J-S13023-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

ABDULHAMID M. ALMANSOURI 

 Appellant No. 978 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 22, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0016022-2013 

 CP-02-CR-0016023-2013 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUNDY, J., and STABILE, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED APRIL 14, 2015 

 Appellant, Abdulhamid M. Almansouri, appeals from the May 22, 2014 

aggregate judgment of sentence of time served followed by five and one-half 

years’ probation after being found guilty of four counts of indecent assault 

and three counts of harassment.1 After careful review, we affirm. 

 The certified record discloses the following relevant factual background 

of this case. Appellant was employed as a cook at Providence Point, a 

retirement home with assisted living facilities and non-assisted living 

facilities. N.T., 4/15/14, at 26-27. Over the span of several months in 

2013, Appellant inappropriately touched four women who also worked in 

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1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(1) and 2709(a)(1), respectively. 
J-S13023-15 

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food services at Providence Point. The first woman, Kathleen Jumblat, who 

was a server in the Providence Point deli, testified to two incidents of 

nonconsensual touching. In the first, Appellant wrapped his arms around 

her waist from behind. Id. at 30. Within weeks of the first incident, when 

she was alone in the walk-in cooler getting supplies, Appellant approached 

her from behind without announcing himself and touched her breasts while 

she had her arms raised to reach a shelf. Id. at 30-31. The second woman, 

Candy Steiner, a cook at Providence Point, also testified that Appellant 

“grabbed [her] breast[s]” while she was alone in the walk-in cooler. Id. at 

51. The third woman, Kimberly Seibel, a server for one of the dining rooms 

at Providence Point, testified to multiple incidents. She stated that they 

always occurred when she was alone either in the vacant dining room or in 

the walk-in coolers. Id. at 67. The first time, Appellant hugged her, 

touching her breasts and buttocks, and would not let her go. Id. at 73. A 

few days later, Appellant approached her from behind without announcing 

himself while she was at her computer workstation and grabbed her breasts. 

Id. at 76-77. Weeks later, Appellant approached her in the walk-in cooler 

and touched her breasts again. Id. at 80. 

The fourth woman, Chalise Schultz, worked for a management 

company that managed the Providence Point dining rooms. She testified 

that on March 24, 2013, she was sitting at her desk checking e-mails on her 

computer when Appellant approached her from behind, reached over her 
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shoulder, and brushed his hand down her body over her breast. Id. at 89. 

Although Appellant did not say what he was doing, Schultz thought he was 

attempting to reach the tape behind her computer monitor. Id. She 

testified that, while his hand did not linger on her body, “the touch was 

deliberate.” Id. at 99. Later that day, she told the managing chef at 

Providence Point about the incident because her direct supervisor was not 

present. Id. at 100. She later reported the incident to the police after she 

learned other women had similar experiences with Appellant. Id. at 95. 

 By two criminal informations filed on December 23, 2013, the 

Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned offenses. 

Specifically, the information filed at docket number CP-02-CR0016022-2013 

(docket number 16022) charged Appellant with the indecent assault of 

Schultz while the information filed at docket number CP-02-CR-0016023-

2013 (docket number 16023) charged Appellant with three counts each of 

indecent assault and harassment for the incidents with the three other 

women. On December 26, 2013, the Commonwealth filed its Pennsylvania 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 582(B)(1)2 notice that it intended to join the two 

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2

 Rule 582 provides, in relevant part, as follows. 

Rule 582. Joinder--Trial of Separate 

Indictments or Informations

(A) Standards 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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cases and try them together. Appellant did not raise a challenge to the 

joinder. On April 15, 2014, a two-day jury trial commenced. On April 16, 

2014, the jury found Appellant guilty of all four counts of indecent assault. 

The trial court then found Appellant guilty of the three summary counts of 

harassment. Thereafter, on May 22, 2014, the trial court sentenced 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

(1) Offenses charged in separate indictments 

or informations may be tried together if: 

 

(a) the evidence of each of the offenses 

would be admissible in a separate trial 

for the other and is capable of separation 

by the jury so that there is no danger of 

confusion; or 

 

(b) the offenses charged are based on 

the same act or transaction. 

(2) Defendants charged in separate 

indictments or informations may be tried 

together if they are alleged to have 

participated in the same act or transaction or 

in the same series of acts or transactions 

constituting an offense or offenses. 

(B) Procedure 

(1) Notice that offenses or defendants charged 

in separate indictments or informations will be 

tried together shall be in writing and filed with 

the clerk of courts. A copy of the notice shall 

be served on the defendant at or before 

arraignment. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)-(B)(1). 
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Appellant to time served followed by five and one-half years’ probation.3 

Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion. Appellant filed a timely notice 

of appeal on June 16, 2014.4

 On appeal, Appellant presents the following two issues for our review. 

I. Was the evidence insufficient to prove, beyond 

a reasonable doubt, that [Appellant] commited 

[sic] indecent assault, where the evidence 

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3

 Specifically, the trial court sentenced Appellant to time-served followed by 

one and one-half years’ probation on the indecent assault conviction at 

count 1 of docket number 16022. On the conviction of indecent assault at 

count 2 of docket number 16022, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a 

term of two years’ probation. On the conviction of indecent assault on 

docket number 16023, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a term of two 

years’ probation. All the sentences were imposed to run consecutively. 

Further, the trial court did not impose any additional penalty for the indecent 

assault conviction at count 3 of docket number 16022 or for the three 

convictions of harassment in docket number 16022. 

We note there is a discrepancy between the sentencing transcript and 

the written sentencing order as to Appellant’s sentence for the conviction of 

indecent assault on docket number 16023. Namely, during the sentencing 

hearing, the trial court indicated it was imposing two months’ probation on 

Appellant, but the written sentencing order and guideline sentence form list 

Appellant’s sentence as two years’ probation. We note that this Court has 

concluded where there is a conflict between the written sentencing order and 

the transcript of the sentencing hearing, the written order controls. 

Commonwealth v. Gordon, 897 A.2d 504, 507 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2006). 

Accordingly, we calculate Appellant’s aggregate sentence by referring to the 

written sentencing order. However, this Court has also held that a trial court 

has the inherent authority to correct clerical mistakes in a written sentencing 

order when the trial court’s intention to impose a certain sentence as stated 

orally at the sentencing hearing is clear and unambiguous. 

Commonwealth v. Borrin, 12 A.3d 466, 473 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc). 

4

 The trial court and Appellant have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925. 
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failed to establish that he intentionally touched 

Schultz for the purpose of arousing sexual 

desire? 

II. Did the trial court err when it instructed the 

jury to disregard cross[-]examination 

questioning about Schultz’s pending criminal 

DUI charges, thus denying him the right to 

confront the witness against him? 

Appellant’s Brief at 7.5

In his first issue, Appellant contests the sufficiency of the evidence the 

Commonwealth presented to convict him of the indecent assault of Schultz. 

Id. at 16. Specifically, Appellant contends “the Commonwealth failed to 

prove that he intentionally touched Schultz’s breast for the purpose of 

arousing or gratifying sexual desire.” Id. Instead, he suggests the contact 

was “purely incidental and accidental ... no more than a non-lingering ‘brush’ 

with the back of the hand.” Id. at 18. 

Our standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 

is well settled. “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider 

whether the evidence presented at trial, and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the 

verdict winner, support the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 91 A.3d 55, 66 (Pa. 2014) (citation 

omitted), cert. denied, Patterson v. Pennsylvania, --- S.Ct. ---, 2015 WL 

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5

 Appellant does not challenge his convictions for three counts of indecent 

assault and three counts of harassment at docket number 16022. 
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731963 (2015). “The Commonwealth can meet its burden by wholly 

circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive 

that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), 

appeal denied, 95 A.3d 277 (Pa. 2014). As an appellate court, we must 

review “the entire record ... and all evidence actually received[.]” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he trier of fact while 

passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence 

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.” 

Commonwealth v. Orie, 88 A.3d 983, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 99 A.3d 925 (Pa. 2014). “Because evidentiary 

sufficiency is a question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our 

scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 

126 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted), cert. denied, Diamond v. Pennsylvania, 

135 S. Ct. 145 (2014). 

 Instantly, Appellant was convicted of indecent assault. A person 

commits indecent assault “if the person has indecent contact with the 

complainant [or] causes the complainant to have indecent contact with the 

person ... for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the 

complainant and[] the person does so without the complainant’s consent[.]” 
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18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). Appellant concedes that the evidence 

established he touched Schultz’s breast without her consent. Id. at 15-16. 

Appellant’s sole argument is that his contact with Schultz’s breast was 

accidental. Id. at 16. 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 

as the verdict-winner, the evidence belies Appellant’s contention that the 

contact was accidental. Schultz testified that prior to the incident she was 

alone in the office, seated at her computer with her back to the doorway of 

the office. N.T., 4/15/14, at 89, 94. Schultz stated that she was not aware 

anyone else was in the office until the moment Appellant touched her breast. 

Id. at 89. She indicated that Appellant reached over her shoulder and 

“slipped” his hand “down [her] breast.” Id. She also stated that “the touch 

was deliberate” and demonstrated how Appellant touched her to the jury. 

Id. at 99. She was startled by the touching and asked Appellant what he 

was doing. Id. at 89. Appellant did not verbally respond but started to 

reach for the tape that was behind her computer monitor. Id. Schultz 

moved the tape to the end of her desk and asked Appellant if he needed 

tape. Id. He did not respond, and instead “kind of got mad and stormed 

out of the office.” Id. at 90. Schultz reported the incident to the managing 

chef later that day. Id. at 100. This evidence was sufficient to enable the

jury to conclude that the contact was intentional and “for the purpose of 

arousing sexual desire.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3126(a)(1). Accordingly, the jury 
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was free to infer that Appellant intentionally initiated the nonconsensual 

contact with Schultz’s breast to arouse sexual desire in himself or her, and 

the totality of the evidence supports the jury’s verdict beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Patterson, supra. As a result, Appellant is not entitled to 

relief on his first issue. See Diamond, supra. 

 In his second issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in 

excluding evidence of Schultz’s pending DUI charges and instructing the jury 

to disregard that evidence. Id.at 19. Appellant maintains he had the right 

to introduce evidence of Schultz’s possible bias in the form of self-interest in 

the outcome of his trial pursuant to the confrontation clauses of both the 

Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9 

of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Id. at 20-22, citing Commonwealth v. 

Evans, 512 A.2d 626, 631 (Pa. 1986). 

We begin by noting our well-settled standard for deciding issues of the 

admissibility of evidence. 

The standard of review for a trial court’s evidentiary 

rulings is narrow. The admissibility of evidence is 

solely within the discretion of the trial court and will 

be reversed only if the trial court has abused its 

discretion. An abuse of discretion is not merely an 

error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or 

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of 

judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the 

result of bias, prejudice, ill-will or partiality, as 

shown by the evidence of record. 

Commonwealth v. Mendez, 74 A.3d 256, 260 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 87 A.3d 319 (Pa. 2014). 
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Before we may reach the merits of this claim, we must address the 

Commonwealth’s contention that Appellant has not preserved this issue for 

our review. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-17. During the crossexamination of Schultz, the trial court ruled to exclude the evidence that 

Schultz had a pending DUI charge at the time she reported the indecent 

assault to police as follows. 

[Defense counsel]: And then you went to the police

when? 

[Schultz]: In September. 

[Defense counsel]: And the police didn’t contact 

you, you contacted them? 

[Schultz]: Yes. 

[Defense counsel]: And when did you go to the 

police; do you know the exact day? 

[Schultz]: I can’t recall. 

[Defense counsel]: Does September 23rd sound 

about right? 

[Schultz]: Uh-huh. 

[Defense counsel]: I’m not saying this to embarrass 

you. I have to ask you this question. Did you get in 

trouble with some criminal charges in August? 

[Schultz]: I’m sorry, what? 

[Defense counsel]: Did you get in trouble with some 

criminal charges in August before you went to the 

police on this incident? 

[Schultz]: Yes, but it doesn’t have anything to do

with this case. 
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[Defense counsel]: But is it pending? 

[Schultz]: Yeah, it is. 

[Defense counsel]: Thank you. 

[Trial court]: I’m going to ask the jury to disregard 

the last series of questions and issues. [Schultz] is 

right, it doesn’t have anything to do with this case. 

You understand what the rules are? 

[Defense counsel]: Yes, ma’am. 

[Trial court]: Then I suggest you follow them from

now on. 

You may step down, Miss Schultz. 

N.T., 4/15/14, at 103-104. 

After the trial court dismissed the jury following the first day of 

testimony, the trial court initiated the following exchange with counsel, 

outside of the presence of the jury. 

[Trial court]: You understand to impeach you must 

have a conviction of crimen falsi. 

[Defense counsel]: It was not under that basis that 

I was introducing that evidence. 

[Trial court]: What basis was it? 

[Defense counsel]: Under Brady [v. Maryland, 373 

U.S. 83 (1963)], in any case, it is my good faith 

belief that I can get into that from the standpoint

that there would be some -- basically the 

Commonwealth would give her some type of benefit 

for her testimony. 

[Trial court]: That’s something you made up. 
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[Defense counsel]: I did not make it up, Your 

Honor. 

[Trial court]: No, it is not the law, but you made it 

up. What is she charged with, murder? 

[Defense counsel]: It is a DUI. 

[Trial court]: Yeah, that’s a good faith belief. She is 

going to get the same sentence everybody else gets. 

Do you think that the Commonwealth is going to 

start bribing victims to come in and testify? Well, I 

don’t. 

Id. at 110-111. 

The trial court thus excluded Schultz’s testimony regarding pending 

DUI charges against her. Id. at 104. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 103 

governs the preservation of a challenge to a ruling to exclude evidence. 

Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence 

(a) Preserving a Claim of Error. A party may 

claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude evidence 

only: 

... 

(2) if the ruling excludes evidence, a party 

informs the court of its substance by an offer 

of proof, unless the substance was apparent 

from the context. 

(b) Not Needing to Renew an Objection or Offer 

of Proof. Once the court rules definitively on the 

record--either before or at trial--a party need not

renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a 

claim of error for appeal. 

Pa.R.E. 103(a)(2)-(b). 
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According to Rule 103, Appellant’s challenge was preserved once the 

trial court issued its ruling to exclude the evidence after learning of the 

substance of the evidence. See Pa.R.E. 103(a)(2). The Commonwealth, in 

arguing that Appellant did not preserve this issue, improperly attempts to 

place a higher burden of preservation on Appellant than Rule 103 

mandates.6 However, Appellant’s challenge was preserved when the trial 

court made its definitive ruling to exclude the evidence. See Id. at 103(b). 

Accordingly, Appellant was not required to take any further action to 

preserve the issue. See Id. at 103(a)(2)-(b). Therefore, we conclude 

Appellant’s issue is properly before us. 

Turning to the merits of Appellant’s evidentiary challenge, our 

Supreme Court, in Evans, held that evidence of pending criminal charges 

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6

 Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that Appellant has not preserved 

his challenge to the evidentiary ruling because he cited Brady, instead of 

the applicable case, Evans. Commonwealth’s Brief at 13. Further, the 

Commonwealth alleges Appellant waived his claims by failing to explain that 

the rule announced in Evans, applied to victims as well as other witnesses 

and included possible favorable treatment by the prosecution. Id. at 14-15. 

The Commonwealth also contends the issue was waived because Appellant 

did not inform the court that Evans applies to evidence of “potential” bias in 

addition to evidence of actual bias. The Commonwealth’s argument relies on 

the discussion that took place after the trial court had ruled to exclude the 

evidence. At the time of this discussion, the issue had been preserved for 

appellate review. See Pa.R.E. 103(b). Therefore, we decline to find waiver 

based on these arguments. Further, even though Appellant cited the 

incorrect case, he provided the rationale of Evans, i.e., that he sought to 

show the victim’s self-interest in the outcome of the case. N.T., 4/15/14, at 

110. Therefore, the Commonwealth’s claims are without merit. 
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against a witness may be introduced to impeach the credibility of the 

witness, reasoning as follows. 

[W]henever a prosecution witness may be biased in 

favor of the prosecution because of outstanding 

criminal charges or because of any non-final criminal 

disposition against him within the same jurisdiction, 

that possible bias, in fairness, must be made known

to the jury. Even if the prosecutor has made no 

promises, either on the present case or on other 

pending criminal matters, the witness may hope for 

favorable treatment from the prosecutor if the 

witness presently testifies in a way that is helpful to 

the prosecution. And if that possibility exists, the 

jury should know about it. 

The jury may choose to believe the witness 

even after it learns of actual promises made or 

possible promises of leniency which may be made in 

the future, but the defendant, under the right 

guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution to 

confront witnesses against him, must have the 

opportunity at least to raise a doubt in the mind of 

the jury as to whether the prosecution witness is 

biased. It is not for the court to determine whether 

the cross-examination for bias would affect the jury's 

determination of the case. 

Evans, supra at 631-632 (footnote omitted). “The opportunity to impeach 

a witness is particularly important when the determination of a defendant’s 

guilt or innocence depends on the credibility of the questioned witness.” 

Commonwealth v. Mullins, 665 A.2d 1275, 1278 (Pa. Super. 1995). 

Accordingly, this Court has held that the rule announced in Evans applies 

equally to the impeachment of a victim. Id. However, “[n]ot every denial 

of an accused’s right to cross-examine with respect to an unrelated case 

requires a new trial. If the error did not control the outcome of the case, it 
J-S13023-15 

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will be deemed harmless.” Mullins, supra at 1279, citing Delaware v. 

Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). In conducting a harmless error 

analysis, we evaluate “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the 

prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or 

absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 

witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise 

permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” 

Van Arsdall, supra at 684. 

 Here, Appellant attempted to cross-examine Schultz, the victim, as to 

her potential bias and possible motive to bring accusations against 

Appellant. After careful review, we conclude that even if we were to assume 

the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony regarding Schultz’s pending DUI 

charges was an error under Evans, it was a harmless error.7 The evidence 

of pending DUI charges was not strong impeachment. The crime of DUI 

does not involve dishonesty, and it did not show Schultz had actual bias. 

Appellant did not make an offer of proof of a quid-pro-quo agreement 

between Schultz and the district attorney’s office. There was simply no 

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7

 “This [C]ourt may affirm [the trial court] for any reason, including such 

reasons not considered by the [trial] court.” Commonwealth v. Clemens, 

66 A.3d 373, 381 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Additionally, we 

“may affirm a judgment based on harmless error even if such an argument 

is not raised by the parties.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 

182 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, Allshouse v. Pennsylvania, 133 S. Ct. 2336 

(2013). 
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evidence that Schultz went to the police with the accusations against 

Appellant to gain favorable treatment in her DUI case. Instead, Schultz 

explained that she went to the police because she heard other women had 

similar experiences with Appellant. N.T., 4/15/14, at 95. Further, the trial 

court permitted Appellant to impeach Schultz’s credibility in other ways. 

Appellant elicited Schultz’s admission that she did not report the incident 

immediately. Id. at 101. Instead, she reported it only in connection with 

reporting a yelling match later that day between her and Appellant. Id. at 

102. Schultz did not inquire into the status of her report or follow up by 

reporting it to her direct supervisor even though she met with her direct 

supervisor the day following the incident. Id. Schultz also conceded that 

she did not raise the incident again until her unemployment meeting after 

she was involuntarily terminated. Id. at 103. In light of the foregoing, we 

conclude the error was harmless. 

Moreover, Schultz was one of four witnesses who testified to 

Appellant’s indecent assaults. Her allegations fit a pattern that was 

corroborated by the testimony of the three other victims. Appellant 

approached all of the victims at Providence Point when they were alone. 

Once isolated, Appellant then made nonconsensual contact with their 

breasts. Comparing the corroborating testimony of the other three victims 

and the extent of impeachment permitted in the cross-examination of 

Schultz with the limited value of the impeachment evidence leads us to 
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conclude that the exclusion of the pending DUI charges was harmless error. 

See Mullins, supra; Van Arsdall, supra. 

 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the May 22, 2014 judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/14/2015