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00inside_front.indd 1 11/8/07 2:08:2
AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

Integration of Weaponized 

Unmanned Aircraft into

the Air-to-Ground System

David B. Hume

Colonel, USAF

Air War College

Maxwell Paper No. 41

Air University Press

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

September 2007

01frontmatter.indd 1 11/8/07 2:08:5
ii

Disclaimer

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely 

those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the 

United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. 

Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

This Maxwell Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web 

site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press 

Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil.

01frontmatter.indd 2 11/8/07 2:08:5
iii

Foreword

Unmanned aircraft (UA) now carry air-to-ground Hellfire 

missiles that give the operator the ability to not just find 

and track ground targets, but also strike them with great 

precision and lethality. Demand is high for the enhanced capabilities of armed UAs. However, there is currently no joint 

consensus on the development and employment of UAs. 

Within the Air Force, the ways intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) and ground attack assets are doctrinally resourced, tasked, and flown in support of requirements 

are at odds with each other. Moreover, the Army’s Warrior 

UA and the Air Force’s Predator have some overlapping capabilities: they operate at similar altitudes, and both carry 

Hellfire missiles. Operators wrestle with competing operational employment concepts: is the armed UA a strike or an 

ISR asset? The answer to that question is fundamental to 

tasking and employment, which in turn must be shaped by 

consistent doctrine.

In this paper, Col David B. Hume, who served as an expeditionary air support operation group commander in Operation Iraqi Freedom, explores some of the mission employment and doctrinal issues associated with this emerging 

weapons system and argues that weaponized UAs should be 

commanded and controlled just like close-air-support (CAS) 

assets. He argues that the Army’s Warrior program, while 

having many beneficial aspects, intersects a clearly defined 

Air Force mission area, which includes close air support, 

aerial imagery, tactical air reconnaissance, and tactical air 

interdiction. To avoid crowded airspace and redundant capabilities, he recommends that the Air Force be given the 

entire mission. He believes that whatever the outcome of the 

struggle over which service owns the mission area, much 

still must be accomplished to effectively command and control weaponized UAs in tomorrow’s battlespace. To further 

that effort, the author also recommends joint employment 

standards for UA weapons, joint agreement on the conduct 

of terminal control, and detailed training requirements for 

UA personnel. Finally, Colonel Hume recommends improvements in joint air-ground command and control to bring 

01frontmatter.indd 3 11/8/07 2:08:5
iv

airspace management into the near-real-time realm, which 

can simplify coordination procedures and truly integrate 

joint fires and tactical assets.

As with all other Maxwell Papers, this study is provided in 

the spirit of academic freedom and is open to debate and serious discussion of the issues. We encourage your response.

STEPHEN J. MILLER

Major General, USAF

Commandant, Air War College

01frontmatter.indd 4 11/8/07 2:08:5
v

About the Author

Col David B. Hume, USAF, is the commander of the 4th 

Air Support Operations Group supporting 5th Corps, US 

Army at Heidelberg, Germany. He is a career weapons systems officer, having flown the D, E, and G variants of the 

F-4 Phantom II and the F-15E Strike Eagle, with over 2,400 

operational flying hours. He is also an experienced jumpmaster and air liaison officer with four tours supporting 

Army units such as the 75th Ranger Regiment and the 18th 

Airborne Corps. He has combat tours in Operations Desert 

Storm, Deny Flight/Joint Endeavor, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom. He has commanded at the flight, detachment, squadron, and group levels and is a joint specialty 

officer, having served as a team chief at the Joint Warfare 

Analysis Center in Dahlgren, Virginia.

Colonel Hume graduated from the University of Virginia 

with a bachelor of science degree in aerospace engineering 

and earned a master of science degree in aeronautical science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in 1997, 

as well as a master’s degree in strategic studies from Air 

University in 2007. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces 

Staff College and the Air War College.

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Abstract

Unmanned aircraft (UA) have changed the nature of warfare. Their persistence, economy, and utility make them 

indispensable on the battlefield, but the lines between the 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and 

ground attack missions of the UA are now blurred. Within 

the Air Force, the MQ-1 Predator does not fit seamlessly 

into the armed reconnaissance role. The ways ISR and 

ground attack assets are doctrinally resourced, tasked, and 

flown in support of requirements conflict with each other. 

The command and control (C2) structure of the theater air 

control system/Army air-ground system (TACS/AAGS) is 

not optimized to support the integration of UA operations 

required in tomorrow’s battlespace. The Army is fielding 

the weaponized Warrior UA system, which crosses service 

lines into what is traditionally and clearly an Air Force mission. This study examines the issues of integrating weaponized UAs into the future battlespace from the standpoint of 

doctrine, operational concepts, and roles and missions. To 

address the disconnects in UA missions and systems, the 

Air Force must treat weaponized UAs like close air support 

and merge the Predator and Warrior requirements. Merging 

the programs will save money, and using the centralized 

control/decentralized execution tenant of airpower vice organic ownership can decrease the number of UAs required 

to support the mission effectively. This merger will require 

both services to establish firm acquisition numbers based 

on joint requirements. The services must establish a joint 

acquisition strategy for interoperability, airframe and spare 

part commonality, and cost savings. This study also recommends establishing joint employment standards and improving C2. Both services must evaluate how they command 

and control weaponized UAs. The TACS/AAGS system must 

be modernized along the lines of a joint air-ground C2 cell 

to allow for near-real-time C2 and dynamic retasking of UAs 

to maximize employment.

vii

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01frontmatter.indd 8 11/8/07 2:08:5


Introduction

The advent of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) has 

changed the nature of warfare. Their persistence, economy, 

and utility have made them indispensable on the battlefield. What began as an advanced concept technology demonstration (ACTD) in 1994 with the UAV that became the 

RQ-1 Predator has evolved into the armed MQ-1 Predator, 

with more weaponized UAVs on the way.1 Soon the US 

Army will field the extended range/multipurpose (ER/MP) 

Warrior unmanned aircraft system (UAS), and the US Air 

Force will field the MQ-9 Reaper, both weaponized and lethal. As UAVs have evolved from an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)-only platform to one that 

can find, fix, and target, much debate has emerged over 

their best employment. 

The lines blurred between the ISR and ground attack 

missions when the first AGM-114 Hellfire missile was testfired from a Predator in February 2001.

2 In her article 

“Clash of the UAV Tribes,” Rebecca Grant describes the 

debates over operational concepts as well as roles and missions, which are similar to debates that have engaged the 

services since the creation of an independent Air Force in 

1947.3

Within the Air Force, the MQ-1 has not fit seamlessly into 

the armed reconnaissance role. Conflicts exist in how ISR 

and ground attack assets are doctrinally resourced, tasked, 

and flown in support of requirements. Between the services, 

the UAV missions of fixed-wing reconnaissance and ground 

attack create a debate over the traditional division of roles 

and missions between the Army and Air Force. Additionally, 

the command and control (C2) structure of the theater air 

control system/Army air-ground system (TACS/AAGS) is 

not optimized to support the integration of UAV operations 

required in tomorrow’s battlespace. 

The purpose of this study is to examine the issues of 

weaponized UAV integration into the future battlespace 

from the standpoint of doctrine, operational concepts, and 

roles and missions and to make recommendations on how 

best to employ this capability in the future. The study provides background information on the evolution and employment of weaponized UAVs and reviews relevant joint and 

02newarticle.indd 1 11/8/07 2:09:1
service doctrine. After analyzing the issues associated with 

C2 of weaponized UAVs, it discusses the programs and 

points of view of the services and emerging doctrine. Finally, it offers recommendations and conclusions based on 

the current issues. 

The discussion is limited to currently fielded or soon-tobe-fielded weaponized UAVs, specifically the MQ-1/MQ-9, 

the ER/MP Warrior UAS, and to a lesser extent the RQ-5 

Hunter. Because the topic is somewhat technical, the discussion assumes an audience familiar with multiservice 

doctrine for air-to-ground C2, joint firepower integration, 

and UAVs. The term unmanned aircraft (UA) describes a 

single UAV, and unmanned aircraft system (UAS) refers to 

the aircraft and its associated C2 equipment that make up 

the system, as adopted by the 2005 Department of Defense 

(DOD) Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap.

4

Background on Unmanned

Aerial Vehicle Employment

UAs are defined by the DOD as powered aerial vehicles 

that do not carry a human operator; they use aerodynamic 

forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be 

piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can 

carry a lethal or nonlethal payload.5 UAs have been around 

for years and were used in Vietnam (e.g., AQM-34 Firebee) 

but did not gain favor as a tactical intelligence platform 

until the Israelis demonstrated their effectiveness with the 

Pioneer in Lebanon in 1982. Acquired by the US Navy from 

Israel, the Pioneer proved its worth at the tactical level during Operation Desert Storm, and its demonstrated ability 

opened up new UA research and development that led to 

the USAF Predator.6 The Predator had its operational debut 

in Bosnia in 1995 and came to the forefront of aviation 

news during Operation Allied Force (OAF) in 1999.7 The 

weaponized Predator was first employed in combat during 

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, and its 

use for air-to-surface attack in Iraq is now commonplace. 

In another Predator first, a UA armed with a Stinger air-toair missile unsuccessfully attempted to engage a MiG-25 

over the Southern Iraq No-Fly Zone in December 2002.8

02newarticle.indd 2 11/8/07 2:09:1
USAF Predator

The Predator ACTD started in 1994 and transitioned to 

the USAF in 1997. The Predator, built by General Atomics, 

has a 48.7-foot wingspan, is 27 feet long, and typically 

cruises at about 80 miles per hour. Its inverted-V tail protects the pusher propeller during takeoffs and landings.9

Typical operating altitudes for the Predator are between 

10,000 and 15,000 feet, but it has the capability to fly at 

altitudes up to 25,000 feet. The MQ-1 has two hard points, 

which are typically used to carry a pair of AGM-114 Hellfire 

missiles. The larger version of the Predator—the MQ-9 

Predator B, now called the Reaper—can operate at altitudes 

above 45,000 feet and has six hard points, allowing it to 

carry up to ten AGM-114 Hellfire missiles or four 500-

pound–class precision weapons.10 Depending on the mission profile, the MQ-1 can stay on station as long as 24 

hours, but typical sorties in Southwest Asia provide 14 

hours of station time. The older Predator versions carried 

two electro-optical (EO) and infrared (IR) sensors, while the 

most recent variants include a laser designator capable of 

designating targets for attack or guiding laser-guided munitions. A synthetic aperture radar (SAR) payload is also 

available for the MQ-1 which allows the system to see 

through weather and clouds, but the installation prevents 

the carriage of missiles.11 A SAR payload will be standard 

on the MQ-9 Reaper.12

Predator Organizations. The Air Force designed the 

Predator system to be operated beyond the line of sight from 

its ground control station (GCS), which requires the use of 

satellite communications for aircraft control. A local line-ofsight GCS is responsible for takeoffs and landings; once the 

UA is successfully airborne, another GCS located outside of 

theater assumes control of the mission.13 At Nellis AFB, Nevada, rated pilots fly the Predator, and sensor operators control what the sensors are looking at, all through a Ku-band 

satellite link.14 Currently, there are three Air Combat Command Predator squadrons: the 11th, 15th, and 17th Reconnaissance Squadrons, all based at Creech AFB in Indian 

Springs, Nevada. The Air Force Special Operations Command also has the 3rd Special Operations Squadron flying 

the MQ-1,

15 and the Air National Guard is transitioning some 

02newarticle.indd 3 11/8/07 2:09:1
of its units to UAs, having already started converting the 

163rd Air Refueling Wing at March AFB, California, to the 

MQ-1.

16 In November 2006, the USAF stood up the first 

MQ-9 squadron at Creech and designated it the 42nd Attack 

Squadron. The USAF plans to buy some 170 MQ-1s by 2010 

as well as 50 to 70 MQ-9s by 2012 to outfit approximately 

15 squadrons for a total of over 220 additional UAs.17

Operational Use. Although first deployed to gather intelligence for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 

Bosnia, the Predator demonstrated its potential in Kosovo 

supporting OAF. Video feeds from the Predator were datalinked to the combined air operations center (CAOC) and to 

other command headquarters, providing the first-ever realtime video feeds of major air combat operations.18 Serbian 

forces claimed to have shot down several Predators, while 

others were lost to icing and technical malfunctions such 

as loss of the C2 data-link signal. Despite these early issues, Predators were deployed to central Asia shortly after 

11 September 2001 (9/11) and have been in continuous 

operation ever since to support combat operations across 

the entire theater. They have been singled out by operational commanders as vital to their mission.19

Recent developments allow video sharing between aircraft and ground personnel. The remote operations video 

enhanced receiver (ROVER) can receive video feeds from 

several types of UAs through a multiband antenna, allowing an operator such as a joint terminal attack controller 

(JTAC) to view the video in real time on the ground while 

supporting ground operations and directing air strikes. The 

ROVER is being fielded as standard equipment for USAF 

JTACs serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are 245 

ROVER kits in-theater for USAF JTACs alone, with the US 

Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and other organizations fielding kits to outfit their forces as well.20

US Army Warrior

The mainstay of the division- and corps-level reconnaissance systems has been the RQ-5 Hunter built by NorthropGrumman. Although full-scale procurement was halted in 

1996 with only seven systems of eight aircraft each, 18 more 

aircraft were purchased in 2004. The Hunter has been em02newarticle.indd 4 11/8/07 2:09:1
ployed in the Balkans as well as in Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF).21 The Hunter has an EO/IR sensor payload for day 

and night operations and can fly at altitudes up to 25,000 

feet for up to 12 hours.22 In 2004 the Army deployed a weaponized version of the Hunter, the MQ-5, to Iraq along with 

the Viper Strike munition; soon all versions will carry the 

weapon. The Viper Strike is a laser-guided, glide munition 

capable of using global positioning system–aided navigation 

with a semiactive laser seeker for terminal guidance. The 

weapon uses a four-pound high explosive antitank (HEAT) 

warhead for top-down attack, which helps to minimize collateral damage.23 Tests of the Viper Strike went very well, 

with seven out of nine direct hits during one testing phase.24

Combat results have yet to be released in a public forum.

The discontinuation of the Hunter program and the cancellation of the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter spurred the 

Army’s interest in the ER/MP UA. In response to the 1990 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) endorsement 

of the mission needs statement (MNS) for a long-endurance 

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) 

capability, the Army produced an operational requirements 

document (ORD) to reemphasize the MNS and to outline 

how the ER/MP program would satisfy Army requirements 

still unmet for RSTA.25 With the ORD in hand, the Army 

moved forward with a competitive process and in August 

2005 awarded General Atomics the ER/MP contract to 

build the Warrior system.

The Warrior UA is very similar to the Predator yet slightly 

larger: 28 feet long with a 56-foot wingspan. (See table 1 for 

comparisons with the MQ-5 Hunter.) The Warrior UA carries a payload similar to the Predator and can carry four 

AGM-114s externally. The major difference from the Predator is the heavy-fuel engine that allows the Warrior to burn 

JP-8, making fuel resupply common with almost all Army 

vehicles. Whereas the Air Force uses rated pilots to fly the 

Predator, Army aviation uses enlisted operators to operate 

the 11 systems with 12 UAs per system. Included with the 

UAS is the one-system ground control station (OSGCS), 

which will allow a single common “cockpit” design to control the entire span of UAs operated by the Army. Units in 

the field will be able to link to Warrior (and other UA) video 

using the one-system remote video terminal (OSRVT), which 

02newarticle.indd 5 11/8/07 2:09:1
is a ROVER terminal on steroids that gives the operator 

more situational awareness on the UA position and attitude 

by using a Falcon View map software overlay.26

USAF Doctrine for ISR Tasking

Most theater ISR requests are coordinated through the 

ISR division (ISRD) of the air operations center (AOC). Typically the ISRD consists of several teams that correlate and 

fuse intelligence, manage ISR operations, and prioritize requests for information/intelligence (RFI).27 Planning for ISR 

operations starts when requirements are established, validated, and prioritized. The collection manager aligns these 

requirements with platforms and sensor capabilities, first 

Table 1. Comparison of UAVs

RQ-5A MQ-5B Warrior A Warrior Block 0

Length (ft) 23 23 27 28

Wing span (ft) 29 34.25 48.7 56

Max. gross takeoff 

weight (lbs) 1,600 1,950 2,350 3,000/3,600

Cruise speed (kts) 60 62 70 60–75

Max. speed (kts) 110 110 125 150

Range mission 

mode (km) 125 125 125 350

Range w/relay (km) 200 200 No relay No relay

Satellite 

communications 

(SATCOM)

No 

SATCOM

No 

SATCOM SATCOM SATCOM

Takeoff distance (ft)/ 

landing* 1,600 2,084 2,000 3,200

Service ceiling (ft) 15,000 18,000 25,000 29,000

Max. endurance 

(hrs) with 80 lb 

payload 9.2 20 31.3 40+

Hardpoints rating 

(lbs) - 2 @ 100 4 @ 150

2 @ 250,

2 @ 500

* Take off and land fully loaded at 9,000 ft density altitude on flat runway

Adapted from Col Don Hazelwood, UAS project manager, Redstone Arsenal, AL, briefing to the author, 21 November 2006.

02newarticle.indd 6 11/8/07 2:09:1
coordinating with planners to determine if organic platforms 

can handle the mission.28 These ISR requirements are prioritized into the ISR sensor collection “deck” and tasked by 

the ISRD for airborne platform collection through the air 

tasking order (ATO).29 Technological innovations have led to 

tasking manned multirole platforms like fighters with targeting pods as nontraditional ISR (NTISR) collectors, while traditional ISR-only unmanned platforms like the Predator have 

now been tasked to perform strike operations. In these cases, 

mission priorities for the aircraft, sensor employment, and 

authority-to-task must be clear and precoordinated.30 This 

doctrine can cause tasking conflicts as addressed below.

Joint Doctrine for TACS/AAGS

The tasking process for C2 of close air support (CAS) for 

ground forces has evolved over many years since first practiced in Europe in 1944. The theater air control system 

(TACS) is the combined force air component commander’s 

(CFACC) mechanism for tasking and controlling air and 

space power to support the needs of the ground forces. The 

TACS allows the CFACC and his or her CAOC to centrally 

plan and control airpower, while the subordinate levels of 

the TACS network are responsible for decentralized execution.31 These are the basic tenants of airpower employment 

and the fundamental organizing principles for air and space 

power.32

The basic element of the TACS consists of the tactical air 

control party (TACP), which is made up of air liaison officers 

(ALO) and enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETAC). The 

TACP is aligned with Army maneuver units from battalion 

through corps with the principle purpose of advising on the 

capabilities and limitations of airpower and assisting in the 

planning, integration, request, and control of airpower.33 At 

the corps, the air support operations center (ASOC) processes immediate requests for CAS and is responsible for 

coordinating and controlling missions in its assigned sector, as well as assisting with time-sensitive targeting (TST).34

All elements of the TACS can communicate via multiple 

nets and means including the joint air request net (JARN) 

and the tactical air direction net (TADN).35

02newarticle.indd 7 11/8/07 2:09:1
The Army air-ground system (AAGS) is closely related to 

and interconnected with the TACS. At all levels, the Army 

airspace command and control (A2C2) element coordinates 

Army aviation integration and deconflicts fire support requests with the fires cell and the TACP. Requests for preplanned air support are sent through Army operations 

channels to the battlefield coordination detachment which 

is collocated with the CAOC.36 Together the network, called 

the TACS/AAGS, is the system for requesting and controlling airpower in direct support of ground forces. The solid 

lines in figure 1 depict the traditional C2 communication 

relationships between elements of the TACS/AAGS, while 

the dashed lines depict alternate communication links between the ground and airborne elements of the system.

A key term needed to discuss airspace deconfliction between fixed wing and rotary wing is the coordinating altitude. The coordinating altitude is a procedural measure 

(altitude restriction) that separates the blocks of airspace in 

which fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft operate.37 Many 

organic Army UAVs operate below the coordinating altitude 

as a method of deconfliction from fixed-wing aviation.

FAC(A)

JSTARS AWACS/CRC

JFC

AOC

BCD ACCE

Land Component

TACP

A2C2

Battalion

II

TACP

A2C2

Brigade

X

TACP

A2C2

Division

XX

TACP ASOC

EOC (WG, GP, SQN)

A2C2

Corps

XXX

Air Force Air Request Net (AFARN/JARN)

TACS-AAGS Connectivity

GLO

Figure 1. Key Air Force and Army Components of the TACS/AAGS. 

(Reprinted from Air Force Doctrine Document [AFDD] 2-1.3, Counterland 

Operations, 11 September 2006, 52.)

02newarticle.indd 8 11/8/07 2:09:1
Doctrinal and Mission Issues

This section discusses the C2, service program, doctrinal, 

and employment issues associated with Air Force and Army 

weaponized UAs. It explores the disconnects in the process 

used by the USAF to task and employ the MQ-1 Predator, 

addresses the Army’s effort to procure the Warrior in spite of 

a debate over its role and missions, and discusses some 

doctrinal differences between the Air Force and Army on 

terminal control, tasking, and overall C2. There are fundamental differences between the Air Force and the Army on 

direct support and ownership of UAs. Without serious dialogue and compromise, the end state could be a crowded 

airspace with redundant capability. 

Tasking and Employment of the USAF Predator

The use of the RQ-1 for ISR only was challenged when 

Gen John Jumper, former chief of staff of the Air Force, 

directed the integration of a laser designator in time for operations in Kosovo that allowed the Predator to designate 

targets for attack by other aircraft. The USAF started to 

realize the full potential of UAs for strike and not just ISR 

after the first Hellfire missile was test fired in 2001.

38 The 

debate still rages. Air National Guard Brig Gen Stanley E. 

Clarke, deputy director for strategic planning for the Air 

Staff, recently commented on the subject: “It’s not cleancut anymore. Predators fitted with Hellfires raise a very interesting question—are they strike or ISR [systems]?”39

Whether the weaponized UAs are perceived as strike or 

ISR systems affects the operational concept of how they are 

tasked and employed. Previously, RFIs were sent to the 

ISRD for processing and prioritization. These requests were 

prioritized in the ISR deck and sourced with a platform. The 

system worked well for traditional imagery requests when 

multiple RFIs were serviced by one pass of the platform. In 

that case, it made perfect sense to organize and prioritize 

the requests and then coordinate which asset would image 

the target. RFIs need to be into the network three days prior 

to the date flown; depending on the type of imagery requested, it could be up to three days before the end user 

gets the final product.40 Maj Clayton “Bags” Marshall pro02newarticle.indd 9 11/8/07 2:09:1
10

vided insight on the insufficiency of ISR doctrine for weaponized UA employment: 

The current ATO cycle works great for a campaign against static 

targets. But in the current war, the 72 hour ATO cycle plus 20 hour 

sortie length means that the Predator target deck is obsolete by 

takeoff. Instead, Preds are given takeoff times and then parceled out 

to users in blocks of time for ad hoc target prosecution. [The] problem is that users have to compete for Pred time, so they put forward 

their most “pressing” requests in order to get slated for Pred time in 

the first place. When they actually succeed in getting support, they 

usually throw out their outdated request[s] and start from scratch 

with new, up-to-the-minute targets.41

 The advantages of the Predator are its long dwell time 

and full-motion video (FMV) capability. Ground commanders immediately saw the value of the Predator for gaining 

battlespace awareness and for battle tracking. The big question now for ground forces is “How do I request an armed 

Predator?” Army units in Iraq or Afghanistan often turn intelligence tips into operations in a matter of hours; for special action units, this may take a matter of minutes. 

Requesting an MQ-1 three days out for an event that has 

yet to materialize is not feasible. Pulling the MQ-1 away from 

its deck tasking is not easy either. It is often easier to task a 

CAS asset through the ASOC to support a short-notice operation than it is to prove to the ISRD that the raid in progress is a higher priority than servicing the ISR deck. What is 

required for the mission is an asset with long dwell time and 

video downlink for the ground commander’s situational 

awareness. The ability to quickly target the same objective 

from the same platform makes the weaponized UAV very effective. If more firepower is required, the JTAC can closely 

coordinate with the sensor operator to mark targets for other 

airborne strike assets. The fighters themselves are often 

equipped with ROVER downlink capability, but they frequently have to leave station to go to the tanker and then 

play catch up upon returning to get reacquainted with the 

tactical situation.

FMV is most useful for the ground commander and operators involved in the current, ongoing mission or operation. FMV is of less value as a data source because it is not 

mensurated or cannot be ortho-rectified. Coordinate mensuration, also called ortho-rectification, is the process 

whereby aerial photographs are registered to a map coordi02newarticle.indd 10 11/8/07 2:09:1
11

nate system and potential measurement errors are removed 

to obtain precise coordinates.42 RFIs requiring this type of 

imagery are best left to the traditional ISR platforms, but 

because of the lack of total ISR assets on the battlefield in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, the MQ-1 often gets tagged with missions better suited for other platforms.

The dwell/stare time of UAs like the Predator is particularly useful for special operations forces (SOF) that are 

looking for patterns or chasing individuals. The quietness 

of some UAVs from a standoff perch will not “spook” or tip 

off the suspect like the sound from a fast-moving fighter, 

an EP-3, or AC-130. Because of these characteristics, the 

MQ-1 is often the platform of choice for SOFs, who often 

have priority for the asset over conventional ground forces. 

With not enough MQ-1s, data-link frequencies, and GCScontrolled orbits to go around, the conventional ground 

units are often left with their organic UAs or fixed-wing 

NTISR, which may or may not have ROVER downlink and 

is often not the ideal platform for the tactical situation.

Unmanned Aircraft Roles and Missions

To close its requirements gap for ISR in Southwest Asia, 

the Army issued the UAS ORD. The utility of UAs has driven 

an increase in Army procurement of UASs to fill this gap. 

The Warrior UAS program will add 121 vehicles to Army aviation. The entire program is expected to cost approximately 

$1 billion.43 Originally, the Army intended to grow by FY 

2011 to 230 UAV units comprised of approximately 2,331

systems and 7,085 air platforms of all types.44 Recent adjustments, however, based on budgetary constraints and 

joint force requirements mean that the number of UAs fielded 

will not be as robust as planned; two classes of midsized 

UAs for the future combat system will not be developed.45

Weaponized, fixed-wing Army UAs, operating at altitudes 

up to 25,000 feet, got the attention of many in the Air Force. 

Discussions between the services about roles and missions 

have been ongoing periodically since the inception of the Air 

Force as a separate service. The debate over the role of Army 

aviation in the 1960s led to the agreement that Army aviation would be strictly limited to support of ground troops 

and would not encroach on traditional USAF roles such as 

02newarticle.indd 11 11/8/07 2:09:1
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interdiction or CAS. This 1966 agreement between the Army 

and Air Force chiefs of staff authorizing the development of 

attack aviation was amended in 1975 to clarify that the attack helicopter did not provide CAS.46 The most recent guidance on roles and missions of the services is found in the 

2002 DOD Directive (DODD) 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, which states 

it is the responsibility of the US Air Force to “organize, train 

and equip and provide forces for close air support and air 

logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed, 

including airlift, air and space support, resupply of airborne 

operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance 

and air interdiction.”47 It further states that the Air Force is 

responsible for providing aerial imagery.48

Some argue based on the DODD that fixed-wing weapons 

delivery is strictly an Air Force mission. Others similarly 

argue that air-breathing ISR platforms operating at altitudes above the coordinating altitude in support of ground 

operations are also an Air Force mission. However, from the 

perspective of Army aviation, a UA delivering an AGM-114 

is really no different from an AH-64 Apache shooting the 

same missile at a ground target. Likewise, the Army has 

been operating the Hunter for years at altitudes above the 

coordinating altitude with few issues.

Terminal Control

Another mission under debate is the terminal control of 

weapons released from platforms providing CAS. Terminal 

control is the authority to direct aircraft to maneuver into a 

position to deliver ordnance.49 Because of the close proximity of friendly forces to the target, CAS requires detailed integration of each air mission supporting ground forces to 

avoid fratricide and to achieve the desired effects on the target.50 The Air Force supports Army maneuver units with 

JTACs and forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC[A]) to provide this detailed integration for CAS as part of TACS. The 

JTAC on the ground directs CAS in support of the ground 

commander’s intent and links the CAS pilot (who may otherwise be unfamiliar with the ground situation) to the battle 

by providing the situational awareness of target and friendly 

locations. JTACs and FACs(A) are the only personnel trained 

02newarticle.indd 12 11/8/07 2:09:1
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and authorized to provide terminal control of CAS on the 

battlefield. From a doctrinal perspective, the Air Force likes 

to see Airmen control airpower. The Army recently established the requirement for JTACs down to the company level 

due to the changing nature of the nonlinear battlefield and 

endorsed the JTAC memorandum of agreement (MOA) that 

set JTAC standards across the services.51 Understanding 

the unique JTAC training requirements that limit production numbers, the Army and Air Force along with USSOCOM 

established the joint fires observer (JFO) program that will 

produce advanced forward observers (FO) capable of conducting surface-to-surface fires and providing targeting 

support to JTACs.52 The JFO will use technology such as the 

ROVER to act as a sensor for the JTAC, who will have overall 

positive control over weapons release from CAS platforms.

The issue of terminal control for a weaponized UA blurs 

when it comes to cross-service ideas on the employment of 

joint fires and CAS. The Air Force considers a Predatordelivered Hellfire in support of ground forces to be CAS, 

and CAS requires a JTAC or FAC(A) somewhere in the loop 

to clear fires and ensure deconfliction. (The Multi-Service 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, published by the 

Air Land Sea Application Center, provides a helpful discussion on how the JTAC and UAS can fit together in a 

CAS employment scenario.53) On the other hand, according to current Army doctrine, an FO who is not even JFOor JTAC-qualified can conduct an attack aviation call for 

fire with an AH-64 armed with AGM-114s. 

Table 2, based on Joint Publication (JP) 3-09.3, Joint 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, 

provides a brief synopsis of the circumstances under which 

the JTAC uses each type of CAS terminal attack control.

The JTAC will usually control a UA using Type 2 CAS 

procedures. The difficulty in controlling a UA-delivered 

AGM-114 is magnified because the FO/JFO or JTAC will 

probably not see the platform, as in a Type 2 or 3 final control. Without ROVER or OSRVT, the JTAC will have to resort to basic CAS talk-on and deconfliction procedures; 

training and certification in this case are essential. The Air 

Force mitigates this sort of risk by having rated pilots fly 

the MQ-1 and a JTAC/FAC(A) perform the final control. 

02newarticle.indd 13 11/8/07 2:09:1
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With the Army, the Warrior could potentially be employed 

by a distant crew supporting an FO on the ground without 

a ROVER/OSRVT feed or JTAC in the loop. This situation 

will present significant operational challenges without 

proper consideration of CAS doctrine and procedures for 

UA employment. The complexity concerning the delivery 

and deconfliction of freefall weapons exacerbates the issue 

of terminal control by non-JTACs. Should the Warrior Block 

0 be outfitted for GBU-12 laser-guided bombs or the smalldiameter bomb, additional debates will emerge about overType of Control JTAC Actions Remarks

Type 1 Used when JTAC must visually 

acquire the attacking aircraft 

and the target for each attack.

Attacking aircraft 

geometry is required to 

reduce the risk of the 

attack affecting friendly 

forces.

Type 2 Used when JTAC requires 

control of individual attacks 

and any of the following 

conditions are true:

• JTAC is unable to visually 

acquire the attacking aircraft 

at weapons release.

• JTAC is unable to visually 

acquire the target.

• The attacking aircraft is 

unable to acquire the mark/

target prior to weapons 

release.

Applicable scenarios are 

night, adverse weather, 

and high altitude or 

standoff weapons 

employment. Successful 

attacks depend on timely 

and accurate

targeting data that may 

be provided by another 

source [e.g., scout, 

combat observation and 

lasing team (COLT), fire 

support team (FIST), 

UAV, SOF, or other assets 

with accurate real-time 

targeting information].

Type 3 Used when JTAC requires the 

ability to provide clearance for 

multiple attacks within a single 

engagement subject to specific 

attack restrictions.

Type 3 control does 

not require the JTAC to 

visually acquire the aircraft 

or the target; however, all 

targeting data must be 

coordinated through the 

supported commander’s 

battle staff.

Table 2. Types of CAS Terminal Attack Control

Adapted from JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support, 3 September 2003, V-14–V-19.

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lapping roles and missions. Is the Army developing a fixedwing CAS and interdiction capability that is redundant to 

the missions and systems that the USAF provides?

Army Direct Support Doctrine

Each Army division will eventually get its own organic 

Warrior system. While this will help meet UA requirements 

for the divisions, it could lead to the ineffective use of a very 

capable asset. The ER/MP mission profiles will include 

RSTA; communications relay; chemical, biological, and nuclear detection; critical logistics delivery; air-to-ground targeting; and potentially air-to-air targeting.54 The number of 

diverse missions and varied requests for support across the 

battlefield could quickly lead to confusion and ineffective 

UA employment as ground units and even divisions fight for 

control of the asset for their mission requirements. The 

Army Air Corps in North Africa in 1943 quickly learned that 

attaching fighter units to specific ground units was an ineffective way to employ airpower across the entire spectrum 

of the battlefield. Out of this confusion was born the airpower tenant of “centralized control/decentralized execution” as a way to focus the specific effects of airpower at the 

right place and time on the battlefield. Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower stated in dispatches following the North African 

Campaign that “direct support of ground troops is naturally 

the method preferred by the immediate military commander 

concerned,” but his vision did not extend beyond the local 

battle.55 It did not consider “the competing demands of individual commanders on a far-flung battlefront, each of 

whom would naturally like to have at his disposal some 

segment of the Air Force for his own exclusive use.”56

The Army’s answer to limited support from low-density, 

high-demand theater assets as well as gaps in corps-level 

Hunter coverage was to procure the Warrior. The ER/MP 

ORD cited an Air Combat Command white paper, dated 13 

April 2004, which stated “the Air Force has been unable to 

service every request in the past due to limited assets.”57 Is 

organic ownership of a weaponized UA the right response to 

past lack of assets? Will organic ownership lead to ineffective or inefficient UA employment across the battlespace? 

These are the questions that future doctrine will have to 

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address to ensure the right mix and proper employment of 

weaponized UAs. 

Grant precisely captures the issue: “For the future, it all 

comes down to where to place the limits on organic UAVs 

and how to ensure that all UAV systems are netted into a 

central battlespace information architecture.”58 The system 

will be in place for potential centralized control/decentralized execution of Army-operated UASs. The OSGCS is designed with a common cockpit so control of platforms can 

be switched from unit to unit across the battlefield, allowing individual users to take control for their specific mission and then pass it back to the division.59 The TACS/

AAGS network exists to allow UA requests to be prioritized 

and platforms to be distributed. The Army is already discussing manned-unmanned teaming to decrease sensorto-shooter delays.60

The way the Army approaches attack aviation support to 

ground units is changing. In Iraq AH-64s are providing convoy escort and quick reaction for troops-in-contact situations. They are teaming with JTACs, fixed-wing CAS, MQ-

1s, and other UAs to find, fix, and finish insurgents who can 

be found in a range of situations such as planting improvised explosive devices, conducting ambush operations, and 

setting indirect attacks with mortars and rockets. This new 

approach to ground operations is not called CAS but direct 

support. Whatever it is called, it is an example of what can 

be accomplished with joint integration. Organic ownership 

may not be the right answer for UA employment unless a 

better way to control assets in near real time can be accomplished. As an example of why legacy A2C2 procedures are 

not adequate for tomorrow’s battlespace, the 4th Infantry 

Division (4 ID) saw the need to change from older ways of C2 

to a near-real-time coordination during their recent deployment to Baghdad for OIF. This need was driven by the aircraft density and airspace complexity over Baghdad.61

TACS/AAGS Shortcomings

The TACS/AAGS system has served the Army and Air 

Force well over the years but is not optimized for the future 

battlefield. The coordinating altitude was 200 feet in Europe 

during the Cold War; now, due to increased low altitude ac02newarticle.indd 16 11/8/07 2:09:2
17

tivity in Iraq, it is 3,000 feet.62 “The ground is rising,” said 

Brig Gen Michael Longoria, formerly of the joint air-ground 

operations (JAGO) office at Langley AFB, Virginia. He further 

related that the JAGO office has heard of requests for block 

airspace up to 10,000 feet.63 The C2 of airspace to support 

Army aviation is typically executed by procedural control, 

which means that established procedures, routes, and fire 

support coordination measures (FSCM) are in effect and followed by aircrews and UA operators alike.64 Blocks of airspace and routes are set aside to ensure deconfliction from 

other assets in the airspace. This will be a particular problem for the battlefield of the future because it is difficult to 

clear entire volumes of airspace to deliver fires, particularly 

for assets like the guided multiple launch rocket system 

(GMLRS). This is an additional problem for large numbers of 

UAs operating in support of multiple units spread across the 

battlespace. Under the current construct, airspace coordinating measures (ACM) such as restricted operations zones 

(ROZ) are established to support UA operations. The number 

of ROZs required to support all of the UAs expected on the 

future battlefield will clog the airspace and constrain fires 

deconfliction. Currently, there is no DOD guidance on how 

many aircraft can be effectively managed in a particular section of airspace. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) 

captured the issue well in a recent report from a trip to 

Southwest Asia: “ACMs such as ROZs do not integrate airspace users. . . . Because airspace is a finite resource, as the 

number of airspace users increases, [airspace C2] elements 

run out of airspace.”65

At Army units from battalion through corps, soldiers and 

Airmen are wrestling with how best to address these issues 

and integrate operations more effectively and efficiently. 

The fire support cell (FSC) is a step in the right direction to 

integrate fire support activities and fires deconfliction. The 

ASOC until recently existed only at corps level but may now 

be included at division level. The A2C2 cell at all levels of 

the TACS/AAGS system is not truly integrated. It coordinates procedures for input into the airspace control plan 

and airspace control order and ensures proper inputs to 

the air tasking order but typically does not positively control day-to-day Army aviation operations. Under positive 

control, aircraft are positively tracked by electronic means 

02newarticle.indd 17 11/8/07 2:09:2
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and communication and are provided direction and deconfliction.66 The 4 ID A2C2 cell saw the need to control airspace below the coordinating altitude over Baghdad. Procedural control in this situation was inadequate, so the cell 

created its own form of near-real-time control by mixing 

positive control with procedural control and cobbling together a low-altitude air picture with feeds from air defense 

radars. The situation was not perfect but was a vast improvement and allowed a more effective and efficient use of 

the airspace by multiple users. The 4 ID is one of the first 

units to deploy to Iraq with the personnel and resources to 

accomplish this task—there is no Army doctrine for the 

Army to control airspace.67 Through the Control and Reporting Center, the ASOC provides positive control for aircraft operating in CFACC airspace above the coordinating 

altitude.68 The airspace of the future will have to be integrated for effective employment of all assets in the battlespace to reduce sensor-to-shooter delays and integrate 

joint fires from multiple assets, be they fixed-wing fighters, 

rotary-wing attack aviation, GMLRS, or UAs.

Recommendations

To optimize the employment of weaponized UAs in support of ground forces and gain the maximum capability 

from systems like the Warrior and Predator, the Army and 

Air Force will have to address the interservice issues concerning the doctrine, roles and missions, and operation of 

UAs. The following recommendations are intended to help 

resolve these issues.

Treat the MQ-1 like CAS

The MQ-1 or Warrior UA is best suited to be managed like 

CAS. In a speech in early 2007, US Air Forces in Europe 

commander Gen William T. Hobbins said, “We need for unmanned aircraft to act like manned aircraft. We need unmanned aircraft to be tasked like manned aircraft. We need 

unmanned aircraft to fly in strike packages with manned 

aircraft.”69 Full-motion video is most useful to the ground 

commander in real time. There are theater-level requirements for long dwell/stare FMV, but those can be prioritized 

02newarticle.indd 18 11/8/07 2:09:2
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just like CAS requests are. When fighters are directed to a 

troops-in-contact situation, they can be pulled at any time 

to support a higher tasking. Likewise, they are available to 

support NTISR taskings when not requested to support 

ground operations. The MQ-1 and future weaponized UAs 

can be tasked in the same manner. Since FMV cannot be 

mensurated, its value to future targeting is limited. UAs are 

best employed in finding the target. The UA can either selfdesignate the target, or another cell such as the ISRD or a 

JTAC, using a program called the Precision Strike Suite for 

Special Operations Forces, can pull mensurated or “sweetened” coordinates for precision-guided munition (PGM) engagement.70 The ISR deck should be serviced by traditional 

assets such as F-16s with the tactical airborne reconnaissance system, which can be mensurated or downlinked to a 

ground station, or the Global Hawk, which is more suited 

for theater-level ISR.

The method for requesting the MQ-1 is optimized for intelligence gathering but not for ground forces. The ISR request system is great for national- or theater-level assets 

but is not effective to support a dynamic tactical battlefield. 

Request for UA support is treated like ISR and is handled 

via a DD Form 1975, which is similar to the form used for 

CAS requests. The TACS/AAGS system is designed to handle CAS requests and can handle tactical ISR requests in 

the same manner, but the breakdown occurs at the CAOC. 

The ISRD and the senior intelligence duty officer decide 

MQ-1 courses of action based on intelligence gain/loss, 

which tends to make the employment doctrine look more 

like centralized control/centralized execution. To further 

complicate matters, the explanation of dynamic retasking 

is confusing in the UAS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, 

and Procedures.

71 All the requestor wants from the tasking 

process is the ability to watch the ground action in real time 

and prosecute targets as they emerge. In these situations 

there is less intelligence gathering than battle tracking. The 

dwell time of UAs makes them attractive to the ground commander to cover drawn-out ground missions over NTISRproviding fighters that may depart mid-mission for fuel. 

The Army understands the utility of FMV and dwell time to 

the ground commander, hence its push to accelerate and 

02newarticle.indd 19 11/8/07 2:09:2
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increase the number of UAs supporting ground units currently in Iraq.72

Give the Weaponized Unmanned Aerial Mission

to the USAF

Weaponized, fixed-wing ISR support to ground forces, 

able to operate at altitudes up to 25,000 feet, is clearly an 

Air Force mission as outlined in DODD 5100.1, Functions of 

the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. Paragraph 6.6.3.2.5 states that it is the USAF’s function “to organize, train, equip, and provide forces for close air support

and air logistic support to the Army and other forces, as directed, including airlift, air and space support, resupply of 

airborne operations, aerial photography, tactical air reconnaissance, and air interdiction of enemy land forces and communications” (emphasis added).73 The Army’s answer to the 

ISR gap and the lack of FMV capability to support ballooning 

theater requirements is to buy its own platform. With cash 

in hand left over from the canceled Comanche program, the 

Army has executed the $1 billion Warrior UAS program. The 

Air Force is rapidly building MQ-1s and MQ-9 Reapers. Is 

this overkill, given the requirements? Is this redundancy 

cost effective in a time of budget constraints? Obviously, the 

discussion on roles and missions for UA support to ground 

troops must take place to answer these questions.

Based on the issues outlined in this study, the Air Force 

should take over the mission of operating weaponized UAs. 

This could lead to a variety of options, some of which have 

already been proposed by the Air Force. One option would 

be to habitually align Predator squadrons with Army units, 

similar to the way the Air Force supports ground units with 

TACPs, which could mean either USAF ownership outright 

or “Army buys, Air Force flies.”74 In conjunction to this proposal, the Air Force could station intelligence personnel 

with TACPs as ISR liaison officers (LNO) to Army units to 

assist in the employment of the Predator and Reaper following the principle of centralized control/decentralized 

execution. The LNO could also help facilitate ISR requests 

as well as assist in tactical target coordinate mensuration 

for PGM engagement.

02newarticle.indd 20 11/8/07 2:09:2
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An agreement on roles and missions is not likely soon. 

Congressional legislation sponsored by Senator Richard 

Shelby of Alabama and signed into law prohibits tactical UAV 

program funds from being transferred from the Army and 

mandates that the Army retain responsibility for and operational control of the ER/MP UAS.75 Even if the services cannot agree on UA roles and missions, there are many advantages to be gained by collaboration. Merging of the joint 

war-fighter acquisition programs, as suggested by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), could eliminate duplication 

of effort, cut redundant systems, and ensure interoperability.76 The QDR specifically addresses capability reviews to 

cut redundancies by assessing joint force capability portfolios.77 The Warrior airframe, although sharing only 15 percent commonality with the Predator, has many positive attributes, such as the heavy fuel engine and automated 

takeoff and landing, and is designed to operate in austere 

conditions.78 Sharing the same manufacturer could lead to 

massive cost savings by merging the acquisition programs, 

and, frankly, the Warrior is a better platform.79 There are 

many features of the one-system ground control station and 

the one-system remote video terminal that promise great 

utility and could make the system interoperable across the 

services if jointly procured.

If the services decide that their weaponized UA programs 

should not be combined, both services will still gain by participating in a joint center of excellence (JCOE) as outlined 

by the JROC in June 2005 and directed by the chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 2005.80 The Air Force 

has years of experience in UA operations and has led the 

way with the MQ-1. Some USAF Predator pilots come from 

fighter cockpits and bring a wealth of weapons-delivery 

knowledge to the community. Cross talk could mitigate 

some of the inexperience of Army UAS operators in the area 

of UA-delivered weapons. The Air Force could share the 

training pipeline for Warrior with the Army. A joint training 

program could ease the burden on USAF rated officers required to fill positions as UA pilots by leveraging Armytrained UAS operators for many portions of the training 

curriculum.

The Army should consider allowing its operators to get a 

private-pilot, single-engine land rating and accrue flying 

02newarticle.indd 21 11/8/07 2:09:2
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hours towards an instrument rating (for which they get 

most of the academics in school). An instrument rating 

would help convince the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) to allow UA operations in the national airspace, among 

other see-and-avoid concerns; provide a tremendous increase in access to training areas; and pave the way for 

routine border operations.81 Currently, Predator operations 

in the nonrestricted national airspace are limited to caseby-case situations for transit only above flight level 180 

where positive control is required.82

Establish Joint Standards for UA Weapons

Employment

The earlier discussion of terminal control highlighted 

the need for joint UA employment standards to govern UAdelivered weapons. Just as the JTAC and JFO MOAs establish training standards across the services, so too an 

interservice training standard for weapons employment is 

required. The services need to endorse a detailed agreement about who can employ armed UAs, who can conduct 

terminal control, and what training requirements must be 

met by UA personnel.

Emerging tactics and procedures have not yet been incorporated into the joint publications such as JP 3-09.3, 

Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for CAS, although 

the UAS JCOE has recently made a submission regarding 

the employment of UAs in CAS.83 The Air Force has addressed terminal control of CAS by armed UAs in AFDD 2-

1.3, Counterland Operations, and this doctrine should be 

incorporated into joint doctrine immediately.84

Improve Joint Air-Ground Command and Control

Efforts also need to be made for real-time or near-realtime C2 of all fires and tactical assets to fight effectively in 

tomorrow’s battlespace. The TACS/AAGS is a stovepipe 

system that was fine for rapid management, planning, and 

deconfliction on the Cold War–style battlefield but is not 

optimized to support real-time C2. It is not truly integrated 

even at corps level, yet it will need to be in order to coordinate rapidly changing airspace to support the needs of the 

commander, especially with the planned multitudes of UAs 

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and other assets. Emerging technology is leading to the 

real-time C2 of combat power with the advent of data link; 

blue force tracker; and identification, friend or foe for UAs, 

in addition to systems like the Army’s tactical air integration system (TAIS) and the Air Force Link-16.85 These types 

of systems and technologies will enable the A2C2 cell to 

move from procedural control to positive control. With all 

elements in the battlespace under some type of near-realtime control, the need for many static FSCMs goes away. In 

his article on the joint air-ground control cell (JAGC2), 

Curtis Neal proposes a JAGC2 cell that fuses all elements 

of various staff functions such as the ASOC, FSC, A2C2, 

and ISR into an organization focused on maximizing the effects of a single war-fighting function (see fig. 2). 

Having an element at division and corps like the JAGC2 is 

absolutely essential to maximize the effectiveness of armed 

UAs integrated with all other joint fires. Without the ability to 

deconflict fires in real time, UA operations will require blocks 

of airspace and ROZs that will hamper fixed and rotary wing 

integration and delay asset transfers between units. The 

JAGC2 will operate similarly to the aforementioned 4 ID airFigure 2. JAGC2 in the Division or Corps Main Command Post. (Reprinted from Col Curtis V. Neal, USAF, retired, “JAGC2: A Concept for 

Future Battlefield Air-Ground Integration,” Field Artillery Magazine, November–December 2006, 15.)

Legend:

A2C2 = Army Airspace Command and Control

AMD = Air and Missile Defense

C2 = Command and Control

TACP = Tactical Air Control Party

FSC = Fire Support Cell

ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance, and

 Reconnaissance

ASOC TACP FSC A2C2

JAGC2

AMD ISR

Other

US Army

or Special

Operations

C2

Elements

02newarticle.indd 23 11/8/07 2:09:2
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space C2 cell during its Baghdad deployment. A JAGC2, 

digitally connected to all players who also have access to the 

standard integrated air picture, will be able to maximize the 

effects of armed UAs teamed with other assets in real time. 

This is a perfect network for centralized control/decentralized execution of all air-delivered effects on the battlefield.

Conclusion

This study examined the issues of weaponized UAV integration into the future battlespace from the standpoint of 

doctrine, operational concepts, and roles and missions and 

recommended ways to best employ this capability in the 

future. What started as an ACTD has come a long way to 

today’s MQ-1 Predator, Warrior, and Reaper—all armed and 

lethal. The demand for FMV and ISR in Afghanistan and 

Iraq has increased tenfold, yet the inability to match platforms with requests has led to gaps in coverage, as requests 

have been left unfilled or filled with fixed-wing NTISR. In an 

effort to cover the ISR and FMV gap, the Army bought its 

own organic UAS to be operated at the division level. The 

weaponized Warrior UAS crosses service lines into what is 

traditionally an Air Force mission. Because of funding limitations, the Air Force had not planned to field the MQ-1 in 

the numbers the Army required but made several proposals 

to take over the entire program as an Air Force mission 

(Army buys, USAF flies). Currently, a QDR recommendation 

to merge the programs is delayed in staffing, and legislation 

precludes the transfer of the program without an amendment to the law. 

Unless a decision is made soon on roles, missions, and 

numbers of UAs needed to support mission requirements, 

the Army and Air Force will have bought and fielded redundant systems with numbers in excess of battlefield requirements. To review, the following recommendations would 

prevent redundancy: 

1. Treat weaponized UAs like CAS. Following the airpower tenant of centralized control/decentralized execution for UAs, as opposed to organic ownership, can 

decrease the numbers required to support the mission 

02newarticle.indd 24 11/8/07 2:09:2
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effectively by the sharing of assets across the battlespace in a manner like CAS. 

2. Give the weaponized UA mission to the USAF. The 

mission area is clearly outlined in DODD 5100.1 as 

an Air Force mission.

3. Merge the Predator and Warrior program requirements, which will reduce costs. The merger will require both services to thoroughly examine their ISR 

requirements as a collective joint portfolio, as suggested in the QDR, and establish firm acquisition 

numbers based on joint requirements. 

4. Create a joint acquisition strategy for interoperability, airframe and spare part commonality, and cost 

savings. The USAF needs to terminate MQ-1 orders 

and buy the Army version of the ER/MP airframe immediately.

5. Establish joint standards for UA employment. Terminal UA control must be standardized across services 

for both UA operators and ground controllers. 

6. Improve C2. Both services must look at how they 

command and control weaponized UAs. The Air Force 

must follow the lead of the Army and get the MQ-1

and MQ-9 out of the old-style ISR tasking channels 

and task them like fighter planes for CAS. Standing 

up the 42nd Attack Squadron with the MQ-9 Reaper 

is a step in the right direction, and all Predator units 

should follow suit. The TACS/AAGS system must be 

modernized along the lines of the JAGC2 to allow for 

near-real-time C2 and dynamic retasking of UAs to 

maximize employment and integration with other 

joint assets in the battlespace.

7. Reexamine how we train UA operators. The Air Force 

should consider the Army model of enlisted or warrant officer UA operators to ease the stress on the 

rated force, while the Army should consider the vast 

midsize UA and weapons-delivery experience resident 

in Air Force fighter and UA squadrons. Army UA operators need to have a private pilot’s license and instrument rating that will not only provide an incentive to the enlisted force but also ease the transition 

for FAA approval to operate in the national airspace.

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A major shift in thinking is required to find ways to best 

integrate weaponized UAs into the fight. Technology and 

innovation rapidly turn ideas into reality. Who would have 

thought six years ago that a test shot with an AGM-114 by 

an RQ-1 Predator would lead to major procurement programs of approximately $1 billion and Reapers armed with 

not only eight Hellfires but also two GBU-12s? Hate it or 

love it, joint is the way ahead for UA procurement and employment.

Notes

1. Elizabeth Bone and Christopher Bolkcom, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: 

Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report 

for Congress (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 25 April 2003), 20.

2. Sue Baker, “Predator Missile Launch Totally Successful,” Aeronautical Systems Center Public Affairs news release, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, 

27 February 2001.

3. Rebecca Grant, “Clash of the UAV Tribes,” Air Force Magazine, September 2005.

4. DOD, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 2005–2030 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 4 August 2005), i.

5. Ibid., 1.

6. Bone and Bolkcom, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 2.

7. Ibid., 22.

8. Jim Krane, “Pilotless Warriors Soar to Success,” CBS News.com, 

25 April 2003, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/04/25/tech/

main551126.shtml.

9. Brent Sadler, “In the Sights of a Joystick Killing Machine,” CNN.

com, 9 June 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/06/09/

sadler.predator.btsc/index.html.

10. Bone and Bolkcom, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 21.

11. Ibid., 22.

12. Maj Clayton R. Marshall, Joint UAS Center of Excellence project officer, Nellis AFB, NV, correspondence with the author, 18 January 2007.

13. Ibid.

14. Sadler, “In the Sights,” 3.

15. Marshall, correspondence.

16. John A. Tirpak, “UAVs with Bite,” Air Force Magazine, January 

2007, 46.

17. Ibid.

18. Bone and Bolkcom, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 23.

19. Ibid., 24.

20. Grady R. Barnett, ACC/A8CT (TACP), Langley AFB, VA, briefing 

provided to the author, 18 February 2007.

21. DOD, Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, 7.

22. Bone and Bolkcom, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 28.

02newarticle.indd 26 11/8/07 2:09:2
27

23. “Viper Strike Laser Guided Weapon for UAVs,” Defense-Update.com, 

25 September 2005, http://www.defense-update.com/directory/viper-strike 

.htm.

24. Harold Kennedy, “Services Focus on Fielding Munitions for Close 

Combat,” National Defense Magazine, December 2005, http://www.nation 

aldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Dec1/Services_Focus.htm.

25. US Army, Extended Range/Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

Operational Requirements Document ACAT Level II for a Milestone B Decision (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 14 June 

2004), 4.

26. Col Don Hazelwood, UAS project manager, Redstone Arsenal, AL, 

briefing to the author, 21 November 2006.

27. AFDD 2-1.7, Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 13 July 2005, 

30.

28. AFDD 2-9, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations” (Draft), 21 November 2005, 12–13.

29. Ibid., 15.

30. Ibid., 47.

31. AFDD 2-1.3, Counterland Operations, 11 September 2006, 51.

32. AFDD 1-1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, 28.

33. AFDD 2-1.3, 63.

34. Ibid., 55.

35. Ibid., 52.

36. Ibid.

37. JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 30 

August 2004, GL-6.

38. Marshall, correspondence.

39. Adam J. Herbert, “Eighty-Six Combat Wings,” Air Force Magazine, 

December 2006, 29.

40. Personal experience of the author as commander, 18th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group, Camp Victory, Iraq, May–September 

2005.

41. Marshall, correspondence.

42. Center for Geographic and Statistical Analysis, http://www.co.yakima 

.wa.us/gis/Center/OrthoPhotos.html.

43. “$214.4M for R&D on Warrior UAV (updated),” Defense Industry Daily, 

12 August 2005, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2144m-for-rd-on 

-warrior-uav-updated-0995/.

44. Hazelwood, briefing.

45. “Army Makes Adjustments to Future Force Unmanned Aerial Systems,” US Army news release, 9 January 2007, http://www.army.mil/ 

-newsreleases/2007/01/09/1293-army-makes-adjustments-to-future 

-force-unmanned-aerial-systems/.

46. Grant, “Clash of the UAV Tribes,” 2.

47. DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, 1 August 2002, 24.

48. Ibid.

49. AFDD 2-1.3, 102.

50. Ibid., 6.

02newarticle.indd 27 11/8/07 2:09:2
28

51. Col David R. Brown, “JTAC MOA vs JTTP,” Field Artillery Magazine, 

January–February 2005, 18.

52. CW3 Christopher A. Saindon, USA, retired, “The FA: Leading Joint 

Interdependency with JACI,” Field Artillery Magazine, September–October 

2006, 16.

53. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-04.15, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned 

Aircraft Systems, August 2006, chapter 4.

54. ER/MP ORD, 12, 18.

55. Quoted in Daniel R. Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations: 

World War II Close Air Support, North Africa (Washington, DC: Office of Air 

Force History and US Army Center of Military History, 1987), 84.

56. Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, 84.

57. Quoted in Mortensen, A Pattern for Joint Operations, 17.

58. Grant, “Clash of the UAV Tribes,” 9.

59. Hazelwood, briefing.

60. ER/MP ORD, 17.

61. CALL and Air Force Office of Lessons Learned (AF/A9L), OIF-OEF 

Airspace Command and Control Collection and Analysis Team Initial Impressions Report, Joint Report, 7 November 2006, 9.

62. Grant, “Clash of the UAV Tribes,” 8.

63. Quoted in Grant, “Clash of the UAV Tribes,” 8.

64. AFDD 2-1.7, 4.

65. CALL and AF/A9L, OIF-OEF Airspace Command and Control, 8.

66. AFDD 2-1.7, 4.

67. CALL and AF/A9L, OIF-OEF Airspace Command and Control, 25, 32.

68. AFDD 2-1.3, 58.

69. Quoted in John T. Correll, “Verbatim,” Air Force Magazine, January 

2007, 51.

70. Saindon, “The FA,” 17.

71. FM 3-04.5, UAS MTTP, II-7. FM 3-04.15, UAS MTTP, II-7. , II-7.

72. Hazelwood, briefing.

73. DODD 5100.1, 24.

74. Col Keith Gentile, HQ USAF/A2ZC, Pentagon, briefing provided to 

the author, 4 May 2006.

75. DOD, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes 

in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act of 2006, Public Law 109-48, 

HR 2863, 109th Cong., 1st sess., sec. 8119, 30 December 2005.

76. Gentile, briefing.

77. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, 6 February 2006), 68.

78. BG Stephen Mundt, deputy chief of staff, Army G-3/5/7, “US Army 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Programs,” Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, 6 April 2006.

79. “Army and USAF Share Son of Predator,” Strategy Page, 24 March 

2006, http://strategypage.com/htmw/htairfo/articles/20060324.aspx.

80. Gen Peter Pace, chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum for 

the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 23 November 2005, 1.

81. Hazelwood, briefing.

82. Marshall, correspondence.

02newarticle.indd 28 11/8/07 2:09:2
29

83. JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 

Support, 3 September 2003, Incorporating Change 1, 2 September 2005.

84. AFDD 2-1.3, 38.

85. Col Curtis V. Neal, USAF, retired, “JAGC2: A Concept for Future 

Battlefield Air-Ground Integration,” Field Artillery Magazine, November–

December 2006, 14–15.

02newarticle.indd 29 11/8/07 2:09:2
02newarticle.indd 30 11/8/07 2:09:2
31

Abbreviations

AAGS	 Army air-ground system

ACM	 airspace coordinating measure

ACTD	 advanced concept technology demonstration

AF/A9L	 Air Force Office of Lessons Learned

AFDD	 Air Force Doctrine Document

ALO	 air liaison officer

AOC	 air operations center

ASOC	 air support operations center

ATO	 air tasking order

A2C2	 Army airspace command and control

CALL	 Center for Army Lessons Learned

CAOC	 combined air operations center

CAS	 close air support

CFACC	 combined force air component commander

COLT	 combat observation and lasing team

C2	 command and control

DOD	 Department of Defense

DODD	 Department of Defense Directive

EO	 electro-optical

ER/MP	 extended range/multipurpose

ETAC	 enlisted terminal attack controller

FAA	 Federal Aviation Administration

FAC(A)	 forward air controller (airborne)

FIST	 fire support team

FM	 field manual

FMV	 full-motion video

FO	 forward observer

4 ID	 4th Infantry Division

FSC	 fire support cell

FSCM	 fire support coordination measure

GCS	 ground control station

GMLRS	 guided multiple launch rocket system

HEAT	 high explosive antitank

IR	 infrared

ISR	 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ISRD	 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

division

JAGC2	 joint air-ground control cell

JAGO	 joint air-ground operations

JARN	 joint air request net

JCOE	 joint center of excellence

JFO	 joint fires observer

JP	 joint publication

03abbreviations.indd 31 11/8/07 2:09:4
32

JROC	 Joint Requirements Oversight Council

JTAC	 joint terminal attack controller

LNO	 liaison officer

MNS	 mission needs statement

MOA	 memorandum of agreement

MTTP	 multi-service tactics, techniques, and

procedures

NTISR	 nontraditional intelligence, surveillance,

and reconnaissance

OAF	 Operation Allied Force

OEF	 Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF	 Operation Iraqi Freedom

ORD	 operational requirements document

OSGCS	 one-system ground control station

OSRVT	 one-system remote video terminal

PGM	 precision-guided munition

QDR	 Quadrennial Defense Review

RFI	 request for information/intelligence

ROVER	 remote operations video enhanced receiver

ROZ	 restricted operations zone

RSTA	 reconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition

SAR	 synthetic aperture radar

SATCOM	 satellite communications

SOF	 special operations forces

TACP	 tactical air control party

TACS	 theater air control system

TADN	 tactical air direction net

TAIS	 tactical air integration system

TST	 time-sensitive targeting

UA	 unmanned aircraft

UAS	 unmanned aircraft system

UAV	 unmanned aerial vehicle

USSOCOM	 US Special Operations Command

03abbreviations.indd 32 11/8/07 2:09:4
33

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