U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i

38–837 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–72]

IRAQ: TRENDS AND RECENT SECURITY

DEVELOPMENTS

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

JULY 18, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director

MIKE CASEY, Professional Staff Member

STEPHANIE SANOK, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, July 18, 2007, Iraq: Trends and Recent Security Developments .... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, July 18, 2007 ....................................................................................... 51

WEDNESDAY, JULY 18, 2007

IRAQ: TRENDS AND RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute ..... 11

Mathews, Dr. Jessica T., President, Carnegie Endowment for International

Peace ..................................................................................................................... 7

Perry, Dr. William J., Co-Director, Preventive Defense Project, Center for

International Security Cooperation, Stanford University ................................. 4

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Kagan, Dr. Frederick W. .................................................................................. 75

Mathews, Dr. Jessica T. ................................................................................... 55

Perry, Dr. William J. ........................................................................................ 66

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

List of Notional Political Timeline, dating from September 2006 to March

2007 ................................................................................................................ 91

Map of the Locations of the Major Iraqi Army and National Police Divisions submitted by Dr. Frederick W. Kagan .............................................. 92

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 95

(1)

IRAQ: TRENDS AND RECENT SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 18, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:12 p.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. And before we

welcome our witnesses, I have a very sad announcement that

former General Wayne Downing, the former commander of Special

Operations Command (SOCOM), died yesterday suddenly of meningitis, and a good friend of all of ours through the years, and I

ask that we have a moment of silence and respect the memory of

General Wayne Downing, please.

[Moment of silence.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Today our committee

gathers to conduct another hearing on the ongoing war in Iraq.

This series of hearings, which will continue through this month

and into September, all are designed to look at the American national security interests in the Middle East and Iraq and what

strategy might best safeguard those interests while allowing for the

reset of our military to be prepared for challenges elsewhere.

We are fortunate to have with us three well-respected experts to

share their views on Iraq on where we should go from here: Dr.

William Perry, the former Secretary of Defense and member of the

Iraq Study Group; Dr. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, the President of

the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Dr. Frederick Kagan, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. And we welcome each of you and thank you for appearing

with us to discuss the trends regarding Iraq.

The last two weeks have seen several major developments in the

political discussion about the way forward in Iraq. Last week the

President issued the interim report on progress made by the Government of Iraq toward meeting the benchmarks included in the

recent Supplemental Appropriations Act. The interim report

showed little or no progress made toward reconciliation in Iraq.

The report judged satisfactory progress on only 8 of 18 benchmarks, even though most of the political benchmarks were approved by the Iraqi Political Committee on National Security, a

body that includes the President of Iraq, Vice Presidents, the leadVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
2

ers of major political parties, and reaffirmed by the Iraqi President

of the Council last fall.

I might also mention that based on unofficial translation, that

group approved 16 benchmarks called ‘‘Notational Political

Timeline’’ dating from September 2006 to March 2007. And, without objection, I will place this list in the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on

page 91.]

The CHAIRMAN. Further, a realistic reading of the report shows

that even on most of those benchmarks rose claim that the Iraqis

were making satisfactory progress. The progress was at best incremental and could not provide a reliable indication that the benchmarks could actually be achieved either by the time of the September report or in the foreseeable future. The only exception to this

conclusion were two benchmarks that were actually achieved by

the Iraqis before either the President or Congress established

benchmarks.

Last week, not long after the interim report was issued, the

House of Representatives passed H.R. 2956, the Responsible Redeployment from Iraq Act. This bill passed by a bipartisan vote, and

it would require the President to begin a redeployment of U.S.

forces from Iraq and would mandate that the transition to a more

limited set of missions in Iraq be complete by April of next year.

It would also require a comprehensive diplomatic, political, economic strategy in which these limited missions could be undertaken.

I introduced this bill because I believe that we are doing a real

harm to our military by following a failed policy in Iraq, and that

by blindly pursuing the President’s latest strategy, we are accepting too much strategic risk.

The third recent development was release of the unclassified key

judgments from the National Intelligence Estimate on the terrorist

threat to our country. The NIE confirms what I feared for some

time now; that while our forces have been tied down in Iraq, al

Qaeda has been rebuilding its strength in the border regions of

Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Iraq has proven to be a distraction from the war on those who

attacked us on September the 11th. I believe we must move to a

more limited presence in Iraq so we can dedicate more resources

toward finally eliminating al Qaeda and posturing our forces to

deal with future strategic threats.

Again, I would like to thank our witnesses, our outstanding witnesses today, for appearing before us. I hope they will address their

views to the current developments and trends in Iraq and share

their thoughts on where we go from here.

Now our Ranking Member, my good friend Duncan Hunter,

would you make your comments please?

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for teeing

this hearing up today. I think it is very timely. Gentlemen, and

3

ma’am, thank you for being with us today and sharing your

thoughts with us.

We have all watched or seen this interim report and seen the

ranking and the grading that the Administration has given on the

18 factors, 8 with some satisfactory progress, 8 with non-satisfactory progress, and 2 that haven’t been pursued long enough to be

given a grade. And we know that everyone, including the insurgents and the terrorists, as well as this Nation and our allies, are

looking forward to the September 15 report. And so I think it is

absolutely appropriate that you folks appear before us and give us

your take on how things are going in the theater.

So especially with respect to the operation that is—this Operation Phantom Thunder, which is the name given the surge which

has now been in place at full strength for some 33 days. So we are

looking forward to your comments on this.

One thing that I am particularly interested in is—and in my personal view is more important than the political accomplishments of

the Iraqi Government—is the standup of the Iraqi military. So I

would particularly like to get your thoughts on the state of equipage and training, and I think, most importantly, the military

operational experience of the Iraqi Army. And the last report we

had was that there are 121—or 129 battalions existent, that many

of them now have some fairly—have been in some fairly contentious zones for extended deployments and have considerable

amount of combat experience. Others have been in more benign

areas and still don’t have a great deal of combat experience.

But your thoughts on that, on how the rotation is going in the

Baghdad region particularly, but also Anbar and in the Sunni Triangle. You may recall that one thing that a number of us had felt

was important was rotating Iraqi battalions from some of the more

benign areas into the contentious zones, getting battlefield experience under their belts and providing at the same time some relief

for the units that have been operating on an extended basis in

those battle zones. So if you could give us your thoughts on that,

particularly—and with respect to what combat missions the Iraqi

forces have been able to accept the lead in and what others you

think they are now primed and ready to take the lead in, and what

steps we can take and the other Coalition partners can take to encourage them to take on greater combat roles.

Understanding the Iraqis are an independent nation, they take

our recommendations for their deployment of troops as just that—

as recommendations. And particularly I would like to have your

thoughts on what other actions we can take to ensure that when

we leave Iraq, we leave it with an Iraqi military in place that has

a good deal of battlefield experience under its belt when the United

States hands this security burden off to them.

So thank you very much for being with us today. And, Mr. Chairman, this is absolutely the most important issue before the American people right now and before us. So I look forward to the hearing. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Dr. Perry, why don’t you be the lead-off batter?

Dr. PERRY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

4

The CHAIRMAN. We understand that you just got in, and we appreciate your extra efforts in being with us this morning. Dr. Perry.

STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM J. PERRY, CO-DIRECTOR, PREVENTIVE DEFENSE PROJECT, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL

SECURITY COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Dr. PERRY. Thank you. I would like to submit my written testimony for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. Thank you.

Dr. PERRY. And I would give you some highlights of that in my

oral statement.

Last December the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group

commissioned by the Congress, reported that the situation in Iraq

is grave and deteriorating. They recommended a new strategy that

entailed a decreased role for the U.S. military and a dramatically

increased role for political and diplomatic engagement. In effect,

they were recommending a surge in diplomacy.

In January, President Bush rejected these recommendations and

announced, instead, a surge in American military forces, with no

apparent change in diplomacy. Since the President announced his

surge strategy, our forces in Iraq have gradually been increased,

and the full complement of about 25,000 additional troops was

reached late in June. The bulk of these additional troops were sent

initially to Baghdad. But as violence increased in other districts,

some of them have been moved to troubled districts.

To this date, the overall level of violence in Iraq and the casualties suffered by American troops has not gone down. Generally,

whenever American troops are deployed in a district, the violence

decreases in that district but increases elsewhere. One positive exception, however, is the Anbar Province where violence has decreased throughout the province. However, the decrease in violence

in Anbar does not seem to be directly related to the surge.

When the Iraq Study Group was in Iraq last September, General

Chiarelli reported that the Sunni tribes in Anbar were beginning

to cooperate with American forces in fighting the al Qaeda units in

that district. We reported that favorable trend in the ISG report

and recommended that this political development should be exploited to the maximum extent possible. It is encouraging to see

that happening now.

This development demonstrates how profoundly political combinations can affect military operations. Indeed, it is a clear indication that any chance of success in Iraq depends not on a military

surge, but a political and diplomatic surge. In my testimony today,

I will explain why I believe the ISG proposal better serves the interests of the United States than the current military surge. But

first I will briefly look back to consider how the disastrous situation in Iraq arose.

The Administration invaded Iraq because of the alleged imminent dangers to the United States from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and their alleged connection to al Qaeda, neither of which turned out to be correct. They also cited their goal

of bringing stability to the Mideast by creating a democratic government in Iraq. But the task of imposing a democratic government

in Iraq turned out to be substantially more difficult than the AdVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
5

ministration had imagined. Indeed, we may never know whether it

was even possible, since the Administration’s attempts to do so

were burdened with serious strategic errors.

In particular, four errors were the most consequential. The Administration failed to get support from regional powers and from

key allies. They did not send in enough troops to maintain security

after the Iraqi army was defeated. They disbanded the Iraqi army,

police, and civil servants a few weeks after the Iraqi army was defeated, and they pushed the Iraqi Provisional Government to establish a constitution and hold elections, but in a faulty process that

did not adequately protect minority rights, thus setting the stage

for a bloody power struggle between Shias and Sunnis.

The cumulative effect of all these strategic errors is a disastrous

security situation in Iraq which continues to deteriorate. The media

reports every day how many American troops have been killed. But

I want to point out an even greater tragedy that does not get as

much attention. Since the war began, almost 30,000 U.S. military

personnel have been killed, maimed, or wounded. The media also

reports on the statistics of Iraqis killed in the sectarian violence.

But I want to point out that well over a million Iraqis already have

left the country, including most Iraqi professionals on whom the

country’s rebuilding depends.

As grim as this situation is, it could become even worse when

U.S. soldiers leave, as the Administration has stated. But in the

absence of political reconciliation, that could be true whether we

leave a year from now or whether we leave five years from now.

I want to repeat that. In the absence of political reconciliation, the

increase in violence could be true whether we leave a year from

now or five years from now.

In the face of this growing disaster, the Congress commissioned

an independent bipartisan study, charged to reach consensus on

the way forward in Iraq. We met two or three days each month

from March to August of last year, being briefed by military and

political experts. A very important part of our fact-finding was consulting with the Iraqi Government, so we went to Baghdad in September and spent four days meeting with all of the top officials of

the Iraqi Government as well as our military commanders in Iraq.

After we returned from Iraq, we spent six intensive days trying to

reach a consensus. This process was very difficult, and it is a tribute to our cochairman that we were able to succeed.

The ISG report was released to the public on 6 December, and

we recommended the following changes:

Shift the mission of U.S. troops from combat patrolling to building up the proficiency and professionalism of the Iraqi Army, including embedding some U.S. soldiers so they could provide role

models and on-the-job training for Iraqi soldiers.

Begin pulling out U.S. combat brigades with a goal of having

them all out by the first quarter of 2008, except—except for a

strong reaction force needed for force protection and for the fight

against al Qaeda in Iraq.

Continue for the indefinite future the support of Iraqi forces with

intelligence, logistics, and air support.

6

Provide both positive and negative incentives for the Iraqi Government to accelerate their reconciliation process and oil revenuesharing so the Sunnis have a stake in a stable Iraq.

And finally, mount an intensive diplomatic effort to persuade

friendly regional powers to assist economically, politically, and with

training, and to put pressure on unfriendly regional powers to stop

arming militias and fomenting violence.

I would point out to you that this is not a defeatist strategy, but

one that recognizes the importance of stabilizing Iraq, and proposes

that change in strategy that recognizes the reality that for four

years our strategy has not achieved that stability in spite of the heroic efforts of our troops.

If the recommendations to the ISG would be followed, many of

our combat brigades would be out of Iraq by the first quarter of

next year. As our Army combat brigades and Marine units return

to their bases in the United States, the Defense Department will

have a huge budget and management problem in restoring them to

full combat readiness. This problem is of special concern to this

committee because of the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in constituting and equipping our Armed Forces.

The Army, all of whose active brigades with high readiness levels

at the beginning of the war, presently has no active brigades not

already deployed, that readiness level needed to meet future contingencies, and low readiness levels invite such contingencies. Indeed, our security may already have suffered because of the perception of Iran and North Korea that our forces are tied down in Iraq.

The Congress also needs to consider the role of the National

Guard, since the compact with these citizen-soldiers has been shattered by extended deployments that have caused many of them to

lose their jobs, or even their families.

In sum, I believe that the President’s diplomatic strategy is too

timid and his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the

lasting and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to

succeed because it is tactical, not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi Government; and because it

would only deepen the divide in this country.

The ISG proposal has a better chance because it recognizes that

the key actions needed in Iraq to effect lasting results must be

taken by the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi Army and because it

provides the support and the incentives for those actions.

Most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan Iraq

Study Group provide an opportunity for Americans to come together again as one Nation indivisible.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much, Dr. Perry. Again, we appreciate your effort in being with us this morning.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Perry found in the Appendix on

page 66.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Mathews, Jessica Mathews, thank you for

being with us also.

7

STATEMENT OF DR. JESSICA T. MATHEWS, PRESIDENT,

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

Dr. MATHEWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great pleasure

to be here, Mr. Hunter.

We are sitting in front of the Armed Services Committee, but

what I have to say to you today is mostly about politics. After four

years, it is necessary for us to look behind the tactics, the things

that we know the most about, and to correct the fundamental mistake that has characterized this war from the beginning, which is

that U.S. strategy has had more to do with the political needs and

interests and rhythms in Washington than it has had to do with

realities on the ground in Iraq. It is time for us to examine whether

the underlying strategy is sound. And I would like to offer some

thoughts on that.

My first point is that the premise of the current strategy, the socalled surge, is that a political solution would follow if the violence

could just be reduced. In my judgment, that is false. What is underway in Iraq today is the natural and usually inevitable struggle

for power that follows a political vacuum. The American presence

is actually prolonging and delaying that struggle.

Our use of the word ‘‘reconciliation’’ too is a huge distortion to

ourselves of what needs to happen. ‘‘Reconcile’’ means to restore

friendship and harmony, and that is not what is needed on the

ground. The assumption that political reconciliation, that movement toward a political solution was moving forward until the attack on the Samara mosque is not supported by the evidence. And

what we have to remember is that we are looking at a struggle for

political power within sectarian groups as well as between them.

I will come back to why this is so important.

A political power-sharing agreement is going to eventually

emerge from Iraq but likely only after the various parties have exhausted themselves, have tested each other’s strengths, and have

convinced themselves that they can get at least as much at the negotiating table that they can in the streets. This is not going to

happen by September or by March of 2008. It is unlikely to happen

in the next five years. Historical experience with civil wars, once

they get going, they take a long time. Those of the last—the postwar period since 1945 have lasted ten years on average, with more

than half—with half of them running more than seven years. So

let’s not expect a quick outcome from this.

To believe that the present strategy will succeed, one has to

make three heroic assumptions.

One is that, together with Iraqi Security Forces, we have enough

force on the ground to contain a long-term guerrilla violence that

springs from many directions.

Second, that a combination of political and military assistance

and coercion can impose a kind of artificial peace that would leap

over the usual phase of political sorting out and struggle.

And third, that we can maintain that peace for long enough that

people will put aside their own natural fears and hopes, and believe that the present distribution of power represents a stable and

inevitable future. If we were willing to stay for a decade or more,

I think that might be true. But few people believe that we are prepared to do that. And even then, it would be an uncertain bet, beVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
8

cause people hold political dreams and desires for revenge for far

longer than that. And the Iraqis know that they live there and we

don’t, and that someday we will be gone and they will remain. And

many of them would plan that way, even if they believed that we

would maintain our present commitment for many years.

So, based on the experience elsewhere and a three-plus-year test

on the ground, I think it is unlikely that more of the same will

produce a united Iraq, at peace with itself. It is a bitter but, I

think, a sounder and wiser conclusion that the American presence

and strategy in Iraq is, as I said, prolonging and delaying a struggle for power that will ultimately resume when we depart.

Second point is that while we have had many—countless changes

in tactics, we have been pursuing the same political goal in Iraq

since 2004, and that is a united government of Sunnis, Shia, and

Kurds working together. We have made no significant—no real

progress toward that in this time.

And the present description of the needed next steps as mundane

and achievable benchmarks if only the Iraqi Government would

work a little harder and not take a summer vacation is a form of

dangerous self-deception. The reason why we have made so little

progress is because these needed steps are hugely difficult and important ones, in which every Iraqi faces enormous personal potential gains and losses. They would be hardly achievable in the best

of conditions, and these are the worst of conditions. Why worst? We

know that four million Iraqis are either refugees out of the country,

internally displaced, or dead. In U.S. per capita terms, that is 50

million people.

Think for a few minutes about what that would be like. Could

we under such conditions come together as a Nation, bury past and

present wrongs, and under foreign occupation and direction make

painful and scary political accommodations, amend our Constitution and reallocate wealth? The question obviously answers itself,

and yet we continue to pretend that the Iraqis can.

Third, we are debating this problem almost entirely in military

terms, which distorts the options available to us. Secretary Perry

has pointed this out. A change in political strategy in Iraq and a

shift in our political attention and economic and military priorities

across the region redefines the possibilities. The analysis has to

recognize, which generally it does not in Washington today, that a

significant change in U.S. policy would change what others are

willing to do.

I believe that the Iraq Study Group’s call for a multinational regional effort and diplomatic offensive is a step in the right direction, but it still presumes that the government—that the current

Government of Iraq would represent that country and, therefore,

that the current U.S. political strategy would continue.

A better approach, a more difficult one but I think a better one,

would be one that more resembles the bond process that successfully laid the basis for political transition in Afghanistan. In that

case, Iraq would be represented by all its major parties. The key

foreign governments would participate and support their various

clients. This would be lengthy and chaotic, I recognize, a much

higher political risk than the U.S. has heretofore been willing to

undertake. But it holds at least the possibility that broad represenVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
9

tation and debate among Iraqis heretofore short-circuited by U.S.

policy, might produce a viable political outcome with less continuing destabilization.

In this plan, a necessary ingredient would be an active role

played by Iran’s more immediate neighbors and that would depend

on the United States’ intent to begin a military withdrawal. The

process should be proceeded by intensive bilateral consultations as

to the best format, likely under U.N. auspices. And while making

its direction absolutely plain, the U.S. Government, in my view,

should not set a time line for the end of its withdrawal, or specify

a predetermined number of residual troops. Both of those should be

determined by the political outcome.

We might be asked to stay in Iraq in a substantial way. We

might not. A key point here is that its success would depend on a

shift of the political energies of the United States—and some fraction of the enormous economic cost that is now consumed by Iraq,

as you know, at a rate of $10 billion a month—to other conflicts

and other theaters in this region that hold inherently greater longterm national security threats to the U.S. than does Iraq. Among

these are Iran; Afghanistan, because of the Taliban and al Qaeda

presence and its links to Pakistan; Pakistan itself, which is an immense threat because of these two, and its nuclear reference and

its instability; and the Israeli Palestinian dispute; and, I would say,

the growing crisis in Iran.

One of the Iraq war’s greatest long-term costs, I think the Chairman was suggesting this in his opening remarks, has been and will

be the attention it has diverted from issues of greater long-term inherent importance to the United States.

Next I want to briefly point out that assertions are being made

about what would happen if we left Iraq, for which there is little

or no evidence, and significant evidence to the contrary. Because

the choice we face now is among all bad options, it is easy to make

a case against any one of them. And while the uncertainties are

immense, it is therefore imperative to examine these claims with

as much care and knowledge as we can command, and at least to

set aside those fears for which there is little evidence.

It is asserted by many in the Administration and outside it that

the violence in Iraq would spread across the region if the U.S. were

to leave. Why? Iraqis are fighting among themselves over power.

There is no reason why they would travel abroad to do so.

Moreover, there is a history that argues strongly in the opposite

direction, that civil wars in this region suck others in, rather than

spread across borders. Algeria, Afghanistan, and even Lebanon,

which sucked in direct troop deployments by Syria and Israel, are

among the civil wars that did not spread. The case for a spreading

war has not been made.

It is likely, however, that an American departure would result in

the war sucking others in more deeply than they are today. This

is most likely, however, through financial and arms support and

proxy fighters rather than troops.

Iran’s neighbors are well aware of the dangers of greater involvement, and neither of the two key players, Saudi Arabia and Iran,

wants a direct confrontation. They and other neighbors are deeply

aware of the risks of a sharper divide between Sunni and Shia

10

countries as evidenced by the sound rejection of recent American

efforts to organize a coalition of Sunni states against Iran.

Another frequent claim is that an American exit would be a tremendous psychological victory for radical Islamists. This echoes the

fear of the dominoes that didn’t fall after Vietnam. In this case, an

American exit from Iraq, not the region, would be a cause for celebration among some terrorists and perhaps a temporary source of

strength.

But it is at least equally true that the American occupation of

Iraq—I use that word because that is how it is seen in the region—

is jihadists’ principal recruiting tool. Who is to say, then, that an

American departure would be, on balance, a shot in the arm or a

significant mid- and long-term loss?

Let me briefly make one final point which I think is directly

within the jurisdiction of this committee, and that is that I believe

it is urgent for Congress to address and end the dangerous charade

that has been underway between Congress and the Administration

regarding the question of whether the U.S. is currently planning a

permanent military presence in Iraq. Congress has passed numerous provisions prohibiting the use of its funds, of allocated appropriated funds, for building a permanent presence; in one case, by

a Senate vote of 100–0. Initially, the Administration strongly opposed these provisions, but afterwards allowed them to pass, presumably on the grounds that the language is meaningless because

no one can say that anything is going to be permanent.

Meanwhile, the U.S. has continued to construct at enormous cost,

an unknown cost, a massive self-contained embassy, as we know,

and military bases whose facilities, military facilities and amenities

and costs, could only be justified by a very long-term planned use.

The major bases are designed to support force protection across the

region and in North Africa.

After years of evasions and denials, late in May the White House

and the Pentagon finally revealed what had been obvious on the

ground all along, in my judgment. Defense Secretary Gates remarked that the U.S. was seeking, quote, a long and enduring

presence in Iraq, for which the model was Korea and Japan. U.S.

forces have been in both of those countries for more than half of

a century. His comments did not receive anywhere near the attention they deserve.

What is the Administration thinking regarding a long-term U.S.

military presence in Iraq? How big a presence? And for what purpose? Is there a settled policy? Is there a document of any kind?

Has it ever been debated at senior levels? Or did the planning and

building begin, as one general has said, by engineers who wanted

to stay ahead of the policy curve and continued on auto-pilot ever

since? This issue is of immense political consequence to the United

States.

Repeated polls show the Iraqis strongly oppose the bases. Across

the Middle East, the enormous American footprint supports those

who believe that the U.S. invaded Iraq in order to control the country and its oil resources and establish itself as a permanent presence in the region. Congress needs to end the Kabuki dance about

spending and call the question on policy. What are the Administration’s plans and thinking? And are they wise?

11

In my view, any serious attention to political and social realities

in Iraq and to opinion across the region and globally would lead

one quickly to the conclusion that major U.S. military facilities in

the Middle East should be located outside that country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mathews can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. I welcome our friend back to this Armed Services

Committee, Dr. Frederick Kagan. The floor is yours, sir.

STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT

SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Dr. KAGAN. Mr. Chairman, honorable members, it is a pleasure

to be in front of you again, speaking on this very important topic.

I note that, as usual, I appear to be in the minority among the witnesses. I have gotten pretty comfortable with that role. I have been

in the minority throughout this discussion, sometimes very close to

being a minority of one, because, although I supported the initial

invasion, I have been a pretty staunch critic of the way the Bush

Administration has pursued the war from, honestly, even before

the invasion began until January of this year. And if you want to

think about what an uncomfortable position it is, support a war

and then oppose the way the Administration fights it.

I would like to take up one point that has been mentioned here—

and it has been mentioned on a few occasions—that I think requires a correction. The United States is not an occupying force in

Iraq, and I know that Dr. Mathews did not indicate that she thinks

that it is, simply that people say that it is.

I have heard a number of prominent leaders in Congress describe

our presence there as an occupation, and I think it is very dangerous for us to use this misleading term. The United States is in

Iraq today pursuant to U.N. Security Council resolutions and at

the request of the Iraqi Government. That is a very different thing

from being an occupying power. And it raises the question of how

we are interacting with our Iraqi ally, because the Government of

Iraq right now is an ally, and for all of our frustrations with it, it

is one of the best allies on the war on terror that we have.

If you measure the quality of alliance by the determination to

fight our number one enemy, al Qaeda, Iraqi troops take casualties

at a rate of about three to one to ours, many of them in the fight

against al Qaeda. And Iraq has taken far more casualties in that

fight, I believe, than any other country in the world.

Let’s step back for a minute and think again about how we got

into the current situation. I don’t want to revisit the question of

whether we should have fought the war or not. I think we are well

beyond the point where that is a discussion that is of significance.

But I would say that from the end of 2003 until early 2006, we

faced a consistent and coherent challenge in Iraq, and that challenge was the Sunni Arab insurgency based primarily in Anbar

Province and driven primarily by the refusal of the Sunni Arabs in

Iraq to accept the subordinate position that any sort of democratic

state in Iraq would consign them to.

12

We had a great many discussions of what the best way would be

of dealing with this insurgency. In my view, the Administration

chose an inadequate strategy that did not focus on suppressing the

insurgency, but instead relied on an emphasis of training Iraqi

forces to do it themselves, something which I always feared would

lead to greater sectarian violence and also an ineffective result.

At the same time, starting in early 2004, the organization al

Qaeda in Iraq, established by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, aimed to establish—aimed to bring into being in Iraq a full-scale sectarian

conflict. That was his stated goal. He desired to do that for a number of reasons which he made clear in a series of publications. For

one thing, al Qaeda is a anti-Shia organization, at least in the form

in which it established itself in Iraq, and Zarqawi regarded it as

an absolute good to kill Shia. But in addition, he also wished to

spur the mobilization of a Shia majority in Iraq and, to that end,

he desired to go into the Shia community to launch attacks on the

Sunni community, so that community would be more heavily mobilized.

In the face of this challenge, we did not respond adequately, in

my view, and we allowed too much scope for al Qaeda in Iraq to

continue its activities, attempting to draw the country toward sectarian conflict. Astonishingly, despite determined efforts by

Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Iraq from 2004 through early 2006, the

Shia community largely responded with restraint. And the primary

security problem that we faced in Iraq in that period stemmed from

the Sunni Arab insurgency and not from sectarian violence.

The destruction of the Golden Dome of the Samara Mosque in

February 2006 by al Qaeda changed that equation, and it led finally to very large-scale, widespread, reprisal attacks by Shia

against Sunni Arabs and the beginning of a tit-for-tat cycle of escalation.

In response to this change in the situation, unfortunately, Administration strategy did not change very dramatically. We continued to focus on putting Iraqis in the lead. We continued to focus

on trying to maintain a small footprint in Iraq. We continued to

focus on trying to maintain a low visibility presence in Iraq.

As a result of this policy from 2003 through early 2007, although

the number of U.S. combat brigades in Iraq has fluctuated from

about 15 to about 20 or 21 at any given moment prior to 2007, all

but two or three of those would be based on forward operating

bases (FOBs) and conducting mounting patrols through areas, but

not maintaining widespread or permanent presence in neighborhoods for which they had the responsibility to help establish security.

I want to emphasize that throughout this period, there almost always were two or three brigades that were engaged in such operations, but they were generally unsupported by operations in their

vicinity. They generally had, of course, inadequate support from

Iraqi Security Forces, not yet mature enough either to engage in

the struggle or not yet numerous enough to do so on a wide scale.

And these operations did not form part of any coherent operational

or strategic approach to the conflict. As a result, sectarian violence

spiraled out of control.

13

With a few exceptions, each month in 2006 was worse than the

last. And by the end of 2006 it seemed apparent to all, including

me, that we were on the path to defeat. In January 2007, the President announced a new strategy, and it is a strategy, it is not simply a change in tactics. It lays out a clear strategic objective, a path

going there. It is a clear military strategy. It is perfectly appropriate to question it. You can disagree with it, you can disagree

with its premises, but it is a strategy. And the assumption is indeed that political progress in Iraq will not be possible or would not

have been possible at the level of violence we saw prevailing in the

country at the end of 2006. And furthermore, that the Iraqi Security Forces by themselves were unlikely to be able to bring the

level of violence down to a point at which normal political process

would be adequate without significant assistance.

As a result, President Bush announced a new strategy whose

military component focused heavily on establishing security in the

core areas of Iraq that were most violent. And to that end, he sent

additional forces into the country. I want to make the point people

frequently focus on this number of 20,000 troops and how can

20,000 troops make a difference. And it is just five brigades and

so forth. But it is not just a question of what those 20,000 additional troops were doing. It is also a question of what the other brigades in the country were doing as well, what the other combat

troops were doing. Because even as the new brigades started arriving at the rate of one a month in January, the commanders in the

field began to take all of the units that had been on FOBs and

push them into the neighborhoods pursuing a fundamentally different approach.

So it is not just a question of another 20,000 troops. It was a

question of what all of the U.S. combat troops in Iraq were doing,

whereas in the past only a handful at a time in any one given place

would be undertaken to establish security. Now, almost all of the

U.S. security forces in Iraq were seeking to establish security.

Neither is it the case that the new troops were initially earmarked to Baghdad and subsequently sent elsewhere as a result of

spreading violence. From the outset, Generals Petraeus and

Odierno were explicit that they thought it was not going to be possible to secure Baghdad without eliminating terrorist sanctuaries

in what they called the ‘‘Baghdad belts,’’ the areas north and south

to the city, in many of which we have had no combat presence for

many years, and that have become very serious terrorist sanctuaries.

As a result, by design, as the new forces flowed in, of five Army

brigades that went in, two brigade headquarters went into Baghdad, three brigade headquarters went into the belts. Of the Marine

forces that went in, all of them were directed outside of Baghdad,

and that was by design. Forces did move around some outside of

Baghdad in response to changing security situations. But the plan

to attempt to control both the belts and Baghdad was the plan from

the outset. And it is, in my view, from a military perspective a

sound plan.

I will emphasize very briefly that it is a plan that is very different from anything that we have tried in the past. In the previous period as we tried to establish security in one part of the

14

country or another at a time, we did indeed allow the enemy to establish safe havens in parts of the country where we were not. The

current operation is attacking almost all of the safe havens that al

Qaeda has established for itself in Iraq at the same time, from

Fallujah through Lake Tharthar, to the southern belt, through

Yusufiyah, Mahmudiyah and now even into Arab Jabour and

Salman Pak, which had been absolutely no-go terrain for us, held

by terrorists for years.

Around into the north in Diyala, we are finally clearing Baquba,

and we are moving around to the north of the city, clearing areas

around Taji and Tarmyia which have also been insurgent strongholds.

If you look at Iraq, Iraq is not a limitless place. And when you

speak about the possibility of al Qaeda displacing away from this

operation, there are a limited number of options that they have.

They can move into Kirkuk and attempt to inflame the situation

there, as they have done, although I would note that the recent attacks that we have seen in Kirkuk are actually a continuation of

what has been a steady drum beat of periodic attacks in Kirkuk

that al Qaeda has been carrying out at least since the beginning

of the year.

They can try to move into Ninawa Province, of which Mosul is

the capital, and inflame sectarian and ethnic tension there. They

have made some efforts to do that. We have been very aggressive

in response with Special Operations, and the Iraqi Security Forces

in that region have been very effective.

Outside of those areas, it is very difficult for al Qaeda to find any

bases. They are not going to be moving into the south, into Shia

land, where there is no support and indeed active hostility to them,

and they are not going to find very good safe havens in Kyrgyzstan

either. So, in fact, the operations that we are currently conducting

severely limit the areas al Qaeda can try to move into and push

them fundamentally, with the exception of Mosul, into areas that

are of far less strategic importance than the area we are currently

engaged in securing.

Now, I do believe it would be necessary to conduct follow-on operations to clear those areas out, but this is not just a question of

pushing them around from one region to another.

At the same time as the surge strategy was being debated, as Dr.

Perry mentioned, we were presented with an opportunity. And it

was an opportunity that few had foreseen. And the opportunity was

that the Sunni sheiks in Anbar Province were turning against al

Qaeda. That was not something that was of our doing primarily.

It was something that resulted from al Qaeda mistakes. But they

are mistakes that are inherent in the nature of that organization,

which in fact pursues a version of Islam, if you want to be generous

and call it that, that is loathsome to most Iraqis and indeed to

most Muslims, and that has very little popular support in the Muslim world. And the evidence is just about anywhere al Qaeda establishes itself and immediately attempts to impose its version of Islamic law, the locals begin to resist, and al Qaeda engages in a

cycle of violence with them. It did that in Anbar Province, killed

a popular sheik, committed a number of other atrocities, and the

15

people of Anbar, particularly the leadership, started to turn against

al Qaeda.

That process was facilitated by the skillful operations by U.S.

military forces in the province, the U.S. Army brigade, commanded

by Colonel Sean McFarland in Ramadi. Marine forces throughout

the province working to clear the area were very important in

shaping this process. These were among the handful of units, as I

mentioned, that had been attempting to establish security in their

areas despite the larger strategy of not doing that, that prevailed

in the theater, and they were successful.

I will confess that as I read about this project in 2006, I was

skeptical. I looked at the low force ratios that the Marines had in

Ramadi, and I said they are never going to be able to do this. I was

wrong. They were able to do it. And they were able to do it in large

part because they were able to work synergistically with this movement of the Sunni sheiks against al Qaeda in the province. The

surge has dramatically increased the speed with which this process

has been moving forward. As some people put it, even when you

are operating with Sunni tribes and many tribal systems, there is

the desire among them to be friends with the strongest tribe. And

we have established ourselves for the moment as the strongest

tribe in al-Anbar, which is one of the reasons why the Sunni sheiks

are comfortable working with us and allowing us to serve as a

bridge between them and the Iraqi Government, and, most of all,

seeking our assistance in fighting al Qaeda, which they now perceive as a deadly foe. This process has expanded beyond al-Anbar.

Similar awakening movements have developed in Salahaddin

Province in the north of Baghdad, in Bago Province, which is a

mixed province to the south where we have even had Shia tribal

leaders come forward and say, hey, we want to do some of the stuff

that the Sunnis are doing in al-Anbar. And it is happening in

Diyala Province where we have had tribal agreements coming together, tribal cease-fires and tribes reaching out to us to work with

us working against al Qaeda as well.

So this is a process that has been spreading and accelerating

over the last year, fueled, I believe, by the confidence that these

leaders have that we will stand by them and help to ensure that

they can prevail in the struggle against al Qaeda.

It is a very important development. It is not one that I believe

can continue in the absence of a strong military presence engaged

in the sorts of operations that we are now pursuing.

Let me also step back for a moment and point out that this shift

in attitudes in Anbar and throughout the country is pivotal not

only in Iraq but in the global war on terror. We have actually seen

this process occur in Afghanistan as well. We have seen it occur in

Somalia. The fact is that al Qaeda does not have very much of a

brand that has much mass appeal in the Muslim world, but it is

frequently the case, because they are such fanatical fighters and so

determined, that unless an outside force is present to defeat and

contain them militarily, they can terrorize local populations into

supporting them against their will.

I think that is a very important lesson for us to take away from

this conflict as we think about pursuing the global war on terror

in general and the counterterrorism fight in Iraq in particular.

16

Responsible people in this city understand and say repeatedly

that we cannot simply abandon Iraq and allow it to become an al

Qaeda safe haven, and advocate leaving U.S. forces behind to engage in counterterrorism. I am not sure I would challenge them to

describe exactly what sort of counterterrorism operations they have

in mind if they don’t look like what we are doing. The sectarian

violence that we are seeing in Iraq right now resulted from the deliberate efforts of al Qaeda to create it for their own benefit, and

they are benefiting every day. If we were to leave, they have made

it clear that they will attempt to recreate the sectarian violence,

which has been coming down steadily, get it up to previous levels

and continue to benefit from it.

I do not understand in this context how we can imagine that we

could fight al Qaeda in Iraq without addressing the sectarian violence that is their primary tool for establishing themselves in the

country.

I would like to make one last point about the discussion of what

the likely consequences of U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be. I

respectfully disagree with Dr. Mathews about the absence of historical evidence for the likelihood of difficulty there. I would refer the

committee to the excellent report done at the Brookings Institute

by Ken Pollack and Dan Byman called ‘‘Things Fall Apart’’ that

brings to bear significant evidence that would lead us to believe

that the consequences will indeed be very dangerous. But I would

like to caution the committee and everyone in this discussion for

making the same mistake that the President is accused of having

made—and I think with some justice before the Iraq war—of assuming that the post-conflict scenario would be rosy, would be optimistic, would go the way we would want it to be. I think we can

make just as large a mistake if we choose optimistic scenarios

about the post-withdrawal situation that are questionable in the

face of many, many reports, some very solidly based, about the possibility that the optimistic scenarios will not play out. I thank the

committee for its attention.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan can be found in the Appendix on page 75.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman for his comments. I am

reserving my questions until a later moment. Mr. Hunter just informed me that he will reserve his comments until a later moment

in this hearing.

Mr. Saxton, you are called upon, please.

Mr. SAXTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you for permitting me

to be the lead questioner here. Let me just begin with this. As I

sat and listened to the witnesses and, of course, most recently Dr.

Kagan, it occurred to me that what we are really trying to do here

is to figure out over time—you don’t have to turn the clock on for

me. That is all right. The lights aren’t working.

The CHAIRMAN. The lights aren’t working. Why don’t we start all

over for him. Start over.

We will start all over for you, and we will watch the clock here.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, as I was saying, thank you.

It occurs to me what we are all trying to do regardless of our perspective on Iraq, what we are all trying to do is to figure out how

to counter the threat caused by al Qaeda and extremist Islamic

17

groups who wish us harm. And as I look at the history of this,

there are efforts that have been made which I think have all been

made in good faith.

We first noticed perhaps—or at least this is my perspective—that

al Qaeda—that extremist Islam was a factor to be dealt with during the 1980’s, and we chose a course of action which was in concert with them because we had an enemy that we recognized as

being a more—an enemy that we needed to deal with in a more direct fashion. Of course, that was the Soviet Union. So we supported

the efforts of the Taliban. And I guess we could make a case today

that maybe that wasn’t the smartest thing to do.

And then during the 1990’s, we entered a new phase of engagement with extreme Islamist groups. During the 1990’s, we had the

attack on the Khobar Towers, we had the attack on the African embassies, we had the attack on the Cole and others, and our decision

at that point was not to do anything to directly confront them. And

I believe that today we could make the case that that was an error

in judgment.

And then, of course, we had the events of 2001 and a new period

of engagement with Islamist terrorist groups, Islamist fundamentalist groups when we went to Afghanistan. And for a time Afghanistan seemed to be a successful engagement until, of course, the

groups fled to the other side of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border

and set up shop all over again, and we found ourselves in that region of the world with newly constituted groups which today are

said to be as strong as or perhaps even stronger than they were

before 2001.

And, of course, that brought us to Iraq, and as Dr. Kagan pointed

out, our intentions were good. We thought we had to deal with Saddam Hussein, and we went there. And under the leadership of the

Bush Administration and Don Rumsfeld, we decided that our policy

would be a limited military one where we would seek to bring on

board an Iraqi security force that we would be able to leave in

charge. And once again we lived through an era—we worked

through an era where we made mistakes.

And so the question today is what should our future policy be?

And I think I have heard two diametrically opposed sets of ideas

about where we ought to go.

Let me just ask Dr. Kagan this. Looking at the history of where

we have been in this fight against fundamentalist extremist

groups, what is your best guess as to what we ought to be doing

and doing in the future and based on where we have been, Dr.

Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. I think we are pursuing the right approach in Iraq

right now, and I think it is very important that we see it through

to the end. I think we are making tremendous progress in defeating al Qaeda in Iraq in conjunction with the Iraqi people. And I

think the historical examples that you have brought to bear are

very telling.

We made a tremendous mistake in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in deciding that Afghanistan was a faroff place of which we knew little and something we could afford to

ignore. And as a result, we allowed the Taliban to seize power, and

18

we allowed al Qaeda to metastasize there, and we found the problems subsequently coming home to roost.

I believe if we let al Qaeda up off the mat in Iraq, we run the

serious danger of having a serious development occur. The enemy

in Afghanistan was very little threat to regions outside of the country while the Soviets were there. As soon as the Soviets withdrew

and the situation collapsed, they became a global threat. I think we

are very likely to face a similar situation in Iraq if we would leave

precipitously. So I think it is very important that we stay and help

the Iraqis finish off this very potent threat.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen.

The clock is now working, and we will call on Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your excellent and very provocative testimony.

Dr. Perry, you have testified that when the Iraq Study Group

went to Iraq and met with our commanding officers in the field

there, all of them—Casey, Chiarelli and Abizaid—when put the

question would three to five additional brigades help the situation

decline the additional troops, would you elaborate further on why

they indicated negatively that they did not need or seek additional

American troops?

Dr. PERRY. Now, Mr. Spratt, my recollection of the discussion—

first of all, I am completely clear that they said, no, this would not

help. When we asked them why not, my recollection of the discussion was that they said that it would delay the Iraqi Government

taking responsibility and taking the decisions that they needed to

be making. They thought that a political reconciliation was necessary for success in Iraq, and that the Iraqi Government was not

taking the necessary actions, and our sending in more troops would

only delay their doing that. That was my best recollection of how

they explained their view.

Mr. SPRATT. Did they indicate, or did anyone indicate, did you

determine independently that additional Iraqi troops are necessary

over and above the 135 battalions now being trained?

Dr. PERRY. They were continuing—as we were there, they were

continuing to train additional Iraqi battalions, but their main conclusion was that the quality of the training needed to be improved.

And that is why we were discussing with them the notion of embedding more American forces in the Iraqi battalions, for the purpose of increasing the professionalism and the capability of the

Iraqi forces by working with American non-commissioned officers

(NCOs) who could serve as role models and who could help train

them, on-the-job training so to speak.

The training that the Iraqi forces had before they went into the

field was basically the kind of training we give our troops in basic

training, and we would not expect to send troops with just basic

training out into combat missions without having experienced

NCOs and officers working with them.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Kagan, you indicate that the first phase is finished with reasonably good results, and you look forward to a successful second phase. Do you think that can be accomplished with

the existing Iraqi forces?

Dr. KAGAN. I do believe that the current operation is designed to

work with the Iraqi forces that are available. Our commanders now

19

have expressed every confidence that they can achieve their objectives with the forces that they have. I believe General Odierno

said, I don’t need more forces, I just need more time.

And I would also note that we have changed the training of

Iraqis force. Iraqi forces that deploy into Baghdad now first run

through a training area in Nasiriyah to the east of Baghdad, which

is designed to give them a much higher quality of training before

we deploy them into the streets. And, of course, since last fall many

more Iraqi forces have been engaged directly in combat and have

received quite a lot of on-the-job training. Reports from the people

that I spoke to when I was in Iraq in May tell me that many Iraqi

units are fighting extremely proficiently and professionally.

Mr. SPRATT. Dr. Mathews, you indicated that we are asking the

wrong questions. One of the series of questions we try to impose,

for lack of any kind of metric, any kind of yardstick by which to

measure progress, were some benchmarks which were put into law

recently, and now we are seeing the answers to those benchmarks.

Were those benchmarks the wrong criteria? Do they go in the right

direction? Some have suggested that we are being a bit too harsh,

holding them to standards that are too tough in the midst of a civil

war of this intensity.

Dr. MATHEWS. Well, Mr. Chairman, as I tried to suggest—excuse

me, Mr. Spratt—the benchmarks—and I think the use of the word

and particularly this list suggest—as I said, these are achievable.

They are rather straightforward. In fact, we are asking, first of all,

to amend the Constitution, which was only agreed to because we

promised the Sunnis that it would be fixed to give them a better

deal. And that was a somewhat unrealistic promise. It has encouraged them to fantasize about what they can get and to dig in their

heels against further work with the government until they can.

And there is no prospect that we are going to. Meetings do not

mean progress, as any Member of Congress knows. The same thing

is true on the oil deal.

What we are talking about here are fundamental allocations of

political power. And I believe that the Iraqis are not yet ready to

make those choices themselves because they haven’t yet tested

each other’s strength and will. And there are too many organized

groups determined to do that. So I believe we are engaged in a

rather elaborate exercise of self-delusion about the benchmarks.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. McHugh from New York.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to you all. I appreciate you being here.

Dr. Kagan, we have heard, and I think understandably, that

there is a deep concern that somehow American forces today are

in the middle of a civil war, that we can extract ourselves from that

civil war. And whether it is the recommendations of the Iraq Study

Group group or the bill that the distinguished chairman had on the

floor just last week focus in on al Qaeda. Do you think that is

achievable? Are we in the middle of a civil war? And can you separate the two in this current environment?

Dr. KAGAN. In my view, any insurgency is definitionally a civil

war, and I have always found this discussion to be a little bit problematic. If you mean are we in the midst of a full-scale civil war

20

in which everyone is trying to kill everyone else, absolutely not. It

is a very organized struggle in which a number—as Dr. Mathews

pointed out—a number of hostile groups are competing with one

another by attacking each other’s populations. We have been in situations like this, in fact, continuously since about 1995 when we

went into Bosnia, and we have demonstrated that we can be successful in such things. But I don’t want to get into the comparisons

between this and the Balkans.

But the answer to your second question is unequivocally no. I

can’t imagine how we could possibly confront al Qaeda and Iraq

without addressing the sectarian conflict that they are themselves

stoking and attempting to benefit from. I don’t understand and no

one has ever explained to me what that kind of engagement, what

that kind of counterterrorism campaign would look like.

Mr. MCHUGH. Would you say that because your argument would

be predicated on a central strategy of al Qaeda is to fulminate the

sectarian violence that we would try to extract ourselves from?

Dr. KAGAN. Not only that, but that they benefit from that sectarian violence because they create sectarian violence, and then they

use the resulting lawlessness to terrorize local people into supporting them. And they also then pose, ironically enough, as the defenders of the local people against the Shi’a attacks that follow.

And the result of this is that it is a very different situation from

what we saw in Afghanistan in the 1990’s. These guys are not establishing large training bases in the desert away from the population. These guys are burrowing into villages, moving into homes,

moving people out, you know, living among the population in the

area that they control. You are not going to be able to get intelligence about these people unless the locals are confident that we

are going to be available, that we are going to be around to protect

them when they turn against al Qaeda. And this is what we have

seen. As we moved into areas and announced that we are going to

be there for a while, the locals start fingering the outsiders who are

al Qaeda. Whether they are Iraqis or not, they tend to be outsiders

in the local village. I simply don’t see how we can continue to

struggle against al Qaeda without engaging in this.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Perry, forgetting for the moment Dr. Kagan’s comments, the

Iraq Study Group spoke about and you commented about a strong

reaction force, about a residual force. Again, the Chairman’s bill

last week spoke about residual forces to protect our embassy, the

largest in the world when completed for us, to train Iraqi forces,

to pressure and disrupt al Qaeda, to provide force protection. I assume we have to feed those troops. You have to provide logistic

support, intelligence, air support. How many troops do you think

we could leave behind safely and effectively? What size force would

that take?

Dr. PERRY. I don’t think I would be qualified to give you the size

of that——

Mr. MCHUGH. Doctor, you are the former Secretary of Defense,

with all due respect.

Dr. PERRY. As the Secretary of Defense, I would have gone to the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, now here is the mission we want——

21

Mr. MCHUGH. That is fair, and I respect that. But the Iraq Study

Group recommended this.

If you made a recommendation, I presume you formulated some

figure of some sort. What would that be?

Dr. PERRY. We did not formulate a figure. We discussed the figure. We discussed it with some of the military people. It would

clearly lead to a reduction in force over what we now have, but it

would still be—I think we said in the report it would still be a sizeable military force remaining in Iraq.

Mr. MCHUGH. Okay. Dr. Kagan, do you have any idea what that

force would take, what it would look like? We have about 160,000

now. What would that force look like, forgetting if it would be successful or not?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, it depends. If the mission is as usually described, to support the Iraqi Security Forces and also to conduct

counterterrorism operations in some form, there have been a number of proposals out there that suggest anywhere from 60- to

100,000 troops would be required for that. I haven’t yet done all

of the math for that. I think the higher estimate of that is probably

more accurate when you consider how heavily obligated we are to

support the Iraqi Security Forces right now logistically.

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you so much for your testimony this morning. I have

asked this question before from our military leaders, and you mentioned this, Secretary Perry. When they disbanded the Iraqi Army,

the police and the civil servants, I have asked them who made this

decision. And the reason I asked this question is because we hope

that this is not repeated again. Was this a military decision? Was

this a civilian decision? I think it was a very, very big mistake to

disband the military, the police, and the civil servants. And I have

asked the military leaders and nobody seems to know where that

decision came from.

Do any three of you have any idea how they were able to arrive

at this conclusion that it was for the interest of our troops and

their people to disband the army, the police and the servants?

Dr. PERRY. I was not there at the time and do not know why or

how that decision was made. I know when it was made, and it was

made shortly after the general who was in charge of the divisional

forces there was relieved and replaced by Mr. Bremer. And I believe it was Mr. Bremer that made the decision. And I do know

that the general strongly opposed that decision and argued to Mr.

Bremer against doing it.

Mr. ORTIZ. Ever make a decision like that without getting all the

mice together, because I think that it was a very costly mistake

that we made.

Dr. PERRY. That is my judgment also.

Mr. ORTIZ. You know, what is the impact on the United States

military of continuing our involvement in Iraq? Are we in danger

of breaking the United States Army through the high rate of deployment and repeated deployments? And one of the reasons I ask

22

this question, I just had a call from my constituent, the family of

a constituent, about five days ago. This individual had been deployed three times. He has been back less than six months, and he

has been called again, and he is going to be activated to go back

to Iraq for a fourth time. I think this is too much.

Not only is this impacting on our reserves, on our National

Guard, the soldiers are tired. And this is why—I was just wondering, I mean, are we in danger of breaking the United States Army

through this high rate of deployment?

Dr. PERRY. I don’t know whether I can answer that question in

the sense you ask it. I would say, though, that I am very much concerned about the Army National Guard. I think they have been

overextended. I think, in effect, we have broken the compact that

we had with the guard. After this war is finally over, it will not

be just a matter of rebuilding the guard. I think we need to reconsider from first principles what the mission of the guard would be

and have a new compact with them that would be more appropriate for the future. And I think that would be a very important

role for this committee to take on that job.

Mr. ORTIZ. I just wonder if anybody else from the witnesses that

would like to respond to that same question since I have a little

time left.

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I will.

I am also very concerned, of course, about the strain that this

war is placing on our military. I am also concerned about the consequences for our military of inflicting the first ever defeat on the

all-volunteer force. This is not a force that is accustomed to losing

wars, and I am very concerned about what the consequences of

that will be.

But I would like to echo Dr. Perry’s comment that there is more

to consider here than simply the strain of the current war. I began

advocating for larger ground forces in 1997, and I have been consistently saying since then that the ground forces need to be larger.

And I know that there has been support in this committee and on

the Hill in general for expanding ground forces even as successive

administrations have opposed doing that. I am happy to see the

Bush Administration has now finally called for an increase in the

ground forces, which I think is urgently required, even if you think

we are going to be out of Iraq in the near future.

If you look at the scale of the potential of future threats, it is

simply unacceptable for us not to be able to undertake an operation

of this scale without imposing such strains on the ground forces.

And I would hope that the committee will continue to work actively

with this Administration and subsequent Administrations to, in

fact, attempt to accelerate and expand the expansion of ground

forces that this Administration has proposed.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones, North Carolina.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, Dr. Kagan, I want to—I agree with you. We can’t go back,

but we can learn from mistakes made by looking at the past. I

want to read one statement to you, and I have a question for each

one. This is an article written by Lieutenant General Greg Newbold, a man I have great respect for, gave up a star simply because

23

he saw what was happening before we went into Iraq; an article

written April 9, 2006, Time Magazine: From 2000 until 2002, I was

a Marine Corps lieutenant general and Director of Operations for

the Joint Chief of Staffs. After 9/11, I was a witness and therefore

a party to the actions that led us to the invasion of Iraq and unnecessary war.

Inside the military family, I made no secret of my view that the

zealots’ rationale—the zealots’ rationale for war made no sense.

The reason I want to mention that—the zealots, the neocons. Are

you a part of the neocon group that wanted to go into Iraq? Yes

or no.

Dr. KAGAN. I supported the invasion of Iraq. I am not sure what

exactly the neocon group is. Usually that is used as a pejorative

term.

Mr. JONES. Well, I would put Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, you

know, the people—Rumsfeld included—that seemed not to care

about the professionals whose intelligence was warning us what

would happen. But that is history. I won’t agree with that. This is

the question: Before the war in Iraq, what was the size of al Qaeda

in Iraq when Saddam was in power?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I don’t know for sure, but I assume

that it was very small. That is what I understand.

Mr. JONES. Okay. Dr. Perry, would you agree with Dr. Mathews

that there was very little, if any, strength of al Qaeda in Iraq before the invasion?

Dr. PERRY. Yes.

Dr. MATHEWS. I think we are confusing two different groups, al

Qaeda in its global form with individuals in Iraq and the group al

Qaeda in Iraq, or al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, which didn’t exist.

Mr. JONES. Okay. So the presence now, whether it is one group

or the other group, is obviously growing inside of Iraq since now

that we have this sectarian war, civil war. I mean, there is no

question about that.

Dr. MATHEWS. No question.

Mr. JONES. Okay. Dr. Mathews, I think I understood you to say

that there is no way to say what will happen when we and if we

downsize the number of American troops in Iraq, whether there

would be a civil war that will spread and grow throughout the nation, that all the countries will come in and try to add fuel to the

fire of a civil war.

Dr. MATHEWS. I would guess that it is very likely that other

countries will get sucked in more deeply than they already are with

more arms and more money and maybe more proxy fighters. I

think it is very unlikely that the war will spread across the borders. Iraqis are principally fighting for power in Iraq. That is what

90 percent of the violence is about. Why would they go across the

borders to do that? Also history tells us that this is not what happens with civil wars in this region. They suck others in rather than

spread.

Mr. JONES. Dr. Perry, as a former Secretary of the Navy—and

I appreciate your concern about the National Guard. We have had

hearings on that. There is no question that the National Guard has

done a magnificent job in supporting the effort in Afghanistan and

24

Iraq, but primarily Iraq. And many of the Governors are very upset

with the fact that there is so much presence of the National Guard.

My time is about to run out. I have got a quick question. Would

you think it would be—if a bill was put in by a Member of Congress to say that the guard would be significantly reduced over the

next year and come back to the States so that they can help the

States during hurricane seasons, floods and every other—do you

see this would be a major hurt for the effort in Iraq?

Dr. PERRY. I would like to see two related changes made. First,

agreeing with Dr. Kagan, I would like to see an increase in the size

of the active duty ground forces, particularly the Army. And then

second, if that were done, that would allow, I think, a restructuring

of the mission of the guard to be primarily homeland defense.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor. Mr. Taylor is not here.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you all for being here.

Dr. Perry, in your end statement at the end you say, quote, in

sum, I believe that the President’s diplomatic strategy is too timid,

his military strategy is too little and too late to effect the lasting

and profound changes needed. His strategy is not likely to succeed

because it is tactical, not strategic, because it does not entail real

conditionality for the Iraqi Government, and because it will only

deepen the divide in our country, end of quote.

Last week at our Oversight Investigation Subcommittee, we had

a great panel including General Wes Clark, who stated very strongly he thinks it is too early to give up militarily on what is going

on in Iraq, but says the thing is going to fall apart, and there isn’t

any point in continuing unless there is a dramatic change in strategy.

Dr. Mathews, in your statement you state we are—quote, we are

debating this political problem almost entirely in military terms,

which limits and distorts the available options. A change in political strategy in Iraq and a shift in political attention on economic

and military priorities across the region redefines the possibilities.

Analysis of options must recognize, and it generally does not today,

that a significant change in U.S. policy will change what others are

willing to do, end of quote.

Last week when we had the vote in the House, I was one of the

ten Democrats that voted against it. And one of the reasons I did

is because it focused only on the military. It was purely a discussion about military options, and it had nothing about the strategy.

I think one of the problems, Dr. Perry—I am going to address my

question just to you if I might. I don’t think that many of us have

a clear understanding of what we are saying when we say strategy.

Summarize for me. What do you think should be our strategy toward Iraq and the region?

Dr. PERRY. My best judgment of the appropriate strategy for Iraq

was the strategy we laid out in the Iraq Study Group, but I think

the important point, to follow up on the specific point that you

made, is that the strategy should entail military, political, and diplomatic. It has to involve all three components for it to be a fullblown strategy.

25

Dr. SNYDER. Give me a one-sentence summary—and I realize

that is unfair—one-sentence summary of what each of those components should be, do you think, toward that region in Iraq.

Dr. PERRY. The military strategy should be focused on building

up the Iraqi Army, to make it fully professional and fully capable

and continuing to fight al Qaeda in Iraq. The political strategies

should be focused on trying to get a reconciliation between the

Sunnis and the Shi’as in Iraq. And the diplomatic strategy should

be focused on bringing the friendly countries in the region in on a

positive supportive role, and helping—and providing the disincentives for Iran and Syria to continue to arm the militias and fulminate violence.

Dr. SNYDER. A couple of days ago, Dr. Philip Zelikow provided a

written statement to the committee, and one of the things he said

is this. And I am going to read from his statement. He says, quote,

‘‘We should all be humble about predicting Iraq’s political future.

Don’t scapegoat their leaders. Many of them are handling and balancing sets of personal and political concerns that are difficult for

us to even comprehend. The bottom line, Iraq is still undergoing a

full-bore political and social revolution; assume further change.’’

And as I thought about that—Mr. Smith and I were talking about

when I walked to work this morning, I didn’t have to think about,

you know, would our families be shot because we were serving in

an elected position. I cannot comprehend what they must be going

through.

That statement seemed to be in contrast with what a lot of us,

including myself, have said in our speeches, that somehow we need

to put pressure on these people, implying that there is not enough

pressure on them today. Are we scapegoating the Iraqi leaders?

And are these benchmarks just clearly—if they were all met 100

percent, all 18 of them, would it get us—you know, would the lions

and the lambs be laying down together in Iraq? And I would like

to hear from all three of you. If you would start, Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. And the benchmarks which the Iraq Study Group

urged to be followed were benchmarks that were proposed by the

Iraqi Government, not benchmarks which we made up, but benchmarks which the U.S. Government imposes on them.

In terms of Dr. Zelikow’s statement about the uncertainty in the

political situation in Iraq, I agree with that, but I think the same

statement can be made a year from now or five years from now.

Dr. SNYDER. Dr. Mathews.

Dr. MATHEWS. I don’t know about scapegoat, but I think the core

of your comment is exactly what I was trying to say, which was

this has nothing to do with being lazy or recalcitrant, but being

asked to do a task that would easily defeat any conceivable effort

in the United States, for example, under conditions where in our

terms 50 million people—50 million are dead or displaced or outside the country. It also tells you a great deal about the training

effort that every Iraqi officer who can do so has his family and his

wife outside the country. It tells you a great deal about why we

cannot get a better result and why the result is so incommensurate

with the investment we made. We are asking something which I

think most people who have really studied this know in their

hearts is not an honest request of another government.

26

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Perry, thank you for being with us today. And I know you

have been with us a lot of times as a former Secretary of Defense.

You mentioned in your testimony that you think we needed to

have a surge in diplomacy rather than a surge in troops, and that

the surge in diplomacy hasn’t been undertaken by the Administration. Now, when you were Secretary of Defense, we had the—of

course in 1993—or Under Secretary—we had a car bomb explode

in the World Trade Center. We had something like 326 separate attacks over that period of time, that 4 years from 1993 to 1997. We

had, of course, in 1996 the Khobar Towers attack which killed 19

American service people.

What surge in diplomacy did you undertake at that time to blunt

this—what appeared to be then a burgeoning campaign by extremists against American—the American people and in some cases

American service personnel?

Dr. PERRY. Let me refer specifically to the Khobar Towers bombing, which is one I am very familiar with in some detail. Two different things we did in response to that. One of them was we

worked extensively with the Saudi Government to prevent the action which that bombing was intended to cause, which was to cause

the American troops to leave Saudi Arabia. We announced strongly

that we were not going to let the bombing drive us out of Saudi

Arabia. We worked with the Saudi Government to prepare an entirely new base for American troops located in the center of the

desert which we could provide better force protection for. That was

a major diplomatic thrust with the Saudi Government to get them

to do that move.

Second, I’d like to comment specifically——

Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Perry, I am talking about a diplomatic thrust.

Dr. PERRY. That was a major diplomatic thrust with the Saudi

Government. They were not at all anxious to make the move we

are talking about. In terms of the decision not to confront the people, we were prepared to confront them, to confront forcibly and

with military action the perpetrators of that. At the time we

thought that had been engineered by the Iranian Government, and

we had a contingency plan prepared to have a retaliatory strike if

that could be confirmed. As it turned out, neither the FBI nor the

Saudi police were able to finally determine who did that, who actually perpetrated that bombing, so we were not able to. But I can

assure you that we were quite prepared to do that.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So you were prepared, but you weren’t able

to ID the perpetrators. So you didn’t——

Dr. PERRY. Exactly. As far as I know, they have not been identified to this date.

Mr. HUNTER. Now, you said you didn’t think there was enough

troops—that was in your preliminary statement—in Iraq. The figures that I am looking at here—and correct me if I am wrong.

When you became the Under Secretary of Defense and later Secretary, we had 14 Army divisions. You then took that down to 10

Army divisions. Do you think in retrospect that was a mistake?

Dr. PERRY. At the end of the Cold War, first the Bush Administration reduced the military by 25 percent.

27

Mr. HUNTER. We had 18 divisions.

Dr. PERRY. Twenty-five percent. And in the Clinton Administration, that was reduced another 8 percent, from 25 percent to 33

percent.

In retrospect, no. I think we should have maintained more Army

divisions.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me ask Dr. Mathews.

You talked about the need to engage diplomatically. What actions would you take with respect to the Iranians right now, with

the Iranians in diplomatic engagement?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think our best hope of conversation with Tehran

that moves forward is about Iraq, because oddly enough, that is

where we share the greatest overlap in common interest.

The other issues that we have with Iran right now are even

tougher, notably the nuclear one. I do think that it is as difficult

as it has been because that government is so divided and so unable

even to agree internally on anything. The prospects for success are

slim, but there is no question that there have been overtures from

the Iranian Government that we have rejected which suggest that

notably and particularly in 2003, but more recently as well. So I

do believe that there is a slim hope for a conversation that moves

forward based on the common interest in Iraq. I think its prospects

would be improved if the U.S. had suggested that it was changing

its political strategy in the country, as I mentioned.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Now, you told me where you think we have

failed in rejecting what you think are some slim overtures from the

Iranians.

What do you think should be our message to the Iranians? And

how would you engage with the Iranians beyond what Ambassador

Crocker did here a month or so ago with the Iranians with respect

to Iraq? Because, in fact, that is exactly what they did, they limited

the conversation, as you know, to Iraq when they had the conversation with the Iranians. You made the statement that we were

spending ten billion a month in Iraq and that that money would

be better spent engaging in other areas of vital concern to us, including Iran. So I just wondered, how would you engage with Iran?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think it has to be done at a higher level from

Ambassador Crocker, much higher level. And it has to be sustained

over a long time. It will not be easy. And again, I do think its

chances of moving forward would be much larger if the U.S. had

changed not its diplomatic strategy, but its political strategy in

Iraq, and probably if the U.S. had indicated its intention to withdraw.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. What should be the substance of this engagement, of our message to Iran, from your perspective?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think the U.S. and Iran share an interest that

Iraq not degenerate into total chaos. That is not in Tehran’s interest any more than it is ours. And we have various of each other’s

interests, including the five interdeals, which is of critical concern

of Iran’s. So we have some mutual leverage. Those are the subjects

that I would put on the table and pursue.

Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Kagan, tell us about your thoughts in terms of

the capability of the Iraqi forces now, the stand-up of the Iraqi

forces. In particular, too, I would like to have your—you know, one

28

thing that has been given constantly by what I call the smooth

road crowd, that somehow there is a smooth road to occupation,

and trying to deliver in an area that is very unfriendly to democracies, trying to deliver democracy, the idea that we should have

kept Saddam Hussein’s army in place with it’s 11,000 Sunni generals, and somehow that would have been the smooth road to security in Iraq right now. But give us your unvarnished assessment

of the capability of the Iraqi military right now in terms of its experience and its equipment and its leadership.

Dr. KAGAN. The Iraqi Security Forces, of course, comprise the police and the army, and the situation is very different in each.

Speaking to the question of the Iraqi Army, it is a young force. It

has not been in existence for very long. We have faced a very

daunting challenge of starting from scratch and building that force.

I agree with you that revisiting the question of what should have

been done with Saddam’s army is probably not fruitful at this

point, but we certainly did face an undaunting challenge in putting

any Iraqi force in the field. We have corrected many of the deficiencies in that force that have led to its failure to show up and

fight adequately in 2005 and 2006. And, in fact, Iraqi Army battalions and brigades are in the fight across the country, and they are

in the fight, it is worth noting, not simply against al Qaeda, but

also against Jaish al Mahdi.

And when we were in Iraq in May of this year, I had the opportunity to go down to Diwania and meet with the Commander of the

8th Iraqi Army Division who has been conducting a very aggressive

clear-and-hold operation in that very large city with very minimal

coalition support against very serious Jaish al Mahdi fighters who

are funded and advised by Iran. So you have Iraqi Army units

fighting across the country with us in Baghdad, but I think we

tend to focus too much only on what they are doing in Baghdad.

I saw a press briefing recently that said there are 7,000 Iraqi

fighters in the southern belt working with Major General Lynch,

and there are about 18,000 Iraqi Army soldiers in the north who

are keeping Nineveh Province from falling apart. So I would say

that the vast majority of the Iraqi Army is in this fight, it is doing

well. It needs to be larger. Unquestionably it needs to be much

larger. It needs to be better equipped, unquestionably. It needs to

be better equipped. Both of those things should be a matter of priority, and I believe under the new command they are becoming a

matter of greater priority.

Mr. HUNTER. And just for all of you, one aspect of al Qaeda involving itself in a way in attempting to end successfully, drawing

Sunnis against Shiites and vice versa, the world has been treated

to a specter on the international television of car bombs going off

in the middle of crowds of women and children detonated by al

Qaeda and reflected in that way by the commentators in the international news media over and over and over again. I can’t help but

think that the popularity of al Qaeda in what I would call the responsible Muslim community in the world, when they see these car

bombs going off or ripping apart crowds of women and children,

must be diminishing.

What is your take on the perception of al Qaeda now by the

world, the Muslim community, at this point in the Iraqi operation?

29

Do you think they are losing some of their shine that they had initially and losing some of their popularity?

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I think it is very hard to gauge the

popularity of a movement. I think what we can say with a fair degree of confidence is that there is an attitude in the Muslim world

‘‘not in my backyard’’ as it comes to al Qaeda. You will still find

Muslims who are supporting the anti-American message of al

Qaeda and supporting various other aspects of that message, but

what we have seen regularly is that as al Qaeda actually establishes itself in a country and starts to implement its version of radical Islam, locals start to resist, and a cycle of violence begins. That

to me tells me that whatever else is going on, the message that

they are carrying beyond anti-Americanism is not selling very well.

Mr. HUNTER. Dr. Mathews and Dr. Perry, what do you think

about that? Do you think they are losing some of their initial popularity?

Dr. PERRY. I don’t have an informed judgment on that question,

Mr. Hunter.

Dr. MATHEWS. I don’t either in a broad sense, but I wanted just

to refer you—and I wish I could remember the reference—recently

reported polling results in Egypt which show that more than 90

percent of the people viewing attacks on civilians is illegitimate

and immoral, but over 93 percent view attacks on U.S. forces in

Iraq as—including those that result in civilian deaths. We have to

recognize the distinguishment that is being made that is related to

what is viewed as a greater evil.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I understand that. But al Qaeda is—I noticed

in the Arab media is being identified as—when they show these

mass bombings with women and children, body parts laying in the

street from these big bombs, they are being identified in the media,

international media, as being al Qaeda bombings. That certainly

doesn’t reflect on attacks on American troops.

So my question is do you think that that is bringing down the

image, giving them a demotion in the propaganda war, if you will,

as a result of those attacks? The commanders who make those decisions to blow up crowds of women and children have to look at the

upsides and the downsides. Do you think there is a downside for

them in terms of their position in the Muslim world?

Dr. MATHEWS. I don’t know. I do think that attacks in Iraq are

judged differently.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Regarding the Iraqi Army, General Peter Pace a few days ago

made reference to the fact that the number of active brigades in

the Iraqi Army has dropped—and I don’t have the numbers before

me—but has dropped by several numbers. I am sure someone can

get that statement for us. But needless to say that is of great concern.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, let me say I agree substantially with Dr. Mathews

and Dr. Snyder’s comments that, you know, a foreign military occupying force being able to solve the issues of such a power vacuum,

power struggle, civil war in Iraq is hard to imagine, and also the

30

notion that there is a certain amount of political pressure that we

can put on them to get them to resolve their differences. The differences are heartfelt and deep, and they are not going to resolve

them, because the bulk of Shi’a and Sunni are both sort of holding

out for the notion that their side can win, and they don’t want to

reach political accommodation because their constituents don’t

want them to. And we can bang our heads against that wall for a

long time. Those fundamental realities don’t seem to me like they

are going to change.

And if there is some assurances that any of you can give me that

I am missing something here, and that there is a greater possibility

of reconciliation any time in the future that we can see, I am happy

to hear it. I doubt it. But even assuming for the moment that that

is wrong, that we could, in fact, somehow, you know, force a political solution there, the troop numbers are disturbing to me in terms

of our commitment. Let me say why. And I have heard even the

generals—I think General Petraeus said this, it might have been

somebody else, that the surge at its current level is not sustainable

past next spring no matter what; that basically we don’t have the

troops to sustain it at that level.

So if you accept the clear-and-hold strategy—as I see it, there are

two flaws to it. One is the one that I mentioned, clear and hold for

how long? Until they decide to resolve their differences politically?

Well, as I just said, and as many of you have said, it doesn’t look

like that is going to happen. But the second is we don’t have the

troops to do that.

If we could be sort of everywhere in Iraq for as long as we want,

then possibly that level of military presence could keep things

under control, but as it stands right now, we are squeezing a balloon. We go into one area, get it under control, leave to go to another area, and it just continues. And given that we don’t have the

troops to maintain this past next spring under any scenario, how

do we get over that hump? How do we deal with the troops?

I guess two parts to that question. One, is it wrong? Do we have

the troop strength to maintain this level of troops past next spring,

or under what scenario does this work if we don’t have those

troops, given the incredible emphasis on the hold part of this? We

don’t have the troops to hold it past next spring. How is that possibly a sufficient amount of time? I start with Dr. Kagan.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. As the gentleman can notice, the

light is not working, so we are keeping time here at the desk.

Mr. SMITH. I trust you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, first of all, we are not squeezing the

balloon. We are operating. We are not simply hitting them in one

area and then moving to another. We are deliberately clearing a

large swath of central Iraq, including almost all of the major insurgent havens, all at once. And it has been frequently reported by

soldiers on the ground and even by media over there that the insurgents are having a hard time finding new places to move to in

the area that they care most about and reestablish themselves because they are tending to find there are also American forces working with Iraqis there as well.

31

Mr. SMITH. But the violence is popping up. I mean, it just popped

up in Kirkuk. It popped up in Baquba when we were in Baghdad.

It seems like they may not be happy there, but they are certainly

killing and causing destruction there.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, there has been al Qaeda attacks in

Kirkuk at least once a month going back to January before that,

and there has been violence in Baquba well back in 2006. This is

not a new thing. This is not a question of them moving back to

Baquba. They have been there all along. Zarqawi was captured not

very far from Baquba, which is where they established the Islamic

State of Iraq. This is not squeezing the balloon. We have just

cleared Baquba, in fact, for the first time. And we have cleared it,

and we are holding it, and we are holding it simultaneously as we

are operating in Fallujah and Yusufiya and Mahmudiyah and

Salman Pak and Arab Jabour and Taji and Tarmiya and Lake

Tharthar.

Mr. SMITH. Skipping forward to next spring when we can’t hold

it any longer because we don’t have the troops to maintain the

surge, what happens then?

Dr. KAGAN. I don’t accept that premise, Congressman. I think

people have said various different things about this. We can sustain the surge beyond April if we choose to, if it becomes necessary.

And then the other question is how rapidly do we start drawing

down, because you can start drawing down potentially in the

spring. The assumption that would undergird that would be an optimistic scenario, that violence—would get violence sufficiently

under control while we are increasing the size and capability of the

Iraqi Security Forces; that it will actually become possible to hand

over to them and have them maintain it, because that has been the

aim of the strategy all along. This has always been designed to be

a bridging strategy, to bring the level of violence down to a point

of which the Iraqi Army and police can secure it and continue it.

Will that happen by the spring? I am not sure. Could we continue this surge beyond the spring if we chose to? Yes, we could.

We will have to see what will become necessary. But I think we

should make that decision when the time is upon us and when we

have a better idea of what the situation on the ground actually is.

Mr. SMITH. Well, I guess I am out of time. I was interested in

the comments of the other two panelists.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the question fully answered?

Mr. SMITH. It was fully answered by Dr. Kagan. I was curious

of Dr. Perry or Dr. Mathews.

The CHAIRMAN. Quickly, Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. If we want to extend the surge beyond spring, the

most obvious way to do that and the most undesirable way to do

it would be to extend the deployment of the troops that are already

there.

Dr. MATHEWS. I would just add that I think U.S. Generals have

made pretty clear that their judgment is that Iraqis would not be

able to manage the security of Iraq alone for several years. This is

not a question of next spring.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The information to which I was making reference a few moments

ago from General Peter Pace is that earlier there were ten battalVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
32

ions of the Iraqi Army operating independently, and today there

are six Iraqi battalions operating independently.

Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to ask a question at this time.

Let me just ask this. Well, let me say this first. I think it is important that we all recognize who our enemies are in the war and

particularly in the front in Iraq. Recently a top al Qaeda leader in

Iraq was arrested by U.S. forces. His name was al Mashhadani,

also known as Abu Shahid. He was actually captured in early July.

And information, according to press releases, indicate that al

Qaeda central, that is the main al Qaeda leadership in Pakistan or

wherever they are, is providing direction to al Qaeda in Iraq. Al

Mashhadani states, quote, the Islamic State of Iraq is a front organization that masks the foreign influence and leadership within al

Qaeda in Iraq in an attempt to put an Iraqi face on the leadership

of al Qaeda in Iraq.

I guess I am interested to know what your take is on this specific

information. I just open that up to anybody that wants to comment.

Dr. KAGAN. I was very pleased to see the release about the capture of this individual, who, according to press release, I believe,

is the top Iraqi in al Qaeda in Iraq. The group, as we know, is

headed by Abu al Massari, who is an Egyptian. The number two—

another—al Massari just means an Egyptian, another fellow who

was identified in that way was recently captured.

We have been rolling up this al Qaeda network in a variety of

ways, and I hope that this capture will help lead us to others as

previous captures have done. It supports, in my view, unequivocally the fact that al Qaeda in Iraq is connected to the global al

Qaeda movement, which is apparently important because some

people in this town have been casting doubt on that. It is not

equivalent to it. Al Qaeda is a franchise movement. Individual

groups pop up on their own, as this one apparently did in Iraq, but

they then do attempt to link into the global movement, which is

significant because the global movement then directs resources in

various ways to different regions depending on its prioritization. It

has been prioritizing Iraq very heavily, and it has been sending, according to General Petraeus, anywhere from 40 to 80 foreign fighters a month into the country. That sounds like a very small number, but we also know that about 80 to 90 percent of the suicide

bombers in Iraq are foreign fighters, and the suicide bombings create a disproportionate sense of defeat here, a disproportionate

sense of violence in Iraq and were, as you know, critical to helping

establish sectarian violence.

So I think that there is no question this capture along with many

others supports on the one hand the conclusion that this al Qaeda

in Iraq is tied to the global al Qaeda network in a way that is very

worrisome, but it also shows that we are being successful in Iraq

in identifying these individuals based largely on local tips and information that we get from being there, rounding them up and unraveling this network.

Mr. SAXTON. I do have a follow-up question, but I would offer the

opportunity for either of the other witnesses.

33

Dr. PERRY. I don’t have anything to add to what Dr. Kagan said.

Thank you.

Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Kagan, with regard to the al Qaeda network,

when we think of an organization, particularly a military organization, we think of a line of command and a formal structure within

which that military organization operates. Based on your experience, could you describe for us the nature of the al Qaeda organization?

Dr. KAGAN. I will do my best. It is not an easy thing to do without access to the classified information since most of our understanding of this comes from sensitive intelligence, and I don’t have

that, but it appears that al Qaeda in Iraq does have actually a fairly impressive hierarchical organization, and they do tend to establish regional emirs in different parts of the country that are responsible for that, that are coordinated with the central leadership

cell.

That having been said, it is a cellular organization based on old

revolutionary principles, that it is designed to maximize security.

So it is difficult when you grab one of these guys to just get everyone else rolled up. And it is an organization in which local initiative plays a big role balanced with the allocation of resources and

priorities from the top. So it is a very flexible, very adaptive organization. It is one that is very difficult to go after.

The best way to go after it is to get—is to eliminate its popular

support, and that is what we have been helping to do in Iraq, because the Iraqis have turned against al Qaeda, and we have been

supporting them. That is by far the most significant, most permanent and most likely to be successful approach that we can follow.

Chasing these guys around with Special Forces is a much harder

thing that is much less likely to lead to success.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, Dr. Kagan.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you to all of you for being here.

I wanted to follow up a little bit on this discussion, because, Dr.

Kagan, you are suggesting, I think, that al Qaeda in Iraq is composed of the Sunni insurgency essentially, that they make up basically al Qaeda in Iraq. I wanted to explore that a little bit further

because we certainly know that there are many experts out there,

among them Dr. Cordesman and others, who have spoken more to

the fact that these are not necessarily jihadists, they are Sunnis

who are opposed to the occupation, and they certainly are involved

in a power grab, which we can well understand. But there is a difference here of how we describe the Sunni insurgency as al Qaeda

versus Sunni insurgency. Could you break that down in your thinking, particularly in terms of numbers and ideology?

Dr. KAGAN. Very happily, Congresswoman. I am not sure you

were here for my opening remarks.

My focus was on saying that I do believe from 2003 to January

of 2007, we were primarily dealing with the Sunni Arab insurgency. It was about the fact that the Sunni community did not

34

want to accept a lesser role in Iraq, and that a major shift occurred

in February 2006 when the sectarian violence was ignited.

I absolutely do not think that al Qaeda makes up even the majority of the Sunni resistance movement. It plays a disproportionate

role because of the nature of its attacks and its objectives and its

organization.

One of the interesting things that we have seen is that in part,

in my view, as a result of the surge and the pressure that we have

been putting on the other Sunni insurgents, we started to see the

Sunni Arab insurgents turning against al Qaeda themselves, and

we have been able to broker cease-fire agreements with the 1920’s

brigades which are very hard-core Baathist insurgents to cooperate

with them against al Qaeda.

So it is absolutely possible. Al Qaeda is certainly the smallest in

number of the insurgent groups, if you want to regard it as an insurgent group. Its objectives are fundamentally different in any

event. It is a terrorist group.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If I may, though, I think because of

the way we discuss it in many ways—I don’t even think in your

comments one would assume from that that it is the smallest

group, and I don’t know whether Dr. Mathews or Dr. Perry wants

to comment on that, But is part of the difficulty that it is perhaps

more emotional? I am not suggesting in any way that their tactics

aren’t horrific and that we need to respond to them, but I also wonder whether it is part of the way in which we are discussing and

being somewhat unclear about the makeup of the insurgency.

Part of that leads me to a question that I would like you all to

address, is how then we counter that, whether through propaganda, through our media, through their media. Have we really

taken ahold of being able to do that, and isn’t it partly because we

have done it—seeing them really as al Qaeda as opposed to other

issues that we might address?

If I may, in another question, Dr. Mathews, I think real quickly

with my time here, one of the things that you mentioned is that

we really have not articulated our intentions, our long-term intentions, in the region.

And I wonder if that isn’t part of the problem that we have had

as well, that we haven’t really put that out there. I mean, we are

talking about the surge, clearly, but I was just in Iraq last week,

and if you ask, what are our long-term strategies in Iraq and in

the region, people start talking about the surge again, which is

not—which is not the strategy that we should be focussing on.

So, number one, is part of the difficulty that we really are not

being very discerning about these insurgent—about al Qaeda and

the insurgency? And also, what do you think our strategy should

be to counteract that in the media perceptions not only in Iraq, but

here at home?

Dr. MATHEWS. Well I think, Congresswoman, that there are two

different ways to send a message about what our intentions are.

One is what we say, and one is what we do. I was trying to make

the point that what we are building there suggests very strongly

to people there and in the region that we intend a permanent presence, and we intend to use Iraq, as somebody has said, sort of as

an American aircraft carrier to project power in the region.

35

I think that is a big mistake. I think this body ought to take on

that issue and debate it, debate its wisdom. Instead this question

of funding provisions has been sort of an ineffective proxy for that.

On the other question that you were asking, you know, I think

it is a terrible mistake to grant al Qaeda in Iraq more importance

than it deserves and, even in a broader sense, to obsess more about

al Qaeda as a threat to the U.S. more than it deserves. And finally,

I think it is important to note that I think it was either General

Petraeus or General Pace who ranked it fourth among—out of five

among the threats that we face in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Jones has a question, I understand, and then we go to Mr.

Murphy.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I just want to read very quickly, and then I do have a question primarily for you, Dr. Perry. An article in the North Carolina

paper, The News & Observer, April 23, 2007, the title, ‘‘Deployed,

Depleted, Desperate’’. Here is a question to those who still support

President Bush’s strategy to stretch out the Iraq war until after he

has left office, and for those who think we should be prepared to

continue our bloody occupation of Iraq for five or ten years. This

is the question—not you personally. But this is the question in the

article: Are you ready to support reinstating Selective Service? I

have Camp LeJeune in my district. I have met with many Army

and Marines. They are the best, but they are tired, and they are

worn out. If we are going to increase the numbers, where in the

world are we going to get the people?

And let me read quickly—and I will let you answer. And from

the same article: Did demands of the war on our troops and their

aged and worn-out equipment already have pushed the annual cost

of enlistment and reenlistment bonuses above $1 billion, and of recruitment advertising to $120 million annually?

I hope I am wrong, but I will tell you that I have been here for

14 years, I go to all the meetings I can go to learn because I am

not an expert in anything, but I just don’t see where we are going

to get the manpower if we don’t discuss the draft, if we are there

with what we have now. If we increase the numbers, where are we

going to get the manpower? Do you think there is going to come

a time that this Congress and the President, whoever he or she

might be, are going to have to discuss the draft?

Dr. PERRY. Yeah. If you consider a draft and ask me to testify,

I would testify against it. I think the all-volunteer force has been

an amazing success in this country, and I strongly support it, and

I would not support going to a draft.

Mr. JONES. Well, I guess I will ask Dr. Mathews. If projections—

and projections sometimes are wrong, I am the first to acknowledge

that—but if projections are accurate, and we have got fewer people

who are going into the voluntary service because of our commitment in Iraq of thousands and thousands of troops, and they know

they are being worn out, and then you have to say, well, where are

we getting the manpower pool? I am not saying do you advocate

a draft or not, but where do you go?

36

Dr. MATHEWS. Congressman, I am really—I am not enough of an

expert. I have views on the draft, but they are views of a layman,

and they really don’t deserve, I don’t think, to be aired here.

Mr. JONES. Well, I guess the point is are we going to have to

grapple with that, Americans are going to have to grapple with

that. And if it continues to go the way it is going with our troops

going four and five times around, somebody at some point in time

is going to have to think, where do we get the manpower from?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think that is undeniable.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Chairman.

And I know Mr. Jones’s kind of question about the manpower

here in America. My focus is about the manpower over in Iraq.

When I was there as a soldier in 2003–2004, I had trained over

600—helped train over 600 Iraqi at that time, called Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC), now called Iraqi Army. And we continually

hear from the President that the critical mission in Iraq from—we

hear this from President Bush is that when they stand up, we will

stand down. However, when you look back—when I was there in

2003, when we trained these ICDC, we didn’t have uniforms for

them. In fact, we gave them Chicago White Sox hats to identify

them. That is how little support the Administration gave us to execute this critical mission.

That was four years ago. Now it doesn’t seem like we are moving

forward far enough. Five days ago, July 13, I know Chairman Skelton mentioned it in the New York Times article, said, American

commanders in Iraq said, and I quote, ‘‘The effort to train Iraqi

Army and police units had slowed in recent months, and would

need to be expanded to enable any large-scale reduction in American force levels,’’ end quote.

The reason given for this lack of progress was in large part because preparing Iraqi units to operate without American backing

have become a secondary goal under the current war strategy,

which has emphasized protecting Iraqis and the heavy use of

American combat power. In short, the surge strategy emphasizes

peacekeeping and force protection and deemphasizes training Iraqi

troops.

The President’s escalation has simply enmeshed American troops

even further being peacemakers in Iraq’s religious civil war. General Pace recently said that there are 6,000 American soldiers involved in the training mission, 6,000 out of 158,000. That is less

than 1 in 25, 4 percent. In fact, a number of Iraqi battalions rated

as capable of operating without American assistance fell to six this

month. That is down from ten in March, shortly after the escalation of troops.

With this in mind—and all that the escalation has done is to

make the Iraqis even more dependent on our American GIs and

marines, not less. I would like to have your thoughts on my comments. If I could start with Dr. Perry.

Dr. PERRY. I concur with the assessment that you just gave me.

The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations were to increase the—increase, not decrease, the emphasis on training, and to do that by

37

putting an emphasis on embedding troops, American troops, within

the Iraqi forces, a way of increasing their professionalism.

We got various assessments to how many troops we have involved, but we are talking about probably 15,000 to 20,000 troops

involved in the training and embedding missions as opposed to the

6,000 that you are describing now.

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you.

Dr. Mathews, please.

Dr. MATHEWS. I just wanted to add that there has never been a

satisfactory explanation of the desertion rate in the Iraqi Security

Forces. And General Pace’s comments—you know, there is a quality of sand being poured into a bottle and running out the bottom

that should make us, I think, ask ourselves something that you

know well, which is that an Army’s most important asset is its motivation, its will, its knowledge of who it is fighting for and for

what. And that is a good part of why the return on the investment

we have made in training has been so low, in my judgment.

Mr. MURPHY. Dr. Kagan.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I would like to thank you for your

service to the Nation both as a soldier and as a Congressman.

I don’t agree that we are pouring sand into a bottle would just

keep coming out of the bottom. The desertion rate in the Iraqi

Army actually tends to be relatively low compared to desertion

rates in armies historically. It is not low compared to ours, but ours

is the best in the world by a long margin.

Mr. MURPHY. If I could focus now, Dr. Kagan, six now of the

Iraqi battalions are dropping.

Dr. KAGAN. Yes. We have reduced—the number of Iraqi Army

that is capable of operating independently has apparently decreased. The number of Iraqi units that are fighting actively

against the enemy, fighting bravely, taking casualties every day

and continuing in the struggle is increasing. Iraqis continue to volunteer. And when you keep in mind that Iraqis volunteering until

very recently had to run the risk of being attacked with suicide

bombs at the recruiting stations, and that basically because it is a

volunteer force and because of the way the Iraqis do leaves, which

has been criticized widely, but it is the way they do business, they

basically have to re-up every month when they come back from

their leaves, and they do that even in the midst of very hard fighting, even among very heavy casualties. So I really have to take exception to the notion that the Iraqi Army is not standing up to this

fight in some way, not that you have said that, but others have

been making that case, and I find that very disturbing.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Johnson from Georgia.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Kagan, although you have been kind of like a lone wolf at

your last couple of hearings, I think you have done an admirable

job of presenting an alternative view on things in Iraq. And I would

like to just ask you whether or not it is true that there are other

strategic challenges that the U.S. may have to confront around the

world in addition to the Iraq force that permeates violence over

there, al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda in general. There are other straVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
38

tegic challenges that we may face throughout the world; is that correct?

Dr. KAGAN. Yes, of course it is, Congressman. We face the challenge of being a global power with interests around the world, and

we face a number of potential threats. In fact, we face a number

of active enemies, including states that are actively working to support those who are killing our soldiers, which includes Iran in this

case. And there are other threats that we can identify. Of course,

North Korea is a major challenge, China is a major challenge, the

instability in Pakistan is a major worry. Clearly there are all sorts

of threats around the world, but I think that it is important to

identify——

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to stop you right there. Are we at risk of

being unable to meet other challenges because our U.S. military is

bogged down in Iraq?

Dr. KAGAN. I am going to hesitate because I know that the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs stated not very long ago that he did

not believe we were at risk of being unable to meet challenges elsewhere based on his professional evaluation of the situation, the

likely nature of those threats.

Mr. JOHNSON. What is your opinion about it?

Dr. KAGAN. Not having looked into what would be required in

various scenarios very carefully, I clearly think we clearly do have

challenges, and I have been on record all along as saying that I

was concerned that the military was too small, and I worried about

this even in the 1990’s. So I believe we do continue to face challenges.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Kagan.

Dr. Perry, thank you for your service to the Nation and your long

and distinguished career in academia and business as well. It has

well prepared you for the tasks, the recent tasks, that you have undertaken.

Dr. PERRY. Thank you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for your service.

What are your thoughts on our ability to meet any of the challenges that may arise around the world, given our——

Dr. PERRY. I think our overextension of our armed forces in Iraq

puts at risk our ability to meet these other challenges. And indeed,

I believe the perception of other nations, even if it is an incorrect

perception, that we are tied down in Iraq has already led them to

take actions which are adverse to American interests.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

And, sir, you mentioned something about we need to create disincentives for Iran and Syria in supporting sectarian violence in

Iraq. What are these disincentives.

Dr. PERRY. Pardon me?

Mr. JOHNSON. You mentioned something about we needed to create disincentives for Iran and Syria to continued support for sectarian violence. What are those disincentives?

Dr. PERRY. I would be most optimistic about our ability to work

with Syria, which I think is working against our interests in Iraq

today. I think we have leverage on Syria, and I think we could use

that leverage effectively, but it would take a really concerted and

sustained diplomatic effort to do that.

39

We have done that in the past with Syria. When Mr. Baker was

the Secretary of State, he met a dozen times with Syria in trying

to get them to take actions which we wanted to take relative to

Israel and was ultimately successful in that. But it takes a long

and sustained diplomatic effort. It cannot be done by our ambassadors in the region. It cannot be done on a one-time basis.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

And, Dr. Mathews, you gave a very cogent analysis of our thinking in terms of this so-called troop surge, and you had stated that

the struggle for power is created by the political vacuum that was

left by the leadership void that was taken out in Iraq, and that this

political power struggle is just a natural result of that, and it is

not soon to end.

Do you have any ideas about how long it might take for the sectarian forces to fight their way out of this and come to some kind

of a political solution and end the fighting over there?

Dr. MATHEWS. The record is that once these sorts of struggles

start, they take a very long time to burn themselves out, because,

of course, the longer they go on, the more people are hurt, the more

people have lost family members, friends, houses, businesses, et

cetera, and the greater the motivation is to keep going. So the

record since 1945, if you look at all the civil wars that have taken

place, is that on average they last ten years.

I do think that there is some hope, and it is a very small one,

as I said, that we could attempt to go back and recreate the step

that we tried to skip of allowing a full-fledged debate among Iraqis

as to their political future. We tried, rather, to put our own set of,

in my view, wholly unrealistic deadlines on them and to restrict

the debate to a very tiny circle of largely exiles, and that produced

a truncated political sorting out that has now manifested itself in

the streets, in this armed struggle. If it goes on, I think it will—

like this, it will go on for many, many years, and——

Mr. JOHNSON. And that is whether we are there or not?

Dr. MATHEWS. I believe so. I mean——

Mr. JOHNSON. We can’t stop it by our presence?

Dr. MATHEWS. I think the evidence suggests not.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia may be interested,

in 1994, on the way to the 50th anniversary of D-Day, I had occasion to go near the Royal Marine headquarters near Exeter, England, and I was briefed by two sergeants that had just returned

from lengthy stays in Bosnia, and both of them agreed that this

will end soon because everybody is getting tired of fighting. And

sure enough, not too long thereafter, we had the peace accords.

I think the question might be, Mr. Johnson, as to if and when

they will all get tired of fighting. And if there is any indication or

any precedent, I think it would be that in Bosnia.

Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Perry, when the Iraq Study Group produced its report, there

was about one page in the whole document dealing with the concept of partition. It was pretty much dismissed out of hand. And

since the report was issued, and we now know from the United Nations that there are four million refugees in Iraq, two million interVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
40

nally, who have kind of fallen back into their own sectarian or ethnic enclaves, the central government clearly is not hitting on all

cylinders in terms of trying to reach reconciliation.

You know—and we have talked about Bosnia now at least a half

dozen times during the course of this hearing. It just seems to me

that maybe we should revisit that concept. And again, I am not

talking about hard partition or soft partition, but clearly people are

retreating into their own—what they feel is the only safe place

they can go, which is their families and their religious groups. And

I was just sort of wondering, A, why was the study group that

dismissive? And, B, do you think it is time to maybe revisit that?

Dr. PERRY. Even though we had only one report about partition,

we spent considerable time discussing it and debating, including

hearing excellent briefings from Mr. Gelb and Senator Biden, both

of whom are strong proponents of it, as you know. And I believe

there was a time when that might have been an appropriate move

for the American Government to take.

I do not believe we have the power to effect that today. When we

were in Iraq, a question we asked each of the members of the

Iraq—we talk to all members of the Iraqi Government, dozens of

them. A question we asked each of them was would they support

a move toward a partition? And to a man—and they were all

men—to a man they all said no, very strongly opposed to it.

Now, to be sure, they all had a vested interest in a partition. But

the point is this is a government which we helped set up the process by which it was established, the government which is elected

by the Iraqi people. So for us today to impose partition, the first

thing we would have to do is remove that government, which would

be, you know, an enormous undertaking and set us back in ways

that are really quite unpredictable. My judgment today is we no

longer have the option, the United States no longer has the option

of imposing a partition. In our discussions in the Iraq Study Group,

many of us believed that that is what Iraq would evolve to in time

anyway, but we did not have the power to make it happen.

Mr. COURTNEY. It does seem people are voting with their feet in

that direction.

Dr. Mathews, I don’t know if you have any observations on that

issue.

Dr. MATHEWS. I would go one step further, which is—than Secretary Perry, which is I think it is a matter of U.S. policy. I agree

with him that we don’t have the U.S. troops to execute this policy

peacefully or even reasonably peacefully, but I think as a choice,

conscious policy, it would be a terrible mistake because it would

convince all those in the region, and there are many, many of

them, that we came there into Iraq to dismantle the strongest Arab

State in the interest of Israel. And I think, you know, as a political

choice of policy to pursue partition, I agree that it may very well

be where things end up, but that is a very different thing than the

U.S. adopting it as its policy. I think it would be very, very unwise

as well as unfeasible.

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, the other recommendation of the study

group, which was to embed and train Iraqi troops. There was a

comment—Colin Powell was quoted in State of Denial—I guess he

had a conversation with President Bush after he left the Secretary

41

of State’s office, where he warned that if you don’t have a government that troops—that an Iraqi Army is connected to, then all you

are doing is training militia. I was just sort of wondering what you

thought of that observation.

Dr. PERRY. I think it is a very good observation, and it is certainly one of the dangers of the tactic of training Iraqi troops.

I should say more generally that even if all the recommendations

of the Iraq Study Group had been carried out, we had no assurance

that that would lead to a stable Iraq because of the uncertainties

about whether the Iraqi Government would be able to sustain. Not

only the President’s strategy, but the strategy of the Iraq Study

Group really depends on the Iraqi Government being able to sustain itself, and I do believe that that is important, very much in

question.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Sestak.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Perry, when you came here in February, I asked you

the question, how long would it be before you became a date-certain person? And you answered, about six months. Do you still believe that? Are you there at this time as the best strategy?

Dr. PERRY. I am not there yet.

Mr. SESTAK. It is not six months yet.

Dr. PERRY. No. But I agree with the President’s assessment that

a departure from Iraq today would lead to disastrous results. I

think there is still an opportunity to try to make the situation stable before we leave, and I still believe that the recommendations

of the Iraq Study Group are the best way of achieving that.

Mr. SESTAK. With regard to the Iraq Study Group, two branch

questions. Iran, in your testimony what I read and what you have

said, we had Mr. Fingar, the head of the National Intelligence

Council, here about a week—a few days ago. He reminded us that

the National Intelligence Estimate about a year ago said that any

rapid withdrawal, defined at 18 months, would have Iraq spin into

chaos. Earlier he had said, however, that Iraq does not want, as

you said, Ms. Mathews, Dr. Mathews, a failed state, a fractionalized government. When he was asked did that 18-month assessment of spiraling chaos include Iran being involved, he said no.

When asked if it would make a difference, he said, you know, it

would. Doesn’t know exactly. Is Iran critical? Is it the critical piece

with Syria to having—if there were to be by force of law a date certain, given enough time, key to leaving behind an unfailed state?

Dr. PERRY. I think both Iran and Syria are playing critical negative roles today. As I have testified before, I think we have some

opportunity to influence Syria in a more positive—take a more

positive course. I am not at all confident we have—today have the

ability to influence Iran to take actions which we want them to

take.

Mr. SESTAK. Dr. Mathews, you have kind of touched on this already.

Dr. MATHEWS. I am not sure I have more to add to what Secretary Perry just said. I think those are the two critical players.

42

But again, I think there—what they are willing to do depends enormously heavily on what our posture is.

Mr. SESTAK. Correct. And that is why my question is, does date

certain, we won’t be there, not just on an interim basis, give the

incentive for them to participate positively? Now, Dr. Fingar said

yes, Mr. Fingar, the head of National Intelligence Estimate.

Dr. MATHEWS. I think it is—I am hesitating because I think we—

that everybody in this town has been too sure about things that

were—this is a multivariable equation, and we tend to always talk

about it one at a time. I think that that is the most likely outcome,

that they would be more willing, and that Tehran in particular

shares an interest in not having chaos on its borders.

Mr. SESTAK. Dr. Perry, one other thing. December 6 you came

out with the ISG, and you had a goal of end of March for the combat troops to have been redeployed. I have watched Somalia where

it took us 6 months to get 6,300 troops out of there, as you remember, and we had still another 17,000 over there just to make sure

it was a safe redeployment. And we didn’t have over 100,000 U.S.

civilian contractors in that country as we do in Iraq. Many people

now go to that date that you have established as the date to some

degree twofold. That date, if it were to be a goal and become a date

certain, is it really the right date, or did you really mean about a

year and a quarter? And number two is——

Dr. PERRY. Iraq Study Group was a date by which we could have

the combat brigades that were patrolling the streets of Iraq out of

Iraq. But even by that date, we would still have a strong rapid reaction force in Iraq, we would still have support forces in Iraq,

there would still be contractors in Iraq. We did not describe a strategy for completely withdrawing from Iraq. I believe that would be

a very, very complicated strategy to execute.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

I have left on the list Mr. Loebsack, Ms. Shea-Porter and Mr. Andrews in that order.

Mr. Loebsack.

Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to the three of you for being here and testifying today.

I am sorry, I was in a previous hearing as well, markup. That is

why I am so late. Some of the things that I may cover may have

been covered already, and I apologize if that is the case.

I want to mostly address my comments and my questions to you,

Dr. Kagan. I just want to make a couple of comments at the outset.

When you were asked if we have enough troops for the surge, you

quoted General Odierno. Of course, we know he is not the person

who is in charge in Iraq. It is General Petraeus, and if the record

shows otherwise, I will be happy to be corrected. But to my knowledge, General Petraeus has never stated so unequivocally as General Odierno has that we have enough troops for the surge. In fact,

some of us were in Iraq in February, Congressman Andrews and

some others, and if I remember correctly, we asked General

Petraeus directly if we had enough troops, and essentially he said

that is all the troops that he has. So I just want to make that clear

at the outset.

43

Also, we had a bit of an interchange long ago, I think a couple

of months ago, about Bosnia and whether we really should compare

Bosnia to Iraq. Now, you began to make that comparison earlier,

and then you qualified that by saying you didn’t want to make that

comparison, but nonetheless you sort of indicated there was a comparison. I just want to state for the record that Bosnia of 1994,

1995, is not Iraq of 2007. They are qualitatively different in a variety of ways, and I am sure you know which ways they are different. So I think it is very, very important when we talk about

how complicated this situation is that we not even hint at some

kind of historical analogies that don’t begin to come close to describing the situation or helping to sort of—helping us here in Congress in particular, let alone the American people, to understand

what is happening in Iraq at the moment.

Also, when you talked about al Qaeda and how much support

they have, you mentioned the way they go about trying to increase

their support, classic insurgency of one sort or another, as you

mentioned, terrorize the population, what have you, also creating

a situation where the population loses whatever confidence it may

have in the authorities at the time. But then you mention later on

that you are not at all optimistic that al Qaeda can hold that support for any length of time because of the terrible things they do

to people and other things.

I do want to ask you a question. In, say, 2004 or even 2005, did

you think that Iraq, Ramadi in particular, Fallujah, Anbar Province—that we may be today in Anbar Province where we are? Did

you anticipate yourself that the sheiks—and not all the sheiks, as

we know, are on board in this, most of them are. Did you anticipate

that there was any possibility whatsoever that the sheiks would

turn against al Qaeda? Did you personally anticipate that?

Dr. KAGAN. I did not. I was very pleasantly surprised by that development.

Mr. LOEBSACK. I talked to people in the State Department at

that time who were very confident that even if the United States

were to withdraw at that time, that eventually the sheiks, those in

control in Anbar Province, would, in fact, turn against foreign

fighters. Now, we know that many of the al Qaeda now are apparently home-grown Iraqis, but at that time there were, in fact, people predicting that that would be the case. So again, you didn’t anticipate that.

I have some concerns, obviously, about depending upon your

analysis at the moment and how you see things going in the future.

Now, that may not be fair, but nonetheless, that is the concern that

I have. You mentioned at one point—and this goes back to your

interchange with Congressman Murphy. But before that you mentioned that there are many Iraqis who are doing well, fighting well,

they are brave and all the rest. I need more than many. Can you

put any kind of numbers on this? And that will be my last question.

Dr. KAGAN. Congressman, I would have to get back to you with

that. I don’t have the numbers off the top of my head about how

many units. I can tell you that we have got about 7,000 in Baghdad, 7,000 outside of Baghdad. There is a division’s worth in

Diwaniya, there is a division’s worth in Nasiriyah, and there is

44

18,000 in Ninawa. Those are the ones I can think of off the top of

my head, a significant portion of the Iraqi Army.

You know, I can go back and try to top up what I think all the

rest of the figures are. Oh, and we have 12,000 in Anbar, who have

signed up this year, whereas previously we were not able to recruit

anything in Anbar.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 95.]

Mr. LOEBSACK. For the record, I have difficulties with the words

like ‘‘many’’ and ‘‘significant.’’ I would like to know if there is any

way—I would like to know precise numbers. If there is any way

that you or our military can give us those numbers, I think that

would be really important for all of us here who have to make decisions on these matters. So thank you very much, and I yield back

my time unless Dr. Mathews would like to make a comment. You

look like it.

Dr. MATHEWS. No. I was just struck that we have been here almost three hours, and nobody has talked about the police, which

are absolutely critical to establishing peace in Iraq, and where we

have a real disaster.

Mr. LOEBSACK. I might just make a comment. I think Congressman Andrews and I—now that things may have changed since February, but that was very disturbing when we were there, was the

difficulty training police. And even prior to the training figure—trying to figure out who the people were who were being trained, and

whether they were really folks we should be training as police. But

again, I don’t want to put words in Congressman Andrews’s mouth,

but I think he probably would agree with me while we were there.

That is a good point and thank you.

And I yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

Dr. Kagan, how many times have you been to Iraq? And when

was your most recent visit?

Dr. KAGAN. I have been to Iraq twice in early April and early

May for about eight days each time, and I am about to return next

week.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And where were you at that time?

Dr. KAGAN. Each time I spent a couple of days in the Green

Zone, and then I rode around with American units in battlefield

circulations in various neighborhoods in Baghdad. I have been to

Baquba, I have been to Taji, I have been to——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. In what capacity?

Dr. KAGAN. What capacity?

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Yes.

Dr. KAGAN. I was there as an observer.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Who invited you?

Dr. KAGAN. I was there at the invitation of General Petraeus.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. I was there in March. Do you think it is a

good sign or a bad sign that mortars are now hitting the Green

Zone, and that people are having to walk around with their armor?

Is it a meaningless sign, or is it a bad sign that maybe we are losing control right inside our embassy area?

Dr. KAGAN. Mortars have been hitting the zone all year.

45

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Let us correct that for a moment. Mortars

have not been raining on them all year. There has been quite a significant change. Yes or no?

Dr. KAGAN. There has been an increase in mortar attacks, but

there have been more mortar attacks——

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. In the interest of five minutes,

thank you. I appreciate that.

Do you agree with Peter Pace when he said—when he was asked

if he was comfortable with the ability to respond to an emerging

world threat, he said no, he was not comfortable because of the

troops and all of the treasure in Iraq and the weariness of the

troops. Yes or no, do you agree with General Pace on the comment?

Dr. KAGAN. I have been concerned about our ability to respond

globally since 1997, and I am on the record about that.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you agree with Max Boot, who stated in

a subcommittee hearing last week that we could get the troops that

we needed from people who wanted green cards, and that they

could come from other countries and go fight for us and get green

cards? Would that be a good policy? Please say yes or no.

Dr. KAGAN. I cannot answer that with a yes or no, Congresswoman. I can tell you that it is a good idea to think about offering

citizenship for a reward for service. The details of that program I

would have to think about in greater detail.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do we need them in order to continue fighting?

Dr. KAGAN. Do we need who?

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do we need people who are not from our country but could use a green card?

Dr. KAGAN. Do we need them to continue the fight? No. I don’t

believe we need them to continue the fighting.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Can you tell me specifically where you would

get the troops? Because the testimony I have gotten from pretty

much everybody is that our troops are exhausted, worn out, and we

don’t have troops that could continue. Where would you get the

troops? And if you could just—like one sentence.

Dr. KAGAN. There are additional troops. We could either extend

the tours of soldiers that are there—this has always been discussed

by the Joint Staff—or we could redeploy National Guard units,

which, as Dr. Perry suggested, would be very undesirable, but

might become necessary. And I also believe that we need to work

to expand the size of the ground forces as rapidly as possible.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. You and I both know that that would take a

great deal of time, recruitment, training, et cetera. So your suggestion now is to extend the time that the troops are there?

Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, I don’t work in the Joint Staff, and

I can’t tell you exactly how this would be done, but I can tell you

that that is one method, and another method is redeploying National Guard forces who have already been there.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, that is good because since you have gone

as an observer, it is important for me to know what you observed.

Now, when I spoke to General Petraeus and General Fill in

March when I was there, General Petraeus and General Fill gave

me widely varying numbers on the number of Iraqi military and

Iraqi soldiers that were going to do the, quote, standing up for evVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
46

erybody. As a matter of fact, General Petraeus doubled the number

in an hour. Do you think we have a better handle on the numbers

of troops and Iraqi police now than we did in March? Do we have

better data?

Dr. KAGAN. I believe that we do have an understanding of how

many Iraqi Army soldiers there are, and how many Iraqi police

there are, understanding that there is fluctuation in a force in wartime. But, yes, I think we have an understanding of that.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And how do you think we got there? Because

when I asked them and they asked about the difference, they said,

well, it is hard to tell, people come and they get their bonuses, they

leave, they don’t come back again, they might die, they might be

sick. How are we basing the data now?

Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, when I was there, briefings that I

received suggested they put new programs in place to identify exactly how many Iraqi police there were, who they were, and make

sure that people were not simply coming in to collect their bonuses,

but that they were actually on the rolls.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. So we are doing better

Administrationwise, administratively there.

Dr. KAGAN. That is what I was briefed when I was there, yes.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Last question—or two questions. Are we there

to bring democracy to Iraq? Is that your overriding belief, that we

are there to bring democracy to Iraq?

Dr. KAGAN. Ma’am, I think that we are there in pursuit of American national interests.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Is that to bring democracy to Iraq? Or could

you tell me what it is exactly?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, I believe we have a vital national interest in

not allowing Iraq to become a failed state and a haven for terrorists.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Was it a failed state before we went in?

Dr. KAGAN. Obviously not.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Last question, do you think we should do the

same for Iran? Do you think we need to go into Iran?

Dr. KAGAN. Congresswoman, I have never advocated invading

Iran.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady.

Mr. Andrews, please.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I would like to thank the panel for their endurance and their very trenchant observations. Thank you very

much.

Dr. Kagan, if today is a typical day in Iraq based upon the data

of the last couple of months, there will be 145 attacks against

someone. On the average, how many of those attacks are launched

by al Qaeda?

Dr. KAGAN. A small number.

Mr. ANDREWS. How small?

Dr. KAGAN. I don’t know.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am sure we don’t either. If we could assume for

a moment that by whatever strategy the al Qaeda forces in Iraq

were completely vanquished, not one attack took place at all, there

47

would still be a very significant level of violence going on every day

in Iraq; would there not?

Dr. KAGAN. There might be, Congressman. It depends very much

on the circumstances. I mean, we can’t in reality simply pluck Iraq

out of the country and make it go away.

Mr. ANDREWS. There might be? There might be? I mean, let’s

look at this for a moment. In an instance where a Shia militia

member attacks a group of Sunnis in a public marketplace, murders 70 or 80 people, are you saying that he might not do that if

al Qaeda didn’t exist, or he probably would do that if al Qaeda

didn’t exist?

Dr. KAGAN. What I am saying is that you actually have to ask

the question, how do we make al Qaeda not exist? Because what

we are attempting to do is establish security not simply by going

after al Qaeda, but by taking measures that will establish security,

but also make it——

Mr. ANDREWS. How did we reduce the efficacy of al Qaeda in

Anbar Province? How did that happen?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, two things happened. One is that the forces

that we had there conducted a clear-and-hold operation in Ramadi

over a long period of time. And the other is local tribal leaders, as

that clear and hold was proceeding, turned against al Qaeda. Both

were necessary, in my view.

Mr. ANDREWS. Wouldn’t you ascribe much more value to the second of those phenomena than the first?

Dr. KAGAN. I don’t think you can separate them, Congressman.

I think reports are that the sheiks would not have turned if we had

not been there working to clear the area.

Mr. ANDREWS. It occurs to me that the—let me ask one other

question that goes to Dr. Mathews’s question about the police. I

visited the Jordanian Police Training Academy in February. It was

a remarkable experience, given the fact that we have absolutely no

idea who came into the process and what they did when they left

after spending an annualized base of about $50,000 year training

these individuals. I think we have trained about 180,000 police

thus far. Why do we need soldiers in Baghdad to pacify the area

if the police were at all effective? Why is this a military problem

rather than a law enforcement problem?

Dr. KAGAN. Because it is a war, Congressman. It is an insurgency, and the insurgents are using military tactics, among other

things. This is not a policing problem, however important the police

are in counterinsurgence.

Mr. ANDREWS. Right, Dr. Kagan. It is a civil war, and it is a civil

war being fought with IEDs and being fought with small-arms fire.

Why aren’t the police effective, the Iraqi Police effective, in identifying the people who are making IEDs and the places in which

they are making them? Why aren’t they effective?

Dr. KAGAN. In some areas the police are. In some areas the police

have been very uneven, and this has been a major focus the of the

command for some months now.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why have they been ineffective in Baghdad?

Dr. KAGAN. In some areas of Baghdad, they have been ineffective. The police, as we all know, are infiltrated by the Jaish al

Mahdi and other militia groups and have not been operating enVerDate 22-MAR-2001 09:17 Dec 03, 2008 Jkt 038837 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-72\199000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
48

tirely in support, to say the least, of what we have been trying to

do, and this has been a major focus of the command.

Congressman Loebsack, I think, wanted numbers. As a result we

have gotten, I believe, 7 of 9 police brigade commanders relieved,

17 of 24 police battalion commanders relieved for sectarian activities. The command has been working on this problem very hard,

but there is still a long way to go.

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Mathews, why do you think the police have

been ineffective in cases where the police have been ineffective, the

Iraqi Police?

Dr. MATHEWS. Because we have largely been training militia who

have different interests in pursuing their own interests.

Mr. ANDREWS. To whom do you ascribe the loyalty of Iraqi Police

forces? To whom are they loyal?

Dr. MATHEWS. Well, I mean, these are very large numbers of people, but on the evidence, the bulk of whom we—that we have

trained have been loyal to their own militia.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why is that, in your opinion?

Dr. MATHEWS. The militia saw an opportunity to gain power, to

gain intelligence about American operations, to gain weapons and

equipment.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why aren’t they loyal to the new Iraqi Government?

Dr. MATHEWS. Well, it varies, you know, between—from one to

the other. But I suppose the core answer is either they have prior

loyalties or that this government doesn’t command that broad a

loyalty among the population.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think it is far more the second.

I thank the witnesses for your answers.

The CHAIRMAN. And I thank the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. Sestak has a follow-on question, please.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Your last comment, as I was talking, is, I think, correct; you

know, it is a myriad approach. I have been taken by the ISG and

by—what you wrote in your testimony—by the comprehensiveness

that we have to have, a strategic approach, not a tactical one to

this issue. I honestly believe Democrats have to turn from peer opposition increasingly to working toward the aftermath of this, because there will be an aftermath, and how well we handle it with

a strategic, comprehensive, coherent approach to the Middle East

is important.

I am concerned about your comments in the sense that I remember in the Clinton Administration, Mr. Secretary, when two divisions for 60 days went down to C3, C4 and the uproar that ensued.

Now we don’t have any non-deployed units in a state of readiness

that could deploy. This is really hurting our strategic readiness.

So my—with that said—and I was taken with the ISG comment.

There was one thing in there that I wonder if we step down—we

talked about training and embedding people. Today out of the

160,000 troops we have there, about 48,000 are combat troops. I

think we have 8,000 advisors right now. One think tank recently

said we should have that be about 20,000 advisors and another

40,000 troops. When the Intelligence Community was here last

week, they said they could not tell us with any accuracy, in fact,

49

it would be an art, not a skill, which military units of the Iraqis

we could safely embed troops in, not to have an issue where—because of their motivation and loyalty.

Does that concern you, Dr. Perry, at all in the sense that leaving

behind a rapid-reaction force, knowing that one-third of our troops

there right now are combat, trying to have enough advisors or

trainers embedded in units that could be of questionable loyalty—

does that really mean much of a scale-down in forces, or does that

also put us to the point that I think is true, that come next spring

we are to the real verge of truly, maybe permanently, for some

time breaking our Army?

Dr. PERRY. Yes, that does concern me, Admiral Sestak. And at

the time we made the recommendation, we made it after a very

careful consultation with the commanders in Iraq at the time, General Chiarelli, General Casey and particularly General Dempsey,

who is in charge of the training and a number of troops, small

number of troops, we had embedded at that time. General

Dempsey’s view then was that this can be safely done, that there

was no examples at all of the Iraqi troops turning against the

Americans who were embedded in them. But I think that question

has to be continually reexamined. What was true last September

may not be true today.

I must say that my own personal experience of that is in my

grandson, who has had three deployments in Iraq. His last deployment was embedded in an Iraqi battalion. He felt completely safe

relative to the soldiers with whom he was embedded.

Mr. SESTAK. My take on this, and the reason I raise it, is I am

somewhat worried that the dynamics have changed since the ISG

came out. And now there is much movement to say, let us see if

that is the solution. We want almost a sequel two before they say

March is the goal, before they say embed the trainers, because so

much has happened.

Dr. PERRY. I agree completely with that, Admiral Sestak, and I

would not support specific recommendations of the group without

reexamining them in light of the current—in particular I would

like to carefully reexamine the embedding recommendations.

Mr. SESTAK. That is what I meant earlier about a deadline.

If I could, one last question, Dr. Kagan. You point out Fallujah,

how it sunk into chaos after we kind of pulled back out. You talk

about Tall’ Afar and Anbar, and that there is some—and like in

Anbar, there was some political will upon the tribal sheiks, things

stabilized to some degree.

What I ask is two quick questions because my time is just about

up. To some degree, where you point out any success, it was because the military was not acting in a political vacuum. So as I

step back, and having been out there with Senator Hagel, the best

three days I have had in Congress, and hearing the highest leaders

of this government say, the highest leaders, it is appeasement, the

re-Baathification law—can I just finish one thing? Is there really

any possibility of ending this thing the way you want to without

truly breaking us militarily, our Army?

Dr. KAGAN. Well, Congressman, if I didn’t think there was a way

of ending this without breaking us, I wouldn’t have advocated the

strategy. I do think that it is possible. I think that it will be very

50

difficult. The sort of political support that we were talking about

in Fallujah and Tall’ Afar and so forth was mainly support to conduct the security operation and willingness of the Iraqi Government to bear the onus for doing that. We have seen tremendous

support from the Iraqi Government to conduct security operations,

and I would add not simply against al Qaeda, but also against even

Jaish al Mahdi militias, which months ago people were very concerned that this government wouldn’t let us go after.

I think that this is a long process. I think that it will take time

for these political accords to be made. But I also think we can improve the security situation dramatically without necessarily having a hydrocarbons law pass, without necessarily having a deBaathification law passed. I don’t believe that those legislative

benchmarks are essential to bringing the violence in Iraq down,

and I think that the recent months hear me out on this. Violence

has dropped even though benchmarks have not been met. Will it

continue; will it be stabilized if there is no progress? Obviously not.

But the question of timelines, I think, is more complicated than

some would like to make it in this regard.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and I appreciate the gentleman’s interest in the aftermath after the American and coalition

forces do leave or limit their presence there.

Maybe one of the witnesses can correct me as to the source of

the quote. I think it was Clausewitz who said that no war ever

ends the way it was anticipated. If you don’t know to the contrary,

we will turn it to Mr. Clausewitz, and with that, we will thank the

gentleman for his questions, and the Ranking Member for sticking

it out here with us.

And, Dr. Perry, Dr. Mathews, Dr. Kagan, you have just been excellent today. We really appreciate you doing this, and it has been

an excellent hearing. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JULY 18, 2007

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 18, 2007

(55)

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

86

87

88

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JULY 18, 2007

(91)

92

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

RECORD

JULY 18, 2007

(95)

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK

Mr. LOEBSACK. But before that you mentioned that there are many Iraqis who

are doing well, fighting well, they are brave and all the rest. I need more than

many. Can you put any kind of numbers on that?

Dr. KAGAN. A number of reports are about to be released that will provide far

greater detail and resolution on this issue than I could, including the Pentagon’s

9010 report and the report of General James Jones produced by CSIS specifically

on the Iraqi Security Forces, to say nothing of the testimony of General David

Petraeus. Nevertheless, I will offer some information available from open sources on

this important issue, including a map of the locations of the major Iraqi Army and

National Police divisions included in the briefing given by Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno on August 17, appended at the end of this document. From that briefing and other reports, it is possible to state that elements of all 11 Iraqi Army divisions and 2 National Police divisions, as well as the Iraqi Special Forces, have been

actively engaged in combat operations against al Qaeda in Iraq and/or Shi’a militias.

General Odierno noted that the ISF ‘‘average over 2,100 company or above operations, over 20,000 independent patrols and over 19,000 independent checkpoints.’’

He described operations by the 2nd Brigade of the 7th Iraqi Infantry Division in

Anbar, the 2nd Iraqi Army Division in Ninewah, and two brigades of the 4th Iraqi

Army Division in Tamim Province (Kirkuk). During my various trips to Iraq in

April, May, and July, I spoke with Iraqi Army and Police officers and American

units partnered with them about operations by the 8th Iraqi Army Division in

Diwaniyah, the 6th IA Division in Baghdad, and the 5th IA Division in Baqubah.

Other reports describe continuous combat operations and patrols conducted by the

3rd IA Division in and around Tall Afar, the 10th IA Division around Nasiriyah,

and the 9th and 11th IA Divisions in Baghdad in support of Operation Fardh al

Qanoon. I spoke with various American and Iraqi officers about the operations of

the two Iraqi National Police Divisions in Baghdad, as well as numerous regular

Iraqi Police in the provinces I visited: Anbar, Salah-ad-Din, Baghdad, Babil, and

Diyala. General Odierno noted that ‘‘there are also over 100,000 Iraqi Police patrolling the streets.’’ MNF–I reports as well as the recent National Intelligence Estimate also relate the successful completion of two rotations of Iraqi Army forces into

Baghdad in support of Operation Fardh al Qanoon. I am not in a position to offer

the Congressman precise figures about how many Iraqi soldiers or policemen are actively engaged in combat or patrolling, but I can state without hesitation that every

division in the ISF is engaged in the fight, and the overwhelming majority of brigades within the Iraqi Army are as well. General Odierno commented in the August

17 briefing, ‘‘I cannot recall for you the last report of an ISF unit avoiding a fight.’’

The story is by no means unreservedly positive. Sectarianism continues to prevail

in some units, particular in the police but even in the Iraqi Army, and combat capability is uneven across the force. But the Iraqi Army and Police number over

300,000 personnel combined, and a high proportion of them are engaged actively in

establishing and maintaining security in their country.

[The map referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 92.]

Æ