U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

30–174PDF WASHINGTON : 2018

LEBANON AND IRAQ: AFTER THE ELECTIONS

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 22, 2018

Serial No. 115–133

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,

or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

THOMAS A. GARRETT, JR., Virginia 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN J. MAST, Florida 

BRIAN K. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

DAVID N. CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

BRADLEY SCOTT SCHNEIDER, Illinois 

THOMAS R. SUOZZI, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Michael Doran, Ph.D., senior fellow, The Hudson Institute ................................ 7

Ms. Danielle Pletka, senior vice president, Foreign and Defense Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute ..................................................................... 16

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D., senior fellow, Center for Middle East Policy, 

The Brookings Institution ................................................................................... 24

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Michael Doran, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 10

Ms. Danielle Pletka: Prepared statement .............................................................. 19

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ............................................ 27

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 48

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 49

Written response from Ms. Danielle Pletka to question submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Ann Wagner, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Missouri ............................................................................................ 50

(1)

LEBANON AND IRAQ: AFTER THE ELECTIONS 

TUESDAY, MAY 22, 2018

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittee will come to order. After 

recognizing myself and Mr. Schneider for our opening statements, 

I will then recognize other members seeking recognition for 1 

minute. We will then hear from our witnesses. Without objection, 

witnesses, your prepared statements will be made a part of the 

record and members may have 5 days in which to insert statements and questions for the record, subject to the length limitation 

and the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

This month’s parliamentary elections in Lebanon and Iraq will 

have lasting implications not just for their citizens but for the interests of the United States and our allies throughout the Middle 

East, especially Israel. 

In Lebanon, Hezbollah and its allies have gained a majority in 

Parliament, increasing the Iranian influence and the control over 

Lebanon’s Government. Many of us have been warning about 

Hezbollah’s growing influence in Lebanon for quite a while now, 

suggesting that tough decisions needed to be made about U.S. assistance, including to the Lebanese Armed Forces, or the LAF. 

As I noted in a hearing on Lebanon last year, I’ve long been concerned over reports of the LAF-Hezbollah cooperation and U.S. 

commitment to the LAF. U.S. law stipulates that no assistance 

may be made available to the LAF or Lebanon’s internal security 

forces if they are controlled by a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist 

organization. Hezbollah certainly classifies. While coalitions are 

still being formed and it is not yet certain which ministries 

Hezbollah or its allies will control, I hope that this administration, 

unlike previous administrations from both parties, takes a cleareyed approach to the LAF and reassesses our security assistance 

to Lebanon. 

Proponents of cooperation with the LAF have long argued that 

the LAF is the best counterweight against Hezbollah and the best 

way to weaken the Hezbollah influence. Yet, after years of cooperation there is zero evidence that this policy is working. In fact, we’ve 

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only seen Hezbollah’s influence grow, including over the LAF. 

There is no doubt that weakening Hezbollah should be U.S. policy. 

The question is whether we are implementing the correct policies 

to do so. 

I am still having a hard time understanding why the administration decided to cancel U.S. democracy and governance assistance in 

the run-up to the elections, assistance that could help support Lebanon’s moderate forces. When I asked State about this in October, 

I was told that the administration would continue to support these 

programs. Yet, in report after report afterward, we heard that Embassy Beirut decided to cancel them. It is impossible to know what 

the election results would have been had these programs been continued. But one thing is clear: Moderate forces have lost once again 

in Lebanon, and Hezbollah and, by extension, Iran, have further 

consolidated control. 

In Iraq, in a slightly different but no less dangerous a scenario, 

the Sadr alliance surprise win has up-ended the presumed political 

order there, forcing a lot of people, including both in the U.S. and 

in Iran, to scramble. Notorious for his anti-American views and 

leadership of a militia that killed hundreds of American troops in 

the mid-2000s, Sadr is now portraying himself as a nationalist and 

a reformer committed to rooting out corruption and protecting Iraqi 

sovereignty. This is certainly going to put the U.S. in a difficult position as our future relationship with Iraq is now at best in limbo. 

There are also a lot of questions about Sadr’s relationship with 

Iran and his professed resistance to Iranian influence. It’s unclear 

just how strongly he believes in stopping Iranian interference in 

Iraq and even if he’s capable or willing to do so. The Iranian Quds 

Force commander has been making the rounds over the past week, 

shoring up ties with pro-Iranian politicians in an attempt to forge 

a more favorable coalition for Tehran—prospects that would severely jeopardize all of the progress and effort that we have put 

into Iraq. 

As of now, it remains to be seen exactly what type of coalition 

we end up with. I do hope we are doing everything we can to limit 

or push back against the influence of Iran and, at the same time, 

we should also be planning on what to do for all possible outcomes. 

What is clear, however, is that Iran is not going anywhere anytime soon in the region and, by all accounts, despite whatever complications Sadr may cause, will maintain a tremendous amount of 

influence. In both Iraq and Lebanon, Iran continues to gain both 

in power and influence to the detriment of their citizens, regional 

stability, and U.S. national security interest. 

With Secretary Pompeo laying out the administration’s Iran 

strategy just yesterday, I am looking forward to hearing from our 

witnesses, their critiques as well as their recommendations for rolling back Iranian influence in Lebanon, in Iraq, and throughout the 

greater Middle East. I am also looking forward to hearing their assessment on how we can get to this point, why the U.S. was unable 

to make more progress in both countries leading up to the elections, and how we can work with our allies to counter Iran and advance our mutual interests in the region. 

Thank you so much, and with that I will yield to my friend, Mr. 

Schneider, of Illinois. 

3

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and I want 

to thank you and Ranking Member Deutch for convening this meeting. In advance, I will thank the witnesses for sharing your perspectives and insights on this important issue. 

These elections in Lebanon and Iraq are, obviously, very important for a number of reasons. It has impact in the countries. It’s 

going to have an impact in the region, and the outcomes of this 

election and the directions these countries take are going to have 

an impact on United States interests. 

The election on May 6th in Lebanon was the first election since 

2009. It should have—perhaps could have been an important step 

forward. But I was very disappointed, personally, by looking at it 

from the perspective of Congress to see the gains made by political 

parties affiliated and allied with Hezbollah. I have long been concerned by Hezbollah’s operations in Lebanon and its involvement 

in the country’s government. I am even more concerned by Iran’s 

growing influence in the region, as evidenced by these recent 

events. 

I would like to associate myself with Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen’s 

comments, and I think we need to make sure we are looking not 

just at the short-term implications of Hezbollah’s success but the 

long-term implications for Lebanon and the region. 

As I turn to Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr’s return to prominence—this 

rise in this election—should be a concern for all of us. The future 

remains unclear, but the influence of—growing influence of Iran 

appears almost certain. The common thread between both these 

elections appears to be Iran and Iran’s influence in the region. 

I think it’s critically important that the United States focus on 

this and develop a strategy, articulate and share that strategy not 

just with Congress but the world. 

I want to thank the subcommittee for holding today’s hearing so 

we can hear from our witnesses on how best to push back against 

Iran’s increasing malign influence. 

We have to find a way to support legitimate aspirations of Lebanese people, the Iraqi people, to create better lives for themselves. 

We have to do it without propping up organizations like Hezbollah 

or strengthening Iran’s other proxies. 

Again, I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member 

and our witnesses today for your time. And with that, I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Schneider. 

Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding 

this important hearing, and I will be very brief in my statement 

so that we can get to our witnesses. 

As former chairman of this committee and having been on the 

committee for more than two decades now, I would just note that 

whereas it’s encouraging to see both Lebanon and Iran hold—excuse me, Iraq hold elections that it’s concerning to see Iran’s growing influence both in Iraq and in Lebanon. 

In Lebanon, Hezbollah and their allied factions hold an increasing number of seats there, a majority in Parliament, and despite 

its political influence Hezbollah, let’s face it, remains a terrorist organization that directly threatens our principal ally in the region, 

4

Israel—and it really does threaten the entire stability throughout 

the region. 

The intelligence community, in fact, now believes that Iranian 

proxies are the primary threat to our personnel in Iraq. So after 

we spent so much blood and treasure, we must not let Iran reap 

the benefits of those sacrifices that were made at such a high cost 

by so many of your troops there, and then the effort that was made 

to finally destroy, for the most part, ISIS. So let’s make sure that 

Iran is not the entity that ultimately benefits from the blood and 

the hard work of so many Americans and our allies. 

And I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot. 

And now, Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

One of my biggest worries is that in the Western world we are 

kind of tired of defending democracy and freedom and we think we 

are exhausted. We are not, but we think we are. 

We convince ourselves we are sometimes and, in fact, when I 

came out of Iraq in 2009 that’s actually when I made the decision 

to run for Congress, because I had seen between 2008 and 2009 

massive improvements because of the surge in Iraq, and I knew 

that Iraq could be successful but we’d have to stick with it for a 

little bit. 

And I heard the President at the time—the new President, 

Obama—say that he wanted to get out of Iraq, and I remember in 

2011, in fact, he said we are leaving behind a stable democratic 

free—all these great adjectives—Iraq and we left. 

And pretty soon we had ISIS, we had the collapse of the government and we are back. So my biggest concern right now, Madam 

Chair, is that as we look at the behavior of Iran in the region I 

think we’ve done the right thing by pulling out of the Iran deal because of their bad behavior. But I think it’s important that no matter what happens in Iraq we be careful not to leave it behind because I’ve got another 5 years in the military and people I know 

are going to be in there even longer. I don’t want to go back again. 

It’s better to stay than leave and come back. 

So with that, Madam Chair, I thank you for holding this, I thank 

the guests for being here and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Kinzinger. 

And now I am pleased to yield to our ranking member, Mr. 

Deutch of Florida. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for calling this 

hearing. I also want to welcome back our panel of experts, all familiar faces to this committee. We appreciate your being here today 

and we look forward to your insight. 

This has been a thought-provoking few weeks in the Middle East, 

to say the least. We’ve watched as elections were held in Lebanon 

and Iraq. Clashes erupted between Israel and Iran on an unprecedented level. The U.S. Embassy moved to Jerusalem, Hamas’ violence renewed near Gaza in its aftermath, and the U.S. withdrawal 

from the JCPOA—all of this gives us on this committee much to 

consider and all of this impacts the discussion we are going to be 

having here today. 

5

Both Lebanon and Iraq are strategic interests to the United 

States. Both have teetered on fully entering Iran’s sphere of influence in recent years, and while the results of the elections invite 

concern over the success of anti-U.S. Shi’a groups, we commend 

both countries for holding what we at this time believe to have 

been fair and honest elections. Democracy as an institution must 

be led from within and we congratulate Lebanon and Iraq for continuing on the path toward democracy. 

Dr. Wittes, you co-led the National Democratic Institute’s delegation to observe the Lebanese elections and I look forward to your 

take on democracy in action as you saw it. 

As we wait to see how the elections will impact the formation of 

new governments in both countries, there are a lot of questions for 

us to think about in addition to the lingering questions about these 

countries’ stability and the trajectory they’re taking. We are concerned about the possible impact of the outcome of these elections 

to the Lebanese and Iraqi relationships with the United States. 

In Lebanon, where the U.S. has dedicated significant assistance 

in its economic and security sectors, we watched as a very low 

voter turnout, estimated at less than 50 percent, voted for traditional Hezbollah-allied partners. 

And I reiterate my long-standing position that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization in its entirety and efforts to normalize 

Hezbollah and similar groups under the guise of politics is both 

misguided and it is dangerous. 

Nevertheless, I believe we must remain committed to helping 

those legitimate government institutions and forces in Lebanon 

that can counter Hezbollah and, ultimately, Iran’s malign influence. 

I am deeply concerned about Iran’s intentions to promote the 

conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. The United States must 

work to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent military presence in Syria from which we have now seen it directly and brazenly 

attack Israel, and from continuing to transfer weapons and capabilities to Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

In Iraq, the recent elections propped up the anti-U.S. cleric, 

Muqtada al-Sadr, whose violent insurgencies against U.S. forces resulted—has resulted in so many U.S. military deaths and we are 

deeply concerned by the Iranian voices permeating from Baghdad 

and the calls for the U.S. to disengage from the region where we 

have expended so much blood and treasure. 

The conventional defeat of ISIS is a tremendous victory but for 

long-term success to take hold Baghdad and the United States 

must remain vigilant. 

A strong democratic Iraq cannot be achieved under the influence 

of the tyrannical Iranian regime and Iran’s attempts to sway Iraq 

in its direction are concerning. 

Apart from foreign influence concerns, both Lebanon and Iraq 

have economic and security concerns that cannot be ignored. ISIS 

and the effort to defeat the group left Iraqi cities in rubble with 

over 2 million Iraqis displaced. 

Lebanon is struggling with the impacts of a mass surge of Syrian 

refugees. Economic growth is vital to stability in both countries and 

I am concerned about government services failing to provide for 

6

citizens who may then turn to groups like Hezbollah or ISIS to fill 

the gap. 

We’ve got to examine the domestic issues and concerns that led 

to the outcomes produced by these elections if we are going to fully 

understand how the ultimately formed governments will orient 

themselves. 

There is a great deal to unpack here and I thank our panel of 

experts for their time and expertise in helping us do that, and I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And now we turn to Ambassador Wagner for an opening statement. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for hosting this 

hearing. 

It’s encouraging to see Iraq and Lebanon hold democratic elections. I am, however, deeply concerned to see Iran’s influence increasing steadily, if slowly, in Iraq and Lebanon’s governing bodies. 

Iran does not hesitate to sow discord in its democratic neighbors 

to undermine our regional initiatives. Democracy flourishing in the 

Middle East is good for American interests and long-term stability 

of the region. It is clear to me that any strategy to contain Iran 

must include a democratic independent Iraq and Lebanon. 

I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and the questions 

that will ensue. I thank you, Madam Chair, for your indulgence 

and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Wagner. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Yes, thank you very much for holding the 

hearing today and if we are concerned about Iran—excuse me, Iraq 

and Lebanon and we are concerned about the expansion of Iranian 

influence, again, let me remind us, as I have in this hearing room 

so often, Iran is not our enemy. 

The mullah regime in Iran is our enemy, and the reason why we 

see that we are losing ground—that we are losing ground in Lebanon and in Iraq is because we have let the mullahs off the hook. 

They don’t have any internal worries so they are on the offensive. 

When we could be helping the Kurds—there are more Kurds in 

Iran than there are in Iraq—but we should be helping the Kurds 

in both Iran and Iraq. There are Baloch. There are people in Iran 

who hate the mullah regime and they’re getting not the type of 

support that they need, and if we started that strategy we would 

have the mullah regime probably defeated within a short period of 

time or at least not engaging in these activities in Lebanon and 

Iraq that are—that are threatening to our security and the stability of that region. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Seeing no other requests for time, now I am delighted to welcome 

our panellists. 

First, we thank Dr. Michael Doran, senior fellow at the Hudson 

Institute, where he specializes in Middle East security issues. 

Prior to this position, Dr. Doran was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, held positions at NYU, Princeton, and the University of Central Florida—finally, a good university—and served as 

a senior director in the National Security Council. 

7

Thank you so much for being here today, sir. We look forward 

to your testimony. 

And next we are delighted to welcome back Danielle Pletka, senior vice president for foreign and defense policy studies at the 

American Enterprise Institute and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. 

Prior to this, Ms. Pletka served as a staffer for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 

Thank you for being here. 

We look forward to your testimony, and we see that your two 

daughters are there behind you—two out of three. Thank you very 

much for being here today. We’ll try to embarrass you as much as 

possible, daughters. 

And finally, we are delighted to welcome back Dr. Tamara 

Cofman Wittes. It doesn’t matter how many times you come here. 

I am still going to slaughter your name. Wittes? Wittes—there we 

go—senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute. 

Previously, Dr. Wittes served as deputy assistant secretary of 

state for Near Eastern affairs as well as Middle East specialist at 

the U.S. Institute of Peace and director of programs at the Middle 

East Institute. 

Thank you so much, all of you, for being here. We look forward 

to your testimony. As I said, your written statement will be made 

a part of the record. So please feel free to summarize, and we will 

begin with you, Dr. Doran. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DORAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

THE HUDSON INSTITUTE 

Mr. DORAN. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member 

Deutch——

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Move your microphone just a little bit. 

Mr. DORAN. How’s that? 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member—Ranking Member 

Deutch, members of the committee—of the subcommittee, it’s a 

privilege to speak to you today. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify on the implications of 

the elections in Iraq and Lebanon. In both countries the results 

represent a setback for the United States. 

In Lebanon, they have, obviously, strengthened the hand of 

Hezbollah. In Iraq, opinion is divided about the extent to which 

Muqtada al-Sadr’s rise represents a victory for Iran. 

Even if the results turn out to be less damaging than the pessimists predict, there is nevertheless little doubt that they complicate American efforts to contain Iran. 

These setbacks, however, are but the latest in a long string of 

Iranian advances and they are by no means the greatest advances. 

With your permission, I will concentrate on how the United States 

might, in broad strategic terms, rebound and reverse the trend. I 

will focus my remarks in particular on the strategic implications of 

President Trump’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. That decision certainly lays the groundwork for 

a more effective American policy. It will not, however, prove sufficient to turn the tables on Tehran. 

8

The United States, I will argue, should adopt a two-speed approach to its competition with Iran. I will argue it should adopt a 

two-speed approach to its competition with Iran—aggressive and 

uncompromising in some areas such as Syria and Lebanon, where 

it enjoys a freer hand, and more nuanced in countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, where conditions are not conducive to an unfettered 

competition. 

Yesterday, Secretary Pompeo laid out a broad strategy or a broad 

policy of rolling back Iranian power throughout the region, not just 

in the nuclear program, but also in terms of its support for terrorism and its influence in the region. I strongly welcome this approach. I think it correctly defined the Iranian problem and I think 

it dispensed with a lot of the illusions of the last 4 or 5 years in 

which we have seen ourselves engaging with moderates in Iraq and 

strengthening them and bringing them into the family of nations. 

And I think that Secretary Pompeo’s speech spoke with admirable clarity about the essence of our strategy now, which is one 

of coercing Iran. Now, the critics of this policy are presenting it as 

a choice of war over peace but I think that’s a false depiction, because what they are calling peace was actually appeasement, as, I 

think, all of the—everyone who spoke today on the subcommittee 

said. 

Iran has been on the march and, unfortunately, that march has 

been facilitated by the enrichment of Iran that the JCPOA made 

possible. So the administration is to be—the administration is to be 

credited with seeing things clearly and for laying the groundwork 

for a policy of seriously containing Iran. However, we have to be 

clear about the fact that Iran is not going to be coerced simply by 

reimposing the sanctions, which the JCPOA—which the decision 

about the JCPOA will entail. 

Coercion means actual coercive policies—the use of hard power 

to make Iran pay a price for the—for its military adventurism 

around the region. 

In Secretary Pompeo’s remarks, he actually spoke about crushing 

Hezbollah and proxies. The word was very evocative. It stood out. 

But I am afraid that it didn’t strike fear in the hearts of any Iranian leaders because they have been treated to this kind of frightful rhetoric before and they have developed a number of—a number 

of clever mechanisms for defeating American hardliners or, let’s 

just say, hardline policies. They have come with ways of waiting us 

out and wearing us down. 

The two-speed strategy that I suggest is one in which we can actually bring hard power to bear against Iran in some arenas and 

in other arenas, like Lebanon and Iraq, having a somewhat lighter 

touch. The essence of it, as I describe in my written testimony, is 

that we should be relying, especially in Syria and in Yemen, on allies who are already in the hard power fight against Iran and 

Israel, in particular. 

I note that our military is very reluctant to get directly involved 

in the conflict against Iran and it complains that it doesn’t have 

an authorization of force. Given that fact—given the difficult politics around it, I think where we should be focusing our attention 

in terms of raising the cost to the Iranians across the board is by 

strengthening the Israelis in Syria and strengthening the Saudis in 

9

Yemen through military support, intelligence support, diplomatic 

support, and other forms of assistance. 

In Iraq and Lebanon in particular I think we have to be aware—

we have to admit that our influence has been somewhat diminished 

and that the complex nature of our interests in those—in those 

countries will make it difficult for us to carry out a hard-power 

competition with the Iranians there. 

But we have to do much more. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, you 

mentioned the—withdrawing support or reviewing support to the 

LAF. The LAF, in my view, is actually the—should be of secondary 

concern to us. The primary concern to me is the control or the influence that Iran and Hezbollah have in the banking and finance 

sector in Lebanon. That’s where it would put the emphasis. 

I’ll just end by saying this—that the Bipartisan Policy Center 

issued a report on Iran policy recently which laid out three basic 

options without choosing one of them. Option one was roll back, option two was containment, and option three was modus vivendi. 

Under the Obama administration, we had a policy that sought 

modus vivendi with Iran without acknowledging it. The effect was 

that we realigned our policy from Baghdad to Beirut in parallel 

with the Iranians. When the Trump administration came in, it 

didn’t have a roll back option in any of the—in Iraq and Syria or 

in Lebanon. 

I don’t think that this decision that it has made is going to make 

roll back possible. I think, however, containment in those—in Lebanon and Iraq is possible. Roll back is possible in Syria. But the 

administration has yet to announce that it is actually going to engage in that kind of hard power roll back, which I think is absolutely essential to the success. 

If we don’t raise the price to Iran across the board, then the 

strategy that they have outlined will not succeed. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Doran follows:]

10


30174a-1.eps

Hudson Institute 

Prepared statement by: 

Michael Doran 

Senior Fellow 

Hudson lnsti tute 

Testimony before U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East and North 

Africa (Committee on Foreign Affairs} 

Lebanon and Iraq: After the Elections 

May 22,2018 

Toward a Two-Speed Strategy 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, members of the subcommittee, it is 

a privilege to speak to you today. I thank you for the opportunity to testifY on the 

implications of the elections in Iraq and Lebanon. In both countries, the results 

represent a setback for the United States. In Lebanon, they have obviously 

strengthened the hand of Hezbollah and Iran. In Iraq, opinion is divided about the 

extent to which Muqtada al-Sadr's rise represents a similar victory for Tehran. Even if 

the final results turn out to be less damaging than the pessimists now predict, there is 

little doubt that they will complicate American efforts to contain Iran. 

These setbacks are but the latest in a long string of Iranian advances. With your 

permission, I will concentrate on how the United States might, in broad strategic terms, 

rebound and reverse the trend. I will focus my remarks, in particular, on the strategic 

implications of President Trump's decision to withdraw from the joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action. That decision certainly lays the groundwork for a more effective 

American policy. It will not, however, prove sufficient to turn the tables on Tehran. 

The United States, l will argue, should adopt a two-speed strategy in its competition 

with Iran. It should behave in an aggressive and uncompromising manner in some 

areas, such as Syria and Yemen, where it enjoys a freer hand; and it should adopt a 

lighter touch in countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, where conditions are less 

conducive to an unfettered competition. 

Yesterday at the Heritage Foundation, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the Trump 

administration intends to shut down Iran's nuclear program and, in addition, to force it to end 

its military adventurism and support for terrorism. Secretary Pompeo promised to "apply 

unprecedented financial pressure on the Iranian regime," to work "closely with the 

Department of Defense and our regional allies to deter Iranian aggression," and to "advocate 

~,J.\N. 
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tirelessly for the Iranian people." 

He listed some twelve steps that Iran must take in order for the United States to accept it as a 

normal member of the family of nations. Iran will not take these steps willingly. Truth be told, 

the day it complies with all of them will be the day after the Islamic Republic ceases to exist. 

The Trump administration, that is to say, has announced a policy oflong-term, aggressive 

containment, not unlike the policy the United States adopted toward the Soviet Union in the 

Cold War. 

We must have no illusions. Success will hinge on grinding down the Iranians-on naked 

coercion. Secretary Pompeo did not shrink from the question of coercion, but he made it 

sound easier than it will be. "[W]e will track down Iranian operatives and their Hizballah 

proxies operating around the world and we will crush them," he said. The word "crush" is 

certainly evocative, but how believable is it? Taken literally, it implies that American soldiers 

will soon be fighting on the ground in Lebanon and Iraq against Iran's proxies. But that's not 

going to happen. For years now, leading figures in both political parties-including President 

Obama and President Trump-have displayed a deep aversion to open-ended military 

commitments in the Middle East The United States, one must conclude, will think twice before 

attacking Iran's proxies directly. How, then, does the Trump administration propose to "crush" 

them? 

Perhaps Secretary Pompeo used the word to signal ofresolve-to warn Iran not to test us. If 

so, it is doubtful that his words frightened leaders in Tehran. This is not the first time that they 

have heard frightful rhetoric from Washington. In the past, American leaders have often failed 

to match their words with deeds; and even when they have, Tehran has frequently managed to 

wear down American resolve. The prototypical example, of course, is President Reagan's 

decision, in1983, to dispatch the Marines to Beirut as part of a multi-national peacekeeping 

force. His staying power dissipated quickly, however, after Hizballah, undoubtedly acting on 

orders from Tehran, drove two truck bombs into the Marines' barracks, killing 241 Americans 

and 58 Frenchmen. The US troops withdrew, and the United States exacted no price from Iran 

for it~ aggression. 

If President Trump's resolve is to prove more lasting, he must back it up with a sustained set of 

coercive policies. Economic sanctions will be a key component of such a policy, but they will 

not do the job alone. Success will also require the use of force. 

Finding the right mix of sanctions and force will prove to be a particularly daunting task, 

thanks to the size of the coalition opposing President Trump's decision to abandon the nuclear 

deal. Significant elements of the national security elite (including parts of the military) 

strongly disapprove of getting tough with Iran. To make matters worse, European allies, 

China, Russia, some of the president's domestic political opponents, and an influential segment 

of the American media stand ready to use the first sign of trouble to convince the American 

public that the president is leading the country into the abyss. 

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Ask yourself this. Would the equivalent of a Marine Barracks bombing today convince skeptics 

in the national security elite to line up behind the new policy, or would it renew their 

commitment to destroy it? The challenge before the president is to bring the requisite force to 

bear against Iran without supporting the accusation that he is behaving with unprecedented 

recklessness. 

His opponents paint the new policy as a choice of war over peace. The "peace" that they extol, 

however, was appeasement masquerading as a new relationship between fictive Iranian 

moderates and the West. In reality, the United States was strengthening the Iranian economy 

while the Revolutionary Guard Corps went on the offensive, spreading its malignant influence 

by force throughout the Middle East. This phony peace curtailed none of the Iranian ambitions 

that the United States and its allies find threatening-including Iran's nuclear program. On the 

contrary, it fueled those ambitions. Be that as it may, in the eyes of President Trump's 

detractors, the problem that most needs solving is his call to coercion, not Iran's behavior. 

For President Trump's policy to be successful, he need not match Iran move for move. He need 

only stress the Iranian system in enough arenas simultaneously to make the total cost of its 

malignant behavior prohibitively high. The United States certainly has the potential to exact 

such a price, with a relatively minor exertion on its part, but it will require an integrated 

approach. Historically, the subordination of policy toward each country in the Middle East to a 

regional Iran strategy has proven notoriously difficult to pull off. In the recent past, for 

example, the regional priority has been to counter the Islamic State. Iran policy has always 

been the second priority, if that. As a result, Iranian-backed militias have enjoyed a permissive 

environment almost everywhere along the line from Baghdad to Beirut. 

Those of us who support the president's new policy, therefore, must strongly urge him to 

define countering Iran, not the Islamic State, as the top national priority in the Middle Eastand to orient the bureaucracies accordingly. One practical way of nudging the administration 

in the proper direction is to call for a survey of resources across the executive branch. During 

the George W. Bush administration, in which I served, the State Department carried out an 

internal assessment that revealed something remarkable: the Department was devoting more 

personnel to Norway than to Iran. This state of affairs was, in part, a legacy of the Cold War. 

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice took immediate steps to bring the allocation of resources 

into alignment with new priorities. 

I strongly suspect that a similar imbalance has once again emerged-and not just or primarily 

in the State Department. The Obama administration constructed a network of bureaucratic 

machinery, spanning multiple agencies, to counter the Islamic State. Built as it was on top of 

the vast counterterrorism apparatus created to fight al-Qaeda, this machinery is now far larger 

than the actual threat from Sunni terrorism warrants. The Trump administration should call 

on each agency to survey resources and personnel allocated to the fight against al-Qaeda and 

the Islamic State, and it should reallocate some percentage of both to the effort to counter Iran. 

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But reallocating resources is the easy part. Much harder is actually changing policy across the 

Middle East. To bend our minds around the challenge that President Trump faces, it is helpful 

to consult a recent report, "U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Strategic Options," prepared by the Middle 

East task force of the Bipartisan Policy Center. The report makes no recommendations. Its 

primary value is in offering us the language for describing the three basic policy options that 

are on offer: rollback, containment, and modus vivendi. 

The Trump administration has now clearly adopted a goal of rollback. However, it has yet to 

institute policies across the Middle East that will certainly achieve its stated goals. The main 

problem facing the administration is the legacy of the Obama administration, which completely 

abandoned rollback as a viable strategy. President Obama's unstated approach, which he and 

his senior officials denied when queried, was to seek a modus vivendi with Tehran. Due to the 

complex political crosscurrents in the Middle East, however, President Obama was not able to 

carry out a uniform modus vivendi policy. But he certainly came close. In Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, 

and Yemen, his successor inherited a two-speed strategy that limited American options either 

to containment or modus vivendi. In each case, the rollback option was simply no longer 

available. 

Trump's moves have begun to revive the rollback option in certain arenas, but it would be 

unrealistic to expect administration to implement it everywhere. A uniform rollback policy is 

unattainable. In countries such as, for example, Lebanon and Iraq, basic prudence calls for a 

lighter touch. Nevertheless, even in those countries it would not be unreasonable to expect 

President Trump to stiffen American policy. His broad goal should be to develop a new twospeed strategy, one that relied solely on rollback and containment. In the fullness of time, he 

should work to eliminate modus vivendi as an option anywhere. 

Rollback, of course, implies some use of hard power. It is, therefore, most safely pursued in 

Syria and Yemen, where the United States and its allies are already engaged in military 

operations. The case of Syria is particularly noteworthy. In his speech yesterday, Secretary 

Pompeo called on Iran to "withdraw all forces under [it.~] command throughout the entirety of 

Syria." This demand was new and sweeping. It represents, however, a goal that the American 

military, has repeatedly rejected. The military's sole mission in Syria, it has frequently 

reminded us, is simply to defeat the Islamic State. 

Devising coercive policies that support the administration's aggressive political goals is a task 

that should occupy the attention anyone interested in the success of President Trump's Iran 

policy. The most direct way to achieve this goal would be for Congress to authorize the use of 

military force against Iran in Syria. From a political point of view, however, this option is 

probably unrealistic. But that fact need not deter us. The United States also has indirect ways 

of striking at Iran-ways that do not risk drawing the United States into a quagmire. 

The easiest of these is to support allies who already in the fight. Secretary Pompeo's 

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Syria goals are notable for bringing America's declared policy into perfect alignment with 

Israeli policy. In contrast to the United States, Israel is already engaged in military operations 

whose stated goal is to drive Iran from Syria. We should therefore ask ourselves what actions 

we might take to strengthen Israel's hand. Militarily, these might include, on the passive end of 

the spectrum, positioning our forces so as to deter Russian counterattacks against Israel. On 

the activist end, they might include arming and training Syrian forces to engage in operations 

against Iran and its proxies-much as we armed the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the 1980s. 

Diplomatically, the United States might associate itself much more directly with the red lines 

that Israel has announced regarding the Iranian presence in Syria. Israel has, for example, 

called for pushing Iran and its proxies away from its border on the Golan Heights. Who is 

prepared to say that Washington has done all in its power to demonstrate to Moscow that it 

fully supports this goal? In short, a policy of greater coordination with jerusalem is both 

possible and desirable. 

In Yemen, too, greater coordination with Saudi Arabia is worth pursuing. More to the point, if 

the United States fails to increase support for allies who are directly engaged militarily action 

against Iran and its proxies, the new rollback policy will likely remain a pious aspiration rather 

than a realistic plan. 

In Lebanon and Iraq, conditions will not support a hard rollback policy. In these countries the 

goal should be to shift the policy away from modus vivendi and in the direction of 

containment. In Iraq, the priority, of course, is the dismantlement of the militia infrastructure 

that the Iranians have built. In Lebanon, many voices have called for an end to American 

support for the Lebanese Armed Forces. I am much less attracted to this option than to using 

sanctions to force the Lebanese banking sector to choose between doing business with 

Hizbollah and Iran or doing business with the United States and its financial institutions. 

American policy has repeatedly avoided taking this action for fear of destabilizing Lebanon. In 

practice, however, heeding this fear has amounted to bowing to Hizballah's blackmail. It has 

given Iran a free hand with the predictable result~ than we now face. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch, and members of the subcommittee, allow 

me to end with a note of caution. Iran will not take a coercive American policy sitting down. It 

will strike back-and it will do so cleverly. It has ten obvious levers to pull: 

1) Adopting a charm offensive in Europe. 

2) Denying America allies inside Middle Eastern countries, by coopting and coercing key 

interlocutors. 

3) Using proxies to take Americans and citizens of allied countries hostage. 

4) Subjecting American troops in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq to attacks. 

5) Seeking diplomatic assistance from the Russians and the Chinese, who have a vested 

interest in seeing American coercion fail. 

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6) Encouraging Ham as and the Palestinian Islamic jihad to attack Israel. 

7) Threatening Israel with rocket and missile attacks from Lebanon. 

8) Precipitating a new nuclear crisis. 

9) Supporting Sunni terrorist groups even while presenting Tehran as the West's ally against 

them. 

10) Assisting the Taliban. 

It almost goes without saying that the United States should begin working with its allies now to 

develop contingency plans for countering these tactics. I say, "almost," because I know from 

experience in the White House that contingency planning is something we extol much more 

than we actually conduct. As obvious as these tactics are, they have often taken Western 

decision makers by surprise, and they have proven effective in wearing down Western resolve. 

Thank you again for offering me the privilege of addressing you. 

6 
16

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Pletka. 

STATEMENT OF MS. DANIELLE PLETKA, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN 

ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Ms. PLETKA. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Deutch, members of 

the committee, thank you so much for asking me to join you here 

today. It’s really a pleasure to be back and thank you for embarrassing my children. It’s really been my life’s work and I am always happy to have help. 

A few months ago, I wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal 

asking whether the United States intended to lose Iraq as we have 

lost Lebanon. The question really feels all the more apropos today 

in the wake of the troubling elections we’ve been talking about here 

today in both those countries. 

So let’s skip to the punch line. In both these cases, the United 

States has, or once had, a chance to challenge Iran at a relatively 

low cost. But as we have already done in Lebanon and Iraq, too, 

I fear, we will miss that chance because we are focused elsewhere, 

myopic about our potential influence, and really too willing to lie 

to ourselves about the status quo. We are really, apparently, indifferent in too many cases to the march of the Islamic Republic of 

Iran across the greater Middle East. 

Beginning with Lebanon, the results of the election are as depressing as they were predictable. Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s 

party lost and their allies lost about 15 seats, which was a rout 

rooted in both Lebanon’s own dysfunction, Hariri’s own lackluster 

performance and the somewhat bizarre interlude during which he 

was kidnapped to Saudi Arabia. 

The winners were two: A protest vote for the Lebanese forces, 

which shouldn’t be confused with the Lebanese Armed Forces—

they picked up seven seats—and the other was Hezbollah with its 

own party and allies picking up about 15 seats. Tammy noted to 

me that Walid Jumblatt’s party also picked up seats. Where Walid 

will stand is always a question in everybody’s mind, but he has 

stood with Hezbollah. 

This is the same Hezbollah that’s amassed an arsenal that would 

be the envy of many countries. Israel estimates Hezbollah has more 

than 150,000 rockets in the south of Lebanon, built up in violation 

of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. Worse still, I understand 

that Iran is changing its arms transfer modus operandi. Because 

it recognizes the difficulty of transferring weapons to its proxies 

over land, through air, over sea, it is instead concentrating on 

transferring know-how: Rocket, missile building, guidance system, 

things like that. If Hezbollah or the Houthis or Hamas or any of 

Iran’s many proxies throughout the region have the know-how to 

build more and more advanced weaponry and the operational latitude to do so, as they do now on Lebanese soil, what does the future hold? 

The last elections confirmed for us that the next Government of 

Lebanon will be run, largely, by Hezbollah, which means, of course, 

it will be run, largely, by Tehran. I know, as Mike said, that the 

Treasury Department is concerned about the integrity of Lebanon’s 

17

banking system. In addition, we should be worried about the fact 

that Hezbollah reportedly wants the Interior Ministry, the Public 

Works Ministry, and the Economy Ministry as for itself using the 

cash that they can get out of those ministries to ease the burden 

on their sponsor in Iran, which is having some economic difficulties. 

So that leaves for us the Lebanese Armed Forces. The Lebanese 

military claims not to coordinate with Hezbollah but there’s evidence to the contrary. Last year, Hezbollah’s military parade in 

Syria included a U.S. M-113 armored personnel carrier. Did it come 

from the Lebanese Armed Forces? Intelligence sources in some 

countries say yes. The U.S. says it doesn’t think so. But we know 

that in southern Lebanon the LAF have allowed Hezbollah to restock, shared intelligence with them, and have jointly manned 

checkpoints. 

Given the weight of the evidence—and there’s more, I am pretty 

sure, in a classified setting—is it not appropriate to worry the Government of Lebanon is effectively itself becoming a proxy of Iran? In light of that, consider we’ve given more than $1.5 billion to 

Lebanon in security assistance and even more in development and 

economic support. 

Defenders of the U.S. posture in Lebanon including some in the 

White House, the State Department, and at the Pentagon suggest 

the LAF are an effective fighting force against ISIS. General Votel, 

the commander of CENTCOM, has been very insistent on that regard. But if fighting ISIS is our sole standard, why should we not 

arm and support Hezbollah? They’re pretty good at that, too. 

That’s the challenge we face. The enemy of our enemy isn’t always our friend and the same is true, unfortunately, in Iraq. 

In part assisted by an alliance with the Iraqi military and the 

so-called popular mobilization forces, we were able to secure a victory against ISIS in Iraq. But this pact with Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Forces-supported Iraqi units will mean the U.S. 

and the Government of Iraq ultimately pay a very heavy price, and 

look no further than the results of these elections in which our ally, 

Haider al-Abadi, came in third place, trailing the leader of the Popular Mobilization Force’s Hadi al-Amiri and Muqtada al-Sadr. 

Unlike in Lebanon, we don’t know what the outcome of the Iraqi 

election is going to be and it may not be a slam dunk for Iran. But 

there’s an underlying point here, and that is the lesson unlearned 

by the United States in Lebanon and, apparently, still unlearned 

in Iraq today. The Islamic Republic of Iran has a foreign policy 

model. They do not seek to dominate. They seek to influence and, 

if necessary, destabilize. They do so through their proxies and, increasingly, through their proxies in Iraq as well. These are Iranian 

expeditionary forces not only loyal to their own countries but answering to command in Tehran. 

If I may have just another 30 seconds. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, go ahead. 

Ms. PLETKA. Iran is no Soviet Union. Its economy is weak and 

its hold over its own people is tenuous, as you yourselves have 

noted. But victory after victory in the Middle East should suggest 

to us that Iran has a winning formula, one that would be—one that 

could be countered with a serious U.S. strategy of engagement, a 

18

theory of our own victory, and one that would not contemplate an 

every decade return for war in the Middle East. 

We must shore up the Iraqi Government as we fail to shore up 

the Lebanese against Iran. We must do so without wavering in our 

commitments, and by offering them choices: Us or them. Us must 

mean genuine political and economic engagement and leadership. 

This is what you were talking about that both the Obama administration and, unfortunately, the Trump administration has cut back 

on. That kind of engagement is far cheaper than war. It must start 

with aiding the battle against corruption, which erodes confidence 

in democracy and markets in Beirut and Baghdad, and it must continue with a commitment to institutions of government. 

You may well ask, because I know we are going to talk about 

this, whether that is not what we have done with the Lebanese 

Armed Forces in Lebanon, and my answer is no. 

We’ve looked away as that country has been sucked into the Iranian vortex, and failed to bolster those who naturally despise Iran 

and its terrorist proxies. 

We’ve allowed weak leaders to take our money and our weapons 

while serving a foreign master—perhaps not always directly but, 

certainly, indirectly. 

We’ve never put it to our nominal allies that they must stand 

against Iran and Hezbollah, not simply rhetorically but actually. 

We’ve never laid the burden on them to prove they’re not working 

with a designated terrorist organization. 

I believe we failed in Lebanon and I believe we’ve lost. Now we 

are faced with the same choice in Iraq. We can either force these 

countries to choose between Washington and Tehran, or we can 

continue to bury our heads in the sand and allow Iran to win again 

and again. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Pletka follows:]

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Lebanon and Iraq 

.AMER!CAI'J 

ENTERPRISE 

INSTITUTE 
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Lebanon and Iraq: After the Elections 

Madam Chairman, Mr. Deutch, Members of the Committee, thank you for asking me join you here 

today. 

A few months ago, I wrote an oped in the Wall Street Journal asking whether the United States 

intended to lose Iraq as we have lost Lebanon. The question feels all the more apropos today, in the 

wake of troubling elections in both those countries. And let's skip to the punch line: In both cases, the 

United States has, or once had a chance to challenge Iran at relatively low cost. But as we have already 

in Lebanon, and Iraq too, I fear, we will miss that chance because we are focused elsewhere, myopic 

about our potential influence, too willing to lie to ourselves about the status quo, and apparently 

indifferent to the march of the Islamic Republic of Iran across the greater Middle East. 

Beginning with Lebanon, the results of recent elections are as depressing as they were predictable. 

Prime Minister Saad Hariri's party and allies lost 15 seats, a rout rooted in both Lebanon's own 

dysfunction, Hariri's lackluster performance and the bizarre interlude during which he was kidnapped to 

Saudi Arabia. The winners were two: one a protest vote for the Lebanese Forces (not to be confused 

with the Lebanese Armed Forces), which picked up seven seats, and the other Hezbollah, with its own 

party and allies picking up 14 seats. 

This is the same Hezbollah that has amassed an arsenal that would be the envy of many countries. Israel 

estimates Hezbollah has more than 150,000 rockets in the south of Lebanon, built up in violation of 

UNSC Resolution 1701. Worse still, I understand that Hezbollah is changing its arms transfer modus 

operandi. Because it recognizes the difficulty of physical weapons transfers to its allies, it is transferring 

know-how- rocket and missile building, guidance systems and the like. If Hezbollah, or the Houthis, or 

Hamas, or any of Iran's many other proxies have the know-how to build more and more advanced 

weaponry, and the operational latitude to do so- as they do on Lebanese soil right now- what does the 

future hold? 

The last elections confirm for us that the next government of Lebanon will be run by Hezbollah. And I 

fear many of the institutions of Lebanon will soon be as well. Which means they will be run by Tehran. 

Here's Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah on Iran and on the Lebanese Armed Forces: 

According to Ci~S, Nasrallah has characterized the LAF as a "partner" and a "pillar" in what 

Hezbollah has described as the "golden formula, which means the resistance, the Army, and the 

people." 

Hezbollah and the LAF coordinated along the Lebanon Syria border in a major battle last year: 

~1!fl. Nasrallah: "What the Lebanese Army did around Aarsal, on the outskirts of Aarsal, and 

along the contact line within the Lebanese territories was essential for scoring this victory." 

On Iran, Nasrallah this year 'ill<i: "We believe in him [Khamenei[ higher than the [Lebanese[ 

constitution (some say that he says it is better to act within the framework of the constitution in 

so and so way). We consider this view tak/if, legal obligation, and necessary."' 

In 2016, he said, "Hezbollah's budget, salaries, money, food, drink, weapons, all of this comes 

from Iran ... as long as there is money in Iran, we have money." 

1 This speech has been denied and publications regarding it in Iran scrubbed, but most analysts suggest the denial 

is more political, because of Lebanese elections, rather than because the speech was not given. 
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Of course, Nasrallah is a known flunky. But here's what Lebanese President Michel Aoun has said of 

Hezbollah, a designated foreign terrorist organization: 

"Hezbollah has altered its political stance and has respected Lebanese sovereignty ... Nasrallah 

has said as much in an address: Hezbollah has renounced its project to install an 'Islamic 

Republic' in Lebanon." 

"Hezbollah are not using their weapons in internal politics. They only ensure our resistance 

against the State of Israel, which continues to occupy part of our territory and which refuses to 

apply UN resolutions regarding the Palestinians' right to return." 

"As long as the Lebanese army lacks sufficient power to face Israel, we feel the need for 

(Hezbollah's) arsenal because it complements the army's role." 

"Iran is present and has its influence in the Middle East and it must be taken into account," he 

said. The president also stressed that Iran has "no ambitions in Lebanon." 

The Lebanese military claims not to coordinate with Hezbollah, but there is evidence to the contrary. 

Last year, a Hezbollah military parade in Syria included a U.S. M113 armored personnel carrier. Did it 

come from the Lebanese Armed Forces? Intelligence sources say yes. We also know that in southern 

Lebanon, the LAF have allowed Hezbollah to restock, shared intelligence with them, and have jointly 

manned checkpoints. 

Given the weight of the evidence -and there is more, I am certain, available in a classified setting-is it 

not inappropriate to worry that the government of Lebanon is effectively itself becoming a proxy of 

Iran? 

In light of that, consider US assistance programs to Lebanon: 

According to President Trump's FY2018 budget request to Congress, the Administration sought 

$103 million in total aid to Lebanon, mostly in economic aid ($213 million was obligated for 

Lebanon in FY2016). 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has been one of the primary sources of U.S. funding for the 

LAF, along with Counterterrorism Partnership (CTPF) funds. Both the House (H.R. 3362) and 

Senate (S. 1780) FY2018 State and Foreign Operations appropriations bills continue FMF funding 

for Lebanon. 

The Senate appropriations report (S.Rept. 115-152) recommends $105 million in FMF to 

Lebanon. 

In August 2017, Embassy Beirut announced the delivery of eight M2A2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles 

and armored field artillery ammunition supply vehicles to the LAF, the first of a total shipment of 

32 Bradleys to be delivered in the coming months. Ambassador Richard also stated that the 

following defense articles had been provided to the LAF in the past 12 months: 

40 M198 howitzers, 

50 armored Humvees, 

an Armed Cessna aircraft with Hellfire missiles, 

55 mortar systems, 

50 Mark-19 automatic grenade launchers, 

1,100 machine guns, including 800 50 caliber machine guns, 

4,000 M4 rifles, 

over 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 

320 night vision devices and thermal sights, and 
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30174b-4.eps

360 secure communication radios. 

Defenders of the U.S. posture in Lebanon, including some in the White House, State Department and 

Pentagon, suggest the LAF are an effective fighting force against ISIS. CENTCOM commander Joseph 

Votel insists that "the Lebanese people are realizing more and more that the LAF, their country's most 

trusted and respected institution, is increasingly capable of protecting them from external threats." 

But if fighting ISIS is our sole standard, why not arm and support Hezbollah? They too are an effective 

fighting force vs ISIS. Why stop there? Why not Iran too? 

This is the challenge we face. The enemy of our enemy is not always our friend. And the same is true in 

Iraq. 

In part assisted by an alliance with the Iraqi military and so-called Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF, 

Hashd a/ Shabi), we were able to secure a victory against ISIS in Iraq. But this pact with Iranian Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Forces-supported Iraqi units will mean the United States and the Government of 

Iraq pay a heavy price too. Look no further than the results of the recent Iraqi elections, in which U.S. 

ally Haidar al Abadi came in third place, trailing the leader of the PMF, Hadi al Ameri (and his Fatah 

party), and ex-Shia-lslamist firebrand Muqtada al Sadr. 

Unlike in Lebanon, we are far from knowing the likely outcome of the elections in Iraq. Turnout was low, 

and the parties are incredibly close in seats. Haggling will take months, and none of this should yet be 

seen as a slam dunk for Tehran. 

But there is an underlying point here, that is the lesson unlearned by the United States in Lebanon and 

apparently still unlearned in Iraq today. The Islamic Republic of Iran has a foreign policy model: they do 

not seek to dominate, they seek to influence, and if necessary, destabilize. They do so through their 

proxies- Hezbollah, Ham as, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis in Yemen, and increasingly, through 

the Hashd al Shabi in Iraq. These are Iranian expeditionary forces, nominally loyal to their own countries, 

but answering to a command in Tehran. 

Iran is no Soviet Union; its economy is weak, its hold over its own people tenuous. But victory after 

victory in the Middle East should suggest to us that Iran has a winning formula, one that could be 

countered with a serious U.S. strategy of engagement, a theory of our own victory- and one that would 

not contemplate an every-decade return for war in the Middle East. We must shore up the Iraqi 

government as we failed to shore up the Lebanese against Iran. We must do so without wavering in our 

commitments, and by offering choices: us or them. Us must mean genuine political and economic 

engagement and leadership, far cheaper than war. It must start with aiding the battle against 

corruption, which erodes confidence in democracy and markets in both Beirut and Baghdad (as well as 

every other Arab capital). It must continue with a commitment to institutions of governance. 

You may well ask, isn't that what we have done with the LAF in Lebanon, and my answer is no. We have 

looked away as the country has been sucked into the Iranian vortex and failed to bolster those who 

naturally despise Iran and its terrorist proxies. We have allowed weak leaders to take our money and 

our weapons while serving a foreign master- perhaps not always directly, but certainly indirectly. We 

have never put it to the LAF that they must stand against Iran and Hezbollah, not simply rhetorically, but 

actually. We have never laid the burden on them to prove they are not working with a designated 

terrorist organization. 
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30174b-5.eps

We failed in Lebanon and we have lost. Now we are faced with the same choice in Iraq. We can either 

force these countries to choose between Washington and Tehran, or we can continue to bury our heads 

in the sand. And allow Iran to win and win again. That is up to us. 

Thank you. 
24

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF TAMARA COFMAN WITTES, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS 

INSTITUTION 

Ms. WITTES. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the committee, good afternoon and thank you 

for inviting me. 

I must begin, as always, by noting that I represent only myself 

before you today. Brookings does not take institutional positions on 

policy issues and although, as Congressman Deutch noted, I was a 

leader of the NDI observer delegation in Lebanon, I am not representing NDI today either. 

The elections in Iraq and Lebanon earlier this month, I think, 

present a fragile but important counterpoint to a region in turmoil. 

Extremists claim that only violence can bring change, and these 

elections promise another path, and when Lebanon and Iraq pull 

off free elections under such trying circumstances as these, I think 

it’s harder for strongmen elsewhere to argue that they can’t afford 

the risk to stability of allowing their own peoples a choice in who 

governs them. 

The political outcomes from these votes offer both risks and opportunities for American policy. I think we need to be wary of 

drawing strong conclusions from ambiguous results and I don’t 

think we have yet lost in either place. 

There are some developments worth nurturing. To curtail Iranian influence to advance our own interest in stability and counterterrorism, the U.S. needs to stay engaged using diplomatic and economic tools and working together with regional partners who share 

our goals of promoting stability and tempering Iranian influence. 

The greatest risk for American policy toward Lebanon and Iraq 

right now would be to embark on blunt force policies either by 

walking away from the fight or by squeezing these fragile countries 

into unwelcome crisis. I think those tactics would actually give 

away American influence and advantage Iran further across the region. Let me describe a couple of trends that I saw in both countries that I think are worth noting and building on. 

In both Iraq and Lebanon, elections yielded low turnout—49 percent in Lebanon, 44 percent in Iraq. Both those who voted and 

those who stayed home expressed impatience with established political movements who are more interested in dividing the spoils of 

government than in actually governing. And in both places, security gains have increased citizens’ appetite for effective governance—for governance that meets their core needs. In both countries 

the military and the security services are relatively trusted national institutions, certainly compared to other parts of the government, and in both countries we see in public opinion polls nationalism is growing relatively to sectarianism. 

And these are trends that present some opportunities for new 

moderating political forces to emerge. But they also present the 

risk that if citizen needs aren’t addressed, those citizens might just 

give up on politics and on government as a source of solutions to 

their problems. 

25

So we have a stake in supporting healthy political competition. 

Now, in neither country did I see an electoral outcome that significantly shifts the balance of power between Iran’s allies and its adversaries. 

As I said, that battle is not over. In Iraq, the process of government formation will be much more important, I think, to determining Iran’s role than the election itself was. And I think that the 

U.S. can be clear about the principles it expects a new government 

to embrace, and we can work with regional partners to create incentives for Iraqi party leaders to move in the right direction. 

In Lebanon, I don’t think it’s quite right to say Hezbollah won 

these elections. I think, in fact, Hezbollah won the political game 

a couple of years ago in October 2016 when, a few months after 

Saudi Arabia cut off its aid to the Lebanese Government and to 

Hariri’s political movement, Hariri cut a deal with Hezbollah to return as prime minister and that’s the deal that seems to hold now. 

But I have to note that Hezbollah’s heavy engagement in Syria 

has costed over 1,000 battle dead. It’s weakened its focus on providing for Shi’a communities in Lebanon, and this political campaign showed that even Hezbollah had trouble getting its loyal voters to the polls, and it faced new independent political challenges 

it hadn’t seen before. I think the failure of Saudi Arabia’s ‘‘my way 

or the highway’’ approach to Lebanon over the last couple of years 

should be instructive to us now. Walking away from the table is 

a good way to ensure you lose the game. 

And just to slightly correct the view that Dany ascribed to me, 

it was actually Geagea’s Lebanese forces that increased its vote 

that I was pointing out to you. Jumblatt is about the same. 

One final note, if I may, about our approach to Iran and how 

these elections fit into the picture. Secretary Pompeo’s speech yesterday laid out a list of desiderata for changed Iranian policies that 

I think we can all agree are worthy goals. But a strategy links 

goals to means and yesterday’s speech did not lay out a realistic 

path by which we can achieve the goals that we seek. 

The Trump administration’s declaration of maximum pressure on 

Iran I think is likely to be tested very quickly by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ratcheting up conflict in existing areas of 

tension around the region, and while sanctions are important, they 

have not historically done much to constrain the IRGC’s regional 

activities. 

Sadly, those activities are relatively cheap for the IRGC and the 

Iranian regime. What troubles me is that at the same moment the 

Trump administration is looking to walk away from key arenas in 

Syria, abandoning local allies, and freeing up space for both Iranian proxies and Sunni extremists who feed off one another, it’s 

hard for me to understand the recent White House decisions to 

withdraw our special forces fighting ISIS, to freeze $200 million in 

pledged reconstruction assistance, or to cut aid to areas in Idlib 

Province that have been freed from ISIS rule. So I worry that the 

determination to neglect our hard-won gains in Syria risks the resurgence of ISIS, cuts directly against our ability to shape this ongoing competition for influence against Iran, and weakens our ability to support our anxious regional partners and protecting their 

own security against Iranian depredation. 

26

We’ve got to stay engaged. We need a strategy that’s long term 

and one that combines military and intelligence assets with diplomacy and economic support. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wittes follows:]

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Testimony of Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D. 

Senior Fellow, Center for Middle East Policy 

The Brookings Institution 

before the 

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and Africa 

Hearing on Lebanon and Iraq After the Elections 

May 22,2018 

Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Deutch, distinguished members of the subcommittee, good 

afternoon. Thank you for inviting me to share my analysis with you. I must begin, as always, by 

noting that I represent only myself before you today; the Brookings Institution does not take any 

institutional positions on policy issues. 

The elections in Iraq and Lebanon earlier this month present a fragile but important counterpoint 

to a region in turmoil. They offer both risks and opportunities for American policy, and we must 

be wary of drawing strong conclusions from ambiguous results amidst very dynamic politics in 

both countries. That said, there are some positive developments worth nurturing in both Iraq and 

Lebanon. The United States must stay engaged, using diplomatic and economic tools and 

working together with regional partners who share our goals of promoting stability and 

tempering Iran's influence. We can encourage sovereignty amidst the region's swirling conflicts, 

support local democratic development, and over time encourage political shifts toward less 

sectarian and more effective and responsive domestic governance. The greatest risk for 

American policy toward Lebanon and Iraq right now would be to embark on blunt-force policies, 

either by walking away from the fight or by squeezing these fragile countries into unwelcome 

crisis. Such tactics would give away American influence, advantaging Iran further across the 

region. 

In assessing these electoral outcomes, the committee has asked us to examine their impact on 

Iran's regional influence and the broader regional geopolitical competition between Iran and its 

adversaries. To place this in the context of US policy toward Iran: Secretary Pompeo's speech 

yesterday laid out a list of desiderata for changed Iranian policies that I think we can all agree are 

worthy goals. But a strategy links goals to means-- and yesterday's speech did not lay out any 

path by which the United States can actually move toward achieving the goals it seeks. 

Maximalist demands plus unilateral sanctions do not make up a strategy. I address strategy 

toward the broader confrontation with Iran below. 
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Elections Are A Notable Counterpoint to Regional Trends 

For Lebanon and Iraq, holding relatively peaceful elections in the face of stressful circumstances 

is itself a small triumph. After the people-power uprisings of the Arab Spring were hijacked by 

violence in Syria, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen; after Egypt's popular overthrow of the Mubarak 

regime was hijacked first by an elected president who betrayed democratic principles, then by a 

military coup and a renewed dictatorship; after resurgent monarchs and extremist militias have 

dominated and driven the region's trajectory for more than half a decade-after all this, a 

relatively peaceful and relatively open election is truly an event worth celebrating. And we have 

now seen three, because Tunisia held municipal elections during the same two-week period as 

Lebanon and Iraq's parliamentary balloting. 

Amidst all the violence and zero-sum arguments, these three electoral exercises otier the Arab 

world a fragile but important counterpoint. Extremists claim that only violence can bring change; 

these elections promise another path. And seeing Lebanon and Iraq pull offfree elections under 

such trying circumstances, it's harder for strongmen in other Arab states to argue that they can't 

afford the risk to stability of allowing their own peoples a choice in who governs them. I don't 

want to overstate this impact, butT do think it's important to recognize the fundamental power of 

citizens making a democratic choice, even in challenging and constrained circumstances. 

Growing Nationalism and Demands for Etiective Govemance 

We also need to examine these elections in the light oflocal political dynamics. Ultimately, like 

other democratic elections, these reflect the views and priorities of voters, and we must not 

dismiss those sentiments if we are to understand the opportunities and risks these outcomes 

present for US interests. 

In both Iraq and Lebanon, elections yielded low turnout.' Both those who voted and those who 

stayed home expressed impatience with established political movements who are more interested 

in dividing the spoils of government than in actually governing. In both of these divided 

societies, sectarian politicians have kept the peace in part by taking a "no-losers" approach to 

forming governments, whereby nearly every faction gets a place at the public trough that it can 

use to provide patronage to its followers. But this approach is facing some limits, as citizens feel 

increasingly secure from civil conflict and impatient with patronage politics, and increasingly 

prioritize basic government etiectiveness over loyalty to their sectarian or tribal group. In both 

1 Lebanese tmnout was about -J.9Yo., as compared to 53% in2009. Iraq·s turnout \Vas about -1-4% as compared to 60% 

in21ll~. 

2 
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Iraq and Lebanon, a sense of nationalism opposed to outside interference is also growing, and 

producing opportunities to weaken the hold of movements rooted in patronage and sectarian 

identity. Lebanese and Iraqi citizens trust their army and security forces more than they do other 

public institutions. 

In both places, these trends otTer the possibility that newer, more independent political forces 

may emerge-- but they also present the risk that, if they don't see progress, citizens could simply 

give up on electoral politics and on the government itself as a source of solutions to their 

day-to-day problems. The alternative to competitive electoral politics in Iraq and Lebanon is not 

likely to be mere apathy-- it's likely to be more violence. As the United States continues to 

confront instability across the region, it has a stake in supporting healthy political competition 

and coalition building, in supporting more etl'ective and responsive governance that addresses 

the concerns of citizens, and in nurturing new political alternatives not defined by sectarian or 

militia afiiliations 

Lebanon 

Lebanon's elections come nine years after the last parliamentary balloting, and five years after 

they were first scheduled. Between the last elections in 2009 and 2016, Lebanon suffered 

through a period marked by bombings and armed clashes between political factions allied with 

and opposed to Syria's Bashar al-Assad, and by political crisis and stalemate that left the country 

without a president for more than two years. The Syrian war next door, which sent over one 

million retugees into Lebanon, also led both regional powers and local extremists contending in 

Syria to try and export their fight to Lebanon. The crisis ended in October 2016 with a 

compromise between Hezbollah and Saad Hariri' s Future Movement by which Hezbollah ally 

Michel Aoun became president and Hariri returned as prime minister. 

The relative stability of Lebanon in the time since that deal was consummated led citizens to 

demand more effective governance, as evidenced in massive public protests over garbage 

disposal and the emergence of new citizen movements and independent politicians campaigning 

against corruption. It also brought modest gains for women's rights and visibility for Lebanon's 

LGBT community, which faced 1111JJllJQ.rnJmlJ& .. §.\1b"-.S:k..tlli1l.lvl'd_Q1lJ11lth.Qt:iti~s dQ;&d dcm:n 

nlanned Pride festival events. 

As this bottom-up pressure mounted, all the traditional political movements had an interest in 

elections to renew and legitimate their leadership. They wrote a new electoral law that was like 

an elephant designed by committee: a hybrid of proportional representation, preferential voting, 

districts of varying size, and Lebanon's unique confessional allocation of parliamentary seats. 

The new law was designed to enshrine the power of established parties, and it largely worked as 

3 
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planned. Thus, the post-election configuration of Lebanese politics, at least with respect to 

Hezbollah/Iran vs. Hariri/Saudi, is not really meaningfully different from the pre-election 

cant! gurati on 

The events that led to these elections, though, makes clear that the balloting was not a mere 

procedural exercise. Regardless of their political preferences, yoters were highly focused on 

corruption jobs and health care. Even traditional parties had to address these practical concerns 

over government effectiveness and make new appeals to attract the nearly 800,000 new voters 

who have come of age since Lebanon's last parliamentary balloting nine years ago. And all of 

the parties, including Hezbollah, faced trouble getting their loyal voters to the polls. In Baalbek 

and in the southern Bint Jbeil district, the movement was publicly challenged by iml_m:>cndent 

c.Qndi_df1t-".lists_-- and in Bint Jbeil, independent candidate Ali al-Amine proved troublesome 

enough that Hezbollah sent thugs to beat hiJn..hllii!y_just two weeks before Election Day. 

Indeed, across the country, the escalating demands of Lebanon's citizens for effective 

government services and the rise of a newly energized civil society led to the emergence of an 

unprecedented number of independent candidates, who eschewed affiliation with 

patronage-based, confessional movements and in some places challenged them directly. 

Although more than 70 independent candidates made it onto ballots, the barriers posed by the 

electoral system and the high cost of campaigning meant that only one-a prominent female 

journalist from Beirut-won a seat in the parliament. 

New movements in any democracy take time to see electoral gains-the more so in a system as 

clientelistic and fractured as Lebanon's. While the United States has for years hoped to see 

alternative Shia movements to Hezbollah and Amal emerge in Lebanon, such etl'orts remain 

marginal and face relentless intimidation and harassment from Hezbollah. Still and all, the 

emergence of trans-confessional, independent politicians and the continued pressure for 

improved governance mean that there is hope for change in Lebanon. Developments over the 

nine years since the last parliamentary elections strongly suggest that change in Lebanese politics 

won't come from above but rather from the grassroots. 

Iraq 

Iraq's election coming so soon after the territorial defeat ofiSIS produced some modest shifts in 

political outcomes. Leading up to the elections, polling showed that Iraqis perceived their society 

was more unified, and that sectarian divisions were improving. Economic conditions and 

corruption were ~in choosing candidates. The voter turnout, though, was 

dramatically lower than previous elections-- which may reflect voter frustration with politics, 

4 
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but could also reflect the high numbers of internally-displaced people across Iraq and a degree of 

confusion over new voting procedures. 

The election campaign and results showed some impact of these pragmatic priorities amongst 

voters. The military success and the desire for effective government support in Mosul, the area 

hardest-hit by ISIS's brutal occupation, led Iraqi Sunnis there to prefer Prime Minister Haider 

al-Abadi's alliance over traditional Sunni parties. But the biggest shift was the re-invention of 

Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's political identity, from a militant advocate of poor Shias' interests 

to the leader of a coalition focused on anti-corruption that included Christian and communist 

candidates. This broadening of Sadr's political appeal, plus what was reportedly an impressive 

ground game getting his loyal Shia supporters to the polls, led his coalition to the top with 54 

seats. 

Pre-dcction pollim: also suggested that the appeal of Islamist parties was declining in Shia areas, 

suggesting the possibility for politicians to find more success in coming years through 

cross-cutting coalitions that reflect pragmatic policies to meet citizen needs. That may not 

happen this year, as 1 discuss below. As in Lebanon, it may take time for politicians feel 

sufficient incentive to shift toward more responsive platforms. But Iraq has managed to hold 

elections on schedule and has undergone three peaceful transfers of power between governments; 

with sustained security and continued electoral exercises, Iraq's politics could begin to shift 

decisively away from the sectarian-patronage model. 

The Etl'ect on Iranian Intluence 

In neither country, in my estimation, did the electoral outcome significantly shift the balance of 

power between Iran's allies and its adversaries. The battle to contain and push back Iranian 

intluence is not lost, but neither is it near over. There are few short-tenn gains to be found in 

either Iraq or Lebanon, but walking off the playing field would itself be a victory for Iran and its 

proxies. 

In Iraq, the process of government formation will be more important to determining Iran's role 

than the election itself was. Parties must compete to assemble any 165 members of the 329-seat 

parliament to nominate a candidate for prime minister and assemble a government. Early 

indications are that Moqtada al-Sadr is seeking a coalition with current prime minister Haider 

al-Abadi's Victory Alliance as the nucleus for a governing bloc that would leave strongly 

pro-Iranian movements outside the government. But government fonnation in Iraq is a tricky 

process, and subject to many twists and turns; moreover, as in Lebanon, party alliances can be 

tleeting and subject to change. There is an important role for outsiders in shaping the 

5 
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environment in which political leaders make their calculations to coalesce in various ways. 

While the United States cannot determine the outcome oflraq's government negotiations, it does 

have influence-- especially working in concert with Gulf Arab states who have assiduously 

courted Abadi, Sistani and Al-Sadr in the past months, and who are hoping to gain tram closer 

economic ties to Iraq. A wise posture for the U.S. government would be to stay engaged and h." 

clear about the principles iJ l'xpecl& a new government to uphold-- continued counterterrorism 

efforts and security cooperation with Washington, maintaining Iraq's neutrality in regional 

conflicts, resolving conflicts with the Kurdish region, and advancing reforms to boost the 

economy-- and work with Arab partners to advance the vision of a sovereign Iraq integrated 

within the Arab world. 

It's quite possible that Iraqi political leaders will conclude that the most stable and productive 

government for their purposes is another ··unity" government in which many movements, 

including those linked to pro-Iranian militias, divide the spoils of government jobs and contracts 

amongst their loyal followers. This would not be an ideal outcome from the American 

perspective, but it's not markedly different from the status quo, and would somewhat constrain 

pro-Iranian factions by virtue of their desire to stay within the consensus necessary to keep the 

government together and their patronage streams intact. It would, however, continue to retard 

necessary reforrns in Baghdad and could exacerbate voter alienation. 

Jn rehanon, the narrative of most Western media reports (Reuters, New York Times, and 

Washington Post, for instance), that Hezbollah won these elections, is not quite tight. Yes, 

Hezbollah and its ally Amal increased their seat total by two. Yes, Hariri' s Future Movement lost 

one-third of its seats. But neither of these outcomes really alter the balance of power in Beirut, 

and the likely result is another government headed by Hariri and including Hezbollah. 

It's more accurate to say that Hezbollah "won" the game of Lebanese politics (for now, because 

in Lebanon no victory is ever final), not on Election Day 2018, but in October 2016, when it 

worked with Hatiri to end the stalemate that had left Lebanon with no president for 

two-and-a-half years. That compromise-in which Hezbollah ally Michel Aoun became 

president and Hariti reclaimed the prime ministry-ended a period of violence and political 

crisis. As was true in October 2016, so now: Hariri's leadership of Lebanon's government will 

depend on Hezbollah's acquiescence; and Hezbollah will continue to wield a veto over 

government decisions it does not see as in its interests. 

It's worth noting that, about six months before the compromise was announced, the Kingdom of 

Saudi Arabia, as part of King Salman's more assertive regional policy, cut aid to Lebanon's 

government and to Sunni leader Saad Hariri's Future Movement. In so doing, the Saudis 

essentially abandoned the playing field and left Hariti dependent on Hezbollah's consent to take 

6 
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power. Last fall, Saudi Arabia's brash crown prince took this "my-way-or-the-highway" 

approach a step further, trying to force a confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah by kidnapping 

Hariri and coercing his resignation on live television. The gambit failed, and Hariri returned to 

his otlice in Beirut, further weakened and leaning further on Hezbollah. The failure of the Saudi 

approach during this period should instruct the United States in its approach now: walking away 

from Lebanon does not weaken Hezbollah, but it does weaken Hezbollah' s adversaries. 

Hezbollah's success in maintaining its veto over Lebanese politics, however, does not mean that 

Hezbollah faces no challenges to its hegemony, with its ally Amal, over Lebanon's Shia 

population. The movement's heavy engagement in Syria has cost it over 1000 battle dead, and 

weakened its focus on providing for local communities. In the Bekaa Valley and Baalbek, this 

political campaign showed some relative softening of support for Hezbollah, and showed clearly 

that the movement had to work harder than normal to mobilize its supporters to go to the polls. 

Most importantly, looking forward, is that the old March 8th and March 14th, pro-Hezbollah and 

anti-Hezbollah coalitions from the 2005 and 2009 elections have fractured. The real political 

movement may emerge amongst the Christian parties. Samir Geagea's Lebanese Forces 

movement was the upset success story of the election, more than doubling its seat total to fifteen 

with a J2].atf(xm.J.bat explicitly challcn!lCS Hezbollah's weapons. Meanwhile, Lebanese President 

Michel Aoun has stepped down from leading the Free Patriotic Movement, and the ambitious 

new party leader and foreign minister, Gebran Bassil, is being courted by Geagea and may 

loosen the party's alliance with Hezbollah. 

Impact of US Noncompliance With the JCPOA 

As noted above, there is still not strategy from the Trump Administration to contain Iranian 

influence or halt its dangerous behavior, merely an intention to punish Iran with sanctions. 

Additional American sanctions will very likely deter international investment in Iran and weaken 

the Iranian economy-- but it will not do much to constrain the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps (IRGC) from its regional activities. The IRGC has its own businesses that profit from 

no-bid contracts with the government worth billions of dollars. Its regional and international 

adventurism also present many opportunities for profit. One study estimated that during the 

period of President Ahmedinejad, the IRGC earned about $13 billion per year in oil smuggling 

alone. Indeed, the IRGC faced no cash shortage when it brought foreign fighters and its own 

troops to Syria to bolster a beleaguered Bashar al-Assad at the height of international sanctions. 

So additional US sanctions will not likely do much to dampen Iranian regional adventures. 

Moreover, the weaker the government revenue stream becomes and the more domestic pressure 

7 
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it faces, the more powerful the IRGC will become as the regime's last line of defense against 

domestic dissent as well as external enemies. 

The Trump Administration's declaration of a maximum pressure campaign to reverse Iran's 

overall foreign policy approach is likely to be tested immediately by the Islamic Republic, 

probably by ratcheting up conflict in existing areas of tension around the region in ways that will 

discomfit our allies and test America's willingness to respond. All things considered, l suspect 

we might see that testing first in Yemen, where escalation is cheapest and Iran would suffer the 

fewest consequences from any retaliation in theatre. Syria is another possibility, although there 

Iran must carefully calibrate its actions to avoid an unwanted escalation of its confrontation with 

Israel. So far, Iran and Saudi Arabia have both preferred to maintain political stability in 

Lebanon and Iraq, having more to gain from political maneuvering than outright coercion -- but 

that could change. 

What troubles me is that, at the same moment that it provokes this increased challenge, the 

Trump Administration seeks to walk away from important arenas like Syria, abandoning the 

playing field at a crucial moment. Either in tenns of counterterrorism or in terms of containing 

lran, it's hard to understand the recent decisions to establish an arbitrary deadline for the 

withdrawal of our special forces fighting TSTS, to freeze the $200 million pledged for Syrian 

reconstruction earlier this year, to cut aid to areas in Tdlib province liberated from TSTS, and to 

cut off the lifesaving assistance to the White Helmets. President Trump's determination to walk 

away from our hard-won gains in Syria cuts directly against the US. ability to shape the ongoing 

competition for intluence in the Middle East and to support our partners in protecting their own 

security against Iranian depredations. 

America's regional partners are resolute in their desire to confront the Iranian challenge, but they 

are understandably anxious about the Administration's commitment to stand with them. They see 

the lack of strategy as well, and their anxiety is deepened by the president's clear intent to 

withdraw both American forces and American economic support from areas where we are still 

not done fighting ISIS. Walking away leaves our local partners against ISIS in Syria without 

options, left to cut their own deals with Assad and Iran or, even worse, with Al Nusra. 

A concerted strategy to reduce Iranian intluence in the region, as .I laid out to you v;hen I 

Ii:_llifksLuLM~Gli!l'-iiL is a long-term strategy. It would combine clear expectations with 

determined, integrated effort using military, intelligence, economic, and diplomatic tools and 

would seek to rally diverse international support for these elements: 

• It would press for resolution of the bitter civil conflicts in Yemen and Syria where Iran 

has found ready purchase and has room to entrench itself further; 

8 
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• It would secure the victory against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria through political and 

economic stabilization, because Sunni extremism and Shia extremism feed off of one 

another; 

• It would mobilize international diplomacy, including through mechanisms like the 

UNSC, to expose Iranian violations of international laws and nonns, and to punish 

specific behavior; 

• It would leverage U.S. and partner country influence in places like Lebanon and Iraq to 

support alternatives to sectarian politics; and 

• It would pursue tight intelligence and security cooperation with our partners to expose, 

interdict, and roll up Iranian activities. 

Sadly, such a comprehensive strategy seems nowhere on the horizon. 

9 
36

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Dr. Doran, Ms. Pletka, 

and Dr. Wittes. Got them all now. 

I would like to get your opinion on U.S. policy on our aid to Iraq. 

If the Sadr organization or any Iranian-linked entity continues to 

control Iraq’s Interior Ministry, is it in the interests of the United 

States to continue aiding Iraq’s interior security force? 

Mr. DORAN. I think it is. I think in the—in the short term we 

don’t know who Sadr is and it’s really a competition now between 

us and Iran over the direction of Sadr. I think it would be too early 

to make any kind of precipitous change to the policy until we can 

stand Sadr before a couple of tests and see which way things are 

going. 

You know, when you look at the core experiences of the Iranian 

regime, it all goes back to the Iran-Iraq war and the threats that 

emanated from Iraq. So the key desire of the Iranians I think—the 

key strategic desire is to make sure that there isn’t an independent 

Iraqi military that can ever threaten Iran again. And that’s got to 

be the key area of competition, and my fear is the same is 

Tammy’s, that if we leave the game we are just going to hand it 

over to them. 

The fact of the matter is we have to play the game a little bit 

more like they do, which is when the Iraqis do something that the 

Iranians don’t like, the Iranians threaten their lives or the lives of 

their loved ones. When the Iraqis do something that we don’t like, 

we send a demarche. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, let’s not adopt their strategy, though. 

Mr. DORAN. We have to threaten things that the Iranians hold 

dear. How’s that? 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. All right. That’s better. Thank you. 

Ms. Pletka. 

Ms. PLETKA. I am going to make a slightly less bloodthirsty comment than Mike. I mean, Muqtad al-Sadr has tried to refashion 

himself as an anti-corruption crusader. I am not quite sure it’s true 

but, on the other hand, it’s certainly a role that’s much needed to 

be filled in Iraq, as I think we could probably all agree. 

You know, one of the things that was very interesting that happened in Lebanon some years back—two decades back—was that 

Lebanon had been riven into very—in the wake of the civil war had 

been riven into all of these different militias who answered to different sects and to different religious parties and to different political parties and to different outside powers. 

It’s not an unanalogous situation to the one that we see in Iraq 

today, although Iran is the dominant player for sure, and the one 

thing that I believe we could do to some good effect is to try to help 

the Iraqi military become a military that serves the government 

and the people of Iraq and not the people and its masters in the 

IRGC. That’s something that they’re only going to be able to do 

with our support. So I think that that engagement is vital. 

I think that the right way to think about this is competition. We 

actually do need to compete with Iran on the territory that they 

designate is important to them in order to ensure that the people 

stand with us—an infinitely preferable ally than with the Iranians. 

Ms. WITTES. Just briefly, I think Dany’s correct to say that that 

Lebanese model of a government is essentially a patronage mechaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:52 Jun 21, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\052218\30174 SHIRL
37

nism for the parties within it. That is the model that Iraqi Governments have followed for the last several cycles. It’s possible they 

don’t need to follow that model this time and I think that there is 

actually increased pressure from voters to see a more effective government and that’s why Sadr kind of rebranded himself in this 

campaign. So I think that that gives us something we can build on 

if we can create the incentives. 

The other thing I would say is that I think all of these Iraqi parties know that this government is not going to yield enough patronage for them if security is not maintained. They all know that they 

need effective internal security and they know that they need 

American help to do it. I think that that does give us quite a bit 

of leverage if we maintain those relationships. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Deutch. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

I was struck, Ms. Pletka, by the way you described Iran’s interests, seeking not to destabilize—seeking not to dominate but to destabilize and influence, and which then made me think that that 

seems to be the same approach that some other countries take. It’s 

the Russian approach. 

And I read through the secretary’s speech again just now and I 

would like to just couch this discussion—take a step out and view 

it through Iran’s activities in Syria—Iran, on the ground in Syria, 

attempting and very clearly—in Syria perhaps it might be different, much closer to domination than destabilisation. 

But the Russians very clearly are interested in destabilization in 

Syria, a policy that extends throughout the region, I would think, 

and I would like you just to speak to that combination and the fact, 

as Dr. Wittes says, that a strategy needs to show us how we are 

going to satisfy our goals and what means we are going to use to 

satisfy those goals. 

And if we are not—if we are talking about the outcome of the 

elections but we are not talking about what’s happening Syria and 

the role that Russia plays, then is it even worth having a conversation about Iran at all if we ignore that critical relationship? 

Ms. PLETKA. I couldn’t agree with you more. Let me be honest, 

I don’t think that any strategy that looks at Iran can be through 

a soda straw in which we—this, to my mind, was what was wrong 

with the JCPOA. The JCPOA was something that compartmentalized certain things in Iran and left others in their baskets to be 

dealt with later but, of course, they weren’t dealt with later. 

Now, you know, we can talk about whether that was a good 

choice or the right way done but that is, in some ways, water under 

the bridge. But we are about to depart on a new strategy toward 

the Iranians that is going to crush them and their regime and their 

economy. 

Isn’t the right place to start in Syria? This has been inexplicable 

to me since 2011, frankly. There are those who suggest that there’s 

an opportunity for us in Yemen. I think that’s a slightly more complex environment. The Saudis and the Emiratis are there. But for 

as long as the Iranians are victorious in Syria, whether it’s for 

themselves or for their allies in the Assad regime, we are not going 

to be rolling them back. 

38

And your note about the Russians is exactly correct. The Russians are opportunists. The Russians are there because we are not. 

The Russians have stepped in not because the costs are high to 

them but because the opportunities are disproportionate to the 

costs, and we have not done enough to raise the cost to the Russians for their adventures overseas. 

So——

Mr. DEUTCH. So, Dr. Wittes, what is the right approach then, 

particularly vis-a-vis Russia? How is it—what—in the strategy that 

you’re looking for, in the strategy that all of us are waiting for, 

what should that strategy—how does that strategy include Russia? 

How do we—and then—and then how does that affect the way we 

deal with Iran in Lebanon and in Iraq? 

Ms. WITTES. You know, I think for a number of years the Russians have played this double game with the U.S. and the West in 

Syria where they have simultaneously taken advantage of all the 

opportunities that Dany just laid out, but in addition to that, said, 

well, when push comes to shove, we can help deliver the Iranians 

on a solution here—we can constrain them. And the question I’ve 

always had is even were they willing, which they have yet to really 

demonstrate they are willing to do, could they, in fact, deliver Iran. 

And this week, I think, is instructive in that regard where you had 

a clear statement out of Moscow about the need for foreign forces 

to depart Syria, and the Iranians turned around immediately and 

said, well, I don’t know who you’re talking about—we are not going 

anywhere. 

So, you know, it may be that American strategy needs to push 

the Russians to make a choice and then see that the Iranians are 

not actually going to go along with their preferences and, therefore, 

that Russia needs to work with us to contain Iran’s role here. 

Mr. DEUTCH. I just want to make sure I understand America’s 

role. America should push Russia to make what choice? 

Ms. WITTES. Rather than simultaneously saying to us, ‘‘We’ll deliver the Iranians,’’ and saying to the Iranians, ‘‘We’ll get the West 

off your back,’’ that they need to make a clear—that they need to 

repeat what they did this week. They need to make some clear—

set some clear expectations and some clear constraints on the Iranians. Now, they have incentive to do that right now because of 

this prospect of escalation between Israel and Iran, because Israel 

has made so clear that it will not tolerate IRGC embedding themselves near the Israeli border, and this is threatening Russia’s own 

gains in Syria. 

Why is it there? It’s there because it wants a permanent military 

presence. It wants to play spoiler against us and it wants to make 

money in Syria’s reconstruction. And if there ends up being a hot 

Iranian-Israeli war over Syrian territory, Russia is not going to 

make any money. So I think this is actually a moment where we 

can push them to push the Iranians, and they will see they cannot 

deliver Iran and they’re going to have to take a harder stance. 

Mr. DEUTCH. And doesn’t that have to be—does that have to be 

a public pronouncement and if it needs to be a public pronouncement wouldn’t that be the kind of—the kind of pronouncement—

the kind of pressure to make a decision that would belong in, say, 

a big speech about Iran policy also? 

39

Ms. WITTES. Yes. 

To me, one of the biggest missing pieces of the speech from Secretary Pompeo this week was that coalition. He kept talking about 

an international coalition that agrees with our goals, that’s going 

to work with us to advance their goals—our goals, and yet he could 

not specify any track of American policy or activity beyond we are 

going to go out to capitals and talk to them that would actually 

produce that result. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you. 

Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Ambassador Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Dr. Doran, I appreciate your book, ‘‘Ike’s Gamble,’’ on what the 

U.S. can learn from Eisenhower’s administration as we examine 

how to treat our friends and partners in the region. 

I am curious what you think about Iraq’s election results and I 

am even more curious to hear your thoughts on the impact that 

President Trump’s Iran deal decision will have on our friends in 

the region. 

Mr. DORAN. Thanks for mentioning my book. [Laughter.] 

For me, the main takeaway from the Iraq election is that Iraq 

cannot be the primary arena in which we are pushing back against 

the Iranians. But it is absolutely—it is absolutely vital that we engage in very significant competition with the Iranians in Iraq but 

more so that there are—there are arenas in which we have—we 

have aggressive unfettered competition with the Iranians. If we 

don’t show all of our allies in the region that we are really serious 

about rolling back Iranian power, not just—not just causing them 

some pain but rolling them back, I am afraid we’ll lose the competition. 

There was actually in my—in my book, since you mentioned it, 

one of my favourite moments in the—in Eisenhower’s experience 

with the Middle East came in 1958 after the Iraqi revolution, 

which took Iraq away from the West, and Eisenhower decided to 

intervene in Lebanon. 

And he met with Sam Rayburn, and Sam Rayburn said, I’m—you 

know, Mr. President, I am worried about two things. Number one, 

I am worried about the Russians—that this will provoke them, and 

number two, I am worried that our—we are going to alienate Arab 

public opinion, both of which are important, and I am afraid—actually, three things—I am also afraid that there’s no end game, basically, and that this will all end badly. 

And Eisenhower said—and I think it was a great moment of tremendous honesty—he said, ‘‘Oh, it’s going to end badly—I can assure you of that.’’

The only question is, does it end badly with us reassuring our 

allies that we are with them against their enemy or does it end 

badly with us not supporting our—not supporting our allies? 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. 

Mr. DORAN. And that’s the situation that we are in now. We have 

to demonstrate to the region that we really mean business. Reimposing the sanctions is good but we have to really push back 

against the Iranians where they are pushing hard, which is Syria. 

40

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you. I agree. 

Dr. Wittes, you just returned from observing Lebanon’s elections. 

I am sure we both agree that Lebanon’s successful elections are a 

promising sign for Middle East democracy. 

But the real source of democratic longevity is bottom-up support, 

and that takes a long time to develop. Are Lebanon’s young people 

engaged in the democratic process? And to what extent has Iran 

and Hezbollah stunted democratic growth in Lebanon? 

Ms. WITTES. Thank you, Congresswoman Wagner. That’s a fantastic question. 

I would say that over the years I have been visiting Lebanon, 

and I also observed the 2009 elections, there’s been quite a flowering of civic engagement and activism among Lebanese youth. The 

main domestic observer organization, LADE, is basically a youthrun organization. The Lebanese Transparency Association also represents that rising generation of Lebanese, and there were about 

800,000 new voters. The age of voting is 21 in Lebanon, and because it had been 9 years since the last election, 800,000 new voters had entered the rolls. 

So all of the parties had to respond to the frustration that young 

people were expressing—that these tired sectarian patronage systems were not meeting their needs—and I think that does offer the 

opportunity for shift away from sectarian politics to something 

that’s more focused on government effectiveness. 

Now, the U.S. Government has made long-term investments in 

Lebanese civil society and youth engagement and empowerment, in 

civic education, and sadly, those investments have flagged in the 

last year and I really do believe those are important and worthwhile to sustain. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Great. Well, thank you for that answer. 

And I am about out of time. Ms. Pletka, I have a question to you 

but I will spare your daughters and I—Madam Chairman, I will—

I will submit it for the record and I thank our witnesses very much 

and I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Madam Ambassador. 

Mr. Schneider of Illinois. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and again, thank 

you to the witnesses for sharing your perspectives today. 

Dr. Wittes, I will start with you. You made the statement that 

the strategy should be linked to goals—links goals to means, and 

that in this region the United States appears to lack a strategy. 

I will start with you but I will open the whole panel: What are 

the implications of not having a strategy and the consequences that 

if we don’t get one shortly we are going to face? 

Ms. WITTES. Well, thank you. 

I think the primary consequence, in addition to simply being ineffective in achieving our goals, is in our relationships with those 

in the region who rely on their partnerships with us and on our 

support. 

And over the course of the last 5 months, I’ve been to Saudi Arabia twice. I’ve been to Kuwait. I’ve been to Lebanon. I will be in 

Israel next month. And I would say that I hear across the board 

anxiety about American policy and American leadership. The intentions are there. The rhetoric sounds great. None of them loved the 

41

Iran deal, although the Gulf accepted it and I think all of them had 

some anxieties about letting it go. 

But what they really want to know is are you there for us for 

the long haul—can we count on you when it matters, and there, I 

think, there are real anxieties emerging and I would say that the 

recent Trump administration decisions on Syria have piqued that 

anxiety even farther. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Ms. Pletka. 

Ms. PLETKA. The consequences of not having a strategy are, you 

know, as we’ve all described, which is that we—our allies in the region are full of doubt that people who are fundamentally well intentioned at any particular level, whether in governance or in economics or in civil society, are worried that there’s not going to be 

a power that stands by them and that those who are there are 

going to—are going to take advantage of our absence in order to 

push the region back toward the direction of autocracy, or worse, 

in the case of Iraq and, I would say, in Lebanon as well. 

But there’s another problem here and that’s a problem of continuity from the Obama administration. Barack Obama famously 

told the Saudis that they were going to need to learn to share the 

region with the Iranians, as if somehow the two of them should 

split everything up while we go home. That’s not a policy and it’s 

not a strategy, and it was a mistake then and, unfortunately, subcontracting to our allies in the region to do what they think is right 

in the absence of a strategy is not a great idea either. 

The bottom line is—and I hope all of us, actually, agree on this 

no matter where we stand on the political spectrum—the bottom 

line is that there is no substitute for U.S. leadership. Our values, 

the things we stand for—and that does not mean as, I think, our 

previous President too often insisted, a choice between abandoning 

the region and war. It really means engagement. It means standing 

up for the kinds of things that matter to the future of the region 

in the long term so we don’t to go back. Good governance, markets—you know, those are the things that matter and we need a 

strategy to get to those things. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I agree with you, and if I could take a step to 

Dr. Doran—that might be the segue to you. I think—and I don’t 

want to put words in your mouth, but I think what I heard you 

say is that we should allow Israel to push back against Iran and 

Syria. I will raise the question. Absent a strategy, is Israel confronting Iran on the border between Israel and Syria has one dynamic and the United States working with our allies in the region 

to keep Iran out of Syria has another dynamic. I think the former 

carries as lot more risk and negative consequence than the latter. 

I would welcome your thoughts on that. 

Mr. DORAN. Yes. In an ideal world, I would prefer that the 

United States defined the end state that it wants in Syria, and put 

together the coalition to achieve it, assigned roles and missions, 

and so on. 

But after watching our politics over the last—over the last 5 

years, I doubt that’s going to happen and I see, on both sides of 

the political aisle, not a lot of appetite for nation building in Syria. 

So I worked from the assumption that that’s—that that’s the baseVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:52 Jun 21, 2018 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\052218\30174 SHIRL
42

line and I have to work within that parameter and that’s why I—

that’s why I am talking about supporting the Israelis. 

I was struck a couple months ago—then Secretary of State 

Tillerson made a statement—a prepared statement about our Iran 

policy in which he said that the United States was working to 

counter Iran across the region, and then General Votel, the commander of U.S. CENTCOM, was testifying before Congress and 

was asked what the military is going to counter Iran in Syria, and 

he said it’s not a U.S. military mission to counter Iran in Syria. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I think what he said was he hasn’t been given 

instructions. 

Mr. DORAN. So but it’s also clear to me that the military doesn’t 

really want to do it. So——

Mr. SCHNEIDER. And I am out of time. 

Mr. DORAN. The basic line—the basic point is, if we are not going 

to do it directly then the next best thing is to support our allies 

who will. 

And yesterday Secretary Pompeo said we want an Iran—we want 

Syria devoid of Iranians. So do the Israelis. So let’s associate ourselves directly with Israeli red lines and support them. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Well, I agree with that. I agree that we need to 

support Israel. It’s our most important ally in the region, one of our 

most important allies in the world. 

But I would just argue that it would be better if Israel doesn’t 

have to confront an Iran with permanent bases in Syria, and instead we work with Israel and our other allies to make sure that 

Iran can’t establish that permanent presence in Syria. 

Mr. DORAN. I totally agree with you. 

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Rohrabacher of California. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know we discuss the Middle East it 

seems so mind boggling in its various parts and I think that we 

have gotten so far away from trying to deal with reality in order 

to keep in place lines that were drawn by colonialists 100 years 

ago. 

Here we have—basically, we are, you know, on the verge of war. 

Not on the verge of war—we are engaged, dramatically engaged, 

with violent and warlike activities, all based on alliances—on these 

lines that were drawn. 

Correct me if I am wrong, but Iraq was not a country until the 

colonialists made it a country, and here we are talking about how 

we are going to keep faith with Iraq. There is no Iraq. The fact is 

is that there are different nationality groups in Iraq that have—

that are—that go many centuries. 

To be very bold, I think that perhaps if we are ever going to have 

peace in that region or be a force for peace in the region, it’s not 

going to be because we are taking sides and we are involved with 

the unrelenting confusion and chaos that we’ve seen going on 

there. 

We don’t need to say that we support the Iraqis. But what we 

do need is to find those nationalities that are at play. The Kurds 

are a nationality. They are people who recognize themselves as 

Kurds. The Iraqis don’t see themselves that way. Am I wrong? 

43

They see themselves as Kurds. They have various different groups 

within Iraq and that’s how they see themselves. 

In Lebanon, we know that you have had—well, you had the 

Druze, you had the Muslims, and you had Christians. I don’t 

know—I guess it’s been a good thing to try to keep Lebanon together. 

But I remember when I was in the White House when Ronald 

Reagan sent the Marines into Beirut and I remember that my 

brother’s best friend, who joined the Marine Corps right after they 

graduated from Camp Lejeune High School, was blown to bits in 

that little incident, and Ronald Reagan knew immediately that was 

not the right tactic to use. 

And that’s when he worked with—and I am going to brag here—

he worked with myself and a number of people, maybe five or six 

others, who established an alternative strategy to sending American troops everywhere and that was called the Reagan Doctrine, 

and it seems to me it worked because it brought down our primary 

enemy, which was the Soviet Union. 

I guess my question to you folks is that, number one, there is a 

Persian entity that—a nationality. You have Iran but, again, we 

are trying to deal transactionally with a nation-state that doesn’t 

exist. 

You have got Boloch. You have got Kurds. You do have a Persian 

heart of Iran. Should we not be going into the reality of trying to—

instead of trying to deal transactionally with what are actually 

nonnations with this—with the colonial leftover designations of territory under what jurisdiction, wouldn’t it be better for us to try 

to restructure and work with those people on restructuring borders 

by siding with those nationalities like Persians as compared to the 

Iranian mullah regime, like the Kurds, like the various Christian—

there’s Christian elements there in Syria as well and we know—

I guess we are trying to work with them. 

I don’t know if that makes any sense to you or not, but what 

doesn’t make sense to me is what we are doing—when hearing over 

and again, oh, we are siding with that group. We are going to hope 

that this group wins the election and there’s no, really, substance 

historically to any of the groups that we are talking about. 

So, as I say, as compared to selecting the Persians, selecting the 

Baloch, selecting the Kurds, selecting those groups—the Druze, 

who are people who have a real nationality about them. 

And sorry if I’ve gone on too long on this question but if you 

want to have a comment to show me how naive I am, thinking that 

we can deal with a Kurdish nation instead of Iraq. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. You did take up the entire 5 minutes with 

the question but we’ll have—who’s the designated answerer? Dr. 

Doran. 

Mr. DORAN. I won’t take more than 10 minutes. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. 

Mr. DORAN. The——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Pardon me. I am sorry for going on too long. 

Mr. DORAN. I don’t—I don’t actually agree with you in this sense 

that, yes, those states were created by the—by the colonialists. But 

they’ve been there for a century and that’s what we’ve got. And any 

attempt to redraw the borders is going to be highly controversial, 

44

and it’s going to affect the lives of millions and it’s going to be an 

act of imperialism at least as great as the act that created those 

states to begin with. And it’s only going to hold if the United States 

military is there in force to hold it. And so, I mean, you’re talking 

about another George W. Bush style invasion of the region in order 

to redraw the—redraw the boundaries. 

So I think we are stuck with what we’ve got, which is working 

with those states which are recognized but also recognizing, as you 

say, that there are some state actors who have—some state actors 

who have their own—their own independent organization and ability to influence things. So it’s—you know, it’s an art of balancing 

the two. But redrawing the boundaries I don’t think will get us out 

of the—get us out of the fire. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, at least we should be dealing with people who we can make—who are our—could be our friends in order 

to defeat the primary enemy, which is what happened when we defeated the Soviet Union. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to our 

witnesses. 

I would like to first turn to Iraq and ask you, Dr. Wittes, is it 

possible for the U.S. to work with al-Sadr and his allies if they do 

form a government in terms of achieving our short and long-term 

objectives in Iraq? And what are your assessments of his true motivations and where do his loyalties lie? And assuming his coalition 

does take control of the government, can the U.S. be expected to 

work in concert with the same coalition who murdered American 

troops and our partners in droves during the height of the Iraq 

war? Do we have any mutual interests that would make that a possibility, and what’s your assessment? 

Ms. WITTES. Well, Congressman, I think it’s a crucial question. 

I don’t think there’s an obvious answer. 

But I would say that yes, I think we do have some interests in 

common. We’ll have to see how Muqtad al-Sadr chooses to play his 

cards. 

He has demonstrated a great deal of political agility—let me put 

it that way—over the years. He’s quite an opportunist, and he now 

sees the political opportunity in moving away from militancy, moving away from Iran declaring independence, moving against the 

corruption visible in other parties, including some of the traditional 

Shi’a parties that are more closely allied with the popular mobilization units, the militias, and more closely allied with Tehran. 

So let’s see what we can do—let’s see, first of all, what his intentions are in terms of government alliances and then let’s see how 

we can work with that. 

I think our interests are, number one, maintaining security and 

counterterrorism cooperation with the Iraqi Government; number 

two, an Iraqi Government that is committed to neutrality and regional conflicts for—to give you a very specific example, we do not 

want an Iraqi Government that would be willing to tolerate these 

Iraqi militias helping transfer militias into Syria, for example. That 

simply is something we can’t afford to see again. We want an Iraqi 

Government that will work to resolve the conflict with Kurdistan 

45

and we want an Iraqi Government that will advance reform, especially in the economy. 

I—at least what we hear from al-Sadr right now I think is encouraging on all of those fronts and I think we need to press for 

clarity. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. 

And what is your opinion with respect to Iranian goals in Iraq, 

and what are they doing to achieve those objectives? 

Ms. WITTES. So I think their goals are a few. Fundamentally, I 

agree with Dany that they are more interested in having a veto 

than in having overwhelming control. 

But I think that the situation in Syria is such that they now seek 

to use Iraq as well as a sort of staging ground and that’s something 

that we must prevent. I think there’s also money, frankly, to be 

made there both for them and for their allies and I think that we 

need to ensure that that doesn’t destabilize the country. 

And so, you know, the goal, from an American perspective, of an 

Iraqi Government that is neutral in regional conflicts itself is a 

goal that heads off Iranian interests. It’s a goal that will require 

Iraqi Shi’a parties in a coalition government to push back against 

Iranian requests on a number of important fronts and I think 

that’s worth investing in. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And, finally, the Iranian representative, obviously, vying of Iranian interests in Baghdad is General Soleimani, 

the head of the Quds Force. 

Considering al-Sadr’s anti-Iran stance, do you think General 

Soleimani can successfully vie for a pro-Iran Government, and if 

not, if they’re not successful in securing a pro-Iranian Government 

in Baghdad, what will the ramifications be for Iran’s land bridge 

and what are the implications of that? 

Ms. WITTES. Okay. So here we get into a little bit of speculation 

in Iraqi politics, which is very, very unpredictable. 

I think there are two major possibilities for government formation. One would be a Sadr alliance with Abadi that might exclude 

all, if not most, of those more pro-Iranian political factions. 

It’s possible they could also put together a big unity government. 

But I think Sadr’s initial inclination is an alliance with Abadi that 

would keep some of those guys out. I think what Soleimani would 

probably like to do is put together a grand coalition of pro-Iranian 

Shi’a parties, bring in some other non-Shi’a parties who want to 

feed at the government trough, and keep Sadr out. 

And so it’s—to me, I think there’s a bit of a zero sum there, and 

I think Sadr is going to be looking to see what’s on the table, not 

only for himself and his political allies, but for an Iraqi Government in which he would participate. 

Our Gulf allies, for example have put on the table significant potential economic investments. The Saudis have done, I think, a 

very creditable job of courting Sadr over the last year, including 

welcoming him in the kingdom. They’ve opened a consulate in 

Basra. They’ve opened their border to trade with Iraq. The Kuwaitis are also suggesting that they could do a lot more business in 

southern Iraq. 

And so there are incentives in play and I think the American role 

here is important as well. I think it’s important that we not make 

46

the mistake of saying, well, our counterterrorism fight against ISIS 

is over—let’s cut economic engagement—let’s cut diplomatic engagement—let’s go home. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicilline. 

Thank you to our witnesses and let’s hope for the best. But we 

fear the worst about the implications of these elections. 

Thank you so much and with that, the subcommittee is adjourned. 

Thank you. Bye, daughters. 

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(47)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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30174n.eps

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman 

May 17,2018 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign 

Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa in Room 2172 of the 

Rayburn House Otlice Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

http•i/vrwwToreignAmurs.house.gcov). 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Tuesday, May 22, 2018 

2•30 p.m. 

Lebanon and Iraq• After the Elections 

Michael Doran, Ph.D. 

Senior Fellow 

The Hudson Institute 

Ms. Danielle Pletka 

Senior Vice President 

Foreign and Defense Policy Studies 

American Enterprise Institute 

Tamara Cofman Wittes, Ph.D. 

Senior Fellow 

Center for Middle East Policy 

The Brookings Institution 

By Direction of the Chairman 
49

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30174m.eps

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON ~------M_i_dr_lle_E_""_s_,_m_d_N._o_rti_,_:Afi:_'·_ic_o _____ ~ HEARING 

Day __ 1_'u_e_sd_u"'~'-~Datc. ____ 05_1,_'2_21_1_8 ___ noom. ___ ~2~1-'72~---

Starting Time 2:36PM Ending Time 3:54PM 

Recesses L_to __ ) ( __ to __ ) ( __ to __ ) L_to __ ) ( __ to __ ) L_to __ ) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Cliaimwn Ros-Lehtineu 

C!Jeck all oft!Je jo/lmving t!Jat app(l'' 

Open Session 0 Executive f£!9scd) Session D Televised IZl 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Lebmum and Iraq: Afler the Elections 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRRSENT: 

Electronically Rccord!&{tapcd) 0 

Stenographic Record l_{j 

GOP Members: Cit airman Ros-Lehtinen, Reps. Chabot, DeSantis, Kiminger, Zeldin, Donovan, Wagner, 

Dem Members: Ranking Member Deutch, Reps. Connolly, Cicilline, Schneider, Lieu 

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an* ({they are not members of:tir/1 committee) 

Rep. Rohrabacher 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [J NoD 

(If "no", please lis! below and include iille, agency, department, m· organization.) 

STATEMENTS l?OR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted.for the record.) 

QJ<11 .mbmittetl by Rep. Wagner for M1·. Pletlw. 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ___ _ 

or 

T!MEADJOURNED __ 3_:_54_P_M __ _ 
50

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30174d.eps

Question: 

Questions for the Record Submitted to Ms. Danielle Pletka by 

Representative Ann Wagner 

House Foreign Affairs Committee 

Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa 

May 22,2018 

Ms. Pletka, Iraq hopes to finance its reconstruction through foreign direct investment, 

particularly in infrastructure. Iraq is a risky destination for U.S. investors. What steps, if any, 

should the U.S. government take to help Iraq make its markets more hospitable to American 

firms~ 

The most straightforvvard answer is one that applies not only to Iraq. The single most important 

determinant of positive investment climate is rule of law Iraq has been unpredictable from a 

security standpoint, but sadly predictable when it comes to economics; the nation is being 

crushed by consumption and more must be done to rein it in.