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46–828 PDF 2009

S. HRG. 110–707 

RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION AGAINST GEORGIA: 

CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Burns, Hon. William J., Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department 

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 8 

Prepared Statement ...................................................................................... 12 

Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator From Pennsylvania ............................. 7 

Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator From Connecticut ............................... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana ........................................... 4 

Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator From Florida ....................................................... 6 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Prepared Statement of Hon. John F. Kerry, U.S. Senator From Massachusetts ....................................................................................................................... 48

Prepared Statement of Hon. Barack Obama, U.S. Senator From Illinois .......... 49 

Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary of State 

William J. Burns by Senator George Voinovich ................................................ 50 

Additional Questions for the Record Submitted to Under Secretary of State 

William Burns by Senator Robert P. Casey, Jr. ................................................ 53 

(III)

(1) 

RUSSIA’S AGGRESSION AGAINST GEORGIA: 

CONSEQUENCES AND RESPONSES 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Christopher Dodd, 

presiding. 

Present: Senators Dodd, Feingold, Nelson, Cardin, Casey, Webb, 

Lugar, Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Voinovich, Murkowski, and 

Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM CONNECTICUT 

Senator DODD. The committee will come to order. 

Let me welcome my colleagues, as well as our witnesses and the 

audience this morning, to be a part of this very important hearing, 

‘‘Russia’s Aggression Against Georgia: Consequences and Responses.’’ 

And we thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for being with us 

this morning. 

Let me, once again, express the apologies of my dear friend and 

colleague from Delaware, Senator Biden, who would normally be 

sitting here holding that gavel, but, as I presume everyone in the 

audience knows, he’s otherwise occupied, and couldn’t be here this 

morning. So, I’m designated as acting chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and delighted to be filling in for him this morning on this very important hearing. 

I’m going to share some opening comments, and then turn to 

Senator Lugar for any opening comments he may have. We don’t 

have a packed room of members yet, so any of my colleagues who 

would like to be heard on this issue may have that opportunity— 

several of whom have been to Georgia and can bring some particular expertise. Senator Biden, in fact, was in Georgia in the 

midst of the events as they unfolded. And then we’ll get to you, Mr. 

Secretary, to respond to some questions we may have. 

At some point here I’m going to try and put up a map, as well. 

I always find having maps can help, it certainly helps me when I 

can see exactly the geography and where various elements are that 

have been the source of the difficulties over the last number of 

weeks. So, when we get to that, if we have a chance, we’ll put that 

up, and then describe where some of the ethnic populations also reVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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side, which I think may help clarify, for those who are looking at 

this, some of the difficulties that are posed by this issue. 

Last month’s war between Russia and Georgia began in a small 

region of South Ossetia, but it obviously cast a very long and broad 

shadow across continents. In the aftermath of the conflict, the 

United States and our allies certainly face some serious new challenges. And as we survey the situation in Georgia today, we face, 

as I see it, three strategic questions. First, What can we do to shore 

up Georgia’s democracy, economy, and its institutions? Second, 

How do we convince Russian leaders that their actions in Georgia 

are antithetical to their own stated goal of becoming a successful, 

respected member of the international community? And third, 

What can and should the Euro-Atlantic community do to prevent 

the consequences of this war, which has already taken a heavy toll 

on Russia and Georgia, from undermining ambitions of the entire 

region? 

In many respects, the first question is the most urgent one. In 

the course of the conflict, tens of thousands of Georgians were driven from their homes. In some areas, entire villages were burned to 

the ground by South Ossetian forces armed and supported by Russia, and their residents have been told they will never be allowed 

to come back. As winter approaches, the situation could become a 

serious humanitarian crisis, as well. Georgia’s problems have been 

compounded by Russia’s gratuitous destruction of critical economic 

infrastructure far outside the autonomous regions of South Ossetia 

and Abkhazia. Georgia’s main rail line, cement factory, and even 

its national forests were all targeted by the Russian military. 

There are two ways to undermine, if not topple, a democratic 

government: Either militarily or by crushing and strangling the 

economy to make life so miserable that the government’s mandate 

comes into question. Many expert observers believe that having 

failed in the first approach, Russia now seems to have shifted to 

the second. Russians undoubtedly will know that the reason that 

young democracies survive is that each year people’s lives get a lot 

better. That happened in Georgia, of course. Before the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia’s whole economy was barely $5 billion a 

year. By last year, it had grown to $10 billion. Next year, it was 

going to be almost $14 billion. Hundreds of thousands of Georgians 

have joined the country’s new middle class. If Russia can halt that 

progress, it’ll cripple Georgia’s young democracy. Georgians don’t 

want a handout. They know how to grow their economy out of this 

conflict situation. They’ve done it before. We have pledged to them, 

rightly so, that the United States and the international community 

are not going to turn our back and walk away from this situation. 

The administration’s speedy commitment of assistance and other 

important signals of support from the international community will 

go far to persuading international investors, who have supported 

the country’s growth, to come back and to help them to rebuild on 

their own. 

We also need to help ensure Georgia’s institutions remain true 

to the principles on which they were founded. Georgia remains a 

very young democracy, as we all know, and is certainly not immune 

from the political problems that challenge other countries at this 

stage of development. It’ll be absolutely critical for Georgians to 

3 

maintain unity in the face of serious adversity, but, at the same 

time, this crisis cannot become an excuse for any actions by the 

government that compromise Georgia’s standing as a proud democracy. 

Second, we will need to continue reassessing our approach for 

dealing with Russia. We simply cannot allow Russia to act like the 

Soviet Union. We cannot allow them to go around intimidating or 

toppling democracies. In many respects, this question is bigger 

than Georgia and bigger than Russia itself. It is a matter of what 

kind of a world we’re going to live in, in the 21st century, and 

whether small democracies are allowed to thrive in that world, or 

whether they’re going to get bullied by the largest kids on the 

block. 

Russia has a critically important relationship with the United 

States and the West, but it’s a relationship that is now badly off 

track. Obviously, we want to work with Russia on a wide range of 

issues. The United States has supported Russia’s attempt to join 

international organizations, and tried to partner with Moscow on 

a wide range of issues. Russia’s increasing integration into the 

international community has had significant benefits for the Kremlin and the Russian people. The country’s economy has grown rapidly in recent years, and Russians are understandably very proud 

of that progress. 

With integration and success come responsibilities, as well. Once 

a country becomes part of the international political and financial 

networks, reputations matter, and matter a great deal. And if you 

develop a reputation for flaunting the rules, then you’ll pay a price 

for that. 

It should be clear to the leaders in Moscow that there are some 

real costs associated with failures to play by the rules of the international system. Russia’s benchmark RTS stock market index has 

lost more than half its value. Now, there are reasons for that loss 

other than these events, but, nonetheless, certainly such a loss has 

a lot to do with that conclusion. Three-quarters of a trillion dollars 

since its peak in May, I might add. Yesterday, and again today, the 

situation has been so bad that the index halted trading altogether. 

Capital flight from the country has spiraled, and risk premiums for 

investment in Russia are nearing stratospheric levels. Russia’s economic success has been the signature achievement of the country’s 

leadership, even if it has been largely predicated on high energy 

prices. If Russia does not reestablish a reputation as a country that 

abides by the rules both at home and abroad, then it may sacrifice 

both its international standing and its economic success. 

Finally, the crisis also has significant regional implications. 

Georgia is an East-West land bridge between the Caspian Sea and 

the Black Sea. When the Russian attack severed communications, 

Armenia was cut off from its one trade route to the West. Azerbaijan saw its economic lifeline, its oil export route to the West, 

close down. And the countries in Central Asia realized that their 

only alternative to exporting oil through Russia was in great danger. 

Georgia’s location in the Caucasus makes it absolutely critical, a 

bridge for goods, energy, and ideas, but also makes it an attractive 

target for those who would like to stop commerce and contact beVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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tween East and West. Beyond Central Asia and the Caucasus, 

what happened to Georgia will have echoes in the Ukraine, in 

Moldova, the Baltics, and Eastern Europe. If leaders in these countries are intimidated to the point that they begin acting in opposition to their democratic interests, it’ll be a major blow to the processes that the Euro-Atlantic integration has transformed much of 

the region so successfully. 

Geopolitically, we are witnessing a major moment in history. Future generations will remember the war in Georgia as a turning 

point. The only question is, What type of turning point? Will it 

mark the moment that Russia recognized the political and economic costs of military conflict with its neighbors was prohibitively 

high and permanently abandon the practice, or will it usher in a 

new era of insecurity in which no country in the region, Russia included, feels confident in its ability to prosper in the absence of 

outside pressure. How the United States and our allies respond, 

not only over the coming days and weeks and months, but over the 

coming years, in my view, will have a significant impact on determining which of these scenarios comes to be the case. 

We are grateful to Ambassador Burns for being with us this 

morning, and look forward to discussing these critical issues. And 

we thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for your work. 

With that, let me turn to the former chairman, Senator Lugar, 

of Indiana. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, I join the chairman in welcoming our distinguished witness. Under Secretary Burns is uniquely qualified to 

discuss the challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Georgia. He’s 

an outstanding public servant, and we are fortunate to have him 

at the forefront of our diplomatic efforts. 

On August 7, Russian military forces invaded the sovereign territory of Georgia. Russia’s aggression should not have been a surprise. For years, Moscow has been implementing a policy designed 

to apply the maximum possible pressure on Georgia: 

First, Russia shut off energy exports to Georgia, claiming that 

terrorist attacks had damaged the gas pipeline running between 

the two countries. 

Second, Moscow instituted a trade embargo against Georgia, cutting off all commerce between them, and closing road connections. 

Third, mail deliveries and direct flights between the two countries were suspended. 

Fourth, Russian authorities arrested thousands of Georgians living in Russia, and deported them. At least two Georgians died during that process. 

Fifth, Russian diplomats disrupted and frustrated the diplomatic 

efforts underway to find a resolution to disputes between Georgia 

and the enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In some cases, 

they even refused to appear at scheduled talks. 

Sixth, the Russian military conducted a large military exercise 

just north of the Georgian border that coincided with increased artillery and small-arms fire between Georgian troops and Russian 

and South Ossetian troops. 

5 

Seventh, Russia asserted increasing control over the administration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and expanded the number of 

Russian officials with extensive military and intelligence backgrounds in these regions. 

Eighth, Russia reinforced its military presence in both Abkhazia 

and South Ossetia in recent months without consulting Georgia, as 

is required under existing agreements. 

Ninth, Russian military aircraft violated Georgian airspace on 

numerous occasions. 

Tenth, Moscow established administrative relationships with 

both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, breaking previous commitments 

made through the Commonwealth of Independent States, and distributed thousands of Russian passports to Abkhazians and South 

Ossetians. 

These events should not have left much doubt in anyone’s mind 

that Russia was looking for a way to justify military action in Georgia. American leaders counseled the Georgian Government not to 

respond to this intimidation. I spoke on the telephone to President 

Saakashvili in April and urged him not to take actions that would 

invite a Russian military response. 

When I visited Tblisi, 2 weeks ago, President Saakashvili asserted that his government had no choice, and that Georgia had to 

defend itself. We may never know definitively who fired first, but 

it’s clear that Russian—Russia implemented an extraordinarily 

provocative plan to lure Georgia into combat. 

Moscow has agreed to several cease-fire agreements, but has not 

yet met its obligations under any of them. Russian troops must 

withdraw from Georgia, and the international community must ensure that conditions on the ground do not permit Russia to determine political events in Georgia. 

The European Union’s announcement that it is sending 200 observers to Georgia is a welcome initiative, but much more needs to 

be done. The United States has moved to provide Georgia with significant humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. I saw, firsthand, the important role the United States is playing in alleviating 

the suffering in Georgia. I joined USAID workers in distributing 

cots and blankets to displaced persons in Tblisi, and observed military servicemen unloading supplies from a C–17. I expressed my 

strong support for the administration’s $1 billion aid package when 

Secretary Rice called to brief me on the details. This is a good first 

step. But, by itself it will not ensure the survival of the democratic 

free-market Georgian government. 

Georgia’s Prime Minister estimated a need for at least $3 billion 

to $4 billion for budget support and infrastructure repair. He forecasts that, unless action is taken quickly, Georgia’s GDP could fall 

more than 10 percent, in contrast to the 10-percent annual growth 

the young economy had been experiencing. 

Moving the Georgian economy back to a sound footing is imperative. Russia has not emerged from this conflict unscathed. Recent 

press reports suggest that Moscow’s stock market, as the chairman 

mentioned, has lost nearly 50 percent of its value and more than 

$20 billion of capital has fled the country. In recent days, the Russian Central Bank has spent $4.5 billion to prop up the ruble. This 

level of financial shock would have crippled the economies of many 

6 

countries around the world, but the tens of billions of dollars Russia receives from its oil and gas exports are allowing it to absorb 

these economic losses. 

The conflict in Georgia cannot be separated from Europe’s dangerous dependence on natural gas from Russia. In fact, the conflict 

in Georgia makes it all the more important for European leaders 

to act on energy security. Commitment to energy diversification, including new pipelines circumventing Russia, is essential to the security of our European allies. 

The Kremlin has shut off energy supplies to six different countries during the last several years. These energy cutoffs were intended to demonstrate Russian willingness to use its commanding 

energy export position to back its demands for foreign and economic policy concessions. A natural-gas shutdown experienced by a 

European country in the middle of winter would cause death and 

economic loss on the scale of a military attack. Such circumstances 

are made more dangerous by the prospects that nations might become desperate, increasing the chances of armed conflict and terrorism. 

In addition to the administration’s assistance package, there 

were several steps the United States must take in the near term. 

We must redouble our efforts to extend a Membership Action Plan 

to Georgia. The failure to extend MAP to Georgia and Ukraine at 

the summit in Bucharest was a mistake that sent the wrong signal 

to Moscow and the international community. A MAP would be powerful symbol of the West’s support for an independent Georgia. 

Finally, the U.S. must lead the international community to establish a diplomatic structure to consider and solve the so-called 

‘‘frozen conflicts.’’ These trouble spots, like Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia, must not be permitted to become incentives or excuses for 

conflict. In addition to the zones in Georgia, the Transdnistria region of Moldova, the Nagorno-Karabakh standoff between Armenia 

and Azerbaijan, and the Crimean region of Ukraine could trigger 

armed conflict. Peaceful solutions are possible, but they will require 

the attention of the United States and our allies. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and we look 

forward to hearing from our distinguished witness. 

Senator DODD. I thank you very much, Senator Lugar. 

And, as I mentioned earlier, let me ask my colleagues of any of 

them have any brief comments. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Very brief, Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator BILL NELSON. I just want to say to our members of the 

committee, that the resurgent Russia’s actions have enormous 

ramifications in things that you wouldn’t think of. For example, 

Russia is a partner with us on the international space station. 

NASA has gotten itself into a fix that we’re going to shut down the 

space shuttle in 2010, and now they’re not going to have the new 

system ready until 2015 or 2016, the new rocket; it’s a Aries rocket 

with a Orion capsule. That’s a 5-or-6-year gap that we only have 

one way to get to the space station that we built and paid for, and 

7 

that is on the Russian spacecraft Soyuz, which we have been using, 

along with our space shuttle, to get to and from the international 

space station. 

Now, if we’ve got a Russia that is trying to exclude itself from 

the family of nations’ normal standard operating procedure, it’s 

going to make it increasingly difficult for us to get along with 

them. But, what is facing us right now—and this is a ramification 

that people don’t realize—is, for that 5-year period, we’ve got to 

contract with the Russians to build those spacecraft in order to get 

us to and from, and to have the safety lifeboat attached in case 

they had to abandon the space station. There’s a 3-year lead time. 

That contract has to be signed right now. And we have to waive 

the law that says that we can’t do business with Russia because 

they’re helping Iran on its nuclear program. That’s an issue in 

front of this committee right now. It’s a waiver of that law. I support it, simply because there’s nothing that we can do about it. 

We’ve got to get to and from our space station. But, because of the 

aggression of Russia in Georgia, we now have this complication facing us, in ways that we would normally never think of, in our ability to get to and from our space station. 

Senator DODD. Very good point. 

Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. I’ll wait. 

Senator DODD. Very good. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., 

U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA 

Senator CASEY. Thank you for chairing the hearing and calling 

it. 

I think that one of the difficulties here is, as much as our Government—and I think there’s bipartisan support for condemnation 

of what Russia’s done—it’s complicated by the fact that we have 

some shared interests. One of them is that we want to do everything possible, as the chairman has done over his career, and Senator Biden, as chairman of this committee, even when he wasn’t 

chairman, and certainly the work of our ranking member, Senator 

Lugar—is to do everything possible—and Nunn-Lugar is the model 

for this—is to do everything possible to make sure that working in 

a bilateral way, with the Russian Federation, as well as other 

countries in a multilateral way—to do everything possible to remove the threat of weapons of mass destruction, and, in particular, 

to focus on fissile material, which is all over the world, in many 

places in the former Soviet Union. So, that imperative is in front 

of us. 

So, I think, even as we make it clear about our stated position 

as a country against this action by the Russians, as well as our intention to extend the Membership Action Plan to Georgia, we have 

to keep our eye on the ball as it pertains to fissile material and 

weapons of mass destruction. And that’s the difficulty, because I 

think there’s a real frustration that the American people feel, that 

sometimes more specific action can’t always take place, beyond condemnation and beyond engagement in diplomacy. But, I think we 

8 

have to be very conscious of the international threat that fissile 

material in the hands of terrorists, as well as the weapons of mass 

destruction, pose. 

So, Mr. Secretary, I don’t envy the difficulty that you have in 

striking that balance, but we appreciate your presence here and 

the leadership—the bipartisan leadership over many years, on the 

threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. 

Thank you. 

Senator DODD. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield my time, in the interest 

of hearing the witness. 

Senator DODD. Very good. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. I yield my time, in the—— 

Senator DODD. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I’ll yield my time, as well. 

Senator ISAKSON. I yield my time. 

Senator DODD. Very good. 

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. And we thank you for being with us 

this morning. 

And let me just say to you and my colleagues, whatever supporting documents and materials beyond your statement will be included in the record. 

And I’ve asked, by the way—and I don’t know if they’ve been distributed or not—for maps of Georgia. And though it may not be 

quite so clear—although you can point out—I think it may be 

marked on the maps themselves exactly where these areas are, including South Ossetia and Abkhazia, so you can get some sense of 

their location. There is actually another map that we’re going to 

make available to you, as well, that shows where the ethnic populations are, which I think may be helpful to take a look at. 

Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY 

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Secretary BURNS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Lugar, members of the committee. I want to thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Georgia crisis and its implications, particularly for our relationship with Russia, where I’ve served for the last 

3 years as U.S. Ambassador. 

With your permission, I’ll submit my written statement for the 

record and offer a very brief summary. 

Senator DODD. So ordered. 

Secretary BURNS. The causes of the current crisis are complicated, with mistakes and miscalculations on all sides. Georgia’s 

decision to use force to reassert its sovereignty over South Ossetia, 

against our strong and repeated warnings, was shortsighted and 

ill-advised, but there was no justification for Russia’s disproportionate response, for its provocative behavior in the runup to the 

crisis, or for sending its military across international boundaries to 

attack Georgia and seek to dismember a sovereign country. 

9 

With a cease-fire in place, the uncertain beginnings of Russian 

withdrawal from Georgia underway, and Georgia’s own economic 

recovery moving ahead, this is a moment to take stock and look 

ahead. A great deal is at stake. 

Russia’s actions in Georgia, particularly its reckless decision to 

recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are deplorable. Russia’s behavior raises serious questions about the future of our relations 

with a resurgent, nuclear-armed, energy-rich, great power which 

has much potential, but more than its share of troubles and complexes, and whom we do not have the luxury of ignoring. 

As we consider the contours of an effective strategy, I would 

highlight a few elements: 

First, it is essential to continue to make common cause with our 

European allies. Our cohesiveness and collective determination is 

the key to effecting Russia’s calculus. American actions have far 

more impact as part of a chorus than as a solo performance, and 

unity among European countries is also crucial. We have worked 

closely with President Sarkozy and the EU leadership in recent 

weeks. We will continue to do so as, standing together, we press 

Russia to fulfill all its commitments under the August 12 and September 8 agreements. While much is made of Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, the wider truth is that Russia needs Europe, 

too, as the market for 75 percent of its gas exports and as a critical 

bridge to a better economic future. 

Second, the United States and Europe must continue to work together urgently to support Georgia’s economic revival and territorial integrity. Senator Biden and other members of this committee were absolutely right, at the outset of this crisis, to highlight the importance of a major American assistance initiative. And 

Secretary Rice proposed, on September 3, a $1 billion economic 

package for Georgia, with the first phase of $570 million this year. 

In the second phase of funding, next year, we hope for strong bipartisan backing for aid that goes beyond immediate humanitarian 

and reconstruction needs and includes new resources to strengthen 

Georgia’s independent media, rule of law, and civil society. We look 

forward to working closely with the Congress in this effort, and 

also intend to coordinate with our European allies, including at the 

donor’s conference planned by the EU later this fall. In the meantime, we will also be assessing Georgia’s security assistance needs, 

again in cooperation with our NATO partners, using the newly established NATO-Georgia Commission. The NATO Secretary General and a delegation of NATO permanent representatives were in 

Tblisi yesterday to underscore our collective support for Georgia. 

Third, we are working to reassure our friends throughout the region of our long-term commitment to their economic modernization, 

democratic development, and well-being. Russia obviously has vital 

interests throughout its own neighborhood, and a great deal of natural influence to bring to play, but that does not entitle it to a region of privileged interests or veto power over the sovereign choices 

of its neighbors. 

We also recognize that out of crisis sometimes come opportunities. Turkey, which I visited earlier this month, is showing real 

leadership in exploring possibilities for easing tensions in the 

South Caucasus. The leaders of Turkey and Armenia had an unVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
10 

precedented meeting in Yerevan, a week ago, and progress toward 

normalization between Turkey and Armenia could open up trade 

and transportation routes for the entire South Caucasus. Moreover, 

it could help open up new avenues for settling the NagornoKarabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. This is also an 

important moment to reassure NATO’s newest northern members. 

Fourth, the United States needs to redouble our efforts, with our 

partners in Europe and Eurasia, to diversify energy supplies and 

transit routes and avoid a singular reliance on Russian oil and gas 

imports. Improving energy efficiency is a significant ingredient, as 

is development of renewable energy sources. The EU’s competitiveness and antimonopoly regulations can also be a valuable tool to 

promote greater transparency and reliability. 

Fifth, it is important to reinforce for Russia the consequences of 

its actions in Georgia as a means of ensuring its compliance with 

its commitments to President Sarkozy. We and our European partners have made clear that there will be no ‘‘business as usual’’ with 

Russia while those commitments remain unfulfilled. For our part, 

the administration has withdrawn the 123 Agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with Russia and suspended United States-Russian bilateral military programs. We continue to review other options. 

In many ways, the most damaging consequences thus far for 

Russia have been self-inflicted economic and political wounds. 

Since August 7, investor confidence has plummeted; at least in part 

because of the Georgia crisis, Russian financial markets have lost 

nearly a third of their value, with losses in market capitalization 

of hundreds of billions of dollars. Capital is fleeing Russia, with $7 

billion leaving the country on August 8 alone, according to Russian 

Finance Minister Kudrin. The ruble has depreciated by nearly 10 

percent since the Georgia crisis began. The Russian Central Bank 

has spent billions of dollars of its reserves to try to halt the slide 

of the ruble. 

The opportunity costs for Russia are even greater, the most important of which may be the country’s ambitious plans to diversify 

the economy and rebuild infrastructure. At a moment of critical 

economic choices, at a moment when Russia can innovate, diversify 

beyond hydrocarbons, and develop to the full its greatest resources—its enormously talented people—it is in danger of missing 

an historic chance and stagnating amidst mounting corruption, cronyism, and demographic ills. 

Russia’s diplomatic isolation was vividly exposed at the recent 

Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, when not one of its 

partners joined it in recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

Nicaragua’s solitary support for recognition of those two breakaway 

regions is hardly a diplomatic triumph. In a rare step, the G–7 Foreign Ministers also issued a statement sharply criticizing the behavior of the remaining member of the G–8. 

Finally, our long-term strategy toward Russia needs to be based 

on a sober assessment of our own interests and priorities, and of 

what’s driving Russia today. Flush with petro dollars and reborn 

pride, the Russia we see before us is a muddle of conflicting impulses, of angry chauvinism and accumulated grievances alongside 

some very 21st-century connections to the global market and new 

11 

attachments to a world in which foreign travel and private property are what animate much of the next generation and the emerging middle class. 

On the one hand, some Russian strategists clearly see opportunities in American difficulties, and see taking us down a notch as the 

best way to assert their own prerogatives and expand their role. 

Another aspect of that inclination was on full and ugly display in 

the Georgia crisis, the very 19th-century notion that intimidating 

small neighbors is what makes great powers great. Those impulses 

are fed by the increasingly authoritarian bent in Russian politics 

over recent years. They are beguiling and cathartic for a country 

that, a decade ago, was about as far down on its luck as a great 

power can go, but they are not the same thing as a positive agenda 

for realizing Russia’s potential in the decades ahead. 

On the other hand, there is the Russia about which President 

Medvedev spoke eloquently during his election campaign, a Russia 

that aspires to become a modern, rules-based, 21st-century, great 

power with a diversified, integrated economy and a political system 

that gradually opens itself to the rule of law. That vision of Russia 

has hardly been on display in recent weeks. Indeed, it has very 

nearly receded from view. But, the realities of Russia’s circumstances may yet force it back to the surface. 

It’s hard to predict which set of impulses will prove strongest in 

the years ahead, or whether the costs and consequences already 

evident in the Georgia crisis will sink in. The truth is, we are likely 

to have a relationship with Russia, for some time to come, which 

mixes competition and political conflict with cooperation. On some 

critically important issues, like combating nuclear terrorism and 

nonproliferation, we have a hardheaded interest in working with 

Russia, as we will be doing when my Russian counterpart joins the 

rest of our ‘‘P5-plus-1’’ colleagues in another round of discussions 

on Iran, the day after tomorrow, in Washington. Nowhere is our cooperation and our leadership more important than on the whole 

complex of nuclear challenges, from setting a good example for the 

rest of the world in managing and reducing our own nuclear arsenals, to ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials on 

the basis of the visionary programs which Senator Lugar has done 

so much to promote. On other issues, like Georgia, we and our 

partners will need to push back hard and systematically against 

Russian behavior. 

Dealing with Russia in the years ahead will require equal parts 

firmness, steadiness, and patience. It will require us to put sustained effort into a common strategy with our European partners. 

It will require us to keep a clear sense of priorities. It will require 

us to keep the door open to long-term, mutually respectful partnership with Russia, if Russia chooses to make that possible, and if 

it chooses to become a responsible stakeholder in the international 

system, but to defend our interests resolutely in the meantime. It 

will require us to keep a sense of strategic confidence and initiative, as well as a sense of the internal weaknesses and growing 

interdependence with which Russian leaders must ultimately contend. And it will require us to continue to focus energy and attention on a relationship with Russia that may often prove frustrating, 

12 

and sometimes even dangerous, but that matters enormously, not 

only to our interests, but to the future of global order. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Burns follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR

POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Georgia crisis and its implications, particularly for our relationship with Russia. 

The causes of this conflict—particularly the dispute between Georgia and its 

breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia—are complex, with mistakes and 

miscalculations on all sides. But key facts are clear: Russia’s intensified pressure 

and provocations against Georgia—combined with a serious Georgian miscalculation—have resulted not only in armed conflict, but in an ongoing Russian attempt 

to dismember that country. Russia sent its army across an internationally recognized boundary, to attempt to change by force the borders of a country with a democratically elected government. 

With a cease-fire in place, the uncertainty of Russian withdrawal from Georgia 

underway and Georgia’s own economic recovery moving ahead, this is a moment to 

take stock and look ahead. Today I will seek to explain how we got here, how we’re 

responding and the implications for our relationship with Russia. 

BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICT

The collapse of the U.S.S.R. was marked by ethnically based violence, especially 

in the South Caucasus. This involved clashes between Azeris and Armenians, 

Ossetians and Ingush, Russians and Chechens, Abkhaz and Georgians, and others. 

These clashes deepened into a series of wars in the early 1990s that ended without 

lasting solutions. Uneasy truces followed, and the conflicts in areas outside Russia 

became known as ‘‘frozen conflicts.’’ 

Two of the disputed regions lie within the internationally recognized territorial 

borders of Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In 1992, following 2 years of armed 

conflict between Georgians and South Ossetians, an armistice was signed by Russian, Georgian, and South Ossetian leaders. The leaders also agreed on the creation 

of a tripartite peacekeeping force of 500 soldiers each from Russia, Georgia, and 

North Ossetia, a territory which lies within the borders of Russia. In practice, however, the North Ossetian peacekeeping contingent ended up being staffed by South 

Ossetians. Fighting in Abkhazia was brutal in those years and, as a result, large 

numbers of ethnic Georgians were expelled from their homes in Abkhazia; before 

the fighting, the ethnic Abkhaz had been a minority—under 20 percent—in 

Abkhazia. 

The next year, 1993, South Ossetia drafted its own constitution, and 3 years after 

that, in 1996, South Ossetia elected its own ‘‘President’’ in an election in which 

mainly ethnic Ossetians—not ethnic Georgians—voted. In 2001, South Ossetia elected Eduard Kokoity as President, again with most ethnic Georgians boycotting the 

election. The following year, in 2002, he asked Moscow to recognize South Ossetia’s 

independence and absorb it into Russia. Throughout this period, Russia acted to 

support the South Ossetian and Abkhaz leaderships. That support was not only political, but concrete, and never more so than through the continued presence of Russian military forces, including those labeled as peacekeepers. 

Georgia emerged from these post-Soviet wars in weak condition. While then-President Shevardnadze deserves credit for helping end the fighting, Georgia could not 

find its feet; its economy remained weak and its government relatively ineffective. 

In the autumn of 2003, President Shevardnadze acquiesced in an attempt by a local 

Georgian strongman—Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze—to steal Georgia’s parliamentary election. This triggered a popular uprising of hundreds of thousands of Georgians, leading to the so-called Rose Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili’s election as 

President. 

Following his 2004 election, Saakashvili and his government moved swiftly and 

effectively to improve governance in Georgia, reducing corruption, pushing through 

economic reforms, and welcoming foreign investment. The Georgian economy started 

to grow rapidly. At the same time, Saakashvili made clear his intention that Georgia follow the path of other successful post-Communist democracies and draw closer 

to, and eventually join, NATO and the European Union. Although they have developed significantly in the past few years, Georgian democratic institutions remain 

weak and much work needs to be done to deepen democratic practices and continue 

13 

economic reforms; authoritarian practices still exist alongside more democratic ones. 

We have made known, and made clear in public, our concerns with some of these 

democratic deficits. 

This progress, however, was paralleled by increasing tensions between Georgia 

and the Russian-supported breakaway territories. After the Rose Revolution, more 

clashes occurred between Georgians and South Ossetians, and between Georgians 

and Abkhaz. Then in 2006, South Ossetians voted for a split from Georgia in a referendum that was, again, largely boycotted by ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia. 

Although there were efforts to resolve the differences through negotiations, by late 

2007 talks had essentially broken down. 

As Georgia’s ambitions to draw close to Europe and the transatlantic community 

became clearer, its relations with Russia deteriorated. In the summer of 2006, Georgia arrested several Russian military intelligence officers it accused of conducting 

bombings in Gori. Moscow responded by closing Russia’s only road crossing with 

Georgia, suspending air and mail links, imposing embargoes against Georgian exports and even rounding up people living in Russia (including school children) with 

ethnic Georgian names and deporting them. At least two Georgians died during the 

deportation process. In March 2007, what we believe were Russian attack helicopters launched an aerial assault, combined with artillery fire, on the Georgian 

Government’s administrative offices in Abkhazia’s Upper Kodori Valley. In August, 

Russian fighter jets violated Georgian airspace, and then unsuccessfully launched 

a missile toward a Georgian radar station. 

This past year, although Moscow lifted some of the economic and transport embargoes, it further intensified the political pressure by establishing an administrative relationship with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In March 2008, Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 

sanctions on Abkhazia, thus removing the CIS prohibition on providing direct economic and military assistance. Then in April, following the NATO summit in Bucharest where NATO leaders declared that Georgia would one day be a member of the 

Alliance, then-President Putin issued instructions calling for closer official ties between Russian ministries and their counterparts in both of the disputed regions. 

Russia also increased military pressure as Russian officials and military personnel were seconded to serve in both the governments and the armed forces of the 

separatist regions. South Ossetia’s ‘‘Prime Minister,’’ ‘‘Defense Minister,’’ and ‘‘Security Minister,’’ for example, are all seconded Russian officials. And while Russian 

peacekeepers in Abkhazia were specifically mandated to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, we saw no net return of Georgians to 

Abkhazia in over a decade. On April 20 a Russian fighter jet shot down an unarmed 

Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia. Russia also 

increased its military presence in Abkhazia without the required consultation with 

the Government of Georgia. In late April, Russia sent highly trained airborne combat troops with howitzers to Abkhazia, ostensibly as part of its peacekeeping force. 

Then in May, Russia dispatched construction troops to Abkhazia to repair a railroad 

link to Russia. 

During this buildup of tension, the United States frequently called on Moscow to 

reverse Russian actions and to participate with us and key European allies in a diplomatic process to resolve these conflicts. In June and July, for example, the U.N. 

Friends of Georgia group, which included the United States, Germany, the U.K., 

and France, urged fellow Friend Russia to engage in invigorated negotiations to advance Georgia’s peace plan for Abkhazia. Yet Russia resisted, in one case even failing to show up for a meeting in mid-June that President Medvedev promised Russia 

would attend. In July, Georgia accepted the Western Friends’ request that Russia 

and Georgia join the U.N. Friends and the Abkhaz for discussions to reduce tension 

and advance the peace process. But once again Russia’s Foreign Ministry refused 

to send a representative. 

During this time, we urged Georgian officials both publicly and privately, on 

many occasions, to resist the temptation of any military reaction, even in the face 

of repeated provocations, which they were clearly facing. President Saakashvili did, 

to his credit, offer extensive autonomy to Abkhazia, including a guarantee that a 

Vice President of Georgia would be from Abkhazia. In July, Secretary Rice traveled 

to Tbilisi to seek to intensify diplomatic efforts to reduce the growing tensions. 

Working closely with counterparts from Germany, France, and the U.K., she called 

for intensified diplomatic efforts on an urgent basis. While expressing support for 

Georgia, she also cautioned President Saakashvili against any temptation to use 

force to resolve these conflicts, even in the face of continued provocations. 

Unfortunately, Russia resisted these European-American efforts to intensify diplomatic efforts to stave off a wider conflict. After Russian military aircraft overflew 

Georgian airspace in July, in violation of Georgia’s sovereignty, while Secretary Rice 

14 

was visiting Tbilisi, President Saakashvili recalled Georgia’s Ambassador to 

Moscow. 

August began with two bomb explosions in Georgian-controlled territory in South 

Ossetia, injuring five Georgian policemen. On August 2, a firefight broke out in 

South Ossetia that killed six South Ossetians and one Georgian policeman. On August 3, Russia declared that South Ossetia was close to a ‘‘large-scale’’ military conflict, and the next day, South Ossetia evacuated hundreds of women and children 

to Russia. On August 5, Moscow issued a statement saying that it would defend 

Russian citizens in South Ossetia. It is important to note that these were mainly 

South Ossetians—that is to say, Georgian citizens—to whom Russia had simply 

handed out Russian passports. On August 6, both Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of opening fire on villages in the region. 

THE CRISIS

Throughout this period, the United States worked with both Georgia and South 

Ossetia, and with Russia, seeking to tamp down the growing conflict. On August 

7 Georgia’s Minister for Conflict Resolution traveled to South Ossetia for negotiations, but his South Ossetian counterpart refused to meet with him and his Russian 

colleague failed to show up. On the night of August 7, shooting broke out between 

Georgia and South Ossetian Armed Forces in South Ossetia. Georgia declared a 

cease-fire, but it did not hold. The Georgians told us that South Ossetians had fired 

on Georgian villages from behind the position of Russian peacekeepers. The Georgians also told us that Russian troops and heavy military equipment were entering 

the Roki Tunnel border crossing with Russia. 

We had warned the Georgians many times in the previous days and weeks 

against using force, and on August 7, we warned them repeatedly not to take such 

a step. We pointed out that use of military force, even in the face of provocations, 

would lead to a disaster. We were blunt in conveying these points, not subtle. Our 

message was clear. 

Georgia’s move into the South Ossetian capital provided Russia a pretext for a 

response that quickly grew far out of proportion to the actions taken by Georgia. 

There will be a time for assessing blame for what happened in the early hours of 

the conflict, but one fact is clear—there was no justification for Russia’s invasion 

of Georgia. There was no justification for Russia to seize Georgian territory, including territory well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia, in violation of Georgia’s sovereignty, but that is what occurred. On August 8, the Russians poured across the 

international border, crossed the boundaries of South Ossetia past where the conflict 

was occurring, and pushed their way into much of the rest of Georgia. Several thousand Russian forces moved into the city of Gori and other areas far from the conflict 

zone, such as Georgia’s main port of Poti, over 200 kilometers from South Ossetia. 

Russia also seized the last Georgian-held portion of Abkhazia, where there had been 

no fighting. 

The full story of that invasion and what occurred is still not fully known. We have 

received evidence of the burning of Georgian villages in South Ossetia. Russia’s invasion resulted in a large number of internally displaced ethnic Georgians who fled 

South Ossetia to Tbilisi and other Georgian towns. Although Russian forces attempted to prevent access to the area by humanitarian aid workers, some Human 

Rights Watch researchers were able to reach the area and reported that the Russian 

military had used ‘‘indiscriminate force’’ and ‘‘seemingly targeted attacks on civilians,’’ including civilian convoys. They said Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs 

in populated areas and allowed looting, arson attacks, and abductions in Georgian 

villages by militia groups. The researchers also reported that Georgian forces used 

‘‘indiscriminate’’ and ‘‘disproportionate’’ force during their assault on South Ossetian 

forces in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages in South Ossetia. Senior Russian leaders have sought to support their claims of Georgian ‘‘genocide’’ against the South 

Ossetian people by claiming that 2,000 civilians were killed by Georgian forces in 

the initial assault. Human Rights Watch has called this figure of 2,000 dead ‘‘exaggerated’’ and ‘‘suspicious.’’ Other subsequent Russian Government and South 

Ossetian investigations have suggested much lower numbers. We are continuing to 

look at these and other reports while we attempt to assemble reliable information 

about who did what in those days. 

THE CEASE-FIRE, RUSSIA’S FAILURE TO HONOR IT, AND RECOGNITION

OF SOUTH OSSETIA AND ABKHAZIA

In the days that followed the Russian invasion, our attention was focused on halting the violence and bringing about a cease-fire. President Bush spoke with a number of European leaders as well as with President Saakashvili, President Medvedev, 

15 

and Prime Minister Putin in an effort to halt the fighting. Secretary Rice dispatched 

Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza to Tbilisi to maintain contact with the 

Georgian leaders, working with Ambassador John Tefft. She herself worked with 

the Georgians and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, and with key Europeans including the French as the European Union (EU) President, and Finnish Foreign 

Minister Stubb, in Finland’s role as Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for 

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to seek to halt the fighting. 

On August 14, Secretary Rice flew to France to consult with President Sarkozy, 

and then flew to Georgia to seek—and successfully obtain—President Saakashvili’s 

signature on a cease-fire agreement. President Sarkozy had negotiated a six-point 

agreement which included the following: 

1. No resort to force. 

2. A definitive halt to hostilities. 

3. Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance. 

4. Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they are usually 

stationed. 

5. Russian forces must withdraw to their positions prior to the outbreak of 

hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian peacekeeping 

forces will implement additional security measures. 

6. Opening of international discussions on security and stability modalities in 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

The U.S. role in this process was central and timely. The Georgians had questions 

about the cease-fire agreement, so we worked with the French who issued a clarifying letter addressing some of Georgia’s concerns. Secretary Rice conveyed the draft 

cease-fire agreement and the letter to President Saakashvili the next day. Based on 

these assurances, some additional assurances from the French, and the assurances 

of our support, President Saakashvili signed the cease-fire agreement on August 15. 

The Ceasefire Accord provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia 

to their positions before the hostilities began, and allows for peacekeepers in South 

Ossetia, limited to the numbers allowed under previous agreements, to conduct patrols a few kilometers from the conflict zone in South Ossetia, not including any cities and not in ways that impede freedom of movement. The Ceasefire Accord does 

not establish a buffer zone; it does not explicitly grant the Russians the right to set 

up checkpoints around Georgia’s ports or along Georgia’s main highways and other 

transportation links; and it does not explicitly grant the Russians the right to have 

any forces whatsoever in places such as Poti, 200 kilometers from South Ossetia. 

This agreement was signed—and should have been honored immediately—by Russian President Medvedev, who had promised to French President Sarkozy Russia’s 

immediate withdrawal upon President Saakashvili’s signature of the cease-fire. Yet 

Russia has still not lived up to the requirements of the cease-fire agreement. In 

these circumstances, with Russia’s having failed to honor the terms of the ceasefire agreement and its promise to withdraw its forces, Secretary Rice flew to Brussels for an emergency NATO meeting on August 19 and, with our allies, produced 

a statement in support of Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty—a statement that was stronger than anyone thought possible. 

Russia recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August 26. 

It did so despite numerous United Nations Security Council resolutions that Russia 

approved and that explicitly affirmed Georgia’s territorial integrity, and that the underlying separatist conflicts must be resolved peacefully, through international negotiations. This irresponsible action was condemned by the EU, NATO’s Secretary 

General, and key Allies. 

Following the EU summit on September 1, President Sarkozy traveled to Moscow 

on September 8 to again seek Russia’s compliance with the cease-fire. 

This has been a fast-moving situation, but that is where we find ourselves today. 

OUR STRATEGIC RESPONSE

In the face of this Russian assault on Georgia, the United States is pursuing three 

key objectives. 

First, we must support Georgia. We seek to stabilize the situation on the ground; 

help the country recover and thrive economically; preserve Georgia’s sovereignty; 

maintain our support for its territorial integrity, and democracy. We are active, 

working with our European allies, in putting pressure on Russia to adhere to the 

cease-fire. Russia must withdraw its military forces from Georgia, back to the lines 

of August 7; Russia is allowed limited patrolling rights by its recognized peacekeepers in the immediate vicinity of South Ossetia only until such time as an international mechanism is developed to take their place. So we are working fast with 

the EU and the OSCE to put in place just such a mechanism. We are also preparing 

16 

to launch international discussions on South Ossetia and Abkhazia, again working 

closely with our European partners. 

We have already taken immediate steps to address Georgia’s humanitarian needs. 

The United States has provided more than $38 million worth of humanitarian aid 

and emergency relief, including food, shelter, and medical supplies, to assist the people of Georgia. U.S. aircraft made a total of 62 relief flights to Georgia from August 

13 through September 4, and on August 24 and 27, 115 tons of emergency relief 

commodities arrived in Batumi on the USS McFaul and the USCGC Dallas. In addition, a third ship, the USS Mount Whitney anchored in Poti on September 5, unloaded an additional 17 tons of emergency relief commodities that was delivered by 

USAID nongovernmental organization partners. On September 3, the Office of the 

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that 90,500 individuals 

have returned to places of origin, following the August conflict. However, UNHCR 

staff note that the number of returnees may be significantly higher due to the passage of time, as well as the difficulty of accurate, in-field returnee counts. According 

to UNHCR, approximately 30,000 individuals may be displaced in the long term. We 

have been working with the Government of Georgia and seven relief organizations 

to ensure that our assistance gets to internally displaced people and other conflictaffected populations. 

On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to help meet Georgia’s 

pressing humanitarian needs, repair infrastructure damaged by Russia’s invasion, 

sustain commercial confidence, and restore economic growth. Five hundred and seventy million dollars, the first phase of a $1 billion United States economic support 

package, will be made available by the end of 2008 and will include emergency 

budget support to the Georgian Government. We will be working extensively with 

Congress in the days to come to fine tune how the assistance will be delivered. We 

are hopeful that there will be strong bipartisan backing for a second phase of support, an additional $430 million of support and other urgently needed reconstruction 

and humanitarian assistance to be provided in future budgets. 

Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to defend itself and 

to deter renewed aggression. The Department of Defense has sent an assessment 

team to Tbilisi to help us begin to consider carefully Georgia’s legitimate needs and, 

working with our allies, develop our response. For several years, the United States 

has played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces to conduct counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to help Georgia rid its Pankisi Gorge 

of Chechen and other extremists and then as part of multinational coalition efforts. 

NATO’s North Atlantic Council decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-Georgia 

Commission aimed at supporting Georgia’s relations with NATO. NATO has also decided to help Georgia assess the damage, including to the Georgian Armed Forces, 

and to help restore critical services necessary for normal public life and economic 

activity. NATO has already sent an advisory support team to Georgia and its Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. The North Atlantic Council 

Permanent Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the near future. Finland’s Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, showed strong and 

effective leadership in working with French Foreign Minister Kouchner to lay the 

diplomatic foundation for the cease-fire agreement and activate the OSCE’s crisis 

response mechanisms. 

Our second key objective is to work together with our friends in the region to support their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, as well as their European and transatlantic aspirations, and overall stability in the region. Since 1989, 

the United States—under the leadership of Presidents George H.W. Bush, President 

Clinton, and President George W. Bush—has supported the right of every country 

emerging from communism to chose the path of its own development, and to choose 

the institutions—such as NATO and the European Union—that it wants to associate 

with and join. Each country must show itself ready to meet the standards of the 

institutions it seeks to join. That is its responsibility, and Georgia and Ukraine 

should be treated no differently than other European countries seeking to join European and transatlantic institutions. 

Concurrently the United States is committed to redoubling efforts to ease tensions 

and resolve conflicts throughout the region. Recently, the leaders of Turkey and 

Armenia took an important step toward reducing their long-standing tensions. We 

applaud the initiative of Armenian President Sargsyan to invite his Turkish counterpart to Yerevan, and President Gul’s willingness to accept the invitation. Their 

meeting creates a new atmosphere in the relationship, and gives hope that a longoverdue thaw has begun. The normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia could also help open up trade and transportation routes for the entire South 

Caucasus. 

17 

Closely connected is resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Its costs can 

still be counted in terms of refugees and displaced persons—nearly a million altogether—provinces denuded of populations, lost economic opportunities, and disrupted trade. The U.S. Government will do all it can to encourage the parties to 

show greater flexibility and creativity in their negotiations. We will do everything 

possible to promote a just and lasting settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 

that proceeds from the principle of our support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, 

and ultimately incorporates other elements of international law and diplomatic 

practice. 

The United States, working closely with our allies, will also look at ways to emphasize the importance of expanding the Southern Corridor for energy supply, 

bringing oil and gas from the Caspian region to Europe. The development of energy 

resources and competitively transporting them to market supports the sovereignty, 

independence, and economic development of the countries of the region. Diversification of sources of energy and their routes to market, alternative energy sources, and 

energy efficiency efforts, is critical to Europe as well. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Finally, our strategic response must include the longer term consequences of the 

invasion of Georgia for our relationship with Russia. Since 1991, three U.S. administrations have based policy toward Russia on the assumption that Russia sought 

to become a nation integrated with the international system and its institutions. 

Since 1991 Russia has asserted its own interest in becoming a part of the world and 

a part of international institutions. And Russia has made progress in this regard, 

with American and European support. But with its invasion of Georgia, its continuing refusal to implement the cease-fire it has signed, and its claim to a ‘‘region 

of privileged interests,’’ Russia has put these assumptions and aspirations at risk. 

Russia and the Russian people are paying a considerable price for their country’s 

disproportionate military action. Today’s Russia is an emergent economic power and 

a net exporter; its interdependency, which connects it with the rest of the world in 

very different ways than in the past has fueled the country’s newfound prosperity 

over the past 8 years. This same interdependency has raised the costs of military 

intervention in Georgia. While much is made of Europe’s energy dependence on Russia, the wider truth is that Russia needs Europe too, as the market for 75 percent 

of its gas exports and a critical bridge to a better economic future. Since August 7, 

investor confidence has plummeted. At least in part because of the Georgia crisis, 

Russian financial markets have lost nearly a third of their value, with losses in 

market capitalization of hundreds of billions of dollars. Serious capital outflows have 

taken place; the Russian Finance Minister admitted that $7 billion left the country 

on August 8; private estimates range as high as $20 billion for capital flight over 

the past 6 weeks. The ruble has depreciated nearly 10 percent since August 7 and 

the Russian Central Bank has spent billions of its reserves to try to halt the slide. 

The opportunity costs for Russia are even greater, the most important of which 

may be the country’s ambitious plans to diversify the economy and rebuild infrastructure. At a moment of crucial economic choices, at a moment when Russia can 

innovate, diversify, and develop to the full its greatest resource—its enormously talented people—it is in danger of missing a historic chance and stagnating amidst 

mounting corruption, cronyism, and demographic ills. 

A great deal is at stake. Russia’s actions in Georgia, particularly its reckless decisions to invade Georgia and recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia, are deplorable. 

Russia’s behavior raises serious questions about the future of our relations with a 

resurgent, nuclear-armed energy-rich Great Power, which has much potential but 

more than its share of troubles and complexes—and whom we do not have the luxury of ignoring. 

It is important to reinforce for Russia the consequences of its actions in Georgia 

as a means of ensuring compliance with its commitments to President Sarkozy. We 

have made clear that there will be no ‘‘business as usual’’ with Russia while those 

commitments remain unfulfilled. For our part, the administration has withdrawn 

the 123 agreement on civil nuclear cooperation with Russia, and suspended U.S.- 

Russian bilateral military programs. We continue to review other options. 

It is essential to continue to make common cause with our European allies. Our 

cohesiveness and collective determination is the key to affecting Russia’s calculus. 

American actions have far more impact as part of a chorus than as a solo performance, and unity among European countries is also crucial. We have worked closely 

with President Sarkozy and the EU leadership in recent weeks. We will continue 

to do so, as standing together, we press Russia to fulfill all its commitments under 

the August 12 and September 8 agreements. 

18 

Russia’s diplomatic isolation was vividly exposed at the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit, when not one of its partners joined it in recognizing 

Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Nicaragua’s solitary support for recognition of those 

two breakaway regions is hardly a diplomatic triumph. In a rare step, the G–7 Foreign Ministers also issued a statement sharply criticizing the behavior of remaining 

member of the G–8. 

Our long-term strategy toward Russia needs to be based on a sober assessment 

of our own interests and priorities, and of what’s driving Russia today. Flush with 

petro-dollars and reborn pride, the Russia we see before us is a muddle of conflicting 

impulses—of angry chauvinism and accumulated grievances, alongside some very 

21st century connections to the global market and new attachments to a world in 

which foreign travel and private property are what animate much of the next generation and the emerging middle class. 

On one hand, some Russian strategists clearly see opportunities in American difficulties, and see taking us down a notch as the best way to assert their own prerogatives and expand their role. Another aspect of that inclination was on full and ugly 

display in the Georgia crisis, the very 19th century notion that intimidating small 

neighbors is what makes Great Powers great. Those impulses are fed by the increasingly authoritarian bent in Russian politics over recent years. They are beguiling 

and cathartic for a country that a decade ago was about as far down on its luck 

as a Great Power can go—but they are not the same thing as a positive agenda for 

realizing Russia’s potential in the decades ahead. 

On the other hand, there is the Russia about which President Medvedev spoke 

eloquently during his election campaign, a Russia that aspires to become a modern, 

rules-based, 21st century Great Power with a diversified, integrated economy and 

a political system that gradually opens itself to the rule of law. That vision of Russia has hardly been on display in recent weeks—indeed it has very nearly receded 

from view—but the realities of Russia’s circumstances may yet force it back to the 

surface. 

It’s hard to predict which set of impulses will prove strongest in the years ahead, 

or whether the costs and consequences already evident in the Georgia crisis will 

sink in. The truth is we are likely to have a relationship with Russia for some time 

to come which mixes competition and political conflict with cooperation. 

On some critically important issues, like combating nuclear terrorism and nonproliferation, we have a hard-headed interest in working with Russia, as we will be 

doing when my Russian counterpart joins the rest of our P5+1 colleagues in another 

round of discussions on Iran the day after tomorrow in Washington. Nowhere is our 

cooperation and our leadership more important than in the whole complex of nuclear challenges—from setting a good example for the rest of the work in managing 

and reducing our own nuclear arsenals, to ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials, on the basis of the visionary programs which members of this committee have done so much to promote. On other issues, like Georgia, we and our 

partners will need to push back hard and systematically against Russian behavior. 

Dealing with Russia in the years ahead will require equal part firmness, steadiness, and patience. It will require us to put sustained effort into a common strategy 

with our European partners. It will require us to keep a clear sense of priorities. 

It will require us to keep the door open to long-term, mutually respectful partnership with Russia—if Russia chooses to make that possible, and if it chooses to become a responsible stake holder in the international system—but to defend our 

interests resolutely. It will require us to keep a sense of strategic confidence and 

initiative, as well as a sense of the internal weaknesses and growing interdependence with which Russian leaders must ultimately contend. And it will require us 

to continue to focus energy and attention on a relationship with Russia that may 

often prove frustrating, and sometimes even dangerous, but that matters enormously not only to our interests, but to the future of global order. 

Thank you, and I look forward to taking your questions. 

Senator DODD. That was an excellent, excellent statement, Mr. 

Ambassador, and we thank you for it. 

I’d like to recognize the Ambassador from Georgia, who’s with us 

in the audience here. We thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for being 

with us this morning. 

We have a good participation by members, and so, I’m going to 

put the 7-minute clock on. I’m not going to bang any gavels around, 

but just so we can kind of keep it in that order, we’ll give everyone 

a chance and maybe we can get several rounds. 

19 

Let me, if I can, pose two or three questions to you, and then— 

rather than go through—ad seriatim, here. The first is—Russia 

claimed, as we all know, it intervened to protect ‘‘their citizens in 

South Ossetia.’’ The citizens they alluded to live within the borders 

of another country, and yet were given citizenship, it almost seems, 

on a whim by the Kremlin. And given the presence of large ethnic 

Russian minorities in the Ukraine, in Kazakhstan, and the Baltics, 

to what extent are you concerned that this incident in Georgia 

would imply that these countries are now at some risk? 

Second, Russia has argued that Georgia lies within their country’s sphere of influence, and what is our position to that claim? To 

your knowledge, have Russian officials outlined what, precisely, it 

means to be a country within their sphere of influence or sphere 

of interest? And where that sphere of influence ends is the second 

question I have for you. 

Third, I’d like to know what concrete steps, beyond the ones 

you’ve talked about here, that the United States and our allies 

should consider taking in the coming days. 

And last—and you and I talked about this privately, and I spoke 

with Senator Biden yesterday about it as well, is the level of assistance we’re talking about. Obviously, there are a lot of pressures, 

fiscally, and I’m concerned about paying Peter from Paul’s account, 

by moving money around. There are a lot of issues in the region. 

To what extent are you giving any thought to how we do this in 

a way that does not jeopardize other important relationships that 

depend upon our financial assistance? 

So, those are the three or four questions I have, and if you’d address them, I’d appreciate it. 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. 

First, with regard to the assistance question you raised last, as 

I mentioned in my opening statement, what we’re seeking is $570 

million in assistance, mostly focused on humanitarian assistance 

and immediate reconstruction needs, before the end of the calendar 

2008. And you make a very important point about the importance 

of keeping our priorities in view and not robbing Peter to pay Paul. 

And we’ve tried to take that into account as we’ve looked through 

the various moneys that we’ve put together. Some of it, about $250 

million, would come in direct budget support, which, again, as Senator Lugar mentioned, is—meets a very immediate need of the 

Georgian Government. Some of it comes through the OPIC program, for which we need authorization from the Congress. Some of 

it comes from the Millennium Challenge Corporation. 

So, we’ve tried to put together a mix that will help provide an 

immediate boost, an immediate signal of confidence in Georgia’s 

economic recovery. Because, just as you said, Mr. Chairman, Georgia had made quite significant strides in recent years by making 

some smart economic choices and attracting foreign investment and 

making Georgia an attractive place to invest. We’re working carefully with the Europeans, as well, who, earlier this week, approved 

about $700 million in assistance over a period of 3 years, and with 

the IMF, which has approved a $700 million standby loan—again, 

as a way of sending a strong signal of support. 

So, we look forward very much to working with the committee 

as we sort through the numbers. We’ll be very mindful of the need 

20 

to keep our priorities in view, but we’re also mindful of the importance of sending a strong signal of support for Georgia right now. 

Senator DODD. Well, I agree with that. We all do. It’s just a question of how we’re doing this. You’ve outlined it well. 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir. 

On the question you raised about spheres of influence, again, as 

I said in my opening remarks, it’s obvious that Russia has vital interests in its own neighborhood, that it has a lot of influence to 

bring to play. But, that does not entitle it to, what President 

Medvedev has termed, a region of privileged interest, and it doesn’t 

entitle it to a veto over the sovereign choices of its neighbors. 

The best guarantee for—whether it’s Russians or any other ethnic or national minorities in neighboring countries—has to do with 

stability, the security, the prosperity, the well-being of those states, 

and the ways in which they take care of all their citizens, including 

minorities, whether that’s in the Ukraine or Kazakhstan or anyplace else. And so, I think it underscores the importance of helping 

to strengthen those societies, which is something that, as you 

know, we’ve been committed to do, on a bipartisan basis, for many 

years. And I think that’s the best answer to the concerns that are 

raised. 

But, as I said, it’s one thing to recognize the natural influence 

that Russia has to bring to play, and what its vital interests are. 

That is not the same thing as entitling anyone to a sphere of influence. 

Senator DODD. The other issue I was interested in is what this 

may imply. Given the presence of large ethnic minorities in 

Kazakhstan and the Baltics, obviously in the Ukraine, to what extent are you concerned that the action in Georgia by Russia may 

portend some other similar actions in other countries arguing the 

same sphere-of-influence argument? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, I think it’s certainly something that we 

and others are concerned about, and need to be concerned about. 

As I said, I think the best prescription for dealing with that concern is doing everything we can to help demonstrate, over the long 

term to all of those countries, our support for their own development. And I think that’s the best way to address that concern. 

Senator DODD. Very good. 

Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Secretary, you are in a unique situation, 

having just served as our Ambassador to Russia for 3 years before 

you assumed your new post. And so, I ask these question, really, 

with the thought in mind that you have as good a grasp of current 

Russian politics and leadership as anyone that I know. As you suggest, we must be thoughtful about a common cause about working, 

obviously, with our European allies. And my impression, at least, 

having just visited NATO and EU, is that there was remarkable 

concurrence; not that every country has the same view of Russia, 

but the ability to stay unified through each of the stages, support 

President Sarkozy, or others, was remarkable. Likewise, I noted a 

feeling, on the part of most of the countries, toward the United 

States that was much more comfortable. Some, because of the Iraq 

war, have felt very uncomfortable. This has changed some perceptions substantially. But, it also has led to a call by the Baltic states 

21 

for some definition of what does article 5 mean? Would somebody 

come to rescue us, in the event that there was a disruption of some 

sort? Or, as we noted, the Poles’ rapid signature on the missile defense agreement. One motivating factor was surely that even if article 5 did not bring military assistance, there would be American 

troops manning the missile sites, and that this was a selling point 

to the Polish people. That’s an argument that perhaps has not 

quite permeated our thinking here, but, nevertheless, was deeply 

felt by many in Poland. 

Now, my question is—the Russians, obviously, have noted all of 

this. We had the ‘‘2 plus 2’’ talks, with the Secretary of State and 

Defense and their counterparts in Russia, that appeared to be constructive. There appeared to be some headway in thinking about 

the START treaty’s renewal, which will need to occur sometime in 

2009. On the Russian side, in fact—a request, really—their position 

was for more intrusive inspection than, apparently, we were prepared to do under the Moscow Treaty. When the Senate ratified the 

Moscow Treaty we were always told it would be buttressed by the 

START Treaty, but now there is a chance that START will not be 

there. So, this is very serious, in terms of cooperative threat reduction. 

But, the Russians took that very seriously, as I understand, in 

the ‘‘2 plus 2.’’ They also took somewhat seriously the problem of 

the missiles from Iran, but, even if not from Iran, from somewhere, 

with the thought, at least, of a discussion of Russians being, perhaps, at our missile sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. 

That was just a short time ago. Now we are in this condition. 

And I just wanted you to reflect on how do we move diplomatically 

to a situation where we proceed with the START negotiations with 

more missile defense in a pan- European, pan-world situation in 

other areas where we can make some headway? Is it conceivable 

that, without criticizing the Russians, we say, ‘‘We have some agenda items here that we need to discuss’’? Can you do that? At the 

same time, all the repercussions of Georgia are redounding around. 

Finally, I just would throw this in, because I want the rest of the 

time for you to answer the question. Clearly, the Russian leadership was surprised by the economic repercussions, although Foreign Minister Lavrov has said, ‘‘You, in the United States, have 

created the problem. It’s your subprime mortgages and the whole 

demise of your economy that’s caused European stock markets to 

fall, including our own.’’ On the other hand, clearly, the rush of 

capital out of Russia, the risk premiums, the ruble problems are 

substantial, yet President Putin has remained, apparently, very 

popular. The nationalistic idea of ‘‘Russia, we’re back, we’re rich,’’ 

and so forth, having still permeated the atmosphere, how do we 

deal with the first agenda, the cooperative security, and at the 

same time work our way through the rocks and shoals of the economic crisis and the problems of President Putin and his popularity? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Senator Lugar, as you know as well as 

anyone, it’s a complicated path, but, I think, to answer your question, it is conceivable that we can continue to work with Russia in 

a hardheaded way on some of the issues that you described, which 

are crucial, not only to our interests and Russia’s interests, but to 

22 

the rest of the world, because the truth is, the United States and 

Russia have both unique capabilities and unique responsibilities in 

the nuclear field. And so, whether it’s with regard to our own arsenals, the future of the START treaty, whether it’s with regard to 

the creativity and will that we can bring to bear to deal with 

broader problems of missile defense, or whether it’s with regard to 

the safeguarding of fissile materials and nuclear installations and 

facilities in Russia itself. All of those, it seems to me, remain coldbloodedly very much in both of our interests, and I think it is conceivable that we can continue to work together on those issues, 

while, at the same time, in a big and complicated relationship, 

making very clear the deep concern that, not only we, but our European partners, have about Russian behavior during the Georgia 

crisis and about the potential for other kinds of Russian behavior 

that’s going to undermine our own interests. 

On the question with regard to the economic consequences of this 

crisis and the popularity of Prime Minister Putin and the Russian 

leadership, it just seems to me that, over time, some of those consequences are going to sink in. There’s no doubt, as you said, but 

that the sense of reborn pride and national assertiveness that has 

grown in the years in which Mr. Putin was president and now in 

the presidency of Medvedev, is something that is popular with a lot 

of Russians. But, what’s also popular is a sense that standards of 

living are rising, a sense, which is very understandable, that it’s 

a society which is beginning to make progress and integrate itself 

into, not just the global economy, but international institutions. 

And I think what’s becoming clear in this crisis is that there are 

some consequences for the kind of national assertiveness and 

overdoing of things which we’ve seen in the Georgia crisis. And 

how and when that’s going to sink in, I’m honestly not certainly, 

but I do think it’s going to have an impact as Russians try to calculate costs and benefits for their own future. 

And I think, you know, as I said, many of those consequences 

and costs are self-inflicted, but there are ways in which I think we 

and our European partners and others in the international community can help shape those choices for Russians, over time, in terms 

of the actions that we take, as well. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

We’ve been joined by Senator Webb and Senator Murkowski. 

Thank you both for coming. 

Senator Casey. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ambassador, we want to thank you for your service and your 

thoughtful statement today. In light of what I spoke of earlier with 

regard to consequences, I’m glad that in your statement you outlined some of them because sometimes that doesn’t get a lot of attention. 

On page 10 of your prepared statement, you cite at least two consequences that are currently in play here. One is the withdrawal 

of the 123 Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with Russia. 

That’s one. Another consequence is the suspension of U.S.-Russian 

bilateral military programs. And then you say that the administration would review other options. I think that’s important, that we 

23 

have that on the record. And, of course, support for the NATO 

membership and Membership Action Plan for Georgia, being another important priority. 

And I wanted to focus on two areas. I’ll get to the nuclear questions of which I spoke a moment ago, but the first area that I wanted to ask you about was the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, 

the so-called CFE Treaty. I was—last year, offered a Senate resolution, which passed the Senate, condemning Russia’s decision to suspend their compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe 

Treaty. And, as you know from having Pennsylvania roots, we have 

over the years, used the expression ‘‘canary in the coal mines’’ as 

a way of predicting what might happen in the future. And I think, 

in many ways, the Russian decision to suspend their compliance 

with that treaty might have been that kind of ‘‘canary in the coal 

mines,’’ a warning or a precursor of what we see, or what we have 

seen just in the last month or so. 

But I wanted to ask you about the impact of the Russian military 

maneuvers in and around Georgia, on their compliance with the 

CFE Treaty, and then, second, anything you can tell us about talks 

with Russia about returning to compliance with that treaty. 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Senator, we’ve—we have had conversations, as you know, with the Russians, periodically, about trying to 

find a way to return to compliance with the—and implementation 

of the CFE Treaty. They’ve been abeyance since the Georgia crisis, 

but it’s something that we’re prepared to consider, over time. The 

specific military measures that the Russians took, recognizing that 

they had suspended their compliance with the treaty, certainly go 

beyond the CFE limits which had existed before, and it seems to 

me that it’s in all of our interests to try to restore, you know, some 

of the rules and some of the architecture which helped preserve 

stability and security in Europe for many years. We’ve made clear 

our willingness, through the adapted CFE Treaty, to adjust to new 

realities, but it’s going to be important for the Russians also to recognize their stake in a set of rules that protect not only wider European interests, but their own, as well. 

Senator CASEY. And just for purposes of explanation, if you’re an 

American watching a hearing like this, and you hear this reference 

to this treaty, and you hear about the significance of it, what does 

it mean to our security, our national security, to make sure that 

the Russians are in compliance with this kind of a treaty? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, I think what the CFE Treaty does, as, 

you know, many other parts of European security architecture have 

done, is provide a degree of transparency and predictability to how 

you move conventional forces around in Europe. When you remove 

that degree of transparency and predictability, it causes a lot of uncertainty and, potentially, instability in the region. And so, that’s 

why we’ve believed that that framework is very important, and 

that’s why, at least for our part, we’re committed to trying to find 

a way back toward the adopted CFE Treaty. But, as I said, it takes 

a Russian recognition of the importance of that, as well. 

Senator CASEY. And I wanted to move, finally, to the issue I 

spoke of earlier, which is the nuclear threat that’s—hangs over the 

world and, I think, arguably, most people would assert, and I know 

our ranking member has done work on this over a career—Senator 

24 

Lugar and I and others have tried to really focus on this to make 

sure that we’re doing everything possible to catalogue fissile material around the world, a lot of it which is in the old Soviet Union. 

And I think it was important in your statement that you said a 

couple of things about this issue and about the imperative, the 

hardheaded imperative of working—continuing to work with the 

Russian Federation on this. You say, and I quote—I’m quoting from 

page 11—‘‘Setting a good example for the rest of the world in managing and reducing our own nuclear arsenals,’’ number one, and, 

number two, ‘‘ensuring the safety and security of nuclear materials,’’ and you go on from there. 

Tell me—and you made reference to the threat that Iran poses— 

just a story in the paper yesterday about Iran’s capacity—its own 

capacity—that has been pointed to recently with regard to enrichment. And I want you to speak—and I know we only have a little 

more than a minute—but just speak to that imperative that you 

have, in the next couple of weeks and months, dealing not just with 

the question of Iran, but, more generally, the threat of nuclear terrorism as it pertains to our relationship with Russia. 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Senator Casey, with regard to nuclear 

terrorism, the United States and Russia launched, a little more 

than a year ago, I think, a very important initiative, the Initiative 

to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which now has about 70 countries 

which have signed up, and which deals with what is a very serious 

and growing threat around the world. And, again, as I mentioned 

before, an area where the United States and Russia really do have 

both unique capabilities and unique responsibilities. And we aim to 

continue to support and strengthen that initiative. 

With regard to Iran, as I mentioned, we continue to work with 

the Russians, the Chinese, the key EU players—the British, the 

French, and the Germans—in an effort, along two tracks, to make 

clear, first to the Iranians, what’s possible if they agree to suspend 

their enrichment programs, but, at the same time, the consequences of their failure to do that. 

As you mentioned, the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy 

Agency, issued another report, a couple of days ago, which reinforced its own serious concern about Iran’s failure to live up to its 

obligations to the IAEA, and that underscores the importance of 

the six of us and the rest of the international community working 

as hard as we can along both of those tracks, but particularly now, 

after a number of months in which the Iranians have failed to respond to the latest Security Council resolution, as well as to the 

very generous package of incentives that we all put on the table, 

the importance of demonstrating consequences for their inaction. 

And that’s an area where we hope and believe we can continue to 

work with Russia and our other partners. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Hagel. 

Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

Secretary Burns, thank you for your good work. 

I want to talk a little bit about an area that Senator Lugar explored with you, and that is the larger context of our relationship 

with Russia. It has been noted here this morning, partly in your 

25 

very complete statement, which I read, in addition to your comments and your testimony, as well as my colleagues’ line of questioning, that we have many common interests with Russia, and 

those common interests will continue—what the Senator from 

Pennsylvania was talking about: Proliferation, nonproliferation efforts, energy, Iran, the Middle East, Iraq. We are living in a world 

where these common interests are now woven into the same fabric. 

And the reality of what took place in Georgia, as you have noted 

and we all are aware, complicates that relationship. 

And my question is—recognizing that this administration has 

but 4 months left in office, and that is a factor, which I recognize, 

but, more to the point, so to the Russians and the Georgians and 

our European allies, that we are going to have a new President, we 

are going to have a new administration, we are going to have a 

new Congress—but, that stated, what initiatives are we taking to 

find some new higher ground to develop new venues, new opportunities, new formats to reconstruct a relationship with Russia? 

You mentioned the ‘‘2 plus 2’’ talks, as Senator Lugar did. For 

example, are President Bush and President Medvedev talking on 

any kind of a regular basis? Are Secretary Rice and Minister 

Lavrov talking on any kind of a regular basis? You talk about our 

common interests, as well, with our European allies and our European partners, and we are working with them, and working 

through NATO, and the various forms that we have with the Europeans on these issues, but what are we doing with Russia? It 

seems to me that’s a pretty essential part of wherever we go. We 

do know—and I think, with Senator Nelson’s comments at the 

opening of this hearing, there’s just but one reflection on this reality, that we’re going to have to find some new common ground 

and new high ground to deal with Russia, which includes Georgia, 

which includes Central Asia, and their interests, as perceived by 

them—not just perceived by us, but their optics. And we’re going 

to have to reverse the optics, to some extent; at the same, time, defend and recognize and honor the interests of any sovereign nation, 

which Georgia is. 

But, there’s going to have to be a very delicate balance struck 

here that we work our way through this, as you know so well, and 

as Senator Lugar has noted—you probably understand it as well as 

anybody in the government today. 

So, if you could take that as a reference, and not a particularly 

succinct question, but I’m interested, really, in—Are we doing anything, taking any new initiatives with Russia, to find some higher 

ground here to get us into the new few years? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, thank you, Senator. We certainly do. And 

I mentioned a couple of the initiatives that had been underway 

and, I think, continue to have potential, notwithstanding the Georgia crisis, whether it’s the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the ‘‘2 plus 2’’ talks, and the efforts that we’ve made to try 

to find, and build on, common ground, especially in the nuclear 

field, the efforts that we’ve made to talk about potential cooperative approaches in areas like missile defense. I think those all remain very important areas of potential cooperation, alongside the 

Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs that Senator Lugar had 

highlighted before. 

26 

The reality is, as I mentioned, that our relationship with Russia 

for some time to come is likely to be a mix, and sometimes an uneasy mix of competition, and sometimes political conflict alongside 

cooperation. And I think it’s going to be difficult to navigate that 

path with the Russians in the years ahead, because Russia’s a society that’s gone through its own very complicated transitions, and 

I described some of the impulses and tensions that are at play, I 

think, in Russia today. But, we don’t have the luxury of ignoring 

Russia or that relationship, and so, we’re going to have to be very 

hardheaded in how we engage both in working with our European 

partners to push back, hard and systematically, in instances like 

the Georgia crisis; to try to ensure that we’re doing everything we 

can to support our other friends in Russia’s own neighborhood to 

avoid such crises in the future; to try to be creative in helping to 

solve some of the so-called frozen conflicts, like Nagorno-Karabakh, 

which I think had within them the seeds of future problems in the 

region; to do everything we can to encourage diversification of energy supplies and energy security, to enhance energy security 

throughout the region—again, working with our European partners 

and our friends throughout Eurasia. 

Senator HAGEL. In all due respect, Mr. Secretary, I understand 

all that, and you’ve covered that ground, but let me go back to my 

question. Are we doing anything new, anything fresh, taking the 

reality that we have before us, as has been noticed this morning, 

the disproportionate response from Russia in Georgia? And what’s 

happened since then? Have we done anything new? Has the President talked to President Medvedev very often? Is there anything 

new? I know what you’ve just noted, here, and what’s been on the 

books and on track, but are we thinking in any different way? Because just as Senator Lugar said, just one element of NATO membership, article 5—does America understand—do all peoples of the 

nations that are members of NATO understand what article 5 

means? We seem to kind of dance around these issues. Our Defense 

Department has been, as you noticed in—noted in your testimony, 

been in Georgia, examining, exploring, coming back with some assessment of what Georgia’s military needs are going to be. Have we 

made a decision there? Have we factored that into any regional 

component of this? But, also, to the point, what are we doing new, 

if anything, with Russia—the United States? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Secretary Rice has spoken with Foreign 

Minister Lavrov this week, and we remain engaged with the Russians. And we need to, as I said, in a very hardheaded way, to push 

as hard as we can with our European partners to get them to comply with the commitments they’ve made to President Sarkozy with 

regard to the Georgia crisis; also, to engage with them in a very 

hardheaded way about some of the regional issues that you just described; and also, to continue to look for ways in which we can 

work together in our mutual interests on some of the other issues 

that we’ve discussed, especially in the nuclear area. 

So, it seems to me there’s no good alternative to that kind of very 

tough-minded engagement with the Russians. There’s too much at 

stake, not just in our own relationship, but the more—wider international interests. 

27 

And so, as I said, the Secretary remains very much engaged with 

her Russian counterpart. There haven’t been any recent conversations, that I’m aware of, between the President and President 

Medvedev. But, we need—we need to work hard at this relationship. And the Russians themselves need to look at their own selfinterest, not only in their relationship with us, but in what they 

have at stake in this crisis and in their behavior beyond it. 

Senator HAGEL. The President has not spoken with President 

Medvedev since the Russian incursion into Georgia? 

Secretary BURNS. I’m not aware of any recent conversation, Senator, but Secretary Rice has certainly spoken to Minister Lavrov 

since then. 

Senator HAGEL. Thank you. 

Senator DODD. Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Under Secretary Burns, President Bush announced, on August 

13, that the U.S. military would lead the U.S. Government’s humanitarian response in Georgia, but, the next day, Secretary Gates 

appeared to contradict the President, stating that the overall response was under the direction of the State Department. But then, 

on August 15, Secretary Rice reaffirmed the Department of Defense’s lead. In the few weeks that followed, reports variously stated that State, Defense, or USAID were in charge. And on September 3, President Bush again referred to the military as the 

leading—as leading the humanitarian response. 

Mr. Burns, it seems to me there is a real lack of clarity as to 

which agency is leading and coordinating the humanitarian response in Georgia. Could you please set the record straight and tell 

us which U.S. agency is responsible for coordinating the humanitarian response in Georgia? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, sir, I mean, it won’t surprise you, but the 

answer is that AID, the Agency for International Development, and 

the Defense Department have worked very closely together on this 

issue. And, you know, each brings particular assets to the task. 

What the U.S. military has done is rapidly facilitate the movement 

of humanitarian supplies, which are sorely needed by the Georgian 

people and the Georgian Government. And so, you had U.S. naval 

vessels bringing in humanitarian supplies over recent weeks, which 

is a natural way to take advantage of that asset. 

At the same time, on the same day that General Craddock, of 

SACEUR, visited Georgia, he was accompanied by Henrietta Fore, 

the head of the Agency for International Development, which I 

think helped demonstrate the role that both the civilian and the 

military side can play, and must play in this instance. 

AID has been very active on the ground in working with Georgia. 

We had a large economic team, an interagency team, working with 

our Georgian counterparts to try and assess both humanitarian 

and reconstruction needs. So, it really was an interagency effort in 

which we’ve all worked together. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So, you’re saying there is no lead agency. 

Secretary BURNS. No, sir. In the—it’s a combined effort. It really 

is. And the Defense Department, in the early stages, took the lead 

in moving humanitarian supplies to Georgia, which was a natural 

step to take; they had the means to do it. It’s the same kind of 

28 

thing we do in other crisis situations around the world. But, over 

time, what we’ve seen is the State Department taking the lead, 

under Under Secretary Reuben Jeffrey, and trying to work with the 

Georgians to develop a longer term plan for reconstruction. So, 

there are a number of different agencies that have had a role—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Is there a plan in place to transition this 

from the military to State and USAID? 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir. And that plan, as I said, has been 

very much a part of what Reuben Jeffrey did when he visited Georgia and put together a reconstruction plan, which is reflected in the 

assistance package, which we’re—you know, which we have proposed and want to work with the Congress on. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, is the military still undertaking humanitarian initiatives? And, if so, will this continue as Russians troops 

draw down and stability, I hope, is restored? 

Secretary BURNS. The military’s role has been to move humanitarian supplies. That’s still ongoing. But, I think we’re beginning 

to move from a phase of provision of humanitarian supplies toward 

a longer term reconstruction—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. Are they doing any other humanitarian efforts, the military? 

Secretary BURNS. Some on the ground, in terms of distribution 

of supplies, but it’s mostly in getting the supplies to Georgia, where 

the Georgian Government, NGOs, and others have worked to make 

sure they get to the people who need them, refugees and others. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Situated in a difficult neighborhood, Georgia 

is obviously an important ally for the United States. And in the 

aftermath of the 2003 Rose Revolution, the administration has 

been a vocal supporter of President Saakashvili. Some experts, 

however, suggest that the United States support has been too focused on the President himself, whose commitment to democracy 

has been questioned, rather than on Georgia’s democratic institutions and building the rule of law, which does seem fragile. 

Just last week, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried testified that, quote, ‘‘Georgian democratic institutions remain weak, 

and much work needs to be done to deepen democratic practices.’’ 

Could you give me, sir, an assessment of U.S. support for democratization efforts in Georgia and whether the promised $1 billion will 

actually include programming for this purpose? 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir, it will. And, as I mentioned in my 

opening statement, in the second tranche of that assistance, we 

have very much in mind to propose to the Congress and work with 

you to provide new resources in areas like civil society, rule of law, 

independent media, because it is true that Georgia needs to make 

improvements in those areas, to build democratic institutions. 

They’ve faced problems in the past, including at the end of last 

year, that need to be addressed. And it’s very much a part of our 

long-term support for—— 

Senator FEINGOLD. What kind of dollars are we talking about, in 

terms of that piece? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, in the second tranche of assistance, we’re 

talking about a total of $430 million. 

Senator FEINGOLD. In Assistant Secretary Fried’s House testimony last week, he was asked whether he agreed that comments 

29 

made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov regarding the 

United States having to, quote, ‘‘choose between a virtual project 

or a real partnership,’’ could be interpreted to mean that cooperation from Russia with regard to Iran and nuclear weapons is dependent on abandoning support for Georgia. And I know Senator 

Casey was getting into this a bit. Secretary Fried seemingly concurred, when he answered that the choice is, quote, ‘‘between cooperation with Russia and support for Georgia,’’ unquote. And he 

acknowledged that Russia has been more a partner than not in cooperating on efforts to deal with Iran’s nuclear weapons program. 

Do we have to choose between support for Georgia and working 

with Russia to prevent Iranian nuclear weapons programs? And, if 

so, which is more important to our national interests? 

Secretary BURNS. No; I don’t think we need to choose. I think 

Russian policy on issues like Iran is not driven by sentiment, it’s 

driven by their own self-interest. I think the Russian regime understands that a nuclear-weaponed Iran is not in their interest, either. 

And I think they see a self-interest in working with us, and with 

others, to try to prevent that from happening. 

At the same time—and I think this is true of a lot of complicated 

great-power relationships—we need to continue to make very clear 

our opposition to what the Russians have done in Georgia, to Russian behavior there. And, as I said, that’s going to be characteristic 

of a relationship that’s going to combine some areas of competition 

and political conflict with areas in which think we can, in a hardheaded way, cooperate. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 

your service. I think the ranking leader and yourself have chronicled well the events in Georgia. 

And I want to welcome the Ambassador. I was in Georgia 3 

weeks ago and had the opportunity to meet with your President, 

Saakashvili, at length, and separate meetings with your Prime 

Minister and Finance Minister, and go to Gori and see the bombing—unnecessary bombing of civilian residences, the razing of 

farms. And we thank you for being here. 

I would—I want to ask a very specific question and then step 

back to some of the more broad questions. 

The funding. I sat down at length with the Finance Minister and 

Prime Minister, talking about the type of assistance that they 

needed. And I think all of us understand how their GDP has grown 

rapidly; the standard of living of Georgians has risen as a result, 

and they want to make sure that people continue to invest there. 

They have a 22-percent foreign direct investment each year. And 

so, it’s the economic side, I think, that they’re most concerned 

about. 

The Prime Minister had a very—he did as good as any government-relations person here in Washington, presenting his case, and 

focused on something called the Phoenix Fund, where, in essence, 

they wanted to make sure that—they wanted us to know that our 

money was going for direct infrastructure investment, not to their 

30 

budget, necessarily. I’ve noticed that our aid is crafted differently, 

differently than what they actually ask us to fund. He wanted to 

put our billion dollars, if we were able to give it, into a revolving 

fund that went for specific infrastructure investment, and having 

those who invested in that fund oversee it to ensure that that was 

what was occurring. I’ve noticed that you’ve asked for aid that 

would actually go directly to their budget. And I’m just curious, I 

mean, that’s not what they asked for. I’m wondering, since that 

will be the most specific thing that we do in the near term, why 

we chose to aid them in this way. And I support aid to Georgia, 

but this is not actually what they asked for. 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Senator, we’ve worked very closely with 

the Georgian Prime Minister and the Georgian Government to try 

to make sure that the assistance that we provide, with your support, goes in the areas that are going to serve their needs most, 

and including the Phoenix Fund. And so, to the best of my understanding, that’s a large part of what we intend to do; in other 

words, to focus on those reconstruction projects which are going to 

be crucial to rebuilding the Georgian economy. So, I’d be glad to 

get back—— 

Senator CORKER. But, I’ve noticed $250 million of our aid was 

not going for that, it was going—it looked—it appears to me, based 

on what your testimony and others have been, is that it’s going, actually, to their budget to help with—they were going to use their 

own resources for that, and we were going to ensure that our resources went to infrastructure, per the Phoenix Fund. You all are 

investing in a different way. 

Secretary BURNS. Well, let me get you a more detailed answer on 

that, Senator, because I don’t want to mislead you. But, I think, 

again, to the best of my knowledge, what we’ve tried to do is work 

very closely with the Georgian Prime Minister, especially, who, as 

you said, is a very impressive man, to make sure that the moneys 

not only we, but the Europeans and others are providing is—has 

gone in a direction which is going to help them recover quickly. So, 

let me follow up on that and—— 

Senator CORKER. If you could do that, and if you could explain 

how the other funding that’s coming in is complementary to what 

we’re doing—I know things around here happen quickly. The wind 

blows through and we do things that sometimes aren’t that well 

thought out. If you could let us know exactly how all that is working together—more specifically, why we’re not funding them in the 

way they’ve actually asked us to, that would be good to hear. 

Secretary BURNS. Be glad to—— 

[The information requested was not available at the time this 

hearing was prepared for printing.] 

Senator CORKER. And, again, thanks for your service. 

It’s interesting, Senator Hagel’s line of questioning. And I certainly am very, very supportive of Georgia, and just, actually, was 

stunned by the way they’ve embraced democratic principles and 

free enterprise, many of which—many of them were educated here. 

On the other hand, you look at—I look at us and Mexico and Canada, for instance, I look at our active involvement in Georgia and 

Ukraine and other places. I look at—I was just in the Czech ReVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
31 

public not long ago, and our missile defense system potentially 

being partially there and in Poland. And, you know, an undercurrent of statements could be made that we, in essence, are kind of 

sticking a stick in the eye of the Russians. I think Senator Hagel’s 

line of questioning was oriented toward, maybe, a lack of active involvement with Russians. 

Just wondering, since you had been there, Ambassador, if you 

might help us a little bit with the psyche, from their perspective, 

as to what our actions have been in that area. 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir. 

Well, the Russians’ leadership certainly hasn’t been shy over the 

last year in expressing their concerns and their opposition in a 

number of areas, whether it’s been Kosovo’s independence, the missile defense plans in Poland and the Czech Republic, or the whole 

issue of NATO enlargement, or the next steps in NATO enlargement, to include Ukraine and Georgia. We’ve engaged, certainly 

during my time as ambassador in Russia, I think, in a very intensive way, to try to work through each of those issues and to accommodate Russian concerns, as best we could. But, the honest answer 

is, Russians have been—the Russian leadership has been deeply 

disturbed by a number of those steps, and that does create, notwithstanding our best efforts, the backdrop against which they 

shape some of their choices. 

I think what it underscores for me is not that we necessarily 

need to accept their concerns, or indulge them; we need to understand them. And we—— 

Senator CORKER. Are we making—just from what it’s worth, it 

doesn’t appear that we’re making much of an effort, if you will, 

quote, ‘‘to understand them.’’ 

Secretary BURNS. Well—I mean, I think—I mean, I can only 

speak to my own experience—certainly made a lot of effort to try 

and understand, at least, the kind of concerns that are developing, 

you know, in a society which, as I said before, has gone through 

a very rough period, especially in the 1990s, which, you know, are 

often seen outside Russia as a period of democratic rebirth, but 

we’re—for a lot of Russians, it was a very tough period. Economic 

uncertainty, disorder of—you know, for many Russians, a sense of 

lost dignity and national humiliation. Now, as I said, you don’t 

have to agree with that assessment. That’s—but that’s very much 

how a lot of Russians, anyway, have seen their predicament in the 

1990s. And what you see today is a Russia, in some ways, floating 

on high energy prices, that finds a fair amount of satisfaction in 

asserting itself. 

I think, given all the interests that we have at stake in our relationship with Russia, it is very important, in a tough-minded way, 

to stay engaged with them, to look for structures, whether it’s the 

‘‘2-plus-2’’ structure that we revived last year, economic structures 

that we’ve talked about in the past, where we’re engaging with 

Russia on these issues, making very clear what our concerns are, 

but trying to see if we can’t find common ground. We haven’t found 

that in the Georgia crisis, and that’s been a very disturbing episode. But, I don’t think it means that we shouldn’t make the effort 

to engage with Russia on these issues. And we have to hope that 

the Russian leadership is going to be prepared to make the same 

32 

kind of effort, and show, through its behavior in meeting its commitments following the Georgia crisis, that it’s also committed to 

that kind of a more constructive relationship. I think it’s very, very 

important for both of us to make the effort. 

Senator CORKER. Mr. Chairman, since you’re not a gavel-banger, 

and I didn’t give an opening statement, I’d like to ask one more 

question. 

Senator DODD. Go right ahead. 

Senator CORKER. What kind of advice are you giving to Georgia 

as it relates to South Ossetia and Abkhazia? I mean, that’s not 

going to go back in the box. OK? These areas, in the foreseeable 

future, are not going to be governed by the country of Georgia. It’s 

just not going to occur, it doesn’t appear to me. I don’t think any 

rational person thinks that’s going to occur. They want to join 

NATO. Part of the NATO requirements are, there are no boundary 

disputes within country. Pretty complex problem. What are you— 

what are you coaching them to do, and what are they talking about 

doing, to resolve that issue? Because it’s not going to return in any 

normal fashion anytime soon. 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Senator, I—the United States, like our 

European partners, is certainly going to continue to support Georgia’s territorial integrity. The Russians committed themselves, in 

both the August 12 and September 8 agreements with the French, 

with President Sarkozy and the European Union, to an international discussion, an international process to try to sort through 

the security, stability, the future of those two breakaway regions. 

And that’s something that we’re going to continue to push the Russians to adhere to. 

In the meantime, I think it’s very important to everybody to understand that there’s no way in which you’re going to solve that 

problem, pursue that international process, by using force. The 

Georgians have made a commitment to non-use of force now, in 

terms of trying to deal with that issue. And the immediate challenge for Georgia, which we’re fully committed to, is trying to rebuild its economy, to strengthen its sovereign, so that Georgia itself 

is, as it was becoming over the last few years, a very attractive 

place, a place whose economy is growing, that’s attracting foreign 

direct investment, that’s beginning, notwithstanding political difficulties at home and the weakness of democratic institutions, to 

apply the rule of law. And I think that’s—that, it seems to me, is 

the best course for Georgia, with a lot of support from the rest of 

us. 

And, again, to do everything we can to try to support that kind 

of an international process, which is called for in both the six-point 

agreement that was reached on August 12 and reinforced on September 8. Much easier said than done, I understand that, but that’s 

the position I think we’re going to continue to push. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Nelson—Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I appreciate, Senator Nelson, very much letting me go first. 

I have an 11:30 commitment that I can’t move, so I’m going to talk 

fast. 

33 

First of all, Mr. Secretary, I can’t think of anyone in government 

that I’d rather be listening to on this subject than you. I appreciate 

you being here. 

Nine days ago, when the Armed Services Committee received testimony, I asked a question about a reprogramming that was taking 

place in the Department of Defense. I believe it was $30 million 

from existing DOD operation and maintenance funds that was 

going to go to the Georgia situation. And I would appreciate it if 

you would remind them of my request on that. This is, you know, 

a time-sensitive area, because of the other commitments that the 

military has around the world. 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir, I will. 

Senator WEBB. The question that I had, really, is from the other 

perspective. When we look at Europe, and that is NATO, we spend 

a good bit of time discussing the situation with respect to Russia, 

and Russia’s intentions, and these sorts of things. And having 

spent a good bit of my life either writing about military alliances 

in our country, specifically NATO, and having spent 3 years when 

I was Assistant Secretary of Defense, before I became Secretary of 

the Navy, working extensively with NATO, one of the concerns that 

I have is, in this NATO enlargement process that followed the demise of the Soviet Union, we are at risk of changing the formula 

itself from something that was clearly an alliance to an area that 

in some cases could be called a system of protectorates, if you were 

looking at what we’re doing in historic terms. And NATO itself, not 

to simplify, seems to be breaking into three different groups. We 

have the old NATO countries, many of which are renewing historic 

relationships in Central and Eastern Europe. Germany is a good 

example of that. We tend to look at the balance of trade with 

China, but Germany, right now, has the highest balance of trade 

in the world. I think it’s $280 billion last year. So, they’re moving 

in a historic direction, to international comity—the business side, 

particularly. 

We have the new countries, which are very dependent, in security terms. And then, we have the United States, that is becoming 

the overarching security guarantor. And if you look at that with respect to the Georgia situation, one can only ask what the implications would have been if Georgia were part of the NATO Alliance 

right now. We’ve talked about the obligations under article 5, but 

we also have a system of government that I don’t think we can call 

a mature political system right now. In your own testimony, you 

talked about some initiatives that we would have, in terms of helping them improve that. We have the question of how the United 

States really should be dealing with the situation of a clearly resurgent Russia. 

What part of that should be made through these military guarantees? That’s the point that we really need to understand, as a government and as a country, that when someone comes into NATO, 

we are giving a formal obligation to defend these countries. And 

then, the third piece of that is Russia itself. How does Russia view 

this? There were two questions with respect to that, before myself. 

And in what way do we really respond, as Russia does have this 

resurgence and figures out where the boundaries of that really are? 

34 

And, I thought, in a part of your testimony that related to the 

economic price that Russia has already paid, is a good indicator of 

other levers that are available than simply military guarantees. So, 

that’s really the conundrum, at this point. What I’m trying to examine, further admissions into NATO, and how that will impact 

the way we deal, not only with Russia, but with our military obligations. 

Secretary BURNS. Senator, very good and very difficult questions. 

With regard to NATO’s expansion and the transition that NATO 

is going through right now, I absolutely agree with you. Article 5 

commitments, formal membership is not something to be taken 

lightly by any of us; and certainly in this administration, I’m sure 

in the next one, people don’t take that lightly, and that’s why 

there’s such a protracted, methodical process that exists, because 

we’re not talking, today, about membership, or immediate membership for Ukraine or for Georgia. What the United States has been 

talking about and supporting, as Senator Lugar said, is simply the 

next stage, the Membership Action Plan, which is designed to help 

countries who are interested in membership get ready for it, to see 

if they can meet the criteria for it. And you mentioned a number 

of the criteria that apply. And as, I think, NATO considers those 

very complicated decisions, and very consequential ones, too, in 

terms of the article 5 commitments that might one day come along 

with them, it’s very important to stay engaged with the Russians, 

as well, because, you know, their influence, their behavior, is going 

to shape European security and stability in some very important 

ways in the future. 

As I said before, that doesn’t mean we have to indulge all of the 

concerns the Russians raise, but we do need to engage them in a 

serious way. We have a Russia-NATO Council, right now, which is 

the mechanism for doing that. 

Senator WEBB. I would suggest, also, that this—it does not necessitate our lack of support for another country if we say that that 

country may not be ready for a formal obligation from the United 

States through NATO. That’s really the question here. We continually hear the words ‘‘sphere of influence’’ when the administration 

comes over and testifies, but an enlarged NATO, particularly if 

there’s not true alliance in these countries, in terms of their ability 

to increase our own security, is, in effect, a sphere of influence, as 

well, wouldn’t you say? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, certainly the Russians perceive—I mean, 

they’ve expressed a lot of anxiety, over the years, about NATO’s expansion, and particularly with regard to the question of Ukraine, 

which is, I think, in many ways, the brightest red line of all for 

many in the Russian political elite. 

Having said that, I also agree with you that there are a number 

of different ways in which you can support the stability, the security, the well-being of countries which deserve that support. That’s 

why Ukraine recently had a summit meeting with EU leaders to 

talk about the possibility of membership in EU and ways in which 

you can tighten that relationship. 

So, I absolutely agree with you, there are a lot of different ways, 

working bilaterally, working with the Europeans, looking at other 

35 

European institutions, in which we can both strengthen those ties 

and strengthen those countries. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you. 

And I appreciate Senator Nelson’s patience. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. Good questions. 

Senator Murkowski. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary. So appreciate your comments, your insight. 

Senator Hagel was asking some interesting questions about possible new areas of engagement: Are there other areas where we can 

work collaboratively or more cooperatively with Russia? And I 

would just throw out to you what I believe is an opportunity for 

us, as an Arctic nation. We don’t have a tendency to think of the 

United States as an Arctic nation, but you certainly know and recognize that. The administration is working on the rollout of a new 

Arctic policy that we are looking forward to reviewing. But, we also 

recognize that, up in the Arctic right now, there is so much that 

is new. Boundaries are ill-defined. We all know who our Arctic 

neighbors are, but, in terms of opportunities that present themselves, whether it’s energy and resource exploration or working collaboratively and cooperatively on maritime issues, issues of commerce, environmental issues, we really don’t have any baggage 

with our neighbors yet on this. 

Now, there was a statement, just this morning, from Mr. 

Medvedev, who—you know, he’s looking at the Arctic, and certainly 

we’ve seen some actions from them in the past that indicate that 

they want to secure their interests in the Arctic and recognize that 

strategic significance. 

I do think that this is one area where we might be able to cement some more cooperative relationships, if we’re proactive now. 

I can’t miss this opportunity to remind people, that as we all 

learned from ‘‘Saturday Night Live,’’ we, in Alaska, can view Russia from our house. So, we’ve got an interest here. We’ve got an opportunity to make something of this. We are an Arctic nation. And 

Russia is our Arctic neighbor up there. So, I throw that out to you 

for consideration. 

I did want to ask just a very quick question about energy interests up there. I understand that, in some of the reports, Russia’s 

aerial bombings in Georgia were specifically directed at the oil and 

gas pipelines that bypass Russia. Is that accurate? And can you 

verify the extent of the damage that was sustained by any of those 

pipelines? 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, ma’am. First, let me say I agree with you 

on the Arctic. I think we do have some common interests, not just 

with the Russians, but with a number of other Arctic countries, 

and I think that’s an area where we need, as you well know, to continue to work together on. 

Second, with regard to pipelines in Georgia, I’m not aware of any 

concrete evidence of targeting of those pipelines or of actual damage done to the two main pipelines that pass through Georgia. It’s 

certainly of enormous concern for all of us, because of the significance, as the Chairman mentioned earlier, of the transit routes 

36 

that go through Georgia. But, I’m not aware of any specific damage 

done to those pipelines—— 

Senator MURKOWSKI. OK. 

Ambassador BURNS [continuing]. During the crisis. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Did we miss any signals here? And I know 

it’s probably easy to be, kind of, the Monday-morning quarterback, 

or what have you. But, looking back, were there any warning signs 

that we missed that would have indicated that Russia was willing 

to take military action as a message to Western nations? Did we 

miss something here? 

Secretary BURNS. I honestly don’t think so. I mean, the situation—this is a situation, a crisis and a set of tensions that’s been 

building for some time. I think we—we, the Europeans, and others, 

could see those tensions building. As I said, there were mistakes 

and miscalculations on all sides. We worked very hard, both with 

the Russians and with the Georgian Government, to urge restraint 

and to urge that the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia be 

resolved politically and diplomatically. The German Foreign Minister had made a very serious effort, in the 6 or 8 weeks before the 

crisis, to try to revive some of the diplomatic mechanisms. The 

Russians as—in one instance, as Senator Lugar mentioned, unfortunately had refused to take part in a meeting that the Germans 

had organized. 

So, I think the warning signs were clear, and we all worked very 

hard to try to restrain the parties and to try to point them back 

in the direction of a diplomatic resolution. And it’s deeply unfortunate that the crisis erupted in the way that it did. And it’s deeply 

unfortunate, in particular, that the Russian Government behaved 

in the way that it did. 

And our focus now, working with the Europeans, is not just on 

rebuilding Georgia, but it’s trying to get the Russians to live up to 

the commitments that they’ve made in the August 12 and September 8 agreements. 

So, I think you could see the tensions and the dangers building, 

not just over the week before the crisis, but really over recent 

months and over the past year. And we tried very hard to avoid 

what we saw take place. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. How important is it at all—there have been 

statements made—the Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza 

was quoted as saying, ‘‘Whoever shot whom first is now no longer 

an issue at all.’’ There was a short article in the Post this morning 

about cell phone records, trying to pinpoint, you know, who started 

it. How important is it to determine that? And, I guess, a bigger 

question is, to what degree does the United States place any of the 

responsibility of the conflict on the Georgian leadership? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, I think that, you know, the picture about 

what exactly happened in the 24–48 hours before full-scale conflict 

broke out is still not a very clear one, and it may never be entirely 

clear. And, you know, we’ll continue to sift through the evidence 

that our Georgian friends have shared with us, that we’ve seen 

from others, as well. 

And, I think, the other important thing to keep in mind, as I 

mentioned before, is that you can’t really just look at the 2 or 3 

days before the crisis, you have to look at the backdrop of provoVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
37 

cations and tensions which were building, steps that the Russian 

Government took in April, for example, to expand government-togovernment relations with local governments in South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia, which were a direct infringement on Georgia’s sovereignty. So, there’s a whole catalog of problems that were building. 

Of course it’s important to try and sort through exactly what 

happened, and I think that’s a process that’s going to continue. 

As I said before, to answer your last question, the truth is that 

there were mistakes and miscalculations on all sides. Despite our 

warnings, the Georgian Government decided to use force to reassert its sovereignty in South Ossetia. And we believe that was 

ill-advised. But, that in no way is a justification for what was an 

obviously disproportionate Russian response, which took Russian 

forces 200 kilometers into Georgia from where the conflict and crisis was occurring in South Ossetia. There’s no justification, no excuse for that. And, to this day, Russia remains—Russian behavior 

remains inconsistent and in violation of some of the commitments 

that they had made to President Sarkozy. 

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Thank you. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Let me, if I may—and—excuse me, Senator Nelson. I apologize. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In August, the U.S. and Poland signed an 

agreement with the Polish Government—it has not been ratified by 

the Parliament—to place 10 U.S. interceptor missiles, a two-stage 

version of the three-stage version of the national missile defense 

system—in Poland with the radar in the Czech Republic. My question is, the rapidity with which that was approved by the Polish 

executive branch, how much was that tied to the fact of a resurgent 

and aggressive Russia in the minds of the Poles? 

Secretary BURNS. Senator, I think it clearly affected the conclusions that the Polish Government drew. Now, it does come against 

the backdrop of a long, drawn-out negotiation over this issue, so 

much of the ground had been covered on the particular agreement 

about missile defense and the 10 interceptors. But, I think it’s clear 

that the Georgia crisis did have an impact on the that calculation, 

in the end. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Now, given the fact that the placement of 

those missiles—still to be developed, because the two-stage version 

has not been developed—given the fact that they are there for the 

avowed purpose of—as a deterrent to a nuclear missile coming 

from Iran, having to do, nothing, with regard to the nuclear arsenal of Russia, why then was this fostered in such a fast track by 

the Poles, vis-a`-vis Russia, when it has nothing to do with any deterrence on Russia? 

Secretary BURNS. I can’t speak for the Polish Government on exactly how their—you know, their calculus unfolded during that period. As I said, there had been a long negotiation between the two 

of us over this issue that had made a fair amount of progress up 

until that point, and there were only a few issues that remained 

to be sorted through. So, as I said, it does seem to me that the unfolding Georgia crisis did have ‘‘an impact’’—I can’t tell you how big 

an impact—on Polish calculations, but—— 

38 

Senator BILL NELSON. Could it have been because Russia had objected, in the first place, to a national missile defense system in 

Eastern Europe, that the Poles saw this as an opportunity to say, 

‘‘This is a red line for us. We’re going to show our independence 

from you, Mr. Russia’’? 

Secretary BURNS. It could be, Senator. I honestly don’t know. 

But, you know, certainly the Russians have made no secret of their 

concern about that particular program in Poland, as well as in the 

Czech Republic. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, Mr. Secretary, you’re the best and 

you’re the brightest. How has the announcement by the Polish executive branch affected the relationship between the United States 

and Russia, since clearly Russia has said they don’t want this system in Eastern Europe? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, sir, the Russian leadership has contained 

its enthusiasm—— 

[Laughter.] 

Ambassador BURNS [continuing]. For that program over the 

years, and particularly for that step. The Russian public statements have been quite outspoken and quite hostile about that step 

that we would take in the agreement with Poland, notwithstanding 

our best efforts to make clear that it represents no threat to Russia 

and that it’s directed against a potential Iranian missile threat. 

But, no, they’ve been absolutely clear and unsubtle in expressing 

their concerns about this. 

Senator BILL NELSON. As to the possible admission of Georgia 

into NATO, what is the position of Germany and France? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, sir, I’d say two or three things. 

First, all of us in the NATO Alliance agreed, at the Bucharest 

Summit, that not only should the road remain open for new members, including Georgia and Ukraine, but it was a pretty strong 

statement that, somewhere down the road, those countries are 

going to become members of NATO. 

On the immediate question of a Membership Action Plan for 

Ukraine and Georgia, which we supported—the United States supported at the Bucharest Summit, and continues to support—there 

are reservations on the part of some other governments. And they 

can speak to them better than I can. But, certainly, Germany and 

France made clear at the Bucharest Summit that they were concerned about whether Georgia and Ukraine were ready to take that 

step. 

I don’t think that the—as I understand them, that the concerns 

expressed by Germany and France were a function so much of their 

concern about Russian reaction as they were a function of their 

genuine uncertainty about whether Ukraine and Georgia were 

ready to take that step yet. And that’s an issue that we’re going 

to continue to work through with our partners in NATO. And I 

can’t predict exactly, you know, what’s going to happen on that 

issue as we move toward the December foreign ministerial meeting 

of NATO. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In the NATO Alliance, is it not true that, 

for any additional member, it has to have the unanimous consent 

of all NATO parties? 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir; I believe that’s the case. 

39 

Senator BILL NELSON. Therefore, if Germany and France object, 

Georgia doesn’t come in. 

Secretary BURNS. Well, certainly with regard—again, we’re not 

talking about membership, at this stage. I think none of us believe 

that Georgia or Ukraine are ready, today, for membership. And 

what we’ve been discussing, a MAP program, is not an invitation, 

it’s not a promise, even, of membership. But, you’re absolutely 

right, that if there are differences within the Alliance over that 

issue, then it’s going to take some more time to sort through it. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I’ve heard a little more strongly that 

Germany and France are objecting to this. 

How do you work through the mental manipulations that we can 

bring in Kosovo, but—and over the objections of Russia—but Georgia can come over the objections of Russia? Tell me how you work 

through that parallel situation. 

Secretary BURNS. Senator, do you mean in terms of Kosovo and 

South Ossetia and Abkhazia or—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. Independence. I’m sorry. 

Secretary BURNS. Independence. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Independence. 

Secretary BURNS. Yes. Yes. Well, I guess, in Kosovo, you had 

what we regard to be a unique set of circumstances, a set of circumstances in which, for a period of almost a decade, you had the 

U.N. administering a particular area of Kosovo, you had an international security force which was responsible for maintaining order 

there, you had a very carefully worked-through system of protection of minority rights in Kosovo, again, which was overseen by an 

international authority, you had a long period of diplomatic effort, 

led by Mr. Ahtisaari, you know, who had been appointed by the 

U.N. Secretary General, to try and sort through a workable diplomatic outcome for Kosovo’s future. And then you had a period in 

which the so-called troika—the United States, European Union, 

and Russia—worked very hard, after Mr. Ahtisaari had come up 

with his plan, to try and produce an outcome. And, against that 

backdrop, the judgment that we and our European partners made 

was that stability in Europe was, in fact, undercut by continued 

stagnation or stalemate on this issue. Russians made very clear 

their opposition to that conclusion. 

I think if you look at the situations in South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia, those three or four ingredients that I mentioned don’t 

apply. You didn’t have that long period of U.N. or international administration, you didn’t have an international security force which 

was keeping order, you didn’t have that long period of internationally led, U.N.-led negotiation, you don’t have a system in place to 

protect minority rights and try to allow for the return of refugees. 

And so, for all those reasons, I think the situations are a little different. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

Let me, if I can—just ask a couple of questions here before I turn 

to Senator Lugar for any followup he may have. 

Obviously, and as you’ve stated it well here, and as I think it’s 

been generally acknowledged here, the Russian reaction was excessive. But, you indicated in your statements, too, the question of 

40 

whether or not this matter could have been avoided. Now, with 20– 

20 hindsight, to what extent do you believe that any actions taken 

by President Saakashvili could have been more moderated in a way 

that might have avoided the situation that occurred, or was that— 

was it unavoidable, in your view, that this was going to happen, 

no matter what occurred? To what extent have we examined that 

side of the equation in examining this question? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Senator, I think we’ve tried to examine 

it very carefully. And I don’t have a perfect answer for what is a 

very good question. I think that, you know, everyone, in different 

ways, contributed, through mistakes and miscalculations, to this 

crisis. I don’t think it was inevitable that it unfolded exactly in the 

way that it did, when it did. But, certainly the tensions have been 

building for a long time. And the Russians were preparing for a 

scenario, at least, in which force could be used in the way in which 

it was used. I can’t honestly tell you that, had events not unfolded 

exactly in the way in which they did at the beginning of August, 

that we would have seen this crisis right now. But, you know, I 

think there were a set of tensions there which have been building, 

which we tried very hard to avoid by reviving diplomatic mechanisms, and were, in the end, unsuccessful at doing that. 

Senator DODD. But, it’s important, it seems to me, to analyze this 

question so we know, to a large extent, what occurred here—to 

make a judgment about this situation, but also, given the possibilities that we’ve talked about here this morning, that this issue goes 

far beyond the geography of Georgia and Russia; this is one that 

now has had huge implications for us, for our allies, and for NATO. 

All of these issues have been highlighted by the set of facts, beginning on August 7. 

I want to come back to the issue raised, maybe by Senator Webb 

or Senator Casey, about military assistance. I think Senator Webb 

may have raised it in the Armed Services Committee. I was reading a story—and I’m just quoting from the story itself, so I have 

no independent information to confirm all of this, but there were 

some issues raised by Robert Hamilton, who’s a defense analyst 

and a regional expert at the Center for Strategic International 

Studies, and he allegedly said that the military assistance we’re 

talking about here would leave Georgia’s Armed Forces with the 

job of protecting the territory under its control—I’m quoting the 

story now—‘‘a mission that they are certainly capable of fulfilling 

if the U.S. assists. Still, Russia is highly unlikely to accept assurance of a purely defensive United States and Georgia intent, so any 

American military aid could heighten tensions.’’ Could you respond 

to that? 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. It’s obviously an issue 

that we have to weigh very carefully. President Bush has made 

clear our willingness to look at ways in which we can help the 

Georgians maintain their security, rebuild their security. That’s 

something that we want to do in conjunction with our NATO partners, as well. And, as I mentioned, we’ve formed this new NATOGeorgia Commission. It’s something that has to be approached 

carefully and methodically. The first stage is, obviously, to assess 

what the needs are, and that’s what we’re engaged in right now. 

And all I can assure you, at this point, is that, you know, as we 

41 

assess those needs, and as we look, potentially, at what decisions 

might be made, we’re going to do that very, very carefully. 

Senator DODD. Well, we do that—— 

Secretary BURNS. We do—— 

Senator DODD [continuing]. In conjunction, it seems to me, with 

our NATO allies, who, it seems to me, have a direct vested interest 

in those decisions. If you’re looking down the road though to NATO 

membership, it raises important questions. I asked Senator Lugar, 

a minute ago, ‘‘Is there any nation that’s ever been made a part 

of the MAP program that was ultimately denied admission to 

NATO?’’ And I gather there’s never been a case of that. So that, 

once you move in this direction, it seems to be, at least historically, 

there’s a certain inevitability to where that leads, however long it 

takes. So while I’m not arguing with it, these kinds of decisions, 

it seems to me, are very important, at this juncture. There needs 

to be a lot of cooperation and a lot of consultation, rather than unilateral decision as to what those needs may be, if, in fact, we’re 

going to be seeking additional cooperation. 

Senator Nelson pointed out that there may be some greater hesitancy on the part of principal NATO allies about an admission of 

Georgia to NATO, and it seems to me that if we go off unilaterally 

in this area, without the kind of deliberation and consultation, 

that, in fact, we may do some serious damage to the outcome of 

that decision. 

Secretary BURNS. Mr. Chairman, it’s a very fair point, and it’s, 

in large part, the purpose of this NATO-Georgia Commission that’s 

been created. We have the NATO Secretary General and all the 

permanent representatives of NATO in Tblisi over the last couple 

of days, so this is very much an effort in which we want to stay 

in the closest possible consultation, for all the reasons you mentioned, with our NATO partners. 

Senator DODD. Very good. 

I see Senator Cardin has joined us. Ben, I’ll yield back my little 

time and then turn to Senator Lugar. 

Senator CARDIN. Well, thank you, Chairman—Mr. Chairman. I 

thank—Senator Dodd. I apologize for not being here for—throughout the hearing. We had two other hearings today. But, this is a 

subject of great interest. The Helsinki Commission, which I chair 

on behalf of the Senate, has held hearings on this same subject. 

And I would just like to ask you one question, if I might, and 

that is—Russia is charting a new course. They’re openly using 

their military outside their own territories, they’ve recognized a region which one would think could be a problem for themselves because of the Russian Federation itself and desire for independence 

in certain regions. My question is, Who’s making the decisions in 

Russia today? I think most of us felt that Mr. Putin would remain 

as the major policymaker in the country, but perhaps President 

Medvedev has more influence than we originally thought. Can you 

help us in trying to sort out how the decisions are being made in 

Russia? We obviously need to have a way to impact decisions in 

that country to create a better relationship. It doesn’t mean we 

agree with what they did. We don’t. But, it’s important for us to 

have an effective relationship with Russia. And can you just help 

us in trying to sort out, politically, what is happening in that counVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
42 

try and whether it’s a shared power between two, or whether Mr. 

Putin’s still in control, or whether there are other forces, that perhaps haven’t had the same type of visibility, that are impacting the 

decisions within Russia? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, Senator, that’s a really good question, 

and I’ll just make two or three comments in response. 

And the first one is that, honestly, one thing I learned in 3 years 

as Ambassador in Moscow is humility, because it’s—it’s a complicated political system and political leadership to try and understand. 

Second, I think President Medvedev, as any Russian President, 

has considerable amount of authority, particularly over national security and foreign policy matters. At the same time, it’s obvious 

that Prime Minister Putin retains a great deal of influence. And so, 

you do have a circumstance of shared power, I think, in a lot of respects. 

There is, across the Russian political elite, including within the 

Kremlin and in the government, I think, a pretty strong consensus 

on some of the issues that we’ve talked about today, whether we 

like it or not, with regard to the reassertion of Russian national interests and a willingness to be pretty aggressive in asserting those 

interests. There’s debate about tactics sometimes. 

I think it’s going to also be interesting to see what kind of debate 

develops as the consequences, particularly the economic consequences, of the Georgia crisis become clear. 

Now, the fall in the Russian stock market is not entirely due to 

the Georgia crisis. It predated it, to some extent. But, the Georgia 

crisis has certainly aggravated that. And so, I think, over time— 

I certainly hope—that that will cause at least some rethinking 

about the approach and the policies that the Russian Government 

embarks upon. Because the issue is not whether Russia is a great 

power or whether Russia is influencing its neighborhood. It obviously is, and it does. The question is how it exercises that power 

and influence, whether it pays attention to the rules that govern 

the behavior of other states in the international system today. And 

so, you know, I think, over time, as those consequences become 

clear, you may see some debate over tactics and over the kinds of 

behavior that we’ve seen recently. But, at this point, it’s a popular 

leadership throughout much of Russia—— 

Senator CARDIN. Let me try to pin you down on your best estimate, or best intelligence, as to how the decision to use their military within Georgia, beyond just the disputed areas, but to go into 

Georgia itself—Mr. Putin, if I am correct, I believe, was at the 

Olympics when that decision was made. He then went back to Russia. But, do you believe that was a decision that had been thought 

out for some time, involving both the President and Prime Minister, or was this a decision made on the ground by the president, 

or how did that come about? 

Secretary BURNS. I don’t honestly know, Senator. I’m sure there 

are contingency plans in place for Russians, as there are for the 

United States or any other country, but exactly how that decisionmaking unfolded over that period of time in early August, I don’t 

know. The President of Russia is empowered, under the Russian 

constitution, ultimately with making those decisions. And so, I asVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
43 

sume that it was President Medvedev, ultimately, who made them. 

But, clearly Prime Minister Putin and others in the leadership had 

significant input into that. 

Senator CARDIN. And if you were—as you are advising our government, we need to invest in both the Prime Minister and the 

President? You believe it’s truly shared, or is the Prime Minister 

the principal architect of what’s going on? 

Secretary BURNS. Sure, no, I think it’s important for us to stay 

engaged, as we do with lots of countries around the world, with the 

President, as well as with the Prime Minister, who has—whomever 

it is in Russia who has responsibilities for economic, domestic, social issues, where we have a lot at stake, too, in terms of our economic engagement. 

Senator CARDIN. Do you see any friction developing within Russia itself? Is there any disagreements, or this is a pretty unified 

team? 

Secretary BURNS. Oh, I think it—Senator, I think it depends on 

the issue. On some of, you know, the behavior that we’ve seen over 

the Georgia crisis, my sense, anyway, is that it’s a fairly unified 

group at the top. But, I think, on other issues there’s a debate that 

goes on over economic policy, over some other aspects of foreign 

policy. It’s not always obvious to us on the outside, but my sense 

is that there’s a debate that sometimes goes on about tactics. On 

this set of issues, my impression is that there was a fair amount 

of consensus in the Russian leadership. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Senator DODD. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you very much. I apologize. Two 

markups at the same time as this hearing. 

And I’m so happy that you’re where you are right now. Because 

of the Presidential election, I think there are some folks out there 

that see us in kind of a state of flux, and I think that having you 

where you’re at sends a good signal out to the rest of the world, 

we’ve got somebody that knows what they’re doing there, at the 

highest level of our government and the State Department. 

First of all, I’d like to say that I’m pleased that Sarkozy has 

taken some leadership role. And it looks like the club is working 

together. I always think that, when you’re dealing with Russia or 

China, that the best way to do it is there are dues that you play— 

pay in the club. If you behave certain ways, you belong to the club, 

and if you don’t behave that way, then you’re no longer in the club. 

And I think they want to be part of the club, and the issue is, you 

know, how far off are they going to go? 

The second issue is the issue of energy. And I recently met with 

the ambassadors from the Balts, and I was surprised, 100 percent 

of their natural gas coming from Russia, half of it, half their oil. 

And they’re vulnerable, in terms of—if Russia decides to use that 

as some kind of a weapon. And I’d interested to know, you know, 

has anybody sat back and looked at some of the initiatives that we 

could take to work with others to try and come up with some alternatives so that they’re less vulnerable, just as, quite frankly, we’re 

vulnerable when somebody else controls the supply and the cost of 

what you do? And in our particular case, some of the people that 

44 

we’re giving oil money to are now buying the debt of the United 

States. So, you’ve got somebody controlling the price, the supply, 

and they buy your debt, you’ve got some significant problems. So, 

I’d be interested in—is there some thought in that area? 

And the other area that I’m concerned about is the whole NATO 

issue. And I’ve been one that’s really pushed expansion of NATO 

and studied history, and once those countries got their independence, I said the one thing I want to do is—let’s get them into 

NATO, because that’ll be—they’ll be more secure that way. And I 

just shudder to think about the Balts, for example, where you’ve 

got large Russian populations, so if they weren’t in NATO today, 

I’m not sure that—who knows what would be going on there. But, 

we’ve got a big meeting coming up in December, and the real 

issue—and I—again, is—What position are we going to take in regard to expansion of NATO? The Ukraine is really interested in 

being invited. And where do we stand in that regard? 

Secretary BURNS. Thank you very much, Senator. 

To start with the NATO question first, I mean, the United States 

position, in the runup to the Bucharest Summit and today, remains 

supportive of extending the next step in the—what can be a 

drawnout membership process for Ukraine and Georgia—the Membership Action Plan, which is the stage, as you well know, where 

you—a country gets ready for the possibility of membership—that 

we continue to support that. 

Now, exactly what’s going to transpire at the December ministerial meeting, or—is hard to predict, at this point, because, as you 

well know, there are some other key partners in NATO who have 

their reservations about whether Ukraine or Georgia are ready for 

that step next. And so, I can’t predict for you exactly the tactics, 

let alone the outcome, of that. 

But, it’s a question that deserves to be weighed very, very carefully, for all the reasons that you mentioned. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Have—one of the other Senators raised the 

issue of article 5. Has there been—is there a definition of when 

that occurs? 

Secretary BURNS. Well, with actual membership—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. Yeah. 

Ambassador BURNS [continuing]. In NATO, as opposed to a Membership Action Plan—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. No; what I’m saying is, is that—someone 

asked the question, ‘‘If Georgia had been in NATO, and what occurred, would that have triggered article 5 of the NATO’’—in other 

words, would have gotten us all involved in saying, ‘‘You’ve got to 

get out of there.’’ 

Secretary BURNS. Well, it certainly, it seems to me, would have. 

I mean, if Georgia had been a member of NATO, the—article 5 applies to all members of NATO. But, again, it’s another of the reasons why this process is a very careful, thorough one, why there 

are criteria that—and one of the criteria, as you well know, Senator, is to have good relations with your neighbors as you move 

ahead in that direction. So, it’s something that we support, but 

which is going to be the subject, I’m sure, of some pretty serious 

discussion within the Alliance in the runup to the December meeting. 

45 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you think that what’s happened makes 

it more likely or less likely that it’ll occur? 

Secretary BURNS. It’s hard to predict, but, I think, for some partners in NATO, it probably isn’t going to ease the concerns that they 

had before. But, it’s hard to predict, at this stage, and I think a 

lot’s going to depend on how this crisis unfolds, whether or not we 

see Russian compliance with its commitments, the commitments it 

made in August and again in September. 

On the energy issue that you raised, Senator, I think it’s a critically important issue, as I mentioned in my opening statement. I 

think there are a number of things that we and our partners can 

do to help strengthen energy security and reduce an over-reliance 

or a singular reliance on Russian gas and oil imports. They involve 

everything from improving energy efficiency, which you’ve actually 

seen in Ukraine over the last couple of years, after the extremely 

unfortunate temporary disruption of gas from Russia, two winters 

ago. One of the byproducts of that has been a greater effort at energy efficiency in Ukraine, which can pay big dividends in parts of 

the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Looking for renewable energy sources is also important. And then, obviously, looking 

at ways in which you can diversify supplies and transit routes so 

that you’re making better use of the enormous energy supplies in 

Central Asia, as well as in the Caucasus itself. And so, I think we 

need to redouble our efforts in all of those areas. 

Russia is going to continue to be a big energy player, globally as 

well as in its own neighborhood in Europe and Eurasia. But, all of 

our interests are served best—and the Russians themselves subscribed to this at the St. Petersburg G–8 summit, two summers 

ago—all of our interests are served best by genuine energy security, which means you’re diversifying sources of supply and transit 

routes. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Did the—can I ask you something? Did the 

question that Bill Nelson raised about—is that—did you discuss 

that? 

Senator DODD. About NASA? 

Senator VOINOVICH. About NASA and the fact that we don’t— 

we’re—we’ve discontinued the use of the shuttle, and what we’re 

going to do in the interim period. 

Senator DODD. Ambassador Burns—I don’t know how knowledgeable you are about the NASA programs and where we are with 

that, but—— 

Secretary BURNS. No; I’ll take a stab at it. I mean, I think Senator Nelson described very—— 

Senator VOINOVICH. I mean, I think that there was—I think—in 

fact, I’ve talked to somebody from the State—about getting a waiver so that—from that—I guess, the provision that says, ‘‘If you do 

business with Iran, that you can’t—we can’t do business with you.’’ 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir. And the administration fully supports 

that waiver, for the very practical reason, as Senator Nelson described, that, you know, our relationship with Russia in space cooperation has really been one of mutual dependence. I mean, we 

both benefited from it, but, particularly in the near term, we really 

do depend on Russia as our source of getting from here to the space 

46 

station. And so, I think it’s an area of cooperation in which we have 

a pretty clear self-interest. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Senator DODD. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. In response to Senator Voinovich’s question, my 

understanding is that the staffs, majority and minority, have considered the waiver, and that would be on the agenda for our business meeting, next Tuesday I believe, so that constructive action 

could be taken by the committee to meet that problem, I believe. 

I just want to raise two or three points, one of which is, in the 

Moscow Times today on this—September 17 issue—there’s a letter 

to the editor by three partners of RST International, a business of 

strategic communication consultancy based in Moscow. The piece 

very candidly describes United States-Russian relations in political 

campaigns, our Presidential campaigns throughout the years, what 

positions candidates have taken, and then how things evolved after 

the elections, pragmatically, with the Russians. Whether one 

agrees with their political analysis, essentially they are indicating 

that, after our campaign is over, whoever is elected President will 

probably attempt to forge some type of a relationship with, not only 

Prime Minister Putin, but President Medvedev, and that we will 

proceed again from there. Which may or may not be the case. I just 

found it interesting that this is being published in Moscow—without knowing the circulation of the Moscow Times and how important that is, but it is a paper in Russia, presently now, and speculating, about our elections, for Russian readers. 

Another footnote is that the Pentagon, each month, provides an 

update of the Nunn-Lugar Program’s progress in eliminating weapons of mass destruction. And during August, the month of contention in Georgia, 10 intercontinental ballistic missiles were destroyed in Russia and four shipments of nuclear warheads were 

sent to safe and secure storage. This is a fairly modest outcome, 

but, nevertheless, the program continues. The 10 missiles destroyed join 720 others that have been destroyed previously during 

the last 16 years, and there are still a good number to go. But, I 

make the point that it is important that this process of cooperative 

threat reduction move ahead, even at fairly low profile, because the 

safety, not only of Russia and the United States, but the world 

really, is involved in the containment of all of this. 

Finally, I just am curious, I talked to General Craddock, our 

NATO commander, when I was in Brussels in early September, 

and he indicated that the Russian forces have a training exercise 

in the area around North Ossetia—that is on the border with 

South Ossetia—every August. So, they were down there again for 

a training exercise in August. I asked, ‘‘Are they there only during 

August?’’ Well, essentially that’s when the exercise occurs. Which 

led me, to—just being the devil’s advocate—what if the shooting between Ossetians and Georgians and so forth had occurred, say, October the 15th? Would the same troops have been there? Well, apparently not. 

Now, I raise this question, because it really gets to the heart of 

good intelligence on our part, on the part of the Georgians, on the 

part of our Embassy in Moscow. These are salient facts, when the 

Russians have not just conscripts, although some were conscripts 

47 

in the South Caucasus, but professional soldiers in the area for a 

training exercise. General Craddock reports that aircraft that were 

flown by the Russians were often flown in very erratic ways at altitude levels that made it fairly easy for the Georgians, with very 

limited armament, to shoot them down. He also pointed out that 

Russian troops just advanced in single file, the tanks the troops 

and so forth, as opposed to a sort of spread formation that would 

have been normal in these things. So, you know, you ask, ‘‘Well, 

why did the Russians win?’’ He said, ‘‘Well, there were a whole lot 

more of them.’’ You know, by the time you have all of the tanks 

and all the troops, whatever may be the level of training or coordination, it was rather overwhelming force that then spread out over 

the country in one form or another. 

It also raised questions about the training of the Georgian troops. 

Certainly, the United States and others have been involved in this, 

but communication breakdowns between various segments. This 

was complicated by the fact that when the Georgian troops were 

flown back from Iraq, the Russians had taken over some of the garrisons where their weapons were stored. So when they returned 

they were, weaponless, or without the provisions that were required at that point. 

I mention this because this requires, I think, some careful analysis by Georgians, by ourselves, by others, as to specifically what 

happened. Not who triggered it and on what day or so forth, but, 

physically, why were Russians there on the border at that time and 

in those numbers? Why didn’t somebody shut the tunnel so that 

5,000 people could not come through? And this is, I think, very, 

very important. I appreciate that, at this point, people tire of the 

tediousness of going into this, play by play, but I simply raise this 

as a part of the hearing, because I suspect you would agree that 

this kind of postmortem analysis is important. 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir, I absolutely do. And I think it is very 

important to engage in that kind of an analysis as a way, not just 

of understanding how this crisis unfolded, but avoiding ones in the 

future. 

Senator LUGAR. Yes. 

Thank you, sir. 

Senator DODD. Let me underscore that point with Senator Lugar. 

In a far less adept way, let me raise that issue—again, it’s not that 

this is in any way to excuse the Russian behavior, which was excessive under any circumstances, but to understand what happened 

and how this unfolded is going to be very important. And at this 

juncture, while it still may be a little early, my hope would be— 

and, I think, certainly Senator Biden would agree, as the chairman 

of the committee—that at some point we get a more detailed explanation and analysis of actually what happened. It seems to be important. 

And I’d underscore the point that Senator Lugar and others have 

raised, as well, and it doesn’t get said often enough, but the NunnLugar proposals have just been remarkable in their achievement, 

and it’s important to point out, in the midst of all of this, and contrary to the Senator’s observation, I think it’s fairly significant 

what happened in August, with those numbers, and then we need 

48 

to understand it. This is not a two-dimensional relationship; it’s 

very complex, it’s deep, and it needs to be well thought out. 

I presume I know the answer to this question, but let me ask it 

of it anyway, and that is, I presume the McCain Campaigns and 

the Obama Campaigns are being well informed, and are being advised on this issue, so there’s knowledge within these two camps 

as to how all of this is progressing—— 

Secretary BURNS. I believe—— 

Senator DODD [continuing]. So that there’s a seamlessness to all 

of this, I hope, come January, in terms of moving on? 

Secretary BURNS. Yes, sir. I believe that’s the case today. And 

certainly as we look ahead to transitions very the next few months, 

it’s something that we’ll pay a lot of attention to in the State Department. Yes, sir. 

Senator DODD. In the case of Senator Biden, as the chair of this 

committee and having been to Georgia, has a deep knowledge and 

understanding of the issue already, but I would hope that would 

continue to be the case. It’s very, very important, it seems to me, 

that this happens. We’re going to have a new administration on 

January 20, and to the extent they are very aware and knowledgeable about what’s transpiring, I think it will be very, very important, as well. 

Any other—further comments or questions? 

[No response.] 

Senator DODD. Well, Mr. Ambassador, let me say again what others have said here—we’re very fortunate to have you. You’re extremely knowledgeable and competent, and I thought your comments today were very well taken. So, I appreciate, immensely, 

your service to the country. And we’ll follow up with this. 

The committee will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Under Secretary Burns, thank you for coming before us today to testify on this 

important subject. Let me start by saying that I was frankly outraged by Russia’s 

actions in Georgia last month. Russia’s disproportionate military response against 

the sovereign, internationally recognized territory of Georgia, which includes South 

Ossetia and Abkhazia, is in violation of international law and is conduct unbecoming of a responsible international stakeholder in the 21st century. 

Let’s be clear: Georgia might have exercised better judgment to avoid falling prey 

to Russia’s provocations, but I reject the notion that there is some sort of moral 

equivalence between Russia’s and Georgia’s conduct. South Ossetia is not Kosovo. 

And launching major military operations by air, ground, and sea deep into the territory of your smaller neighbor, attacking its cities and ports, and damaging its civilian and economic infrastructure is simply not acceptable. 

I am pleased to have worked with my colleagues on the Senate Foreign Relations 

and Armed Services Committees to clear an amendment to the defense authorization bill yesterday that sends this clear message to Russia, our allies, and the rest 

of the world. 

Make no mistake, Russia’s actions have diminished its standing in the international community and should lead to a review of existing, developing, and proposed multilateral and bilateral arrangements. I look forward to hearing from you 

what sources of leverage we have available to encourage Russia to abide by its international commitments. 

49 

Russia should immediately comply with the September 8, 2008, follow-on agreement to the six-point cease-fire negotiated on August 12, 2008. And I hope that you, 

together with your counterparts in Europe, are delivering a clear message of your 

own to Moscow: If Russia continues to violate international law and its commitments, its long-term relationship with the West will be adversely affected and its 

rightful place in the political, economic, and security institutions of the 21st century 

and a future partnership with our democracies will be jeopardized. 

Looking ahead, both Russia and Georgia must refrain from the future use of force 

to resolve the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and both countries should work 

with the EU, the OSCE, and the U.N. Security Council to identify a political settlement. 

In the meantime, I will be supporting a robust Senate assistance package, as well 

as international efforts underway, to provide humanitarian and economic reconstruction assistance to Georgia, and aid the development of a strong, vibrant 

multiparty democracy. We also should redouble efforts with the EU, Georgia, and 

its neighbors to ensure the free flow of energy to Europe. 

The real test for American and European diplomacy in the months ahead will be 

how to back Georgia’s people and its democratically elected government without antagonizing Russia and sliding back into more hostile relations reminiscent of the 

cold war. The United States continues to have interests in common with Russia, including combating the proliferation of nuclear weapons, halting Iran’s nuclear program, and fighting terrorism. 

Over time, these shared interests can serve as a basis for improved long-term relations. But we are regrettably in a different place today due to Russia’s pattern 

of aggressive behavior in Georgia and elsewhere. I know you will have thoughts on 

how we can strike a balance that passes this crucial test. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on ‘‘Responses to the Conflict 

between Georgia and Russia.’’ 

When Russian military forces invaded Georgia last month, I condemned Russia’s 

aggressive actions, called for Russia to cease its bombing campaign and withdraw 

its ground forces, and stated that Georgia’s territorial integrity must be respected. 

I spoke with Georgian President Saakashvili on August 9 and conveyed to him my 

deep regret over the loss of life and the suffering of the people of Georgia. 

For many months, I have warned about the potential for escalation of this simmering dispute. I called upon Russia to stop provoking Georgia and also warned 

Georgia not to fall for Russia’s baiting. Instead of military escalation, I stated in 

April and again in July that there needs to be active international engagement to 

peacefully address the disputes over South Ossetia and Abkhazia, including a highlevel and neutral international mediator and a genuine international peacekeeping 

force in Georgia. No matter how the conflict in August started, it is clear that Russia escalated it well beyond the dispute over South Ossetia and Abkhazia. There is 

no justification for Russia’s invasion of Georgia or recognition of South Ossetia and 

Abkhazia as independent states. 

Together with our European and other partners, we must take action on several 

fronts. First, neutral, international observers must immediately be deployed to 

Georgia to verify that the Russians are upholding their commitments. This means 

not only strengthening the OSCE observer mission in South Ossetia but also dispatching EU observers to all parts of Georgia including the conflict zones. These observers must not only monitor implementation of the cease-fire agreement but also 

investigate all claims of human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing. 

Second, the international community must continue to hold Russia accountable for 

its continued misconduct and violations of international law. So long as Russia continues to violate international law and refuses to respect the territorial integrity of 

its neighbors, the United States and Europe must work together to consider other 

measures, including suspension of Russian applications to join the WTO and OECD. 

Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states should be 

rejected. 

Third, we must make Georgia’s economic recovery an urgent strategic priority. 

Senator Biden and I have called for $1 billion in reconstruction assistance to help 

the people of Georgia during this trying period. The administration has embraced 

this idea, and Congress should provide the funding immediately to demonstrate that 

Russia will not get away with its attempt to humiliate Georgia by destroying its inVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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frastructure, military equipment, and villages. I also welcome and encourage European efforts to help rebuild Georgia. 

Fourth, a clear lesson of the Georgia crisis is that we and our European allies 

must pursue energy policies that reduce dependence on Russian oil and gas. This 

means working urgently to increase efficient use of energy, especially in those countries in the transatlantic community still recovering from wasteful Soviet practices. 

It also means developing alternative energy sources and alternative supplies for Europe and Eurasia. Just as the United States and Europe committed in the 1990s 

to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which can deliver 1 million barrels of oil per 

day from Central Asia across a route that does not depend on Russia, today we must 

jointly build other alternative production and pipeline projects. 

Finally, events in Georgia make it more necessary than ever for the United States 

and Europe to reiterate their shared commitments to the sovereign right of all European countries to live in freedom from the threat of military or economic coercion. 

Beyond the attack on Georgia, the past few months and years have seen Russian 

cyberattacks in Estonia, use of energy blackmail against Ukraine, and threats to 

point missiles at Poland and other East European states. We must stand together 

against these acts. 

Russia today is not the Soviet Union, and we are not returning to the cold war. 

I will continue to press for direct dialogue with the Kremlin on issues of mutual 

interest, including keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists, reducing our nuclear arsenals, and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear 

weapons. Russia has the potential to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system, and I hope that one day it can be included in the wider Euro-Atlantic community. Russia’s recent choices, however, are threatening this potential and 

reminding us all that peace and security in Europe cannot be taken for granted. 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO UNDER SECRETARY OF

STATE WILLIAM J. BURNS BY SENATOR GEORGE VOINOVICH

ENERGY SECURITY

Question. Are Russia’s actions in Georgia based on the ′′grand strategy′′ of energy 

security and the ‘‘B-T-C’’ (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) pipeline? [Note: The BTC pipeline 

runs from Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia, bypassing Russia.] 

Answer. We have no information indicating that energy was Russia’s immediate 

motivation for invading Georgia, or that Russia targeted Georgia’s energy infrastructure. While the Russian invasion may have rattled investor nerves, the BakuTblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the South Caucasus Gas pipeline—the anchors 

of the Southern Corridor through which Azerbaijani oil and gas flow to Europe— 

were not damaged by the Russian action. That said, the Russian invasion of Georgia 

should serve as a wake-up call to strengthen and expand a ‘‘Southern Corridor’’ of 

energy infrastructure, to transport Caspian oil and gas to European and world markets. The development of Caspian energy resources and diversified export routes are 

the best means for supporting the sovereignty, independence and economic development of Georgia, as well as other countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Central Europe. Senior U.S. leadership has taken this message to the region in recent 

weeks and will continue to do so. 

Question. In your opinion, how serious a problem is Europe’s increasing dependence on Russian gas and oil? 

Answer. Europe is overly dependent on Russian energy supplies. Natural gas consumption in the European Union is expected to double over the next 25 years—with 

imports exceeding 80 percent by 2030—as gas becomes the fuel of choice for power 

generation, fueled by EU climate change commitments and the phasing out of nuclear power in some EU countries. A recent IEA estimate has European gas demand 

increasing by over 250 billion cubic meters (bcm/a) by 2015, and contracted volumes 

falling short by more than 118 bcm/a in the same year. 

Russia would like to increase its market in Europe and increase European dependence on Russian gas. Russia will not be able to achieve the goal of increasing 

its share of European market if Caspian energy can reach the European market 

independent of Russian delivery. The IEA has said that Russia could have trouble 

filling its existing European gas contracts as early as 2011—absent significant upstream investment—and Russian gas production declined in 2007 for the first time 

since 2000, decreasing by 0.8 percent over 2006. Additionally, Russia’s heavy-handed approach to gas transit issues with Ukraine and its purchases of European midVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
51 

stream and downstream assets—all while giving limited European access to the 

Russian upstream—has concerned several EU countries. 

The EU needs to diversify its hydrocarbon sources, including the development of 

the ‘‘Fourth’’ or ‘‘Southern Corridor’’ of energy infrastructure to bring Caspian and 

Middle Eastern gas to Europe and explore its liquefied natural gas options. 

Question. What steps can/should European states take to decrease their dependence on Russian gas and oil? 

Answer. Diversification of energy sources, the appropriate use of competition and 

regulatory policies and enhanced grid interconnectivity, would complement ongoing 

EU efforts to develop alternative sources of energy and enhance energy efficiency 

efforts. All are critical to a long-term strategy to increase EU energy security. 

With 6.4 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and 25.2 percent of world gas 

reserves, Russia is an important supplier of hydrocarbons. Russia supplies one third 

of European oil imports and almost 50 percent of the European Union’s (EU) natural gas imports (27 percent of overall EU gas consumption), but many Central and 

Eastern European states are dependant on Russia for over 80 percent of their natural gas imports. 

The Russia-Georgia conflict, combined with past Russian energy cutoffs to neighboring countries, should encourage Europe to diversify its supplies and mitigate its 

dependence. Enhanced European energy security will require the EU to insist on 

greater market integration. Enabling the development of a ‘‘Fourth’’ of 11Southern 

Corridor’’ of energy infrastructure to bring Caspian Basin oil and gas to European 

and world markets, e.g., via the Nabucco or Turkey-Greece-Italy interconnector, 

would be prudent. The Caspian and Middle East (including Iraq and Egypt)—with 

their 84,490 BCM in reserves compared to Russia’s 47,650 BCM—are critical alternative sources for meeting the EU’s natural gas needs. 

Additionally, competition and internal market policy would increase the competitiveness and efficiency of electricity and natural gas markets. Passage of the proposed ‘‘Third Energy Package’’ and a more aggressive use of EU and national Competition Authorities could mitigate Gazprom’s influence based on its dominant market position. The September 19, 2007 proposals, if enacted, would require the 

unbundling of the production and supply of electricity and gas from their transmission. These provisions could increase gas and electricity connections between 

member states, boosting efficiency and reducing the risk of an energy cutoff in member states that are highly dependant on one supplier—significantly enhancing EU 

energy security. 

NATO

Question. Are Georgia’s chances of being offered a NATO Membership Action Plan 

(MAP) at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December 2008 bolstered or reduced in the wake of the Russia—Georgia conflict? Does the administration still 

support offering a MAP to Georgia in December? 

Answer. The administration continues to strongly support Georgia’s aspirations 

for Euro-Atlantic integration, including its eventual accession to NATO. Georgia is 

an important partner of the Alliance and a valuable contributor to security, having 

provided important support in Kosovo and the third-largest contingent in Operation 

Iraqi Freedom before the August 8 invasion. 

At the Bucharest Summit last spring, NATO’s leaders agreed that Georgia would 

become a member of NATO. they tasked allied foreign ministers to review Georgia’s 

progress in December. Following the Georgia-Russia conflict, NATO reaffirmed its 

support for the commitments made at its summit in Bucharest and established the 

NATO-Georgia Commission to supervise the process set in hand in Bucharest. 

Ministers have the authority to decide on MAP in December, and we believe the 

answer should be yes. Georgia’s leadership recognizes that the country has work to 

do before allies could consider Georgia for membership, and this process would take 

years. Allies differ on when Georgia should enter MAP. In this context, it is important to emphasize that no non-NATO country has a veto over NATO enlargement. 

MAP is not the same as membership, it does not guarantee an invitation, does 

not set a timeline, and does not include a security guarantee. Georgia has made 

some noteworthy reform progress with NATO’s support, but its efforts must continue, and MAP is the process that will help Georgia meet NATO standards. In fact, 

the prospect of NATO membership motivates countries to tackle difficult reforms, 

and the work that these aspirants undertake to meet NATO standards benefits 

their entire region, helping the aspirants to become more stable, democratic, and reliable. 

52 

Question. Are Ukraine’s chances of being offered a NATO Membership Action 

Plan (MAP) at the NATO summit in December 2008 bolstered or reduced in the 

wake of the Russia-Georgia conflict? 

Answer. The United States supports Ukraine’s Euroatlantic aspirations, including 

its expressed desire to advance its relations with NATO. We continue to support a 

NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine. MAP is a work program designed to help NATO aspirants make the reforms necessary to prepare them for 

NATO membership. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Alliance declared 

that Ukraine will become a member, but some allies differ on when Ukraine should 

take that next step. In this context, it is important to emphasize that no non-NATO 

country has a veto over NATO enlargement. 

It is also important that the Ukrainian Government be united in its readiness to 

pursue MAP. MAP is not the same as membership, it does not guarantee an invitation, does not set a timeline, and does not include a security guarantee. MAP does 

give aspirant countries the means and motivation to meet NATO’s standards 

Ukraine has made some noteworthy reform progress with NATO’s support, but its 

efforts must continue. Ultimately, these reform efforts benefit the entire region, 

helping aspirants to become more stable, democratic, and reliable. 

CONSEQUENCES

Question. The Bush administration has suggested that, as a result of Russia’s incursion into Georgia, its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be 

in jeopardy. Is the United States contemplating holding up or opposing Russia’s accession to the WTO? 

Follow-Up: If so, would that indicate a change in U.S. policy of encouraging Russia’s membership and participation in the WTO and other multilateral economic organizations? 

Answer. The President said, ‘‘By its recent actions, Russia is putting its [WTO] 

aspirations at risk.’’ Secretary Rice has also stated, ‘‘Russia’s bid to join the World 

Trade Organization is now in jeopardy.’’ While we have supported Russia’s full integration into the global economy—operating under rules-based organizations benefits 

Russia, the United States and the world economy—if Russia continues down its current path this goal will not be achievable. 

Russia is responsible for the timing and progress of its accession. The Russian 

government is aware of the actions it needs to take in order to meet the terms for 

WTO accession and conform to the rules of the WTO. Russia must simply decide 

whether it will undertake these actions or not. 

Question. Should Russia be excluded from meetings of the G-8? 

Answer. While the United States has long supported Russia’s aspirations to integrate into the world economy and institutions, Russia’s invasion of Georgia and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia put its aspirations in jeopardy. Such actions 

are not those of a responsible world partner. 

We are reevaluating our relationship with Russia. We are doing so in concert with 

our international partners, including other G-7 countries. For example, Japan, as 

the G-8 Presidency, has postponed G-8 meetings that were to have taken place in 

September and through the middle of October. 

Our immediate focus is to support Georgia and countries in Russia’s neighborhood. We also seek full Russian compliance with all elements of the August 12 and 

September 8 Agreements. 

Question. I am concerned about Russia’s potential response to economic sanctions 

by the U.S. and Europe. We have seen Moscow shutdown gas pipelines to the 

Ukraine/Western Europe. Moscow has most recently seized control of BP’s Russian 

joint-venture. How would Russia respond to potential economic sanctions by the 

U.S. and/or Europe? 

Follow-up: The Russians are a very proud people. Is it possible to design targeted 

sanctions that would not risk deepening tensions between Russia and the West? 

Answer. Russia is indeed a proud country, one whose leaders chose to react 

against actions such as sanctions, in particular from the United States, against 

whom Russia and previously the Soviet Union traditionally measured itself. It is 

possible that Russia would seek ways to retaliate for any sanctions imposed on it. 

It is also possible that Russian leaders are aware of the severe costs Russia has already borne through its invasion of Georgia and may seek ways to avoid a further 

deterioration in their country’s standing in the world. 

53 

We will work with our European allies and other friends and allies to encourage 

Russia to make better decisions than some recent ones. We can do this, among other 

things, by making it clear that Russia failed to destroy Georgia’s sovereignty and 

independence; that their invasion has done little more than demonstrate that Russia’s military could overcome the armed forces of a much smaller and weaker country. 

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO UNDER SECRETARY OF

STATE WILLIAM J. BURNS BY SENATOR ROBERT P. CASEY, JR. 

Question. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Georgia, senior Russian leaders 

contended that Russia’s actions to protect a persecuted ethnic minority parallel 

NATO action in 1999 to protect the Kosovar minority against Serbian war crimes 

and ethnic cleansing. The decision by the United States and NATO allies to recognize Kosovo as an independent nation earlier this year was also cited by Russia as 

a legal precedent for its decision to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Do you view these statements by senior Russian leaders as a cynical 

exercise to justify their actions? Or is there a possibility that Western recognition 

of Kosovo, no matter how just or correct, spurred Russia to retaliate by recognizing 

separatist regions within an ally of the United States? How do we best respond to 

statements by Russian officials and their allies that Kosovo set the precedent for 

South Ossetia? 

Answer. Russia has tried to justify its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia 

as independent states by comparing the situation in the separatist regions to that 

of Kosovo. However, Kosovo was a unique case and not a precedent for any other 

conflict, neither Georgia’s breakaway territories nor any other separatist movement. 

When responding to Russian officials it is best to let the facts speak for themselves. 

In 1999, following the ouster of Milosevic’s military from Kosovo, the UN Security 

Council set the framework for resolving Kosovo’s status in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, which was adopted without any dissents (China abstaining). 

Among other things, UNSCR 1244 denied Serbia a role in governing Kosovo; authorized the establishment of an interim UN administration for Kosovo; provided for 

local self-government; and envisioned a UN-led political process to determine 

Kosovo’s future status. UNSCR 1244 contemplated independence as a possible outcome of that process. 

Thus, Kosovo was never a breakaway territory (like South Ossetia or Abkhazia), 

but had a status recognized by the UN Security Council. Unlike in Kosovo, there 

is no UN-sanctioned international administration is Abkhazia or South Ossetia. 

There is no international security force operating under UN authorization or mandate and Russia’s actions in Georgia fly in the face of UNSCR 1808, the most recent 

of many Security Council Resolutions of Georgia, passed on 15 April 2008, which 

explicitly ‘‘Reaffirms the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognized 

borders. . . .’’ There are no security guarantees to protect different ethnic communities, and Russia has failed for nearly two decades to create the conditions for the 

return of refugees. On the contrary, Russia has deliberately avoided using available 

avenues to bring resolution to the protracted conflicts in Abkhazia and South 

Ossetia. 

Question. Can you assure the committee that the events of the past month have 

not led to any disruption or delay in ongoing bilateral and multilateral efforts to 

reduce the threat of weapons of m ass destruction in the Russian Federation and 

former Soviet Union as a whole (the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program)? 

Answer. Proliferation threat reduction under the Nunn-Lugar program remains 

on track despite Russia’s attack on Georgia. Activities are ongoing since it still benefits the national security interests of the United States to provide assistance to 

eliminate nuclear weapons and their delivery systems at the source, to consolidate 

and secure potential WMD materials and prevent their smuggling, to increase 

transparency and a high standard of personnel conduct, and to redirect efforts of 

former WMD scientists toward productive use. 

Under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program we have 

had many successes with the countries that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet 

Union after 1991. For example, nuclear weapons are being transported securely 

from the operational bases where they are being deactivated to secure storage or 

dismantlement. Delivery systems such as strategic submarines with submarineVerDate Aug 31 2005 12:37 Feb 02, 2009 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\DOCS\46828.TXT MikeBB PsN: MIKEB
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launched ballistic missiles, land-based silo-launched ICBMs such as SS-18s and SS19s, and SS-25 road-mobile systems are being eliminated. Since 2001 when the limits of START I were met, the number of START-accountable warheads remaining 

on strategic delivery systems of the former Soviet Union has decreased from 6,000 

to approximately 4,000, a net reduction of approximately 2,000 warheads in 7 years. 

It is in the U.S. interest to continue to cooperate in reducing proliferation risks not 

only through CTR but also through multilateral and other partnership programs, 

such as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of 

Mass Destruction and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 

Æ