[Cite as Hook v. Gahris, 2011-Ohio-6491.]

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

 SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

REBECCA L. HOOK : 

: Appellate Case No. 2011-CA-36 

Plaintiff-Appellee : 

: Trial Court Case No. 2007-JUV-444 

v. : 

: 

WILLIAM D. GAHRIS : (Juvenile Appeal from 

: (Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

: 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

O P I N I O N

Rendered on the 16th day of December, 2011. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

SCOTT B. BEALS, Atty. Reg. #0055519, 30 Warder Street, Suite 250, Springfield, Ohio 

45504 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

DIANE DePASCALE, Atty. Reg. #0016654, Liberty Tower, Suite 1406, 120 West Second 

Street, Dayton, Ohio 45402 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

 

FAIN, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant William Gahris appeals from an order of the Clark County 

Juvenile Court adopting a magistrate’s decision that prevents him from having his natural 

child within five hundred feet of his stepchild during his parenting-visitation time. Gahris 

contends that the Juvenile Court erred when it determined that the Ohio Rules of Evidence did 
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not apply to the proceeding below. He further contends that the Juvenile Court erred by 

failing to consider all the of evidence presented. 

{¶ 2} We conclude that the Juvenile Court erred. The Ohio Rules of Evidence do 

apply to custody and visitation hearings brought under R.C. Chapter 3111. We further 

conclude that the issue of whether the trial court properly considered all of the evidence is 

moot in view of our holding that the Ohio Rules of Evidence apply to this proceeding. 

{¶ 3} Accordingly, the judgment of the Juvenile Court is Reversed, and this matter is 

Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I 

{¶ 4} Rebecca Hook and William Gahris were never married, but they are the parents 

of one minor child. In 2007, Hook filed a complaint, under R.C. Chapter 3111, in the Clark 

County Juvenile Court seeking acceptance of administrative orders establishing paternity and 

setting Gahris’s child support obligation. The Juvenile Court adopted the administrative 

orders. 

{¶ 5} Gahris subsequently filed a motion seeking custody of the child or, 

alternatively, visitation. They parties later filed an agreed order whereby Hook was 

designated as residential and legal custodian of the child and Gahris was granted visitation. 

{¶ 6} In April 2010, Hook moved for an ex parte order, as well as a permanent order, 

suspending Gahris’ visitation time. Hook supported the motion with an affidavit in which 

she alleged as follows: 

{¶ 7} “ * * * 

{¶ 8} “[Gahris’s] live-in girlfriend has a minor child, who is 10 years old and who 
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also lives with [Gahris]. 

{¶ 9} “[Hook] has reason to believe that [the ten year old child] did inappropriately 

touch [the parties’ minor child] in a sexual manner while visiting with [Gahris] based upon 

statements made by [the parties’ minor child] on March 29, 2010 and thereafter. 

{¶ 10} “On April 5, 2010, [the parties’ minor child] was evaluated by Amber Lee, 

MSW, LSW, for the CARE House Child Advocacy Center, Dayton, Ohio (Associated with 

Children’s Medical Center). Ms. Lee’s opinion is that [the child’s] statements were true and 

that said child should not be in contact with [the older child] at this time. 

{¶ 11} “At this time it is in [the best interest of the parties’ minor child] to suspend 

parenting time with [Gahris] until further investigation is completed or until arrangements can 

be made to ensure the child will not have contact with [the older child].” 

{¶ 12} An ex parte order was entered on that date suspending the child’s visitation 

with Gahris and restraining Gahris “and anyone else associated with [him], from discussing 

the incident with [the parties’ child].” On the day the matter was set for hearing, the parties 

entered into an agreed order reinstating the visitation but requiring that the older child not be 

present during the visitation times and that any telephone contact between the children would 

be supervised. The order also stated that the older child would “receive counseling.” The 

matter was set for a review hearing. 

{¶ 13} Hook later moved to modify the agreed order and to suspend all contact 

between the children. Gahris moved to exclude all testimony regarding “statements allegedly 

made by the parties’ minor child * * * to [Hook] and in forensic interview(s) as testimonial 

and inadmissible [hearsay].” 
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{¶ 14} A hearing was held before the magistrate in October 2010. At the hearing, the 

following colloquy took place between Hook and her attorney: 

{¶ 15} “Q: Will you please let the Court know why you [filed the motion to suspend 

and/or modify visitation]? 

{¶ 16} “A: Because [my child] had told me – 

{¶ 17} “MS. DEPASCALE: Objection to any statement the child allegedly made out 

of Court. 

{¶ 18} “THE COURT: Mr. Beals? 

{¶ 19} “MR. BEALS: Your Honor, I believe that the statements that [the parties’ 

child], that my client will be testifying to will fall under the exception of excited utterance by 

[the child] in this situation. 

{¶ 20} “THE COURT: Try and lay a foundation. 

{¶ 21} “Q: When you – as far as the conversation or the statements made by [your 

child], what day was that? 

{¶ 22} “A: It was Monday, I believe it was March 28. 

{¶ 23} “Q: And then on, just prior to that Monday, had he had visitation with Mr. 

Gahris? 

{¶ 24} “A: Yes. He came home Sunday night. 

{¶ 25} “ * * * 

{¶ 26} “Q: And things that [the child] said, what time of the day was it when he said 

these things to you? 

{¶ 27} “A: It was in the morning around 10:00, between 10:00 and 11:00. 
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{¶ 28} “Q: And what were you doing at the time? 

{¶ 29} “A: [He] was in the bathtub, and I was in the hallway immediately outside of 

the bathroom bringing laundry. 

{¶ 30} “Q: And were you and he talking about the visitation or anything of that nature, 

or were you talking about other things, or not talking at all? 

{¶ 31} “A: We really weren’t talking. He was playing, and that was it. 

{¶ 32} “Q: And as he was playing, what did he say? 

{¶ 33} “MS. DEPASCALE: Objection. 

{¶ 34} “THE COURT: Say what he said. 

{¶ 35} “THE WITNESS: He said, Mommy, [the older child] told me to suck on his 

penis. 

{¶ 36} “THE COURT: What’s your objection? 

{¶ 37} “MS. DEPASCALE: There is no foundation for an exception to the hearsay 

rule. This is prohibited, inadmissible testimony under the Six [sic] Amendment, and also – 

{¶ 38} “THE COURT: Just the short objection. 

{¶ 39} “MS. DEPASCALE: Just one case citation, under the standards set by Ohio vs. 

Arnold, Ohio Supreme Court this year. 

{¶ 40} “THE COURT: Mr. Beals? 

{¶ 41} “MR. BEALS: Yes, your Honor. There’s substantial case law, State vs. 

Wagner, State vs Gertz (phonetic spelling), In Re: Diem (phonetic spelling), all indicating that 

statements specifically made by a small child regarding sexual assault that happened within a 

short period of time afterwards to be considered excited utterances. There’s been times 
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where six days have passed, there’s been times where two weeks have passed and the Court 

still considered it an excited utterance based upon the child’s age. 

{¶ 42} “THE COURT: Objection is overruled. 

{¶ 43} “ * * * 

{¶ 44} “Q: So after he made that statement to you, what was your response? 

{¶ 45} “A: I said, what? And he said, [the older child] told me to suck on his penis, 

and that he couldn’t suck on mine because that would be bad. And so the conversation 

ensued, do you want me to – 

{¶ 46} “Q: What happened after that? 

{¶ 47} “A: I asked him, I said, well, did you suck on [the older child’s] penis? And 

he said no. I went into the bathroom immediately, and I said did you suck on [his] penis, and 

he said no. And I said, did he suck on yours? And he said no. And I asked him did [he] 

touch your penis? And he said no. I said did you touch [his]? And he said no. I said did 

[he] pull your pants down? And he said no. I said did [the older child] pull his pants down? 

 And he said yes. 

{¶ 48} “MS. DEPASCALE: Objection, move to strike, same basis, your Honor, for the 

record. 

{¶ 49} “THE COURT: Overruled.” 

{¶ 50} A psychologist who had evaluated [the parties’ child] also testified at the 

hearing. She was also permitted to testify, over objection, that the child had consistently 

related to her that the older child had told him to suck his penis. 

{¶ 51} Following the hearing, the magistrate entered a decision that it was in the best 
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interest of the parties’ child to have no contact with the older child. The magistrate ordered 

that Gahris not permit the older child to be within 500 feet of the parties’ child. 

{¶ 52} Gahris filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. He specifically objected 

to the magistrate’s evidentiary ruling permitting Hook and the psychologist to testify regarding 

the statements made by the child. A hearing was held on the objections in the Juvenile Court 

in February 2011, following which the trial court ordered the parties to submit briefs on the 

issue of whether the Ohio Rules of Evidence apply to this proceeding in Juvenile Court. The 

matter was briefed, and the Juvenile Court rendered a decision holding that the Rules of 

Evidence have no application to the matter at issue in this case. 

{¶ 53} Thereafter, the Juvenile Court entered an order overruling Gahris’s objections 

and adopting the magistrate’s decision. The Juvenile Court renewed its holding regarding the 

non-application of the Rules of Evidence as part of its final order. 

{¶ 54} From the order of the trial court restricting contact between the two children, 

Gahris appeals. 

II 

{¶ 55} Gahris’s First, Second and Third Assignments of Error state as follows: 

{¶ 56} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 

DENIED DEFENDANT/FATHER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY 

SUA SPONTE EXCLUDING APPLICATION OF THE OHIO RULES OF EVIDENCE IN 

THIS JUVENILE COURT CASE WHEREIN TWO UNWED PARENTS DISPUTED 

PARENTAL RIGHTS RE: FATHER’S PARENTING TIME. 
8

{¶ 57} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 

DENIED DEFENDANT/FATHER’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL 

PROTECTION BY SUA SPONTE EXCLUDING APPLICATION OF THE OHIO RULES 

OF EVIDENCE IN THIS JUVENILE COURT CASE WHEREIN TWO UNWED PARENTS 

DISPUTED PARENTAL RIGHTS RE: FATHER’S PARENTING TIME. 

{¶ 58} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 

ADMITTED HEARSAY STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY THE PARTIES’ 

CHILD: M.G. (THEN, AGE 3) - CONTRARY TO THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 

OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHT TO 

DUE COURSE OF LAW OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION - ARTICLE 1, § 16.” 

{¶ 59} Gahris contends that the Juvenile Court erred when it determined that the Ohio 

Rules of Evidence have no application to the proceedings in this case. 

{¶ 60} We begin with Evid.R. 101, which states in pertinent part as follows: 

{¶ 61} “(A) Applicability. These rules govern proceedings in the courts of this state, 

subject to the exceptions stated in division (C) of this rule. 

{¶ 62} “(B) Privileges. * * * 

{¶ 63} “(C) Exceptions. These rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not 

apply in the following situations: 

{¶ 64} “ * * * 

{¶ 65} “(6) Other rules. Proceedings in which other rules prescribed by the Supreme 

Court govern matters relating to evidence. 

{¶ 66} “(7) Special non-adversary statutory proceedings. * * * 
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{¶ 67} “ * * * .” 

{¶ 68} Thus, with several specific exceptions that are not material to these 

proceedings, the Rules of Evidence apply to all judicial proceedings unless there is a specific 

rule promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court stating otherwise. 

{¶ 69} There are several sections in the Rules of Juvenile Procedure wherein it is 

specifically stated that the Rules of Evidence do not apply, or that a juvenile court may admit 

evidence not normally allowed by the evidence rules. For instance, Juv.R. 7(F)(3), which 

governs detention hearings, states that the Juvenile Court “may consider any evidence * * * 

without regard to the formal rules of evidence.” Juv.R. 7(F)(3), emphasis added. 

Additionally, Juv.R. 34(B)(2) provides that in dispositional hearings, the Juvenile Court may 

“admit evidence that is material and relevant, including, but not limited to, hearsay, opinion, 

and documentary evidence[.]” 

{¶ 70} We have not found, and Hook has not cited, any rule applicable to juvenile 

court proceedings concerned with parental visitation that supersedes the Ohio Rules of 

Evidence. Indeed, as a general rule the “Ohio Rules of Evidence apply to juvenile court 

proceedings * * * [except that] their applicability at the dispositional stage is somewhat 

limited.” Gianelli & Salvador, Baldwin’s Ohio Juvenile Law Section, 21:9, at 297-298 

(2011). (Footnote omitted.) 

{¶ 71} Furthermore, Juv.R. 1(C)(4) states that the Juvenile Rules of Procedure do not 

apply “in proceedings to determine parent-child relationships * * *.” The Staff Notes to this 

rule state that it “now reflects current terminology used in Revised Code Sections 3111.01 

through 3111.19 regarding the establishment of the parent and child relationship.” See, Ohio 
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Rev. Code Ann. Juv.R. 1 (Baldwin 2009). We note that this entire action has proceeded 

under the auspices of R.C. 3111.01 through R.C. 3111.19, which permits a father, after a 

determination of paternity, to file a motion seeking a determination of parental rights and 

responsibilities, including custody and visitation issues. Thus, the parties and the trial court 

have assumed that for the purposes of Juv.R. 1(C)(4), a proceeding to determine parent-child 

relationships includes the determination of custody and visitation rights. 

{¶ 72} In custody and visitation proceedings in domestic relations courts, the Ohio 

Rules of Evidence have been applied in determining the admissibility of hearsay statements. 

In Harrison v. Harrison (February 25, 1992), Franklin App. No. 91AP-888, the Tenth District 

Court of Appeals affirmed a determination of a domestic relations court that the provisions 

relating to hearsay in the Ohio Rules of Evidence apply to statements made by a child in 

custody matters. Id. at * 4. See also, Arnold v. Arnold (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 465, 

470-474, in which the Twelfth District Court of Appeals applied the Ohio Rules of Evidence 

to hearsay statements made by a child in a divorce case. In Roach v. Roach (1992), 79 Ohio 

App.3d 194, 203-205, this court addressed a trial court’s rulings regarding a child’s hearsay 

statements in a custody battle following a divorce, and applied the Ohio Rules of Evidence. 

{¶ 73} We see no reason why the Ohio Rules of Evidence – specifically, the rules 

pertaining to hearsay – would apply to custody and visitation proceedings before a domestic 

relations court but not to custody and visitation proceedings before a juvenile court. Indeed, 

to apply a different evidentiary standard in custody and visitation proceedings depending upon 

whether the parents are married (so that jurisdiction would lie in the domestic relations court) 

or not married (so that jurisdiction would lie in the juvenile court) would raise issues under the 

Equal Protection clauses of both the United States and Ohio constitutions. 
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{¶ 74} We conclude that the Ohio Rules of Evidence apply to proceedings in a 

juvenile court involving parent-child relationships, specifically including the issues of custody 

and visitation or parenting time. Thus, the trial court erred by failing to consider Gahris’s 

objections to the magistrate’s decision permitting the introduction of hearsay evidence. Upon 

remand, the trial court may consider whether some or all of the testimony to which Gahris 

objected might be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 

{¶ 75} Gahris’s First, Second and Third Assignments of Error are sustained. 

III 

{¶ 76} Gahris’s Fourth Assignment of Error states: 

{¶ 77} “THE JUVENILE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AND 

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE FACTORS 

REQUIRED BY [R.C. 3109.051].” 

{¶ 78} Gahris contends that the magistrate did not consider all the factors regarding 

the child’s best interests, so that the Juvenile Court therefore erred by adopting the 

magistrate’s decision. 

{¶ 79} We have reviewed the magistrate’s decision and find nothing therein to 

indicate that the magistrate failed to consider all of the evidence and statutory factors it 

deemed applicable to this case. From reading Gahris’s argument in support of this 

assignment of error, it appears that he is questioning whether the evidence supports the 

findings made by the magistrate with regard to each of the factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051. 

In other words, Gahris is making a manifest-weight argument, not the proposition stated in 

this assignment of error that the magistrate failed to consider the statutory factors. 
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{¶ 80} In any event, since we have concluded that the trial court proceeded under the 

mistaken assumption that the Ohio Rules of Evidence do not apply to this proceeding, we need 

not consider this argument; upon remand the evidence admitted may be different, and the trial 

court may reach a different conclusion from the evidence. 

{¶ 81} The Fourth Assignment of Error is overruled as moot. 

IV 

{¶ 82} Gahris’s First, Second and Third Assignments of Error having been sustained, 

the order of the trial court from which this appeal is taken is Reversed, and this cause is 

Remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. 

 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

FROELICH, J., concurs. 

DONOVAN, J., concurs in judgment only. 

Copies mailed to: 

Scott B. Beals 

Diane Kappler DePascale 

Hon. Thomas J. Capper