J-S02036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

PRITAM RAJ-SHARM KANDEL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 954 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Union County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-60-CR-0000055-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: APRIL 4, 2023

Appellant, Pritam Raj-Sharm Kandel, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on June 8, 2022, after the court convicted him of Driving 

Under the Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”).

1 After careful review, we affirm in part 

and vacate in part.

On December 8, 2020, Buffalo Valley Regional Police Sergeant Fred 

Hetrick, Jr. was traveling north on State Route 15 when he witnessed a car on 

the southbound shoulder. Sergeant Hetrick noticed that the car’s lights were 

on and the operator, later identified as Appellant, was in the process of exiting 

the vehicle through the driver’s door. Sergeant Hetrick performed a U-turn 

and, approximately 3 to 5 minutes later, approached Appellant’s vehicle. 

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1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). The court also convicted Appellant of the summary 

offense of Careless Driving. Id. at § 3714(a). Appellant’s issue on appeal 

relates solely to his DUI conviction. 
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When he approached, Sergeant Hetrick noticed damage to the driver’s 

side of Appellant’s vehicle, and that the front passenger-side tire was flat. 

Appellant had also turned off his lights and was laying across the rear seats. 

Through the course of interacting with Appellant, Sergeant Hetrick 

smelled alcohol on Appellant’s breath and noticed that Appellant’s eyes were 

bloodshot and glassy, and his speech was slurred. Appellant failed two field 

sobriety tests and a preliminary breath test indicated the presence of alcohol.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, Sergeant Hetrick determined 

that Appellant was under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered 

him incapable of safe driving and, as a result, arrested Appellant. Sergeant 

Hetrick took Appellant to a local hospital, where Appellant refused to submit 

to a chemical test of his blood.

On December 6, 2021, the Commonwealth presented its evidence at a 

bench trial. Sergeant Hetrick, who testified on behalf of the Commonwealth, 

testified in a manner consistent with the above. The Commonwealth also 

presented the court with a video recording of the incident taken from Sergeant 

Hetrick’s vehicle.

Appellant also testified at trial. He stated that before Sergeant Hetrick 

arrived, his car had hit a pothole and then a railing. Appellant pulled his car 

off to the side of the road and called his wife to request that she pick him up. 

Knowing that he was going to have a long wait, Appellant decided to turn the 

car’s lights off and move to the back seat. While in the back seat, Appellant 

drank 3 beers.
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At the conclusion of trial, the court convicted Appellant of DUI. In 

rendering its verdict, the court explained that it did “not find [Appellant’s] 

testimony concerning the circumstances of the accident to be credible.” Id. at 

52. On June 8, 2022 the court imposed a 5-day to 6-month sentence of county 

incarceration and granted Appellant immediate parole for time served.

2 The 

court also ordered, as part of Appellant’s sentence, that Appellant “suffer a 

twelve-month operator license suspension and a one-year ignition interlock 

restriction.” Amended Sentence, 6/8/22, at 1 (unpaginated).

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of 

the evidence, which the court denied. Appellant then timely filed a Notice of 

Appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).3

A.

In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s exercise 

of discretion in denying his post-sentence challenge to the weight of the 

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2 Although it appears that Appellant has completed serving his incarceration 

sentence, this appeal is not moot because the instant DUI conviction carries 

with it continuing civil consequences and the potential for increased 

consequences if Appellant is convicted of DUI in the future. See 

Commonwealth v. Lehnerd, 273 A.3d 586, 589 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2022); 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3804(a), (e). See also Commonwealth v. Foster, 214 A.3d 1240, 

1246 (Pa. 2019). 

3 Unfortunately, the judge that presided over Appellant’s trial retired before 

issuing a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. We are, however, capable of analyzing 

the issue presented because the trial court placed its credibility determinations

on the record at the conclusion of trial. N.T. Trial at 52-53.
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evidence.

4 Appellant’s Br. at 5. In essence, Appellant argues that the trial 

court should have found credible his testimony that “he drank after his vehicle 

came to rest, not before[,]” and place more weight on this testimony than the 

other evidence presented at trial. Id. at 9-11.

“The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact, who is 

free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 545 

(Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). “Resolving contradictory testimony and 

questions of credibility are matters for the factfinder.” Commonwealth v. 

Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 917 (Pa. Super. 2000). It is well-settled that we 

cannot substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Talbert, 129 A.3d

at 546.5, 6

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4 Appellant also purports to challenge the sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s 

evidence. Appellant’s Br. at 5. Appellant’s argument, however, is a challenge

to the trial court’s credibility determinations and, thus, a challenge to the 

weight, and not the sufficiency, of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 

692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997).

5 This Court’s review of a weight claim is a review of the trial court’s exercise 

of discretion in denying the weight challenge raised in the post-sentence 

motion. Talbert, 129 A.3d at 545-46. As our Supreme Court has made clear, 

reversal is only appropriate “where the facts and inferences disclose a palpable 

abuse of discretion[.]” Commonwealth v. Morales, 91 A.3d 80, 91 (Pa. 

2014) (emphasis omitted).

6 To sustain a conviction for DUI—General Impairment, the Commonwealth 

must prove that the defendant drove, operated, or was “in actual physical 

control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of 

alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving[.]” 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1).
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Appellant essentially asks this Court to reassess his credibility, find his 

testimony credible, and then find his testimony more persuasive than the 

testimony of Sergeant Hetrick. It is well settled that this Court cannot 

substitute its credibility determinations for that of the factfinder or reweigh 

the evidence. Here, the factfinder found Appellant’s testimony lacked

credibility. It is not within the purview of our review to reassess that 

determination or reweigh the evidence.

Our review of the record reveals no abuse of the trial court’s discretion.

Consequently, this claim fails. 

B.

In conducting our review of Appellant’s case, we have identified a 

sentencing illegality.7 We conclude that the court lacked the authority to 

impose the license suspension and ignition interlock aspects of Appellant’s 

sentence, thus rendering them illegal. As a result, we vacate those 

restrictions.

“A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of the court to 

impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge to the legality of 

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227, 230 (Pa. Super. 2022) 

(en banc) (citations omitted). “If no statutory authorization exists for a 

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7 We may raise the issue of sentencing legality sua sponte. Commonwealth 

v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013). Our standard of review is de 

novo and scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 

526, 528 (Pa. Super. 2019). 
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particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An illegal 

sentence must be vacated.” Id. (citations omitted). 

“Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Code sets forth a statutory scheme which 

requires the executive branch[, through the Department of Transportation

(“the Department”),] to issue and regulate motor vehicle licenses.” 

Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488, 500 (Pa. 2003). Specifically, 

Section 1531 grants the Department with the authority “for revocation and 

suspension of operating privileges and for driver education, testing and 

control[.]” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1531. Within the statutory scheme, the Code requires 

that the Department suspend a driver’s operating privilege if he or she is 

convicted of DUI:

The department shall suspend the operating privilege of an 

individual . . . upon receiving a certified record of the individual’s 

conviction of or an adjudication of delinquency for:

(i) an offense under section 3802 [relating to DUI 

offenses.]

75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(1)(i) (emphasis added).8

The Code also requires that the Department suspend the license of any 

person arrested for DUI who refuses to submit to chemical testing:

If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3802 

is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, 

the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police 

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8 We note that 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804(e)(2)(iii) includes an exception to the license 

suspension requirement for defendants convicted of a first offense under 

Section 3802(a). 
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officer, the department shall suspend the operating privilege of 

the person as follows:

(i) Except as set forth in subparagraph (ii), for a 

period of 12 months.

Id. at § 1547(b)(1)(i) (emphasis added).

9

The judiciary’s role is “limited to determining guilt” of DUI. Mockaitis, 

834 A.2d at 501 (citation omitted). It is undisputed that the legislature vested 

in the Department, and not the trial court, the authority to suspend a license. 

Id.10

Similarly, Section 3805 of the Vehicle Code grants the Department with 

the authority to require that a person convicted of DUI, and who seeks to have 

his driving privileges restored, accept the installation of an ignition interlock 

system. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3805(a)(1). Our Supreme Court has explained that by 

enacting Section 3805, the General Assembly “delegate[ed] to the 

Department, not the courts, the authority to impose the interlock 

requirement.” Whalen v. Com., Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 32 A.3d 677, 680 n.3 (Pa. 2011) (emphasis added). Thus, “a

sentencing court has no statutory authority to order installation of [ignition 

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9 Appellant refused chemical testing. N.T. Trial, 12/6/21, at 13.

10 In Mockaitis, our Supreme Court found unconstitutional Act 63 on the 

grounds that it violated the Separation of Powers doctrine because it delegated

to the courts the responsibility to determine whether and when repeat DUI 

offenders are entitled to conditional restoration of their operating privileges, 

which is a function of the executive branch of government. 834 A.2d at 503. 

Following Mockaitis, our legislature passed, inter alia, Sections 3804 and 

3805, which grant to the Department the exclusive authority to make ignition 

interlock and license suspension determinations. See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3804, 

3805.
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interlock] devices” and a sentence imposing an interlock system is illegal and

must be vacated. Commonwealth v. Williams, 871 A.2d 254, 266 (Pa. 

Super. 2005).

The above law makes clear that it is for the Department, and not the 

courts, to impose license suspensions and the use of ignition interlock 

systems. Because the trial court in this case imposed these restrictions when 

only the Department has the authority to do so, their imposition is illegal. As 

a result, we vacate the license suspension and ignition interlock aspects of 

Appellant’s sentence.11

In sum, we vacate the license suspension and ignition interlock portions 

of Appellant’s sentence. We affirm all other aspects of his judgment of 

sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part, vacated in part.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/4/2023

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11 This outcome does not preclude the Department from suspending 

Appellant’s license and mandating an ignition interlock system when Appellant 

seeks restoration of his driving privilege.