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Combating WMD 

5 JTF-Elimination Integration and Combined 

Elimination Team Training in the Republic of 

Korea 

 By LTC John C. Barber 

10 A Call for a National WMD JIPOE Process: 

 Getting Back to Fundamentals 

 By LTC Nicholas Wager, PhD and 

 MAJ Samuel J. Willmon 

19 There Is No “E” in Combating WMD 

By Al Mauroni 

	

 	



International 

37 Fleeing the NEST 

By Andy Oppenheimer 

42 Chemical Brothers 

By John Eldridge 

Science and Technology 

26 The Nuclear Science and Engineering 

 Research Center. A Research Partnership 

 Between the Defense Threat Reduction 

 Agency and the United States Military 

 Academy 

By LTC Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D., 

MAJ Robert F. Schlicht, and 

COL(R) Brian E. Moretti, Ph.D. 

31 Chemical Weapons Production in Russia is 

 Closer to Being a ‘Cold’ Idea 

By MAJ Adam S. Talkington 

33 Dosimetry Needs and Challenges for 

 Active Interrogation Systems 

By MAJ Michael P. Shannon and 

Dr. Nolan E. Hertel 

36 Last Call for Professional Engineering 

 Licensure? 

By LTC Nik Putnam, PG 

 

42

37
From The Director 

1 USANCA Update

By Mr. Peter Bechtel 

 

3 USANCA Breaks Ground 

 on New Facility at 

Fort Belvoir 

By LTC Dirk Plante, 

LTC Brooks, and 

CW5 Gomes, Photographer 

 

Do You Know...

25 DARPA Urban Grand 

Challenge 2007 has a winner! 

By Mr. Robert Pfeffer 

46 Combating 

WMD Resources 

 

COLUMNS 

	





	



Published by the 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 

(USANCA) 

Director 

Mr. Peter Bechtel 

Managing Editor 

MAJ Andrew Pache 

Assistant Editor 

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes 

Editorial Board 

 Mr. Joseph Nellis, LTC John Cuellar 

 and MAJ Andrew Pache 

Design/Layout 

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United 

States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are 

those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal’s content does not necessarily reflect the US Army’s position 

and does not supersede information in other official Army publications. 

Distribution: US Army organizations and activities with CBRN-related missions, 

to include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear 

surety programs, to each FA52 officer, and to Army attachés. The Secretary of 

the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the 

transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of 

funds for printing this publication have been approved by HQ, TRADOC, 12 Nov 

98, IAW Army Regulation 25-30. 

Article Submission: We welcome articles from all US Government agencies and 

academia involved with CBRN matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Submit articles in Microsoft Word and include photographs, graphs, tables, etc. as 

separate files, please call or email us for complete details. The editor retains the 

right to edit and select which submissions to print. 

Mailing Address: Director, US Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency ATTN: MONACWO, Suite 101, Springfield, VA 22150-3164. 

Telephone: 703-806-7855, DSN 656-7855, fax 703-806-7900 

Electronic Mail: dcsg3usanca2@conus.army.mil Subject line: ATTN: Editor, 

CWMD Journal 

31

5
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 



FROM THE DIRECTOR 

USANCA Update 

Mr. Peter Bechtel, Director 

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

1 

he Army continues to sustain, prepare, reset, and 

transform to meet requirements in a complex and 

dynamic environment. Key to this effort is integration of Combating WMD strategy into our Army both operationally and institutionally. Concurrently, the Army 

must ensure these activities are synchronized with those 

of our joint partners and across the interagency. The US 

Army CBRN School is an example of not only recognition 

of the environment, but a necessary step in transforming 

to meet new challenges. Activities such as adding CWMD 

instruction in the US Army War College distance learning 

curriculum, a continued capability increase in the 20th Support Command (CBRNE), and Army senior level participation in strategic steering groups all convey a consistent 

and comprehensive transition of Army CWMD capability in 

line with the Army transformation as a whole. 

 A significant event was the February 2008 ground 

breaking for the new USANCA facility. A simple action in 

its own, but one which marks continued transition and increased capability. Even though ground breaking ceremonies are usually low key, participation by Army Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Operations LTG James Thurman, USSTRATCOM Center for CWMD Deputy Director RADM William P. Loeffler, and Los Alamos National Laboratory National Security Office Dr. Patrice Stevens demonstrated 

the importance of continued capability improvement 

marked by joint teaming. It also demonstrated the crucial 

marriage between the technical and the operational with 

CWMD in the persistent conflict. Fort Belvoir estimates 

Spring 2009 as the occupation date for the renovated facility which will include conferencing support, enhanced IT 

connectivity, and the security and support which comes 

with a Fort Belvoir location. 

Current Activities 

 Our Army participation in delegations to the NATO 

Joint Capability Group on Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence (JCGCBRN) and the CBRN Defence Operations Working Group (CBRNWG) are heavily 

influencing (by emphasizing a US DOTMLPF approach to 

capabilities development) both groups' transition to capability-based business practices from their respective historic material-based and doctrine-based approaches. This 

transition will enhance the operational relevance of 

JCGCBRN's and CBRNWG's program of work leading to 

improved CBRN defense capability during coalition operations. 

 We are leading the JCGCBRN Scenario Team of Experts (ToE) charged with establishing a base-line set of 

operational CBRN scenarios to support capability development studies conducted across NATO and Australian, British, Canadian, American (ABCA) Armies forums. The ToE 

is currently collecting existing NATO and national-level 

CBRN scenarios for consideration for inclusion in a recommended scenario set that the ToE will present to the 

JCGCBRN in September 2008. 

 The nuclear Weapons Effects Strategic Collaborations 

(WESC), most recently hosted by USANCA Analysis 

Branch in February 2008, is identifying user capabilities 

and prioritizing requirements for nuclear weapons effects 

research and development. The WESC is the forum 

Mr. Peter Bechtel 

Director 

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 2

through which US/UK national requirements in nuclear 

weapons effects can be discussed and the potential for 

collaborative programs of mutual benefit explored. The 

WESC assembles the community of nuclear weapons effects managers, users and developers to share information on technologies, gaps and plans. The Principals consists of representatives from STRATCOM, DTRA, NNSA, 

and UK. 

 Internal to the Army, the TRADOC development of the 

Army Combating WMD Concept Capability Plan in parallel 

with USSTRATCOM development of the Combating WMD 

Joint Capability Document will serve to operationalize 

CWMD strategy and inform future capability development. 

We continue to assist the Assistant to the Secretary of 

Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs 

in the development of DoDI 3150.aa – CBRN Survivability 

Program and supporting the Electromagnetic Environmental Effects (E3) community in developing DoDI 

3222.cc – E3 Program while coordinating drafting efforts 

between the CBRN and E3 communities to ensure EMP 

Survivability is adequately addressed in both DoDI 

3150.aa and DoDI 3222.cc. 

 From a planning and operations perspective, Army efforts to integrate CWMD strategy continue to realize success. Coordinated efforts on the part of planners in ARNORTH and AMC will result in a full integration of Chemical Accident Incident Response Assistance (CAIRA) procedures with response to national emergency under the 

USNORTHCOM framework which is not only a reflection 

of operational integration but also marks continued maturation of USNORTHCOM in a post 9-11 environment. As 

the Department of Defense refines strategic guidance coupling security cooperation priorities with contingency guidance we must take advantage of opportunities for coordination between current operations and future operations 

as well as theater cooperation and contingency plans. 

This coupling effect is already well known with the CWMD 

community. The linkages between the pillars, as described in the National Strategy, tie together all interagency activities from nonproliferation to counterproliferation to consequence management. CBRN planners must 

seek opportunities to accomplish CWMD strategy in all 

operations recognizing what effects are created by a given 

action be it in a ‘build partner capacity’ or ‘deter/dissuade’ 

setting. 

 Our Army must continue to integrate CWMD Strategy 

into its operational activities. Identification of Army Component requirements and incorporation of those requirements into strategic fora is the method by which we sustain and improve current activity and inform future capability development. 

 Thanks to all of you for your continued efforts toward 

this end. 

 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 2
3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

ork on the future home of 

the United States Army 

Nuclear & Combating 

WMD Agency (USANCA) officially 

kicked off with the Ground Breaking 

Ceremony on 21 February 2008. The 

ceremony was held at Building 238, 

Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Over the years 

the building had been home to the 

installation’s Thrift Shop, Commissary 

and Class VI store. In less than one 

year Building 238 will re-open for 

business as the new home of the 

Army’s Combating WMD Field Operating Agency. 

 The official party for the ceremony 

consisted of Lieutenant General 

James D. Thurman, the Army Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7; Mr. Peter 

Bechtel, Director USANCA; and Colonel Brian Groft, Deputy Director, 

USANCA. Of extreme importantance, LTG Thurman echoed the 

threats from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear devices, materials, and explosives that could cause 

immense danger to facilities, Soldiers, sailors, airman, and marines. 

“Today, more than ever, we must be 

on point. The world is watching us, 

and we must get the job done.” 

 Several VIPs from the Combating 

WMD community and the Fort Belvoir 

Garrison attended the ceremony, including Rear Admiral William Loeffler 

(STRACOM Center for Combating 

WMD), Dr. Patrice Stevens (Los Alamos National Laboratory), and Command Sergeant Major Tracey Anbiya 

(Fort Belvoir Garrison Command 

Sergeant Major). 

 As this is a renovation of an existing building, the actual “ground breaking” involved a sledgehammer to begin the demolition of the interior of the 

building. As guests looked on, many 

envious, the official party donned 

hard hats and eye protection before 

taking their turn at the wall. LTG 

Thurman, Mr. Bechtel, and COL Groft 

each took turns swinging the 

“ceremonial” five-pound sledgehammer into the drywall of one of the 

rooms. 

 After the ceremony, guests were 

invited to stay for refreshments, and 

review the display boards depicting 

the layout for the new facility, 

USANCA’s historical lineage, and the 

capabilities of our reorganized 

agency. 

New Facility 

 Building 238 is located on 16th 

Street, on the South Post of Fort Belvoir. It will undergo an extensive 

renovation program to prepare a 

15,500 square foot state-of-the-art 

facility as the future home of 

USANCA. Plans call for the renovation to be completed in early 2009, 

with a projected move-in occurring in 

March 2009. The new office will include conferencing areas, classified 

storage and computing rooms, a 

workshop and exercise support facility, and executive suites, all furnished 

with modern furniture and information 

technology equipment. USANCA will 

occupy most of the building, and our 

neighbor will be the United States 

Army Manpower Analysis Agency 

(USAMAA), currently located elsewhere on Fort Belvoir. 

History 

 Since 1977, USANCA has been 

headquartered on the Engineer Proving Ground area of Fort Belvoir in 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 3

USANCA Breaks Ground on New Facility at 

Fort Belvoir 

LTC Dirk Plante, USANCA 

LTC Andrae Brooks, USANCA 

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes, USANCA (Photographer) 

Blueprint of USANCA’s nearly 15,500 square foot state of-the-art facility. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 4

Springfield, Virginia. The agency 

traces its lineage to the Office of Special Weapons Development (OSWD), 

established at Fort Bliss, Texas in 

1952. Over the years OSWD went 

through many transformations to become the U.S Army Nuclear Group, 

then the Combat Developments Command Nuclear Agency, and finally the 

United States Army Nuclear Agency 

(USANA). In 1975, USANA moved to 

Fort Belvoir. Following a merger with 

the Nuclear Weapon System Safety 

Committee, and the U.S. Army 

Chemical and Nuclear Surety Group, 

the agency became the U.S. Army 

Nuclear and Chemical Agency 

(USANCA) in 1977. 

Capabilities 

 On 1 October 2006, USANCA became the Combating WMD Field Operating Agency of the Army G-3/5/7, 

with the mission to provide nuclear 

and Combating WMD planning and 

execution expertise for the implementation of Army CWMD strategy and 

policy at the corps level and above in 

order that the Army meet joint operational requirements in achieving national objectives to combat WMD. 

Operational capabilities of the agency 

include modeling and simulation support to the Army, CWMD Planning 

Assistance Teams to the Army Service Component Commands, augmentation of Army units with specialized missions, international and treaty 

support, and analysis capabilities in 

support of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. 

The completion of the state-of-the-art 

facility will increase the agency’s operational capabilities, and allow the 

agency to provide world-class support 

during exercises and contingencies of 

the Army Staff and commands. 

LTC Dirk Plante is a Nuclear & Counterproliferation Officer in the CWMD Analysis Branch at USANCA. He has a B.S. in 

Physics from Texas Christian University, 

and a M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from 

the Air Force Institute of Technology. His 

previous FA52 assignment was as a Nuclear Weapons Effects Officer at DTRA. 

His email address is 

dirk-plante@us.army.mil. 

LTC Andrae Brooks is a Chemical Officer 

in the CWMD Analysis Branch at 

USANCA. He has a B.S. in Geology from 

University of Kentucky, and a M.S. in Environmental Engineering from Colorado 

School of Mines. He was previously assigned as the Corps Chemical Officer with 

Headquarters, Allied Rapid Reaction 

Corps (HQ ARRC), in the Joint HQ, 

Rheindahlen, Germany. 

His email address Is 

andrae.brooks@us.army.mil. 

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes is a Nuclear 

Targeting Officer in the CWMD 

Training Plans and Operations at 

USANCA. He was previously assigned 

as the MOS 131A Targeting Technician 

Program Manager, Fort Sill, OK. He is 

also a graduate of the Joint Targeting 

School, Dam Neck, VA. His email 

address is 

stephen.gomes@us.army.mil. 

LTG Thurman, Mr. Bechtel and COL Groft prepare to make history. 

Mr. Bechtel describes new features of the building to LTG Thurman. 
5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 



JTF-Elimination Integration and Combined 

Elimination Team Training 

in the Republic of Korea 

LTC John C. Barber 

Chief, CWMD Plans for United States Forces Korea (USFK) 

COMBATING WMD 

uring Exercise Ulchi Focus 

Lens (UFL) ‘07, the Army’s 

20th Support Command 

Headquarters and USSTRATCOM’s 

Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) strategically deployed to 

the Republic of Korea (ROK) and 

formed a Joint Task Force for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 

elimination operations (JTF-E) in support of Combined Forces Command 

(CFC). During this same period (Aug 

2007), two WMD Joint Response 

Teams from the 110th Technical Escort Battalion deployed to the ROK 

and led two weeks of combined sensitive site exploitation training with 

teams from the ROK Chemical Special Forces Battalion, ROK NBC Defense Command. 

 The National Military Strategy to 

Combat WMD (NMS-CWMD) defines 

WMD Elimination as “military operations to systematically locate, characterize, secure, disable, and/or destroy 

a state or non-state actor’s WMD programs and related capabilities in hostile or uncertain environments.” More 

specifically, elimination operations 

will: 

• Prevent the looting or capture of WMD and related materials.

• Render harmless or destroy weapons, material, 

agents, and delivery systems 

that pose an immediate or 

direct threat

• For intelligence purposes, 

exploit program experts, 

documents, and other media 

to prevent further WMD proliferation or regeneration.

Beginning in 2005, CFC and United 

States Forces Korea (USFK) addressed the need to train with a WMD 

Elimination Task Force in ST 9.0 in 

both its CMETL and JMETL. Based 

on the potentially large number of 

WMD sites in North Korea, CFC 

ground components lack the specialized teams, equipment, and expertise 

to exploit these sites. In order to fully 

achieve the standards, CFC needed 

to successfully integrate a JTF for 

WMD Elimination during an annual 

exercise, develop a concept of operations (CONOPS), and incorporate the 

JTF-E into its plans. 

 The February, 2006 Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR)directed the 

following: “Expand the Army’s 20th

Support Command (CBRNE) capabilities to enable it to serve as a Joint 

Task Force capable of rapid deployment to command and control WMD 

Elimination and site exploitation missions by September 2007”. The JTF 

Elimination is not a standing JTF. 

Upon receipt of a Combatant Command (COCOM) Request for Forces 

(RFF) at USJFCOM, elements of the 

20th SUPCOM and the Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) – 

an element from USSTRATCOM, as 

well as other joint and interagency 

“plugs” come together to form the JTF 

Elimination headquarters. Although 

the subordinate units of the JTF 

Elimination are predominantly Army, 

some come from specialized assets 

across the services and the interagency. 

GEN Bell 

(CDR, UNC/CFC/

USFK): 

“We all learned 

enormously 

together, and I 

can clearly 

endorse an Initial 

Operational 

Capability of this 

outfit” 

 During the plenary session of the 

Counterproliferation Working Group 

(CPWG) in February 2006, the ROK 

Ministry of National Defense and 

United States Office of the Secretary 

of Defense for Counterproliferation 

Policy began discussing the need for 

not only the integration of a JTF-E 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 6

into CFC, but also the need for the 

ROK to develop their own capabilities 

to command and control elimination 

operations as well as specialized 

teams to conduct sensitive site exploitation (SSE). As a direct result of 

the CPWG, CFC initiated plans to 

begin two major partnership building 

activities between the US and the 

ROK. The first initiative involved annual Combined WMD sensitive site 

exploitation (SSE) team training, and 

the second involved the integration of 

the JTF-E into CFC during UFL 07. 

Combined WMD Sensitive Site 

Exploitation (SSE) Team Training 

 For the team training, the Defense 

Threat Reduction Agency provided 

funding to send 15 ROK Soldiers 

from ROK NBC Defense Command’s 

Chemical Special Forces Battalion to 

Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), 

Maryland to train with the 22d Chemical Battalion (Technical Escort). In 

September 06, the ROK Soldiers accompanied by the CFC CWMD Plans 

Branch traveled to APG and trained 

with the 22d CM BN for two weeks. 

This training marked the beginning of 

an ongoing effort between the US 

and ROK to build ROK capabilities to 

conduct highly technical SSE missions. 

 The second iteration of combined 

SSE training occurred in August 2007 

in conjunction with exercise UFL ‘07. 

For this iteration, two US Joint Response Teams from the 110th Chemical Battalion (Technical Escort) deployed from Fort Lewis, WA to the 

ROK to train with the ROK Chemical 

Special Forces Battalion. In coordination with the 50th ROK Infantry Division, ROK NBC Defense Command 

hosted the training at an urban warfare training site, which replicated a 

small North Korean village. After a 

week of classes and hands on training, the ROK and US Soldiers formed 

combined SSE teams for the second 

week. During the second week, a 

typical scenario included: the use of 

cutting torches and saws to enter a 

facility; the use of the (PINS) to conduct non intrusive chemical ordnance 

assessment to characterize unexploded chemical munitions; and a 

detailed personnel decontamination 

following each mission. 

 The ROK and the US plan to continue this annual training alternating 

the location between the ROK and 

the US. The goal is to build 12 ROK 

Joint Response Teams with capabilities similar to those found in the US 

technical escort battalions, and capable of conducting SSE missions. 

JTF-Elimination Integration into 

CFC during UFL ‘07 

 

 Immediately following the QDR in 

February 2006, planners from CFC 

and the 20th SC (CBRNE) began discussing the possibility of using UFL 

‘07 to conduct the JTF-E Initial Operational Capability (IOC) validation 

exercise. In December 2006, planners from the 20th SC (CBRNE) attended CFC’s initial planning conference for UFL ‘07 and validated that 

the UFL scenario was the perfect 

venue for their upcoming validation 

exercise. 

 During the UFL ‘07 mid planning 

conference in February 2007, the 

Breaching Operations- A Soldier from the 110th Chemical Battalion 

(Technical Escort) breaches the entrance to a suspected chemical weapons 

storage facility. 
7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

CFC CWMD Plans Branch and six 

planners from the 20th SC (CBRNE) 

hosted a JTF-E workshop to begin 

detailed planning and coordination 

across the CFC staff. The primary 

objectives were to develop the following: a concept of operations, C2 architecture, command relationships, 

scenario event lists, and intelligence 

summaries for North Korean WMD 

sites. In addition, they began planning all of the logistical support to 

include: strategic lift, transportation, 

work space for the operational Command Post (60 personnel) with appropriate communications, and operational work spaces within the CFC 

command post for 20th SC (CBRNE) 

Coordination Elements (12-15 personnel). 

 As action officer level planning 

and coordination continued throughout the spring, the plenary session of 

the ROK/US Counterproliferation 

Working Group (CPWG) met in 

Washington DC in May 2007. During 

this session, senior policy officials on 

both sides agreed to support JTF-E 

participation in UFL ‘07. They also 

agreed to continue the combined 

SSE training as well as building a 

ROK capability to command and control elimination operations. With the 

assurance that CFC was not out in 

front of US OSD or ROK MND policy, 

the UNC/CFC Commander approved 

the JTF-E’s participation in UFL ‘07 

based partly on the progress 

achieved through the CPWG. 

 In final preparation for participation 

in UFL ‘07, LTG(R) Ayres (UFL Senior Observer) and BG Wendel 

(Commander, 20th SC) came to Korea in June and facilitated a week 

long workshop with the CFC staff, 

USJFCOM, 20th SC (CBRNE), and 

the Joint Elimination Coordination 

Element (JECE) from the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating WMD 

(SCC). The primary objectives of the 

seminar were to inform the CFC staff 

of the JTF-E capabilities, agree upon 

the command relationship, develop a 

concept for integrating the coordination elements into the CFC staff as 

well as subordinate components, and 

develop a concept of operations for 

supporting ground components in 

SSE operations. 

LTG Peterson, Deputy Commander, USFORSCOM, speaks to BG Wendel, Commander, 20th Support Command 

(CBRNE), and Soldiers from the NBC Defense Command and the 110th Chemical Battalion (Technical Escort) following 

a combined ROK/US sensitive site exploitation mission. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 8

In August 2007, the 135 personnel 

from the 20th SC (CBRNE) along with 

30 personnel from the JECE deployed to the ROK and established a 

JTF-E under the operational control 

of CFC for exercise UFL ‘07. The 

JTF-E headquarters plugged into 

CFC using the CENTRIXS-K network 

and monitored updates to the CFC 

Commander via the click-to-meet features on the network. Coordination 

Elements (CE) from the JTF-E were 

located with the CFC C35 Future Operations Division, C35 CWMD Plans, 

C2, and Combined Unconventional 

Warfare Task Force (CUWTF). The 

click-to-meet capabilities allowed the 

JTF-E to conduct collaborative planning with these section/components 

throughout the exercise. Throughout 

the exercise, the JTF-E conducted 

deliberate planning for several chemical/biological WMD sites in North Korea. In addition, they worked with the 

C35 CWMD planners to develop a 

draft “Elimination Operations” tab for 

inclusion into the CWMD appendix to 

the CFC OPLAN. 

 With respect to security cooperation and partnership building, the JTF

-E headquarters hosted several observers from the ROK Ministry of National Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 

Korean Arms Verification Agency, 

and NBC Defense Command in order 

to help the ROK develop their own 

capability to command and control 

elimination operations. This effort was 

highlighted by BG Wendel’s invitation 

to BG Lee (Commander, ROK NBC 

Defense Command) and his staff to 

attend the JTF-E’s final draft presentation on the concept of operations for 

JTF-E support to CFC’s Ground 

Component Command. 

Conclusion 

 There is a conclusion from three 

separate perspectives: CFC/USFK, 

ROK, and 20th SC (CBRNE)/JECE 

(which come together to for the JTFE). From the CFC perspective, UFL 

‘07 provided the opportunity to train to 

standard IAW our CMETL/JMETL ST 

9.0, thus integrating a capability to 

command and control elimination operations and provide highly skilled 

SSE teams to the ground components to exploit North Korean WMD 

sites. 

LTG(R) Ayres: 

“I consider their 

participation in 

UFL to have been 

a complete 

success. 

JTF-E has 

developed an 

operational focus 

that is suitable 

for a command 

that is OPCON to 

a COCOM” 

Soldiers from the Republic of Korea's NBC Defense Command and the US 110th Chemical Battalion (Technical Escort) 

take a group photo following two weeks of combined sensitive site exploitation training in the Republic of Korea. 
9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

From the ROK perspective, both UFL 

‘07 and the combined team training 

greatly enhanced their effort to develop their own elimination operations 

capabilities. And finally, from the JTF

-E perspective, the exercise provided 

the 20th SC (CBRNE) with the opportunity to complete its IOC validation 

IAW the QDR, which directed IOC by 

September 2007. In closing, the following are significant quotes with respect to the JTF-E integration into 

CFC during UFL ‘07. 

LTC John C. Barber is the Chief, 

CWMD Plans for United States 

Forces Korea located in Yongsan, 

Seoul, Korea. He has a B.S. in Environmental Science from Eastern Kentucky University, a MPA in Public Administration and Environmental Resources from Jacksonville State University, and an MA in National Security and Strategic Studies from the 

Naval War College. He was previously assigned as the Executive Officer, 82d Chemical Battalion; Chief, 

Technical Training Department, U.S. 

Army CBRN School; and Brigade 

Chemical Officer, 6th Cavalry Brigade 

(AH-64). His email address is 

john.c.barber@korea.army.mil. 

Soldiers from the Republic of Korea's NBC Defense Command and the US 110th Chemical Battalion (Technical Escort) 

conduct decontamination operations following the exploitation of a chemical storage facility. 

9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 10

his article serves to rekindle 

the lost art of conducting Intelligence Preparation of the 

Battlespace (IPB) – now called Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) in current 

doctrine. While most of us can recall 

experiences with IPB from national 

training centers, in the age of concepts like capabilities-based planning, 

the adaptive planning cycle, and effects-based operations the applying 

the IPB process to the combating 

WMD (CWMD) problem set seemingly requires a leap of faith.1

 

 The fact remains that no national–

level, predictive, IPB-like analytical 

process exists that addresses the 

CWMD problem set. The absence of 

a reasoned IPB process and the predictive threat courses of action (COA) 

it would produce has caused strategic 

decision makers to make decisions 

based on “scenarios.” The scenarios 

presented for strategic-level decision 

making, devoid of the analysis of all 

available data, discipline, and reasoned consideration of the facts and 

assumptions, highlight the difference 

between a scenario and a finished, 

predictive, threat COA. In the face of 

the multitude of WMD scenarios that 

span the spectrum of potentiality and 

likelihood, in venues ranging from 

public perception and the media to 

the inner circles of the Department of 

Defense, the Executive Branch, and 

the senior leaders on Capitol Hill, the 

fundamental question remains – how 

likely are these scenarios? How well 

does our current scenario development process regarding WMD depict 

what we know, what we don’t know, 

and what we think about current and 

future threats? Further, without consensus throughout the IC on key 

WMD facts and assumptions, the 

proffered scenarios often serve as the 

opinion of a few, carry no weight, and 

fail to galvanize synchronized IA/DoD 

responses. 

 As the military’s CWMD planning 

efforts mature across the combatant 

command and geographic combatant 

command (here, abbreviated as COCOM and GCC, respectively) staff 

structures, one of the greatest challenges we face stems from our lack of 

understanding of the operational environment. In order to actively prosecute our CWMD campaigns, we must 

know where and how to apply strategic military activities and planning 

A Call for a National WMD JIPOE Process: 

Getting Back to Fundamentals 

LTC Nicholas Wager, PhD 

Joint Special Operations Command 

MAJ Samuel J. Willmon 

Joint Special Operations Command
11 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

efforts in the current and predicted 

operational environments. The arguments presented in this article demonstrate how to apply the IPB process to address this challenge. Further, this article provides the framework for recognizing the scope of the 

WMD problem set demands execution of the IPB process at the national 

level – with DOD and interagency (IA) 

partners working collaboratively and 

dynamically. 

 To help the CWMD community 

make this leap of faith, this article 

reviews the JIPOE concept, assesses 

the status of the CWMD community’s 

ability to synchronize efforts, addresses current shortfalls in the 

CWMD community, and presents a 

recommended solution based on IPB 

as the corner stone of a synchronized, national-level CWMD JIPOE 

process. 

What is JIPOE? 

 Stated most succinctly in JP 2-

01.3, “Joint intelligence preparation of 

the [Operational Environment 

(JIPOE)] is the analytical process 

used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint 

force commander’s (JFC’s) decision 

making process.” 2 JP 2-01.3 further 

declares that the JIPOE doctrine applies except when the commander 

has determined that exceptional circumstances exist. 3 This begs the 

question – which commander has 

determined (and explicitly stated) 

such exceptional circumstances apply 

to the WMD problem set and that the 

JIPOE process does not apply? 

More on the application of the JIPOE 

process to the WMD problem set follows, but first, a quick review of the 

process is in order. 

 Fundamental to understanding 

JIPOE process is the fact it is an evolutionary process and not a product. 

While the products that fall out of a 

JIPOE reflect the analysis at a singular point in time, the design of the 

process itself allows for continuous 

updates as the operational environment changes or additional information becomes available. The provision of predictive intelligence aimed 

at determining the adversary’s probable intent and most likely future 

COAs serves as the primary focus of 

the JIPOE process. In addition, JIPOE assists “JFCs and their staffs in 

achieving information superiority by 

identifying adversary centers of gravity (COGs), focusing intelligence collection at the right time and place, 

and assessing the effects of the battlespace environment on military operations.” 4

 The JIPOE process consists of the following four steps: 

- Step 1: Define the total battlespace 

 environment 

- Step 2: Describe the battlespace 

 effects 

- Step 3: Evaluate the enemy 

- Step 4: Determine and describe 

 probable adversary courses 

 of action 

 Although the responsibility for 

managing the JIPOE process falls on 

the Joint force intelligence directorate 

(J-2), “a full understanding of the operational environment typically will 

require cross-functional participation 

by other joint force staff elements and 

collaboration with various intelligence 

organizations, [other government 

agencies], and nongovernmental centers of excellence.” 5

 

 As staff officers engaged in the 

“Long War,” we must not view the 

JIPOE process as outlined above as 

a cold-war relic; rather, it requires us 

to seek modern methods of applying 

traditional doctrine. As staff officers, 

we must question the sources of information that are feeding current 

military decision making processes. 

No commander or staff officer could 

argue against the importance of understanding the threat’s decision cycle. “Identifying, assessing, and estimating the adversary’s centers of 

gravity, critical vulnerabilities, capabilities, limitations, intentions, most 

likely COA, and COA most dangerous 

to friendly forces and mission accomplishment” 6

 serve as keys to the 

threat mind set. The current problem, 

as it relates to CWMD, is that no JIPOE process exists and no DoD organization is willing and capable of 

accomplishing the task. 

How Does JIPOE Relate to the 

CWMD Problem Set? 

 The JIPOE process relates directly 

to the CWMD problem set. Doctrine 

currently describes how to translate 

the conventional JIPOE process and 

adapt it for stability operations “the 

intelligence operation must help to 

collect - then fuse - political, criminal, 

economic, linguistic, demographic, 

ethnic, psychological, and other information regarding conditions and 

forces that influence the society.” 7 

JIPOE applies to CWMD planning 

efforts in the identification of potential 

threat streams, resource allocation, 

and the development of friendly and 

threat COAs. Further, application of 

the JIPOE process reveals an additional paradigm shift required by the 

CWMD community that recognizes 

the counterterrorism and CWMD are 

not two distinct problem sets. We 

must view the CWMD problem as 

being network-based and approach it 

using a holistic methodology – identifying state and non-state actors 

(individuals, terrorist groups, and nongovernmental entities) in a comprehensive fashion, not as singular entities operating independent from one 

another. Only a limited set of pathways to a WMD capability (state or 

non-state) begin and end without 

some form of outside assistance 

(either witting or unwitting). The employment of a system-of-systems approach thru the JIPOE process is also 

grounded in doctrine: “Developing a 

systems view can promote a commonly shared understanding of the 

operational environment among 

members of the joint, interagency, 

and multinational team, thereby facilitating unified action.” 8

 

 Acknowledgement of the preceding arguments leads to the third, and 

equally important paradigm shift – 

WMD are weapon systems, not an 

amorphous or intangible means of 

prosecuting war. As tangible weapon 

systems, WMD have predictable templates for program development, materiel acquisition, weapons development, production, assembly, and employment. These templates for WMD 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 12

pathways serve the same purpose as 

the doctrinal templates in a traditional 

IPB. By themselves, these templates 

offer little insight into possible enemy 

intent. However, when tuned to the 

operational environment, they can 

serve as a powerful tool for predicting 

enemy intentions and capability. In 

this sense, the JIPOE process applies directly to CWMD operational 

and planning efforts. 

 Intelligence analysis drives our 

current operations and future planning efforts. JP 2.0 describes the 

intelligence cycle as having the following six elements: planning and 

direction, collection, processing and 

exploitation, analysis and production, 

dissemination and integration, with 

evaluation and feedback occurring 

continuously. 9 JIPOE “supports and 

is supported by each phase of the 

intelligence cycle,” 10 as shown in 

the figure above. 

 Under the current dynamics operating within the CWMD community, 

the JIPOE process does not exist. 

Therefore, drawing from Figure 1, we 

essentially have a five-cylinder engine attempting to operate with one of 

the cylinders mis-firing – the JIPOE 

initial feeds into the Planning & Direction phase of the intelligence cycle. 

In the current operating condition, 

execution of the ICP Development

and Collection Management functions 

relies on woefully scarce “confirmed 

reporting” without reasoned, predictive analysis injects from a JIPOE 

process. As a result, both the ICP 

and CM functions tend to provide either overly specific guidance 

(applicable to minute aspects of the 

problem set) or non-specific guidance 

(that fails to map to any portion of the 

problem set). The resulting collection 

and analysis effort is not focused 

against prioritized and target-able 

intelligence gaps. 

 It is worth noting that JP 2.0 describes JIPOE as “a systematic approach used by intelligence personnel

to analyze information about the battlespace environment and the adversary.” 11 Currently, the CWMD community does not apply the JIPOE 

methodology to the CWMD problem 

set. This leaves a host of questions 

unanswered: how do we determine 

the relative importance of and provide 

decision makers with perspective for 

WMD threat streams? – develop nonproliferation or counterproliferation 

options? – identify capability gaps 

and appropriate solutions? – develop 

adversary COA used to drive wargaming scenarios? – allocate our 

scarce CWMD resources? And all in 

the absence of strategic and operational understanding of the battlespace, what the threat is capable of 

doing, or how he might do it. 

Figure 1. JIPOE Interaction with the Intelligence Cycle. 
13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

Why Do We Need the WMD JIPOE 

Process? 

 To apply our strategic guidance 

and execute operational plans, COCOMs, their staff, and subordinate 

commanders must understand and 

visualize the who, what, when, where, 

and how an adversary might seek to 

achieve or deploy a WMD capability. 

It does not suffice to tell a COCOM a 

particular named terrorist group could 

employ Anthrax or that a homemade 

recipe for an agent will not work because they don’t have the westerncentric expertise or equipment. A list 

of WMD-related questions requiring 

answers to illuminate the problem set 

might include: who (individual names, 

cell, groups) is involved? – what type 

of agent is being prepared? – where 

is the materiel support coming from? 

– where is the agent being produced? 

– where will it be employed? – how is 

the agent being produced? – how will 

it be employed? The answers to 

these questions accomplish more in 

terms of arraying strategic assets to 

confirm/deny what we believe is occurring in the operational environment 

than generic statements about threat 

actors and WMD capabilities. 

 Current planning and organizational constructs do not establish the 

conditions for successful CWMD 

campaigns, let alone the synchronization of multiple campaigns. While 

some planners argue that the Adaptive Planning Cycle is too short, intelligence doctrine and guidance has 

replaced the traditional Intelligence 

Estimate with a Dynamic Threat Assessment (DTA). Further, the DTA 

and STRATCOM’s variant of the DTA 

fail to predict threat WMD COAs in a 

meaningful way. Compounding the 

issue, our capstone document for all 

things CWMD, JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, explains a host of nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and 

consequence management concepts 

but fails to mention any aspect of JIPOE or how to apply the CWMD concepts to predicted threat WMD COAs. 

12

 

 The Adaptive Planning Cycle begs 

for a continuous WMD JIPOE process. The aggressive timeline for plan 

development, approval, and review 

requires that the DTA or STRATCOM’s variant must adopt a comprehensive view of the problem set and 

offer predictive analysis to guide COCOM actions and decisions. Further, 

future versions of JP 3-40 must address WMD JIPOE process. CBRN 

subject matter expertise is scarce 

among COCOM/GCC staff and planning elements. This amounts to a 

severe capability gap. Appropriate 

resources and tools are required. We 

cannot expect COCOM and GCC 

staff members to tackle this global 

problem set on their own. 

 Within military channels, the WMD 

JIPOE process directly supports COCOM/GCC operational planning. 

WMD JIPOE products support the 

synchronization of intelligence collection and analysis efforts; provide the 

framework for a common, global picture of potential threat streams; and 

provide the context needed to identify 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 14

and/or distinguish potential adversary 

COAs. 

 To truly combat WMD, the WMD 

JIPOE process supports the holistic 

application of options from across the 

range of elements of national power 

(DIME – diplomatic, information, military, and economic). Many options 

for addressing potential WMD threats 

exist within diplomatic, information, 

and economic realms. Commanders 

and staff at all levels must understand 

and leverage these non-military 

CWMD options. Within the context of 

military options, WMD JIPOE products support the selection of the appropriate military mission (of the eight 

military mission areas) to address 

identified threats. Further, when executed correctly, the WMD JIPOE 

process could support the identification of capability gaps and the selection of appropriate solutions from 

across the DOTLMPF spectrum 

(doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities). 

 WMD JIPOE products support 

increased IA synchronization such as 

identifying areas requiring greater 

diplomatic effort to deter/dissuade 

state transfer of materiel, technology, 

and expertise. In terms of information, WMD JIPOE supports the development of national and IA strategic 

communication plans that promote 

nonproliferation themes and the building of partnership capacity to combat 

WMD (e.g.: PSI). A comprehensive 

WMD JIPOE will identify opportunities 

for direct engagement by other government agencies (OGA, e.g.: DOS 

and DOE support for increasing border and port security capabilities) and 

the means for implementing financial 

incentives and disincentives (e.g.: 

U.S. financial support for partner capacity-building programs, application 

of export controls, freezing of financial assets). A WMD JIPOE process 

is not only required by DoD, all USG 

agencies can effectively use the process to develop, and when necessary, 

employ comprehensive and interlinked CONOPS to defend our homeland and interests abroad. 

A Proposed WMD JPOE Model 

 The following elements serve as a 

general scheme for applying the JIPOE process to the CWMD problem 

set. 

Step 1: Define the battlespace environment. 

 As depicted in the outer ring of 

Figure 1. (page 12), an initial WMD 

JIPOE begins with an assembly of 

available data and by ascertaining the 

required assumptions. The most significant failure in the current planning 

environment that effectively inhibits 

the use of the JIPOE process is that 

we assume either the data does not 

exist or too much data exists. The 

second greatest hurdle to executing a 

WMD-based JIPOE is that in the majority of the CWMD planning efforts, 

critical assumptions are made in the 

absence of a coherent analysis of the 

available data. Subsequently, planners and decision makers enter into 

COA development/acceptance without all of the relevant facts (or arbitrated assumptions). 

 During a traditional JIPB process, 

the typical data sets (facts and assumptions) include: terrain/weather 

data, mobility corridors, key terrain, 

observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, weapon system 

specifications, avenues of approach, 

etc. In a similar manner, a WMDbased JIPOE seeks to follow a similar 

process in defining the battlespace 

environment. 

 Examples of pertinent data sets 

include the following: terrorist areas 
15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

of operation and areas of influence; 

terrorists known to (or suspected of) 

developing WMD capability; regions 

lacking state resolve (or capability) to 

counter Islamic extremism; locations 

and security of WMD stockpiles; locations of WMD components, precursors, and seed stock materials (and 

their associated security); locations of 

restricted and dual-use materiel or 

equipment stockpiles and distributors; 

locations providing physical, financial, 

religious, educational, and intellectual 

safe haven; locations of smuggling 

networks capable of trafficking WMDrelated materiel or finished weapons; 

the status of CBRN detection capabilities at land/sea/air points of entry 

(border crossing points, ports, and air 

hubs) worldwide; and the status of 

partner capacity to interdict WMDrelated activity. 

Step 2: Describe the battlespace’s 

effects (friendly and adversary operations). 

 Based on the assembly of the data 

and assumptions made during Step 

1, in a traditional JIPB, the description 

of the battlespace’s effects begins 

with an analysis of the battlespace 

environment. Just as the traditional 

JIPB analysis supports the development of a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO), the WMD version of a MCOO will highlight risk areas associated with the acquisition, 

development, or activity surrounding 

WMD. These risk areas represent 

the convergence of: sources of WMD 

materiel, expertise, or finished weapons; routes suitable for trafficking materiel or expertise; networks capable 

of facilitating WMD development; safe 

havens that could facilitate the development of WMD; and information domains suitable for providing access to 

WMD-related materials or knowledge 

(or capable of supporting clandestine 

collaboration among groups or individuals). 

Step 3: Evaluate the adversary. 

 In the WMD JIPOE, this step differs very little from the traditional 

JIPB: identify adversary COG; update 

or create adversary models; determine the current adversary situation; 

and identify adversary capabilities. 

Noted exceptions include the additional burden of identifying the critical 

vulnerabilities associated with the 

adversary’s COG and the identification of the adversaries’ networks the 

support their current (and projected) 

capabilities. Adversary models in the 

WMD JIPOE include “doctrinal templates” that depict pathways to a 

WMD capability in terms of agent/

weapon choice, materiel/precursor/

process requirements, and associated decision points or points of injection. The points of injection play a 

significant role in the WMD problem 

set as terrorists (and under some circumstances, state actors) are unlikely 

to follow a nation state proliferation 

pathway. For example, it is unlikely 

that a terrorist group would seek to 

develop uranium conversion and enrichment technologies in order to obtain enriched uranium from uranium 

ore. Far more likely, a terrorist group 

will seek a witting (or unwitting) state 

or NGE point of injection that can provide the materiel needed. 

Step 4: Determine adversary 

courses of action. 

 As in Step 3 above, this step 

translates from the traditional JIPB to 

the WMD JIPOE without significant 

modifications (WMD merely serves as 

the focal point): identify the adversary’s likely objectives and desired 

end state; identify the full set of COA 

available to the adversary; evaluate 

and prioritize each COA; develop 

each COA in the amount of detail 

time allows; and identify initial collection requirements. For the WMD JIPOE, we want suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and doctrinally consistent COA that describe the who, 

what, when, where and how an adversary will achieve (and possibly 

employ) WMD. In a generic sense, 

we define these as: 

Who: State actor, terrorist 

group, NGE (or some combination 

thereof). 

What: Chemical, biological, 

radiological or nuclear (by agent 

and production path). 

How: This statement should 

geographically capture the network and activity that supports the 

materiel, technology and information acquisition, financial support, 

expertise required, and employment methods that support the 

agent and production pathway 

identified in the “what” above. 

When: Each threat COA 

should be identifiable as either a 

current or future threat capability 

(with an estimate in terms of 

months/years for future capabilities). 

Where: As expressed in the 

“how” statement, the “where” 

statement should include all identified and predicted aspects of the 

pathway development. 

WMD JIPOE Products 

 Using JP 2-01.3 as a basis, the 

following list serves as an example of 

WMD JIPOE products that support 

CWMD decision making and operational planning: 

• Common Operational Picture / 

Common Intelligence Picture 

• Predictive analysis threat picture 

• Intelligence synchronization matrix (synchronize/refine intelligence collection IOT answer 

PIRs and IRs 

• Infrastructure overlay 

• Lines of communication overlay 

• Governance overlay 

• Pattern analysis (violations of 

international/national protocols, 

agreements, and laws regarding 

CBRN materiel) 

• Doctrinal template (pathways to 

CBRN capability, state and nonstate) 

• Threat event template/matrix 

• Decision support template 

• Set of prioritized threat COAs 

• Activities matrix 

• Situational Template 

WMD JIPOE Execution 

 In its simplest form, WMD JIPOE 

execution stems from a notional commander posing the following questions: what does the WMD threat look 

like and what are we doing about it? 

Armed with WMD JIPOE products, 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 16

the staff could readily respond with 

the current enemy situational template, provide reasoned threat COAs, 

layout our current intelligence gaps 

and collection posture, focus collection against NAIs/TAIs, identify capability shortfalls, recommend friendly 

COAs, and address resource allocation and requirements concerns. 

Combating WMD, however, is not a 

DoD-centric problem. Therefore, we 

must consider how to effectively communicate a DoD-centric process such 

as JIPOE to the broader Interagency 

WMD community. 

 Combating WMD is a national 

problem that requires a DoD and Interagency integrated solution. Developing the necessary WMD IPB products most certainly requires non-DoD 

assets and capabilities. Within the 

DoD key partners include: OSD, Joint 

and Service staff members, COCOM/

GCC staff members, the Defense 

Intelligence Agency, and elements 

from the respective Service intelligence production centers. Key partners outside of DoD include: Department of State, Department of Energy, 

Department of Homeland Security, 

the Department of Treasury, the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, the 

Central Intelligence Agency, the National Counterterrorism Center, the 

National Counterproliferation Center, 

the National Security Agency, and the 

National Geospatial-Information 

Agency as depicted in Figure 2. 

 Proper execution of the national 

strategies for CWMD must couple 

strategic and operational planning 

efforts with the intelligence cycle. 

Commanders and staff must understand the current set of PIR and IR; 

the current intelligence collection posture; as well as where, how, and 

when to focus intelligence collection 

assets. The intelligence community 

(rife with its own list of organic issues) 

must develop and promote the growth 

of intelligence analysts with the skills, 

knowledge, and capacity to tackle this 

difficult problem set. The WMD Commission’s Report refers to this group 

as a “virtual community of specialists.” 13 In the rush to develop/

enhance WMD intelligence analysis, 

the tendency throughout the IC has 

been to hire personnel as analysts 

first with the expectation that the 

technical understanding of CBRN 

technologies, weapons, and weapons 

effects would come from on the job 

training. While this process has filled 

billets on paper, in practice, it has not 

Figure 2. Intelligence Cycle, JIPB Process, and WMD JIPOE Process Cross-walk. 
17 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

adequately filled the intelligence community’s ranks with personnel best 

suited to understand and articulate 

the CWMD threat. It might be more 

effective for the IC to hire CBRN 

SMEs and teach the tools needed for 

intelligence analysis. 

 The lack of CBRN subject matter 

experts across the DoD structure extends beyond intelligence organizations. There exists an inherent lack 

of CBRN capability and knowledge 

across the J2, J3, J5, J7, and J8 organizations at the COCOM/GCC 

level. The COCOM/GCC staffs rely 

on reach back to national assets to 

address CBRN issues. This limits the 

synchronization of CWMD initiatives 

across theater/AOR boundaries, not 

only within military channels, but also 

across the DIME construct; inhibits 

data sharing across organizational 

boundaries; and makes WMD JIPOE 

execution problematic. 

 In response to the current capability shortfall, as shown in Figure 3., 

above, we are advocating for the establishment of a national WMD JIPOE 

fusion center, coached and mentored 

by military professionals practiced in 

the art of JIPOE, counter terrorism, 

and schooled in the sciences and 

pathways of WMD. While the underlying reasons are manifold, critical 

factors include: the ability to balance 

and merge the efforts between state 

WMD and non-state/terrorist WMD 

collection efforts, change the state vs. 

non-state paradigm; responsiveness 

to mission focus vice routine intelligence production requirements; and 

the ability to leverage existing work. 14 

The long-term strategy for combating 

WMD, however, must include a national-, interagency-level “fusion center” (potentially housed by the DNI at 

the NCTC/NCPC), as well as fusion 

cells at each COCOM/agency. The 

COCOM/agency-level cells provide 

the capability to leverage the national 

fusion center’s work; the refinement 

required to meet the needs of a particular COCOM, agency, or area of 

responsibility; and promote analytic 

and data-sharing cross-talk across 

regional and organizational boundaries. 

Outlook

 As a professional body of CBRNE 

staff members, we must become 

more vocal in our efforts to attack the 

CWMD problem set. The published 

guidance and emerging operational 

concepts exist – again, produced in 

the absence of a reasoned WMD JIPOE process. As a result, terms 

such as “overly broad,” “vague,” 

“ineffective,” and in some cases, 

Figure 3. Notional WMD Fusion Cell (FC) cross-talk, with SOCOM staff build-out (representative). 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 18

“conflicting” often best describe the 

guidance and operational concepts. 

We must take action and get into the 

terrorist mindset. As senior DOD 

leaders and OGAs become more 

aware of the CWMD problem set, the 

WMD JIPOE process is gaining 

greater recognition. As a moderately 

successful predictor of train wrecks, it 

is merely a matter of time before the 

hard questions begin – either selfimposed or in response to a WMD 

event. I further predict that any reliance on the “lack of confirmed reporting” as an excuse for inaction will not 

sit well – with either the senior leadership or the American public. We 

must take the CWMD campaign on 

the offensive. 

 The following statements are important concepts for all of us to keep 

in mind as we educate ourselves, 

leaders, and peers alike. The CWMD 

problem set is tractable and finite – 

viable options do exist for us to deny, 

dissuade, deter, and defeat the 

spread of WMD – as long as we can 

understand and visualize the operational environment. Combating terrorism and counterproliferation are 

not distinct problem sets – CWMD 

demands a comprehensive and continuous approach that spans state, 

non-state actors, and nongovernmental entities. Combating 

WMD is a national problem set that 

requires a DoD and IA integrated effort and solution. We must demand 

more predictive analysis from the IC – 

while confirmed reporting may succeed in tackling the 5-meter target, 

execution of the comprehensive strategy to CWMD requires predictive 

analysis that looks beyond today and 

gives us the vision on how best to 

expend resources and be prepared 

and equipped to engage the threats 

of the future. 

 Combat operations and test beds 

such as the National Training Centers 

have proven the strengths of the predictive analysis resulting from the 

JIPOE process. Why then are we not 

employing the JIPOE process to face 

and prepare for our nation’s greatest 

threat? 

LTC Wager is the Division Chief of 

the special plans division at the Joint 

Special Operations Command at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. He has a B.S. 

in Physics from New York University, 

a M.S. in Applied Physics from the 

Naval Post Graduate School, and a 

Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering from 

the Air Force Institute of Technology. 

He was previously assigned as a 

plans chief and operations chief in the 

First Infantry Division. 

MAJ Willmon is a Plans Officer in the 

special plans division at the Joint 

Special Operations Command at Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina. He has a B.S. 

in Physics from the United States 

Military Academy and a M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from the Air Force 

Institute of Technology. He was previously assigned as an intelligence 

officer at the National Ground Intelligence Center and held operational 

assignments with the First, Second, 

and Third Infantry Divisions. 

ENDNOTES 

1

 The authors acknowledge the definition of WMD as provided in JP 1.02, 

but recognize that terrorist CBRN 

devices, by design or employment 

technique, may not result in “a high 

order of destruction” nor “destroy 

large numbers of people.” 

2

 Joint Staff, JP 2-01.3: Joint Tactics, 

Techniques, and Procedures for Joint 

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, May 24, 2000, vii. 

3

 JP 2-01.3, i. 

4

 JP 2-01.3, I-1. 

5

 Joint Staff, JP 3-0: Joint Operations. 

September 17, 2006, IV-4. 

6 JP 2-01.3, viii. 

7

 Joint Staff, JP 5-0: Joint Operational 

Planning. December 26, 2006, IV-28. 

8

Joint Staff, JP 3-33: Joint Task 

Force Headquarters. February 16, 

2007. 

9

 Joint Staff, JP 2.0: Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 

March 9, 2000. 

10 JP 2-01.3, I-8. 

11 JP 2-0, II-9. 

12 Joint Staff, JP3-40: Joint Doctrine 

for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, July 8, 2004. 

13 Commission on the Intelligence 

Capabilities of the United States of 

America Regarding Weapons of 

Mass Destruction, Report to the 

President of the United States, March 

31, 2005. 443. 

14 SOF WMD Threat Assessment, 

John Hopkins University/Applied 

Physics Laboratory: Laurel, MD, October, 2005. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 18
19 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

ver the past six years, there 

has been an increasing trend 

by military professionals to 

use the term “CBRNE” – chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and 

high-yield explosives – as the descriptor for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Those counterproliferation analysts who actually address 

nation-state WMD programs have 

been overcome by the counterterrorism community. To a large degree, 

this has been driven by interpretation 

of the National Strategy to Combat 

Weapons of Mass Destruction, which 

proposes that terrorists are actively 

seeking WMD material and technology from rogue nations who have 

state-run WMD programs. 

 The possibility of a terrorist 

CBRNE incident is often viewed as 

being more dangerous to the United 

States than a nation-state’s WMD 

program. Whether this is a rational 

concern or not is another issue. Since 

the counterterrorism proponents use 

the term “CBRNE” to describe the 

range of weapons considered by terrorists, they encouraged the use of 

the term “CBRNE” weapons as another way to describe “WMD” materials. A review of past terrorist case 

issues does not support the finding of 

terrorist incidents matching the level 

of destruction caused by nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons, 

and yet the trend continues.1

 The debate has become centered 

on whether “high-yield explosives” – 

as employed by terrorists in mass 

casualty events – ought to be included in the definition of “weapons of 

mass destruction.” The Department of 

Justice, and specifically the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, has a federal 

statute to address the criminal use of 

high-yield explosives as a WMD 

event, along with any amount – down 

to grams – of dangerous chemical, 

biological, or radiological material. It 

may be that the Bureau had intended 

mass casualty events, rather than 

WMD events, to be the target of its 

jurisdiction. However, given the 

DoD’s role in combating terrorism, the 

military’s counterproliferation and 

counterterrorism communities have 

clashed over the terminology. 

 The military began changing its 

language from nuclear, biological, 

and chemical (NBC) defense to 

chemical, biological, radiological, and 

nuclear (CBRN) defense around 2000

-2001, formalizing the change in 

2003. One reason for this change 

was the recognition that the defined 

threat by unconventional munitions 

had expanded from nation-state 

WMD programs, designed for largescale battlefield use, to include terrorist use of CBRN hazards. To capture 

the broader defensive measures necessary against both threats, “CBRN 

defense” has become a generic term 

to address passive defense 

(counterproliferation), consequence 

management, and antiterrorism 

measures. So is it CBRN or CBRNE? 

Should there be two terms or one 

term? Who’s right? 

 It’s important to understand why 

the many changes in terminology occurred and what the impact on the 

development of policy, doctrine, and 

material has been. The purpose of 

this article is to examine the use of 

the terms “CBRN,” “CBRNE,” and 

“WMD” and to make the cause that 

the discussion of terrorist use of highyield explosives is not appropriate in 

the context of “combating WMD.” The 

basis of this argument lies not only in 

the appropriate use of defense terminology, but also has implications in 

executing arms control agreements, 

crafting defense policy, and developing military capabilities. 

Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction” 

 In April 1937, German pilots supporting General Franco’s nationalist 

forces bombed the city of Guernica, 

then holding about 7,000 residents. 

Over a three-hour period, the German 

air force used high explosives and 

incendiary munitions to destroy the 

old town and kill about a third of the 

population in what can only be described as a deliberate terror attack. 

That December, an editorial in the 

London Times was still discussing the 

incident: “Who can think at this present time without a sickening of the 

heart of the appalling slaughter, the 

suffering, the manifold misery brought 

by war to Spain and to China? Who 

can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, 

waged as it would be with all the new 

weapons of mass destruction?” 2 

While this attack used high explosives and certainly caused both mass 

casualties and mass destruction, it 

paled in comparison to the strategic 

bombing campaigns that would occur 

later during World War II. 

 Modern development of chemical 

weapons had started in 1915, while 

biological weapons had a later formal 

development date of 1941 for the 

United States military. Throughout the 

years between 1918 and 1945, no 

government official or military leader 

ever referred to chemical or biological 

weapons as “weapons of mass destruction.” They were unconventional 

weapons planned for employment at 

the operational and strategic level, 

but not WMDs. The formal use of that 

term to describe NBC weapons did 

not start until after the offensive use 

of atomic weapons against Japan in 

1945. The United Nations Commission for Conventional Armaments 

defined WMDs as “atomic explosive 

weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological 

weapons, and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive 

effect to those of the atomic bomb or 

other weapons mentioned above.” 3

This is not to say that the United Nations has applied this definition uniformly since that date; only that the 

There Is No “E” in Combating WMD 

Al Mauroni 

Senior Defense Consultant 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 20

original definition was intended to 

evolve as weapon technologies 

evolved. The issue of whether conventional weapons with significant 

damage effects should be considered 

as WMDs has never been addressed. 

 Without exhaustively covering the 

same discussions that others have 

already documented, let me note a 

number of significant events related 

to the definition of WMDs: 

• 1956, Soviet Marshall Zhukov 

identifies the threat of atomic, 

biological, and chemical weapons as “weapons of mass destruction.”

• 1969, a UN report discusses 

the danger of chemical and biological weapons as being as 

significant as nuclear weapons, 

using a strategic bomber attack 

against a major city to compare 

the impact of 15 tons of BW 

agent (tularemia), 50 tons of 

nerve agent (VX), and a megaton atomic bomb.

• Between 1972 and 1990, the 

U.S. military discusses the implications of tactical and operational employment of nuclear, 

biological, and chemical (NBC) 

weapons. The term “WMD” is 

only used by arms control experts, not operational concept 

developers.

• 1991, the U.S. government 

acknowledges failures to address the adversarial use of 

chemical and biological weapons against its military forces. 

This leads to the development 

of a Defense Counterproliferation Initiative to develop offensive and defensive options 

against non-nuclear nationstates that have a CB weapons 

capability.

• 1992, Congress passes the 

WMD Control Act of 1992, referring to NBC weapons.

• 1994, the Joint Staff initiates 

an antiterrorism/force protection 

office (J34) to coordinate military doctrine and concepts, focusing on “conventional” weapons.

• 1994, Congress passes the 

Violent Crime Control and Law 

Enforcement Act, broadening 

the term “WMD” as “any destructive device” that includes 

poisonous chemicals, disease 

organisms, or radioactivity that 

could be dangerous to human 

life.

• 1995, Aum Shinrikyo uses 

sarin-filled pouches in the Tokyo subway to kill 12, injure 

hundreds, and panic thousands. Interest in CB terrorism 

sharply increases.

• 1995, Oklahoma City bombing (168 dead, more than 800 

injured) causes discussion of 

terrorist use of high explosives 

as a “WMD” incident. The FBI 

and FEMA create a terrorist 

incident annex to the Federal 

Response Plan in 1997 to address federal responsibilities to 

support a response to terrorist 

WMD incidents.

• 1996, Congress defines 

WMD as weapons that disseminate chemicals, biologicals, or radiological material/

radioactivity that could cause 

death or serious injury to “a 

significant number of people.” 

This number is never quantified.

• 1996, Congress directs the 

DoD to conduct a “domestic 

preparedness program” where 

military instructors train emergency responders on how to 

respond to CB incidents. The 

training does not address responding to radiological/

nuclear or explosives use.

• 1998, the Joint Staff releases Joint Publication 3-07.2, 

which addresses antiterrorism. 

The publication addresses terrorist WMD incidents, but there 

is no mention of “CBRNE.”

• 1998, Congress directs the 

development of what are eventually called WMD Civil Support 

Teams to assist state and local 

emergency responders. The 

teams have no capabilities to 

address incidents involving explosives.

• 1999, the Gilmore Commission on Homeland Security 

uses the term “CBRN” in reference to terrorist incidents. The 

term “terrorist WMD” doesn’t 

make sense to them.

• 1999-2001, the Joint Staff 

develops an overarching counterproliferation strategy to enable military execution of counterproliferation concepts. It 

does not address explosives.

• 2000, Defense Secretary Bill 

Cohen appoints an Assistant to 

the Secretary of Defense for 

Civil Support (ASTD[CS]), who 

is supposed to address domestic CBRNE incidents.

• 2001, the ATSD(CS) position 

is eliminated and ASD(SO/LIC) 

takes responsibility for coordinating terrorist CBRNE response policy.

• 2002, the White House releases National Security Presidential Directive-17 as the National Strategy to Combat 

WMD, changing the Joint 

Staff’s counterproliferation concept into a combating WMD/

homeland security document.

• 2002, DTRA and JFCOM 

recommend changing “Manage 

Strategic Deterrence of Weapons of Mass Destruction” to 

“Manage Deterrence of 

CBRNE Weapons” in the Universal Joint Task List.

• 2002, the Joint Staff authorizes the stand-up of a Joint 

Requirements Office for CBRN 

Defense, which will address 

CBRN defense issues in passive defense, force protection, 

consequence management, 

and homeland defense. There 

is no mention of explosives.

• 2003, during Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, the 75th Exploitation 

Task Force searches for evidence of Iraq’s WMD program. 

The task force ignores the 

huge piles of explosives, munitions, and conventional weapons stacked high in the warehouses.

• 2005, during the Mossauwi 

trial, the jury is instructed to 

consider the use of commercial 

airplanes in the 9/11 event as 

“weapons of mass destruction.”
21 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

 Dr. Seth Carus does a much better job discussing the various definitions of WMD and their sources, 4

 to 

include the debate over the terms 

NBC, CBRN, and CBRNE, but that is 

not the point here. This list of events 

is meant to illustrate two important 

things. Between 1972 and 1990, the 

U.S. military talked about NBC weapons as an aspect of state-versusstate military operations. It didn’t matter if one were discussing U.S. unconventional weapons or the adversary’s unconventional weapons. Between 1992 and 2001, there was a 

shift where WMD became something 

that “other nations did” as a destabilizing function, while the U.S. nuclear 

weapons program was a stabilizing, 

good thing. Between 1995 and 2001, 

the combating terrorism moved toward the term “CBRNE,” while counterproliferation was solely associated 

with proactive actions against a nation-state’s WMD program(specifically 

the adversarial use of CB weapons). 

So what happened after 2001? 

 After the 9/11 event, the Bush administration changed national defense policy – as is its prerogative – 

to emphasize its concern over linkages between terrorist CBRNE incidents and nation-state WMD programs, in particular due to the concern that a terrorist might desire to 

use a nuclear or biological weapon in 

an attack on an American city with 

the intent of causing mass casualties. 

Whether one believes this scenario to 

be valid or not is irrelevant to the argument. It was the act of addressing 

terrorist WMD issues under combating WMD strategy that has caused 

the debate over whether “E” belonged 

in combating WMD or the combating 

terrorism community. 

The Arms Control Community 

Says “There Is No ‘E’ in Combating 

WMD” 

 The term “WMD” had its origins in 

arms control, and for half of the 20th

century, was solely used by the arms 

control community. To them, the term 

included all “unconventional weapons,” to include nuclear, biological, 

and chemical weapons developed by 

nation-states, with the intention of 

causing significant effects at the operational and strategic level. By controlling their development and potential use, the arms control community 

intended to establish a set of general 

norms for the international community, and in particular, to reduce the 

impact on noncombatants. Over the 

past seven years, the term “WMD” 

has been used more loosely by a larger community, including military and 

political leaders. 

 The arms control community is 

concerned about conventional weapons that use high-yield explosives, 

and has had numerous discussions 

on the appropriate use of land mines, 

particular classes of ammunition, and 

incendiary devices, for instance. But 

they also clearly relegated conventional explosives as outside the scope 

of weapons of mass destruction, once 

defined in 1948 as “comparable in 

destructive effect” of nuclear weapons. It is clear that many chemical 

and biological weapons, if used in 

small quantities in discrete scenarios, 

would fall outside this distinction. The 

arms control community has vigorously avoided that discussion, perhaps fearing that nations might try to 

develop and use small stocks of CB 

weapons in an effort to get around 

the potential international backlash 

over using “WMDs.” 

 The arms control community has 

often debated over whether the military employment of riot control agents 

and similar non-lethal incapacitants 

might loosen restrictions on chemical 

warfare, merely because of their 

chemical composition and similar 

means of employment (as an aerosol 

or gas against unprotected personnel). The US Senate deliberately took 

riot control agents, herbicides, and 

incendiary devices out of the purview 

of the Chemical Weapons Convention, even though some of these were 

termed “chemical munitions” in World 

War II and Korean Conflict. With the 

recent insurgent use of chlorine in 

Iraq, the Director of the Organization 

for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has even suggested that the use 

of that common industrial chemical 

was an expansion of chemical warfare, no matter the very brief period 

that chemical was used as a munition 

fill during World War I. But no one 

has suggested that explosives ought 

to be considered a WMD merely because they have a chemical composition. 

 The State Department has reorganized its arms control offices, creating the Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation to replace its former Arms Control and 

Nonproliferation office. In addition to 

working all the WMD treaty issues – 

the Chemical Weapons Convention, 

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty, and others – the State Department approves all foreign government requests for U.S. assistance in 

responding to terrorist CBRN incidents. They do not consider highyield explosives to be a “WMD” issue, 

although there are other arms control 

treaties, such as the Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe treaty, which 

do address conventional munitions. It 

is generally understood that, unless 

specifically requested, overseas terrorist incidents involving conventional 

explosives will be addressed by the 

host nation. 

STRATCOM says “There Is No ‘E’ 

in Combating WMD” 

 Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assigned the responsibility of 

“integrating and synchronizing” DoD 

combating WMD operations to U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in 

2005. That command led the development of the National Military Strategy to Combat WMD (released in 

2006), which largely built upon the 

counterproliferation strategy developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff J-5 

directorate (Nuclear and Counterproliferation Division) between 1998 and 

2001. This document takes a very 

clear stand that “WMD” means nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and deliberately excludes explosives from the discussion. 

 At the 2007 National Defense University’s “Combating WMD” conference, two renowned defense experts 

basically stated that nuclear weapons 

were the only true WMD, and with the 

exception of a few biological weapons, there really were no other types 

of weapons worth discussing. This is 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 22

not an uncommon discussion today, 

especially as the nation struggles to 

address the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons technology by Iran and 

North Korea. If the majority of biological weapons and all chemical weapons can be so casually disregarded, 

what does that say about the idea 

that high-yield explosives are a 

“WMD” of concern? 

 Guidance at the top levels of DoD 

is unclear. The Joint Staff’s Capstone 

Concept for Joint Operations (dated 

August 2005) 5 does include “E” in 

the term WMD, and even adds a related term “weapons of mass effects” 

to further confuse the issue. Within 

the office of the Undersecretary of 

Defense for Policy, there is clear direction that DoD support to foreign 

consequence management missions 

will not include responding to terrorist 

explosive incidents. DoD response to 

domestic consequence management 

does, however, include supporting 

terrorist high-yield explosive incidents. In fact, the US Army’s 20th

Support Command (CBRNE) has 

responsibilities for both responding to 

requests for supporting domestic and 

foreign consequence management 

and executing combating WMD mission areas, in addition to its legacy 

mission of supporting the Army’s CB 

weapons stockpile/nonstockpile responsibilities. When OSD had the 

opportunity to update its instruction 

on its combating WMD responsibilities (DoDI 2060.02), 6

 the final decision was to avoid defining WMD at 

all! 

 Within DoD, there are clear 

boundaries between counterterrorism 

and counterproliferation, not merely in 

policy direction, but in doctrine, concepts, funding, and execution. It is 

only when one discusses the possibility of terrorist use of “WMD” material 

that it becomes contentious. Table 1 

represents the differences in executing passive defense, antiterrorism, 

and consequence management missions in regards to a CBRN hazard 

are very distinct. This is where the 

clarification is desperately required. 

Although the threat is technically the 

same in every instance, the response 

– and who addresses the response – 

is very different. 

Table 1. Executing Passive Defense, Antiterrorism, and Consequence Management missions in regards to a CBRN 

hazard. 

Passive Defense Antiterrorism

Consequence 

Management

Who is in charge of 

developing defense 

policy and defense 

concepts?

Spec. Asst. for Chemical and

Biological Defense and Chemical

Demilitarization Programs; Asst.

Sec. of Def. for Global 

Security Affairs; STRATCOM

Asst. Sec. of Def. for Special

Operations/Low-Intensity 

Conflict; Asst. Sec. of Def. 

for Homeland Defense; 

SOCOM

Asst. Sec. of Def. for Special

Operations/Low-Intensity 

Conflict; Asst. Sec. of Def. 

for Homeland Defense; 

NORTHCOM

What is the threat? NBC weapons affecting a large

area of the battlefield

Improvised CBRN hazards

affecting a small area within 

a military base or facility

Improvised CBRN hazards

affecting a small area within

an urban center

Who is the target? Service members during combat Service members and 

untrained civilians

Civilians and emergency 

responders

What is the mission? Ensure that military personnel

survive and sustain combat

operations in a hazardous

environment

Reduce the vulnerability of

individuals and critical

infrastructure under the

commander’s scope

Protect public health and

safety, restore essential

government services, and

provide emergency relief

When and where is 

the attack?

On a battlefield in all conditions, 

during military combat operations

At military bases throughout 

the world

In cities across the Nation 

and in support of allied 

nations

What is the allowable 

risk for CBRN 

exposure?

High risk; emphasis on mission 

over long-term health and safety

Moderate risk to noncombatants, very low risk for very 

important persons

Very low to emergency 

responders 

What equipment is 

used by the 

responders?

Military equipment designed for

acute exposure

Mix of specialized military

equipment and standard

equipment

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 

specification, protects 

against long-term chronic 

exposure

Who funds the 

purchase of equipment?

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

through the DOD CB Defense 

Program

Services and installation

commanders

Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, National Guard 

Bureau, and Services 

(depending on the

particular response)
23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

The Services and Antiterrorism 

Community say “We Really Only 

Care About ‘E’.” 

 Military installation commanders 

have a responsibility to protect those 

individuals working at and living on 

their bases and in their facilities. In 

developing a force protection plan, 

these commanders assess the local 

threats and their vulnerabilities, and 

based upon their available resources, 

prioritize their actions and execute a 

plan to meet that responsibility. During the twentieth century, their concern was nearly completely focused 

on conventional threats – criminals, 

espionage, sabotage, car bombs, 

pipe bombs, firearms, and the like. 

Terrorist WMD incidents were addressed in an appendix basically noting that there were defensive military 

capabilities, but in general, there are 

none employed at domestic military 

installations. 

 Following the 9/11 incident, OSD 

Policy inserted language into the Defense Planning Guidance for 2004 to 

direct the development and execution 

of a CB defense installation protection program. The basic approach 

was to take existing military CB defense sensors (designed for the battlefield), employ them at particular 

fixed locations on the base, and tie 

those into the base’s command post. 

This concept was expanded, beyond 

reasonable cost/schedule expectations, to an unconstrained effort to 

protect the entire base’s population 

and to tie the protected bases into the 

Department of Homeland Security’s 

efforts to address terrorist CBRN incidents. Despite the transfer of nearly 

$1.5 billion from service antiterrorism 

programs into a special project run by 

the DoD CB Defense Program, 7 this 

effort has failed to accomplish much 

more than equipping hazmat response teams and providing limited 

training. It failed for a number of reasons. 

 First, military CB defense equipment was never designed to operate 

24/7 throughout the year on a fixed 

site. Given the quantities required to 

adequately address an installation’s 

critical areas, no installation – other 

than the Pentagon – could afford to 

man, operate, or sustain such a system on its own. Second, the approved 

concept was never designed to protect every person on the installation – 

it was designed to ensure the installation could continue essential operations while evacuating non-essential 

personnel and awaiting the arrival of 

federal response elements to support 

local and installation responders. The 

acquisition office executing the program ignored both of these points. 

Third, the antiterrorism community, 

from OSD down to the installation 

commanders, refused to integrate 

CBRN defense into their force protection directives, concepts, and force 

protection conditions (FPCONs). 

They didn’t want to complicate the 

installation commander’s challenges 

with a threat that had such a low 

probability of occurring. 

 There was a challenge for many to 

believe that there were fundamental 

differences between facing a militarygenerated CB warfare attack on a 

battlefield as opposed to a terrorist 

CBRN hazard created within an installation’s boundaries. The hazard is 

the threat, right? Perhaps the hazard’s physical properties are the 

same, but certainly the responses to 

the threat are distinct. Some people 

could not get past the point that military CB defense equipment and concepts were designed to provide a full 

protective capability for a limited time 

against a robust threat, while the installations could accept a much more 

limited protective capability based on 

a smaller, limited threat, risk management practices, and vulnerability assessments. The Deputy Secretary of 

Defense signed out a concept of operations basically outlining a more 

flexible “CBRNE” installation protection concept in 2006, but this concept 

was (and continues to be) ignored. 

 Although the services and combatant commands receive jointly developed (and OSD-funded) CBRN defense equipment and concepts for 

military operations on the battlefield, 

their capability for protection against 

conventional explosives and terrorist 

incidents is funded and executed by 

the individual services and combatant 

commands. Because there is no 

“joint” explosives concept or R&D 

program, each service – indeed, each 

installation commander – can and 

does develop unique approaches to 

addressing terrorism incidents, based 

on the particular installation’s threat 

and vulnerability assessment. And in 

these approaches, terrorist CBRN 

incidents rank very low on probability, 

which is reflected in their annual funding requests. 

A Path Forward 

 The intent to use the term CBRNE 

for combating terrorism efforts was 

made in good faith. The concept of 

addressing terrorist incidents under 

an “all-hazards” approach is sound, 

and certainly any response to terrorist 

CBRN incidents ought to be structured along the same lines as how 

conventional incidents are currently 

managed. First, the overwhelming 

majority of terrorist incidents will be 

conventional, and any terrorist CBRN 

incident is going to be small and limited in its effects (compared to any 

military combat scenario). Second, 

the Department of Homeland Security’s National Response Plan has 

clearly indicated the value of a single 

“all-hazards” approach that allows for 

the development of common protocols and plans to address natural disasters and man-made accidents/

incidents. It makes sense to integrate 

CBRN response into the current response protocol – the difficulty has 

been getting the antiterrorism community to do the integration, which 

they have fiercely resisted to date. It 

makes sense to capitalize on technologies developed to counter CBRN 

hazards faced on the battlefield and 

apply those concepts and technologies to the requirements of military 

installations and homeland security 

missions. 

 It does NOT make sense to believe that counterproliferation experts 

(and in particular, those military specialists trained in passive defense) 

ought to also develop capabilities and 

response to high-yield explosive 

threats on the battlefield. Besides the 

fact that there are practically no explosive munitions that even approach 

tactical nuclear weapons effects, 

each service already addresses the 

threat of conventional explosives on 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 24

the battlefield – it’s the bread and 

butter of the business. Even the 

threat of short- and medium-range 

ballistic missiles, once closely associated with NBC capabilities, has been 

handled separately from the combating WMD strategy. So why use the 

term “CBRNE” as if it were a jointlyaccepted concept when discussing 

the challenge of addressing nationstate WMD programs? It simply does 

not follow logic. Yet the failure to accept these basic truths is not limited 

to the general defense community but 

also to the counterproliferation specialists. 

 Recently, the Army Chemical 

Corps changed the name of their 

corps chemical officer position to 

“CBRNE Officer.” On the plus side, 

the corps staff gained a major from 

the Ordnance Corps to address antiterrorism efforts. On the negative 

side, this name change could provide 

the justification for the Ordnance 

Corps to take over the responsibility, 

since the majority of terrorism threats 

are (and will continue to be) conventional explosives. The result will be a 

decrease in emphasis on counterproliferation issues. Look at the constant 

attention gained by the use of improvised explosive devices in Iraq, given 

the Joint IED Defeat Organization 

and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, as opposed 

to the past hunt for Iraq’s WMD program. Who is DoD going to put in 

charge of “CBRNE” issues? Which 

profession will address its issues, the 

CBRN defense specialist or the antiterrorism specialist? 

 Nor does the Air Force’s “CounterCBRNE” concept make sense, given 

the very well-defined combating 

WMD strategy against which their 

concept proffers to address. Its 

“counter-CW” concept appears to be 

a combination of offensive operations 

and passive defense, while its 

“counter-BW” concept is more of a 

combination of force health protection 

and passive defense. Although it appears that the Air Force has abandoned a “counter-NW” and “counterE” concept, the term “counterCBRNE” is still used frequently. It is 

understandable that, given the “global 

war on terror” that dominates discussions of national strategy, people 

want to use the term that attracts the 

most attention. But this overlap of 

combating WMD and combating terrorism responsibilities and concepts 

of operation is causing more confusion and discourse than is healthy. 

DoD needs to make a stand on this 

issue, to enforce its joint strategy on 

combating WMD and to successfully 

integrate CBRN defense into antiterrorism practices. 

 The Bush administration has, for 

better or for worse, used the term 

“WMD” in its case supporting the preventive invasion of Iraq and emphasized the potential threat of terrorist 

use of WMD materials and technologies. As a result, the defense community has lost the ability to coherently 

discuss what ought to be done in 

terms of combating the WMD programs of nation states vice combating 

terrorist intentions to use CBRN hazards against non-combatants. One 

solution is to restrict the use of the 

term “WMD” to official arms control 

documents and to stop using the term 

in public discussions of military doctrine and strategy. One ought to use 

the term “unconventional weapons” or 

NBC weapons if discussing the ambitions of nation states, and save the 

term “CBRNE” for discussions of terrorist groups. If a defense conference 

is titled “Combating WMD” but only 

focuses on nuclear weapons, is that 

really benefiting the quality of academic discussion in this area? 

 From a practical point of view, this 

is a win-win for organizations such as 

the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, the DoD CB Defense Program, and other agencies developing 

similar capabilities for combating 

WMD and combating terrorism. Instead of stating that the Defense Department requires a single set of generic CBRNE defense capabilities for 

counterproliferation, antiterrorism, 

and consequence management, we 

ought to be stressing that there are 

three very distinct customers requiring similar CBRN defense technologies but different solutions. This approach emphasizes that the defense 

agencies understand and appreciate 

the fact that there is a difference in 

the policies, funding, and requirements between CBRN defense and 

CBRNE response. The result would 

be a much closer fit of affordable and 

sustainable solutions against current 

warfighter challenges, addressing 

specific policy concerns as well as 

funding constraints. 

Al Mauroni is a senior defense consultant working in the Washington DC 

metro area. A former Chemical Corps 

officer, he has more than twenty 

years experience in DOD chemicalbiological defense programs and policy issues. He has published numerous articles and six books on the 

topic, the latest of which is “Where 

Are the WMDs?” by Naval Institute 

Press, 2006. 

ENDNOTES 

1 Jonathan Tucker, “Toxic Terror” (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 

2

 London Times Online, http://

www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/system/

topicRoot/Guernica/, and Wikipedia

website (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Weapons_of_mass_destruction#_ref0) accessed May 25, 2007. 

3

 SIPRI, The Problem of Chemical 

and Biological Warfare (New York: 

Humanities Press, 1971), 4:193. 

4 Carus, Seth. Defining Weapons of 

Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: 

NDU Press, 2006). Iv Available at 

http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/

docUploaded//OP4Carus.pdf. 

5 Available at http://www.dtic.mil/

futurejointwarfare/concepts/

approved_ccjov2.pdf. 

6 Available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/

directives/corres/pdf/206002p.pdf. 

7

 Since its inception in 2004, the 

funding for Joint Program Guardian’s 

CB Installation Protection Program 

was slashed in half in 2006 after fully 

fielding equipment to only one installation. A special OSD working group 

developed a new implementation plan 

with much more modest goals, which 

is in the process of being executed. 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 24
25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 



DARPA Urban Grand Challenge 2007 has a Winner! 

Robert A. Pfeffer, Physical Scientist 

or the second time in a row there is a winner of a 

DARPA-sponsored Grand Challenge. The previous 

Grand Challenge was held 2005. It required an 

autonomous vehicle to traverse a 132-mile rural California 

environment within 10 hours. A total of four vehicles completed the course in less than the required time. The fastest time was recorded by “Stanley” of the Stanford Racing 

Team (Stanford, CA). 

 

 

This time, vehicles had to maneuver through a mock city 

urban environment. The winner, Tartan Racing 

(Pittsburgh, PA) won $2 million for finishing the course in 

the fastest time. The second place winner, the Stanford 

Racing Team (Stanford, CA) won $1 million, while the 

$500 thousand third place award went to Victor Tango 

(Blacksburg, VA). All three finished the race under the 

specified time limit. 

 Now what does this mean to the military? Quite simply, it means autonomous vehicle technology will reach 

the battlefield much faster. A new generation of unmanned sensors, C4I, and weapons delivery systems can 

now become an integral part of the future battlefield. The 

Future Combat System and/or the Heavy Brigade Combat 

Team are possible applications of this technology. There, 

unmanned ground-based vehicles could “drive-by-wire” in 

much the same way as some of the first generation “fly-by

-wire” UAVs . 

 

Further Reading: 

Spring/Summer 2006 NBC Report, and the previous issue 

of Combating WMD Journal Issue 1. 

 

The official DARPA Grand Challenge web site 

http://www.grandchallenge.org. or 

Google search on DARPA Grand Challenge 

DO YOU KNOW... 

First Place Winner – Tartan Racing, Pittsburgh, PA.
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 26

he Nuclear Science and Engineering Research Center 

(NSERC) is a Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA) field element located at the United States 

Military Academy (USMA), West 

Point, New York. Established by mutual agreement between USMA and 

DTRA in May 2007, the NSERC leverages USMA faculty and cadet expertise in the solution of problems of 

interest to DTRA and the Department 

of Defense (DoD). The NSERC is 

hosted by the USMA Department of 

Physics and manned by DTRA personnel with USMA faculty experience. 

Within DTRA, the NSERC falls under 

the Nuclear Technologies (NT) Directorate in the Research and Development (RD) Enterprise. This article 

chronicles the establishment of the 

NSERC, how the NSERC supports 

the missions of DTRA and USMA, the 

NSERC’s role in developing Functional Area 52 (FA52), Nuclear and 

Counterproliferation Officers, and the 

NSERC faculty and cadet research 

models. The article concludes with 

how the NSERC can work with you 

and your organization to leverage 

USMA faculty and cadet expertise to 

help meet your research needs. 

A Brief History of the NSERC 

 After the attack on September 11, 

2001, USMA and the Department of 

Physics foresaw the Army’s increased need for officers with nuclear 

and weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) skills. To help fill this need,

the nuclear engineering major in the 

USMA Department of Physics was 

established in August 2003.1 The Department of Physics recognized that 

an active nuclear engineering research program was a key element in 

creating and maintaining a vibrant 

academic major, and so the Nuclear 

SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY 

The Nuclear Science and Engineering Research Center 

A Research Partnership Between the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency and the United States Military Academy 

LTC Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D. and MAJ Robert F. Schlicht 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

COL(R) Brian E. Moretti, Ph.D. 

United States Military Academy 

Logo for the newly established Nuclear Science and Engineering Research Center, a Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

(DTRA) field element located at the United States Military Academy (USMA), West Point, New York. 
27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

Engineering Research Group (NERG) 

was founded in August 2004.2

 The NERG’s mission was “... to 

conduct quality, rigorous research in 

nuclear engineering and the nuclear 

sciences to support the United States 

Army, and to enhance the nuclear 

engineering academic program, the 

Department of Physics, and USMA.” 3

The NERG, composed of volunteers 

from the Department of Physics faculty interested in conducting research, began to meet regularly in the 

fall of 2004. The NERG served several important functions. It brought 

together information about ongoing 

research efforts in the DoD, became 

a forum for the exchange of ideas, 

placed an increased emphasis on 

faculty research, and established the 

structure required to coordinate ongoing research efforts. The result was a 

dramatic increase in the quantity of 

faculty research, and a faculty more 

in tune with current research efforts. 

The NERG demonstrated the desire 

of the faculty and the cadets to conduct research and emphasized the 

synergy created by a collaborative 

group. The NERG also demonstrated 

to the department leadership that the 

faculty and cadets were a resource 

that could substantially contribute to 

the greater research effort in the 

DoD, but to most effectively harness 

this potential, there must be full-time 

researchers. Such full-time investigators would allow the faculty to concentrate on research and not the administrative requirements inherent in 

running a research program. 

 At this point, the concept of the 

NSERC was born.4 To most effectively use the research talents of the 

faculty and cadets, USMA sought to 

invite the DoD to establish a nuclear 

science and engineering research 

center at USMA. Like the NERG, the 

NSERC would promote and support 

nuclear engineering research within 

the Department of Physics. However, 

instead of being created by USMA 

and manned internally from faculty 

within the Department of Physics, the 

NSERC would instead be created 

and manned by DoD assets. With 

the support of the Head of the Department of Physics and the Dean of 

the Academic Board, COL Edward 

Naessens, the Nuclear Engineering 

Program Director, Dr. Brian Moretti, 

and CPT Michael Shannon briefed 

the NSERC concept to Dr. Dale Klein, 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense 

for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD

(NBC)) and Dr. James Tegnelia, Director of DTRA, in May 2005. Dr. 

Klein and Dr. Tegnelia were supportive of the NSERC concept and gave 

approval for establishment of the 

NSERC as a field office of DTRA to 

be located at USMA. 

 Staffing the NSERC plan and writing the Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA) between DTRA and USMA to 

establish and operate the NSERC 

consumed much of the next two 

years and was led by Dr. Brian Moretti and LTC Jeffrey Musk at USMA, 

and Mr. Todd Hann and LTC Steve 

Creighton at DTRA. Dr. Tegnelia 

signed the MOA to establish the 

NSERC on 10 April 2007 for DTRA 

and BG Patrick Finnegan signed the 

MOA on 2 May 2007 for USMA, making the NSERC a reality. The 

NSERC received its initial operating 

budget on 18 June 2007 and the 

NSERC achieved initial operational 

capability on 20 August 2007. 

Why a NSERC? Why at USMA? 

 Normally, there are fifteen to 

twenty FA52 officers assigned to the 

USMA faculty, most serving in the 

Department of Physics. Outside of 

DTRA, USMA has one of the largest 

populations of FA52 officers. All of 

the FA52 officers in the Department 

of Physics have a master’s degree or 

a doctorate in nuclear engineering or 

physics, graduate school research 

experience, and a proven record of 

success in the Army. Historically, 

most of these officers have not continued their graduate school research 

once assigned to the USMA faculty, 

making them an under-utilized resource for both USMA and the Army. 

Many of these officers have a desire 

to engage in research, but research 

time directly competes with other demands on their out-of-class discretionary time, such as involvement in 

leading cadet sports, cadet clubs, and 

cadet military training. By making 

new, real-world research opportunities, facilities, and direct support from 

DTRA available to these officers, the 

NSERC is able to tap into this wealth 

of talent for the benefit of DTRA, 

USMA, and the Nation. 

BG Patrick Finnegan, Dean of the Academic Board, signing the memorandum 

of agreement to establish the NSERC on 2 May 2007. From left to right: LTC 

Jeffrey Musk, COL Raymond Winkel, Jr., Head of the Department of Physics, 

BG Patrick Finnegan, COL Edward Naessens, Deputy Head of the Department 

of Physics, and Dr. Brian Moretti. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 28

 USMA is the only Service Academy with a nuclear engineering major. On average, twelve cadets per 

graduating class major in nuclear engineering, with an additional twelve or 

so majoring in physics. These cadets 

are available to work on NSERCsponsored projects through a clientbased capstone design project, integrative experience, in-class projects, 

and independent study. 

 Cadets also become involved in 

NSERC research through Academic 

Individual Advanced Development 

(AIAD) experiences at DTRA, NNSA, 

the National Laboratories, and elsewhere. AIADs are the USMA equivalent of summer research internships 

at civilian universities. They typically 

last four weeks and are voluntary for 

the cadets since they give up either 

leave time or additional military training to participate. Nuclear engineering cadets participating in NSERCcoordinated AIADs can continue their 

AIAD research in their capstone design project. 

 The NSERC’s location at USMA 

enhances its ability to collaborate with 

the Academy’s centers of excellence5

, such as the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC)6

 and the 

Photonics Research Center (PRC).7 

Through the CTC, the NSERC involves cadets in policy-related research in the areas of nuclear terrorism and homeland defense. In return, the NSERC provides technical 

WMD expertise and advice to the 

CTC from both DTRA and the Department of Physics. In the area of highenergy lasers, as related to the National Ignition Facility (NIF) for example, the NSERC can leverage the 

expertise of the PRC, which is 

manned by members of the Department of Physics, the Department of 

Electrical Engineering and Computer 

Science, and the Department of 

Chemistry and Life Science. 

 The synergy created by USMA’s 

unique combination of FA52 officers, 

the nuclear engineering major, centers of excellence, and cadets in need 

of militarily-relevant projects makes 

USMA an excellent location for the 

NSERC. 

The NSERC Researchers’ Role at 

USMA 

 The NSERC full-time researchers’ 

role at USMA is to serve as a conduit 

through which DTRA expertise, research, and projects can be brought 

into USMA to enhance the educational experience of cadets and to 

provide cutting-edge research opportunities for USMA faculty and cadets 

in support of DTRA objectives. We 

coordinate with DTRA HQ, NNSA, 

and the National Laboratories to find 

projects suitable for cadet and faculty 

research. Often, these organizations 

have research needs but do not necessarily know if they are appropriate 

for USMA cadet and faculty work. 

Most have projects that are not immediately suitable in scope or content for 

cadet (undergraduate) research but 

instead have general “mission areas” 

or “research areas” of interest. This 

is where the NSERC researchers can 

help. It is our mission to work with 

these client organizations to translate 

their areas of interest into appropriate 

cadet and faculty research and design projects. Once work begins on a 

NSERC-supported project, NSERC 

personnel mentor, guide, and assist 

the faculty and cadets. Our assistance may include providing work 

space, procuring needed equipment 

and software, or the funding of faculty 

and cadet travel to conferences or to 

meet with project sponsors. 

Faculty Research Model 

 Involving faculty in research is one 

of the NSERC’s core missions, and 

also one of its greatest challenges. 

After spending a year teaching introductory physics (i.e., “the core 

course”), faculty serve either as a 

course director for an elective course 

in nuclear engineering or advanced 

physics, or in a leadership position in 

the core course. After two years of 

teaching, faculty can seek academic 

promotion to the rank of assistant 

professor. Academic promotion requires scholarly research and publication in a refereed journal. NSERCsupported research keeps faculty upto-date on both the research needs of 

The missions of DTRA, USMA, and the NSERC. 

DTRA Mission 

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency safeguards America 

and its allies from Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, 

biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosives) by providing capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the 

threat, and mitigate its effects. 

USMA Mission 

To educate, train and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each 

graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to 

the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career 

of a professional excellence and service to the Nation as an 

officer in the United States Army. 

NSERC Mission 

To increase the output of USMA faculty and cadet research in 

support of DTRA objectives; enhance the professional development of USMA faculty; and contribute to the education of 

cadets, especially those majoring in nuclear engineering of 

physics - the next generation of Army leaders. 
29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

DTRA and on current events in the 

research community and can help 

faculty achieve academic promotion. 

Besides benefiting the researcher 

and DTRA, faculty research also 

benefits the USMA classroom by enhancing the educational experience 

of cadets. Faculty research is further 

expected to inspire more cadets to 

consider majoring in nuclear engineering or physics. 

 The NSERC researchers facilitate 

faculty research by providing projects 

that faculty can get involved in and 

quickly become productive. We provide well-defined research topics to 

interested faculty and give them the 

resources, support, and necessary 

guidance. Under the NSERC model, 

any faculty member willing to devote 

time to research will be able to make 

a valuable contribution and so we 

expect that there will be multiple officers and cadets working on many of 

the NSERC research areas. 

 Often, graduate school research, 

particularly experimental research, 

cannot be easily continued at USMA 

due to lack of research-specific 

equipment, software, and on-site collaborators. The NSERC helps here 

by providing faculty with research 

topics and needed resources. For 

officers about to attend graduate 

school en route to USMA, we provide 

them a list of research topics of interest to DTRA (high-altitude nuclear 

effects, for example) that they can 

continue upon arrival at USMA. 

USMA officers reassigned to DTRA 

are linked with research topics of interest to their future DTRA directorate, facilitating their transition into 

new assignments. 

Cadet Research Model 

 The ideal cadet-research model 

begins with a cadet AIAD experience 

between the sophomore and junior 

years. The AIAD introduces cadets 

to a real-world project supervised by 

a project sponsor. The following 

summer, after their first full year in the 

nuclear engineering major (junior 

year), these cadets can return for a 

second AIAD at the same location. 

Returning to USMA, the cadets continue their research under the supervision of NSERC personnel in a yearlong capstone engineering design 

project. In the capstone design project, research is conducted in teams 

of three to four cadets with an assigned faculty mentor. NSERC personnel serve as the primary project 

mentors for all DTRA projects. For 

many cadets, following this model is a 

challenge since summer scheduling 

conflicts prevents some cadets from 

participating in the AIAD of their 

choice. But for those who do follow 

the model, they gain invaluable experience and insight into challenges 

facing the DoD nuclear community. 

NSERC Research Topics for Academic Year 2008 

 During Academic Year 2008 

(August 2007 to May 2008), the 

NSERC mentored cadet and faculty 

research in the following areas: 

• Modeling the dispersion of 

contaminants from a dirty bomb 

in an urban area using the 3-D 

high-fidelity simulation code Aeolus+. 

• Designing experiments to 

compare model results among 

the SCENARIO, GSCENARIO, 

and NORSE high-altitude nuclear 

effects (HANE) codes. 

• Designing radiation hardening 

experiments and targets needed 

to produce needed radiation environments for the National Ignition Facility (NIF). 

• Designing a nuclear facility 

from unclassified sources and 

studying its vulnerability to conventional and unconventional 

attacks. 

LTC Mark Visosky, Nuclear Engineering Program Director, and LTC Jeffrey Musk, NSERC Director, mentoring Cadets 

James Johnson, Brian Czarnecki, and Korey Cook on their NE496 capstone design project. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 30

• Using the Sandia National 

Laboratories ALEGRA code to 

design an experiment for 

measuring the properties of 

materials under high pressure. 

Long-Term Vision 

 Some of the USMA nuclear engineering and physics majors of today 

will be the FA52 officers of tomorrow. 

Involving these cadets in DTRA and 

NNSA research now through the 

NSERC will give them valuable experience and insight into the nuclear 

weapons and FA52 communities. 

Officers who worked with the NSERC 

as cadets will enter the FA52 community with real DTRA experience - a 

definite benefit to both the officer and 

their organization. 

 Currently, the NSERC is concentrating its efforts on involving nuclear 

engineering and physics majors in 

research but it already involves cadets from other academic majors 

across USMA. Experiencing the kind 

of research and missions performed 

by DTRA, NNSA, and the FA52 community may lead some of these cadets to consider future careers in 

FA52 bringing even more high-quality 

officers into the growing FA52 community. Ultimately, it is envisioned 

that the NSERC will serve as the conduit through which DTRA research 

projects are funneled to all academic 

departments at USMA, and through 

which USMA faculty from any department can reach back to DTRA to incorporate DTRA materials, expertise, 

and information into their classrooms. 

 In the fall 2007 semester, we 

taught lessons on nuclear terrorism 

for the Seminar on Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and Terrorism, a course 

taught in the Department of Social 

Sciences by the Combating Terrorism 

Center. In November, LTC Musk 

served as a co-chair for the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials table 

at the 59th Annual Student Conference on United States Affairs 

(SCUSA) hosted by the Department 

of Social Sciences. 

 The immediate NSERC benefit to 

DTRA is the research conducted by 

USMA cadets and faculty on projects 

of interest to DTRA. However, the 

NSERC’s role in introducing cadets to 

DTRA, NNSA, and the FA52 community, “growing” future FA52s, and developing current FA52 officers may 

turn out to be its most important and 

lasting contributions. 

Working with the NSERC 

 The NSERC is seeking research 

topics related to DTRA mission areas, 

and welcomes project ideas both 

from within and outside the DoD. 

Working through the NSERC gives 

the client access to USMA faculty 

expertise, outstanding cadet researchers, and the capabilities of 

DTRA. In return, clients can expect 

high-quality undergraduate-level research from the cadets, and professional-quality faculty research. In 

addition to providing results to the 

client, it is also expected that NSERC 

researchers will publish their results 

in a suitable venue. 

 What types of projects are suitable 

for the NSERC? Currently, the 

NSERC is best equipped to do computational and theoretical research. 

Within the NSERC and the Department of Physics, expertise exists in 

the areas of infrastructure characterization, MCNP modeling, explodingwire physics, plasma physics, space 

physics, high-altitude nuclear effects, 

nuclear weapons effects, the nuclear 

fuel cycle, and nuclear reactor theory. 

The NSERC plans to expand its research scope to encompass experimental topics, particularly in the area 

of radiation detection. 

Contact Us 

 To become involved in NSERC 

research, or to submit a project for 

USMA cadet or faculty research, 

please contact: 

LTC Jeffrey H. Musk, Ph.D 

Director 

(845) 938-0093 

(845) 938-5803/3062 (FAX) 

jeffrey.musk@usma.edu

or

MAJ Robert F. Schlicht 

Researcher 

(845) 938-0094 

(845) 938-5803/3062 (FAX) 

robert.schlicht@usma.edu

Mailing address: 

NSERC (MADN-PHYS) 

United States Military Academy 

646 Swift Road 

West Point, NY 10996 

ENDNOTES 

1

 For more information on the nuclear 

engineering major at USMA, see NBC 

Report, Fall/Winter 2002, pp.29-31. 

2

 For more information on the NERG, see 

NBC Report, Fall/Winter 2005, pp. 7-9. 

3 NBC Report, Fall/Winter 2005, p. 7. 

4

 The Nuclear Engineering Research 

Center (NERC) was the original name of 

the organization that was later to become 

the Nuclear Science and Engineering 

Research Center (NSERC). The original 

concept for the NERC was discussed in 

NBC Report, Fall/Winter 2005, p. 9. At 

the time of the Fall/Winter 2005 article, it 

was believed that the NERC could be 

staffed internally within USMA, as the 

Photonics Research Center is. 

5

 In addition to the NSERC, USMA is 

home to fourteen other centers of excellence. These range from the technical, 

such as the Photonics Research Center, 

to the educationally-oriented, such as the 

Center for Teaching Excellence, to those 

focusing on analysis, such as the Operations Research Center (ORCEN). Each 

center directly contributes to the USMA 

mission and conducts independent research and analysis. 

6

 The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) 

at West Point contributes relevant scholarly perspectives through education, research and policy analysis to combat terrorist threats to the United States. It maintains expertise in four primary areas: terrorism, counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction. By 

developing a curriculum of the highest 

quality, producing theoretically informed 

studies, and crafting relevant policy recommendations, it has become an internationally recognized center of excellence 

dedicated to the advancement of terrorism knowledge and expertise. 

7

 The Photonics Research Center's three 

principle missions focus on education of 

both cadets and officers, the conduct of 

basic and applied research, and support 

to the Army and Department of Defense 

in the area of lasers and photonics.

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 30
31 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

ecently, the United States 

and Russia scored an important, albeit quiet victory toward ending the production capability 

for weapons of mass destruction. 

 In July 2007, the last piece of 

processing equipment in the former 

chemical weapon production facility 

located in Novocheboksarsk, Russia, 

was destroyed. Along with the Volgograd, Russia, facility, which was destroyed in 2005, these complexes 

were responsible for the production of 

the majority of Russia’s deadly nerve 

agents: sarin, soman and VX. 

 The project began 10 years ago, 

when the leadership in the Republic 

of Chuvashia, where Novocheboksarsk is located, expressed the desire 

to eradicate their legacy of past 

chemical weapons production. 

 The government in Cheboksary 

(capital of Chuvashia) sought assistance from the Russian Federation 

and the United States. As a result, 

the Department of Defense directed 

the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) to assemble a project 

team for this demilitarization project 

from within the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction (CTR) directorate in the 

Operations enterprise. 

Chemical Weapons Production in Russia is Closer to 

Being a ‘Cold’ Idea

MAJ Adam S. Talkington 

Building 350 at Novocheboksarsk, was a VX production and filling facility. Photograph courtesy of the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Program. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 32

 The DTRA team was formed and 

repeatedly visited the plant site between 1997 and 2007. The team’s 

task was to complete the work designed to bring an end to the capability of producing deadly chemical 

weapons, and help to dismantle and 

destroy the facility under provisions of 

the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 

Reduction (CTR) program. 

 

 The Novocheboksarsk complex 

included Building 350, a seven-story 

structure where deadly chemical 

weapons and materials were created 

for use in the battle plans of the old 

Soviet Empire during the 1960-1980s. 

Agent production and munitions filling 

operations finished in the mid-1980s, 

and the building sat vacant for over a 

decade. It was determined to be unacceptable to leave as it was, and 

assistance was requested to dismantle and destroy the facility. 

 The project cost more than $45 

million, and was headed by DTRA 

with support from the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and Parsons 

Delaware, Inc. For over five years, 

Parsons, TVA, DTRA, and the Russian Federation’s Khimprom Joint 

Stock Company at Novocheboksarsk 

worked to design and build three thermal treatment units (furnaces) to thermally decontaminate scraps and 

waste. 

 Two years ago, the DTRA/TVA 

and Khimprom team completed the 

installation of the thermal treatment 

units within the building, and the processing of equipment and building materials began. The final destruction of 

the processing equipment was completed in July 2007, and now only 

scrap metal remains for thermal decontamination. It was jointly agreed 

that the Novocheboksarsk facility no 

longer possessed the capability to 

produce deadly chemical weapons 

because the last piece of former production equipment was destroyed. 

The formal announcement that Russia officially has one less production 

facility is left to the Russian Federation in coordination with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemicals 

Weapons, the executive agency of 

the Chemical Weapons Convention. 

 Support for project completion 

came from interpreter Emily 

Durakovsky, project support staff 

Cedric Adams, Kevin Turner and 

Yvonne Pool-Poe, and David Stephenson from TVA. Ben Moberley, 

Science Application International Corporation, provided technical assistance. 

 In support of Department of Defense and DTRA’s goal, the world has 

been made safer by the elimination of 

this production facility. 

MAJ Talkington is a Nuclear and 

Counterproliferation Officer FA52. He 

is currently assigned as Chief, Strategic Planning in the Program Integration Branch for all Cooperative Threat 

Reduction (CTR) activities worldwide, 

and Principal Advisor in the Joint Operational Environment to the Program 

Integration Director, Division Chiefs 

and staff of the CTR Directorate of 

DTRA. His previous assignment was 

with AFIT, where he was a student of 

Nuclear Engineering. 

This article was originally published 

by DTRA Connection Oct 2001 Volume 9 Number 10 

 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 32
33 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

he purpose of this article is to 

address some of the challenges and questions associated with active interrogation nuclear 

detection systems. Deployment of 

these types of systems is fundamental to meeting the challenges presented by the counterproliferation 

mission space. The execution of the 

counterproliferation mission on the 

future battlefield requires the use of 

sophisticated technologies coupled 

with the intellectual and physical capabilities of the modern soldier to dissuade, deter and defeat the enemy’s 

use of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). 1 A key component of this 

mission space is the ability to effectively detect the movement of illicit 

nuclear materials and systems across 

the entire spectrum of the battlefield. 

Several efforts are underway to develop systems and technologies 

which support this detection mission. 

These efforts can be broken into two 

key areas, active nuclear detection 

systems and passive nuclear detection systems. While both modalities 

are important to the overall mission 

space, this discussion will focus on 

the challenges and needs for active 

nuclear detection systems. 

 Active “interrogation” nuclear detection systems operate on the premise of using radiation (historically neutron or photon) from a radiation 

source to stimulate the emission of 

characteristic radiation within the suspect target. In general, the radiation 

source is a radiation generating device such as an accelerator or a neutron generator. Scientists in both 

academia and at the Department of 

Energy (DOE) national laboratories 

have conducted a great deal of research over the past 20 years, exploring these systems from source to related detector technology development. This methodology is attractive 

since special nuclear material provides several key signatures when 

stimulated with incident radiation. In 

this case, physics is on our side and 

can be exploited to solve difficult detection problems, which is the reason 

many federal agencies are interested 

in the employment of active interrogation technology. 

 The Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) is pursuing several 

active interrogation technologies 2 

including electron accelerator-based 

systems which utilize bremsstrahlung 

induced photonuclear detection. 3 A 

key concern of DTRA and the user 

community is properly accounting for 

the dose received by the interrogated 

object (e.g. a vehicle, container, etc.) 

as well as both soldiers and civilians 

which are within the immediate vicinity of such a device. Acceleratorbased systems operate in a pulsed 

mode in which the charged particles 

are delivered in pulses within 1 ns to 

1 μs and are spaced a few milliseconds apart. When used in a standoff 

mode-of-operation in an outdoor environment, such systems utilize both 

collimated and uncollimated beams to 

control the spatial behavior of the 

radiation emissions. The accelerator 

nominal operating parameters (e.g. 

beam current, repetition rate, beam 

energy, etc.) used in interrogating a 

suspect object can be varied which 

complicates dose measurement. Furthermore, the pulsed nature of an 

accelerator radiation field presents a 

litany of challenges in terms of dose 

determination. This paper will provide an overview of research being 

performed at the Georgia Institute of 

Technology to study the dosimetry 

needs for active interrogation systems as well as some other institutional questions such as dose limits, 

system deployment and regulatory 

implications. The model used to present this research is the 

bremsstrahlung-based system being 

developed by the Idaho National 

Laboratory (INL) for DTRA. 

Active Interrogation Dosimetry 

Challenges 

 Several challenges exist for performing dosimetry in active interrogation environments. In general, active 

interrogation devices are acceleratorbased systems which operate in a 

pulsed mode. Steady-state radiation 

fields, such as those emanating from 

an isotopic source, are fairly straight 

forward in terms of dose measurement whereas the pulsed environment provides a unique set of challenges in terms of measuring dose. 

The following are a discussion of 

some of those challenges. 

1. Charged Particle Equilibrium 

(Build-up) 

 Charged particle equilibrium 

(CPE) is a condition that is fundamental to radiation dosimetry.4

 Since 

the dose in a photon field stems from 

the ionization and excitation of the 

secondary charged particles which 

are generated via the photoelectric 

effect, Compton scattering and pair 

production, achieving CPE in a dose 

measuring device is required to obtain a reasonable estimate of the 

dose. The challenge in high-energy 

bremsstrahlung fields is that current 

(standard) dosimeters do not provide 

for CPE above a few MeV. CPE can 

be obtained by placing tissueequivalent material (such as a buildup cap) around the dosimeter. This 

Dosimetry Needs and Challenges for 

Active Interrogation Systems 

MAJ Michael P. Shannon 

U.S. Army Student Detachment (Georgia Institute of Technology) 

Dr. Nolan E. Hertel 

Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 34

material is generally tissue equivalent 

plastic or polymethyl mythacrylate 

(PMMA). The challenge with using a 

build-up cap is ensuring that the lowenergy portion of the photon spectrum is not overly attenuated. This 

attenuation will cause an underestimate in the total dose measured by 

the dosimeter. 

2. Detector Partial Volume Effect 

 The measurement of dose in the 

primary beam of a bremsstrahlungbased system is based on the premise that the dosimeter/detector is uniformly irradiated. In general, ionization chambers are the instrument of 

choice for pulsed-field exposure 

measurements. Air-filled chambers 

are the best ionization chambers for 

measuring exposure since exposure 

is defined by the amount of ionization 

charge created in air. 5 Electric fields 

are applied within the ion chamber to 

collect the radiation-induced charge. 

This collected charge is then converted into dose. The response of an 

ionization chamber irradiated nonuniformly (partially) can vary significantly and thus underestimate the 

dose. The beam size can contribute 

to this phenomenon. The actual dose 

within the primary beam will be higher 

than the instrument reading based on 

the ratio of the detector’s actual volume to the beam volume within the 

detector. 6 Moreover, corrections 

must be made for ion recombination, 

to be discussed in the next section. 

In general, a large volume detector 

with an appropriate build-up cap is 

needed to ensure uniform irradiation 

and thus an accurate dose measurement. 

3. Pulsed Field Effects 

 Bremsstrahlung-based active interrogation systems, which generally 

operate at a low duty cycle, often suffer from pulsed field effects. During a 

pulse, which typically lasts for 1 ns to 

1 μs and occur every few milliseconds, the maximum dose rate for an 

ionization chamber may be exceeded . This effect can result in a 

non-linear response of the ionization 

chamber. The incomplete collection of charge is known as ion recombination and results in dose 

measurements which are lower than 

the actual dose . This is due to the 

fact that some positive and negative 

ions combine (due to the large ion 

densities within the pulse) before they 

can be separated by the chamber’s 

electric field. This phenomenon can 

be corrected for by taking measurements at various bias voltages and 

applying a correction factor. 

4. Neutron Production 

 The high-energy photon fields 

used in active interrogation produce a 

secondary neutron field. The challenge with measuring this secondary 

neutron dose is the fact that the response of neutron dosimeters is 

strongly dependent on the neutron 

energy spectrum. In general, the reference radiations used for dosimeter 

calibration have spectra that differ 

from that measured near the active 

interrogation system. Typically, the 

effective dose due to neutrons from 

the primary beam of an active interrogation system is much less than the 

photon dose. However, the neutron 

dose in the surrounding area is a 

function of shielding materials and 

system design. This dose can be a 

concern if not correctly measured. 

5. Skyshine 

 The primary beam of an active 

interrogation system will scatter both 

in the air and off the interrogated object. This scatter term can create 

dose via skyshine at distances away 

from the area of operation. This effect must be taken into account when 

determining the total dose from an 

active interrogation system. 

Current Research 

 The thrust of current research is to 

develop the ability to measure, in real

-time, photon doses in the 

bremsstrahlung-based active interrogation radiation environment. Work is 

underway at Georgia Tech to develop 

a photon dosimeter/detector which 

provides near real-time dose estimates while accounting for the issues 

mentioned above. In order to develop a detection system, one must 

know and understand the radiation 

field surrounding the system. The 

characterization and assessment of 

dose for an active system deployed in 

an outdoor environment, has never 

been conducted. The technical literature contains a great deal of work in 

the area of accelerator health physics; however, most of this work is 

based on shielded facilities. The idea 

of operating an accelerator outdoors 

in a potentially populated area for the 

purposes of detecting illicit nuclear 

material is truly cutting edge. 

 Although the interrogation technique is new, the challenges associated with dosimetry can be addressed and solved with research. 

The photon dose surrounding the 

system can be estimated using Monte 

Carlo codes such as MCNP . Such 

numerical simulations are very useful 

in providing insight into the radiation 

field behavior and a predictive capability to assist in the design of dose 

measuring instruments. The validation of such simulated data is accomplished through actual dose measurements. Dose measurements can be 

conducted utilizing passive detectors 

such as thermoluminescent dosimeters (TLDs) or optically stimulated 

luminescent (OSL) dosimeters. Both 

types of dosimeters are effective in 

estimating dose; however, lack the 

ability to provide real-time data since 

they are passive devices which must 

be read after the measurement is 

completed. Active dosimeters/

detectors, such as ionization chambers or proportional counters, can 

provide accurate dose estimates; 

however, they suffer many of the effects described above when operated 

in a pulsed field so appropriate technical precautions must be taken. 

 The implications of deploying an 

active interrogation system present a 

unique set of questions in terms of 

dose limits and regulatory considerations. The National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 

(NCRP) recommends that an inadvertently exposed person should receive 

an effective dose of less than 1 mSv 7

(where 10 mSv is equal to 1 rem) for 

a single inadvertent exposure. The 

NCRP further recommended that that 

this limit can be raised to 5 mSv, if 

necessary, to achieve national security objectives. 8

 These recommenda-
35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

tions are consistent with 10 CFR 20 9

limits as well as those used in current 

Army systems. There are questions 

to be addressed in terms of dose limits: Do these limits make sense for 

active interrogation systems? What 

are the drivers that would lead to a 

change in these limits? Is there a 

technical basis? These questions 

must be answered before an active 

interrogation system is deployed. 

Conclusion 

 Research is underway to scientifically study the dose implications of 

active interrogation systems. The 

thrust of this work is to provide a 

sound technical basis for answering 

dose-related questions as well as 

overcoming the obstacles associated 

with deploying these technologies. 

MAJ Michael Shannon is a Nuclear 

and Counterproliferation Officer 

(FA52) and currently a Ph.D. Candidate in Nuclear and Radiological Engineering at the Georgia Institute of 

Technology in Atlanta, GA. His Ph.D. 

dissertation research is focused in the 

area of radiation detector development and dosimetry for active interrogation systems and environments. 

His research directly supports 

DTRA’s bremsstrahlung-based research and development effort at the 

Idaho National Laboratory. He has a 

B.S. in Aerospace Engineering and 

an M.S. in Aeronautical Science from 

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and an M.S. in Health Physics 

from Georgia Tech. He was previously assigned as an Assistant Professor and Instructor in the Department of Physics at the U.S. Military 

Academy. His email address is michael.shannon1@us.army.mil. 

Dr. Nolan Hertel is a Professor of Nuclear and Radiological Engineering 

and a Senior Research Fellow in the 

Sam Nunn Security Program at the 

Georgia Institute of Technology in 

Atlanta, GA. He has a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering and an M.S. in Nuclear Engineering from Texas A&M 

University. He has a Ph.D. in Nuclear 

Engineering from the University of 

Illinois. Dr. Hertel is an internationally 

recognized expert in radiation shielding and dosimetry. His research interests are concentrated in radiation 

measurement, shielding and dosimetry. For more than 10 years, he 

has been involved in numerical radiation dosimetry and has an ongoing 

program in the computation of fluence

-to-dose conversion coefficients for 

neutrons, protons, and photons. 

Presently, he is involved in research 

on the characterization of various 

handheld instruments for use in 

emergency response to terrorist acts 

involving radioactive materials and for 

the detection of radioactive contraband. Dr. Hertel also serves as the 

coordinator of the Georgia Tech Focused Research Program on Pioneer 

Research in Nuclear Detection (GT 

PRIND). In this effort, Dr. Hertel has 

assimilated a multidisciplinary group 

of researchers on the Georgia Tech 

campus to address the nuclear detection needs for national defense, 

homeland security, nuclear nonproliferation verification and other related 

activities. His email address is 

nolan.hertel@me.gatech.edu. 

References

1. DOD Joint Staff, “National Military 

Strategy to Combat Weapons of 

Mass Destruction,” Washington, D.C., 

2006. 

2. Harbs, R., “Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA): Combating 

the Radiological/Nuclear Threat,”

IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, 

Honolulu, Hawaii, October 2007. 

3. Norman, D., et al, “Active Nuclear 

Material Detection and Imaging,” INL/

CON-05-00370, Idaho National Laboratory, October 2005. 

4. Attix, F., “Energy Imparted, Energy 

Transferred and Net Energy Transferred,” Physics in Medicine and Biology, Volume 28, Number 12, pg. 

1388, 1983. 

5. Knoll, G., “Radiation Detection and 

Measurements, Third Edition,” John 

Wiley & Sons, 2000. 

6. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements, “Report 

No. 144 – Radiation Protection for 

Particle Accelerator Facilities,” Bethesda, Maryland, 2005. 

7. National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. “Report 

No. 116 - Limitation of Exposure to 

Ionizing Radiation,” Bethesda, Maryland, 1993. 

8. National Council on Radiation Prot e c t i o n a n d M e a s ur em e n ts . 

“Presidential Report on Radiation 

Protection Advice for Pulsed Fast 

Neutron Analysis System Used in 

Security Surveillance,” Bethesda, 

Maryland, 2002. 

9. 10 CFR 20. “Standards for Protection Against Radiation,” Washington, 

35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 36

	ome FA 52 Officers do not have Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology 

(ABET) accredited undergraduate degrees 

but later received MS and PhDs in Engineering 

and Science from those same institutions. Professional Engineering licensure is a qualification 

that carries legitimacy and credence within authoritative science and engineering circles often 

traveled by FA 52 Officers. As one of these “late 

bloomers” I felt it appropriate to share one way 

of availing oneself to this professional development opportunity. 

 When scoping State PE Licensure information found at http://www.ncees.org/licensure/

licensing_boards/, I noted that many States are 

in the process of closing the door on exceptions 

to policy regarding applicant requirements for 

ABET accredited undergraduate engineering degrees. I have found that the State of Virginia offers a PE through an Engineering and Technology Program option for use by those applicants 

with degree in fields other than engineering or a 

related science, or with no degree. For this option you may visit http://www.dpor.virginia.gov/

dporweb/eit_form.cfm for more information. In 

essence, the applicant must have taken a combination of 128 semester hours in mathematics, 

science, & technology courses. 

 This may seem daunting for those of us that 

have been out of the undergraduate school environment, for some 15 years or more. The endeavor to pass the fundamental and PE exams 

that result in licensure is a serious undertaking. 

Indeed, there is no indication that a ‘last call’ for 

those without ABET undergraduate engineering 

degrees: The opportunity for those of us determined to strive for professional engineering excellence still exists. 

LTC Nik Putnam is a Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer FA52. His previous assignment 

was with the 30th Engineer Battalion 

(Topographic), Fort Bragg, NC, as the Battalion 

Executive Officer. 

 

Last Call for Professional Engineering Licensure?

LTC Nik Putnam, Professional Geologist 
37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 


ossibly the first time the general 

public heard anything about the 

United States’ Nuclear Emergency Search Teams (NEST) was 

from seeing the feature film, The 

Peacemaker, which depicted a terrorist carting a small nuclear primary in a 

backpack through the streets of New 

York intent on destroying the United 

Nations (and most of the city). The 

heroes of the movie are joined by 

NEST team members in helicopters 

scanning the streets a few metres 

above the tops of skyscrapers -- their 

goal to detect and track the mancarried bomb as it moves closer to its 

target, then for Nicole Kidman to dismantle it single-handed. 

 NEST was set up in 1975, a year 

after a Boston hoaxer threatened to 

detonate a nuclear device unless paid 

$200,000. Scientists with the Atomic 

Energy Commission were flown to 

one airport. Their radiation detection 

equipment went to another. No one 

was sure what to look for or how to 

find it or exactly what to do if they did. 

As it turned out, the government's 

bewilderment really didn't matter. The 

extortionist never picked up the 

money the FBI left at a prearranged 

spot. Fortunately for Boston, there 

was no bomb. Since then there have 

been over 125 incidents, which have 

all officially been hoaxes. 

Team response 

 The NEST is a volunteer response 

group of more than 900 personnel on 

call who have highly specialised expertise and equipment. They are 

managed and directed as part of an 

emergency response branch of the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the US Department of Energy (DOE), on a small 

annual budget of roughly $40 million. 

Their mission: to boldly search for, 

defuse or as safely as possible destroy, nuclear material or weapons, 

perform diagnostics and assessment 

of suspected nuclear devices, carry 

out technical operations in support of 

render safe procedures, and package 

devices for transport to final disposition. The teams also assist the FBI in 

investigating a crime involving nuclear theft, and increasingly relevant 

in terms of the terrorist threat, improvised nuclear devices (INDs) and radiological dispersal devices (RDDs). 

 Out of the 900+ specialists, ad hoc

response groups can range from five 

advisory members to operational 

teams of 45 physicists, chemists, 

mathematicians, communications 

specialists, security experts, meteorologists, and other technical specialists from the national nuclear laboratories and facilities, some of whom 

have designed nuclear weapons. As 

terrorist incidents can arise with no 

warning, the teams must be prepared 

for rapid deployment at any time; otherwise, they may be drafted in for pre

-deployment planning. They must 

also co-ordinate between agencies, 

including State Department, FBI, 

state and local officials, and possibly 

foreign governments. 

 The NEST teams are usually accompanied by special-operations 

commandos from the FBI'S domestic 

counterterrorism office, but the DOE 

has authority to call in counterterrorist 

special mission units (SMUs), comprising élite members of the Army's 

Delta Force and the Navy's SEAL 

Team 6. NNSA also works with the 

Customs Service to detect and analyse incidents involving smuggling of 

radiological materials into the US. 

Fleeing the NEST 

Andy Oppenheimer looks at the work of the US Nuclear Emergency Search Teams 

INTERNATIONAL 

Recovered looted yellowcake barrels at the abandoned al-Tuaitha nuclear facility in Iraq after a team scoured the surrounding villages and recovered them. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 38

 Within NEST the Accident Response Group (ARG) deals with accidentally damaged nuclear weapons 

(‘Broken Arrows’); the Joint Technical 

Operations Team (JTOT), responds 

to the threat of a terrorist device. The 

heart of the search operation is the 

Search Response Team, consisting 

of seven full-time emergency response personnel who are on a fourhour standby to be transported immediately by military or civil aircraft to 

the area being searched. Once deployed, their task is to instruct and 

equip local first-responders. This will 

include training of ‘novice’ searchers 

who have local knowledge and may 

help the primary team to trace the 

source, although security would be of 

paramount importance where local 

searchers could compromise an operation. 

 The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) is usually the firstresponding resource in assessing a 

radiological emergency, and advises 

on what further steps should be taken 

to minimise hazards. RAP teams arrive at the scene within four to six 

hours after notification of an emergency to conduct the initial radiological assessment of an affected area 

and determine what actions to take. 

 As an ongoing process NEST and 

RAP specialists track all the examples of information on nuclear bombbuilding on the Internet and elsewhere, a problem that did not exist 

when the teams were set up – although in 1979, the US government 

fought to stop a radical magazine 

from publishing details and diagrams 

on how to build a hydrogen bomb. 

The information was eventually published by other sources, but open 

sources do not include the vital steps 

necessary to construct the most complex explosive devices ever made. 

Past NEST ‘call-outs’ 

 NEST crews have officially never 

found a nuclear bomb, but there have 

been several scares and at least one 

actual threat. Since 1978, of these 60 

have been nuclear extortion (mostly 

by nuclear industry employees), 25 

nuclear reactor hoaxes, 20 nonnuclear extortion; and 650 cases involving reported or attempted illicit 

sale of nuclear materials. 

 Details of past cases are not available, although some stories have 

done the rounds – one such being a 

call the FBI received on in February 

1999, saying that radioactive material 

was aboard an Amtrak train bound 

from Chicago to Seattle and that its 

passengers were in danger. This and 

an eastbound passenger train were 

diverted to a remote stretch of track in 

Montana. NEST teams were flown to 

the site; after searching both trains 

they found no device. 

 In 1976 NEST vans monitored 

radiation in the streets of Washington, 

D.C. following a tip-off that a terrorist 

US Fire Service personnel using GR135 Plus, which is hand-held Radioactivity 

Characterization Equipment for searching, measuring and identifying HEU, plutonium and other radioactive sources. 
39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

group could mark the Bicentennial 

celebrations with a bang. In August 

1980 a sophisticated IED was detonated in Harvey's Casino in State 

Line, Nevada. The device was exploded by a failed attempt to render it 

safe. While not nuclear, the IED presented the kind of challenges that 

could be encountered in an IND and 

became a benchmark for the development of new equipment and techniques to render safe similar devices. 

 In the immediate aftermath of 

9/11, NEST has been deployed twice 

a year. Teams were tasked in January 2002 with searching major US 

cities for a possible terrorist-deployed 

RDD. In February 2002 teams also 

quietly provided support to security 

efforts at the Salt Lake City Winter 

Olympics. That same year, NNSA 

administrator John Gordon testified at 

a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee that the NEST could 

respond to a potential incident within 

four hours, but that they would in future need to act even more quickly. 

 More recently, in October 2005 a 

radiation sensor at Colombo, Sri 

Lanka signaled that the contents of 

an outbound shipping container included radioactive material. After 

American and Sri Lankan inspectors 

hurriedly checked camera images at 

the port, they concluded that the suspect crate might be on any one of five 

ships - two of which were steaming 

toward New York. One NEST team 

flew to Canada and a second intercepted one of the ships before it 

could reach Hamburg. Nothing was 

found. When the United States Coast 

Guard stopped the two New Yorkbound ships in territorial waters, scientists boarded the vessels and, using diagnostic equipment, found nothing. The offending vessel was on an 

Asian route, and its cargo was scrap 

metal mixed with radioactive materials that had been dumped improperly. 

Low-Level radium and palladium are spread to simulate a nuclear accident to test search response. 

Surface contamination detector. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 40

NEST equipment 

 Precise details of operational 

search procedures remain classified 

to deny any potential threat from the 

defeat of developing countermeasures response plans. The specialised equipment first available to the 

NEST was the early Surveillance Accident Nuclear Detection System 

(SANDS) which continues to evolve. 

It includes a range of nuclear radiation detection systems for surveying 

an area for lost or diverted nuclear 

weapons and SNM (special nuclear 

materials: weapons-grade uranium 

and plutonium) and also for delineating the distribution of radioactive material resulting from a nuclear accident. A DoD programme is under way 

to upgrade NEST'S detection capabilities and counterterrorism intelligence to counter the rising threat of 

nuclear terrorism. 

 Equipment is both vehicle-carried 

and hand-held. The teams have four 

helicopters and three planes at their 

disposal and the exteriors of vans 

carrying teams with their equipment 

are disguised by fake commercial 

artwork prepared by a dedicated 

graphics agency. The Aerial Measuring System (AMS) is deployed on 

board the aircraft and helicopters to 

detect and measure radioactive material deposited on the ground, including at extremely low radiation levels, 

and can conduct real-time air sampling and tracking of airborne radiation. This information helps determine 

how fast contaminants are moving 

and in what direction. 

 Detection of devices is carried out 

using neutron and gamma detectors. 

Material emitting neutrons and 

gamma rays, which can shoot out 

hundreds of metres, can be most 

easily detected while a team is driving 

up a street, walking through a building, or flying low over a town. Sensitive passive heat detectors are used, 

as decaying nuclear material gives off 

more heat than detectable highenergy particles. As would be expected, much depends greatly on the 

nuclear material used – whether it 

emits alpha radiation, which can be 

shielded by a single sheet of paper, 

while beta rays cannot penetrate 

wood or a dry wall. 

 The kit also includes Portac, a 

portable x-ray source that can quickly 

provide high-quality images of a 

weapon's interior; a high-pressure 

non-magnetic water cutting tool; robots with video cameras; and disablement and damage-limitation devices. 

The teams have to be unobtrusive: 

hand-held detectors are carried in 

toolboxes, briefcases and beer coolers. They have a fleet of nondescript 

vans and trucks at their disposal to 

carry, along with the detectors, tons 

of kit for satellite informationgathering, lathes to machine their 

own equipment at the scene, cameras, scuba and climbing gear, tents, 

special foam and freezing chemicals. 

 The teams carry an armoury of 

laptops and disk drives - such as 

those which went missing in May 

2000 at Los Alamos Nuclear Weapons Laboratory (LANL). The disks 

Searching for looted material in Iraq 
41 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

contain information about materials, 

design, and other physical parameters of both domestic and foreign nuclear weapons. Results from detection sensors along with other physical 

measurements and observations are 

fed into the NEST laptops. Advanced 

software is then used to make a best 

attempt to generate procedures and 

advice on disarming the devices. The 

best way, though, to work out how to 

dismantle an IND (or any bomb) is to 

build one yourself. So NEST scientists spend a lot of time trying to 

dream up how a nuclear device would 

be assembled. 

Render safe 

 Once an unexplainable radioactive 

emission is located, a plain-clothes 

NEST deactivation squad takes off in 

tandem with the FBI'S commandos. 

They are guided from a NEST command post inside an ordinary-looking 

recreation vehicle. Faced with an unknown design, JTOT volunteers 

would evaluate the device without 

disturbing or destroying it, and determine how it was constructed and how 

to determine the source of the 

weapon from its design or materials. 

A Home Team provides JTOT with 

rapid access to expanded expertise 

and a vital computing link. At the site, 

scientists can weigh what their diagnostic tools told them against data 

from more than 1,000 US nuclear 

tests. Those data are available to 

them on the laptops, which run simulations of a device's destructive potential. But it is most likely that a nuclear or radiological deployment is 

likely to be of an improvised nature. 

 The mission is ‘render safe’ - disable the device then move it to a safe 

spot for disassembly. The device 

must be rendered inert, which involves making safe the high explosives (HE) that surround the nuclear 

core. HE are very difficult to render 

100% inert. If Portac radiography reveals the HE is cracked, it must be 

stabilised with injections of a vulcanising rubber before the weapon is 

moved. The device would be surrounded by a tent enclosure several 

tens of metres in height and width, 

then filled with special foam to contain the radioactive material if the 

bomb exploded during defusing. 

The Percussion-Actuated Nonelectric 

(PAN) Disrupter is a disablement tool 

used to dismantle suspected RDDs 

and also preserve forensic evidence. 

Other equipment is for containment of 

particulates released in an RDD explosion. 

 Almost every week the FBI randomly selects several cities for visits 

by NEST. Agencies in larger metropolitan areas such as San Francisco, 

Los Angeles, Chicago, New York and 

others have worked alongside NEST 

in training exercises, which involve 

the hiding of fake nuclear weapons 

containing radioactive materials sufficient to represent emissions that 

would be given off by an actual nuclear bomb. In the words of one 

NEST operative: “You have to have 

the knowledge of a Nobel scientist, 

nerves of steel and loud noises can't 

make you jumpy.” 

Reprinted with kind permission from 

NBC International, Autumn 2007 

41 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

Postcard sent to the governor of California claims small 

amount of plutonium has been released in the Capital 

building to demonstrate the folly of nuclear energy 

and toxic substances. 

Examples of NEST call-outs since 1975

El Paso, 

Texas unknown 13 April1990 

Indianapolis, 

Indiana unknown 27 Nov 1987 

Telephone caller claiming to represent a Cuban political 

movement says a nuclear device he has invented would go 

off that night in a bank building. 

Sacramento, 

CA unknown 9 April 1979 

Wilmington, 

N.C. 

30 Jan 1979 

Suspect 

arrested, 

convicted 

Former employee at a nuclear fuel processing plant leaves 

a radioactive sample and a note at the door of the plant 

manager. He demands $100,000 or threatens to scatter 

uranium in a city. 

Spokane, 

WA. 

23 Nov 1976 unknown 

Police receive a message threatening 10 explosions, 

each dispersing 10 pounds of radioactive waste. 

Message demands $500,000. 

Los Angeles, 

CA. 

unknown 31 Jan 1975 

A threat, including the drawing of a one-megaton hydrogen 

bomb, supposedly from the radical group Weather 

Underground. Nuclear bombs said to be placed in 

three buildings. 

Reason for Call-out Result Date Location

Caller to the mayor's office saying nuclear explosive built 

with uranium would blow up a 3 sq m area. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 42

hlorine gas is now being 

used by sectarian terrorists 

against civilians in Iraq. 

Heavier than air, it clings to the 

ground and spreads quickly in a light 

wind. Eventually lethal in large quantities, it chokes the victim to death. The 

terrorists have found that it increases 

the death toll for two reasons. Firstly, 

without individual personal equipment 

(IPE) the emergency services get 

delayed in reacting to an event and 

secondly those close to the blast, 

immobilised by their injuries, die 

through asphyxiation. The injury toll is 

vastly increased (by over 150 in the 

21 February 2007 Baghdad event). 

Awash with chlorine 

 Experts accept that the terrorists 

clearly understand the risks inherent 

in trying to synthesise, store and then 

deliver one of the 'classic' agents 

such as sarin. Why bother, when a 

common-range toxic chemical can be 

used? Sadly, history repeats itself. In 

1915, the Germans used gas for the 

first time - as a means of breaking the 

tactical stalemate that had descended 

on the western front. The gas they 

used was chlorine. It was available. 

Health spas were big business in prewar Germany and the average resort 

used thousands of kilograms of chlorine gas to purify the water. They 

were producing 40 tons a day by the 

outbreak of war. In Iraq today and 

especially in neighbouring wealthy 

Gulf states, there are swimming pools 

in every hotel and many thousands of 

private homes. Chlorine is readily 

available. 

 Fortunately, modern individual 

protective equipment (IPE) and collective protection (COLPRO) is effective against chlorine and other traditional gases. Armed forces are well 

protected but the civil emergency services, less so. 

Dawn of the superterrorist 

 Military personnel today face an 

unfamiliar and uncomfortable challenge. Compared with 30 years ago, 

the character of warfare has changed 

beyond recognition. Then, both 

NATO and Warsaw Pact forces 

planned for the massive use of 

chemical weapons (CW) on the battlefield, both in the area denial role to 

foil amphibious assault and, offensively, to gain ground. Armoured units 

and infantry trained hard to fight a 

lengthy, dirty war. 

 Armed forces today operating in 

the Middle East, Africa, Sri Lanka and 

Afghanistan find themselves in hostile 

territory, mounting fast tactical operations out of heavily defended garrisons. They face a much more challenging threat. The enemy is highly 

trained, dedicated, motivated, mobile 

and armed with sophisticated weaponry supplied by sponsoring states. 

These are superterrorists with a resourceful insight into the use of CW. 

 At an individual level, they have 

studied the Internet as well as the 

written notes on chemical, biological, 

radiological, nuclear (CBRN) circulated within the Al Qaeda network. It 

has become a local idea, using the 

resources available at the time. Even 

the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil 

Eelam - 'Tamil Tigers') have used 

chlorine gas - in a 1990 attack 

against a military camp in East Kiran. 

Looking at events like these, targeted 

against sophisticated, disciplined military forces, most recently in Iraq, experts see a grave danger, as happened in 1915, that the insurgents 

may re-learn an ancient lesson and 

see chlorine as a significant forcemultiplier. They will have analysed 

the results and may be persuaded to 

move on to other things. 

TICs on the battlefield 

 Western intelligence has produced 

a long list of inherently toxic industrial 

chemicals (TICs) whose extraction or 

synthesis, storage, distribution and 

utilisation still remains largely unprotected, because government cannot 

agree with industry - which should 

bear the cost. NATO's International 

Task Force 25 (ITF-25) defines a TIC 

as a chemical compound with an inhalation LCt50 of less than 100,000 

mg per min m3 (where LC50 equals 

Chemical Brothers 

John Eldridge examines chemical threats to troops during military operations around the world 

The Swift Engineering KillerBee UAS allows a payload between 14 and 30 kg 

and can stay airborne for up to 15 hours a useful vehicle for CW detection. 
43 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

the separate effective concentrations

for lethality in 50% of the exposed 

population and t = time of exposure) 

and an 'appreciable' (undefined) vapour pressure at 200°C. 

 There has been an undercurrent 

of anxiety that many of these materials would start to appear on the battlefield. The recent use of chlorine is 

therefore extremely significant, although it has received little ongoing 

media attention. Industry uses many 

compounds with utility as CW agents. 

In the Middle East, for example, there 

is an extremely large requirement for 

robust pest control. Some of the latter 

are close to the nerve agents 

(malathion is an example from the 

organophosphate group) and others 

include cyanide and ammonia. 

 The Russians used a fast-acting 

opioid analgesic (fentanyl) in trying to 

knock down Chechen rebel hostagetakers in 1992. The effects of fentanyl 

in this kind of situation were poorly 

understood and 127 of the 850 hostages (mainly the young) died. And 

CW is not the only thing in the terrorists' sights. Radioactive materials are 

more difficult to procure in any quantity but could be much more effective 

in a long-term area denial role. Although BW is seen as essentially a 

strategic weapon, the general desire 

to inflict massive casualties could be 

realised by the self-infected terrorist. 

However, in the tactical threat to 

troops, it is the use of CW which is 

the most pressing challenge. 

Instant reaction 

 Mobility, a key factor in military 

operations, would be frustrated by the 

need to operate continuously protected, especially in the Gulf climate. 

Also, the requirement for close contact with local populations in order to 

win hearts and minds precludes such 

a method of operating. Continuously 

protected operation would be the only 

sure way of surviving the kind of nonotice threat posed in this type of environment but remains out of the 

question. The nature of the threat 

prevents any form of early warning 

but widely dispersed individual detector/warners can offer valuable alarm 

information to those downwind of the 

affected victim, allowing others time 

to mask up. 

 How, then, has the defence community and industry moved to meet 

the challenge? In this changed threat 

environment, individual protection 

assumes perhaps a greater significance than detection. A roadside 

bomb or suicide attack comes without 

warning. No time to look at screens, 

only time to mask up as a fast as possible. Clearly, the key element here in 

saving lives is speed (and therefore 

the ease) with which a mask can be 

donned. The quality of filtration 

comes a very close second and, 

here, there have been significant developments both in large scale filtration for COLPRO as well as at an 

individual level. 

Nanoprotection 

 The insides of both types of filter 

were once similar. Not so today. 

Nanotechnology has been brought to 

bear on IPE filter design. Especially in 

face-mask canisters, both vibration 

and adsorption of water-vapour cause 

a decay in the adsorptive effectiveness of the carbon filter. Carbonbonded carbon composites allow a 

more rigid structure, avoiding the settling effect and presenting a consistent face to the incoming challenge. 

Carbon nanotubes - highly rigid, long 

stranded, fullerene-type allotropes of 

carbon hold great promise in the improvement of shelf life and filter effectiveness. At molecular level, activated 

carbon can be placed precisely on 

microengineered lattice structures to 

give the most efficient labyrinth in 

which to trap the challenge material. 

 Different compounds are utilised 

to improve activation (ASC-TEDA 

charcoal) to render it more effective 

against high vapour pressure compounds such as the blood agents. In 

fact the USA moved away from ASC/

TEDA charcoal some time ago, 

based on the perceived dangers from 

its chromium content. Its patented 

replacement, ASZM-TEDA, carbon 

uses a triethylenediamine compound 

containing copper, silver, zinc and 

molybdenum molecules for activation. 

Ion-exchange technology makes the 

impregnation process less hit-andmiss than at present. There are rivals 

to carbon as well. Zeolites (crystalline 

structures of oxygen, silicon and aluminium) are being examined as alternatives. MCM-41 (Mobile Crystalline 

Material) is a particularly interesting 

silicate structure which lends itself to 

molecular sieves and to filters. Unlike 

carbon, the white colour of silicates 

takes on the colours of activation 

compounds such as copper or chromium. These, in turn change when 

challenged with agent, giving a visual 

indication of the remaining capacity in 

a filter which is not available to carbon. 

Filtration and mobility 

 An important factor in ensuring the 

effectiveness of mask filtration is the 

ability to monitor its quality. Mask 

testing has also moved ahead and 

products like Air Techniques International's TDA-99M allows a full range 

of parameters to be assessed and 

recorded including the integrity of the 

face seal, inlet and outlet valves and 

drinking devices, for a wide variety of 

masks. 

The Avon Protection M50 mask, shown 

here with twin conformal filters forms 

the next generation of respiratory protection for the US armed forces as part 

of the Joint Service General Purpose 

Mask Program. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 44

 COLPRO filtration, not concerned 

so much with portability and size, has 

focused on technologies like pressure 

or temperature swing (P/T Swing), 

whereby two adjacent filter beds are 

alternately challenged and purged, 

managed by a 'bootstrap' system. 

This cycle was found to have a detrimental effect on traditionally manufactured carbon filters for similar but 

larger-scale reasons to the IPE canister. Improving the stability and rigidity 

of the carbon structure increases the 

life and, using silicon-based filters, 

the high temperatures involved in the 

purging process actually improves the 

quality of filtration. 

 The traditional IPE suit has attracted some subtle changes in technology. The level and type of activation has been optimised to face the 

challenge of toxic industrial materials 

(TIMs). Non-woven polymers with 

better 'wicking' capability and less 

heat-stress impact have emerged. 

The bonding of the fibres at the 

seams and joints has also improved, 

reducing the possibility of leaks. Impermeable suits, essential for activities like remediation and thorough 

decon now offer better mobility, visibility and internal climate control. 

Forewarned is forearmed 

 The first purpose of CW detection 

is to give enough warning to personnel to minimise injury. Whilst networked perimeter detection systems 

are a tried and tested solution, fast 

deployment of detection capability 

further afield is vital for force protection. A great deal of effort is being put 

into land-mobile CBRN reconnaissance. For example, a UK consortium 

comprising Smith's Detection, Siemens Power Generation and Bruhn 

Newtech has delivered a technical 

demonstrator to the UK MoD within a 

six-month timescale, designed to offer an adaptable, comprehensive, 

integrated system suitable for fitting 

to a variety of potential recce vehicles. It deploys an integrated suite of 

Radiation CW agent and, in the future, BW detectors. The first purposedesigned CBRN recce vehicle, the 

German Fuchs, carries a similar integrated suite from Bruker Daltonics. 

Developed for the first Gulf War, 

Fuchs has become popular and now 

equips a number of armed forces 

apart from the German armed forces, 

including the UK and USA. The CW 

agent detector here is based on the 

GC/MS system RAID-2. 

Detection takes off 

 There are other methods on the 

horizon offering a quicker response to 

intelligence of a developing raid with 

a CBRN flavour. In fact, this is where 

aviation meets nanotechnology. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) such 

at Swift Engineering's KillerBee UAS 

could carry a CBRN detection payload. With an open architecture approach, the load bay accepts between 14 and 30 kg of payload, trading off against endurance (a healthy 

maximum of 15 hours). The vehicle 

A UK consortium comprising Smiths Detection, Siemens Power Generation and Bruhn Newtech recently delivered to the 

UK MoD an integrated detection system, designed for adaptable deployment in a variety of vehicles, such as the UK 

Spartan CRV(T). 
45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

itself could operate on-board sensors, 

surveying the suspected zone of contamination or could deploy standalone sensors upwind of vulnerable 

sites and formations. 

 

 The Defence Science Office 

(DSO) of the US Defence Advanced 

Research Project Agency (DARPA) is 

looking at remote agent detection for 

BW and some research is focusing 

on optical systems which, in future, 

could form a UAS payload. The 

DARPA Femtosecond Adaptive 

Spectroscopy Techniques for Remote 

Agent Detection (FASTREAD) programme aims to overcome the shortcomings of current LIDAR techniques 

(which provides temporal data but not 

discrimination) and spectral analysis 

(poor specificity), using anthrax 

spores as the trial challenge. 

 CW detection technology has 

moved on and although not instantaneous, the leading products offer extremely fast reaction times. In the 

past, detection has been dogged by 

high false alarm rates, the need for 

specialised maintenance and logistic 

support and poor ease of use. All that 

has changed. Three elements have 

come into play: nanotechnology, system integration and improved software. Not only has the basic design 

moved ahead in each approach but 

the convergence between the underpinning science and these three elements has accelerated the improvement to all-round capability. 

 For example, early detectors 

which relied on optical signals, such 

as photo ionisation devices (PID) and 

flame photometry detectors, were 

prone to fogging. Early IMS devices 

suffered from high false alarm rates 

and were unsuitable inside COLPRO. 

Modern IMS devices such as Smiths 

Detection's Lightweight Chemical Detector (LCD), an individual detector 

issued to UK and other armed forces, 

and Bruker Daltonics’ RAID-M-100 

both cover TICs in addition to the 'war 

gases'. Gas Chromatography and 

Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS) devices 

were cumbersome and only viable as 

vehicle-mounted systems. Synodys 

(France) produces the miniaturised 

DAXEL 2C GC/MS system. In addition to developments like these, 'labon-a-chip' has met microfluidics and 

future aviation has converged with 

nanotechnology. 

 In October last year, two US companies, NanoDynamics of Buffalo NY 

and ICx Agentase of Pittsburgh, 

joined forces to develop a nanoengineered biocatalytic air monitor 

capable of detecting nerve agents at 

extremely low concentrations. In the 

case of sarin, the first noticeable effect is miosis at concentrations between 0.5 and 2.0 mg min m3

 and the 

monitor will detect concentrations well 

below this level. Smart Dust (see 'Lab 

on a Chip: Promised Land of Detection - NBC International Winter edition) is an extremely promising piece 

of science which, at relatively low 

cost, can deploy a widespread array 

of such detectors, unseen and unfound by the enemy. Micro volume 

immunoabsorbant assays are emerging, offering near-real time detection. 

Technologies such as High 

Performance Liquid ChromatographyInductively-Coupled Plasma-Mass 

Spectrometry (HPLC-ICP-MS) have 

been developed by companies like 

Agilent Technologies in the USA, with 

its 7500 series. 

Measuring up to new CW threats 

 At unit level, a comprehensive 

detection capability still remains vital 

for the protection of fixed bases and 

vulnerable maritime platforms. Mobile 

formations, headquarters unit staff, 

locally employed workers and supporting units cannot possibly be expected to operate at the top level of 

CBRN preparedness indefinitely. Insurgent or terrorist attacks, whilst becoming increasingly sophisticated 

through the support of sponsoring 

states, lack the reach available to 

modern armed forces such as aircraft 

and unmanned aircraft systems 

(UASs). 

 

 Whilst rocket RPGs and mortars 

have sufficient range, the business of 

sourcing or manufacturing, storing, 

filling munitions, deploying and 

launching CBRN warheads is yet to 

be considered worth the risk compared with the ease and devastating 

effectiveness of conventional warheads. Nevertheless, the chlorine 

events in Iraq suggest that the time 

cannot be far away when these 

weapons will form a more central part 

of the terrorist inventory. Detecting 

launch sites is a key task for reconnaissance vehicles and aircraft, both 

conventional and unmanned. Lowtech release methods for CWA are 

readily available and toxic vapour 

from vehicle-mounted pressurised 

containers could be released well 

upwind of a protected base or airfield. 

The Aum Shinrikyo sect successfully 

used such an arrangement in 1994 at 

Matsumoto, with a nerve agent manufactured and stored in great secrecy 

under the noses of the Japanese police. The agent was released from a 

truck-mounted array of industrial 

sprayers connected to a heater. 

There were seven deaths and nearly 

300 casualties. 

 In summary, the new threat to 

armed forces has caused both the 

defence community and industry to 

think again - to take the wider view in 

trying to combat the short-notice 

CBRN hazard in a very different operational environment than in the 

past. Technology has come to the 

rescue and begun to deliver the kind 

of warning and protection required by 

the new environment. The biggest 

gap is in the provision of countermeasures to first-responders and guidance to the civilian population, especially in Iraq. 

Cdr John Eldridge MBE FNI, former 

editor of Jane's Nuclear, Biological 

and Chemical Defence, was principal 

Royal Navy staff adviser on CBRN at 

the UK Ministry of Defence during the 

first Gulf War. 

Reprinted with kind permission from 

NBC International Summer 2007. 

45 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 46

	



	



Introduction to Combating WMD 

Course 

This course introduces students to US Government and Department of Defense Combating 

WMD (CWMD) strategy, policy and operations. 

8-10 Apr 2008 – NCR 

7-9 Jul 2008 - DNWS 

Locations: 

National Capitol Region (NCR) and Defense 

Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS) 

Albuquerque, New Mexico 

US Nuclear Policy 

This course explains the US policy and it’s history; reviews NATO policy, discusses nuclear 

deterrence: theory, principles, and implications; 

discusses instruments of national power and implications for nuclear weapons; review nuclear 

surety and intelligence; discuss nuclear treaties 

and arms control. 

21-23 Apr 2008 

15-16 Jul 2008 

This course is taught at DNWS. 

Email: DNWS@abq.dtra.mil 

Fax (505) 846-9168 or DSN 246-9168 

Online Registration:

https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil/StudentArea/Login.asp 

Army Regulation 10-16

This regulation prescribes the mission and functions of the U.S. Army Nuclear and 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA). This newly revised 

AR is expected for release in May 2008. 

Among the changes: 

- Reflects the transfer of USANCA from TRADOC to HQDA. 

- Establishes the responsibilities for development and maintenance of Army consequence assessment modeling programs and establishes a skill identifier for consequence assessment modelers. 

2008 Technical Meetings

HEART Conference: 31 Mar-4 May, Colorado Springs, CO 

DOD E3 Program Review: 7-11 APR, San Diego, CA 

Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference: 14-18 JUL, Tucson, AZ 

POC is Mr. Robert Pfeffer @ 703-806-7862 

FA52 Courses of Interest 

Theater Nuclear Operations Course 

(TNOC) 

TNOC is the only course offered by a Department of Defense 

(DOD) organization that provides training for planners, support 

staff, targeteers, and staff nuclear planners for joint operations and 

targeting. The course provides overview of nuclear weapon design, 

capabilities and effects as well as U.S. nuclear policy, and joint nuclear doctrine. TNOC meets U.S. Army qualification requirements 

for the additional skill identifier 5H. The course number is DNWSR013 (TNOC). Call DNWS at (505) 846-5666 or DSN 246-5666 for 

quotas and registration information. 

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer Course 

(NCP52) 

NCP52 is the Functional Area 52 qualifying course. Initial priority is 

given to officer TDY enroute to a FA52 assignment or currently 

serving in a FA52 position. For availability, call the FA52 Proponent Manager at (703) 806-7866. 

Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability 

(HPAC) 

HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of 

hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and the collateral 

effects of these releases on civilian and military populations. HPAC 

employs integrated source terms, high resolution weather and particulate transport algorithms to rapidly model hazard areas and human collateral effects. 

Registration, Software Distribution and Training: 

(703)-325-1276 Fax: (703) 325-0398 (DSN 221) 

https://acecenter.cnttr.dtra.mil.acecenter@cnttr.dtra.mil 
47 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 

Pantex Plant Operations

 Participants will learn about nuclear weapon 

(programmatic) high explosive operations and tests, the 

US nuclear weapon complex, nuclear weapon design history, production operations, and US nuclear weapon dismantle issues. This training course will provide educational overviews and tours of actual facilities and equipment used in the US nuclear weapons production, transportation, and storage process. This course will also provide an overview of the CI threat to the nuclear weapons 

operations at the Pantex Plant.

 There is no tuition charge, agencies are responsible for 

their trainee’s travel and per diem expenses. This workshop consists of lecture sessions and Plant tours and 

demonstrations. All workshop sessions are conducted at 

the Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas. There are two scheduled workshops: 

15-18 April 2008 

17-20 June 2008 

Registration Deadline: 60 days before course date; participants will receive reporting instructions 30 days before 

course start date. 

For further information please contact the Training Coordinator at (865) 574-9226. 

WMD Terrorism 

 This workshop provides a basic overview of the technical and terrorist threat aspects of nuclear, chemical, 

and biological weapons. 

 Participants will be introduced to the various Federal 

Response Elements and the role that each plays when 

responding to a WMD event as well as counterterrorism 

policy. The first day concluded with Trends in Terrorism 

Overview. Nuclear technology briefings on the infrastructure required to support a nuclear weapons effort 

will be provided. Production of materials useful for radiological threat devices will also be covered. Briefings 

on illicit nuclear materials and scams will lead to a threat 

analysis exercise (an analytical methodology useful for 

any WMD type threat). Technical briefings on the 

chemical, and biological terrorism threat, materials and 

methods, and agents and effects are followed by a demonstration of detection and personal protection equipment. 

There is no tuition charge, agencies are responsible for 

their trainee’s travel and per diem expenses. This workshop is conducted at Fort Story, Virginia, September 8-

12 2008. 

For further information please contact the Training Coordinator at (865) 574-9226. 

Do you have information to share with the 

“CWMD Community?” 

Get it posted here. Send your input to 

dcsg3usanca2@conus.army.mil, in the Subject line: 

ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal 

Note: The editor retains the right to edit and select 

which submissions to print. 

Army Knowledge Online (AKO) users: 

Electronic back issues available! 

Open up AKO and type in: Nuclear and Counterproliferation in the Search for... dialog box on the right 

side of the web page. Following that you will receive 

a page showing all unrestricted content in AKO. 

Select: Nuclear and Counterproliferation 

This will bring you to the Nuclear and Counterproliferation page. Scroll towards the bottom and you will 

see Combating WMD Journal. There you can find 

back issues. 
 Combating WMD Journal Issue 2 48

Peacekeepers 

A time exposure of eight Peacekeeper (LGM-118A) 

intercontinental ballistic missile reentry vehicles 

passing through clouds while approaching an openocean impact zone during a flight test. 

 (U.S. Air Force photo)