Filed 11/15/23 Rome & Associates v. Moi CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

ROME & ASSOCIATES, A.P.C., et 

al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

PATRIZIO MOI,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B322725

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 22STCP00648)

 

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Jeff Mann and Jeff A. Mann for Defendant

and Appellant.

Rome, Eugene Rome, Brianna Dahlberg, and Andrew 

Keyes for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

_________________________________________________
2

Patrizio Moi appeals from a judgment confirming an 

arbitration award, contending the petition to confirm the award 

was premature and his motion to quash notice of the petition and 

his own petition to vacate the award were erroneously denied. 

We disagree with each contention, and therefore affirm the 

judgment.

BACKGROUND

A. Agreement

In 2019, Moi, Jabari McDavid and Jabari’s Inc. (the Jabari 

parties will be referred to as “Jabari”; Moi and Jabari are 

collectively the “Clients”) entered into a legal representation 

agreement with Rome & Associates, A.P.C. (the Firm) to 

represent them in a lawsuit. 

The agreement provided, “The Clients agree to pay [the 

Firm] on an hourly basis for services rendered.” “With respect to 

the fee allocation between Moi . . . and [Jabari],” the agreement 

provided that “the Clients agree that all work will be performed 

for both sets of Clients. Consequently, it is anticipated that [fees 

and expenses] will be split on a 50/50 basis between Moi and 

[Jabari] . . . . However, in the more rare situation where a 

litigation event concerns only one party, e.g.[,] a Motion for 

Summary Judgment as to Moi’s claims only, then, in that 

situation and in the good faith determination by [the Firm], the 

entirety of fees incurred in connection with that event shall be 

apportioned to the concerned party . . . .” 

The agreement provided that any dispute between the 

parties would be resolved by binding arbitration. 
3

B. Arbitration

1. Arbitration Proceedings

After the representation ended, Moi commenced an 

arbitration proceeding before the Los Angeles County Bar 

Association (LACBA), seeking recovery of certain attorneys’ fees 

and costs from Eugene Rome, the Firm’s principal, that had been 

billed by the Firm. 

The Firm counterclaimed against Moi and Jabari for 

recovery of unpaid fees and costs, alleging claims for breach of 

written contract, open book account, and quantum meruit. Moi, 

Jabari, Rome, and the Firm all agreed to binding arbitration. 

Shortly before arbitration, the Firm disclaimed any 

recovery against Jabari. 

The arbitration was held on November 16, 2021. 

The Firm claimed it billed the Clients $203,891.83, for 

which they were jointly and severally liable, but Moi paid only 

$85,925 and owed the balance of $117,966.83.

Moi claimed that all fees were to be split 50-50 between 

him and Jabari. He also claimed the Firm’s billing was excessive, 

and he should have been billed only $70,907 and was owed the 

$15,018 he overpaid.

The primary issue was whether Moi was obligated to pay 

100 percent or only 50 percent of the fees owed to the Firm.

The arbitration panel found that the Firm should have 

charged only $191,367.83, which should have been paid half by 

Moi and half by Jabari. Moi had already paid $85,975, leaving a 
4

balance of $105,392.83 owing. The panel determined that Moi 

owed 50 percent of this balance, or $52,696.42.

1

The panel credited Moi for half of a $8,259.78 filing fee it 

thought he had paid, $4,129.89, resulting in an award of 

$48,566.53, payable solely by Moi. 

On January 5, 2022, the LACBA issued an award in the 

amount of $48,566.53, payable solely by Moi.

On January 19, the LACBA issued and served by mail a 

corrected award in the amount of $50,196.42, payable only by 

Moi. 

2. Post-Arbitration Emails

After service of the original award, Moi initiated an email 

exchange with the arbitration panel. We take the following facts 

from Moi’s motion to admit those emails into evidence on appeal, 

post.

On January 14, 2022, Moi emailed the arbitration panel, 

with copies to other interested parties, requesting that the award 

be amended to reflect Jabari’s indebtedness to the Firm. He 

argued that the panel’s determination that Jabari owed half of 

the Firm’s fees should apply not only to the balance owing but 

also to the $85,975 Moi had already paid, which should reduce 

the award against Moi by half of that amount, $42,987.50.

Also in the email, Moi informed the panel that he paid 

$5,000 for the filing fee, not $8,259.78. 

1 We note the seeming divergence between the panel’s 

findings—that Moi and Jabari were each responsible for half of 

the Firm’s fees—and its award, which essentially disregarded 

Moi’s prior payment. In emails we discuss below, Moi complained 

to the panel that the award effectively assessed him 72 percent of 

the fees. The panel twice reaffirmed its calculation.
5

On January 17, 2022, the arbitration panel emailed the 

parties indicating it had considered Moi’s January 14 email and 

reviewed the reward. After review, the panel left the allocation 

in place but reduced Moi’s filing fee credit from $4,129.89 to 

$2,500 to reflect that Moi paid only a $5,000 filing fee, not 

$8,259.78. (This occasioned the increased award, ante.)

On February 18, 2022, Moi emailed Eugene Rome, with 

copies to the panel, arguing Jabari’s 50 percent responsibility for 

the Firm’s fees “applied from the date of the retainer 

agreement . . . not from the date of the fee dispute.” He also 

argued the award should be against Moi Productions, Inc., which 

had contracted with the firm, not against Moi himself.

On February 22, 2022, the panel, responding to Moi’s 

February 18 email, found there was no miscalculation in the 

award and stated there should be no further contact between the 

parties and the panel. 

C. Litigation

1. The Firm’s Petition to Confirm and Judgment

On February 24, 2022, the Firm filed a petition to confirm 

the award in the Los Angeles County Superior Court. 

The Firm served the petition on Moi through his attorney, 

Brian Trinidad, and sent a courtesy copy of it to Trinidad himself. 

Trinidad informed the Firm that he no longer represented Moi “in 

reference to the petition to confirm fee award.”

Moi filed no opposition to the Firm’s petition to confirm the 

arbitration award but on March 29, 2022, filed by special 

appearance a “Motion to Quash Alleged Service of Notice of 

Petition,” arguing service via Trinidad was improper because he 

had retained Trinidad only for limited purposes and had not 

authorized him to accept service of the Firm’s petition.
6

The hearing on the Firm’s petition to confirm the award

and Moi’s motion to quash was held on June 2, 2022. The minute 

order reflects Moi’s “appearance” by attorney Michael Sayer. 

After the hearing, the trial court “overruled” Moi’s motion to 

quash and granted the Firm’s petition to confirm the award. The 

hearing was not transcribed and no settled statement was 

requested or prepared.

Later in the evening on June 2, 2022, Moi filed a petition to 

correct the arbitration award. 

On June 9, 2022, the court entered judgment in the amount 

of $50,196.42 in favor of the Firm and against Moi, with interest 

at 10 percent per year from January 17, 2022. 

2. Post-Judgment Proceedings

On June 16, 2022, Moi filed an ex parte application to stay 

enforcement of the judgment pending the hearing on Moi’s 

petition to correct the award. The trial court denied the 

application on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over 

the matter.

On August 4, 2022, Moi’s June 2 petition to correct the 

arbitration award came on for hearing. Finding it lacked 

jurisdiction to hear the petition after judgment had been entered, 

the court denied the petition. The hearing was not transcribed 

but a settled statement was prepared. 

Moi appeals. 
7

DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of the Firm’s Petition

1. Moi Forfeited any Claim that the Firm’s 

Petition was Untimely by Failing to Object on this 

Ground Below

Moi contends the trial court erred in entertaining the 

Firm’s petition (filed February 24, 2022) to confirm the 

arbitration award because it was filed too soon after the 

arbitration panel’s February 22, 2022 response to his second 

email. We reject the contention.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1285, any party 

to an arbitration in which an award has been made may petition 

the court to “confirm, correct or vacate the award.”2 “Once a 

petition to confirm an award is filed, the superior court must 

select one of only four courses of action: It may confirm the 

award, correct and confirm it, vacate it, or dismiss the petition.” 

(EHM Productions, Inc. v. Starline Tours of Hollywood, Inc.

(2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1058, 1063 (EHM).) “ ‘[I]t is the general 

rule that, with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator’s decision cannot 

be reviewed for errors of fact or law.’ [Citation.] Under section 

1286.2, the court may vacate the award only under ‘ “very limited 

circumstances.” ’ [Citation.] Neither the trial court, nor the 

appellate court, may ‘review the merits of the dispute, the 

sufficiency of the evidence, or the arbitrator’s reasoning, nor may 

we correct or review an award because of an arbitrator’s legal or 

factual error, even if it appears on the award’s face. Instead, we 

2 Undesignated statutory references will be to the Code of 

Civil Procedure.
8

restrict our review to whether the award should be vacated under 

the grounds listed in section 1286.2.” (Id. at pp. 1063-1064.)

We review confirmation of an arbitration award de novo.

(Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 362, 

376, fn. 9.) “If the trial court’s ruling relies on a determination of 

disputed factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test on 

those particular issues. [Citation.] Where error is shown, this 

court may not set aside the order unless the error prejudiced the 

appellant. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)” 

(EHM, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 1063.)

Here, Moi never objected to the trial court that the Firm’s

petition to confirm the arbitration award was premature. He 

therefore forfeited his right to raise this challenge on appeal. 

(See In re Carrie W. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 746, 755 [“An 

appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or 

erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses 

asserted, where an objection could have been but was not 

presented to the [trial] court by some appropriate method”].)

2. The Firm’s Petition was Timely

On the merits, the Firm’s petition was timely.

Section 1288.4 provides that no petition to confirm, correct 

or vacate an arbitration award “may be served and filed . . . until 

at least 10 days after service of the signed copy of the award upon 

the petitioner.”

“If an application is made to the arbitrators for correction of 

the award, the date of the service of the award . . . shall be 

deemed to be” 30 days after service of the award or the date of 

service of a correction of the award or denial of the application, 

whichever is earlier. (§ 1288.8.)
9

Here, the corrected arbitration award was served on 

January 19, 2022. The Firm filed its petition to confirm the 

award on February 24, 2022, more than 10 days later. Therefore, 

the petition was timely.

Moi claims that his emails of January 14 and February 18, 

2022, constituted applications for correction of the award, which 

under section 1288.8 triggered new dates for service of the award. 

Therefore, he argues, section 1288.4 prevented the Firm from 

filing a petition to confirm the award until ten days after the 

panel’s February 22 response to his February 18 email. We 

disagree.

First, the emails upon which Moi relies were not presented 

to the trial court and are not the record on appeal. Moi offers the 

emails for the first time in a request for judicial notice on appeal 

and a motion for leave to produce documentary evidence on 

appeal. We deny the request and motion.3

3 Moi requests that we take judicial notice, augment the 

record, or make a factual determination under section 909, so 

that the record in these proceedings will include the emails he 

exchanged with the arbitration panel but not presented to the 

trial court, in order to demonstrate that the Firm’s petition to 

confirm the arbitration award was premature. “Augmentation 

does not function to supplement the record with materials not 

before the trial court. [Citations.] Reviewing courts generally do 

not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial 

court. Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the correctness of a trial 

court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only matters 

which were part of the record at the time the judgment was 

entered.’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 

Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.)

No exceptional circumstances exist that would justify 

deviating from that rule, either by taking judicial notice or 
10

Even were we to consider Moi’s post-award email exchange 

with the panel, and even assuming his emails of January 14 and 

February 18 constituted applications to correct the award and 

triggered a new date for service of the award under section 

1288.8, Moi suffered no prejudice. 

Moi’s second application to correct the award was 

substantially the same as his first. In the first, he argued that 

the panel’s determination that Jabari owed half of the Firm’s fees 

should apply not only to the balance owing but also to the amount 

Moi had already paid, which should reduce the award against 

Moi by half of the amount he paid. In the second email, Moi 

argued that Jabari’s 50 percent liability for the Firm’s fees should 

be applied from the time of the retainer agreement, not the time 

of the fee dispute.

The Panel ruled on Moi’s first application to correct the 

award on January 17, 2022, correcting the award upward. The 

Firm complied with section 1288.4 by filing its petition to confirm 

the award more than ten days after this ruling.

The panel denied Moi’s second application to correct the 

award on February 22, 2022. 

The Firm filed its petition only two days later, on February 

24, but Moi’s second application to correct the award was 

substantially the same as the first, triggering no new date for 

service of the award under section 1288.8. In any event, the 

hearing on the petition did not occur until June 2, 2022, giving 

Moi time to prepare an opposition. Moi filed no opposition. 

exercising the power to take evidence under section 909. The 

request and motion are denied.
11

Moi offers no explanation how the Firm waiting an 

additional eight days, until March 4, 2022, before filing its 

petition would have made any difference. He does not claim, for 

example, that he had insufficient notice or time to understand 

the implications of the award and formulate a challenge to it, 

either to oppose the petition or to file his own petition to vacate 

the award.

Because Moi was not prejudiced by the alleged error, the 

trial court’s order may not be reversed. (See EHM, supra, 21 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1063.)

Moi argues he need not show prejudice because the court’s 

error was structural and jurisdictional, i.e., the trial court lacked 

jurisdiction to rule upon the Firm’s petition because it was 

premature. Moi offers no legal authority in support of the 

proposition that the 10-day waiting period of section 1288.4 is 

jurisdictional. He has therefore forfeited the argument.

In any event, the 10-day waiting period of section 1288.4 is 

not jurisdictional. 

“[W]e apply a ‘presumption that statutes do not limit the 

courts’ fundamental jurisdiction absent a clear indication of 

legislative intent to do so.’ [Citations.] This approach reflects ‘ “a 

preference for the resolution of litigation and the underlying 

conflicts on their merits by the judiciary.” ’ [Citations.] To be 

sure, mandatory procedural rules—like many statutes of 

limitations or other filing deadlines—serve important policy 

goals, and courts must enforce them when properly raised. 

[Citation.] But we will not assume that the Legislature intended 

to imbue a time bar with jurisdictional consequences merely 

because the statute speaks in mandatory terms; as we have said, 

‘jurisdictional rules are mandatory, but mandatory rules are not 
12

necessarily jurisdictional.’ [Citations.] To establish that a 

particular filing deadline is jurisdictional, more is required. 

Much as the high court has said of Congress, our Legislature 

‘must do something special, beyond setting an exception-free

deadline, to tag a statute of limitations as jurisdictional’ in the 

fundamental sense.” (Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 932, 950 [holding that the timing mandate of section 

1288.2 is not jurisdictional].) 

For example, section 1288.2, which prescribes the time 

limit for responding to a petition to confirm an arbitration award, 

“speaks only to obligations of the litigants and makes no 

reference at all to the power of the courts—in other words, the 

section reads as an ordinary statute of limitations,” not a 

jurisdictional prescription. (Law Finance Group, LLC v. Key, 

supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 950.) Sections 1288.2 and 1288.4 both 

appear in Article 2 (“Limitations of Time”) of Chapter 4 

(“Enforcement of the Award”) of the California Arbitration Act. 

Our Supreme Court’s holding that the limitation prescribed in 

the former is not jurisdictional applies equally to that prescribed 

in the latter.

B. Moi Fails to Show the Court Erred in Denying his 

Motion to Quash

Moi argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion to 

quash service of the Firm’s petition because it was served only on 

Trinidad, who although engaged by Moi for the arbitration had 

no authority to receive the petition on Moi’s behalf. We disagree.

Service of a petition to confirm an arbitration award is “in 

the manner provided in the arbitration agreement for the service 

of such petition and notice” or, “[i]f the arbitration agreement 

does not provide the manner in which such service shall be made
13

. . . [,] [¶] . . . Service within this State shall be made in the 

manner provided by law for the service of summons in an action.” 

(§ 1290.4.) Sections 415.10 and 415.40 require that “a copy of the 

summons and of the complaint [is sent] to the person to be 

served.” In a proceeding to confirm or vacate an arbitration 

award, service on the attorney who may have represented a party 

in arbitration but was not authorized to accept service in court 

proceedings is insufficient. (Mercuri v. Ligar (1964) 225 

Cal.App.2d 240, 241.)

But “[a] general appearance operates as a consent to 

jurisdiction of the person, dispensing with the requirement of 

service of process, and curing defects in service.” “A general 

appearance occurs when the defendant takes part in the action or 

in some manner recognizes the authority of the court to proceed.” 

(Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 52.) This rule 

“applies to one who appears in a lawsuit after defective service of 

process upon him . . . .” (De Luca v. Board of Supervisors (1955) 

134 Cal.App.2d 606, 609.) A party who appears and argues at a 

hearing, never requests a continuance of the hearing, and never 

claims prejudice by reason of insufficient notice or service is 

deemed to have waived any claim of inadequate service or notice 

assuming. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 697-698.)

Here, because the joint hearing on the Firm’s petition to 

confirm the award and Moi’s motion to quash was not 

transcribed, and no settled statement was requested, Moi 

provides no adequate record to affirmatively show error. (See In 

re Marriage of Deal (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 613, 622 [“Under wellestablished rules of appellate procedure, . . . the appellant . . . has 

the burden to provide an adequate record on appeal and to 

affirmatively show error”]; see also Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. 
14

Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 [“ ‘Failure to 

provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be 

resolved against [the] appellant”].) We do not know, for example, 

that Moi’s counsel made only a special as opposed to general 

appearance at the June 2, 2022 hearing to contest the Firm’s 

petition, or what was discussed. We do not know whether the 

trial court believed Moi’s representation that Trinidad was 

unauthorized to represent him in court proceedings. And we do 

not know whether Moi’s attorney argued substantively at the 

hearing, requested a continuance, or claimed prejudice by reason 

of insufficient notice or service. We must therefore presume the 

trial court’s denial of Moi’s motion to quash—either due to 

insufficient proof or waiver—was correct.

C. The Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Consider Moi’s 

Petition to Correct the Award

Moi argues the trial court erred in denying his petition to 

correct the arbitration award. We disagree.

“[E]ntry of judgment ordinarily terminates a trial court’s 

jurisdiction to rule on the merits of a case.” (Ballona Wetlands 

Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 455, 

479.) “Once judgment has been entered . . . the court may not 

reconsider it and loses its unrestricted power to change the 

judgment.” (APRI Ins. Co. S.A. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 

Cal.App.4th 176, 181.)

Here, once the court entered judgment on June 9, 2022, it 

lacked jurisdiction to change that judgment in response to Moi’s 

petition, filed June 2, 2022.

Moi argues the judgment did not deprive the court of 

jurisdiction because it is void for reasons he asserts on appeal. 
15

But for reasons discussed above, we conclude the judgment is not 

void.

D. Attorney Fees on Appeal

The Firm requests that we award it attorney fees incurred 

on appeal pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 

6203. We will leave that decision to the trial court. (See Bus. & 

Prof. Code, § 6203, subd. (c) [“a court confirming . . . an award 

under this section may award to the prevailing party reasonable 

fees and costs incurred in obtaining confirmation . . . , including, 

if applicable, fees and costs on appeal”].)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to recover their 

costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.