United States General Accounting Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

February 1997 MILITARY BASES

Mission Transfers

Affecting Ellsworth 

Air Force Base

GAO/NSIAD-97-58

GAO United States

General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-275750 

February 24, 1997

Senator Thomas A. Daschle

Senator Tim Johnson

United States Senate

As you requested, we examined the costs and benefits of several B-1B

aircraft mission transfers affecting the Ellsworth Air Force Base (AFB)

located in South Dakota. Specifically, this report addresses the (1) extent

to which the Air Force analyzed the costs and benefits of the proposed jet

engine intermediate maintenance consolidation at Dyess AFB, Texas;

(2) costs and benefits of transferring the Route Integration

Instrumentation System (RIIS) from Ellsworth to Nellis AFB, Nevada; and

(3) reasons for and cost of constructing facilities for housing B-1B aircraft

at the Robins AFB in Georgia. The B-1B unit that is moving to Robins AFB

was previously located at Dobbins AFB and was activated in fiscal year

1996 when a F-15 unit was deactivated at that base.1

Results in Brief The Air Force’s mid-1995 preliminary analysis showed that consolidating

B-1B engine intermediate maintenance at Dyess AFB could result in

savings. However, this analysis was based primarily on discussions among

maintenance personnel. It did not include certain factors that could reduce

the savings because several important decisions, such as the extent that

back-up capabilities would need to be retained at other bases, were not

made until later in calendar year 1995. Moreover, a cost/benefit analysis,

including estimated workload distribution, and one-time construction,

moving, and set-up costs, was not conducted. Such an analysis, using

updated data, is needed to assess whether the consolidation would in fact

save money and result in operating efficiencies.

Our analysis of Air Force data showed that transferring the RIIS, a

computer-based system for assessing flight crew training missions, to

Nellis AFB from Ellsworth, should result in annual savings of about

$262,000, primarily by reducing staff requirements. No significant military

construction is presently needed or planned for the transfer; however,

some modifications may be necessary to meet security requirements. If

projected savings are accurate and estimated one-time transfer costs do

1

The Air Force is realigning, converting, and/or deactivating some units in response to a declining

defense budget and changes in force structure needs. Within the Air National Guard, the six fighter

wing allocation required converting or closing one of the four F-15 units. Converting units from F-15s

to B-1Bs, rather than closure, minimizes the impact of force reductions, according to the Air Force.

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not increase substantially, transfer costs will be recovered in less than 

3 years.

The National Guard provided several reasons for its decision to relocate a

newly established B-1B unit from Dobbins AFB to Robins AFB. According to

the National Guard, moving the B-1B unit to Robins minimized personnel

dislocations, avoided costly runway repairs, provided diversified training

routes, and permitted collocating the B-1Bs with supporting tankers. Other

existing B-1B bases, including Dyess, Ellsworth, and McConnell, were

briefly considered for the B1-B unit. To put B-1B aircraft at an existing

B-1B base, however, would have required activating an additional National

Guard unit, while at the same time deactivating a unit. The National Guard

estimates construction costs for the B-1B wing at Robins will total about

$99.5 million. Construction started in October 1996 and is scheduled to be

completed in 2001.

Background B-1B units, with a total of 93 aircraft, are deployed at 5 bases in the

continental United States.2

 Figure 1 shows the location of units and the

number of aircraft in them as of August 14, 1996.

2

The report Air Force Bombers: Options to Retire or Restructure the Force Would Reduce Planned

Spending (GAO/NSIAD-96-192, Sept. 30, 1996) provides more information on DOD’s bomber force

requirements and options for reducing spending on bombers.

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Figure 1: Number of Aircraft Assigned to Each B-1B Unit as of August 1996

(42) 7th Wing

Dyess, Texas

(29) 28th Bomb Wing

Ellsworth, South Dakota

(11) 184th Bomb Wing

McConnell, Kansas

(8) 366th Composite Wing

Mountain Home, Idaho

(3) 116th Bomb Wing

Robins, Georgia

. .

. .

.

Source: Air Combat Command.

RIIS is a data collection system used to provide feedback to air crews on

their performance during flight training. Data collected from training

locations around the country are transmitted to a central computer and

processed into a video format. This video is then transmitted to the air

crew’s home base, where it is used to brief crew members on the results of

their training.

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Because the units at McConnell and Robins are National Guard units, the

National Guard Bureau and the Air Force’s Air Combat Command (ACC)

share responsibility for organizing, equipping, maintaining, and training

them.

Need to Conduct

Cost/Benefit Analysis

of Intermediate

Maintenance

Consolidation Using

Updated Data

There are three levels of B-1B engine maintenance: organizational,

intermediate, and depot. Organizational and intermediate maintenance are

performed at each base. Generally, organizational maintenance includes

preventive maintenance and minor repairs that do not require engine

removal. Intermediate maintenance includes scheduled maintenance and

major repairs that generally cannot be completed without removing the

engine from the aircraft. Depot maintenance, which overhauls engines to a

like-new condition, is performed by the Air Logistics Center at Tinker AFB,

Oklahoma.

In mid-1995, ACC led a team that performed preliminary analysis of the

benefits of consolidating B-1B engine intermediate maintenance activities.

The analysis indicated that consolidation could reduce the total number of

personnel authorized for intermediate maintenance units by 24: 14 active

duty positions and 10 National Guard positions. On the basis of fiscal year

1996 personnel authorizations, intermediate maintenance units would be

reduced from 190 to 166 positions. The ACC maintenance official who

conducted the study stated, however, that the analysis was based on

discussions among engine maintenance personnel and not on a logistics

composite model (LCOM)3

 or formal manpower analysis of the workload to

be performed at each base.

In late 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force instructed ACC to consolidate

B-1B jet engine intermediate maintenance activities at Dyess AFB.

However, in implementing the Secretary’s decision, the maintenance

official stated that ACC would retain limited intermediate maintenance

capabilities at Ellsworth and Robins AFBs and a full intermediate

maintenance capability at McConnell AFB. According to the same official,

the limited capabilities at Ellsworth and Robins are needed to perform

intermediate maintenance activities that can be completed quickly,

thereby limiting the amount of time aircraft will be inoperable while

engines are in transit. Further, the full capability at McConnell is needed to

provide a back-up facility in the event that operations at the consolidated

facility are impaired.

3

The LCOM model used determines manpower requirements for B-1B jet engine intermediate

maintenance units using factors such as programmed flying hours, historical data on engine failures,

and maintenance tasks performed by the unit. Additional positions may be authorized for supervisors

and any maintenance that is not included in the flying-hour program.

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The ACC maintenance official stated in September 1996 that ACC had not

prepared a comprehensive cost/benefits analysis to support the decision to

establish a consolidated facility at Dyess. He stated that ACC had not yet

developed comprehensive estimates of the one-time costs of

consolidation, including the costs of constructing facilities and moving

personnel and equipment to Dyess. For example, ACC had not completed

its analysis of support equipment requirements for the consolidated

facility. In addition, a recent LCOM analysis indicates that savings may be

less than indicated by the preliminary analysis. According to the ACC

maintenance official, the LCOM analysis indicates that consolidation will

reduce total active duty maintenance personnel requirements by only

about five positions. He added that ACC had not yet obtained updated

information on potential National Guard staffing reductions at Robins.

In October 1996, the Air Force indicated that the consolidated facility at

Dyess AFB should be operational in January 1998, pending completion of a

major B-1B engine upgrade. Completing a more comprehensive cost and

benefits analysis prior to the consolidation could ensure that savings and

operating efficiencies would result from the consolidation.

RIIS Transfer Will

Likely Be Cost

Effective

Before September 1996, the RIIS unit was located at Ellsworth AFB and

reported to a range support headquarters unit located at Nellis AFB. In

September 1996, the RIIS unit was relocated from Ellsworth to Nellis AFB.

Table 1 shows that direct RIIS operating costs at Nellis are projected to be

about $262,000 less per year, in fiscal year 1997 dollars, than at Ellsworth.

As shown, annual contractor support costs at Nellis are expected to be

over $208,000 more than at Ellsworth; however, combined military and

civilian personnel costs at Nellis are expected to be almost $470,000 less

than at Ellsworth. We did not analyze indirect costs, such as family

housing and base support costs. Air Force officials stated these costs

would be similar at both bases.

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Table 1: Direct RIIS Annual Operating

Costs at Ellsworth Compared With

Nellis (1997 dollars)

Cost category Ellsworth Nellis Difference

Personnel

Military $1,042,967 $675,172 $367,795

Civilian 152,835 50,945 101,890

Subtotal 1,195,802 726,117 469,685

Contractors 1,590,551 1,799,338 (208,787)

Other operation and maintenance 30,662 30,000 662

Total costs $2,817,015 $2,555,455 $261,560

Source: ACC.

The lower personnel costs at Nellis are due to a reduction of nine

positions in the RIIS unit’s personnel authorization. The RIIS unit at

Ellsworth was authorized 26 positions (23 military and 3 civilian), while

the unit at Nellis is authorized only 17 (16 military and 1 civilian). ACC and

RIIS officials explained that the consolidation of range support missions at

Nellis allowed them to eliminate several management and support

positions.

ACC and RIIS officials stated that the one-time costs of moving the RIIS unit

from Ellsworth and setting it up at Nellis will be less than $600,000. The

largest portion of the costs are related to contractor modifications,

training of personnel, and setup of the RIIS unit to make it operational.

Equipment moving costs, relocation costs for military personnel, and room

renovation costs to make the RIIS operational make up 25 percent of the

costs.

Nellis was able to keep transfer costs for the RIIS near $600,000 by housing

the equipment in an existing building that did not need extensive

modifications to make it operational and ensure its security. No significant

military construction is presently needed or planned for the RIIS

operations; however, some building modifications may be necessary to

meet security requirements. From our observations of the RIIS unit at Nellis

and discussions with RIIS personnel, this arrangement appeared

reasonable.

If projected savings at Nellis are accurate and estimated one-time transfer

costs do not increase substantially, transfer costs will be recovered in less

than 3 years.

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Military Construction

at Robins AFB

During the Cold War, heavy bombers were used primarily for nuclear

deterrence and were operated solely by the active duty Air Force.

According to the Air Force, the National Guard’s part-time workforce was

incompatible with the bombers’ nuclear mission because of a requirement

for continuously monitoring all personnel directly involved with nuclear

weapons. With the end of the Cold War and increased emphasis on the

bombers’ conventional mission, the Air Force initiated efforts to integrate

Guard and reserve units into the bomber force.

As part of its total force policy, the Air Force assigned B-1B aircraft to the

National Guard. Since the National Guard needed to deactivate an F-15

fighter unit, it decided to convert the F-15 wing at Dobbins AFB to B-1B

aircraft. In addition, the unit was moved to Robins AFB because, according

to National Guard Bureau officials, the runway at Dobbins was too short

for B-1Bs and there were environmental issues at Dobbins, such as noise

restrictions in the Atlanta area. Planning for the move started in 1992.

In September 1993, a component of the National Guard Bureau issued a

written cost/benefits analysis for relocating the 116th Fighter Wing from

Dobbins to Robins. The objective of the analysis was to capture the

one-time and recurring costs of the move and to evaluate alternative

construction options at Robins.

A National Guard official stated that there was no written analysis

assessing the costs and benefits of locating the 116th to another Air

National Guard F-15 base or an existing B-1B base. He stated that the other

National Guard F-15 units were located at New Orleans, Hawaii, and St.

Louis, and did not have suitable facilities for B-1Bs. Converting the 116th

Fighter Wing at Dobbins to B-1Bs and moving it to Robins minimized

personnel dislocations, avoided costly runway repairs, provided

diversified training routes, and permitted collocating the B-1Bs with

supporting tankers, according to the Air Force.

The National Guard official stated that Dyess, Ellsworth, and McConnell

AFBs were briefly considered for the B-1B unit, but added that those bases

were located in states that did not have National Guard F-15 units. To put

B-1Bs at an existing B-1B base would have required activating an

additional National Guard unit, while at the same time, deactivating a unit.

They added that this would not have been consistent with the Guard’s

policy of minimizing force reductions and that decisions to activate or

deactivate National Guard units are politically sensitive. In fiscal 

year 1996, the 116th Fighter Wing at Dobbins AFB converted from F-15s to

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B-275750 

B-1B aircraft and started the move to Robins AFB. According to National

Guard officials, about 90 percent of the personnel have moved and are

staying in temporary quarters on Robins. About 95 percent of the vacant

full-time positions have been advertised. The ground breaking ceremony

for construction of new facilities occurred in October 1996. The National

Guard Bureau estimates that military construction costs at Robins for the

wing will total about $99.5 million as described in table 2. Construction is

scheduled to be completed in 2001.

Table 2: Estimated Military

Construction Costs for the 116th

Fighter Wing at Robbins AFB

Dollars in millions

Description of work

Estimated

costs

Operations, command, training, personnel support, medical, dining, and

civil engineer facilities $21.4

Munitions storage and training facilities 17.1

Composite aircraft maintenance complex, fuel cell, power check pad,

sound suppressor to support engine testing, and corrosion control hangers

with shops 13.9

Site work, utilities, primary roads and parking lots, and miscellaneous

structures 12.3

Consolidated aircraft and hydrant refueling system, aircraft hydrant

systems, and fuel storage 9.4

Aircraft parking aprons and taxiways 8.8

Hanger bay and shops 8.4

Other 8.2

Total $99.5

Source: ACC.

Regarding your interest about the capacity of these bases to receive the

aircraft, an ACC official stated that it is uncertain whether existing facilities

at Dyess and McConnell could accommodate the B-1B aircraft that were

assigned to Robins. He also stated, however, that over $100 million was

invested in the 1980s at Ellsworth and that Ellsworth might have had

adequate facilities for the additional aircraft with only limited renovation.

However, as stated previously, these bases did not have National Guard

F-15 units. Therefore, putting B-1Bs at an existing B-1B base requires

activating an additional National Guard unit, while at the same time,

deactivating a unit.

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Recommendation We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force conduct a

comprehensive cost/benefits analysis to ensure that savings and operating

efficiencies will result from the consolidation of jet engine intermediate

maintenance at Dyess.

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation

A draft of this report was provided to the Department of Defense (DOD)

and agency comments were requested. DOD and Air Force officials

provided oral comments. DOD and Air Force officials agreed with the facts

presented in the report. They did not agree, however, with the

recommendation to the Air Force to conduct a comprehensive

cost/benefits analysis of the consolidation of jet engine intermediate

maintenance at Dyess to ensure that savings and operating efficiencies will

result. The officials stated that the Air Force believes it has already done

sufficient analysis to support the consolidation decision. According to the

officials, Dyess is the logical choice because (1) the majority of the B-1B

force structure is currently located there, (2) the capability is sufficient to

handle the additional workload, and (3) it supports the Air Force goal of

moving toward lean logistics and two (rather than three) levels of

maintenance. Furthermore, the operation and mission would not be

significantly affected by the consolidation.

As stated in this report, however, the analysis supporting the decision did

not include certain factors that could impact the decision. This analysis

was based primarily on discussions among maintenance personnel and did

not include factors, such as the need to retain back-up capabilities and

retain limited intermediate capabilities at other bases. Therefore, we

continue to believe that a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis of the

consolidation is needed to assess whether the consolidation will save

money and result in operating efficiencies. This study should also include

the points raised by the Air Force in commenting on this report.

Scope and

Methodology

We reviewed reports and documents relevant to B-1B mission transfers

affecting Ellsworth AFB. We also interviewed officials from Air Force

Headquarters, ACC, the National Guard Bureau, and range support units at

Nellis AFB.

To estimate operating costs for RIIS, we used average 1997 military and

civilian personnel costs, including all basic benefits, provided by the Air

Force. We obtained personnel authorizations from unit manning

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documents and obtained operation and maintenance costs from financial

reports and other records provided by ACC.

Our review of the RIIS operations at Ellsworth AFB and Nellis AFB focused

on identifying the major operating costs at each location and the one-time

costs to transfer the operations. We concentrated on personnel and

operation and maintenance costs as the primary components of operating

costs. We discussed the basis and accuracy of the data with Air Force

officials; however, we did not independently determine the reliability of

the information. In addition, we observed RIIS operations at Nellis AFB and

discussed the RIIS construction requirements with RIIS operations and base

security officials.

We obtained information on the cost of and rationale for locating the B-1B

wing at Robins from the National Guard Bureau. We also examined

military construction project data sheets and discussed construction

requirements with an ACC official.

We performed our work between August and November 1996 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and the

Air Force, interested congressional committees, and other parties. Copies

will also be made available to others on request.

If you have any questions concerning this report, please call me at

(202) 512-8412. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix I.

David R. Warren, Director

Defense Management Issues

Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-97-58 Military Bases
Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-97-58 Military Bases
Appendix I 

Major Contributors to This Report

National Security and

International Affairs

Division, Washington,

D.C.

Charles I. Patton, Jr., Associate Director

Nomi Taslitt, Assistant Director

John Schaefer, Evaluator-in-Charge

Randolph Jones, Senior Evaluator

Alexandra Martin-Arseneau, Senior Evaluator

(709225) Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-97-58 Military Bases
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