PUBLISH UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

__________________ _______________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. CORNELIA TOM TAPAHA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 17-2104

__________________ _______________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:16-CR-01099-MV-1)

__________________ _______________ Justine Fox-Young, Albuque rque, New Mexico (R obert J. Gorence, Gorence & Oliveros, Albuqu erque, New Mexico, with her on the briefs), for Defendant-Appellant. Marisa A. Ong, Assistant United States Attorney (James D. Tierney, Acting United States Attorn ey, with her on the brief), Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

__________________ _______________ Before MATHESON , KELLY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

__________________ _______________ BACHARACH , Circuit Judge.

__________________ _______________ Ms. Cornelia Tapaha was convic ted of assault for hitting her boyfriend, Mr. Myron Yazzie, with he r car. She appeals this conviction, arguing that the district court FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### June 5, 2018 Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2  violated her constitutional ri ght to present a defense by excluding certain testimony fro m three witnesses: (1) Ms. Tamara Tapaha, Cornelia’s sister; 1 (2) Mr. Yazzie; and (3) Cornelia herself,

 violated the Confrontation Clause by ex cluding certain testimony by Mr. Yazzie, and

 erred in refusing to admit reda cted portions of an interview with a law-enfo rcement officer. We conclude that

 exclusion of the testim ony did not deprive Co rnelia of her right to present a defense,

 exclusion of certain testimony by Mr. Yazzie did not violate the Confrontation Clause, and

 the district court did not err in excl uding the redacted interview statements. Therefore, we affirm. I. Background To analyze Cornelia’s appellate ar guments, we begin with the acts underlying the conviction and consider how they related to the evidence that was excluded. A. Cornelia runs h er car into Mr. Yazzie, allegedly in selfdefense. The acts underlying the conviction are largely undispu ted. Cornelia and Mr. Yazzie picked up Tamara, and the three of them drank together in

1 For ease of reference, we refer to the Tapahas by th eir first names.3 the car. As Mr. Yazzie drove, he gr ew increasingly agitated by Cornelia’s need to make frequent stops so that she could urinate. When they arrived at a gas statio n, Cornelia went inside and Mr. Yazzie retrieved a large wrench and put it in th e back seat. On returning to the car, Cornelia learned about the wrench; she late r confronted Mr. Yazzie about what he was planning to do wi th it. Mr. Yazzie responded by punching Cornelia in the face, and the two continued to bicker. Eventually, Mr. Yazzie exited the car while yelling at Cornelia. Cornelia followed Mr. Yazzie with the car and “nicked” him once. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 792. At that poi nt, Mr. Yazzie started pounding on the hood and yelling. He then moved away, 2 and Cornelia struck him again with the car. In district court, Corn elia asserted self-defen se, alleging that she had been scared because of years of abuse by Mr. Y azzie. To support this defense, Cornelia sought to present ev idence of Mr . Yazzie’s past acts of violence. The district court allowed Corn elia, Tamara, and Mr. Yazzie to testify about the day of the incident and three prior instances of Mr.

2 Cornelia testified that Mr. Yazzi e had moved a short distance away and then “was standing there” wh en she hit him th e second time. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 793. In contrast, Ta mara testified that Mr. Yazzie had “kind of [run]” before Corn elia struck him. Id. at 623.4 Yazzie’s violence toward Cornelia. Bu t the court excluded testimony about other acts of violence. B. Cornelia tells a police officer about past acts of violence, but the court admits only a redacted version of the statements. After hitting Mr. Yazzie with her car, Cornelia s poke to a police officer (Mr. Jefferson Joe). At trial, Officer Joe testified about some of Cornelia’s statements. Cornelia sought introducti on of other statements that she had made to Offi cer Joe, but the district court excluded them. II. Constitutional Right to Present a Defense In claiming the denial of a constitutional righ t to present a defense, Cornelia relies on the ex clusion of testimony by herself, Tamara, and Mr. Yazzie. A. Standard of Review For this claim, we apply

 the abuse-of-discretion standa rd to the district court’s application of the Federal Rules of Evidence and

 de novo review to the constitut ionality of the evidentiary rulings. See United States v. Dowlin , 408 F.3d 647, 659 (10th Cir. 2005). B. The Admitted Testimony To apply this standard, we must consider how the excluded testimony related to the evidence introduced at trial.5 1. The Day of the Incident The district court a llowed extensive testim ony by Corn elia and Tamara about the day of the incident. The sisters describe d the events on the day in question, which included four relevant facts: 1. The sisters feared wh at Mr. Yazzie might do with the wrench after retrieving it. 2. After leaving the gas station, Cornelia and Mr . Yazzie argued and Mr. Yazzie seemed “jealo us about something.” Tamara testified that Mr. Y azzie had frequently gott en jealous and that when he did, he would get mad at Cornelia. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 615. 3. Mr. Yazzie tried to hit Cornelia multiple times and landed a blow to her face while she was dr iving, causing her to swerve. 4. After they pulled over, Tamara left the car and started walking away. Cornelia testified that at that point, Mr. Yazzie hit her again and threaten ed her, saying that he wished she was dead and that he would “make [going to jail] worth it this time.” Id. at 788. In testifying about thes e facts, Cornelia stated that she had hit Mr. Yazzie with the car to pr otect herself, explaining that she wanted to scare him because he would otherwise have continued to hurt her if he had reentered the car. Id. at 794. 2. Mr. Yazzie’s Prior Acts of Violence The district court also admitted testimony from th e three witnesses about Mr. Yazzie’s prior violence towa rd Cornelia. For ex ample, Cornelia testified that Mr. Yazzie would “usually” hit her with a closed fist and that6 his blows would “alway s [be] on the face.” Id. at 757. 3 Mr. Yazzie added that he had hit Cornelia when they we re living together and that he had gone to jail as a result. The witnesses also testified about three prior incidents. First, both sisters testified that on Halloween a few years earlier,

 Tamara, Cornelia, and Mr. Yazzie had been drinking in a car;

 Mr. Yazzie had gotten drunk, stopp ed the car, and argued with Cornelia; and

 Mr. Yazzie then hit Co rnelia in the face an d pushed her into oncoming traffic. Second, Cornelia testified about a past incident in which Mr. Yazzie had punched her in the face and stabbed her brothe r in the ch est with a knife. Mr. Yazzie corrobora ted this incident, though he claimed that he had only “poked” Cornelia’s brother with the knife. Id. at 711. Third, Cornelia testif ied about another incident in which Mr. Yazzie had hit her twice in the face with his fist. C. The Excluded Testimony Cornelia unsuccessfully tried to present addition al testimony from the three witnesses. That testimony would have encompassed both the day of the incident and Mr. Yazzie’s prior acts of violence.

3 Cornelia included multi ple references to what would “always” or “usually” happen. But the district cour t tried to limit these references and told the jury to disregard them.7 1. The Day of the Incident The proposed testimony included a proffer of testimony by Mr. Yazzie about the day of the incident. Mr. Yazzie would have testified that

 he believed that Cornelia’s runn ing him over was an accident and that Cornelia had not been trying to hurt him,

 he had heard that he could “get pretty aggressive” when he blacked out,

 he had a violent character an d had gone to jail for drunken violence,

 he got what he deserved becaus e of his aggression and past violence toward Cornelia, and

 he “probably” would have “continued to hurt [Cornelia] had she not stopped [him] by hi tting [him] with the car” because of his penchant for violence. Id. at 727, 729. The district court excluded Mr. Ya zzie’s proposed testimony about Cornelia’s state of mi nd on the ground of relevance. In addition, the court excluded the ot her proposed testimony without an explanation. 2. Mr. Yazzie’s Prior Acts of Violence The district court also excluded te stimony that woul d have provided greater detail about Mr. Yazzie’s hist ory of violence toward Cornelia. First, the three witne sses would have testified generally about Mr. Yazzie’s past violence. For example, Mr. Yazzie would have testified that

 he had a short fuse when drinking and

 he had pushed Cornelia against the wall a few times.8 Similarly, Tamara would have tes tified that Mr. Yazzie had frequently been violent to Cornelia and would push her around two to three times per month, often using a closed fist to h it Cornelia in the chest or face. And Cornelia would have testified that Mr. Yazzie had ab used her throughout their relationship. This abuse, inflicted about every other week, generally involved blows to Cornelia’s face or head. The three witnesses also would have testified about additional incidents of violence. For example, Tamara would have testified about two incidents: 1. Mr. Yazzie once drank heavily a nd acted cruelly to Cornelia. When the two of them went to their bedroom, Tamara heard yelling and thumps from Cornelia getting thrown against the wall. Tamara then saw Mr. Yazzie slap Cornelia in the face. 2. Another time, Tamara heard Mr. Yazzie push Cornelia against the wall and saw him hit her head against the wall. Likewise, Cornelia would have tes tified about three other incidents: 1. Mr. Yazzie once hit Cornelia’s brother on the head with a wrench. This was the same wrench that Mr. Yazzie had retrieved before getting hit with the car. 2. Three or four times, Mr. Yazzie locked Cornelia out of their apartment and she had to sleep in the car. 3. Twice, Mr. Yazzie smashed th e windows of Cornelia’s car— once while she wa s still in the car.9 Cornelia tried to use this history of abuse to bolster her self-defense claim; she would have testified that these experiences le d her to fear for her safety on the day of the incident. The district court ex cluded the proposed tes timony, reasoning that

 testimony had already been presen ted on the most serious prior incidents and

 the lack of specific descriptions or dates for the incidents had rendered them insufficiently sim ilar or close in time to the events underlying the present charge against Cornelia. The court also noted that (1) the wren ch was not used on the day of the incident and (2) the prior incident with the wrench had taken place much earlier. D. The Constitution al Analysis Cornelia argues that exclusion of the proffered testimony violated her constitutional right to presen t a defense. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments grant a defendant the “right to testify, pres ent witnesses in his own defense, and [] cross-examine witnesses against him—often collectively referred to as the right to present a defense.” United States v. Markey , 393 F.3d 1132, 1135 ( 10th Cir. 2004). But this right is not absolute; a defendant mu st still “‘abide the ru les of evidence and procedure.’” United States v. Dowlin , 408 F.3d 647, 659 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bautista , 145 F.3d 1140, 1151 (10th Cir. 1998)); see Taylor v. Illinois , 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (“The accuse d does not10 have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is . . . inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.”). In light of the need to satisfy evidentiary requirements, Cornelia bears a two-part burden on her constitutional claim. First, she must demonstrate that the district court ab used its discretion in excluding the evidence. Dowlin , 408 F.3d at 659. Second, sh e must demonstr ate that the excluded evidence “‘was of such an exculpatory nature that its exclusion affected the tria l’s outcome.’” Id. (quoting Richmond v. Embry , 122 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 1997)). Attempting to satisfy this two-pa rt burden, Cornelia argues that

 the excluded evidence was admi ssible under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 405 and

 the erroneous exclusion of this evidence impaired her ability to present her central cl aim of self-defense. Although she was able to describe her fear on the day of the incident, Cornelia argues that

 her abusive relationship with Mr. Yazzie affected the objective reasonableness of her fear and

 the jury could not properly a ssess Cornelia’s stated fears without knowing about Mr. Y azzie’s abusive history. We conclude that the district c ourt acted within its discretion in excluding some of Mr. Yazzie’s proffe red testimony based on the Federal Rules of Evidence. Even if the other proffered testimony should have been11 allowed under the federal evidentiary rules, exclusion would not have infringed Cornelia’s constitutiona l right to present a defense. 1. Properly Excluded Statements by Mr. Yazzie Some of Mr. Yazzie’s proffered testimony was impermissibly speculative, warranting exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 Under these rules, a witness can testif y about something only if he or she has personal knowledge. Fed. R. Evid. 602; see Fed. R. Evid. 701 (stating that a witness can give an opinion onl y if it is “rationally based on the witness’s perception”). Ac cordingly, testimony is in admissible when it is speculative. See Hill v. J.B. Hu nt Transp., Inc. , 815 F.3d 651, 666 n.10 (10th Cir. 2016). Two of Mr. Yazzie’s statements were properly excluded as speculative: 1. Mr. Yazzie character ized the incident as an accident and thought that Cornelia had not intended to hurt him. 2. Mr. Yazzie stated that he pr obably would have continued to hurt Cornelia if she had not run him over, which was based on his statement that he tends to be aggressive when he blacks out. For the first statement, Mr. Y azzie would have testified about Cornelia’s state of mi nd. But Mr. Yazzie ad mittedly lacked any recollection of the incident; thus, hi s surmise about Corn elia’s thinking

4 The district court did not rely on the speculative nature of this testimony. But we may affirm the cour t’s decision on an y basis supported by the record. United States v. Pam , 867 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.1 (10th Cir. 2017).12 was not based on hi s personal knowledge. See Lowry v. City of San Diego , 858 F.3d 1248, 1255-5 6 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc ) (upholding the district court’s exclusion of testimony because the witness was slee ping at the time of the event, prev enting the “persona l knowledge” required by the Federal Rules of Evidence). For the second statement, Mr. Yazzie would have opined that Cornelia needed to act in self-defense because he probably would have continued to hurt her if she had not run him over. Mr. Yazzie did not profess to remember that he had in tended to hurt Corn elia; rather, he testified that others had remarked th at he would act aggressively when blacking out during his drunken spells. He ther efore stated that

 he tends to act violently when drinking and

 “because of . . . [h is] character trait for violence,” he “probably” would have continued to hurt Cornelia if she had not taken action. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 729. But Mr. Yazzie admitted that he co uld not recall being run over, what his intentions had been, or how much of a threat he had posed to Cornelia. His testimony was merely that he te nds to act violently when drunk and that his drunkenness would probably have led him to inflic t more injuries if Cornelia had not stopped him. This speculation was not admiss ible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See p. 11, above.13 2. The Remaining Testimony that Was Excluded The other excluded testimony falls within four general categories: 1. Additional details involving Mr. Yazzie’s abuse of Cornelia throughout the relationship, 2. Mr. Yazzie’s character for violence when drunk, 3. the incident when Mr. Yazzie hit Cornelia’s brother with a wrench, and 4. the two incidents in which Mr. Yazzie sm ashed the windows of Cornelia’s car. See Part II(C), above. Cornelia argues that this testim ony was necessary to show the reason ableness of her fear when she hit Mr. Yazzie with the car. But even if the district court had abused its discretion in excluding this evidence, the ruling would not have viol ated the right to present a defense. Our assumption of evid entiary error would satisf y the first step of the constitutional analysis. See p. 10, above. At the se cond step, we consider whether the excluded evidence “‘was of such an ex culpatory nature that its exclusion affected th e trial’s outcome.’” United States v. Dowlin , 408 F.3d 647, 659 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Richmond v. Embry , 122 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 1997)); see p. 10, above. This inquiry consists of two questions: 1. Was the proffered testimony “‘ the type that if believed would have, by necessity, exculp ated the defendant’”? 2. If the proffered tes timony had been admitte d, would it “‘have created a reason able doubt that did no t exist without the evidence’”?14 Dowlin , 408 F.3d at 660 (quoting Richmond , 122 F.3d at 874). The answer to both questi ons is “no.” First, even if the excluded eviden ce had been relevant, this evidence would not necessarily have proven the reasonableness of Co rnelia’s fear of serious bodily injury. See United Stat es v. Toledo , 739 F.3d 562, 567 (10th Cir. 2014) (stating that a valid self-defense claim re quires that the fear of harm be reasonable). Cornelia does not argue otherwise, asserting only that the excluded evidence would have cr eated a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 50. Second, if the exclud ed testimony ha d been admitted, it would not have created a reasonable doubt about th e outcome based on the cumulativeness of the ev idence and the weakness of Cornelia’s selfdefense claim.

a. Cumulativeness The excluded evidence would not have added an ything significant to the testimony already admi tted. The four categories of excluded evidence might have been relevant to explain Co rnelia’s fear of Mr. Yazzie. But the jury had already heard ample evidence about why Cornelia was scared. For example, the jury had already heard about Mr. Yazzie’s frequent acts of drunken violence and his violence on the day of the incident. Thus, the jury was fully aware that15  Cornelia had been abused by Mr. Yazzie throughout their relationship and

 this abuse had continued on the day of the incident. Additional details about Mr. Yazzie’s past abus e and his character for violence would not have meaningfully added to the existing evidence. In addition, the prio r incident involving th e wrench would have added little to the extens ive evidence of violence already presented to the jury. The wrench was arguably releva nt because its presence might have frightened Cornelia. But Cornelia had an extens ive opportunity to testify about the wrench and did, describing what she thought when she learned that Mr. Yazzie ha d retrieved the wrench and put it in the back seat. The window-breaking incidents woul d likewise have added little. Cornelia testified that Mr. Yazzie ha d nothing in his ha nds when she ran him over; in the prior incidents, Mr. Yazzie had br oken the car windows with cinder blocks and an iron bar. To the extent that Cornelia was afraid Mr. Yazzie might nonethe less break her car window s, she had an ample opportunity to testify abou t her fear of Mr. Yazz ie at the time of the incident. In these circumstances, we concl ude that the excl uded testimony would have added relati vely little to the eviden ce that was ultimately allowed.16 b. Weakness of Cornelia’s Self-Defense Claim Even with the additio nal testimony, Cornelia’s assertion of selfdefense would have remained weak. It was undisputed that

 Mr. Yazzie had exited the car and was walking away before Cornelia “nicked” hi m the first time and

 Mr. Yazzie had then walked or run away from the vehicle and had his back to Cornelia when she struck him th e second time. When walking or runn ing away, Mr. Yazzie wa s empty-handed, and Cornelia could have driven away or called the police. See United States v. Talamante , 981 F.2d 1153, 1157 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that a selfdefense claim fails when the defendant could have safely withdrawn from the conflict but did not do so). And Cornelia never told law-enforcement officials that she had act ed in self-defen se; instead, she admitted hitting Mr. Yazzie because she was angry. In these circumstances, we conclude that Cornelia’s self-d efense claim was weak. * * * If the excluded evidence had b een admitted, it would not have created a reasonab le doubt about the outcome. Therefore, any error in excluding this eviden ce did not violate Cornelia ’s constitutional right to present a defense. See id. (holding that there was no violation of the right to present a defense beca use the defendant “had the opportunity to testify, to state that he feared the victim, to argue self-defense, and to [examine]17 the victim and bring out the facts rela ted to the victim’s propensity for violence”). III. Confrontation Clause In addition, Cornelia urges a violation of the Confrontation Clause when the district court restricted her cross-ex amination of Mr. Yazzie. 5 But Mr. Yazzie was Cornelia’s own witn ess, and he was never declared adverse. Cornelia accor dingly conducted a direct examination of Mr. Yazzie, and it was the government that cross-ex amined him. Cornelia provides no explanation or support for her contention that she had a right to cross -examine Mr. Yazzie. Rather , this argument is just another way of claiming that the distri ct court infringed Cornelia’s right to present a defense by excluding Mr. Yazzie’s prof fered testimony. See Richmond v. Embry , 122 F.3d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that the right to present defense-witness tes timony implicates th e rights to due process and compulsory powers rather than the Confrontation Clause); accord United States v. Wilkens , 742 F.3d 354, 364 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to exclusion of testimony from the defense’s own witnesses).

5 Cornelia forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in district court. United States v. Williams , 888 F.3d 1126, 1131 (1 0th Cir. 2018). But the government does not ar gue for forfeiture; we therefore exercise our discretion to consider this argument on the merits. See id.18 IV. Redacted Interview Statements Finally, Cornelia clai ms that the district court erred by excluding portions of an interview that she had given to Officer Joe shortly after the incident. The government pr esented a redacted versio n of the interview. In this version, Cornelia stated that she had run over Mr. Yazzie because she was mad at him. But the gov ernment excised all of Co rnelia’s references to Mr. Yazzie’s past abuse. Cornelia un successfully trie d to present the excised portions, arguing that they bore on her a ssertion of self-defense. In district court Cornelia rec ognized that the statements would ordinarily constitute hearsay, but sh e argued that the statements were admissible (1) as prior consistent stat ements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B), 6 and (2) as impeachment of Officer Joe’s testimony, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its disc retion in rejecting both arguments. A. Prior Consistent Statements Cornelia characterizes the excised statements as prior consistent statements because they were consiste nt with her trial theory of self-

6 On appeal, Cornelia ar gues that the statemen ts were admissible “as prior consistent statements regardi ng her reasonable fe ar of injury.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 21. To the ex tent that Cornelia is arguing that the statements were admissib le to rebut a charge of recent fabrication, that argument is addressed below. To the ex tent that Cornelia instead means to argue that the statements were admissible to prove her stat e of mind, this argument was forfeited beca use it had not been raised in district court. United States v. Gould , 672 F.3d 930, 938 (10th Cir. 2012).19 defense. But prior consistent statements are admissible only if they “rebut an express or implied charge that th e declarant recently fabricated [the testimony].” Fed. R. Evid . 801(d)(1)(B)(i). And wh en Cornelia proffered the excised statements, ther e had not yet been an express or implied charge of fabrication. Cornelia points to the government’s subseq uent closing argument. There the governmen t argued that Cornelia ’s testimony had been “completely inconsistent” with her statements to officers. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 932. Bu t Cornelia’s theory is unpersuasive because

 the government did not present its closing argument until after Cornelia had offered the excised statements and

 the closing argument did not suggest that Cornelia had fabricated her account. In its closing argument, the government referre d to inconsistencies between Cornelia’s trial testimony and other ev idence. But the government did not suggest that Cornelia had fabricated her account. In light of the absence of a prior a llegation of recent fabrication, the district court acted within its discretion in rejecting Cornel ia’s theory as a basis to introduce the excised statements.20 B. Impeachment Cornelia insists that the excised statements were also admissible to impeach Officer Joe’s te stimony. We disagree. At trial, Officer Joe testified: Q. Now, Mr. Joe, du ring any of your conv ersations with the Defendant in this matter, did she ever claim that she was physically abused by Myron Yazzie on July 8th of 2015 [the date of the incident]? A. No. Q. Did she ever claim that she was threatened by him on July 8th of 2015? A. No. Q. Did she ever claim that she was hit or touched by him in an angry manner on July 8th of 2015? A. No. Q. Did she ever claim she had to protect herself or defend herself from him to protect herself or another person on July 8th, 2015? A. No. Q. Why did she consistently cl aim that she hit Mr. Yazzie? A. Because she was mad. Appellant’s App’x, vol. 2 at 162-63. Cornelia’s intervie w included this exchange, which was excluded at trial: CI Jefferson Joe: All right. What was the argue—besides him threatening to walk off again, was there some other reasons why the anger in you just came out?21 Cornelia Tapaha: We’d been toge ther for like fi ve years and he used to be really abusive toward s me. . . . He us ed to like hit me, throw me around, and st uff like that . . . .

. . . CI Jefferson Joe: I understan d that you’re—you’re angry, and you just told us that, you know, your an ger just got out and with the years of physical abus e and, you know, the drinking and—and everything just came out.

. . . CI Jefferson Joe: Your relation ship with Myron, you told us about this five, six years of physical abuse and (inaudible) mental—mental abuse also. Was there anything in court that you filed ag ainst him? Appellant’s App’x, vol. 1 at 136, 139, 149. Cornelia insists that this exchange should have b een allowed. For this contention, Co rnelia characterizes Officer Joe’s testimony as stating that Cornelia had not co mplained of abuse. According to Cornelia, the excised statements would undermine this testim ony by showing that she had raised self-defense in her interview. This ar gument fails because the excised statements were consistent with Of ficer Joe’s testimony. Officer Joe testified only that Corn elia had not said anything about the need to defend hers elf on the day of the incident, for every question asked only what Cornelia had said about that particular day. By contrast, all of the excised statements pertaine d to Mr. Yazzie’s past abuse. Cornelia’s statemen ts about past abus e did not conflict wi th Officer Joe’s trial testimony about statements i nvolving the day of the incident.22 Officer Joe characterized Cornelia’s prior statem ents as an admission that she had run ove r Mr. Yazzie because she was mad. This characterization of the interview was consistent with Co rnelia’s excised statements. Cornelia never asserted in the interview that she had acted in self-defense, and she rec ounted the past abuse to explain why sh e was mad. Therefore, the excised stat ements do not conflict with Officer Joe’s trial testimony. In these circumst ances, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in excl uding the excised statements. 7
V. Conclusion We conclude that

 Mr. Yazzie’s speculative tes timony was properly excluded under the Federal Rule s of Evidence and the exclusion of other testimony did not deprive Cornelia of her constitu tional right to present a defense,

 Cornelia has not shown a violation of the Confrontation Clause, and

 the district court acted within its discretion in excluding the excised portions of Cornelia’s statements to Officer Joe. Therefore, we affirm.

7 The government also argu es that Cornel ia’s excised statements could not be used to impeac h Officer Joe because th ey were not his own statements. See Garcia-Martinez v. City & Cty. of Denver , 392 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[I] mplicit in the use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach is the requ irement that the impeached witness actually made the prior statement.”). We need not addre ss this argument.