Subsequent to filing the instant a ction, Ms. J uerg ens wa s found to be an “ incapa citated 1 ind ivi du a l,” and

An dr e a Slo an w a s a

pp ointe d a s G ua

rd ian a nd Con se rv ator

on be ha lf of Ms. Juer g e ns and

ha s b e e n s ub sti tut e d a s Pla int if f f or Ms. Juer g e ns , in

bo th h e r i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity and in her capa city as the sole membe r of 1230 23r d Street, L L C. See Do c ke t N o. [114 ] at 2; see also F ourt

h A m. C omp l., Do c ke t N o. [120 ]. F or c onve nie nc e , th e Court

sh a ll r e fe r t o M s. J uerg ens and Ms. Sloan interc hang eably as “Plaintiff.” Plaintiff also orig inally

named a s Defe ndants in this matter First Mount Ver non 2 M o rt g a g e , L
. L
. C
. ( “ F M V L L C ” ) , a s w e l l a s i n d i v i d u a l s W i l l i amK e n n e y, R o b e rtW i l l i amC ar n e y, ANDREA SL OAN, a s Guardia n and Conservator on be half of Ma ry J uerg ens, an Incapa citated Individual, in both Mary Juer g e ns ’ i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity and a s th e so le member of

“1230 23rd Stree t, L L C,” Pla int if

f/ Counte r- De fe nd ant,
v. URBANTI TL E SERVI CES, I NC., e t al

. , De fe nd ants /Co un te r- Pla int if fs
. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 06-1524 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (F ebrua ry 12, 2010) The a bove-c aptioned lawsuit wa s filed by the orig inal Plaintiff in this matter, Mar y Juer g e ns , ne arl y

thr e e y e a rs a g o to c ha lle ng e the le g a lity of tw o d isp arate loa

ns e xten de d to 1 Plaintiff, eac h of which w as sec ured by a condominium located at 1230 23rd Street, N.W., Ap artme nt 5 05 , Wa sh ing ton , D .C. 20 03 7 ( the “ Con do ” ). Pla int if f i nit ia lly name d a s D e fe nd ants in this action Urban Title Servic es, Inc. (“ UTS”) a s well as Da le Dunca n, First Mount Ver

non In d u s tr i a l Lo anA s s o c i at i o n , In c . ( “ F M V ILA ” ) , A rthur B e n n e t t , an d

B r i c k s h i r e S e t t l e m e n t s , LLC (“B rickshire ”). Acc ordingto Plainti ff, the f irst of the two loans at issue in this case was 2and Paul Erb. Plaintiff’s c laims ag ainst Defe ndant FMV L L C were dismiss ed by this Court i n a Memorandum Opinion and O rder dated F ebrua

ry 4, 2008, J

ue rge ns v . U

TS , 533 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2008), a

nd Plaintiff’s claims ag ainst the individual Defe ndants Kenne y , Carney , and Erb.have been voluntar ily dismiss ed by

Plaintiff, see Jt. Sti p. Re g ard ingDi smi ssa l of De fe nd ants Wil liam Kenney

and Paul Erb, Doc ket No. [112] and Stip. of Dismissal, Docket No. [113] (dismissing without prejudice any and all cla ims asserted a g ainst Defe ndants Kenne y and Erb ind ivi du a lly

); see also Notice a

nd Stip. of Vol. Dismi ssal, Docke t No. [116] (dismissing any and all claims asser

ted ag ainst Defe ndant Carne y ). 2 extended by

the Owe n L iving Tr

ust with the assistance of

UTS, while the sec ond loan (her einaf ter “ FMV L oan”) was e x tended by FMVI L A with the assistance of B ennett, Dunc an and B ri c ks hir e (c oll e c tiv e ly

wi th F MV I L A, “ F MVDe fe nd ants ” ). Pla int if f h a s si nc e vo luntari ly dismiss ed with pre

judice all of he r cla ims ag ainst UTS. SeeStip. of Dismi ssal, Docke t No. [243] . Acc ording ly , the only claims that rema in at issue in this l awsuit relate to the sec ond of these two loans, the F MV L oan. Plaintiff and the F MV Def endants have filed a

series of cross-motions for pa

rtial
summa ry jud g me nt. Th e Court

pr e vio us ly

ru le d o n s e ve ra l of

the pa rt ie s’ c ro ss- mot ion s — sp e c if ic a lly , th os e mot ion s f

or pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt f

ile d b y Pla int if f w ithre sp e c t to
a lle g atio ns in h e r F ourt

h A me nd e d Co mpl a int

re latin gto t

he F MVL oa

n a nd tho se re late d c ro ssmotions for partial summary judgme nt by

the FMVDef

endants. Se e J

ue rge ns v , U TS , 6 52 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009). B y separ ate Me morandum Opinion and Or der issued this same date, the Court ha s a lso ru le d o n Pl a int if f’ s mo tio n f

or pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt f

ile d w ithre sp e c t to Def endant Dunc an’s c ounterc laims as well as De fenda nt Duncan’ s motion for partial summary judgme nt. Sti ll outst anding , howeve r, ar e seve ral motions for par tial summary

judgme nt filed by De fe nd ant B ri c ks hir e and De fe nd ant D un c an w ithre sp e c t to c e rt a in a lle g atio ns and c la ims
asser ted ag ainst them in Pl aintiff’s F ourth Amende d Complaint. This Memorandum Opinion3

addre sses two of those re maining motions filed by Def endant B rickshire , namely Br ickshire’ s [177] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment Reg ardingthe Absenc e of D amag es to Plaintiff from the L ate F iling of Cer tain Documents with the District of Columbia Recor der of Dee ds and Br ickshire’ s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment on Count XXXI- Violation of DC Code Section 28-3901, Et Seq. (Consumer Protec tion Procedure s Act). Upon a se arc hing r eview of the memora

nda filed w ith respec t to the pendingmotions, t he exhibi ts thereto, the r eleva nt case law and statutes, and the e ntire re cord he rein, the Court orde rs as follows, for

the re asons set for

th below. B rickshire ’s [177] Motion for Partial Summary Re g ard ingthe Ab se nc e of Da ma g e s to Pla int if

f f ro m th e L ate F ili ngof

Ce rt a in D oc ume nts wi th the District of Columbia Recorde r of De eds is GRANTED. I n addition, Bric kshire’s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment on Count XXXI- Violation of DC Code Section 28-3901, Et Seq. (Consumer Protection Proce dures Ac t) is GRANTED-I N-PART and DEN I ED-I

N-PART; specific ally , the motion is GRANTED insofar a s Plainti ff a lleg es that B rickshire violated para g raphs ( e) & (f) of sec tion 3904 of the CPP A, but is DENI ED insofar as Plaintiff alleg es that Br ickshire violated se ction 3904(z-1) of the CPPA. I. BACKG ROUND A. Factual Back

ground Th e Court

a ssume s f

amil iari ty wi th t he fa c tua l ba c kg ro un d o f t his c a se , whic h is se t f

or th in detail in this C ourt previous’ opinions, see J uergens v . UTS, 65 2 F . Su pp . 2 d 5 1 ( D. D. C. 20 09 ); J ue rge ns v . U

TS , 2 46 F .R. D. 4 ( D. D. C. 2 00 7) ; J ue rge ns v , U TS , 533 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D .D .C. 20 08 ); J

ue rge ns v , U TS , 6 52 F . Su

pp . 2 d 4 0 ( D. D. C. 2 00 9) ; J ue rge ns v , U TS , 6 52 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009), and the Court theref ore a ddresse s here in only such fa cts as ar e4

nece ssary for r esolution of the motions curre ntly befor e the Court. B efor e doingso, howeve r, the Court pauses brie fly

to comment upon the par ties’ compliance with the L ocal Civil Rule 7(h)(1). As the D. C. C ir c uit

ha s e mph a size d, “ [L CvR 7( h) (1 )] p la c e s th e burd e n o n th e pa rt ie s a nd the ir counsel, who a

re most familiar with the liti g ation and the r ecor d, to cry stalliz e for the district court the material fa cts and re levant portions of the r ecor d.” Jack son v. Finnegan, He nderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner , 1 0 1 F. 3 d 1 4 5 , 1 5 1 (D
. C
. C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) ( ci t i n g Twis t v . M e ese , 854 F.2d 1421, 1425 ( D.C. Cir. 1988). Be cause of the sig nificanc e of this task and the potential hardship plac ed on the c ourt if the par ties are dere lict in their duty , courts re quire strict compliance with L CvR 7(h)(1). See id. at 150. This Court has repe atedly advised the pa

rties that it strictly adher es to the text of L ocal Civil Rule 7(h)(1) when re solving motions for summary judgme nt. See, e .g., 1/30/09 Scheduling a nd Procedur es Orde r, Doc ket No. [155] at 2. Counsel ha s b e e n c a

uti on e d th at th e y

are e xpe c te d to “ c omp ly fu lly with L ocal Civil L CvR 7(h)” and that the Court “assumes f

acts identified by

the moving pa

rty in its st atement of

materia l fac ts are admitted, unless such a f

act is controve rted in the stateme nt of g enuine issues filed in opposition to the motion.” Id. (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) . M or e ov e r, the Court ha s c a uti on e d th e pa

rt ie s th at it “may strike pleading s not in conformity with these rules.” Id. No ne the le ss, wh ile B ri c ks hir e ha s c omp lie d w iththe re qu ir e me nts of L CvR 7( h) (1 ) i n fi lin gits mot ion s f

or pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt, Pla int if

f h a s f a ile d to do so in o pp os ingtho se mot ion s. F ir st, a lth ou g h Pl a int if f h a s p ro vid e d th e re qu ir e d r e sp on se state me nts in o pp os iti on to B ri c ks hir e ’s pe nd ingmot ion s, a signif ic ant n umb e r o f P la int if

f’ s sp e c if ic re sp on se s to Br ickshire’ s statements of fa ct ar e inade quate a nd fail to comport with the re quirements of L CvR 7( h) (1 ). F or

e xamp le , ma

ny of Pla int if f’ s f a c tua l a sse rt ion s a

re no t su pp or te d b y “ pr e c ise5

citations to the portions of the re cord,” as re quired. Rather , they contain only

g ener ic re fer ence s to P la int if

f’ s c on so lid ate d s tate me nt o f m ate ri a l f a c ts, a 78 -p a g e do c ume nt t

hat pu rp or ts t o r e late to all summary

judgme nt motions and cr oss-motions filed by the par ties and which w as filed without leave of

this Court, seePl.’s [ 199] S tmt. of Mat. Fac ts. See, e .g., Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶¶ 2, 3, 5, 16, 17; Pl.’s [ 198] R esp. ¶¶ 1, 2, 4. Setting aside for the moment that Plaintiff’s consolidated stateme nt violates the local rule s of this Court and shall be disreg arde d for that
re a so n, a s is dis c us se d b e low , Pl a int if f’ s g e ne ra l r e fe re nc e s to the c on so lid ate d s tate me nt — made without spec ifying a ny particula r par ag raph or

fac tual asser

tions contained there in — are insufficient. Plaintiff has imper missibl y shifted her

burden to locate and identify the re levant fac ts to thi s Court, leavingit to guess whic h of the 75 fa ctual stateme nts set forth in the
c o n s o l i d at e d

f i l i n gs h e p ur

p o rt e d l y r e l i e s u p o nt o c r e at e a

g e nu i n e d i s p u t e o f

m at e r i a l f

a c t . In setting out the r eleva

nt fac tual background below, the Court — consistent with its prior orde rs and L CvR 7(h)(1) — de ems admitted any fac ts identified by

Def endants in their state ments of materia l fac ts that are not a ppropriate ly

controve rted by

Plaintiff. Se c on d, in a dd iti on

to f ili ngthe ind ivi du a l r e sp on se state me nts sh e pr ov ide d in opposition t o Br ickshire’ s motions for partial summary judgme nt, Plainti ff a lso filed the consolidated stateme nt of materia l fac ts refe rre d to above. SeePl.’s [ 199] S tmt. of Mat. Fac ts. Plaintiff did not seek prior lea ve of the Court to file her c onsolidated fac tual statement and, a s the Court has previously

observe d, the document wa s filed in violation of both this C ourt’s orde rs and the loca l rules of this Court. Se e J ue rge ns v . U

TS , 652 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55-56 (D .D.C. 2009). Mo re ov e r, the c on so lid ate d s tate me nt, wh ic h a pp e ars to h ave be e n inte nd e d p ri nc ipa lly a s a
me ans of su pp le me nti ngPla int if

f’ s o wn c ro ss- mot ion s f

or summa ry jud g me nt, do e s n ot d ir e c tly6

respond to the B rickshire ’s statements of material fa cts not in issue filed with its m otions for pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt a

nd is the re fo re of

little a ssi sta

nc e to t he Court in i de nti fy

ingwh at, i f
an y, m at e r i a l f

a c t s ar e p ur

p o rt e d l y i nd i s p u t e w i thr e s p e c tt o th e p e n d i n gm o t i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y, the Court shall — once a g ain — disreg ard Plaintiff’s c onsolidated [199] Statement of Mater ial Fa cts and a

ny fac tual asser

tions set forth there in, as well as the D efe ndants’ [223] J oint Response, in rulingon the pendingmotions. Cf. J ue rge ns v . U

TS , 652 F. Supp. 2d 51, 55-56 (D.D.C. 2009). A s a conse quence , the Court is left with only the individual statements of
mate ri a l f a c t and re sp on se state me nts of

g e nu ine iss ue s in

dis pute that w e re fi le d w iththe pa rt ie s’ briefing . Given that these statements ar e nar rowly tailored to ea ch individual motion, the Court at this point provides only a short introduction to the fa cts of this case , with a more de tailed discussion to follow below as is nece ssary for e valuation of a

particula r cla im. The he art of Plaintiff’ s lawsuit ag ainst the FMV D efe ndants, including Br ickshire, is her alleg ation that the FMVL oan wa s intended to be, or should prope rly be construe d as, a pe rsonal
mor tg a g e loa n — no t a c omm e rc ia l lo an. As the pa rt ie s a g re e , th e re le va

nt d oc ume nts re latin gto the FMVL oan, whe n taken at fac e value , purport to cha rac terize the loan a s a $250,000
commerc ial loan extended by FMVI L A to 1220 23rd Street, L L C (here inafter , “L L C”), a limited liability corpor ation of which Plaintiff is the sole shar eholder . Plaintiff nonetheless conte nds that the loan is, or should proper ly be construe d as, a pe rsonal re sidential loan, based upon two alternative theories: (1) Plaintiff claims that the FMV D efe ndants offe red he r a pe rsonal mortg ag e loan, not a c ommercia l loan, and that she sig ned only documents re lated to a r esidential loan; thus, although the FMV L oan docume nts on their fac e purpor tedly descr ibe the F MV L oan
as commer cial in nature , such docume nts were fra udulently obtained by

forg ery , such that the7

entire tra nsaction is fra

udulent, Pl.’s Fourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 89-91; (2) alternatively , Plaintiff
a lle g e s th at, e ve n a ssumin gsh e did in f a c t si g n th e re le va

nt l oa n d oc ume nts purp or

tin gto descr ibe the F MV L oan as c ommercia l in nature, the loa n is nonetheless unlawf

ul as it is an ill e g a l c on sume r r e sid e nti a l lo an im pe rm iss ibl y

dis g uis e d a s a

c omm e rc ia l lo an in

or de r t o avo id fair le nding la

ws and disclosure require ments, id. ¶ 92. Not unsurprising ly , the FMVDef endants de ny

Plaintiff’s alleg ations and asse rt that the FMV L oan is a va lid commercia l loan extended to Plainti ff’ s L L C. See id. ¶¶ 94- 96. The Def endants c ontend that they assisted Plaintiff, at her r equest, in establishingthe L L C; ti tle to the Condo was then tra

nsfer red f rom Plaintiff to the L L C, and FMVI L A extended a law ful
commerc ial loan for $250,000 to the L L C, which was se cure d by the Condo. See id. ¶ 96. As prese nted by

the par ties, then, the key

question underlying this ca se is whether the FMV L oan is a leg itimate commerc ial loan lawf ully extended to the L L C or whether it is an
un lawf ul l oa n — e ith e r b e c a

us e the un de rl yingdo c ume nts we re fr a ud ule ntl y fo rg e d b y

the F MV Def endants or be cause it was unlawfully disguised by

the FMVDef

endants a s a commer cial loan in o rd e r t o avo id f

a ir le nd inglaws and

dis c los ur e re qu ir e me nts . A s th e Court ha s p re vio us ly observe d, this ult imate question appe ars unlikely to be suitable for

resolution on summary judgme nt based on the r ecor d befor e the Court at this time. Se e J ue rge ns v . U

TS , 652 F. Supp. 2d 51, 58 (D.D.C. 2009). A t present, the Court is pre sented with two ver y differ ent stories reg ardingthe formation of the L L C and the issuance of the F MV L oan. None theless, to the extent the parties’ a

rguments in the instant moti ons do not depend upon or tur n on this key fac tual dispute, summary judgme nt on such discre te issues may be appr opriate.Plaintiff also alleg es in Count XXXIV of he r F ourth Amende d Complaint t hat 3 Br ickshire is liable for

the conduc t of Def

endant Dunc an under

the theory

of Respondeat Sup e ri or . F ourt

h A m. C omp l. ¶

¶ 5 12 -1 5. B ri c ks hir e ha s n ot m ov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt w ith re sp e c t to thi s c la im. 8 B. Procedural Bac kground Plaintiff filed her F ourth Amende d Complaint i n the above -ca ptioned civil action on October 7, 2008. SeeFour

th Am. Compl ., Docke t No. [120] . Plaintiff sets forth 25 ca uses of action ag ainst the FMV D efe ndants in this matter stemming fr om the issuance of the FMVL oan. See ge nerally id. As is of particula r re levanc e to the instant Memora ndum Opinion, Pl aintiff has alleg ed, inte r a lia , claims for br eac h of contra ct (Count XXI ), bre ach of fiduciar y duty (Count XX I I ) a nd ne g lig e nc e (C ount XXI I I ) a g a ins t B ri c ks hir e ba se d u po n it s a lle g e d c on du c t w ith
re s p ec tt o th e F M V Loa ncl o s i n g, see id. ¶¶ 375- 98, as we ll as a cla im for violation of the District of Columbia’s Consumer Protection Proce dures Ac t (“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 29.3901 et seq. (Count XXXI ), see id. ¶¶ 482- 97. 3 Discover y in this case is now closed, a nd the par ties have e ach f

iled a series of motions for pa rtial summary

judgme nt. The Court previously issued a Memora

ndum Opinion ruling on tho se mot ion s f

or pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt t

ha t w e re fi le d b y

Pla int if f w ithre sp e c t to
a lle g atio ns in h e r F ourt

h A me nd e d Co mpl a int

re latin gto t

he F MVL oa

n a nd tho se re late d c ro ssmotions for partial summary judgme nt by

the FMVDef

endants. Se e J

ue rge ns v . U

TS , 6 52 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009). In addition, the Court has, by separ ate Me morandum Opinion and Or de r i ssu e d th is s ame date , r ule d o n Pl a int if

f’ s mo tio n f

or pa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt f

ile d w ith respe ct to Def

endant Dunc an’s c ounterc laims as well as De fenda nt Duncan’ s motion for partial summary judgme nt. As indicated a bove, the instant Memora ndum Opinion addresse s9

B ri c ks hir e ’s [177 ] Mot ion fo r P art ia l Summa

ry Judg me nt R e g ard ingthe Ab se nc e of Da ma g e s to Plaintiff from the L ate F iling of Cer tain Documents with the District of Columbia Recor der of Dee ds and B rickshire ’s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment on Count XXXI- Violation of DC Code Section 28-3901, Et Seq. (Consumer Protection Procedur es Ac t). Finally , the Court notes that afte r the pa rties’ c ross-motions for summary judgme nt had been f ully briefe d, Plaintiff advised the Court that she ha d executed a spe cial wa rra nty deed selling the Condo at issue in this l itigation to a third-pa rty purcha ser, a

nd that Def

endant F MV I L A h a d a g re e d to re le a se its lie n o n th e Con do in e xch ang e fo r r e c e ivi ng$3 19 ,2 29 .1 8 in compensation from the sale pr ocee ds. See[242] Status Report. II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a par ty is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt “if the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that the re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); see also Tao v. Free h , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the movingparty bear s the “initial responsibility of informingthe district court of the basis for [its] motion, and identifying those portions of the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits which [it ] believe[s] demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 7 7 U. S
. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1 9 8 6 ). Inre s p o n s e, th e n o n -m o v i n g p arty mu s t“go beyond the pleading s and by [i ts] own af

fidavits, or depositions, answer s to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, ‘desig nate’ specific fac ts showing that ther e is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. at 324 (interna l citations omit ted).10

Although a

court should dra

w all infer ence s from the supportingrec ords submitted by the nonmoving pa

rty , the mere exis tence of a f actua l dispute, by

itself, is insufficient to bar summar y judgme nt. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To be materia l, the fac tual asser

tion mustbe ca

pable of aff ectingthe substantive outcome of the litigation; to be g enuine, the issue must be suppor ted by sufficie nt admissible evidence that a re asonable trier- offac t could find for the nonmoving pa rty . Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 8 13 F .2 d 1 23 6, 12 42 -4 3 ( D. C. Cir . 1 98 7) ; Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251 (the c ourt must determine “ whether the evidenc e prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par

ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w”) . “I f the e vidence is merely colora ble, or is not sufficie ntly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be g rante d.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (interna l citations omit ted). “ Mere alleg ations or denials in the a dverse party ’s pleading s are insufficient to def

eat a n otherwise pr oper motion for summar y judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Callaghan , 9 38 F . Su

pp . 4 6, 49 (D .D .C. 19 96 ). Th e a dv e rs e pa rt y mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly “show that ther e is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I nd us . Co. v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, while the movant bear s the initial responsibility

of identifying those portions of the re cord that demonstrate the a bsence of a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t, t he burd e n s hif

ts t o th e no n- mov ant t o “ c ome fo rw ard wi th ‘s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a genuine issue for trial .’” Id. at 58 7 ( c iti ngF e d. R. C iv. P. 56(e) ) (e mphasis in origina l).Plaintiff’s brea ch of c ontrac t (Count XXI ), bre ach of fiduciar y duty (Count XXI I ), and 4 neg lige nce ( Count XXI I I ) cla ims ag ainst Br ickshire a re e ach pr emised on an ide ntical set of alleg ations relatingto the establishment of the L L C and essentially asser t alternative theories of rec overy for the sa me conduc t. SeeFour

th Am. Compl . ¶¶ 375- 98. Specifica lly , Plaintiff alleg es that B rickshire enter ed into a contr act with her and owe d a duty

of ca re a nd/or fiduciar

y duty to h e r t o “ pe rf

or m th e c los ingon

the [F MVL oa

n], i nc lud ingus inga

pr op e r a nd a c c ur ate a c c ounti ngstate me nt, e ns ur ingthe a ll l oa n d oc ume nts c omp ly

wi th a ll r e le va

nt l aws and

statut e s, notarizing a

nd authenticating loan doc uments by a license d notary , promptly disbursing f

unds associate d with this l oan, promptly filing loa n documents and loa

n rele ases a

nd conductingthe settlement in a manne r in ac corda nce w ith all releva

nt laws and statutes.” Id. ¶¶ 376, 384, 392. Ac c or din gto P la int if

f, B ri c ks hir e br e a c he d th is c on tr a c t, w a s n e g lig e nt, and /or br e a c he d it s fiduciar y duty to her by : (a) “ by

failingto use a prope r and a ccur ate a ccountingstatement;” (b) “by failingto ensure that the all loan documents c omply with all releva

nt laws and statutes;” ( c)
“ by fa ili ngto n ota

ri ze a nd a uth e nti c ate loa

n d oc ume nts by

a lic e ns e d n ota

ry ;” (d ) “ by

fa ili ngto promptly disburse funds a ssociated with this loan;” (e ) “ by failing to promptl y filing [sic] loan docume nts and loan releases ;” (f ) “ by fa ili ngto c on du c t th e se ttl e me nt i n a mann e r i n acc ordanc e with all re levant laws a nd statutes;” (g ) “by

using a HUD- 1 settlement statement that did not accur ately

ref lect the nature of the transac tion;” and (h) “ by paying ‘ transfe r’ a

nd ‘re cordation’ tax es to the District of Columbia Recor der of Dee ds.” F ourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 377- 82, 385-87, 393-95 ( emphasis adde d). 11 III . D ISC USS ION A. Brickshire’

s Motion for Parti al Summary J udgment Re

garding the Absenceof Damages to the Plaintiff from the Lat e Filing of Certain Documents with the District of Columbia Recorde r of Deeds Br ickshire’ s pendingMotion [ 177] for Par tial Summ ary

J udg ment focuse s on Plainti ff’ s claim that B rickshire failed to timely file ce rtain F MV L oan docume nts with the District of Columbi a Rec order

of De eds — name ly , (a) the Dee d convey ing the Condo from Plaintiff to the L L C (the “De ed”) , and (b) the re lease of the UTS L oan (“ Release ”). F ourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 170- 72. Plaintiff relies on B rickshire ’s alleg ed late f iling of the se loan doc uments as support for he r brea ch of c ontrac t (Count XXI ), bre ach of fiduciar y duty (Count XXI I ), and ne g lige nce ( Count XXI I I ) cla ims ag ainst Br ickshire. See id. ¶¶ 375- 98 (alleg ing, inte r a lia , that Br ickshire “ fail[ed] to p ro mpt ly

fi le loa n d oc ume nts and

loa n r e le a se s” ). B ri c ks hir e c on te nd s th at it is e nti tle d to 4Th e Court no te s th at Pla int if

f c on tin ue s to dis pute that sh e in f a c t si g ne d a

ny do c ume nts 5 ref ere ncingthe L L C, including, by implication, the Deed. See, e .g. , Pl .’ s [19 8] Re sp . ¶ 1. Th is dispute is not, however, material to the re solution of Brickshire ’s pendingmotion, which focuses on whether

the untimely

filing of the Dee d — reg ardle ss of whethe r Plaintiff in fac t signe d the document — dama g ed Plaintiff. 12 summary judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s claims for br eac h of contra ct, bre ach of fiduciar y duty , and
ne g lig e nc e to t

he e xtent e a c h is ba se d u

po n Pl a int if

f’ s a lle g atio n th at B ri c ks hir e fa ile d to tim e ly file the De ed and Re lease with the Recorde r of De eds bec ause ne ither Plaintiff herse lf nor the L L C sustained any

damag e as a

result of the late filing
. See ge nerally Br ickshire’ s [177] MSJ
. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Br ickshire’ s motion, seePl.’s [ 198] Opp’n, and B rickshire a reply , see Br ickshire’ s [216] Reply . Br iefingon Br ickshire’ s motion i s theref ore c omplete. As set forth ther ein, Plaintiff alleg es — and B rickshire does not dispute — that both the Dee d and the Rele ase w ere untimely filed with the Recor der of Dee ds. Specifica lly , with respec t to the Dee d, the par

ties ag ree that the Dee d bear s an execution date of August 31, 2005, but was not rec orded w ith the District of Columbia Recorder of De eds until September 21, 2006. Br ickshire’ s [177] Stmt . ¶¶ 1,2; Pl.’s [198] Resp. ¶¶ 1, 2. Be tween the time the Dee d was 5 executed on August 31, 2005, and the time it was filed with the Rec order of De eds on September 21, 2006, the par

ties ag ree that no interveningliens were filed with respe ct to the Condo ( i.e., the subject of the D eed) . Br ickshire’ s [177] Stmt . ¶ 4; Pl.’s [ 198] R esp. ¶ 4. As c oncer ns the Release , while the par

ties do not specifica lly

indicate whe n the Relea se wa s executed, they ag ree that it was not reg istered with the District of Columbi a Rec order

of De eds until April 21, 2008. Br ickshire’ s [177] Stmt . ¶ 3; Pl.’s [ 198] R esp. ¶ 3. Withre sp e c t to the iss ue of ho w Pl a int if

f w a s d ama g e d b y

B ri c ks hir e ’s fa ilure to t ime ly file the De ed and the Release , Plaintiff’s rea l estate settlement e x pert, Ha rry S. J acobs, te stified at13

de po sit ion

a s f oll ow s: Q. We all acknow ledg e that the de ed, the de ed of trust, a nd the Geor g e Owe ns re le a se we re re c or de d late , c or re c t? A. M y un d er s t an d i n g. Q. Ho w i f at a ll w a s Ms . Jue rg e ns dama g e d b y that? A. Well, so long as the lien of t he deed of trust rema ins of record, she would not be ab l e t o s ec ure ei th er

re fi n an ci n g o r s u

b o rd i n at e f

i n an ci n g. Q. The f act it was r ecor ded late, a m Icorr ect that the f

act that they

wer e re corde d late - A. You said re lease . Didn’t y ou say rele ase? Q. The G eorg e Owe ns relea se is the re lease of that loan. A. Rig ht. Wel l, i f t

he re le a se is r e c or de d late , th e n th e lie n s tay e d o n lo ng e r t ha n it should have. Q. An d is the re any

ind ic atio n th at th at [ sic ] st opped her from g etting a

ny loans or any thing that she wanted? A. I t would. Imean, it would have to be – Q
. Is th e r e an y i n d i c at i o ni td i d ? I u n d e r s t an d i n gyo uh av e n ’ tr e a d h e r t e s t i m o n y. But is there any

indication that anyone eve r ra ised that as an issue w ith her, eve r? A. Ido n’ t r e c a ll. * * * Q. So i f [the de e d o f t

ru st a nd the de e d] w e re re c or de d late, wou ld a g re e wi th m e th atM s . J u er gen s wa s n o td am age d b y th atre co rd i n g? A. B y those two documents – let’s se e, the de ed of trust a nd – y es, I

would ag ree . Q. An d w ithre g ard

to t he Ge or g e Ow e ns re le a se , you wo uld a g re e wi th m e that if Ms. Juer g e ns wa s una

wa re of any iss ue ra ise d w ithre g ard

to a ny e ff e c t of the late rec ordingof the Ge org e Owe ns relea se that she would not be da mag ed by that e ith e r, c or

re c t?In addition, it is undisputed that Plainti ff’ s mortga g e broke r expert, Gar y Schiller, 6 testified that neither

she nor the L L C were damag ed as a result of the late filing of any document in this case. B rickshire ’s [177] Stmt . ¶ 7; Pl.’s [ 198] R esp. ¶ 7. Plaintiff conte nds, howeve r, that this testim ony

is imm ater ial to the prese nt motion as Mr. Schill er w as not ca lled as an e x pert on this iss ue and w ill not be called to testify on this iss ue at tria l; rather, Plaintiff indica tes that she will present proof

of dama g es via Mr. Jacobs. SeePl.’s [ 198] R esp. ¶ 7. B rickshire has not responde d in its reply

to Plainti ff’ s argument on this pointand ther efor e appe ars to agree that Mr. Schiller’s testimony

is irreleva

nt to the resolution of its moti on. Se e ge ne ra lly Br ickshire’ s [216] Re ply . Re g ard le ss, to t

he e xtent a

dis pute e xists be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s a s to the ult imate admissibili ty

of Mr. Schiller’ s testimony reg ardingthe lack of

damag es to Plaintiff, the Court n e e d n o tr e s o l v e i tatth i s t i m e a s e v e na b s e n tc o n s i d e r at i o no f

M r . S c h i l l e r ’ s t e s t i m o n y, Br ickshire’ s motion m ust be g rante d. 14 A. Well, the ty

pe of da mag e that ar ises from a late re corde d rele ase w ould be dama g e to your c re dit

re po rt , f or e xamp le , b e c a

us e wh e n th e y

do the c re dit repor ts, it would st ill show that y ou have a n outstanding mortg ag e. Q. Ar e y ou

awa re of any c re dit re po rt that sh ow e d th e Ge or g e Ow e ns – A. No. Q. Any thing e lse? A. Other than what I

said was spe culative or

hy pothetical, that it would preve nt her from re financ ing or

putting subordinate -- that would be – Q. An d th e re is n o te sti mony that sh e atte mpt e d to do any of that? A. Those would be the ty pes of damag es that would occ ur. Q. Yo uwo u l d

agr ee wi thm e t h atas y o us i th er e, y o uar e n o taw ar e o f a n y d am age flowingfrom a late re cordingof the Ge org e Owe ns relea se? A. Yes, I would. B ri c ks hir e ’s [177 ] MSJ, Ex. D (E xce rp ts f ro m O c t. 2 7, 20 08 De po sit ion of Ha rr y S. Ja c ob s) (“Jacobs De p.”) at 198:14-202:15. Wit h that fac tual background in mind, the Court now turns 6 to consider the me rits of the par ties’ ar g uments on the issue of dama g es re lating to the late filing of the De ed and Re lease
.15 1. Choice of L aw Be cause this is a diversity action the Court must first apply the District of Columbia’s choice of law r

ules to determine which forum’ s substantive laws to apply to Plainti ff’ s brea ch of contra ct, bre ach of

fiduciar y duty , and neg lige nce c laims ag ainst Br ickshire. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. M

fg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Unde r the District of Columbia’s rule s, the Court first determines whether a “tr ue conf lict” exist s betwee n the laws of c ompeting jurisdictions. GEICO v . Fetisoff, 958 F.2d 1137, 1141 ( D.C. Cir. 1992). Where no true conflict exis ts, a court a

pplies the law of the District of Columbia by defa ult. Id. Neither Br ickshire nor

Plaintiff have r aised the c hoice of law issue in their brie fingfiled with reg ards to B rickshire ’s [177] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment. This may

in part be du e to t he unus ua l and

re g re tta ble fa c t th at ne ith e r p art

y ha s c ite d to any

le g a l a uth or ity or c a se law i n th e ir

re sp e c tiv e br ie fs
. Although B rickshire asser ts, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that proof of damag es is a nec essar

y element of

Plaintiff’s claims for br eac h of contra ct, bre ach of fiduciar y duty , and neg lige nce, ne ither par ty has cited a

ny leg al authority

for that pr oposition. Havingfailed to c ite to any law, it is not surprising then that the parties have also ove rlooked the
c ho ic e of law i ssu e . N on e the le ss, se tti nga sid e the pa rt ie s’ ina de qu ate br ie fi ngon thi s p oint, i t is appar ent that no true c onflict exist s betwee n the potentially interested f

orums — namely , the District of Columbia, where Plaintiff is a resident a nd wher e the Condo is located, a nd the Commonwealth of Virg inia, wher e the e vents relating to the F MV L oan tra nsaction took place
. B o thD i s tr i c tan d

V i r g i n i a l awr e qu i r e p r o o f

o f i n j ur y ( i.e. , damag es) a s an ele ment of cla ims forCompare Osbourne v . Capital City Mortgage Corp. , 727 A.2d 322, 324-25 (D .C. 1999) 7 (cla im for bre ach of

contra ct re quires proof

of some ac tual damag e under District law) with Sunrise Continui ng Care, LLC v. W right , 671 S.E.2d 132, 135 (Va. 2009) (cla im for bre ach of contra ct under

Virg inia law re quires “injury or dama g e to the plaintiff c aused by the bre ach of obligation”). Com pa reAr me nia n G e no c ideMu se um &Me mo ria l, I nc . v . Ca fe sji an Fa mi ly 8 Foundation, Inc. , 595 F. Supp. 2d 110, 116 (D.D .C. 2009) (bre ach of fiduciar y duty require s proof of injury under D istrict law) with Carstensen v. Chrisland Cor p. , 442 S.E.2d 660, 666-68 (Va . 1994) (br eac h of fiducia ry duty require s proof of da

mag es under

Virg inia law). Compare District of Col umbia v. Cooper , 483 A.2d 317, 321 (D.C. 1984) ( elements of a 9 cause of ac tion for neg lige nce inc lude damag e to the intere sts of the plaintiff) with Blue Ridge Serv. Corp. of Va. v. Sax on Shoes, Inc

. , 624 S.E.2d 55,62 (Va. 2006) (ele ments of a ne g lige nce action under

Virg inia law re quire proof that “bre ach w as the proximate cause of injury , resulting in damag e to the plaintiff” ). 16 brea ch of c ontrac t, brea ch of f iduciary duty , and neg lige nce. Acc ording ly , as no true c onflict 7 8 9
e xists , a nd a s th e pa rt ie s h ave no t a dv oc ate d f or the a pp lic atio n o f V ir g ini a

law, the Court

sh a ll, by defa ult, apply the District of Columbia’s substantive law to conside ration of B rickshire ’s motion. 2. Br ickshire is Entitled to Summ ary J udg ment as Plaintiff Has Not S u s t ai n edAn y

Da m age as a R es u l to f t h e Lat e F i l i n gs As ind ic ate d a

bo ve , B ri c ks hir e ha s mo ve d f or summa ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to Plaintiff’s claims for br eac h of contra ct, bre ach of fiduciar y duty , and neg lige nce to the e x tent
eac h claim is based on B rickshire ’s fa ilure to timely filed the De ed and Re lease . Br ickshire
c on te nd s th at th e se c la ims fa il b e c a us e ne ith e r P la int if

f n or the L L C su sta ine d a

ny dama g e a s a result of the late filing s. SeeBr ickshire’ s [177] MSJ . The Court turns first to consider Br ickshire’ s claim that Plaintiff suffer ed no dama g es as a result of the late filing of the De ed befor e then turningto consider B rickshire ’s ar g ument with respec t to the late filing of the Release
.17 a. Plaintiff has conc eded that neither she nor the L L C suffer ed damag es as a

result of the late filing of the De ed. Br ickshire f

irst argues that neither

Plaintiff nor the L L C suffer ed dama g es as a result of the late f iling of the Dee d. As demonstrate d above, it is undisputed that no interveninglien was f i l e d o nth e s u b j e c tp r o p e r

ty ( i.e. , the Condo) betwe en the date the De ed wa s executed and the date it was f

inally rec orded a

nd that Plaintiff’s own expert, Mr. Jacobs, admitted at deposition that th e late re c or din gof

the De e d d id n ot r e su lt i n a ny dama g e to P la int if

f. B a se d o n th e se undisputed fac ts, Bric kshire conte nds it is entit led to judgme nt as a matter of law that Plainti ff did not suffer da

mag es fr om the late filingof the De ed. B rickshire ’s [177] MSJ at 4. The Court finds that Plaintiff has conc eded this ar g ument. Whil e Plaintiff’s opposition briefingaddre sses Br ickshire’ s arguments reg ardingthe Relea se (a s discussed below) , she fa ils to provide any response to Bric kshire’s a rguments specific ally

reg ardingthe late f

iling of the Dee d. See Pl.’s [198] Opp’n at 5-6. Indeed, he r opposition makes no mention whatsoeve r of the D eed, a nd for g ood rea son, as her

own re al estate settlement expert testified that Plaintiff was not dama g ed by the late f iling of the Dee d. SeeJ acobs D ep. at 6- 10 (“Q . So if [ the dee d of trust and the de ed]
w e r e r e c o r d e d

l at e , w o u l d

a g r e e w i thm e th atM s . J u e r g e n s w a s n o td am a g e d b y th atr e c o r d i n g ? A. B y those two documents . . . y es, I would ag ree .”). The Court there fore treats Pl aintiff’s f ailure to re spond as a c oncession that neither she nor the L L C were injured as a result of the D eed’ s late filingand that her claims for br eac h of contra ct, bre ach of

fiduciar y duty , and neg lige nce f

ail to the extent each a

re ba sed on B rickshire ’s failure to timely

file the De ed with the District of Columbia’s Rec order of De eds. See H

opkins v. W omen’ s Div., Ge neral Bd. of Global Ministri es , 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D .C.2003), aff ’d 9818

Fe d. Appx. 8 (D.C. C ir. 2004) (“ I t is well understood in this C ircuit that when a plaintiff files an op po sit ion

to a dis po sit ive mot ion

and a dd re sse s o nly

c e rt a in a rgume nts ra ise d b y

the de fe nd ant,
a c ourt may tr e at th os e argume nts that th e pla int if f f a ile d to a dd

re ss a s c on c e de d. ” ); se e als o Franklin v. Potter, 60 0 F . Su pp . 2 d 3 8, 60 (D .D .C. 20 09 ) ( tr e atin gde fe nd ant’ s a rgume nt i n motion for summary

judgme nt as conc eded where plaintiff fa iled to addre ss it in hi s response)
. Ac c or din g ly , B ri c ks hir e ’s [177 ] Mot ion fo r P art ia l Summa

ry is G RA NT ED wi th r e sp e c t to Plaintiff’s brea ch of c ontrac t (Count XXI ), bre ach of fiduciar y duty (Count XXI I ), and neg lige nce ( Count XXI I I ) cla ims ag ainst Br ickshire to the e x tent eac h claim is based on Br ickshire’ s failure to timely filed the De ed. b
. T h e un d i s p u t e d

f a c t s d e m o n s tr at e th atn e i th e r P l a i n t i f f n o r th e LLC wer e dama g ed as a

result of the late filing of the Relea se. Br ickshire ne x t argues that neither Plaintiff nor the L L C suffer ed dama g es as a result of the late f iling of the Release . Specifica lly , Br ickshire c ontends that it is undis puted that neither Plaintiff nor the L L C was damag ed by the late f iling of the Release and that Plaintiff’s own r eal estate se ttlement expert, Mr. J acobs, a dmitted as much at deposition. SeeB ri c ks hir e ’s [177 ] MSJ at 4. Plaintiff disputes this contention, arguing that she was damag ed by the late f iling of the Release beca

use “the fac t that the debt re mained on re cord ha d a neg ative impact on [her] cre dit.” Pl.’s [ 198] Opp’n at 5. Her sole support for this asser tion, however , is Mr. J acobs’ deposition testimony — the same te stimony

relied upon by

Br ickshire in support of its motion. See id. at 6. Plaintiff claims that contrar y to Bric kshire’s a ssertion Mr. Jacobs in fact testified that Plainti ff had bee n damag ed by

the late f iling of the Release
. Id. at 6. As Plaintiff points to no other evidenc e in support of he r asse rtion that she sustained dama g es, the pa rties’ dispute turns on theWhil e Plaintiff does not direc t the Court to any other re cord e vidence in support of her 10 claim that she suff

ere d damag es fr om the late filingof the Relea se, Plaintiff does adva nce a n alternative leg al ar g ument that Br ickshire’ s motion shoul d be denie d beca use Virg inia Code § 6.1- 2.13 re quires a “ settlement ag ent” to “c ause r ecor dation of the de ed, the de ed of trust, or mortg ag e, or othe r docume nts require d to be re corde d . . . within two business day s of settlement.” Pl.’s [198] Opp’n at 5-6. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, “ the fa ct that this statute is so clear provides support for

Plaintiff’s belief that [ Br ickshire] was der elict in its duti es towar d [P laintiff].” Id. This argument is wholly without merit. Even if the Court we re to a cce pt that Virg inia code a

pplies to the rec ordation of the Re lease in the District of Columbia, Plainti ff’ s argume nt g oe s to the qu e sti on of wh e the r B ri c ks hir e vio late d a duty to P la int if

f; it d oe s n ot g o to the qu e sti on

c ur re ntl y at is su e , whic h is wh e the r P la int if f w a s d ama g e d b y

B ri c ks hir e ’s fa ilure to timely file the Relea se. 19 testimony of Mr. Jacobs and whe ther the e x cer pted statements support B rickshire ’s or Plaintiff’s
argume nt. 10 The Court conc ludes that Br ickshire ha s the better a rgument and that Plaintiff’s asse rtions
are based on a

flawe d rea ding of

Mr. J acobs’ testimony . Specifica lly , while Mr. Jacobs testified that the late f

iling of the Release could haveresulted in injury to Plainti ff — by

damag ing he r
cre dit report or pr ecludingher f rom secur ing a dditional financing— he admitted that ther e wa s no evidenc e that she did

in fac t suffer

such dama g es in this case. A s outlined above, Mr. Jacobs testified that any

damag es to Plaintiff were “spec ulative or hy pothetical,” a

nd that he had not
seen a ny evidenc e that Plaintiff’s cr edit repor t had bee n damag ed or that she had be en pre cluded from obtainingref

inancingor subordinate financ ing. Jacobs De p. at 201:22-202:10. Indeed, he plainly conce ded that he w as not awa re of any damag e flowingfrom the late rec ordingof the Release
. Id. at 202:12-15 (“ Q. You would agree with me that as you sit here, you are not awar e of any damag e flowingfrom a late re cordingof the Ge org e Owe ns relea se? A. Yes, I would.”). Plaintiff’s relianc e on Mr. Jacobs’ testimony is theref ore misplace d. As she has not dire cted the Court to any

other e vidence on the re cord c ontradictingMr. J acobs’ admission that Pl aintiff wa sAs thi s is a div e rs ity a c tio n, the Court

mus t g e ne ra lly

fi rs t de te rm ine wh ic h s tate law t o 11 apply . The Court notes, howe ver, that neither pa rty has cha lleng ed the a

pplication of the District’s consumer

protec tion statutes to Brickshire and both there fore assume that District law g overns. “ The Court nee d not and does not question the par ties’ assumptions on that point.” Da v is v . G ra nt Par

k Nur sing H om e LP , 6 39 F . Su

pp . 2 d 6 0, 65 (D .D .C. 20 09 ); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Comme rcial Union Ins. Co. , 82 F.3d 478, 482- 83 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (pa rties may waive c hoice- of-law

arguments); C&

E Servs., I

nc. v. A shland, Inc. , 498 F. Supp. 2d 242, 255 n. 5 (D .D .C. 20 07 ) ( same ); cf. In re Korean A ir Li nes Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983 , 932 F.2d 1475, 1495 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 1) (c ourt s n e e d n ot a dd re ss c ho ic e of

law q ue sti on s su a s

po nte). 20 not injured by

the late f iling of the Release , there is no ge nuine dispute of mater ial fac t and Br ickshire is entitled to summary judgme nt. Accor dingly , Br ickshire’ s [177] Motion for Partial Summary is also GRANTED with re spect to Plaintiff’s bre ach of contra ct (Count XXI ), bre ach of fiducia ry duty (Count XXI I ), and ne g lige nce ( Count XXI I I ) cla ims ag ainst Br ickshire to the extent each c laim is based on B rickshire ’s fa ilure to timely filed the Relea se. B. Brickshire’

s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J

udgment on Count XXXI - Violation of

DC Code Section 28-3901, Et Se q. ( Consumer Protection Proce dures Ac t) The Court turns next to consider Br ickshire’ s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment filed with respe ct to Count XXXIof Plaintiff’s F ourth Amende d Complaint, which
asser ts that Bric kshire, alongwith Defe ndants Dunca n and F MVI L A, violated the District of Columbi a’s Consumer Protec tion Procedure s Act (“ CPP A”) , D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq. 11 “The CPP A re g ulates transa ctions betwee n a consume r and a merc hant.” Adler v. Vision Lab Telecomm unications, Inc. , 3 93 F . Su pp . 2 d 3 5, 39 (D .D .C. 20 05 ); see also Howard v. Riggs Nat’l Bank, 432 A.2d 701, 709 (D.C. 1981). A s is releva nt to Pl aintiff’s c laim, section 3904 of the CPPApr ov ide s th at it

is a vio latio n o f t

hat A c t f or a me rc ha nt t o ta ke c e rt a in e nume ra

te d a c tio ns , re gar d l es s o f w h et h er

an y co n s u m er

i s i nfa ctm i s l ed , i n cl u d i n g:21

* * * (e) misrepre sent as to a mate rial fa ct which ha s a tende ncy to misl ead; (f ) f a il t o s tate a

mate ri a l f

a c t if su c h f a ilure te nd s to mis le a d; * * * (z-1) violate a

ny provision of Chapter 46 of this title [t he Consumer Credit Service Org anizations Act, D.C. Code § 28-4601 et seq. ]. D.C. Code § 28-3904(e ), (f ) and ( z-1). As set forth in the F ourth Amende d Complaint, P laintiff alleg es that B rickshire violated par ag raphs ( e) a nd (f) of sec tion 3904 in two principal way s: (1)

“ by fa ili ngto s tate a

mate ri a l f

a c t if su c h f a ilure te nd s to mis le a d, sp e c if ic a lly , b y fr a ud ule ntl y disguisingthe loan to Mary J uerg ens as a

commerc ial loan rather than, what was in re ality , a persona l consumer r esidential loan in orde r to cha rg e Mar y J uerg ens a hig her r ate of interest and to circumve nt District of Columbia mortga g e, consume r and f air lendinglaws;” a

nd (2) “ by providing Mary

J uerg ens with a fa lse, incomplete a nd dece ptive HUD- 1 settlement statement.” Four th Am. Compl . ¶¶ 487- 88. In addition, Plainti ff a lleg es that B rickshire violated par ag raph (z-1) of se ction 3904 by

“violat[ing] the District of Columbia Consum er Cre dit Service Org anization Act, D.C. Code § 28-4601 et seq. ” Id. ¶ 489. B ri c ks hir e a

rgue s th at it

is e nti tle d to summa

ry jud g me nt o n Pl a int if

f’ s CPPAc la im, to the extent it i s based on a n alleg ation that Br ickshire “ fra udulently disguised” the FMVL oan, beca use it had no role in the or igination of the FMV L oan, cr eatingthe L L C or prepa ringany of the F MVL oa

n d oc ume nts oth e r t

ha n th e HU D- 1; a c c or din g ly , e ve n a ssumin gthat Pla int if f i s
corr ect that the F MV L oan is in fac t a consumer loan fra udulently disguised a s a commer cial loan, there is no evidence that Br ickshire kne w that the F MV L oan wa s any thing other

than aAl tho ug h Pl a int if f p ur po rt s th at “ [t]he re is a

qu e sti on of mate ri a l f

a c t pr e se nte d a s to 12 wh os e be ha lf

De fe nd ant D un c an w a s a c tin g(whe the r B ri c ks hir e Se ttl e me nt, L L C’ s o r F ir st Mount Vernon I L A’s) . . . when he dr afte d the loan docume nts,” she off ers no f actua l support for this claim. See Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 3. Instead, Plaintiff simply ref ers the Court to her

“Statement of F acts Not in I ssue.” See id. Al tho ug h unc le ar, the Court a ssume s th at Pla int if

f i s r e fe rr ingto her c onsolidated Statement of F acts Not in I ssue, seePl.’s [ 199] S tmt. of Mat. As indicated a bo ve , th at do c ume nt w a s f ile d in vio latio n o f b oth

the loc a l c ivi l r

ule s a nd thi s Co ur t’ s o rd e rs , and the Court has the ref

ore disre g arde d it for purposes of this Memorandum Opinion. Nonethele ss, even if the Court were to consider the c onsolidated statement (which it does not), Plaintiff’s broad r efe renc e to the entire 78-pag e docume nt — done without citation to any particula r par ag raph or

fac tual statement — is wholly insufficient to cr eate a g enuine dispute of materia l fac t. The Court has made clea r that in filing the ir statements of mate rial fa ct and response statements, the par ties must, “[ a]t all point s, [] furnish pre cise c itations to t he portions

22 commerc ial loan, as a ll loan documents indicated that the loan is commerc ial in nature. See ge ne ra lly Br ickshire’ s [178] MSJ . In addition, Bric kshire conte nds that it is entit led to summary judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s CPP A claim to the extent it is based on the alleg ation that Br ickshire pr ov ide d a

“ fa lse , in c omp le te and

de c e pti ve HU D- 1 s e ttl e me nt s tate me nt” be c a us e any e rr or s in the HUD- 1 wer e not mater ial and we re e ntere d by Br ickshire at the direc tion of others. See id. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Br ickshire’ s motion, seePl.’s [ 197] Opp’n, and B rickshire a reply , seeBr ickshire’ s [215] Reply . Br iefingon Br ickshire’ s motion i s theref ore c omplete. As set forth ther ein, the fa cts rele vant to Br ickshire’ s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment are as follows. With respect to B rickshire ’s role in the F MV L oan tra nsaction, the parties a g ree that Br ickshire ha d no role in the orig ination of the F MV L oan, which w as Def endant F MVI L A’s re sponsibili ty , or in the cr eation of the L L C, which was unde rtake n by De fe nd ant D un c an. B ri c ks hir e ’s [178 ] Stmt. ¶¶ 1, 2; P l.’ s [19 7] Re sp . ¶

¶ 1 , 2 . In a dd iti on , it

is
un dis pute d o n th e pr e se nt r e c or d th at B ri c ks hir e its e lf did no t pr e pa re any of the loa n d oc ume nts ; rathe r, De fenda

nt Duncan dr afte d the documents a nd then provided the m to Brickshire
. Br ickshire’ s [178] Stmt . ¶ 3; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 3. Simi larly , the par ties ag ree that Br ickshire 12of the re cord on which they rely .” See, e .g., Jan. 30 , 2 00 9 O rd e r, Do c ke t N o. [155 ] at p. 2. Th is Pla int if f h a s n ot d on e . In th e a

bs e nc e of su c h r e c or d c itatio ns , it

is n ot t he Court ’s ob lig atio n to speculate as to which of

the 75 statements conta ined in her 78- pag e consolidate d statement Pla int if f i nte nd e d to re ly

on fo r s up po rt

of he r c la im. Ac c or din g ly , Pl a int if f h a s f a ile d to de mon str ate that th e re is a dis pute a s to wh e the r D un c an a c te d a s a n a g e nt f or B ri c ks hir e in dr a ft ingthe loa

n d oc ume nts . In r e sp on din gto B ri c ks hir e ’s state me nt ¶ 5, a s q uo te d a bo ve , Pl a int if

f h a s si mpl y 13 repe ated, a lmost verbatim, her re sponse to Br ickshire’ s statement ¶ 3 — s tatin gthat “ [t]he re is a question of mater ial fac t presente d as to whose be half De fenda nt Duncan w as ac ting whe n he draf ted the loan doc uments (whethe r B rickshire Settlement, L L C’s or Fir st Mount Vernon I L A’s).” SeePl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 5. Plaintiff’s a ssertion is not only unresponsive to B rickshire ’s statement, but also fa ils to raise a dispute of material fa ct for the same re asons outlined above by the Court with respec t to Pl aintiff’s r esponse state ment ¶ 3. Se e su pra n. 12. 23 had no involvement with deter mining the r ate of

interest that Plaintiff was c harg ed in association with the FMV L oan. B rickshire ’s [178] Stmt . ¶ 4; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 4. It is also undisput ed that “[t] here is no claim in this case, and no f acts to sug g est, that Def

endant B rickshire circ umvented District of Columbia mortg ag e, consume r or f air lendinglaws.” B rickshire ’s [178] Stmt . ¶ 5; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 5. Rather, in this case , the re cord de monstrates that B rickshire ’s 13 role wa s to order the title searc h, obtain the title insurance , prepa re the UTS L oan re lease , disburse ce rtain monies re ceive d afte r settlement and — a s is of particular rele vance to the parties’ arguments — prepa re the HUD- 1. Br ickshire’ s [178] Stmt . ¶ 9; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 9. S p e c i f i c a l l y w i thr e s p e c tt o th e H U D
- 1 , B r i c k s h i r e w a s a s k e d b y F M V IL A ’ s at t o r

n e y, Def endant Dunc an, to pre pare the HUD- 1 for the F MV L oan. B rickshire ’s [178] Stmt . ¶ 15; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 15. B rickshire indicates, a nd Plaintiff ag ree s, that Br ickshire pr epar ed the HUD- 1 with information provided by Dunca n. Br ickshire’ s [178] Stmt . ¶ 6; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 6. Wit h reg ards to the c ontents of the HUD -1, it lists the place of settlement — not as the a ctual phy sical location where the settlement docume nts were signe d — but as Br ickshire’ s then-plac ePlaintiff does not dispute that her e x pert, Mr. Schiller, ma de this statement, but she 14 protests that Mr. Schiller’s testimony should not be considere d beca use he w as not identified as an expert on the issue of the place of settlement and how it relates to the HU D-1. Pl.’s [197] Re sp . ¶ 11 . Sh e ins te a d d ir e c ts the Court to t he te sti mony

of he r r e a l e state se ttl e me nt e xpe rt , Har vey J acobs, who Plaintiff contends testified that she w as dama g ed by the fa ct that the HUD -1 listed the place of settlement as B rickshire ’s place of business rather than the phy sical location of settlement. Id. The Court does not agree , howeve r, that Mr. Jacobs’ testimony on this point supports a finding , as Plaintiff claims, that she wa s damag ed by the place of settlement listing on the HU D- 1. Th e c ite d p or tio n o f M r. Jac ob ’s te sti mony do e s n ot i nd ic ate that th e sp e c if ic location listed on the HUD- 1 is of import, but merely ref lects Mr. Jacob’s opinion that Plaintiff was damag ed by

the settlement itself — re g ardle ss of the ac tual location listed on the HUD- 1. SeeJ acobs D ep. at 194:2-195:4 (“ Q: How wa s she damag ed by g oing to Tow er Court instead of L itt le Riv e r T ur

np ike ? A:
. . . [I ]f s he did n’ t g o to any

loc atio n, sh e wo uld

n’ t ha ve e nte re d into this transaction and w ouldn’t have be en cha rg ed the f ees. . . . Q : . . . How does the a ddress unde r place of settlement ca

use her any damag e? A: I f she didn’t g o to the settlement at all, then -. . . - sh e wo uld

n’ t ha ve the se dama g e s. ” ). Pla int if f’ s atte mpt

to s tr e tc h th is t e sti mony

to s up po rt

a fi nd ingthat th e sp e c if

ic pla c e of

se ttl e me nt, a s in dic ate d o n th e HU D- 1, dama g e d Pl a int if f i s without merit. 24 of business, which wa s located in Anna dale, Vir g inia. Br ickshire’ s [178] Stmt . ¶¶ 6- 7; Pl.’s [197] Resp. ¶¶ 6- 7. Br ickshire indicates that it is it s prac tice to place its address as the place of settlement, reg ardle ss of wher e the a ctually closing documents we re sig ned, since that is where the file is maintained. B rickshire ’s [178] Stmt . ¶ 10; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 10. In addition, Plaintiff’s mortg ag e broke r expert, Gar y Schiller, testified at de position t hat the ac tual place of settlement, as listed on the HUD -1, is “without conseque nce.” Br ickshire’ s [178] Stmt . ¶11; Br ickshire’ s [178] MSJ , Ex . D (Excerpts of O ct. 31, 2008 Deposition of Ga ry Schiller) (“ Schiller Dep.” ) at 107:18-109:13. 14 The HU D-1 a lso indicated at line 104 that ther e wa s an esc row amount of $60,966.04. B ri c ks hir e ’s [178 ] Stmt. ¶ 1 2; P l.’ s [19 7] Re sp . ¶ 12 . T he pa

rt ie s a g re e that th is i nd ic atio n w a s in
err or and that those monies were never withheld. Br ickshire’ s [178] Stmt . ¶ 13; Pl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 13. Plaintiff’s re al estate settlement expert, Har vey J acobs, a dmitted at deposition that thi s ty pePlaintiff’s response to Bric kshire’s state ment ¶ 14 is non-re sponsive and does not 15 c on tr a dic t or

oth e rw ise dis pute B ri c ks hir e ’s a sse rt ion that th is t y pe of e rr or did no t r e su lt i n damag e to Plaintiff. SeePl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶ 14 ( “Plaintiff’s re al estate settlement attorney expert, attorney

Har vey J acobs, te stified that disclosures ar e the ke y issue with reg ard to a

HUD1.”). Although Plaintiff c ontinues to argue that the F MV L oan is in rea lity an unlawf

ul 16 c omm e rc ia l lo an, sh e do e s n ot d isp ute that B ri c ks hir e ha s p re vio us ly wo rk e d w ithF MV I L A o nly in association with commerc ial loans and that the loa n documents indicate on their fa ce that the FMV L oan is commerc ial in nature. SeePl.’s [ 197] R esp. ¶¶ 16, 17. 25 of er ror is only

a “sc rivene r’s e rror ” and w ould not result in harm to Plainti ff. B rickshire ’s [178] Stmt . ¶ 14; Br ickshire’ s [178] MSJ , Ex . F ( Ex cer pts of Oct. 27, 2008 De position of Harve y J acobs) (“Jacobs De p.) at 196-20- 197:5. 15 Br ickshire indicates that it has previously serve d as a se ttlement ag ent for D efe ndant FMVI L A and that, in that ca pacity , it has worked only on commerc ial loans. Br ickshire’ s [178] Stmt . ¶ 16. B rickshire further indicates that Dunc an has a lway s acte d as F MVI L A’s conta ct person f or commer cial loans. Id. Finally , all loan documents pre pare d by Dunca n and provide d to Bric kshire re fer

red to the F MV L oan as a commerc ial loan, and ther e wa s no indication on the fac e of the loan documents provide d to Bric kshire that the F MV L oan wa s consumer in na ture. Id. ¶ 17. 16 Ba sed on these undisputed f acts, B rickshire contends that it is entitled to summ ary judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s CPP A claim. The Court turns first to Pl aintiff’s a lleg ation that B ri c ks hir e vio late d p ara g ra ph s ( e ) a nd (f ) o f s e c tio n 3 90 4 “ by

fr a ud ule ntl y dis g uis ingthe loa

n to Mary J uerg ens as a

commerc ial loan rather than, what was in re ality , a per sonal consumer residential loan in or der to c harg e Mar y J uerg ens a hig her r ate of interest and to c ircumvent District of Columbia mortga g e, consume r and f air lendinglaws.” F ourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 487-88.26

Br ickshire c ontends that Plaintiff’s claim must fail bec ause the re is no evide nce that Bric kshire kn e w that th e F MVL oa

n w a s any thi ngoth e r t

ha n a c omm e rc ia l lo an, a s a ll l oa n d oc ume nts indicate that the loa

n is a commerc ial in nature. The Court ag ree s. Even a ssuming, as Plaintiff urg es, that the F MV L oan is ac tually a per sonal loan improperly

disguised a s a commer cial tra nsaction, there is no direct or c ircumstantial evidenc e on the pre sent rec ord to sug g est that Br ickshire kne w or ha d rea son to know that the FMV L oan wa s any thing but a c ommercia l loan. As indicated a bove, the undisputed fa cts on the pre sent rec ord indicate that B rickshire had no role in the orig ination of the F MV L oan, in the cr eation of the L L C, in determining the rate of intere st Pl aintiff wa s char g ed, or in the pr epar ation of any of the FMV L oan docume nts (other than the HUD- 1). Nor ha s Plainti ff pr offe red a ny evidenc e that B ri c ks hir e c ir c umv e nte d D istri c t of Col umb ia

mor tg a g e , c on sume r o r f

a ir le nd inglaws in relation to the FMV L oan tra nsaction. Rather , in this case, the r ecor d demonstrates that Br ickshire’ s role wa s limi ted to order ing the title searc h, obtaining the title insurance, pr epar ing the UTS L oan re lease , disbursing c erta in monies rece ived af ter settlement a

nd — as is of pa rt ic ula r r e le va nc e to t he pa rt ie s’ argume nts — p re pa ri ngthe HU D- 1, wh ic h B ri c ks hir e did wi th information provided by

Dunca n. Notwithstanding the materia l dispute conce rningthe true
natur e of the F MVL oa

n, it i s unc on tr ov e rt e d th at th e F MVL oa n d oc ume nts pr ov ide d to Br ickshire indicated on their fa ce that the FMV L oan wa s commerc ial in nature. In addition, Br ickshire ha d previously serve d as a se ttlement ag ent for D efe ndant FMV I L A on commer cial loans only

and had a lway s understood that Dunc an wa s FMVI L A’s conta ct per son for
c omm e rc ia l lo ans . Pl a int if f h e rs e lf ha s n ot d ir e c te d th e Court to a ny e vid e nc e oth e rw ise sug g esting that Br ickshire wa s awa re of the alleg edly

persona l nature of

the FMVL oan.27

Ac c or din g ly , th e Court

fi nd s th at Pla int if

f h a s f a ile d to pr of

fe r a ny fa c t f ro m w hic h a

re a so na ble jury could conc lude that B rickshire “fr audulently disguis[ed]” the FMV L oan as a commerc ial loan “in orde r to cha

rg e Mar y J uerg ens a hig her r ate of interest and to c ircumvent District of Col umb ia mor tg a g e , c on sume r a

nd fa ir le nd inglaws ,” a s sh e c la ims
. The Court turns next to P laintiff’s alleg ation that Br ickshire violated pa ragraphs ( e) a

nd (f) of sec tion 3904 “ by

providing Mary

J uerg ens with a fa lse, incomplete a nd dece ptive HUD- 1 settlement statement.” F ourth Am. Compl. ¶¶ 487-88. Section 3904(e ) and ( f) r equire that any misrepre sentations or omissions are “ materia l” in nature and have a tende ncy to misl ead. See D.C. Code § 28-3904(e ) (pr ohibits “misreprese nt[ ing] as to a mate rial fa ct which ha s a tende ncy to m isl e a d” ) a

nd (f ) (pr oh ibi ts the “ fa il[ure ] to s tate a mate ri a l f

a c t if su c h f a ilure te nd s to mislead”). B rickshire argues that “the err ors Plaintiff alleg es on the HU D-1 a re e ither not err ors
or ar e not mater ial,” and thus it is entitled to summ ary judgme nt on this allegation as well. See Br ickshire’ s [178] MSJ at 6. The Court a g ree s. Whil e the issue of

materia lity

is a g ener ally

question of fa ct for the jury , see G rayson AT& T Corp. , 9 80 A. 2d

11 37 , 1 15 7 ( D. C. 2 00 9) , s umm ary jud g me nt i s n on e the le ss a pp ro pr iate wher e, as he re, the plaintiff has fa iled to direct the Court to the e x istence of any fac ts from which
a re asonable jury

could find that the a lleg ed stateme nts or omissions wer e mater ial in nature. A s indicated a

bove, Plaintiff’s own e x perts testified that the two ide ntified “e rror s” on the HU D-1 — namely , the listed place of settlement and the escr ow amount set for th in line 104 — were , respe ctively , “without conseque nce” and re sulted in no harm to Plaintiff. See Schiller Dep. at 107:18-109:13 (testifying that the actua l place of settlement, as listed on the HUD -1, is “without conseque nce” ); J acobs D ep. at 196- 20-197:5 (testifying that mist aken listing of esc row amount28

was a “scr ivener ’s er

ror” that would not harm Plaintiff). Pla int if f h e rs e lf of fe rs no c ounte rv a ili nge vid e nc e fr om whic h a re a so na ble jur y c ou ld find that any

alleg ed misrepr esentations or omissi ons on the HUD- 1 wer e mater ial with a tendenc y to misl ead. I

ndeed, he r opposition briefingis devoid of any discussion reg arding materia lity

and is almost entirely

unresponsive to B rickshire ’s motion for summary judgme nt on this point
. Se e ge ne ra lly

Pl.’s [ 197] Opp’n. For e x ample, Plaintiff dedica tes the first thre e pag es of her opposition t o mere ly

repr oducing , in almost verbatim form, the a lleg ations from her Four th Amended Complaint in an appa rent e ffor t to demonstrate that the “ [C PPA] applies to the settlement of the loan at issue.” Id. at 8-10. B ut Bric kshire has not c ontested the a pplicability

of the CPP A to the FMVL oan, and Plaintiff’ s unsupported alleg ations have no w eig ht at summary jud g me nt. Simi larl y , Pl a int if f d e dic ate s se ve ra l pa g e s to arguin gthat B ri c ks hir e “ ha d th e duty to provide a HUD- 1 settlement statement to [P laintiff].” See id. at 11-13. B rickshire , howeve r, has not disputed that it was obligate d to provide an a ccur ate HU D-1, instead a ssertingonly that any alleg ed er rors we re not mate rial and that it therefor e ca nnot be held liable unde r the CPPA. F ina lly , Pl a int if

f a rg ue s th at sh e ha s p re se nte d s uf fi c ie nt f a c ts t o “ pr e se nt[] a

jur y qu e sti on a s to whether the Def endants [including B rickshire ] entered into a c onspiracy to defra ud [P laintiff] of the protec tions of RESP A and TI L A.” Id. at 16. B ut Plainti ff of fer s no expl anation as to why this argument is releva

nt to Brickshire ’s pendingmotion reg arding the lack of

materia lity

under the CPP A nor c an the Court itself divine any rele vance . Moreove r, while Plaintiff — in arguing that B ri c ks hir e vio late d th e Re a l E state Pr oc e dure s A c t of 19 74 (“ RES PA” ) a

nd the Tr uth in L endingAct (“ TI L A”) — repe ats her a lleg ations that Br ickshire a nd/or other De fenda

nts made various er rors in the HU D-1, she f

ails to offer

any supporting c itations to t he fa ctual re cord a nd29

makes no a

rgument that such alleg ed er rors, e ven if a ccur ately

descr ibed, ar e mater ial misrepre sentations or omissions with a tendency to misl ead. See id. at 13-16. The Court
re ite rate s th at Pla int if

f m ay no t c on tin

ue to r e ly on he r o wn un su pp or te d a lle g atio ns but mu st support her a

rguments on summary

judgme nt with specific c itations to t he re cord. This she ha s not done. Acc ording ly , there are no g enuine disputes of material fa ct on the pre sent rec ord and Br ickshire is entitled to summary judgme nt as a matter

of law w ith respec t to Pl aintiff’s alleg ations in Count XXXIthat Br ickshire violated se ctions 3904(e) and 2904(f ) of the CPPA. Br ickshire’ s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment on Count XXXIis theref ore GRANTED insofa

r as Plaintiff alleg es that B rickshire violated par ag raphs ( e) & (f) of sec tion 3904 “by fra udulently disguisingthe loan to Mary J uerg ens as a

commerc ial loan rather than, wh at w a s in

re a lity , a pe rs on a l c on sume r r e sid e nti a l lo an in or de r t o c ha

rg e Ma ry Juer g e ns a highe r r ate of

int e re st a nd to c ir c umv e nt D istri c t of Col umb ia

mor tg a g e , c on sume r a

nd fa ir lendinglaws.” Th e Court

no te s, ho we ve r, that th is d oe s n ot r e so lve in f ull Pla int if

f’ s a lle g atio ns a g a ins t Br ickshire a s set forth in Count XXXI of the F ourth Amende d Complaint. As indi cate d above, Plaintiff has alleg ed not only that Br ickshire violated pa ragraphs ( e) a

nd (f) of sec tion 3904, but that it also violated para g raph( z-1) of sec tion 3904. See Fo urt hAm
. C o mp l
. ¶ 4 8 9
. Al th o u gh B ri c ks hir e ha s p ur

po rt e dly mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to Count XXX Iin i ts entirety , its mot ion addre sses only Plaintiff’s alleg ations that it viol ated pa ragraphs ( e) a

nd (f) of section 2904 and f

ails to provide any

analy sis of Plainti ff’ s alleg ation that Br ickshire violated para g raph ( z-1) of sec tion 3904. Se e ge ne ra lly Br ickshire’ s [178] MSJ ; Bric kshire’s [215]30

Reply . Br ickshire ther efor e has not shown that it is entitled to summary judgme nt on Plainti ff’ s CPP A claim to the extent it is based on a lleg ed violations of sec tion 3904(z-1), and its [ 178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment on Count XXXIis theref ore D ENI ED insofar

as Plaintiff alleg es that B rickshire violated sec tion 3904(z-1) of the CPPA. IV . C ON CL USI ON For the re asons set for

th above, B rickshire ’s [177] Motion for Partial Summary Re g ard ingthe Ab se nc e of Da ma g e s to Pla int if

f f ro m th e L ate F ili ngof

Ce rt a in D oc ume nts wi th the District of Columbia Recorde r of De eds is GRANTED. I n addition, Bric kshire’s [178] Motion for Partial Summary J udg ment on Count XXXI- Violation of DC Code Section 28-3901, Et Seq. (Consumer Protection Proce dures Ac t) is GRANTED-I N-PART and DEN I ED-I

N-PART; specific ally , the motion is GRANTED insofar a s Plainti ff a lleg es that B rickshire violated para g raphs ( e) & (f) of sec tion 3904 of the CPP A, but is DENI ED insofar as Plaintiff alleg es that B ri c ks hir e vio late d s e c tio n 3 90 4( z-1 ) o f t he CPPA . A n a

pp ro pr iate Or de r a c c omp anie s th is Memorandum Opinion. Date: F ebrua

ry 12, 2010 /s/ CO LLEEN K OLLA R- K OTEL LY United States District J udg e