2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-8-2013

Roy Green v. Warden Bledsoe

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-3254

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Recommended Citation

"Roy Green v. Warden Bledsoe" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 409.

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-3254

___________

ROY ALLEN GREEN,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN BLEDSOE; ASSOCIATE WARDEN HUDSON; ASSOCIATE WARDEN 

MAJORANA; CAPTAIN TRATE; LT. HEPNER; LT. SCAMPONI; LT. EDINLER; 

BROWN, Health Services Admin; DR. PIGOS; PIEORIA, Physicians Assistant; 

RN DELEON

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 11-cv-00481)

District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

July 12, 2013

Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 8, 2013)

___________

OPINION

___________

PER CURIAM

Roy Allen Green appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 

Middle District of Pennsylvania, which granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss/motion for 
2

summary judgment in Green’s civil rights action. We will affirm the District Court’s

judgment.

In March 2011, Green filed a complaint concerning his treatment when at the United 

States Penitentiary, Lewisburg. After an incident in late October 2009 when alleged members 

of the Aryan Brotherhood assaulted correctional officers, Green (a suspected member of the 

Aryan Brotherhood) and certain other inmates were subjected to “double-cuffing” whenever 

they were moved. Green, who describes himself as a “large individual,” alleged that the cuffs 

used at Lewisburg were too small for his wrists and had to be forced on, resulting in cuts, open 

wounds, numbness, pins and needles, loss of dexterity, and permanent nerve damage. Green 

alleged that “big boy” cuffs were available but the defendants refused to use them, despite his 

complaints. Green stated that he was moved within the prison four times a day and that the use 

of the too-small cuffs for a full calendar year constituted “torture.” After a year, prison 

officials compromised and allowed Green to be cuffed in one small pair of handcuffs and one 

larger pair, which Green found “not as bad,” although he alleged that it still caused “pain, 

swelling, numbness, [and] occasional bruising.”1

The assigned Magistrate Judge construed the complaint as raising claims that the tight 

cuffing violated the Eighth Amendment, both through deliberate indifference to Green’s 

medical needs, and through use of excessive force. The Magistrate Judge recommended 

 1 Green apparently had been moved to a new facility by the time he filed his complaint. It is not clear 

when the move took place.
3

granting the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.2

The Magistrate Judge determined that the supervisory prison officials were not liable for 

excessive force based on their decision to order special restraints, as “Green’s past conduct and 

history amply justified this use of force; the force applied was modest, given the grave dangers 

inherent in Green’s penchant for assaultive conduct; the risk to staff and others posed by Green 

was great . . .; and Green’s ability to nearly kill another prisoner while held under these 

restraints

As to the medical claim, the 

Magistrate Judge noted that Green had “received on-going medical treatment for his wrist 

injuries,” including “examinations, treatment with ointment and bandages, use of warm 

compresses, and consultation and examination by outside medical experts.” The Magistrate 

Judge also noted that “medical staff [had] determined that removal of the double handcuffs was 

not medically necessary.” Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) at 33. The Magistrate Judge 

characterized the claims as mere disagreement as to the proper course of treatment. The 

Magistrate Judge further determined, citing Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010), that one 

defendant, DeLeon, was a Lieutenant Commander in the Public Health Service, and was thus 

immune from liability.

3

 2 Defendants had filed a document characterized as a “Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for 

Summary Judgment.” The Magistrate Judge determined that the motion gave Green notice that it 

might be considered as a motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge noted that Green also 

submitted numerous documents in connection with his response to the Defendants’ motion, so he 

would not be prejudiced if the Court construed the motion as one for summary judgment. 

demonstrated that it would have been extremely dangerous to further temper these 

security measures.” R&R at 37-38. The Magistrate Judge also remarked that Green could not 

3 In fact, as the District Court recognized in its Memorandum accompanying the order adopting the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report, Green was not restrained at the time of the referenced incident; he had been 

released from the cuffs for recreation.
4

“premise a constitutional claim on the failure of prison supervisors to act favorably upon his 

complaints,” because “inmates like Green have no constitutional right to a grievance procedure 

in prison.” R&R at 38 & 39. The Magistrate Judge further concluded that correctional officers 

were entitled to qualified immunity because their use of force was “objectively reasonable 

under the circumstances.” R&R at 40-41. The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation over Green’s objections, and Green timely appealed.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. To the extent the District Court 

determined whether evidence supporting a summary judgment motion (or a motion in 

opposition thereto) was competent, we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. 

Schubert v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., 148 F.3d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1998). After reviewing 

the underlying evidentiary decisions, we review the District Court’s order granting summary 

judgment de novo, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Id.; Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2011). A grant of summary 

judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a).

Green first argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly considered a videotape 

submitted by the Defendants, which apparently4

 4 Green was not apprised of the contents of the video; it was submitted for in camera inspection by the 

Magistrate Judge.

recorded an incident in May 2010 during 

which Green repeatedly stabbed another inmate. Green argued that the videotape was 

irrelevant, as the double-cuffing policy was not instituted because of the incident; in fact, the 
5

policy had been in place for several months before the incident. While this is true, the video 

confirmed the need to continue double-cuffing when transporting Green, and thus was relevant 

in determining whether the prison’s security measures constituted excessive force. 

Green also argues that the District Court erred by rejecting as hearsay the declarations 

of fellow prisoners that he submitted in support of his response to the summary judgment 

motion. However, it appears that the Magistrate Judge and District Court Judge considered all 

the evidence that Green submitted.5

The “‘core judicial inquiry’” in cases involving excessive force is “not whether a certain 

quantum of injury was sustained, but rather ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to 

maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Wilkins v. 

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 

(1992)). “In determining whether a correctional officer has used excessive force in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment, courts look to several factors including: (1) the need for the 

application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was 

used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4) the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and 

inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to 

them; and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” Brooks v. Kyler, 

 R&R at 40; Dist. Ct. Op. at 3, n.2. Having determined 

that the District Court properly considered the videotape, and having determined that the 

District Court considered the declarations of Green’s fellow prisoners, we now consider 

whether summary judgment was warranted as to Green’s claims.

 
6

204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986) (internal 

quotations omitted)). 

While Green disputes the prison’s purported reasons for instituting double-cuffing,5

Although it is not clear whether Green suffered any permanent injury from the double-cuffing, 

he indisputably suffered minor, temporary injuries. Although the District Court did not 

explicitly discuss the two remaining factors relating to the amount of force used, given Green’s 

propensity for violence, we cannot say that the amount of force used was grossly 

disproportionate to the need for the use of force. Green argues that “big boy” cuffs could have 

been used to temper the severity of the force. While this factor may weigh in his favor, 

considering the totality of the Whitley factors, we hold that the District Court properly granted 

summary judgment on the excessive force claims. 

he 

concedes that double-cuffing was permissible. Green also does not directly dispute the finding 

that he posed a threat to the safety of inmates and prison staff. 

As to the claim that certain of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Green’s 

medical needs, we agree with the District Court that summary judgment was appropriate. Even 

assuming, without deciding, that Green demonstrated a “serious” medical need, Green cannot 

show that the medical defendants were deliberately indifferent to his need, as we agree with the 

District Court that the “abrasions and contusions suffered by [Green] on his wrists have been 

 5 Green disputes the prison’s contention that he is a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, and he disputes 

the factual basis for the Magistrate Judge’s statement that Green “repeatedly stockpiled weapons, stole 

handcuff keys, assaulted fellow prisoners and indulged in lethal violence.” Appellant’s Brief at 4, 17, 

21.
7

routinely and conscientiously treated by prison’s medical staff.”6

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court judgment.

 Dist. Ct. Op. at 5.

 6 Thus, we need not reach Green’s allegation that the District Court improperly found that defendant 

DeLeon was immune from Bivens liability because the allegation of the DeLeon’s employment in the 

Public Health Service was supported only by an unverified assertion.