Issue 5 Spring/Summer 2010

Making Foreign Consequence 

Management Harder 

Pandemics of the Past: A 

Learning Opportunity 

Defining Weapons of 

Mass Destruction 

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accident & 

Incident Program in Europe 

Nuclear Medical Science Officers: 

Army Health Physicists Proudly Serving and 

Defending Their Country around the Globe 

The Need to Redefine Electromagnetic (EM) Protection: 

“A Think Piece" 

USANCA Launches Army CWMD 

Information Portal (ACIP) 

Have You Been Published? 

Nuclear Power Plants on Military Installations: 

“A Think Piece”

Sea Power - Deterrence From The Sea 

The Mission that Drove 

World History

Historical Development of the 

Nuclear Weapons Accident 

Response Procedures
Combating WMD

3 Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction 

By LTC Randy G. Mastens

7 The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accident & Incident Program in Europe 

 By LTC Kel Lauritzen and 

Lt Col Dirk van den Zwan 

14 Making Foreign Consequence Management Harder 

By Al Mauroni

18 Pandemics of the Past: A Learning 

Opportunity 

By MAJ W. David Jones 

22 Nuclear Medical Science Officers: Army 

Health Physicists Proudly Serving and 

Defending Their Country around the Globe 

By COL Mark A. Melanson

Inside the Journal 

History

47 The Mission that Drove World History

By Dr. Timothy Joseph

54 Historical Development of the Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures 

By MAJ W. David Jones 

57 Sea Power - Deterrence from the Sea

By CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

 

Science and Technology

33 The Need to Redefine Electromagnetic 

(EM) Protection: “A Think Piece" 

By Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer

41 Nuclear Power Plants on Military Installations: “A Think Piece”

By Mr. William A. Macon

46 USANCA Launches Army CWMD Information Portal (ACIP) 

By Gerald Barrington

Observant? Find all 13 clouds they’re hiding in plain sight!

7

41
1 From The Director

By Mr. Peter Bechtel 

 

 

Do You Know...

31 What the Future Warfighter Might Look 

Like?

By Mr. Robert Pfeffer 

65 Have You Been Published?

By CW5 Stephen A. Gomes 

67 Combating 

WMD Resources 

COLUMNS

Published by the 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA)

Director

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Editor

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Editorial Board

Mr. Mark W. Fishback, Operations Division 

Mr. Joseph Nellis, Capabilities Division 

MAJ Joseph Beckman, Analysis Division

Design/Layout

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United 

States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are 

those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DoD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal’s contents does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army’ 

positions and does not supersede information in other official Army publications.

Distribution: U.S. Army organizations and activities with CBRN-related missions, 

to include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear 

surety programs, and FA52 officer. The Secretary of the Army has determined that 

the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law. 

Article Submission: We welcome articles from all U.S. Government agencies and 

academia involved with CBRN matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Submit 

articles in Microsoft Word without automatic features, include photographs, graphs, 

tables, etc. as separate files, please call or email us for complete details. 

The editor retains the right to edit and select which submissions to print.

Mailing Address: 

Director, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA)

ATTN: MONA-CWO 

5915 16th Street Bldg 238 Fort Belvoir, VA 22160.

Telephone: 703-806-7858, DSN 656-7858, Fax 703-806-7900

Electronic Mail: USANCA2@conus.army.mil

Subject line: ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal (your subject)

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 

Combating WMD 

Resource Page 

57

31
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

T 

FROM THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Director 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

1

his is both an exciting and critical time for 

the Army’s combating WMD community. 

Over the last few months the Executive 

Branch has released several key policy documents including the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Nuclear Posture Review, and the National Security Strategy. Each of these documents has significant impact and influence on 

how the Army plans to train and equip the force. 

Furthermore, the documents provide guidance 

and insight into how the government intends to 

execute future missions. Imbedded in these 

seminal documents are ―specified‖ or ―implied‖ 

requirements. USANCA and the Army Staff are 

taking an aggressive approach ensuring that the 

correct Army agency or command is integrated 

into the development of strategic options. As a 

result it has been an incredibly busy time.

 One area that is immediately recognizable is 

the expanded requirements for a Standing Joint 

Task Force-Elimination. Currently it is unclear 

what the headquarters will look like and what its 

span of authority will be, however, the 20th Support Command (CBRNE) will continue to play 

the predominant Army role in support of the 

elimination missions. To that end the 20th is expanding their capacity with the addition of Nuclear Disablement Teams (NDT) to support 

OCONUS contingency operations. And the 

NDT’s are in turn expanding mission profiles to 

include an increasing number of WMD Coordination Elements (WCE) to provide broader support 

to all geographic AORs. With the recent transformation of the Technical Escort Battalions, this 

provides the Army with the capacity to operate 

more efficiently and globally, providing support 

to the War, and preparing for additional contingencies within the ARFORGEN model.

 Further developments are happening in 

Homeland Defense. The CBRNE Consequence 

Management Response Force (CCMRF) concept is currently being revisited and analyzed. 

Options being proposed by USNORTHCOM will 

require Army readiness to meet future WMD 

Consequence Management requirements domestically, while at the same time supporting the 

Army goal to reach the optimal ARFORGEN cycle of 1:3. Within the Joint Community there is 

lengthy discussion of the requirements for an 

emerging Foreign Consequence Management 

(FCM) mission. The recent response to the Haiti 

earthquake has created some interesting data 

points regarding force flow and response times. 

This experience is informing the ongoing discussion on FCM and assisting in shaping the reMr. Peter Bechtel 

Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 2

quirements. 

 Nuclear weapons (or indeed any WMD) in the 

hands of terrorists remains the greatest threat to 

our national security. And while the only effective 

way to Combat WMD is a ―whole of the government‖ solution, the simple fact is that the Army 

will do the heavy lifting. USANCA and the Army 

Staff work daily with FORSCOM, TRADOC, and 

the Joint Community to ensure we are the best 

prepared and are the best fit for any task in the 

eight CWMD mission areas. Under the current 

constraints, it is becoming more important to ensure our friends, allies and partners are also 

poised to meet these mission challenges with 

internal domestic forces. The primary way to 

accomplish this is through shaping combined 

exercises to increase and improve partner capabilities.

 Over the last six months, several senior 

leader tabletop exercises (TTX) occurred that 

discussed many of the CWMD 8 mission areas. 

The outputs from most of the TTX-determined 

that if we build partnership capacity (BPC) we 

will be well positioned to meet our national security objectives. That is easier said than done. 

In few cases do partner nations overtly engage 

in combating WMD, particularly without a perceived problem. However, our partners certainly should collaborate on issues that are of a 

direct concern to them. The solution is to find 

those crosscutting operational and tactical 

―tasks‖ that meet both CWMD and non-WMD 

challenges. Ongoing programs with the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency, Department of State, 

Department of Energy and others use this approach. 

 To develop innovative and enduring solutions, the next Army CWMD Synchronization 

Conference (14-16 September 2010) will develop a range of potential Phase 0 shaping 

tasks. The conferees will develop intermediate 

objectives or those tasks that build the ―desired 

effects‖ which meet the military strategic objectives. Simply put, if we can determine what 

twenty, thirty, or forty training events that must 

occur at the strategic, operational and tactical 

level, then we can begin to build ―packages‖ to 

meet the ASCC requirements. I expect over the 

next several months to determine what engagement tools or events are common to all the 

ASCCs. I will have USANCA then look for Army 

and Joint resources to build training teams. 

 Within the Army structure there is an ongoing program executed by the USA Corps of 

Engineers (USACE). The Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness (CMEP) program has been 

active globally for years and has a record of successful engagement. While USACE will continue to execute the program oversight has been 

transferred to USANCA, where I expect CMEP 

to become an umbrella program not only covering traditional natural disasters, but WMD CM, 

Health Affairs, Narcotics, and other transnational 

threats. Using CMEP with a wide-angle lens we 

can build ―plug and play‖ events that meet cross 

cutting goals and objectives. This is just one 

way that the Army can efficiently and effectively 

build our own capacity to meet our Phase 0 

shaping requirements.

 Therefore as you prepare for this year’s Army 

CWMD Synchronization Conference I’d ask that 

you think about Phase 0 requirements in your 

AOR, or how your organization can assist in 

closing gaps. Our conference end state will contribute immensely towards shaping the Army’s 

strategy for the next few years. 
3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

H 

3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Defining Weapons of Mass Destruction

LTC Randy G. Masten 

Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations 

US Army Command & General Staff College 

ostile states and non-state 

actors in possession of WMD 

represent significant security 

challenges. Some states, including 

supporters of terrorism, already possess WMD and are seeking even 

greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation.

Joint Publication (JP) 1

 According to JP 3-40, Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, ―The 

primary challenges facing the joint 

force commander (JFC) are: the diversity of threat actors, including the 

emergence of nontraditional WMD 

threats; the varied nature of WMD 

demands a varied approach to deterrence; a complex WMD proliferation 

continuum; the dual-use nature of 

much of the related technology and 

expertise; and the increasing complexity and number of WMD proliferation networks.‖ 2

 So, what exactly are 

WMD? JP 3-40 defines WMD as 

―Chemical, biological, radiological, or 

nuclear weapons capable of a high 

order of destruction or causing mass 

casualties...‖3 While the definition fits 

the mental model that most people 

have of WMD, this article will show it 

is not the definitive or singular definition provided within Joint or Army 

doctrine. 

 The phrase ―weapons of mass 

destruction‖ has evolved into a wonderfully elastic term that can be 

stretched to include all forms of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) 

agents. The definition for WMD tends 

to expand and contract to better fit 

the needs or agenda of the individual 

or group employing the term. In the 

past decade, the phrase has developed such a flexible meaning that the 

term WMD is currently too broad and 

no longer suffices to meet the needs 

of the Department of Defense (DOD) 

or interagency environment. As the 

name implies, weapons of mass destruction should be limited to a category of weapon systems and munitions that are intentionally designed 

with the capability of inflicting a catastrophic degree of death or destruction 

upon its intended target. 

 Currently the Army and other Services do not have doctrines for combating WMD. As each Service develops its doctrine for combating WMD, 

they need to have a common definition from which to base their doctrine. 

If the definition of WMD remains 

overly broad, there is a risk of crying 

wolf for every use of a chemical or 

biological weapon. In order for the 

services to focus on real world, major 

threats a clear, consistent, and common definition of WMD must be accepted by the DOD and all of the Services. This paper will review a few of 

the many current definitions for WMD 

and offer a common definition to be 

adopted by the Army and its Sister 

Services.

Evolution of the Term WMD

 The phrase WMD originated out of 

the increasingly industrialized and 

mechanized battlefields of Europe in 

the years preceding World War II. 

The first published account of the 

term was made on 28 December 

1937 in a London Times article describing atrocities in the Spanish Civil 

War. Cosmo Gordon Lang, 

Archbishop of Canterbury, proclaimed 

in a sermon ―Who can think without 

horror of what another widespread 

war would mean, waged as it would 

be with all the new weapons of mass 

destruction.‖ 4 This reference to 

WMD was made with regard to Germany’s aerial bombardment of the 

city of Guernica, the continued employment of chemical weapons, and 

the use other advanced armaments 

during the Spanish Civil War. Following World War II, the United Nations 

(UN) adopted the term WMD and 

Pablo Picasso, Guernica, oil on canvas, 1937 Reina Sofia National Museum, 

Madrid. Guernica shows the tragedies of war and the suffering it inflicts upon 

individuals, particularly innocent civilians.

COMBATING WMD
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 4

added atomic weapons to the definition, while at the same time condemning their use around the world.5

 

WMD were defined in 1948 by the UN 

Commission for Conventional Armaments as those which include ―atomic 

explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and 

biological weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which 

have characteristics comparable in 

destructive effect to those of the 

atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned above.6

 This definition, while 

flawed, continues to guide international disarmament diplomacy and 

applies to international law, given the 

use of the term in several arms control treaties.

 Over the course of the next five 

decades, the common definition of 

WMD continued to morph. During the 

1950’s, the term became synonymous with nuclear weapons and remained so throughout the era of MAD 

(mutual assured destruction). Later, 

during the 1970s, the term came to 

include biological and chemical weapons as well. It wasn’t until the end of 

the decade that WMD came to include a virtually unconstrained number of weapons. The United States 

Code, Title 18, Crimes and Criminal 

Procedure, currently defines WMD 

as:

(A) any destructive device

as defined in Section 921 of 

this title; [Section 921’s definition includes grenades, 

mines, missiles with an incendiary or explosive 

charge of more than onequarter ounce, and rockets 

with a propellant charge of 

more than four ounces.] 7

(B)any weapon that is designed or intended to cause 

death or seriously bodily 

injury through the release, 

dissemination, or impact of 

toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors;

(C) any weapon involving a 

disease organism; or

(D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation 

or radioactivity at a level 

dangerous to human life 8

 The decision to include any 

weapon containing nuclear, biological, or chemical agents as a WMD 

has brought about the following equation: NBC = WMD. According to the 

Nuclear Threat Initiative 9―the most 

widely used definition of weapons of 

mass destruction in official US documents is nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.‖ 10

 One example 

can be found in the 2006 National 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction. Its opening sentence clearly illustrates this point: 

―Weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) – nuclear, biological, and 

chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one 

of the greatest security challenges 

facing the United States.‖ 11 

 The 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) definition of WMD adds 

―enhanced high explosive weapons 

(E)‖ and ―other more asymmetrical 

weapons‖ to the WMD equation, 

thereby creating WMD/E. The acronym WMD/E is often used interchangeably with CBRNE (chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

enhanced high explosives). 12 The 

issue here is that another ill-defined 

term ―enhanced high explosives‖ has 

been added onto the end of the already confused term WMD. Additionally, no definition is provided for the 

phrase ―other more asymmetrical 

weapons.‖ Instead of avoiding this 

poorly defined terminology, the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Report (QDR) uses both WMD and 

CBRNE; while not providing a definition for either term. 13

 

 The 2004 NMS definition of WMD 

further adds to the confusion by including weapons capable of causing 

mass disruption. This represents a 

dramatic departure from earlier definitions:

WMD/E includes chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as 

other, more asymmetrical 

―weapons‖. They may rely 

more on disruptive impact 

than destructive kinetic effects. For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks 

against transportation networks may have a greater 

economic or psychological 

effect than a relatively small 

release of a lethal agent. 14

 The 2004 NMS expanded the definition for WMD to include cyberweapons that are not designed, nor 

capable, of causing mass destruction. 

These weapons are capable of causing a mass disruption in society and 

producing mass effects upon their 

intended targets, but they lack the 

ability to produce a large number of 

casualties. Therefore, these weapons should be categorized as weapons of mass effect (WME). The cyber

-attack examples in the NMS definition are not intended to bring about a 

high degree of destruction to people 

or a nation’s physical infrastructure. 

Instead, these cyber-attacks affect a 

system or systems in order to produce a high degree of disruption. If 

destruction were to occur, it would be 

a secondary or tertiary effect and not 

the primary intent of the cyberweapon. An example of this would 

be a software coder that writes a line 

of code into a software program that 

enables power plants to control their 

electrical flow. If the malicious code 

was properly hidden and selflaunched on all user systems at the 

same date and time, the potential 

affect would be a complete loss of 

power to millions of electrical power 

users and the wide-spread disruption 

of US economic, governmental, and 

societal activities. The first order effect of such an attack would be mass 

disruption; while there are some obvious secondary/tertiary cascading orders-of-effect that can propagate from 

the initial target of the attack, they 

would not be the primary goal of the 

attack. This type of cyber-attack can 

be classified as a WME, but it does 

not constitute the use of a weapon of 

mass destruction. A WME is designed to be symbolic or to cause 

financial, psychological, and political 

damage against their targets, more 

so than to cause physical destruction.

 However, an item not specifically 

addressed in the NMS definition is a 

cyber-weapon with the capability, 

intent, and inherent design, to cause 

mass destruction. An example of this 

type of weapon would be a code spe-
5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

cifically designed to cause mass destruction, such as by successfully 

targeting a pesticide factory. In this 

example, a cyber-weapon would target a factory using chemicals in the 

production of many pesticides. The 

code would cause chemicals to be 

routed into water storage tanks, 

rather than into its own containers. 

The resultant reaction could cause a 

toxic gas cloud to form and be released into the surrounding environment. This scenario would replicate 

the disaster that occurred at a Union 

Carbide facility in Bhopal, India on 23 

December 1984, when human error, 

not a cyber-weapon, caused the formation of a toxic gas cloud. The incident in Bhopal killed more than 2,500 

people and injured more than 

400,000. 15 The profound environmental effects of this disaster are still 

felt today in Bhopal. 16 Would such a 

cyber-weapon be classified as a 

WMD, as its primary intent would be 

to cause mass destruction and 

death?

Ambiguity Surrounding WMD

 As a result of the confusion surrounding the definition of WMD, examples of how the term WMD can be 

misapplied are found with relative 

ease. For instance, the Monterey Institute of International Studies maintains the Monterey WMD Terrorism 

Database, which monitors opensource information regarding the use 

of WMD. ―The database includes 

more than 1,100 incidents - from 

1900 to the present - that relate to the 

use of CBRN materials as possible 

weapons.‖ 17  MIIS is a wellrespected academic institution and its 

WMD Terrorism Database is maintained through US government funding. The database tracks any CBRN 

agents which have been, or have attempted to be, employed against a 

human target. The use of a CBRN 

agent directly constituted the use of a 

WMD regardless of its design or capability for causing destruction. Thus 

the database is filled with WMD terrorist events that include the use of 

such common chemicals as battery 

acid, hydrochloric acid, chlorine gas, 

pepper spray, to name a few. While 

these events may constitute the use 

of a chemical agent as a weapon, 

once described they hardly meet the 

threshold for mass destruction.

 If the use of any nuclear, biological, or chemical agent against a person/place can be construed as a use 

of WMD, then Georgy Markov was 

assassinated by a WMD in the middle 

of London in 1978. Mr. Markov was a 

Bulgarian dissident living in England, 

whose assassin (allegedly the KGB) 

used an umbrella gun to fire a single 

microscopic projectile containing 

Ricin poison into Mr. Markov’s leg, 

which subsequently resulted in his 

death. 18 In this incident, a chemical 

agent was used, it was weaponized, 

and it caused the destruction of a 

living target. This weapon clearly 

lacked ―mass‖ by the nature of its 

design and intent, as it was only capable of killing a single individual; 

however, under several current definitions used within the Department of 

Defense, this could be classified as a 

WMD attack. 19

Definition and Criteria for WMD

The term weapon of mass destruction 

means any weapon or device that is 

intended, or has the capability, to 

cause death or serious bodily injury to 

a significant number of people 

through the release, dissemination, or 

impact of

(A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; 

(B) a disease organism; or 

(C) radiation or radioactivity. 

U.S. Code Title 50, Ch. 40, Sect. 

2302 War and National Defense Definitions

 The United States military is 

tasked with defending our Nation 

against attacks and threats posed by 

WMD. ―The highest priority of the US 

military is to defend the Nation from 

all enemies.‖20 If combating WMD is 

a stated objective for our military 

forces, then it is incumbent upon the 

leadership to ensure that WMD exists 

as a clearly defined and consistent 

term in our military doctrine and policies. Additionally, our allies and enemies alike clearly understand what 

our government means when it uses 

the term WMD. Thus, the term is left 

open to exaggeration or downplay. 

Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s Casablanca Test of ―I know it 

when I see it,‖ will not stand up to 

international or domestic scrutiny. If 

the term WMD can include almost 

every weapon, then it meaning is too 

broad to be of use in military doctrine. 

 

 An excellent case can be made to 

avoid the use of the term WMD in 

military doctrine, as the term has become overly broad and is now commonly used as a convenient catch 

phrase for nuclear, biological, and/or 

chemical weapons. The term was 

originally developed for diplomatic 

dialogue to facilitate multilateral disarmament talks. And, the term WMD 

has remained relatively consistent in 

meaning within the international disarmament arena. WMD would be 

best left to in the lexicon of the disarmament negotiators and treaties; 

however, the term is now so prevalent that this is not a probable solution 

to the problem at hand. ―The horse 

has left the barn,‖ so to say.

 Currently, it is not feasible to remove the term WMD from military 

doctrine. Therefore, the term needs 

to have a standardized and consistent definition within military doctrine. 

The criteria for determining if a 

weapon can be considered to be a 

WMD should be based on design, 

intent, and capability. In order to be 

considered to be a WMD, the weapon 

should meet all three of the following 

criteria:

1. Design: The agent is weaponized, 

(i.e., it exists as a weapon system 

comprised of the agent and a delivery 

vehicle). 

2. Intent: The weapon system is 

manufactured or created with the intent to cause large-scale destruction 

of life and/or infrastructure. Does not 

include unintended or unpredictable 

second and third order effects of the 

weapon’s use.

3. Capability: The weapon system 

has the ability to cause large-scale 

destruction through a single release, 

not the cumulative affect of the 

employment of multiple weapons 

(bombardment). 

 This definition and its set of criteria 

will prevent a WME or CBRNE attack 

from officially being classified as a 

5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 6

WMD attack. It will also serve to 

separate chemical and biological munitions from WMD in planning campaigns or operations against a potential enemy. Under this proposed definition a Sarin-tipped mortar round 

would not be considered to be a 

WMD, nor would anthrax-laced letters. While both would clearly violate 

either Article I of the Chemical Weapons Convention or Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention, they 

would not be classified as WMD, as 

they lack the capability for mass destruction. 

Conclusion

 In the military profession, as in the 

legal realm, words have meaning. 

They are used to convey specific 

thoughts and ideas and should be 

chosen accordingly. The term WMD 

is used throughout the most recent 

NSS, NMS, and QDR with each offering its own definition for WMD. The 

US has gone to war over the threats 

posed by WMD, yet it has not provided the military, its allies, or its enemies with a consistent definition for 

these weapons systems. Planners 

and policymakers must agree upon a 

definition that does not exaggerate or 

downplay the capacity for destruction 

that is present in the weapons possessed by potential enemies. To do 

so, is a grave disservice to the United 

States and those sworn to protect 

and defend against her. 

 The proposed use of definition of 

WMD provided in Title 50 of the US 

Code breaks the strict NBC = WMD 

paradigm and provides a more consistent definition for these threats. 

The intent is not to diminish the 

threats posed by NBC or CBRNE, but 

to keep their capability for destruction 

in perspective. To claim that an improvised explosive device (IED) laced 

with a pesticide is a WMD is to exaggerate its destructive capability and 

potentially cause an undue level of 

anxiety among our ground troops. 

 While at the same time, the risk of 

diminishing the actual threat posed by 

a weapon capable of mass destruction is likely. If virtually every threat 

on the battlefield can be deemed to 

be a WMD, the soldier may come to 

view them with less concern than 

they rightly deserve. All CBRNE 

weapons and IEDs should be regarded as grave threats to human 

life; however, the term WMD should 

be reserved for those weapons that 

are capable of producing a largescale catastrophic event.

LTC Randy G. Masten is an instructor 

in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations 

at the US Army Command & General 

Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, 

Kansas. He has a B.G.S. from Texas 

Christian University, a M.A. in Russian and Eastern European Studies 

from the University of Kansas and a 

MMAS in Military History from the US 

Army Command & General Staff College. He was previously assigned as 

a Senior Military Analyst and Team 

Chief at the Defense Intelligence 

Agency. His email address is 

randy.masten@us.army.mil. 

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1: Doctrine for the Armed 

Forces of the United States

(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 02 May 2007 Incorporating 

Change 1of 20 March 2009), I-7.

2. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-40: Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (Washington, DC : 

Government Printing Office, 10 June 

2009), xi.

3. Ibid, GL-6.

4. ―Archbishop’s Appeal,‖ London 

Times, 28 December 1937, p 9.

5. United Nations Security Council 

Resolution S-10/2, 1948.

6. S/C.3/32/Rev. ll reprinted in The 

United Nations and Disarmament, 

1945-1970 (United Nations publication, Sales No. 70.IX.l), p. 28.

7. United States Code, Title 18, Section 921, Chapter 44, para 4, 5 January 2009.

8. United States Code, Title 18, Section 2332a, Chapter 113B, 5 January 

2009.

9. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) 

is a non-profit organization with a 

mission to strengthen global security 

by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

10. Nuclear Threat Initiative website, 

h t t p : / / w w w . n t i. o r g / f _ wm d 4 1 1 /

gloss.html, accessed 3 March 2010.

11. National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction

(Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, December 2002) 1.

12. DOD began the process of moving to CBRNE in the late 1990s, when 

the JCS definition was altered to include high explosives ―E‖.

13. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

(Washington, D.C.: Government 

Printing Office, 1 February 2010), iv 

and 19.

14. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States of 

America: A Strategy for Today, A Vision for Tomorrow (Washington, D.C.: 

Government Printing Office, 2004), 1.

15. University of Michigan, Environmental Justice Case Study: Union 

Carbide Gas Release in Bhopal, India, University of Michigan Website 

w w w . u m i c h . e d u / ~ s n r e 4 9 2 /

lopatin.html, accessed 31 September 

2004.

16. ―No Takers for Bhopal Toxic 

Waste,‖ British Broadcast System 

website, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

south_asia/7569891.stm, accessed 3 

March 2010.

17. MIIS Website, 

http://cnswmd.miis.edu/db/wmdt, accessed 3 March 2010.

18. The KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) was the intelligence and security of the former Soviet Union. V. Rich, ―Murderous Experiments of Stalin's Police Chief,‖ 

New Scientist, Vol. 135, 6 May 1992, 

8. Ricin is a potent cytotoxin that can 

be derived from the seeds of the Castor plant and is one of the most toxic 

known substances.

19. US Code Title 50, War and National Defense, Section 2302, Chapter 40, 8 January 2008.

20. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 18.
7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

A 

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Accident & Incident Program in Europe

LTC Kel Lauritzen Nuclear Policy Officer, European Command 

Lt. Col Dirk van den Zwan Nuclear and Non-Proliferation Policy Staff Officer, 

Netherlands Defense Staff, International Military Cooperation Department 

U.S. C-17 GlobeMaster carrying United States (U.S.) 

nuclear weapons over 

Europe crashes after an in-flight 

emergency. The crash kills the crew 

resulting in ―loss of custody‖ for the 

weapons. The weapons break apart 

and burn on impact. Confusion 

reigns. Was this a terrorist act? Is 

there a radioactive hazard to the public? What measures should first responders take? Is a nuclear explosion possible? While this scenario 

may be improbable, there have been 

U.S. nuclear weapons accidents in 

Europe. A U.S. Air Force B-52 broke 

apart in a refueling accident over 

Palomares, Spain in 1966 strewing 

four nuclear bombs on the ground 

and in the water. The conventional 

explosives in two of the bombs exploded scattering radioactive material 

from the nuclear components. The 

U.S. excavated and sent over 1400 

tons of contaminated soil to the Savannah River Plant and site monitoring is still in effect today. As late as 

2004, the U.S. Government paid for 

decontamination efforts. If a nuclear 

weapons accident happened tomorrow, the affected governments and 

the U.S. would focus intensely on the 

accident response.

 The 1957 North Atlantic Council 

Communiqué established stocks of 

nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 

2009 Strasbourg Declaration on Alliance Security stated deterrence was 

a core element of NATO’s strategy 

and based on an appropriate mix of 

nuclear and conventional capabilities. 

While the Alliance reduced its nuclear 

forces drastically during the last 20 

years and President Obama seeks a 

world free from nuclear weapons, at 

least in the short term, U.S. weapons 

will remain in Europe during the disarmament stage. 

US Nuclear Accidents & Incidents 

on Foreign Soil

 How would we respond to this 

accident? A nuclear weapon accident response is complicated in the 

U.S. with multiple agencies and overlapping authorities. Overseas, it 

faces additional complexities. Foreign nations have primary consequence management responsibility 

even for U.S. nuclear weapon accidents. The U.S. needs to respect 

nations’ sovereignty, preserve U.S. 

custody of nuclear weapons, and mitigate the accident consequences. 

Incorporating a large U.S. multiagency response into a large multiagency foreign response (and potentially several countries) is challenging. 

 

 The Department of State (DOS) 

addresses this complexity by negotiating Nuclear Accident & Incident 

(NAI) Agreements to clarify roles and 

to develop an effective response capability in the unlikely event of a U.S. 

nuclear weapons accident. DOS is 

the U.S. lead federal agency and coordinates the U.S. whole government 

response for overseas nuclear 

weapon accidents. U.S. European 

Command (EUCOM) is responsible 

for the military part of the response 

and tasks components to provide a 

Response Task Force (RTF) for a 

nuclear weapon accident. A general 

officer commands the US Air Forces 

in Europe (USAFE) RTF and reports 

directly to the EUCOM Commander. 

EUCOM and USAFE develop Implementing Joint Operational Plans 

(IJOPs) with the necessary operational detail for the RTF under the 

umbrella of the DOS agreements. 

These plans are an integration of 

U.S. and foreign emergency management plans. 

 The problem is these agreements 

and IJOPs do not always exist. After 

9/11, there was a renewed interest in 

NAI agreements. Often non-nuclear 

disasters or mishaps have motivated 

the US and other countries to focus 

on NAI programs, whether it’s a large 

fireworks factory disaster or simply an 

aircraft containing an official US Embassy mail pouch over-running the 

runway. National emergency management systems enable effective, 

collaborative incident management, 

but these disasters highlight short-
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 8

comings. In 2002 and 2005, DOS 

approached several nations about 

developing NAI agreements and protocols. However, no agreements 

were concluded.

 This resistance exists on both the 

U.S. and foreign sides. There are 

concerns about classifications and 

political repercussions, ―Can we even 

discuss this with the nations?‖ ―Can 

we even write this article?‖ A joint 

U.S. – foreign nation nuclear accident 

response program is often deemed 

too sensitive. This hypersensitivity 

stems from the perception that the 

existence of a plan equates to the 

confirmed presence of US nuclear 

weapons in that country. The existence of a joint NAI program with a 

specific country does not mean that 

the U.S. has weapons within that 

country. Since NATO’s nuclear capable units may require the transport of 

U.S. nuclear weapons within the 

theater, the NAI program focuses on 

plans to deal with the possible accident consequences. EUCOM addresses questions about the locations 

of U.S. nuclear weapons with the 

U.S. ―No Confirm, No Deny‖ policy, 

then turns the discussion back to the 

fundamentals of accident response. 

Keeping accident response separate 

from political questions downplays 

the sensitivity of NAI response

 

 Support exists for accident response planning independent of positions about nuclear weapons. For 

example, after a military aircraft crash 

in 2009, a Green Party representative 

from Germany, Ulrike Höfken, called 

for joint NAI exercises with the military, fire, police and rescue services.1

Based on the Green Party stand 

against nuclear weapons, one might 

think a Green Party representative 

would not encourage joint nuclear 

weapons accident exercises, however, all parties realize preparing for 

this high risk, low probability event is 

prudent.

 A U.S. NAI is similar to other sensitive disaster scenarios nations deal 

with every day: power plant radiation 

emissions, rail accidents with toxic 

materials shipments and aircraft accidents. EUCOM’s experience with 

foreign nation emergency management representatives is that they approach a NAI in the same professional manner. A NAI program for 

securing and mitigating an accident 

has spill-over benefits, since required 

actions are similar to other joint efforts. 

The Department of State -

European Command Approach 

 But how can you effectively minimize the accident aftermath, which 

requires joint planning and preparation without the foundation of agreements and IJOPs? Arthur Ashe’s 

words come to mind, ―Start where 

you are. Use what you have. Do what 

you can.‖ The inability to progress 

on NAI agreements caused a rethinking of the approach - moving away 

from national agreements and focusing on developing actual response 

capabilities. In 2007, the National 

Security Presidential Directive 28 

Committee of Principals supported 

this new direction with the DOS 

―Playbook‖ as the first manifestation. 

The DOS Foreign Consequence 

Management program developed the 

―Playbook‖ to give the U.S. Embassies a checklist for responding to U.S. 

nuclear weapons accidents. In early 

2008, DOS and EUCOM hosted a 

seminar to introduce this new concept. There are three main points:

1. Integrate Embassy, RTF and foreign nations into training, rehearsals 

and exercises. While recognizing the 

legal importance of agreements, EUCOM has focused on integrating all of 

the players into NAI training, movement planning and exercises, utilizing 

core mil-to-mil connections as the 

starting point. Civilian ministries and 

agencies would lead the response to 

a U.S. NAI. By integrating training, 

U.S. organizations gain an appreciation for the national response capabilities; while the foreign nation organizations learn about U.S. response capabilities and the designed 

safety features of U.S. nuclear weapons (Enhanced Nuclear Design 

Safety, improved High Explosives, 

etc). The U.S. has designed its nuclear weapons to withstand the most 

severe accident without a nuclear 

yield or release of radioactive contamination, but many do not know 

that a nuclear explosion in an accident is virtually impossible. The U.S. 

and foreign emergency management 

exchanges allows them to scope the 

problem and take appropriate actions 

in a nuclear accident. This grass 

roots approach builds capacity in the 

absence of formal agreements. 

2. Develop capability through existing military coordination structures. 

The integration of each nation’s response system and the U.S. system 
9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

is bi-lateral. The NATO Allied Command Operations Directive 80-6 specifically refers to NAI response as a bi

-lateral responsibility. However, EUCOM uses forums like the NATO 

Joint Theatre Surety Management 

Group (JTSMG) to address many 

nuclear issues in a broader framework. EUCOM leverages these structures to allow countries with less developed programs develop a more 

robust capability by observing nations 

with more advanced programs. 

3. Develop ―European‖ NAI response 

academic material. Most U.S. guidance focuses primarily on U.S. response operations. Logically, The 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) based its training on this US 

model and often used concepts such 

as declaring a U.S. National Defense 

Area around a NAI site. Many of 

these methods are simply not applicable in Europe. Upon completion of 

the first round of NAI Response training, EUCOM asked the DTRA Director to revamp its NAI training program 

to better reflect the overseas response environment. Since then, 

DTRA has begun providing invaluable 

support to multiple initiatives: It modified the RTF training to focus on 

unique European requirements; is 

developing an annual European NAI 

exercise; and will facilitate the upcoming European NAI Senior Leaders Seminar. This article discusses 

the impacts of these changes later. 

In addition to DTRA’s academic efforts, EUCOM is sponsoring a NATO 

School course and it assists nations 

in developing their own internal Fire 

Academy training courses.

Building Response Capability

 EUCOM developed an overarching NAI program to support foreign nation, U.S., and joint requirements for a functional NAI program. 

The following paragraphs discuss the 

senior leader, academics, bi-lateral, 

training & exercises, and movement 

segments. 

Senior Leader Programs 

 The Department of Defense (DoD) 

and DTRA host a NAI Senior Leader 

Seminar every year to provide training to senior leaders. This seminar 

addresses the interaction between 

State, Federal, DoD, and Department 

of Energy (DOE) agencies for a U.S. 

nuclear weapons accident within the 

United States. This seminar does not 

focus on a U.S. NAI overseas where 

the DOS and the nations play a critical role. The DOS and EUCOM are 

hosting the European NAI Senior 

Leader Seminar in 2010 to provide a 

similar overseas forum for high level 

discussions. The seminar will include 

senior Embassy officials, Ministry of 

Defense officials, Department of Energy Senior Energy Officials, U.S. 

RTF Commanders, U.S. Initial Response Force Commanders, the EUCOM Plans & Policy Director and the 

FBI. The Third Air Force Vice Commander will be the seminar facilitator 

with DTRA providing seminar support. This meeting ensures a common understanding of the US overseas response. 

 In addition, USAFE, DTRA and 

EUCOM developed a joint executive 

session to brief senior leaders on the 

NAI program. This provides an opportunity to brief new RTF commanders, Embassy officials and general 

officers about the EUCOM NAI program.

Bi-lateral Meetings

 Most nuclear accident planning is 

bi-lateral by nature, so bi-lateral 

meetings serve a critical role. The 

Netherlands – United States Standing 

Operations Group (NUSOG) is a bilateral group that meets regularly to 

discuss procedures, education and 

engagement programs. Multiple 

agencies, across a range of functional areas, from both the foreign 

and U.S. governments attend these 

conferences. Dutch members come 

from the Ministry of the Interior, Defense, Environment, Transportation, 

Explosive Ordnance, Fire, Police and 

Rescue agencies. U.S. members 

include the U.S. Embassy, EUCOM, 

DTRA, USAFE, Munitions Support 

Squadron, various wings and Third 

Air Force. The NUSOG has seven 

functional areas, each with a U.S. 

and foreign national lead responsible 

to address specific functional area 

issues. 

Academics

 Nuclear weapons accident response incorporates many different 

organizations. This requires various 

academic programs to reach all the 

training audiences.

 RTF Training: USAFE, DTRA 

and EUCOM restarted on-site 

training in 2007 for all US nuclear 

response elements. This training 

lasts one day and improves NAI 

response at all levels of command. The mobile training team 

(MTT) conducts the sessions on 

a regular cycle. USAFE and EUCOM coordinate the schedule 

Nuclear Accident & Incident (NAI) Program. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 10

and invite DOS and local military 

and civilian authorities as subject 

matter experts and members of 

the training audience. In one 

example, the United Kingdom 

(UK) Nuclear Accident Response 

Organization instructed and participated in training in March 

2009. Their expert provided details on specific national capabilities that raised the course training value. DTRA provides 

course materials and facilitators 

and helps develop ―European‖ 

NAI response academic material. 

In the future, DTRA plans to 

modify the MTT material to specifically address each nation 

emergency response structure. 

 U.S. /Foreign Nation NAI Course: 

This is a week-long comprehensive joint U.S. -Foreign Nation 

courses for educating civilian and 

military personnel. EUCOM 

plans to tailor these courses for 

each nation. The NUSOG developed the first joint NAI course. 

Functional experts in the NUSOG developed the course segments. As part of the preparation, the Dutch sponsored instructors from the Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) 

to travel to Europe to review The 

Netherlands response organization and procedures. These instructors helped to develop the 

course curriculum through interviews with Dutch and U.S. personnel. 

 The NUSOG held the first iteration 

of the course at DNWS in October 

2009 in Albuquerque, NM with 26 

Dutch and 19 U.S. participants. Participants came from a variety of organizations: The Netherlands’ Ministries of Interior, Defense, Housing 

Spatial Planning and the Environment, Transport Public Works and 

Water Management, Royal Netherlands Air Force, Municipalities, Regional Firefighters, Hazardous Materials personnel, National Crisis Centre, 

Air Staff, Department of Energy, 

DOS, EUCOM, USAFE, Third Air 

Force, Air Force Major Operating 

Bases, Munitions Support Squadrons 

and DTRA. The course had a series 

of table top exercises integrating all 

functional areas and levels of response, as well as intense mock media interviews. In keeping with the 

multi-lateral approach, the NUSOG 

invited other nations to observe the 

training and reported the results of 

the seminar to the JTSMG. 

 NATO NAI Course: Using the 

NUSOG course as a base, the 

nations, DTRA and EUCOM are 

creating a generic NATO NAI 

course. A NATO course allows 

personnel from several countries 

to attend and better understand 

the scope of an NAI response. 

The first course will be in December 2010 at the NATO School in 

Academic work at the Defense Nuclear Weapons School, Albuquerque, NM.

The Netherlands-United States Standing Operations Group (NUSOG) emblem.
11 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Oberammergau, Germany. Instructors will include foreign nationals, the Department of Energy, the Embassy, DTRA, EUCOM and USAFE.

 Firefighting Instructions: Since 

many of the first responders to a 

NAI are civilians, EUCOM works 

with national organizations to 

develop unclassified firefighting 

instructions. Without prior exposure to nuclear weapon accident 

hazards, first responders arriving on scene are unlikely to 

know how to minimize contamination and safeguard public 

health. It is better that firefighters learn what protective gear is 

adequate during an academic 

session, not under the stress of 

putting out a fire. The nations 

provide these instructions, but 

the U.S. provides technical advice and assists in development.

Joint NAI Exercises 

 In addition to academics, accident 

response exercises are crucial to solidify NAI programs. DIMMING SUN 

03 in the UK, was one of the largest 

overseas NAI exercises. There were 

also several DIAMOND FLIGHT exercises in the Netherlands. EUCOM 

invited four Dutch to attend a U.S. 

NAI exercise in Wyoming in 2006. In 

2008, the NUSOG proposed to include multi-lateral observers to bilateral NAI exercises to share lessons 

learned. This model is not unprecedented within Europe. EUCOM initially briefed the concept of multilateral participation at the JTSMG and 

in December 2009, The Netherlands 

presented a voluntary annual rotating 

joint NAI exercise to the JTSMG. In 

May 2010, The UK is hosting the first 

Dimming Sun 03, UK MCA Command Post.

Firefighters are usually the first responders to a NAI.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 12

such exercise, ASTRAL BEND that 

includes a joint UK-US seminar at 

RAF Mildenhall. The UK Ministry of 

Defence invited other national representatives to attend this exercise as 

observers. An overview of the exercise will be given to the JTSMG. 

Next year, a joint US-Dutch integrated exercise is scheduled with 

other bi-lateral exercises lining up for 

subsequent years. 

 Other types of exercises include 

DOS table top exercises at the embassies to practice NAI procedures. 

The last such exercise was in July 

2009 with the US Embassy in The 

Hague, The Netherlands. EUCOM 

and DTRA also attended a Belgium 

military aircraft crash exercise. EUCOM and the nations can use the 

lessons learned from these exercises 

to integrate a U.S. presence at accident sites.

Movements and Foreign 

Disclosure Information

 Transportation Command Tanker 

Airlift Control Center provides notifications to the U.S. Embassy for 

movements. The Embassy then coordinates overflight approval with the 

nation and response capability is 

placed on stand-by. After the movements are coordinated, Third Air 

Force conducts rehearsal of concept 

drills. These rehearsals address any 

specific considerations for the upcoming movement and foreign representatives are included to ensure better 

coordination. Including these representatives has been helpful, but not 

without growing pains. The Foreign 

Disclosure Office (FDO) clears movement information prior to release to 

other nations because of its sensitive 

nature. In one instance, the FDO 

approval came one day after the 

movement rehearsal, so the representative could not attend the actual 

briefing. Instead, USAFE held a special ―make-up‖ briefing two days later. 

Since then, Third Air Force FDO is 

clearing a template of the information 

for a smoother, quicker clearance 

process.

 To confidently discuss and release 

information to our allies is critical for 

the NAI program. EUCOM regularly 

clears training program information 

through the FDO. In the move from a 

strictly bi-lateral approach to a more 

multi-national approach, EUCOM has 

worked with partners to ease bilateral restrictions. This allows formerly bi-lateral only information to be 

disclosed on a multi-lateral basis. In 

most cases, this was easier than supposed because most accident response information is unclassified. 

Early on in the NAI process, the 

FDOs within the DOE and DoD expended a considerable effort to determine exactly what information about 

weapon design safety the U.S. could 

release and at what classification levels. Proper classification ensures 

civilians without security clearances 

can access the information they need 

to do their jobs. 

NAI Public Affairs

 Because of the safety design characteristics of nuclear weapons, any 

actual radiological contamination is 

expected to be relatively minor; however, the public affairs aspect of an 

accident is a difficult facet. In addition, while ―No Confirm, No Deny‖ is 

the standing policy, there is an exception for a nuclear accident, ―During a 

nuclear weapon accident overseas. . . 

the theater Commander. . .with concurrence of the foreign government 

through the appropriate Chief of U.S. 

Mission, may confirm the presence of 

nuclear weapons or radioactive nuclear components in the interest of 

public safety.‖ 2This disclosure may 

occur with just the public perception 

of a hazard -- even when no actual 

radiological hazard exists; both governments can immediately confirm 

the presence of a nuclear weapon, if 

it promotes public safety. With modern communications, having a coordinated public affairs strategy is important. 

 In contrast to the U.S. public affairs policy, the French have an open, 

active public affairs policy toward nuclear weapons. The French are free 

to confirm nuclear weapons locations 

and this gives them more latitude in 

their public affairs strategies, to include active public education campaigns on the consequences of a nuclear weapons accident. EUCOM 

was able to compare strategies at a 

French NAI public affairs conference 

in 2009 sponsored by the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense. 

Nuclear Accident & Incident Policy

 A number of NAI response policies 

shape the US Government NAI program in Europe. The DoD Instruction 

3150.08 "DoD Response to U.S. Nuclear Weapon Incidents" summarizes 

key overseas policies: 

 A Nuclear Weapons Accident / 

Incident Exercise (NUWAIX) 

program shall test annually DoD 

consequence management capabilities to respond to a U.S. 

nuclear weapon accident in foreign nations.

 DTRA shall provide training and 

exercise support to EUCOM and 

the Response Task Forces. 

DTRA shall coordinate the training curriculum to remain consistent with the EUCOM Contingency Plan 4367 ―Response to 

U.S. Nuclear Weapon Accident / 

Incident within the Theater.‖

 The Secretary of the Air Force 

shall provide funding to ensure 

RTF operational capabilities 

and participation in the NUWAIX program.

 The EUCOM Commander shall 

coordinate response actions 

with the Chief of Mission in 

each affected country and conduct an 18-month NUWAIX 
13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

training cycle for headquarters staffs 

and RTF. Agreements with the participating nations in consultation with 

DOS govern the scope and scheduling of exercises. 

 The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OUSD Policy Nuclear Matters) 

has worked closely to support the 

EUCOM NAI program. They have 

attended numerous conferences and 

meetings. At the request of the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, EUCOM 

briefed the European NAI program In 

October 2009 to the Nuclear Weapons Accident Incident Response Subcommittee of the Nuclear Command 

and Control System Committee of 

Principals Deputies to keep them updated. EUCOM updated the Subcommittee again in February 2010. 

Nuclear Accident Plans 

 As the operational headquarters, 

Third Air Force is responsible for the 

NAI response operational plan. Third 

Air Force is hosting an extended Operational Planning Team with representatives invited from various response locations to address RTF operational procedures and country 

specific actions, timelines, personnel 

and equipment variations in the Third 

Air Force base plan. Several factors 

make it more difficult to develop a 

coherent RTF plan. Third Air Force 

forms the RTF only after an accident 

occurs and the RTF consists of several geographically separated units: 

Third Air Force headquarters, an initial response force from the closest 

major USAFE installation to the accident, a Munitions Support Squadron 

and the DOE Accident Response 

Group; the RTF engages other specialty teams, as needed. NAI response is only a small part of these 

units’ overall mission; each unit is 

only a small portion of the RTF; and 

they must know how to operate in 

different foreign national emergency 

response systems. This makes it 

difficult to coordinate an integrated 

U.S. response. 

Summary

 Planning and preparing for a possible NAI in Europe presents unique 

challenges that require an integrated 

approach from multiple agencies. 

EUCOM works closely with both U.S. 

and foreign departments and agencies. While foreign nations have the 

primary response capability, because 

of the sensitive nature of nuclear 

weapons and U.S. technical expertise, it is critical to ensure any U.S. 

input flows smoothly into the national 

response. Where agreements and 

IJOPs are in place, EUCOM works 

closely with US and foreign agencies 

to ensure close coordination. Where 

formal agreements do not exist, EUCOM uses practical coordination procedures and leverages existing military structures in a multi-lateral approach to develop a more robust response capacity. If a transport vehicle crashes, the Nuclear Accident/

Incident program will ensure a fluid 

response that protects public health 

and mitigates the consequences.

LTC Kel Lauritzen is a Nuclear Policy 

Officer with European Command 

(EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. He 

has a M.A. in International Relations 

from Boston University and a M.A in 

Operations Research from Kansas 

State University and a B.S. in Economics from Brigham Young University. His previous assignment was as 

Branch Chief, Test Programs for 

DTRA, Albuquerque. His email address is kelly.lauritzen@eucom.mil

Lt. Col Dirk van den Zwan is a Nuclear and Non-Proliferation Policy 

Staff Officer with The Netherlands 

Defence Staff, International Military 

Cooperation Department. His email 

address is dm.vd.zwan@mindef.nl

ENDNOTES

1. Rhein-Zeitung, Wednesday, March 25, 

2009, ―Schleudersitz rettet Piloten in letzter Sekunde‖ p.7.

2. DoD Directive 5230.16, ―Nuclear Accident and Incident Public Affairs Guidance”, November 21, 2003

UK Decontamination tents.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 14

O 

ver the past eight years, the 

U.S. military’s capability to 

support the federal response 

to a terrorist incident involving a 

weapon of mass destruction (WMD) 

has stumbled forward in a mad sort of 

dance – two steps forward, one step 

to the side, and one step back. It is 

often assumed that any terrorist incident involving any significant amount 

of chemical, biological, radiological, 

or nuclear (CBRN) material will automatically require support from the 

Department of Defense (DOD) to 

manage its consequences. The 

DOD’s development of a WMD consequence management capability has 

been complicated by a number of 

factors.

 There is the question of who the 

U.S. military is supporting: domestic 

state and local governments, foreign 

governments, or military installation 

commanders. The threat ranges from 

CBRN hazards and high-yield explosives to natural disasters and industrial accidents. U.S. military response 

capabilities range from technical advisors and specialized technical units to 

traditional support forces such as military police, engineers, and logisticians. The U.S. military has been told 

to plan for multiple simultaneous 

large-scale WMD incidents, single 

catastrophic events such as 9/11, and 

small-scale releases of industrial hazards. Debate continues on how 

quickly the U.S. military must arrive at 

the incident scene: within the first 

―golden hour‖ after the incident, within 

48 hours, or within five days.

 The challenge is that those DOD 

agencies engaged in developing consequence management capabilities 

are just saying ―yes‖ to all of these 

questions without qualifying how to 

build and resource this mission. 

That’s just not a responsible way to 

assist federal agencies that plan for, 

prepare for, respond to and recover 

from terrorist CBRN incidents. As a 

result of the inability to untangle the 

Gordian knot, efforts to develop consequence management capabilities 

have been made much harder than it 

needs to be. Like many public policy 

issues, the development of military 

capabilities to respond to terrorist 

CBRN incidents has evolved over 

time in an incremental fashion, but 

has not been evaluated as a whole 

against contemporary challenges as 

to whether this capability is still appropriate or, in fact, requires change.

 Consequence management includes those actions required to protect public health and safety, restore 

essential government services, and 

provide emergency relief from the 

hazards associated with a natural 

disaster, industrial accident, or terrorist incident. Originally, Presidential 

Decision Directive-39 directed the 

DOD in 1995 to support crisis and 

consequence management with 

―technical operations.‖ DOD had also 

viewed consequence management as 

a capability that would be required to 

restore operations at US military installations and facilities following a 

major combat operation that featured 

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The purpose of consequence 

management is not to prevent an attack or save lives, but rather to restore essential services and to return 

a contaminated area to pre-incident 

conditions. 

Building a Domestic Consequence 

Management Capability

 Before 2001, domestic consequence management was a simple 

concept. DOD had technical experts 

who provided an expert capability that 

the federal, state, and local emergency responders lacked. The Army’s 

Technical Escort Unit provided technical advice and limited support to 

emergency responders prior to and 

Making Foreign Consequence Management Harder

Al Mauroni

Senior Defense Consultant
15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

during an incident. The Marine Corps’ 

Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF) helped state/

local emergency responders assess 

and clean up the hazard after the incident. Because of Aum Shinrikyo’s 

1995 sarin nerve agent attack in Tokyo, DOD was directed to train the 

emergency responders in 120 cities 

on chemical and biological terrorism 

response and to develop its Reserve 

and National Guard forces to support 

such responses. Defense Secretary 

William Cohen approved the WMD 

Civil Support Team concept in 1998 

as a way to quickly provide subject 

matter experts to state and local 

emergency responders. The dedicated manpower was low and the 

cost of this technical support was insignificant, compared to other major 

defense priorities (and that’s the way 

DOD wanted it). 

 After 2001, assumptions were that 

terrorists would use CBRN materials 

to cause simultaneous mass casualty 

incidents at multiple cities. There was 

limited rationale behind the assumption. It was more of an uninformed gut 

feeling that this is what terrorists in 

general would do, based on one particular terrorist group’s practice of 

coordinating high-explosive incidents 

and the operational use of airplanes 

as mass-casualty weapons. As a result, Congress pressured DOD to 

accelerate its fielding and accreditation of 55 WMD Civil Support Teams. 

Government officials considered 

whether DOD should lead – rather 

than support – any federal response 

to a terrorist CBRN incident. The 

stated goal was that DOD should be 

able to provide the capability to respond to up to three multiple and simultaneous WMD mass casualty 

events. Actually developing that capability was a controversial issue, one 

that would be debated for several 

years. 

 When the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established 

in 2003, one of its first actions was to 

address the possibility of biological 

terrorism under the Homeland Security Presidential Directive-10, 

―Biodefense for the 21st Century.‖ In 

2005, DHS formed the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to develop 

means to identify the illicit movement 

of radiological and nuclear materials 

into the United States. Senior US 

government officials have stated on 

more than one occasion that chemical terrorism is not a significant 

enough threat that would require a 

massive federal response. In 2007, 

DHS began implementing guidelines 

for strict oversight of security at certain chemical facilities. 

 Despite these initiatives and the 

very generous DHS state/local grants 

program addressing CBRN terrorism 

preparations, DOD continued its efforts to build larger and more specialized units to support DHS in any response to CBRN terrorism. In addition to the civil support teams, the 

National Guard Bureau has planned 

to field seventeen CBRNE Emergency Response Force Packages –

at about 160 persons each – and 

DOD plans to create three CBRNE 

Consequence Management Response Forces, each one fielding between 4000-5000 personnel. The 

Army organized its chemical specialty 

units and explosive ordnance disposal units into the 20th Support 

Command (CBRNE), stationed at 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, 

to respond to terrorist incidents and to 

support national special security 

events (among other missions). 

 Now in 1995, this robust DOD response force might be seen as justified. The 2001 Amerithrax incident 

certainly fanned the flames of desire 

for a rapidly deployable and large 

group of technical specialists that 

could deliver a full range of emergency response capabilities. It might 

seem that only the military could provide such a capability. But today, 

given the lack of any identified specific foreign terrorist ―WMD‖ threat, 

the high demands of operational combat missions, and the enhanced capabilities of federal and state law enforcement, emergency responders, 

and the intelligence community, one 

has to wonder if – given the chance 

to design a military WMD consequence management capability – this 

huge investment of personnel and 

material would be the optimal design 

that DOD would propose today. Such 

academic pondering is irrelevant, as 

political realities would prevent any 

significant change of the current military units designated to support domestic response. 

The Mission Outside the 

United States

 As difficult as the domestic consequence management mission is to 

understand and implement, the DOD 

mission to develop and sustain a foreign consequence management capability is even harder to explain. Foreign consequence management includes assistance provided by the 

United States to another nation to 

regain essential government services 

and to mitigate the effects of a terrorist CBRN incident. Beyond that, it is 

unclear what the exact scope of the 

requirement is, what the authorities 

are, what resources are required, 

what the definition of ―timely response‖ is, and – most importantly –

who ought to budget for the training 

and sustaining of dedicated forces 

conducting foreign consequence 

management. The only thing that is 

very clear is that the State Department controls the authorization process by which US military forces provide foreign consequence management capabilities to other nations.

 This mission should not be confused with the combatant commands’ 

requirement to organize and control a 

join task force for consequence mana g e m e n t d u r i n g t r a d i t i o n a l 

(conventional) military combat operations. If coalition forces are fighting 

another nation armed with CB weapons, there is clear guidance that the 

combatant command is to organize 

consequence management forces to 

assist those states who might be attacked by CB weapons over the 

course of that conflict. This mission 

should not to be confused with humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, 

which addresses those efforts to alleviate human suffering or to contribute 

to regional security or stability 

through deliberate planning 

(humanitarian assistance) or immediate response (disaster relief). In addition to the unique technical characteristics of CBRN hazards, the focus of 

consequence management is on restoring the essential services of a 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 16

government – not saving lives or alleviating human suffering. If there is no 

government that requests US support, it is not consequence management.

 This focus on definitional clarity 

may seem overstated, but the need 

for it becomes clear when one sees 

the continuous debates and redefinitions of consequence management 

within DOD (let alone interagency 

discussions) every year. There is little 

consistency in what the mission is 

and who is responsible for addressing 

it, and as a result, there is little progress on developing a consistent and 

sustainable capability. Yet there has 

been no OSD policy leadership to 

resolve this basic issue of defining 

the mission and establishing the parameters for developing the capability.

 There is the scenario where a US 

military installation or facility in an 

overseas location is hit by a terrorist 

CBRN hazard. Who responds to such 

an event? Is it solely the installation 

commander’s responsibility to coordinate recovery efforts by coordinating 

within his or her service? Is it the host 

nation’s responsibility to respond? Or 

is the US military (as a whole) expected to provide a capability, either 

in theater or deployable to that theater, to restore essential services and 

mitigate the consequences of this 

unique hazard? The answer is ―yes‖ 

to all. 

 The installation commander is responsible to protect all of the workers 

and residents within the area of responsibility, to include implementing 

antiterrorism measures to protect 

against CBRN terrorism. However, 

because there is a very low probability that such an incident might happen 

and because antiterrorism funding is 

limited, there are often no significant 

antiterrorism measures designed for 

CBRN terrorism or resources inherent 

to the installation to support consequence management. The services in 

general are reluctant to preposition 

the significant logistics required for 

the mission and would probably turn 

to private contractors to provide postincident response capabilities. 

 The host nation response will be 

varied, depending on its inherent response capabilities, the extent of its 

specialized forces’ training, the resources available to address this 

threat, and of course, prior planning 

and agreements with local and regional US forces. It probably is safe 

to say that most nations do not have 

significant resources on a per capita 

basis as compared to the United 

States, but host nations do have the 

authority to respond to terrorist incidents and do know how to address 

incidents involving industrial chemicals, radiological hazards, and highyield explosives. In many cases, such 

as Europe, nations work together and 

with international organizations to 

respond to biological outbreaks and 

nuclear accidents. It may very well be 

that these nations will not require 

U.S. government assistance for most 

terrorist CBRN incidents. 

 Still, there are those who believe 

that the combatant commands must 

have either an in-theater consequence management force or a rapidly-deployable joint task force to provide this capability. Some reference 

the vastly overstated assumptions 

and consequences in the fifteen 

Homeland Security Planning Scenarios as rationale and basis for developing forces for foreign consequence 

management. These worst-case scenarios were not meant for budgeting 

resources; decisions based on these 

scenarios would demand significant 

numbers of personnel and material to 

be dedicated to the very low probability of a terrorist CBRN incident. No 

service wants to commit to this concept when the national defense priorities are to support military combat 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and defend the homeland from attack. 

 An alternative solution requires 

that laws and regulations addressing 

the mission and roles of domestic 

consequence management forces be 

altered to enable these forces to deploy in support of foreign consequence management missions. This 

concept proposes a ―global‖ consequence management force posture 

with centralized management. However, since each nation has a unique 

set of capabilities toward specific 

threats, this joint task force would 

have to be prepared to execute a 

broad range of emergency response 

tasks with respect to all possible 

CBRN hazards. Dedicating a joint 

task force to execute missions on call 

both within and outside of the United 

States could be costly, and, in all likelihood, would still be unable to deploy 

to a foreign incident site within 96 

hours of the event. In addition, taking 

domestic consequence management 

forces away from the states and local 

responders might elicit some significant political displeasure at the potential vulnerability caused by their deployment. 

 Some will argue that the Army’s 

20th Support Command (CBRNE) 

already wrestles with the challenge of 

addressing the demands of responding to domestic terrorism, supporting 

conventional military operations, and 

addressing WMD interdiction and 

elimination tasks. However, the 20th

can not task National Guard units and 

is not designed to respond to nonotice overseas terrorist CBRN incidents. One might also argue that it is 

ill-prepared to do so, lacking both the 

necessary authorities and resources 

to adequately execute the mission –

and it is highly unlikely that it would 

receive either in the near future. 

These are not inconsequential issues. 

Changing the Mind-Set

 The way out of this dilemma requires changes in perceiving the 

threat and organizing an acceptable 

response. We need to stop using 

worst-case scenarios – and in particular, the 10-kiloton nuclear terrorist 

incident – as the basis for planning 

DOD’s manpower and resourcing 

requirements. There is no other area 

of defense policy where this type of 

worst-case scenario planning is supported. Violent extremist groups and 

insurgents in particular are not receiving WMD materials and technology 

from nation-states. They are improvising with available materials, using 

drums of volatile industrial chemicals, 

small amounts of toxins, and radiological material for dirty bombs. Their 

goal is not to overthrow Western civilization; it is to weaken the govern-
17 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

ment’s authority and to influence the 

local populace, enabling their freedom to execute specific and limited 

organizational goals and objectives. 

Accordingly, we need to accept that a 

massive US military task force will not 

be required for the overwhelming majority of foreign consequence management responses, short of an active conflict with a WMD-armed state.

 The National Military Strategy to 

Combat WMD proposes a framework 

that was originally designed to 

counter the actions of adversarial 

nation-states armed with CB weapons. It was not intended to be a 

homeland defense/civil support strategy, and in fact, DOD has developed 

a separate document detailing its 

homeland defense/civil support strategy. It was not (initially) intended to 

address the US military’s response to 

the threat of adversarial nuclear 

weapons. We need to recognize 

those facts and embrace the difference between strategies intended to 

deter nation states with WMD programs and those intended to stop 

terrorists with CBRN material. There 

is a world of difference between those 

two communities, and loosely using 

the term ―WMD‖ does not help to develop the right capabilities.

Conclusions

 Domestic consequence management is a sacred cow requiring careful address. In an ideal situation, 

DOD would re-assess and re-assign 

those forces to a more practical and 

sustainable size, working with DHS 

and other government agencies to 

provide technical advice and cooperation in any required response scenario. We have to accept the politics 

surrounding this area and the nature 

of incremental policy direction. But at 

the same time, we should abandon 

ideas of using domestic consequence 

management forces for foreign consequence management missions. It’s 

not executable, for legal, political, 

logistical, and financial reasons. 

 DOD does need to adapt to the 

language that DHS and the interagency uses – that is to say, the U.S. 

government doesn’t use the terms 

― c r i s i s m a n a g e m e n t ‖ a n d 

―consequence management,‖ but 

rather prefers the more holistic term 

―incident management.‖ Using this 

term would, at the least, limit arguments over whether particular DOD 

forces ought to be supporting the crisis phase or the consequence phase 

or both. It would also more clearly 

support interagency discussions if all 

parties were to use common terms 

and frameworks regarding the complicated framework of organizing federal 

response to catastrophic incidents. If 

the US government truly believes in a 

―whole-of-government‖ approach, it 

must enforce a common lexicon for 

all federal agencies.

 The DOD foreign consequence 

management capability should be 

limited to an advisory role. During the 

previous administration, there was a 

focus on ―building partnership capabilities‖ for CBRN defense and consequence management. This should 

continue. It is not practical to dedicate 

US forces in overseas theaters or to 

develop a standing joint task force 

within the United States for the sole 

purpose of foreign consequence 

management. DOD can, however, 

provide technical advisor teams to 

those nations wishing to build up their 

incident response capabilities, and 

develop a technical ―reach-back‖ capability to support any US military 

operational response. The services 

and combatant commands need to 

cooperatively develop plans for each 

overseas installation, plans that are 

shaped to the constraints and capabilities of each host nation. This will 

require the addition of a few dedicated CBRN defense experts to the 

combatant command staffs (expertise 

that is sorely lacking right now).

 Military and civilian leadership 

view the threat of nation-state WMD 

programs and terrorist CBRN incidents as real, but manageable. Other 

defense priorities will continue to prevail over the issue of how DOD 

should respond to domestic and foreign consequence management. It 

truly is a case of if, not when terrorists 

will develop and use a WMD within 

the United States or against a US 

military installation overseas. If we 

are to develop a practical and sustainable foreign consequence management capability, these key principles must be clearly understood. If 

DOD leaders believed that a terrorist 

CBRN incident was imminent and the 

effects would be catastrophic, one 

would not see these mid-level action 

officers debating concepts, personnel, and funding. The keys to success 

include using realistic threat scenarios, adopting a common lexicon with 

interagency partners, and considering 

international capabilities while maintaining technical experts in key staff 

positions (in particular, augmenting 

combatant command staffs) and in 

deployable teams to assist federal, 

state, local, and international emergency responders. 

Al Mauroni is a senior policy analyst 

with more than twenty-three years 

working DOD chemical-biological 

warfare and defense programs and 

policy. He is a former Army officer 

and 1985 graduate of CarnegieMellon University. He has published 

six books, the latest of which is 

“Where Are The WMDs?” by the Naval Institute Press, and has also published numerous journal articles on 

the topic. This paper does not reflect 

the official position of any one person 

or any particular organization.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 18

ntroduction

 In April of 2009, newscasts from 

Mexico proclaimed that hundreds 

of Mexicans were ill with an influenza 

virus which was later identified to be 

―Swine Flu.‖ Reports abounded 

about a significant number of deaths 

and a large number of infected people. The disease quickly began to 

spread across international borders, 

with confirmed infections in the 

United States (U.S.), United Kingdom 

(UK), New Zealand, Spain, Germany, 

and China. The Centers for Disease 

Control (CDC) and Prevention and 

the World Health Organization (WHO) 

mounted a phenomenal campaign to 

educate people regarding ―Swine 

Flu,‖ and the more appropriate moniker of ―H1N1 Influenza Type A‖ slowly 

began to replace the term ―Swine 

Flu.‖ The disease was found in almost every state within the U.S. 

within several weeks of the initial infection. A sort of hysteria broke out 

regarding the deadly implications of 

―Swine Flu,‖ or ―H1N1 Influenza Type 

A.‖ The mass media prompted many 

to stay home, not spread the disease, 

and see a doctor if you showed signs 

and symptoms of the flu; the most 

important symptom was dizziness, 

which normally does not occur with 

other strains of influenza. However, 

despite the media hype, the disease 

caused far fewer deaths and initial 

infections than many had predicted; 

the vast majority of those who were 

confirmed to have H1N1 Influenza A 

recovered. 

 This article will explore the following: What is the criterion for an epidemic or pandemic? What are the 

key differences between the two 

terms? What is influenza? How does 

it infect populations? Have there 

been other epidemics or pandemics 

in the past from which we can learn? 

What conclusions can we draw from 

the past? Did the CDC and the WHO 

take the right steps to limit the swine 

influenza pandemic of April and May 

of 2009?

Epidemic versus Pandemic

 The term, ―epidemic,‖ is a word 

whose origin lies with Greek: ―epi + 

demos,‖ meaning ―Upon people.‖1 An 

epidemic, is therefore, a disease that 

remains in a limited geographic region, but may be widespread among 

the population of that region. The 

term, ―pandemic,‖ is a word of Greek 

origin also: ―pan + demos,‖ which 

means ―all people.‖ A pandemic is 

not isolated to a geographic region; 

the disease spreads far and wide, 

encompassing entire countries, continents, and possibly the world.2

 Many people commonly mistake 

the meanings of the two words; epidemics are confined to geographical 

areas, whereas pandemics are widespread.

Types of Influenza

 There are three major types of 

influenza, categorized by the suffixes 

A, B, and C. Influenza A is the type 

found in humans and many other 

mammals, including birds. Influenza 

A viruses have given rise to major 

epidemics and pandemics in both 

human and mammal/avian populations. Influenza B is nearly endemic 

to humans and it is far less common 

than Influenza A. It is occasionally 

found in populations of seals and ferrets. The genetic properties of Influenza B and its extremely limited host 

species preclude it from propagating 

a pandemic in humans. Influenza C 

is found in humans, dogs, and swine. 

It is also far less common than Influenza A, but it can produce virulent 

epidemics and extensive individual 

illness. Strains of influenza are categorized according to two major surface proteins: hemagglutinin, denoted by Hx, where ―x‖ is an integer, 

and neuraminidase, denoted by Ny, 

where ―y‖ is an integer. To date, 

medical science has identified sixteen 

distinct varieties of hemagglutinin and 

nine distinct varieties of neuraminidase found in influenza A. As an example, both Spanish Influenza and 

Swine Influenza are categorized as 

H1N1 Influenza A. Because Spanish 

Influenza and Swine influenza share 

similar typing, the Center for Disease 

Control and Prevention and the World 

Health Organization both issued 

strong statements in the early days of 

the most recent pandemic. The diseases are structurally similar in major 

respects, but there are subtle genetic 

differences which identify them as 

either Spanish or Swine Influenza.3

 Medical science has a system that 

codifies influenzas using genetic coding. An example of how influenza is 

categorized is shown in figure 1.

Pandemics of the Past:

A Learning Opportunity

MAJ W. David Jones

Chief of Doctrine and Joint Lessons Learned 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Information Analysis Center Albuquerque, NM

I 
19 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Infection by and Replication of 

Influenza

 Hemagglutinin is a protein that 

causes cells to agglutinate, or clump 

together, close to the virus. Hemagglutinin on the surface allows the influenza virus to attach itself to epithelial cells found in the throat, nose and 

lungs of mammals (and the intestines 

of birds); the virus then fractures 

sialic acid sugars and penetrates the 

cell membrane. The hemagglutinin 

shell of the virus breaks open through 

a process called endocytosis, releasing the interior contents of the virus 

into the host cell’s cytoplasm. The 

viral proteins and RNA are then transported into the host cell’s nucleus, 

where they begin to ―reprogram‖ the 

host cell’s nucleus to create a copy 

(or more likely several copies) of the 

virus. Once these copies are made, 

the replicated viruses are transported 

to the Golgi bodies of the cell and, 

once released, bind to the interior cell 

membrane of the host cell. The 

neuraminidase proteins break down 

the sialic acids of the host cell’s cell 

membrane, allowing the new viruses 

to exit the host cell. The cell dies 

after the cell membrane is ruptured 

from the interior. Drugs now exist to 

combat either the action of the hemagglutinin protein interaction with 

possible host cells (also known as M2 

inhibitors) or the action of neuraminidase to release new viruses. Examples of M2 inhibitors are amantadine 

and rimantadine; neuraminidase inhibitors include such trademarked 

drugs as Tamiflu (oseltamivir) and 

Relenza (zanamivir). Each drug is 

effective in preventing a number of 

different strains of influenza, but none 

of the drugs is effective in dealing 

with all known Hx/Ny combinations 

and types of influenza.4 

History of Influenza Pandemics

 There have been many epidemics 

and pandemics throughout the history 

of mankind. With regards to influenza, a number of pandemics were 

recorded in the 20th century. The 

most notable were the Spanish Influenza (also known as H1N1 Influenza 

Type A) of 1918, which now stands 

as the most important and widely 

studied pandemic; the Asian Influenza of 1957 (also known as H2N2 

Influenza Type A); the Hong Kong 

Influenza of 1968 (also known as 

H3N2 Influenza Type A); and the 

Russian Influenza of 1977 (debatable 

as a pandemic, since it affected children only). Other notable epidemics 

were the Swine Influenza of 1976 and 

the Avian Influenza of 1997.5 Each 

pandemic is examined in some detail 

below.

Spanish Influenza of 1918

 The Spanish Influenza Pandemic 

of 1918 infected approximately twenty 

to forty percent of the world’s population, eventually killing around twenty 

to one hundred million people worldwide, depending on the source. Although exact figures are unknown, 

current evidence suggests that as 

many as six hundred seventy-five 

thousand Americans died over a twoyear period during the outbreak. 

There is little epidemiological or historical evidence that suggests the 

location of ―patient zero.‖6 Most victims were young, healthy adults, suggesting that their own immune systems overreacted (also known as a 

cytokine reaction, often called a 

―cytokine storm‖), filling the lungs with 

fluid in an attempt to combat the disease. Most deaths from other strains 

of influenza occur in those who are 

advanced in years or who are very 

young; Spanish Influenza departed 

significantly from that norm. The majority of deaths occurred from secondary bacterial infections such as 

pneumonia, but the virus itself caused 

hemorrhaging in the lungs resulting in 

a massive death toll. Infection rates 

were as high as 50% in numerous 

populations. No continent was left 

unscathed. 

 As is the case with many pandemics, this occurrence of influenza did 

not make a single sweep unleashing 

death across the planet; instead, it 

progressed in waves, with the second 

generation killing far more than the 

first.7 No other recorded pandemic 

infected and killed more people 

across the globe, except the bubonic 

plague (Black Death) of the 14th century. 

Asian Influenza of 1957

 The Asian Influenza was a pandemic outbreak of avian influenza 

that originated in China in early 1956; 

the pandemic lasted until 1958. 

Hemagglutinin

Neuraminidase

A/Fujian/411/2002 (H3N2)

Virus

Type

Geographic

Origin

Year of

Isolation

Virus

Subtype

Strain

Number

Figure 1. Categorizing Influenza.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 20

Unlike the Spanish Influenza Pandemic of 1918, the exact geographic 

origin of this pandemic was located. 

The disease originated from avian 

influenza mutation in wild ducks 

which combined with a pre-existing 

human strain. The virus was first 

identified in Guizhou. It quickly 

spread to Singapore by February 

1957, reached Hong Kong by April 

1957, and the U.S. by June 1957. 

Aapproximately 69,800 people in the 

U.S. died. Estimates of worldwide 

death tolls vary widely depending on 

source, ranging from one to four million. The Asian Influenza was identified to be the H2N2 strain of type A 

influenza, and an influenza vaccine 

was developed in 1957 to contain its 

outbreak. Modern medical advances 

are credited with making this pandemic relatively short lived, and is 

certainly credited with saving the lives 

of many people across the globe. 

The Asian Influenza strain later 

evolved by antigenic shift (a major 

RNA change) into H3N2 which 

caused a milder pandemic from 1968 

to 1969. Both the H2N2 and H3N2 

pandemic strains contained avian 

influenza virus RNA segments.8

Hong Kong Influenza of 1968

 Related to the Asian Influenza 

Pandemic of 1957, the Hong Kong 

Influenza of 1968 was, in a sense, a 

mild pandemic as compared to the 

Spanish Influenza and the Asian Influenza. The Hong Kong Influenza 

pandemic killed an estimated one 

million people worldwide. In the U.S., 

the disease killed an estimated 

33,800 people.

 As the name implies, the disease 

was known to have originated geographically in Hong Kong. As is the 

case for several pandemics in the 

past, the disease originated as a 

cross between avian influenza, human influenza, and swine influenza; 

the host organism was determined to 

be swine, and the disease then 

passed on to humans.

 The death rate was low for this 

pandemic; the fact that the Asian Influenza and the Hong Kong Influenza 

share the same neuraminidase protein distinction (N2), and that people 

had been vaccinated against H2N2 

influenza A as a result of the Asian 

Influenza may have played a significant factor in limiting the effects of the 

disease; however, cross-immunity is 

not generally well understood within 

strains and sub-types of influenza 

viruses. It is known that infection 

rates were fairly high in Hong Kong, 

but the mortality rate was low. As the 

disease spread across southeastern 

Asia, the death rate remained relatively low; people in that region still 

had a high immunity to the disease’s 

effects. Within Hong Kong, infections 

peaked two weeks after the pandemic 

started (patient zero was identified to 

have been infected on July 13, 1968), 

and subsided six weeks later.9

Russian Influenza of 1977

 The Russian Influenza of 1977–

1978 was an epidemic caused by 

influenza strain A/USSR/90/1977 

(H1N1). It infected mostly children 

and young adults under the age of 

23; adults over the age of 23 were 

spared because of similar events 

which occurred between 1947 and 

1957. These older adults had substantial immunity. Some have called 

it an influenza pandemic, but because 

it only affected the young, it is not 

considered a true pandemic. The 

virus was included in the 1978–1979 

influenza vaccine.10 Mortality rates 

were very low.

Lessons Learned

 History has shown that pandemics 

do not follow a set cycle. In the past, 

the CDC and WHO have made predictions that have not followed. Several predictions regarding avian influenza since 1997 have been localized, 

thereby earning the title of epidemic, 

but not pandemic; however, both organizations strongly suggested that 

the disease would be widespread and 

cause widespread infection and a 

significant number of worldwide mortalities. The most recent events of 

April and May 2009 were also touted 

to cause the same net results. However, the number of confirmed infections was significantly below what 

prediction models suggested.

 People are certainly more wellinformed and well-connected in ―the 

Information Age‖ than in previous 

generations. Using internet search 

engines yields a plethora of websites 

that offer advice; a number of them 

provide sound scientific principles 

that the ordinary person can take to 

prevent infection. The news media 

has also taken on an important role. 

Many newscasts have discussed the 

latest epidemic of Swine Flu; the media has suggested common-sense 

approaches proffered by both the 

Center for CDC and WHO are highly 

effective at limiting the spread not 

only of influenza, but other diseases 

as well. On the other hand, some 

communities went substantially overboard in dealing with the possibility of 

an epidemic; schools were closed, 

graduation ceremonies and proms 

were cancelled, and people visiting 

foreign countries were quarantined, 

even though none were sick.

 Among the most important steps 

that the average person can take to 

prevent infection is vaccination. Vaccinations are prepared using the best 

guesses from each hemisphere’s previous season’s influenza strain. 

Many times, vaccinations are successful; however, influenza tends to 

experience antigenic drifts as time 

progresses. In that case, the virus’s 

genetic information tends to drift 

slightly as the virus replicates itself in 

the host organism. At other times, a 

more dramatic antigenic shift occurs. 

In this case, the virus alters significantly, usually when the host has infections of different strains that combine in a host. A new strain of influenza is created as the RNA sequences combine to form a new pattern, which then must be typed. Antigenic drifts and antigenic shifts are 

the nemesis of vaccination programs. 

Small variations in genetic material 

can render entire vaccination programs useless.

 An important step in preventing 

disease is keeping public places 

clean and sanitary. Using household 

bleach, alcohol, and sanitary wipes 

have been shown to be extremely 

effective in controlling the spread of 

disease. Some grocery stores have 

taken the precaution of using alcohol 

wipes to sanitize shopping cart han-
21 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

dles. Several news stories have 

aired and patrons expressed positive 

feedback that corporations were looking out for their personal welfare. 

Such stories, while rewarding on a 

personal level, are compelling evidence of what average citizens can 

do to prevent disease.

 There is debate whether or not the 

CDC and WHO exercised too much 

caution in the April 2009 outbreak of 

Swine Flu, and whether such caution 

invoked panic and hysteria. With only 

two deaths reported among US citizens (note: those deaths were not 

conclusively linked to H1N1 Influenza 

A alone as of 10 May 2009) and 

widely varying numbers of deaths 

across the world for the first three 

weeks of known or suspected infections, WHO raised its pandemic influenza alert level to phase 5 on April 

29. In a quote from Doctor Margaret 

Chan, World Health Organization Director General,

“Ladies and gentlemen,

Based on assessment of all available 

information, and following several 

expert consultations, I have decided 

to raise the current level of influenza 

pandemic alert from phase 4 to phase 

5. Influenza pandemics must be 

taken seriously precisely because of 

their capacity to spread rapidly to 

every country in the world. On the 

positive side, the world is better prepared for an influenza pandemic than 

at any time in history. Preparedness 

measures undertaken because of the 

threat from H5N1 avian influenza 

were an investment, and we are now 

benefitting from this investment.” 11

 The mission of these organizations is to assess the situation and 

respond in the best way possible. 

With the information available, the 

organizations executed their mission 

humanely and compassionately. Experts from around the world contributed to the decisions the Director 

General made. Dr.Chan’s actions 

spurred many at the state and local 

level to make hard choices that ultimately have saved lives; it certainly 

limited the spread of H1N1 Influenza 

A. Predictive models indicated that 

H1N1 Influenza A would spread rapidly with potentially grave results. 

 As of early July 2009, the U.S. 

reported approximately 210 deaths 

related to, but not necessarily caused 

directly by, H1N1. The efforts and 

swift actions made by the CDC and 

WHO have minimized misery, suffering, and potential catastrophe.

 The CDC and WHO initiated a 

campaign to educate the ordinary 

citizen regarding precautions people 

should take. Those efforts were effective, simple, and did not impact the 

struggling US economy adversely. 

Parts of the economy, notably medical supply firms, received orders for 

goods that exceeded quarterly demand for several quarters in the fiscal 

year. Suppliers of masks, for example, were overwhelmed by the urgent 

requests from many areas of the 

country. People took the advice of 

the WHO and CDC; their personal 

actions limited the spread of the disease, reducing the predictive models 

to ―worst-case scenarios.‖ Vaccine 

manufacturers have significantly increased volume of flu vaccine for the 

northern hemisphere’s flu season, 

anticipating that H1N1 Influenza A 

could stage a massive return in the 

fall and winter of 2009 and 2010.

Conclusion

 History has shown that pandemics 

are unpredictable and deadly, and 

that they can have dire consequences. From each pandemic of the 

20th Century, medical science 

gleaned volumes of information. Advances in treatment, gene sequencing and identification, and vaccination 

programs each has contributed to 

saving lives. Common sanitation 

practices also contributed to preventing infection. The CDC and WHO 

took advantage of lessons learned 

from history, predictive models, and 

information that transited from across 

the globe to issue warnings and raise 

awareness. The actions of these organizations prevented a large-scale 

pandemic. While future historians 

may suggest and debate that the organizations overreacted, it is certain 

that their execution of events was 

systematic and that their recommendations saved lives. History has recorded instances where government 

and private organizations were too 

slow in reacting to developing situations to the detriment of populations; 

the CDC and WHO made the right 

recommendations. We have proven 

that we have learned from history. 

We have proven that fast action can 

prevent epidemics and pandemics. 

Though we have no cure for influenza, we can take significant protective measures at multiple levels to 

ensure that this, or any other disease 

we encounter, will not result in widespread illness, death, or other catastrophic impacts.

MAJ W. David Jones is the Chief of 

Doctrine and Joint Lessons Learned 

at the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency’s Information Analysis Center 

in Albuquerque, NM. He has a B.S. 

in Physics from North Carolina State 

University, a M.S. in Physics from the 

Naval Postgraduate School, and is 

working on a Ph.D. in Physics from 

The University of New Mexico.

His email address is

william.d.jones@dtra.mil 

ENDNOTES

1. http://dictionary.reference.com/

browse/epidemic

2. http://dictionary.reference.com/

browse/pandemic

3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

influenza

4. ibid.

5. ibid.

6. http://en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/1918_flu_pandemic

7. http://pandemicflu.gov/general/

historicaloverview.html; http://

en.wikipedia.org/

wiki/1918_flu_pandemic

8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Asian_Flu#Asian_flu

9. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Hong_Kong_Flu#Hong_Kong_flu

10. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Influenza_A_virus_subtype_H1N1#Russi

an_flu

11. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/

news/statements/2009/

h1n1_20090429/

en/index.html 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 22

ntroduction 

 For over half a century, Nuclear Medical Science 

Officers (NMSO) have been a part of the Army Medical 

Service Corps, tracing their proud heritage and lineage 

directly back to the Manhattan Project and the subsequent 

nuclear weapon testing program 1

 These commissioned officers are health physicists who 

wear the Army uniform and practice the craft of military 

health physics. The mission of the NMSO is: 

“to be a highly competent, dedicated, and professional 

Soldier scientist whose unique expertise is military health 

physics and whose solemn mission is to protect the war 

fighters and those they defend against harm from all 

sources of radiation, both military and civilian” 2. 

 Currently, there are about 60 NMSOs on active duty 

with a comparable number serving in the Army Reserves 

and National Guard. The purpose of this article is to highlight some of the duties and responsibilities of Nuclear 

Medical Science Officers while they serve and defend the 

Nation. It discusses NMSO roles in medical health physics, deployment health physics, homeland defense, emergency response, radiation dosimetry, radiation research, 

education, and training, support to Army radiation safety, 

and national and international scientific collaborations. 

The article closes with a discussion of NMSO career opportunities and a brief summary and conclusions. 

Medical Health Physics 

 Over one third of the NMSO positions are located 

within Army hospitals and medical centers where they 

serve as medical health physicists. In these assignments, 

the NMSO serves as a radiation safety officer (RSO), ensuring the protection of patients, workers, and the general 

public from the use of radiation and radioactive materials 

in medical diagnosis, therapy, and research. Like their 

civilian counterparts, they manage medical radiation 

safety programs regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (except those facilities located outside of the 

United States, which are self-regulated by the Army). 

While in these medical RSO positions, NMSOs perform 

initial and annual radiation safety surveys of medical, dental, and veterinary x-ray systems. They also complete inventories and leak tests of radioactive sealed sources, 

ensure appropriate radioactive source security measures 

are implemented, maintain radiation dosimetry programs 

(to include bioassay), conduct fetal dose assessments, 

respond to radioactive spills and incidents, support inpatient radioiodine therapy and brachytherapy procedures, 

and perform shielding evaluations.3

 It is through these hospital assignments that NMSOs 

develop and hone their technical skills so that they are 

ready to perform their ―go to war‖ mission of assessing 

radiological risks and protecting others against radiation 

during military operations. Specifically, during these garrison assignments, junior officers are developed and mentored by more senior and experienced NMSOs, learning 

about radiation detection and measurement, radiation dosimetry, radiation shielding, and how to safely handle radiation sources and radiation producing devices. 

Deployment Health Physics 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers proudly wear the 

Army uniform because of their direct support to U.S. military deployments overseas, to include war. To date, over 

half of all NMSOs have deployed around the globe. These 

Soldiers have deployed to many countries, such as Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bosnia, Iraq, Korea, Kosovo, Kuwait, 

Montenegro, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Somalia, and 

Uzbekistan, along with a host of others. One of the critical 

roles that NMSOs fill during wartime operations is to serve 

I 

Nuclear Medical Science Officers: 

Army Health Physicists Proudly Serving and Defending 

Their Country Around the Globe

COL Mark A. Melanson

Radiological Consultant to the Army Surgeon General, 

Office of the Surgeon General 

Nuclear Weapon Test ―Upshot Knothole‖, Nevada Test 

Site 1953.
23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

as combat theater RSOs; there is currently a Nuclear 

Medical Science Officer serving as theater RSO for each 

of the two wars the United States is fighting, one in Iraq 

and one in Afghanistan. These brave officers are responsible for all radiation safety issues, providing protection for 

over 150,000 deployed U.S. Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, 

Airmen, and Coast Guardsmen. 

 Among their many duties and responsibilities, the theater RSOs provide radiation safety training for the deployed 

units, manage physical security screening systems using 

radioactive materials or producing ionizing radiation, issue 

and exchange hundreds of personnel dosimeters, investigate incidents involving radiation exposure, recover and 

safeguard orphan radioactive sources, and perform routine measurements of ambient radiation levels.

 Another example of important ―down range‖ health 

physics support that NMSOs provide is conducting base 

camp assessment of areas where U.S. troops are bivouacked. These multimedia surveys include laboratory 

analysis of soil, water, and air samples. These environmental assessments ensure that personnel are not exposed to unsafe levels of radiation. 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers also lead special 

teams that perform other field assessments to ensure 

troop safety. One of these special assessments was conducted when U.S. Forces secured the Tuwaitha Nuclear 

Research Center, the crown jewel of Saddam Hussein’s 

nuclear weapon development program during the early 

phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The massive 23,000 

acre site outside of Baghdad was attacked by Coalition 

Forces and then subsequently looted and burned by local 

Iraqis. 4 Because of this potentially hazardous situation, 

the White House directed that a special mission be 

launched to conduct a complex radiological risk assessment to determine if the more than 4,000 Soldiers and 

Marines guarding the massive site were in danger of overexposure to radiation, which thankfully they were not (See 

23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Combat Theater Command Radiation RSO checking an 

area air sampler at a U.S. base camp in Iraq. 

Figure 4. Nuclear Medical Science Officer (right) 

briefing Soldiers about radiation risks at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center in Iraq. 

Nuclear Medical Science Officer serving as a medical Radiation Safety Officer and surveying a medical fluoroscopy 

system at Ireland Army Community Hospital, Fort Knox, 

Kentucky.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 24

Figure 4). Based upon in situ measurements and environmental sampling (air and soil), the highest upper bound 

dose equivalent for troops securing and patrolling the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center was estimated to be only 

1.1 cSv, well below peacetime occupational radiation 

safety standards and therefore safe.5

 In order to ensure that troops treated in a combat zone 

receive the same level of quality medical care that they 

would receive back home, NMSOs also support deployed 

military hospitals. These NMSOs deploy to conduct comprehensive surveys of medical, dental, and veterinary xray equipment, to include state of the art computed tomography systems. 

 As a result, U.S. troops wounded during their deployments are able to receive high quality diagnostic images 

with a minimal radiation dose, thereby ensuring both efficacy in their medical treatment and their medical safety. 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers have served as the 

leader of the Army Contaminated Equipment Retrograde 

Team (ACERT) in Kuwait and surveyed hundreds of military vehicles, along with other items of equipment and material for radiological contamination prior to retrograding 

them back to the United States.

 The Nuclear Disablement Team (NDT) is a special team 

deployed to disable enemy nuclear weapon programs. 

This elite team has received highly specialized training on 

nuclear weapon development technology (cascade impactors, centrifuges, etc.) from scientists and engineers at the 

Department of Energy (DOE) and the measures required 

to safely disable equipment. While the NDT did not find 

any evidence of an active nuclear weapon development 

program in Iraq, it did secure, safeguard, and escort highly 

radioactive sources out of the war zone so that they could 

not be used as radiological dispersal devices, or ―dirty 

bombs.‖ 

 In addition to their wartime mission, the NDT is capable 

of augmenting nuclear and radiological incident and accident response in the continental United States. The NDT 

is fully self-sufficient and can set up and operate a radiological decontamination ―hot line‖, processing scores of 

contaminated casualties, or members of the public who 

are not injured, but may have some external radiological 

contamination. Throughout the year, the NDT has a very 

robust training schedule designed to prove team capabilities and ensure team member readiness. Because of its 

unique assets and the ability to deploy quickly, the NDT 

has been available to support important political events 

such as the most recent Presidential Inauguration and the 

annual State of the Union Address. The NMSO assigned 

to the NDT serves as the RSO for the team and ensures 

the protection of the team members during their deployments at home and abroad. 

Homeland Defense 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers have been ensuring 

the defense of the American homeland since the founding 

of their specialty over half a century ago. During the attacks of September 11th, 2001, a NMSO deployed to the 

Pentagon after it was struck by one of the high-jacked 

planes in order to confirm the absence of radiological contamination from plane components, such as depleted uranium counterweights, or terrorist planted materials.6 Since 

early 2004, a NMSO has been assigned to the Pentagon 

Force Protection Agency’s (PFPA) Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Directorate. 

This health physicist manages a vast integrated array of 

portal monitors and roving detectors in order to intercept 

anyone trying to sneak radioactive sources into the vast 

3.7 million square foot building. 

 A senior NMSO is assigned to the Department of 

Homeland Security and currently working on nuclear interdiction technologies designed to identify and intercept covert radioactive sources 

Nuclear Medical Science Officer surveying Abrams Tanks 

for radiological contamination in Kuwait. 

CBRNE 

Directorate Logo 

Pentagon Force 

Protection Agency. 
25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

being smuggled on the immense American interstate highway system. 

 Serving as the CBRNE Defense Staff Officer on the 

Army Staff, a Nuclear Medical Science Officer is responsible for developing and implementing Army policy in response to nuclear or radiological threats to the United 

States and her military forces. This officer is also responsible for procuring and stockpiling various m medical 

counter measures, such as potassium iodide, chelating 

agents like zinc and calcium trisodium diethylenetriamepentaacetate (DTPA), and decorporating agents like 

Prussian Blue for use by U.S. Forces. 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers have also been actively involved in evaluating prototype physical security 

cargo screening systems using radioactive materials or 

producing ionizing radiation in order to protect Army installations around the world.7

Emergency Response 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers also stand ready to 

respond to nuclear or radiological accidents or incidents 

worldwide. During the infamous nuclear reactor accident 

at Chernobyl, a special scientific team led by a NMSO deployed to Moscow to assist the United States Ambassador 

in assuring that Americans living within the Soviet Union 

were safe.8The Medical Radiobiology Advisory Team 

(MRAT) is another NMSO-led emergency response team 

that is located at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI) in Bethesda, Maryland and provides expert consultation on the medical management of 

radiological casualties and patient decontamination to the 

highest levels of the U.S. Government.9

 The United States Army Radiological Advisory Medical 

Team (USARAMT) was originally created in 1964 in order 

to manage and treat casualties from U.S. nuclear weapon 

accidents10; since 9/11, this team has become a valuable 

medical resource for responding to incidents of nuclear or 

radiological terrorism.11 The USARAMT has participated in 

many civilian exercises involving radiologically contaminated patients to include Operation Purple Haze, a Department of Homeland Security sponsored dirty bomb exercise at the Baltimore Raven’s football stadium. This 

large exercise involved the deployment of all response 

assets from the City of Baltimore and the State of Maryland. The NMSO leader of the USARAMT served as the 

senior medical controller evaluating the overall medical 

response.12 The USARAMT has also partnered with local 

civilian hospitals in the Washington, D.C. area by participating in mass casualty exercises involving radiologically 

contaminated patients. 

 These exercises are useful in coordinating joint responses and for the military and civilian responders to 

learn about each other’s capabilities in a training environment, rather than during an actual radiological or nuclear 

emergency. 

 Located within the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA), the NMSO on the Consequence Management 

Advisory Team (CMAT) can conduct detailed modeling of 

nuclear or radiological incidents and predict fallout deposition. Other NMSOS at Army hospitals have participated in 

mass casualty exercises, to include a nationwide medical 

exercise testing the country’s response to multiple radiological casualties.13

 The NMSOs at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute were also key contributors to the ―Medical 

Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook.‖ 14 

This important reference is used as a resource the world 

over for the proper handling of patients from nuclear or 

radiological accidents or incidents. Another way that 

NMSOs have supported nuclear or radiological emergency response is through the drafting and publishing of 

the ―CBRNE Battle Book‖, a convenient pocket sized reference guide for anyone responding to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive incidents.15

 Also, 

NMSO expertise was sought for the groundbreaking development of coherent federal policy for responding to a 

nuclear detonation on American soil that included critical 

guidance to protect emergency responders from lethal 

levels of radiation in the aftermath of such a horrific 

event.16

 Each of the fifty states has an Army National Guard 

25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Nuclear Medical Science Officer leading the U.S. Army Radiological Advisory Medical Team during an exercise with a 

local Washington, D.C. civilian hospital. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 26

Civil Support Team - Weapons of Mass Destruction (CSTWMD) providing radiological monitoring and decontamination support within their respective states; the NMSO on 

these CST -WMDs serves as the RSO helping to ensure 

team safety. Recently, the 32nd CST -WMD participated 

in a high level exercise involving a simulated ―dirty bomb‖ 

attack at the Baltimore Raven’s football stadium in downtown Baltimore Maryland. The exercise was very demanding and provided much needed realism to help prepare the 

team for its important mission in responding to radiation 

emergencies. 

Radiation Dosimetry 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers provide key support 

to the Army’s vast radiation dosimetry program that monitors approximately fourteen thousand Soldiers and Army 

civilians.17 Overseeing this massive program is the responsibility of the Radiological Hygiene Consultant to the 

Army Surgeon General, a NMSO Colonel and the senior 

health physicist in the Army. This critical medical oversight 

includes inspecting and evaluating the Army Dosimetry 

Center located on Redstone Arsenal, Alabama and investigating and validating all overexposures of Army dosimeters on behalf of the Army Surgeon General.18 Junior 

NMSOs operate the Deployable Dosimetry Laboratory 

(DDL), which is mounted on a lightweight military vehicle 

and capable of deploying to the field and processing hundreds of thermoluminescient dosimeters daily. The DDL is 

equipped to provide rapid and defensible dosimetry in 

support of deployed operations radiological emergencies.19 Nuclear Medical Science Officers have been part of 

the ongoing developmental effort to field a tactical radiation dosimetry system that is sensitive and accurate 

enough to provide National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) accredited dosimetric results. 

 In the area of internal radiation dosimetry, NMSOs 

manage the Army’s radiobioassay program, located at the 

Army’s Public Health Command at Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Maryland; this program includes analyzing radiobiologic samples, calculating internal doses, and reporting 

the results to the individual, their healthcare provider, and 

the Army Dosimetry Center for archiving.20 Part of the 

Army’s bioassay program includes screening returning 

troops from deployments for exposure to depleted uranium (DU) anti-armor munitions. To date, over 2,300 individuals have provided urine bioassays for analysis with 

only a handful showing measureable DU levels; most of 

these individuals had confirmed embedded fragments of 

DU from fratricide or ―friendly fire‖ incidents21 with medical 

follow ups by the Veterans Administration. The large remainder of the Soldiers had no indication of depleted uranium intake, with urinary levels of natural uranium consistent with dietary levels reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 

Radiation Research, Education, and Training 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers are also actively engaged in conducting radiation research and providing radiation education and training. NMSOs assigned to the 

AFRRI conduct both radiobiology research and teach the 

Medical Effects of Ionizing Radiation (MEIR) course to all 

members of the Department of Defense; the MEIR course 

is recognized worldwide as a premier primer course on the 

biological effects of ionizing radiation and the health effects from radiation exposure. The NMSO assigned to the 

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences 

(USUHS) serves as the RSO for the university, which contains a medical school, nursing school, and the AFRRI. 

This officer is also an adjunct professor on the USUHS 

faculty, providing radiation safety and health physics instruction to the myriad of courses offered at USUHS and 

assists students that are performing radiation related research. 

Nuclear Medical Science Officer (right) with the 32nd Civil 

Support Team – Weapons of Mass Destruction (CST –

WMD) participating in Operation Purple Haze, a dirty bomb 

exercise at the Baltimore Raven’s football stadium in Baltimore, Maryland. 

Nuclear Medical Science Officer manning the Deployable 

Dosimetry Laboratory during a field training exercise at 

Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. 
27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

 Most NMSOs conduct important health physics research during their Army funded fellowships for master 

and doctoral level degrees in civilian universities, thereby 

furthering the scientific knowledge about radiation and its 

health effects. Some of the research topics pursued by 

these officers have included: advances in radiation detection technology, computerized radiation safety training, 

improvements in accurate radiation measurement for diagnostic radiology, radiation biodosimetry, and decontamination technologies for fixed radiological contamination.22

 

Much of this important research is presented at professional society meetings, such as the Health Physics Society, or published in peer-reviewed scientific journals. It is 

important to note that all but two of the forty five references cited in this article are publications authored or coauthored by NMSOs while serving on active duty. 

 When questions were raised about the risks to Soldiers 

in armored vehicles struck with DU munitions fired by 

friendly forces, NMSOs took the lead in securing funding 

for and in the management of the complex five-year, six 

million dollar Depleted Uranium Capstone Aerosol Study 

and Human Health Risk Assessment.23 This elegant research project measured the depleted uranium aerosols, 

their concentration and particle size distribution, resulting 

from the perforation of tank and armored personnel carrier 

crew compartments by depleted uranium kinetic energy 

penetrators.24 As it turns out, individuals who were in 

these damaged vehicles at or near the time of impact and 

perforation, but were not wounded with depleted uranium 

fragments, received upper bound doses below U.S peacetime radiation safety standards for emergency responders 

and these scientific results support the fact that depleted 

uranium is a safe anti-armor munition.25

 The Nuclear Medical Science Officer assigned to the 

United States Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, evaluates and prioritizes the Army’s biomedical research requirements for nuclear weapon effects and other 

weapons of mass destruction.26 This NMSO also participates in research projects, such as the development of 

Soldier performance models for typical combat tasks, as a 

function of dose and time, subsequent to nuclear weapon 

detonations. These estimates give battlefield commanders 

an assessment of force effectiveness on the nuclear battlefield and are a part of Army doctrine. Another research 

project is the fielded of an unmanned aerial vehicle that 

can locate and identify radioactive materials or areas of 

radiological contamination while in flight. 

 While assigned to the Army Medical Department Center and School at Fort Sam Houston, Texas and the U.S. 

Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, NMSOs provide 

training in the medical effects of radiation, to include the 

effects from nuclear weapon detonations. At the United 

States Military Academy at West Point, New York, a 

NMSO is on the faculty of the Department of Physics and 

teaches physics, to include health physics to the cadets . 

This instructor also serves as a positive role model and 

mentor for these future Army officers. 

Nuclear Medical Science Officer Support to Army 

Radiation Safety 

 Nuclear Medical Science Officers provide vital ongoing 

support to the Army’s large radiation safety program. In 

fact, the first Army Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) was a 

NMSO who singlehandedly designed and implemented 

the corporate radiation safety program for the United 

States Army that continues to this day.27 Currently, 

NMSOs support Army radiation safety by serving as members of the Army Radiation Safety Council and the Army 

Reactor Council, which oversees the Army’s one of a kind 

Fast Burst Nuclear Reactor at White Sands Missile 

27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Nuclear Medical Science Officer doing Electron Paramagnetic Resonance Radiation Biodosimetry research.

Nuclear Medical Science Officer teaching Optics at the 

United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 28

Range, New Mexico. Within Army Medical Command, a 

senior NMSO manages and oversees the worldwide system of hospitals and medical research facilities using radionuclides and radiation producing devices to ensure patient and worker safety.28

 To ensure regulatory compliance, junior NMSOs perform surveys and inspections of 

Army radiation safety programs around the globe. Additionally, Nuclear Medical Science Officers serve as part of 

Special Medical Augmentation Response Teams or 

SMART teams that respond to incidents involving potential 

radiological exposure of personnel and provide radiation 

risk communication.29

 In the area of Army policy, NMSOs helped to draft, 

staff, and implement the Army’s Risk Management System. This decision model conveniently integrates all occupational and environmental risks, to include radiation, into 

a matrix that properly normalizes all operational risks during deployment and combat operations. This critical information then allows military commanders to make timely 

and informed risk management decisions during complex 

and dangerous military operations.30

 When Army veterans with health problems inquire 

about potential radiation exposure during their service, 

NMSOs at the Army’s Veterans Radiation Exposure Investigation Program (VREIP) conduct a detailed investigation 

in order to assess radiation exposure and determine dose. 

This research include reviewing veteran service records to 

confirm duty assignments, locations, and dates, querying 

archived radiation dosimetry records, and estimating upper bound radiation doses for veterans who were not issued or did not wear personnel dosimeters. The results of 

the VREIP investigations are sent to the Department of 

Veterans Affairs so that the diseases and illnesses. 

National and International Scientific Collaborations 

 Because of their knowledge, NMSOs have lent their 

scientific expertise and served the national and international scientific community. A NMSO served as a representative to the multi-agency working group writing Federal Guidance Report No.14, Radiation Protection Guidance for Diagnostic and Interventional X-ray Procedures. 

As head of Delegation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NMSOs forged standardized agreements 

to handle and process nuclear combat casualties.31 Nuclear Medical Science Officers have also consulted on the 

health and environmental effects of depleted uranium by 

serving as consultants to the World Health Organization 

(WHO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency.32 An 

NMSO also served as a member of the international scientific team sent by the United Nations to the Balkans to 

assess the health and environmental risks from the use of 

depleted uranium by NATO forces and which concluded 

that these risks were not significant.33 

 When the Nicaraguan Government had concerns about 

the safety of its radioactive waste disposal facility because 

of an outbreak of illnesses in individuals working on a construction site adjacent to the building, a NMSO led the scientific mission to perform radiation measurements and 

assess the radiation risk. The team found the facility to be 

safe, briefing this to the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua 

and the head of the Nicaraguan Atomic Energy Commission. They also provided useful recommendations to further enhance the physical security of the radioactive waste 

disposal site and better safeguard the highly radioactive 

radium brachytherapy sources stored there.34

Nuclear Medical Science Officer Career Opportunities 

 Health physicists who choose to become NMSOs receive commissions as Army Officers in the Medical Service Corps and can serve on Active Duty, in the Army Reserves, or in Army National Guard. The rank at which one 

enters the Army is dependent upon the level of education 

attained and the amount of health physics experience of 

the individual. For example, a health physicist with a 

bachelor’s degree in health physics or a related field (like 

nuclear physics or nuclear engineering) would receive a 

commission as a second lieutenant. Individuals having an 

appropriate master’s degree would be commissioned as a 

first lieutenant, while those with an appropriate doctoral 

degree would come into the Army as a captain. Initial assignments for NMSOs are typically at Army medical centers as Deputy Radiation Safety Officers or at the Army 

Public Health Command as junior health physicists; it is 

during these initial assignments that new NMSOs learn 

about Army health physics and Army officership while receiving guidance and mentoring from senior Nuclear Medical Science Officers. 

 Typically after two assignments, NMSOs are eligible to 

compete for highly coveted, fully funded fellowships to 

Nuclear Medical Science Officer (on the left) serving as part 

of a United Nation’s mission to Kosovo. 
29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

pursue graduate degrees (masters or doctorates) in health 

physics. During graduate school, these officers receive 

their full pay and allowances while incurring no student 

loan debt. After graduation, these health physicists are 

then assigned to duty positions where they can effectively 

utilize what they have learned in school. 

 As they continue their careers, NMSOs take on assignments with greater and greater responsibilities that further 

develop and groom them to be become senior Army 

health physicists and Army leaders. Once NMSOs are 

promoted to the rank of major, they become field grade 

officers and can fill more advanced technical positions and 

begin leading junior Nuclear Medical Science Officers. 

Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel NMSOs serve in senior 

Army and Defense Department staff positions making and 

overseeing radiation policy. Highly competitive NMSOs 

have also been selected to serve in command and chief of 

staff positions, having the distinct honor of leading both 

Army units and Soldiers. 

 Throughout their careers, NMSOs receive competitive 

pay and benefits as compared to their civilian colleagues, 

to include pay increases for longevity, promotions, and 

annual cost of living increases (See Figure 1). This lucrative pay includes a non-taxable allowance for housing that 

is dependent upon the cost of living for the area where the 

officer is assigned and an allowance for subsistence. Also, 

many states across the country do not tax military pay 

while an officer is serving on active duty. 

 Competitive pay and allowances for NMSOs continue 

as they stay in the service, making the Army a highly 

worthwhile career option (See Figure 2). 

 After serving 20 years or more, NMSOs may retire, 

receiving a military pension for the rest of their lives. After 

a Nuclear Medical Science Officer completes an Army 

career, he or she usually has experienced the entire 

breadth and depth of the health physics profession and 

looks back upon his or her service with great pride and a 

real sense of accomplishment. Most of these retired officers then find successful employment in the civilian sector 

as they start second health physics careers, while some 

choose to completely retire and travel or pursue their 

treasured hobbies and interests fulltime. 

Summary and Conclusions 

 The purpose of this article is to provide an overview of 

the roles and responsibilities of NMSOs, along with a 

glimpse of unique experiences and opportunities for these 

uniformed military health physicists. Established in the 

aftermath of the development and use of the world’s first 

atomic bomb, the Nuclear Medical Science Officer has 

served with distinction as skilled leaders in the Army Medical Department. These highly trained and competent Army 

officers serve in an array of capacities around globe, ensuring that those who fight our Nation’s wars are protected 

against the potentially harmful effects of radiation, regardless of the source. 

29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Figure 2. Long Term Comparison of Median Nuclear Medical Science Officer Annual Pay as Compared to Median 

Health Physics Salary Survey Data: Source – HPS Salary 

Survey 2007 (Nuclear Medical Science Officer pay includes 

base pay and allowances for housing and subsistence and 

$12,000 for the healthcare benefit.) 

Figure 1. Starting annual salary for Nuclear Medical Science Officers as compared to median starting annual salaries for health physicists based upon academic degrees: 

Source – Salary Information for Health Physicists and Nuclear Engineers, Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE), 2009 (Nuclear Medical Science Officer pay 

includes base pay and allowances for housing and subsistence and $12,000 for the healthcare benefit.) 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 30

 Whether they serve in an Army hospital, deploy with 

units to combat zones, stand ready to ensure homeland 

defense, respond to radiation emergencies, conduct radiation research, education, and training, support Army radiation safety, or collaborate with national and international 

scientists, the Army’s NMSOs continue a proud tradition of 

serving and defending the United States of America in 

places both near and far while practicing their craft of military health physics. Nuclear Medical Science Officers are 

truly ―Nuclear Medics‖, sharing a proud legacy and forging 

a bright future by continuing to protect the world’s best 

warriors against the world’s most deadliest weapons. 

 Individuals interested in pursuing an exciting and rewarding health physics career as an Army Nuclear Medical Science Officer can contact Colonel Mark A. Melanson, Radiological Hygiene Consultant, Career Field 

Leader for the Army’s Nuclear Medical Science Officers, 

at (202)-356-0058, Monday through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 

4:00 p.m., EST, or send him an email via his email address at mark.melanson@us.army.mil. To contact a local 

Army recruiter or to obtain additional information about 

joining the United States Army, go to www.goarmy.com. 

Colonel Melanson is the Nuclear Medical Science Consultant to the Army Surgeon General and the senior health 

physicist in the Army. He has a bachelors degree in physics from Dickinson College and a master’s degree and a 

doctorate in radiation health sciences from the Johns Hopkins University, and certified health physicist (CHP). His 

assignments include Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), 

Landstuhl Army Regional Medical Center; health physicist, 

U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency; Project Engineer, Johnston Atoll Plutonium Remediation Project; Radiation Hygiene Consultant, Headquarters, U.S. Army Materiel Command; Program Manager, Health Physics Program, U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine; Director, Radiation Safety, Walter Reed 

Army Medical Center; and Leader, U.S. Army Radiological 

Advisory Medical Team. OCONUS assignments include 

Germany, Johnston Atoll, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Iraq.

ENDNOTES

1. Ginn, RVN, The History of the United States Army Medical Service Corps, Center for Military 

History, 1997. 

2. Melanson, MA, ―The Role of the Army Nuclear Medical Science Officer in the Global War on 

Terrorism‖, paper delivered at the 53rd Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, 2008. 

3. Tonry, L, ―Intraoral X-Ray Room Shielding Evaluation‖, Health Physics, 83(): S60-S64, November 2002. 

4. Melanson, MA, ―Assessing and Communicating Radiation Risks in Iraq‖, Army Medical Department Journal, January-March, pp. 39 – 43, 2004. 

5. Melanson, MA, ―Deployment Radiation Risks to U.S. Troops at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research 

Center During the Early Phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom‖, Proceedings of the Midyear Topical 

Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Materials Control and Security: Risk Assessment, Handling, and Detection, pp. 171 – 176, 2005. 

6. Reyes, R, et al, ―Health Physics Support to the Special Medical Augmentation Response Team 

– Preventive Medicine in Response to the Terrorist Attack Against the Pentagon on September 

11th, 2001‖, Proceedings of the 36th Midyear Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Radiation 

Safety Aspects of Homeland Security and Emergency Response, 310 – 315, 2003. 

7. Moscato, PM, et al, ―Operational Radiation Safety Considerations for Newly Developed and 

Fielded Army Radiation Emitting Systems Used for Physical Security Screening‖, Proceedings of 

the Midyear Topical Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Radiation Safety Aspects of Homeland Security and Emergency Response, 88 – 94, 2003. 

8. Luckett, L, et al, ―Operation Chernobyl Challenge: The Public Health Response by U.S. Military 

Forces in Europe‖, Proceedings of the International Radiological Post-Emergency Response 

Issues Conference, Washington, DC, September 9-11, 1998. 

9. Remick, AL, et al, ―U.S. National Response Assets for Radiological Incidents‖, Health Physics 

Volume 89(5), 471 – 484, 2005. 

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31 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

ver the past few years, the author has been following the development of new technology as a 

series of advancements that could have military 

applications [Further Reading 1 &2]. It is now possible to 

be more specific. These projections are the opinion of the 

author and are not necessarily under current development.

 Nanowarrior – the 21st Century Robocop! The ability of 

scientists to see down to the nanometer level and control 

the development of materiel with essentially zero defects 

or precisely controlled defects means it is possible for engineers to fabricate incredible new products that can outperform even the presently conceived 2010 version and 

2020 (Darth Vader) version of Future Force Warrior 

(Figure 1). Some of these applications include advanced 

Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Information (C4I), medical breakthroughs, mission completion 

using minimum power, and combat uniform systems of 

smart material, reduced carrying weight, and increased 

weapon lethality. 

Figure 1. Nano Warrior - the 21st Century Robocop. 

 In addition to nanotechnology applications, it is reasonable to assume dramatic advances in unmanned aerial 

vehicle (UAV) and unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) platforms, systems, guidance and control as well as new insulating materials and lightweight armors. One such materiel 

is Aerogel, aka ―frozen smoke‖ (Figure 2). Aerogel can 

withstand a direct blast of 1kg of dynamite and protect 

against heat from a blowtorch at more than 1,300 0C. 

[Further Reading 3]

 Listed at Table 1 are some specific military applications 

for these new technologies that might be fielded within the 

next ten to twenty years.

 So just what does all this mean to the warfighter? Consider the following comparison of a small group (perhaps 

as many as 10 personnel) of today’s and future warfighters on a three-day mission in (1) a jungle-like environment, and (2) a desert-like environment. Only some of the 

above applications will be mentioned.

 In both cases, today’s warfighter would likely wear 

combat uniforms, body armor, helmet, boots and would 

carry a ruck sack (about sixty pounds), possibly a radio 

(about seven pounds), and a weapon (about ten pounds). 

As you can see, weight reduction is one of the most critical concerns for today’s warfighter; stealth is another.

 The future warfighter on the same mission would have 

improved combat uniforms, helmet, and boots that would 

incorporate a wide range of new technology to significantly 

reduce weight (by as much as 50%) and vastly improve 

warfighter daytime and nighttime capabilities. For short 

range, time-sensitive, secure communication, the warfighter might use a carbon nanotube transceiver cut to 

desired frequencies. These ultralight nanotransceivers 

and their associated nanocomputers would draw such low 

power that power generators could be derived from thermoelectric circuits or solar cells woven in the combat uniform or helmet. Insulated combat uniforms, helmets and 

DO YOU KNOW...

What the Future Warfighter Might Look Like?

Robert A. Pfeffer

Physical Scientist

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

O 

Figure 2. Aerogel, One of the World’s Lightest Solids. 

[Further Reading 3] 

Photo: DoD

 1(a) Robocop ® 1(b) Future Force Warrior

MGM Studios Poster ©
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 32

boots could use next-generation aerogels, presently the 

world’s lightest material. Aerogels could also be made 

into body armor and even to filter polluted water. Combat 

uniforms would have medical capabilities as well. For example, bleeding wounds would be staunched using combat uniform or aerogel material that is antibacterial. 

Warfighters in a Jungle-like Environment 

 These same future warfighters would benefit not only 

from the developments mentioned above, but they would 

also use flexible, biocompatible rubber films for use in implantable or wearable energy harvesting systems. Combat uniforms could be made to wick moisture away from 

the body and equipment could be made waterproof. Waterproofing boat surfaces would reduce drag to more silently extricate personnel from danger and return them 

during night or day to base camp using low noise, low 

heat-producing electric motors or hydrogen fuel cells. Prior 

to their deployment, future warfighters would be given 

nanomedicines to protect them from jungle toxins and diseases and to provide their commanders with real-time 

monitoring of battle stresses.

Warfighters in a Desert-like Environment 

 Desert combat uniforms would cool the warfighters 

body core temperature and generate electrical power from 

body heat or sunlight. Solar powered electric motors 

(daylight travel) or hydrogen fuel cell powered vehicles 

(nighttime travel) would move warfighters noiselessly 

through the desert while generating low thermal profiles. 

These new applications, and those mentioned above, 

would vastly reduce the weight carried by warfighters yet 

increase their ability to successfully complete their mission.

 Does anyone know this will happen for all future warfighters within twenty years? No, but the technology is 

maturing rapidly enough that Special Forces could benefit 

from some or all of these breakthroughs well within twenty 

years. 

Further Reading

1. Pfeffer, Robert, Do You Know...One Carbon Nanotube 

Molecule Does an Operable Radio Make?, pp. 21-22, 

CWMD Journal, Issue 3, 2008.

2. Pfeffer, Robert, Do You Know...Medical Microbots Are 

Nearer Than You Think?, pp. 16-17, CWMD Journal, Issue 4, 2009. 

3. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/science/

article2284349.ece

Table 1. Possible New Technology Applications 10-20 Years.
33 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

I 

troduction

 The traditional approach used to 

protect Army circuits supporting such 

critical missions as command, control, communications, computers, and 

intelligence (C4I) and weapons delivery is no longer sufficient to protect 

them from the evolving Twenty-First 

Century electromagnetic (EM) threat. 

Several recent DOD decisions, coupled with a dramatic increase in electronically sophisticated individuals, 

terrorist groups, and organized states 

intent on compromising Army electronic superiority, have already led to 

an increased sensitivity of Army circuits. This increased sensitivity provides a convincing argument that future Army circuits supporting critical 

missions must be protected against 

not only unacceptable upset, catastrophic damage, or both (referred to 

in this article as either traditional EM 

protection or E3 protection) but also 

against cyber and information attack 

(referred to in this article as nontraditional EM protection). 

 This article first looks at the present EM threat and the approach 

Army takes to protect electronics 

against it. Two recent DOD decisions 

that have increased Army circuit sensitivity and accelerated the need to 

redefine the term EM protection are 

then highlighted, followed by a discussion on the growing cyber threat 

against Army C4I. The status of 

Army system protection against the 

total EM threat is then identified. Finally, the article concludes with a discussion on how some of the emerging technologies could enhance protection against this new EM threat 

spectrum while reducing overall life 

cycle protection costs. 

The Present EM Threat and System 

Protection

EM Threat from E3-induced Stresses.

 Over the years, the Army successfully protected critical circuits from a 

diverse EM threat. This threat originated from EM environments (EMEs) 

that stressed electronic circuits. The 

EMEs were generated a number of 

ways, so they could be deliberate or 

non-deliberate, manmade or natural. 

Such diverse origins meant EMEs 

could be narrow band or wide band, 

and they could be in-band or out-ofband relative to the electronics of 

concern. And once these EMEs were 

coupled onto a system, the resultant 

electromagnetic environmental effects (E3s) were sensed by input/

output circuits as unwanted current 

and voltage stresses. The stress 

magnitudes then determined whether 

they were a threat to the circuit. If the 

stresses were high enough, they 

were known as traditional EM threats.

 There is an in-band component of 

E3 that is addressed by Army Electronic Warfare (EW). This E3 component is discussed later in the article.

Table 1 provides a list of some of the 

more common present-day EMEs 

that have been an EM threat to Army 

equipment. 

 The fact that circuits ―see‖ only 

voltages and currents and do not care 

how they originate outside the circuit 

have prompted many Army system 

designers and test and evaluation 

personnel to use a simple, yet effective approach to E3 protection 

[Further Reading 1]. It is called Unified E3 Protection (UE3P), and it 

uses the barrier concept to isolate 

sensitive circuits from those EMEs 

and E3s. This approach has been 

used to substantially reduce the cost 

of system E3 protection by making 

protection a part of the original system design.

 Present EM Protection. Critical 

circuits are generally associated with 

equipment that support critical missions. Thus, they are often found on 

weapons delivery systems and C4I 

systems. In the days when critical 

electronics were built to military 

specifications, circuits were generally 

analog and usually very rugged. 

Hence, most only had to be protected 

against catastrophic failure. (An exception to this rule was electronics 

that required protection even during 

exposure; e.g., Identification Friend or 

Foe (IFF) systems.) Catastrophic 

failure was therefore the primary concern for analog circuit designers of 

the 1950s and most of the 1960s. 

One would assume protection against 

catastrophic failure would be relatively inexpensive, especially if design 

engineers considered E3 protection 

collectively early in system design. 

Unfortunately, protection and test 

verification was often done separately 

for each EME and in some cases was 

done after equipment design 

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

The Need to Redefine Electromagnetic (EM) Protection: 

“A Think Piece“

Robert A. Pfeffer

Physical Scientist 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 34

(commonly referred to as 

retrofit) to enhance the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for 

performance. 

 With the advent of digital 

electronics in the late 1960s 

and early 1970s, however, 

electronic circuits became 

considerably smaller, more 

sophisticated, and often 

more susceptible to a given 

noise level. The occurrence 

of unacceptable upset increased, and with it, the need 

for electronics designers to 

provide additional protection 

against upset. And even 

though today’s electronics 

are digital and more sensitive, and modern day EM 

threats can cause both 

catastrophic failure and unacceptable upset, equipment 

protection is no longer a significant cost driver. An example of protection costs for 

legacy and future systems is 

provided later.

 It should be noted that 

even though protection 

against both unacceptable 

upset and catastrophic failure 

is affordable, it is still widely 

regarded as a survivability 

(not an operational) requirement. Program managers 

(PMs) consider survivability 

to be in their ―trade space‖, 

since it is not a key performance..parameter (KPP) per 

DODI 5000.02 guidance 

[Further Reading 2]. Thus, 

EME susceptibilities that program managers might accept up-front in their acquisition programs could later 

result in noise degrading the 

SNR. This degradation is 

not always evident in the 

ambient silence of PowerPoint presentations, simulations, and/or laboratory environments those same PMs 

use to support their program 

survivability trade-off plan.

 The relatively high-level, 

in-band EM threat 

(mentioned earlier) continTable 1. Typical EMEs Legend.

HEMP – High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse

SREMP – Source Region EMP

CW – Continuous Wave

HIRF – High Intensity Radio Frequency

ECM – Electronic Countermeasure

HPM – High Power Microwave

UWB – Ultra-wideband

ESD – Electrostatic Discharge

Table 1. Typical EMEs. [Further Reading 1]

HEMP
35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

ues to be the responsibility of the Army EW community, a 

community typically composed of Army operators, frequency managers, and intelligence engineers. Thus, their 

primary responsibilities are offensive and defensive C4I 

jamming and circuit damage. Since in-band C4I details 

are often close-hold, the EW community does not interface directly with the E3 community on equipment and 

network survivability/vulnerability. Hence, the E3 and EW 

communities continue to develop their own sometimesunique approach to circuit protection. Unfortunately, this 

independent approach is not the most cost-effective way 

to protect against new, evolving in-band, non-traditional 

EM threat that could compromise circuit security without 

being identified. 

Recent DOD Decisions Affecting System Protection

 Two recent DOD decisions that have already affected 

Army digital circuit sensitivity and their EM protection are 

(1) the move toward a net-centric wireless long-haul C4I 

system, and (2) the support of auctioning to the commercial community a significant number of DOD-controlled 

frequencies, sub bands, and bands. 

 Perhaps the most dramatic change in military C4I 

structure has been the DOD decision to move to a netcentric wireless long-haul C4I system. In 2002, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks Information Integration (ASD (NII)) released DOD Directive 8100.01 

Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy [Further 

Reading 3]. It describes the net-centric structure of the 

new DOD long-haul backbone. For Army, it means that 

C4I survivability must now include Army portals to the 

GIG. And because the GIG is essentially a computerbased system, GIG security becomes an Army survivability issue. Future Army C4I is therefore dependent not only 

on GIG survivability but on the ability of the GIG to be free 

from individuals and/or organizations that use their computer-based knowledge to gain unauthorized access to the 

net-centric wireless network (―hackers‖). Recent articles 

have shown both hacker types are an increasing threat to 

DOD-owned computer-based systems [Further Reading 4, 

5, and 6].

 At about the same time, DOD began reducing the number of frequency bands they controlled for military purposes by making many of those bands and sub bands 

available to the commercial community. These frequencies and wavelengths are centered near the visible spectral range, as shown in Figure 1. 

 Starting in early 2000 and still continuing, the DOD saw 

much of the traditional military spectrum auctioned off to 

commercial companies for use in the private sector (e.g., 

cell phones, first responder communication nets, and radio 

frequency data links). The auctions have proven so successful there is now less dedicated military spectra with 

greater signal concentration in specific parts of that spectrum. Figure 2 illustrates the present status of military and 

commercial use of this crowded spectral range. 

 Figure 2 implies that the remaining spectrum controlled 

Figure 1. The EM Spectrum of General Interest to DOD.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 36

by the military has been reduced to a modest percentage 

of the total spectrum the DOD once controlled. As the 

military spectrum decreases, our reliance on new technology to protect the spectrum increases. In fact, more and 

more sophisticated electronics are being designed to replace or supplement human situational awareness and 

decision making. The age of unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAVs) and extremely small and intelligent battlefield sensors has already arrived. Soon, fighter aircraft and mobile 

ground vehicles could be unmanned. 

 The decision on the part of the U.S. military to use low 

power, small feature size components (including 

nanotechnology electronics) has not gone unnoticed. The 

international community has increased its interest in advanced electronics, electronic warfare, and electronic defeat. In fact, it is not unreasonable to assume future battlefield sensors will be developed that can passively find 

military electronic signals, determine their operating characteristics, and then actively defeat them. 

Status of Army System Protection 

 Great News – EM Protection Against Most Out-of-Band 

Threats. As they relate to critical Army systems, wide 

band and narrow band EMEs can couple their energy onto 

system cables and other forms of non-deliberate antennas. These out-of-band signals can drive input/output circuits beyond their normal operating levels and lead to 

catastrophic failure. By simply limiting these and other 

induced signals to (or below) normal operating levels, design engineers have protected equipment supporting critical Army missions for very little cost (as low as < 1% of 

the equipment per unit cost). When the coupled wide 

band or narrow band signal has a substantial amount of 

energy in-band (e.g., HEMP onto FM or lightning onto AM 

transceiver antennas), the unwanted signal will degrade 

SNR performance and cause unacceptable upset to internal clocks or even catastrophic failure to input/output circuits. In both cases, the same approach to protection is 

used. That UE3P approach uses the barrier concept: potentially sensitive electronics are isolated from external 

EMEs by the use of shields and shield penetration controls, whose attenuation levels are set from circuit design 

margins selected by the PMs. And it has been used for 

addressing all forms of E3 protection, especially for out-ofband and some forms of in-band protection. Table 2 

(following page) provides a bar chart of system protection 

costs. These costs reflect legacy system costs for protection against all nuclear weapons effects (NWE), including 

HEMP. The table was originally prepared for the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency by Army Test and Evaluation 

Command at White Sands Missile Range (ATEC DATS 

WSMR). 

 Table 3 (page 38) identifies estimated protection costs 

for the Future Combat System (FCS) for several UE3P 

application cases: HEMP alone, HEMP integrated with all 

NWE, and HEMP integrated with all other EME. ATEC 

DATS WSMR data were used to compiled in the Table.

 The data in both Table 2 and Table 3 support the conclusion that the cost of designing in protection against the 

traditional EM threat is not only low (and therefore affordable) but it is also continuing to decline.

 Good News - EM Protection Against Present In-Band 

Threats. Perhaps the most challenging protection scheme 

for circuit designers is protecting critical electronics from in

-band threats. While it is possible to limit in-band signals 

Figure 2. Specific EM Bands of Both Military and Commercial Interest.
37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

to normal operating levels, it is extremely difficult to eliminate them entirely or to stop them from interfering with 

normal transmission and reception. In the past, antennas 

were protected from unwanted signals with high capacitance metal oxide varistors (a type of surge suppressor) 

placed at the antenna base. This in-band protection 

worked well for analog circuits, where protection was only 

against catastrophic circuit failure due to a high-amplitude 

signal pulse. Message upset was acceptable as long as 

the message could be repeated, but it allowed systems to 

be jammed by a burst of in-band signals. The challenge 

of the EW community was, therefore, to find the frequencies of the opponent’s electronics and then re-transmit 

them at high enough signal strength to jam or destroy circuits while at the same time protecting their own electronics from hostile EW attack. Jamming or destroying circuits 

are just two of many in-band problems confronting future 

C4I systems, but they might not be the most insidious. 

 So, the good news is the Army knows how to protect 

their electronics against most in-band EME pulses as well 

as most out-of-band EMEs.

 Not-so-good News – The Evolution of Asymmetric 

Threats. The bad news is recent battlefield successes of 

modern U.S. military electronics has exposed a possible 

Achilles heel. Rogue nations and extremist groups now 

realize it is both difficult and costly to confront the US using traditional military tactics and equipment. To gain the 

advantage, they might attempt to overcome the technological advantage the U.S. now has in weapons, sensors, 

C4I, and weapons guidance systems. However, this commitment to develop and maintain advanced technology 

involves a substantial, long-term investment in state-of-the

-art weapons and semiconductor development. Instead, 

rogue nations and terrorists prefer to fight on their own 

terms, such as prolonging a low-level conflict, inflicting 

casualties on U.S. forces in guerilla-like warfare and using 

commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment to take advantage of readily available advanced technology. In 

these cases, a reliance on asymmetric threats is a real 

option, and some of them could be electromagnetic in nature. 

 Consider several trends that confront the U.S. military 

as it strives to maintain an edge in EM protection.

 Reality: High-tech Expertise Has Moved Off-shore. 

Most of the electronics technology now comes from Asia, 

an area with massive populations and a growing academic 

and industrial presence in semiconductor technology. Already, China and India are developing their own semiconductor technology expertise. They are graduating many 

more electrical engineers and computer scientists than the 

37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Table 2. Legacy NWE (Including HEMP) Protection Costs. [ATEC DATS WSMR]
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 38

US; some estimate as many as 5-times more [Further 

Reading 7]. In addition, India has the world’s greatest 

concentration of software engineers and programmers 

with China a close second. These trained engineers and 

scientists, plus countless untrained ―hackers‖, could very 

well be directing their activities toward compromising 

electronics and electronic systems. The U.S. press has 

recently accused the Chinese of successfully hacking into 

some Pentagon computer systems [Further Reading 5 

and 6]. Other friendly nations (Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore) are very sophisticated electronically and they, too, 

could be developing their own techniques for intercepting 

messages and inserting misinformation. It therefore 

wouldn’t take very long for any of them to look at new 

ways to compromise sophisticated electronics. All these 

newly trained and untrained people are making the next 

generation C4I potentially more vulnerable to the evolving 

new EM threat.

 Reality: The In-band Threat Continues to Evolve. Consider for a moment a way of compromising sophisticated 

electronics. Instead of trying to cause unacceptable upset or catastrophic failure, both of which would be recognized compromises, a potential asymmetric threat technique would be to ―hack‖ into the system and at the appropriate time insert electronic signals at a circuit’s normal 

operating level to ―fool‖ the circuit security software into 

thinking it is receiving a legitimate signal. Such a threat is 

possible today, and it is constantly evolving into a more 

serious problem. In the future, more widespread attacks 

during peacetime and military conflicts could lead to catastrophe: civilian databases (e.g., banks, stock market, federal government) could be manipulated, and military C4I 

systems, Global Positioning System, autopilots, even sensor circuits could be compromised. Traditional EM protection will not stop this EM threat. System security can only 

be protected using software techniques. 

 The above example is one of a hostile force deliberately attempting to compromise a mission critical system. 

A second in-band example is one that starts out as a nonhostile EM problem. It illustrates how the military can inadvertently create a threat on their own equipment by 

fielding new technology before conducting a thorough test 

program and deployment strategy. In 2002, the DOD Directed Energy Test and Evaluation Capabilities Study 

completed a comprehensive analysis of testing facilities 

that would be required to assess both blue and red force 

systems. A capability was then developed based on 2002 

force-on-force specifications for systems and threats. In 

the intervening years, the global war on terror resulted in 

new and different systems that warfighters quickly developed and fielded. Some of the systems sent to theater 

used commercial frequencies that DOD did not plan (nor 

were authorized) to use in 2002. This deployment was 

done in order to rapidly field new COTS-developed emitters that generate much higher frequencies and field 

strengths than were originally designed for use on 2002 

light tactical vehicles. The result was a blue-on-blue force 

EM threat problem not originally anticipated. These results, if obtained by hostile forces, could be used to jam or 

damage fielded Army systems deployed in the field by 

simply purchasing equivalent COTS generators sold by 

commercial venders and using them in the field.

 These examples and other new forms of asymmetric 

EM threats could be used not only by rogue nations but 

also by radical groups. Future asymmetric sources could 

be smaller, more directed, use less power and be far less 

expensive than present high power EM sources. All an 

adversary would need is specific transmit and receive 

knowledge for the targeted electronics devices. And with 

the DOD selloff of many frequency bands and sub bands, 

the remaining frequency bands and sub bands would be 

more readily identified on the battlefield and more easily 

attacked. 

 This new asymmetric approach to compromise weapons delivery systems, C4I and advanced sensors will force 

the historically separate Army E3 and EW communities 

and Army frequency managers to work together. The 

Army is already using time sensitive, secure networks for 

most of its information transfer, and it will soon be using 

such wireless networks as the GIG to provide/receive battlefield information to/from others. Survivability and security will thus become one and the same problem and that 

problem must not be in the PM’s ―trade space‖. 

New Technologies and Their Impact on Protection

 The Army has an opportunity to select promising new 

technologies that can counter projected threats against 

Table 3. 2007 FCS Protection Costs Estimates. [ATEC DATS WSMR]
39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

critical circuits while reducing EM protection costs to PMs. 

To introduce a timeline into this discussion, consider two 

time periods in which there are mature EM threats (Table 

4 and Table 5): (1) short term (ten years or less), and (2) 

long term (more than ten years). Ten years was selected 

since most COTS-based acquisitions typically take ten 

years or less to be deployed. 

Table 4 category descriptors:

Net-centric/Wireless C4I – The decision to go with a future 

computer-based C4I system means EW-like, in-band 

threats (e.g., cyber attack) becomes a major system-level 

problem – a potential sensitivity

Increasing EM Threat – cyber attacks on military C4I at 

local and long-range nodes, plus increased E3 warfare on 

targets of opportunity – a potential sensitivity

Smaller Chip Size – progressively smaller feature sizes 

(150 nm to 90 nm to 45 nm) lead to lower weight and 

lower power requirements but could also lead to increased 

circuit sensitivity (e.g., to single event effects) – a potential sensitivity

Nanotechnology – near-perfect atomic monolayer structures reduce imperfections and enhance reliability; examples include carbon nanotubes and graphene (singlelayered sheets of carbon atoms arranged like chicken 

wire) and are sometimes called ―disruptive‖ technologies –

a potential protection

Unmanned Equipment (first and second generation) – sophisticated electronic circuits could replace man-in-theplatform – a potential sensitivity

COTS – the use of electrical components with unknown 

sensitivity to military environments – a potential sensitivity

Hardware and Software Protection – designing in/

maintaining hardware and software protection reduces life 

cycle acquisition costs - a potential E3 protection

DOD Spectrum Sale – fewer DOD bands require more 

creative C4I security concepts – a potential sensitivity

 In the short term, the use of nanotechnology in circuits 

will further reduce the size of components while actually 

hardening them through minimizing lattice imperfections. 

By combing this technology with the development of security software into new system design, protection costs will 

be minimized.

Table 4. Short Term (10 yrs or less).

Table 4 and Table 5): (1) short term (ten years or less), 

and (2) long term (more than ten years). Ten years was 

selected as the duration for both short and long term, since 

most COTS-based acquisitions typically take ten years or 

less to be deployed.

39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Nanoscale materials and effects are 

found in nature all around us. Nature’s 

secrets for building from the nanoscale 

create processes and machinery that 

scientists hope to imitate. Researchers 

already have copied the nanostructure of 

lotus leaves to create water repellent 

surfaces being used today to make stainproof clothing, other fabrics and materials. Others are trying to imitate the 

strength and flexibility of spider silk, 

which is naturally reinforced nanoscale 

crystals. Our bodies and those of all 

animals use natural nanoscale materials, 

such as proteins and other molecules, to 

control our bodies’ many systems and 

processes.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 40

Summary

 The EM threat to Army critical circuits is getting more 

severe, and the traditional approach to protection is no 

longer the panacea. To cost-effectively address the total 

EM threat one must now redefine the threat to include the 

cyber threat and develop a comprehensive approach to 

EM protection against catastrophic failure, unacceptable 

upset, and the compromise of secure net-centric wireless 

C4I. This approach must begin with a change in Army 

structure that more efficiently oversees traditional and non

-traditional protection. A series of observations follow: 

1. The modern U.S. Army places increasing reliance on 

advanced weapon and semiconductor technology as a 

viable force multiplier, and this trend is likely to continue in 

the foreseeable future. 

2. Future Army C4I will be entirely time-sensitive and secure and will have increased EM protection in order to 

address the evolving threat. Circuit hardening against 

traditional EM threats will continue, and software modifications will provide network security. 

3. Whereas E3, spectrum management, and EW are 

presently treated as separate entities in the Army, the 

most effective and least costly approach to future EM protection will be their integration into one community that 

addresses all three entities as part of a single technical 

solution. If done properly, this integration will efficiently 

emphasize hardware and software protection and will be 

integrated into a complete, low cost system/subsystem/

circuit design. 

4. The Army must have a single proponent for all EM/E3 

policy issues.

5. Even though the EM threat is evolving rapidly, it is the 

opinion of the author that the selective use of modern 

technologies (e.g., nanotechnology) will enhance EM protection and increase the affordability of future military 

equipment to E3, information attack, and other forms of 

EM threats [Further Reading 9], even as the list of growing constraints appears to make them more sensitive.

Mr. Robert A. Pfeffer is a Physical Scientist at the United States 

Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency at Fort Belvoir, VA, working 

on nuclear weapons effects. He has a B.S. in physics from Trinity University and an M.A. in physics from The Johns Hopkins 

University. Previous government experience includes Chief of 

the Harry Diamond Laboratory (HDL) Electromagnetics Laboratory and Chief of the 400-acre Woodbridge Research Facility, 

both in Woodbridge, VA. His e-mail address is 

robert.pfeffer@us.army.mil.

Further Reading

1. QSTAG 1051, A Unified Approach to Electromagnetic Protection, American, British, Canadian, Australian Standardization Program, 6 October 1998.

2. DODI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 8 December 

2008, p. 20. 

3. DODD 8100.01, Global Information Grid (GIG) Overarching Policy, 19 

September 2002.

4. http://www.rense.com/general72/pentaa.html.

5. http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/04/21/pentagon.hacked/index.html.

6. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,295640,00.html.

7. http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1220/p01s01-ussc.html.

8. Lloyd, Seth, Privacy and the Quantum Internet, Scientific American, October 2009, pp. 80-84.

9. www.ndu.edu/.../Information%20Warfare%20and%20Deterence%20.../

ch2.html.

10. nanotechnology Big Things from a Tiny World handout found here: http://

www.nano.gov/Nanotechnology_BigThingsfromaTinyWorldspread.pdf.

Table 5 category descriptors:

Integrated EM Threat – more sophisticated cyber and E3 attacks used by enemies as part of their overall combat plans –

a potential sensitivity

Nano-C4I and Sensors – postage stamp microchips that perform as multi-frequency transceivers and sensors with minimal power requirements – a potential protection

Advanced Unmanned Equipment – minimal man-in-the-loop from afar implies advanced onboard circuits must perform 

increased decision-making on their own – a potential sensitivity

COTS Storage Items– trustworthiness – a potential protection

Hardware & Software Protection – If treated separately, the cost soars; if treated together in the design, the cost diminishes; example: possible quantum mechanical information transfer breakthrough in securing C4I [Further Reading 8] – a 

potential protection

 Long term projections are even more promising. The maturation of short term nanotechnology, plus the application of 

promising hardware and software protection means future military equipment design will be robust and affordable. 

Table 5. Long Term (more than 10 years).
41 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

I 

ntroduction

 Historically, the U.S. Army has 

operated with the assumption that low 

cost energy would be readily available when and where it is needed. 

Now, however, reliable access to affordable, stable energy supplies is a 

significant challenge for the Army and 

the nation. Given the Army’s reliance 

on energy, disruption of critical power 

and fuel supplies would harm the 

Army’s ability to accomplish its missions. Such a risk exposes an Army 

vulnerability that should be addressed 

by a more secure energy position and 

outlook. The Army’s assumptions 

concerning future plans for power and 

fuel at home, overseas and on the 

battlefield should account for such 

challenges.

 The specific focus of this article is 

on how nuclear energy can be considered as part of the overall renewable/alternative energy mix, for not 

just the Army but also for Department 

of Defense (DOD) installations in 

general. For the Army, the Army Energy Security Implementation Strategy (AESIS) issued in January 2009 

by the Army Senior Energy Council 

(SEC) and the Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Energy and Partnerships established 

five Strategic Energy Security Goals 

(ESGs). One of these goals, ESG 3, 

―Increased Use of Renewable/

Alternative Energy,‖ is to raise the 

share of renewable/alternative resources for power and fuel use, which 

can result in a decreased dependence upon conventional fuel sources. 

Alternative Energy is defined in the 

AESIS as any source of energy (e.g., 

nuclear, clean coal technologies, hydrogen) that can supplement or replace fossil fuels (oil, coal and natural 

gas) and other conventional energy 

sources. This ESG also supports 

national goals related to renewable/

alternative energy. 

 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 includes 

a provision that requires the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study to 

assess the feasibility of developing 

nuclear power plants on military installations. In summary, the study 

shall consider: options for construction and operation; cost estimates 

and the potential for life cycle cost 

savings; potential energy security 

advantages; additional infrastructure 

costs; impact on quality of life of military personnel; regulatory, State, and 

local concerns; impact on operations 

on military installations; potential environmental liabilities; factors impacting safe co-location of nuclear power 

plants on military installations; and, 

any other factors that bear on the 

feasibility of developing nuclear 

power plants on military installations. 

Currently, Mr. Brian J. Lally, the Director of Facility Energy in the Office 

of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment), 

is the lead for the ongoing feasibility 

study.

 Clearly, as Army Energy Security 

Implementation Plans (AESIPs) are 

developed according to the AESIS 

and the Secretary of Defense conducts a formal feasibility study on 

deploying nuclear power plants on 

military installations, the nuclear energy option for military power and fuel 

production will likely gain increased 

attention and may warrant consideration by senior leaders in coming 

years. The possible renaissance of 

an Army Nuclear Power Program 

comes at a time when the commercial 

nuclear power industry is actively pursuing new nuclear power plants, with 

22 combined operating license applications currently under review by the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC).

Army Nuclear Power Program

 In 1954 the Secretary of Defense 

assigned to the Army the responsibility for developing land-based nuclear 

power plants required by the three 

military services. The Army in turn 

delegated the responsibility for its 

share of this program to the Chief of 

Engineers. At that time the Navy was 

responsible for developing nuclear 

power for the propulsion of Navy vessels, and the Air Force for developing 

nuclear power for the propulsion of 

aircraft. These programs were carried out in close coordination with the 

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission 

(AEC). The joint Army-AEC program 

was known as the Army Nuclear 

Power Program (ANPP).

 The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) successfully ran a 

Nuclear Power Program from 1954 

until 1979, primarily to supply electric 

power in remote areas. The Army 

built and operated 2 Megawatt electric (MWe) stationary nuclear reactors 

at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and Fort 

Greeley, Alaska. A 10 MWe floating 

nuclear power plant onboard the 

STURGIS barge supplied electric 

power at Gatun Lake in the Panama 

Canal. Portable 1 MWe nuclear reactors were operated at Sundance, 

Nuclear Power Plants on Military Installations:

“A Think Piece”

Mr. William A. Macon, Jr.

Army Reactor Program Manager

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 42

Wyoming; Camp Century, Greenland; and, McMurdo 

Sound in Antarctica. These small nuclear power plants 

provided electricity and steam heating for remote military 

facilities and could be operated efficiently for long periods 

without refueling. The Army also considered using nuclear power plants overseas to provide uninterrupted 

power and defense support in the event that military installations were cut off from their normal logistics supply lines. 

 Other efforts to develop a nuclear power plant small 

enough for full mobility began as early as 1956, including 

a gas-cooled reactor design combined with a closed-cycle 

gas-turbine generator that could be transportable on semitrailers, railroad flatcars, or barges. The AEC supported 

these developments because they would contribute to the 

technology of both military and small commercial power 

plants. These early efforts had numerous challenges and 

setbacks. For example, the infamous SL-1 boiling water 

reactor accident at the National Reactor Testing Station at 

Idaho Falls, Idaho, on January 3, 1961, destroyed the reactor and killed three operators. Several other innovative 

nuclear plants were designed but never built, including a 

proposed liquid metal cooled reactor. 

 The AEC eventually concluded that achieving the 

ANPP objectives in a timely manner and at a reasonable 

cost was too difficult to justify continued funding of its portion of projects to develop small, stationary, and mobile 

reactors. Cutbacks in military funding for long-range research and development because of the Vietnam War led 

the AEC to phase out its support of the program in 1966. 

The costs of developing and producing compact nuclear 

power plants were simply too high without a clearly defined objective backed by the DOD. The Army's participation in nuclear power plant research and development efforts steadily declined and eventually stopped altogether.

 Stewardship of the Army’s deactivated reactors after 

1979 was maintained by USACE and continued to be 

overseen by the Army Reactor Systems Health and Safety 

Review Committee (ARCHS). In 1996, Army Regulation 

50-7 established the Army Reactor Program designating 

the Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 as the proponent for the 

program and created the Army Reactor Council (ARC) to 

replace ARCHS to provide overall executive oversight of 

Army reactors. In addition to the deactivated USACE reactors remaining at Fort Belvoir, Fort Greely, and onboard 

the STURGIS barge moored at the James River Reserve 

Fleet, Virginia, the Army continued to operate two fast 

burst reactors for nuclear effects testing: the Army Pulse 

Radiation Facility (APRF) at Aberdeen Proving Ground, 

Maryland; and, the Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) at White 

Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The APRF was shut 

down in 2004 and is currently being decommissioned. 

The FBR continues to operate. The three USACE reactors will be decommissioned in the future as funding becomes available. 

 The ARC has an oversight role for any new reactor 

projects. The ARC is responsible for approving proposals 

for new reactors and sponsoring associated technical 

studies as required. Therefore, any development of nuclear power plants on Army installations would necessarily 

require ARC review and approval. Since the Army has not 

SM-1, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 1957-1973.

SM-1A, Fort Greely, Alaska, 1962-1972.

MH-1A, STURGIS, 1967-1975.
43 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

been involved with any new reactor projects for over 40 

years, there are numerous issues that will need to be addressed if senior leaders decide to build and deploy new 

nuclear power reactors on military installations.

Challenges Ahead for Consideration

 A renaissance of the ANPP or similar program would 

require retracing many of the steps performed in the early 

1950’s that established the original program. In 1952, the 

Army Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) conducted a 

DOD study to determine the feasibility of developing reactor plants to serve military power needs on land. In 1953, 

the report was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 

who established the requirement for development of military nuclear power plants. On the recommendation of the 

JCS, the Secretary of Defense in February 1954 assigned 

responsibility for the development effort to the Army. The 

ANPP was then established with two staff elements, one 

within AEC and the other in OCE, both headed by a single 

individual appointed by the Army with AEC concurrence. 

A similar sequence of events (study, recommendation, 

decision, and implementation) would be required to establish a new program today. DOD would need to determine 

feasibility, establish a requirement, and assign responsibility for a new program, and that program would then need 

statutory authority, funding, and staffing to be implemented. The recent legislative provision for DOD to conduct a feasibility study is a good first step towards a new 

program, but is certainly no guarantee that anything more 

may happen beyond a study unless all stakeholders are 

willing and determined to move forward to make it happen.

 The AEC has been replaced by the Department of Energy (DOE) and the NRC since Army reactors were last 

developed in the 1960’s. The DOD would need to establish new relationships with these organizations. A Memorandum of Agreement between AEC and DOD dating back 

to 1967 regarding health and safety responsibilities for 

DOD reactors acquired pursuant to Section 91b of the 

Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, remains legally 

effective. This agreement should be updated to address a 

renewed DOD/DOE program and NRC safety reviews of 

new reactor concepts. 

 New reactor concepts appropriate for military installations will likely involve innovative and unproven designs. 

The NRC has historically focused on light-water reactor 

designs and would have to develop new licensing requirements and processes for the new technologies. To meet 

the statutory requirement of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 

to complete construction and operation of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP) by FY2021, the NRC estimated in 2008 that it would take 5 years to develop necessary analytical tools, data, and other regulatory infrastructure (e.g., regulatory guides, standard review plan, etc.) 

for confirmatory safety analyses and license review, and 

another 4-5 years to conduct the licensing review. DOD 

may be able to justify a faster safety review process for 

new reactors under a national security and/or homeland 

defense priority, but again there is no guarantee that the 

NRC would expedite reviews unless all stakeholders are 

willing to move forward to support the ESGs and other 

national goals.

 Resolving these initial issues alone would simply lay 

the groundwork for a new ANPP or similar program. 

There are many more issues to address and resolve to 

actually build an entirely new program from inception to 

full deployment and operation. For the focus of this article, it is important to understand that these initial issues 

should be addressed as part of the DOD feasibility study 

to ensure that potential deployment of nuclear power 

plants on military installations can be seriously considered 

in the future as part of the overall renewable/alternative 

energy mix. In all likelihood, commercial plants licensed 

by the NRC to provide dedicated electrical power to military installations via long-term power purchase agreements may be more practical than DOD becoming the 

owner/operator of new reactors.

Small Modular Reactor Concepts

 Several commercial vendors such as Hyperion, NuScale, and General Atomics have been developing small 

modular reactor (SMR) designs intended to be ―power 

modules‖ that can be sited individually or ganged together 

to meet power needs. These reactors are appealing for 

possible deployment on or near military installations, and 

they are just a few examples of the many new designs 

under development. Other designs for deployable tactical 

power systems are in development. While many of these 

innovative designs are characterized as ―inherently safe,‖ 

there are still many aspects of their design and operation 

that require further safety analyses for either military or 

commercial licensing. A point to emphasize when evaluating possible deployment of SMRs on military installations is that prototype plants could receive expedited 

safety reviews for construction and operation, and these 

demonstration plants could then provide useful operating 

data for more extensive safety reviews required for full 

commercial licensing. 

Hyperion Power Module

 Hyperion Power Generation has a compelling 25 MWe 

liguid-metal cooled fast reactor design that could be very 

practical for military installations. Like a ―nuclear battery,‖ 

the Hyperion Power Module (HPM) is a compact, transportable unit that can deliver reliable and economically 

attractive power for about seven to ten years between 

module replacements. It can be installed in an underground containment vessel, externally monitored, and 

possibly require a minimal staff of licensed nuclear operator personnel. 

 The HPM reactor core consists of 24 assemblies of 

uranium hydride metal fuel enriched to about twenty percent, 18 boron carbide control rods, and a quartz radial 

reflector. Heat transfer from the 500 degrees Celsius reactor to steam generators on the surface is via heat pipes 

containing liquid lead-bismuth eutectic coolant. The center of the core contains a void space where boron carbide 

43 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 44

marbles would be dropped in case of an emergency for 

safe shutdown.

 The HPM is about 1.5 meters in diameter and 2 meters 

high, comparable in size to a residential hot tub. The 

compact size, along with the transportability and ease of 

operation, makes the factory-sealed and self-contained 

HPM a viable option for providing consistent, reliable, affordable power in remote locations, or alternatively as secure power for large military installations at risk of losing 

commercial grid power for extended periods of time. Buried underground and out of sight, the HPM presents a 

minimal security threat and its radiation safely shielded 

from people and the environment. For further information 

see their web site at: hyperionpowergeneration.com

NuScale Power Module

 NuScale Power, Inc., has developed a modular, scalable design for a 45 MWe nuclear power plant based on 

known proven technology. Similar to a conventional light 

water reactor, the NuScale Power Module (NPM) features 

an integrated reactor vessel enclosed in an air evacuated 

containment vessel, immersed in a large pool of water and 

located below grade. The NPM’s simple and robust design maximizes safety and security through use of automated systems, modularity, and multiple fission product 

barriers.

 The NPM reactor core consists of 24 17x17 standard 

UO2 fuel assemblies six feet in length and enriched to 4.95 

percent. It operates at 1500 psig and 300 degrees Celsius with a 24 month refueling interval. Unlike a current 

plant, the NPM’s engineered safety features include a 

passive decay heat removal system and containment heat 

removal system, as well as other severe accident mitigation and prevention design features.

 The NPM integrated vessel is about 2.7 meters in diameter and 14 meters high. For all intents and purposes 

the NPM is still very much like a miniature conventional 

light water reactor plant complete with a multi-module control room and licensed operator staff. This may be more 

than most military installations need, but commercially 

licensed and operated units could be located on or near 

military installations to provide dedicated electrical power. 

For further information see their web site at: nuscalepower.com

General Atomics RS-MHR

 General Atomics has a design for a gas-cooled reactor 

coupled to an advanced gas turbine system to achieve 

high efficiency and small size. The Remote Site – Modular Helium Reactor (RS-MHR) provides steady-state 

power in the range of 10 to 25 MWe. The RS-MHR can 

be constructed in about a year and all equipment can be 

truck transported. The plant can possibly be operated by 

a small technician staff and the reactor monitored remotely through satellite uplink.

 The RS-MHR reactor core consists of standard hexagonal graphite blocks having longitudinal channels for 

coolant flow and 19.9 percent enriched fuel compacts containing ceramic coated particle fuel. The core contains 

sufficient fuel for five to ten years of operation without the 

need for refueling. The ceramic fuel coatings can tolerate 

temperatures much higher than those postulated to occur 

during even the most severe accident scenarios and can 

Hyperion Power Module. NuScale Power Module.
45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

safely retain fission products during both normal and accident conditions. RS-MHR safety is further enhanced by a 

combination of passive and intrinsic safety features that 

requires no active safety features or operator action to 

ensure safe operation and shutdown. 

 The combination of the modular helium reactor and an 

advanced gas turbine represents the ultimate in simplicity, 

safety, and economy. The reactor coolant directly drives 

the turbine which turns the generator, allowing costly and 

failure prone steam generating equipment to be eliminated. The result is a simplified power cycle with very 

high efficiency and reliability, and low power cost. An alternative design for a high temperature gas-cooled Process Steam/Cogeneration Modular Helium Reactor (PS/CMHR) can provide 950 degrees Celsius process heat for 

transportation fuel development and hydrogen production 

for various energy applications. General Atomics is also 

developing a small gas-cooled fast reactor called EM2 that 

can be scaled to as low as 25 MWe for military installations.

 The entire RS-MHR reactor and power conversion system can fit into two small pressure vessels housed in an 

above-grade shielded concrete structure mounted on a 

single 11x10 meter basemat and about 10.5 meters high. 

Above-grade construction of the facility enables a high 

degree of siting flexibility, particularly in remote areas with 

permafrost or high ground water, where construction has 

to be simple and not require large excavations or heavy 

lifting equipment. Where cost competiveness may be 

more important than the security advantage of underground construction, the RS-MHR or PS/C-MHR could be 

viable options to meet some military energy requirements. 

For further information see their web site at: ga.com

Conclusion

 The deployment of nuclear power plants on or near 

military installations could be a viable solution for the dual 

problems of escalating energy costs and the increasing 

security risks of extended electrical grid outages. The 

DOD feasibility study may well demonstrate the viability of 

nuclear power for serious consideration as part of the military’s future energy mix; however, this would constitute 

only a necessary first step. Further challenges lie ahead 

to implement a new program to build and operate nuclear 

reactors on or near military installations if senior leaders 

decide to embrace nuclear power. Fortunately, there is a 

historical precedent to follow. Where the Army successfully used land-based nuclear power once before, the 

Army could help make it happen again. 

 Beyond the issue of possibly deploying nuclear power 

plants on or near domestic military installations, some military planners are already considering the use of deployable nuclear power systems to help satisfy future tactical 

energy requirements. Nuclear power could be a viable 

alternative for producing electricity, synthetic fuels, and/or 

potable water on distant battlefields to reduce the increasingly costly and burdensome logistics requirements 

needed to sustain our forces abroad. While the foreseeable challenges of implementing a domestic nuclear 

power program in the near term are formidable enough, 

the long term challenges of implementing battlefield nuclear power systems are more speculative and uncertain. 

But again, where the Army once experimented with deployable tactical nuclear power before, the Army could 

build upon historical precedent to support a future feasibility study in this area. 

Mr. William A. Macon, Jr., is a nuclear engineer assigned 

to the U.S. Army Nuclear and Combating WMD Agency at 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He is a 1983 graduate of the United 

States Military Academy and has a MS degree in nuclear 

engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. His 

previous military assignments include the 101st Airborne 

Division, 1st Armored Division, and the former Defense 

Nuclear Agency. His previous civilian employment includes Carolina Power and Light Company and the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission. His email address is 

bill.macon@us.army.mil. 

General Atomics RS-MHR.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 46

T 

 he creation of the Army CWMD Information Portal 

(ACIP) will further enable USANCA to be the premier 

Army organization for exercising coordination, analysis, and integration of Nuclear and CWMD operations, 

planning, and future capabilities for the Army across Joint 

and Strategic domains in support of National and DOD 

objectives. Right now the ACIP is in its infancy but it has 

already begun to provide the CWMD community with useful information and data regarding Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) topics, Nuclear Reactors, CBRN Modeling and Simulation. The USANCA information portal, referred to as ACIP, was developed as a 

planning resource and resolve the problem of researching 

CWMD material from many points of references online to 

avoid replicating existing resources. The portal is intended 

to reduce or eliminate the time spent sorting through the 

vast amount of CWMD information available while looking 

for specific CWMD reference material. The ACIP, when 

fully populated, will provide the Army’s CWMD community 

with one central point of reference. ACIP has undergone 

several development iterations and format changes since 

standing up on the unclassified Army Knowledge Online 

(AKO) in May 2009 and the formal introduction at the 

CWMD Conference hosted at USANCA in September 

2009. 

How can you access it?

 USANCA’s initial prototype of the ACIP is currently located in the unclassified Army Knowledge Online (AKO) 

with the near term intention to provide a classified version 

in AKO-S. The ACIP can be accessed by doing a search 

for USANCA in AKO or going to the following URL in AKO: 

https://www.us.army.mil/suite/page/481530.

What does it looks like?

 The ACIP layout was created with user friendly navigation and content viewing. Visitors navigate thru the individual USANCA Division areas to find information provided by each subject matter expert. 

Who are the contributors?

 The initial portal information was established by 

USANCA content managers from the CWMD Analysis 

Division. These designated subject matter experts from 

each section of the Analysis Division submitted data to 

populate the portal and will maintain currency of the content. Other USANCA Divisions will add content and 

populate their respective web pages in the future.

What’s in the ACIP?

 The purpose of this service is to improve the way members of the CWMD Community of Interest store and gather 

information regardless of location. The ACIP is a gathering of CWMD information found at one central location 

that is readily available. The ACIP provides useful links to 

other sites that may help with visitor’s research and data 

gathering. The user can find historical information, driving 

directions and security requirements for visiting USANCA. 

ACIP is a valuable tool for the CWMD community and 

Army.

Gerald Barrington is an Information Technology Specialist 

at USANCA, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. He has a B.S. Information Science University of Stratford. He was previously 

assigned as a director of microbiology research with the 

Air Force Research Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving 

Ground, Edgewood, Maryland. His email address is gerald.barrington@us.army.mil and can be reached at (703) 

806-7801.

USANCA Launches Army CWMD Information Portal 

(ACIP) 

Gerald Barrington

Information Technology Specialist 

ACIP front panel user interface. 
47 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

T 

hree facts most of us know are: the United States 

entered World War-II when the Japanese bombed 

Pearl Harbor, Dec 7, 1941; the war ended when 

the first weapons of mass destruction ever created were 

used against Japan in 1945; and the Manhattan Project

was the undertaking that built those weapons. Beyond 

that, few truly understand the epic story of that mission. 

After seeing my recent book: ―Historic Photos of the Manhattan Project,‖ The United States Army Nuclear and 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency 

(USANCA) asked if I would provide a full appreciation of 

this monumental accomplishment for their readers.

 The Manhattan Project is justly the most profound endeavor and accomplishment the world has ever known. It 

was the U.S. response to the undeclared and top-secret 

race to produce the first weapon of mass destruction 

known to humanity. It behooves us all to truly comprehend 

the full story: the politics of its birth - why we had to win 

the race - how it took hold and grew incredibly fast - the 

successes and failures – the dedicate military, scientists, 

and civilians who were the project - the inconceivable organizational and scientific challenges and accomplishments - the happiness yet sadness of success – the philosophical differenced regarding use of the bombs, and 

how the project never really ended but continues yet today 

to give us so much. 

 Never had so much been accomplished so quickly by 

so many. The statistics of politics, time, manpower, organization, conditions, and construction were in and of themselves staggering, but equally so was the inconceivable 

pace in the advancement of science required to make success possible. There never has been, or will be again, a 

HISTORY

The Mission that Drove World History

– The Manhattan Project –

Timothy Joseph, Ph.D.

Technical Writer

The plutonium implosion bomb ―Fat Man‖ was just over 10 feet long and 5 feet in diameter, weighing 10,200 

lbs. It produced an explosive force of 21,000 tons of TNT, a temperature of 7,000 degrees, and winds of 625 

MPH. The mushroom cloud rose to 11 miles.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 48

mission of such intense importance, challenge, and 

achievement as the Manhattan Project, a single mission 

that radically drove world history.

 To give you the insight and understanding requested 

by USANCA will require a series of articles, for no single 

article could possibly do justice. In this initial article I start 

at the very beginning -- the project’s birth: the chaotic politics of a world at war; the scientists that realized the need; 

the military that took action and moved beyond the impossible; and the perfect teaming of scientists, military, and 

civilians who brought it about. As we move through this 

journey, I will highlight the exceptional factors that make 

this project truly mind-boggling.

 Germany invaded Poland in 1939, France and Britain 

declared war on Germany, and all of Europe was steeped 

in war. The U.S. Watched closely but stood clear for two 

years, until the infamous bombing of Pearl Harbor. The 

extraordinary political circumstances of that time created 

an unimaginable world threat. The need to act in response 

to that threat became clear to certain scientists in Europe. 

More importantly, that chaos provided many of the scientific minds responsible for success of the mission. How? 

There had been a long, terrible history of German and 

Jewish conflict, and when Adolf Hitler took power in 1933, 

there was a mass exodus of scientists and professors 

from Germany, for they knew his leadership meant loss of 

freedom, and the beginning of a reign of tyranny. Had 

those scientists stayed in Germany and been loyal to Hitler, the scientific knowledge needed to succeed would 

have remained there, and one can only imagine the consequence. 

 

 Because those scientists defected (most going to Brittan and the U.S.), we knew that Germany was working 

feverously to split the atom, with the sole purpose of building a horrific weapon of mass destruction. Using the theoretical work of Leo Szilard and Enrico Fermi, Otto Hahn 

and Friedrick Strassman in Germany bombarded uranium 

atoms with neutrons in 1938 and said that the nuclei had 

burst; they wrote a manuscript, which Szilard and Fermi 

took to Columbia University in Manhattan and indeed 

found neutron multiplication in uranium. This proved that 

nuclear fission indeed was possible. Theoretically, if you 

smashed the uranium nucleus and unleashed all the neutrons, they could in turn smash other nuclei and create an 

uncontrolled chain reaction of immense energy. Those 

defected scientists knew the Germans were working on 

that very process.

 Szilard approached his good Jewish friend Albert Einstein and they drafted a letter to President Roosevelt, August 2, 1939, concerned with the work in Germany, suggesting the U.S. move forward quickly before Germany 

succeeded; thus began the most important race in world 

history. 

Exceptional Factor: Had those renowned scientists 

not defected, had we not known of the German’s progress in using undiscovered physics to create the first 

weapon of mass destruction, had that letter of concern not been written, had Roosevelt disregarded the 

possibility since everything was theoretical anyway, 

what then? Likely, no project.

 Okay. The president believed the threat was real and 

set the race in motion, but remember, we hadn’t even split 

the atom. With only $6,000 from the government, Enrico 

Fermi, Leo Szilard and their team of scientists built a 25 ft 

wide by 20 ft high crude pile of graphite weighing 771,000 

lbs under the abandoned racquet court of the University of 

Chicago called the Chicago Pile 1 (CP-1). In it they put 

80,590 lbs of uranium oxide and 12,400 lbs of uranium 

metal costing one million dollars, and the rest is history. 

They created the first controlled nuclear fusion chain reaction. It lasted 28 minutes, produced less than 1-watt of 

energy, but proved the atom could indeed be split. In doing so they also proved the concept of a nuclear weapon 

of incredible energy by employing an uncontrolled fusion 

reaction. 

 Another critical aspect was the wisdom of the military 

leader, General Leslie Groves, the director of the Manhattan Project. Why so? Because he was told by his Scientific 

Director, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer and his scientists, that 

a bomb is theoretically possible, but it would need lots of 

highly enriched uranium or plutonium. They explained that 

three or four laboratory scale processes could produce 

incredibly small quantities, but it would take massive factories to make enough for a bomb; and oh, if we indeed can 

Leslie Groves at the Y-12 site in Oak Ridge,TN, with 

Secretary of War Robert Patterson and Senator Tom 

Stewart, Sept 29, 1945.
49 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Manhattan Project workers at Hanford donated their time to purchase a B-17 named Day’s Pay for the war effort, 

and workers at Oak Ridge purchased a B-25 named Sunday Punch. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 50

make enough, we don’t know how to make a bomb with it. 

The number of scientific and manufacturing unknowns 

was staggering.

 Perhaps the most brilliant decision General Groves 

made was to take no chances. He decided to go with all 

possibilities. He told his team to take what little they knew 

about the four laboratory processes, multiply it by several 

thousand times, and tell him want he needed to construct 

the huge facilities to manufacture the amount of highly 

enriched uranium and plutonium needed. Then he asked 

what they needed to figure out how to build a bomb with it 

assuming they could manufacture enough material.

Exceptional Factor: Groves began the construction of 

massive plants when what was to go inside was unknown, for they were to employ four processes never 

before proven. He had selected the sites even before 

the successful first chain reaction of CP-1. He believed the theories of the scientists, had faith in their 

ability to move from laboratory scale to full scale facilities, and set out new research in how to manufacture large quantities of highly enriched uranium and 

plutonium as he built the facilities. At the same time, 

he built a large high explosive research facility to figure out how to build a bomb. Had he waited to determine what would work, had he not started construction 

when merely a theory existed, how much longer would the 

war have lasted? Would we have won the race? 

 Think about this. It would be unheard of today to even 

consider something so monumental. Yet before the scientists had any idea how to produce what they needed, 

Groves kicked off the most massive and incredible project 

the world has ever known, based on theories and a thousand unknowns with literally no certainty of success. I cannot fathom anyone getting their arms around the number 

of uncertainties yet going forward with such a massive 

construction undertaking -- Groves did. Remember, I am 

not talking small research buildings, but immense factories 

and facilities with hundreds of support buildings and infrastructure, including huge electric power plants, chemical 

plants, and giant buildings all to separate tiny isotopes of 

uranium and make plutonium form uranium.

 In Oak Ridge Tennessee, four huge facilities in three 

different valleys were constructed at the same time. 

 Y-12 was constructed to house the electromagnetic process for separating and enriching 

uranium using Calutrons. There were 13,200 

workers and operating force of 22,842 employees.

An aerial photo of the enormous gaseous diffusion building at K-25 in Oak Ridge, nearly a mile long, with the residential 

area in the background called Happy Valley. 12,000 workers were employed at the site.
51 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

 K-25 was constructed to separate Uranium 

isotopes by diffusing uranium hexafluoride gas 

through porous barriers in the famous nearly 

mile long U shaped gaseous diffusion building. 

At K-25 there was a construction workforce of 

25,000. It had its own little city called Happy 

Valley with school and stores. 

 X-10 (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) started 

with the Graphite Reactor for production of 

Plutonium-239 from uranium so scientists 

could research and develop chemical and 

physical methods to separate the isotopes of 

plutonium. It had a workforce of 3,247.

 The S-50 plant and large power plant were 

built on the Clinch River, to separate uranium 

by liquid thermal diffusion. Shortly after it went 

full-scale it was shut down due to problems 

and demolished the following year, it was a 

failure. 

 Los Alamos, NM, out in the middle of nowhere, Groves 

purchased a boy’s school and soon more than 50 buildings were built to research advanced high explosive research and bomb-design. 

 Hanford, Washington, large full-scale reactors and 

huge power plant were built based on the CP-1 design for 

production of plutonium. 

 Nearly 3⁄4 of the world’s supply of mercury was in Oak 

Ridge, and tons of pure silver was borrowed from the U.S. 

Mint since the amount needed was not available anywhere else. Towns, schools, shopping areas, theatres, 

hospitals, residential areas with houses, trailers, hutments, 

and barracks went up by the thousands to house and support the workers and their families. And remember, this 

was all going on at the same time in three different remote 

parts of the U.S. One man, General Groves, and his team 

of scientists, managed all of this, to turn theoretical physics into the first weapon of mass destruction. 

On August 6, at 8:15 am, the uranium bomb ―little boy‖ was released at 32,000 ft. over Hiroshima and detonated 

1,900 ft. Everything within a circle of about two miles was completely destroyed and fires instantly raged across 

nearly 4.5 square miles.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 52

If that’s not enough of a challenge, here’s another amazing fact. Everything researched, designed, and constructed was done with slide rule, pencil and paper, and 

mechanical adding machines. There were no such things 

as calculators let alone computers, or PERT or GANT 

charts, and few engineering drawings were made, for 

things were being constructed on the fly. Yet simultaneously, in Hanford, Washington, Los Alamos, New Mexico, 

and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, enormous plants were being 

constructed.

 Let me talk science for a moment. Protons and neutrons in an atom’s nucleus are bonded together by incredible amounts of energy. Knowing the number of protons 

and neutrons in one nucleus, scientists can calculate the 

energy released when all the bonds are broken. To give 

you an idea of how much energy that is, if you could release all the energy in all the nuclei of all the atoms in a 

single Lincoln penny, you could power New York for over 

a year. I ran that by a physicist friend and he confirmed it. 

 The major unknown for the project scientists was how 

many neutrons would be released, and how many of them 

would strike another nucleus to release more neutrons, 

and how much uranium or plutonium do you need to use 

in a bomb since you know all the neutrons will not be released. They struggled with the answer, and let me just 

say, they missed the mark considerably, using more nuclear material than needed. There were just too many unknowns about fission and bomb construction. 

 General Groves and his team of scientists struggled 

with the following: which processes should be utilized to 

make highly enriched uranium and plutonium; how to increase laboratory scale methods to full scale factories; 

how to configure and construct a mechanism/bomb that 

would produce an uncontrolled chain reaction using uranium and another with plutonium; how much nuclear material should be used; and how to do it all without an accident that could contaminate or take out the city and personnel doing the work. Remember, all of this was unexplored science, most of it theoretical, and yet in three remote areas of the U.S., huge facilities were constructed.

 In the next article, I will show you those incredible 

―People‖ of the Manhattan Project who actually did the 

work – the workers and their families. We will look at their 

sacrifices, their efforts, their pride as Americans, their understanding of secrecy, how they lived and where they 

worked. We’ll take a close look at the primitive tools they 

had to work with, but with which they accomplished so 

much, and we’ll look closely at the three remote regions 

This famous photo take in Oak Ridge on August 14, 1945 says it all, the war and the killing were over.
53 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

where this all took place. In future articles I will take you to 

the construction of the two different types of bombs, testing, deployment, the incredible destruction and cost in 

property and life, the surrender, and the celebration of 

peace and sadness of defeat. We will look too at the difficult decision and philosophy of using such a weapon, and 

lastly, I will show you why that incredible project never 

ended, yet continues to impact our world today in so many 

positive ways.

 In conclusion, let me say this: When the United States 

entered WW-II, the single goal was to end it. Wars are 

ended in two ways—killing, and fear of being killed. In just 

the seven months before the two nuclear bombs were released on Japan, conventional bombing raids had destroyed most of 67 Japanese cities killing hundreds of 

thousands, yet no end to the war was in sight. Changing 

conventional bombing raids to two single nuclear bomb 

drops instilled enough fear in the Japanese to bring about 

surrender and the end of WW-II. Estimates vary, but as 

many as 500,000 Japanese died and 5 million made 

homeless by war’s end. Worldwide, more than 70 million 

people, most of them civilians, lost their lives in WW-II, the 

deadliest conflict in all of human history. The Manhattan 

Project ended that conflict. 

 The honor of achievement belongs to every scientist, 

military and political leader, and every individual worker 

involved in the Project. Although the two nuclear bombs 

ended the war, it did so at a great cost to innocence. I 

write this paper with utmost respect and sadness for every 

individual who unwillingly paid the ultimate price of war. 

Every American celebrated the end of the war and new 

found peace, yet at the same time shed tears for those 

innocent Japanese people who died and suffered the consequence of our success. If only wisdom could wipe war 

from the face of the earth as quickly as were so many innocent souls.

 

Dr. Timothy Joseph, is a freelance technical writer in 

Knoxville, TN. He holds a B.S. in Zoology, a B.S. in

Education, an M.S. in Biology, and a Ph.D. in Biology/

Fisheries. He is a past High School Teacher and College 

Professor, and Senior Scientist with the U.S. Department 

of Energy, and he is a published novelist.

His email address is timjosephphd@gmail.com

ENDNOTES

These photos are part of the collection of nearly 200 Photographs contained in: "Historic Photos of the Manhattan

Project,‖ by Dr. Timothy Joseph, Published by Turner Publishing, Nashville, TN. For an autographed copy of the 

author’s new book, ―Historic Photos of the Manhattan 

Project,‖ you may contact the author or it can be obtained, 

unsigned, from any bookstore.

General Leslie Groves (left), military head of the Manhattan Project, with Prof. Robert Oppenheimer (right), scientific head of the project. Photo: DOE

Manhattan Project Lapel Pin, ca. 1945.

Source: History of Atomic Energy Collection, 0386.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 54

I 

ntroduction

On July 16, 1945, the United States 

(U.S.) detonated the world’s first nuclear weapon in Alamogordo, New 

Mexico. Residents from hundreds of 

miles away report seeing ―two sunrises‖ that day. The light that fell 

upon the world that morning ushered 

in a new era – the Atomic Age. Since 

the Atomic Age ushered in novel and 

devastating approaches to modern 

warfare, safety took on a new meaning. Within a few years, the U.S. had 

developed a number of different nuclear weapon designs. Weapon designers created a number of different 

safety features to ensure that a nuclear weapon would not prematurely 

or accidentally detonate. Many approaches used physical separation of 

components, but in the earliest days 

of weapon design, the explosives 

used in the bombs and warheads 

were more sensitive. Once disturbed, 

the weapon could explode, scattering 

parts over wide areas and releasing 

expensive radioactive materials in the 

aftermath. Eventually, engineers and 

designers produced and tested a 

number of explosives; after thorough 

testing and examination under a variety of conditions, several types were 

adopted.

 During the maturing days of the 

Atomic Age, a number of accidents 

involving U.S. nuclear weapons occurred that required domestic and 

foreign military and government civilians to respond quickly. Since 1945, 

history records a total of thirty-two 

nuclear-weapon accidents in the 

United States. While details of many 

of these accidents remain classified, 

the accidents of yesteryear encouraged early emergency response planners to develop procedures in the 

event that a nuclear weapon was 

damaged in an accident. The net 

result after almost three decades of 

accident response was the Department of Defense (DoD) 3150.8-M, 

also commonly referred to as the Nuclear Weapons Accident Response 

Procedures (NARP) manual. This 

article will describe in some detail the 

development of the NARP from an 

unclassified, historical basis.

Feasibility Study

 The NARP was authorized by DoD 

Directive 3150.8. That directive created the first version of the NARP, 

which until 1999 was administered as 

DoD 5100.52-M. In 1999, the manual 

was changed to the current DoD 

3150.8-M.

 In its almost 30-year history, the 

NARP underwent a plethora of 

changes. From earliest records available at the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency’s Defense Threat Reduction 

Inform ation Analysis Center 

(DTRIAC) at Kirtland Air Force Base, 

New Mexico, the DoD executed a 

feasibility study authored by Major 

Dennis K. Maj Dakan, USAF, entitled 

―Joint Nuclear Accident Response‖ 

under the supervision of the Air Command and Staff College to develop a 

manual. This culminated in a document produced in the summer of 

1977. The feasibility study made the 

following statements:

 A nuclear weapons accident occurring in the U.S. may require response by several federal agencies, 

two or more military services, and 

state and local government agencies. 

The federal agencies and military 

services have published directives 

pertinent to nuclear weapons accident response and recovery operations. The purpose of this research 

project is to investigate federal 

agency and military service directives 

to ascertain the feasibility of developing a joint program for nuclear accident response. These directives are 

examined for commonality and mutually exclusive requirements concerning clear accident response. The 

author concludes that a joint nuclear 

accident response program is feasible.1

 The feasibility study indicates a 

need to prepare a set of procedures 

that may be used by military and civilian first responders to mitigate the 

effects of a nuclear weapon accident. 

Maj Dakan, was assigned to the Interservice Nuclear Weapons School 

at Kirtland AFB, NM, recognized that 

a severe problem existed in the joint 

community regarding interservice 

cooperation at a nuclear weapons 

accident site. Prior to the author detailing this research, there were no 

standardized procedures that all four 

services adhered to when dealing 

with this sensitive issue. As a participant of Palomares incident in Spain, 

Historical Development of the 

Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures

(NARP)

MAJ W. David Jones

Chief of Doctrine and Joint Lessons Learned 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Information Analysis Center Albuquerque, NM. 
55 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Maj Dakan noted several serious accidents occurring in the past and recognized that a lack of standards extended across all the services prevented a more timely response effort.2

 Maj Dakan identified several key 

issues which he thought were paramount to addressing a solution:

1. To determine the specific intent of 

the relevant DoD implementing instructions.

2. To determine specific requirements 

of each military service in responding 

to nuclear weapons accidents.

3. To determine commonality and 

exclusive service requirements pertaining to nuclear accident response.

4. To recommend a plan of general 

response actions that could be accepted as a joint regulation/instruction 

for each service.3

These issues would form the basis for 

the remainder of the document.

 Maj Dakan relates the creation of 

the Atomic Energy Commission and 

the DoD as part of his statement of 

the problem; in his research, the two 

agencies provided very little mutual 

cooperation. The creation of the Defense Atomic Support Agency (which 

eventually became the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency) helped 

somewhat, but there was no unifying 

entity that had studied or created a 

document that brought together all of 

the support agencies that had been 

or would be involved in mediating a 

nuclear weapon accident. The services and a number of agencies had 

signed a mutual aid document entitled ―Joint Department of Defense 

and Atomic Energy Commission 

Agreement in Response to Accidents 

Involving Radioactive Materials‖ in 

1966; the agreement spelled out roles 

and responsibilities of a large number 

of agencies, but it lacked the authority 

to enforce guidance. This omission 

was added in a Joint Memorandum 

signed in 1970. The Defense Atomic 

Support Agency was renamed the 

Defense Nuclear Agency in 1971, 

and the Atomic Energy Commission 

was replaced by both the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; with these agency 

changes in place, the Joint Memorandum began to specify more detailed 

roles and responsibilities. In addition, 

three specific memoranda were written to empower agencies regarding 

nuclear weapons accident response: 

DoD 5100.52, DoD 5230.16, and 

DoD 7730.12. 

 DoD 5100.52 instructed the following:

1. Guidance to the military services 

and Defense Nuclear Agency for 

planning and providing radiological 

assistance in the event of a radiological accident; 

2. Assignment of DoD responsibilities 

for participation in the Interagency 

Radiological Assistance Plan (IRAP); 

and 

3. Confirmation of DoD responsibilities in the Joint DoD-ERDA Agreement - Response to Accidents Involving Radiological Materials.4

 DoD 5230.16 added information 

regarding the role of public affairs. 

The instruction dictated that the DoD 

would make a prompt release of information to the public in the interest of 

maintaining safety and to prevent 

panic and chaos. It also instructed 

units responsible for transporting nuclear materials to create detailed 

manifests and contingency plans.5

 DoD 7730.12 mandated prompt 

reporting to officials at the National 

Military Command Center in the event 

of a nuclear weapon accident or incident, and it also established procedures that units would use in such an 

event.6

 Maj Dakan’s suggestions and 

comprehensive research were incorporated using all of these instructions, 

plus a number of interagency and 

interservice ideas to form the first 

comprehensive nuclear weapon accident response manual in 1983.

1983 NARP

 The first version of the NARP had 

a total of 154 pages, cover to cover. 

It had eighteen sections, and was 

developed by the field command of 

the Defense Nuclear Agency, which 

is the predecessor of the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency.

 The 1983 version outlined specifics in many areas, including the responsibilities of government agencies, command and control, radiological safety and health physics, communications, security, medical, weapons operations, public affairs, logistics support, legal, site restoration, a 

summary of specialized capabilities, 

training, and general references.7

1984 NARP

 The second version of the NARP 

had a total of 164 pages, cover to 

cover. It had seventeen sections, 

and was developed and published by 

the Defense Nuclear Agency.

 The 1984 version spelled out the 

purpose of the NARP:

This manual provides a consolidated 

summary of procedural guidance, 

technical information, and Department of Defense responsibilities to 

assist DoD forces in preparing for 

nuclear weapon accident response in 

the United States. It is intended to 

assist the on-scene commander and 

his staff in directing the recovery from 

a nuclear weapon accident. The information contained herein is intended 

specifically for use in responding to a 

DoD nuclear weapon accident within 

the United States and its territories 

and possessions.8

 The 1984 NARP outlined specifics 

in many areas, including the responsibilities of government agencies, 

responsibilities of other agencies, 

management of accident response, 

radiation safety and environmental 

monitoring, communications, security, 

medical, weapons operations, public 

affairs, logistics support, legal, site 

restoration, a summary of specialized 

capabilities, training, and a list of 

agreements, directives, publications, 

and general references.9 The 1984 

NARP was a more detailed revision, 

and included a significantly increased 

number of diagrams, tables, and 

technical references, especially re-

 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 56

garding dosimetry and health-physics 

related information. 

 The 1984 version of the NARP 

lasted a number of years before a 

revision and published again in 1999. 

In the meantime, the Department of 

Energy (DOE), the Defense Special 

Weapons Agency ( a predecessor of 

the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency and the agency that replaced 

the Defense Nuclear Agency), and 

the Joint Nuclear Accident Coordinating Center created an additional supplement to the NARP called the 

―Nuclear Accident Response Capability Listing,‖ or NARCL. The first 

NARCL was published in 1995, and a 

revision was published in 1997. The 

NARCL listed agencies, their radiation detection and monitoring equipment, and point-of-contact telephone 

numbers in the event that a nuclear 

weapons accident or incident occurred within the continental United 

States (CONUS). Outside CONUS 

listings were also included in the 

event that host nations requested US 

assistance for accidents occurring 

overseas. 10

1999 NARP (DoD 3150.8-M)

 A monstrous document, the 1999 

version of the NARP was double the 

content of its predecessor at 388 

pages from cover to cover. This hefty 

document included chapters on the 

following areas: nuclear weapons 

accident response procedures, shipboard accident response (new), radiological hazard and safety environmental monitoring, respiratory and 

personnel protection (new), contamination control, bioassay procedures 

(new), radioactive materials, characteristics, hazards, and health considerations (new), conversion factors for 

weapons-grade plutonium (new), 

medical, security, weapon recovery 

operations, communications, public 

affairs, legal, logistic support, training, 

overview of the site-remediation process (new), accident science response 

(new), intermediate actions (new), 

long-term actions (new), summary of 

specialized capabilities, and a bibliography. The 1999-version had a significant number of appendices at the 

end of most chapters. Of note was a 

point-of-contact listing for major DoD 

and non-DoD organizations involved 

in accident response. 

 The 1999 3150.8-M was the first 

truly extensive manual designed to 

bring the interagencies together to 

mitigate a nuclear weapon accident 

or incident. The manual was divided 

into four major parts: Planning, Policy, and Response Guidance; Technical and Administrative Issues of Radiological Response; Site remediation 

Guidance; and Specialized Assets 

and Points of Contact. This NARP 

was designed to help the reader pinpoint very specific information quickly 

and efficiently. The manual contained an even greater number of 

illustrations than the 1984 version, 

wh ic h a s s is t e d t h e r e a d e r 

(commander, staff officer, or student) 

in visualizing how to set up a national 

defense area, tactical operations centers, media relations and other outlets, and how to tackle the accident 

site itself. The 1999 version was, at 

that time, one of the most complete 

technical manuals in DoD inventory.11

2005 NARP (DoD 3150.8-M)

 The 2005 NARP took a step 

backward by reducing information, 

decreasing to 344 pages cover to 

cover. Major subdivisions and chapters were deleted or made into substantially smaller appendices.

 The 2005 NARP contained chapters on: functional response tiers and 

nuclear weapon accident response 

assets and resources; US territory 

nuclear weapon accident response 

phase I: notification and deployment; 

US territory nuclear weapon accident 

response phase II: initial response; 

US territory nuclear weapon accident 

response phase III: accident site consolidation; US territory nuclear 

weapon accident response phase IIII: 

weapon recovery operations and disposition; US territory nuclear weapon 

accident response phase v: site 

remediation; shipboard accident response; foreign territory US nuclear 

weapon accident response concept of 

operations; radiological hazard and 

safety environmental monitoring; 

medical; security; communications; 

public affairs; legal; logistic support; 

and training.12

Future Versions of the NARP

 A new version of the NARP is currently under review and expected to 

be released later this year. The Defense Nuclear Weapons School and 

other agencies have received copies 

for comment. These additional 

changes may help the NARP become 

more user-friendly. In its history, the 

NARP, which started out as an Air 

Force Air Command and Staff student’s project, has become one of the 

founding documents upon which the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency is 

based. Its usefulness as doctrine is 

proven, and has become an essential 

tool in many of the classes held at the 

Defense Nuclear Weapons School, 

which is part of the Defense Threat 

Reduction University.

 The NARP has changed since its 

beginnings, and no doubt will continue to change, so long as the world 

faces threats from nuclear powers 

and terrorists. As long as the U.S. 

has nuclear weapons as part of its 

defense strategy, the NARP will live 

on, and commanders and staffs 

across the planet will be required to 

understand the clean, proven, scientific doctrine found in its pages.

MAJ W. David Jones is the Chief of 

Doctrine and Joint Lessons Learned 

at the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency’s Information Analysis Center 

in Albuquerque, NM. He has a B.S. 

in Physics from North Carolina State 

University, a M.S. in Physics from the 

Naval Postgraduate School, and is 

working on a Ph.D. in Physics from 

The University of New Mexico.

His email address is

william.d.jones@dtra.mil 

ENDNOTES

1. Joint Nuclear Accident Response Feasibility Study. 

Maj Dennis K. Dakan, USAF, Air Command and Staff 

College, May 1977.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. DoD 5100.52, dated 1971.

5. DoD 5230.16, dated 1971.

6. DoD 7730.12, dated 1971.

7.Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures. 

11 March 1983.

8. Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures. 

January 1984.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.

11. DoD 3150.8-M. Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures. December 1984.

12. DoD 3150.8-M. Nuclear Weapons Accident Response Procedures. February 22, 1985.

 
57 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

T 

his is the final article highlighting some of America’s nuclear arsenal during the Cold War era. 

America’s nuclear sea power has been a part of 

our extended deterrence from that era and continues into 

the present. The first article, ―Tactical Nuclear Weapons 

in the Cold War Era... A Blast from the Past ‖ discussed 

the United States (U.S.) Army’s nuclear arsenal. These 

tactical nuclear weapons allowed the Land Component 

Commander highly flexible response options consisting of 

terrain obstructing atomic demolition munitions, artillery 

fired atomic projectiles (AFAP), and long range guided 

missiles; the second article, ―Peace is our Profession‖ 

highlighted the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command 

(SAC) responsibility for nuclear deterrence through 

manned bombers, cruise missiles and intercontinental 

missiles and their ability to strike globally. This article will 

chronicle some of the nuclear weapons the U.S. Navy employed to keep the peace and freedoms of the sea the 

world has come to know. 

The mission of the U.S. Navy is to maintain, train and 

equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning 

wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom 

of the seas. 

 Mission statement of the United States Navy

 From their simple mission statement, there are a variety of underlying and complex supporting missions. The 

support missions were many, to include air defense of the 

fleet, anti submarine warfare (ASW) and global strike mission, that not only supported the fleet, but the U.S. nuclear 

enterprise as a whole as the third leg of our TRIAD.1

These missions continue today, but some nuclear weapons employed then have been withdrawn as the weapons 

systems were retired, removed or in some cases replaced 

with conventional weapons. 

 What I have not adequately captured in my previous 

articles are the sheer destructive powers of these nuclear 

warheads. How does a nuclear warhead with a yield of 10 

kilo tons (kt) that’s 10,000 tons, compare to conventional 

explosives? Figure 1. illustrates this point by comparing 

conventional ordnance to its nuclear siblings. As you can 

see if we want conventional strike equivalence, we are 

going to be striking a target for a very long time and with a 

lot of ordnance. Imagine trying to remove a tree stump in 

the middle of a field with a small hatchet or one stick of 

dynamite. The tree stump can get removed with either 

method; it just depends on how quickly you want that tree 

stump removed and what resources you have at hand to 

remove the stump.

Atomic Projectiles

 The U.S. Navy during the Cold war still had battleships 

in their inventory. Some were mothballed but for those 

awaiting another combat patrol, their guns were formidable. The Second World War era battleships armed with 

16‖ guns were impressive enough, but they did not escape 

nuclear armament. The 16’ guns could fire conventional 

2700 pound armor piercing (AP) shells capable of penetrating over 27 feet of concrete and more than 32 inches 

of side armor plate. In addition to the standard conventional high capacity (HC) and AP shells, the battleships 

could deliver atomic projectiles. The Mark 23 atomic warhead could strike targets at distances over 25 miles. This 

varied basic load of ammunition ensured both nuclear and 

conventional fire support missions to ground operations. 

Sea Power 

Deterrence from the Sea

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Nuclear Targeting Officer

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Photograph by: Department of Energy
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 58Figure 1. Conventional versus Nuclear 1 Kilo ton 10 Kilo tons 100 Kilo tons 1 Ton Not to Scale “Little Boy” (10 kT Gun-Type)
59 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Fleet Air Defense

 Air supremacy whether it is on land or sea serves as a 

hedge to protect our deployed fighting forces. The air defense of the fleet is vital to survival of the ships at sea. 

This lesson learned from the Second World War demonstrated that the survivability of the fleet depended on the 

defeat of inbound enemy aircraft. Many surface and subsurface vessels were damaged, destroyed or sunk from 

aircraft that breeched air cover or the fleet’s defensive armament. Once inside, the aircraft can do considerable 

damage in a short amount of time. Today this threat is not 

only aircraft, but high speed anti-ship missiles. The U.S. 

Navy began a series of tests and developments for antiaircraft missiles under Operation Bumblebee after World 

War II. The importance of Operation Bumblebee was to 

design missiles that could provide a mid level of defense 

from air attack between carrier aircraft and anti-aircraft 

guns. Among the U.S. Navy anti-aircraft weaponry in their 

arsenal were the RIM-2 Terrier, and the Talos nuclear missiles.

RIM-2 Terrier

The Convair RIM-2 Terrier was a two-stage medium-range 

naval surface-to-air missile (SAM) designed for the air defense role as a development from the Bumblebee Project. 

It and was among the earliest SAM systems to equip U.S. 

Navy vessels built during the 1960s. It could be installed 

on smaller ships rather than the larger and longer-ranged 

RIM-8 Talos. 

 Initially, the Terrier used radar beam-riding guidance, 

wing control, conventional warhead, and had a top speed 

of only Mach 1.8, with a range of 10 nautical miles (nm). 

The short relatively short range and speed made it useful 

only against subsonic targets. Due to emerging technology and newer requirements, it had major improvements 

before it was even in widespread service. The wings were 

replaced with fixed strakes, and the tail became the control surface, it used a newer motor pushing it to a higher 

speed (Mach 3), with extended range, and improved maneuverability. The RIM-2D Terrier BT-3A (N) (Beam-riding, 

Tail control, series 3 Nuclear) used the W45, a 1kt nuclear 

warhead; all other variants used a conventional warhead. 2

Talos

The Bendix RIM-8 Talos was also a development of the 

Bumblebee SAM Project. The Talos saw limited use due 

to its large size and few ships could accommodate the 

system. The size and weight of the missile was similar to 

jet fighter aircraft of the time. 

 Talos was a long-range naval SAM missile using radar 

beam riding for guidance to the vicinity of its target, and 

semi-active radar homing (SARH) for terminal guidance. 

Thrust was provided by a solid rocket booster for initial 

launch and a Bendix ramjet for flight to the target. The 

characteristic design of the Talos is the arrays of four 

SARH receiver antennas surrounding the nose of the Talos missiles and the warhead doubling as the ramjet's 

compressor.

 The initial Talos RIM-8A had an effective range of approximately 50 nm, and a conventional warhead. The Talos RIM--8B was a RIM-8A with a W30 nuclear warhead. 

The RIM-8D was the nuclear warhead version of the Talos 

RIM-8C, an improved missile having doubled its original 

range. The Talos RIM-8E "Unified Talos" utilized a warhead that could be exchanged with a nuclear warhead 

while under way at sea. This model eliminated the need 

to carry dedicated nuclear warhead only variants. Interestingly, the Talos missile also had surface-to-surface capabilities. The nuclear variants were employed from 1959 to 

1979. The Terrier and Talos missiles were replaced by 

the extended range RIM-67 Standard missile.3

Convair RIM-2 Terrier . Photo: U.S. Navy

Bendix RIM-8 Talos Surface t Air Missile 

Photo: U.S. Navy
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 60

Cruise Missiles

Cruise missiles are different than a submarine launched 

ballistic missile (SLBM), as they use a turbofan engine for 

propulsion and are much smaller in size and delivery yield 

than SLBMs. Cruise missiles delivered by U.S. Navy vessels are launched through vertical tubes on surface vessels or via torpedo tubes in submarines and have a short 

range compared to ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles use 

a solid fuel rocket motor and have a short duration of powered flight but much greater range using terminal speed 

and velocity to strike their targets. 4

Regulus

The first submarine missile program was "Regulus," the 

forerunner of the Tomahawk cruise missile. The submarine-launched, subsonic, turbojet-powered Regulus missiles were specifically designed to carry nuclear warheads. The diesel-electric submarine type used for 

Regulus were submersible ship guided (SSG), later when 

the submarine fleet began to use nuclear propulsion; the 

acronym was further modified to SSGN to denote nuclear. 

 Regulus I was first launched at sea in March 1953 by 

the converted USS Tunny (SSG-282), housing two missiles in a pressurized hangar. The missile had a range of 

about 500 nm. By mid-1958, USS Grayback (SSG-574) 

and USS Growler (SSG-577) had been commissioned as 

the first purpose-built Regulus submarines, each carrying 

two in a large bow hangar. At that time, the Navy had four 

SSGs and four missile-carrying cruisers at sea.

 USS Halibut (SSGN-587) was the first nuclear powered 

submarine specifically designed to carry and launch missiles. Commissioned in January 1960, the USS Halibut 

could carry four Regulus II missiles in a hangar integral 

with the hull. Regulus submarines could only prepare and 

fire their missiles on the surface, then dive to periscope 

depth to guide the missile to the target. This proved to be 

a critically limiting factor, as the Regulus had a very noticeable back blast from the surface launch. 

 Regulus II was an improvement over Regulus I, flying 

at supersonic speeds at Mach 2 and a range reaching 

1,200 nm, nearly almost twice as Regulus I Production of 

Regulus was phased out in January 1959 with delivery of 

the 514th missile, and removed from service in August 

1964. Regulus provided the first nuclear strategic deterrence force for the U.S. Navy during the early years of the 

Cold War, and would the forerunner of the Tomahawk 

cruise missile.

 The Regulus designed and manufactured by Chance 

Vought was 30 feet long, with a wingspan of 10 feet, a 

diameter of 4 feet, and would weigh between 10,000 and 

12,000 pounds, containing either the W5 or the W27 nuclear war head. 5

 

BGM-109 Tomahawk 

The BGM-109 Tomahawk is a medium to long-range, allweather, low-altitude subsonic cruise missile. There are 

several variants of the Tomahawk employing various 

types of warheads, with the most notable as the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile or simply TLAM. The Tomahawk was a replacement to the Regulus and is a dual purpose cruise missile armed with a conventional high explosive warhead or W80 nuclear warhead. The nomenclature of a nuclear armed variant is modified to Tomahawk 

Land Attack Missile – Nuclear or TLAM-N.

 The TLAM is launched through a torpedo tube and 

rises to the surface, deploying small wings then starts the 

turbofan engine. The small size of the TLAM gives it a low 

radar cross section and its low-level flight profile makes it 

difficult to intercept. The TLAM is launched on a preset 

course initially then later in the flight profile switches to 

other navigating systems to guide the missile to its target 

Regulus I firing off the deck of the USS Los Angeles 

(CA135). Photo: U.S. navy

BGM-109 Tomahawk in flight. Photo: DoD
61 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

with excellent accuracy. The Tomahawk was originally 

designed and manufactured by General Dynamics, with 

some manufactured by McDonnell Douglas, now all are 

manufactured by Raytheon. 6 

Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW)

ASROC 

ASROC is the acronym for Anti-Submarine ROCket an allweather, all sea-conditions anti-submarine system developed by the U.S. Navy in the 1950s and deployed in the 

1960s. Upgraded with improvements, it is still used by the 

U.S. Navy on cruisers, destroyers, and frigates and on 

warships of other nations.

 When a surface ship, patrol plane or anti-submarine 

helicopter detects an enemy submarine by sonar and/or 

other sensors, it relays the sub's position to an ASROCequipped ship for attack. The ship would fire the ASROC, 

an unguided rocket carrying an acoustic homing torpedo 

or a nuclear depth bomb (NDB) toward the target. At a pre

-determined point on the rockets trajectory, the payload 

separates from the missile and deploys by parachute to 

permit a soft water entry at a low speed with minimum detectable noise. The water entry activates the torpedo, and 

guided by its internal sonar system, homes in on the target 

using either active or passive sonar.

 In cases where the ASROC carried an NDB, the unguided bomb would quickly sink to a predetermined depth 

where it would detonate. The nuclear variant of the ASROC carried the W44 nuclear warhead. The nuclear 

armed weapons were removed from deployment and retired by 1989. 7

SUBROC

SUBmarine ROCket is the acronym for the UUM-44, a 

submarine-launched rocket intended as an anti-submarine 

weapon with the U.S. Navy. Its development began in 

1958, and by 1965 the U.S. Navy began receiving the new 

weapon. A planned successor, the UUM-125 Sea Lance, 

was delayed due to funding problems and eventually canceled.

 SUBROC was launched from a submarine torpedo 

tube, similarly like that of the Tomahawk cruise missile. 

After launch, the solid fuel rocket motor ignited and SUBROC would rise to the surface. The launch angle then 

changes and SUBROC traveled to the target following a 

predetermined ballistic trajectory. At a predetermined time 

in the trajectory, the reentry vehicle containing the warhead separates from the solid fuel motor section. The warhead, a W55 nuclear depth bomb, drops into the water, 

rapidly sinking before exploding in proximity to its target. A 

direct hit was not necessary, as the pressure from the explosion would rupture the sub’s hull.

SUBROC's approach was not detectable by the target in 

time to take evasive action, the warhead yield would make 

evasive maneuvers pointless. SUBROC was less flexible 

in its use than ASROC since its only payload was a nuclear warhead and no plans were made to convert SUBROC with conventional high explosive warheads. SUBROC was decommissioned following the end of the Cold 

War in 1989. 8

Torpedoes

The ASTOR is the acronym for the Mark 45 Anti Submarine TORpedo. The ASTOR was designed for high-speed, 

deep-diving enemy submarines. The electrically-propelled 

19-inch torpedo was 227 inches long and weighed 2,400 

pounds. The torpedo had a range of 5 to 8 miles and utilized the W34 nuclear warhead. The torpedo had no internal homing capability; all guidance, target tracking, and 

detonation was provided by control wire from the launching submarine as a positive control measure for nuclear 

warheads of this design. Development of ASTOR was 

completed in 1960 and it entered service in 1963; by 1976 

the Mark 45 was withdrawn from service. 9

Bombs and Depth Charges

Mk 101 ―Lulu‖

The Mark (Mk) 101 Lulu was developed the in the 1950s 

as an air delivered nuclear depth bomb utilizing the W34 

nuclear warhead. 

Destroyer USS Agerholm fires an ASROC with a nuclear 

depth bomb in the "Swordfish" test in 1962.

SUBROC after leaving the water. Photo: U.S. Navy 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 62

It was deployed by the U.S. Navy for anti-submarine warfare, in five different models, from 1958 until 1971. These 

weapons could be used by U.S. and NATO maritime aircraft such as the Royal Air Force Avro Shackleton aircraft, 

and Dutch Navy P-2 Neptune and P-3 Orion aircraft. The 

Mk-101 "Lulu" was replaced by the multi-purpose B57 nuclear bomb in the mid-1960s. 

 The danger of this weapon was the lack of any type of 

accelerometer (speed sensor) safeties. If the weapon accidentally fell off an aircraft parked on a flight deck and 

rolled overboard it could detonate when it sank to the preset depth. The weapon would not detonate at a preset 

depth if these safeties were incorporated into the design. 

The design of the safeties could differentiate between high 

speed free fall from an aircraft, and the slower bomb sink 

rate from a fall. 10

B-57

The B-57 was a bomb that could be used by tactical strike 

aircraft in a land warfare role, as well as the nuclear depth 

bomb role. The B-57 could be deployed by most U.S. 

fighter, bomber and Navy antisubmarine warfare and patrol aircraft (S-3 Viking and P-3 Orion), and by some U.S. 

Navy helicopters including the SH-3 Sea King. The B-57 

could also be used by Canada's CF-104s.

 Entering production in 1963 as the Mk 57, the bomb 

was designed for high-speed tactical aircraft. It had a 

streamlined body to withstand supersonic flight. The B-57 

was also equipped with a parachute retarder to slow the 

weapon's descent, allowing the aircraft to escape the blast 

at altitudes under 200 ft. A hydrostatic fuze was utilized for 

the depth charge role in anti-submarine use.

 The B-57 was produced from 1963 to 1967. After 1968, 

the weapon became known as the B-57 rather than the 

Mk 57. The B-57 was produced in six versions, and over 

3000 weapons were built, the last of which was retired in 

June 1993. 11

Mk 90 ―Betty‖

The Mk 90 Betty was a nuclear depth charge developed in 

1952 as an anti-submarine weapon. It utilized a Mark 7 

nuclear warhead. All weapons had been retired and withdrawn from service by 1960. 12

Guided Ballistic Missiles 

 In the mid 1950s, the National Security Council (NSC) 

requested an Immediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) for 

the defense of the United States. This was in part a measure for deterrence to the missile development by the Soviet Union. The NSC directed that part of this missile force 

must be sea-based. The Secretary of the Navy created 

the Special Projects Office (SPO) to work this new requirement. The SPO was tasked with adapting the liquid-fueled 

Jupiter IRBM for shipboard launch. The Jupiter was originally an Army missile designed for land-based operation. 

Liquid propellants required strict and careful handling, and 

it was difficult on land, let alone to be adapted to ship 

board use. As a result of these limiting safety and handling factors the U.S. Navy began a parallel effort to the 

U.S. Air Force to develop safer solid-fuel rocket motors. 13

 Further improvements to solid fuels, smaller and more 

powerful motor technology, electronic and manufacturing 

technology reduced the size of the launch platform. Also 

improved missile guidance, and reentry body (RB) assemblies produced the first true SLBM. 

 The first solid-fueled missile incorporating this new 

technology was the Polaris missile. The first submarine 

launch of a Polaris occurred in July 1960 from the USS 

George Washington. Three hours later a second missile 

was successfully launched. These two shots marked the 

beginning of sea-based nuclear deterrence for the U.S. 

New Technology– New Mission, New Nomenclature

 The U.S. Navy classifies their vessels by a unique hull 

classification system. For a nuclear-powered, ballistic nuclear missile-carrying submarine the classification is 

SSBN. The SS denotes a "submersible ship", B denotes 

"ballistic missile," and the N denoting "nuclear powered." 

In U.S. naval parlance, ballistic missile submarines are 

called "Boomers". Submarines in general are also referred to as ―boats‖ while surface vessels are ships. 

Mk 45 ASTOR Photo: Author’s collection

B-57 Dual purpose tactical Bomb.
63 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines 

 Since the 1960s, strategic deterrence has been the 

SSBN’s sole mission, providing the U.S. with its most survivable and enduring nuclear strike capability. The Navy’s 

fleet ballistic missile submarines serve as an undetectable 

launch platform for intercontinental missiles. They are designed specifically for stealth and the precision delivery of 

nuclear warheads. 

 Ohio class SSBNs have the capability to carry up to 24 

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) with multiple independently-targeted warheads. The SSBN’s primary weapon, the Trident missile, was built in two versions. The first generation missile, Trident C-4, has been 

phased out of service and replaced by the larger, longerrange, and more precise Trident II D-5. The first eight submarines (SSBN 726 to 733) were initially built to only carry 

the C-4 missile. The first four Ohio class (SSBN 726 

through SSBN 729) ended their strategic deterrent mission in the early 2000s when they began the conversion 

process into guided missile submarines, or SSGNs. SSBN 

730 through 733 have been retrofitted to carry the D-5 

missile. SSBN 734 to 743 were designed from the beginning to carry the D-5 missile and continue to execute their 

primary mission of strategic deterrence. All pre-Ohio class

submarines were retired in 1995. 14 

Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles a Chronology

Polaris. 

The Polaris program began in 1957 from the prime contractor Lockheed, now Lockheed Martin for all three versions. The program ended in 1968 after more than 1,400 

missiles had been built. The Polaris A-1 missile served as 

a strategic asset. The missile was developed to complement the limited number of medium-range systems deployed throughout Europe. As those systems lacked the 

range to attack major Soviet targets, Polaris was developed to increase the level of nuclear deterrence. At this 

time there was little threat of counterforce strikes, as few 

systems had the accuracy to destroy missile systems. The 

primary advantages of ballistic missile submarines were 

their ability to launch submerged, which offered improved 

survivability for the submarine. 

 The first version, the Polaris A-1, had a range of 1000 

nautical miles (nm) and a single Mk 1 re-entry body (RB), 

carrying a single W-47 nuclear warhead, using an inertial 

guidance system and was deployed from 1960 to 1974. 

The two-stage solid fuel missile had a length over 28 ft, a 

body diameter over 50 in, and a launch weight nearly 

63 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Image: U.S. Navy.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 64

29,000 lbs. The later versions (the A-2, A-3) were larger, 

weighed more, and had longer ranges than the A-1. The 

range increase was improved: The A-2 range was 1,500 

nm, the A-3 2,500 nm, and the B-3 2,000 nm. The A-3 

featured multiple W-58 RBs which spread the warheads 

over the target area. The A3, W58 variant was deployed 

from 1964 to 1982. The Polaris missile and associated 

nuclear warheads are all retired from U.S. service. 15

UGM-73 Poseidon

The Poseidon missile was the second ballistic missile system deployed by the U.S. Navy. The Poseidon used a two

-stage solid fuel rocket and the W68 nuclear warhead. It 

replaced the Polaris missile beginning in 1972, major advances in nuclear warhead yield and increased accuracy. 

Originally a planned improved model of the Polaris (B-3) 

was dropped and the new missile was designated Poseidon C3 to emphasize the technical advances over its 

predecessor. The Poseidon was only constructed in a single model with the designation UGM-73A. Poseidon had 

a 2,500 nm range, greater payload capacity, improved 

accuracy, and multiple RB capability. Poseidon could deliver the W68 thermonuclear warhead to multiple targets. 

The Poseidon was replaced by Trident I in 1979, and Trident II in 1990. 

Global Strike

Trident Series of Missiles a Short Primer

The Trident series had two variants known as Trident I 

(C4) UGM-96A and the Trident II (D5) UGM-133A. There 

is no direct relationship between Trident I and II missiles, 

for example upgrading a common launch platform or improving a rocket motor. The C4 and D5 designations put 

the missiles within a class or "family" started in 1960 with 

Polaris A1, A2 and A3 and continued with the Poseidon 

C3 in 1971, but that is where the similarities end. The Trident I, sometimes referred to as EXPO (Extended Range 

Poseidon), was an improved version of the Poseidon C-3 

missile; the Trident II D-5 however incorporates a completely new design technology and warhead.

Trident I (C4) SLBM

The Trident I is a three-stage, solid fuel, inertial/stellarguided, SLBM utilizing the W76 nuclear warhead. It had a 

range of about 4,000 nm. It is a multiple independentlytargeted RB system and was originally deployed on the 

Lafayette-class and early Ohio-class (Trident) submarines. 

The Trident I missile was initially deployed on modified 

Poseidon submarines with updated fire control equipment 

beginning in 1979. The Trident I had increased range and 

accuracy over the Poseidon missile. The updated weapon 

system included many improvements resulting from electronic technology. The Trident I was phased out in the 

1990s and early 2000s. 16

Trident II (D5) SLBM 

The Trident II is a three-stage, solid fuel, SLBM that utilizes the W88 warhead. It has an improved range of over 

the Trident I. The Trident II uses the latest electronics for 

improved reliability and maintainability and built with improved materials. The Trident II is deployed on the Ohioclass submarines, starting in 1990 and continues to be 

deployed today. The Trident II missile booster is also provided to the United Kingdom (U.K.). The U.K. utilize their 

own warheads on the missiles and deployed on Vanguard 

class submarines. 17

Conclusion

 Unfortunately we cannot be ―nuclear free‖ for some 

time to come, a fanciful dream but not practical. Since 

Pandora’s Box opened up she’s not likely to close any 

time soon taking all of the design secrets with her. Nuclear warheads of any design and yield are truly the most 

destructive devices ever conceived by man.

 In our lifetime and the years beyond, it is hoped that 

the fictional order given in the movie, ―Crimson Tide‖ by 

Captain Ramsey (Gene Hackman), will never be issued: 

“This is the Captain. Set condition 1-SQ for strategic 

missile launch. Spin up missiles one through five, 

and twenty through twenty-four. The release of nuclear weapons has been authorized. This is not a 

drill.” 18

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes is a Nuclear Targeting Officer 

assigned at USANCA. He is a graduate of the Joint Targeting School, Dam Neck, VA, and a certified Nuclear Target Analyst. 

His email address is stephen.gomes@us.army.mil

ENDNOTES

1. TRIAD: A nuclear triad refers to a nuclear strategy consisting of three 

components: 1. Strategic bombers (armed with bombs or missiles), 2. 

Land-based missiles (intercontinental missiles (ICBMs)), and 3. Ballistic 

missile submarines (SSBNs). The purpose of having a TRIAD nuclear 

capability is to significantly reduce the possibility that an enemy could 

destroy all of a country's nuclear forces in a first strike attack. The design of the TRIAD ensures a credible threat of a second strike, and increases a nation's nuclear deterrence. 

2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-2_Terrier

3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-8_Talos

4. Air University Primer U.S. Missile Systems

5. http://www.olive-drab.com/od_nuclear_slbm.php, http://

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSM-N-8_Regulus

6. ibid

7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RUR-5_ASROC

8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UUM-44_SUBROC

9. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_48_torpedo

10. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mk-101_Lulu_NDB_

(Nuclear_Depth_Bomb)

11. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B57_nuclear_bomb

12. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_90_Betty_nuclear_bomb

13. ibid

14. http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?

cid=4100&tid=200&ct=4

15. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UGM-27_Polaris

16. ibid

17. ibid

18. Fictional order from the movie ―Crimson Tide‖, 1995 directed by Tony 

Scott, produced by Don Simpson and Jerry Bruckheimer, written by Michael Schiffer and Richard P. Henrick.
65 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Have you been Published?

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Editor

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

U 

Get your article published in the Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Journal today!

SANCA publishes the Combating Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (CWMD) Journal on a semiannual basis (Spring-Summer & Fall-Winter). The 

purpose of the magazine is to highlight the U.S. Army’s 

unique mission of providing nuclear and CWMD technical 

expertise in support of all Army elements and to other U.S. 

Government and NATO agencies as requested. 

 We encourage our readership to provide articles that 

discuss all facets in the world of combating weapons of 

mass destruction to include training, operations, exercises, science and technology, history, book reviews, new 

systems and equipment.

 Your article submission not only helps the community, 

but it also establishes you as a published author. This can 

be a boost in your career or personal development, just 

some food for thought. 

Article Submission

 We welcome articles from all agencies and academia 

involved with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 

and high yield explosives (CBRNE) matters. Articles received are reviewed and approved by the CWMD Journal 

Editorial Board prior to publication. Please provide a summary of your article, as this will help the editorial board 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 66

better place the article in the applicable category. 

 Submit articles in Microsoft Word without any automatic formatting such as footnotes, numbering and do not 

embed any pictures/diagrams etc, within the text. Please 

include photographs, graphs, tables, etc. with captions as 

separate files and applicable insert point(s). We will strive 

to put these in the locations as requested, but due to format limitations we will place them as close to the insert 

point as possible.

 Digital images as a minimum should be no lower than 

600 dpi for best results and in .JPEG or .TIF format in this 

case, ―bigger is better.‖ For any text or images used, 

please cite the resource used, and request copyright permission. 

 Articles submitted for consideration should be concise, 

in the active voice, and must be information that is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public, please 

see your local chain of command and public affairs office 

on criteria and review. 

 At the end of the article we include a short biography, 

including your full name, rank, current unit, and job title; a 

list of your past assignments, experience, email address, 

and telephone number. If you would like to refrain from 

releasing this information, we will respect your wishes and 

will not print applicable information.

 Please call or email us for additional details or clarifications. The editor retains the right to edit and select submissions to publish. 

In the future we will organize and list all previous NBC Reports and CWMD Journals so our readership can review 

these publications.

Disclaimer

 Occasionally we receive articles that may be controversial and as such, the views expressed are strictly those of 

the authors, not the Department of Defense (DoD) or its 

elements. The CWMD Journal’s content does not necessarily reflect the U.S. Army’s position and does not supersede information in other official Army publications.

Distribution

 The CWMD Journal is normally distributed to U.S. 

Army organizations and activities with CBRNE related missions to include all combat and materiel developers, units 

with chemical and nuclear surety programs, and FA52 

officers. 

 USANCA normally produces the CWMD Journal in 

printed and electronic format, however this issue is electronic only. Future issues may possibly be electronic only 

due to rising publishing and mailing costs. 

 We have electronic issues on USANCA’s Army’s Combating WMD Information Portal (ACIP) currently hosted on 

the Army’s Knowledge Online (AKO). Please see the 

Army CWMD Information Portal (ACIP) article in this issue 

for further information.

 Simultaneously, the CWMD Journal is available at an 

unrestricted alternate website courtesy of the Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information 

Analysis Center (CBRNIAC). This website has a wealth of 

subjects and hosts our current and previous issues at the 

following link:

https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil/Products/Links/

KeyDocs/Pages/USANCA.aspx

 Although this is the last Journal that I will perform the 

Graphics and Layout assignment, I will continue as the 

Editor and provide continuity for a future replacement. I 

have certainly enjoyed working the technical aspects of 

the Journal publishing process.

If you would like to contact USANCA please e-mail or 

write to us at our new address.

Mailing:

Director, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

ATTN: MONA-CWO

5915 16th Street, Bldg 238

Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

Telephone:

703-806-7858, DSN 656-7858, Fax 703-806-7900

E-mail: 

USANCA2@conus.army.mil

Subject line: ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal followed by 

your subject that you would like to discuss.
67 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5

Combating WMD Resource Page 

Army Combating WMD

Information Portal (ACIP)

The Army Combating WMD Information Portal 

(ACIP) is a USANCA sponsored web-based 

Combating WMD information resource for the 

Army Combating WMD community planning. The 

ACIP is the gateway to information and resources on Combating WMD information and is 

currently located on NIPR AKO USANCA Home 

Page. It is a prototype being developed on the 

unclassified network and will transition to the 

classified SIPR network as it matures. From 

AKO, search for USANCA. On the USANCA 

Home Page find the Army CMWD Information 

Portal (ACIP) and click ―Open web site in a separate browser window‖ and open the ACIP to give 

it a trial run. The ACIP is being built to support 

you, the CWMD planner. Provide suggestions 

and comments regarding content and appearance to Mr. Gerald Barrington. His e-mail address is gerald.barrington@us.army.mil. 

U.S. Nuclear Policy

This course explains the U.S. policy and its history; reviews NATO policy; discusses nuclear 

deterrence: theory, principles, and implications; 

discusses instruments of national power and implications for nuclear weapons; reviews nuclear 

surety and intelligence; discusses nuclear treaties and arms control.

This course is taught at the

Defense Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS)

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Email: DNWS@abq.dtra.mil

Fax (505) 846-9168 or DSN 246-9168

Online Registration:

https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil/StudentArea/Login.asp 

Theater Nuclear Operations Course 

(TNOC)

TNOC is the only course offered by a Department of Defense organization that provides training for planners, support staff, targeteers, and staff nuclear planners for joint operations and targeting. The course provides overview of nuclear weapon design, capabilities and effects to include U.S. nuclear policy, and joint nuclear 

doctrine. TNOC meets U.S. Army qualification requirements for the 

additional skill identifier 5H. The course number is DNWS-R013 

(TNOC). Call DNWS at (505) 846-5666 or DSN 246-5666 for quotas and registration information.

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer Course 

(NCP52)

NCP52 is the Functional Area 52 qualifying course. Initial priority is 

given to officers TDY enroute to a FA52 assignment or currently 

serving in a FA52 position. There is limited availability outside of 

the FA52 community. Please call the FA52 Proponent Manager at 

(703) 806-7866 to inquire on available seats.

Combating WMD Courses

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency hosts two Combating WMD 

courses, the Introduction to Combating WMD and Advanced Combating WMD. 

The introductory course provides an overview of U.S. Government 

and Department of Defense strategy and policy relating to Combating WMD and instruction is focused around the three pillars of 

Combating WMD and the eight military mission areas. 

The advanced course applies aspects of the Joint Operation Planning Process to Combating WMD related plans and operations. Both courses are taught using a combination of instructor-led 

modules and practical tabletop exercises. 

For more information on course dates and registration information, 

visit the Defense Nuclear Weapons School’s website https://

dnws.abq.dtra.mil. Mobile Training Teams are available upon 

request.

Pandemic Influenza Overview

This class describes influenza types, variations, and effects, and 

identifies worldwide threats from pandemic influenza. The course 

examines U.S. strategy to combat the spread of pandemic influenza, identifies organization and responsibilities to implement countermeasures to pandemic influenza.

Identifies DOD plans and capabilities to respond to pandemic influenza by examining supporting technologies for detection, surveillance, protection, and mitigation of pandemic influenza.

This is a distance learning course, to register go to the Defense 

Nuclear Weapons School at: https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil 

Past Issues Available Online!

USANCA is partnering with Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information 

Analysis Center (CBRNIAC) to bring you the 

latest Journal in electronic format as well as 

some previous issues of The NBC Report. 

https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil/Products/

Links/KeyDocs/Pages/USANCA.aspx
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 5 68

Shot "Frigate Bird" of Operation Dominic I on 6 May 1962

Seen through the periscope of USS Carbonero (SS-337), submerged 25 miles from the aim point, 

this graphic illustration shows Frigate Bird’s mushroom-shaped cloud boiling skyward from its 

original burst altitude of 11,000 feet. The range clock at the upper right indicates 1433, the local 

time at the aim point was one hour earlier. The Frigate Bird test was a Submarine Force demonstration, featuring a Polaris A-1 missile fired from USS Ethan Allan (SSBN-608). The Frigate Bird 

test remains the only end-to-end system test of a strategic nuclear missile, from launch to detonation – ever carried out by either side during the Cold War. Photo U.S. Navy