COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

June 22, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP265-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2014CF3942

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JUAN RAMONE CAMACHO,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee

County: THOMAS J. McADAMS, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Dugan, Graham and White, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2020AP265-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Juan Ramone Camacho appeals his judgment of 

conviction for second-degree sexual assault of a child. He argues that he is 

entitled to a new trial because the trial court erroneously admitted DNA test results 

including Camacho as a potential father of the child conceived by his fifteen-yearold niece and a related statistic indicating that it was 700 million times more likely 

that Camacho, instead of another unrelated male, was the father. We conclude that 

the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting this evidence,

and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Upon suspicion that she might be pregnant, fifteen-year-old J.A. 

took a home pregnancy test and, subsequently, went to the hospital for 

confirmation of the positive result. J.A. was estimated to be about twenty to 

twenty-one weeks pregnant. She underwent an abortion.

1

 

¶3 J.A. testified during the trial that she never had sexual intercourse. 

However, she recalled the Easter weekend in April 2014 she spent at her uncle’s2

house, where she woke up without her clothes on after taking a nap. J.A. testified 

that Camacho picked her and her younger brother up and took them to his house

for a sleepover. Camacho was smoking marijuana during the car ride and after 

prodding and pressuring, Camacho convinced J.A. to smoke. J.A. had never 

smoked marijuana before, and she complained of feeling “[l]oopy, dizzy, tired.” 

 

1

 Following the abortion, a Milwaukee police officer who was at the hospital, conveyed 

the fetus to the Milwaukee County Medical Examiner’s Office to get a tissue sample from the 

fetus for a DNA test. 

2

 J.A.’s mother testified that she and Camacho were full-blooded siblings. 
No. 2020AP265-CR

3

She was watching television at Camacho’s house with her younger brother and 

Camacho’s girlfriend’s daughter, when Camacho offered to let her take a nap in 

the other room so she could feel better. J.A. went to sleep in the bedroom fully 

clothed. When she awoke, her pants were off, her underwear was pulled down,

her shirt was pulled up past her belly button, and she had “a lot of discharge” of a 

“clear fluid” from her vaginal area. She cleaned and dressed herself, but did not 

say anything until over four months later in August 2014. She feared she was 

pregnant, but did not want to tell her mother. Instead, she told her brother, and her 

brother convinced her to tell their mother. 

¶4 Camacho was charged with second-degree sexual assault of a child 

in September 2014 and he was found guilty in May 2016, after a four-day jury 

trial.

3

 The trial court subsequently sentenced Camacho to thirty years 

imprisonment composed of twenty-two years and six months of initial 

confinement, and seven years and six months of extended supervision. 

¶5 During the trial, in addition to hearing testimony from J.A., J.A.’s 

mother, and two of the officers involved in the case, the jury also heard testimony 

from a DNA analyst from the Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory about testing

performed using the fetal tissue and DNA samples from J.A., Camacho, and J.A.’s 

brother.

4

 In her testimony, the analyst described the method she used to compare 

the fetal tissue to the samples provided and explained that she looks for matching

 

3

 The Honorable Stephanie Rothstein presided over the proceedings in Camacho’s case 

until August 2015, at which time the Honorable Thomas J. McAdams took over the proceedings 

as a result of a reassignment of the court’s calendar. 

4

 A sample was taken from J.A.’s brother and tested at Camacho’s request. J.A. never 

accused her brother of sexually assaulting her.
No. 2020AP265-CR

4

DNA at fifteen different points. She testified that the DNA from the fetal tissue 

and the DNA from Camacho’s sample matched at all fifteen points, but the fetal 

sample did not match at all fifteen points when compared with J.A.’s brother’s 

sample. Thus, the DNA analyst testified, “Camacho could be included as a 

possible father to the fetal tissue” and that “assuming that [J.A.] is the mother of 

the fetal tissue, it is 700 million times more likely that [] Camacho is the father of 

the fetal tissue than an unrelated, unknown individual.”5 The analyst addressed 

the statement in the report that the statistical calculation was based on the 

assumption that Camacho and J.A. were unrelated. She stated that a statistic that 

accounted for the fact that Camacho and J.A. were related would “more accurately 

assesses the likelihood of parentage.” However, she testified that her statistic 

remained the same even in light of the familial relationship between Camacho and 

J.A., and nothing would change the fact that the fetal tissue and Camacho’s sample 

matched on all fifteen points. 

¶6 On cross-examination, Camacho extensively questioned the analyst 

about the procedures she used to conduct the testing and, in particular, the impact 

 

5

 The DNA analyst issued two reports in this matter with these conclusions. Her first 

report, dated September 9, 2014, stated that Camacho “is a possible biological father of the fetal 

tissue” and “it is at least 700 million times more likely” that Camacho “is his biological father 

than if a random, unrelated male is the father.” The second report, dated August 26, 2015, 

included the same information but added an additional paragraph towards the end of the report 

that stated: 

It should be noted that this statistical analysis is based on 

the assumption that the mother and alleged father are unrelated. 

For a statistical analysis which more accurately assesses the 

likelihood of parentage for a situation in which the mother and 

alleged father are related, the submitter is advised to seek 

consultation from a parentage testing laboratory.

Both of these reports were admitted into evidence at trial, and the paragraph added to the second 

report provides the basis for Camacho’s argument on appeal.
No. 2020AP265-CR

5

that the assumption had on her statistical calculation and her recommendation that 

the State consult a parentage testing lab because of the familial relationship 

between Camacho and J.A.

6

 Camacho asked if the analyst recommended that a 

parentage testing lab be consulted “[b]ecause it will establish for real who the 

father is.” She again testified, “No, this would not say -- This would not change 

the fact that [] Camacho types, all match of up with what the father’s type would 

have to be. It would merely change possibly, the statistic.” The analyst was 

further questioned on this topic by the State during redirect: 

[State:] Would that change your findings in any regards 

about him being more likely the father, in one in 700 

million or the African American database, the 1 in 900 

million for the Caucasian database, the 1 in 9 billion in the 

Hispanic southeast database, or the 7.9 billion Hispanic 

southwest database? 

[Analyst:] It would not, as I have no other way of 

calculating a statistic in this case. 

¶7 When later asked whether the statistics “prove” that Camacho was 

the father, she again testified, “All I can say is the types that were required of the 

father were present in [] Camacho’s profile. He is a possible father of the fetus. 

That is all I can say.” 

¶8 Prior to the trial, Camacho, proceeding pro se, filed several motions 

related to the DNA testing and seeking to exclude the DNA testing evidence and 

the analyst’s testimony for various reasons. As pertinent here, in his first motion 

in limine, Camacho sought to exclude the DNA test results and, as one of those 

 

6

 Camacho was represented by three separate attorneys appointed by the State Public 

Defender’s Office before he filed a motion seeking to proceed pro se on March 2, 2015. The trial 

court granted his motion at a hearing on that date and appointed standby counsel to assist 

Camacho. 
No. 2020AP265-CR

6

reasons, argued that the results should be excluded “because of ‘exaggerated 

statistical calculations [and] interpretations.’” Camacho reasoned that the test 

results should be excluded based on the analyst’s comparison to databases for 

Caucasian, African-American, and other races when Camacho is of Puerto-Rican 

descent. Shortly before trial, Camacho filed an “Addendum to Motion in Limine,”

wherein Camacho again sought to exclude the DNA test results, but this time he 

included as one of the grounds the fact that the statistical analysis was based on 

the inaccurate assumption that he was not related to J.A., and the statistic itself 

was “only meant and relevant” for unrelated individuals. Both these motions 

in limine were denied and, as with many of the other challenges Camacho raised to 

the DNA test results, were thought to be the proper subject of cross-examination. 

¶9 Camacho now appeals and argues that the trial court erroneously 

exercised its discretion when it denied his requests to exclude the DNA testing 

evidence. More specifically, Camacho argues that the statistic contained in the 

analyst’s reports and testified to during trial was irrelevant because it was based on 

the inaccurate assumption that Camacho and J.A. are unrelated. He further argues 

that, if this evidence is relevant, it was unfairly prejudicial and misled the jury and, 

therefore, should have been excluded.7 

DISCUSSION

¶10 “The question of whether to admit evidence is within the circuit 

court’s discretion.” State v. Warbelton, 2009 WI 6, ¶17, 315 Wis. 2d 253, 759 

 

7

 The State additionally argues that any error in the admission of the DNA testing 

evidence is harmless. Because we conclude that the evidence was properly admitted, we do not 

address the State’s argument regarding harmless error.
No. 2020AP265-CR

7

N.W.2d 557. We will reverse a circuit court’s decision “only if the circuit court 

erroneously exercised its discretion.” Id. “A circuit court erroneously exercises 

its discretion when it bases its decision on a misstated fact or an incorrect view of 

the law.” Id.

¶11 As a preliminary matter, the State argues that Camacho waived his 

right to challenge the admission of the DNA testing evidence because, after being 

advised by the trial court and standby counsel about the potential need for a 

Daubert hearing,8 Camacho specifically and repeatedly stated that he was not 

asking for a Daubert hearing to challenge the science behind the results.

9

 In 

response, Camacho argues that he was not required to challenge the DNA testing 

evidence under Daubert and his repeated attempts to exclude the results before 

trial were sufficient to apprise the State and the trial court of his objection. 

¶12 We agree with Camacho that he has not waived his right to 

challenge the DNA testing evidence. Camacho filed two motions in limine that 

specifically raised objections to the statistical calculation, and the DNA test results 

generally were the subject of much debate during the pre-trial proceedings. These

were sufficient to put the court and opposing counsel on notice of Camacho’s 

objection. See State v. Corey J.G., 215 Wis. 2d 395, 405, 572 N.W.2d 845 (1998)

(“An objection or motion is sufficient to preserve an issue for appeal if it apprises 

the court of the specific grounds upon which it is based.”). Moreover, a Daubert

hearing was not required to preserve the challenge Camacho raised to the DNA 

 

8

 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

9

 The analyst’s second report containing the additional paragraph had not been issued at 

the time Camacho filed his first motion in limine. 
No. 2020AP265-CR

8

testing evidence being based on an inaccurate underlying assumption. See State v. 

Giese, 2014 WI App 92, ¶23, 356 Wis. 2d 796, 854 N.W.2d 687 (“The accuracy of 

the facts upon which the expert relies and the ultimate determinations of 

credibility and accuracy are for the jury, not the court.”). Therefore, we turn to the 

merits of Camacho’s arguments.

¶13 Camacho first argues that the DNA test results in this case were 

improperly admitted because the results lack probative value and, therefore, are 

not relevant evidence. He argues that “[a]lthough the results purportedly relate to 

a fact of consequence—whether Camacho had sex with J.A.—they do not help 

answer that question.” 

¶14 Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to make the 

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” WIS. STAT.

§ 904.01 (2019-20).

10

 To determine whether evidence has probative value, we ask 

“whether the consequential fact or proposition for which the evidence was offered 

becomes more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” State v. 

Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶70, 320 Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832. Probative value “is 

a common sense determination based less on legal precedent than life 

experiences.” Id. (citation omitted).

¶15 In this case, common sense dictates that the DNA test results 

certainly make the fact of consequence here more or less probable than it would be 

without the evidence. The analyst testified that Camacho’s DNA matched with 

 

10

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
No. 2020AP265-CR

9

the DNA from the fetal tissue on all fifteen points tested and, therefore, Camacho 

was included as a possible father of the fetus. She then testified to a statistic that 

Camacho was “700 million times more likely” to be the father based on those 

results. She further testified that any inaccuracy in the statistic being based on the 

assumption that Camacho and J.A. are unrelated does not change the matching 

points of DNA found between Camacho and the fetal tissue, and does not even 

change her statistic. As she explained, accounting for the fact that Camacho and 

J.A. are related would produce a more accurate statistic, but the fact remained that 

Camacho was a potential father.

¶16 Consequently, the DNA test results help determine whether

Camacho is the father of the fetus and, in turn, are probative of the fact of 

consequence, namely whether Camacho had sex with J.A. See State v. Hartman, 

145 Wis. 2d 1, 14-16, 426 N.W.2d 320 (1988) (“Evidence which informs the jury 

of the probability that the defendant is the father of a child who was alleged to 

have been conceived as a result of a sexual assault perpetrated by the defendant is 

clearly relevant to the determination of whether the defendant sexually assaulted 

the mother of the child.”). Even considering the limits of the statistic, the statistic 

itself is also still probative of the fact of consequence, even if it is less so. Thus, 

we discern no erroneous exercise of discretion on the trial court’s part in admitting 

the evidence because the DNA test result comparing Camacho and the fetus and
No. 2020AP265-CR

10

the resulting statistic had probative value in determining whether Camacho had 

sexual intercourse with his niece.

11

¶17 Camacho next argues that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 

delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” See WIS.

STAT. § 904.03. He further argues that the DNA test results are inadmissible 

because the risk of unfair prejudice and misleading the jury substantially outweigh

what little probative value the test results have. Camacho argues that, assuming 

the test results have any probative value, the “jurors were presented with a 

calculation that made it appear highly likely” that Camacho was the father,

without any ability “to assess the extent to which the familial relation undermined 

that calculation.” Then, given that J.A. was sleeping during the alleged assault, 

the DNA test results played “the central role” in the State’s case. 

¶18 Contrary to Camacho’s contention, the jury was presented with an 

ability to assess the DNA evidence and was not misled in a way that constituted 

unfair prejudice, and did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the 

DNA testing evidence. The DNA analyst testified regarding the testing process—

she described the number of points she looks for in comparing DNA samples, she 

described that Camacho’s sample matched on all points when compared with the 

 

11

 Camacho further argues that we should reverse the trial court’s decision to admit the 

DNA testing evidence because the trial court utterly failed to exercise discretion at the time it 

denied Camacho’s motion in limine. We recognize that, at the time it denied Camacho’s motion 

in limine on this specific topic, the trial court said nothing more than, “Okay. That one’s going to 

be denied as well. All right. Let’s move on to 4.” However, we also recognize that this denial 

followed several motions, hearings, and lengthy discussions on the topic of the DNA testing 

evidence. Thus, we find sufficient evidence of the trial court’s discretion in the record.
No. 2020AP265-CR

11

fetal tissue, and she described that J.A.’s brother did not match. She thus 

explained to the jury that Camacho could be included as a possible father and 

J.A.’s brother was excluded based on the matching points. She also further 

testified to the statistic and the limits of that statistic. 

¶19 Moreover, Camacho extensively cross-examined the analyst not only 

on the underlying assumption that Camacho and J.A. are unrelated, but also on 

several points where the analyst’s testing deviated from protocols and procedures. 

Accordingly, the jury had the tools necessary to assess the analyst’s testimony and 

was not misled by the statistic when it is placed within the overall context of the 

trial. Additionally, given the probative value of the evidence and the low risk of 

misleading the jury, the probative value was not substantially outweighed such 

that the DNA testing evidence should have been excluded.

¶20 Camacho additionally argues that the statistic was unfairly 

prejudicial because of the emphasis the State placed on the statistic during the

closing argument. During closing arguments, the prosecutor led with the statistic 

provided by the analyst, but he spent the majority of his closing argument focused 

on J.A.’s testimony. After leading with the statistic, he then said, “I don’t want 

you to get lost in the stats in this case because we spent all day yesterday on DNA 

and the statistics and things like that.” He then spent a significant amount of time 

discussing J.A.’s account. Given the context in which the statistic was used and 

the amount of time the prosecutor spent on J.A.’s account, any risk of unfair 

prejudice is again outweighed by the probative value of the DNA testing evidence. 

¶21 In further arguing for exclusion, Camacho relies on State v. Denton, 

2009 WI App 78, 319 Wis. 2d 718, 768 N.W.2d 250, and argues that the State 
No. 2020AP265-CR

12

impermissibly “sift[ed] and winnow[ed]” the evidence in his case just as the State 

did in Denton. We do not agree. 

¶22 In Denton, we first recognized that the defendants had no notice of 

the computer-generated animation that the State sought to introduce. Id., ¶12. We 

then stated that “the surprise in this case was coupled with the danger of prejudice 

and confusion.” Id. There is no element of surprise here. Given the extent of the 

pre-trial proceedings focused on the DNA testing, Camacho was clearly aware of 

the results. Moreover, the prejudice and confusion in Denton was premised on the 

fact that the State failed to lay any foundation for the animation, and failed to 

explain to the jury how to use the animation evidence. Id., ¶¶21-22. Instead, the 

State introduced the animation to the jury as if it was an eyewitness account as 

opposed to what it actually was, namely, “a collage of information” based on all 

the witness accounts. Id., ¶22. The record here clearly reveals that is not what 

happened in Camacho’s case. Rather, the analyst was clear about the limits of her 

statistic, and both the State and Camacho questioned her on the accuracy of the 

statistic, among many other things. Denton is, therefore, not instructive regarding 

whether the DNA testing evidence should have been excluded here.

CONCLUSION

¶23 In sum, we conclude that the DNA testing evidence was properly 

admitted. The evidence was relevant and its probative value was not substantially 

outweighed by any unfair prejudice or misleading of the jury. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
No. 2020AP265-CR

13

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5.