~UPTJI~CNUREG/CR-6981 0S0 SAN D2008-1776P

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

ým~s an 'a fa ir~

Lairge Sca~a Ewacua~inss

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS

IN NRC PUBLICATIONS

NRC Reference Material

As of November 1999, you may electronically access

NUREG-series publications and other NRC records at

NRC's Public Electronic Reading Room at

http://www.nrc..ov/readinq-rm.html. Publicly released

records include, to name a few, NUREG-series

publications; Federal Register notices; applicant,

licensee, and vendor documents and correspondence;

NRC correspondence and internal memoranda;

.bulletins and information notices; inspection and

investigative reports; licensee event reports; and

,Cormmission papers and their attachments.

NRC publications in the NUREG series, NRC

regulations, and Title 10, Energy, in the Code of

Federal Regulations may also be purchased from one

of these two sources.

1. The Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Mail Stop SSOP

Washington, DC 20402-0001

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov

Telephone: 202-512-1800

Fax: 202-512-2250

2. The National Technical Information Service

Springfield, VA 22161-0002

www.ntis.gov

1-800-553-6847 or, locally, 703-605-6000

A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment is

available free, to the extent of supply, upon written

request as follows:

Address: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Administration

Mail, Distribution and Messenger Team

Washington, DC 20555-0001

E-mail: DISTRIBUTION@nrc.gov

Facsimile: 301-415-2289

Some publications in the NUREG series that are

posted at NRC's Web site address

http://www.nrc.qov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nurecqs

are updated periodically and may differ from the last

printed version. Although references to material found on a Web site bear the date the material was accessed,

the material available on the date cited may

subsequently be removed from the site.

Non-NRC Reference Material

Documents available from public and special technical

libraries include all open literature items, such as

books, journal articles, and transactions, Federal

Register notices, Federal and State legislation, and

congressional reports. Such documents as theses,

dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and

non-NRC conference proceedings may be purchased

from their sponsoring organization.

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a

substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are

maintained atThe NRC Technical Library

Two White Flint North

11545 Rockville Pike

Rockville, MD 20852-2738

These standards are available in the library for

reference use by the public. Codes and standards are

usually copyrighted and may be purchased from the

originating organization or, if they are American

National Standards, fromAmerican National Standards Institute

11 West 42nd Street

New York, NY 10036-8002

www.ansi.org

212-642-4900

Legally binding regulatory requirements are stated

only in laws; NRC regulations; licenses, including

technical specifications; or orders, not in

NUREG-series publications. The views expressed

in contractor-prepared publications in this series are not necessarily those of the NRC.

The NUREG series comprises (1) technical and

administrative reports and books prepared by the

staff (NUREG-XXXX) or agency contractors

(NUREG/CR-XXXX), (2) proceedings of

conferences (NUREG/CP-XXXX), (3) reports

resulting from international agreements

(NUREG/IA-XXXX), (4) brochures

(NUREG/BR-XXXX), and (5) compilations of legal

decisions and orders of the Commission and Atomic

and Safety Licensing Boards and of Directors'

decisions under Section 2.206 of NRC's regulations

(NUREG-0750).

1.

DISCLAIMER- This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. Government.

Neither the U.S. Government nor any agency thereof, nor any employee, makes any warranty, expressed or

implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any

.information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed in this publication, or represents that its use by such third

party would not infringe privately owned rights.
US.NR NUREG/CR-6981 *. U..NRCSAND02008-1 776P

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Protecting People and the Environment

Assessment of Emergency

Response Planning and

Implementation for

Large Scale Evacuations

Manuscript Completed: August 20008

Date Published: October 2008

Prepared by

J.A. Jones, F. Walton, and J.D. Smith'

B. Wolshon, Associate Professor2

'Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, NM 87175

Operated by Sandia Corporation for the

U.S. Department of Energy

2 Louisiana State University

Baton Rouge, LA 70803

P. Milligan, NRC Technical Lead

D. Johnson, NRC Project Manager

NRC Job Code R3118

Office of Nuclear Security and-Incident Response

Abstract

Evacuation is a key protective action element in the emergency preparedness plans for nuclear

power plants (NPPs). Following the devastating hurricane season of 2005, the nation

recognized the need to review emergency response planning. The NRC has sponsored this

study to assess Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, as well as other large scale evacuations

from which lessons learned may further enhance the emergency preparedness program for

radiological emergencies at NPPs. Evacuations related to these incidents have brought to light

issues that have not been previously encountered during large scale evacuations. The

knowledge gained from studying 11 large scale evacuations is used to determine if the

emergency planning activities were effective in managing the response effort. The 11 incidents

covered wide geographical areas and affected 14 NPP Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs).

None of the evacuations were related to the NPPs. Discussions with emergency response

personnel confirmed that response to many of these incidents benefitted from the use of some

of the emergency planning elements developed for the EPZs. Research of evacuations such

as these provides an opportunity to understand contributing factors that support the

effectiveness of emergency response activities. A key finding of this study is that emergency

planning for NPPs has substantially anticipated and addressed the issues identified in the large

scale evacuations researched. Insights and lessons learned are identified, and suggestions are

provided for possible enhancements to the NRC and FEMA emergency preparedness program.

Paperwork Reduction Act Statement

The information collections contained in this NUREG are covered by the requirements of 10

CFR Part 50, which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval

number 3150-0011.

Public Protection Notification

The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for

information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a

currently valid OMB control number.

iii

Table of Contents

Page

A b stra ct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

T able of C ontents .............................................. ............... v

Executive Sum m ary ........................................................... vii

A cknow ledgm ents ... ........................................................ xi

A cronym s ......................................... .......................... xiii

1.0 Introduction ....................................................... 1

1.1 O bjective and Scope ... .......................................... 3

1.2 B ackground ..................................................... 4

2.0 M ethodology ........................................................... 5

2.1 Selection of Incidents .............................................. 5

2.2 D ata G athering ................................................... 6

2.3 Field Investigation ................................................ 7

2.4 Analysis of Incident Response Elements ............................ 8

2.5 Comparative Assessment .......................................... 8

3.0 Evacuation Case Study Overviews ...................................... 9

3.1 Hurricane Georges (1998) ........................................... 9

3.2 Southern California W ildfires (2003) ................................. 10

3.3 Hurricane Ivan (2004) ............................................ 11

3.4 Chemical Fire, Romulus, Michigan (2005) ............................ 12

3.5 Hurricane Katrina (2005) .......................................... 12

3.6 Hurricane Rita (2005) ............................................. 14

3.7 Hurricane W ilm a (2005) ........................................... 16

3.8 New England Flooding (2006) ...................................... 17

3.9 Chemical Fire, Apex, North Carolina (2006) ........................... 17

3.10 Hawaii Earthquakes (2006) ......................................... 18

3.11 California Fires (2007) ..... .................................. 19

3.12 Emergency Planning Around Nuclear Power Plants ..................... 19

3.13 Case Study Summary ......................................... 20

4.0 Analysis of Incident Response Elements ................................... 21

4.1 Planning .................................................. 22

4.2 Im plem entation ........................... ...................... 32

4.3 Summary of Analysis of Incident Response Elements .... .............. 44

5.0 NRC and FEMA Emergency Preparedness Program .......................... 47

V
5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

Introduction ..............................................

Regulatory and Guidance Document Review ..........................

Assessment of Emergency Planning Elements .........................

Summary of Regulatory and Compliance Review .......................

47

48

50

56

57

57

57

61

6.0 California Wildland Urban Interface Fires: 2003 and 2007 ............ .........

6.1 Introduction ......................... ............ ...

6.2 Identification of Lessons Learned ...................................

6 .3 S um m ary ......................................................

7.0 Observations and Recommendations ...................................... 63

7.1 O bservations .................................................... 63

7.2 Recom m endations ............................................... 64

8 .0 G lossary ............................................................. 67

9.0 R eferences ........................................................... 69

Appendix A Evacuation Case Studies ....................................... Al-65

Figures

Figure ES-1

Figure 1.1

Figure 4..1

Figure 4.2

Figure 4.3

Rating of Seven Emergency Response Elements ......................... vii

Hurricane Katrina Approaching Gulf Coast States ....................... 2

Relative Rating of Planning Elements ................................ 32

Relative Rating of Implementation ................................... 44

Relative Rating of Planning and Implementation ...................... 45

Tables

Table 2.1

Table 5.1

Large Scale Evacuations ........................................... 6

Com parison M atrix ............................................... 51

vi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the summer of 2005, Hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma made landfall in the United States

testing the emergency preparedness community to the fullest extent and brought to light some

issues that have not been previously encountered in large scale evacuations. Most

assessments conclude that the evacuation for Hurricane Katrina was successful, in terms of

traffic management (United States, 2006a), but for those who did not or could not evacuate, the

results were often catastrophic. A larger evacuation for Hurricane Rita, only 3 weeks later, was

by most accounts a failure; the biggest failure of which was communication to the public (HRO,

2006). Research of evacuations such as these provides an opportunity to understand

contributing factors that support the effectiveness of emergency response activities. This study

included research on 11 large scale evacuations. In eight of the 11 incidents, the hazard or

response encroached upon nuclear power plant (NPP) Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs)

affecting a total of 14 EPZs. For some of these incidents, elements of emergency planning for

the EPZs were utilized and benefitted response activities. A key finding of this study is that

existing emergency planning requirements for NPPs substantially anticipate and address issues

identified in the 11 large scale evacuations researched.

For the high profile evacuations studied many formal lessons learned have been developed and

changes to improve response capabilities are in progress or have been implemented. Several

important concepts related to improved response were identified in this research including:

" Regional resources are being integrated into large scale evacuation planning;

" Evacuation techniques improve when tested;

* Enhancements in

emergency

communications improve Excellent

response effectiveness;

" Information provided to

evacuees while en route Very

during an evacuation is Effective

beneficial; and Effective I

Im proved planning for ,,i R,

special needs NI

individuals who do not Marginally I!iI'L'

reside in special needs Effective ii] ~ :.' facilities is needed. N{il• 1i \0 M1 Ineffective I..

:71 -0 0 ~ 0 D n

Figure ES-1 summarizes R r- a a =

planning and uPlanning _.

implementation E] Implementation 0 C o

effectiveness of the seven

emergency response

elements evaluated in this

study. A major observation Figure ES-I Rating of Seven Emergency Response Elements

is that the effectiveness of

vii
implementation was directly related to the level of planning. What is also clear was that the

effectiveness in addressing special needs was rated less than other planning elements. The

observations of this study, as reflected in Figure ES-1, show that when the level of resources

applied to an emergency preparedness element is sufficient, the implementation of that element

is sufficient. For instance, training and communication among emergency responders have

received additional resources in the last few years, which contributed to the very effective rating.

Public education, communication with the public, evacuation, and sheltering are rated effective.

Only the special needs category was rated less than effective based largely on the lack of

planning for special needs individuals who do not reside in special facilities and on problems

encountered with special facilities in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Existing NPP

requirements largely address and mitigate the issues that caused the lower ratings for the

evacuations studied.

Emer gency preparedness for NPPs is regulated by the NRC in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E

to 10 CFR Part 50. These regulations include requirements that address and mitigate the

difficulties experienced in the large scale evacuations assessed in this study. The NRC bases

its licensing decisions, in part, on its assessment of the onsite capabilities and on a review of

FEMA's assessment of the offsite capabilities. These onsite and offsite capabilities for NPPs

include comprehensive coordination of resources, dedicated support services, warning and

notification systems, and frequent and thorough cross jurisdictional training and exercises.

Decision processes are established and tested; communication resources are planned,

implemented, and tested; and infrastructure is assessed to understand the potential impacts

during an evacuation.

A review was conducted of NRC and FEMA emergency preparedness regulatory, programmatic

and guidance documentation to compare the existing emergency preparedness program with

the seven emergency planning elements. The regulatory review demonstrated that existing

criteria, plans, and procedures are already in place to address most of the issues that were

experienced in the large scale evacuations studied. These regulatory requirements and

guidance are well established, and lessons learned from this study may further enhance the

emergency preparedness program. It is recommended that the NRC and / or FEMA emergency

preparedness program consider offsite planning enhancements to better address the following:

1. Special needs individuals who do not reside in special facilities;

2. Special needs individuals in congregate care centers;

3. Integrating a regional approach to evacuations;

4. Availability of resources for special needs individuals and special needs facilities;

5. Communication to the public who are not in the affected area to support staged evacuations

and mitigate shadow evacuations;

6. Pets at congregate care centers.

These recommendations were developed after review of the selected evacuations which had

brought to light issues that have not been previously encountered in large scale evacuations

including the catastrophic impacts for residents that did not follow evacuation orders, resources

for special needs facilities being unavailable, and shadow evacuations affecting the evacuation

of risk areas. These issues occurred primarily in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita when

authorities deviated from the emergency. response planning and procedures that were in place.

viii
Such deviations are not likely to occur within the NPP emergency preparedness program

because of frequent and thorough training, drills, and exercises which are regularly inspected.

In addition the NRC and other Federal agencies would immediately be involved in the unlikely

event of an NPP accident providing oversight that would reduce any potential for deviation from

emergency response planning and procedures. The prospective offsite planning enhancements

identified herein could further strengthen the emergency preparedness program.

ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Following the devastating hurricane season of 2005, the nation recognized the need to review

emergency response planning. The NRC, in a proactive effort, has sponsored this study to

assess Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, as well as other large scale evacuations from

which lessons may be learned that could further enhance the existing emergency preparedness

program. In support of this activity, the NRC Technical Leader, Patricia Milligan, provided the

technical leadership to ensure this project met the needs of the emergency preparedness

program. Randy Sullivan, Kathryn Brock, and Steve LaVie provided technical insights

supporting key elements of this project. Don Johnson was the NRC project manager

responsible for contractual matters. Joe Jones led the project team for Sandia National

Laboratories and performed the technical assessments of the evacuations in this study. J. D.

Smith of Sandia provided technical support to the project and supported the field investigation

efforts. Ms. Fotini Walton performed extensive research for Sandia National Laboratories to

support development of case studies and supported the development of the technical report.

Dr. Brian Wolshon, Associate Professor at Louisiana State University Hurricane Center,

supported the research and development of this study, performed technical review of this report,

and provided insights and consultation based on his extensive experience in evacuation and

transportation assessments related to hurricanes.

xi

ACRONYMS

ADA Americans with Disabilities Act

ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action

CDF California Department of Forestry

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOE Department of Energy

DOT Department of Transportation

EAL Emergency Action Limit

EAS Emergency Alert System

EOC Emergency Operations Center

EOM Emergency Operations Manager

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPP Emergency Preparedness Program

EPZ Emergency Planning Zone

ERT Emergency Response Team

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FHWA Federal Highway Administration

ICS Incident Command System

JIC Joint Information Center

LEPC Local Emergency Planning Committee

MAST Mountain Area Safety Taskforce

MEMA Mississippi Emergency Management Agency

NHC National Hurricane Center

NIMS National Incident Management System

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NRF National Response Framework

NRP National Response Plan

PIO Public Information Officer

SEMS Standardized Emergency Management System

xiii

1.0 Introduction

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall east of New Orleans, Louisiana,

becoming the most costly natural disaster in the history of the United States. Hurricane force

winds and storm surge of almost 10 meters (about 33 feet) caused extensive damage

throughout Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. The failure of levees that protected

New Orleans caused catastrophic flooding throughout the city and brought to light problems

related to Federal, State and local post-hurricane response. In the weeks following Hurricane'

Katrina, Hurricanes Rita and Wilma made landfall along the Gulf Coast. Although these events

occurred within six weeks of each other, the emergency response activities and the public

response to the evacuations varied greatly.

Previous studies of large scale evacuations implemented in the last 30 years (Witzig, et al,

1987; Weston, 1989; NRC, 2005a) identified that in the United States, evacuations of more

than 1,000 people occur about three times a month and generally proceed safely. When

casualties did occur, they were typically due to the hazard, and deaths during evacuations wererare in these studies. The casualties that resulted from the recent hurricanes are not typical of

evacuations and warrant extensive review to understand the differences in the response or

hazards that may have contributed to the number of casualties. Lessons learned from these

incidents, along with additional selected evacuations, are investigated herein to support a better

understanding of the implementation of protective actions in response to large scale incidents.

The knowledge gained from this study was used to determine if lessons learned from these

incidents could be used to enhance the NRC and / or Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) emergency preparedness program.

Most assessments conclude that the management of evacuation traffic for the Gulf States in

response to Hurricane Katrina went very well (United States, 2006a). Approximately two million

people evacuated from Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama. However, not everyone followed

the evacuation orders, with some people either choosing to stay behind or not having the ability

to evacuate. Although many individuals in Louisiana did not evacuate for Hurricane Katrina, the

cause for such decisions was not due to traffic congestion but is largely attributed to the late

decision to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans. The Failure of Initiative (2006a)

states "the incomplete pre-landfall evacuation led to deaths." In contrast with the ability to

manage traffic during the evacuation for Hurricane Katrina, the evacuation in response to

Hurricane Rita approximately three weeks later was so poorly orchestrated around Houston,

Texas, that tens of thousands of residents turned around and went home after being stranded

in traffic for many hours. The biggest failure of the Hurricane Rita evacuation was

communication to the public (HRO, 2006). Understanding the causes for the difference in

response to similar threats may be beneficial in identifying enhancements in emergency

planning for NPPs, recognizing that any such evacuation for a NPP would cover a much smaller

geographic area and far fewer individuals.

The events of 2005 provide an excellent opportunity to develop lessons learned in emergency

response and alone could provide significant knowledge. Hurricanes provide an excellent basis

for assessing emergency planning, but there are some aspects of hurricanes that may not be

directly applicable to the NRC and / or FEMA nuclear power plant (NPP) emergency

preparedness program. The approach time and the seasonal nature of hurricanes provide

I
opportunities for emergency response agencies that are not always available for other types of

hazards. To provide a multi-hazard assessment, the initial scope of this study included a

diverse set of ten large scale evacuations. In October 2007, near the end of the research, a

series of fires occurred in southern California prompting the evacuation of almost one million

people. The magnitude of the California evacuations and the timing of the incident provided an

opportunity for the NRC to add a valuable addition to the scope of this study. The additional

scope included reviewing the lessons learned from the 2003 California fires and assessing the

effectiveness of implementation of these lessons learned during the 2007 California fires. Thus,

in total, eleven evacuations were studied.

The eleven evacuations selected for research ranged from 3,000 to over 3 million evacuees.

The evacuations studied were distinctly different for a variety of reasons including geographic

location and,.complexity of the events. For the hurricane evacuations, which may involve

millions of people over hundreds of thousands of square miles, it is important to recognize how

the geographical size affects the response. To put these natural disasters in perspective with

NPP emergency planning, the geographic size of the hazard and areas affected must be

understood. In NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of

Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power

Plants", an Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) around an NPP is established as about 16 km

(about 10 miles) with the understanding that detailed planning within 10 miles would provide

substantial basis for

expansion of response

efforts in the unlikely

event that this proved

necessary (NRC, 1980).

Hurricane Katrina, by

comparison, was

approximately 640 km

(400 miles) across.

Figure 1.1 depicts

Hurricane Katrina as it

approached the Gulf

States. The 16 km (10

mile) EPZs for River

Bend and Waterford

NPPs are also shown in

the figure to provide a

perspective of

geographical size

difference.

Figure 1.1. Hurricane Katrina approaching the Gulf Coast States. The 16

km radius (10 mile) EPZs for Waterford and River Bend NPPs are shown

to scale demonstrating the size difference between evacuation of a 10

mile EPZ and evacuation for a hurricane. (Scale 1" - 160 miles)

2
A second important factor is the affected population. Hurricanes frequently require evacuation

of more than 1 million people and can directly impact hundreds of communities whereas large

population EPZs may include about 20 communities. The ten NPP EPZs with the largest

populations range from approximately 140,000 people to over 300,000 people (FEMA, 2005a).

These populations do not represent seasonal changes such as beach populations or other

transient populations that may be within the EPZ; nonetheless, the data provides a good

comparison to the large population difference between EPZs and the populations affected in

the incidents assessed herein. In the unlikely event of an NPP emergency that might require

an evacuation, a keyhole approach would likely be implemented in accordance with NRC

guidance in Supplement 3 to NUREG - 0654 (NRC, 1996). A keyhole includes evacuating the

3.6 km (2 mile) ring around the NPP and at least three 22.5 degree sectors. This area equates

to about 20 percent of the EPZ. The public residing within the keyhole area would evacuate to

locations outside of the EPZ. The required travel distance to safely exit the hazard area is

significantly shorter than needed for a hurricane. Congregate care centers are typically

established between 5 and 10 miles outside of the EPZ (NRC, 1980).

When hurricanes approach States within which there are EPZs, elements of the emergency

planning for the EPZs are inherently utilized, and in some instances proactively utilized to

support the response. For the hurricanes researched, the pre-landfall emergency response

activities was the main focus. To some extent the post-landfall activities, were researched when

consequences may potentially have been avoided if earlier protective actions had been more

successful. Due to the availability of information, the emphasis of this project was on Hurricane

Katrina; however,.all eleven case study evacuations within this report were thoroughly

researched to understand the emergency response activities and the lessons learned from

each incident. Detailed case studies are included in Appendix A, Case Studies. Within

emergency response organizations and regulatory bodies, definitions of common terms,

although generally consistent, have been found to vary in some cases. For this reason, a

glossary is provided in Section 8.0 defining terms that may not be familiar to non-emergency

response personnel and terms that may have different interpretations when used in other

context.

1.1 Objective and Scope

The NRC intends to use the knowledge gained from recent large-scale emergency response

activities as a resource to determine if the emergency planning activities that were available and

implemented were effective in managing the response effort. The objective of this study was to

determine if there are areas within the NRC and / or FEMA emergency preparedness program

that may be enhanced based on lessons learned, and to identify where the program may have

already anticipated and addressed elements that may not have been effective in the major

evacuations studied. To accomplish this objective, the scope of the project included:

" Identifying eleven large scale evacuations for evaluation;

* Reviewing the level of planning in place for each evacuation;

* Assessing the extent to which the planning was implemented in the emergency response;

" Identifying key factors that affected the implementation and response to evacuations;

" Comparing the assessment of the evacuations to the NRC and FEMA emergency

preparedness program elements; and

3
0 Reviewing the 2007 California fires to assess implementation of lessons learned.

When available, emergency planning documentation in place at the time of each incident was

reviewed to provide a basis in determining the effectiveness of planning and implementation.

The evacuations studied included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005, Hurricane Ivan

in 2004, and Hurricane Georges in 1998. The remaining evacuations studied were selected

based on a qualitative assessment derived from the process used in NUREG/CR-6864,

"Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations" (NRC, 2005a).

1.2 Background

NRC recognizes the benefit of assessing large scale evacuations to determine where

enhancements in the emergency preparedness program may be beneficial. In 2003, NRC

initiated efforts to assess large scale 6mergency evacuations, and in January 2005, the NRC

published NUREG/CR - 6864 "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency

Evacuations" (NRC, 2005a), which presented a comprehensive investigation of public

evacuations in the United States. The data collected during that study has proven valuable in

identifying emergency planning activities, public behavior, and other trends observed during

evacuations.

In response to the 2005 hurricane season, the .NRC, interested in lessons learned for itself and

licensees, established the 2005 Hurricane Season Lessons Learned Task Force. This Task

Force was chartered to develop a set of lessons that can be applied to natural phenomena.

The NRC published the "Task Force Report, 2005 Hurricane Season Lessons Learned" (NRC,

2006), which included the following three Priority 1 recommendations:

(1) The NRC should assess agency communications equipment and services associated with

emergency notification systems and recommend improvements in diversity and reliability.

(2) By May 10, 2006, the NRC should improve existing natural phenomenon response

procedures for reactor and fuel facilities and materials licensees to clearly define roles and

responsibilities, provide responder guidance, and to be consistent across the regional

offices.

(3) By June 1, 2006, the NRC should improve consistency and apply best practices in

dispatching and maintaining accountability of responders and site staff. The accountability

of staff should be highly visible.

There were eight Priority 2 recommendations in the Task Force Report, one of which was that

the NRC utilize the information from the evacuations following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita to

assess the impacts on the agency's emergency preparedness program (NRC, 2006).

Since the publication of NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (NRC, 1980), licensees and local

and State agencies have developed detailed radiological emergency response programs.

These emergency management programs for NPPs are mature and comprehensive, and

evacuation is a key protective action within these programs. To support comprehensive

planning, there is a desire to integrate lessons learned from other emergency management

activities to better prepare for a response in the unlikely event of an NPP accident.

4
2.0 Methodology

To perform the research necessary to support gathering of lessons learned related to

emergency preparedness, a methodology was employed which included identification of

incidents, collection and analysis of information, and comparison to NRC and FEMA

requirements and guidance for NPP emergency planning. This approach provides a direct

means of identifying where insights and lessons learned may benefit the NPP emergency

preparedness program. The approach included the following activities:

* Identification of incidents for investigation;

* Literature review;

" Field investigation;

" Analysis and rating of incident response elements;

* Review of NRC and FEMA regulatory and guidance documentation; and

* Development of a matrix to compare the NRC and FEMA requirements with the emergency -

planning elements.

Research included a comprehensive literature review, interviews of emergency response

managers and responders, discussions with university staff, and site visits to California,

Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina to obtain detailed first hand information on the

evacuations. Staff also attended the "Disaster Planning for the Carless Society Conference" in

New Orleans, Louisiana on February 8 - 9, 2007 and the National Hurricane Conference on

April 2-6, 2007 to meet with emergency responders, technical experts, and evacuees to learn

about related issues.

2.1 Selection of Incidents

The scope of this study included evaluating the lessons learned from five hurricanes, the 2007

California fires and five additional evacuations. A qualitative approach was taken in the

selection of the additional evacuations with emphasis on incidents that were large scale and

had some unique attribute associated with the evacuation. For example, the Hawaii earthquake

was selected because the evacuation included primarily special facilities. To select the five

additional evacuations, a basic profiling was conducted following the criteria used in

NUREG/CR-6864. Incidents were expected to have broad media coverage, and the emergency

management personnel contacted were expected to have current and relevant knowledge of

the -incidents. The criteria for an evacuation to be considered for further study included the

following:

" Evacuations of more than 1,000 people;

" Evacuations occurred between 2003 and 2006, with one evacuation in 1998; and

* Evacuations occurred within the United States.

Due to the timing of the 2007 California fires and the addition of this incident to the project after

the initial assessments of the original ten evacuations were complete, a case study was

developed for the fires, but the 2007 fires were not included in the assessment of effectiveness

5
in Section 4.0.

Table 2.1 identifies the 11 evacuations selected for research., The approximate number of

evacuees is difficult to identify precisely, and the values listed are generally available through

literature. The total number of evacuees from these incidents approached. 10,000,000 people.

Table 2.1. Large Scale Evacuations_____

Date J Incident ]~Name JState I# Evacuated _ _ _ I _ I _ I_ _ I _ I_ (approximate)

September Hurricane Georges FL, MS, AL 1,200,000

1998 _______ ____

October Wildfire 2003 Southern CA 100,000

2003 California Fires_____

September Hurcn vnFL, NC, 2.milo

2004 Hurcn vnMS, GA 2_._3_millio

August Hurricane Katrina LA, MS, 2 million

2005 AL, FL ______

September .Hurricane Rita TX, LA 3 million

September Tcnlgal Chemical Fire Ml 3,000

2005 Tcnlgal Romulus, MI ____

October Hurricane. Wilma FL 300,000

2005 ____

May Flood New England NH, MA, 7,000 2006 Flooding ME

October TcnlgalChemical Fire NC 17,000

2006 Tcnlgal Apex, NC _____

Ocobr Earthquake HawiiH 3,000

2006 ________ Earthquake ___________

October Wildfire 2007 California CA 900,000

2007 _ _ _ _ _ _ Fires I____ _ _ _ _ _

2.2 Data Gathering

The data collection began with an extensive review of available literature to support the

development of a case study for each evacuation. Hurricanes Katrina and Rita have resulted in

many formal investigations and research efforts on these incidents continue. Most of the

Hurricane Katrina publications relate to the post-incident casualties, but some investigations

have assessed emergency planning; for example, the "Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan

Evaluation" (DOT, 2006), which was performed by the United States Department of.

Transportation in cooperation with the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

This document as well as other government sponsored investigations and assessments were

reviewed including "A Failure of Initiative, Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to

Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina" (United States, 2006a), and

"The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned" (United States, 2006b).

6
Because of the multiple agencies and jurisdictions involved in large scale incidents, data

gathering can be an exhaustive effort. To focus these efforts, a data collection form was

developed and included questions on the following topical areas:

• Hazard that caused the evacuation;

* Demographics;

" Community awareness of area hazards and potential protective actions;

* Emergency planning and response;

* Evacuation specific details;

• Special needs individuals and facilities; and

• Shelters.

The data collection form was populated with information from published literature, media reports

and documented assessments of evacuation experiences. Information from State and local

agencies, including emergency response plans and public information brochures developed by

emergency management agencies, was also reviewed. Additional information sources included

journal articles, books, conference proceedings, university research centers, and local and

national news media.

2.3 Field Investigation

After the initial data gathering, a field investigation was conducted to obtain first hand

information on emergency planning elements and implementation experience. The field

investigation included contacting local, regional, and State response agencies that supported

the evacuations. Field and telephone interviews were conducted with emergency responders,

support personnel, university staff and, in some cases, evacuees. The data collection form was

used to guide each interview.

The objective of the interviews was to obtain first hand information on elements of the

emergency response. The interviews covered a wide range of topics related to the evacuation,

including:

" Evacuation decision making • Training and drills

• Notification of response personnel and * Special facilities

the public * Special needs individuals

" Public response • Community preparedness

* Communications * Consequences

• Traffic management and control * Shadow evacuations

* Shelters • Unusual or special circumstances

When available, the emergency response plans for each incident were reviewed prior to the

interviews to provide an understanding of the basis from which the response took place. Site

visits were conducted in California, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina to meet with

emergency response managers and personnel.

7
2.4 Analysis of Incident Response Elements

The emergency response for these large scale incidents was very broad, therefore a few

important emergency planning elements were selected for detailed assessment. Elements were

selected that are of most interest to the project and were expected to provide insights and

lessons learned which may be of benefit to the NRC and / or FEMA emergency preparedness

program for NPPs. Seven emergency response elements were selected for review including

training, public education, communication with the public, communication with emergency

response, evacuation, special needs, and shelters.

For the emergency response elements selected, a qualitative assessment of both planning and

implementation was conducted. The assessment of planning was based on the level of detail

included in the emergency response plans. The assessment of implementation was developed

from information gained in the field interviews and data gathering process.

2.5 Comparative Assessment

A comparative assessment of the emergency planning elements was developed. The NRC and

FEMA emergency preparedness program regulations and guidance documents used for the

assessment were:

0 10 CFR 50.47 - Emergency Plans;

* Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 - Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and

Utilization Facilities;

0 Management Directive 8.2 - NRC Incident Response Program;

* NUREG-0728 - NRC Incident Response Plan;

0 NUREG-0654/FEMA - REP-1, Rev.1 - "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of

Radiological Emergency Response and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants";

NUREG-0654/FEMA - REP-1, Rev.1, Supplement 3 "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation

of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power

Plants" Draft Report for Interim Use; and

67 FR 20580, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation

Methodology," April 25, 2002.

8
3.0 Evacuation Case Study Overviews

.The information obtained during the research and field investigations supported the

development of detailed case studies for each evacuation incident. Case studies were

developed to document the key activities and events that occurred and how these may have

affected the success of the evacuation. A case study overview for each evacuation is provided

below chronologically in the order in which the evacuations occurred with full case studies

included in Appendix A, Case Studies. The information below is intended to summarize some

of the important factors of each incident with much greater detail provided in Appendix A.

It is important to note that the precise values of evacuation numbers, damage estimates, areas

affected, and number of deaths can vary among published reports. This is very typical of large

scale evacuations, because responders are focused on the safety of the public and not on

counting evacuees. For casualties, sometimes injuries sustained during the emergency result

in death at a later date, thus the casualties listed may also change with time. The values

identified in the case studies should be regarded as representative of the incident, but should

not be considered official values.

3.1 Hurricane Georges (1998)

Overview:

* Approximately 1.2 million people evacuated.

* Evacuations were generally staged.

* Construction on Interstate 10 severely affected the traffic flow.

* Approximately 65,000 people sheltered along the Gulf Coast.

* The New Orleans Superdome, where 16,000 people sheltered, was used for the first time.

* The Superdome sustained some damage from those who sheltered.

* The EPZs for Turkey Point and Waterford NPPs were within the area affected by the

hazard.

In September 1998, Hurricane Georges crossed the Florida straights and was projected to

make a final landfall in Mississippi, prompting evacuation orders for approximately 1.2 million

residents in coastal communities in Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. The Gulf

Coast communities had not experienced a large hurricane in many years. In New Orleans, the

last hurricane that caused significant damage to the city was Hurricane Betsy in 1965. In Biloxi,

Mississippi the last hurricane to cause major destruction was Hurricane Camille in 1969.

Although more than a million people evacuated for Hurricane Georges, compliance was

considered low. Emergency responders in Louisiana and Mississippi indicated that the length

of time between these hurricanes was a factor in the low compliance to evacuation orders.

Public compliance with evacuation orders was better in Mississippi than in Louisiana.

Emergency managers agreed that many of those who stayed behind did so because they had

survived Hurricane Camille or Betsy and did not believe that Hurricane Georges would be as

destructive. Some of the problems recognized during the response included an over-reaction to

the need to evacuate, insufficient planning, and limited coordination between various agencies

responsible for evacuation (Wolshon, 2001).

9
Approximately 600,000 people evacuated in Louisiana. In Jefferson and Orleans parishes, only

about a third of the residents ordered to evacuate actually left the area (Howell, 1998).

Construction on Interstate 10 heading out of New Orleans reduced the Interstate to one

westbound lane causing major gridlock for those trying to leave the city.

Approximately 65,000 people sheltered in the Gulf Coast States including about 2,500 special

needs individuals (USACE, 1999). The New Orleans Superdome was used for the first time as

a shelter of last resort, and approximately 16,000 were estimated to have used the facility.

Evacuees looted and damaged the building, although it does not appear the damage was

significant.

3.2 Southern California Wildfires (2003)

Overview:

* More than 100,000 people evacuated.

* Evacuations were staged.

" Shelter in place was implemented in select areas.

" More than 20 people died, many of whom were trying to evacuate from their homes (Mutch,

2007).

• Communications were difficult due to the terrain and the large number of fire fighters

responding from different jurisdictions.

" More than 10,000 people used shelters.

" The Simi Fire burned approximately 80,000 acres in 16 hours (CDF, 2003).

* Special needs facilities and special needs individuals not residing in facilities were

evacuated.

Beginning on October 21, 2003 and continuing through November 4, 2003, Southern California

experienced the largest wildland urban interface fire in the State's history. The fast moving fires

consumed 740,000 acres and required over 15,000 fire fighters to support the effort (CDF,

2004). Over 100,000 people evacuated their homes, and many of these people were from

mountainous areas with very limited routes of egress. One of the largest single evacuation

efforts was concentrated in San Bernardino County where mountain area residents evacuated

after dark in areas without power. Previous community awareness programs in San Bernardino,

such as the Mountain Area Safety Taskforce (MAST), and continuous efforts from emergency

responders, were attributed to the success of this mountain community evacuation.

Evacuations in response to the California fires were staged with communities evacuated

depending on the changing fire conditions. Major urban areas were threatened, miles of power

lines were destroyed, communications were difficult, and numerous roads were closed. At least

five interstates were closed at some time during the incident (CDF, 2004). The loss of

infrastructure affected communications and limited evacuation routes. In some areas, residents

were advised to shelter in place because routes of egress were closed due to the fire or

because fire conditions Were too dangerous to safely evacuate an area.

Emergency response agencies used multiple methods to communicate with the public (CDF,

2003). The Cedar Fire had moved quickly and evacuation notification for this fire was primarily

10
door-to-door contact or via loudspeakers on emergency vehicles. San Diego County normally

would have used the EAS, but it was deemed impractical at the time because the information

would be inaccurate due to the swiftness of the fire, and it was approaching midnight when

many residents would not have their televisions or radios turned on to receive the EAS

message (CDF, 2004). Although overall compliance was high, the constantly changing

conditions resulted in a mixed response to the evacuation. Some people did not follow

instructions provided by emergency responders, and a few individuals refused to evacuate.

More than 20 people died from the fires, many of whom were trying to evacuate from their

homes (Mutch, 2007)

3.3 Hurricane Ivan (2004)

Overview:

* Approximately 2.3 million people evacuated the Gulf States.

* Four elderly individuals in New Orleans died during the evacuation.

* The evacuation of coastal areas was generally staged.

* Traffic congestion caused delays up to 36 hours.

* Contraflow was implemented for the first time in Alabama and Louisiana with marginally

successful results.

* Evacuees in all States had difficulty finding shelter or hotel rooms.

* The New Orleans Superdome was opened as a special needs shelter and later expanded

as a shelter of last resort.

* Only 1,100 people sheltered in the Superdome.

* The EPZs for Waterford and River Bend NPPs were within the area affected by the hazard.

Hurricane Ivan was the strongest hurricane of the 2004 season making landfall near Gulf

Shores, Alabama on September 16, 2004 as a Category 3 hurricane. Approximately 2.3 million

people were ordered to evacuate from the coastal regions of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and

Louisiana. Although the evacuations in response to Hurricane Ivan were generally considered

improved with respect to previous evacuations, many problems were encountered.

In Florida, emergency management had implemented response plans-for Hurricanes Charley

and Frances in the previous month. With this recent experience, post-storm reports still

identified "mixed" evacuation messages being conveyed to the public (Wolshon, 2005) with

early, voluntary, recommended, and mandatory evacuations being ordered throughout the

region. In many cases the evacuation messages were changed during the hurricane watch.

The time frame in which evacuation orders were issued was a problem for some evacuees. For

instance, evacuation notifications were distributed as early as two days before tropical storm

winds were expected to hit the coast, but residents were still expected to report to work. This

caused some evacuees to leave later than they would have otherwise, aggravating already

congested roadways.

In Louisiana, mandatory evacuations were ordered in at least six parishes. In New Orleans and

six other parishes, voluntary evacuations were recommended. Evacuation orders often lacked

specificity with orders issued for evacuation of flood-prone areas. Although the evacuation plan

for the area had recently been updated with improvements intended to reduce congestion, a

11
universal observation by emergency management officials surveyed in a post-incident

transportation analysis was that heavy traffic and congestion were problems during the

evacuation (FEMA, 2005b). Intense traffic congestion resulted in some people taking up to 36

hours to evacuate the city. Four elderly persons died during the evacuation of New Orleans.

Prior to Hurricane Ivan, there were limited plans in place to identify or evacuate special needs

individuals who did not reside in special needs facilities.

3.4 Chemical Fire, Romulus MI (2005)

Overview:

" Approximately 3,000 persons evacuated.

• There were initial concerns of terrorism but this was quickly ruled out.

• There was a small shadow evacuation, but this did not affect the evacuation.

* Residents outside of the evacuation area were asked to shelter in place.

" Ambulances were used to evacuate a few special needs residents.

" Police and fire department personnel drove through some areas to verify that people had

evacuated.

• Two high schools were used as shelters, although few people reported to the shelters.

On August 9, 2005, a hazardous waste tank exploded initiating a chemical fire in Romulus,

Michigan (HHS, 2006). A voluntary evacuation of approximately 3,000 people within 0.8 km

(0.5 miles) of the plant was ordered. The population immediately outside of the evacuation

area, were asked to shelter in place, close windows and doors, and turn off air conditioners.

The fire department utilized a public address system, the media, and some door-to-door

notification to inform the public to evacuate. Officials had only issued an order to evacuate a

0.8 km (0.5 mile) radius; however, the media announced a 1.6 km (1 mile) radius for the

evacuation area. Because the area was larger and the additional evacuees were not affecting

the response, the fire department did not attempt to correct the error. Those who evacuated

were allowed to return home after two days. In the research of this incident, emergency

management confirmed that there was an initial concern that this accident may have been

initiated by terrorists, but the concern was quickly alleviated.

3.5 HurricaneoKatrina (2005)

Overview:

* Approximately 2 million people evacuated.

* Only one death was attributed to the evacuation (Times - Picayune, 2005).

* The evacuation was considered successful for those who wanted to and could leave.

* Some parishes, such as Plaquemines, had very high evacuation rates.

* Evacuations in Louisiana and Mississippi were generally staged.

* More than 1,800 people died during and after Hurricane Katrina.

• Approximately three quarters of those who died were elderly.

* More than 75,000 people sheltered in over 240 facilities throughout the region.

* The New Orleans Superdome was officially opened as a shelter of last resort.

12
• The New Orleans Convention Center was not officially opened as a shelter, but became an

ad hoc shelter as residents and tourists searched for high ground.

" Over 6,000 prison inmates were evacuated after the hurricane.

" The DHS National Response Plan (NRP) was implemented for the first time.

• The EPZs for Waterford, River Bend, and Grand Gulf NPPs were within the area affected by

the hazard.

* Elements of emergency response planning for the Waterford NPP were utilized to support

the evacuation in the vicinity of the plant.

Hurricane Katrina first made landfall near Buras, Louisiana on August 29, 2005 as a Category 3

hurricane. At landfall in Louisiana, wind speeds of up to 200 km/hr (125 miles/hr) were reported

(NHC, 2005), and the storm was approximately 645 km (400 miles) wide. The impact of the

hurricane was devastating in many ways, including the flooding of New Orleans, the storm

surge destruction along the eastern Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama coastlines, and the

destruction from hurricane force winds that continued inland for many miles. The post-landfall

response for this incident was larger than any local, State, or Federal agency had planned.

With local, county and State resources overwhelmed and unable to adequately respond, the

DHS NRP was invoked for the first time on August 30, 2005 (DHS, 2004).

In the days preceding the hurricane, approximately 2 million people evacuated the region. The

pre-landfall evacuation of New Orleans during this time period was widely viewed as a success,

and data showed that more people were able to leave the city in a shorter time than had been

thought possible (Wolshon, 2006). Many local Emergency Operations Managers or parish

presidents ordered mandatory evacuations early beginning August 27, 2005. Several parishes

in Louisiana and counties in Mississippi and Alabama coordinated efforts to facilitate a staged

evacuation. The public was notified primarily through television and radio broadcasts.

Evacuation notices were provided by local and State authorities, and some door-to-door

notification, usually in high risk areas, was conducted. The evacuations were staged and

pamphlets were handed out to inform residents of the order in which they would evacuate when

the evacuation was implemented. Residents living in low lying areas, mobile homes, and along

waterways were encouraged to evacuate early. To facilitate massive traffic volumes, contraflow

lanes in Louisiana and Mississippi were opened early in the evacuation and traffic management

was coordinated among the two States.

Staged evacuations are frequently conducted in hurricane areas to move people nearest the

coastline away from the hazard first and help reduce traffic congestion. The mayor of New

Orleans delayed the issuance of a mandatory evacuation order until August 28, 2005. This was

the first ever mandatory evacuation order for the City of New Orleans. Beginning in the

afternoon of August 28, 2005, New Orleans city buses were used to transport residents to the

Superdome (LOHSEP, 2006). The Superdome was established as a shelter of last resort.

In Mississippi, Alabama, and eastern Louisiana the hurricane effects were completely different

with most damage caused by a storm surge and hurricane force winds. In Mississippi, coastal

communities such as Bay St. Louis, Waveland, Pass Christian, Gulfport and Biloxi were

devastated when a storm surge of more than 10 meters (up to 35 feet) inundated the area.

In Mississippi, well organized efforts to move special needs individuals to shelters were

13
implemented. In Gulfport, Mississippi, arrangements were in place to use school buses and

ambulances to transport special needs individuals to shelter facilities. The list of special needs

individuals in this area had not been well developed resulting in residents calling for assistance

during the evacuation. There were no reports of individuals who wanted to leave but could not;

however, local responders identified the need for a more complete list as an area for

improvement.

In New Orleans, after the hurricane passed, devastation was caused by flooding when the

levees and pump systems failed. Approximately 80 percent of the city was flooded with water

depths of more than 5 meters (almost 20 feet) in many areas. The flooding caused thousands

of individuals, who had not been evacuated in response to the hurricane, to leave their homes

and seek shelter. Many of these individuals went to the Superdome or Convention Center. As

these facilities became overcrowded, evacuees were turned away and forced to seek shelter

elsewhere, although alternative shelters were virtually non-existent. Problems were

compounded by the lack of supplies for several days.

A massive search and rescue operation ensued to rescue those stranded in their homes due to

the flooding. This included rescuing residents of nursing homes, hospitals, prisons, and other

facilities. The. flooding severely affected the response activities, requiring use of helicopters and

boats for most of the effort. The heat and lack of communications created significant challenges

during the rescue effort. More than 1,400 people lost their lives in Louisiana (LDHH, 2006).

Approximately 70 percent of all deaths were people older than 60 years of age (United States,

2006b). Another 231 people died in Mississippi, bringing the total to almost 1,800. with several

hundred reported missing (United States, 2006a).

Hurricane Katrina was the first large scale disaster to fully test the NRP and revealed that

Federal agencies, including OHS, had varying degrees of unfamiliarity with their roles and

responsibilities under the NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS) (United

States, 2006a). During the response to Hurricane Katrina, critical elements of the NRP were

executed ineffectively, late, or not at all. These critical elements included such actions as

declaration of an Incident of National Significance, convening of an Interagency Incident

Management Group, and designation of the Principal Federal Official (United States, 2006a).

3.6 Hurricane Rita (2005)

Overview:

" Aggressive communication and fear tact ics prompted more than 3 million people to

evacuate from the Houston area and Texas coast (HRO, 2006).

" Approximately 400,000 evacuees from Hurricane Katrina had relocated to the Houston

region and were included in the Hurricane Rita evacuation.

" Over 100 fatalities were directly attributed to the evacuation (Henk, 2007).

" The evacuation was generally staged with Galveston, Corpus Christie and Jefferson County

evacuating prior to Houston.

" The evacuation of Galveston was very successful.

" Thousands of special needs individuals were evacuated out of the region.

" Evacuation travel times from 12 to 36 hours were not uncommon.

14
" Contraflow lanes were unplanned and established too late to have much benefit.

* Regional shelters were quickly at full capacity.

" The EPZs for the South Texas Project, River Bend, and Waterford NPPs were within the

area affected by the hazard.

" Elements of the Matagorda County emergency planning for the South Texas Project NPP

were used to support the emergency response for the county.

On September 24, 2005 Hurricane Rita made landfall near Port Arthur, Texas. In the days

preceding landfall, residents along the Texas Gulf Coast began preparations for an evacuation

that included both Texas residents and evacuees of Hurricane Katrina who had relocated to the

area. In an effort to avoid the criticism seen as a result of the late mandatory evacuation of New

Orleans for Hurricane Katrina, the local mayors of Galveston, Houston and other communities

ordered mandatory evacuations early. It was evident that Houston officials were aware of the

delay in ordering the evacuation of New Orleans only a few weeks earlier and wanted to be sure

that evacuation orders for Hurricane Rita were issued with ample time to comply. In order to

persuade residents to evacuate, authorities frequently referenced the recent events in New

Orleans (Litman, 2006) and warned residents not to place themselves in a similar situation. In

the Houston area, officials requested people evacuate if they lived in areas that had previously

flooded. These broad based instructions and fear tactics resulted in a much larger number of

individuals evacuating than actually needed to evacuate. In their haste to order the region to

evacuate, officials did not consider the impact of so many individuals on the roadway system.

The resulting traffic congestion and poorly coordinated transportation logistics created a hazard

in itself.

The fear over what had occurred in New Orleans and Mississippi three weeks earlier coupled

with the high influx of evacuees from Hurricane Katrina prompted more than 3 million people to

evacuate the Houston area. and the Texas coast (HRO, 2006). An estimated two-thirds of the

evacuees did not need to evacuate (TTR, 2006) but did so because of poor communication,

fear tactics, and what researchers have termed as the "Katrina Effect." The severe traffic

congestion and lengthy evacuation times resulted in fuel shortages for many evacuees.

Temperatures in the Houston area neared 100 degrees, aggravating pre-existing health

conditions of some evacuees and causing dehydration and heat stress in others. As a result,

approximately 130 fatalities were reported with at least1 106 of these related to the evacuation

(Henk, 2007). Only three deaths in Texas were identified as direct deaths from the hurricane.

Direct deaths indicate those caused by the direct effects of the winds, flooding, tornadoes,

storm surge or oceanic effects.

An example of applied training was evident during the evacuation of the University of Texas

Medical Branch in Galveston, Texas. Due to discussions in pre-planning activities, the hospital

was able to be completely evacuated in 12-hours using ambulances, helicopters, planes., and

buses. The agencies responsible for the evacuation made quick and effective decisions directly

in-line with training and from experience.

15
3.7 Hurricane Wilma (2005).

Overview:

" As many as 300,000 people evacuated.

" Hurricane Wilma was the third large hurricane to hit the United States in a period of 6

weeks.

" Evacuations were generally staged.

" In some areas, approximately 80% of those ordered to evacuate did not leave.

" Hurricane Wilma caused the largest electrical disruption ever reported in Florida.

• More than 100 shelters were opened to the public. " Approximately 37,000 people, including about 2,100 special needs individuals, reported to

shelter facilities.

" Monroe and Miami Dade counties provided city and school buses for those who needed

transportation.

* The EPZs for Turkey Point and St. Lucie NPPs were within the area affected by the hazard.

Hurricane Wilma was the twelfth hurricane and the third Category 5 hurricane of the 2005

Atlantic hurricane season. Hurricane Wilma was the most intense hurricane of the season and

caused considerable damage in the Yucatan Peninsula. The hurricane lessened in strength and

made landfall in southern Florida as a Category 3 hurricane on October 24, 2005.

Evacuations in anticipation of Hurricane Wilma began on October 19, 2005 when Florida

officials ordered tourists out of southern Florida and ordered schools closed to allow families to

prepare and evacuate from the storm. Although Florida residents were strongly urged to

evacuate the area, media reports indicate that in some areas, as many as 80% of residents

under mandatory evacuation orders did not evacuate. In other areas, the compliance rate was

more consistent with other hurricanes. The low compliance to evacuation orders in areas of

Florida is not uncommon and can be attributed to a variety of factors. In Florida there are better

building codes and some people believe their homes will withstand hurricane winds (USACE,

1999). Additionally, the routineness of the hazard and ambivalence that some long time

Floridians have come to develop with respect to hurricane preparedness contribute to a low

compliance rate. Maybe most importantly for this incident, Hurricane Wilma was a very slow

moving storm, and many residents were not sure of the direction or convinced that they would

be affected.

In Monroe County, Florida providing transportation to residents is an important factor in an

evacuation. Many residents live on boats and do not have vehicles for transportation. There is

one highway in and out of Monroe County, and residents requiring a ride can wait on the side of

the road for bus transportation. Individuals with special needs can register to be picked up or

can call during the evacuation and request to be picked up. Generally, this population group is

evacuated first.

Shelters were available to residents prior to and post-landfall of Hurricane Wilma with over 120

shelters open and available to residents. Over 37,000 evacuees and more than 2,100 special

needs evacuees registered at shelters (Florida Emergency Management, 2005).

16
3.8 New England Flooding (2006)

Overview:

*Over 7,000 people evacuated.

*Evacuations were staged based on flood conditions.

*Over 600 roadways were flooded out, but this did not adversely affect the evacuation.

*Shelters were established in all affected areas.

*Approximately 10 percent of evacuees used shelter facilities.

*Several special needs facilities were evacuated.

*The EPZs for Seabrook and Pilgrim NPPs were within the area affected by the hazard.

From May 11 through May 23, 2006, record amounts of rain fell over Massachusetts, New

Hampshire, and parts of southern Maine causing thousands of residents t o evacuate. Flooding

that occurred as a result of the heavy rainfall was reported as the worst since the New England

Hurricane of 1938 (CBS, 2006). Evacuations often occurred in pockets throughout the region

on an as needed basis depending on where they were located in the flood plain and projected

weather forecasts. Hundreds of roads were closed in Massachusetts due to flooding, and over

600 roads were closed in New Hampshire. Having recently experienced extensive flooding in

October, 2005, the public readily cooperated with evacuation requests in 2006.

Several nursing homes and other special needs facilities were evacuated. In Lawrence,

Massachusetts, a large nursing home with approximately 243 residents was evacuated in 8

hours. Due to the fast rising flood, some evacuees had to be floated out of the facility in

oversized laundry bins (Catholic Health World, 2006).

3.9 Chemical Fire in Apex, North Carolina (2006)

Ove rview:

*Initial instructions were to shelter in place.

*Approximately 17,000 persons evacuated.

*The evacuation was staged.

*One nursing home with approximately 100 individuals was evacuated.

*Raleigh city buses were used to transport those that needed transportation (very few people

used this mode of transportation).

*A shadow evacuation of more than 30,000 people was observed.

*The chemical facility and the evacuated area are located within the Shea ron Harris NPP

emergency planning zone.

*Elements of the Shearon Harris NPP emergency plan were utilized to support the

evacuation efforts.

On October 5, 2006 a fire at a hazardous waste facility in Apex, North Carolina caused the

evacuation of over 17,000 people. The evacuation was staged, and very clear geographical

demarcation areas were communicated to the public. Initial instructions to the public were to

shelter in place followed by an evacuation order issued a short time later. *Some residents who

lived close to the facility and could see flames and hear explosions evacuated spontaneously

17
before being told to do so. Emergency management personnel estimated that a large shadow

evacuation contributed more than 30,000 additional people to the evacuation. Emergency

management officials stated that only a small number of people chose not to evacuate the area.

During the incident, the Apex Police Department and 911 Center were in the plume exposure

pathway and were evacuated. Approximately 15 police cars in the parking lot could not be

utilized for the evacuation because they were within the area contaminated by chemicals carried

in the plume. Some police officers called to duty had no vehicle or communication resources to

use in the response. Through the resourcefulness of the police department and emergency

response agency, this did not adversely affect the evacuation.

One nursing home with approximately 100 residents was evacuated without incident in about

3.5 hours. To accommodate transit dependent individuals, Raleigh city buses were used to

evacuate those who needed transportation. This activity was implemented in an ad hoc manner

and was conducted successfully, although few people utilized the resource.

3.10 Hawaii Earthquake (2006)

Overview:

" Approximately 3,000 people evacuated.

" Evacuations were primarily from hotels and hospitals.

* The evacuation was conducted in a matter of hours.

" Shelters were established quickly and used effectively.

* Some special needs individuals were airlifted to Honolulu.

On October 15, 2006, an earthquake occurred near the big island of Hawaii. The earthquake

caused an evacuation of about 3,000 people from Kona and South Kona. The majority of the

evacuees were from hotels and a hospital damaged by the earthquakes. Hotel evacuees were

taken to a local gymnasium until alternate accommodations could be found. Kona Community

Hospital was evacuated and required a few patients be flown to Honolulu. Though there was no

threat of a tsunami from the quake, police implemented tsunami evacuation plans to keep traffic

moving on the roadways. Those who did not have to drive were encouraged to stay at home

during the day. The Hawaii earthquake is of interest in this research because the evacuees

were primarily from special facilities and hotels. Although most of the evacuees were tourists,

there were no reports of individuals not understanding or not following the evacuation orders.

The evacuated hotels and resorts had developed their own emergency response plans which

included evacuation plans. From discussions with hotel personnel, the guests were notified to

evacuate via the public address system which still worked after the earthquake. It only took a

few minutes to evacuate one hotel, and staff did go through each room to verify that residents

had evacuated.

18
3.11 California Fires (2007)

Overview:

* Approximately 900,000 people evacuated.

• Evacuations were initially staged but became more widespread as the fire quickly

encroached upon areas.

" Shelter in place was implemented in select areas.

" Twelve deaths were identified, and two of these were elderly individuals being evacuated.

• Communications were significantly improved over the 2003 fires.

" QualComm Stadium was used as a mega-care center for residents, special needs and pets. * Latch key kids were evacuated in San Bernardino.

" Multiple special needs facilities and special needs individuals not residing in facilities were

evacuated.

* The EPZ for San Onofre NPP was within the area affected by the hazard.

Between October 20 and November 9, 2007 a series of 23 wildfires burned across areas of

southern California from Los Angeles and San Bernardino Counties in the north down to San

Diego and Imperial Counties near the United States and Mexico border in the south. The

wildfires precipitated the largest evacuation in California's history, with some estimates

suggesting nearly a million people evacuated (LA Times, 2007). The fires burned more than

500,000 acres and consumed over 3,200 structures, including more than 2,200 homes (OES,

2007a). In addition to the destruction of property, the wildfires caused the death of 12 people,

identified at the time of this research, and the injury of an additional 139 people (OES, 2007a),

more than 60 of whom were firefighters.

Although similar in many respects to evacuations for other hazards, wildfire evacuations, are

somewhat different because they are very fluid and based on the conditions of the event. The

2007 wildfires, as is common, had no set origin and pattern of movement. The plans for

wildfires basically involve a fire department's order of where and when to evacuate, and the

corresponding law enforcement agency determining how best to carry out the evacuation.

Some areas, like the mountainous regions of San Bernardino County, do have designated

emergency routes inasmuch as they are the only routes out of the area.

Because fire conditions warrant the priority movement of some areas prior to others, phased

evacuations have been affected by ordering certain areas to evacuate earlier. Emergency

response personnel stated that using tools like the AlertSanDiego system to target earlier calls

to the most threatened zones first were helpful. Although most evacuations started as staged,

they were quickly overcome by the size and speed of the fire and became more general, large

area evacuations.

3.12 Emergency Planning Around Nuclear Power Plants

In eight of the eleven incidents studied, the hazard encroached upon one or more nuclear

power plant EPZs. These eight incidents covered wide areas and affected 14 EPZs.

Discussions with emergency response personnel confirmed that response to many of these

incidents benefitted from the use of emergency planning elements developed for the EPZs.

19
During the field investigations, the emergency response personnel frequently cited the

preparedness and training activities conducted for the NPP as being beneficial in preparation for

response to the hazard. For the South Texas Project NPP in Matagorda County Texas, the

emergency management department implemented some of the emergency response plan

elements developed for the NPP and attributed some of their success during Hurricane Rita to

the response exercises conducted for the NPP. In St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, some of the

off-site emergency response plan elements for the Waterford 3 NPP were also used to support

the evacuation, including the siren system, which was used as a form of notification for

Hurricane Katrina. In Apex, North Carolina, the emergency response agency is within the EPZ

for Shearon Harris NPP, and their training was also instrumental in the successful evacuation

for the Apex fire. For the hurricanes that affected Florida, emergency response personnel

stated that the EPZ evacuation routes are commonly the same for hurricanes. Emergency

planning elements developed for the EPZs around NPPs were used to support these

evacuations and proved to be beneficial.

3.13 Case Study Summary

The eleven incidents researched for this study cover a wide range of experience in emergency

response and evacuations. Some of the common observations from these case studies

include:

" Most of the evacuations were conducted in a staged manner.

" Special needs institutions were evacuated in most of the emergencies.

" Special needs individuals were evacuated in most of the emergencies.

* Shelters were used to support all of the evacuations.

* Most incidents included shadow evacuations.

* Emergency planning developed for EPZs was utilized and benefitted the response in eight

of the eleven incidents.

In all of the incidents researched, there were elements of emergency planning and

implementation that worked extremely well. It was evident in the case studies that

implementation of lessons learned from previous evacuations improves subsequent response,

and integrating regional resources in evacuation planning also improved the response.

20
4.0 Analysis of Incident Response Elements

The analysis of incident response elements included a comparison of the emergency response

plans for each incident with the implementation of these plans as described in the case studies.

As stated earlier, the 2007 California Fires were added to the scope of this project after the

ratings had been completed and are not included in the assessments in this section. For each

of the ten evacuations rated, local and / or emergency response plans were reviewed to provide

a basis for the comparison. Emergency response plans were reviewed as the upper tier

documents that establish responsibilities, authorities, and planning. Detail for conducting

response activities is found in implementing procedures. Implementing procedures are typically

developed by each of the agencies that have responsibilities under the emergency response

plan. During field investigations, emergency response personnel were asked about

implementing procedures, but a detailed review of these procedures was not practical and not

within the scope of this study. For this study, five hurricanes, two technological hazards, one

wildfire, one earthquake, and one flood were assessed. The diversity of these incidents

presents a challenge when comparing common elements of emergency response but also

provides the opportunity to learn from different types of responses., Due to the number of

municipalities affected in these large scale incidents, many emergency response plans were

obtained and reviewed, but not all local plans were included in the review.

The purpose of this incident assessment was to review areas of emergency preparedness and

response to identify insights and lessons learned for the NRC and / or FEMA NPP emergency

preparedness program. To support this review, the following seven emergency response

elements were determined to be of greatest interest in meeting the objectives of this study:

1. Training,

2. Public Education,

3. Communication with the Public,

4. Communication with Responders,

5. Evacuation,

6 Special Needs, and

7. Shelter Facilities.

Each of the above elements was evaluated and rated subjectively for planning and

implementation. The following criteria were used in the assessment:

Planning: Was the plan comprehensive and broad enough to encompass the hazard

encountered? Did the plan include descriptions of responsibilities arid

authorities? Did the plan include public education, training, chain of

command, public notification'and warning, communications, transportation

routes and modes, special needs individuals and facilities, and sheltering?

Did the plan include coordination with other jurisdictions?

Implementation: Were the elements of the emergency response plan implemented according

to plan? Were the pre-incident elements conducted, such as public

education and responder training? Was the chain of command followed?

Were timely decisions made? Were plans coordinated with other

21
jurisdictions, if applicable?

The rating scale used five levels including ineffective, marginally effective, effective, very

effective and excellent. This rating scale is similar to the rating scale used in the "Catastrophic

Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation" (DOT, 2006). The ratings are applied to the seven

elements of interest and should not be considered comprehensive ratings for any incident. In

establishing the ratings, an attempt was made to not allow the effectiveness of one incident to

disproportionately affect the rating for the set of evacuations analyzed. Finally, it is noted that

only ten incidents were assessed for this project. Although these ten incidents were high profile

large scale evacuations, they may not be fully representative of a larger set; thus, more

quantitative statistical analyses are not possible.

4.1 Planning

For the assessment of planning elements, emergency response plans at the State and / or local

level were reviewed for each incident, and where possible the plans that were in place at the

time of the incident were reviewed. It was evident from this review that emergency response

planning was generally well documented in identifying objectives and the resources required to

meet response needs, although there are areas for improvement as identified below. This is

consistent with the Nationwide Plan Review (DHS, 2006a and 2006b), which found that State

and urban area plans are generally consistent with Federal planning guidelines. It is also

consistent with the Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan evaluation, which found that

planning was very effective (DOT, 2006).

4.1.1 Training

Training as addressed in emergency response planning was rated as very effective. Training

is an essential element of emergency response planning and was included in all of the

emergency response plans reviewed. Training is a broad activity that encompasses items such

as continuing education, on-line training courses, and formal classroom and field training.

Training also includes table top exercises, drills, and full scale exercises. In general, it was

found through review of documentation and discussions with emergency response personnel

that training of emergency response personnel is routine, thorough and practical for emergency

responders. Training was addressed in the emergency response plans, details were provided

on types and frequency of training, and structured programs were frequently identified.

Emergency response personnel confirmed that the training generally follows the established

plans and procedures. Comprehensive training is not always available to smaller jurisdictions

and is not as formalized for select hazards, such as flooding or wildfires.

The State and local plans reviewed contain provisions for training that are adequate for most

emergency response needs. The plans reviewed included discussion of the need for training

and the types of training to be conducted, with some plans including detailed training

requirements. In discussions with emergency responders, the overwhelming response was that

they receive training that is directly applicable to incident response. The size and extent of

training was often dependent upon the size of the community and anticipated hazards, as well

as available funding, staffing, and scheduling constraints.

22
An important element of training is the conduct of exercises. Most plans called for at least one

large scale exercise each year. In Texas, traffic management tests were conducted in five

hurricane evacuation regions in June, 2005 (HRO, 2006). Cross jurisdictional exercises have

not been frequently conducted, although these are becoming more common. The importance of

cross jurisdictional exercises is receiving more attention, and it appears the trend is to develop

response plans on a more regional basis with consideration for both the receiving jurisdictions

and the evacuating jurisdictions.

Emergency response personnel and management understand the benefits of training and

dedicate substantial portions of their time to training. There was a commitment among

responsible authorities to ensure that adequate training is planned, available and provided.

New topics are routinely added to the training regimen in response to lessons learned. At the

2006 National Hurricane Conference, for example, training was offered in the areas of rapid

needs assessments and emergency planning and special needs populations. Training that

covers traffic management plan development and traffic control for emergency response is now

also available. The need for such training has become evident based on the response to

Hurricane Katrina and other incidents.

The training opportunities for emergency responders are abundant and continue to develop.

These same training opportunities are available to emergency response agencies that serve

EPZs. Emergency responders in the vicinity of EPZs have additional opportunities for training

specific to the response conditions of a potential NPP accident.

4.1.2 Public Education

Public education as addressed in emergency response planning was rated as effective. Most

of the plans reviewed referenced public outreach efforts of some kind ranging from distributing

information at libraries to mailing brochures to all residents. Some plans included use of

televised emergency awareness messages. In the areas where there are annual hazards such

as the Gulf Coast States, fire and flood prone areas, education programs are frequently well

defined and include public awareness presentations to local civic groups, schools and

businesses. At least one plan included preparing special information to target selected special

needs population groups.

Seasonal hazards such as hurricanes, floods and wildfires differ in educational awareness

needs from technological hazards, such as chemical fires. The Atlantic and Gulf Coast States

are subjected to a hurricane season from June 1 through November 30 each year and typically

have educational awareness programs to inform the public before and during the season. The

start of the hazard season is often discussed in newspapers and broadcast through local and

national news media. Public education efforts to inform the public of potential hazards on a

routine basis can be extensive in hurricane regions and in wildfire and flood prone areas.

Brochures and other mailings are frequently distributed to all area residents. Public awareness

campaigns are common in some coastal cities to inform the public and improve the registration

of special needs individuals. In some areas, information on local hazards is provided annually

to school children. Lastly, most State and local emergency response agencies have websites

that provide information on the hazards in the area, protective actions, and requirements for the

public in the event that protective actions are. recommended.

23
Technological hazards may have no warning and frequently occur in areas where residents may

be unaware of the potential hazards. Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) are

established to provide a forum for emergency management agencies, responders, industry and

the public to work together to understand the chemical hazards within their communities and to

develop emergency plans in case of accidental releases. LEPCs develop websites and conduct

public meetings making information available to the interested public. In large scale

technological evacuations, lack of public education has not been an issue, because the

emergency response for a technological hazard is usually very prescriptive (NRC, 2005a). For

these types of incidents, the public may not need much, if any, information on their

responsibilities and will be informed by authorities and provided specific direction as the incident

unfolds.

In researching public education, there were documented success stories with many incidents,

and there were issues identified as well. In the Blue Ribbon Report on the California wildfires, it

was stated that the lack of a comprehensive public education program has resulted in a public

that is uninformed or apathetic about wildfire risk reduction (Campbell, 2004). However, in the

same report, the pre-incident awareness activities of the Mountain Area Safety Taskforce in San

Bernardino California was credited with facilitating the successful evacuations from mountain

communities.

Although there are large amounts of information available to the public, the incidents assessed

indicate that the public was not always aware of their role in the emergency. Only one

emergency response plan identified the need to develop special information to target special

needs population groups. In reviewing older emergency response plans as well as newer

plans, it appears that there is a trend to increasing efforts in public awareness and utilizing a

larger variety of media to convey this information. From a general perspective, the DHS

Nationwide Plan Review (DHS, 2006b) identified that most of the participants in the plan had

developed comprehensive public outreach and education programs, but in general, public

education was not sufficiently addressed. The Nationwide Plan Review identified that specific

information and procedures to increase the public's ability to prepare for and respond to an

incident were not in place. Public education within EPZs generally includes distribution of

information packets, which may be brochures, calendars, or other forms of information, at least

annually. Information is made available to the public, as required in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), on

how they will be notified and what actions they should take. It was evident during this research

that differences in planning among counties or parishes was frequently dependent on the local

commitment of a specific emergency management agency. Such commitment appeared to be

fostered by the frequency in which organizations interact with one another during emergencies.

The routing training and drills for NPP emergency response planning also fosters a similar

relationship among response agencies.

4.1.3 Communications

4.1.3.1 Communications with the Public

Communication with the public was rated effective and includes communication before and

during an incident. Communication protocols are established to inform residents of a hazard,

warn them of potential response actions, and advise them when to take protective action.

24
Notification and warning methods were identified in the emergency response plans. The types

of notification and alert systems identified included use of the Emergency Alert System (EAS),

Reverse 911® type systems, route alerting, sirens, television broadcasts, cable television scroll,

and websites. Route alerting is generally defined as emergency responders driving through

neighborhoods informing the residents via a public address system from their vehicle.

However, some areas also use the term route alerting synonymous with door-to-door

notification. For hurricane incidents, newspapers and distribution of paper notices are

frequently used because of the time available prior to predicted landfall. The selection of public

notification methods depends upon the timing and extent of the incident. Some plans stated

that information on evacuation routes and shelters would be conveyed over the EAS, and some

plans included prepared EAS messages.

All plans identified the need for communication with the public during an evacuation. However,

only a few plans described potential methods or resources necessary to communicate with the

public during these stages of the incident. Many plans do not address communicating details

on available transportation modes, such as busing, access to transportation, and requirements

for individuals using these modes, such as restrictions on what evacuees may carry with them

when traveling on buses (DOT, 2006). While en route during a large scale evacuation, it is

necessary to inform the evacuees of the direction of travel, road conditions, traffic conditions,

and other logistical travel needs such as whether gas or rest facilities are available. Common

systems to provide information to evacuees while they are en route include Highway Advisory

Radios, dynamic message signs, public radio station announcements, and traveler information

phone numbers. All of the plans reviewed included one or more of these communication

methods.

Most States have implemented telephone traveler information systems to provide information on

roadway and evacuation conditions. States are increasingly using the Federal Communication

Commission established telephone numbers (211, 311, and 511) to provide general information

to the public and evacuees. Although not implemented in all States, these phone numbers,

which are similar to the 911 emergency phone number, are dedicated for non-emergency

assistance or traffic related information. The public may call these numbers and speak to an

individual to ask questions or may receive a recording on the status of events. A practical

problem with providing current traffic information to evacuees is that there are fewer traffic data

acquisition systems along routes outside of urban areas, and thus congestion may become

quite large before the traffic management center is aware of the condition. This can result in

inaccurate information provided to the evacuees. Telephone systems can also become

overloaded in an emergency and frequently the public is asked to refrain from using the system.

The need to convey information in multiple languages was identified in about half of the plans

reviewed, but there was not a consistent approach to addressing this need. The Nationwide

Plan Review (DHS, 2006b) also identified the inability to provide messages to the public in

multiple languages as a widespread weakness.

Communication with the public prior to and during an evacuation is important to facilitate an

effective public response, but consideration must be given to the likelihood of the hazard

impacting the area. It is essential that emergency response planning address the need for

communication of frequent, concise, and unambiguous information to the public. None of the

25
plans reviewed included communicating with the public outside of the declared evacuation area

to inform them of expectations. This is an area where enhancements may be beneficial in

reducing unnecessary evacuations and reducing traffic congestion. Informing the public in nonaffected areas at early stages of the incident may help reduce shadow evacuations and free up

much needed capacity on the roadway network. Communication with the public residing in

EPZs would begin with sirens or tone alert radios followed by EAS messages. The

communication systems are routinely tested and exercised.

4.1.3.2 Communications with Emergency Responders

Communication among emergency responders was rated very effective. An effective response

requires communication between response agencies, field incident command centers, and

emergency operations centers. All of the emergency response plans reviewed identified

requirements for communications among emergency response personnel. All of the plans

identified the communication resources and discussed a chain of command. Most plans

identified, at least to some extent, the types of systems to be used and how these systems are

coordinated. As communities improve their communication infrastructure, the emergency

response plans are being updated to integrate these improvements.

In the last few years, many municipalities and agencies have obtained 800 MHZ radio systems.

These systems have become a primary resource for communications, but they can still be

overwhelmed when the number of agencies and personnel participating in the response is

greater than the number for which the system was designed. Redundant and back up means of

communications such as cell phones, telephones, satellite phones, two-way radios, and

amateur radios are routinely identified in the plans to augment communication among

responders. For large scale incidents which require such a variety of communications, an

emphasis on interoperability is necessary. Only a few plans identified interoperability as a

necessary function of the communications system, however, the planning of multiple

communication methods mitigates some interoperability issues.

4.1.4 Evacuation

Evacuation as addressed in emergency response planning was rated overall as effective.

Evacuation planning requires consideration of the areas to be evacuated, the means to

evacuate the public, and the population groups to be evacuated. All of the plans reviewed

established a chain of command and identified the authorities responsible for declaring an

evacuation.

The emergency response plans typically included information on techniques used to facilitate

better movement of vehicles during an evacuation, such as more extensive placement of traffic

control officers, use of dynamic message signs to communicate congestion status, rest areas,

gas stations etc., pre-placement of tow trucks and service. vehicles, and use of contraflow. At

least one plan reviewed included all of these strategies. The Federal Highway Administration

(FHWA) suggests that some strategies to improve the impacts of traffic influencing events

should also include providing travelers with information on travel conditions and improved

management of construction zones (FHWA, 2004).

26
Most of the emergency response plans did not discuss advanced traffic management strategies.

Typically for technological hazards, the evacuations were generally ad hoc in nature, meaning

that evacuation routes were determined in real time and usually influenced by wind direction.

Planning should consider that impacts to the transportation network in large scale evacuations

often occur far away from the source (Wolshon, 2006). Some States such as Louisiana,

integrate the expertise of transportation agencies with emergency management and public

safety to support improved traffic control by bringing the planners and implementation resources

together. It was observed that when enhanced traffic management planning for large

population areas was integrated among agencies, the evacuation was more efficient. Law

enforcement was typically identified as responsible for implementing the evacuation. Some

plans stated that evacuation routes would be identified in the EAS messages, while others

included the actual evacuation routes. Some plans included a description of the means to

evacuate transit dependent individuals, and a few plans included information on individuals with

special needs.

The transit dependent population, for this study, is identified in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,

Rev. 1, Appendix 4 as permanent residents that do not have access to an automobile. This

population group differs from special needs in that aside from not having an automobile, the

population group is assumed to be without need of other assistance. At least three plans stated

that city buses would pick up individuals waiting along established bus routes. One plan

included clearance times required for hurricane evacuations.

Evacuation of the transit dependent public requires additional planning and this was included in

most plans. Busing was included in the planning for both Harris County arnd the City of

Galveston and was implemented in Texas during Hurricane Rita. Likewise, busing was planned

and successfully used in the evacuation for Hurricane Katrina in many parishes in Louisiana

and in areas of Mississippi. Busing is also planned and very well organized in Florida. The City

of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (2005) stated that the city would

utilize all available resources to evacuate threatened areas and that special arrangements

would be made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves. The plan further stated

that approximately 100,000 citizens of New Orleans do not have means of personal

transportation. Planning for the use of buses to support the evacuations appears to have been

in place at the time of Hurricane Katrina but was not implemented at an appropriate level to

support the needs of the public.

Louisiana has since developed a new plan to evacuate the transit dependent population from

the New Orleans area. The new plan includes regional coordination with the Federal

government to acquire the necessary buses from surrounding areas and States. The logistics

of mobilizing buses from regional areas requires making a decision to mobilize more than 100

hours prior to landfall of a hurricane (Montz, 2007). Busing of people out of the area will begin

54 hours prior to the onset of tropical storm force winds. Pets are not allowed on the buses, but

will be placed in animal crates and evacuated separately, not to the public shelters, but to

locations provided by the Department of Agriculture (Montz, 2007). Implementation of this new

approach will provide opportunities to learn whether such adjustments improve the evacuation

response. This approach to busing is different than the planning for EPZs which provides that

buses supporting an evacuation be identified and the time to mobilize and evacuate the

residents that require public transportation be estimated (NRC, 1980).

27
4.1.5 Special Needs

In reviewing emergency response plans for this element, both special needs facilities as well as

special needs individuals were assessed, and both were found lacking in sufficient detail in

most plans. These two categories are reviewed separately because of the distinct differences.

Special needs facilities are required to have their own evacuation plans while special needs

individuals utilize public resources available during an evacuation. In reviewing the emergency

response plans for these incidents, special needs facilities were identified in all plans and

special needs individuals were identified in most plans. However, the means and methods for

evacuating were not well described. For instance, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

(ADA) was not referenced in any of the emergency response plans reviewed. The only specific

mention of ADA related activities was during the 2007 California response to the fires where the

Reverse 9115 system had the capability and was used to call teletypewriter systems and

telecommunication devices of deaf individuals and individuals with speaking impairments.

There were instances noted of disabled individuals at shelters who needed to be carried to

restroom facilities because shelters were not ADA compliant. The emphasis of emergency

response planning is on the immediate safety of the public, as it must be. As local emergency

preparedness and response programs develop, it was observed through discussions with

emergency response personnel that existing Federal requirements, such as ADA, are being

integrated to the extent practical, and where safety of the public is not compromised.

4.1.5.1 Special Needs Facilities

Special needs facilities as addressed in emergency response planning was rated marginally

effective. Special needs facilities were evacuated in all but one of the evacuations researched

in this study. Only the Romulus chemical fire evacuation did not require evacuation of a special

facility. Most of the emergency response plans reviewed mentioned that special needs facilities

are responsible for developing their own plans. At least one plan listed the special needs

facilities in the area. None of the plans mentioned that the special needs facility evacuation

plans should be reviewed or coordinated. None of the plans identified the potential need to

support the evacuation of special facilities. One plan stated that special needs individuals are

the responsibility of the facility.

Special facilities typically include hospitals, nursing homes, prisons, schools, and other facilities

where additional time may be necessary to evacuate the public. These facilities usually develop

their own evacuation plans and include provisions for transport of the residents. Special needs

Medicaid and Medicare certified facilities are required under 42 CFR 483.75 to have detailed

written plans and procedures to meet all potential emergencies and disasters. In developing

their evacuation plans, special facilities face unique issues and must decide whether the risks of

evacuating seriously ill and frail individuals are greater than the risk of not evacuating.

Supporting the medical needs of some individuals is challenging making planning very

important. Support during an evacuation may include such things as providing specialized

transportation, medication, maintaining specialized medical equipment, or providing a medical

attendant throughout the evacuation. The responsibility for evacuation planning may be that of

the facility, but coordination among evacuation plans is necessary to assure resources will be

available during a large scale evacuation.

28
The Florida Emergency Status System was identified at the 2007 Nursing Home Hurricane

Summit as a promising planning practice (FHCA, 2007). The system is used to report and track

health care facility status. The Georgia Division of Public Health is developing a system similar

to the Florida system and will include data on evacuation transportation resources to help

identify where resources may be over committed (FHCA, 2007). These improvements are

based on lessons learned and indicate that States are beginning to recognize that special

facilities require additional attention during planning. For emergency planning within EPZs,

NUREG-0654, provides that special facilities be considered separately from the general

population in order that details can be developed at the facility level.

4.1.5.2 Special Needs Individuals

Special needs individuals as addressed in emergency response planning was also rated

marginally effective. Special needs individuals were addressed in most emergency response

plans. A fundamental issue with special needs individuals is the lack of a consistent definition

and the limited efforts to identify this population group prior to an incident. The definition used

in this document is any individual who is unable to comply with an evacuation order without

assistance from outside the home. The Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation

(DOT, 2006) included people who are elderly, those with disabilities or medical conditions,

people with limited English proficiency, people with hearing and sight impairment, and people

without access to private vehicles within the definition. The Nationwide Plan Review further

adds to the definition individuals who are impoverished, chemically dependent, and those with

emotional or mental disabilities (DHS, 2006b). The definition may be expanded further to

include households where minor children are left alone at home (i.e., latch key kids). Although

the basic definition of special needs covers all of the groups mentioned, emergency response

personnel do not universally understand or consider all of these groups during planning or

response. As an example, Hurricane Katrina made landfall near the end of the month when

many lower-income families could not afford to evacuate. Traditionally this group was not

considered special needs, but it is now recognized that additional planning is needed to support

evacuation of this group.

Most of the plans reviewed identified the need to evacuate special needs individuals and

included a fairly broad definition for this population group. None of the plans included as broad

a definition as the above. Some plans provided information on how to identify special needs

individuals prior to an emergency. Most of the emergency response plans reviewed for the Gulf

Coast States included planning to pick up special needs individuals and take them to

evacuation transfer points or special needs shelters. But only two of the plans included

sufficient detail to actually implement, on a large scale, the evacuation of special needs

individuals. The acuity level of nursing home residents influences the time to evacuate (FHCA,

2007), and this was not addressed in most of the emergency response plans.

Some counties and parishes implement plans to improve the evacuation of this population

group including proactive efforts to locate and register individuals prior to a hazard event. An

issue complicating registration is the reluctance of individuals to identify themselves as having

special needs. In discussions with emergency planners and evacuees, some of the reasons for

reluctance to register include:

29
" An assumption that someone (friend or family) will be willing to assist them;

" Sensitivity to their disability or their need for assistance;

* Concern about the security of the data; and

• Some individuals simply do not realize they have special needs.

The last bullet is particularly true of elderly individuals, who may believe they are able to

evacuate, but some of whom should not attempt a multi-hour evacuation without assistance.

Proactive planning for special needs individuals is in place in many areas including Florida,

Mississippi, and parts of Louisiana where special needs individuals are identified prior to an

incident. Most of the response plans stated that registration cards were used to obtain

information on special needs individuals and many emergency management departments allow

registration via the web or telephone. In discussions with emergency response personnel, the

response rate using registration cards alone can be low.

Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, was identified as a proactive parish where the Office of

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness recognizes the time consuming and safety

sensitive issues of this population group and conducts very detailed planning. This includes

using public health announcements combined with extensive outreach efforts to have people

register with the parish. Home visits are made to each applicant and their condition and needs

are verified. This has proven very effective in preparing for evacuations (St. Amant, 2007).

The planning for special needs individuals is now better recognized and is improving, but for

those plans in place at the time of the incidents investigated herein, there were few that

provided comprehensive planning for this population group. This population group needs

advance planning to facilitate successful evacuation (FHWA, 2006). Planning should address

early identification, communication, transportation, and sheltering needs for this broad

population group.

4.1.6 Shelter Facilities

The assessment of shelter facilities as addressed in emergency response planning is rated

effective. Shelter facilities were discussed in all of the emergency response plans reviewed. A

review was conducted of types of shelters planned (e.g., general, special needs, last resort),

under what conditions shelters were expected to be opened, and whether or not sufficient

capacity was planned. There was a consistent lack of adequate planning for pets, limited

planning for special needs individuals, and lack of adequate space for the very large

evacuations.

Throughout the Gulf States, shelter facilities are used on a large scale. In Mississippi, shelters

are planned for those who cannot evacuate and for those with special needs. In some areas,

arrangements are in place with ambulance services to move individuals with special needs to

shelter facilities. In Florida, shelter space has increased significantly in the last few years and

-more space is being added. Since Hurricane Andrew in 1992, Florida has had an aggressive

program to increase shelter capacity to meet the anticipated demand and has significantly

added to their inventory of shelters. In areas such as Monroe County, which is located at the

southwestern tip of Florida and includes most of the Florida Keys, shelters are not planned to

30
open in the Keys for Category 3, 4, and 5 hurricanes and people must evacuate the Keys.

Shelters are generally located in the Miami area for Keys residents.

Following Hurricane Georges, Louisiana State University conducted an assessment of

approximately 200 shelters in Louisiana in the "Comprehensive Assessment of Hurricane

Shelters: Lessons from Hurricane Georges" (Pine, 2003) and concluded that shelters opened

for Hurricane Georges were considered by the local emergency management directors as the

safest locations and best available sites. For Hurricane Georges, the Superdome was intended

to be a special needs shelter only, but was later opened as a shelter of last resort.

In parishes throughout Louisiana, the shelter program is well planned. Most of the issues

encountered with the Superdome and other shelters for Hurricane Katrina were due to the

unexpected length of duration of the shelter period caused by the flooding of the city. The

Superdome was not intended to house, feed and supply water to people for several days

(Untied States, 2006a). Had the flooding not occurred, most individuals would have likely

returned home the following day. For Hurricane Katrina, special needs shelters were planned

and established in Lafayette, Alexandria, Baton Rouge, and Monroe and other areas; however,

individuals usually needed to have their own travel arrangements to get to these shelters.

Sheltering evacuees is a well planned and routinely implemented protective action, but there

are a few areas where improvement is needed. There remains a consistent lack of capacity for

large scale evacuations. There continues to be a need for additional shelters for special needs

individuals, and there is a need to improve the transport of individuals to shelters. Lastly, lack of

capacity at pet friendly shelters continues to be observed. The issue, observed in many

evacuations, is that people frequently refuse to evacuate if they can not take the family pets.

Thus, the accommodation of pets is recognition that to fully protect the public and improve

evacuation compliance, the entire family must be accommodated.

4.1.7 Planning Summary

Emergency response plans were reviewed for each of the incidents investigated. The review

included State and / or local plans depending on the incident and availability of the response

plans. Training and communications among emergency responders received very effective

ratings. Special needs received a marginally effectiverating, and the remaining elements all

received effective ratings. Figure 4.1 on the following page provides a summary of the

effectiveness of emergency response planning elements.

31
Figure 4.1. Relative Rating of Planning Elements

4.2 Implementation

While the rating for emergency response planning elements was based primarily on review of

emergency response plans, the rating for implementation elements was based primarily on the

information from interviews, research of each incident, and after action reports.

4.2.1 Training

Implementation of training for emergency response personnel and management was rated very

effective. Training was found to be conducted on the emergency response plans and

implementing procedures. Emergency response personnel generally agreed that training,

which includes drills and exercises, provided the foundation for field decisions. Most

emergency response activities follow procedure, at least initially. Responders are deployed,

incident command established, teams assigned activities, such as traffic control, based on

situation priorities, etc. Training supports a timely and structured deployment and response to

the incidents.

With the dynamic nature of emergencies, responders adjust their response actions to the

conditions and timing of the incident and depend on training to provide the foundation for field

decisions. For instance, in Apex, North Carolina, the emergency operations center had to be

relocated multiple times. The police station was in the plume exposure area and had to be

32
evacuated leaving behind a dozen police cars which were then unavailable for use. The

emergency response team overcame these conditions and successfully evacuated over 17,000

people safely out of the hazard area in a matter of hours. Another example of applying training

skills to an incident occurred with the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, Texas.

The evacuation of this facility had been discussed among emergency response personnel in

planning activities; however the facilities had never been fully evacuated. The evacuation of the

facility was completed in a 12-hour period using ambulances, helicopters, planes, and buses to

support this first complete facility evacuation. The agencies responsible for the evacuation

made quick and effective decisions directly in line with their training and experience.

Examples of how training provides responders the knowledge to respond and adjust to incident

requirements were identified in almost all of the evacuations researched. The training received

by emergency management departments located within NPP EPZs was also instrumental in

supporting successful evacuations. In Matagorda County Texas, which includes the South

Texas NPP, the emergency management department attributed some of their success during

Hurricane Rita to the response exercises conducted for the NPP. To support the evacuation,

the county implemented some of the emergency response plan elements developed for the

South Texas NPP. In St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, some of the off-site emergency response

plan elements for the Waterford 3 NPP were also used to support the evacuation. In Apex,

North Carolina, the emergency response agency is within the EPZ for Shearon Harris NPP and

training was also instrumental in the successful evacuation for the Apex fire.

Responders that would be involved in response to an NPP emergency receive frequent and

thorough training which is tested through drills and exercises. Thus, as well as training was

conducted and implemented in these large scale emergencies, training for NPP responders is

even more thorough.

4.2.2 Public Education

For implementation, education of the public was rated effective. The effectiveness of public

education is assessed primarily by the response of the public to the protective action orders.

Communication from those ordering the evacuation influences the public response; thus, for the

rating of public education, this study considers whether the public followed the evacuation

orders, when they evacuated, and whether people were adequately prepared to evacuate.

The effectiveness of public education was challenging to assess for this diverse set of incidents.

In smaller incidents such as the Hawaii and Romulus evacuations, compliance was high and

response was immediate. These were areas where there has been little or no attempt to

educate the public prior to the incident. For the Romulus, Michigan fire, the public was

.generally unaware of the hazardous nature of the facility and had no experience with

evacuations. The evacuation for the Hawaii earthquakes included mostly tourists who had no

knowledge of what to do in an emergency. In each of these incidents, the public responded to

the immediate instructions provided by authorities.

The population in Apex, North Carolina resides within the EPZ for the Shearon Harris NPP and

receives emergency planning information at least annually. The Apex evacuation was

conducted very orderly and efficiently in spite of the changing wind conditions and need to

33
frequently relocate the field command center and expand the evacuation area. In California,

planning and education of the public on the potential for wildfires was also conducted in some

areas. As reported in the Blue Ribbon Report on the California wildfires, the evacuation of

approximately 80,000 residents of a mountain community was successful in part due to the

public education efforts (Campbell, 2004). In Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, the Office of

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness conducts an effective public awareness

program, which includes using public health announcements combined with extensive outreach

efforts (St. Amant, 2007). The Plaquemines Parish emergency management had also

developed public information brochures and delivered these brochures to all residents of the

parish. The Governor's Division of Emergency Management in Texas had distributed at least

40,000 public awareness pamphlets in 2005, prior to Hurricane Rita (HRO, 2006).

The rating of effective was based on the fact that there were instances identified in the

evacuations where individuals did not follow instructions. There were instances when large

segments of the population did not evacuate, such as in New Orleans during Hurricanes

Georges, Ivan, and Katrina. There were large shadow evacuations associated with two of the

incidents including Hurricane Rita and the Apex fire indicating that large numbers of people

evacuated unnecessarily. Finally, there were instances of individuals who did not have the

means to evacuate in New Orleans and in Mississippi, and these individuals had not made

plans for evacuation. The above issues with evacuation response can be attributed to public

education, but can also be attributed to the decision making and communication provided during

the incident. There are many reasons that people choose not to follow the orders provided

during an incident. Improvements in public education could be developed to specifically target

some of these reasons.

4.2.3 Communications

The planning elements identify multiple methods of communicating warnings and notifications to

the public. The systems are available, identified for use, and used in the notification process;

however, the messages were not always clear to the public. The results of unclear or indecisive

communication adversely affect the response of the public and, as seen in some of the

incidents assessed, may cause too many or too few people to evacuate.

4.2.3.1 Communications with the Public

Communication with the public was rated effective. In most of the evacuations researched,

communication with the public on the need to evacuate was timely, accurate and useful, and

compliance was high. In a few instances though, the messages to the public were not clear or

were not timely resulting in problems. There was an inconsistent approach to communicating

with the public during and after these incidents. Lack of communication with the public was

attributed to failure in the plans for evacuating the low-mobility population in response to

Hurricane Katrina (Wolshon, 2006). In contrast, the messages to the public were frequent and

convincing for Hurricane Rita and resulted in a very large compliance; however, according to

the House Research Organization, the biggest failure of the Hurricane Rita evacuation was

communication to the public (HRO, 2006) which was often not specific resulting in about 2

million people evacuating that did not need to leave.

34
For natural disasters such as hurricanes where large scale evacuations are ordered, there is

usually time to notify the public and provide direction on the protective action. Hurricane

direction can be predicted in general, but the precise impact area can change considerably in

the 24 hours prior to landfall. As hurricanes develop in the Atlantic or Gulf of Mexico, they are

tracked by the National Weather Service, which provides frequent updates on predicted landfall.

Respons *e agencies must balance the recommendation for protective actions with the potential

for the hazard to affect the actual area. Forest fires and wildfires can change direction quickly

and affect areas that may have been considered safe just hours earlier. As demonstrated in the

2003 California Fires, such changes can occur so quickly that there is not always time to notify

all of the affected residents, particularly in sparsely populated areas. Natural disasters also

present an additional challenge because of the breadth of the impacted area. For Hurricanes

Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005, as well as both California fires, the media coverage was

extensive, and the general public was very aware of the potential hazard. Such broad coverage

is informative, but may not always be specific enough for residents to understand if they are in a

mandatory evacuation area.

Common methods used to notify the public included EAS messages, Reverse 91 1' type

systems, route alerting, television news broadcasts, and notifications at special events, such as

local football games. The siren system surrounding the Waterford 3 NPP in St. Charles Parish,

Louisiana was used as a form of notification for Hurricane Katrina and was effective in getting

the initial notification to the community. One of the most successful communications methods

continues to be door-to-door notification and route alerting. This is a slow and labor intensive

effort, but it assures that residents have been contacted*. Route alerting was used to some

degree in most of the incidents studied. For the Romulus and Apex chemical fires and

California fires, route alerting was widely used as a method to inform the public. It was also

used in many areas of Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas for hurricanes, but on a more

localized basis such as in mobile home parks and low lying neighborhoods.

Multiple methods of communication were used in every incident. This approach helps to inform

larger numbers of the public, but this does not always ensure a high percentage of the public

receives the message. In Hurricane Charlie in 2004, the Lee County Florida emergency

management program used thirteen different means to communicate with the public including

media broadcasts, Reverse 91 1', and some route alerting (Lee County, 2006). In an after

action report, it was determined that fewer than 30 percent of those ordered to evacuate

actually left. Less than 20. percent of the public stated they heard the mandatory evacuation

order. The telephone information system only reached 10 percent of those called with 40

percent hanging up and 40 percent not answering (Lee County, 2006). Providing multiple

means of notification increases the probability that the public will hear the message and

provides a means by which they can verify the information.

When considering forms of communication, demographics must be considered. In New

Orleans, some information was communicated in Spanish and Vietnamese, while in Florida

some information was published in Spanish, French and German. There was little information

identified in the research of real time communication of evacuation information during news

broadcasts, although one report was found where a televised evacuation message was

presented in Spanish in Mississippi and local Spanish television networks covered the 2003 and.

2007 California fires.

35
Some States, including Texas, Louisiana, Florida, California and others did use the 211, 311

and 511 telephone information systems to provide general information to evacuees. The 211

system was a valuable asset in Texas in support of Hurricane Rita (United Way, 2005) and was

widely used in the 2007 California fires. Dynamic message signs, which can be programmed

remotely and changed as conditions change, were utilized in most of the incidents assessed to

provide information to evacuees. Even with these added attempts to communicate with the

public during the evacuations, available shelter locations were not always well communicated:

Thus, individuals arriving at shelters were sometimes told to continue on to the next available

shelter. Providing information resources to evacuees en route is a trend that emergency

planners are integrating into their response plans.

Effective notification led to Plaquemines Parish, a coastal parish in Louisiana, recording an

evacuation compliance rate of greater than 99 percent prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina (St.

Amant, 2007). But a very broad based message was issued in the Houston area stating that

residents who had experienced flooding in the past should evacuate. The evacuation warnings

in Houston also emphasized the recent experience with Hurricane Katrina to further encourage

residents to evacuate. A more direct message could have been communicated directly to those

specific areas of coastal Texas that needed to evacuate and may have limited the evacuation to

those who were at risk.

Authorities are learning that how they communicate evacuation orders has an impact on the

response. The public must believe that if they are ordered to evacuate, it is because there is a

real threat to the community. To reduce evacuation of areas that are not at risk, authorities

should assure that when they order an evacuation, they do so only for those areas that are

potentially at risk. These are difficult and challenging elements to balance when ordering an

evacuation. Frequently, such as with hurricanes and wildfires, the direction and impact is not

always predictable with much accuracy by the time the evacuation orders must be made.

During the 2007 California fires, emergency response personnel stated that the mayor of San

Diego had asked that people not affected by the fires to refrain from driving when possible to

support the evacuation efforts.

4.2.3.2 Communications with Emergency Responders

Communication with emergency responders was rated very effective based on the resources,

planning and infrastructure dedicated to and used in response activities. Emergency response

professionals are frequently required to overcome issues with communications and routinely

demonstrate that through training and ingenuity, they have the ability to overcome these issues.

Emergency response agencies have aggressively updated their communications systems over

the last five years. However, there are still frequent communication issues with emergency

response radios and communication systems such as interoperability problems between

systems of different jurisdictions. Radio frequencies can be overwhelmed with too many

participants, and telephone networks can become inundated with calls sometimes making

communication between emergency response organizations difficult

In spite of upgraded systems, there remain some common issues encountered in response to

emergencies. During Hurricane Wilma, there were issues with overload of the 800 MHZ radio

system used by the county (Lee County, 2006). This was partly due to the loss of two

36
communication tower links and to the number of users on the system. Interoperability issues

between the multiple response agencies was a finding in the California Blue Ribbon Report.

During the 2003 California wildfires, incompatible communication systems often made it

impossible for strike teams to communicate with incident commanders. Fire fighters used their

ingenuity to compensate for the communication problems resorting to cell phones, two way.

radios, and even special signals on their engines (Campbell, 2004). The need for improvement

in communications was identified as a finding in the Blue Ribbon Report. The improvements

implemented after the 2003 California fires resulted in a response to the 2007 California fires

that was confirmed by emergency management staff to have had very few communications

problems and none that adversely affected the response.

Although interoperability and overloaded systems are still relatively common, the redundancy in

the communication network generally provides the infrastructure to meet the needs of

responders. The use of cell phones, telephones, and back up radio are common in every

incident. Cell phone systems can be overloaded as well, but there are systems in place, that

when implemented, restrict the use of cell phones to emergency responders. Use of WebEOC'

applications in some of the incidents also helped assure accurate information was available

quickly among responders. There were no incidents identified where communication issues

impacted the overall success of an evacuation.

4.2.4 Evacuation

The implementation of evacuations was rated as effective. In establishing this rating, an

attempt was made to review the entire evacuation and not allow individual decisions or isolated

problems to skew the rating. Evacuation was rated as effective because the resources were

generally available, the infrastructure generally adequate, and the processes generally sufficient

to meet the response needs. For some of the incidents researched, less than adequate

implementation of processes was identified.

In the review of the ten evacuations, it is ,evident that as the geographic area and number-of

evacuees increase, errors in decision making can result in greater consequences. The

transportation issues encountered during the evacuation for Hurricane Rita were directly linked

to the evacuation orders which were very broad. Likewise, the late decision to order a

mandatory evacuation for New Orleans contributed to the low compliance pre-landfall

evacuation of the city which led to deaths caused by the hazard (United States, 2006a). Such

decisions are effectively a failure to follow planning. Decisions that deviate from planning are

less likely to occur during an emergency for an NPP where plans including decision chain

actions are exercised routinely. Among the non-hurricane evacuations assessed in this project,

generally fewer agencies were involved, and the decision processes was more localized. In

these instances, the decision making processes appeared to be more direct and resulted in

evacuations that were very successful.

All of the incidents reviewed had resources to support the anticipated evacuation, although- not

all of the necessary resources were utilized. As volumes of traffic increased above the

anticipated levels, resources were quickly diminished in some incidents, and the transportation

system became overwhelmed as seen in the traffic congestion for Hurricanes Georges, Ivan

and Rita. Evacuation routes were usually well defined either through use of evacuation signs,

37
barricades, or manned intersections where traffic control officers directed evacuees. In south

Texas where the large number of evacuees inundated the transportation network, the

infrastructure could not support the evacuation. In that part of the State, the outbound

Interstates narrow to two lanes shortly out of the Houston area, and the capacity of the roadway

infrastructure was not adequate for the number of evacuees.

Evacuees were directed to a large extent by the law enforcement agencies involved. These

agencies established traffic control points by posting officers at intersections and barricading

areas to direct traffic along the evacuation routes. This is a labor intensive approach that has

been demonstrated as one of the most effective means of facilitating traffic flow, and was

utilized in all of the evacuations assessed. In discussions with Mississippi and Louisiana

emergency personnel, providing manned intersections in the receiving cities to help disperse

traffic as it arrives was demonstrated to improve traffic flow for the Hurricane Katrina

evacuation. This was a lessons learned from previous evacuations. For the Hawaii earthquake

and Romulus fire, few intersections required barricades or manned personnel to direct the

traffic. In Apex, North Carolina, traffic control had to be relocated multiple times as the wind

blew the plume in different directions affecting the evacuation routes. Traffic control also had to

be adjusted during the evacuations for the New England floods, which affected a large area and

had an added impact of hundreds of roads having been flooded out.

Through integration of lessons learned, the Gulf Coast States had improved their evacuation

planning, and travel times for the Hurricane Katrina evacuation, although lengthy, were

significantly improved over previous evacuations. Louisiana transportation officials had

integrated lessons learned from Hurricane Pam and Hurricane Ivan and revised the State

contraflow plan which was a key factor in the successful evacuation of Louisiana. Contraflow is

the reversing of lanes to allow more!traffic to travel in a specific direction. For Hurricane

Katrina, contraflow was initiated early, was well organized with plenty of access points and was

considered successful. Contraflow has also proven successful for hurricanes in Alabama and

other coastal States, but it must be implemented efficiently. Alabama revised their evacuation

plans, practiced to reduce the time required to reverse traffic flow on major routes, and

encouraged local officials to define smaller evacuation zones within their jurisdictions to better

target evacuation actions (United States, 2006a). By integrating lessons learned and working

with transportation planners, Louisiana was able to improve their contraflow plans after using

contraflow in Hurricane Ivan.

Contraflow is not always effective as demonstrated in Hurricanes Ivan and Rita. For Hurricane

Ivan, contraflow was implemented, but the loading and unloading of traffic was not optimized

and actually contributed to congestion. In response to Hurricane Rita, contraflow was

implemented late, as a corrective action, to alleviate already congested roadways.

Implementation of contraflow while the roadways were heavily congested took additional time.

When the contraflow was finally in use, it did help with traffic flow.

Infrastructure is never designed to accommodate evacuation level traffic (Wolshon, 2006).

Therefore, traffic management needs to be optimized to facilitate the large volume of traffic

during an evacuation. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, few States integrated transportation planning

agencies with emergency response agencies in an attempt to optimize traffic management. In

the evacuation of Hurricane Ivan, the contraflow operations in Louisiana did not work effectively.

38
Louisiana then integrated the expertise of these agencies, the success of which was evident in

the evacuation for Hurricane Katrina. Following the guidance of transportation planners, the

implementation of contraflow for Hurricane Katrina was improved and worked very well.

The use of buses to support public evacuation works very effectively when the logistics are predefined. Buses were used to support evacuations in six of the evacuations researched. In

response to Hurricane Rita, the City of Galveston, Texas transported approximately 4,000

people using buses. Harris County, Texas evacuated approximately 50,000 individuals using

mostly commercial buses and some school buses (Harris County, 2006). School buses,

although convenient, do not have air conditioning and have no space for cargo and are not well

suited for lengthy evacuations. Additionally, the capacity of school buses is usually based on

children, and this must be taken into account. Emergency response personnel supporting the

evacuation of Galveston, Texas said that buses filled with adults, children and belongings

generally held about 50 percent of their rated capacity when full. The planning for management

of pets on buses was not in place at the time of the evacuation for Galveston, and decisions

were made at the time to allow pets on the buses. These pets included dogs, cats, birds,

snakes, etc. Individuals who supported the evacuation stated that allowing pets on the buses

worked relatively well. It was the lengthy multi-hour bus rides that contributed to difficulties with

pets overheating, and there were food, water and waste problems. Issues such as travel time

are important considerations, but are not likely to be an issue when evacuating a 16 km (10

mile) EPZ where travel distances and times are considerably less than those for hurricanes.

It was well publicized that New Orleans did not use all of the available municipal buses or local

school buses to support the evacuation, with only twenty buses used to transport individuals to

the Superdome (United States, 2006a). The lack of available buses became a high profile

lessons learned after Hurricane Katrina. Large scale use of buses for any future evacuation of

New Orleans is now coordinated regionally to acquire the necessary number of buses to

evacuate the transit dependent population from the city (Montz, 2007). The lead time to

mobilize these resources is quite long and will require decisions to mobilize long before a

confident prediction of the hurricane landfall location can be determined. The planning for EPZs

provides that buses supporting an evacuation be identified and the time to mobilize and

evacuate the residents that require public transportation be estimated (NRC, 1980). The

implementation of busing is evaluated during NPP offsite exercises.

For a large scale evacuation to be successful, there must be a beginning and an end to the

evacuation. More precisely, evacuees must have a place to go that is ready to receive them.

This necessitates a need to have a regional approach that includes coordination of evacuation

plans with adjoining jurisdictions (DOT, 2006). This also provides evacuees a means to enter

and exit the transportation network in a controlled manner. In Mississippi, the traffic control

implemented for the evacuation extended north to Hattiesburg, Mississippi to provide controlled

vehicle egress. This was a lesson learned from previous evacuations where congestion was

encountered because controls were not in place. Similarly, the evacuation of southern

Louisiana in response to Hurricane Katrina included traffic control in Baton Rouge and the

closure of one lengthy (approximately 64 km or 40 mile) segment of an area Interstate to

facilitate the passage and exiting of traffic.

39
4.2.5 Special Needs

Special needs facilities were evacuated in all but one of the incidents assessed. There were no

special needs facilities evacuated during the chemical fire in Romulus, Michigan. Although

there are many instances of very effective actions in evacuating select facilities and individuals,

the sheer number of casualties from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in this category necessitates a

low rating.

4.2.5.1 Special Needs Facilities

The implementation of the evacuation of special needs facilities was rated marginally

effective. Special needs Medicaid and Medicare certified facilities are required under 42 CFR

483.75 to have detailed written plans and procedures to meet all potential emergencies and

disasters. But these plans are not often coordinated with the local or regional emergency

response agencies. This results in little or no coordination of resources to support the

evacuation of these facilities. In smaller communities, emergency response managers reported

contacting facilities directly to assure that they had the resources necessary to evacuate and to

determine if they needed any additional evacuation support (St. Amant, 2007). In larger

communities, direct communication with each facility was not conducted, and there was no

organized approach to contact these facilities to assure they were making arrangements for

evacuation.

Special needs facilities were evacuated during the New England flooding including at least one

nursing home, a senior citizen community, and a half-way house (CBS, 2006). It took

approximately 10 hours to evacuate the nursing home, when a hoist was required to be

constructed to safely move non-ambulatory patients from a sub-level floor. In Lawrence,

Massachusetts, a large nursing home with approximately 245 residents was evacuated after

flooding had reached the facility. Some evacuees were floated out of the facility in laundry bins

(Catholic Health World, 2006). In Apex, North Carolina a nursing home with approximately 100

patients was successfully evacuated in approximately 3.5 hours without incident. In Hawaii,

approximately 3,000 people were evacuated because of the earthquake, the majority of which

were from hotels and the Kona Community Hospital. Some of the patients were flown to other

facilities for care. In at least four of the evacuations studied, patients were successfully airlifted

out of the hazard zone. In another positive and very successful action, the University of Texas

Medical Branch in Galveston completely evacuated in a 12-hour period using ambulances,

helicopters, planes, and numerous public and school buses to support this first time full

evacuation of the facility. Hundreds of special needs patients were airlifted out of the Southeast

Texas Regional Airport. Although evacuation of the medical branch had been discussed among

responders, the implementation of the evacuation was largely ad hoc.

In Louisiana and Texas, the evacuation of special needs facilities was not generally successful.

In the response to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina, there were widespread reports of difficulties and

issues related to the evacuation of this population group. Most of the nursing homes had

evacuation plans, and the decision to, evacuate, in many cases, was left to the operator of the

home. For those homes that chose not to evacuate, there was no post-evacuation process to

confirm whether these individuals were evacuated. In Texas and Louisiana resources required

to support evacuation of special needs facilities were sometimes double-booked and not

40
available for-all of the facilities when needed (HRO, 2006).

In the evacuations for Hurricane Katrina and Rita, it became obvious that evacuation plans for

special needs facilities are not generally coordinated with community evacuation plans. Some

special needs facilities relied on the same bus or ambulance services, not considering that the

transportation service only had vehicles for a limited number of facilities (USACE, 2007). In

some instances, where buses were available, trained drivers were difficult to find. In Hurricanes

Katrina and Rita, many drivers evacuated with their families. For these evacuations, the

planning for special needs facilities was generally ineffective. The resources necessary to

support evacuation of special needs facilities and individuals require planning with the

appropriate level of detail and coordinated with local and State emergency planning to optimize

the use of the limited resources available. NUREG-0654 states that for emergency planning

within EPZs, special facilities should be considered separately from the general population so

that details can be developed at the facility level.

4.2.5.2 Special Needs Individuals

The implementation of the evacuation of special needs individuals was rated marginally

effective. This population group has become widely publicized since the evacuations for

Hurricane Katrina and Rita. Evacuating those with special needs who do not reside in special

needs facilities begins with defining and locating these individuals. Some local agencies

maintain lists of persons with various special needs (St. Amant, 2007), but information for many

agencies is incomplete or outdated. There have been longstanding opportunities for residents

to register with their local emergency management agency, but the voluntary disclosure rate is

low. The State of Florida has a very aggressive program to identify special needs individuals

and their evacuation needs (HRO, 2006). To improve in this area, New Orleans is establishing

a 311 telephone information hotline to register residents with special needs (FHWA, 2006).

Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana had the most comprehensive and proactive program identified in

the research and has a very high registration rate (St. Amant, 2007).

As noted in "A Failure of Initiative" (2006a), New Orleans was unprepared to provide

evacuations and medical care for its special needs population, and Louisiana officials lacked a

common definition of "special needs." In 2005, New Orleans did not have an adequate number

of buses to support the evacuation of the transit dependent population even though the City of

New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Plan (2005) identified that 100,000 people were

potentially without means to evacuate. Prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans had

over 400 municipal buses available of which twenty were used to transport people to the

Superdome (United States, 2006a). Additional hundreds of school buses that were not used to

support the evacuation prior to landfall were flooded after the levees breached.

Historically, very few individuals, including elderly and frail individuals, died as a direct result of

an evacuation (NRC, 2005a). This statistic held true for Hurricane Katrina, where in the

evacuation of more than a million people, only one nursing home resident was identified through

research as having died during the pre-landfall evacuation (Times-Picayune, 2005). In the

evacuation for Hurricane Ivan, four elderly individuals in New Orleans died during the

evacuation. In the response to Hurricane Rita some residents that evacuated from nursing

homes and hospitals did die during or as a direct cause of the evacuation (Henk, 2007).

41
Additionally, there were nursing homes and hospitals in the New Orleans area that did not

comply with evacuation orders, and many residents of these facilities died after the flooding of

the city when food, water, electricity, and air conditioning were no longer available. Licensed

facilities are required to have evacuation plans, and it is incumbent upon those in charge of

these facilities to implement such plans. Since these recent hurricanes, protocols for

coordination of evacuation resources as well as better evacuation planning for special needs

facilities are being developed.

Florida emergency management has a more mature program for the evacuation of the special

needs population that do not reside in special needs facilities. Florida has implemented

programs for identifying and preparing for this population group before an incident occurs. The

Emergency Evacuation Assistance Program, as well as other assistance programs, encourage

those who require nursing care, assistance with daily living, or medical support equipment to

register with their local Office of Emergency Management. Although Florida has aggressive

programs for identifying the special needs individuals, the response rate to these programs is

not high. Miami-Dade County has a plan in place to transport people via bus to American Red

Cross shelters during a hurricane evacuation. Residents are told to listen to the media or call

the 311 non-emergency information line to find out when the buses will transport people from

the pick-up points to American Red Cross evacuation centers. In some Louisiana parishes (St.

Amant, 2007) and Mississippi communities, a grass roots approach is taken that includes

meeting with churches, civic centers, and senior homes to identify those that may require

assistance. These proactive approaches achieve a higher registration rate. In other areas,

registration cards are mailed that not only ask the resident to register if they have a need, but

also to identify friends, neighbors, or relatives that may have a need. The emergency

management agency then contacts the individuals directly. This use of registration cards does

result in people registering, but it is not as effective as more proactive registration methods as

the grass-roots efforts.

Lastly, in the 2007 California fires, the sheriff, police and fire departments had active roles in

evacuating special needs individuals. Emergency response personnel stated that when

necessary, they evacuated special needs individuals and other stranded individuals in their

patrol cars and fire engines. The fires in San Bernardino County started in the morning after

residents from the mountain communities had gone into town to work. As a result, there were

many latch key kids left at home that required evacuation. For those parents who had not

planned for the safety of their children in the event of an emergency, Sheriff department

personnel had to divert resources to support the evacuation of these children.

4.2.6 Shelter Facilities

Shelter facilities were established for all of the evacuations researched, and the implementation

of shelter facilities was rated as effective. This assessment did not overlook the widely

publicized problems with shelter facilities in New Orleans after the landfall of Hurricane Katrina.

In the context of this project, which is primarily assessing those protective actions that occurred

up to the actual hazard, the New Orleans shelters were opened and received a very large

number of individuals who were protected from the hurricane hazard. Had the levees not

breached, these evacuees would have left the Superdome and Convention Center within a day,

and the. lengthy stays and post-flooding issues would likely not have occurred.

42
In Louisiana, shelter facilities were used extensively for Hurricanes Katrina and Georges, but

were used in a limited manner for Hurricane Ivan. Almost 200 shelters were opened within the

Gulf States, including 88 shelters in Louisiana in response to Hurricane Georges (Pine, 2003).

The Superdome was opened for the first time and was intended to be a special needs shelter

only. However, it became a shelter of last resort because there were thousands of individuals

who had not evacuated. In the parishes surrounding New Orleans and throughout the rest of

Louisiana, the shelter program is well established and was implemented with success in

Hurricane Katrina and previous hurricanes. During Hurricane Katrina, special needs shelters

were opened in Lafayette, Alexandria, Baton Rouge, and Monroe, Louisiana and other

locations. Shelters were also opened on a wide scale in Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and

Florida for Hurricane Katrina.

In Monroe County Florida, emergency response agencies generally open shelters for Category

1 and 2 hurricanes. For more intense hurricanes, shelter locations are coordinated with inland

counties. In response to Hurricane Wilma, a Category 3 hurricane at landfall, over 100 shelters

were opened in Florida, including some in Monroe County. Busing was available to transport

individuals to these shelters. In response to Hurricane Rita, the very limited number of available

shelters in the Houston, Texas area required evacuees to travel as far as Austin, San Antonio

and Dallas, where shelters were available. Shelters filled to capacity quickly and many

evacuees were turned away from shelters nearer to Houston and had to continue traveling until

they could find an available shelter or hotel. In Mississippi shelters are established in response

to hurricane threats including facilities used as shelters of last resort and shelters for individuals

with special needs. Prior to the evacuation for Hurricane Katrina, contracts were in place with

ambulance services to transport special needs individuals to shelters. To locate individuals with

special needs, the local officials combined their special needs individuals list with a special

needs list from the ambulance service.

Florida and Mississippi, as well as other States, had pet friendly shelters available. However,

pet friendly shelters are still limited, and in some cases, pet owners may be separated from their

pet. In order to improve upon the evacuation of pets, on October 6, 2006 the "Pets Evacuation

and Transportation Standards Act of 2006" was signed into law amending the Stafford Act to

ensure that State and local evacuation plans address the evacuation of pets.

For the Hawaii earthquake, California fires, Apex and Romulus chemical fires, and many of the

communities affected by hurricanes, the shelter facilities were established as planned and

utilized with few incidents. For the larger evacuations, shelter capacity was frequently

exceeded and pet friendly shelters were typically not widely available. The California fire

evacuations were very receptive to pets and included evacuation of hundreds of horses as well.

Pets were allowed in QualComm stadium and other shelters. Florida and Mississippi, as well as

other States, are developing more pet friendly shelters to accommodate evacuees with pets.

Many elements of the shelter programs worked well, and they also are improving with

implementation of lessons learned.

4.2.7 Summary of Implementation

The implementation of emergency response elements was reviewed for each of the ten

evacuations and compared to the established criteria. Training and communication with

43
emergency responders received very effective ratings which correspond to the very effective

planning ratings also received for these two categories. Special needs received a marginally

effective rating, which also corresponds to the planning rating assigned. There were.excellent

individual performances identified in almost all of the incidents reviewed, such as the timely and

effective evacuation of Apex, North Carolina, Romulus, Michigan, Galveston, Texas, and

Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. Figure 4.2 provides a summary of the effectiveness of the

implementation elements.

Excellent

Very

Effective

Effective

Mrginally

Effective

Ineffective - -

CD CD C

(a rn 0

0 0 (

:3 :3•p •-

Figure 4.2 Relative Rating of Implementation

4.3 Summary of Analysis of Incident Response Elements

Having reviewed the incidents against the criteria defined earlier, the elements received ratings

of marginally effective, effective, or very effective. Figure 4.3 presents the effectiveness ratings

for each category. The rating for each element was established independently for both the

planning and implementation sections. The ratings are qualitative and subjective based on

professional judgement and expertise. In preparing Figure 4.3, it became evident that the

ratings for planning corresponded directly to the ratings for implementation. this result

reinforces the concept that the success of the implementation is directly related to the level of

preparedness. Also evident in Figure 4.3 is that most emergency response elements are

effective or very effective. This is indicative of the mature nature of emergency response, the

extensive training, and the culture of emergency response organizations.

44
Figure 4.3. Relative Rating of Planning and Implementation

The emergency response planning and implementation for special needs individuals and

facilities received the lowest rating. Primary reasons for this rating include the lack of

coordinated planning for special needs facilities and the lack of planning for special needs

individuals who do not reside in special needs facilities. This is an area that is currently

receiving much attention and improvement.

The investigation and research that has been conducted by the Federal government,

universities and private industry since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has identified many areas of

improvement in emergency response. The DHS, NRC, FEMA, States, counties, parishes and

local authorities are implementing improvements to the emergency response program to assure

that the response for large scale incidents addresses lessons learned and better meets the

needs of the public. Examples of response to lessons learned include NRC completion of

priority recommendations identified in the 2005 Hurricane Season Lessons Learned Task Force

(NRC, 2006), the passing of pet evacuation bills at the State and Federal levels, the planning for

regional busing to support large scale evacuations, the efforts in Florida to improve the shelter

program, and the efforts in Louisiana and Mississippi to coordinate and improve implementation

of contraflow.

45

5.0 NRC and FEMA Emergency Preparedness Program

5.1 Introduction

Section 4.0 provided an assessment of the effectiveness of planning and implementation of

selected emergency response elements for ten of the incidents investigated. These

assessments identified insights and lessons learned that may be beneficial to the NRC and / or

FEMA emergency preparedness program. The following section presents a discussion of the

seven emergency planning elements and the NRC and FEMA emergency preparedness

regulatory, programmatic and guidance documentation.

Before an operating license can be issued for a nuclear power reactor, the NRC must make a

determination that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and

will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. Onsite emergency plans developed by

the license applicant, and offsite plans developed by the State and local organizations, are

required to meet the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). These emergency plans establish

response organizations, methods, resources, and capabilities for responding to emergencies at

the facility. Implementing procedures provide detailed instructions directing this response. The

offsite plans are generally integrated with the all hazards planning for the jurisdiction. The

onsite and offsite response capabilities are initially and periodically evaluated by NRC and

FEMA, respectively, through review of plans and procedures and evaluation of emergency

exercises and drills. The NRC bases its licensing decisions, in part, on its assessment of the

onsite capabilities, and on a review of FEMA's assessment of the offsite capabilities. If at any

time after the license is issued, NRC or FEMA should determine that reasonable assurance

does not exist, the NRC must take steps to see that the deficiencies are remedied and whether

other enforcement actions are warranted.

The incidents investigated in this study included technological hazards and natural disasters.

The size of the evacuation areas ranged from a 1.6 km (1 mile) radius for the Romulus chemical

fire to the multi-State evacuations for hurricanes. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (NRC,

1980) establishes the EPZ around an NPP at about 16 km (about 10 miles) with the

understanding that detailed planning within the EPZ provides a substantial base for the

expansion of response efforts beyond the EPZ in the event this proved necessary (NRC, 1980).

Furthermore, in the unlikely event of an NPP accident that requires an evacuation, the

evacuation may be implemented for a portion of the EPZ, may involve the entire EPZ, and

although very unlikely, could involve areas beyond the EPZ. Most often, a keyhole evacuation,

based on wind direction would be the preferred evacuation strategy. The population within the

keyhole area would be evacuated and the keyhole would be expanded if wind conditions

change. The application of insights and lessons learned from the evacuations researched are

considered in the context of the size of the affected area and the number of people potentially

affected.

47
5.2 Regulatory and Guidance Document Review

For this assessment, a detailed regulatory, programmatic and guidance document review was

conducted and included the following documents:

0 10 CFR 50.47 - Emergency Plans;

0 Appendix E to Part 50 - Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and

Utilization Facilities;

0 Management Directive 8.2 - NRC Incident Response Program;

* NUREG-0728 - NRC Incident Response Plan;

SNUREG-0654/FEMA - REP-1, Rev.1 - "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of

Radiological Emergency Response and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants."

* NUREG-0654/FEMA - REP-1, Rev.1, Supplement 3 "Criteria for Preparation and

Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of

Nuclear Power Plants" Draft Report for Interim Use; and

* 67 FR 20580, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation

Methodology," April 25, 2002.

Only those elements applicable to this study were evaluated. Elements such as onsite controls,

radiation monitoring, contaminated workers, etc., are not relevant to this study of evacuation

related activities and are not included in the review.

The above documents were selected because they establish the foundation of the emergency

preparedness program. Except as provided, 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires that onsite and offsite

emergency response plans for NPPs meet the 16 planning standards of paragraph (b). 10 CFR

50.47 (b)(1 0) states in part that "A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume

exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public." The public is all persons

located within the EPZ, including residents, transients, special needs individuals, and any other

member of the public. Appendix E to Part 50 requires that licensees and applicants provide an

analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various

sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent

populations.

The NRC Management Directive 8.2 (NRC, 2005c) is the programmatic document for the NRC

Incident Response Plan, NUREG-0728 (NRC, 2005d). This directive is used to identify NRC

organizational responsibilities that provide assistance, commit staff, and manage the NRC

response to incidents. The NRC Incident Response Plan (NRC, 2005d) provides the framework

for NRC interface and coordination with licensees and other stakeholders during incidents. The

function of these documents is to support the NRC response to emergencies. The NRC

Incident Response Plan includes detailed information on roles and responsibilities, capabilities,

and activities undertaken by the NRC for a nuclear emergency, and includes the concept of

operations for incident response. The NRC Incident Response Plan also describes the link

between the NRC's response and the National Response Plan which was superceded by the

National Response Framework in January, 2008 (DHS, 2008). Under the National Response

Framework, NRC is the Coordinating Agency for events occurring at NRC-licensed facilities and

for radioactive materials either licensed by NRC or under NRC's Agreement States Program. If

the severity of an event is significant, rises to the level of General Emergency or is terrorist

48
related, DHS will take on the role of coordinating the overall Federal response. In such cases,

NRC retains a technical leadership role as a cooperating agency.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP1, Rev. 1, (NRC, 1980) was developed to provide a common

reference and guidance source for State and local agencies and licensees in the development

of radiological emergency response plans. The final document included in this review is the,

Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents, EPA-400-R92-001, (EPA, 1992). This document was included in the review, but was not evaluated for

Table 5.1. As an EPA document, it includes information on protective actions and is an integral

part of radiological emergency response planning but is not directly related to most of the

emergency planning elements.

5.2.1 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program

Emergency preparedness programs developed in accordance with the above regulations and

guidance are evaluated through Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercises which

are designed to test the capability of offsite organizations to protect public health and safety

through the implementation of their emergency response plans and procedures under simulated

accident conditions (FEMA, 2002). The exercise evaluation criteria were established in the

following documents.

* FEMA-REP-14 - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Manual (FEMA, 1991 a);

* FEMA-REP-15 - Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology

(FEMA, 1991b); and

• 67 FR 20580, "FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation

Methodology," April 25, 2002.

A draft FEMA "Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology" was

published in the Federal Register April 25, 2002, and lists the following six Exercise Evaluation

Areas:

1. Emergency Operations Management

2. Protective Action Decisionmaking

3. Protective Action Implementation

4. Field Measurement and Analysis (not applicable to this study)

5. Emergency Notification and Public Information

6. Support Operations/Facilities

Each of the evaluation areas includes sub-elements that provide more detailed criteria.

Exercises are conducted and evaluated following these FEMA criteria, and Final Exercise

Reports are prepared.

49
5.2.2 Supplemental Documentation

To support a comprehensive review, supplemental documentation was also reviewed including:

" FEMA Final Exercise Reports;

" Emergency planning brochures; and

" NRC response procedures.

The Final Exercise Reports are prepared by FEMA when a full participation offsite exercise is

conducted at a nuclear power plant. For this project, reports were selected for three nuclear

power plants and reviewed to assess how the planning elements were implemented. There

were no deficiencies assessed in the three Final Exercise Reports reviewed, but there were

some 'Areas Requiring Corrective Action' (ARCAs) identified. An ARCA is defined in FEMAREP-14 as an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise

that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health and safety.

Over 50 emergency planning calendars and brochures were also reviewed during the course of

this research. These public information packages included general as well as specific details on

evacuation, sheltering, special needs individuals and other emergency response information.

This information represents the actual emergency response information provided to the public.

Lastly, NRC emergency response procedures were reviewed for response to hurricanes and

response to natural phenomena incidents and procedures describe the early activities in

monitoring such events as hurricanes. They detail the activities to be performed prior to landfall

of a hurricane as well as post-landfall.

5.3 Assessment of Emergency Planning Elements

The seven emergency response elements in the comparison are training, public education,

communication with the public, communication with emergency responders, evacuation, special

needs, and shelter facilities. A high level comparison matrix is provided in Table 5.1. It should

be noted that it is not necessary or expected for all of the planning elements to be covered in all

of the documents. Discussion of the comparative assessment for each planning element is

provided below.

50
Table 5.1 Comparison Matrix

NRCIFEMA 10 CFR Management NUREG NUREG 67 FR

50.47 Directive 8.2 0728 06541FEMA- 20580

REP-1

Plnning Elemen

Training / / NA

Public Education / / / / NA

Communication with / / / / /

Public

Communication / / / /

with ER

Evacuation V/ NA NA / /

Special Needs / NA NA / I

Shelter / NA NA / /

5.3.1 Training

The requirements to establish a training program and conduct drills and exercises to validate

the training are well integrated within the regulatory framework. Training and the conduct of

periodic exercises are addressed in 10 CFR 50.47, and Appendix E to Part 50 requires

provisions for the training program be described and offsite plans be exercised biennially.

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 provides guidance for the implementation of 10 CFR 50.47

and includes detail on types of exercises and drills, including communications drills, fire drills,

and medical emergency, radiological monitoring and health physics drills, and radiological

emergency response training (NRC, 1980). Management Directive 8.2 establishes the incident

response Qualification, Training and Exercises and Drills program within the NRC (NRC,

2005c). Training and exercises are program readiness elements of NUREG - 0728 which

includes the conduct and coordination of exercises (NRC, 2005d).

The training for nuclear emergencies among Federal,'State and local response personnel is the

most comprehensive, mature, thorough and practical of any industry. Training is validated

through frequent and comprehensive drills and exercises.

5.3.2 Public Education

The requirement to provide information to the public on protective actions is identified in 10 CFR

50.47(b)(7). The regulation requires that information on how the public would be notified and

their expected actions be made available to the public on a periodic basis. Appendix E to Part

50 requires informing the public and transients at least annually and requires that information

51
provided to the public be addressed in implementing procedures. Consistent with the

regulation, NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (NRC, 1980) provides that emergency

preparedness information be provided annually to the public. Common methods of

implementing this guidance include mailing calendars or brochures to every household within

the EPZ. Information is also frequently included in the local telephone book.

In assessing the public education element, more than 50 emergency planning brochures and

calendars for nuclear power plant EPZs were reviewed. The information packages are intended

to help members of the public better understand the potential risk and the expected actions they

may be required to take in the unlikely event of an accident. The information packages contain

instructions such as what to do if ordered to shelter or evacuate, children are in school, an

individual has special needs, etc. Locations of congregate care facilities are discussed and

driving directions frequently are provided.

The information provided on school children most often states that children will be evacuated

separately, and parents should not attempt to go to the school. An item that is not addressed is

the possibility that the school is in a different emergency response planning area than the

parent. In this case, there is the possibility that the parent would be directed to a different

congregate care center than the child. Also not considered is the likelihood that parents will

attempt to pick up their children regardless of instructions not to do so. An enhancement for

public education may include considering the effect of parents arriving at the school to pick up

their children.

5.3.3 Communications with Public

The regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.47 specify that procedures be in place to notify the

public. The regulation requires that a means to provide instruction to the EPZ population is

established and that content of the messages is established. The plant operator is required to

develop and maintain an emergency action level (EAL) scheme that incorporates multiple,

diverse, and redundant EALs that identify classification thresholds based on plant parameter

indications, reports from plant personnel, and results of surveillance and other assessments.

When an EAL is exceeded, the appropriate emergency classification is declared and the offsite

authorities are notified of the event and whether public protective actions are warranted.

Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 requires a description of the means of notification and that the

licensee have the capability to notify State and local agencies within 15 minutes of an incident.

The State and local officials must have the capability to then notify the public within 15 minutes

of their receipt of notification, if urgent. NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 provides that

administrative and physical means for prompt notification of the public and that plans be in

place for notifying the resident and transient population (NRC, 1980). These notification

requirements and guidance have driven the development of comprehensive communications

systems and plans that are routinely tested and exercised.

In the review of FEMA Final Exercise Reports, communication systems and procedures were

found to perform well, but a few ARCAs were identified related to notification and

communication to the public. An ARCA is an observed or identified inadequacy of

organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact

52
public health and safety. For the ARCAs identified, in each case they were successfully redemonstrated.

" In one instance, there was an initial EAS message to the special needs population, but there

were no follow on messages which were necessary for the special needs population to

understand their expected actions.

" In one report, some schools did not know where their tone alert radios were or the purpose

of the radios.

" In one exercise, media briefing on evacuation did not include information on evacuation

routes or information on school children.

* In one instance, a press release identified that there was a Site Area Emergency; however,

sufficient time had passed prior to the announcement of the Site Area Emergency and a

General Emergency had already been declared by the site.

The importance of providing clear and direct information to the affected public is recognized and

embedded within response procedures. It is also important to provide clear and direct

information to the public that is not at risk, although emergency planners are sometimes

reluctant to ask people not to leave an area. To limit shadow evacuations and reduce traffic,

the public in the region around the evacuation area should be informed of the benefit of

following directions, such as, refraining from travel during the main evacuation. An

enhancement should be considered in the emergency preparedness program to provide

instruction to the population that is not at risk, but located near the areas evacuated.

5.3.4 Communications among Emergency Responders

The requirements established in 10 CFR 50.47 include identifying staffing, resources and

procedures needed to communicate with emergency response agencies. Within this regulation

are requirements that procedures be in place, provisions exist for prompt communication with

response organizations, and adequate facilities and equipment are available. Arrangements for

requesting and accommodating State and local staff must also be in place. Each of these

requirements are tested in periodic exercises, also required in 10 CFR 50.47.

Appendix E to Part 50 requires a description of the means to notify onsite and offsite agencies

and requires an analysis of the time to notify these agencies. Appendix E requires periodic

testing among Federal, State, local agencies and the licensee. The guidance in NUREG0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 includes that each organization provide 24 hour per day manning of

communication links and that alerting and notification methods be described. Procedures to

notify offsite authorities must also be established.

The regulatory and guidance documentation provides significant detail in the requirements for

staffing, equipment and procedures to support communications among emergency response

agencies. These systems and processes are tested with a minimum frequency established in

67 FR 20580, FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology,

for the Emergency Notification and Public Information evaluation area. The systems are also

tested routinely in non-FEMA related exercises.

53
5.3.5 Evacuation

Development of a range of protective actions, which shall consider evacuation, is required in 10

CFR 50.47. Appendix E to Part 50 requires a description of protective measures taken within

the EPZ, including evacuation, identification of officials responsible for ordering an evacuation,

and a description of the alerting and activating of response agencies. Appendix E requires

consideration of the permanent and transient population groups and an analysis of the time to

evacuate.

Evacuation elements are discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Section II.J and in

Supplement 3 to NUREG 0654. These documents establish guidance on the evacuation

decision process and include discussion on identification of evacuation routes, assessment of

population distribution by evacuation area, and projected traffic capacities. Appendix 4 of

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 provides guidance on the development of evacuation time

estimates. Appendix 4 provides guidance that permanent residents, transients, and persons in

special facilities be included in the analyses. An estimate is required for each special facility

and is to include an assessment of the means of transportation (NRC, 1980). Schools are

specified to be included in the special facility group. Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1,

Rev. 1 provides the guidance necessary for applicants to perform an evacuation time estimate.

The lessons learned from the investigation of evacuations revealed that implementation of

evacuation planning improves with practice. This finding is very consistent with the findings of

NUREG-CR 6864, "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations"

(NRC, 2005a). The implementation of traffic control is simulated in exercises, but is not always

deployed in the field. An enhancement that may be beneficial in evacuation planning would be

more detailed assessment of traffic management, particularly where extensive traffic control

may be planned. This may include table top exercises or field drills that include locating the

traffic control devices, transporting them to designated locations, and installing these devices

when appropriate. Drills of this nature may help assure that the resources and time included in

the planning for traffic control are appropriately understood.

5.3.6 Special Needs

Although 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E do not specifically identify requirements for special

populations, the broadly worded requirements are applicable to all segments of the population

within the EPZ without exception. Guidance on meeting these regulatory requirements for the

various segments of the population is provided in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 (NRC,

1980) and in various guidance memoranda issued by FEMA.

5.3.6.1 Special Needs Facilities

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev.- 1 Section II. G, (NRC, 1980) provides that public education

and information include the special needs of the handicapped public. Section II.J, provides that

plans include a means for protecting special needs individuals whose mobility may be impaired

due to such factors as institutional or other confinement. Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654/FEMAREP-1, Rev. 1 provides that a separate evacuation time estimate of special needs facilities be

performed and that a means of transport be described. Schools are to be considered as special

54
needs facilities (NRC, 1980).

Special needs Medicaid and Medicare certified facilities are required under 42 CFR 483.75 to

have detailed written plans and procedures to meet all potential emergencies and disasters.

These plans are not always coordinated at the local level as observed in the evacuations

researched in this study. The Florida Emergency Status System and the Georgia Division of

Public Health are actively developing systems to better identify the resource needs for this

population group (FHCA, 2007). An enhancement that should be considered is that evacuation

plans for special needs facilities within EPZs include a local review to assure that adequate

resources are available based on the expressed needs of each facility. Such a review could be

included and assessed under the FEMA exercise evaluation methodology.

5.3.6.2 Special Needs Individuals

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Appendix 4, states that special attention must be given to

those households not having automobiles when developing evacuation time estimates.

Appendix 4 also provides for an estimate of the time to evacuate the segment of the public

dependent on public transportation. The regulations and guidance documents require planning

for special needs individuals under the broad requirement that all segments of the population be

included in planning. In review of emergency response brochures for reactor sites, information

is frequently provided for transit dependent individuals and special needs individuals. Bus

routes are sometimes provided with instructions for the individuals wait at the nearest bus stop.

There are no instructions on how to get to the bus stop or how long to wait for a bus. There are

also no instructions provided on what provisions should be taken, or not taken, to the bus stop.

Almost all of the brochures reviewed included a special needs information form used to register

the name, location and special needs of an individual. In discussion with a limited number of

response personnel, the response rate using only the registration card is low. In Linn County,

Iowa, the Linn County Emergency Management Agency had previously used the registration

card approach. However, in the last few years they have initiated a proactive registration effort

and work with various service groups to help educate individuals on completing response cards

(LLIS, 2007). This proactive effort, coordinated with the Duane Arnold Energy Center, has

almost doubled the number of registered special needs individuals since its inception.

Identifying special needs individuals who do not reside in special facilities prior to an incident is

an important element in emergency response planning. An enhancement should be considered

to establish more detailed guidance for the offsite planning and evacuation of special needs

individuals. Such an enhancement should include a comprehensive definition of special needs

individuals.

5.3.7 Shelter Facilities

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1 provides that public information include the location of

relocation centers which should be at least 8 km (5 miles) outside of the EPZ and provides that

a description of the means of registering evacuees be described (NRC, 1980). There is no

specific guidance provided relocation centers for special needs individuals beyond that

applicable to all segments of the population.

55
Almost all of the emergency planning brochures reviewed stated that pets are not allowed in

reception centers. A few brochures mentioned that pets should be caged and evacuated with

the family and at least one brochure stated that residents should not take their pets with them

because reception centers are not equipped to care for pets. The instructions contained in NPP

emergency planning brochures could be updated to address the need to accommodate pets.

Enhancements in the guidance for congregate care facilities could include addressing sheltering

of special needs individuals and the need to accommodate pets.

5.4 Summary of Regulatory and Compliance Review

The NRC and FEMA emergency preparedness program has demonstrated the ability to

respond timely and effectively through successful drills and exercises conducted at specified

frequencies. As indicated in this assessment of the seven emergency response planning

elements, the NRC and FEMA emergency preparedness program requirements meet the

objectives necessary to facilitate successful implementation of the planning elements.

Enhancements to the NRC and / or FEMA emergency preparedness program have been

identified that would potentially make the program even better.

56
6.0 California Wildland Urban Interface Fires: 2003 and 2007

6.1 Introduction

In October 2003, Southern California experienced the State's worst ever wildland urban

interface fire, and in 2007, California experienced a second large and destructive fire. In the

four years between these fires, the State identified lessons learned and implemented numerous

recommendations to reduce the risk of similar threats in the future. The 2003 fires consumed

about 740,000 acres, claimed 24 lives, destroyed more than 3,600 homes (Campbell, 2004) and

caused the evacuation of approximately 100,000 individuals. The 2007 fires consumed more

than 518,000 acres (EDD, 2007), claimed at least 12 lives, destroyed more than 2,200 homes,

and caused the evacuation of more than 900,000 individuals. The timing of the 2007 fires

provided an opportunity within this study to assess the effectiveness of improvements

implemented since the 2003 fires.

Wildfire evacuations though similar in many respects to other evacuations, are also very

different. They are very fluid and based on the conditions of the event. These fires have no set

origin and pattern of movement, thus evacuations are developed as conditions develop. Some

areas have designated "emergency routes" but only inasmuch as they are the only routes out of

the danger zone. The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection responds to more

than 5,000 fires annually with about 97percent of these extinguished the first day (CDF, 2003).

In recent history, there have been many devastating fires in the State, each of which has

resulted in lessons learned and improvements. In 1991, the Oakland Hills fire burned more

than 1,600 acres, destroyed approximately 3,400 homes, and claimed 25 lives (CDF, 2003). In

1993, the Laguna Beach Fire destroyed approximately 400 homes, and other fires in Southern

California the same year destroyed another 1,200 structures prompting the development of the

California Fire Plan. In 1993, the State passed the Standardized Emergency Management

System Act (SEMS) and established Fire Safe Councils (CDF, 2003). The SEMS required the

State of California to use a standardized emergency management system from which the ICS

later evolved. In 2002, MAST was organized which included extensive pre-event planning

efforts, elements of which are emergency preparedness and evacuation.

Following the 2003 fires, the governor of California formed the Blue Ribbon Commission to

conduct a review and present recommendations to help make California less vulnerable to fires

in the future (Campbell, 2004). In addition to the Blue Ribbon Report, many After Action

Reports and lessons learned documents have been published that also assess elements of the

response to the fires. These reports provide a basis for which effectiveness of improvements

that were integrated as a result of lessons learned are assessed. The intent was to determine

how these lessons learned may have benefitted or improved the response in 2007 and whether

such improvements might be beneficial to the NRC and / or FEMA emergency preparedness

program.

6.2 Identification of Lessons Learned

In 2003, prior to the fires', the awareness of fire risk in California was high and efforts were

undertaken to plan and pre-stage resources. Some of the efforts undertaken included the

57
declaration of a State of Emergency in March, 2003 that required agencies to take a number of

steps to reduce risk including preparing safety / evacuation plans. The Predictive Services

branch at the Forest Service Southern Operations Center in Riverside, California monitored

weather and fuel conditions in the region (CDF, 2003). On October 20, 2003, the Forest

Service moved additional aircraft into the southern California region. Such proactive planning

and pre-staging of equipment were unprecedented for response to a potential fire threat. After

months of planning and readiness activities, on October 23, 2003 the fire siege began.

Although well prepared, the combination of fuel, wind, and shear number of simultaneous fires

were impossible to control.

In the development of after action reports and other studies related to the evacuations, many

lessons learned have been compiled. Lessons learned, findings, and recommendations for the

2003 fires were identified in the Blue Ribbon Report (Campbell, 2004) including:

" There were no minimum Statewide training standards.

" A comprehensive public awareness program was needed.

" Communications interoperability was essential for effective command and control during

mult-agency, multi-discipline responses to major incidents.

* It was recommended that all EOCs'dedicate a Public Information Officer (PIO) or establish a

JIC.

• It was recommended that local governments improve public outreach and emergency

evacuation education.

Agency After Action Reports and post-incident assessments also included lessons learned in

core areas of training, preparedness, education, and communication (CDF, 2005) some of

which include:

" Implementation of a JIC was needed early in an incident to provide a unified message to the

community, public and media (Maxfield, 2004).

" Development of a multi-jurisdictional evacuation plan was needed (Mutch, 2007).

" Radio communication problems caused coordination problems between agencies and units

in the field and prohibited effective situation awareness (Maxfield, 2004).

" Cell phones can augment communications, but these systems become overloaded.

* There was a need to provide evacuation information Spanish as well as English (CDF,

2004).

* Agencies that had trained together functioned more effectively as a unified team (Maxfield,

2004).

6.2.1 Improvements from Lessons Learned

The lessons learned that relate to the seven emergency response elements considered

previously in this study are discussed below.

Training

Since the 2003 fires, more than 377 firefighters have been trained in wildland urban interface

firefighting techniques (CDF, 2005). In addressing lessons learned related to training, the

Forest Service has increased the numbers and readiness of firefighting resources. The Forest

58
Service has also implemented a leadership training course with the intent of increasing the

abilities of leaders to make appropriate decisions and take independent action when necessary

(CDF, 2005). Incident Management Teams are either pre-positioned or required to be in place

within 12 hours whereas this requirement used to be 24 hours (CDF, 2005).

Public Education

Public education improvements included an increase in the number of Fire Safe Councils to

more than 90 (CDF, 2004). Fire Safe Councils primarily address pre-fire management such as

fuel reduction and protection of communities and are a means of integrating community support

(Campbell, 2004). Information staff has been increased (CDF, 2004) to provide additional

individuals who are instrumental in the proactive education of the public, officials, and the media

regarding increased risk of wildfire (CDF, 2004).

Communication with the Public

Communication with the public, including timely notification, is vital if an area is to be evacuated

prior to the onset of the hazard. Multiple methods of communication with the public are usually

attempted. In 2003, the Cedar Fire had moved quickly and evacuation notification for this fire

was primarily by door-to-door contact or via loudspeakers on emergency vehicles. San Diego

County normally would also use the EAS, but it was deemed impractical at the time because the

information would be inaccurate do to the swiftness of the fire and the late hour of the

notification at 12:01 am (CDF, 2004). In 2007, the City of San Diego used all methods available

to notify the public of the need for action. Methods used to notify residents in the path of the

Witch Creek / Guejito fire included:

* Door-to-Door;

* Police and Fire sirens;

* Police and Fire vehicle and helicopter lights;

* Media outlets;

* EAS;

* Reverse 9116;

• AlertSanDiego mass notification system; and

* Community Access Phone System.

In addition, the 211 information line was available with operators who had current knowledge of

the incidents. San Diego County personnel said that the 211 system, although overwhelmed in

this response, was helpful in reducing calls into the 911 emergency system. The Reverse 911®

system sent out almost 15,000 calls predawn on October 22, 2007 to notify residents of

mandatory evacuations (AAR, 2007). Because of the rapid spread of the Guejito Fire, it was not

possible to construct and launch a Reverse 911 session prior to arrival of the flames (AAR,

2007). AlertSanDiego was also used and is similarly to the Reverse 911®, however,

AlertSanDiego has additional benefits including the ability to dial numbers based on geographic

location whereas the Reverse 9118 dialed numbers in numerical order. A community access

phone system (CAPS) is also available in San Diego to provide a direct information line to the

public. During the Cedar Fire of 2003, 12 lines were established for this system, whereas in

2007, this was increased to 20 lines, and operators answered over 12,300 calls.

59
Communication among Emergency Responders

Communication among emergency responders were improved considerably in 2007 as

compared to 2003. Radio communication problems exist in most large scale incidents

throughout the nation and include such issues as too many teams assigned to each channel,

incompatibility among systems and frequencies, non-essential radio traffic, and in California, an

added issue was the limitation of radios due to the terrain. Cell phones, telephones, and

satellite phones were used to augment radio communications. In some instances, couriers

were used and in other instances field teams used a system of siren tones to alert one'another

(Campbell, 2004).

By the time the 2007 fires started, San Diego County had improved their communications

system such that communication, as reported by responders, had few if any problems.

Improvements included availability of the 800 MHZ radios, better use of channels, and

integration of WebEOC', a web-based emergency management communications system, to

facilitate internal communications. Incident command guidelines were established and followed

in San Diego, and media relations were well managed (AAR, 2007).

Evacuation

The evacuations in 2003 and 2007 were quite different with approximately 100,000 people

evacuating in 2003 and more than 900,000 evacuees in 2007. A primary difference in the

evacuations was the rapid spread of the 2007 fires. Typically, as in 2003, the Santa Ana winds

lessen in the evenings and fire fighters are better able to control as well as predict directions. In

2007, the winds were sustained throughout the evenings. The fire departments involved made

decisions based on the best information available, including from fire spotters that are located

well ahead of the flames to monitor the spread. Fire departments recommended both

mandatory evacuations and voluntary evacuations for areas that could be potentially affected.

The evacuations in most areas began as staged events with voluntary and mandatory

evacuation areas identified. Response personnel stated that most fires moved so quickly that

the staging became more of a general evacuation. At least five Interstate highways were

closed for a period of time during the 2003 fires and two Interstates were closed during the 2007

evacuations. In each incident, the loss of these roadways affected the evacuation. Caltrans,

which is the California Department of Transportation, worked with police in helping to establish

evacuation routes. This included use of traffic video information to help communicate

evacuation congestion. To help alleviate unnecessary congestion, the mayor of San Diego

asked that people who did not need to travel refrain from driving during the peak of the

evacuations.

The evacuation of pets was very proactive in the 2003 and 2007 fires. In 2007, the San Diego

Sheriffs Department mounted patrol assisted with the evacuation of hundreds of horses using

department horse trailers when needed. People were encouraged to evacuate their pets, and

shelters in many instances accommodated these animals.

Special Needs

In 2007, the special needs population that was evacuated was considerably larger than in 2003.

In discussions with response personnel, although it is not desired, when necessary, response

60
personnel evacuate individuals in their patrol cars and even in fire engines if lives are at risk. In

San Bernardino, the Sheriffs Department had to support the evacuation of latch key kids that

were left at home while parents were at work. The children were later reunited with parents at

evacuation logistics centers. Also in San Bernardino, the local community bus service for the

mountain areas ran virtually non-stop to evacuate residents with special needs. The service

picked up people who were 'regular' riders and also responded to requests when residents

called for assistance.

In San Diego, in general the areas that required evacuations were homeowners with vehicles.

There were as many as 11 special facilities evacuated and the residents were taken to

comparable facilities outside the evacuation zone or to shelters. There were no reports of lack

of transportation resources to support these evacuations.

Response personnel in both San Bernardino and San Diego knew of no reports where people

were unable to evacuate due to a lack of means. However, an after action report identified that

segments of the local population are under represented in the planning and preparedness

process including special needs individuals, non-English speaking, transients, and homeless

(AAR, 2007). There was also a lack of Spanish speaking translators (AAR, 2007) reportedly

available to support shelter facilities and well as general logistics and interaction with evacuees.

Shelter Facilities

The largest shelter used in the 2007 fires was at QualComm stadium. Because this was a

stadium, it was frequently compared to the Louisiana Superdome used as a shelter for

Hurricane Katrina. Emergency response personnel very clearly pointed out that there is no

basis for any type of comparison. The only common element was that both shelters were

stadiums. The evacuees that sheltered at QualComm generally had their own Vehicle and

could come and go at will. Thus, they frequented restaurants and shopped for basic supplies as

needed. Donations of food, water, and necessities poured into Qualcomm almost immediately

such that the traffic from these donors contributed to the congestion around the stadium. Thus,

there was really no common basis for a comparison to the Superdome.

The City had in fact learned a lesson from Hurricane Katrina on the need to keep people

entertained, and the City Parks and Recreation department brought in activities for children.

The shelter was established before the Red Cross could support the facility and volunteers were

needed. In many cases these included city workers as well as Community Emergency

Response Team or CERT volunteers. CERT is a volunteer network of citizens in California that

have limited training and are credentialed to support emergency response activities. The CERT

teams assisted with many elements of the emergency response most notably interacting with

evacuees and supporting needs at shelters. The shelter program in California was very

acceptable of pets. Pet shelters were available, and pets were also accepted at many of the

evacuee shelters including QualComm stadium.

6.3 Summary

Following the 2003 California fires, State, city and county agencies prepared assessments of

lessons learned and needs to improve response and reduce risk in the future. In 2007, another

series of fires occurred in California prompting the evacuation of almost ten times the number of

61
residents that had evacuated in 2003. The evacuation of over 900,000 residents was widely

viewed as successful. The implementation of improvements developed from these lessons

learned were clearly instrumental in supporting effective communication among responders and

the public, facilitating massive evacuations, and sheltering thousands of evacuees.

The insights from the study of these fires do support that implementation of lessons learned can

occur quickly and have beneficial impacts on response. In the review of the California fires

there were few new lessons learned. The need to plan for the evacuation of latch key children

became evident when the San Bernardino Sheriffs Department began receiving calls from

parents. Another lesson learned although obvious to the firefighters, was the need to be

prepared to respond to wind shifts and changes in direction of the hazard.

From emergency planning around NPPs there is no specific guidance for evacuation planning of

latch key children. This is addressed under the broad requirement that planning be in place for

the public. With regard to changing direction of the hazard, emergency preparedness around

NPPs includes deployment of plume trackers to identify the bounds of the plume. This action as

well as expanding the evacuation area, -when needed, is tested in large exercises.

62
7.0 Observations and Recommendations

The extensive research of evacuations conducted for this study provided many insights and

lessons learned that will benefit the NRC and / or FEMA emergency preparedness program.

Through detailed assessment of 11 evacuations, this study identifies emergency response

elements that worked as planned and some that did not work as planned. Within emergency

response programs, several important concepts were identified that were clearly associated

with improved emergency response, including:

* Regional resources are being integrated into large scale evacuation planning. It was

observed that when enhanced traffic management planning for large population areas was

integrated among agencies, the evacuation was more efficient.

* Evacuation techniques improve when tested.

* Information provided to evacuees while en route improves an evacuation.

* Enhancements in emergency communications improve response effectiveness.

* A greater awareness has developed for the need to plan for special needs individuals who

do not reside in special facilities.

7.1 Observations

This report captures the insights and lessons learned in the case studies and summary

assessments herein. Some of these include the following:

1. Evacuations need to have a beginning and an end. Once individuals are removed from

an area they need to have a destination with adequate support resources. To

accomplish this, emergency response agencies are developing a more regional

approach to evacuations.

2. Most of the evacuations studied were staged. Staging of evacuations facilitates

movement of individuals in higher risk areas early in the evacuation process. For NPP

evacuation planning, the use of staged evacuations is a potential protective action.

Communication messages for those that need to evacuate and those that should not

evacuate until instructed could be planned ahead of time.

3. The deviations from emergency plans in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita caused problems

that rippled through the response and ultimately resulted in consequences that may

have been avoided had plans been followed more prescriptively. Decisions that deviate

from emergency response planning would not be likely to occur during an emergency for

an NPP where plans are exercised routinely. The response oversight and support for an

NPP accident is structured to limit the potential for such decisions.

4. The success of emergency response is directly related to the commitment of the local

emergency response agencies. It was evident during this research that differences in

planning among counties or parishes was frequently dependent on the local commitment

of specific emergency management agency. The proactive approach of these agencies

is similar to the proactive planning and exercising conducted under the NRC and FEMA

NPP emergency preparedness program. The routine frequency of drills and exercises

63
facilitates regular interaction among agencies and individuals responsible in the event of

an NPP emergency.

5. The role and capacity of shelters for special needs individuals is not always understood

(FHCA, 2007). Although a shelter may be designated for special needs individuals, not

all special needs shelters are fully equipped and staffed for severely dependent special

needs individuals.

7.2 Recommendations

It is recommended that the NRC and / or FEMA emergency preparedness program consider

planning enhancements that address:

1. Special needs individuals who do not reside in special facilities - Guidance could be

developed for identifying the number of individuals, needs of these individuals, and

resources required to implement protective actions for this population group, such as

specialized transportation.

2. Guidance to accommodate special needs individuals in congregate care centers - Guidance

could be established for the accommodation of special needs individuals who may be

expected at congregate care centers.

3. Integrating a regional approach to evacuations - Guidance could be established based upon

population density whereby traffic management plans for high population density sites would

be coordinated with receptor municipalities.

4. Assessment of time needed to implement detailed traffic control plans - Exercises could

include assessing the time to implement the traffic control plan including locating materials,

transporting materials to control points, and mobilization of resources to man the control

points as defined in local plans.

5. Guidance that assures duplicate use is not planned for the same special needs resources,

such as number of ambulances for evacuation of special needs facilities - Guidance could

be established for review of resources planned for special needs facilities.

6. Communication to evacuees and to the non-affected public to support staged evacuations

and mitigate shadow evacuations - Planning guidance for offsite communications could be

developed to include messages for staged evacuation of an EPZ and for providing

instructional information to residents that are not in affected areas.

7. Consideration of the effect of parents arriving at the school to pick up their children -

Planning guidance could be developed to define logistics and traffic management to mitigate

any impact of parents picking up their children from school.

8. The need to accommodate pets at congregate care centers - Planning guidance could be

developed that better defines the concern of pets at congregate care centers. For instance,

pets may be allowed if kept outside or in transport cages, etc.

64
Emergency preparedness for nuclear power plants (NPPs) has advantages that inherently

mitigate most of the potential difficulties experienced in large scale evacuations assessed in this

study. The emergency preparedness programs around NPPs include comprehensive

coordination of resources, dedicated support services, warning and notification systems, and

frequent and thorough cross jurisdictional training. Decision processes are established and

tested; communication resources are planned, implemented, and tested; and infrastructure is

assessed to understand the potential impacts during an evacuation. Some of the elements of

the NPP emergency preparedness were observed during this study. In eight of the incidents

studied, the hazard encroached upon one or more EPZs affecting a total of 14 EPZs.

Emergency personnel confirmed that response to many of these incidents benefitted from the

use of some of these emergency planning elements developed for the EPZs.

The comparison developed in this study of the NRC and FEMA regulatory and guidance

documentation affirmed that most of the lessons learned in the evacuations studied herein have

been anticipated and are already addressed in existing planning and procedures within the NRC

and FEMA framework. The suggested enhancements will further strengthen this well prepared

program.

65

8.0 Glossary

Cable Scroll - A method of communicating to the public through use of a scripted message that

is scrolled along the bottom of the television screen.

Clearance Time - The time estimated to evacuate an area or region in response to a hurricane

threat.

Congregate Care Center - A facility established as a receptor site for evacuees and used as a

shelter facility. The facility is designated to receive evacuees and is usually established to

provide limited provisions including food, water, and bedding for time periods of a day or two.

Other common terms used to designate congregate care centers are reception centers,

evacuation shelters, and relocation centers.

Contrafiow - Changing the direction of travel on roadways such that more lanes are directed in

the outbound direction away from the hazard. This is usually limited to Interstate roadways but

has also proven successful on smaller roadways.

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) - A generic area defined about a nuclear facility to facilitate

offsite emergency planning and develop a significant response base. The area is about 16 km

(about 10 miles) around a nuclear power plant within which extensive emergency planning is

developed in accordance with NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. Although the radius for the

EPZ implies a circular area, the actual shape depends upon the characteristics of a particular

site (NRC, 1980).

Reverse 911® type systems - Commercially available telephone network systems thatare

used to call all of the telephone numbers within a selected area and communicate a

preprogrammed emergency. response notification. The size of the area is determined at the

time of the incident and can be quite precise.

Route Alerting - Generally considered the use of emergency vehicles to drive through

neighborhoods and use public address systems to notify the residents of an emergency.

However, some areas also use the term route alerting synonymous with door-to-door

notification.

Shelter - A facility designated to receive evacuees. The facility is usually established to provide

limited provisions including food, water, and bedding for time periods of a few hours to a day or

two.

Special Facilities - Any facility within which the resident individuals are under the control and

supervision of the management. This includes but is not limited to nursing homes, hospitals,

prisons, and day care centers. In developing evacuation information for nuclear power plants,

schools shall be included in this population segment (NRC, 1980).

Special Needs Individual - Any individual who is unable to comply with an evacuation order

without assistance from outside the home. This population group encompasses a wide range of

individuals including people who are elderly, those with disabilities or medical conditions, people

67
with limited English proficiency, people with hearing and sight impairment, and people without

access to private vehicles (DOT, 2006). Also included in this group are impoverished

individuals, chemically dependent individuals, and individuals with emotional or mental

disabilities (DHS, 2006b). The definition should also include minor children who are left home

alone (i.e., latch key kids).

Transient population - Individuals who do not normally reside within the evacuation area but

are in the area when an evacuation is directed. This includes tourists, shoppers, employees,

and any other visitor that is not a resident and not in a special facility.

Transit dependent population - The transit or transport dependent population is identified in

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, Appendix 4 as permanent residents within an EPZ that do

not have vehicles with emphasis that special attention be given those households without

automobiles. This population group differs from special needs in that aside from not having an

automobile, the population group is assumed to be without need of other assistance.

WebEOC® - A web-based emergency management communications system that facilitates

real-time information sharing by linking local, State, and Federal sources together. This internet

based tool helps maintain a current and consistent information flow during an emergency.

68
9.0 References

Associated Press (AP). "New England Floods Now Deadly." ABC News. May 16, 2006.

Campbell, Senator William. "Governor's Blue Ribbon Fire Commission, Report to the

Governor." April 2004.

Catholic Health World. "Flooding Forces Mary Immaculate Evacuation." Catholic Health World,

Vol. 22, No. 10. June, 2006.

"Chemical Plant Blaze Challenges Fire Crews." ClickOnDetroit.com. August 10, 2005.

"Chemical Fire Rocks Romulus." Ecology Center. November/December 2005.

California Department of Forestry. (CDF). "California Fire Siege, 2003: The Story." October 21-

November 4, 2003. U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region. 2003.

California Department of Forestry. (CDF). "The 2003 San Diego County Fire Siege Fire Safety

Review." U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region. 2004.

California Department of Forestry. (CDF). "The Story One Year Later 2004." An After Action

Review. U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region. R5-PR-015. January, 2005.

City of San Diego Response. "After Action Report - October 2007 Wildfires." (AAR) 2007.

Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) (DHS). "National Response Framework."'January,

2008. DHS, 2008.

Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) (DHS). "Nationwide Plan Review Phase I Report."

February 10, 2006. DHS, 2006a.

Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) (DHS). "Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report."

February 10, 2006. DHS, 2006b.

Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) (DHS). "National Response Plan." December, 2004.

DHS, 2004.

Department of Transportation (U.S.) (DOT). "Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan

Evaluation: A Report to Congress." June 1, 2006. DOT 2006.

Employment Development Department (EDD). "The Economic Impact of the October 2007

Souther California Wildfires." Employment Development Department labor Market Information

Division. State of California. December, 2007.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). EPA-400-R-92-001. "Manual of Protective Action

Guides and Protection Actions for Nuclear Incidents." 1992.

69
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA Nuclear Facilities and Population

Density within 10 Miles map, June 2005a.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and United States Corps of Engineers

(USACE). "Hurricane Ivan Post-Storm Transportation Analysis." 2005b.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 67 FR 20580, "FEMA Radiological

Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology." April 25, 2002

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA-REP-1 4. "Radiological Emergency

Preparedness Exercise Manual." September, 1991a.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA-REP-1 5. "Radiological Emergency

Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology." September, 1991 b.

Federal Highway Administration. "Traffic Congestion and Reliability: Linking Solutions to

Problems." Cambridge Systematics, Inc. with Texas Transportation Institute. July 19, 2004.

FHWA 2004.

Florida Health Care Association (FHCA). "Caring for Vulnerable Elders During a Disaster:

National Findings of the 2007 Nursing Home Hurricane Summit." 2007 Nursing Home Hurricane

Summit. March 21-22, 2007. St. Petersburg Beach, Florida.

Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES). "2003 Southern California Fires After Action

Report." Office of Emergency Services, June 17, 2004.

Harris County Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management. "Hurricane Rita

Evacuation of a Major Urban Area." 2006 Presentation. www.hcoem.org.

Henk, Russell. Freeway Tolling Operations in the America's Conference. Texas Transportation

Institute. Houston, Texas. May, 2007.

Howell, Dr. Susan E. "Evacuation Behavior in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes Hurricane

Georges." The University of New Orleans Survey Research Center, November 1998.

Lee County. "Hurricanes Charley and Wilma After Action and Evaluation Report." Lee County

Division of Public Safety, Emergency Management Program, September, 2006. Lee County,

2006.

Linn County Iowa's Program to Evacuate Individuals with Disabilities and Other Special Needs.

Lessons Learned Information Sharing. LLIS, 2007. www.Ilis.gov.

Litman, Todd. "Lessons From Katrina and Rita: What Major Disasters Can Teach

Transportation Planners." Victoria Transport Policy Institute, British Columbia, Canada. Journal

of Transportation Engineering, Vol. 132, January 2006.

70
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals. (LDHH). "Reports of Missing and Deceased."

April 18, 2006.

Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). "Lessons

Learned, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita." 2006

Maxfield, William F. "Lessons Learned Report, Fire Storm 2003 "Old Fire"." San Bernardino

County Fire Chief's Association. 2004.

Montz, Cindy.; "ESF-1 General Population - Assisted Transportation." Presentation: National

Hurricane Conference. New Orleans, 2007.

"New England Rains Ease, Floods Remain." CBS News. May 16, 2006.

New Orleans. "City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan." City of

New Orleans, Louisiana. 2005

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC) "Task Force Report, 2005 Hurricane Season

Lessons Learned." March 30, 2006. NRC 2006.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). NUREG/CR-6864, SAND2004-5901

"Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations." Dotson, L and J.

Jones, Sandia National Laboratories: Albuquerque, New Mexico. NRC 2005a.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). NUREG/CR-6863, SAND2004-5900

"Development of Evacuation Time Estimates for Nuclear Power Plants." Jones, J. and L.

Dotson, Sandia National Laboratories: Albuquerque, New Mexico. NRC 2005b.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). NRC Incident Response Program, Directive 8.2

NRC: Washington, D.C. September 19, 2005. NRC 2005c

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). NUREG - 0728, "NRC Incident Response Plan."

Rev. 4. NRC: Washington, D.C. April 2005. NRC 2005d.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). NUREG-0654/FEMA - REP-1, Rev. 1,

Supplement 3, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response

Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" Draft Report for Interim Use.

NRC: Washington, D.C. July 1996. NRC, 1996.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (U.S.) (NRC). NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria

for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness

in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." NRC: Washington, D.C. November 1980. NRC, 1980.

Pine, J. C., Brian D. Marx, Marc L. Levitan, and Daniel Wilkins; Louisiana State University.

"Comprehensive Assessment of Hurricane Shelters: Lessons from Hurricane Georges." Natural

Hazards Review, American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 2003. ASCE, 2003.

71
St. Amant, Jesse. "Lessons Learned from Experience: What Works and What Doesn't."

Presentation: National Hurricane Conference. New Orleans, 2007.

Texas House of Representatives: House Research Organization (HRO). "Evacuation Planning

in Texas: Before and After Hurricane Rita." Interim News. Number 79-2. February 14, 2006.

Texas Transportation Researcher (TTR). "Sidestepping a Cyclops." Texas A&M University;

Texas Transportation Institute, Vol. 42, No. 2. 2006.

Times - Picayune. "State Probing Death During Evacuation." New Orleans Edition, No. 277.

October, 25, 2005.

United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). "Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans

and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System." Final Report, Volume II, The

Consequences. March 26, 2007.

United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). "Hurricane Georges Assessment, Review of

Hurricane Evacuation Studies Utilization and Information Dissemination." August, 1999.

United States. Congress. House. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for

and Response to Hurricane Katrina. "A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina." Washington:

U.S. G.P.O., 2006a.

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States Assistant to the President for.

Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism. "Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina".

Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006b.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). "EQ Resource Recovery Explosion

and Fire Romulus, Wayne County, Michigan." EPA Facility ID: MID060975844. 2006.

United Way. "After the Storms: 2-1-1 Stories from the 2005 Hurricane Season." United Way of

America, Alexandria, VA. United Way, 2006.

Weston, R. F. Inc. "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations."

National Environmental Studies'Project Nuclear Management and Resources Council. 1989.

Witzig, W.F., and S.D. Weerakkody. "Evacuation Risks: Quantification and Application to

Evacuation Scenarios of Nuclear Power Plants." Nuclear Technology. Vol. 78. July 1987.

Wolshon, Brian; "Evacuation Planning and Engineering for Hurricane Katrina." The Bridge,

Volume 36, Number 1. National Academy of Engineering. Spring, 2006.

Wolshon, Brian. "New Orleans Experience in Hurricane Ivan; Lessons Learned and Potential

Improvements." Louisiana State University; LSU Hurricane Center. 2005.

Wolshon, Brian; Elba Urbina; Marc Levitan. "National Review of Hurricane Evacuation Plans

and Policies." Louisiana State University Hurricane Center. 2001.

72
APPENDIX A

CASE STUDY REPORTS

Table of Contents

Page

Hurricane Georges .................................................... A-2

Southern California Fires 2003 ................................................. A-7

H urricane Ivan . ...... ....................................................... A -13

Chem ical Fire, Rom ulus, Michigan ............................................. A-18

H urricane Katrina .............................. ............................. A -21

H urricane R ita ............................................................. A -32

H urricane W ilm a ........................................................... A -38

New England Flood ................................................... A-42

Chemical Fire, Apex, North Carolina ............................................ A-46

Hawaii Earthquake ......................................................... A-51

California Fires, 2007 .......... . ........................................ A-55

A-1
HURRICANE GEORGES - September 28, 1998

Number Evacuated: Approximately 1,200,000

Category: Natural

Specific Type: Hurricane

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

Hurricane Georges made landfall near Key West, Florida as a Category 2 hurricane on

September 25, 1998, and made another landfall near Biloxi, Mississippi on September 28, 1998

with 105 mph winds and a storm surge of approximately 5 meters (16 feet) along Mississippi's

Gulf Coast. Many communities along the Gulf Coast evacuated including, but not limited to

New Orleans, Louisiana; Biloxi, Mississippi; and Miami-Dade and Monroe Counties, Florida. In

response to the hurricane, the Louisiana Superdome was used for the first time as a refuge of

last resort. Prior to landfall, there were published concerns on the number of residents that

required transportation or had other special needs. For those who attempted to leave, in almost

all cases, family or friends were able to provide assistance (USACE, 1999).

The storm system hovered over Mississippi for eight hours flooding large areas. One death was

directly attributed to the storm (NHC, 1999). Other deaths were related to the hurricane

included an elderly woman who died from heat stress while trying to evacuate from New

Orleans, two fatalities from fires caused by candles in areas where power had been lost, and

one traffic accident fatality in Florida caused by slick roads. Problems recognized during the

response to the storm included an over-reaction to the need to evacuate due to the wellpublicized threat, insufficient planning, and limited coordination between various agencies

responsible for evacuation (Wolshon, 2001).

History of Emergencies

The regions affected by Hurricane Georges are often threatened by hurricanes, flooding and

tornados. The last major hurricane and evacuation experienced in Monroe and Miami-Dade

Counties prior to Hurricane Georges was Hurricane Andrew in 1992. The last hurricane which

posed a large threat to the city of New Orleans was Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and Hurricane

Camille was the last to cause major destruction in Biloxi in 1969. In discussions with

emergency responders, Hurricanes Betsy and Camille had become the baseline from which

many Louisiana and Mississippi residents measured subsequent hurricane warnings. Although

it had been some time between large hurricanes for each of these areas, these cities

experience hurricane and tropical storm threats frequently, and the residents are aware of the

hurricane hazards in their area.

Emergency Preparedness

All of the affected areas had emergency plans at the time of Hurricane Georges, but not all were

current. In Monroe County, Florida, the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP)

provides the framework for local officials to respond to multiple types of large scale emergency

events including hurricanes. The CEMP details responsibilities of county, city, private and State

agencies, and the roles that each are expected to play (Monroe County, 2002). The CEMP also

includes annexes and standard operating procedures to guide responses to hurricanes and

other events.

A-2
In Louisiana, the last hurricane evacuation study had been conducted ten years earlier.

Community preparedness activities included planning, training, drills and exercises, and

community awareness programs. New Orleans did have an emergency plan, which was used

in response to Hurricane Georges.

From approximately 1970-1990, New Orleans and Biloxi experienced a lull in hurricane activity.

During this time, the Gulf Coast region experienced a population boom in coastal communities.

Emergency plans, models of roadway capacities and other essentials necessary to implement

efficient large-scale evacuations had not kept up with this change (Wolshon, 2001). After

lessons learned from Hurricane Georges (and Floyd) it was determined beneficial to have the

Louisiana Department of Transportation (DOT) involved in emergency planning and response.

Prior to these incidents, DOT had only been involved peripherally in the emergency

management process. Since Hurricanes Georges (and Floyd), the Louisiana DOT has taken a

more active role in the planning, management, and operations of hurricane evacuations

(Wolshon, 2001).

Training

Training is provided regularly to emergency response personnel in all of the affected

communities. Joint training is also conducted between emergency response and industry,

including the nuclear power plants and chemical plants in the surrounding counties and

parishes. Training includes planning, tabletop exercises, drills and full scale exercises. At the

time of Hurricane Georges, cross jurisdictional exercises for hurricane threats were not often

conducted. Other preparedness activities include emergency response exercises, which test

the plans for hospital evacuations during hurricanes (Monroe County, 2002).

Public Education

Community awareness to hurricane hazards is very high although large scale hurricanes had

not affected some of these areas in decades. Brochures and informational packets are

distributed to educate residents of their roles and responsibilities during a hurricane.

Information is published in newspapers and presented through other local media on where and

how to access shelters. Information is provided in a variety of forms on the hazards of

hurricanes and the need to comply with evacuation orders.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The governor, mayor and parish presidents and county/parish authorities have the authority to

declare an evacuation. Although the governor has authority to order an evacuation, this

responsibility is almost always delegated to a local authority, such as the mayor, or

county/parish authority (United States, 2006b). Although there had been many years since

previous hurricanes, there were no reports identified of issues with decision making in Florida

and Mississippi. In Louisiana some parishes ordered mandatory evacuations while New

Orleans and others only recommended evacuations.

Communications with Emergency Responders

Senior officials and emergency responders were aware of the approach of the hurricane from

local radio and media coverage, as well as preparatory actions in anticipation of the hurricane.

A-3
There were no notification problems observed in the research. An emergency operations center

(EOC) was opened in each of the affected areas. Communication between field and emergency

responders were conducted via radio, cell phone and telephone.

Communication with the Public

The public was notified of the approaching hazard and evacuation orders through a variety of

avenues. In preparation for the 1998 hurricane season, public information brochures were

distributed highlighting areas vulnerable to flooding, evacuation areas, and tips on how to be

prepared for a hurricane (USACE, 1999). Local media were provided hurricane response

information early in the season to ensure that consistent messages were passed on to the

public.

Recommended, voluntary, and mandatory evacuations were issued by local authorities and

announced over local radio and television networks. Law enforcement officials drove through

select neighborhoods using sirens and public address systems and went door-to-door in some

areas to encourage people to leave high risk areas. Updated information was provided by

emergency response agencies to the media outlets and was also posted on websites (USACE,

1999). Residents relied heavily on local radio and television outlets to receive information on

the status of the incident. Although many methods were used to communicate, residents living

mandatory or recommended evacuation zones frequently reported not understanding whether

their home was in an evacuation area (USACE, 1999).

Evacuation

Evacuations for Hurricane Georges initially began in the coastal areas of South Florida when

officials recommended those living in mobile homes, low-lying areas, and tourists leave the

area. This region is frequently advised to evacuate due to approaching storms. Many residents

carefully weigh whether or not they will evacuate depending on the projected forecast of the

storm, the recommendations of local and State officials, previous experience, and the advice of

family and friends. The response rate to evacuation orders can be attributed to a variety of

factors in Florida, including the fact that there are better building codes and some people

believe their homes will withstand winds (USACE, 1999). Sometimes residents are not

convinced they are in the hazard area, or they are not aware that they live within an area under

mandatory evacuation orders.

In Jefferson and Orleans Parish, Louisiana, only about a third of the residents left the area in

response to Hurricane Georges, and many of those who did leave waited until 24-30 hours

before the projected landfall to evacuate (Howell,.1998). The majority of those who evacuated

from their homes did not leave the parish, staying with friends or family within the parish. In

Jefferson Parish, people were more likely to evacuate if their home was known to be in a floodprone area and if they had a car. In Orleans Parish, residents identified the recommendation

from their mayor as a motivating factor of whether to leave or not (Howell, 1998). According to

the Hurricane Georges Assessment survey, 54 percent in Louisiana, 60 percent in Mississippi,

62 percent in the Lower Keys and 22 percent in northwest Florida left their homes in response

to Hurricane Georges (USACE, 1999). Of those who did not leave, the majority stated that they

felt the storm was not strong enough or did not pose a big enough threat to warrant an

evacuation (Howell, 1998).

A-4
Construction on outbound roadways contributed to severe congestion along evacuation routes

in Louisiana and Mississippi. During the evacuation, the State responded and cleared the

construction areas to open both westbound lanes. Other parishes within Louisiana experienced

flooding along roadways during the evacuation (USAGE, 1999). Experiences from Hurricane

Georges showed the need for increased evacuation route capacity, development of systems for

faster and more reliable traffic flow, the ability to get reliable traffic information out to the

traveler, and the need for better planning and coordination during regional and cross-state

evacuations (Wolshon, 2001).

Special Needs

Special needs facilities, including hospitals and nursing homes, were evacuated in response to

Hurricane Georges with some patients being airlifted to safety. Approximately 40 percent of

households in Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Lower Keys had someone within their household

that required some sort of assistance to evacuate (USAGE, 1999). About half of these

households only needed transportation, while the other half needed special care due to a

medical or physical condition. In almost all cases, family or friends were able to provide

assistance to those who needed it (USAGE, 1999). Plans were not well developed at the time

to identify or evacuate special needs populations in Louisiana or Mississippi.

Monroe County, Florida has a long standing registration program for the special needs

population which was used to support the evacuation of special needs individuals. Programs

such as this help identify individuals who may need assistance in evacuations and identify the

level of assistance needed.

Shelters

More than 200 shelters were open throughout Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama.

Approximately 65,000 people stayed in a shelter during or after the hurricane, and almost 2,500

people were reported as having special needs (USAGE, 1999). Many of these shelters were

staffed by American Red Cross volunteers. Shelters reported inadequate staffing for special

needs individuals, lack of food, water and beds, loss of power and communications, evacuees

not going to their designated shelter, and the need for more shelters. The Louisiana

Superdome was used for the first time as a shelter of last resort. Around 16,000 people were

reported to have stayed in the Superdome. The facility was looted and damaged by those who

sheltered, but it does not appear the damage was significant..

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Orleans Parish Emergency Management

Jefferson Parish Emergency Management

St. Charles Parish Emergency Management

Gulfport, Mississippi Fire Department

References

Army Corps. of Engineers (U.S.) (USAGE). "Hurricane Georges Assessment, Review of

Hurricane Evacuation Studies Utilization and Information Dissemination." August, 1999.

A-5
Howell, Dr. Susan E. "Evacuation Behavior in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes Hurricane

Georges." The University of New Orleans Survey Research Center, November 1998.

Monroe County Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, CEMP. 2002

National Hurricane Center. Guiney, John L. "Preliminary Report; Hurricane Georges 15

September- 01 October 1998." NHC, 1999.

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States Assistant to the President for

Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism. "Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina".

Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006b.

Wolshon, Brian, Elba Urbina, and Marc Levitan. "National Review of Hurricane Evacuation

Plans and Policies." Louisiana State University Hurricane Center. 2001.

A-6
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES. 2003

Number Evacuated: > 100,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Fire

INTRODUCTION

From October 21 through November 4, 2003, Southern California experienced the worst

wildland urban fire in the State's history when over 740,000 acres burned, 3,710 homes were

destroyed, and 24 people lost their lives (CDF, 2003). This series of fires forced more than

100,000 people to evacuate. The 2003 Southern California wildfires included fourteen different

fires the smallest of which burned approximately 100 acres, and the most destructive fire

consumed over 270,000 acres (CDF, 2003). As devastating as these fires were, the proactive

planning and response of California fire agencies along with support from around the country

prevented these fires from causing even greater destruction.

The fire response teams had benefitted from the implementation of improvements that had been

initiated due to lessons learned from previous fires. The Incident Command System (ICS), the

California Fire Plan, and the National Fire Plan are some of these improvements (CDF, 2003).

Additionally, the Forest Service Predictive Services at the Southern Operations Center had

closely monitored the weather and fuel conditions and had predicted the Santa Ana wind

conditions prior to the fires. Using this information, fire fighting resources were moved to

Southern California before most of the large fires had started (CDF, 2003).

A number of complexities differentiated these fires from past fire seasons. Multiple rapidly

moving fires were burning concurrently often covering multiple jurisdictions and leading to

overlap of some responsibilities (CDF, 2003). This region of Southern California includes some

of the most populated areas of the country. San Bernardino, Los Angeles, Riverside, San

Diego, and Ventura Counties were all declared Major Disaster Areas.

History of Emergencies

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection responds to more than 5,000 fires

annually with about 97 percent of these extinguished the first day (CDF, 2003). With this

consistent volume of activity, the State of California and the Forest Service have actively

progressed in emergency planning andresponse to fires. In 1993, the Laguna Beach Fire

prompted the development of the California Fire Plan, and the State passed the Standardized

Emergency Management System Act (SEMS) the same year. The SEMS required the State of

California to use a standardized emergency management system from which the Incident

Command System (ICS) later evolved.

Some of the communities affected by the 2003 fires had experienced fire-related evacuations in

previous years. The Roblar 2 Fire on Camp Pendelton was reminiscent of the 1985 Roblar Fire

the experience from which had prepared the Camp Pendelton Fire Department and surrounding

communities and facilitated a very aggressive response at the local and Federal level (CDF,

2003).

A-7
Emergency Preparedness

The California Fire Plan, National Fire Plan, ICS, SEMS, Multi-Agency Coordinating System

(MACS), and other programs were used during the response. All these programs in some way

are intended to unify various fire agencies to provide consistent direction and information to

responders, policy makers, and the public. The ICS system was developed to facilitate a more

efficient response. This system addressed several recognized weaknesses in fire response

prior to the 2003 fires, such as identifying a person or persons in charge of the response, having

a plan that can expand if an incident worsens, and having trained professionals or incident

teams that can be dispatched to a site as single units (CDF, 2003). Prior to the 2003 fires there

were more than 50 Fire Safe Councils within the region (Mutch, 2007; CDF, 2003). These Fire

Safe Councils are established to help communities prepare for wildfires.

In 2002, the Mountain Area Safety Task Force (MAST) was organized to address public safety

and forest issues on private and public lands. The efforts of the task force include intensive preplanning efforts in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties (CDF, 2003). MAST is one of the

most extensive pre-event planning efforts conducted in the region.

Traininq

Training for fire fighters is diverse and includes many different agencies (Campbell, 2004).

Routine training includes drills and exercises that focus on fire safety and response. Private

industries including hotel chains, petrochemical facilities, and other large industries conduct joint

exercises with fire personnel to prepare both the emergency responder and industry in their

roles and responsibilities during a fire.

Extensive training is provided to fire responders, however, after the fires of 2003 it was

recognized there were no Statewide initial training standards or maintenance of performance

standards (Campbell, 2004). California has led efforts in developing new training programs, but

has not brought these together in a coordinated manner. Training programs were not readily

available in all areas of the State, and funding for the development of new or existing training

programs was not always available. Training programs prior to 2003 were determined by the

local fire departments based on local needs and the availability of resources (Campbell, 2004).

Public Education

The communities of Southern California are aware of the fire risk; however, a finding of the Blue

Ribbon Report (Campbell, 2004) was that a comprehensive public awareness education

program is needed. Through community awareness groups such as MAST, efforts are being

implemented to better educate the public of their environment and responsibilities. Forestry and

fire departments are now taking a proactive approach to educate the public on fire safety

through interactive websites, videos, fact sheets and community group presentations.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Makinq

The relationships that existed among local, State, and Federal agencies provided an excellent

example of multi-agency cross jurisdictional cooperation and facilitated decision making. In a

State as large and populous as California, cooperative efforts between local, State and Federal

A-8
agencies were critical in the response to wildland urban fires (Campbell, 2004). Agencies

worked together coordinating assets from neighboring fire stations and State resources.

Political boundaries were constantly crossed during the two-week ordeal. Command, control

and coordination processes were pre-planned under the command structure provided by the

ICS. It was frequently the responsibility of the Incident Commander or local authorities to issue

necessary evacuation orders.

Communications with Emergency Responders

Early in 2003, State agencies had been aware of the drought and fuel conditions that could

contribute to fires. The Forest Service had received funding for additional fire prevention patrol

units and Predictive Services in Riverside California had been closely monitoring conditions

continuously. Senior local officials and emergency responders were generally notified of an

incident via local authorities or media coverage. An EOC and several Incident Command Posts

were established to respond to the fires. A Joint Information Center was activated on October

27, 2003 and logged an average of 1,450 calls per day (CDF, 2003).

Communications were sometimes difficult among emergency responders in the field. Some

local fire departments had radios that were on different frequencies than those used by State or

Federal agencies. The 700 MHZ and 800 MHZ radio systems did not often work in

mountainous terrain and were not always able to meet the heavy communication demand

between firefighting resources. Communication was sometimes limited among 800 MHZ

systems if the radios were made by different manufacturers. Incompatible communication

systems sometimes made it difficult for strike teams to communicate with commanders resorting

to cell phones and two-way radios when available (Campbell, 2004). Cell phone and satellite

phone use was limited to areas where signals were available. At times firefighters used fire

engine sirens to communicate with nearby engines.

Communication with the Public

The public was generally kept informed on the progression of the fires through television, radio

and newspapers. However, these fires moved very quickly and changed direction frequently

due to the Santa Ana winds. When time allowed, voluntary and mandatory evacuation notices

were provided to residents following standard communication methods. The public was notified

of evacuations areas via television and radio broadcasts, and sometimes door-to-door

notification by emergency responders and neighbors. Reverse 9118 systems, sirens, and public

address systems were also methods used to inform the public (OES, 2004). Helicopters flew

over some neighborhoods announcing evacuation warnings using loudspeakers (Mutch, 2007).

In spite of the number of methods used, some members- of the public expressed disappointment

in not having been notified of the need to evacuate or not having sufficient information to make

an educated evacuation decision (Mutch, 2007; Campbell, 2004). For example, EAS messages

were not consistently used due to the continuously changing situation. Often, emergency

responders felt they could give a more up-to-date message if they communicated the

information directly to the public. Also, EAS messages were not always used due to the timing

of the evacuation. If an evacuation needed to occur during the night, emergency responders

recognized that most people would be sleeping and would not receive the message. Thus,

going door-to-door or using sirens to notify the public was viewed as the more appropriate

A-9
notification method in these instances. A recommendation in the post-action assessment ofthe

fires was for local areas to develop appropriate early warning systems which may include a

combination of systems (Campbell, 2004).

In a proactive effort to communicate with the public, the MAST used a JIC to provide mountain

area residents and evacuees information during the fires. The center was activated on October

27, 2003 and logged 23,000 calls during the incident. Agency employees and volunteers

staffed the center which was available to callers 24/7. Most callers requested information on

road closures, lifting of the evacuation, and reentry information (OES, 2003).

Evacuation

Evacuations that occurred as a result of the 2003 California Fire Siege are best described as

staged with communities evacuated depending on the changing threat conditions. In some

situations, residents were advised to shelter-in-place either because routes of egress were

closed, or fire conditions were too dangerous to safely evacuate an area (CDF, 2003).

Residents did not always follow instructions provided to them by emergency responders. Some

residents left when they had not been advised to evacuate, some chose not to leave, and some

evacuated after fire conditions worsened. The fast moving nature of these fires created

difficulty in coordinating evacuations and in notifying the public. In some areas, residents had

only minutes of notice to evacuate, and as a result, 24 people died (Campbell, 2004), many of

whom were in the act of evacuating at the last minute (Mutch, 2007).

The largest single evacuation effort was concentrated in San Bernardino County when 80,000

mountain area residents evacuated (Campbell, 2004). Much of the evacuation was conducted

after dark and portions of the affected area were without electricity. Because of previous

community awareness programs implemented through the MAST, the evacuation was a

success and was completed in only a few hours. Evacuation plans for rural areas in San

Bernardino County had included contraflow on some roadways, but these were not

implemented (SILC, 2004). When communities were advised to evacuate, the response was

generally immediate and congestion became an issue with some traffic backups of 3-4 hours.

reported on rural roadways (SILC, 2004).

In most of the areas, those who evacuated had access to private vehicles. Sometimes

evacuation routes were identified and communicated the evacuees. However, not all areas had

pre-planned evacuation routes. Traffic control points were manned during the entirety of the

event. There were numerous roads that were cut-off or closed due to fire conditions. At least

five major interstates (Interstates 5, 8, 15, 210 and 215) were closed at some time during the

fires.

The San Diego County Animal Control facilitated the rescue and shelter of over 3,500 horses

and 500 domestic animals. The evacuation of the animals was coordinated with the Sheriffs

Department (CDF, 2003).

Special Needs

The State Independent Living Council (SILC) has participated in Statewide disaster planning for

many years. Transit for special needs individuals was available in some areas. The Mountain

Area Rural Transit Agency (MARTA) evacuated dozens of people with disabilities. This was

A-10
successful because MARTA drivers knew where their frequent riders lived (SILC, 2004). Lists

of disabled individuals were available in the fire departments, but with firefighters in the field, the

office activities were very limited and the disability lists were not accessed.

The fires had a significant impact on lower income families, the elderly, and special needs

individuals (OES, 2004). The Governor's Office of Emergency Services identified this as an

area where improvement could be made (OES, 2004). There were no reports identified of

residents being unable to evacuate because of special needs or lack of transportation.

Shelters

California has a well developed voluntary organization network and in response to the disaster,

voluntary organizations opened and operated tens of shelters throughout the area. Residents

were typically directed to a local shelter, but most chose instead to stay with friends, family, or in

other accommodations. At least 41 shelters and evacuation centers were opened in response

to the California Fires and were usually managed by the American Red Cross. Approximately

11,000 people reported to the shelters (FEMA, 2004). Over 1,600 people were sheltered in

unused airport hangers at the San Bernardino International Airport and more than 3,000

evacuees were sheltered at Norton Air Force Base (OES, 2004).

Approximately 8,000 families camped out in cars and recreational vehicles in the QualComm

Stadium in San Diego which was reported as providing an organized and clean facilities. The

facility had been designated an evacuation center, not a shelter, and was closed quickly forcing

evacuees to find shelter elsewhere.

In San Bernardino County, residents of two nursing homes were evacuated to a shelter at

Norton Air Force Base, but many of the residents evacuated without bringing their mobility aids.

Some of these evacuees were bedridden and needed volunteers to carry them to the restrooms

when needed. Evacuation planning had not included vehicles that could carry wheelchairs

(SILC, 2004).

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Fire and Rescue Division; California Governor's Office of Emergency Services.

.San Bernardino County Sheriff-Coroner Department

San Diego County Office of Emergency Services

References

Campbell, Senator William. "Governor's Blue Ribbon Fire Commission, Report to the

Governor." April 2004.

California Department of Forestry. (CDF). "California Fire Siege, 2003: The Story." October 21-

November 4, 2003. U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region. 2003.

California Department of Forestry. (CDF). "The 2003 San Diego County Fire Siege Fire Safety

Review." U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region. 2004.

A-11
California Department of Forestry. (CDF). "The Story One Year Later 2004." An After Action

Review. U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region. R5-PR-015. January, 2005.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). "The California Fires Coordination Group: A

Report to the Secretary of Homeland Security." February 13, 2004.

Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES). "2003 Southern California Fires After Action

Report." Office of Emergency Services, June 17, 2004.

Mutch, Robert W. "FACES: The Story of the Victims of Southern California's 2003 Fire Siege".

Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center. July 2007.

State Independent Living Council (SILC). "The Impact of Southern California Wildfires on

People with Disabilities." California State Independent Living Council. Sacramento, California.

April, 2004.

A-12
HURRICANE IVAN - September 16,2004

Number Evacuated: Approximately 2.3 million

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Hurricane

INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Ivan was the strongest hurricane of the 2004 season making landfall near Gulf

Shores, Alabama on September 16, 2004 as a Category 3 hurricane. Approximately 2.3 million

people were urged to evacuate along the coasts of Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana.

Hurricane Ivan was the third hurricane to cause an evacuation in little over a month in the

Florida Keys with Hurricane Charley having made landfall on August 13, and Hurricane Frances

on September 4, 2004.

In Louisiana, mandatory evacuations were ordered in at least six parishes, and voluntary

evacuations were recommended in six other parishes. The mayor of New Orleans aggressively

recommended a voluntary evacuation of New Orleans; however, only about one third of the

New Orleans metropolitan area evacuated prior to the hurricane landfall. The evacuation plan

for the area had recently been updated with improvements intended to reduce congestion. The

plan, which included the first use of contraflow, was implemented, but severe traffic congestion

was still experienced by evacuees.

A notification of an unusual event was declared on September 14, 2004 at Waterford 3 nuclear

power plant located within St. Charles Parish. The declaration was due to the issuance of a

Hurricane Warning for St. Charles Parish, Louisiana (NRC, 2004a). Waterford 3 sustained no

damage to safety systems from the storm and was able to remain at 100 percent power.

History of Emergencies

Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida are often threatened by natural disasters such as

hurricanes, floods, and tornadoes. Technological hazards are also present due to heavy

industry in most of these areas. The Florida Keys had been hit by two other hurricanes in a

matter of weeks prior to Hurricane Ivan. In New Orleans, the most recent evacuation due to a

hurricane threat had been Hurricane Georges in 1998.

Emergency Preparedness

An emergency plan for New Orleans was available and used in response to Hurricane Ivan.

This plan included a section on evacuation, but did not include a means of evacuating the

transit dependent population out of the city. New Orleans residents that were unable to

evacuate the city were informed they should "vertically" evacuate, meaning to seek shelter in

multi-story buildings (CNN, 2004). This would allow them to be above the expected flood level.

In Florida, emergency management had implemented emergency preparedness plans for

Hurricanes Charley and Frances in the previous month and were well prepared for Hurricane

Ivan.

A-13
Training

Comprehensive training is provided regularly to emergency response personnel in all of the

affected communities. Joint training is also conducted between emergency response and

industry, including the nuclear power plants and chemical plants in the surrounding counties

and parishes. Training includes planning, tabletop exercises, drills and full scale exercises.

Other preparedness activities include emergency response exercises, which test the plans for

hospital evacuations during hurricanes (Monroe County, 2007).

Public Education

Community awareness to hurricane hazards is high due to the frequency in which hurricanes

threaten this part of the country. Brochures and informational packets are distributed to educate

residents of their roles and responsibilities during a hurricane. Information on the hazards of

hurricanes and the need to comply with evacuation orders is provided in a variety of forms at

State to local levels. Information was published in newspapers and presented in other the local

media on where and how to access shelters. At the time of Hurricane Ivan, the Gulf Coast was

aware of the hazards posed by hurricanes and the potential flooding that could occur having just

witnessed the impact of Hurricanes Charlie and Frances on the State of Florida.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The governor, mayor and parish presidents and county/parish authorities have the authority to

declare an evacuation. Although the governor has authority to order an evacuation, this

responsibility is almost always delegated to a local authority, such as the mayor, or

county/parish authority (United States, 2006b).

Local authorities of some areas, including New Orleans, had desired for contraflow to be

established, but implementation was delayed until State Police were available to man traffic

control sites. Multiple evacuation routes used were merged near Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

There had been no coordination with Baton Rouge authorities on managing the evacuation

traffic. As a result, the evacuation traffic combined with the normal daily flow of local traffic

resulted in congestion around the Baton Rouge metro area.

In Alabama, contraflow was implemented on Interstate 65. Although the traffic volumes

observed did not warrant use of contraflow, decision makers demanded its implementation.

Contraflow was used for about 10 hours, but traffic counts at the time suggested that the main

evacuation surge was already over. Although the use of contraflow may not have been

necessary, the implementation experience will prove beneficial in the future.

Communications with Emergency Responders

Senior officials and emergency responders were well aware of the approach of the hurricane

from local radio and media coverage, as well as preparatory actions in anticipation of the

hurricane. There were no notification problems identified in the research. An EOC was opened

in each of the affected areas. Communication between field and emergency responders were

conducted via radio, cell phone and telephone.

A-14
Communication with the Public

Evacuation information was provided to the public through a variety of outlets in the days prior

to landfall. These included local news media coverage, radio broadcasts and newspaper

reports. Hurricane evacuation information was provided by local officials primarily through

.these media outlets. In some areas, door-to-door notification was provided to residents.

Post-storm reports identified that there were "mixed" evacuation messages communicated to

the public (Wolshon, 2005). One hindrance to the evacuation was the time frame in which

evacuation orders were issued. Many evacuation notifications were distributed on Tuesday;

however, people were still expected to report to their work places on Tuesday and Wednesday.

This is believed to have caused many people to leave later than they would have otherwise.

Evacuation

In Florida, evacuation orders began as early as September 9, 2004 when officials instructed

tourists and residents in low-lying areas and mobile homes to leave the Florida Keys. This was

the third visitor evacuation of the Keys within a four week period. Although many did evacuate,

some decided not to leave until the projected path of the storm was more certain. Two days

later, mandatory evacuations were ordered for the Charlotte County barrier islands and mobile

home parks. Authorities reported that many residents had already evacuated before the initial

order was given. Some residents, having experienced the recent hurricanes, spontaneously

evacuated as soon as Hurricane Ivan appeared to be a threat.

On September 13, 2004, the path of Hurricane Ivan shifted direction but still had a cone of

probability to make landfall between Florida and west of New Orleans. In Mississippi, residents

living south of 1-10 were under a mandatory evacuation order. In a survey of the four States

affected, virtually every county emergency management office reported heavy traffic and

gridlock as characteristic of the evacuation (USACE, 2005). The State of Mississippi had

planned and used officers from many different State agencies to support the traffic control.

Although the State was ready to respond, traffic congestion was not anticipated as early as it

had occurred. In discussions with emergency responders, traffic congestion was heavy in

Mississippi.

Residents trying to evacuate from New Orleans were also stuck in traffic, with some evacuees

taking more than 36 hours to reach their destination. A new contraflow plan had been

developed, and although the plan had been modeled, Hurricane Ivan was the first time the

revised plan had been implemented. Contraflow was implemented to alleviate the growing

traffic congestion but bottlenecks were created at loading and unloading points on the route.

There were new lessons learned on the placement and timing of equipment and the need to

include a regional approach in planning.

The evacuation for Hurricane Ivan was considered successful by many in the emergency

response community relative to previous evacuations. More than twice the number of residents

were able to evacuate New Orleans in response to Hurricane Ivan compared to Hurricane

Georges. Officials, working with traffic engineers and planners, realized after Hurricane Ivan

that contraflow should not be used to fix congestion after it occurs, but rather, should be

implemented before traffic congestion escalates. In New Orleans, two special needs patients

died while stuck in evacuation traffic.

A-15
Special Needs

In Louisiana, there were limited plans in place to identify special needs individuals who may

have difficulty leaving. Few parishes had established plans or outreach programs to identify this

population group and develop transportation plans. Furthermore, at the time of Hurricane Ivan,

the special needs population would have generally been defined as individuals with health

problems or physical constraints that would keep them from evacuating. In 2004, transit

dependent individuals were not generally considered special needs.

Shelters

Shelters for evacuees and special needs individuals were opened in every affected State. Even

with the large number of shelters, many evacuees displaced by Hurricane Ivan found it difficult

to find shelters or hotels with vacancies. Hotels as far north as Memphis, Tennessee were at

full capacity. In Baldwin County, Alabama, shelters were unable to be opened because

projected winds were too high.

The 2004 hurricane season was the first major test of the Florida shelter system since 1995 and

more than a thousand public shelters were opened during the season, with 88 designated for

special needs (SERT, 2005). Although improvements in the shelter programs have advanced in

all of the States affected, common issues included shortages of supplies, lack of security and

overcrowding. In Monroe County, Florida, officials had said that no shelters would be open in

the Florida Keys prior to the storm due to increased area hazards. Also in Florida, some

shelters could not be opened as a result of damage sustained from Hurricanes Charley and

Frances.

New Orleans residents were advised to find their own shelter in multi-story buildings. The

Superdome had been opened as a shelter of last resort on September 15, 2004. Only 1,100

people sheltered at the Superdome during Hurricane Ivan, with 300 National Guardsmen

providing security (Southern Digest, 2004). The New Orleans School System opened 10

facilities to be used as shelters and informed evacuees they these shelters were intended to

only provide a roof over their heads and no other services. Additional facilities used as shelters

included schools, universities, churches, sports arenas, and even a performing arts center.

In Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, shelters were established for special needs

individuals. In some of the affected counties and parishes, transportation was provided, but in

many instances, these individuals needed to provide their own transportation to the shelter.

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Louisiana State University Hurricane Center

Jefferson Parish Emergency Management

Orleans Parish Emergency Management

St. Charles Parish Emergency Management

A-16
References

Army Corps of Engineers (U.S.) (USACE). "Hurricane Ivan Post-Storm Transportation

Analysis." September, 2005.

CNN. "Gulf Coast Residents Begin Evacuations." September 14, 2004.

Florida State Emergency Response Team. SERT. "2005 Special Needs Shelter Report."

Division of Emergency Management and Department of Health. June, 2005.

Monroe County Florida Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, CEMP. 2007

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual

Occurrence-PNO-IV-04-025. September 15, 2004. (NRC, 2004a).

The Southern Digest. "Hurricane Ivan Exposes Flaws in New Orleans' Disaster Plans."

September 21, 2004.

United States. Executive Office of the President. United States Assistant to the President for

Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism. "Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina".

Washington, D.C.: White House, 2006b.

Wolshon, Brian. "New Orleans Experience in Hurricane Ivan; Lessons Learned and Potential

Improvements." Louisiana State University; LSU Hurricane Center. 2005.

A-17
CHEMICAL FIRE. Romulus, Michigan - August9. 2005

Number Evacuated: Approximately 3,000

Category: Technological

Specific Type: Chemical Fire

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

On the evening of August 9, 2005, a chemical recovery plant in Romulus, Michigan caught fire

when a hazardous waste tank exploded. Workers heard noises and smelled a solvent, and

evacuated the site according to the site evacuation plan. Local and neighboring fire officials

and hazmat teams immediately responded to the incident. After assessing the fire, response

teams decided to let the it' burn rather than apply water on the fire. After the fire died down, it

was extinguished by the firefighters. A voluntary evacuation of 0.8 km (one-half mile) around

the plant was implemented, and approximately 3,000 people were ordered to evacuate. Those

in the surrounding area immediately outside of the evacuation zone sheltered in place and were

asked to close windows and doors and turn off air conditioners (National Response Center,

2005).

On August 11, 2005 Romulus city officials lifted the evacuation order after health assessments

concluded the area was safe for reentry (HHS, 2006). Approximately 20 people had been

treated at the hospital for breathing difficulties and burning throats (National Response Center,

2005). In discussions with emergency management, personnel confirmed an initial concern that

the accident may have been initiated by terrorists, but the concern was quickly alleviated.

History of Emerqencies

The chemical facility is located approximately 24 km (15 miles) southwest of Detroit in -Romulus,

Michigan, near the Detroit Metropolitan Airport. There is a high density of chemical and

industrial facilities in the area. The community had not experienced a severe incident with these

hazards and has not been involved in a recent evacuation.

Emergency Preparedness

Emergency planning information is available through the City of Romulus Local Emergency

Planning Committee. Romulus is one of 97 emergency planning districts in Michigan. The

Romulus Emergency Management department incorporates plans, response and recovery

actions for all hazards. Emergency Management coordinates activities with local, county, State,

Federal agencies, and schools, private and public business (City of Romulus). As of 1997,

Romulus, Michigan had over 170 facilities registered with the EPA for hazardous waste

handling (Ecocenter, 2005).

Training

Emergency responders are regularly involved in training exercises and drills. Some of these

drills include joint training between industry and government agencies. A variety of drills are

conducted from table-top exercises to full-scale drills. The full-scale drills generally occur on an

annual or bi-annual basis.

A-18
Public Education

The community affected by the evacuation is in an area densely populated with industrial

facilities. Emergency planning information is-available through the City of Romulus web site

and through the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC). No recent evacuations had

occurred in this area and residents had little experience with alerting methods, but this did not

affect the success of the evacuation.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The decision to evacuate was made by local emergency response authorities. The command

and control process was implemented in accordance with the emergency response plan.

According to the existing plans, the local fire chief was head of incident command. The

response involved local agencies from surrounding cities and towns. After the incident, city

officials acknowledged the efforts of the firefighters and police within the communities as an

example of how mutual aid can work effectively.

Communications with Emergency Responders

Senior officials were notified of the incident after the emergency call was received by 911

operators. To support the response, a mobile command post was brought in, and all decisions

were coordinated from this location. There were no problems encountered with notification of

senior officials or emergency responders. Communications between field emergency

responders and the EOC were primarily conducted over radios and cell phones. Typically cell

phones were used to communicate to officials and department heads who were located offsite,

and radios were used in the field.

Communication problems resulted when various agencies used different radio frequencies.

Some used an 800 MHZ system, while others used UHF radio. Emergency responders using

these different radios could not communicate with each other and had to augment

communications with cell phones.

Communication with the Public

Police and firefighters went through the neighborhoods within a 0.8 km (one-half mile) radius

announcing the evacuation via loudspeakers and also went door-to-door to inform residents in

some areas. The fire department only issued an order to evacuate a 0.8 km (0.5 mile) radius;

however, the media broadcast a 1.6 km (1 mile) radius for the evacuation area. Because the

area was larger and the additional evacuees were not affecting the response, the fire

department did not attempt to correct the error. In the days following the explosion, officials

communicated event status, hazards, and reentry information to the public predominantly

through media outlets, including television and radio broadcasts and newspaper articles. Only a

few residents outside the evacuation area were reported to have evacuated.

Evacuation

A voluntary evacuation was ordered for households within a 0.8 km (0.5 miles) radius of the

chemical plant. This evacuation order encompassed approximately 3,000 people. Many of the

residents that evacuated were not aware of the close proximity of the plant to their homes

(Ecocenter, 2005). Those who remained in the surrounding areas were asked to stay inside,

A-19
close windows and doors, and keep air conditioning units off. Residents rapidly evacuated the

area and were not allowed to re-enter the area to retrieve belongings for two days. According to

Romulus police, as residents were informed of the need to evacuate, and residents were

informed of the location of available shelters.

Police and fire personnel drove through some neighborhoods to verify that residents had

evacuated. Traffic control points were established and manned during the entirety of the event.

Barricades were put up to keep people out of the area, but it was reported a few individuals

went around the barricades and returned.

Special Needs

There were no special needs facilities in the area covered by the evacuation order, but

ambulances were used to evacuate some special needs individuals out of the area. There were

plans in place to use school buses to evacuate people that did not have transportation, but

there were no reports of these being implemented. The City of Romulus website provides

instructions for residents who lacked transportation out of an area to ask a neighbor for

assistance. If a neighbor was not available, instructions were to listen to the emergency

broadcast station for further information.

Shelters

Residents were informed that shelter was available at the Romulus High School and Wayne

Memorial High School, which were located less than 5 km (about 3 miles) from the chemical

facility. Residents were not provided specific directions to the shelter locations because

residents are familiar with the area. City personnel from Romulus and Wayne, Michigan as well

as the American Red Cross and Salvation Army, managed the shelters. The American Red

Cross was able to assist both shelters very quickly.

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Romulus Fire Department

References

Ecocenter. "Chemical Fire Rocks Romulus, November/December 2005." Ecology Center.

November/December 2005.

National Response Center. Incident Summary. United States Coast Guard. Washington DC.

August 8, 2005.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). "EQ Resource Recovery Explosion

and Fire Romulus, Wayne County, Michigan." EPA Facility ID: MID060975844." 2006.

A-20
HURRICANE KATRINA - August 29, 2005

Number Evacuated: Approximately 2 million

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Hurricane

INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Katrina made landfall on August 25, 2005 in southern Florida as a Category 1

hurricane. The hurricane intensified and made a devastating second landfall near Buras,

Louisiana on August 29, 2005 as a Category 3 hurricane (NHC, 2006). Hurricane Katrina was

.approximately 640 km (400 miles) across prompting the evacuation of approximately 2 million

people along the Gulf Coast from Louisiana to Florida. The evacuation was generally

considered successful (United States, 2006a).

A few hours after landfall, the levee system surrounding New Orleans failed and approximately

80 percent of the city flooded. In some areas, the depth of flooding exceeded 6 meters (more

than 20 feet). A massive search effort ensued to rescue those who had not evacuated the area

prior to landfall. Approximately 1,800 people lost their lives, with only one death attributed to

the pre-landfall evacuation (Times - Picayune, 2005). Approximately 75 percent of those who

died more than 60 years old (United States, 2006b). In the days following landfall, local, State

and Federal government response agencies were tested to their limits.

The New Orleans devastation occurred after the levee system failed. In Mississippi, eastern

Louisiana, and Alabama, it was the hurricane force winds and storm surge that devastated the

region. At landfall, the Mississippi coast experienced 155 mph winds and a storm surge of

about 10 meters (about 34 feet) that swept inland (United States, 2006a). Half of Mississippi

was left without power, and high winds and tornadoes generated by the storm left thousands

homeless. The communities of Bay St. Louis, Waveland, Pass Christian and others were

heavily damaged. Hurricane Katrina turned 60 percent of the State of Mississippi into a

catastrophic disaster area. Two hundred and thirty one people from Mississippi were killed by

the storm and more than 200,000 were displaced (United States, 2006a). As reported in the

Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina (2006b), approximately 75 percent of those who died

were more than 60 years old. In discussions with emergency responders in Louisiana and

Mississippi, many residents who did not evacuate during Hurricane Katrina had lived through

Hurricane Betsy or Camille and believed that Hurricane Katrina could not be as devastating.

This hurricane presents a very complex study in emergency preparedness and response.

Hurricane Katrina was the first United States disaster to ever exceed $100 billion in damages

(USACE, 2007). Over 300,000 homes were either destroyed or left uninhabitable and over 100

million cubic yards of refuse was generated (United States, 2006b). The collection and disposal

of the tremendous amount of debris was identified as one of the largest and most unexpected

issues encountered by St. Charles parish emergency responders. Communication systems

were crippled in the days following landfall.

A-21
The Waterford 3 nuclear power plant located in St. Charles Parish, Louisiana received minimal

damage from localized flooding and incurred no damage to safety systems. Preparations at

Waterford 3 began on August 26, 2005, with twice daily meetings with St. Charles Parish

emergency management. Loss of offsite power occurred on August 29 and was not restored

until September 2, 2005.

History of Emergencies

The Gulf Coast States have experienced numerous natural and technological disasters

including hurricanes, tropical storms, flooding, tornadoes, and chemical incidents. The region is

often threatened with the possibility of hurricanes. New Orleans had evacuated in 1998 in

response to Hurricane Georges and in 2004 in response to Hurricane Ivan. However, the city

had not experienced a catastrophic hurricane since Hurricane Betsy in 1965. The State of

Mississippi had also ordered evacuations in response to Hurricane Georges in 1998 and

Hurricane Ivan in 2004, but had not been seriously affected by a hurricane since Hurricane

Camille in 1969. These two hurricanes, Betsy and Camille had become benchmarks for many

longtime area residents.

Emergency Planning

New Orleans has long been identified by emergency planners as susceptible to severe flooding

from hurricanes due to large areas of the city located below sea level. The city had most

recently been evaluated in the Hurricane Pam exercise in 2004. The implementation of lessons

learned from the.Hurricane Pam exercise was incomplete, but for those activities where lessons

learned were implemented, improvements over previous hurricane evacuations were evident.

State transportation officials had revised the State contraflow plan based on lessons learned

during the Hurricane Ivan evacuation a year earlier. This was a key factor in the successful

evacuation of Louisiana.

The Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness prepares and

maintains a homeland security and emergency operations plan, which establishes the policies

and structure for the State's management during emergencies and disasters (United States,

2006a). Emergency operations are first managed at the parish level. If local authorities

become overwhelmed, overextended, or overtaxed, State emergency management agencies

are required by law to take authority. Similarly, if State agencies become overwhelmed, Federal

agencies are requested to assist in the response efforts.

The City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (2005) provided for the

use of all available resources to evacuate threatened areas, and identified that special

arrangements would be made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves. The plan

identified the need to evacuate approximately 100,000 citizens of New Orleans who do not have

personal transportation. However, these measures were largely ineffective do to a lack of

detailed planning to manage the key.operational aspects of such a scenario.

The State of Mississippi and local communities, such as Gulfport, Biloxi, and Pass Christian,

implemented their emergency plans. The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)

had been using Federal grants to fund improvements in emergency plans (United States,

2006a)

A-22
Alabama authorities had implemented lessons learned from Hurricanes Dennis and Ivan and

had practiced to reduce the time needed to implement contraflow. Also, Alabama implemented

a proactive communications strategy which was a key element in the response. The governor

of Alabama had visited all of the Gulf Coast counties prior to landfall urging residents to

evacuate in accordance with mandatory evacuation orders (United States, 2006a).

Training

Training is provided at State and local levels throughout Louisiana. A minimum of one full-scale

exercise, which includes the mayor, elected and appointed officials, independent authorities and

non-governmental agencies, is conducted in New Orleans annually. Coordinated training is

conducted annually with the State, and exercises and drills are conducted annually among

emergency responders and many private industries.

In Mississippi, the State recommends local emergency response plans be tested and exercised

annually. In early 2005, over 1,200 first responders in Mississippi received training in the

National Incident Management System (NIMS), which contributed to the ability to quickly

present a unified front during Hurricane Katrina (United States, 2006a). MEMA offers numerous

training exercises for State and local emergency managers, public officials, members of

volunteer relief organizations and professionals. The MEMA training program provides a way to

train State and local officials in disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery.

Jurisdictions across Mississippi prepare in advance through training activities and by using the

skills learned, to build local teams that respond to emergencies. Coordinated drills and

exercises are conducted among local and State agencies. A full-scale EOC at the State level is

activated at least annually.

Public Education

At the start of the hurricane season, there are many opportunities for the residents along the

Gulf Coast to receive information on the threat of hurricanes. These include local television and

radio broadcasts, newspaper articles, and websites. The Louisiana DOT also conducted a

public information campaign which included civic meetings, news media announcements, and

the distribution of contraflow maps and directions at local stores and gas stations. The New

Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan identifies the need for public education

and includes discussion on developing media for those that do not use traditional media (New

Orleans, 2005). Brochures are mailed out in many counties and parishes. The emergency

awareness brochure for Plaquemines Parish had been completed and was distributed to

residents only a couple of weeks before Hurricane Katrina (St. Amant, 2007).

Mississippi, Alabama and Florida coastal communities have had several hurricane evacuations

in the last 10 years, which contributed to public awareness. The Gulf Coast States plan for a

staged evacuation, and residents are provided information on which areas evacuate in a

specified order. The Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan includes

discussion on preparedness and dissemination of public information packages. Also in

Mississippi, responders such as local fire chiefs make frequent educational presentations to

schools and civic groups to maintain awareness of the public.

A-23
EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

Before the landfall of Hurricane Katrina, local, State and Federal agencies coordinated fairly

well together. The decisions to evacuate were made by local officials and were often

coordinated with neighboring parishes and the State. While many parishes in Louisiana and

counties in Mississippi and Alabama were evacuating under mandatory orders, the City of New

Orleans had only issued a voluntary evacuation order. According to the City of New Orleans

Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (2005), it is the responsibility of the mayor to

order an evacuation. The delay in ordering a mandatory evacuation contributed to the

consequences as identified in the Failure of Initiative (2006a) which states "the incomplete prelandfall evacuation led to deaths."

In Mississippi, assistance and coordination with Florida emergency responders prior to landfall

proved highly beneficial. The law in Mississippi provides the governor authority to order an

evacuation, although longstanding practice is to give that responsibility to local authorities.

When evacuation decisions are made, these are communicated to State agencies who

implement evacuation elements such as traffic control and contraflow. Evacuation orders were

made by local mayors or appropriate authorities in the response to Hurricane Katrina.

Political boundaries were crossed at all levels of government, which is normal for any hurricane

response. In St. Charles Parish, Louisiana, the Parish President evacuated the public works

staff to a coordinated location just outside of the hazard area. Once the hurricane had passed,

the public works staff were then in place with the necessary equipment to facilitate reentry into

the area. Reentry requires, among other things, clearing roadways of fallen trees and debris to

allow traffic movement. Having the foresight to pre-position public works staff and equipment

expedited the reentry activities and assured a fully equipped and available public works staff to

begin post-incident assessments and repairs to infrastructure. In Mississippi, some emergency

response staff were allowed to evacuate, but after the passing of the hurricane many were

unable to return.

Communication with Emerqency Responders

Senior officials and responders were aware of the approaching hurricane days prior to landfall

and initiated proactive communications among responders and with the heavy industry partners

in the region. The communication among field response teams was well planned and executed.

Communication among coastal and inland counties and parishes were well coordinated and

facilitated a staged evacuation of these areas. Routine conference calls to local emergency

management agencies and EOCs started as early as August 25, 2005, and the Louisiana State

EOC was activated on August 26, 2005. Communications between the EOC and field

responders prior to landfall was conducted via conference calls, e-mail, telephones, cell phones,

and radio transmissions.

After landfall, many communication avenues were lost. Satellite phones, radios and couriers

were used as means of communicating until telephone systems could be repaired. Radio

communication was severely impaired due to the hurricane and flood damage. The Mississippi

Federal Coordinating Officer testified that communications were far below what was needed to

A-24
be effective in the post-hurricane response (United States, 2006a). Thirty-eight 911 call centers

were out of service and local wireless networks were severely damaged (United States, 2006a).

Many first responders could only communicate with each other through limited radio availability

and satellite phones (United States, 2006a). First responders trying to communicate over radio

transmissions had to wait for long periods of time to send messages because there were only

two radio channels available. Satellite communications were intermittent at best due to high

winds, incomplete signals, and the lag time that occurs when using a satellite phone.

Responders sometimes complained about problems operating satellite phones, but some of

these complaints are likely due to the operator not fully understanding how to use the satellite

phones.

Communication with the Public

The public was notified of the approach of Hurricane Katrina days in advance of landfall through

local and national media. The National Hurricane Center disseminated warnings and hurricane

forecasts via the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) weather radio and the

internet, operating in conjunction with the EAS (United States, 2006b). Pamphlets were handed

out in many areas instructing residents on the order they were to evacuate during staged

evacuations. Residents in mobile homes, along waterways, and those in lower elevation areas

were encouraged to evacuate early. Instructions on what to bring and which roadways to use

were communicated to residents in the days leading up to a hurricane evacuation.

Local news stations, radio stations, cable television, and national TV stations broadcast the

voluntary and mandatory evacuation orders issued by officials. The most common form of

notification was through the media. All parishes and counties used media to inform the public

and some had law enforcement personnel go door-to-door and drive streets in select areas

using loud speakers to notify residents of mandatory evacuation orders. St. Charles Parish has

its own television station, website and radio station that provided up-to-date information. St.

Charles Parish also used the siren system for the Waterford 3 nuclear power plant in their

efforts to notify the public. During the evacuation, message signs were provided along the

evacuation routes to inform evacuees of current traffic and storm conditions.

In New Orleans, some information was communicated in Spanish and Vietnamese, while in

Florida some information was published in Spanish, French and German. There were few

reports of real time communication in a non-English language being presented through major

local media broadcasts, although one report was found where a local news station in Mississippi

presented information in Spanish.

In the days and weeks following Hurricane Katrina, information was communicated to residents

and evacuees through web sites and national and local media outlets. Evacuees were able to

contact FEMA and the American Red Cross for assistance. Databases with information on

missing persons, pet shelter information, reentry information, road conditions and other

essential information were available, but sparsely populated. The damage to communication

systems throughout the region limited the ability to convey information, which frustrated

individuals in their attempts to locate missing persons and obtain information on their homes.

Due to the size of the affected area, the extent of damage and the number of evacuees, it

A-25
remained difficult to obtain information for many months.

A post-evacuation survey of Hurricane Katrina evacuees (Kaiser, 2005), reported that of those

who chose not to evacuate, 73 percent heard the evacuation notification, and 25 percent

reported that they did not hear the message. Of the 25 percent who did not hear the

notification, .19 percent said that although they did not hear the evacuation message, they were

aware that an order had been given for their area. Sixty-six percent said that the evacuation

notice provided was clear (Kaiser, 2005).

Evacuation

On August 28, 2005, Hurricane Katrina had strengthened to a Category 5 storm, and the

National Weather Center issued a very descriptive warning in an effort to emphasize the high

risk of this hurricane and help persuade residents to evacuate. The notice stated among other

things that the majority of industrial buildings will become non-functional, airborne debris will be

widespread and may include items such as household appliances and light vehicles, people and

pets exposed to these winds will face certain death if struck, and most of the area will be

uninhabitable for weeks (United States, 2006b). Although fear tactics are not usually

considered the best way to influence people, this message did help convince some people to

evacuate that may not have done so otherwise.

The evacuation of the general population was one of the largest emergency evacuations in

United States history and was generally considered successful in terms of regional traffic

management (United States, 2006a). Many of the issues with evacuation were related to

decisions to evacuate and the ability of residents to comply with the evacuation orders. For

those who wanted to and could leave, the evacuation was better than previous evacuations.

The research for this study only identified one death in Louisiana that was directly attributed to

the evacuation. A nursing home had evacuated the day before Hurricane Katrina made landfall,

and during the 12 hour bus ride an elderly nursing home resident died (Times - Picayune,

2005).

Mississippi

During the days prior to landfall, MEMA conducted extensive planning sessions to develop an

EOC activation timeline, as well as plan for protective actions and proactive response. Contacts

with FEMA were made and the public was encouraged to begin preparing for the storm (United

States, 2006a). Mississippi's National Guard was activated and the governor of Mississippi

declared a State of Emergency on August 26, 2005. On August 27, 2005, MEMA activated its

State EOC; and county liaisons were deployed to Jackson, Harrison, Hancock, Pearl River,

Stone, and George Counties. The State Emergency Response Team was deployed to Camp

Shelby. The Governor of Mississippi implemented the contraflow plan on 1-55 and 1-59 which

was a measure that was primarily to assist the State of Louisiana evacuation.

The evacuations were generally staged, with lower-lying areas, mobile home owners, and

residence along waterways encouraged to evacuate prior to those in safer-areas. Evacuations

of Hancock, Harrison and Jackson Counties proceeded well with approximately 400,000 people

evacuating. In efforts to encourage people. to evacuate out of the area, MEMA urged coastal

cities to not open shelters. In discussions with emergency responders in Mississippi, many

motorists ran out of gas during the evacuation. There were limited plans in place in Mississippi

A-26
to evacuate individuals who were transit dependent, and in many areas there were no plans to

support this population group.

MEMA recognized the need for teams of specialized professionals to support post-hurricane

response. A lesson learned was to have these teams organized, equipped, credentialed, and

trained prior to an incident. Mississippi officials indicated-that it is very difficult and time

consuming to do this after the incident.

Louisiana

Many parishes within southern Louisiana recommended residents start evacuating early in

response to Hurricane Katrina (United States, 2006a). The mayor of New Orleans

recommended a voluntary evacuation for the communities of Algiers, the Lower 9th, and other

low-lying portions of the city. Despite announcements of hurricane watches and warnings,

many residents appeared unaware or unconcerned about the storm (United States, 2006b). On

August 27, 2005, Plaquemines and St. Charles Parishes ordered mandatory evacuations within

their parishes. In discussions with emergency operations managers, these two parishes

coordinated their evacuations with each other so that residents in Plaquemines Parish, which is

closer to the coast, could start evacuating before St. Charles residents.

The Louisiana evacuation plan had been updated in 2004 after the evacuation for Hurricane

Ivan. The updated plan included a staged evacuation and an improved contraflow plan, which

was prepared and implemented in less time than expected (United States, 2006a). State Police

were deployed to assist with the evacuation, and traffic volume and rate of flow began to be

monitored in the EOC. It was estimated that approximately 92 percent of the threatened

population in Louisiana had evacuated (United States, 2006b). According to traffic count data

collected from routes close to New Orleans, traffic flow had dropped to a "trickle" about 8 hours

prior to storm landfall, suggesting everyone with the means and desire-to evacuate had done

so. In New Orleans it was estimated that only about 80 percent of the population actually left,

leaving close to 70,000 people still in the city (United States, 2006a).

Following the mandatory evacuation order for New Orleans on August 28, 2005 the Regional

Transit Authority began running special services from twelve sites across the city to take

evacuees to the Superdome and later take special needs persons on to Baton Rouge (United

States, 2006a). In the afternoon, conditions had reached a point that all flights in and out of

New Orleans airport were canceled and contraflow operations ceased due to high winds.

In the days following landfall, a massive search and rescue operation was conducted to

evacuate survivors. Approximately 63,000 people were rescued in New Orleans through the

efforts of the National Guard, Fish and Wildlife Service, United States Coast Guard and other

agencies. In post-incident surveys, 56 percent of the population who did not evacuate from

New Orleans stated that they could have found a way to leave before the storm hit (Kaiser,

2005). In many victim's homes, cars were found left in the driveway (Untied States, 2006a).

Also, in discussions with individual evacuees, many of those that did not evacuate had a

practical reason for not evacuating. A common reason for not evacuating was belief that the

storm would not be as bad as publicized. About one-third of those who did not evacuate

reported lack of money as the reason (Kaiser, 2005).

A-27
Special Needs

An element of the Hurricane Katrina response that received a large amount of media coverage

was the evacuation of the special needs population. The lack of a formal definition of "special

needs" among emergency management officials contributed to the issues associated with

evacuating this population group. Special needs individuals, as defined in the Catastrophic

Hurricane Evacuation Plan Evaluation (DOT, 2006) included people who were elderly, those

with disabilities or medical conditions, people with limited English proficiency, people with

hearing and sight impairment, and people without access to private vehicles. Special needs

individuals can also include those who are impoverished, chemically dependent, and those with

emotional or mental disabilities (DHS, 2006). Although planning for hurricanes was thorough

along the Gulf States, none of the emergency response plans in the region included such a

broad definition of this population group.

Mississippi

In Gulfport, Mississippi, arrangements were in place to use school buses to transport the special

needs population to area shelters. The system was effective in getting people to a safe

location. Arrangements were also in place with an ambulance service to transport those who

were non-ambulatory. Prior to the evacuation, a special needs list had not been-fully compiled

through local agencies; however, the ambulance service had its own list, and the county was

able to use it to identify some of the special needs individuals. There were no plans in place to

evacuate individuals who were transit dependent. These individuals needed to make

arrangements for transportation to shelters and in many cases called 911 to request assistance.

The police and fire department responded to requests until the hurricane force winds were too

hazardous. In Hancock, Harrison and Jackson counties, only a small percentage of the

population is dependent on public transportation. These people were encouraged to make

evacuation arrangements with friends or family if possible. Shelters were opened in the area for

those that were unable to evacuate.

Louisiana

Following the mandatory evacuation order of New Orleans on August 28, 2005, police and fire

department personnel were sent through'the city asking people to go to checkpoints where

buses would pick them up to take them to the Superdome (United States, 2006a).

Approximately twenty buses were used to support this effort (United States, 2006a). There

were no signs posted with* instructions on where to meet buses, and residents found it difficult to

know where these checkpoints were. There were no plans for individuals who could not get to a

checkpoint.

In Plaquemines Parish, the emergency management department sends out special needs

registration information via newspapers, cable television, and local television networks. Twentyfour residents had registered in Plaquemines, and thirty people ultimately required assistance

evacuating. The parish Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness recognizes

the time consuming and safety sensitive issues of this population group and conducts very

detailed planning. This includes using public health announcements combined with extensive

outreach efforts to have people register with the parish. Home visits are made to each

applicant, and their condition and needs are verified. This has proven very effective in

preparing for evacuations (St. Amant, 2007). The Plaquemines Parish President and

A-28
Emergency Management Agency took a very proactive approach getting people out of the

parish.

St. Charles Parish, Plaquemines Parish and others had also proactively planned for the

evacuation of their special needs populations. Those with special needs were encouraged to

self-identify with the parish if assistance was expected to be needed during the evacuation. In

St. Charles Parish, a card was sent out each year to identify those who cannot evacuate for

health reasons. The parish emergency management agency typically receives about 95 cards

each year. St. Charles residents were instructed to call the Emergency Management office, and

a bus picked them up from their homes and transported them to a local park where they were

evacuated from the parish. Approximately 800 people requested such assistance during

Hurricane Katrina (St. Charles Emergency Management).

Nursing home managers and owners prefer to shelter in place during a hurricane and as a

result, approximately 70 percent of nursing homes did not implement evacuation procedures

(Schlenger, 2006). Evacuating a nursing home may be a risky to the residents well being and is

very expensive, requiring special transportation arrangements for ambulances and specialized

busing. This cost is not refunded to a nursing home owner if a hurricane shifts course and

misses an evacuated area. Therefore, the decision to evacuate a nursing home is often made

late in the event, when in fact, the decisions are better made early, because it takes much more

time to evacuate special needs facilities.

Sixty to seventy nursing homes were affected by Hurricane Katrina. The Louisiana Department

of Health and Hospitals had established seven special needs shelters which quickly became

overwhelmed (Schlenger, et. al., 2006). According to the Louisiana Nursing Home Association,

licensed facilities are required to have an emergency plan. The development of individual

evacuation plans resulted in facilities identifying the same local busing and ambulance

resources to support an evacuation. This planning practice resulted in a lack of resources.

Only 21 Louisiana nursing homes evacuated prior to hurricane landfall (LNHA, 2006). Buses

that been contracted were not always available (Schlenger, 2006), and residents had to travel in

borrowed vehicles that sometimes lacked air-conditioning or broke down along the way. Trips

took longer than expected and food and water were sometimes rationed. Medicine, oxygen

tanks and incontinence supplies were often left behind. Thirty-six additional facilities were

evacuated post-landfall, but these nursing homes and hospitals were not a priority during the

rescue process (LNHA, 2006). As a result of poor planning, bad decisions and unfortunate

circumstances, over 200 nursing home patients died as a result of Hurricane Katrina.

Another group of special needs persons are those under the control of local and State

correctional facilities. With the approach of Hurricane Katrina, some facilities evacuated

prisoners in the days prior to landfall. A few facilities, most in Orleans Parish, did not evacuate

prior to the storm. The Louisiana Department of Corrections stated that the evacuation,

although a "logistical challenge," was safe and efficient (DPS, 2005).

Shelters

In Mississippi, over 50 shelters were opened and 36 more were placed on stand-by (United

States, 2006a). These shelters were primarily schools and churches operated by the American

Red Cross. Special needs shelters and a pet friendly shelter in the Jackson Coliseum were

A-29
also opened. By August 28, 2005 shelters were reported at full capacity. To support

communities in the area, families at Maxwell Air Force Base took in pets from evacuees in

Mississippi and cared for the pets throughout the incident and until the owners could be located

(United States, 2006a). The Shelby County Humane Society in Alabama also sheltered pets

during the emergency.

In Louisiana, shelters were established as part of the evacuation plan and were typically placed

along the evacuation routes. A sheltering task force led by the Department of Social Services

and the Department of Health and Hospitals coordinated activities with the State EOC and

parishes (United States, 2006a). The American Red Cross began pre-landfall preparations on

August 27, 2005 and had every resource at its disposal on alert or moving in anticipation of the

event (United States, 2006a). As shelters in Louisiana began to reach capacity, shelters in

Texas, Mississippi, and other nearby States began to open (United States, 2006a). Area

churches in Louisiana implemented a program called "Brother's Keeper," which assisted in

getting those who lacked transportation or had other special needs out of the area.

Throughout Louisiana, the American Red Cross opened 563 shelters which housed almost

150,000 people, but they did not certify any shelters in New Orleans (Brinkley, 2006). Ten

special needs shelters were open in Alexandria, Baton Rouge, Bossier City, and Monroe and

other municipalities and housed almost 2,500 people (United States, 2006a). In New Orleans,

the Superdome, which had originally been designated as a special needs shelter, opened to the

general population as a shelter of last resort. The pre-landfall population at the Superdome

rose to approximately 12,000, which included approximately 400 special needs individuals

(United States, 2006b). Shelters of last resort were also established in several other parishes

(United States, 2006a).

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Jefferson Parish Emergency Management

Orleans Parish Emergency Management

St. Charles Parish Emergency Management

Louisiana State University Hurricane Center

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA)

Gulfport, Mississippi Fire Department

References

Brinkley, Douglas. "The Great Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans, and the Mississippi

Gulf Coast." 2006

Department of Homeland Security (U.S.) (DHS). "Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 Report."

February 10, 2006. DHS, 2006.

Department of Transportation (U.S.) (DOT). "Catastrophic Hurricane Evacuation Plan

Evaluation: A Report to Congress." June 1, 2006. DOT 2006.

Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections. "Positive Stories." DPS 2005.

A-30
Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA). "Prepared Statement of Joseph A. Donchess

Executive Director Louisiana Nursing Home Association." January 31, 2006.

National Hurricane Center (NHC). "Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August,

2005." Updated August 2006.

New Orleans. "City of New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan." City of

New Orleans, Louisiana. 2005

Schlenger, William E., et. al. "Estimating Loss of Life from Hurricane Related Flooding in the

Greater New Orleans Area." Abt Associates Inc., Prepared for the U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers Institute for Water Resources. Alexandria, Virginia. May 19, 2006.

Select Bipartisan Committee. "A Failure of Initiative." Final Report of the Select Bipartisan

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington D.C. 2006.

St. Amant, Jesse. Lessons Learned from Experience: What Works and What Doesn't.

Presentation: National Hurricane Conference. New Orleans, 2007.

Times - Picayune. "State Probing Death During Evacuation." New Orleans Edition, No. 277.

October, 25, 2005.

United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). "Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans

and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System." Final Report, Volume II, The

Consequences. March 26, 2007.

Washington Post, Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University (Kaiser Family). "Survey of

Hurricane Katrina Evacuees." September 2005.

A-31
HURRICANE RITA - September 24. 2005

Number Evacuated: More than 3 million

Category: Natural

Specific: Hurricane

INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Rita made landfall near Port Arthur, Texas on September 24, 2005 as a Category 3

hurricane. Mandatory evacuations had been enacted in Florida and residents along the Gulf

Coast began early-stage preparations for another mass evacuation. By September 21, 2005,

Hurricane Rita had strengthened to a Category 5 hurricane and the projected path included the

Houston area prompting an evacuation of Houston and the surrounding areas. With Hurricane

Katrina fresh in their minds, Houston area residents began to evacuate in record numbers. The

wide area affected and the strong encouragement of the local officials resulted in an evacuation

of more than 3 million people (HRO, 2006) although most media reports place the evacuation

estimate closer to 2 million people. As a result of the lengthy evacuation times in extreme heat,

130 fatalities were attributed to the evacuation (Henk, 2007).

Louisiana was also in the projected path, and residents in Cameron, Calcasieu, JeffersonDavis, Acadia, Iberia, and Vermillion Parishes were encouraged to evacuate before the storm

made landfall. In New Orleans, plans for reentry were postponed because of the weakened

state of New Orleans levee system. The storm surge Caused damage along the coastal areas

of western Louisiana and southeastern Texas (Knabb, 2006). The storm surge and wind

speeds in Galveston were not nearly as severe as feared. The levees breached in New

Orleans, flooding the city again and delaying the return of residents.

History of Emergencies

The Gulf Coast States have historically experienced numerous natural and technological

disasters including hurricanes, tropical storms, flooding, tornadoes, and chemical incidents.

The region is often threatened with the possibility of hurricanes and 2005 had been a very

active hurricane season. The Houston and Galveston area also has experience with hurricanes

and tropical storms. The residents were sensitive to Hurricane Rita as a result of the

catastrophic destruction that had occurred in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama only weeks

earlier by Hurricane Katrina.

Emergency Preparedness

The Houston Emergency Management Plan provides the general and conceptual framework for

a coordinated multi-agency response and efficient use of resources during a major emergency

or disaster (Houston EMP, 2005). The Houston Emergency Management Plan includes

elements such as chain of command, alerting, operating and recovery procedures, functions of

the Emergency Operations Center (EOC), guidelines for coordinating operations between

departments and the field, the authority for the development of training exercises, and

responsibilities of each agency (Houston EMP, 2005). More recently, the Galveston-Houston

area has adopted a zip code evacuation plan to facilitate staged evacuations in response to

future hurricane threats.

A-32
According to Matagorda County Emergency Management, the location of the nuclear power

plant within this coastal county has resulted in a very robust emergency management agency.

The county emergency management personnel recognize it is better prepared to respond to

emergencies due to the extensive training and daily coordination with response agencies.

Training

The Houston emergency plan requires training personnel to ensure that they are prepared to

handle an emergency. Training includes awareness exercises, as well as more in-depth

training for personnel who will be involved in either departmental or city emergency operations.

Drills and exercises are conducted regularly at four levels including orientation, tabletop

exercises, functional exercises, and full-scale exercises which simulate disaster events and

include response and discussion in the field (Houston EMP, 2005).

Public Education

The Houston Office of Emergency Management provides educational opportunities to the

citizens of Houston on home and business emergency preparedness, and response (Houston

EMP, 2005). The community's awareness of hurricane hazards and the importance of

evacuation was high, because of the recent events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. The

Galveston County Office of Emergency Management web site includes information on

evacuation.

In 2006, Galveston County proclaimed Hurricane Awareness Week in the County of Galveston.

The intent was to remind residents at the beginning of the hurricane season of roles and

responsibilities in response to the potential threat of a hurricane. To further improve public

education for future responses, the Texas task force report recommended a 'targeted' public

outreach effort that extends beyond public service announcements (Task Force, 2006).

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

Over 100 jurisdictional boundaries were crossed in the response to Hurricane Rita (Task Force,

2006). Local mayors or county Judges in Texas have the authority to order evacuations in their

jurisdictions. Although authorizing local authorities this responsibility is typical, having no

central authority to coordinate the timing of evacuations for a wide scale emergency can

contribute to congestion (Task Force, 2006).

Two key decision issues for Hurricane Rita were the decision to order a broad based evacuation

of the Houston area and the decision emphasize that residents not allow this to become

"another Katrina." These decisions have been attributed to the overwhelming response of the

public to the evacuation orders.

Communications with Emergency Responders

Emergency responders and local officials were aware of the approach of the storm days before

landfall. Emergency responders were notified of conditions through the National Hurricane

Center, national and local media coverage, and by senior officials. Emergency Operations

Centers (EOC) and Incident Command Posts were used. Communications from the EOCs were

coordinated through a JIC that collected and distributed information from departmental Joint

A-33
Information Officers (Houston EMP, 2005). Information was communicated between various

agencies via internet, e-mail, fax, cell phone, telephone lines, satellite phones, and radios.

Communication between emergency responders worked well in the planning, implementation,

and post-event response.

Communication with the Public

Communities in Texas and Louisiana were notified and informed of the current emergency

situation through a variety of means. These included television and radio broadcasts, National

Hurricane Center updates, notifications and updates provided by local and State officials,

Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages, cable TV overrides, internet updates, door-to-door

notification, and dynamic message signs such as those displayed along highways (Houston

EMP, 2005).

Although the messages were frequent and convincing and resulted in a very large compliance,

according to the House Research Organization, the biggest failure of the Hurricane Rita

evacuation was communication to the public (HRO, 2006). Officials advising the public to

evacuate compared the incident to Hurricane Katrina and emphasized the deaths that occurred

as a result of residents not evacuating for Hurricane Katrina. This aggressive form of

communication resulted in two thirds of residents evacuating who in fact did not need to

evacuate (TTR, 2006). Had the public been notified the evacuation would take more than 20

hours, residents could have better prepared by taking extra food, water, fuel, etc. Because

people were unprepared, many residents gave up and turned around rather than risk being

stuck in traffic when the storm hit (HRO, 2006).

The evacuation plan and notification system for the South Texas Project NPP was used in the

Matagorda County response to Hurricane Rita. Radio, television and some route alerting was

used to notify the area residents. All of these forms of communication are outlined in the

emergency response plan for the South Texas Project NPP.

Evacuation

The evacuation of more than 3 million people in response to Hurricane Rita (HRO, 2006) was

the largest experienced in Texas history. Not only did emergency responders have to deal with

their own large urban population, but also an additional 400,000 evacuees that had been

displaced from Louisiana by Hurricane Katrina and were residing in the Houston area (Task

Force, 2006). In preparation for the hurricane, the Federal Department of Transportation (DOT)

reached out to transit agencies along the Gulf Coast, and in cooperation with FEMA, staged 650

buses four days before landfall to support evacuation of Texas counties, New Orleans and

southern Louisiana parishes (White House, 2005).

Evacuations were initially planned to be staged beginning September 21, 2005, with residents in

more threatened areas of Texas, such as Galveston, Corpus Christi, and Jefferson County

evacuating before residents in Houston. Some local officials organized people with large

vehicles such as trailers to evacuate first, because these are more susceptible to accidents in

high winds. The most obvious problem with the evacuation was the gridlock traffic leading away

from the coast.

Having experienced traffic issues along the Texas coast in response to Hurricane Brett in 1999,

A-34
a contraflow plan had been formulated for 1-37 in Corpus Christi (TTR, 2006). Plans to utilize

contraflow on other interstates, such as 1-10, were ruled out because of logistics and lack of

manpower needed to implement such plans (HRO, 2006). By September 22, 2005, all major

roadways out of Houston were at a gridlock. Contraflow was implemented late and was

developed in an ad hoc manner. It took 10-12 hours to prepare for the start of contraflow on the

three main roadways affected. To improve upon this in future responses, the Texas task force

report recommends additional contraflow plans be developed (Task Force, 2006). These

measures are now in place and ready to be used in the future, if needed.

With the large number of evacuees and lengthy travel times, necessities including food, water,

restroom facilities, gas, and medical facilities were scarce along evacuation routes. In some

areas, local officials prohibited cars from exiting the road, even for such emergencies as

medical needs or picking up family members or children from daycare (HRO, 2006). The traffic

conditions led to frustration and discomfort among evacuees. Thousands of evacuees turned

around and returned to their homes, rather than endure the frustration or risk being trapped in

their car when the hurricane arrived.

There was some difficulty in finding qualified bus drivers because once a mandatory evacuation

was ordered, many drivers evacuated with their families (HRO, 2006). Some areas allowed bus

drivers to take their families with them on their evacuation routes. This technique makes the

order to assist in the evacuation of the public more appealing to the drivers (Task Force, 2006).

Another concern was time the bus drivers would have to work. Bus drivers are often regulated

on the amount of straight hours they are allowed to drive without rest. Placing more than one

driver on each bus was considered as a possible solution; however, doubling up on drivers

results in fewer buses available for the evacuation. Temporary emergency relief to this

regulatory requirement was ultimately received.

In the Galveston area, pets were allowed on buses. In discussions with emergency

management personnel involved with the evacuation, the placement of pets on buses was not a

problem. These included dogs, cats, birds, snakes, and other household pets. Problems

encountered were related to the long travel time causing some pets to overheat. Furthermore,

there was a lack of food and water and no ability to deal with waste. As has been confirmed in

past evacuations, people are often reluctant to leave their family pets at home, thus

accommodating pets in Galveston was a proactive and successful initiative.

Special Needs

The emergency response plan for Houston identify special needs individuals as the

responsibility of the institution. The plan did not address special needs individuals who do not

reside in special needs facilities. There was also no comprehensive definition of special needs

individuals, which was also an issue during Hurricane Katrina. The Hurricane Rita Evacuation

Task Force report, defined people with special needs as "those who cannot take care of

themselves during an evacuation" (Task Force, 2006). The definition includes the elderly,

individuals with physical or mental disabilities and their care givers, the homeless, and those

without transportation (Task Force, 2006). Although the definition of special needs individuals

was not documented in the State of Texas or City of Houston emergency response plans, local

officials in Houston, Galveston, and along the Texas coast recognized this population group and

A-35
implemented evacuation efforts. Considering the lack of preplanning for this population group,

the evacuation of these individuals was organized quickly and generally conducted successfully.

Special facilities such as nursing homes and hospitals require extra attention during an

evacuation, and under Texas law licensed facilities are required to have an evacuation plan.

The law does not address the quality of the plan or its currency (Task Force, 2006). One of the

greatest tragedies of Hurricane Rita occurred when a bus evacuating residents of a Bellaire,

Texas nursing home caught fire and 23 of the passengers died. Many of the passengers were

mobility impaired, making escape difficult or impossible. In other cases, arrangements made by

nursing homes to shelter or transport their residents were compromised when State and Federal

officials took beds or vehicles the nursing homes had planned to use (HRO, 2006). Additionally,

several bus and private ambulance companies, which had been contracted by nursing homes,

did not fulfill their duties to evacuate the residents either because they were over booked or

because drivers had already evacuated (HRO, 2006).

A successful evacuation of a special needs facility included transfer of patients from the Texas

Medical Branch Hospital to the University of Texas Health Care Center in Tyler, Texas. The

evacuation of this facility had been discussed among emergency response personnel in

planning activities; however, the facilities had never been fully evacuated. The ensuing

evacuation was completed in a 12-hour period using ambulances, helicopters, planes, and

buses.

Shelters

At least 150,000 people sought shelter in American Red Cross Shelters in response to

Hurricane Rita. Shelters were established in Dallas, Austin, San Antonio, and many other

communities throughout Texas. The shelter situation for Hurricane Rita was complicated

because of the evacuees already in the area from Hurricane Katrina. Thousands of evacuees

from Hurricane Katrina were in shelters in the Houston area, and these individuals needed to be

re-evacuated for Hurricane Rita. In Austin alone, 50 shelters were opened to house 15,000

evacuees (ARC, 2005). Those evacuating were encouraged to stay with family or friends

whenever possible. Schools, churches, stadiums, senior citizen facilities, and colleges were

just some of the types of facilities that served as shelters for Hurricane Rita.

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Matagorda County Emergency Management

Louisiana State University Hurricane Center

References

American Red Cross. ARC. "Rita Moves Thousands More into Shelters." September 26, 2005.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). "National Situation Report." September 21,

2005.

Henk, Russell. "Freeway Tolling Operations in the America's Conference." Texas

Transportation Institute. Houston, Texas. May, 2007.

A-36
Houston Emergency Management. "City of Houston Emergency Management Plan Volume 1,

Basic Plan; Revised September 2005." (EMP) September 2005.

Knabb, Richard, D. Brown, and J. Rhome. "Tropical Cyclone Report Hurricane Rita, 18-26

September 2005." National Hurricane Center (NHC). March 17, 2006.

State of Texas. "Task Force on Evacuation, Transportation and Logistics." Final Report to the

Governor. February 14, 2006

Texas House of Representatives: House Research Organization (HRO). "Evacuation Planning

in Texas: Before and After Hurricane Rita." February 14, 2006.

Texas Transportation Researcher (TTR). "Sidestepping a Cyclops." Texas A&M University;

Texas Transportation Institute, Vol. 42, No. 2. 2006.

White House. "Fact Sheet: The Federal Government's Hurricane Rita Preparations."

September, 2005.

A-37
HURRICANE WILMA - October 24, 2005

Number Evacuated: 300,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Hurricane

INTRODUCTION

Hurricane Wilma was the thirteenth hurricane of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season and the

third Category 5 hurricane of the season (NHC, 2006). After traveling through and causing

considerable damage in the Yucatan Peninsula, Hurricane Wilma made landfall in southern

Florida as a Category 3 storm on the morning of October 24, 2005. Evacuations in preparation

for Hurricane Wilma began on October 19, 2005 when Florida officials ordered tourists out of

southern Florida and closed schools to allow families to prepare and evacuate (Palm Beach

Post, 2005). Estimates vary, but multiple media reports identify approximately 300,000 people

evacuated in response to the hurricane.

The southernmost counties of Florida, including Monroe, Miami-Dade, Collier and Broward were

the most at risk of hurricane force winds and flooding. This area attracts a large number of

tourists and includes a large retirement community. Residents were strongly urged to evacuate

the area in the days leading up to the storm. Reports indicate that as few as 10 to 20 percent of

the population of the Florida Keys actually evacuated (Palm Beach Post, 2005), but other areas

of Florida had a higher compliance rate.

Hurricane Wilma caused the largest electrical disruption ever reported in Florida leaving

approximately 3,250,000 Florida homes without power. Turkey Point and St. Lucie nuclear

power plants are both located in areas affected by declared hurricane warnings. St. Lucie

County Emergency Management stated that traffic control points and evacuation routes used in

the response to Hurricane Wilma were similar to those identified in the emergency response

plan. Both plants declared Unusual Events as a result of the oncoming storm. St. Lucie and

Turkey Point nuclear power plants received minimal damage from Hurricane Wilma (NRC,

2005a; NRC, 2005b).

History of Emergencies

Southern Florida is very experienced in hurricane preparedness and evacuation. As the

thirteenth hurricane of the season, Florida had Very recent experience with this type of

emergency. Florida is also often threatened by other natural hazards, such as flooding,

wildfires, and tornadoes.

Emergency Preparedness

The Florida Emergency Management Offices at the State and local levels have comprehensive

emergency plans. The Monroe County Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP)

provides the framework for local officials to respond to any type of large scale emergency event.

The plan details responsibilities of county, city, private and State agencies (Monroe County,

2007).

A-38
Training

Emergency response agencies in southern Florida regularly conduct emergency drills and

exercises. In 2005, the emergency plans had been fully implemented in response to three other

hurricanes that had threatened the area prior to Hurricane Wilma. The Miami-Dade County

Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security coordinates with Federal, State,

regional, and local partners in training and exercises that strengthen the ability of the local

emergency management community and prepare responders to manage large-scale incidents

(Miami-Dade Emergency Management).

Public Education

Community awareness to hurricane hazards is high due to the frequency hurricanes threaten

this part of the country. Brochures and informational packets are available to educate residents

of their roles and responsibilities during a hurricane. Information is published in newspapers

and presented through local media on where and how to access shelters.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

Over 34 counties or jurisdictions responded to Hurricane Wilma. The State of Florida was

highly involved in the response along with Federal agencies. Decisions to evacuate the

threatened population were made by county managers, mayors, and local authorities. In

Florida, this decision process is tested frequently, and confidence among the decision makers is

high. The level of cooperation between local, State and Federal resources was good. As a

result of pre-planning and responses to hurricanes earlier in the season, roles and

responsibilities were well conveyed among different agencies and divisions. Many of these

agencies work often together in planning, training and drills.

Communications with Emergency Responders

Local officials and emergency responders were aware of the approaching storm from media

coverage, correspondence with the National Hurricane Center, and coordination with other

agencies. Responders used radios, telephones, cell phones, and satellite phones to

communicate with each other (Florida Emergency Management, 2005a). In Indian River

County, the communication tower for the EOC was destroyed and the facility severely damaged,

requiring the EOC to be moved to the sheriff's office. Despite power failures and some

localized communication issues, the State EOC was able to conduct scheduled conference calls

with the counties (Florida Emergency Management, 2005b).

Communication with the Public

While Hurricane Wilma was in the Gulf of Mexico, it was reported as the largest and most

intense hurricane ever recorded resulting in extensive national and local media coverage many

days in advance of landfall. The hurricane moved very slowly and provided southern Florida

time to prepare and notify the public. Evacuation notices as well as shelter locations were

announced through local media, and information was available on emergency management

websites. In some areas, police and emergency responders drove through neighborhoods with

bullhorns, or went door-to-door urging residents in threatened areas to evacuate.

Communication during the evacuation included local television and radio broadcasts and

A-39
dynamic message signs along the highways. Florida also has a 311 telephone system

available for people to call for information throughout an incident.

Evacuation

Evacuation efforts began on October 19, 2005 when tourists were encouraged to leave the

area. Residents began evacuating on October 21, 2005 when many counties across southern

Florida ordered mandatory evacuations for those residing in low lying areas, mobile homes or

,substandard homes (Florida Emergency Management, 2005d). Voluntary evacuations were in

effect for populations outside of these areas.

Due to a low compliance rate, reported as less than 20 percent, the traffic density during this

time frame was similar to that which occurs on a daily basis in Southern Florida (Keynews.com,

2005). Because Hurricane Wilma traveled very slowly across the Gulf of Mexico, people were

able to watch it slowly dissipate from a Category 5 storm down to a Category 3 storm.

Emergency management officials also attributed this low rate of compliance to the fact that

many people had evacuated needlessly for other hurricanes. Some people did not have the

funds to evacuate, because they had exhausted their funds in previous evacuations. Another

reason attributed to low compliance is the understanding that there are more stringent building

codes in Florida, and some people believe their homes will withstand strong winds (USACE,

1999). Some residents were not convinced they were in the hazard area.

During the evacuation some highways were reported as severely congested, but this was

mostly attributed to areas where minor accidents had occurred.

Special Needs

.At least four hospitals were evacuated in response to Hurricane Wilma including the Glades

General Hospital and Hendry Regional Hospital (Florida Emergency Management, 2005c).

There were also more than 20 Adult Family Care Facilities and Assisted Living Facilities and

approximately 60 nursing homes evacuated (Florida Emergency Management, 2005c).

The Emergency Evacuation Assistance Program is one of many programs that encourage those

who require skilled nursing care, assistance with daily living or are on life saving medical

equipment dependent of electricity to register with their local Office of Emergency Management.

Registration includes identifying the means of assistance needed in the case of an emergency.

Florida emergency management agencies acknowledge the special needs population that does

not reside in special facilities and implement programs to identify this population before an

incident occurs. Although their programs are mature, the percentage of individuals registering

for support in Florida is still relatively low. The reasons for this may include an assumption by

special needs individuals that someone (friend or family) will be willing to assist them; some

individuals have reported being sensitive to their disability and their need for assistance; some

individuals are concerned about the security of their personal data; and others simply do not

realize they are in the special needs population. The latter is particularly true of elderly

individuals, who may believe they are able to evacuate, but should not be attempting a multihour evacuation.

A-40
Shelters

Miami-Dade County, Monroe County and others have plans in place to transport people via bus

to shelters during a hurricane evacuation. Residents are told to listen to the media or call 311

for bus information. There is one highway in and out of Monroe County, and residents requiring

a ride wait on the side of the road for bus transportation.

Residents in Florida are encouraged to try and shelter first at a friend or family residence

outside the evacuation zone in lieu of sheltering at a Red Cross facility. Over 120 shelter

facilities were open accommodating almost 40,000 evacuees. At least 27 special needs

shelters were available and these facilities accommodated over 2,150 special needs individuals

(Florida Emergency Management, 2005c). Florida also has an effective pet friendly shelter

program, but these shelters can reach capacity quickly. Typically, counties in Florida request

that residents apply for admittance or make reservations for a pet-friendly shelter.

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

St. Lucie County Emergency Management

Florida Emergency Management, Monroe County

References

Florida Emergency Management. "Situation Report No. 13; Hurricane Wilma." Florida State

Emergency Response Team; October 24, 2005; 2:30 pm. (2005a).

Florida Emergency Management. "Situation Report No. 14; Hurricane Wilma." Florida State

Emergency Response Team; October 24, 2005; 8:00 pm. (2005b).

Florida Emergency Management. "Situation Report No. 17; Wilma's Aftermath." Florida State

Emergency Response Team; October 25, 2005. (2005c).

Keynews.com. "Most Stay for Hurricane Wilma's Arrival." October 23, 2005.

httl://www.keysnews.com/hurricaneedition/1 024 MostStay.htm

National Hurricane Center (NHC). "Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Wilma." January 2006.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual

Occurrence. PNO-11-05-008A. October 24, 2005; 1:15 pm. 2005a.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Preliminary Notification of Event or Unusual

Occurrence. PNO-1 1-05-009A. October 24, 2005; 1:15 am. 2005b.

Palm Beach Post. "Hurricane Wilma: Day-by-Day Recap." 2005.

httg://www.palmbeachpost.com/storm/content/storm/2005/atlantic/wilma/recap.html

United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). "Hurricane Georges Assessment, Review of

Hurricane Evacuation Studies Utilization and Information Dissemination." August, 1999.

A-41
NEW ENGLAND FLOOD, 2006

Number Evacuated: Approximately 7,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific: Flood

INTRODUCTION

From May 11 to May 23, 2006, record amounts of rainfall fell over Massachusetts, New

Hampshire, and parts of southern Maine. Flooding that occurred as a result of the heavy rainfall

was reported as the worst since the New England Hurricane of 1938 (CBS, 2006). More than

7,000 people were evacuated under mandatory and voluntary evacuation orders as flood levels

rose. Homes were evacuated on an as needed basis depending on where they were located in

the flood plain and according to projected forecasts. Frequently, homes in lower lying areas of

communities were the only ones evacuated. Dams within the region were at capacity with some

breaches further contributing to the flooding (Portsmouth, 2006a).

The Seabrook and Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants are located in the region affected by the May

2006 floods. Pilgrim is located near Plymouth, Massachusetts, and Seabrook Station is located

in Seabrook, New Hampshire, approximately 65 km (40 miles) north of Boston, Massachusetts.

There were no reports of flooding at either facility.

During the recovery effort, there was a report in Lawrence, Massachusetts of the need for

bilingual staff to support the completing of paperwork for assistance. City employees assisted

in translating where needed, and the Red Cross provided a few Spanish speaking rescue

workers (Boston Globe, 2006). There were no reports identified of issues with the evacuation

due to language barriers.

History of Emergencies

The Massachusetts and New Hampshire area is experienced with flooding and hurricanes, and

almost every year some evacuations are required in response to flooding. All five of the

Federally declared major disasters in the Massachusetts since October 1996 involved flooding.

Evacuations in response to flooding had also occurred in October of 2005 in many of the same

areas. During the October 2005 flood, several fatalities were reported of individuals who did not

evacuate. Local authorities attribute some of the cooperative response of the public during the

2006 floods to the realization of the consequences of not following the direction of emergency

responders.

Emergency Preparedness

Emergency preparedness activities are conducted extensively at State and local levels. These

activities include preparing plans, conducting- training exercises and drills, and educating the

public of local emergency hazards. Planning is conducted by both State and local emergency

management agencies. The New Hampshire Radiation and Emergency Plans Coordinator

stated that emergency responders located within the Seabrook Emergency Planning Zone are

A-42
well prepared to respond to various types of emergencies due to frequent training and exercises

conducted for the plant.

The communities are aware of the alerting mechanisms used for this type of disaster. The

public is often informed of hazardous situations through EAS messages announced over local

radio and television stations, through local law enforcement, and Reverse 91 1® systems.

Training

Training is provided for emergency responders and includes, but is not limited to, training on the

Incident Command System (ICS), National Incident Management System (NIMS) awareness

training, hazardous material awareness, mass care and logistics. The community emergency

response agencies regularly conduct drills and exercises ranging from table-top exercises to

full-scale drills. These types of drills are conducted locally, regionally, and State wide.

Emergency plans used in the May 2006 Floods were previously tested in a full-scale field

exercises.

Public Education

Proactive measures are in place to improve and maintain community awareness of local

hazards. One program in Massachusetts involves emergency management officials going to

local public events to educate the public. New Hampshire has an informative website where

citizens may obtain information and answers to common questions related to local hazards.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Makinq

Affected counties within New Hampshire and Massachusetts used their emergency plans in

response to the flooding. Local officials ordered evacuations, and there were no major

problems reported with the decision making process or with the time spent on decision making.

The level of cooperation among local and State agencies was reported as good during the

incident. Only minimal Federal assistance was needed for this emergency response, because

efforts could .be adequately controlled by local and State resources. -Local and State

emergency management agencies, along with police and fire departments, aided in the

evacuation effort. The command and control process during the response was carried out

according to existing plans.

Communications with Emergency Responders

Regional and local EOCs were used for the emergency response. Using local EOCs provided

the regional EOC a better perspective of the overall response. There were no problems

relaying information between field emergency responders and the EOCs. Cell phones, radios,

and a web based EOC were all forms of communication between responders. Responders

followed ICS and Emergency Support Function (ESF) guidelines to assign and communicate

responsibilities and roles. This structured system assigns agencies with similar functions to

work together to accomplish a common goal. There were no reports of confusion on

responsibilities.

A-43
Communication with the Public

As conditions gradually worsened in the days prior to evacuations, officials and the public were

notified of the conditions via extensive television and radio coverage. There were no problems

with the notification. The means by which the public was notified of weather conditions and

evacuation status was dependent upon the location of the community. Methods of notification

included EAS messages on local TV and radio stations, route alerting with public address

systems, Reverse 91 1' calls, and door-to-door communication. Due to the nature of the

flooding, evacuations did not occur simultaneously.

Communication issues were reported in post-incident recovery efforts. In Lawrence,

Massachusetts a large percentage of the population spoke only Spanish (Boston Globe, 2006).

Translators were needed to communicate directions in completing forms in the recovery effort.

Evacuation

Due to the localized areas of flooding, evacuations were typically conducted on a small scale,

although there were some instances of entire communities needing to evacuate. Evacuees

were informed of shelters in the area, but were not provided specific directions to their location.

In these small communities, residents generally knew the locations of the schools and

community centers and directions were not needed. Often, families were simply instructed to

move to higher ground and were able to return to their homes within a few hours. There were

cases of families evacuating before they were ordered to do so, but this was not a problem.

More than 600 roads were closed in New Hampshire (Portsmouth, 2006b) at various times due

to flooding. The Army National Guard assisted in: manning road blocks', and the Department of

Transportation was involved in repairing roads damaged by the flooding. Residents were

cooperative and usually left early enough to avoid problems in reaching their desired

destinations. Some of the evacuated areas included residents dependent upon public

transportation. No plan was in place to evacuate these individuals, and they were able to

evacuate either with the aid of family and friends or by using the regular public transportation

system.

Police aided in directing traffic and manning road blocks. State officials said that the

evacuations as a whole went very well, and no major problems were identified.

Special Needs

Several special needs facilities were evacuated as a result of the flooding, including several

nursing homes and a half-way house with 40 female inmates (AP, 2006). It took approximately

10 hours to evacuate one nursing home, when a hoist was required to be constructed in order

to safely move a non-amb~ulatory patient from a sub-level floor. In Lawrence, Massachusetts, a

large nursing home with approximately 243 residents was evacuated in 8 hours. Due to the fast

rising flood, evacuees had to be floated out of the facility in oversized laundry bins (Catholic

Health World, 2006).

In New Hampshire several special needs individuals were evacuated to shelters (Portsmouth,

2006a). The States of Massachusetts and New Hampshire both recognize the concern of

evacuating special needs residents, and both agree that there is definite room for improvement

on how this evacuation could effectively be completed. Although it is encouraged at the State

A-44
level for special needs plans to be created, it is ultimately up to local jurisdictions to create such

plans and registries to identify this population. Also, because of privacy issues, which are also

cited as primary reasons for not registering in other States (HRO, 2006), it is often left up to the

individual to register themselves as a special needs person.

Shelters

Shelters were open throughout the region and were run primarily by local chapters of the

American Red Cross. At least 14 shelters were open in Massachusetts, and at least 18 shelters

were opened New Hampshire (ARC, 2006) with community centers, gymnasiums and schools

used as shelter locations. Local restaurants donated a large amount of food and water to the

shelters, and there were no reported shortages of necessities. It was estimated that

approximately 10 percent of those who were evacuated went to a shelter.

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Massachusetts Emergency Management Department

New Hampshire Emergency Management Department

References

American Red Cross (ARC). "New England Flooding Forces Families from Homes, Red Cross

Responds." May, 22, 2006.

Associated Press (AP). "New England Floods Now Deadly." ABC News. May 16, 2006.

Boston Globe. "The Lack of Translators is Slowing Flood Relief in Lawrence." May 28, 2006.

Catholic Health World. "Flooding Forces Mary Immaculate Evacuation." Catholic Health World,

Vol. 22, No. 10. June, 2006.

CBS. "New England Rains Ease, Floods Remain." CBS News. May 16, 2006.

Portsmouth Herald. "Evacuations Enacted in Newmarket." May 16, 2006. 2006a.

Portsmouth Herald. "Portions of New England Submerged after Record Rainfall." May 16,

2006. 2006b.

A-45
CHEMICAL FIRE. Apex. North Carolina - October 5. 2006

Number Evacuated: Approximately 17,000

Category: Technological Disaster

Specific Type: Hazardous Materials Facility Fire

INTRODUCTION

On the evening of October 5, 2006, a fire started at a hazardous waste management and

transportation facility in Apex, North Carolina. Responders who arrived at the site described a

haze in the air near the storage facility and observed smoke coming from the building. The

Apex Fire Chief immediately ordered the team to back off and directed that water not to be used

on the fire. The Fire Chief contacted Wake County Emergency Management and requested

notification calls to residential and business telephones within 0.8 km (0.5 miles) of the facility.

A message instructed the public to "stay inside, close windows and doors and listen to the radio

or television for further information." At 10:00 p.m., an evacuation order for the same area was

issued. The evacuation order was expanded to a 1.6 km (1 mile) radius from the facility about

90 minutes later. The Apex response included implementation of shelter in place, a large scale

evacuation, evacuation of a nursing home, and evacuation of transit dependent individuals.

Each of the response elements was successfully implemented and the protective action

response activities were complete within about 6 hours.

Some law enforcement personnel reported being overcome by fumes as they conducted house

to house evacuation notifications. This resulted in the evacuation zone being expanded to 6 km

(3.75 miles) downwind of the facility. Evacuations continued through the night with the final

evacuation zone established around 4:00 a.m. on October 6, 2006. Approximately 17,000

residents were estimated to have evacuated (National Response Center, 2006), and a shadow

evacuation of more than 30,000 people was also reported.

Eighteen people were taken to emergency rooms complaining of respiratory problems, including

12 police officers and three firemen. Area hospitals registered 45 people complaining of

respiratory distress; however, no one was admitted as a result of health issues caused by the

fire.

History of Emergencies

Community evacuations had not occurred in Apex in the previous ten years, although

evacuations in localized areas have occurred as a result of hurricanes, winter storms, and

severe thunderstorms. Approximately one year earlier, various agencies and jurisdictions had

worked together to assist in the recovery efforts following Hurricane Katrina. The Town of Apex

was actively involved in sheltering Hurricane Katrina evacuees, as well as getting separated

family members back in touch with one another. Through these activities as well as others,

emergency responders were proficient with communicating with one another and well aware of

responsibilities in an emergency situation.

A-46
Emergency Preparedness

Emergency management departments from the town of Apex and Wake County have been

working together for years. The chemical facility and the declared evacuation zone are within

the 16 km (10 mile) emergency planning zone (EPZ) of the Shearon Harris nuclear power plant

(NPP) where emergency response planning is extensive. Apex did have an emergency plan in

place prior to the chemical fire. The plan had recently been updated to comply with the

requirements mandated for the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and had been

coordinated with the emergency response plan for Wake County. The emergency plan had

been coordinated between the Shearon Harris NPP and State and local emergency response

agencies and provided a strong foundation for the response actions during this incident.

Training

Town personnel had recently been trained on the use of the town emergency plan. Emergency

responders were also required to attend the State Fire Marshall's Unified Command and control

training (NF&R, 2007). In Apex, fire and law enforcement personnel are provided annual

refresher training for the Shearon Harris NPP Emergency Plan response. Local, county, and

State emergency responders are continuously involved in joint training exercises, drills, or

response activities for a variety of reasons, including their responsibilities for the Shearon Harris

NPP. Drills range from table-top exercises to full-scale field exercises. Apex fire and law

enforcement departments, town employees, department heads, and town council members

were required in 2005 to complete NIMS training (NF&R, 2007). In addition to training required

within agencies, several industries in Wake County conduct training drills for emergency

responders. There had not been any such drills or training conducted with the chemical facility.

Public Education

Public awareness is considered high for the Shearon Harris NPP, but few people knew of the

chemical facility or the types of materials it handled. Residents within the 10 mile EPZ of the

Shearon Harris NPP are provided annual information describing emergency response activities

in the event of an incident at the plant. Annual Safety Awareness Days are conducted by the

Apex Fire Department addressing a variety of safety topics including evacuation.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The Apex Fire Chief was the Incident Commander and made the decision to evacuate. The

decision making process was clear, and decisions were made and executed in a timely manner.

The level of cooperation among local, State, and Federal agencies prior to, during, and after the

incident was considered outstanding. The Town of Apex fire, Emergency Medical Service and

law enforcement agencies have had "mutual aid" agreements in place with the surrounding

communities on a continuing basis. The success of the incident response was attributed to the

cooperation between local, county and State personnel. Federal responders brought expertise

and also cooperated well with local responders.

Communications with Emergency Responders

The initial dispatch of first responders was through the Wake County computer-aided dispatch

(CAD) system via radio and pager. The Raleigh Hazardous Materials Team was also notified

through the CAD system. There were no problems in notifying emergency personnel.

A-47
An EOC was activated by Wake County, and a field incident command post (ICP) was

established after the Incident Commander arrived on-scene. The ICP was relocated four times

during the incident due to changes in wind direction. Communication among responders

included cell phones, NEXTEL Direct Connect, 800MHz radios, Sprint Air Card for Internet

access, and access to the Wake County local area network system. The majority of

communication between field responders and the ICP was conducted via the Wake County 800

MHZ system (NF&R, 2007). At the time, law enforcement personnel were not on the 800 MHZ

system. To address this communication gap, a law enforcement employee was stationed at the

command post to convey messages to field police personnel (NF&R, 2007). All

communications systems worked well throughout the incident.

Roles and responsibilities were communicated and assigned according to the Incident

Command System (ICS). With several different agencies reporting to the scene, the ICS

allowed for easy communication between agencies. Agencies were organized according to

their discipline.

Communication with the Public

The "Communicator System," similar to a Reverse 911® system, was used to notify residents of

the evacuation. The public was also notified through EAS messages, NOAA Weather Radio,

Radio and TV broadcasts, and in some cases, door-to-door notification from law enforcement

personnel.

Hospitals around Apex were notified of the incident and made aware that an increase in patients

may be expected as a result of side effects from the chemical fire. A decontamination station

was set up outside hospitals for any patients that might be contaminated (NF&R, 2007). The

Wake County School System was also notified that three schools were being used as shelters.

Following the evacuation, information was provided to the public via a media center. Residents

could call or visit and obtain information on the status of activities.

Evacuation

The evacuation began at around 10:00 p.m. on October 5, 2006, and within about six hours

17,000 residents, or approximately 50 percent of Apex, North Carolina, was evacuated.

Emergency responders estimated that more than 30,000 additional residents left during a

shadow evacuation. The evacuation was staged with very clear geographical demarcation

areas conveyed to the public. The success of the evacuation was attributed to the

professionalism of the fire department and law enforcement personnel.

Initial protective action instructions to shelter in place were provided by emergency responders

through the media. It was observed that most people were willing to comply with those

instructions. When an evacuation was ordered for an area, people generally complied with the

request. Some people evacuated spontaneously before being told to do so, and a small

number of people chose not to evacuate.

An early issue in the response was whether enough emergency responders were available to

assist in road closures, evacuations, and directing traffic out of the area. However, extra

personnel were obtained after the North Carolina State University football game ended and

State troopers, county sheriffs, and police became available to help with traffic (NF&R, 2007).

A-48
Traffic control points were manned until the evacuation order was lifted. No traffic problems

were encountered during the evacuation, and only a few minor accidents were reported.

Residents were provided specific instructions of where to go if they were evacuated. The Apex

Town Manager informed the public via television broadcasts that if evacuees needed a place to

go, they could shelter at the Olive Chapel Road Elementary School or the Timber Creek

Elementary School. Raleigh city buses were mobilized ad hoc to transport any persons who

required public transportation out of the area. Few people used the bus transportation.

A significant part of the town's physical resources was cut off as the plume spread quickly. Fire

stations, the Apex Police Department, town hall, and the community center were in the plume

pathway (NF&R, 2007). The Apex Police Department and 911 Center were also evacuated.

There were approximately 15 police cars in the parking lot that could not be used since they

were considered contaminated. Thus, some police officers that were called to duty, had no

vehicles.

Apex law enforcement went door-to-door following the evacuation order to verify that residents

within the evacuation zone were aware of the situation and had evacuated if they chose to do

so. Any resident that needed to reenter the area had to report to a specified location and

request an escort. These situations were limited to an emergency only basis and typically took

a few minutes to complete.

Special Needs

The Shearon Harris NPP does provide a means for residents within the 16 km (10 mile) EPZ to

register if assistance is needed in the case of a NPP incident, but the plan does not extend to

other hazards that could require evacuations. There were no reported incidents of residents not

being able to evacuate. The city medical branch assisted in the evacuation of 103 nursing

home patients from a single nursing home. Seventeen ambulances, wheelchair vans, and two

transit buses were used to evacuate the facility (NF&R, 2007). The evacuation of the nursing

home was completed without incident in about 3.5 hours.

Shelters

As identified in the emergency plan, the Community Center, which is also the town shelter, was

in the process of being to opened as an evacuation center. During the time frame in which the

center was being prepared, the plume changed direction placing the center within the

evacuation zone. The center was then required to evacuate.

The American Red Cross managed two reception centers, and Wake County Human Services

managed one shelter. Another shelter was opened at Green Hope High School, north of the

town. The two reception centers were later consolidated at a high school. Approximately 500

persons reported to shelters, and approximately 10 support personnel were located at each

shelter to assist evacuees. Local restaurants donated a large amount of food and water to the

shelters, and there were no reported shortages of necessities.

A-49
CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Wake County Emergency Management

Town of Apex Fire Department

Apex Police Department

References

National Response Center. Incident Summary. United States Coast Guard. Washington DC.

October 5, 2006.

White, John. "On the Scene." National Fire and Rescue (NF&R). Jan/Feb 2007.

A-50
HAWAII EARTHQUAKE - October 15, 2006

Number Evacuated: Approximately 3,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Earthquake

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

On October 15, 2006, two earthquakes occurred within a few minutes of each other in Hawaii in

the general vicinity of the towns of Hawi and Kiholo Bay. Hawi is a small town on the island of

Hawaii. Tremors resulting from the earthquakes were felt throughout all of the islands. The

Hawi earthquake was considered a separate earthquake because of its distinct source location

(Brandes, 2006). Extensive, mostly non-structural damage occurred as well as landslides,

power outages and waterline breaks which were reported to some degree throughout West

Hawaii. Around seventy percent of the island was without power for varying periods of time.

Approximately 3,000 people were evacuated from Kona and South Kona, many of which were

from hotels that were damaged (Harris, 2006). Kona Community Hospital was also evacuated

because of damage. Most of the evacuees stayed on the island and moved to temporary

shelters. Evacuees from the Kona Community Hospital were taken to the Keauhou Sheraton

Conference Center (Chock, 2006), and a few acute care patients were flown to Hilo Medical

Center. About 50 residents were moved from a long-term care facility in Honokaa, and 60

residents were evacuated from the Paniolo Club condominiums.

It was determined there was no threat of a tsunami, but police implemented tsunami plans to

keep traffic moving on the roadways. Residents and tourists who did not have to drive were

encouraged to stay off the roadways, and police reported people were cooperative with

emergency response. The disaster occurred early on a Sunday morning when people were just

getting up and traffic on the roadways was light.

History of Emergencies

The State and island of Hawaii are susceptible to evacuations due to'natural hazards including

volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, fires, and floods. Previous evacuations

have occurred for the 2006 floods in Huula, the 2005 wildfire in Waikoloa, and the 1989

Kalapana earthquake Hawaii experiences thousands of minor earthquakes each year, most

commonly attributed to lava moving below the surface. Most of these earthquakes can only be

detected through the use of seismic instruments, and those that can be felt seldom result in

damage to infrastructure.

Emergency Preparedness

The community's emergency preparedness activities include planning, training, and community

awareness. Prior to the 2006 earthquake, Hawaii revised their emergency plan to include the

2006 National Incident Management System (NIMS) recommendations. At the time of the

earthquake, the revised plan had not been implemented; however, emergency responders were

able to carry out an efficient response effort by using the current version of the emergency

A-51
response plan. Of note in this incident was that most of the evacuations occurred in hotels and

at a local hospital. These facilities are required to have local emergency response plans.

Training

Training among industry and emergency response agencies is conducted annually on such

subjects as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) processes, Homeland Security,

NIMS, multi-agency training, and hazardous materials. The Hawaii Civil Defense department

conducts regular training exercises (Hawaii County Mitigation Plan, 2007). Hawaii county and

the State of Hawaii regularly conduct drills and exercises ranging from table-top exercises to

near full-scale drills.

Public Education

The community is aware of the local hazards and evacuation procedures. However, the

majority of those evacuated following the earthquake were tourists and hospital patients. As a

result, it is expected that the awareness with evacuation procedures for those who were actually

evacuated was low. The community was also aware of how to obtain information concerning

necessary actions in the event of an earthquake. Most residents relied on television or radio

sources to obtain information concerning the earthquake even though a power outage made

information difficult to obtain in the first few hours.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

According to the Administrator for Hawaii County Civil Defense, there was a strong sense of

cooperation between local, State and Federal organizations from the beginning. "Everyone on

the island knows everybody and there's a cooperation that you don't see on the mainland, and it

makes things easier" (Harris, 2006). FEMA has a Pacific Area office located in Honolulu and

representatives were at the State emergency operations center within hours of the earthquake.

Communications with Emergency Responders

State and local officials were well aware of the occurrence of the earthquake which 'were felt

throughout the Hawaiian islands. Emergency responders knew from plans in place that they

were to report to the Civil Defense Office. An EOC was set up at both the State and local

levels. The State EOC was located in Honolulu and the Hawaii County EOC was located in Hilo

(Hawaii County Mitigation Plan, 2007).

This full-scale disaster required warning, evacuation, police, fire, ambulance services, mass

care, damage assessment, and medical services to support the response. Emergency

responders were dispersed throughout the affected area and were able to communicate with

State and county EOCs. Radios, cell phones and telephones were the primary form of

communication between emergency responders.

Communication problems did occur when the power went out at the beginning of the incident.

The high volume of calls made in the minutes and hours following the earthquake jammed

telephone lines making communication among emergency responders difficult. As a result,

residents were encouraged not to use the telephone unless it was an emergency. The Civil

A-52
Defense broadcast EAS reports to inform the public of the hazard status and that a tsunami was

not a threat. Because of the power outages, few people received the early EAS messages.

Communication with the Public

Guests staying in hotels were notified to evacuate via the facility public address systems and

staff going door-to-door. No problems with communication were reported and guests

cooperated with directions. The community had previous experience with the alerting

mechanism used including EAS messages broadcast by radio and television stations. The

island does have emergency sirens, but these are used only in the case of an approaching

tsunami. Since a tsunami threat was not a concern with this emergency, the sirens were not

used.

Some members of the public felt that they were not properly informed of necessary actions

following the earthquake. This lack of communication caused frustration among residents,

especially those located in a tsunami evacuation zone. The residents did not know if the

earthquake had been strong enough to warrant an evacuation of the coastal area. Some

residents felt that the emergency sirens should have been used following the earthquake.

However, Civil Defense stated that the sirens were not used in this emergency because there

was no threat of a tsunami. It was imperative to the Civil Defense department that the public not

lose trust in the meaning of an alarm when there was no imminent danger at hand. For some

time following the earthquake, the only way to inform the public on the western half of the island

was through emergency responders making rounds notifying residents that there was no

tsunami threat present.

Evacuation

The evacuation of the hotels and hospital was conducted relatively quickly. The number

evacuated from each facility was small, and the distance needed to move people to safety was

not far. Hapuna Beach Prince Hotel staff stated that it only took a few minutes to evacuate the

hotel. Police did man traffic control points after the earthquake, and evacuees were given

specific instructions about where they were supposed to go. Traffic lights were non-functional

due to the loss of power.

Road transportation was disrupted in some places due to landslides and damage to bridges.

There are limited roadways within Hawaii, and when roads are closed, areas can be essentially

cut off from access by emergency response vehicles. The area of North Kohala, including

Hawi, was cut off from the rest of the island for hours due to road closures. Kawaihea Port

handles approximately 60 percent of the imports coming to Hawaii and was also closed

following the earthquake.

Special Needs

This evacuation was unique because primarily special facilities were evacuated. The decision

to evacuate was made by officials at these locations. The manager of Mauna Kea Beach

Resort and Hapuna Beach Prince Resort decided to evacuate guests immediately after the

earthquake in order to assure that the buildings were safe (Pacific Business News, 2007).

Hospital facility administrators decided to evacuate patients from Kona Community Hospital and

the long-term care facility in Honokaa. Kona Hospital patients were assisted and cared for by

hospital staff until they could be transferred to other facilities. The power went out at the

A-53
hospital and none of the elevators were on backup generators. The evacuation required

patients be taken down stairways (Chock, 2006). Some patients were housed for a few days in

a hotel with their caretakers until the hospital could be repaired (RMS, 2006). There were no

reports of injuries to patients caused by the evacuation efforts.

Shelters

Following the earthquake, shelters were opened and operated by the American Red Cross.

Patients from Kona Hospital were evacuated to a shelter at the Keauhou Sheraton, which was

staffed by nurses and volunteers. Other Red Cross shelters were opened at Yano Hall, the Old

Kona Airport, and the Waimea Community Center (ARC, 2006).

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

Hapuna Beach Prince Hotel

References

American Red Cross (ARC). "Red Cross Responds to Earthquake." October 16, 2006.

Brandes, Horst G., Peter G. Nicholson, Ian N. Robertson. "Reconnaissance Following the

October 15, 2006 Earthquakes on the Island of Hawaii." University of Hawaii College of

Engineering (UH). Research Report UHM/CEE/06-07. October 26, 2006.

Chock, Gary., et. al. "Compilation of Observations of the October 15, 2006 Kiholo Bay (Mw 6.7)

and Mahukona (Mw 6.0) Earthquakes, Hawaii." December 31, 2006.

Harris, Chandler. "Trouble in Paradise" Republic Incorporated. November 14, 2006.

http://www.emerqencVmqmt.com/story.print.php?id= 102346

Hawaii County Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan. "Chapter 3, Risks and Vulnerability Analysis."

Pages 3-1-3-42.

Pacific Business News. "Earthquake Damage Will Lead to Upgrades at Mauna Kea Beach."

January 26, 2007.

Risk Management Solutions (RMS). "2006 Kiholo Bay, Hawaii Earthquake." RMS Event Report,

2006.

A-54
CALIFORNIA FIRES, 2007

Number Evacuated: > 900,000

Category: Natural Disaster

Specific Type: Fire

INTRODUCTION

Between October 20th and November 9th 2007 a series of 23 wildfires burned across areas of

southern California from Los Angeles and San Bernardino Counties in the north down to San

Diego and Imperial Counties near the US-Mexico border in the south. During these 19 days,

the fires burned some 517,267 acres and consumed 3,204 structures, including 2,233 homes, 5

businesses, 966 out buildings (OES, 2007a). In addition to the destruction of property, the

flames also tragically resulted in the deaths 12 people identified at the time of this research, and

were attributed to the injury of an additional 139 people (OES, 2007a), including more than 60

firefighters. The wildfires also precipitated the largest evacuation in California's history, with

some estimates suggesting the emergency relocation of nearly a million people (LA Times,

2007).

One of the most commonly cited contributing factors to the fire danger in the fall of 2007 were

the drought conditions which have existed periodically in the region for the past decade. This,

combined with seasonally hot weather and strong Santa Ana winds, created favorable

conditions for the creation and rapid spread of wildfires. Wind gusts during the fire period were

reported by the San Diego City Fire Department officials to have reached and even exceeded

100 mph in some locations. Multiple sources have also been suggested as causes for the fires

in the different locations around the region.

As California is a Mutual-Aid State, the effort to fight the fires, coordinate the evacuations, and

accommodate the needs of the displaced and injured residents was shared among agencies at

all jurisdictional levels, including city, county, State and the Federal governments. Fire fighters

and emergency management and response agencies also benefitted from the lessons learned

from previous fires, most recently a similar series of wildfires in 2003. Interviews with local

officials clearly asserted that all of these factors combined to undoubtedly save both people and

property from even greater losses. However, the interviews also showed that despite these

successes, the knowledge gained from recent experience, and the benefits achieved from the

shared effort, the enormous size and fast-moving nature of the 2007 fires combined with the

enormous populations in the area did result in some problems of communication, coordination,

and public response. An official After Action Report (AAR) conducted by the City of San Diego

documented both the lessons learned from the event as well as recommendations to address

them in the future (AAR, 2007).

History of Emergencies

Because of its size, diverse geography, active geology, large population, and significant

industries, the State of California is confronted with a wide spectrum of natural and man-made

hazard threats, including earthquakes, floods, landslides, wildfires, and radiological/nuclear

among many others. FEMA records show that, historically, California ranks second only to

Texas on the number federally declared disasters. Since 1953, the state has seen 73 disaster

A-55
declarations (compared to 81 in Texas) for an; average of nearly one and a half disasters per

year. This figure is also more than twice that of the national state average (FEMA, 2008). In

addition to these federal declarations, state records indicate that another 64 Emergency &

Disaster Proclamations and Executive Orders have been issued by the state government since

December of 2003 (CA-QES, 2008).

Wildfires constitute a significant percentage of California's large scale emergencies. The case

study of the 2003 wildfires showed that the state's Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

responds to more than 5,000 fires annually with about 97 percent of these extinguished the first

day (CDF, 2003). With this volume of activity, the State of California and the Forest Service

have actively progressed in emergency planning and response to fires, most notably in the

Standardized Emergency Management System. The SEMS requires the State of California to

use a standardized emergency management system from which the Incident Command System

(ICS) is based on.

Emergency Preparedness

To confront the array of hazards that threaten the State, California officials have a robust and

complex management structure for coordinating responses to emergencies. In past fires, the

California Fire Plan, National Fire Plan, lCS, SEMS, Multi-Agency Coordinating System

(MACS), and other programs have all been employed. These programs are intended to unify

various fire agencies to provide consistent direction and information to responders, policy

makers, and the public. Another of the cornerstones of this unified response approach is the

State's Mutual Aid Plan (QES, 2007b). Its primary purposes include the following goals:

" To provide for systematic mobilization, organization and operation of necessary fire and

rescue resources of the state and its political subdivisions in mitigating the effects of

disasters, whether natural or man-caused.

" To provide comprehensive and compatible plans for the expedient mobilization and

response of available fire and rescue resources on a local, area, regional and statewide

basis.

" To establish guidelines for recruiting and training auxiliary personnel to augment regularly

organized fire and rescue personnel during disaster operations.

" To provide an annually-updated fire and rescue inventory of all personnel, apparatus and

equipment in California.

" To provide a plan and communication facilities for the interchange and dissemination of fire

and rescue-related data, directives, and information between fire and rescue officials of

local, state, and federal agencies.

* To promote annual training and/or exercises between plan participants.

The basic concept of the structure is to have situations dealt with on a local level. Then, as

local agencies find their resources inadequate to confront the threat; they are able to request

assistance from other local and regional jurisdictions. Ultimately, requests for assistance bcan

go up to the state and even federal level as conditions warrant. One example of assistance

going all the way up to the State and Federal level was in the contribution of 1,500 California

National Guard troops an additional pledged of up to 17,000 other military personnel if needed.

Military aircraft and Fire engines were also made available for use during the firefighting efforts

and 100 California National Guard medical personnel provided medical assistance.

A-56
Interviews with local officials also pointed out some of the difficulties that can also occur within

the Mutual Aid system. When response personnel are called to emergencies outside of their

home jurisdiction, they may leave their home areas more vulnerable to other hazards. As an

example, the City of San Diego only had 40 fire fighters and 10 fire engines to cover their entire

city during the wildfire emergency. An apartment fire that occurred within the city while the

wildland fires were underway resulted in a loss of seven apartment buildings to a fire that would

have normally been extinguished before reaching this level had a full contingent of resources

been available. San Bernardino County officials also pointed out that since response workers

are often waiting to be called to an out of jurisdiction emergency, it caused additional stress on

personnel and resources as they wait to be called.

Since the 2003 fires the governor has increased funding to state fire protection by 84 percent.

Since 2003, 109 fire engines have also been purchased, there is year-round staffing in high-risk

areas, the Reverse 911® system and similar systems have been expanded and there has been

coordination between the Multi-Agency Incident Resource Processing System with the

California Fire and Rescue Mutual Aid System.

Training

Training for fire fighters is complex and diverse and includes many different agencies

(Campbell, 2004). Routine training includes drills and exercises that focus on fire safety and

response. The regional law enforcement academy is located in San Diego providing a common

training foundation for many of the agencies that ultimately respond to cross jurisdictional

emergencies such. as the fires. Cross jurisdictional exercises are conducted throughout the

region including the State's Golden Guardian exercise series initiated in 2004. Since the 2003,

more than 377 firefighters have been trained in wildland urban interface firefighting techniques

(CDF, 2005). The Forest Service has also increased the numbers and readiness of firefighting

resources. The Forest Service has also implemented a leadership training course with the

intent of increasing the abilities of leaders to make appropriate decisions and take independent

action when necessary (CDF, 2005).

The State of California also maintains an exercise resource web page whose purpose is to

enable practitioners to easily access to standardized and well-established exercise resource

materials that can be adapted for local agency use. The materials included on the site represent

a cross-section of exercise types from natural hazard to terrorism events. The state OES also

maintains a training branch to offer exercise design courses (OES, 2008a).

Public Education

The communities of Southern California are generally aware of the fire risk; however, a finding

of the Blue Ribbon Report (Campbell, 2004) was that a comprehensive public awareness

education program is needed. Through community awareness groups such as MAST in San

Bernardino, efforts are being implemented to better educate the public of their environment and

responsibilities. Forestry and fire departments are now taking a proactive approach to educate

the public on fire safety through interactive websites, videos, fact sheets and community group

presentations.

A-57
In 2005, the State of California OES has also established a program called the "Public/Private

Partnership for Emergency Management" (OES, 2008b). The goal of this program is to permit

private-sector resources to augment the state's first-responders' resources during the initial

days after a disaster to aid California's citizens and businesses. This program establishes

formal relationships between government and the private sector to monitor resources controlled

by the private sector, such as food and telecommunications, during disasters. A successful

example of a public-private partnership was the effort also launched in 2005 called the "Be

Smart. Be Responsible. Be Prepared. Get Ready!" campaign. The governor's family and OES,

encourage residents in the state to be prepared for disasters. The campaign also includes a

brochure in eight different languages titled "10 Ways"(OES, 2008c). This information is also

anticipated to be expanded to incorporate business preparedness needs, as well as special

needs populations.

EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Decision Making

The relationships that existed among local, State, and Federal agencies provided an excellent

example of multi-agency cross jurisdictional cooperation and facilitated decision making. In a

State as large and populous as California, cooperative efforts between local, State and Federal

agencies were critical in the response to wildland urban fires (Campbell, 2004). Agencies

worked together coordinating assets from neighboring fire stations and State resources.

Political boundaries were constantly crossed during the three-week event. Command, control

and coordination processes were pre-planned under the command structure provided by the

ICS and MACS. It was frequently the responsibility of the Incident Commander or local

authorities to issue necessary evacuation orders. It was also notable that the cross-jurisdictional

event extended across the border to Mexico during the emergency.

During the 2007 wildfire emergency, the California Governor declared a state of emergency in

seven California counties (Archibold, 2007). These actions were followed by a federal

emergency declaration in which both federal aid and military personnel and equipment were

ordered to supplement state and local response efforts (White House, 2007). It was estimated

that over 6,000 firefighters worked to fight the fires. In addition to the state and federal military

units, these personnel were also assisted by nearly 3,000 prisoners convicted of non-violent

crimes (Reuters, 2007), and 60 firefighters from the Mexican cities of Tijuana and Tecate (San

Diego Union Tribune, 2007a).

On a local level, it was apparent that decisions of what areas to evacuation and when they

should begin are made by the fire departments. Meetings with local officials showed that fire

department officials designate where and when to evacuate based on knowledge and

experience of wind conditions, fuel source availability, and threats to population. However, it

was also clear that their job is to fight the fires. Thus, they are not heavily involved in the

evacuation, although it was reported that firefighters did evacuate some people using fire

engine when needed. The law enforcement agencies actually manage and control the

evacuation process. If needed, some local DOT and DPW agencies play a minor overall in the

evacuation by providing barricades, variable information signs, and closing roads.

A-58
Communications with Emergency Responders

Although the general conclusion was that the communication of emergency-related information

to residents and evacuees was carried out effectively and some areas of need were identified in

communication among the emergency responders (AAR, 2007), the overwhelming opinion was

that communication was handled quite effectively from within and between the various

responding agencies. Communications were said to not have been a problem and

communication interoperability was relatively seamless. Another example of an effective tool in

San Diego County were the web-based emergency management communication tools like

WebEOC® software that made it possible for up to 500 agency representatives to have a

complete, instantaneous, full situational awareness. It should, however, be pointed out that at

times the fire moved faster than people's ability to get information into get system, update

messages, have them read, and be able to use it in a useful fashion.

The City of San Diego After Action Report did identify some relatively minor issues associated

with radio communications. This included a shortage of 800MHz radios among firefighting

crews, that may have, at times, slowed the deployment of firefighters and equipment at various

times and locations. Another issue was the lack of tactical channels for unit-to-unit

communication. This limitation led to overcrowding on the available channels and the delay of

information exchange at time when the bands were filled.

There was a lack of current map books reported in many areas. Detectives and administrative

officers supporting the effort do not always have access to mapping or know how to use the

software in patrol vehicles (AAR, 2007). Although an inconvenience, this was not reported to

have delayed the response or affected the evacuation.

Communication with the Public

The City of San Diego report documented the level to which all available venues of

communication were employed during the emergency, from quite sophisticated to the most

basic (AAR, 2007), including:

* Door-to-door knocking by first responders and neighbors

0 Police and Fire-Rescue vehicle sirens

0 Police and Fire-Rescue vehicle and helicopter lights

0 Constant monitoring and information flow to media outlets for dissemination to the public

0 Emergency Alert System via television media

0 Reverse 9110 mass notification system

0 AlertSanDiego mass notification system

0 Community Access Phone System

0 211 Information Line

* Individual and community preparedness.

The Reverse 911® system was used effectively to distribute messages for individuals to prepare

for evacuation and in many areas to issue mandatory evacuation messages. It was noted that

many people relied solely on receiving a Reverse 911® call before preparing or evacuating their

homes (AAR, 2007). All residents and businesses in an affected area with listed numbers were

notified with the system. Individuals who registered their unlisted numbers as well as cell

phones were also contacted. During the 2007 fires, the Reverse 9118 system also called

A-59
teletypewriter systems and telecommunication devices for the deaf (TTY/TDD) for individuals

with hearing and/or speaking impairments. The system is able to automatically redial numbers

if it receives a busy signal, and leaves a voicemail if it reaches an answering machine. The

system was said to have been timely and effective, although improvements are thought to be

possible, particularly for phasing evacuations. While the system manufacturer claims that it can

issue about 300,000 calls per hour, experience has show that outgoing call rates are function of

the local telephone switching capabilities available in an office or telephone exchange.

A similar, though newer, system is the AlertSanDiego.com system used by San Diego County

emergency management officials. The acquisition of this system was as a direct result of the

2003 fires. This is a web-based tool is similar to Reverse 911@®, but may be better suited for

evacuation because also incorporates a simple mapping tool within the software that can be

used to prioritize calls to specific areas, rather than calling numbers within the database in

numerical order. It can also use a computer generated voice to really typed messages. It can

be accessed and controlled remotely via the Web, although caution must also be exercised in

relying on it do to potential overuse of communication bandwidth during emergencies.

A community access phone system (CAPS) is available in San Diego to provide a direct

information line to the public. Operators answered over 12,300 calls received through the

system (AAR, 2007). In addition to CAPS, the State of California provides a 211 information

line for the public to access community information from live phone specialists who answer

questions about the non-profit services and agencies. Operators answered over 110,000 fire

related calls in response to these fires (AAR, 2007). San Diego city officials also noted benefits

of using 211 call systems to communicate with the public, particularly to relay general

information. The system was useful most notably to relay non-emergency related agency

contact numbers so that such non-emergency calls could go to these offices directly, instead of

using emergency dispatchers to give out numbers or transfer calls to others.

Evacuation

Similar to most evacuations, the exact number of residents who evacuated, when they left, and

where they came from and went to is not known for certain. However, several sources have

suggested that the total number of evacuees during the event was near one million people,

making it the largest in the history of California. Reports and interviews showed that

evacuations orders were issued as both "mandatory" and "voluntary" during the event. The type

of evacuation and when the orders were issued were a function of the speed and movement

direction of the fires.

Although similar in many respects to evacuations for other hazards, wildfire evacuations, are

somewhat different because they very fluid and based on the conditions of the event. The 2007

wildfires, as is common, had no set origin and pattern of movement. As such, there are no

formally written evacuation plans, although a basic template of action does exist. These are

not, for example, like hurricane evacuation plans that feature designated routes and formally

declared temporal trigger points that govern when to initiate certain actions. The plans for

wildfires basically involve a fire department's order of where and when to and the law

corresponding law enforcement agency determining how best to carry it out. Some areas, like

the mountainous regions of San Bernardino County, do have designated emergency routes

inasmuch as they are the only routes out of the area.

A-60
Similarly, there are no written or formalized "phased" evacuation plans in San Diego or San

Bernardino Counties. However, since the fire conditions do warrant the priority movement of

some areas prior to others, phased evacuations have been affected by ordering certain areas to

evacuate earlier and by using tools like the AlertSanDiego system to target earlier calls to the

most threatened zones first. Although most evacuations started as staged, they were quickly

were overcome by size and speed of the fire and became more general, large area

evacuations.

There was no implementation of proactive traffic management techniques like contraflow or

priority signalization during the 2007 fire event. In general, such actions seemed to be viewed

somewhat negatively because of the additional control manpower they would likely require.

Despite this, contraflow operations were seriously discussed for Ramona (north of San Diego)

by local officials but, they were never implemented. In discussions with San Diego city officials

it was learned that contraflow was used on a major roadway in the 2003 Cedar Fire also near

Ramona.

Discussion also revealed that, at times, up to 15 major roadway routes were closed during the

fires due to dangerous fire conditions. However, these closures did not appear to have

impacted the evacuation. Most notably, all of the most heavily traveled highways of Interstates,

5, 8, and 15, were closed at different times. To address this situation, local officials worked with

their federal counterparts at the Camp Pendleton Marine Corps Base to permit public use of

on-base roadways for evacuation traffic to access northbound of 1-5 in lieu of 1-15.

Another general finding regarding the California evacuation was that the population tended to

be more affluent and mobile than in other emergencies, particularly the Hurricane Katrina

evacuation in New Orleans. Similarly the local population tended to be knowledgeable of

evacuations; educated and aware of the potential dangers; and prepared to leave quickly with

their most critical belongings.

Throughout the evacuation residents were encouraged to evacuate with their pets. The region

around San Diego is well known for the equestrian facilities. The San Diego mounted patrol

used their horse trailers to help evacuate horses out of the area.

Special Needs

Although the evacuation of threatened population proceeded relatively smoothly some issues

associated with the movement of dependent and special needs populations during the 2007

wildfire event were noted. Access to a large nursing staff played a role in the successful

evacuation of Pomerado Hospital and the adjacent nursing home (AAR, 2007). The City of San

Diego After Action Report recognized that special need citizens tend to be under represented in

the emergency planning and preparedness process (AAR, 2007). During the emergency it was

found that some elderly and infirm groups experienced some difficulties in evacuating. A report

documented the evacuation of 11 nursing homes that involved the movement of about 350-500

residents from nursing homes, assisted living centers, and independent living facilities (LA

Times, 2007). Although the records do not indicate the details of their origin point or their health

condition, four elderly San Diego residents were noted to have died during the evacuation. Of

these, two of the decedents succumbed while being moved to safer medical facilities and two

others past away at hotels where they were sheltering.

A-61
Another group that had been reported in the media' to have been underserved during the fire

was the migrant worker and Hispanic speaking population. The Reverse 9110 calls that were

used to notify the public were not conducted in Spanish, although local Spanish television

networks did broadcast evacuation information. Some migrant workers in California were

reported by some to have remained in agricultural fields even if the area was under a

mandatory evacuation. The reasons for not evacuating were not provided. For non residents

that did evacuate, some were denied entry at shelters because they did not possess adequate

identification credentials. There were media reports of some individuals arrested because they

did not have adequate identification. Although city officials pointed out that there were no

reports of people not having evacuated because they did not understand that an evacuation

was in place. The city's After Action Report did document a "chronic lack of translators, which

hindered the ability to evacuate and/or provide other emergency services." (AAR, 2007).

Shelters

In addition to evacuees who made personal sheltering arrangements, residents from the

southern California region also sheltered at numerous public evacuation centers throughout the

region, including (AAR, 2007):

* QualComm Stadium (where an estimated 12 to 15 thousand people sheltered)

* Public Schools

" Civic centers

" Churches

The American Red Cross played a primary role in the establishment, support, and management

of care and shelter facilities. It was noted that from the start of the emergency, large donations

of food, water, cots blankets, and even children's toys began to arrive at care facilities, most

notably the QualComm stadium. The significant operational areas required at the shelters

included:

" Food management

" Donations Management

* Comfort Services

" Health and Special Needs

" Volunteer Management

" Animal Services

* Distribution Management

• Facilities Management

* Security

QualComm stadium was opened as a City run mega-care and shelter facility beginning on

October, 22, 2007 (AAR, 2007). The facility received thousands of evacuees, special needs

individuals, and animals. Approximately 400 nursing home patients created medical and

logistical needs not previously experienced at the shelter (AAR, 2007).

During the wildfire emergency, all of the communities involved supported the evacuation of pets

with the residents. In the San Diego and San Bernardino, officials set up "pet-friendly"

evacuations shelters and even accommodated pets at QualComm stadium. It was estimated

A-62
that there were between 10,000-15,000 pets located in evacuation centers. The website

Petfinder.com set up a 24-hour call center to link evacuees with volunteers willing to provide

temporary homes for a displaced pet. Lists of pet friendly hotels were given for southern

California. Typically hotels were allowing pets to stay at the hotels for no extra cost. San Diego

Human Society and the SPCA provided information regularly on their websites about animal

evacuation centers. At QualComm Stadium location-provisions were also made to shelter large

animals like horses.

CONTACTS AND REFERENCES

Contacts

California State Fire and Rescue Chief/FIRESCOPE Executive Coordinator

Governor's Office of Emergency Services

San Bernardino County Sheriff-Coroner Department

San Diego County Office of Emergency Services

City of San Diego Fire-Rescue Department

City of San Diego Office of Homeland Security

References

California Department of Forestry. (CDF). "California Fire Siege, 2003: The Story." October

21-November 4, 2003. U.S. Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Region. 2003.

City of San Diego Response. "After Action Report - October 2007 Wildfires." (AAR) 2007.

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). "Declared Disasters by Year or State."

February 29, 2008.

Governor's Office of Emergency Services. "Quick Facts for Southern California Wildfires."

(OES, 2007a). 2007.

Governor's Office of Emergency Services. "Emergency Managers Mutual Aid Plan." (OES,

2007b). 2007.

Governor's Office of Emergency Services. "Training and Special Programs." (OES, 2008a).

2008.

Governor's Office of Emergency Services. "Public/Private Partnership for Emergency

Management." (OES, 2008b). 2008.

Governor's Office of Emergency Services. "10 Ways." (OES, 2008c). 2008.

Los Angeles Times. "Scale of the fire's disruption on display at San Diego Stadium." October

23, 2007.

Reuters News Service. "California turns to prisoners to fight huge fires." October 26, 2007.

A-63
San Diego Union Tribune. "Mexican firefighters helping in California return to Mexico to fight

blaze." October 23, 2007. 2007a.

The White House. "President Bush Meets with Cabinet, Discusses Fires in California."

Washington, D.C. October 24, 2007.

A-64
NRC FORM 335 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER

(9-2004) (Assigned by NRC, Add Vol., Supp., Rev.,

NRCMD 3.7 and Addendum Numbers, if any.)

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

(See instrucions on the reverse) NUREGICR-6981

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 3. DATE REPORT PUBLISHED

Assessment of Emergency Response Planning and Implementation for Large Scale MONTH YEAR

Evacuations 10 2008

4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER

R3118

5. AUTHOR(S) 6. TYPE OF REPORT

J.A. Jones, F. Walton, J.D. Smith, B.Wolshon

7. PERIOD COVERED (Inclusie Dates)

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, provide Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and mailing address; if contractor,

provide name and mailing address.)

Sandia National Laboratories

Albuquerque, NM 87185-0779

Louisiana State University

Baton Rouge, LA 70803

9. SPONSORING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS (If NRC, type Same as above'; if contractor, provide NRC Division, Office or Region, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

and mailing address)

Division of Preparedness and Response

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

ILI 1-Je* KI~tl* IWI D -4~Sf IfRAI~~ I I a kfw.

11. ABSTRACT (200 orfds or less)

An important component of radiological emergency plans is the evacuation of the population in the event of a general

emergency condition at the nuclear power plant. In January, 2005, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published a

report "Identification and Analysis of Factors Affecting Emergency Evacuations" (NUREG/CR-6864), which was the most

comprehensive investigation of public evacuations in the United States in more than 15 years. Data was collected for 230

evacuation incidents, occurring between January 1, 1990 and June 30, 2003. Detailed case studies were prepared for a subset

of 50 incidents that were selected based on a profiling and ranking scheme designed to identify evacuation incidents of

sufficient complexity to challenge the local and regional emergency response capabilities. The data collected during this study

and its subsequent analysis has proven very valuable in identifying behavioral and other trends during evacuation events.

Since the completion of this research, several high profile evacuations have occurred, including Hurricane Katrina in New

Orleans, Hurricane Rita in Houston, as well as major wildfires across the western U.S. The NRC commissioned an update to

its 2005 evacuation case study publication to evaluate: Evacuation experience of the selected communities (e.g. timeliness,

related injuries, hazard avoidance);

Level of preplanning that was in place for the affected areas and extent that the preplanned requirements were

implemented during the emergency response; Critical factors contributing to the efficiency of or impediments to the evacuations

(e.g., drills, training, preparedness, experience, resources, facilities, and organizational structure;

and additional factors that may have contributed to less than satisfactory public response.

12. KEY WORDSIDESCRIPTORS (List words or phrases that will assist researchers in locating the report.) 13. AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Emergency planning, Hurricane Katrina, special needs populations, communication, training, drills, unlimited

plans 14. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

(This Page)

unclassified

(This Report)

unclassified

15. NUMBER OF PAGES

16. PRICE

NRC FORM 335 (9-2004) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER
Fedhrl Recycling Progrum

NUREGICR-6981 Assessment of Emergency Response Planning and Implementation for

Large Scale Evacuations

October 2008

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

OFFICIAL BUSINESS