U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

•ahVWinter 2009

Peace Is Our Profess*

The U.S. Air Force during the Cold War

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Aligning Capabilities with National Strategy

Towards a New

Deterrence

A History of Chemical

Warfare Part II

The Zero Hour

Silver Bullets for Peace in the Middle East

Opportunities for Higher Education in Nuclear

Engineering at the University of Maryland
Inside theJournal

Combating WMD

3 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Aligning Capabilities with National

Strategy

By Mr. Al Mauroni

9 Just When We Thought the Hard Part Was

Over

By LTC Andrae Brooks

Lawrence E. Boeing

Toward a New Deterrent Analysis and

Recommendations for the Commission on the

Strategic Posture of the United States

By The New Deterrent Working Group,

Introduction by VADM Robert R. Monroe

History

24 Peace is Our Profession, The U.S. Air Force

during the Cold War

By CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

30 Chemical Warfare: Part II

By Mr. A. Mark Diglio

37 USANCA Officially Opens New Headquarters

By Mr. Paul Bello, Fort Belvoir Eagle Staff Writer,

Ms. Marny Malin, Fort Belvoir Eagle Staff Photographer

Book Review

Science and Technology 38 Code Name: Downfall

18 The Zero Hour - Silver Bullets for Peace

in the Middle East

By MAJ Todd Hathaway

22 Opportunities for Higher Education in

Nuclear Engineering at the University of

Maryland

By Lt Vern Conaway, USAF

Wing Attack Plan R cover sheet idea courtesy of Stanly Kubrick's movie,

"Dr. Strangelove: or, How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb"
COLUMNS

Published by the

United States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

(USANCA)

Director

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Managing Editor

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Editorial Board

Mr. Mark W. Fishback, Mr. Joseph Nellis,

and MAJ Joseph Beckman

Design/Layout

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

From The Director

1 CWMD Planning

By Mr. Peter Bechtel

36 International

CBRN Standardization in NATO (Non-Medical)

By Mr. Frank R. Jordan

Do You Know...

1 6 Medical Microbots

Are Nearer Than You

Think?

By Mr. Robert Pfeffer

40 Combating

WMD Resources

Combating WMD £

Resource Page v

Disclaimer: Combating WMD Journal is published semi-annually by the United

States Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency (USANCA). The views expressed are

those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal's content does not necessarily reflect the US Army's position

and does not supersede information in other official Army publications.

Distribution: US Army organizations and activities with CBRN-related missions,

to include all combat and materiel developers and units with chemical and nuclear

surety programs, to each FA52 officer, and to Army attaches. The Secretary of

the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the

transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department. Use of

funds for printing this publication was approved by HQ, TRADOC, 12 Nov 98, IAW

Army Regulation 25-30.

Article Submission: We welcome articles from all US Government agencies and

academia involved with CBRN matters. Articles are reviewed and must be approved by the Combating WMD Journal Editorial Board prior to publication. Submit articles in Microsoft Word and include photographs, graphs, tables, etc. as

separate files, please call or email us for complete details. The editor retains the

right to edit and select which submissions to print.

Mailing Address: Director, US Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

ATTN: MONA-CWO, Suite 101, Springfield, VA 22150-3198.

Telephone: 703-806-7858, DSN 656-7858, Fax 703-806-7900

Electronic Mail: dcsg3usanca2@conus.army.mil

Subject line: ATTN: Editor, CWMD Journal

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
FROM THE DIRECTOR

CWMD Planning

Mr. Peter Bechtel, Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Mr. Peter Bechtel

Director

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) recently completed the Joint Planning and Execution

Community (JPEC) review process for their respective Combating WMD (CWMD) campaign plans. This

process sought to align the aforementioned plans with

various national-level strategies and strategic guidance

documents (e.g., Guidance for the Employment of the

Force). As a result, each GCC CWMD campaign plan embraces an operational design that provides a common

planning framework for CWMD across geographic

boundaries and global commons. However, the rather

broad end states and strategic objectives found within

theater-level campaign plans often presents challenges for

the Army when viewed through the lens of full spectrum

operations (FSO) and when implemented through the elements of ground combat power (e.g., movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, etc.). Operational granularity

remains paramount to Land Component Commanders

(LCCs) as they will bear the brunt of CWMD execution.

Therefore, it is imperative that CWMD planning at the

Army Service Component Command (ASCC) enlist the

operational tenets of land warfare.

This is where USANCA excels as a Field Operating

Agency (FOA); we have explored several planning models

with the ASCCs and standing US Field Armies in an endeavor to develop tailored, well coordinated, and executable CWMD campaign support plans. There are several

key areas where USANCA influences or directly supports

ASCC activities as illustrated by figure 1. Under AR 10-

16, USANCA is able to field two unique capabilities to accomplish the nuclear and CWMD mission. The first such

capability is the CWMD Planning Assistance Team

(CPAT); the second is the Nuclear Employment Assistance Team (NEAT). As the CPAT name implies, it is designed to provide technical expertise across the operational and tactical spectrum of CWMD to ASCC staffs. We

have already experienced a great deal of success participating in the USFK and USARCENT planning efforts. At

present, USANCA teams are poised to assist 8

th US Army,

USARPAC, and USARAF. In the next twelve to eighteen

months, the weight of USANCA will lend doctrinal fidelity

and operational depth to all ASCC planning efforts.

Culminating our engagement activities for fiscal-year

2009 was the 4

th Annual Army Combating Weapons of

Mass Destruction Conference held at our new facility on

Fort Belvoir from 15-17 September 2009. The purpose of

the Army CWMD conference was to provide a forum for

dialogue across the Army CWMD community to address

key Army CWMD issues. There were 78 attendees at the

conference including representatives from all of the Army

Service Component Commands (ASCCs), the Joint Staff,

the Army Staff, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(DTRA), 20th SUPCOM, TRADOC, FORSCOM, Army Material Command (AMC), Office of the Secretary of Defense

(OSD), Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG), Edgewood

Chemical Biological Center (ECBC), Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA), National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)

and USANCA. ASCCs were the main focus of the conference. Our goal was to identify and address key CWMD

planning issues and capability gaps affecting the Army's

ability to support Geographic and Sub-Unified Command

plans for CWMD. The high level of participation allowed

us to identify a number of issues that have the potential to

significantly improve the ASCCs' planning and support

efforts.

1 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
National

i Military

Strategy

USAREUR

8.7thUS Army

ARCENT

(3rd US Army)

USARPAC

IARNORTH

|(5thUS Army)

Figure 1. USANCA Planning Support.

This is only the start for the annual process. The Army

Council for CWMD (ACCWMD) is the mechanism for continuing deliberations and consultations. The ACCWMD

using three distinct working groups will cover Policy; Plans

and Operations; and Capabilities, will meet on a regular

basis as a mechanism for exchanging information and

addressing issues. As the various ASCC CWMD plans

garner fidelity, those mature plans should assist with informing nascent planning efforts. USANCA is postured to

assist this linkage, and to advocate for resources within

the Army Staff, TRADOC, and FORSCOM.

Finally, USANCA maintains the capability to employ

Nuclear Employment Augmentation Teams (NEAT).

NEAT provides offensive nuclear planning support to augment ASCC and LCC staffs in support of training, planning, exercises, and operations. This includes providing

analysis of consequences of execution and, most importantly, the potential impact of planned nuclear strikes on

maneuver operations. USANCA coordinates with and

supports U.S. Strategic Command Center for combating

WMD, DTRA and other Joint and Service staffs in maintaining an ability to compute, coordinate, nuclear weapons

safety, effects, target coverage data, and target analysis

procedures for all nuclear weapons of all U.S. Services

and NATO. Because of these relationships and their understanding of nuclear weapons effects and nuclear targeting, NEAT personnel also provide support to the Defense Threat Reduction University in presenting the Theater Nuclear Operations Course.

Providing CWMD and nuclear targeting expertise and

support to the Army is a mission essential task for

USANCA. USANCA planners are engaged in the CWMD

planning process; we have enjoyed the privilege of assisting in the development of GCC CWMD plans throughout

the JPEC review process; taken requests for follow-on

technical and planning support; stand ready to assist

ASCCs and JFLCCs in planning, coordinating and executing their CWMD missions.

V

Combating WMD Journal Issue 3 2
COMBATING WMD

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Aligning Capabilities with National Strategy

Mr. Al Mauroni

Senior Defense Consultant

The views expressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense (DOD) or its elements. Combating WMD Journal's content does not

necessarily reflect the US Army's position and does not supersede information in other official Army publications

At a past conference at the

National Defense University, I

made a comment about the

nebulous nature of the term

"weapons of mass destruction" or

WMDs. I suggested that our ability to

develop and evaluate distinct concepts and capabilities to counter

WMD threats was impaired by the

deliberate avoidance of using direct,

clear terms that address homeland

security requirements distinct from

warfighter requirements. People use

the term "WMD" when they are

clearly only interested in addressing

nuclear weapons, for instance. A

member of the audience waved me

off. "We know what we mean when

we say 'WMD,'" he said. At the break,

a man from the State Department

approached me. "Definitional clarity is

the beginning of all wisdom," he said.

Currently, we lack that definitional

clarity.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command

released a document outlining the

"Joint Operating Environment 2008"

in December 2008. This document

assures us that the "the threat of

mass destruction - from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons - will

likely expand from stable nationstates to less stable states and even

non-state networks." The Department of Defense (DOD) "Capstone

2

Concept on Joint Operations," released in January 2009, touches on

the need to address the threat of

WMDs in both conventional and irregular conflicts of the future. Two

imperatives that require implementation to allow the success of this concept include the need to:

• Improve knowledge of

and capabilities for nuclear

warfare and operations in

chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear environments.

• Renew emphasis on and

understanding of strategic deterrence, including nuclear deterrence.

The National Military Strategy to

Combat WMD parrots the National

Strategy to Combat WMD in its concept and terms. Both purport to identify a "nexus" between international

terrorist organizations and nationstate WMD programs, without clearly

defining the differences between

homeland security and warfighting

concepts. The Deterrence Operations

Joint Operational Concept (JOC) and

the Combating WMD Joint Integrating

Concept (JIC) discuss nuclear weapons and WMD issues (respectively),

but these concepts are stove piped

and not integrated into the mainstream of military operations and

strategy. The few joint publications

specifically addressing WMD issues

are, sadly, a mulligan's stew of tactically-focused tasks and procedures

from the four services, and are not

focused at the strategic level.

Throughout the Department, discussions of conventional or irregular warfare overinflate the threat of WMDs

on the modern battlefield and treat

the issue as a "special topic" - a

threat that needs to be considered,

but dealt with at the national strategy

level. Meanwhile, those responsible

to address this topic within the Office

of the Secretary of Defense studiously ignore WMD issues in light of

"other priorities."

There is no clearer example of this

doctrinal dyslexia than how combating WMD is portrayed in the Universal

Joint Task List. Consistently over the

past seven years, there has been no

visible, organized attempt to identify

the WMD tasks associated with combating terrorism and homeland defense/civil support tasks as distinct

from those faced by military forces

facing a nation-state adversary. Instead, they are all consolidated under

the topic of "combating WMD," which

primarily addresses the protection of

US military forces during conventional

operations. Instead of recognizing

that these are distinct concepts, it

became easier to just move all WMD

tasks into one basket. This threatbased approach to viewing complex,

strategic unconventional warfare

weakens our understanding of this

important topic. As a result, the military community has struggled - and

failed - to discuss and evaluate the

capabilities of nuclear deterrence and

combating WMD within defense policy, the defense budget, and overall

modernization requirements.

The issues of employing nuclear

weapons and protecting military

forces from WMDs are complex, but

this should not be an excuse to ignore them. In the "Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on

DOD Nuclear Weapons Management," Dr. James Schlesinger observed that DOD has not addressed

the capabilities required to execute

nuclear deterrence within the evolving

Joint Capability Area (JCA) structure.

3 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
The JCA framework is an ongoing

attempt to functionally group DOD

capabilities to support capability

analysis, strategy development, and

investment decision-making.

Schlesinger believed that the absence of a "Strategic Deterrence

JCA" at the top tier negatively impacts the Department's effectiveness

in addressing modernization of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems (specific aircraft and submarines).

Important national and DOD-level

documents refer to nuclear deterrence with varying degrees of clarity.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) states that the nuclear

deterrent will remain robust as a keystone of U.S. national power. Other

policy documents subsume nuclear

weapons in the terminology of kinetic

strike or WMD. All make reference to

nuclear deterrence but stress developing additional, nonnuclear capabilities to increase the number of options

available to the President. Most of the

documents deal with the strategic

aspects of force employment. This

results in deterrence capabilities being taken for granted. Recent history

has demonstrated that without adequate policy articulation and oversight

by the DOD, the military services will

not be motivated to sustain the nuclear deterrent—and will use the resources elsewhere.

As opposed to force employment capabilities, in recent years the military

has tended to discount the political

and psychological element of deterrence and focus exclusively on

whether there were sufficient weapons to threaten or attack a set of targets. Such a criterion, employed by

some in the military for deciding

whether a weapon system is

"militarily cost-effective," misses the

crucial point of whether the weapon

system can contribute to overall deterrence. This concept is important for

the deterrence umbrella, because

different capabilities provide different

levels of deterrence, assurance, or

dissuasion depending on the potential

adversary or ally and its individual

psychology. The same principle also

holds true for the dissuasion of adversaries and provides greater political

maneuverability to control escalation.

The creation of the recommended

Portfolio/JCA for deterrence and

fenced funding for nuclear capabilities

would help address these shortfalls in

the current process.

There are nine Tier 1 JCAs, 35

Tier 2 JCAs, and 116 Tier 3 JCAs in

4

the latest framework. The Department's intent is to manage the toplevel JCAs as vetting boards and

"capability portfolios" during requirements development, budget reviews,

and policy discussions. During past

reviews of the JCA taxonomy and

definitions, there was a discussion as

to whether the capability to "combat

WMD" ought to be identified as a discrete Tier 1 JCA. The combating

WMD advocates not only lost their

argument for a Tier 1 JCA, but also

the following proposal to see it as a

subordinate Tier 2 capability under

the Protection JCA. Instead, the eight

mission areas identified within the

National Military Strategy to Combat

WMD are addressed in three Tier 1

JCAs - offensive operations under

"Force Application;" threat reduction

cooperation and security cooperation

and partner activities under "Building

Partnerships;" and WMD interdiction,

WMD elimination, active defense,

passive defense, and consequence

management under "Protection." ° In

addition, the capabilities of situational

awareness of the presence and

movement of WMD technology and

material and WMD attribution are addressed under "Battlespace Aware-

,, 6

ness.

Similarly, strategic deterrence is

currently addressed by capabilities

identified under Force Application,

Building Partnerships, and Protection.

It may be true that the Department

has not actively addressed the elements of strategic deterrence under

the JCA taxonomy or developed a

modernization plan based upon the

new JCA taxonomy. However, the

Department has made the decision

that both strategic deterrence and

combating WMD, while important

concepts, are executed through the

application of particular capabilities

that also address conventional warfare concepts, rather than as a distinct, parallel capability area.

This is not necessarily a bad thing;

in fact, the decision ought to be applauded, from an academic point of

view. The military capabilities required to execute strategic deterrence

and combating WMD are not separate and unique from those currently

required to execute combat functions

during conventional and irregular operations. Whether the Joint Staff and

Services actually view and manage

strategic deterrence and combating

WMD functions appropriately is another story. The Protection Functional

Capability Board (FCB) - the groups

that meet to review and vet issues for

each Tier 1 JCA - reviews all combating WMD mission areas except for

offensive operations, which is handled by the Force Applications FCB.

The board does not distinguish homeland security capabilities or antiterrorism programs as distinct from those

required for military combat operations. As Dr. Schlesinger notes, there

is no clear pathway for strategic deterrence capabilities. The current JCA

taxonomy does not allow the Department to make serious reviews as to

aligning resources against required

capabilities to counter WMD.

Assessing Capabilities to Counter

WMD

Perhaps the greatest challenge in

assessing DOD capabilities to combat WMD or to effect strategic deterrence is the poor development of

these concepts in light of current operational and strategic concepts of

warfare. It is difficult to clearly articulate what military capabilities are required for combating WMD when its

"Joint Integrating Concept" is incoherent and too broadly based. Consider

that document's stated end, ways and

means to combat WMD:

• End: The United States, its

Armed Forces, allies, partners,

and interests are neither coerced nor attacked with WMD.

• Ways: The Joint Force

Commander (JFC), in support of

globally integrated Unified Action, will conduct a campaign to

proactively and comprehensively dissuade, defeat, deter, or

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 4
mitigate the rogue behavior of

multiple networks of state and

non-state actors. The JFC focuses the military campaign

against the decision-making

calculus of the WMD actor. The

JFC will influence this decisionmaking calculus through selective application of military capabilities against an expanded

operational environment to impose costs or deny benefits or

to influence the perception of

costs, benefits, and value of

restraint for any WMD-related

course of action.

• Means: Fully integrated US

Armed Forces capabilities linked

across components, echelons of

command, and elements of Unified Action and enabled by a

common and collaborative information environment.

Classic Pentagonese, for those

familiar with the language. One might

summarize the "ways" section by stating that US military forces will seek to

compel adversaries not to use WMDs

by all available means. The Joint Integrating Concept elaborates upon the

"ways" section by identifying four military strategic objectives, which in turn

lead to the eight combating WMD

mission areas. This construct allows

the Department to then identify and

analyze discrete tasks necessary to

accomplish the missions, and correspondingly, the capability gaps that

exist. But the major challenges with

this concept remain:

• Equating nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical

weapons as equal threats under

the term "WMD."

• Viewing general terrorist

capabilities to use CBRN hazards in discrete, small-scale

events as equivalent to those of

nation-states with large WMD

programs.

• No clear distinction between capabilities required to

protect military forces during war

and capabilities required to support anti-terrorism programs that

protect noncombatants and military installations.

Faulty assumptions of the current

and future WMD threat; to wit:

* That state pursuit of WMD

will continue and the number of WMD-capable states

opposed to US interests will

grow (they have actually

declined over the past three

decades).

* That state support of terrorists' pursuit of WMDs will

continue (no such activity

by any distinct group has

actually been noted or reported).

* That those terrorists

"inclined towards rogue behavior" will be more capable

of pursuing WMDs without

state sponsorship (pursuit

should not be equated to

achieving a capability to

cause mass casualties).

When the DOD Counterproliferation Initiative was developed in the

mid-1990s, it was focused on the

threat of adversarial nations lacking

nuclear weapons but having an offensive CB weapons program. This concept, which evolved into the National

Strategy to Combat WMD, was fundamentally altered in 2000-2001 to

remove consequence management

as a subordinate capability to counterproliferation and to become an

equal "pillar" with nonproliferation and

counterproliferation. The strategy

viewed nuclear weapons, either in the

hands of terrorists or nation-states, as

the most challenging threat, but used

the term "WMD" as its default expression. This was a purposeful act, designed to develop a single national

strategy that addressed both homeland security response to potential

terrorist CBRN incidents and military

operations against nation-state WMD

programs. The National Military Strategy developed later, purported to address homeland security, but to a

large extent, it remained a modification of Cold War proliferation theory

for use against nation-states, rather

than one designed to plan for and

respond to domestic WMD terrorism.

Because of this ambiguity in the

National Military Strategy, material

projects developed to address the

armed forces' requirements are competing with those projects designed

for homeland security functions (e.g.,

chemical and biological detectors

designed for combat operations and

the equipment used by the WMD Civil

Support Teams). Proposed concepts

for combating terrorist WMD efforts,

such as improving information, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to identify the flow of WMD

materials and technologies, are confused with pandemic flu surveillance

concepts. The deliberate ambiguity in

the national strategy, with its focus on

a specific threat, has weakened the

Department's ability to develop focused capabilities to counter WMD

threats.

To correct this ambiguity, the Department should immediately pull references to "non-state actor pursuit of

WMDs" and "enabling WMD networks" from its strategy and concepts

and make it clear that the current National Military Strategy addresses the

protection of its armed forces from

nation-state unconventional weapon

programs. There is no evidence of

the collaboration of terrorist groups

and "rogue nations" to exploit WMD

capabilities, and it is unclear whether

there are "networks" to attack as the

means to defeat them. The counterterrorist community needs to address

the threat of terrorists seeking CBRN

hazards, just as it addresses the general threat of all terrorist activities.

The Department needs capabilitybased concepts and tools, not strategies that address specific tactics and

weapons.

Similarly, the Department's efforts

to address WMD threats within the

scope of homeland defense and civil

support ought to be clearly segregated as a distinct threat from nationstate forces poised to attack military

forces. While the technical aspects of

CBRN hazards and WMDs are similar, the targeted audiences are different, the desired level of risk to the

responders is far different, and DOD

forces are acting in support to other

federal agencies or governments

rather than as lead agents. The De5 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
Table 1. Capability Framework for Protection Addressing Conventional Threats, WMD Threats and Homeland Security

Missions.

Tier 2

Tier 3

CounterproliferationCombating

Terrorism

Homeland Security

(DOD Aspects)

Prevent and Defeat Significant Threats

WMD

Interdiction

Antiterrorism -

Physical Security

Homeland Defense

- Threat

Awareness

Detect Threats Prior to Employment

Control Access to Critical Areas

Investigate and Intercept Threats

Seize Materials and Defeat Weapons

Protect Individuals, Systems, and Facilities

Active & Passive Defense

Antiterrorism -

Resource

Application

Critical Infrastructure Protection

(DOD)

Assess Infrastructure & Assets

Implement Protective Measures for

Critical Facilities

Mitigate Risk to Individuals and

Systems

Provide Threat Information to Leaders

Provide Force Health Protection

Respond to the Incident/Accident

Battlefield

Consequence

Management

Domestic/Foreign

Consequence

Management

Civil Support

Assess the Hazard and Understand

the Consequences

Provide Hazard Info to Leaders

Minimize Hazard to Individuals

Manage Casualties

Support Initial Federal Response to

the Incident/Accident

Recover Fully from the Incident/Accident

WMD

Elimination

Humanitarian

Assistance/

Disaster Relief

Emergency

Preparedness

Provide Impact Analysis

Reconstitute the Infrastructure

Restore the Environment

Dispose of Hazardous Materials

partment should not confuse the need

to protect military personnel from

WMD effects during high-risk combat

operations with the much more challenging requirement of responding to

a terrorist CBRN incident to protect

noncombatants within the United

States.

The Problem with Protection

The JCA taxonomy is not the easiest thing to understand. Basic military

capabilities for the Army used to be

as simple as "shoot, move, and communicate." Because the JCA taxonomy is designed to link common capability requirements, defense policy,

and budget strategies together, it has

gotten more complicated. "Force Application," while retaining two simple

subtasks - move and engage - is

detailed down to more than 80 subtier capabilities. That may be due to

the parochial concerns of the four

services when it comes to the understandably important area of offensive

capabilities designed for a future battlefield. Various communication capabilities can be found in "Battlespace

Awareness," "Net-Centric" operations,

and "Command and Control." Combat

support services can be found in

"Logistics" and "Force Support" capability areas. The goals of "Building

Partnerships" and "Corporate Management" are not hard combat capabilities, but reflect desired DOD capabilities necessary to execute the Department's missions. And then there

is "Protection."

The Protection JCA is broken into

two aspects - preventing attacks and

g

mitigating effects. Under the prevention capability, the goal is to defeat kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that are delivered from the air

and space, from the earth's surface

(ground or sea), and from below the

surface (underground or under the

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 6
Marines don chemical gear at a range in the Middle East.

USMC Photo by Cpl. Jeremy Ross 12

sea). Under the mitigate capability,

the goal is to minimize the impact of

lethal and non-lethal threats, to include chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, electromagnetic pulse

(distinct from nuclear weapons effects), explosives, projectiles, directed energy, and natural hazards.

This is the only JCA in which the underlying tiers are threat-based rather

than capability-based actions. That

bears repeating - directly contrary to

the original philosophy of the JCA

framework, the underlying concept of

the Department's Protection JCA is

threat-based.

In addition to articulating threatbased requirements, the Protection

JCA is poorly designed to address

the gamut of capabilities required for

force protection (anti-terrorism) and

homeland security. Certainly there is

more to homeland defense and civil

support than "preventing" and

"mitigating." This framework is entirely too simplistic and focused on

traditional combat operations, and

does not address the full spectrum of

DOD force protection requirements.

For instance, the JCA does not include force health protection, the capability to "sustain and protect the

health" of military service members.

Force health protection is included

under "Force Support" with other

medical capabilities. Similarly, general engineering, required to "modify,

maintain, or protect the physical environment" is under the Logistics JCA

instead of Protection. Combat engineering, required to support land

combat maneuvers by defeating hazards and enhancing survivability, is

not under Force Support or Protection, but is also in Logistics. One sees

here a selective application of individual agendas by specific communities

for convenience rather than by derived logic.

The Joint Staff and Services have

been intellectually lazy in this area.

There is another model for Protection,

readily available, found in the Department of Homeland Security's mission

area analysis. The overall mission of

"Secure the Homeland" is supported

by four missions: Prevent, Protect,

Respond, and Recover. Using the

framework within this document, and

ignoring the Joint Staff's rule that a

sub-tier cannot use the same words

as in the Tier 1 title, one can develop

a capability-based framework for Protection that addresses conventional

threats, WMD threats, and homeland

security missions (see table 1).

This is by no means an exhaustive

list, but it is an illustrative example of

how the Protection JCA could be

modified to become a capabilitybased framework that accurately addresses the mission areas within

counterproliferation, combating terrorism, and homeland security. At the

same time, the Building Partnerships

JCA must take on the burden of identifying and assessing nonproliferation

activities, to include security cooperative agreements and threat reduction

programs. These activities are in line

with the responsibilities of that JCA,

and they should not be abrogated to

the Protection JCA merely out of convenience or attempts to bundle all

combating WMD mission areas under

one umbrella.

Fundamentally, the Department

needs to reassess how it has developed the concepts of strategic nuclear deterrence, combating WMD,

and combating terrorist WMD. The

2002 National Strategy to Combat

WMD is not a valid approach for today's WMD challenges, as it was

based on faulty assumptions to begin

with. The Department needs a grand

strategy that addresses how the

armed forces, in coordination with

other federal agencies, counter WMD

activities to ensure the ability of its

military forces to move, shoot, and

communicate unhindered by nationstate use of WMDs. This counter

WMD strategy should be viewed as a

three-legged stool, requiring strategic

deterrence, nonproliferation, and

counterproliferation for optimal stability. Another key aspect is the return of

consequence management

(specifically addressing military installations and facilities attacked by nation-states with WMD capabilities) as

a subordinate element to counterproliferation. Similarly, we should use the

term "defense support to civil authorities" or civil support when referring to

the DOD support to the overall federal response to domestic catastrophic disasters and incidents. Continuing to define "WMD" or "CBRNE" consequence management as if it were

distinct from all other incident management is ridiculous and selfdefeating.

The homeland security and combating terrorism communities should

address the possibility of terrorist

CBRN incidents under an all-hazards

approach, integrating all federal activities addressing the response to a

terrorist CBRN incident under the

7 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
National Response Framework. Even

given the unlikely (and unproven)

scenario of a terrorist organization

accepting WMD materials or technology from a nation-state, it is unlikely

that the resulting incident will even

come close to the descriptions of

mass casualty events so clearly illustrated in the worst-case scenarios.

The key to successfully implementing

these strategies is the ability to develop accurate and timely threat assessments that both identify terrorist

capabilities and motivations and the

location and activities of nation-state

experts and production facilities associated with WMD programs.

The Department needs to consider

how strategic deterrence will be incorporated into the JCA framework.

Given the past series of events in

regards to Air Force nuclear security

and operations, this review is urgently

needed. As a starting point, it might

be suggested that capabilities under

Force Support, Battlespace Awareness, Force Application, and Building

Partnerships be examined as fundamental components of strategic deterrence.

Conclusions

Current and past documents

throughout DOD assure us that

WMDs remain one of the gravest

threats to our armed forces and to

American civilians in the homeland.

And yet it cannot be said that those

responsible for developing defense

strategies and concepts for strategic

deterrence have been very successful in maintaining that very critical

capability. The Department has not

designed a strategic deterrence concept for the post-Cold War.

We do have distinct concepts and

cost-effective capabilities for protecting military forces on the battlefield,

but they are not interchangeable with

the mission of protecting noncombatants. The antiterrorism programs for

US military installations and facilities

still lack sustainable and effective

CBRN defense equipment, despite

the development of a specific concept

of operations for that capability in

2004. Our homeland defense and

civil support programs addressing the

terrorist WMD threat have been developed in an ad hoc and stove piped

fashion. The common thread among

these challenges is the inability to

conceptualize the capabilities required for countering WMD.

The DHS mission areas of Prevent, Protect, Respond, and Recover,

with some minor modifications in the

sub-tiers of those missions, offer a

potential avenue for relief. By developing a construct of tiered capabilities

under the Protection JCA that equally

address counterproliferation, combating terrorism, and homeland security,

the Department can - for the first time

- have a distinct set of tools to examine common needs for protection

against WMD threats while retaining

necessary characteristics unique to

each concept. However, the Department must also take the additional

step of directing the Building Partnerships JCA to take charge of the nonproliferation mission areas, and perhaps aspects of consequence management and WMD interdiction, since

those mission areas also require partnerships to succeed.

:.>

•-

Al Mauroni is a senior defense consultant working in the Washington DC

metro area. A former Chemical Corps

officer, he has more than twenty

years experience in DOD chemicalbiological defense programs and policy issues. He has published numerous articles and six books on the

topic, the latest of which is "Where

Are the WMDs?" by Naval Institute

Press, 2006.

ENDNOTES

1 JFCOM, "Joint Operating Environment 2008", December 2008, available at http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/

storyarchive/2008/JOE2008.pdf.

2 DOD, "Capstone Concept for Joint

Operations, Version 3.0," January

2009, available at http://

www.jcs.mil/090115CAPSTONEConc

eptJointOps.pdf.

3 DOD, "Report of the Secretary of

Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear

Weapons Management," December

2008, pp. 25-28. Available at http://

www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/

PhasellReportFinal.pdf.

4 Based on the JCA Framework

dated January 12, 2009, available at

http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/

strategic/jca_framework.xls

5 The breakout of combating WMD

mission areas among respective

JCAs was based upon an independent review of the defense issues identified within the 2008 Guidance for the

Development of the Force document.

6 Situational awareness and WMD

attribution are not mission areas but

are identified capabilities under the

combating WMD concept.

7 Author's personal observation

while working in the J5 Strategy and

Policy directorate, Joint Chiefs of

Staff.

8 This statement was made at a

briefing by a Defense Science Board

member at a U.S. Strategic Command conference in November 2005

in reference to its 2005 Summer

Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to

Weapons of Mass Destruction, which

was released in 2007.

9 OSD made the decision to place

the Tier 2 area "Research and Development" in Protection, not because it

belonged there, but because it didn't

want that area to be under Corporate

Management. For the sake of this

argument, this paper ignores this recent and hopefully reversible decision.

10 Interestingly, the JCA definitions

describe chemical, biological, and

radiological hazards as "non-kinetic

weapons," although they are often

delivered by kinetically-based

weapon systems.

11 Homeland Security Institute,

"Homeland Security Strategic Planning: Mission Area Analysis," Arlington, VA, March 28, 2007. Available at

http://www.homelandsecurity.org/

hsireports/

MAAReportFinal28Mar07public.pdf.

12. www.defendamerica.mil/

photoessays

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 8
Just When We Thought the Hard Part Was Over

LTC Andrae Brooks

U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

Lawrence E. Boing

Special Projects Manager,

Nuclear Engineering Division, Argonne National Laboratory

Having recently become a

FA52 at the ripe old age of 41

and the rank of LTC, I find

the list of potential CBRN related issues and functional work to be somewhat overwhelming, yet fascinating. I

agree that the crossover or "nexus" of

CBRN and radicalism is in fact a

daunting task to imagine, prepare for,

and ultimately prevent. However,

what I find as equally critical, the vast

FA52 job opportunities that require an

experienced officer that is well versed

and yet understands the full breadth

of what exactly "CBRN" really entails

these days.

In addition to the core engineering

science and fundamentals of the nuclear genre, the abstract CBRN related issues such as radiation and

health physics, safety, environmental

regulation, national defense, energy,

capability design and survivability,

intelligence interpretation, biological

and chemical surety, international

treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Conventions, NATO and ABCA,

and even CBRN modeling and simulation (just to name a few) are all potential FA52 minefields that must be

negotiated. We'll save the equally

daunting laundry list of supporting

CBRN agencies, organizations, departments, and centers for a follow-on

article.

The point is: Combating Weapons

of Mass Destruction and FA52 requirements are changing rapidly.

Now, more than ever, FA52s must

grasp the concept that CBRN includes so much more than the Cold

War, Air Land Battle, and nuclear

Mutual Assured Destruction. Ironically, these were the good old days.

As such, it is now truly essential that

all FA52s seize every training opportunity that will enhance the CBRN tool

bag of experience and broaden the

subject matter expertise of the officer

in terms of CBRN.

As just one example of some new

experienced based training that is

available and an excellent educational opportunity for FA52s, Argonne

National Laboratory (ANL) has developed a new training course for facility

Decontamination and Decommissioning, or D&D. As a chemical officer I

didn't even know there was a reactor

in the DoD, yet alone on Aberdeen

Proving Ground, Maryland. Now I

find myself involved in and supporting

the D&D project as a member of the

technical support working group that

will coordinate the shipment and disposal of low level radioactive waste!

The Aberdeen Pulse Radiation Facility (APRF) research and test reactor

was built in 1967 to serve the needs

of the DoD, other U.S. Government

agencies, and NATO in order to

evaluate nuclear effects of both neutron and gamma radiation and permanently ceased all reactor operation in

December of 2003 (Decommissioning

Plan, Army Pulse Radiation Facility,

Aberdeen Test Center, Revision 2,

March 2008). The D&D for the APRF

commenced in early summer 2009

with an estimated completion date of

December 2009. Planning is underway and I am excited about learning

the process, and providing some enA 3

.. All k

•JO ^

Removing a Heat a Exchanger

vironmental assistance to the project

leadership.

Initially, I attended the ANL D&D

Training Course as a preparation activity and I found it to be well worth

the time and cost. The lecturers were

very knowledgeable and willing to

answer questions openly and address

attendee issues individually. Topics

such as excavation tactics, techniques, and procedures, soil sampling

(both environmental and radiation

sampling and monitoring), D&D steps

and procedures, historical

(experience based) lessons learned,

planning, safety, and overall project

management were invaluable.

ANL has now (effective officially 1

April 2009) teamed up with ORAU

(Oak Ridge Associated Universities)

and established a Decommissioning

Certification Program (DCP). Addi9 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
Cleaning up contaminated facilities at the Laboratory that are surplus to

operational needs.

tional information and requirements

on the DCP include:

DCP General Requirements:

• Program opens for Registration Annually.

• Participants are required to

attend two core/requisite

training courses with one additional elective preferably

within a 24 month period (not

mandatory to the timeframe,

but suggested)

• Upon completion of the 3

training courses and verification by the ORAL) program

coordinators, the individual

will be issued the Decommissioning Certificate.

ORAL) will maintain a database of the

Database of Certificate issued for the

record.

Important Note: Any of the training

courses can be taken separately outside of the DCP if desired by the participant.

DCP Participation:

• Open to any interested participant - foreign or domestic.

• Technical background or

other degrees or educational

background is highly encouraged, useful, and recommended.

• Fees are inclusive for the

training course with any additional administrative expenses.

DCP Requisite Courses:

• Facility Decommissioning

(ANL)

http:www.dd.anl.gov/

ddtraining/index.html

• MARSSIM (Multi-Agency

Radiation Survey and Site

Investigation Manual)

http://www.orau.org/

busops/ivhp/healthphysics/marssimcourse.htm

DCP Elective Training Courses:

• Any of the RESRAD Workshops (ANL)

• Site Characterization

Course (ORAL))

• Gamma Spectroscopy Course

(ORAU)

Note: Additional Information on the

Program, Upcoming Events, and

Points of Contact can be found at:

http://www.dd.anl.gov/ddtraining/

certificate_program.html

http://www.dd.anl.gov/ddtraining/

certificate_program.html

In closing, this article is in no way

meant to be an advertisement for Argonne or ORAU, rather as information to be used for the FA52 community. The new Decommissioning Certification Program is an excellent additional "spanner" in the CBRN tool

bag and serve as a reminder of just

how broad and diverse the CBRN

challenge can be for a junior FA52

Officer.

I

LTC Andrae Brooks is the Chemical

Officer in the CWMD Analysis Branch

at USANCA, in Springfield, VA. He

has a B.S. in Geology from University

of Kentucky, and a M.S. in Environmental Engineering from Colorado

School of Mines. He was previously

assigned as the Corps Chemical Officer with Headquarters, Allied Rapid

Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), in the

Joint HQ, Rheindahlen, Germany.

His email address is

andrae.brooks@us. army. mil.

Lawrence E. Boing is a graduate of

Purdue University . He manages the

Special Projects within the Nuclear

Engineering Division of Argonne National Laboratory. Manages various

decommissioning areas focusing on:

international decommissioning activities, technical assistance/oversight in

niche areas of decommissioning,

supporting technical information exchange and training courses on various decommissioning and related

technical topics for the past 29 years.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 10
Toward a New Deterrent

Analysis and Recommendations for the Commission on

the Strategic Posture of the United States

By the New Deterrent Working Group

Introduction by VADM Robert R. Monroe, USN, Retired

1

Iff', .n. • . . T[|e pKl|eil,0,u| JounlJ, tl( |k. U|mt.j Sltm A|| Fc„(t.

ntroduction

America's nuclear deterrent,

which has kept us safe for over 60

years, is in grave danger of failing.

Our nuclear strategy-still that of the

Cold War-has little relevance to today's principal adversaries and

threats. The nuclear weapons that

make up our stockpile are also virtually irrelevant and well beyond the

end of their design life. Our experienced personnel are retiring, and our

nuclear facilities are antique and deteriorated.

Secretary of Defense Robert

Gates recently stated that "no one

has designed a new nuclear weapon

in the United States since the 1980s,

and no one has built a new one since

the early 1990s. ... The United

States is the only declared nuclear

power that is neither modernizing its

nuclear arsenal nor has the capability

to produce a new nuclear warhead."1

To make matters worse, if we start a

modernization program immediately,

pursue it vigorously, and resume essential underground testing, it will still

take about two decades before we

could begin replacing our stockpile.

Thus, the relevant issue is not

whether our nuclear deterrent is safe,

secure, and reliable today, but what

actions we must take today to ensure

its effectiveness in 20 years, in an

uncertain and dangerous world.

After years of denying funding for

nuclear initiatives, Congress last year

created a 12-person Congressional

Commission on the Strategic Posture

of the United States, chaired by Bill

Perry, former secretary of defense,

TRADITIONAL

NUCLEAR TRIAD

ICBMs

NEW TRIAD

Nuclear & Non

Nuclear

Strike Capabilities

Transition

Bombers SLBMs

Active & Passive

Defenses

Responsive

Defense

Infrastructure

Transition of the Traditional Nuclear TRIAD to New Triad.

and co chaired by Jim Schlesinger,

former secretary of defense, secretary of energy, and director of central

intelligence. The commission started

work in summer 2008, delivered an

interim report in December 2008, and

will submit a final report in spring

2009.

Quite separately, in early 2008 the

New Deterrent Working Group, an

informal coalition of experts in national security and nuclear weapons,

sponsored by the Center for Security

Policy, became concerned that the

commission would have only two

"nuclear programs" to consider: one

the unannounced "nuclear freeze" the

United States has followed during the

18 years since the Cold War ended,

and the other the "world without nuclear weapons" initiative recommended by Perry, George Shultz,

Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn for

the past two years. Both programs

would lead to unilateral nuclear disarmament by the United States-the first

unintentionally, the second intentionally. To outline a third program, that

of a strong nuclear deterrent, the

working group prepared the following

remarks and provided them to the

commission in the summer of 2008.

America's Failing Nuclear

Deterrent

The United States is at a critical

moment in its history. To an extent

largely unknown to the American people and even to many US policy makers, the nuclear deterrent that has

served as the backbone of our defense posture for 50 years is becoming obsolete, unreliable, and poten11 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
Photo: Department of Defense

tially ineffective. This is the direct and

predictable result of the practice of

essentially "freezing" our nuclearweapons strategy and stockpile over

the past 18 years since the end of the

Cold War.

Unfortunately, we may freeze

weapons policies and modernization

programs, but our doing so does not

preclude changes to the arsenal itself. To the contrary, such a nuclear

freeze serves to ensure that the combined effects of aging and changing

strategic circumstances go unaddressed, resulting in an inexorable

reduction in capability and relevance

to the nation's deterrent requirements. We have even refrained from

making much-needed improvements

to the stockpile's safety, security, and

control rather than undertaking new

designs that we could validate only by

underground testing.

The problem is not confined to the

weapons themselves. At the nuclear

labs and plants operated by the National Nuclear Security Administration, the human and physical infrastructure essential to our deterrent is

in real jeopardy. There is virtually no

one left in that once-great industrial

enterprise who has ever designed,

tested, or produced a nuclear

weapon.

Meanwhile, the Defense Department has downgraded the importance

and value of nuclear weapons across

the board. The investigation that followed a recent, unauthorized B-52

flight with six full-up nuclear weapons

revealed a widespread lack of focused military attention to nuclear

procedures and policy.2In short,

America is years late in transforming

its nuclear strategy and stockpile from

a Cold War orientation to one focused

on today's adversaries-as well as tomorrow's-and to the different and far

more distributed threats they represent.

The Nuclear Threats We Face

While America has largely neglected its nuclear arsenal and associated weapons complex for nearly

two decades, others have taken a

very different approach. Notably,

Russia and China are making significant investments in the modernization

of their nuclear forces. We have reason to believe that some of these will

involve highly advanced, specializedeffects nuclear weapons (known as

"fourth generation" weapons).

In addition, nuclear-weapons technology has proliferated of late to a

number of rogue states. There is reason to fear that one or more of these

nations may be willing to help terrorist

organizations acquire nuclear weapons-and perhaps use them. In short,

more states today have active (if, in

some cases, still-covert) nuclearweapons programs than ever before.

Apart from the United States, virtually

all of these countries-comprising

roughly half the world's populationare working to enhance their nuclear

capabilities.

Like it or not, tens of thousands of

nuclear arms exist around the world,

and neither they nor the know-how

and capability to make them are going to disappear. Knowledge, once

gained, cannot be washed away by

treaties-let alone by unilateral US

nuclear disarmament. For generations to come, our lives and civilization will depend on effectively countering these threats.

The Failure of Nonproliferation

The accelerating proliferation of

nuclear-weapons technology in

places like Pakistan, North Korea,

Iran, and Syria represents an indictment of the effort to prevent such a

danger via arms control. The global

nonproliferation regime has been

steadily declining for many years, and

it has now reached the point of impotence. The last Nonproliferation

Treaty Review Conference, five years

in preparation, achieved nothing.

Non-nuclear-weapon states that have

signed the treaty increasingly flout

their international obligations by pursuing clandestine weapons programs

under the guise of civilian power activities.

The success of such rogue states

threatens to trigger regional proliferation cascades, which could soon become global. Some of our allies and

friends who formerly relied on the US

"nuclear umbrella" for protection

could feel constrained to join these

proliferators, in part as a result of

their loss of confidence in our outdated arsenal and our ability and will

to use it. This cascade might well

lead to a world characterized by frequent use of nuclear weapons, from

which there is no return.

To avoid such a frightening prospect, the United States must both

eliminate questions about the credibility of its deterrent and adopt a more

effective approach to nonproliferation.

If we are to have any chance of fulfilling these two roles and averting an

unimaginably dangerous world, we

must change our policies and programs significantly.

A Program for Recovery

America must reestablish the posture of nuclear strength that saved

the West-and the world-during the

half-century-long Cold War. During

those decades, our nuclear posture

was also the key factor in preventing

renewed outbreaks of global conventional wars and the terrible costs they

entail. To provide a similar insurance

policy for the future, we must undertake at a minimum the following eight

critical steps:

• Immediate Actions

As a matter of great urgency, two

initiatives are in order: First, the president must issue a clear, firm statement to the effect that a credible,

safe, secure, and reliable nuclear

deterrent is essential to America's

security and that we will maintain it

with highest priority.

Second, we must reestablish the

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 12
U.S. Air Force ICBM undergoing routine maintenance.

Photo: Tech. Sgt. Bob Wickley

Reliable Replacement Warhead as a

vital program in order to prevent the

loss of core nuclear-weapon capabilities in the National Nuclear Security

Administration's labs and plants, and

to provide the optimum replacement

approach for those overage weapons

in our stockpile that we will need for

decades to come. This warhead provides our only current opportunity to

recapture the experienced, integrated

management expertise necessary to

guide new nuclear weapons from

concept definition to service introduction. Without it, this invaluable capability, for all intents and purposes, will

be lost.

• National Debate

The issue of deterring nuclear attack, despite its potentially existential

importance to millions of Americans,

has scarcely-if ever-been rigorously

discussed in a highly visible way

since the Cold War ended. If the

United States wishes to maintain an

effective nuclear deterrent, it will need

a strong consensus, reflected in solid

bipartisan majorities, sustainable over

the decades required to implement

that program. We can assure such

majorities only by informing the

American people and enlisting their

support.

Toward that end, we must initiate

a thoughtful national debate on (1)

the nature of deterrence in this new

age, (2) its role in US foreign policy

and national security strategy, (3) the

role of nuclear weapons in this strategy, and (4) the characteristics and

approximate numbers of nuclear

weapons needed to provide effective

deterrence today and in the future.

• Advanced Technology

We must reestablish a continuing,

robust research, development, test,

and evaluation program. Currently,

we should focus on cutting-edge

technology in research, exploratory

development, and accelerated development across dozens of fields relevant to advanced designs for nuclear

weapons.

This scientific approach is absolutely essential if the United States

desires to understand the possibilities

-for us and for potential adversariesin physics, weapons effects, materials, explosives, diagnostics, and so

forth. Verifiable evidence indicates

that our peer adversaries are working

very hard to develop new and more

usable systems in order to exert leverage over the United States and further their strategic interests. If we

allow them to continue unchallenged,

we may lose our world leadership

position. At the very least, without a

corresponding US research and development effort, America's deterrent

cannot possibly remain commensurate with the emerging nuclear threat.

• Military Preparedness

The Defense Department must

recommit to the need to maintain, for

the foreseeable future, both an appropriate nuclear arsenal and the com13 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
petencies necessary to field and exercise it. Doing so will entail preserving America's existing nuclearweapons platforms and capabilities

as well as planning, budgeting, and

performing the long-range actions

needed to contend with an uncertain

nuclear future.

Specifically, the armed services must

take the following steps:

1. Establish military requirements

for new nuclear weapons that will

credibly deter current and future adversaries and threats. These counterproliferation weapons should have

low yield, great accuracy, and intrinsic security features to prevent unauthorized use. They must also produce

reduced collateral damage and minimal residual radiation yet destroy

deep underground bunkers as well as

neutralize biological and chemical

agents.

2. Plan, program, and budget for

follow-on strategic submarines, seaand land-based intercontinentalrange ballistic missiles, bombers,

cruise missiles, and so forth.

3. Increase emphasis on nuclearspecialist personnel, nuclear strategy

and tactics, and nuclear exercises.

4. Work as a closely integrated

team with the Department of Energy

and the National Nuclear Security

Administration to revitalize and transform our nuclear-weapons infrastructure. In addition, the military's insights

and expertise will prove vital to informing the aforementioned national

debate.

• New Nuclear Weapons

We must adopt anew a national

commitment to design, test, and produce, on a continuing basis, new nuclear weapons. We can maintain expertise in these "performance arts"

only by engaging in them. Simply put,

the extreme complexity and hazards

of the work are such that there is no

substitute for competent, integrated

management, which, in turn, requires

continuing, hands-on experience.

Although the throughput in terms of

numbers of weapons may amount to

tens per year (rather than the hundreds routinely in the pipeline at the

height of the Cold War years), we can

realize no credible deterrent over time

without an active pipeline that includes a "hot" production line.

• Nuclear Infrastructure

The United States must immediately commence the comprehensive

modernization of its nuclear-weapons

infrastructure. We have debated the

measures necessary to do so for

years and have proposed plan after

plan. We have done little, however.

Meanwhile, our facilities become ever

-more antiquated, dilapidated, and

unsafe. We most urgently need a

modern fabrication facility for the

"pits," the heart of a warhead, with

adequate flexibility to produce several

designs simultaneously and a

throughput capacity sufficient to permit replacement of the stockpile's

obsolescent weapons at an acceptable rate.

• Effects of Nuclear Weapons

We must revitalize the Pentagon's

national research and development

program for examining the effects of

nuclear weapons. The survivability of

American weapons systems

(conventional and nuclear); our command, control, communications, and

computer systems; and our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems against a wide range

of nuclear-weapons effects depends

on our successfully hardening and

testing these systems. Good design

and simulator testing can help, but

actual underground nuclear testing is

essential in order to assure survivability. Such test and evaluation is also

indispensable for assessing and correcting the vulnerabilities of critical

parts of the country's civil infrastructure against such threats as electromagnetic pulse.

• Prevention of Proliferation

Finally, America must undertake a

sweeping course correction with respect to countering nuclear proliferation. Full effectiveness, of course,

demands changes in the world's approach to nonproliferation-not just this

country's. Still, any improvement in

the utility of global efforts to prevent

the spread of nuclear-weapons technology and capabilities remains

unlikely unless and until the United

States adopts a more practical strategy for contending with this threat.

Over the last several decades, the

Nonproliferation Treaty has been distorted by the preoccupation of its

stewards with promoting nuclear disarmament rather than with preventing

proliferation. Apart from the steady

erosion of the US arsenal, this fixation has neither resulted in the appreciable diminution of existing inventories of nuclear weapons around the

world nor prevented a mushrooming

of proliferation to other states.

With some 188 signatories (out of

about 193 nations in the world), the

40-year-old Nonproliferation Treaty,

the accepted cornerstone of the

global nonproliferation regime, provides the basis for our efforts. If we

wish the treaty actually to prove helpful, however, we must refocus attention and effort on its actual language

and intent.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty's purpose is to prevent proliferation, codifying the right of five nations-the permanent members of the

United Nations Security Council-to be

nuclear-weapons states and requiring

all other signatories to remain nonnuclear-weapons states. Each of the

188 signatory states has voluntarily

accepted this inequality and endorsed

a treaty that places no restrictions

whatsoever on the five nuclearweapons states as regards designing,

testing, producing, and deploying nuclear weapons.

Given the aforementioned hard

strategic realities, the United States

should redirect its nonproliferation

policy along the following lines: (1)

emphasize that nonproliferation requires enforcement; (2) urge that the

five nuclear-weapons states accept

this implicit responsibility; (3) until all

five agree, be willing to act unilaterally, or in coalition, as a default action

to prevent proliferation; and (4) regularly modernize our stockpile to keep

it effective, safe, secure, reliable, and

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 14
Without these actions, the remnants

of global nonproliferation will inevitably become ever-more irrelevant and

ineffectual.

America's Choice:

Weakness or Strength?

In conclusion, the nation must decide between weakness and strength

now. Adopting the former by continuing the 18-year-long post-Cold War

status quo can only lead to dangerous, unilateral US nuclear disarmament. We would be ill advised to

adopt the agenda for accelerated dismantling of our nuclear arsenal now

promoted as a way to "reinvigorate"

the moribund nonproliferation regime.

Champions of the latter idea propose,

among other things, that we (1) cut

our nuclear stockpile below its already vastly reduced level, (2) commit irrevocably (by treaty) to forgo

necessary testing, and (3) refrain

from all essential nuclear modernization or replacement activities. They

believe that doing so will cause our

adversaries to reduce their arsenals

and motivate the entire world eventually to abandon nuclear weapons.3

Regrettably, there is no basis in

past experience or in logic for these

lofty hopes. To the contrary, history

has clearly shown that unilateral US

reductions, far from causing a similar

response, actually stimulate nuclear

buildups by adversaries. Second, as

a practical matter, it would be impossible to verify the elimination of all

nuclear weapons. Third, reduced

numbers encourage first strikes designed to disarm. Fourth, and most

importantly, the ultimate goal of a

world without nuclear arms is not only

unachievable but also a Utopian delusion. Nuclear weapons cannot be

"uninvented." Pursuit of such a goal

by the United States would constitute

a formula for the further evisceration

of America's deterrent and for a world

in which only the most dangerous

states and perhaps nonstate actors

have these weapons-a world of unimaginable horror and chaos.

For these reasons, the United

States has no real choice other than

adopt a policy of peace through abiding nuclear strength. The foregoing

eight measures will assure that such

strength continues far into the future

and, with it, will enhance the prospects for a world free of either nuclear

war or global conventional conflagrations.

The New Deterrent Working Group

-an informal coalition of experts in

national security and nuclear weapons, sponsored by the Center for Security Policy-seeks to inform lawmakers and the public about the need for

the United States to maintain a credible and an effective nuclear deterrent.

VADM Robert R. Monroe, USN, Retired (BS, US Naval Academy; MA,

Stanford University), is a selfemployed national security consultant. Admiral Monroe enlisted in the

Navy during World War II, and in

1946 he entered the Naval Academy

from the fleet. Commissioned in

1950, he served in destroyers, minesweepers, cruisers, and amphibious

assault ships, including three commands at sea. He subsequently

served in flag rank for 11 years, including (as vice admiral) positions as

director of the Defense Nuclear

Agency and director of Navy Research, Development, Test, and

Evaluation. His Navy career spanned

the Cold War as well as the Korean

and Vietnam conflicts. Retiring from

the Navy after 38 years, he joined

Bechtel, a large, worldwide, hightechnology engineering, construction,

and management firm, serving successively as business line manager,

vice president, senior vice president,

partner, and senior counselor for 22

years. He currently serves or has recently served as a member of numerous advisory boards for the Department of Defense, Department of

State, Department of Energy, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and other government and

private organizations. Admiral Monroe frequently authors papers on nuclear-weapons issues.

ENDNOTES

1. Secretary of Defense Robert M.

Gates (speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,

Washington, DC, 28 October 2008),

http://www.defenselink .mil/speeches/

speech.aspx?speechid=1305.

2. See Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear

Weapons Surety, Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear

Weapons (Washington, DC: Office of

the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2008).

3. George P. Schultz et al., "Toward a

Nuclear-Free World," Wall Street

Journal Online, 15 January 2008,

http://online.wsj.com/public/

articleprint/

SB120036422673589947.html.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of

the author cultivated in the freedom of

expression, academic environment of

Air University. They do not reflect the

official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the

United States Air Force or the Air University

Reprinted with kind permission from

The Air & Space Power Journal,

Spring 2009.

15 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
DO YOU KNOW.

Medical Microbots Are Nearer Than You Think?

Robert A. Pfeffer

Physical Scientist, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

For those of us old enough to remember the 1966

Harry Kleiner movie Fantastic Voyage and the 1966

Isaac Asimov book (below) based on that screenplay we are beginning to see the reality of saving a human

life by miniaturization, that is, shrinking medical tools (not

doctors) so they travel through the bloodstream while

viewing and fixing arterial problems along the way. In the

film Raquel Welch, her four male companions (I already

forgot their names), and their submarine were shrunk and

then injected in the carotid artery of a comatose Soviet

defector to remove a blood clot in the brain. While that is

still a long way off, modern day nanotechnology has

opened the door to the development and use of small micro-motors injected into the bloodstream that power their

way upstream to problem areas. These micro-motors are

also known as microbots.

Bantam Books Cover

Just what is a microbot? Let's start with the Wikipedia

definition of microbotics. Microbotics (or microrobotics) is the field of miniature robotics, in particular mobile

robots with characteristic dimensions less than 1 mm."

The term can also be used for robots capable of handling

micrometer size components. Recently, scientists have

used piezoelectricity to power micro-motors 250 micrometers (one-fourth of a millimeter) in width. These microbots

are small enough to be injected into the bloodstream via

catheter in a less invasive technique than the more tradinmuBKor

lUCIttlFlIISSKR

_H0arfuiDiiicAii

CTTOKifJWT ilYlflflSBUBr

Film Poster by Tom Chantrell

tional "cut-and-sew" medical procedure. They are small

and yet are powerful enough (4.25 microwatts) to travel

virtually anywhere in the bloodstream, even the cranial

artery.

And why is piezoelectricity the answer? Other techniques have been tried, but Professor James Friend, team

leader at Monash University, Australia, has shown that

piezoelectric motors can be scaled down, even to a size

that works in the bloodstream. His team has already built

several of these motors and he is now working on ways to

improve their control. By the way, the researchers have

given the micro-motor a name: Proteus. And that takes us

back to Raquel and the Fantastic Voyage....

For more information and an interesting video of the

team's work, go to:

http://www.iop.org/News/news_32484.html

Quality of life will stand to benefit from this medical

breakthrough. They could be used to treat strokes and

hardened arteries in senior citizens. They could also be

used to treat cancer patients. Microbots could also be an

enormous benefit to military personnel on or near the battlefield. In much the same way medivac helicopters have

been used to reduce fatalities, future front line medics

could use catheter tubes to insert microbots into patients

to address bloodstream blockages, infections and other

problems.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 16
Courtesy of Sandia National Laboratories, SUMMiTTM Technologies, www.mems.sandia.gov

SEM image of a spider mite on a polysilicon MEMS gear-train. Spider mites range in size from 0.5 mm to 1 mm. Original

image and many others are available online at: http://mems.sandia.gov/scripts/images.asp

Microelectromechanical systems (MEMS) (also written as

micro-electro-mechanical, or MicroElectroMechanical) is

the technology of the very small, and merges at the nanoscale into nanoelectromechanical systems (NEMS) and

nanotechnology. MEMS are also referred to as micromachines (in Japan), or Micro Systems Technology - MST

(in Europe). MEMS are made up of components between

1 to 100 micrometers in size (i.e. 0.001 to 0.1 mm) and

MEMS devices generally range in size from 20 micrometers (20 millionths of a meter) to a millimeter. They usually

consist of a central unit that processes data, the microprocessor and several components that interact with the

outside such as microsensors.

Further Reading on Microbots:

Microbotics, Wikipedia.

Watson, B. ef a/, Piezoelectric ultrasonic resonant motor

with stator diameter less than 250 pm: the Proteus motor,

2009 Journal of Micromechanics and Microengineering,

19 022001 (5pp), January 2009.

Further Reading on Miniaturization:

Pfeffer, Robert, Do You Know...one carbon nanotube

molecule does an operable radio make?, Issue 3, pp. 21-

22, Fall/Winter 2008.

Regis, Ed, The World's Smallest Radio, Scientific American, March 2009.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MEMS

CD

17 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY

The Zero HourSilver Bullets for Peace in the Middle East

MAJ Todd Hathaway

FA 52 Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer

In times of crisis people unite. A

global crisis of greater proportions

than any other event in human

history will ultimately precipitate the

trend towards global consensus in the

coming months and years. What will

such a crisis entail? For now, conflict

over seemingly finite energy resources is a major factor aggravating

an untenable stalemate of geopolitical

and economic forces in the Middle

East. Tensions between Israel and

Iran through the perpetual conflict

between Israel and its immediate

neighbors appear to be independent

of the energy issue, but are they?

Tensions overtly arise from Iran's pursuit of 'peaceful' nuclear energy.

What if we offered Iran a way forward

that did not require nuclear energy?

The United States could provide Iran

and the rest of the world 'silver bullet'

advanced energy technologies.

Problem solved, right?

What would Iran's likely response

be? Well, what choice would Iran's

government have if the offer was publicly disclosed through official channels at the United Nations? If Iran's

government accepts the offer to replace dual-use nuclear power development with an advanced energy

technology that cannot pose an existential threat to Israel, problem

solved. If Iran declines, Russia and

China could no longer justify to the

international community their continued support for Iran's nuclear program. Again, problem solved, as

Iran's government needs Russia and

China's full backing to remain in

power.

Since reviewing the U.S. Army

National Ground Intelligence Center's

report (NGIC-1823-0869-07, published on 5 July 2007) on zero point

energy research, Army Major Todd

Hathaway chose to conduct an independent investigation of advanced

energy technologies that do not fall

into conventional alternative energy

fields of research and development.

This independent investigation culminated in events held in Bethesda,

Maryland, on 20 August 2007, and

Charlotte Hall, Maryland, on 28-29

June 2008. Based on the interviews

and research conducted over the last

five years, it is clear that advanced

energy technologies commonly identified as zero point energy technologies are not only real; they are being

brought to full scale production

through strictly independent, privately

funded initiatives.

The difficulties in bringing advanced energy technologies to the

military and the public have compromised our nation's ability to end continued dependency on foreign hydrocarbon fuels. All hydrocarbon-based

energy production devices are obsolete, including hybrid cars, since they

have conventional battery banks and

high replacement costs. Even the

hydrogen cars using the new fuel cell

Mr. Tomion's Electrodynamic Field Generator's primary power system with a sustained input plasma discharge at

300V in a rarified argon environment.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 18
Mr. Sumaruck's Military Prototype Zero-Amp Unit.

technology fall into a similar category of pedagogic obsolescence, as hydrogen production only shifts the problem

by serving merely as an energy storage technology, and

does not solve the real problem of our dependency on

imported hydrocarbon fuels.

Advanced energy technologies have many advantages

over hydrocarbon fuels and conventional alternative energy technologies. The volume of hydrocarbon fuels imported to the United States could be drastically reduced to

a level that would eliminate the need for nations to protect

current and future overseas energy resources in order to

19 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4

maintain energy and material demands by shifting a small

fraction of either private or government R&D funding (less

than one-tenth of one percent of the current R&D budget)

to advanced energy technologies. The economics of advanced alternative energy systems are considerably less

expensive than our present multi-trillion dollar hydrocarbon fuel based energy and transportation infrastructures.

Advanced energy technologies would also preserve the

integrity of the planet's ecosystem once implemented on a

global scale.

Eddie Sines is a Vietnam veteran and a retired electronics technician from Naval Research Laboratory. Mr.

Sines has been working on a novel generator design to

channel magnetic flux and generate electricity. Upon further development, this new method of power generation

has the potential to produce megawatts of clean electricity

for powering electrical cars, trucks and everything in our

homes within the next ten years, free of the standard

power grid - no more blackouts or brownouts during severe weather and other unexpected events. Mr. Sines'

power generation technology could replace centralized

power plants with clean, highly efficient distributed electrical power systems. Mr. Sines developed a novel transformer design while researching the concept at Naval Research Laboratory, a design that allows 5-10 times greater

power throughput at a fraction of the weight of conventional transformers. His unique transformer design is scalable and could save DoD hundreds of millions of dollars

through power losses reduction while also minimizing our

overseas logistical footprint by incorporating his improved
transformer design into preexisting equipment and overseas/domestic installation energy infrastructures.

Peter Sumaruck is a Vietnam veteran who served as a

Navy Seal sniper. After 20 years of research, Mr. Sumaruck has built and demonstrated a portable 5 kW generator that is close-looped; e.g., the device is not connected

to an external power source during operation for extended

periods of time. The inventor is willing to demonstrate the

unit to military personnel. A larger 50 kW unit is also under development.

Jim Boswell has developed a wind turbine that doesn't

actually use the wind for power generation, but extracts

energy from what can be best described as an electromagnetic phenomenon. The B800 unit sells for $15,000,

and purportedly produces nearly 3 kilowatts continuously,

plus or minus around 200 watts - easily enough to supply

power for a 2,000 square foot home. Mr. Boswell also

sells theB1500, which provides 30 kW of continuous

power for commercial customers. Installation costs for

either unit remain under $1000. Mr. Boswell also has a

hybrid wind/solar technology for powering streetlights and

parking lot lights, which he says could save the city of

Fresno an estimated $40 million annually, the state of

California $80 billion annually, and the U.S. $800 billion

annually - nearly the amount of the recent stimulus packMr. Boswell's B1500, which produces nearly 30,000

Watts, stands 20-30 feet tall on a 3-foot by 2-foot deep

concrete pad.

age. Mr. Boswell is also interested in manufacturing larger units and installations of as high as 4 megawatts in

size.

The best case scenario for wind generation production

is "on" about 15-20% of the time on average. The best

case of Sun energy is 1/3 of the 24-hour day, and a comparable output of 3 kilowatts, costs $30-40,000 installed. When weighing the $5/Watt installed price for the

B800, remember that this generator is claimed to provide

a steady, continuous output at nearly 3 kilowatts, hence

the quicker return on investment. Depending on the cost

of electricity, Mr. Boswell says the unit can pay for itself in

less than three years.

Mr. Boswell has contacted media, private industry and

government officials from local to national levels, but the

standard response has been essentially null -- at least

directly. Recently, Mr. Boswell has been receiving among

other things, threats with the theme of "stop building your

equipment." Since then, for security purposes, he dismantled the fuel-less motor technology; but the patented "wind

turbine" is still powering his home. Other researchers

listed in this article have had similar experiences. Though

Mr. Boswell is primarily interested in manufacturing this

technology with the "Made in U.S.A." label, his requests

have fallen on deaf ears in the United States; but the technology has garnered a lot of interest in China, Japan, and

South Korea.

Carl Falsnes is a Canadian researcher who has developed a hybrid of Stan Meyer and Herman Anderson's

technology. His prototype will be powering vehicles and

generators using only hydroxy gas. Mr. Falsnes also resurrected Nicola Tesla's wireless power transmission technology as recently demonstrated online. There are many

other examples of new "silver bullet" technologies, but all

of these independently funded projects remain in early

stages of development, and the researchers continue to

seek necessary funding to bring their respective technologies into production.

If advanced alternative energy technologies were

adopted worldwide, the impetus for nations to protect their

energy resources around the world could be eliminated.

Every person on the planet could have access to an

unlimited supply of electrical energy and the means of producing clean water. All nations could fully embrace the

Kyoto Protocol, as these advanced energy technologies

reduce the level of environmental pollutants during operation. Cost savings is also an attractive feature of these

technologies when you consider the total cost of our nation's dependency on fossil fuels, with a collapsing global

economy a direct result of continued hydrocarbon fuel dependence. In effect, we could change the world as we

know it, as energy scarcity would become a thing of the

past. The hurdles to transforming our nation's energy infrastructure are many and the technical solutions are by

no means simple; however, current research findings have

shown that obstacles to berthing a post-hydrocarbon fuel

society are surmountable given sufficient time and reCombating WMD Journal Issue 4 20
Mr. Boswell's streetlights line a street in fog at approximately 3 a.m. in China.

search funding to scale these technologies to megawatt

range output.

A follow-on event with live demonstrations of advanced

energy technologies was held at the Southern Izaac

Walton League in Waldorf, Maryland on May 30-31, 2009.

This event is similar to previously scheduled events summarized online at www.altenergy2012.com. A National

Press Club briefing and meetings with members of Congress will be scheduled as demonstrated technologies are

independently validated and replicated through The Orion

Project (www.orionproject.org) and Advanced Energy Research Organization (www.aero2012.com), as well as

through other independent R&D initiatives. The military is

in a position to review these and other technologies as

they are made available for field testing; however, funding

from the government and private industry remain elusive

and no formal process is in place for reviewing new technologies on site. Bringing a final product to market in a

timely manner is also being compromised by a global

economy in precipitous decline. The military is in a position to overcome any obstacles to bringing advanced energy technologies to the rest of the world.

We must support these advanced energy research initiatives, rather than rely on processes that have failed to

support independent research initiatives. Mankind can no

longer afford the luxury of maintaining the status quo in

the realm of energy consumption. It is time for massive

change on a global scale; and supporting advanced energy technology research and development that will inevitably benefit everyone is our last and best hope to avoid a

cataclysmic transition to a post-hydrocarbon fuel society.

For more information on advanced energy technologies,

order the books, "Breakthrough Power - How Quantumleap New Energy Inventions can Transform Our World" by

Jeane Manning and Joel Garbon and "The Energy Solution Revolution" by Brian O'Leary. Additional information

on various advanced energy technologies can also be

found online using keyword searches for the topic of interest, with many of these technologies listed online at

www.altenergy2012.com and www.peswiki.com/

index.php/Directory:Best_Exotic_Clean_Energy_

Technologies.

Major Todd Hathaway is a graduate student at the University of Maryland at College Park and is completing an M.S.

in Nuclear Engineering en route to a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering. He has a B.S. in Metallurgical Engineering

from Iowa State University and an M.S. in Administration

from Central Michigan University. He was previously assigned as an Interagency Integrations Officer at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. His email address is

todd.c.hathaway@us.army.mil and may be contacted directly at 240-997-4582.

,

21 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
Opportunities for Higher Education in

Nuclear Engineering at the University of Maryland

MAJ Todd Hathaway

FA 52 Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer

(Graduate Program in

Nuclear Engineering

SCHOOI OY ENGINEER.il

There is a rapidly growing national need for the education of

a large number of graduatelevel nuclear engineers at the U.S.

Department of Energy, at nuclear

utilities, and at energy consulting

companies. A rapid expansion in the

number of nuclear power plant licenses is expected within the next

five years, and smaller, portable nuclear power plants under development throughout the world. The University of Maryland is committed to

the education and training of future

graduate-level nuclear engineers,

researchers and national leaders.

The program combines crossdisciplinary engineering principles in

nuclear sciences and reliability with

new concepts in nuclear engineering,

advanced research approaches and

practical industrial methods. The

education Nuclear Engineering

graduate students receive is directed

toward a greater emphasis of safety,

reliability and the environment, while

maintaining program strengths in reactor engineering.

The program's advantages for

Army FA52 officers lie in its location

and facilities. The College Park campus is near the headquarters of the

U.S. Department of Energy and the

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the headquarters of the nuclear

power unit of the Bechtel Corporation,

and nuclear utilities in Maryland, in

Virginia and southern Pennsylvania. The program's facilities include a 250 kW nuclear research reactor, a neutron activation laboratory,

a 10 MeV linear electron accelerator

and a gamma ray irradiation laboratory. The facilities also include laboratories for microelectronic failure

analysis, radiation chemistry analysis

as well as dosimetry and extensive

computational capabilities.

In addition to the core curriculum,

each student selects a secondary

area of study, a process that allows

them to tailor their education with a

focus that will support their professional objectives. The learning environment is excellent, with small

classes, and a faculty dedicated to

education with a great deal of personal attention given to students.

The Graduate Program in Nuclear

Engineering, administered by the Department of Materials Science and

Engineering, offers graduate study

leading to the Master of Science

(M.S.) and Doctor of Philosophy

(Ph.D.) degrees. The program's multi

-disciplinary faculty provides the required depth of knowledge to its

graduates entering a career in nuclear engineering and to practicing

engineers seeking to enhance and

extend their capabilities.

The program concentrates in basic

and applied nuclear engineering, engineering research in its broadest

sense. Research that is actively pursued includes risk and reliability assessment of nuclear systems, complex system safety and maintainability

and failure mechanisms associated

with the radiation environment. The

areas of radiation chemistry and radiation engineering are key research

thrusts of the program. The present

notable competencies of the program

are:

• The program's reactor safety

and nuclear probabilistic risk

assessment research program has achieved international recognition, and the

Program's nuclear engineering program is contributing to

the international improvement

of nuclear power plant safety

by providing training in nuclear safety and operation to

local consulting firms and

government officials.

• The Graduate Program in

Nuclear Engineering program

is the only such program in

the State of Maryland and the

tri-state area (Maryland, Virginia and Delaware, even extending to southern Pennsylvania).

• The program trains engineers

for employment in Maryland's

private industry, utilities and

government agencies.

• The Program's radiation engineering program is unique to

Eastern U.S., offering expertise in radiation chemistry and

physics as well as radiation

effects in microelectronics

and space deployable systems.

• The program is the only one

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 22
of its kind that combines advanced reactor designs with a

scientific approach to design

for reliability and safety.

• The program's faculty has

international reputation not

only in the field of nuclear

engineering, but also in materials, mechanical, and reliability engineering. Our faculty

members have published

books, been elected to fellowship in professional societies,

and garnered a variety of special awards.

The Laboratory for Radiation and

Polymer Science, directed by Professor Mohamad Al-Sheikhly, has pursued the chemistry and materials of

the radiation processing industry

since 1960. The Laboratory supports

companies and government laboratories with radiation-related research

and consulting services in three areas:

• Applied radiation and physics

of polymers: crosslinking scission, polymerization, and effects on reinforced and filled

polymers. These include the

development ofproducts for

ordinary commercial use

(packaging materials, elastomers, membranes, textiles,

etc.); and the degradation of

insulating materials in space

satellites and nuclear reactors;

• Radiation sources technology,

such as transport of high energy electrons in complex

targets, dosimetry, and optimization studies; and

• Fundamental aspects of radiation bearing on applied

problems, such as radiation

chemistry of crystalline alkane

and semicrystalline polymers,

initiation mechanisms of vinyl

polymerization, and radiation

effects on morphology and

metrology of polymers.

The Radiation Facilities at the

University of Maryland have recently

installed a brand new, state-of-the-art

high-energy linear accelerator

(LINAC). The TB-10/15 LINAC (L3

Communications, San Leandro, CA)

generates a 10 MeV electron beam

with an average beam power of 15

kW and compliments the existing medium-energy LINAC. The highenergy beam provides an opportunity

for research and industrial applications which lower energy LINACs are

incapable of accomplishing, including

medical sterilization. This is possible

due to the unique ability of highenergy electrons to be converted to

photons with a relatively high efficiency. In addition to its high energy

electron beam, the L3 LINAC is also

equipped with a scanning magnet

and horn assembly which sweeps a

beam of electrons over a 60 cm surface in either a horizontal or vertical

orientation, depending on the specific

application. This feature provides the

University of Maryland with an ideal

setup for pilot-scale studies of radiation processing. Research and industrial applications of the high-energy

LINAC include:

• Polymer modification

• Sterilization of medical devices

• Radiation treatment of food

products

The LINACs electron gun.

One of the key advantages

for FA52 officers is the option to begin coursework prior to a full-time

assignment at the University of Maryland. Several independent study

courses are available, many of which

are listed online at http://

www.testudo.umd.edu/

ScheduleOfClasses.html (under

ENNU). Up to six credits may be

transferred from another institution

towards degree completion requirements. The academic degree completion plan can be tailored to suit the

needs of every FA52 officer, with

flexibility built into both the M.S. and

Ph.D. degree programs. For those

FA52 officers interested in a follow-on

assignment at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI)

in Bethesda, Maryland, M.S./Ph.D.

research can be conducted on site at

AFRRI, as well.

Questions about the Graduate

Program in Nuclear Engineering at

the University of Maryland may be

sent to Dr. Aristos Christou at christou@umd.edu or the Academic Advisor for Army FA52 officers, is

Dr. Mohamad Al-Sheikhlys. His email

address is: mohamad@umd.edu.

Major Todd Hathaway is a graduate

student at the University of Maryland

at College Park and is completing an

M. S. in Nuclear Engineering en route

to a Ph.D. in Nuclear Engineering. He has a B.S. in Metallurgical

Engineering from Iowa State University and an M.S. in Administration

from Central Michigan University. He

was previously assigned as an Interagency Integrations Officer at the

Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

His email address is

todd.c.hathaway@us.army.mil and

may be contacted directly at 240-997-

4582.

23 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
HISTORY

"Peace Is Our Profession"

The U.S. Air Force During the Cold War

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes

Joint Nuclear Targeting Officer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

rologue P

Soon after World War II, it became clear that the world was not to

enjoy the peace it had valiantly fought

to preserve. The Communists made

it known that they would expand

where they could. Potential targets of

opportunity were areas of political

upheaval and economic distress.

The ultimate target then and now is

democracy itself, and above all its

strongest supporter, the United

States.

Our national policy of opposing

aggression against the free world led

us to support many nations when

they were threatened with Communist

takeover. The United States helped

Europe recover from the war under

the Marshall Plan; we joined in organizing NATO and other defense alliances. We organized the West Berlin Airlift when West Berlin was threatened. We played a major role in repelling Communist aggression

against the Republic of Korea. We

were almost at the brink of nuclear

war with the Soviet Union during

those tense days in October of 1962

with the Cuban Missile crises. Communist aggression was confined during the Cold War as a result of our

nuclear deterrence polices.

In this segment of a continuing

series of United States Forces during

the Cold War, I will discuss some of

the delivery platforms and weapons

used by the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in

their arsenal of democracy during the

Cold War. The genesis begins with

the first atomic weapons to be emB-29 Superfortress "Enola Gay" piloted by COL Tibbets, the world's first Atomic Bomber. Photo: USAF

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 24
B-29 Superfortress "BOCKSCAR" piloted by MAJ Sweeny, dropped the second Atomic Bomb.

ployed in combat, the "Little Boy" and

"Fat Man".

On 6 August 1945 at 08:15 AM a

high flying B-29 Superfortress

bomber named "Enola Gay" piloted

by Colonel Paul Tibbets of the 393d

Bombardment Squadron, 509 Composite Group, released a Mark I

atomic bomb called "Little Boy". This

was the first atomic bomb used

against the Empire of Japan, the target: Hiroshima. The weapon was

developed by the secret Manhattan

Project during World War II. The Hiroshima bombing was the second

nuclear explosion in history; the first

was the "Trinity" test. Mr. Martin

Moakler (USANCA) wrote a 3 part

article regarding Trinity (see End- i

notes for more information ). This

destructive power from a single

weapon previously thought unimaginable, now became a reality. According to most estimates, the immediate

effects of the blast may have killed as

many as 70,000-80,000. And a like

number later died from related blast

and burn injuries. Additionally, more

casualties arose from exposure to

radiation.

The "Fat Man" was the second

atomic weapon used against the Em25 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4

pire of Japan, the Little Boy having

been released just three days earlier.

On 9 August 1945, at 11:02 AM, the

B-29 Superfortress bomber named

"Bockscar"; piloted by Major Charles

Sweeney, of the 393d Bombardment

Squadron, 509 Composite Group released Fat Man over Nagasaki, Japan. Fat Man was detonated at an

altitude of approximately 1,800 feet

over the city. Due to Nagasaki's hilly

terrain, the damage was somewhat

less extensive than the relatively flat

Hiroshima. An estimated casualty

resulted with approximately 39,000-

75,000 people killed by the bombing

at Nagasaki and like Hiroshima, many

more died of radiation exposure and

injuries associated directly and indirectly from the blast.

After the second detonation, war

with the Empire of Japan officially

ceased and an unconditional surrender was enacted, thus ending the

Second World War.

Post War Transformation

On 21 March 1946, the United

States Army Air Forces (USAAF) was

divided into three separate commands: Tactical Air Command (TAC),

Air Defense Command (ADC), and

Strategic Air Command (SAC). The

National Security Act of 1947 established a new element, The Department of the Air Force on 18 September 1947. Effective 26 September

1947, personnel of the Army Air

Forces (AAF) were transferred from

the Department of the Army (formerly

the War Department) to the Department of the Air Force. SAC retained

its organization and mission after the

USAAF became the U.S. Air Force

(USAF) on 18 September 1947. 2

A revision to National Defense

Following the end of combat operations in Korea, President Eisenhower, called for a review of current

national defense policies. It was determined that nuclear weapons and

air power were key elements to deter

war. Instead of maintaining large conventional land and sea forces the Eisenhower administration determined

airpower would be a major component to deter or defeat adversaries in

future conflicts.

Key elements of the revised national defense policies now included

reliance on nuclear weapons; heavily

modernizing air power, better integration of strategic forces; and support of

NATO. The Eisenhower administration's doctrine of "massive retaliation," stated in short, that the United

States would not limit a response to

aggression made the adversary think

about the notion of war and the possible escalation that might ensue.

SAC and American National

Strategic Policy

National strategic policy during the

Cold War with the Soviet Union was

based primarily on nuclear deterrence. As an instrument of this policy, SAC would be the cornerstone.

The main planning element of the

Air Force became the responsibility of

SAC. SAC's original mission statement, expressed by General Carl

Spaatz, then commanding general of

the USAAF, was:

"The Strategic Air Command will be

prepared to conduct long-range offensive operations in any part of the

world, either independently or in cooperation with land and naval forces;

to conduct maximum-range recon-
naissance over land or sea, either independently or in cooperation with land and naval forces; to provide combat

units capable of intense and sustained combat operations

employing the latest and most advanced weapons; to train

units and personnel of the maintenance of the Strategic

Forces in all parts of the world; to perform such special

missions as the Commanding General Army Air forces

may direct".

General Curtis E. LeMay took command of SAC in

1948 transforming it to an unparalleled combat force ready

to retaliate on a moment's notice. General LeMay was a

strong advocate of strategic bombing. This doctrine focused on the destruction to an adversary's cities and industrial centers. General LeMay believed that the existence of the atomic bomb made this type of warfare the

only workable strategy, rendering battlefield conflicts essentially obsolete.

In a period of five years, under General LeMay's command, SAC had achieved an unprecedented level of striking power. From its initial handful of wartime B-29 Superfortress bombers, only a few of which were "Silverplate"

early nuclear capable aircraft, SAC transitioned to its first,

truly intercontinental bomber, the Convair B-36. Of the

seventeen wings in the atomic force, eleven were

equipped. The B-47 force had grown from 62 to 329

planes, the B-36 force reached 185, and the reconnaissance RB-36 component numbered 137. At its peak, the

SAC force included more than 1,500 bombers, most of

them the swept-wing B-47. Supporting the bomber force

then were more than 500 tankers and 200 fighter aircraft.

America projected its nuclear power with air bases from

Greenland to North Africa, within striking distance to the

Soviet Union.

Demonstrating SAC's retaliatory capability

Operation Chrome Dome was an airborne alert mission

designed to deter enemy forces from planning a surprise

attack on the United States. This airborne mission allowed

SAC to have an immediate retaliatory capability. Bombers

flew along routes covering parts of Western Europe to

North Africa. To keep the B-52s airborne for long periods,

refueling squadrons performed numerous air refueling

missions. These operations lasted for five years in the

early 1960s. 5

U.S. Air Force delivery systems in the Cold War included aircraft and various types of guided missiles. The

guided missiles included surface to surface Intermediate

Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM), Medium Range Ballistic

Missiles (MRBM), and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(ICBM). Other U. S. Air Force missiles employed at the

time consisted of air-to-air; and air-to-surface.

The discussion will only focus on Cold War era weapons, and weapons still in the inventory will not be listed. I

won't go into details of every weapon produced, employed, experimental, or canceled as this would go beyond the scope of this article. I will list a few representaF-100 Supersaber dropping its nuclear payload.

Photo: USAF

tive examples of the weapons employed by the USAF during the Cold War.

Aircraft

Typical U.S. Air Force aircraft were fighters, light bombers often referred as "tactical bombers" and heavy bombers. Volumes can be written on aircraft alone, so I'll only

list a few representative aircraft.

Among some of the notable aircraft that graced the

skies with nuclear armament was the North American F100 Super Saber, an aircraft cable of supersonic speeds

in level flight constructed mostly of titanium. The Republic

F-105 was a Mach 2 fighter-bomber that could carry a single nuclear bomb internally for high-speed, low-altitude

penetration. The F-102 and F-106 charged with air defense of the Continental United States under the Air Defense Command were armed with the AIM-26 nuclear

tipped air to air missile.

Bombers used during the Cold War included the B-36

Peacekeeper, a massive jet and conventional piston engine bomber capable of reaching targets globally, the B-47

Stratojet jet bomber was a medium-range bomber capable

of flying at high subsonic speeds and primarily designed to

penetrate Soviet airspace. The B-47's were operational

from the 1950s to early 1960s, and was the backbone of

SAC until the B-52 became fully operational.

Convair B-58 Hustler The first operational supersonic

jet bomber capable of Mach 2 speed for the USAF was

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 26
KC-135 Stratotanker refueling a B-52 bomber. In flight refueling helped to keep bombers airborne 24 hours a day during

Operation Chrome Dome. Photo: USAF

the Convair B-58 Hustler. This aircraft was developed during the late

1950s as a result of a SAC requirement for an aircraft to employ nuclear

weapons at high speeds and altitude.

With the introduction of highly accurate Soviet surface-to-air missiles, the

B-58's mission profile changed into a

low-level penetration role, limiting its

range and strategic value.

General Dynamics FB-111 was a

multi-role aircraft entering service in

1967, and retiring in 1998. As a longrange interdiction/strike aircraft it was

designed to penetrate Soviet air defenses at low altitudes and at high

speeds to deliver its nuclear payload.

Boeing B-52 "Stratofortress"

This is a long-range strategic bomber

operated by the U. S. Air Force since

1955, still performing its conventional

mission and available for its nuclear

mission. The B-52 Stratofortress replaced the Convair B-36 as the main

bomber to conduct the nuclear deterrence mission. With new upgrades

and extension programs, this 54 year

old war bird still has many more years

of life. It is said that the last pilot to

command a B-52 has yet to be born.

Tanker Aircraft

Not often thought about as part of

the nuclear infrastructure were tanker

aircraft. To keep bomber aircraft airborne constantly, many air refueling

aircraft were needed. The most prolific Tanker was the KC-135, a modified Boeing 707. This aircraft was

first introduced to the USAF in August

1956, with full production commencing in the following year. The last KC

-135 was delivered to the Air Force in

1965 and this aircraft continues this

mission today.

Tactical and Strategic Bombs

Through the years, the USAF inventory contained many bombs that

were type classified as "Tactical",

later changing to "non-strategic" and

Strategic. These ranged from several

kilotons to megatons yields. These

newer bombs were more powerful

and lighter weight compared to the

days of Little Boy and Fat Man. Many

early bombs are still in service well

beyond the end of the Cold war era.

Surface to Surface Cruise Missiles

Martin MGM-1 "Matador" was

the first operational surface-tosurface cruise missile built by the

U.S. similar in concept to the German

V-1 of WWII. Originally flown in

1949, by the end of 1953 the first

squadron was operational, but not

deployed until 1954, as the 1st Pilotless Bomber Squadron, Bitburg Air

Base, Germany, armed with a nuclear

warhead. The missile was capable of

flying over 700 miles and at an altitude of 30, 000 feet.

Martin "Mace" The Mace had a

dual role as a mobile-launched variant called the MGM-13 and CGM-13

for a container-launched version. The

Mace was a tactical surface-tosurface missile developed from the

MGM-1 Matador. Mace was launched

from a mobile trailer or a hardened

bunker using a solid fuel booster

rocket for initial acceleration and a

turbojet for sustained flight. Deployment began in 1959 with the missile

remaining in service until the early

1970s.

General Dynamics/McDonnell

Douglas BGM-109G "Gryphon"

This was a ground-launched Cruise

Missile (GLCM) developed in the

1970s to provide the Air Force with a

highly mobile, reliable, precisionguided, ground-based system for delivering "tactical" thermonuclear warheads. Congress approved the project on the contingency that it be an

adaptation of the Navy's BGM-109

Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM). The U. S. Air Force developed the mobile launcher and

Launch Control Center (LCC) necessary to make the SLCM land-mobile.

27 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
Plumbbob John Nuclear Test, the only live test of a Genie

rocket on July 19th 1957. Fired from US Air Force F-89J

over Yucca Flats, Nevada Test Site at an altitude of

-15,000 ft (4.5 km). 9

Surface to Air Missiles

CIM-10 "BOMARC" The CIM-10 BOMARC was a joint

development with Boeing and Michigan Aeronautical Research Center, hence the name BOMARC. The Program

was a joint U.S. and Canadian effort between 1957 and

1972 to protect against the Soviet bomber threat. This

strategy required the deployment of tactical stations

armed with BOMARC missiles along the east and west

coasts of North America and the central areas of the continent.

Air to Air Missiles

DOUGLAS AIR-2A "GENIE" The AIR-2A Genie air-toair rocket was the world's first nuclear-armed air-to-air interceptor missile and consequently was the most powerful

ever deployed by the United States Air Force. It was carried by Air Defense Command's F-89J, F-101B, and F106A interceptor aircraft.

HUGHES AIM-26 "FALCON" The AIM-26A was the only

guided nuclear-armed air-to-air missile ever deployed by

the USAF. Development of a nuclear-armed derivative of

the AIM-4 Falcon began in 1959 to give interceptor aircraft

a head-on kill capability against enemy bombers,

since radar homing technology of the day was too inaccurate for a conventionally armed missile. The AIM-26A

became operational with F-102 interceptors in 1961. The

nuclear warhead and the all-weather capability of the radar guidance made the AIM-26A the most powerful air-toair missile ever deployed.

Air to Surface Missiles

North American Aviation Corporation AGM-28

"Hound Dog" The AGM-28 Hound Dog missile was a

supersonic, jet powered, air-launched cruise missile. The

Hound Dog was originally envisioned as a temporary

standoff weapon for the B-52, to be used until the AGM-48

Skybolt air launched ballistic missile could be deployed.

The Skybolt program was canceled and the Hound Dog

was deployed for 15 years, retiring in 1975, replaced by

newer weapons.

Boeing AGM-69 "SRAM" The Short-range attack missile, or SRAM was a nuclear air-to-surface missile designed to replace the older AGM-28 Hound Dog stand-off

missile. The requirement for the weapon was issued by

SAC in 1964, and the SRAM entered service in 1972. It

was carried by the B-52, the FB-111A, and, for a very

short period starting in 1986, by the B-1Bs.

Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM)

PGM-17 "Thor" Development of the Thor was initiated

by the US Air Force in 1954 as a Tactical Ballistic Missile.

The goal was a missile system that could deliver a nuclear

warhead over a distance of 1,150 to 2,300 miles (1,850 to

3,700 km). Thor was the first operational ballistic missile in

the arsenal of the United States, operated by the US Air

Force. Named after the Norse god of Thunder, it was deployed in the UK between 1959 and September 1963 as

an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). It was

later augmented in the U.S. IRBM arsenal by the PGM-19

Jupiter.

Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM)

PGM-19 "Jupiter" In December 1955, the U.S. Secretaries of the Army and Navy announced a dual Army and

Navy program to create a land and sea based MRBM.

Because of naval basing, the Jupiter MRBM was designed as a short squat missile to ease handling aboard

ships. The Navy withdrew from the project in November

1956 in favor of the solid fuel Polaris missile. Despite the

withdrawal of the Navy from the project, the Jupiter MRBM

retained its original dimensions. As a result, the Jupiter

was too wide to be carried aboard contemporary cargo

aircraft. Jupiter was America's second MRBM design, the

first being Thor. In November 1956, the Department of

Defense assigned all land based long range missiles to

the U. S. Air Force. The U. S. Army retained battlefield

missiles with a range of 200 miles (320 km) or less.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 28
The Jupiter MRBM program was from its silo,

transferred to the U. S. Air Force.

Jupiter was withdrawn from service in

1963

- te*v

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles

(ICBM) ^^J ^ J^

SM-62 "Snark" The Northrop SM62 Snark was a specialized intercontinental cruise missile with a nuclear

warhead operated by SAC from 1958

until 1961. It takes its name from

Lewis Carroll's fictional monster.

The Snark was launched from a light

platform by two rocket booster engines. It switched to an internal jet

engine for the remainder of its flight.

An advanced feature of the Snark

was its ability to fly missions of up to

11 hours and return for a landing.

Landing was accomplished by setting

the Snark on a flat, level surface allowing it o skid to a stop like a conventional glider and the missile could

be flown repeatedly.

Convair Division of General Dynamics CGM-16/HGM-16 "Atlas"

Originally designed as an ICBM in the

late 1950s, Atlas became the foundation for a family of successful space

launch vehicles (SLV). The Atlas

rocket family is today used as a

launch platform for commercial and

military satellites, and other space

vehicles. The Atlas was first tested in

1957 becoming the first successful

U.S. ICBM.

Glenn L. Martin Company LGM25 "Titan II"

The Titan II was a significant improvement over the Titan I. The Titan

II was originally designed as an

ICBM, and later used as a medium-lift

SLV to carry payloads for the Air

Force, National Aeronautics and

Space Administration (NASA) and

National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA).

The Martin Company received a contract for the missile in June 1960. The

Titan II used storable propellants, a

significant step towards safety and

reliability. The Titan I's fueling configuration was time consuming and

dangerous, as it had to be raised

from its silo and fueled before launch.

The use of storable propellants enabled the Titan II to launch directly

29 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4

The Titan II was first flown in December 1961 and the missile, redesignated as the LGM-25C, reached initial operating capability in October

1963. The last Titan II missile, located

at Silo 373-8 near Judsonia, Arkansas, was deactivated on May 5, 1987.

LEM-70 "Minuteman II" ICBM

The LGM-30F Minuteman II was an

improved version of the Minuteman I

missile. Development on the Minuteman-ll began in 1962 as the Minuteman Is entered SAC's nuclear force.

Minuteman-ll production and deployment began in 1965 and completed in

1967. It had an increased range, payload, guidance system, and better

accuracy.

LGM-118 "Peacekeeper" ICBM

The LGM-118A Peacekeeper,

dubbed the "MX missile" (for MissileeXperimental), was a land-based

ICBM deployed by the United States

starting in 1986. The development of

the Peacekeeper began with the

counterforce, hard-target mission. It

was to be used against hardened

enemy missile silos with first-strike

capability. This required high accuracy, survivability, range and a flexibility that was not available in other

ICBMs. The last Peacekeeper was

removed from alert on September 19,

2005 during the final deactivation

ceremony when the 400th Missile

Squadron inactivated as well.

Epilogue

After the collapse of the Soviet

Union, many of the services reorganized, as there was no longer a perceived "threat." The USAF underwent a significant reorganization of

their commands. Among the vanquished were the war fighting elements that had defined the U. S. Air

Force for nearly 45 years, Strategic

Air Command and Tactical Air Command. These two units were combined into a single command as the

newly created Air Combat Command

(ACC). Air refueling and transportation now came under Air Mobility

Command (AMC), assuming control

of the tankers that once belonged to

SAC. The ICBM force was now under new management with yet another new command called Air Force

Space Command (AFSPC). 3

Summary

America and perhaps the world relied

on the U.S. Air Force and to SAC in

particular for nuclear deterrence. The

professionalism displayed by these

crews could read like that of a personal citation: For exceptional performance, and devotion to duty that

reflect great credit upon you and the

U.S. Air Force. This dedication to

duty was certainly in keeping with

their unit motto:

"Peace Is Our Profession."

i

CW5 Stephen A. Gomes is a Joint

Nuclear Targeting Officer assigned at

USANCA. He was previously assigned as the MOS 131A Targeting

Technician Program Manager, Ft. Sill,

OK. He is a graduate of the Joint

Targeting School, Dam Neck, VA.

His email address is

stephen.gomes@us.army.mil

ENDNOTES

1. Martin Moakler Trinity - Beginning

of the Atomic Age Part I (The NBC

Report Spring/Summer 2005 predecessor of The CWMD Journal); Trinity

- Secrets & Security Part II (The NBC

Report Fall/Winter 2005); Trinity -

Day of Two Dawns Part III (The NBC

Report Spring/Summer 2006)

2. http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/

3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

StrategicAirCommand

4. http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/

PopTopics/SAC.htm

5. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/

agency/sac.htm

6. http://www.hill.af.mil/library/

museum/coldwar.asp

7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AGM69_SRAM

8. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SM

62_Snark

9. Wikipedia and DoD credit

http://en.wikipedia.org was the

source used for information resean

article input and image retrieval

(This banner was previously

used on all SAC Bombers and

Air Refueling Tankers.)

.
Chemical Warfare: Part II

Mr. A. Mark Diglio

Chemical Engineer, U.S. Army Nuclear and CWMD Agency

In January 2009 Combating WMD

Journal Issue 3, we focused on

the history of Chemical Warfare

(CW) in ancient times. The article

reviewed how CW developed over

the centuries from earliest times. The

intent was to demonstrate that chemicals can be used in primitive ways to

inexpensively create devastating impacts. This issue presents a review

of CW history in modern times, World

War I (WW I), CW use prior to 1920.

Subsequent articles in this series will

look at CW use in WW II, through the

present and information to assist in

preparedness and planning. Before

embarking upon review of early Modern CW, it is important to be reminded of why we need to be prepared.

The Threat

There is a growing air of global

malcontent. It is not a passing fad. It

is a part of life we must all be aware

of, adapt to and as a society aggressively act upon. The strongest threat

of terrorism comes from that of the

radical Islamic movement in the Muslim world. Their numbers are now

estimated around 15% of the global

Muslim community. Why? They are

the only significant organized religion

that believes in killing "non-believers"

to get closer to god. If left to their

own designs, radical Islamic terrorism

will continue to grow causing fear and

death to rise as if it were a world cancer. This radical branch of Muslim

religion stops at nothing, the Jihad

(personal struggle), to fight the ways

of the West (primarily America, Britain, and Israel) by killing nonbelievers like insects. They bolster

their numbers by lying to the young,

the poor, and the uneducated by coercing and intimidation about the 'Evil

West'. Their ranks include the young,

poor and uninformed. Their resources are vast and include those

that are Western educated engineers

and doctors. The organization origi3K. ^^1 K* . *

A ,

. j

1

1

t

IjmM Photo Courtesy of the Assc>ciated Press

nally funded with oil money from the

Middle East has developed elaborate

networks of organized white collar

crime schemes as well as investment

in legitimate businesses. Their funding is used for propaganda, recruitment, weapons, training, espionage

and research. This threat is real and

will not dissipate. When ignored, it

will only continue to grow stronger.

Radical Islamic terrorists are not the

only threat for use of CWMD. Governments of considerable power have

fallen. In their wake is the opportunity

for rogue factions or fallen governments to pursue any and all means to

regain financial and political power.

This series of articles on CW are presented to raise awareness of CWMD

that we may better deter, detect and

defeat their use both from terrorists

and rogue nations.

Chemical Warfare Ancient Times

Relook

A brief recap of highlights from

Part I, the history of CW in ancient

times and some of its more noteworthy uses follows. CW involves the

use of chemical substances to incapacitate, injure, or kill an enemy or

enemy's environment. For example,

in early times, salt was used to destroy farmland. Recently, oil tankers

were taken hostage for million dollar

ransoms in the Indian Ocean. On

February 1, 1991, Saddam Hussein

set fire to all the oil wells in Kuwait

turning daytime battle skies black and

drenching the Dessert Storm war

zones with choking air. CW started

before 1000 BC with the Chinese use

of poisonous smokes to sicken enemy troops. Poisoned tipped arrows

were used in some conflicts (in recent

times, poisoned tipped umbrellas,

darts and knives were used for assassinations). The Greeks used poisons to kill their enemies in 590 BC.

In 190 BC, Hannibal hurled deadly

poisonous snakes aboard enemy

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 30
Aerial photograph of a chlorine gas attack by the Germans against the Russians in 1916. From Popular Mechanics

Magazine March 1916. 10

ships. In 678 AD, the Greeks defeated the Arab fleet using Greek Sea

Fire, an inextinguishable oil based

fire. 1241 AD, the Mongols used poison gas in the Battle of Legnica.

1456 AD, Belgrade defenders fired

Arsenic bombs, grenades and soaked

rags against the Turks. In the AngloFrench 30 Years War (1618 to 1648

AD), stinking jars and toxic bombs

were used in great quantities. The

methods and variety of chemicals

used for warfare are seemingly endless.

The Stage for Modern Chemical

Warfare

The use of CW was considered

barbaric after the 17th century. Civilized countries made tacit and formal

gentlemen's agreements over the 18th

and 19th centuries to ban their use. In

America's own Civil War, for example, plans were made to use chlorine

gas, hydrochloric and sulfuric acidsbut they were never acted upon by

the Union. American leaders deemed

it too inhumane. Before the second

half of the 19th century, many poisonous chemicals were discovered, but

could not be produced on a mass

scale. It was industrialization after

1850 that raised the urgency and

concern for international address to

prohibit chemical warfare. For the

first time, countries had industrialized

with the capability to produce mass

quantities of synthetic chemicals. It

was this fear of poison applied on a

massive scale that promoted international agreements banning use of

poisons.

In an attempt to limit the unchecked destructiveness of war, on

July 29, 1899, the Hague Declaration

was signed. It prohibited the use of

projectiles for diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases deeming

their use 'immoral.' On October 18,

1907, Europe signed the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and

Customs of War on Land noting it

was especially forbidden "to employ

poison or poisoned weapons." While

the United States agreed in principle

with the Hague agreements, it did not

immediately sign. Despite these antiCW accords, most industrialized

countries continued both research

and plans to prepare for potential CW

use. Research was justified for deterrence. However, much less publicized was offensive research to get

the military advantage if ever needed

or retaliation-in-kind should someone

else use it first.

The world scene changed with the

31 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
A Chronology of the Escalation of CW in WW I

April 22,

1915 Germany releases the first successful modern CW attack with chlorine gas near Ypres, Belgium.

April 24,

1915 Germans conduct a second chlorine gas attack at Ypres against Canadian troops.

May 31,

1915

Germans use chlorine phosgene mix along 12 kilometers of Russian front, at Bsura-Rumka. Some

12,000 bottles of gas were used, resulting in 9,000 casualties, including 6,000 deaths.

July 15,

1915 Germans fired 100,000 155mm benzyl bromide shells in Argonne.

Dec 19,

1915 Germany released 88 tons of phosgene from 4,000 cylinders against Brits at Nieltje, Flanders.

Mar, 1916 US used 75 artillery shells of phosgene for the first time in Verdun, France with devastating effect.

July, 1916 Allied forces used shells filled with hydrogen cyanide during the Somme offensive.

Mar, 1917 Airplanes are used for the first time to spread CW, phosgene, creating vast lethal concentrations.

July 12,

1917 Germans first use mustard gas by Ypres, Belgium.

Sep, 1917 First use of "Clarks" arsine based gases that cause nausea and vomiting that passed through gas

masks.

start of the Great War. WW I erupted

in 1914 on the European continent,

massive waves of men and equipment thrown against each other. For

the first time, a major conflict quickly

evolved into a stalemate in the

trenches. Troops gained a few miles

over the course of months only to

lose them the next. This stalemate

lasted for nearly a year. With forces

evenly matched, both sides were

looking for an advantage to break the

impasse.2

Early Modern Times

WW I ushered in a new era for

CW use. For the first time, warring

nations employed industrially produced chemicals in mass quantities

with deadly mass effectiveness. Because Germany had the lead possessing the world's most advanced

chemical industry (in large part due to

its strong textile dye industry and its

world lead in dyestuff production), it

enjoyed an inherent advantage in this

type of warfare over other countries.

Germany also had some of the

world's best chemists of the day.

They discovered how to make ammonia industrially, a key ingredient to

easy production of many CW agents.

It lessened Germany's dependence

on foreign suppliers for nitrates which

2

would be cut once the war started.

Interestingly, the French were actually the first to use chemicals in

WW I, August 1914. They used ethyl

bromoacetate for riot control against

the Germans, but too mild to be effective. The French argued it was not

poisonous enough to constitute violation of the accords. None-the-less, it

provided Germany a weak excuse to

claim The Hague agreements invalid.

Also, Germany argued the Hague

Declaration only prohibited poisonous

projectiles.

Germany tried several times before getting CW to work on a large

scale. October 1914, 3,000 explosively charged shells loaded with a

lung irritant (dianisidine chlorosulfate)

were used on the English. It didn't

work because the high energy explosive burnt the chemical, neutralizing

any effects. On January 15, 1915,

Germany unsuccessfully used another irritant (methylbenzyl bromide -

tear gas) by firing 18,000 shells upon

the Russians near Bolimow, but subfreezing temperatures prevented the

liquid agent from vaporizing rending it

harmless.3 However, the Germans

weren't about to give up. Thanks to,

Fritz Haber, a renowned German

chemist that founded the Haber Institute (some refer to him as the father

of modern CW); Germany later

earned the notorious title of first country to successfully use CW in modern

times.

April 22, 1915, an otherwise pleasant sunny spring day in Belgium near

Ypres, marked the dawn of a new era

of CW. Germany's third attempt to

use CW (chlorine gas) in WW I, again

an experiment, opened a 4-mile wide

hole in the trench line. It was so effective that German commanders

were unprepared with any reinforcements to advance and take advantage of their victory.

From the opening passage of "A

Higher Form of Killing" by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman:

"At five o'clock, three red rockets

streaked into the sky, signaling the

start of a deafening artillery barrage.

High-explosive shells pounded into

the deserted town of Ypres and the

villages around it. At the same time

the troops sheltering near Langemarck saw two greenish-yellow

clouds rise from the enemy's lines,

catch the wind, and billow forward,

gradually merging to form a single

bank of blue-white mist: out of sight,

in special emplacements protected by

sandbags and concrete, German CW

pioneers were opening the valves of

6,000 cylinders spread out along a

four-mile front. The cylinders contained liquid chlorine - the instant the

pressure was released and it came

into contact with the air it vaporized

and hissed out to form a dense cloud.

At thirty parts per million of air chlorine gas produces a rasping cough.

At concentrations of one part per

thousand it is fatal. The breeze

stirred again, and one hundred and

sixty tons of it, five feet high and hugging the ground, began to roll toward

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 32
German troops fitted in gas masks escape a phosgene cloud in 1916.

the Allied trenches.

3

fare had begun.""

Chemical WarMore specifics are provided in

John Tucker's War on Nerves. 1,600

large and 4,130 small steel cylinders

filled with pressurized liquid chlorine,

a total of 5,730 cylinders and 168

metric tons. Heavier than air, the 5

foot high cloud drifted across the no

man land into the trenches at a leisurely pace of four miles per hour.

Gradually the warmth of the ground

caused the cloud to expand to a

height of about thirty feet and assume

a yellow-green color, darker near the

ground and lighter on the top. Allied

estimates inflated to underscore outrage were placed that a total of 5,000

men were killed with an additional

10,000 casualties. The taboo against

the use of poison gas had been broken. Now the international gloves

banning CW were coming off.

By summer of 1915 following the

successful German use of chlorine

gas, both sides prepared to protect

against CW by issuing millions of gas

masks. While the early designs were

crude by today's standards, the

masks bought time and often meant

the difference between life and death.

The earliest protection was only liquid

soaked rags, grossly inadequate for

real protection. The allies had an

advantage in gas mask designs over

the Germans in that they did not have

as severe a limitation on available

resources for filter media and mask

materials. The Germans used what

they had, to do the best they could,

and they did exceedingly well. While

weak in gas mask and protection, the

Germans experimented using a variety of CW agent compound and technique firsts. For example, Germany

was first to discover that gas masks

challenged with a variety of agents

dramatically lowers the mask's effectiveness. Due to the unpredictability

of the weather, effective planning for

use of CW was complex at best.

Times for release and reenforcements were difficult to coordinate. The best time of delivery often

changed, but timing was critical for

success and to avoid bringing the

horror to your own troops.

At the beginning of the final year

of WW I in 1918, it was estimated one

of four projectiles fired by both sides

were chemical. At WW I's conclusion

with the signing of the November 11,

1918, one in two shells fired were

chemical. (Allied forces overwhelmed

the Germans which were in steady

retreat hence their signing of a cease

fire. Hostilities remained until formal

signing of the Treaty of Versailles

seven months later, June 28, 1919.

While phosgene caused the most

deaths in WW I, mustard caused the

most casualties. £ However, this

may be due in large part to the late

introduction of mustard gas during the

last year of fighting (July 1917). Mustard burns leave scars for a lifetime

and mustard is a known carcinogen.

Even if you survive the exposure, you

may not survive the ravaging of your

body 20 years later from inoperable

cancer.

33 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
Chemical Warfare Technology Development Timeline 6

Agents Dissemination Protection Detection

1900s

Chlorine

Chloropicrin

Phosgene

Mustard gas

Wind dispersal Smell

1910s Lewisite Chemical shells Rosin oil clothing

Gas mask

1920s Projectiles w/central

bursters CC-2 clothing

1930s G-series nerve agents Aircraft bombs Blister agent detectors

Color change paper

1940s Missile warheads

Spray tanks

Protective ointment

(mustard)

Collective protection

Gas mask w/Whetlerite

1950s

1960s V-series nerve agents Aerodynamic Gas mask w/water supply Nerve gas alarm

1970s

1980s Binary munitions Improved gas masks

(protection, fit, comfort) Laser detection

1990s Novichok nerve agents

This is a photo of an unidentified Canadian soldier with mustard gas bums in

WW I, 1917-1918. Damp areas of clothing, or exposed areas allowed the

agent to penetrate, causing excruciating injuries.

The body tries to heal and cleanse

itself from this heinous silent actor,

but can't. Particularly nasty if one

inhaled the gas and survived, there is

a high probability of contracting lung

cancer long after the single mustard

exposure.

An estimated 1.3 million died from

CW in WW I with about 100 thousand

that died from CW in combat. Compare this to 26.7 million WW I deaths

by other forms of warfare of which 6.8

million died in combat.4 Note the

number dying from conventional

wounds is 4 times higher than conventional combat deaths, but the

number chemical wounds resulting is

deaths is 13 times higher for CW.

This is what Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman refer to as "a higher

form of killing" the title of their 2002

book.

The primary CW agents used in

WW I were chlorine gas, phosgene

and mustard. Cyanide was dabbled

with as with cyanogen chloride, but

not in great quantity. WW I prompted

the U.S. to form what later became

the Chemical Corps. 9 Countries developed protection from chemicals -

gas masks with carbon filters and

protective over garments. This in

part, is what limited the effectiveness

of CW in WW I compared to conventional weapons. None the less, it was

a great factor in combat effectiveness

due to the labors of chemical protection equipment, primarily, a gas

mask. There are physical limits on

how long one can wear a gas mask,

how effect one can aim a rifle, or see

approaching assailants. However, all

nuclear biological and chemical contamination can be defeated through

use of proper equipment only if protection is available and used. When

unprotected, CW fatalities and

wounded casualties were high in WW

I and will be today.

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 34
During WW I, well employed CW

would swamp the enemies hospital

care facilities. Frequently, the only

remedy for exposure during WW I

was bed rest. Few doctors knew how

to treat or properly identify the exact

CW agent of exposure or the proper

Q

treatment.

Summary of Modern CW in WW I

Initially, Germany held the lead in

chemical agent deployment. From

1915 to 1918, the tactical employment of chemical weapons varied

between the belligerents. However,

by late 1918, both sides were using

similar delivery systems and chemical

agents. The effect of gas should be

neither belittled nor exaggerated. The numbers of gas casualties

were often inflated or decreased, depending on the needs of the moment

for propaganda reasons. "The novelty of the weapon, the secretiveness

of the chemists, and the inexperience

of the troops provided ideal conditions for the growth of legends, for

claims and counter-claims, and for

assertions that went unchallenged." After the signing of the armistice, the use of chemical agents during World War I caused the public

and the military to closely examine

them, and prepare for their future

use.

Closing Remarks

Following WW I, developed countries raced to develop more deadly

CW agents than chlorine, phosgene,

blister agent and mustard. They succeeded, Germany again in the lead.

Agents were developed that are invisible, odorless, colorless so potent

a drop will kill - nerve agents, an unfortunate by-product of pesticide research. This topic will be further explored in a future issue. Remember,

it is only through awareness, planning

and constant vigilance that we will

combat chemical WMD and terrorism.

Mr. A. Mark DigHo serves as a

Chemical Subject Matter Expert at

the USANCA, in the G-3/5/7 at Ft.

Belvoir, VA. He has a B.S in Chemical Engineering from the Pennsylvania State University and a Masters

in Business Administration with a minor in Procurement from the Florida

Institute of Technology. He recently

served 12 years at the Chemical Materials Agency as an Associate Project Manager and expert in Chemical

Demilitarization. His career began

with 16 years as a Combat Developer

of NBC Protective Equipment at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, an expert in

air filtration and barrier materials.

His email address is:

mark.diglio@conus.army.mil. )

ENDNOTES

1. Peter Mier's movie: Obsession -

Radical Islam's War Against the West

http://www.obsessionthemovie.com

2. Jonathan B. Tucker: War of

Nerves: Chemical Warfare from

World War I to Al-Qaeda, 2006

3. Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman: A Higher Form of Killing, 2002

4. R. Everett Langford: Introduction

to Weapons of Mass Destruction;

Radiological, Chemical, and Biological

5. Al Mauroni: Chemical and Biological Warfare, 2

nd Edition, 2007

6. http://

www.newworldencyclopedia.org/

entry/Chemicalwarfare

7. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Chemical_warfare

8. Brian Blodgett, Professor, American Military University; Article from

August 11, 2001: Germany's Use of

Chemical Warfare in World War I

http://www.firstworldwar.com/

features/chem ical_warfare.htm

9. History of the Chemical Corps

since 1918 http://www.wood.army.mil/

cbrns/history.html

10. This media file is in the public

domain in the United States. This

applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its

first publication occurred prior to

January 1, 1923.

11. Image provided courtesy of and

can be found at commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/

Category:WorldWar...

As well as Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-

R05923,_Flandern,_deutsche_Soldat

en_in_Gasangriff.jpg

35 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
International

CBRN Standardization in NATO (Non-Medical)

Mr. Frank R. Jordan

U.S. Head of Delegation to CBRN Working Group (CBRNWG)

and Joint Capability Group on CBRN (JCGCBRN)

Threats of global terrorism and proliferation of

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are major

challenges to the NATO alliance. These challenges

significantly enhance the importance of multinational force

interoperability with respect to CBRN-related doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; training, and materiel.

NATO armed forces must be prepared and capable of operating in chemical, biological, and radiological environments or when encountering toxic industrial hazards. The

foundation for NATO armed forces interoperability is

achieved through the NATO Standardization Program.

NATO standardization is vital to combined operational

effectiveness across the spectrum of NATO military operations. The objective of standardization is to achieve a required critical level of interoperability that fosters increased national burden sharing to NATO missions and

contributes to the ability of Alliance forces to train, exercise, and operate effectively both together and with forces

of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and other non-NATO countries.

The Alliance encourages national and NATO authorities to develop, agree to, and implement concepts, doctrine, procedures and designs that enable interoperability

during multinational operations. The promulgation and

implementation of CBRN-related NATO Standardization

Agreements (STANAGs) and other allied publications help

countries to achieve required levels of interoperability and

to better accomplish common strategic, operational and

tactical tasks; to understand and execute common procedures; and to employ techniques, materiel and equipment

more efficiently.

The responsibility for the development of non-medical

CBRN-related STANAGs primarily rests with two working

groups within the NATO structure: the doctrine focused

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense

Operations Working Group (CBRNWG) and the materiel

focused Joint Capability Group on Chemical, Biological,

Radiological and Nuclear Defense (JCGCBRN). Collectively these groups in collaboration with the NATO Strategic Commands and other NATO bodies are addressing

CBRN interoperability standards for current and future

CBRN terrorism and proliferation challenges. The collective products of these two groups establish NATO's CBRN

interoperability standards for tactical units (general forces)

and specialized CBRN elements such as the Multinational

CBRN Battalion, -an integral component of the NATO Response Force-.

The CBRNWG is in its 48th year of developing, coordinating and assessing operational standardization matters.

The group is comprised of voting members from all 26

NATO nations; non-voting participants from other NATO

bodies and other NATO Strategic Commands; and observers from NATO PfP countries, Contact Countries, and

Non-NATO bodies. Currently, the CBRNWG is responsible for 31 non-medical CBRN-related STANAGs and associated Allied Publications that provide guidance organized along the lines of the Allied Joint Publication 3.8 (AJP

-3.8), NATO Doctrine for CBRN Defence and five of its

agreed CBRN defense enabling components (detection,

identification and monitoring; warning and reporting; physical protection; hazard management). Additional responsibilities of the working group includes evaluation of lessons

learned from recent operations and exercises and monitoring of advances in CBRN defense capabilities to produce amended or new standards.

The JCGCBRN is a joint, tri-Service body responsible

for equipment-related aspects of CBRN detection, identification, monitoring; sampling and identification; hazard

management; physical protection; radiological and nuclear

defense; challenge/threat. Membership is similar in composition as that of the CBRNWG. This group is responsible for 22 STANAGs and 19 Allied Engineering Publications which address CBRN materiel concepts, specifications, and test and evaluation procedures required to

achieve CBRN survivability of NATO armed forces personnel and equipment. Additionally, the group fosters information exchanges on CBRN defense (to include technology advancements) and proposes cooperative developments related to CBRN defense equipment.

Today, the CBRNWG and JCGCBRN are addressing

the challenges of global terrorism and proliferation of

WMD. Continuous STANAG improvements are redefining

the critical levels of interoperability required for NATO

armed forces to meet and survive these challenges.

Securing our Future

• 1949-2009 •

Garantir I'avemr de notre secunte

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 36
USANCA Officially Opens New Headquarters

Mr. Paul Bello, Fort Belvoir Eagle Staff Writer

Ms. Marny Malin, Fort Belvoir Eagle Staff Photographer

Tuesday 21 July 2009 marked a new chapter in the

history of the United States Army Nuclear and

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency.

Not only was it the unveiling of its new, state-of-the

-art headquarters, but a dedication to a noteworthy colleague from its past. Peter Bechtel, the agency's director

since 2006, greeted guests by saying the 16th Street location was a manifestation of an opportunity received

through Base Realignment and Closure in recent years.

Since 1977, the agency had been consolidated and located at Fort Belvoir North, the old Engineer Proving

Ground, which will soon be home to another organization -

the National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency.

As USANCA moves forward with its mission of providing nuclear planning and execution across the globe,

Mr. Bechtel said the building would also stand as a tribute

to LTG Leslie Richard Groves - an Army engineer who

helped design the Pentagon and an integral leader of the

Manhattan Project during the early 1940s. With members

of the Groves family looking on, including his son, Richard, LTG James D. Thurman, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S.

Army, said the occasion was not only a great day for the

Army, but a great way to continue the father's legacy.

"I have the honor of watching men and women perform

great work every day. They're the ones who move this big

green machine forward," LTG Thurman said. "We live in

an era of persistent conflict. The contributions of LTG

Groves will continue with a new generation and we will do

whatever it takes to defend the U.S.A.

"As I'm sure he would tell you, nothing can be stopped

when everyone works together toward a common goal. "

Being back at Belvoir brought many memories for LTG (R)

Groves, who retired from the Army in 1982 as a lieutenant

general, himself. According to him, he still recalls the afternoon of Aug. 6, 1945 - the day he was pulled out of class

by a colonel and told the news that America had just

dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

"I was taken to a pay phone and told by another colonel that I was going to be inundated with reporters asking

me all sorts of questions. The colonel instructed me to

decline all requests for interviews and simply say I didn't

know what anyone was talking about," LTG (R) Groves

told the audience.

"Even after a picture of my father appeared on the front

page of a major newspaper, I still told reporters, I don't

know what you're talking about.' I'm sure they were

pleased to hear that and went off to write something very

flattering about me, " LTG (R) Groves said. After a chorus

37 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4

of laughs, he continued to say the last two years of his

father's service were quite difficult, due to the severity of

the times. However, he said his father would be pleased to

know that nuclear planning is continuing again with the

Army and that it will go a long way in protecting the nation

for years to come.

"Having his son and family here makes this ceremony

all the more special," Mr. Bechtel said. "LTG (R) Groves

was a true leader of his time and is part of our agency's

long and vivid history. With this fully operational building,

we will continue his vision of enhancing international programs well into the future." Mr. Bechtel said the new

building will have a staff of 35 and provide further training

on nuclear targeting and research. Mr. Bechtel said the

building can provide secure video conferencing and additional space for storing classified material.

m •. J«f

Photo by Marny Malin

LTG James Thurman, Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 and

retired LTG (R) Richard H. Groves shake hands after unveiling the plaque dedicated to LTG (R) Groves' father, Lt.

Gen. Leslie Groves, during Tuesday's U.S. Army Nuclear

and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency

ribbon-cutting ceremony.

Plaque designed by CW5 Stephen Gomes, USANCA.
Book Review

Code-Name Down Fall

Lt Vern Conaway, USAF

Air & Space Power Journal Book Review

Norman Polmar and Thomas

Allen present a clear repudiation of the idea that the

dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was unnecessary. Instead, the United States was

planning a massive invasion of the

Japanese home islands, code-named

Downfall, in which the detonation of

the bombs were nothing more than

the United States trying to do everything in its power to end the war as

quickly as possible. Whether the

bombs ended the war or simply made

the invasion easier was not an issue

in deciding whether or not to use the

bomb. The bomb was a weapon and

in the arsenal.

The authors lead the reader

through a concise but thorough background of both prewar plans involving

a war against Japan and through the

war itself, from the surprise attack at

Pearl Harbor to the surrender of Japan aboard the USS Missouri. The

background is excellently laid and the

authors do a great job of bringing the

war to life. From memoirs and interviews the reader gains insights into

what the commanders on both sides

of the lines were actually thinking.

Overall, Code-Name Downfall is

an excellently researched book that

proves its thesis well beyond a reasonable doubt. Almost all sources

used are primary sources, including

official memorandums from national

archives, interviews, memoirs, official

military plans, studies, and communications, and, most importantly, recently declassified Magic intercepts

(of Japanese secret communications)

that are on repository at the National

Security Agency.

Polmar and Allen masterfully

prove the thesis that the United

States was going to invade whether

or not it used the bomb (unless Japan

surrendered, of course). As the

United States and its Allies made

their way across the Pacific, the authors chronicle not only how the battles were fought but how the lessons

learned would be applied in the plan

for the final invasion of Japan. As the

Allies drew nearer to Japan itself, the

reader is exposed to the vastly intricate deception plans as well as to the

contingency plans for the use of terror

weapons (chemical and biological).

The final invasion plan is also intricately laid out, from the arguments

over when and where to land the invasion force to which forces were

going to land on which beaches.

The key to the thesis, however,

lies with the Magic intercepts. These

intercepts clearly showed that the

Japanese were in no way considering

surrendering just because their

homeland was about to be invaded.

Rather, that only strengthened their

will as the military prepared the entire

population, including women and children, to defend the homeland against

the Allies. Not only were the Japanese not open to negotiations in the

least, there was no guarantee that the

dropping of the two atomic bombs

would end the war. In fact, American

planners were calculating how many

more bombs would be available for

the invasion that was scheduled for 1

November 1945.

Thus, the invasion was destined to

take place unless the atomic bombs

ended the war. Code-Name Downfall,

despite its shortage of detailed maps,

shows that the atomic bombs were

necessary considering the fact that

the Japanese showed no intention of

surrendering without a fight to the

finish. Only the dropping of the

bombs precluded that end.

Lt Vern Conaway, USAF Maxwell

AFB, Alabama

Review used courtesy of Air & Space

Power Journal, 28 October 2008

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/

airchronicles/bookrev/allen.html

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 38
Combating WMD Resource Page

Theater Nuclear Operations Course

(TNOC)

TNOC is the only course offered by a Department of Defense organization that provides training for planners, support staff, targeteers, and staff nuclear planners for joint operations and targeting. The course provides overview of nuclear weapon design, capabilities and effects as well as U.S. nuclear policy, and joint nuclear

doctrine. TNOC meets U.S. Army qualification requirements for the

additional skill identifier 5H. The course number is DNWS-R013

(TNOC). Call DNWS at (505) 846-5666 or DSN 246-5666 for quotas and registration information.

Nuclear and Counterproliferation Officer Course

(NCP52)

NCP52 is the Functional Area 52 qualifying course. Initial priority is

given to officers TDY enroute to a FA52 assignment or currently

serving in a FA52 position. There is limited availability outside of

the FA52 community. Please call the FA52 Proponent Manager at

(703) 806-7866 to inquire on available seats.

Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability

(HPAC)

HPAC provides the capability to accurately predict the effects of

hazardous material releases into the atmosphere and the collateral

effects of these releases on civilian and military populations. HPAC

employs integrated source terms, high resolution weather and particulate transport algorithms to rapidly model hazard areas and human collateral effects.

Registration, Software Distribution and Training:

(703)-325-1276 Fax: (703) 325-0398 (DSN 221]

https://acecenter.cnttr.dtra.mil.

Email: acecenter@cnttr.dtra.mil

Pandemic Influenza Overview

This class describes influenza types, variations, and effects, and

identifies worldwide threats from pandemic influenza.

Examines U.S. strategy to combat the spread of pandemic influenza, identifies organization and responsibilities to implement

countermeasures to pandemic influenza.

Identifies DOD plans and capabilities to respond to pandemic

influenza by examining supporting technologies for detection,

surveillance, protection, and mitigation of pandemic influenza.

Location: Distance Learning, register here:

https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil

Army Combating WMD Information

Portal (ACIP)

The Army Combating WMD Information Portal

(ACIP) is a USANCA sponsored web-based

Combating WMD information resource for the

Army Combating WMD community planning. The

ACIP is the gateway to information and resources on Combating WMD information and is

currently located on NIPR AKO USANCA Home

Page. It is a prototype being developed on the

unclassified network and will transition to the

classified SIPR network as it matures. From

AKO, search for USANCA. On the USANCA

Home Page find the Army CMWD Information

Portal (ACIP) and click "Open web site in a separate browser window" and open the ACIP to give

it a trial run. The ACIP is being built to support

you, the CWMD planner. Provide suggestions

and comments regarding content and appearance to Mr. Jack Riegel.

His e-mail address is: jack.f.riegel@us.army.mil.

U.S. Nuclear Policy

This course explains the U.S. policy and its history; reviews NATO policy; discusses nuclear

deterrence: theory, principles, and implications;

discusses instruments of national power and implications for nuclear weapons; reviews nuclear

surety and intelligence; discusses nuclear treaties and arms control.

This course is taught at the

Nuclear Weapons School (DNWS)

Albuquerque, New Mexico

Email: DNWS@abq.dtra.mil

Fax (505) 846-9168 or DSN 246-9168

Online Registration:

https://dnws.abq.dtra.mil/StudentArea/Login.asp

Pasf issues available online!

USANCA is partnering with Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear Defense Information Analysis

Center (CBRNIAC) to bring you the latest Journal in

electronic format as well as some older issues of The

NBC Report.

https://www.cbrniac.apgea.army.mil/Products/Links/

KeyDocs/Pages/USANCA.aspx

39 Combating WMD Journal Issue 4
Titan II missile launching from silo. tttiiwfltMfti'iiiff U.S. Air Force file photo

Combating WMD Journal Issue 4 40