4134 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 13

[Docket No. 28764; Amdt. No. 13–28]

RIN 2105–AC63

Inflation Adjustment of Civil Monetary

Penalties; Correction

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule, correction.

SUMMARY: This document contains a

correction to the final rule published in

the Federal Register on December 20,

1996, (61 FR 67444). That final rule

implements the Federal Civil Penalties

Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as

amended by the Debt Collection

Improvement Act of 1996.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 29, 1997.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Joyce Redos, (202) 267–7158.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Need for Correction

In the final rule document (FR Doc.

96–32258) published in the Federal

Register on December 20, 1996, (61 FR

67444), the chart entitled, Minimum

and Maximum Civil Penalties Adjusted

for Inflation, Effective January 21, 1997,

is corrected to read as follows:

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 13

Administrative practice and

procedure, Air transportation,

Investigations, Law enforcement,

Penalties.

The Amendments

Accordingly, 14 CFR part 13 is

corrected by making the following

correcting amendments:

PART 13—INVESTIGATIVE AND

ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES

1. The authority citation for part 13 is

revised to read as follows:

Authority: 18 U.S.C. 6002; 28 U.S.C. 2461

(note); 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5121–5124, 40113–

40114, 44103–44106, 44702–44703, 44709–

44710, 44713, 46101–46110, 46301–46316,

46501–46502, 46504–46507, 47106, 47111,

47122, 47306, 47531–47532.

§ 13.305 [Amended]

2. In § 13.305(d), the chart is revised

to read as follows:

MINIMUM AND MAXIMUM CIVIL PENALTIES—ADJUSTED FOR INFLATION, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 21, 1997

United States Code

citation

Civil monetary penalty

description

Minimum

penalty

amount as

of

10/23/96

New adjusted minimum penalty

amount

Maximum penalty

amount as of 10/26/96

New adjusted maximum

penalty amount

49 U.S.C. 5123(a)

(changed 1990).

Violations of hazardous materials

transportation law or regulations.

$250 per

violation

per day

$250 per

violation

per day

$25,000 per violation

per day.

$27,500 per violation

per day.

49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(1)

(1958).

Violations of FAA statute or regulations by a person.N/A N/A $1,000 per violation per

day or per flight.

$1,100 per violation per

day or per flight.

49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(2)

(changed 1987).

Violations of FAA statute or regulations by a person operating an aircraft for the transportation of passengers or property for compensation.N/A N/A $10,000 per violation

per day or per flight.

$11,000 per violation

per day or per flight.

49 U.S.C. 46301(a)(3)(A)

(1974).

Violations of FAA statute or regulations involving the transportation

of hazardous materials by air.

N/A N/A $10,000 per violation

per day or per flight.

$11,000 per violation

per day or per flight.

49 U.S.C. 463(a)(3)(B)

(1988).

Violations of FAA statute or regulations involving the registration or

recordation under chapter 441 of

aircraft not used to provide air

transportation.

N/A N/A $10,000 per violation

per day or per flight.

$11,000 per violation

per day or per flight.

49 U.S.C. 46301(b)

(1987).

Tampering with a smoke alarm device.N/A N/A $2,000 per violation ...... $2,200 per violation.

49 U.S.C. 46302 (1984) Knowingly providing false information about alleged violations involving the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States.N/A N/A $10,000 per violation .... $11,000 per violation.

49 U.S.C. 46303 (1984) Carrying a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon.N/A N/A $10,000 per violation .... $11,000 per violation.

Issued in Washington, DC on January 23,

1997.

Donald P. Byrne,

Assistant Chief Counsel.

[FR Doc. 97–2244 Filed 1–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

14 CFR Part 27

[Docket No. 97–ASW–1; Special Condition

27–ASW–4]

Special Condition: McDonnell Douglas

Helicopter Systems Model MD–600N

Helicopter

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final special condition; request

for comments.

SUMMARY: This special condition is

issued for McDonnell Douglas

Helicopter Systems (MDHS) Model MD–

600N helicopter. This helicopter will

have a novel or unusual design feature

associated with the Full Authority

Digital Engine Control (FADEC). The

applicable airworthiness regulations do

not contain appropriate safety standards

to protect systems that perform critical

functions from the effects of highintensity radiated fields (HIRF). This

special condition contains additional
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 4135

safety standards that the Administrator

considers necessary to ensure that

critical functions of systems will be

maintained when exposed to HIRF.

DATES: Effective January 29, 1997.

Comments for inclusion in the Rules

Docket must be received by April 29,

1997.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed

in duplicate to the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Office of the

Assistant Chief Counsel, Attn: Rules

Docket No. 97–ASW–1, Fort Worth,

Texas 76193–0007, or delivered in

duplicate to the Office of the Assistant

Chief Counsel, 2601 Meacham Blvd.,

Fort Worth, Texas 76137. Comments

must be marked Docket No. 97–ASW–1.

Comments may be inspected in the

Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal

holidays, between 9 a.m. and 3 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Robert McCallister, FAA, Rotorcraft

Standards Staff, Regulations Group, Fort

Worth, Texas 76193–0110; telephone

(817) 624–5121.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA

has determined that notice and

opportunity for prior public comment

hereon are impracticable because these

procedures would significantly further

delay issuance of the approval design

and thus delay delivery of the affected

helicopter. Reaching agreement on the

certification basis has delayed issuance

of this special condition. These notice

and comment procedures are also

considered unnecessary since the public

has been previously provided with a

substantial number of opportunities to

comment on substantially identical

special conditions, and their comments

have been fully considered. Therefore,

good cause exists for making this special

condition effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

Although this final special condition

was not subject to notice and

opportunity for prior public comment,

comments are invited on this final

special condition. Interested persons are

invited to comment by submitting such

written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Communications

should identify the regulatory docket

number and be submitted in duplicate

to the address specified under the

caption ADDRESSES. All communications

received on or before the closing date

for comments will be considered. This

special condition may be changed in

light of comments received. All

comments received will be available in

the Rules Docket for examination by

interested persons, both before and after

the closing date for comments. A report

summarizing each substantive public

contact with FAA personnel concerning

this rulemaking will be filed in the

docket. Persons wishing the FAA to

acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this special

condition must submit a self-addressed,

stamped postcard on which the

following statement is made:

‘‘Comments to Docket No. 97–ASW–1.’’

The postcard will be date and time

stamped and returned to the

commenter.

Background

On April 7, 1995, MDHS, located in

Mesa, Arizona, made application to the

FAA to amend Type Certificate (TC)

H3WE to include the Model MD–600N

helicopter.

Type Certification Basis

Based upon the criteria of 14 CFR part

21 (part 21), Subpart B, § 21.19, the FAA

will approve design of the MD–600N

model helicopter as an amendment to

TC H3WE, and a new TC will not be

required. The certification basis for the

MD–600N will be part 27, as amended

by Amendments 27–1 through 27–30,

except as more specifically stated as

follows:

Section 27.561 as amended through

Amendment 24

Section 27.562 as amended through

Amendment 25

Section 27.607 as amended through

Amendment 3

Section 27.785 as amended through

Amendment 20

Section 27.863 as amended through

Amendment 16

Section 27.1325 as amended through

Amendment 12

The Model MD–600N will use digital

electronics in systems such as the

FADEC, which make the rotorcraft

vulnerable to HIRF. The existing

airworthiness regulations do not contain

adequate or appropriate safety standards

for the protection of these systems from

the effects of HIRF external to the

helicopter; therefore, a special condition

is required; reference FAA Policy

Memorandums dated December 5, 1989,

January 30, 1990, March 8, 1991, and

July 29, 1992.

Special conditions may be issued and

amended, as necessary, as a part of the

type certification basis if the

Administrator finds that the

airworthiness standards designated in

accordance with § 21.101(b)(2) do not

contain adequate or appropriate safety

standards because of novel or unusual

design features of an aircraft or

installation. Special conditions, as

appropriate, are issued in accordance

with § 11.49 and will become a part of

the type certification basis, as provided

by § 21.101(b)(2).

Special conditions are initially

applicable to the model for which they

are issued. Should the applicant apply

for a supplemental type certificate (STC)

to modify any other model included on

the same TC to incorporate the same

novel or unusual design feature, the

special conditions would also apply to

the other model under the provisions of

§ 21.101(a)(1).

Discussion

The MDHS Model MD–600N, at the

time of application, incorporated one

and possibly more electrical/electronic

systems, such as FADEC, that will be

performing functions critical to the

continued safe flight and landing of the

helicopter. FADEC is an electronic

device that performs the functions of

engine control during visual flight rules

(VFR) and instrument flight rules (IFR)

operations in instrument meteorological

conditions. After the MD–600N design

is finalized, MDHS will provide the

FAA with a hazard analysis that will

identify any other critical functions,

required for continued safe flight and

landing, performed by the electrical/

electronic systems.

Recent advances in technology have

given rise to the application in aircraft

designs of advanced electrical and

electronic systems that perform critical

functions. These advanced systems are

responsive to the transient effects of

induced electrical current and voltage

caused by HIRF incident on the external

surface of the helicopter. These induced

transient currents and voltages can

degrade the performance of the

electrical/electronic systems by

damaging the components or by

upsetting the systems’ functions.

Furthermore, the electromagnetic

environment has undergone a

transformation not envisioned by the

current application of the § 27.1309(a)

requirement. Higher energy levels

radiate from operational transmitters

that are currently used for radar, radio,

and television. Also, the number of

transmitters has increased significantly.

Existing aircraft certification

requirements are inappropriate in view

of these technological advances. In

addition, the FAA has received reports

of some significant safety incidents and

accidents involving military aircraft

equipped with advanced electronic

systems when they were exposed to

electromagnetic radiation.

The combined effects of the

technological advances in helicopter

design and the changing environment

have resulted in an increased level of

vulnerability of the electrical/electronic
4136 Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Rules and Regulations

systems required for the continued safe

flight and landing of the helicopter.

Effective measures to protect these

helicopters against the adverse effects of

exposure to HIRF will be provided by

the design and installation of these

systems. The following primary factors

contributed to the current conditions:

(1) increased use of sensitive electronics

that perform critical functions, (2)

reduced electromagnetic shielding

afforded helicopter systems by

advanced technology airframe materials;

(3) adverse service experience of

military aircraft using these

technologies, and (4) an increase in the

number and power of radio frequency

emitters and the expected increase in

the future.

The FAA recognizes the need for

aircraft certification standards to keep

pace with the developments in

technology and environment and, in

1986, initiated a high priority program

to (1) determine and define the

electromagnetic energy levels; (2)

develop and describe guidance material

for design, test, and analysis; and (3)

prescribe and promulgate regulatory

standards.

The FAA participated with industry

and airworthiness authorities of other

countries to develop internationally

recognized standards for certification.

The FAA and airworthiness

authorities of other countries have

identified a level of HIRF environment

that a helicopter could be exposed to

during IFR operations. While the HIRF

requirements are being finalized, the

FAA is adopting special conditions for

the certification of aircraft that employ

electrical/electronic systems performing

critical functions. The accepted

maximum energy levels that civilian

helicopter system installations must

withstand for safe operations are based

on surveys and analysis of existing radio

frequency emitters. These external

threat levels are believed to represent

the worst-case exposure for a helicopter

operating under IFR.

The specified HIRF environment is

based on many critical assumptions.

With the exception of takeoff and

landing at an airport, one of these

assumptions is that the aircraft would

be not less than 500 feet above ground

level (AGL). Helicopters operating

under visual flight rules (VFR) routinely

operate at less than 500 feet AGL and

perform takeoffs and landings at

locations other than controlled airports.

Therefore, it would be expected that the

HIRF environment experienced by a

helicopter operating VFR may exceed

the defined environment by 100 percent

or more.

This special condition will require the

systems that perform critical functions,

as installed in aircraft, to meet certain

standards based on either a defined

HIRF environment or a fixed value

using laboratory tests.

The applicant may demonstrate that

the operation and operational

capabilities of the installed electrical/

electronic systems that perform critical

functions are not adversely affected

when the aircraft is exposed to the HIRF

environment. The FAA has determined

that the environment defined in Table I

is acceptable for critical functions in

helicopters operating at or above 500

feet AGL. For critical functions in

helicopters operating at altitudes less

than 500 feet AGL, additional

considerations must be given.The

applicant may demonstrate by a

laboratory test that the electrical/

electronic systems that perform critical

functions withstand a peak

electromagnetic field strength in a

frequency range of 10 KHZ to 18 GHZ.

If a laboratory test is used to show

compliance with the HIRF

requirements, no credit would be given

for signal attenuation due to

installation. A level of 100 v/m and

further considerations, such as an

alternate technology backup that is

immune to HIRF, are appropriate for

critical functions during IFR operations.

A level of 200 v/m and further

considerations, such as an alternate

technology backup that is immune to

HIRF, are more appropriate for critical

functions during VFR operations.

For helicopters, the primary

electronic flight displays are critical for

IFR operations and a FADEC is an

example of a critical functioning system

for all operations (both IFR and VFR).

A preliminary hazard analysis must

be performed by the applicant for

approval by the FAA to identify

electrical/electronic systems that

perform critical functions. The term

‘‘critical’’ means those functions whose

failure would contribute to or cause a

failure condition that would prevent the

continued safe flight and landing of the

helicopter. The systems identified by

the hazard analysis that perform critical

functions are the ones that are required

to have HIRF protection.

A system may perform both critical

and noncritical functions. Primary

electronic flight display systems and

their associated components perform

critical functions such as attitude,

altitude, and airspeed indication. HIRF

requirements would only apply to the

critical functions.

Compliance with HIRF requirements

will be demonstrated by tests, analysis,

models, similarity with existing

systems, or a combination of these

methods. Service experience alone will

not be acceptable since such experience

in normal flight operations may not

include an exposure to the HIRF

environmental condition. Reliance on a

system with similar design features for

redundancy as a means of protection

against the effects of external HIRF is

generally insufficient since all elements

of a redundant system are likely to be

concurrently exposed to the fields.

The modulation should be selected

for the signal most likely to disrupt the

operation of the system under test,

based on its design characteristics. For

example, flight control systems may be

susceptible to 3 HZ square wave

modulation while the video signals for

electronic display systems may be

susceptible to 400 HZ sinusoidal

modulation. If the worst-case

modulation is unknown or cannot be

determined, default modulations may be

used. Suggested default values are a 1

KHZ sine wave with 80 percent depth of

modulation in the frequency range from

10 KHZ to 400 MHZ and 1 KHZ square

wave with greater than 90 percent depth

of modulation from 400 MHZ to 18 GHZ.

For frequencies where the unmodulated

signal would cause deviations from

normal operation, several different

modulating signals with various

waveforms and frequencies should be

applied.

Acceptable system performance

would be attained by demonstrating that

the critical function components of the

system under consideration continue to

perform their intended function during

and after exposure to required

electromagnetic fields. Deviations from

system specification may be acceptable

but must be independently assessed by

the FAA on a case-by-case basis.

TABLE 1.—FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/

METER

Frequency Peak Average

10–100 KHZ .................. 50 50

100–500 ........................ 60 60

500–2000 ...................... 70 70

2–30 MHZ ...................... 200 200

30–100 .......................... 30 30

100–200 ........................ 150 33

200–400 ........................ 70 70

400–700 ........................ 4020 935

700–1000 ...................... 1700 170

1–2 GHZ ........................ 5000 990

2–4 ................................ 6680 840

4–6 ................................ 6850 310

6–8 ................................ 3600 670

8–12 .............................. 3500 1270

12–18 ............................ 3500 360

18–40 ............................ 2100 750

As discussed above, this special

condition would be applicable to the
Federal Register / Vol. 62, No. 19 / Wednesday, January 29, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 4137

Model MD600N helicopter, modified by

MDHS. Should MDHS apply at a later

date for a STC to modify any other

model on TC H3WE to incorporate the

same novel or unusual design feature,

the special conditions would apply to

that model as well, under the provisions

of § 21.101(a)(1).

Conclusion

This action affects only certain

unusual or novel design features on one

series of helicopters. It is not a rule of

general applicability and will affect only

the manufacturer who applied to the

FAA for approval of these features on

the affected helicopters.

The substance of this special

condition has been subjected to the

notice and comment procedure in

several prior special conditions and has

been finalized without substantive

change. It is unlikely that prior public

comment would result in a significant

change in the substance contained

herein. For this reason, and because a

delay would significantly affect the

certification of the helicopters, which is

imminent, the FAA has determined that

prior public notice and comment are

unnecessary and impracticable, and

good cause exists for adopting this

special condition immediately.

Therefore, this special condition is

being made effective upon issuance. The

FAA is requesting comments to allow

interested persons to submit views that

may not have been submitted in

response to prior opportunities for

comment.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and

27

Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation

safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.

The authority citation for this special

condition is as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 1344, 1348(c), 1352,

1354(a), 1355, 1421 through 1431, 1502,

1651(b)(2); 42 U.S.C. 1857f-10, 4321 et seq.:

E.O. 11541; 49 U.S.C. 106(g).

The Final Special Condition

Accordingly, pursuant to the

authority delegated to me by the

Administrator, the following special

condition is issued as part of the

supplemental type certification bases for

the McDonnell Douglas Helicopter

Systems Model MD–600N helicopter.

Protection for Electrical/Electronic

Systems From High Intensity Radiated

Fields

Each system that performs critical

functions must be designed and

installed to ensure that the operation

and operational capabilities of these

critical functions are not adversely

affected when the helicopter is exposed

to high intensity radiated fields external

to the helicopter.

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on January 21,

1997.

Eric Bries,

Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 97–2243 Filed 1–28–97; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. 96–CE–38–AD; Amendment 39–

9908; AD 97–03–02]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Glasflugel

Models H301 ‘‘Libelle’’, H301B

‘‘Libelle’’, Standard ‘‘Libelle’’, Standard

Libelle 201B, Club Libelle 205, and

Kestrel Sailplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation

Administration, DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts a

new airworthiness directive (AD) that

applies to Glasflugel Models H301

‘‘Libelle’’, H301B ‘‘Libelle’’, Standard

‘‘Libelle’’, Standard Libelle 201B, Club

Libelle 205, and Kestrel sailplanes. This

AD requires measuring and adjusting

the control surface weight and static

moment, and inserting amendments into

the Glasflugel Flight and Service

Manual. This AD results from reports of

considerable variation of the weight and

static moment of the control surface on

the affected sailplanes found during

repair or repainting of the control

surface. The actions specified by this

AD are intended to prevent sailplane

flutter because the weight and static

moment of the control surface are not

within certain limits, which could result

in flutter and subsequent loss of control

of the sailplane.

DATES: Effective March 21, 1997.

The incorporation by reference of

certain publications listed in the

regulations is approved by the Director

of the Federal Register as of March 21,

1997.

ADDRESSES: Service information that

applies to this AD may be obtained from

Glasflugel, c/o Hr. H. Streifeneder,

Glasfaser-Flugzeug-Service GmbH,

Hofener Weg, D–72582 Grabenstetten,

Germany. This information may also be

examined at the Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA), Central Region,

Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel,

Attention: Rules Docket 96–CE–38–AD,

Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas

City, Missouri 64106; or at the Office of

the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol

Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

J. Mike Kiesov, Project Officer, FAA,

Small Airplane Directorate, 1201

Walnut, suite 900, Kansas City, Missouri

64106; telephone (816) 426–6932;

facsimile (816) 426–2169.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Events Leading to This AD

A proposal to amend part 39 of the

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR

part 39) to include an AD that would

apply to Glasflugel Models H301

‘‘Libelle’’, H301B ‘‘Libelle’’, Standard

‘‘Libelle’’, Standard Libelle 201B, Club

Libelle 205, and Kestrel sailplanes was

published in the Federal Register on

October 15, 1996 (61 FR 53683). The

action proposed to require measuring

and adjusting the control surface weight

and static moment, and inserting the

following amendments into the

Glasflugel Flight and Service Manual, as

applicable:

Sailplane models

Glasflugel Flight and

Service Manual

amendment page

numbers

H301 Libelle and

H301B Libelle.

pages 14a and 14b.

Standard Libelle ........ pages E14a and

E14b.

Standard Libelle 201B pages E15a and

E15b.

Club Libelle 205 ........ pages 42a and 42b.

Kestrel ....................... pages 27a and 27b.

Accomplishment of the proposed action

as specified in the notice of proposed

rulemaking (NPRM) would be in

accordance with the instructions in the

above-referenced Glasflugel Flight and

Service Manual amendments.

The NPRM resulted from reports of

considerable variation of the weight and

static moment of the control surface on

the affected sailplanes found during

repair or repainting of the control

surface.

Interested persons have been afforded

an opportunity to participate in the

making of this amendment. No

comments were received on the

proposed AD or the FAA’s

determination of the cost to the public.

The FAA’s Determination

After careful review of all available

information related to the subject

presented above, the FAA has

determined that air safety and the

public interest require the adoption of

the rule as proposed except for minor

editorial corrections. The FAA has

determined that these minor corrections

will not change the meaning of the AD