J-S21039-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

ANTHONY SCOTT 

 Appellant No. 2330 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the PCRA Order October 17, 2011 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0702311-2006 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., ALLEN, J., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2014 

 Anthony Scott appeals, pro se, from the order entered October 17, 

2011, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, denying his 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9541 et seq. Scott seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of an 

aggregate 14 to 28 years’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ probation 

imposed after the trial court, sitting without a jury, found him guilty of rape1

and related charges for the repeated sexual abuse of his girlfriend’s 

daughter. On appeal, Scott raises nine issues asserting trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, trial court error, and the unconstitutionality of a provision in 

the Pennsylvania Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S § 3121. 
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The facts underlying Scott’s conviction were briefly summarized by this 

Court in the unpublished memorandum decision affirming his judgment of 

sentence on direct appeal: 

The present offenses arise from [Scott’s] sexual abuse of

his girlfriend’s daughter, J.W. Until she was six years old, J.W. 

lived in Georgia with her siblings and aunt. At that time, J.W.’s 

father died, and J.W.’s mother brought the family to Philadelphia 

where they resided with [Scott]. [Scott] promptly began to 

sexually abuse J.W. by touching her vagina and chest. The 

abuse escalated and when the child was seven years old, [Scott] 

raped her. [Scott] continued to have sexual intercourse with 

J.W., and after she was ten years old, started to force her to 

give him oral sex. In 2006, when she was in sixth grade, J.W. 

told her best friend, B.D., about the abuse. B.D. encouraged 

J.W. to report the crimes to the authorities, and J.W. followed 

that advice on April 8, 2006. Two police officers arrived at the 

home and took J.W. to be interviewed by a detective. While J.W. 

was in the detective’s office, J.W.’s mother telephoned and said 

that she did not believe the allegations and that J.W. was not 

permitted to return home. 

Commonwealth v. Scott, 988 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished 

memorandum at 2). 

 Scott was subsequently arrested and charged with numerous sexual 

offenses. The case proceeded to bench trial, and, on February 8, 2007, the 

trial court found Scott guilty of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 

aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, statutory sexual assault, 

sexual assault, unlawful contact with minor, endangering the welfare of 

children, corruption of minors, and simple assault.2

 On October 12, 2007, 

____________________________________________ 

2

 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121, 3123(a)(1), 3125, 3126(a)(1), 3122.1, 3124.1, 

6318(a)(6), 4304, 6301(a), and 2701(a), respectively.
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the trial court found that Scott met the criteria for classification as a sexually 

violent predator,3

and imposed an aggregate sentence of 14 to 28 years’ 

imprisonment, followed by five years’ probation. No direct appeal was filed.

 On January 28, 2008, Scott filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel was 

appointed, and filed a petition to withdraw and accompanying 

Turner/Finley4“no merit” letter. However, the docket reveals that on

September 24, 2008, the trial court permitted defense counsel to withdraw 

his Turner/Finley letter, and reinstated Scott’s direct appeal rights nunc pro 

tunc. Scott then filed a direct appeal nunc pro tunc, and on November 25, 

2009, a panel of this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. See Scott, 

supra.

5

 

 On February 16, 2010, Scott filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. 

Thereafter, he filed pro se amended and supplemental petitions both before 

and after counsel was appointed on September 3, 2010. On January 3, 

2011, PCRA counsel filed a motion for discovery,6 seeking: (1) the police 

____________________________________________ 

3

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10 et seq. 

4 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).

5

 Scott raised only two issues in his direct appeal, both challenging the 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A panel of this Court dismissed both 

claims without prejudice to Scott’s right to raise them again in a PCRA 

petition. See Scott, supra. 

6 The Rules of Criminal Procedure provide, in pertinent part, “no discovery 

shall be permitted at any stage of the [PCRA] proceedings, except upon 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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reports;7

(2) permission to subpoena the victim’s medical records from 1999 

through 2006; (3) a hearing to determine if the victim’s diary contained any 

any exculpatory information; and (4) permission to subpoena all records 

from the Department of Human Services (DHS) from 1999 through 2006. 

Although the Commonwealth turned over all police reports and DHS records 

in its files, it opposed discovery of the victim’s medical records and diary.8 

Thereafter, on June 1, 2011, PCRA counsel filed an amended petition 

asserting counsel’s ineffectiveness for failing to object to the hearsay 

testimony of the victim’s friend, and challenging the PCRA court’s denial of 

the motion for discovery.9 Scott filed a pro se objection to counsel’s 

amended petition, and the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss the 

PCRA petition. On September 14, 2011, the PCRA court issued notice, 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, of its intent to dismiss the petition without 

first conducting an evidentiary hearing, to which Scott, once again, filed a 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

leave of court after a showing of exceptional circumstances.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1) (emphasis supplied). 

7

 PCRA counsel averred that he attempted to obtain copies of the police 

reports from prior counsel, but was unsuccessful. See Motion for Discovery 

Under Post Conviction Relief Act, 1/3/2011, at ¶ 5(a).

8

 The Commonwealth further asserted that none of these records were in its 

files. 

9

 Although no order specifically denying the motion for discovery is included 

in the certified record, Scott avers in his amended petition that the PCRA 

court “denied [him] the ability to subpoena the records.” Amended Petition 

Under Post Conviction Relief Act, 6/1/2011, at ¶ 11. 
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pro se response. However, on October 17, 2011, the PCRA court dismissed 

the PCRA petition, and Scott filed a timely notice of appeal. 

While that appeal was pending, and after counsel filed a Rule 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, Scott filed a pro se

petition for withdrawal of counsel, claiming that PCRA counsel ignored the 

issues he wished to raise on appeal, and requesting to proceed pro se. On 

March 5, 2012, this Court directed the PCRA court to conduct a Grazier10

hearing to determine if Scott’s request to proceed pro se was knowing, 

intelligent and voluntary. See Order, 3/5/2012. Following a hearing on 

April 9, 2012, the PCRA court denied Scott’s petition to proceed pro se. 

Thereafter, counsel filed another concise statement pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), raising the same two issues included in the first 

statement, and, additionally, arguing the trial court erred in denying Scott’s 

petition to proceed pro se. In an unpublished memorandum decision filed on 

March 5, 2013, a panel of this Court agreed with Scott’s contention that the 

PCRA court “failed to hold a proper colloquy to address whether [Scott] 

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily asserted his right to selfrepresentation[.]” Commonwealth v. Scott, 69 A.3d 1282 (Pa. Super. 

2013) (unpublished memorandum at 13). Accordingly, the panel vacated 

the order denying PCRA relief and remanded for a proper Grazier hearing. 

____________________________________________ 

10 Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). 
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Upon remand, the PCRA court held another Grazier hearing, and, on 

April 11, 2013, granted Scott’s request to proceed pro se. That same day, 

the PCRA court reinstated its original order dismissing Scott’s PCRA petition. 

This timely appeal followed.11

 

Scott raises the following nine issues for our review: 

1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

hearsay testimony at trial? 

2. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying his motion for 

discovery where exceptional circumstances were shown? 

3. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion 

in limine challenging the competency of the minor victim and witness, and 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the Commonwealth 

to introduce an out-of-court statement of the minor victim and witness in 

derogation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1? 

4. Whether the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 

were “contrary to fact and reality” when the court relied upon 

“unsubstantiated[,] incorrect, false and misleading evidence to form these 

findings of fact[?]”

____________________________________________ 

11 On April 26, 2013, the PCRA court ordered Scott to file a Rule 1925(b) 

concise statement, and Scott complied with the court’s directive on May 3, 

2013. 
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5. Whether the Commonwealth committed a Brady12 violation 

when it withheld evidence contained in the DHS reports? 

6. Whether Scott’s convictions were against the weight of the 

evidence? 

7. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for stipulating to 

documents which inculpated Scott? 

8. Whether “Article V, Section 10(C) Pa. Const. 1968 transcends 

Republican Form of Government clause, Article IV, Section 4, United States 

Constitution (21 June 1788)[?]” 

9. Whether the cumulative effect of the foregoing errors warrants 

a new trial or discharge? 

See, Scott’s Brief at unnumbered p. 9.

 Preliminarily, we note that to be eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner 

must plead and prove, inter alia, “[t]hat the allegation of error has not been 

previously litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). “[A]n issue is 

waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at 

trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state postconviction 

proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). Further, “[c]laims not raised in the 

PCRA court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to 

this Court.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 851 A.2d 883, 889 (Pa. 2004) 

____________________________________________ 

12 Brady v. Marlyand, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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(citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 

778 (Pa. 2009) (issues not preserved in PCRA petition are waived on 

appeal). 

 Based upon the foregoing, we find issues four, five, six, and eight are 

waived for our review. Issues four and six assert trial court error, and could 

have been raised on direct appeal. Issues five and eight were not included 

in Scott’s pro se or amended PCRA petitions, nor were they raised in Scott’s 

pro se response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907 notice. Rather, they were 

raised for the first time in Scott’s pro se Rule 1925(b) statement, and are, 

therefore, waived for our review.13

 Accordingly, we proceed to a discussion 

of Scott’s remaining claims.

When reviewing an order dismissing a PCRA petition, we must 

determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by record 

evidence and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5 A.3d 

1260, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2010). “Great deference is granted to the findings 

of the PCRA court, and these findings will not be disturbed unless they have 

no support in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 21 A.3d 

680, 682 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

____________________________________________ 

13 We note that Scott raised a Brady claim in a September, 2010 application 

for leave to supplement his pro se PCRA petition. However, that Brady

claim referred to a purportedly missing police report, not DHS records. 
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Where, as here, many of the petitioner’s claims challenge the 

ineffectiveness of counsel, our review is well-settled: 

We begin our analysis of ineffectiveness claims with the

presumption that counsel is effective. To prevail on his 

ineffectiveness claims, Appellant must plead and prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, three elements: (1) the

underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no 

reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) Appellant 

suffered prejudice because of counsel’s action or inaction. With 

regard to the second, i.e., the “reasonable basis” prong, we will 

conclude that counsel’s chosen strategy lacked a reasonable 

basis only if Appellant proves that “an alternative not chosen 

offered a potential for success substantially greater than the 

course actually pursued.” To establish the third, i.e., the 

prejudice prong, Appellant must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been 

different but for counsel’s action or inaction.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 18 A.3d 244, 259-260 (Pa. 2011) (internal 

citations omitted). “Failure to establish any prong of the test will defeat an 

ineffectiveness claim.” Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1061 

(Pa. 2012) (citations omitted). 

 First, Scott argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to 

the hearsay testimony of B.D., the victim’s minor friend with whom she 

confided that Scott had sexually abused her.14

 He claims B.D.’s testimony 

____________________________________________ 

14 We note that the PCRA court found this issue waived for vagueness. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/17/2013, at 5-6. Although we acknowledge that 

Scott did not specify what hearsay testimony he was challenging in his Rule 

1925(b) concise statement, this issue was raised in his prior direct appeal 

and in counsel’s amended PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 

988 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. 2009) (unpublished memorandum); Amended 

(Footnote Continued Next Page) 
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was not admissible under the “prompt complaint” exception to the hearsay 

rule, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 613(c)(1), because (1) it was not offered to rebut a 

specific charge of bias, but rather presented as affirmative evidence, and (2) 

the victim’s statements to B.D. did not qualify as a “prompt” complaint since 

they were made four to five years after the alleged abuse began. See

Scott’s Brief at 3-4. Furthermore, Scott contends the introduction of B.D.’s 

hearsay testimony, which corroborated the victim’s testimony, could not be 

considered harmless error because the prosecution rested entirely upon the 

credibility of the victim. 

 The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence define hearsay as a statement 

“that (1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or 

hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 

asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E. 801(c)(1)-(2). Hearsay statements are 

generally inadmissible at trial unless an exception to the hearsay rule 

applies. Pa.R.E. 802. One such exception applies to the admission of a prior 

consistent statement: 

[P]rior consistent statements may be admitted to corroborate or 

rehabilitate the testimony of a witness who has been impeached, 

expressly or impliedly, as having a faulty memory, or as having 

been induced to fabricate the testimony by improper motive or 

influence. Admission of prior consistent statements on such 

grounds is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, 

to be decided in light of the character and degree of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________ 

Petition Under Post Conviction Relief Act, 6/1/2011, at ¶ 7(1). Therefore, we 

decline to find it waived for vagueness. 
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impeachment. It is not necessary that the impeachment be

direct; it may be implied, inferred, or insinuated either by crossexamination, presentation of conflicting evidence, or a 

combination of the two. 

Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 498, 512 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted), appeal denied, 880 A.2d 1237 (Pa. 2005). See Pa.R.Crim.P. 

613(c)(1). 

Here, B.D.’s testimony, regarding what the victim told her about the 

sexual abuse, was admissible following defense counsel’s cross-examination 

of the victim. During the cross-examination, defense counsel emphasized 

that the victim did not tell any adults, including her mother, about the 

abuse. More importantly, defense counsel implied the victim fabricated the 

story after learning that her family might move to New Jersey. See N.T., 

2/8/2007, at 120-121. Therefore, B.D.’s testimony concerning what the 

victim had told her about the abuse, was admissible as a prior consistent 

statement. Because “trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a 

meritless claim[,]”15 we conclude that Scott’s first issue fails.

 Next, Scott contends the PCRA court erred in denying his request to 

subpoena the victim’s medical records and diary.16 He argues that, contrary 

____________________________________________ 

15 Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

16 The PCRA court also found this issue waived for vagueness. Again, we 

disagree. The documents Scott sought from the PCRA court were clearly set 

forth in counsel’s motion for discovery. See Motion for Discovery under Post 

Conviction Relief Act, 1/3/2011. Therefore, we are able to discern his claim 

on appeal. 
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to the PCRA court’s characterization, Scott’s request for the victim’s medical 

records was not overbroad since “[t]he request was for exactly the relevant 

time period relating to the alleged sexual assaults.” Scott’s Brief at 5. 

Further, Scott claims that, although the victim denied she wrote about the 

assaults in her diary, he was entitled to review her diary records “to 

determine whether [she] was being truthful.” Id. Indeed, he contends, “[i]t 

is likely that [the diary] could shed some light on the true story of what was 

going on at the time.” Id.

 The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure proscribe discovery 

during collateral proceedings “except upon leave of court after a showing of 

exceptional circumstances.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1). “We review the denial 

of a discovery request in post-conviction proceedings for abuse of 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011), 

cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 835 (2013). 

Here, Scott has not demonstrated that either the victim’s medical 

records or her diary contain any relevant, exculpatory evidence. In fact, he 

has not even established that any medical records exist, let alone that they 

would prove the victim had not been raped. Moreover, the victim testified 

that she did not write about the assaults in her diary, and Scott has 

presented no evidence to the contrary. See N.T., 2/8/2007, at 125. “We 

will not sanction a fishing expedition when Appellant fails to provide even a 

minimal basis for his claim.” Commonwealth v. Lark, 746 A.2d 585, 591 
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(Pa. 2000). Accordingly, we detect no abuse of discretion on the part of the 

PCRA court in denying Scott’s discovery request.

 In his third issue, Scott argues trial counsel was ineffective for failing 

to file a motion in limine challenging the competency of the minor victim and 

witness. Scott contends that where, as here, the witnesses are under the 

age of 14, “there must be judicial inquiry as to mental capacity.” Scott’s 

Brief at 7, quoting Rosche v. McCoy, 156 A.2d 307, 311 (Pa. 1959). 

Furthermore, he asserts that the admissibility of the victim’s out of court 

statements should have been considered in an in camera hearing pursuant 

to the tender years statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1.17

____________________________________________ 

17 The Tender Years statute provides, in pertinent part: 

(a) General rule.--An out-of-court statement made by a child 

victim or witness, who at the time the statement was made was 

12 years of age or younger, describing any of the offenses 

[relating to sexual assault] not otherwise admissible by statute 

or rule of evidence, is admissible in evidence in any criminal or 

civil proceeding if: 

(1) the court finds, in an in camera hearing, that the evidence is 

relevant and that the time, content and circumstances of the 

statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability; and 

(2) the child either: 

(i) testifies at the proceeding; or 

(ii) is unavailable as a witness. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1(a). 
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The PCRA court addressed Scott’s competency argument as follows: 

 In order for a complainant to be competent, they must 

have the capacity to communicate, the mental capacity to 

observe and remember the occurrence, and a consciousness of 

the duty to speak the truth. Commonwealth v. R.P.S., 737 

A.2d 747, 749 (Pa. Super. 1999)(quoting Rosche v. McCoy, 

156 A.2d 307, 310 (Pa. 1959)). Once it is determined that the 

complainant is competent it is up to the fact finder to determine 

if the complainant’s testimony was credible. Commonwealth v. 

Blackeney, 946 A.2d 645, 653 (2008)[, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 

1177 (2009)]. Generally, a witness’s competency to testify at 

trial is presumed and the burden falls on the objecting party to 

demonstrate incompetence. Commonwealth v. Harvey, 812 

A.2d 1190, 1199 (Pa. 2002). However, when a child under the 

age of fourteen is called to testify, the competency of the minor 

must be independently established. Courts have held that a 

separate colloquy in order to determine the understanding of the 

oath is not necessary if the trial court has the opportunity to 

observe the minor’s demeanor. Id. In the instant case, J.W. 

was able to understand the questions asked of her by counsel 

and was able to frame and express intelligent answers to those 

questions regarding the details of the abuse. Any challenges 

defense counsel would have raised regarding J.W.’s testimony 

would have been denied; therefore, this claim is meritless. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/17/2013, at 7-8. We agree. Although the trial court 

should have conducted a separate colloquy, pursuant to Harvey, to 

determine the competency of the minor victim and witness, who were 13 

and 14 years old respectively, the court sat as fact finder in this non-jury 

trial, and had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor. 

Therefore, we conclude the fact that “the trial court did not engage in a 

distinct colloquy regarding the truthfulness aspects of [their] competency did 

not prejudice [Scott].” Harvey, supra, 812 A.2d at 1199. Accordingly, no 

relief is warranted on this claim. 
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We also find Scott’s Section 5985.1 challenge meritless.18

 We 

concluded above that J.W.’s out of court statements to B.D. were admissible 

as prior consistent statements pursuant to Pa.R.E. 613(c)(1). See supra. 

The tender years exception in Section 5985.1 provides yet another exception 

to the hearsay rule. See Hunzer, supra, 868 A.2d at 510. Because we 

have already found that the testimony was admissible under Rule 613(c)(1), 

trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a challenge under Section 

5985.1. See Commonwealth v. Curley, 910 A.2d 692, 698-699 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (discussing the differences between Pa.R.Crim.P. 613(c) and 

42 Pa.C.S. § 5985.1), appeal denied, 927 A.2d 622 (Pa. 2007). Therefore, 

again, no relief is warranted. 

In his seventh issue, Scott argues counsel was ineffective for 

stipulating to documents that inculpated him in the crimes. Specifically, 

Scott challenges trial counsel’s stipulation to the admissibility of the victim’s 

DHS records. He contends the documents are “riddled with hearsay 

testimonials that vouch for the veracity of the victim[.]” Scott’s Brief at 19. 

Moreover, he notes the records also list three other dates of allegations, two 

of which were “unfounded” and one of which was “indicated.” Id. 

____________________________________________ 

18 Although Scott does not specify which out-of-court statements he is 

challenging, we presume he is referring to B.D.’s testimony concerning the 

statements J.W. made to her about the abuse. 
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A review of the trial transcript reveals that trial counsel stipulated as 

to “the authenticity and admissibility [of the DHS records] without having to 

have the DHS worker testify.” N.T., 2/8/2007, at 181. While the records 

may contain some hearsay testimony, we remind Scott that he was tried 

before the court sitting without a jury, and “trial judges sitting as fact finders 

in criminal cases are presumed to ignore prejudicial evidence in reaching a 

verdict.” Commonwealth v. Dent, 837 A.2d 571, 582 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citation omitted), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1143 (Pa. 2004). Scott simply 

cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s 

stipulation to the DHS records.19

 

Lastly, Scott contends the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s 

ineffectiveness, and the trial court’s errors, warrants either a new trial, or 

discharge. We disagree. 

It is well-settled that no number of failed ineffectiveness claims 

may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually. 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 966 A.2d 523, 532 

(2009). Accordingly, where ineffectiveness claims are rejected 

for lack of arguable merit, there is no basis for an accumulation 

claim. Commonwealth v. Sattazahn, 597 Pa. 648, 952 A.2d 

640, 671 (2008). 

____________________________________________ 

19 Moreover, with regard to the purported allegations of another “indicated” 

incident, we note that Scott has not demonstrated that that incident 

involved the victim, nor that it involved an allegation of sexual assault. 

Further, as we noted supra, Scott could have subpoenaed additional records 

from DHS, but failed to do so. 
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Commonwealth v. Busanet, 54 A.3d 35, 75 (Pa. 2012), cert. denied, 134 

S. Ct. 178 (U.S. 2013). 

Therefore, because we conclude that none of Scott’s claims raised in 

this appeal are worthy of relief, we affirm the order of the PCRA court 

dismissing Scott’s PCRA petition.

 Order affirmed. Scott’s pro se Motion for Reconsideration/Remand is 

denied. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/24/2014