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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO END 

TAXPAYER FUNDING FOR INEFFECTIVE 

FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

INSURANCE, HOUSING, AND 

COMMUNITY OPPORTUNITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 2, 2011 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Financial Services 

Serial No. 112–13 

( 

(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES 

SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama, Chairman 

JEB HENSARLING, Texas, Vice Chairman 

PETER T. KING, New York 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

RON PAUL, Texas 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

JOHN CAMPBELL, California 

MICHELE BACHMANN, Minnesota 

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas 

THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan 

KEVIN McCARTHY, California 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

MICHAEL G. FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

BLAINE LUETKEMEYER, Missouri 

BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

NAN A. S. HAYWORTH, New York 

JAMES B. RENACCI, Ohio 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia 

ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois 

DAVID SCHWEIKERT, Arizona 

MICHAEL G. GRIMM, New York 

FRANCISCO ‘‘QUICO’’ CANSECO, Texas 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts, Ranking 

Member 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

RUBE ́ N HINOJOSA, Texas 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

CAROLYN MCCARTHY, New York 

JOE BACA, California 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina 

DAVID SCOTT, Georgia 

AL GREEN, Texas 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

JOE DONNELLY, Indiana 

ANDRE ́ CARSON, Indiana 

JAMES A. HIMES, Connecticut 

GARY C. PETERS, Michigan 

JOHN C. CARNEY, JR., Delaware 

LARRY C. LAVENDER, Chief of Staff 

(III) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSURANCE, HOUSING, AND COMMUNITY OPPORTUNITY

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois, Chairman 

ROBERT HURT, Virginia, Vice Chairman 

GARY G. MILLER, California 

SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia 

SCOTT GARRETT, New Jersey 

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina 

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia 

SEAN P. DUFFY, Wisconsin 

ROBERT J. DOLD, Illinois 

STEVE STIVERS, Ohio 

LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois, Ranking 

Member 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

NYDIA M. VELA ́ ZQUEZ, New York 

EMANUEL CLEAVER, Missouri 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts 

(V) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on: 

March 2, 2011 ................................................................................................... 1 

Appendix: 

March 2, 2011 ................................................................................................... 29 

WITNESSES 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 2011 

Barofsky, Hon. Neil, Special Inspector General, Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP) .................................................................................................. 2 

Jones, Katie, Analyst in Housing Policy, Congressional Research Service 

(CRS) ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Marquez, Hon. Mercedes M., Assistant Secretary, Community Planning and 

Development, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 6 

Scire, Matthew J., Director, Financial Markets and Community Investment, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) .................................................. 7 

Stevens, Hon. David H., Assistant Secretary for Housing and Commissioner 

of the Federal Housing Administration, U.S. Department of Housing and 

Urban Development (HUD) ................................................................................. 4 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statements: 

Barofsky, Hon. Neil .......................................................................................... 30 

Jones, Katie ....................................................................................................... 37 

Marquez, Hon. Mercedes M. ............................................................................ 46 

Scire, Matthew J. .............................................................................................. 59 

Stevens, Hon. David H. .................................................................................... 78 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Biggert, Hon. Judy: 

Written statement of the American Alliance of Home Modification Professionals (AAHMP) ........................................................................................... 88 

Written statement of Americans for Tax Reform .......................................... 91 

Written statement of Mark A. Calabria, Ph.D., Director, Financial Regulation Studies, Cato Institute ....................................................................... 94 

Written statement of Satya Thallam, Director, Financial Markets Working Group, and Anthony Sanders, Senior Scholar, the Mercatus Center 

at George Mason University ........................................................................ 99 

Written statment of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, with attachments ............................................................................................................. 107 

Article from The Wall Street Journal entitled, ‘‘Housing Market Masochism,’’ dated March 2, 2011 ...................................................................... 121 

Article from The Washington Times entitled, ‘‘Obama’s helping hand 

hoodwinks homeowners,’’ dated March 1, 2011 .......................................... 123 

(1) 

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO END 

TAXPAYER FUNDING FOR INEFFECTIVE 

FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 

Wednesday, March 2, 2011 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INSURANCE, HOUSING, 

AND COMMUNITY OPPORTUNITY, 

COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES, 

Washington, D.C. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

2220, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Judy Biggert [chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Biggert, Hurt, Miller of California, McHenry, Dold; Gutierrez, Waters, and Sherman. 

Also present: Representative Green. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing, 

and Community Opportunity will come to order for a hearing entitled, ‘‘Legislative Proposals to End Taxpayer Funding for Ineffective Foreclosure Mitigation Programs.’’ 

Thank you all for being here in these tight quarters. Unfortunately, this hearing was put on the schedule rather late, so we are 

in the second hearing room. The reason that I am starting now, 

and the ranking member and I waived our opening statements, is 

because we are going to have votes. In fact, we expected them at 

quarter to one, and then we are expecting another series of votes, 

so the more that we can accomplish right now, the better. 

So I am just going to start with the witnesses, and I would like 

to welcome them. And members will be always welcome to submit 

their statements for the official hearing record, but we will immediately proceed to our panel of witnesses. 

Our first witness is the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, Neil Barofsky. 

Inspector General, I understand you are retiring from your post, 

so I would like to thank you for your service and wish you the best 

in your future endeavors. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Thank you. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. And next, we will hear from HUD FHA 

Commissioner David Stevens. Welcome back. Also from HUD, our 

third witness is the Assistant Secretary for Community Planning 

and Development, Ms. Mercedes Marquez. 

Our fourth witness is the U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment, Matthew Scire. And our final witness is Ms. Katie Jones, who is an AnVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:40 May 31, 2011 Jkt 065670 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\65670.TXT TERRIE
2 

alyst in housing policy with the Congressional Research Service of 

the Library of Congress. 

So welcome, all of you. 

And, Inspector General, you are recognized for 5 minutes for 

your statement. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NEIL BAROFSKY, SPECIAL 

INSPECTOR GENERAL, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM 

(SIGTARP) 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Chairwoman Biggert, Ranking Member Gutierrez, and members 

of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to appear before you today to 

testify about the HAMP program. HAMP, of course, arose out of 

the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. If you would suspend for a moment— 

Please put those posters down; that is against the decorum in 

our hearings. Thank you. 

I am sorry about that. Please continue, Inspector General. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Sure. 

HAMP, of course, arose out of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act’s requirement that TARP be used not just to benefit 

the Wall Street banks, but also Main Street through a specific goal 

of preserving homeownership. Unfortunately, since HAMP’s announcement 2 years ago that it would help up to 3 to 4 million 

struggling homeowners achieve sustainable permanent modifications, the numbers have been nowhere close, with fewer than 

540,000 permanent modifications to date. 

Five weeks ago, in testifying before the House Oversight Committee, I was asked the same question that is the subject of this 

hearing, whether given the disappointing results of HAMP, the program should be terminated. At that time, I thought this conversation was premature and that Treasury should be given an opportunity to respond to what had become bipartisan criticism and concern that the program was failing to do two things: one, set forth 

its plan on how to revamp the program so it could meet those important TARP goals of preserving homeownership; and two, finally 

answering the question that needs to be answered for there to be 

any true discussion about whether to continue this program or not, 

which is how many people Treasury expects to help through this 

program with sustainable permanent modifications. 

Unfortunately, since that hearing Treasury has done little to address these concerns. On the one hand, Secretary Geithner has acknowledged that the program will come nowhere close to meeting 

its original expectations and that the program itself suffers from a 

major design flaw in that the incentives for the servicers are insufficient to overcome the conflicts of interest that are inherent in the 

program as Treasury designed it. 

But rather than then build on this belated recognition of failure, 

Treasury continues to celebrate the status quo. Last week, to an 

applauding crowd of mortgage servicers, one Treasury official confirmed that there would be no meaningful change or changes in the 

HAMP program and that all that would be done is tweaks around 

the program’s edges. 

3 

Since then, other Treasury officials, seemingly on a daily basis, 

have been issuing defenses of the program, saying that it has been 

successful, citing ever-changing goals and milestones that are 

meaningless and misguided. 

Even more disturbing is Treasury’s continued and inexplicable 

failure of transparency in identifying how many people it expects 

this program will help over the course of its life span. Steadfastly 

refusing to do so for more than a year, this past December, the 

Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) tried to fill the void by providing its own estimate of 700,000 to 800,000 modifications over 

the life of the program. 

But since that past hearing, rather than issue its own numbers, 

its own estimate of the total number of people who would be 

helped, Treasury has done something astonishing. In a written report to Congress, it suggests both that the COP’s estimate of 

700,000 to 800,000 is accurate and also the number might be twice 

that amount. Another Treasury official testifying before the subcommittee only stated that the program would help as many people 

as it could. Treasury’s refusal to be transparent about the number 

of people it expects to help does it no service, and merely fuels the 

concerns and suspicions of those seeking to terminate the program 

and providing for those who would otherwise seek to defend it, depriving them of the necessary tools to respond. 

So here we are 2 years later with now basically universal and bipartisan agreement that the HAMP program is failing to meet 

TARP’s goal of preserving homeownership, with Treasury standing 

alone as the defender of the status quo. 

In fact, this past week, one senior Treasury official, in declaring 

the program a success, was citing to its otherwise disappointing 

rate of conversion from trial modifications to permanent—this, the 

conversation rate and tried to defend it by comparing it to a baseball player and said that if a baseball player hit for a 330 average, 

that would be successful, so therefore the HAMP program has been 

successful. 

Now, to be sure, for those people, proportionately few, who do receive sustainable permanent modifications, they will receive a benefit under this program. But these type of flip statements and comparisons demean the real harm that is suffered by many of the 

more than 800,000 families who have seen their modifications terminated under the HAMP program and the up to 2.3 to 3.3 million 

families who might have been reached by this program if only it 

had been better designed, better managed, and better executed by 

the Treasury Department. 

I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

answering any questions you have. 

[The prepared statement of Inspector General Barofsky can be 

found on page 30 of the appendix.] 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much. 

I now recognize Commissioner Stevens for 5 minutes. 

4 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DAVID H. STEVENS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HOUSING AND COMMISSIONER OF 

THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD) 

Mr. STEVENS. Thank you, Chairwoman Biggert, Ranking Member 

Gutierrez, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the 

opportunity to testify here today. I am pleased to discuss the Administration’s programs designed to help families and the housing 

market recover from the economic crisis. 

First, let me speak briefly about the progress of the recovery. As 

you know, when home prices were falling every month for 30 

straight months when President Obama took office, the Administration had no choice but to take action. 

The results are clear. Monthly foreclosure starts are down more 

than 30,000 a month from this time a year ago. More than 4.1 million distressed home borrowers have received mortgage assistance 

since April of 2009, including HAMP modifications, FHA loss mitigation activities, and voluntary private efforts as part of the HOPE 

NOW Alliance, more than twice the number of foreclosures completed during that time. Still, the housing market remains fragile. 

Where the crisis was initially driven by defaults created by risky 

subprime loans, today unemployment and negative equity are the 

main drivers of foreclosures. To respond to these new challenges, 

the Administration has unveiled new tools, two of which I would 

like to talk about today. 

The first is the FHA short refinance program to help some of the 

estimated 1.5 million borrowers who owe more on their mortgages 

than their homes are worth. Making matters worse, these borrowers often can’t move to find a new job or refinance their loan 

into a lower payment, because their house is underwater. 

Through the program, a targeted group of borrowers who are current on their mortgage payments, will have an opportunity to have 

their loans modified or refinanced into a sustainable FHA fixedrate mortgage. 

To qualify, the existing first lien holder must write down at least 

10 percent of the unpaid principal balance. Then the borrowers are 

able to refinance an underwater, non-FHA insured mortgage into 

an FHA-insured mortgage at 97.75 percent of the home’s value. As 

a result, the vast majority of the program’s cost is borne not by the 

taxpayer, but by the investors and institutions which own these 

loans. 

While we have faced some initial implementation challenges, 

with Wells Fargo, Citi Mortgage, and GMAC Ally having just announced they will soon begin short refinance pilots and several 

other major lenders indicating they will begin participating this 

year, we expect to see some progress in the months ahead. 

What first started with the foreclosures from bad loans has now 

transitioned into issues with unemployment and negative equity. 

As we work to help homeowners who have watched the value of 

their homes plummet during this crisis, the Administration is 

working to help families who are facing foreclosure through no 

fault of their own, because they have lost their jobs. 

In October, we announced the emergency homeowners loan program, a $1 billion initiative authorized by Congress to provide a 

5 

zero interest, forgivable bridge loan of up to $50,000 to as many as 

30,000 distressed borrowers in 32 States and Puerto Rico. This program is designed to bring the homeowner current on their mortgage and then provide additional assistance to reduce the monthly 

payments to affordable levels. Assistance terminates when the borrower’s income is restored to 85 percent of their pre-crisis levels. 

Once assistance is complete, the loan will be secured by a junior 

lien against the homeowner’s principal residence. Created by the 

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform bill, this program complements the 

Treasury Department’s hardest hit fund and will be administered 

through two delivery channels: individual State agencies for States 

with similar programs in place; and through a network of intake 

and housing counseling agencies designed by NeighborWorks 

America. 

Madam Chairwoman, I would like to be the first to acknowledge 

that it is taking longer to implement the program than we had expected due to challenges that are unique to it. But I would note 

that the emergency home loan rule and notice have been sent to 

the Federal Register and are now publicly available on the HUD 

Web site. 

HUD is currently working to sign cooperative agreements with 

key program partners including NeighborWorks and those substantially similar States. And this spring, we hope to provide information as to when, where, and how borrowers can apply for the 

NeighborWorks Program. 

These initiatives supplement a variety of programs already in 

place to continue our Nation’s economic recovery. Mark Zandi of 

Moody’s Analytics said just recently that not only have the Administration’s collective efforts to date helped to stem the vicious cycle 

of steadily declining home prices that was leading to escalating 

loan defaults when we took office, but also stated ‘‘any further price 

declines could be forestalled to an additional 500,000 solid modifications over the coming year’’ and that these kind of approaches, 

particularly principal write-downs represent a key to getting there. 

Of course as President Obama has pointed out, we cannot prevent every foreclosure, nor would it be responsible to assist every 

borrower who bought more than they could afford. But those aren’t 

the families these efforts assist. Rather, they are tailored to assist 

responsible borrowers who are at risk of foreclosures through no 

fault of their own, whether they have lost their jobs due to this recession or because they have seen their property values collapse. 

That is why the Administration is opposed to all four bills that 

are the subject of this hearing, and it is why I urge Congress to 

instead support our efforts and help us improve them. Thank you 

for the opportunity to testify before you today. 

[The prepared statement of Commissioner Stevens can be found 

on page 78 of the appendix.] 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you. We have had a roll call, but 

we will try and do one more testimony before we run off like lemmings to the House Floor. 

Next, we have the Honorable Mercedes Marquez. 

6 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MERCEDES M. MARQUEZ, 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN 

DEVELOPMENT (HUD) 

Ms. MARQUEZ. Chairwoman Biggert, Ranking Member Gutierrez, 

and members of the subcommittee, thank you so much for the opportunity to testify today in support of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. 

Let me start by clarifying that the NSP Program is not a foreclosure prevention program, but rather a tool to help communities 

address and mitigate the negative effects that vacant, abandoned, 

and blighted properties have on neighborhoods and property values. 

While monthly foreclosure starts are down more than 30,000 per 

month from the same time 1 year ago, the housing market remains 

fragile. Neighborhood stabilization investments are important because they prevent further decline. Since 2008, HUD, NSP grantees, and a range of private sector and nonprofit partners have 

worked together to craft distinctive, market-oriented responses that 

stabilize and improve neighborhoods while these dollars often turn 

foreclosed and abandoned properties into affordable rental housing 

that families need and shore up the equity of neighboring homeowners in these communities. 

I am responsible for overseeing all three rounds of Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds, including: the initial $4 billion program established by HERA in 2008; $2 billion for NSP2 appropriated by the Recovery Act; and the $1 billion for NSP3 included 

in Dodd-Frank. All told, we expect the $7 billion in Neighborhood 

Stabilization Funds to impact 100,000 properties in the Nation’s 

hardest-hit markets and with grantees reporting that more than 

36,000 of these properties are under construction, we are more 

than a third of the way there. 

While 100,000 properties may seem small by comparison to the 

millions of foreclosures we have seen in recent years, the targeted 

nature of these allocations, and the statutory requirement that 

grantees focus their funds on areas with the greatest need, has enabled NSP to not only impact those homes and neighborhoods 

where the funds are invested, but to produce a multiplier effect 

that impacts our local, regional, and even national housing markets. 

I am pleased to report that the funds have been well-managed, 

both at the Federal and local levels. To date, HUD has obligated 

signed grant agreements with States, local governments, and nonprofits for 100 percent of NSP1 and NSP2 dollars and we expect 

the NSP3 funds by the end of this month. 

Indeed, the 99.6 obligation rate for NSP1 grantees at the 18- 

month deadline speaks to the commitment and tenacity of communities across the country, even during a difficult budget environment and to CPD’s NSP technical assistance effort, which ensured 

accountability of these funds by helping grantees assess their markets and retool their efforts to produce the biggest impact with the 

minimum taxpayer investment. 

Most important of all, Madam Chairwoman, these efforts are producing results. To date, communities using NSP1 have produced 

7 

more than 5,300 rehabilitated or newly constructed homes, more 

than 6,000 households have received direct homeownership assistance to acquire formerly foreclosed or abandoned properties, and 

more than 9,700 blighted properties have been demolished and 

cleared. 

But statistics alone don’t capture the impact this program is actually having. In Cleveland, Ohio, NSP funds have made a huge 

difference in helping reduce vacancy rates. Despite an estimated 

18,000 vacant properties, NSP has helped Cleveland reduce the vacancies in one East Side neighborhood by nearly 40 percent in the 

last 2 years. At the same time, this helped responsible homeowners 

like Millie Davis, who recently earned her Master’s Degree in 

Urban Planning from Cleveland State University, buy a home closer to where she works and invite her mom to live with her. 

Or Lee County, Florida, one of the regions hardest hit by foreclosures with over 2,600 foreclosure filings per month at one point. 

Lee County not only used their NSP dollars to help its communities 

come back to life, they have also partnered with the sheriff’s department there to create a weed-and-seed program to reduce crime 

in these areas. 

One hardworking nurse, Priscilla Hardaway, was paying more 

than $1,000 in monthly rent when she learned about the NSP program. Because of NSP, she purchased a home, and now affords a 

mortgage of $528 per month, a dramatic savings. 

Madam Chairwoman, I believe these two examples illustrate the 

impact this investment is having: helping stabilize hard-hit communities; creating sustainable homeownership opportunities for responsible homeowners; and stabilizing or raising property values 

for families who have lost so much over these past few years 

through no fault of their own. 

These are the kinds of values we want our housing market to 

support in the years ahead: more affordability; more sustainability; 

and more transparency and accountability when it comes to taxpayer dollars. That is the difference this program is making and, 

with your partnership, will continue to make in the coming 

months. That is why I am here to support this program and to 

stand against the four bills. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Marquez can be 

found on page 46 of the appendix.] 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you. I think we have time for one 

more, since we have 10 minutes. 

Mr. Scire, please proceed for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MATTHEW J. SCIRE, DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL 

MARKETS AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) 

Mr. SCIRE. Thank you. Chairwoman Biggert, Ranking Member 

Gutierrez, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss GAOs assessments of Treasury’s Making Home 

Affordable Program including its loan modification program called 

PAM. 

8 

It has been over 2 years since Treasury first announced the 

Home Affordable Modification Program with the promise of helping 

3 to 4 million homeowners in danger of losing their homes. Since 

then, 1.7 million homeowners have been offered to file mortgage 

modifications, and in December there were 522,000 active, permanent modifications. 

However, the number of homeowners who face foreclosure remains high. As of December, about 3.7 million mortgages were 90 

or more days delinquent or in the process of foreclosure. That represents more than a fourfold increase over the number of such 

mortgages in 2005. Put another way, over 8 percent of all mortgages face the prospect of foreclosure. 

We reported in July of 2009 and in June of 2010 on the challenges that Treasury and servicers faced in implementing the 

HAMP program, and the challenges that distressed homeowners 

faced using it. Later this month, we will report on the continuing 

challenges Treasury faces in its efforts to modify mortgages or otherwise help homeowners through its Making Home Affordable Program. 

We also will report on the outcomes of borrowers who were either 

denied or fell out of Treasury loan modifications. At the outset, I 

think it is important to note that Treasury’s HAMP program is 

part of an unprecedented response to a particularly difficult time 

in our Nation’s mortgage market. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act called for Treasury to, among other things, preserve 

homeownership and protect home values, and HAMP continues to 

be Treasury’s cornerstone effort for doing this. 

However, more than a year after Treasury’s initial announcement of HAMP and the goal of bringing consistency to foreclosure 

mitigation, we reported last June that servicers continued to treat 

borrowers seeking to avoid foreclosure inconsistently, in part because of a lack of specific guidance from Treasury. 

Servicers used different definitions for determining whether a 

homeowner was in imminent danger of default. Servicers also varied in their message for ensuring compliance with program requirements. We also found that Treasury had not specified consequences 

or remedies if servicers do not comply with program requirements 

and has yet to do so. 

We recommended that Treasury take a number of steps to improve program transparency and accountability, but it has not fully 

implemented these measures. We also noted that as Treasury continued to design and implement new HAMP programs, including 

the Principal Reduction and Foreclosure Alternatives Program, it 

would be important to develop sufficient capacity to establish 

meaningful performance measures and make appropriate risk assessments. 

In our ongoing work, we find that these newer efforts, along with 

the second lien program, have gotten off to a slow start with limited activity reported to date. The slow pace was due to several reasons and Treasury has taken steps to address many, but the potential effects of these changes remain to be seen. We believe there is 

more that Treasury could do. Treasury could do more to ensure 

that servicers have capacity to undertake these added responsibilities. Treasury could also do more to establish goals and effect the 

9 

performance measures for these programs as we recommended last 

June. 

Finally, to better understand the outcome for borrowers that 

HAMP was unable to help, we surveyed six large HAMP servicers. 

We found that borrowers denied HAMP modifications most often 

became current at the time of our survey. Those who fell out of 

modification most often were in the process of or had received a 

proprietary modification. 

And those borrowers who defaulted on permanent modifications 

most often were in the process of foreclosure. Going forward, it will 

be important to understand what explains borrower outcomes from 

foreclosure mitigation efforts. And here again, we think there is 

more the Treasury can do to more clearly understand the final disposition of borrowers who fall out of the HAMP program. 

In summary, Madam Chairwoman, the Treasury’s HAMP program has not lived up to expectations. It has helped fewer persons 

than it had initially promised, and more announced programs have 

had limited activity. We continue to find that Treasury could do 

more to bolster program accountability and transparency. 

Treasury can begin by understanding better the capacity of services to undertake, additional responsibilities for delivering recently 

implemented programs. It could specify what outcomes it expects 

of these programs. It could also do more to hold servicers accountable by establishing clear goals and performance benchmarks. 

This concludes my opening remarks. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scire can be found on page 59 

of the appendix.] 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Yes. Thank you very much. 

This committee will recess until we return immediately after 

Floor votes. I wouldn’t give up your seats. 

[recess] 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The hearing will come to order. 

We have one more witness, Ms. Katie Jones, professional analyst. 

You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF KATIE JONES, ANALYST IN HOUSING POLICY, 

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (CRS) 

Ms. JONES. Chairwoman Biggert, Ranking Member Gutierrez, 

and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to be here today. 

My name is Katie Jones and I am an analyst at the Congressional 

Research Service. As requested by the subcommittee, my testimony 

will provide dot-com information and performance and funding 

metrics on the Home Affordable Modification Program, or HAMP, 

the FHA Short Refinance Program, the Interagency Homeowners 

Own Program, and the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. 

Since CRS does not collect independently collect data, the numbers provided in my testimony come from data that are made publicly available by the administering agencies or other Federal entities. 

My testimony today highlights information that is discussed in 

two CRS reports, written by myself and my colleagues, both of 

which I have included for the record. CRS has not performed additional analyses specifically for this hearing. As is our policy, CRS 

10 

takes no position on these legislative proposals or on the initiatives 

themselves. 

The first initiative that I will discuss is HAMP, which was established by the Administration using TARP funds. HAMP became active in March 2009 and currently has an end date for entering into 

new modifications of December 31, 2012. HAMP provides financial 

incentives to facilitate mortgage modifications that lower borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments to no more than 31 percent of 

their monthly income. Borrowers first enter into a trial modification, which is supposed to become a permanent modification as borrowers make all of their trial period payments on time. 

The incentive payments provided by the Federal Government are 

offered for permanent modifications. Treasury was designated 

nearly $30 billion in TARP funds for HAMP and its related initiatives. As of February 25, 2011, just over $1 billion has been dispersed. In addition to the TARP funds, Fannie Mae and Freddie 

Mac will provide up to $25 billion for the cost of modifying mortgages that they own or guarantee. 

Under the HAMP incentive structure, some of the incentives are 

designed to be paid based on the future performance of the modifications. For this reason, Treasury may continue to have a contractual obligation to pay servicers for their past performance under, 

or reliance on, the HAMP program, even if the program were to be 

terminated before its currently scheduled end date. 

In public announcements when HAMP began, Treasury estimated that HAMP could reach between 3 million and 4 million 

homeowners. As of Treasury’s most recent report, which just came 

out today, there were almost 540,000 permanent active HAMP 

modifications, and about another 145,000 modifications were in the 

trial period, for a total of nearly 685,000 active modifications. 

At the same time, over 800,000 modifications have been canceled 

since the start of the program. Most of these were trial modifications that never converted to permanent status. Nearly 54 percent 

of the active modifications are GSE loans, so the cost of modifying 

these loans come from the GSEs, rather than TARP funds. 

The next initiative I will discuss is the FHA Short Refinance Program, which was also established by the Administration using 

TARP funds. It allows certain homeowners who are current on 

their mortgage payment, but owe more than their homes are worth, 

to refinance into new mortgages insured by FHA if the original 

mortgage lender agrees to write down the principal balance by a 

certain amount. The program was announced in March 2010 and 

became effective on September 7, 2010. 

Currently, borrowers can refinance through the program until 

December 31, 2012. Treasury has designated up to $8 billion in 

TARP funds for the FHA Short Refinance Program to cover a portion of expected losses through the program. As of the January 

2011 FHA report, 40 loans have refinanced through the program. 

The next program that I will discuss, the Emergency Homeowners Loan Program, was established by Congress in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. That legislation also provided up to $1 billion in mandatory funding to 

HUD to administer the program. 

11 

Through the program, HUD will provide short-term zero interest 

subordinate loans to some homeowners who meet certain eligibility 

criteria and who experienced a reduction in income due to unemployment or underemployment to help cover the cost of their mortgage payment. HUD will forgive the subordinate loan entirely after 

5 years if the borrowers meet certain conditions. HUD has allocated $1 billion in funding under this program to 

the 32 States and Puerto Rico that are not eligible to receive funding under Treasury’s hardest-hit funds. The program is expected to 

begin taking applications this spring. Since the program is not yet 

taking applications, no funds have been dispersed to borrowers to 

date. By statute, no new loan agreements with borrowers can be 

entered into after September 30, 2011. 

Finally, Congress established the Neighborhood Stabilization 

Program in the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 to provide funds to States and local communities to purchase and redevelop foreclosed or abandoned properties. Congress subsequently 

provided two additional rounds of funding for the programs. These 

components of NSP are identified as NSP1, NSP2, and NSP3, respectively. Unlike the other programs I have discussed, NSP is not 

designed to prevent foreclosures, but rather, to help communities 

deal with the aftermath of foreclosures. 

NSP1 and NSP3 funds were awarded by formula, while NSP2 

funds were awarded competitively. To date, HUD data show that 

NSP funds have principally been used for acquisition and residential rehabilitation activities. As of January 13, 2011, HUD reported 

that NSP1’s grantees have completed nearly 20,000 units. HUD announced 283 NSP3 grantees on September 8, 2010. These grantees 

were required to submit their action plans to HUD by March 1, 

2011, and HUD is expected to award these funds shortly. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jones can be found on page 37 

of the appendix.] 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much. We will now proceed to questions. And members are limited to 5 minutes, as well. 

So I will start the questioning, but first I would like to enter into 

the record, without objection, a number of written testimonies and 

letters: first, the testimony from Kelly William Cobb on behalf of 

Americans for Taxpayer Reform; second, testimony from Mark A. 

Calabria on behalf of the Cato Institute; third, the March 1, 2011, 

letter from the National Foreclosure Prevention and Neighborhood 

Stabilization Task Force; fourth, a March 1, 2011, Washington 

Times article entitled, ‘‘Obama’s Helping Hand Hoodwinked Homeowners’’; fifth, testimony from Satya Solomon and Anthony Sanders 

at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University; sixth, testimony from the U.S. Treasury Department; and seventh, a March 

2, 2011, Wall Street Journal article entitled, ‘‘Housing Market Masochism.’’ 

My first question is to all the witnesses—the Administration has 

noted that 4.1 million distressed homeowners have received mortgage assistance since April 2009. However, according to the testimony that this subcommittee received on February 15th, around 

3.5 million of these mortgage modifications were completed without 

any government program and no taxpayer assistance. Meanwhile, 

12 

about 580,000 programs were completed through a government 

program. 

So why is the Administration providing help to these programs 

when the majority of the modifications were made through efforts 

of the private sector? 

Would anybody care to address that? 

Ms. JONES. Chairwoman Biggert, while HAMP is not directly 

under my authority or HUD’s authority, I would articulate it in a 

couple of fashions. 

First of all, by previous testimony before the House Financial 

Services Committee, under the previous Congress, the two heads of 

the mortgage businesses were Bank of America and Wells Fargo, 

as an example, highlighted the fact that HAMP really created the 

blueprint for all other modification programs that have been implemented in this country, that they had seen, that they implemented 

in their institutions, being the largest institutions in the market. 

So clearly, the tangible value of creating something in an environment that we had never experienced before started with HAMP 

and allowed the private sector to ultimately model after the HAMP 

program. 

The interesting variable, however, and difference—and this 

comes from the OCC, who has stated that the HAMP program 

clearly is more effective than what they have seen in private modifications. 

Just to give a couple of examples, the median savings on a 

monthly basis for borrowers from HAMP is $527 a month versus 

$337 to the OCC review of private modifications. 

And also the other variable is, if you look at redefault rates, 

which I think reflects the sustainability of the HAMP program, the 

redefault rates for the OCC review is about 19 percent after a borrower is 60 days late after 6 months in the program. 

And HAMP redefault rates are 10.7 percent after 6 months. 

So, while the numbers have clearly been smaller and the total 

numbers are counted in the scorecard, there is absolutely unequivocal support, both from the private sector and in—and results that 

the HAMP program clearly was the model by which others followed, and that the HAMP performance of borrowers in the HAMP 

program exceeds those in the private sector. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. But besides the data that we have gotten 

from Federal oversight entities, this is something that my constituents have come in to see me about because they wrote seeking a 

mortgage modification under the HAMP program. 

And so they were told, just while you are waiting, it is going to 

take us 3 months or so to go through this—pay the lower amount, 

starting now, and then you will continue when there is a loan 

modification. 

What happened to them is that then some of them were told that 

they weren’t qualified to do it. And so please pay us back, back to 

the rate that you were paying plus a penalty. 

And I think the penalty is what really got these people, and particularly somebody who is in that place where they weren’t able to 

make the payments, which is why they sought the modification. 

13 

And so it is—most of them went into foreclosure and lost their 

homes. And I think that is kind of a false hope to have people do 

that and then they are not able to fulfill— 

Mr. SCIRE. If I could— 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Yes, Mr. Scire, I know that you have had 

some dealings with this. If you would comment on that, please. 

Mr. SCIRE. For a borrower in that kind of situation, the servicer 

is required to first consider them for the HAMP program. So a 

servicer should not be telling a borrower and trying to move them 

into the proprietary without first full consideration for the HAMP 

program. 

I would also point out that the proprietary modifications generally will have different terms, which I think the Commissioner 

was hinting at, than the HAMP program. 

So you are not going to get as generous a modification on the 

proprietary program, generally. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Okay. 

Could you maybe—what are the characteristics of borrowers who 

have redefaulted or were canceled? What did you see as far as people who thought that they could do this and then couldn’t make the 

mortgage payments? 

Mr. SCIRE. For those who redefaulted, just like those who did 

not, they tended to have higher back-end DTI, for example. They 

tended to have lower FICO scores. 

So they generally were more risky borrowers, if you will, those 

who got through HAMP and then redefaulted. 

We did some other analysis where we are looking at what became of them. And there we also see those who redefault more 

often end up in foreclosure. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you. My time has expired. 

I turn to the ranking member, Mr. Gutierrez— 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you very much. 

First of all, welcome to all of you. I want to express, first of all, 

my apologies, because I really feel that this room and this venue 

is really inadequate, especially for the seriousness of the issue. 

There are people outside who can’t get in. I have had difficulty 

listening to people as they have given testimony. 

I hope that in the future we would use a venue that is appropriate to the importance and the substance of the issue that we are 

discussing here today. 

And because I—just to be quick about something, I don’t think, 

really gives value to the importance of people losing their homes 

and communities being destroyed and stripped apart across America. 

Now as one who voted for TARP reluctantly, for over $700 billion 

in order to save the financial markets of the United States of 

America so that one day we could have some stability in our economy again, and it just seems to me, Madam Chairwoman, that in 

the last 2 years, the markets, the S&P is up 50 percent. 

Pretty good if you are in the market. Goldman Sachs and the 

others are handing out bonuses once again to themselves. They are 

doing well and prospering. 

We see that the money that we invested in our financial institutions that was largely due to their own greed, to their own misVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:40 May 31, 2011 Jkt 065670 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\65670.TXT TERRIE
14 

takes, that we, the American public and American taxpayers put 

in to save them, they are doing well. 

And what is the thank you we get? I think most of the American 

people, Madam Chairwoman, are saying, once again, they did well. 

And we get the short end of the stick because people aren’t getting 

back into their homes. 

Now, I want to thank—I can’t say your name, I am sorry. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. ‘‘Barofsky.’’ 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Mr. Barofsky—I apologize. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. I think I mispronounced your name at the beginning as well, so— 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. But I want to thank you for your service. I want 

to thank you for your testimony. You will be missed in this process. 

And so I want to thank you for coming, and I just want to kind 

of part from where you are at. I agree. 

They need to set standards and that is our responsibility and our 

obligation. I won’t do that here in this— 

I have other avenues and other opportunities in which to seek redress on that issue, and I will do that, at that appropriate—because I don’t believe we should be discussing eliminating this program. 

I think we should be discussing how we improve this program 

and how we expand the opportunity to Americans. And I say that 

on the basis of, God, the other side did really well. 

We came at a moment of crisis and we saved them from themselves and their own mistakes. 

And now those who are suffering the most, the homeowners, 

given the collapse of this bubble of our real estate, we should be 

there, 540,000 is not enough. We put $50 billion into this program. 

It was a key cornerstone to getting Democrats or people on this 

side of the aisle to accept and to support a Republican President 

and a Republican Secretary of the Treasury. That is bipartisanship. 

And what does a Democrat say and those who want it say? 

We want some help for American men and women not to lose 

their most precious asset, the thing in which they have most of 

their equity and most of their savings and most of their future, 

their homes. 

And now we are talking about stopping that from happening? I 

say shame on us if we give the Goldman Sachs of the world and 

we give all the investment bankers on Wall Street—and they are 

up 50 percent, ladies and gentlemen. 

Some of them are up even more, billions of dollars in their pockets. And we are going to strip the ability of American homeowners 

to obtain and stay in their homes. 

I don’t think that is the America that I came to represent in the 

Congress of the United States, and that is why I will continue to 

oppose legislation that stops— 

I say let’s fix it, but let’s not strip the program. It still has valuable goals, and I think we can reengineer and we can remodify the 

modifications so that people can stay in their homes. 

That is certainly something that I am going to continue to attempt to champion here in the Congress of the United States. And 

I thank the chairwoman for the— 

15 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. And I thank the ranking member. This 

venue is very inadequate, as we see with everybody sitting here 

and standing here. 

Be that as it may, we are here. And I would recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Dold, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DOLD. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I appreciate it and I want to thank you all for taking the time 

to come. And I also want to apologize to those who are here. It is 

a little warm as well. So we appreciate that. 

But I am delighted to know that it is getting picked up and hopefully many others will have the opportunity to see what we are 

talking about here today, because it is very important. 

A couple things that I wanted to go over—and, really, the line 

of questioning I am going to focus on is going to be on the refinance 

program. 

I know that, Secretary Marquez, you had talked about earlier, in 

your opening statement, that funds have been well-managed. And 

certainly, I would like to go into a little bit about the refinance, in 

terms of resources that have been spent on it, versus the number 

of refinances that have actually happened. 

So would you say that, with regard to the FHA refinance program, the funds have been well-managed? 

Ms. MARQUEZ. On that, I will have to defer to my colleague, Dave 

Stevens, the FHA Commissioner. 

Mr. DOLD. Okay. 

Ms. MARQUEZ. I run the NSP program. 

Mr. DOLD. I understand, but I am just saying, if you—we are 

talking about several programs. I will direct it over to the Secretary in a second, but—so you are not really familiar with that 

specific— 

Ms. MARQUEZ. That is not in my portfolio. 

Mr. DOLD. Okay. I will then go over to Secretary Stevens. Can 

you tell me if you believe those funds have been well-managed? 

Mr. STEVENS. Yes, no funds have been spent, Congressman. The 

funds were there for covering potential losses in the event of ultimate default, and no money has been spent out of those monies at 

this point. 

Mr. DOLD. So is the information that I am receiving with regard 

to—I have been told that we have, through TARP, approximately 

$50 million that has been disbursed. Is that incorrect, out of the 

8-plus billion? 

Mr. STEVENS. That is incorrect. Not all of that was for the FHA 

short refinance program. But just—if I could clarify because I 

think— 

Mr. DOLD. Please. 

Mr. STEVENS. —it is an important question. The program, FHA 

short refi is part of kind of a mosaic of offerings that have been 

created by the Administration. And this was created later in the 

process to deal primarily with negative equity. 

If you think about HAMP, for example, HAMP was an early creation to deal with borrowers who have been put into subprime 

loans and alternative products that they never should have been 

put in, in the first place, and that was meant to modify their payments downward. 

16 

As the recession moved forward over the last couple of years, 

those problems transgressed into areas that were specifically related to negative equity and unemployment. 

The short refi program, which was only actually implemented in 

the late fall of last year, is still being operationalized by a number 

of institutions to get it into the market. In fact, this week alone it 

has been reported that Wells Fargo, GMAC/Ally, Citi, and other 

major institutions have stated publicly that they are just in the 

process of implementing pilots to roll out the short refinance program. 

The monies that were allocated were designed to protect the fund 

going out past 2020, in the event of losses that might be incurred 

from FHA short refis that would be originated to protect the taxpayer—protect the fund itself from being at risk. 

So, at this point, no funds have been expended whatsoever. 

Mr. DOLD. If I can, do you have a response to that, in terms of 

funds from TARP that have been allocated? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. There has been a significant obligation toward 

the short refi program, but because there have been only a small 

handful of actual refinances, none of which have defaulted yet, 

there has been no real expenditure of money. The expenditure will 

occur if the program is successful. 

And if there are refinances and then there are problems with 

those refinances, that is when the TARP money kicks in, either as 

the guarantee, on one end, for failures, where TARP has the first 

loss position. And then secondly, there is an additional $2.5 billion 

that is allocated to help extinguish or modify second liens associated with this program. But to date, nothing has really happened, 

from a TARP perspective, on the short refi program. 

Mr. DOLD. How long has the program been operational? 

Mr. STEVENS. Again, Congressman, the program was—this was 

a later addition to deal with the economy. It was fully rolled out 

in November of last year. 

Mr. DOLD. And how many— 

Mr. STEVENS. And institutions were able to offer it from that, 

from November. And just to be clear, each of these institutions had 

to evaluate their portfolios. It was optional for investors to decide 

whether to write down. They had to create systems and we are just 

seeing those institutions begin to operationalize this now as we 

speak. 

Mr. DOLD. I appreciate that. And one of the things that, at least, 

that—$50 million that has at least been put into the initial kitty. 

We have under 40 loans thus far, since September 2010, which 

may have been its inception, but maybe fully rolled out in November. 

Still, we have seen 39. We have $50 million allocated if it goes 

well. And we have, I think—correct me if I am wrong—a little bit 

over $8 billion is what is totally allocated in there? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Well, yes. For this particular program, it is really 

almost a total of $10 billion of TARP funds that are allocated. The 

additional funds that you are referring to from that are dedicated 

to other TARP modification programs like the HAMP program. 

17 

Mr. DOLD. And since my time is really running out, just one last 

question. So homeowners can’t participate unless the senior lender 

will reduce their principal by at least 10 percent? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. That is correct. 

Mr. DOLD. Is that correct? So principal lenders on performing 

loans will have to agree to reduce the principal by 10 percent in 

the private sector? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Absolutely, yes. 

Mr. DOLD. Do you anticipate that there are going to be many 

who are going to flee to this program, that this was going to be a 

good idea? 

Mr. STEVENS. We were always very clear from the beginning to 

understate the numbers. And while it started off slow, I will tell 

you that, in the first few months, we have 245 applications in process. It exceeds what HOPE for Homeowners did in 3 years. 

By no means are we touting success, but these are complex programs to implement. If you read any of the news this week, three 

major national institutions announced that they are going to be 

doing pilots with the short refinance program. 

I do not expect large numbers. And I think that is an absolute 

concern. Because it is voluntary on the part of these servicers to 

participate, with the investors that hold those mortgages. 

Mr. DOLD. My time has expired. I would like, out of the 240 that 

you have in process, how many do you anticipate will actually 

make it through? 

Mr. STEVENS. Two hundred and forty loans is a very low number. 

Mr. DOLD. I understand. 

Mr. STEVENS. And I can’t estimate exactly what would go 

through. I will tell you this, that of the loans that have been financed already, the average write-down was $77,000. The average 

loan-to-value is 90 percent. And the average FICO score is 711. 

So these are—I actually anticipate, if the sample were to keep 

like that, and as institutions implement the program, it will be seeing significant write-downs. And these loans will be very sustainable, exceeding what we expected from a risk factor, which would 

mean that the TARP allocation would be underutilized in that 

process. 

But it is very early in the stage to be evaluating the program, 

since it was just literally implemented over the past few months. 

Mr. DOLD. Thank you. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. McHenry, is recognized. 

Mr. MCHENRY. I thank the Chair. And thank you for your leadership on this. 

And I am glad everyone is able to get into this little table together and share this space. But to you, Commissioner Stevens, 

thank you for coming back. 

I wish that Treasury was here with you. However, we were informed by Treasury that they would prefer a 2-week notification. 

And so I am sorry this burden falls to you, and I would hope that 

you would encourage Mr. Massad to come forward, rather than let 

you answer these questions that are very pressing. 

Under the HAMP program, under the status quo, how many permanent modifications do you foresee actually happening? 

18 

Mr. STEVENS. Congressman, I do apologize that I am not the 

HAMP expert here at the table. And I encourage you to communicate with that office. I think—let me give you some estimates 

that I have heard, and I would be glad to share those with you. 

So we have 540,000 permanent modifications now. We have 

150,000 families who are in trial modifications. And we just announced, I think, another 27,000 new permanent modifications. 

The numbers are definitely smaller than what was originally expected from the HAMP— 

Mr. MCHENRY. Do you have an estimate? 

Mr. STEVENS. The current expected population that, on a pro 

forma basis, looking forward at this point, looks to be about 1.4 

million to 1.5 million families— 

Mr. MCHENRY. On the HAMP Web site, it still says 3 million to 

4 million. 

Mr. STEVENS. And again, I can’t answer for the HAMP Web site. 

I— 

[laughter] 

I apologize. That is managed by a different department, and— 

Mr. MCHENRY. Sure, okay. But in your discussions in the Administration, you think 1.4 is—okay. 

Now, how many permanent modifications do you foresee? 

Mr. STEVENS. Okay, so the 3 million to 4 million on the Web site, 

if I could just clarify, is an estimate of all modifications that will 

occur. That includes the HAMP modifications, FHA’s modifications, 

and the HOPE for Homeowners modifications. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Wow. This is very different than what was said 

in March of 2009 when this program began. 

Mr. Barofsky, is the 3 million to 4 million under the HAMP program—was that the original goal set forward, if you recall? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Three million to four million was what was originally intended and announced as the number of sustained permanent mortgage modifications that would come under that program, 

that would be funded by HAMP, provided by HAMP. And even Secretary Geithner now acknowledges that we are going to come absolutely nowhere close to that number. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Okay. Do you foresee seeing a sustainable modification, basically what is also termed a permanent modification? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. It is somewhat shameful that at this point, here 

we are in March 2011 and the Treasury Department will, in one 

breath, say that we know the number is not going to be anywhere 

close to what we originally said it would be, and then in the second 

breath, refuse—this is such a basic failure in transparency, to 

refuse to tell SIGTARP, to tell GAO, to tell the Congressional Oversight Panel, to tell you what their expectation is as to the total 

numbers that are going to receive permanent modification. 

All we have is an estimate, the best estimate from the Congres- sional Oversight Panel, of $700,000 to $800,000, and Treasury, in 

its admission to Congress, saying, maybe that number is right or 

maybe it is going to be double that number. 

And that is the exact opposite of transparency. It evades accountability. And it is trying to cover up a program that is clearly a failure. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Failure? 

19 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Failure. 

Mr. MCHENRY. Mr. Stevens, do you contend that is accurate or 

inaccurate? 

Mr. STEVENS. Again, I am just going to—Congressman, I think 

it is an important question. I understand the debate. Without question, the HAMP numbers have not been what was originally forecast. Again, it is not—I am a member of the Housing and Urban 

Development. We are clearly very concerned about all the programs 

that are trying to be implemented. 

I would say this, and I think it is important. I have been in this 

housing finance industry for 3 decades. We have never been 

through an environment like this in history. These programs were 

developed and created— 

Mr. MCHENRY. Sure, but— 

Mr. STEVENS. —in an environment that had never been created 

before. 

Mr. MCHENRY. —we are 2 years in on this, and I realize— 

Mr. STEVENS. So we are 2 years in, but I would just say, Congressman, that—and I refer back to testimony stated by Barbara 

Desoer of Bank of America, Mike Heid of Wells Fargo, the two— 

the presidents of each of those respective mortgage institutions. 

They would have no modification in their testimony that this program was the blueprint for it. 

So while the numbers— 

Mr. MCHENRY. So the blueprint for it—have they done more or 

less, in terms of permanent modifications, than HAMP? 

Mr. STEVENS. They— 

Mr. MCHENRY. More or less? 

Mr. STEVENS. They have done more. 

Mr. MCHENRY. More? So at lower— 

Mr. STEVENS. But at lower payments and higher redefault rates? 

Mr. MCHENRY. Right. But they have helped more people. 

Mr. STEVENS. Lower payment reduction, excuse me. 

Mr. MCHENRY. They have helped more people? Is that what you 

are testifying to? 

Mr. STEVENS. I hope they— 

Mr. MCHENRY. Because that is the number that I have, as well. 

Mr. STEVENS. I would be hopeful that they helped vastly more 

people considering it is the servicers and originators in this country 

that originated the products that ultimately went in default. And 

if they can do it without taxpayer support, that would be all the 

better. 

Mr. MCHENRY. What we get down to is this is about people and 

the harm that HAMP is giving—the harm that HAMP is doing to 

people. And it is their government with their tax dollars doing active harm, based on the analysis we have had, by stringing people 

out, putting them more upside down in their payment, taking every 

bit of savings that they can get out of these people, and still taking 

their homes. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Miller. Oh, I am sorry, I am 

so sorry, the gentlelady from California. 

Ms. WATERS. Oh, thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. 

And I am sorry I was a little bit late coming in. 

20 

But let me just say from the onset that I have had a hand in 

helping to develop some of the programs that are being questioned 

here and are set for ending. I don’t want to talk a lot about the 

HAMP program because I think we all agree that there were weaknesses in the HAMP program, that there are ways by which it 

could have been strengthened, and it did not do everything that it 

should do. 

But I am not willing to talk about eliminating the opportunity 

for some people to get a loan modification by not replacing HAMP 

with something. And for those people who are talking about getting 

rid of all these programs and they come with no programs or proposals to help working people, to help Americans who are in trouble, to help many Americans who are in trouble having defaulted 

or in foreclosure or threatened to be in foreclosure, not because 

they are bad citizens. 

And I will say it over and over again, millions of Americans 

didn’t all of a sudden become bad citizens not paying their debts. 

Something went wrong. 

And we know what went wrong. What went wrong was there 

were exotic products that were placed on the market, that were not 

regulated. There were products that were placed on the market 

such as no-doc loans, and these loans that are resetting, loans 

that—teaser loans that got people in for a little amount of money. 

So we owe it to the people to try and be of assistance because we 

didn’t do what we should have done in order to do the kind of regulation that will protect them from all of these fraudulent practices 

that were out there. 

Having said that, let us take a look at the NSP program. Now, 

to get rid of NSP is going backwards. NSP is the Neighborhood 

Stabilization Program that goes into these communities where you 

have all of these boarded-up properties that have been foreclosed 

on, driving down the value of homes that are being kept up in the 

neighborhood, increasing the cost to the cities for fire, fire departments and police departments, who now have to take care of the 

crime that is going on in these vacant properties, weeds growing 

up. 

And not only is it a good program, to help stabilize the neighborhoods, and to make sure that we retain the value, it is a program 

that creates jobs. It is jobs intensive. 

In order to rehab these houses and to put them back on the markets, we employ a lot of people. We employ the contractors. We get 

the Realtors involved. We get the title people involved. We get subcontractors involved. It goes on and on and on. It is job producing. 

When there are estimates that talk about some of these cuts and 

how they are going to cause the loss of jobs, it is true. You can absolutely see it in something like NSP. 

Many of the people who are talking about getting rid of NSP 

don’t even know what NSP is. They are simply talking about slash 

and burn. 

And so I helped to create NSP. I believe in it. Communities want 

it. It is being implemented well. The HUD took a look from the 

very beginning at how it is being implemented and moved quickly 

to strengthen it. 

21 

And now, cities and towns love it. They are doing a good job with 

it. 

And I don’t have any questions. I just have a lot to say. 

Not only is this program good for the city, some people think, oh, 

this is just—this is for rural areas, this is for suburban areas, this 

is for everybody. So I don’t want anybody to be mistaken to think, 

oh, this is just something for some of those cities that got in trouble. No, this is a good American program. It should not be cut. 

And I don’t know what else you can say to help educate all of 

the Members of Congress about the value of NSP, but ask them to 

go back to their cities and talk with their mayors and talk with 

people about NSP that they want to cut and see what kind of response they get. 

With that, I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentlelady yields back. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Madam Chairwoman, may I ask unanimous consent that Congressman Green, a member of the full committee— 

when everyone on the subcommittee has been given an opportunity, be allowed to ask questions? 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. And I ask unanimous consent that we insert a 

letter to both you, Madam Chairwoman, and me about the Neighborhood Stabilization Program from the National Association of 

Counties, National League of Cities, and U.S. Conference of Mayors 

in the record. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentleman from California, Mr. Miller. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I have enjoyed a lot of the comments. I will go back in history to say Ms. Waters remembers me 

introducing language on predatory lending versus subprime probably 6 times. We got it to the Senate, and Senate Democrats filibustered it every time. We started in 2002. Had we done that, perhaps Countrywide and others would not have done what they did 

and ruined the marketplace. 

Also, there were comments on the monies lent to banks in TARP 

I that was under a House and Senate controlled by Democrats. It 

was a bipartisan bill. The money lent to the banks was repaid. 

That also should be stated. 

The problem I have today is Freddie and Fannie are in serious 

trouble and this Administration is charging them 10 percent interest for funds to keep them going. That is abhorrent. Ten percent 

interest. 

So if we want to put the facts on the table here, let’s put all the 

facts on the table. 

My good friend Maxine talked about the Neighborhood Stabilization Program. The problem I have with it is the equitable allocation 

I think is absolutely questionable: Los Angeles County in NSP 1, 

2, and 3 got $26.5 million; San Bernardino County got $33.2 million; and Orange County got $4.3 million. 

Neighborhood Lending Partners, Inc., got $50 million. I don’t 

know who they are. The Community Builders, Inc., got $78.6 milVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:40 May 31, 2011 Jkt 065670 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\65670.TXT TERRIE
22 

lion. Chicanos por la Causa, Inc., got $137 million, $137 million. I 

don’t know who they are. 

The Inspector General of HUD already identified numerous misuses of NSP money at the State level and the Government Accountability Office has questioned the information system in place that 

HUD used to track the money. There is very little hard evidence 

on whether the funds are being used by the recipients in a costefficient manner. 

I guess the question I have is, the new proposed budget deficit 

is $1.6 trillion. This program is allocated for $7 billion. Is there any 

mechanism that requires repayment of these funds to the Federal 

Government? Can anybody answer that? 

Ms. MARQUEZ. These are grant funds. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. They are grant funds to be repaid 

to the groups who buy the houses, rehab the houses, and sell the 

houses. So what we are saying is, we are giving $7 billion of taxpayers’ money to groups and organizations out here and to cities 

and none of it comes back to the Federal Government? 

Ms. MARQUEZ. The money is going to homeowners and to American citizens. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. There is a repayment of the funds 

to the group. So you are telling me if a group buys a foreclosed 

home and they rehab the home, they just give the house away? 

Ms. MARQUEZ. I would be happy to discuss it. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. Yes. 

Ms. MARQUEZ. The NSP program is in three phases. The formulas you speak about, formula program in NSP1 and in NSP3, 

as—spoke about, are done by formula. It takes into account— 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. That is not the question. I have 

talked about that. Where does the money go when it is repaid? Is 

this just a gift? 

Ms. MARQUEZ. When the money is repaid, it is calculated the 

way other community development programs are done. In fact, it 

mirrors the CDBG program, which uses it as program income. So, 

for instance— 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. But wait a minute. We don’t give 

CDBG program money to—we didn’t give $50 million to Neighborhood Lending Partners, we did not give $78 million to Community 

Builders, we did not give $137 million Chicanos por la Causa, Inc. 

Ms. MARQUEZ. In fact, sir, I guess I would say that we allocate 

money through communities, like NSP does with CDBG. CDBG 

does the same thing, we allocate to the grantees and the grantees 

have the discretion and the flexibility to then grant funds or lend 

funds to various sub-recipients. 

It is probably true that if I were to check the records, I am pretty 

sure the Community Builders actually does receive money from 

CDBG from various States. And in fact, Chicanos por la Causa or 

these different groups run them through NSP2 and they are national groups. So they are doing work in multiple States. 

So what they are doing is all throughout the country. Chicanos 

por la Causa— 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. But there is a big difference between 

taking and making sure boarded-up houses are off the marketplace, 

23 

rehabbed and sold, putting new people in there, then just giving $7 

billion worth of government funds away. 

And that is what we are doing, we are giving $7 billion worth 

of taxpayer dollars away to groups and organizations and there is 

no requirement for repayment. But in the bill, there is an opportunity for them to buy the property and sell the property. And the 

money goes back to them. It goes back to them. Mr. Stevens, do 

you have anything to add to that? 

Mr. STEVENS. Congressman, I—under my authority, it is Assistant Secretary Marquez. 

Mr. MILLER OF CALIFORNIA. I think it is a huge, enormous waste 

of taxpayer dollars to put $7 billion out there, giving some—they 

can say nonprofits, whatever you want to call it, the opportunity 

to receive the funds. I don’t think there is adequate oversight over 

those funds, and if they sell the property to take the funds back 

and keep those funds. 

A program like this should have been used for the purpose of 

making sure that foreclosed properties were taken off the market, 

if that was the intent, rehab them, sell them, then the money 

comes back to the Federal Government. But this government has 

to stop giving the taxpayers’ monies away like we are today. We 

don’t have $7 billion to keep throwing out there today. We just 

don’t have it. 

And if we are going to do something like this, it should be done 

in the form of a loan basis, not a grant, and especially when I don’t 

think the grant was equitably distributed to the different groups 

out there. 

I yield back. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Hurt, is recognized. 

Mr. HURT. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

Welcome, to all of the witnesses. 

Mr. Barofsky, are you familiar with an article that was written 

in The Washington Times this morning that talked about a survey 

that was conducted by a group called ProPublica? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. I haven’t read The Washington Times article. I 

am familiar with ProPublica’s survey they did of HAMP recipients. 

Is that— 

Mr. HURT. That is the one—that is the subject that I am talking 

about. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Oh, no, absolutely. We actually cited to it in 

our—one of our most recent quarterly reports. 

Mr. HURT. Okay. And what was remarkable to me was their projection that during the progress of the HAMP program, that recipients were told to fall behind in order to qualify for the HAMP help. 

Based on their calculations, they figured that 500,000 of those 

who received the HAMP program assistance actually were told 

that. 

I wondered if you would comment on that and surmise as to 

whether or not you think that estimate is correct. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. I can’t speak on whether that estimate is correct 

or not. But it doesn’t surprise me. 

24 

This has been one of the inherent problems of this program, is 

that the mortgage servicers entrusted with this program have done 

an abysmal job. There is universal agreement on this. 

But Treasury has done nothing to punish or penalize these 

servicers. 

So what you have is a program where these servicers routinely 

violate the rules, routinely violate the guidelines that—they are not 

supposed to ever tell a homeowner, oh, by the way, you should stop 

making payments. That is a direct violation of the rules. 

But we hear anecdotally time after time that this has happened. 

So what is the Treasury Department’s role in this? They are enabling this behavior by not imposing financial penalties, by not trying to call back funds, by not denying servicer payments. But they 

do nothing—one of the reasons why I think— 

Mr. HURT. You could argue that the person they are trying to 

help is the one who gets hurt the most because you could argue 

that certainly some of these folks might not have gotten into the 

modification program if they had not been told to miss a payment 

so they could qualify for assistance. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Which is, again, why, when Treasury cites as a 

success of this program the 1.4 or 1.5, now, million homeowners 

who have received trial, temporary modifications, and say that they 

have all received a benefit, why, that just is so dead wrong, because there are so many who have suffered as a result of this program and had the rug pulled out from under them. 

Mr. HURT. Are there other examples of underhanded or wrong 

encouragement that was given by servicers, other than the—that 

the proposal that you fail to pay your mortgage so that you can 

qualify for the program? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. We have heard and we have reported on, from 

our hotline, all sorts of different behavior. Losing documentation is 

one of the most common errors. 

Whether intentional or not, we have had homeowners who can 

document that their paperwork has been lost, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 times. 

And then they are pulled out of the program. They are kicked out 

of the program, even though they have made every payment on 

time. 

They are hit, as the Chair said, they are hit not just with a bill 

for all of the difference between their trial payments and the 

amount original done, but late fees. Homeowners are being hit with 

late fees. 

And Treasury permits this in their program, late fees, when they 

have never actually missed a payment. And all that— 

Mr. HURT. But they are paying the reduced—paying the trial 

modification amount? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. But so they—right, right. So they make all those 

payments, but not only do they get hit with the difference but with 

the late fees. 

Mr. HURT. Right. 

Mr. BAROFSKY. Which Treasury allows. And then the servicer 

tacks all of that onto the mortgage balance. And they get that 

money first when there is a foreclosure. 

Or if it goes into one of these proprietary modifications, they are 

vastly inferior. 

25 

And I find it puzzling that Treasury continues to cite this as the 

success of the HAMP program when they cite these proprietary 

modifications so adoringly when they would never qualify. 

They would be rejected— 

Mr. HURT. My time is about to expire. But I would love it if either Ms. Marquez or Mr. Stevens would like to comment on what 

he has stated, in terms of the—what I would say fraudulent behavior. 

Is there anything you want to add to that for those estimates? 

Mr. STEVENS. Again, I would encourage you to work with the Department of the Treasury that manages the HAMP program. I am 

not well-versed enough in the details of those comments. 

Mr. SCIRE. If I could add, we reported last year about concerns 

on equitable treatment of borrowers. And a borrower need not be 

delinquent to be considered for a HAMP modification. 

They could be current, but as a servicer must then consider 

whether or not the borrower is in imminent danger of default, we 

recommended that Treasury establish criteria for making that determination. 

And Treasury has not done so. We found, of the 10 servicers we 

visited, they had 7 different definitions for determining whether a 

borrower who was current should be considered for HAMP. 

Mr. HURT. I thank the witnesses. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. 

I thank the witnesses as well. 

I suppose I am the only person in the room who is not surprised 

that we have a program that is not perfect. Imperfect program. The 

question really is, who do you punish if the program isn’t perfect? 

Do you punish the people who can benefit from the program by 

eliminating it? Or do you try to find a means by which the imperfect can be perfected? Who do you punish? 

Mr. Barofsky, you don’t advocate punishing the homebuyers, do 

you? 

Mr. BAROFSKY. We have advocated tirelessly that Treasury 

should fix the program. 

Mr. GREEN. Fix the program. Thank you, sir. Please, I don’t 

mean to be rude, crude, and unrefined, but I have much to say and 

little time to say it. 

Fix the program. Does any one among you advocate punishing 

the homeowners by ending the program? Let the record reflect that 

not one person advocates ending the program and punishing the 

homeowners. 

Ms. JONES. I do have to say that CRS doesn’t advocate any position— 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, but for your edification, there are persons who will distort what has been said here today, but for what 

I am doing right now, I have to do my job. And my job is to make 

sure that those who want to be set free by knowing the truth will 

be free. If you know it, it will free you. And I want to free some 

souls. 

The people who are damaged, who are to be helped by these programs, many of whom were pushed into subprime loans, who qualiVerDate Nov 24 2008 17:40 May 31, 2011 Jkt 065670 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 K:\DOCS\65670.TXT TERRIE
26 

fied for prime loans by the yield spread premium—for those who 

don’t know, the yield spread premium said simply, you qualify a 

person for a 5 percent loan and if you can get them to take out an 

8 percent loan, you will get a lawful kickback. 

That was what took place at the time many of these loans were 

being made. And many people were pushed into subprime loans 

who qualified for prime loans, 3/27, 2/28, bearable rates. 

Qualified for the bearable rate but didn’t qualify for the adjusted 

rate. Teaser rates that coincided with prepayment penalties. If you 

try to get out of the loan, you have to pay this huge penalty that 

they could not afford. 

So let’s not kid ourselves. 

We have a lot of people who were victims of a system that allowed these kinds of dastardly products to not only manifest themselves but to become a part of the broader market and be sold and 

securitized, credit default swaps, the list can go on and on of the 

things that were occurring at the time. 

So we have to ask ourselves the question, who do we punish? Do 

we punish the people who can benefit from the programs by terminating them? Or do we do what we do when we have a problem 

with a military program, we fix it. 

We fix the problem. When we sell $200 toilet seats, we fix it. 

When we sell $100 hammers, we fix it. Why not fix this? 

When we have a problem in a police department, we don’t say 

we are going to end the police department. We fix the problem and 

continue to have the police on the beat. 

Who do we punish? Do we punish the people who can benefit by 

terminating the program? Name me one perfect bill that has ever 

been passed in Congress, other than the ones that I—of course. 

The point is, my dear friends, let’s assume for the record that all 

that you have said is true. You don’t set the policy. That is our job. 

Does everybody agree with that? 

If there is a person among you who thinks that you set policy, 

raise your hand so that you can be properly terminated. All right. 

You don’t set policy. 

We set policy. And in setting policy, we have to make tough decisions. The easy decision is to eliminate something that we don’t 

like. The tough decision is to work together, bipartisanship, come 

up with a means by which that which is unacceptable can work for 

the American people. This is what the American people expect of 

us. 

We have helped Wall Street. We have helped Main Street. Now 

it is time for us to help Home Street. These are dollars for homeowners. Let’s help Home Street. 

And my final question is this, my time has ended, but maybe I 

can get a quick answer. 

Have any of you done any studies on the impact of this nationally, ending all of these programs at the same time, at the time of 

the crisis we are going through? Anybody? Anybody? 

Ms. MARQUEZ. Not of all of them. 

Mr. GREEN. Okay. All right. Thank you very much. I yield back 

the balance of my time that I do not have. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Thank you very much. 

27 

I would like to ask unanimous consent to insert in the record 

written testimony of the American Alliance of Home Modification 

Professionals. 

We have just been called for another vote—timing is perfect, I 

guess, here. 

Let me note that some members may have— 

Mr. GUTIERREZ. —if you have time, I would like to continue. I 

think it is important. And we are not coming back. 

Chairwoman BIGGERT. Yes. We missed the last vote—we were 

able to get in—so I would prefer to adjourn. I would just note that 

members may have additional questions for these witnesses which 

they may wish to submit in writing. Without objection, the hearing 

record will remain open for 30 days for members to submit written 

questions to the witnesses and to place their responses in the 

record. 

[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

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