1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) DARRELL ROBERT MOORE , ) ) P etitioner , ) ) v. ) ) Civil Action No. 17

- cv - 651 (TSC) ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al ., ) ) ) Respondent s . ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Petitioner, appearing pro se , seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
. The petition establishes that in March 1995, a jury in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia convicted Petitioner of conspiracy to assault and rob; first

degree murder while armed; assault with intent to kill while armed; first

- degree burglary while armed; and possession of a fir e arm during a crime of violence. In May 1995, petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 120 years. ( See Pet. at 1

- 2 ). Petitioner claims now that he “is actually and factually innocent of First Degree Murder.” ( Id . at 5). As his grounds for re lief, Petitioner states (1) that both the Superior Court and the D.C. Court of Appeals “failed to address all of [his] claims in Motion 23

- 110 Proceedings , ” and (2) that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance when, among other conduct , he failed to m ov e to sever Petitioner’s trial from that of his co

- defendants. ( Id
. at 5, 7 ). For the reasons explained below, the C ourt finds that it lacks jurisdiction. Consequently, this case will be dismissed.2 U nlike a prisoner convicted in a state court or in a United States district court,

“ a District of Columbia prisoner ha s no recourse to a federal judicial forum unless [ he shows that] the local remedy is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Garris v. Lindsay , 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam) ( citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus , “[i]n order to collaterally attac k his sentence [or conviction] in an Article III court[,] a District of Columbia prisoner faces a hurdle that a federal prisoner does not.” Byrd v. Henderson , 119 F.3d 34, 3 7 (D.C. Cir. 1997). D istrict of Columbia prisoners may challenge their convictio ns collaterally by filing a motion in Superior Court pursuant to D.C. Code § 23

- 110, which has been described as “a remedy analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ” for attacking a federal conviction
. Blair

- Bey v. Quick , 151 F.3d 1036, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1998). See By rd , 119 F.3d at 36

- 37 (explaining that “[s]ince passage of the Court Reform Act [in 1970], . . . a District of Columbia prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his sentence must do so by motion in the sentencing court

- the Superior Court

- pursuant to D.C. C ode § 23 110”)
. Section 23

- 110 of the D.C. Code states: [an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . cou rt if it appears . . . that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. D.C. Code § 23

- 110(g). The Court of Appeals has interpreted that language as “divest [ing] federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners who could have raised viable claims pursuant to § 23

- 110(a)
. ” Williams v. Martinez , 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ; see Ibrahim v. United States , 661 F.3d 1141, 11423 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ( stating that “the availability of relief by motion under § 23

- 110 typically precludes the challenger from seeking habeas relief in federal court”). Section 23

- 110(a) (1) authorizes a D.C. prisoner “ claiming the right to be released upon the ground that
. . . the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the l aws of the District of Columbia” to “ move the court to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence. ” T he Court of Appeals has concluded “ that the § 23

- 110 remedy is neither inadequate nor inef fective to test the legality” of a D.C. prisoner’s conviction where he has raised a claim of actual innocence
. Ibrahim , 661 F.3d at 1146 ; s ee Earle v. United States , 987 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2013 ) ( district court “ lacks jurisdiction to consider [the petitioner’s] actual innocen ce claim

— whether asserted as a ‘ gateway ’ claim t o federal court review or as a ‘ stand

- alone ’ claim

— because ‘either claim’ is available under D.C. Code § 23

- 110
.

. . and, therefore, is foreclosed by Section 23

- 110(g) ”) (quoting Ibrahim , 661 F.3d at 1143 )
. And a claim predicated on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness “fall s squarely within the scope of section 23

- 110(a).” Whoie v. Warden , Butner Fed. Medical Ctr ., 891 F. Supp. 2d 2, 3 (D.D.C. 2012) ; s ee Reyes v. Rios , 432 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Section 23

- 110 provided the petitioner with a vehicle for challenging his conviction based on the alleged ineffectiveness of his trial counsel.”); Garmon v. United States , 684 A.2d 327, 329 n. 3 (D.C. 1996) (“A motion to vacate sentence under [§] 23

- 110 is the standard means of raising a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.”). Petitioner’s attachments to the petition show that he pursued collateral relie f in the local courts , albeit unsuccessfully. Petitioner contends that the local courts4 “failed to address all of [his] claims,” Pet.at 5, but t his court lacks jurisdiction to review the decisions of other courts, including those of the D.C. Superior Cour t and the D.C. Court of Appeals. See United States v. Choi , 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85 (D.D.C. 2011) (district courts “generally lack[] appellate jurisdiction over other judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts.”) (citing Lewi s v. Green , 629 F. Supp. 546, 553 (D.D.C. 1986))
. More importantly , Petitioner ’s lack of

success in the local courts d oes not r ender the local remedy in adequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention
. See Richardson v. Stephens , 730 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing cases). For it is only when a claim “falls outside [§ 23

- 110’s] scope” that questions arise about the effectiveness of the local remedy. Martinez , 586 F.3d at 1000
. Bec ause the instant petition is grounded upon cla ims that are cognizable under D.C. Code § 23

- 110, this court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it
. Garris , 794 F.2d at 727. A separate order of dismissal accompanies this memorandum opinion
.

Date: May 24, 2017 

## Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge