United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to the Chairman and the Ranking

Member, Subcommittee on Personnel,

Committee on Armed Services, U.S.

Senate

January 1997 MILITARY ATTRITION

DOD Could Save

Millions by Better

Screening Enlisted

Personnel

GAO/NSIAD-97-39

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-270643 

January 6, 1997

The Honorable Dirk Kempthorne

Chairman

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Personnel

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

This report responds to the request of the former Chairman and the current Ranking Member

that we review the attrition rates of first-term, active-duty military personnel who are separated

within the first 6 months of their enlistments. Specifically, we (1) calculated how much the

services could save by achieving their goals for reducing 6-month attrition, (2) determined the

adequacy of the data that the Department of Defense uses to allow it to establish realistic goals

for reducing attrition, and (3) identified the principal reasons that enlistees are separated from

the services while they are still in training.

Unless you announce its contents earlier, we plan to make no further distribution of this report

until 3 days after its issue date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of Defense,

the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We will also

make copies available to others upon request.

Please contact me at (202) 512-5140 if you or your staff have any questions concerning this

report. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Mark E. Gebicke

Director, Military Operations and

 Capabilities Issues
Executive Summary

Purpose For at least the last decade, about one-third of enlistees in the military

services have failed to complete their first tours of duty. Concerned that

the attrition rate was so high, the former Chairman and the Ranking

Member of the Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed

Services, asked GAO to review the attrition rates of first-term, active-duty

military personnel who are separated within the first 6 months of their

enlistments. Specifically, GAO (1) calculated how much the services could

save by achieving their goals for reducing 6-month attrition,

(2) determined the adequacy of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) data for

allowing it to establish realistic goals for reducing attrition, and

(3) analyzed the principal reasons that enlistees are separated from the

services while they are still in training.

Background After recruiters have prescreened applicants for the military services, the

applicants are sent to military entrance processing stations (MEPS), which

are the responsibility of the Military Entrance Processing Command. When

it has been determined that the applicants are qualified, through medical

and aptitudinal tests, they are sworn into the Individual Ready Reserve, in

an unpaid status, for up to 1 year. Once they are called to active duty,

enlisted personnel enter basic training, which can last from 6 to 12 weeks,

depending on the service. After basic training, recruits go on to initial skill

training, which can range from a few weeks to more than a year.

In fiscal year 1994, DOD recruited more than 176,000 new recruits. Of that

number, more than 25,000 were separated by the 6-month point in their

contracts.

Results in Brief All the services agree that reducing early attrition is desirable. To this end,

three services have attrition-reducing targets ranging from 4 to 10 percent.

If the services reach their goals, they would realize immediate short-term

annual savings ranging from around $5 million to $12 million. The services

may not be able to realize savings through reductions in their related

training and recruiting infrastructure for many years. However, possible

long-term savings could range from more than $15 million to $39 million.

Despite the fact that the services have these goals, DOD, at present, lacks

consistent and complete information on the causes of attrition.

Implementing arbitrary attrition-reduction goals could result in a

reduction in the quality of recruits.

Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

DOD’s primary database for managing attrition cannot be used to

adequately determine the reasons that recruits separate and to set

appropriate targets for reducing attrition for two reasons: (1) the services

interpret and apply DOD’s uniform set of separation codes differently

because DOD has not issued directives on how to interpret them and

(2) current separation codes capture only the official reason that an

enlistee leaves the service.

Thousands of recruits are separated in the first 6 months because the

services do not adequately screen applicants for disqualifying medical

conditions or for preservice drug use. One reason that this screening is

inadequate is that recruiters do not have sufficient incentives to ensure

that their recruits are qualified. Thousands of recruits also are separated

who fail to meet minimum performance criteria. Recruits have problems

meeting performance standards because they are not physically prepared

for basic training and because they lack motivation.

Principal Findings

DOD Could Save Millions

of Dollars by Reducing

Attrition

If the services reach their goals for reducing attrition, they would realize

immediate short-term savings because they would be transporting,

feeding, clothing, and paying fewer recruits. In some cases, reducing

attrition may require that the services add preenlistment medical tests or

more screening mechanisms to their recruiting and examining processes.

However, GAO believes that these added costs would be more than offset

by the immediate short-term savings achieved through having to recruit,

process, and train fewer recruits. Even larger dollar savings could be

realized over time as the services began to reduce the infrastructure

associated with recruiting and training enlistees.

Using GAO’s calculations of the fixed and marginal costs of recruiting and

training and the services’ highest and lowest targets for reducing attrition,

GAO estimates that if the services were to reduce their 6-month attrition by

4 percent, their immediate short-term savings would be $4.8 million. If the

services achieved a 10-percent reduction of attrition, their short-term

savings would be $12 million. Over time, if the services reduced 6-month

attrition by 4 percent, their infrastructure savings could be as high as

$15.6 million. If they were able to reduce their 6-month attrition by 

Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

10 percent, potential infrastructure savings could be as much as

$39 million.

DOD’s Data Does Not

Allow the Services to Set

Realistic Attrition Goals

While significant savings could be achieved by reducing attrition, GAO

believes that the services’ current goals for reducing attrition are arbitrary.

That is, DOD and the services do not currently have sufficient information

to determine what portion of 6-month attrition is truly avoidable. The

danger of setting arbitrary goals is that these goals can become “attrition

ceilings,” which can result in the inadvertent retention of lower quality

recruits. To set realistic and achievable targets for reducing attrition, DOD

and the services need more complete and accurate data on why recruits

are being separated.

DOD’s current data on attrition is inconsistent and incomplete for two

reasons. First, the services interpret DOD’s definitions of separation codes

differently and therefore place enlistees with identical situations in

different discharge categories. Second, DOD’s separation codes capture

only the officially assigned reason for discharge, when many other factors

may result in an enlistee’s separation. DOD has not issued guidance for

applying these separation codes.

Screening Processes Do

Not Identify Thousands of

Recruits Who Are

Unqualified for Service

About 83 percent of the 25,000 who were discharged in their first 6 months

were assigned separation codes indicating that they (1) were medically

unqualified for military service, (2) had character or behavior disorders,

(3) had fraudulently or erroneously entered the military, or (4) failed to

meet minimum performance criteria.1

 Separations for medical conditions

and failure to meet performance standards represent at least 55 percent of

all 6-month attrition for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year

1994. This percentage is understated for two reasons. First, some persons

who have medical problems are categorized as fraudulent enlistments

because they concealed medical problems. Second, some persons who

have performance problems are categorized as having character or

behavior disorders. GAO was not able to calculate the number of persons

discharged for drug use because these separations are categorized in many

different ways.

GAO found that recruits were enlisted and later separated because DOD’s

screening processes were inadequate in the following ways:

1

The Defense Manpower Data Center maintains data on all the services’ enlistees; fiscal year 1994 was

the most current year for which complete data was available.

Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

• Recruiters do not have adequate incentives to ensure that their recruits are

qualified. The Navy recently began to subtract points from recruiters’

quotas when their enlistees did not graduate from basic training. It is too

soon, however, to determine the effect of this change on attrition. Over the

years, the Marine Corps has allowed its recruiting units the flexibility to tie

recruiters’ incentive systems to enlistees’ successful completion of basic

training. However, this policy has not been uniformly applied throughout

the Marine Corps, and its incentive system, as those of the other services,

does not appear to provide adequate incentives for recruiters to screen out

unqualified applicants. Basic training personnel suggested that awarding

recruiters with partial credit for screening out unqualified personnel or

changing monthly goals to floating 3-month goals might relieve the

pressure on recruiters to enlist personnel later found to be unqualified.

• The services do not require all applicants to provide the names of their

medical insurers or their past medical providers. Also, the medical

screening forms contain vague and ambiguous questions and may be easy

for applicants to falsify.

• DOD’s current system of capturing information on medical diagnoses does

not allow it to track the success of recruits who receive medical waivers.

DOD has just approved a project to compile a comprehensive database of

medical conditions for all accessions. Information from this database will

provide DOD with the ability to reevaluate its physical enlistment

standards, to analyze the medical reasons that recruits are separated, to

make fact-based policy changes to reduce medical attrition, and to

determine whether it would be cost-effective to provide more medical

tests to all or selected groups of applicants.

• The responsibility for reviewing medical separation cases to determine

whether medical conditions should have been detected at the MEPS now

resides with the Military Entrance Processing Command, the organization

responsible for the medical examinations.

• The Navy and the Marine Corps do not test applicants for drugs at the MEPS

but wait until they arrive at basic training.

Thousands of Recruits Are

Discharged for Failure to

Meet Minimum

Performance Criteria

More than 7,200 of the recruits who entered the services in fiscal year 1994

were discharged in the first 6 months of service because they failed to

meet minimum performance criteria. Basic training personnel throughout

the services said that these recruits are not physically prepared for basic

training and lack motivation. Basic training personnel suggested that

recruits might be better prepared for the physical demands of basic

training if they were more fully informed of the services’ physical training

requirements and encouraged to exercise to become physically fit before

Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

going to basic training. The Army has a new program, which was nearing

implementation in December 1996, to (1) award enlistees retirement

points for participating in physical activities with their recruiters before

going to basic training and (2) allow enlistees access to military fitness

centers and military medical facilities if they are injured.

To try to improve recruits’ motivation, all the services have taken actions

to improve the basic training environment. They have established

motivational and rehabilitation units for recruits with motivational

problems and injuries. The Army and the Air Force, in particular, have

stressed positive leadership by their drill instructors. Despite these

improvements, GAO’s interviews with separating recruits suggest that

negative leadership techniques continue to be a factor in recruits’ lack of

motivation to meet performance standards.

Recommendations To reduce the attrition of enlisted personnel during the first 6 months of

their terms of enlistment, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense

issue implementing guidance on DOD’s separation codes and direct the

services to strengthen their recruiter incentive and medical screening

systems. GAO also recommends that DOD use its newly proposed database

of medical diagnostic codes to improve medical screening and that DOD

move the responsibility for reviewing medical separations from the

Military Entrance Processing Command. Finally, GAO recommends that

drug testing for all services be moved to the MEPS and that the services

adopt Delayed Entry Programs similar to the Army’s new proposed

program. These recommendations are presented in their entirety in

chapters 2 and 3.

Agency Comments

and GAO’s Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of the GAO report, DOD concurred with GAO’s

recommendation to use DOD’s newly proposed database on medical

diagnostic codes to improve medical screening and with GAO’s

recommendation to strengthen the services’ Delayed Entry Programs. DOD

partially concurred with GAO’s recommendations to issue implementing

guidance on DOD’s separation codes and to direct the services to

strengthen their recruiter incentive systems and screening mechanisms.

DOD also partially concurred with the GAO recommendation to test all

applicants for military service for drugs before they report to basic

training. DOD did not concur with GAO’s recommendation to remove the

review of medical separation files from the agency that conducts the

medical screening. DOD believes that the Military Entrance Processing

Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Executive Summary

Command is the appropriate entity to perform this review. GAO continues

to believe that an entity completely outside the medical screening process

would be more able to objectively determine whether the MEPS physicians

should have discovered disqualifying medical problems. DOD’s comments

appear in their entirety in appendix I and are discussed in 

chapters 2 and 3.

Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Contents

Executive Summary 2

Chapter 1 

Introduction

10

A Significant Portion of First-Term Attrition Occurs During

Training

10

Demographics of Fiscal Year 1994 Recruits 12

Three Separate Commands Recruit, Screen, and Train New

Enlistees

13

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 15

Chapter 2 

DOD Could Save

Millions of Dollars by

Reducing Attrition

18

Services’ Plans for Reducing Attrition 18

The Services Make a Substantial Investment in Recruits Who

Separate in the First 6 Months

19

Short-Term Savings in Variable Costs by Reducing Attrition 21

Possibility of Long-Term Savings Through Infrastructure Cuts 22

Dangers of Establishing Attrition Targets Without Adequate

Information on Why Recruits Are Separated

23

DOD Does Not Have Data Available to Establish Appropriate

Targets for Reducing Attrition

24

Recommendation 27

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 27

Chapter 3 

Thousands of Recruits

Are Separated Early

Because They Are

Unqualified or

Unmotivated

29

Screening Processes Do Not Identify Thousands of Recruits Who

Are Unqualified for Service

30

Thousands of Recruits Discharged for Failure to Meet Minimum

Performance Criteria

41

Recommendations 45

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 46

Appendixes Appendix I: Comments From the Department of Defense 50

Appendix II: Major Contributors to This Report 64

Tables Table 1.1: Percentage of Enlistees Who Are Separated During

Their First Terms

11

Table 1.2: Percentage of Enlistees Who Are Separated in the First

6 Months of Their First Terms

11

Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Contents

Table 2.1: Services’ Investment in Recruits Who Enlisted in Fiscal

Year 1994 and Were Separated in the First 2 Months

20

Table 2.2: Services’ Investment in Recruits Who Enlisted in Fiscal

Year 1994 and Were Separated in the First 3 to 6 Months

21

Table 2.3: Marginal Cost Savings to Be Gained by Reducing

Attrition by 4 and 10 Percent

22

Table 2.4: Long-Term Savings by Achieving 4-Percent and

10-Percent Reductions in 6-Month Attrition

23

Figures Figure 1.1: DOD’s 2-Month, 6-Month, and 1-Year Attrition for

Fiscal Years 1990 Through 1994

12

Figure 1.2: Process of Recruiting and Training Enlisted Personnel 15

Abbreviations

AFQT Armed Forces Qualification Test

ASVAB Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery

DEP Delayed Entry Program

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center

DOD Department of Defense

GAO General Accounting Office

MEPCOM Military Entrance Processing Command

MEPS Military Entrance Processing Station

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

For at least the last decade, about one-third of those who have enlisted in

the military services have failed to complete their initial enlistment

contracts. One-third of these separating enlistees left the military before

they reported to their first duty assignments. The military services make a

substantial investment in training, time, equipment, and related expenses

for military enlistees.1

 The separation of enlisted personnel before they

complete their initial training is wasteful because the services lose their

investment and must increase accessions to replace these losses.

Consequently, first-term attrition is an issue of significant concern at all

levels within the armed forces.

A Significant Portion

of First-Term Attrition

Occurs During

Training

New recruits take an enlistment oath and sign a contract to serve one of

the military services for a specified period of time, typically 4 years.

Despite this contractual obligation, Department of Defense (DOD) data

shows that about one-third of new recruits fail to complete their first

terms. This attrition figure has been relatively constant over the past 

10 years and has held true for each of the services. Table 1.1 shows

attrition rates for enlistees who entered the services in fiscal years 1986

through 1991. DOD generally tracks enlisted attrition up to the 3-year point

in enlistees’ first terms. In this report, however, we show attrition at the

4-year point because the majority of enlistees have 4-year contracts.

Calculations of attrition at the 3-year point do not include the attrition of

those who have 4-year contracts and leave the services in the last year of

their commitments. Enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1986

were scheduled to complete 4-year contracts in fiscal year 1990. Likewise,

enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1991 were expected to

complete their 4-year contracts in fiscal year 1995.

1

Not all recruits have completed training at the 6-month point in their first terms because some initial

skill training lasts beyond this point. In rare cases, initial skill training can last as long as a year or

more. However, for the purpose of this report, we examined attrition at the 6-month point because at

that time, most enlistees have completed both basic and follow-on training and are being assigned to

their first duty stations.

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Table 1.1: Percentage of Enlistees Who

Are Separated During Their First

Terms

Fiscal year enlistees

entered the services Army Navy

Marine

Corps Air Force All services

1986 32.1 35.2 38.1 27.2 32.6

1987 31.9 33.4 35.3 26.3 31.7

1988 34.6 33.8 32.5 26.3 32.8

1989 36.3 35.5 34.5 31.2 35.0

1990 37.2 34.2 38.0 31.2 35.4

1991 37.7 31.7 35.4 32.8 34.6

Source: Defense Manpower Data Center.

Our analysis of the data further reveals that attrition is not evenly

distributed throughout a first-term enlistment. About one-third of

first-term attrition occurs within the first 6 months of an enlistee’s term,

during the time when many recruits are still in training and before they

report to their first duty assignments. Table 1.2 displays the attrition rates

at the 6-month point, again for each service and for all services, for

enlistees who entered the services between fiscal years 1986 and 1994.

(Fiscal year 1994 was the latest year for which the Defense Manpower

Data Center (DMDC) had complete data at the time of our review.)

Table 1.2: Percentage of Enlistees Who

Are Separated in the First 6 Months of

Their First Terms

Fiscal year enlistees

entered the services Army Navy

Marine

Corps Air Force All services

1986 10.4 13.1 15.9 10.7 11.8

1987 9.2 12.7 13.2 10.0 10.8

1988 9.8 14.4 12.6 9.0 11.6

1989 10.0 12.8 13.9 9.4 11.3

1990 10.7 10.1 15.6 10.2 11.1

1991 13.0 10.2 14.1 10.5 11.9

1992 12.8 12.9 12.9 9.2 12.3

1993 15.3 15.8 13.6 11.6 14.6

1994 15.7 15.7 12.5 11.6 14.4

Source: DMDC.

Figure 1.1 shows that, in fiscal years 1990 through 1994, DOD’s 2-month,

6-month, and 12-month attrition rates increased steadily in a parallel

pattern. Attrition rates shown in figure 1.1 are cumulative. That is, 6- and

12-month attrition rates include all attrition up to those two points in time.

Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.1: DOD’s 2-Month, 6-Month,

and 1-Year Attrition for Fiscal Years

1990 Through 1994

Attrition rate (percent)

0

5.00

10.00

15.00

20.00

25.00

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Fiscal year

2 months

6 months

1 year

Source: GAO’s analysis of DMDC data.

Demographics of

Fiscal Year 1994

Recruits

We concentrated our analysis of 6-month attrition on the cohort of recruits

who joined the military in fiscal year 1994, as this was the latest year for

which DMDC had complete statistics during the time of our review.

Additional data provided to us by DOD demonstrates that fiscal year 1994

was a representative year in terms of the education levels and quality of

the recruits who joined the military. Researchers have investigated several

factors that influence attrition during the first term of enlistment. These

include educational credentials, gender, age, race, enlistment term, and

military occupational specialties.2

 According to DOD and the services, the

most important of these variables in determining the attrition rate is

recruits’ educational attainment. Most researchers have found that

2

See Report to Congress: Educational Enlistment Standards: Recruiting Equity for GED Certificates

(Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management Policy), Apr. 1996); Attrition

Revisited: Identifying the Problem and Its Solutions (Human Resources Research Organization,

FR-PRD-95-01, Jan. 1995); Who Stays, Who Leaves? Attrition Among First-Term Enlistees (Rand,

N-2967-FMP, May 1989); Trends in Attrition of High-Quality Military Recruits (Rand, R-3539-FMP, Aug.

1988); and First-Term Attrition in the Marine Corps (Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 92-200,

Mar. 1993).

Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

enlistees who were high school graduates had lower attrition rates. A

second predictor of lower attrition rates is enlistees’ scores on the Armed

Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). Those who score in the upper 

50th percentile have historically had lower attrition rates. In fiscal year

1994, 96 percent of all recruits were high school graduates, and 72 percent

of all recruits scored in the upper 50th percentile on the AFQT. In that same

year, 68 percent of all recruits were high school graduates and scored in

the upper 50th percentile of the AFQT. All of these figures compare

favorably with data from other recent fiscal years.

The magnitude of DOD’s 6-month attrition becomes apparent when studied

in context with DOD’s total accessions. In fiscal year 1994, DOD recruited

more than 176,000 recruits who did not have prior military service. Of that

number, more than 25,000 recruits were separated by the 6-month point in

their contracts.

Three Separate

Commands Recruit,

Screen, and Train

New Enlistees

After a recruiter prescreens an applicant for military service, the applicant

is sent to one of 65 military entrance processing stations (MEPS) located

throughout the country. At the MEPS, which are under the direction of the

Military Entrance Processing Command (MEPCOM), the applicant takes the

Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to determine whether

he or she is qualified for enlistment and a military job specialty,3

 and a

medical examination is given to determine whether he or she meets

physical entrance standards. After it has been determined that an

applicant is qualified, the applicant is sworn into the service and enters the

Delayed Entry Program (DEP). When an applicant enters the DEP, he or she

becomes a member of the Individual Ready Reserve, in an unpaid status,

and awaits being called to active duty. An individual may remain in the DEP

for up to 1 year. Just before reporting to the service basic training

command, the new recruit returns to the MEPS, undergoes a brief physical

examination, and is sworn into active duty.

Basic training lasts from 6 to 12 weeks. Most enlistees have completed

basic training before the 3-month point in their first terms, though their

graduation points may vary, depending on how long their basic training

lasts and on whether they have to be held back to repeat some parts of

basic training. The Air Force basic training program lasts 6 weeks and is

given at one training site, located at Lackland Air Force Base in San

Antonio, Texas. Navy recruits remain in basic training for 9 weeks at one

3

In some cases, applicants are given the ASVAB in high school or at independent sites apart from the

MEPS.

Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

site, located at the Naval Training Center in Great Lakes, Illinois. The

Marine Corps’ basic training curriculum is 11 weeks long for men and 

12 weeks long for women, and recruits are trained in San Diego,

California, and Parris Island, South Carolina. The Army has two types of

basic training sites: sites that provide only basic combat training and

one-station unit training sites that provide both basic combat training and

follow-on initial skill training. The Army’s basic combat training sites are

located at Fort Knox, Kentucky; Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri; and Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The Army’s one-station unit

training sites are located at Fort Benning, Georgia; Fort Knox, Kentucky;

Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Fort McClellan, Alabama; and Fort Leonard Wood,

Missouri. Army basic training lasts 8 weeks.

By the 6-month point in their first terms, most enlistees have completed

follow-on training in technical skills, though the length of such training

can vary widely, from a few weeks to a year or more. In some cases,

graduates of basic training go directly to their first duty assignments.

Figure 1.2 displays the most common recruiting and training pipeline for

new enlistees.

Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

Figure 1.2: Process of Recruiting and Training Enlisted Personnel

Applicant

Recruiting Station

MEPS 

ASVAB test

Physical exam

First enlistment oath

Delayed

Entry

Program

MEPS 

Final processing

Second enlistment oath

 into active duty

Brief physical exam

Up to

1 year

USAF

USA

USMC

USN

Few weeks to more than a year

6-12 weeks

Basic Training

Air Force

Army

Marine Corps

Navy

USAF

USA

USMC

USN

First Assignment

Technical Training

Prescreening

Source: GAO.

Objectives, Scope,

and Methodology

At the request of the former Chairman and Ranking Member of the

Subcommittee on Personnel, Senate Committee on Armed Services, we

reviewed the attrition rates of first-term, active-duty military enlistees who

are separated from the military within the first 6 months of their

enlistments. Specifically, we (1) calculated how much the services could

save by achieving their goals for reducing 6-month attrition,

(2) determined the adequacy of DOD’s data for allowing it to establish

realistic goals for reducing attrition, and (3) analyzed the principal reasons

that enlistees are being separated from the services while they are still in

training.

We limited the scope of our review to attrition at the 6-month point for

two reasons. First, an enlistee’s discharge is categorized as an entry-level

separation until the 6-month point in the enlistee’s term. The entry-level,

Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Chapter 1 

Introduction

180-day point serves in some sense as a probationary period. If enlistees

are discharged after 6 months, they may be entitled to more benefits and

undergo a more complex separation process. Our second reason for

measuring attrition at the 6-month point is that this point marks the end of

training for most first-term enlistees. Because of the variation in the length

of follow-on training, however, some enlistees continue in training for a

year or longer into their first terms.

To identify the potential cost savings that DOD could realize by reducing its

first-term attrition, we first determined the magnitude of annual service

accessions and first-term attrition, over time, by obtaining and reviewing

data maintained by DMDC. We also compared DOD- and service-provided

data regarding average costs to recruit, examine, test, screen, transport,

and train new enlistees. This data includes both the short-term variable

costs that are associated with the cost per recruit and the longer-term

fixed costs that are associated with the infrastructure required to recruit

and train new enlistees. In addition, we reviewed service-identified targets

for reducing first-term attrition and applied these targets to the cost data

to identify the potential for cost savings.

To determine the adequacy of DOD’s data regarding reasons for first-term

attrition, we analyzed DMDC’s database of enlistee separations and

reviewed DOD’s corresponding list of separation codes, which designate

the official reasons that enlistees are separated. Additionally, we reviewed

the services’ separation instructions and met with personnel officials at

basic training locations for each of the services to identify similarities and

differences in the way the separation codes are applied at the different

locations.

To analyze the principal reasons that DOD is separating enlistees within the

first 6 months of their enlistments, we reviewed DMDC’s database of

separations in each of the services for enlistees who entered the services

in fiscal years 1990 through 1995. We then compared this data to the

service separation codes. Specifically, we concentrated on separations

that occurred in fiscal year 1994, as this was the most recent year for

which DMDC had complete data at the time of our review. To understand

reasons for attrition, we also interviewed officials in DOD and each of the

services who are involved in recruiting, examining, screening, training, and

separating enlistees. To obtain the perspective of separating recruits, we

conducted one-on-one interviews with a total of 126 recruits, who were

being separated but were still at the basic training commands at the time

of our site visits. We recognize that these recruits do not represent a

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Introduction

statistical sample of all recruits who will be separated this year.

Nevertheless, their responses do supplement information provided to us

by DOD and service officials.

We performed our work at the following DOD and service headquarters,

commands, and installations:

• Directorate for Accession Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense, Force Management Policy, Washington, D.C.;

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs, Washington,

D.C.;

• Army Directorate of Military Personnel Management, Washington, D.C.;

U.S. Army Recruiting Command, Ft. Knox, Kentucky; and Army Basic

Training, Fort Jackson, South Carolina;

• Air Force Directorate of Military Personnel Policy, Washington, D.C.; Air

Force Recruiting Service, Randolph Air Force Base, San Antonio, Texas;

and Air Force Basic Training, Lackland Air Force Base, San Antonio,

Texas;

• Manpower Plans and Policy Division, Marine Corps Headquarters,

Arlington, Virginia; Marine Corps Recruiting Command, Arlington,

Virginia; and Marine Corps Basic Training, Marine Corps Recruit Depot,

Parris Island, South Carolina;

• Navy Office of Military Personnel Policy and Career Progression,

Washington, D.C.; Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, Virginia; Navy

Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Washington, D.C.; and Navy Recruit

Training Command, Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois; and

• U.S. Military Entrance Processing Command, North Chicago, Illinois;

Military Entrance Processing Station, Fort Jackson, South Carolina; and

Military Entrance Processing Station, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

With regard to recruit training, we conducted audit work at Lackland Air

Force Base and the Great Lakes Naval Training Center because those are

the only locations where the Air Force and the Navy provide basic

training. In the case of the Marine Corps, we selected Parris Island

because this is the only site where the Marines train both male and female

recruits. In the case of the Army, we selected Fort Jackson, South

Carolina, because this training location provided the greatest variation in

job specialties. We conducted our review from November 1995 to

October 1996 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards. DOD’s comments on a draft of this report are summarized in

chapters 2 and 3 and are presented in their entirety in appendix I.

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All the services agree that reducing early attrition is desirable. To this end,

three services have developed attrition-reduction targets ranging from 

4 to 10 percent. If the services were to reach their goals, they would realize

immediate short-term savings because they would be transporting,

feeding, clothing, and paying fewer recruits. In some cases, reducing

attrition may require that the services add preenlistment medical tests or

more screening mechanisms to their recruiting and examining processes.

However, we believe that these added costs would be more than offset by

immediate short-term savings. The services could accrue these savings

because they would need to recruit, process, and train fewer recruits to

meet the same accession needs. Even larger dollar savings could be

realized over time as the services began to reduce the infrastructure

associated with recruiting and training enlistees.

Using our calculations of the fixed and marginal costs of recruiting and

training and the services’ highest and lowest targets for reducing attrition,

we estimate that if the services were to reduce their 6-month attrition by 

4 percent, their immediate short-term savings would be $4.8 million. If the

services achieved a 10-percent reduction of attrition, their short-term

savings would be $12 million. Over time, if the services reduced 6-month

attrition by 4 percent, their infrastructure savings could be as high as

$15.6 million. If they were able to reduce their 6-month attrition by 

10 percent, potential infrastructure savings could be as much as

$39 million.

While we believe that significant savings could be achieved by reducing

attrition, we also believe that the services’ current goals for reducing

attrition are arbitrary. That is, DOD and the services do not currently have

sufficient information to determine what portion of 6-month attrition is

truly avoidable. The danger of setting arbitrary goals is that these goals

can become “attrition ceilings,” which can result in the inadvertent

retention of lower quality recruits. To set realistic and achievable targets

for reducing attrition, DOD and the services need more complete and

accurate data on why recruits are being separated.

Services’ Plans for

Reducing Attrition

Reducing attrition to zero is neither practical nor possible. Attrition will

always occur because recruits will have medical conditions that cannot be

discovered in the MEPS examinations, they will be injured during training,

or they will not adapt to military life. However, several military officials we

spoke with believe that attrition can be reduced because a portion of it is

avoidable. For example, some recruits are now being enlisted with

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medical problems or with drug use habits that could have been detected

earlier in the enlistment process or that were detected and were waived.

Though no one in the services can define exactly what portion of attrition

can be avoided, three of the services have set targets for reducing it. The

Navy, for example, has planned a “War on Attrition” to reduce attrition at

all stages, from recruitment to retention in the fleet. The Navy hopes to

reduce its attrition at all stages by 5 to 10 percent. Specifically, the Navy

would like to reduce attrition from basic training by 2,000 persons per

year.

The Army has recently contracted for a study of what an “acceptable” level

of attrition should be. In the absence of such a defined level, the Army has

suggested a 4-percent goal for reducing attrition up to the 6-month point.

The Marine Corps has recently proposed several initiatives to reduce

enlisted attrition at various stages of the training pipeline. However, it has

not defined quantitative goals for reducing attrition.

Finally, the Air Force has taken a new look at enlisted attrition. In

December 1995, the Air Force began to look at issues that pertain to

military attrition. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force’s fiscal

year 1997 budget proposal contains goals for reducing attrition. The Air

Force has accordingly reduced its budget on the assumption that it will be

able to reduce its current basic training attrition rate from 9.5 percent to

7 percent and its first-term attrition after basic training by 5 percent.

The Services Make a

Substantial

Investment in

Recruits Who

Separate in the First 6

Months

The military services’ investment in their enlisted personnel is made up of

both fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs can be thought of as

overhead or infrastructure costs that are not easily or quickly changed and

cannot be directly associated with a single enlistee. Examples of this type

of cost are the total number of recruiters or drill instructors or the money

spent by a service on a television advertisement campaign for recruiting.

The variable costs are directly connected to each recruit, such as costs for

MEPS examinations, transportation from MEPS to basic training, issuance of

clothing, and pay and allowances for each enlistee.

On the basis of DOD cost data, we estimate that in fiscal year 1996, DOD and

the services spent about $390 million in fixed and variable costs to recruit

and train individuals who never made it to their first duty stations. It costs

between $9,400 and $13,500 to recruit and train an active-duty enlistee

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through basic training and an additional $6,100 to $16,300 to train the

enlistee in an initial skill.

To calculate the services’ investment in enlistees who separated in fiscal

year 1994, we multiplied the numbers of those separated at the 2-month

and 6-month points by the average investment per enlistee. We chose the

2-month point because at this time, most recruits have completed basic

training. We chose the 6-month point because by that time, most recruits

have completed follow-on training. We used the most current attrition cost

figures available—for fiscal year 1993. We converted fiscal year 1993

dollars to fiscal year 1996 dollars.

Of the services’ $390 million investment in enlistees who never made it to

their first duty stations, about 60 percent of this investment, or

$231.8 million, was made in enlistees who were separated in their first 2

months of service (see table 2.1).

Table 2.1: Services’ Investment in

Recruits Who Enlisted in Fiscal Year

1994 and Were Separated in the First 2

Months

Fiscal year 1996 dollars

Service

Number of

accessions

Attrition rate

(percent)

Number

of attrited

enlistees

Investment

in each

separated

enlistee

Total

investment in

all separated

enlistees

Army 61,408 9.85 6,051 $13,522 $81,821,622

Navy 53,501 12.56 6,721 12,077 81,169,517

Marine Corps 31,759 9.81 3,114 14,322 44,629,848

Air Force 29,760 8.69 2,585 9,360 24,195,600

Total 176,428 10.47 18,471 $231,816,587

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DMDC data.

About 40 percent of the services’ investment in enlistees who were

separated in the first 3 to 6 months, or $158.3 million, was made in

enlistees who were discharged between the 3rd and 6th months of service

(see table 2.2).

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Table 2.2: Services’ Investment in

Recruits Who Enlisted in Fiscal Year

1994 and Were Separated in the First 3

to 6 Months

Fiscal year 1996 dollars

Service

Number of

accessions

Attrition rate

(percent)

Number

of attrited

enlistees

Investment

in each

separated

enlistee

Total

investment in

all separated

enlistees

Army 61,408 5.69 3,493 $20,733 $72,420,369

Navy 53,501 3.22 1,723 26,552 45,749,096

Marine Corps 31,759 2.78 884 20,426 18,056,584

Air Force 29,760 2.89 859 25,672 22,052,248

Total 176,428 3.94 6,959 $158,278,297

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and DMDC data.

Short-Term Savings in

Variable Costs by

Reducing Attrition

Significant near-term savings in variable costs could result from screening

out the applicants who are now enlisting and are almost immediately being

separated. For example, if recruiters send individuals with medical

disqualifications to the MEPS, the service still pays for a MEPS examination,

which costs around $70. If the individuals with these disqualifying medical

conditions make it through their medical examinations, the services must

pay for their transportation to basic training and then pay, clothe, house,

and feed these recruits while they await separation. After separation, the

services must pay to transport the enlistees home. As another example,

when the services do not test for drugs until the recruits arrive at basic

training, those services incur all the marginal costs, which could have been

avoided had the services tested the recruits for drugs at the MEPS.

1

 If the

services have to add screening mechanisms in order to disqualify recruits

earlier, the cost of these additional mechanisms would have to be

subtracted from any calculations of marginal savings. Such added

screening mechanisms could include requiring more preenlistment

documentation or medical tests.

Marginal cost savings resulting from improved and earlier screening of

recruits could be realized immediately. The marginal cost of sending a

recruit to basic training and then separating him or her can be substantial.

For example, the Navy calculates that its marginal cost for each recruit

who is separated from basic training is $4,700 for each male and $4,900 for

each female. These figures are based on the Navy’s estimate that it costs

$83 to transport a recruit to basic training; $3,650 to pay, feed, and house

1

The marginal cost is the variable cost of recruiting and training each recruit.

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the recruit while at basic training;2 $91 to provide the recruit’s medical

examination at basic training; $817 to provide a male recruit with clothing

($995 for a female recruit); and an additional $83 to transport the recruit

home after separation. If the Navy were to screen out recruits for medical

or drug disqualifications after the MEPS examination but before sending

them to basic training, its immediate cost savings would be at least $4,700

per recruit.3

Assuming that the Navy’s marginal costs are comparable to those of the

other services, we estimate that the marginal cost savings realized through

a 4-percent reduction of attrition would be $4.8 million. With a 10-percent

reduction in 6-month attrition, the services could realize $12 million in

savings. (See table 2.3.)

Table 2.3: Marginal Cost Savings to Be

Gained by Reducing Attrition by 4 and

10 Percent

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Service

Savings resulting from a

4-percent reduction in attrition

Savings resulting from a

10-percent reduction in attrition

Army $1.8 $4.5

Navy 1.6 4.0

Marine Corps 0.8 1.9

Air Force 0.6 1.6

Total $4.8 $12.0

Source: GAO’s analysis of DOD and DMDC data.

Possibility of

Long-Term Savings

Through

Infrastructure Cuts

Over time, if the number of unqualified recruits were significantly reduced

through better screening, it would be possible to reduce the services’

infrastructure associated with recruiting and training, resulting in savings

due to lower fixed costs. An important caveat is that these cost reductions

probably would not be proportional to the decrease in attrition. For

example, if attrition were reduced by 10 percent, it is likely that

infrastructure costs would fall by something less than 10 percent. One

2

This calculation is based on the Navy’s estimate that the average recruit remains at basic training 25

days before being separated and costs the Navy $146 per day.

3

We requested similar cost data from the other three services. They were unable, however, to provide

us with marginal costs comparable to those of the Navy because (1) the services’ methodologies in

calculating costs differed, (2) the services captured different data elements, and (3) the services did

not capture certain data elements that are necessary to calculate how much it costs to send recruits to

basic training and then separate them. For example, the Marine Corps did not track the average time in

service of an enlistee who is separated during basic training. Data provided to us by the Army did not

distinguish between fixed and variable costs, and the Army’s average cost was calculated using the

cost of all enlistees who separate during their first terms. Finally, the Air Force provided us with the

variable cost per graduate from basic training, but not the cost of each separated enlistee.

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important reason that infrastructure costs are not likely to decrease in the

same proportion as attrition falls is that the services may need to ensure

that their recruiting and training organizations maintain excess capacity in

the event of future increases of accessions. The services now determine

staffing and funding for recruiting commands based on the services’

accession missions, which have the potential for being lower if attrition

were to decrease.

Despite these caveats, we believe that it provides perspective to

demonstrate the magnitude of the possible savings to be gained through

reducing attrition and the associated recruiting and training infrastructure.

To provide this perspective, we have chosen the services’ highest and

lowest attrition goals: a 4-percent reduction and a 10-percent reduction of

6-month attrition (see table 2.4).

Table 2.4: Long-Term Savings by

Achieving 4-Percent and 10-Percent

Reductions in 6-Month Attrition

Fiscal year 1996 dollars in millions

Service

Savings resulting from a

4-percent reduction in attrition

Savings resulting from a

10-percent reduction in attrition

Army $6.2 $15.4

Navy 5.1 12.7

Marine Corps 2.5 6.3

Air Force 1.8 4.6

Total $15.6 $39.0

Source: GAO’s analysis of DOD and DMDC data.

Dangers of

Establishing Attrition

Targets Without

Adequate Information

on Why Recruits Are

Separated

We agree that reducing attrition is possible and that the services’ current

targets for reducing attrition may represent modest and achievable goals.

However, the services do not know whether more reductions are possible.

DOD and the services do not currently have adequate information to

determine how much attrition is avoidable and therefore should be cut.

Establishing arbitrarily defined targets for reducing attrition, without

knowing precisely what these targets should be, could result in the

services’ retaining less qualified recruits.

According to officials throughout the services, reducing attrition would be

no problem. They feared, however, that cutting attrition could result in a

corresponding reduction in the quality of their enlistees. That is, service

officials feared that limiting attrition could force them to retain less

qualified recruits. In 1980, we also anticipated this possible negative effect

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of attrition ceilings.4 At that time, we expressed concern that the Office of

the Secretary of Defense and the services “might, because of congressional

concern over attrition levels, attempt to control rather than manage

attrition.” We stated that “While control, through such means as attrition

ceilings, is a quick and easy way to reduce attrition, it could ultimately

prove counterproductive by retaining in the service persons who do not

belong there, which would result in equally serious problems.” We also

pointed out that before DOD can effectively manage attrition, it must have

adequate data on the reasons that enlistees separate early.

DOD Does Not Have

Data Available to

Establish Appropriate

Targets for Reducing

Attrition

In 1980, as during this review, we found that DOD did not have data on

attrition that allowed it to assess service-wide attrition trends and the

factors behind their changes. DOD’s data is inconsistent and incomplete for

two reasons. First, DOD’s primary source of service-wide attrition

data—which is managed by DMDC—contains only the officially assigned

separation codes assigned to enlistees, when many other reasons may

drive enlistees’ discharges. Second, the services interpret DOD’s definitions

of the separation codes differently and therefore place enlistees with

identical situations in different discharge categories. Because of these two

drawbacks, DMDC’s attrition data can be used to deduce only a rough

estimate of why enlisted personnel leave the services.

DOD’s Primary Database

Captures Only the Official

Reason for an Enlistee’s

Separation

DMDC data captures only one of many possible reasons that enlistees leave

the service. The reasons for separation that are collected in DMDC’s

database are based on separation codes taken from a servicemember’s

official discharge form, the DD Form 214.5

 The separation program

designator is a three-character code that captures the service’s official

reason for separation. DMDC converts these designators into interservice

separation codes, which it developed in an attempt to enable cross-service

comparisons of separation reasons.

Our analysis of these separation codes and our interviews with service

officials and over 100 separating recruits revealed that enlistees generally

have many reasons for leaving, only one of which is recorded in DMDC’s

database. A 1991 Rand study of enlisted personnel files also found that

over 80 percent of the recruits whose files they examined had multiple

4

Attrition in the Military—An Issue Needing Management Attention (GAO/FPCD-80-10, Feb. 20, 1980).

5

The DD Form 214 is a servicemember’s “Certificate of Release or Discharge From Active Duty.”

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reasons for their early release.6 Rand found that, typically, the separation

code chosen by a service to go on the servicemember’s DD-214 “is the

separation code that the service believes would provide the most direct

path to a successful discharge or that would offer the strongest legal case.

It does not indicate the actual reason why the recruit separated early.”

Services Interpret DOD’s

Definitions of Separation

Codes Differently

In our 1980 report, we recommended that DOD improve existing

management information systems to include attrition data-reporting

systems that were more uniform. At that time, as at present, each service

had designed its own system of classifying attrition by reasons, and these

systems varied by installation, according to commanders’ interpretations

of criteria. Consequently, DOD and the services were not able to compare

trends by cause among the services.

In an attempt to standardize the services’ use of these codes, DOD issued a

list of the codes with their definitions. However, it has not issued

implementing guidance for interpreting these definitions, and the services’

own implementing guidance differs on several points. While we believe

that the individual services and local commanders should have flexibility

in managing their personnel programs, we also believe that DOD and

service headquarters have the responsibility for ensuring that their

separations of enlisted personnel are consistent with overall DOD policy,

are uniformly applied, and are effective.

Assigning a particular separation code rather than another has many

implications. As we were told by service officials, it is in the best interest

of basic training personnel to assign separation codes that reflect least

poorly on the basic training site. For example, some officials told us that if

a recruit has minor medical problems but even more severe motivational

problems, basic training personnel might choose to separate this recruit

for medical reasons, as opposed to performance problems. Separating a

recruit for medical rather than performance problems is face-saving for

both the recruit and basic training personnel. The recruit does not have to

admit that he or she could not meet the minimum performance standards,

and the command does not have to admit that it could not motivate the

recruit.

Conversely, Army officials we spoke with said that, until recently, one

Army basic training site had been discharging injured recruits for failing to

meet minimum performance standards. They also said that, since

6

Why Recruits Separate Early (R-3980-FMP, 1991).

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personnel at the Army’s basic training site had been told by upper-level

officials that its separations for preexisting medical conditions were too

high, they expected that the training command would begin to separate

recruits with medical problems under other codes.

During our review, we found the following examples, among others, of the

differences in the way the services assign separation codes:

• An enlisted person who exhibits a situational adjustment problem in

adapting to military life is separated from the Air Force for a personality

disorder, from the Navy for an erroneous enlistment, and from the Marine

Corps for failure to meet minimum performance standards. Air Force

personnel told us that most persons separated for adjustment disorders do

not have true personality disorders, and the discharge documentation

could cause persons separated with this description to carry a stigma into

later life.

• An enlisted person who is discharged for a disqualifying medical condition

that he or she did not know about in advance may be discharged from the

Marine Corps under the separation code for the convenience of the

government or for erroneous enlistment. In the Army, this same person is

separated using the separation code indicating that he or she did not meet

medical/physical standards.

• If an enlistee intentionally withholds medical information that would

disqualify him or her and is then separated for this same medical

condition, the enlistee is discharged from the Air Force and the Marine

Corps for a fraudulent enlistment. The Army categorizes this separation as

a failure to meet medical/physical standards unless it can prove that the

enlistee withheld medical information with the intent of gaining benefits.

The Air Force and the Marine Corps do not require this proof of intent.

The Navy categorizes this separation as an erroneous enlistment, which

indicates no fault on the part of the enlistee.

DMDC Data Provides Only

a Rough Estimate of Major

Reasons for Attrition

DMDC data for fiscal year 1994 shows that DOD’s attrition rate was

14.4 percent at the 6-month point in enlistees’ first terms. This means that

in fiscal year 1994, 25,430 enlisted personnel were separated from the

services within the first 6 months of their enlistment terms. Of this

number, 21,229, or about 83 percent, were assigned separation codes

indicating that they (1) were medically unqualified for military service,

(2) demonstrated character or behavior disorders, (3) fraudulently or

erroneously entered the military, or (4) failed to meet minimum

performance criteria.

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While these separation codes represent general areas in which the services

suffer the most early attrition, the codes cannot provide a basis for

determining how much of the attrition in these areas can be reduced. For

example, in the area of medical disqualifications, DMDC’s data does not

quantify what percentage of enlisted personnel discharged with this

separation code had verifiable medical conditions that could have been

screened out in advance. In the area of character and behavior disorders,

the data does not distinguish between those separated for severe

personality disorders and those who experienced mild situational

disorders and might have been having motivational problems. In the area

of fraudulent and erroneous enlistment, the data does not allow the

services to determine what percentage of those separated in this category

were discharged for concealing criminal background histories, as opposed

to medical or psychological conditions. Finally, in the area of performance

separations, the data does not allow DOD to determine what percentage of

these enlistees were separated for minor injuries or what percentage might

have been further counseled or rehabilitated.

DOD Has Proposed a

Project to Develop a

Database on Medical

Discharges

According to an official in DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Health Affairs, DOD approved a project in July 1996 to compile

a comprehensive database of medical conditions for all accessions. This

database project was funded in September 1996. As part of the project,

doctors throughout the services will be required to use an internationally

recognized medical code book to diagnose medical conditions for all their

patients. This information will be fed into a database maintained by DMDC

and will then be analyzed by the Walter Reed Institute of Research. This

database will provide DOD with the ability to reevaluate its physical

enlistment standards, to analyze the medical reasons that recruits are

separated, and to make fact-based policy changes to reduce medical

attrition.

Recommendation To provide a reliable database for DOD to manage attrition and for the

services to set appropriate targets for reducing attrition, we recommend

that the Secretary of Defense issue implementing guidance for DOD’s

separation codes.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with our

recommendation that the Secretary of Defense issue implementing

guidance for DOD’s separation codes (see app. I). DOD agreed that “the

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administrative techniques at the user level for coding these losses require

attention in order to validate attrition rates and the recommendation to

enforce standardization is valid.” DOD also stressed that its separation

codes were the subject of a standardization initiative in 1993, which

provided a common list to all services for use starting October 1, 1993. As

we state in our report, the lack of standardization in the services’ use of

separation codes is a long-standing issue, dating back to at least 1980.

While DOD’s issuance of a list of standardized separation codes was a step

in the right direction, we found that the services have not been applying

these codes consistently and that this lack of consistency makes it

impossible for DOD to analyze reasons for attrition on a service-wide basis.

DOD questions our statement that basic training personnel sometimes

choose the separation code that allows them to “save face,” stating that

the original intent of the separation codes listed on the DD-214s was not to

capture reasons for attrition. Though this may be the case, these codes are

at present the only service-wide information on reasons for separations. If

DOD decides that it would be more feasible to collect service-wide reasons

for separation using a different mechanism, we would not object. Our

concern is that such data be collected and analyzed, not that the data be

based on separation codes listed on the DD-214s.

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Unmotivated

During this review, we focused on separations in three categories:

separations for medical conditions that were not disabilities, separations

for drug use, and separations for failure to meet performance standards.

Separations for medical conditions and failure to meet performance

standards represent at least 55 percent of all 6-month attrition for enlistees

who entered the services in fiscal year 1994. This percentage is

understated for two reasons. First, some persons who have medical

problems are being separated as fraudulent enlistments because they

concealed their medical histories. Second, some persons who have

performance problems are being separated for character or behavior

disorders. We were not able to calculate the number of persons discharged

for drug use in all the services because separations for these persons are

categorized in many different ways. For example, a person who uses drugs

could be separated for erroneous or fraudulent enlistment, personality

disorder (if found to be drug-dependent), misconduct, or drug

rehabilitation failure.

A calculation of the numbers of persons in each of these three categories

can only be approximate because the services assign separation codes

differently and because persons placed in one of these categories might

have actually been separated for many different reasons. Even so, the data

indicates in a general way why attrition during the first 6 months of an

enlistee’s term occurs. This data—along with our interviews with

recruiting, examining, and training personnel and with separating

recruits—indicates that the services’ screening processes are not

identifying significant numbers of persons who have disqualifying medical

conditions or who use drugs.

The data also indicates that DOD separates thousands of personnel who do

not meet minimum performance standards. Recruits have problems

meeting performance standards because they are not physically prepared

for basic training and because they lack motivation. GAO’s interviews with

separating recruits and recent research suggest that negative leadership

techniques at basic training may contribute to some recruits’ lack of

motivation to meet performance standards.

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Screening Processes

Do Not Identify

Thousands of Recruits

Who Are Unqualified

for Service

DOD’s current processes for screening enlisted recruits are inadequate in

the following ways:

• Recruiters do not have sufficient incentives to screen out persons who

may not be fully qualified to complete basic training.

• Recruiting and MEPS screening mechanisms and service waiver policies

result in the enlistment of thousands of persons who have preexisting

medical conditions and who are later separated. Also, the responsibility

for reviewing cases involving preexisting medical conditions resides with

MEPCOM, which poses a conflict of interest because this is the command

most directly responsible for determining the physical qualifications of

military applicants.

• The Navy and the Marine Corps do not test recruits for drugs until they

arrive at basic training.

Recruiters’ Incentives Are

Not Adequately Tied to

Enlistees’ Successful

Completion of Basic

Training

In a sense, recruiters have a conflict of interest. Though they are obliged to

their services to recruit only qualified personnel, their performance is

judged primarily on how many recruits they enlist per month. Recruiters’

monthly recruiting goals are established on the basis of the services’

accession needs, which are in turn driven by end strength numbers and

budget allocations. The recruiters’ goals are also connected to the

numbers of basic and follow-on training slots. That is, recruiters must

keep a steady and constant flow of enlisted personnel into the services. At

the same time, recruiters are the first step in the process of determining

whether applicants are qualified mentally and physically to serve in the

military. Despite this secondary but very important function, recruiters

receive no credit for screening out unqualified applicants before they are

enlisted.

Recruiters’ quotas are tied to whether their recruits enter active duty after

being in the Delayed Entry Program. After enlisting, recruits may remain in

the Delayed Entry Program from 2 days to 1 year. If an enlistee drops out

of the Delayed Entry Program, the recruiter gets no credit for that

enlistment. After the recruit begins active duty and is transported to basic

training, only two services—the Marine Corps and the Navy—continue to

hold their recruiters responsible for whether their recruits successfully

complete basic training.

The Air Force and the Army do not tie their recruiters’ incentive systems

to successful completion of basic training because they believe that

recruiters should not be penalized for their recruits’ failure to complete

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basic training. According to Air Force officials, the Air Force provides

feedback to its recruiters on each loss from training and produces data

quarterly to identify recruiters whose recruits have high or low training

attrition rates. This allows Air Force supervisors to take corrective actions

with recruiters whose recruits are separated at a high rate. The Army

believes that once applicants are transported to basic training, recruiters

have done their jobs and are no longer able to influence their enlistees’

performance.

Beginning in June 1996, the Navy implemented a revised recruiter

incentive system that will subtract points from recruiters whose enlistees

do not complete basic training. Because the new system has just been

implemented, the Navy has not yet determined whether the system will

help to reduce attrition.

For many years, the Marine Corps has given its recruiting units the

flexibility to design incentive systems that factor in successful basic

training graduation rates and to deduct recruiter points when a recruit

fails basic training. According to Marine Corps recruiting officials,

however, their recruiting incentive systems are not uniform because

Marine Corps headquarters authorizes each recruiting district and station

to develop its own awards systems. That is, some recruiting stations may

choose to award additional points to recruiters for each successful basic

training graduate or to take points away for each recruit who drops out,

and others may not. In any case, some Marine Corps basic training officials

suggested that Marine Corps recruiters are still driven primarily by their

monthly goals. These officials said that the threat that recruiters might

lose points 3 months later (when the recruit fails basic training) does not

provide sufficient motivation for Marine Corps recruiters to do more

thorough screening.

Basic training officials from all services told us that they believed that

recruiters do not have adequate incentives to ensure that their recruits are

qualified medically, morally, and psychologically. That is, these officials

believe that recruiters are driven by their monthly goals to recruit persons

who may not be fully qualified and that recruiters do not have an incentive

to thoroughly probe applicants to learn of possibly disqualifying medical,

psychological, or criminal problems.

Recruiters are not solely responsible for the services’ failure to screen out

unqualified recruits. We agree with service officials that it is not the

recruiters’ job to determine whether recruits are medically qualified.

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Rather, it is the MEPS physicians’ job to perform this function. Even so, we

believe that the services do not provide recruiters with adequate

incentives to ask applicants probing questions that might reveal

disqualifying information. Asking probing questions leads to two

complications for recruiters. First, if recruiters uncover potentially

disqualifying information about their applicants, they create more

paperwork for themselves in that they must request waivers. Second,

recruiters might have to reject applicants who are not qualified and miss

their monthly quotas.

In some cases, recruiters are given bonus points for recruiting top quality

recruits, “quality” recruits being defined as those who have high school

diplomas and score in the upper percentiles of the ASVAB. However,

recruiters are not sufficiently rewarded for other indicators of excellence

in enlisting personnel for the services, measures such as thoroughness of

screening, suitability of matches between an applicant and the job for

which he or she is most qualified, and length of time the applicant stays in

the military. These indicators suggest that recruiters’ incentive systems

could be improved by comparing them to incentive systems for job

counselors. Recruiters are trained to be sales people, rather than job

counselors or placement officers.

Two suggestions were made to us during our fieldwork for improving

recruiters’ incentive systems to relieve the pressure to recruit unqualified

personnel. First, it was suggested that recruiters receive partial credit for

thoroughly probing applicants and ultimately finding that they are

unqualified. This partial credit would provide an incentive for recruiters to

fully screen applicants without losing all credit for investing time in

working with these persons.

A second idea for improving the recruiter incentive systems was to give

recruiters a “floating goal.” Under this type of system, a recruiter’s goal

would not be set for one month only but could, for example, be a 3-month

goal that continued to move forward. With such a floating goal system, a

recruiter would be provided with an incentive to overproduce one month

to relieve the pressure of the next month’s goal. Conversely, if the

recruiter were unable to meet one month’s goal, he or she would be able to

make up that lack in the next month. According to officials from the Office

of the Secretary of Defense, this floating goal system has been tried and

has met with failure. Past experience showed that recruiters tended to

wait until the last possible moment to meet their recruiting goals. While

we did not evaluate why this floating goal system did not work in the past,

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we continue to believe that innovative ideas like these merit further

consideration and study.

Thousands Are Separated

for Preexisting Medical

Disqualifications

The services are enlisting persons with disqualifying medical conditions

for two primary reasons: (1) applicants conceal their medical histories and

(2) the services waive medical conditions that, according to DOD directives,

are disqualifying. The Military Entrance Processing Command reviews the

personnel files for all enlistees who are separated for preexisting medical

conditions to determine when medical screening has not been effective.

However, the fact that the responsibility for reviewing these cases lies

with the same command that does the medical screening raises the

possibility of a conflict of interest.

DMDC data indicates that approximately 6,800 of the nearly 

176,400 enlistees who entered the services in fiscal year 1994, or

3.9 percent, were found to be not medically qualified for service within the

first 6 months of their terms. Of the approximately 6,800 personnel who

were separated for preexisting medical conditions, around 3,600 were in

the Army, 1,700 were in the Navy, 1,400 were in the Air Force, and 100

were in the Marine Corps. The Air Force’s and the Marine Corps’ numbers

are understated because they separate persons who conceal medically

disqualifying information for fraud.

The problem with enlisting medically unqualified recruits into the services

is a long-standing one. In 1965, in 1968, and again in 1970, we reported the

numbers of personnel who enlisted in the services with preexisting

medical conditions.1

 We estimated that $17.9 million was expended during

fiscal year 1969 by the military services, primarily for pay and allowances,

uniforms, and travel, for personnel discharged because of preservice

physical defects after serving in the military for a year or less.

In our 1970 report, we stated that discharges for medical conditions that

existed prior to service accounted for 2.3 percent of all accessions

between fiscal years 1966 through 1969. During our current review,

MEPCOM reported that discharges in this category represented 2.9 percent

of all accessions in fiscal year 1994 and 3.3 percent of all accessions in

fiscal year 1995. According to an official in the Office of the Secretary of

1

Unnecessary Costs Incurred Because of Acceptance of Physically Unqualified Enlisted Members in

the Armed Services (B-14686, Apr. 2, 1965); Report on Matters Relating to Enlisted Personnel

Discharged Because of Defects That Existed Prior to Entrance Into Military Service (B-146986, Mar. 21,

1968); and Discharge of Military Enlisted Personnel Because of Preservice Physical Defects (B-146986,

July 27, 1970).

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Defense, enlistees today are more likely to conceal disqualifying medical

conditions than they were during the draft. During the draft, many

inductees wished to avoid military service, while now enlistees are

voluntarily enlisting and have more of an incentive to conceal medical

conditions.

Applicants Are Not

Systematically Required to

Provide Medical Records Prior

to Enlistment

MEPCOM’s data for fiscal year 1994 indicates that over half of all separations

for preexisting medical conditions involved the applicants’ concealment of

their medical conditions. Concealment of past medical history is made

easier by the fact that applicants are required to present medical histories

only if they report past medical problems. Applicants who wish to join the

service have an incentive to conceal such information.

Of all the services, the Navy had the most complete data on whether

enlistees who were separated for medical conditions had known about

and reported these conditions prior to enlistment. Personnel at the Navy’s

basic training clinic administer a questionnaire to all recruits who are

separated for preexisting medical conditions asking them whether they

had previously reported their conditions. According to Navy clinic

personnel, 1,684 Navy recruits were separated for medical conditions in

calendar year 1995. Of these, 43 percent, or 724 recruits, reported on their

questionnaires that they had seen civilian physicians at some time before

they enlisted in the Navy about the condition for which they were

separated. Fifty-five percent of all those discharged for preexisting

medical conditions (928 recruits) reported that they had told their

recruiters of their conditions before enlisting, and 41 percent 

(683 recruits) reported that their recruiters had told them not to mention

the medical conditions. Navy clinic personnel told us that “identifying

those patients with conditions not compatible with Navy service prior to

their enlistment saves training dollars and keeps these patients away from

a potentially dangerous environment.” However, while Navy doctors had

compiled these statistics, they knew of no resulting changes to the

enlistment screening process.

According to Navy recruiting officials, data compiled by Navy doctors

from this questionnaire began to be reported to the Navy’s Recruiting

Command in January 1996. These officials said that to date, 60 percent of

all the fiscal year 1997 allegations against recruiters had been immediately

retracted by recruits. The remaining 40 percent of these allegations were

referred to the Navy Recruiting Command’s Inspector General for further

investigation.

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Personnel from basic training camps for all four services told us that they

share information with their recruiting commands on what enlistees tell

them about recruiters’ failure to encourage the enlistees to completely

divulge medical conditions. However, they also stressed that enlistees

often blame their recruiters when they themselves are guilty of

withholding medical information. According to these officials, only a very

small percentage of enlistees’ allegations about recruiters are

substantiated. These officials also told us that when it comes down to the

recruit’s word against the recruiter, the services side with the recruiter.

Personnel throughout the services stressed the difficulty of encouraging

applicants to be honest in divulging their past medical conditions and the

difficulty of obtaining past medical records. If an applicant has lived in

several different places, it would be extremely difficult for the services to

research medical records from dozens of hospitals.

The services now ask applicants to provide medical records only when

they divulge past medical problems. Neither do the services ask all

applicants to provide the names of their medical insurers and medical

providers. Asking all applicants to provide such information might reduce

the number who do not fully disclose past medical histories. We realize

that some applicants may not be insured; some might have had several

different insurers and visited many hospitals and doctors over a period of

years; and others may continue to withhold information about their

medical histories. However, we believe that applicants would be less likely

to conceal past medical problems if they were required to (1) provide the

names of their medical insurers and past medical providers and (2) sign a

release form allowing the services to request their medical records.

The services would not necessarily have to obtain medical records for all

applicants. Rather, the services could determine how frequently they

needed to research applicants’ medical histories in order to ensure that

applicants believed that the information they provided the services could

and might be verified. To ensure that the paperwork burden of recruiters

was not increased and that recruiters themselves did not know which

applicants would receive this greater scrutiny, the services could place the

responsibility for obtaining medical files on persons who are not

production recruiters.

Officials from the Office of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

suggested that one reason that applicants may not be reporting

disqualifying medical information is that the questions on the “Applicant

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Medical Prescreening Form” (DD Form 2246) are not specific enough.

Recruiters use this form to ask applicants about their past medical

histories and drug use. Army officials believe that recruiters are following

“the letter of the law” when gathering medical data. That is, recruiters are

asking the questions contained on the form verbatim and are not asking

follow-up questions at least in part because they are not medically

qualified to know what the relevant medical questions are. Army officials

suggested that the prescreening form might be revised to make the

questions more specific and to tie the questions more closely to medical

conditions that most often result in recruits’ separations.

During our review, we also found that some of the questions on the

recruiter’s prescreening form were vague and ambiguous. For example,

one question is “Have you ever had or have you now back trouble?” The

form does not define or give examples of what an applicant should

consider to be “back trouble.” Another question is “Have you ever had or

have you now addiction to drugs or alcohol?” There is no question on the

form asking whether the applicant has tried alcohol or drugs or how often

the applicant has used alcohol or a particular drug.

After applicants have completed the recruiter’s prescreening form, they fill

out a second medical history form at the MEPS, the “Report of Medical

History” (SF 93). During our visit to the Navy’s basic training camp,

doctors there said that they believed that the MEPS medical history form

was obsolete, ambiguous, and easy for applicants for falsify. For example,

one of the questions on the form is “Have you ever had or have you now

lameness?” Navy doctors pointed out that the term “lameness” is no longer

used by medical personnel. The form also asks, “Have you ever had or

have you now [a] ’trick’ or locked knee?” The form contains no definitions

of “trick” or “locked.” Also, Navy basic training doctors said that they

could tell that applicants do not thoroughly read the form as they record

their answers. These doctors believe that applicants often automatically

check “no” to all questions, not realizing that one question requires a “yes”

answer if an applicant is to be determined qualified. The question that

requires a “yes” answer asks whether applicants have vision in both eyes.

Navy doctors often find that applicants have checked “no” to this question

and then have had to go back to correct and initial their answer.

In an effort to get more complete and accurate information from recruits

on their medical histories, the Navy’s basic training doctors ask recruits to

fill out an automated form upon arrival at basic training. This

questionnaire, which the Navy doctors wrote themselves, contains more

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specific questions and requires recruits to fully read the questions because

some questions require “yes” answers, and others require “no” answers.

Also, for some questions, the doctors deliberately use different

terminology to ask the same medical question. Navy basic training doctors

believe that asking questions in different ways makes it more likely that

recruits will recognize their particular symptoms and report them.

DOD Does Not Have Empirical

Data on the Cost-Effectiveness

of Waivers or Medical

Screening Tests

MEPCOM data for fiscal year 1994 indicates that close to 8 percent of

separations for preexisting medical conditions involved cases in which the

services granted waivers for the very conditions for which the recruit was

later separated. DOD has set uniform enlistment standards for all the

services in DOD Directive 6130.3, “Physical Standards for Appointment,

Enlistment, and Induction.” However, this same directive also grants the

services the authority to waive the enlistment standards, and, according to

MEPCOM officials, the services frequently do so. The Army, for example,

told us that the only two medical conditions for which waivers could not

be granted were pregnancy that existed prior to enlistment and human

immunodeficiency virus.

Personnel throughout the services explained that it is difficult to

determine which medical conditions to waive because some recruits with

disqualifying medical conditions, such as severe flat feet, are able to

successfully complete basic training, while others are not. Statistical data

is not currently available that would enable the services to predict which

disqualifying medical conditions represent good attrition risks.

According to an official in DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Health Affairs, DOD’s physical enlistment standards are not

empirically linked to performance in the military, but rather are based on

military experience and expert judgment. This official cited as an example

DOD’s change in its asthma policy. Before Operation Desert Storm,

applicants who had histories of asthma but had not had an asthma attack

since age 12 could qualify for military service. Just after the war, however,

military leaders recommended that persons who had any history of asthma

should be disqualified. This recommendation was based on military

leaders’ personal observations of the effects of environmental conditions

on servicemembers during the war.

DOD’s recently approved plan to collect data on the medical histories of all

accessions, including those who separate early, will provide an

opportunity for DOD to base its enlistment standards and waiver policies on

sound research data. DOD plans to begin revising its enlistment standards

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using this new database beginning in fiscal year 1997. DOD’s new database

will also allow DOD to determine whether it would be cost-effective to add

screening tests to MEPCOM medical examinations or to refrain from giving

some medical screening tests at the basic training sites. At present, some

basic training screening tests are more thorough than those given at the

MEPS, and at other times, recruits are given the same tests at the MEPS and

at basic training. For example, while some basic training camps do pap

smears, tests for Hepatitis B, and sickle cell anemia, the MEPS do not.

According to MEPCOM officials, female applicants are not given pap smears

at the MEPS because, statistically, women of this age typically do not have

health problems that would be surfaced through pap smears. If this were

the case, however, it is not clear why female recruits are given pap smears

when they arrive at basic training. When recruits are found to have

medical problems related to these tests given at basic training but not at

the MEPS, they are sometimes separated from the services.

On the other hand, the MEPS do some examinations that are repeated at the

basic training camps. For example, all recruits are tested for vision and

hearing at the MEPS, and at basic training, all or selected recruits are

retested. During our review of separation files and our interviews with

separating recruits, we found many cases of recruits who were being

separated for vision and hearing problems that were not discovered until

the recruits had been retested at basic training. MEPCOM officials told us

that the vision and hearing testing done at the MEPS is comparable in

sophistication to the testing done at the basic training camps. If this is the

case, it is unclear (1) why recruits need to be retested at basic training and

(2) why recruits frequently fail the vision and hearing tests given at basic

training camps after having passed them at the MEPS.

Army officials suggested that an alternative to conducting more thorough

medical screening on all recruits would be to conduct more thorough

medical screening only on applicants whose medical histories indicated

problems. The MEPS already require that applicants who report medical

problems be seen by medical specialists. However, if applicants do not

report medical problems and MEPS doctors do not detect problems,

applicants can avoid such medical consultations. With improved screening

forms, with better incentives for recruiters to collect medical information,

and with DOD’s proposed medical database, DOD would have a sound basis

for determining which applicants should undergo more thorough medical

examinations.

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MEPCOM’s Review of Medical

Cases Poses a Possible Conflict

of Interest

The military services are required to send to MEPCOM all separation

packages for persons discharged for medical conditions that existed prior

to service. MEPCOM’s doctors then categorize the individual cases to

determine whether the medical conditions should have been detected at

the MEPS. According to MEPCOM’s Command Surgeon, in fiscal year 1994,

only 3.3 percent of the medical separation cases were due to an error on

the part of MEPS personnel.

Basic training doctors and other personnel told us of cases in which

persons arrived at basic training who were very obviously medically or

psychologically disqualified. They cited cases of a recruit with a glass eye,

numerous recruits who had no vision out of one eye, a recruit with a

hearing aid, recruits with holes in their eardrums, and a recruit who had

severe and debilitating mental problems. When we asked MEPCOM officials

about these cases, they said that they had heard similar anecdotal

information about recruits who had not been screened out at the MEPS.

However, they said that, generally, persons reporting these cases cannot

provide the type of information that would allow MEPCOM to investigate the

cases and trace them back to the appropriate MEPS.

We reviewed a selected sample of MEPCOM’s files on these cases and its

determination of whether medical conditions should have been detected

by MEPS doctors. We found no instances in which MEPCOM had improperly

classified cases. However, we believe that there is a conflict of interest

because the responsibility for reviewing and categorizing cases resides

with MEPCOM, which plays the most significant role in the medical

screening process. MEPCOM’s Command Surgeon told us that the Air Force

also categorizes preexisting medical separation cases and has in certain

instances challenged MEPCOM’s classifications.

Thousands Separated for

Drug Use

The Air Force and the Army test all of their applicants for drugs at the

MEPS. As a result, they are able to screen out persons who test positive for

drugs at the time of their preenlistment medical examinations. The Navy

and the Marine Corps, on the other hand, do not test applicants for drugs

at the MEPS but wait until they arrive at basic training. The Navy and the

Marine Corps then separate many recruits for testing positive for drug use

upon arrival at basic training.

After the Army and the Air Force test their recruits for drugs during the

MEPS medical examination, they require recruits to sign a statement that

they will refrain from drug use while in the Delayed Entry Program. The

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Army’s and the Air Force’s rationale for not retesting recruits for drugs at

basic training is that any drug use on the part of recruits will demonstrate

itself in recruits’ performance.

In fiscal year 1994, 1,669 recruits were discharged from the Navy because

of drug use. During our initial visit to the Great Lakes Naval Training

Center, our review of personnel records and interviews with separating

personnel indicated that some of these recruits had received waivers for

preenlistment drug use, and some had been in the Delayed Entry Program

for insufficient periods of time to eliminate all drugs from their systems.

We reviewed the personnel records of 19 Navy recruits who were

separated for drug use. Of these 19, the personnel records included

documentation that 17 had admitted to drug use prior to enlistment; 2 had

not. Of those who tested positive for drugs upon arrival at basic training,

seven had been in the Delayed Entry Program 1 month or less. Six of these

seven had admitted to prior drug use. In other words, some recruits were

transported to Navy basic training when recruiters or MEPS personnel

knew that they had used drugs. Navy recruiting officials said that if these

recruits had admitted to drug use within the past 30 days, they would not

have been sent to basic training. Since March 1990, this has been the

Navy’s policy. Up until March 27, 1996, the Navy denied reenlistment rights

to enlisted persons who tested positive for drugs at basic training. On that

date, the Navy changed its policy to allow some recruits who tested

positive for marijuana to reenlist after a period of 6 months.

Navy recruit division commanders told us that recruits being separated for

positive drug tests are generally good performers and want to stay in the

Navy. At the Navy’s basic training camp in Great Lakes, Illinois, we

interviewed seven recruits being separated for drug use. Four had tested

positive for marijuana, two for cocaine, and one for an hallucinogenic

drug. Of the four who had tested positive for marijuana, three had been in

the Delayed Entry Program 1 month or less. All four wanted to stay in the

Navy, and two wished to appeal their cases.

Like the Navy, the Marine Corps tests for drugs at basic training but not at

the MEPS. While the Navy grants no waivers for those who test positive for

drugs, the Marine Corps grants waivers to enlistees who test positive for

marijuana at basic training. In fiscal years 1995 and 1996, around

70 percent of recruits who tested positive for marijuana at Parris Island

Marine Corps Recruit Depot were granted waivers. The Marine Corps

bases its decisions on granting waivers on (1) what type of drug was used,

(2) whether the use was experimental or routine, (3) whether the drug was

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used while the enlistee was in the Delayed Entry Program, (4) whether the

enlistee admitted to the drug use, (5) whether the enlistee is drug

dependent, and (6) whether the enlistee has been convicted of any

drug-related offenses.

Thousands of Recruits

Discharged for Failure

to Meet Minimum

Performance Criteria

Of all recruits entering the services in fiscal year 1994, approximately 7,200

were discharged in the first 6 months of service because they failed to

meet minimum performance criteria: around 4,800 in the Army, 1,300 in

the Marine Corps, 600 in the Air Force, and 500 in the Navy. The Army’s

numbers for recruits separated in this category are significantly higher

than those of the other services for at least three reasons: (1) the Army

enlists more recruits than any other service; (2) the Army places persons

with mild, situational adjustment problems in this category; and (3) until

recently, the Army placed recruits who had been injured in training in this

category. According to basic training personnel, recruits who are

discharged for failure to meet minimum performance criteria include

those who fail physical training standards, who cannot meet weight

standards, who fail inspections, or who cannot otherwise adapt to basic

training.

Recruits Fail to Meet

Performance Standards

Because They Are Not

Physically Fit

Basic training personnel throughout the services said that recruits who are

in good physical shape have a greater chance of meeting overall military

performance standards. Those struggling to meet physical requirements

are often correspondingly demotivated to meet other military

requirements. Service officials suggested that two ways of ensuring that

recruits are better prepared to succeed in basic training are to (1) more

fully inform them of the physical training requirements of basic training

while they are still in the Delayed Entry Program and (2) encourage

recruits to become physically fit while they are waiting to go on active

duty.

All of the services encourage enlistees to become physically fit while they

are in the Delayed Entry Program. The services stress that these physical

activities must be voluntary. For many years, the Marine Corps has

encouraged its recruiters to provide opportunities for enlistees to

participate in physical training activities on a voluntary basis. Recently,

the Navy and the Army have also restructured their Delayed Entry

Programs to encourage recruits to become more physically fit before they

enter basic training. As part of the Army’s new proposed program, which

was near the implementation stages in December 1996, the Army will

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allow recruits in the Delayed Entry Program access to military fitness

centers before they report to basic training and reward them with

retirement points for participating in voluntary physical training exercises

with their recruiters.2

 As another part of the Army’s proposed new Delayed

Entry Program, enlistees will be required to learn basic military customs

and rules. Learning such material before arriving at basic training will

lessen recruits’ stress in attempting to learn large amounts of material in

the short time allotted to basic training. Air Force officials told us that they

do not require recruiters to conduct any formalized physical training for

recruits while they are in the Delayed Entry Program because they believe

that the Air Force would be legally liable for injuries sustained by recruits

while participating in such training.

All four services stop short of making physical training activities

mandatory for enlistees because they believe that requiring physical

training activities could make the services liable for any injuries enlistees

sustain while in such training. Yet, according to Army legal officials,

enlistees are already entitled to the use of military health care facilities

when they are participating in training activities. Enlistees in the Delayed

Entry Program are members of the Individual Ready Reserve in an inactive

duty status. We believe that taking more assertive steps to make recruits

physically fit will result in fewer injuries during basic training and in

reducing the number of enlistees who are separated during basic training.

Recruits Fail to Meet

Performance Standards

Because They Lack

Motivation

Another principal reason that recruits are discharged for failure to meet

minimum performance standards is that they lack motivation. During our

review, we found that all four services have taken steps to improve

recruits’ motivation by changing the basic training environment. For

example, the services have all established remedial physical training

programs for recruits who are not able to meet physical standards. The

services have also established motivational and rehabilitation units for

those with motivational problems and injuries. The services are also

concerned with ensuring that drill instructors do not abuse their recruits.

The Air Force, in particular, believes that it has made significant

improvements in this area. A senior Air Force official wrote in June 1995,

“The negative, profane and perhaps even abusive drill sergeant is all but

gone. [In 1992], almost 10% of our trainees complained of verbal abuse or

2

According to an official from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command, retirement points may be used to

calculate retirement eligibility if the soldier chooses future service in the reserve component. If the

soldier chooses active service, these retirement points would not be included in the calculation of

retirement eligibility for the regular component.

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profanity. Today it’s 4.1%, and this continues to come down. We will get it

to zero.”

While all four services have similar prohibitions on drill instructors’

treatment of basic trainees, many recruits told us that some drill

instructors motivated recruits through negative leadership. The official

policy in each service is to treat recruits with respect. Navy instructions,

for example, state that “the training process must at all times reflect

respect for dignity and rights of the individual and provide a training

environment which is free from all forms of abuse.” Specifically, the

instructions say that “the use of vulgar, obscene, profane,

sexually-oriented, humiliating, or racially/ethnically-slanted language to

address or refer to a trainee(s) directly or indirectly is prohibited. A

trainee will be addressed only by his/her last name, rank/rate, or by the

word ‘recruit.’”

Despite this official policy, about one-third of the 126 recruits we

interviewed told us that they were subjected to humiliating treatment and

that this treatment contributed to their desire to leave the military. We

were told that drill instructors use obscene language frequently. What we

heard from recruits reinforced findings of Army, Air Force, and Rand

studies that concluded that negative motivation has a detrimental effect on

recruits’ desire to stay in the military.3

 We do not conclude from the

anecdotes that recruits related to us that negative treatment of recruits is

widespread because we cannot generalize from our 126 interviews.

One study completed by the Army Training and Doctrine Command

(TRADOC) in 1984 found that the way drill sergeants interacted with their

trainees influenced their units’ early discharge rates. According to the

TRADOC report, “Those drill sergeants who outwardly demonstrated

concern for the trainees’ well-being, personally gave additional informal

instruction to marginal performers, and who were effective counselors

tended to have more cohesive platoons with lower attrition.” The TRADOC

report recommended that training for drill instructors be bolstered to

stress positive leadership and performance counseling. TRADOC hoped to

create a “win-win” climate in which they expected higher cohesion and

lower attrition. TRADOC called this positive leadership philosophy

“Insist/Assist.” The Army intended to continue to insist that military

3

“Trainee Discharge Program Study,” (Army Training and Doctrine Command, Dec. 26, 1984); Trends in

Attrition of High-Quality Military Recruits (R-3539-FMP, Aug. 1988); and “Developing Airmanship: The

Focus of the Air Force Indoctrination Process,” paper prepared for the Air War College, Air University,

Maxwell Air Force Base, April 1993. As a disclaimer contained in the Air Force paper suggests, it does

not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force.

Page 43 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
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standards be met and to assist all recruits to meet these standards. TRADOC

emphasized that “The leadership approach of all trainers must be based on

positive leadership techniques and the understanding that trainee

performance is nearly always a function of cadre leadership.”

In 1988, a Rand study noted that the Army’s basic training attrition rate

was sharply reduced for the fiscal year 1984 and 1985 cohorts. Rand

concluded that this reduction in attrition “reflects at least in part the

explicit or implicit effect of the Army [1984 TRADOC] study.” That is, Rand

believed that this drop in attrition demonstrated that attrition management

can yield large benefits. Rand qualified this conclusion by stating that a

study would have to be conducted to ensure that the Army’s lower basic

training attrition would not result in a correspondingly higher attrition rate

for enlistees later in their terms. For the short term, however, Rand stated

that the Army’s change in training philosophy and other changes made as a

result of TRADOC’s 1984 study, meant that

With no adjustment in recruit quality or standards, the new Army program resulted in 4 and

6 percent more trained high-quality men and women available, respectively, in FY85 than in

FY83. These effects are comparable in magnitude with those of enlistment incentives such

as enlistment bonuses and educational benefits.

During our review, we found that the Army had readopted its 1984

philosophy to “Assist/Insist.” In a Department of the Army briefing on

attrition dated July 17, 1996, the Army reasserted its 1984 study’s

conclusions. The Army stated that it hoped to change its training

philosophy to “stress a positive, reinforcing, success-oriented

environment.” The Army said that it hoped to stress positive leadership, to

tell its training personnel, “Don’t tear down to build. Instead build to

build.”

In 1993, an Air Force basic training squadron commander came to similar

conclusions to those of the Army concerning the effects of negative and

positive leadership during basic training. The Air Force training

commander said that at the time he was a basic training squadron

commander in 1988, training philosophies, particularly recruit motivation

techniques, varied among the eight Air Force training squadrons. The

squadron commander reported that “some were notoriously negative (and

borderline abusive by using such methods as threatening language,

physical intimidation, and excessive profanity). Others were more

moderate, and several were quite positive. . . .” The squadron commander

believed that negative styles of leadership would not instill the qualities,

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values, and attitudes that were important to the Air Force. He noted the

following:

While there is the need for “rigid” motivation in [basic training] to instill certain military

skills (i.e., discipline, following orders, etc.), and to organize and control large numbers of

recruits, total reliance on the “negative” style won’t produce the objectives we seek. For

instance, an airman (or flight) that has been motivated mostly by fear, who repeatedly over

six weeks has been corrected in a degrading or harassing manner, may end up resenting

authority rather than respecting it. While we may produce someone who follows orders,

he/she may not do so willingly. Further, a total emphasis on negative motivation risks

seeing individual effort dissipating in a more relaxed training environment later on. We

can’t afford that. Our focus must be on positive motivation. This does not mean that we

“coddle” or “carry” trainees, nor does it mean eliminating the firmness that is an essential

element of the Basic Training program. It does mean a total emphasis on professional

behavior and proper role modeling.

The Air Force officer who made these observations said that in the years

that he was a squadron commander, attrition rates varied widely from

squadron to squadron, depending on leadership techniques. In his

squadron, where he employed positive motivational techniques, the

attrition rate remained at 5 to 6 percent, below the Air Force’s basic

training rate of 7.07 in fiscal year 1988 and 7.87 in fiscal year 1989. This Air

Force officer attributes differences in attrition rates among the squadrons

to differences in leadership styles.

Recommendations To reduce the attrition of enlisted personnel during the first 6 months of

their terms of enlistment, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense

take the following actions:

• Require (1) all the services to review and revise their recruiter incentive

systems to strengthen incentives for recruiters to thoroughly prescreen

persons with medical histories and (2) the Marine Corps, the Air Force,

and the Army to more closely link recruiting quotas to recruits’ successful

completion of basic training. The services may wish to consider such ideas

as awarding recruiters partial credit for thoroughly screening applicants or

using a “floating goal” system.

• Direct the services to require all applicants for enlistment to (1) provide

the names of their medical insurers and providers and (2) sign a release

form allowing the services to obtain past medical information. Taking

these two steps would provide the services with the tools to identify

applicants’ past medical problems and add an incentive for applicants to

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be forthcoming in reporting past medical conditions. To ensure that

applicants are made aware that the services do follow up in researching

medical histories, the services could determine how frequently they need

to obtain applicants’ medical records. To ensure that recruiters do not

know which applicants will have their medical histories researched and

that recruiters are not further burdened by paperwork, records should be

obtained by someone who is not a recruiter. Medical records obtained

through this process should be included in the file reviewed by the MEPS

physician at the applicant’s preenlistment physical examination.

• Direct the services to revise their “Applicant Medical Prescreening Form”

(DD Form 2246) and their “Report of Medical History” (SF 93) to ensure

that medical questions are specific, unambiguous, and tied directly to the

types of medical separations most common for recruits during basic and

follow-on training.

• Use DOD’s newly proposed database of medical diagnostic codes to

determine whether adding medical screening tests to the MEPS

examinations and/or providing more thorough medical examinations to

selected groups of applicants could cost-effectively reduce attrition at

basic training.

• Place the responsibility for reviewing medical separation files, which

currently resides with MEPCOM, with an organization completely outside the

screening process. Such a review would ensure that no conflict of interest

interfered with the objective review of which medical conditions should

have been detected by MEPS physicians.

• Direct all the services to test applicants for drugs at the MEPS to prevent

the enlistment of those who now test positive for drugs upon arrival at

basic training.

• Direct the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force to consider adopting

a program similar to the Army’s new Delayed Entry Program, under which

recruits are encouraged to participate in voluntary physical activities with

their recruiters and may be granted military retirement points for their

participation. Also, direct the services to provide those in the Delayed

Entry Program with access to military fitness facilities and to military

medical facilities if they are injured while participating in physical

activities with their recruiters.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD provided the following

responses to our recommendations. (DOD’s comments are presented in

their entirety in app. I.)

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DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the services be

directed to review and revise their recruiter incentive systems and stated

that it will direct the services to review their programs and make revisions

as necessary. Although DOD also stated that it does not find it advisable to

direct the services to revise their recruiter quota systems unless careful

analyses warrant revisions, DOD also stated that the Navy’s new recruiter

incentive system, which subtracts points from the recruiter’s quota when a

recruit does not complete basic training, has resulted in lower attrition.

Revisions such as the Navy’s, to “ensure that recruiters maintain a level of

’ownership’ in the process,” are exactly what we are recommending in our

report. We believe that the Navy’s new incentive system provides an added

incentive for recruiters to take responsibility for the success of their

recruits in basic training.

DOD also partially concurred with our recommendation that DOD take

actions to improve applicants’ reporting of past medical problems. DOD

stated that it would direct MEPCOM to obtain from applicants the names of

their medical insurers and providers, along with a medical records release

form. DOD stated that MEPCOM will monitor changes in the rates of

disclosures for past medical conditions and obtain cost estimates for

tracking and obtaining medical records.

In response to our recommendation that DOD revise its medical screening

forms, DOD partially concurred. DOD stated that it will direct the services to

review and revise DD Form 2246 and to review SF 93, which is not a DOD

form.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to use its newly proposed

database of medical diagnostic codes to determine whether adding

medical screening tests to the MEPS examinations and/or providing more

thorough medical examinations to selected groups of applicants could

cost-effectively reduce attrition at basic training. DOD stated that it has

already established a panel to address this and related issues.

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to place responsibility for

reviewing medical separation files outside MEPCOM. DOD stated that MEPCOM

is an independent agent, completely separate from the recruiting services,

and has no conflict of interest. DOD said that the primary purpose of

MEPCOM’s reviews is to “improve medical judgment—to educate physicians

with the intent of improving physicians’ ability to make the right call given

the context of their screening exams.” We believe that this is an important

function. However, we continue to believe that MEPCOM has a conflict of

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interest in determining whether its own physicians should have discovered

disqualifying medical problems in applicants and whether its own

screening methods could be improved. We believe that an entity

completely outside the medical screening process would be more able to

objectively make these determinations.

In response to our recommendation that all services test applicants for

drugs at the MEPS, DOD partially concurred. Before requiring the Navy and

the Marine Corps to change their drug testing procedures, DOD will require

them to conduct a detailed cost-benefit analysis. We agree that a

cost-benefit analysis would give DOD a sound basis for this change in

policy. However, we believe that any such cost analysis should include the

cost of transporting, feeding, clothing, and paying recruits who are now

entering the Navy and the Marine Corps and almost immediately being

separated because they test positive for drugs upon arrival at basic

training. Of the Navy’s enlisted personnel entering basic training in fiscal

year 1994, 1,669 were separated for erroneous entry, drug abuse.

Considering the $4,700 marginal cost of transporting, feeding, clothing,

and paying each of these recruits while they were being separated, the

Navy could have avoided $7.8 million in costs by testing these recruits

before they entered the service.

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Navy, the Marine Corps,

and the Air Force consider adopting a program similar to the Army’s new

Delayed Entry Program. However, DOD stated that the benefits of this new

program have not yet been confirmed and that it is not likely that military

retirement points will be included in this program. DOD did not state why

military retirement points may not be included.

Page 48 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Page 49 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Note: GAO comments

supplementing those in the

report text appear at the

end of this appendix.

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

Page 50 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 51 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 27.

Now on p. 25.

Now on pp. 24-25.

See comment 3.

See comment 4.

Now on p. 19.

Page 52 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 5.

See comment 6.

Now on p. 45.

Now on pp. 30-31.

See comment 7.

Page 53 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on p. 6.

See comment 8.

See comment 9.

Page 54 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See comment 10.

Now on pp. 42-43.

See pp. 46-47.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

Now on pp. 45-46.

See p. 47.

Now on p. 46.

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Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 47.

Now on p. 46.

See p. 47.

Now on p. 46.

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Comments From the Department of Defense

See pp. 47-48.

Now on p. 46.

See p. 48.

Now on p. 46.

Page 58 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

See p. 48.

Page 59 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

The following are GAO’s comments on the Department of Defense’s (DOD)

letter dated December 5, 1996.

GAO Comments 1. We agree that the problems DOD is experiencing with enlisted attrition

are not new. We disagree, however, with DOD’s statement that our report

offers no new insights. DOD’s problems with attrition date back to at least

1965, when we reported on the numbers of recruits who were entering the

service with physically disqualifying conditions. DOD’s problems with data

on reasons for attrition date back to at least 1980, when we recommended

that it improve its data collection in this area.

Despite DOD’s long-standing history of losing one-third of its enlisted

personnel before the end of their first terms, DOD’s department-wide

approach to predicting and screening for attrition has been limited to two

primary criteria: whether recruits have high school diplomas and whether

they score in the upper half of the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).

While it is true that recruits with high school diplomas and high AFQT

scores have lower attrition, we believe that using these two predictors to

manage attrition has reached its limit. That is, since 1983, the percentage

of DOD recruits who have high school degrees has been over 90 percent,

and the percentage of recruits who score in the upper half of the AFQT

percentile has remained at 58 percent and above. Yet attrition has

remained at around 30 percent or higher for this entire period of time.

We believe that our approach in this report is new in that we are urging

DOD to recognize the limitations of these two predictors and concentrate

on what we see as the real drivers of high attrition: the recruiting and

examining processes themselves. To reduce enlisted attrition, DOD must

make systemic, and even cultural, changes to its recruiting and screening

processes. We believe that the primary reason for high attrition is that the

services are driven by their obligation to meet overall recruiting goals and

end strength numbers. Further, we believe that the changes that DOD has

made to its recruiting and screening processes over the years have been

only incremental and that addressing the problem of first-term attrition

will require innovative changes to the recruiting quota system and

screening process such as those we present in our recommendations. We

also believe that, though the services may be taking individual initiatives

to reduce attrition, DOD needs to gather service-wide data on the reasons

for attrition and take service-wide measures to control and manage

attrition. We do not mean to imply that the services are not concerned or

are not taking actions to address attrition. In fact, we cite many of these

Page 60 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

efforts throughout the report. We do believe, however, that DOD needs to

control and manage attrition service-wide. Cultural changes to the

recruiting and examining processes will require DOD’s direct involvement

and its application of individual service successes among all the services.

2. We could not estimate the cost of implementing the recommendations

we make to improve the screening of recruits because of DOD’s

long-standing failure to collect service-wide reasons for attrition. For

example, because DOD does not now know how many recruits are

separated for a particular medical condition, we could not calculate the

cost-effectiveness of adding various medical tests at the Military Entrance

Processing Stations. As another example, because DOD does not have

service-wide and consistent information on how many recruits are

separated for drug use, we could not evaluate the relative effectiveness

and costs of the services’ different drug-testing policies. Until DOD collects

such service-wide data, it will be unable to make policy changes based on

sound evaluations of their cost impact. We support DOD’s recent efforts to

capture more accurate medical diagnoses for those who are separated

from the military. This action indicates that DOD recognizes its need to

collect more specific data on why personnel separate.

3. During our review, various officials told us that when there are several

reasons for separating a recruit, the basic training commands have an

incentive to choose the most “face-saving” reason to record on a

servicemember’s official release form. For example, if a recruit has both

motivational and medical problems, the basic training unit has a built-in

incentive to record the medical problem as the reason for separation both

because the basic training unit would not have to admit that it failed to

motivate the recruit and because the recruit would not have to admit that

he or she failed. We make this point simply to illustrate the fact that DOD’s

only service-wide database on reasons for attrition does not always

accurately capture the actual reason that a recruit fails to complete his or

her first term of enlistment. Even if military units are not intentionally

miscoding separations, our point remains. The separation codes now being

captured by the Defense Manpower Data Center represent DOD’s only

service-wide information on why recruits are being separated, and this

information is not useful in determining why attrition is occurring. We do

not mean to suggest that DOD must use its database of separation program

designators for this purpose. What we do recommend is that DOD issue

implementing guidance for DOD’s separation codes to provide a reliable

database for managing attrition. DOD could adapt its current database of

separation codes or create a new one to serve this purpose.

Page 61 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
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Comments From the Department of Defense

4. Our recommendations are intended to prevent unqualified recruits from

ever entering the services, not to allow unqualified recruits to be retained

in training and later separated. We do not believe that unqualified recruits

should be retained. Rather, we believe that better screening would prevent

unqualified recruits from ever enlisting.

5. The Attrition Advisory Group may in the future be successful in

proposing ways to reduce attrition. However, at the time of our review, the

Army had not provided us with information on whether the Group had

implemented any initiatives.

6. We discuss the efforts of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

(Health Affairs) to create a medical database on separations in chapters 2

and 3.

7. We state in our report that we believe that the recruiters’ award systems

need to be more closely tied to their recruits’ successful completion of

basic training. We believe that the Navy’s newly implemented recruiter

incentive system provides such a link, though it is too soon to predict the

new system’s effect on attrition. We have just begun a review of the

recruiter incentive system and plan to issue a report providing more detail

on this issue next year.

8. We state in our report that our interviews with 126 separating recruits

do not represent a statistically significant sample. Nevertheless, we

present the information because we believe that what these recruits had to

say about why they were leaving is valid in presenting the emotional

effects on recruits of being separated from the military and that any

positive changes the services make to improve the atmosphere for recruits

at basic training will enhance the morale of all recruits. On the basis of

DOD’s comments on our draft report, we have deleted all conclusionary

statements on this issue.

9. Our comment on the inadequacy of DOD’s data was intended to point out

that the data is not specific enough to allow DOD to determine whether

counseling and rehabilitation efforts would have been called for in certain

instances. For example, if recruits who have disqualifying medical

problems are being discharged under a separation code that indicates

performance problems, then counseling and rehabilitation for these

recruits would not have any effect. As another example, because recruits

with motivational problems can be discharged under separation codes that

Page 62 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix I 

Comments From the Department of Defense

indicate medical problems, DOD cannot determine whether motivational

techniques might have worked to help these recruits.

10. We discuss the Air Force’s efforts to reduce attrition, in a general way,

in chapter 3.

Page 63 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
Appendix II 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Sharon Cekala

Elliott Smith

Beverly Schladt

David Moser

MaeWanda Jackson

Jai Lee

Charles Perdue

Bill Beusse

Waverly Sykes

Ernie Jackson

Nancy Ragsdale

(703122) Page 64 GAO/NSIAD-97-39 Military Attrition
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