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38–989 PDF 2008

S. Hrg. 110–621 

WATCHING THE WATCH LIST: BUILDING AN 

EFFECTIVE TERRORIST SCREENING SYSTEM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

OCTOBER 24, 2007 

Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

( 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

CHRISTIAN J. BECKNER, Professional Staff Member 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ROBERT L. STRAYER, Minority Director for Homeland Security 

JOHN K. GRANT, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Lieberman ........................................................................................... 1 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 3 

Senator Tester .................................................................................................. 19 

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 21 

Senator Warner ................................................................................................ 23 

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 23 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 27 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2007 

Eileen R. Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 5 

Hon. Glenn A. Fine, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice ................. 8 

Leonard C. Boyle, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice ......................................................... 10 

Paul Rosenzweig, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security .......................................................................................... 13 

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Boyle, Leonard C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 65 

Fine, Hon. Glenn A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 

Larence, Eileen R.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 37 

Rosenzweig, Paul: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 13 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 71 

APPENDIX 

‘‘Promoting Accuracy and Fairness in the Use of Government Watch Lists, 

Statement of the Constitution Project’s Liberty and Security Initiative,’’ 

The Constitution Project, December 5, 2006 ..................................................... 78 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requestors, 

‘‘Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and 

Expand Use of the List,’’ October 2007 .............................................................. 87 

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division, 

‘‘Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center,’’ Audit Report 07– 

41, September 2007 .............................................................................................. 169 

Questions and responses for the record from: 

Ms. Larence ....................................................................................................... 275 

Mr. Fine ............................................................................................................. 278 

Mr. Boyle ........................................................................................................... 284 

Mr. Rosenzweig ................................................................................................. 293 

(1) 

WATCHING THE WATCH LIST: BUILDING AN 

EFFECTIVE TERRORIST SCREENING SYSTEM 

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in Room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Lieberman, Levin, Carper, Tester, Collins, 

Voinovich, and Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good morning. In this hearing, we continue this Committee’s oversight of our homeland security programs that have been created since September 11, 2001. Last 

week, we had one on port security. Yesterday, we had another interesting hearing on an aspect that we still need some help on. And 

today, we go to one where we have made some progress, although 

we still have some questions, and this is our focus on the terrorist 

watch list—a critical tool in our battle to keep terrorists from entering the United States and attacking our homeland again as they 

did on September 11, 2001. 

After September 11, 2001, we found as part of the investigation 

of how that event occurred that lists of suspected or potential terrorists that were in the possession of the Federal Government, 

many different Federal agencies, were, however, not shared, and 

certainly not shared in a way that increased deterrence of a terrorist attack. As a result, we now know that two of the September 

11, 2001, hijackers—Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar—were 

known to the CIA and NSA and were regarded as dangerous by 

both agencies. But that information was never shared with the Immigration and Naturalization Service or the State Department, and 

therefore, these two terrorists were allowed to enter our country 

and be part of carrying out the most devastating attack on our 

homeland in our history. 

The Terrorist Screening Center, operated by the FBI, was created in December 2003, to state it simply, to make sure that nothing like that ever happened again. Its mission was to pull together 

all the different lists of potential terrorists into one master list and 

to make sure that everyone who needed that information to protect 

our homeland had easy access to it. This master list is used as the 

basis for the creation of separate databases used by a number of 

2 

1The GAO Report on ‘‘Terrorist Watch List Screening’’ appears in the Appendix on page 87. 

Federal agencies today, including as TSA’s No Fly List and the 

State Department’s CLASS list or database, which is used to 

screen visa applicants. The terrorism watch list is also a vital tool 

State and local law enforcement can now access, creating a powerful new link to generate leads on potential terrorists within our 

country because of the access that hundreds of thousands of State 

and local law enforcement officers have to that list. 

This is a vast improvement over where we were before and on 

September 11, 2001. I want to thank the Terrorist Screening Center, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Department of 

Homeland Security, and other Federal agencies for the significant 

progress they have made over the last 4 years in closing this previous gap in our homeland security. 

The Government Accountability Office reports today in a report 

that we are releasing on this progress.1 But it also discusses some 

remaining vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the watch list system 

which we will want to discuss. The Department of Justice Inspector 

General, also appearing before us today, has found similar problems in the watch list system in his audits of the Terrorist Screening Center. 

Some of the concerns that we are going to discuss stem from the 

sheer size of the list. It contained 158,000 names in July 2004. 

That grew to 755,000 names by May of this year, and it now stands 

at about 860,000 names. That is nearly a 500-percent increase in 

3 years. Of course, if there is a good reason to have each of those 

names there, the increase in the size of the list is good news for 

our homeland security. But if many of these names are mistakenly 

there, the credibility of the terrorism watch list and its usefulness 

will be compromised. So we want to talk about that. 

I know that the Terrorist Screening Center has undertaken efforts to review portions of the watch list, such as the entire No Fly 

List, and has a long-term plan to review the entire watch list. But 

with the list likely to go over 1 million names in the near future, 

we need to know that there are clear standards for placing names 

on it and, of course, for taking them off it. 

Another concern expressed by the Department of Justice—and I 

guess I would say the traveling public, or some of it—is providing 

an appeal for individuals who are caught in the watch list system 

because they have the same name or a similar name to someone 

who deserves to be on the list. 

The most famous of these cases is our own colleague, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, famously denied boarding on different airline 

flights because his name resembled that of an IRA terrorist. It took 

weeks to get this cleared up. I am going to try to avoid humor here 

because this is a serious subject. But it is essential that we have 

a redress system that is easy for people to navigate and can quickly 

resolve problems of mistaken identity without, of course, weakening the terrorist watch lists and their utility. 

Now, on the other side of the spectrum, the GAO report does cite 

some cases where people whose names were justifiably on the 

watch list have, nonetheless, been admitted into our country by 

Customs and Border Protection and cases where people on the No 

3 

Fly List have been allowed to board international flights traveling 

to the United States. That, of course, is the most serious of all 

vulnerabilities that could exist in this system. 

So, bottom line, the picture I believe we are going to see today 

and the testimony we are going to hear and the questions we are 

going to ask, I think, will be around this reality. We have a new 

system in place. It is a great improvement over what existed before, but there are still occasions when that system lets in people 

who are on the watch list and keeps out people who should not be 

on the list. And, of course, all of us want to fix those 

vulnerabilities. But it is with appreciation for all that you have 

done that I welcome the witnesses and that I call on the Committee’s Ranking Member now, Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me begin by 

commending you for holding this hearing. I think continuing oversight by this Committee is so important, and this is certainly an 

issue that directly affects the security of our country, but also affects our constituents day in and day out. 

The use of the terrorist watch list inspires both confidence and 

concern—confidence that our counterterrorism agencies are determined to detect and disrupt the travels of those who would do us 

harm, but also concern that this increased security may come at a 

cost to privacy and civil liberties. 

As the Chairman indicated, the 9/11 Commission noted that as 

many as 15 of the 19 hijackers might have been intercepted by border authorities if a procedure had been in place to link previously 

accumulated information to their names. Several of the hijackers 

had been cited in intelligence community files for terrorist links. 

Existing but untapped data on travel patterns, bogus visa applications, and fraudulent passport information could have focused official attention on some of the terrorists. Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the government simply had no such consolidated system. 

Based on its investigation, the 9/11 Commission recommended 

that the Federal Government design a comprehensive screening 

system to help front-line officials at our borders and other critical 

points confirm the identity of people trying to enter our country or 

to board airplanes and to disrupt their plans if they pose a security 

threat. 

The need for effective information sharing and for tools to track 

terrorists’ movements is self-evident. But if these databases contain 

information that is inaccurate, obsolete, or error-prone, then watch 

lists can prove to be both ineffective and unfair. Suspects who pose 

a security threat can pass unimpeded if they are not listed or if 

technical problems prevent their identification. 

On the other hand, all of us have heard from innocent constituents who have had the misfortune to share a similar name or other 

identifying data with a suspect on the watch list. Individuals who 

do not belong on the list can face frustrating delays every time they 

travel, and as Senator Kennedy and others have found, it can be 

very difficult to get erroneous information corrected. In addition, 

4 

1The GAO report appears in the Appendix on page 87. 

2The DOJ Inspector General’s report appears in the Appendix on page 169. 

volumes of personal information in the hands of government can 

present a tempting target for identity thieves. 

Creating and maintaining a comprehensive terrorist watch list is 

an enormous endeavor fraught with technical and tactical challenges. On the technical side, integrating information from multiple 

government databases and then transmitting that information securely and accurately is no easy task. To be useful to our officers 

in the field, the watch list must provide reliable and accurate information that can be quickly evaluated and then used as a basis for 

action. 

The GAO report 1 that we release today and the DOJ Inspector 

General’s report2 that we received last month provide us with the 

means to review the screening process and assess its strengths and 

weaknesses. 

The GAO report details the use of the watch lists by law enforcement over a 42-month period. Federal, State, and local officials had 

more than 53,000 encounters with individuals on the watch lists 

during that period. 

Unfortunately, as the Chairman mentioned, there are troubling 

examples of targeted individuals passing through screening undetected. We also have the more recent, very troubling case where 

Customs and Border Protection allowed an individual from Mexico 

who was infected with a dangerous strain of TB to pass across the 

border several times. 

A particularly troubling problem has been the failure to detect 

individuals on the No Fly List before they board a U.S.-bound aircraft overseas. In some cases, the government’s response to delayed 

detection has resulted in planes being diverted for an emergency 

landing—almost always, they seem to get diverted to Bangor, 

Maine—so that a suspicious individual can be questioned, detained, 

or refused entry. And perhaps the most recent example of that happening that resonated with people my age was when Cat Stevens 

was on the plane that was diverted to Bangor, Maine. 

These reports underscore the need to make the watch lists more 

accurate and more timely. After all, if we are dealing with the 

problem when the suspect is already on the plane, it is really a bit 

too late. We need to also improve the system for seeking redress 

if individuals believe that they have been wrongfully targeted. My 

understanding is that the Terrorist Screening Center is working 

with the GAO and the Inspector General to implement their recommendations. 

Any system that relies on judgments made by various personnel 

in different agencies applying varying standards will never be perfect, particularly when we are dealing with very large, complex 

databases. It is, nevertheless, imperative that improvements be 

made so that the American people can have more confidence and 

less concern about this important safeguard against terrorist attacks. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Thanks to the witnesses for being here. We have an excellent group 

of witnesses. We are going to vote around 11 or so, so hopefully we 

5 

1The prepared statement of Ms. Larence appears in the Appendix on page 37. 

can get through the opening statements and some questioning by 

the Senators who are here before we have to go and come back. 

We will begin with Ms. Larence—is it Larence, you say? 

Ms. LARENCE. Larence. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Larence. OK, forget the ‘‘W.’’ 

Ms. LARENCE. It was there before Ellis Island. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, we have a lot of stories we could tell 

about that. 

OK. Ms. Larence is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government Accountability Office of the United 

States, which has been such a strong source of support and assistance to this Committee and the Congress in general. So we welcome your testimony now. 

TESTIMONY OF EILEEN R. LARENCE,1 DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 

SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. LARENCE. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Committee, I am pleased to be here this morning to summarize a 

report released today on the Federal Government’s use of the terrorist watch list to screen individuals for possible threats to homeland security. As you acknowledged already, unlike September 11, 

2001, when agencies generally did not share information on known 

or suspected terrorists, our work shows that now the Terrorist 

Screening Center maintains one master repository of records on individuals with real or potential ties to terrorism. Agencies use the 

list to, for example, screen people applying for a visa, crossing 

through ports of entry into the country, or stopped for traffic violations. 

Our work also shows that agencies find the terrorist watch list 

to be an important counterterrorism tool, but we have found that 

it could be strengthened by addressing potential security vulnerabilities, using all appropriate screening opportunities, and providing for greater accountability and effectiveness. 

In our report, we address several fundamental questions. First, 

how do people get on and off the list? Intelligence agencies, the 

FBI, and other Federal agencies nominate individuals to the watch 

list using a relatively low bar because they want to make certain 

they do not miss any threats. Generally, agencies determine whether the information available on an individual provides a reasonable 

suspicion that the person has known or potential links to terrorism. 

Sometimes agencies have limited information and so must use 

their subjective judgment to determine who to list. To help guide 

these decisions, agencies use criteria and have review processes. 

For example, according to the FBI, generally any person subject to 

a counterterrorism investigation is put on the list after going 

through a formal review and approval process. If the investigation 

does not show a terrorist threat, as defined by Attorney General 

guidelines, the person is to come off the list. 

We do not know how the intelligence community makes such decisions because, in part, the CIA chose not to discuss this with us. 

Officials from both the National Counterterrorism Center that reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:34 Dec 05, 2008 Jkt 038989 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38989.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
6 

ceives and forwards to the Terrorist Screening Center all nominations with international links to terrorism as well as the Screening 

Center itself said they review nominations to ensure there is a 

nexus to terrorism and have criteria to do so. While the Terrorist 

Screening Center reports deleting some 100,000 total records from 

the watch list so far, as you noted, it continues to grow significantly. 

The second question we answered is: How often have agencies 

encountered people on the list, and what has happened to them? 

As of May, airlines or agencies matched the names of travelers 

with names of people on the watch list about 53,000 times, although they matched some people more than once. Most matches 

were within the United States by State and local law enforcement 

or other government agencies. Individuals were sometimes arrested 

or denied a visa, boarding an aircraft, or entry into the country. 

But most often they were questioned and released because the derogatory information on the person did not show a legal basis, such 

as a criminal violation, to take any other action. 

Agency officials said that they use information collected during 

questioning to assess the threat posed by the individual, to track 

the person’s movement, and to update intelligence or investigation 

files. And the Terrorist Screening Center shares information on encounters daily through a reporting process. 

On a related note, our prior work that we issued in a report in 

September 2006 showed that agencies were almost as often mistakenly identifying and stopping, questioning, and in some cases 

searching individuals who are not the person on the watch list but 

who unfortunately have a name similar to someone on the list. We 

reported why this happens, how this is being addressed, and what 

redress is available to these individuals, and I would be glad to discuss that work further. 

The third question our report today addresses is whether there 

are potential security vulnerabilities in agency screening processes. 

Agencies do not check against all names on the watch list. According to the Terrorist Screening Center, this can be a vulnerability, 

or at least a missed opportunity to collect information. Rather, the 

center sends subsets of the watch list to other information systems 

that agencies use to screen individuals depending on the agency’s 

mission or operational capabilities. For example, Customs and Border Protection maintains an information system it uses to check all 

travelers, including U.S. citizens, for criminal or immigration violations or other concerns before they enter the country. Because of 

this broad mission, the Terrorist Screening Center sends CBP the 

highest percentage of watch list records to use during its screening. 

In contrast, airlines receive fewer names to screen passengers 

using the No Fly List or Selectee List. According to TSA, this is because its mission is transportation safety, not intelligence or investigations. And nominations to these two lists must pass a higher 

bar or more stringent criteria established by the Homeland Security Council, such as posing a threat to civil aviation. 

In addition, TSA requires that watch list records used for screening contain sufficient identifying information, but not all watch list 

records do so, and so these records are not passed to the airlines 

7 

for screening. This is also the case for State and local law enforcement. 

TSA and FBI officials told us that the requirement for full information and records is to minimize the times people are misidentified and that screening against all names on the list would 

not necessarily result in increased security, but they did not provide the basis for their position; therefore, we continue to recommend that both agencies assess the extent of vulnerabilities in 

their screening processes and address them. 

Agencies also acknowledged that individuals on the watch list 

have passed undetected through their screening, but they said they 

are taking steps to address this problem. For example, CBP has 

cases of people on the watch list who were not identified until they 

had entered the country, but it is working on corrective actions. 

Likewise, as noted in your opening statements, individuals on 

the No Fly List have boarded aircraft, and sometimes flights had 

to be diverted. Agencies know this because for international flights 

into the United States, Customs and Border Protection screens all 

passengers a second time after the airlines to determine if the passengers can enter the country. To do this screening, CBP needs 

passenger data that currently is not sent to CBP in time to screen 

before a flight departs. A new rule in February will require that 

the data be provided to CBP sooner, which could help to identify 

individuals on the No Fly List before planes are airborne. 

It is important to note that there is no such second screening on 

domestic flights, but considering such a process would require assessing impacts on privacy and air travel, and TSA’s new Secure 

Flight passenger pre-screening system, once implemented, may 

help to alleviate this concern. 

Finally, our work showed that the Federal Government has not 

identified and implemented all possible terrorist screening opportunities as mandated. The State Department is pursuing opportunities with some foreign partners, the Terrorist Screening Center is 

entering agreements with some agency components, and DHS is 

working on guidelines to help the private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure screen employees to see if they pose 

threats. But we have recommended that all appropriate screening 

opportunities be identified and implemented and that DHS complete and implement the private sector guidelines, and the agency 

has agreed with these recommendations. 

In conclusion, overall GAO’s findings stem in part from the fact 

that while each agency owns a parochial piece of the watch list 

process, no one entity is accountable overall for resolving interagency conflicts, addressing vulnerabilities, monitoring results, and 

ensuring that the list is working as intended. Furthermore, the 

government does not have an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan with a recommended governance structure to provide for 

the most effective watch list screening. The President tasked DHS 

to work with relevant agencies to develop these plans. DHS said 

it submitted them in November 2004. The Homeland Security 

Council did not approve and implement the plans, however. We 

were not given copies of the plans to review or the opportunity to 

discuss this issue with the Homeland Security Council. So we have 

recommended that DHS update and resubmit these plans and that 

8 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Fine appears in the Appendix on page 54. 

the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that they are implemented and that the governance structure agencies recommend be given the responsibilities 

and authorities needed to manage and be held accountable for 

screening governmentwide. DHS agreed to its recommendation, but 

the White House chose not to respond to our report. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement, and I would be 

happy to answer any questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Ms. Larence, for an 

excellent report. I appreciate the question you posed at the end and 

really the challenge, and we will want to hear from the other witnesses about that, about accountability and responsibility here. 

Glenn Fine is the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, familiar to us, even respected by us. Thanks for being here. 

TESTIMONY OF HON. GLENN A. FINE,1 INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. FINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify on the 

development and status of the terrorist watch list screening system. 

For the past several years, the Department of Justice Office of 

the Inspector General (OIG) has examined the work of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency effort administered 

by the FBI. Created in 2003, the TSC integrates U.S. Government 

terrorist watch lists into a consolidated database and provides 24- 

hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week responses to Federal, State, and local 

governments to assist in screening for individuals with possible ties 

to terrorism. Prior to the establishment of the TSC, the Federal 

Government’s terrorist screening system was fragmented, relying 

on at least a dozen separate watch lists maintained by a variety 

of Federal agencies. 

In June 2005, the OIG issued our first audit of the TSC’s operations. This audit found that the TSC had made significant strides 

in developing a consolidated terrorist watch list database. But we 

also found weaknesses in various areas of TSC operations, including that the TSC had not ensured that information in the consolidated database was complete and accurate. 

Last month, we completed a follow-up review examining the 

TSC’s progress in improving its operations since our 2005 audit. 

The recent audit found that the TSC has continued to make significant progress in important areas. However, we also concluded that 

the TSC’s management of the watch list continues to have significant weaknesses and that the information in the watch list database was not complete or fully accurate. 

These weaknesses can have enormous consequences. Inaccuracies 

in watch list data increase the possibility that reliable information 

will not be available to front-line screening agents, which could 

prevent them from successfully identifying a known or suspected 

terrorist. Furthermore, inaccurate watch list information increases 

the chances of innocent persons being stopped or detained because 

of misidentifications. 

9 

For these reasons, we believe it is critical that the TSC and the 

agencies providing watch list data to the TSC further improve the 

accuracy of the information. In short, our September 2007 audit 

credited the TSC for improving its operations. It has enhanced its 

efforts to ensure the quality of watch list data, increased staff assigned to data quality management, and developed a process and 

a separate office to address complaints by persons seeking redress 

related to terrorist watch list screening. However, we also determined that the TSC needs further improvement. I would like to 

make five observations about these needed improvements. 

First, the TSC still maintains two versions of the watch list database. While the TSC is developing an upgraded, consolidated database that will eliminate the need to maintain parallel systems, the 

two databases were not identical in content when we tested them, 

which they should be. In addition, the number of duplicate records 

in the TSC database has significantly increased. 

Second, we found that not all watch list records were being sent 

to downstream screening databases. We discussed this issue with 

TSC officials, who agreed with our findings and began correcting 

those omissions. 

Third, our review found that the TSC did not have a process for 

regularly reviewing the contents of the consolidated database to ensure that all outdated information is removed, as well as to affirm 

that appropriate records are watch-listed. 

We concluded that the TSC needs to further improve its quality 

assurance efforts for ensuring the accuracy of the watch list 

records. Since our last report, the TSC has increased its quality assurance efforts and implemented a data quality improvement plan. 

In general, we believe that these actions are positive steps. We also 

recognize that it is impossible to completely eliminate the potential 

for errors in such a large database. However, we identified continuing inaccuracies in records that had undergone the TSC’s quality assurance processes. 

For example, the TSC completed a special quality assurance review of the No Fly List, which dramatically reduced the number of 

records on the list. But our examination of the TSC’s routine quality assurance reviews revealed continued problems. Specifically, we 

examined 105 records subjected to the routine quality assurance review and found that 38 percent of these records continued to contain errors or inconsistencies that were not identified through the 

routine quality assurance efforts. Thus, the TSC continues to lack 

important safeguards for ensuring data integrity, including a comprehensive protocol outlining the quality assurance procedures and 

a method for regularly reviewing the work of TSC staff to ensure 

consistency. 

Fourth, we found that the TSC’s efforts to resolve complaints 

from individuals about their possible inclusion on the watch list 

have improved since our previous audit, and the TSC has created 

a dedicated unit to handle redress complaints. However, the TSC’s 

redress activities were not always timely. Moreover, a high percentage of complaints requiring modification or removal is a further indicator that watch list data needs continuous monitoring and attention. 

10 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Boyle appears in the Appendix on page 65. 

Fifth, we found that the TSC does not have a policy or procedures to proactively use information from encounters with individuals to reduce watch list misidentifications. Considering that nearly half of all encounters referred to the TSC Call Center are negative for a watch list match, we recommended that the TSC consider 

misidentifications a priority and develop strategic goals and policy 

for mitigating misidentifications, particularly for individuals who 

are repeatedly misidentified. 

In total, our report made 18 recommendations to further improve 

the TSC’s watch-listing process. These recommendations include 

making improvements to increase the quality of watch list data; revising the FBI’s watch list nominations process; and developing 

goals, measures, and timeliness standards related to the redress 

process. In response, the TSC agreed with the recommendations 

and stated that it would take corrective action. 

Finally, I want to mention a separate audit that we are currently 

conducting to examine the specific policies and procedures of Department of Justice components for nominating individuals to the 

consolidated watch list, which is a very important issue. We are 

conducting this review in conjunction with other Intelligence Community OIGs, who are examining the watch list nomination process 

in their agencies. These OIG reviews are being coordinated by the 

OIG for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

In conclusion, the TSC deserves credit for creating and implementing a consolidated watch list and for making significant 

progress in improving the watch list and screening processes. However, our reviews have found continuing weaknesses in some of 

those processes. We believe it is critical that the TSC further improve the quality of its data and its redress procedures. Inaccurate, 

incomplete, and obsolete watch list information can increase the 

risk of not identifying known or suspected terrorists, and it can 

also increase the risk that innocent persons will be repeatedly 

stopped or detained. While the TSC has a difficult task and has 

made significant progress, we believe it needs to make additional 

improvements. 

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to answer 

any questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Mr. Fine, for an excellent statement and for your continuing interest in this subject, 

which we all want to get right and want to be fair. 

The next witness is Leonard Boyle, Director of the Terrorist 

Screening Center. It is a personal pleasure for me to welcome Mr. 

Boyle here because he comes to this position having previously 

served with honor and effect as the Commissioner of Public Safety 

of the great State of Connecticut. We welcome your testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF LEONARD C. BOYLE,1 DIRECTOR, TERRORIST 

SCREENING CENTER, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you very much, Chairman Lieberman, thank 

you for those kind words, Senator Collins, and Members of the 

11 

Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee today on these two important reports that have been issued. 

As both reports note, the Terrorist Screening Center plays a critical role in the government’s multi-layered strategy to prevent another terrorist attack on the United States. That multi-layered 

strategy calls for, in the first instance, every effort to prevent a potential terrorist from leaving his or her country of origin. 

To that extent, the Terrorist Screening Center, having created 

the Terrorist Screening Database, sends to the State Department 

a significant number of identities of persons who may be seeking 

to obtain a visa to enter the United States. Because of the work 

that has been done by the TSC, all consular officers around the 

world now have access to the U.S. Government’s best understanding, both the intelligence and law enforcement community, of 

those who pose a terrorist threat to the United States. Every consular officer, in considering a visa application, can query the database and use any information that is found there as one factor in 

determining whether that particular person ought to be granted a 

visa to enter the United States. 

The second phase of that multi-layered strategy is for persons 

who are trying to enter the United States at our borders, for our 

Customs and Border Protection agents to have access to a similar 

set of information, slightly broader than what is given to the State 

Department, which is tailored to meet the needs of Customs and 

Border Protection so that a CBP agent can make the best informed 

determination as to whether he should grant a person access to the 

United States. He queries the IBIS or TECS system, which is supplied by the Terrorist Screening Center, for a determination as to 

whether that person, who is seeking entry to the United States, 

has been identified as a known or suspected terrorist. 

The third level of protection is within our borders. If a person 

does manage to get into the United States, or is already here, and 

is in the view of the law enforcement community or the intelligence 

community a potential terrorist threat to our Nation, information 

is now made available to all State, county, municipal, and tribal 

police officers throughout the United States, a force multiplier of 

about 750,000 law enforcement officers that did not exist prior to 

the creation of the TSC. 

While law enforcement officers did have access to Federal databases regarding certain types of suspected problem persons, they 

did not have access to the intelligence community’s assessment of 

known and suspected terrorists. They do now. 

Chairman Lieberman, in your earlier remarks, you made reference to two of the September 11, 2001, hijackers. I would also 

cite a particular example. On the morning of September 9, 2001, 

a State trooper stopped a young man who was traveling north on 

I–95, did all the appropriate actions, including run that man’s 

name through the National Crime Information Center, found no 

negative or derogatory information. The trooper did his job and 

sent that person on his way. Two days later, that person, Ziad 

Jarrah, and four of his co-conspirators hijacked United Airlines 

Flight 93 and, but for the actions of some very brave and heroic 

people, would have probably crashed that plane into some significant national asset. 

12 

That is the type of information that is now available to all State, 

county, municipal, and tribal police officers as a result of the work 

that is being done by the TSC. 

That being the case, of course, we will not be satisfied until we 

are certain that we have the best, most effective, and most accurate 

watch list possible. And to that end, we welcome the recommendations that have been made by the Office of the Inspector General 

as well as by the Government Accountability Office. We are using 

those reports as a road map to improve the watch list, to make our 

processes better. 

I think a fair assessment of what the TSC has done in 31⁄2 years 

is that it has achieved with remarkable success the basic objectives 

that were tasked to it by HSPD–6, that is, the creation of a unified 

watch list, the creation of a means to update that watch list on a 

daily basis, the creation of a system to export those lists to Customs and Border Protection, the State Department, State and municipal law enforcement, as well as the TSA, to protect our flying 

public and also to create a call center, a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-aweek call center, so that anytime any of those screening agents or 

law enforcement agents encounters a known or suspected terrorist, 

they call the Terrorist Screening Center, they do not get a busy signal, and they do not get a recording. They get a human being who 

answers that phone, who has full access, electronic access, to all of 

the underlying derogatory information about the person who has 

been encountered. 

We have also spent a great deal of effort reaching out to our foreign partners in satisfaction of the goals tasked to us by HSPD– 

6. We now have six agreements with foreign partners. Spain recently publicly announced that we had executed an agreement with 

Spain to share watch-listing information, and we have numerous 

discussions going on with our foreign partners around the world to 

try to increase the amount of sharing that we have with our foreign 

partners. So we are, I believe, in a position where we are now 

ready, having satisfied those basic objectives, to refine the watch 

list and make it better. 

I would address just a couple of matters that have previously 

been raised, and the first has to do with redress. We understand 

that our obligation is to protect the safety of this Nation, but to do 

so in a way that protects and preserves civil liberties and privacy. 

To that end, as a result of the recommendations that were made 

by the OIG in 2005, the TSC has created a redress office staffed 

by seven people, dedicated employees who review every matter that 

comes to our attention. To date, they have reviewed close to 500 

separate matters that have been brought to us. They do a complete 

de novo review of the watch-listing status of any person who is referred to us to make an independent determination as to whether 

that person is properly listed or not. 

We also have put in place a number of processes to address the 

concerns that have been raised by the Office of Inspector General 

to ensure that we are now, in fact, consolidating both components 

of our system so that there is a single, unified, one-component system of our watch list. We have set up a daily reconciliation process 

to make sure that those two components every day are reconciled. 

We also have added a compliance officer to make sure that we have 

13 

1The prepared statement of Mr. Rosenzweig appears in the Appendix on page 71. 

appropriate standard operating procedures in place. And we have 

also brought on a data integrity officer, a senior official from the 

Department of Homeland Security, to make sure that we do not 

have gaps within our systems so that we are properly structured 

to meet our needs, to meet our requirements, and to meet the mission that has been set out before us. 

So, again, I thank you for the opportunity to address you today, 

and I am happy to answer any questions that members might 

have. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Very good. Thanks for that excellent testimony, Mr. Boyle. We will have some questions for you. 

Our final witness on the panel this morning is Paul Rosenzweig, 

who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Welcome. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL ROSENZWEIG,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Thank you very much. Thank you, Senator 

Lieberman and Senator Collins, for inviting me. It is a particular 

pleasure to be here today. Though I have been with the Department 2 years and have testified nearly a dozen times, this is my 

first opportunity to actually testify in front of my home Committee 

in the Senate. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. There is a story there. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I know it very well. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We tried. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. It is especially a pleasure because of the constructive and thoughtful nature of the discussion we are having 

today. I would have a great deal of difficulty disagreeing with any 

of the comments and recommendations that we have heard from 

the General Accounting Office or with any of the statements that 

have gone before. As Senator Collins so aptly said, it is a big system, and that makes it imperfect to some degree. And our goal is 

to make it as close to perfect as we can, recognizing that it is an 

unachievable objective. 

I speak not as a nominator to the TSC because DHS puts very 

few people onto the watch list but, rather, as a consumer of its 

product. And as a consumer, we are as troubled by errors in the 

system when they exist as anybody, simply because they are an annoyance to the traveling public with whom we deal every day; more 

importantly, they are a waste of resources. For every time that we 

look at somebody who is not the right person, that is time not 

spent looking in the right place. 

I think it is fair to say that, by and large, we have had a number 

of successes and much work needs to be done. Let me briefly give 

you a sense of some of those successes. 

We have put in place a layered system for checking people as 

they arrive at the border, to take but one example. That includes 

not only the Department of State Visa Lookout System, but also 

the export of the No Fly and Selectee Lists to international airlines 

for checking of those who are traveling to the United States. It inVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:34 Dec 05, 2008 Jkt 038989 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\38989.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
14 

cludes capture of data on all travelers to the United States, alien 

and U.S. citizens, through the Advanced Passenger Information 

System and the Passenger Name Records. And, finally, of course, 

it includes the final check at the port of entry by Customs and Border Protection officers provided with the watch list to make a determination, as Mr. Boyle said, given the best information available 

whether or not a particular individual should be admitted. 

We have also had great success and made great strides, I think, 

in improving our redress process. Mr. Boyle has described some of 

the improvements that were made at TSC. Within DHS, we have 

developed the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) in partnership with the Department of State, which is a one-stop shop for 

people to enter the system to seek redress and, if appropriate, to 

receive notifications from us that they get put on a cleared list, in 

effect. 

We have also developed at the ports of entry themselves something we call the Primary Lookout Override (PLOR) system, which 

means that we can make corrections directly on the screens in 

front of us and ensure that once we have identified somebody as 

a misidentification, a false positive, he never again gets troubled. 

And that gets propagated through the system. 

So we have made great strides, I think, but as you said, there 

is much work to be done. You mentioned, Senator Collins, the unfortunate visits of several airlines to Bangor. I am happy to say 

that we have not had any in 2 years, and that is part of our ongoing process. There are two other pieces that are going forward that 

should come online in the next months to year that will improve 

that even further. One is, as Ms. Larence noted, the development 

of the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) quick query 

system. That will require the transmission of passenger information to CBP for checking at the National Targeting Center against 

the Terrorist Screening Database before the airplane takes off from 

a foreign country. It will allow that transmission up until the doors 

are actually closed, but will require it before wheels-up. So we will 

be doing that checking. 

We will also be developing a system called Secure Flight, which 

will take into the TSA the watch list name matching for the No Fly 

and Selectee lists. As you probably know, today we export that list 

to the airlines, and a lot of the problems we have is simply because 

there are 63 different airlines that fly here, and they do it 63 different ways. That creates, at worst, inconsistency if not error. We 

have published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to anticipate 

bringing that on board into the United States sometime late this 

year or early next year. 

I am constrained to mention at this juncture that we are resource constrained in doing that. We have requested $53 million in 

the President’s budget for that effort. The Senate appropriations 

mark is $28 million, and that will, of course, delay that implementation going forward. But, nonetheless, those two pieces of the puzzle ought to improve our ability a great deal. 

But the final thing that I would say is that what we have come 

to recognize as consumers is that there are inherent limitations to 

watch list name matching by themselves. The case of the Mexican 

gentleman with tuberculosis that you mentioned is an example of 

15 

that, where we can only work with as much information as we 

have, and if the information is incomplete or inaccurate, that defeats to some degree our ability to conduct watch list name matching. What we need to do and the other piece of the puzzle is to go 

beyond watch list name matching to enhance our ability to identify 

people through secure identification documents, to use the information we collect about individuals, to identify unknown names 

through link analysis—people traveling together where one is 

known and one is not known, for example—and, finally, of course, 

through the US–VISIT program to develop enhanced biometric capabilities so that the name does not matter because the fingerprint 

never changes while the names may. All of those taken together 

will further enhance our ability. 

Now, we will never get away from a name-based watch list 

matching system because for many people who are deemed threats 

to us we do not have the biometric identification, we do not have 

the fingerprint. We have the names and the many aliases that are 

also records in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB). But as we 

continue to put on these layers, we will, I believe, enhance our ability to identify correctly those who pose a threat and reduce the instances in which we make mistakes or errors. 

Taken together, I think that paints a good picture of how we at 

DHS are using the Terrorist Screening Database. We have had a 

number of successes. Last year, at the borders, 5,900 positive 

matches against the watch list—not all of those denied entry, but 

all of those people of interest who I am glad we identified before 

they entered the United States. 

We can do better for sure, but I share with Mr. Boyle—and, I 

take it, with Ms. Larence and Mr. Fine—the sense that between 

where we were on September 10, 2001, and where we are now, we 

have made great strides. More work needs to be done, but the improvement is quite noticeable. 

I thank you for your attention, and I, too, look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Secretary Rosenzweig. I appreciate the testimony very much. We are going to do a 5-minute 

round so all four of us can have a chance to ask some questions 

before the votes go off. 

Mr. Boyle—and I am having a hard time not calling you Commissioner Boyle—let me ask you to comment on the growth in the 

size of the watch list. Of course, as I said in my opening statement, 

this is good news, assuming all those names are correct, but the 

database has gone from 158,000, GAO reports, in June 2004 to 

860,000 today, and it is going up at around 20,000 records per 

month. And I know there is a process by which they got on that 

list. 

As it approaches 1 million, is it reasonable to assume that there 

really are 1 million people who are known or suspected terrorists? 

Mr. BOYLE. No, and for context, the watch list or the Terrorist 

Screening Database does not reflect some 800,000 human beings. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So explain that. I understand that. 

Mr. BOYLE. Sure. We have approximately 860,000 records in the 

Terrorist Screening Database. We create a record for any identification that a person might use if he or she is trying to enter this 

16 

country or is trying to obtain documents in support of terrorist activity. So, for example, if a person uses the name Len Boyle and 

has at various times used three separate dates of birth, that will 

create three separate records in the Terrorist Screening Database. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. 

Mr. BOYLE. We have some persons for whom we have 50 or more 

records, as the GAO report points out. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BOYLE. So the actual number of human beings reflected in 

the database is far fewer than 800,000. I cannot give you an exact 

number because, in fact, we do not know for sure. Some people actually successfully create an entire separate identity. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

Mr. BOYLE. So even if we looked at the database, we might see 

what appear to be two completely separate identities that reflect 

but one person. So the number is far fewer. 

Another thing I think is very important for the public to understand is that about 95 percent of the database consists of non-U.S. 

persons. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BOYLE. That is, people who are not U.S. citizens or who have 

been granted permanent resident alien status. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And you are getting those from the intelligence community, both ours and foreign intelligence, cooperating 

agencies? 

Mr. BOYLE. Most often, yes, sir, and they are coming from hot 

spots around the world. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BOYLE. Areas of strong anti-American sentiment, and the 

theory behind watch-listing those persons is if there is a reasonable 

suspicion that this person has been associated with terrorist activity, perhaps has provided funding to a terrorist organization or has 

attended a terrorist training camp, we want that person listed in 

the database so that if next week, next month, next year that person tries to enter the United States, Customs and Border Protection and the State Department are going to be able to look at that 

person, know what we know about him, what the intelligence community knows about him, and make a determination. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. So, bottom line, not all the people on 

there are there with full justification but that there is a reason 

why everyone who is on there is on there, and you are the man 

who sees it all. I presume you would say that, to the best of your 

knowledge, most of the names on there deserve to be on there. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir. Using the reasonable suspicion standard, 

those names are vetted first by the nominating agency, then by 

NCTC, then by us to make sure that there is a reasonable suspicion of a nexus to terrorism. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Give me your response to the question 

that Ms. Larence raised at the end, which is that the TSC is really 

doing its job, but that there is no one in the Federal Government 

to oversee the operation of the watch lists overall to make priority 

decisions about investments or even accountability. How do you respond to that? And if you think she is right, should you do that? 

17 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, as the Members of the Committee are aware, 

HSPD–11 designates the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 

Security to have overarching responsibility for watch-listing in general. We, at the Terrorist Screening Center, work through our governance board; we work very closely with DHS. But we are, I would 

put it, more the nuts and bolts of watch-listing and screening rather than the overarching strategic approach to screening. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Would you say the Secretary of Homeland 

Security is the one responsible for that overarching view? 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir, and we work very closely with DHS in accomplishing those objectives. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. One of the things that really thrills me 

most about what you have reported today is the access that local, 

State, tribal, etc., law enforcers have to this terrorism database because it vastly expands our potential to catch these people before 

they act. Are the State, local, county, and tribal law enforcers using 

it? 

Mr. BOYLE. They are using it, and they have been fantastic partners with us, and we are continuing our outreach with State and 

local law enforcement. One of the things that we are going to be 

doing at the TSC over the next several months is providing State 

and local law enforcement with a daily report showing the encounters with suspected terrorists around the country so that a police 

chief in Minneapolis will know how many encounters occurred in 

his general area or the new Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Public Safety will know how many encounters occurred 

in Connecticut. They have been wonderful partners. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. Thanks very much. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Commissioner Boyle—I will use that name as well. 

Mr. BOYLE. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. I could not help but think that, as you described the incident that I remember so well from the 9/11 Commission’s report, had that State trooper had access to the kind of 

information in the system today, that individual terrorist would 

have been stopped and many of the others would have been as 

well. So I want to commend all of you for the work that you are 

doing even as I ask some questions about some concerns that I 

have. 

Mr. Secretary, this morning we received information from CBP 

that the original information that it had received on the Mexican 

national with TB on April 16 was not actually an alias, which had 

been the agency’s justification for not stopping the individual in the 

first place. What we found is that, in fact, CBP and the system had 

the individual’s middle name, his two hyphenated last names, and 

a date of birth that had an error in it, but the error was corrected 

the very next day. 

So the information and the lookout was entered into the computer system on April 16, and yet this individual was able to cross 

the border an astonishing 21 times. And it was only when his 

Mexican doctor confiscated his visa and turned it over to U.S. authorities that he was stopped. 

That raises real concerns to me about the effectiveness of the 

computerized system and the name-matching process, and indeed, 

18 

in the report that GAO did, it found that individuals were able to 

pass despite being on the watch list due to not only errors in the 

computer system but also that the name-matching process is not 

very sophisticated. 

If an individual with a dangerous strain of TB can cross 21 times 

after being put on the list, that raises a lot of concerns to me about 

whether you are capable of stopping terrorists or other public 

health threats when there is a slight variation in the name. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Thank you for the question, and it actually allows me, if you will permit me, to explain the watch list namematching algorithms we use in a little bit of detail because it is important to understand. And to explain, I will use myself as an example because we are not publicly discussing this gentleman’s 

name. 

My name is Paul Samuel Rosenzweig. My mother’s maiden name 

is Hahn. And my birth date is actually 10/31/59, but let’s assign 

me 10/8/59 as a birth date. So when we do a name check against 

that, we use as a parameter the very first initial of my first name, 

my last name, and my date of birth. So I am P. Rosenzweig, 10/ 

8/59, in my hypothetical example. 

If the information we get from another source, in this case CDC 

from the Mexican health officials, is different from that, the question is how closely that match exists. The individual that we are 

talking about used his second name and flipped his two last names, 

so he would have been in my hypothetical example Samuel 

Rosenzweig Hahn, and he also flipped at least initially the date of 

birth, from 10/8 to 8/10. So the match algorithm would have been 

S. Hahn, 8/10/59, matched against P. Rosenzweig, 10/8/59. All 

three of the parameters that we search against miss. And what 

happened on the very first day was we used those parameters, and 

we said this person is not in the system, something must be wrong. 

Now, in order to find further information about a person, we 

start by suppressing some of the information. We say maybe there 

is a mistake in the date of birth, so you take that out and you ask 

for all the S. Hahns. But, of course, that does not catch P. 

Rosenzweig either because that does not work. 

Then you say let’s get rid of the first name, S., and catch all of 

the Hahns. That, too, would not catch a person whose last name 

is not Hahn but is, in fact, Rosenzweig. 

It is only when you start asking all people who might have the 

name in any particular order—because we do not know the nature 

of the mistake up front—that is, Hahn or Rosenzweig or S. or that 

date of birth, that I would pop up. 

Now, that, too, does not actually sound like too much of a problem for us to do a check, but then we actually have to resolve those 

hits. And we get approximately 1 million land border crossings a 

day, and though Hahn and Rosenzweig are relatively uncommon 

names, this individual had a more common set of names. 

So to give you an example, and, again, using a hypothetical example, on Monday of this week J. Rodriguez, picking a relatively 

common Hispanic name, there were 816 crossers with that name. 

Now, if you suppress the first initial and just went for Rodriguez, 

you probably do something like 20 times that, or 16,000. And if you 

did Rodriguez plus another common Hispanic name like Gutierrez, 

19 

to pick our Commerce Secretary, as either/or, you would maybe get 

30,000. I have not run the numbers, but that is a rough order of 

magnitude. That 30,000, that is 29,999 false positives for sure, 

plus, of course, this individual does not cross every day, and that 

is repeated every day in the system. 

We have had many complaints that the lines on the Southern 

border are already too long. As the type of information we get is 

less and less accurate and we widen the field to make an examination based upon the name check, we get more and more people who 

will be overwhelming our secondary inspection capabilities, extending the line beyond belief and inconveniencing lots of people who 

are not matches for any of those. 

In retrospect, it is easy to understand that we should have just 

switched the matrilineal and patrilineal names and dropped the 

first name and corrected the date of birth. But that is only because 

we know what the right answer is now. It is very hard. And I am 

happy to talk about it more when—— 

Senator COLLINS. My time has expired. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. I am sorry. 

Senator COLLINS. But I appreciate the explanation. It is my understanding that the birth date was corrected very quickly, so it is 

not exactly the same as your hypothetical example, but I understand your point. Thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Senator Collins. Senator Tester. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR TESTER 

Senator TESTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. I bet there are not too many Testers coming in every day. 

Senator TESTER. It makes me appreciate that my name is not 

John Smith. [Laughter.] 

I appreciate the work that each and every one of you folks do in 

your respective roles. 

I guess the first question is for Director Boyle, and it gets down 

to what the rules are for getting into the database. You had said 

95 percent of the people are not U.S. citizens. Is that correct? 

Mr. BOYLE. Roughly, yes. 

Senator TESTER. So are the rules the same for folks that are not 

U.S. citizens and folks that are U.S. citizens for getting on that 

watch list? 

Mr. BOYLE. The standard is the same, sir. It is a reasonable suspicion standard. Each agency may have its own protocol. For example, an FBI nomination comes about after an FBI case agent opens 

a preliminary inquiry or a case on terrorism, and that has to be 

consistent with the Attorney General’s guidelines. But the reasonable suspicion standard applies across the board. 

Senator TESTER. And 43,000 involved in those kind of suspicions 

or counterterrorism investigations? 

Mr. BOYLE. I do not have the numbers in front of me, sir, but 

if that—— 

Senator TESTER. Well, that would be 5 percent of 860,000. 

Mr. BOYLE. If that is the way the match works out. 

Senator TESTER. A couple things, and I think the Chairman 

touched on one of them, and that is, in fact, does the county, city, 

20 

highway patrol, and tribal police forces all have access to this information? 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER. And they are all encouraged to use it. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, they are. 

Senator TESTER. And then you talked about seven employees 

dealing with 500 reviews on redress. How long has that board been 

in existence? 

Mr. BOYLE. We created the redress group after the 2005 report 

from the Office of Inspector General. I can get you the answer by 

turning around just briefly. 

Senator TESTER. Well, I guess more specifically, it was created 

sometime in 2005. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir. 

Senator TESTER. So it has been in effect for a couple years? 

Mr. BOYLE. That is correct, sir. 

Senator TESTER. Are those 500 people, are the majority of them 

Americans or U.S. citizens? If you do not know that, you can give 

me—— 

Mr. BOYLE. I do not know. I am turning to our redress officer. 

Senator TESTER. That would be good. 

Mr. BOYLE. I do not have the answer to that. 

Senator TESTER. And the other thing is you had mentioned that 

you felt that a majority of the people that were on that list were 

on that list—and make no mistake about it, mistakes can be made 

when you are talking about a list this size. In Mr. Fine’s testimony, 

he said that 38 percent were errors or inconsistencies. Could you 

explain that, Mr. Fine? I mean, there seems to be some difference 

in opinion on the surface here. 

Mr. FINE. Well, we are not saying that those 38-percent people 

should not be on the list, but when we looked at a sample of 105 

that had gone through the quality assurance review, we found errors in there—for example, the date of birth was wrong, incomplete, incomplete field, other errors, which showed that it was not 

complete and accurate, despite the fact that it had already gone 

through the quality assurance program. That gave us concern 

about the quality assurance program, and we wanted there to be 

more comprehensive protocols and testing of this quality assurance 

program to make sure that they were completely accurate. 

Senator TESTER. I understand. Mr. Rosenzweig, you said that 

there were inherent limitations on the name situation, and the 

Chairman talked about Senator Kennedy being on the list at one 

point in time. What about the other side of the equation and you 

have somebody who gets off the list and just by happenstance there 

is a terrorist on the list that has the same name? What are the impacts there? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Well, thank you for the question, Senator. Actually, what we are doing inside DHS—and it is parallel to things 

that TSC is doing—is we do not take the name off the list. We will, 

for example, issue somebody who has gone through the TRIP program a cleared number that is his kind of personal additional identification number. We leave his name on the list, but the addition 

of additional information means we can differentiate. 

21 

Senator TESTER. Can an individual within one of the agencies or 

in government place names on this watch list, or are there clear 

criteria, period, that are followed in every case? 

Mr. BOYLE. There are clear criteria, sir. Any person who is being 

nominated to the Terrorist Screening Database who is suspected of 

being involved in international terrorism, that nomination has to 

be vetted through the National Counterterrorism Center, and the 

derogatory information regarding that nominee must meet the 

standards that are appropriate for inclusion on the list. 

Senator TESTER. Thank you very much. Thanks for your answers. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Tester. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is interesting that we hear examples of anecdotal situations 

where people are on the list and somehow get through the system. 

We also hear similar examples of individuals that are on the list 

that should not be on the list and somehow have not been taken 

off the list. But the fact of the matter is that from what I hear 

today and read in the written testimony, we have made really outstanding and significant improvement in screening people and the 

sharing of information on the watch list, and I congratulate you. 

The thing that is of concern to me is that there are still some 

things that need to be done. Mr. Fine, do you have a term of office? 

Mr. FINE. No. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Are you out with the next Administration? 

Mr. FINE. I serve at the pleasure of the President. All IGs do, although if the President wanted to remove me, he would have to 

give the reasons why to both Houses of Congress. I would note that 

this Committee and Congress is considering amendments to the IG 

Act to create a term of office of 7 years. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, the point is that you will be around for 

a while. Ms. Larence, you will be around. Mr. Boyle, you will be 

out, I believe. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Rosenzweig, you will be out also. The real issue for me is the 

transformation of some really significant issues in terms of intelligence gathering for our people. And, by the way, I just recently 

met with the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force in Cleveland, and 

they are doing a fantastic job. And the great response that I got 

from local government officials is that they are really sharing information, and they are sharing information well. In fact, local law 

enforcement is embedded at the FBI today. For a former mayor 

that lived in a town where the Federal agencies did not even talk 

to each other, the outlook is very promising. To see that kind of coordination and communications is just very exciting and comforting. 

But what I am concerned about is this: Does anyone have a strategic plan on how to remedy the things that you have pointed out? 

And is there an agreed upon metric to determine whether or not, 

in fact, they have accomplished it so that a year and a half from 

now, or more, we are not doing the same thing but with different 

players? Mr. Fine or Ms. Larence, are you going to be able to tell 

22 

us whether or not they really have made changes in terms of the 

issues that you are concerned about? 

Ms. LARENCE. No, sir. That was the major finding in our report, 

that even though the President tasked DHS to work with all the 

agencies involved in screening from soup to nuts and put a plan 

together, including a recommendation about a governance board for 

this process, that has not been completed to date. I understand 

from the statement from the Homeland Security Council that DHS 

has agreed to put that plan together and submit that to the Homeland Security Council, and they have agreed to look at that issue 

and take action on it. But we are as concerned as you. You mentioned the growth of the watch list. Who is managing that? Who 

is asking those questions? In our conversations with the National 

Counterterrorism Center, they are expressing the same concerns 

about the growth of the list and our ability to manage that. 

GAO was the only organization for the first time that put together the outcomes of this process across the agencies and took a 

look and said what does that mean and is this process working as 

intended. And so unless the agencies and the White House make 

that happen, I am afraid not, sir; we will be back in a couple of 

years to discuss concerns again. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, from the point of view of this Committee, the issue we ought to be concentrating on is that a plan be 

put in place to implement GAO’s recommendations. We must also 

implement metrics to determine whether or not the plan is being 

instituted so that we do not lose momentum during the change of 

administrations. 

Ms. LARENCE. Yes, sir, a plan, and also we are suggesting an entity be identified, and that could be an interagency governing council, that is given the responsibility and the accountability to watch 

this process from soup to nuts. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Boyle, if you are not getting cooperation 

from someone that you think you should have cooperation from, 

what do you do? 

Mr. BOYLE. I go to the Director of the FBI or to the Secretary 

of the Department of Homeland Security, and the cooperation has 

never been a problem, sir. And with respect to your question about 

the recommendations, the Office of Inspector General made 18 recommendations to the Terrorist Screening Center. We have accepted 

all of them. We will be meeting with Office of Inspector General 

staff in early December. I expect that as many as six or more of 

those recommendations we can close out as having been satisfied. 

Others are more long term, and we will be presenting the Office 

of Inspector General with our long-term plan to address each of 

those matters. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, the only thing 

that I would recommend is that either you and Senator Collins 

bring them in and see the plan or have another hearing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. We will do one or the other, and thank 

you for focusing on this. 

Let me mention briefly how we are going to proceed. Senator 

Carper has yielded to Senator Warner for one question. Then Senator Carper will proceed. I will head over to vote with Senator 

Warner, leaving Senator Carper with really unlimited power for a 

23 

1The responses from Mr. Fine and Mr. Boyle appear in the Appendix on pages 278 and 291 

respectively. 

few moments. And then he can recess the hearing, but then we will 

come back for a few more questions. It could take 20, 25 minutes 

before we come back, but hang around. 

Senator Warner. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER 

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank my colleagues. 

We are privileged in the Commonwealth of Virginia to have the 

National Ground Intelligence Center, and I visit quite frequently, 

and they are on the cutting edge of biometrics. And it has come to 

my attention—I am not sure of the accuracy—that the Terrorist 

Screening Center presently does not have a number of these capabilities, including the use of biometrics. 

Are you leveraging research and capabilities from other areas to 

incorporate it at the Terrorist Screening Center? Are you planning 

to get biometrics capabilities? Or do you think it should be made 

a part of the program? Please answer the question for the record.1

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir. 

Senator WARNER. I will ask each of the witnesses to make a contribution. Thank you. 

Mr. BOYLE. Biometrics will play a key role in—— 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER [presiding]. I am going to ask you to withhold 

your answer at this time. 

Mr. BOYLE. OK. But put it in the record? 

Senator CARPER. If each of you would do that, it would be much 

appreciated. We have a vote on the way. We are voting on whether 

or not to order an up or down vote on the nomination of Leslie 

Southwick to serve on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, and we 

have about 6 minutes to go. I do not want to miss that vote. 

I have a statement for the record. I will ask unanimous consent 

that it be entered into the record. Since there is no one here but 

me to object, I suspect it will show up in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is a very interesting hearing for me. My staff and I have spent a great deal 

of time over the past year or so learning a lot about the watch list process. We were 

doing this to help a constituent and a friend from Delaware who was having just 

a terrible time getting through airports. 

This gentleman has a name that I’m assuming is similar to a name that appears 

on one or more of the watch lists out there. Depending on who was screening him 

when he got to the airport, he might have to wait hours to get through security. 

I believe he also missed flights from time to time. I eventually had to go all the 

way to the TSA Administrator’s office to set things right. 

I found this situation troubling not because it involved someone from Delaware, 

but because it told me that we’re probably spending a lot of our time and resources 

inconveniencing innocent people. And time and resources are not unlimited, so we’re 

probably missing opportunities to catch individuals who truly are worthy of our 

scrutiny. 

According to the GAO report that inspired this hearing, this is in fact the case. 

There have been a number of instances when individuals—terrorists or suspected 

24 

1The response from Mr. Rosenzweig appears in the Appendix on page 305. 

2The responses from Mr. Boyle and Mr. Rosenzweig appear in the Appendix on pages 292 

and 311 respectively. 

terrorists, I assume—have been able to board planes or to enter the country when 

they probably should not have been able to. 

I’m pleased that we were able to make the watch list system work better for my 

constituent in Delaware. It appears, however, that we have our work cut out for us 

if this system is going to be as effective as it needs to be. 

We need fewer false positives, of course, but it’s more important that those who 

we rely on to make appropriate use of the terrorist watch lists—agencies like TSA, 

law enforcement, the airlines—are armed with the up-to-date and accurate information they need to make us safe. 

Senator CARPER. I have two questions that I will ask each of you 

to respond to for the record. In fact, the first one, Secretary 

Rosenzweig, I will ask you to respond to it, and the second one, Ms. 

Larence, I will ask you to respond. First of all, to the Secretary, 

this is a question on a system called Secure Flight. I understand 

that the Department of Homeland Security has a system in the 

works called Secure Flight that at least some believe will more accurately screen individuals at the airports against terrorist watch 

lists. Explain to us how Secure Flight will reduce false positives 

and other screening issues that have been discovered over the 

years. And, further, I would ask when do you believe the system 

will be up and running and what is your Department doing to help 

airlines improve their screening processes in the meantime?1

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. It would be my pleasure. 

Senator CARPER. We will give you a copy of it before you leave. 

And, Ms. Larence, you note in your testimony that the decision 

on whether or not to place someone on the watch list is often somewhat subjective. There are individuals apparently on the watch list 

who are terrorists, suspected terrorists, but there are also some 

there who are simply being investigated for some other reason. Are 

there clear enough rules out there for determining who should and 

who should not be on the list and who ultimately makes the decision and what does he or she base his or her decision on? You are 

the one who made that point. I believe that would be a question, 

I think, for the Secretary, and if you would respond to that for the 

record, I would be grateful.2

With that having been said, we thank you for being here. We 

thank you for your testimony. And I am going to just say for now 

the hearing is in recess, but we are not adjourned, so hold on. 

Thanks very much. 

[Recess.] 

Chairman LIEBERMAN [presiding]. The hearing will reconvene. 

Thank you for your patience. I hope that one or two other Members 

will come back because they indicated to me that they had some 

other questions. 

Let me go first to you, Ms. Larence, and this question of who has 

overall responsibility for, you might say, the strategic decisions related to terrorist screening in the U.S. Government. Mr. Boyle, as 

you heard, indicated that the Secretary of Homeland Security has 

that authority. There was a plan submitted, never adopted, by the 

Homeland Security Council. I am not clear exactly why that has 

not happened. Are you? 

25 

Ms. LARENCE. No, sir. We actually met with each of the key players, and they gave us their perspectives on their role. The Director 

of National Intelligence staff obviously said they have a role in information and intelligence but not in screening operations, so they 

did not really think they were the appropriate person or organization to do that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. LARENCE. Likewise, TSC explained their role. So DHS was 

tasked with working with the agencies to develop the plan, but 

DHS was not tasked with being the overall entity that we are calling for. And so it is our understanding that one possible model that 

was suggested would be an interagency council with representatives from each of those key players in that screening process. TSC 

has a council like that already in existence to advise them on their 

piece of the watch list process. Our point, though, is such a council 

would need additional authorities to be able to have responsibility 

for intelligence operations and outcomes. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And those authorities would be able to do 

what? Spell it out a little more. 

Ms. LARENCE. We think that somebody needs to be accountable, 

again, for really evaluating the watch list process, to make sure 

that, for example, they would answer questions about how are 

agencies making nominations, and are they doing that consistent 

with the right criteria. They could look at the screening across 

agencies to make sure that this is being done consistently. They 

could look at how the information is being used that is developed 

from the watch-listing process. And, most importantly, they could 

monitor the outcomes of the process to determine if it is complying 

with privacy issues, if we are getting the types of outcomes that we 

want, and how we can better manage misidentifications. And they 

could also help to make sure that people consistently apply new 

technical opportunities and tools such as new computer algorithms 

or more sophisticated search engines. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes. Mr. Boyle, are any of those responsibilities ones that you believe that you carry out now? Or do you 

think that they really are in a different direction than what you 

have been doing every day? 

Mr. BOYLE. Some of those fall pretty squarely, Senator, within 

what we are doing right now. For example, the algorithm project 

is something that we have been involved with. We are currently 

approaching the testing phase to try to change search algorithms 

so that the search engines that are being used across the communities are more finely tuned and attuned more specifically to the 

types of names that we are encountering in the process these days. 

So that is one example of a matter that we are intimately involved 

in. I consider that part of the tactics, if you will, of screening, the 

nuts and bolts that we are involved in, as is biometrics, which we 

are also involved with. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Ms. Larence, do you reach a conclusion, 

based on all your knowledge of what is happening here, about what 

the best person, office, or group would be to perform this larger 

oversight role? 

26 

Ms. LARENCE. The potential model of an interagency council 

seemed to us to make sense because there are so many equities involved in this process. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Ms. LARENCE. If I could just respond quickly, the Algorithm 

Working Group is a good example. It is going to be up to the agencies to voluntarily implement whatever algorithm is developed from 

that group, so there is really no one saying, are we going to be implementing this consistently or making sure that this happens. 

So a lot of the decisions are made through consensus, working 

groups, or voluntary measures, and we are just wondering if that 

is the most effective way to manage this process. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Yes, OK. 

Commissioner Boyle, let me go to a different part of this, which 

is what you do to make sure that the nominating agencies—that 

is, agencies that suggest you put somebody on the terrorism list— 

are following the same criteria. 

Mr. BOYLE. Again, as we noted earlier, Senator, the standard 

that is used is one of reasonable suspicion. In the first instance, 

that determination is made by the nominating agency itself. 

Second, all international terrorism nominations—and about 98 to 

99 percent of the database are persons who are associated with 

international terrorism. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BOYLE. All of those nominations go to the National Counterterrorism Center where there is a second review or vetting of the 

underlying derogatory information to make sure it meets appropriate standards, and then it comes to us. So there are three 

phases at which the determination is made does this derogatory information meet a reasonable suspicion standard. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Levin is here, and I want to ask 

one more line of questions—I am glad to see him—and then I will 

yield to him. This, Commissioner Boyle, is on the question of what 

happens when there are hits found to the list. I believe I read and 

Ms. Larence said today that there were 53,000. Is that the right 

number, Ms. Larence? 

Ms. LARENCE. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And I understand that GAO issued a restricted distribution version of its public report to us today which 

provides, I think, valuable statistics about watch list encounters 

and the results of those encounters. I know we cannot talk about 

those statistics in detail, but to the best of your ability, I wonder 

if you could talk a little bit about the categories of things that happen when somebody’s name genuinely turns up on the list. I am 

leaving aside here—well, you might want to mention it—the false 

positives. What else happens? 

Mr. BOYLE. When our call center receives a call from either a 

Customs and Border Protection agent or a municipal police officer 

who has encountered one of our watch-listed subjects, our call 

taker in the first instance, accessing all of the underlying information, verifies that this is or is not the watch-listed person. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So let me interrupt you a second. When 

there is what I would call a hit, a match, in each case the person 

at the point of entry, they call that 24-hour, 7-day-a-week service? 

27 

Mr. BOYLE. They should be calling. Now, we do have instances 

where we do not get calls, and we are working actively to try to 

prevent that. But, yes, if a police officer pulls somebody over or a 

CBP agent encounters someone at a border, they will get a screen 

that tells them to call the Terrorist Screening Center. 

They call the center. One of our analysts receives the call, accesses electronically all of the underlying information, and in the 

first instance tries to determine and does determine is the person 

who you are encountering the watch-listed person or is it someone 

who unfortunately shares a name. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. BOYLE. We can usually make that determination within 10 

minutes or less. If, in fact, the person who has been encountered 

is the watch-listed person, we then immediately notify the FBI’s 

Terrorist Screening Operations Unit. The TSOU then notifies the 

case agent who is responsible for the case that has that particular 

person watch-listed so that there can be an appropriate operational 

response. 

The other things that happen are that the screen that the police 

officer in this example would receive tells the police officer, according to a category code, what action can be taken. Most often it is 

not to arrest because there has to be an active arrest warrant for 

that to happen, but most often it is simply to try to gather information. So that is the general procedure that happens. 

Just to link back momentarily to the Ziad Jarrah case, if, in fact, 

the person who has found his way into the United States and is 

encountered as a known or suspected terrorist is not the subject of 

an FBI investigation, then when we notify the Terrorist Screening 

Operations Unit, they will set a lead to the nearest FBI office, creating an investigation to follow up on that person to make sure 

that the FBI monitors what he is doing. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is really interesting because I would 

guess that most people would suspect that when you have found 

somebody who is a known or suspected terrorist, you would take 

them into custody, or the law enforcement person would take them 

into custody. But what you are saying is that there is really not 

a basis for that. 

Mr. BOYLE. Only if there is an active arrest warrant or a detention order or if the person has done something else that would justify an arrest. But, no, the fact that the person is on the list does 

not in and of itself justify an arrest. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. But the Members of the Committee and 

the public I presume can have some confidence that having seen 

that person, that person is likely then to be followed if this is really 

a known or suspected terrorist. 

Mr. BOYLE. It is a great opportunity for law enforcement to gather intelligence about that person because if the case agent is investigating that particular suspected terrorist and that person is 

stopped on the highway, we can get valuable information, such as: 

Where he is at that particular moment; who else is in the car with 

him; has he been found near a critical infrastructure or some other 

area that is particularly sensitive. It is a tremendous intelligence 

tool. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks. Very interesting. Very helpful. 

28 

1 A clarification of this response by Mr. Fine appears in the Appendix on page 279. 

Senator Levin, welcome. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I will try to avoid questions if they have been 

asked before. 

The IG has found duplicate records in the Terrorist Screening 

Database which can slow down the screening process or even put 

a law enforcement officer at risk if the handling instructions are 

inconsistent. The IG’s report says that TSC officials stated that 

they will review the TSDB on a weekly basis for duplicate records. 

Is that now going on? 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir, and I think it is important to identify that 

duplicate records in some instances are unavoidable because we 

have to maintain more than one record on a particular person because our downstream customers may want different fields of information. So while it appears to be duplicative because the name, 

date of birth, etc., is the same, we have to include some additional 

information. 

What is of real concern and what was importantly pointed out 

by the Office of Inspector General is when there are inconsistencies 

that might result in a different sort of category code. We are reviewing that to make sure that does not occur. 

Senator LEVIN. About how many inconsistencies have appeared? 

Is this a rare thing? Is this one out of a thousand? 

Mr. BOYLE. I believe that the figure that was identified by the 

Office of Inspector General was 38 percent? 

Mr. FINE. I think that referred to problems with the quality assurance review. I think our report said that we saw approximately 

2,000 in the first instance of duplicate records. I am not sure all 

of them had different handling instructions, but that was the concern that we had, duplicate records with significantly different handling instructions. 

Senator LEVIN. What percentage is that? 

Mr. FINE. If there are approximately 800,000 records, it is a very 

small percentage. 

Senator LEVIN. So it is less than a quarter? 

Mr. FINE. Less than 1 percent, yes.1

Senator LEVIN. OK. The GAO report says that the Terrorist 

Screening Center is developing a process that would permit law enforcement and border control agencies to directly inquire of the 

database as opposed to contacting the TSC by telephone when 

there is a possible hit. What is the status of that process to allow 

direct access to the database? 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, that is a remote query that we are in the process of putting in place. Right now the only availability of that is 

for certain FBI offices which we have made available so that agents 

at certain airports and other areas can access the database through 

a BlackBerry device. 

I should point out, though, Senator, that even once that remote 

query project is in practice, we will always want the encountering 

agent to call our center because it is our call takers, our analysts 

29 

1The Constitution Project’s report appears in the Appendix on page 78. 

who have full electronic access to all of the underlying information 

on the watch list. 

Senator LEVIN. And it is not possible for someone in the field to 

have that direct access to all the underlying data? 

Mr. BOYLE. No, because of classification issues. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, the IG follow-up audit of the 

Screening Center found that there are two watch lists, not one. 

One is a Web-based system and the other is an older legacy 

version. They are supposed to be identical but they are not. The IG 

found that multiple watch list records were missing from one or the 

other database that was used by either visa, border, or law enforcement personnel. The Terrorist Screening Center has apparently 

told the IG that having two versions is necessary for technological 

reasons. That is troubling to me, but explain why you have to have 

two versions. 

Mr. BOYLE. Well, we have had substantial discussions with our 

friends from the Office of Inspector General about that. At one 

point there were two separate systems. Right now we have what 

I would call two components of a single system. We have an ingest 

system through which we receive the nominations. We then have 

to take those nominations and export them or the export system to 

our downstream clients. 

The short answer to the question, sir, is that sometime during 

the first quarter of calendar year 2008, we expect to be able to retire that export system so that everything will be done through 

that first component, which will satisfy the IG’s understandable 

concern. 

Second, with respect to the time between now and then, as a result of what the IG has identified, we now do a daily reconciliation 

of those two components so that at the end of each day, if they do 

not zero out, the very next day one of our analysts takes that report and his first priority, his first order of business is to ensure 

that those records are, in fact, properly reconciled. 

Senator LEVIN. And you have the funding to achieve that goal in 

2008? 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Fine, the President has directed DHS to work with other 

agencies and departments to identify other appropriate screening 

opportunities, including the use of the watch list to screen applicants for private sector jobs when it is a job involving critical infrastructure. 

Now, some people who advocate this point out that if you are 

having an individual who is working in a chemical plant, for example, this kind of screening could be very helpful. Others, such as 

the Constitution Project,1 the think tank, have said that it is inappropriate to use watch lists for employment screening. And still 

other people have pointed out that a person who is turned down 

for a job who was mistakenly listed on a watch list would not be 

30 

likely to conclude that was the reason, unlike a frequent traveler 

where it is pretty obvious that is what has occurred. 

Do you have any thoughts on this issue that you could share 

with us? 

Mr. FINE. I do think that it is an important issue to pursue, but 

it raises some significant concerns, particularly because of the factors that you just identified. It is not a minor inconvenience that 

you are going to be delayed at the airport a short period of time. 

When you are looking at it in the private sector, it can have very 

serious implications about not being able to get employment without having any reason or knowledge about why that is. It also gives 

us concerns because of the size of the watch list and the potential 

inaccuracies in the watch list about the impact of the mistakes on 

it. 

So while I am not opposed to pursuing this, I do think that these 

important safeguards need to be considered and discussed. One of 

the things that I do think needs to be discussed is not solely how 

people get onto the watch list—we have had a lot of discussion 

about this today, and it is an important subject—but how people 

get off of the watch list, how people are removed. And the FBI has 

a process where if the case is closed, they are removed. I am not 

sure all the other entities have that same process or have that 

same standard, so I agree with the GAO that they need to look at 

that in terms of a high-level review and pursue these opportunities, 

but to ensure that there are safeguards in place. 

Senator COLLINS. I think that is a very difficult issue when you 

start extending the watch list to matters of employment. Clearly, 

we do not want terrorists to have the ability to work at a nuclear 

power plant or chemical facility or other critical infrastructure. But 

if you start having a system where the personnel director of a company has access to a watch list which may not be accurate and uses 

that to turn someone down for a job, I think it raises a host of new 

questions and we need to proceed with a lot of care in that area. 

Mr. Boyle, that raises an issue as well about how long it takes 

for an individual who is mistakenly included on a watch list to obtain redress. The IG has found that TSC on average takes about 

67 days to close its review of an inquiry from an individual who 

believes he or she is mistakenly listed. 

Now, for a busy traveler, for a business traveler who is traveling 

every single week, several times a month, 2 months can involve a 

great deal of inconvenience if they have been incorrectly identified. 

Could you comment on what TSC is doing to try to expedite these 

reviews? 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes. We are monitoring on a regular basis the average time that it takes us to resolve these matters. Sometimes because we must spend a fair amount of time dealing with the nominating agency to try to find out exactly what the information is 

that supports the nomination and that nominating agency’s view of 

that person’s watch list status, it can take a while, obviously particularly if we are dealing with someone who is overseas. But we 

are monitoring that. We are trying to reduce the time. 

I would also point out that, as the OIG report mentioned, although we would like to see the time that it takes reduced, the 

quality of the work that is being done by our redress unit is quite 

31 

remarkable. And we certainly do not want to sacrifice the quality 

of what those folks are doing for the sake of expediency. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much, Senator Collins. 

Commissioner Boyle, I know today the Committee did receive the 

Memorandum of Understanding with this new series of policies regarding redress. Is there anything more you would like to say 

about that. We appreciate the fact that it has come into effect. Parties to this are the various agencies involved in the various terrorism databases. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, and thank you for the opportunity to address 

that, Mr. Chairman. This has been the result of a lot of hard work 

by a lot of folks over the past several months. 

We have had in place a process whereby our redress analysts in 

our redress unit work with the various agencies. The Memorandum 

of Understanding that is being released today commits each one of 

those agencies to identify a high-level official who will be responsible for ensuring that each of those agencies responds appropriately and quickly to any request for information relating to redress. So we believe that this will be a help in expediting the process and will continue to help us do so in a way that produces the 

appropriate result. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Good. Secretary Rosenzweig, let me come 

back to the question and answer you had with Senator Collins 

about the Mexican national with tuberculosis who came back and 

forth across the borders undetected. I understood your example, 

and it was quite perplexing in its way. I want to mention two 

things to you to ask you to respond now or afterward. 

One, I have seen the name of the individual, and it is not a common Hispanic name. 

Two, my staff has continued to talk to the folks from Customs 

and Border Protection, and I do not know exactly what the individual did. I must say I do not have that, and I would like to; I 

think the Committee should understand that, the public should, 

from yourself or the Customs and Border Protection people. But I 

gather from the CBP people, or my staff does, that this was not a 

switch of names, that the person did something else. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Thank you for the opportunity. Let me be 

clear. My hypothetical—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That was a hypothetical. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG [continuing]. Was about me, and it shows the 

difficulty when we do not know what the mistake is. In the Hispanic culture, it is very common for transposition. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. It is very common for a transposition of birth 

dates because of the European style of 12/9 becoming 9/12. 

We got a lookout, and the very first information lacked the first 

name and had the wrong birth date. We try within that all the 

other possible permutations that we can think of, given our knowledge—I mean, we are not, despite the fact that some people might 

think so, routinized robots who do not actually try and approach 

these things with creativity. We tried reversing the names. We 

tried reversing the birth dates. We did indeed get a corrected birth 

date. But we do not know if that is a correct corrected birth date. 

32 

The first one having been wrong, we do not know if the second— 

it is only when we actually find the person a month later that we 

know that it is actually a corrected birth date as opposed to another incorrect iteration. 

We run all of those possibilities. In none of them, as I understand it—and, granted, this is very fact intensive—did we have a 

match, principally because we lacked a first name that was at all 

accurate. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So you ran those at the time the person 

came through or afterward to see how the person got through? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. No. We are looking for him in our records. This 

person is identified to us as a frequent border crosser. If that is accurate, we should have a record of this person having crossed the 

border, not only the 20 times between the date and afterwards, but 

also the 50 times that he did before we ever got a report from the 

Mexican health authorities, which, of course, I cannot do anything 

until I get a notice. 

When we throw all of these iterations of possibilities at the data 

set and say, do you have any Hahns, do you have any Rosenzweigs, 

do you have any 10/31/59s or 10/8/59s or 8/10/59s, we do not get 

a match that matches these descriptions. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. So that was just an example, and you 

are not sure whether he switched his name or not, the two names? 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. We have no information about what the source 

of the incomplete—I think the fair way to say this is incomplete information that we got. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. So at that point, you have somebody that 

Mexico has told you is coming back and forth with a real contagious health problem, and you are trying to find him but you cannot. I mean, that is basically—— 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. That is it. And, perhaps I will just disagree 

with you slightly in characterization, but of the three names that 

we had, two of them to our eyes looked reasonably common, particularly the first name we got and one of the two latter names. 

Whether they are as common as Rodriguez, that is a value judgment that I—— 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. But my Rodriguez example was intended to 

demonstrate that the only way I can guarantee finding one is to 

take all three names and all the possible dates of birth and run 

them all separately. And that just creates lots and lots of false 

positives. 

If we have the accurate information with the name-matching algorithm, we can find a person, but even there we are also hobbled 

by misspellings. One of these names is indeed a complex name, so 

we can try variants on that spelling. But we do not know what the 

error is in the information we have until roughly 40 days later 

when we finally get the match and say, ‘‘Ah, of course. If only we 

had known.’’ 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Could I just follow up on your point? 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Sure. 

33 

Senator COLLINS. Because my information is a bit different. First 

of all, the agency knew that this individual was crossing at the El 

Paso, Texas, border crossing, so it is not as if we have a huge number of border crossings where this individual is coming through. 

Surely, that should have helped narrow the search. 

Second, the fact is, as I understand it from Customs and Border 

Protection, the individual was able to cross 21 times after the agency had the correct hyphenated last name, and I agree with the 

Chairman that this is not like Joe Smith. This last name is a hyphenated, not common last name. And you had the correct date of 

birth. When you know where the individual is going to be crossing, 

what his last name is, and his correct date of birth, the fact that 

the first name is missing seems to me not a sufficient explanation 

for why there was not a match. You had the middle name, the hyphenated last name, and the correct date of birth, and you know 

where he is coming from. You know at which border crossing to be 

on the alert. 

So I think this does not fit your example at all. Your example 

is a compelling one of what can happen, but it does not fit the facts 

of this case as they have been presented to me. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Again, with respect, Senator, I think we are 

looking at it backwards. We now know that El Paso is the place 

that he most frequently crossed. In fact, my information is that all 

of his crossings were not at El Paso but at other ports of entry as 

well. So, unless we know in advance that is the only place, we are 

obliged to look everywhere. 

I would also say that El Paso is one of the three busiest crossing 

points in the United States on a daily basis. There are thousands 

and thousands of people. 

It is the case that with the information we had, had we restricted 

ourselves to that, we could have picked out all the people with 

those names crossing across the border. But not knowing who he 

is and without the first name, that would have included everybody 

who has either of those two hyphens, because you and I now know 

that is the correct answer, that his name is Rosenzweig-Hahn— 

and, again, I will not use his personal name. But, with respect, it 

is a bit of back-seat driving. I cannot know that until I find him. 

So I have to look at all the Rosenzweigs and all the Hahns in order 

to be able to be sure that I am getting the right answer. 

We try and heighten our scrutiny of those people, but that is a 

larger number of people than you might suspect. 

Senator COLLINS. He was not using an alias. That was the first 

report that we got from the Department—that was the reason. 

That turned out not to be the case. 

I am really concerned about this. This person was potentially 

very dangerous from a public health perspective, but what if this 

had been a terrorist? If a terrorist about whom we have an accurate last name and an accurate middle name and an accurate date 

of birth could cross 21 times, when you know it is likely where the 

individual is going to be crossing, that is of huge concern to me. 

And I say that with all due respect to the good job that is being 

done on this watch list. We have come a long ways. But if, in fact, 

with that kind of information a person can cross into our country, 

that really concerns me. 

34 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Well, I do not mean to suggest that it does not 

concern us as well, and certainly with this event we are going to 

go back and review our procedures on watch list name matching 

to ensure that we are doing the best that we can. But I do have 

to say that given the volume of people that we have crossing the 

land border and not knowing ex ante whether or not we actually 

have the accurate names—because we have already determined, at 

least to some degree, that there is something missing because it is 

not coming up on our system fully. We have to always characterize 

and balance the risk/benefit of who we are targeting for secondary 

screening in the devotion of resources. 

I have to also say—and I think that this is predictive but accurate—that if the case were somebody who was a terrorist or on the 

terrorist watch list, which, of course, this person is not because it 

is a public health risk, we would probably apply a different risk 

calculus, especially if it were an active investigation of somebody 

we thought were coming immediately to do harm to the United 

States. We would stop all the Rosenzweigs and all the Hahns no 

matter what, and that would just be too bad and a difficult time 

for the mistakenly stopped ones who would be cleared after secondary. But we have to dial up and dial down the degree of closeness of screening and match that we seek, and at busy ports on the 

land side, we are disabled by the volume and by the need to process people in 10 seconds, at least as we currently stand, from doing 

much better. 

I should add, by the way, that we have modernization money in our budget, too, $100 million. The screens my guys use are 25 

years old for these things, so that is part of the answer, better software and things like that. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. You understand our concern. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. Absolutely. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. And we are going to stay on this. As one 

of you said earlier, a terrorism watch list which is based on names 

obviously has limitations. One of them is if somebody uses an alias 

that they have not used before. Right, Commissioner? Then we are 

not going to catch him. 

Mr. BOYLE. Yes, sir, unless we have some reason to link that 

alias with that person. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. To that person. Am I correct in my recollection, surprisingly, that all or most of the September 11, 2001, 

terrorists actually used their own names? 

Mr. BOYLE. For the most part, that is correct. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. That is what I thought, which was amazing. Now, of course, what is perplexing, to put it mildly, about this 

case of the Mexican national with tuberculosis is that we, our government, had his name from the Mexican health authorities, and 

we were still, for the reasons you said, not able to stop him. I suppose hindsight is always clearer, but I was interested in what you 

said, that obviously if we knew this person was a terrorist, even 

if we had the confusion, in your case we would have stopped everybody with those two names. It is an interesting value judgment 

when you have somebody with tuberculosis which could cause a 

real health problem here. I am sure people would have complained, 

but, again, what I am about to say I say with hindsight, I wish you 

35 

had stopped everybody with his two names if that is what was necessary to stop him from coming in. It would have bothered a lot of 

people, a lot of false positives, but I think overall public interest 

would have been better served. 

Mr. ROSENZWEIG. If I may, sir, and this is a complete throw the 

ball to somebody else. But in making those kinds of determinations, we rely obviously very strongly on Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control to tell us what they assess 

is the risk and how much or how little we need to dial up or dial 

down the matching process. And I am told that we actually had 

this discussion with HHS, and they made a judgment that they did 

not want to press for better identification information because that 

has systematic effects about discouraging people from seeking 

treatment. That is completely outside of my lane, and it certainly 

is something you should be interested in following up on. But we 

take the medical judgments as given to us by our partners. We do 

not do doctors. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. OK. So, I ask you to keep us posted on 

your continuing review of this because we are not satisfied yet because we do not want this to happen again, and we know that the 

GAO report mentions other cases in which people on a watch list 

earlier this year—or was it last spring—got by and got into the 

country. And it also reminds us that to the extent that we move 

to tamper-proof IDs for people to come into the country who are 

able to make that easily entered into an electronic system and that 

we move to biometrics to the extent that we have biometrics on 

people, that is obviously at a higher level of certainty. 

But I want to come back to the beginning because I think the important thing is that the Terrorist Screening Center and the accumulation of lists and the process you have has raised our guard 

much higher than it was before and on September 11, 2001. For 

that we thank you. And I guess the other part of this clearly is that 

there is more to do. We have a big country, and a lot of people coming in and out of it every day, astounding numbers, really—legally 

I am talking about, not even illegally—and how we do our best 

using modern technology to filter out those who either are dangerous to us in terms of terrorism or health is critically important. 

So I thank you. 

Senator Collins, do you want to add anything? 

Senator COLLINS. No, thank you. 

Chairman LIEBERMAN. Thanks very much for what you have 

been doing. The hearing record will be open for 15 days for Members to submit additional questions to you and for you to answer 

some of the questions. Senator Warner, I know, would particularly 

like an answer to his question for the record. 

I thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

(37) 

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