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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JERVIS LAVERN GOODRICH, : No. 4:CV-04-1603

:

Plaintiff : (Judge Jones)

:

v. :

:

STEPHEN WILCOX, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

July 13, 2005

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

Pending before the Court is a document entitled “Requesting Change of

Venue” (doc. 10) filed by Plaintiff Jervis Lavern Goodrich (“Plaintiff” or

“Goodrich”) on June 28, 2005. For the reasons that follow, we will construe

Plaintiff’s submission as a Motion to Recuse and deny the Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On July 22, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District

Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against Pennsylvania State Troopers

Stephen Wilcox and Christopher Soo pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Rec.

Doc. 1). In the complaint, Goodrich alleges that on September 10, 2002,

Defendants Wilcox and Soo made an unlawful investigatory stop of an automobile

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at 11:19 p.m. Additionally, Goodrich asserts that due to the illegal stop, his fiancé

at the time, Malissa Kinne, and himself were subjected to an illegal search and

seizure, false arrest, harassment, and illegal incarceration. Goodrich alleges that he

and his fiancé were not given their Miranda warnings and were subjected to Fourth

and Fifth Amendment violations. On April 1, 2005, Plaintiff filed an amended

complaint in which he added two defendants, Pennsylvania State Troopers Richard

Davy and Kevin Patterson. (See Rec. Doc. 8). 

On June 28, 2005 Goodrich submitted a document entitled “Requesting A

Change of Venue,” which is the subject of this Order.

DISCUSSION:

In Goodrich’s submission to the Court of June 28, 2005, he states that he

requests a change of venue based upon the fact that the undersigned presided over

Goodrich’s previous criminal case, United States v. Jervis Laverne Goodrich,

4:CR-03-36, which was tried by a jury. On August 10, 2004, a jury found

Goodrich guilty on Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and

864(a)(1), conspiracy to manufacture and distribute controlled substances and theft

of anhydrous ammonia, and not guilty on Counts 3 and 4. The jury found that

Goodrich was an organizer or leader of a criminal conspiracy, that there was an

unlawful discharge of a hazardous or toxic substance, and that the offense involved

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the unlawful transportation and storage of a hazardous waste. On June 10, 2005,

the Court sentenced Goodrich to 71 months on each of Counts 1 and 2 to be served

concurrently and 6 years supervised release, 6 years on Count 1 and 3 years on

Count 2, to be served concurrently. On June 15, 2005, Goodrich appealed his

sentence to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.

Goodrich’s reasons for requesting a “change of venue” include feeling

uncomfortable due to recent proceedings, a conflict of interest between himself and

the undersigned, and prejudice or bias that will “undoubtedly [sic] occure [sic] if it

hasn’t already.” (See Rec. Doc. 10). We will construe Goodrich’s submission as a

Motion to Recuse as he is requesting that the undersigned recuse himself from the

above-captioned case.

There are two statutory provisions that address recusal: 28 U.S.C. §§ 144

and 455. The two statutory provisions have been deemed in pari materia so that

the test for disqualification is similar under both sections. See, e.g., United States

v. Gittman, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9587, *6 (E.D. Pa. 1989); United States v.

Romano, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12257, *4 (E.D. Pa. 1988). To warrant recusal

under § 144, the motion and affidavit must allege a factual basis for a finding of

extrajudicial bias. The judge must harbor actual bias against the litigant that is not

derived from the evidence or conduct of the parties which the judge observes in the

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course of the proceedings. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir.

1980). Section 455 requires a judge to recuse himself in any proceeding in which

“his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Third

Circuit Court of Appeals has instructed that the above language has been

interpreted to mean that “a judge should recuse himself where a reasonable man

knowing all of the circumstances would harbor doubts concerning the judge’s

impartiality.” United States. v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1983). 

Section 455 also requires a judge to recuse himself where he as a “personal bias or

prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts

concerning the proceeding[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 

The Supreme Court instructed in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540

(1994), that opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events

occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not

constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated

favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Id. at 555. 

“Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving

of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a

bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives

from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree

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of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.” SecuraComm

Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2000)(quoting

Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555). 

In addition, courts of appeal have explained that familiarity with a defendant

and/or facts of a case from earlier participation in judicial proceedings is not

sufficient to disqualify the judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a) and (b). In re

Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 614 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1980)(The

evidentiary findings made by the judge did not disqualify him on the merits

because there were no allegations of personal bias based on extrajudicial sources as

required by 28 U.S.C. § 144. Therefore judge’s impartiality to preside over civil

antitrust trial cannot be questioned even though judge presided over criminal trial

and ruled that there was sufficient independent evidence of conspiracy to permit

jury’s consideration of statement of coconspirator.); see also Katsaros v. Cody, 744

F.2d 270 (2nd Cir. 1984)(In action arising under Employee Retirement Income

Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., and concerning mishandling of

pension trust funds, judge is not obligated to recuse himself simply on basis that he

presided at criminal trial of one of defendants arising out of defendant’s activities

as trustee of pension fund in question, since recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) for

bias or prejudice is required only if information or knowledge possessed by judge

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stems from extrajudicial source, and is not applied to knowledge acquired by judge

while he performs judicial duties.). 

After a careful review of the record in the case sub judice, including

Goodrich’s sentencing before the Court, we conclude without hesitation that none

of Goodrich’s purported bases for recusal mandate recusal of the undersigned

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455. We note that Goodrich submitted his Motion to

Recuse a short period of time after he received his sentence in the criminal matter

previously addressed. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated

that a party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for

recusal and we reiterate that principle at this juncture. See SecuraComm

Consulting, Inc., 224 F.3d at 278; see also In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613, 728

(3d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat’l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350, 1356 (3d Cir. 199).

 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse is denied.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

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1. Goodrich’s submission entitled “Requesting A Change of Venue,”

(doc. 10) which the Court construed as a Motion to Recuse, is

DENIED.

s/ John E. Jones III

John E. Jones III

United States District Judge

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