[Cite as State v. Brooks, 2023-Ohio-3986.]

COURT OF APPEALS

RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO

Plaintiff-Appellee

-vsLADASIA BROOKS

Defendant-Appellant

JUDGES:

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.

Hon. John W. Wise, J.

Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

Case No. 2019 CA 0104

O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 2018 CR 0832

JUDGMENT: Reversed and Remanded

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: November 2, 2023

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

DAVE YOST KATHERINE R. ROSS-KINZIE

OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER

ANDREA K. BOYD 250 East Broad Street

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL Suite 1400

30 East Broad Street, 23rd Floor Columbus, Ohio 43215

Columbus, Ohio 43215
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 2

Wise, J.

{¶1} This matter is before this Court on limited remand from the Supreme Court 

of Ohio.

Procedural History and Remand

{¶2} In State v. Ladasia Brooks, 5th Dist. Richland App. No. 2019 CA 0104, 2020-

Ohio-4123, Appellant appealed her convictions on aggravated burglary, burglary, assault, 

domestic violence, and criminal damaging to this Court. In her appeal, Appellant argued, 

inter alia, the trial court deprived her a fair trial when it applied the version of R.C. 

§2901.05, the self-defense statute, which was in effect at the time the offenses occurred, 

rather than the amended statute in effect at the time of trial which contained burdenshifting changes. This Court found that the burden-shifting changes contained in the 

newer version of R.C. §2901.05 did not apply retroactively and found that the trial court 

properly instructed the jury as to Appellant’s self-defense claim.

{¶3} The Ohio Supreme Court accepted a discretionary appeal and a certified 

conflict as to the application of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228 and found that “H.B. 228 applies to 

all trials conducted on or after its effective date of March 28, 2019, irrespective of when 

the underlying alleged criminal conduct occurred.”

{¶4} In addressing the arguments before it, the Supreme Court found:

The state also argues that because Brooks claimed she was not 

trespassing when she entered Myers’s home, she may not assert a selfdefense claim. Although the state raised this argument in the court of 

appeals and seemingly in the trial court, it was not addressed by the court 

of appeals. Since we accepted jurisdiction in this case to answer a 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 3

proposition of law and a certified conflict question about the applicability of 

House Bill 228 to a defendant’s trial and nothing more, we will not address 

the state’s argument but instead remand the case to the court of appeals 

for it to address that argument. 

{¶5} State v. Ladasia Brooks, 170 Ohio St.3d 1, 2022-Ohio-2478, at ¶22.

{¶6} The Court found that, “if, as the state has argued, Brooks was not entitled 

to a self-defense claim, then the error that is the subject of the certified question would 

be harmless.” Id. at ¶ 24. The Supreme Court then remanded the case back to this Court 

to “consider whether Brooks was entitled to a self-defense claim.” Id. at ¶24. 

{¶7} Initially, we note that the issue of whether or not Appellant was entitled to a 

self-defense instruction was not assigned as error and therefore not addressed in the 

original appeal.1 However, based on the Supreme Court’s instructions to this Court to 

consider same, we shall therefore endeavor to do so now. 

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶8} For purposes of this limited remand, a review of the facts and procedural 

history are as follows:

{¶9} On September 20, 2018, Appellant Ladasia Brooks was indicted with a sixcount indictment: Count One: Aggravated Burglary, a felony of the first-degree, in violation 

of R.C. §2925.11(A)(1); Count Two: Burglary, a felony of the second-degree, in violation 

of R.C. §2911.12(A)(1); Count Three: Possession of Criminal Tools, a felony of the fifthdegree, in violation of R.C. §2923.24(A); Count Four: Assault, a misdemeanor of the first 

1 The state of Ohio did not file a cross-assignment of error, either in this Court or the Ohio 

Supreme Court, challenging the trial court’s decision to instruct the jury on self-defense. 

Therefore, this issue was never before this Court in the original appeal.
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 4

degree, in violation of R.C. §2903.13(A); Count Five: Domestic Violence, a misdemeanor 

of the first degree, in violation of R.C. §2919.25(A); Count Six: Criminal Damaging, a 

misdemeanor of the second-degree, in violation of R.C. §2909.06(A)(1). 

{¶10} At trial, the State presented the following testimony and evidence:

{¶11} Daniel Myers testified he and Appellant have a five-year-old child together. 

(T. at 250-251). Mr. Myers broke off his relationship with Appellant in May of 2018. (T. at 

250-253). Up until June 5, 2018, the last contact that Mr. Myers had with Appellant was 

to talk about a birthday party for their daughter several weeks prior to the incident. (T. at

256). 

{¶12} On June 5, 2018, the day before their daughter's birthday, Mr. Myers was 

living at his mother's house at 232 Bartley Avenue in Mansfield, Ohio. (T. at 257). Mr. 

Myers' mother, Alicia Randolph, had locked the door when she left for work that morning. 

(T. at 421). Mr. Myers was sleeping in bed with his girlfriend Stephanie Price when he 

woke up to find Appellant standing in his bedroom. (T. at 261). Appellant then began 

attacking Ms. Price by striking her in the head and pulling her hair. (T. at 261, 263, 353, 

355, 452). 

{¶13} Mr. Randolph, Mr. Myers' stepfather, testified that he heard yelling and went 

to Mr. Myers' room with a baseball bat for protection. (T. at 394). Mr. Myers and Mr. 

Randolph attempted to get Appellant off of Ms. Price. (T. at 261, 264). Appellant then 

began attacking Mr. Myers and bit his ear, causing it to bleed. (T. at 261, 277-278, 362). 

Once Mr. Randolph got Appellant off of Mr. Myers, she fled. Id. As Appellant fled, she 

grabbed Mr. Myers’ wallet and stole $70. (T. at 265). Mr. Randolph was able to take a 

picture of Appellant as she fled down the stairs. (T. at 266-267). Mr. Myers testified that 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 5

no one had given Appellant permission to be in the home on June 5, 2019. (T. at 253-

255, 261-262).

{¶14} After Appellant fled the house, Mr. Myers went downstairs and locked the 

door for fear that she might return. (T. at 269). Mr. Randolph was able to take two pictures 

of Appellant as she came back to his house shortly after she fled. (T. at 273). These 

pictures show Appellant holding the $70 that she had just stolen from Mr. Myers' wallet. 

Appellant came back to the door and punched the window in the door, breaking it. (T. at

274). After Appellant left the second time, Ms. Price went to the convenience store where 

her friend, Amy Picheco, worked and told her what happened. Ms. Picheco then called 

Police. (T. at 277, 358).

{¶15} A year prior to the incident, Mr. Myers' mother, Alicia Randolph, who owns 

the house, told Appellant that she was no longer welcome in the house after she punched 

holes in the wall. (T. at 416). Also, in the previous year, Appellant attacked Mr. Myers at 

his job with mace. (T. at 455-456). Approximately three months prior to the June 5 

incident, Mrs. Randolph caught Appellant in her home and again told her she was not 

welcome and to never return. (T. at 417). Approximately two weeks prior to the incident, 

Appellant entered the residence and stole Mr. Myers' dog. (T. at 390). Jackie Randolph, 

Mr. Myers' stepfather, called Appellant and told her to return the dog. Id. When she 

returned, Mr. Randolph confronted Appellant for taking his dog. (T. at 39). Appellant then 

produced a can of mace and told him to come out to the street. Id. Since the dog was 

back in his house and Appellant had brought her daughter with her, Mr. Randolph went 

back into is home. Id. Appellant threatened Mrs. Randolph and said that she would come 

to the house anytime she wanted. (T. at 418).
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 6

{¶16} On June 5, 2018, Mr. Myers was seen by a physician, Dr. Revill, and was 

treated for a human bite wound to his left ear. (T. at 238, 245). Mr. Myers told Dr. Revill 

that the injury came from being bitten by Appellant. (T. at 245). To treat the injury, Mr. 

Myers was given a tetanus shot and prescribed the antibiotic Augmentin. (T. at 238-239). 

{¶17} Ms. Price did not have health insurance so she did not seek medical 

attention. (T. at 356- 357). Ms. Price' head hurt for two weeks preventing her from taking 

showers. (T. at 357). Ms. Price took Advil for the pain, but it did not help. (T. at 367-368). 

After the incident, Ms. Price felt afraid to be around Mr. Myers for fear that Appellant would 

attack her again, so she ended their relationship. (T. at 369).

{¶18} Appellant testified at trial and claimed that on May 28, 2018, Mr. Myers had 

threatened to shoot her, and she filed a police report. (T. at 530-531). Appellant admitted 

to entering Mr. Myers' house through a door but claimed that she had Mr. Myers' 

permission to be there. (T. at 500-501). Appellant also admitted to getting into a "tussle" 

with Mr. Myers and stated that she only bit him after he bit her on the arm first and that 

he had her pinned down on the bed by her wrists when she bit him. (T. at 505-506). 

{¶19} Appellant testified that Myers’ step-father then came in to the room and hit 

her in the left knee with a baseball bat. (T. at 507-508). Appellant further testified that she 

and Ms. Price then got into a physical altercation. (T. at 508-509). She testified that she 

threw “Stephanie from here to here so I could get to the door and get out because I didn’t 

know what was going to happen next or who was going to attack me or was my baby 

going to get hurt. So I fought with Stephanie and got myself to the door.” (T. at 509). She 

further testified that she was afraid for herself and her unborn baby, and explained she 

was scared “[b]ecause I didn’t know if Daniel – you know, if he would bite me ... And he 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 7

was there with a baseball bat. I didn’t know if it was to hit me. I didn’t know what Stephanie 

was thinking. So I was scared because I didn’t know what they were going to do to me. 

There were three of them and one of me.” (T. at 536).

{¶20} Appellant stated that she accidently broke the window on the door when 

she was banging on it because she had left her sandal in the house. (T. at 511).

{¶21} During trial, the State dismissed Count Three. 

{¶22} On October 11, 2019, Appellant was found guilty of the remaining counts. 

The trial court sentenced Appellant to seven (7) years in prison on the aggravated 

burglary. The court also imposed concurrent terms of seven (7) years for the burglary, six 

(6) months for the assault, six (6) months for domestic violence, and ninety (90) days for 

criminal damaging, for a combined total of seven (7) years in prison. Appellant was also 

given seven days of jail credit and ordered to pay $7 in restitution.

{¶23} The issue now before this Court on remand is:

{¶24} I. WAS APPELLANT ENTITLED TO A SELF-DEFENSE CLAIM?

I.

{¶25} Upon review, we find that Appellant was entitled to a self-defense 

instruction.

Self Defense under R.C. §2901.05

{¶26} To support a claim of self-defense involving the use of non-deadly force, a 

defendant must show that “(1) he/she was not at fault in creating the situation giving rise 

to the affray; (2) he/she had reasonable grounds to believe or an honest belief that he or 

she was in imminent danger of bodily harm, and (3) he/she did not use more force than 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 8

was reasonably necessary to defend against the imminent danger of bodily harm.” State 

v. Paskins, 200 N.E.3d 684, 2022-Ohio-4024, ¶ 48 (5th Dist.). 

{¶27} In State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, the Ohio 

Supreme Court clarified the burden of proof where a defendant asserts a claim of selfdefense under the version of the statute that became effective March 28, 2019. It 

recognized that “R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) triggers the state's duty to disprove self-defense so 

long as ‘there is evidence presented that tends to support that the accused person used 

the force in self-defense’ ” - a burden that is not all that heavy. Id. at ¶ 20, 22 (“The 

reference in R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) to ‘evidence presented that tends to support’ self-defense 

indicates that the defendant's burden of production is not a heavy one and that it might 

even be satisfied through the state's own evidence.”). As such, “a defendant charged with 

an offense involving the use of force has the burden of producing legally sufficient 

evidence that the defendant's use of force was in self-defense.” Id. at ¶ 25. “[I]f the 

defendant's evidence and any reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a 

rational trier of fact to find all the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the 

light most favorable to the defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden,” and 

the state must then disprove self-defense. Id. at ¶ 25. In that case, “the sufficiency-of-theevidence standard of review applies to [the defendant's] burden of production and a 

manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review applies to the state's burden of 

persuasion.” Id. at ¶ 26.

Standard of Appellate Review

{¶28} While the abuse of discretion standard has traditionally been applied when 

reviewing the propriety of giving a particular instruction, this standard is not applicable in 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 9

light of the language of the self-defense statute, R.C. §2901.05, and its recent 

interpretation by the Ohio Supreme Court. The Ohio Supreme Court has expressly 

declared the sufficiency standard in State v. Messenger, supra: “the sufficiency-of-theevidence standard of review applies to [the defendant's] burden of production [that he 

was acting in self-defense] and a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review 

applies to the state's burden of persuasion [that he was not acting in self-defense].” Id. at 

¶ 26; State v. Asp, 2023-Ohio-290, 207 N.E.3d 893, ¶ 56 (5th Dist.).

{¶29} The standard has also been described as de novo. State v. Robinette, 

2023-Ohio-5, 205 N.E.3d 633, ¶ 39 (5th Dist.); State v. Sullivan, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 

2019-L-143 and Lake Nos. 2019-L-144, 2020 WL 1847387, 2020-Ohio-1439, ¶ 33 

(“[b]ecause sufficiency is a question of law, ‘[o]ur standard of review for determining 

whether the trial court properly refused to give a jury instruction is de novo’ ”) (citation 

omitted). Regardless of whether it is described as a sufficiency or a de novo standard, 

what is essential for appellate review is that, “if the defendant's evidence and any 

reasonable inferences about that evidence would allow a rational trier of fact to find all 

the elements of a self-defense claim when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

defendant, then the defendant has satisfied the burden.” Messenger at ¶ 25. The 

Supreme Court has also recognized that the defendant's burden is not a demanding one: 

“[t]he reference in R.C. 2901.05(B)(1) to ‘evidence presented that tends to support’ selfdefense indicates that the defendant's burden of production is not a heavy one and that 

it might even be satisfied through the state's own evidence.” Id. at ¶ 22.

{¶30} Thus, under the law as currently written, the trial judge assumes the role of 

a gate-keeper to determine whether evidence was presented from any source that tends 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 10

to support that the accused person used the force in self-defense, defense of another, or 

defense of that person's residence. However, when exercising its gate keeper function to 

determine whether the jury should be instructed on self-defense, the trial court should 

only concern itself with whether the evidence produced at trial “tends to support” that 

Appellant used force in self-defense. If it has, then the jury must decide whether the state 

has disproved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused person used the force in selfdefense, defense of another, or defense of that person's residence. State v. Robinette, 

5th Dist. No. 2021 CA 00124, 2023-Ohio-5, 205 N.E.3d 633.

{¶31} Under the present version of the law, whether she ultimately used or did not 

use force in self-defense is a question of fact for the jury to decide after hearing the 

evidence, judging the credibility of the witnesses and receiving proper instructions on the 

law from the trial court. Id.

Analysis

{¶32} Here, we are tasked with deciding whether evidence was presented that 

tends to support that Appellant used force in self-defense.

{¶33} In this case, for the purpose of determining whether Appellant was entitled 

to a self-defense instruction, the relevant evidence is as follows: Appellant testified that 

she had permission from Mr. Myers to come in to the house to get money for her 

daughter’s birthday trip to the zoo. (T. at 499-500). She further testified that on the date 

of the incident she had personal belongings including clothes, toiletries, her credit card, 

and her social security card in the home. (T. at 497-498, 499-500, 501-502, 509-510). 

She stated that she only went in to the house to collect the money, not with an intent to 

commit any offense. Id. She testified that when she entered his room, Mr. Myers jumped 
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 11

out of bed and grabbed her arms, and then, while holding her down on the bed with her 

arms pinned at her sides, Mr. Myers bit her. (T. at 502, 505-506). She stated that she 

then bit him to make him let her go. Id. She stated that Mr. Myers’ stepfather then came 

into the room with a baseball bat and hit her with it. (T. at 507-509). She explained that 

she got into a physical altercation with Mr. Myers’ girlfriend, Stephanie Price, as she was 

trying to get away and out of the room, away from Mr. Myers’ stepfather and the baseball 

bat. Id. She also testified that she was scared for herself and her unborn baby because 

there were three people against her in that room. (T. at 536).

{¶34} Conflicting testimony was also presented concerning whether Appellant 

had permission to enter the residence. However, if there is conflicting evidence, the 

instruction must be given. State v. Davidson-Dixon, supra ¶20; State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 110673, 2022-Ohio-2577, 2022 WL 2981506, ¶10. The defendant's 

testimony alone can be *evidence that tends to support that he used force in self-defense. 

See, State v. Sullivan, supra, 2020-Ohio-1439, ¶45; State v. Belanger, supra, 190 Ohio 

App.3d 377, 941 N.E.2d 1265 at ¶6

{¶35} This evidence, when construed in Appellant's favor, tends to support her

claim that she used force in self-defense. Accordingly, it was necessary, not discretionary, 

for the trial court to instruct the jury as to the elements of self-defense. 

{¶36} Based on the foregoing, we answer the issue on remand, whether Appellant 

was entitled to an instruction on self-defense, in the affirmative.
Richland County, Case No. 2019 CA 0104 12

{¶37} Accordingly, this matter is reversed and remanded to the Richland County 

Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings consistent with the law and this opinion.

By: Wise, J.

Hoffman, P. J., and

Baldwin, J., concur.

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