[Cite as In re A.B.M., 2020-Ohio-3590.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

IN RE A.B.M. : 

 : No. 108440 

A Minor Child : 

 : 

[Appeal by Father, T.M.] : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 2, 2020 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Juvenile Division 

Case No. CU-16-117933 

 

Appearances: 

Stafford Law Co., L.P.A., Joseph G. Stafford, and Nicole A. 

Cruz, for appellant. 

 

The Law Office of Eric J. Cherry and Eric J. Cherry, for 

appellee. 

 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

Appellant T.M., the established father (“Father”) of minor child 

A.B.M., appeals the March 12, 2019 judgment of the Cuyahoga County Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, arising from a custody action. For the reasons 

stated herein, we affirm. 
I. Background and Facts 

This court recently issued an opinion in In re A.B.M., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 107556, 2019-Ohio-3183 (“A.B.M. I”). In that case, Father appealed 

the August 20, 2018 judgment entry (“Parenting Order”) that determined the 

parental rights of Father and M.R. (“Mother”), the single mother of A.B.M. Excerpts 

of the opinion that are pertinent to the current appeal are included below. 

A.B.M. was born to [Mother] * * * shortly after Mother’s high school 

graduation. Father was also a recent high school graduate. On 

March 11, 2014, Father was established as the biological father by the 

Cuyahoga County Department of Job and Family Services (“CCDJFS”). 

The parties never married but lived together sporadically. 

Id. at ¶ 2. 

Father moved to Florida in January 2015, Mother and A.B.M. 

followed shortly afterward. After several moves between Florida and Ohio, 

Father decided to remain in Ohio. Mother decided to remain in 

Florida. On December 12, 2016, Father filed an application to 

determine custody of A.B.M. and a motion to restrain Mother from 

returning to Florida after Mother’s visit to Ohio. Father alleged that 

Mother: (1) was unable to provide stable living conditions, (2) had not 

maintained stable employment for more than three months in the past 

two years, and (3) A.B.M., who was four years of age at the time, had 

not been in a structured school environment. 

The trial court granted the ex parte motion filed by Father on March 17, 

2017, to restrain Mother from returning to Florida where she and 

A.B.M. were residing. An interim parenting order was issued 

governing visitation. 

Id. at ¶ 3-4. 

At the April 25, 2018 hearing, the trial court heard testimony from 

Father, Mother, the maternal grandmother, and the guardian ad litem. Mother 
testified that she became engaged and gave birth to her fiancé’s child while in 

Florida. She planned to return to Florida with A.B.M. if the trial court allowed. 

The trial court awarded equal parenting time to Father and Mother, 

designated each parent as the legal custodian and residential parent 

during their respective parenting times, and designated Mother as 

residential parent for school purposes. Father was ordered to pay child 

support of $214.47 per month and was also required to provide health 

insurance. The trial court also set forth parenting time in the event the 

Mother chose to move to Florida after filing a notice of intent to 

relocate. 

Id. at ¶ 34. 

This court addressed Father’s opposition to the relocation decision: 

Father challenges the trial court’s finding that “[s]hould mother choose 

to move to Florida and upon the filing of a notice of intent to relocate, 

Father shall have the standard long-distance parenting time.” Journal 

entry No. 0911440943, page 2. Father asserts that the trial court failed 

to determine that relocating was in the child’s best interest and the 

court did not consider the costs associated with the standard longdistance parenting schedule. 

In re A.B.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107556, 2019-Ohio-3183, at ¶ 52. 

This court decided 

The trial court’s requirement that Mother file a notice of intent to 

relocate does not negate the right of Father to oppose the notice based 

on appropriate grounds. See, e.g., In re R.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 87027, 2006-Ohio-4266, ¶ 11 (relocation alone does not constitute 

changed circumstances justifying a parenting modification). Based on 

the evidence before us and the presumption afforded by the absence of 

findings of fact [in this case], we cannot say that the trial court abused 

its discretion in determining that the relocation is in the child’s best 

interest. 

Id. at ¶ 56. 

Finally, this court concluded that “there is competent, credible 

evidence supporting our determination that the conclusion of the trial court is in the 
child’s best interest.” Id. at ¶ 57, citing In re A.M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98384, 

2012-Ohio-5078, ¶ 18, and In re L.S., 152 Ohio App.3d 500, 2003-Ohio-2045, 788 

N.E.2d 696 (8th Dist.). 

The A.B.M. I opinion was released and journalized on August 8, 2019. 

Postjudgment and prior to the release of A.B.M. I, the trial court denied Father’s 

motion to stay execution of the Parenting Order pending appeal in A.B.M. I. On 

September 21, 2018, this court denied Father’s stay request, and on October 9, 2018, 

Father again asked the trial court to stay execution of the Parenting Order to 

preempt Mother’s anticipated relocation filing. 

Mother filed the relocation notice on October 10, 2018, and 

immediately relocated to Florida with A.B.M. Sua sponte, on October 12, 2018, the 

trial court issued an order restraining the relocation and granted temporary custody 

of A.B.M. to Father pursuant to Juv.R. 13 (“Restraining Order”). The same date, 

Mother moved to vacate the Restraining Order on the ground that the Parenting 

Order provided that Mother could relocate upon filing a notice to relocate, and it set 

forth the long-distance visitation schedule in the event of relocation. Mother also 

provided evidence of employment and, subsequently, housing and school 

enrollment. 

On October 17, 2018, Father demanded attorney fees and litigation 

expenses in his request that Mother be held in contempt for violating the Parenting 

Order and the Restraining Order. Mother filed for temporary custody on 

November 13, 2018. On November 27, 2018, Father opposed the motion and 
advised that documentation had been filed in Florida and a hearing was scheduled 

to register the temporary custody order for enforcement. 

Mother allowed A.B.M. to return to Ohio with Father during the 

Christmas break with the understanding he would deliver A.B.M. to Mother at the 

January 2019 hearing on the pending motions. Upon his return to Ohio, Father 

notified Mother that A.B.M. would remain with Father due to the temporary custody 

award. 

The January hearing was rescheduled to March 8, 2019. This court 

denied Father’s March 4, 2019 renewed emergency motion to stay the Parenting 

Order pursuant to App.R. 7(A). A stay was currently pending in the trial court and 

this court did “not find it impracticable” for Father to “wait for the trial court to rule 

on the pending motion to stay.” Journal entry No. 0912094958 (Mar. 6, 2019). 

The hearing proceeded on March 8, 2019. On March 12, 2019, the 

trial court issued a decision. The trial court determined that “based on the facts that 

have arisen since the filing of the final judgment entry and that were known to the 

Court at the time” of the original entry, “no change of circumstance has occurred 

necessitating a modification of the Court’s order to serve the best interests of the 

child.” Id. “The Court’s prior order shall remain in full force and effect pending 

appeal, including the Court’s order for long distance parenting, holiday and vacation 

time as applicable.” Id. 

The trial court denied Father’s motions to stay execution of the 

Parenting Order and for child support, and to be designated residential parent. 
Father’s motion to return the child to the court’s jurisdiction was denied as moot. 

The trial court granted Mother’s motion to vacate the Restraining Order that 

contained the grant of temporary custody to Father, which rendered Mother’s 

motion for temporary custody moot. The trial court also dismissed sua sponte 

Father’s motion to show cause for violating the Parenting Order and Restraining 

Order. 

 Father appeals. 

II. Assignments of Error 

Father assigns three errors: 

I. The trial court was without jurisdiction to proceed upon 

Mother’s notice of intent to relocate during the pendency of Father’s 

appeal. 

II. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion 

by granting Mother’s notice of intent to relocate. 

III. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion 

by sua sponte dismissing Father’s motions to show cause and motion 

for attorney fees and litigation expenses. 

III. Discussion 

A. Jurisdiction and Ruling 

We combine the first and second assigned errors for ease of analysis. 

We find that the errors lack merit. 

 The legislature granted jurisdiction to the juvenile and domestic 

relation courts to determine the parent-child relationship. In re A.M.S., 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 107495, 2019-Ohio-3181, ¶ 16, citing In re C.W., 9th Dist. Lorain 

Nos. 16CA011044, 17CA011162, and 17CA011165, 2018-Ohio-5265, ¶ 22. Domestic 
relations courts allocate parental rights relating to divorce, dissolution, and related 

actions. R.C. 3109.04(A). The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine 

custody of a child who is not the ward of any other court in Ohio under 

R.C. 2151.23(A), but the court must exercise its jurisdiction in child custody matters 

in accordance with R.C. 3109.04. See R.C. 2151.23(F)(1), In re Bonfield, 97 Ohio 

St.3d 387, 780 N.E.2d 241 (2002). 

Both courts are authorized to make custody matter determinations 

guided by R.C. 3109.04 entitled “[a]llocation of parental rights and responsibilities 

for care of children; shared parenting.” Id. “As R.C. 3109.04 makes clear, the 

guiding principle in a custody matter is the best interest of the child.” In re M.S.,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99563, 2013-Ohio-4043, ¶ 21. “Before allocating parental 

rights and responsibilities, the trial court is required to determine whether a 

parenting plan is in the best interest of the child.” Id. “The ultimate goal of 

R.C. 3109.04 is to arrive at a decision that is in the best interests of the child.” Id. 

This court must consider that 

[w]hen reviewing a ruling pertaining to the allocation of parental 

rights, the trial court is to be afforded great deference. Miller v. Miller, 

37 Ohio St.3d 71, 523 N.E.2d 846 (1988). “The discretion which a trial 

court enjoys in custody matters should be accorded the utmost respect, 

given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s 

determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned. The 

knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and the 

parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court 

by a printed record. In this regard, the reviewing court in such 

proceedings should be guided by the presumption that the trial court’s 

findings were indeed correct.” Id. at 74 (internal citations omitted). 

Strauss v. Strauss, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95377, 2011-Ohio-3831, ¶ 8. 
“An appellate court must uphold the trial court’s allocation of 

parental rights and responsibilities absent an abuse of discretion, which implies that 

the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” Id. at ¶ 9, citing 

Mason v. Mason, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80368, 2002-Ohio-6042, citing Masters 

v. Masters, 69 Ohio St.3d 83, 630 N.E.2d 665 (1994). Accordingly, absent a clear 

showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse the trial court’s judgment. Id. 

In this case, the juvenile court was vested with original jurisdiction by 

the parentage action that established Father’s paternity. Father now challenges the 

trial court’s jurisdiction to entertain the Father’s objections to relocation pending 

the appeal in A.B.M. I. Father argues that the proceedings should have been stayed 

pending appeal because Father argued in A.B.M. I that the residential parent and 

relocation determinations in the Parenting Order are not in the child’s best interest. 

This, Father argued, rendered the proceedings below void due to lack of jurisdiction. 

 Generally, 

[o]nce an appeal has been filed, the trial court loses jurisdiction “except 

to take action in aid of the appeal.” State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v. 

Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97, 378 N.E.2d 162 

(1978). The trial court retains jurisdiction only over issues not 

inconsistent with the reviewing court’s jurisdiction to reverse, modify, 

or affirm the judgment, such as collateral issues like contempt or 

appointment of a receiver. Howard v. Catholic Social Servs. of 

Cuyahoga Cty., Inc., 70 Ohio St.3d 141, 146, 637 N.E.2d 890 (1994). 

Furthermore, “the determination as to the appropriateness of an 

appeal lies solely with the appellate court. A juvenile judge has no 

authority to determine the validity or merit of an appeal.” In re S.J., 

106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 9. 
In re Adoption of C.P.F., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101147 and 101148, 2014-Ohio4479, ¶ 16. 

 The trial court determined the best interests of the child in the 

Parenting Order where it designated Mother as the residential parent for school 

purposes and stated: “‘[s]hould mother choose to move to Florida and upon the 

filing of a Notice of Intent to relocate, father shall have to [sic] the standard longdistance parenting time.’” In re A.B.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107556, 2019-Ohio3183, at ¶ 52, quoting journal entry No. 0911440943, page 2. The entry did not 

specify that relocation could not take place until the 30-day objection period 

applicable to notices of intent expired. Mother argued at the hearing that her 

reliance on the express language of the Parenting Order is reasonable. 

Mother filed the notice to relocate and departed. The trial court 

issued a sua sponte restraining order that directed that the child return to the 

jurisdiction and granted temporary custody to Father pending expiration of the 30- 

day relocation period and any objections posed by Father. Mother filed a motion to 

vacate the restraining and temporary custody order. Father objected to the 

relocation and argued that it was not in the best interest of the child. Father also 

moved to return the child to Ohio, be designated residential parent, and hold mother 

in contempt for violating the judgment and for attorney fees. 

 “A trial court has authority to enforce its judgments in the absence of 

an order staying execution.” White v. White, 50 Ohio App.2d 263, 272, 362 N.E.2d 

1013 (8th Dist.1977). “[T]he mere filing of a notice of appeal without a stay order 
does not deprive the trial court of authority to enforce its judgment.” Id., citing In 

re Kurtzhalz, 141 Ohio St. 432, 48 N.E.2d 657 (1973); Vavrina v. Greczanik, 40 Ohio 

App.2d 129, 318 N.E.2d 408 (8th Dist.1974); Rippel v. Rippel, 328 N.E.2d 816 (8th 

Dist.1974). 

In other words, “‘[a]n order issued by a court with jurisdiction must 

be obeyed until reversed by proper procedure.’” Ruschel v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 89977 and 90500, 2008-Ohio-2035, ¶ 53, quoting 

Strong v. Bauman, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 17256 and 17414, 1999 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 2272, *16 (May 21, 1999). The trial court’s “‘retained jurisdiction includes 

the authority to take any action which would aid in the execution of the appealed 

judgment.’” Trumbull Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Rickard, 11th Dist. Ashtabula 

No. 2017-A-0048, 2019-Ohio-2502, ¶ 21, quoting State ex rel. Klein v. Chorpening, 

6 Ohio St.3d 3, 4, 450 N.E.2d 1161 (1983). 

The trial court also disclosed that the sua sponte restraining order was 

issued to “maintain the status quo.” (Tr. 37.) “I ordered the temporary custody 

order to do my best to maintain the status quo, because it wasn’t done properly. The 

30 days did not have a chance to transpire.” (Tr. 122.) “There’s a theory in the law 

where you use” “restraining orders to keep something from deteriorating to the 

point where you can’t repair it * * *. Maintain the status quo.” (Tr. 122-123.) The 

trial court added that the purpose of the notice of intent hearing was to allow the 

parties to be heard, “[b]ut to be heard doesn’t mean to change.” (Tr. 122.) 
The trial court addressed Father’s objections. R.C. 3109.051(G) 

provides, “[i]f the residential parent intends to move to a residence other than the 

residence specified in the parenting time order or decree of the court, the parent 

shall file a notice of intent to relocate with the court that issued the order or decree.” 

R.C. 3109.051(G)(1). Upon motion by the court or the nonresidential parent, “the 

court * * * may schedule a hearing with notice to both parents to determine whether 

it is in the best interest of the child to revise the parenting time schedule for the 

child.” Id. 

 R.C. 3109.051(G) contemplates a modification of the “parenting time 

schedule” due to the relocation and not readjudication of the propriety of the 

relocation. As this court noted in A.B.M. I, the Parenting Order’s relocation 

provision “does not negate the right of Father to oppose the notice based on 

appropriate grounds.” In re A.B.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107556, 2019-Ohio3183, at ¶ 56. 

“‘A parent has a constitutional right to live anywhere in the country 

that she chooses and to relocate at will.’” Id. at ¶ 53, quoting Valentyne v. Ceccacci, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83725, 2004-Ohio-4240, ¶ 47, citing Miller v. Miller, 3d 

Dist. Henry No. 7-03-09, 2004-Ohio-2358. R.C. 3109.051 “simply permits a court 

to adjust visitation rights in light of the relocation.” Ross v. Ross, 9th Dist. Summit 

No. 26106, 2012-Ohio-2175, ¶ 7. A trial court may then consider the factors in R.C. 

3109.051(D) and “‘determine visitation that is in the best interest of the child.’” 
Morrow v. Becker, 9th Dist. Medina No. 07CA0054-M, 2008-Ohio-155, ¶ 11, 

quoting Braatz v. Braatz, 85 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 706 N.E.2d 1218 (1999). 

The record and the judgment entry reflect consideration of the 

requisite R.C. 3109.051(D) factors. 

The prior interaction and interrelationships of the child with the child’s 

parents, siblings, and other persons related by consanguinity or affinity 

of the child; 

The geographical location of the residence of each parent and the 

distance between those residences; 

The child’s and parents’ available time, including, but not limited to, 

each parent’s employment schedule, the child’s school schedule, and 

the child’s and the parents’ holiday and vacation schedules; 

The age of the child; 

The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community; 

The amount of time that will be available for the child to spend with 

siblings; 

Each parent’s willingness to reschedule missed parenting time and to 

facilitate the other parent’s parenting time rights; 

Whether either parent has established a residence or is planning to 

establish a residence outside this state; Mother has established a new 

residence in Palmetto, Florida. 

Journal entry No. 0911440943, p. 1-2. 

The trial court considered the best interest of A.B.M. in the Parenting 

Order. Father’s objections are limited in scope to a revision of the visitation 

schedule. Mother provided evidence of employment, housing, and school 

enrollment for A.B.M. The trial court heard testimony from the parties and 

reiterated that “based on the evidence presented in its totality, mother has 
demonstrated that it is in the child’s best interest to relocate with her mother and 

sister.” (Tr. 127.) 

“[B]ased on the facts that have arisen since the filing of the final 

judgment entry and that were known to the Court at the time” of the original entry, 

“no change of circumstance has occurred necessitating a modification of the Court’s 

order to serve the best interests of the child.” Journal entry No. 0912112894 

(Mar. 13, 2019), p. 1. “The Court’s prior order shall remain in full force and effect 

pending appeal, including the Court’s order for long distance parenting, holiday and 

vacation time as applicable.” Id. 

 The trial court also considered whether Father’s objections 

constituted a request for modification of the Parenting Order based on a change of 

circumstance. The trial court explained that the Parenting Order encompasses 

consideration of Mother’s relocation to Florida as a change of circumstance and 

offered that modification of the Parenting Order would be improvident while the 

appeal is pending. 

Specifically, the trial court stated: 

the Court having anticipated various changes of circumstances in its 

original order, including that the parents may parent one way or share 

in their parenting or be allocated certain parenting rights and 

responsibilities when in the same locale, but should that locale change 

and there would be more distance, as anticipated, that one would be in 

Ohio and one would be in Florida, that the allocation would then 

change to the alternative methodology, that no change of circumstance 

has been demonstrated to, and I believe that the Court is, to some 

extent, prohibited from impacting that as the Court — as the case 

remains on appeal. 
(Emphasis added.) (Tr. 127-128.) 

 Thus, the record reflects that the trial court was cognizant of the 

pending appeal as acknowledged on the record and in the final judgment entry: 

The Court’s Parenting order is currently on appeal to the 8th Judicial 

Appellate District and includes an assignment of error related to the 

Court’s order for long distance parenting time for father should mother 

move from the jurisdiction. 

Journal entry No. 0912112894 (Mar. 13, 2019), p. 1. 

We find that the trial court had jurisdiction to enforce the Parenting 

Order in this case in the absence of a stay of execution pending the appeal, and that 

the trial court’s denial of Father’s objections did not constitute an abuse of 

discretion. The trial court effectively maintained the status quo and all parties were 

in the same position prior to and after the trial court’s proceedings pending appeal. 

Assuming arguendo that any error exists, the error is harmless under the unique 

facts of this case because this court affirmed the Parenting Order determination in 

In re A.B.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107556, 2019-Ohio-3183. See Doe v. Rupp, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 71938 and 72966, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 292, at 17 

(Jan. 29, 1998). 

The first and second assigned errors lack merit. Our determination 

that the trial court had jurisdiction moots the alternative argument posed by 

appellant that jurisdiction is afforded by Civ.R. 75(H). 
B. Show Cause, Attorney Fees, and Litigation Expenses 

The third assigned error challenges the trial court’s dismissal of the 

motion to show cause and for attorney fees and litigation expenses. We find that 

appellant’s argument is without merit. 

 Mother filed the notice of intent to relocate on October 10, 2018, and 

promptly departed. On October 12, 2018, the trial issued a sua sponte order that 

restrained Mother from removing the child from the trial court’s jurisdiction and 

granted temporary custody to Father “pending expiration of the thirty (30) days 

related to the Notice of Intent, should father object and request a hearing before the 

Court upon the location of the child through another state.” Journal entry 

No. 0912112894 (Mar. 12, 2019). 

 Also, on October 12, 2018, Mother filed a motion to vacate the trial 

court’s sua sponte order based on the express language of the July 2018 Parenting 

Order. The Parenting Order provides that “[s]hould mother choose to move to 

Florida and upon the filing of a Notice of Intent to relocate, father shall have to [sic] 

the standard long-distance parenting time.” Mother explained that the Parenting 

Order did not specify that relocation could not take place until the 30-day objection 

period expired and that her reliance on the express language of the Parenting Order 

was reasonable. 
On October 17, 2018,1 Father filed a motion to show cause and for 

attorney fees and costs claiming Mother improperly removed the child from the trial 

court’s jurisdiction in violation of the July 31, 2018 and October 12, 2018 trial court 

entries. 

 The trial court ruled that Mother’s “motion to vacate the restraining 

order is granted, and the Court’s prior order restraining the mother from 

removing/relocating the child from the jurisdiction of the court and for temporary 

custody to father is vacated and held for naught.” Journal entry No. 0912112894 

(Mar. 12, 2019), p. 2. “The Court, sua sponte, dismisses father’s motion to show 

cause and for attorney fees and litigation expenses.” Id. 

In addition, the trial court stated at the hearing, “[w]ith regard to the 

motions to show cause, I’m going to dismiss those sua sponte because I am trying to 

get you all just to follow the rules.” (Tr. 128.) The trial court also pointed out that 

the child had been in the Father’s custody from December 2018 to March 2019. 

“With respect to a trial court’s decision on a motion to show cause 

why a party should not be held in contempt, an appellate court cannot reverse unless 

the trial court abused its discretion.” Baxter v. Thomas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 101186, 2015-Ohio-2148, ¶ 78, citing State ex rel. Ventrone v. Birkel, 65 Ohio 

St.2d 10, 417 N.E.2d 1249 (1981). “‘A refusal to punish for contempt is largely within 

the discretion of the trial court’” where the “‘contempt proceedings are invoked 

 1 The time-stamp on the motion is dated October 17, 2018, the certificate of service 

is dated October 11, 2018, and the affidavit attached as an exhibit to the motion is dated 

October 15, 2018. 
solely by the person aggrieved by disobedience of the court’s order.’” Id., quoting 

Thomarios v. Thomarios, 9th Dist. Summit No. 14232, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 59, 

*2 (Jan. 10, 1990). “An abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or 

judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable.’” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 

(1983). 

 Mother testified that she willingly allowed A.B.M. to return to Ohio 

with Father during the winter break in accord with the long-distance visitation 

schedule. “I really wanted her to spend time with her dad. As much as I want her 

to spend time with me, she also needs to spend time with her dad.” (Tr. 27.) The 

trial court also pointed out that A.B.M. was in Father’s custody from December 

2018, to March 2019. 

 Father has been afforded due process. The parties addressed 

Father’s objections, relocation, visitation, and attendant circumstances at the 

hearing. Father’s motion to show cause arises from the relocation that Father 

argued violated the sua sponte restraining order and the Parenting Order. However, 

the trial court declared that the restraining order was vacated and held for naught. 

Based on the foregoing, we do not find that the trial court abused its 

discretion by dismissing the motion for contempt, attorney fees, and costs. The third 

assigned error also lacks merit. 

 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and 

LARRY A. JONES, SR., J., CONCUR