FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D2023-0571

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ROGER MARION LOFTON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.

Linda L. Nobles, Judge.

May 8, 2024

PER CURIAM.

Appellant Rodger Lofton appeals the denial of his motion for 

postconviction relief. We affirm.

Appellant was convicted of attempted second degree murder, 

and he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 30 years. That 

conviction and sentence were summarily affirmed by this Court. 

See Lofton v. State, 237 So. 3d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). This 

conviction followed the shooting of Anthony Booth, an 

acquaintance. Appellant has maintained that he was acting in 

self-defense as Booth tried to rob Appellant, but the prosecution 

argued Appellant shot Booth because of a dispute over real 

property. 
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Following the direct appeal, Appellant moved for 

postconviction relief raising five claims of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel, a claim of newly discovered evidence, and a claim 

that the verdict was inconsistent. After receiving a response from 

the State, the trial court ordered an evidentiary hearing on two 

grounds (two and seven) of the motion. Appellant was appointed 

counsel for the hearing.

In ground two, Appellant claimed his trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to investigate and depose a witness – Bryan 

Taylor (sometimes spelled Brian Taylor in the record). According 

to Appellant, Taylor knew Booth intended to rob Appellant and, in 

fact, supplied Booth with a gun. Had defense counsel investigated 

Taylor, Appellant’s claim of self-defense would have been 

bolstered, he argued. In ground seven, Appellant alleged that 

Taylor sent defense counsel correspondence after the trial. Such 

correspondence constitutes newly discovered evidence, Appellant 

claims.

At the evidentiary hearing, Appellant’s trial counsel testified, 

and through cross-examination, it was established that defense 

counsel was informed of the identity of Taylor before trial, but 

counsel failed to investigate further. Defense counsel 

acknowledged receiving a letter from Taylor after the trial, which 

he forwarded to appellate counsel. 

Taylor was also called to testify at the evidentiary hearing, 

but before his testimony started, the trial court warned Taylor that 

he would be admitting to a felony if he, a convicted felon, testified 

that he possessed a firearm on the day of the shooting. In 

response, Taylor stated he no longer wished to testify. But 

Appellant called him anyway. When asked whether he had sent a 

letter to defense counsel and whether he had been with Appellant 

or Booth on the day of the shooting, he “plead[ed] the Fifth.” 

On cross by the State, Taylor testified he has known Appellant 

since childhood “through the neighborhood.” Likewise, he knew 

Booth. Taylor heard Booth had been shot, but he was addicted to 

heroin back then, so everything was a “haze.” He did not attempt 

to contact Appellant thereafter, Taylor testified. 
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Appellant also testified. He explained that he did tell defense 

counsel that Taylor was a potential witness for the defense. He 

added that he previously sold drugs, and Appellant believed Booth 

shot him because Appellant was no longer selling drugs to him. 

The trial court then entered a written order addressing all of 

Appellant’s claims. Pertinent to the instant appeal, the trial court 

found with respect to defense counsel’s failure to investigate and 

depose Bryan Taylor that counsel was indeed deficient given the 

information provided to him. However, the trial court found that 

defense counsel’s deficient performance did not prejudice the 

defense. The trial court observed that Taylor did not testify at the 

evidentiary hearing that he had prior knowledge of any intent on 

the part of Booth to rob Appellant. Nor did Taylor testify, the trial 

court noted, that he ever supplied Booth with a gun. 

The trial court also denied relief as to ground one of the 

motion, a denial which Appellant now challenges. In that claim, 

Appellant had argued that defense counsel was ineffective for 

failing to impeach Booth’s trial testimony. Appellant claimed that 

Booth testified in deposition and at trial that several times he went 

to the back room of the residence where Appellant was to help 

move items, including an air conditioning unit. Had defense 

counsel offered photographs of the back room, then the jury would 

have seen that there was very little to move out of the back room 

and would have discredited Booth’s version of events, Appellant 

had claimed. 

But in denying relief on this ground, the trial court found that 

Appellant was misrepresenting Booth’s testimony. Booth testified 

that he was called to the back room several times by Appellant, 

rather than walking to the back room several times. Moreover, 

defense counsel did ask about the air conditioner during 

Appellant’s trial testimony and that of another witness. Further, 

photographs of the residence, including the back room, were 

admitted at trial, which the jury could have examined when 

evaluating the credibility of the witnesses.

On appeal, Appellant argues that defense counsel should have 

used “blood trail” evidence obtained from the site of the shooting 

in the residence to impeach Booth’s trial testimony. This “blood 
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trail” argument was not raised below. Interestingly, in ground 

four of his motion, Appellant referred to the fact that “only one 

drop” of blood was found in the residence. This is hardly argument 

that a “blood trail” would have contradicted Booth’s version of 

events, and anyway, in ground four, Appellant argued defense 

counsel was ineffective for failing to use the “one drop” and 

gunshot residue as evidence that Booth was a shooter as well as 

Appellant. Such an argument is very different from what has been 

raised on appeal. As it was not raised below, the “blood trail” 

argument is not preserved for appellate consideration. See 

Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985) (“In order to be 

preserved for further review by a higher court, an issue must be 

presented to the lower court and the specific legal argument or 

ground to be argued on appeal or review must be part of that 

presentation if it is to be considered preserved.”). 

As for the failure of defense counsel to investigate and depose 

Bryan Taylor, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant 

did not establish prejudice, as was his burden to do. While Taylor 

did appear at the evidentiary hearing, he offered no testimony 

which would establish that the outcome of the trial would have 

been different had he testified. While Appellant claimed in his 

postconviction motion that Taylor knew Booth planned to rob 

Appellant and that Taylor gave Booth a gun, there was no evidence 

of such offered in the postconviction proceeding. To prevail on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show both 

that trial counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the 

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant so as to deprive 

him of a fair trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984); Everett v. State, 54 So. 3d 464, 471-72 (Fla. 2010). A 

movant “must establish prejudice by ‘show[ing] that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” 

Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1103 (Fla. 2008) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A reasonable probability is a 

“probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Id. Given the lack evidence that Taylor’s trial testimony would 

have contradicted the prosecution’s theory of the case, had he been 

called, Appellant failed to establish he was prejudiced.
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Appellant requests that the remaining grounds in his motion 

be reviewed, though he does not make any argument as to those 

grounds on appeal. Given the lack of specific argument on these 

remaining grounds, we affirm. See Givens v. State, 314 So. 3d 765 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (explaining an issue is abandoned when no 

argument is made in the initial brief). 

Accordingly, the denial of postconviction relief is AFFIRMED. 

B.L. THOMAS, BILBREY, and TANENBAUM, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Roger Marion Lofton, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Zachary F. Lawton, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.