COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT

Transition Incentives Program

Provisions of the Conservation Reserve Program

Date: February 2, 2010

Agency: USDA/Farm Service Agency

Contact: Alexander Barbarika

Natural Resources Analysis Group

Economic and Policy Analysis Staff

Farm Service Agency

U. S. Department of Agriculture

Washington, DC 20250

202-720-7093

Alexander.barbarika@wdc.usda.gov

I. Title

The CRP Transition Incentives Program is authorized by Section 2111 of the Food, 

Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (Pub. L. 110-246, the 2008 Farm Bill).

II. Summary

Section 2111 of the 2008 Farm Bill authorizes $25 million for incentive payments to retired or 

retiring owners and operators with expiring Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) contracts who 

sell or long-term lease their expiring CRP land to beginning or socially disadvantaged farmers or 

ranchers that are not family members. The retired or retiring owner or operator will receive CRP 

rental payments for 2 additional years beyond contract expiration to encourage participation. To 

be eligible for this program, farmers or ranchers who purchase or lease the former CRP land are 

required to obtain a conservation plan and follow sustainable livestock and crop production 

practices.

Beginning or socially disadvantaged farmers or ranchers who participate in this program are 

allowed to begin to make conservation and land improvements in the final CRP contract year. 

They also will be eligible for enrollment in three USDA conservation programs and may begin 

the organic certification process during the CRP contract’s final year. Members of the retired or 

retiring owner or operator’s family who are beginning or socially disadvantaged farmers or 

ranchers may participate in the program in order to obtain eligibility for enrollment in certain 

conservation programs, but the 2 additional years of rental payments would not be paid to the 

retired or retiring owner.

If fully subscribed, an estimated 400 to 1,800 beginning or socially disadvantaged farmers and 

ranchers would benefit. With an average CRP rental payment of $39/acre to $49/acre for two 

years, obligations are estimated at between $5.1 million and $17.1 million. These cost estimates 

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reflect the total obligation for fiscal years 2010-2012; payments would be made over a number of 

years, depending on when CRP contracts expire. Due to the limited amount of eligible farmable 

quality CRP acreage likely to be offered for sale or lease, and the location of beginning and 

socially disadvantaged farmers relative to the location of eligible CRP lands, participation and 

costs are expected to be closer to the lower end of this range than the higher end.

III. Need for Action

The cost of acquiring land is a major barrier faced by beginning and socially disadvantaged 

farmers and ranchers who desire to start new operations or expand existing ones. The Transition 

Incentives Program lowers this barrier because the two extra years of annual CRP rental 

payments will encourage retiring or retired farmers with expiring CRP contracts to accept a 

slightly lower price for their land if selling or leasing to members of the targeted population. The 

$25 million provided in the 2008 Farm Bill for these payments will reduce the land acquisition 

costs of beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers, while ensuring that land 

being removed from CRP through this program is farmed or ranched using sustainable 

production practices.

IV. Alternatives Considered

We considered three alternatives implementing this program, which are analyzed in this CBA. 

Alternative A is the one selected.

Alternative A.—Implement the program using the maximum flexibility provided by the 2008 

farm bill: The 2008 Farm Bill requires expenditures “to the maximum extent practicable” of $25 

million, and allows for up to 2 years of additional rental payments as an incentive. This option 

will provide the full 2 years of rental payments, plus also defines a retired or retiring owner or 

operator as anyone with an expiring CRP contract who had retired from farming or will do so 

within 5 years. In addition, this option defines expiring CRP lands to include land that was 

under CRP contracts that expired on September 30, 2009. This alternative provides the 

maximum possible benefits within the requirements specified in the 2008 Farm Bill.

Alternative B.—Do not include a retroactive definition of expiring CRP lands: Land under CRP 

contracts that expired on September 30, 2009 would not be eligible under this alternative. Only 

land under CRP contracts that expired on or after the effective date of this rule would be eligible. 

This alternative would not provide benefits for CRP land transitions that took place between 

September 30, 2009 and the effective date of this rule. This alternative would reduce the number 

of eligible expiring acres by about 16 percent relative to the selected alternative (Alternative A).

Alternative C. —One Year of annual rental payments: The 2008 Farm bill specifies that this 

program can make annual payments to retiring CRP owners or operators for not more than an 

additional two years. Under this option, only 1 year’s rental payments would be provided. 

Although more land could in theory be transferred within the $25 million funding limit, 

participation would likely be reduced due to the lower incentive structure.

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V. Background—Eligible CRP Farms and CRP Lands

CRP land characteristics reflect the primary purposes of the program, which are to reduce 

erosion, improve water quality, and restore wildlife habitat on land. As a result, much CRP land 

is highly erodible, not suitable for annual cultivation, or at best, has severe limitations when 

utilized for producing crops. This situation is best described using USDA’s Natural Resources 

Conservation Service (NRCS) land classification designation (Table 1). Only 23 percent of CRP 

acreage is designated as land capability class (LCC) 1 or 2, and most suitable for cultivation. A 

large proportion of CRP land (41%) is in LCC-3, which has severe limitations for cropping. The 

remaining land is LLC-4 or higher, which is not suitable for use as cropland. Some land in the 

higher-numbered classes could be used for livestock production or forage.

Table 1. Land Capability Class of CRP and All Cropland.

LCC

CRP All Cropland

Acres % Acres % Suitability for Cultivation

1 229,000 1 26,567,000 7 Few limitations

2 7,274,000 22 174,950,000 46 Moderate limitations

3 13,485,000 41 114,963,000 30 Severe limitations reduce choice of crops or 

require special conservation practices, or both

4 7,719,00 24 40,577,000 11 Very severe limitations restrict choice of plants 

or require very careful management, or both

5 178,000 1 2,932,000 1 Mainly limited to pasture, forestry

6 3,216,000 10 12,923,000 3 Suitable for pasture, forestry, not cultivation

7,8 596,000 2 4,085,000 1 Unsuitable for cultivation

Total 32,696,000 100 376,998,000 100

Source: 1997 National Resources Inventory. LCC descriptions can be found at

http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technical/NRI/maps/meta/m6175.html

These LCC estimates of CRP lands are based on the 1997 National Resources Inventory and, as 

such, represent CRP in 1997. More recent estimates are not available, but there is little reason to 

expect that the distribution among LCCs has changed to a significant extent since that inventory 

was taken.

Another measure of CRP land’s ability to be cropped sustainably is the land’s erodibility index 

(EI). This is a measure of the land’s inherent erosion potential relative to its soil loss tolerance 

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value. Soil loss tolerances are the amount of soil that can be lost through erosion per year 

without significantly reducing the long-term productivity of the land. Land with an EI of 8 or 

greater is eligible for CRP enrollment, and the higher the EI, the greater the probability of 

enrollment. For current whole-field CRP enrollment devoted to grass plantings, the distribution 

among EI levels is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. Erodibility Index Levels of Eligible CRP Land.*

Erodibility Index All Contracts

Less than 8 3,240,000 (20%)

8 to 14.9 8,058,000 (50%)

15 or Greater 4,723,000 (30%)

Total 16,021,000 (100%)

Source: Farm Service Agency CRP contract data files.

*Whole-field CRP grass plantings expired or expiring 2009-2012.

This table shows that 80 percent of CRP land is in the highly erodible category (EI>8). Thirty 

percent has very high EI levels (EI>15) and will be difficult, if not impossible, to crop while 

maintaining erosion below soil loss tolerance levels. In summary, much of expiring CRP land is 

not suitable for sustainable grazing or crop production, based on the Land Capability Class or 

Erodibility Index.

Table 3 provides information about current CRP participants and their farms. Sixteen million 

CRP acres of grass plantings which are in contracts that expired, or are expiring, during 2009-

2012 are eligible for the Transition Incentives Program (representing contracts on 128,000 

farms).1

 This analysis excludes CRP tree plantings because interest from members of the 

targeted groups in buying or leasing these lands for sustainable crop or livestock production 

would likely be very low. Also not included are farms with only small parcels enrolled, 

including land enrolled under CRP’s continuous signup provisions, because the smaller parcels 

would typically not represent an economically viable farming or ranching opportunity.

1 This estimate includes land that was under CRP contracts that expired in 2009 (also see Alternative B, which 

addresses ineligibility of 2009 contracts for program participation).

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Table 3. Characteristics of CRP Farms and Land.

Characteristic Quantity

Number of farms 1 128,000

Average farm size (cropland only) 1 487 ac.

CRP acres 1 16.0 mil. ac.

CRP acres per farm 1 125 ac.

Average rental payment 1 $39/ac.

Average age of owner/operator 2 58 years

Percent full-time farming 2 35%

Percent retired 2 25%

1 Farm Service Agency CRP contract data files, based on contracts expiring 2009-2012.

2 Lambert, D. et al (2009), based on 2001 survey.

*Whole-field CRP grass plantings expired or expiring 2009-2012.

Also affecting potential participation is the spatial correlation between the location of beginning 

and socially disadvantaged farms and that of eligible CRP lands. As the maps on pages 13 and 

14 illustrate, the spatial correlation is fairly low and will tend to keep participation relatively low. 

In other words, much of the expiring CRP land is located in areas that have relatively few 

socially disadvantaged or beginning farmers.

VI. Costs and Benefits of This Rule

Alternative A. Implement the Program as Specified in the Rule, Using Maximum 

Flexibility Provided in the 2008 Farm Bill

Retired or retiring CRP farmers. An owner or operator selling or long-term leasing CRP 

land to a non-family member would receive an additional 2 years of CRP rental 

payments. As specified in the 2008 Farm Bill, total payments can not exceed $25 million 

through FY 2012. Because of the added CRP payments, and depending on the 

competitiveness of land markets, an owner or operator may be willing to accept a lower 

rental rate or sales price from a member of the eligible population groups than they would 

from another potential buyer. The recipient of the land could thus benefit from the lower 

land acquisition costs. Participating owners and operators are required to permit the 

buyer access to the expiring CRP land before the sale of the land has occurred, which 

could serve to discourage retired or retiring farmer participation.

Beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers. Members of these targeted 

groups would have enhanced opportunities to begin or expand operations. Acquisition 

costs and lease agreement rental amounts would average lower for participants, although 

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it is not possible to estimate how much lower. The amount of discount that any 

beginning or socially disadvantaged farmer would receive will depend on the degree of 

competition for land in the given geographic area, which can vary widely. Where 

competition for land is strong, little (or no) discounting would likely occur, and benefits 

would accrue primarily to the CRP contract holder. In contrast, if competition is weak 

(it’s a buyers’ market), more benefits would accrue to the purchaser (the beginning or 

socially disadvantaged producer). It is not known to what extent discounting would 

occur, so no estimates of the potential benefits to the targeted groups can be made, 

although it can be assumed to be somewhat less than $25 million (see later discussion).

In addition to possibly receiving a discount on the purchase price or lease rates, the 

beginning or socially disadvantaged participant becomes eligible for enrollment in 

USDA’s Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), the Conservation 

Stewardship Program (CSP), and for re-enrollment of expiring continuous signup CRP 

practices. The current 12-month waiting period for new owners before CRP enrollment 

is allowed is waived for participants in this program.

The following simplified examples illustrate two extremes of the possible distribution of 

benefits between a seller and buyer. This analysis does not consider a leasing situation.

Example assumptions:

• All parties know that the fair market value of the land is $2,000 per acre.2

• Two years of CRP rental payments amount to $100 per acre ($50 per year per 

acre).

• The CRP plot is 120 acres.

• The tax implications and transaction costs are identical for all parties.

• All non-eligible entities (buyers who are not beginning or socially disadvantaged 

farmers or ranchers) offer fair market value ($2000 per acre) for the CRP plot.

• Net returns to production on the former CRP land are the same for all parties.

Example 1: An eligible entity competes against any number of non-eligible entities. 

Using only economics as the basis for decision making, the eligible entity’s offer 

need only exceed the highest non-eligible entity’s offer by $0.01 to be selected by 

the seller. In this case, the eligible entity pays a discounted purchase price 

($1,900.01 per acre) and the retired or retiring seller receives $0.01 per acre more 

($1900.01 from the buyer plus $100 from USDA = $2000.01) than they would 

have if they had sold to the non-eligible entity. Almost all the benefits ($99.99 

per acre) accrue to the eligible buyer.

 $/Acre

Eligible entity pays: $1,900.01

USDA pays: $100.00

2 According to NASS, the average value of U.S. cropland in 2009 was $2,650 per acre.

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CRP contract holder receives: $2,000.01

Non-eligible entity offers: $2,000.00

Benefit to eligible entity: $99.99

Example 2: As in the prior example, multiple eligible entities compete against any 

number of non-eligible entities. In this example, however, strong competition for 

land increases bids that must to be offered by eligible entities. The successful 

purchase price would be $2,000.00 per acre (the fair market value), and no added 

benefit would accrue to the eligible entity. The seller would receive $2,100 per 

acre ($2,000 from the buyer and $100 from USDA). All benefits ($100 per acre 

in CRP payments) would accrue to the seller.

 $/Acre

Eligible entity pays: $2,000.00

USDA pays: $100.00

CRP contract holder receives: $2,100.00

Non-eligible entity offers: $2,000.00

Benefit to eligible entity: $0.00

Thus, in these simple examples, the benefit to the eligible entity purchasing the land 

would range from $0 to $11,998.80 ($99.99 per acre times 120 acres). The benefit to the 

seller ranges from $1.20 to $12,000. In both cases, the seller would receive the $6,000 in 

annual CRP rental payments for each of 2 years (calculated as 120 acres times $50

annually, or $12,000 for 2 years), but in the first case the seller would discount the per 

acre price below market value by nearly the entire CRP rental payment amount.

In general, the spatial correlation between the geographic location of expiring CRP lands 

and of targeted farmers and ranchers appears relatively weak (see attached maps on pages 

13 and 14). As a result, competition among eligible targeted group members would 

likely be on the lower end of the scale, and targeted group members could be expected to 

receive some discounting of purchase or lease prices. In other words, the beginning and 

socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers who do participate are expected to be able to 

put in competitive bids for expiring CRP land against primarily non-eligible buyers (the 

Example 1 scenario), and thus capture at least some of the financial benefits of this 

program.

Eligibility and Participation

It is difficult to estimate how many eligible CRP farm owners or operators will be 

interested in selling or leasing their expiring CRP lands through the Transition Incentives 

Program, or how many of those in the targeted groups will be interested in participating. 

Beginning farmers and ranchers are defined as owners or operators who have been 

farming or ranching for 10 or fewer years, which would include anyone who is not 

currently farming or ranching as well as those with limited experience in farming. Due to 

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lack of available data, an estimation of how many persons who are not currently farmers 

or ranchers would start farming as a result of this program was not considered in this 

analysis. Data on current beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers was used.

Recent data on CRP participants’ intentions upon expiration of their contracts does not 

appear to exist. A nationwide survey of CRP participants reported that 3 percent of CRP 

acres in 1992 would be sold after contracts expired. Many factors are relevant to the 

percent of eligible CRP acres likely to be sold or leased under this program. Incentives 

provided by this program could cause an increase in the percentage that was reported in 

the 1992 survey. In addition, any long-term leasing that would occur would also increase 

the percentage. In contrast, some of the expiring CRP land could be sold for nonagricultural uses, meaning a lower percentage would apply for sales to farmers or 

ranchers. On balance, these reasons suggest a slightly higher percentage rate of expiring 

CRP land sold, which in this analysis is assumed at 4 percent.

Assuming beginning and socially disadvantaged farmers purchase farms in proportion to 

their population relative to all currently operating farms (34%--see Table 4), and that on 

average 4 percent of expiring CRP is sold or leased, then in the absence of the incentives 

provided by this program, about 1.4 percent of expiring or expired CRP land would be 

bought by a beginning or socially disadvantaged farmer annually.

Table 4. All Farms and Farms that are Owned or Operated by Beginning or Socially 

Disadvantaged Farmers or Ranchers.

Quantity

Data from Census of Agriculture

 All farms 2,205,000

 Beginning farms (less than 10 years) 653,000

 Socially disadvantaged farms 142,000

 Percent of all farms that are beginning farms 30%

Estimates Based on Census of Agriculture Data

 Percent of socially disadvantaged farms that are also 

beginning farms 

43,000

 Beginning or socially disadvantaged farms 752,000

 Percent of farms that are beginning or socially 

disadvantaged

34%

Source: USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service website.

As noted earlier, much of the expiring CRP land is not suitable for cultivation, and would 

be difficult to crop sustainably. Some land could be used for livestock production, but 

generally that activity requires large tracts of land. Only 11 percent of expiring CRP 

tracts (about 46% of CRP acres) are 200 or more acres in size (FSA Contract Data).

Table 5 illustrates participation rates using different assumptions about which Land 

Capability Class CRP expiring acres are sold or leased by participants in this program. 

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Using a 1.4 percent participation rate results in a range of 53,000 acres (see scenario 3 in 

Table 5 below) and 220,000 acres (scenario 1) in the Transition Incentives Program, 

depending on which LCCs are assumed to be sold or leased. Scenario 1 assumes that 

CRP lands in LCCs 1-6 participate equally. Scenario 3 assumes that members of the 

targeted groups only buy or lease lands in LCCs 1 or 2.

Based on the average CRP acres per eligible farm of 125 acres, between 413 beginning 

and socially disadvantaged farmers and ranchers (Scenario 3) and 1,758 farmers and 

ranchers (Scenario 1) would benefit.

Table 5. Participation Estimates Under Different Scenarios.

Land Capability Class

1-6

(Scenario 1)

1-3

(Scenario 2)

1-2

(Scenario 3)

Eligible *

 CRP land 16.0 mil. ac. 10.2 mil. ac. 3.7 mil. ac.

 CRP farms 128,000 82,000 29,000

Participation Estimates

 Land sold or leased 220,000 ac. 144,000 ac. 53,000 ac.

 Farms 1,758 1,148 413

* See earlier designation of eligible lands.

Due to lack of available data on the retirement plans of CRP owners or operators with 

expiring contracts, and those who are planning to retire within 5 years, this analysis 

assumes all otherwise eligible CRP participants would be eligible for the Transition 

Incentives Program. This is a reasonable assumption, given that the average age of CRP 

participants with expiring contracts is 58 (see Table 3).

Cost Estimates

Total cost estimates for the program depend in part on the CRP rental payments 

associated with estimated participation rates. The average rental payment for all eligible 

CRP acres is $39 per acre. If only the more productive CRP acreage is transferred, 

however, the average payment rate would be higher, because the rental payments on 

more productive land are typically higher. (The LCC and EI provide indicators of 

productivity levels, but there are exceptions. Lands in higher LCCs and with higher EI 

levels can be more productive than lands in lower LCCs or with lower EI levels. The 

LCC only determines limitations for cropping, and the EI only determines the degree of 

conservation needed to maintain productivity if cropped.) It is likely that the land 

transferred under this incentive program will be the land more suitable for cropping, with 

slightly higher average rental rates than the average for all CRP land. 

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<$25 $25-$34 $35-$49 $50-$74 $75-$106

$/Acre

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Acres

Millions

Per-Acre Rental Payments for Eligible CRP

The bar chart above shows the distribution of per-acre rental payments for eligible CRP 

acres and Table 6 shows the regional distribution of acres and the associated average 

rental payments. Rental payments in the most productive regions, such as the Corn Belt, 

average $72/acre, with 135,000 eligible acres. In the Plains and Mountain regions, where 

most of the eligible CRP acreage is located, payments average between $32/acre and 

$36/acre. To provide cost estimates, three rental payment averages are used: $39/acre 

($78 over 2 years), $44/acre ($88 over 2 years) and $49/acre ($98 over 2 years). These 

estimates reflect the expectation that the more productive lands are more likely to be 

transferred.

Table 6. Whole-Field CRP Grass Plantings*

Region Eligible CRP

(Acres) 

Average Rent

($/A)

Northeast 36,000 49

Appalachian 224,000 60

Southeast 101,000 39

Delta States 98,000 41

Corn Belt 135,000 72

Lake States 613,000 52

Northern Plains 4,462,000 36

Southern Plains 3,419,000 34

Mountain 4,811,000 32

Pacific 908,000 44

U.S. 16,021,000 39

Source: Farm Service Agency CRP contract data files.

*Whole-field grass plantings expired or expiring 2009-2012.

Combining the participation estimates derived above (CRP sold or leased acres) with 

alternative average rental payment rates yield obligation estimates between $5.1 million 

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(scenario 3, $49/acre CRP rental payment) and $17.1 million (scenario 1, $39/acre CRP 

rental payment) (see Table 7). This results in an average program cost per farm owned or 

operated by a beginning or socially disadvantaged farmer or rancher between $9,750 and 

$12,250.

Table 7. Potential Participation and Obligation Estimates for FY 2010-2012*.

Land Capability Class

1-6

(Scenario 1)

1-3

(Scenario 2)

1-2

(Scenario 3)

Participation Estimates

 Land sold or leased 220,000 ac. 144,000 ac. 53,000 ac.

 Farms 1,758 1,148 413

Costs

 Average rent per acre @$39/acre @$44/acre @49/acre

 .Total obligations $17.1 mil. $12.6 mil. $5.1 mil.

 Cost per Farm $9,750 $11,000 $12,250

* The obligation estimates reflect the three-year total from FY 2010-12. Note that 

outlays would be made over a number of years, depending on when contracts expire.

Environmental and other potential impacts. Farmers and ranchers participating in this 

program will be required to obtain and follow a conservation plan, which would 

minimize many of the potential adverse environmental impacts of agricultural production 

on former CRP land. Therefore, this program may have qualitative environmental 

benefits. In addition, participants are eligible for two USDA programs, the 

Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) and the Conservation Stewardship 

Program (CSP). The current 12-month waiting requirement for CRP eligibility that 

applies to new owners and operators is waived for participants in this program, allowing 

for immediate enrollment in continuous CRP practices. Some beginning and socially 

disadvantaged producers may choose to apply for organic certification, which would have 

additional environmental benefits. However, if this program causes land that would have 

remained in CRP or a conserving use, or in grass for forage production, to be returned to 

annual cropping, environmental benefits could be reduced in those instances. 

Costs could be incurred by NRCS in providing technical assistance for conservation plan 

development to participants. In addition, the National Organic Certification Cost-Share 

Program could have increased demand for its resources, as could the Loan Program for 

Beginning Farmers and Ranchers. However, since it is likely that some of the land 

transferred under this program would need conservation plans, undergo organic 

certification, or participate in the loan program without this program, it is not appropriate 

to attribute these cost impacts solely to this program.

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Costs, Benefits, and Other Impacts of Alternative B - Definition of Expiring CRP 

Lands is Not Retroactive.

Under Alternative B, only CRP participants with contracts expiring in 2010 and later 

would be eligible for the 2 additional CRP rental payments. Under Alternative A, the 

selected alternative, CRP participants with CRP contracts that expired in 2009 would be 

eligible for the 2 additional years of CRP rental payments. Making CRP participants 

with land under contracts that expired in 2009 (after 2008 Farm Bill passage) ineligible 

would decrease eligible land by 2.5 million acres relative to Alternative A, and would 

reduce the number of eligible farms by 20,200 (Table 8). Assuming the owners of these 

acres participate in the Transition Incentives Program at the same 1.4-percent rate as the 

owners of other expiring CRP lands, estimated obligations would decline by 16 percent 

and the estimated number of targeted farmers and ranchers who benefit would decline by 

16 percent. 

Table 8. CRP Acres Eligible for Transition Incentives by CRP Contract Expiration Year.

FY 2009-2012 FY 2010-2012 FY 2009

Number of Contracts 127,964 107,746 -20,200

Acres 16,021,000 13,525,000 -2,496,000

Percent of Total Acres 100% 84% -16%

Costs, Benefits, and Other Impacts of Alternative C - One Year of Annual Rental 

Payments

Section 2111 of the 2008 Farm Bill provides authority to make no more than 2 years of 

additional CRP rental payments to qualifying CRP contract holders. The rule specifies 

that participants receive the full 2 years of payments. One year’s worth of payments, 

rather than two years’ worth, would both reduce the incentive for CRP participants to 

accept lower prices for their land and decrease the benefit to targeted populations. 

Although in theory more land could be transferred under the $25 million dollar funding 

limit, participation would likely be reduced due to the lower incentive structure. Because 

this program is not expected to use all the available funding with the offer of 2 years of 

CRP payments, it follows that reducing the incentive to participate would reduce 

participating acres relative to Alternative A. The reduced participation, combined with a 

50-percent reduction in the payment rate, would cause obligations (and outlays) to 

decline by more than 50 percent.

References

Lambert, D., P. Sullivan, R. Claassen, and L. Foreman. 2009. Conservation-Compatible 

Practices and Programs. Who Participates? Economic Research Report Number 14. U.S. 

Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

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Osborn, C.T., M. Schnepf, and R. Keim. 1993. The Future Use of Conservation Reserve 

Program Acres: A National Survey of Farm Owners and Operators. Soil and Water Conservation 

Society.

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