more information on NDU Press and access to JFQ, visit the Web 

site at www.ndupress.edu. 

The Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy 

research and strategic gaming organization within the National 

Defense University (NDU) serving the Department of Defense, 

its components, and interagency partners. The institute provides 

senior decisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming 

events and supports NDU educational programs in the areas of 

international security affairs and defense studies. Through an 

active outreach program, including conferences and publications, 

INSS seeks to promote understanding of emerging strategic 

challenges and policy options.

 

I N S T I T U T E F O R N A T I O N A L S T R A T E G I C S T U D I E S

David H. Gurney

Director, NDU Press

Eugene B. Rumer

Interim Director and Director of Research