### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON Ma y 16, 200 6 S es sio n
STATE OF TENNESS EE, ex rel . LATONYA CAMPBELL v . THOMAS CON LEY

Direc t Appeal from the Juvenile Court for G ibson County

No. 8265 Robert

W. Newell, Jud ge

No. W2005-01842-C OA-R3-JV - F iled May 25, 2006

The trial c ourt g rante d Respondent Father a downwar d deviation from the child s upport g uidelines when se tting re troac tive child support. We reve rse.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Juv e nileCo ur t R e ve r se d; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, in w h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., joined.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r, a nd Juan Vi lla se no r, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l, for the State of

Tenne ssee.

J o e s p h E

. T u b b s , f

o r t h e ap p e l l e e , T h o m a s C o n l e y.

OP IN ION This appea l require s us to determine whe t h er the trial court erre d under Te nnessee Code Annotated § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(C) when it g rante d Respondent/Appellee Thomas Conley (“F ather ”)
a do wn wa rdde viatio n f

ro m th e c hil d su pp ort g uid e lin e s wh e n d e te rm ini ng re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt

. The fac ts r eleva nt to our determination of the issue raised on appea l a re no t d i s p u ted. A l t h o u g h t h e p ar t i e s d i s a g r e e o n t h e d a t e o f t h e i r f i r s tm e e t i n g , P e t i t i o n e r

/ A p p e l l a n tL a t o n ya Campbell (“M o th e r ” ) w a s f if te e n y e ar s o f

a g e w h e n s h e g a v e b irthto F a th e r ’ s c h il d in 1 9 8 8 , and fourtee n y ear s of ag e whe n she bec ame pr eg nant. Father wa s twen t y -s ev en y ear s of ag e. Additionally , al t h o u gh the parties dispute the leng th and fre quency of their se x ual re lationship, Mother does not c ontend she wa s forc ed to have sexual relations with Fathe r. Mother c ontends Father kne w she wa s a minor; Father c ontends he be lieved Mother w as over eig hteen.-2-

On Fe bruary

10, 2004, the State filed a petition on Mother’s behalf in the J uvenile Court of Gi bs on Cou nty

se e kin g to e sta

bli sh pate rn ity

a g a ins t F a the r. Th e juv e nil e c ou rt e sta bli sh e d p a te rn ity on September 1, 2004, a nd set child support ac cording to th e gu i d eli nes. The c ourt assesse d retroa ctive child support for 432 wee ks. Father then f iled a motion to alter or amend the judgment to reduc e the a war d of re troac tive child support. Following a hea ring on J uly

12, t h e t rial court g rante d Father’s motion and a ssessed re troac tive child support dating from F ebrua ry 24, 2004, the date F ather

submitt ed to paternity testing. The trial court enter ed final judg ment on J uly 18, 2005, and Mother filed a timely notice of appea l to this Court. We reve rse a nd rema nd to the trial court to s e t r e tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt a t th e g uid e lin e a mou nt.

Issue Presented
The issue pre sented for

our re view, as w e re word it, is whether , under Te nnessee Code Annotated § 36- 2-311(a )(11) (C), the trial c ourt err ed by g ranting Father a downwa rd devia tion from the child support g uidelines wher e the c hild was the produc t of statutory rape of Mother by

Father.

Stan dard of Revie w
A trial court must applythe child support g uidelines as set forth in the Rules and Reg ulations of the De partment of H uman Service s when de termining child support. The g uidelines set forth the pres u m p t i v el y corr ect a mount of child support and ar e to be a pplied as a r ebuttable pr esumption. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101 (e )( 1)(A) and (e )(2) (2005). This standa rd also applies to re troac tive child support. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 36- 2-311(a )(11) (2005). The trial court, in its discretion and in consideration of factors enumerate d in the s tatute, m ay deviate from t he guidelines in setting a n awa rd of r etroa ctive child suppo rt . Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 2-311(a )(11) (A)( 2005). Howe ver, the Code provides that the tria l court does not have the discre tion to deviate from the g uidelines when setting a n awa

rd of r etroa ctive child su p p o rt wher e, base d on clea r and c onvincing evidenc e, the child is the product of rape or incest of the m other by the father of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 2-311(a )(11) (C)(ii). The determination of whether § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(C)( ii) require s a prior f inding of culpa bilityin a criminal court and of w hether “ra pe” includes statutory

rape for the pur

poses of the section are questions of statutory construction. Statutory construction is a matter

of law w hich
we re v iew de novo , with no presumption of corr ectne ss affor ded to the trial c ourt. Hil l v

. Ci ty of Ge rm an tow n , 31 S.W .3d 234, 237 (Tenn. 2000)

. Anal y sis

Our objective when construing a statute is to eff ectuate the purposes of the Ge n eral Assembly

. Lipscomb v. Doe , 32 S.W .3d 840, 844 (Tenn. 2000). I nsofar as possible, the intent of the Gene ral Asse mbly

should be determined by the natural and ordinary meaning of the wor ds used in the statute, and not by

a construc tion that is forced or which limits or ex tends the mea ning. Id. When the lang uag e of a

statute is clear , we must utiliz e the plain, a cce pted meaning of the wor ds
us e d b y the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

to a sc e rt a in the statut e ’s pu rp os e a ndapp lic a tio n. I f the wo rd ing is ambig uous, we must look to the entire statutory scheme and at the leg islative history to asce rtain the-3-

Gene ral As s em bly ’s intent and purpose . We must construe statutes in their entire ty , neither constricting nor ex panding the Gene ral Asse mbly ’s intent. I n so doing, w e assume that the Gene ral Assembly chose the words of the statute purposely , and that the wor ds chosen “ convey some intent and have a m ea n i n g and a pur pose” w hen conside red w ithin the context of the e ntire statute. Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson , 151 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tenn. 2004) (citations omitted).

I n his brief to this Court, Father asserts “ra pe” a s used in § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(C)( ii) is lim ited to r ape a s d e fi ne d in Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 39 -1 3- 50 3 a ndno t st a tut ory ra pe a s d e fi ne d in Tenne ss ee C o d e An notated § 29-13- 506. Father a rg ues that to construe rape as used in § 36-2- 311(a) (11)( C)(ii) to include statutory rape would be at odds with the definition of ra pe at § 39- 13- 503. He f

urther a sserts that he ha s not been c onvicted of statutory rape and that the statute of limit ations has run.
Chapter 2 of

Title 36 of the C ode provides for the e stablishment of paternity and leg itimation. Section 311 of the c hapter sets out the require ments of an or der of pare ntag e. Unde r the sec tion, an order of par entag e must include, int e r a lia , a dete rmination of child support pursuant to cha pter 5 of the Ti tle . T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 6- 2- 31 1( 20 05 ). Se c tio n 3 6- 2- 31 1( a )( 11 )( C) pr ov ide s:

(C ) D e viatio ns [fr om the c hil d s up po rt g uid e lin e s] sh a ll n ot b e g rante d in circ umstances whe re, ba sed upon cle ar a nd convincing evidenc e: (i) The fathe r has a

demonstra t ed h istory

of violence or domestic violence toward the mother, the c hild's c are taker or the c hild; (ii) The c hild is t he produc t of rape or incest of the m other by the fa ther of the child; (i ii) Th e mothe r o r c are take r o f the c hi ld , or th e c hil d h a s a re a so na ble appre hension of harm from the father or those acting on his behalf towa rd the mother, the child' s car etake r or the c hild; or (iv) The fathe r or those a cting on his be h alf, has abused or ne g lected the child.

Father’s a ssertions and the tria l c ourt’s finding that Father has not be en convic ted of statutory rape and that the statute of limit ations for rape has run are irrele vant to the applicability of § 36-2- 311(a) (11)( C)(ii) to an order of par entag e. Section 36-2- 311(a) (11)( C) provides only that a trial court may not deviate f

rom the child support guidelines whe n setting r etroa ctive support whe n clea r and convinc ing e vidence supports a finding of any circ umstances e numera ted in (C)(i )- (i v ). The section re quires neither

a criminal conviction nor the bey ond a re asonable doubt standard of proof
re qu ir e d fo r c ri min a l c on vic tio n. Th us , th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de te rm ini ng that a fi nd ing of

g uil t in
a criminal court is nece ssary to invoke § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(C)( ii).

Further, the tria l court er

red in g ranting a downwar d deviation wher e the undisputed proof de mon str a te s th e c hil d w a s th e pr od uc t of statut ory ra pe of Mo the r by F a the r. Th e re is n oth ing in the plain lang uag e of § 36- 2-311(a )(11) (C) that supports Father’s arg ument that rape as used in the section does not e ncompass statutory rape

. Section 36-2-311 permits a downwa rd deviation fromW e ad d i t i o nal l y note t he o ut rage of t he t ri al co urt a t th e a b usi ve nat ure of a s exual rel at i o nshi p be t ween a 1

tw e n ty-si x o r tw e n ty-sev e n ye a r o ld m a n a n d a fo u rte e n ye a r o ld gir l.
-4- retroa ctive child support whe re the fathe r demonstrates by clea r and c onvincing evidence that

“ app lic a tio n o f the g uid e lin e s wo uld be un jus t or ina

pp ro pria te in or de r to p ro vid e fo r the int e re sts of the child or the e quity

betwee n the parties.” Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 36-2- 311(a) (11)( A) a nd (B )(2005) . The Code pr ovides t h at co u rts must consider, as a basis for de viating f

rom the g uid e lin e s: (i) the e x tent to which the father did not know , and could not have known, of the e xiste nc e of

the c hil d, the birth o f the c hil d, his po ssi ble pa re ntag e of th e c hil d
or the loc a tio n o f the c hil d; (ii) The extent to which the mother intentionally , and without go o d ca u se, failed or ref used to no t i fy t h e fathe r of the e x istence of the child, the birth of the child, the fa ther' s possible parenta g e of the child or the location of the child; and (iii) The attempts, if any , by the child's mother or c are taker to notify the fa ther of the mothe r' s p re g na nc y , o r the e xiste nc e of th e chi ld , the fathe r' s p os sib le pare ntag e or the location of the c hild.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(A) (2005). Additionally , the trial court’s de termination must be supported by

written finding s. Tennesse e Code Annota ted § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(B )(2005)

. The trial c ourt ’s d i s cr et ion to deviate fr om guide lines is removed whe n clea r and c onvincing evidenc e supports a f

inding of any of the circumstance s enumerated in § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(C)( i)-(iv). I n such ca ses, the equities be tween the parties do not justify a downwa

rd devia tion.

Th e pu bli c po lic y

of thi s State is that pa

re nts , inc lud ing un marrie d pa re nts , are re qu ir e d to support their childre n. Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W .3d 188, 190 (Tenn. 2000). This public policy i s evidenc ed by

the paternity

statutes. Id. D o w n w ar d d e v iati o n s f r o m th e p r e s u mp ti v e ly

c o rr e ct child support g uidelines are per m i t ted in consideration of the best intere sts of the child and the equities betwe en the pa

rties. Se e , e .g ., Hi ll v . H

ill , 152 S.W .3d 543, 546-47 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2004); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 2-311(2005)

.
I t is also the public policy of this State that adults will not engage i n s ex u al intercour se, consensua l or otherwise , with minors who are four or more y ear s y oung er tha n the adult. Tenn. Code An n. § 3 9- 13 -5 06 (2 00 3) ; State v. W alker , No. 01C01-9409-CC-00325, 1995 WL 548852, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 15, 1995)( no perm. app. filed )(stating : “We acc ept as true the prosec utor’s
c on c lus ion that st a tut ory

ra pe is ‘ of fe ns ive to the pu bli c .’ ” ). Of fe nd ing thi s str on g pu bli c po lic y is 1 a cla ss E felony . Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-506. Consent is not a def ense to statutory

rape

. Sta te v. Mc Knight , 900 S.W .2d 36, 49 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

. Moreove r, a defe ndant’s ig noranc e of the minorityof the victim is not required. State v. Vazquez , No. M1999-00211-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 502826, at *2 n.2 (Te nn. Crim. App. Apr. 27, 2000)( no perm. app. filed ).-5-

The Ge nera l Assembly

unambig uously

has dec lare d that a downwa rd de v i at ion from the child support g uidelines in an awa rd of retroa ctive child support is w ithin the discretion of the trial court when application of the guidelines i s unjust or i nappropriate in light of the equities betwe en the pa rt ie s. Th us , a do wn wa

rd de viatio n is a n e qu ita

ble c on sid e ratio n. Th e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y a lso unambig uously

has dec lare d that, despite other equitable considerations, ther e shall be no downwar d de viatio n w he re c le ar andc on vin c ing e vid e nc e de mon str a te s a his tory of vio le nc e , r ape , o r i nc e st, or abuse or neg lect of the child. I n such ca ses, e quity does not demand a

downwar d deviation reg ardle ss of other f

actor s enumerated by

the sec tion.

I n light of the entire statutory scheme of title 36, chapt er 2, a nd the strong public policy discourag ing sexual re lations be tween adults and minors a s define d in § 39-13-506, we c annot fath o m h o w r e mo v in g s tatu to r y r ap e f r o m th e d e f

in it io n o f r ap e f

o r th e p u rp o s e s o f § 36-2- 311 further s the public policy of Tenne ssee. On the contra ry , including sta tutory ra pe within the definition of ra

pe for the purposes of

§ 36-2-311 pr omotes the public poli ci es an n ounced by the Gene ral Asse mbly

in the Code.

I n this case, c lear

and convinc ing e vidence unequivoca lly establishes t hat t he child for whom retroa ctive support is soug ht is the produc t of statutory rape of Mother by

Father. It is undisput ed that when Mother became preg nant s he was fourtee n y ear s of age and Father was twe nty -seve n y ear s of a g e

. Se c tio n 3 6- 2- 31 1( a )( 11 )( C) pr oh ibi ts a do wn wa rdde viatio n f

ro m th e g uid e lin e a mou nt i n a n a wa rdof re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt wh e re a c ir c ums ta nc e e nu me rate d in (i )- (i v) of the se c tio n is demonstrated by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Applic at i on of the sec tion does not require a criminal convic tion. Neither equity , nor t he plain lang uag e of Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 36- 2- 31 1( a )( 11 )( C) , n or

the pu bli c po lic y

of Te nn e sse e as enu nciate d b y the Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

in Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 36-2- 311(a) (11) a nd § 39-13-506 c ountenanc e a dow nwar d deviation from the pr esumptively

corr ect c hild support guidelines w here t h e ch ild is a product of ra pe, including statutory

rape , of the Mother

by the Father.

Hol din g
The trial court err ed under Tenne ssee Code Annotated § 36-2-311( a)( 11)(C) i n gra n ting F a the r a do wn wa rdde viatio n f

ro m th e c hil d s up po rt

g uid e lin e s in sett ing re tr oa c tiv e c hil d s up po rt

. We reve rse the judg ment of the trial c ourt and re mand this action to the trial court with inst ructions to set retroa ctive child support at the g uidel i n e am o u n t

. C osts of this appeal ar e taxed to the A p p e l l e e , T h o m a s C o n l e y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE