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ECONOMIC RECOVERY

OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 20, 2008

Serial No. 110–43

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget

(

Available on the Internet: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/house/budget/index.html 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET 

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina, Chairman 

ROSA L. DELAURO, Connecticut, 

CHET EDWARDS, Texas 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine 

ALLYSON Y. SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

XAVIER BECERRA, California 

LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas 

EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon 

MARION BERRY, Arkansas 

ALLEN BOYD, Florida 

JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

DARLENE HOOLEY, Oregon 

BRIAN BAIRD, Washington 

DENNIS MOORE, Kansas 

TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin, 

Ranking Minority Member 

J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina 

JO BONNER, Alabama 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

MARIO DIAZ–BALART, Florida 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

PATRICK J. TIBERI, Ohio 

JON C. PORTER, Nevada 

RODNEY ALEXANDER, Louisiana 

ADRIAN SMITH, Nebraska 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

THOMAS S. KAHN, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

AUSTIN SMYTHE, Minority Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

Hearing held in Washington, DC, October 20, 2008 ............................................. 1

Statement of: 

Hon. John M. Spratt, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Budget ..... 1

Hon. Paul Ryan, ranking minority member, House Committee on the 

Budget ............................................................................................................ 1

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 3

Hon. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board .......................... 4

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 9

Speech given at the Economic Club of New York, October 15, 2008 .... 13

Responses to Mr. Etheridge’s questions for the record .......................... 87

Martin Neil Baily, the Brookings Institution ................................................. 36

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 39

Iris J. Lav, deputy director, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities ........... 44

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 48

William W. Beach, director, Center for Data Analysis, the Heritage Foundation ............................................................................................................. 55

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 57

Hon. Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

North Carolina, questions for the record .................................................... 86

Hon. Jon C. Porter, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Nevada, prepared statement of .................................................................... 88

(1)

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES 

MONDAY, OCTOBER 20, 2008

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m. in Room 210, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Spratt [chairman of the 

committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Spratt, DeLauro, Schwartz, Kaptur, 

Becerra, Doggett, Blumenauer, McGovern, Tsongas, Scott, Baird, 

Moore of Kansas, Moore of Wisconsin, Ryan, Garrett, Simpson, and 

Tiberi. 

Chairman SPRATT. In the interest of time, it is important that we 

stick by the clock today, and, therefore, I call the hearing to order. 

We will begin with some few short comments. We began this 

year wary of a recession. And to mitigate if not avoid it, we passed 

a countercyclical bill with rebates and business tax concessions, totaling about $150 billion in revenues foregone. 

Before adjourning, Congress acted again. At the Bush administration’s request, we passed recovery measures which included 

budget authority of $700 billion, a new kit of tools for Treasury and 

the Federal Reserve. The House also passed a $61 billion bill to 

shore up the economy, but faced with a veto threat, the Senate did 

not follow through. 

We called this hearing to know Chairman Bernanke’s assessment 

of the economy and ask whether you, sir, believe that further action is needed to boost the economy and turn it around. Our second 

panel will deal with specific fiscal actions that the Congress might 

take to counteract current economic conditions. 

I would say to all the members here that the chairman is committed to leaving at 11 o’clock, and we have agreed with that understanding. And we want to proceed as expeditiously as possible. 

And therefore, I am holding my statement to this length and turn 

now to Mr. Ryan for any opening statement he has. 

Mr. RYAN. All right. Thank you, Chairman. I guess I will take 

the cue off that, and I will ask unanimous consent that my opening 

statement be included in the record. 

Thank you for having this hearing. 

We are all concerned about a weak economy and the impacts on 

our families. My own hometown of Janesville, Wisconsin, is suffering particularly from the consequences of this downturn. That is 

why I voted for the extension of unemployment insurance. But I 

also want to pursue policies to ensure sustained economic growth. 

2

The topic of today’s hearing, options for economic recovery, the 

Democrats have already come out with their preferred option, a 

bloated $300 billion spending stimulus package. The advertised intent of this package is to get the economy back on track. We all 

want that. Yet we should not be under any illusion that this stimulus package will address the core problems of our current financial crisis and our economic weakness. 

The major problem, which Chairman Bernanke is about to describe, has been that our credit markets have virtually frozen up 

and nearly stopped functioning. Left unaddressed, this situation 

poses a real threat of a financial meltdown, followed by a deep and 

prolonged recession. 

Well, the Fed has acted preemptively and promptly to address 

this crisis. It has taken extraordinary and unprecedented measures 

to inject liquidity into these frozen credit markets and to preserve 

the integrity and the functioning of our financial system. We in 

Congress have also taken actions on a bipartisan basis, passing legislation designed to stabilize the financial markets. We have also 

extended unemployment insurance to soften this blow from the 

downturn to those individuals who are losing their jobs in this. 

Now, in the interest of time, I will be brief only to say that this 

is the Budget Committee, and the CBO director has already told 

us that the deficit this year could well climb to above $750 billion. 

That is before this kind of a stimulus package, which, with more 

government spending being shoveled out the door, at best would 

probably give us a little pop in GDP statistics, manipulating the 

economic statistics, but not addressing the core problem, which is, 

how do we grow the economy? What are the policies we put in 

place to give us long-run, sustained economic growth? 

I would simply close by saying this: The doctrine that is giving 

us this stimulus idea of spending more money here this year is a 

Keynesian principle, it is a Keynesian doctrine. It is well-founded 

and held by many people. But that same economic doctrine which 

is bringing this bill to this hearing says you don’t raise taxes when 

the economy is in trouble. 

Yet this Democratic majority passed just this year the largest tax 

increase in American history. They are already proposing tax rates 

on capital, tax rates on investment, tax rate increases on small 

businesses. In fact, the chairman of my own committee, the Ways 

and Means Committee, is saying we want a 45 percent top tax rate 

for small businesses. Seven out of 10 jobs in this country come from 

small businesses. The last thing Congress ought to be doing under 

any economic doctrine is raising taxes in a recession, yet that is 

precisely what this majority is proposing to do. 

So shoveling $300 billion out the door, bringing our deficit up to 

a trillion dollars, will only serve to actually weaken the dollar, increase our borrowing costs, and not address the fundamental problems in our economy. We need policies that grow the economic pie, 

that grow opportunity. Raising taxes on opportunity is not the answer. 

With that, Chairman, I will yield the balance of my time. And 

I thank Chairman Bernanke for coming here to join us today. 

[The information follows:]

3

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL RYAN, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

PART I

Thank you, Chairman Spratt. Welcome, Chairman Bernanke. 

We’re all concerned about a weak economy and the impact on American families. 

My own hometown is suffering from the consequences of this downturn. That’s why 

I’ve voted for the extension of unemployment insurance, but I also want to pursue 

policies to ensure sustained economic growth. 

The topic of today’s hearing is ‘‘Options for Economic Recovery.’’ The Democrats have already come out with their preferred option: a bloated $300 billion stimulus 

package. 

The advertised intent of this package is to ‘‘get the economy back on track.’’ Yet, 

we should not be under any illusion that this stimulus package will address the core 

problems of our current financial crisis and economic weakness. 

The major problem, which Chairman Bernanke is about to describe, has been that 

our credit markets have virtually frozen up and nearly stopped functioning. Left 

unaddressed, the situation posed the very real threat of a financial meltdown followed by a deep and prolonged recession. 

The Fed has acted preemptively and promptly to address this crisis. It is taking 

extraordinary and unprecedented measures to inject liquidity into these frozen credit markets and preserve the integrity and functioning of our financial system. 

We in Congress have also taken action by passing bipartisan legislation designed 

to stabilize financial markets. 

These actions, combined with weakness in our economy, obviously entail costs. 

The CBO has just warned us that even without a stimulus package, this year’s 

budget deficit could reach $750 billion. Adding the Democratic stimulus package 

would take the budget deficit to $1 trillion. That tells me that we are simply not 

serious about our fiscal situation. 

A much higher level of government spending and increased deficits is going to 

sharply raise our debt service costs and weaken the dollar. 

Although the long-run costs of the proposed stimulus are real, the long-run benefits are highly suspect. In fact, we have seen time and time again that these temporary fiscal spending packages simply provide one or two quarters of ‘‘pop’’ before 

the economy simply reverts back to its pre-stimulus trend. That is because they do 

nothing to change the main factors driving our long-term growth trajectory. 

If higher government spending led to robust economic growth, our economy would 

be soaring along right now instead of entering a recession. 

If Congress is going to take action, it should be through fast-acting tax policy that 

boosts incentives to invest and create jobs. That is the growth dynamic that leads 

to a bigger economic pie. Short-term actions like stimulus do not grow the economic 

pie; they simply transfer funds from one part of the economy to another. 

PART II

The Democratic $300 billion stimulus proposal raises serious concerns about how 

Washington will respond to the financial crisis. 

I’m afraid that this is only the beginning, and that we are going to see a lot more 

government intervention in the economy that will be detrimental to jobs, wages, and 

the financial security of the American people. 

My fear is that this financial crisis, and the policy reactions it has forced us to 

take, could send us down a path toward a fundamentally different economic model—

one of bigger government, higher spending and taxes, and heavy-handed government controls—rather than a reliance on private markets. 

This would be a serious mistake. When I look back at the root causes of our current financial crisis, I don’t see an indictment of our capitalist system, but rather 

a distortion of private markets through some of the Federal Government’s actions. 

First, earlier this decade the Federal Reserve set the stage for a wave of mortgage 

borrowing by keeping credit conditions too loose for too long. Low interest rates encouraged both homeowners and financial institutions to borrow too much and become highly leveraged, which is accentuating the pain of the massive de-leveraging 

we are witnessing today. 

Second, the Federal government encouraged, mandated, and subsidized both lenders and borrowers to extend and accept mortgage credit to people who simply were 

not in a financial position to repay these loans. 

Third, I’ve been warning for a decade that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac posed 

a huge risk to taxpayers. During that period, Fannie and Freddie, at the urging of 

members of Congress and others, were creating and securitizing more risky loans. 

4

In addition, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac became the largest holders of mortgagebacked securities. In fact, by the time the government was forced to take these companies over, their combined mortgage investment portfolios had reached $1.5 trillion, which exceeds the entire GDP of countries like Canada, Mexico, and Spain. 

Clearly, a variety of private actors were also at fault, but Fannie and Freddie’s 

large purchases of mortgage-related securities, many of which were near-prime or 

subprime, put the government stamp of approval on a fundamentally flawed system—a system of cheap money, low risk, and ever-rising home prices. 

Looking ahead, we need to modernize our antiquated regulatory system, improve 

transparency, and make sure those that take risks are fully accountable for the consequences. 

But we should also be careful to guard against a regulatory over-reaction formulated in the heat of the current crisis that may have unintended consequences down 

the road. 

Also, we should not mistake the urgent action we are undertaking now in reaction 

to the crisis as a template for a viable, long-term economic model. 

Though it may be obscured by recent events, the unprecedented economic growth 

and prosperity we have witnessed in this country over its history has been driven 

by free markets—by entrepreneurship, innovation, and private risk and reward. 

Government did not create this prosperity and my concern is that we will take 

actions that will hurt Americans ability and opportunities to secure renewed prosperity in the future.

Chairman SPRATT. I would say to Mr. Ryan, the farthest away 

of our intentions with this hearing today is to talk about a tax increase. And I am a little bit lost as to what he is referring to. But 

in the interest of time, let’s proceed. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you, sir, for coming. We know that your 

time is at a premium, that there are many demanding your attention, but we also represent the people of this country, 435 different 

districts. And as we have learned with the $700 billion bailout 

package, so-called, we need to communicate with the American people to help them understand what is being done and what purposes 

it serves. And I think that your coming here will enhance the 

public’s understanding of where we stand. 

The floor is yours. You can read your testimony, which will be 

made part of the record. 

I would also ask unanimous consent at this point that all members, the chairman included, be allowed to include their opening 

statements. 

And your statement will be included in its entirety in the record. 

Mr. Bernanke, again, thank you for coming. We appreciate you 

being here. 

STATEMENT OF BEN S. BERNANKE, CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF 

GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 

Mr. BERNANKE. Thank you. 

Chairman Spratt, Representative Ryan and other members of the 

committee, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss recent developments in financial markets, the near-term economic outlook, and 

issues surrounding the possibility of a second package of fiscal 

measures. 

As you know, financial markets in the United States and some 

other industrialized countries have been under severe stress for 

more than a year. The proximate cause of the financial turmoil was 

the steep increase and subsequent decline of house prices nationwide, which, together with poor lending practices, have led to large 

losses on mortgages and mortgage-related instruments by a wide 

range of institutions. 

5

More fundamentally, the turmoil is the aftermath of a credit 

boom characterized by underpricing of risk, excessive leverage, and 

an increasing reliance on complex and opaque financial instruments that have proved to be fragile under stress. A consequence 

of the unwinding of this boom and the resulting financial strains 

has been a broad-based tightening in credit conditions that has restrained economic growth. 

The financial turmoil intensified in recent weeks as investors’ 

confidence in banks and other financial institutions eroded and risk 

aversion heightened. Conditions in the interbank lending market 

have worsened, with term funding essentially unavailable. Withdrawals from prime money market mutual funds, which are important suppliers of credit to the commercial paper market, severely 

disrupted that market. And short-term credit, when available, has 

become much more costly for virtually all firms. Households and 

State and local governments have also experienced a notable reduction in credit availability. 

Financial conditions deteriorated in other countries as well, putting severe pressure on both industrial and emerging market 

economies. As confidence in the financial markets has declined and 

concerns about the U.S. and global economies has increased, equity 

prices have been volatile, falling sharply on net. 

In collaboration with governments and central banks in other 

countries, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve have taken a 

range of actions to ameliorate these financial problems. To address 

ongoing pressures in interbank funding markets, the Federal Reserve significantly increased the quantity of term funds it auctions 

to banks and accommodated heightened demands for funding from 

banks and primary dealers. 

We have also greatly expanded our currency swap lines with foreign central banks. These swap lines allow cooperating central 

banks to supply dollar liquidity in their own jurisdictions, helping 

to reduce strains in global money markets and, in turn, in our own 

markets. 

To address illiquidity and impaired functioning in the market for 

commercial paper, the Treasury implemented a temporary guarantee program for balances held in money market mutual funds, 

helping to stem the outflows from these funds. 

The Federal Reserve put in place a temporary lending facility 

that provides financing for banks to purchase high-quality, assetbacked commercial paper from money markets funds, thus providing some relief for money market funds that have needed to sell 

their holdings to meet redemptions. 

Moreover, we will soon be implementing a new commercial paper 

funding facility that will provide a backstop to commercial paper 

markets by purchasing highly rated commercial paper from issuers 

at a term of 3 months. 

The recently enacted Emergency Economic Stabilization Act provided critically important new tools to address the dysfunction in 

financial markets, and thus reduce the accompanying risks to the 

economy. The Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP, authorized 

by the legislation, will allow the Treasury to undertake two highly 

complementary activities. 

6

First, the Treasury will use TARP funds to provide capital to financial institutions. Indeed, last week, nine of the Nation’s largest 

financial institutions indicated their willingness to accept capital 

from the program, and many other institutions, large and small, 

are expected to follow suit in coming weeks. 

Second, the Treasury will purchase or guarantee troubled mortgage-related and possibly other assets held by banks and other financial institutions. Taken together, these measures should help 

rebuild confidence in the financial system, increase the liquidity of 

financial markets, and improve the ability of financial institutions 

to raise capital from private sources. 

As another measure to improve confidence, the act also temporarily raised the limit on the deposit insurance coverage provided 

by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the National 

Credit Union Administration from $100,000 to $250,000 per account, effective immediately. 

Unfortunately, the loss of confidence in financial institutions became so severe in recent weeks that additional steps in this direction proved necessary. The FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, and 

the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the President, 

determined that significant risks to the stability of the financial 

system were present. With this determination, the FDIC was able 

to use its authority to provide, for a specified period, unlimited insurance coverage of funds held in non-interest-bearing transactions 

accounts, such as payroll accounts. In addition, the FDIC announced that it would guarantee the senior unsecured debt of 

FDIC-insured depository institutions and their associated holding 

companies. 

In taking the dramatic steps of providing capital to the banking 

system and expanding guarantees, the United States consulted 

with other countries, many of whom have announced similar actions. Given the global nature of the financial system, international 

consultation and cooperation on actions to address the crisis are 

important for restoring confidence and stability. 

These measures were announced less than a week ago, and although there have been some encouraging signs, it is too early to 

assess their full effects. However, I am confident that these initiatives, together with other actions by the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and other regulators, will help restore trust in our financial 

system and allow the resumption of more normal flows of credit to 

households and firms. 

I would like to reiterate the critical importance of the recent legislation passed by the Congress. Without that action, tools essential 

for stabilizing the financial system, and thereby containing the 

damage to the broader economy, would not have been available. 

That said, the stabilization of the financial system, though an essential first step, will not quickly eliminate the challenges still 

faced by the broader economy. 

Even before the recent intensification of the financial crisis, economic activity had shown considerable signs of weakening. In the 

labor market, private employers shed 168,000 jobs in September, 

bringing the total job loss in the private sector since January to 

nearly 900,000. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate, at 6.1 percent 

in September, has risen 1.2 percentage points since January. InVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Jan 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-43\45532.TXT HBUD PsN: DICK
7

coming data on consumer spending, housing, and business investment have all showed significant slowing over the past few months, 

and some key determinants of spending have worsened. Equity and 

house prices have fallen, foreign economic growth has slowed, and 

credit conditions have tightened. 

One brighter note is that the declines in the prices of oil and 

other commodities will have favorable implications for the purchasing power of households. Nonetheless, the pace of economic activity is likely to be below that of its longer-run potential for several quarters. 

As I noted, the slowing in spending and activity spans most 

major sectors. Real personal consumption expenditures for goods 

and services declined over the summer and apparently fell further 

in September. Although the weakness in household spending has 

been widespread, the drop-off in purchases of motor vehicles recently has been particularly sharp. Increased difficulty in obtaining 

auto loans appears to have contributed to the decline in auto sales. 

Consumer sentiment has been quite low, reflecting concerns about 

jobs, gasoline prices, the state of the housing market, and stock 

prices. 

In the business sector, orders and shipments for nondefense capital goods have generally slowed, and forward-looking indicators 

suggest further declines in business investment in coming months. 

Outlays for construction of nonresidential buildings, which had 

posted robust gains over the first half of the year, also appear to 

have decelerated in the third quarter. Although the less favorable 

outlook for sales has undoubtedly played a role, the softening in 

business investment also appears to reflect reduced credit availability from banks and other lenders. 

As has been the case for some time, the housing market remains 

depressed, with sales and construction of new homes continuing to 

decline. Indeed, single-family housing starts fell 12 percent in September, and permit issuance also dropped sharply. With demand 

for new homes remaining at a low level and the backlog of unsold 

homes still sizable, residential construction is likely to continue to 

contract into next year. 

International trade provided considerable support for the U.S. 

economy over the first half of the year. Domestic output was 

buoyed by strong foreign demand for a wide range of U.S. exports, 

including agricultural products, capital goods and industrial supplies. Although trade should continue to be a positive factor for the 

U.S. economy, its contribution to U.S. growth is likely to be less 

dramatic as global growth slows. 

The prices of the goods and services purchased by consumers 

rose rapidly earlier this year, as steep increases in the prices of oil 

and other commodities led to higher retail prices for fuel and food, 

and as firms were able to pass through a portion of their higher 

costs of production. These effects are now reversing in the wake of 

the substantial declines in commodity prices since the summer. 

Moreover, the prices of imports now appear to be decelerating, 

and consumer surveys and yields on inflation-indexed Treasury securities suggest that expected inflation has held steady or eased. If 

not reversed, these developments, together with the likelihood that 

8

economic activity will fall short of potential for a time, should bring 

inflation down to a level consistent with price stability. 

Over time, a number of factors will likely promote the return of 

solid gains in economic activity and employment in the context of 

low and stable inflation. Among those factors are the stimulus provided by monetary policy; the eventual stabilization in housing 

markets that will occur as the correction runs its course; improvements in our credit markets as the new programs take effect and 

market participants work through remaining problems; and the underlying strength and recuperative powers of our economy. 

The time needed for economic recovery, however, will depend 

greatly on the pace at which financial and credit markets return 

to more normal functioning. Because the time that will be needed 

for financial normalization and the effects of ongoing credit problems in the broader economy are difficult to judge, the uncertainty 

currently surrounding the economic outlook is unusually large. 

I understand that the Congress is evaluating the desirability of 

a second fiscal package. Any fiscal action inevitably involves tradeoffs, not only among current needs and objectives but also because 

commitments of resources today can burden future generations and 

constrain future policy options between the present and the future. 

Such trade-offs inevitably involve value judgments that can be 

properly made only by our elected officials. Moreover, with the outlook exceptionally uncertain, the optimal timing, scale and composition of any fiscal package are unclear. 

All that being said, with the economy likely to be weak for several quarters and with some risk of a protracted slowdown, consideration of a fiscal package by the Congress at this juncture seems 

appropriate. Should the Congress choose to undertake fiscal actions, certain design principles may be helpful. To best achieve its 

goals, any fiscal package should be structured so that its peak effects on aggregate spending and economic activity are felt when 

they are most needed, namely during the period in which economic 

activity would otherwise be expected to be weak. 

Any fiscal package should be well-targeted, in the sense of attempting to maximize the beneficial effects on spending and activity per dollar of increased Federal expenditure or lost revenue. At 

the same time, it should go without saying that the Congress must 

be vigilant in ensuring that any allocated funds are used effectively 

and responsibly. Any program should be designed, to the extent 

possible, to limit longer-term effects on the Federal Government’s 

structural budget deficit. 

Finally, in the ideal case, a fiscal package would not only boost 

overall spending and economic activity, but would also be aimed at 

redressing specific factors that have the potential to extend or 

deepen the economic slowdown. As I discussed earlier, the extraordinary tightening in credit conditions has played a central role in 

the slowdown thus far and could be an important factor delaying 

the recovery. If the Congress proceeds with a fiscal package, it 

should consider including measures to help improve access to credit 

by consumers, home buyers, businesses and other borrowers. Such 

actions might be particularly effective at promoting economic 

growth and job creation. 

Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions. 

9

[The prepared statement of Ben Bernanke follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman,

Federal Reserve Board 

Chairman Spratt, Representative Ryan, and other members of the Committee, I 

appreciate this opportunity to discuss recent developments in financial markets, the 

near-term economic outlook, and issues surrounding the possibility of a second package of fiscal measures. 

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

As you know, financial markets in the United States and some other industrialized countries have been under severe stress for more than a year. The proximate 

cause of the financial turmoil was the steep increase and subsequent decline of 

house prices nationwide, which, together with poor lending practices, have led to 

large losses on mortgages and mortgage-related instruments by a wide range of institutions. More fundamentally, the turmoil is the aftermath of a credit boom characterized by underpricing of risk, excessive leverage, and an increasing reliance on 

complex and opaque financial instruments that have proved to be fragile under 

stress. A consequence of the unwinding of this boom and the resulting financial 

strains has been a broad-based tightening in credit conditions that has restrained 

economic growth. 

The financial turmoil intensified in recent weeks, as investors’ confidence in banks 

and other financial institutions eroded and risk aversion heightened. Conditions in 

the interbank lending market have worsened, with term funding essentially unavailable. Withdrawals from prime money market mutual funds, which are important suppliers of credit to the commercial paper market, severely disrupted that 

market; and short-term credit, when available, has become much more costly for virtually all firms. Households and state and local governments have also experienced 

a notable reduction in credit availability. Financial conditions deteriorated in other 

countries as well, putting severe pressure on both industrial and emerging-market 

economies. As confidence in the financial markets has declined and concerns about 

the U.S. and global economies have increased, equity prices have been volatile, falling sharply on net. 

In collaboration with governments and central banks in other countries, the 

Treasury and the Federal Reserve have taken a range of actions to ameliorate these 

financial problems. To address ongoing pressures in interbank funding markets, the 

Federal Reserve significantly increased the quantity of term funds it auctions to 

banks and accommodated heightened demands for funding from banks and primary 

dealers. We have also greatly expanded our currency swap lines with foreign central 

banks. These swap lines allow the cooperating central banks to supply dollar liquidity in their own jurisdictions, helping to reduce strains in global money markets 

and, in turn, in our own markets. To address illiquidity and impaired functioning 

in the market for commercial paper, the Treasury implemented a temporary guarantee program for balances held in money market mutual funds, helping to stem 

the outflows from these funds. The Federal Reserve put in place a temporary lending facility that provides financing for banks to purchase high-quality asset-backed 

commercial paper from money market funds, thus providing some relief for money 

market funds that have needed to sell their holdings to meet redemptions. Moreover, we soon will be implementing a new Commercial Paper Funding Facility that 

will provide a backstop to commercial paper markets by purchasing highly rated 

commercial paper from issuers at a term of three months. 

The recently enacted Emergency Economic Stabilization Act provided critically 

important new tools to address the dysfunction in financial markets and thus reduce 

the accompanying risks to the economy. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 

authorized by the legislation will allow the Treasury to undertake two highly complementary activities. First, the Treasury will use TARP funds to provide capital to 

financial institutions. Indeed, last week, nine of the nation’s largest financial institutions indicated their willingness to accept capital from the program, and many 

other institutions, large and small, are expected to follow suit in coming weeks. Second, the Treasury will purchase or guarantee troubled mortgage-related and possibly other assets held by banks and other financial institutions. Taken together, 

these measures should help rebuild confidence in the financial system, increase the 

liquidity of financial markets, and improve the ability of financial institutions to 

raise capital from private sources. 

As another measure to improve confidence, the act also temporarily raised the 

limit on the deposit insurance coverage provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC) and the National Credit Union Administration from $100,000 

10

to $250,000 per account, effective immediately. Unfortunately, the loss of confidence 

in financial institutions became so severe in recent weeks that additional steps in 

this direction proved necessary. The FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Secretary of the Treasury in consultation with the President determined that significant risks to the stability of the financial system were present. With this determination, the FDIC was able to use its authority to provide, for a specified period, unlimited insurance coverage of funds held in non-interest-bearing transactions accounts, 

such as payroll accounts. In addition, the FDIC announced that it would guarantee 

the senior unsecured debt of FDIC-insured depository institutions and their associated holding companies. In taking the dramatic steps of providing capital to the 

banking system and expanding guarantees, the United States consulted with other 

countries, many of whom have announced similar actions. Given the global nature 

of the financial system, international consultation and cooperation on actions to address the crisis are important for restoring confidence and stability. 

These measures were announced less than a week ago, and, although there have 

been some encouraging signs, it is too early to assess their full effects. However, I 

am confident that these initiatives, together with other actions by the Treasury, the 

Federal Reserve, and other regulators, will help restore trust in our financial system 

and allow the resumption of more-normal flows of credit to households and firms. 

I would like to reiterate the critical importance of the recent legislation passed by 

the Congress; without that action, tools essential for stabilizing the financial system 

and thereby containing the damage to the broader economy would not have been 

available. That said, the stabilization of the financial system, though an essential 

first step, will not quickly eliminate the challenges still faced by the broader economy. 

ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Even before the recent intensification of the financial crisis, economic activity had 

shown considerable signs of weakening. In the labor market, private employers shed 

168,000 jobs in September, bringing the total job loss in the private sector since 

January to nearly 900,000. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate, at 6.1 percent in 

September, has risen 1.2 percentage points since January. Incoming data on consumer spending, housing, and business investment have all showed significant slowing over the past few months, and some key determinants of spending have worsened: Equity and house prices have fallen, foreign economic growth has slowed, and 

credit conditions have tightened. One brighter note is that the declines in the prices 

of oil and other commodities will have favorable implications for the purchasing 

power of households. Nonetheless, the pace of economic activity is likely to be below 

that of its longer-run potential for several quarters. 

As I noted, the slowing in spending and activity spans most major sectors. Real 

personal consumption expenditures for goods and services declined over the summer 

and apparently fell further in September. Although the weakness in household 

spending has been widespread, the drop-off in purchases of motor vehicles recently 

has been particularly sharp. Increased difficulty in obtaining auto loans appears to 

have contributed to the decline in auto sales. Consumer sentiment has been quite 

low, reflecting concerns about jobs, gasoline prices, the state of the housing market, 

and stock prices. 

In the business sector, orders and shipments for nondefense capital goods have 

generally slowed, and forward-looking indicators suggest further declines in business investment in coming months. Outlays for construction of nonresidential buildings, which had posted robust gains over the first half of the year, also appear to 

have decelerated in the third quarter. Although the less favorable outlook for sales 

has undoubtedly played a role, the softening in business investment also appears 

to reflect reduced credit availability from banks and other lenders. 

As has been the case for some time, the housing market remains depressed, with 

sales and construction of new homes continuing to decline. Indeed, single-family 

housing starts fell 12 percent in September, and permit issuance also dropped 

sharply. With demand for new homes remaining at a low level and the backlog of 

unsold homes still sizable, residential construction is likely to continue to contract 

into next year. 

International trade provided considerable support for the U.S. economy over the 

first half of the year. Domestic output was buoyed by strong foreign demand for a 

wide range of U.S. exports, including agricultural products, capital goods, and industrial supplies. Although trade should continue to be a positive factor for the U.S. 

economy, its contribution to U.S. growth is likely to be less dramatic as global 

growth slows. 

11

The prices of the goods and services purchased by consumers rose rapidly earlier 

this year, as steep increases in the prices of oil and other commodities led to higher 

retail prices for fuel and food, and as firms were able to pass through a portion of 

their higher costs of production. These effects are now reversing in the wake of the 

substantial declines in commodity prices since the summer. Moreover, the prices of 

imports now appear to be decelerating, and consumer surveys and yields on inflation-indexed Treasury securities suggest that expected inflation has held steady or 

eased. If not reversed, these developments, together with the likelihood that economic activity will fall short of potential for a time, should bring inflation down to 

levels consistent with price stability. 

Over time, a number of factors are likely to promote the return of solid gains in 

economic activity and employment in the context of low and stable inflation. Among 

those factors are the stimulus provided by monetary policy, the eventual stabilization in housing markets that will occur as the correction runs its course, improvements in our credit markets as the new programs take effect and market participants work through remaining problems, and the underlying strengths and recuperative powers of our economy. The time needed for economic recovery, however, will 

depend greatly on the pace at which financial and credit markets return to morenormal functioning. Because the time that will be needed for financial normalization 

and the effects of ongoing credit problems on the broader economy are difficult to 

judge, the uncertainty currently surrounding the economic outlook is unusually 

large. 

FISCAL POLICY

I understand that the Congress is evaluating the desirability of a second fiscal 

package. Any fiscal action inevitably involves tradeoffs, not only among current 

needs and objectives but also—because commitments of resources today can burden 

future generations and constrain future policy options—between the present and the 

future. Such tradeoffs inevitably involve value judgments that can properly be made 

only by our elected officials. Moreover, with the outlook exceptionally uncertain, the 

optimal timing, scale, and composition of any fiscal package are unclear. All that 

being said, with the economy likely to be weak for several quarters, and with some 

risk of a protracted slowdown, consideration of a fiscal package by the Congress at 

this juncture seems appropriate. 

Should the Congress choose to undertake fiscal action, certain design principles 

may be helpful. To best achieve its goals, any fiscal package should be structured 

so that its peak effects on aggregate spending and economic activity are felt when 

they are most needed, namely, during the period in which economic activity would 

otherwise be expected to be weak. Any fiscal package should be well-targeted, in the 

sense of attempting to maximize the beneficial effects on spending and activity per 

dollar of increased federal expenditure or lost revenue; at the same time, it should 

go without saying that the Congress must be vigilant in ensuring that any allocated 

funds are used effectively and responsibly. Any program should be designed, to the 

extent possible, to limit longer-term effects on the federal government’s structural 

budget deficit. 

Finally, in the ideal case, a fiscal package would not only boost overall spending 

and economic activity but would also be aimed at redressing specific factors that 

have the potential to extend or deepen the economic slowdown. As I discussed earlier, the extraordinary tightening in credit conditions has played a central role in 

the slowdown thus far and could be an important factor delaying the recovery. If 

the Congress proceeds with a fiscal package, it should consider including measures 

to help improve access to credit by consumers, homebuyers, businesses, and other 

borrowers. Such actions might be particularly effective at promoting economic 

growth and job creation. 

Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions.

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very 

much indeed. 

Mr. Chairman, in your speech to the Economic Club of New York 

recently, you noted that, ‘‘In one respect we are’’—and I am parsing 

and quoting—‘‘better off than those who dealt with earlier financial 

crises. Generally, in past crises, broad-based government intervention came too late. Waiting too long to respond has usually led to 

much greater costs of intervention and, more importantly, magnified the painful effects of financial turmoil on households and 

businesses. In this case, prompt and decisive action by political 

12

leaders,’’ quoting from your statement, ‘‘will restore more normal 

market functioning much more quickly and at a lower cost.’’ You 

went on to warn, ‘‘Even if markets stabilize, a broad economic recovery will not happen right away.’’

In a separate talk, your vice chair, Donald Kohn, said, ‘‘It is likely the economy will be subpar well into next year.’’ One of our witnesses today, Dr. Martin Baily, has said, ‘‘I don’t know if there is 

anything we can do in the short run to avoid a mild recession. The 

question is what we can do to avoid a very severe recession.’’

These are the concerns that caused us to call this hearing. They 

go to the heart of the hearing. The question is, if we are threatened 

with a recession, it could be deep and severe and last long after you 

have stabilized the financial markets. Wouldn’t prompt and decisive action now be less than the costs of intervention and turmoil 

later? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Mr. Chairman, as I indicated, I think given the 

uncertainties about the near term and the risks that still exist, I 

think that it is appropriate for Congress to be thinking about a fiscal program at this time. The size and the composition of that are 

obviously items for the Congress to determine in negotiation and 

discussion. 

And I would reiterate the point that there is an awful lot of uncertainty right now, arising in part from the fact that we don’t 

know how quickly the credit markets will return to normal and 

how quickly credit extension will return to normal. So, in that respect also, I think we need to be flexible and continue to watch the 

situation as we go forward. 

Chairman SPRATT. You also stated in your speech, and you have 

said elsewhere, that this problem began with the problem in the 

subprime mortgages but it has become much broader than that. 

Nevertheless, that is one of the primary causes. And the first steps 

being taken by the Fed and the Treasury go to recapitalizing the 

banks of this country. The first tranche of $250 billion will be spent 

for that purpose. 

How do we get money flowing back into the housing markets so 

we can both restart the housing markets and also deal with the 

huge number of foreclosures and mortgages in default? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, the steps being 

taken in the financial markets are directly intended to try to address the problems of credit availability not just for mortgages but 

more generally. 

By restoring the strength of the financial institutions, by restoring confidence in the financial markets, by taking troubled assets 

off of balance sheets, we will restart the flow of credit more generally, which is a very important step. 

Chairman SPRATT. But there is no legal requirement, as I understand it, that the banks divert a certain portion of their recapitalized funds to housing or housing modification mortgages, things of 

that nature. 

Mr. BERNANKE. There are requirements that the banks meet 

standards for renegotiating and restructuring troubled mortgages. 

But I was going to go on to say that I think that, beyond banks 

themselves, which are of course one important group of mortgage 

lenders, there are other things that are going on and can be done. 

13

In particular, Fannie and Freddie, the stabilization of those two 

companies, I think, despite some run-up in mortgage rates last 

week, I do think will provide more credit, more available credit for 

homeowners going forward. 

The Congress, of course, has just passed the Hope for Homeowners bill, which allows troubled mortgages to be written down in 

terms of principal and then renegotiated and refinanced into the 

Federal Housing Administration. Further steps could be taken 

along those lines if the Congress wished to. 

The Congress could also further support Fannie and Freddie’s 

funding and address some of the costs that they face in order to 

make more credit available to the mortgage market. 

Chairman SPRATT. Last question from me. You ended your testimony by saying, ‘‘Any program should be designed, to the extent 

possible, to limit longer-term effects on the Federal Government’s 

structural budget deficit.’’ You also say that we should consider 

measures that would improve consumer credit access, business access to credit. 

Would you elaborate a little further on those, please, sir? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, certainly. 

We are in a situation where the deficit is large. That is not totally inappropriate, given the nature of the emergency that we are 

facing, and not totally avoidable, given the loss of tax revenues associated with the decline in the economy. Nevertheless, it is important, obviously, to maintain careful and, you know, well-managed 

fiscal position in the longer term. Indeed, one of the reasons that 

economists argue for conservative fiscal management is that precisely when times like this come around you want to have the capacity and the scope necessary to deal with the problem. 

With respect to the credit markets, the Congress has a variety 

of tools that it might use to try to address some of the problem, 

which, as I said, is very central to the economic slowdown. Depending on the particular case, Congress might consider guarantees or 

partial guarantees. It might consider direct lending. It might consider tax credits. In the case of the housing market, it might consider things like paying the guarantee fees in Fannie and Freddie. 

There are other tax measures that could be taken to stimulate 

credit. 

There is just a variety of things that could be done. And I think 

the right way to think about it is to look at each situation, try to 

ascertain the extent to which credit markets are failing or not functioning properly, and to try to find methods that will restore credit 

to something closer to a more normal level. 

Obviously, these would have to be temporary and carefully designed. The Federal Reserve is more than happy to try to work 

with you on specific possibilities. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, sir. 

[The speech referred to follows:]

SPEECH BY CHAIRMAN BEN S. BERNANKE AT THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF NEW YORK, 

OCTOBER 15, 2008

STABILIZING THE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ECONOMY

Good afternoon. I am pleased once again to share a meal and some thoughts with 

the Economic Club of New York. I will focus today on the economic and financial 

14

challenges we face and why I believe we are well positioned to move forward. The 

problems now evident in the markets and in the economy are large and complex, 

but, in my judgment, our government now has the tools it needs to confront and 

solve them. Our strategy will continue to evolve and be refined as we adapt to new 

developments and the inevitable setbacks. But we will not stand down until we have 

achieved our goals of repairing and reforming our financial system and restoring 

prosperity. 

The crisis we face in the financial markets has many novel aspects, largely arising 

from the complexity and sophistication of today’s financial institutions and instruments and the remarkable degree of global financial integration that allows financial shocks to be transmitted around the world at the speed of light. However, as 

a long-time student of banking and financial crises, I can attest that the current 

situation also has much in common with past experiences. As in all past crises, at 

the root of the problem is a loss of confidence by investors and the public in the 

strength of key financial institutions and markets. The crisis will end when comprehensive responses by political and financial leaders restore that trust, bringing 

investors back into the market and allowing the normal business of extending credit 

to households and firms to resume. In that regard, we are, in one respect at least, 

better off than those who dealt with earlier financial crises: Generally, during past 

crises, broad-based government engagement came late, usually at a point at which 

most financial institutions were insolvent or nearly so. Waiting too long to respond 

has usually led to much greater direct costs of the intervention itself and, more importantly, magnified the painful effects of financial turmoil on households and businesses. That is not the situation we face today. Fortunately, the Congress and the 

Administration have acted at a time when the great majority of financial institutions, though stressed by highly volatile and difficult market conditions, remain 

strong and capable of fulfilling their critical function of providing new credit for our 

economy. This prompt and decisive action by our political leaders will allow us to 

restore more normal market functioning much more quickly and at lower ultimate 

cost than would otherwise have been the case. Moreover, we are seeing not just a 

national response but a global response to the crisis, commensurate with its global 

nature. 

This financial crisis has been with us for more than a year. It was sparked by 

the end of the U.S. housing boom, which revealed the weaknesses and excesses that 

had occurred in subprime mortgage lending. However, as subsequent events have 

demonstrated, the problem was much broader than subprime lending. Large inflows 

of capital into the United States and other countries stimulated a reaching for yield, 

an underpricing of risk, excessive leverage, and the development of complex and 

opaque financial instruments that seemed to work well during the credit boom but 

have been shown to be fragile under stress. The unwinding of these developments, 

including a sharp deleveraging and a headlong retreat from credit risk, led to highly 

strained conditions in financial markets and a tightening of credit that has hamstrung economic growth. 

The Federal Reserve responded to these developments in two broad ways. First, 

following classic tenets of central banking, the Fed has provided large amounts of 

liquidity to the financial system to cushion the effects of tight conditions in shortterm funding markets. Second, to reduce the downside risks to growth emanating 

from the tightening of credit, the Fed, in a series of moves that began last September, has significantly lowered its target for the federal funds rate. Indeed, last 

week, in an unprecedented joint action with five other major central banks and in 

response to the adverse implications of the deepening crisis for the economic outlook, the Federal Reserve again eased the stance of monetary policy. We will continue to use all the tools at our disposal to improve market functioning and liquidity, to reduce pressures in key credit and funding markets, and to complement the 

steps the Treasury and foreign governments will be taking to strengthen the financial system. 

Notwithstanding our efforts and those of other policymakers, the financial crisis 

intensified over the summer as mortgage-related assets deteriorated further, economic growth slowed, and uncertainty about the financial and economic outlook increased. As investors and creditors lost confidence in the ability of certain firms to 

meet their obligations, their access to capital markets as well as to short-term funding markets became increasingly impaired, and their stock prices fell sharply. 

Prominent companies that experienced this dynamic most acutely included the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the investment bank Lehman Brothers, and the insurance company American International 

Group (AIG). 

The Federal Reserve believes that, whenever possible, the difficulties experienced 

by firms in financial distress should be addressed through private-sector arrangeVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Jan 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-43\45532.TXT HBUD PsN: DICK
15

ments—for example, by raising new equity capital, as many firms have done; by negotiations leading to a merger or acquisition; or by an orderly wind-down. Government assistance should be provided with the greatest reluctance and only when the 

stability of the financial system, and thus the health of the broader economy, is at 

risk. In those cases when financial stability is broadly threatened, however, intervention to protect the public interest is not only justified but must be undertaken 

forcefully and without hesitation. 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac present cases in point. To avoid unacceptably large 

dislocations in the mortgage markets, the financial sector, and the economy as a 

whole, the Federal Housing Finance Agency put Fannie and Freddie into conservatorship, and the Treasury, drawing on authorities recently granted by the Congress, made financial support available. The government’s actions appear to have 

stabilized the GSEs, although, like virtually all other firms, they are experiencing 

effects of the current crisis. We have already seen benefits of their stabilization in 

the form of lower mortgage rates, which will help the housing market. 

The difficulties at Lehman and AIG raised different issues. Like the GSEs, both 

companies were large, complex, and deeply embedded in our financial system. In 

both cases, the Treasury and the Federal Reserve sought private-sector solutions, 

but none was forthcoming. A public-sector solution for Lehman proved infeasible, as 

the firm could not post sufficient collateral to provide reasonable assurance that a 

loan from the Federal Reserve would be repaid, and the Treasury did not have the 

authority to absorb billions of dollars of expected losses to facilitate Lehman’s acquisition by another firm. Consequently, little could be done except to attempt to ameliorate the effects of Lehman’s failure on the financial system. Importantly, the financial rescue legislation, which I will discuss later, will give us better choices. In 

the future, the Treasury will have greater resources available to prevent the failure 

of a financial institution when such a failure would pose unacceptable risks to the 

financial system as a whole. The Federal Reserve will work closely and actively with 

the Treasury and other authorities to minimize systemic risk. 

In the case of AIG, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury judged that a disorderly 

failure would have severely threatened global financial stability and the performance of the U.S. economy. We also judged that emergency Federal Reserve credit 

to AIG would be adequately secured by AIG’s assets. To protect U.S. taxpayers and 

to mitigate the possibility that lending to AIG would encourage inappropriate risktaking by financial firms in the future, the Federal Reserve ensured that the terms 

of the credit extended to AIG imposed significant costs and constraints on the firm’s 

owners, managers, and creditors. 

AIG’s difficulties and Lehman’s failure, along with growing concerns about the 

U.S. economy and other economies, contributed to extraordinarily turbulent conditions in global financial markets in recent weeks. Equity prices fell sharply. Withdrawals from prime money market mutual funds led them to reduce their holdings 

of commercial paper—an important source of financing for the nation’s nonfinancial 

businesses as well as for many financial firms. The cost of short-term credit, where 

such credit has been available, jumped for virtually all firms, and liquidity dried up 

in many markets. By restricting flows of credit to households, businesses, and state 

and local governments, the turmoil in financial markets and the funding pressures 

on financial firms pose a significant threat to economic growth. 

The Treasury and the Fed have taken a range of actions to address financial problems. To address illiquidity and impaired functioning in commercial paper markets, 

the Treasury implemented a temporary guarantee program for balances held in 

money market mutual funds to help stem the outflows from these funds. The Federal Reserve put in place a temporary lending facility that provides financing for 

banks to purchase high-quality asset-backed commercial paper from money market 

funds, thus reducing their need to sell the commercial paper into already distressed 

markets. Moreover, we soon will implement a new, temporary Commercial Paper 

Funding Facility that will provide a backstop to commercial paper markets by purchasing highly rated commercial paper directly from issuers at a term of three 

months when those markets are illiquid. 

To address ongoing problems in interbank funding markets, the Federal Reserve 

has significantly increased the quantity of term funds it auctions to banks and accommodated heightened demands for temporary funding from banks and primary 

dealers. Also, to try to mitigate dollar funding pressures worldwide, we have greatly 

expanded reciprocal currency arrangements (so-called swap agreements) with other 

central banks. Indeed, this week we agreed to extend unlimited dollar funding to 

the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, and the 

Swiss National Bank. These agreements enable foreign central banks to provide dollars to financial institutions in their jurisdictions, which helps improve the functioning of dollar funding markets globally and relieve pressures on U.S. funding 

16

markets. It bears noting that these arrangements carry no risk to the U.S. taxpayer, 

as our loans are to the foreign central banks themselves, who take responsibility 

for the extension of dollar credit within their jurisdictions. 

The expansion of Federal Reserve lending is helping financial firms cope with reduced access to their usual sources of funding and thus is supporting their lending 

to nonfinancial firms and households. Nonetheless, the intensification of the financial crisis over the past month or so made clear that a more powerful, comprehensive approach involving the fiscal authorities was needed to address these problems 

more effectively. On that basis, the Administration, with the support of the Federal 

Reserve, asked the Congress for a new program aimed at stabilizing our financial 

markets. The resulting legislation, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, provides important new tools for addressing the distress in financial markets and thus 

mitigating the risks to the economy. The act allows Treasury to buy troubled assets, 

to provide guarantees, and to inject capital to strengthen the balance sheets of financial institutions. The act also raises the limit on deposit insurance from 

$100,000 to $250,000 per account, effectively immediately. 

The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) authorized by the legislation will 

allow the Treasury, under the supervision of an oversight board that I will head, 

to undertake two highly complementary activities. First, the Treasury will use the 

TARP funds to help recapitalize our banking system by purchasing non-voting equity in financial institutions. Details of this program were announced yesterday. Initially, the Treasury will dedicate $250 billion toward purchases of preferred shares 

in banks and thrifts of all sizes. The program is voluntary and designed both to encourage participation by healthy institutions and to make it attractive for private 

capital to come in along with public capital. We look to strong institutions to participate in this capital program, because today even strong institutions are reluctant 

to expand their balance sheets to extend credit; with fresh capital, that constraint 

will be eased. The terms offered under the TARP include the acquisition by the 

Treasury of warrants to ensure that taxpayers receive a share of the upside as the 

financial system recovers. Moreover, as required by the legislation, institutions that 

receive capital will have to meet certain standards regarding executive compensation practices. 

Second, the Treasury will use some of the resources provided under the bill to 

purchase troubled assets from banks and other financial institutions, in most cases 

using market-based mechanisms. Mortgage-related assets, including mortgagebacked securities and whole loans, will be the focus of the program, although the 

law permits flexibility in the types of assets purchased as needed to promote financial stability. Removing these assets from private balance sheets should increase liquidity and promote price discovery in the markets for these assets, thereby reducing investor uncertainty about the current value and prospects of financial institutions. Unclogging the markets for mortgage-related assets should put banks and 

other institutions in a better position to raise capital from the private sector and 

increase the willingness of counterparties to engage. With time, the provision of equity capital to the banking system and the purchase of troubled assets will help 

credit flow more freely, thus supporting economic growth. 

These measures will lead to a much stronger financial system over time, but steps 

are also necessary to address the immediate problem of lack of trust and confidence. 

Accordingly, also announced yesterday was a plan by the Federal Deposit Insurance 

Corporation (FDIC) to provide a broad range of guarantees of the liabilities of FDICinsured depository institutions, including their associated holding companies. The 

guarantee covers all newly issued senior unsecured debt, including commercial 

paper and interbank funding, and it will also cover all funds held in non-interestbearing transactions accounts, such as payroll accounts. This broad guarantee will 

be effectively immediately, and fees for coverage will be waived for 30 days. After 

the 30-day grace period, banks may continue to participate in the guarantee program by paying reasonable fees. 

I would like to stress once again that the taxpayers’ interests were very much in 

our minds and those of the Congress when these programs were designed. The costs 

of the FDIC guarantee are expected to be covered by fees and assessments on the 

banking system, not by the taxpayer. In the case of the TARP program, the funds 

allocated are not simple expenditures, but rather acquisitions of assets or equity positions, which the Treasury will be able to sell or redeem down the road. Indeed, 

it is possible that taxpayers could turn a profit from the program, although, given 

the great uncertainties, no assurances can be provided. Moreover, the program is 

subject to extensive controls and to oversight by several bodies. The larger point, 

though, is that the economic benefit of these programs to taxpayers will not be determined primarily by the financial return to TARP funds, but rather by the impact 

of the program on the financial markets and the economy. If the TARP, together 

17

with the other measures that have been taken, is successful in promoting financial 

stability and, consequently, in supporting stronger economic growth and job creation, it will have proved itself a very good investment indeed, to everyone’s benefit. 

Stabilization of the financial markets is a critical first step, but even if they stabilize as we hope they will, broader economic recovery will not happen right away. 

Economic activity had been decelerating even before the recent intensification of the 

crisis. The housing market continues to be a primary source of weakness in the real 

economy as well as in the financial markets, and we have seen marked slowdowns 

in consumer spending, business investment, and the labor market. Credit markets 

will take some time to unfreeze. And with the economies of our trading partners 

slowing, our export sales, which have been a source of strength, very probably will 

slow as well. These restraining influences on economic activity, however, will be offset somewhat by the favorable effects of lower prices for oil and other commodities 

on household purchasing power. Ultimately, the trajectory of economic activity beyond the next few quarters will depend greatly on the extent to which financial and 

credit markets return to more normal functioning. 

Inflation has been elevated recently, reflecting the steep increases in the prices 

of oil, other commodities, and imports that occurred earlier this year, as well as 

some pass-through by firms of their higher costs of production. However, expected 

inflation, as measured by consumer surveys and inflation-indexed Treasury securities, has held steady or eased, and prices of imports now appear to be decelerating. 

These developments, together with the recent declines in prices of oil and other commodities as well as the likelihood that economic activity will fall short of potential 

for a time, should lead to rates of inflation more consistent with price stability. 

This past weekend, the finance ministers and central bank governors of the Group 

of Seven industrialized countries met in Washington. We committed to work together to stabilize financial markets and restore the flow of credit to support global 

economic growth. We agreed to use all available tools to prevent failures that pose 

systemic risk. We affirmed we will ensure our deposit insurance programs instill 

confidence in the safety of savings. We agreed to ensure that our banks and other 

major financial intermediaries, as needed, can raise capital from public as well as 

private sources. We further agreed that we would take all necessary steps to 

unfreeze interbank and money markets, and that we will act to restart the secondary markets for mortgages and other securitized assets. Finally, we recognized 

that we should take these actions in ways that protect taxpayers and avoid potentially damaging effects on other countries. I believe that these are the right principles for action, and I see the steps announced by our government yesterday as 

fully consistent with them. 

I have laid out for you today an extraordinary series of actions taken by policymakers throughout our government and around the globe. Americans can be confident that every resource is being brought to bear to address the current crisis: historical understanding, technical expertise, economic analysis, financial insight, and 

political leadership. I am not suggesting the way forward will be easy, but I strongly 

believe that we now have the tools we need to respond with the necessary force to 

these challenges. Although much work remains and more difficulties surely lie 

ahead, I remain confident that the American economy, with its great intrinsic vitality and aided by the measures now available, will emerge from this period with renewed vigor.

Mr. Ryan? 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

I enjoyed your speech at the Economic Club in New York last 

week. And I am also comforted by the fact that you are one of our 

Nation’s leading scholars on what went wrong during the Great 

Depression. And particularly your work on adverse feedback loops 

I find very telling. 

You suggested that fiscal policy was not a significant factor in 

addressing the problems during the Depression; instead, that monetary policy and stabilizing the banking sector were the key factors. 

Don’t we face a similar situation today, where our economic ills 

are due to problems in our financial services sector and the response of monetary authorities or lack thereof? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, as I indicated, I thought the two critical 

lessons learned from the 1930s were, first, to have an appropriate 

monetary policy. In the 1930s, the Federal Reserve allowed prices 

18

to fall at 10 percent a year, which is obviously, you know, not appropriate. Secondly, the second lesson is to try to stabilize the financial system, not allow the credit system to break down. And, 

again, the authorities failed to do that from 1929 to 1933. 

Some of the steps that were most effective early in President 

Roosevelt’s first term were reversing those problems. So I think 

those are very important. I think that is an important reason why, 

you know, why we are going to control and manage the situation. 

We won’t be making those mistakes. 

Again, as I said, a fiscal package is potentially helpful and 

worthwhile to be considered. But the composition and size of that, 

there are many different ways you could go on that. I think that 

is up to Congress to try to figure out. 

Mr. RYAN. But the core component of our efforts to prevent a prolonged downturn is monetary, is what I am taking from that, and 

that there might be a fiscal complement to that. 

Let me ask you this question. The next session of Congress, at 

the end of it, we have very large tax rate increases that will occur. 

And it is already embedded in the current law. 

And if our goal and effort is to redeploy private capital, to bring 

savings and investment off the sidelines and redeploy them in the 

economy to create growth and get out of the recession, is it a good 

idea at the end of the next session to dramatically increase the 

after-tax rate of return on investment by increasing the tax on investment? 

Dividends taxes, capital gains taxes, marginal income tax rates, 

all are scheduled to increase substantially by the end of the next 

session. In fact, this majority here passed a budget resolution 

which all but guarantees those things will happen. We are looking 

at legislation moving through here possibly as early as next March 

that might bring the top rate, which is the one that the passive entities, small businesses, subchapter S’s pay, up to as high as 45 

percent. 

In this time of a recession, of a downturn, is it a good idea to 

dramatically raise the tax on investment, the tax on entrepreneurship, risk-taking, and on small businesses? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Congressman, you are addressing two issues, 

both of which are relevant. 

Mr. RYAN. But that is fiscal, and since we are here to talk about 

fiscal policy, there is spending and taxing components to fiscal policy. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Absolutely, absolutely. But you are alluding to 

two different issues, both of which I think you are making good 

points. 

You know, first, as you noted earlier, there is the Keynesian, or 

demand, effects of tax and spending policies. From that perspective, generally speaking, you would not want to have a net tax increase in the middle of a slowdown, and just from a demand perspective. And so that is certainly something you want to look at. 

More generally, I think that—and this is the other issue—I think 

everyone would agree probably on the committee that our tax system needs improvement, it needs to be made more consistent with 

growth, more efficient. To the extent that improvements in the tax 

19

code could be part of this program, if you do undertake one, that 

is only a good thing. 

So both aspects of that, I think, are relevant as you think about 

these issues. 

Mr. RYAN. Okay. 

Let me ask you just one last question about your balance sheet. 

The Fed’s balance sheet has grown considerably during this time, 

from I think about $900 billion pre-crisis to about $1.8 trillion 

today, as it established a number of these credit facilities to extend 

loans to private companies. 

Does the expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet present any difficulties for you in terms of your conduct of monetary policy? And 

are there any limitations on expanding your balance sheet further? 

Mr. BERNANKE. First, Congressman, a good bit of that expansion 

is these swaps we have done with other central banks, which allows them to make dollar liquidity available in their own economies. And I would just note that there is no credit risk to us because their counterparties are those other central banks, and they 

are responsible for the lending and the credit risk. 

The increase in the size of the balance sheet creates operational 

difficulties, obviously, managing all that. Generally speaking, however, it does not have a significant effect on monetary policy or inflation risk. 

And one very important contribution there is what the Congress 

did in the recent emergency act, which gave the Federal Reserve 

the ability to pay interest on reserves. By paying interest on reserves, we are able to keep the short-term interest rate close to the 

committee’s target and, therefore, maintain our monetary policy at 

the same time that we provide this extra liquidity to the system. 

I would also just note for clarity that providing this liquidity does 

not increase the money supply. The money supply has grown slowly, and there is no inflationary impact. 

Mr. RYAN. You are sterilizing this as you move——

Mr. BERNANKE. We are sterilizing, meaning that we are undoing 

the effects of the money supply, so there is no net effect on the 

money supply. 

Mr. RYAN. Right. So just for laymen, as you pump money 

through the system to these facilities over here, you are mopping 

up excess money over there to make sure that there is a net no increase in the money supply, correct? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Exactly. 

Mr. RYAN. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Doggett. Three minutes, Mr. Doggett. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

While sincerely applauding your personal commitment to right 

our economy, I continue to have the same concerns about the effectiveness of the bailout and its fairness to taxpayers. 

As of this morning, are you personally aware of any Federal employee at any relevant Federal regulatory entity who has been fired 

or demoted or disciplined in any way as a result of this debacle? 

And since Congress approved this $700 billion bailout, are you 

personally aware of any request that has been made to anyone in 

the private sector responsible, whether they are on Wall Street or 

20

somewhere else, for this debacle that they be replaced or just asked 

to take a pay cut? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, on Wall Street there have been quite a few 

high-profile firings of CEOs based on their performance in the recent period. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Since the bailout? 

Mr. BERNANKE. The bailout was—you know, the capital injection 

was only last week. But there——

Mr. DOGGETT. Well, I am talking about since it was signed into 

law. There really have not been any requests that Treasury has 

made that any of those people be replaced, have they? 

Mr. BERNANKE. So, the Treasury’s approach is twofold. First, we 

want to strengthen our financial system so that the counterparties 

who deal with our banks will not be worried about their insolvency 

and will be willing to deal with them. 

Mr. DOGGETT. I understand there may be a rationale for taking 

that course, but I just want to make it clear that there has been 

no removal of anyone from any Federal regulatory agency, or discipline, or any request that anyone since the bailout was signed 

into law be removed or asked not to take even a bonus on Wall 

Street. 

Mr. BERNANKE. If the Treasury undertakes to deal with a mismanaged bank that is close to failure, then its terms will be much 

more Draconian and tough than the case where we are just trying 

to broaden the base of capital throughout our economy. 

In the case of the Federal Reserve, I would mention that when 

we made this large loan to AIG Insurance, we——

Mr. DOGGETT. Yes, sir. That was before the bailout, and you did 

take some action there. But that has not been copied since then. 

How about just a request that the individuals not be rewarded 

with a bonus this year? 

As you know, when Deutsche Bank’s CEO and many of its leading traders have pledged that they will waive millions in annual 

payouts, there is a recent report that six major U.S. banks have reserved a total of $70 billion for pay and bonuses this year, a substantial portion of which represents discretionary year-end bonuses. 

Isn’t the American taxpayer in this bailout just being asked to 

subsidize those executive compensation schemes and maintaining 

dividend payments? 

And indeed, since the bailout bill, in the short period you described, hasn’t Treasury actually weakened what I viewed as political pablum in the original bailout bill on golden parachutes by saying that you don’t define a golden parachute as anything that is a 

mere three times normal pay and bonuses? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, Congressman, my understanding—and you 

can follow up with Treasury—my understanding is that all of the 

provisions that Congress inserted with respect to executive compensation have been applied to every recipient of capital, which 

was not required by the bill. So there have been applications of 

what was in the bill. I don’t think that Treasury has authority beyond what Congress gave it to insist on other restrictions. 

Mr. DOGGETT. It did define a golden parachute as three times 

anything these banks want to pay their executives, didn’t it? 

21

Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Garrett? 

Mr. GARRETT. I thank the chairman and I thank the ranking 

member for holding this important meeting today. 

And I thank the chairman, as well, for your important work, as 

always, during these amazingly difficult times. 

You know, we are here primarily to discuss the idea of a new economic stimulus package. It was back earlier this past year, this 

year in February is when Congress passed 5140, which was the 

Economic Stimulus Act of 2008; $150 billion was said to be targeted, timely and temporary. And as I have said before, I am not 

sure how well it was targeted or timely, but the temporary aspect 

we can certainly attest to by the data that came after it. 

And I am all in favor of returning the proverbial tax dollars back to the taxpayer. In that case, what we basically did was send $600 

checks to folks for them to spend. But the data seemed to show 

that what you saw after that was simply a spike in retail sales for 

a short period of time. That is why I would say you had a temporary effect but no real stimulating effect overall on the economy. 

And I am going to get back, if time remains, to ask you your 

comment on what really needs to be done to stimulate an economy. 

Is it just getting people to have a short period of time to be able 

to spend money, whether it is unemployment checks or some of the 

other ideas that are floating around now or the past ones, or 

whether you need some more what I would say is job creation-type 

things, encouraging assets that are sitting on the sidelines to get 

back into the mix? 

But before I get to that, let me just ask you a couple other questions with what is going on. It was in your testimony, and I think 

I know some of the answers on this, but I will ask you anyway. 

You said you are going to be buying, in the process of buying 

high-grade commercial paper. And I believe the answer will be, but 

I will ask you, the authority to do this—maybe you said this in 

your testimony—would be under section 13.3 of the Federal Reserve Act. Is that correct? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Correct. That is correct. 

Mr. GARRETT. Okay. I assume, but I will ask you, do you have 

the authority under that act, if exigent circumstances dictate and 

you see the need to, to go beyond high-grade paper to buy other 

things else to try to get the markets going again and what have 

you? 

Mr. BERNANKE. The law requires that we be adequately secured. 

We are not allowed to make loans without security or some guarantee of repayment. 

Our plan for a repayment in this case is three-fold: first, collateral when available; secondly, endorsements, which basically is a 

second signature; and third, that we are charging fees and spreads 

on those commercial paper credit to provide a cushion for credit 

purposes. 

In principle, we could do further, but it would be much more difficult because we would need to have better—at a lower credit rating, we would have to find stronger guarantees to protect our lending. 

22

Mr. GARRETT. I only have a few seconds here apparently. Do you 

have the authority to go out and actually buy mortgage-backed securities as well? 

Mr. BERNANKE. We have that authority. We also have the—that 

is not even 13.3. We have the authority under just ordinary open 

market operations to buy—sorry—GSE-guaranteed only mortgagebacked securities. 

Mr. GARRETT. Only GSEs. You don’t have authority under 13.3 

to buy other mortgage-backed securities? 

Mr. BERNANKE. No. 

Mr. GARRETT. You don’t. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. McGovern? 

Mr. MCGOVERN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much for being here today. I have to tell you, 

in light of these difficult economic times, I wouldn’t want to be you 

for anything in the world. But there are days I don’t want to be 

me either, when I go home and talk to some of my constituents 

who are angry, who are frustrated and who are hurting. 

And so I want to say as clearly as I can that the frustration over 

the Federal response to the economy goes deep and wide. People 

are not just reading about the economy, they are seeing and feeling 

what this lousy economy means in their 401(k)s, in their pensions 

and their mortgages and their jobs. I went along with the $700 billion proposal presented by the administration, by you and others, modified by the House and Senate. 

And we talk a lot about how that package helps people not only 

on Wall Street but on Main Street. But, quite frankly, we are not 

doing nearly enough for the people who live on Main Street or any 

of the side streets where economic security is growing more and 

more precarious. 

Now, we have given billions for banks, but very little for States 

and localities. And this financial crisis may be global, but all the 

cuts and the pain and the sacrifices seem to be local. Last week, 

my Governor from Massachusetts announced he is going to have to 

make huge spending cuts. And he is doing this because tax revenues are plunging, along with the stock and real estate market 

meltdowns. 

And behind every one of these dollars that we talk about here 

in Washington are real people. And I think we need desperately 

here in Washington to help our States. We need to provide them 

with direct support, especially for Medicaid, for food stamps, for 

unemployment benefits, and for infrastructure projects that are 

ready to get up and running, which provide jobs, income and revenue. 

So I guess, you know, you have kind of suggested that—well, I 

am trying to make it clear, to be clear here. I think it would be 

helpful for us for you to be as emphatic in favor of an economic 

stimulus package that would invest in our States and our local 

communities as you were in terms of this rescue package that we 

passed. 

And one final question: How are you using your new authority 

under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act to help State and 

local governments? Have you considered using any of the $700 billion to purchase State and municipal bonds from financial instituVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Jan 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-43\45532.TXT HBUD PsN: DICK
23

tions? And would you consider making a direct investment into primary bond insurers? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Let me just—first of all, I am very concerned 

about the average person. That is my only motivation for what we 

are doing. I was very emphatic about the financial rescue plan because I think if the financial system crashes the implications for 

everyone in the country would be quite severe. I understand the 

need of Congress to try and address the problems of their constituents, and I think you should do so. That is your job, that is what 

you have been elected to do. 

With respect to State and local—I should also remind you it is 

the Treasury that is, of course, running this program and their decisions. The bill suggests a focus on mortgage and mortgage-related 

securities, and I think that is where they are starting. But, you 

know, I suppose that alternatives would be possible. 

I mentioned earlier the importance of allowing credit to flow 

more freely. This might be an area where the Federal Government 

could assist the State and local governments at lower cost by simply helping them obtain credit at more normal rates, which is one 

of the problems that they are facing right now. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Simpson? 

Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being here. We appreciate it very 

much. 

Let me ask this question. It came to me a few weeks ago, or a 

few days ago, talking with the bankers and the home builders and 

the automobile dealers and the real estate agents in my State that 

have some concerns about the $250 billion we are putting into the 

financial markets. 

And then I read this article in the Wall Street Journal that I am 

certain that you have read, and let me preface it with these comments. It says here, Treasury essentially forced nine major U.S. 

banks to agree to $125 billion from the Federal Government. Mr. 

Yingling of the American Bankers Association said, ‘‘Most banks 

are well-capitalized and do not need cash infusions.’’

And then it says, ‘‘Analysts, investors and some bankers applauded the government’s rescue. They said it would help rebuild 

confidence in the industry and could set the stage for a wave of 

consolidation in which stronger companies take over their weaker 

rivals.’’ And Mr. Kansas, the former CEO of North Fork Bancorp, 

said, ‘‘Banks are likely to use the government’s capital to retire 

outstanding debt that pays a higher yield than the 5 percent on the 

government’s preferred shares. They will reduce funding costs, 

boosting profits. Such moves will pad banks’ profits without supporting the overall economy.’’

How do you respond to that? And do you think that is accurate? 

And is that what we are intending to do with the $250 billion? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, first of all, let me be just clear, we are not 

throwing $250 billion out the window. What we are doing is buying 

preferred shares in strong companies that will pay a return and 

will be repaid. So it is an acquisition of assets, not a spending program. 

Mr. SIMPSON. But isn’t the purpose to get that money out into 

the market to free up capital? 

24

Mr. BERNANKE. The purpose is to make those institutions stronger so that people will be willing to deal with them, which they were 

not previously. And that is why we were on the brink of a very serious banking crisis, which looks to be in better situation right 

now, looks to be having been averted. 

Most importantly, though, by making the banks stronger, giving 

them more capital, it frees up their balance sheet, gives them more 

capacity to lend. We need them, over and above just being well-capitalized in a regulatory sense, we need them to have the capacity 

to make new loans and extend credit to our economy. Otherwise, 

the economy is not going to be able to grow. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Is there anything that requires them to lend that 

money, that new capital that they get, rather than use it for mergers and acquisitions of less secure banks and so forth to grow, essentially? 

I noticed that you have said one of the problems that you have 

in this whole environment is that we have allowed some companies 

to become too large to fail. Are we creating more of that? 

Mr. BERNANKE. I don’t think so. The capital is being spread 

across the country, to small banks as well as large banks. When 

you have this capital and you no longer have these tough balance 

sheet constraints, if you have the capital you should go out and 

lend it, if you have good opportunities. 

Now, we can’t force them to lend, because we don’t want to force 

them to make bad loans. We want them to make good loans that 

are based on their assessment of credit quality. But that being 

said, a bank that has lots of extra capital is passing up profit opportunities if it doesn’t make loans. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Scott? 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, you mentioned the need to take troubled assets 

off balance sheets. There is a difference between illiquid assets and 

worthless assets. And this is important, because lending authority 

is a function of the balance sheet of the bank and the capital accounts. You can get more money into the capital accounts if you 

mark to fair value rather than mark to market. 

What is the status of that? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, mark-to-market accounting is the province 

of the SEC and the FASB and so on. There have been some clarifications that have been issued, in particular that banks need not 

blindly follow market prices in cases where there are very few 

transactions and very illiquid markets. 

Mr. SCOTT. So if you have a temporarily illiquid asset, you don’t 

have to lose all of the value by marking to market. 

Mr. BERNANKE. That has been a clarification in that direction, 

yes. 

Mr. SCOTT. In buying stock, you get value, as you have indicated. 

Can this be done without any significant cost to the taxpayer? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, I believe that all the banks will pay us 

back with interest. And I would expect that there would be no cost 

on these capital programs, or very limited cost. 

Mr. SCOTT. And that would get capital into the banks’ capital accounts so that they could have more lending authority. 

25

Mr. BERNANKE. More lending capacity and greater confidence in 

terms of being able to deal with their counterparties. 

Mr. SCOTT. And is there any suggestion that overpaying for 

worthless assets from all over the world is better than the targeted 

purchase of preferred shares, as you are doing? 

Mr. BERNANKE. The plan is not to overpay for anything. The plan 

is to use market mechanisms to try and determine the appropriate 

pricing for those assets; in doing so, to unfreeze markets which are 

not currently giving good assessments of what the longer term values of those assets are, and to create more liquidity in those markets. 

If that is successful, that will be an important contribution to try 

to get these markets going again and bringing private money in as 

well. But I do think that the capital program is valuable, and I 

supported that. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. The idea that we are not going to overpay 

for assets was a little murky during the consideration of the bill. 

There was every indication that we would. 

Can I get chart number one? 

In the 1990s, we made the tough choices in our budget and balanced the budget, went into surplus, and were rewarded with great 

economic numbers. The Dow was the best in 75 years, great jobs, 

in stark contrast to what is going on now. 

What did we do right in the 1990s that we are not doing now? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, part of what happened in the 1990s—you 

mentioned two things, the budget surplus and the Dow. I mean, 

those two things were connected. With the very high Dow, capital 

gains and other income was providing lots of revenue. So your view 

of the 1990s depends in part on whether you think the Dow was 

appropriately priced at the peak in the late 1990s. To the extent 

that it was a bubble, then part of that prosperity was not sustainable. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I guess the harder we work and the more responsible we are, the luckier we get. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Tiberi? 

Mr. TIBERI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Chairman, for being here today. I know you have a 

very difficult job. 

Knocking on doors the last 2 days in two Columbus suburbs, I 

heard a lot of opinions, a lot of opinions from people who are pretty 

upset, upset with the $700 billion, the $250 billion infusion last 

week. 

And a common theme was the only thing we did is create a deeper hole for our children to dig out of, in terms of debt for the future. 

And I would like you to comment on that. 

But overall, if you could speak to this committee, but more im- portantly to the American people, on why that $250 billion infusion 

is a good thing for Main Street and side streets, as Mr. McGovern 

said, and why the overall package is important to Main Street and 

the side streets in our districts. Because people aren’t feeling that 

that is helping with their problems. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Congressman, I understand the communication 

problem that exists here. Let me just make a couple of comments. 

26

The first is, the $700 billion headline number is an enormous 

number. It does not reflect anything like what we would expect to 

be the actual ultimate cost of this program to taxpayers. As has 

been discussed, we are acquiring assets for that money. And, in 

particular, the capital that we have injected into these banks, as 

long as the banks remain healthy, they will pay that capital back 

with interest, and the taxpayer will not be out any money. 

In terms of why this is good for the person on Main Street, you 

know, I have studied these issues for many years as an academic. 

And what we have seen in the 1990s in East Asia, what we have 

seen in Japan, what we saw in Sweden, what we have seen in 

many other cases in the postwar period is that very severe financial crises lead inevitably to deep and protracted recessions. It is, 

therefore, essential to stabilize the financial system as soon as possible and to get credit flowing again. 

And I think that we are seeing that we have made progress, that 

we did address this question early rather than late. And that gives 

us much better prospects for getting the economy going again early. 

I think since the rescue package was passed, I suspect, evidently 

not from all your constituents, but I suspect more people are recognizing that the credit constraints really are hitting home. And the 

people can’t get auto loans, that there are plenty of firms small and 

large that can’t get ordinary credit, that housing mortgage credit 

is harder to get. These are direct consequences of our financial crisis. And things that stabilize the financial system and get credit 

flowing again will have direct and palpable benefits to people on 

Main Street and to the economy. 

Mr. TIBERI. Just one final point to emphasize what Chairman 

Spratt said earlier. There appears at least to be a disconnect right 

now, because there are people who are concerned who are still losing their home or in neighborhoods where homes have been lost. 

There doesn’t appear to be anything, in terms of what they are 

feeling, to help with that home foreclosure situation. Just something to put on your radar screen. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Baird? 

Mr. BAIRD. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Mr. Tiberi hit the nail on the head. The public doesn’t yet get 

that we would have had a collapse. Now, you couldn’t very well 

come to the public and say that, probably. 

But what would have happened, in your mind, had we not passed 

the bill we passed recently? 

Mr. BERNANKE. If we had not passed that bill, we would have not 

had the authority to do the capital injections we did last week. The 

Federal Reserve would not have had the ability to expand its balance sheet, because we would not have had the interest on reserves 

provision. 

And the risk would have been, while all the other countries in 

the world, in Europe and elsewhere, were taking strong measures 

to protect their banks and protect their markets, that we would 

have had a very severe financial crisis in the United States that 

would have resulted in the failure of major institutions and would 

have led to a very severe and protracted recession in this country, 

27

and that actions to remedy that a few months from now would not 

have been sufficient to undo the damage. 

Mr. BAIRD. So if we translate that into the average guy, lost jobs, 

lost businesses, lost farms, lost homes, far more than we are seeing 

now. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Absolutely. 

Mr. BAIRD. That is what we have to help people understand. 

Secondly, this issue of a fiscal stimulus. I favored the last time 

that we should have invested in infrastructure. We are talking now 

about investments in infrastructure, which could actually build 

things, tangible assets for a long time, and create jobs. 

Can you discuss briefly that issue, if we do this and put people 

to work and build things? 

Mr. BERNANKE. So, first of all, infrastructure is a form of capital. 

It pays a return if it is well-invested. That is a very good thing for 

the economy. It is very constructive. 

Now, there is a somewhat separate issue here, though, which is, 

will it stimulate the economy in the relatively near term? And 

there the question really turns on, how much extra spending and 

employment will you get from infrastructure projects that you 

would not otherwise have had? And the concern usually has been 

that infrastructure projects take a long time to plan and develop, 

and once the project starts, it takes a number of years, so that the 

actual implications for near-term activity are limited. 

To the extent that that problem can be addressed—and I don’t 

honestly know to what extent there are things on the shelf that can 

be pulled off or maintenance that could be not deferred or things 

of that sort; that is a question you have to determine——

Mr. BAIRD. Let me interject on that. 

Mr. BERNANKE [continuing]. That could be helpful. 

Mr. BAIRD. In my district, schools, roads, bridges, water treatment projects are waiting to be done—permitted, designed, ready 

to go. They lack the capital. And I think that is the case nationwide. And we have studied that on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. And to my way of thinking, if we are going 

to do this, I will tell you, much better than a tax cut. 

And the final thing I would say is, I find it just so intriguing that 

my friends on the other side would suggest that tax increases are 

somehow going to cripple the economy and then turn around and 

say we are passing more debt onto our children. We are passing 

debt onto our children largely because of the tax deficit that has 

been created and because of the costs of this conflict. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Kaptur? 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, welcome. I know you are a voice of reason in 

these discussions. And in my very brief time, I would like to render 

some opinions, perhaps that some might be able to use. 

I view as most curious, uneven and incomplete the set of administration’s actions being taken to address this meltdown. And what 

I see happening is a greater concentration toward the big banks, 

many of whom were wrongdoers in my opinion, rewarding the irresponsible, and new costs being imposed on community banks, for 

example, that very much were not a part of making the bad loans. 

28

Number two, I view the bursting of the housing bubble as the 

key element in the meltdown, yet nothing is being done now to address the rising foreclosure rates in places like Ohio. And if we 

don’t do workouts now or get a moratorium for a brief period of 

time, we are going to see this problem being exacerbated into this 

last quarter and next year. 

Number three, the purchase by the government of bad loans 

made by bad lenders remains a bad idea. And I would urge you to 

use market discipline to help resolve the situation, as you well 

know was done in the 1930s and certainly in the 1980s. 

And I would ask you to look to the FDIC—though I know you 

are not directly involved, you are in administration meetings on 

this—look to get the FDIC to use its full emergency powers to protect all general creditors of those banks with the fraud exception. 

That has not been done. The administration is slowly getting there, 

but it isn’t there yet. That is the most important thing that can be 

done to engender confidence in the system. 

Number two, urge the FDIC to employ the Net Worth Certificate 

Program we successfully used back in the 1980s, rather than the 

TARP program, which essentially rewards the bad actors. 

Number three, urge the SEC to mark housing loans from an accounting perspective to true market economic value, as opposed to 

an arbitrary index. 

Finally, I wanted to say that I think the Fed has an important 

role to play in sorting out the bad actors. What is surprising to me, 

though, through all of this, though Countrywide was a major mortgage lender, and the New York Times reported yesterday they were 

Fannie’s biggest mortgage client, the September 2004 audit showed 

that in six of Countrywide’s largest regions, one in eight of their 

loans was severely unsatisfactory because of shoddy underwriting, 

yet the Federal Reserve’s New York office maintained them on 

their list of primary dealers, security dealers, for the Fed, until 

they were purchased by Bank of America this year. 

So in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 

the Fed was saying, Give them a green light. Frankly, I don’t understand that and wonder if you could respond. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Certainly. 

First of all, on Countrywide, the primary dealer is a totally separate company from the mortgage lender. The quality of that dealer 

and its operations is independent of what the other part is doing. 

On foreclosures, I agree with you that stopping preventable foreclosures is extraordinarily important. It will help the housing market, it will help communities, it will save us money in the long run; 

and I hope that we will look to continue ways to do that. I am very 

much in favor of that. 

On community banks, community banks did not make subprime 

loans, but they do have other commercial real estate and other 

loans which are problematic. Some of them do need capital. Some 

of them will be selling to the asset program. I think it is very important that whatever we do, that it not disfavor community banks, 

that it maintain the diversity and strength of our community banking system; and I support that very strongly. 

29

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Chairman, could I just ask the Chairman of the 

Fed if he could provide for the record the difference between Countrywide and Countrywide. 

Mr. BERNANKE. They are two separate companies, the primary 

dealer and the—-

Ms. KAPTUR. There is no relationship between them at all? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Not in terms of—the primary dealer doesn’t 

make mortgage loans. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. 

Mr. Bernanke, thank you for your service, as you have heard 

from all of us, in this time of tremendous turmoil and uncertainty. 

I, too, like Mr. McGovern, just returned from Massachusetts this 

morning. As you know and as he indicated, our State has experienced tremendous fiscal stress with a shortfall in its budget of over 

a billion dollars. The governor and legislature are working to address it, but you can imagine it is a most difficult time. 

My question really is, as they work to make significant cuts that 

will reduce services both within State government across our communities and the many organizations—nonprofit and otherwise—

that are affected, if this doesn’t simply serve in the end to further 

weaken the broader economy, wouldn’t we be wise to consider some 

relief in the next stimulus package? 

Mr. BERNANKE. From a spending perspective, to the extent that 

relief leads the States and localities to restore services, to conduct 

greater maintenance and those sorts of things, it does contribute to 

demand and would be part of a stimulus package. You don’t want 

to be in a situation where you are compensating them for past 

spending or putting money in the rainy-day fund, because that 

doesn’t help the current situation in terms of spending and activity. 

I reiterate what I said before, which is: One way to approach 

this, one problem that they are facing now, as you well know, is 

that the municipal bond markets are not functioning well, and they 

are facing very high interest rates and finding it very difficult to 

obtain credit. Addressing that issue might be one way to be of assistance to States and localities. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Well, it is my understanding, if we were to include 

some relief in a stimulus package, that it would address the—that 

there wouldn’t be enough to really make up for the all the shortfall 

across the board, across the many State governments, so that it 

really would be more just a way of helping to avoid some of the 

really dramatic cuts that are going to have to take place. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. You yield back your time. 

Dr. Bernanke and Mr. Chairman, we are at the 11:00 hour. I 

have got six more questioners. I can reduce that to 21⁄2 minutes, 

and we will get you out of here in 15 minutes, if that is agreeable. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Moore of Kansas. 

Mr. MOOREE OF KANSAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being 

here. I think a lot of us would agree that one of the worst political 

blunders here was using the term ‘‘bailout’’ instead of ‘‘economic 

rescue’’ or ‘‘economic recovery,’’ because it was never, never my intention, and I think a lot of others’ either, to bail out Wall Street, 

30

but to try to protect the people on Main Street, back around our 

homes and in our congressional districts, who are in retirement, 

are nearing retirement, who have 401(k)s or otherwise invested in 

the stock market, who took a terrible, terrible beating here. 

That is the only reason I voted for this package. Am I correct, 

or am I looking at this incorrectly? 

Mr. BERNANKE. That is absolutely correct, and that is the only 

reason I supported the package. 

Mr. MOORE OF KANSAS. Thank you. That answers my question. 

Thank you, sir. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Blumenauer of Oregon. 

Mr. BLUMENAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, I am curious, you referenced from the outset that 

part of what started this cascade appeared to be problems in the 

housing market, precipitous decline that led to a series of other 

things unraveling. 

I am curious if you see an opportunity in the short term to do 

something dramatic to change their status vis-a-vis bankruptcy law 

or other Federal intervention that could help stabilize it; and, second, if you are concerned at all about further unraveling on Wall 

Street due to hedge funds that are having massive claims, evidently made against them for cash that might continue the downward slide over the course of the next couple of months. 

Mr. BERNANKE. On the first question, we have to keep in mind 

how big the housing sector is—I mean, an $18 trillion sector. It 

would be very difficult, even for the Federal Government, to put a 

floor under housing prices as a general matter. I think the two best 

ways to address the housing issue are, first——

Mr. BLUMENAUER. May I just, if I may, we—in business and vacation homes, we allow, in bankruptcy, people to go directly to the 

market. The Federal Government doesn’t have to do this. This is 

part of the bankruptcy provision, for example. 

Aren’t there mechanisms that could be done similar to that that 

get us out of that box? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, I was going to say, I think the two best 

ways to approach the housing market, one of them which relates 

to what you are saying, is to help prevent preventable foreclosures. 

Steps have been taken in that direction. 

I would support further steps to try to make sure that everyone 

who can afford to stay, who has sustained a mortgage and wants 

to stay in the home, is able to stay in the home. I think there are 

ways to address that. 

The second thing is, again, part of our problem is that the mortgage markets are not working properly. Taking steps to strengthen 

the mortgage markets and make mortgage credit more available to 

the public, I think would also be an important step to try to stabilize housing. 

On hedge funds: Hedge funds, a number of them have taken a 

lot of losses right now, but that is appropriate. They are risk takers, and as they have made bad guesses—or as many people have—

of course they have lost and their investors have lost. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. DeLauro. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

31

Dr. Bernanke, are we in a recession, your judgment, are we in 

a recession now? Yes or no. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, I don’t think it is a fair question for the 

following reason: A recession is a technical term that was created 

by academics for studying a certain pattern. 

Ms. DELAURO. We have got many economists, one coming this 

afternoon from Brookings, who says that there is a recession. Are 

we in a recession now? 

Mr. BERNANKE. We are in a serious slowdown in the economy, 

which has very significant consequences for the public. Whether it 

is called a ‘‘recession’’ or not is of no consequence. 

Ms. DELAURO. Moving from there, then, to what a—in Friday’s 

New York Times, Paul Krugman wrote the following, ‘‘There is not 

much Ben Bernanke can do for the economy. He can and should 

cut interest rates even more, but nobody expects this to be more 

than provide a slight economic boost.’’

Let’s talk about the Federal Government. What size should an 

economic recovery package be? $150 billion? $300 billion? 

Dr. Bernanke, you are an economist. Besides being the head of 

the Fed, you have a Ph.D. from Harvard in economics. Give us your 

best judgment in terms of you are also a student of the Depression. 

Let us know what size this ought to be. 

I have got to move quickly because I have got just a few minutes. 

I want to talk about what should make up that in your view—not 

mine or my colleagues’, you as an economist, Dr. Bernanke. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, I am an economist. You will hear many 

other economists who will give their views. 

I think that this is partly—has to do with the composition and 

the debate that you all will have about what is appropriate to put 

into this. 

I cannot tell you, as Congress, what number you should pass. 

That is up to you. 

Ms. DELAURO. What would you suggest, 150? 

Mr. BERNANKE. If you undertake a fiscal package, given the slowing of the economy, I think it should be significant, but I can’t give 

you a number. 

Ms. DELAURO. Okay. The pieces of it, investing in maintaining 

roads, bridges, schools, alternative sources of energy, of projects as 

a way to create jobs and to put disposable income in the hands of 

a consumer. Yes? No? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Those are very valuable things to do. But in 

terms of their short-term stimulus, as I mentioned to somebody 

earlier, it depends on what the timing is. Will you have these 

things up and running with people working in your term or not? 

Ms. DELAURO. We believe they can. Is it a good thing? The answer apparently is yes. 

Okay, helping States and localities to prevent cuts in services—

health care, police services, construction jobs—yes or no? 

Mr. BERNANKE. If it involves additional services and spending in 

the short term and if those are valuable services, then that would 

be constructive from the point of view of spending and growth. 

Ms. DELAURO. Extension of the UI benefits? 

Mr. BERNANKE. I think you have done that already, right? 

32

Ms. DELAURO. No, no. We passed it in the House. It didn’t pass 

in the Senate. The President says that, in fact, if we did that—

quite frankly, he said that people would stop looking for jobs. 

Mr. BERNANKE. I am quite sure that the UI benefits were extended. There is a temporary extension, emergency extension of unemployment compensation. 

Chairman SPRATT. Goes from 39 weeks to 52. 

Ms. DELAURO. This is a new extension we are talking about. This 

is a new extension, because 800,000 people, as of the end of this 

month, are going to lose their benefits. We did that in the past. We 

are now talking now, which we did pass in the House before. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Moore. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You had said in your speech to the Economic Club of New York 

that the financial crisis was much broader than subprime lending, 

large inflows of capital in the United States and other countries 

stimulated reaching for yield and under-pricing of risk, excessive 

leverage under the development of complex and opaque financial 

instruments. 

My question is, is some of our economic stimulus money going to be used for what I hear, different numbers—$60 trillion, perhaps—

to secure these opaque financial instruments? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Are you referring to the $700 billion? 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Yes. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, again, a good part of that is going to go 

into capital, as we have already seen; and then parts that go into 

buying assets will be done for the most part——

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Mortgage-related assets with underlying houses, raggedy as they may be, versus these opaque instruments. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, unfortunately, a lot of mortgages are held 

in these complex instruments. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Okay, let me ask a question before 

my time runs out. 

I see a lot of commercials talking about how Freddie and Fannie 

just have precipitated this entire financial downturn. Then I note 

that James Lockhart, the agency director of the Federal Housing 

Finance Agency, has said that of the $12 trillion in outstanding 

mortgages, these troubled assets, the 2 to 4 percent of them, are 

being held by Fannie and Freddie, versus nonbanking entities like 

Countrywide that were responsible for, like, 84 percent of these. 

Is that correct, that 2 to 4 percent of these troubled assets are 

being held by Fannie and Freddie? 

Mr. BERNANKE. I had not heard that number. I know they have 

some bad assets. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. This is a quote by James Lockhart. 

Mr. BERNANKE. I would like to see the context of that number. 

I think the problem with Fannie and Freddie was, as the Federal 

Reserve pointed out for many years, they didn’t have enough capital to bear against the amount of risk they were taking in their 

portfolio. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. The risk for troubled assets or just 

their mortgages, period? 

33

Mr. BERNANKE. They certainly have a lot of assets. A lot of mortgages have problems, and we discovered that when we went in and 

looked at the losses and evaluated their portfolios. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Is it a fair statement that some of 

these nonbanking internationals like Countrywide have been the 

precipitating factor in underwriting these troubled assets versus 

some sort of statement that Fannie and Freddie sort of led the 

charge into this economic crisis? 

Mr. BERNANKE. I think the main contribution that Fannie and 

Freddie made was having insufficient capital. That was their main 

problem. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Insufficient capital versus the poor, 

criminal underwriting. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Schwartz of Pennsylvania. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you are going to you can hear 

from many of us the frustration we are expressing on behalf of our 

constituents about, is this working, how is it going to work in both 

the short-term and long term. 

I wanted to follow up on the previous questions. We are certainly 

looking at what we can do in the short term, and we feel an obligation to take some action. 

We have done some already to give you and, of course, and Secretary some authority to get us out of the situation we are in right 

now, some economic stabilization and, hopefully, renewed investor 

confidence, some capital in the markets. But what I wanted to ask 

about is what we can do in both the short and long term, going forward, so I want to look at not just the short term but the long 

term. 

We have had years of failures of investments in innovation and 

new technologies—energy technologies, we have just done some of 

that. But what would you say, going forward, we ought to be doing 

as we look at both infrastructure in the short term, but long term—

investments in education, investment in helping small businesses 

be able to do that innovation and new technology. 

If we don’t start to grow new businesses, we are going to continue to talk about how do we just get out some recovery for Wall 

Street? I mean, what my constituents are saying to me is how are 

we going to create those new jobs that really matter to them in 

their district. 

It seems to me the only way we do that is to use some of our 

clout and, potentially, tax policy, as well as government funding, 

for investment encouragement incentives for innovation, cuttingedge technologies, new jobs of the future, educate our workforce for 

the future. 

Do you agree with that, or do you think that what we have done 

is enough for us to go forward when we leave the free market? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, what we are doing right now is trying to 

stabilize our short-term financial crisis and the associated effects 

on the economy. 

But for the long term, we want to make all kinds of investments, 

human capital investments. Education is critically important, 

workforce skills. R&D technology is a critical part of our portfolio, 

other kinds of investments from energy to infrastructure to private 

34

capital. So all of these things are very important for long-term 

growth. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you very much. 

Do you want to give us some advice about how we deal with that, 

given the national debt that we are in and the increased national 

debt we are going to see this year. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Well, a lot of private—a lot of capital investment 

takes place—can take place in the private sector. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. It should. 

Mr. BERNANKE. But clearly there are going to have to be some 

very tough choices made. 

Part of the problem here is that we have an aging population, 

which is going to create additional needs through entitlements and 

so on. You have a very tough job ahead of you. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. But, nonetheless, you are recommending that we 

make some of those kinds of investments in order to be able to create the jobs——

Mr. BERNANKE. Our society as a whole needs to make investments in both people and in physical capital. 

Ms. SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Last member, Mr. Becerra of California. 

Mr. BECERRA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for staying the extra time. Perhaps on 

another occasion when you have the time, we will have an opportunity to flesh out the elements of what would make a good fiscal 

package to lead to further economic recovery. But I do appreciate 

the comments you have made to date with regard to the potential 

for a good stimulus or a fiscal and economic recovery package. 

I do want to make notes that I appreciate your words with regard to the Tax Code and how improvements to it could be a very 

good thing. So perhaps we could flesh that out with you later on 

in the future as well. 

I wanted to move towards this whole issue of the way the markets are reacting. It seems to me that everyone agrees that the 

markets always yearn for stability, some predictability. I think you 

would agree with that. 

One of the problems that we have seen with this crisis is that 

they have had little sense of predictability and stability about what 

might happen with the financing of the different markets. But to 

some degree, the markets always try to anticipate what is going to 

happen. Maybe they are not able to do it today because they always try to forecast, and to the degree possible, factor into their 

investment decisions what they see ahead or what might be around 

the corner. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Of course, yes. 

Mr. BECERRA. I know that they are constantly trying to forecast 

what you will do on interest rates. They certainly were forecasting 

what we would do with regard to this $700 billion package, and I 

suspect they will continue to try to forecast and anticipate what we 

do. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. 

35

Mr. BECERRA. When we come to this next administration, next 

Congress, we are going to be facing the Bush tax cuts which begin 

to expire at the end of 2010. The markets have known that, Wall 

Street has known that; we have known that in 2010 the Bush tax 

cuts would be expiring. 

I would think that for the same reasons that the markets yearn 

for predictability and stability and always try to forecast and factor 

in what they will do with their investment decisions, given what 

they see ahead of them, that they must be factoring in and to some 

degree anticipating what might happen when 2010 arrives with regard to those Bush tax cuts. 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. BERNANKE. Yes. But there are a lot of other uncertainties 

and factors as well. 

Mr. BECERRA. I understand that completely. Nothing is totally 

predictable. 

But to the degree that they see before them a law that is set to 

expire at the end of 2010, that affects much of what they do because of the taxes that are implicated, to some degree you would 

think that since 2001 and 2003 when the Bush tax cuts were first 

passed, they have had to be in the process of trying to forecast 

where we would head in fiscal policy here in Congress and the 

White House come the end of 2010. 

Mr. BERNANKE. I would think so, yes. 

Mr. BECERRA. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your 

testimony, for coming today, for your forthright answers, and not 

least for your forbearance. We very much appreciate it, and thank 

you for your input to our process. 

Mr. BERNANKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Our next panel will explore more specifically 

the options before us, concrete measures that we might take. 

This panel consists of Martin Baily, who is now a Senior Fellow 

at The Brookings Institution, but was formerly the Chairman of 

the Council of Economic Advisers for President Clinton; Iris Lav, 

Deputy Director of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities; and 

William Beach, Director of the Center for Data Analysis at The 

Heritage Foundation. 

STATEMENTS OF MARTIN N. BAILY, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION; IRIS J. LAV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES; AND 

WILLIAM W. BEACH, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you all for coming. We look forward to 

your testimony. 

We have your testimony prefiled and as a matter of procedure 

make it a part of the record, if there is no objection, so that you 

can summarize it as you see fit. 

Let’s begin with Mr. Baily. 

36

STATEMENT OF MARTIN N. BAILY, PH.D. 

Mr. BAILY. Thank you very much, Chairman Spratt, Representative Ryan and other members of the committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to speak. 

My own perception of the economy accords very closely with the 

one that Chairman Bernanke gave. I do think we are in a recession, which has declined GDP, and GDP has been declining since 

the middle of the year. 

Some forecasters are saying this will be a mild recession, and I 

think it may be. There is a good deal of uncertainty about that. But 

increasingly we are seeing forecasts of a more severe recession, and 

I think that is rather likely—I say here about a 25 percent probability of what I call a very severe recession, which would perhaps 

involve as much as a 4 percent decline in GDP in the last quarter 

of this year and again in the first quarter of next year and a continuing, perhaps smaller decline in the second quarter. 

I don’t think that is inevitable. I think there are things that Congress could do, including the stimulus package that is the subject 

of this hearing to try to avert a more severe crisis. I think it is important that those things be done. 

Now, obviously, as many of you have said in this hearing and 

elsewhere, the housing market has been at the center of this recession and the likelihood of a more severe recession. So I think it is 

a priority to do something about the housing market. 

We have talked a lot already about the injection of capital, which 

I support, in the finance institutions. I disagree with the sentiments that have been expressed here that that injection and perhaps taking some of the distressed assets is a crucial part of reinvigorating the banking and financial system and is essential to the 

recovery of the Main Street economy. I do think it would be helpful 

to do something more direct on the housing side also. 

I am a little unsure myself exactly how that $700 billion is going 

to be allocated to different uses. Of course, there was money that 

was put into Fannie and Freddie that can expand their mortgage 

lending. So whether this particular package you are considering 

now should include money for housing or not, I am not certain of 

that. 

I think there need to be additional funds put into housing. If it 

is not available in the money that has already been appropriated, 

then I think some additional should be put there. 

I won’t go over some of the issues around exports, commodity 

prices; Chairman Bernanke mentioned that already, and I agree 

with the things that he said. 

Let me go—turn my attention more to how large I think the 

package should be, a stimulus package and what it should contain. 

I have a little sympathy with Chairman Bernanke, as you were 

pressing him, having been in an official position myself, I think he 

naturally wants to avoid trying to have a dominant role in fiscal 

policy; he feels monetary policy, his view. But since I am not in his 

shoes, I will be more specific. 

I just sort of look at a kind of rule of thumb, although I am fairly 

familiar with the forecasting models that do this more professionally. It looks to me that a package—that Congress is looking 

at about the right range, $150-300 billion. The 150, I think if the 

37

mild recession scenario is true—and, of course, a lot of dynamics 

of that are already unfolding—if that scenario were to be true, then 

I think 150 would get us back—would avoid at least a severe recession and would get us back growing again in 2009. 

Since I think that mild scenario recession is a little too optimistic, I think we probably will need a package that is somewhat 

larger than that. 

At the same time, like many of the members of this committee, 

I am very concerned about the amounts that we are adding to the 

budget deficit and the effect that will have on future generations 

and their ability to service that debt and repay that debt. So I 

would not like to see this go over the $300 billion mark and not 

have too many Christmas tree ornaments on it, but to keep it 

under that. 

In fact, I proposed that perhaps there will be a package in two tranches of $200 billion that would be made now, and an additional 

$100 billion that would be agreed upon, but that would not actually 

take place unless the unemployment rate went over 7.5. I don’t 

know exactly what the right trigger is, but I wanted to put some 

number out there. I think we are quite likely to see an unemployment rate over 7.5. 

Now, what should be the elements in it? I have already mentioned the need for stabilizing the housing market. As I say, I find 

it attractive to, perhaps through Fannie and Freddie, make available mortgages at somewhere between 5 and 6 percent. That has 

gotten a proposal from Glenn Hubbard, who was the Chairman of 

the Council in the beginning of the Bush administration. I am supporting it. 

Some of my colleagues at Brookings support that, making—allowing people to roll into a mortgage at roughly what we think 

would be a market rate if we didn’t have a crisis. Glenn Hubbard 

said 5.25; maybe it is that, maybe it is 5.5, but somewhere in that 

range, so as to avoid some of the effects of interest rate resets that 

would take place. 

Now, some of those mortgages that are currently held would involve prepayment penalties, that people have been given a low 

teaser rate at the beginning. So if they try to repay that mortgage, 

there are some penalty provisions within it. 

I don’t want to try to bail out people who have made bad decisions all around, but I think there were some loans that were 

made, that were originated, where the people did not know what 

they were getting into; and I think there is a case for helping them. 

So I do think there is a case for readjusting some of those penalties 

downwards, or perhaps rolling them into the next mortgage so that 

those prepayment penalties did not become an obstacle to acquiring 

a more affordable mortgage. 

I do think that the tax rebates that we had last time were a good 

move, and I think we should do them again. One of reasons I think 

that is attractive is that the IRS could use the same list they used 

before. We could get this money out of the door very quickly. Since 

we are in, I think, a recession, and threatening by the fourth quarter of this year that we may be in a severe recession, I think there 

is a lot to be said for getting some money out as tax rebates as we 

did earlier. 

38

Those tax rebates, people argue about how effective they were. 

I think they meant the consumption was higher than it would have 

been without the tax rebates. I don’t think every dollar will get 

spent, but I do think most of it will get spent over the space of 

three or four quarters. 

There has been some discussion here about unemployment insurance. I do think we should try to make sure that people are not 

losing their unemployment benefits. There is a danger with unemployment insurance where people remain unemployed, but I think 

in the current situation it would be a mistake to have people lose 

their unemployment benefits. 

I am also concerned about the fact that the number, the fraction 

of unemployed covered by unemployment insurance, is not very 

high and is down compared to what it was historically. It has been 

low for a while, but—so I propose here that perhaps we should look 

at extending unemployment insurance to people who are not currently getting it. 

I think part-time workers, who are often women, miss out on unemployment benefits; and I mention what was done in 1975. Some 

of my colleagues, I would say, say to me, we don’t want to try a 

new program now, we have got to do this quickly. But I think I 

want to leave this on the table as something that should be considered. 

On infrastructure, there has been a lot of mention of infrastructure. I share the concern that Chairman Bernanke had that we 

don’t want stuff that is going to roll out very slowly. But I do think 

there are some maintenance expenditures and some stuff that is 

ready to go that is being described here that could be preserved, 

that would go right into preserving jobs and increasing the benefits 

of the Nation’s infrastructure. 

I mentioned a couple of other things, State aid and business tax 

changes, but I think I am going to go quickly to the two items that 

I think might stand in the way of a fiscal stimulus package. One 

is, would a fiscal stimulus package cause a run on treasuries or a 

run on the dollar? I don’t believe so. I think it is reasonable to 

worry about that; we are escalating the deficit and the debt, and 

we certainly don’t want to undermine the full faith and credit of 

the United States, but there is certainly no sign in markets that 

that is an issue right now. In fact, Treasury interest rates have 

been low. There has been a flight to quality and, actually, the dollar. 

I actually welcomed the decline in the dollar that took place after 

2002, because I think it made our manufacturing sector more competitive. I don’t want to see the dollar go back up to where it was, 

but it has actually been stronger in the last few weeks than at its 

low point. I think it was well over 1.50 to the Euro, 1.56 or something, and know it is substantially higher than that. So we are not 

seeing a run on the dollar. 

Then, finally, on inflation, I have a lot of confidence on the Federal Reserve that they are going to keep inflation under control. We 

have a weak economy, commodity prices are falling, as Bernanke 

mentioned, inflation expectations are easing. 

39

1The discussion in this section has benefitted from my work as an advisor to the McKinsey 

Global Institute. I have also benefited from the analysis of Macroeconomic Advisers and other 

forecasters. The views are the author’s own. 

So, again, while I don’t like the inflationary consequences of escalating the deficit and the debt, I don’t think inflation is our biggest 

concern right now. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you, Dr. Baily. 

[The statement of Mr. Baily follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARTIN NEIL BAILY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

The author is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Initiative on Business and Public Policy at The Brookings Institution in Washington DC. He was previously the 

Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers and a member of President Clinton’s 

cabinet (1999-2001). He also served as a Member of the Council (1994-96). He would 

like to thank Barry Bosworth, William Gale, Robert Litan, Ezra Greenberg and 

Charles Schultze for very helpful comments, but the views expressed here are those 

of the author only. 

KEY POINTS IN THIS TESTIMONY

• The steps now being taken to ease the financial crisis are the right ones and 

I expect to see credit conditions easing gradually. • The Main Street economy of jobs and production is now very weak and the 

housing market has not yet stabilized. We are in a recession and the only question 

is how deep it will be. • Policymakers are debating a fiscal stimulus package of between $150 billion and $300 billion and that is the right range to be thinking about. • According to the Blue Chip forecast, GDP declined in the third quarter and 

there will be a mild recession with a further decline in the fourth quarter. With a 

mild recession scenario like this, a stimulus package of $150 billion would be 

enough to get the economy back on a growth path. • The Blue Chip is too optimistic, however, and the chances for a severe recession 

are pretty high, in which GDP would decline at a 4 percent annual rate in both the 

fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, with continuing but smaller 

declines until late in 2009. Under this scenario a stimulus package of $300 billion 

would be enough to ameliorate the recession substantially, although it would not 

eliminate it. • Given the uncertainty involved, I recommend an immediate stimulus package of $200 billion and the preparation of an additional stimulus of $100 billion that 

is triggered if unemployment goes over 7.5 percent. • It is vital to stabilize the housing market. Some of the funds in the financial 

rescue package should be used to help households directly. If more funds are needed, a portion of the stimulus package should be used for this purpose. Enabling families to move into 30-year fixed rate mortgages through Fannie and Freddie at a 

rate of interest between 5 and 6 percent is an attractive approach to providing this 

assistance. • It is vital that a stimulus work quickly and provide as much boost to spending 

as possible. A further round of tax rebates to be distributed this fall would get help 

to the economy quickly. • Other possible approaches include assistance for unemployment insurance, and 

aid to states and localities. The latter could include funds for infrastructure, provided this does not slow down disbursement. Increased maintenance of our existing 

infrastructure is vital and would add to jobs quickly. 

• The explosion of federal debt is very troubling and must be addressed by Congress once the crisis is past. Concerns about the marketability of Treasury securities 

and about inflation are real but not great enough to counter the urgent need for 

a new fiscal stimulus. 

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 1

The U.S. and global economies have been severely stressed by the crisis in financial markets. The drying up of lending has adversely impacted both the business 

and consumer sectors. Many economists at Brookings, along with others, have advocated the use of direct capital injection into financial institutions to recapitalize 

them and allow the resumption of bank lending and thanks to the actions of ConVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Jan 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-43\45532.TXT HBUD PsN: DICK
40

gress, the Treasury has both the funds and the authority to accomplish this and has 

now started the process of recapitalization. It would have been better had this process started earlier, but I am cautiously optimistic that the steps now being taken 

here in the United States as well as by other countries will be enough to stabilize 

the financial sector. Given that this crisis has repeatedly turned out to be worse 

than expected, however, that may not be the case and Congress and the Administration must stand ready to do whatever is needed to restore an effective financial sector. A strong financial sector is essential to overall economic growth and the recovery of Main Street. It is reasonable to expect that taxpayers be protected as far as 

possible and share in any future capital gains that result from the rescue, but it 

would be a terrible mistake to let this sector go under, even though Wall Street has 

caused many of its own problems. 

Even though the financial sector is likely on the right track, the housing market 

remains very depressed and home prices are still falling. The most important factor 

determining whether homeowners default is whether or not they are under water, 

with outstanding mortgage debt exceeding the value of the house. However, with 

a recession underway, families that face unemployment or loss of income for other 

reasons will find that it is impossible for them to pay their mortgages or credit card 

bills and they lose their homes. Policies have been put in place already to help 

homeowners, but they may not be enough. If the American economy is to move to 

a sustainable recovery, the housing market has to stabilize. 

The economy of Main Street is headed in the wrong direction, with employment 

falling, unemployment rising and monthly data that suggest that GDP has been declining since mid year. GDP growth will likely turn negative when the data for the 

third quarter are tabulated, and the decline will be much larger in the fourth quarter of this year. GDP can be expected to fall for one or two more quarters in 2009. 

The biggest weight pulling the economy down has been the residential housing sector and, so far, there is no clear evidence that this has turned a corner. The data 

on housing starts released October 17 continue to show a pace of rapid decline and 

I expect to see further reductions in residential construction for the rest of this year 

and perhaps into 2009. The numbers on retail sales released last week were very 

weak especially since the figures for earlier months were revised down, auto sales 

are low, and industrial production is falling. Consumption is being adversely affected by the huge loss of wealth from the decline in home prices and equity prices 

and can be expected to decline at about a 3 percent annual rate in the second half 

of this year. Business investment held up well in the early stages of the crisis, but 

is now falling also. The U.S. economy is in a recession and the only question is how 

deep it will be. Unemployment tends to lag behind the business cycle and often continues to rise even after a recovery is underway. Based on the economic trends now 

at work, it is very probable that unemployment will hit the range of 7 to 8 percent 

and a deeper recession is quite possible. Unemployment hit 10 percent in the 1982 

recession and, while I do not think we will reach that level in this recession, we 

cannot rule it out. It takes GDP growth at a rate between 21⁄2 and 23⁄4 percent to 

keep unemployment from rising, and a higher growth rate to bring unemployment 

down. We may see a solid bounce back in growth in the second half of 2009, but 

it is more likely that it will take until 2010 before unemployment declines again. 

One of the bright spots this year has been the performance of U.S. exports. After 

adjusting for inflation, exports grew at over 12 percent at an annual rate in the second quarter and are likely to match that pace or more in the third. In addition, inflation-adjusted imports are weak as a result of the fall in the dollar that began in 

2002 and the weakening U.S. economy. Domestic demand actually remained flat in 

the second quarter and all of the GDP growth was accounted for by the improvement in net exports. Exports have been keeping us out of the graveyard. Looking 

ahead, I expect that exports will remain a positive and that imports will still be 

weak, but the effects of trade will not be large enough to offset falling consumption 

and investment. Currently, both Europe and Japan are weakening and likely will 

head into their own recessions, making for a slowing of U.S. export growth. The dollar has recovered some ground against the euro also, which will trim U.S. export 

gains. 

One economic factor that is clearly helping and is likely to remain a positive is 

commodity prices. The price of oil fell below $70 a barrel on October 16th, less than 

half of the peak price it hit earlier this year. Commodity prices fluctuate greatly and 

it is hard to tell exactly where they are headed, but a weakening global economy 

can be expected to depress commodity prices, so it is unlikely that they will return 

to anything close to their peak levels. The United States, of course, is a producer 

of commodities as well as a consumer, so there are companies and workers that are 

hurt when commodity prices fall. On balance, however, U.S. economic growth benefits from a fall in commodity prices, especially oil and food prices which very quickly 

41

2See the Brookings website for links to recent papers on the financial crisis and what to do 

about it. 3The U.S. economy produces and spends about $14 trillion a year or $3.5 trillion in each quar- ter. The first round effect of an additional $40 billion in spending, therefore, is to add 1.1 percentage points to the GDP growth rate in the first quarter of 2009. That increment to growth 

would drop to 0.55 percentage points in the second and third quarters. In a slack economy, a 

positive increment to consumer spending is likely to have a second round effect, as the increase 

in retail sales or other spending puts more money into the hands of the workers and businesses 

that provide the goods and services. I assume there would be the equivalent of about another 

$50 billion as a secondary effect for each $100 billion of initial stimulus. It is hard to know the 

timing of this secondary effect—it would likely be spread over 12 to 18 months after the passage 

of the stimulus package. To get a rough magnitude, I assume that the secondary impact would 

add 0.2 percent to growth in the second quarter of 2009, another 0.2 percent in the third quarter, 0.15 in the fourth quarter and the rest spread further into the future. 

affect the wallets of consumers. There is nothing like seeing oil at $140 a barrel to 

make oil at $70 a barrel look good. 

In the early stages of the financial crisis it was notable that jobs and GDP were 

holding up rather well; in fact there was 2.8 percent growth in the second quarter. 

That good news about growth was deceptive, however. The financial crisis has set 

in motion the dynamics of an economic downturn. Even though the financial sector 

is probably on the road to recovery, its negative impact on growth will remain with 

us for a while yet. 

This recession was not inevitable. Almost everyone was caught up in the belief 

that housing prices would keep rising and this encouraged speculation and over-borrowing by households, lax lending standards by mortgage providers and a failure 

to supervise and regulate banks effectively. Wall Street banks as well as foreign 

banks became overleveraged and took on excessive risks, credit rating agencies 

failed to do their job.2 There is plenty of blame to go around. Congress, the Administration and the Federal Reserve should have done more to help and so should the 

economics profession. Given what has happened, there is nothing that Congress can 

do now that will allow us to avoid a recession, and so the goal now is damage control, avoiding a deep recession and putting in place the basis for a solid recovery. 

WHAT CAN POLICYMAKERS DO TO AMELIORATE THE RECESSION?

Given the economic weakness, there is a strong case for a new fiscal stimulus 

package that would boost spending and offset the chain reaction of declining spending and employment. Historically, the use of fiscal policy to smooth the business 

cycle has had a mixed record. It is hard to assess where the economy stands, so that 

fiscal stimulus can sometimes have an impact when the economy is already recovering and does not need the help. That problem does not apply to the current situation. It is clear that the economy is trending down and needs help to sustain aggregate demand and private sector employment. The more serious objection to a stimulus package is that it will contribute to the budget deficit and that is indeed a 

valid argument, but it does not carry the day. If the economy goes into a severe recession, tax revenues will fall sharply and the impact on the budget deficit will likely be even worse than the impact of the fiscal stimulus. Even if a stimulus package 

creates a net cost to the deficit, that cost is worthwhile to avoid the damage of a 

severe recession. 

How large should the stimulus package be? Assume that there is a stimulus passed this fall that injects $100 billion into the economy in the first quarter of 

2009, and that around 80 percent of this amount is spent over the first three quarters of 2009—$40 billion in the first quarter and $20 billion in each of the subsequent two quarters. (I have used $100 billion as a round number to make the arithmetic easier to follow. There is a good case for a larger stimulus package than this.) 

Such a package would add about 1.1 percent to GDP growth in that quarter about 

O.75 percent to the GDP growth rate in the second and third quarters of 2009. The 

overall, the increment to GDP growth in 2009 would be a little under 0.7 to the 

growth rate for the year (averaging the quarterly effects of 1.1, 0.75, 0.75 and 0.15). 

A larger stimulus package, I assume, would scale up the impact proportionately, 

with a package of $150 billion being 50 percent larger and a package of $300 billion 

having three times the impact.3

The current Blue Chip consensus forecast says that GDP declined 0.3 percent in 

the third quarter of this year and will decline 1.1 percent in the fourth quarter. The 

Blue Chip then says that GDP will decline by only 0.1 percent in the first quarter 

of 2009 and will resume positive growth after that. If this Blue Chip forecast is correct, a package of $150 billion would boost growth to 1 percent in the first quarter 

of 2009, and as high as 2.9 percent in the second quarter. Under this scenario, a 

stimulus of $150 billion seems plenty. 

42

The Blue Chip consensus is too optimistic and many of the forecasters who contribute to this consensus have been revising down their forecasts. Consider a pessimistic scenario where there is about a 4 percent GDP decline in the fourth quarter 

of this year, about the same in the first quarter of 2009, about a 1.5 percent decline 

in the second quarter of 2009, about a 1 percent decline in the third quarter and 

a small positive growth rate in the fourth quarter. I do not think we will see a recession quite that bad, but that scenario is not out of the bounds of possibility. There 

is about a 25 percent probability that we will see a recession of this severity in the 

absence of offsetting policy actions. Suppose Congress were to enact a stimulus 

package of $300 billion—a number that is around the high end of the current debate. This would boost growth but even so there would be a GDP decline of 0.7 percent in the first quarter of 2009, followed by positive growth of about 0.75 in the 

second quarter and growth of just over 2 percent in the third quarter. The fourth 

quarter of 2009 would remain sluggish unless the stimulus had succeeded in reviving consumption. Under this scenario, a $300 billion stimulus would not result in 

buoyant growth in 2009, but it would substantially offset the severe recession. 

What are the uncertainties around these estimates? I have assumed that 40 cents 

of each dollar of stimulus is spent in the quarter in which the money is received 

by families and 80 cents is spent over three quarters. Some economists will judge 

these numbers are too high and point to the impact of the first stimulus package 

in 2008 where consumption fell in the second quarter and is expected to fall in the 

third, despite the rebate checks. The difficulty with that view is that we do not 

know the counterfactual, what the situation would have been without the tax rebates. Very likely, consumption would have been significantly lower. Given that 

American consumers on average have been spending nearly all of their disposable 

income for many years, I find it hard to believe that they will save a huge fraction 

of any additional income from a new stimulus package for more than a few quarters. 

Initially, the 2008 tax rebates went into savings accounts or to pay off debts, but 

this strengthening of consumer balance sheets is allowing them to weather the economic conditions of today with smaller cutbacks in spending. 

It is quite possible, however, that the lags will be longer than specified in this 

example. A stimulus package passed this fall might not get money into people’s 

hands until the second quarter of next year and the impact of that on spending 

might be lagged into the latter half of 2009 or into 2010. If the Blue Chip forecast 

turned out to be correct and, in addition, it took a while for the stimulus to work, 

we could find that the policy had over-stimulated an economy that was already well 

into recovery. My own judgment is that this recession is likely to be prolonged, so 

I am not too worried about that possibility. In addition, monetary policy could act 

to slow the economy if it turns out that it is overheating. 

Given the dangers the economy is facing, I view $150 billion as being about the 

minimum amount that will have a serious impact on economic growth in 2009. 

Given the concerns about the budget deficit that I articulate shortly in this testimony, I would not exceed a $300 billion package. My specific proposal within this 

range of numbers is therefore to prepare a stimulus package in two tranches. The 

first to be enacted immediately would be for $200 billion. The second tranche for 

an additional $100 billion would be ready to go and would be enacted on the basis 

of a trigger. One possible trigger would be that if the unemployment rate moves 

over 7.5 percent, the second tranche is released. 

WHAT FORM SHOULD THE STIMULUS PACKAGE TAKE?

The important factors to consider are well-known to this committee and I recommend the analysis of stimulus design provided this spring by the Congressional 

Budget Office. In order to alleviate a recession that is already underway, it is important to get the money into the hands of Americans quickly and that this addition 

to income translates into additional spending as close to dollar for dollar as possible. 

Given the problem of the exploding budget deficit, it is important that the changes 

be temporary and do not contribute unduly to the worsening of the deficit in the 

long run. 

• Stabilizing the Housing Market. The economy will not return to sustained economic growth while the housing market continues to fall. And there is a two-way 

interaction between these two factors because supporting economic growth will help 

stabilize the housing market. Congress has already agreed to a substantial investment of capital into the GSEs to support the mortgage market. And the terms of 

the $700 rescue package allow for the purchase of mortgages as well as mortgagebacked assets. Since I do not know how much money it will take to recapitalize the 

banking system, so I am not sure how much is available for direct support of the 

housing market. If there is not enough money already approved, then I would urge 

43

the Committee to support additional funds for families facing default. It is very hard 

to do this without rewarding past misbehavior by either lenders or borrowers, but 

I find attractive the proposal from both Republican and Democratic economists to 

allow households to roll existing mortgages into new 30-year fixed rate mortgages 

available through Fannie and Freddie at an interest rate between 5 and 6 percent. 

These would particularly be valuable to families caught in interest rate re-sets to 

high levels, and the pre-payment penalties could be adjusted and rolled into the new 

mortgage, or eliminated altogether. The program would be restricted to owner-occupied properties. 

• Tax rebates. I urge the committee to pass quickly a new tax rebate package. 

If this were done very quickly, the IRS could use the same taxpayer list that was 

used earlier this year and the money would be released this fall. Having the rebates 

be refundable ensures that low and moderate income families get a benefit. The IRS 

got the rebate checks out quickly earlier this year and using this approach is simple 

and quick. 

• Unemployment Insurance. This program has traditionally been a backstop for 

the economy, serving as an important automatic stabilizer. With the job situation 

deteriorating there are many workers reaching the point where benefits are exhausted and it would make sense to extend the duration. Over the years, the fraction of the unemployed receiving benefits has declined and women seem particularly 

disadvantaged because they often work part-time. In 1975 Special Unemployment 

Assistance was enacted by a Democratic Congress and signed by President Ford to 

help persons that were not eligible under the usual rules. I would support such a 

program again now, particularly to help single mothers or fathers who have lost jobs 

but are not eligible for standard UI benefits and who will find it difficult to qualify 

for welfare. This program should be funded by the federal government and not by 

the states (the program was federally funded in 1975). 

• Infrastructure. Many House members are concerned about the deplorable state 

of the nation’s infrastructure and would like to devote some fraction of the stimulus 

package to infrastructure investment. I share the concerns about the state of our 

roads and bridges, but I am also aware of the objection to using infrastructure investment as a stabilization policy because it can be too slow to work. There are two 

ways in which this problem could be overcome: First, there is great need for improved maintenance of the infrastructure, including crumbling roads that need repair and bridges that may age prematurely or even collapse because they have not 

been looked after. Looking after the existing infrastructure is not as exciting as cutting ribbons on new projects, but it could generate jobs quickly and meet an important need. Second, there are state and local projects that are being cancelled because of the short term budget pressures. Sustaining such projects would avoid layoffs that would otherwise take place. 

• Aid for States and Localities. There are many states and localities that are feeling tremendous budget pressures because of the weak economy and the decline in 

property tax revenue. Providing assistance to them would prevent or ameliorate the 

cutbacks in spending that would otherwise occur. 

• General budget assistance, targeted perhaps to states with high unemployment 

and mortgage default rates 

• Assistance to sustain Medicaid spending. Some states are finding it difficult or 

impossible to sustain support for health care because of budget pressures. 

• Business Tax Changes. The marginal rate of corporate tax is higher in the 

United States than in many other countries with whom we compete internationally. 

At the same time, corporations do not pay a lot of tax—the average rate of taxation 

is pretty low. As part of a long run package of tax reforms I support the idea of 

broadening the base of corporate tax and lowering the rate. In my judgment, however, adjusting business taxes now is not attractive as a response to the recession. 

Capital gains taxes are already low. Investors are staying on the sidelines of the 

stock market because they are concerned about market risk and volatility, not because of concerns about the taxes they might pay on capital gains. In the past several years, non-financial corporations have improved their balance sheets and added 

to their cash holdings. It is much more important to get the balance sheets of the 

financial sector into better shape and free up lending to businesses and consumers. 

The fiscal stimulus package is sufficiently important, however, that if business tax 

changes are necessary to obtain bipartisan support for the package, I would support 

them on that basis. 

44

THE THREAT OF INFLATION AND THE FISCAL CHALLENGE: $700 BILLION HERE, $300

BILLION THERE AND PRETTY SOON WE ARE TALKING ABOUT REAL MONEY

A year or so ago, when the economy was still growing it was clear that the problem of chronic budget deficits was real and urgent. We have known for years that 

the population is aging and living longer and that Medicare, Medicaid and, to a lesser extent, Social Security were going put pressure on the budget for years to come. 

I support fiscal discipline and believe that the federal budget should be balanced 

on average over a period of years. Can we really afford to pay for a fiscal stimulus 

package over and above the $700 billion for the rescue package together with the 

funds for Fannie, Freddie, AIG, and Bear Stearns? There are two possible economic 

arguments for why we might find it unwise to expand the deficit for a stimulus 

package. The first would be that it caused a flight from U.S. Treasury securities and 

perhaps a run on the dollar. The second is that it would result in inflation. It would 

take more space than is available to go into these issues in depth, but the simple 

answer is that neither concern is large enough to prevent passage of a fiscal stimulus. 

Investors here in the U.S. and around the globe know the fiscal situation of the 

federal government and anticipate the likely expansion of the national debt. Despite 

that, there is no shortage of buyers for U.S. Treasuries. The interest rate on 10-

year notes is under 4 percent and the U.S. dollar has appreciated against the euro 

in the past year and stands now at about $1.34. There has been a ‘‘flight to quality’’ 

recently as a result of the crisis and the benchmark of quality remains U.S. Treasury securities. I am deeply troubled by the persistence of federal deficits, the over 

dependence on foreign borrowing and the lack of a national debate about how to pay 

for federal spending and how to moderate its growth. But letting the economy go 

into a deep recession is not going to solve the long run fiscal challenge facing America. Global financial markets will let us borrow to pay for the stimulus package and 

we should go ahead and do that. 

There is a working model of inflation that has guided policymakers over the years 

and its first ingredient is that inflation will increase when commodity prices go up 

and will decrease when these prices decline. Commodity prices are set in global 

markets and are only partly under the influence of the state of our own economy 

or our monetary policy. The second ingredient is that inflation will increase when 

there is excess demand in the economy, production capacity is strained and labor 

is in short supply. It will fall when there is slack in the economy. The third ingredient is linked by most economists to inflation expectations, so that when higher inflation is expected it can actually cause higher actual inflation. Of these three ingredients, the first two are pointing to an easing of inflationary pressures: commodity 

prices have come down and seem likely to stay well below their peak. The U.S. economy already has slack capacity and will have much more in the year ahead. For 

the third ingredient, there have been signs of an upward adjustment of inflation expectations, something that has troubled the FED in the past year. That seems to 

be fading, however, as the other drivers of inflation ease off. Adding huge amounts 

to federal borrowing is not a good thing for inflation, but that concern is not enough 

to change the case for the stimulus. I am old-fashioned enough to think about wageprice spirals as much as expectations, and on this score, there is little sign of the 

kind of wage price spiral that was so difficult to deal with in the 1970s. With good 

productivity growth, businesses are not facing an upward push of labor costs. 

CONCLUSION

The American economy is in trouble and the balance of risks strongly favor a substantial fiscal stimulus. I urge Congress to act on this proposal as soon as possible.

Chairman SPRATT. Now, Iris Lav from the Center on Budget and 

Policy Priorities. 

STATEMENT OF IRIS J. LAV 

Ms. LAV. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today. 

My testimony is focused on why Federal fiscal relief for the 

States is particularly necessary and an effective part of the stimulus plan at this time. Now, it doesn’t mean that I don’t think any 

other things should be part of a stimulus plan or would be effective—and I could discuss those in the Q&A. But I think the issue 

45

of the States is particularly critical, and I would like to explore 

that fairly fully with you, if I may. 

So State finances are in pretty dire straits. There are about 36 

States at this moment that are experiencing fiscal stress. If I could 

have my first slide, please. 

So the stress comes in a couple of pieces. There are 29 States 

that, when they enacted their fiscal year 2009 budgets, which 

started on July 1 in most States, they closed gaps, deficits of $48 

billion that were about 9 percent of these States’ budgets, huge. 

Those are the light blue and the orange States there. 

But the budgets have soon fallen apart. The revenue estimates 

they used in enacting those budgets turned out to be much more 

optimistic than what is actually happening with the economy. So 

we have 22 States that are again in trouble with midyear deficits 

that most of them have to do something about. Those are another 

$11 billion. Those are the orange and the dark blue States, the orange being the ones that have both initial and midyear deficits. 

We also have been tracking collection numbers for some of the 

larger States. We have new collection numbers. If I could have the 

next slide, please. 

They are really pretty bad. These are adjusted for inflation. You 

can see that sales tax revenues in particular, as consumption has 

fallen off, have dropped in a lot of States—you know, in the 8 and 

9 percent range. Florida has had a 12 percent drop in sales tax collections. Income tax revenues are also down in a large number of 

States. 

I think most of the States, even though I said there are 22 States 

with midyear gaps, these are numbers that have really just come 

out. The September numbers are the ones that really drove those 

down, and they have not taken them into account. So further down, 

those revisions are pretty much inevitable. 

Now, of course, that is this year, and we are not going to be done 

with this problem, with the economic problems, at the end of this 

year. Pretty soon, we get to—governors are right now putting together their fiscal year 2010 budgets, and they will begin to be debated in January and February. That situation looks very bleak. I 

think that there are 16 States that have already announced 2010 

deficits, but that number is low because most States don’t—you 

know, aren’t talking about it yet or haven’t projected yet. 

If we want to try and think of what is going to happen next year, 

one thing we can do is look what happened in the recession in the 

early part of this decade—if I could have the next slide, please. 

Deficits started at about $40 billion in fiscal year 2002, but rose 

to $75 billion in fiscal year 2003 and $80 billion in fiscal year 2004. 

Now, in this downturn, economic conditions are worse than they 

were then. That was a relatively mild recession; for unemployment, 

then, peaked at 6.3 percent. It is already 6.1 percent; pretty much, 

most forecasters are talking about it trending toward 8 percent at 

this point in time. 

When unemployment goes up, it obviously reduces State income 

taxes. People also lose their health insurance, they also come on to 

Medicaid. They need other services, and that is likely to be even 

greater than in the past. Although, you know, there were 6 million 

46

new people that came on to the Medicaid rolls in the earlier recession, I would anticipate a lot more than that now. 

Second, the decline in the stock market this time has matched 

the decline in the last recession by some of the measures of markets. It is unclear where the bottom of the market is, whether we 

have reached it, whether we have not. Of course, no one knows, 

and that affects income taxes as well through capital gains taxes. 

Third, and very important, is that in the last recession consumers used home equity loans—the housing market was strong—

and other sources of credit to bolster their consumption. That is not 

available to consumers now, to say the least. So consumption expenditures and sales taxes are likely to fall more steeply. I just 

showed you how steeply they are falling right now. 

So I would estimate—I had made an estimate that, given deterioration of revenue and given the history of the last recession, that 

we are looking, going forward, at about $100 billion in deficits, 

something in that neighborhood for 2010, the upcoming fiscal year. 

Now, those deficits are particularly problematic, because unlike 

a Federal deficit, when a State has a deficit, it leads directly to 

spending cuts and tax increases, which leads to reduced demand 

which further harms the economy. You know, all States but one 

have a requirement to balance their budget, so they have to take 

action. When these revenues go down and the demand for services 

go up, they have very few choices. Under the balanced budget requirement, they can do one of three things, they can draw down reserves, they can cut spending, or they can raise taxes. 

Now, States have been pretty prudent on reserves. They entered 

this, this economic weakness, with the largest reserves they had 

ever had, $69 billion, or 10.5 percent of their general fund budgets. 

They have used down quite a lot of that, and they are on the road 

to being depleted, given this year’s actions for the purposes of 

budget balancing. 

Of course, all the reserves are not matched, necessarily, in all the 

States. There is a big chunk of that in Alaska which isn’t going to 

have a problem. 

But the other two options States have to balance their budgets 

are cutting spending and raising taxes. As I said, both of those intensify the economic downturn. They lay off employees, they cancel 

contracts, they eliminate payments to businesses and to nonprofits 

that provide direct services, cut benefits to individuals. Then those 

people who, in turn, lose their jobs have less money to spend on 

consumption; and you get a decline in the economy greater than 

the budget cut in the first place. 

Tax increases, of course, also remove demand from the economy, 

because people in businesses have less to spend. 

Obviously, the Federal Government doesn’t have this constraint, 

so it makes great sense, in our federalist system, for the Federal 

Government to try and prevent these economically damaging actions. So you will recall, of course, that in May of 2003, just before 

the beginning of State fiscal year 2004 there, you enacted a $20 billion fiscal relief package. It provided two types of assistance to the 

States; half of it was in the form of an increase in the Federal 

share of Medicaid, technically known as the FMAP, and the other 

part was general grants to States, $10 billion of each kind. 

47

That was very important in the last recession, but it was not enacted until a million people had already lost eligibility for Medicaid 

as States cut back, and States had already made deep cuts in K12 education, raised tuition in public universities and community 

colleges and done a lot of other damaging things. In the best of all 

worlds, it would have been enacted before some of those demand 

reducing cuts were enacted. It was criticized by the GAO primarily 

because it was too late. 

So States have already begun cutting their budgets now. About 

half the States have made budget cuts in public health insurance 

programs, services for the elderly and the disabled, K-12 education, 

et cetera. Eighteen States have cut their workforce, and States are 

poised to make far more drastic cuts as they deal with their midyear deficits and enact their 2010 budget. This is about one of the 

best forms of stimulus you can do, preventing these procyclical 

cuts. 

I would think this time around that more than $20 billion in relief will be necessary. In fact, I would suggest that about $50 billion is the right number to be thinking of right now. It would be 

about half the expected deficits for 2010, or you can think of it as 

a third of the combined 2009-2010 deficits—however, less than a 

third, however you want to look at it. And I would say the majority, perhaps about two-thirds of it, should be in the form of increased FMAP, increasing the Federal share of Medicaid. That can 

be used right away. It is immediately put to work. We know there 

are going to be people coming rapidly onto the Medicaid rolls. It is 

the new spending that Chairman Bernanke was talking about. 

If you don’t do that, and people lose their private health insurance, it looks like we might trend to a somewhat shameful 50 million people uninsured in this country. 

I think the other piece of it should be available, again as a block 

grant, both to prevent cuts in education and programs like that; 

but also one of the things that States cut is aid to localities. Local 

governments also have been having problems, and we really don’t 

want the States to be cutting aid to localities at this time. 

So people often—when I say this, or when people say this, people 

often raise the question, aren’t we creating a moral hazard? If the 

Federal Government goes ahead and helps the States, doesn’t that 

give the States license to be less responsible with their own fiscal 

house in good times, knowing that the Federal Government might 

bail them out? I think the answer is a very clear no, that is not 

true. 

The evidence of what has happened before and the evidence of 

what States have done is pretty clear. Between 2001 and the today, 

or even before this downturn started, the beginning of this downturn, States have reduced expenditures as a share of the economy. 

States are not bulking up their expenditures in any way. They 

also—you know, their taxes are about the same, and States did 

build up these very substantial rainy-day funds that I mentioned. 

So I think that States have a lot of reasons to themselves be responsible. We are not talking about the Federal Government giving 

the States everything they need. They are still going to have to 

make very painful cuts. 

48

1This includes states with deficits that were closed in enacting their fiscal year 2009 budgets, 

states with mid-year gaps, and three states (Kansas, Oregon, and Washington) that did not have 

fiscal year 2009 deficits but are projecting deficits for fiscal year 2010. 

I mean, $100 billion is like $1 in every seven States’ pay—spent 

from their operating budgets. So it is a huge amount, and that is 

if it was evenly distributed, which—you know, it will be more than 

that in some States. 

I would suggest that this, of course, be temporary, that States 

should be allowed to use the fiscal relief over a 15-to-18-month period to make sure it is coming in immediately as stimulus. 

Finally, I would just say the hallmark of a good stimulus is that 

it is well targeted, temporary and timely. That is sort of the same 

thing I think that Chairman Bernanke said at the end, that you 

really have to make sure it is being spent right away and that it 

is getting where it needs to be and that it is temporary. 

Federal fiscal relief fits perfectly into those criteria. For this reason, any number of economists have called for fiscal relief to the 

States as the key part of the stimulus package, and they include 

people such as Mark Zandi, Paul Krugman, Larry Summers, Jared 

Bernstein, Alan Blinder and many others. 

So I thank you for your consideration. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Ms. Lav follows:]

Prepared Statement of Iris J. Lav, Deputy Director,

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today why federal fiscal relief 

for states is a particularly necessary and effective part of a stimulus plan at this 

time. 

State finances are in dire straits. At least 36 states are experiencing fiscal stress.1

• There are 29 states that closed shortfalls of $48 billion in enacting their fiscal 

year 2009 budgets (for the year beginning July 1, 2008 in most states). The shortfalls equaled 9 percent of these states’ general fund (operating) budgets. 

• Since fiscal year 2009 budgets were enacted, budgets have fallen out of balance 

producing new, mid-year deficits in 22 states and the District of Columbia that total 

more than $11 billion or 4 percent of budgets. 

• The latest revenue collection numbers suggest that the situation is rapidly 

worsening. Third quarter 2008 sales tax and income tax revenue are coming in well 

below prior year levels and well below states’ initial projections in most of the states 

that have released figures. These latest figures have not yet been taken into account 

in most states’ budget forecasts. 

• At least 16 states have announced that they are expecting deficits for state fiscal year 2010 that so far total $18 billion, but that number is very low because it 

is very early in the year for most states to make such a projection and because revenue collections continue to weaken. Deficits during the downturn in the early part 

of the decade reached $75 billion and $80 billion in the second and third year of 

that fiscal crisis, and economic conditions are now projected to be significantly worse 

than they were then. Judging from the rate at which revenue is deteriorating and 

the history of prior recessions, the 2010 gaps are likely to be in the $100 billion 

range. 

These state deficits are particularly problematic because, unlike the federal deficit, they lead directly to spending cuts and tax increases that reduce demand, 

which further harms the economy. 

Whenever the national economy stagnates or falls into recession, state revenues 

also stagnate or decline. This happens just at the very time that states face upward 

pressure on their budgets as residents lose jobs and income and health insurance 

and become eligible for Medicaid or other safety net programs. This produces deficits. 

These state deficits are not like the increase in the federal deficit that typically 

also occurs during a recession. This is because all states but one have a requirement 

to balance their general fund (operating) budgets. States with flagging revenues 

49

cannot provide even the normal level of services—let alone meet the increased demand for services and supports. 

Under balanced budget requirements, states have three primary actions they can 

take during a fiscal crisis: they can draw down available reserves, they can cut expenditures, or they can raise taxes. 

Most states do keep ‘‘rainy day funds’’ and other reserves to try to anticipate this 

problem. States entered this period of economic weakness with the largest reserves 

they have ever had, totaling $69 billion or 10.5 percent of their general fund budgets 

at the end of fiscal year 2007. But those funds are on the road to being depleted 

for the purpose of budget balancing—and that was before the events of the last four 

weeks that undoubtedly have weakened fiscal conditions in the states. 

The other two options states have to meet their balanced budget requirements are 

tax increases and budget cuts. These options both are pro-cyclical. That is, they intensify the economic downturn rather than help the economy recover. 

The spending cuts and tax increases states make when they must balance their 

budgets under conditions of falling revenue can further slow a state’s economy during a downturn and contribute to the further slowing of the national economy, as 

well. When states cut spending, they lay off employees, cancel contracts with vendors, eliminate or reduce payments to businesses and nonprofit organizations that 

provide direct services, and cut benefit payments to individuals. In all of these circumstances, the companies and organizations that would have received government 

payments have less money to spend on salaries and supplies, and individuals who 

would have received salaries or benefits have less money for consumption. This directly removes demand from the economy. 

Tax increases also remove demand from the economy by reducing the amount of 

money people and businesses have to spend. 

In contrast to the states, the federal government can run a deficit, and it does 

not have to take the actions damaging to the economy (and to low- and middle-income families needing state services) that state balanced budget requirements force 

on states during recessions. Thus, one of the best ways to stimulate the economy 

in a downturn is for the federal government to provide short-term, additional funding to states. You will recall that in 2003, you enacted a $20 billion fiscal relief package for 

states. It provided two types of assistance to states: 1) a temporary increase in the 

federal share of the Medicaid program; and 2) general grants to states, based on 

population. Each part was for $10 billion. 

While extremely important, the 2003 fiscal relief package was not enacted until 

after 1 million people lost eligibility for Medicaid because of state cutbacks, and 

deep cuts had been made in K-12 education, child care, state workforces, and a variety of other areas. In the best of all worlds, it would have been enacted before those 

demand-reducing cuts were made. 

States already have begun cutting their budgets; about half of the states have 

made cuts in public health programs, services for the elderly and disabled, K-12 

education, or universities and colleges. At least 18 states have cut their workforce. 

And states are on the verge of making far more drastic cuts as they deal with their 

mid-year deficits and begin to enact fiscal year 2010 budgets. 

There is the opportunity to prevent many of these damaging actions through providing fiscal relief. Preventing these pro-cyclical state actions is among the best 

forms of stimulus you could provide, because it both prevents budget cuts to programs that are needed by people who are losing jobs and incomes in this recession, 

and prevents state actions from worsening the economy. 

This time around, however, it seems that much more than $20 billion in relief will 

be necessary. 

• To stop the most damaging of the budget cuts, fiscal relief of approximately $50 

billion would be needed. This would be about one-half of the expected deficit for 

state fiscal year 2010 (or less than one-third the combined deficits for state fiscal 

years 2009 and 2010). 

• The majority of the fiscal relief ($30 billion to $35 billion) would be most effective as an increase in the federal share of the Medicaid program (FMAP), accompanied by a ban on states reducing eligibility in that program and thereby driving 

up the ranks of the uninsured. Without such assistance, the number of uninsured 

in this country could rise to 50 million. 

• The remainder of the relief could be made available to prevent cuts in education 

and other critical state programs, as well as to lower the likelihood that states will 

cut aid to localities. 

Federal fiscal relief of $50 billion would provide a substantial stimulus by averting that amount of pro-cyclical actions by states that otherwise would be inevitable. 

It would be sufficient to prevent many of the state budget cuts that would be most 

50

2The gaps are 4 percent of the budgets of the 20 states that have provided specific estimates. 

There are no estimates for California and Illinois.

harmful to low- and moderate-income households, including the newly unemployed. 

But, relative to the size of the deficits, it would not create a ‘‘moral hazard’’ that 

could in any way induce states to be less responsible with their own finances. The 

need to amass substantial ‘‘rainy day funds’’ and other reserves during strong economic times would remain. 

I would stress that the payments to states would be temporary. States should be 

allowed to use fiscal relief over a 15 month or 18 month period after enactment. 

The hallmark of a good stimulus is that it is well-targeted, temporary, and timely. 

Federal fiscal relief to the states fits well on all of those dimensions. For these reasons, a number of economists have called for fiscal relief to the states to be a key 

part of a stimulus package, including Mark Zandi, Paul Krugman, Laurence Summers, Jered Bernstein, and Alan Blinder, among others. 

The following reviews some of the details of the current situation and the case 

for fiscal relief. 

STATE FISCAL CONDITIONS

When states project deficits—gaps between projected revenue and projected 

spending—for an upcoming fiscal year, they have to take action to close those deficits. As noted above, 36 states are already experiencing fiscal stress. Twenty-nine 

states closed shortfalls of $48 billion in enacting their fiscal year 2009 budgets. In 

many states, however, the revenue estimates used to project their budget shortfalls 

were still far too optimistic; the economy has seriously deteriorated since those 

budgets were enacted. As a result, budgets have fallen out of balance producing 

new, mid-year deficits in 22 states and the District of Columbia that total more than 

$11 billion or another 4 percent of budgets2 (See Figure 1.) And that is a snapshot 

of the situation last week. Virtually every day, additional states are announcing 

shortfalls or increasing their estimate of the size of their shortfalls. 

States are just beginning to release revenue collection data for the 3rd quarter 

of 2008 (which is the first quarter of fiscal year 2009 in most states). The sales tax 

data certainly reflects the slump in retail sales and consumption, while the income 

tax data reflects, among other factors, the increase in the unemployment rate. 

There are revenue declines in most of the states that have released data. For example, sales tax revenues for the third quarter 2008 compared to the third quarter 

2007 are down 8.8 percent in California, 12.1 percent in Florida, 8.0 percent in 

Georgia, 7.3 percent in Massachusetts, and 8.5 percent in Missouri, after adjustment for inflation. (See Table 1.)


lav1.eps
51

3This includes the deficits states closed in enacting their 2009 budgets and the mid-year deficits for which there are estimates.

Looking ahead to 2010, it is difficult to overstate the fiscal problems states will 

face. It seems increasingly likely that this recession will be more severe than the 

last recession, and thus state fiscal problems are highly likely to be worse than they 

were in 2003 when fiscal relief was last enacted. 

This is true for at least three reasons: 

• Unemployment, which peaked after the last recession at 6.3 percent, has already reached 6.1 percent, and many economists expect it to rise to 7 percent or 

even 8 percent. This would reduce state income taxes, and increase participation in 

Medicaid and other services, to a greater degree than in the past. 

• The decline in the stock market now has matched the decline in the last recession by some measures and may yet fall further. This affects states’ capital gains 

taxes, which in many states are a major component of income taxes. 

• Consumers’ access to home equity loans and other sources of credit is far less 

than it was in the last recession, so consumption expenditures and therefore sales 

taxes are likely to fall more steeply than in the past. 

Even though this recession and fiscal crisis is likely to be considerably deeper 

than the one at the beginning of the decade, it is still instructive to look at what 

happened in that prior recession. That recession was relatively short and mild, yet 

created large state fiscal deficits over a four-year period. The fiscal year 2002 deficit 

was $40 billion, but it rose to $75 billion in 2003 and $80 billion in 2004. 

This year, the deficit for the first year of the fiscal crisis, fiscal year 2009, is $59 

billion and still growing.3 (See Figure 2) 


lav2.eps
52

4They are Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 

Some 16 states have already announced that they face deficits they will have to 

close in enacting their fiscal year 2010 budgets.4 Ten of those states have estimated 

the size of those gaps for a total of $18.2 billion. As additional states announce gaps, 

and the size of the gaps are reevaluated for deteriorating economic conditions, the 

size of the 2010 gap will grow substantially. The 2010 gap is likely to be in the 

range of $100 billion—or even more if the economy experiences additional deterioration between now and then. 

Under state balanced budget constraints, deficits of this size inevitably mean very 

large cuts in Medicaid, education, and other vital programs. If the deficits were 

evenly spread over the states, $100 billion would represent about 14 percent of state 

general fund expenditures. 

BUDGET CUTS

In the last recession, 1 million people lost health insurance because of cutbacks 

in Medicaid and SCHIP in 34 states. In addition, one-third of the states cut child 

care subsidies or otherwise limited access to child care, two-thirds cut per-pupil expenditures for K-12 education, and most raised tuition at public colleges and universities. Aid to local governments for functions other than education also was cut in 

many states, which led local governments to scale back services on which low- and 

middle-income people rely. 

The worst of the budget cuts generally come in the second or third year of a state 

fiscal crisis, and that pattern is likely to hold this time around. That is because in 

the first year of an economic slowdown, states can draw down rainy day funds and 

reserves. They also can take actions such as instituting hiring and travel freezes, 

as well as finding items in their budget that are more marginal to their core functions. 

So far this year, about half the states have enacted budget cuts that affect lowand moderate-income people—reductions in funding and services in public health 

programs, services for the elderly and disabled, K-12 education, or universities and 

colleges. While these reductions are quite serious to anyone who is hit by them, they 

are not yet at the devastating level seen in the last recession or the even deeper 

cuts in some previous recessions. 

For example, in enacting its fiscal year 2009 budget, Rhode Island eliminated 

health coverage for 1,000 parents and will require 7,800 low-income families to pay 

higher monthly premiums for public insurance (which is likely to result in some who 

cannot afford the premiums becoming uninsured). States such as Arizona and California are reducing their Medicaid rolls by increasing the frequency with which 

some recipients must reapply for benefits, which research suggests will cause eligible people to become uninsured. On another front, tuition at state universities and 

community colleges has been increased in at least 11 states, with increases ranging 

from 4 percent to 15 percent. Rhode Island, for example, hiked community college 


lav3.eps
53

tuition by 14.3 percent. Tuition increases such as these affect the ability of students 

with limited means to attend college. 

As states cope with the reality that the economic assumptions they used in enacting their fiscal year 2009 budgets were too optimistic, they are poised to make another round of budget cuts for the current fiscal year. Cuts are in the process of 

being made in Maryland, Massachusetts, Virginia, Utah, and Georgia. Another set 

of states are getting ready to consider cuts, including South Carolina, New Jersey, 

Connecticut, New York, New Hampshire, Florida, Nevada, Arizona, and California. 

These states either have scheduled special legislative sessions after the elections to 

make additional cuts, or will be doing so through executive powers. 

It will not be long, however, before states will begin to deliberate their fiscal year 

2010 budgets in early 2010. It is in those budgets—as states cope with what is likely 

to be $100 billion in deficits after they have already taken all of the ‘‘easier’’ actions—that the most damaging cuts will occur. Since portions of state budgets, such 

as courts, corrections, public safety and homeland security, and others cannot be cut 

or cut much, states budget cuts typically fall on health care, education, and aid to 

local governments. 

Some of the deepest cuts are likely to occur in state health programs, particularly 

Medicaid and SCHIP, as they did in the last recession. Medicaid is often high on 

the list when states need to make budget cuts. Unlike aid to schools, for example, 

which generally is committed at the beginning of the school year, Medicaid is a program that is spent monthly. A change in Medicaid in any month will affect expenditures for the remainder of the fiscal year. And since Medicaid costs generally rise 

rapidly as enrollment is boosted by people losing jobs and income, it becomes a target for cuts. With the number of uninsured already 46 million in 2007, the combination of people losing jobs and some businesses dropping health insurance to try to 

stay afloat, the number of uninsured could reach 50 million if public program cut 

eligibility or cannot finance insurance for those newly eligible for Medicaid and 

SCHIP. 

Education is also a major concern. In the last recession, we saw new or higher 

fees for textbooks and courses, shorter school days, reduced personnel, and reduced 

transportation. States or school districts took actions that resulted in teacher layoffs 

and larger classroom sizes, or eliminated offerings such as music, enrichment programs and the like—all of which arguably affect the quality of the education children receive. And, as noted above, when tuition at universities and community colleges are increased, it reduces the ability of students from low- and moderate income families to access higher education. 

SIZE OF STIMULUS

We estimate that federal fiscal relief to states should total about $50 billion. This 

would be about one-half of the expected deficit for state fiscal year 2010 (or less 

than one-third the combined deficits for state fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and probably an even smaller fraction of total deficits states will face, since fiscal problems 

are likely to continue into sates fiscal year 2010). 

The number $50 billion sounds like a lot, particularly compared to the $20 billion 

provided in the last downturn. This downturn is likely to be considerably deeper 

than the one in the early part of the decade, with higher unemployment, greater 

drops in consumption, and the additional factor of the housing sector weakness. 

Deficits will be larger, and more aid is needed. 

Some people raise the issue of whether a large federal payment to the states 

raises the specter of ‘‘moral hazard.’’ Some may ask whether, if the federal government provides aid to states in a recession, this will create a moral hazard problem 

in which states overspend, cut taxes too much, and/or fail to build up ‘‘rainy day’’ 

funds during periods of economic growth because they expect the federal government to bail them out when an economic downturn comes. 

It is highly unlikely that the $50 billion would create a moral hazard, because 

it would be far from the total amount of deficit states have to close. They still will 

have to take actions that negatively affect their residents—actions most policymakers are quite loathe to take. The need for such actions provides a significant 

incentive to states to be prudent and save funds during the next economic expansion. 

Moreover, the evidence suggests that the federal fiscal relief provided in the past 

did not have this effect. The federal government provided such relief in the last 

downturn, and states have not overspent or slashed taxes since then in the expectation that they would be bailed out during future downturns. On average, state expenditures as a share of the economy at the beginning of the current downturn were 

lower than they were in state fiscal year 2001, while state taxes as a share of the 

54

5State Medicaid spending in federal fiscal year 2008 is estimated to be roughly $156 billion in fiscal year 2008. $30 billion is just under 20 percent of state spending. CBPP calculations 

based on CBO March 2008 Medicaid baseline. 6 Enrollment was 35.7 million in December 2001 and 41.8 million in December 2004—a 17 

percent increase. If one adds back the approximately 1 million people who lost eligibility for 

Medicaid prior to enactment of the fiscal relief, the increase would be 20 percent. Data from 

Kaiser State Health Facts. 7Two factors cause Medicaid to increase during a downturn. As unemployment rises, more 

people need Medicaid. The Urban Institute estimates 1 percent point increase in the unemployment rate equals 1 million additional Medicaid enrollees. Jon Gruber estimates it at 1.2 million 

enrollees. In addition, the increase in health care costs continues to erode employer-based insurance, especially when businesses have low profitability or losses, which adds to the Medicaid 

rolls. 8See, for example, Iris Lav, Jason Levitis, and Edwin Park, House Stimulus Plan Effectively 

Targets Fiscal Relief to States, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, September 26, 2008. 

http://www.cbpp.org/9-26-08sfp.htm 

economy were at about the same level. In addition, states built up substantial ‘‘rainy 

day’’ reserve funds to draw upon in a downturn; at the end of 2006, those reserves 

were actually a little larger, as a share of annual state expenditures, than before 

the recession at the start of this decade. 

The problem is that recessions can have such large effects on state budgets that 

they tend to wipe out rainy day reserves and produce sizeable shortfalls. For example, states began this decade with reserves equaling 10.4 percent of annual expenditures, a quite substantial amount. But these reserves closed only about one-quarter 

of the state budget gaps that opened up through state fiscal year 2003. Rainy day 

fund and other reserve balances in the current economic crisis are no where near 

enough to plug the deficits. 

FORM OF STIMULUS

The majority of the fiscal relief would be most effective as an increase in the federal share of the Medicaid program (FMAP), together with a ban on states from reducing eligibility in that program. 

Cuts in Medicaid not only hurt people who become uninsured, but also generally 

result in reductions in payments to providers—which in turn can lead to reduced 

staffing and reductions in demand for goods and services in the state. An increase 

in the FMAP tied to maintenance of effort provision can avert the most damaging 

of such cuts. 

An increase in the FMAP also provides particularly timely and effective stimulus. 

States, most of which will have rising Medicaid costs as people losing jobs and income come onto the rolls, can immediately use the funds from an increased FMAP 

to pay those costs. There is no need to develop projects, go through an appropriation 

process, or even have the legislature in session. This makes the FMAP a particularly good vehicle for stimulus. Going forward, states could probably absorb $30 billion to $35 billion in enhanced FMAP. $30 billion would represent approximately 20 percent of state Medicaid 

spending.5 In the last recession, Medicaid enrollment increased by 17 percent and 

arguably would have increased by about 20 percent if states had not drastically cut 

enrollment prior to receiving federal fiscal assistance.6 Since this recession is likely to be deeper and more prolonged than the one at the beginning of the decade, $30 

billion to $35 billion seems like a reasonable number to assist states in handling 

increased caseloads and costs, to prevent large-scale increases in the number of uninsured, and to avoid the fiscal drag on the economy.7

The other $20 billion (or $15 billion) should be provided as a flexible block grant. 

This could prevent cuts in education and social services—which lead to reductions 

in employment in the government and nonprofit sectors and create a drag on the 

economy. It also could lessen the tendency of states to cut their aid to local governments in recession. A number of local governments also have revenue problems or 

soon will because of declining housing values and property taxes and are likely to 

impose cuts on public services. 

Earlier this year, when fewer states were facing fiscal stress, the Center has released reports suggesting that fiscal relief might be targeted on states that are experiencing the most economic stress, as measured by changes in employment, foreclosures, and food stamp rolls (as a proxy for changes in poverty).8 In particular, 

it was clear that energy- and commodity-rich states were benefiting from extraordinarily high prices for those goods and were not experiencing fiscal problems. 

These states included West Virginia, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico, North Dakota, 

Montana, Wyoming, and Alaska. As U.S. and world demand has weakened in the 

last month, however, it appears that those high prices will be declining; the price 

55

of oil has already dropped from a peak of $145 a barrel to the $70 range. As a result, it is likely that fiscal distress will ultimately reach most states if present 

trends continue. It may no longer be necessary to use the type of targeting we had 

earlier suggested, or it may make sense to target one type of the assistance but not 

the other. 

TIMING

In the last recession, federal fiscal relief for states was enacted at the end of May, 

2003, just before the beginning of state fiscal year 2004. As the year-by-year deficit 

chart shows, states had already been coping with deficits and enacting budget cuts 

for two years before the federal fiscal relief was enacted. By the time federal relief 

was enacted, for example, 1 million people had already lost eligibility for public 

health insurance programs. The relief specified that no further eligibility reductions 

could be made, so it undoubtedly prevented additional deterioration. 

It would be far better to enact fiscal relief now, before states make the deep cuts 

that otherwise will be inevitable as they enact cope with mid-year deficits and particularly as they enact their state fiscal year 2010 budgets (for the year beginning 

July 1, 2009 in most states) in the first part of 2009.

Chairman SPRATT. Dr. Beach. Thank you for coming. 

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. BEACH 

Mr. BEACH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ryan, 

members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be with you this 

morning. 

My name is Bill Beach, and I am the Director of the Center for 

Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation. 

We are at an odd moment in the evolution of these economic 

challenges. There is great hope, but little evidence, that the credit 

market fixes will work. There is increasing concern, but again, little evidence to date that the financial crisis will push the general 

economy into a severe recession. 

My own sense is that we have passed into a recession that could 

become significantly worse and long lived if Congress and other 

governments make wrong or ineffective policy moves. Recessions 

that start in credit markets last longer than those that stem from 

shocks to aggregate demand or supply. This one looks like it could 

be with us for a long while unless we do highly effective things to 

reduce its impact. 

The question now is, what should Congress do. Congress obviously should do nothing to harm the economy. I always say that 

in my testimony. 

It should let the Federal Reserve lead the effort to stabilize economic activity. It should keep its focus on crafting long-term, progrowth economic policy. Most importantly, Congress should make 

no change to basic policies that would signal increases in risk either through raising taxes or through increasing burdensome regulations. 

It also should be extremely wary of any legislation that could in 

any way be interpreted as America withdrawing from international 

product or capital markets. Congress can ill afford to repeat the 

awesome errors of its predecessor in the early days of the Great 

Depression and retreat from the world economic stage. 

I recommend that Congress address economic policies in three 

interrelated areas, all of which affect near- and long-term economic 

performance. I will speak about the first two of these three—tax 

policy, energy policy and long-term spending. 

56

There are areas of economic policy where congressional action 

can be timely and targeted, though it may not intend to be short 

range in focus at all. Those areas involve the reduction of investment risk. 

What can increase risk? Many factors, of course, but public policy 

commonly looms large. Tax increases, especially if they land on 

capital, increase the cost of capital and lower investment returns. 

When investors are uncertain about whether taxes will go up or 

stay the same, they still can act as though taxes have risen if they 

judge the risk of an increase to be nearly equal to an actual increase. Rising uncertainty can have the effect of driving down investments in riskier takings. 

So here is what I recommend on the tax side, and I know that 

this is something that can be timely and targeted, but I don’t know 

temporary. Make the tax reductions of 2003, 2001 and 2003, permanent. Thus, among the first things that Congress can do to address the current slowdown is to pronounce definitively on the tax 

increases scheduled for 2009 and 2011. 

There are projects, new businesses, expansions of existing businesses that would be undertaken today if Congress signaled that 

taxes would be lower in 3 years. Since nearly all major capital undertakings last beyond this 3-year period, it is likely that making 

all or more of the Bush tax deductions permanent would stimulate 

economic activity today, as well as in 2011. 

Accelerated depreciation: In addition, we know from past experience that accelerating the tax depreciation of capital equipment 

and buildings for—or 1-year expensing of business purchases that 

otherwise would be depreciated over a longer period of time is a 

good way to stimulate the economy. This was certainly the record 

in the last slump. Democrats and Republicans have commonly supported this approach. 

Look at taxes on capital gains and dividends: We also have recent experience with reducing the tax rate on long-term capital 

gains and dividend income. If Congress were to reduce these tax 

rates by 50 percent or more in the next 2 years, the cost of capital 

to businesses would fall and investment stability would be enhanced. Indeed, if Congress were to approve a temporary zero capital gains tax rate on new stock issues, troubled banks could raise 

more of the capital they desperately need without having to go 

every day to the Treasury Department. 

Lower the corporate profits tax: In one area of fundamental public policy there is now universal agreement that our Federal business taxes are far too high. The tax rate on corporate profits is the 

second highest in the world. 

Why is it not the firm policy of this committee and this government and this country to make certain that the corporate profits 

tax is always below the average corporate income tax of other industrialized companies. Such a policy would enhance our competitive standing worldwide and significantly reduce the incentive for 

U.S. firms to relocate to lower countries—lower-tax countries. 

If Congress were to make the tax reductions of 2001 and 2003 

permanent and lower the corporate profits tax from 35 to 25 percent, I estimate the following economic effects would ensue. This is 

57

done from a model of the U.S. economy which is in widespread use 

throughout the government and the private sector. 

More jobs: By making the 2001 and 2003 tax deductions permanent and reducing the corporate profits tax by 1,000 basis points, 

an annual average of 2.1 million more jobs would be created. Indeed, over the 10-year period for which these forecasts apply, 3.4 

million more jobs would be created above baseline—current-law 

baseline in 2018. 

These tax moves would dramatically increase the level of national output. The growth rate of the economy would increase by 

a full half percentage point in 2011 and 2012 when taxes will otherwise increase under current law. The annualized growth rate 

jumps by three-tenths of 1 percent, and, on average, gross domestic 

product averages $284 billion more over the forecast window. 

These tax changes dramatically improve household income, partly because the economy is so much better and partly because the 

average tax burden falls. The average household would have an additional $5,138 to spend or save after paying taxes. By 2018, that 

amount rises to $9,700 additional after-tax dollars. 

Let me just say something quickly about energy policy because 

it is also related to getting the economy moving. Rapidly increasing 

prices for gasoline and petroleum-based energy generally slowed 

the economy and made the economy more vulnerable to the economic setbacks that we are having today. If Congress acts to expand energy supplies, looking—the forward-looking prices will fall 

and economic activity will shed off the drag that stems from that 

sector. 

Let me illustrate in closing. Economists working with me in my 

Center for Data Analysis at Heritage estimated the economic effects of a $2 increase in retail unleaded gasoline. We have just experienced such an increase over the past 14 months. We found that 

total employment falls by 586,000 jobs, after-tax personal income 

falls by $532 billion, personal expenditures consumption fall by 

$430 billion, and significant personal savings are spent to pay for 

the increased cost of gasoline. Those are the damages that were 

done when the gasoline prices were rising rapidly upward. 

A resumption of world economic growth might again fuel those 

increases. So look to the energy policy as one handle that you can 

use in stimulating the economy. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Beach follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. BEACH, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR DATA ANALYSIS, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

The stock market turmoil that has captured everyone’s attention is rooted in the 

ongoing crisis in credit markets and aggravated by the slowdown in general economic activity that stems from the ills of the financial sector. It is all the more spectacular by the extraordinary highs and lows that equity markets are recording. It 

almost seems that the only thing truly predictable about today’s investment markets is just how unpredictable they have become. 

Yet, the current situation on Wall Street and in bourses all around the world is 

not altogether new territory. We have seen amazing changes in stock market indexes before, and we have seen recovery in each instance. What is new to everyone 

except the very few who can remember market activity during the early 1930s is 

the high level of risk aversion that surrounds virtually every transaction. The 

LIBOR/Fed funds spread, a reliable measure of risk, has reached record levels in 

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the past four weeks; and the Federal Reserve lost all control of their Fed funds target rate in the middle of September and has failed so far to recapture it. (See Figures 1, 2 and 3 attached). Despite some of the boldest moves ever made by the government of the United States to tame these fears, a high intolerance to risk continues.

We’re at an odd moment in the evolution of these economic challenges: there is 

great hope but little evidence that the credit market fixes will work; and there is 

increasing concern but, again, little evidence that the financial crisis will push the 

general economy into a severe recession. My own sense is that we have passed into 

a mild recession that could become significantly worse and long-lived if Congress 

and other governments make wrong or ineffective policy moves. Recessions that 

start in credit markets last longer than those that stem from shocks to aggregate 

demand or supply. This one looks like it could be with us for a long while unless 

we do highly effective things to reduce its impact. 

There also is an increasing awareness that the roots of the current crisis are firmly planted in public policy mistakes, which includes excessive liquidity produced by 

decisions by the Federal Reserve. The engaged public appears to understand that 

staunching the current flow of bad economic news requires that the root causes of 

this crisis be dealt with. Congress and the past two administrations bear responsibility for expanding the spectrum of home mortgages into segments of the population that were not ready for the financial responsibilities of mortgage credit. The 

Fed bears responsibility for fueling the feverish pace of speculation surrounding 

mortgages, and regulatory bodies must own up to their failure to rein in these market excesses. 

Congress also finds itself at the center of debate over how best to respond to the 

deepening economic slowdown. Indeed, there is widespread expectation that the 

House and Senate will send the President legislation very soon to stimulate the 

economy. Many who find themselves out of work or have seen their incomes or businesses decline doubtless look forward to congressional action. The question now is, 

what should Congress do? 

As I will argue later in my testimony, Congress obviously should do nothing to 

harm the economy; it should let the Federal Reserve lead the effort to stabilize economic activity; and it should keep its focus on crafting long-term, pro-growth economic policy. Most importantly, Congress should make no change to basic policies 

that would signal increases in risk either through raising taxes or through increasing burdensome regulations. It also should be extremely wary of any legislation that 

could in any way be interpreted as America withdrawing from international product 

or capital markets. Congress can ill afford to repeat the awesome errors of its predecessor in the early days of the Great Depression and retreat from the world economic stage. 

Congress should take this moment of slow growth to do what it does best: set 

broad economic policy. In this instance, Congress should concentrate on signaling 

to investors and workers alike that its principal focus will be on improving proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Jan 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-43\45532.TXT HBUD PsN: DICK

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growth economic policy, mainly in the areas of tax, regulatory, and spending policies. Serious work by the Congress in these areas will create greater predictability 

for investors and business owners and assure workers that they will have a better 

chance of improving their wages through increased productivity. Efforts to enhance 

the long run may very well have immediate, short-run benefits as economic decision 

makers reduce the risk premium they place on starting new businesses or expanding existing enterprises.

I recommend that Congress address economic policies in three interrelated areas, 

all of which affect near- and long-term economic performance: (1) tax policy, (2) energy policy, and (3) long-term spending. 

Nearly every significant general slowdown in economic activity is a good time for 

congressional policymakers to ask: Are we doing everything we can to support longterm economic growth? That is, slowdowns are good times to get back to policy fundamentals and make certain that everything Congress can do to allow the economy 

to grow has been done. 

I am convinced the Congress is not the best policymaking body for addressing the 

short-run challenges of the economy. That role is better played by the Federal Reserve System. So much of what Congress does is tied to the budget and appropriation processes, which take time to reach legislative results. Moreover, Members of 

Congress frequently do not have the time or background for keeping up with financial markets, the ebb and flow of economic data, and the actions of economic institutions the way the Fed does, or even as the economic agencies of federal and state 

governments do. These institutional factors explain why congressional action often 

occurs after the need for action has expired and why the actions it takes often are 

not as targeted as they need to be. 

However, there are areas of economic policy where congressional action can be 

timely and targeted, though it may not intend to be short-range in focus at all. 

Those areas involve the reduction of investment risk. 

Investors are driven, in general, by comparative rates of return when making investment decisions between various opportunities. If two business opportunities are 

possible but one has a better rate of return than the other, then the investor will 

go with the superior opportunity—the one with the higher rate of return. Suppose, 

though, that outside factors intervene (a flood, war, regulatory changes) and this 

otherwise superior investment now carries more risk than the inferior one. The investor discounts the rates of return for the greater amount of risk, and if the rate 

of return on the first opportunity is still superior, the investor goes with that same 

opportunity. If, on the other hand, the risk is too great to go with the otherwise 

superior opportunity, the investor may take the more cautious approach of avoiding 

risk and placing funds in the opportunity with the otherwise lower rate of return. 

TAX POLICY CHANGES

What can increase risk? Many factors, of course, but public policy commonly looms 

large. Tax increases, especially if they land on capital, increase the cost of capital 


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1Matthew Knittel, ‘‘Corporate Response to Accelerated Tax Depreciation: Bonus Depreciation 

for Tax Years 2002—2004,’’ U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis, Working 

Paper No. 98, May 2007, Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Department of Treasury. 

and lower investment returns. When investors are uncertain about whether taxes 

will go up or stay the same, they still can act as though taxes have risen if they 

judge the risk of an increase to be nearly equal to an actual increase. And rising 

uncertainty can have the effect of driving down investments in riskier undertakings. 

Make the tax reductions of 2001 and 2003 permanent: Thus, among the first 

things Congress can do to address the current slowdown is to pronounce definitively 

on the tax increases scheduled for 2009 and 2011. There are projects, new businesses, and expansions of existing businesses that would be undertaken today if 

Congress signaled that taxes would be lower in three years. Since nearly all major 

capital undertakings last beyond this three-year period, it is likely that making all 

or most of the Bush tax reductions permanent would stimulate economic activity 

today as well as in 2011.

I am probably not the only one here today who knows of businesses that are preparing now for higher taxes in 20ll. They are preparing themselves by reducing 

their riskier projects and providing for stronger cash flows in 2010. It is altogether 

possible that there are projects being cancelled today that would otherwise go forward if taxes were not scheduled to rise in 2011. At times like the present, the 

speech of policymakers is as important as the policy actions they take. The decision 

makers in business and investment are watching Washington closely to discern the 

direction Congress will take in responding to this crisis. If that direction includes 

tax increases, then investors will find more favorable economies to support and business owners will, as much as they can, locate their expanded activities in places 

with more favorable tax regimes. 

Thus, Congress should signal today what it plans to do on taxes in two or three 

years. For my part, I urge the Congress to make permanent the key provisions of 

the 2001 and 2003 tax law changes. Maintaining lower tax rates on labor and capital income will encourage both labor and capital to work harder now when we need 

that greater activity. 

Accelerated depreciation: In addition, we know from past experience that accelerating the tax depreciation of capital equipment and buildings or one-year expensing of business purchases that otherwise would be depreciated over a longer period 

of time for tax purposes can help during periods of slow growth. This was certainly 

the record in the last slump.1

Taxes on capital gains and dividends: We also have recent experience with reducing the tax rate on long-term capital gains and on dividend income. If Congress 

were to reduce these tax rates by 50 percent for the next two years, the cost of capital to businesses would fall and investment stability would be enhanced. Indeed, 

if Congress were to approve a temporary zero capital gains tax rate on new stock 


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2See Karen A. Campbell, ‘‘How Rising Gas Prices Hurt American Households,’’ Heritage 

Foundation Backgrounder, No. 2162, July 14, 2008. A copy of this report is attached to this testimony as Appendix 1. 

issues, troubled banks could raise the more of the capital they desperately need 

without having to go to the Treasury Department. 

Lower the corporate profits tax: In one area of fundamental tax policy there now 

is nearly universal agreement: our federal business taxes are far too high. The tax 

rate on corporate profits is the second highest in the world. Why is it not the firm 

policy of the government of this country to make certain that the corporate profits 

tax is always below the average corporate income tax of other industrialized countries? Such a policy would enhance our competitive standing world wide and significantly reduce the incentive for U.S. firms to relocate to lower tax countries. 

The current high rate affects the location decisions of businesses that end each 

tax year with taxable income and every business decision by taxable and non-taxable corporations who estimate the costs of buying new equipment and expanding 

operations. Congress should follow the lead of its Ways and Means Chairman and 

decrease the income tax on corporations. In fact, it should dramatically drop that 

rate. 

If Congress were to make the tax reductions of 2001 and 2003 permanent and 

lower the corporate profits tax from 35 to 25 percent, I estimate the following economic effects would ensure: 

• More jobs: By making the 2001 and 2003 tax reductions permanent and reducing the corporate profits tax by 1000 basis point, an annual average of 2.1 million 

more jobs are created. Indeed, 3.4 million jobs above a current law baseline are created in 2018 by newly energetic businesses. 

• Overall economic activity more vigorous: These tax moves dramatically increase 

the level of national output. The growth rate of the economy increases a full half 

percentage point in 2011 and 2012, when taxes will otherwise increase under current law. The annualized growth rate jumps by .3 of a percent, and Gross Domestic 

Product averages $284 billion more over a 10-year forecast window than would prevail under current law. By 2018, GDP is $321 billion higher. 

• More after-tax household spending: These tax changes dramatically improve 

household income, partly because the economy is so much better and partly because 

the average tax burden falls. The average household would have $5,138 dollars 

more to spend or save after paying their taxes. By 2018, this amount is $9,750 (after 

subtracting inflation). 

Do not depend on demand-side stimulus: Demand-side stimulus (tax rebates, the 

child tax credit, and the 10 percent tax bracket) do little to change the course of 

the sluggish economy. Certainly for tax rebates, we have just passed through a laboratory experiment of sorts. President Bush signed legislation earlier this year that 

gave each taxpayer a $600 tax rebate ($1,200 for married taxpayers). Congress 

hoped that these rebates would stimulate consumption and prevent the economy 

from falling into a recession. While the jury is still out on this experiment, initial 

and supporting evidence for this view looks very thin. 

More than likely, the tax rebate of 2008 will join those of 2001 in falling well 

below expectations as a way to stimulate the economy or move it from a prolonged 

sluggish growth trend. Indeed, the contraction in investment and thus job creation 

did not begin to improve until after the 30 percent partial expensing in the 2002 

act and the 50 percent partial expensing in the 2003 act, which also cut the tax 

rates on dividend and capital gain income. Congress has enacted depreciation and 

expensing stimulus plans under Republican and Democrat majorities. 

ENERGY POLICY

Rapidly increasing prices for gasoline and petroleum based energy generally 

slowed the economy, helped bring on our current recession, and their effects continue to impede job and income growth. If Congress acts to expand energy supplies, 

forward looking prices will fall and economic activity will shed off the drag that 

stems from this sector. 

Let me illustrate. Economists working with me in the Center for Data Analysis 

at Heritage estimated the economic effects of a $2.00 increase in retail unleaded 

gasoline.2 We have just experienced such an increase over the past 14 months. We 

found that 

• Total employment falls by 586,000 jobs. 

• After-tax personal income falls by $532 billion. 

• Personal consumption expenditures fall by $400 billion, and 

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3See Johanthan E. Hughes, Christopher r. Knittel, and Daniel Sperling, ‘‘Evidence of a shift 

in the Short-Run elasticity of Gasoline Demand,’’ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, w12530 (September, 2006). 

• Significant personal savings would be spent to pay for the increased cost of gasoline. 

These national level results reflect the economic effects of price changes. That is, 

disposable income falls because the economy slows below its potential. In addition, 

households have to spend more in gasoline. 

We looked at the economic effects on three types of households. Let me describe 

the effects on one of these: a married household with two children under the age 

of 17. For this household, disposable income falls by $1,085; purchases of goods and 

services falls by $719; and $792 is taken out of personal savings just to pay the gasoline bill. 

Some analysts argue that gasoline consumers can adapt to higher prices by 

changing their driving patterns and their automobiles. However, new research by 

Jonathan Hughes, Christopher Knittel, and Daniel Sperling (all from the University 

of California-Davis) shows that families today have little opportunity to quickly 

adapt to higher prices. Most working families have two income earners who commute by automobile to work. They live in suburbs away from mass transit opportunities. Their children have extensive after-school activities to which they are transported more often than not in an SUV. Today’s short-term price and income elasticities are a full ten times smaller than those estimated using data from 20 years 

ago.3

These lower elasticities mean that consumers have a much harder time adapting 

to gasoline price shocks today than two decades ago. Pretty much all they can do 

is reduce their consumption on other items and take funds out of savings to pay 

for the higher priced gas. Doing so, of course, slows the economy and makes everyone else worse off. 

There are many economic problems facing Congress, from slowing global economic 

activity to persistently bad news from our financial sector. Congress can act on some 

of the economic fronts before it, but its ability to affect the nation’s economic future 

is limited. On energy, however, its actions to increase supplies in the short and long 

run could do some good, particularly for workers looking for jobs and families hoping 

to keep their children in violin lessons and little league baseball. 

I am a free trader who believes imports are central to our economic vitality and 

future economic strength. However, our heavy reliance on foreign oil producers (imported oil now constitutes over 60 percent of our daily petroleum demand) has made 

us subject to price variations due to supply disruptions, supply extortion, and booming world demand. I believe that increasing the domestic production of petroleum 

and refined oil products would have a positive effect on our domestic economy, largely through more jobs and income. 

In another study prepared by economists in my Center, we asked what would be 

the economic effects of increasing domestic production of petroleum by 10 percent. 

The U.S. currently consumes 20 million barrels per day, of which around 65 percent 

come from foreign sources. If domestically sourced petroleum increased by 2 million 

barrels per day, what would be the economic effects. 

Our analysis indicates that such an increase would 

• Expand the nation’s output as measured by the Gross Domestic Product by 

$164 billion. 

• Increase employment by 270,000 jobs. 

Congress exercises enormous authority over petroleum mining, largely through its 

regulation of off-shore and federal land oil reserves. Authorizing more oil mining in 

these reserves today would begin to wean the U.S. from the economically harmful 

reliance on so much foreign petroleum. 

One of the more tragic features of recent energy policy actions by Congress is how 

often it has failed to increase access to energy resources on the grounds that doing 

so would not have any effect on supply or price for years. While possibly correct 

from an engineering standpoint, this excuse for inaction makes no sense economically. If Congress were to announce greater access to proved reserves, mining activity would immediately begin, capital and talent would leave other parts of the world 

and travel to the United States, forward pricing markets would feel the downward 

pressure on prices that impending supply increases make, and ordinary Americans 

would not discount their own economic futures as much as they do today. 

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4See Stuart M. Butler, ‘‘Solutions to Our Long-Term Fiscal Challenges,’’ Testimony before the 

Committee on the Budget, United States Senate, January 31, 2007.

SPENDING POLICY

Increase confidence in the U.S. economy by addressing long-term spending challenges. While the attention of most policymakers will be on immediate responses to 

the current slowdown, everyone should attend to a factor that’s increasingly important to confidence in the U.S. economy: the seeming unwillingness of Congress to 

seriously address the enormous financial challenges from entitlement spending. 

Many investors and organizations that play key roles in the future of the U.S. economy are worried about long-term growth given the fiscal challenges posed by Social 

Security’s and Medicare’s unfunded liabilities. The Financial Times recently reported that the lead analyst for the U.S. at Moody’s warned that the credit rating 

agency would downgrade U.S. treasury government debt if action was not soon 

taken to fix entitlements. 

Thus, at a time when the economy is slowing and the speech as well as the actions of Congress can affect economic activity, policymakers should take concrete 

steps that will announce their intention to address unfunded liabilities in these important programs. While reforms in these programs may be beyond what this Congress can do, it is possible to signal change by reforming the budget rules. 

Currently, the federal budget functions as a pay-as-you-go system, with a very 

limited forecast of obligations and supporting revenues. We just do not see in the 

official budget what may happen over the next 30 years. The five and ten-year budget windows do not permit Members or the general public to sense the obligations 

that are coming beyond that ten-year time horizon. 

A good first step in addressing the long-term entitlement obligations of the United 

States would be to show these obligations in the annual budget. This could be done 

by amending the budget process rules to include a present-value measure of longterm entitlements. Such a measure would express in the annual budget the current 

dollar amount needed today to fund future obligations. Such a measure has been 

endorsed by a number of accounting professionals, including the Federal Accounting 

Standards Advisory Board. 

A solid second step would be to convert retirement entitlements into 30-year 

budgeted discretionary programs. Such a move recognizes that mandatory retirement funding programs for millionaires that crowd out discretionary spending programs for homeless war veterans make no sense at all. If we are to contain entitlement spending and reform the programs driving those outlays, then a paradigm 

shift likely will be required. Recognizing Social Security and Medicare as discretionary programs helps to force attention on changes that will assure their survival 

well into the 21st century.4

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Ryan, would you like to lead off? 

Mr. RYAN. Sure. Can you bring up chart 14, please. 

About 5 months ago we passed a stimulus package, a demandside stimulus package. If you take a look at chart 14, if you look 

at personal consumption expenditures, that is about 17 percent of 

GDP, gross domestic product. Look at what happens. We basically 

got a one-quarter pop in GDP statistics. Then we gravitated back 

towards the pre-stimulus trend. 

So the concern I think some of us have in doing this fast, demand-side stimulus is they might give you a pop in a quarter in 

which they take place, but then you go right back down. The question is, what is it we can we do to build in the long-term, sustainable growth, grow the economic pie so that we might create new 

and lasting job growth and permanently reduce unemployment. 

That is point one. 

Point two is, look at our fiscal situation we are in right now. We 

are looking at easily a $750 billion deficit next year alone. You 

throw a stimulus thing on this, $300, we are over a $1 trillion, a 

$1 trillion budget deficit. 

Now the question is—I think you can have good disagreements 

about this—what does that do to the value of our dollar? What does 

64

that do to our borrowing costs? More to the point, what does that 

do to the signals we send to the markets, to the global markets, 

on America’s ability to borrow and our borrowing costs? All of these 

borrowing costs put an enormous tax rate increase on future generations. It speaks to the ability of our economy to grow in the future or not. 

The one thing I think we often forget here is global competitiveness. You know, we used to just take it for granted that the American economy is always going to be the fastest growing economy, 

the marvel of the world. We are number one, we always will be. 

Well, the oceans don’t separate our economies anymore. With 

technology today, with globalization, it is just so integrated. That 

is why our relative economic and tax policy relative to our competitors matters so much more than it ever did before. 

So going into the next session of Congress with this notion that 

we are going to dramatically increase tax rates on investment, on 

capital, on small businesses, especially relative to our foreign competitors, to me, is just like the economic equivalent of shooting 

yourself in the foot. 

So I will just start with you, Dr. Beach, because you focus on 

econometrics and modeling. Give us your sense of modeling—I 

know you cut your testimony short—on what kind of job increase 

would we have using a model on this, just if we actually produce 

some more of our own energy, say 2 billion barrels of oil produced 

in America versus overseas? 

What kind of job increases would we see if we lowered the aftertax rate of return on capital by doing some of the tax things you 

mentioned? What are the job implications of lowering the corporate 

income tax versus keeping it where it is, which, as you mentioned, 

is the second highest in the world? 

So, what are the job implications for these kinds of fiscal decisions that we are about to make? 

Mr. BEACH. Well, all of those things you just mentioned in isolation have a positive effect on unemployment, particularly private 

sector employment. Of course, that should be the objective that you 

should be looking at this point. 

I was at one time, Congressman, I guess, one of the principal 

revenue planners for the State of Missouri back when I was young. 

That happened to be in the early 1980s when we were facing significant contractions in our revenue sources, almost identical to 

those, but multiplied by twice, that Iris Lav put up for you. 

At that time, we thought the best thing that we could do and 

what the Federal Government could do would be to look at their 

fundamental tax policy. There are ways we could cut bridges, we 

could close operations which were no longer needed; and because 

we had shortfalls of revenue, we did all of that. 

But we also spent a lot of time looking at our business taxes, 

both short-term business taxes, like having a zero tax rate on small 

business income for a period of 18 months that would then lead to 

a little higher rate when they fully recovered. That is not a bad 

idea at the State level, not a bad idea at the Federal level. 

Looking at fundamental tax reform: The corporate business tax 

rate matters a great deal on location. The State of Missouri was 

trying to get people to move from Iowa and Illinois, Kansas, Mr. 

65

Moore, into Missouri. I think all of the things that you have mentioned are significant. 

A lot of people think energy production won’t produce jobs. It is 

just, you know, energy production in Saudi Arabia, now it is in the 

United States. But we were amazed to learn in our models that 

that was actually a very positive thing to do. We were looking at 

half a million jobs to 800,000 jobs over about a 5-year period, just 

from increasing energy production by 10 percent in the United 

States. 

So you can do that as part of the stimulus package. You can do 

that as part of your long-term growth. 

Mr. RYAN. I appreciate the indulgence, we don’t have a clock in 

these two positions here, chairman or ranking, but I will just ask 

one more question for each of you. This is something, I think, we 

on each side of our aisle are concerned about, have to be concerned 

about. 

Are we building the seeds of too many too-big-to-fail institutions 

in this country? We are getting through this crisis, and we are 

doing it by seeing mergers, by seeing financial institutions grow, in 

order to take the balance sheet problems. But what is it we ought 

to do after we get through this crisis to assure that we don’t have 

too many too-big-to-fail institutions which, down the road, if we do 

not manage risk properly, do not supervise and regulate effectively, 

what kind of seeds are we planting for ourselves and how do we 

best prevent that from really being a problem down the road? 

I will just start with each of you. Thank you. 

Mr. BAILY. Thank you. 

We are creating too many institutions that are too big to fail. I 

am not sure what we can do about it over the next short period 

of time. 

There are advantages to having large financial institutions. They 

operate in global markets. The problem is that when they get into 

trouble, we have to go rescue them. 

I am not enjoying this rescue package. I am sure you are not. It 

is putting money into companies that have made bad decisions. I 

think we have to do it to preserve the financial sector. 

I think, going forward, we need to take a hard look at our regulatory system and supervisory system, which I think failed, to 

make sure that those institutions that are large—because we are 

going to continue to have large financial institutions—are being 

regulated in a way that is effective. 

I don’t think that necessarily means more regulation. There were 

rooms full of regulators in some of these large banks. We need to 

be more effective in our regulation to make sure that they don’t 

fail. 

I share your concern. We are creating some moral hazards. 

I would make one more quick comment, and that is the one-quarter pop; I wish it had been more of a two- or three-quarter pop. But 

given that we are expecting GDP to decline in the fourth quarter 

and probably in the first quarter of next year, I think getting a 

short-term stimulus out there, even if it only gives us a two- to 

three-quarter pop, would be worthwhile. 

Ms. LAV. I mean, I am not an expert on these financial institutions, but I think the answer is to let—worry a little bit less about 

66

size and a little more about how do we make sure they don’t fail; 

how do we make sure that these institutions are responsible to people, they are responsible to the laws, and that the regulations are 

right, to make sure they can’t have these kinds of excesses. 

I mean, lots of people could see that there was something wrong 

going on in the mortgage market, for example. It wasn’t that nobody saw it. It is just that it wasn’t—you know, nothing moved forward to try to fix it. So I think that is the answer, you know, to 

be proactive. 

Mr. BEACH. Congressman, I think moral hazard is going to be 

harder to manage that than the money supply. I think that is going 

to be on your desk for a long, long time. 

I supported the bailout—excuse me, the rescue plan like you did. 

I did so with my eyes open, that we are creating policies now, 

which will be in the boardroom as business parameters. Well, we 

can make that investment. We can do those things because, after 

all, a few years ago, the Federal Government spent an enormous 

amount of money to make sure that we didn’t fail. 

You have got to do something in public law that will reverse that 

tendency; otherwise, we are going to be here, I would guess, in a 

few years with the health care industry, because we are probably 

going to create another bubble out of this that will move into another part of our economy. 

Just let me also say that bailouts, rescue plans, oftentimes result 

in the revaluation of a country’s sovereign debt; and that is reflected by a downward pattern in the valuation of their currency. 

That won’t happen right away, but the sooner, the closer we get to 

the generation, my generation retiring—and that is just a few 

years, of course—we are going to be looking at debt revaluation 

issues. I think they will be related to the policies which are being 

worked out now. 

Chairman SPRATT. Just to engage in our battle of the charts 

here, let me put two up as a historic reminder, something that we 

as Democrats are proud of, namely, the real economic growth rate 

of the Clinton administration, 1993 to 2000, versus the Bush administration, 3.7 percent versus 2.4 percent of the policies that you 

have just been discussing. 

In addition, with respect to jobs, if we could have that chart, the 

average number of jobs created during the Clinton administration 

was 237,000, the Bush administration, 52,700. 

Mr. RYAN. Does that include the recession that President Bush 

inherited as it came into office? 

Chairman SPRATT. That includes the entire period of time. That 

is just for the record. 

Now, Mr. Doggett. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don’t believe it is reasonable to launch a large new expenditure without considering how 

the last $700 billion that Congress approved is being used. With 

nobody taking personal responsibility for any part of this financial 

system fiasco either in Washington or on Wall Street, and with 

some of the people who contributed to the crisis actually getting rewards instead of penalties, we don’t have a formula for preventing 

a reoccurrence of these excesses. 

67

Going forward, we have essentially the same Federal regulatory 

personnel, the same Wall Street directors, the same executives running the same show as they were running before the Bush administration made its urgent plea of bailout or bust. And I believe the 

American people would be better served by our seeking more accountability, more transparency and a better return on their investment. 

While I am very pleased that direct investment in banks, an approach that so very recently Secretary Paulson was in this Congress condemning as what he called an admission of failure, that 

that was used as the first choice of the Treasury. I don’t believe 

that there is adequate public understanding of the terms of that investment. 

Treasury acted not as the lender of last resort, but as the lender 

of best resort, offering banks a far sweeter deal than the terms 

Warren Buffet required, a far sweeter deal than the British banks 

got. Indeed, about the same similarity with the Buffet deal and the 

Treasury deal is the name applied to the stock, which in Treasury’s 

purchase amounts to essentially a below-market 5 percent loan. 

Mr. Buffet got twice as much in dividends as taxpayers are to receive, and he got more than 85 percent more common stock rights 

than taxpayers will get. And now, according to Chairman 

Bernanke’s speech last week in New York, the Treasury will return 

to the purchase of toxic securities—what Nobel Prize-winning economist, Joseph Stiglitz, has called the ‘‘cash-for-trash plan.’’

Most folks, seeing so much money being spent now out of the 

$700 billion, have good reason to wonder how much of it will be 

available when the new President is sworn in in January. And all 

of this comes with an understanding, I think by everyone, that this 

$700 billion is not about stimulating our economy out of the current economic recession. It is only the necessary and expensive 

medicine for preventing a financial system shutdown. 

Against that backdrop and recognizing that the Bush administration is responsible for adding literally trillions of dollars of additional national debt and recognizing, as several of you said, that 

sooner stimulus is better than later stimulus, isn’t the more prudent approach for us immediately for when the Senate reconvenes 

on November 17th to simply approve in its current form, or something very similar, the bill that the House has already approved to 

provide $60 billion, approximately $61 billion, in immediate stimulus to try to get this economy moving again without prejudging 

what action may be necessary when we reconvene in January? 

Dr. Baily, if you would lead off. 

Mr. BAILY. Thank you. I appreciate your concern about what has 

happened. I think it has been a rather sad episode in history. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Indeed. 

Mr. BAILY. There are a lot of people to blame I think on this. I 

think there will be some accountability; we do have a legal system 

which is going to hold some people accountable. There are a lot of 

people who have lost money. 

But this is certainly a sad episode. And I think we are doing this 

rescue package because we really need to do this rescue package, 

not because we like it——

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Mr. DOGGETT. Sir, I wouldn’t disagree that action was needed; it 

was a question of responsible action. 

But as my time dwindles, let me just ask you specifically, isn’t 

the most responsible thing to do now, as far as a stimulus for our 

economy, to have the Senate approve the bill the House has already approved in about 3 or 4 weeks, and then consider what addition is needed when we reconvene next year? 

Mr. BAILY. Well, as an economist, I would like to see a stimulus 

get out there as quickly as possible. So I don’t want to comment 

on all the specifics and details, but to get a stimulus that, as Iris 

said, was quick and temporary and had the most effect on the economy. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Is there any element of the stimulus that we approved, which included some increase in the Medicare matching 

right, an increase in food stamp benefits, an extension of unemployment benefits and some modest infrastructure investments, 

that you would be opposed to, in what we have already passed? 

Mr. BAILY. No, I support those measures. As I said in my testimony, I would like to see a round of tax rebates done quickly. 

Mr. DOGGETT. And, Ms. Lav, my time is up, but do you agree 

with the package Congress has already approved as at least a first 

step to trying to get our economy righted? 

Ms. LAV. I think it has all the right elements in it. It is good for 

that. 

I think I would like to see it be bigger. And so that the politics 

this year is about how you can best get to there. But I think the 

time is now for something bigger if it is politically possible to do 

that. 

Mr. DOGGETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. McGovern. Mr. Scott. 

Oh, I beg your pardon. Mr. Garrett, I beg your pardon. I almost 

got away with it. 

Mr. GARRETT. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. 

Dr. Baily, if I heard you right—and correct me if I heard you 

wrong—you said that where we are now with a weak dollar is a 

good thing. I would always think just the opposite, that we should 

be trying to strive with the monetary and fiscal policy to get a 

strong dollar. 

And at the same time you made that comment, you were also 

making the comment part of the rationale there is because of the 

low cost of borrowing and the flight to treasuries. But isn’t that 

just because we are in a tight credit market right now, and that 

is just the market where they are going to go into? And if everything goes through with this $700 billion bailout, which I did not 

support, but if it all goes through, as we hope that it will, that that 

credit situation will change, liquidity will flow again and the interest rates on those treasuries will not be these historic low numbers, 

and we will be in a worse situation than we are now? 

Mr. BAILY. I think we need a dollar that is appropriate, that 

makes our manufacturing sector competitive. I don’t want to see a 

weak dollar. There are costs to us for a weak dollar, so I wouldn’t 

use that word at all. 

69

I don’t think we should have an overvalued dollar; and I think 

the dollar had become overvalued by 2002, and that is why I think 

some adjustment of the dollar is appropriate. 

I actually think the China currency should be adjusted up 

against the dollar because I don’t think they are at the market 

equilibrium. I want to see markets work right in terms of making 

our economy more competitive. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. 

And, Ms. Lav, you made the comment—I just went back to your 

notes—your comment says three ways that a State can deal with 

a situation. It seems to me, at least in my own State, in the State 

of New Jersey, we have found a fourth way to deal with our economic problems, and that is the same as what the Federal Government does, and that is called borrowing. 

We don’t raise taxes, we don’t cut—well, actually New Jersey 

does. We raise a lot of taxes in New Jersey; and cut spending—

well, we never do that. But we borrow despite the fact the constitution doesn’t allow it. So isn’t that really the fourth category? Isn’t 

that what sort of skews some of the numbers out there? 

Ms. LAV. Most States absolutely can’t borrow. Although some of 

them can do things like borrowing from the future in the sense 

that they can sort of sell a future stream of earnings, which is a 

sort of borrowing from the future, but it is actually a sale, like 

when they securitize their tobacco settlement revenue and that sort 

of thing. 

So New Jersey has kind of a large overhang of debt that it has 

acquired for various purposes in the past. 

States balance their operating budget and then they borrow for 

other things. They certainly borrow, that is what—they would sell 

bonds, they borrow for infrastructure. Infrastructure in States has 

nothing to do with their operating budget; by and large, that is a 

separate part of the budget that is not covered by balanced budget 

requirements, and they borrow to do those things. And that is a lot 

of the way that New Jersey has—you know, it has floated bonds. 

And it has got a larger debt than most other States, there is no 

question about that; and the interest rate comes onto the general 

fund budget and is a problem for it. 

But most States are not entirely in the same situation as New 

Jersey. 

Mr. GARRETT. And I don’t know—I have to delve into it more—

some would argue that New Jersey at least—not to pick on New 

Jersey, but they have used it more just for infrastructure, but they 

also actually have used it in the past for operating expenses. 

Ms. LAV. They have through switching around. There are a couple of States that do that—New Jersey, Illinois and California, but 

very few others. 

Mr. GARRETT. Mr. Beach, you made the comment you supported 

the bailout, and you worry about the moral hazard in the boardroom that they sort of put that out there and they said, now we 

can anticipate the Federal Government stepping in and relieving 

us of some responsibilities, I guess—your words, not mine. But 

what we need to do now is have the Federal Government step in 

to rectify that. 

70

You have been around here for a while and looked at how the 

Federal Government works. You have seen how we have come up 

with solutions to problems before, such as in Sarbanes-Oxley, 

which basically was supposed to provide us with all the transparency in the world with absolutely no cost to the economy or the 

business system. Of course, we know it did have a tremendous cost, 

and it may have actually made our Wall Street market move overseas in a lot of ways because of that. 

I understand what you are saying, what needs to be done, but 

knowing the history of the way the Federal Government operates, 

do you have any pleasant view that that is actually what is going 

to occur now, that we are going to come up with a proverbial worldclass regulator, which we obviously could not get in place prior to 

the demise—almost demise of Fannie and Freddie, that actually 

solves these problems? 

Mr. BEACH. Now that I am the old hand here, let me just say 

that usually the policy-making bodies of the Congress don’t get it 

quite right the first time. And that is because of the way that you 

operate with your elections and with your committee structures 

and so forth. That is not a criticism, because what is great about 

the system is that you do return to the same issues time and time 

again. 

Once the regulatory bodies have settled on their rules, one of the 

things you notice is, they rarely return to take a look at the rules. 

They wait for you to push them. So I am hopeful on the second goround of this—and I am confident in the next Congress you will 

have second and third go-rounds—that you will find ways of putting strictures, rules in place that will make it extremely difficult 

for this moral hazard thing to propagate into yet another real problem that you have to solve. 

Mr. GARRETT. I am sure there are going to be a lot of strict rules. 

Mr. BEACH. I agree. Regulation is probably going to be the least 

of the problems you have. 

Mr. GARRETT. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Baily, you mentioned the troubled assets on the banks’ books. 

And I was actually surprised to hear Chairman Bernanke talk 

about not overpaying for assets, because in discussions—there is 

nothing in the bill to restrict buying worthless assets at overpriced—overpriced; and in my discussions with people before the 

bill is that is exactly what was intended. 

If the intention now is to purchase these so-called ‘‘troubled assets’’ at a good-faith estimate of fair value, even when there is technically no market, they are temporarily illiquid, but at a good-faith 

estimate of fair value, what does the government purchase of the 

asset do that marking to fair value wouldn’t have done for free? 

Mr. BAILY. I was puzzled by the top when it first came out. It 

seemed to me, the need was to recapitalize the banks. And my understanding was that they would probably overpay for the assets 

relative to what those assets could command in the marketplace, 

and the difference would then be used to recapitalize the banks. 

I think it is much better what they are doing now, which is to 

inject capital directly into the banks. 

71

Mr. SCOTT. Rather than buy worthless assets from all over the 

world, a small percentage of which would actually land in the capital account of banks that we are aiming at? 

Mr. BAILY. Right. So I think that is a better plan. 

I do think there was a rationale towards creating more of a market for some of these assets. So I actually think that using some 

of the $700 billion to buy some of these assets, using this reverseauction technique, might allow greater liquidity in those markets 

for assets that hopefully are not worthless, but that do have some 

value when held to maturity, and we can create greater liquidity 

in that market. 

I understand the dangers of overpaying. But I think that is a legitimate part of this rescue package. 

Mr. SCOTT. But if it is at fair value, you could have accomplished 

most of what we are aiming at just allowing mark to fair value 

rather than marking to market? 

Mr. BAILY. Well, the idea, I think, is that if you can create an 

effective market for these assets, that it improves the liquidity of 

the banks and allows them to sell assets, but I understand the concern. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there any thought that we might actually buy 

enough of these assets to create a market? 

Mr. BAILY. Well——

Mr. SCOTT. I mean, there are tens of trillions of dollars out there, 

and we are talking about $700 billion. 

Mr. BAILY. I think it could help. I think it could help. I recognize 

your concerns, Congressman. 

Mr. SCOTT. Helping home owners, now that we essentially own 

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, what would be the ultimate cost of 

doing one of these loans at a commercial rate 5.25, 5.75, for those 

that can actually pay? 

Mr. BAILY. Well, if you are issuing the mortgage at what will 

be—once this crisis is passed, will be a fair market or a commercial 

rate, then the cost to taxpayers—there wouldn’t be a cost to taxpayers. 

Mr. SCOTT. You can essentially help the taxpayer at no cost to 

the taxpayer? 

Mr. BAILY. Well——

Mr. SCOTT. Excuse me, the homeowner at no cost to—at probably 

no cost to the—there is no guarantee here? 

Mr. BAILY. There is no guarantee. 

Mr. SCOTT. But you would——

Mr. BAILY. There may be some cost to the taxpayer, but I think 

you can minimize that cost while maximizing the help to the home 

owner. 

Mr. SCOTT. You also mentioned a prepayment issue. 

What would your reaction be to legislation to prohibit prepayment penalties as inherently unfair, especially when some of these 

mortgages can reset at draconian rates? 

Mr. BAILY. I think we would have been better off without these 

mortgages that started at the low interest rates and then were 

pushed up, because I think they ended up being deceptive. 

If you do offer a homeowner a mortgage with a very low rate of 

interest, that is not a market rate. You are losing money in the 

72

first few years. And so that is why they put in some of these prepayment penalties. 

But I do think that the Federal Reserve has put out guidelines 

for mortgages that are more stringent than the ones that were in 

place. 

Mr. SCOTT. What would your reaction be to a prohibition against 

prepayment penalties? 

Mr. BAILY. I think at this point it is probably a good thing. I 

think it is a good thing. 

Mr. SCOTT. Bang for the buck on the kinds of things you can do 

for a stimulus: Capital gains tax cuts, what kind of bang for the 

buck do you get on government expenditure resulting in actual 

stimulus to the economy if it is capital gains tax cuts versus extending unemployment benefits, food stamps or direct aid to 

States? 

Mr. BAILY. I believe you would get more bang from the buck from 

the other things than you would from a capital gains tax cut. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Simpson. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Do you believe that too, Mr. Beach? 

Mr. BEACH. No. That is actually not what the literature shows. 

When you reduce the taxes on capital, you get a much faster reaction in productive markets than when you reduce the taxes on 

labor. 

What you should do is, you should look after the needs of people 

who are hungry and unemployed because it is the right thing to do. 

And there will be plenty of those people and will be plenty of opportunity for you to pass that kind of legislation. 

If you want to get the economy moving again, then focus like a 

laser beam on what causes the economy to move; and it usually, 

in the short run, is capital costs. So that is why the Chairman was 

looking at any way that you could unfreeze credit from your side—

he has his side—but from the legislative side. Look at accelerated 

depreciation, bonus depreciation, full expensing as a short-term 

stimulus for 2 or 3 years. 

But the literature clearly indicates that it is just the opposite. 

You go after capital first and labor second if you are going to look 

at growing the economy out of an immediate problem. Do the right 

thing for people and then be hardheaded about the economy. 

Mr. SIMPSON. My study of the Depression of 1932—I hate to call 

it the Great Depression, because I hate to use the word ‘‘great’’ 

with ‘‘depression’’—was if there were two mistakes that they made, 

and they did many things right trying to address it and stuff—this 

isn’t a criticism. But if they did two things wrong, it was that they 

raised taxes and, two, that they became more protectionist and isolationist. 

Is that a fear that we have, that we are going to do the same 

thing? I mean, we have got some free trade agreements before Congress now that should pass, I think. 

Mr. BEACH. You certainly don’t want to do the opposite. And the 

literature, the history of that period, does assign three public policy 

mistakes, one of which was a tax increase to balance the budget 

because at that time even Franklin Delano Roosevelt, prior to his 

73

election as President, believed in balancing budgets at the State 

and the Federal level. 

We kind of know a little bit differently now. Ultimately, it is the 

right thing to do in the short run. It may not be the right thing 

to do. 

Secondly, a protectionist attitude that led to the passage, prior 

to the Democrats taking over, of a very bad international trade 

law. 

And thirdly, what the Chairman was talking about this morning 

from this side of the table what the Federal Reserve failed to do 

in terms of its own responsibilities. 

Those three things have generally been figured out as the three 

triggers that made a recession into a very serious and, hopefully, 

unprecedentedly bad and never-to-be-repeated depression. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. Baily, I will tell you, just for your purposes, 

information, I agree with Mr. Baird. I will tell you, I have talked 

to my transportation departments. Both local, State, and everyone 

else, they have projects that have been engineered and ready to go 

that are on the board. 

I voted against the economic stimulus package because I didn’t 

think it was an economic stimulus to give people $600 checks so 

they could buy TVs made in China. I thought we could actually employ people and we would get something out of that in the end, and 

that would be an improvement in our infrastructure, and there 

would be a value there. 

To the extent that we do that, that makes sense to me. And it 

is not slow; there are things out there ready to go. So I just thought 

I would throw that out. 

But last, Ms. Lav, when I read your testimony and I heard your 

testimony, I kind of get the impression that you feel the purpose 

of State government is to employ people. 

The purpose of State government is to deliver services. To the extent we employ people to do that, that is a good thing. But when 

I read that we ought to be bailing out States, and that it doesn’t 

present a moral hazard to those States that we are going to be bailing out—we have got States that do a good job. We do things differently. We administer our services differently. Some States do it 

more efficiently than other States. 

I was in the State legislature in 1987 when we went through 

some very difficult times. We had to make tough choices. And now 

we are going to prevent some States from making difficult choices 

by doing that. 

The governor of Idaho just a couple months ago, or a month ago, 

ordered a 1 percent holdback across the board, told them to be prepared for a 2 percent; and when he talked about it, he said, As we 

create this new budget, we are going to have to make priority decisions. What is wrong with that? 

I read in your thing that States take action such as instituting 

hiring freezes and travel freezes, as well as finding items in their 

budget that are more marginal to the core function. Isn’t that a 

good thing? 

Ms. LAV. I said in my testimony that what they have done up 

until now, that those things are mild and that that is nothing 

74

against what is coming. So I characterized the things you just said 

as ‘‘mild.’’

And most States can find a 1 percent or a 2 percent cut. I mean, 

during good times things tend to expand maybe, you know, or be 

a little less efficient than they have to be. So 1 percent, 2 percent, 

3 percent usually is a possibility. But what I am talking about is, 

on average, 14 percent, which will be 20 percent in some States. 

And that is—and of course, the purpose of States is to provide services. That is why I am talking about putting the majority of the 

fiscal relief through Medicaid. 

In the last recession there were 6 million additional people who 

needed Medicaid. There would have been more if States hadn’t—

at least another million if States hadn’t cut eligibility. 

Mr. SIMPSON. But in your testimony one of the things is, you say 

that you don’t believe States ought to be able to adjust their requirements for Medicaid if you give this relief. Isn’t that what the 

States do? They make decisions, different States, based on different 

needs in their State or what the State legislature perceives? Some 

States are much more generous. 

In SCHIP, you saw some States giving up to 400 percent of income poverty levels; other States chose not to do that. In Idaho, it 

was 185 percent. Are we saying that 400 percent is the appropriate 

level? And I voted for the SCHIP improvement. 

Ms. LAV. I am not saying any level at this point is appropriate. 

I mean, a lot of States have prioritized health care as private employers have dropped, and so they have made those choices. 

But what I am saying is, while you are giving the Federal 

money, you don’t want the States simply to substitute the money 

you give them for some other expenditures because that is not 

stimulus basically. You want it to be additional stimulus; and so, 

therefore, you don’t want them to reduce eligibility, back out the 

money and use it for something else. You want them to use it for 

Medicaid, which is why there is that—for new people coming onto 

the rolls, which makes it forward-looking stimulus. 

And in answer to your question, you get about, according to 

Moody’s Economy.com you get about $1.36 in stimulus for every 

dollar you spend in State fiscal relief. 

Mr. SIMPSON. Let me tell you what my State will—and I have 

not talked to them yet, but I will guarantee you what my governor 

and what my State legislature will tell me. 

If you are going to bail out the States for whatever, the problems 

that they currently face, whether it was through their own inactions or wasteful spending or whatever, and that Idaho is going to 

get somebody that says, Keep it, we will solve our own problems; 

you have got a big enough problem of your own in Washington with 

a $450 or $1 trillion deficit. 

Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Mr. Baird. 

Mr. BAIRD. I thank the Chair. I thank our witnesses. 

As I listened to the debates over the last few weeks and today 

I think about how we have labeled generations these days. There 

is the Greatest Generation and there is Generation X and there is 

a new generation. I have got two 31⁄2-year-old boys, and they are 

part of Generation M; and the reason I say ‘‘M’’ is, I am thinking 

75

of Mercutio in Romeo and Juliet whose dying words were ‘‘A plague 

on both your houses.’’

And sometimes I listen to the Dems and Republicans, and I have 

got to tell you, we are passing onto these kids unconscionable, unconscionable, crushing levels of debt and deficit. And there are good 

ideas on both sides, Dems and Republicans, and there are really 

bad ideas on both sides. But this level of deficit is not sustainable, 

and this level of debt is not. 

We talk about targeted and temporary and whatever—timely. 

Man, I would be much better with prompt and paid for and permanent. I would rather see us do things that we pay for that leave 

us a permanent asset. 

And hence, when Mr. Simpson—I appreciate his acknowledgement. We share this agreement about the last stimulus; we got 

nothing tangible out of that. We didn’t get a road, a bridge, a water 

treatment infrastructure. We got nothing that we could point out 

to our kids and say, Look, this not only put people to work, it gave 

you cleaner water, more efficient roads, safer bridges, improved 

schools, et cetera. So if we are going to do something on this, I hope 

we will do something that is paid for and leaves us something lasting. 

The other thing that strikes me is, we have to streamline the 

economy as well. Just throwing more money at it is like putting 

more fuel in a very boxy automobile. We have all kinds of regulatory structures, requirements, et cetera. It takes 10 years from 

inception to construction for highway projects now, 10 years. 

We are translating documents into multiple languages, we are 

doing multiple levels of EIS, we have got umpteen Federal agencies. That costs money in the financial sector. 

Do you want to help our banks? Tell us they don’t have to send 

us those lousy privacy notices every month that nobody reads, or 

every year. There are all sorts of things that we ought to be looking 

at, top to bottom, to say, Where is their drag-wind resistance on 

an economy that has to get going? And we haven’t talked about it 

at all today, but that is a structural issue. 

I worry, Mr. Beach, about the permanency of the tax cuts. Because I don’t doubt that you can create all the jobs, et cetera. I 

could create a lot of jobs today by taking my credit card out and 

buying all kinds of stuff, but there are deficit implications to that. 

And I worry, Ms. Lav, about the issue of bailing our States out. 

I think there is moral hazard. Some States step up to the plate, 

maintain their infrastructure, care for their kids’ health care. We 

have seen it in our State. We have much higher coverage of our 

kids. SCHIP comes along, we don’t get the benefit; the States that 

did lag get the benefit. 

Mr. Baily, I appreciate your acknowledging infrastructure, but I 

am really concerned about this one more helicopter drop of money 

having lasting impact. So I put that out there. 

Mr. Beach, are you concerned about the deficit? And I will put 

that in the context that Doug Holtz-Eakin testified almost exactly 

2 years ago before this very committee, maybe exactly 2 years ago, 

that the so-called ‘‘stimulus effect’’ of tax cuts doesn’t generate revenue to exceed the cost of the tax cuts. He modeled it eight or nine 

different ways. 

76

Now, are you concerned about that at all? 

Mr. BEACH. I am very concerned about it. I have been testifying 

for years for a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution. I 

think it is extremely important. But now I am on another jihad, 

and that is that, take your $700 billion rescue plan and imagine 

it as a bucket—I know we are not talking about a bailout today, 

but just imagine it that way—and then imagine what it is going 

to take you just to rescue Social Security when your children are 

25. And—that will be about 56 of those buckets, and that will be 

money you are going to have to raise. 

As far as taxes are concerned, I came today to talk to you about 

making the Bush tax cuts or those reductions permanent. That is 

one idea. I would much prefer you to take the entire Tax Code 

apart and make it more efficient. If you decide that you need to 

have more revenue, fine, or less revenue, fine; but a more efficient 

Tax Code, regardless of whichever way you go, will do wonders for 

the economy. I don’t know that you have time to do it now, but 

whatever you do on taxes, make that your objective. 

Mr. BAIRD. So the efficiency and streamlining argument could be 

vastly superior to just throw more money at it? 

Mr. BEACH. It is vastly more superior. And the deficits we are 

talking about now, Congressman, from this or from anything that 

you are going to do in the next Congress are simply minor tiny little pebbles compared to what we are looking at in the tsunami debt 

coming our way. 

Ms. LAV. We have looked very carefully at whether it is State 

policy or the economy that is causing these deficits. And the States 

that have the deficits, we looked at three factors; we have got a lot 

of research on this. 

The States that are having problems, the States that are having 

the highest foreclosure rates, we looked at three factors. There is 

nothing the States did wrong; it is not the States’ fault. The States 

that are having the highest increases in poverty measured by food 

stamp rolls, that is nothing the States did, that is what is happening in the national economy. 

And the States that are having the greatest declines in employment. That matches almost exactly with the States that are having 

deficits now. 

So I think that whatever the differences in State policies, they 

are swamped by what the economy is doing to the States now. 

Mr. BAILY. Can I make a quick comment? 

First of all, I agree with you entirely about the need to do something about the deficit in the long run. I don’t have young children 

anymore, but I do have a grandchild now, and I am quite concerned about what we are passing on to her. 

I think it is just unrealistic, the discussion, the debate we are 

having about taxes and spending. I mean, we need to make reforms 

on Medicare. Social security is not so much of a problem. But we 

need to make some of these reforms, and then we need to think 

about how we are going to pay for all that spending. 

In terms of a helicopter drop, I understand why you have some 

concern about that. I am more concerned about making sure we get 

enough money out there quickly that we turn this economy around, 

because things are looking very ugly right now. 

77

Mr. BAIRD. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Kaptur. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. And I 

thank the witnesses for coming. 

I am one of the Members that voted ‘‘no’’ on both bills before 

Congress. I would do so again. I feel that the Congress passed 

something that would not be effective, but would be fast. 

And I believe that criminal prosecutions need to proceed—the 

FBI is underfunded to do that—to show that in the decade of the 

1990s and in this decade there was willful intent by very powerful 

financial institutions in this country to create money where there 

was no underlying asset. And people knew exactly what they were 

doing. 

I would like to place on the record, and I will read these very 

quickly, the list of the primary government securities dealers that 

the Federal Reserve maintains in New York: 

As of October 1, 2008, Bank of America, which just bought Countrywide; BNP Paribas Securities Corporation; Barclays Capital; 

Cantor Fitzgerald; Citigroup; another one of the troubled institutions, Credit Suisse Securities; Daiwa Securities; Deutsche Bank 

Securities; Dresdner Kleinwort Securities; Goldman Sachs, another 

company that just came under the bank holding—a company that—

for which they paid nothing for the FDIC insurance that they are 

now eligible to use; HSBC Securities; J.P. Morgan Securities; Merrill Lynch Securities; Mizuho Securities; Morgan Stanley, another 

company that just came under the umbrella of the FDIC; and UBS 

Securities, LLC. 

The Congress gave the administration the green light, and now 

they behave like Wrong Way Corrigan. Rather than bringing to 

task some discipline inside this market, we have essentially allowed the administration to reward the irresponsible financial institutions. Why haven’t the people in the administration used the 

full powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to resolve 

this situation, as we have in the past, including the use of the net 

worth certificate program? 

I disagree with Dr. Baily. I don’t think that we should be taking 

taxpayer money and placing it in these institutions. I think we 

should be using the net worth certificate program and the tried and 

true mechanisms of market discipline to work out, bank by bank, 

what needs to be done to make the consumer as whole as we can 

make them. 

We can do the mortgage workouts there as well. We don’t have 

to do it in this backward way. In fact, back in August when the 

Congress passed that housing legislation, it was supposed to stem, 

give some help to do workouts at the local level so we wouldn’t exacerbate the foreclosure situation. 

We are exacerbating it. In places like Ohio foreclosures are getting worse, not better. And there is nothing happening now immediately to not make it worse and to precipitate a much deeper and 

longer recession. 

So if anyone from the administration is listening, I hope they will 

look to the FDIC to use its full powers, to look to the net worth 

certificate program, to look to the fair value accounting and to 

using the true value of the asset rather than arbitrary indexed 

78

value through SEC accounting standards, use the market discipline 

that we need to use rather than taking more money from the taxpayers. 

The question I really have of you is—and frankly, I am somewhat in shock in what the Chairman of the Federal Reserve said 

to me, there was no relationship between the Countrywide that sits 

on the Federal Reserve’s board of primary security dealers up in 

New York and the Countrywide institution which made most of the 

loans, subprime loans, that got us into all this trouble to begin 

with. And I want to place some information about Countrywide on 

the record here today. 

I would like to ask you, which businesses benefit from debt? As 

America becomes deeper and deeper in debt, which businesses 

broker in that debt and earn money off the debt, the growing debt 

of the American people? 

Mr. BAILY. You are opposed to the rescue package. I respectfully 

disagree. I think when the ship hits the iceberg, you can go back 

and say, as they have apparently done, that there were defective 

rivets and defective steel. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But the ship is headed in the wrong direction, Doctor; the ship is headed in the wrong direction. They have injected 

some capital into some of the biggest institutions in this country, 

but it hasn’t stopped the hemorrhage. 

What they have done is one way of going about this problem. A 

better way would have been to use the FDIC’s full emergency powers, much better way to go about this. 

Mr. BAILY. Well, Sheila Bair and the FDIC, I think, are doing an 

outstanding job now. 

Ms. KAPTUR. They could do better. They could do better. They 

could use their full powers. 

Mr. BAILY. Well, that is probably true. I think they are doing the 

right thing at this point. 

Ms. KAPTUR. But who benefits from debt? 

Mr. BAILY. The U.S. Treasury debt? 

Ms. KAPTUR. The American people’s debt. 

Mr. BAILY. The American people’s debt? 

Ms. KAPTUR. As brokered through the Treasury. Who benefits 

from debt? Who is making money off the American people’s debt? 

Mr. BAILY. Well, we have spent more than we have received in 

revenue. And many Americans that have received the benefits of 

that spending, whether it is Medicare spending or Social Security 

spending—and Social Security has actually been sold, I shouldn’t 

put them on the table—but other kinds of spending that we haven’t 

paid for. So in some sense we, the American people, are having to 

pay the passing on the bill, but we have actually benefited in the 

short term. Other institutions use U.S. debt. 

I don’t think anybody is making excessive returns on holding 

government debt. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Who makes money off the U.S. debt, sir? This is not 

a complicated question. Aren’t they the very institutions that are 

benefiting from the capital infusion by the American taxpayers? 

Mr. BAILY. Yes. They earn an interest return on holding that 

money, yes. 

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Ms. KAPTUR. And what is their interest return that you estimate? 

Anyone on the panel, how much money do they make in a year? 

How much money will——

Mr. BAILY. Well, the total interest on the debt, I don’t have that 

number at my fingertips, but it is certainly very large. 

Ms. KAPTUR. It is billions of dollars? 

Mr. BAILY. Yes. 

Ms. KAPTUR. Yes. Thank you. 

And I wonder if any of your organizations could provide for the 

record which institutions are benefiting from the growing debt of 

the American people? Do any of you have that? 

Mr. BEACH. I would be happy to supply some information to you 

on that, Congresswoman. 

Ms. KAPTUR. I thank you. We will make it a part of the record, 

Dr. Beach. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. Moore. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Thank you so much. I would like to 

pursue some questions that have already been raised, and I raised 

earlier with Chairman Bernanke. 

I am very concerned about the $700 billion investments. And I 

think as long as we are trying to make capital infusions in banks 

or trying to strategically purchase troubled assets where there is 

an underlying mortgage, I think perhaps we are heading in some 

direction where we can recover taxpayers’ dollars. 

I am really, really concerned about these tranches and about 

these CDOs and other kinds of products—I think Ms. Kaptur just 

referred to it—where we have foreign investors and overleveraged 

dollars. 

What strategy do we have to just abandon the purchase of those 

troubled assets and let the markets work? I mean, let investors 

belly up, let them—you know, the market forces work here. To 

what extent do we have—do you think we will be able to accomplish that public policy imperative? 

Maybe I will ask Mr. Beach that. 

Mr. BEACH. Congresswoman, that is a great question. 

Let’s suppose that all public policy responses fail. You know, the 

evidence is not completely there that this is going to work, okay? 

So one of your contingency plans should be that everything fails, 

everything the Congress does fails. Then what markets will do, 

they will clear; and they will ruin companies, and they will wipe 

out debt, and the market mechanisms will work. And what will 

happen is that on the other side a smaller, but very efficient market will be present. 

I think what the Treasury Secretary and the Chairman of the 

Federal Reserve were thinking a couple of weeks ago was that that 

was too great a price to bear, and you had to buy these weights 

inside the portfolios that were not performing, the troubled assets. 

You had to make the infusions because the ruthlessness of market 

clearing would be a bloody thing to watch. 

So I have no doubt that the market will be very efficient and 

ruthless in getting its house in order. And maybe that is what we 

have to have. But on the other hand—you know, right now the jury 

is out on that. 

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Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Mr. Beach, let me ask you another 

question. You made a compelling argument for making the tax reductions of 2001 and 2003 permanent, accelerate depreciation, reducing the tax rate on long-term capital gains and dividend income. 

Are you concerned at all in terms of our recovery about the lack 

of revenue that is coming in? You say that we shouldn’t really position ourselves to worrying about the demand side, consumer side. 

You don’t seem to have much sympathy for consumer spending as 

being an answer. 

Mr. BEACH. That is very important. Right. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Do you worry about the lack of revenue? 

Mr. BEACH. As a former revenue planner, I can see that your revenues are going to be way short, based on the current tax system 

that you have in place. So what I am suggesting is that now you 

can make moves to essentially increase revenues or to decrease the 

rate of fall in revenues. And the actions which I have laid out are 

actions which I believe would be effective. 

If you do nothing, your revenues are going to fall and they are 

going to fall precipitously because of the contraction which is going 

on. So you should join your fellow Democrats and Republicans who 

have in the past said, accelerated depreciation, 1-year expensing, 

corporate rate reductions. Those are good things to do to increase 

revenues. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. I have only 45 seconds left, and I am 

very intrigued with this line of questioning. 

You know, timeliness is one of the three parts of the three-legged 

stool: targeted, timely and temporary. So certainly extending the 

tax cuts permanently would not meet the temporary thing. 

What about timely? How fast would increasing these tax reductions, making them permanent, have an impact on Main Street? 

Mr. BEACH. I just love that question. And the reason why this 

is the fastest thing you can do, it is the moment you begin to hold 

hearings and markets begin to judge that the Ways and Means and 

finance committees are going to do this, they actually begin to price 

it in. 

So it has an effect even before you pass the legislation, whereas 

spending is something that requires the dollars to get into the 

hands of governments or of businesses or of individuals in order for 

it to have that effect. 

So the fastest thing you can do by far, light speed, is on the tax 

side. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. Okay. 

Can I just follow up tolerance? 

Chairman SPRATT. One more question. 

Ms. MOORE OF WISCONSIN. If, in fact, this has been a great strategy, these tax cuts are in place now and they have been in place 

since 2001, why aren’t they working? 

Mr. BEACH. That is a great question, and that is one—that is an 

absolutely great question. 

First off, the tax reductions of 2001 were intended to react to a 

recession which we stemmed over between administrations. In my 

view, the 2001 tax reductions were far too demand-side oriented to 

actually do any good, they did a little bit of good. But in the end, 

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by 2002 and 2003, this Congress had done what I said it does oftentimes, go back at it and do it again; and you passed some really 

fine tax reductions that moved this economy forward. 

And then I think we have had a number of things that have buffeted public policy. We have not had several policies competently 

executed by both Congress and the administration. On top of that, 

we have had this building bubble. 

So I honestly think, if you take a look at the tax cuts that are 

pro-growth tax cuts, those have performed well and you would be 

in pretty hot water right now had they not been in place. 

Chairman SPRATT. Ms. DeLauro. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My understanding is, Dr. Beach, you talked about an economic 

recovery program a size between $150 billion to $300 billion, depending on circumstances. 

Mr. BAILY. I am Dr. Baily. 

Ms. DELAURO. Ms. Lav, what is your sense of an economic recovery package as we begin to think about putting this together? Just 

give me size. 

I have three other questions so I want to just kind of move quickly. 

Ms. LAV. It depends on what the pieces are. 

Ms. DELAURO. Well, you said $50 billion? 

Ms. LAV. $50 billion. And I think that I would associate myself 

with Mr. Baily. 

Ms. DELAURO. And my understanding from you, Mr. Beach, is, 

you don’t believe in having an economic recovery package? 

Mr. BEACH. Oh, contrary. No. 

I have laid one out for you. It is just different than the one you 

have been talking about. 

Ms. DELAURO. Right. It is my understanding with regard to the 

capital gains that while this improves cash flow—people can spend 

it on salaries, they can spend it—it doesn’t necessarily stimulate 

the economy. 

Bonus depreciation can do that at the outset; it is a question of 

timing. But that was probably stuff that was going to be done already so it is not an increase in stimulus. 

Ms. Lav, let me go back to you for a second. I read your report 

very, very carefully, particularly because the shortfalls have opened 

up in the budgets of at least 21 States, including my own State of 

Connecticut. So clearly, in my view, an economic recovery package 

can help prevent cuts to health care coverage, public safety, education resulting from a State budget crisis. And I am there and will 

be supportive of those kinds of efforts. 

I want to ask you a question with regard to the infrastructure 

projects, and it adds capital budgeting, and I understand that with 

regard to States. But to what degree do you believe the economic 

and fiscal situation in these States is having on their ability to 

move forward with infrastructure projects? 

Ms. LAV. I think what is holding up the infrastructure projects 

is the bond, the liquidity issue, the ability to sell their bonds, because that is how it is that they, the States and localities, fund infrastructure. 

82

I would like to say—I think it is probably appropriate, just as the 

Federal Government is moving in to buy commercial paper—that 

bonds are a great investment. They are fine; State and local bonds 

are great. 

There are two kinds of bonds: the ones that are just cash flow 

bonds, like California, like Governor Schwarzenegger made a big 

fuss about and ultimately sold on the private market; but the infrastructure bonds, they are having to pay a lot of interest and so 

forth. 

So that would be one of the better things you could do to move 

infrastructure along. 

Ms. DELAURO. And do you believe—how helpful do you believe 

infrastructure funding will be in any economic recovery? How can 

it be helpful to States recover through job creation? Do you think 

there is a link? 

Ms. LAV. Yes, as long as you can do it fast enough. And I think 

if they are ready to sell their bonds, it is ready to go, so that is 

good. 

Ms. DELAURO. Rising interest rates on bonds for these investments limiting investor interest, if you can believe issuing Federal 

bonds—you just answered that—at low interest rates for these 

projects could significantly help the States? 

Ms. LAV. Right. And that is a good way to target. 

Ms. DELAURO. I have another question which I would like to ask, 

if I can just throw this out there. 

As part of a financial recovery package we passed last month, we lowered the child tax credit threshold to $8,500 benefiting 13 million children, 2.9 million who would become newly eligible for a 

benefit, 10.1 who would see their credit increase due to this provision. That is according to the Tax Policy Center, something I have 

advocated for for a very, very long time. 

In fact, I believe the threshold should be dropped to zero, and something which we set the stage for with $300 child tax credit, 

including in the stimulus package that we passed with other tax 

rebates earlier in the year. 

As we try to get a grasp on what would be most effective in stimulating the economy, providing long-term growth, what, if any, additional tax relief do you believe should be provided for the middle 

class? Do you think we should continue with an $8,500 threshold 

for the child tax credit or, in fact, expand it further in 2009? 

Should we, as well, expand the earned income tax credit, offer income tax rate cuts and rebates and so on? 

Ms. Lav, let me have you start. 

Ms. LAV. I think that—you know, I am a little unclear whether 

tax rebates or something are the best thing to do right now. But 

I suspect that if you do them, they should be not only for the middle class, but they should go, as the last ones did, all the way 

down. Because you want to put the money in the hands of the people that are going to spend it the fastest, and those are the people 

who need it the most and who you are sure are not going to put 

it in their savings account, which is not going to help the economy 

right now, or pay down a credit card. Well, they might do that. 

So I think that money put into the hands of the people who need 

it right now, that is a good thing. That was great with the child 

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tax credit. We are very happy. It could go down a little lower. I am 

not sure about zero; as you know, we don’t think that. 

So I think there are things that need to be done with the EITC 

improvements, expansion. That also would be very good, particularly for people who don’t have children living with them. I mean, 

that is a sort of a forgotten group of people who really would also 

be quite stimulative to give them additional funds. 

Mr. BAILY. I think the EITC is a great program. It was started 

many years ago. 

Ms. DELAURO. By Ronald Reagan, I might add, who said that the 

best way to lift people out of poverty was through the EITC. 

Mr. BAILY. It was greatly expanded in the Clinton administration, which I was a part of, and I think we were very proud of that. 

I think it is a great program. 

I do think some of these issues need to be addressed in sort of 

long-term tax policy which addresses the issue of revenue and all 

of that. I don’t know that all of these things can be addressed in 

the short-run stimulus package. 

Ms. DELAURO. On the infrastructure question that I asked Ms. 

Lav about, it leading to job creation increase, albeit we can posit 

that these things all need to be done, they have to be ready to go; 

we are there on that issue. 

But just your view as to that link between the infrastructure 

piece and job creation and quickly putting money into the hands 

of consumers. 

Mr. BAILY. If we can get that done quickly—and it is really incremental spending, not just displacing other spending—it certainly 

would add to jobs. It would be a very immediate stimulus to jobs 

under those circumstances. 

And I did mention in my testimony, also, the need for maintenance. I remember in the 1975 recession an economist from Pittsburgh saying, we could use all the unemployed filling in the potholes in Pittsburgh. I think there are some maintenance things 

that could be done. 

Ms. DELAURO. Oh, schools, without question. Maintenance is a 

very, very big part of that, and I appreciate your saying that. 

Mr. BEACH. Let me just add one thing to the comments of my 

fellow panelists that I am very pleased to be with. 

A lot of the middle class, broadly defined, is involved in small 

businesses, millions upon millions of small businesses. We can’t 

forget those. In all of our discussion I think we need to keep them 

in our focus. 

And so what I threw out this morning in just oral testimony—

and I will throw it out again—what is wrong with a temporary tax 

rate for small businesses? It is targeted. You could do it on a timely 

basis. Those that have a corporate form could get a 25 percent rate; 

those 25.2 million small businesses that file through the 1040 as 

a personal, the sole proprietors, partnerships and sub-Ss, LLCs 

could see a temporary reduction in their tax rate as well. 

That is middle class, par excellence. It also is directly related to 

job creation, and it could be done in an extremely rapid way. 

Ms. DELAURO. I would say to you, Mr. Beach, that I am pro 

doing something for small businesses. And I like them to be defined 

and determined as small businesses and not what normally hapVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Jan 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00087 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-43\45532.TXT HBUD PsN: DICK
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pens in this institution where it emanates up the chain to the very, 

very big corporations and the very wealthiest, both with individuals and corporations. 

Quick last question, Ms. Lav: Should the Medicaid funds be targeted to particular States versus the across-the-board percentage 

increase to all the States? 

Ms. LAV. Well, we had been advocating targeting until, I think, 

very recently when we are now seeing a plunge in the—you know, 

it was really the energy States and the commodity States, and everybody else was in trouble. 

As I said, 36 States are in trouble, so there are about a dozen 

that aren’t. And now that the price of oil has dropped and we are 

going to see demand weakening around the world, I am not so sure 

that we need to do the targeting anymore. I think it is right on the 

cusp of whether we should or not right now. If we do block grants, 

maybe we should target because that has been a criticism in the 

past. 

If I could just make one quick comment, I think the best thing 

we can do for small businesses is to stimulate demand because 

they are not going to pay taxes if they don’t have any profits, and 

if there is no demand, they cannot make a profit. 

Ms. DELAURO. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. One last question from me, if you will—Dr. 

Baily in particular. 

This doesn’t strike me as your garden variety business cycle recession. It started with the phenomenon of subprime mortgages, 

but as Dr. Bernanke pointed out today, it has broadened considerably beyond that. 

As I look at the proposals that are in place for addressing the 

primary source of the problem, namely, distress in the housing 

market, reverse-wealth effect as values plummet, I don’t really see 

the pathway by which these billions of dollars flow from the major 

banks to individual borrowers, particularly those who are in default. 

I can see them using this to make new loans, but I wonder how 

the money gets to defaulted mortgagors. 

And secondly, having been in the business before, I know it is 

very individualized. There is no debtor who has exactly the same 

problem as his neighbor. So there is no cookie-cutter solution, no 

wholesale solution. It is going to have to be retail banking. And 

that is going to take a lot of people across this country. And I just 

don’t see it coming together. 

First of all, the $250 billion is going to the capitalization, recapitalization of banks. The $100 billion that follows that won’t come 

for some time, because they will have to come back and there will 

be a comment period before the money is approved by the Congress. We could be months away before real money is available for 

the homeowners who are in distress, and by that time they may 

be beyond help. 

Have you given any thought to how this will work with the structure we have in place with the Economic Stabilization Act? Any 

other ideas about how it could be made to work? 

85

Mr. BAILY. This is not a garden-variety recession, I agree. The 

1982 is the worst one we have had since World War II. This one 

is of a different character and is certainly, in its effect on housing 

and household wealth, is probably more severe than that one, or 

certainly comparable to that one. So I agree with you on that point. 

Second, I agree that what is being done on the banks is indirect. 

You are trying to rescue the banking system; you are not putting 

money directly into homeowners or families. And I think that is 

one of the reasons we are here today, is to think about what is the 

right way to get money directly into the hands of Americans and 

stimulate demand. 

I think we do have to recapitalize the banking system. I don’t 

think there is any choice. You can look across countries, you can 

look in U.S. history, and we have to recapitalize the banks. 

I think it is also important that we devote some of this money 

to working out the mortgage problem. I mentioned in my testimony 

the suggestion of allowing people to roll into 30-year, fixed-rate 

mortgages in order to reduce the number of foreclosures. We have 

obviously had other legislation and other programs that have 

helped homeowners. But I agree with you completely, we need to 

target some of these funds back to the homeowners. 

Chairman SPRATT. Not the least of our problems is that the Federal Government or any other creditor can’t really move in until 

they have sued to judgment their claim against the mortgagebacked security. Then they have to dis-assemble it and take out the 

individual mortgages. That assumes that they are buying the whole 

package, because I understand these packages have been sold in 

slivers, and that could be a problem too. So it is a Byzantine, bramble-bush legal nightmare. 

Mr. BAILY. It is. It is. And that is why it is so hard to unravel 

this thing. I do think the suggestion of allowing homeowners to roll 

into new mortgages would help resolve it. But I agree with you, it 

is a bramble bush. 

Chairman SPRATT. Well, let me just say what has happened. So 

you have to close a new mortgage. In the meantime, these folks 

haven’t made their house payment. By definition, they almost will 

not have made other payments as well, because the house payment 

comes first and the car payment comes next. 

When you go to search the title in order to take a clear first lien 

on the property, guess what? The hospital has a judgmental lien 

against them; the other creditors as well, credit cards. Then you 

have a bigger problem than just the mortgage debt, with all of the 

accumulated administrative costs and legal fees. You have these 

other liens that have to be cleared off the record. 

Mr. BAILY. That is right. In my home State of Maryland, they 

have had a program to try to help mortgage owners that are distressed. And it has been fairly expensive, and they haven’t helped 

a lot of mortgage owners. So it is a difficult problem to solve, precisely because of these legal structures that you describe. 

I don’t have a—I don’t have a full answer for you, Congressman. 

I think it is going to take a while to play that out, and that is why 

we need to try to keep the rest of the economy going. 

Chairman SPRATT. I think there is a fair amount of improvisation in what they are doing right now. 

86

Mr. BAILY. Absolutely. 

Chairman SPRATT. And this has yet to be improvised. 

Iris Lav or Bill Beach, do you have any further comments? 

Ms. LAV. No. 

Chairman SPRATT. Okay. 

Mr. BEACH. Thank you very much, Chairman. I think they are 

improvising. 

Chairman SPRATT. Thank you all of you for coming. 

Mr. BEACH. Thank you. 

Chairman SPRATT. I very much appreciate it. Your answers have 

been extremely helpful to us, and we are grateful to you for your 

contribution. 

Mr. BAILY. Thank you for having me, sir. 

Chairman SPRATT. I ask unanimous consent that those members 

who did not have the opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses 

be given 7 days to submit questions for the record. 

We don’t have any legal process by which we can compel answers, so don’t worry. [Laughter.] 

Thank you very much. 

The meeting is hereby adjourned. 

[Questions for the record submitted by Mr. Etheridge follow:]

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY MR. ETHERIDGE

I would like to thank Chairman Spratt for holding this important and timely 

hearing. I regret that due to previously scheduled meetings in my district, I was 

unable to attend. Like everyone, I am concerned with the deteriorating state of our 

financial industry and our economy as a whole. We are continuing to see negative 

economic indicators throughout the economy, like rising unemployment and decreased quarterly growth, at the same time, the effects of the crisis on Wall Street 

are beginning to be felt on Main Street. I look forward to a continued discussion 

of possible stimulus measures that can get our economy back on track, and I thank 

you for the opportunity to have Federal Reserve Board Chairman Bernanke address 

my questions. 

1. Chairman Bernanke, I have heard from several small business owners throughout my district who are concerned by the continued decrease in small business lending. As you know, Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act earlier this month to increase liquidity in the lending industry, and last week Secretary 

Paulson announced a plan to use $250 billion of that authority to provide capital 

to banks by purchasing equity in those that choose to participate. Outside of the 

nine major banks that have already announced participation in this plan, how many 

banks do you expect to participate in this program? In addition, if regional and local 

banks choose to participate in this program, what guarantees are there that they 

will use this money to make more loans for small businesses? How long will it take 

for local businesses to feel the effect of Treasury’s actions? 

2. In addition, I am concerned that the Small Business Administration (SBA) has 

mistakenly been awarding small business contracts to large firms as reported in the 

Washington Post. This is precisely the time that SBA could be picking up the slack 

in lending to small businesses, and using their government backed guarantee to provide confidence in the marketplace. Are there any provisions to increase capital for 

SBA or to give them an increased role during this financial crisis? 

3. Beyond the steps that have already been taking, what action can the Federal 

Reserve, Treasury Department, or Congress take to improve liquidity so that small 

business can grow and qualified consumers can get credit to keep our economy on 

track?

[Responses to Mr. Etheridge’s questions follow:]

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[The statement of Mr. Porter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JON C. PORTER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS

FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

On Monday October 20, 2008 the House Budget Committee held a hearing on the 

options and challenges involved with our economic recovery efforts. While I was unable to attend due to previous engagements, I would like to commend my colleagues 

on the Budget Committee for holding a hearing on this matter. 

In the State of Nevada, my constituents have been particularly hit hard by our 

current financial crisis. Economic events of the past several months have shaken the 

foundations of our financial systems and have led to the failure of a number of 

banks and lending institutions, three in Nevada alone. Furthermore, my constituency is suffering from one of the nation’s highest foreclosure rates as well as an esVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:53 Jan 22, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00092 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 J:\DOCS\HEARINGS\110TH\110-43\45532.TXT HBUD PsN: DICK

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calating unemployment rate. The matters under discussion today before the Budget 

Committee are of vital interest to me and my constituents, and I look forward to 

additional conversations with the panelists as we continue to navigate through this 

trying time and ensure that our recovery efforts are done in a timely and appropriate manner. 

At this critical moment in our financial future, while we are working as cautiously 

and expeditiously as we can to help stabilize the economy in a manner that protects 

taxpayers and homeowners, we also need to learn from this situation to protect us 

in the future. With this in mind, I introduced legislation calling for a special commission of inquiry into this crisis that would investigate the origins of the crisis as 

well as provide recommendation to guard against future crisis. 

We must have a full understanding of what led to this crisis in order to prevent 

it in the future. I remain committed to working with my colleagues on both sides 

of the aisle, and in the administration, to ensure that the public does not face the 

same situation in the future.

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

Æ