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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA

ROCKY JAY BURNS, 

 Appellant,

 v.

STATE OF ALASKA, 

 Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-13793 

Trial Court No. 3AN-15-08427 CR 

O P I N I O N

No. 2771 — February 2, 2024 

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, 

Anchorage, Erin B. Marston, Judge.

Appearances: Rocky Jay Burns, in propia persona, Wasilla, 

Appellant. Eric A. Ringsmuth, Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, 

Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.

Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges. 

Judge HARBISON.

Rocky Jay Burns was found guilty, following a bench trial, of one count 

of first-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (for obtaining substantial 

income by committing five or more drug offenses for operating an unregistered 

marijuana sales and delivery business from January to September 2015), six counts of 

fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (for delivering more than 
– 2 – 2771

one ounce of marijuana on six occasions in 2015), and one count of fifth-degree 

misconduct involving a controlled substance, a misdemeanor (for delivering less than 

one ounce of marijuana in January 2015).

1 The fourth-degree drug misconduct counts 

were dismissed by the State prior to Burns’s sentencing.2

Burns appeals his remaining felony conviction, arguing that a 2014 ballot

initiative repealed both the statute that classifies marijuana as a controlled substance3

and the statute for first-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.

4 He also 

contends that the sentence imposed for this offense — 5 years to serve with no 

suspended time — was outside of the superior court’s sentencing authority and imposed 

contrary to the rule of lenity. For the reasons explained in this opinion, we reject these 

claims.

Factual and procedural background

In November 2014, voters approved a ballot initiative entitled, “An Act to 

Tax and Regulate the Production, Sale, and Use of Marijuana.”5 Under authority from 

the Alaska Constitution, this initiative enacted AS 17.38.010 – AS 17.38.900.6 These 

1 AS 11.71.010(a)(3), former AS 11.71.040(a)(2) (2015), and former

AS 11.71.050(a)(1) (2015), respectively. 

2 See Alaska R. Crim. P. 43(a)(1).

3 AS 11.71.190(b).

4 AS 11.71.010.

5 SLA 2014, Initiative Measure. 2.

6 See Alaska Const. art. XI, §§ 1, 4, 6.
– 3 – 2771

statutes legalized, under Alaska law, certain personal use of marijuana by adults7as 

well as specific activities by registered marijuana businesses.8

The ballot initiative declared that marijuana regulations were to be created 

within nine months of the initiative’s effective date (i.e., in the nine months following 

February 24, 2015).9 The initiative also declared that a Marijuana Control Board would 

“begin accepting and processing applications to operate marijuana businesses one year 

after the effective date of this act” (i.e., it would begin accepting such applications on 

February 24, 2016).10 Thus, in May 2015, the legislature amended AS 17.38 by adding 

a provision establishing the Marijuana Control Board and tasking it with registering and 

regulating marijuana businesses.11

In April 2016, a grand jury indicted Burns for one count of first-degree 

misconduct involving a controlled substance and nine counts of fourth-degree 

misconduct involving a controlled substance. The State later reduced one of the counts 

of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance to fifth-degree 

misconduct involving a controlled substance, a misdemeanor.

With regard to the fifth-degree misconduct involving a controlled 

substance charge, the State alleged that, on January 28, 2015, Burns, acting as a 

principal or an accomplice, delivered less than one ounce of marijuana.12

With regard to the counts of fourth-degree misconduct involving a 

controlled substance, the State alleged that from June through September 2015, Burns, 

7 AS 17.38.020.

8 AS 17.38.070.

9 Former AS 17.38.090(a) (2015).

10 Former AS 17.38.100(b) (2015). 

11 AS 17.38.080.

12 Former AS 11.71.050(a)(1) (2015).
– 4 – 2771

acting as a principal or an accomplice, knowingly delivered more than one ounce of 

marijuana on eight different occasions.13 (The State dismissed two of these charges 

before trial, leaving six counts of fourth-degree drug misconduct.)

With regard to the first-degree misconduct involving a controlled 

substance charge, the State alleged that, between January 1, 2015 and September 17, 

2015, Burns, acting as a principal or an accomplice, knowingly engaged in a 

“continuing criminal enterprise.”14 For purposes of this statute, a person is engaged in 

a “continuing criminal enterprise” if they obtain substantial income or resources by 

committing a series of five or more violations of AS 11.71, at least one of which is 

punishable as a felony, and they do so in concert with at least five other people who 

they organize, supervise, or otherwise manage.15 The State alleged that the six counts 

of fourth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance were the offenses 

required to establish that Burns was guilty of first-degree misconduct involving a 

controlled substance.

After significant motion practice, the case proceeded to a bench trial.

During the trial, the State presented evidence that Burns earned over $700,000 by 

selling and delivering marijuana through his unregistered business, Discreet Deliveries, 

between January 1, 2015 and September 17, 2015. Burns’s co-defendant and former 

business partner, Larry Stamper, testified that he and Burns began operating Discreet 

Deliveries after the ballot initiative was approved. They purchased marijuana from 

growers, packaged the marijuana, and then delivered it to customers. As Discreet 

Deliveries grew its business, it hired fifteen employees and rented office space. 

Between January and September 2015, the business conducted over 5,000 transactions.

13 Former AS 11.71.040(a)(2) (2015).

14 AS 11.71.010(a)(3).

15 AS 11.71.010(b).
– 5 – 2771

Cynthia Franklin, the former director of the Alaska Alcoholic Beverage 

Control Board and the Marijuana Control Board, testified during the State’s case. She 

explained that the Marijuana Control Board was tasked with drafting and enforcing 

marijuana regulations, and that the ballot initiative had given the Board until November 

2015 to complete drafting the regulations. Franklin stated that, given the deadline and 

the nature of growing a plant (i.e., marijuana), “nobody was really conducting 

[marijuana retail] business legally in Alaska . . . until well into 2016.” The director of 

the Alaska Alcohol and Marijuana Control Office, Erika McConnell, similarly testified 

that the Marijuana Control Board first issued licenses to marijuana-related businesses

in “the second half of 2016,” and that in 2015, the board did not issue any licenses to 

marijuana retail businesses.

Around May 2015, Franklin wrote a letter to unregistered marijuanarelated businesses, including Discreet Deliveries, informing them that they were

operating illegally. (Burns subsequently testified that he did not receive this letter but

did read about it in the newspaper.)

On August 6, 2015, Anchorage police officers served search warrants on 

Discreet Deliveries’ warehouse and Burns’s residence. Detective Michele Logan

testified at trial that the police recovered boxes of envelopes, some empty and some full 

of cash, from these locations. Each envelope contained information about a marijuana 

transaction, including customer information, the amount of marijuana that was sold, 

and the price paid. A total of 5,536 envelopes were analyzed, including many showing

that the customer had ordered and received more than one ounce of marijuana. The 

police also recovered a whiteboard with a table indicating that Discreet Deliveries 

earned $746,173 between January and the end of July.

The police later obtained a copy of Discreet Deliveries’ payroll files,

which indicated that Discreet Deliveries employed fifteen people. Several police 

officers testified that they had engaged in undercover purchases of one ounce or more 

of marijuana from Discreet Deliveries between June and August 2015.
– 6 – 2771

After the State rested its case, Burns moved for a judgment of acquittal, 

arguing that the ballot initiative had impliedly repealed the criminal laws relating to 

marijuana and that the State had not proved that he intended to deliver one ounce or 

more of marijuana. The court denied the motion.

Burns then testified on his own behalf. He admitted that the fifth-degree 

misconduct involving a controlled substance charge against him was “legitimate” 

because the conduct occurred before February 24, 2015 (the effective date of the ballot 

initiative), but he challenged the remaining charges relating to conduct that occurred 

after that date. During his testimony, Burns did not deny that he and Stamper had 

operated Discreet Deliveries, nor did he dispute that Discreet Deliveries was a 

marijuana sales and delivery business that had at least five employees. Burns also did 

not deny that he had earned over $700,000 by selling and delivering marijuana through 

Discreet Deliveries in 2015.

Instead, Burns made the following assertions that he believed relieved him 

of criminal culpability: that the criminal statutes pertaining to marijuana had been 

“superseded” by the ballot initiative for transactions involving less than one ounce of 

marijuana; that he never intended for his employees to sell one ounce or more in any 

transaction; and that he believed he was operating legally under the “personal use 

section” of the initiative (by assisting others in acquiring less than one ounce of 

marijuana16) until additional regulations were promulgated by the Marijuana Control 

Board.

The superior court found Burns guilty as charged. Prior to sentencing, the 

State dismissed the six remaining counts of fourth-degree misconduct involving a 

controlled substance, and Burns was sentenced only for one count of first-degree and 

one count of fifth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.

16 See AS 17.38.020(1), (5).
– 7 – 2771

The superior court imposed a sentence of 5 years to serve with no time 

suspended for the first-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance conviction

17

and 30 days with no time suspended for the fifth-degree misconduct involving a 

controlled substance conviction.

18 The court ordered that the sentences would be served 

concurrently, and it recommended that Burns be permitted to serve the sentence on 

ankle monitoring.

This appeal followed.

Why we reject Burns’s claim that AS 17.38 implicitly repealed the statutes 

criminalizing marijuana-related conduct

On appeal, Burns contends that the 2014 initiative that was codified as

AS 17.38 impliedly repealed AS 11.71.190(b), the statute declaring that marijuana is a 

schedule VIA controlled substance, and with it, all of the laws that criminalize 

marijuana-related conduct.

Alaska’s appellate courts have recognized two categories of implied 

repeal.

19 First, when provisions in “two acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later 

act . . . constitutes an implied repeal” of the conflicting provisions of the earlier act.

20

Second, when a “later act covers the whole subject of [an] earlier one and is clearly 

intended as a substitute,” the later act constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.21

17 See AS 12.55.125(b) (providing the applicable sentencing range of 5 to 99 years).

18 See AS 12.55.135(a) (providing the applicable sentencing range of 0 to 1 year).

19 See Good v. Anchorage, 450 P.3d 693, 696 (Alaska App. 2019) (quoting Peter v. 

State, 531 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Alaska 1975)).

20 Id. 

21 Id.
– 8 – 2771

Burns claims that there is an irreconcilable conflict between AS 17.38 and

AS 11.71.190(b). According to Burns, the new laws permitting some adult personal use 

of marijuana and allowing certain marijuana-related commercial activity by registered 

businesses are in irreconcilable conflict with the statutes placing marijuana on the 

controlled substance list and criminalizing certain marijuana-related activity.

We have explained that, in assessing whether there is an irreconcilable 

conflict between statutes, the “legislative intent is key.”22 For this reason, we examine 

the totality of the relevant legislative framework, interpretating the statutes in context 

rather than isolation, with a view to reconciling any conflict and producing a 

harmonious whole.23 If our examination reveals that enforcement of the prior statute 

cannot be reconciled with the legislative purpose of the new statute, we will deem the 

prior statute to have been impliedly repealed.24

Prior to the 2014 ballot initiative, most marijuana-related activity (other 

than adult personal use within the home and medical marijuana use25) was classified as 

a criminal offense. This was accomplished by statutes which classified marijuana as a 

schedule VIA controlled substance,

26 hashish (“the dried, compressed, resinous product 

22 Id. at 698 (citing Progressive Ins. Co. v. Simmons, 953 P.2d 510, 516 (Alaska 

1998)).

23 Id.

24 See id.

25 See Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504 (Alaska 1975) (holding that adult personal use 

within the home is a privacy right under the Alaska Constitution); AS 17.37.010-.080 

(pertaining to medical marijuana).

26 AS 11.71.190(b).
– 9 – 2771

of” a marijuana plant) as a schedule IIIA controlled substance,27 and which criminalized 

certain conduct involving these substances.28

The 2014 ballot initiative, which was codified as AS 17.38, legalized the 

personal use of marijuana for adults, and it included hashish in the definition of 

marijuana.

29 Under these statutes, adults twenty-one years of age or older can lawfully 

possess, use, display, purchase, and transport one ounce or less of marijuana,

30 and may

assist or support another person who is at least twenty-one years old in any of those

acts.

31

The legislation also legalized the operation of four types of marijuanarelated businesses — retail marijuana stores, marijuana cultivation facilities, marijuana 

product manufacturing facilities, and marijuana testing facilities — as long as these 

businesses engaged in only certain proscribed activities and as long as they had a 

“current, valid registration.”32

The legislation contains an express statement of its purpose, stating that 

the statutes in AS 17.38 are intended to “allow[] law enforcement to focus on violent 

27 AS 11.71.160(f); see also AS 11.71.900(11).

28 See, e.g., AS 11.71.030(a)(2); former AS 11.71.040(a)(2), (4) (2014); former 

AS 11.71.050(a)(1), (2)(E) (2014); former AS 11.71.060 (2014).

29 AS 17.38.020 (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except as otherwise 

provided in this chapter, the following acts, by persons 21 years of age or older, are lawful 

and are not criminal or civil offenses.”); AS 17.38.900(10).

30 We note that although these statutes legalized certain marijuana activity under 

Alaska law, they have no impact on federal marijuana laws.

31 AS 17.38.020(a)(1), (5). Burns testified at trial that he presumed that his business 

was legally “assisting” others in the personal use of marijuana. 

32 AS 17.38.070.
– 10 – 2771

and property crimes, and to enhance individual freedom.”33 The statutes aim to regulate 

“the production and sale of marijuana” in order to promote “the health and public safety 

of our citizenry,” explaining that “legitimate, taxpaying business people, and not 

criminal actors, will conduct sales of marijuana” and that “marijuana sold by regulated 

businesses will be labeled and subject to additional regulations to ensure that consumers 

are informed and protected.”34

On appeal, Burns contends that because the provisions under AS 17.38

declare that specific acts are permitted “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,”35

these statutes irreconcilably conflict with the statute placing marijuana on the controlled 

substances list and the statutes that criminalize marijuana-related conduct.

We do not agree with Burns’s contention. Under the plain language of 

AS 17.38, its provisions legalize only (1) certain use of one ounce or less of marijuana, 

including hashish, by adults twenty-one and older,

36 (2) certain personal cultivation of 

marijuana,37 and (3) certain marijuana-related commercial conduct by businesses 

registered by the Marijuana Control Board.38 Because AS 17.38 provides a narrow 

carve-out from AS 11.71, legalizing some, but not all, marijuana-related conduct, 

AS 17.38 and AS 11.71 can be interpreted harmoniously and in alignment with the 

legislation’s stated purpose of legalizing certain adult personal use of marijuana and 

creating a regulated marijuana industry. The electorate’s goal was not to legalize all 

marijuana-related conduct; instead, Alaskan citizens intended to regulate marijuana in 

33 AS 17.38.010(a). 

34 AS 17.38.010(b)(2)-(3).

35 See AS 17.38.020; AS 17.38.070.

36 AS 17.38.020.

37 AS 17.38.030.

38 AS 17.38.070(a)-(e); see also AS 17.38.121(a), (b)(1)-(3); AS 17.38.200.
– 11 – 2771

order to promote the health and safety of the public and to focus law-enforcement 

resources on violent and property crimes.39 Therefore, nothing about the purpose of 

AS 17.38 is inconsistent with marijuana continuing to be a controlled substance.

40

Burns raises other arguments to support his contention that AS 17.38 

repealed the statute classifying marijuana as a controlled substance and the statutes that 

criminalize marijuana-related conduct. For example, he argues that because 

AS 17.38.900 includes a definition of marijuana that differs from the definition of 

marijuana in AS 11.71.900, AS 17.38 impliedly repealed AS 11.71.190. But the only 

difference between the two definitions is that the newer definition includes marijuana

“resin” and “compound[s], manufacture[s], salt[s], derivative[s], mixture[s], or 

preparation[s]” of marijuana resin while AS 11.71.900’s definition does not. While this 

may suggest that the electorate intended to amend the definition of marijuana to include 

hashish and other resin products, it does not suggest that the electorate intended to 

remove marijuana or hashish from the controlled substance list altogether.

Burns also claims that if AS 17.38 did not impliedly repeal the statutes 

that criminalize marijuana-related conduct, then even lawfully registered marijuana 

businesses are violating AS 11.71.010. Burns asserts this is an “absurd” result that

would be contrary to the expressly intended purpose of the ballot initiative. To support 

his claim, Burns notes that the statute for first-degree misconduct involving a controlled 

substance criminalizes conduct “[e]xcept as authorized under AS 17.30”41 (the statutory 

scheme that permits manufacture and distribution of controlled substances by persons

39 AS 17.38.010.

40 Cf. Audio of House Labor and Commerce Committee, House Bill 123, testimony of 

Cynthia Franklin, Executive Director, Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 3:28:57 –

3:31:02 p.m. (March 27, 2015) (testifying that the Marijuana Control Board needs 

enforcement authority over black market marijuana-related commercial activities).

41 AS 11.71.010.
– 12 – 2771

in compliance with the federal Controlled Substances Act42). According to Burns, 

because the law contains an exception for conduct “under AS 17.30” but does not also 

contain an exception for conduct legalized under the ballot initiative, even registered 

retail marijuana businesses are violating this provision.

But a thorough reading of the entire title demonstrates that Burns 

misunderstands the first-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance statute. As 

we are about to explain, despite its failure to provide an exception for conduct 

authorized under the ballot initiative, AS 11.71.010 does not criminalize the activities 

of registered marijuana businesses that are compliant with the initiative-enacted 

statutes.

A defendant violates AS 11.71.010(a)(3) if they commit a violation of

AS 11.71 on five or more occasions, and one of these violations is punishable as a 

felony.

43 Of the crimes under AS 11.71, second-degree misconduct involving a 

controlled substance does not proscribe any misconduct involving marijuana,44 and 

fifth- and sixth-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance are 

misdemeanors.45 Thus, a registered marijuana business cannot violate 

AS 11.71.010(a)(3) unless it commits third-degree or fourth-degree misconduct 

involving a controlled substance. And while the crimes of third- and fourth-degree 

misconduct involving a controlled substance both include certain marijuana-related 

42 AS 17.30.020.

43 AS 11.71.010(a)(3), (b)(2)(B).

44 See AS 11.71.021.

45 AS 11.71.050 and AS 11.71.060, respectively. Both of these offenses also have a 

stated exception for conduct authorized by AS 17.38.
– 13 – 2771

conduct, the activities of businesses that are registered under AS 17.38.200 and comply 

with AS 17.38 are exempted from criminal liability.

46

We accordingly conclude that the marijuana-related conduct of a business 

that is complying with AS 17.38 is not punishable as a felony under AS 11.71, and, as 

a result, a person operating such a business would not be guilty of violating 

AS 11.71.010. Thus, nothing about AS 18.38 creates an absurd result with respect to 

AS 11.71.010.

Why we reject Burns’s remaining challenges to his conviction

Burns raises two additional challenges to his conviction. First, he notes 

that a criminal statute is void if it is so vague that people of ordinary intelligence must 

guess at its meaning, and he asserts that, after the enactment of AS 17.38, 

AS 11.71.010(a)(3) is impermissibly vague.47

In determining if a statute is vague, courts “consider whether there is a 

history or a strong likelihood of arbitrary enforcement and uneven application” and then 

ask “whether the statute provides adequate notice of [the] prohibited conduct.”

48 As we 

explained above, we have reviewed both AS 17.38 and AS 11.71, and we conclude that 

these statutory schemes may be read harmoniously. The newer scheme, AS 17.38, 

legalizes certain conduct that formerly was prohibited by AS 11.71, and there is nothing 

confusing about what conduct is now permitted. We accordingly reject Burns’s 

vagueness claim.

46 See AS 17.38.070(a)-(e) (declaring that specific acts are permitted 

“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law”).

47 See Alleva v. State, 479 P.3d 405, 408 (Alaska App. 2020).

48 Dep’t of Revenue v. Nabors Int’l Fin., Inc., 514 P.3d 893, 899 (Alaska 2022)

(alterations in original omitted) (quoting Halliburton Energy Servs. v. State, Dep’t of Lab., 

Div. of Lab. Standards & Safety, Occupational Safety & Health Section, 2 P.3d 41, 50 

(Alaska 2000)).
– 14 – 2771

Lastly, Burns undertakes an evaluation of marijuana under the Controlled 

Substances Advisory Committee’s criteria for adding, deleting, or rescheduling a 

substance.49 Based on this evaluation, Burns argues that marijuana should not be a 

controlled substance.

But the process for changing the controlled substances list is reserved for 

the legislative and executive branches of government, not for individual citizens or this 

Court. Under Alaska law, proposals for changes to controlled substances lists are made 

by the Controlled Substances Advisory Committee, which considers certain statutory 

factors50 and then makes recommendations to the governor.51 After this, the governor 

introduces legislation in accordance with the committee’s recommendation,

52 and the 

legislature may enact changes consistent with the governor’s proposal. Because 

changing the controlled substances list is not a function of the judicial branch or of 

individual citizens, we reject Burns’s claim.

Why we conclude that the superior court had authority to impose the 

sentence and that the sentence was not clearly mistaken

Burns was convicted of, inter alia, first-degree misconduct involving a 

controlled substance, an unclassified felony.53 The sentencing range for this offense was 

5 to 99 years, with a mandatory minimum sentence of 5 years to serve.

54 The superior 

49 See AS 11.71.120.

50 AS 11.71.120(a), (c).

51 AS 11.71.110(1).

52 AS 11.71.120(a).

53 AS 11.71.010(c).

54 AS 12.55.125(b); see Krack v. State, 973 P.2d 100, 104 (Alaska App. 1999)

(“Presumptive sentencing does not apply to first-degree misconduct involving a controlled 
– 15 – 2771

court could not refer Burns’s case to the three-judge sentencing panel because his case 

was statutorily ineligible for referral.55 Thus, as the superior court indicated during the 

sentencing hearing, 5 years was the minimum sentence it could impose.

Burns claims that because the statute underlying his conviction was 

impliedly repealed, he did not commit a crime, and therefore, the superior court did not 

have the authority or jurisdiction to impose his sentence. But as we have already 

explained, the statute underlying Burns’s conviction was not impliedly repealed, and 

the superior court has general jurisdiction to hear all criminal matters.56 Burns was 

charged with criminal conduct, so the superior court had jurisdiction to hear his case 

and sentence him.57

Burns also contends that the court should have imposed a lower sentence 

because lower penalties were available if he had been convicted of a less serious 

crime.

58 For example, Burns claims that he could have been convicted of fourth-degree 

misconduct involving a controlled substance, a class C felony,

59 or convicted for 

substance which is an unclassified felony with a minimum 5-year sentence and a maximum 

99-year sentence.”).

55 A person who is sentenced for first-degree misconduct involving a controlled 

substance is sentenced under AS 12.55.125(b). And under AS 12.55.165(a), a defendant is 

eligible for referral to the three-judge sentencing panel only if they are sentenced under 

AS 12.55.125(c), (d), (e), or (i).

56 AS 22.10.020(a). 

57 AS 12.55.015.

58 Burns asserts that under the rule of lenity, the superior court should have imposed a 

more lenient sentence. But the rule of lenity or strict construction comes into play “only 

when, after employing normal methods of statutory construction, the legislature’s intent 

cannot be ascertained or remains ambiguous.” De Nardo v. State, 819 P.2d 903, 907 

(Alaska App. 1991). As we have explained, the statutes at issue in this case are not 

ambiguous. Thus, the rule of lenity does not apply.

59 AS 11.71.040(d).
– 16 – 2771

violating an individual community’s prohibition of the sale and manufacture of 

marijuana, a class A misdemeanor.

60 Burns also asserts that the court was authorized to 

impose civil penalties for failure to comply with marijuana regulations.

61 Burns 

contends that he should have been sentenced in accordance with the more lenient 

sentencing laws applicable to these offenses.

But the prosecutor, not the superior court, makes charging decisions,

62 and 

the legislature, not the court, determines the sentencing range that may be imposed once 

a defendant is convicted of an offense.

63 Here, the State chose to charge Burns with an 

unclassified felony under AS 11.71.010. He was duly convicted of that offense, and the 

court was required to sentence him as prescribed by the legislature.

64 The superior court 

sentenced Burns to the minimum term of imprisonment within the statutory range, and 

we conclude that this sentence was not clearly mistaken.65

For these reasons, we reject Burns’s challenge to the sentence imposed by 

the superior court.

Conclusion

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.

60 AS 17.38.330(d).

61 See AS 17.38.190(a)(9).

62 See State v. Dist. Court, 53 P.3d 629, 633-34 (Alaska App. 2002).

63 See Anderson v. State, 904 P.2d 433, 436 (Alaska App. 1995).

64 See Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361, 1368 (Alaska App. 1982).

65 See McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 814 (Alaska 1974) (explaining that appellate 

courts employ the “clearly mistaken” standard when reviewing sentencing decisions).