F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

L I V I N G W E L L M E D I C A L C L I N I C , I N C .; P R E G N A N C Y C A R

E C E N T E R O F T H E N O R

T H C O A S T , I

N C .; C O N F I D E

N C E P R E G N A N C Y C E N T E R , I N C ., Plaintiffs-Appellants ,

v.

X A V I E R B E C E R

R A , * Attorney General, Attorney

General of the State of California, in his official capacity ; K

A R E N S M I T H , M.D., Director of California Department of Public Health, in her official capacity ; M I C H A E L G E O R G E C O L A N T U O N O , City Attorney of Grass Valley , California, in his official capacity ; A L I S O N B A R R A T

G R E E N , County

Counsel of Nevada County , California, in her official capacity ; C I N D Y D A Y -W I L S O

N , City Attorney of Eureka, California, in her official capacity ; J E F F R

E Y S. B L

A N C K , County Counsel of Humboldt County , California, in his official capacity ; C H R

I S T O P H E R A. No. 15-17497

D.C. No. 4:15-cv-04939-J SW

ORDERL I V I N G W E L L M E D

. C L I

N I C V

. B E C E R

R A 2

C A L L I H A

N , City Attorney of Salinas, California, in his official capacity ; C H A R

L E S J

. M C K E E , County Counsel of Monterey County , California, in his official capacity , D efendants-Appellees.

On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States

F iled April 28, 2018

B efore: Dorothy

W . Nelson, A. W allace Tashima, and J ohn B . Owens, Circuit J udg es.

SUMMARY * *

P relim inary Injunction / F irst Am endm ent

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the panel r eversed in part, vacated in part, a nd remanded to the district court for further proceeding s in lig ht of National Institute of

Family and Life Advocates v

. Becerra ( “NIFLA”) , 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018).

* Xav ier B ecerra h as b een su b stitu ted f or h is p red ecesso r, Kam ala D. Harris, as A tto rn ey Gen eral f o r t h e State o f C alif

o rn ia un d er F ed

. R

. A

p p

. P . 4 3 (c)(2 ).

** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co urt. It h as b eenp rep ared b y

co urt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.L I V I N G W E L L M E D

. C L I

N I C V

. B E C E R

R A 3

I n NIFLA , the Suprem e Court concluded that the plaintiffs

were “likely t o succeed o n the merits of their [ free speech] challeng e to the licensed notice [ requirement in the California R eproductive F reedom, A c c o u n t a b i l i t y , C o m p r e h e n s i v e C a

r e , and Transparency

Act] .” 138 S. Ct. a t 2376. The panel held that the same provision was at issue in this case, and reversed the district cour t’s c o nclusion that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their F irst Amendment free speech claim.

The panel vacated the district c o u r t’s order on the three remaining preliminary injunction W inte r factors, a

nd remanded for the district court to reconsider them in lig h t of NIFLA

.

ORDER

This cas e i s back b efore us on remand from the United States Supreme Court. S ee LivingW

e ll Med. Cl i n i c , Inc. v

. Becerra , 2 018 W L 3148265 ( U.S. J une 28, 2018). I n lig h t o f National Institute of Family and Life A d vocates ( “NIFLA”)

v. Becerra , 13 8 S

. Ct. 2361 (2018), w e reverse in part , vacate in part , and rem and this case to the district court for further proceeding s.

“A p laintiff s e e k ing a preliminary injunction must establish [ 1] that he is likely to succeed o n the merits, [ 2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable h arm in the a bsence o f preliminary r e l i e f

, [ 3 ] that the balance o f the equities tips in his favor, and [ 4] that an injunction is in the public interest.” W inter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, I nc. , 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citati o n s omitted). A “plaintiff [ must] make a showing on all four prongs ” to o btain a preliminary injunction. AllianceL I V I N G W E L L M E D

. C L I

N I C V

. B E C E R

R A 4
for the W ild Rockies v. Cottrell , 632 F .3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Garcia v

. G oogle, Inc. , 786 F .3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 201 5 ) ( en b anc) ( stating that a plaintiff “must show” all fo u r f actors before an injunction may issue (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

I n NIFLA , the Supreme Cour t concluded that the plaintiffs

were “likely to succeed on the merits of t h e i r [ free speech] challeng e to the licensed n otice [ requirement in the California R e p r o d u ctive F reedom, A ccount a b i l i t y , C o m p r e h e n s i v e C a

r e , and Transparency Act] .” 138 S. Ct. at 2376. The same provision is at is s u e h e r e

. See LivingW ell M ed. Clinic , 2018 WL 3148265, at *1. W e there f o r e reverse the district court’s conclusion that L i ving W ell Medical Clinic, I n c., Preg n ancy Care Center o f t h e North Coast, I nc., a nd Confidence Preg nancy Center, I nc. (“Plaintiffs”) were not likely to succeed on the merits of their free speech claim.

The district court further premised its analy sis o f the other three W inter factors on its conclusion that Pla i n tiffs’ F irst Amendment c laim was not likely to succeed. W e t h er e fore vacate the district c o urt’s o r der on the three remaining W inter factors and rem and for the district court to consider them ag ain in lig h t of NIFLA

. Plaintiffs-Appellants shall recover their cos ts on appeal from Defendants-Appellees.

REVERSED in part, VACATED in p a rt, a nd REMANDED.