[Cite as State v. Daley, 2011-Ohio-3584.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 95689 

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs.

 JOHN DALEY 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-534962 

BEFORE: Jones, J., Kilbane, A.J., and Sweeney, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 21, 2011 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 

Dennis N. Loconti 

Connick & Associates Co., L.P.A. 

Northpoint Tower, Suite 1720 

1001 Lakeside Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 

Robert L. Tobik 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

BY: John T. Martin 

 Cullen Sweeney 

Assistant Public Defenders 

310 Lakeside Avenue 

Suite 400 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

American Civil Liberties Union 

BY: Carie L. Davis 

 Melvyn R. Durchslag 

 James L. Hardiman 

Max Wohl Civil Liberties Center 

4506 Chester Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44103

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

William D. Mason 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Marc D. Bullard 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
 LARRY A. JONES, J.:

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, John Daley, appeals from the trial court’s judgment 

finding him incompetent to stand trial, ordering that he be hospitalized for restoration to 

competency, and ordering that he be treated with antipsychotic medication if needed. 

We reverse and remand. 

I. Procedural History and Facts 

{¶ 2} Daley was charged in March 2010 with retaliation, intimidation, aggravated 

menacing, menacing, and telecommunications harassment. The charges stemmed from 

allegedly threatening voicemail messages left by Daley on the telephone messaging 

system of an employee of the Cuyahoga County Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”). 

 The charges also stemmed from an allegedly threatening letter written by Daley to the 

CSEA employee. 

{¶ 3} The trial court referred Daley to the court’s psychiatric clinic for a 

competency evaluation and a hearing was held on same. The evaluating psychiatrist, Dr. 

Stephen Noffsinger, diagnosed Daley with psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified, 

and opined that Daley was not competent to stand trial because he was not able to assist in 

his defense. Daley declined an independent evaluation.1

 

 1

The trial court’s docket shows that during the pendency of this appeal Daley filed a motion 

for an independent psychiatric evaluation, which the trial court granted. 
{¶ 4} Daley testified at the competency hearing that he had been and was able to 

continue assisting his attorney in his defense. He also testified that his descriptions of 

the American legal system, such as his description of divorce court as the “high court of 

Satan,” were not meant to hurt anybody, but were based on his religious belief that 

divorce is against the word of God. 

{¶ 5} At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Daley incompetent to 

stand trial and ordered him hospitalized for restoration to competency. The trial court 

also ordered that Daley be treated with antipsychotic medication if needed. 

{¶ 6} Daley raises two assignments of error for our review: 

“[I.] The trial court erred in finding that the defendant is not competent to stand 

trial and ordering him transferred to Northcoast Behavioral Healthcare for 

restoration to competency, including its finding that treatment with antipsychotic 

medication is medically appropriate, in the defendant’s best interest and is the least 

restrictive intervention to restore him to competency. 

“[II.] The trial court erred and deprived appellant of his right under the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution to due process of law when it 

ordered forced medication.” 

{¶ 7} The American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. (“ACLU”), 

as a friend of the court, raises two assignments of error for our review: 

“[I.] Appellant’s religious beliefs, no matter how unorthodox, are protected by the 

First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I §7 of the Ohio 

Constitution and therefore cannot be the sole basis upon which to base a finding of 

incompetence. 

“[II.] The trial court erred and deprived appellant of his right under the Fifth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution to due process of law when it 

ordered his forced medication.” 

 

II. Law and Analysis 
{¶ 8} We consider Daley’s and the ACLU’s first assignments of error together. 

R.C. 2945.37 provides in relevant part as follows: 

“(B) In a criminal action in a court of common pleas, a county court, or a 

municipal court, the court, prosecutor, or defense may raise the issue of the 

defendant’s competence to stand trial. If the issue is raised before the trial has 

commenced, the court shall hold a hearing on the issue as provided in this section. 

* * * 

“*** 

“(G) A defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. If, after a hearing, 

the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that, because of the defendant’s 

present mental condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature 

and objective of the proceedings against the defendant or of assisting in the 

defendant’s defense, the court shall find the defendant incompetent to stand trial 

and shall enter an order authorized by section 2945.38 of the Revised Code.” 

{¶ 9} An appellate court will not disturb a competency determination if there was 

“some reliable, credible evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion.” State v. 

Williams (1986), 23 Ohio St.3d 16, 19, 490 N.E.2d 906. The adequacy of the “data 

relied upon by the expert who examined the [defendant] is a question for the trier of fact.” 

 Id. 

{¶ 10} In In re Milton (1987), 29 Ohio St.3d 20, 23-24, 505 N.E.2d 255, the Ohio 

Supreme Court stated: 

“The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 7, Article I of 

the Ohio Constitution safeguard an individual’s freedom to both choose and 

employ religious beliefs and practices. See Bd. of Edn. of Cincinnati v. Minor 

(1872), 23 Ohio St. 211, 250. A person’s religious beliefs are protected 

absolutely. Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 

903, 84 L.Ed. 1213. The state may not interfere with the expression of belief, nor 

may it ‘compel behavior offensive to religious principles.’ (Emphasis deleted.) 

School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp (1963), 374 U.S. 203, 250, 83 S.Ct. 

1560, 1586, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (Brennan, J., concurring).” 
{¶ 11} Upon review, we do not find that there was “some reliable, credible 

evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusion” that Daley was incompetent. Rather, 

Dr. Noffsinger’s opinion that Daley was incompetent, formulated after an hour and 

ten-minute evaluation, was based solely on Daley’s religious beliefs. Specifically, Dr. 

Noffsinger opined that Daley, a “radical Christian,” “expresses such extreme intensity of 

religious belief in very unorthodox religious beliefs to the point to constitute psychosis.” 

Noffsinger further testified that treating Daley would “change his psychotic symptoms of 

which are a religious theme[,]” so that his “intensity and [ ] preoccupation with his 

religious beliefs will be greatly decreased.” 

{¶ 12} Daley’s religious beliefs are constitutionally protected, however. Because 

the record demonstrates that Dr. Noffsinger’s diagnosis was based solely on Daley’s 

religious beliefs, we find that the trial court erred in finding him incompetent. 

{¶ 13} In light of the above, Daley’s and the ACLU’s first assignments of error are 

sustained. Given our disposition of each of the first assignments of error, the second 

assignments of error are moot and we do not address them. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). 

 

Judgment reversed; case remanded to trial court for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee his costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

LARRY A. JONES, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, A.J., and 

JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., CONCUR