[Cite as Jamison v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2014-Ohio-4906.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

JESSICA L. JAMISON 

 Plaintiff-Appellant 

-vsBOARD OF STARK COUNTY 

COMMISSIONERS, ET AL 

 Defendants-Appellees 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

: Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2014CA00044 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil appeal from the Stark County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 2013CV01528 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 3, 2014 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendants-Appellees 

DAVID SPALDING RICHARD NICODEMO 

157 Wilbur Drive N.E. ROSS RHODES 

North Canton, OH 44720 110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510 

 Canton, OH 44702 
[Cite as Jamison v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2014-Ohio-4906.]

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant appeals the September 24, 2013 judgment entry of the Stark 

County Common Pleas Court granting appellees’ motions for summary judgment. 

Facts & Procedural History

{¶2} In February of 2013, appellant Jessica Jamison (“Jamison”) began doing 

volunteer work at the Stark County Dog Pound in order to fulfill one of the requirements 

for a class she was taking at Mount Union College. On March 7, 2013, appellant 

selected a pit bull being housed at the dog pound for a training exercise. Appellant was 

bitten by the pit bull during a “clicker training” exercise. 

{¶3} Appellant filed a complaint on June 6, 2013, alleging several causes of 

action. In Count I, appellant moves for declaratory judgment as to the liability of 

appellee Stark County Board of Commissioners (“Board”) and Stark County Dog 

Warden’s Department as to whether R.C. 955.28(B) imposes strict liability on the Board 

and a finding that said statute does not contain an exception for governmental or 

sovereign immunity. In Count II of appellant’s complaint, appellant seeks declaratory 

judgment as to the strict liability of appellees Reagan Tetreault (“Tetreault”) and Jane 

Doe pursuant to R.C. 955.28(B) as keepers and/or harborers of the pit bull at the time of 

the incident. In Count III, appellant alleges that the actions of the appellees in 

permitting appellant to be exposed to the pit bull while performing her volunteer work at 

the dog pound was in bad faith and constituted wanton and/or reckless conduct. In 

Count IV, appellant asserts claims for personal and bodily injury based on principles of 

common law negligence. 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 3 

{¶4} The trial court granted a motion to dismiss by the Stark County Dog 

Warden’s Department based upon the fact that the Stark County Board of 

Commissioners, also a named party, was the proper party to the action. Appellees filed 

a motion to dismiss Counts I, II, and III, which the trial court denied. On August 7, 2013, 

appellant filed a motion for summary judgment and for declaratory judgment as to 

Counts I and II of her complaint. Appellant argued that there are no permissible 

defenses to liability in R.C. 955.28(B) other than what is specifically provided in the 

statute and thus sovereign immunity is not an exception to liability under R.C. 

955.28(B). On August 14, 2013, the Board moved for summary judgment as to all 

counts of the complaint and appellees Tetreault and Jane Doe moved for summary 

judgment as to Counts I, II, and II of the complaint and partial summary judgment as to 

Count IV, except as it relates to bad faith, wanton, or reckless conduct. Appellees 

argued that R.C. 955.28(B) does not specifically impose liability on political subdivisions 

or their employees and thus they are immune from liability as the running of the dog 

pound is a governmental function. 

{¶5} The trial court issued a judgment entry on September 24, 2013 and stated 

that there is no dispute that the Board is a political subdivision for purposes of R.C. 

2744.02 or that holding dogs at the Stark County Dog Pound is a governmental function 

pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A)(1). The trial court found R.C. 955.28(B) does not 

expressly impose liability on a political subdivision and thus the Board is immune from 

liability. Further, with regards to the individual employees, that R.C. 955.28(B) does not 

expressly impose liability on employees of a political subdivision to waive immunity 

pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c). The trial court found appellant’s argument as to the 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 4 

strict liability of R.C. 955.28(B) to be without merit. The trial court found there was a 

genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether Tetreault and Jane Doe acted with 

malicious purpose, bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. On February 10, 2014, 

appellant filed a motion to dismiss Count III, bad faith and wanton and/or reckless 

conduct, with prejudice. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on February 12, 

2014. Appellant appeals the September 24, 2013 judgment entry and assigns the 

following as error: 

{¶6} “I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS APPELLANT’S 

ARGUMENT THAT APPELLEES ARE STRICTLY LIABLE FOR MS. JAMISON’S 

INJURIES UNDER R.C. 955.28 AND ADDITIONALLY FAILED TO ADDRESS THE 

CONFLICT WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN R.C. 955.28 AND R.C. 2744.01 ET SEQ., 

PURSUANT TO THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS OF THIS CASE. 

{¶7} "II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT R.C. 955.28(B) 

CONSTITUTES AN EXCEPTION TO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY UNDER R.C. 

2744.03(A)(6)(C), WITH REGARD TO EMPLOYEES OF A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION.” 

Summary Judgment 

{¶8} Civ.R. 56 states, in pertinent part: 

Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written 

admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written 

stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 5 

evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated 

in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered 

unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only 

from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can 

come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse 

to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment 

is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or 

stipulation construed mostly strongly in the party’s favor. A 

summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be 

rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 

genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 

{¶9} A trial court should not enter a summary judgment if it appears a material 

fact is genuinely disputed, nor if, construing the allegations most favorably towards the 

non-moving party, reasonable minds could draw different conclusions from the 

undisputed facts. Hounshell v. Am. States Ins. Co., 67 Ohio St.2d 427, 424 N.E.2d 311 

(1981). The court may not resolve any ambiguities in the evidence presented. Inland 

Refuse Transfer Co. v. Browning-Ferris Inds. of Ohio, Inc., 15 Ohio St.3d 321, 474 

N.E.2d 271 (1984). A fact is material if it affects the outcome of the case under the 

applicable substantive law. Russell v. Interim Personnel, Inc., 135 Ohio App.3d 301, 

733 N.E.2d 1186 (6th Dist. 1999). 

{¶10} When reviewing a trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment, an 

appellate court applies the same standard used by the trial court. Smiddy v. The 

Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 506 N.E.2d 212 (1987). This means we review 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 6 

the matter de novo. Doe v. Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 2000-Ohio-186, 738 N.E.2d 

1243. 

{¶11} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of 

informing the trial court of the basis of the motion and identifying the portions of the 

record which demonstrates absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of 

the non-moving party’s claim. Drescher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 662 N.E.2d 264 

(1996). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact 

does exist. Id. The non-moving party may not rest upon the allegations and denials in 

the pleadings, but instead must submit some evidentiary materials showing a genuine 

dispute over material facts. Henkle v. Henkle, 75 Ohio App.3d 732, 600 N.E.2d 791 

(12th Dist. 1991). 

I. 

{¶12} Appellant first argues that the Board is strictly liable for her injuries 

pursuant to R.C. 955.28(B). Specifically, that the immunity in R.C. 2744 applies to “acts 

or omissions” of a political subdivision and since R.C. 955.28(B) is not based upon an 

“act or omission” and instead is based upon strict liability, R.C. 2744 immunity is not 

applicable. Appellant concludes that R.C. 2744 immunity applies only to negligent or 

intentional acts, but not strict liability statutes. We disagree. 

{¶13} At common law, the keeper of a vicious dog could not be liable for 

personal injury caused by the dog unless the keeper knew of the dog’s vicious 

propensities. Beckett v. Warren, 124 Ohio St.3d 256, 2010-Ohio-4, 921 N.E.2d 624. 

The strict liability statute of R.C. 955.28(B) “eliminated the necessity of pleading and 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 7 

proving the keeper’s knowledge of the dog’s viciousness.” Id. Consequently, in an 

action for damages under R.C. 955.28(B), the plaintiff must prove (1) ownership, 

keepership, or harborship of the dog; (2) proximate cause; and (3) damages. Id. The 

defendant’s knowledge of the dog’s viciousness and the defendant’s negligence in 

keeping the dog are irrelevant in a statutory action.” Id. 

{¶14} R.C. 2744.02(A) provides that a political subdivision is “not liable in 

damages in a civil action for injury * * * to person or property allegedly caused by any 

act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in 

connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” In this case, there is no 

dispute that the Board is a political subdivision or that the injury occurred in connection 

with a governmental function of the dog pound. Further, strict liability is “liability that 

does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach 

of an absolute duty to make something safe.” Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). 

Strict liability is also termed “liability without fault.” Sikora v. Wenzel, 88 Ohio St.3d 493, 

2000-Ohio-406, 727 N.E.2d 1277. 

{¶15} The reference to an “act or omission” in R.C. 2744.02(A) does not 

summarily exclude all strict liability statutes from the general grant of immunity in R.C. 

2744. While strict liability removes the necessity of proving the act or omission was 

negligent (i.e. fault) and, with regards to the dog bite statute, removes the necessity of 

proving the defendant’s knowledge of a dog’s viciousness, it does not remove the 

requirement that there must be an act or omission for liability to be imposed. As noted 

above, to succeed under R.C. 955.28(B), a plaintiff must still prove that the defendant 

kept, harbored, or owned the dog, which all constitute “actions.” Further, a plaintiff must 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 8 

also prove that the dog proximately caused the injuries. Proximate cause is defined as 

“some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and the 

damage the plaintiff has suffered.” R.H. Macy & Co. Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 51 Ohio 

St.3d 108, 554 N.E.2d 1313 (1990). Accordingly, appellant’s argument that there is no 

“act” or “omission” as required for R.C. 2744 immunity due to the strict liability of R.C. 

955.28(B) is not well-taken. 

{¶16} In her first assignment of error, appellant also argues that R.C. 2744 and 

R.C. 955.28(B) cannot be reconciled and, when a conflict exists, the more specific 

statute of R.C. 955.28(B) is controlling. We disagree. 

{¶17} “It is a well-settled rule of statutory interpretation that statutory provisions 

be construed together and the Revised Code be read as an interrelated body of law.” 

Summerville v. Forest Park, 128 Ohio St.3d 221, 2010-Ohio-6280, 943 N.E.2d 522. 

R.C. 1.51 provides that when statutory provisions are in conflict, “they shall be 

construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both.” When construing a statute, the 

paramount concern is “the legislative intent in the statute’s enactment, and to discern 

that intent, we read the words and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar 

and common usage.” Wilson v. Kasichi, 134 Ohio St.3d 221, 2012-Ohio-5367, 981 

N.E.2d 814. 

{¶18} R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) establishes a grant of general immunity to political 

subdivisions and R.C. 955.28(B) imposes strict liability on an owner, keeper, or harborer 

of a dog for an injury caused by the dog. On their face, utilizing the common usages of 

the words and phrases in the two statutes, there is no conflict between R.C. 2744.02(A) 

and R.C. 955.28(B). R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), also included in the Political Subdivision Tort 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 9 

Liability Act, creates an exception to immunity “when civil liability is expressly imposed 

upon the political subdivision by a section of the Revised Code.” Thus, only when a 

statute imposing liability contains such an express imposition of liability on political 

subdivisions is it the “more specific” statute on the question of liability. R.C. 955.28(B) 

does not have any language expressly creating liability upon a political subdivision. 

Perry v. City of East Cleveland, 11th Dist. Lake No. 95-L-111, 1996 WL 200558 (Feb. 

16, 1996). Accordingly, the statutory provisions can be construed together and read as 

an interrelated body of law, giving effect to both R.C. 2744 and R.C. 955.28. 

{¶19} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

II. 

{¶20} Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to recognize that R.C. 

955.28(B) constitutes an exception to sovereign immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) 

with regards to employees of a political subdivision. We disagree. 

{¶21} R.C. 2744.03(A)(6) provides immunity to an employee of a political 

subdivision unless an exception found within R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a) through (c) applies. 

R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) provides that an employee may be liable if “[l]iability is expressly 

imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code.” This language is 

identical to the language found in R.C. 2744.02(B)(5). 

{¶22} When interpreting statutes, we must give words their ordinary and natural 

meaning unless a different interpretation appears in the statute. Layman v. Woo, 78 

Ohio St.3d 485, 678 N.E.2d 1217 (1997). The ordinary meaning of the word “expressly” 

is “in direct or unmistakable terms; in an express manner; explicitly, definitely, directly.” 

Butler v. Jordan, 92 Ohio St.3d 354, 2001-Ohio-204, 750 N.E.2d 554, quoting Webster’s 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 10 

Third New International Dictionary 803 (1986). A general imposition of liability is not 

sufficient to impose liability pursuant to R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c). O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 

Ohio St.3d 374, 889 N.E.2d 505 (2008). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the 

term “person” in a statute is too general to impose liability on an employee of a political 

subdivision whereas a statute imposing liability on a “home” when “home” was defined 

by the statute as specifically including homes run by the political subdivision and a 

statute expressly imposing liability on specific, named, county employees (“school 

teacher,” “school employee,” “school authority”) with regards to reporting child abuse 

and neglect are sufficient to invoke the R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) exception and impose 

liability on the employees of the political subdivision. Id.; Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 

Ohio St.3d 266, 2007-Ohio-1946, 865 N.E.2d 9; Campbell v. Burton, 92 Ohio St.3d 336, 

2001-Ohio-206, 750 N.E.2d 539. Words which refer to an entire class which may 

include employees of a political subdivision but do not expressly, explicitly, or directly 

reference employees of a political subdivision are not sufficient to expressly impose 

liability under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c). Cramer v. Auglaize Acres, 113 Ohio St.3d 266, 

2007-Ohio-1946, 865 N.E.2d 9; O’Toole v. Denihan, 118 Ohio St.3d 374, 889 N.E.2d 

505 (2008). 

{¶23} In this case, R.C. 955.28(B) uses the words “keeper, owner, or harborer” 

without any reference to political subdivisions or their employees as the terms “keeper, 

owner, or harborer” are not defined anywhere in Revised Code Section 955, entitled 

“Dogs”. There is no indication in the language of Revised Code Section 955.28 that the 

General Assembly has abrogated the immunity provided to employees of a political 

subdivision with an express imposition of liability. R.C. 955.28(B) does not 
Stark County, Case No. 2014CA00044 11 

unmistakably, explicitly, or definitely state that an employee of a political subdivision is 

liable. Without any express imposition of liability, the R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(c) exception is 

not triggered and appellees Tetreault and Jane Doe are entitled to immunity. Further, 

the primary case cited by appellant is factually distinguishable from the case at hand 

dealing with the operation of a dog pound as it arose in the context of the handling of a 

police K-9 dog at home with a deputy sheriff. Hicks v. Allen, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 

2005-A-0002, 2007-Ohio-693. 

{¶24} Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶25} Based on the forgoing, appellant’s assignments of errors are overruled 

and the September 24, 2013 judgment entry of the Stark County Common Pleas Court 

is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Wise, J., and 

Baldwin, J., concur