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40–360 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–94]

SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

OCTOBER 10, 2007

(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas

ADAM SMITH, Washington

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina

ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California

RICK LARSEN, Washington

JIM COOPER, Tennessee

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

MARK UDALL, Colorado

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

NANCY BOYDA, Kansas

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

KATHY CASTOR, Florida

DUNCAN HUNTER, California

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JEFF MILLER, Florida

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey

TOM COLE, Oklahoma

ROB BISHOP, Utah

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

PHIL GINGREY, Georgia

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania

THELMA DRAKE, Virginia

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas

GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director

JULIE UNMACHT, Professional Staff Member

AILEEN ALEXANDER, Professional Staff Member

MARGEE MECKSTROTH, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Wednesday, October 10, 2007, Security Challenges Involving Pakistan and

Policy Implications for the Department of Defense ........................................... 1

APPENDIX:

Wednesday, October 10, 2007 ................................................................................. 45

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 2007

SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND POLICY

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Ranking Member,

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1

WITNESSES

Curtis, Lisa, Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, the Heritage

Foundation ............................................................................................................ 12

Haqqani, Husain, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University, and Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute ......................................................... 9

Schaffer, Ambassador Teresita C., Director, South Asia Program, Center for

Strategic and International Studies ................................................................... 5

Weinbaum, Dr. Marvin G., Scholar-in-Residence, Middle East Institute ........... 7

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Curtis, Lisa ....................................................................................................... 88

Haqqani, Husain ............................................................................................... 72

Hunter, Hon. Duncan ....................................................................................... 49

Schaffer, Ambassador Teresita C. ................................................................... 55

Weinbaum, Dr. Marvin G. ............................................................................... 64

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Questions submitted.]

(1)

SECURITY CHALLENGES INVOLVING PAKISTAN AND

POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, October 10, 2007.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in room

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman

of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED

SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, the hearing will come to

order. I wish the staff will note that the gavel comes down now as

opposed to a few moments ago when we made the announcement

that it would be delayed a few minutes.

First, I would be remiss if I did not mention our late colleague

and our friend, the gentlelady from Virginia, Jo Ann Davis. She

was a loyal member of this committee, a good friend to us, one who

represented her district and cared for those in uniform so well, a

strong advocate for shipbuilding, which was the centerpiece for the

district she represented, and her loss is a loss to not just this committee or Congress, but to our country. We are very sad about this,

but we all know she did fight the good fight over a good period of

months and caused us to have great admiration for her, and she

will be missed. As you know, the memorial services will be held tomorrow at her home in Virginia.

I would yield at this moment to my friend from California and

the Ranking Member, Duncan Hunter, for any comments he might

have regarding Jo Ann Davis.

STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE

FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON

ARMED SERVICES

Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is a sad time when we mourn the death of a

colleague, and when you think about Jo Ann Davis, I think about

two things. I think about her as a person who was a tireless and

a faithful fighter for her constituents, and as somebody who was

extremely tough in a political fight, but always straight ahead, always with strong principles, strong views and an intense loyalty to

her allies and to the principles that she believed in, and also was

a very compassionate person toward those who she felt needed

help. And I have always thought of Jo Ann as the consummate supVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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porter of the underdog, the person who would take a position and

fight that position out, even if she were the only vote in the room

for that particular position, because of her principles.

And, you know, people leave a lasting impression on you here in

this committee, and perhaps the relationships and the friendships

that we have are the most important part of serving on this great

Armed Services Committee. This was a gentlelady who loved the

people, who wore the uniform of the United States and served them

and served her constituents, had maybe that character that we all

aspire to of being a faithful servant.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very sad time for us, and I know that

the House leadership has announced that there will be a number

of Members going down to the services, and so I would recommend

to everybody that everyone avails themselves of that information

and, in the least, perhaps will send a card to Chuck—to Jo Ann’s

husband—and let him know how very, very much we appreciated

her.

And I know there are hundreds of thousands of people in her district who appreciated her so much because of how she served them,

but I want to let you know that I really—and I am sure all of the

members on this committee appreciated her great and sparkling

personality, her adherence to principle, and her vitality and all of

the energy that she brought to the political contest in this great

forum every day. So, again, I urge all members to jot down a letter,

if you can, or a note.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if any members of the Virginia delegation would like to make a statement at this time. I know they are

all very much impacted by this loss.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. The gentlelady from Virginia.

Mrs. DRAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the

opportunity to talk about a dear friend of mine, Jo Ann Davis.

I think all of you who participate in this committee, who watch

this committee, know that Jo Ann was a person of great faith,

great courage, great principle, and she cared very much about

other people. And I believe that it was never Jo Ann’s intent to end

up in the greatest legislative body in the world, but it was her life’s

work of caring about other people, that the people of her district

trusted her and sent her here, and that there is one thing you

would say about Jo Ann Davis: Every single thing that she did was

based on her principles, her belief system, and she was absolutely

willing to stand up and fight.

She confided in me that she believed she would beat this cancer—she did the first time around—but that she felt she was going

through this in order to help other people and to raise awareness

and to make sure that other women did put things aside and have

the treatment they needed. That is so Jo Ann Davis.

So we all mourn her loss. We extend our sympathy to her family,

and I know this committee will greatly, greatly miss her.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The Members will note that there

was a resolution honoring the memory of Jo Ann Davis yesterday,

and I know some here participated in addressing that.

We have a new member of our committee, a gentleman from Colorado, who has been approved by the Republican Conference, and

3

I would like for him to be welcomed: Doug Lamborn from the great

State of Colorado.

Stand up, so we will see who you are.

Thank you so much for joining us, and we know that there will

be a lot of work ahead of you. We welcome you.

There is also a temporary member who will be with us from time

to time. Jim Langevin, who is a former permanent member of this

committee, will join us from time to time.

Ladies and gentlemen, we meet today to address security challenges involving Pakistan. This is an important hearing, and it

could not be more timely.

For too long, Iraq has been preoccupying us away from evolving

security concerns and potential conflicts in other parts of the world

that are vital to us. We must have a broader strategic focus and

a stable democratic and prosperous Pakistan actively working to

counter terrorism, and we must have Islamist militants who could

be extremely valuable as a partner. Yet the country still faces serious security challenges that demand our active attention and engagement.

I am concerned that our policy toward Pakistan has not been as

comprehensive as it should be, that we may be unprepared to handle any repercussions if events in Pakistan continue to move as

rapidly as they have in recent years. Recent testimony before this

committee on global threats and a substantial unclassified national

intelligence effort confirmed that al Qaeda has become progressively active in western Pakistan, where they are determined to be

enjoying a safe haven. Bin Laden’s lieutenants are still believed to

be in that region.

Moreover, the U.S. Commander for Counterterrorism Operations

in Afghanistan, Major General David Rodriguez, recently blamed a

growing al Qaeda presence in Pakistan for an estimated 50 to 60

percent increase in foreign fighters infiltrating into Afghanistan. At

the same time, internal instability in that country has been on the

rise since 2007, fueled by the lethal attacks within the country

from Islamist militants and the political crisis surrounding President Musharraf’s run for reelection. Americans have provided Pakistan with about $10 billion in assistance since 9/11, yet many experts argue that such assistance has not been well targeted.

I am pleased to have some of the country’s top experts with us

today: Ambassador Teresita Schaffer from the Center for Strategic

and International Studies; Dr. Marvin Weinbaum from the Middle

East Institute; Lisa Curtis with the Heritage Institute; and the

gentleman, who evidently is caught in traffic, Husain Haqqani with

Boston University. He, hopefully, will join us momentarily.

We welcome you. We thank you for your expertise in sharing

your thoughts with us today. This is a very, very important hearing

for us, and we thank you for being with us.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for

calling this very important hearing today. It is one that is critical

to America’s efforts in a very, very important part of the world.

Before I make my comments on the hearing, Mr. Chairman, let

me just also thank you for welcoming Doug Lamborn, and I am

joining your welcome to our new member, and I will remind my colVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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leagues that he comes from that 5th District in Colorado that was

held by our great colleague Joel Hefley. And he has big shoes to

fill, but I know that he will do a great job in filling those shoes.

He served in the Colorado state legislature, in the house and in

the senate, and he comes to us with lots of legislative experience

and with a strong advocacy of our men and women in uniform.

That is very important to him, so it is absolutely appropriate that

he serves on this committee.

Mr. Chairman, also, he is married to Jeanie, and they have

raised five children, including one daughter who recently married,

and they have four sons. And so I would like to also join in welcoming our newest colleague, Doug Lamborn.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, let me just say to our guests, I

thank them for being with us on this very important issue.

You know, since September 11th, President Musharraf’s decision

to join the United States in the war on terror was very welcomed.

Pakistan has been a key ally of the U.S., a very valuable strategic

partner, and today it supports U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military operations in Afghanistan and

makes a lot of contributions and some sacrifices against extremism

and militancy. These efforts have resulted, we all know, in a number of al Qaeda and Taliban leaders killed or captured in Pakistan.

In addition to its counterterrorism efforts, Pakistan has made

progress on its eastern border with India. Tensions between the

two countries have noticeably decreased due to confidence-building

measures, and Pakistan and India are both committed to taking

steps toward resolving the historical animosity that exists over

Kashmir.

I am interested in your thoughts, incidentally—to our guests—regarding the U.S. role in the Indo-Pakistani dialogue process, and

although we have had a lot of positive dividends during the last six

years, I think we also have to recognize that we have had some

troubling developments.

In July, this committee heard from intelligence officials who assessed that the al Qaeda terrorist network had become progressively active in western Pakistan, where they have what has been

called a ‘‘safe haven.’’ For the last eight months, I have expressed

my concerns over such developments and the internal challenges

facing Pakistan’s leaders, military, and people.

Today I would like to get your views on the following: One, on

the security front, al Qaeda’s exploitation of the September 2006

Tribal Peace Agreement in Waziristan, which allowed some of the

top al Qaeda leadership to hide out, operate, and plan to the status

of Taliban entrenched along the Afghanistan-Pakistani border and

Balukistan regions; the impact on military operations in Afghanistan; and three, the status of the safety and the security of Pakistan’s nuclear materials and technologies.

On the political front, the current and evolving political environment from the recent reelection of President Musharraf on Saturday and the surrounding circumstances; and, two, the likelihood

that the political power equation in Pakistan will change and what

that could mean for the U.S.-Pakistan security relationship.

5

So, if you could talk about that a little bit, we would certainly

appreciate it. Although we on the Armed Services Committee are

reviewing and understanding this political dynamic, reviewing this

with you will help us assess how it relates to the willingness, capacity, and capabilities of the Pakistan government to address the

extremism that resides on its soil as well as other strategic challenges it deals with in the region.

I think it is important to recognize that, weeks after the July release of the U.S. National Intelligence Assessment on terrorist

threats to the homeland and the storming of Islamabad’s Red

Mosque, President Musharraf increased pressure on the extremists

residing in the tribal areas and declared that Pakistan will not tolerate the al Qaeda sanctuary by moving two Pakistani army divisions into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the so-called

FATA, and one of those divisions, I believe, coming off the Indian

border. There are now approximately 100,000 troops from the Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Also, folks, if you could speak to the posture of that corps, because there has been information that I have seen to the effect that

most of that corps resides in garrison, and it is not undertaking

what one might call ‘‘aggressive operations.’’

President Musharraf is also committed to increasing development assistance to complement this military offensive. So we are

interested in your assessments of these operations.

So thank you for being with us today. I know you have got a lot

of territory to cover, so I will submit the rest of my statement for

the record.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the discussion. It is absolutely

timely, and I want to thank our witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and the balance is accepted without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 49.]

The CHAIRMAN. We welcome you. Our panel is complete. We appreciate your being with us so much. I hope you can do your best,

as witnesses, to condense your testimony. It does not have to quite

be in 25 words or less, but as you see, we have a large turnout of

members, and I know folks do wish to ask questions, and we are

bound by the 5-minute rule here, and if you could do your best to

summarize, that would be quite helpful. So we welcome you.

Ambassador Schaffer, we will start with you, please.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR TERESITA C. SCHAFFER, DIRECTOR, SOUTH ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you for inviting me to testify this morning.

I am sure every witness who has spoken to you about Pakistan

in the past six years has used the words ‘‘critical time.’’ I am not

going to break that pattern. It is a critical time in a country that

matters profoundly to U.S. security.

In the past six months, President Musharraf has been seriously

weakened. The major non-religious political figures, in my view,

6

have been diminished, and the U.S. has been publicly involved in

the dealmaking leading to Pakistan’s next government. The biggest

security challenge for the United States, however, comes from the

newly emboldened violent extremists who are challenging the authority of the Pakistani state. U.S. policy needs to address both the

decline in political legitimacy and the problems posed by violent extremists.

I expect that Musharraf’s election last weekend will eventually

be confirmed by the Supreme Court and that legislative elections

will be held in January. The government that follows these elections is likely to be an uneasy one. Musharraf will be one power

center. He believes in unity of command, as he has often told us,

and is not particularly interested in power sharing. Both his political party and, perhaps, the army will be strongly tempted to manipulate the election to minimize Ms. Bhutto’s claim on power. If

she does participate in government, she will strongly defend her

turf, and assuming that Musharraf retires from the army, that institution will be under new leadership and will be a distinct power

center no matter how careful Musharraf has been to promote officers loyal to himself.

I want to focus on the government’s biggest challenge, a nasty

and violent campaign by extremists, both those connected with the

Afghan Taliban and homegrown movements that had been brazenly defying the government’s authority last summer at the

Islamabad Red Mosque. The death toll since July is at least several

hundred. State authority looks weak, and the army, I regret to say,

looks inept.

An effective response to this kind of campaign requires a canny

mixture of military and political tools. In the past year we have

seen no evidence that the Pakistan army has adequate

counterinsurgency skills. One expert whom I respect very much

claims that the way they are trained is almost the opposite of how

one needs to operate in a counterinsurgency environment, nor have

we seen any indication of the government’s having the political

tools needed to integrate the tribal areas into Pakistan.

I support the Administration’s request for development funds for

the tribal areas, but this will be the work of a generation, and in

the meantime, the Pakistan government and army will probably

hedge their bets, a tactic that, I doubt, can work. In other words,

where the U.S. is hoping for boldness, I fear it may get caution.

The position of the U.S. in Pakistan makes this particularly dangerous. The U.S. has become a symbol of opposition to Musharraf,

and people are talking about Afghanistan as ‘‘America’s war.’’ This

is a fundamentally wrong-headed notion, but the thing that is dangerous for us is that it sets the U.S. up to be blamed for all of the

shortcomings of this next government. We urgently need to reposition the United States so that this government and its eventual

successor can work with the United States without risking its political life. How can we do this?

I would start with forthright support for genuinely free and fair

elections. Do not make excuses for the repressive actions of the

government, which, I fear, may increase over the coming months.

Give high priority to economic assistance, and use it in ways that

benefit people. The greatest boost to our national standing in PakiVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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stan in recent years came when the United States responded with

such speed and dedication to the earthquake in Kashmir. The military played a critical role there. The watchword should be that the

United States wants a relationship with Pakistan that can continue from one set of leaders to another.

The second big recommendation is to work with the military on

military issues, including whatever help we can provide to beef up

their shortcomings in counterinsurgency, but do not build up its political role, and emphasize the primacy of civilian leadership.

Finally, I believe the United States needs to give top priority to

developing a common strategy with Pakistan on Afghanistan. This

is needed not just for Afghanistan, but also for the stability of

Pakistan, which is fundamental to our long-term interests in the

region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Schaffer can be found in

the Appendix on page 55.]

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Weinbaum, please.

STATEMENT OF DR. MARVIN G. WEINBAUM, SCHOLAR-INRESIDENCE, MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Dr. WEINBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Members, if I had appeared before you a number of months ago

and had said that most of us who look at Pakistan believe at this

point in time that Pakistan has in the Northwest Frontier Province, the Northwest Frontier area, lost the battle against extremism and terrorism, I think I might have raised some eyebrows.

Given the media coverage and some of the comments that Ambassador Schaffer has made, I am sure now, however, that there is a

great deal of credibility in that, and the consequences, as we have

recognized here, are quite considerable for the United States, for

our success in dealing with the insurgency in Afghanistan, in stabilizing that country and, of course, in uprooting the al Qaeda network.

The spread of Islamic extremism in Pakistan and, I might mention, the consequences, as you have already heard, for Pakistan, its

stability, its integrity, are really tied up with what happens in that

tribal region. My written statement suggests how we got to this

point and indicates how this has been an evolving situation, in fact,

beginning in the 1980’s. What I want to stress here today are some

of the options in policies that we might and Pakistan might follow.

Clearly, now, at this point, I think we have come to see, as the

situation has worsened in Afghanistan, that we have put additional

pressure on President Musharraf. Let me suggest, however, that

increasingly this pressure has been counterproductive. Actions

taken by President Musharraf have not only fallen short, but have

had the double-barreled effect of intensifying opposition within the

frontier region and also eroding his political support in the country.

We have seen now, additionally, the political problems of President

Musharraf’s during this year, and that has distracted him further

from dealing with the great challenges that the frontier presents.

I might mention also that it is very interesting to see in this election period, as this election gamesmanship has been going on, how

8

little attention is being paid to extremism. Indeed, most of the political parties have dodged the issue.

Well, let me suggest that there are very few good options here,

at least in the short term, but let me indicate that, of course, one

option for Pakistan is to revive its military effort, to commit itself

to a more aggressive approach. The recent setbacks that the military has suffered might, you would imagine, have stiffened the resolve of the Pakistan military; after all, it is a very proud military.

And as to the fact that they have been humiliated consistently

here, most recently with the kidnapping of several hundred of their

troops, possible desertions as well, this should have a positive effect

in getting them, as I say, to take a more aggressive position.

The imminent new head of the military, General Kiani, is known

as a very forthright general, and certainly he may step up to it, up

to the task. But let me say that, for a more effective military posture, we are basically dealing with the fundamental weakness that

the Pakistan military faces—a weakness of training, a weakness of

equipment, and, yes, a weakness of motivation. This is not going

to be overturned easily or soon. And, of course, I should mention

this connection of the difficulty, as well, when it comes to the fact

that so much of what this is going to require here is going to require a different public mood in Pakistan. At the moment, although

there are many in Pakistan who certainly do not accept the militants’ extremist views and their actions against the army, nevertheless, that distinction here has not been made strong enough

that, in fact, this is their war and not a war carried on on the behalf of the Americans.

A second approach here is to negotiate a settlement here, and ultimately this is what we are going to come to. There is going to be

some kind of agreement. It may not be an agreement that we

would particularly find desirable, because, I think, the point that

has to be made here is that this struggle which is going on in the

frontier is not really on our behalf. This is a struggle because the

Pakistan state has been challenged. It has been challenged, and, as

I say, it is a very serious challenge. So what we are seeing here

is an ineffective response, for the moment, to this challenge. It has

very little impact, unfortunately, on what is going on in Afghanistan. I want to come back to that.

Also, as my written testimony demonstrates, we have to accept

the fact that the agreement is going to be made out of weakness,

not out of strength, and, in fact, the people we are negotiating with

are not the traditional leaders. Those leaders are, by and large,

gone. They have been killed. They have run away. So, although

this ultimately is going to be what is the result of this campaign,

nevertheless, it is not necessarily going to be in our good interest.

I think, also, another way to deal with this would be for a delivery of social services, justice and security for the people of the

FATA, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a channeling of

development, and, as you have heard, the United States has now

committed itself to $750 million for this purpose. Unfortunately, I

think, if it is not too little, it certainly is too late. The Pakistanis

asked for this kind of support in 2002, and we were too wrapped

up with the notion here that the only thing at issue here was

counterterrorism, and we failed to do it. Now we are doing it, but

9

the difficulty is obviously in delivery. At this point in time, without

a more secure security situation, it is doubtful that that can be delivered.

A fourth way of going about this would be to build a national

mandate in Pakistan for directly confronting extremism. Right now

that mandate does not exist. As you have heard, the people of Pakistan really think that, for the most part, what is going on there is

Pakistani killing Pakistani, and again, as I mentioned before, it

failed to recognize how much this is something that is critical to

the future of the Pakistan state, a state which is already a weak

nation.

The view here is that extremism can be best faced through democracy, and I certainly subscribe to that. I believe this is necessary on its own basis, regardless of whether there was a military

challenge in the frontier, but I think we also have to look at this

soberly to recognize that a coalition government may not be in a

better position, itself, to deal with the challenges militarily that are

presented in the frontier. It is ultimately going to take the military’s willing capacity together with, of course, the kind of development I have been speaking about.

Finally, here in—the possible options here—and that is working

more closely with the United States. We suggested publicly not too

long ago that perhaps what we ought to do is to now, perhaps, unilaterally intervene where we feel that we have targets to attack.

This has not played well in Pakistan. We had better recognize this

and that this, in fact, could make the situation politically even

worse for President Musharraf.

Now, finally, then, what I want to say is that we have no really

short-term answers here, but we have, I am afraid, only one good

option, and that is to use our own efforts here to interdict the infiltrators, the people who are the suicide bombers who are bringing

in the explosive devices into Afghanistan. What I am getting at

here is that our only option here is to fortify ourselves to redeploy

a larger number of troops into the frontier area on the Afghanistan

side. This is, I am afraid, in the short and medium term, going to

be our only possible option. This has got to go along, however, at

the same time, in that there is no simple military solution in Afghanistan either, with accelerated development, with better governance, and, of course, with a more realistic strategy in dealing

with the poppy crop. In this, Pakistan will continue to have a role,

but I guess where I come out on all of this is that the U.S. is going

to have to readjust its expectations about what Pakistan is willing

and is able to accomplish for us in this already explosive tribal

frontier.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Weinbaum can be found in the

Appendix on page 64.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Haqqani, please.

STATEMENT OF HUSAIN HAQQANI, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY, AND

SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

Mr. HAQQANI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10

As a Pakistani currently living and teaching in the United

States, I bring to this committee a deep commitment to close and

friendly relations between Pakistan and the United States.

The first point I would like to make is that U.S.-Pakistan relations have usually been cyclical in nature. They have started with

great hopes, and they have ended in great disappointment. During

the period of great hope, the United States has invested large sums

of money in terms of aid, and then in the period of disappointment,

on the American side, the attitude has been, We spent so much

money; what did we get for it? On the Pakistani side, the feeling

has been that the United States is about to walk away from us

once again. I think that the current situation is one in which the

first thing we should all be clear about is that that cyclical pattern

needs to be broken.

Since 1954, the United States has given large amounts of aid to

Pakistan off and on, and the bulk of that aid has gone to the Pakistani military. The assumption always has been that the aid that

goes to Pakistan buys the United States influence with the most

influential institution in Pakistan, namely, the Pakistani army.

Just the statistics would give an idea to this committee that, since

1954, almost $21 billion has been given to Pakistan in aid, including the amount that has not yet been disbursed but that has been

budgeted for 2008. Of these, $17.7 billion was given under military

rule, and only $3.4 billion was given to Pakistan under civilian governments.

As Pakistan moves toward some civilianization of its government, it is important to bear that in mind that this identity of the

United States with military rule should now end, and if assistance

has to be provided to Pakistan, assistance should continue under

civilian rule as much as there has been under military rule. If we

have failed in getting our objectives to the military government

under General Musharraf, we should recognize our mistakes but

not penalize the people of Pakistan under a civilian government for

doing that. On average, the United States has given Pakistan $559

million for each year that Pakistan has been under military rule,

and it has given Pakistan only $181 million for each year it has

been under civilian rule. This is, of course, not to say that the civilian governments have been more competent than the military regimes. The question of which form of government has suited Pakistan better is something that Pakistanis debate on a daily basis,

but from the U.S. point of view, Pakistan now is at a point where

the long-term issues of the Pakistani state’s effectiveness need to

be addressed.

The reason why the Pakistani army is failing in the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas is because the Pakistani state no longer

has the level of effectiveness that a state of that size should have

in dealing with problems like an insurgency, with non-state actors

like al Qaeda having greater influence in some parts of the tribal

areas than the state of Pakistan does. I think that the U.S. policy

should be one of nuanced engagement with Pakistan. The engagement should continue. The U.S. should ensure that the leverage

that it has bought is put to good use.

What should it be put to use for? It should be put to use for a

strong military effort backed by civilian support. What has been

11

lacking so far is civilian support. General Musharraf has totally

failed in mobilizing civilian support for the war against terrorism

in Pakistan. Pakistani civilian support for the war is absolutely

necessary. It may not come overnight, but I think the U.S. needs

to identify civilian partners who will be able to provide that support.

At the same time, it is also important for the United States to

use the leverage it has built with the Pakistani military, not to just

consistently praise the Pakistani military and in the process reinforce the prejudices of the Pakistani military that have led them

to take part in four military coups in Pakistan’s short history of 60

years. Instead, every interaction, whether at the civilian diplomatic

level or at the military-to-military level, should be used to convince

the Pakistani military that it is as much part of the problem as it

is part of the solution.

On the specifics that are of concern to this committee, the problems in the Northwest Frontier Province and the problems in the

Federally Administered Tribal Areas, I believe that the Pakistani

military is facing a serious crisis not just of training, equipment,

and motivation, but of morale. These large numbers of troops who

are virtually surrendering themselves to the insurgents in

Waziristan without putting up a fight would not have done so if

they were not conflicted within themselves, and that conflict comes

from a belief system after years of having been told that the

Jihadists represent a force for good. Now that they are being told

to fight them, some of them are not able to make that transition

as quickly as General Musharraf was able to make after 9/11 with

a phone call from Washington, D.C.

I think, there, a major input needs to be made not only of development funds, but of a major initiative to try and persuade people

in the tribal areas that the Jihadists do not represent a force for

good for them or for Pakistan.

Last but not least, as Pakistan’s transition becomes apparent,

the U.S. must make sure that General Musharraf does not wiggle

out of his promises about shedding his uniform. The new vice chief

of army staff, who is likely to become the next chief of army staff,

is a person who is absolutely committed to the notion of civilian

control over military matters. He does not like the military being

involved in politics. At least, that is his stated position.

I think that the United States has a role to play in ensuring that

General Musharraf adheres to the promises he has made to the Supreme Court of Pakistan and to Pakistan’s largest political party

in the negotiating process that has taken place between General

Musharraf and the Pakistan People’s Party, and the process of national reconciliation that is set to have been started should now expand to include other groups, including the Pakistan Muslim

League led by Mr. Nawaz Sharif, so that Pakistan civilians and

Pakistan’s military are not at loggerheads with each other, but actually work together. Just as we all know, no military can actually

wage a successful military effort without the backing of the nation.

If the Nation is conflicted, the military effort suffers, and the same

is happening in Pakistan right now.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much.

12

[The prepared statement of Mr. Haqqani can be found in the Appendix on page 72.]

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Curtis.

STATEMENT OF LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW,

ASIAN STUDIES CENTER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Ms. CURTIS. Chairman Skelton, Congressman Hunter and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to

appear today. It is an honor to testify on a topic of such immense

importance to our country.

Pursuing a strong and stable relationship with Pakistan will be

one of America’s most important foreign policy objectives for several years to come. The range and complexity of issues involved in

our relations require focused and sustained U.S. attention. Recent

developments, however, are threatening to create misunderstanding between our two countries and to derail this critical partnership.

Pakistani failure to control a burgeoning terrorist safe haven in

its tribal areas bordering Afghanistan is causing alarm in Washington, while recently passed U.S. legislation conditioning military

assistance to Pakistan is causing doubts about the U.S. as a reliable long-term partner.

In order to sustain the U.S.-Pakistan partnership over the longterm, we need to better align our strategic perspectives of the region. We should not repeat mistakes of the past. A second breach

in the relationship, like that caused by the Pressler Amendment

that cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990, would seriously jeopardize

U.S. interests in South Asia and would have severe implications on

the global fight against terrorism.

Pakistan is in the midst of an historical political transition that

will determine the core direction of the country at a time when extremists are seeking to provoke an Islamic revolution. Washington

should welcome the transition to civilian democratic rule.

Pakistani frustration with prolonged military rule and the perception that Washington is more interested in preserving

Musharraf’s rule than in restoring democracy is eroding popular

support for the broader fight against terrorism. A recent poll taken

by the U.S. organization Terror Free Tomorrow shows that an overwhelming majority of the Pakistanis do not view the fight against

terrorism as benefiting their country, nor do they see defeating al

Qaeda as a priority for their leaders. Instead, they blame the recent violence in Pakistan on its counterterrorism cooperation with

the U.S., and they increasingly question the benefits of continuing

to support U.S. efforts that, in their opinion, rely too heavily on

military force.

In what may prove to be a major blow to the terrorists in the

region, Pakistan reported killing possibly 200 militants in clashes

this past weekend in North Waziristan. The capture of over 240

Pakistani soldiers in late August, as Marv pointed out, demonstrates, however, the complexity in dealing with the terrorists in

the border areas where the local populations share a Pashtun identity with about 30 percent of the Pakistan army.

Washington and Islamabad need to work more closely in joint efforts that bring U.S. resources and military strength to bear on the

13

situation in North and South Waziristan. They need to employ a

combination of targeted military operations and economic assistance programs that drive a wedge between the Pashtun tribal communities and the international terrorists. Washington’s pledge of

$750 million over the next 5 years to develop the tribal areas is

certainly welcomed, but Pakistan will have to restore the writ of

the government before the aid is disbursed, to ensure it does not

fall into the wrong hands. The Reconstruction Opportunity Zone

Initiative is also an integral part of our overall strategy to uproot

terrorism from the border areas. The Administration and Congress

should work together to launch this project as soon as possible.

Another obstacle to dealing with the terrorist safe haven in the

tribal areas is Washington’s and Islamabad’s differing perspectives

on Afghanistan. Pakistan and the U.S. share the overall goal of

bringing stability in Afghanistan, and they agree that the Taliban’s

resurgence in Afghanistan would have a blow-back effect in Pakistan. However, for a variety of reasons, including Pakistani doubts

about the U.S. long-term commitment to the region and Islamabad

distrust of the Karzai government, Islamabad is reluctant to crack

down fully on the Taliban and the other extremists operating from

its territory. This means that the U.S. will have to take a more

proactive role in promoting better Pakistan-Afghanistan relations

and prod both countries to cooperate in areas such as border monitoring and trade, but also address longstanding political tensions.

The Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007 that

passed the House and is now before the Senate acknowledges this

and authorizes the President to appoint a special envoy to promote

closer Pakistan-Afghanistan cooperation.

It is also critical that India and Pakistan maintain momentum

in their peace process. One reason for continued Pakistani ambivalence toward the Taliban stems from the concern that India is trying to encircle it by giving influence in Afghanistan.

Last, I believe that conditioning U.S. assistance to Pakistan

sends a negative signal at a time when we need to demonstrate

that the fight against terrorism is a joint endeavor that benefits

Pakistan as much as it does the U.S., as well as the global community. The abrupt cutoff of the U.S. aid to Pakistan in 1990 convinced Pakistanis that the U.S. is a fickle partner and uncommitted to the region. Conditioning assistance now only fuels that perception, as well as the idea that Pakistan is fighting terrorism

under coercion, rather than to protect its own citizens.

That concludes my remarks. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis can be found in the Appendix on page 88.]

The CHAIRMAN. Can anyone tell me how the Pakistani army or

military is recruited? Do they have a draft, or is it all volunteer?

Dr. WEINBAUM. Volunteer.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. It is an all-volunteer force, sir. It is recruited—much, though not all of it, is recruited from certain parts

of the country, particularly the central part of the province of Punjab, and it has become kind of its own little world. They have got

their own education system, a lot of economic facilities. They have

an extraordinarily high standard for——

14

The CHAIRMAN. How large is the army?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Hmm?

The CHAIRMAN. How large is it?

Dr. WEINBAUM. About 600,000.

The CHAIRMAN. I have just one question, and any one of you can

answer it.

What are the implications of President Musharraf’s planned resignation from his military post? Anybody.

Mr. HAQQANI. The implications, of course, would be, on the one

hand, it would strengthen the civilians’ role in government, and it

may actually bring to an end or at least diminish the opposition

that General Musharraf attracts by virtue of having both positions.

The succession in the Pakistan army is going to follow a clearly

defined structure, because the army is an institution that is very

structured, and it might actually enable a new commander to take

over who will be closer in age and, in terms of training, have better

interaction with his other commanders, because one of the biggest

problems that is emerging from General Musharraf’s hanging in

there for so long is that the gap between the military academy

course that General Musharraf attended and the military academy

course that his lieutenant generals and major generals attended

has been increasing, and that gap also, usually, translates into ineffective relationships or relationships that are not necessarily

built together while having been in the army in the chain of command at the same time. So I think it would probably be a good

thing for both the Pakistan army and Pakistan’s political development.

Dr. WEINBAUM. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add one remark.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Dr. WEINBAUM. I think that—I certainly agree with Professor

Haqqani.

We have a problem, though, in that not immediately, but there

were 10 years in which there was no military-to-military relationship with Pakistan, and with that generation of people who did not

have the contacts with us that General Musharraf had with British—in this case, with Kiani, with the United States, we are going

to be seeing, very shortly, those people rising to positions of importance. This is an unfortunate consequence of having turned our

back on Pakistan in 1990.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, if one of you could describe

to me—we had a series of briefings on this, and it is still a little

bit unclear as to the insurgents, the terrorists, who are now

ensconced in this safe haven and as to what their real relationship

is with the tribes. Is it one of an intimidation nature, like the

Montagnards in the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) in the Central

Highlands? Is it one of a common affiliation or a friendly partnership, or is it a business?

Mr. HAQQANI. It is a mixture of all, sir. It goes back to the antiSoviet war during which this entire area was the place from which

the operations against the Soviets were launched inside Afghanistan. So, at that time, of course, several jihadi organizers came

from all over the world, including some from the Arab world. Some

15

of them intermarried with the local tribespeople, and so now, for

example, we have a situation where the number two in al Qaeda,

Ayman al-Zawahiri, actually has a local wife and, therefore, is related to one particular tribe through marriage. So it is a 20-year/

30-year relationship.

There are economic interests that work together. These tribes are

generally very poor. They do not have very good agrarian land. The

literary rate, for example, for women in the entire tribal belt is 3

percent, and for men it is about 17 percent. So, therefore, there are

not really that many economic opportunities. There is no industry.

The agriculture is insignificant. Most major facilities do not exist,

and there, the ability, especially of the international terrorist networks like al Qaeda, to raise funds globally and bring them to the

people is another incentive.

So it is business. It is family. It is ideological ties built over the

last two to three decades, and it is tribal pride in the case of those

who feel that their matters have to be resolved by them, themselves, rather than by outsiders, because we must understand that

the bulk of the officers corps of Pakistan’s army comes from regions

that are not necessarily Pashtun and, certainly, not from the tribal

areas.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, if the relationship between the extremists

and the locals is that strong, why do you think—you have discussed the idea of the United States trying to utilize resources in

terms of putting money in, development, all the things that sometimes accompany a military operation where you are trying to

bring about the friendship of the population. That sounds to me

like you have got some pretty strong elements that will be very difficult to turn aside with a couple of water projects or to change or

to cleave.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. That is why, sir, I described this as the

work of a generation.

What the Pakistani state basically has to do through some combination of political, economic, and other means is to make the tribal leaders in those areas feel that their future depends on Pakistan, and that they should not look on the Pakistani leadership as

outsiders, but, as you said yourself, this does not happen quickly

or easily.

Mr. HUNTER. Yes. Go ahead.

Dr. WEINBAUM. If I might just add to that, what we are dealing

with here is a different leadership. Previously the way the British

earlier and then the Pakistan government dealt with this leadership was through political agents who offered bribes and also

threats.

What we have now, increasingly, in radicalized laws and in

young men who are unemployed and who are getting some of the

funds that Mr. Haqqani had mentioned—what we are getting now

are people who are ideologically bent, and these individuals have

mostly as their mission the Islamitization and, indeed, the

Talibanization of their own country, and so their agenda is not one

that you can easily buy off.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, then, the last question, Mr. Chairman.

Give me the relationship of the army—of these 100,000 folks who

are compromised somewhat by the frontier force and, to some deVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
16

gree, by the regular Pakistani army—their relationship with these

tribal communities.

As they come in searching—presumably searching for the enemy,

do the tribes take up arms against them? Do they stand by? Do

they try to help in subtle ways the terrorist community there?

What is the relationship?

Dr. WEINBAUM. You know, some tribes—and we should really

talk about subtribes and smaller units—do side with the military.

Others, clearly, are working against the military. So it is hard to

generalize about this, but for the most part, the military does not

engage in the kind of door-to-door operations that we are familiar

with.

For example, in southern Afghanistan, the military, for the most

part, has not taken the initiative in the tribal area recently. The

other day, the 200 or so who were killed were killed by aerial bombardment. So there is not really a strong relationship here.

Let me just sum up by saying what the military has done with

some success. Until the Red Mosque affair took place, it has tried

to use that old method of divide and rule. It has tried to support

some factions against other factions, and that for a while did work.

But now we see that that original agreement of September 2006

has been broken by virtually all of the tribes in the Waziristan

area.

Ms. CURTIS. Can I just emphasize Ambassador Schaffer’s point

about this taking a long period of time, and we have to have a certain amount of patience?

It is economic development in the first instance, but it is about

changing the ideology. As Professor Haqqani pointed out, there are

the links going back to the Afghan war. In many ways these people

are stuck in the 1980’s, the 1990’s. They have not absorbed the

changes that have been brought by 9/11. So part of this is ideological, and it does start with socioeconomic development, but it does

take a long time.

Just to point out, as to the idea of sort of dividing and conquering and the fact that these tribes do have different loyalties, and

the Pakistan government has tried to use that in order to get tactical gains, should we say, in the long run, I do not think that that

kind of strategy is going to be effective. There has to be an all-out,

comprehensive effort that does include politically integrating these

areas into Pakistan, and there have been efforts in this regard by

some of the Pakistani political parties who argue that if you do

bring those areas into the broader Pakistani political framework,

you are likely to get at this problem of extremism, because then

there will not be so much power going to the mosques and these

unofficial links, and you will have the areas being part of the overall Pakistani system.

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may just say one word.

There will be some people who will be diehard, ideologically committed extremists, and they can be dealt with militarily. Then

there are those who are in it because this is their livelihood. They

facilitate the jihad, and so that is their livelihood. I think that the

government of Pakistan’s desire is to at least get these people out

of that mix and give them an alternative livelihood rather than just

being the facilitators of extremists who get funds from outside and,

17

therefore, are influential through their ability to provide resources

to the locals.

So it is two parallel tracks. I mean, of course, if Osama bin

Laden marries into a tribe and, therefore, buys that loyalty to that

marriage, that tribe will have to be dealt with differently than the

tribe that is there only because it is getting money to be able to

allow people safe passage through the mountains and the hills and

the caves that that tribe controls.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Spratt.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your excellent presentations and

testimony.

I think it was you, Mr. Haqqani, who said that the Musharraf

government and the army tend to draw a distinction between the

Taliban and al Qaeda.

Number one, how do they distinguish the two? How do they identify one as opposed to the other? How do they justify that distinction?

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, first of all, the Taliban are exclusively

Pashtun. They are either Afghans, and now, increasingly, they are

Pakistanis, so they speak the Pashtun language. They are from the

area.

What the Musharraf government describes as al Qaeda are essentially those who are of non-local origin—for example, Arabs,

Uzbeks, Chechens, even people from the Xinjiang province of

China—who have all assembled there and who are led primarily by

the ideology as well as the organizational structure of Osama bin

Laden. I personally feel that——

Mr. SPRATT. So the al Qaeda are identifiable? They are distinguishable from the Taliban and any other extremists?

Mr. HAQQANI. Yes, they are. My only comment would be that, in

some cases, there are Taliban groups that have actually placed

themselves virtually under the control of al Qaeda, and that is a

reality that the government of Pakistan has been very reluctant to

admit, but it is a reality that people like me have been pointing

out for three or four years, that there are at least some Taliban

who are not just local; they are essentially integrated into the al

Qaeda command structure and should, therefore, be treated just

like al Qaeda should be treated or is treated.

Mr. SPRATT. Well, you say that the army really does not appear

to have a plan for going after al Qaeda, but if they know their safe

havens and the places where they live can distinguish them from

other extremist elements, what is holding them back and preventing them from taking that initiative? Is it Musharraf, himself, or

his government?

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, making a distinction between the two as individuals or groups is not necessarily the same thing as saying that

they actually know the different safe havens, because in some cases

the Taliban provides a safe haven for al Qaeda. So, if the al Qaeda

people were actually to come out and a Pakistan army person were

to be confronted with an Arab from al Qaeda and a Pashtun

Taliban, he would be able to make the distinction, but if you are

18

flying over, you do not necessarily make a distinction, because both

dress alike.

In the end, the Pakistani government’s intelligence capability

and the U.S. intelligence capability in this matter is not something

that is shared with people like myself who are outside of government, but if they do have the intelligence and they do not go after

them, the only explanation for that would be that people in the

government of Pakistan feel that they do not need to solve this

problem right now.

Mr. SPRATT. All of you seem to suggest that Musharraf has his

faults and his shortcomings, for sure, but it begs the question: Is

there anyone better who would take his place if he were deposed

or somehow defeated?

In particular, I have been told that, in the army, the junior officers tend to be much more fundamentalists in Islam and ideological

than do the senior officers, who are more like the British for that

matter. They are more worldly and less ideological. Is that a correct observation that the junior officers in the army are apt to be

worse?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. That I cannot tell you, sir.

There has been an increase in public piety in Pakistan over the

past 10, 20 years, and I am sure the army has participated in that,

but like other organizations, it tends to recruit officers like the old

ones. So I suspect that there is not a stark difference between the

generations.

I would urge you, though, not just to think in terms of this individual or that individual. You have got a government structure in

Pakistan where institutions historically have become weaker, and

that is one of the big problems we are dealing with. Musharraf

today is not the same guy that we have been working with for the

past six weeks. His power and ability to control things in Pakistan

have significantly diminished in the past six months. He has shown

a need and a willingness to reach for repressive measures when politically challenged, and I think what you are going to deal with in

the future is a more brittle Musharraf without, unfortunately, the

buildup of institutions that can help moderate this, and that, I

think, is the most urgent need for our long-term policy in Pakistan.

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Pakistan currently is believed to have enough

fissile material, mainly enriched uranium, for maybe 90 nuclear

weapons and is assumed to have the capability to deliver them over

significant distances. Officially, the United States continues to urge

Pakistan to join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and offers no official recognition of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capability,

which certainly exists in spite of this policy of not recognizing it.

I have a staff-prepared document in front of me which says the

obvious, I think, that internal instability has been on the rise in

Pakistan since mid–2007. Now, there has been essentially no discussion of the nuclear issue relative to Pakistan, although they

could have as many as 90 weapons, with internal instability; and

we are near-hysterical over the possibility that Iran may obtain a

nuclear weapon or two.

19

Are we too little concerned about the nuclear issue in Pakistan,

too much concerned about the nuclear issue in Iran? What are your

thoughts?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think that the army, as an institution, has

firm control—command and control over the nuclear weapons; and

I don’t think there is any reason to be unduly concerned, with this

political transition that we are in, that something could happen

with the command of those nuclear weapons.

Our issue with Pakistan’s assets is more long-term. Certainly,

the U.S. needs to make it a priority, the security and safety of

Pakistan’s nuclear assets, and I will talk about a particular case

that happened shortly after 9/11 in which some senior retired Pakistani nuclear scientists actually met with al Qaeda leaders—I

think Osama bin Laden himself. And this is something that we

need to be concerned about, retired officials who still have links to

jihadists, particularly al Qaeda, and their willingness to associate

and communicate with them.

I think it is the penetration of the nuclear establishment that the

U.S. should be most concerned about, and so that means we need

to work with Pakistanis in ensuring nuclear safety and security.

This is difficult to do because, as you said, Pakistan has not signed

NPT, and U.S. law prohibits any cooperation that might enhance

Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. So this is certainly a sensitive

issue, but is one that we need to forge through and we need to continue pursuing.

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may make a short comment, sir, nuclear nonproliferation in South Asia and non-proliferation concerns relating

to Pakistan have simply not been on the agenda of the U.S. Government for the last couple of years, and I think that they need to

be brought back on the agenda. That is not to say that Pakistan’s

nuclear weapons pose a threat to international security right away.

But to the extent that we want to control nuclear proliferation all

over the world, I think that the U.S. Government should start taking an active interest in ensuring that South Asia, as a region—

and that applies to both India and Pakistan—that the nuclear capabilities are brought under some international regime because,

right now, both countries are non-signatories of the Non-proliferation Treaty, and none of the international obligations apply to either of them at the moment.

Mr. BARTLETT. The international rules for nuclear non-proliferation seem to be pretty clear. You can’t have a nuclear weapon until

you have them, and then it is okay. Is that going to obtain to Iran

as well?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I am sure that the U.S. does not wish it

to obtain to Iran, but more importantly, I am sure the U.S. would

like not to find out, because they don’t want Iran to develop the

things in the first place.

I think, in the case of Pakistan, the U.S. has had, historically,

two big worries about its nuclear arsenal: one, that it not be used

in the most obvious cases—that would be a hypothetical war with

India; two, that it not be exported. And on that score, as you know,

there have been some lapses, particularly the network run by A.Q.

Kahn. And Lisa said, the security of the existing arsenal is as good

or as bad as the security of the Pakistan army.

20

I would say, right at the moment, probably pretty good, but certainly nothing one can be complacent about.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would try to see if I

could understand.

I think Mr. Haqqani mentioned that President Musharraf has

not been able to mobilize civilian support, but he is able to win an

election. Normally, at least here in the United States, if somebody

is able to win an election, you can normally try to mobilize civilian

support. So what is the missing ingredient here? How come he

can’t do that if he is able to win an election?

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may explain the Pakistani system, sir, he

hasn’t been elected like the President of the United States is elected. The people did not vote. He was elected by the parliament, so—

he had an election for parliament in 2002, which was described by

the State Department and all international observers as seriously

flawed.

And now there is a parliamentary election, and in principle, he

should have waited for the next parliament to elect the next president. But to ensure that he will be president, he asked the current

parliament to vote on him. And because he already had a majority,

he had the deck stacked there. He won. So read in the newspaper:

He got 98 percent of the votes cast. Basically, you are talking about

some 300-odd people voting for him out of parliament. All the opposition parties boycotted the election. The major opposition party,

led by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, decided to abstain

from the election but did not resign from the parliament.

So it is more the technical victory. It gives him legal cover to remain president for the next five years. It is not a legitimate election.

As far as popularity is concerned, the same poll that Ms. Curtis

quoted from Terror Free Tomorrow shows us that Osama bin

Laden right now has more favorable ratings in Pakistan in opinion

polls than General Musharraf does.

Mr. ORTIZ. So what problems would be created once the courts

come out and certify him, that he has won the election? What problems do you anticipate would happen when that happens?

Mr. HAQQANI. The problems that are most likely to happen are

that the Pakistani political parties and the loyalists who have been

campaigning against General Musharraf will continue to campaign

against him. The only way it may be averted is if a parliamentary

election is held and the parliamentary election is genuinely free

and fair; and the people feel that now Musharraf is a transitional

figure so let us accept him as a transitional figure.

My fears are that General Musharraf is too used to being an absolute ruler. But if he is willing to give up absolute power and

share it with whoever wins the parliamentary election and allows

them to become prime minister with full powers under the constitution, then we could actually see a transition in which the fact

that he is unpopular does not matter. It would be a bit like Chile

and Pinochet in the end game; when Pinochet is withdrawing and

21

the elections are held and a new government is coming in, his

shadow is still there, but it is a shadow, not full power.

That is the scenario that would be a good scenario.

The bad scenario would be that General Musharraf insists on

saying, ‘‘Now that I have been elected, the election has been certified, I am the boss and I am going to continue business as usual.’’

If that happens, we will see a lot of friction and conflict in Pakistan; and for the purposes of the members of this committee, it will

be a major, major distraction from the war against terror, because

while the president and his main advisers are busy trying to control the government and survive in office, there is no likelihood

that an effective war can be waged against the terrorists.

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the things—and I know there is a lot of dealmaking between our government and the Pakistani government.

But I think one of the things that we—at least that I see missing

is that we are not going to the Pakistani people. But how do you

do that? I mean, how can we engage the masses of Pakistani people?

I think that is a mistake that we have made, not only in Pakistan, but in many places; that instead of going to the people, we

go to, of course, the politicians and other government officials. Is

there a way to do that more effectively?

Dr. WEINBAUM. Sir, the Pakistani people, by and large, view the

partnership with the United States as one with the army and

Musharraf. We failed here by the way in which we have used our

assistance, as you have heard. Some 80 percent of all the assistance that we have given over the years has gone for the military

or for security. The people of Pakistan have viewed this relationship, therefore, as not necessarily in their interests.

As you have also heard, there was a bright moment, back two

years ago just now, when we demonstrated to the Pakistan people,

through our support when the earthquake took place, our willingness to move our military in and to assist in the relief efforts,

which was so significant, because what it said for that brief time

was, here was the United States military operating for the people

of Pakistan, something which was not going to benefit directly the

army or Musharraf.

I think generally what we have with President Musharraf is

someone who—for lack of, indeed, thinking about plan B, we have

thrown our lot in with President Musharraf and lavished praise on

him over a long period of time and not recognized the way in which

this was being interpreted in Pakistan society. The more we have

done it of late, the more we have only reinforced the idea that

somehow this is a relationship with him.

We failed also to—only quite belatedly did we suggest to push

him, in a sense, toward a partnership, in this case with Benazir

Bhutto. But that came very late in the game and was so transparent that now most people in Pakistan view that as, again, something which was orchestrated here in Washington. It serves neither

President Musharraf nor, for that matter, Madam Bhutto.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

Mr. SPRATT [presiding]. Mr. Jones of North Carolina.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

22

And I want to say to the panel, this has been fascinating. What

I have heard is of great concern to me. It truly is. And I am sure

it is to many people like myself who are not experts in this area.

Ambassador Schaffer, your comments about—and you certainly

explained it—a critical time. I was really just taken aback when

the professor said that bin Laden was the most popular figure in

Ms. Curtis’ poll.

Ms. Curtis, would you go back briefly and explain the poll, the

couple of questions that you might have asked the people of Pakistan, as it related to the image of America in and around that area

and, also, how you asked the question about bin Laden.

Just curiosity more than anything, the reason I am asking.

Ms. CURTIS. What the Terror Free Tomorrow poll showed, which

I think was about a month ago, was that the Pakistani people do

not see the fight against terrorism as their fight; they see what is

happening as being done largely at the U.S.’s behest, even though

the terrorists certainly threaten the Pakistani state.

And we saw Osama bin Laden, in a recent video, call on Pakistanis to rise up and overturn the regime. So clearly there is an

extremist threat, but for several different reasons the Pakistanis

themselves are not seeing it that way. They are not digesting it the

way, I think, we in America view the situation. And so this is a

problem, and we do have to work on improving perceptions of

America in Pakistan.

Our credibility is at an all-time low. I think we were slow to recognize the ferment for democracy in that country. We have recently

adopted a policy that is promoting democracy, but I think that it

may be too little too late. I think it is very important that President Musharraf remove his military uniform because of the problems with the election that Professor Haqqani pointed out with the

Presidential election.

And there are challenges within the Supreme Court to that election as we speak that have still not been decided upon. If the Supreme Court legitimizes that election, I think it is incumbent on

President Musharraf to step down from his position as Chief of

Army staff. He has already promised the Court this. He reneged

on this pledge in 2004; if he does it again, there will certainly be

political unrest.

And so this is a key issue that I think the U.S. can help on.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Sir, I think that there are two other aspects of that poll that are important. One is the fact that it took

place at a time when General Musharraf’s popularity was really

tanking for reasons that had essentially nothing to do with the

United States. But he has been in power for eight years; and Pakistan is a tough country to govern, so that even if he had no flaws

at all, it seems logical that his popularity would have fallen. And,

of course, with the tug of war he was conducting with the Supreme

Court, that certainly intensified it.

The other important factor is Iraq. And the United States in the

public mind in Pakistan has become so associated with this attack

on Muslims, as it is seen, that this very much intensifies the

unpopularity of the United States.

I served in Pakistan 30 years ago. I traveled all over the place

without worrying about my security. My kids spoke Urdu and chatVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ted up all the neighbors and the villagers across the way. It was

a very different country then.

Mr. HAQQANI. And if I could just explain, the question that was

asked in the poll was, ‘‘Do you approve or disapprove of the following?’’ And it listed several people. So Ms. Bhutto, for example, had

a 63 percent approval rating, and Mr. Nawaz Sharif, the former

Prime Minister, had 56; Osama bin Laden had 44 and General

Musharraf had 33. So Osama bin Laden is not the most popular

person in Pakistan; it is just that he has a higher favorable rating

than General Musharraf does.

Dr. WEINBAUM. Sir, there is another poll, and that is by the Pew

Organization, which indicated a favorable view of the United

States by approximately 17 percent of the Pakistan public.

I think that the real tragedy here is that Pakistan’s alternatives

have been so dismal that it has—even on the Democratic Front

here, it has choices here that even many of the Pakistan people in

the parties themselves would say, ‘‘It is sad that this is really the

menu that we have politically to choose from.’’

And much of President Musharraf’s strength over the last few

years has been by default, that there has been no one who has

been able to step up. And I think it is unfortunate now that because Benazir Bhutto has chosen to negotiate with him, the fact

that she has produced up to this point so little in the way of concessions from him, I fear that she, who represents perhaps the

most progressive elements in Pakistan, now has lost so much credibility that even that point of view may have suffered.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I agree with your analysis wholeheartedly, about the box that we

are in and perhaps how we got there. I wonder if you could address

sort of the counterargument and the reason our Administration has

pursued this path, is that the fear that while—if it is not

Musharraf, then the extremists take over and we don’t have control; we can’t risk moving away from him because there is no alternative.

It seems to me that we would have been better served and we

would even be better served now to push for democracy, because

we may have Musharraf, but we are losing the population. And, ultimately, as we lose the Pakistani population, their support for the

U.S., even their support for the notion that the extremists in their

midst, like al Qaeda, are a profound threat to them. When they see

us as the cause of that, we are really undermining our policy.

So, two questions: What is the specific way back from that? How

do we get the population of Pakistan to—and I don’t even think we

should focus on getting them necessarily to be more sympathetic to

the U.S. I think we need to get them to the point where they see

al Qaeda, the Taliban, and that group of extremists as a threat to

them that they need to confront. That would be my goal.

But what is the way back to that? And what is the risk along

the way of those people gaining more electoral power if we try to

move off of Musharraf? How do we get the former without falling

into the latter?

24

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I think you are talking fundamentally

about the message that Pakistani leaders who are seeking popular

election will be delivering or won’t be delivering as the case may

be. Where the U.S., I think, missed a number of opportunities was

that our support for the democratic process in Pakistan has been,

at best, anemic. And if we had been having this conversation a few

years ago, there were lots of alternatives, none of them perfect, but

several of them, with people that we had in fact worked in the

past. So it is not as if it was just Musharraf and the crazies.

You now have the possibility of a government emerging from the

next elections that will include Musharraf’s people and Benazir

Bhutto’s people, all of them having lost something in credibility

and political popularity in the process of getting there. They have

an opportunity to recast the struggle against the extremists as

Pakistan’s struggle. If they don’t do that, I would submit to you

they are in trouble, because there has been violence in Pakistan in

the past three months on a scale that I can’t remember.

Mr. SMITH. Can I focus in on that point?

As you mentioned earlier, a lot of the Pakistani people have said

it is because of Musharraf’s policies, his alliance with the U.S.,

what we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. There has got to be

a piece of it that, ‘‘Gosh, these extremists are a threat to us.’’ So

I would imagine there is some balance in the public opinion.

Can you help me out with your greater knowledge of how the

Pakistani people look at that?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I can’t help you out at the level of the

man on the street or the man in the wheat fields, because there

are an awful lot of them; it is a country of 160 million people. But

if you are talking about the opinion of elite, educated people, there

is widespread recognition that extremists, particularly those that

are prepared to use violence, pose a real threat to the integrity of

the state.

Lisa and I were at a meeting last weekend with a number of distinguished Pakistani representatives who made the most impassioned plea to that effect that I can remember hearing in a long

time.

So it is really a question of how you articulate and how you envision the battle for self-preservation that I think the Pakistani state

has to undertake. And this is something that is taking place not

just in the frontier areas, but also in what Pakistanis call the ‘‘settled areas.’’ The Red Mosque, after all, was in downtown

Islamabad, which is a sleepy, suburban-feeling capital.

Mr. SMITH. I am about out of time. I want to ask one final question.

Isn’t there a certain wisdom at this point in stepping back a little

bit on our part as the U.S. and saying, ‘‘We believe in democracy

enough to accept its outcome in Pakistan, and we don’t feel the

need to manipulate it?’’

Or is the risk in doing that greater than the rewards?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. There is a risk in everything. I would

agree with that statement.

Dr. WEINBAUM. One of the problems that we have now is that

our credibility has fallen so low that virtually anything we do is

misinterpreted.

25

For example, just a few weeks ago Secretary Rice initiated a

phone call at apparently two in the morning which—I don’t think

we decided that. But there was a great deal of disagreement within

the elite itself, within the establishment itself, whether going to

emergency rule was really in the best interest of the country, or the

military for that matter. Secretary Rice, I think, changed the balance here or the feeling and he did not go ahead.

What happened in Pakistan is that rather than getting the credit

for salvaging democracy in this case, we got the blame for interfering in their politics, so that this is a situation that we face here

that, I agree with you, it is perhaps necessary to step back.

Let me add one thing. There is a distinction in the public in

Pakistan between al Qaeda and the Taliban. Al Qaeda are viewed

as foreigners; here, I think a lot, a majority in Pakistan, are willing

to see them as a source of terrorism and recognize that.

But we have to realize that a large part of the country, particularly the Pashtun area of the country, does not see the Taliban, the

Afghan Taliban as the enemy. They view them as one and the

same kind of people. They share many cultural values together.

They also believe that what they are doing in Afghanistan is supporting the Pashtun people in Afghanistan.

So there is a great deal of difference there, and it is important,

because it limits what the Pakistan government can actually do in

dealing with the Afghan Taliban.

Again, making another distinction, the Pakistani Taliban, their

agenda is the kind of agenda we have been hearing, and that is to

spread this Talibanization inside Pakistan.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Gingrey.

Dr. GINGREY. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

It seems to me the discussion this morning about the region is

a fear that we are developing a policy of a circular firing squad, ultimately, and I think about the fact that we have supported—and

I think you pointed out that most of our support has gone to Pakistan over the last many years on the military side—F–16s, as an

example, other weapons systems technology.

And now, more recently, of course, we are involved with India in

trying to cooperate with them on a civilian nuclear program as they

attest it to be. And I just wonder how we can reconcile the two

areas of support of these two countries who are—there is a constant conflict between them not over just the Kashmir region. But

how do we reconcile what we are doing in Pakistan with our policy

in India?

And the second part of the question is, what can we do to try to

help these two countries get along better with each other?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I think the answer is to continue doing what

we have been doing. We have come a long way in terms of encouraging an Indo-Pak peace process, which of course was launched in

January 2004. The Pakistani leadership has, for obvious reasons,

been distracted, and those talks have not moved forward very far

in the last few months, which is quite understandable. However, I

will note that the two countries do have meetings in New Delhi—

next week, as a matter of fact—to talk about nuclear confidence

26

building as well as a joint counterterrorism mechanism. So I think

there is interest in continuing the peace process.

But certainly the U.S. should not put this issue on the back

burner. It needs to continue to focus on pushing this process forward, because it is fundamental to overall security in the region.

And in terms of what we are doing with each side, the U.S. has

chosen to dehyphenate its relations with Pakistan, with India, no

longer seeing the relationships through the lens of their dispute

over Kashmir or their dispute—overall animosity with each other.

And I think this is the correct policy, because India is an emerging

country with an economy that is moving forward. It is playing an

increasing role in Asia. So what we are doing with India has more

to do with its role in Asia and our interests there, whereas with

Pakistan, clearly we need to have a long-term relationship that

works toward promoting democracy, stability, counterterrorism, et

cetera. So both relationships are incredibly important, but for very

different reasons.

But I agree with you. The Indo-Pak peace process is fundamental

to overall regional stability, and it impacts the situation even in Afghanistan. So, for that reason, we can’t take our eye off the ball

in continuing to encourage those talks.

Dr. GINGREY. I would like some of the other panelists to comment on that, too.

But how many attempts have been made on Musharraf’s life?

Three or four or so. And he is not going to be there forever, even

though he says he is there for another five years. Something is

going to happen, the possibility of something happening. And what

kind of rogue regime is going to be there then with our military

technology? I mentioned the F–16s, and I have got great concerns

about that.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. That is just one of the reasons that I

think it is essential with the United States to maintain contact

with the range of leaders in Pakistan—with the army, with the political opposition. And to put its support behind an open democratic

process that has, I would suggest to you, a better chance of producing leadership in Pakistan that wants to be part of the world rather than withdrawing from it.

There aren’t any easy answers, and Pakistan is going to be a

deeply troubled country, I think, for some time. But I see that as

the best way of trying to muddle through.

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, I would say that it is not necessarily—this is

a Cold War attitude we have had. There was a time when there

was competition between India and Pakistan, and the United

States thought that it could get advantage by giving weapons to

Pakistan and ultimately to India. I think that that attitude needs

to change. I think Pakistan needs schools, sanitation, health care.

I think that Pakistan’s—this attitude that every time the Pakistani

military comes to power and comes to Washington, D.C., asking for

new weapons systems, we think that that is what is going to buy

America leverage there. I think that has been proven wrong in the

past.

I think that the real leverage for the United States will come

through a vibrant Pakistan in which the 160 million people of

Pakistan feel they have a stake in their country and its relationVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
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ships with the rest of the world, a process that is happening in

some of the countries.

So there are two types of people in Pakistan: Those who want to

see Pakistan as the next Korea, South Korea, or the next Taiwan

or the next Japan; and there are those whose vision is that Pakistan should be a militarized state that should be able to fight with

India; and at the same time, there are those within the militarized

state vision who actually want a jihadist vision.

I think it is time to encourage the vision of Pakistan that is

about globalization and joining the rest of the world, rather than

just thinking in terms of what new weapons systems can we sell

them next year.

Dr. GINGREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews from New Jersey.

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to thank the chairman for calling this

hearing. I think it is very timely. I also thank the panel for great

testimony.

I think we have the right to be hopeful about this relationship,

but we have the duty to be pessimistic and a duty to be sober. And

let me spin out a very sobering series of events and ask whomever

on the panel to comment.

Ambassador Schaffer talked about the likelihood that whoever

wins the new round of elections won’t have a lot of credibility. I

think that is self-evident.

Let us assume that that government fails to make the war

against the terrorists a national mission, and they get overwhelmed by the lack of support for what is going on. And let us

assume that things further fall apart, and the violence that the

ambassador made reference to rises, and there is a chaotic situation, and the jihadist vision that Mr. Haqqani just referenced a

minute ago comes to pass.

Given today’s circumstances, what probability would each of the

panelists put on the likelihood that that vision of a fundamentalist

government taking over in Pakistan would occur? Given where we

are today, how would you assess the probability of us winding up

shortly down the road with an Islamic fundamentalist government

running things in Pakistan?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Given a halfway decent performance by

the next government, I would assess it relatively low.

Mr. ANDREWS. What if the performance fails?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. If the performance is bad and seen to be

bad, by which I mean trouble in the streets, tapering off of economic growth, visible and obvious reverses by the army in dealing

with the frontier areas, then I have a real concern that a hybrid

government of the sort that now seems to be a possibility would

tarnish all the participants in it and would set the stage, possibly,

for the religious parties to do better than they historically have.

Now, let me distinguish between the religious parties and the

militants. The religious parties are participants in the political

process; they are not themselves people who take up arms. They

include their share, some would say more than their share, of people who are in it for the patronage. The militants are people who

are prepared to use violence.

But there is some overlap between the two groups.

28

Mr. ANDREWS. So how would you assess the probability the militants would ascend?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. The only way I can see that happening

would be if they made common cause with somebody in the army.

Mr. ANDREWS. Dr. Weinbaum, what is your assessment?

Dr. WEINBAUM. I would add to what Ambassador Schaffer has

said. It really depends on what happens with the mainstream of

Pakistan’s politics. I think the great hope here, based on the past,

is that most Pakistanis really do support moderate, mainstream

politics.

These parties are not programmatic parties, as such, but they

have dominated. As you have heard this figure so many times, the

religious parties, at best, get 11 percent of the vote.

The great fear would be that if a military government—and

Musharraf has been doing this—if it continues here to sideline the

moderate parties, that if it encumbers the moderate parties, there

will be effectively a vacuum, and so then that the alternative to the

military will be a solution which is promulgated by the religious

parties.

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Haqqani, remember my question, the premise

of it was that we had a failed credibility of the new government.

So what happens if that happens?

Mr. HAQQANI. In case of the failed credibility of the government,

the Pakistan army will still have residual strength to be able to

keep things under control for maybe another five, seven years. But

ten years down the road, unless Pakistan’s internal crises are addressed and there are multiple crises—there are the tribal areas,

there are the economic injustices——

Mr. ANDREWS. You think it is high?

Mr. HAQQANI. I think in ten years it could be very high unless

those crises are addressed.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you.

Ms. Curtis, what do you think?

Ms. CURTIS. Well, first, I think your scenario—I think the

chances are very low so long as a general election is held and is

perceived as credible. I think the scenario that you spell out is

more likely in the event that we don’t move forward with a political

process in returning to civilian democratic rule.

Mr. ANDREWS. Why would you favor conditioning U.S. aid on at

least holding a general election then? Because you said there

shouldn’t be any condition on U.S. aid. Wouldn’t it make sense

then? Just say, we don’t care about the outcome? Just say, you

have to have the election?

Ms. CURTIS. I think it is complex, and I think we need to encourage elections. But we can do that diplomatically. Our statements

mean a lot. When we call on the government to release opposition

politicians, it matters.

So I think our statements mean a lot, but conditioning the assistance sends the wrong signal.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I think—Mr. Haqqani?

Mr. HAQQANI. I just wanted to make a quick comment.

As long as it is not seen as a return to Pressler, meaning legislation that will automatically come into effect and therefore will hurt

29

Pakistan and will therefore be seen as Uncle Sam dictating to

Pakistan, I think that some pressure from both Congress and the

executive branch for a free and fair election, because Pakistan has

a track record of being able to hold elections. Whether they are free

or fair is a different matter.

So I think that a free and fair election which is inclusive and allows everybody a level playing field, I think, is something that is

in the interest of Pakistan and in the interest of the U.S.-Pakistan

relationship; and anything you do in favor of it is welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to try to squeeze a couple more

members in, and then we have four votes, one 15-minute and three

5-minute votes. But subject to the witnesses being able to stay with

us, we will return, because it is a very, very important hearing.

Mr. Akin, to be followed by Ms. Davis.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You might have commented on this earlier.

In terms of the overall instability that is introduced in Pakistan,

what percent do the, particularly, Saudi-funded madrasah—how

much element of trouble is that?

Because my visit to Pakistan a couple years ago was at a heady

time where relations had just been improved with India. There was

no more fighting. We stood at the border where you would have

been shot two months before. A lot of things looked like they were

going the right way.

But on the other hand, there was no public school system, and

Saudi oil money was being used to basically train up a new generation of crazies.

Could you comment on, how does that affect the overall? Is that

a big thing, or is that just something that over time becomes a

problem?

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, I attended a madrasah, sir, in the 1960’s at

a time when Pakistan had only a handful of madrasahs, and I assure you that I haven’t grown up to be a crazy.

But something has changed. There are more than 10,000

madrasahs now, and they are producing crazies. And what has

changed is that my madrasah was locally funded; it was funded by

the community. It was a traditionalist seminary. It taught us the

Koran, and it taught us traditional Islamist learning and did not

necessarily teach us to hate anybody. Things have changed since

then.

I think that one of the impacts of the war against the Soviets in

Afghanistan was that General Zia ul-Haq invited the Saudis—both

private individuals, by the way, and the royal family. So it is not

just the royal family; it is also private charities from Saudi Arabia

and other gulf countries that have now established madrasahs.

Even if only a small fraction of them are used as recruitment centers for radicals, it is a disturbing problem.

The government of Pakistan says it is trying to address the problem, but many of the cast of characters in Pakistan’s radical movement come from the same schools. And when people who are engaged in militancy are coming from the same set of schools, then

there is definitely a connection; and those schools are a problem,

and I think that that needs to be addressed.

30

But at the same time, the public school system in Pakistan has

virtually broken down. Pakistan invests less than two percent of its

gross domestic product (GDP) in education, notwithstanding the

fact that Pakistan has a very young population. And for that young

population, schools need to be built.

And Pakistan’s public school system needs to be mended, because

a lot of families do not intend to send their children to madrasahs

to make them radicals. They send them because they need these

kids to go somewhere to study something. So if there is a viable

public school system which absorbs a large number of young people, then I think that the significance of the madrasahs in relative

terms will diminish.

At the same time, the radical madrasahs need to be shut down.

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis, and then we will

break for the four votes. I hope you can return for the completion

of the hearing.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and

thank you for the hearing. I think it is very important.

And I want to thank all of you for being here.

Could you go back to the reference that you all have made in one

way or another to U.S. policy and the issue of conditioning, whether it is Department of Defense (DOD) assistance or other assistance, to the fight against terrorism? I think I heard from all of you

that you felt that that conditioning issue is not a good idea and

that, in fact, it goes back to the 1990 concern about our fickleness.

But could you flesh that out some more in terms of what—specifically, what other leverage you believe that the U.S. should be utilizing that it hasn’t used?

And if there is some contribution in there to the—you referenced

retraining of the military, looking at it differently in terms of

whether it is able to act more like a counterinsurgency. What—

where is the U.S.? What should the U.S. position be? And how can

we influence that in a way—being a partner as opposed to being

in some different kind of relationship?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I lived through Pressler as a government

official. It was always looked on as the heavy hand of the United

States. I would estimate that it probably brought us two, three

years of delay on Pakistan’s nuclear program. It obviously did not

prevent Pakistan from developing nuclear weapons, as it had been

intended to do. So that gives me a somewhat jaundiced eye on the

effectiveness of legislatively mandated conditions.

I believe that it would be completely appropriate, however, for

the Administration, as a matter of policy and perhaps with some

encouragement from the Congress, to calibrate our military sales

and our military assistance to Pakistan’s policies.

I have argued in my testimony that we needed to find some way

of encouraging the Pakistan army in developing expertise in the

military tools of counterinsurgency. I don’t know whether the

United States is the best source of that expertise, but if we aren’t,

we ought to help them find who is.

31

I think that doing this as a matter of policy can probably have

quite a lot of impact without having quite the same PR disaster as

a legislatively mandated cutoff.

Ms. CURTIS. I think that given the importance of our relationship

with Pakistan, the fact that U.S. credibility is so low, they are facing threats from extremists, we have seen the violence increase

dramatically over the last few months—it is a very dicey situation,

and when the U.S. comes in and announces, ‘‘Well, we are going

to condition our assistance,’’ as happened with House Resolution

(H.R.) 1, implementing the 9/11 legislation act, we just don’t help

our cause.

If we are trying to bring the Pakistani people along in the fight

against terrorism, promoting economic development, moderation,

democracy, I just don’t think that we help our cause when we publicly condition.

Now, I think there is much more room to use more savvy diplomacy, if you will. I think it is incumbent upon our diplomats to find

ways to pressure, to hold the Pakistanis’ feet to the fire, in other

words, on some of these issues, and to look at it more from a strategic perspective.

I mean, certainly Pakistan, it has had three wars with its neighbor India. Relations are tense with Afghanistan. You know, there

is a need for support in terms of managing the strategic challenges

that they face. So I think the U.S. would be better served by dealing more holistically, rather than coming in and conditioning, on

one particular occasion, the assistance.

Mr. HAQQANI. My quick response would be that there are many

tools between the sledgehammer of sanctions and the indulgence of

constant praise that we have heaped on General Musharraf in the

last few years. I think that every time the United States engages

with Pakistani officials and makes its concerns known, it does have

an effect.

When Secretary of State Rice called General Musharraf and told

him an emergency was not acceptable, we didn’t see emergency. It

worked. Similarly, when the U.S. ambassador in Islamabad said

that she was recently concerned with the arrests, guess what? Everybody arrested was released in 48 hours.

I think a little more forthright talk is needed. Maybe it is time

to tell them that they have been making mistakes.

Mrs. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We will break momentarily. We shall return.

The hearing will resume.

The gentleman from Texas is recognized.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be back.

One of two questions. One, the briefing document made a comment that President Musharraf and Ms. Bhutto, while viewed as

pro-Western and had been pro-Western, are viewed as unrepresentative of the priorities of most Pakistani people. So I would like

your comments on that.

The other thing is you are talking about how to deal with the

ungoverned areas of the tribal areas. You talked about economic

development and jobs and those kinds of things. In September, I

had the chance to fly along the Afghani-Pakistan border on the AfVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
32

ghanistan side. That area appears to be, for lack of a better phrase,

a moonscape.

You have already said agriculture is limited. Are there hard minerals that can be mined? Is there an opportunity for economic development in that section of Pakistan that would realistically make

sense, in terms of trying to prevent their radicalization of folks in

that particular area?

So comments on either of those questions.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I will tackle the pro-Western part of it.

The United States has worked with Musharraf for the past six

years—actually, for the past eight years. He certainly sees Pakistan’s future in engagement with the West and with the United

States. He certainly sees Pakistan’s economic future as most promising if you get that kind of engagement going. I would describe

him as a Pakistani nationalist but in that context.

Benazir Bhutto is an educated woman. She went to Harvard. She

went to Oxford. She has worked with the United States also.

Pro-Western does not necessarily equate to support for the full

range of U.S. foreign policy, and of course, Iraq is a big exception

there. It does, in both cases, mean that they are not interested in

the Taliban’s vision of Pakistani society. They would like to see

Pakistan as a modern society. The word ‘‘secular’’ translates badly

into Urdu, but the way we think of ‘‘secular,’’ that is what they

have in mind.

Mr. CONAWAY. Could you focus more on the lack of identification

with the Pakistanis’ priorities for their own country? That particular comment, is that accurate?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Well, I think, for most Pakistanis, there

are very gut-level economic issues that are the top priorities and

that are probably greater priorities than the degree of religiosity

that is or is not present in the society. Most Pakistanis are religiously conservative but not radical. Neither one of these people is

a farmer. They have never had to make their living on two and a

half acres of growing wheat or whatever, so it requires an effort of

mind for them to relate to that level of economics. I think it is one

they are perfectly capable of, but they do come from a different

background, and there is a kind of instinctive difference there.

Whereas, a lot of Pakistanis assume that whoever talks the most

Islamic language is sympathetic. For either Musharraf or Benazir

Bhutto, there is a weariness of the too-passionate sides of religion,

because they have seen the abuses it can lead to. What this means

is that, if you want to infuse in people the idea that religious extremism is dangerous, you have to find a way of articulating it that

does not make it sound like you are anti-religion. I think there are

people who have done this in Pakistan. I am not sure that has been

very effectively done in the past few years, however.

Dr. WEINBAUM. On the economic side, if you are talking about

the great mass of Pakistanis, there are economic issues—above all,

inflation. This is something that we, obviously, cannot contribute

to helping them on. They also talk about corruption. Here, again,

this is not something we can directly assist them with.

As far as the frontier is concerned, you are absolutely right. This

is desolate. I, too, have flown over that area, and not only are there

33

innumerable places to hide; there are very few places to grow anything that is economically feasible.

However, we should recognize the major source of income. If you

are not talking about smuggling, there is remittances—that is, to

send abroad your population to send back funds—and this is really

where a great deal of it takes place. Now, that does not mean that

they cannot be building roads and schools, but as long as they have

in that area an ideological agenda, many of these people do not

want schools, and they are afraid of roads because they know that

is the road that the army is going to take to come at them.

So we have a very difficult job, but a large part of it is that you

have to recognize that, for all of these years, that area has been

treated as a stepchild. It has never been developed. They have allowed it to fester as a backwood area because it suited the government’s purposes. That way, they could keep these people at some

distance, and they would not be troublemakers. The British started

with it, and we have seen the Pakistanis continue with it.

So it is a real uphill. There is not going to be a single crop—there

is not going to be a single industry which is somehow going to turn

this around.

Mr. HAQQANI. Without disagreeing with Ambassador Schaffer

and Professor Weinbaum, let me just add one point—that the distinction needs to be made between General Musharraf and Benazir

Bhutto.

Benazir Bhutto, being a politician who does need votes and has

engaged in electoral politics even though she has been in exile now

for about eight years, does have the same exercise here. You know

that you have to actually talk to the people. You have to get in

touch with them. So, once she gets back, she will become aware of

the concerns of the average man very quickly.

On the economic side, it is the estimate of a very senior Pakistani economist that 65 million people in Pakistan live below the

poverty line, which is they live on less than $1 a day; 65 million

live just above the poverty line; and 30 million can be described as

well-to-do, which is the whole range from lower-middle class to the

upper-middle classes and the very, very rich, the guys who actually

flaunt their Rolls Royces and their Porsches.

In that, Ms. Bhutto’s party, the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP),

traditionally has found a base amongst the poor, even though she

does not personally live the same lifestyle as that of her electorate.

So the PPP—because, as a party, it is still intact—if she can somehow connect the concerns about extremism with the concerns of her

base with economic injustices, then there is hope that she will be

able to succeed a little bit better than General Musharraf in being

able to bring the people on the agenda of anti-extremism.

In the tribal areas, among other things, maybe irrigation systems, nurturing whatever water sources already exist; finding alternative means of employment, not necessarily in large-scale industry, but in cottage industry; creating new opportunities for people to get the skills that will get them into the remittance pool—

but as skilled rather, than as unskilled workers—those are the

things that are the options for changing the economy and the face

of that region.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

34

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to focus for a minute on the security along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was a trip a number of us

made back in May, talking to some of the NATO troops, describing

Taliban terrorists coming to and fro across the border, and there

being almost a dysfunctional relationship between the Pakistan

army, NATO, and Afghanistan’s—whatever troops they have there.

I mean, it seemed like there were not even communication systems

established to talk about tracking people who were moving back

and forth.

Given the amount of money we are investing in Pakistan’s military and, obviously, the commitment in Afghanistan, it just seems

like there should be a better security arrangement with the Pakistani government about tracking what people are seeing with their

own eyes coming over the borders.

Dr. WEINBAUM. You know, sir, there is a tripartite arrangement

of the three militaries—the Afghan military, the U.S. forces operating on the border, as well as the Pakistanis—and there has been

some success with this in sorting out differences here.

But what you are talking about here is tracking across the border, and I think that that can only come about when, on both sides

of the border, there is a much more effective security arrangement.

There are innumerable places along that border where one can infiltrate, so that I do not think there is any way in which, even with

the best of intentions, that the governments involved here are

going to be able to stop that. You have to stop it from within. Once

they get to the border, they are going to get across.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, it certainly seemed that the Afghanistan officials that we met with expressed a lot of frustration in terms of

their interaction with the Pakistan government. So I get your

point, but it just also seems that, you know, government to government, there should be a better arrangement than what exists right

now.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. You will hear frustration on both sides

of the line. This whole issue could not be more difficult for both the

Pakistanis and the Afghans, and they have tended to blame each

other, rather than to focus together on how to fix the problem.

This is one of the reasons that I urged in my testimony that the

U.S. start trying to develop with Pakistan and with Afghanistan at

least some elements of a common strategy for stabilizing the government in Afghanistan. Because, if you could start to fix the rather poisonous relationship between the two leaders, then you would

have a much better basis for trying to find ways of cooperating

across a porous border.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, I mean the arrests that took place in Germany this summer of the three terrorists who were clearly being

trained in some part of Pakistan suggests that, again, all of the

long-term economic development and all of the things that you

have talked about here today obviously are important elements to

the strategy, but, clearly, we have an immediate security issue

here. I mean, if those guys were trained in Iraq, the political fallout from that would have been, I think, just overwhelming. I mean,

for some reason, the fact that it was not in Iraq and was in a difVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
35

ferent part of the world seemed to get sort of brushed a little bit

aside.

The fact is, I mean, to me, it just seems like, in terms of the U.S.

national security interests, the threat of being hit either here or in

Europe emanates from the tribal areas of Pakistan. And it just

does not seem like, with all of the money we are spending over

there, it is too much to ask our government to be a little bit better,

in terms of trying to get these security arrangements more functional.

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, if I may say so, one of the things that the U.S.

Government is not investing enough in is in building the civilian

law enforcement capability of Pakistan.

You see, the thing is that, to catch the kind of people you are

talking about, the three people who are trained, you need law enforcement, rather than an Air Force with F–16 aircraft. I mean,

you know, we have given them F–16 aircraft, but that is not going

to solve this problem. This problem is going to be with gumshoes

and local police work. And I think that that is an area that Congress could focus on, building Pakistan’s law enforcement capability and making it better, so that people can be intercepted before

they get out of Pakistan and while they are training there.

To the extent that there are elements within the government of

Pakistan who are either tolerant of or supportive of the extremists,

I think a lot more straight talk is needed between the United

States intelligence service, the Pakistani intelligence service, and

the Afghan intelligence service. So far, the process of intelligencesharing is one in which action does not always materialize on time.

Ms. CURTIS. I think you are absolutely right. There needs to be

better coordination between NATO and the Pakistan government.

I think that seems quite obvious, so I wholly endorse what you

have said.

I think part of the problem in dealing with Pakistan on these

issues is that so much of it is sort of under the radar, and what

is useful in terms of countering the terrorist threat may be politically unpopular. So there is a tendency to want to keep these

issues below the radar, and on some of the issues where we do find

Pakistani cooperation, perhaps it is not touted publicly.

So this makes it very difficult, I think, to get to the heart of the

matter. But I think you certainly have hit on something very important and something that should be pursued.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here today.

I am really very appreciative of Pakistan as a longtime ally of

the United States. I am very appreciative because, two weeks ago,

I was at the Khyber Pass and saw the truck traffic into Afghanistan at Jalalabad. It is impressive to me to see the commerce that

is going on. I am also very pleased that soon, if it has not already

occurred, there will be truck traffic between India and Pakistan for

the first time in decades. And as the co-chair of the India Caucus,

I really want to see a stable, economically growing, and positive

Pakistan.

I have had the privilege in my service of seeing some of the good.

Now, I visited with the earthquake relief several years in

36

Muzaffarabad. It was so inspiring to see the young U.S. Marines.

As Pakistani-Americans, they were speaking Urdu with the people,

in providing relief.

But in my last visit, I was there with Congressman Courtney,

and I was reading some of the newspapers. And not to infringe on

the freedom of speech, but we need to get a message out, because

I was appalled that these newspapers that look very modern and

progressive contained outright lies about our troops, about the

United States—anti-American propaganda. It was so absurd that

there was a column by Fidel Castro. That was just a joke, the

thought that a totalitarian dinosaur would be resurrected to write

absolute garbage about the American people.

Again, not to infringe on the freedom of speech, but we really

need to get information out. I have seen it firsthand. My National

Guard unit, the 218th, is currently operating 1,600 troops in Afghanistan, training the Afghan police, providing for humanitarian

relief. There are great stories of helping provide health clinics, by

opening schools, by providing wells, by helping develop roads, by

helping develop crops. All of this is such a positive story.

So, Mr. Haqqani, how can we get this message out and counteract Fidel Castro?

Mr. HAQQANI. Congressman, when I was a child growing up in

Pakistan, I was somebody who used to go to the American library.

That is where I learned my English. That is where I learned my

major ideas. I came from a poor family. I could not afford a very

expensive English school, elite school. I grew up reading the biographies of America’s Founding Fathers. I knew the Declaration of

Independence by the time I was 15. And the first time I came to

the United States was because I beat the entire American Embassy

staff at a game of Trivial Pursuit about American history, and the

ambassador decided that I was the appropriate person to be sent

here under the International Visitor Program.

The point I am trying to make is that the U.S. Government, despite complaining and feeling that this is not happening, is no

longer investing in those kinds of programs with the same kind of

vehemence as it used to do during the Cold War. For security reasons, the American libraries no longer exist. The United States information service was dismantled.

So, as far as the Pakistani media is concerned, Fidel Castro and

his embassy manage to get his speech or his article to the newspaper. Most of these newspapers in Pakistan—now that there is

complete press freedom in Pakistan, there is a lot of diversity. They

do not have the resources to find the materials. If we had the

means to get more and more ideas and materials out and if more

Pakistani journalists had access to all of you, they would be able

to get more ideas that are different from the ideas that are being

spread there.

Security has become a concern. Most American diplomats do not

get out of the embassy compound or outside of Islamabad. They do

not do the small town. The day went when Ambassador Schaffer,

as an officer of the U.S. embassy, could actually go to a small town

and speak to the local school. Those days are gone, so we need to

create some kind of mechanism.

37

And this is not just for Pakistan. It would apply to Afghanistan.

It would apply to Iraq. It would apply to other Muslim countries,

as well.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I just want to thank all of you for being here.

And as time concludes, we need to get the positive message out of

what we are proposing to do and doing in Afghanistan and what

we hope to be positive for the people of Pakistan.

Thank you very much.

I yield the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Shea-Porter.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here.

Ms. Curtis, my question has to do with a comment you made earlier in the hearing. You said India was trying to gain influence in

Afghanistan, or it was the Pakistani perception that they were trying to do that, that they were being encircled.

Could you please elaborate on that?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I think, if we are going to be able to stabilize

Afghanistan and to ensure that the Taliban does not again gain influence in the country, we are going to have to look at the issue,

to a certain extent, from Pakistan’s perspective and understand

their security perceptions of the region and understand their historical animosity with India.

Where they want a stable Afghanistan, they are seeking a government that is not anti-Pakistan either, so they become very sensitive to issues with India’s opening consulates and pursuing development activities, which are, obviously, legitimate activities.

I would argue from the U.S. perspective that India’s role can be

quite positive. Being a democracy, they provide a good example for

Afghanistan, which is trying to develop itself into a democracy.

I am saying that we need to understand where Pakistan is coming from if we are going to get them on board with our strategic

perception of the region. That is really what we have to do. We

have to get ourselves on the same sheet of music, in terms of the

importance of stabilizing Afghanistan and the fact that the Taliban

will not be allowed to have influence in the government.

And we need the Pakistanis to take a more proactive role in undermining Taliban ideology. We can argue back and forth about

who somebody in the government might be supporting or who they

are not, but if we actually saw Pakistan take steps to actively undermine the ideology itself, then we, I think, could be more assured

that they were, in fact, on the same sheet of music as us.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Can you tell me what India is doing, exactly?

You said they are opening up consulates and they are working on

some development projects. By the invitation of Afghanistan or

under what auspices?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. They have pledged funding for the new parliament building. They are involved in the construction of a highway. And this is all at the invitation of the Karzai government.

There is a new program where they offered to educate 1,000 Afghans, to provide them scholarships to Indian universities. Now,

Pakistan came forward with the same offer, and the Karzai government refused it.

38

So, yes, I think we have a situation where there is some insecurity on Pakistan’s part about the relationship between the Indian

government and the Karzai government, and that we just need to

understand it more fully.

And that is why I have argued extensively in my written testimony that the U.S. needs to get more proactively involved in facilitating better overall relations between Pakistan/Afghanistan at the

same time as Pakistan/India and start to encourage regional initiatives where each country has a different strategic perception of the

region based on economic cooperation, political reconciliation, and

stability, so that we get out of this 1990’s mentality of vying for political influence in Afghanistan or the dispute over Kashmir. It is

a very ambitious effort, but I think we really need to start pursuing it.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.

I do have another question, please.

Dr. Weinbaum, or anybody who would like to answer this, how

much is the U.S. involved? And in terms of building up and assisting the kinds of programs that we just heard Ms. Curtis mention,

are we doing the same kind of work, and is it the same level that

we have done before in the past for Afghanistan and for Pakistan?

We were talking about how much involvement there is in Pakistan, for example, with the American libraries. What are we doing

now to help them? And do we have non-governmental organizations

there and very visible to the Pakistanis, as well?

Dr. WEINBAUM. With respect to your last comment, there are

non-governmental organizations working there, but the situation

has reached such a point where even the best of the non-governmental organizations are viewed with suspicion.

For example, we have to be very careful in that, as we come in

to support education, that this is not viewed, as it is in some parts

of Pakistan, as an effort on the part of the United States to take

them away from Islam, to perhaps impose on them our Western

values. So, much of what we do in our assistance has to be calibrated very carefully. It has to be very sensitive to the fact that

it is easy, under this particular environment, to have it misconstrued.

We do have an accelerated program here of helping in the educational field. As I said, we have to be very careful about that. We

also have moved rather recently to help in the health field. It is

essentially, though, a problem in that, whatever we are doing,

somehow it is never registered the way it should be.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. We need to be more visible as we do these

things?

Dr. WEINBAUM. That was the beauty of the earthquake, because

there it was; it was visible, it was upfront, and it received a lot of

publicity.

Coming back to this question about the Pakistan newspapers,

the problem is that the papers are reflecting what is going on in

the rest of the society. They are, by and large, perpetuating some

of these myths that are going on about the United States. And this

can happen with free press.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

39

I might announce that the members-only top-secret briefing that

is scheduled in this room for 2 o’clock has been delayed until 2:30

this afternoon, and members should be advised.

Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate you all’s very in-depth discussion today.

The American people, I believe, care deeply about the people of

Pakistan and their aspirations to raise families, to develop economically, and to be secure. They have every right to be a player

in the neighborhood and to be a proud nation. We express that will

through our elections, which we have coming up next year.

So I want you to go ahead to November 15th of 2008. Your phone

rings, and it is the President-elect, and they say, ‘‘I saw you on C–

SPAN some time ago, and I want you to tell me the top three, four,

or five things that I need to be thinking about in these next few

weeks, as I put together my Administration and personnel and the

foreign policy objectives we need to take for Pakistan.’’

If we could start with you, Ms. Curtis. I am the last person

standing between the chairman and lunch, so try to be brief if you

could. Ms. Curtis, I know you have a list of things, but if you could,

prioritize the kinds of things that you would tell the President-elect

about what they ought to pursue.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, I would hope that the problem in the tribal

areas that we have discussed, hopefully in a year, has been—at

least we have begun to see some changes, in terms of there not

being the dangerous safe haven that we see there today. However,

if that issue is still there, I think that has to be at the top of our

agenda, ensuring that this is not a safe haven, and we have to convince the Pakistanis to work with us in cooperative efforts.

You know, obviously, the Pakistanis have gone back on the military offensive in the region, and they are taking actions. But I do

not think this alone is going to deal with the seriousness of the

problem that we face. And it has to be a cooperative effort, where

we understand that the persistence of a terrorist safe haven in that

region does not benefit either one of us.

You know, I would encourage Indo-Pakistani dialogue. I would

highlight how fundamental that is to ensuring our overall goals in

South Asia. Again, I would highlight the need to encourage Pakistan to take a proactive effort in undermining the ideology of the

Taliban. There seem to still be differences between the U.S. position and the Pakistan position over the future of Afghanistan and

what role the Taliban would play. The Pakistanis seem to hold out

the position that the Taliban will play some kind of a role in a future Afghanistan, and I think we have to make it clear that the

extremist ideology that the senior Taliban leadership holds does

not have a place in Afghanistan; we are encouraging a pluralistic

democracy. And there have to be efforts to peel away some of the

local, you know, guns-for-hire that may be with the Taliban for

money but who do not necessarily subscribe to the ideology.

You know, getting those elements to peel off and become part of

the political process, sort of a bottom-up approach, I think, is the

direction we need to go. But giving power to the senior Taliban or

somehow thinking that through negotiations we can make them

40

part of the system, I think, is naive and is not something that

should be pursued.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Mr. Haqqani.

Mr. HAQQANI. I think the first thing would be to assure the Pakistani leadership that the United States is a long-term partner of

Pakistan and that Pakistanis do not need to create or keep alive

problems simply to get American attention.

Second, after having convinced them that the U.S. is our partner

and that ‘‘we are there for the long haul for you’’ and ‘‘do not

worry’’ and ‘‘do not think, if the Taliban is over, then your relationship with us is over,’’ help us finish them off, help us finish off al

Qaeda. Then focus on the elimination of terrorism and terrorist

safe havens, because these are interlinked. As long as the Pakistanis feel insecure about having a long-term commitment from the

U.S., they also will have an interest in keeping alive the problem,

so that then they can be the ones who will help the United States

in solving the problem. And that becomes a self-perpetuating cycle.

Third, democracy and civilian control over the military matters.

The United States, historically, has had an attitude that, ‘‘It does

not matter to us whether you are ruled by them. We would like you

to be democratic, but if you cannot get there, well, we will deal

with the military, and we will keep pumping money into a military

regime to bolster it.’’ I think it is important that Pakistan’s internal dynamic changes, and the only way Pakistan’s internal dynamic is going to change is if Pakistan becomes a functioning democracy with full civilian control over the military, rather than the

military being an institution totally on a tangent, working on its

own agenda.

The fourth is Pakistan’s regional problems. I think——

Dr. SNYDER. I am sorry. Pakistan’s what?

Mr. HAQQANI. Pakistan’s regional ambitions and problems. I

think that the United States has a role to play in bringing Pakistan and Afghanistan closer and also in ensuring that Pakistan

and India continue along the road of mutual dialogue, especially in

the Pakistan-Afghanistan equation.

Now that they have one government that is close to the United

States and that is supported by the United States, I think more

needs to be done than the famous one-time meeting between President Karzai and General Musharraf that was sponsored by President Bush. I think the next President of the United States should

do something more, and whoever is leading Pakistan in November

2008 and whoever is leading Afghanistan in 2008 should actually

be brought together in a process that reassures Pakistan that Afghanistan is not going to become part of a movement against Pakistan in collusion with India, that Afghanistan has its own aspirations, and has a right to those aspirations and that Pakistan and

Afghanistan can be very close friends and neighbors.

If we do that, then maybe the interest inside Pakistan to keep

alive extremism as a state policy will diminish, and then the few

extremists who are alive and surviving can be dealt with through

a mixture of military force, law enforcement, and incentives to buy

them off.

Thank you, sir.

41

Dr. WEINBAUM. I believe that the priorities have already been

very nicely laid out here.

I would also stress, as Professor Haqqani has, the need to establish our reliability. So much of the thinking in Pakistan dwells on

the fact that, as soon as our interests in the region are somehow

satisfied, that we will, as we have in the past, be off. And therefore,

what they must do, and particularly with regard to Afghanistan, is

they must have a reserve strategy. And this is the heart of a lot

of the problem here that the Afghans have and the belief that

somehow Pakistan, especially if the United States demonstrates

that it has a short-term interest in Afghanistan and that the

United States and the international community will be out of

there—that, therefore, Pakistan has to establish some kind of buffer zone with Afghanistan. It is very important that they be disabused of that idea.

I also would agree that democracy is something we have to convince them we really care about. And as Professor Haqqani and

Ms. Curtis have indicated, they do not believe that now, but it is

worth our interest, because this is the one place in the Muslim

world where I would put my money on democracy. You do not have

to teach them what democracy is. Now, they have not experienced

much of it, but it is remarkable how the Pakistani people really aspire to what we would call a democracy. And it will not be exactly

like ours, of course, but it is something that we recognize as being

something we could praise.

I want to say also—and this is something that the new President, whoever that individual might be, has to recognize—that

there used to be a time when Pakistan was very much focused on

its own interests. Today, Pakistan knows—everyone, practically, in

Pakistan, because of the media; there are so many television channels—they know what is going on in the region and in the rest of

the world. Our policy, as it plays out in the rest of the world, will

have influence on what happens, whether it is the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Iraq, wherever. We are going to be judged by what

we do elsewhere, not only by what we do in Pakistan, and that is

a change.

So I think that, whoever this new President is going to be, we

do know this, that our relationship with Pakistan is going to be

critical to our future security. They cannot do very well without us;

we cannot manage without them.

The CHAIRMAN. Following through on a thought of Dr. Snyder’s

a moment ago, below the surface, what is the animosity between

the leadership of Afghanistan and the leadership of Pakistan?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. There has been historically a bad relationship between the two, basically for two reasons.

One is Afghanistan has kind of an ambiguous place in Pakistan’s

ethnic politics. The ethnic group that has historically dominated in

Afghanistan has close relatives on the Pakistani side who have felt

themselves kind of out in left field, with respect to the rest of Pakistan. And so there has been sort of a built-in tension there.

The other and probably the more compelling reason is that, historically, Afghanistan has had a very close relationship with India.

If you look at a map, you can see why this has left generations of

42

Pakistanis, especially in the army, feeling like they are in the middle of a squeeze play.

At the moment, you have something else that has been added to

that. Hamid Karzai, who is the President of Afghanistan, is a man

who, before 2001, had reasonably decent relationships in Pakistan,

but he came to power as part of the implosion of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban, and he came to power with the people who had been

referred to as the ‘‘Northern Alliance,’’ who had strong support

from India and from Russia during the years when the Taliban

were in control of Afghanistan. So, right off the bat, anyone who

had them as his allies was going to be looked on with enormous

suspicion in Pakistan, and Karzai was no exception.

When you then got into the actual business of governing Afghanistan, he had a very tough agenda. He started out with, basically,

no instruments of power. He did not have an army; he is starting

to develop one now. He did not have roads that he could use to get

foreign aid out into the boondocks. And he had many

vulnerabilities.

And as the insurgency gained force—and the insurgency was

spearheaded by people who had been Pakistan’s allies for many

years—he came to look on Pakistan as responsible for his problems.

The Pakistanis, on the other hand, came to look on him as a totally

feckless leader who could not get his act together in Afghanistan.

So this, coupled with a difficult history, meant that each of the

leaders felt he had lots of reason to blame the other for his problems. And it is always easier to blame somebody else.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one last question. I am quite interested

in professional military education, particularly for our war colleges,

both intermediate and senior, here in our country. Would you assess for us the IMET program toward Pakistan? That is International Military Education and Training. I think we picked it up

when we went several years without inviting them to our intermediate and senior war colleges, but they are attending now, is my

understanding.

Could you assess that for us, please?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I am going to give you a political take on

it, because I cannot get into details about what courses they have

taken. But from a point of view of our overall relations with Pakistan and with the Pakistan military, this is one of the most important contact points that we have had. It has been professional,

military to military. The U.S. training institutions have provided

training that the Pakistani military value enormously.

The CHAIRMAN. Those of us, Ambassador, who are interested in

professional military education draw a distinction between training

and education. I just thought I would throw that in.

Go ahead.

Ambassador SCHAFFER. I would argue that both of those are very

valid distinctions, but both of those have been essential in building

up the professional respect, understanding, and sense of a common

professional cause that exists between the United States and the

Pakistani military.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you increase the IMET program?

Ambassador SCHAFFER. Yes, I would, because I think this is exactly the kind of contact that is constructive in terms of the miliVerDate 22-MAR-2001 13:57 Nov 21, 2008 Jkt 040360 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-94\283000.000 HAS2 PsN: HAS2
43

tary role of the Pakistan military but does not encourage them to

expand their political role.

Mr. HAQQANI. Sir, I have been looking at this for a while, and

I think that the program, as it is structured right now, is more in

the direction of training than in the direction of education. For example, I have spoken at the Army War College——

The CHAIRMAN. You have spoken where?

Mr. HAQQANI. I have been invited to speak at the Army War College.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. That would be Carlyle.

Mr. HAQQANI. Carlyle.

The CHAIRMAN. You bet.

Mr. HAQQANI. I have been there twice in the last two years.

There is always one Pakistani military officer there.

I think, in fact, given the situation and the importance of Pakistan, perhaps the positions for Pakistan available for that level of

education need to be increased, as does—the head of SOCOM, I

know, has been talking about increasing educational exchanges.

And I think that that would be something that would be—SOCOM

is the Special Operations, and they would like to do that.

I think that the other educational facilities need to be expanded,

both in terms of the number of positions available for Pakistanis

and the level at which they come. Because, you know, one person

coming a year does not solve the problem, given the size of the

Pakistani military and the significance and the importance of it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you do that, would you have to invite a comparable number from India?

Mr. HAQQANI. You may have to do that, but that may not be a

bad thing either, because, after all, India is also an increasingly

important country. And it may be in the interest of the United

States to have four generals in the Indian Army who have been

trained in the United States, as opposed to one—and the same goes

for the Pakistani side—trained and educated.

Dr. WEINBAUM. Sir, let me just add that there is a reciprocal to

this, as well, and that is having American officers serve or attend

educational institutions in Pakistan. The Staff College at Quetta,

for example, has been a place where we have sent people in the

past. Obviously, it was also suspended for a long time. We have

just started now to send people over there. This is very important

because the possibility of having Americans there at this point is

a way of spreading what we are about to many, many more Pakistanis who would otherwise not be able to have the exposure to the

United States. So there ought to be a reciprocal element to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate that. I am very familiar with

the international program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, which, of

course, is the intermediate war college for majors and their comparable ranks. And I am very appreciative of your thoughts.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience and for

your excellent testimony and for your expertise. We are most appreciative.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

OCTOBER 10, 2007

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