E PLURIBUS UNUM

NATIONAL TRA SPORTATION

B OARD

SAFE T Y

N

National Transportation Safety Board 

Washington, D.C. 20594

Marine Accident Brief 

Accident Number DCA03MM033 

Vessel: U.S. Passenger Vessel Columbia O.N. 557340, 418 feet long 

(LOA), 3,946 gross tons, inspected, built in 1974 

Accident Type: Fire 

Location: Wrangell Narrows near Wrangell, Alaska 

Date: May 28, 2003 

Time: 0144 local

Owner: State of Alaska 

Property Damage: $125,000 

Injuries: None

Complement: Crew 43

Passengers 170 

Accident Description 

About 0121 on May 28, 2003, the Alaska Marine Highway System ferry 

Columbia, with 170 passengers on board, departed Petersburg, Alaska, en route to 

Wrangell, Alaska. The ferry was equipped with three ship-service diesel generators,

located in the auxiliary engine room, and the vesselís electrical load required that two of 

the generators be online during normal underway operations. On this morning, the shipservice generators in use were Nos. 1 and 2. 

Shortly after the Columbia left port, an oiler on watch made his normal inspection 

rounds of the engineering spaces. While the oiler was in the auxiliary engine room, he

noticed an odor suggesting that an equipment item was overheating. He said that he was 

unable to locate the source of the odor and, about 0135, went to the control room and 

informed the watch engineer and the chief engineer of his observations. 

The chief engineer said that he immediately went into the auxiliary engine room. 

He was searching for the source of the smell and standing between the diesel engines for

the Nos. 1 and 2 generators when, about 0144, he heard an unusual noise and saw a burst 

of flames in the area of the No. 2 generatorís cooling fan ports. The vessel then lost 

electrical power, which shut down the electrically driven main engine fuel pumps. The 

main engines then shut down, leaving the ship without propulsion power and the ability 

to steer while it was in Wrangell Narrows (figure 1). 

1 NTSB/MAB-04/02 
Figure 1. Wrangell Narrows, where the Columbia lost electrical power. 

The chief engineer stated that the emergency diesel generator then started 

automatically, supplying power for the emergency lighting, some navigation equipment, 

and the steering system. He said that he immediately returned to the control room and

ordered the watch engineer to start the diesel engine that powered the shipís omnidirectional bow thruster, which gave the crew on navigation watch the capability to use 

the bow thruster and the vessel rudder to move out of the traffic lane and to drop anchor. 

The chief engineer noticed that the circuit breaker for the No. 2 generator had

tripped on the main switchboard. He then ordered the shutdown of the No. 2 generatorís 

diesel engine remotely from the control room and returned to the auxiliary engine room, 

accompanied by the junior engineer. The chief engineer and the junior engineer observed 

a fire beneath the turbocharger of the No. 2 generatorís diesel engine. The junior engineer 

2 NTSB/MAB-04/02 
put out the fire using a portable CO2 extinguisher; however, the smoke continued to 

increase and became so thick that the two men had to leave the auxiliary engine room. 

Upon returning to the control room, the chief engineer telephoned the bridge to 

report the generator fire and to request that the firefighting team be called out. The chief 

engineer then ordered all off-watch engineering personnel to report to assist with the 

emergency. 

The firefighting team reported to the engine control room. After being briefed 

about the fire by the chief engineer and the junior engineer, two men from the team (the 

chief mate and the third engineer), wearing fire-protective clothing and self-contained 

breathing apparatus, entered the auxiliary engine room about 0153. Once in the auxiliary 

engine room, the third engineer discovered that the air filter on the turbocharger of the

No. 2 generator was on fire, producing billowing smoke that filled the space. The third 

engineer lifted the burning air filter out of the air intake, and the chief mate put out the 

fire using a portable CO2 fire extinguisher. The team then began inspecting the auxiliary

engine room for other fires and damage. A short time later, the chief mate noticed that the 

air filter had reignited, and the team doused the filter with water to extinguish the fire. By 

0207, the Columbia crew established that the No. 2 generator fire was extinguished and, 

in accordance with the companyís operating procedures, posted a reflash watch as a 

precaution. 

The Columbiaís engineers ventilated the engineering spaces and then started the

Nos. 1 and 3 ship-service diesel generators. After electrical power was fully restored, the 

crew restarted the two main engines at 0230, and engine control was shifted to the bridge 

so that the navigation watch could resume the voyage to Wrangell. 

Rehabilitation of the Electrical Plant 

On May 28, 2003, the Columbia arrived in Ketchikan, Alaska, where Alaska 

Marine Highway System officials had the No. 2 generator removed so that it could be 

sent to an electrical repair facility. Consulting engineers also checked the other shipservice generators. The Columbiaís engineers told the consulting engineers that 

generators Nos. 1 and 3 had operated satisfactorily while en route to Ketchikan; however, 

megger1

 tests revealed that the No. 3 generator had a short (low resistance to ground) on 

one phase and was not suitable to operate. Agency officials, therefore, also had the No. 3 

generator removed from the engineroom so that it could be sent to the electrical repair 

facility to be examined further and repaired. Because the Columbia now lacked two 

operable ship-service generators, the ferry had to be taken out of service. On June 4, 

2003, the Alaska Marine Highway System had a new generator installed so that the ferry 

could operate, and the Columbia was returned to service. 

 1

 A test instrument used to measure insulation resistance and other high resistances. 

3 NTSB/MAB-04/02 
According to agency officials, the Nos. 2 and 3 ship-service generators on the

accident ferry had last been overhauled in 1999. The examination of generator No. 3 at 

the repair facility in early June 2003 revealed that the insulating varnish appeared to be in 

ìexcellent condition.î Examiners found no evidence of an insulation breakdown that 

could account for the low megger reading. The contract repair technicians then rewound 

the generator, and, on June 12, 2003, megger tests were conducted indicating that the 

generator was in proper operating condition. The tests on June 12 were witnessed by the 

port engineer for the Alaska Marine Highway System and a representative of the 

American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), the ferryís classification society. On June 13, 2003, 

while the Columbia was in Bellingham, Washington, the repaired generator was loaded 

onto the ferry. Installation of the generator was completed while the ferry was underway. 

On June 20, 2003, the Columbia returned to Bellingham, where the repaired generator 

underwent a day of testing under the supervision of an ABS representative, who 

determined that the generator operated satisfactorily. 

The initial examination of ship-service generator No. 2 showed that the equipment 

unit had sustained heavy damage from the fire. Much of the copper wiring in the lower 

part of the generator had melted and vaporized. The Alaska Marine Highway System 

contracted for an in-depth failure analysis, which was conducted in July 2003. Consultant 

engineers removed the remaining windings and inspected them for evidence of improper

assembly or insulation failures, but could find no failure condition. The examining 

contractor concluded that the insulation breakdown had occurred in the lower part of the 

generator, which had been mostly destroyed. He further concluded that 

an electrical event or events, possibly the switchboard fire of a few years ago or 

the indiscriminate application of Hi-Pot testing during the dip and bake process, 

caused aging or hard spots in at least one of the windings near the bottom of the 

generator. This caused a short between turns which increased the current in that

coil. The heat was eventually enough to cause additional turns to become shorted 

and then to start the melting process in the winding. As the molten copper started 

to flow, it shorted windings phase to phase, and the event quickly became a

catastrophic failure. 

The switchboard fire referred to by the contractor occurred on June 6, 2000.2 At 

the time, the Nos. 1 and No. 2 generators were in operation. The engineer on watch was 

making an inspection round of the engineering spaces when he observed that the No. 2 

generator was surging ìfrom a slower speed to a higher speedî and was moving

erratically on its foundation. The engineer proceeded to the control room, where he

observed fire coming out of the switchboard. The fire was subsequently extinguished by 

the crew. An investigation into the fire determined that it had been caused by a short 

circuit in the switchboard, and that the short circuit had caused ìsubstantial damageî to 

the switchboard. The No. 2 generator was examined following the accident and found to 

be undamaged. 

 

2

 For more information, see National Transportation Safety Board, Fire On Board the U.S. Passenger

Ferry Columbia, Chatham Strait, Near Juneau, Alaska, June 6, 2000, Marine Accident Report

NTSB/MARñ01/02 (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2001). 

4 NTSB/MAB-04/02 
5 NTSB/MAB-04/02 

Probable Cause 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of 

the fire and the destruction of the wiring in the No. 2 ship-service generator on the 

Columbia was a breakdown in the generatorís wiring insulation. 

Adopted: April 19, 2004