Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

MARK SMALL GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

JAMES B. MARTIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DAWN M. BAILEY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 84A01-1308-CR-346

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE VIGO SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable John T. Roach, Judge

Cause Nos. 84D01-0911-FC-3456 and 84D01-0911-FC-3532

January 29, 2014

MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION

BAKER, Judge 
2

Appellant-defendant Dawn Bailey appeals the trial court’s revocation of her 

probation and contends that the trial court erred when it reinstated the remainder of her 

suspended sentences. More particularly, Bailey argues that, even though she pleaded 

guilty to violating several conditions of her probation, the trial court should not have 

reinstated the remaining four years of her sentences. In light of Bailey’s complete failure 

to adhere to the requirements of her probation, we cannot say that the trial court erred in 

revoking her probation or in ordering her to serve the reminder of her originallysuspended sentences. 

FACTS

On September 15, 2011, Bailey, pursuant to a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to 

two counts of class C felony forgery and three counts of class D felony theft. Bailey 

received a sentence of four years on each of the forgery counts and two years on each of 

the theft counts. Each of the sentences were to run concurrently, for an aggregate 

sentence of four years. The trial court ordered that two years of Bailey’s sentences be 

executed and two years be suspended and that she spend two years on formal probation. 

Also on September 15, 2011, in a second cause, Bailey pleaded guilty to class C

felony forgery and was sentenced to four years, with two of those years executed, two 

suspended, and two years served on formal probation. When combined, the two 

sentences amounted to four years executed, four years suspended, and four years on 

formal probation. 
3

Following Bailey’s release from the Department of Correction, a notice of 

probation violation was filed on April 24, 2013. The notice alleged that Bailey had not 

notified the probation office of her change of address, that her whereabouts were 

unknown, and that she had failed to report for a drug screen. On April 25, 2013, a 

warrant was issued for Bailey’s arrest. On May 3, 2013, Bailey once again failed to 

report to her probation officer. On July 9, 2013, Bailey pleaded guilty to violating her 

probation in both causes, and, on July 17, 2013, the trial court revoked Bailey’s 

probation. After examining Bailey’s file, the trial court determined that she should serve 

the remainder of her suspended sentences, a total of four years. 

Bailey now appeals.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

The decision to revoke probation is within the sole discretion of the trial court. 

Reyes v. State, 868 N.E.2d 438, 440 (Ind. 2007). On appeal, we review that decision for 

an abuse of discretion. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). We consider 

only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing the evidence or 

judging the credibility of the witnesses. Id. If we find there is substantial evidence of 

probative value to support the trial court’s decision that a defendant violated the terms of 

her probation, this Court will affirm the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. Id. at 

639-40.

Here, Bailey pleaded guilty to violating the terms of her probation. Appellant’s 

App. p. 19-20. Her probation was predicated on her ability to fulfill certain requirements, 
4

namely reporting to her probation officer and participating in drug screens. Id. at 39. In 

light of Bailey’s failure to comply with these requirements or even inform the probation 

office of her whereabouts, the trial court properly concluded that she was incapable of or 

refused to adhere to the conditions of her probation. Id. Additionally, while Bailey 

argues that the trial court revoked her probation without adequate information, we do not 

find this argument convincing because the record demonstrates that the trial court had 

examined Bailey’s files several times before her hearing and Bailey had pleaded guilty to 

the alleged violations. Tr. p. 1-2; Appellant’s App. 19-20. Considering Bailey’s 

disregard of her probation requirements, the trial court was well within its discretion in 

ordering Bailey to serve the remainder of her sentences.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

NAJAM, J., and CRONE, J., concur.