COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Alston and AtLee 

Argued by teleconference 

TERRANCE KEVIN HALL 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0481-17-3 JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR. 

 JANUARY 9, 2018 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

F. Patrick Yeatts, Judge 

Yvonne Z. Schewel (Yvonne Z. Schewel LLC, on brief), for 

appellant. 

John I. Jones, IV, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee. 

 A judge of the Circuit Court of the City of Lynchburg sentenced Terrance Kevin Hall to 

three mandatory minimum periods of incarceration in connection with his pleas of guilty to 

certain drug distribution offenses. On appeal, Hall argues that the circuit court erred when it 

imposed those mandatory minimum sentences. We disagree, and affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

 The evidence is undisputed. On three dates in late 2014, Hall sold cocaine. The 

Commonwealth charged him with three counts of distribution of cocaine, second or subsequent 

offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248, and the circuit court later convicted him of those 

offenses.1

 Sentencing occurred in February 2017. On the day of sentencing, just before Hall’s 

hearing was to begin, his attorney provided the Commonwealth a copy of a two-page summary 

 1

 Because two of the drug sales occurred near a school, the circuit court also convicted 

Hall of two separate felony counts of distribution of drugs in a school zone. Hall did not 

challenge those convictions. 

PUBLISHED 
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of the three drug transactions that formed the basis for his charges. The document was 

handwritten by Hall, and the last paragraph stated: 

I’m sorry I don’t have any information as far as the supplier goes. 

The only knowledge I had of the man was a phone number. We 

did not really associate on a personal level[;] the relationship was 

purely business. I only called and placed an order and I’d meet 

him, that was the extent of our relationship. He would only be

recognizable to me by sight. 

During the sentencing hearing, Hall moved the circuit court not to impose the mandatory 

minimum periods of incarceration (“the mandatory minimums”) otherwise required upon a 

conviction of a second or subsequent offense of distribution of cocaine. Hall provided a written 

motion to the circuit court, which included the handwritten document as an attachment. 

Code § 18.2-248(C) contains a five-factor test (“the safety valve provision”). If a trial 

court finds that a defendant has complied with all five factors, the mandatory minimums do not 

apply. Hall’s motion addressed each factor, and he argued that because he had satisfied all five 

factors, the mandatory minimums were inapplicable. The only factor about which the parties 

disagreed was subpart “e,” which requires that “[n]ot later than the time of the sentencing 

hearing, the person has truthfully provided to the Commonwealth all information and evidence 

the person has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or 

of a common scheme or plan.” The circuit court denied Hall’s motion, finding that “the motion 

is not timely and there has not been compliance with the statute.” For each of the three counts of 

cocaine distribution, second or subsequent offense, the circuit court sentenced Hall to five years 

in the penitentiary, with two years suspended, for a total sentence on those charges of fifteen 

years in the penitentiary with six years suspended. Hall then noted this appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 

Va. App. 561, 567, 760 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2014). When those decisions “involve the 
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interpretation of a statute or the common law, such an interpretation is a question of law 

reviewed de novo on appeal.” Id. at 568, 760 S.E.2d at 135. In this case, the circuit court 

convicted Hall of three counts of distribution of cocaine, second or subsequent offense, in 

violation of Code § 18.2-248(C). That subsection provides that any person convicted of a second 

or subsequent offense of distribution of cocaine “may, in the discretion of the court or jury 

imposing the sentence, be sentenced to imprisonment for life or for any period not less than five 

years, three years of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment to be served 

consecutively with any other sentence.” However, later in Code § 18.2-248(C), the safety valve 

provision states as follows: 

 The mandatory minimum term of imprisonment to be 

imposed for a violation of this subsection shall not be applicable if 

the court finds that: 

a. The person does not have a prior conviction for an 

offense listed in subsection C of [Code] § 17.1-805; 

b. The person did not use violence or credible threats of 

violence or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon in 

connection with the offense or induce another participant in the 

offense to do so; 

c. The offense did not result in death or serious bodily 

injury to any person; 

d. The person was not an organizer, leader, manager, or 

supervisor of others in the offense, and was not engaged in a 

continuing criminal enterprise as defined in subsection I; and 

e. Not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the 

person has truthfully provided to the Commonwealth all 

information and evidence the person has concerning the offense or 

offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a 

common scheme or plan, but the fact that the person has no 

relevant or useful other information to provide or that the 

Commonwealth already is aware of the information shall not 

preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has 

complied with this requirement. 
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This appeal raises a question similar to that in Sandidge v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 

150, 793 S.E.2d 836 (2016). In that case, Sandidge’s attempt to invoke the safety valve 

provision of Code § 18.2-248(C) came only after the start of the sentencing hearing. As is the 

case here, the only factor at issue in Sandidge was subpart “e.” Sandidge argued on appeal that 

the statutory language from subpart “e” requiring that the disclosure of information be made 

“[n]ot later than the time of the sentencing hearing” meant only that the disclosure of information 

needed to occur prior to the end of the sentencing hearing. Id. at 158, 793 S.E.2d at 840. The 

Commonwealth argued that such language meant that the disclosure needed to occur prior to the 

beginning of the sentencing hearing. Id. A panel of this Court agreed with the Commonwealth 

and held that “the phrase ‘[n]ot later than the time of the sentencing hearing’ means prior to the 

commencement of the sentencing hearing.” Id. at 160, 793 S.E.2d at 841 (alteration in original). 

Because Sandidge had not provided his information until after the sentencing hearing had begun, 

it was untimely and his sentence was affirmed. 

Here, Hall argues that he complied with the requirement that disclosure occur prior to the 

beginning of the sentencing hearing. He acknowledges that Sandidge held that providing the 

information at any time after the commencement of the sentencing hearing is per se untimely. 

He urges us to validate his suggested corollary: providing that information at any time before the 

commencement of the sentencing hearing is per se timely, and thus Hall’s disclosure here 

satisfied subpart “e.” This is an oversimplification, because it fails to account for the 

requirement that the information disclosed be truthful and complete. 

The safety valve provision of Code § 18.2-248(C) is unambiguous. Sandidge, 67 

Va. App. at 157, 793 S.E.2d at 840. Thus we apply the plain meaning of the words rather than 

resorting to any rule of statutory construction. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 294 

Va. 57, 65, 803 S.E.2d 336, 340 (2017). Furthermore, “it is our duty to interpret the several parts 
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of a statute as a consistent and harmonious whole so as to effectuate the legislative goal.” Va. 

Elec. & Power Co. v. Bd. of Cty. Supervisors, 226 Va. 382, 387-88, 309 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1983). 

Subpart “e” contains not just a timing component for the provision of information (“[n]ot later 

than the time of the sentencing hearing”) but also an accuracy and completeness component 

(“truthfully provided . . . all information and evidence”). 

This requirement of truthfulness is meaningless unless the 

Commonwealth has an opportunity to assess and validate the 

defendant’s information. Without the ability to test a statement for 

veracity and completeness, courts would be required to assume the 

truth, and the full disclosure, of statements given by a felon at 

sentencing for the purpose of avoiding a decade-long mandatory 

prison term. Given the strong incentive any defendant has to avoid 

such a lengthy sentence, the General Assembly quite reasonably 

drafted a statute that permits the courts and the Commonwealth to 

guard against the provision of false and/or incomplete information. 

Sandidge, 67 Va. App. at 159-60, 793 S.E.2d at 841. In order to comply with subpart “e,” a 

defendant must provide the information not just “prior to the commencement of the sentencing 

hearing,” id. at 160, 793 S.E.2d at 841, but far enough in advance of that hearing to permit the 

Commonwealth to “test [the] statement for veracity and completeness,” id. at 159, 793 S.E.2d at 

841.2 Only when information is verified in this way can a trial court determine that a defendant 

has complied with subpart “e.” 

 Although we recognize the utility a brighter line would provide, we cannot prospectively 

declare that providing information a certain number of hours or days before the start of a 

 2

 There is no practical reason evident from the record that Hall could not have provided 

his information further in advance of the sentencing hearing. Although we recognize that 

frequently, a defendant does not decide to plead guilty to a criminal charge until shortly before 

trial, in the cases on appeal here, Hall entered his pleas over the course of several months in the 

Fall of 2016. On December 28, 2016, he pleaded guilty to the final charge on appeal, and the 

circuit court continued all of the cases to February 22, 2017 for sentencing. That left Hall with 

nearly two months during which to decide whether to attempt to avail himself of the safety valve 

provision, and to provide information necessary to comply with subpart “e” of that provision. 
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sentencing hearing will or will not be timely.3

 “[S]ince such restrictive language is not written in 

the statute it may not be added under the guise of interpretation.” S. Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 

206 Va. 831, 836, 147 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1966). Trial courts must make that determination 

case-by-case, because the assessment of timeliness (like the related requirements of truthfulness 

and completeness) is a qualitative undertaking, not a quantitative one. Here, we find that Hall’s 

disclosure of information moments before the start of the sentencing hearing was untimely, 

because it did not afford the Commonwealth the opportunity “to test [the] statement for veracity 

and completeness.” Sandidge, 67 Va. App. at 159, 793 S.E.2d at 841.4 This failure left the 

circuit court unable to determine whether Hall had complied with subpart “e.” 

III. CONCLUSION

 Hall’s attempt to avoid imposition of the mandatory minimum sentences by complying 

with the safety valve provision of Code § 18.2-248(C) came too late, failing to afford the 

Commonwealth the opportunity to assess his information “for veracity and completeness.” Id. at 

at 159, 793 S.E.2d at 841. This failure left the circuit court unable to determine whether Hall had 

complied with subpart “e” of the safety valve provision. For these reasons, the circuit court did 

not abuse its discretion when it imposed the mandatory minimum sentences upon Hall. 

Affirmed. 

 3

 Indeed, as the Commonwealth acknowledged at oral argument in this case, there could 

be circumstances when disclosure just before sentencing, as occurred here, might satisfy subpart 

“e.” Oral Argument Audio at 11:31 to 11:46 (Dec. 7, 2017). 

4

 Bearing further on the issue of veracity and completeness, it is noteworthy that during 

the presentence investigation, Hall was uncooperative when asked by the probation officer about 

his level of drug involvement in the community. Additionally, Hall denied affiliation with any 

gang, despite, according to Virginia Department of Corrections records, being a confirmed 

member of the “Crips” gang.