No. 89-041 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1989 

CITY OF GREAT FALLS, MONTANA, 

Plaintiff & Respondent 

-vsALICE PRICE, 

Defendant & Appellant 

ALICE PRICE, 

~ross/Plaintiff & Appellant 

-VSCITY OF GREAT FALLS, MT, a municipal corporation; 

RICHARD D. STEVENS; JOHN DOE AUSTIN; WILLIAM B. 

REID; AUSTIN-REID DEMOLITION, a business association, 

Cross/Defendants & Respondent 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Cascade, 

The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

La Rue Smith, Great Falls, MT 

For Respondent : 

J. David Slovak, City Attorney, Great Falls, MT 

Mark J. Higgins, Ugrin, Alexander, Zadick and Slovak; 

Great Falls, MT 

Submitted on Briefs: June 1, 1989 

D,ecided: July 6, 1989 

Filed: 
Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Alice Price appeals from an order of the District Court 

for the Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, dismissing 

with prejudice her cause of action against the City of Great 

Falls and Richard D. Stevens, hereinafter referred to as 

"defendants." We affirm. 

Ms. Price raises seven issues for our review, none of 

which directly address the propriety of the District Court's 

dismissal of this action. We therefore restate the issue on 

appeal as whether the District Court properly granted defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12 (b) , M.R.Civ.P. 

on the basis that defendants were immune from suit? Since we 

conclude that dismissal was proper, we will not discuss the 

remaining issues raised by Ms. Price. 

On October 30, 1987, Alice Price was cited for violation 

of Great Falls City Ordinance 8.48.080 for knowingly and 

purposely allowing waste paper, clothing, boxes, discarded 

furniture, appliances, and other rubbish to accumulate on her 

property. The notice to appear and complaint was signed by 

Richard D. Stevens, a Zoning Technician for the City of Great 

Falls, who is a named defendant in this action. 

At a non-jury trial in City Court, Ms. Price was found 

guilty of creating a nuisance on her property at 620 6th 

Avenue South. The court ordered Ms. Price to completely 

abate the nuisance within seven days, and further ordered 

that if the nuisance was not completely abated by March 2, 

1988, the City of Great Falls shall do so and charge the cost 

of the procedure to Ms. Price. When she did not clean up her 

property by the ordered date, Richard Stevens, pursuant to 

the court's order, contracted out the clean-up project and 

billed Ms. Price for the cost, which was $495. 
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Ms. Price appealed her conviction to the District Court, 

and in subsequent pleadings, sought compensatory damages for 

personal property which was allegedly wrongfully removed, and 

for mental distress and suffering, as well as punitive damages and attorney fees. These damages were asserted against 

defendants Richard Stevens and the City of Great Falls, as 

well as the two individuals hired to complete the clean-up of 

Ms. Price's property. The City of Great Falls and Richard 

Stevens filed a motion to dismiss Ms. price's claims for 

relief pursuant to Rule 12, M. R.Civ.P., based on procedural 

errors, including the transformation of a criminal matter to 

a civil action under a rule providing for appeals of civil 

cases to district court. Defendants also argued that they 

were immune from suit. The District Court granted defendants' 

motion, concluding that both the City of Great Falls and 

Richard Stevens were immune from suit for damages under the 

facts of this case. It is from this order that Ms. Price 

appeals. 

The actions complained of in this case relate to Richard 

Stevens' activities in carrying out, on behalf of the City of 

Great Falls, the sentence legally imposed by the City Court 

Judge. The District Court determined that in so doing, Mr. 

Stevens was immune from suit under S 2-9-112, MCA, as interpreted in Knutson v. State (1984), 211 Mont. 126, 683 P.2d 

488. Section 2-9-112, MCA, provides: 

Immunity from suit for judicial acts and omissions. 

(1) The state and other governmental units are 

immune from suit for acts or omissions of the 

judiciary. 

In regard to that section this Court first stated: 
. . . The immunity statute applies to judicial acts 

with no stated limitation. It applies to protect 

the state and governmental agencies whenever the 

judicial power of the state is put to use in a 

judicial action. . . . 

In that case Ms. Knutson argued that the immunity statute did not apply to the Department of Institutions which she 

contended had miscomputed the good time allowance. The Court 

concluded that the Department of Institutions was protected 

under the immunity section, stating: 

. . . Sentences are pronounced by courts, not by 

the Department of Institutions. Knutson's sentencing was the result of a judicial act. Further, - the 

immunity statute protects any governmental agency 

involved - in - the judicial - act - of sentencing. 

(Emphasis supplied. ) 

The issue in the present case is whether or not the City 

as well as Mr. Stevens are protected by the immunity statute. 

Under the analysis of Knutson, we conclude that they are. In 

carrying out the express provisions of the sentence, Mr. 

Stevens was directly involved in an act of the judiciary and 

is therefore afforded immunity. Since he was acting as an 

agent of his employer, the immunity statute also protects the 

City of Great Falls. We hold that S 2-9-112, MCA, provided 

immunity for both the defendants City of Great Falls and its 

agent, Richard Stevens. 

We affirm the order of the District Court dismissing the 

plaintiff's case with prejudice. 

We Concur: