FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

JANUARY 10, 2002

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

*

Honorable R. Kenton Musgrave, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade,

sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 00-11105 

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 97-14106-CV-EBD 

JOHN ANGUS WRIGHT,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT 

OF CORRECTIONS, Michael W. Moore,

Respondent-Appellee.

__________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Florida 

_________________________

(January 10, 2002)

Before EDMONDSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and MUSGRAVE*

, Judge. 
2

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Fifteen and a half years ago, John Angus Wright robbed a bank in Stuart,

Florida. While he and his confederates in the crime were fleeing, one of them fired

shots at an innocent civilian. As a result of his criminal activity on that day,

Wright was later convicted in state court of two counts of armed robbery and one

count of third degree felony murder, and he was sentenced to consecutive life

sentences for the robberies and to five years on the attempted murder. 

During the intervening years, Wright’s efforts to have his conviction and

sentence set aside in the courts of Florida have proved unavailing. His attempt to

gain federal habeas relief has been rebuffed by the district court, and this is the

appellate part of that proceeding. The case comes to us on a certificate of

appealability presenting two issues: 1) whether the trial court’s failure to conduct

a competency hearing violated Wright’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due

process rights; and 2) whether Wright’s trial without a determination of his

competency to stand trial violated his Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. For 

reasons we will discuss, we answer both of those questions (after reformulating the

second one) in the negative and affirm the district court’s judgment.
3

I. BACKGROUND

A. THE FACTS OF THE CRIME

On August 8, 1986, John Angus Wright, George Jackson, and Lisa Morrison

drove to a gun store in Stuart, Florida, where Wright and Morrison purchased a

handgun. Wright himself paid for the weapon with cash. Later that day, Wright

and Jackson entered a bank in the same town while Morrison waited outside in the

car. Inside the bank, Wright, who was wearing a baseball cap and sunglasses, held

the tellers at gunpoint with his newly acquired weapon and ordered them to give

him money. He said: “Be calm, this is a robbery, give me all your money. I want

hundreds and fifties.” After they had collected cash from the tellers, Wright and

Jackson left the bank and fled the scene in the getaway car driven by Morrison. 

While fleeing, one or both of the men fired shots at a truck whose driver attempted

to block the parking lot exit. Law enforcement officers pursued and arrested

Wright, Jackson, and Morrison that same day. 

B. OTHER FACTS RELATING TO WRIGHT’S MENTAL STATE

In 1969, a decade and a half before the crime and trial in this case, Wright

had been charged with various offenses including robbery and carrying a

concealed weapon. Before he could be tried on those charges, however, he was

committed to South Florida State Hospital, where he was diagnosed as psychotic
4

and suffering from schizophrenia, and was found incompetent to stand trial. In

May of 1970, a doctor at South Florida State Hospital concluded that Wright’s

schizophrenia was in remission and that he was now “sane, knows the difference

between right and wrong, understands the nature of the charges and can assist

counsel in his defense.” The hospital recommended that Wright continue taking

anti-psychotic medications. 

Two other mental health experts evaluated Wright in June of 1970 and

agreed that although he had been unable to distinguish between right and wrong or

appreciate the consequences of his acts at the time of the offenses in September of

1969, he was at the time of their evaluations competent to stand trial. One of

those experts recommended that Wright continue his medication, and both of them

said that Wright should continue psychiatric treatment on a regular basis. 

As a result of the experts concluding that Wright was competent to stand

trial, he was tried on a charge of grand larceny but on July 1, 1970 was found not

guilty by reason of insanity on that charge. After that adjudication but before the

trial in this case, Wright was found guilty of robbery approximately seven different

times in seven different cases. The record does not indicate whether his

competency or sanity was questioned on any of those occasions.
5

Before the trial that led to the present proceeding began on January 19,

1987, defense counsel moved for appointment of a mental health expert to

determine Wright’s insanity at the time of the offense, and the trial court granted

the motion. On January 15, 1987, defense counsel filed a notice of intent to rely

upon the insanity defense. On that same day, defense counsel orally moved for the

appointment of two additional experts to determine Wright’s competence to stand

trial and to further develop his insanity defense, but the trial court denied that

motion. 

Defense counsel never requested that the trial court conduct a hearing on the

issue of whether Wright was mentally competent to stand trial. During the trial,

defense counsel did present testimony on the issue of Wright’s sanity at the time of

the crime which had occurred five months before trial. Fred J. Petrilla, Jr., Ph.D., a

psychologist who interviewed Wright on December 8, 1986, approximately five

weeks before trial, testified that Wright was a paranoid schizophrenic, was

clinically depressed, had a “great deal of psychopathy,” and suffered from

delusions of grandeur. He further testified that Wright’s schizophrenia was

chronic and recurrent, and that he had a need for treatment and continued care. 

Additionally, Dr. Petrilla testified that Wright, at the time of the offense, was
6

“actively psychotic,” had no appreciation for the consequences of his action, and

was unable to distinguish between right and wrong. 

Dr. Petrilla also informed the court and jury of Wright’s chronic drug and

alcohol abuse, including his abuse of the drug LSD, since the age of twelve. He 

testified about Wright’s family history of severe mental illness, including his

mother’s diagnosis of and hospitalization for schizophrenia and the psychological

care his sister had received. Finally, Dr. Petrilla noted Wright’s flat affect, lack of

eye contact, and twitching leg during his pretrial interview five weeks before, and

he remarked on Wright’s continued flat affect at trial. However, Dr. Petrilla also

testified that during his interview Wright had given responsive answers to

questions concerning his name, address, and “different things of those lines,” and

that Wright had told him that he entered the bank with another man and then

robbed it. Dr. Petrilla did not express an opinion about whether Wright was

competent to stand trial. 

The court and jury also heard testimony from Dr. Sanford Jacobson, a

psychiatrist who in 1969 had diagnosed Wright with chronic and recurrent

paranoid schizophrenia and had found him to be insane at the time of the events

leading to his arrest and incarceration that year in Dade County, Florida. Jacobson

testified to his recommendation in 1969 that Wright be committed to a state facility
7

for long-term hospitalization and treatment. He also testified, however, that he

had not seen Wright in seventeen years and was not able to render any opinion as

to Wright’s current mental health. 

The trial court admitted into evidence the 1970 report of Carl Marlowe, Jr.,

a psychiatrist who, after examining Wright in order to determine his sanity and

competency to stand trial in 1970, found that Wright had a schizophrenic

personality. Marlowe’s report stated that Wright had been unable to distinguish

between right and wrong and to know the nature and consequences of his acts at

that time, but that he possessed “the capacity to answer charges against him, aid in

his own defense and stand trial.” In other words, it had been Dr. Marlowe’s

opinion that at the time Wright stood trial in 1970 he was mentally competent to do

so. His report had recommended Wright’s continued psychiatric treatment,

supervision, and medication on a regular basis. 

During the trial in this case, defense counsel informed the trial court of the

prior court proceedings in which Wright had been found incompetent to stand trial

and not guilty by reason of insanity. While defense counsel presented the court

with several judgments, the court stated that they all appeared to be related to the

same case, at least one aspect of which resulted in Wright’s 1970 acquittal by

reason of insanity on grand larceny charges. The court admitted into evidence for
8

the jury’s consideration that judgment of acquittal by reason of insanity but not the

other judgments. Although not admitted into evidence for the jury to hear, records

of several of Wright’s convictions occurring after he had been found not guilty by

reason of insanity in 1970 were provided to the court. Those records showed that

Wright had been found guilty of robbery approximately seven times in seven

different cases. There is nothing before us to suggest that there was any indication

in the records that the trial court saw that Wright’s competency to stand trial had

ever been questioned on those occasions. 

In the State’s rebuttal case, the court and the jury heard testimony from

Lieutenant Art Jackson, supervisor of the maximum security section of the Martin

County Jail. Jackson testified that from five days after Wright’s arrest on August

8, 1986 until the trial began on January 19, 1987, he had escorted Wright every

Wednesday night to the law library located at the courthouse, where he saw Wright

advising other inmates, selecting law books for them, and discussing legal motions

with them. He told how, during that same five-month period, he had seen Wright

talk to guards and other inmates, watch TV, read books, and write various things,

including motions. According to Jackson, Wright was “a very alert person.” 

Jackson had heard Wright advise another inmate to fire his attorney, and had heard

him speak highly of his own attorney. 
9

Gerald Piastine, a correctional officer at the Martin County Jail, testified that

he saw Wright at least two to three times per week after Wright was first

incarcerated on these charges and up until the trial. He told how he had observed

Wright talking and playing cards with other inmates, as well as helping them with

their legal papers. Piastine also testified that Wright said he was teaching another

inmate English in return for that inmate teaching him Spanish. 

The jury rejected Wright’s not guilty by reason of insanity defense. He

was convicted on January 28, 1987 of two counts of armed robbery and one count

of attempted third degree felony murder. On March 27, 1987, Wright was

sentenced on those convictions to two consecutive life terms without possibility of

parole for the robberies, and a term of five years for the attempted murder, to be

served concurrently. 

In July and August of 1987, seven and eight months after Wright’s trial, two

mental health experts evaluated him and concluded that he was incompetent to

stand trial on another set of criminal charges pending against him in Palm Beach

County, Florida. A third mental health expert, Dr. Alejandro Villalobos, evaluated

him during this time period and also found that Wright “is incompetent to stand

trial, either because he is psychotic or because of a deliberate attempt to appear

incompetent.” On October 21, 1987, the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit
10

in Palm Beach County, Florida, accepting the opinions of those experts, deemed

Wright incompetent to stand trial and involuntarily committed him for psychiatric

care. After Wright had been treated, the Florida Department of Health and

Rehabilitative Services determined in July of 1988 that he had been restored to

competency. Once competent to proceed to trial, Wright pleaded nolo contendere

to the set of charges in Palm Beach County. 

C. THE DIRECT APPEAL AND OTHER POST-CONVICTION 

PROCEEDINGS

Wright appealed his January 1987 conviction and sentences to the District

Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in

failing to conduct a competency hearing to determine whether his sanity had been

restored by the time of trial; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion for

judgment of acquittal based upon the insanity defense; (3) the cumulative effect of

the prosecutorial misconduct as related to his insanity defense required that he

receive a new trial; and (4) the trial court erred in entering a written sentencing

order that differed from the court’s oral pronouncement. 

With regard to his first claim, Wright contended that the trial court’s failure

to conduct a competency hearing violated Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.210, as well as

Florida case law. He argued that because he previously had been found not guilty

by reason of insanity, and because the prosecution had failed to present evidence
11

prior to the commencement of trial that his sanity had been restored in the interim,

the trial court “had reasonable grounds to believe that [he] may not be competent to

stand trial . . . and . . . erred in not holding a competency hearing.” There was

initially some disagreement in the present proceeding about whether Wright had

argued this as a federal constitutional law claim as well as a state law violation, but

the State has now conceded that Wright did raise it as a federal constitutional issue. 

 In the appellate court, the State responded on the merits of the issue and did not

assert any procedural bar. 

In a two-sentence opinion, the state appellate court affirmed Wright’s

convictions and the sentences on the armed robbery counts, but remanded for

clarification as to whether the sentence on the attempted felony murder count was

to be served concurrently or consecutively. Wright v. State, 536 So. 2d 1072 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 1988). On remand, the trial court clarified that Wright’s sentence on

the attempted murder count was to be served concurrently with his life sentence on

the armed robbery count. 

On April 21, 1991, Wright filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850, claiming, among other things, that he had been

tried while he was mentally incompetent. He argued that his admittedly untimely

filing of his 3.850 motion, should be excused both because a mandamus
12

proceeding had intervened and because he had “virtually no memory of the crime

and only a hazy recollection of being at trial.” 

In August of 1991, the trial court dismissed Wright’s motion for postconviction relief because it had been filed more than two years after his

convictions became final. The court noted that belated motions are permissible

under certain circumstances, but found that Wright had failed to allege continuous

incompetency and memory loss from November 29, 1988 through April 1991. His

mental competency, the court noted, was evident from the fact that Wright had

himself filed four separate motions and one response during that time frame. 

Wright appealed the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. 

On March 18, 1992, the state appellate court issued an opinion that affirmed

the denial of Wright’s 3.850 motion as untimely with respect to his convictions and

sentences for the armed robbery counts. The motion was held to be timely,

however, as to the concurrent five-year sentence imposed for the attempted murder

conviction, and the court reversed the denial of relief on that sentence and

remanded for further proceedings. Wright v. State, 596 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1992). On remand, the trial court again denied the motion as to the attempted

felony murder sentence, and this time the appellate court affirmed the denial 
13

without written opinion. Wright v. State, 621 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.

1993).

In October 1991, while his appeal from the denial of his 3.850 motion was

pending, Wright filed in the Fourth District Court of Appeal a pro se state habeas

petition, alleging fourteen instances of ineffective assistance by his appellate

counsel. That petition was denied on December 4, 1991, and the Florida Supreme

Court dismissed Wright’s petition for review on February 10, 1992. Wright then

filed a pro se petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,

which was also denied. On July 17, 1996, Wright, proceeding pro se, petitioned

the Fourth District Court of Appeal for permission to apply for a writ of error

coram nobis as to the attempted third degree felony murder conviction, but that

court denied the application, and the Florida Supreme Court dismissed Wright’s

request for review of that denial. 

On March 31, 1997, Wright filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus

in federal district court, claiming, among other things, that the state trial court: (1)

violated his procedural due process rights under Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,

86 S. Ct. 836 (1996), by failing to conduct a competency hearing on its own

initiative, and by denying defense counsel’s oral motion for appointment of
14

additional mental health experts and a competency hearing; and (2) violated his

substantive due process rights by trying him while he was incompetent. 

In response to the petition, the State argued that it should be denied as

untimely because it was filed outside the one-year grace period provided for by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. 104-132, 110

Stat. 1214 (1996). The State also argued that Wright’s claims were unexhausted

because they had not been raised in the state court as violations of federally

protected rights, and that they were also procedurally barred because any effort by

Wright to exhaust the claims in state court would be denied as untimely and

successive. 

On July 30, 1999, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

concluding that Wright’s habeas petition was not time-barred. The judge found

that Wright’s procedural due process claim was not exhausted as a federal

constitutional issue, because in state court Wright had argued his claim only as a

violation of state law. The magistrate judge further found that even if that claim

was exhausted, Wright was still not entitled to federal habeas relief because the

state court’s denial of the claim on the merits was reasonable. As to Wright’s

substantive due process claim, the magistrate judge reasoned it was unexhausted

because it had only been put forward as a violation of state law and procedure until
15

Wright raised it as a federal law claim in his Rule 3.850 motion filed on April 21,

1991. Because the state court had expressly applied a procedural bar to that claim,

the magistrate judge held the substantive due process claim was procedurally

barred from federal habeas corpus review. The merits of that claim is not

something that was addressed in the report and recommendation. 

On February 4, 2000, the district court adopted in its entirety the magistrate

judge’s report and denied Wright’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The

district court granted a certificate of appealability as to: (1) whether the trial court’s

failure to conduct a competency hearing violated Wright’s Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process rights; and (2) whether Wright’s trial without a

determination of his competency to stand trial violated his Sixth and/or Fourteenth

Amendment rights.

II. DISCUSSION

A. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ISSUE INVOLVING 

MENTAL COMPETENCY 

The first issue specified in the certificate of appealability involves a

straightforward mental incompetency procedural due process claim, which was

timely raised on direct appeal and rejected on the merits without discussion by the

Fourth District Court of Appeal. See Wright v. State, 536 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. Dist.
1

As we have already mentioned, the State initially contended that in his direct appeal Wright

had raised the failure of the trial court to conduct an inquiry into his mental competency only as a

state law violation. Wright insisted he had raised the issue as a federal constitutional claim, too, and

at oral argument before us the State conceded that he had. We accept that concession.

16

Ct. App. 1988).1 Applying the deference prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the

district court held that the state appellate court’s decision on this issue was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court.

To start with, Wright says that the district court should not have given the

state court’s decision any deference under § 2254(d)(1), because the rejection of

this claim without any discussion of it does not amount to the claim having been

“adjudicated on the merits” in the state court proceedings, which is a predicate for

the application of § 2254(d)(1). We have not previously addressed this issue,

although we brushed up against it in Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir.),

reh’g and reh’g en banc denied, – F.3d – (11th Cir. Aug. 16, 2001), petition for cert.

filed (U.S. Nov. 12, 2001) (No. 01-798). In that case, it was unclear whether the

federal constitutional issue had been raised and decided in state court – we

expressed “grave doubt” that it had been – and the attorneys representing the

State insisted that the state court had not addressed the federal issue. Id. at 1365. 

In those circumstances, we held that no deference was due the state court’s
17

decision of the federal constitutional issue for the simple reason that the state court

probably had not decided it. Id. We would not defer to that which did not exist. 

The circumstances in this case are different from those in Romine, because

here neither side denies that the federal issue was raised in and decided by the state

court, and we do not gravely doubt that it was. Instead, the question here is

whether the state court’s summary, which is to say unexplicated, rejection of the

federal constitutional issue qualifies as an adjudication under § 2254(d) so that it is

entitled to deference. Six circuits have squarely addressed that question, all of

them concluding that the summary nature of a state court’s decision does not lessen

the deference that it is due. See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 310-12 (2d Cir.

2001); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied,

122 S. Ct. 74 (2001); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); 

Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 1999); James v. Bowersox, 187

F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1143, 120 S. Ct. 994 (2000);

Delgado v. Lewis, 181 F.3d 1087, 1091 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted and
2

 Our position is also supported by decisions of two other circuits, the Fifth and Seventh, that

sparse or otherwise unsatisfactory state court discussion is not grounds for failing to grant deference

under § 2254(d)(1). See Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 696 (5th Cir.) (“[O]ur focus on the

‘unreasonable application’ test under Section 2254(d) should be on the ultimate legal conclusion that

the state court reached and not on whether the state court considered and discussed every angle of

the evidence.”), reh’g en banc granted, 264 F.3d 1149 (5th Cir. Sept. 5, 2001); Hennon v. Cooper,

109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997) (“It doesn’t follow that the criterion of a reasonable determination

is whether it is well reasoned. It is not. It is whether the determination is at least minimally

consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.”).

18

judgment vacated on other grounds, 528 U.S. 1133, 120 S. Ct. 1002 (2000).2 We

agree with those circuits. 

We begin with the plain language of the statute itself. See Harris v. Garner,

216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“We begin our construction of [a

statutory provision] where courts should always begin the process of legislative

interpretation, and where they often should end it as well, which is with the words

of the statutory provision.”), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2214 (2001); United States v.

Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) (“In construing a statute we must

begin, and often should end as well, with the language of the statute itself.”

(quotation marks and citation omitted)). The plain language of § 2254(d)(1)

requires only that the federal claim have been “adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings” and have “resulted in a decision” that is neither contrary to nor

involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. That is all the

text of the provision requires.
19

A judicial decision and a judicial opinion are not the same thing. The chief

responsibility of judges is to decide the case before them. They may, or may not,

attempt to explain the decision in an opinion. The text of § 2254(d)(1) accepts this

orthodox view. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (“Nothing in the phrase ‘adjudicated

on the merits’ requires the state court to have explained its reasoning process.”);

Bell, 236 F.3d at 160 (“First and foremost, the language of § 2254(d) does not

support such a requirement.”). The statutory language focuses on the result, not on

the reasoning that led to the result, and nothing in that language requires the state

court adjudication that has resulted in a decision to be accompanied by an opinion

that explains the state court’s rationale. See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (“Nowhere

does the statute make reference to the state court’s process of reasoning.”); Aycox,

196 F.3d at 1177 (“The focus is on the state court’s decision or resolution of the

case.” (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, all that is required is a rejection of the

claim on the merits, not an explanation. 

To conclude otherwise on this issue would be writing into § 2254(d)(1) an

additional requirement that Congress did not put there – a requirement that the

state courts explain the rationale of their decisions. Some might view such an

addition as an improvement, others would not. Regardless, it would be an

addition, and courts ought not add to what the legislature has said is the law. See
20

Garner, 216 F.3d at 976 (declining to add exception to statute on ground that “[w]e

will not do to the statutory language what Congress did not do with it, because the

role of the judicial branch is to apply statutory language, not to rewrite it.”). Our

function is to apply statutes, to carry out the expression of the legislative will that

is embodied in them, not to “improve” statutes by altering them. See Badaracco v.

Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386, 398, 104 S. Ct. 756, 764 (1984)

(“Courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects

susceptible of improvement.”).

The plain language of § 2254(d)(1) is enough, and we could stop there, but

we add another thought. Reading into the statute a requirement that state courts

spell out their rationale would run counter to the main thrust of the amendments to

the habeas corpus provisions that were enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Those amendments, including the one that

resulted in § 2254(d), plainly were intended to require greater federal court

deference to state court decisions and to promote more federal-state judicial

comity. Telling state courts when and how to write opinions to accompany their

decisions is no way to promote comity. Requiring state courts to put forward

rationales for their decisions so that federal courts can examine their thinking

smacks of a “grading papers” approach that is outmoded in the post-AEDPA era. 
3

In Neelley v. Nagle, 138 F.3d 917, 926-27 (11th Cir. 1998), we declined to give deference

to a state court decision because the court’s opinion explicitly misapplied the controlling Supreme

Court decision. We do not disregard Neelley, but we decline to extend that decision beyond its facts

to the different circumstances of this case. The failure of a state court to set out its reasoning is not

equivalent to the conspicuous misapplication of Supreme Court precedent. We will not presume that

a state court misapplied federal law, and absent indication to the contrary will assume that state

courts do understand “clearly established Federal law . . . as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States,” § 2254(d)(1). 

21

See Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the approach

to § 2254(d)(1) that would have federal habeas courts judge the quality of the state

courts’ reasoning, because such an approach “would place the federal court in just

the kind of tutelary relation to the state courts that the recent amendments are

designed to end”). In § 2254(d) Congress meant to, and did, mandate deference to

state court adjudications on the merits of federal constitutional issues, and a

decision that does not rest on procedural grounds alone is an adjudication on the

merits regardless of the form in which it is expressed.3

We turn now to the question of whether the state court’s rejection of

Wright’s procedural due process claim is a decision that involves “an unreasonable

application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). The clearly established federal law on

this issue, as determined by the Supreme Court, is set out in Drope v. Missouri,

420 U.S. 162, 95 S. Ct. 896 (1975), Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 836

(1966), and Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S. Ct. 788 (1960). Under
22

Dusky the standard for mental competency to stand trial is “whether [a defendant]

has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of

rational understanding – and whether he has a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings against him.” 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 789

(internal quotation marks omitted). Under Drope and Pate the standard for

determining whether a trial court violates the Due Process Clause by failing to

conduct an inquiry into a defendant’s competency to stand trial, where no inquiry

is requested, is whether the objective facts known to the trial court at the time

create a bona fide doubt as to mental competency. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S.

Ct. at 908; Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S. Ct. at 842 (“Where the evidence raises a

‘bona fide doubt’ as to a defendant’s competence to stand trial, the [trial] judge on

his own motion must impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing . . . .”). 

There is no contention that the state appellate court’s rejection of the mental

competency procedural due process claim in this case was contrary to the actual

decisions in Drope, Pate, or Dusky; instead, the dispute centers around the

unreasonable application prong of § 2254(d)(1). In determining whether the state

court’s decision is an unreasonable application of the law set out in those three

Supreme Court decisions, we need not decide whether we would have reached the

same result as the state court if we had been deciding the issue in the first instance. 
23

Instead, we decide only whether the state court’s decision of the issue is

objectively unreasonable. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411, 120 S. Ct.

1495, 1522 (2000) (“Under § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, then,

a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.”); Brown v. Head, – F.3d –, No. 00-15886 (11th Cir. Nov.

15, 2001) (“It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the

state court decision that we are to decide.”). 

The Fourth District Court of Appeals decision rejecting Wright’s procedural

due process claim relating to mental incompetency is not objectively unreasonable. 

The facts known to the judge during the trial are that Wright suffers from

schizophrenia, which had caused him to be judged mentally incompetent in 1970,

which was seventeen years before the trial in this case. And he knew that Wright

had been adjudicated not guilty by reason of insanity when he was tried on the

charges relating to that earlier case. But the trial judge also knew that, on that

distant occasion, following his treatment in a hospital Wright’s mental

competency had been restored. The medical experts all agreed that Wright’s

illness was one that went into periods of remission from time to time. The judge
4

The fact that Wright was adjudged incompetent to stand trial in connection with other

charges seven and eight months after the trial of this case cannot be considered in this analysis,

because it is obviously not something known to the judge in this case while this trial was being

conducted. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, 95 S. Ct. at 908 (focusing on evidence of pretrial behavior

and trial testimony); Pate, 383 U.S. at 385, 86 S. Ct. at 842 (focusing on the evidence introduced at

trial).

24

heard that in the years between the findings and adjudication in 1970 and the trial

of this case in 1987, Wright had been tried and convicted on a number of

occasions without any finding (or apparent suggestion) that he was mentally

incompetent. 

Although Wright attempted an insanity defense at the trial of this case in

January of 1987, it failed. One expert, who had examined Wright five weeks

before the trial, testified that he had been actively psychotic at the time of the crime

five months earlier, but the expert did not testify that Wright was not mentally

competent either at the time of the evaluation, or more importantly, at the time of

the trial. Instead, he testified that during the evaluation Wright had been

responsive in answering questions about his name, address, and similar things, and

Wright had accurately described to him the crime and Wright’s role in it. There

was no expert opinion or other testimony suggesting that Wright was mentally

incompetent to stand trial in 1987.4

 There was plenty of unrebutted testimony

indicating that, whatever may have been his condition on other occasions, Wright

was mentally competent during the period immediately leading up to the trial. A
25

corrections officer and an employee testified without contradiction about Wright’s

perfectly normal activities in jail from shortly after his arrest to the date of the trial. 

They told about Wright’s legal research and drafting, the legal assistance and

advice he provided other inmates, his normal discussions with guards and inmates, 

his reading and watching TV, playing cards, and plans to learn Spanish. 

The state appellate court’s rejection of Wright’s procedural due process

claim implicitly reflects a conclusion that all of the facts considered together were

not sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt as to whether Wright, at the time of this

trial in January of 1987, had “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether he [had] a

rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Dusky, 

362 U.S. at 402, 80 S. Ct. at 789 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because that

conclusion is not objectively unreasonable, the district court did not err in denying

habeas relief to Wright on this claim.

B. THE SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIM

INVOLVING MENTAL COMPETENCY

The second issue the district court specified in the certificate of appealability

is: “Whether petitioner’s trial without a determination of his competency to stand

trial violated his Sixth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights.” That specification
26

seems to include the first one, the Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

issue, which we have already discussed. To the extent that the second specification

raises the issue of whether there is a Sixth Amendment right, or a Fourteenth

Amendment right to a mental competency examination in addition to the

procedural due process right we have already discussed, it is a non-starter for

Wright. There is no Supreme Court decision that dictates the rule that trial without

a determination of mental competency violates any constitutional provision other

than the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of procedural due process. 

Accordingly, recognition and application of such a rule in this collateral attack

proceeding is barred by the non-retroactivity doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.

288, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), and its progeny. Besides, Wright does not appear to

have raised such a claim in the district court.

In any event, the parties have not treated the second issue specified in the

certificate of appealability as raising the question of whether the failure of the trial

court to determine if Wright was competent to stand trial violated some yet

unannounced rule of constitutional law. Instead, they have argued this second

specification issue to us as though it were the question of whether Wright was

actually tried while mentally incompetent in violation of the substantive due

process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, we will construe
27

the COA so that the second question specified in it includes the substantive due

process issue that was actually presented to the district court and which the parties

have argued to us. See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1248 n.2 (11th Cir.

2001) (“Although our review is limited to the issues specified in the COA, we will

construe the issue specification in light of the pleadings and other parts of the

record.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Wright did claim in the district court that he had been tried while mentally

incompetent in violation of his substantive due process rights. Without reaching

the merits of that claim, the district court held that it was procedurally barred

because it had not been raised on direct appeal. Wright concedes he failed to raise

the claim on direct appeal but contends that the law of this circuit establishes that a

petitioner’s substantive due process claim that he was tried while mentally

incompetent cannot be procedurally defaulted. The COA the district court issued

did not explicitly cover this procedural default issue. Notwithstanding that,

Wright urges us to conclude that when a COA has been issued as to a claim on the

merits, after the district court has held that claim to be procedurally barred, we

should construe the COA as including the threshold issue of procedural default as

well as the merits. That makes sense to us. Unless we review a district court’s

threshold ruling that a claim is procedurally barred from consideration, it would be
28

a waste of our time to consider the merits of the claim. See Jones v. Smith, 231

F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Absent an explicit statement by the district

court, in cases where a district court grants a COA with respect to the merits of a

constitutional claim but the COA is silent with respect to procedural claims that

must be resolved if the panel is to reach the merits, we will assume that the COA

also encompasses any procedural claims that must be addressed on appeal.”). So,

we will decide that procedural bar issue. 

The district court’s ruling that Wright had procedurally defaulted his

substantive due process mental competency claim is contrary to the law of this

circuit that such claims generally cannot be defaulted. See Johnston v. Singletary,

162 F.3d 630, 637 (11th Cir. 1998); Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107

(11th Cir. 1995); Adams v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1356, 1359 (11th Cir. 1985). 

Bound as we are to follow prior panel precedent, we conclude that Wright’s

substantive due process claim relating to mental competency is not procedurally

barred, and we will address its merits. We review it without any § 2254(d)(1)

deference, because there is no state court decision on the merits of this claim. 

As we have held, “‘a petitioner raising a substantive claim of incompetency

is entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his or her

incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.’” Medina, 59 F.3d at 1106
29

(quoting James v. Singletary, 957 F.2d 1562, 1571 (11th Cir. 1992)). Only “[a]

petitioner who presents clear and convincing evidence creating a real, substantial,

and legitimate doubt as to his competence to stand trial is entitled to a hearing on

his substantive competency claim.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). The point is that on this claim, “the standard of proof is high and the

facts must positively, unequivocally, and clearly generate the legitimate doubt”

about whether the petitioner was mentally competent when he was tried. Id.

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “Not every

manifestation of mental illness demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the

evidence must indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the

charges.” Id. at 1107 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 

Wright has not met that high standard. The fact that he suffers from chronic

schizophrenia the effects of which have come and gone over the years is not

enough to create a real, substantial, and legitimate doubt as to whether he was

competent to stand trial in January of 1987. His incompetency to stand trial seven

and eight months later, like his incompetency to stand trial seventeen years earlier,

is relevant, but it is not enough to counter the best evidence of what his mental

condition was at the only time that counts, which is the time of the trial. The best

evidence of Wright’s mental state at that time of trial is the evidence of his
30

behavior around that time, especially the evidence of how he related to and

communicated with others then. The unrebutted evidence at trial is that in the days

and weeks leading up to the trial Wright behaved in a perfectly normal fashion,

related well to others, and had no problem at all communicating with them. There

is no evidence that he behaved abnormally at trial, nor is there any evidence that he

had any problem understanding the charges against him or communicating with his

counsel. This claim fails on the merits.

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s denial of habeas relief is AFFIRMED.