IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

December 13, 2016 Session

HERBERT S. MONCIER v. NINA HARRIS, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County

No. 190527-2 Clarence E. Pridemore, Jr., Chancellor

___________________________________

No. E2016-00209-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

This appeal involves a request for access to examine records under Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 10-7-505 in which the plaintiff sought the release of civil forfeiture 

documents from the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security. The trial 

court held that the plaintiff did not show sufficient cause for release of the sought after 

documents in a non-redacted format. We find that the issue has become moot owing to 

the legislative enactment of 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Chapter 722, § 5. Accordingly, we 

vacate the trial court’s judgment and dismiss this case. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Vacated; Case Dismissed

JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D.

SUSANO, JR., J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., joined.

Herbert S. Moncier, Knoxville, Tennessee, appellant pro se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General & Reporter, Andree S. Blumstein, 

Solicitor General, and Janet M. Kleinfelter, Deputy Attorney General, Nashville, 

Tennessee, for the appellees, Nina Harris, Joseph Bartlett, and William Gibbons.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff Herbert S. Moncier (“Attorney”) filed an official 

request with the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security’s (“TDOSHS”) 

03/10/2017
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Legal Division – East (“the Department”) to inspect any case files for which forfeiture 

warrants had been received since January 1, 2015. Attorney asserted this claim under 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-503 (2016), Tennessee’s Public Disclosure Act. 

Paragraph (a) of said section provides:

All state, county and municipal records . . . , except any 

public documents authorized to be destroyed by the county 

public records commission in accordance with § 10-7-404, 

shall at all times, during business hours, be open for personal 

inspection by any citizen of Tennessee, and those in charge of 

such records shall not refuse such right of inspection to any 

citizen, unless otherwise provided by state law.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a). Attorney contends that Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 40-33-204(g) holds that notice of seizures are public records. He asserts the trial 

court’s ruling addressed only forfeiture warrants.

Due to the large number of files pertaining to the request (1,790 total), the 

Department notified Attorney that they would send him the files in installments of fifty at 

a time. The Department complied by sending the first installment on August 10, 2015. On 

August 11, 2015, the Department’s staff attorney, Nina Harris, notified Attorney that 

address information had been removed from the notices of seizure and forfeiture warrants 

in compliance with Tennessee’s Uniform Motor Vehicle Record Disclosure Act 

(“UMVRDA”), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-25-101 to -112. 

Attorney expanded his request on August 17, 2015, asking for case-management sheets 

relating to each case file. The Department informed Attorney that this information was 

already included in the first installment and was to be included in future installments. The 

Department further explained that certain personal information, including addresses, 

would be redacted from all files sent to Attorney if it was obtained from motor-vehicle 

records under Tennessee’s UMVRDA and under the federal Driver Privacy Protection 

Act (“DPPA”), codified at 18 U.S.C. sections 2721 to –25. 

Under Tennessee Code Annotated sections 55-6-204(a), (b) and (e), the 

Department maintains copies of records of licenses, applications and denials for licenses, 

the names of licensees who had licenses suspended or revoked, and accident reports, 

court records for vehicle-related convictions and driver education completion certificates. 

In every application for a license, the applicant is required to submit personal information 

including full name, date of birth, country of residence, residence address and other 

information as required to determine eligibility. Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-321. The 

Department maintains a database within which the personal information of licenseholders and applicants is stored. Similarly, the Department of Revenue maintains a 

vehicle registration database in accordance with statutes concerning motor vehicle title 

and registration. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 55-1-101 to –110.
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Civil forfeiture proceedings under Tennessee law are governed by Tennessee Code 

Annotated sections 40-33-201 to –215. Officers are required to prepare and deliver a 

“Notice of Seizure” receipt to persons in possession of property that is seized. Tennessee 

Code Annotated section 40-33-203 requires a Notice of Seizure to include the following:

(1) A general description of the property seized and, if the 

property is money, the amount seized;

(2) The date the property was seized and the date the notice of 

seizure was given to the person in possession of the seized 

property;

(3) The vehicle identification number (VIN) if the property 

seized is a motor vehicle;

(4) The reason the seizing officer believes the property is 

subject to seizure and forfeiture;

(5) The procedure by which recovery of the property may be 

sought, including any time periods during which a claim for 

recovery must be submitted; and

(6) The consequences that will attach if no claim for recovery 

is filed within the applicable time period.

Notices of Seizures also include, by necessity, the addresses of the person whose property 

was seized. 

Officers are required to apply for a forfeiture warrant within five days of a seizure 

in which the owner was arrested. If the owner was not arrested, “the officer making the 

seizure shall present to the court, at the date and time specified on the notice of forfeiture 

warrant hearing, the application for a forfeiture warrant, the affidavit in support, the 

notice of seizure, and the notice of forfeiture warrant hearing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-

204(b)(3). If a forfeiture warrant is granted by the judge, then “within seven (7) working 

days, [the officer shall] send the warrant, a copy of the affidavit and the notice of seizure 

to the applicable agency.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-33-204(g). The case files requested by 

Attorney contain these Notices of Seizure, forfeiture warrants and other related 

documents.

Citizens may claim a right to property seized under Tennessee’s civil forfeiture 

statutes by filing a claim in writing requesting a hearing and providing the person’s 

interest in the property within thirty (30) days of receiving the forfeiture warrant. Tenn. 
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Code Ann. § 40-33-206(a). Attorney’s initial request to the Department appears to be in 

the interest of obtaining address information for persons whose property was seized in 

order to contact those persons regarding legal services to potentially regain the seized 

property.

The Department handles in excess of 10,000 civil forfeiture cases per year. These 

cases originate from more than six hundred law enforcement agencies in Tennessee. 

Often citizens subject to asset seizure are, understandably, unwilling to provide personal 

information, including addresses, date of birth and other information. In such situations, 

the officer conducting the seizure utilizes the person’s driver’s license or consults the 

Department’s database of motor vehicle records to acquire the information (address, date 

of birth, etc.). Similarly, when a person’s driver license is out of date, officers utilize the 

same database to fill in the gaps.

Similarly, seizing officers utilize the Department of Revenue’s vehicle registration 

database when seizing vehicles from persons who do not own the vehicle to be seized. 

Officers will search for the owners and personal information associated with the owner in 

the Department of Revenue’s vehicle registration database.

Because the Department does not track when officers utilize these databases to fill 

in the gaps, the Department cannot adequately determine whether personal information, 

including addresses, on Notice of Seizures and subsequent documents in the seizure 

process was acquired from motor-vehicle records databases. For this reason, the 

Department redacted all addresses in the files received by Attorney, including from the 

Notices of Seizure, believing the redactions were required by the UMVRDA and the 

DPPA.

Attorney filed a Complaint for Access to Examine Records on October 23, 2015 

pursuant to Tennessee’s Public Disclosure Act under Tennessee Code Annotated section 

10-7-505(a) against the Commissioner of the Department, Bill Gibbons, Harris, and 

Supervisor of the Department’s Legal Division in the Eastern Section, Joseph Bartlett 

(“Officials”). Attorney’s complaint first alleged Officials’ redactions pursuant to 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-25-104 violated Art. I, §19 (“right to examine 

clause”) and Art. XI, §16 (“Bill of Rights to remain inviolate”) of the Tennessee 

Constitution. The complaint further alleged the redactions were a “pretext” for denying 

Attorney access to Public Records under Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-

503(2)(A). 

In response to Attorney’s petition, the trial court issued a show cause order on 

November 3, 2015, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-505(b), ordering 

Officials to appear at a hearing on November 17, 2015. 

On November 8, 2015, Attorney served a subpoena on Harris demanding both her 
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appearance at the show cause hearing and the production of various documents. 

Puzzlingly, Attorney’s subpoena does not appear in the record. However, Officials filed a 

motion to quash on November 16, 2015, the day before the hearing. Their motion 

detailed that Attorney’s subpoena also demanded Harris’s presence and the production of 

additional documents, including internal manuals, memoranda, and operating procedures 

in addition to emails, faxes, letters and other modes of communication. Officials’ motion 

argued that the subpoena was improper because (1) the text and narrow procedural 

guidelines of the petition process under the Public Records Act (Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-

505(a)) prohibits the use of discovery tools such as subpoenas for show-cause hearings 

and (2) that case law interpreting the Public Records Act precludes using discovery 

methods in show-cause hearings generally, including subpoenas. 

On the same day, Officials also filed a response to the petition and a supporting 

affidavit from the Assistant General Counsel for the Department. The affidavit of 

Assistant General Counsel Lizabeth Hale broadly covered the practices and policies of 

the Department regarding disclosing personal information in vehicle databases and the 

Department’s communications with Attorney before the filing of the case before us. 

Officials’ response asserted that (1) the Department’s redactions were mandated by the 

UMVRDA, the DPPA, and by relevant state and Supreme Court precedent, (2) that 

neither the UMVRDA nor the DPPA violates the Tennessee Constitution because the 

right to access public records is not a constitutional right and may be limited by the 

General Assembly, and (3) that Tennessee’s civil forfeiture statutes do not require 

agencies to acquire addresses of owners of seized property to be obtained from public 

records, and (4) that Officials are entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.

On November 17, 2015, the date of the show-cause hearing, Harris did not appear 

at the hearing nor did she produce the documents requested in Attorney’s subpoena. The 

show-cause hearing occurred by proffers of exhibits. The trial court granted Officials’ 

motion to quash Attorney’s subpoena at the conclusion of the hearing without issuing a 

written opinion. Attorney filed a Rule 15 motion to amend his pleadings to ensure 

conformity to issues raised by Officials’ Response, exhibits proffered at the hearing and 

the arguments of the parties at the hearing. Officials did not object to Attorney’s Rule 15 

motion to incorporate the issues raised in the areas previously mentioned (in Officials’ 

initial Response and any evidence introduced at the show-cause hearing). Officials did 

object to Attorney’s attempts under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 10.04 to assert 

and attach evidence that was not raised in Official’s Response, was not raised at the 

hearing, and was not raised by the exhibits proffered at the hearing. On January 15, 2016, 

the court denied Attorney’s Motion to Amend without issuing an opinion. 

The court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Judgment on 

January 27, 2016, dismissing the petition with prejudice in favor of Officials. As to facts, 

it found that Attorney requested from the Department all forfeiture warrants from January 

1, 2015 onward. We assume the court meant, and the record clearly reflects, that Attorney
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requested entire case files, including forfeiture warrants and Notices of Seizure, in 

addition to other documents. 

As to law, the court held that Tennessee’s UMVRDA and the federal DPPA 

prohibit the Department from releasing addresses of individuals listed on forfeiture 

warrants (and we assume any other documents in the case files) that “may have” been 

obtained from either the Department’s motor vehicle database (and we assume the 

Department of Revenue’s database too). The court reasoned that the Department met its 

burden for showing cause in not releasing the information because there is “no 

discernible way” to determine whether addresses on forfeiture warrants (or any 

documents in the case files, we assume) were or were not obtained from either of the 

motor vehicle databases. As such, the court held that both the UMVRDA and DPPA 

prohibit the release of addresses without redaction.

The court further held that the UMVRDA does not violate Article I, section 19 of 

Tennessee’s constitution by prohibiting the release of personal information such as 

addresses on forfeiture warrants (and we assume other documents in the case files, such 

as notices of seizure). The court reasoned that we have previously held that no 

constitutional right to inspect public records exists. Further, the court relied on the same 

case law in Abernathy v. Whitley, 838 S.W.2d 211–14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) to reaffirm 

the principle that the legislature has the “power to create, limit, or abolish a right which is 

not conferred by the Constitution.” Attorney filed this timely appeal. 

III. ISSUES

We have consolidated the issues on appeal as follows:

1. Whether the enactment of 2016 Tenn. Pub Acts, Ch. 722 

has rendered this appeal moot?

2. Whether the trial court correctly held that Tennessee’s 

UMVRDA does not violate Art. I, § 19 of the Tennessee 

Constitution?

3. Whether the trial court properly held that Harris had met 

her burden of proof for the show cause order under Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 10-7-505?

4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

Harris’s motion to quash Attorney’s subpoena and in denying 

Attorney’s post-hearing motion for leave to amend his 

petition?
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A court’s findings of fact are reviewed de novo with a presumption of correctness, 

unless the evidence preponderates against it. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Determining 

whether the Tennessee Public Records Act applies to specific records in a party’s control 

is a question of law, and, as such, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo 

with no presumption of correctness. Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family 

Servs., Inc., 87 S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tenn. 2002). Determining whether a case is moot is also 

a question of law. Alliance for Native Am. Indian Rights in Tennessee, Inc. v. Nicely, 182 

S.W.3d 333, 338 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 

We review a motion to quash a subpoena under an abuse of discretion standard, 

examining whether the trial court “(1) applie[d] an incorrect legal standard, (2) reache[d] 

an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) base[d] its decision on a clearly erroneous 

assessment of the evidence.” State v. Mangrum, 403 S.W.3d 152, 166 (Tenn. 2013). 

Similarly, a trial court’s decision to deny a motion to amend pleadings may only be 

overturned upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Smith v. King’s Daughters and Sons 

Home, No. W2015–00435–COA–R3–CV, 2015 WL 8730834, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2015). 

IV. DISCUSSION

The first issue we will address is whether the matter before us has been rendered 

moot by a recent enactment of the Tennessee General Assembly. We hold that the case is

now moot, and, subsequently, the trial court’s order should be vacated.

Tennessee’s justiciability doctrines require that a case remain a live controversy 

from its infancy until its appellate conclusion. Cisneros v. Cisneros, No. M2013–00213–

COA–R3–CV, 2015 WL 7720274, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (citing Norma Faye Pyles 

Lynch Family Purpose LLC v. Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196, 203–04 (Tenn. 2009) 

(“Norma Faye”)). Whereas justiciability doctrines such as ripeness and standing focus on 

a suit’s birth, the focus in a mootness inquiry is on a suit’s death. Norma Faye, 301 

S.W.3d at 204 (citing 13B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.1, at 735–37). A case ceases to be justiciable and 

becomes moot “because of a court decision, the acts of the parties, or some other reason 

occurring after its commencement.” Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 204 (citing West v. 

Vought Aircraft Indus., Inc., 256 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tenn. 2008); McCanless v. Klein, 188 

S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tenn. 1945); McIntyre v. Traughber, 884 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1994)). Essentially, a case is moot if “it no longer serves as a means to provide 

some sort of judicial relief to the prevailing party.” Id. (citing Knott v. Stewart Cnty., 207 

S.W.2d 337, 338–39 (Tenn. 1948); Bell v. Todd, 206 S.W.3d 86, 96 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

2005); Massengill v. Massengill, 255 S.W.2d 1018, 1019 (Tenn. 1952)).
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The Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the mootness doctrine in Tennessee in 

Norma Faye, explaining that absent an explicit “constitutional imperative[,] . . . decisions 

to dismiss a case on the ground of mootness require the exercise of judgment based on 

the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id., 301 S.W.3d. at 204 (emphasis added). This 

requires a two-part inquiry: first, we examine as a matter of law whether the case has 

become moot owing to a “court decision, the acts of the parties, or some other reason 

occurring after its commencement.” Id. Second, if the controversy at issue is determined 

to be moot, we do not apply the doctrine “mechanically[,]” but, rather, we must examine 

whether the issue at controversy meets one or more of the circumstances for not invoking 

the mootness doctrine. Id. These circumstances, or factors, include: 

(1) when the issue is of great public importance or affects the 

administration of justice, (2) when the challenged conduct is 

capable of repetition and of such short duration that it will 

evade judicial review, (3) when the primary subject of the 

dispute has become moot but collateral consequences to one 

of the parties remain, and (4) when the defendant voluntarily 

stops engaging in the challenged conduct.

Id.

First, we examine whether this suit has become moot owing to the enactment of 

2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 722, section 5. Originating as House Bill 2052, 2015 Gen. 

Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2015), and signed into law on April 26, 2016 (effective July 

1, 2016), this enactment made several changes, inter alia, to Tennessee’s Public 

Disclosure Act codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-503 et seq. The 

change that Officials contend is dispositive is the addition of Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 10-7-504(a)(29) (other amendments to the statute have made the pertinent 

sections appear in (a)(29) rather than in (a)(28) as Officials contended in their brief). The 

amendment added the following provision at Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-

504(a)(29):

(29)(A) No governmental entity shall publicly disclose 

personally identifying information of any citizen of the state 

unless:

(i) Permission is given by the citizen;

(ii) Distribution is authorized under state or federal 

law; . . .

(C) For purposes of this subdivision (a)(29), 

“personally identifying information” means:

(i) Social security numbers;

(ii) Official state or government issued driver licenses 

or identification numbers;
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(iii) Alien registration numbers or passport numbers;

(iv) Employer or taxpayer identification numbers;

(v) Unique biometric data, such as fingerprints, voice 

prints, retina or iris images, or other unique physical 

representations; or

(vi) Unique electronic identification numbers, 

addresses, routing codes or other personal identifying data

which enables an individual to obtain merchandise or service 

or to otherwise financially encumber the legitimate possessor 

of the identifying data.

Id. (emphasis added). Officials contend that pursuant to this statutory provision, 

“addresses . . . or other personal identifying data” of citizens are confidential and not 

subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act, regardless of whether the address was 

obtained from or in connection with a motor vehicle record or from another source. 

Because the issue of mootness here “hinges upon principles of statutory 

construction,” whether Tennessee Code Annotated 10-7-504(a)(29)(C) prohibits 

disclosure of residential addresses, we must “ascertain and give effect to the legislative 

intent without unduly restricting or expanding [the] statute’s coverage beyond its 

intended scope.” Memphis Publ’g. Co. v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 87 

S.W.3d 67, 74 (Tenn. 2002). The statute prior to and after the 2016 amendment includes 

language that it “shall be broadly construed so as to give the fullest possible public access 

to public records.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(d) (2016). As such, “we interpret the 

terms of the Act liberally to enforce the public interest in open access to the records of 

state, county, and municipal governmental entities.” Memphis Publ’g., 87 S.W.3d at 74. 

Statutory construction requires the courts to “ascertain and to carry out the General 

Assembly’s intent.” Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 213 (citing Colonial Pipeline Co. v. 

Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 836 (Tenn. 2008)). The intent of a statute is often “reflected in 

the statute’s words, and, therefore, we must focus initially on the words of the statute.” 

Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 213. (citing Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 

S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn. 2008). “When the words of the statute are clear and 

unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute, but rather, we must simply enforce 

the statute as it is written.” Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 213 (citing Green v. Green, 293 

S.W.3d 493, 507 (Tenn.2009); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 277 

S.W.3d 381, 386 (Tenn.2009)).

Here, the amended statute prohibits the disclosure of “personally identifying 

information of any citizen of the state” which includes “addresses . . . or other personal 

identifying data which enables an individual to obtain merchandise or service or to 

otherwise financially encumber the legitimate possessor of the identifying data.” Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(29). The plain language of this statute is not ambiguous and 
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“does not require us to consult dictionaries or resort to canons of construction.” Norma 

Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 213. The statute prohibits the disclosure of certain information that 

the General Assembly believed could “financially encumber” the legitimate possessor of 

the identifying data,” and it clearly includes addresses. In common vernacular and 

understanding and in context of the subsection protecting personally identifying 

information, “addresses” clearly refers to the residential addresses of citizens of 

Tennessee.

The “common sense” reading of the preceding language suggests that the word 

“electronic” at the beginning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504(a)(29)(C) is 

only referring to identification numbers, and it is separated by two other words and a 

comma from the word “addresses.” See Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 213 (holding under a 

common sense reading that “[a] local government ‘exercises’ its eminent domain power 

when it files a complaint in court seeking to condemn private property. . . . [T]he plain, 

common sense interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 13–16–207(f) requires a local 

government to obtain the required certificate before filing its complaint.”). Therefore, the 

statute applies to citizens’ addresses in both paper and electronic formats.

The use of “addresses” in other parts of the original statute also include reference 

to “residential street addresses” and city, state and zip code, see Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 10-7-504(f)(1)(D), and also “home and work addresses[,]” see id. at 

section 10-7-504(j)(2). However, the 2016 amendment only uses the word “address” 

once, and it appears only in the dispositive section. See 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 722, § 

5. Further, the other sections of the original statute where the word “address” is utilized 

are generally in sub-sections that are self-limited to the subsection in which the word 

appears. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(15) to -(16).

Attorney, alternatively, argues that the language of Tennessee’s civil forfeiture 

statutes establish that the documents at issue here, Notices of Seizures and forfeiture 

warrants, are “public records” per Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-204(g). 

Attorney asserts that language trumps the 2016 amendment to the Public Records Act. 

Further, Attorney contends that the description of “personally identifying information” 

refers to electronic records, not the paper documents Attorney seeks in the form of Notice 

of Seizures and forfeiture warrants.

Examining the facts and circumstances presented here by the statutory addition, 

Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 204, we find Attorney’s first argument against mootness 

unpersuasive. Supporting the clear and unambiguous language of the statute to the 

contrary of Attorney’s position, the title of the amending legislation states it is an “Act to 

amend Tennessee Code Annotated . . . Title 10 . . . relative to protecting personally 

identifying information in public records.” 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 722. (emphasis 

added). As such, the legislative history reflects that the purpose of the amendment was to 

protect certain personally identifying information that the General Assembly believed 
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needed protecting, such as the information listed under Tennessee Code Annotated 

section 10-7-504(a)(29)(C). This enactment was carried out because potentially 

personally identifying information is located in public records.

Further, Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504(a)(29) is a completely new 

addition that brought entirely new categories of personal information under a confidential 

umbrella, supporting the legislature’s intent to limit the Public Disclosure Act. See Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 10-7-504(a)(29). Further, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-33-

203(g)’s defining of certain documents as “public records” does not support Attorney’s 

assertion that such a definition is an “authoriz[ation] under state or federal law” that 

would permit the release of information under Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-

504(a)(29). As noted above, the purpose of the recent amendment to the Public 

Disclosure Act was to protect personal information that existed in public records. This 

support is bolstered by the inclusion of redaction language for confidential information in 

other parts of the bill. See 2016 Tenn. Pub. Acts, Ch. 722, § 2 (codified at Tennessee 

Code Annotated § 10-7-503(a)(5) (“Information made confidential by state law shall be 

redacted whenever possible, and the redacted record shall be made available for 

inspection and copying.”)).

Second, Attorney’s argument that “personally identifying information” listed in 

Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504(a)(29)(C)(vi) refers only to electronic 

documents and not the paper documents he seeks is without merit. Under that rationale, 

paper documents with the very same information (routing codes, unique electronic 

identification numbers and other data that could financially harm the legitimate owner) 

would be disclosable, to the detriment of citizens everywhere. Such a construction cannot 

stand. See Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 204.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the enactment of Chapter 722 amending 

the Public Records Act is “some other reason occurring after [this lawsuit’s] 

commencement” that renders this appeal moot owing to the General Assembly’s explicit 

statutory prohibition on publicly disclosing citizens’ addresses, specifically, here relating 

to Notices of Seizures, forfeiture warrants and related documents in the Department’s 

case files. Norma Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 204. 

Officials contend that the 2016 statutory amendment, specifically Tennessee Code 

Annotated section 10-7-504(a)(29)(A) and (C)(vi), prohibits Public Disclosure Act 

releases of any addresses of any citizens of the state, regardless of whether the addresses 

were obtained from motor vehicle databases. We do not address that broad issue here. 

Our holding is narrowly applicable to the documents in question: Notices of Seizure, 

forfeiture warrants, and other documents held by the Department in civil forfeiture case 

files requested by Attorney. 

Next, we turn to whether any of the Norma Faye factors are applicable and 
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whether this appeal should progress notwithstanding our finding of mootness. Norma 

Faye, 301 S.W.3d at 204. Attorney asserts all four factors apply in this situation. We 

disagree. 

First, the challenged conduct, redacting addresses, is now explicitly permitted by 

statute, and, as such, it is statutorily required conduct rather than “capable of repetition 

and of such short duration that it will evade judicial review.” Id. at 204. Second, the only 

“collateral consequences” that remain are Attorney’s inability to obtain addresses and, 

subsequently, mail advertisements to potential clients who have had property seized 

under civil forfeiture statutes. Id. Attorney still maintains the ability to advertise his 

services through numerous other likely more effective methods and means, including 

print, television, radio, and internet advertising. Third, Officials have not voluntarily 

ceased engaging in the conduct and are now required to redact addresses under the 2016 

amendment, so that factor is irrelevant.

Threshold considerations must be analyzed with regards to the fourth factor, when 

the “issue is of great public importance or affects the administration of justice,” 

including:

(1) the public interest exception should not be invoked in 

cases affecting only private rights and claims personal to the 

parties; (2) the public interest exception should be invoked 

only with regard to “issues of great importance to the public 

and the administration of justice”; (3) the public interest 

exception should not be invoked if the issue is unlikely to 

arise in the future; and (4) the public interest exception should 

not be invoked if the record is inadequate or if the issue has 

not been effectively addressed in the earlier proceedings.

Id. at 210–11. If the case before us fails to meet any of these considerations, the public 

interest exception will not apply. Id.

First, this case fails to meet the first threshold because it only affects the private 

rights of Attorney, a private citizen, seeking addresses from the Department for the 

purpose of soliciting clients for his law practice. Second, the General Assembly has 

clearly stated its public policy preference in the interest of protecting personally 

identifying information in public records, such as addresses, by passing Chapter 722 and 

amending Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-504. As such, the divulging of 

personally identifying information per Attorney’s request runs contrary to being an issue 

of “great importance to the public and the administration of justice.” Id. Third, the issue 

cannot be re-litigated in the future because Chapter 722 has ratified and authorized the 

Department’s redaction of addresses, effectively eliminating the chance of future 

litigation over the issue. 
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As to the fourth factor, even if it has merit, the failure to meet the first three 

factors precludes the issue and requires us to hold that the public interest exception to the 

mootness doctrine is inapplicable in the instant case. Therefore, none of the Norma Faye

factors apply in the instant case and this appeal is moot. The other issues raised are 

hereby pretermitted due to our finding of mootness.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that this appeal has become moot and the 

judgment of the trial court is vacated and this case is dismissed. Costs of this appeal are 

taxed to Appellant, Herbert S. Moncier.

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JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JUDGE