E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATIO

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B OAR D

SAFE T Y

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National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594 

Railroad Accident Brief

Accident No.: DCA-07-FR-010 

Location: Stockton, California 

Date: August 30, 2007 

Time: 4:59 a.m., Pacific daylight time1

Railroad: BNSF Railway Company 

Property Damage: $500 

Fatalities: 1 

Injuries: None 

Type of Accident: Remote control locomotive switching operation 

The Accident 

On August 30, 2007, about 4:59 a.m., a westbound BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) 

train, consisting of a locomotive and two cars, was being remotely controlled when it collided 

with the side of a standing tank car that was fouling2 a crossover between two tracks at BNSF’s 

Mormon Yard in Stockton, California. A helper, who was remotely controlling the moving train, 

had been riding the side ladder on the leading end of a covered hopper car. When the hopper car 

collided with the tank car, the helper was killed. At the time of the accident, it was dark, and the 

temperature was 74° F. The property damage was $500. 

The remote control train crew consisted of a foreman, who was on his regular 

assignment, and the helper, who had filled a vacant position. The foreman and the helper had 5 

years and 2 years of experience, respectively, as remote control operators. The crew had reported 

for duty at 11:00 p.m. on August 29 (the night before the accident) and had been on duty about 6 

hours when the accident occurred. Each man had a remote control transmitter attached to his 

vest. Each man had also carried a railroad radio and a handheld lantern. 

 1

 All times in this brief are Pacific daylight time. 

2 Fouling means that equipment on an adjacent track is within the clearance zone needed for passing 

movements. In this case, the area needed for safe crossover movement. A crossover is not fouled until its outer 

switches are lined for use of the crossover. 

NTSB/RAB-08/06 
Figure 1. Map of accident. 

At 12:30 a.m., on August 30, about 4 1/2 hours before the accident occurred, the yard 

trainmaster radioed the remote control crew to advise them that a local train crew was about to 

move rail cars from the main track and place them on track 132. The remote control crew helper 

replied to the yard trainmaster that they were going to use the crossover between tracks 133 and 

132. The trainmaster acknowledged the helper. 

About 12:45 a.m., the local train crew moved the rail cars from the main track to track 

132 and set them off. The last two rail cars moved onto track 132 were left about 1 1/2 car 

lengths short of the crossover clearance point.3 (See figure 1.) 

The local train’s conductor radioed the yard trainmaster about 12:55 a.m. and stated the 

following: 

Hey, do I need to clear these crossovers completely here? How does this work on 

this track? Because right now, the way they set, we’re going to have to tie-on to 

whatever’s down there on the east end and shove it all. Is it possible I can cut off 

them off right here where it’s at now? 

The yard trainmaster replied, “Yeah, that’s OK, over.” Therefore, the local train crew 

uncoupled their locomotive from the rail cars on track 132 and left the area to complete other 

assignments. The remote control crew would not have heard this conversation between the local 

 3

 Railroad cars placed on a track near a switch or a crossover must be left far enough beyond the crossover to 

prevent collision with equipment being moved through the crossover. The nearest point to the crossover, where 

equipment can be safely placed without being struck by other equipment, is referred to as the clearance point. 

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train crew and the yard trainmaster because local train crews and yard crews routinely use 

separate radio channels for their assigned work. 

Meanwhile, the remote control crew was working in another part of the yard. About 4:46 

a.m., the foreman transferred control of the locomotive to the helper. The foreman instructed the 

helper to couple the locomotive to two cars that were standing on track 133 at the east end of the 

yard and to shove the cars through the crossover and onto track 152.4

At 4:52 a.m., the foreman again radioed the helper and told him to couple the locomotive 

to the cars on track 133 and to shove the cars westward onto track 152, so that the cars would be 

clear of the crossover. The foreman then walked to the crossover and lined both switches of the 

crossover so that the helper could move equipment from track 133 to track 152. Two of the cars 

on the west end of track 132 that had been set off by the local train crew were fouling the 

crossover. One minute later, the foreman radioed the helper and told him to shove the cars 

through the crossover. 

The remotely controlled locomotive was positioned at the east end of the two cars. The 

helper rode a side ladder on the leading car’s northwest corner to provide visual point protection 

while using his remote control transmitter. At 4:56 a.m., he radioed the foreman that he was 

moving west to the crossover. 

Upon hearing the helper’s message, the foreman walked to an open area on the west side 

of the yard office and started talking with fellow employees. The recorded speed at the time of 

impact was 6 mph. An overhead security camera mounted on the yard office recorded the helper 

using his lantern to sweep the area ahead of his movement. At 4:58 a.m., the foreman radioed the 

helper to say that he was walking to assist the helper in securing the cars and the locomotive; 

however, the foreman said that he received no response from the helper. After the foreman 

radioed the helper a second time, he heard a brief but unidentified radio transmission. Seconds 

later, the car that the helper was riding collided with the last car that had been set out on track 

132. (See figure 2.) 

Guidelines for Operation of Remote Control Locomotives 

On February 14, 2001, about 6 years before the accident, the Federal Railroad 

Administration (FRA) issued Safety Advisory 2001-1 to establish guidelines for the operation of 

remote control locomotives. The FRA recommended that railroads establish written standard 

operating procedures, including a requirement that remote control operators not ride on a freight 

rail car under any circumstances when operating a remote control locomotive. This advisory was 

neither mandatory nor a Federal regulation. 

 4

 Track 152 and track 132 are physically adjacent; however, the two tracks have different designations at either 

side of the crossover switch. 

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Figure 2. View of accident scene looking east. (White square shows white paint mark on 

side of track 132 rail that identifies east clearance point for crossover from track 133. 

White circle shows point of collision.) 

In March 2006, the FRA issued a report titled “Safety of Remote Control Locomotives 

(RCL) Operations” to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. The 

report was the FRA’s assessment of the impact of remote control locomotive operations on 

railroad safety. In the report, the FRA cited its safety advisory, which recommended that remote 

control operators refrain from riding cars under any circumstances while actively engaged in 

operating locomotives. The FRA went on to say that older remote control transmitters required a 

hand to operate the throttle and another hand to operate the brake. The FRA stated that the new 

remote control transmitters have a speed control feature, which allows the operator to grasp a rail 

car ladder with one hand. The other hand may then be used to hold a lantern or operate a radio. 

Railroad and labor organizations have stated that this operation can be performed safely, 

and, as an added safety measure, industry practices allow employees to choose when it is safe to 

ride a car. As a result, BNSF rules leave the decision to the operator whether to ride the side of 

the car while operating a remote control locomotive. 

Postaccident Action 

Following this accident, the FRA revised its regulations to prohibit employees from 

lining crossover switches that result in a fouled condition. On February 13, 2008, the FRA added 

49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 218.103, “Hand-operated switches, including crossover 

switches,” to require that employees operating or verifying the position of a hand-operated 

switch visually determine that switches are properly lined for the intended route and that no 

equipment is fouling the switch. 

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Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the 

August 30, 2007, collision between a BNSF Railway yard train and standing rail cars at a 

crossover between tracks 132 and 133 in Stockton, California, was the remote control foreman’s 

failure to ensure that the crossover was not fouled when he lined switches to allow the helper to 

move the remotely controlled train through the crossover. Contributing to the accident was the 

yard trainmaster’s failure to inform the remote control crew that a local train crew had left rail 

cars on track 132 that were not clear of the crossover. Contributing to the severity of the accident 

was the remote control helper’s position on a side ladder of the train’s leading rail car as he was 

controlling the train through the crossover. 

Adopted: December 5, 2008 

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