FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-4169

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CHARLES VANSMITH,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Respondent.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Original Jurisdiction.

May 10, 2018

ROBERTS, J.

The petitioner, Charles Vansmith, petitions this Court for a 

writ of certiorari. The petitioner argues that the trial court 

departed from the essential elements of law by using section 

775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2017), to determine that it still 

had jurisdiction to keep him placed in a secure residential facility

based on section 916.303(3), Florida Statutes (2017). We find that 

the trial court did not depart from the essential elements of law

and deny the petition.

On June 5, 1996, the State charged the petitioner with having 

committed two counts of lewd and lascivious acts in the presence 

of a child on March 4, 1996. On July 17, 1996, the petitioner was 

adjudged incompetent to proceed due to an intellectual disability. 

On January 5, 2005, the petitioner was committed to a secure 
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residential facility, and the criminal charges against him were 

dropped. At some point, the petitioner filed a motion with the trial 

court to terminate jurisdiction. The petitioner argued that each of 

his prior charges had a maximum sentence of fifteen years in 

prison and he had been placed in a secure residential facility for 

more than fifteen years. The petitioner argued that the trial court 

only had jurisdiction for fifteen years based on section 916.303(3). 

The trial court denied the motion finding that it had jurisdiction 

for thirty years based on the court’s ability to structure sentences 

consecutively in accordance with section 775.021(4)(a), which 

prompted the petitioner to file the instant petition for writ of 

certiorari. 

Certiorari is generally the proper procedural mechanism for 

seeking review of an order that involuntarily commits a person. 

Dep’t of Children & Families v. Ramos, 82 So. 3d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 

2d DCA 2012); Woods v. State, 969 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2007). Certiorari review is only available when the petitioner 

shows that the order under review (1) constitutes a departure from 

the essential elements of law and (2) results in a material injury 

for the remainder of the case, and (3) the harm cannot be remedied 

on appeal. City of Freeport v. Beach Cmty. Bank, 108 So. 3d 684, 

687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). The second and third prongs are what 

provide this Court with jurisdiction, so those elements must be 

analyzed first. Id. 

Because the petitioner’s liberty interests are at stake, this 

Court has jurisdiction. Certiorari jurisdiction also lies when a 

petitioner alleges that a trial court has acted in excess of its 

jurisdiction. Dep’t of Children & Families v. Carmona, 159 So. 3d 

165, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

The petitioner’s argument is predicated on the language 

contained in section 916.303(3). When interpreting statutes, courts

focus on legislative intent. Crews v. State, 183 So. 3d 329, 332 (Fla. 

2015). To discern legislative intent, a court first applies the plain 

and obvious meaning of the statutory text. Id. If the language 

provides a clear and unambiguous meaning, then the court will 

apply that meaning without resorting to the rules of statutory 

construction. Gaulden v. State, 195 So. 3d 1123, 1125 (Fla. 2016).

An ambiguity exists when reasonable people can find different 
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meanings in the same language. Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Clipper 

Bay Invs., LLC, 160 So. 3d 858, 862 (Fla. 2015). When there is an 

ambiguity, a court may look to the cannons of statutory

interpretation and construction. Anderson v. State, 87 So. 3d 774, 

777 (Fla. 2012). 

Section 916.303(3), states in relevant part:

A defendant’s placement in a secure facility may not 

exceed the maximum sentence for the crime for which the 

defendant was charged.

The phrase “maximum sentence” is not defined in chapter 

916. The phrase “maximum sentence” also means “maximum 

sentences” based on section 1.01(1), Florida Statutes (2017). Based 

on the plain language of the relevant portion of section 916.303(3), 

one could interpret the phrase “maximum sentence(s)” in two 

different ways. One interpretation is the maximum sentence a 

defendant could receive for each individual crime charged, and the 

other interpretation is the maximum allowable sentence based on 

a trial court’s sentencing structure. Since the relevant portion of 

section 916.303(3) is ambiguous, this Court resorts to the rules of 

statutory interpretation and construction. 

The legislative intent for chapter 916 is stated in section 

916.105, Florida Statutes (2017). The language contained in this 

section has remained relatively unchanged since it was enacted, 

with the exception of the enactment of subsection (4), which was 

added in 2006. See § 916.105, Fla. Stat. (1985-2017). Based on the 

stated legislative intent, it appears the Legislature was 

attempting to balance the rights and needs of the individuals with 

the need to protect society. The Legislature found the need to 

protect society so important that it made an escape or an 

attempted escape from a secure facility a second-degree felony

when it enacted this section. See § 916.175, Fla. Stat. (1985). In 

2006, the Legislature amended section 916.175 to require any 

punishment that was imposed for an escape or attempted escape 

to run consecutively to any former sentence that had been 

imposed. See § 916.1081(2), Fla. Stat. (2006-2017). 

A well-known rule of statutory construction is that the 

Legislature is presumed to know the statutes that are in existence 
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at the time it enacts new legislation. Barnett v. Dep’t of Mgmt. 

Servs., 931 So. 2d 121, 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). The Legislature 

enacted the relevant statutory language in 1983 in section 

916.13(3). When the new language was added, it read:

In no case may a client’s placement in a secure facility 

pursuant to this part exceed the maximum sentence for 

the crime for which he was charged. 

At the time, the Legislature enacted the above language in 

section 916.13(3), trial courts had been authorized to structure 

sentences consecutively under section 775.021(4) for seven years, 

see section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1976), and singular 

versions of words included the plural versions of words for decades, 

see section 1.01, Florida Statutes (1941). Because sections 

775.021(4) and 1.01(1) had been in existence before the Legislature 

enacted the statutory language at issue, the Legislature is 

presumed to have known that a trial court could determine that it 

had jurisdiction for an extended period of time based on a 

consecutive sentencing structure. 

The petitioner urges us to apply the rule of lenity, which is 

codified in section 775.021(1). The rule of lenity is a canon of last 

resort that requires any ambiguity in the statute to be resolved in 

favor of a defendant. Kasischke v. State, 991 So. 2d 803, 814 (Fla. 

2008). 

The rule of lenity applies to statutes that criminalize or 

penalize criminal behavior. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 

333, 342 (1981). Section 916.303 states:

(1) The charges against any defendant found to be 

incompetent to proceed due to intellectual disability or 

autism shall be dismissed without prejudice to the state 

if the defendant remains incompetent to proceed within a 

reasonable time after such determination, not to exceed 2 

years, unless the court in its order specifies its reasons 

for believing that the defendant will become competent to 

proceed within the foreseeable future and specifies the 

time within which the defendant is expected to become 

competent to proceed. The charges may be refiled by the 
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state if the defendant is declared competent to proceed in 

the future.

(2) If the charges are dismissed and if the defendant is 

considered to lack sufficient capacity to give express and 

informed consent to a voluntary application for services 

and lacks the basic survival and self-care skills to provide 

for his or her well-being or is likely to physically injure 

himself or herself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, 

the agency, the state attorney, or the defendant’s 

attorney shall apply to the committing court to 

involuntarily admit the defendant to residential services 

pursuant to s. 393.11.

(3) If the defendant is considered to need involuntary 

residential services for reasons described in subsection

(2) and, further, there is a substantial likelihood that the 

defendant will injure another person or continues to 

present a danger of escape, and all available less 

restrictive alternatives, including services in community 

residential facilities or other community settings, which 

would offer an opportunity for improvement of the 

condition have been judged to be inappropriate, the 

agency, the state attorney, or the defendant’s counsel 

may request the committing court to continue the 

defendant’s placement in a secure facility pursuant to 

this part. Any placement so continued must be reviewed 

by the court at least annually at a hearing. The annual 

review and hearing must determine whether the 

defendant continues to meet the criteria described in this 

subsection and, if so, whether the defendant still requires 

involuntary placement in a secure facility and whether 

the defendant is receiving adequate care, treatment, 

habilitation, and rehabilitation, including psychotropic 

medication and behavioral programming. Notice of the 

annual review and review hearing shall be given to the 

state attorney and the defendant’s attorney. A 

defendant’s placement in a secure facility may not exceed 

the maximum sentence for the crime for which the 

defendant was charged.
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Based on the plain language contained in section 916.303, the 

statute does not criminalize behavior. The petitioner has argued 

that it punishes him because his liberty has been taken away. 

Section 916.303(1) specifically allows charges to be reinstated if 

the petitioner becomes competent. If section 916.303 punishes 

criminal behavior, then the reinstatement of charges at a later 

date would be a violation of the principles against double jeopardy. 

Double jeopardy arguments have been advanced by civilly 

committed individuals and have been reviewed by the United 

States Supreme Court. In reviewing an argument that the Kansas 

Sexually Violent Predator Act (the Act) subjected a person to 

double jeopardy, the United States Supreme Court examined the 

Act to determine if the Act was civil or criminal in nature. Kansas 

v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360-71 (1997). The United States 

Supreme Court stated that even though a statute is placed within 

the civil statutes, the label is not always dispositive. Id. at 361.

Since the person committed argued that he was being punished, 

the court examined the objectives of the Act. Id. at 361-64. The 

two primary objectives of criminal punishment are retribution and 

deterrence. Id. at 361-62. Finding no evidence of retribution or 

deterrence in the Act and that the Act was civil in nature, the 

United States Supreme Court found that the Act did not violate 

the principles against double jeopardy. Id. at 369-71. 

Even though section 916.303 is contained in the criminal 

procedure and corrections section, that label is not definitive. 

Upon examining sections 916.303 and 916.105, we find no evidence 

of retribution or deterrence. Since there is no evidence of an intent 

to punish a person who has been committed with the aid of section 

916.303 and no evidence that section 916.303 criminalizes 

behavior, section 775.021(1) does not apply. 

Based on the foregoing, we find that the Legislature intended

section 775.021(4)(a) to be applied when determining the 

maximum sentence referred to in section 916.303(3). Since the 

trial court determined the petitioner’s maximum sentence utilizing 

section 775.021(4)(a), it did not depart from the essential elements 

of law. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to meet his burden, 

and we deny the petition for writ of certiorari. 

DENIED.
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WOLF and WETHERELL, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Marcia M. Perlin, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Steven Woods, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Respondent.