J. A14010/14 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

RICHARD L. FRANZOSA AND 

TRACY FRANZOSA, HIS WIFE 

: 

: 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

: 

v. : 

: 

MARK LAZO AND 

KAREN LAZO, HIS WIFE, 

: 

: No. 1656 MDA 2013 

: 

 Appellants : 

Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County 

Civil Division at No. 2011-11575 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 02, 2014 

Appellants appeal from the order of the trial court granting appellees’ 

complaint in ejectment and denying appellants’ counterclaim based upon 

adverse possession. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 Appellants and appellees own adjoining properties in Hazle Township. 

Appellees purchased their property on December 15, 1990. Appellants first 

obtained possession of their property on August 18, 1989, when it was 

purchased by Clarence W. Wolfe, III (“Clarence”), the former husband of 

appellant Karen Lazo (“Karen”). Karen was added to the deed on 

December 18, 1989, and acquired it in her name alone on January 25, 2005 

through a Bankruptcy Trustee deed. Appellant Mark Lazo (“Mark”) was 

added to the deed on January 28, 2005. Appellants claim that in August 
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1989, they first cleared a section of the appellees’ property and thereafter 

used it as a lawn. 

 Over the years, a number of disputes have arisen between the parties 

as to appellants’ use of the disputed parcel. On September 3, 1998, an 

attorney for Clarence sent the following letter to appellees: 

Dear Mr. Franzosa: 

 As I am sure you will recall, you and I had a 

telephone conversation on August 4, 1998 relative to 

the possible purchase by Clarence Wolfe, my client, 

of your lot on Main Street in Pardeesville. You had 

indicated to me at that time the problems you have 

had with Clarence Wolfe in the past and your reasons 

for being upset with him. You had also indicated to 

me that you would think about the possibility of a 

sale to Mr. Wolfe and let me know if you are willing 

to sell the property to him. 

 The purpose of this letter is just to inquire as 

to whether or not you have considered the possibility 

of selling the property to Mr. Wolfe and if you are 

willing to do so. 

 Very truly yours, 

 /s/ 

 James A. Schneider 

Letter, 9/3/98. 

 Ultimately, on September 12, 2011, appellees resorted to legal action, 

filing a complaint in ejectment. Appellants responded on November 23, 

2011, with an answer and new matter in which they raised their claim of

adverse possession. Appellants’ claim of adverse possession runs from 
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August 1989 presumably until August 2010 which would have been when 

the statutory 21-year period matured. See 68 P.S. §§ 81-88. The trial 

court denied appellants’ claim by order entered August 12, 2013. Appellants 

filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by order entered 

September 3, 2013. This timely appeal followed. 

 Appellants raise the following two issues on appeal: 

A. Did the Trial Court err in holding that there 

was no adverse possession where there was 

clear uncontradicted evidence of clear cutting 

and cutting down trees, cultivating the lawn 

and establishing a lawn from August, 1989 

(Conclusions of Law, Numbers 3 and 4, Record 

33-34) and accordingly, this area was not a 

“woodland”, thereby utilizing the wrong 

standard to establish adverse possession. 

B. Did the trial court err in holding an offer was 

made to purchase the property, negating 

continuity of adverse possession (Conclusions 

of Law, Number 7, Record 34)? 

Appellants’ brief at 3.

 We begin by noting our standard of review: 

 The case of Glenn v. Shuey, 407 Pa.Super. 

213, 595 A.2d 606 (1991) thoroughly sets forth the 

standard of review to be applied today and the 

substantive law of adverse possession, as follows: 

At the outset, we note that “the 

factual findings of a trial court sitting 

without a jury carry the same weight as 

a jury verdict, and we will not disturb 

those findings on appeal absent an error 

of law or abuse of discretion.” Arcadia 

Co., Inc. v. Peles, 395 Pa.Super. 203, 

207-208, 576 A.2d 1114, 1116 (1990) 
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(citing Pato v. Cernuska, 342 Pa.Super. 

609, 612, 493 A.2d 758, 759 (1985)); 

see also Bigham v. Wenschhof, 295 

Pa.Super. 146, 148, 441 A.2d 391, 392 

(1982). 

 It is well settled that a party 

claiming title to real property by adverse 

possession must affirmatively prove that 

he or she had “actual, continuous, 

exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and 

hostile possession of the land for twentyone years.” Conneaut Lake Park, Inc. 

v. Klingensmith, 362 Pa. 592, 594-95, 

66 A.2d 828, 829 (1949) (citing Parks 

v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 301 Pa. 475, 

152 A. 682 (1930)); see also Klos v. 

Molenda, 355 Pa.Super. 399, 513 A.2d 

490 (1986); Tioga Coal Co. v. 

Supermarkets General Corp., 289 

Pa.Super. 344, 433 A.2d 483 (1981), 

alloc. denied, 500 Pa. 555, 458 A.2d 

1355 (1983). Each of these elements 

must exist, otherwise the possession will 

not confer title. Conneaut Lake, 362 

Pa. at 594-595, 66 A.2d at 829. “An 

adverse possessor must intend to hold 

the land for himself, and that intention 

must be made manifest by his acts . . . 

He must keep his flag flying and present 

a hostile front to all adverse 

pretensions.” Klos, 355 Pa.Super. at 

403, 513 A.2d at 492 (citations and 

quotations omitted). 

Brennan v. Manchester Crossings, Inc., 708 A.2d 815, 817 (Pa.Super. 

1998), appeal denied, 727 A.2d 1115 (Pa. 1998), quoting Glenn v. 

Shuey. 

We will address appellants’ second issue only, as it is dispositive of this 

appeal. Simply stated, it is well settled that an attempt to purchase 
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property from the titled owner constitutes an unequivocal recognition that 

the offeror’s adverse title is subservient and breaks the required continuity 

necessary to adverse possession. Pistner Bros., Inc. v. Agheli, 518 A.2d 

838, 840-841 (Pa.Super. 1986). Clarence offered to purchase the property 

in dispute in September 1998, and this broke the continuity of appellants’ 

present claim. 

 Appellants attempt to avoid this result by characterizing the letter 

from Clarence’s attorney not as an offer to purchase, but as a mere 

“invitation to negotiate.” We find this distinction to be specious. An offer to 

purchase need not specify a price in order to constitute an offer to purchase. 

Moreover, even a mere invitation to negotiate is sufficient to satisfy 

Pistner Bros. An invitation to negotiate to purchase property carries the 

same recognition that the offeror’s adverse title is subservient. There is no 

merit here. The trial court properly found that appellants failed to 

demonstrate adverse possession. Accordingly, we will affirm the order 

below. 

 Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

JosephD.Seletyn,Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/2/2014