THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2022 WY 116

 APRIL TERM, A.D. 2022

September 22, 2022

NORTH SILO RESOURCES, LLC, a 

Delaware limited liability company,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

KIRSTIN J. DESELMS; SINGLETREE 

LAND, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability 

company; HUGH DESELMS; PAUL A. 

WOODS; CHERYL S. WOODS; SHELLI 

R. WOODS; CODY S. WOODS; 

CHARLOTTE JOAN HUTTON; 

HUTTON FAMILY PARTNERSHIP; 

MIKE HUTTON and HUTTON 

MINERALS, LLC, a Wyoming limited 

liability company,

Appellees

(Defendants).

S-21-0267, S-21-0291

Appeal from the District Court of Laramie County

The Honorable Thomas T.C. Campbell Judge

Representing North Silo Resources, LLC:

Warren W. Harris and Stephani A. Michel, Bracewell LLP, Houston, Texas; 

Anthony T. Wendtland, Wendtland & Wendtland LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming; 

William E. Sparks and Nicol T. Kramer, Beatty & Wozniak, P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, and Casper, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Wendtland.
Representing Kirstin J. Deselms; Singletree Land, LLC; and Hugh Deselms: 

Kristopher C. Koski and Justin A. Daraie, Long Reimer Winegar LLP, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Daraie. 

Representing Paul A. Woods and Cheryl S. Woods: 

Alexander K. Davison and Patrick D. Kent, Patton & Davison LLC, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Kent. 

Representing Shelli R. Woods and Cody S. Woods:

No appearance.

Representing Charlotte Joan Hutton; Hutton Family Partnership; Mike Hutton; and 

Hutton Minerals, LLC: 

J. Mark Stewart, Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. 

Stewart. 

Before FOX, C.J., and KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN, JJ. 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are 

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 

permanent volume.
1

GRAY, Justice. 

[¶1] This case arises from a dispute over mineral ownership and the corresponding rights 

of a mineral lessee. Appellant North Silo Resources, LLC (North Silo), the mineral lessee, 

sought a declaratory judgment and to quiet title in certain minerals underlying property in 

Laramie County, Wyoming. It also asserted a claim for breach of lease against the mineral 

owner. The district court held that North Silo did not have standing to quiet title or to claim 

breach of its lease and that its mineral lease encumbers only 50% of the mineral estate. 

North Silo appeals. We find North Silo’s lease encumbers 100% of the mineral estate. 

North Silo had standing to quiet title and standing to assert a claim for breach of lease. We 

reverse and remand. 

ISSUES 

[¶2] While the parties present varying issue statements, the dispositive issues are: 

1. What minerals are encumbered by North Silo’s mineral 

lease?

2. Does North Silo have standing to assert a claim seeking to

quiet title to its leasehold and for breach of lease? 

FACTS 

Initial Conveyances to the Huttons and the Woods 

[¶3] In 1987, C Bar J Ranches, Inc. (C Bar J) owned 100% of the surface and minerals 

of property located in Laramie County, Wyoming (Property).1 On May 7, 1987, C Bar J 

sold the Property to William R. Hutton and Charlotte J. Hutton (the Huttons) and provided 

them a warranty deed (the C Bar J-Hutton Deed). The C Bar J-Hutton Deed conveyed the 

Property and one-half of the existing mineral rights. It reserved “One-Half of the existing 

mineral rights for 20 years” and provided that “At the end of the 20 years, the mineral rights 

are to become the property of the purchasers.” 

[¶4] On April 27, 1992 (before C Bar J’s twenty-year reserved mineral interest 

terminated), the Huttons sold the Property to the Woods defendants by a contract for deed 

(Woods Contract for Deed). The Woods Contract for Deed was memorialized in a 

memorandum of sale recorded in April 1992. A warranty deed conveying the Property to 

1

 The Property is described as:

Township 17 North, Range 64 West of the 6th P.M. Laramie County, 

Wyoming: 

Section 25: All 

Section 35: All, Except Right of Way for U.S. Highway 85. 
2

the Woods (the Hutton-Woods Deed) was held in escrow pending the Woods’ performance 

of their obligations under the contract for deed. In the Hutton-Woods Deed, the Huttons 

granted the Woods “all rights” to the Property, but reserved a life estate in all minerals 

owned by the Huttons and the right to develop those minerals during their lifetime: 

[The Huttons] reserve to [themselves] for the period of 

their lives, all minerals, including oil and gas they may own, 

that may be on, in, under or produced from the above described 

land. 

[The Huttons and the Huttons’] assigns shall, during 

their lives, have the exclusive right and privilege of making, 

executing and delivering leases of the land for the extraction or 

production of minerals. On termination of this reservation, the 

interest reserved shall be owned by [the Woods and the 

Woods’] heirs and assigns. 

In 2008, the Woods fulfilled the terms of the Woods Contract for Deed and recorded the 

Hutton-Woods Deed. 

Subsequent Conveyances by the Woods 

[¶5] Also in 2008, the Woods entered into two separate contracts for deed, one with 

Kirstin Deselms and one with Hugh Deselms (collectively, the Woods-Deselms Contracts 

for Deed). By these deeds, the Woods conveyed the Property and “one-half of the oil, gas, 

and other minerals” the Woods “now owned” or would “later acquire[]” and reserved the 

other half for their lives and their children’s lives. The Woods-Deselms Contracts for Deed 

provided: 

Buyer acknowledges and agrees that all mineral rights 

associated with the Property were previously reserved by 

William and Joanne [Charlotte] Hutton for their joint lifetimes, 

and that it cannot be determined with certainty when Sellers 

will acquire clear title to the mineral rights associated with the 

Property. 

Kirstin Deselms and Hugh Deselms completed their obligations under the Woods-Deselms 

Contracts for Deed and recorded warranty deeds in 2013 (the Woods-Deselms Deeds). In 

2015, Kirstin Deselms conveyed her interest in the Property to Singletree Land, LLC. 
3

Subsequent Conveyances by the Huttons 

[¶6] In November 1994, the Huttons quitclaimed “all rights, title, any interest owned, 

claimed, or held . . . in and to the mineral rights and interest in and to real property” to The 

Hutton Family Partnership. In October 2016, The Hutton Family Partnership quitclaimed 

“all of its interest in and to all the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be 

produced” from the Property to Hutton Minerals, LLC. We refer to the Huttons, The 

Hutton Family Partnership, and Hutton Minerals, LLC, as “the Huttons” unless context 

requires a distinction to be made. 

[¶7] In 2010, after C Bar J’s twenty-year reserved mineral interest terminated, the 

Huttons leased “all of” their oil and gas mineral interests under the Property to Cirque 

Resources (Cirque). The lease provided Cirque an option to extend. Cirque exercised its 

option in 2015. Through a series of assignments in 2018 and 2019, North Silo acquired 

Cirque’s interests under the lease and is the current mineral lessee. 

The Dispute and the District Court’s Rulings 

[¶8] The parties dispute the mineral ownership created by the outlined conveyances. 

[¶9] North Silo asserts that the 1987 C Bar J-Hutton Deed transferred one-half of the 

minerals to the Huttons outright, and one-half of the minerals to the Huttons as a vested 

remainder subject to C Bar J’s twenty-year reservation. Therefore, the Huttons own a life 

estate in 100% of the minerals and the corresponding executory rights. These interests are 

measured by the lives of William R. Hutton and Charlotte J. Hutton. Accordingly, North 

Silo argues that its mineral lease encumbers 100% of the minerals. 

[¶10] The remaining parties interpret the transactions differently. They assert the minerals 

reserved by C Bar J were unvested, and that they did not vest in the Huttons in 1987, and 

had not vested when the Huttons sold the property to the Woods in 1992. The Huttons’ 

reservation of a life estate in “all minerals, including oil and gas they may own, that may 

be on, in, under or produced from” the Property was limited to the minerals conveyed and 

did not include the minerals reserved by C Bar J. The reserved, unvested minerals 

transferred to the Woods when the twenty-year contingency expired. They assign mineral 

ownership as follows: 

• The Hutton Family Partnership owns a life estate in 50% of the minerals, measured 

by the lives of William R. Hutton and Charlotte J. Hutton; 

• The Woods received the 50% C Bar J remainder and subsequently sold half of this 

interest and half of their future interest in the Huttons’ 50% of the minerals to the 

Deselms. They own a present life estate in 25% of the minerals obtained when the 

C Bar J reservation expired—measured by the lives of the Woods and their 
4

children—and they own a life estate in a future interest in 25% of the minerals 

reserved by the Huttons; 

• Singletree Land, LLC, and Hugh Deselms own a present interest in 25% of the 

minerals, a future interest in 25% of the minerals reserved by the Huttons, and a 

future interest in the remaining minerals reserved by the Woods in the WoodsDeselms Deeds. 

From this position, these parties assert that North Silo’s lease encumbers only 50% of the 

minerals—those minerals subject to the Hutton life estate. In August 2019, the Huttons, 

Woods, Deselms, and Singletree executed a “Stipulation of Interests and CrossConveyance” (the Stipulation) stipulating to the apportionment of mineral ownership set 

forth above. They filed the Stipulation with the county clerk.2

[¶11] North Silo filed this lawsuit, seeking a declaration as to the percent of the mineral 

estate encumbered by its lease. It asserted claims for quiet title to its mineral lease, slander 

of title, bona fide purchaser of the mineral lease, and breach of the lease. The defendants 

filed motions to dismiss, which the district court largely granted. It dismissed North Silo’s 

claims for slander of title and bona fide purchaser. Concluding that North Silo had no 

standing to quiet title or to claim breach of its lease, it also dismissed North Silo’s claims 

to quiet title and for breach of lease. The district court allowed North Silo to proceed with 

its declaratory judgment claim. 

[¶12] The Woods, Singletree Land, LLC, and Hutton Minerals, LLC, filed counterclaims. 

Following discovery, all parties filed motions for summary judgment. The summary 

judgment motions focused on North Silo’s claim for a declaration determining the mineral 

ownership percentages encumbered by its lease. The district court found that the 

defendants had “stipulated to the exact meaning and intent of the entire record title” and 

concluded that the Huttons owned only 50% of the minerals and North Silo’s lease covered 

“only . . . Hutton Minerals 50% mineral interest in the Property measured by the life estate 

of Charlotte J. Hutton.”3 North Silo appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

I. What minerals are encumbered by North Silo’s mineral lease? 

2 This stipulation is discussed in more detail, infra at ¶¶ 17–20. 

3 The district court issued a pretrial decision letter in which it effectively dismissed the Woods, Deselms, 

and Singletree Land, LLC, Wyoming Royalty Payment Act (WRPA) counterclaims. The remaining claims 

were the Huttons’ counterclaims for violations of the WRPA and the other defendants’ counterclaims for 

conversion, accountings, and breaches of the surface use and access agreement. The court held a three-day 

bench trial and found against North Silo on most of these claims. North Silo appealed. It subsequently 

appealed the district court’s attorney’s fees and costs orders. Those appeals have been consolidated here.
5

A. Standard of Review 

[¶13] W.R.C.P. 56(a) governs summary judgments: 

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each 

claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on 

which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

“We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo and afford no 

deference to the district court’s ruling. This Court reviews the same materials and uses the 

same legal standard as the district court.” Bd. of Trs. of Laramie Cnty. v. Bd. of Cnty. 

Comm’rs of Laramie Cnty., 2020 WY 41, ¶ 6, 460 P.3d 251, 254 (Wyo. 2020) (citations 

omitted) (quoting Est. of Weeks by & through Rehm v. Weeks-Rohner, 2018 WY 112, ¶ 15, 

427 P.3d 729, 734 (Wyo. 2018)); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters Loc. Union No. 279 v. City of 

Cheyenne, 2013 WY 157, ¶ 8, 316 P.3d 1162, 1165 (Wyo. 2013). 

B. Interpretation of Deed and Lease Terms 

[¶14] When we interpret contracts, our goal is to determine the intent of the parties to the 

document. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Box Creek Min. Ltd. P’ship, 2018 WY 67, ¶ 19, 420 P.3d 161, 

166 (Wyo. 2018). Deeds and mineral leases are contracts, and we apply our typical contract 

interpretation principles to them. Ecosystem Res., L.C. v. Broadbent Land & Res., LLC, 

2012 WY 49, ¶ 12, 275 P.3d 413, 417 (Wyo. 2012); Sutherland v. Meridian Granite Co., 

2012 WY 53, ¶ 8, 273 P.3d 1092, 1095 (Wyo. 2012). As with all contracts, in construing 

deeds affecting mineral interests, this Court focuses “on the general intent of the parties, 

concentrating on the purpose of the grant in terms of the respective manner of enjoyment 

of surface and mineral estates and the exploitation of the mineral resources involved.” 

Caballo Coal Co. v. Fid. Expl. & Prod. Co., 2004 WY 6, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d 311, 315 (Wyo. 

2004) (citations omitted). 

[¶15] We begin by looking at the document itself and the “specific language” of the 

document. BNSF, ¶ 19, 420 P.3d at 166 (quoting Gilstrap v. June Eisele Warren Tr., 2005 

WY 21, ¶ 12, 106 P.3d 858, 862 (Wyo. 2005)). We give words “their plain and ordinary 

meaning. Plain meaning is that meaning which the language would convey to reasonable 

persons at the time and place of its use.” BNSF, ¶ 20, 420 P.3d at 166 (quoting Gilstrap, 

¶ 12, 106 P.3d at 862); see also Caballo, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d at 315 (in construing mineral deeds, 

the Court applies a “historical context analysis” to the words used in the deed). 

If the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, then 

we secure the parties’ intent from the words of the agreement 
6

as they are expressed within the four corners of the contract. 

Common sense and good faith are leading precepts of contract 

construction, and the interpretation and construction of 

contracts is a matter of law for the courts. We have also 

recognized that the language of a contract is to be construed 

within the context in which it was written, and the court may 

look to the surrounding circumstances, the subject matter, and 

the purpose of the contract to ascertain the intent of the parties 

at the time the agreement was made. 

Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Res., Inc., 2003 WY 41, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 703, 708 (Wyo. 2003) 

(citations omitted) (quoting Williams Gas Processing--Wamsutter Co. v. Union Pac. Res. 

Co., 2001 WY 57, ¶ 12, 25 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Wyo. 2001)) (citing Boley v. Greenough, 

2001 WY 47, ¶ 11, 22 P.3d 854, 858 (Wyo. 2001); Newman v. RAG Wyoming Land Co., 

2002 WY 132, ¶¶ 11–12, 53 P.3d 540, 544 (Wyo. 2002)). See also Ecosystem, ¶ 12, 275 

P.3d at 417–18 (In construing an unambiguous contract, we may “examine evidence of the 

circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed to arrive at the parties’ intent. 

Relevant considerations may include the relationship of the parties, the subject matter of 

the contract, and the parties’ purpose in making the contract.” (citations omitted)). 

[¶16] “However, if the meaning of a contract is ambiguous or not apparent, it may be 

necessary to use evidence in addition to the contract itself in order to determine the 

intention of the parties. In such instances, interpretation of the contract becomes a mixed 

question of law and fact.” Wadi Petroleum, ¶ 12, 65 P.3d at 708 (citations omitted). “An 

ambiguous contract is one which is obscure in its meaning because of indefiniteness of 

expression or because of a double meaning being present.” BNSF, ¶ 22, 420 P.3d at 167 

(quoting Wadi Petroleum, ¶ 12, 65 P.3d at 708). Whether an ambiguity exists is a question 

of law for the court to determine. Caballo, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d at 315 (citations omitted). 

C. The August 2019 Stipulation 

[¶17] In August 2019, the defendants executed a “Stipulation of Interests and CrossConveyance” (the Stipulation). Neither C Bar J nor William R. Hutton were parties to the 

stipulation. The Stipulation states it is “effective for all purposes as of May 13, 2008” and 

provides that its intent is “to clarify and forever resolve such title issues pertaining to all 

right, title and interest in and to all oil, gas and other minerals in, on and under” the 

Property. The Stipulation states that the parties to the C Bar J-Hutton Deed intended “to 

reserve to [C Bar J] one-half (1/2) of the fee mineral interest in [the Property] until May 7, 

2007, upon which said date the one-half (1/2) term mineral interest would lapse vesting the 

then owners of [the Property] with said one-half (1/2) mineral interest[.]” (Emphasis 

added.) The Stipulation also states that it was the intent of the Hutton-Woods Deed to 

“reserve, to [the Huttons], the mineral interest owned [by them] at the time being one-half 
7

(1/2) of the minerals in, on and under [the Property].” Finally, the Stipulation declares 

that: 

it was the intent of the [Hutton-Woods Deed] that [the Huttons] 

were provided with the exclusive right to lease said one-half 

(1/2) mineral interest for the exploration and production of oil 

and gas during the lives of William R. Hutton and Charlotte J. 

Hutton but that any lease so executed by [the Huttons] of the 

1994 Warranty Deed, or their assigns, would be effective only 

for the lives of William R. Hutton and Charlotte J. Hutton and 

that the remaindermen would be free to enter into their own oil 

and gas lease(s) covering said one-half (1/2) mineral interest 

following the deaths of [the Huttons]. 

[¶18] The district court gave “great weight” to the Stipulation in determining ownership 

of the mineral rights and concluded the Huttons owned a life estate in 50% of the minerals. 

North Silo argues that the district court’s reliance on the Stipulation disregarded our 

longstanding rules of contract interpretation.4 We agree.

[¶19] It is well-settled that courts may consider extrinsic evidence “where the terms of an 

agreement are ambiguous or are used in some special or technical sense not apparent from 

the contractual document itself[.]” Caballo, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d at 315 (quoting Hickman v. 

Groves, 2003 WY 76, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d 256, 259 (Wyo. 2003)); see also Jacobs Ranch Coal 

Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 2008 WY 101, ¶ 16, 191 P.3d 125, 131 (Wyo. 2008). 

In those instances, “the court may look beyond the four corners of the agreement in order 

to determine the meaning intended by the parties.” Caballo, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d at 315 (quoting 

Hickman, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d at 259). Courts may also look to extrinsic evidence when 

considering whether a contract is ambiguous. Id. We have explained that in doing so, 

courts “may consider extrinsic evidence bearing upon the meaning of the written terms, 

such as evidence of local usage and of the circumstances surrounding the making of the 

contract. However, the court may not consider the parties’ own extrinsic expressions 

of intent.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hickman, ¶ 11, 71 P.3d at 260). 

[E]vidence of the parties’ intent regarding what particular 

terms in their agreement mean is considered only when the 

contract is ambiguous. Because we use an objective approach 

to interpret contracts, evidence of a party’s subjective intent is 

4 North Silo also contends that the Stipulation is legally unsound because it does not include signatures of 

all the original parties to the deeds in the chain of title (C Bar J or its agents, and William Hutton) and 

because North Silo recorded its leases prior to the execution of the Stipulation, was not a party to the 

Stipulation, and did not ratify it. We do not address these arguments. 
8

not admissible, regardless of whether the court determines a 

contract is ambiguous or clear. 

Ultra Res., Inc. v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 23, 226 P.3d 889, 905 (Wyo. 2010) (citing 

Wells Fargo Bank Wyo., N.A. v. Hodder, 2006 WY 128, ¶ 31, 144 P.3d 401, 412 (Wyo.

2006); Omohundro v. Sullivan, 2009 WY 38, ¶ 24, 202 P.3d 1077, 1084–85 (Wyo. 2009)). 

[¶20] The Stipulation is an after-the-fact expression of intent endorsed by some, but not 

all, parties to the deeds at issue. It is subjective intent evidence that our rules of contract 

(and deed) interpretation exclude from a court’s consideration. It was improper for the 

district court to consider the Stipulation, and we disregard it here. We, as required by our 

rules of interpretation, begin our analysis by looking to the language of the deeds. 

D. The Relevant Deeds and Their Language

[¶21] The conveyances from C Bar J to the Huttons and from the Huttons to the Woods 

are determinative as to mineral ownership and consequently to the minerals encumbered 

by North Silo’s current lease. 

[¶22] The parties do not dispute that after the conveyance, the Huttons owned all the 

surface estate and one-half of the mineral estate. They disagree about the effect of the C 

Bar J reservation. North Silo claims the C Bar J-Hutton Deed vested title to one-half of 

the minerals in the Huttons outright and gave them a vested remainder in the other half of 

the minerals which C Bar J had reserved. After twenty years, the Huttons realized the 

remainder, giving them a life estate in 100% of the minerals. The remaining parties assert 

the reserved minerals did not transfer to the Huttons. The resolution of this dispute informs 

the interpretation of all subsequent deeds and leases. We turn first to the C Bar J-Hutton 

Deed. 

1. What was conveyed by the C Bar J-Hutton Deed, and to whom was it 

conveyed? 

[¶23] C Bar J reserved “One-Half of the existing mineral rights for 20 years” and “At the 

end of the 20 years, the mineral rights [were] to become the property of the purchasers.” 

North Silo contends that, correctly interpreted, the C Bar J-Hutton Deed vested a future 

interest in the reserved minerals in the Huttons. The remaining parties argue that the 

Huttons had only a contingent remainder, and ownership of the reserved minerals had not 

yet vested in the Huttons when they sold the property to the Woods. They claim the 

contingency is rooted in the term “purchasers.” They assert “purchasers” refers to the 

owner of the property at the end of the twenty-year reservation and not to the Huttons, who 

are elsewhere referred to in the deed as “grantees.” They contend the Woods owned the 

Property when the twenty years expired, making the Woods the “purchasers” and owners 

of the reserved minerals rights. 
9

[¶24] We find the deed to be unambiguous and look to the plain language of the deed to 

determine the ownership interests reserved and conveyed. C Bar J reserved one-half of the 

mineral estate for a definite term, twenty years. See Williams v. Watt, 668 P.2d 620, 625–

36 (Wyo. 1983); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Donative Transfers § 24.6 (Am. 

L. Inst. 2011) (“The term of years is a present interest that terminates on the expiration of 

a term that is measured in one or more years . . . .”). C Bar J retained a present interest in 

the reserved half of the mineral estate. It conveyed the remainder of this interest on the 

expiration of twenty years. A remainder is a future interest created in a transferee. See 

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Donative Transfers § 25.2; 3 David A. Thomas, 

Thompson on Real Property § 23.02 (2012 & Supp. 2021). Remainders can be contingent 

or vested. Thomas, supra, § 23.02. “A property interest vests at the point when no 

contingency can defeat the interest.” Jackson as Tr. of Phillip G. Jackson Fam. Revocable 

Tr. v. Montoya, 2020 WY 116, ¶ 24, 471 P.3d 984, 989 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Shriners 

Hosps. for Child. v. First N. Bank of Wyo., 2016 WY 51, ¶ 32, 373 P.3d 392, 404 (Wyo. 

2016)). 

The broad distinction between vested and contingent 

remainders is this: In the first, there is some person in esse 

known and ascertained, who, by the will or deed creating the 

estate, is to take and enjoy the estate, and whose right to such 

remainder no contingency can defeat. In the second, it depends 

upon the happening of a contingent event, whether the estate 

limited as a remainder shall ever take effect at all. The event 

may either never happen, or it may not happen until after the 

particular estate upon which it depended shall have been 

determined, so that the estate in remainder will never take 

effect. 

Jackson, ¶ 24, 471 P.3d at 989 (quoting Shriners Hosps., ¶ 32, 373 P.3d at 404). 

[¶25] In Williams, this Court considered mineral rights created by a grant excepting “an 

undivided one-half interest in all oil, gas, and mineral rights in and under the balance of 

the land for a period of 20 years . . . , and as long thereafter as [minerals] continue to be 

produced therefrom . . . .” Williams, 668 P.2d at 629. We concluded that because the event 

upon which Williams was “to take the mineral estate is one certain to occur,” Williams’ 

interest in the disputed minerals was a vested remainder. Id. at 632–33. 

[¶26] The remainder created in the C Bar J-Hutton Deed was vested if some person, 

“known and ascertained,” took the estate under terms that no contingency could defeat. 

The passage of twenty years was certain to occur and was not a contingency that could be 

defeated. We turn next to the use of the term “purchasers.” If the “purchasers” were the 

Huttons, they were known and ascertained and their right to the remainder could not be 
10

defeated. They had a vested remainder. If, on the other hand, “purchasers” did not refer 

to the Huttons, there was no “known and ascertained” person to take the estate, and the 

interest was a contingent remainder. 

[¶27] The Woods argue they are the purchasers referred to in the deed because they had 

purchased the Property when the twenty-year reservation expired. In support of their 

argument, they point out that the deed does not specify that the mineral rights become the 

property of the purchasers from the C Bar J after twenty years. The Deselms and 

Singletree make similar arguments. They contend that while “the Huttons might have been 

the purchasers” at the end of the twenty-year term, “it was not ‘certain and definite’ they 

would be.” 

[¶28] The C Bar J-Hutton Deed states that C Bar J “does . . . grant, . . . sell, CONVEY 

AND WARRANT” the Property “for and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars 

($10.00) and other valuable consideration.” The C Bar J-Hutton Deed refers to C Bar J as 

“the GRANTOR” and “William R. Hutton and Charlotte J. Hutton, husband and wife” as 

“the GRANTEE.” The deed conveyed the Property and “One-Half of the existing mineral 

rights for 20 years” and stated that “At the end of the 20 years, the mineral rights are to 

become the property of the purchasers.” 

[¶29] Turning to the use of the word “purchasers” versus the use of the word “grantee” in 

the C Bar J-Hutton Deed’s reservation clause, we give the terms “grantee” and “purchaser” 

their plain and ordinary meaning. Gilstrap, ¶ 12, 106 P.3d at 862 (we interpret a “deed like 

a contract from specific language [in] the deed,” and we give terms “their plain and 

ordinary meaning” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Black’s Law Dictionary 

defines grantee as “[o]ne to whom property is conveyed.” Grantee, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It defines purchaser as “[s]omeone who obtains property for 

money or other valuable consideration; a buyer.” Purchaser, Black’s Law Dictionary. 

While we can find no case that directly addresses these particular terms, many cases 

address interchangeable or synonymous terms and find any differences to be without 

distinction. See, e.g., Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1063 (Md. 

1999); Atlanta Dev. Auth. v. Clark Atlanta Univ., Inc., 784 S.E.2d 353, 358 (Ga. 2016); 

Statham v. Kelly, 584 S.E.2d 246 (Ga. 2003); Corlett v. Cox, 333 P.2d 619, 621 (Colo. 

1958). Other cases have indirectly addressed the terms “grantee” and “purchaser” which 

are often used interchangeably. See, e.g., Choice Pers. No. Four, Inc. v. 1715 Johanna 

Square Ltd., No. 01-05-00830-CV, 2007 WL 1153046, at *5–6 (Tex. App. Apr. 13, 2007) 

(the terms “grantee” and “purchaser” were used interchangeably in the deed in question, 

and the court found the grantee was the purchaser); Home Builders v. Jones, 157 S.E. 521, 

521 (Ga. Ct. App. 1931) (the court explained that “the purchaser” was the “grantee in the 

deed”). Any distinction is without significance when the deed itself unambiguously 

manifests the intent of the parties. See O’Brien v. Vill. Land Co., 794 P.2d 246, 250 (Colo. 

1990). 
11

[¶30] When we interpret deed language, we apply common sense, Wadi Petroleum, ¶ 11, 

65 P.3d at 708, and give terms the “meaning [the] language would convey to reasonable 

persons at the time and place of its use.” Gilstrap, ¶ 12, 106 P.3d at 862. It contravenes 

common sense that at the time of the conveyance, “purchasers” would refer to 

uncontemplated future purchasers who might buy the property from the Huttons on some 

unknown future date. In the C Bar J-Hutton Deed, the designations “grantee” and 

“purchasers” were used synonymously. The Huttons were the grantees and the purchasers. 

[¶31] Even if we were to conclude that “the purchasers” is an ambiguous term, the parties’ 

course of conduct after the conveyance is consistent with North Silo’s interpretation of the 

deed. “Course of conduct evidence may properly be considered in interpreting an 

ambiguous contract.” Whitney Holding Corp. v. Terry, 2012 WY 21, ¶ 29, 270 P.3d 662, 

671 (Wyo. 2012) (citing B & R Builders v. Beilgard, 915 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Wyo. 1996)). 

In Whitney Holding we observed: 

The Terrys acted at all times as the owners of the mineral estate 

that was burdened by the Zimmerman life estate. The Terrys 

executed and filed affidavits of survivorship reflecting 

termination of the Zimmerman life estate after Mr. 

Zimmerman died in 1988. They entered into several oil and

gas lease agreements. They at all times acted as owners of the 

mineral estate. Whitney, on the other hand, did nothing. It 

took no action of any kind, until this lawsuit, to reflect that it 

claimed any interest in the mineral estate. The course of 

conduct evidence was properly relied upon by the district court 

to interpret the deed and supports the district court’s decision. 

Whitney Holding, ¶ 29, 270 P.3d at 671. 

[¶32] Here, the Huttons acted as owners of all the mineral rights in the Property. They 

executed an oil and gas lease with Cirque in 2010, and through 2015 they accepted bonus 

payments under that lease for 100% of the net mineral acreage. The Appellees did nothing 

indicating they owned mineral interests during this time. In fact, in subsequent 

transactions, they acknowledged that the Huttons owned a life estate in 100% of the 

minerals. After acquiring the Property, the Woods sold the Property to the Deselms and in 

each of these transactions the contracts for deed provided: 

Buyer acknowledges and agrees that all mineral rights 

associated with the Property were previously reserved by 

William and [Charlotte] Hutton for their joint lifetimes, 

and that it cannot be determined with certainty when Sellers 

will acquire clear title to the mineral rights associated with the 

Property. 
12

(Emphasis added.) 

[¶33] It was not until August 2019, after North Silo began drilling operations on the 

property, that the Appellees took quarrel with the ownership of the mineral rights and 

executed the Stipulation. See supra ¶¶ 17–20. 

[¶34] In the C Bar J-Hutton Deed, the designations “grantee” and “purchasers” were used

synonymously. The C Bar J Deed identified the Huttons as the grantees. The Huttons paid 

valuable consideration for the property making them the purchasers. Given the 

unambiguous terms of the C Bar J Deed, the Huttons received a vested remainder in the 

reserved 50% of the minerals. 

2. What did the Huttons reserve in the Hutton-Woods Deed?

[¶35] This brings us to the Hutton-Woods Deed. In 1992, the Huttons contracted to 

transfer their interest in the Property to the Woods. C Bar J’s twenty-year reservation of 

50% of the mineral interests had not expired. (Twenty years from May 7, 1987, the date

of the C Bar J-Hutton Deed, was May 7, 2007.) As stated above, the Huttons owned 50% 

of the mineral interests and a vested remainder in the reserved mineral interests when they 

contracted with the Woods. The Hutton-Woods Deed, filed after the Woods satisfied the 

terms of the contract for deed in 2008, granted the Woods “all rights” to the Property with 

reservations: 

[The Huttons] reserve to [themselves,] for the period 

of their lives, all minerals, including oil and gas they may 

own, that may be on, in, under or produced from the abovedescribed land. 

[The Huttons and the Huttons’] assigns shall, during 

their lives, have the exclusive right and privilege of making, 

executing and delivering leases of the land for the extraction or 

production of minerals. On termination of this reservation, the 

interest reserved shall be owned by [the Woods and the 

Woods’] heirs and assigns. 

(Emphasis added.) 

[¶36] We first consider whether the Huttons reserved their vested remainder. Gilstrap 

provides a framework for analyzing deeds with express reservations or exceptions: 

there are three quanta of interest that must be ascertained in 

order to construe a deed that contains a reservation. First, the 
13

quantum of interest specified in the granting clause must be 

determined. If the granting clause does not expressly limit the 

grant to a lesser amount, then the quantum of interest 

purportedly conveyed is 100 percent of all right, title and 

interest. The next step in this process is to ascertain the 

quantum of interest reserved in a subsequent clause. 

The final quantum to be determined is that quantum of 

interest the grantee is to receive under the deed. This amount 

can be calculated by subtracting the quantum of interest 

reserved to the grantor from the quantum of interest conveyed 

in the granting clause. 

Gilstrap, ¶ 14, 106 P.3d at 863 (quoting Cole v. Minor, 518 So. 2d 61, 63 (Ala. 1987)). 

[¶37] The quantum of interest identified in the Hutton-Woods Deed granting clause is “all 

rights” to the Property. The plain meaning leads us to conclude the Huttons conveyed 

everything they owned, except as limited by the reservation. We next review the quantum 

of interest reserved. The Huttons expressly reserved for their lifetimes “all minerals . . .

they may own.” They also reserved “during their lives, . . . the exclusive right and privilege 

of making, executing and delivering leases of the land for the extraction or production of 

minerals.” The district court concluded that the Huttons only owned 50% of the minerals, 

and they reserved only those minerals that they owned. 

[¶38] We held above that the Huttons owned a vested remainder in the C Bar J reserved 

minerals when they executed the Hutton-Woods contract for deed. The question presented 

is whether the Huttons’ reservation of “all minerals” they “may own” in the deed included 

their vested remainder. 

[¶39] In Williams v. Watt, Williams owned a vested remainder interest in the disputed 

minerals. Supra ¶ 25; Williams, 668 P.2d at 632–33. He entered a contract for deed 

conveying his property to Watt. The deed expressly excepted, “all of the oil, gas and 

mineral rights . . . to which he is entitled under the present ownership . . . and which have 

not been . . . reserved or conveyed by previous owners[.]” Williams, 668 P.2d at 622. We 

held the reservation of “all” mineral rights “to which he is entitled” indicated the parties 

“intended to and did withhold from the grant to the Watts” Williams’ vested remainder 

interest in the minerals. Id.

[¶40] In Rox Petroleum, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion. In 

Rox, the grantors conveyed half of their mineral interests to two different oil companies 

“for a period of ten (10) years, and as long thereafter as oil and gas is produced[.]” Rox 

Petroleum, L.L.C. v. New Dominion, L.L.C., ¶ 3, 184 P.3d 502, 504 (Okla. 2008). The 

Oklahoma court held that, with respect to this half of the minerals, the grantors were left 
14

with a “possibility of reverter” once the minerals were no longer produced. Id. ¶¶ 11–12, 

184 P.3d at 505–06. The grantors’ heirs later conveyed the property to the Oklahoma City 

Chamber of Commerce. Those deeds excepted “all the oil, gas and other minerals, all that 

portion of such minerals now owned by grantors being reserved by them[.]” Id. ¶ 4, 184 

P.3d at 504. The court concluded that the reservation of “all” of the grantors’ mineral 

interests “is a clearly expressed intention, without ambiguity, to reserve the possibility of 

reverter since it was part of the . . . minerals owned by the grantors at the time.” Rox 

Petroleum, ¶ 12, 184 P.3d at 505; see also Crosswhite v. McCully, 857 P.2d 90, 90 (Okla. 

Civ. App. 1993) (reservation of “all of the oil, gas, and other minerals” included 

reversionary interest). 

[¶41] A reservation of “all minerals . . . they may own” applies to vested mineral interests 

owned at the time of the reservation. “‘All’ has . . . been defined as a word that ‘ . . . is 

commonly understood and usually does not admit of an exception, addition, or exclusion.’” 

Johnson v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 568 P.2d 908, 911–12 (Wyo. 1977) (quoting Consol. 

Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Nicholas, 137 N.W.2d 900, 904 (Iowa 1965)). Here, the 

Huttons expressly reserved “all minerals . . . they may own” for their lifetimes. This clearly 

reserved a life estate in their presently held mineral interest and their vested remainder. 

The Hutton-Woods Deed provided that the Huttons, “during their lives, have the exclusive 

right and privilege of making, executing and delivering leases of the land for the extraction 

or production of minerals.”5 The Huttons reserved the executory rights to lease their 

presently held mineral interest and vested remainder. 

[¶42] Finally, we must determine what interest the Woods received under the deed. “This 

amount can be calculated by subtracting the quantum of interest reserved to the grantor 

from the quantum of interest conveyed in the granting clause.” Gilstrap, ¶ 14, 106 P.3d at

863 (quoting Cole, 518 So. 2d at 63). The quantum of interest the Woods received was 

“all rights” to the Property, see supra ¶ 35, less the quantum reserved by the Huttons—“all 

minerals . . . they may own” (a present life estate in 50% of the minerals and a life estate 

in the vested remainder in the remaining 50% of the minerals, which were owned by C Bar 

J for a term of years). The Woods received the Property subject to the Huttons’ reservation 

of a life estate in 100% of the mineral interests and the executory rights to lease those 

minerals. 

E. The Authority to Lease the Minerals 

[¶43] The final deed interpretation question is the scope of the Huttons’ rights to encumber 

the minerals. The district court concluded that the Huttons’ executive rights permitted 

them to execute leases but any such lease is limited by their life estate and cannot extend 

beyond their lifetimes. North Silo argues that because the Huttons reserved the mineral 

5

 “[T]he right to give a mineral lease is usually called the executive power.” Picard v. Richards, 366 P.2d 

119, 124 (Wyo. 1961). We refer to this right as the executive right or executory rights.
15

estate and executive rights for life, they can execute leases that extend past their life estate. 

The Deselms and Singletree Appellees contend that the Huttons did not have the right to 

enter leases that extend beyond their lifetimes. 

[¶44] The extent to which a party holding a life estate in minerals and executive rights 

may encumber mineral rights is a question of first impression for this Court. Other courts 

considering the question have held that reserved executive rights can empower a party 

holding a life estate to execute leases beyond the life estate term. See, e.g., RLM Petroleum 

Corp. v. Emmerich, 896 P.2d 531, 535 (Okla. 1995); Steger v. Muenster Drilling Co., 134 

S.W.3d 359, 373 (Tex. App. 2003); Glass v. Skelly Oil Co., 469 S.W.2d 237, 240–41 (Tex. 

Civ. App. 1971), writ refused NRE (Nov. 10, 1971); Amarillo Oil Co. v. McBride, 67 

S.W.2d 1098, 1100–01 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), writ refused. They reason that, while 

typically a lease executed by a term interest holder would not endure beyond the interest 

holder’s estate, “if a life tenant is granted the power to lease, but cannot bind future 

interests, ‘there is very little utility to the power because of the natural reluctance of any 

lessee to accept a lease which might be terminated by the death of the lessor.’” Steger, 134 

S.W.3d at 374 (quoting 1 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 8.1, at 

214 (1987)). 

[¶45] The determination of whether the reservation of executive rights allows a life tenant 

to execute mineral leases that extend beyond their lifetime requires examination of the deed 

language. Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 373 (looking to the “plain, ordinary meaning of the terms 

used in” the will conveying executive rights). 

[¶46] In Steger, 134 S.W.3d at 373, the decedent’s will granted one life tenant the “full[] 

power and authority” to “manage, control and lease” a specific mineral interest (the J.W. 

Maddox interest) “for all purposes . . . during her [lifetime] and to extract therefrom all oil, 

gas and or other minerals.” It gave the other life tenant the power, “during . . . her 

[lifetime],” to “make leases of whatever nature” to other mineral interests on Tracts 1–3 

“and to extract therefrom all oil, gas and/or other minerals . . . over which . . . she may have 

control.” The court held that: 

Construing these terms in accordance with their ordinary 

meanings, [the] will unambiguously authorized [the first life 

tenant] to lease [her] half of the community for every end that 

she sought to attain, including the end of making oil and gas 

leases that extended beyond her lifetime, and gave [the second 

life tenant] the power to execute oil and gas leases of any kind 

or class at all, including those that extended beyond her 

lifetime. 

Id. at 373–74. The Steger court concluded, “In light of this unambiguous language, we 

decline to hold, as Mrs. Steger urges, that the time limits [the decedent] placed on [the life 
16

tenant’s] exercise of the powers granted to her—her lifetime—limited the types of leases 

she could enter.” Id. at 374. 

[¶47] In Peppers Refining Co. v. Barkett, the grantor conveyed a one-half mineral interest 

to grantees for a period of twenty-five years with the mineral interest reverting back to 

grantor at the end of that period. The grant of the mineral interest included “all grantor’s 

rights to operate for said minerals” and the right to “deal and contract with regard thereto.” 

Peppers Ref. Co. v. Barkett, 256 P.2d 443, 445 (Okla. 1953). The Peppers court held that 

the leases entered into by the grantee could extend past the term of the mineral interest 

grant: 

Only one conclusion can be reached in interpreting this 

language. The mineral interest was conveyed to plaintiffs for 

the term of 25 years only, but any leases executed within that 

period did not expire at the same time. They continued in force 

subject only to the reversion of the royalty or mineral interest 

to the defendants herein. It is no different from the situation 

which would have obtained had defendants conveyed the 

minerals outright to plaintiffs with the provision that they 

would, at the end of 25 years be reconveyed, subject to the 

rights of lessees, under the terms of existing leases. As to 

[grantees], at the end of said period, their interest and estates 

in the lands and their rights under the leases ceased. The rights 

of lessors to the benefits flowing from an oil and gas lease are 

not personal but inure to the owner of the minerals or of the 

royalty interest in those minerals if such royalty interest has 

been carved out of, and alienated from, the mineral estate. In 

the instant case that had not been done. The minerals had been 

conveyed. Twenty-five years later, they reverted burdened 

only by the outstanding leasehold estate. 

Id. at 446. 

[¶48] The Oklahoma court considered different language in RLM. There, the court 

recognized that if a grantee is “specifically given the power to lease, any lease granted

should be capable of enduring beyond the specified term of years.” RLM, 896 P.2d at 535. 

The court explained, 

It is possible to create an interest in the minerals alone which 

is terminable upon the expiration of a definite period of time. 

It is difficult to classify such an interest in terms of 

conventional property law, but it is obviously a greater interest 

than an estate for years. It is either an estate for years without 
17

impeachment for waste, an estate for years to which the open 

mine doctrine applies, or is a fee, from the standpoint of 

enjoyment, which is terminable upon a certain date. The owner 

of such an interest has a right to extract and retain minerals 

produced and undoubtedly can confer the right upon another 

by an oil and gas lease. Such a lease would not ordinarily be 

capable of enduring beyond the term of the grantor’s estate, 

but if he is specifically given the power to lease, any lease 

granted should be capable of enduring beyond the specified 

term of years. 

Id. at 535 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on 

the Law of Oil and Gas § 20.5, at 128 (1989)). In RLM, the grantors reserved a 25-year 

mineral interest, expressly providing “that at the end of the 25-year period, all mineral 

rights including the right of leasing mineral rights and the right of egress for development 

of the minerals will return to the record owner.” Id. The RLM court concluded that this 

language limited the extent to which the term interest holder could lease the minerals: 

The deed expressly provides that at the end of the 25-year 

period, all mineral rights including the right of leasing mineral 

rights and the right of egress for development of the minerals 

will return to the record owner. There is no indication that the 

[grantors] agreed to be subject to any leases entered by the term 

mineral interest holder. 

Id. at 535–36. 

[¶49] Here, the Huttons’ executive rights reservation stated that they “shall, during their 

lives, have the exclusive right and privilege of making, executing and delivering leases of 

the land for the extraction or production of minerals. On termination of this reservation, 

the interest reserved shall be owned by Grantees . . . .” This reservation of rights limits the 

time period during which the Huttons have the right of “making, executing and delivering 

leases” to their lifetimes. It does not, however, limit the nature of the leases that the Huttons 

can make—it does not limit the length of the leases the Huttons could enter to their 

lifetimes. The Huttons retained the power to execute oil and gas leases that extended 

beyond their respective lifetimes. When the Huttons entered the mineral lease with Cirque, 

they leased “all” the mineral interests they owned—100% of the mineral interest in the 

Property for their lifetimes.6 Accordingly, the lease to North Silo remains in effect 

according to its terms when the Huttons’ life estate terminates. 

6

 This conclusion renders erroneous the district court’s conclusion that North Silo was liable to the Woods 

and Singletree defendants for conversion, and its order that North Silo prepare an accounting and pay the 

Woods proceeds for their share of the mineral interests. 
18

II. Does North Silo have standing to assert a claim seeking to quiet title to its 

leasehold and for breach of lease? 

[¶50] North Silo sought to quiet title to its leasehold interest in the Property.7 The district 

court held that North Silo lacked standing to quiet title because it was not a mineral owner. 

The district court also held that because North Silo could not pursue its quiet title action, 

“it follows that it cannot litigate a claim for breach of [l]ease based on a failure to defend 

title to the lands and minerals covered by that lease.” We first consider North Silo’s 

standing to quiet title and then its claim for breach of lease. 

A. Standard of Review 

[¶51] “The existence of standing is a legal issue reviewed de novo.” HB Fam. Ltd. P’ship 

v. Teton Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2020 WY 98, ¶ 16, 468 P.3d 1081, 1087 (Wyo. 2020)

(citing N. Laramie Range Found. v. Converse Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 2012 WY 158, 

¶ 22, 290 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Wyo. 2012); Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc. v. Gunter, 2007 

WY 151, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007)).

B. Standing to Quiet Title 

[¶52] Statutory standing exists when a plaintiff has a cause of action under a particular 

statute. HB, ¶ 19, 468 P.3d at 1088.8 Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201 establishes who may 

seek to quiet title: 

[A quiet title] action may be brought by a person in 

possession of real property against any person who claims an 

estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of 

determining the adverse estate or interest. . . . 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201 (LexisNexis 2021). 

7 North Silo claimed it “is entitled to a decree quieting title as to the effectiveness of the Lease covering 

100% of the mineral interest in the Property against any claims thereto by” the defendants. 

8

 “We have drawn a distinction between ‘prudential’ and ‘statutory’ standing.” HB, ¶¶ 15–19, 468 P.3d at

1087–88 (citing Matter of Est. of Stanford, 2019 WY 94, ¶ 9, 448 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2019)). Prudential 

and statutory standing principles are “vital jurisprudential rules that assist courts in filtering cases,” Matter 

of Adoption of L-MHB, 2018 WY 140, ¶ 24, 431 P.3d 560, 568 (Wyo. 2018), and both ensure the courts 

provide relief to claimants who “have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm[.]” Allred v. Bebout, 

2018 WY 8, ¶ 30, 409 P.3d 260, 268 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 116 S.Ct. 

2174, 2179, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996)). The Brimmer test evaluates prudential standing. Stanford, ¶ 10, 448 

P.3d at 864; see Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974); Allred, ¶ 37, 409 P.3d at 270. The 

defendants appear to argue that under the Brimmer test, North Silo lacks standing. We do not apply the 

Brimmer test for prudential standing when standing is established statutorily. HB, ¶¶ 15–19, 468 P.3d at

1087–88.
19

[¶53] The language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201 is unambiguous. To maintain a quiet 

title action, a plaintiff must have (1) possession of the real property,9 (2) some interest in 

the property, and (3) the party against whom the action is brought must claim “an estate or 

interest” adverse to the plaintiff. See Ultra Res., ¶ 51, 226 P.3d at 911 (“In a claim for 

declaration of ownership of real property, i.e., quiet title, the plaintiff must allege an interest 

in the real property and the defendant ‘claims an estate or interest adverse to him.’” 

(quoting Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201)); Hirsch v. McNeill, 870 P.2d 1057, 1059 (Wyo. 

1994) (“In order to maintain a quiet title action, the plaintiff must have (1) possession, and 

(2) legal title or some interest in the property.” (citing Black v. Beagle, 59 Wyo. 268, 286, 

140 P.2d 594, 595 (1943))). 

[¶54] The parties do not dispute that North Silo has a mineral lease, is in possession of the 

property, or that its interests are adverse to the defendants. The Deselms defendants 

contend that North Silo lacks standing to quiet title because it has no fee interest in the 

minerals. The question is whether North Silo’s mineral lease qualifies as an interest in 

property under the statute.10 

In some jurisdictions, the lessee under an oil and gas 

lease acquires no corporeal interest in the land itself, but rather 

9

 Regarding possession, we have explained: 

“[T]he reason that possession in some degree is usually a prerequisite to 

bringing a quiet title suit is that a legal remedy is ordinarily available to 

one out of possession.” 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title and Determination 

of Adverse Claims § 36, at 170 (1972). When no other remedy is available, 

however, the claimant may maintain an action to quiet the title to the 

property even though he does not have possession of it. Id. Additionally, 

“[i]f the land is in a natural condition, uninclosed [sic] by fences, and

vacant, the person holding title to the land may initiate a quiet title action 

even without allegation or proof of possession on his part.” 65 Am. Jur.

2d, supra, § 43, at 175. In that instance, the title holder is presumed to 

have constructive possession of the land. Id.; see also 1 Herbert T. 

Tiffany, The Law of Real Property § 20 (3d ed. 1939 & Supp. 1995). 

Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 418 (Wyo. 1995). 

10 We have considered whether parties have sufficient interests to give rise to a quiet title action on other 

occasions. In Ultra Resources, we considered whether the defendants had an adverse interest in the 

property. We held that the plaintiffs in that case could not assert a quiet title action against the defendants 

because the defendants did not make a claim to title. If a defendant “does not make a claim to title, there 

is no dispute to adjudicate.” See Ultra Res., ¶ 53, 226 P.3d at 912. In other words, because the defendants 

did not claim an interest adverse to the plaintiff, the plaintiff could not quiet title. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-

32-201. In Hirsch, the plaintiffs, whose property had been seized and sold to satisfy federal tax liens, sought 

to quiet title. We held that because their tax judgment had gone unappealed, the plaintiffs no longer had an 

interest in the property and could not state a quiet title claim as a matter of law. Hirsch, 870 P.2d at 1060. 

Here, unlike Ultra Resources, there is no dispute that the defendants claimed an interest adverse to North 

Silo. As in Hirsch, the question is whether North Silo has an interest in the property that would give rise 

to its ability to seek to quiet title. 
20

a privilege a prendre; until the actual discovery of oil, the 

interest of the lessee in the land is inchoate. On these 

principles, oil remaining in the ground before recovery is a part 

of the land and belongs to the owner of the land, but when 

recovered, becomes personal property which is thereupon 

subject to division in accordance with the terms of the contract 

of lease. However, the profit a prendre has also been described 

as an interest in real property in the nature of an incorporeal 

hereditament. Under this view, the owner of land has the 

exclusive right on his or her land to drill for and produce oil; 

this right, when transferred to a lessee, is a profit a prendre, a 

right to remove a part of the substance of the land. As such, an 

oil and gas lease conveys a license to explore, or a profit a 

prendre. Like other easements, a profit a prendre, often simply 

referred to as a “profit,” is an incorporeal hereditament or an 

intangible right in the land, and while easements generally 

allow one to go onto land owned by another person, a “profit” 

allows one not only to go onto the land of another but also to 

take some product from the land. 

38 Am. Jur. 2d Gas and Oil § 65, at 481 (2019) (footnotes omitted). “In Wyoming, the 

right created by an oil and gas lease is a profit á prendre, connoting the right ‘to search for 

oil and gas and if either is found, to remove it from the land . . . .’” State v. Pennzoil Co., 

752 P.2d 975, 980 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Denver Joint Stock Land Bank of Denver v. Dixon, 

57 Wyo. 523, 122 P.2d 842, 847 (1942)); Boatman v. Andre, 44 Wyo. 352, 12 P.2d 370, 

373 (1932) (holding that oil and gas leases are profits a prendre and incorporeal 

hereditaments). 

[¶55] State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Stringer, 77 Wyo. 198, 209–10, 310 P.2d 

730, 733–34 (1957) addressed the question of whether the owners of an oil and gas lease 

were subject to notice requirements for the construction of public roads. Wyoming Statute 

§ 48-316 required notice be mailed to “all persons owning lands or claiming any interest 

in any lands over or across which said road is proposed to be located[.]” Wyo. Stat. § 48-

316 (W.C.S. 1945) (emphasis added). The State Highway Commission argued that 

because an oil and gas lease was a profit a prendre, it was not an interest in real property 

subject to statutory notice requirements. This Court rejected that argument: 

The Boatman case itself states that an oil and gas lease 

constitutes a right; and 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 2d ed., p. 

1397, therein cited, contains this statement which we think is 

conclusive: 
21

. . . Since the grant of such a right [profit a prendre] 

involves a transfer of an interest in land, it must be 

created by writing . . . . 

Clearly, an oil and gas lease is ‘an interest in land’ within 

the meaning of § 48-316. 

Stringer, 77 Wyo. at 209–10, 310 P.2d at 733–34 (emphasis added). In Ready v. Texaco, 

we clarified that the right to a profit a prendre provided in an oil and gas lease “is part of 

the realty.” Ready v. Texaco, Inc., 410 P.2d 983, 985–86 (Wyo. 1966). See also 58 C.J.S. 

Mines and Minerals § 244, at 239 (2017) (“A mineral lease does not create the ordinary 

relation of landlord and tenant; instead, it conveys an interest in real property.”). 

[¶56] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201 provides that to bring a quiet title action, a person must 

“claim[] an estate or interest” in the land. An oil and gas lease is an “interest” in land 

within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-32-201. North Silo has standing to seek to quiet 

title. 

C. Standing to Claim Breach of Lease 

[¶57] North Silo claimed that the Huttons breached their lease by failing to warrant and 

defend title to the minerals encumbered by the lease.11 The district court’s conclusion that 

North Silo lacked standing to bring this cause of action was erroneous. North Silo, as a 

party to the lease, has standing to assert a claim for its breach. 

[¶58] An oil and gas lease is a contract. Pennzoil, 752 P.2d at 978. A breach of lease 

claim is akin to a breach of contract. An action for breach of contract is not statutorily 

derived. Accordingly, standing to bring a cause of action for breach of contract is 

prudential standing and requires application of the Brimmer test. See supra note 8; Matter 

of Phyllis V. McDill Revocable Tr., 2022 WY 40, ¶ 29, 506 P.3d 753, 762 (Wyo. 2022); 

Matter of Est. of Stanford, 2019 WY 94, ¶ 9, 448 P.3d 861, 864 (Wyo. 2019); Washakie 

Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 317 (Wyo. 1980). The Brimmer test 

requires a justiciable controversy: 

First, a justiciable controversy requires parties having existing 

and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, rights or 

interests. Second, the controversy must be one upon which the 

judgment of the court may effectively operate, as distinguished 

from a debate or argument evoking a purely political, 

administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, 

11 Warranty clauses in oil and gas leases require the lessor to defend title to the lease’s covered land. 4 

Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas § 52.2, at 319 (1990).
22

it must be a controversy the judicial determination of which 

will have the force and effect of a final judgment in law or 

decree in equity upon the rights, status or other legal 

relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest, or, 

wanting these qualities be of such great and overriding public 

moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of them. 

Finally, the proceedings must be genuinely adversary in 

character and not a mere disputation, but advanced with 

sufficient militancy to engender a thorough research and 

analysis of the major issues. Any controversy lacking these 

elements becomes an exercise in academics and is not properly 

before the courts for solution. 

Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974) (quoting Sorenson v. City of 

Bellingham, 496 P.2d 512, 517 (Wash. 1972)). Each of these qualifications is met in this 

case. North Silo, as a party to the lease, has standing to assert a breach of lease claim 

against the other party to the lease, the Huttons. 

CONCLUSION 

[¶59] The Huttons own 100% of the mineral interests in the Property and the executive 

rights to those minerals for their lives. Accordingly, North Silo’s mineral lease encumbers 

100% of the minerals. The Huttons’ executive rights allowed them to enter leases that 

extend beyond their lives. Finally, North Silo has standing to assert claims quieting title to 

its leasehold and for breach of lease. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.