Filed 5/11/22 P. v. Simpson CA4/1

Opinion following rehearing

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

OPINION ON REHEARING

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

TEVINE TAJ SIMPSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

D079474

(Super. Ct. No. C1653732)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 

Socrates Peter Manoukian, Judge. Dismissed.

Lori A. Quick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant. 

Xavier Becerra, Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorney 

General, Catherine A. Rivlin and Bruce M. Slavin, Deputy Attorneys 

General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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As part of a plea bargain, Tevine Taj Simpson agreed to plead no 

contest to one count of using personal identifying information without 

authorization (Pen. Code,1 § 530.5, subd. (a)), in exchange for receiving a 16-

month lower-term sentence, to be served locally and with no postrelease 

supervision. But in December 2019, after Simpson repeatedly failed to 

appear in court, the trial court exercised the Cruz2 waiver incorporated in the 

plea bargain and sentenced Simpson to a three-year upper-term sentence 

(still to be served locally and without postrelease supervision). 

On appeal, Simpson challenges only the trial court’s imposition of the 

upper-term sentence. As we will explain, however, Simpson’s appeal is moot 

because he fully served his sentence as of May 2021, is not subject to 

postrelease supervision, and has not identified any ground on which we 

should exercise our discretion to entertain a moot appeal. Accordingly, we 

will dismiss the appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Trial Court Proceedings

In 2018, Simpson entered into a plea bargain under which he pleaded 

no contest to a single felony count of using personal identifying information 

without authorization (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), which carries a potential sentence 

of 16 months, two years, or three years (§§ 530.5, subd. (a), 1170, subd. 

(h)(1)). Under the plea bargain, Simpson would receive a 16-month sentence 

to be served in county jail, with no postrelease supervision. The deal also 

included a Cruz waiver that would allow the court to impose a longer 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 (Cruz).
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sentence if Simpson failed to appear for future court dates without 

reasonable justification. 

In April 2018, the court entered Simpson’s plea and ordered him to 

return in August 2018 for sentencing. Simpson failed to appear in August 

2018 and on several later occasions. In November 2019, he was apprehended 

in Georgia and extradited to California. 

On December 20, 2019, the trial court sentenced Simpson to the upper 

term of three years, to be served in county jail. The court credited Simpson 

with 80 days of presentence custody credits, and specified that “[u]pon 

[Simpson’s] release from custody, there will be no further supervision.” 

Appeal

In February 2020, Simpson filed a notice of appeal in the Court of 

Appeal for the Sixth District. The appeal was fully briefed in November 

2020. 

In September 2021, the Supreme Court transferred Simpson’s appeal to 

this court. 

On March 21, 2022, we issued a nonpublished opinion affirming 

Simpson’s sentence. 

Petition for Rehearing

On April 5, 2022, Simpson filed a petition for rehearing. He argued 

rehearing was necessary so that we could remand for resentencing in light of 

changes in the law that took effect January 1, 2022. We ordered the Attorney 

General to respond to the petition. 

On April 15, the Attorney General filed a response, arguing the appeal 

should be dismissed as moot because Simpson was released from custody in 

May 2021 “and has fully served his sentence.” The Attorney General stated 
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he had requested and was awaiting receipt of documentation confirming this

claim. 

On April 18—two days before our opinion would become final—we 

granted Simpson’s petition for rehearing. We ordered the Attorney General 

to “submit evidence substantiating its claim that [Simpson] has served his 

entire sentence.” And we ordered Simpson to submit a letter brief 

“addressing whether this appeal is moot in light of [the Attorney General]’s 

claim that [Simpson] has served his entire sentence.” 

Supplemental Submissions

On April 29, the Attorney General submitted a report from the County 

of Santa Clara Department of Corrections that stated Simpson “was released 

to the Custodial Alternative Supervision Program” on March 9, 2021, “with a 

scheduled release date of” May 4, 2021. 

Also on April 29, Simpson submitted a letter brief arguing the appeal is 

not moot. Simpson maintained that, even though he is no longer in physical 

custody, he is still subject to postrelease supervision, the duration of which 

could be shortened by a determination that the trial court erred in imposing 

the upper-term sentence. Simpson’s appellate counsel asserted in the 

submission that, “[b]ecause [Simpson] lives in Los Angeles County, it is that 

county that is supervising him.” The submission included a photograph of a 

form from the County of Los Angeles Probation Department that indicated 

Simpson is subject to probation in a different case. Simpson represented that 

calls by his appellate counsel to the probation department to secure 

additional documentation “have not been returned or even acknowledged.” 
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Motion to Withdraw Petition for Rehearing

On May 4, 2022—the apparent anniversary of Simpson’s release from 

custody—Simpson filed a motion to withdraw his petition for rehearing and 

subsequent letter brief. 

In a supporting declaration, Simpson’s appellate counsel stated that

when she filed the petition for rehearing, it was her “[mis]understanding that 

because [Simpson] lives in Los Angles County, supervision for [this] case . . . 

had been transferred there.” She explained trial counsel “was unable to 

give . . . any information on the current status of the case,” and calls to the 

Los Angeles County Probation Department “were never returned.” 

Counsel advised that on May 2, the Deputy Attorney General handling 

this appeal advised her “he had finally been able to contact probation 

departments for both Santa Clara and Los Angeles Counties and that 

[Simpson]’s sentence in [this case] had been served in full” and “[h]e was not 

subject to community supervision.” 

Accordingly, Simpson requested “permission to withdraw the petition 

for rehearing and subsequent letter brief on the ground that the issue raised 

therein is moot.” Simpson’s counsel represented that the Attorney General 

“has no objection” to the requested relief. 

Simpson did not address the Attorney General’s contention that the 

appeal, as a whole, should be dismissed as moot.

DISCUSSION

I. This Appeal is Moot

In opposing Simpson’s petition for rehearing, the Attorney General 

argued this appeal should be dismissed as moot because we cannot grant 

effective relief inasmuch as Simpson has fully served his sentence and is not 

subject to further supervision. (See People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 
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645 (DeLeon) [where the appellant has completed his sentence and is no 

longer subject to postrelease supervision, the “appeal is technically moot 

because a reviewing court’s resolution of the issues could offer no relief 

regarding the time he spent in custody or the parole term that has already 

terminated”]; Cucamongans United for Reasonable Expansion v. City of 

Rancho Cucamonga (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 473, 479 [“ ‘[A]n appeal should be 

dismissed as moot when the occurrence of events renders it impossible for the 

appellate court to grant appellant any effective relief.’ ”].)

Initially, Simpson argued the appeal is not moot because we could 

grant effective relief by remanding for resentencing, which could result in a 

shorter sentence that would also shorten the remaining period of postrelease 

supervision. However, Simpson has since acknowledged he was not subject 

to postrelease supervision in this case. Thus, he has not identified any 

effective relief we can grant. 

Nor has Simpson identified any issue in this case that is a matter of 

continuing public interest that is likely to recur yet evade appellate review. 

(See DeLeon, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 646.) Thus, we decline to exercise our 

discretion to entertain a technically moot appeal. (Ibid.)

Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal as moot.

II. Motion to Withdraw

Because we are dismissing this appeal as moot, we similarly deny as 

moot Simpson’s motion to withdraw his petition for rehearing and 

supplemental letter brief.

This appeal should serve as a cautionary tale for all appellate counsel 

to learn and advise the courts of the custodial status of appellants who are 

appealing issues relating only to their sentences. The failure to do so here 

has wasted hours of scarce judicial resources on an appeal that was moot 
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when it was transferred to this court, when we filed our original opinion, and 

when Simpson filed his petition for rehearing.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.