ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATE

DEFINITION, BACKGROUND, AND STRATE

CONCEPTS

Steven Metz

and

Douglas V. Johnson II

January 2001
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors 

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart

the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Governmen

report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

The authors would like to thank Major General Robert 

Melissa Applegate, William Speer, Stewart Smith, Douglas 

Rusty Miller, Gary Williams, Walter Anderson, Max Man

Antulio Echevarria, Eric Kramer, Harry Frank, William D

Robert Steele, Conrad Crane, John Martin, Douglas Lovelace, a

Tilford for insightful comments on the briefings that preceded th

or on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any errors or misinterpre

which remain do so despite their best efforts.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and sh

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Arm

College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Comments a

be conveyed directly to the authors. Dr. Metz at can be contacted 

245-3822, fax (717) 245-3820, or email at Steven.

carlisle.army.mil. Dr. Johnson can be contacted at (717) 245-40

(717) 245-3820, or email at Douglas.Johnson@carlisle.army.mil

of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Pro

Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-382

the Internet at rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

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ISBN 1-58487-041-9

ii
Following the May 2000 Army-Marine Warf

Talks, the Army resolved to develop an Army-Marine 

view of a strategy for combating asymmetric threat

U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, in turn, set 

defining asymmetry within the context of military do

assessing the implications of asymmetric mi

capabilities, and suggesting strategic concep

countering asymmetric threats.

This special report is the result of that tasking. In 

Steven Metz and Dr. Douglas Johnson recomm

definition of strategic asymmetry that is both simp

comprehensive, reflecting the need for military do

that transcends the specific issues of today. They 

assess the strategic situation of the United States in 

of both positive asymmetry—that which gives U.S. for

advantage over opponents—and negative asymmetr

might be used to counter U.S. forces. Finally, they off

strategic concepts as part of the response to asym

maximum conceptual and organizational adapta

focused intelligence, minimal vulnerability, full spe

precision, and an integrated homeland security strat

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offe

special report as part of the ongoing refinement 

Army’s understanding of the strategic benefit

challenges arising from asymmetry.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

iii
OF THE AUTHORS

STEVEN METZ became Acting Chairman, Strateg

Planning Department, in September 2000. He has 

Research Professor of National Security Affairs 

Strategic Studies Institute since 1993. Dr. Metz al

held the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies 

U.S. Army War College. Prior to that, he served o

faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Comman

General Staff College, and several universities. He ha

served as an advisor to U.S. political organization

campaigns, testified in the U.S. Senate and Ho

Representatives, and spoken on military and se

issues around the world. He is author of more th

articles, essays, and book chapters on such topics as n

war, insurgency, U.S. policy in the Third World, m

strategy, South African security policy, and U.N. 

operations. Dr. Metz’s current research deals with 

security policy toward Turkey and Pakistan. He holds 

in Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studies fro

University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in Po

Science from the Johns Hopkins University.

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II has been with the Str

Studies Institute since 1985, first as Strategic Res

Analyst and then as Associate Research Profes

National Security Affairs. His 30 years of service in th

Army included two combat tours, a variety of troop an

assignments, and instructor duty at the U.S. M

Academy and the School of Advanced Military Stud

Fort Leavenworth. He is the principal author of bo

1991 and 1994 versions of Field Manual 100-1, The 

Dr. Johnson’s current research addresses Army 

Next-2025. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Aca

a M.A. in History from the University of Michigan, 

Ph.D. in History from Temple University. He is 

graduate of the U.S. Army Command and Genera

College and holds a diploma from the U.S. Army 

College.

iv
DEFINITION, BACKGROUND,

AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Introduction.

In war, there are always differences betwee

opponents. At times these are insignificant, pa

disparities with no bearing on the outcome. At other 

the differences between opponents are important, p

one in a position of advantage, the other at a disadva

This is a very simple observation, but from it flows one 

pressing issues faced by the United States today: str

asymmetry.

Strategic asymmetry is the use of some sort of diff

to gain an advantage over an adversary. It is an idea 

as warfare itself, appearing under a number of g

Among strategic theorists, Sun Tzu placed great st

psychological and informational asymmetry, writing 

All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with 

enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; fe

disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepa

against him; where he is strong. avoid him.

1

In the middle of the 20th century, the British str

theorist B.H. Liddell Hart advocated “the in

approach” in strategy. The wisest strategy, he conte

avoids the enemy’s strength and probes for weak

Edward Luttwak, who is one of the more a

contemporary strategic theorists, has extrapola

general rule from it. Strategy, Luttwak contends, in

actual or possible armed conflict between thinking hu

and thus is dominated by a “paradoxical logic” based 

“coming together and even the reversal of opposites.”

3

appears best, more effective, or most efficient, in 

words, often is not.

1
Many of history’s greatest generals also had an insti

feel for it. Like the U.S. military in the Gulf Wa

Mongols under Genghis Khan and his successors ofte

superior mobility, operational speed, intellig

synchronization, training, and morale to crush enem

lightning campaigns. When necessary, the Mongols 

the superior technology of Chinese engineers to und

successful sieges. Other conquerors, whether Ro

Europeans, Aztecs, or Zulus, brought superior techn

discipline, training, and leadership to the battlefield. 

in anti-colonial wars also relied on asymmetry, we

guerrilla operations, protracted warfare, political wa

and a willingness to sacrifice into Maoist “People’s Wa

Intifada, and the “Troubles” of Northern Ireland. 

metry is as old as warfare itself.

Throughout the Cold War, asymmetry was an imp

element of U.S. strategic thinking, but was seldom ca

that name. Matching Soviet quantitative advanta

Europe with American and NATO qualitative supe

was integral to U.S. strategy. Other concepts su

Massive Retaliation of the 1950s or the Maritime St

of the 1980s elevated asymmetry to an even higher p

Beginning in the 1990s, thinking within the Departm

Defense (DoD) began to shift with growing recognition 

potential for asymmetric threats to the United States

was part of DOD’s increasingly sophisticated u

standing of the post-Cold War security environment

the global distribution of power was asymmetric, it fo

that asymmetric strategies would be a natural evolu

Explicit mention of asymmetry first appeared in 

Doctrine in 1995.

5

 The concept, though, was used in 

simplistic and limited sense. The doctrine de

asymmetric engagements as those between diss

forces, specifically air versus land, air versus sea, a

forth.

6

 This very narrow concept of asymmetry had l

utility. The 1995 National Military Strategy approach

issue somewhat more broadly, listing terrorism, the 

2
information warfare as asymmetric challenges. In 199

concept of asymmetric threat began to receive g

attention. The Report of the Quadrennial Defense R

(QDR) stated,

U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena m

encourage adversaries to use . . . asymmetric means to atta

our forces and interests overseas and Americans at home.

The National Defense Panel (NDP), a senior level 

commissioned by Congress to provide an assessment 

long-term defense issues the United States faced, wa

more explicit. The Panel’s report stated:

We can assume that our enemies and future adversaries ha

learned from the Gulf War. They are unlikely to confront 

conventionally with mass armor formations, air superior

forces, and deep-water naval fleets of their own, all areas 

overwhelming U.S. strength today. Instead, they may fi

new ways to attack our interests, our forces, and our citize

They will look for ways to match their strengths against o

weaknesses.

8

The NDP specifically mentioned the danger from e

actions that might cause greater than expected 

casualties, the use of weapons of mass destruction to 

or complicate U.S. access to a region and inflict casu

attacks on U.S. electronic and computer-based inform

systems, the use of mines and missiles along strai

littorals, terrorism, and similar threats.

Following this, there was a flurry of activity to fle

the meaning and implications of strategic asymm

particularly within the intelligence community an

Joint Staff.

9

 The most important single study was th

Joint Strategic Review, Asymmetric Approaches to Wa

This provided a conceptual framework of asymm

threats, and a number of recommendations. Joint 

2010, a 1995 document prepared by the Chairman th

to provide a conceptual template for the future develo

3
Joint Vision 2020, the follow-on document released in 

did, labeling asymmetric approaches like long 

ballistic missiles “perhaps the most serious dang

United States faces in the immediate future.”

10

 Final

Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress in 

and 1999 noted that U.S. dominance in the conven

military arena encourages adversaries to seek asym

means of attacking U.S. military forces, U.S. interest

Americans. The 2000 Annual Report, while retaini

description of asymmetric threats used in the pr

reports, dropped the word “asymmetric.”

This treatment of asymmetry in official str

documents indicates that the concept is an importa

that, according to most experts, may grow even 

significant. Yet the development of strategy and doct

both deal with asymmetric threats and take advant

the U.S.’ own asymmetric capabilities requires g

conceptual rigor. Phrased differently, asymme

important to strategy, but not everything is asym

Strategic leaders and thinkers must be clear on 

asymmetry is and what it is not. This special report se

help clarify this with an eye toward doctrinal clar

suggesting a definition and conceptual foundati

thinking about strategic asymmetry. It will then prov

overview of the U.S. situation in terms of str

asymmetry, and propose some strategic concepts d

with asymmetry.

Definition and Conceptual Foundation.

Clear thinking begins with simple yet compreh

definitions. This way those involved can have 

assurance that they are speaking of the same thing. 

several definitions of strategic asymmetry have appea

Department of Defense documents, most have s

codified the specific security problems or threats fa

the United States today or have reflected su

4
1998 report from the National Defense Universit

instance, defined asymmetry as not “fighting fair.”

11

fairness is subjective and fluid, definitions of this sort 

little contribution to rigorous strategic thinking. Do

and strategic clarity demand a simple and compreh

definition.

The 1999 Joint Strategy Review provided the br

official treatment of asymmetry. It states:

Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent 

undermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknes

using methods that differ significantly from the United Stat

expected method of operations. [Asymmetric approach

generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock 

confusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom 

action, or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation 

an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches oft

employ innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, 

technologies, and can be applied at all levels of warfare

strategic, operational, and tactical—and across the spectru

of military operations.

12

This definition expanded official thinking but ha

shortcomings: it remains specific to the current str

environment and American security situation; and it 

primarily with what might be called “negative” asymm

what an opponent might do to the United States—rathe

giving equal weight to how the U.S. military mig

asymmetry against its opponents.

A more general and complete definition of str

asymmetry would be:

In the realm of military affairs and national sec

asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thin

differently than opponents in order to max

one’s own advantages, exploit an oppon

weaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain gr

freedom of action. It can be political-stra

military-strategic, operational, or a combinati

5
values, organizations, time perspectives, or 

combination of these. It can be short-ter

long-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It c

discrete or pursued in conjunction with symm

approaches. It can have both psychologica

physical dimensions.

While the key is the idea that significant differences o

kind exist, there are several elements of this definitio

warrant elaboration.

Dimensions of Asymmetry. Strategic asymmetry 

positive or negative. Positive asymmetry entails 

differences to gain an advantage. U.S. military strate

instance, places great value on superior tra

leadership, and technology. This strategy seeks to 

sustain this superiority and make use of it. Ne

asymmetry is a difference that an opponent might 

take advantage of one’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities

in other words, a form of threat. Most of DOD’s th

about asymmetry focuses on its negative form.

Strategic asymmetry can also be short-ter

long-term. As military history shows, many if not 

types of strategic asymmetry are short-term. Sooner o

the enemy adjusts. In World War II, for instance, blit

succeeded for a year or two until the Soviets found w

counter it. It took longer, but Third World governmen

their militaries eventually found counters to M

People’s War. The 1999 air campaign against S

suggests that enemies may find ways to counter th

advantages in airpower by camouflage, dispersion

dense but relatively unsophisticated air defense sy

Long-term asymmetry is rarer. The United State

probably be able to sustain its asymmetric advantag

certain types of enemies for a fairly long time, in larg

because it is able and willing to devote more resour

maintaining military superiority than potential en

are able and willing to devote to overcoming the Am

6
does require constant effort and adaptation: any m

force that stands pat during a time of strategic chang

decline in effectiveness.

Strategic asymmetry can be deliberate or by de

The United States is relatively rare in that its strat

actively think about asymmetry and how best to us

control it. More often, antagonists in a conflict or war s

use what they have and do what they know how to do

the outcome is asymmetric is more accidental than pla

For instance, when untrained military forces use irr

methods as when a combined force of French and In

defeated the British General Edward Braddock nea

Duquesne in 1775, or a group of American mounta

defeated a loyalist force commanded by Major P

Ferguson at King’s Mountain in 1780, victory came be

the Indians or the American mountaineers fought in 

they understood, not because they analyzed the weakn

the somewhat more conventional Loyalist force

designed ways to take advantage of them. In 

anti-colonial wars or insurgencies the “less advanced” 

preferred to emulate the “advanced” ones. Mao hel

guerrilla war was seldom decisive but should be use

preface for large scale mobile war.

13

 After all, it was n

Viet Cong that overthrew the government of 

Vietnam, but a conventional combined arms force 

North Vietnam. When countering asymmetric th

understanding whether the asymmetry is deliberate 

default is important since an enemy using deli

asymmetry is likely to make more adjustments and 

requires a more flexible strategy to counter.

Strategic asymmetry can be low risk or high 

Some forms of asymmetry such as superior train

leadership are time tested. They may entail costs to d

and maintain, but seldom increase strategic or opera

risk. The high cost of having a fully trained, equipped, 

force reduces risk even though it may not fully p

against all asymmetric actions as seen recently in Ad

7
limited investment and very high risk to those under

it, may have disproportionate consequences like rem

the U.S. naval presence from that key port (and oth

well). Other forms of asymmetry are experimen

untested, and thus entail significant risk. Terroris

instance, may be a low cost but high risk approach s

can generate a backlash against those who use it o

rather than erode the resolve of the target. Just as 

mutations in nature prove dysfunctional or, at 

insignificant, many forms of strategic asymmetry are 

desperation that do not work or only work for a l

period of time.

Strategic asymmetry can be discrete or integ

with other, symmetric techniques. Generally only th

desperate antagonists in a conflict would rely sol

asymmetric methods. Those who are able inte

asymmetric and symmetric methods. As Joint Vision 

notes, “our adversaries may pursue a combinat

asymmetries, or the United States may face a num

adversaries who, in combination, create an asym

threat.”

14

 Generally, such integrated approaches are 

powerful than strategies that rely solely on 

symmetric or asymmetric methods.

Finally, asymmetry can be material or psycholo

The two concepts are interrelated: a material asym

advantage often generates psychological advantage

there have been states and militaries throughout h

that were particularly adept at manipulating psycho

asymmetry, often by propagating an image of fierc

The Mongols, Assyrians, Aztecs, and Zulus are exa

These great conquerors found a combination of materi

psychological asymmetry most effective. While they t

to be superior to their enemies in training, leadersh

doctrine, the image of fierceness augmented this adva

Often psychological asymmetry is cheaper tha

material variant, but is harder to sustain.

8
asymmetry resides at the operational level of wa

history of warfare is replete with operational 

asymmetry such as the German use of submarine war

counterbalance the British advantage in capital 

urban operations to counterbalance a military forc

superior mobility and long-range fires such as the batt

Stalingrad or Hue; guerrilla operations in an enemy

area as an adjunct to conventional operat

operational-level deception such as Operation B

GUARD, the deception plan to support the Allied inva

Normandy; and, anti-access or counter-deploy

techniques using missiles, mines, terrorism, and 

weapons. Military-strategic asymmetry is an inte

military strategy based on asymmetry rather than u

as an adjunct to symmetric methods. Examples in

Maoist People’s War, blitzkrieg, and Massive Retal

the strategic concept created during the Eisen

administration that stated that aggression by the 

Union would lead to an American strategic nuclear str

the Soviet homeland. Political-strategic asymmetry 

use of nonmilitary means to gain a military advantag

instance, attempts have been made in recent years t

certain forms of military technology banned, inc

information warfare. If this succeeds, it would be mo

hindrance on the United States, with its extensive ca

for information warfare, than for a less developed 

Similarly, one opponent in a conflict might be able to g

advantage by painting themselves as a victim and g

the “moral high ground.” To some extent the 

Vietnamese were able to do this against the United S

Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein both attem

but failed. In any case, political-strategic asymme

likely to become increasingly significant as the inform

revolution and globalization link the world more close

make states more susceptible to external political pres

Forms of Asymmetry. At least six forms of asym

are relevant in the realm of national security and wa

9
operational concepts or tactical doctrines than the e

Examples include guerrilla war and other kin

nonlinear concepts. Many of the operational concept

the Army anticipates using in the future such as adv

vertical envelopment with mobile, protected forc

opposed to air assaults or air drops using simple foot-m

infantry) would entail an asymmetry of operational co

Asymmetries of technology have been comm

military history, particularly in wars that pitt

industrially advanced state against a backward one, s

Europe’s imperial wars of the 19th and 20th cen

While the Europeans brought a wide array of m

advantages to bear in their colonial wars, Hillaire 

captured their enduring trust in technological asym

when he wrote, “Whatever happens, we have got the M

gun and they have not.” This was not an empty cla

conflicts where the lesser developed antagonist do

have the time or the ability to adapt to advanced techn

it can be decisive. The Maxim gun, for instance, wa

used by Britain’s colonial forces in the Matabele w

1893-94. In one engagement, 50 soldiers fought off 

Matabele warriors with just four Maxim guns. C

enemies, though, tend to find counters to asymmet

technology during protracted wars. Vietnam provid

clearest example of this.

Asymmetries of will are important when one anta

sees its survival or vital interest at stake, and the o

protecting or promoting less-than-vital interests. Th

of asymmetry, particularly relevant to the United 

today, played a role in earlier conflicts in Vietnam, So

and Iraq. An asymmetry of will leads the antagonis

the higher stake to be willing to bear greater costs, 

greater risk, and undertake actions which th

committed antagonist might eschew on moral or 

grounds. Asymmetries of will are most relevant at th

of grand strategy. At the operational and tactical lev

equivalent of an asymmetry of will is an asymme

10
Napoleon held, “In war the moral is to the material as 

to one.” Asymmetries of will are closely relat

normative asymmetries which come into play w

conflict involves antagonists with different ethical o

standards. This becomes increasingly important 

contemporary security environment as the United 

faces enemies willing to use terrorism, ethnic clea

human shields, and the like. In the long term such a

may be self-defeating since they alienate pot

supporters, but they can generate desired results 

short term, particularly as they highlight any asymm

will.

Asymmetries of organization have also been imp

in the history of warfare. At times, organiza

innovations gave great advantage to a state even when 

not have a technological advantage or any other 

Examples include the Macedonian phalanx, the form

of Swiss pikemen which dominated European battl

during the Renaissance, the “nation in arms” that h

French Revolutionaries stave off a number of profes

European armies, the system of independent but mu

supporting corps created by Napoleon, and insu

undergrounds. In the future, state militaries ma

nonstate enemies organized as networks rather 

hierarchies, again leading to organizational asymme

Finally, asymmetries of patience or time persp

can be significant. These are conceptually linked 

asymmetry of will, but more often operate in cross-cu

conflicts. Specifically, an asymmetry of time persp

may occur when one antagonist enters a war willing to 

continue for a long period of time while their oppon

only able to sustain their will for a short war. For a var

reasons, the United States prefers the quick resolu

armed conflict. There is a sense on the part of Am

leaders that the congressional and public support f

use of force that does not involve vital national intere

a limited life span. Furthermore, many of the adv

11
precision bombs and missiles are in limited su

Restocking requires starting up dormant production 

Because of America’s global security commitm

involvement of the U.S. military in a protracted c

might encourage other enemies to undertake aggre

believing U.S. resources are spread too thin. The 

advantage in strategic mobility may produce a “quic

which is the preferred operational style. Knowin

preference and knowing or suspecting the limited Am

stockpile of precision weapons, an adversary might s

extend a conflict. In addition to putting a strain o

“quick win” preference, if the weapons become bl

collateral casualties will rise and the enemy may 

position of some moral advantage. This means th

shorter a conflict involving the U.S. military, the grea

American advantage. Asymmetries of patience h

cultural component as well. Americans are instinc

impatient, seeking fast resolution of any problem. D

the Vietnam War the point was often made that this st

stark contrast to the “Asian” perspective on time w

greater patience and willingness to prevail in a confli

lasts for years or decades. While sweeping cu

generalizations are fraught with danger, there is at 

kernel of truth in this one. Somewhere, the U.S. mili

likely to face an enemy attempting to take advantage 

asymmetry of patience.

The American Situation.

A number of things makes the United States pote

vulnerable to negative asymmetry. The American eco

society, national security organization, and infrastr

are all complex, creating many schisms and seams wh

enemy might attack. American values, particularly r

for due process of law, adherence to the law of 

conflict, and the accompanying desire to minimize coll

damage and noncombatant casualties, can create str

vulnerabilities or military risks. The openness 

12
using force slow the decisionmaking process. This al

create vulnerabilities and increase risk.

American military strategy, with its stress on 

engagement, long-range power projection, adv

technology, cooperation with allies and coalition par

and complex processes for force and doctrine develop

likewise poses potential vulnerabilities. As the Am

military moves toward greater reliance on inform

superiority, as an example, the loss or compromise o

important capability could have serious operationa

strategic effects including a loss of confidence. The fa

the United States is often engaged in actions that 

involve vital national interests, in obscure places, 

success is hard to define establishes the conditions 

asymmetry of will. And elements of the American str

culture, especially the lingering fear of “another Vietn

narrowly bounded notion of security which tends to 

barriers between the military and other sec

organizations like the police, and the tendency to see 

episodic and abnormal, add further vulnerabilities.

Yet even given these potential vulnerabilitie

United States also has a number of strengths that pre

to deal with asymmetric challenges and to take adva

of positive asymmetries. The U.S. military has some 

best personnel, leadership, equipment, and training 

world. No other military spends more time, money

effort on assessing emerging threats and undert

analysis and experimentation. In all operating en

ments, the U.S. military has clear superiority ove

existing enemy. In the information operating environ

the U.S. military can probably attain and hold dom

(although this has not been proven). The U.S. milit

unsurpassed in strategic agility due to its ability to p

and sustain combat power around the world; it is 

adept at joint and combined activities than any other 

power. The geographic isolation of the United State

most areas of armed conflict is an advantage. In an 

13
United States has built, the nation’s scientifi

technological base, its wealth, and, perhaps most of a

cultural affinity for innovation, adaptability

transformation all augment the ability to meet asym

challenges and make use of asymmetric advantage

news, then, is both bad and good.

Traditionally, as American strategic thinkers 

assessed the nation’s vulnerability to asymmetric th

they focused on operational level challenges. They 

their greatest attention to terrorism, particularly a

against the American homeland; the use of complex t

like urban areas; anti-access strategies using missil

mines; and political activities designed to dis

potential partners. These will pose serious proble

coming years, but are amenable to solutions that co

improved organization, operational concepts, doc

training, and technology. The military, DoD, and 

agencies of the government have ongoing progra

explore and respond to all of these. Less attention ha

given to other, equally feasible asymmetric chall

especially protracted warfare, political constriction

organizational asymmetry based on the emerge

networked enemies. In a sense, the United States is 

first stages of understanding asymmetry, of usi

positive form and countering its negative form. Much 

remains to be done.

Strategic Concepts.

The operational concepts that form the basis of the 

Vision—full spectrum dominance derived from dom

maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, a

dimensional protection—are designed to take advant

positive asymmetry, but are also relevant to coun

negative asymmetry. To best meet asymmetric chall

though, the U.S. military should adopt and develo

strategic concepts that build on the Joint Vision opera

14
blocks of a comprehensive strategy to make better 

positive asymmetry and counter negative asymmet

such they could also be integrated into the National M

Strategy and National Security Strategy.

Maximum Conceptual and Organizational Adapta

Two characteristics of asymmetric threats are partic

important: American defense planners today cannot 

precisely what sort of asymmetric threats will emerg

what types will prove effective; and, the effectiven

asymmetric threats which do have an impact will soo

later decline as the enemy adjusts. By maxim

conceptual and organizational adaptability and flex

the U.S. military can assure that it will rapidly co

emerging asymmetric threats, and speed the proc

which an asymmetric threat becomes insignifica

ineffective. Phrased differently, in a time of str

fluidity and asymmetry like the current one, the m

that develops new concepts and organizations more q

than its opponents has a decided advantage.

For the U.S. military, the process of adaptatio

transformation must become both continuous and 

DoD and the Services must institutionalize ways to d

Part of the solution involves shifting attitudes. Inno

and creativity must be nurtured and valued throu

both the uniformed and DoD civilian ranks. 

iconoclasts and nonconformists should not rule the mi

they should be valued, preserved and heard. E

mentation and research should focus on strategi

operational adaptability. For instance, experiments s

be run to create new types of organizations for dealin

new types of enemies. If networked nonstate en

become a major threat to American security, how q

could the nation form an effective organization to dea

them? Probably not quickly at all but, with rigorous 

and experimentation, this would be possible. 

likelihood, components of the future U.S. military mus

15
are to be countered.

DoD experimentation should focus more on pot

asymmetric challenges. Today the enemy in most S

and DoD experiments or wargames remains a trad

mechanized, state military which has invaded a 

boring state. While some asymmetric wargames hav

conducted, they should form a greater proportion 

total. Rather than seeking to confirm or endorse ex

transformation and modernization programs, 

wargames should a robust test of them. The red te

such wargames, whether composed of contractors, me

of the military, or DoD civilians, should be encoura

win, thus testing blue team organizations and concep

the National Training Center, the Army has learn

value to the blue team of defeat at the hands of a 

skilled red team. For some reason, this same proc

seldom applied to strategic wargames. But to mak

work, national political leaders, whether in D

Congress, must recognize that a blue team “defeat

wargame does not invalidate a transformati

modernization program, but simply provides a me

adjustment and refinement.

The process of focusing more analysis 

experimentation on asymmetric challenges wou

strengthened if it had an institutional focus. DoD s

consider the creation of something like a center for the 

of emerging threats closely linked to the Joint comm

the combatant commands, and the Service

independent enough to be imbued with creativit

innovative thinking. This center should be tied to the 

Experimentation Process at Joint Forces Comman

Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, the De

Intelligence Agency’s futures programs, and the s

experimentation programs, concept development ce

and battle labs. It should, in addition, have s

interagency and multinational connections.

16
prepare for asymmetric challenges by making modula

central criterion in the force development process

would apply to both systems and units. Versatilit

agility are the touchstones. The Services and the 

community should undertake extensive experimenta

the process of rapidly building task-specific organiz

from the ground up. There is a sound base of experien

knowledge given the U.S. military’s experiences at fo

joint task forces. This simply needs to be driven furt

explore how future task-specific organizations would 

interagency and multinational ties. Modularity shou

be a criterion for the development and procurem

systems. Multipurpose systems like the Blackhaw

HUMVEE set the stage for this. The logical follow-on 

be mobility systems that could do an even wider ar

tasks and be reconfigured according to the mission

would give the Army an added degree of flexibilit

better prepare it for asymmetric challenges. 

multipurpose systems are seldom as effective as 

purpose ones, in an age of strategic uncertainty whe

single purpose that should be focused on is not 

multipurpose systems might make the most sense 

could serve as a foundation for single purpose systems 

or if the strategic environment becomes clearer).

Focused Intelligence. There is growing agreement 

defense and intelligence communities that U.S. intell

efforts need to be at least partially refocus

nontraditional threats, including asymmetric ones

will be most effective if the intelligence collection, an

and dissemination process becomes increasingly 

agency, breaking down divisions and barriers betwe

various components of the intelligence communi

addition, intelligence focused on asymmetric threats s

make greater use of open sources—publicly ava

information appearing in print or electronic form.

16

 

1999 Joint Strategy Review suggested, the United 

should immediately undertake a multiagency, h

17
intelligence community should also be intimately in

in the process of maximizing adaptability and flex

particularly by strengthening the red teams in war

and experimentation.

The Joint Strategy Review emphasizes the ne

improved human intelligence (HUMINT) to co

asymmetric threats.

17

 But while improved HUMINT 

be useful, new technology for the collection, assess

fusion, and dissemination of intelligence would a

helpful. Human intelligence has very finite limita

Sources are not always available or reliable. Rathe

relying solely on overhead imagery and signals inter

nanotechnology and robotics could be combined int

intelligence systems that surpass both past tec

collection systems and HUMINT in some types of 

Defending against asymmetric challenges, then, dem

bold new thinking on methods of intelligence collecti

Minimal Vulnerability. The Joint Vision concept 

dimensional protection applies as well to asymm

threats. In the realm of force protection, current e

augmented by developments in robotics and non

weapons, can help counter terrorism and other attem

erode American will by causing casualties. Mi

vulnerability would also require resiliancy or nonde

ence on systems that are susceptible to attack. 

sources of anything, whether information systems, 

assets, port facilities, or some other part of the logisti

support systems, invite asymmetric attacks. With 

systems, redundancy may be so expensive that the 

asymmetric attack is worth running but, hopefully

cases will be rare. By the same token, all reasonable 

should be taken to avoid dependency on any one met

operation or system. For instance, if the U.S. m

becomes so dependent on information superiority t

cannot function without it, asymmetric attacks a

information systems could be devastating, perhaps 

decisive. This implies that even as the U.S. military 

18
skill at older, low-tech methods. Even if one ow

computer, it is still useful to know how to pe

mathematics with a pencil and paper.

Finding ways to project power against an enem

employs an access denial strategy and to sustain pro

forces without forward bases would be an important 

minimizing vulnerability. Since the campaigns of U

Grant and William Sherman, the “American way o

has called for the build-up of massive amounts of m

and supplies in a theater of operations, and then the 

this material advantage to attain decisive victory thro

strategy of annihilation. This is contingent on the en

absence of effective power projection to strike at th

bases. In the American Civil War, the Confederacy s

did not have the force necessary to capture Union dep

places like City Point, Virginia. In the European the

World War II, the English Channel, the Royal Air Forc

the Royal Navy kept the rear bases safe until ade

American forces were deployed. And, in the Gulf 

American military power protected the massive s

bases. But in a future where enemies often have 

precision guided munitions and weapons of 

destruction (along with delivery systems), in-th

sanctuaries may not exist. Even air superiority and t

missile defense would be inadequate agai

nuclear-armed enemy, since they cannot assure the 

100 percent effectiveness that is necessary. Given th

future American military may confront an enemy u

counter-deployment strategy in which sabotage or pre

guided munitions and ballistic missiles, whether 

nuclear, biological, and chemical warheads or conven

ones, are used to attack U.S. bases and staging areas b

the United States and in a theater of operations

threaten states that provide support, bases, staging 

or overflight rights to the United States.

An enemy using a counter-deployment strategy 

have to be met with a combination of long-range pre

19
missile defense, focused logistics, strategic dece

information assurance, and anti-terrorism. The mor

U.S. forces can limit the need for a lengthy build

forces, equipment, and supplies, the less risk posed 

counter-deployment strategy. As the 1997 National D

Panel wrote,

The days of the six-month build-up and secure, large, rear-a

bases are almost certainly gone forever. WMD [weapons of m

destruction] will require us to increase dramatically the me

to project lethal power from extended ranges.

18

The capacity to deploy forces and resupply them fro

continental United States directly into a thea

operations could prove invaluable, minimizing the ch

that states in the theater of operations could be intim

to the point that they deny the United States forward 

or staging areas.

An enemy using a counter-deployment strategy co

blunted in several interrelated ways. One would be th

greater intra-theater mobility via lighter force

systems such as high-speed, shallow draft sealift v

Another would be through use of what might be 

“theater reconfiguration areas” rather than trad

fixed bases. Such theater reconfiguration areas co

located in remote areas of nations which agree to host 

with a landing strip as the only fixed part of the base

the other things needed to prepare equipment and tro

combat could be mobile, concentrating just befo

inbound aerial convoy arrived and dispersing as soo

left. The inventory of supplies at a theater reconfigu

area would be kept to a minimum, and replenished o

necessary. Repair and hospital facilities would a

mobile and dispersed. Theater reconfiguration areas 

be protected by conventional concealment met

electronic masking, and a laser-based missil

air-defense web combining ground-based fire plat

long-loiter and quick-launch unmanned aerial v

20
platforms. Autonomous sentry systems whic

somewhere between a full-fledged robot and a 21st ce

mobile, smart mine could provide local sec

Host-nation support would be kept to a minimum to p

operational security. To complicate targeting by en

several decoy theater reconfiguration areas could be 

in each country that allowed them. Such a “shell 

could provide effective deception and thus complica

attempts to strike at the theater reconfiguration area

missiles.

Full Dimensional Precision. The American milita

remain vulnerable to normative and political asymm

The more that operations can limit collateral damag

reach a speedy resolution, the less likely these chal

will prove important. One way of doing that is with 

greater, full dimensional precision. A component of 

physical precision—the ability to hit targets with 

accuracy from great distances with precisely the d

physical effect. Physical precision derives from imp

intelligence, guidance systems and, increasingly, fro

ability to adjust or “tune” the effects of a particular w

A proposed electro-magnetic gun, for instance, cou

adjusted from a non-lethal setting to an extremely 

one.

19

 But there is more to precision than simply hitti

right target. Military strategists and commanders 

think in terms of psychological precision as well—sha

military operation to attain the desired attitudes, b

and perceptions on the part of both the enemy and 

observers, whether noncombatants in the area of oper

or global audiences. How might future militaries 

greater psychological precision? To some extent, tech

can help. It is vital to have a very wide range of m

capabilities—a “rheostatic” capability—to assure th

operation has the desired psychological affect

suggests a growing need for effective nonlethal we

particularly when the psychological objective 

demonstrate the futility of opposition without kill

21
is steeled rather than broken or that public opposi

mobilized. Some advocates of nonlethal weapons go so 

to see them as the central element in future a

conflict.

20

 While this is probably an overstatement

weapons will be integral to psychological precision.

Different forms of psychotechnology might allow g

psychological precision. Conceivably, technology mi

developed to give militaries the ability to alte

perceptions of targets, perhaps causing intense fear, 

or whatever reaction was required. But any state wi

capability and inclination to develop such technology s

be extraordinarily careful because of the potenti

violations of basic human rights. In the vast majo

cases, technology for psychological manipulation sho

eschewed. Some state or organization unbounded by e

and legal constraints, though, eventually may field an 

of psychotechnology weapons. Then the United Stat

have to decide whether to respond in kind or seek 

means of defense. The potential for a psychotechology 

race is real.

Technology, though, is only part of psychol

precision. There is a vast body of psychological an

particularly dealing with anxiety and fear, not adeq

integrated into military planning. When the goal is to 

fear and anxiety or collapse the will of an enem

operation should be phased and shaped for max

psychological impact. Successful militaries must take 

to assure that operational and strategic planning sta

psychologically astute, whether by educating the pla

themselves or using information technology to p

access to psychologists, cultural psychologists

members of other cultures. They should undertake 

cultural psychological studies aimed at building data 

and models which can help guide operational planni

Integrated Homeland Security. Modern technolog

globalization have changed the nature of str

22
conflict and warfare will only take place far fro

homeland. Future enemies will have the means to st

the American homeland, whether through mis

information attacks, or terrorism. To defend agains

the United States needs to develop a robust and inte

homeland security strategy and organization. Many 

are already underway in this arena. In particular, 

have been made in critical infrastructure protection a

military role in homeland defense. One of the big tas

the future, though, is to continue to seal the seams be

the array of agencies and organizations involv

homeland defense since these are the things that 

vulnerabilities that an enemy might take advantage 

Recommendations.

Ultimately, negative asymmetry can be mitigate

not eliminated. That said, the United States is not 

verge of disaster. Existing U.S. military forces, o

zations, technology, strategy, and doctrine can eithe

with most asymmetric threats or be quickly modified 

so. The more adaptable, flexible, and strategically ag

U.S. military is, the better it will be prepared to dea

asymmetry. Positive asymmetry will continue to p

the U.S. military with advantages over most enemies

so, the U.S. military should continue to refi

understanding of asymmetric challenges. Specifica

should:

• Adopt a more general and complete definit

asymmetry and use this as a foundation for doct

• Integrate the five strategic concepts, Max

Adaptability and Flexibility, Focused Intelli

Minimal Vulnerability, Full Dimensional Pre

and Integrated Homeland Security into Am

national security strategy.

23
1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., L

Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 66-67.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart,Strategy, 2d revised edition, New York: 

1974.

3. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and 

Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987, p. 5 and ff.

4. The most cogent expression of Massive Retaliation is 

Foster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Department 

Bulletin, Vol. 30, January 25, 1962, pp. 107-10.

5. Joint Publication (herafter Joint Pub) 1, Joint Warfar

Armed Forces of the United States, January 10, 1995, pp. IV-10 t

IV-11.

6. The same discussion of symmetrical and asymmetrical ac

included in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, July 16, 1997, pp. 6

and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1, 

III-10.

7. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quad

Defense Review, May 1997, Section II.

8. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st C

Report of the National Defense Panel, Washington, DC, Decemb

p. 11.

9. For instance, in 1998 CENTRA Technologies formed a blue 

panel on asymmetric warfare on a contract from the inte

community. One workshop, held in December 1998, included D

Hillen, Mr. Richard Kerr, Dr. Steven Metz, Admiral William 

USN (Ret.), Professor Martin van Creveld, and Lt. General Pa

Riper, USMC (Ret.). The project seems to have been dropped af

meeting.

10. Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2000

11. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Engaging Po

Peace: The 1998 Strategic Assessment, Washington, DC: N

Defense University, 1998, chapter 11.

24
1999, p. 2.

13. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War,” in Selected Works 

Tse-Tung, Vol II, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967, p. 17

14. Joint Vision 2020, p. 5.

15. For elaboration on this idea, see Steven Metz, Armed Co

the 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-M

Warfare, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies In

April 2000.

16. See Robert D. Steele, “Open Source Intelligence: What Is 

Is It Important to the Military?” reprinted at http://www.o

Proceedings/95Vol1/aab0aw.html; and Robert D. Stee

Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, Fairfax, VA: 

International Press, 2000, pp. 105-126. Steele is one of the pione

most ardent advocates of open source intelligence.

17. Joint Strategy Review 1999, pp. 31-32.

18. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st C

Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, p. 42.

19. U.S. Army Chief Scientist A. Michael Andrews, intervie

Ron Laurenzo, Defense Week, November 29, 1999, p. 6.

20. For example, John B. Alexander, Future War: Non

Weapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare, New York: St. M

1999.

25
Major General Robert R. Ivany

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors

Dr. Steven Metz

Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II

Director of Publications and Production

Ms. Marianne P. Cowling

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Christine A. Williams

Cover Artist

Mr. James E. Kistler